www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 1 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office released the seventh edition of its biennial defense white paper, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” on March 31, 2011. This document aims to communicate the latest information on China’s military development, strategy, capabilities, and intentions. China began publishing defense 

white papers in 1998, partly as a means of increasing transparency in response to 

regional concerns about the growing capabilities and actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Despite the systematic release of these documents, many 

of China’s neighbors and other regional powers continue to express concerns 

about China’s lack of military transparency. The Chinese maintain that they are 

becoming more open over time and highlight the importance of transparency 

about strategic intentions rather than capabilities.

According to Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, the principal coordinator of 

China’s defense white papers, the document is “a government statement that 

provides a public explanation on the state’s national defense policy and national 

defense conduct.” In his opinion, the 2010 iteration has three new main points: 

“First, the white paper further expounds on and openly declares the basis for 

and the determination in China’s pursuit of a national defense policy that is 

defensive in nature; second, it systematically introduces new developments in 

the building and deployment of the armed forces; and third, it fully presents 

the important roles played by the armed forces in such aspects as confidencebuilding and protecting peace.” He concludes that the issuance of China’s defense white paper serves three distinct functions: externally, it builds confidence 

and clears doubts; internally, it raises national defense awareness; and it deters 

and warns adversaries.1

 Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Ministry 

Chinese Military 

Transparency: Evaluating the 

2010 Defense White Paper

by Phillip C. Saunders and Ross Rustici

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Center for the study of Chinese Military 

Affairs

About the Authors

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of 

Studies and Distinguished Research 

Fellow in the Center for Strategic

Research (CSR), Institute for

National Strategic Studies (INSS), at

the National Defense University. He

is also Director of the Center for the 

Study of Chinese Military Affairs. 

Ross Rustici is a Contract Research 

Analyst in CSR.

Key Points

◆◆ China’s 2010 Defense White Paper 

provides relatively little new data 

and less information about Chinese 

military capabilities and modernization efforts than previous editions. 

Consistent with past white papers, 

this one does not provide any information about specific weapons 

systems or about nuclear forces 

and modernization efforts. 

◆◆ An INSS methodology for evaluating military transparency indicates 

that China’s 2010 white paper 

receives lower transparency ratings than the 2008 edition and 

provides less information than 

defense white papers of other 

major Asia-Pacific powers. 

◆◆ China emphasizes the importance 

of transparency about strategic 

intentions rather than capabilities. 

◆◆ Although Chinese military officers 

state that increased transparency 

is intended to reassure neighbors 

about China’s benign intentions, efforts to downplay China’s expanding military capabilities suggest 

that the 2010 Defense White Paper

will make little progress toward 

this goal. 

July 2011
2 SF No. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, states, “One 

important function of the national defense white paper 

is increasing trust and alleviating the suspicions of the 

outside world.”2

 These and other interviews indicate that 

the Chinese view the purpose of defense white papers in 

a similar fashion to the rest of the world: as documents 

intended to increase trust and confidence and reduce 

suspicion. These goals cannot be achieved without a high 

level of transparency.

Unfortunately, the use of the word transparency is 

problematic due to multiple competing definitions. This 

makes objective analysis about claims of military transparency difficult in general, including in the context of 

defense white papers. A number of well-qualified analysts 

have discussed limited transparency in the 2010 Chinese paper, but the subjective nature of their assessments 

makes their conclusions less persuasive to a Chinese audience.3

 To help address this gap, Michael Kiselycznyk and 

Phillip C. Saunders published the study Assessing Chinese 

Military Transparency in 2010.4 The study, which created 

a comprehensive rating system for defense white papers, 

defines military transparency as “providing information 

about military capabilities and policies that allows other 

countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities 

with a country’s stated security goals.” This study adapted a sample defense white paper format developed in a 

Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 

working group and created a rating template with 7 sections and 19 individual categories designed to primarily 

assess current military structure, capabilities, and doctrine. The rating template also includes a forward-looking 

element by evaluating defense budget trends and planned 

acquisitions/procurement.

