CAN TOBACCO CURE SMOKING? A REVIEW OF

TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 3, 2003

Serial No. 108–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

CAN TOBACCO CURE SMOKING? A REVIEW OF TOBACCO HARM

REDUCTION

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

87–489PDF 2003

CAN TOBACCO CURE SMOKING? A REVIEW OF

TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 3, 2003

Serial No. 108–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida

JOE BARTON, Texas

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

Vice Chairman

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan

Ranking Member

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

LOIS CAPPS, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana

TOM ALLEN, Maine

JIM DAVIS, Florida

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

HILDA L. SOLIS, California

DAN R. BROUILLETTE, Staff Director

JAMES D. BARNETTE, General Counsel

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida, Chairman

FRED UPTON, Michigan

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

Vice Chairman

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO, California

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana

(Ex Officio)

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

Ranking Member

HILDA L. SOLIS, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

JIM DAVIS, Florida

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BART STUPAK, Michigan

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,

(Ex Officio)

(II)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Testimony of:

Burton, Steven L., Vice President, Smoking Controls Strategic Development and Switch, Glaxo SmithKline Consumer Health Care ................... 96

Carmona, Vice Admiral Richard H., U.S. Surgeon General, Public Health

Service, Department of Health and Human Services ................................ 40

Muris, Hon. Timothy, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission ..................... 34

Myers, Matthew L., President and CEO, National Center for Tobacco

Free Kids ....................................................................................................... 116

Rodu, Brad, Professor, Department of Pathology, University of Alabama

at Birmingham .............................................................................................. 86

Sweanor, David T., Counsel, Non-Smokers Rights Association .................... 122

Tomar, Scott L., Editor, Journal of Public Health Dentistry, University

of Florida College of Dentistry, Division of Public Health Services and

Research ........................................................................................................ 81

Verheij, Richard H., Executive Vice President, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco

Company ........................................................................................................ 103

Wallace, Robert B., Vice Chairman, Committee to Assess the Science

Base for Tobacco Harm Reduction, Institute of Medicine ......................... 78

Additional material submitted for the record:

Alliance for Health Economic and Agriculture Development, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 157

Eisele, David W., prepared statement of ........................................................ 167

Healton, Cheryl G., President and CEO, American Legacy Foundation,

letter dated June 10, 2003 ........................................................................... 155

Landrith, George, President, Frontiers of Freedom, letter dated May 29,

2003 ................................................................................................................ 156

Marzulla, Nancie G., prepared statement on behalf of Defenders of Property Rights ..................................................................................................... 159

Myers, Matthew L., President and CEO, National Center for Tobacco

Free Kids, letter dated June 20, 2003, enclosing response for the

record ............................................................................................................. 168

Phillips, Carl V., Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Public

Health, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 163

(III)

(1)

CAN TOBACCO CURE SMOKING? A REVIEW OF

TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION

TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Cliff Stearns (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Stearns, Whitfield, Cubin,

Shimkus, Shadegg, Bass, Terry, Fletcher, Ferguson, Issa, Otter,

Tauzin (ex officio), Schakowsky, Solis, Markey, Brown, Davis, Stupak, Green, McCarthy, and Strickland.

Also present: Representative Waxman.

Staff present: Kelly Zerzan, majority counsel; Ramsen Betfarhad,

majority counsel; Jon Tripp, deputy communications director; Jill

Latham, legislative clerk; and Jonathan J. Cordone, minority counsel.

Mr. STEARNS. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to

order.

Without objection, the subcommittee will proceed pursuant to

Committee Rule 4(e). So ordered.

The Chair recognizes himself for an opening statement.

I am pleased to welcome all of you to the Commerce, Trade, and

Consumer Protection Subcommittee hearing on tobacco harm reduction.

No one disputes the harm to human health from cigarette smoking. Smokers are at a 16-fold increased risk of lung cancer, 12-fold

increased risk of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and a twofold increased risk of mild cardio-infarction. Oncologists estimate

that smoking related illnesses were responsible for 100 million

deaths in the 20th century. Those ilnesses killed some 400,000

Americans every year.

Over the last few decades this country has invested substantial

public and private resources to encourage smokers to quit using tobacco. That investment has paid off. We have made great gains in

reducing the use of cigarettes.

While in 1965, 42 percent of Americans smoked cigarettes, today

only 26 percent of men and 22 percent of women are smokers.

While this is the good news, as noted in the Institute of Medicine

report, ‘‘Clearing the Smoke,’’ the decline in the rates of smoking

among adults has leveled off during the 1990’s.

2

So where do we go from here? Today we are here to discuss tobacco harm reduction. Harm reduction strategies have been used

for a number of years for a variety of different societal problems.

