J-S12025-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH C. NICHOLSON,

Appellant No. 855 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order of February 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000689-2010, CP-15-CR-0001301-

2010, CP-15-CR-0001302-2010.

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2016

Appellant, Joseph C. Nicholson, appeals pro se from the order entered 

on February 20, 2015, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. Appellant was a janitor working at Downingtown West High School 

in Chester County, Pennsylvania. He was a well-known alumnus of the 

school having played quarterback for the football team. Between September 

2008 and January 2010, Appellant engaged in various acts of sexual 

misconduct with three minor female students, R.E., L.C., and D.H.1 Some of 

these acts occurred at Appellant’s home, while other acts occurred at the 

____________________________________________

1

 We use their initials to protect the victims’ identities.
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school as captured on surveillance video. Appellant also showed each of the 

three victims a photo of his penis. Following a two-day jury trial 

commencing on March 1, 2011, a jury convicted Appellant of four counts of 

corruption of minors, two counts of indecent assault, and one count each of 

statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), and 

aggravated indecent assault.2 On July 22, 2011, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of 13 to 26 years of imprisonment. On 

October 12, 2012, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

See Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 62 A.3d 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance 

of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

On November 4, 2013, Appellant filed a timely3 pro se PCRA petition. 

On November 15, 2013, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent 

____________________________________________

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), 3122.1, 3123(a)(7), and 

3125(a)(8), respectively.

3

 PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(5). Although Appellant did not seek review with our Supreme 

Court, judgment did not become final until the 30-day period to appeal to 

the Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (petition for allowance 

of appeal to Supreme Court shall be filed within 30 days of order issued by 

Superior Court). Thus, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

Monday, November 12, 2012. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (computation of 

time). Thus, Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, filed on November 4, 2013, 

was within the PCRA’s one-year requirement.
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Appellant. On December 26, 2013, appointed counsel filed a petition to 

withdraw and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v Turner, 

544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (en banc). Appellant filed a pro se request for an extension of 

time to file an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court granted the request; 

however, Appellant did not file an amended PCRA petition. Instead, 

Appellant’s family retained an attorney who entered his appearance on 

January 31, 2014. At that time, retained counsel requested time to review 

the record, which the PCRA court granted. On May 2, 2014, retained 

counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to 

Turner/Finley.

4

On May 7, 2014, the PCRA court entered notice of its intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant filed a pro se response after the 20-day 

response period. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (“The defendant may respond to 

the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice.”). In that 

response, Appellant largely reiterated the claims he set forth in his pro se

PCRA petition and alleged retained counsel erroneously withdrew from 

representation. For the first time, in his untimely Rule 907 response, 

____________________________________________

4 Although the exact dates are not made entirely clear by the record, the 

PCRA court first allowed appointed counsel to withdraw and later permitted 

retained counsel to withdraw.
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Appellant claimed prejudice because of the racial composition of his jury. On 

February 20, 2015, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s 

PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.5

Appellant presents the following issues, pro se, for our review:

1. The court erred in dismissing Appellant’s first, timely 

filed, pro se PCRA petition without an evidentiary 

hearing or the granting of [a] prayer for relief.

2. The court erred in granting PCRA counsel leave to 

withdraw pursuant to [a] Finley no-merit letter, where 

meritorious issues existed and where counsel failed to 

amend the PCRA petition.

3. PCRA counsel was ineffective for abdicating his duty to 

amend Appellant’s first, timely filed pro se PCRA 

petition; for failing to address each and every issue 

raised in the pro se petition in counsel’s no-merit letter; 

and where the court erred in granting leave to withdraw 

based upon that defective letter.

4. Appellant is entitled to PCRA relief pursuant [to] the 

utilization of self-incriminating evidence, illegally 

obtained through wire-taps, searches, coerced 

confession, and other police misconduct, in violation of 

the United States and Commonwealth Constitutions.