For each of the 19 categories, the rating system includes specific definitions and criteria for each of the four 

levels of transparency, which are represented using a color-coded system. Red, orange, yellow, and green ratings 

indicate, respectively, no transparency, low transparency, 

medium transparency, and high transparency. The rating 

system uses consistent language in the rating criteria to 

ensure comparability across categories. For example, an 

orange (low) transparency rating usually indicates that a 

white paper listed or identified some relevant information 

but did not include the description or analysis required 

for a yellow (medium) or green (high) rating. Each white 

paper is rated independently by two raters, who refer back 

to the specific wording of the rating criteria to resolve any 

disagreements.5

 The methodology and definitions detailed 

in that study were used to assess the transparency of China’s 2010 Defense White Paper. This paper thus serves as 

an addendum to the original study. It evaluates the transparency of the most recent Chinese white paper and puts 

the ratings into historical and regional context.

Ratings for China’s 2010 Defense 

White Paper

The following table presents the overall transparency 

ratings for China’s defense white papers. In the analysis 

below, we provide the rationale for why each of the 19 

categories in the 2010 white paper received its specific 

transparency rating.

Security Environment. This section addresses current or developing international, regional, and internal 

trends that threaten or have the potential to threaten the 

country. The section consists of international, regional, 

and internal categories.

The discussion of China’s security environment 

in the 2010 Defense White Paper generally receives a 

medium transparency rating. The paper’s first chapter, 

“The Security Situation,” is not explicitly divided into 

international, regional, and internal categories, but the 

delineation among the three levels of analysis is readily 

the Chinese view the purpose of 

defense white papers in a similar 

fashion to the rest of the world: 

as documents intended to 

increase trust and confidence 

and reduce suspicion
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 3 

apparent. The section identifies but fails to adequately 

analyze a number of trends. Internationally, the chapter 

highlights that “international strategic competition centering on international order, comprehensive national 

strength and geopolitics has intensified.” In support of 

this claim, the paper elaborates on tensions within the 

existing international order and highlights that “progress toward . . . a multi-polar world is irreversible.” This 

section lists a litany of nontraditional security threats 

such as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change, 

nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, and 

transnational crime. While there is some discussion of 

White Papers 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Security Environment

International

Regional

Internal

National Security Goals

Strategic

Tactical

General Defense Policy

Doctrine

Mission

Major Areas of Concern

International

Regional

Internal

Current Defense Posture

Total Personnel

Structure of Force

Command Structure

Armaments

Defense Management

Overall Budget

Budget Trends

Planned Acquisitions 

or Procurements

International Activity

Relationships, 

Exchanges, Joint Exercises

PKO/Humanitarian 

Missions

Chinese Defense White Paper Transparency Ratings, 1998–2010

No Transparency Low Transparency Medium Transparency High Transparency

Key
4 SF No. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

these trends, there is little analysis. Furthermore, what 

little analysis there is does not offer any insight into how 

these trends affect China. The result is a medium transparency rating in the international category.

The regional category also receives a medium 

transparency rating. This category makes multiple 

assertions about growing regionalism and the overall 

security environment. In general, the white paper presents regional economic trends in a positive light, while 

acknowledging negative security trends. Despite describing these trends, a consistent lack of analysis and 

a concerted attempt to deemphasize contentious territorial disputes prevented a high transparency rating. 

China’s limited discussion of internal security trends 

means that this category received a low transparency rating. (The internal security rating is adversely 

affected by the rating system, which does not accept 

the PRC view that Taiwan is purely a domestic issue.) 

Once the analysis of Taiwan is discounted, the discussion of internal security trends is superficial. In a departure from previous years, there is little discussion of 

internal economic progress. The focus of this category 

is on nontraditional security threats and territorial integrity. However, there is no explanation of or support 

for claims such as “Separatist forces working for ‘East 

Turkistan independence’ and ‘Tibet independence’ 

have inflicted serious damage on national security and 

social stability.” The inconsistency in identifying and 

explaining internal security trends coupled with discounting Taiwan equates to a low transparency rating 

for this category.

National Security Goals. This section addresses the 

economic, political, social, and security objectives that 

are critical to the country’s development and security and 

the policy approaches that it pursues to ensure national 

security objectives are fulfilled. The section consists of 

strategic and tactical categories.