For example, clean needle programs are used to prevent the spread

of HIV. Methadone programs are employed to prevent the use of

elicit drugs, and sex education is provided to stem the rising tide

of teen pregnancy and disease.

The title of our hearing, ‘‘Can Tobacco Cure Smoking?’’ at first

blush seems counterintuitive. However, there is an increasing

amount of research suggesting that some tobacco products are less

harmful than others. For those smokers who can’t seem to quit

smoking, switching to a less hazardous product could save lives.

Today we will hear from a diverse group of experts espousing a

range of opinions on issues of tobacco harm reduction. We worked

closely with the minority to insure a fair and balance panel of witnesses that can speak to the science of this issue.

One of our witnesses today, Dr. Brad Rodu, will assert that

smokeless tobacco products are 98 percent safer than cigarettes,

and that by switching committed smokers to smokeless products,

we can save lives, reducing the potential societal harms that may

result from the promotion of tobacco harm reduction claims.

Some believe that switching from one tobacco product to another

does nothing to solve the tobacco problem. The Federal Trade Commission has general regulatory authority over misleading and deceptive advertising, as well as specific authority over the advertising and marketing of tobacco products.

As tobacco companies attempt to market their products as reduced risk, as one company has already tried to do, the Federal

Trade Commission will be in the position of evaluating these

claims.

So I look forward to hearing from Chairman Muris, how his

Commission plans to deal with these, shall we say, vexing issues.

We also hear from the Surgeon General, who is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on public

health and scientific issues. Tobacco has long been a subject of Surgeon General reports. As we move into a new era of tobacco debates, we welcome Vice Admiral Carmona to the Commerce, Trade,

and Consumer Protection Subcommittee.

Our goal should always be to reduce the use of tobacco. In that

light, today’s hearing provides an opportunity to examine the efficacy of the tobacco harm reduction approach which calls for minimizing and decreasing death among cigarette smokers without

completely eliminating tobacco and nicotine use.

In closing, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before the

committee. I look forward to their testimony, and I seek, in addition, unanimous consent to enter into the record the written testimony of Mike Szymanczyk, Chairman and Chief Executive Office,

Philip Morris USA.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Michael Szymanczyk follows:]

3

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIKE SZYMANCZYK, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, PHILIP MORRIS USA

I. INTRODUCTION

On behalf of the more than 12,000 employees of Philip Morris USA, I am honored

to submit these remarks regarding reduced exposure and reduced risk tobacco products, including their potential health impact and the challenges of sensibly regulating them. In particular, I’d like to emphasize our strong support for passage by

the 108th Congress of meaningful and effective regulation of tobacco products by the

Food and Drug Administration. We believe that legislation empowering the FDA to

act should fully implement the thoughtful, comprehensive and rigorous regulatory

principles articulated by the Institute of Medicine in its landmark report, Clearing

the Smoke, which was commissioned by the FDA itself.

We applaud the subcommittee for its leadership in holding this hearing. We agree

with its interest in seeking a bipartisan way to fashion a coherent national tobacco

policy. We look forward to working with you and your colleagues in the full House

towards the passage of legislation that is designed to benefit adult consumers by

reducing the harm caused by tobacco consumption, and to establish clear rules that

will be applied to, and enforced uniformly throughout the tobacco industry.

We hope to convey three critical points that we believe are relevant to the issues

the subcommittee is considering:

• Philip Morris USA strongly supports legislation that would provide the FDA with

comprehensive, meaningful and effective authority to regulate tobacco products.

The FDA should have the power to fully implement all of the 11 regulatory

principles—including those relating to potentially reduced exposure/reduced risk

products—recommended by the IOM Report.

• For many years now, we have been hard at work trying to develop and consider

ways to successfully market innovative tobacco products that have the potential

to reduce smokers’ exposure to harmful compounds in cigarette smoke. Our

progress has been encouraging thus far, and we have high hopes for these products as we move forward.

• We would like very much to be able to bring these products to market in the regulated environment contemplated by the IOM Report, subject to FDA review of

both the underlying science and the communications about this science that we

would make to consumers. In the absence of FDA authority in this area, we are

forced into making a difficult choice between making claims that haven’t been

validated by a government agency, on the one hand, and not providing smokers

with information that may be important to them, on the other. Neither of these

alternatives would be ideal, in our view, either from our own perspective or as

a matter of public policy. Clearly, FDA regulation would be the best approach.

We hope that today will mark the beginning of a new and much better chapter

in our nation’s effort to feel confident that tobacco products, and the tobacco industry, are properly regulated, given both the dangers of the products and the acknowledgement that adults should continue to be able to make informed decisions about

smoking for themselves.

