14-3912

Mazur v. New York City Department of Education et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST

SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 6th 4 day of November, two thousand fifteen.

5

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,

8 Circuit Judges.

GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD,* 9

10 District Judge.

11

12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

13 JOAN MAZUR, 

14 Plaintiff-Appellant,

15

16 -v.- 14-3912

17

18 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

19 et al., 

20 Defendants-Appellees.

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22

* The Honorable Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States

District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by

designation.

1
1 FOR APPELLANT: STEVEN A. MORELLI, LAW OFFICE OF

2 STEVEN A. MORELLI, Garden City,

3 New York.

4

5 FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL J. PASTOR (with Richard

6 Dearing on the brief) for

7 Zachary W. Carter, Corporation

8 Counsel of the City of New York,

9 New York, New York.

10

11 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

12 Court for the Southern District of New York (Torres, J.).

13

14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

15 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

16 AFFIRMED. 

17

18 Joan Mazur appeals from the judgment of the United

19 States District Court for the Southern District of New York

20 (Torres, J.) dismissing her discrimination complaint on

21 summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with

22 the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues

23 presented for review. 

24

25 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

26 de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable

27 to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable

28 inferences in its favor.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416

29 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). 

30

31 1. A number of Mazur’s claims, including claims

32 asserted under § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law

33 (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law

34 (“NYCHRL”) were dismissed on the ground of collateral

35 estoppel because these claims were litigated during Mazur’s

36 hearing pursuant to N.Y. EDUC. § 3020-a (hereinafter “§

37 3020-a”) . Because such a hearing is “an administrative

38 adjudication, we must give its findings preclusive effect.” 

39 Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free

40 Sch. Dist., 411 F.3d 306, 311 (2d. Cir. 2005). This accords

41 with the general principle that “New York courts will give

42 administrative determinations preclusive effect if made in a

43 quasi-judicial capacity and with a full and fair opportunity

44 to litigate the issue.” Id. at 312. 

45

46 During the hearing, Mazur presented both of her

47 discrimination theories, arguing that her supervisors’

2
1 criticisms and charges were mere pretexts for

2 discrimination. A. 140-41, 163-64. The hearing officer,

3 after a full and fair litigation, determined that Mazur was

4 subject to discipline because of, inter alia, her excessive

5 absenteeism, poor teaching, and failure to improve in

6 response to the recommendations of her supervisors. A. 130-

7 31, 182-89. Defendants advance these findings as

8 legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions. 

9 Absent evidence sufficient to support a reasonable finding

10 of discriminatory motivation--which, as we conclude below,

11 is lacking–-we must accept the hearing officer’s

12 determination that Mazur was guilty of the charged conduct

13 and disciplined for these legitimate reasons. 

14

15 Mazur argues against this preclusive effect on the

16 ground that there is an insufficient opportunity for

17 discovery in a § 3020-a proceeding. We reject her argument,

18 as did the district court, because she neither identifies

19 any discovery demand she made in the § 3020-a proceeding

20 that was rejected nor points to any subsequently available

21 evidence that could have changed the result. See Special

22 Appendix (“SPA”) 15 (“Here, [p]laintiff does not point to

23 any deficiencies in the discovery in connection with the

24 3020-a hearing, and tellingly, [p]laintiff does not provide

25 any additional evidence in her moving papers that post-dates

26 the 3020-a hearing or demonstrates that the discovery in the

27 3020-a hearing was somehow deficient.”). 

28

29 2. Mazur challenges the grant of summary judgment on

30 her claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

31 (“ADEA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

32 Because her employer provided non-discriminatory reasons for

33 the disciplinary action taken towards Mazur, the presumption

34 in Mazur’s favor established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

35 Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) “completely drops out of the

36 picture.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d

37 Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

38

39 We agree with the district court that Mazur failed to

40 make out a sufficient case under the ADEA because Mazur does

41 not point to evidence from which a jury could draw a

42 reasonable inference of age discrimination. The district

43 court concluded that Mazur had failed to rebut defendants’

44 reasons, and Mazur has not specifically addressed this

45 finding on appeal. SPA 21. And assuming her sprained ankle

46 is a disability under the ADA, Mazur failed to adduce

47 evidence of discrimination to rebut her employer’s

3
1 identification of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for

2 her discipline.

3

4 3. Mazur argues that summary judgment should not have

5 been granted on her ADEA and ADA hostile work environment

6 claims. An “actionable discrimination claim based on

7 hostile work environment . . . is one for which the

8 workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,

9 ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently pervasive to alter

10 the conditions of the victim’s employment . . . . .” 

11 Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 240 (2d

12 Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In view of

13 the stringent standard governing hostile work environment

14 claims and the fact that summary judgment was properly

15 granted on Mazur’s ADEA and ADA discrimination claims, the

16 district court correctly determined that Mazur’s hostile

17 work environment claims were unsupported by the record. 

18

19 4. As to Mazur’s First Amendment retaliation claim,

20 the district court properly found that summary judgment was

21 warranted because Mazur’s complaints did not address a

22 matter of public concern. See Ruotolo v. City of New York,

23 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). As to Mazur’s Equal

24 Protection, ADA, ADEA, and NYSHRL retaliation claims,

25 summary judgment was proper because Mazur “has offered

26 insufficient evidence of causation linking [her]

27 [suspension] to motives of retaliation or discrimination to

28 overcome the cumulative probative weight of the evidence of

29 a legitimate reason for [her] discharge and of the final

30 termination decision” rendered during the § 3020-a hearing. 

31 Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113,

32 119 (2d Cir. 2002). As to the NYCHRL retaliation claim:

33 even construed broadly in Mazur’s favor, these claims fail

34 for a lack of the requisite causal link between Mazur’s

35 complaints and any alleged retaliatory action. Moreover,

36 the record contains numerous non-retaliatory reasons for any

37 action taken against Mazur. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole

38 Cheuvreux North America Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8 (2d Cir.

39 2013) (noting that summary judgment is appropriate if “the

40 record establishes as a matter of law that discrimination

41 play[ed] no role” in employer’s actions) (internal quotation

42 marks omitted).

43

44

45

46

4
1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in

2 Mazur’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of

3 the district court.

4

5 FOR THE COURT:

6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

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