The discussion of China’s national security goals receives a medium transparency rating. The “National Defense 

Policy” chapter identifies broad “strategic” level national security goals of “safeguarding national sovereignty, security 

and interests of national development,” “building informationized armed forces and winning informationized wars,” 

“maintaining social harmony and stability,” and “maintaining world peace and stability.” The chapter varies widely in 

its description of each of these goals, but it outlines three of 

the four with sufficient detail to garner a medium rating. 

The “Arms Control and Disarmament” chapter does a far 

more complete job of not only listing major strategic goals, 

but also describing the way in which China is attempting 

to attain them. Because of the disparity of information in 

these two chapters, the rating for national security goals is 

considered a low medium. To attain a high rating, the “National Defense Policy” chapter would have to describe all 

the strategic goals in depth, and both chapters would have 

to conduct an analysis of how these goals are important to 

China’s national security in addition to prioritizing them.

Tactically, the white paper is far more descriptive. For 

example, when discussing tactics to maintain world peace 

and stability, the paper identifies “strategic coordination and 

consultation with major powers and neighboring countries” 

as one way to achieve this strategic objective. Because this 

level of description is consistent throughout the chapter, 

this category is rated medium. It fails to achieve a high rating because there is no analysis of how these actions will 

ensure that China’s national security objectives are secured.

General Defense Policy. This section addresses the 

approaches, framework, or principles that guide a country’s defense policy and the primary missions, responsibilities, or roles assigned to the armed forces in pursuit of 

this defense policy. The section consists of doctrine and 

mission categories.

The discussion of China’s general defense policy receives a mix of low and medium transparency ratings. 

the white paper presents regional 

economic trends in a positive light, 

while acknowledging negative 

security trends
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 5 

The “National Defense Policy” chapter details elements 

of China’s doctrine, which is described as a defensive 

doctrine built upon the philosophy of “only attacking after being attacked” and a self-defensive nuclear strategy. 

This chapter not only discusses specific approaches to 

maintaining China’s defense, but also links that doctrine 

to China’s national strategic goal of “supporting this 

important period of strategic opportunities for national 

development.” This category received a medium transparency rating (declining from a high rating in the 2008 

white paper) due to an insufficient explanation of this 

doctrine’s role in policy. A more detailed discussion of 

how a defensive doctrine aids in advancing the identified 

policy goals would be necessary for the category to earn 

a high transparency rating.

The “National Defense Policy” and “Deployment 

of the Armed Forces” chapters specify the missions for 

China’s armed forces. This category receives a low transparency rating due to a lack of consistent identification 

and description regarding missions. While this section 

lists some specific missions such as “safeguarding border, coastal, and territorial air security” and “maintaining 

social stability,” there is little discussion of the missions 

of the military services and the PLA Second Artillery 

Force (PLASAF), which operates China’s land-based 

nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. The only specific reference to missions for any of the individual services or the PLASAF is about the People’s Liberation 

Army Navy (PLAN) enhancing “its capabilities in strategic deterrence and counterattack, and develop[ing] its 

capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters.” 

Despite offering a good description of border security 

and maintaining social stability, these chapters would 

have to identify and describe in detail the missions of the 

service branches and the PLASAF to warrant a medium 

transparency rating. (The 2008 Defense White Paper 

included more information about service missions and 

received a medium transparency rating.)

The disparity between the 2008 and 2010 white 

paper iterations highlights an important caveat to the 

rating methodology: It only considers information presented in the current white paper. This technique is at 

odds with expressed Chinese views that the white papers should be viewed as a set. This divergence between 

how the paper is rated and the Chinese view occasionally 

results in a lower transparency rating. For example, the 

2008 Defense White Paper has an in-depth discussion of 

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) missions, 

while the 2010 version does not mention its missions at 

all. We do not believe that these missions have changed 

in the intervening period, but the fact that the information was not included in the 2010 paper yields a lower 

transparency rating.

Major Areas of Concern. This section addresses specific international, regional, or internal situations, issues, 

conflicts, or problem spots that concern or threaten the 

country. This section differs from the Security Environment category by focusing on concrete issues and situations and the policies the country employs to confront 

them. The section consists of international, regional, and 

internal categories.

The discussion of China’s major areas of concern 

receives low to medium transparency ratings in the different categories. Most of the discussion in this section 

overlaps with international security trends. In most 

cases, the white paper does not detail specific international situations or crises that concern China or indicate how it is responding to these concerns. For this 

reason, both international and regional areas of concern 

receive a low transparency rating. The 2010 white paper identifies prompt global strike, missile defense, and 

the new strategic commanding heights (outer space 

the disparity between the 2008 

and 2010 white paper iterations 

highlights an important caveat to 

the rating methodology: It only 

considers information presented in 

the current white paper
6 SF No. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

and cyber space) as China’s main international military 

concerns. It also identifies policy-related concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that 

“deep-seated contradictions and structural problems 

behind the international financial crisis have not been 

resolved.” The Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan, political 

turbulence, ethnic and territorial disputes, and maritime and territorial rights are all listed as regional concerns, although often with just a few words devoted to 

each topic. For an increased rating in these categories, 

the white paper would need to include a detailed description of the concerns.

The discussion of internal concerns receives a higher 

rating due in large part to the extensive description of 

current cross-strait relations. With this as the exception, 

this section follows the established pattern of listing a 

few security concerns but offering very little description and no explanation. In addition to issues related to 

Taiwan, the domestic section also highlights “separatist 

forces working for ‘East Turkistan independence’ and 

‘Tibet independence.’” While issues such as poverty alleviation and natural disasters are referenced in other sections, there is no explicit indication that these are major 

areas of concern. For a high transparency rating, a greater 

discussion of internal issues and a detailed analysis would 

be needed.

Current Defense Posture. This section addresses the 

details and composition of a country’s armed forces. This 

includestotal number of personnel serving in the defense 

forces of the country, organization of the armed forces 

and the order of battle, chain of command and the structure of decisionmaking, and weapons systems and equipment of the armed forces. The section is broken down 

into total personnel, structure of force, command structure, and armaments categories.

Total personnel. Like the 2008 version, the 2010 

white paper does not include an overall figure for the size 

of the PLA. It does provide the total number of lawyers 

and legal advisors employed by the armed forces (26,342) 

and the number of militia (8 million). Despite missionspecific breakdowns for the militia, lawyers, and some 

international missions, the fact that the white paper does 

not indicate the number of personnel in the armed forces 

mandates a rating of no transparency. To achieve an orange rating, the white paper must include an accurate 

number of personnel in the armed services.

Structure of force. The scant space devoted to the 

PLA, PLAN, PLAAF, the Second Artillery, the People’s 

Army Police Force, reserves, and militia provides little 

information on their respective force structures. The paper identifies the number of army combined corps (18), 

number of fleets and their names, and the air commands 

in each military region.6

 While this provides a basic overview of how each service is structured, it does not identify or provide the number of combat units within this 

structure. For example, the paper does not present details 

on the number of air wings that comprise the Chengdu 

area command or give the number of planes within each 

air wing. This category receives a low transparency rating.

Command structure. The only reference to command structure can be found in the “National Defense 

Mobilization and Reserve Force Building” chapter. 

While this discussion is detailed and descriptive, it represents only a small fraction of the armed services; as a 

result, this category receives a low transparency rating 

(a decline from the medium transparency rating in the 

2008 white paper). To achieve a medium transparency 

rating, the white paper must include the command authority at the highest levels and list specific geographic 

and service structures.

Armaments. The “Modernization of the People’s 

Liberation Army” chapter contains a general description 

the 2010 white paper identifies 

prompt global strike, missile 

defense, and the new strategic 

commanding heights (outer space 

and cyber space) as China’s main 

international military concerns
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 7 

of weapons platforms used by each service but has no 

information on the Second Artillery. For example, the 

air force operates “airborne early warning and control 

aircraft, third generation combat aircraft, and air and 

missile defense systems,” and the navy is incorporating “new types of submarines, frigates, aircraft and large 

support vessels.” This listing of general platforms fulfills 

the basic requirements for a low transparency rating. To 

increase to a medium rating, the white paper must include a description of particular weapons systems, such 

as J–10s or DF–21s.

Defense Management. This section addresses a 

country’s defense budget and future procurement plans. 

This includes overall spending on the armed forces and 

defense, budget figures that provide historical context 

for current defense spending or information on future 

spending plans, and planned weapons systems or capabilities procurements. The section consists of overall budget, budget trends, and planned acquisitions or procurements categories.

The chapter “Defense Expenditure” includes a figure 

for China’s 2010 defense budget (Renminbi 532, about 

$82.3 billion at current exchange rates). The paper presents a comparison of China’s budget as a percentage of 

China’s gross domestic product and state expenditure. 

A table in the chapter divides China’s 2009 defense expenditures into three categories: personnel, training and 

maintenance, and equipment. The paper includes a brief 

explanation of what is covered within these three broad 

categories, but it does not provide any specific figures for 

spending on procurement or research and development, 

both of which are important for judging future capabilities. These figures are further divided by active force, 

reserve force, and militia. Because the chapter does not 

discuss any defense-related expenditure not included in 

the official defense budget or provide information on the 

budgets of individual services, this category receives a 

medium transparency rating.

The budget trends category receives a low transparency rating. A table in the white paper presents the 

defense budget as a percentage of China’s annual state 

financial expenditure from 1998 to 2009. This information places China’s past defense expenditures into historical context, but the white paper does not provide any 

estimated or projected size of the defense budget beyond 

2010, information that would be needed for a medium 

transparency rating.

Similarly, the planned acquisitions and procurements category receives a low transparency rating because 

the white paper offers only general references to some of 

the capabilities China plans to acquire in order to fulfill 

modernization goals. The majority of these capabilities 

are related to logistics and to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4

ISR). At no point does the white paper discuss any specific weapons platforms, quantities, or 

timelines for procurement or purchases (which is needed 

for a medium transparency rating).

International Activity. This section addresses the 

international activities of a country’s armed forces. This 

includes the country’s defense relationships, military 

exchanges, and joint exercises with other nations, participation in international defense organizations, and 

participation in bilateral or multilateral peacekeeping or 

humanitarian missions. The section consists of relationships, exchanges and joint exercises, and peacekeeping 

operations (PKO)/humanitarian missions categories.

The 2010 Defense White Paper receives a high transparency rating regarding international activity. It provides 

a description of China’s international relationships, exchanges, and joint exercises in the chapters “Deployment 

of the Armed Forces” and “Military Confidence Building.” 

the white paper offers only 

general references to some 

of the capabilities China plans 

to acquire in order to fulfill 

modernization goals
8 SF No. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

It also provides a comprehensive chart listing “Major International Exchanges of the Chinese Military 2009–2010” 

(appendix I), “Participation in Strategic Consultations and 

Dialogues 2009–2010” (appendix II), “Joint Exercises and 

Training with Foreign Armed Forces 2009–2010” (appendix III), and “Imports and Exports of Seven Major Types 

of Conventional Arms 2008, 2009” (appendices VI, VII). 

“Deployment of the Armed Forces” details China’s participation in United Nations PKOs, the Gulf of Aden mission, 

and international disaster and relief operations. An appendix provides further information in a chart detailing China’s 

international peacekeeping missions from 1990 to the present. This includes the number of PLA personnel involved, 

types (observers, staff officers, or police), and dates deployed. 

Another appendix provides further information in a chart 

detailing China’s participation in international disaster relief activities in 2009 and 2010. This includes the country 

involved, the type of disaster, aid given, value of the aid, and 

what type of personnel was deployed. While this section 

continues to receive a high transparency rating, appendix III 

does not include the PLAAF’s joint exercise with Turkey in 

October 2010. This omission was not enough to reduce the 

white paper’s rating but is notable nonetheless.

Overarching Assessment

Overall, the 2010 Defense White Paper includes little new information and provides less information than 

previous white papers about military command structure, strategic national security goals, PLA missions, and 

China’s military modernization. When compared to the 

2008 white paper, the 2010 iteration receives a lower rating in three categories and a higher rating in only one. 

Furthermore, there are several categories where the rating did not change, despite a noticeable reduction in information. Our conclusion that the 2010 white paper is 

less transparent than previous editions is consistent with 

that of other PLA experts who used subjective criteria 

and also found that it contained less information than 

the 2008 edition.7

 While there are indications that the 

drafters of the white paper are sensitive to foreign perceptions and interested in improving China’s military 

transparency, the new document does not make much 

progress toward that goal.

Despite the 2010 white paper receiving a lower 

transparency rating, it does not change the overall assessment in Assessing Chinese Military Transparency that 

China’s white paper is approximately as transparent as 

those of Southeast Asian states and significantly less 

transparent than the defense white papers of major East 

Asian and Asia-Pacific states that are a more comparable 

peer group based on economic and military strength.8

This conclusion is compatible with the findings of Professor Tai Ming Cheung in his efforts to build a Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index.9

This year’s white paper does present a limited 

amount of new and useful information. It shows that 

the informationization agenda has been widely adopted 

throughout the military apparatus, discusses in greater 

detail advancing C4ISR capabilities with a new emphasis on viewing space and cyber as strategic issues, hints 

at building a capable blue water navy with accompanying logistics infrastructure, and lays out the organizational structure and leadership system for national 

defense mobilization.

Nevertheless, discussion of actual military capabilities decreased significantly in comparison to the 2008 

white paper, which devoted separate chapters to each 

individual service and the Second Artillery. This year’s 

paper contains only five paragraphs on military service 

modernization efforts. As usual, the white paper focuses 

heavily on discussion of Chinese intentions coupled 

while there are indications that 

the drafters of the white paper are 

sensitive to foreign perceptions 

and interested in improving China’s 

military transparency, the new 

document does not make much 

progress toward that goal
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 9 

with only vague references to capabilities—and has no 

mention of any specific weapons systems (for example, 

China’s aircraft carrier program, efforts to develop antiship ballistic missiles, or the development of the J–20 

stealth fighter).

Despite other countries voicing concern over the 

lack of specific information regarding PLA capabilities, 

the PLA leadership has long insisted that intentions 

rather than capabilities are the more important aspect 

of military transparency. Furthermore, they often justify 

China’s actions and modernization programs as reactions to what other countries are doing or to broader 

trends in the development of military technology. In 

their narrative, China must modernize its armed forces 

to defend itself. New capabilities or actions that others 

may perceive as threatening are presented as responses 

to changes in the international security environment or 

reactions to other states.

This narrative is laboriously adhered to in the 2010 

white paper. Given the precedent of rarely singling out 

states, the white paper relies on the international security 

environment to provide justification for China’s military 

capabilities and modernization program. The white paper 

was reportedly delayed for several months for revisions 

to the assessment of the security environment (found in 

the “Security Situation” chapter). These revisions produced a more favorable depiction of the international 

and regional security environments and may have caused 

a reduction of information on military modernization 

programs, which might now appear unmotivated by the 

more benign description of the security environment.

One striking aspect of the 2010 white paper, only 

partly captured by the transparency rating system used in 

our analysis, is its extremely limited and veiled references 

to adverse regional security developments in 2009–2010. 

Many security analysts would argue that a more assertive 

Chinese diplomatic and military posture in the region—

including such actions as the harassment of the USNS 

Impeccable, increased Chinese patrolling and naval exercises in the South China Sea, verbal bullying of Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Northeast Asian 

countries in regional meetings, and economic retaliation 

against Japan following a collision between a Japanese 

coast guard vessel and a Chinese fishing boat—is a major factor that heightened regional security concerns and 

prompted many countries to improve their security ties 

with the United States.10 They would point to North 

Korea’s 2009 nuclear weapons test and 2010 sinking of 

the South Korean navy ship Cheo’nan and shelling of 

Yeonpyeong Island as important destabilizing regional 

developments (neither is mentioned in the 2010 white 

paper). They also highlight the Chinese leadership’s reluctance to condemn these actions, increased support for 

the North Korean regime, and the planned succession 

of Kim Jong-eun as important regional developments.11

China’s actions and role in these events are entirely missing from the discussion of the regional security environment in the 2010 Defense White Paper. The overall 

tone of the paper—based on language, omitted information, and the amount of text dedicated to issues—seeks 

to create a message of strategic reassurance to China’s 

neighbors. However, the reduction in transparency about 

specific Chinese military capabilities and general defense 

policy is likely to have the opposite effect.

When the findings described above were presented 

in a recent international conference, one Chinese participant argued that the lower rating for the 2010 white 

paper is an artifact of the assessment methodology rather 

than an actual decrease in transparency. He complained 

that because the assessment did not consider information about command structure and missions presented 

in previous white papers, the 2010 Defense White Paper 

the white paper focuses heavily on 

discussion of Chinese intentions 

coupled with only vague references 

to capabilities—and has no mention 

of any specific weapons systems
10 SF No. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

received an artificially low rating. If information from 

previous white papers had been included, two categories 

would have received higher ratings and the overall transparency rating would have remained constant.

There are sound methodological reasons for a rating 

system to focus on the information in a single white paper rather than to rate all available white papers as a set. 

Rating only the most recent paper avoids the problem of 

subjective determinations about whether information in 

older white papers has become dated or inaccurate. This 

approach also facilitates comparisons across countries, 

not all of which publish white papers on a regular schedule. It would be possible in principle to construct a moving average system that considers information from both 

old and new white papers, but this would bias transparency ratings in a upward direction (because transparency 

ratings in a moving average system would not decline 

even if a new white paper contained significantly less information than older ones). Accordingly, we believe the 

rating system should produce as accurate a transparency 

rating as possible for individual white papers, and then 

use detailed content analysis to consider why the ratings 

in individual categories changed. We agree that a comprehensive assessment of a country’s military transparency should use all available information.

As we discussed in the explanation of our ratings 

above, we believe that artifacts in the rating system 

had limited impact on our conclusion that the 2010 

white paper is less transparent than the previous edition. Most observers would agree that China’s military 

capabilities have improved significantly over the last 

2 years, but the discussion in the white paper provides few details on those changes. As we rated the 

2010 white paper, we found that a number of categories (especially those focused on military capabilities) 

contained less information than previous editions. In 

a few cases, this resulted in a lower rating; in other 

cases, the rating stayed the same even though less relevant information was provided in the 2010 white paper. The armaments category is a good example. The 

low transparency rating did not change even though 

the amount of information in the 2010 white paper 

decreased significantly. Furthermore, the discussion 

of the services and Second Artillery is drastically reduced. The 2008 white paper devoted approximately 

21 percent of its text to the military services and the 

Second Artillery, whereas the 2010 white paper devoted only 6 percent.

This critique of the assessment methodology misses 

a broader point about transparency. While we agree that 

PLA missions probably have not changed since 2008, 

we do not know that for certain. The drafters of China’s 

white paper may want to keep each edition short and 

focused on new developments, but that inherently decreases transparency because outside observers are left 

to wonder if things are omitted because nothing has 

changed or because China does not want to highlight the 

changes. Most outside observers would also agree that 

omitting relevant information about the modernization 

of Chinese military capabilities in order to make space 

for a discussion of the military legal system is not a good 

tradeoff if China wants to increase transparency.

Conclusion

While the 2010 Defense White Paper appears intended to assuage the concerns of China’s neighbors 

and the broader international community about PLA 

actions and modernization efforts, it does so at the 

expense of reduced transparency about Chinese military capabilities. The 2010 version includes little new 

information and provides less information than previous white papers about military command structure, 

most observers would agree that 

China’s military capabilities have 

improved significantly over the last 

2 years, but the discussion in the 

white paper provides few details on 

those changes
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 11 

strategic national security goals, PLA missions, and 

China’s military modernization. Specifically, the 2010 

white paper is less transparent than the 2008 version 

in the categories of General Defense Policy—Doctrine, 

General Defense Policy—Missions, and Current Defense Posture—Command Structure. (The 2010 edition did, however, improve its transparency rating in the 

category of Major Areas of Concern—Internal.) This 

edition of the white paper portrays China’s military 

modernization as a means of aiding the international 

community and attempts to convey an image of China 

as a benign international actor. In crafting this message, 

there are large sections detailing Chinese involvement 

in international cooperation coupled with a noticeable 

omission of any Chinese agency in regional incidents.

This reduction in transparency is at odds with China’s 

own position regarding the evolution of transparency. For 

years, Chinese interlocutors have maintained that greater transparency benefits the strong at the expense of the 

weak. Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary general 

of the Chinese Military Science Association, states:

Military transparency could only . . . progress 

gradually in a step by step fashion. . . . Any 

comparison on China’s progress in military 

transparency should be vertical. . . . China has 

become more in line with international practice 

in the past few years, and it is sincerely trying 

to reinforce trust and erase doubt, while hoping 

to gain understandings from the international 

community on the modernized construction of 

China’s national defense.12

Unfortunately, the 2010 iteration of China’s defense 

white paper does not conform to this ideal. It is undeniable that China is a growing military power. Publicly 

available Chinese assessments of PLA capabilities13 place 

China on par with regional powers such as Japan, South 

Korea, and Australia; many outside observers would rate 

the PLA as the strongest Asian military in the region. 

Yet rather than progressing toward the level of transparency of other Asia-Pacific major powers, the 2010 white 

paper constitutes a step backward. Several Chinese military officers have stated that as China grows in comprehensive national power, it should become more transparent. The many interested observers of the PLA will await 

the publication of China’s 2012 Defense White Paper 

to judge whether the 2010 paper is a one-time exception to the trend of gradually increasing Chinese military 

transparency or reveals a cap on China’s willingness to 

be transparent about its expanding military capabilities. 

Transparency about both intentions and capabilities is 

important if confidence-building measures such as publication of defense white papers are to achieve their objective of “increasing trust and alleviating the suspicions 

of the outside world.”

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge Michael Kiselycznyk for 

his contributions in developing the analytical framework used in this 

study and to thank Christopher Yung, CAPT Mark Redden, USN, 

William Norris, David Finkelstein, Dean Cheng, Tai Ming Cheung, 

and the participants in the April 2011 University of California Institute 

on Global Conflict and Cooperation conference on transparency 

for helpful comments on earlier drafts. They also thank Jeffrey 

Smotherman, Lisa Yambrick, and Tara Parekh at NDU Press and 

Kimberley Berlin in INSS for assistance in preparing the manuscript 

and posting the associated files on the Institute’s Web site.

Notes

1 This paragraph draws upon an interview conducted by Guangming Ribao Online, April 15, 2011, available at <http://theory.gmw.

cn/2011-04/15/content_1836103.htm>.

2 Yuan Yuan, “PLA Major General Expounds on Military 

Transparency in PRC Defense White Paper,” Beijing Liaowang, 

no. 40.

3 Dean Cheng, “The Limits of Transparency: China Releases 

2010 Defense White Paper,” Web Memo, The Heritage Foundation, April 7, 2011, available at <www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/the-limits-of-transparency-china-releases-2010-defense-white-paper>; Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Grading 

China’s Military Plans,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2011, available 

at <http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/04/09/

grading-chinas-military-plans/>; Michael S. Chase, “China’s 

2010 National Defense White Paper: An Assessment,” China 

Brief 11, no. 7, April 22, 2011, available at <www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37839&tx_

ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=517>.

4 Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, Assessing Chinese 

Military Transparency, China Strategic Perspectives 1 (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, June 2010), available at <https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CI

SOPTR=41584&CISOMODE=print>.
12 SF No. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

5 See Ibid., 6–12, for a more detailed discussion of the methodology.

6 All of this information was presented in the 2008 white paper, 

and in the case of the air force and Second Artillery, it was presented 

in more detail.

7 See the comments of Michael D. Swaine, Dennis J. Blasko, and 

David M. Finkelstein at the Center for Naval Analyses–Institute for 

National Strategic Studies roundtable on the 2010 Defense White Paper, 

April 20, 2011, available at <www.vimeo.com/visioncna/cnachinaconference>; and Ian Easton, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” Roundtable 

Report, July 2011 (forthcoming), available at <www.cna.org/centers/

china/publications>. 

8 Updated tables comparing China’s 2010 Defense White Paper 

with other Asia-Pacific white papers are available on the INSS Website at <www.ndu.edu/press/China2010transparencytable.html>. 

9 Professor Tai Ming Cheung presented key findings of the 

“IGCC 2010/11 Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index” at a 

University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Workshop on Defense Transparency in Northeast Asia, La Jolla, 

CA, April 28–29, 2011.

10 For contemporaneous analysis, see the relevant issues of 

Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Comparative Connections, available at <http://csis.org/program/

comparative-connections>.

11 For regional perspectives, see Ross Babbage, “Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030,” Kokoda Paper no. 15, February 2011, 31–34, and 

Japan’s 2010 Defense White Paper, 3–5, 61–64.

12 Luo Yuan, Beijing Liaowang, no. 15, April 11–17, 2011, 64.

13 Department of Defense (DOD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: 

DOD, 2010); National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), NIDS 

China Security Report (Tokyo: NIDS, 2011).

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS