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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 108th Congress

1st Session

S. PRT.

2003

108–33

STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS:

STILL KEPT IN THE DARK

ABOUT HOMELAND SECURITY

R E P O R T

PREPARED BY THE

MINORITY STAFF

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

AUGUST 13, 2003
(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman

TED STEVENS, Alaska

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

JOYCE RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Minority Professional Staff Member

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Minority Counsel

AMY B. NEWHOUSE, Chief Clerk
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1

Background ....................................................................................................... 1

Recommendations ............................................................................................. 2

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5

Defining the Challenge ............................................................................................ 6

The Role of the Department of Homeland Security .............................................. 8

An Urgent Agenda For Reform: State and Local Information Needs and

How to Meet Them ............................................................................................... 11

A Place at the Table ......................................................................................... 11

Timely Threat and Watch List Information ................................................... 11

Two-Way Flow .................................................................................................. 13

Security Clearances .......................................................................................... 15

Special Case of Special Needs: Fire Fighters .................................................. 18

Threat Advisory System ................................................................................... 19

Recommendations: Repairing the Federal-Local Information Breach ................. 20

(1)

STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS: STILL KEPT IN

THE DARK ABOUT HOMELAND SECURITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

America’s safety demands that state and local officials, especially

law enforcement and public safety professionals—our front line defenders—are fully engaged in the war against terrorism. Yet almost 2 years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Governmental Affairs Committee (GAC) Minority staff found that these

officials are being asked to fight the war against terrorism with incomplete and unreliable access to one of the most potent weapons

in the homeland security arsenal: information.

State and local first responders and first preventers still do not

systematically receive from the Bush Administration the information they need to prevent or respond to another catastrophic terrorist attack, nor does vital information flow effectively from them

to the federal government. These information gaps pose a significant challenge for the federal government and leaves the American

people at unacceptable risk.

This report contains the results of a staff investigation conducted

at the request of Senator Joe Lieberman, Ranking Member of the

Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Lieberman asked GAC

Minority staff to review the information needs of state and local officials and assess the progress of the Bush Administration in meeting those needs. Staff interviewed officials on the front lines in the

fight against terrorism, while also reviewing reports, hearings, and

other public information.

State and local officials told staff that what they want most is

to have a seat at the table as the administration grapples with

homeland security protection. They need reliable and timely information about terrorist threats, individuals on federal terrorist

watch lists, and investigations of suspected terrorists in their jurisdictions. Several officials told staff there is currently no effective

mechanism for allowing hundreds of thousands of local law enforcement officials to systematically provide information to, or receive

information from, the federal government. And, the federal government has barely even acknowledged the information needs of our

nation’s local fire fighters. This is extremely troublesome, especially

because fire fighters nationwide are most communities first line of

defense against conventional, chemical, radiological, and biological

attacks.
2

State and local officials also expressed frustration with the time

it takes for them to receive security clearances necessary for access

to classified information. And they believe that changes are needed

in the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System—a key

piece of the federal government’s strategy to communicate with

state and local officials, as well as the public, about terrorist

threats.

Information that allows state and local officials to deter, prevent,

mitigate, prepare, and if necessary respond to acts of terrorism—

homeland security information—is difficult to quantify or define because it includes many different categories of information that is

of varying interest to a host of different state and local officials. It

ranges from publicly available information—for example about

available federal resources to bolster homeland defenses—to highly

classified intelligence information about terrorists available only to

those with appropriate security clearances. Yet, understanding and

systematically fulfilling these varying information needs—while

also ensuring that state and local officials can provide information

to the federal government—is crucial to our homeland defense.

The commitment has been made on paper. The administration’s

‘‘National Strategy on Homeland Security’’ released in July 2002

included information sharing and systems as one of ‘‘four foundations’’ of homeland security success. And several provisions in the

Homeland Security Act of 2002 establish Congress’ intent to create

a new paradigm of information sharing between the federal government and state and local agencies and officials.

But the Bush Administration’s rhetoric about making information sharing and systems a key to homeland security success has

not translated into the kind of aggressive actions necessary to fundamentally change the status quo and protect the American people.

The result of this lack of leadership is that many state and local

officials—who also often lack the funding, training, and technology

to counter terrorism—are left, if not entirely blind, straining to see

the terrorist threat and how to respond to it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Bush Administration must act now and forge an effective

partnership with state and local officials. It must provide the aggressive leadership necessary to replace state and local officials’

blindfolds with binoculars and to provide them with a seat at the

homeland security table. Implementing the following recommendations will facilitate the information sharing necessary to create

such a partnership:

1. Make Consolidated Federal Watch Lists Available to

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies

The President should immediately issue an Executive Order to

consolidate terrorism watch lists; the Department of Homeland Security should oversee the consolidation of all federal terrorism

watch lists and provide state and local law enforcement officials

the ability to check names against a consolidated list by the end

of this year. Sufficient resources must be made available, and senior officials held accountable for getting the job done.
3

2. Build Information Bridges Between States and Localities

DHS should encourage the creation of national and regional task

forces (including multi-state task forces) as necessary (over the

next year) to coordinate information sharing needs, bringing together state and local officials, including fire fighters, emergency

management professionals, and police officers, as well as federal officials. These Task Forces should provide state and local officials a

permanent ‘‘seat at the table’’ to ensure that information needs are

addressed at all levels. DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination should also create a best practice database allowing localities to share and compare solutions to homeland security problems.

3. Overhaul the Security Clearance Process

Provide the resources necessary to expedite security clearances

for designated state and local officials—including appropriate fire

officials—as nominated by governors and approved by DHS. Immediately assess the feasibility of requiring agencies to proactively

recognize clearances issued by others for state and local officials,

unless there are compelling security or law enforcement reasons

not to do so. Establish a task force to review the security clearance

process for state and local officials and report back in 6 months on

ways to modernize it so that it meets the nation’s needs in the war

against terrorism.

4. Create In-State 24-Hour Command Centers

Expedite the establishment of 24-hour operations centers in each

state to provide connectivity and information sharing between the

nation’s 650,000 local law enforcement officers and federal agencies.

5. Refine the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System

Immediately refine the Threat Advisory System to provide state

and local officials specific information about terrorist threats and

detailed guidance on how to respond to those threats. Put in place

secure communications systems to inform key homeland security

officials across the country of changes in the alert level and other

information so they can start putting in place heightened protective

measures.

6. Sharpen the DHS Office of State and Local Government

Coordination (OSLGC)

Immediately equip OSLGC adequately and task it with overseeing state and local information sharing issues. The OSLGC

must make it a priority to ensure that DHS and other federal agencies meet the information needs of state and local officials.