We are mindful that it has been nearly eight years since Dr. Kessler made his

initial rulemaking proposal, and two years since the IOM published its report. Yet

today, there is still no FDA authority to regulate tobacco products. My company

wants very much to be a part of resolving the impasse and is convinced that the

remaining policy differences can be resolved through mutually respectful discussions

that seek such a resolution. We believe that a coherent, national tobacco policy can

be crafted that will effectively deal with tobacco issues, without unintended consequences for the millions of consumers, employees, tobacco growers and retailers

who will be dramatically affected by the results of Congressional action.

II. OUR SUPPORT OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS REGULATION BY THE FDA, INCLUDING

AUTHORITIES BASED ON IOM’S 11 REGULATORY PRINCIPLES

The Importance of FDA Regulation of Tobacco Products

FDA regulation of tobacco products is an important Federal initiative that is certainly needed. For more than three years now, we have urged passage of an effective

and comprehensive FDA regulatory policy, and we remain determined to be a constructive force in the effort that lies ahead to shape this policy.

When we say that we strongly support ‘‘effective’’ regulation by the FDA, we mean

it. We’re not playing word games or referring to a weak or watered-down plan. ‘‘Effective’’, to Philip Morris USA, means a regulatory plan that is designed and funded

in a way that can fully accomplish its stated objectives, including:

4

• Providing smokers with additional information about what’s in their cigarettes,

and about the dangers of smoking—both now and on an ongoing basis—as the

science evolves and new information becomes available; • Aiding in the development of products that meaningfully reduce the harm caused

by smoking; • And guiding the accurate communication of any implications of switching to reduced risk or reduced exposure products that may be developed, which includes

being sure to communicate that there is no ‘‘safe’’ cigarette, and the best thing

to do from a health standpoint is to quit smoking.

‘‘Effective’’ to us does not mean regulations that are loophole-ridden or intentionally

weak, punitively cumbersome, or likely to generate unintended negative consequences—it means real reforms that get the stated and agreed upon job done.

We believe that additional regulation makes sense for a number of reasons. Although these efforts are not often the focus of public attention, the fact is that we

at Philip Morris USA devote enormous resources to developing products that have

the potential of reducing the harm caused by smoking, running our factories, working with our suppliers, making our payroll and paying our taxes. We are asking for

new regulation because today there are simply not sufficiently clear and consistent

guidelines for the manufacture and performance of cigarettes. It is not clear, for example, how we and the rest of the tobacco industry should communicate to consumers about our products. What rules there are increasingly arise at the state

level, which will inevitably lead to conflicting standards that could confuse consumers, disrupt interstate commerce and significantly complicate orderly and uniform manufacturing and distribution processes.

Meaningful, effective and uniform FDA regulation would better align our business

practices with society’s expectations, and would further our goal of being a responsible, effective and respected manufacturer and marketer of tobacco products for

adults who smoke. We believe Americans support meaningful and effective new regulation of tobacco product manufacturing processes, performance standards and how

we communicate with consumers, especially about potentially reduced exposure and

reduced risk products. The public also supports efforts to continue to build the momentum that has developed toward reducing the incidence of youth smoking. However, we don’t believe that there is strong support in the country for the new rules

to go too far, and significantly intrude on adults’ continued ability to smoke if they

want to.

When Philip Morris USA first announced its support for FDA regulation of cigarettes, some were understandably surprised and skeptical, in part because our company—along with other major manufacturers, retailers and advertising groups—had

opposed the agency’s assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products under the medical device statute in 1996. Our opposition to FDA’s unilateral initiative was not disagreement with regulation per se, but rather disagreement with that specific kind

of regulation. We continue to believe that regulation of tobacco products as medical

products would be a mistake—despite the fact that nicotine is a drug, and we agree

that cigarette smoking, and nicotine in cigarette smoke, are addictive ‘‘because tobacco regulation needs to focus on how we can reduce the harm to society of a dangerous, agriculturally-based product that is nonetheless legal for adults to use, and

the medical device rules simply are not suited to that purpose.

That is why we believe it is most appropriate that both major legislative proposals

that have attracted attention in the past year—H.R. 140, sponsored by Representatives Davis and McIntyre, and S. 2626 from the last Congress, sponsored by Senators Kennedy, DeWine and others—regulate tobacco products under a new chapter

of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act designed especially for such products. We’re convinced that this is the right approach, and are extremely encouraged by the enormous similarities between the two bills. We believe that there is far more common

ground in our views than there are differences. And, although on some issues there

are some important divergences of opinion among the various stakeholders on a few

issues, they are truly differences in degree only.

