www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 271 1 

China in the Middle East

During the 9th century, Arab traders regularly plied lucrative maritime routes 

that connected the Persian Gulf to southern China by way of the Indian Ocean. This 

commercial activity, which mostly involved jade, silk, and other luxury goods, went on 

for centuries and became part of what is now known as the Silk Road. In some ways, 

the world is now witnessing a restoration of that ancient trading relationship between 

two civilizations—except that oil and consumer goods have replaced jade and silk.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

presided over one of the most remarkable economic expansions in modern history. 

From 1990 to 2000, gross domestic product (GDP) grew an average of 9 percent 

each year, lifting millions out of poverty.1 In order to sustain this growth and continue providing jobs to the growing number of citizens entering the labor market, the 

government not only needed to find new markets for Chinese exports; it also had to 

secure additional energy sources to keep factories and the economy as a whole running. This led the CCP to adopt the “going out” (zou chu qu) strategy in 2001. This 

strategy called for expanding investment activity outward, taking on major foreign 

construction projects, and developing overseas natural resource supplies. The Middle 

East, with its unexploited emerging markets and abundance of oil, caught the attention of the Chinese government. Prior to 2001, China maintained a limited presence 

in the region, and its activities consisted mainly of oil purchases and arms sales. Since 

then, however, an increasing number of Chinese officials, businesspeople, and private 

citizens have answered the call to “go out” and have streamed into the Middle East.

China’s emergence as a major actor is already impacting the U.S. strategic 

position in the region. For example, U.S. attempts to craft sanctions on Iran during 

the summer of 2010 were complicated by China’s opposition, partly due to sizable 

Chinese energy investments in Iran. The opposition was withdrawn only after a 

The Emergence of China in 

the Middle East

by James Chen

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Authors

James Chen was a Research 

Associate in the Near East South 

Asia Center at the National Defense 

University and is now an East Asia 

Program Officer in the Institute for 

Global Engagement.

Key Points

◆ China’s presence in the Middle 

East has grown exponentially 

over the past decade and is affecting the region’s strategic 

environment. Chinese influence is 

multidimensional, encompassing 

economics, defense, diplomacy, 

and soft power.

◆ Beijing currently sees its interests in the Middle East best 

served by focusing on commerce and keeping a low profile. 

However, Middle Eastern states 

are increasingly drawing China 

into political and security issues, 

which may lead China to play a 

more prominent political role in 

the region.

◆ To mitigate any potentially 

negative effects of China’s growing influence, the United States 

should explore cooperative efforts with China in energy security, continue strategic dialogue 

with the Chinese government on 

Middle East issues, and maintain 

a military presence to ensure 

continued security of U.S. allies 

and freedom of navigation in 

Middle Eastern waters.

December 2011

Center for the study 

of chinese mi

litary 

affairs
2 SF No. 271 www.ndu.edu/inss

revised United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 

weakened the impact of punitive measures. U.S. officials 

also suspect that, despite the passage of the resolution, the 

Chinese have engaged in dealings with Iran that further 

undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions.2

 For this 

and other regional issues, the United States will have to 

increasingly take Chinese interests and influence into account in developing its Middle Eastern policy.

Facets of China’s Presence

Whether measured in terms of economics, security, 

diplomacy, or soft power, China has become increasingly 

active in the Middle East over the last decade. Activity and increased presence do not automatically translate 

into actual influence (especially if defined in terms of 

getting other countries to take costly actions they would 

not otherwise undertake). However, China’s expanding 

interactions with Middle Eastern countries may eventually expand common interests or create dependent relations that increase Beijing’s regional influence.

Growing Economic Interdependence. One of the most 

obvious indicators of China’s increasing involvement in 

the Middle East is the explosion in economic activity. 

From 2005 to 2009, the total trade volume between China 

and the Middle East rose 87 percent, to $100 billion, and 

the Middle East’s exports to China grew by 25 percent.3

In contrast, exports from the Middle East to the United 

States declined by 45 percent during that same period. 

