AFGHANISTAN

Key Oversight Issues

Report to Congressional Addressees

February 2013

GAO-13-218SP

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Following the withdrawal of US and coalition forces from 

Afghanistan, in August 2021 the State Department 

requested that GAO temporarily remove and review 

reports on Afghanistan to protect the safety of 

individuals associated with US assistance or programs. 

As a result of that review, GAO decided to redact some 

information from this report.
Page i GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Letter 1 

Background 2

Scope and Methodology of This Review 11

Agency Comments 13

Enclosures I Afghanistan’s Security Environment 17

Enclosure II Transition of Lead Security to Afghan Security Forces 19

Enclosure III Future Cost and Sustainability of Afghan Security Forces 21

Enclosure IV DOD Planning for the Drawdown of Equipment in 

Afghanistan 23

Enclosure V Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence 25

Enclosure VI Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Funds to Support 

Afghanistan 27

Enclosure VII Oversight and Streamlining of Development Assistance to 

Afghanistan 29

Enclosure VIII Oversight of U.S. Contracts in Afghanistan 31

Enclosure IX Planning for the Future U.S. Presence in Afghanistan 33

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Appendix I Key Facts about Afghanistan 35

Appendix II Ethnic Map of Afghanistan 36

Appendix III Major U.S. Transit Points into and out of Afghanistan 37

Appendix IV Documents that Constitute the Strategic Framework for U.S. 

Efforts in Afghanistan 38

Appendix V U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan 42

Appendix VI Related GAO Products 45

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Tables

Table 1: U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan Reconstruction and 

Relief by Category and Selected Accounts, Fiscal Years 

2002-2013 8

Table 2: Major U.S.-Administered Programs or Accounts Used to 

Fund Development Efforts in Afghanistan 30

Table 3: Descriptions of the Afghan, U.S., and NATO Documents 

that Constitute the Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan 38
Page iii GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figures

Figure 1: Interactive Geopolitical Map of Afghanistan 3

Figure 2: Time Line of Selected Events and U.S. Troop Levels in 

Afghanistan, 2001-2012 5

Figure 3: Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan 7

Figure 4: Breakout of U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan 

Reconstruction and Relief, Fiscal Years 2002-2012 10

Figure 5: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported by Type 

in Afghanistan, December 2005 through December 2012 17

Figure 6: Number of Insider Attacks from 2007 through 2012 18

Figure 7: Projected U.S. and Other Donor Support for ANSF 22

Figure 8: Cost of Various Routes for the Removal of Containers and 

Vehicles from Afghanistan 24

Figure 9: Afghanistan’s Domestic Revenues from 2006 to 2011 25

Figure 10: Afghanistan’s Total Public Expenditures from 2006 to 

2011 26

Figure 11: U.S. Dollars and Afghan Afghanis 28

Figure 12: U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan 34

Figure 13: Key Facts about Afghanistan 35

Figure 14: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan 36

Figure 15: Major U.S. Transit Points into and out of Afghanistan 37

Abbreviations

AFSA Afghanistan Freedom Support Act

AIF Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

APPF Afghan Public Protection Force

ASFF Afghan Security Forces Fund

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
Page iv GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

DA Development Assistance 

DOD Department of Defense

DOD CN Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and 

 Counter-Drug Activities

DOJ Department of Justice

ERMA Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance 

ESF Economic Support Fund

FMF Foreign Military Financing

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GHCS Global Health and Child Survival

IDA International Disaster Assistance 

IMET International Military Education and Training

IMF International Monetary Fund

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law 

 Enforcement

ISAF International Security Assistance Force 

MNNA Major Non-NATO Ally

MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance 

NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 

 Related Programs 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

OPLAN Operational Plan

PKO Voluntary Peacekeeping 

PMP Performance Management Plan

PSC Private security contractor

RC Regional Command

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers 

 Europe

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

 Reconstruction

State Department of State

TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations 

UN United Nations

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

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Page 1 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 11, 2013

Congressional Addressees: 

The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to defeat and prevent the return 

of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Since fiscal year 2002, U.S. costs reported 

for U.S. military, U.S. diplomatic, and reconstruction and relief operations 

in Afghanistan have been over $500 billion.1 Given U.S. strategic goals 

and the level of U.S. resources expected to support Afghanistan in the 

future, we have identified a number of key issues for the 113th Congress 

to consider in developing oversight agendas and determining the way 

forward in Afghanistan. Significant oversight will be needed to help 

ensure visibility over the cost and progress of these efforts. The 

enclosures, based on existing GAO work, suggest specific areas for 

oversight on the following topics:

• Afghanistan’s security environment. Afghanistan’s security situation 

remains volatile in part due to an increase in insider attacks.

• Transition of lead security to Afghan security forces. The security 

transition is under way, and international forces are shifting to an 

advise-and-assist mission.

• Future cost and sustainability of Afghan security forces. A shortfall 

currently exists in Afghan domestic revenue and international 

commitments to cover the anticipated costs of Afghan security forces, 

and despite past recommendations and a congressional mandate, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has not routinely provided long-term 

cost estimates for sustaining those forces.

• DOD planning for the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan. DOD 

has applied some lessons learned from Iraq to its planning and has 

 

1

We reviewed estimates developed by the Congressional Research Service and Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, as well as obligations data provided by 

DOD and allotment data provided by the Departments of Justice and State. While 

allotment data are available for U.S. reconstruction and relief efforts in Afghanistan, 

specific funding figures of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan do not exist because 

funding provided to DOD for military operations is generally appropriated by operation, not 

country. Specifically, DOD received funding for Operation Enduring Freedom, which 

includes Afghanistan.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

taken several steps to prepare for the drawdown in Afghanistan, but 

has not fully considered the costs and benefits of returning excess 

equipment.

• Afghanistan’s donor dependence. Afghanistan’s domestic revenues 

do not cover its total public expenditures, over 90 percent of which are 

covered by the United States and international partners. The 

international community has pledged its continued support.

• Oversight and accountability of U.S. funds to support Afghanistan. 

The United States continues to take steps to improve Afghanistan’s 

financial management capacity, as well as the accountability of U.S. 

direct assistance.

• Oversight and streamlining of development assistance to Afghanistan. 

Oversight of U.S. programmatic funds has been enhanced, but U.S. 

development efforts in Afghanistan could benefit from a shared 

database.

• Oversight of U.S. contracts in Afghanistan. Contract management and 

contractor vetting require continued attention.

• Planning for the future U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The military to 

civilian-led transition in Iraq could offer lessons for similar efforts in 

Afghanistan as the United States plans for five diplomatic sites and 

the future U.S. military presence is under negotiations.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a mountainous, land-locked, and 

economically poor country of over 30 million ethnically diverse people 

located in central Asia. (See fig. 1 for an interactive geopolitical map of 

Afghanistan.)

Background 
Page  GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 1: Interactive Geopolitical Map of Afghanistan Interactive graphic

• Click to make view needed visible. In the “Print” dialog box, choose “current view,” then “OK.” Repeat for each view.

Print instructions • A print version of this graphic is also available in appendices I, II and III.

Directions:

[Click ] on the buttons to view more information.

Kandahar

Jalalabad Herat

Mazar-e

Sharif

Pakistan

India

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan Tajikistan

China

Iran

India

Islamabad

Dushanbe

Kabul

Badakhshan

Badghis

Baghlan

Balkh

Bamian

Daykundi

Farah

Faryab

Ghazni

Ghor

Helmand

Herat

Jowzjan

Kabul

Kandahar

Kapisa

Khost

Kunar

Kunduz

Laghman

Logar Nangarhar

Nimroz

Nuristani

Paktika

Paktiya

Panjshir

Parwan

Samangan

Sar-e-Pul

Takhar

Uruzgan

Wardak

Zabul

Population

Geography Economy

Governance

Geopolitical map of Afghanistan

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, and Government of Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 

2007/2008: A Profile of Afghanistan; Map Resources (map); Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (photos).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

In June 2011, the President announced that after nearly a decade of 

conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. combat troops would be withdrawn in 2014. 

The President also announced that the United States would remain 

committed to supporting the development of a sovereign Afghanistan. In 

May 2012, the United States signed the Enduring Strategic Partnership 

Agreement with Afghanistan, outlining the goals for the future bilateral 

relationship, and in November 2012, the two nations began negotiations 

on a future bilateral security agreement that would govern any future role 

for U.S. military forces. It is possible that some U.S. forces would remain 

in Afghanistan to advise or assist the Afghan government after 2014; 

however, no decisions have yet been made. U.S. forces in Afghanistan 

have begun to draw down from an estimated high of 99,800 in March 

2011 to approximately 66,000 in December 2012 and shift their role from 

carrying out combat operations to advising and assisting Afghan forces 

while transitioning lead security responsibilities to Afghan forces. 

Afghanistan is scheduled to hold presidential elections in April 2014. 

According to Department of State (State) officials, the 2014 election will 

be the crucial test of Afghanistan’s political transition. (See fig. 2 for a 

time line of selected events and U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan.)

Recent U.S.-Afghan Events
 

Page 5 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 2: Time Line of Selected Events and U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan, 2001-2012
Page 6 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al Qaeda and prevent its return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Specific 

objectives in Afghanistan in support of this goal are to (1) deny safe 

haven to al Qaeda and (2) deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the 

Afghan government.2 (See fig. 3 for a description of key strategies and 

plans that collectively guide U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.)

2

The U.S. strategic goals for Afghanistan were recently changed from those that appeared 

in the October 2012 U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. The goals as 

they appeared in October 2012 were to (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its 

affiliates and prevent their return to Afghanistan; and (2) build a partnership with the 

Afghan people that ensures that the United States will be able to continue to target 

terrorists and support a sovereign Afghan government.

Strategic Framework for 

U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan
Page  GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

 

Kabul

Source: Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to NATO, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, UN, and government of Afghanistan documents; 

Department of Defense (photo); Map Resources (map).

Crosscutting issues

Afghan documents and 

international agreements

U.S. plans

and strategies

Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan

NATO plans 

and documents

Bonn Agreement

December 2001 Afghan Compact

January 2006

Afghan 

National 

Development 

Strategy

2008

London 

Conference 

Communiqué

January 2010

Kabul Process 

July 2010

Bonn

Conference 

Conclusions

December 2011

Chicago Summit 

Declaration 

May 2012

Operation Enduring 

Freedom Campaign 

Plan

November 2001 

continuing

Status of 

Forces 

Agreement

Afghanistan May 2003 and Pakistan 

Regional 

Stabilization 

Strategy

November 

2011

Supreme 

Headquarters of 

the Allied Powers 

Europe (SHAPE) 

Operational Plan

June 2003 

August 2012 International 

Security 

Assistance 

Force 

(ISAF) 

Operational 

Plan 

March 2006 

continuing

NATO 

Strategic Plan 

for Afghanistan

May 2012

North Atlantic 

Council Initiating 

Directive

October 2012

Security foundation

Governance

 pillar

Rule

of 

law

 pillar

Socioeconomic 

development

 pillar

Reconciliation and reintegration

Role of women in society

Borders

Information initiatives

Regional cooperation

Enduring 

Strategic 

Partnership 

Agreement 

May 2012

Tokyo Conference 

Declaration and 

Framework 

July 2012

Enduring 

Presence 

Plans 

Post 2014

2012

Afghanistan 

Pakistan 

Objectives 2015

August 2012

Civil-Military 

Strategic 

Framework for

Afghanistan

October 2012

Strategic goal

Interactive graphic Figure 3: Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan

Print instructions • A print version of this graphic is also available in appendices IV and V.