7. Judge Federal Officials Based on How Well They Share

Information

Immediately revise federal agencies’ performance management

systems to reward information sharing. Senior officials should be

evaluated, in part, on their success or failure in breaking down barriers to sharing information. Bonuses should be dependent, in part,

upon making measurable progress in improving information shar-
4

ing systems and processes, and special awards should be given to

employees who demonstrate exemplary leadership and results in

overcoming obstacles to sharing homeland security information.

8. Make Sharing Homeland Security Information a Top Priority

Immediately make sharing homeland security information with

state and local officials a high priority for DHS and other key agencies; assign the Deputy Secretaries or Chief Operating Officers responsibility for overseeing implementation, monitoring, and reporting on agency progress.
5

1George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, introductory letter, July 2002.

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat-strat-hls.pdf) 2 Council on Foreign Relations, America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger, October 2002, at

2. (http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland—TF.pdf)

INTRODUCTION

Since September 11, 2001, a consensus has emerged that to successfully defend against terrorism, federal agencies and officials

must much more effectively share homeland security information

with their state and local counterparts and receive from the ‘‘front

lines’’ the vital information only those state and local officials can

provide.

Numbers alone illustrate the need for successful collaboration.

Some 11 million law enforcement officials and first responders—police officers, firefighters, public health professionals, emergency

medical technicians, and others—are spread throughout America,

with advanced training, intimate knowledge of their communities,

and their ears always to the ground. In contrast, far fewer federal

personnel are involved in homeland security. Many of these federal

personnel—some 170,000—now work for the new Department of

Homeland Security (DHS); approximately 11,500 work as FBI

agents. But relatively few federal employees are ‘‘on the beat,’’ day

after day, and in a nation this size, they constitute nowhere near

the army needed to defend against the enemy in this unprecedented war on our home front. To the extent that we have a homeland security army, the overwhelming majority of foot soldiers on

the front lines are from state and local governments.

The homeland security information they need is difficult to define precisely, or to quantify, because it includes many different

categories of information that is of varying interest to a host of different state and local officials. It ranges from publicly available information—for example about available federal resources—to highly classified intelligence information available only to those with

appropriate security clearances. It could be information about ‘‘best

practices’’ in a given homeland security area that should be widely

shared among elected officials, or sensitive, yet unclassified information of primary interest to law enforcement officials. Understanding and systematically fulfilling these varying information

needs is crucial to homeland defense.

The Bush Administration does appear to be aware of the problem. In his letter accompanying the release of The National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002, President Bush states:

‘‘This is a national strategy, not a federal strategy.’’1 The strategy

identifies ‘‘information sharing and systems’’ as one of four foundations essential to its success.

Despite this recognition, however, real progress has been slow. In

October 2002, a non-partisan task force on homeland security sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and led by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman released its final report,

‘‘America Still Unprepared, Still in Danger.’’ It warned that

650,000 state and local law enforcement officers ‘‘continue to operate in a virtual intelligence vacuum, without access to terrorist

watch lists provided by the U.S. Department of State to immigration and consular officials.’’ 2
6

Because America’s safety demands that state and local officials

are fully engaged as quickly as possible in the fight against terrorism, Senator Lieberman asked staff for the GAC Minority to review the information needs of state and local officials and the

progress the Bush Administration was making in meeting those

needs. GAC staff subsequently interviewed officials who are on the

front lines in the fight against terrorism, and reviewed reports,

hearings, and other public information.

It quickly became clear that most police officers, fire fighters,

and other first responders and first preventers continue to operate

without the information they need from the federal government

and have yet to be fully integrated into the President’s recommended ‘‘national strategy’’ for homeland security. Though some

progress has been made, the Bush Administration’s stated commitment to making information sharing and systems one of its four

foundations of homeland security success has thus far not been

matched by the kind of action necessary to fundamentally change

the status quo.

A considerable amount of attention is necessarily focused, at the

moment, on establishing information sharing systems within DHS.

The administration faces a tremendous challenge integrating information systems and sharing information just among the agencies

being merged into the Department. However, this is not an ‘‘either/

or’’ challenge. Federal agencies, led by DHS, must simultaneously

and aggressively forge a new culture, along with effective processes

and systems, for sharing information with state and local officials.

But thus far, the leadership necessary to fully bridge some crucial

information gaps has not been forthcoming.

The result of this lack of leadership by senior officials in the administration is that many state and local officials—who also all too

often lack the funding, training, and technology to counter terrorism—are left, if not entirely blind, straining to see the terrorist

threat and how best to respond to it.

DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

To defeat an enemy that operates on and targets our home soil,

information must swiftly and reliably flow downstream from federal agencies to those officials in states and local communities who

can act upon it. It must flow up—from states and localities to federal officials. It must move sideways—from states and localities to

other states and localities that need vital information. And, at the

same time, it must flow horizontally among the numerous federal

agencies with homeland security responsibilities.

The reluctance of the federal intelligence community to allow information specific to the attacks of September 11, 2001 to flow

downstream has been well documented. In December 2002, the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry (Joint Inquiry),

stated:

Serious problems in information sharing . . . persisted,

prior to September 11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies.

This included other federal agencies as well as state and
7

3Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Final Report—Part 1, December 10, 2002, at 8. 4Markle Foundation, Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age, A Report of the

Markle Foundation Task Force, October 2002, at 70. (Http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle—Full—Report.pdf) (Hereinafter ‘‘A Report of the Markle Foundation Task

Force.’’) 5Governor James Gilmore, Testimony, Consolidating Intelligence Analysis: A Review of the

President’s Proposal to Create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, Hearing Before the Governmental Affairs Committee, (S. Hrg. 108–54), February 14, 2003, at 20 (Printed Hearing Record

Pending). (Hereinafter ‘‘Gilmore testimony, GAC Hearing, February 14, 2003.’’) 6 International Association of Chiefs of Police Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit, Report

Draft, March 2002, at 5.

local authorities. This lack of communication and collaboration deprived those other entities, as well as the Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable information in the ‘‘war’’ against Bin Ladin.3

An October 2002 report, ‘‘Protecting America’s Freedom in the

Information Age,’’ prepared by a task force organized by the Markle

Foundation, made clear that many months after the September 11

attacks, such problems still persisted:

Several federal agencies have relationships with state and

local actors: the FBI and other federal law enforcement

agencies communicate regularly with law enforcement personnel; FEMA has ties to state and local first responders;

the Department of Health and Human Services interacts

with the public health community. But sharing is ad hoc

and inconsistent. The local entities often do not know what

to share or with what federal agency they should share it.

federal agencies often resist sharing information with state

and local entities because of concerns about operational security and the potential for leaks.4

Cultural obstacles reinforce structural ones. At a GAC hearing on

February 14, 2003, former Virginia Governor James Gilmore, who

chairs the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, cited a

‘‘supreme and total distrust by the federal government authorities

of the states and locals. The idea of sharing sensitive information

with a police chief of a major jurisdiction or the governor of a state

is anathema,’’ said Gilmore. ‘‘Progress is being made, but they are

trying to break a cultural barrier and it is going to require dramatic leadership at the executive and congressional level to make

that happen.’’ 5

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has also

called attention to the anti-sharing cultures in federal agencies,

and reports more specifically:

