a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Financial Management, 

the Budget, and International Security, 

Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate

May 2003 NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

U.S. and International 

Assistance Efforts to 

Control Sealed 

Radioactive Sources 

Need Strengthening

GAO-03-638
The precise number of sealed sources in use is unknown because many 

countries do not systematically account for them. However, nearly 

10 million sealed sources exist in the United States and the 49 countries 

responding to a GAO survey. There is also limited information about the 

number of sealed sources that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned, but it is 

estimated to be in the thousands worldwide. Many of the most vulnerable 

sealed sources that could pose a security risk are located in the countries of 

the former Soviet Union. 

All of the 49 countries that responded to GAO’s survey reported that they 

have established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. 

However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Departments of 

State and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Commission told 

GAO that countries’ controls over sealed sources vary greatly and are 

weakest among less developed countries. 

In fiscal year 2002, DOE established a program focusing on improving the 

security of sealed sources in the former Soviet Union and has started to fund 

security upgrades in Russia and other former Soviet countries. The 

Departments of Defense and State and NRC also have programs to help 

countries strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE plans to expand its 

program to other countries and regions in 2003 and is developing a plan to 

guide its efforts. However, the department has not fully coordinated its 

efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a 

governmentwide strategy is established. In addition, as of January 2003, the 

majority of DOE’s program expenditures totaling $8.9 million were spent by 

DOE’s national laboratories in the United States. 

Abandoned Electrical Generators Containing Large Amounts of Radioactive Strontium-90 in 

a Former Soviet Union Country 

Sealed radioactive sources, 

radioactive material encapsulated 

in stainless steel or other metal, are 

used worldwide in medicine, 

industry, and research. These 

sealed sources pose a threat to 

national security because terrorists 

could use them to make “dirty 

bombs.” GAO was asked to 

determine (1) the number of sealed 

sources worldwide and how many 

have been reported lost, stolen, or 

abandoned; (2) the controls, both 

legislative and regulatory, used by 

countries that possess sealed 

sources; and (3) the assistance 

provided by the Department of 

Energy (DOE) and other U.S. 

federal agencies to strengthen 

other countries’ control over sealed 

sources and the extent to which 

these efforts are believed to be 

effectively implemented. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Energy (1) develop a 

comprehensive plan for DOE to 

guide its future efforts, (2) take the 

lead in developing a 

governmentwide plan to strengthen 

controls over other countries’ 

sealed sources; and (3) strengthen 

efforts to increase program 

expenditures in the countries 

requiring assistance. 

DOE agreed with our 

recommendations to strengthen the 

program but believes it has fully 

coordinated with other federal 

agencies. DOE’s contention is 

contrary to other agencies’ views. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-638, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on Financial Management, the Budget, 

and International Security, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

May 2003

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

U.S. and International Assistance Efforts 

to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources 

Need Strengthening 
Page i GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

The Number of Sealed Sources in Use and Lost, Stolen, or 

Abandoned Worldwide Is Unknown 7

Countries Have Established Legislative and Regulatory Controls 

over Sealed Sources, but Adequacy of Controls Varies 18

DOE Has a Program to Help Other Countries Secure Sealed Sources, 

but Strengthened Coordination and Planning Are Needed 23

Conclusions 37

Recommendations for Executive Action 38

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42

Appendix II: Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries 44

Appendix III: List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and Responses 61

Appendix IV: Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving Sealed 

Sources 65

Appendix V: Information About Accidents Involving Sealed Sources 74

Appendix VI: Information on Producers and Distributors of Radioactive 

Material 83

Appendix VII: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Policy on Exports of 

Sealed Sources 85

Appendix VIII: Results of the International Conference on the Security of 

Radioactive Sources 88

Appendix IX: Information on IAEA’s Revised Categorization of Radioactive 

Sources 91

Appendix X: Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model Project Program 93

Appendix XI: France’s System for Controlling Sealed Sources 96

Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Energy 98

Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of State 99

Appendix XIV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 102

Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 104
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Tables Table 1: Regional Distribution of Sealed Sources in Countries 

Responding to GAO’s Survey on the Security of 

Radioactive Sealed Sources 8

Table 2: Reported Lost or Stolen and Recovered Sealed Sources 12

Table 3: Estimated Number of Radioisotope Thermoelectric 

Generators in the Former Soviet Union 15

Table 4: Assistance to Improve Controls over Radioactive Sources 

through January 31, 2003 31

Table 5: Radiological Threat Reduction Program Expenditures by 

DOE’s National Laboratories as of January 31, 2003 35

Table 6: Countries Surveyed and Surveys Received 61

Table 7: Significant Seizures of Illicitly Trafficked Sealed Sources 

Since 1993 69

Table 8: Selected Accidents Involving Sealed Sources Since 1983 75

Table 9: Estimated Costs Related to the Accident in Mexico 76

Table 10: Major Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material 

Used to Manufacture Sealed Sources 83

Table 11: Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model Project 

Program 93

Figures Figure 1: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Manufactured 

in the Former Soviet Union 14

Figure 2: Abandoned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator in 

Russia 16

Figure 3: Seed Irradiators Used in the Former Soviet Union 17

Figure 4: Moscow Radon Building Scheduled for DOE-Funded 

Security Upgrades 25

Figure 5: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades in the Former 

Soviet Union 26

Figure 6: Reported International Trafficking Incidents Involving 

Radioactive Sources, 1993-2002 66

Figure 7: Illicit Trafficking Incidents by Type of Radioactive 

Source, 1993-2002 67

Figure 8: Contaminated Radioactive Debris from Demolished 

Residences in Goiania 78

Figure 9: Location Where Sealed Sources Were Found, Lilo, 

Georgia 80
Contents

Page iii GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

GAO General Accounting Office

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

MINATOM Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

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Page 1 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

May 16, 2003 Letr

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Financial Management,

 the Budget, and International Security

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Akaka:

Since September 11, 2001, U.S. and international nuclear safety and 

security experts have raised concerns that terrorists could obtain 

radioactive material used in medicine, research, agriculture, and industry 

to construct a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb.” This 

radioactive material is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal, such as stainless 

steel, titanium, or platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called 

a sealed radioactive source. These sealed sources are used throughout the 

United States and other countries in equipment designed to, among other 

things, diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws and other 

failures in pipeline welds, and determine the moisture content of soil. 

Depending on their use, sealed sources contain different types of 

radioactive material, such as strontium-90, cobalt-60, cesium-137, 

plutonium-238, and plutonium-239. If these sealed sources fell into the 

hands of terrorists, they could use them to produce a simple and crude, but 

potentially dangerous, weapon by packaging explosives, such as dynamite, 

with the radioactive material, which would be dispersed when the bomb 

went off. Depending on the type, amount, and form (powder or solid), the 

dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness for people 

nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and social 

disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the 

contaminated area. 
Page 2 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Given the concerns about the security of sealed sources worldwide, you 

asked us to determine, to the extent possible (1) the number of sealed 

sources worldwide and how many are reported lost, stolen, or abandoned; 

(2) the controls, both legislative and regulatory, used by countries that 

possess sealed sources; and (3) the assistance provided by the Department 

of Energy (DOE) and other U.S. federal agencies to strengthen other 

countries’ control over sealed sources and the extent to which these efforts 

are believed to be effectively implemented. To address these objectives, 

we distributed a survey to 127 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)1

member states to determine, among other things, how countries control 

sealed sources. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology, 

appendix II presents the results of the survey, and appendix III contains a 

list of the countries we sent the survey to, including those that responded 

to it. We also met with or had discussions with officials from several 

countries to learn more about how they regulate and control sealed sources 

and met with officials from international organizations, such as IAEA and 

the European Commission,2

 to obtain their views on the problem of 

uncontrolled sealed sources. A forthcoming report will address controls 

over sealed sources in the United States. We conducted our review from 

May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief The precise number of sealed sources that is in use today or that has been 

lost, stolen, or abandoned is unknown because many countries do not 

systematically account for them. Some estimates are available, however. 

For example, about 2 million licensed sealed sources are currently being 

used in the United States, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), and the 49 countries that responded to our survey reported that 

7.8 million sealed sources are in use. Limited information exists about the 

number of sealed sources that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned—

commonly referred to as “orphan sources”—but it is estimated to be in the 

thousands worldwide. In the United States, about 250 sealed sources or 

1

Affiliated with the United Nations, IAEA’s aims are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear 

energy and to verify that nuclear material under its supervision or control is not used to 

further any military purpose. 

2

As the European Union’s executive body, the European Commission has three main tasks: 

to serve as the sole initiator of policy, to act as guardian of the European Union treaties by 

investigating treaty breaches, and to supervise the implementation of European Union law 

in the member states. 
Page 3 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

devices containing sealed sources are reported lost or stolen annually, but 

the majority of these sources are recovered. The countries that responded 

to our survey said that a total of 612 sealed sources had been reported lost 

or stolen since 1995, 254 of which had not been recovered. U.S. and 

international nuclear safety and security experts told us that the largest 

number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources is located in the 

former Soviet Union. Of particular concern are as many as 12 electrical 

generators that were abandoned in the Republic of Georgia. These 

generators are powered by high activity levels (ranging from 40,000 to 

150,000 curies) of strontium-90—a destructive radioactive material. 

Recently, the United States and other countries—and IAEA—located and 

secured most of these generators believed to exist in Georgia. However, 

more than 1,000 additional generators that are not adequately protected 

and pose a significant security risk are spread throughout the former Soviet 

Union. 

All of the countries that responded to our survey reported that they have 

established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. 

However, nuclear safety and security experts from DOE, the Department of 

State, the Department of Defense (DOD), NRC, IAEA, and the European 

Commission told us that controls on radioactive sources vary greatly 

between countries and focus primarily on protecting public health and 

safety rather than on securing sealed sources from theft or destructive use. 

These experts also told us that controls over sealed sources are weakest 

among less developed countries. For example, representatives from 

several countries of the former Soviet Union told us that their national 

systems of control need improvement, particularly regarding inventorying, 

consolidating and securing, and transporting sealed sources. Because of 

concerns about many countries’ inability to control radioactive materials—

IAEA has estimated that as many as 110 countries worldwide do not have 

adequate controls over sealed sources—IAEA established a program to 

help 88 countries enhance their regulatory infrastructures. Although the 

program has helped countries improve their regulatory controls, many 

participating countries continue to have numerous regulatory deficiencies. 

In the absence of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been 

inadequately protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to 

the export or import controls of sources; and basic record keeping has 

been lacking. Finally, officials from the Department of State, the European 

Commission, and IAEA told us that France has implemented a system for 

controlling sealed sources that could serve as a model for other countries. 

France’s system requires distributors of sealed sources to assume financial 

responsibility for recovering and disposing of them. 
Page 4 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE and other U.S. agencies have funded programs to strengthen controls 

over sealed sources in other countries. DOE, which has the largest 

program, received about $37 million since fiscal year 2002 to initiate a 

program to assist other countries in controlling their sealed sources. 

According to DOE officials, the program is expected to receive an 

additional $22 million in supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003, 

including $5 million for securing nuclear material in Iraq. DOE established 

a program focusing on improving the security of sites containing sealed 

sources in the former Soviet Union because that is where DOE believed the 

greatest threat exists. DOE has begun funding site assessments and 

security upgrades at several locations in Russia, Uzbekistan, the Republic 

of Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. In Russia, for example, DOE has 

focused on securing sources at several large nuclear waste repositories 

scattered around the country. Furthermore, the Secretary of Energy 

recently announced that the program will expand to other regions of the 

world. Other U.S. federal agencies have begun efforts to help countries 

strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. Since fiscal year 2001, 

DOD has obligated about $1.7 million to inventory, secure, and dispose of 

sealed sources in Kazakhstan. In fiscal year 2002, the State Department 

received appropriations totaling about $1.2 million primarily to support 

IAEA projects on the safety and security of sealed sources. Finally, the 

NRC received about $250,000 from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) to help Armenia develop a registry of sealed sources 

and improve Armenia’s legislative and regulatory framework for controlling 

sources. 

DOE’s initial efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate 

planning and coordination, and the majority of the program funds were 

spent in the United States rather than in the countries of the former Soviet 

Union. DOE is in the process of developing a plan to guide its efforts. 

However, DOE officials told us that more detailed planning and analysis 

will be needed to, among other things, (1) determine which countries 

outside the former Soviet Union present the greatest security risk and most 

urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding requirements, and 

(3) develop performance measures to gauge program success. In addition, 

Department of State and NRC officials told us that DOE has not fully 

coordinated its efforts with their agencies. In their view, DOE needs their 

input to ensure that a comprehensive governmentwide strategy is taken to, 

among other things, leverage program resources, maximize available 

expertise, avoid possible duplication of effort, and help ensure future 

program success. DOE has not systematically undertaken the kind of 

comprehensive planning that would foster better coordination with the 
Page 5 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

other agencies and could also lead to better coordination with other 

countries’ nuclear organizations. For example, officials from Russia’s 

nuclear regulatory organization, Gosatomnadzor, told us that DOE did not 

adequately consult them when it initially selected sites in Russia for 

security improvements. Regarding DOE’s effort to secure sealed sources in 

the former Soviet Union, as of January 31, 2003, DOE had spent about 

$8.9 million, including $3 million transferred to IAEA. Of the remaining 

$5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent was spent in the United States by 

DOE’s national laboratories. DOE officials told us that the program is still 

in its early stages and that the objective of the program is to place a 

significant percentage of funds in the recipient countries to improve 

security. 

This report makes recommendations designed to improve the management 

of DOE’s efforts to help improve controls over sealed sources. Specifically, 

it recommends that DOE (1) develop a comprehensive plan that identifies 

those countries that most urgently require assistance, establish realistic 

time frames and resources necessary to accomplish program goals, and 

establish meaningful performance measures; (2) take the lead in 

developing a governmentwide plan designed to, among other things, 

improve interagency coordination; and (3) strengthen its efforts to increase 

program expenditures in the countries requiring assistance. 

Background Sealed sources are used throughout the world for a variety of peaceful 

purposes. Until the 1950s, only naturally occurring radioactive materials, 

such as radium-226, were available to be used in sealed sources. Since 

then, sealed sources containing radioactive material produced artificially in 

nuclear reactors and accelerators have become widely available, including 

cobalt-60, strontium-90, cesium-137, and iridium-192. Radioactive material 

can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt-60 is a metal, while the 

cesium-137 in many sealed sources is in a powdery form closely resembling 

talc. Radioactive materials are measured by their level of activity. The 

greater the activity level—measured in units called curies3

—the more 

radiation emitted, which increases the potential risk to public health and 

safety if improperly used or controlled. The intensity of radioactive 

3

The curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear physics, it is 

precisely defined as the amount of substance in which 37 billion atoms per second undergo 

radioactive disintegration. In the international system of units, the becquerel is the 

preferred unit of radioactivity. One curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels. 
Page 6 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

materials decays over time at various rates. The term “half-life” is used to 

indicate the period during which the radioactivity decreases by half as a 

result of decay. 

Usually, radioactive material with high radioactivity is placed in a sealed 

container to prevent leakage of the material itself. Because of the varied 

characteristics of the radioactive material—physical structure (metal, 

ceramic, or powder), activity level, half-life, and type of radiation emitted, 4

some materials pose a greater risk to people, property, and the 

environment than others. According to IAEA, the level of protection 

provided to users of the radioactive material should be commensurate with 

the safety and security risks that it presents if improperly used. For 

example, radioactive materials used for certain diagnostic purposes have 

low levels of activity and do not present a significant safety or security risk. 

However, powerful sealed sources, such as those used in radiotherapy 

(cancer treatment) that use cobalt-60, cesium-137, or iridium-192, could 

pose a greater threat to the public and the environment and would also 

pose a potentially more significant security risk, particularly if acquired to 

produce a dirty bomb. 

The small size, portability, and potential value of sealed sources make them 

vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal, and theft. According to IAEA, 

illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material, including sealed 

sources, has increased worldwide in recent years: IAEA reported 272 cases 

of illicit trafficking in these sources from 1993 to the end of 2002. (See 

app. IV for more information about illicit trafficking incidents.) While no 

dirty bombs have been detonated, in the mid-1990s Chechen separatists 

placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park. Although the 

device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the 

incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to 

use sealed sources as weapons of terror. 

U.S. and international experts have noted that some accidents involving 

sealed sources can provide a measure of understanding of what the 

4

Radioactive material emits alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, neutrons, or a 

combination thereof. For example, americium-241 emits alpha particles and gamma rays; 

cobalt-60 emits beta particles and gamma rays; and strontium-90 emits only beta particles. 

Alpha particles are not a hazard outside of the body; beta particles can be more penetrating 

and cause radiation damage. Both, however, are generally most hazardous when ingested or 

inhaled. Gamma rays are an external hazard because they can easily pass through clothing 

and skin. Neutron particles are less common but can also cause damage.
Page 7 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

possible impacts of a dirty bomb might be. In 1987, an accident involving a 

cesium-137 sealed source in Brazil killed four people, injured many more, 

and caused about $36 million in damages to the local economy. This 

accident had such an enormous psychological impact on the local 

population that the atomic symbol was added to the region’s flag as a 

lasting reminder of the accident’s consequences. Appendix V contains 

more information about worldwide accidents involving sealed sources. 

The Number of Sealed 

Sources in Use and 

Lost, Stolen, or 

Abandoned Worldwide 

Is Unknown 

The precise number of sealed sources that is in use worldwide is unknown 

because many countries do not systematically account for them. The lack 

of a full accounting of sealed sources makes it equally difficult to determine 

the number that has been lost, stolen, or abandoned—referred to as 

“orphan sources.” Orphan sources, which are estimated to number in the 

thousands worldwide, are considered by U.S. and international officials to 

pose significant health, safety, and security risks because they are outside 

of regulatory control. According to U.S. and international safety and 

security experts, one of the most urgent problems is locating and securing 

orphan sources in the former Soviet Union because they pose a significant 

security risk. 

The Number of Sealed 

Sources in Use Worldwide Is 

Unknown Because 

Countries Do Not 

Systematically Account for 

Them

The number of sealed sources in use worldwide is unknown, but some 

estimates are available. According to IAEA, millions of sealed radioactive 

sources have been distributed worldwide over the past 50 years. 

Approximately 2 million licensed sealed sources are in use in the United 

States, according to the NRC. In addition, according to the European 

Commission, approximately 500,000 sealed sources have been supplied to 

operators in the 15 member states of the European Union, of which about 

110,000 are currently in use. The European Commission also estimated in 

1999 that approximately 840,000 sealed sources exist in Russia, although 

Russian officials believe the total number is significantly higher. 

The 49 countries that responded to our survey reported a total of about 

7.8 million sealed sources that are in use within their countries. These 

sealed sources are used in various applications, such as industrial 

radiography and therapeutic medicine. Table 1 summarizes the responses 

received from the countries surveyed regarding the number of sealed 

sources in use and their major applications.
Page 8 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 1: Regional Distribution of Sealed Sources in Countries Responding to GAO’s 

Survey on the Security of Radioactive Sealed Sources

Source: GAO.

a

The United States was not surveyed for this report.

Several factors contribute to the lack of comprehensive information about 

the number of sealed sources worldwide. According to IAEA, many 

countries do not maintain accurate or complete inventories of sealed 

sources in use or registries of users of sources. In response to our survey, 

28 of the 49 countries said they had an inventory of sealed sources. In 

addition, 17 countries said they were in the process of developing an 

inventory. However, several countries that reported they had inventories 

indicated that the number of sources was estimated rather than actual. A 

few countries, including a European nation, indicated that they did not 

have the resources necessary to develop a national registry of sources and 

users.

An additional factor contributing to countries’ limited or incomplete 

inventories is that sealed sources have been imported and exported by 

distributors and governments without consistent monitoring or tracking by 

the suppliers, the recipients of the sources, or the appropriate regulatory 

Region

Number of sealed 

sources in use Major applications

Africa 834 Smoke detectors, academic/research, 

and fixed gauges

Asia 18,420 Fixed gauges, analytical instruments, 

and academic/research

Europe 4,866,024 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and 

academic/research

Former Soviet Union 20,344 Smoke detectors, irradiation, and 

academic/research

Middle East 6,545 Medical-diagnostic, 

academic/research, and portable 

gauges

North Americaa and 

Central America

2,887,025 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and 

academic/research

South America 2,836 Smoke detectors, fixed gauges, and 

medical-diagnostic

South Pacific 1,854 Industrial radiography, smoke 

detectors, and irradiation

Total 7,803,882
Page 9 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

authority. Appendix VI provides information on the major producers of 

sealed sources worldwide.

The Chairman of NRC noted in March 2003 that international commerce in 

these sources is extensive and that existing controls on imports and 

exports are minimal. For example, most U.S.-origin sealed sources are 

exported under a general license.5

 This means that in most instances, 

sealed sources are exported without NRC knowing the type, amount, or 

activity level of the sources, or their destination. (See app. VII for more 

information about NRC’s export regulations.) 

Sealed sources have also been distributed worldwide by a variety of means 

other than commercial trade without adequate monitoring and oversight. 

As a result, the sealed sources have not always been properly accounted 

for and accurately inventoried. For example, sealed sources have been 

(1) distributed by corporations working in developing countries without 

formal clearance from or approval by the recipient country’s regulatory 

authority, (2) donated by medical practitioners and nonprofit 

organizations, and (3) provided through international technical 

cooperation programs. IAEA has reported that international 

corporations—such as oil companies—have brought sealed sources used 

in oil exploration into developing countries. In some cases, there was no 

competent authority in the country to register or license the sealed 

sources, and existing national rules were regarded as too complicated or 

difficult for the corporations to follow. One African country reported in 

response to our survey that its inventory of sealed sources was incomplete 

because foreign construction companies had not notified the country’s 

regulatory authority when it imported sealed sources. 

According to IAEA, medical practitioners have brought sealed sources into 

developing countries for the purpose of establishing health clinics and 

hospitals and a number of sources were not properly accounted for. IAEA 

reported that hospitals in many developed countries donated large 

amounts of surplus radium-226 to hospitals in developing countries in the 

1960s. One African country responding to our survey noted that according 

to old records, radium had been imported into the country but could not be 

5

Under NRC regulations sealed sources may not be exported to certain countries and may 

only be exported to certain other countries in limited quantities. Sealed sources may not be 

exported to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan. 10 C.F.R. § 110.28. Sealed 

sources may be exported only in limited quantities to Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Burma, 

Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and Syria. 10 C.F.R.§ 110.29. 
Page 10 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

located. Nonprofit organizations have also provided medical equipment 

using sealed sources to foreign countries. For example, the American 

International Health Alliance, operating under a series of cooperative 

agreements with USAID and DOE, has donated medical supplies, 

pharmaceuticals, and equipment, including those containing sealed 

sources, to countries in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 

Europe since 1992.6

 According to an official from the American 

International Health Alliance, DOD also donated medical equipment 

containing sealed sources from field facilities to several countries in the 

former Soviet Union under the auspices of Operation Provide Hope. Since 

1992, over 500 airlift deliveries by DOD to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan occurred, but the exact 

number of sealed source devices donated is unknown.

IAEA has supplied sealed sources to many countries through its technical 

cooperation program.7

 In 1991, IAEA estimated that it had provided many 

developing countries with 565 sources since 1957. IAEA officials told us 

that IAEA had provided developing member states with over 1,000 devices 

containing sealed sources since 1996. Most of these sealed sources are not 

considered a security risk by IAEA because of their low radioactivity. 

However, officials did note that about 125 of the 1,000 devices contained 

sources that could pose security risks if acquired by terrorists. These 

include (1) teletherapy machines with cobalt-60 sources of activity 

between 5,000 and 7,000 curies, (2) brachytherapy machines with cesium137 sources of activity between 0.5 and 1 curie and iridium-192 sources of 

10 curies, (3) irradiators with cobalt-60 sources with activity in the range of 

12,000 to 200,000 curies, and (4) calibrators with activity around 4,000 

curies. IAEA officials said that they were uncertain, however, the extent to 

which the sealed sources have been included in countries’ inventories.

While it is the responsibility of each country—and not IAEA—to maintain 

accurate inventories of the sources, IAEA has encouraged many of its 

member states to establish and/or strengthen their radiation and waste 

6

The American International Health Alliance and its partners identify the health needs of 

local populations, develop strategies for meeting those needs, and implement programs and 

services to help local populations attain their goals. The equipment supplements voluntary 

and in-kind commitments of individual health care professionals, partner hospitals, and 

universities.

7

IAEA’s technical cooperation program is designed to provide its member states with 

technical assistance by providing equipment, expert services, and training that support the 

upgrading and establishment of nuclear techniques and facilities.
Page 11 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

safety infrastructures via the model project program. In addition, IAEA 

policy does not allow for the approval of any technical cooperation 

projects involving the use of significant sealed sources unless the member 

state in question has, among other things, an effective regulatory 

framework that includes a system of notification, authorization, and 

control of sealed sources together with an inventory of sources. IAEA’s 

model project program is discussed on pages 22 and 23 of this report. 

DOE has provided countries with sealed sources under the Atoms for 

Peace Program. According to a March 2002 DOE Inspector General report, 

Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign 

Countries, DOE could not fully account for sealed sources loaned to 

foreign countries and no longer maintained an accounting and tracking 

system for sealed sources. The report noted that DOE and its predecessor 

agencies provided 33 countries, including Iran, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, 

and Vietnam, with 536 sealed sources, which contained plutonium, from 

the 1950s through the 1970s. Initially, these materials were loaned to 

foreign facilities, and the U.S. government maintained ownership. 

However, in the 1960s, the U.S. government began transferring ownership 

through direct sale or donation, but it still retained title to much of the 

sealed sources provided to foreign entities. The report concluded that 

(1) the oversight of sealed sources was inadequate and that inaccurate 

inventory records limit DOE’s ability to protect nuclear materials from loss, 

theft, or other diversion, and (2) DOE should work with IAEA to establish 

adequate regulatory oversight of sealed sources in foreign countries. In its 

response to the report, DOE stated that it is not the current policy of the 

U.S. government to track sealed sources once they are in the control of 

foreign entities and that to track loaned sealed sources would require a 

change in policy and international agreements.

Limited Information Exists 

about the Number of Lost, 

Stolen, or Abandoned 

Sealed Sources

Because many countries cannot account for their sealed sources, there is 

limited information on the number of sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or 

abandoned—referred to as “orphan sources.” According to the Director 

General of IAEA, orphan sources are a widespread phenomenon, and 34 of 

the 49 countries responding to our survey indicated that orphan sources 

pose problems in their country. In the European Union, up to 70 sealed 

sources are lost among its member states annually. According to NRC, 

about 250 sealed sources or devices are lost or stolen in the United States 

annually, but the majority of the sources have been recovered. NRC said 

that the European Union does not report sources as being lost unless they 

are at a certain activity level that exceeds the NRC threshold for tracking 
Page 12 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

purposes. As a result, NRC typically reports a greater number of lost sealed 

sources than the European Union does. 

The problem of orphan sources is most significant in the countries of the 

former Soviet Union, where the collapse of the centralized Soviet 

government structure over a decade ago led to a loss of records and 

regulatory oversight over sealed sources. According to Russia’s nuclear 

regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, 51 sealed sources were reported lost in 

2002 and 245 were lost in 2000. No information was made available to us 

for 2001. In the Republic of Georgia, over 280 orphan sources have been 

recovered since the mid-1990s. Survey respondents reported that 612 

sources had been lost or stolen since 1995. Of the 612 reported orphan 

sources, 254 had not yet been recovered. Table 2 summarizes the number 

of lost, stolen, and recovered sources reported.

Table 2: Reported Lost or Stolen and Recovered Sealed Sources 

Source: GAO.

a The United States was not included in this survey.

Thirty-five of the 49 countries we surveyed indicated that they had an 

organized process to search for orphan sources, and several of these 

countries listed one or more organizations that are responsible for 

removing the sources once they have been found. However, the remaining 

14 countries, spread across different regions, reported that they did not 

have a similar process to search for orphaned sources. Four of the 14 

countries were located in Africa. 

Region

Reported lost or stolen 

sealed sources

Recovered sealed

sources

Africa 8 0

Asia 93 11

Europe 298 213

Former Soviet Union 35 14

Middle East 41 24

North Americaa and Central 

America 72 65

South America 21 10

South Pacific 44 21

Total 612 358
Page 13 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Six countries indicated that there were disincentives to finding orphaned 

sources. In particular, they noted that an individual who reports finding a 

source might be held responsible for paying for its disposal. Russian 

officials told us that facilities possessing sealed sources that are no longer 

used are responsible for disposal costs. The disposal fees are very high 

and, as a result, the users are reluctant to notify authorities about them and 

frequently opt to dispose of them illegally. 

Certain Lost, Stolen, or 

Abandoned Sealed Sources 

Pose a Significant Security 

Risk

According to U.S. and international safety and security experts, among the 

most urgent problems are the security risks posed by the approximately 

1,000 radioisotope thermoelectric generators located in the former Soviet 

Union. These generators were designed to provide electric power and are 

ideally suited for remote locations to power navigational facilities, such as 

lighthouses, radio beacons, and meteorological stations.8

 Each has activity 

levels ranging from 40,000 to 150,000 curies of strontium-90—similar to the 

amount of strontium-90 released from the Chernobyl accident in 1986. 

These generators pose a security risk because they may not be adequately 

protected or secured. An international effort was initiated about 2 years 

ago to recover and secure these generators in remote locations in the 

Republic of Georgia. Although the exact number of generators in Georgia 

is unknown, IAEA and Georgian officials told us that at least six generators 

have been recovered. 

8

The United States had also deployed a small number of radioistope thermoelectric 

generators in Alaska. 
Page 14 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 1: Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Manufactured in the Former 

Soviet Union

We met with the Russian organization that developed the radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators—the Russian National Technical Physics and 

Automation Research Institute. Institute officials told us that the 

generators pose a serious security and safety threat and should all be taken 

out of service. They noted that the units have a design service life of 10 to 

15 years and that no repair or maintenance has been done on any of these 

units since 1991. However, Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) 

officials said that the generators are technically sound and should not be 

completely removed from service without adequate replacement power. 

MINATOM officials said they are considering extending the life of the 

generators in order to keep them in service significantly longer than 

originally planned. Table 3 shows the estimated number of radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators located in the countries of the former Soviet 

Union.
Page 15 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 3: Estimated Number of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators in the 

Former Soviet Union

Sources: NRC, MINATOM, and Russian National Technical Physics Automation Research Institute.

a

The estimated number of generators in Georgia ranges from 6 to 12. 

b

Includes 829 that are operational and 169 that are in storage.

There have been numerous attempts to steal the sealed sources from these 

generators. For example, in recent years there have been six attempts to 

disassemble the generators in Kazakhstan and a number of similar events 

in Georgia and Russia. Some of the strontium-90 sealed sources from the 

generators have been found in residential areas. In a few instances, people 

who have stolen the sealed sources have used them for heating and 

cooking, and officials have speculated that the metal shielding might have 

been used to make bullets. In 2001, three woodsmen in Georgia who found 

the strontium-90 sealed source from an abandoned and dismantled 

generator used it as a heat source and suffered severe radiation burns. 

IAEA and DOE officials told us that other devices containing sealed 

sources, such as seed irradiators that were used in the former Soviet Union, 

pose significant security risks. Seed irradiators were mounted on trucks 

and used to irradiate seeds in order to kill fungus and inhibit germination. 

According to IAEA and DOE, each irradiator has activity levels of over 

1,000 curies of cesium-137 in powdery form (cesium chloride). 

Country

Radioisotope thermoelectric 

generators

Armenia 1

Azerbaijan 1

Belarus 3

Georgia 12a

Kazakhstan 3

Russia 998b

Tajikistan 1

Ukraine 12

Total 1,031
Page 16 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 2: Abandoned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator in Russia
Page 17 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 3: Seed Irradiators Used in the Former Soviet Union 

IAEA’s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety told us that 

no one knows the total number of orphan sources or their location in the 

former Soviet Union. IAEA is continuously obtaining new information 

about previously unknown devices using sealed sources. This makes it 

extremely difficult for the agency to develop strategies to locate and 

recover these sources in a systematic way. The Director also told us that 

the problem of orphan sources is not unique to the former Soviet Union and 

that similar problems exist in other parts of the world. 
Page 18 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Countries Have 

Established Legislative 

and Regulatory 

Controls over Sealed 

Sources, but Adequacy 

of Controls Varies 

All of the countries responding to our survey said they have established 

legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. However, U.S. and 

international nuclear safety and security experts told us that controls 

placed on radioactive sources vary greatly between countries and focus 

primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on securing sealed 

sources from theft or destructive use. According to IAEA, as many as 110 

countries worldwide do not have adequate controls over sealed sources 

and the agency has established a program to help 88 countries upgrade 

their regulatory infrastructures. 

Countries Responding to 

Our Survey Reported That 

They Have Established 

Controls over Sealed 

Sources

All of the countries that responded to our survey reported that they have 

established legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources. The 

countries that responded to our survey identified various controls over 

sealed sources, including (1) licensing and inspection; (2) tracking the 

import and export of sources; (3) maintaining national registries of 

sources’ users; (4) maintaining national inventories of sources; 

(5) searching for and recovering lost, stolen, or abandoned sources; 

(6) securing sources; and (7) regulating their safe transport. According to 

IAEA, controls over sealed sources are based on countries’ development of 

a framework of laws and regulations. Twenty-five of the 49 countries 

reported that they had established a strong legislative framework to control 

sealed sources and most of these same countries indicated that they had a 

strong regulatory framework as well. Several countries characterized their 

legislative or regulatory framework as weak. The countries that reported 

having a strong legislative or regulatory framework were spread across 

many regions, including the former Soviet Union, Europe, Africa, and the 

South Pacific. Countries reporting that they had weak or nonexistent 

regulatory frameworks were located primarily in the former Soviet Union, 

the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and South America. 
Page 19 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Countries reported using various guidelines to develop their laws or 

regulations that serve as the basis for controls over sealed sources. Fortyfour of the 49 countries said they used either one or both IAEA guidelines—

(1) the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing 

Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources and (2) the Code of 

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.9

 Twelve of the 

countries responding to our survey indicated that they base their regulatory 

controls, in part, on European Union regulations. European Commission 

officials told us that efforts are under way to strengthen controls over 

sealed sources, including harmonizing measures among member states for 

the recovery of orphan sources. These efforts began prior to September 11, 

2001, in response to accidents where orphan sources were melted with 

scrap metal, resulting in significant economic damages. In 2002, the 

commission adopted a proposed directive to improve controls over sealed 

sources that emit large amounts of radiation. The proposal urges that 

necessary measures be taken to protect public health from orphan source 

exposure. More recently, a commission committee proposed that users of 

radioactive sources in the European Union be charged a refundable deposit 

before acquiring sealed sources. 

All of the countries responding to our survey identified one or more 

organizations responsible for regulating sealed sources. Forty-five of the 

49 countries reported that regulatory organizations inspect facilities where 

sealed sources are stored or in use. Regarding enforcement, three 

countries failed to list any actions that inspectors could take to ensure 

compliance with laws and regulations. Many of the countries identified 

more than one enforcement mechanism available, including levying fines, 

suspending or terminating licenses, and closing a facility. Enforcement 

mechanisms, however, are not always used. Representatives from one 

European country—that did not respond to our survey but discussed these 

matters with us—told us that imposed fines tend to be so low that many 

users of sealed sources may find it cheaper to pay the fines rather than 

comply with the regulations. 

9

The International Basic Safety Standards are intended to ensure (1) the protection of 

individuals and the population against radiation exposure, (2) the safety of radiation 

sources in order to prevent accidents, and (3) the security of sources to prevent the 

relinquishing of control over their use. IAEA’s Code of Conduct is a nonbinding document 

that applies to all radioactive sources that may pose a significant risk to health and the 

environment. It does not cover fissile materials used to construct weapons of mass 

destruction and sources within military or defense programs. The code is currently being 

revised to reflect member states’ increased concerns about the security risks posed by 

sealed sources.
Page 20 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

All of the countries responding to our survey reported that users of sealed 

sources are required to secure radioactive materials in their possession. In 

addition, 39 of the respondents reported that they had facilities to store 

disused sources. However, only 18 countries indicated that they have a 

facility to permanently dispose of the sealed sources. Those countries that 

did not have any storage facilities were primarily located in Africa. 

Representatives from four former Soviet Union countries told us that the 

absence of secure storage poses a serious security problem, and an official 

from the Republic of Georgia told us that a well-protected centralized 

storage facility was urgently needed. 

All but four of the countries responding to our survey said they had 

regulations covering the safe transport of sealed sources. The countries 

that did not have such regulations were located in Africa, South America, 

and the Middle East. Although Russia did not respond to our survey, 

Russian officials told us that they were concerned about moving sealed 

sources safely and securely. They said that sources that were no longer 

being used are moved great distances by trucks and are vulnerable to theft 

because the operators of the vehicles must stop to rest or lose 

communications owing to the remoteness of the locations where they are 

traveling. 

Countries’ Controls over 

Sealed Sources Vary and Are 

Weakest among Developing 

Countries 

Nuclear safety and security experts from the Departments of Energy, State, 

and Defense; NRC; IAEA; and the European Commission told us that 

controls placed on sealed sources vary greatly between countries and have 

focused primarily on protecting public health and safety and not on 

securing the sources from potential terrorists threats. According to IAEA, 

as many as 110 countries worldwide lack the regulatory infrastructure to 

adequately protect or control sealed sources. Many of these countries are 

considered less developed and are confronted with social, political, and 

economic problems that divert attention from imposing controls on the 

many thousands of radioactive sources used in hospitals, research 

facilities, industries, or universities. In many cases, these countries’ 

regulatory organizations have a limited number of trained personnel. In the 

absence of regulatory controls, radioactive sources have been inadequately 

protected or secured; little or no attention has been paid to export or 

import controls of sources; and there has been a lack of basic record 

keeping. IAEA’s Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety told 

us that many countries also lack the commitment or political will to 

exercise controls over sealed sources. 
Page 21 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

In March 2003 over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries met in 

Vienna, Austria, to participate in an international conference on the 

security of radioactive sources. The conference, sponsored by the 

governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, emphasized 

that all users of sealed sources share a responsibility for managing them in 

a safe and secure manner and that the manufacturers of sources and 

regulators have important roles to play. The conference also noted that 

high-risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated 

control, including orphan sources, raise serious security and safety 

concerns. U.S. and international experts are in the process of developing a 

systematic approach to identifying the highest-risk sources. In 2000 IAEA 

established a categorization of sealed sources to, among other things, 

determine the level of oversight that should be applied to the safety and 

security of a particular type of source. In response to growing concerns 

about sealed sources being used as a terror weapon, IAEA has revised the 

categorization. The categorization, which is still in draft, provides a 

relative numerical ranking of sealed sources and practices for which they 

are used. Appendix VIII provides more information about the conference, 

and appendix IX contains additional details about IAEA’s revised 

categorization of sources.
Page 22 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

IAEA Has Implemented a 

Program to Help Many 

Countries Improve 

Regulatory Controls

In 1994 IAEA established a model project program to enhance countries’ 

regulatory infrastructure. This program is available to any IAEA member 

state upon request. (See app. X for a list of countries participating in the 

program.) The program has expanded and includes 88 countries. As of 

December 2002, IAEA had spent $27.7 million to help these countries. 

Each country’s progress is measured through five milestones, including the 

establishment of a regulatory framework.10 This milestone is considered 

the most time-consuming and requires that the country draft and 

implement radiation protection laws and regulations; designate and 

empower a national regulatory authority; and establish a system for the 

notification, authorization, and control of radioactive sources, including 

the preparation of an inventory of sources and installations. According to 

IAEA, about 77 percent of the countries participating in the program as of 

September 2001 had promulgated the necessary laws and established 

regulatory authorities. In addition, about 42 percent of the countries had 

adopted the necessary regulations; about 50 percent had systems for the 

notification, authorization, and control of radioactive sources in place and 

operational; and about 80 percent had systems in place to inventory 

sources. Considering that the program had been under way since the mid1990s, the level of achievement was much lower than expected, and the 

time necessary to overcome some of the difficulties faced by the countries 

was underestimated. The reasons that many of the countries had not fully 

implemented this milestone included (1) time-consuming legislative and 

regulatory procedures; (2) institutional instability; (3) budgetary 

constraints, resulting in, among other things, a high turnover of qualified 

staff; (4) unfocused regulatory structures, resulting in overlapping 

responsibilities; (5) limited regulatory independence and empowerment; 

and (6) insufficient financial and technical resources, trained staff, and 

support services. Several countries responding to our survey indicated that 

additional assistance is needed to improve controls over sealed sources, 

including radiation detection equipment and training for regulatory staff. 

U.S. and international officials told us that there are about 50 additional 

countries needing assistance that are not member states of IAEA and are 

not eligible for assistance under the model project program. According to 

IAEA, many of these countries have sealed sources that are being used 

10The five milestones are (1) the establishment of a regulatory framework, (2) the 

establishment of occupational exposure control, (3) the establishment of medical exposure 

control, (4) the establishment of public exposure control, and (5) the establishment of 

emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
Page 23 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

without adequate controls. These officials are concerned that without 

appropriate regulatory oversight, sources in these countries pose a 

particularly serious threat because they are not adequately protected. 

Officials from the Department of State, IAEA, and the European 

Commission told us that France has implemented a system for controlling 

sealed sources that could serve as a model for other countries, including 

many developing nations. France’s system requires distributors of sealed 

sources to assume financial responsibility for recovering and disposing of 

these sources at the end of their 10-year life. According to French officials, 

this system has significantly reduced the number of orphan sources. 

France’s system for controlling sources is discussed in more detail in 

appendix XI.

DOE Has a Program to 

Help Other Countries 

Secure Sealed Sources, 

but Strengthened 

Coordination and 

Planning Are Needed

DOE has the primary U.S. government responsibility for helping other 

countries strengthen controls over sealed sources. Since fiscal year 2002, 

DOE has received $36.9 million to, among other things, secure sources at 

several large nuclear waste repositories in Russia and other countries of 

the former Soviet Union. Other U.S. federal agencies, including the 

Departments of Defense and State, and NRC have efforts under way to help 

countries strengthen controls over sealed sources as well. DOE’s initial 

efforts to secure sealed sources have lacked adequate planning and 

coordination, and the majority of program expenditures have been in the 

United States. According to DOE officials, efforts are under way to 

improve the management of the program, including the development of a 

plan and better coordination with other agencies. 

DOE Is Leading the U.S. 

Effort to Help Other 

Countries Secure Sealed 

Sources

DOE is leading U.S. government efforts to help other countries strengthen 

controls over sealed sources. DOE’s effort is part of the overall U.S. 

national strategy to reduce the risk that terrorist groups could use these 

materials in a dirty bomb attack against the United States. A congressional 

report instructs DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year 2002 supplemental 

appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty bombs.11 In response to 

the congressional requirement, the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s Office of International Material Protection and 

Cooperation established the Radiological Threat Reduction program in 

11H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 431 (2001).
Page 24 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

January 2002, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002, 

and received an additional $16.3 million appropriation in fiscal year 2003. 

The program is expected to receive an additional $22 million in 

supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2003, including $5 million to 

secure nuclear material in Iraq.

Initially, DOE evaluated the threat to national security from radioactive 

materials and determined that sealed sources pose a greater threat than 

other radioactive materials, such as radioactive waste and nuclear fuel, 

because of their availability; radioactivity; and other physical 

characteristics, such as half-life. DOE did further studies of the dirty bomb 

threat, including (1) narrowing the list of sealed sources that are a high 

priority because of their characteristics and availability, (2) analyzing 

possible scenarios in which a radiological dispersion device could be used, 

and (3) determining what the economic consequences of a dirty bomb 

attack in the United States would be. The former assistant deputy 

administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and 

Cooperation told us that it would be impossible to secure all sealed sources 

but that by determining which sources pose the greatest risk, DOE could 

prioritize its efforts. 

DOE has focused on securing sealed sources in the countries of the former 

Soviet Union because DOE officials have determined that is where the 

greatest number of vulnerable sealed sources is located. In April 2002 the 

Radiological Threat Reduction program initiated its first security upgrade 

project at the Moscow Radon, a regional facility involved with collecting, 

transporting, processing, and disposing of sealed sources and low- and 

intermediate-level radioactive waste. There are 35 Radon facilities in the 

former Soviet Union, but the Moscow Radon is by far the largest and 

collects almost 80 percent of the institutional, industrial, and medical 

radioactive wastes in Russia from almost 2,000 enterprises in the city of 

Moscow, the Moscow region, and nine neighboring regions. During our 

visit to the Moscow Radon in October 2002, Radon officials showed us the 

building for which most of the DOE-funded upgrades are planned. (See 

fig. 4.) Planned upgrades at the site include surveillance cameras, motion 

detectors, vehicles, building upgrades, and a security facility where guards 

can monitor the building where most high-activity sources are stored. 

Although there have been no known attempts at theft of materials at the 

site, Radon officials told us that upgrades are needed because existing 

security is inadequate. 
Page 25 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 4: Moscow Radon Building Scheduled for DOE-Funded Security Upgrades 

The program has also secured sealed sources in Uzbekistan and the 

Republic of Georgia. In Uzbekistan, DOE has funded security upgrades at 

research and irradiation facilities and the construction of a national 

repository for sealed sources, and plans to fund increased physical security 

upgrades at a dozen regional cancer treatment facilities. In the Republic of 

Georgia, DOE funded security upgrades at a facility where radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators and other high-activity sealed sources are 

stored. Upgrades in both countries included bricking up windows; 

reinforcing doors; improving or replacing roofs; upgrading storage vaults; 

installing motion detectors and alarm systems; and other low-cost, 

“low-tech” measures. Figure 5 shows an example of the security upgrades 

funded by DOE. 
Page 26 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 5: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades in the Former Soviet Union

(Top) before: Weak doors and windows; door locked with a simple padlock; and gaps/holes in roof.

(Bottom) after: Reinforced steel doors with double locks that cannot be cut; bricked-up windows; alarm 

system; patched, reinforced roof. 

In June 2002 DOE launched two additional efforts—a bilateral initiative 

with MINATOM to secure sealed sources at Russian facilities identified by 
Page 27 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

MINATOM, and a Tripartite Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA. The 

objective of the Tripartite Initiative is to improve the security of sealed 

sources in former Soviet states by developing inventories of sealed 

sources, locating the sealed sources, recovering the sealed sources, storing 

recovered sealed sources in a secure manner, and disposing of the sources.

Ultimately, DOE hopes that Russia will play a key role in recovering sealed 

sources in other former Soviet states because many of these sealed sources 

were manufactured in and distributed from Russia. In July 2002 MINATOM 

provided DOE with a number of priority projects for funding in Russia. 

These projects included recovering and securing radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators, and recovering orphan sources at 45 sites in 

Russia. According to DOE, the sites will be prioritized according to the 

type and activity level of the radioactive material present. 

DOE has completed site assessments at four Radon sites in Russia. 

Upgrades at these facilities are expected to be completed by the end of 

fiscal year 2004. A key criterion for deciding if the site requires upgrades is 

an inventory of the sealed sources stored there—if the inventory includes 

sealed sources that DOE has determined to be high risk, security upgrades 

will be implemented. 

Under the Tripartite Initiative, 19 additional Radon sites in other former 

Soviet states will be assessed. These Radon sites are located in Armenia, 

Azerbaijan, Belarus,12 Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. DOE also 

plans to perform site assessments and security upgrades at medical, 

industrial, and research facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, 

similar to those done in Uzbekistan and Georgia. DOE, IAEA, and 

MINATOM officials visited Moldova in the fall of 2002 to conduct a physical 

security evaluation, implement the upgrades at the Moldova Radon, and 

identify other sites where further work is needed to improve security. DOE 

and IAEA officials conducted a similar trip to Tajikistan in December 2002. 

Work in both countries is expected to be complete in the summer of 2003, 

and DOE plans to initiate projects in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Baltics, and 

possibly Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan in fiscal year 2003.

12Current U.S. policy is to restrict assistance in Belarus to humanitarian assistance and 

exchange programs with state-run educational institutions; Russia and IAEA will likely 

carry out any work to secure sealed sources in Belarus under the Tripartite Initiative. 
Page 28 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

In March 2003 the Secretary of Energy announced a new initiative to 

broaden the Tripartite Initiative to other countries needing assistance to 

secure high-risk vulnerable sources. The emphasis of the expanded 

initiative will be on developing countries outside of the former Soviet 

Union. As part of this expanded effort, DOE expects to initiate work in 

Serbia and Indonesia this year. 

Finally, DOE also has a program designed to strengthen other countries’ 

controls over sealed sources managed by the Office of International 

Nuclear Safety within the National Nuclear Security Administration. The 

office is working with IAEA, other international organizations, NRC, and 

the State Department to develop a management program for sealed 

sources. The purpose of this program is to protect the health and safety of 

the public and people who work with sealed sources by developing 

literature and training programs. The program also contributed assistance 

for the international effort to recover orphan sources in the Republic of 

Georgia, including providing technical assistance, detection and personnel 

protection equipment, training, and software. In Armenia, this program is 

providing training, equipment, and other technical assistance to enhance 

the safety and security of sealed sources. As of September 30, 2002, DOE 

had spent about $330,000 for these activities.

DOD, State, and NRC Also 

Have Programs to 

Strengthen Other Countries’ 

Controls over Sealed 

Sources 

DOD, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction program,13 is helping 

Kazakhstan to inventory, secure, and dispose of about 2,000 sealed sources, 

primarily cesium-137 and cobalt-60, from an out-of-service industrial 

facility, and identify other facilities with sealed sources. The manager of 

the program told us that although sealed sources are not traditionally 

considered to be weapons of mass destruction, DOD undertook this project 

because the Kazakhstan government asked for assistance and the quantity 

and types of sealed sources posed a security threat. The program began in 

fiscal year 2001, prior to the establishment of DOE’s program to secure 

sealed sources, and DOD does not expect to engage in any further projects 

to secure sources in the former Soviet Union countries. The $1.7 million 

project is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2003. 

13The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is designed to help the countries of the former 

Soviet Union destroy and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 

weapons of mass destruction. 
Page 29 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

The State Department is also funding various projects to strengthen 

controls. For example, State provided IAEA with $1 million in fiscal year 

2002 to support the agency’s projects related to the safety and security of 

radioactive sources. Additionally, State allocated $120,000 in fiscal year 

2002 from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund14 for a pilot project 

to develop and improve radiation safety programs in developing countries, 

including controls over sealed sources. The project was initially developed 

by the Health Physics Society15 and proposed by State’s Office of the Senior 

Coordinator for Nuclear Safety. Health Physics Society members volunteer 

their time, and State Department funding is used for travel, per diem, the 

cost of shipping donated equipment to the host countries, and evaluation of 

the project—about $3,000 spent to date. Four countries—Costa Rica, 

Ecuador, Jamaica, and Panama—were chosen for the pilot; however, work 

has been initiated in only two countries. The project was recently 

reactivated after a suspension of several months because of State 

Department concerns about program management, security, and liability 

issues. 

The State Department has also contracted with Sandia National Laboratory 

for a $100,000 study to assess the current laws and procedures governing 

intercountry transfers of sealed sources. Specifically, the study is looking 

at six countries that are either major exporters or importers of sealed 

sources and will provide information on, among other things, the number 

of sources that is imported and exported, and whether exporters are 

required to verify whether the countries they are exporting to have controls 

in place to ensure the safety and security of sealed sources. 

In addition, NRC has a program to strengthen controls that focuses on 

Armenia. NRC has spent $62,000 in Freedom Support Act funds transferred 

from USAID to assist Armenia. Initially, NRC will help Armenia develop a 

registry of sealed sources, including identifying the information required; 

develop the database; and help Armenia gather, assess, develop, and verify 

existing data on sources. Currently, Armenian regulations on sealed 

sources and other radioactive materials are spread across different 

ministries and departments, and many have not been changed since the fall 

14The mission of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund is to undertake high-priority, 

rapid response projects to halt the proliferation of and destroy or neutralize weapons of 

mass destruction, and limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons.

15The Health Physics Society is a scientific and professional organization whose members 

specialize in occupational and environmental radiation safety.
Page 30 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

of the Soviet Union. NRC plans to assist Armenia with reviewing existing 

regulations and developing consolidated regulations on, among other 

things, licensing and inspections of radioactive sources, which will apply 

governmentwide and meet international standards. In addition, NRC 

provided Russia and Ukraine with guidance and training on the licensing 

and regulation of sealed sources in the mid-1990s. NRC has also started 

working with Canada and Mexico to share information about controls over 

sealed sources in each country and improve cross-border controls and has 

provided cost-free experts to help IAEA update its Categorization of 

Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct. 

Finally, DOE and State are providing funds to support IAEA efforts to 

strengthen controls over sealed sources. DOE and State have pledged a 

total of $8.2 million—67 percent of the total $12.2 million pledged—to 

IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.16 This fund was established after the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in conjunction with IAEA’s action 

plan to improve nuclear security worldwide. The State Department has 

directed $1 million of its contribution specifically toward activities to 

improve the controls over sealed sources, and DOE’s $3 million 

contribution is entirely directed to these efforts. Planned activities to 

improve the security of sealed sources in member states include, among 

other things, enhancing ongoing activities to improve controls of sealed 

sources; developing standards, guidelines, and recommendations on the 

security of radioactive sources; establishing security standards for the 

transport of radioactive material; and locating and securing orphan 

sources. 

Table 4 summarizes the amounts that the Departments of Energy, State, 

and Defense, and NRC have received, obligated, and spent to help other 

countries strengthen their controls over sealed sources as of January 31, 

2003.

16Other countries that have pledged voluntary contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund 

include Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the 

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, and the 

United Kingdom. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nongovernmental organization, has also 

pledged to contribute to the fund. 
Page 31 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 4: Assistance to Improve Controls over Radioactive Sources through January 31, 2003 

Sources: DOE, DOD, Department of State, and NRC.

a

DOD figures are through April 1, 2003.

DOE Efforts Have Not Been 

Well Planned and 

Coordinated with Those of 

Other U.S. Agencies

DOE is in the process of developing a plan to guide its efforts to help other 

countries secure sealed sources. According to DOE officials, initial 

attempts to develop a plan were stopped in May 2002 because the former 

administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and 

Cooperation felt that the program needed to show tangible results quickly. 

In the absence of a plan, DOE officials told us that the program has 

modeled its work in Russia on previous DOE projects to secure fissile 

materials in Russia through its Material Protection, Control, and 

Accounting program. The director of the program told us that while the 

initial approach to securing sealed sources in Russia—focusing on 

improving physical security at Radon sites—was a good idea, it hindered 

DOE from setting priorities among other sites in Russia. He further noted 

that the program is now focusing on improving the security of the most 

vulnerable high-risk sources first. 

Program/Activity Description Received Obligated Spent 

DOE Radiological Threat 

Reduction program 

Assisting Russia and other former Soviet 

Republics to secure sealed sources. Includes 

$3 million for IAEA activities. 

$36,900,000 $11,426,600 $8,934,000

DOE International Emergency 

Management program

Training program for control and management 

of radioactive materials. Also provides 

assistance to help locate, handle, and safely 

remove high-risk sources. 

430,000 430,000 330,000

DOD Cooperative Threat 

Reduction programa

Securing, inventorying, and disposing of 

sources in Kazakhstan.

1,703,884 1,699,214 975,140

State Department Radiation 

Safety without Borders Pilot 

project

Assisting to build radiation safety 

infrastructures in developing countries 

participating in the IAEA model project.

120,020 120,020 3,094

State Department study 

conducted by Sandia National 

Laboratory 

Studying protocols on international transfers of 

sealed sources in several countries.

100,000 100,000 49,300

State Department Nuclear 

Safety

Funding to IAEA. 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000

Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

Designing and developing a registry of sources, 

and assistance to assess and develop 

regulations related to radioactive materials in 

Armenia. 

250,000 250,000 62,000

Total $40,503,904 $15,025,834 $11,353,534 
Page 32 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE officials told us that they recognize that the development of a plan is 

essential. DOE’s draft plan has established short- and long-term program 

elements, including consolidating and securing dangerous materials in 

vulnerable locations; leveraging critical partnerships, such as continuing to 

work with IAEA on key efforts such as the model projects program and the 

code of conduct; and continuing to help countries detect smuggled 

radioactive materials through its Second Line of Defense program.17 In 

addition to the plan, DOE officials said they are also developing a more 

detailed action plan; radioactivity thresholds for vulnerable high-risk 

radioactive materials; and guidelines for describing the actions that should 

be taken by DOE when sources are found to exceed those radioactivity 

thresholds. As part of its overall effort, DOE officials told us that more 

detailed planning and analysis will be needed to, among other things, 

(1) determine which countries present the greatest security risk and most 

urgently require assistance, (2) identify future funding requirements, and 

(3) develop performance measures to gauge program success. 

Despite these recent initiatives to improve program planning, officials from 

Gosatomnadzor, the Russian agency responsible for regulating sealed 

sources in use at almost 8,000 facilities in Russia, told us that beyond an 

initial meeting, DOE had not consulted with them in the selection or 

prioritization of sites for physical security upgrades. In particular, 

Gosatomnadzor officials were surprised that DOE was focusing so much 

attention on improving security at the Radon facilities in Russia where they 

believed the probability that sealed sources will be stolen is low. They said 

that it would be preferable to begin securing sealed sources from other 

vulnerable sites near Moscow, for example, out-of-service irradiation and 

research facilities. A systematic approach is required to assess needs, 

identify priorities, and develop a comprehensive approach to securing 

sealed sources. In their view, DOE’s initial approach had the potential to be 

superficial. 

DOE officials told us that they are now working more closely with 

Gosatomnadzor. In a March 31, 2003, letter from DOE’s Acting Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for International Material Protection and Cooperation 

to Gosatomnadzor’s First Deputy Chairman, the DOE official noted the 

need for regulatory oversight of the Russian radiological industry and 

17See Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning (GAO-02-426, May 16, 2002). 
Page 33 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

suggested that a proposal be formulated jointly with NRC to work 

cooperatively in this area. 

DOE is also seeking to improve planning and coordination of the Tripartite 

Initiative. According to an IAEA official, DOE coordinated its efforts with 

IAEA and Russia on the Moldova visit that contributed to a successful start 

of the Tripartite Initiative. The participants jointly developed and 

implemented a common approach for securing some vulnerable sealed 

sources, and arrangements were made to construct a facility to store these 

sources. However, the IAEA official told us that the Tajikistan assessment 

was not well coordinated. He noted that DOE was not flexible in 

scheduling the preliminary assessment visit and that Russia did not 

participate in the visit. Because of the timing of the visit, IAEA’s 

representative to the Tripartite Initiative was unable to participate in the 

visit, however, an official from IAEA’s Department of Technical 

Cooperation did accompany the DOE team. 

DOE officials told us that they were unable to make changes to their 

existing itinerary because they would have incurred significant delays if 

travel dates were changed due to country clearance restrictions for U.S. 

government travel in Tajikistan. Furthermore, they noted that because of 

the different roles that DOE, MINATOM, and IAEA play under the Tripartite 

Initiative, it is not necessary that representatives of each organization be 

present on each visit. As currently envisioned, the Russian and IAEA 

participants will act as an advance team, gathering information about 

which sealed sources exist in a given country and their current level of 

vulnerability. Subsequently, the U.S. team will visit the country and 

negotiate contracts to improve security at the vulnerable sites. 

IAEA’s official also told us that, overall, the Tripartite Initiative has not been 

well planned. Initial efforts have been ad-hoc, and a more systematic 

approach is needed as the program continues. He said that improved 

planning is essential particularly because the Tripartite Initiative will be 

used as a model to guide future efforts as the program expands worldwide. 

DOE officials agreed that improved coordination is needed. DOE, 

MINATOM, and IAEA are working to finalize a “Terms of Reference” 

document that defines the objectives, scope, roles, operational framework, 

and procedures to be followed for implementing projects under the 

Initiative. Furthermore, preliminary schedules for missions to several 

countries have been jointly developed through August 2003. 
Page 34 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Department of State and NRC officials told us that DOE has not fully 

coordinated its efforts with their agencies, although they noted that efforts 

were recently under way to improve coordination. These officials told us 

that DOE needs their input to ensure that a comprehensive 

governmentwide strategy is taken to, among other things, leverage 

program resources, maximize available expertise, avoid possible 

duplication of effort, and help ensure long-term success. DOE has not 

systematically undertaken the kind of comprehensive planning that would 

foster better coordination with the other agencies and could also lead to 

better coordination with other countries’ nuclear organizations. For 

example, DOE did not adequately consult NRC or State when developing 

the Radiological Threat Reduction program or developing the Tripartite 

Initiative with MINATOM and IAEA. Officials from NRC and the State 

Department expressed interest in sharing information and working with 

DOE to plan and execute the Radiological Threat Reduction program, but 

told us that there had been limited information sharing between agencies. 

Both NRC and the State Department have extensive experience in nuclear 

regulatory and safety-related issues in the former Soviet Union. NRC has 

received approximately $50 million from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal 

year 2002 to support regulatory strengthening efforts in the countries of 

central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These efforts 

have included training other countries’ regulators in all aspects of licensing 

and inspection procedures, advising on how to establish a legal basis for 

nuclear regulations, and developing a control and accounting system for 

nuclear materials. The State Department’s Office of the Senior Coordinator 

for Nuclear Safety, which was established about 10 years ago, provides 

overall policy guidance for efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-designed 

nuclear power reactors. Since then, the office’s mandate has expanded to 

include the safety of other foreign civilian nuclear facilities, including 

research reactors and waste facilities. In addition, State Department 

officials said that more recently, State has been leading U.S. negotiations to 

revise IAEA’s Code of Conduct and leading consultations within the U.S. 

government with large exporters of sealed sources to strengthen export 

controls on international transfers of them. 

Several officials also told us that DOE was focusing too narrowly on rapid 

physical security upgrades and not taking into account long-term needs to 

develop better regulatory infrastructures in host countries. These officials 

also said that a coordinated, targeted effort to identify and secure the most 

vulnerable and high-risk sealed sources could eliminate the greatest risks, 

and that developing regulatory frameworks in host countries would 
Page 35 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

significantly improve the safety and security of sealed sources. DOE noted 

that part of the program’s strategy is to support IAEA initiatives to leverage 

resources of member states to improve the security of sealed sources in 

their countries. They are hoping to build on the work IAEA has done in this 

area, particularly on the development of regulatory infrastructure.

The Majority of DOE’s 

Program Expenditures Have 

Been in the United States 

DOE budgeted $20.6 million for the Radiological Threat Reduction program 

in fiscal year 2002 and received an additional $16.3 million in fiscal year 

2003. DOE had spent about $8.9 million of the total $36.9 million received 

as of January 31, 2003, including $3 million transferred to IAEA’s Nuclear 

Security Fund. Of the remaining $5.9 million in expenditures, 93 percent 

was spent in the United States by DOE’s national laboratories for labor, 

travel, equipment, and overhead. Only $407,900 had been spent by the 

national laboratories in the countries receiving assistance. Table 5 shows 

expenditures by the laboratories by component of cost as of January 31, 

2003. 

Table 5: Radiological Threat Reduction Program Expenditures by DOE’s National Laboratories as of January 31, 2003

Source: DOE.

Dollars in thousands

Program activities in the United States

Program activities in the 

former Soviet Union

Laboratory Labora Travelb Equipment Overhead Travelc

Services 

and 

equipment Total

Argonne National Laboratory $707 $82.7 $3.1 $0.4 0 $3.0 $796.2 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 1,263.9 114.4 103.2 0 29.5 0 1,511.0

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory 65.3 8.4 0.6 -0.1d 0 0 74.2

Nonproliferation and National 

Security Institute 142.9 3.5 0 0 0 0 146.4

Nevada Operations Office 65.4 6.0 0 9.1 15.7 10.0 106.2

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 208.5 0 1.3 0 0 0 209.8

Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory 2,316.2 132.3 45.8 12.5 0 327.9 2,834.7

Remote Sensing Laboratory 175.2 38.5 1.9 7.6 11.8 10.0 245.0

Sandia National Laboratory 10.5 0 0 0 0 0 10.5

Total $4,954.9 $385.8 $155.9 $29.5 $57.0 $350.9 $5,934.0 
Page 36 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

a

Includes salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and pensions that are directly chargeable to the 

Radiological Threat Reduction program. DOE’s headquarters employees’ salaries are not 

charged directly to the program but are funded through DOE’s Office of International 

Material Protection and Cooperation.

b

Includes both travel and per diem costs—foreign and domestic—for laboratory officials 

and subcontractors. 

c

Includes travel costs for officials from other countries. 

d

The negative amount reflects funds from a prior fiscal year that were returned to the 

Radiological Threat Reduction program by the laboratory. 

DOE officials cited several reasons why only a small percentage of the 

funds allocated to the program since fiscal year 2002 had been spent as of 

January 31, 2003, including the following:

• The new program required significant start-up effort to assess the threat 

posed by sealed sources, determine the potential impacts from the 

detonation of a dirty bomb, and categorize and prioritize the types of 

sources that pose the greatest security risk.

• Difficulties and other unforeseen delays are frequently associated with 

doing work in the former Soviet Union. For example, the Russian 

Ministry of Construction, which maintains the Radon sites in Russia, 

raised concerns, after work had already started, that it had to authorize 

any work performed at those sites. Consequently, work was stopped at 

the Radon sites for several months. Initially, this Ministry had not been 

consulted by DOE and MINATOM in discussions about performing work 

at the Radon sites. 

• It took DOE a significant amount of time to establish appropriate 

contacts in the countries of the former Soviet Union where DOE plans 

to provide assistance. While DOE has a long history of working with 

Russia to secure fissile materials through its Material Protection, 

Control, and Accounting program, DOE was required to identify and 

work with a different set of organizations responsible for regulating 

sealed sources.

DOE officials told us that expenditures in countries of the former Soviet 

Union and other regions of the world are expected to increase as the 

program evolves. According to DOE, as the program matures security 

upgrades will be followed by comprehensive and costly consolidation and 

disposition activities, all of which will take place in foreign countries. DOE 

has requested an additional $36 million for the program in fiscal year 2004. 
Page 37 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

The director of the program said that the amount requested was an 

estimate based on anticipated future funding requirements. He expects 

that the funds will be allocated for, among other things, continued work in 

Russia, including securing large numbers of radioisotope thermoelectric 

generators, additional contributions to IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, and 

expanded efforts to secure sources in countries outside of the former 

Soviet Union. The director also noted that plans to secure sources in other 

parts of the world are still being developed and that DOE wants to ensure 

that it has a sound basis for determining which countries to select for 

assistance. 

Conclusions The attacks that occurred in September 2001 widened the array of potential 

scenarios and challenges that U.S. decision makers must confront 

concerning terrorist threats. Sealed sources containing radioactive 

material, which have many beneficial industrial, medical, and research 

applications, must now be considered possible terrorist weapons. These 

sealed sources are in virtually every country of the world and are often 

inadequately secured or accounted for. The central question is, What can 

the United States and the world community do to confront this problem, 

given the likely vast and unknown number of sources that exist and 

continue to be manufactured and distributed globally? 

DOE appears to be well suited to help countries secure sealed sources 

because of its long history in securing weapons grade material in the 

former Soviet Union. Further, DOE’s efforts to develop a plan to guide its 

efforts is a step in the right direction. However, additional planning and 

detailed analyses will be needed to, among other things, systematically 

identify and prioritize countries that require assistance, establish realistic 

time frames and resources necessary to accomplish these tasks, and 

develop meaningful performance measurements. The elements of such a 

plan assumed greater importance in light of the Secretary of Energy’s 

recent announcement that DOE’s program will expand beyond the 

countries of the former Soviet Union. For this reason alone, it is imperative 

that a comprehensive plan be established and implemented before 

significant amounts of appropriated funds are spent to improve 

international controls over sealed sources. Regarding program 

expenditures, we agree with DOE’s objective to maximize program 

resources in the recipient countries. To date, the national laboratories have 

spent the majority of the program funds in United States and we believe 

that this trend needs to be reversed as the program evolves. We would 

expect that in the future, a markedly smaller percentage of program funds 
Page 38 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

will be directed toward the national laboratories and the greatest 

percentage will go to the countries that need the assistance to strengthen 

controls over sealed sources. 

We share the views of Department of State and NRC officials who 

expressed their concerns that DOE was not adequately coordinating its 

efforts with the other agencies. The Department of State and NRC have a 

long history of working on international nuclear safety issues, and their 

expertise and insights would be valuable, we believe, in crafting an overall 

governmentwide plan for strengthening controls over sealed sources. In 

particular, NRC has experience in working closely with many countries of 

the former Soviet Union to develop and strengthen national regulatory 

infrastructures. Clearly, any long-term plan requires that countries have a 

competent regulatory authority that can place appropriate levels of 

controls on sealed sources. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy (working with the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration):

• Develop a comprehensive program plan for helping other countries 

secure sealed sources that includes (1) a unified set of program goals 

and priorities, including a well-defined plan for meeting these goals in 

the countries to be included; (2) program cost estimates; (3) time frames 

for effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures; 

(5) ways to sustain upgrades to the facilities and equipment financed, 

including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country, 

including a plan for transferring responsibilities to the host country for 

building and equipment maintenance. The plan should be flexible and 

updated periodically to ensure that long-term efforts are sustainable. 

• Take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to 

strengthen controls over other countries’ sealed sources. The plan 

should be developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of State, 

Defense, and Homeland Security, and the Chairman of NRC. In addition, 

this plan should be coordinated with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency to avoid overlap or duplication of effort. 

• Strengthen efforts to increase program expenditures in the countries 

requiring the assistance.
Page 39 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission with draft copies of this report for their 

review and comment. We also provided IAEA with pertinent sections of 

the report for review. DOD had no comments on the draft report. DOE’s, 

State’s, and NRC’s written comments are presented as appendixes XII, XIII, 

and XIV, respectively. The three agencies and IAEA also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration agreed with our 

recommendations that the program needs strengthening and noted that the 

Secretary and the Administrator are actively involved with the international 

community to address the security of other countries’ sealed sources. 

However, DOE disagreed with our finding that it had not coordinated its 

efforts with NRC and the Department of State to ensure that a 

governmentwide strategy is established. Further, DOE believes that it is 

important to place the report’s findings in context since the program is in 

its startup phase. Regarding DOE’s point about coordination, we had been 

told several times during the course of our review by NRC and State 

Department officials that DOE had not systematically included these 

agencies in the development of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen 

other countries’ controls over sealed sources. In fact, we raised this issue 

with DOE program officials during our review and these officials 

acknowledged that DOE needed to do a better job in coordinating its 

program with other U.S. agencies. Although NRC and State Department 

officials told us that coordination has improved recently, they endorsed the 

need for the development of a governmentwide strategy to ensure that they 

fully participate in future U.S. efforts. Regarding DOE’s concern about 

putting the report’s findings in context, we noted in the draft report that the 

program required a significant start-up effort to, among other things, assess 

the threat posed by sealed sources, determine the potential impacts from 

the detonation of a dirty bomb, and prioritize the types of sources that pose 

the greatest threat. 

State agreed with the facts presented in our report and noted that a 

comprehensive approach to controlling sources will require a concerted 

diplomatic effort that should be combined with the technical expertise 

possessed by DOE in recovering and securing sealed sources in other 

countries. State said that it possesses a unique perspective that is crucial 

to the success of the program and hoped that we would clarify our 

recommendation to delineate between DOE’s technical programmatic 

responsibilities and State’s overall diplomatic role in guiding international 
Page 40 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

strategies for securing radiation sources. Regarding State’s point, we 

acknowledge State’s responsibility to develop and implement international 

strategies on behalf of the U.S. government. However, we believe, as noted 

in the report, that DOE is well suited to help other countries secure sealed 

sources because of its long history in securing weapons grade material in 

the former Soviet Union and that it should take the lead in developing a 

comprehensive plan to strengthen controls of other countries’ sealed 

sources. 

NRC made several points. First, NRC believed that our report should have 

focused more attention on high-risk radioactive sources rather than on 

radioactive sources of all types. NRC stated that the vast majority of 

radioactive sources in use in the United States and abroad are not useful to 

a terrorist and that it has been working with DOE and IAEA to finalize 

IAEA’s revised Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive 

Sources and the revised Categorization of Sources. In addition, NRC noted 

that only a few of the radioactive sources that are lost or stolen in the 

United States are high-risk and that a majority of the sources reported lost 

or stolen involve small or short-lived sources which are not useful as a 

radiological dispersion device. Second, NRC identified various efforts that 

it has undertaken to improve the security of high-risk sources in the United 

States. Third, NRC pointed out that we should consider including the 

Department of Homeland Security in our recommendation that calls for the 

development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries secure 

sealed sources.

Regarding NRC’s comments, one of the objectives of our report was to 

specifically determine the number of sealed sources worldwide, and we 

believe that it is important to develop information, to the extent possible, 

regarding the number of all sealed radioactive sources that are in use. In 

fact, IAEA has placed great emphasis, particularly among developing 

countries, on the importance of developing and maintaining inventories of 

sources for safety and security purposes. As we noted in our report, 

current IAEA policy does not allow for the approval of any Technical Cooperation project involving the use of significant radiation sources, unless 

the member state in question, among other things, complies with the 

requirements to maintain an effective regulatory framework that includes 

an inventory of sources. 

While we agree with NRC that the highest-risk sources present the greatest 

concern as desirable material for a “dirty bomb,” other sealed radioactive 

sources could also be used as a terrorist weapon. No one can say with 
Page 41 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

certainty what the psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty 

bomb—regardless of the radioactive material used to construct it—would 

be. In addition, it is important to note that work by NRC, IAEA, and others 

to characterize sources is still ongoing. 

Regarding NRC’s comments about its activities to increase the security of 

the highest-risk sources, we will address these matters in our forthcoming 

report on U.S. efforts to strengthen controls over sealed sources in the 

United States. Finally, during the course of our review, no agency we met 

with was aware of or told us of a role being played by the Department of 

Homeland Security in securing sealed sources in other countries. However, 

we agree with NRC that it makes sense to coordinate the development of a 

governmentwide plan for this activity with the Department of Homeland 

Security and we have revised our recommendation to include the 

department.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the 

date of this letter. We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of 

Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the 

Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security; the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and 

interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at 

202-512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report are 

included in appendix XV.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Robinson

Managing Director, Natural Resources

and Environment 
Page 42 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To answer our objectives related to (1) number of sealed sources 

worldwide and how many sources are lost, stolen, or abandoned and (2) 

the legislative and regulatory controls that countries that possess sealed 

sources use, we distributed a questionnaire to 127 member countries of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including 3 countries whose 

IAEA membership had been approved but had not yet taken effect at the 

time of our survey. We did not, however, survey all IAEA member states. 

Specifically, we did not distribute questionnaires to Afghanistan, Cuba, 

Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Holy See. The State 

Department recommended that we not correspond with the first eight 

countries listed. We determined from discussions with IAEA that the Holy 

See did not have any sealed sources. We did not include the United States 

because it is being treated separately in another GAO report. 

IAEA provided us with a list of the appropriate contacts for most of the 

countries we planned to survey. These officials were primarily from 

member countries’ regulatory authorities. We pretested the survey with the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and with representatives from 

Brazil, Poland, the United Kingdom, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. After 

revising the survey to reflect the comments of these officials, we 

distributed it in December 2002 via E-mail and fax, and through countries’ 

embassies in Washington, D.C., and Vienna, Austria, where IAEA is located. 

As a follow-up for nonrespondents, we also distributed questionnaires 

directly to many countries’ representatives who were attending an 

international conference in Vienna, Austria, on the security of radioactive 

sources. We also sent out periodic reminders to the countries from January 

through March 2003 requesting their assistance to complete the survey in a 

timely fashion. We received responses from 49 IAEA member states (39 

percent), including countries from Asia, North and South America, the 

former Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. According to 

IAEA officials, the response rate was consistent with the rate it achieves 

when it sends out similar types of questionnaires to member states. In 

addition we were told by IAEA officials and others that there is an inherent 

difficulty associated with trying to obtain these types of data from 

countries owing to the sensitive nature of some of the questions and 

countries’ concerns about ensuring the confidentiality of their responses. 

Our survey results were used without attempting to project the information 

to the universe of IAEA members. We did not assume that nonrespondent 

countries would have had similar answers to our survey. Regarding the 

matter of confidentiality, we notified the countries that the results from the 

survey would be reported in aggregate and that individual responses would 

not be disclosed. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

We supplemented the results obtained from the survey with interviews with 

officials from several countries, including Brazil, France, Kazakhstan, the 

Republic of Georgia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan to learn 

more about how they regulate and control sealed sources. We also met 

with officials from IAEA and the European Commission to obtain their 

views on the security problems and challenges associated with sealed 

sources. In addition, we also interviewed and obtained pertinent 

documents from officials of several U.S. government agencies, including 

the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and NRC. 

We attended two DOE-sponsored conferences related to the security of 

sealed sources. The first conference, held in London, United Kingdom, 

during September-October 2002, focused on international approaches to 

nuclear and radiological security. The second conference, which was held 

in Vienna, Austria, in March 2003, focused on the security of radioactive 

sources and was attended by representatives from more than 120 

countries. 

To determine what assistance has been provided by the United States to 

other countries to strengthen their controls over sealed sources, we 

obtained budget, obligation, and expenditure data from the four agencies 

providing assistance—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, and 

NRC. To assess how well the programs were being implemented, we 

interviewed program officials from each agency and reviewed pertinent 

documents, including agency plans as available. We also obtained 

information about these programs through interviews with representatives 

of IAEA and officials from some of the countries receiving U.S. assistance.

Finally, we visited Russia to obtain a first-hand look at a waste facility that 

contains sealed sources. Specifically, we traveled to the Moscow Radon 

site at Sergiyev Posad, located about 90 kilometers from Moscow. While in 

Russia we also interviewed officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy, 

the Ministry of Health, the Kurchatov Institute, Gosatomnadzor (Russia’s 

nuclear regulatory organization), the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the 

Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research Institute.

We performed our review from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 44 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries ApendxiI

This appendix presents a copy of the survey sent to 127 IAEA member 

countries and the results of that survey. 
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 45 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 46 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 47 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 48 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 49 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 50 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 51 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 52 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 53 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 54 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 55 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 56 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 57 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 58 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 59 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II

Results of Survey of IAEA Member Countries

Page 60 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 61 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix III

List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and 

Responses ApendxiI

Table 6 lists all of the countries that we sent surveys to and identifies 

whether or not they completed the survey when this report was being 

written.

Table 6: Countries Surveyed and Surveys Received

Country

Completed the 

survey 

Did not complete the 

survey

Albania X

Algeria X

Angola X

Argentina X

Armenia X

Australia X

Austria X

Azerbaijan X

Bangladesh X

Belarus X

Belgium X

Benin X

Bolivia X

Bosnia and Herzegovina X

Botswana X

Brazil X

Bulgaria X

Burkina Faso X

Cambodia X

Cameroon X

Canada X

Central African Republic X

Chile X

China X

Colombia X

Costa Rica X

Croatia X

Cyprus X

Czech Republic X

Democratic Republic of the Congo X
Appendix III

List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and 

Responses

Page 62 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Denmark X

Dominican Republic X

Ecuador X

Egypt X

El Salvador X

Eritreaa X

Estonia X

Ethiopia X

Finland X

France X

Gabon X

Georgia X

Germany X

Ghana X

Greece X

Guatemala X

Haiti X

Hondurasb X

Hungary X

Iceland X

India X

Indonesia X

Ireland X

Israel X

Italy X

Jamaica X

Japan X

Jordan X

Kazakhstan X

Kenya X

Korea (Republic of) X

Kuwait X

Kyrgyzstana X

Latvia X

Lebanon X

Liberia X

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country

Completed the 

survey 

Did not complete the 

survey
Appendix III

List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and 

Responses

Page 63 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Liechtenstein X

Lithuania X

Luxembourg X

Macedonia X

Madagascar X

Malaysia X

Mali X

Malta X

Marshall Islands X

Mauritius X

Mexico X

Moldova X

Monaco X

Mongolia X

Morocco X

Myanmar X

Namibia X

Netherlands X

New Zealand X

Nicaragua X

Niger X

Nigeria X

Norway X

Pakistan X

Panama X

Paraguay X

Peru X

Philippines X

Poland X

Portugal X

Qatar X

Romania X

Russian Federation X

Saudi Arabia X

Senegal X

Sierra Leone X

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country

Completed the 

survey 

Did not complete the 

survey
Appendix III

List of Countries Surveyed by GAO and 

Responses

Page 64 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Source: GAO.

a

IAEA membership has been approved by the IAEA General Conference and will take effect once the 

necessary legal instruments are deposited. 

b

IAEA member state as of March 17, 2003. 

Singapore X

Slovakia X

Slovenia X

South Africa X

Spain X

Sri Lanka X

Sweden X

Switzerland X

Tajikistan X

Tanzania X

Thailand X

Tunisia X

Turkey X

Uganda X

Ukraine X

United Arab Emirates X

United Kingdom X

Uruguay X

Uzbekistan X

Venezuela X

Vietnam X

Yemen X

Yugoslavia X

Zambia X

Zimbabwe X

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country

Completed the 

survey 

Did not complete the 

survey
Page 65 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents Involving 

Sealed Sources ApendxiIV

This appendix provides information about the illicit trafficking in, or 

smuggling of, radioactive material over the past decade and focuses 

primarily on 17 incidents involving sealed radioactive sources. There is 

sketchy—and sometimes contradictory—information about many of these 

cases for a number of reasons, including (1) many trafficking incidents are 

never detected by authorities; (2) some may be known but not reported 

because the country does not participate in IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking 

Database program; (3) details about these incidents may be considered 

sensitive by the countries where they occur; and (4) until recently, 

trafficking of radioactive materials was not considered by U.S. and 

international nonproliferation experts to be as great a concern as the 

trafficking of weapons-grade nuclear material. IAEA is encouraging 

countries to provide more details about all trafficking incidents involving 

radioactive materials so that better information can be developed and more 

accurate assessments and analysis can be performed. 

Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit 

trafficking in, or smuggling of, radioactive material worldwide, including 

sealed sources. According to IAEA, sealed sources, such as cesium-137, 

cobalt-60, strontium-90, and iridium-192 are considered to pose the greatest 

security risk. In 1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents 

involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Seventy 

countries, or about one-half of IAEA’s member states, currently participate 

in the database. As of December 31, 2002, IAEA listed 272 confirmed 

incidents involving the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, including 

sealed sources.1

 According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which 

the information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact 

from the reporting country. Of the 272 confirmed illicit trafficking 

incidents reported by IAEA, there were 179 incidents with potentially high 

risk sealed sources that pose the greatest security risks. More than twothirds of the 179 incidents involving these sources occurred after 1997. 

Figure 6 depicts the frequency of reported international trafficking 

incidents involving sealed sources since 1993. Figure 7 provides 

information on types of sealed sources and other radioactive materials 

involved in international trafficking incidents.

1

The IAEA database includes incidents since January 1, 1993, that involved radioactive 

material other than nuclear material. In most cases, the radioactive material was in the form 

of sealed sources, but some incidents involving unsealed radioactive sources or 

radioactively contaminated materials, such as contaminated scrap metal, have also been 

reported to the illicit trafficking database and are included in the statistics. 
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 66 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 6: Reported International Trafficking Incidents Involving Radioactive 

Sources, 1993-2002
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 67 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 7: Illicit Trafficking Incidents by Type of Radioactive Source, 1993-2002

Sources: IAEA (data); GAO (presentation). 

Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed 

Sources

Several observations can be made based on the incidents involving the 

illicit trafficking of sealed sources.

• The majority of the incidents involved deliberate intent to illegally 

acquire, smuggle, or sell radioactive material. Several other incidents 

reported, however, do not reflect criminal intent but have resulted from, 

among other things, the inadvertent transportation of contaminated 

scrap metal. The unregulated scrap metal industry throughout the 

former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe poses potential security and 

safety risks nonetheless because many radioactive sources are stolen 

for the metal shielding, leaving the source exposed and potentially very 

dangerous. 
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 68 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

• Since the mid-1990s, the trafficking of radioactive materials has 

generally increased. The increase in illicit trafficking cases may be due, 

in part, to the increased reporting of these incidents by countries and/or 

improved radiation detection systems placed at countries’ border 

crossings.

• From 1993 through 1998, trafficking incidents involving radioactive 

material were primarily reported in Russia, Germany, and Estonia. In 

the past few years, there appears to have been an increase in trafficking 

through Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania. 

• According to the illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, high-risk 

sealed sources are more likely to be trafficked than weapons-grade 

fissile material, such as highly-enriched uranium. This is because such 

sources have numerous beneficial applications and are not as tightly 

controlled as fissile materials. 

IAEA and DOE officials told us that the actual number of trafficking cases 

involving sealed sources is larger than what is currently being reported 

because many trafficking incidents are never detected by authorities and 

many countries are not always willing to share sensitive trafficking 

information. Another factor that affects the number of confirmed cases 

reported is the credibility of the information. According to DOE, a 

significant amount of time and expertise is required to assess a particular 

incident before it can be deemed credible. Despite difficulties in drawing 

conclusions from illicit trafficking data, the threat posed by illicit 

trafficking is a real and growing problem. The Director of IAEA’s Office of 

Nuclear Security also told us that every reported case should be taken 

seriously. Furthermore, she noted that countries need to report their 

smuggling incidents more systematically so that better assessments can be 

performed. 

Table 7 provides information about 17 significant cases of illicit trafficking 

identified by IAEA and others since 1993. A brief discussion of each case 

follows the table. 
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 69 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 7: Significant Seizures of Illicitly Trafficked Sealed Sources Since 1993

Sources: IAEA, Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Ridgway Center for International Security Studies.

Khohtla-Jarve, Estonia, 

1993

This incident involved two men who worked as assistants to an “engine” 

driver at a mineral fertilizer plant, which is located in Khohtla-Jarve, 

Estonia. The two men stole a device containing 2.8 grams of cesium-137 

and were arrested. According to available information, the suspects 

intended to sell the cesium to an unspecified buyer. 

Date

Country where

material was seized Material How material was found

April 1993 Estonia Cesium-137 Interdiction by police

July 1993 Germany Strontium-90 Discovered by police 

investigation 

September 1994 Bulgaria Multiple sources Discovered by police 

investigation

October 1994 Romania Strontium-90 Discovered by police 

investigation

July 1995 Estonia Radium-226 Discovered by police 

investigation

November 1995 Russia Cesium-137 Tip provided to news reporter

October 1998 Ukraine Multiple sources Discovered by customs 

officials at airport

July 1999 Russia Californium-252 Discovered by police 

investigation

August 1999 Turkey Cesium-137 Discovered by police 

investigation

September 1999 Ukraine Strontium-90 Discovered by police 

investigation

August 1999 Russia Cesium-137 Discovered by police 

investigation

February 2000 Ukraine Strontium-90 Discovered by police 

investigation 

March 2000 Uzbekistan Radioactively contaminated material Interdiction at border by 

customs officials

December 2000 Romania Multiple sources Discovered by police 

investigation

January 2001 Greece Multiple sources Discovered by police 

investigation

January 2002 Belarus Strontium-90 Discovered by police 

investigation

May 2002 Bulgaria Multiple sources Interdiction by police 
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 70 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Saarbrucken, Germany, 

1993

In July 1993, German police recovered an unidentified amount of 

strontium-90 that had been transported from Ukraine. The material, which 

was packed in small containers, was found by police from information 

provided by Ukrainian security services. Reportedly, the containers were 

discovered in three plastic bags after Ukrainian police had told the German 

police where to find them. Police in Kiev, Ukraine, arrested 17 people in 

connection with the operation. 

Sofia, Bulgaria, 1994 In September 1994, following a 5-day undercover operation, Bulgarian 

authorities arrested six Bulgarians and confiscated 19 containers of 

radioactive substances, including plutonium, cesium-137, strontium-90, 

plutonium-beryllium sources, and thallium-204 that had been stolen from 

the Izotop Enterprise near the capital, Sofia. According to available 

information, the theft was made possible by poor security at the laboratory.

Urechesti, Romania, 

1994

In October 1994, Romanian authorities arrested three Moldovans, two 

Jordanians, and two Romanians for trying to sell 7 kilograms of strontium 

in a lead pipe. One suspect, a former military officer, had smuggled the 

strontium to Moldova. The material was then passed to intermediaries in 

the Romanian province of Transylvania, where it was offered to the 

Jordanians for $400,000.

Tallinn, Estonia, 1995 In July 1995, Estonian security police arrested two Estonians who had 

radium-226 in their car. According to available information, it was thought 

that the radium was smuggled into Estonia via middlemen in St. 

Petersburg, Russia, indicating that more people were probably involved. 

Moscow, Russia, 1995 In November 1995, acting on a tip, Russian television reporters discovered 

a 32-kilogram container, containing cesium-137 and wrapped with 

explosives, in a Moscow park. According to available information, 

Chechen separatists were responsible for this incident and had reportedly 

obtained the radioactive material from either cancer-treatment equipment 

or an instrument calibration device used in flaw detection equipment. The 

Chechens threatened to detonate the device if Russia decided to resume 

combat operations in the region.
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 71 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Kiev, Ukraine, 1998 In October 1998, a radiation health specialist at a German company that 

consults on reactor safety was arrested by customs police at Kiev airport in 

possession of a container of radioactive material from Chernobyl. 

According to available information, a Russian scientist asked the health 

specialist to take a metal container holding a small amount of radioactive 

material out of the country for analysis. Russian officials were unsure of 

the exact type of material involved, but suspected it contained cesium, 

strontium, and zirconium. 

St. Petersburg, Russia, 

1999

In July 1999 Russian law enforcement officials arrested two men who 

attempted to sell 5 grams of californium-252. One of those arrested, a 

technician from Murmansk, was approached by a criminal group who 

enlisted his help to procure californium-252. The technician, who was 

responsible for removing spent nuclear components from a nuclearpowered icebreaker, smuggled the radioactive material off the icebreaker. 

Along with an accomplice, the technician packed the californium-252 into a 

container filled with paraffin, which they placed within a canister of water. 

After the initial offer from the criminal group fell through, the technician 

and his accomplice traveled to St. Petersburg in search of another buyer, 

where they were arrested. 

Istanbul, Turkey, 1999 In a joint operation, the Istanbul Organized Crime and Arms Smuggling 

Office and the National Intelligence Organization arrested five people, one 

of whom was from the Republic of Georgia, as they tried to sell cesium-137 

to policemen acting as buyers in Istanbul in August 1999. The cesium, 

which was in two separate steel tubes and weighed 49 grams, was 

smuggled into Turkey from an unknown location.

Uzhgorod, Ukraine, 

1999

In September 1999, a Russian citizen was arrested after police officers 

discovered that he was carrying two containers of strontium-90. The 

material was discovered on the suspect during a document check by 

Ukrainian police. It is believed that the suspect was taking the radioactive 

materials from Russia to Western Europe. The suspect was in possession 

of a number of forged documents, including a forged diplomatic 

identification card. 
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 72 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Volgograd, Russia, 1999 In August 1999, Russian security police recovered six containers of cesium137, which were stolen from a Volgograd oil refinery in May 1998. Earlier 

efforts to locate the stolen containers, including the establishment of 

checkpoints with radiation monitors on local roads, had proven fruitless. 

According to reports, the thieves had hidden the stolen cesium containers 

to avoid this police dragnet and hoped to sell the material after the search 

for it had finally been abandoned. 

Donetsk, Ukraine, 2000 In February 2000, A Ukrainian law enforcement unit confiscated 27 

containers of strontium-90. Five individuals were reportedly involved in 

the illegal trafficking of this material. The group allegedly tried to contact 

foreign buyers, who were in fact members of the law enforcement unit. 

The radioactive material was reportedly stolen from a military unit 

deployed in the region and was stored in an apartment. Reports stated that 

the individuals were attempting to sell the 27 containers for $168,000.

Beshkoprik, 

Uzbekistan, 2000

In March 2000, Uzbekistan customs officers seized an Iranian-registered 

truck on the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border about 20 kilometers from 

Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, after discovering it contained highly 

radioactive material. Kazakhstan customs officials had cleared the truck 

and issued a certificate indicating that it had passed radiation screening. 

Uzbekistan officials determined that the level of gamma radiation emitted 

by the cargo was 100 times over the acceptable level. Uzbekistan customs 

officials then returned the truck to their Kazakhstani counterparts. The 

destination listed on the truck’s manifest was Quetta, Pakistan, and some 

reports speculated that the incident involved efforts to smuggle radioactive 

material intended for use by terrorist groups to build a radiological 

weapon.

Piatra Neamt City, 

Romania, 2000

In December 2000, five suspects were arrested while trying to sell 

1 kilogram of radioactive material (strontium, plutonium, and cobalt), to 

undercover police officers posing as prospective buyers of radioactive 

material. The suspects included a former officer of an antiorganized crime 

police unit in Moldova and four Romanians who were bodyguards in charge 

of protecting the shipments and who were responsible for organizing the 

sale of the materials. 
Appendix IV

Information on Trafficking Incidents 

Involving Sealed Sources

Page 73 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Thessaloniki, Greece, 

2001

In January 2001, Greek law enforcement officials uncovered several 

hundred metal “wafers” of commercially available alpha-emitting ionization 

sources, containing a total of 3 grams of plutonium and americium. The 

cache was found buried in a forest 12 kilometers from Thessalonki. The 

sources were believed to be smuggled from Eastern Europe, and there was 

speculation about organized criminal involvement in the smuggling of these 

sources. An investigation was launched, but to date, there have been no 

publicly released results.

Minsk, Belarus, 2002 In January 2002, police in Minsk, Belarus, arrested two persons in 

connection with an attempt to sell four sealed sources of strontium-90 that 

one of the suspects had been storing in his apartment. One of the suspects 

had stolen the sources 4 years earlier during his military service, and the 

other was arrested while trying to sell them. 

Veliko Tarnova, 

Bulgaria, 2002

In May 2002, Bulgarian authorities seized 101 plutonium sources and an 

americium-beryllium source from a vehicle near Veliko Tarnova. The 

sources were detected when police officers stopped a taxi with four 

individuals during a routine inspection. Thirty-nine of the plutonium 

sources had certificates indicating that they had been manufactured in 1990 

by Izotop-Moscow and had been ordered for a ferryboat station in Varna. 

Because the 10-year guaranteed service life of the sources had expired, it is 

possible that the sources were diverted after they had been removed from 

service for disposal.
Page 74 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving Sealed 

Sources ApendxiV

According to IAEA and the World Health Organization, there have been 

more than 100 accidents involving sealed sources over the past 50 years. 

Many of these accidents have been small and resulted in few injuries. The 

actual number of accidents worldwide is unknown because many countries 

do not report or record such events. This appendix describes 10 accidents 

that occurred since the early 1980s. Although these accidents were not the 

result of malevolent actions, they are useful in gaining a better 

understanding of the potential consequences following the loss of control 

of sealed sources. 

We have included, to the extent that it was available, information on the 

economic impacts of the accidents. The costs associated with lost 

equipment, damage to property, and the disposal of radioactive waste can 

be very significant. The cost components associated with radiological 

accidents include

• medical treatment of exposed individuals;

• radiation surveillance, including searching for lost sealed sources and 

contaminated areas;

• decontamination and dismantling of contaminated buildings and 

property,

• loss of production capacity;

• radioactive waste management and disposal; 

• monetary compensation to individuals who received excessive doses of 

radiation;

• rebuilding or possible relocation costs; and

• effects on international trade.

Nonmonetary impacts may include:

• loss of public confidence and credibility in the government, and

• public questions about all uses of ionizing radiation.
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 75 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 8 provides information about 10 significant cases of accidents 

identified by IAEA and the World Health Organization since 1983. A brief 

discussion of each case follows the table.

Table 8: Selected Accidents Involving Sealed Sources Since 1983

Sources: IAEA and the World Health Organization.

Juarez, Mexico, 1983 A teletherapy unit containing a cobalt-60 source was purchased and 

imported by a Mexican hospital without compliance with existing import 

requirements. After the unit was stored for 6 years in a warehouse, its 

scrap value attracted the attention of a maintenance technician. The 

technician dismantled the unit and removed the cylinder containing the 

sources and other metal parts. He then loaded them into a pickup truck, 

drove to a junkyard, and sold the parts as scrap. Before arriving at the 

junkyard, he ruptured the sealed cobalt source, dispersing about 6,000 tiny 

pellets of cobalt-60 in the truck bed. 

When cranes moved the ruptured cylinder, the cobalt-60 pellets were 

spread over the junkyard and mixed with other metal materials. 

Consequently, pellets and pellet fragments were transferred to vehicles 

used for transporting the scrap to various foundries. The technician’s 

pickup truck remained parked on the street for 40 days and was then 

moved to another street, where it remained for an additional 10 days. An 

Year Location 

Type of sealed source 

involved 

Number of 

significant 

exposures 

Number of 

related 

deaths Associated costs

1983 Juarez, Mexico Cobalt-60 80 0 $34 million

1984 Morocco Iridium-192 11 8 Unknown

1987 Goiania, Brazil Cesium-137 50 4 $36 million

1994 Tammiku, Estonia Cesium-137 3 1 Unknown

1996 Gilan, Iran Iridium-192 1 0 Unknown

1997 Lilo, Georgia Cesium-137 11 0 Unknown

1998 Los Barrios, Spain Cesium-137 6 0 $28 million

1999 Yanango, Peru Iridium-192 1 0 Unknown

2000 Samut Prakarn, 

Thailand

Cobalt-60 10 3 Unknown

2001 Lja, Georgia Cesium-137 2 0 Unknown
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 76 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

unknown number of people passed by the truck each day and children used 

it as a play area. It was later discovered that contaminated scrap metal 

from the junkyard had been used to manufacture reinforcing rods and 

metal table bases. A truck transporting contaminated rods passed near a 

DOE national laboratory, where radiation detectors indicated the presence 

of radioactivity. Two days later, the authorities ascertained the origin of the 

contaminated rods.

U.S. and Mexican officials spent an estimated $34 million to track, recover, 

and secure these radioactive products. An extensive investigation showed 

that 30,000 tables and 6,000 tons of reinforcing rods had been made from 

the contaminated material. In addition, 814 buildings were partly or 

completely demolished because the radioactivity in the reinforcing rods 

resulted in higher-than-acceptable levels of radiation. The accident 

exposed 4,000 people to radiation, and 80 people received significant 

doses. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the estimated costs associated 

with the accident.

Table 9: Estimated Costs Related to the Accident in Mexico 

Source: IAEA.

Morocco, 1984 In 1984, iridium-192 sources were being used to radiograph welds in a 

fossil-fuel power plant under construction. One of these sources dropped 

to the ground from a radiography camera, where a passerby picked it up 

and took it home. The source was lost from March to June 1984 and, as a 

result, eight persons died from overexposure to radiation. In addition, 

three others suffered severe injuries from overexposure that required 

Dollars in thousands

Action taken Cost

Transport and disposal of contaminated material $15,640

Demolition and reconstruction to remove contaminated reinforcement bars in 

buildings 8,500

Loss of production capacity 3,740

Value of contaminated material 2,040

Technical and operational personnel and equipment 680

Security and surveillance by police and army forces, and legal or political 

problems 3,400

Total $34,000
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 77 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

hospitalization. It was initially assumed that the deaths were from 

poisoning. Only after the last family member died was it suspected that the 

deaths might have been caused by radiation. 

Goiania, Brazil, 1987 A private radiography institute moved to new premises and left behind a 

cesium-137 teletherapy unit without notifying the licensing authority. 

Because the building was partially demolished, the teletherapy unit was 

unsecured. Two people entered the building and removed the source 

assembly. They dismantled the source assembly at home and ruptured the 

sealed source. After the sealed source was ruptured, remnants of the 

source assembly were sold for scrap to a junkyard owner. He noticed that 

the material had a blue glow in the dark. Over a period of days, friends and 

relatives came to witness the phenomenon. Fragments of the source, the 

size of rice grains, were distributed to several families. Five days later, a 

number of persons started to show gastrointestinal distress.

Because the sealed source contained cesium chloride, which is highly 

soluble and easily dispersed, there was considerable contamination of the 

environment, resulting in external irradiation and internal contamination of 

several persons. Some individuals suffered very high internal and external 

contamination because of the way they had handled the cesium chloride 

powder, such as rubbing it on their skin, eating with contaminated hands, 

and handling various objects. Consequently, four people died within 4 

weeks of being hospitalized. In total, 249 people were contaminated, and 

112,000 people were screened for contamination. 

The environment was also severely contaminated. Eighty-five houses were 

significantly contaminated, and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The 

decontamination process required the demolition of seven residences and 

various other buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive 

waste.

The accident had a great psychological impact on the whole region. Many 

people feared contamination, irradiation, and incurable diseases. Over 

8,000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain 

certificates stating that they were not contaminated. These were needed 

because operators of commercial airplanes and buses refused to allow 

people from the region to board and hotels refused to register them. The 

social and psychological impact of the accident was so great that an 

outlying region to Goiania, where the waste repository was established, has 

incorporated the trifoil symbol of radioactivity into the region’s flag.
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 78 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Economically, there was discrimination against products from Goiania, 

resulting in a 20 percent decrease in the sales of cattle, grains, and other 

agricultural products from the region. Tourism decreased virtually to zero 

and the gross domestic product for the region decreased by 15 percent. It 

took 5 years for the gross domestic product to return to preaccident levels. 

In total, the direct and indirect costs for emergency response and remedial 

action are estimated to be $36 million. 

Figure 8: Contaminated Radioactive Debris from Demolished Residences in Goiania

Tammiku, Estonia, 

1994

In October 1994 a sealed source that was discovered in scrap metal was 

recovered and transferred to a radioactive waste repository under the 

supervision of the national government. Three brothers entered the 

repository without authorization and removed a metal container enclosing 

a cesium-137 source and the source fell out of the container. One of the 

men placed the source in his pocket and took it home. The source 

remained in the house for 27 days, resulting in the overexposure of five 

individuals, including one fatality. The sealed source was thought to be 
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 79 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

part of a gamma irradiator, but none had ever been used or registered in 

Estonia. According to available information, it is possible that the source 

was brought into Estonia from the Russian Federation with miscellaneous 

scrap metals for export to Western Europe. 

Gilan, Iran, 1996 At a combined cycle fossil fuel power plant in Iran, radiography equipment 

with an iridium-192 sealed source was used to examine welds from a boiler. 

At the end of the radiographer’s shift, the source became detached from its 

drive cable and fell to the floor unnoticed. Later, a worker moving thermal 

insulation materials around the plant noticed a shiny, pencil-sized metal 

object in a trench and put it in his pocket. The source was in his chest 

pocket for approximately two hours, resulting in a high radiation dose. As 

a result of this exposure, the worker had abnormal redness of the skin, 

severe bone marrow depression, and an unusually extended radiation 

injury requiring plastic surgery.

Lilo, Georgia, 1997 Eleven border frontier guards became ill owing to exposure from multiple 

radioactive sources, including 12 cesium-137 sources, one cobalt-60 source, 

and 200 radium-226 sources. These sources were abandoned when the 

military site was transferred from the Soviet Union to the Republic of 

Georgia. All individuals suffered from skin ulcerations and chronic 

radiation sickness. No deaths were associated with this accident. 
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 80 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 9: Location Where Sealed Sources Were Found, Lilo, Georgia

Los Barrios, Spain, 

1998

In May 1998, a cesium-137 source was accidentally melted at a stainless 

steel factory. As a result of the periodic maintenance and cleaning of the 

filter system at the factory, the dust was removed, and much of it was sent 

to two different factories several hundred kilometers from the factory. The 

dust was contaminated with cesium-137, and about 400 people were 

monitored for contamination. Measurements of a large number of water, 

air, and soil samples were obtained from nearby towns and at locations 

several hundred kilometers away. Traces of cesium-137 were found but 

considered negligible. In countries outside of Spain, the environmental 

impact was minimal. The economic consequences of the accident, 

including temporary suspension of factory operations, decontamination 

operations, and management of the resulting radioactive waste, were 

estimated to be over $25 million.

Yanango, Peru, 1999 In February 1999 an iridium-192 source fell out of a radiography camera 

being used at a hydroelectric power plant. Later that day, a welder picked 

up the iridium-192 source and placed it in the right back pocket of his 
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 81 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

trousers. For the next several hours, the welder continued his work and 

later took a minibus home with 15 other people onboard. Once home, the 

welder’s wife fed their 18-month-old child while she was sitting on the 

welder’s trousers, and two other children were 2-3 meters from the iridium 

source for approximately 2 hours. The welder received extensive radiation 

burns that required the amputation of his right leg. The wife suffered 

lesions on her lower back after her brief exposure to the sealed source. No 

radiation effects were reported for the children.

Samut Prakarn, 

Thailand, 2000

A company in Bangkok, Thailand, possessed several teletherapy devices 

containing cobalt-60 without authorization from the Thailand Office of 

Atomic Energy for Peace. The teletherapy device was originally installed at 

a hospital in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1969. In 1981, a new source was 

installed, and the hospital received no further maintenance from the 

manufacturer of the teletherapy unit and source. When the teletherapy unit 

was removed from service in 1994, the maintenance contractor had gone 

bankrupt and the manufacturer was no longer producing cobalt-60 units. 

As a result, the hospital was left with the disused source to manage and 

control. Since the hospital did not have sufficient storage space, it sold the 

device and source to a new supplier without the authorization of the 

regulatory authority. In 1999 the new supplier was notified that its lease of 

the warehouse was to be terminated and relocated the device to a parking 

lot that was owned by its parent company. 

In the autumn of 1999, the company relocated the teletherapy devices to an 

unsecured storage location without the authorization of the national 

regulatory authority. In late January 2000, several individuals obtained 

access to the unsecured storage location and partially disassembled the 

teletherapy device. The individuals took the unit to a residence and 

attempted to disassemble it further. 

In early February 2000, two individuals took the disassembled device to a 

junkyard in Samut Prakarn, Thailand, to segregate component metals and 

sell them separately as scrap. While a junkyard worker was disassembling 

the device, the cobalt-60 source fell out of its housing unobserved by the 

junkyard workers or the individuals. By the middle of February 2000, 

several of the people involved, including the finders of the source and 

junkyard workers, had begun to feel ill and sought medical assistance. 

Physicians at the hospital suspected the possibility of radiation exposure 

and reported their suspicions to the regulatory authority. Altogether, 10 
Appendix V

Information About Accidents Involving 

Sealed Sources

Page 82 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

people received high doses of radiation from the source. Three of those 

people, all workers at the junkyard, died within 2 months of their exposure.

Lja, Georgia, 2001 In December 2001 three woodsmen found two heat-emanating metallic 

containers near their campsite in a forest near the village of Lja in western 

Georgia. This village is in the Abkhazia region of the Caucasus. This 

region is subject to political unrest and has sought its independence from 

the Republic of Georgia. As a result, during the past decade, the region has 

been largely inaccessible to Georgian and international authorities. The 

woodsmen involved in the accident used the containers as a heat source 

and experienced nausea, vomiting, and dizziness within hours of exposure 

to the containers. At a local hospital in Tbilisi, Georgia, the woodsmen 

were diagnosed with radiation sickness and severe radiation burns, and at 

least two of the three were in serious condition. In February 2002, an 

IAEA-sponsored search and recovery team found the containers and 

discovered that each one was previously used in Soviet-era radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators. 
Page 83 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix VI

Information on Producers and Distributors of 

Radioactive Material ApendxiVI

This appendix provides information about the major producers and 

distributors of radioactive material used to manufacture sealed sources. 

Six countries are the major suppliers of the radioactive material: Argentina, 

Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Russia, and South Africa. Canada is the 

largest exporter of radioactive material and has provided over half of all 

radioactive material used in medical applications worldwide. Table 10 lists 

the major producers and distributors of radioactive material used to 

manufacture sealed sources.

Table 10: Major Producers and Distributors of Radioactive Material Used to Manufacture Sealed Sources

Country Major organizations producing and/or distributing sources

Argentina National Atomic Energy Commission and INVAP S.E. 

Australia Australian Nuclear Science and 

Technology Organization 

Belgium National Institute for Radio Elements and Belgian Nuclear Research Centre

Brazil Instituto de Pasquisas Energeticas Nucleares

Bulgaria Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy

Canada Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., and MDS Nordion

China China Isotope Corporation and Nuclear Power Institute of China

Czech Republic Nuclear Research Institute

Denmark Risoe National Laboratory

France CIS Bio International 

Commissariat A L’Energie Atomique Centre D’Etudes De Valduc

Germany AEA Technology QSA, GmbH., Chemotrade, 

Isotope Products Europe Blaseg, GmbH., and 

STS—Steuerungstechnik & Strahlesnschutz GmbH

Hungary Atomic Energy Research Institute and Institute of Isotopes Co., Ltd.

India Bhabha Atomic Research Centre

Indonesia National Nuclear Energy Agency

Japan Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Institute for Atomic Energy Rikkyo University

Malaysia Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research

Netherlands I.D.B. Holland B.V.

Russia Atomenergoexport, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Kurchatov Institute, Mayak 

Production Association, Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors, and St. 

Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics

South Africa South African Nuclear Energy Corporation

South Korea Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

Sweden Studsvik AB
Appendix VI

Information on Producers and Distributors of 

Radioactive Material

Page 84 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Sources: IAEA and Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

United Kingdom Ametek Advanced Measurement Technology, Nycomed Amersham, and Reviss Services 

Limited

United States Department of Energy

Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Major organizations producing and/or distributing sources
Page 85 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix VII

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Policy 

on Exports of Sealed Sources ApendxiVI

In most cases, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grants a general license 

for the export of sealed sources to all countries containing byproduct 

material except certain proscribed countries: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 

Korea, and Sudan. Byproduct material is (1) any radioactive material 

(except special nuclear material) yielded in, or made radioactive by, 

exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using 

special nuclear material (as in a reactor) and (2) the tailings, or wastes 

produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from 

ore.

According to NRC, limited quantities of sealed sources can also be 

exported under a general license to “restricted” countries: Afghanistan, 

Andorra, Angola, Burma, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and Syria. 

A general license, provided by regulation, grants authority to a person for 

certain activities, in this case, the export of sealed sources, and is effective 

without filing an application with NRC or the issuance of a licensing 

document to the person or organization exporting the sealed source. NRC 

has placed most sealed sources for export under a general license for 

several reasons, including the following: (1) subject to NRC or Agreement 

State1

 oversight, the United States is responsible only for ensuring the safe 

use and control of radioactive materials used to manufacture sealed 

sources within U.S. territory; (2) foreign countries have the sovereign 

responsibility for ensuring appropriate regulatory controls over radioactive 

material, including such material imported from other countries; and 

(3) control over radioactive material would not be enhanced by requiring 

specific licenses for material exported from the United States. A specific 

license would not ensure that the exported materials would be subject to 

controls and regulatory oversight in a foreign country because the license 

does not ensure that the recipient country has adequate regulatory controls 

over the material that is exported from the United States. Under a specific 

license, the export request must be reviewed and approved by NRC in 

consultation with other appropriate agencies, including the Departments of 

Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy.

NRC officials told us that they are required only to maintain a database of 

exports of sealed sources that are issued under a specific license and 

certain other exports of concern, such as americium-241 and neptunium1

A U.S. state that has signed an agreement with NRC under which the state regulates the use 

of by-product and other materials within that state. Currently, there are 32 U.S. Agreement 

States.
Appendix VII

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Policy 

on Exports of Sealed Sources

Page 86 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

237. The United States, as a nuclear weapon state, has agreed to report all 

exports of americium and neptunium to IAEA. With regard to shipments of 

sealed sources, NRC officials told us that the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection maintains a database 

of all transactions, identified by tariff number, including those including 

sealed sources that are exported under a general license. However, these 

officials also said that it would be very difficult for the Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection to track these specific shipments of sealed sources 

because the information on manifests is general in nature.

NRC officials told us that they were not aware of any sealed sources that 

were exported under a general license from the United States that have 

been used for malicious purposes. They noted that there have been 

thousands of such exports, most of which involve material in forms or 

quantities that pose minimal safety or health risks if properly used and 

controlled. However, there have been a few cases where lax local 

regulatory oversight over high-risk materials resulted in instances where 

sealed sources were eventually lost or improperly disposed of, resulting in 

harmful exposure to individuals.