Directions: Mouseover text to view more information.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

As of September 30, 2012, DOD had reported obligations of about $440 

billion for Operation Enduring Freedom from September 2001 through the 

end of fiscal year 2012. U.S. agencies allotted $6.6 billion for diplomatic 

operations between fiscal years 2002 and 2012. U.S. agencies also 

allotted $79.7 billion for reconstruction and relief in Afghanistan between 

fiscal years 2002 and 2012 (see table 1). The United States, as well as 

the international community, has focused its efforts in areas such as 

training of the Afghan army and police, infrastructure development, and 

economic growth.

Table 1: U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan Reconstruction and Relief by Category and Selected Accounts, Fiscal Years 2002-

2013

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years

2002-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

2002-2012

Total 2013 Request

International Affairs Programs $11,596 $2,813 $4,179 $2,689 $2,308 $23,586 $2,570

Security 3,186 a 534 648 471 391 5,229 656

 —INCLE 1,787 484 589 400 324 3,584 600

 —FMF 1,059 0 0 0 0 1,059 0 

 —Other 340 50 59 71 67 587 56

Governance and development 6,755 b 2,106 3,438 2,137 1,837 16,273 1,849

 —ESF 5,621 2,048 3,346 2,068 1,837 14,919 1,849

 —Other 1,134 58 92 70 0 1,354 0 

Humanitarian 1,656 c 172 93 80 81 2,083 65

Department of Defense Programs 16,072 6,339 10,001 11,946 11,532 55,890 7,159

Security 14,570 d 5,813 9,558 10,996 10,582 51,518 6,155

 —ASFF 13,060 5,607 9,167 10,619 10,200 48,653 5,749

 —DOD CN 1,061 206 391 377 382 2,416 405

 —Other 450 0 0 0 0 450 0 

Governance and development 1,502 e 527 443 950 950 4,371 1,004

 —CERP 952 527 443 400 400 2,721 425

 —AIF 0 0 0 400 400 800 400

 —Other 550 0 0 150 150 850 179

Drug Enforcement Administration 106 19 19 19 19 182 18

Total $27,774 $9,171 $14,199 $14,654 $13,859 $79,657 $9,747

Source: GAO analysis of Departments of Defense, Justice, and State data.

Funding for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Notes: Table 1 does not include funding provided for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Totals 

may not add due to rounding.

a

INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. FMF = Foreign Military Financing. 

Other international affairs security includes International Military Education and Training (IMET); 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR); and Voluntary 

Peacekeeping (PKO) funds.

b

ESF = Economic Support Fund. Other international affairs governance and development includes 

Development Assistance (DA); Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS); Treasury Technical 

Assistance; and International Organizations and Programs funds.

c

Humanitarian assistance includes Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA); Emergency Refugee 

and Migration Assistance (ERMA); International Disaster Assistance (IDA); Transition Initiatives; Food 

for Education/Food for Progress; U.S. food assistance programs authorized through Title I (Food for 

Progress) and Title II (Food for Peace) of the Food for Peace Act (also known as P.L. 480); the Bill 

Emerson Humanitarian Trust; and section 416(b) food aid funds.

d

ASFF = Afghan Security Forces Fund. DOD CN = Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and 

Counter-Drug Activities. Other DOD security includes Train and Equip funds and National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1207 transfers.

e

CERP= Commander’s Emergency Response Program. AIF = Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. Other 

Department of Defense governance and development include Task Force for Business and Stability 

Operations (TFBSO) and Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) funds.

As shown in figure 4,

• $56.9 billion, more than two-thirds of the allotments, were provided to 

support Afghanistan’s security in areas such as the development of 

Afghan army and police forces and counternarcotics efforts.

• $20.6 billion, a quarter of the allotments, were provided to support 

governance and development efforts such as the construction of 

roads and schools.

• $2.1 billion, the remainder of the allotments, were provided for 

humanitarian assistance.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 4: Breakout of U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan Reconstruction and Relief,

Fiscal Years 2002-2012

Since the issuance of our last Afghanistan key issues product in 2009,3

we have issued over 50 products and provided numerous congressional 

briefings on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Our work to date has covered key 

issues outlined in the U.S. strategic framework, including: Afghanistan’s 

security environment, the increase in insider attacks, the transition of 

security from the United States and NATO to the Afghan government, 

U.S. efforts to advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF), costs and sustainability of ANSF, DOD planning for the 

drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, U.S. support for Afghan governance, 

Afghan donor dependency, U.S. development efforts, and oversight of 

U.S. contracts and funds, among other issues and concerns. See 

appendix VI for a list of related GAO products.

 

3

GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-473SP

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).

Recent GAO Work and 

Recommendations 

Regarding Afghanistan
 

Page 11 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Over the course of our work on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, we have 

recommended a range of improvements that should be considered in 

program planning and implementation and identified conditions that affect 

success. For example, we have made recommendations on a need for 

improved interagency coordination and planning, such as the 

development of plans that include measurable goals, specific time 

frames, and cost estimates. We have also made recommendations on the 

need for improved internal controls and oversight over U.S. funds and 

contracts, such as the provision of adequate training of oversight 

personnel and completion of preaward risk assessments prior to providing 

direct assistance to Afghan government ministries. U.S. agencies have 

generally concurred with our recommendations and have taken steps to 

address a number of them, several of which are noted in the enclosures. 

In addition, we have identified several existing conditions—such as the 

security environment and the limited institutional capacity of the 

Afghanistan government—that continue to create challenges to the 

United State’s efforts to assist in securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding 

Afghanistan.

This special publication represents an update to our April 2009 product, 

Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, and is based on 

our work to date. To generate a list of possible key issues, we reviewed 

past products concerning Afghanistan (as well as the Iraq transition) by 

GAO, cognizant agency inspectors general (including the Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), the Congressional 

Research Service, and research institutions. Working with GAO’s subject 

matter experts, we narrowed the list of issues and identified potential 

oversight questions. We interviewed cognizant agency officials located in 

Afghanistan and Washington, D.C., from DOD, including U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers; North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); State; the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID); and the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), including the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance 

and Training, and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program. We used these interviews to refine our key issues, gain updated 

information and data, follow up on actions taken regarding our past 

recommendations, and identify relevant lessons learned from the Iraq 

transition. We also worked with the officials to determine what portions of 

our past classified or restricted work could be presented in a public 

Scope and 

Methodology of This 

Review 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

product. We then synthesized this information to provide a balanced and 

comprehensive overview for each issue and pose oversight questions.

We updated relevant data when possible, and performed additional data 

reliability assessments when necessary. These additional assessments 

were only conducted on data that we had not previously reported; all 

other data were assessed as part of our work to date. We assessed the 

reliability of the U.S. government budget data for U.S. military operations 

and reconstruction and relief efforts in Afghanistan by comparing data 

received from other agencies and asking knowledgeable officials to 

corroborate and clarify the data.

We updated our estimate of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures and 

converted the data from U.S. fiscal and Afghanistan’s solar years to 

calendar years. To estimate Afghanistan’s total public expenditures, we 

reviewed the government of Afghanistan’s budget (revenues, 

expenditures, and donor contributions) and expenditure data from DOD 

and State in addition to publicly available expenditure and donor 

assistance data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development’s Development Assistance Database, the World Bank’s 

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, United Nations Development 

Program’s Law and Order Trust Fund, India’s budget documents, and 

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan, among others. Based on our analysis of these 

documents, we estimated Afghanistan’s total public expenditures, on- and 

off-budget, disaggregated by security and nonsecurity expenditures. Our 

estimates are based on actual disbursements, not budget estimates. 

Afghanistan’s budget cycle was organized around solar years. For 

example, solar year 2010/11 begins on March 21, 2010, and ends on 

March 20, 2011. However, since the latest budget cycle, Afghanistan has 

switched its reporting to calendar years. We converted Afghanistan’s 

solar year and U.S. fiscal year data by using a quarterly adjustment and 

assuming a continuous flow of disbursements without quarterly variation.

In most cases, we determined that the data mentioned above were 

reliable enough for our purposes, and noted our concerns regarding any 

data reliability issues. The information on foreign law in this report is not 

the product of our original analysis, but is derived from interviews and 

secondary sources. Further information on our scope and methodologies, 

as well as data reliability assessments, can be found in the reports 

referenced in appendix VI.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

We prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General to 

conduct work on GAO’s initiative because of broad congressional interest 

in the oversight and accountability of U.S. funds provided to Afghanistan 

and to assist Congress with its oversight responsibilities. In addition, 

Section 1220 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013,4 requires GAO to report on any substantial updates to the 

campaign plan for Afghanistan. Appendices IV and V of this report 

provide an analysis of recent updates to various documents, including the 

Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, that constitute the 

strategic framework for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.5

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to February 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD, DOJ, 

State, and USAID. Each agency informed us that they were not providing 

formal comments. However, each provided technical comments, which 

we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees. In addition, we are sending copies of this product to the 

President and Vice President of the United States, and the Secretaries of 

Defense and State; the Attorney General of the United States, the USAID 

Administrator; and other interested parties. The report is also available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff 

 

4

Pub. L. No. 112-239 (Jan. 2, 2013).

5

In 2012, GAO provided updated information in accordance with its requirements under 

section 1226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. 

No.111-84 [October 28, 2009]), focusing on the progress of U.S. civilian-military plans to 

transition lead security responsibility to the Afghan government (GAO-12-598C), the cost 

of sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (GAO-12-438SU), and Afghanistan’s 

donor dependency (GAO-11-948R). These reports are cited in Appendix VI.

Agency Comments
 

Page 14 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

have any questions about this report, please contact Charles Michael 

Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or the 

individual(s) listed at the end of each enclosure. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this product. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this product are listed in appendix VII.

Loren Yager Janet St. Laurent

Managing Director Managing Director

International Affairs and Trade Defense Capabilities and 

 Management

Enclosures
 

Page 15 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

List of Addressees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Patty Murray

Chairman

The Honorable Jeff Sessions

Ranking Member

Budget Committee

United States Senate

The Honorable Robert Menendez

Chairman

The Honorable Bob Corker

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Coburn

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Chairman

The Honorable Lindsey Graham

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate
 

Page 16 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ed Royce

Chairman

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa

Chairman

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairman

The Honorable Nita Lowey

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable John F. Tierney

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives
Page 17 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

Several factors have contributed to Afghanistan’s current high-threat 

security environment, challenging the international community and Afghan 

efforts to implement programs throughout the country. For example, 

insurgents continue to find safe havens in Pakistan from which to launch 

attacks. Additionally, the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan continues to be a 

source of funding for insurgent groups and undermine the Afghan 

government’s effort to improve political stability, economic growth, and 

rule of law. More recent issues include an increase in attacks on U.S. and

coalition personnel by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) commonly 

referred to as “insider attacks,” as well as the required transition of some 

security responsibilities from private contractors to a state-led enterprise—

known as the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). 

Key Findings

The security situation in Afghanistan, as measured by enemy-initiated 

attacks, has deteriorated since 2005, affecting U.S. and allied 

reconstruction operations. DOD attack data as of December 2012 show 

that the pattern of enemy-initiated attacks has remained seasonal in 

nature, generally peaking from June through September each year and 

then declining during the winter months (see fig. 5). 

Figure 5: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported by Type in Afghanistan, December 2005 through 

December 2012 

Insider attacks on U.S. and coalition military personnel have increased, 

raising questions about efforts to protect U.S. personnel working with 

ANSF. One of the central tenets of the NATO-led International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan is enhanced unit 

partnering in which coalition units provide training, assistance, and 

development functions to ANSF units until they are able to conduct 

Enclosure I: Afghanistan’s Security 

Environment

Background

Afghanistan’s security environment 

continues to undermine the Afghan 

government’s and international 

community’s reconstruction efforts. 

In December 2009, recognizing that 

the situation in Afghanistan had 

become more grave, the U.S. 