As a result, China surpassed the United States last year 

as the top destination for the Middle East’s exports. On 

the other side of the trading ledger, China is also the top 

source of the region’s imports, most of them being lowcost household goods that increase purchasing power for 

the average Middle East consumer. For example, a greater 

number of Egyptians are now able to afford cars due to the 

availability of inexpensive Chinese models,4

 and in Gaza, 

residents enduring the Israeli blockade have come to depend upon cheap Chinese goods in their day-to-day lives.5

Chinese investors and contractors have significantly 

increased their activity in the Middle East. Investment 

flows from China have grown tenfold, from $1 billion in 

2005 to $11 billion in 2009;6 China is the largest foreign investor in both Iraq and Iran. Middle Eastern governments 

have also reached out by bringing Chinese contractors in 

to work on major infrastructure project investments. Saudi 

Arabia hired the state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation to work on the Mecca monorail project, which went into operation in November 2010, just in 

time to accommodate the 2.8 million people who arrived 

for Hajj. Egypt has also partnered with China to develop 

its Suez special economic zone, and the Iraqi government 

awarded five separate contracts to Chinese oil companies 

to develop its long-neglected oil fields. In addition, China 

signed an agreement with the Iranian government to build 

a railway line from Tehran to the Iraqi border as part of 

an overall plan to link the Middle East to Central Asia 

and China through rail. Chinese influence is also evident 

in Northern Africa, where the Algerian government hired 

Chinese construction firms for several major projects including an airport, a mall, 60,000 homes, and a 745-mile 

east-west highway, the longest on the continent.7

The Middle East has seen a growing influx of Chinese tourists. This is reflective of an overall trend of rising Chinese outbound tourism, but it is also indicative 

of Chinese travelers’ interests in the Middle East. Local tourism industries in countries such as Jordan, the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt are increasingly catering to this growing market. For example, Egypt 

opened a tourist office in Beijing, and the national carrier, 

Egypt Air, started almost-daily flights between the two 

countries. Egyptian tour guides have received Chinese 

language training, and hotels have made special arrangements to accommodate Chinese tourists, who often travel in groups. Jordan greatly simplified entry procedures 

for Chinese visitors by allowing them to obtain landing 

visas instead of having to apply through the Jordanian 

Embassy, a process that used to take up to 4 months. 

For non–oil-producing countries whose economies rely 

heavily on the tourism industry, Chinese visitors represent a significant source of hard currency.8

Expanding Scope of Military Activities. While the 

United States maintains a dominant military role in the 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 271 3 

Middle East, China has notably expanded the scope of 

its military activities and presence there. 2010 was a particularly active year for Chinese military diplomacy in the 

region as senior Chinese officials embarked on a flurry of 

visits to Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Oman, the UAE, and 

Qatar, all of which produced official pronouncements vowing strengthened defense cooperation. Two notable events 

may have been the impetus behind these visits. First, Chinese warships made port calls in the UAE in March and in 

Egypt in July, marking the first time in its history that the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy had ever ventured 

into the region.9 Second, the Turkish air force secretly invited the PLA air force to take part in its annual Anatolian 

Eagle exercise in September, the first time that Turkey and 

China engaged in military exercises together.10 Moreover, 

the Iranian government even allowed Chinese fighter jets 

to travel through its airspace to join the drills.

The Chinese arms industry has also opened its doors. 

From 2005 to 2009, China exported over $600 million 

worth of arms to the Middle East.11 While this pales 

in comparison to the $12 billion that the United States 

sold to the region during the same period, China is increasingly seen as an alternative to Russia as a supplier of 

advanced weapons. For example, Egyptians, dissatisfied 

with the quality of Russian arms, have switched to Chinese products. Iran’s attempts to purchase an advanced 

Russian S–300 air defense system failed, and it has expressed interest in acquiring a Chinese version instead. 

In the case of Iran, China’s arms trading activity goes 

beyond simple transactions to include transfer of designs, 

manufacturing techniques, and technology. A Chineseconstructed missile plant in Iran went online in March 

2010 and will produce antiship missiles with ranges that 

could reach targets in the Persian Gulf.12

The PLA has gradually expanded its physical presence 

in the Middle East primarily through participation in multilateral operations. The Chinese navy has deployed vessels 

in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international antipiracy 

patrols since a UN Security Council resolution authorized 

the action in 2008. China also has a contingent of 345 soldiers in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and two observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organization.13 While 

these deployments have been gradual and largely noncontroversial in nature, they represent a significant turn toward 

expanding China’s presence and role in the region. The antipiracy mission, in particular, was described by the PLA 

navy commander as the first time China has “gone abroad” 

to protect its “strategic interests” with military force.14

Diplomatic Agility. China is unique among the foreign 

powers in the Middle East in that it simultaneously maintains largely positive and substantive relations with the region’s four major ethnic groups: Arabs, Persians, Turks, and 

Jews. Part of this is due to China’s foreign policy principle of 

“noninterference in internal affairs,” which endears it to regimes that receive criticism from Western governments over 

their human rights records. However, Chinese diplomats 

have also been careful to maintain low profiles and adhere 

to noncommittal positions on controversial regional issues.

The Chinese government regularly engages the Middle East’s major regional organizations such as the Gulf 

Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), often sending 

senior leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier 

Wen Jiabao to their conferences. This engagement has facilitated the growing economic exchanges between China 

and the member-states of these organizations, but also occasionally serves some of China’s strategic interests. For 

example, in 2009, after the Chinese government cracked 

down on rioters in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang province, it received OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu on a visit to the troubled region. He refrained from 

criticizing the Chinese government and only expressed 

hope that “development on the cultural field will go hand 

in hand with the economic field.”15 This provided China 

with significant political cover and helped smooth over relations with Middle Eastern governments.

Soft Power. China’s soft power—the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through the attractiveness of its 

culture, political ideals, and policies—is yet another important facet of its influence in the Middle East. From an 

historical standpoint, the ancient Silk Road legacy provides a positive point of connection between China and 
4 SF No. 271 www.ndu.edu/inss

the Middle East, while the CCP’s actual involvement in 

the region’s turbulent modern history has been minimal. 

Both Chinese and Middle Eastern officials regularly invoke the Silk Road reference in their present-day dealings with each other.16 The Chinese development model, 

which has produced economic growth while maintaining 

regime stability, particularly appeals to Middle Eastern 

governments, especially in comparison to Western calls 

for both political and economic reforms.

Among the general public in the Middle East, 

multiple opinion polls have indicated that China’s image is consistently viewed more positively than that of 

the United States. An Arab youth survey conducted by 

a Dubai-based public relations agency in 2009 revealed 

that China received higher favorability ratings than the 

United States among 18-24 year-olds.17 Likewise, Pew 

Global Attitude Project surveys from 2005 onward show 

favorable views of China ranging between 45 and 53 

percent, while those of the United States languish between 19 and 38 percent.18 Similar findings from the 

BBC World Service Opinion Poll in 2010 show that 43 

percent of those surveyed viewed Chinese influence as 

positive versus 29 percent for the United States.19 Finally, 

in the Brookings Arab Public Opinion Poll conducted in 

2010, when asked for one’s preference of a superpower, 

China advanced from its third-place ranking in 2009 to 

second place, while the United States remained second 

to last.20

These positive, albeit idealized, views of China’s culture, economy, and political policies have resulted in rising 

interest in Chinese language study. A growing number of 

Middle Eastern businessmen feel that learning Chinese 

is essential for their future business interests. Confucius 

Institutes, organizations funded by Beijing to teach Chinese language and culture abroad, are already operating in 

Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Morocco. The 

newest one opened in the UAE in March 2011.

Another source of Chinese soft power in the Middle 

East is the presence of over 21 million Muslims within 

China’s own borders. The Hui ethnic group makes up 

about 45 percent of this population. Originally descendants of Persian and Arab traders who migrated to China during the Silk Road era, they have largely integrated 

into Chinese society while maintaining a distinct Muslim identity. Many of them are able to speak Arabic due 

to Qur’anic instruction received in religious schools, so 

an increasing number have found work as translators for 

Middle Eastern traders in China.

Potential Sources of Backlash

One of the features underlying Chinese influence in 

the Middle East is that Beijing is generally welcomed 

and viewed as nonthreatening by the region’s governments and their people. That said, certain Chinese policies and practices have stirred resentment on multiple 

occasions and could serve to undermine the country’s 

influence over the long term if left unmanaged. In some 

ways, Chinese strengths in the economic and political 

spheres have proven to be double-edged swords as well.

For example, the Middle East’s burgeoning trade 

with China has benefited the region’s oil-exporting governments as well as consumers in the form of lower prices 

for imported Chinese goods. However, local nontechnical 

industries have struggled to compete with their Chinese 

counterparts and have suffered as a result. During a session of the Iranian parliament in July 2010, a lawmaker 

complained that Chinese imports posed a “serious threat” 

to domestic businesses.21 Palestinian businesses that produce the iconic kaffiyeh headscarves are being underpriced 

by Chinese offerings by as much as 40 percent, which has 

led to the shuttering of all but one Palestinian factory. In 

Egypt, Chinese dominance of the marble industry has put 

nearly 90 percent of local factories out of business. Many 

lanterns that are hung in Egyptian homes during Ramadan are also now imported from China, threatening the 

economic survival of local craftsmen.

The typical practice of Chinese contractors bringing 

in their own laborers to work on infrastructure projects 

further exacerbates the Middle East’s high unemployment. In 2009, simmering resentment in Algeria against 

Chinese construction workers exploded into violent 

clashes.22 A Chinese company and its workers operating 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 271 5 

in an Iraqi oil field were threatened and attacked by local residents who were angry over failing to receive any 

benefits in the form of jobs or monetary compensation.23

Similar dynamics have surfaced in other developing 

countries such as Zambia and Angola, where the Chinese are active in resource extraction.

China’s heavy-handed policies towards its predominantly Muslim Uighur population in Xinjiang could also 

hurt its relations with the Middle East. While reactions 

from Middle Eastern governments to Beijing’s handling 

of the Xinjiang riots last year were largely muted, there 

were two notable exceptions. Turkey’s Prime Minister 

Tayyip Erdogan labeled the crackdown “a kind of genocide,”24 and senior clerics in Iran leveled criticism at 

China in their public sermons. These remarks reflected 

a certain level of popular anger in some countries, especially in Turkey due to the Uighurs’ Turkic origins. The 

crackdown also drew condemnation and vows of revenge 

from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Despite the 

negative repercussions, the Chinese government regards 

maintaining tight control over Xinjiang as essential to 

national security. Consequently, there is little room for 

any compromise that could substantively resolve Uighur 

grievances against the government.

As China increases its influence in the Middle 

East, its refusal to take sides on political issues may 

also end up angering regional governments. For example, in an annual China–Arab League forum held 

in May, the Arab participants were rebuffed in their 

attempts to have the Chinese sign off on a joint statement declaring East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Arab League Secretary-General Amr 

Musa expressed his displeasure, stating, “When we 

talk about political coordination, we are talking about 

issues of interests to China. China’s interests are served 

if we support it in these issues. Also, we want China to 

support us in issues that concern us. These two things 

have to go hand in hand.”25 These sentiments show 

that while China’s reluctance to broach politics can 

endear the country to Middle Eastern governments 

weary of Western calls for democratic reform, it can 

also engender displeasure when expectations for “political coordination” grow.

A Shifting Strategic Environment

While the United States is still the predominant 

external actor in the Middle East, China’s growing presence will affect the U.S. ability to maneuver and influence 

events in the region. To be sure, China currently sees its 

interests best served by accommodating U.S. primacy in 

the Middle East rather than challenging it. However, at 

the same time, the CCP also wishes to cultivate an image 

as a “responsible” international actor or major power, and 

this will mean deepening its involvement in the region. It 

is this desire that has Beijing playing a more visible role 

in Middle Eastern affairs by, for example, appointing a 

special envoy to the Middle East, taking part in antipiracy patrols, and sending a peacekeeping force to Lebanon.

This dynamic has not been lost on Middle Eastern 

governments as they increasingly seek to enlist and sway 

Chinese support toward their political and security issues. For example, when the UN Security Council was 

deliberating over sanctions on Iran in mid-2010, Israel 

sent a delegation to Beijing in an attempt to persuade 

the Chinese government to lend its full support to the 

sanctions effort. At the same time, the Israelis warned of 

energy supply disruptions in the event of an Israeli military strike against Iran. In another issue involving Iran, 

China’s National People’s Congress invited the speaker 

of the UAE Federal National Council in September to 

present the emirates’ case for gaining control of three islands in the Persian Gulf that Iran currently occupies. 