Specific licenses are required to export radioactive material in waste and 

tritium for recovery and recycling purposes. This is because a final NRC 

rule (59 F.R. 48994), effective November 10, 1994, revoked the general 

license for bulk tritium and alpha-emitting radionuclides having an alpha 

half-life of 10 days or greater but less than 200 years to conform NRC’s 

regulations to the export control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers’ 

Group2

 for nuclear-related, dual-use items. Tritium and reactor-produced 

alpha-emitting radionuclides are two commodities on the Nuclear 

Suppliers’ Groups dual-use list whose exports are regulated by NRC. In 

addition, tritium and alpha-emitting radionucliedes are controlled by the 

Nuclear Suppliers’ Group because of their potential application in the 

production of weapons of mass destruction. 

Another final rule on the import and export of radioactive material

(60 F.R. 37556), effective August 21, 1995, established specific licensing 

requirements for the import and export of radioactive material in the form 

of waste coming into or leaving the United States to conform with NRC’s 

2

The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group consists of 30 nuclear supplier countries and seeks to control 

exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both dual-use and specially 

designed and prepared.
Appendix VII

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Policy 

on Exports of Sealed Sources

Page 87 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

regulations to the guidelines of the IAEA Code of Practice on the 

International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste. 

In view of increased post-September 11 terrorism concerns, NRC is 

considering changes to its general license provisions to improve controls 

over exports. Possible changes include (1) ensuring that the exporter 

confirm that the customer in the foreign country is authorized by the 

recipient country to possess the material; (2) requiring prior notification to 

NRC for risk-significant shipments; and (3) as appropriate, providing 

national or international source registries with data for risk-significant 

shipments. Changes under consideration are expected to be implemented 

in fiscal year 2004 by orders with compensatory measures and in fiscal 

years 2004-2005 by a rule change as part of a broader NRC plan to improve 

controls over the imports and exports of sealed sources. Other possible 

and more restrictive controls for exports include a requirement for a 

specific export license for high-risk material such as high-activity cobalt-60 

sources or imposing a specific prohibition on such exports to countries 

that do not have acceptable sealed source security, control, and 

accountability requirements. The United States is coordinating these 

efforts with other countries that export sealed sources to ensure 

consistent, adequate controls. In addition, in conjunction with the change 

of the national threat level to “orange” in March 2003, NRC issued a 

security advisory to licensees concerning certain quantities of certain highrisk sources, which included exports and imports.
Page 88 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix VIII

Results of the International Conference on the 

Security of Radioactive Sources ApendxiVI

This appendix provides information concerning several key findings and 

recommendations from the international conference on the security of 

radioactive sources held in Vienna, Austria, in March 2003. The conference 

was sponsored by the governments of the United States and the Russian 

Federation and hosted by the government of Austria. It was organized by 

IAEA in cooperation with the European Commission, the World Customs 

Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the 

European Police Office. Over 700 delegates from more than 120 countries 

attended the conference. 

The conference produced key findings in the following areas: 

(1) identifying, searching for, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive 

sources; (2) strengthening long-term control over radioactive sources; 

(3) interdicting illicit trafficking; (4) planning the response to radiological 

emergencies arising from the malevolent use of radioactive sources; and 

(5) recognizing the role of the media/public education, communication, and 

outreach.

Regarding identifying and searching for sources, the conference 

encouraged countries to 

• develop and implement national action plans, on the basis of their own 

specific conditions, for locating, searching for, recovering, and securing 

high-risk radioactive sources; 

• accelerate the establishment of a coherent and transparent scheme for 

the categorization of radioactive sources in order to provide for the 

safety and security of sources; and 

• assist other countries, as appropriate, in identifying, searching for, 

recovering, and securing high-risk sources.

Concerning strengthening long-term control over radioactive sources, the 

conference encouraged countries to 

• formulate and implement national plans for the management of sources 

throughout their life cycle;

• develop, to the extent practical, standards for the design of sealed 

sources and associated devices that are less suitable for malevolent use 

(e.g., alternative technologies and less-dispersible forms of high-risk 

sources); and
Appendix VIII

Results of the International Conference on 

the Security of Radioactive Sources

Page 89 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

• establish arrangements for the safe and secure disposal of disused highrisk sources, including the development of disposal facilities.

Regarding illicit trafficking, the conference recognized the need for greater 

international efforts to detect and interdict the illicit trafficking of high-risk 

sources and to take appropriate enforcement actions. In support of this 

objective, the conference encouraged countries to 

• further develop and strengthen measures to detect, interdict, and 

respond to the illicit trafficking of high-risk radioactive sources;

• deploy and widely use technologies for detecting high-risk radioactive 

sources, with emphasis on ensuring the sustainability of monitoring and 

detection equipment;

• undertake further research on and development of detection 

technologies for use at borders and elsewhere;

• enhance cooperation between government agencies responsible for 

preventing, detecting, and responding to illicit trafficking incidents, 

especially in the fields of information sharing, communications, and 

training;

• pool resources through, for example, the sharing of monitoring and 

detection equipment on common borders; and 

• continue support for and development of IAEA’s illicit trafficking 

database.

The conference recommended that countries develop comprehensive plans 

to prepare for and respond to radiological emergencies involving 

radioactive sources. In support of this recommendation, the conference 

encouraged countries to, among other things,

• enhance current national and international response arrangements, 

taking into account the need to respond both proactively and reactively 

to the new scenarios presented by the possibility of the malevolent use 

of high-risk radioactive sources and 

• consider establishing mechanisms to facilitate effective coordination in 

the event of a radiological emergency.
Appendix VIII

Results of the International Conference on 

the Security of Radioactive Sources

Page 90 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Finally, the conference recognized that the public’s understanding of the 

nature and consequences of radiological emergencies will largely 

determine how the public reacts to such emergencies. As a result, the 

conference encouraged countries to

• conduct public outreach and awareness programs to foster a better 

understanding of radiological threats and the appropriate response in 

the event of a radiological emergency in order to minimize social and 

economic disruption;

• educate the public regarding the nature of radioactivity, the 

consequences of the malevolent uses of high-risk radioactive sources, 

and the procedures for mitigating those consequences in order to 

reduce the psychological impact of radiological terrorism;

• strengthen their education and training programs as a means to promote 

confidence building within the public; and 

• assume greater responsibility for gaining the trust of the media and 

informing them about the potential threat of radiological terrorism to 

help ensure that the media will communicate information accurately in 

a nonsensational manner to avoid fueling public fear and panic.
Page 91 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix IX

Information on IAEA’s Revised Categorization 

of Radioactive Sources ApendxiIX

The purpose of IAEA’s Categorization of Radioactive Sources is to provide 

a fundamental and internationally harmonized basis for risk-informed 

decision making. The draft document provides a categorization for 

radioactive sources used in industry, medicine, agriculture, research, and 

education. The principles of the categorization can be equally applied to 

radioactive sources, such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators that 

may be under military control. The categorization does not apply to 

radiation-generating devices such as X-ray machines and particle 

accelerators, although it may be applied to radioactive sources produced 

by, or used as, target material in such devices. The revised categorization 

divides sources into five categories, according to their potential to cause 

harmful health effects, should the source not be managed safely and 

securely. The categories are defined as follows:

• Category 1 sources are considered extremely dangerous. If not safely 

managed safely, the radioactive material would likely cause permanent 

injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it 

for more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to 

this amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an 

hour. Furthermore, the amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by 

fire or explosion, could possibly—but would be unlikely to—

permanently injure persons in the immediate vicinity or be life 

threatening to them. There would be little or no risk of immediate heath 

effects to persons beyond a few hundred meters. It would be highly 

unlikely for a category 1 source to contaminate a public water supply to 

dangerous levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in 

water.

• Category 2 sources are also considered personally dangerous. If not 

safely managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could 

cause permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in 

contact with it for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be 

fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a 

period of hours to days. The amount of radioactive material, if 

dispersed by fire or explosion, could possibly—but would be very 

unlikely to—permanently injure or be life threatening to persons in the 

immediate vicinity. It would be virtually impossible for a category 2 

source to contaminate a public water supply to dangerous levels, even if 

the radioactive material were highly soluble in water.

• Category 3 sources are also considered to be dangerous. If not safely 

managed or securely protected, the radioactive material could cause 
Appendix IX

Information on IAEA’s Revised 

Categorization of Radioactive Sources

Page 92 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

permanent injury to a person who handled it or were otherwise in 

contact with it, for some hours. It could possibly—although it is 

unlikely—be fatal to be in close contact to this amount of unshielded 

radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. The amount of 

radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or explosion, could possibly—

but is extremely unlikely to—permanently injure or be life threatening 

to persons in the immediate vicinity. It would be virtually impossible for 

a category 3 source to contaminate a public water supply to dangerous 

levels, even if the radioactive material were highly soluble in water.

• Category 4 sources are unlikely to be dangerous. It is very unlikely that 

anyone would be permanently injured by this amount of radioactive 

material. This amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or 

explosion, could not permanently injure persons. 

• Category 5 sources are not considered dangerous. No one could be 

permanently injured by this amount of radioactive material. 

Furthermore, this amount of radioactive material, if dispersed by fire or 

explosion, could not permanently injure persons.

 IAEA has developed a list on the basis of practices (such as irradiators, 

industrial radiography, and teletherapy) as part of its relative ranking of 

sealed sources. Examples of the most dangerous (category 1) include 

radioisotope thermoelectric generators, sterilization and food preservation 

facilities containing cobalt-60 or cesium-137, and medical equipment 

containing cobalt-60. The least dangerous (category 5) include low-doserate brachytherapy devices and lightning detectors containing americium241. 
Page 93 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix X

Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model 

Project Program ApendxiX

Table 11 provides a list of the countries participating in IAEA’s model 

project program and the year they joined the program.

Table 11: Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model Project Program

Country Year joined the program

Albania 1996

Algeria 2002

Angolaa 2001

Armenia 1996

Azerbaijan 2003

Bangladesh 1996

Belarusb 1996

Benina 2003

Bolivia 1996

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996

Bulgaria 2001

Burkina Fasoa 2001

Cameroona 1996

Central African Republica 2003

China 2001

Columbia 1998

Costa Rica 1996

Croatia 2001

Cyprus 1996

Democratic Republic of the Congoa 1996

Dominican Republic 1996

Ecuador 2000

Egypt 2001

El Salvador 1996

Ethiopia 1996

Estonia 1996

Gabona 1996

Georgia 1997

Ghana 1996

Guatemala 1996

Haiti 1999

Hungary 2001
Appendix X

Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model 

Project Program

Page 94 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Indonesia 2001

Iran 2001

Ivory Coasta 1996

Jamaica 1997

Jordan 1997

Kazakhstan 1996

Kenya 2001

Kuwait 2001

Latvia 1996

Lebanon 1996

Libya 2001

Lithuania 1996

Macedonia 1996

Madagascar 1996

Malaysia 2001

Malia 1996

Malta 2001

Mauritiusa 1996

Moldova 1996

Mongolia 1996

Morocco 2001

Myanmar 1996

Namibiaa 1996

Nicaragua 1996

Nigera 1996

Nigeriaa 1996

Pakistan 2001

Panama 1996

Paraguay 1996

Philippines 2001

Portugal 2001

Qatar 1996

Romania 2001

Saudi Arabia 1996

Senegala 1996

Sierra Leonea 1996

Singapore 2001

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Year joined the program
Appendix X

Countries Participating in IAEA’s Model 

Project Program

Page 95 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Source: IAEA.

a

These countries are participating only in milestones 1 and 2 of the model project program.

b

Belarus completed the program in 2000.

Slovenia 2001

South Africa 2002

Sri Lanka 1996

Sudan 1996

Syria 1997

Tajikistan 2002

Tanzania 2001

Thailand 2001

Tunisia 2001

Turkey 2001

Ugandaa 1996

United Arab Emirates 1996

Uruguay 2000

Uzbekistan 1996

Venezuela 2002

Vietnam 1996

Yemen 1996

Yugoslavia 2003

Zambia 2002

Zimbabwea 1996

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Year joined the program
Page 96 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix XI

France’s System for Controlling Sealed 

Sources ApendxiXI

French officials told us that their system for controlling sealed sources has 

several key components, including stringent controls on the licensing and 

tracking of the sources. Distributors of devices containing sealed sources 

must be authorized to market such devices and must send monthly 

accounts of the movement of sources to the French government agency 

responsible for regulating sealed sources. End users must have a license 

covering each site where the sources are used, and the maximum duration 

of a license is 5 years. For items such as smoke detectors, the end user is 

not required to have a license, but the distributor must be licensed. 

Approximately 30,000 sources in use in France are tracked by the 

government, and there are nearly 5,000 licensees. This number does not 

include very small sources like iodine grains used for medical purposes 

(there are about 80,000 such sources) and smoke detectors (for 400,000 

buildings), which are exempt from licensing requirements for end users. 

Sealed sources are subject to an annual inspection, and the end user pays 

for the inspections. The fee is a function of the number of sealed sources 

owned by the licensee. The inspection is designed to confirm that the 

sealed sources are properly accounted for, adequately secured, and safely 

used. In order to renew a license, the licensing agency must be provided 

with documentation of the annual inspections. If the end user is not 

inspected, it is subject to fines and may also be fined if the inspection 

shows that it is not adequately protecting devices containing sealed 

sources. Fines are based on health and safety infractions—not security 

violations—and the fines can be as high as about $15,000. 

France has also established a system to control orphan sources that has 

three main components. 

• End users are required to remove any source from service not more than 

10 years after it was purchased.

• The company supplying the source to the end user is required to include 

disposal costs within the purchase price. 

• All other companies in the supply chain agree contractually to take back 

the source after 10 years.

Under France’s system, the company supplying—or distributing—the 

sealed source is required to ensure, through a financial guarantee, that 

funds will be available to pay for the disposal of the source in case the 

distributor goes out of business or files for bankruptcy. The financial 
Appendix XI

France’s System for Controlling Sealed 

Sources

Page 97 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

guarantee is made either through an annual fee paid to an association of 

source distributors or by providing France’s national waste management 

agency with a deposit. The association represents 99 percent of all 

distributors of devices containing sealed sources in France. About 50 

distributors are members of the association. Typically, the distributor 

makes an initial deposit of about $1,000 and then pays an annual fee on the 

basis of the total activity of sources it has distributed, the technology that 

the sealed sources are used for, and the value of the source. French 

officials responsible for administering the system told us that, initially, 

distributors did not like it because of the excessive amount of paper work 

involved. However, companies now see the value of the system. 

Distributors also have the option of contracting with France’s radioactive 

waste management agency for disposal of the sources if they do not want 

to join the association. Typically, the smaller distributors who choose this 

option do so because they may only supply one or two sources per year and 

do not want to share the risk of joining the larger association, where costs 

are spread among many distributors. Distributors who choose this option 

are required to deposit funds with the agency to guarantee that disposal 

costs will be covered. The deposit ranges from about $1,000 to several 

thousand dollars. When a source is returned, the agency returns the 

deposit (less an administrative fee) to the distributor. According to French 

officials, only 1 percent of the distributors of sources in France use this 

option because they believe it is more expensive than belonging to the 

association, which spreads the financial risk among all of its members. In 

addition, the cost determined by the waste management agency is based on 

the entire cost of disposal and takes into account inflation and other 

economic factors. To date, the waste management agency has not had to 

use the fund to dispose of any disused sealed sources. The agency has 

always been able to locate a source’s manufacturer to take back the source 

or find another manufacturer willing to accept it.

According to French officials, when the system was first put into place, it 

posed a difficulty for distributors, who had to pass the cost of the financial 

guarantee to the end user. However, now that the system has been in place 

for many years, the additional costs are accepted, and users are pleased not 

to have to deal with disposing of the sources on their own. We were told 

that the process works well and has contributed to the reduction in the 

number of lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed sources. Currently, about one 

sealed source per year is orphaned in France. 
Page 98 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix XII

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiXI
Page 99 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix XIII

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiXI
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 100 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 101 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 102 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix XIV

Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission ApendxiXIV
Appendix XIV

Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

Page 103 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 104 GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix XV

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiXV

GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Kerry Dugan Hawranek, Preston 

S. Heard, Glen Levis, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, and Rebecca 

Shea also made key contributions to this report. 

(360199)
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