President announced his decision 

to deploy additional troops to 

Afghanistan to disrupt and defeat 

extremists. In June 2011, the U.S. 

President announced that combat 

troops would be withdrawn in 2014.

Afghanistan’s Security 

Situation Remains Volatile

Insider Attacks on U.S. Military 

Personnel Have Increased 
Page 18 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

operations independently. However, between 2007 and 2012, ANSF killed 

or wounded over 290 U.S. and international coalition personnel in 87 

attacks. The number of these attacks has increased over time (see fig. 6). 

Among the attacks with identified causes, DOD and NATO have identified 

the personal motivations of individual ANSF members—including stress 

and ideological beliefs of attackers with no previous ties to insurgents—as 

the largest single cause of insider attacks. According to one ISAF and 

several DOD officials, as the United States and ISAF continue to shift their 

focus from a combat to an all advise-and-assist mission, larger numbers of 

personnel may be exposed to a possible insider attack. 

Figure 6: Number of Insider Attacks from 2007 through 2012

In April 2012, we reported on DOD’s increased efforts to reduce the 

number of insider attacks, but also identified a lack of sharing between 

DOD and the Afghan government of biometric data (such as fingerprints, 

iris scans, and facial photographs) that is used to help screen ANSF 

members before they come into contact with DOD personnel. We

recommended that DOD take additional steps to renew the sharing of 

biometric data on ANSF members and candidates with Afghanistan. DOD 

agreed with and is making efforts to address our recommendation. 

Partially because of the increased frequency of insider attacks, ISAF 

reduced some partnering missions between ISAF and ANSF for a period 

in September 2012 while new safety protocols were implemented. 

NATO and Afghanistan are shifting from the use of private security 

contractors (PSCs) to the Afghan government-owned APPF, and this 

transition may affect the security of the military, U.S. civilians, and 

implementing partners attempting to deliver development assistance 

throughout the country. An August 2010 decree by Afghan President 

Karzai directed the dissolution of PSCs in favor of APPF, to provide a feefor-service force to secure international, governmental, and 

nongovernmental operations, sites, and facilities. According to U.S. 

officials, APPF faces various impediments to providing security services to 

DOD and USAID and its implementing partners, including an immature 

logistics system, limited recruiting, training and command and control 

capabilities, equipment shortages, and a lack of qualified English 

speakers. These impediments could affect APPF operational capabilities 

and the transition at ISAF sites to APPF protection, and may result in 

increased security costs, among other things.

Oversight Questions

1. What is the status of DOD’s efforts to reduce the number of insider 

attacks, such as renewing biometric data sharing with the Afghan 

government? 

2. With the implementation of APPF, what are the effects on security for 

U.S. agencies and their implementing partners and the cost of 

providing that security in Afghanistan? 

The Introduction of the Afghan 

Public Protection Force May 

Increase Security Concerns for 

U.S. Military and Civilian

Operations

Points of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov 

Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431, 

russellc@gao.gov 
Page 19 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

In November 2010, the Afghan government and NATO agreed upon a 

plan for transferring lead security responsibilities from the NATO-led 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014 with the drawdown of

international forces. Specifically, the Afghan government and ISAF—

including the United States—agreed to a transition process that 

emphasizes a shift in ISAF’s role from conducting combat missions to 

advising and assisting ANSF. Lead security responsibility in Afghanistan is 

defined as responsibility and accountability for planning and conducting 

operations within a designated area, with ISAF support as required. For 

example, ANSF continues to rely on coalition forces for, among others, air, 

logistics, intelligence, and medical evacuation support. The successful 

transfer of lead security responsibility from international forces to ANSF is 

critical to countering insurgents and creating sustainable security and 

allows the withdrawal of international troops. 

Key Findings

The transfer of lead security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF is a joint 

ISAF-Afghan decision-making process that is under way. Under this 

process, ISAF and Afghan officials determine the readiness of geographic 

areas to transition based on the following four factors: 

1. the capability of ANSF to take on additional security tasks with less 

assistance from ISAF; 

2. the level of security needed to allow the population to pursue routine 

daily activities; 

3. the degree of development of local governance; and

4. whether ISAF is properly positioned to withdraw as ANSF capabilities 

increase and threat levels diminish. 

The transition for each geographic area is a multiphased process, with

ISAF tracking progress through metrics, such as security and governance. 

The areas (provinces, districts, and/or cities) are grouped into one of five 

tranches for transition. As of December 2012, the transition of four of the 

five tranches had been announced, and over 87 percent of the Afghan 

population was living in areas under Afghan lead security with the military 

support of U.S. and coalition partners. By mid-2013, it is expected that all 

areas will have entered the transition process and that by December 2014

the transition will be complete. 

According to ISAF, ANSF would need to be under effective Afghan civilian 

control and fully capable of addressing security challenges on a 

sustainable and irreversible basis for the transition to be successful. 

However, the readiness of the Afghan government to sustain ANSF has 

been questioned. For example, we previously highlighted concerns raised 

about the cost to sustain ANSF (see encl. III). Additionally, in October 

2012, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

(SIGAR) reported that the Afghan government would likely be incapable of 

fully sustaining ANSF facilities after the transition (SIGAR. ANSF 

Background

Since 2001, the United States 

and its NATO partners have been 

responsible for securing 

Afghanistan and leading the effort 

to secure, stabilize, and rebuild 

Afghanistan. In 2010, the United 

States and the international 

community announced their 

intentions to transition security to 

the Afghan government. This 

transition is under way and is 

expected to be completed by the 

end of 2014. 

Transition of Lead Security 

from ISAF to ANSF Is a Joint 

ISAF-Afghan Process 

Enclosure II: Transition of Lead Security to 

Afghan Security Forces
Page 20 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Facilities: Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for 

Operations & Maintenance. Washington, D.C.: Audit 13-1, Oct. 30, 2012).

DOD and ISAF have reported progress in increasing ANSF capabilities, 

but the tool they use to assess the performance of ANSF units changed 

several times. When we reported on Afghan National Army capability in 

January 2011, the highest capability rating level for a unit was 

“independent,” meaning that it could execute the full spectrum of its 

mission without any assistance from coalition forces. As of August 2011, 

however, the highest level had changed to “independent with advisors,” 

meaning that a unit could execute its mission, but could also request

coalition forces when necessary (see GAO-12-951T). Under these lower 

standards, more units have been rated at the highest level. In November

2012, DOD reported progress in increasing the capability of ANSF, with 14 

percent of army and 13 percent of police units rated at the highest level of 

capability. In addition, DOD reported that 43 percent of army and 19 

percent of police units were rated at the second highest level, “effective 

with advisors.” DOD acknowledged that the changes to the rating levels, 

as well as the elimination of certain requirements for validating units, were 

partly responsible for the increase in ANSF units rated at the highest level. 

As part of the overall transition of lead security, NATO's mission in 

Afghanistan is shifting from a combat role to an advise-and-assist mission. 

For the U.S. contribution, DOD has used a variety of approaches to 

provide U.S. forces to carry out the advise-and-assist mission. For 

example, in early 2012, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps began to deploy 

small teams of advisors with specialized capabilities—referred to as 

Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams—that are located throughout 

Afghanistan, to work with Afghan army and police units from the 

headquarters to the battalion level, and advise them in areas such as 

command and control, intelligence, and logistics. More recently, the Army 

began tailoring the composition and mission of its brigade combat teams 

to further focus on advising efforts. The Army and Marine Corps, however, 

have continued to face some challenges when supplying these teams, 

such as in providing the required field grade officers and specialized 

capabilities. Our past work examining the use of advisor teams in Iraq and 

Afghanistan highlighted certain areas that we believe are relevant to 

DOD’s plans to provide the Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams in 

support of the current mission in Afghanistan. Specifically, we have 

identified challenges related to the sourcing and training of personnel, 

command-and-control relationships, and support. Given the key role of 

advisory teams in supporting the transition process, these areas will be 

important considerations for DOD as it continues to refine its use of 

advisor personnel to mentor and develop ANSF.

Oversight Questions

1. What is the status of the transition process in those areas where 

ANSF has taken the lead in security? 

2. Given the changing measures of ANSF capabilities, to what extent is 

ANSF capable of addressing security challenges on a sustainable 

basis? 

3. What enabling capabilities, including advisor support, will DOD need to 

continue to provide to ANSF beyond 2014?

4. What steps is DOD taking to address challenges in providing advisor 

personnel, in terms of number of teams, ranks, and specialized 

capabilities?

ANSF Capabilities Have 

Reportedly Increased, but the 

Tool Used to Assess ANSF 

Performance Has Changed 

ISAF’s Mission Is Evolving 

from Combat to Advise-andAssist 

Points of Contact

For more information, contact:

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619, 

pickups@gao.gov
Page 21 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

Helping Afghanistan build capable and sustainable security forces is 

critical to the success of transitioning lead security responsibilities to 

Afghanistan by the end of 2014. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the 

international community pledged to continue to assist in financing the 

sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) beyond 2014. 

The World Bank, the Afghan government, and the International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) have reported that Afghanistan will likely need donor 

assistance to fund ANSF until at least 2021. DOD requested $5.7 billion to 

support ANSF for fiscal year 2013, which, if approved, would bring the 

total U.S. funding levels for ANSF for fiscal years 2002 through 2013 to 

over $57 billion. In Chicago, the Afghan government and the international 

community agreed with setting a goal for Afghanistan to assume full 

financial responsibility for its security forces no later than 2024.

Key Findings

Our analysis shows that projected Afghan domestic revenues will be 

insufficient to cover the cost of ANSF through fiscal year 2015. Our 

analysis of DOD data estimates that the cost of continuing to build and 

sustain ANSF will be at least $25 billion for fiscal years 2013 through 

2017. Multiple factors are expected to influence the final cost of sustaining 

ANSF, including the size of the force—which is expected to decline, 

according to a preliminary model, from 352,000 to 228,500 by 2017—as 

well as planned reductions in infrastructure and training costs by 2014. 

According to DOD, continuous efforts are made to adjust ANSF 

capabilities and requirements to achieve cost reductions, including the 

Afghan First (the purchase of goods and services from Afghan producers) 

and Afghan Right (building and procuring items according to Afghan 

specifications) initiatives. At the Chicago Summit, the Afghan government 

pledged to devote at least $500 million in 2015 and annually thereafter to 

funding ANSF, which is about 14 percent of its 2015 projected domestic 

revenues. However, even if the Afghan government committed 100 

percent of its projected domestic revenues to funding ANSF, this amount 

would cover only about 75 percent of the cost of supporting security forces 

in fiscal year 2015 and would leave the Afghan government no revenues 

to cover any non-security-related programs, such as public health.

At the Chicago Summit, the United States and its allies laid out a plan for 

future funding for ANSF; the U.S. annual contribution is projected to 

decline over time but still cover the majority of the costs. Our analysis 

shows that donors funded about 95 percent ($33.7 billion) of Afghanistan’s 

total security expenditures, with the United States funding approximately 

91 percent ($32.4 billion) of that amount from 2006 through 2011. On the 

basis of projections of U.S. and other donor support for ANSF for fiscal 

years 2012 through 2017, we estimate that there will be a gap each year

from 2015 through 2017 between ANSF costs and donor pledges if 

additional contributions are not made (see fig. 7). According to State, 

excluding Afghan and U.S. funds, the international community has 

pledged over $1 billion annually to support ANSF from 2015 through 2017.

Enclosure III: Future Cost and Sustainability 

of Afghan Security Forces

Background

An international coalition of 

countries, including the United 

States, other NATO members, and 

other nations, has made 

contributions to build ANSF, which 

consists primarily of the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) and the 

Afghan National Police (ANP). U.S. 

agencies allotted over $52 billion to

build and sustain ANSF from fiscal 

years 2002 through 2012.

Afghanistan’s Domestic 

Revenue Will Not Cover the 

Expected Cost of Its Security 

Forces 

The United States and the 

International Community 

Committed to Fund ANSF, but 

a Funding Gap Is Anticipated
Page 22 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 7: Projected U.S. and Other Donor Support for ANSFa

a

These projections are based on data and planning assumptions from early 2012 and, 

according to DOD officials, are subject to change based on ongoing planning efforts to 

develop and sustain ANSF force structures. 

b

GAO analysis of the projected costs of ANSF is completed by fiscal year, while annual 

pledged amounts by individual countries are based on calendar year.

c

Pledges were converted to U.S. dollars using January 24, 2013 currency exchange rates.

Although DOD has developed ANSF cost estimates beyond 2014, it has 

not provided its long-term cost estimates for sustaining ANSF in its 

semiannual reports to Congress. Our analysis of DOD data estimates the 

cost of continuing to support ANSF from 2013 through 2017 over $25 

billion, raising concerns about the sustainability of ANSF. We previously 

recommended, and Congress mandated, that DOD report to Congress 

about the long-term cost to sustain ANSF. While DOD’s semiannual 

reports issued to date include information on current or upcoming fiscal 

year funding requirements for ANSF and donor contributions, estimates 

for long-term costs are absent. DOD stated that because the long-term 

ANSF cost estimates depend on a constantly changing operational 

environment, it provides cost information to Congress through briefings 

and testimony, as appropriate. This mechanism, however, does not allow 

for independent assessment of DOD’s estimates to assist Congress as it 

considers future budget decisions.

Oversight Questions

1. If the ANSF force size does not decrease as expected, what are the 

alternative cost estimates and sources of funding for a larger force? 

2. To what extent are the United States and the international community 

identifying additional cost savings for ANSF? 

3. To what extent have the United States and the international 

community developed plans to cover possible ANSF funding gaps?

Despite Mandate, Long-Term 

Cost Estimates for Sustaining 

ANSF Have Not Been Routinely 

Provided to Congress

Points of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 23 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

With the U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan, DOD faces an 

unprecedented logistical challenge. Removing equipment from 

Afghanistan requires transiting routes with physical and geopolitical 

challenges. These factors could increase costs and slow the drawdown of 

an estimated 50,000 vehicles and more than 90,000 containers. DOD has 

begun planning for the reduction of hundreds of thousands of major end 

items—that is, equipment important to operational readiness such as 

aircraft, motorized and towed vehicles, and weapons—worth more than 

$36 billion. To drawdown the major end items, DOD has three primary 

options: remove the equipment from Afghanistan; transfer it to another 

agency or to the Afghan government; or destroy it in-theater. According to 

one DOD estimate, the cost of removal and transfer of items could be 

almost $6 billion. Senior DOD officials who oversaw the logistics for the 

military withdrawal from Iraq see a greater challenge in Afghanistan.

Key Findings

DOD has applied some, but not all, relevant lessons learned from the Iraq 

drawdown to its planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan. For 

example, the drawdown from Iraq demonstrated the importance of early 

planning for equipment drawdown, and the military services have applied 

this lesson by issuing guidance outlining the processes and procedures for 

drawing down equipment in Afghanistan. However, not all lessons from 

the Iraq drawdown have been applied. For example, during the Iraq 

drawdown, the Army noted that contractor equipment should be 

inventoried and entered into an automated records accounting system. 

However, DOD officials told us that full inventory of contractor equipment 

has not yet been attained in Afghanistan. In September 2011, we 

recommended that DOD implement a process to maintain visibility over 

contractor equipment. At the time, DOD agreed with the recommendation.

DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment from Afghanistan in the 

following three ways, but challenges remain: 

(a) Established command structures and guidance. DOD’s Central 

Command designated U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) as the 

command responsible for equipment drawdown. USFOR-A has published 

a base closure and transfer guide that outlines processes for the handling 

of equipment during transition. 

(b) Made efforts to improve property accountability. In September 2011, 

USFOR-A initiated an inventory of all the equipment in Afghanistan to 

identify items not previously accounted for in DOD’s systems of record,

but DOD officials acknowledged that they lack visibility over contractor 

equipment. 

(c) Established and expanded transportation options. DOD has increased 

the capacity of air/sea transportation routes out of Afghanistan (see fig. 8), 

but the land/sea routes from Afghanistan have limited operational 

capability for the return of equipment. U.S. Transportation Command is 

currently conducting tests to determine the capacity of the land/sea routes 

Background

In June 2011, the United States 

announced plans to reduce the 

number of U.S. troops in 

Afghanistan in accordance with 

U.S. objectives to transition to an 

Afghan-led security presence by 

2014. DOD completed the 

reduction of 33,000 troops from 

Afghanistan in September 2012, 

but much equipment has 

accumulated in the country through 

10 years of inflow without 

corresponding outflow.

DOD Has Applied Some 

Lessons Learned from Iraq to 

Planning for the Drawdown of 

Equipment in Afghanistan 

DOD Established Command 

Structures and Guidance, 

Property Accountability, and 

Transportation Options for the 

Drawdown of Equipment in 

Afghanistan 

Enclosure IV: DOD Planning for the Drawdown 

of Equipment in Afghanistan
Page 24 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

for the return of equipment from Afghanistan. Because of geopolitical 

complexities in the region it is unknown when these land/sea routes will be 

operational for the removal of equipment. As a result, DOD has had to rely 

on a combination of air/sea transport, a more costly transportation option. 

DOD transportation costs for the return of equipment vary depending on 

such factors as the type of equipment, route, and mode of transportation. 

For example, according to DOD data, transportation costs for the return of 

a single vehicle or container can range from $8,000 to $153,000, 

depending on the option employed (see fig. 8).

Figure 8: Cost of Various Routes for the Removal of Containers and 

Vehicles from Afghanistan

Consistent with DOD's supply chain materiel management policy, DOD 

has issued additional guidance requiring the military services to assess 

and document the costs and benefits when equipment is transferred or 

destroyed. However, there is no specific guidance requiring the military 

services to assess and document the costs and benefits of returning 

equipment, and they have not done so. Returning equipment involves 

transportation, repair, and storage costs that could be weighed against 

benefits to determine whether it is actually cost-effective to return it. Based 

on our analysis, the return of these items without full consideration of the 

costs and benefits is particularly problematic for unneeded items. When 

such excess items are returned without full consideration of costs and 

benefits, there is increased risk of unnecessary transportation and storage 

expenditures. In December 2012, we recommended that the military 

services conduct and document analyses to compare the costs and 

benefits of returning excess items and use these analyses in decisions 

regarding their return (see GAO-13-185R). DOD concurred. 

Oversight Questions

1. To what extent does DOD’s execution of the equipment drawdown 

support drawdown objectives and milestones with an efficient use of 

resources?

2. To what extent has DOD developed mitigation plans to address 

potential cost and operational impacts for removing equipment if there 

are disruptions to land-based supply routes?

3. To what extent do decision makers have sufficient information on the 

costs and benefits of returning excess items? 

DOD Has Not Fully Considered 

the Costs and Benefits of 

Returning Excess Equipment 

from Afghanistan

Point of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431, 

russellc@gao.gov
Page 25 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

The international community, including approximately 50 countries and 

international entities such as the World Bank and the United Nations, has 

provided significant support to help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. U.S. 

agencies have allotted over $81.7 billion for reconstruction and relief in 

Afghanistan between fiscal years 2002 and 2012, and the U.S. President 

has requested over $9.7 billion for these purposes for fiscal year 2013. In 

July 2012, at the international conference in Tokyo, Japan, donor 

countries and international organizations committed to continue supporting 

the Afghan economy through 2015 and beyond. Donors also raised 

concerns about Afghanistan’s dependency on donors to fund its public 

expenditures—funds spent to provide public services to the Afghan 

population, such as security, infrastructure projects, and government 

salaries—and continued reconstruction efforts. We have raised concerns 

about Afghanistan’s inability to fund planned government expenditures 

without foreign assistance (see GAO-11-948R).

Key Findings

Afghanistan’s domestic revenues funded about 10 percent of its estimated 

total public expenditures from 2006 to 2011. Domestic revenue grew from 

$0.6 billion to $2.0 billion from 2006 to 2011 (see fig. 9), an increase of 

over 230 percent. At the same time, Afghanistan’s estimated total public 

expenditures grew from $5.8 billion to $17.4 billion, an increase of over 

200 percent, maintaining a gap between revenues and expenditures.

Figure 9: Afghanistan’s Domestic Revenues from 2006 to 2011 

Donors funded approximately 90 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total 

public expenditures from 2006 to 2011, with the United States providing 

64 percent of that amount (see fig. 10). The United States funded an 

estimated 91 percent of Afghanistan’s total security expenditures and 

about 37 percent of Afghanistan’s total nonsecurity expenditures between 

2006 to 2011. In numerous reports and congressional briefings, we have 

Enclosure V: Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence

Background

Afghanistan is one of the world’s 

poorest countries and ranks near 

the bottom of virtually every 

development indicator category. 

The nation's gross domestic 

product (GDP) is estimated at 

about $18 billion for 2011. 

According to the most recent 

figures, approximately 35 percent of 

Afghanistan’s population is 

unemployed and lives below the 

poverty line, suffering from 

shortages of housing, clean 

drinking water, and electricity.

Afghanistan’s Domestic 

Revenues Do Not Cover Its 

Total Public Expenditures

The United States and 

International Partners Funded 

about 90 Percent of 

Afghanistan’s Estimated Total 

Public Expenditures
Page 26 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

raised concerns about Afghanistan’s inability to fund planned government 

expenditures without foreign assistance and raised questions about the 

sustainability of U.S.-funded road, agriculture, and water infrastructure 

development projects, as well as Afghanistan’s ability to sustain its 

national security forces.

Figure 10: Afghanistan’s Total Public Expenditures from 2006 to 2011

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

Donors funded, on average, 56 percent of Afghanistan’s on-budget 

expenditures and 100 percent of its off-budget expenditures. Between 

2006 and 2011 about 79 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated $73 billion in 

total public expenditures were “off-budget”—that is, funded by the 

international community outside of the Afghan national budget, such as 

equipment for Afghan National Security Forces. The remaining 

expenditures were “on-budget”—that is, within the government’s budget 

and funded by domestic revenues and donor contributions. As a result, a 

majority of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures were outside the direct 

control of the Afghan government. 

The international community has pledged to continue to support 

Afghanistan through 2017 if certain metrics regarding reform in 

Afghanistan are met. Given Afghanistan’s future revenue generation 

projections and expenditures, the country will likely continue to be reliant 

on the donor community through at least 2024. In July 2012, the 

international community committed to providing over $16 billion for 

Afghanistan’s economic development through 2015. The community also 

committed to sustaining support, through 2017, at or near the levels of the 

past decade to respond to the fiscal gap estimated by the World Bank and 

the Afghan government.

Oversight Questions

1. To what extent are U.S. programs assisting Afghanistan’s ability to 

increase domestic revenue and close the gap between revenues and 

total public expenditures?

2. What is the estimated amount of U.S. and other donors’ financial 

contributions to Afghanistan expected to be through 2017? 

Donors Funded Over Half of 

Afghanistan’s On-Budget 

Expenditures and All OffBudget Expenditures

International Community Has 

Pledged Continued Support

Points of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 27 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its 

development aid through the Afghan government budget within 2 years. 

Such direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan 

government ministries. The United States more than tripled its awards of 

such direct assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010 compared with 

fiscal year 2009, using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds.

Improving the Afghan government’s management of public finances is 

critical to the successful transition of more development aid being 

provided though the Afghan government budget. According to U.S. 

officials and documents, a challenge to this effort is the high level of 

corruption that exists throughout the Afghan government. Persistent 

corruption in Afghanistan undermines security and the people’s belief in 

the government, as well as effective accountability of U.S. funds provided 

directly to the Afghan government. 

Key Findings

The United States continues to make efforts to improve Afghanistan’s 

public financial management capacity to develop a budget, expend funds, 

and increase accountability and transparency. For example, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of 

the Treasury and Defense (DOD) have supported the Afghan 

government’s goals to improve its capacity to develop a national budget 

and expend funds through various activities, such as USAID projects that 

provide technical assistance and training to Afghan civil servants. A 

number of factors, however, including high levels of corruption in 

Afghanistan, pose ongoing challenges to these programs. 

We found in 2011 that U.S. government efforts were aligned with Afghan 

government goals; however, the U.S. government could not fully 

determine the overall extent to which its efforts had improved the Afghan 

government’s public financial management capacity because (1) U.S. 

agencies have reported mixed results; and (2) weaknesses in USAID’s 

performance management frameworks, such as lack of performance 

targets and data, prevent reliable assessments of its results (see GAO-11-

907). In September 2011 we recommended that for public financial 

management efforts USAID take steps to establish performance targets in 

its Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP) and ensure that 

implementing partners’ PMPs include baselines and approved targets, 

among other recommendations. In November 2011, USAID approved the 

contractor’s updated performance management plan for its only remaining 

public financial management capacity project to include baseline and 

targets for each indicator. Addressing concerns about the capacity of 

Afghan officials to administer larger amounts of funding for development 

and public services programs is important, as more donor funding is 

expected to be provided directly to Afghanistan’s budget in 2013 and 

beyond. 

Background

Since 2002, U.S. agencies have 

collectively allotted over $80 billion 

to help stabilize Afghanistan and 

build the Afghan government’s 

capacity to provide security, 

enhance governance, and develop 

a sustainable economy. The United 

States provides assistance to 

Afghanistan through contracts and 

assistance instruments, such as 

grants and cooperative 

agreements, and in the form of 

direct assistance, or “on-budget” 

assistance—funding provided 

through the Afghan national budget 

for use by its ministries.

U.S. Efforts to Improve 

Afghanistan’s Financial 

Management Capacity 

Continue

Enclosure VI: Oversight and Accountability of 

U.S. Funds to Support Afghanistan 
Page 28 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

USAID and DOD have taken steps to help ensure the accountability of 

their direct assistance to Afghan ministries. In 2011, although we found 

that USAID had established and generally complied with various financial 

and other controls in its direct assistance agreements (such as requiring 

Afghan ministries to maintain separate bank accounts and records subject 

to audit), it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct 

assistance before awarding funds (see GAO-11-710). For example, 

USAID had not completed preaward risk assessments in two of the eight 

cases of bilateral assistance we identified, despite the USAID 

administrator’s prior commitment to Congress that the agency would not 

proceed with direct assistance to an Afghan public institution before 

assessing its capabilities. USAID has since taken steps to respond to our 

recommendations to address these issues, including issuing new agency 

policies on risk assessments. We also found that DOD had established 

procedures in 2011 governing its direct assistance to Afghan ministries, 

following our discussions with DOD about our initial findings.

Figure 11: U.S. Dollars and Afghan Afghanis 

To provide a higher level of accountability for U.S. and international

assistance funds, the Afghan government and the international community 

agreed at the Tokyo Conference in 2012 to implement accountability 

mechanisms including the Mutual Accountability Framework, which was 

designed to ensure that the Afghan government is achieving governance 

and development goals. Going forward, the Afghan government and the 

international community are expected to monitor performance in five major 

areas of governance and development and determine a time line for 

achieving Framework goals. Additionally, following the Tokyo Conference, 

the Afghan President presented an anticorruption decree enumerating 

specific actions that the Afghan government will take to improve 

governance and the rule of law. 

Oversight Questions

1. What steps have U.S. agencies taken to help ensure that 

anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan will enhance accountability of U.S. 

funds in Afghanistan? 

2. To what extent is the Afghan government prepared to handle higher 

levels of direct assistance, given the capacity challenges faced 

throughout the government? 

3. To what extent is the Mutual Accountability Framework designed to be 

effective in ensuring that the Afghan government is achieving 

governance and development goals?

U.S. Agencies Took Steps to 

Enhance Accountability of 

Direct Assistance to 

Afghanistan 

A Mutual Accountability 

Framework Designed to 

Improve Accountability of U.S. 

and International Funds to 

Afghanistan Is to Be 

Implemented

Point of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov 
Page 29 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

U.S. agencies have allotted almost $20 billion for development efforts in 

Afghanistan since 2002 through the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State 

(State). These agencies have undertaken thousands of development 

activities in Afghanistan through multiple programs and accounts. In a 

number of cases, however, systemic weaknesses in oversight and 

monitoring of development project and program performance in 

Afghanistan exist, and the various programs and accounts used to 

execute development activities in Afghanistan overlap to some degree 

across categories of development assistance. While such overlap could 

be beneficial in terms of synergy and unity of effort, it also creates the 

potential for duplication of efforts if plans and activities are not properly 

coordinated.

Key Findings

Oversight of the billions of dollars provided to U.S. development programs 

in Afghanistan has been enhanced. We have previously reported on 

systemic weaknesses in USAID’s oversight and monitoring of the 

performance of projects and programs carried out by its implementing 

partners in Afghanistan. In 2010 we reported that USAID did not 

consistently follow its established performance management and 

evaluation procedures with regard to its agriculture and water sector 

projects. For example, only two of the seven USAID-funded agricultural 

programs included in our prior review had targets for all of their 

performance indicators. We concluded that, in the absence of consistent 

application of its existing performance management and evaluation 

procedures, USAID’s programs were more vulnerable to corruption, 

waste, fraud, and abuse. In response to our recommendations to improve 

its performance oversight and monitoring, USAID took several steps 

including issuing a new performance monitoring plan and approving its 

implementing partners performance targets. 

The four main U.S. development programs and accounts in Afghanistan 

have similar goals and activities, overlap to some degree, and may 

duplicate each other’s efforts (see table 1 for a description of those 

programs and accounts). Programs administered by USAID and DOD 

funded similar activities in Afghanistan across similar, broadly defined 

categories of assistance: agriculture, democracy and governance, 

education and health, energy and electricity, economic growth, and 

transportation. We found in fiscal year 2011 that these programs were 

implemented in many of the same Afghan provinces and districts—in 33 of 

the 34 provinces and in 249 of the 399 districts (see GAO-13-34). 

According to agency officials, these overlapping development efforts can 

be beneficial, provided that agencies leverage their respective expertise 

and coordinate efforts. However, the officials also acknowledged that such 

overlap creates the potential for duplication of efforts if plans and activities 

are not properly coordinated.

Enclosure VII: Oversight and Streamlining of 

Development Assistance to Afghanistan

Background

The United States has devoted 

significant funding and efforts in 

Afghanistan to development 

activities and programs. Its 

strategic framework identifies socioeconomic development as a key 

pillar of achieving its objectives of 

countering insurgent activity in 

Afghanistan.

Oversight of U.S. Programmatic 

Development Funds Has Been 

Enhanced

U.S. Development Efforts in 

Afghanistan Overlap and May 

Duplicate Each Other 
Page 30 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Table 2: Major U.S.-Administered Programs or Accounts Used to Fund Development Efforts in Afghanistan

 

Economic Support Fund 

(ESF)

Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP)a

Task Force for 

Business and Stability 

Operations (TFBSO)

Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund 

(AIF)

Primary agency or agencies responsible USAID DOD DOD DOD and State

Fiscal year in which funding for 

Afghanistan began

2002 2004 2009 2011

Program or account description for 

Afghanistan

Supports Afghan 

government in its efforts to 

promote economic growth, 

establish a democratic and 

capable state governed by 

the rule of law, and 

provide basic services for 

its people. 

Enables U.S. commanders in 

Afghanistan to carry out smallscale projects designed to 

meet urgent humanitarian 

relief and reconstruction needs 

in their areas of responsibility.

Supports projects to help 

reduce violence, 

enhance stability, and 

support economic 

normalcy through 

strategic business and 

economic opportunities.

Supports high-priority, 

large-scale 

infrastructure projects 

that support the U.S. 

civilian-military effort in 

Afghanistan.

Funding provided in fiscal year 2011 

(millions)

$2,068 b$400 $224 $400 

Total funding provided since inception 

(millions)b

$14,919

 

$3,439 $555 $800

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Management and Budget and agency data.

a

CERP may also fund some nondevelopment activities. We exclude nondevelopment 

CERP activities from our analyses in this table. 

b

U.S. agencies use a variety of methods to coordinate development efforts 

in Afghanistan, but lack a single database to share and retain data. Our

analysis of USAID’s development activities and DOD’s CERP activities 

identified potentially duplicative development projects; however, we could 

not conclusively determine whether or not these efforts had resulted in 

duplication (providing the same goods and services to the same 

beneficiaries) because of gaps and inconsistencies in USAID’s and 

DOD’s respective databases. USAID and DOD officials cited informal 

communication and interagency meetings as the primary method of 

coordinating USAID and CERP efforts. However, the effectiveness of 

such coordination may depend on the priorities of the staff involved and 

could be hampered by high staff turnover and lack of data retention. 

Funding is based on allocations and agency allotments for Afghanistan assistance. 

In 2010 we recommended that agencies report their development efforts 

in a shared database; however, agencies have made limited progress in 

collecting and retaining critical data on development efforts in such a 

database. USAID’s Afghan Info database has been designated as the 

central repository of data for U.S. foreign assistance efforts in Afghanistan. 

DOD has not reported its projects in the shared database, citing concerns 

with the sensitive nature of its data, which USAID noted could be mitigated 

by internal controls. We continue to believe that a shared database that 

incorporates all U.S.-funded development efforts in Afghanistan, including 

DOD’s CERP activities, is needed to help mitigate potential informationsharing gaps and reduce the risk of duplication. In November 2012 we 

asked Congress to consider requiring U.S. agencies to report information 

on their development-related activities in a shared database. While USAID 

agreed with this recommendation citing concerns about visibility into DOD 

projects post-2014, DOD disagreed with the need for legislative action. 

Oversight Questions

1. What steps are U.S. agencies taking to ensure that USAID has insight 

into DOD projects? 

2. What steps have U.S. agencies taken to develop a shared database 

that includes all development efforts? 

U.S. Agencies Use Various 

Methods to Coordinate but 

Lack a Shared Database That 

Includes All Development 

Efforts

Points of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 31 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

Since 2001, contractors have played a key role in U.S. efforts to stabilize 

and rebuild Afghanistan. Federal agencies have hired contractors to

increase agricultural capacity, train Afghan police, maintain weapons

systems, and provide security and logistical services to U.S. forces and 

other personnel. As the United States moves forward with planning for the 

drawdown of U.S. military forces and the transition to a civilian-led 

presence in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to plan 

for the efficient demobilization of its contractors, while the Department of 

State (State) needs to conduct acquisition planning for contract support 

after the transition. At the same time, DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) continue to face contract and 

management challenges, such as ensuring that a sufficient number of 

trained personnel are available to oversee contractors and that vendors 

and contractor personnel are vetted effectively. 

Key Findings

DOD’s and State’s experiences in Iraq highlight important considerations 

for contract management that require continued attention during the 

drawdown and transition to a civilian-led presence in Afghanistan. During 

the drawdown from Iraq, DOD faced challenges with demobilizing its 

contractors, including determining contract requirements and identifying 

risks associated with potential changes in contracting vehicles. We made 

several recommendations in April 2010 to address related concerns, 

which DOD took steps to address. Additionally, as occurred in Iraq, the 

ratio of contractor to military personnel may increase substantially as the 

drawdown progresses in Afghanistan, as contractors provide some 

services previously provided by military personnel. This relative growth in 

contractor personnel as the pool of military personnel available to perform 

contract oversight functions decreases necessitates an increased focus on 

oversight to help mitigate the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Furthermore, as we reported in August 2012, coordination between DOD 

and State occurred late during the Iraq drawdown, contributing to delays 

that made the transition and associated acquisitions of critical goods and 

services more challenging. State found itself without sufficient personnel 

with the expertise to conduct necessary acquisition activities to support its 

mission in Iraq, and, as a result, relied on DOD for acquisition support. 

However, the departments did not fully comply with requirements for the 

use and management of such support, which continues to limit State’s 

ability to conduct acquisition planning for the transition in Afghanistan. 

Over the next year, as the U.S. transition in Afghanistan evolves, the 

departments face a shrinking window of opportunity to determine whether 

State’s continued reliance on DOD is appropriate or State should develop 

its own capacity. Otherwise, State risks again relying on DOD’s support by 

default rather than through sound business decisions.

DOD, State, and USAID face contract management and oversight 

challenges in Afghanistan, and their oversight of U.S. contracts requires 

additional improvement. For example, as we reported in September 2012, 

Background

DOD, State, and USAID have 

relied extensively on contractors to 

support troops and civilian 

personnel and conduct 

reconstruction efforts in

Afghanistan. For fiscal year 2012, 

DOD obligated approximately 

$17.6 billion on contracts 

performed in Afghanistan, with 

State and USAID reporting 

obligations of $633 million and 

$714 million, respectively.

Contract Management during

the Drawdown and Transition

Requires Continued Attention

Oversight of U.S. Contracts 

Requires Additional Improvement

Enclosure VIII: Oversight of U.S. Contracts in 

Afghanistan 
Page 32 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

the three agencies continue to experience difficulty in reporting reliable 

information on their contracts and contractor personnel in Afghanistan. 

Such information is a starting point for ensuring proper management and 

oversight. Furthermore, in March 2012, we reported that DOD oversight 

personnel in Afghanistan did not always receive adequate training and 

that DOD continued to lack a sufficient number of oversight personnel in 

Afghanistan, which in some cases resulted in projects being completed 

without sufficient oversight. In April 2010 we reported that, absent 

strategic planning for their use of contractors, individual offices within 

State and USAID often made case-by-case decisions on using contractors 

to support contract or grant administration, and risks, such as possible 

conflicts of interest or insufficient oversight, were not always addressed. 

We recommended that the agencies take actions such as developing new 

training standards, conducting workforce planning, and issuing relevant 

guidance. The agencies have taken steps to address some of these 

recommendations and challenges. For example, DOD has developed a 

new training course for contract oversight personnel with a focus on 

contingency operations, while State has developed new guidance to 

address conflict of interest and contract oversight risks. USAID has also 

implemented an initiative in Afghanistan that includes several efforts to 

improve contract award and oversight processes. However, additional

efforts will be necessary to help ensure sufficient contract oversight. 

Our prior work also identified limitations among DOD’s, State’s, and 

USAID’s procedures for ensuring that vendors and contractor personnel 

are vetted effectively to help minimize risks to U.S. efforts and personnel.

We reported in June 2011 that DOD and USAID had developed vendor 

vetting programs in part to address concerns that money from U.S. 

contracts was being diverted to fund insurgent and criminal activities, but 

State had not. At that time, we also reported on limitations in procedures 

for vetting non-U.S. vendors and emphasized the need for better 

information sharing among agencies about vendor vetting. We 

recommended that DOD and USAID take steps to improve their vetting 

processes by using a risk-based approach and that State assess the need 

for and possible options to vet non-U.S. vendors. We also recommended 

that the agencies consider procedures to improve information sharing. 

DOD and USAID have since taken steps to improve their vetting 

processes, and in June 2012, State announced that it would begin vetting

certain contractors in Afghanistan. A concept for an interagency vetting 

working group to improve information sharing among Embassy sections 

and agencies has also been developed. Going forward, continued 

attention will be necessary to help ensure effective vetting processes and 

procedures in Afghanistan and future contingency operations. 

Oversight Questions

1. What steps is DOD taking to plan for its use and demobilization of 

contractors during its drawdown from Afghanistan? 

2. How are DOD and State coordinating for a transition of contracted 

services when State assumes the lead U.S. role in Afghanistan after 

the drawdown of U.S. forces? 

3. To what extent do DOD, State, and USAID have adequate staff 

resources, both in terms of numbers and expertise, in Afghanistan to 

ensure the appropriate level of contract management and oversight? 

4. How will DOD, State, and USAID institutionalize lessons learned about 

contract management in Afghanistan to help ensure that they do not 

face similar contract management challenges in future contingencies?

Contractor Vetting Procedures 

Need Continued Attention

Point of Contact

Timothy DiNapoli, (202) 512-4841, 

dinapolit@gao.gov

Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431, 

russellc@gao.gov 
Page 33 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

February 2013

Issue

Plans for the United States’ post-combat presence in Afghanistan, 

currently scheduled to begin in January 2015, have been developed by 

the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and are currently 

being reviewed by U.S. National Security Staff. The United States is 

transitioning from counterinsurgency and stability operations toward more 

traditional diplomatic and development activities, according to U.S. 

strategic documents. Current plans envision a diplomatic presence at the 

U.S. embassy in Kabul and four consulates in other major cities. A 

possible smaller but continuing military presence in Afghanistan is 

expected to advise and assist Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

and continue counterterrorism efforts beyond 2014. Current plans call for 

a further drawdown of both civilians and military personnel; however, 

specific figures have not yet been determined.

Key Findings

While the circumstances, combat operations, and diplomatic efforts in Iraq 

differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons can be learned from the 

transition from a military to civilian-led presence in Iraq and applied to 

Afghanistan to avoid possible missteps and better utilize resources. In 

Iraq, State and DOD had to revise their plans for the U.S. presence from 

more than 16,000 personnel at 14 sites down to 11,500 personnel at 11 

sites after the transition had begun—in part because the United States did 

not obtain the Government of Iraq’s commitment to the planned U.S. 

presence. Given these reductions, we found that State was projected to 

have an unobligated balance of between about $1.7 billion and about $2.3 

billion in its Iraq operations budget at the end of fiscal year 2013. 

According to DOD officials, U.S. Forces-Iraq planning assumed that a 

follow-on U.S. military force would be approved by both governments. The 

decision not to have a follow-on force led to a reassessment of DOD’s 

plans and presence. Attacks on diplomatic facilities in countries such as

Libya should also be considered as the United States plans future facilities 

in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies should take the necessary steps to ensure 

that all facilities in Afghanistan meet security standards to the maximum 

extent possible and that mitigating steps are taken to address 

vulnerabilities. We previously recommended that such steps be taken in 

Iraq; U.S. agencies concurred and have since begun vulnerability 

assessments at Iraq sites.

State’s current plans for the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan call for 

maintaining a significant presence of diplomats. In May 2012, the U.S. and 

Afghan Presidents signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that 

committed both countries to strengthened long-term strategic cooperation. 

Additionally, in July 2012, the U.S. President declared Afghanistan a 

“major non-NATO ally,” 1 of 15 countries to receive such status, which 

qualifies Afghanistan for certain privileges supporting defense and security 

cooperation. These and other agreements, as well as U.S. planning 

documents, demonstrate the intention of the United States to maintain 

strong civilian and diplomatic ties with Afghanistan.

Background

In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, 

the United States established a 

diplomatic and military presence in

Afghanistan. The total number of U.S. 

civilians under the authority of the 

U.S. embassy peaked at 1,253 in 

January 2012. Civilian personnel 

under DOD authority reached a high

of 3,022 in March 2011, coinciding 

with the highest number of U.S. troops 

at 99,800. The United States has 

since begun to draw down its civilian 

and military personnel in Afghanistan. 

Transition from Military to 

Civilian-Led Presence in Iraq 

Could Offer Lessons for 

Afghanistan 

U.S. Civilian Presence in 

Afghanistan Is Expected to 

Remain Substantial 

Enclosure IX: Planning for the Future U.S. 

Presence in Afghanistan 
Page 34 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 12: U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan

State’s enduring presence plan includes an embassy in Kabul (see fig. 12, 

above left), and four other posts in, according to State officials, the key 

strategic locations of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. The 

U.S. embassy in Kabul is currently undergoing a major construction 

project to expand the chancery and replace temporary offices and housing 

with permanent structures. A new consulate facility in Herat opened in 

March 2012. Although State determined that the initially selected site for a

consulate facility in Mazar-e-Sharif was found to be unsuitable, a new 

location has not yet been decided upon. To date, State has committed

approximately $900 million to expand embassy facilities and establish new 

consulate facilities in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. Additional costs to 

establish consulate facilities in Jalalabad and Kandahar have not yet been 

determined. According to officials, State is planning for over 700 civilians 

to be posted in Afghanistan beyond 2014. All plans, according to State 

officials, are subject to ongoing deliberations. 

Although U.S. and Afghan officials have stated that a continued military 

partnership between the two countries is desired beyond 2014, the details 

of that partnership have not yet been determined. Sensitive issues on the 

status and precise nature of an ongoing U.S. military presence remain to 

be negotiated between the United States and Afghanistan. U.S. and 

Afghan authorities began negotiations on a bilateral security agreement in 

November 2012 to establish a framework for the U.S. military’s post-2014 

presence. As agreed in the May 2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement, 

the goal is to complete the negotiations of the bilateral security agreement

within one year, by November 2013. This agreement is expected to

supersede the current status of forces agreement upon entry into force. 

According to DOD officials, issues regarding the future roles and 

responsibilities of any U.S. forces that remain in Afghanistan after 2014, 

such as immunity for foreign military forces under Afghan law, are likely to 

present a challenge as negotiations progress.

Oversight Questions

1. In light of the lessons learned from the Iraq transition, to what extent 

has State taken steps to plan for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan? 

2. What steps are State and DOD taking to ensure that all post-2014 

facilities meet security guidelines and that site vulnerabilities are 

addressed?

3. What steps has the United States taken to plan for the multiple 

possible outcomes of the bilateral security agreement negotiations? 

State Plans for Five Diplomatic 

Sites in Afghanistan Post-2014 

Future U.S. Military Presence 

in Afghanistan Is Uncertain 

Point of Contact

For more information, contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619, 

pickups@gao.gov 
Appendix I: Key Facts about Afghanistan

Page 35 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 13: Key Facts about Afghanistan

INSTRUCTIONS for interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return 

to Figure 1.

a

Afghanistan’s National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008: A Profile of Afghanistan 

identified a smaller labor force of over 12 million.

b

Afghanistan’s National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008: A Profile of Afghanistan found 

a lower literacy rate of 26 percent of the total adult population (39 percent for males and 12 percent of 

females).

Appendix I: Key Facts about Afghanistan
Appendix II: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan

Page 36 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 14: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan

INSTRUCTIONS for interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return 

to Figure 1.

Appendix II: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan
Appendix III: Major U.S. Transit Points into and 

out of Afghanistan

Page 37 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Figure 15: Major U.S. Transit Points into and out of Afghanistan

INSTRUCTIONS for interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return 

to Figure 1.

Appendix III: Major U.S. Transit Points into 

and out of Afghanistan
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the 

Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan

Page 38 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

This appendix provides information regarding documents shown in figure 

3 (see table 3). This information can also be accessed via the interactive 

rollovers in the electronic version of the figure.

Table 3: Descriptions of the Afghan, U.S., and NATO Documents that Constitute the Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan

Documents Date issued Description

Afghan documents and international agreements

Bonn Agreement December 2001 The Bonn Agreement, signed in December 2001 under the sponsorship of 

the United Nations (UN), was the first of several international agreements that 

laid out a framework for the transition of Afghanistan from Taliban rule to a 

new Afghan national government. The agreement established an interim 

authority for Afghanistan, requested the UN to authorize an international 

security force to assist in the transition, and set out the role of the UN to 

advise the interim authority.

Afghan Compact January 2006 The Afghan Compact (January 2006) was the product of the 2006 London 

Conference—a meeting of Afghanistan’s government, over 50 other nations, 

and the UN and other international organizations. The compact first 

introduced the concept of security, governance, and development as the 

areas of focus for Afghan reconstruction activities. In the compact, the Afghan 

government, with the support of the international community, committed to 

achieving benchmarks in these areas, such as developing a professional 

national army by the end of 2010.

Afghan National 

Development Strategy 

2008 The Afghan National Development Strategy (2008) is Afghanistan’s guiding 

document for achieving its reconstruction goals. The strategy focuses on 

improving the country’s security, governance, and economic growth and 

reducing poverty. It also provides information on the resources needed to 

carry out the strategy and on the shortfall in Afghanistan’s projected revenue. 

It was released in 2008 and is effective through 2013.

London Conference 

Communiqué

January 2010 The London Conference Communiqué, issued in January 2010, was the

product of the 2010 London Conference. Conference participants committed 

to helping the government of Afghanistan in several areas, such as 

anticorruption and improving the capability of the Afghan army and police 

forces. Conference participants also acknowledged the intention of NATO’s 

North Atlantic Council to begin transitioning the lead responsibility for 

security—province by province—from NATO’s International Security 

Assistance Force to Afghan forces in late 2010/early 2011.

Kabul Process July 2010 The Kabul Process, established as a result of the July 2010 Kabul 

Conference, created an internationally agreed-upon “path to an economically 

sustainable, socially vibrant and stable Afghanistan, led by Afghans for 

Afghans, [and] supported by the international community.” The Process is 

defined by the National Priority Programs, which were introduced at the 

conference and address a wide range of issues raised in the Afghan National 

Development Strategy and serve as a prioritization and implementation plan 

for the strategy. 

Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the 

Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan 
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the 

Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan

Page 39 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Documents Date issued Description

Bonn Conference 

Conclusions

December 2011 The Bonn Conference Conclusions, issued at the December 2011 Bonn 

Conference, began the discussion of Afghanistan’s future during 2015-

2024—which was termed the “Transformation Decade” at the conference—

following international declarations that international military forces would 

complete their drawdown in Afghanistan by December 2014.

Chicago Summit 

Declaration

May 2012 The Chicago Summit Declaration, issued at the May 2012 Chicago Summit, 

drew together the 28 NATO countries and Afghanistan to discuss the 

sustainability of Afghan National Security Forces beyond the drawdown of 

international military forces in 2014. Nations affirmed their commitment with 

pledges of financial support.

Enduring Strategic 

Partnership Agreement

May 2012 The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of 

America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was signed on May 2, 2012. 

The agreement details several areas in which both parties agree to support 

one another, including protecting and promoting shared democratic values, 

advancing long-term security, reinforcing regional security and cooperation, 

supporting social and economic development, and strengthening Afghan 

institutions and governance. As part of this agreement, the United States 

pledged to designate Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), and did 

so on July 6, 2012; MNNA status qualifies a country for certain privileges 

supporting defense and security cooperation, but does not entail any security 

commitments to that country.

Tokyo Conference 

Declaration and Framework

July 2012 The Tokyo Conference Declaration and Framework, issued at the July 2012 

Tokyo Conference, resulted in a declaration of continued support toward 

Afghanistan’s long-term economic growth and fiscal self-reliance, called upon 

greater Afghan effort to combat corruption, and elicited pledges of financial 

support for Afghanistan as it heads into the “Transformation Decade.” It also 

introduced the Mutual Accountability Framework that holds Afghanistan and 

the international community accountable for achieving and supporting good 

governance goals and indicators across five areas.

U.S. plans and strategies

Operation Enduring

Freedom Campaign Plan

November 2001 

continuing

The Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan (2001) and updates are 

classified. Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing U.S.-led operation 

that coordinates with ISAF to conduct counterterrorism operations in 

Afghanistan and elsewhere. It operates under a U.S. commander who is also 

the commanding general of ISAF. 

Status of Forces 

Agreement 

May 2003 The Status of Forces Agreement was established through the exchange of 

diplomatic notes on September 26, December 12, 2002, and May 28, 2003, 

and entered into force on May 28, 2003. The agreement lays out the status of 

DOD military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan in connection with 

cooperative efforts in response to terrorism; humanitarian and civic 

assistance; military training and exercises; and other activities. These 

personnel are accorded a status equivalent to administrative and technical 

staff of the U.S. embassy under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 

Relations of 1961, making them immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan 

authorities, among other protections.
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the 

Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan

Page 40 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Documents Date issued Description

Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization 

Strategy

November 2011 The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, signed by the 

Secretaries of Defense and State, was released in January 2010 and, 

according to State officials, most recently updated in November 2011 through 

the Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement. The report 

focuses on U.S. non-military efforts and states that the U.S. combat mission 

is not open-ended but that the United States is committed to building a lasting 

partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan. With regard to Afghanistan, the 

strategy focuses on supporting an Afghan-led, sustainable transition; building 

an economic foundation for Afghanistan’s future; supporting Afghanistan’s 

governance and political institutions; strengthening Afghan rule of law; 

sustainable development investments; advancing the rights of Afghan women 

and girls; and oversight of Afghanistan assistance. Under each of these 

areas, the strategy identifies key issues and achievements. According to 

State officials, it supersedes the March 2009 U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan.

Afghanistan Pakistan 

Objectives 2015

August 2012 Afghanistan Pakistan Objectives 2015, signed in August 2012, replaced the 

National Security Council Strategic Implementation Plan signed in July 2009 

and is classified. According to State officials, the plan provides a series of 

goals and objectives for implementing the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 

Stabilization Strategy. The plan also includes measures of effectiveness to 

track progress in achieving the objectives.

Civil-Military Strategic 

Framework for Afghanistan

October 2012 The Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan was originally signed 

in August 2009 (and named the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan) 

by the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and the commanding general, U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan. It was updated in February 2011, March 2012, and 

October 2012 and renamed the Civil-Military Strategic Framework. The 

current framework is less detailed than the original to be more adaptable and 

allow flexibility, according to officials. The framework is designed to articulate 

the strategic vision guiding U.S. government efforts to achieve U.S. national 

goals in Afghanistan and to ensure that U.S. civilian and military efforts in 

Afghanistan are fully integrated and complementary. The plan addresses four 

categories of effort, including security, governance, rule of law, and 

socioeconomic development, as well as the crosscutting issues of 

reconciliation and reintegration, the role of women in society, borders, 

information initiatives, and regional cooperation.

Enduring Presence Plans 

Post 2014

2012 According to State officials, the Enduring Presence Plans Post 2014 are 

classified planning documents submitted by State, DOD, and the Intelligence 

Community to the National Security Staff. Together they lay out initial plans 

for the post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

NATO plans and documents

Supreme Headquarters of 

the Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE) Operational Plan

June 2003

August 2012

The SHAPE OPLAN (June 2003) is a classified document. According to a 

NATO official, this plan was issued in 2003 to direct NATO operations inside 

Kabul. SHAPE, a component of NATO, was established in 1951 as part of an 

effort to establish an integrated and effective NATO military force. SHAPE’s 

mission is to prepare, plan, and conduct military operations in order to meet 

NATO political objectives.

The SHAPE OPLAN (August 2012) is a classified document. According to a 

NATO official, this plan provided for NATO to assume responsibility 

throughout Afghanistan—all regions plus established Regional Command 

Capital (Kabul). This document was revised three times since its initial 

release in April 2006.
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the 

Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 

Afghanistan

Page 41 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Documents Date issued Description

International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) 

Operational Plan

March 2006 continuing The ISAF OPLAN (March 2006) is classified. The current revision was 

released in October 2011. ISAF is a NATO-led mission in Afghanistan 

established by the UN Security Council in December 2001. ISAF is 

composed of troops contributed by the United States, Canada, Australia, New 

Zealand, and other nations, including member nations of the European Union 

and NATO. ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability 

and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the 

Afghan National Security Forces, and facilitate improvements in governance 

and socioeconomic development.

NATO Strategic Plan for 

Afghanistan

May 2012 The NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (May 2012) is classified. According 

to DOD, it confirms NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan through 2024 and 

defines objectives for ISAF through the completion of security transition at the 

end of 2014. It also includes a mid-2013 interim milestone for the Coalition 

and Afghanistan marking the beginning of the ANSF assumption of the lead 

for combat operations across the country and a shift in NATO’s primary 

mission from combat to training, advising, and assisting in order to ensure the 

ANSF have required support while adjusting to their increased 

responsibilities. It replaced the April 2008 Comprehensive Strategic Political 

Military Plan.

North Atlantic Council 

Initiating Directive

October 2012 The North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive (October 2012) is classified. 

According to DOD, the North Atlantic Council acknowledges commitments 

made at the Chicago summit and issued the North Atlantic Council Initiating 

Directive to start formal operations planning for the post-2014 NATO-led 

international training, advisory, and assistance mission in Afghanistan.

Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to NATO, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, UN, and government of Afghanistan documents.
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic 

Framework for Afghanistan

Page 42 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

This appendix provides information regarding the U.S. Civil-Military 

Strategic Framework for Afghanistan in figure 3. This information can also 

be accessed via the interactive rollovers in the electronic version of the 

figure.

The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al Qaeda and prevent its return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Specific 

objectives in Afghanistan in support of this goal are to (1) deny safe 

haven to al Qaeda and (2) deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the 

Afghan government.1

Each pillar below contains key priorities.

• Security foundation

• Security is the foundation of the Framework, creating an 

environment that allows progress on the three key pillars. The 

counterinsurgency campaign will degrade the insurgency to a 

level that denies it the ability to threaten the Afghan state and 

enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume full 

responsibility for security by the end of 2014.

1. Support the development of an increasingly capable ANSF that 

can partner with the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) to neutralize the insurgency.

2. Execute the counterinsurgency campaign.

• Governance pillar

• Working with the United Nations Assistance Mission to 

Afghanistan and allied partners, the United States will continue to 

support Afghan efforts to strengthen governance by facilitating 

efforts to ensure that government and its institutions are 

representative, accountable, responsive, constitutionally 

legitimate, and capable of performing key functions.

 

1

The U.S. strategic goals for Afghanistan were recently changed from those that appeared 

in the October 2012 U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. The goals as 

they appeared in October 2012 were to (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its 

affiliates and prevent their return to Afghanistan; and (2) build a partnership with the 

Afghan people that ensures that the United States will be able to continue to target 

terrorists and support a sovereign Afghan government.

Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic 

Framework for Afghanistan

Strategic Goal

Pillars and Key Priorities
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic 

Framework for Afghanistan

Page 43 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

1. Support constitutional succession through credible and inclusive 

presidential elections.

2. Strengthen checks and balances and independent institutions.

3. Strengthen revenue collection and budget prioritization, execution, 

and accountability at both the national and subnational levels.

4. Stem corruption through support for open and accountable 

government.

• Rule of law pillar

• The United States will support Afghan efforts to offer meaningful 

access to fair, efficient, and transparent justice based on Afghan 

law. The United States also will support Afghan efforts to increase 

the government of Afghanistan’s legitimacy among Afghans by 

promoting a culture that values the rule of law. U.S. government 

rule-of-law entities will continue to pursue a wide range of

activities focusing on the fight against corruption in Afghanistan. 

The U.S. government also will support the government of 

Afghanistan’s efforts to transition the Afghan National Police to a 

rule-of-law based institution. Collectively, these efforts are 

expected to form the foundation for a functioning civil society.

1. Increase access to justice by developing institutional capacity, 

providing legal education, and strengthening capacity to combat 

corruption.

2. Partner with the government of Afghanistan to increase its 

capacity to manage a safe, secure, and humane correctional 

system that discourages the radicalization of prisoners.

3. Provide support for traditional justice systems.

4. Develop law enforcement leadership and capacity.

• Socioeconomic development pillar

• The United States will support sustainable, inclusive economic 

growth that will help Afghanistan to be increasingly integrated 

economically within the region. The United States will also 

facilitate access between Afghanistan and the international 

economy to strengthen governmental and private sector 

development.

1. Support private sector investment, job creation, and food security.

2. Improve Afghanistan’s economic integration into the region 

through the New Silk Road Initiative, which will improve 
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic 

Framework for Afghanistan

Page 44 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s ability to access foreign markets and supply its 

domestic market.

3. Strengthen the capacity of the government of Afghanistan to act 

as an important enabler of sustainable private sector participation 

in the economy, regulatory reform, public revenue generation, and 

improved flow of resources from Kabul to the provinces.

4. Strengthen the capacity of the government of Afghanistan at 

central and subnational levels to operate and maintain 

infrastructure and key services, and support critical gains in 

education and health.

• Reconciliation and reintegration: The United States will continue to 

support Afghan efforts to achieve a broad-based political 

reconciliation that includes leadership elements of the insurgency.

• Role of women in society: The United States will continue to prioritize 

gender issues to ensure the positive gains of the last 11 years are 

irreversible and Afghanistan achieves continued progress on the 

protection and promotion of women’s rights.

• Borders: The United States will support government of Afghanistan 

efforts to improve its border management practices, apply consistently 

the rule of law, and increase efforts to interdict cross border 

movement of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal networks, addressing 

these networks’ associated financial activity.

• Information initiatives: The United States will pursue the use of 

strategic communications and access to information for Afghan 

citizens that support credible and inclusive presidential elections, 

promote the government of Afghanistan’s legitimacy, counter 

extremist voices, and facilitate transition.

• Regional cooperation: The United States is committed to supporting 

all confidence-building measures outlined in the Kabul Conference, 

offering support and assistance in a way that makes sense for the 

region, and is welcomed by the region’s countries. For example, the 

Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure 

and Stable Afghanistan between Afghanistan and neighboring 

countries represents an opportunity for the region’s countries to 

develop more cooperative arrangements on security, trade, 

infrastructure, and natural disasters.

Crosscutting Issues
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 45 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

This appendix provides a list of recent products related to each enclosure. 

Report numbers with an SU or RSU suffix are Sensitive but Unclassified 

and those with a C suffix are classified.

Sensitive but Unclassified and Classified reports are available to 

personnel with the proper clearances and need-to-know upon request. 

For a copy of a Sensitive but Unclassified or Classified report, please 

contact the point of contact listed in the related enclosure.

The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. GAO-10-655R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2010.

Afghanistan Security: Multiple Campaign and Operational Plans Direct 

U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. GAO-10-619C. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 

2010.

Overseas Contingency Operations: Reported Obligations for the 

Department of Defense. GAO-09-1022R. Washington, D.C.: September 

25, 2009.

Overseas Contingency Operations: Reported Obligations for the 

Department of Defense. GAO-09-791R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2009.

Afghanistan: U.S.- and Internationally-Funded Roads (GAO-09-626SP), 

an E-supplement to GAO-09-473SP. GAO-09-626SP. Washington, D.C.: 

April 21, 2009.

Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-473SP. 

Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.

Defense Biometrics: Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely 

Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of Biometrics in 

Afghanistan. GAO-12-442. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2012.

Afghan Security: Renewed Sharing of Biometric Data Could Strengthen 

U.S. Efforts to Protect U.S. Personnel from Afghan Security Force 

Attacks. GAO-12-471SU. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012.

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on 

Terrorist Safe Havens. GAO-11-561. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011.

Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Letter 

Enclosure I: Afghanistan’s 

Security Environment
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 46 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Drug Control: International Programs Face Significant Challenges 

Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign 

Policy Objectives. GAO-10-921T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Afghanistan’s Security Environment. GAO-10-613R. Washington, D.C.: 

May 5, 2010.

Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but 

Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts 

Needed. GAO-10-291. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2010.

Afghanistan’s Security Environment. GAO-10-178R. Washington, D.C.: 

November 5, 2009.

Afghanistan Security: Security Transition. GAO-12-598C. Washington, 

D.C.: September 11, 2012.

Observations on U.S. Military Capabilities to Support Transition of Lead 

Security Responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces. 

GAO-12-734C. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2012.

Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and 

Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.

Interim Results on U.S.-NATO Efforts to Transition Lead Security 

Responsibility to Afghan Forces. GAO-12-607C. Washington, D.C.: 

May 18, 2012.

Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide 

Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556. 

Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Needed to 

Improve DOD Guidance, Integration of Tools, and Training for Collection 

Management. GAO-12-396C. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2012.

Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan 

Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps. 

GAO-12-293R. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2012.

Enclosure II: Transition of 

Lead Security to Afghan 

Security Forces
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 47 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to Improve Visibility 

and Sustainment of Knowledge and Skills in Army and Marine Corps 

General Purpose Forces. GAO-12-50. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 

2011.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army 

Brigades to Support the Advising Mission. GAO-11-760. Washington, 

D.C.: August 2, 2011.

DOD Has Increased Its Use of Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Capabilities in Afghanistan but Would Benefit from 

Improved Planning for Using Its Capabilities and Utilization of Lessons 

Learned. GAO-11-224C. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2011.

Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and 

Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.

Afghanistan Security: Estimated Costs to Support Afghan National 

Security Forces Underscore Concerns about Sustainability. 

GAO-12-438SU. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2012.

Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers 

Needed; Long-Term Costs Not Determined. GAO-11-66. Washington, 

D.C.: January 27, 2011.

Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need 

Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess 

Equipment. GAO-13-185R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2012.

Defense Management: Steps Taken to Better Manage Fuel Demand but 

Additional Information Sharing Mechanisms Are Needed. GAO-12-619. 

Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.

Warfighter Support: DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and 

Distribution Challenges Remain in Afghanistan. GAO-12-138. 

Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2011.

Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address 

Challenges in Supply Chain Management. GAO-11-569. Washington, 

D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Enclosure III: Future Cost 

and Sustainability of 

Afghan Security Forces

Enclosure IV: DOD 

Planning for the 

Drawdown of Equipment 

in Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 48 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, 

Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role. 

GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011.

Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress and 

Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan. 

GAO-10-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2010.

Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress and 

Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan. 

GAO-10-462C. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2010.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient 

Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. GAO-10-376. 

Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2010.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for 

the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO-10-179. Washington, D.C.: 

November 2, 2009.

Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence. GAO-11-948R. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2011.

Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. 

Assistance to Afghanistan Government. GAO-11-710. Washington, D.C.: 

July 20, 2011.

Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs. 

GAO-12-802T. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2012.

Afghanistan Governance: Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall 

Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity. 

GAO-11-907. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2011.

Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. 

Assistance to Afghanistan Government. GAO-11-710. Washington, D.C.: 

July 20, 2011.

Enclosure V: Afghanistan’s 

Donor Dependence

Enclosure VI: Oversight 

and Accountability of U.S. 

Funds to Support 

Afghanistan 
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 49 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Afghanistan Development: Agencies Could Benefit from a Shared and 

More Comprehensive Database on U.S. Efforts. GAO-13-34. Washington, 

D.C.: November 7, 2012.

Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs. 

GAO-12-802T. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2012.

Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information 

Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. GAO-12-534. 

Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012.

DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations: Actions Needed 

to Establish Project Management Guidelines and Enhance Information 

Sharing. GAO-11-715. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.

Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector 

Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination. 

GAO-11-138. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010.

Afghanistan Development: USAID Continues to Face Challenges in 

Managing and Overseeing U.S. Development Assistance Programs. 

GAO-10-932T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2010.

Afghanistan Development: Poverty and Major Crop Production 

(GAO-10-756SP), an E-Supplement to GAO-10-368. GAO-10-756SP. 

Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010.

Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance Management 

and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID’s Agricultural Programs. 

GAO-10-368. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010.

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts. 

GAO-09-1015T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and 

Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-615. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.

Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to 

Better Prepare for Future Contingencies. GAO-12-1026T. Washington, 

D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Enclosure VII: Oversight 

and Streamlining of 

Development Assistance to 

Afghanistan 

Enclosure VIII: Oversight 

of U.S. Contracts in 

Afghanistan 
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 50 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on 

Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R. 

Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency 

Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. 

GAO-12-750. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2012.

Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations 

by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

GAO-12-854R. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2012.

Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements 

Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.

Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, 

Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role. 

GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011.

Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for 

Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel. 

GAO-11-886. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011.

Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Address Contract 

Oversight and Vetting of Non-U.S. Vendors in Afghanistan. 

GAO-11-771T. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011.

Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement. 

GAO-11-355. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011.

Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address 

Systemic Challenges. GAO-11-580. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2011.

Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued 

Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and 

Associated Personnel. GAO-11-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2010.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient 

Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. GAO-10-376. 

Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2010.
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 51 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of 

Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. GAO-10-357. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2010.

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using 

Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472. 

Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts, 

Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel. 

GAO-10-509T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2010.

Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and 

Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations. 

GAO-10-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2010.

Contingency Contracting: Further Improvements Needed in Agency 

Tracking of Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

GAO-10-187. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2009.

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face 

Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. GAO-10-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize 

Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security 

Contractors. GAO-09-351. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009.

Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency 

Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. 

GAO-12-750. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2012.

Mission Iraq: State and DOD Have Not Finalized Security and Support 

Capabilities. GAO-12-759RSU. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.

Mission Iraq: State and DOD Face Challenges in Finalizing Support and 

Security Capabilities. GAO-12-856T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.

“Status of Transition to State-Led U.S. Security Assistance to Iraq.”

Sensitive but Unclassified Briefing for Job Code 320893, Washington, 

D.C.: April 2012.

Enclosure IX: Planning for 

the Future U.S. Presence 

in Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products

Page 52 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. 

Civilian Presence. GAO-12-285. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2012.
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 53 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 

Director), Thomas Costa, Julia Jebo Grant, Christopher J. Mulkins, 

Debbie Chung, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Etana Finkler, David W. 

Hancock, Brandon L. Hunt, Guy LoFaro, Anne McDonough-Hughes, 

Sharon Pickup, Jeremy Sebest, Stephen K. Woods, and Amanda G. 

Weldon made key contributions to this product.

Godwin M. Agbara, Ashley G. Alley, Pedro Almoguera, Johana R. Ayers, 

Carole F. Coffey, Teakoe Coleman, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin de 

Alteriis, Timothy J. DiNapoli, Mark Dowling, Emily Gupta, Kasea Hamar, 

Patrick Hickey, Jordan Holt, Farahnaaz Khakoo-Mausel, Joseph 

Kirschbaum, Bruce Kutnick, Drew Lindsey, Judith A. McCloskey, Tet 

Miyabara, Mary E. Moutsos, Marcus Lloyd Oliver, Nina Pfeiffer, Elizabeth 

Repko, Kendal B. Robinson, Luis E. Rodriguez, Cary B. Russell, Mona 

Sehgal, Esther Toledo, Pierre Toureille, and Sally Williamson provided 

technical assistance and additional support.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320924)
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