The UAE hailed China’s offer to mediate the dispute.26

Thus far, China has maintained a careful balance 

and managed to avoid taking any clear sides in political 

disputes. However, this position may not be sustainable 

as Chinese involvement and influence in the Middle 

East grow. In the past, joint press statements issued by 

Chinese and Middle Eastern officials often affirmed 

support for Beijing’s one China principle, an issue that 

is a “core interest” to the CCP.27 Middle Eastern governments may wish to start using this, among other 
6 SF No. 271 www.ndu.edu/inss

things, as a bargaining chip to gain Chinese support 

for certain political issues. Amr Musa alluded to such a 

possibility when he stated, “If you protect my interests, 

I will protect yours. If you take a position that does not 

reflect that will, I will take a similar position.”28

Not only are Middle Eastern countries seeking to 

gain Chinese support in their regional disputes, but 

they also increasingly see relations with China as a 

way to establish a measure of independence from the 

United States. For example, Saudi Arabia has been one 

of the most important U.S. regional partners since the 

1970s. However, Saudi Arabia has also been eagerly developing its relations with China. After King Abdullah 

acceded to the throne in 2006, he chose China as the 

destination for his first international trip. More significantly, this also marked the first time that a Saudi 

king had ever visited China. The need to maintain this 

close relationship is understandable since China surpassed the United States as the top buyer of Saudi oil in 

2009.29 While the United States is still Saudi Arabia’s 

primary security partner, the Chinese have become the 

Kingdom’s largest economic partner.

All of these dynamics portend a future in which 

Chinese policies in the Middle East may eventually 

run up against those of the United States. In fact, a 

former Chinese special envoy to the Middle East recently wrote, “Bilateral quarrels and clashes [between 

the United States and China] are unavoidable.”30 The 

U.S. Middle East policy will have to increasingly take 

into account China’s growing presence and influence in 

the region. Differences are likely to arise, but debilitating conflicts are not necessarily inevitable if the two 

powers take proactive steps to engage each other and 

manage their interests, some of which are convergent, 

in the region.

Recommendations

Although the United States and China hold differing interests and priorities in the Middle East, areas of 

convergence exist that could provide opportunities for 

positive engagement and cooperation. U.S. strategic interests in the region as outlined in the 2010 National 

Security Strategy include:31

◆ cooperating with regional governments in counterterrorism

◆ maintaining access to energy

◆ ensuring the security and stability of U.S. allies and 

partners 

◆ pursuing nonproliferation, especially in the case of Iran 

◆ working toward Arab-Israeli peace 

◆ supporting the integration of the region into global markets.

The Chinese government has not officially articulated its Middle East interests in such a document, but 

writings from China’s academics and its activities in the 

region point to the following priorities:

◆ securing access to energy sources 

◆ developing markets for Chinese exports of goods 

and labor

◆ combating terrorist support for Uighur separatists 

◆ obtaining diplomatic support from Middle East 

governments against Taiwan.

As the priorities show, the United States and China, as the world’s first- and second-largest consumers of 

energy, share a vital interest in stable and secure energy 

sources in the Middle East. However, they hold different 

approaches toward achieving their goal of energy security. 

The United States has sought to bolster the reliability of 

the international energy market, while China prefers acquiring equity stakes in energy exploration and production projects. Nevertheless, there are still some areas where 

cooperation would yield benefits to both countries:

◆ Strengthen the international energy market. In order to reduce any zero-sum competitive dynamics 

for Middle Eastern energy resources, the United 

States will need to perform actions that reassure 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 271 7 

China about the reliability of the international energy market. A good first step was taken during the 

May 2010 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The two sides issued the U.S.-China Joint 

Statement on Energy Security Cooperation, which 

declared the importance of establishing “open, 

transparent, highly efficient, and competitive energy 

markets” and outlined steps for formal cooperation 

between the U.S. Energy Information Administration and China’s National Energy Administration in 

data sharing and technical assistance.32 Washington 

and Beijing should continue to build in substantive 

ways upon this initial foundation.

◆ Improve the long-term security of shipping lanes. 

The United States and China have worked together 

effectively at a tactical level to counter piracy in the 

Gulf of Aden since 2009. Further cooperation is possible for a long-term solution to the piracy problem 

that would involve economic development of Africa’s eastern coastline and maritime infrastructure. 

This would tackle the challenge in a comprehensive, 

long-term way that addresses not only security, but 

also the poverty and economic underdevelopment 

that are at the root of the piracy problem. For China, 

this effort would also complement its already extensive economic activities in Africa as well as lay the 

groundwork for the improvement or construction of 

port facilities that could be used to safely refuel and 

resupply ships from China and other nations.

While the United States and China can potentially 

cooperate on energy security, the two sides’ interests will 

most likely diverge in other areas. The issue of applying 

sanctions to Iran illustrates how U.S. interests in nonproliferation and ensuring Israel’s security might conflict with China’s interest in gaining access to Iranian oil 

and developing an export market for its arms industry. 

Potential negative effects of this and other differences 

can be managed through the following approaches:

◆ Reinvigorate dialogue on Middle East issues between the State Department and the Chinese 

Foreign Ministry to discuss each side’s interests, expectations, and red lines in areas such as arms sales, 

nonproliferation, the Middle East peace process, 

and counterterrorism cooperation. Identifying converging interests could form the basis for addressing 

more challenging issues.

◆ Maintain U.S. military commitment to the Middle East. While the U.S. military’s presence in the 

Middle East is often singled out as a source of 

resentment for extremists, U.S. commitment ultimately underwrites not only the security of U.S. 

allies and partners, but also ensures the freedom 

of navigation and safety of commercial shipping 

in Middle Eastern waters. China recognizes that 

it benefits significantly from these effects and 

would be hesitant to jeopardize this state of affairs 

through any actions that would directly frustrate 

U.S. interests in the region.

The National Security Strategy’s prescribed approach toward China is to both pursue a “positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship” and “prepare 

accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies . . . 

are not negatively affected.” This two-handed strategy 

is also how the United States should deal with China’s 

emergence in the Middle East. Pursuing cooperation 

and proactive engagement with Beijing on the one hand 

while solidifying U.S. hard power primacy in the region 

on the other will ensure that China’s rising influence can 

be shaped to contribute to peace, stability, and development in the Middle East. 

Notes 1 The World Bank World Development Indicators and Global 

Development Finance database, available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>. 

2 Tom Doggett and Susan Cornwell, “Lawmaker Wary of China/Iran Ties,” Reuters, September 20, 2010, available at <http://www.

webcitation.org/5xRqvofsD>. See also Mark Dubowitz and Laura 

Grossman, “Iran’s Chinese Energy Partners: Companies Eligible for 

Investigation under U.S. Sanctions Law,” Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, September 2010, available at <www.iranenergyproject.

org/documents/1674.pdf>.

3 This and other trade statistics were compiled from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics database.
8 SF No. 271 www.ndu.edu/inss

4 “Chinese Firms Boost African Investment,” China Daily, April 

21, 2010, available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRr05pBB>.

5 Ahmed Aldabba, “Made-in-China Products Still Present in 

Gaza,” Xinhua, February 13, 2010, available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRr68t0o>.

6 “China Global Investment Tracker: 2010,” The Heritage 

Foundation, available at <www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/

china-global-investment-tracker-2010>.

7 Alfred De Montesquiou, “Algeria Getting Makeover Thanks 

to China, New Airport, Mall, Prison,” Associated Press, January 18, 

2010, available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRrOThUB>.

8 For example, see Chris Zambelis, “China Tests Its Mettle in 

Syria,” Asia Times, November 6, 2008, available at <www.atimes.com/

atimes/China/JK06Ad02.html>.

9 Mahmoud Habboush, “Middle Kingdom Visits Middle East 

as Chinese Navy Docks at Port Zayed,” The National, March 25, 2010, 

available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRs5XI48>; “Chinese 

Naval Warships Pay Five-Day Visit to Egypt,” Xinhua, July 26, 2010, 

available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRs84ZAr>.

10 Anshel Pfeffer, “Growing Ties between Turkey, China, Iran 

Worry Israel and U.S.,” Haaretz, October 7, 2010, available at <http://

www.webcitation.org/5xRsCVbGH>.

11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms 

Transfers Database, available at <www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

12 Stephen Blank, “China’s Rising Profile in International Arms 

Sales,” China Brief, December 16, 2009, available at <http://www.

webcitation.org/5xRsFQL0V>.

13 UNIFIL, available at <http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.

aspx?tabid=1504>; and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, available at <www.sipri.org/databases/pko>.

14 “Chinese Navy Off on Historic Anti-Piracy Mission,” Agence 

France Presse, December 26, 2008, available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRsHCdTm>.

15 “OIC Chief Urges Cultural Sensitivity in Xinjiang,” Agence 

France Presse, June 23, 2010, available at <http://www.webcitation.

org/5xRsJ3XOe>.

16 For example, see Ming Jinwei, “Iranian Ambassador Sees Great 

Potential for Iran-China Co-op,” Xinhua, September 20, 2010, available 

at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRsLJ9BQ>; “Full Text of Chinese 

Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech at the Arab League,” Xinhua, November 

7, 2009, available at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRsMvl4e>.

17 “Highlights of the Second ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab 

Youth Survey,” ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, March 7, 2010, available 

at <www.arabyouthsurvey.com/downloads/highlights2009.pdf>.

18 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, available 

at <http://pewglobal.org/>.

19 “Global Views of United States Improve While Other 

Countries Decline,” BBC, April 18, 2010, available at <http://www.

webcitation.org/5xRsYPfUl>.

20 Shibley Telhami, “2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll: Results of 

Arab Opinion Survey Conducted June 29–July 20, 2010,” The Brookings Institution, August 5, 2010, available at <http://www.webcitation.

org/5xRsacJim>.

21 Reihaneh Mazaheri, “Energy Trumps All in Iran-China 

Ties,” Asia Times, September 14, 2010, available at <www.atimes.com/

atimes/Middle_East/LI14Ak02.html>.

22 “Chinese Migrants in Algiers Clash,” BBC News, August 4, 

2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8184499.stm>.

23 Timothy Williams, “China Oil Deal Is New Source of Strife 

Among Iraqis,” The New York Times, September 5, 2009, available at 

<http://www.webcitation.org/5xRstFlKg>.

24 “Turkey Attacks China ‘Genocide,’” BBC News, July 10, 2009, 

available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8145451.stm>.

25 “China Refuses to Support Arab Claims over East Jerusalem,” 

Al Jazeera TV, May 14, 2010, available at <http://www.webcitation.

org/5xRt7hlDh>.

26 Kareem Shaheen, “China Asks UAE to Argue Case for 

Islands Occupied by Iran,” The National, September 21, 2010, available 

at <http://www.webcitation.org/5xRtboB1F>.

27 Beijing’s one China policy states that the People’s Republic of 

China is the sole legitimate government of the Chinese people and 

that Taiwan is an “inalienable” part of China. When Beijing asks governments to publicly declare their support for the one China policy, it 

implies that the governments will forego any official contacts with the 

Taiwanese government. For more information, see “The One-China 

Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000),” Taiwan Affairs Office and the 

Information Office of the State Council, February 2000, available at 

<http://www.webcitation.org/5xRte6GCr>.

28 “China Refuses to Support Arab Claims over East Jerusalem.” 

29 Henry Meyer, “China and Saudi Arabia Form Stronger Trade 

Ties,” The New York Times, April 20, 2010, available at <http://www.

webcitation.org/5xRu4BwHf>.

30 “What Will China’s Rising Influence Mean for the Middle 

East Region?” The Daily Star, October 1, 2009.

31 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, May 2010, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/

default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.

32 Department of State, “U.S.-China Joint Statement on Energy 

Security Cooperation,” May 25, 2010, available at <www.state.gov/r/

pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142179.htm>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS