Filed 6/25/24 P. v. Lane CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TALAL HANSEAN LANE,

Defendant and Appellant. D083331

(Super. Ct. No. SCN423383)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,

Daniel F. Link and James E. Simmons Jr. , Judge s . Affirmed.

Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,

Daniel Rogers and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorney s General

, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Talal Hansean Lane guilty of driving under the influence

of drugs causing injury. During a pre

- trial hearing

, the trial court denied2

Lane ’s motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 ( Marsden ) to

substitute appointed counsel. We resolve this matter by memorandum

opinion and affirm. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002)

97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851

- 854.)

We review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion. (See

People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696 ( Smith ).) “[T] he decision whether

to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute

another attorney during the trial is within the discretion of the trial court,

and a defendant has no absolute right to more than one appointed attorney .”

( Marsden

, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) Relief is available when appointed counsel

fails to provide “adequate representation” or defendant and counsel have

“ such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to

result .” ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854.)

We discern four arguments by Lane

.
First, at the Marsden hearing Lane contended counsel did not

communicate with him until two weeks before trial. Lane and counsel agreed

they had steady communication durin g the two weeks preceding trial, but

disagreed about the level of communication in the months prior

. Lane

claimed counsel would not return his calls

. However, c ounsel informed the

court that he made himself “ very accessible ” to Lane by regularly answer in g

his calls or call ing him back the same day , and “responding to his emails

. ”

The court explained t o Lane that he could expect adequate legal

representation whether or not he received individualized attention from his

appointed counsel.

Although Lane interprets the court’s comment to mean that he could

not expect “real representation” because his attorney was appointed rather

than retained, we disagree. Rather

, the court accurately indicated that an3

attorney ’s conduct does not fall below the standard of care by not

immediately address ing each of the defendant’s concerns or walking the

defendant through each step of the process

. (See People v. Ferenz (2024)

99 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1040

- 1041 ( Ferenz ) .) Indeed

, a d efendant ’s complain t of

not being “ able to speak with counsel as often as [ defendant ] would have

liked ” does not sufficiently establish incompetence. ( People v. Valdez (2004)

32 Cal.4th 73, 96.) Under the circumstances here , the court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that Lane’s perceived lack of communication did not

indicate irreconcilable conf l ict

.
Second, Lane contend ed his dis agreement with counsel’s trial tactics

warranted substitution of counsel. Specifically, he was dissatisfied with

counsel ’s unwilling ness to assist in (1) expung ing a prior conviction to

eliminate a strike offense and (2) amend ing a police report.

“ [A] d isagreement between a defendant and appointed counsel

concerning trial tactics [do es not] necessarily compel the appointment of

another attorney.” ( People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905.) “When a

defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is

‘captain of the ship’ and can make all but a few fundamenta l decisions for the

defendant.” ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376.)

Here, counsel had explained to Lane that his request to seek

expungement was not “ ‘ a viable request [then] ’ because he ha[d] open cases, ”

and generally expungement would not eliminate strike offenses. (See People

v. Daniels (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 520, 525

- 526 ; Pen. Code, § 1203.4 .) C ounsel

also explained he had never hear d of a police report be ing successfully

amended to reflect trial testimony

. He instead focused on defending Lane in

the upcoming jury trial. We need not discuss whether any of Lane’s collateral

requests would have been successful because counsel’s explanation for his4

tactical decision to focus on trial preparation sufficiently demonstrated that

Lane received adequate representation

. (See People v. Orey (2021)

63 Cal.App.5th 529, 56 8

- 569 .) We agree with the People that while counsel

did not do everything Lane wanted from a tactical standpoint, their

disagreements did not create an irreconcilable conf lict.

Third, Lane contend ed counsel’s use of “ heated words ” the “first time”

they spoke on the phone signal ed a complete breakdown in the relationship.

Lane describ ed a phone call in which counsel “ yelled at me and he told me

,

‘ [d] idn’t I tell you I’ll call you when it’s time for me to talk to you? ’ ” However,

“heated words .

. . alone do [ ] not require a substitution of counsel absent an

irreconcilable conflict.” ( Smith

, 6 Cal.4th at p. 69 6 .) After this initial phone

call, Lane and counsel contin ued communicating over the phone and email ;

c ounsel further asserted he d id not have a problem with Lane and was

competent ly ready for trial.

Finally, w hile Lane contends all three of his specific complaints

collectively signal a complete breakdown in relationship , we disagree

. T he

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lane’s Marsden motion

because his meritless complaints collectively do not amount to an

irreconcilable conflict. (S ee Ferenz

, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1041.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.