Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1610-CR-2300 | March 30, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

P. Jeffrey Schlesinger

Lake County Public Defender

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas Clark,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1610-CR-2300

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G01-0907-FB-63

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1610-CR-2300 | March 30, 2017 Page 2 of 6

[1] Thomas Clark was convicted of Resisting Law Enforcement,1 a Class D Felony. 

He argues that the State did not offer sufficient evidence to show that he 

resisted law enforcement. Finding sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts2

[2] On July 1, 2009, Officer Highland Weaver of the Schererville Police 

Department was working on patrol when he was dispatched to the Immanuel 

Presbyterian Church because of a report that a man later identified as Clark was 

there and armed. The dispatch included a description of a dark color 2007 

Mitsubishi. Officer Weaver was already on a nearby street and drove there 

immediately in a fully marked squad car with the lights and sirens on. When he 

arrived at the church, he saw the vehicle driven by Clark coming out of the 

church’s driveway. Officer Weaver tried to block Clark’s exit in such a way 

that would show that he was trying to make a traffic stop, but Clark went 

around the officer’s vehicle and entered Route 30. Clark sped up and entered 

the road’s westbound traffic. Officer Weaver was “right behind” Clark and had 

his lights and sirens activated. Tr. p. 31. The traffic on the road was moderate. 

Officer Weaver did not know whether Clark saw him. 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (2006). The statute that applied at the time of Clark’s offense has since been repealed 

and re-codified at Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1. 

2 Oral argument took place on March 16, 2017, at the Culver Academies. We thank counsel for the quality 

of their written and oral arguments, for participating in the post-argument discussion with the audience, and 

for commuting to Culver. We especially thank the faculty, staff, and students of the Culver Academies for 

their gracious hospitality and thoughtful post-argument questions.
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[3] Route 30 has an emergency lane that law enforcement officers can use to 

conduct traffic stops. Officer Weaver radioed other units to have them observe 

whether the vehicle he was following was the vehicle matching the description 

in the dispatch. At some point, Clark’s vehicle accelerated with Officer 

Weaver’s vehicle behind him. Route 30’s speed limit is fifty miles per hour; 

Clark was driving about fifty-five miles per hour and did not exceed sixty miles 

per hour. As they continued westbound, they passed three intersections before 

reaching the four-way traffic light at the Joliet Street intersection. Clark tried to 

go around the traffic that was at the intersection, but he was blocked in by 

squad cars. Officer Daniel Smith had approached the intersection driving 

eastbound in the westbound turn lane or shoulder; he testified that he had the 

impression that Clark was going to continue driving based on Clark’s vehicle’s 

abrupt movement into his lane. At the time of the stop, Officer Weaver had 

followed Clark for less than a mile—which took one to two minutes—before 

Clark pulled over. Officer Weaver got out of his vehicle, drew his weapon, and 

with the other officers who had arrived, approached Clark. Clark cooperated 

with the officers; he voluntarily gave his name to them and answered honestly 

when asked if he had any weapons in the vehicle. The officers apprehended 

Clark and took him into custody. 

[4] The State charged Clark with resisting law enforcement, a Class D felony. 

Following a July 18, 2016, jury trial, a jury found Clark guilty as charged. On 

September 1, 2016, the trial court sentenced him to two years, all of which was 

suspended to probation. Clark now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[5] Clark argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of resisting law 

enforcement. Specifically, he challenges whether Officer Weaver ordered him 

to stop and whether he fled from law enforcement. When reviewing a claim of 

insufficient evidence, we will consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences that support the conviction. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 

2011). We will affirm if, based on the evidence and inferences, a reasonable 

jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bailey v. 

State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). To convict Clark of Class D felony 

resisting law enforcement, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Clark knowingly or intentionally fled from a law enforcement officer after 

the officer had, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law 

enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, identified himself as a law 

enforcement officer and had ordered Clark to stop. I.C. § 35-44-3-3 (2006).

[6] Clark first asserts that the evidence does not sufficiently show that Officer 

Weaver ordered Clark to stop. A police officer’s order to stop may be given 

through visual indicators. Fowler v. State, 878 N.E.2d 889, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). Evidence of a proper visual order to stop is based on the circumstances 

surrounding the incident and whether a reasonable person would have known 

that he had been ordered to stop. Id. at 894-95.

[7] The statute in effect at the time Clark was stopped stated that an order to stop 

could be given through activation of a police cruiser’s lights and sirens. Officer 
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Weaver testified that he responded to the dispatch with his vehicle’s lights and 

siren activated. He tried to block Clark’s exit from the church parking lot when 

Clark drove around him and onto Route 30. Clark did not immediately pull 

over, even though Officer Weaver followed him for nearly a mile on Route 30

with his lights and siren on. In light of this evidence, the jury could have 

reasonably inferred that Officer Weaver ordered Clark to stop, and that Clark 

would have known that he had been ordered to stop.

[8] Clark next asserts that the evidence does not sufficiently show that he fled from 

law enforcement. This Court considers the definition of “flee from justice” as

Removing one’s self from or secreting one’s self within 

jurisdiction wherein offense was committed to avoid arrest; or 

concealing one’s self therein, with intent, in either case, to avoid 

arrest, detention, or punishment for some criminal offense.

Cowans v. State, 53 N.E.3d 540, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Black’s Law 

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). “Flight” in the context of the resisting statute 

“should be understood to mean a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement 

when the defendant is aware that a law enforcement officer has ordered him to 

stop or remain in place once there.” Id. (citation omitted).

[9] The evidence favorable to the trial court’s verdict shows that Clark drove 

around Officer Weaver and passed at least three intersections before being 

forced to stop. Officer Smith testified that he thought Clark would have

continued driving had Smith not blocked him with his squad car. Moreover, 

even though Clark may not have driven fast or far after being ordered to stop, 
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speed and distance do not necessarily determine whether he fled from law 

enforcement. See Manning v. State, 995 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 

(finding that the defendant fled when she moved her vehicle forward in stopped 

traffic and when the traffic began to proceed despite the presence of police cars 

with sirens and emergency lights activated and police officers yelling at her with 

their guns drawn). The jury could have drawn the reasonable inference that 

Clark continued driving on Route 30 despite knowing that he had been ordered 

to stop; further, the jury could have reasonably concluded that such action 

constituted flight from law enforcement. In essence, Clark is asking us to 

reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, which we will 

not do. We find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.