____________________________________________

5

 Appellant placed his notice of appeal in the prison mailbox on March 18, 

2015. A pro se prisoner's appeal shall be considered filed when notice of the 

appeal is deposited with prison officials or placed in the prison mailbox. See 

Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (pursuant to 

prisoner mailbox rule, notice of appeal in PCRA case was timely). Thus, 

Appellant filed his notice of appeal within the 30-day appeal period. See

Pa.R.A.P. 903. On April 7, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Appellant placed his Rule 1925(b) statement in the prison mailbox 

in a timely manner. The PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) on May 15, 2015. 
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5. Appellant is entitled to PCRA relief pursuant to the 

utilization of self-incriminating evidence [that was] 

illegally obtained in violation of the poisonous tree 

doctrine during the Loudermill hearing.6

6. Appellant is entitled to PCRA relief [for] ineffective and 

layered ineffective assistance of counsel rendered 

during pre-trial, trial, post-trial, and PCRA legal 

proceedings.

7. The sentences imposed by the court were excessive, 

illegal, and an abuse of judicial discretion, in violation of 

Appellant’s federal and state rights to due process.

8. The voir-dire process and jury pool were racially biased 

and defective, depriving Appellant of his right[] to a fair 

trial by an impartial jury of his peers.

9. The evidence is insufficient and the verdict contra[r]y to 

the weight of the evidence to [ob]tain [a] conviction for 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI).

10. The court erred in declaring that Appellant’s issues were 

waived where waiver was the direct result of 

inef[f]ective and layered inef[f]ective assistance of 

counsel.

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (complete capitalization, unnecessary punctuation, 

and quotations omitted) (italics and bold text supplied).

Upon review of Appellant’s brief and the certified record, we conclude 

that Appellant waived several of the issues listed above as they were 

previously litigated or could have been raised on appeal. Appellant also 

____________________________________________

6

“A Loudermill hearing is a pre-termination hearing given to a public 

employee that is required by due process, as established in Cleveland 

Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).” Ray v. 

Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 19 A.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
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waived several issues for failing to preserve them properly. Two of 

Appellant’s issues lack merit. Thus, there is no merit to Appellant’s first, 

sixth, or tenth claims. Our rationale follows. 

Our Supreme Court has set forth our well-settled standard of review as 

follows:

In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether 

the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record 

and free of legal error. To be entitled to PCRA relief, 

appellant must establish, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, his conviction or sentence resulted from one or 

more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2), 

his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, and 

the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial, or on 

direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, 

strategic or tactical decision by counsel. An issue is 

previously litigated if the highest appellate court in which 

appellant could have had review as a matter of right has 

ruled on the merits of the issue. An issue is waived if 

appellant could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, 

at trial, on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction 

proceeding.

Counsel is presumed effective, and appellant bears the 

burden of proving otherwise. To prevail on an 

ineffectiveness claim, appellant must establish:

(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no 

reasonable basis existed for counsel's actions or 

failure to act; and (3) appellant suffered prejudice as 

a result of counsel's error such that there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different absent such 

error.

Failure to prove any prong of this test will defeat an 

ineffectiveness claim. If a claim fails under any necessary 

element of the [aforementioned three-pronged] test, the 

court may proceed to that element first. When an appellant 
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fails to meaningfully discuss each of the three 

ineffectiveness prongs, he is not entitled to relief, and we 

are constrained to find such claims waived for lack of 

development. Further, counsel cannot be deemed 

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803-804 (Pa. 2014) (quotations, 

footnotes, original brackets, ellipses, and most internal citations omitted).

In issues two and three, Appellant claims the PCRA court erred in 

granting both PCRA attorneys leave to withdraw because meritorious issues 

existed, counsel failed to amend the PCRA petition, and, instead, counsel 

filed Turner/Finley no-merit letters. Appellant’s Brief at 2-6. Our Supreme 

Court has held that a defendant waives any objection to PCRA counsel’s 

representation by not responding to a Turner/Finley letter or during the 

20-day response period under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. See Commonwealth v. 

Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 879 n.2 and 3 (Pa. 2009) (“failure to challenge PCRA 

counsel’s withdrawal upon his receipt of counsel’s no-merit letter” or “during 

Rule 907’s 20-day response period” results in waiver.). Upon review of the 

certified record, Appellant did not file a response to either appointed or 

retained counsel’s no-merit letters. Moreover, Appellant did not file a Rule 

907 response within the 20-day response period and, thus, it was untimely. 

More specifically, upon review of the record, the PCRA court filed its Rule 

907 notice on May 7, 2014; Appellant signed a certificate of service, 

attached to his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, indicating that 

he placed the response in the prison mailbox on July 4, 2014. Fifty-eight 
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days transpired which is clearly outside of the 20-day period under Rule 907. 

Thus, Appellant waived his second and third issues as presented.7

In his fourth issue presented, Appellant contends that police illegally 

wiretapped a conversation between victim R.E.’s mother and Appellant. 

While Appellant concedes that the information obtained from the wiretap 

was not “directly use[d] ... during the [police] interrogation or at trial,” he 

contends that “Officer Trautmann used [the wiretapped conversation] like a 

weapon to force R.E. to cooperate, knowing that without her testimony he 

had no case.” Id. at 9. More specifically, Appellant maintains that “[j]ust 

because Officer Trautmann did not mention the wiretap [] does not mean 

that he did not indirectly use the wealth of sel[f]-incriminating information 

obtained in [that] event[] to his advantage.” Id. at 12. As such, Appellant 

claims police “manipulated the evidence, indirectly using evidence unlawfully 

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7 Regardless, upon review, both attorneys followed the proper procedure for 

withdrawing under Turner/Finley:

Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation 

must proceed under [Turner/Finley] and must review the 

case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a 

“no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this 

Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's diligent 

review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner wants 

to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack 

merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.

Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

 
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obtained, that would render Appellant’s alleged confession unconstitutional.” 

Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). He claims that “[d]espite being ‘Mirandized,’ 

he knew that he would not leave the station a free man.” Id. at 11. 

Appellant claims retained counsel was ineffective for stating in his no-merit 

letter that “whatever legal improprieties there may have been with 

respect to the recording of [Appellant’s] conversation with [R.E.’s mother]” 

they were immaterial “because the evidence pertaining to this recording was 

never introduced to the jury at trial.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 

Accordingly, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

seek suppression of his statements to police. He also indirectly suggests 

retained PCRA counsel was ineffective when he stated that there were “legal 

improprieties” with the wiretap, but then filed a no-merit letter stating that 

there were no meritorious issues. 

Upon review of the record, on February 15, 2011, Appellant filed a 

counseled motion to suppress evidence asserting that, “[d]uring the course 

of the investigation, law enforcement recorded a conversation between 

[R.E.’s mother] and [Appellant].” Motion to Sup[p]ress Evidence, 

2/15/2011, at 1, ¶2. The thrust of Appellant’s claim was that he believed 

his conversation was private and the Commonwealth was prohibited from 

recording such conversations. Id. at 1-2, ¶5. Appellant also argued that 

the Commonwealth violated the Wiretap Act “by failing to obtain proper 

paperwork” and “utilizing law enforcement not authorized under the 

[Wiretap A]ct.” Id. at 2, ¶6. 
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 On February 24, 2011, following argument, the trial court entered an 

order denying relief. Appellant did not appeal that determination on direct 

appeal. Thus, this suppression issue was previously litigated prior to trial 

and then waived because it could have been raised on direct appeal. 

On this issue, however, in his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant also 

alleges that trial counsel provided “gross negligence ... in his representation 

of [Appellant] at all phases of trial.” PCRA petition, 11/4/2013, at 3, ¶5(c). 

Thus, we will examine whether direct appeal counsel was ineffective for 

failing to litigate the issue on direct appeal and whether retained PCRA 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on collateral review. The 

PCRA court determined Appellant was not entitled to relief, because his claim 

lacks merit:

Following a hearing, [the trial court] denied [Appellant’s] 

motion to suppress his recorded admissions; however, the 

Commonwealth did not use the wiretap at trial. 

Nonetheless, Appellant claims its nonuse does not prove 

that the information thus obtained by police was not used 

against him. [Appellant] does not identify the precise 

evidence to which he objects, or whether and to what 

extent, if at all, such evidence was used against him at trial. 

Rather, he argues that any information so obtained was 

available to and implicit in information furnished to police 

who investigated the allegations against him. He thus 

claims that any evidence garnered by the police based upon 

their knowledge of his prior admissions [] should have been 

excluded. 
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[Appellant] confessed his culpability to police during nonthreatening questioning after full Miranda[8] warnings, and 

substantially admitted his culpability when he testified in his 

own defense at trial. Each of his teenage victims testified 

against him at his trial, including the victim whose mother 

spoke with Appellant during the recorded, wiretapped 

conversation. 

* * *

Instantly, there is no Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation of 

[] Appellant’s rights, since the wiretap evidence was legally 

obtained, and, importantly, Appellant was not compelled to 

be a witness against himself during the wiretap, having 

initiated the contact with the victim’s mother. There was no 

interrogation by police during the wiretap. There is no 

arguable Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation, since 

the recorded conversation took place on February 4, 2010, 

over a month before [Appellant] was arrested on March 11, 

2010. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/15/2015, at 10-12 (emphasis in original).

Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court’s assessment and discern 

no abuse of discretion or error of law. As Appellant concedes, the police did 

not use the information gleaned from the wiretapped conversation directly 

against him during police interrogation or at his trial. We have confirmed 

this information in our review of Officer Trautmann’s trial testimony. 

Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights and he signed a consent form 

before giving a confession. N.T., 3/1/2011, at 157-158. The video-

____________________________________________

8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1969). As a general rule, the 

prosecution may not use statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, 

stemming from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it 

demonstrates that he was apprised of his right against self-incrimination and 

his right to counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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recorded police interview was shown to the jury. Id. at 159. Moreover, at 

trial, Appellant admitted that he had “sexual intercourse – vaginal 

intercourse” with the subject of the wiretapped conversation, victim R.E. 

N.T., 3/2/2011, at 77. Additionally, throughout Appellant’s pro se appellate 

brief, Appellant admits culpability for the sexual acts referenced in the 

wiretapped conversation. See Appellant’s Brief at 7 (“innocent flirtations 

crossed the line of appropriateness. One relationship in particular, the one 

with ‘R.E.’ went too far, and [Appellant] found himself in a consentual [sic] 

sexual relationship with her.”) (emphasis supplied); id. at 30 (“Yes, 

Appellant admitted his culpability for the offenses he committed”). As such, 

there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel should have 

challenged Appellant’s statements to police. In turn, PCRA counsel cannot 

be ineffective for failing to raise the issue on collateral review. 

Finally, we note there is no reference appearing anywhere in the 

record, and Appellant has not provided any, as to when the wiretap was 

actually conducted. The date of the wiretap is not listed in the transcript of 

the recorded conversation, Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, Appellant’s 

motion to suppress, either of PCRA counsels’ no-merit letters, or in 

Appellant’s pro se appellate brief. As such, Appellant has not provided 

evidence that police conducted the wiretap before the victims gave 

“coerced” statements to police as he alleged. Thus, for this additional 

reason, Appellant has not provided evidence to support his current claim.
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Next, in his fifth issue presented, Appellant claims that police used 

self-incriminating evidence from a Loudermill hearing to coerce his 

confession. Appellant’s Brief at 13-16. Essentially, Appellant claims that at 

his Loudermill hearing “[h]e made several self-incriminating statements 

concerning dates and times he was with ‘R.E.,’ which law enforcement 

officers should not have been permitted to [use for investigative purposes] 

because they were involuntarily given under the continuing threat of job and 

career termination.” Id. at 15.

Regarding Appellant’s claim pertaining to his Loudermill hearing, the 

PCRA court determined:

[Appellant] contends that the [Downingtown] School 

Board’s hearing “was [transformed] into an illegal fishing 

expedition benefiting the Commonwealth with a treasure 

trove of illegally obtained incriminating evidence” against 

him. As discussed by retained counsel in his “no-merit” 

letter, Appellant was warned at the inception of the School 

Board hearing, that he had the right to counsel and that any 

statements he made could be used against him. Appellant 

did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right. At trial, John 

Nodecker, the principal of Downingtown West High School 

testified that he was present at Appellant’s Loudermill

hearing. At that hearing, Appellant was informed of some 

of the evidence that had been independently developed by 

the School District respecting his encounters with female 

students, particularly with respect to one of the victims, 

who at the time was uncooperative; however, Mr. Nodecker 

further testified that Appellant denied any sexual 

conduct with that victim or other wrongdoing. 

[Appellant] thereafter resigned his position with the School 

District without further hearings being conducted by the 

School Board. 

* * *
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Contrary to Appellant’s [p]etition, the record in this case 

does not support his averment that he disclosed 

incriminating evidence at the Loudermill hearing. Rather, 

he denied any allegations of wrongdoing. The evidence 

used to convict Appellant was developed independently by 

the police during their investigation, as spread upon the trial 

record, including the trial testimony of his victims. 

Appellant’s claim is meritless.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/15/2015, at 12-14 (emphasis in original).

Upon review, we agree. There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that 

counsel was ineffective. According to Principal Nodecker, Appellant did not 

admit culpability at the Loudermill hearing. N.T., 3/1/2011, at 123-124. 

Moreover, Appellant was not terminated due to his testimony at the 

Loudermill hearing; instead, “[h]e resigned his position” soon thereafter. 

Id. at 125. 

Furthermore, Appellant claims that police used his admission that he 

was with R.E. on one of the nights in question, as revealed at his 

Loudermill hearing, to then coerce Appellant to inculpate himself. 

However, upon review of the record, Officer Trautmann testified that he 

interviewed R.E. on February 1, 2010, a day before Appellant’s Loudermill

hearing. Id. at 142. While R.E. denied having sex with Appellant in that 

interview, Officer Trautmann testified as follows:

We began to discuss the incidents – or the night of the 17th

into the 18th [of January 2010], which would be a Sunday 

into a Monday. She admitted to going out of the house[,] 

leaving her cousin’s house. She admitted going over to 

[Appellant’s] house. She used the word initiating a lot. She 

said she initiated going over there. She said she initiated 

hugging, she initiated kissing, she tried to initiate sex with 

[Appellant].
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Id. at 143.

As the foregoing demonstrates, Appellant’s claim that the police used 

information gleaned from the Loudermill hearing against him in a 

subsequent police interview lacks merit. Police had the same information, 

i.e., that Appellant was with R.E. on the night in question, from interviewing 

the victim directly. This information was available to the police prior to 

Appellant’s statements at the Loudermill hearing. As such, counsel cannot 

be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue. Thus, Appellant’s 

fifth issue fails. 

Appellant’s seventh issue, wherein he argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence because of its 

consecutive nature, was previously litigated on direct appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 62 A.3d 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(unpublished memorandum denying Appellant’s claims on direct appeal) at 

*12-14. 

In his eighth issue presented, Appellant challenged the racial 

composition of his jury for the first time in his untimely response to the 

PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, and, hence it is waived for the same reasons 

as his second and third issues.9

____________________________________________

9

 Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated:

We have stressed that a claim not raised in a PCRA petition 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. We have 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Finally, in his ninth issue, Appellant claims the evidence at trial was 

insufficient, or contrary to the weight of the evidence, to sustain his 

conviction for IDSI. Appellant failed to raise this issue in his court-ordered 

Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and it is 

waived. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011) (“In 

order to preserve their claims for appellate review, appellants must comply 

whenever the trial court orders them to file a statement of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues not raised 

in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”).

Having found Appellant failed to plead and prove any meritorious 

issues or counsel’s ineffective assistance, at any level, we reject Appellant’s 

sixth and tenth issues that generally allege ineffective and layered 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Likewise, we conclude that Appellant was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. “There is no absolute right to an 

evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1067 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted). “On appeal, we examine the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

reasoned that permitting a PCRA petitioner to append new 

claims to the appeal already on review would wrongly 

subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of 

the PCRA. The proper vehicle for raising [a belated] claim is 

... a subsequent PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (internal 

citations, quotations and original brackets omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302 

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal.”).
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issues raised in light of the record to determine whether the PCRA court 

erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and in 

denying relief without an evidentiary hearing.” Id. As the abovementioned 

analysis demonstrates, there were no genuine issues of material fact 

requiring an evidentiary hearing. As such, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit. 

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/18/2016