In some cases real, and in others only perceived, the hierarchical organization of law enforcement and intelligence

agencies . . . leads to organizational incentives against intelligence sharing and even anti-sharing cultures. At best,

the disaggregation of activity means that managers in one

agency might not imagine that others would find their intelligence data useful. At worst, the structure creates an

‘‘us’’ versus ‘‘them’’ mentality that stands in the way of

productive collaboration.6
8

7 A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, at 11.

8 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 102(c). In addition to this requirement, Executive Order 13228

which established the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001 requires the Office to ‘‘coordinate the strategy of the executive branch for communicating with the public in the event

of a terrorist threat or attack within the United States. The Office also shall coordinate the development of programs for educating the public about the nature of terrorist threats and appropriate precautions and responses.’’ (Executive Order 13228, Sec. 3(i) (October 8, 2001), 66 Fed.

Reg. 51812 (October 10, 2001)). 9 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 801. 10 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 892. The Homeland Security Act recognizes the disparate and

complex requirements for information in the fight against terrorism. Sec. 892(b)(1) states:

‘‘Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community, shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland security information with Federal agencies and appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information may be shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with assessClearly, the Bush Administration must provide the aggressive

leadership necessary for federal, state, and local governments to

meet the challenge of sharing homeland security information with

those who need it to secure our nation. As the Markle report noted,

the intelligence and other information critical to homeland security

‘‘will come from across the country and around the world,’’ and

while Washington, D.C. is a ‘‘critical node in that network,’’ it is

‘‘only one of many.’’ The report states: ‘‘To bring together this farflung community of analysts and operators working directly on the

problem is the real challenge.’’ 7 It is a challenge from which we

must not shrink.

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY

In passing the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–296)

(HSA or Act), Congress recognized the need for focused, sustained,

and committed leadership to build better bridges between the federal government and state and local officials. The Act charges the

Secretary of Homeland Security with facilitating the sharing of information between the federal government, state and local government personnel, and the private sector.8

Three specific mandates in the Act are particularly relevant.

First, the HSA establishes an Office of State and Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) in the Office of the Secretary and

makes it responsible for: coordinating the activities of the Department relating to state and local government; assessing and advocating for the resources needed by state and local government to

implement the national strategy; providing state and local government with regular information, research, and technical support;

and developing a process for receiving meaningful input from state

and local government to assist the development of the national

strategy.9

Second, the HSA requires the President to prescribe and implement procedures for federal agencies to share homeland security

information with other agencies—including DHS—and with appropriate state and local personnel. These procedures are to address

both classified and unclassified information. Each federal agency is

required to designate one official to administer these provisions.

The President is required to report to Congress on the implementation of these procedures, with recommendations to increase the effectiveness of sharing information between federal, state, and local

entities, not later than November 25, 2003.10 The Bush Adminis-
9

ments of the credibility of such information.’’ Sec. 892(b)(2) further provides that each information system shall ‘‘(A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information,

though the procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the capability to

restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of organization, position of a recipient within an organization, or a recipient’s need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel.’’ 11 Executive Order 13311, ‘‘Homeland Security Information Sharing,’’ (July 29, 2003) assigns

to the Secretary of Homeland Security most of the President’s responsibilities under Section 892

of the Act. Other functions are delegated to the Attorney General and the Director of Central

Intelligence. 68 Fed. Reg. 45149 (July 31, 2003); see also http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030729–10.html. 12 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 201(d)(8) and (9). The Act makes the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection responsible, among other things, for reviewing,

analyzing, and making ‘‘recommendations for improvements in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement information, intelligence information, intelligence-related

information, and other information relating to homeland security within the federal government

and between the federal government and state and local government agencies and authorities.’’

The Under Secretary is also responsible for disseminating, ‘‘as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the Department to other agencies of the federal government

with responsibilities relating to homeland security, and to agencies of state and local governments and private sector entities with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence,

prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.’’ 13 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 201(d)(16). 14Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Final Report—Recommendations, December 10, 2002, at 4. The Joint Inquiry recommended that Congress and the

Administration ‘‘ensure the full development within the Department of Homeland Security of

an effective all-source terrorism fusion center that will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counter terrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence

information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community.’’

tration first issued an Executive Order delegating responsibility for

prescribing the required procedures on July 29, 2003—9 months

after the Act was passed, and 3 months before it is to report on

its progress to the Congress.11

Finally, the HSA also charges the intelligence unit within DHS

with broad responsibilities for sharing homeland security information. These include: making recommendations to improve information sharing; administering the Homeland Security Advisory System; exercising primary responsibility for public advisories related

to threats to homeland security; and providing advice about appropriate protective measures and counter measures to state and local

government agencies and authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public.

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) of the new Department was created specifically to establish a central location to integrate, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information related to terrorist threats across all levels

of government, especially including state and local governments.12

The HSA also makes the IAIP responsible for ‘‘coordinating training and other support to the elements and personnel of the Department, other agencies of the federal government, state and local governments that provide information to the Department, or are consumers of information provided by the Department, in order to facilitate the identification and sharing of information revealed in

their ordinary duties and the optimal utilization of information received from the Department.’’ 13

Rather than follow the mandate of the HSA and the recommendation of the Joint Inquiry to create an all-sources intelligence center within DHS,14 the administration has created a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) that reports to the Director

of Central Intelligence. Senator Lieberman, among others, has
10

15 Joseph I. Lieberman, letter to Secretary Tom Ridge, July 1, 2003. 16Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, at 57. See

also General Accounting Office, GAO–03–715T, Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, testimony of Robert F. Dacey and Randolph C. Hite Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, May 8,

2003, at 25–26 (discussing the information-sharing responsibilities for DHS identified by each

of the national strategy documents).

strongly criticized this decision for yielding to current cultural barriers rather than challenging them—and expressed concern that

this arrangement may reinforce, rather than break down, information sharing walls with state and local officials. In a letter to President Bush on April 29, 2003, Lieberman wrote: ‘‘The fundamental

problem is that by placing the TTIC under the command of the

Central Intelligence Agency and not the Department of Homeland

Security, it will be removed from our government’s daily efforts to

improve domestic defenses, constrained by cultural and institutional rivalries between the CIA and the FBI, isolated from state

and local governments, and unaccountable to the nation’s top

homeland security official.’’

Secretary Ridge defended the administration’s decisions relative

to TTIC in a letter dated June 17, 2003—but, among other issues,

he failed to adequately address one of Senator Lieberman’s key

concerns: as constituted, the TTIC, under the Director of Central

Intelligence, would not effectively incorporate state and local law

enforcement into anti-terror intelligence activities. In a response,

Senator Lieberman noted that one of the primary lessons from the

September 11, 2001 attacks is that individuals outside the intelligence community, and even outside the federal government,

might hold crucial pieces to the terrorist puzzle. He added, ‘‘we will

have a much better chance of stopping attacks if the threat analysis center effectively integrates and utilizes the knowledge, skills,

and information of those [including state and local law enforcement] outside the intelligence community.’’ 15 The provisions in the

HSA demonstrate Congress’ intent to create a new paradigm of information sharing between the federal government, state, local

agencies, and officials.

In addition to the HSA, the President’s National Strategy for

Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space,

and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also acknowledge the importance of

information sharing and identify key responsibilities for DHS. For

example, the National Strategy for Homeland Security cites the

need for DHS to ‘‘integrate information sharing across state and

local governments, private industry, and citizens.’’ 16

To solve these information challenges, federal officials must be

held accountable for overcoming traditional thinking that places

federal agencies at the top of the hierarchal organizational pyramid

with non-federal agencies viewed as untrustworthy or otherwise

not suited to be full partners in the effort to secure the nation. Organizational incentives against intelligence sharing must be swiftly

identified and discarded. Perhaps most important, as Congress

clearly intended, the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other senior administration officials must provide the

leadership necessary to ensure that barriers to sharing information

are systematically overcome.
11

17Staff Interview with Timothy Lowenberg, Adjutant General State of Washington, February

25, 2003 (‘‘Lowenberg February 2003 Interview’’). 18Staff Interview with John Skinner, Director, Intelligence Section, Baltimore Police Department, February 12, 2003 (‘‘Skinner Interview’’); Staff Interview with Karen Walton, Chief Operating Officer and other officials, New Haven, CT, March 5, 2003 (‘‘Walton Interview’’); Staff

Interview with Benjamin Barnes, Director, Office of Public Safety, Health and Welfare, Stamford, CT, March 7, 2003. 19Gerald R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Police Executive Research Forum, Protecting

Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series, March

2003, at 7.

AN URGENT AGENDA FOR REFORM: STATE AND LOCAL

INFORMATION NEEDS AND HOW TO MEET THEM

A Place at the Table

Governors, mayors, county officials, law enforcement officers, fire

officials, medical, emergency management officials, and public

health officials have general information needs in common, but also

many demands that diverge significantly. For this reason, the Secretary must first and foremost ensure that state and local officials

are fully included in the Department’s decisionmaking process. Indeed, state and local officials told us that what they want most is

to have a seat at the table as the administration grapples with

homeland security protection.

For example, Major General Timothy Lowenberg, the Adjutant

General of the State of Washington and the state’s homeland security director, said that while he was included in discussions that

helped shape the initial, broad national homeland security strategy

(which the administration released in July 2002), he had not been

consulted in the development of subsequent strategies on physical

infrastructure security and cyber security, which were released in

February 2003. Expressing a common refrain among those interviewed by Committee staff, Lowenberg said, ‘‘The only way the procedures [for information sharing] will be meaningful is if they bring

us in.’’ 17

‘‘Bringing them in’’ means more than occasional conference calls

or interaction with federal officials based on personal relationships.

State and local homeland security professionals interviewed by

GAC staff emphasized the need for systematic and institutionalized

communication and cooperation with federal officials. Yet these officials—especially law enforcement officers—more often credited

personal relationships with federal officials (where they existed)

rather than any well-developed system for sharing information

with facilitating their exchange of information with the federal government to date.18 This is consistent with the findings of a November 2002 forum of federal and state law enforcement officials convened by the Police Executive Research Forum, a non-profit organization of law enforcement professionals. Participants in the forum

‘‘acknowledged that barriers to information exchange exist in all

law enforcement agencies, and at every level,’’ and emphasized the

importance of making information sharing strategies intrinsic to

organizations, not based on personal relationships.19

Timely Threat and Watch List Information

Localities and states need reliable and timely information about

terrorist threats, about individuals on federal terrorist watch lists,
12

20Staff Interview with Ralph Ogden, Sheriff, Yuma County, Arizona, February 24, 2003

(‘‘Ogden Interview’’). 21Staff Interview with David Huffman, Sheriff, Catawba County, North Carolina, February

25, 2003. 22Lowenberg February 2003 Interview, note 17 above. 23Staff Interview with Timothy Lowenberg, Adjutant General State of Washington, May 20,

2003 (‘‘Lowenberg May 2003 Interview’’). 24General Accounting Office, GAO–03–322, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists

Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, April 2003, at 3. (Hereinafter ‘‘GAO Report, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to

Promote Better Integration and Sharing’’)

as well as about the investigations of suspected terrorists within

their jurisdictions.

Local law enforcement officials with whom GAC staff spoke described examples of being left out of the intelligence and information loop. Sheriff Ralph Ogden of Yuma County, Arizona, said he

receives far too little information from federal intelligence on

threats to specific targets or facilities in his jurisdiction.20 Sheriff

David Huffman of Catawba County, North Carolina told staff: ‘‘We

need the details of the particular incident that caused the [terrorist

threat] alert to be given in the first place.’’ 21

Major General Lowenberg of Washington State told GAC staff

that he too lacked sufficient intelligence and threat information

from the federal government.22 Just as importantly, Lowenberg explained that state public health officials especially lack secure

methods to communicate with the federal government. For example, he explained that, were the Centers for Disease Control or the

Plum Island Animal Disease Center to confirm the presence of a

plague, there would be no way to communicate that information to

states except through open source, unsecured transmission methods. He said that, to date, there simply has been ‘‘no provision’’—

in terms of prioritization or resource allocation—for a secure communications infrastructure to share information about such biothreats with public health officials.23

Some of the most vital streams of information to which state and

local officials are not now privy are the 12 terrorism watch lists

separately maintained by the State Department and 8 other federal

agencies. Watch lists are basically automated databases—supported by analytical capabilities—that contain a wide variety of

identifying data such as name, date of birth, and biographical data

about suspected terrorists.24 When utilized effectively, watch lists

can be effective tools to keep terrorists out of our country or find

them once they are inside our borders. In fact, we know today that

2 of the 19 September 11 hijackers should have been placed on the

watch list as long as 20 months before the attacks.

However, as these databases are currently constituted, local officials cannot efficiently access them to detect potential terrorists

once they may be within America’s borders. The reason is simple:

nearly 2 years after September 11, the Bush Administration has

yet to consolidate and integrate the watch lists maintained by different agencies, much less systematically share the information on

them with appropriate state and local officials. Consequently, when

making routine stops, police officers cannot search a consolidated

federal watch list to determine whether an individual is suspected

of terrorism.
13

25George Tenet, written testimony, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks,

June 18, 2002, at 19, and October 17, 2002, at 18. (Testimony available in the Governmental

Affairs Committee files.) 26GAO Report, Information Technology, Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, note 24 above, at 17. 27Ogden Interview, note 20 above.

In an April 2003 briefing on the efforts to consolidate the information on these lists and make them available to local law enforcement agencies, GAC staff was informed that the administration

has yet to even make a formal policy decision to consolidate the

lists—despite the fact that CIA Director George Tenet testified to

Congress twice, in June and October of last year, that a national

watch list center was being created that would correct the failures

and lapses of the past.25

An April 30, 2003 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO)

confirmed the lack of progress. GAO said that much of the data

contained in the watch lists is still not being shared among federal

agencies, much less with state and local law enforcement agencies.

GAO found that terrorist watch lists compiled by nine federal agencies are frequently incompatible with one another and cannot be

merged or compared easily. In addition, GAO stated that the agencies reported that they received no direction from the White House

Office of Homeland Security identifying the needs of the government as a whole in this area. As a result, ‘‘Federal agencies do not

have a consistent and uniform approach to sharing watch list information.’’ 26 In July 2003, a senior administration official reported

to GAC Minority staff that there had been no progress towards consolidating the watch lists.

To protect the American people, state and local officials need access to this information—and from a single source. For example,

Sheriff Ogden said he needs a ‘‘clearinghouse for federal databases,

a one-stop-shop’’ where he can get information about deportations,

prosecutions, and apprehensions by the Border Patrol. Now, he and

other local law enforcement officials around the country have to try

and access many different databases. However, they need the ability to find out immediately if someone who has been stopped in

their jurisdiction is of interest to other agencies.27

Two-Way Flow

Local officials can and must be much more than recipients of information. Our 650,000 law enforcement officers nationwide should

be leveraged by the federal intelligence and law enforcement authorities as hunters and gatherers of intelligence—as ‘‘force-multipliers.’’ After all, these local officials know the people and

vulnerabilities within their communities; they know the norms and

consequently understand what is not normal; and they encounter

individuals during routine activities that may also be of legitimate

interest to federal agencies. Any successful information sharing

strategy, therefore, must focus both on pushing vital counter terrorism intelligence and information quickly and effectively upstream from the thousands of state and local officials to the feds,

as it does sending data downstream.
14

28Staff Interview with James Kallstrom, Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism to the Governor of New York, February 27, 2003 (‘‘Kallstrom Interview’’). 29 Id.

Yet, several officials told us there is currently no effective mechanism allowing hundreds of thousands of local law enforcement officials to systematically provide information to or receive information

from the federal government. To fix this serious flaw, in February

Senator Lieberman called for the establishment of a 24-hour operations center in each state that would serve as a conduit for sending information from local officials to the federal government and

back—a suggestion made by James Kallstrom, formerly a 28-year

veteran of the FBI and currently Senior Executive Vice President

at MBNA Bank America and Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism

to the Governor of New York. Kallstrom contends that the vast majority of the nation’s local law enforcement officers ‘‘are virtually

not a part of the war against terrorism.’’ 28

To facilitate communication with local law enforcement, the FBI

has established some 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)

around the country, which typically consist of representatives of

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies working together

to deter, counter, or respond to acts of terrorism. The JTTFs play

an important role in allowing law enforcement information to be

exchanged and investigations to be coordinated across different jurisdictions and levels of government. However, GAC staff was informed by some officials that while JTTFs are useful, they do not

provide information to many state and local law enforcement officials who are critical in the war against terrorism. JTTFs are not

helpful to many of the police officers who must be engaged in combating terrorism because the classified information JTTFs handle

cannot be shared with those who lack security clearances; and systems to declassify, where appropriate, and share the information

are not in place.

For example, in New York State, JTTFs include about 250 police

officers. However, approximately 69,000 others are not part of the

task forces. Kallstrom believes that we need to ‘‘train and provide

relevant information to the rest of the cops.’’ He said that nationally, ‘‘we’re not asking or tasking or allowing 99.9% of police to

have any impact in counter terrorism.’’ 29

The federal government must also take steps to facilitate the

flow of homeland security information among other jurisdictions.

Terrorist attacks pay no heed to distinctions or boundaries between

state and local jurisdictions. However, to protect the public, state

and local governments must overcome walls of separation among

themselves. For example, Major General William Cugno, the Adjutant General of Connecticut who has lead agency responsibility for

developing and coordinating counter terrorism and domestic preparedness for the state, said that even though Connecticut is next

to New York, there is currently no forum where officials of the two

states can systematically share emergency operations and management information. Although both states participate in and share information through national organizations, such as the National

Emergency Management Association and the Adjutant General’s

Association, Cugno said more direct participation and interaction is

lacking. He noted, for example, that while Connecticut would be
15

30Staff Interview with William Cugno, Adjutant General State of Connecticut, May 29, 2003. 31 A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, note 4 above, at 51. 32 Id., at 75. 33Staff Interview with Jack Weiss, Los Angeles City Councilman, February 5, 2003. Some of

the other officials with whom GAC staff spoke noted that some best practices information was

already being collected by disparate organizations, including police and firefighters’ associations

and the National Governors Association’s Center for Best Practices. OSLGC could play an important role in pulling this information together in one place. 34Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Research Service, Access to Classified Information: Seeking Security Clearances for State and Local Officials and Personnel, Government Information

Quarterly, forthcoming Summer 2003. (Hereinafter ‘‘Frederick M. Kaiser, CRS, Access to Classified Information’’).

greatly affected by an evacuation of New York City, there are no

coordinated efforts, resources, or requirements that would include

Connecticut in New York’s evacuation planning.30 With over 50,000

state and local jurisdictions in America, the task of coordinating

various domestic defense information requirements demands strong

federal leadership.

The Markle Foundation recommends establishing task forces

that include ‘‘all key actors from the federal, state and local governments and the private sector to facilitate local, real and virtual

communities’’ and a central leadership role for the DHS.31 The report states:

First, states must begin organizing themselves to gather

and share information more effectively. Second, the federal

government needs one entity responsible for coordinating

its role in this effort. . . . There currently is no coordinated strategy in the federal government for interaction

with state and local entities.32

A critical need is for mechanisms to ensure that state and local

jurisdictions do not waste precious time and resources by unnecessarily reinventing the wheel. For example, Jack Weiss, a Los Angeles City Councilman, told GAC staff that local officials are often

left to figure out complex homeland security challenges without the

benefit of knowing what is happening in other areas. He believes

OSLGC at DHS should help overcome this challenge by actively facilitating the sharing of best practices.33

Security Clearances

The challenge of sharing homeland security information with

state and local officials cannot be met without dramatic changes in

the procedures the government now uses to grant security clearances. The security clearance process—designed to determine access on a need-to-know basis to classified national security information—has been focused mostly on federal employees, applicants,

and contractors. Until now, state and local officials haven’t had a

significant place in the process. But the war on terrorism has

changed the landscape. According to the Congressional Research

Service (CRS), addressing this new situation means providing official security clearances for non-federal officials and elected public

officials at any level as standard policy, requirements that are ‘‘unprecedented in their scope.’’ 34 A report by CRS explains:

Because of the absence of standardized security clearance

requirements, high-ranking state and local public officials—mayors, municipal chiefs of police, county execu-
16

35 Id. 36 National Governors Association, NGA Center for Best Practices, States Homeland Security

Priorities, Issue Brief, August 9, 2002, at 2. 37 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 891(a)(5) and (6). 38 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 892(c)(1) and (2). 39Governor James Gilmore, Testimony, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House

Permanent Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry, October 1, 2002, unpublished transcript at

135. (Testimony available in the Governmental Affairs Committee files.)

tives, sheriffs, and even governors, in some instances—

have been denied certain information; and those who have

received it may not have been able to share it with their

colleagues, even officials who otherwise outranked or supervise them. This condition has existed, in large part, because their need for classified national security information has been narrow and circumscribed—confined, for instance, to nuclear weapons facilities or certain defense establishments within their jurisdictions. The heightened

priority to combat terrorism, by contrast, has broadened

the boundaries.35

The National Governors Association’s Center for Best Practices

has also cited the need for expanded access to information, stating:

‘‘Governors and other high-ranking officials must receive timely

and critical intelligence related to terrorist threats. Granting security clearances to certain state and local personnel using a compartmented, need-to-know system would facilitate securing sharing

of critical intelligence.’’36

Congress recognized this necessity in the HSA, which states,

‘‘The needs of state and local personnel to have access to relevant

homeland security information to combat terrorism must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected status of such information and to protect the source and methods used to acquire such

information.’’ The HSA notes that granting security clearances to

certain state and local personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information regarding specific terrorist threats among federal, state, and local levels of government.37 The Act requires the

President to prescribe procedures under which federal agencies

may share classified homeland security information with appropriate state and local personnel, and expresses the sense of the

Congress that such procedures may include ‘‘carrying out security

clearance investigations with respect to appropriate State and local

personnel.’’ 38

GAC staff interviews with state and local officials revealed their

continuing frustration over the lack of security clearances and

therefore, their limited access to classified information.

The problem has reached as high as governors’ mansions. Former

Virginia Governor Gilmore testified at a Joint Inquiry hearing on

October 1, 2002 that, in his 4 years as Governor (1998–2002), he

never received any intelligence or law enforcement information regarding terrorists and never received a security clearance that

would have allowed him to be briefed on possible terrorist plots.39

A leading emergency management official in one state provided

a stark example of why urgent change is needed: a critical private

sector asset whose disruption by terrorists would cause tremendous

damage to the nation is located in his state. He is aware of this

because he has the appropriate security clearances. Yet, the official
17

40Staff Interview with Emergency Management Official, February 2003. 41Lowenberg May 2003 Interview, note 23 above. 42Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Research Service Memorandum, Security Clearance Program: An Overview, February 27, 2003, at 10. 43Pasquale J. D’Amuro, Testimony, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, Consolidating Intelligence Analysis: A Review of the President’s Proposal to Create a Terrorist Threat

Integration Center, (S. Hrg. 108–54) February 26, 2003, at 58 (Printed Hearing Record Pending).

was not able to inform the governor of the vulnerability because

more than a year and a half after being elected to office, the governor was still awaiting appropriate clearances.40

The security clearance gaps frustrate common-sense efforts to

safeguard significant vulnerabilities. According to Major General

Timothy Lowenberg, the Adjutant General of Washington State,

even if he were to receive classified information about a bio-threat,

he would not be allowed to share it with the top public health official in his state because that official does not have the required security clearances. He also noted the irony that, while the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has funded equipment for

secure audio, video, and data communications in state emergency

operations centers, as well as installed secure equipment for governors, in many cases the equipment cannot be used because too

few state emergency management officials have clearances.41

As noted earlier, an important link between state and local law

enforcement is the FBI’s JTTFs. But their usefulness is limited because governors, mayors, attorneys general, many other law enforcement officers, fire fighters, and others who sometimes need access to classified information are typically not included in JTTFs.

Another problem is how quickly and efficiently the clearances are

approved. For years, the security clearance approval process has

been beset by bureaucratic complexity and delays which now frustrate the ability of federal officials to leverage the strengths of

state and local law enforcement, and vice versa. Reports by CRS,

the GAO, the Department of Defense Inspector General, and others

have documented a host of concerns, including: a sizeable and

growing backlog in background investigations; substantial and rising costs in time and resources associated with such investigations;

failure to comply with investigative standards; duplications and

delay in adjudications; and continued outdated and disjointed governing authorities and the resulting confusion for both administrators and applicants.42

The Bush Administration asserts that it is making progress in

clearing up the backlog of security clearance applications. For example, at a February 26, 2003 GAC hearing, Pasquale J. D’Amuro,

Executive Assistant Director of the FBI for Counterterrorism, said

that the Bureau had received over 1,200 requests for Top Secret

level security clearances from state and local law enforcement officers and approved 936 of them for officers working in the Bureau’s

JTTFs.43 Governors have also now signed non-disclosure agreements with DHS, allowing them to receive certain classified information over secure equipment that has been installed using grants

from FEMA. FEMA is also working on clearances for state homeland security advisors.

However, much more remains to be done. For example, many

state and local officials do not realize—until learning it through

difficult experience—that a high-level clearance issued by one fed-
18

44Murphy and Plotkin, Police Executive Research Forum Report, March 2003, at 22. 45Mitt Romney, written testimony, Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, Investing in

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing State and Local Governments, (S. Hrg. 108–83), May 15,

2003, at 9. (Printed Hearing Record Pending) 46Staff Interview with Peter Gorman, Captain, Fire Department of New York, February 26,

2003.

eral agency does not mean that the individual is cleared for all

agencies. A March 2003 report by the Police Executive Research

Forum cited the example of one local official who had two federal

security clearances, but not one from the FBI. As a result, the FBI

would not share classified information with him. Another executive

had a Top Secret clearance from the National Guard, but only a Secret clearance from the FBI. The report did note that, as a result

of the session, participants learned ‘‘that is it possible to have one

federal agency transfer its security clearance to another federal

agency immediately if the applicant makes a request.’’ 44

At a May 15, 2003 GAC hearing, Governor Mitt Romney of Massachusetts recommended that security clearances be standardized—perhaps within DHS—and made reciprocal between agencies

and levels of government. Romney also recommended that the process for federal security clearances should be expedited.45 Clearly

far too little, if any, progress has been made on these recommendations.

Special Case of Special Needs: Fire Fighters

GAC staff found that the federal government has barely even acknowledged the information needs of our nation’s local fire fighters.

This is extremely troubling, especially because fire departments nationwide are most communities’ first line of defense against conventional, chemical, radiological, and biological attacks; many of their

needs for advanced equipment and training also have not been met;

and budgetary strains are stretching the personnel and resources

of these departments thinner than ever.

Peter Gorman, a captain in the Fire Department of New York,

pointed out that while fire fighters are often the first of the first

responders to arrive after an incident, they are typically not

brought into the information loop until after they are called upon

to respond. Gorman used the example of a potential attack with a

‘‘dirty bomb’’ or the release of poison gas in a subway: if intelligence agencies have reason to believe that such an attack could

occur, fire fighters need to know in advance to effectively prepare

and deploy resources for the eventuality. He believes that senior

fire officials—not just those who have law enforcement powers—

should also have top-level security clearances and participate in

JTTFs.46

Major Marc Bashoor, Commander of the Prince George’s County,

Maryland Fire Department’s Special Operations Division, expressed similar sentiments. He agreed that many fire fighters with

a need to know are ‘‘not in the loop.’’ Bashoor explained that even

though he is head of the County’s hazardous materials and bomb

squad, he cannot receive classified intelligence information: for example, he is not eligible to receive classified information about the

latest mechanisms terrorists may be using to deliver explosives. He

said a fire detective with law enforcement powers represents the
19

47Staff Interview with Marc Bashoor, Commander Special Operations Division, Prince

George’s County, Maryland Fire Department, May 19, 2003. 48Walton Interview, note 18 above. 49Skinner Interview, note 18 above. 50 Jeffrey Horvath, Ed Plaugher, Chauncey Bowers, Testimony, Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, Investing in Homeland Security, Challenges on the Front Lines, (S. Hrg. 108–

82), April 9, 2003, at 31.

department on the JTTF, but that the representative typically cannot share what he learns. Bashoor does not believe fire fighters

need information about terrorism investigations (the primary information shared in JTTFs), nor does every fire fighter necessarily

need certain intelligence information. But current obstacles, especially lack of security clearances, leave many that do have a need

to know out of touch. Bashoor noted that knowledge about the

weapons that terrorists plan to use eventually may be shared in

training sessions—but it may take ‘‘a year or two’’ before the information is included. Right now, he said, information that would be

very useful to bomb squads and hazardous materials teams ‘‘just

doesn’t get to us.’’ Bashoor is not aware of any federal initiatives

to understand, much less address, these information needs.47

Threat Advisory System

The color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System is a key

piece of the federal government’s strategy to communicate with

state and local officials, as well as the public, about terrorist

threats. Yet GAC staff interviews with these officials made clear

that, as currently implemented, the present system operates more

like a blunt instrument than a sharp information tool. A change in

the alert level may now raise officials’ general ‘‘level of vigilance,’’

but without more pointed information on what prompted the

change or more specific federal instructions on precise steps that

might be taken to protect people from the threat, state and local

officials are limited in knowing where to focus their efforts.

Officials in New Haven, Connecticut stressed that they needed a

description of the reason the alert level has been elevated and that

officials at the local level needed to know what a change in alert

status means to them.48 As John Skinner, Director of the Intelligence Section of the Baltimore Police Department summed it up,

the limited information currently provided by the alert is simply

‘‘not actionable.’’ 49

Another troubling aspect of the current alert system is how word

of it travels—or fails to travel. At an April 9, 2003 GAC hearing

on homeland security challenges facing first responders, witnesses—including the Police Chief of Dover Delaware, Fire Chief of

Arlington, VA, and a Prince Georges County, MD Fire Captain—

all indicated that they first heard the alert level was being raised

in March through the news media, rather than through official

channels.50

After terrorist attacks killed over 75 people in Saudi Arabia and

Morocco, the alert level was raised from Code Yellow to Orange, for

the fourth time, on May 20, 2003. As CNN reported the news, it

noted that officials were at that very moment contacting state and

local officials to inform them of the decision. Clearly, the internal

distribution channels necessary to fully and timely inform those of-
20

ficials with key homeland security responsibilities about heightened terrorist threats still have not been established. This leaves

local officials in a reactive, not proactive, mode from the very start.

RECOMMENDATIONS: REPAIRING THE FEDERAL-LOCAL

INFORMATION BREACH

The Bush Administration must act now and provide the aggressive leadership necessary to replace state and local officials’ blindfolds with binoculars and to provide them with a seat at the homeland security table. America needs a proactive, energized, and wellinformed front line of defense that works in seamless partnership

with the federal government in order to protect its people from terrorism. Implementing the following recommendations will facilitate

the information sharing necessary to create such a partnership:

1. Make Federal Watch Lists Available to All State and

Local Law Enforcement Agencies.

CHALLENGE: The frontline ‘‘first preventers’’ in the

war against terrorism lack simple, streamlined access to the federal databases that are most valuable

in the effort to identify and apprehend terrorists.

All units in post-war Iraq were given a pack of playing cards

with the names and faces of top officials from Saddam Hussein’s

regime and the Ba’ath party. Yet, with a constantly changing roster of suspects to potentially apprehend, the frontline soldiers in

the war against terrorism here at home are not provided with clear

and simple access to federal terrorism watch lists. Twenty-one

months after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the administration

still has yet to consolidate the 12 watch lists maintained at 9 different agencies, frustrating the efforts of state and local law enforcement, and federal officials, to readily access the information

they contain. It is imperative that the administration makes these

issues a priority, set a timetable for completion, and ensure accountability.

RECOMMENDATION: The President should immediately issue an Executive Order to consolidate terrorism watch lists; the Department of Homeland Security should oversee the immediate consolidation

of all federal terrorism watch lists and provide state

and local law enforcement officials the ability to

check names against a consolidated watch list by

the end of this year. Specific goals and timetables

must be set, resources made available, and senior officials held accountable for getting the job done.

2. Build Information Bridges Between States and Localities.

CHALLENGE: States and localities still operate far

too much as information islands, in relative isolation

from their neighbors. Cities, counties, and states

also have few resources to learn what their counterparts around the country are doing to effectively

protect their localities.
21

To ensure that homeland security information is shared effectively, the federal government must also help to establish mechanisms to build information bridges among states, and among states

and localities. This includes ensuring that best practices are documented and shared, facilitating the establishment of mutual aid

agreements which cross states and jurisdictions, and providing fora

where state and local officials can work closely with each other,

and with federal officials, to identify and systematically address all

homeland security information sharing needs.

RECOMMENDATION: Charge DHS with encouraging, over the next year, the creation of national

and regional task forces (including multi-state task

forces) as necessary. These task forces should bring

state and local officials, including fire fighters,

emergency management professionals, and police officers, as well as federal officials, together to coordinate their information sharing needs and provide

state and local officials a permanent seat at the

table to ensure that information needs are addressed at all levels. DHS’s Office of State and Local

Government Coordination should also create a best

practices database allowing localities to share and

compare solutions to homeland security problems.

3. Overhaul the Security Clearance Process

CHALLENGE: Many state and local officials who

need high-level information access lack the necessary federal security clearances to do what their

job—and our safety—demands.

The current processes for providing security clearances are burdened by backlogs; various agencies do not routinely recognize

clearances issued by others; and key state and local officials must

often wait months before a clearance is granted. In essence, the security clearance process that served our nation when the primary

threats were abroad must be reoriented to address information

sharing challenges in the war against terrorism.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Provide the resources necessary to expedite clearances for designated state

and local officials—including appropriate fire officials—as nominated by governors and approved by

DHS. Immediately assess the feasibility of requiring

agencies to proactively recognize clearances issued

by others for state and local officials, unless there

are compelling security or law enforcement reasons

not to. Establish a task force to review the security

clearance process for state and local officials and report back in 6 months on ways to modernize it so

that it meets the nation’s needs in the war against

terrorism.

4. Create In-State 24-Hour Command Centers

CHALLENGE: States lack a single point of contact

for both receiving ‘‘downstream’’ information needs
22

51State of Georgia, Department of Public Safety, October 9, 2002. (http://www.gahomelandsecurity.com) 52Kallstrom Interview, note 28 above.

and pushing intelligence and other information ‘‘upstream.’’

New York’s Counter Terrorism Advisor, James Kallstrom, has

urged creation of 24-hour command centers in each state to serve

as hubs merging police on the front lines with state and federal

agencies, especially DHS. Construction of such a center is now underway in New York. Similarly, the State of Georgia, with some

federal funds from the Justice Department, has created the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Its priority is to organize existing state and local law enforcement resources into a

statewide intelligence gathering and sharing network.51 As

Kallstrom points out, to be effective, these centers must be closely

coordinated with federal agencies through DHS.52

RECOMMENDATION: Expedite the establishment of

24-hour operations centers in each state to provide

connectivity and information sharing between the

nation’s 650,000 local law enforcement officers and

federal agencies.

5. Refine the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System

CHALLENGE: The current advisory system offers little guidance to local officials on what specific steps

they should take to guard against specific threats.

The Homeland Security Advisory System, which the administration itself admits is still a work in progress, may raise and lower

officials’ general level of vigilance, but without more specific information or instructions from the federal government on precise

steps that might be taken to protect people from the threat, state

and local officials do not know where to focus their efforts. The system should be revamped so that officials are provided with actionable intelligence. DHS also needs to ensure that officials at the

state and local level with a need to know have a swift and reliable

channel to receive information so that they can start putting in

place heightened protective measures.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Immediately refine the

Threat Advisory System to provide state and local

officials specific information about terrorist threats

and detailed guidance on how to respond to those

threats. Put in place secure communications systems

to inform key homeland security officials across the

country of changes in the alert level.

6. Sharpen the DHS Office of State and Local Government

Coordination

CHALLENGE: Strong and consistent leadership is

necessary to overcome cultural barriers to sharing

information with state and local officials. DHS must

make this an explicit priority, especially for the Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
23

53Gilmore testimony, GAC Hearing, February 14, 2003, note 5 above. 54Sara Michael, ‘‘Knowledge Hoarding: Agencies find incentives can encourage the reluctant

to share what they know.’’ Federal Computer Week, April 28, 2003.

While the office is now functioning, its overall budget, staff resources, plans, and priorities are as yet unclear. The office has not

yet demonstrated a clear capacity to foster the kind of fundamental

changes necessary to create a new information-sharing paradigm.

The administration must act to ensure that OSLGC receives sufficient staff and budgetary resources, and bureaucratic clout, to vastly improve the sharing of information with state and local governments. The office must work closely with the Information Analysis

and Infrastructure Protection Directorate—which is responsible for

disseminating intelligence analysis to state and local officials, and

coordinating training and other support to these officials to assist

them as information sharers and consumers—to ensure that this

vital national priority is addressed.

RECOMMENDATION: Immediately equip OSLGC

for, and task it with, overseeing state and local information sharing issues. The OSLGC must make it

a priority to ensure that DHS and other federal

agencies meet the information needs of state and

local officials.

7. Judge Federal Officials Based on How Well They Share

Information

CHALLENGE: To overcome cultural and other barriers to effectively sharing information with states

and localities, DHS and other agencies must hold

senior officials accountable for achieving results

while providing positive incentives to motivate

change.

Without changing the system of accountability—so that agency

officials’ performance is graded, in part, based on how well they

share—it will be impossible to fundamentally change the status

quo. When Governor Gilmore testified before GAC about the proposed Terrorist Threat Integration Center, he stated: ‘‘There is

going to have to be an understanding that information of this type

of sensitive nature is going to have to be shared. If it is not shared,

then there should be penalties connected with the non-sharing.’’ 53

Agencies seeking to improve the sharing of information have also

learned that employees must be positively motivated and are establishing incentives to achieve results—including employee recognition programs.54

RECOMMENDATION: Immediately revise federal

agencies’ performance management systems to reward information sharing. Senior officials should be

evaluated, in part, on their success or failure in

breaking down barriers to sharing information. Bonuses should be dependent upon making measurable

progress in improving information sharing systems

and processes and special awards should be given to

employees who demonstrate exemplary leadership
24

and results in overcoming obstacles to sharing

homeland security information.

8. Make Information Sharing a Priority, Track and Monitor

Progress

CHALLENGE: Meeting the complex challenge of

sharing homeland security information with state

and local officials requires sustained and focused

leadership by the Secretary of Homeland Security

and other top administration officials.

The Bush Administration has cited five government-wide goals,

and several agency-specific goals, in its so-called ‘‘management

agenda’’ that identifies its top priorities for federal agencies. These

agenda items—including counterproductive ideas like establishing

mandatory quotas for systematically privatizing federal employees’

jobs—receive high-level attention from senior administration officials. The chief operating officers in each agency, typically the Deputy Secretaries, have been delegated responsibility for the agenda,

and progress is tracked by periodically grading agencies’ performance as green (indicating successful progress is being made); yellow

(indicating mixed results); and red (for unsatisfactory performance). The challenge of sharing homeland security information,

which the Bush Administration has identified in its national strategy and is vital to governments’ ability to protect the American

people, must be elevated to the highest priority status within the

administration. Progress must be systematically monitored and

tracked—and agencies should be graded on their performance.

RECOMMENDATION: Make sharing homeland security information with state and local officials a high

priority for DHS and other key agencies; assign the

Deputy Secretaries or Chief Operating Officers responsibility for overseeing implementation, monitoring and reporting on agency progress.

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