Our Support of Regulation by the FDA of Potentially Reduced-Exposure

and Reduced-Risk Products, Based on IOM’s 11 Regulatory Principles

The IOM Report ‘‘recommends strengthened federal regulation of all modified tobacco products with risk reduction or exposure reduction claims, explicit or implicit’’,

and proposes 11 regulatory principles to ‘‘build on the foundation of existing food

and drug law, with appropriate adaptations to take into account the unique toxicity

of tobacco products.’’

Philip Morris USA has, for more than three years, been advocating many of the

elements encompassed by the 11 regulatory principles contained in the IOM Report;

many of these elements are already contained in bills such as H.R. 140 from this

5

Congress and S. 2626 from the 107th Congress. As a step in moving forward to a

thorough discussion of what we believe are the best components of an FDA regulatory process, we respectfully offer the following observations about IOM’s 11 principles, the degree to which they are already reflected in bills like H.R. 140 and S.

2626, and ways in which we think that the legislation can be improved so as to better translate the IOM Report’s principles into legislative language:

IOM Principle #1

The Principle. Manufacturers of tobacco products, whether conventional or modified, should be required to obtain quantitative analytical data on the ingredients of

each of their products and to disclose such information to the regulatory agency. • Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support the principle of providing quantitative

information about the ingredients used in the manufacture of our cigarettes, with

appropriate safeguards to protect trade secrets. We think that the FDA should be

able to provide smokers with confidence that the ingredients added to cigarettes do

not increase the inherent health risks of smoking, including increasing addiction.

And, as discussed below regarding Principle #8, we have no objection to disclosing

the results of our own ingredients testing to the FDA, so it can assess every ingredient we use. • Translation into Legislative Language. This principle is specifically covered by

section 904 of the new FDA title in both H.R. 140 and S. 2626, which require all

tobacco product manufacturers to provide to the agency, on an annual basis, ‘‘A listing of all tobacco ingredients, substances and compounds that are, on such date,

added by the manufacturer to the tobacco, paper, filter, or other component of each

tobacco product by brand and by quantity in each brand and subbrand’’, as well as

‘‘All documents (including underlying scientific information) relating to research activities, and research findings, conducted, supported, or possessed by the manufacturer . . .’’

IOM Principle #2

The Principle. All tobacco products should be assessed for yields of nicotine and

other tobacco toxicants according to a method that reflects actual circumstances of

human consumption; when necessary to support claims, human exposure to various

tobacco smoke constituents should be assessed using appropriate biomarkers. Accurate information regarding yield range and human exposure should be communicated to consumers in terms that are understandable and not misleading. • Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle. We believe that the

FDA should be authorized to require the disclosure of information about individual

compounds in cigarette smoke, in addition to tar and nicotine, that it believes would

be meaningful to consumers, as long as the information can be generated according

to validated, standardized and commercially feasible test methods that reflect actual

circumstances of human exposure, or reliably calculated on the basis of the test results obtained from such methods. • Translation into Legislative Language. There are a number of provisions in H.R.

140 and S. 2626 that specifically embody this principle. Section 511(b) of H.R. 140

and section 917(b) of S. 2626, for example, both require the FDA—within 24

months—to create rules covering ‘‘the testing, reporting, and disclosure of tobacco

product smoke constituents and ingredients that the Secretary determines should

be disclosed to the public in order to protect the public health. Such constituents

shall include tar, nicotine, carbon monoxide, and such other smoke constituents or

ingredients as the Secretary may determine to be appropriate.’’ In addition, the bills’

provisions empowering the FDA to assess health claims are discussed in more detail

in several of the Principles below.

IOM Principle #3

The Principle. Manufacturers of all potential reduced-exposure products should be

required to conduct appropriate toxicological testing in preclinical laboratory and

animal models as well as appropriate clinical testing in humans to support the

health-related claims associated with each product and to disclose the results of

such testing to the regulatory agency. • Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle. In order to support

marketing claims relating to reduced exposure or reduced risk, we believe that the

best approach would be for a manufacturer to (i) design a cigarette that significantly

reduces various harmful compounds in the inhaled smoke; (ii) provide scientific evidence that this change reduces biological activity in appropriate cellular and laboratory animal models; (iii) measure or model adult smoker exposure to the smoke from

these cigarettes; (iv) share these results with the scientific and public health communities to seek to gain their agreement that the test results are scientifically valid

and relevant to adult smokers, and also support a conclusion that the new cigarette

6

design may, in fact, reduce the risks of smoking; and (v) work with regulatory agencies to appropriately communicate these results and their significance to adult

smokers.

• Translation into Legislative Language. This principle is largely embodied in the

two major FDA bills, where section 912(a)(2) of H.R. 140 and section 913(a)(2) of

S. 2626 both authorize the FDA to designate a tobacco product as ‘‘reduced risk’’

based on a manufacturer’s application that, among other things, ‘‘demonstrates

through testing on animals and short-term human testing that use of such product

results in ingestion or inhalation of a substantially lower yield of toxic substances’’

than other tobacco products, and ‘‘if required by the Secretary, includes studies of

the long-term health effects of the product.’’ We believe that this language would

more fully reflect the IOM Report’s principle if, in addition to referring to ‘‘reduced

risk’’ products, it specifically mentioned ‘‘reduced exposure’’ products. Clearly, as the

IOM Report indicates and as its principles as a whole demonstrate, it is likely that

the scientific data will support reduced-exposure claims before the FDA, or the scientific community in general, is prepared to conclude that a particular new cigarette

will actually reduce the risk of contracting a tobacco-related disease.

IOM Principle #4

The Principle. Manufacturers should be permitted to market tobacco-related products with exposure-reduction or risk-reduction claims only after prior agency approval based on scientific evidence (a) that the product substantially reduces exposure to one or more tobacco toxicants and (b) if a risk reduction claim is made, that

the product can reasonably be expected to reduce the risk of one or more specific

diseases or other adverse health effects, as compared with whatever benchmark

product the agency requires to be stated in the labeling. The ‘‘substantial reduction’’’

in exposure should be sufficiently large that measurable reduction in morbidity and/

or mortality (in subsequent clinical or epidemiological studies) would be anticipated,

as judged by independent scientific experts.

• Philip Morris USA’s Position. As noted above, we support the principle that the

FDA should regulate ‘‘reduced risk’’ claims. In addition, we support the principle

that claims about reduced exposure to specific tobacco toxicants (i.e., harmful compounds in cigarette smoke) should be subject to FDA oversight. We agree with the

IOM Report that government analysis of proposed exposure-reduction claims, and

the data that should be required from manufacturers to support them, should be

different than with respect to claims of actual risk reduction.

• Translation into Legislative Language. Section 912(a)(3) of H.R. 140 and section

913(a)(3) of S. 2626 both partially reflect this principle, as they provide the FDA

with full authority to regulate risk-reduction (but not specifically exposure-reduction) claims, including requiring that the product carry ‘‘a label prescribed by the

Secretary concerning the product’s contribution to reducing harm to health’’ and

comply ‘‘with requirements prescribed by the Secretary relating to marketing and

advertising of the product.’’ H.R. 140 also reflects the IOM Report’s judgment that

accurate, non-misleading claims should be permitted rather than suppressed. We

would respectfully suggest that the language in both bills could be improved by adding clauses that would both specifically incorporate IOM’s exposure-reduction concept, and adopt this Principle’s specific language regarding the proper standard for

what evidence would support either an exposure-reduction or risk-reduction claim.

We also note that S. 2626 could be interpreted to permit FDA to refuse to permit

any truthful, non-misleading claim regarding ‘‘reduced risk’’ or ‘‘reduced exposure’’—

even if a valid scientific showing has been made—if the agency speculates that the

claim could, for example, discourage quitting at some point in the future. This is

a legitimate concern, but it is contrary to IOM Principle #4, and, we believe, should

be addressed by clearly communicating the claim so that consumers are not misled,

and accompanying the claim with a clear reminder that the best option from a

health perspective is to quit. IOM also proposes dealing with this concern through

post-market surveillance, which is discussed in Principle #6 below. Finally in this

regard, both the Supreme Court and several Courts of Appeals have strongly indicated that the kind of suppression of truthful information advocated by some in the

tobacco control community cannot withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.

A white paper discussing these cases in greater detail is attached to this Statement

as Annex 1.

IOM Principle #5

The Principle. The labeling, advertising, and promotion of all tobacco-related products with exposure-reduction or risk-reduction claims must be carefully regulated

under a ‘‘not false or misleading’’ standard with the burden of proof on the manufacVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
7

turer, not the government. The agency should have the authority and resources to

conduct its own surveys of consumer perceptions relating to these claims.

• Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle for the reasons stated

regarding Principle # 4 above.

• Translation into Legislative Language. In addition to the analysis above regarding Principle #4, we note that H.R. 140—through its linkage of FDA regulation to

a tobacco quota buyout and a user fee that would fund both the buyout and the new

regulatory regime—is the only major legislative proposal currently under consideration that would ensure that, as the IOM Report’s Principle #5 urges, the FDA will

in fact have ‘‘the resources to conduct its own surveys of consumer perceptions relating to these claims.’’ We would also respectfully suggest that both section 912(a)(3)

of H.R. 140 and section 913(a)(3) of S. 2626 be amended so as to specifically incorporate IOM’s ‘‘not false or misleading’’ standard for all claims regarding exposure

or risk-reduction.

IOM Principle #6

The Principle. The regulatory agency should be empowered to require manufacturers of all products marketed with claims of reduced risk of tobacco-related disease

to conduct post-marketing surveillance and epidemiological studies as necessary to

determine the short-term behavioral and long-term health consequences of using

their products and to permit continuing review of the accuracy of their claims.

• Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle as articulated and further believe it should be expanded to clearly include application to products with

reduced exposure claims. As noted above, the effects of these products on the overall

harm caused by tobacco is a legitimate and valid public health concern, and one

which needs to be monitored and studied. And, as we believe that the FDA should

be able to determine which marketing claims are appropriate, it is sensible that it

should make use of the sort of surveillance and studies noted in this principle.

• Translation into Legislative Language. Both major FDA bills contain provisions

that fully embody this principle. Section 912(e)(1) of H.R. 140 and section 912(a) of

S. 2626 broadly empower the FDA to ‘‘require a tobacco product manufacturer to

conduct postmarket surveillance for reduced risk [of] a tobacco product of the manufacturer if the Secretary determines that postmarket surveillance of the tobacco

product is necessary to protect the public health or is necessary to provide information regarding the health risks and other safety issues involving the tobacco product.’’ For clarity, as indicated above regarding other provisions, we would suggest

also adding an explicit reference to exposure-reduction claims, to ensure that the

FDA is authorized to require post-market surveillance of them, too.

IOM Principle #7

The Principle. In the absence of any claim of reduced exposure or reduced risk,

manufacturers of tobacco products should be permitted to market new products or

modify existing products without prior approval of the regulatory agency after informing the agency of the composition of the product and certifying that the product

could not reasonably be expected to increase the risk of cancer, heart disease, pulmonary disease, adverse reproductive effects or other adverse health effects, compared to similar conventional tobacco products, as judged on the basis of the most

current toxicological and epidemiological information.

• Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle. As IOM notes in its

report, it is logical that the regulatory agency charged with evaluating the relative

risks presented by different tobacco products—which we believe is most appropriately the FDA—should not be overwhelmed with what would be the enormous

task of pre-approving every introduction of a new line extension using existing product designs, when such products do not make reduced risk or reduced exposure

claims, and are certified by the manufacturer to present the same issues of public

health as predicate tobacco products. Requiring pre-market approval of such products would not serve the public health interests identified by the IOM Report, and

would pose substantial burdens on both the regulators and the manufacturers.

Moreover, we support the IOM Report’s concept of placing the burden on manufacturers to certify that any new product (including any existing brand which is introduced with changed characteristics) would not present increased risk, and then, on

the basis of such certification, to introduce the product (without reduced risk or exposure claims) into the marketplace. As the IOM Report suggests, the FDA would

then have the authority, if upon investigation it disagrees with the manufacturer’s

certification and concludes that there is in fact an increased risk, to seek the product’s removal from the market. We do not advocate—and we do not believe Principle

#7 would require—that pre-market approval provisions ‘‘grandfather’’ today’s tobacco products from further regulation. In whatever form they eventually take, perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
8

formance standards (see Principle #9 below) would apply to all tobacco products

(whether on the market today or introduced in the future).

• Translation into Legislative Language. All of the existing legislative proposals

relating to pre-market approval are very complex, but we believe that the provisions

of section 910 of H.R. 140 come the closest to fully embodying this principle. First,

section 910 reflects the IOM Report’s suggestion that products carrying exposurereduction or risk-reduction claims be treated separately from new products that do

not. Second, it requires manufacturers to submit extensive information about any

such new product to the FDA at least 90 days prior to commercial introduction, and

empowers the agency to ‘‘suspend the distribution of the tobacco product that is the

subject of that report if the Secretary determines that there is a reasonable likelihood that the tobacco product is not substantially equivalent to a tobacco product

commercially marketed (other than for test marketing) in the United States . . .’’ Finally, the concept of ‘‘substantial equivalence’’ is defined in section 910(a)(2) of H.R.

140—consistent with IOM’s ‘‘no increased risk’’ concept—as being a product that either ‘‘has the same characteristics as the predicate tobacco product’’ or, in the alternative, ‘‘has different characteristics and the information submitted contains information, including clinical data if deemed necessary by the Secretary, that demonstrates that it is not appropriate to regulate the product under this section because the product could not reasonably be expected to increase the health risks to

consumers compared to a conventional tobacco product that is commercially marketed in the United States . . .’’

IOM Principle #8

The Principle. All added ingredients in tobacco products, including those already

on the market, should be reported to the agency and subject to a comprehensive toxicological review.

• Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle for the reasons stated

regarding Principle #1 above and Principle #9 below.

• Translation into Legislative Language. From a legislative perspective in the

major FDA bills, toxicological assessment of ingredients is part and parcel of the

agency’s performance standard authority, which is discussed below in the context

of IOM Principle #9.

IOM Principle #9

The Principle. The regulatory agency should be empowered to set performance

standards (e.g., maximum levels of contaminants; definitions of terms such as ‘‘low

tar’’) for all tobacco products, whether conventional or modified, or for classes of

products.

• Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle, and have been actively

advocating a Congressional grant of authority to the FDA to reduce harm by imposing mandatory performance standards on tobacco products, even including those

that would require design changes that consumers might not like. Our main concern

with this concept is that, if not translated carefully into legislative language, it

could permit—or even require—the agency to do what nobody should want: to impose performance standards requiring changes that are so radical that tobacco products are effectively banned, or consumers are driven away from the legitimate market and towards illicit, completely unregulated products. We think that consumers,

tobacco growers and many other stakeholders support our view that these standards

should not make tobacco products unpalatable for adult smokers; no one would benefit from performance standards so radical that they further increase the demand

for counterfeit or other illicit products.

Specifically, we believe that the FDA should have the authority to ensure that ingredients used in the manufacture of tobacco products do not increase their inherent

health risk or addictiveness; because the ingredients are under the manufacturers’

control, this authority should, in our view, include the power to prohibit the use of

any ingredient shown to increase health risks even if the ban would impact the product’s taste. Apart from ingredients, we also support authority for the FDA to impose

changes to the other design or inherent characteristics of a tobacco product—including the inherent properties of tobacco leaf itself—that it finds will protect public

health, so long as the changes are technically feasible and would not negatively impact adult consumers’ enjoyment of the product in a significant way. There is no

public consensus supporting FDA actions that force radical changes on the design

or inherent characteristics of today’s tobacco products that adult smokers may not

be prepared to accept. We believe that instead, FDA should use its enormous persuasive powers and regulatory tools to encourage consumers to quit, or—by utilizing

the reduced risk/reduced exposure authorities contemplated by IOM’s other prinVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
9

1 Indeed, the reason that the Supreme Court rejected FDA’s initial ‘‘medical device’’ tobacco

rule is that it determined that, under that approach, the agency would have been required to

ban tobacco products, and that such a ban could not be squared with the overall national tobacco

policy already put in place by Congress.

ciples—to switch to products whose design and composition the agency favors from

a public health perspective.

Ingredients. The major legislative proposals currently under consideration—including both H.R. 140 and S. 2626—contemplate the use of ‘‘performance standard’’

authority by the FDA to regulate ingredients used in the manufacture of tobacco

products based on its belief of what would be appropriate to protect public health.

We believe that this is a legitimate role for the agency to the extent it is used to

ensure that ingredients do not increase the inherent risk of cigarette smoking, including by increasing its addictiveness. Tobacco products are inherently dangerous,

but the government should have authority to make sure that nothing is used by

manufacturers to make them even more so. Philip Morris USA stands ready to submit all of its ingredients to rigorous FDA review and testing, to share the results

of testing it has previously conducted, and to work with the agency as it makes its

own assessment of any added risks they may present.

An approach that focuses on increased risk from ingredients has been explicitly

adopted by the IOM Report, which asserts that ‘‘. . . [FDA] should... have the authority to remove from the market ingredients...that do not meet [a] test of no increased risk . . .’’ To be clear, we think that FDA authority to test and, if necessary,

prohibit the use of specific ingredients it finds to increase the inherent risks of

smoking should apply to ingredients currently in use as well as to new ones. There

should be no ‘‘grandfathering.’’

However, FDA authority over ingredients should not, in our view, extend beyond

the concept of ‘‘increased risk’’. A broader scope—for example, based purely on what

would be ‘‘appropriate to protect public health’’—could permit the agency, for example, to prohibit specific ingredients solely because they improve the taste of a tobacco product, on the theory that, by trying to make the products taste bad, consumption will drop and public health will be benefited. Under such an approach, the

FDA could even order that bad-tasting ingredients be added to cigarettes, so as to

decrease their palatability. These powers would be, we respectfully submit, simply

incompatible with the principle that tobacco products are legitimate and that adults

should continue to be permitted to consume them if they wish. To quote from the

preamble to the FDA’s own proposed tobacco rule from 1996:

Black market and smuggling would develop to supply smokers with these products . . .[which] would be even more dangerous than those currently marketed,

in that they could contain even higher levels of tar, nicotine, and toxic additives.

If regulation of cigarettes is to be based purely on eliminating their known inherent dangers, we readily agree that it would be best if nobody smoked at all. But

Americans want to see a new regulatory regime that incorporates other values as

well—tolerance, adults’ continued ability to make their own decisions about issues

that affect their health, law enforcement considerations, and the degree to which

government should intrude generally into the realm of personal issues.1 If Congress

is to reflect this consensus and balance these competing concerns, it will need to

tailor FDA’s authority so that it is focused on encouraging quitting and harm reduction for adults who continue to smoke, rather than trying to force Americans to

adopt tobacco-free lifestyles.

Smoke Constituents and Other Performance Standards. For the same reasons, we

believe that the FDA should have broad power to require the reduction or elimination of smoke constituents (the compounds produced by tobacco when burned),

that will seek to reduce harm while ensuring that the agency will not order mandatory performance standards that are technically infeasible, or could only be met by

design changes in tobacco products that adult smokers find unacceptable. For example, if there is no limitation whatsoever contained in the performance standard authority, the agency could force rapid, radical reductions in tar and nicotine yields,

or require that manufacturers utilize filters that would eliminate the products’

taste. Strategies such as these may well be legitimate in the effort to reduce harm,

but we respectfully suggest that the strategies are best dealt with under the FDA’s

authority over reduced exposure and reduced risk tobacco products, discussed above.

• Translation into Legislative Language. H.R. 140 and S. 2626 both fully embody—with one important difference between them—IOM’s suggestion that the FDA

be provided with specific authority to impose performance standards, including

those relating to added ingredients and smoke constituents. Section 907(a) of both

bills empower the agency to

10

2This bracketed language appears only in S. 2626.

adopt performance standards for a tobacco product if the Secretary finds that

a performance standard is appropriate for the protection of the public health.

This finding shall be determined with respect to the risks and benefits to the

population as a whole, including users and non-users of the tobacco product,

and taking into account—(A) the increased or decreased likelihood that existing

users of tobacco products will stop using such products; and (B) the increased

or decreased likelihood that those who do not use tobacco products will start

using such products. A performance standard established under this section for

a tobacco product shall include provisions to provide performance that is appropriate for the protection of the public health, including provisions, where appropriate—(i) for the reduction [or elimination] 2 of nicotine yields of the product;

(ii) for the reduction or elimination of other harmful constituents or harmful

components of the product...

The authority this language confers over ingredients extends beyond the concept

of ‘‘increased risk’’. By permitting the FDA to change any ingredient if it concludes

that such action is ‘‘appropriate to protect public health’’ (so long as the removal

does not render the tobacco product ‘‘unacceptable for adult consumption’’), H.R. 140

would appear to permit FDA, for example, to prohibit or reduce specific ingredients

solely because they improve the taste of a tobacco product, on the theory that, by

trying to reduce the product’s palatability, consumption will decline and public

health will benefit. We’re pleased that the notion of adult acceptability appears in

H.R. 140, because it is compatible with the principle that tobacco products are legitimate and that adults should continue to be permitted to consume them if they wish.

We respectfully suggest, however, that Congress consider revising this language, insofar as it relates to ingredients, to more fully reflect IOM’s ‘‘no increased risk’’ concept.

For the same reasons, we appreciate the fact that H.R. 140’s performance standard authority applies the concept of adult acceptability to FDA’s power to require

the reduction or elimination of smoke constituents, or to order other mandatory design changes in tobacco products. Sensibly, the bill appears to contemplate that the

FDA will use its authority regarding reduced risk and reduced exposure products—

including those with low initial consumer acceptability—to encourage the proliferation of new product designs that have the potential of reducing the harm caused

by smoking. Using this authority, the agency will have enormous ability to use its

credibility with the American people to persuade adult smokers to switch to any alternative product designs of its choosing. New products that achieve a critical mass

of adult consumer acceptance would then be ready to move to the next regulatory

phase. If FDA concludes, after monitoring the marketplace in the manner suggested

by IOM, that such a product innovation has been proven to reduce harm in the long

term, the agency could—and, in our view, should—incorporate the results of the

technology into a performance standard so that it becomes the new baseline for the

entire category of tobacco products.

The performance standard authority in S. 2626 does not contain any concept of

adult acceptability, or any other limitation on the FDA’s authority to radically redesign tobacco products ‘‘to protect the public health.’’ There is clearly a difference

of opinion between those who believe that there needs to be specific policy direction

from Congress to the FDA regarding consumer acceptability, and others who view

health impact as the sole issue that the agency should be permitted to consider

when it sets performance standards for tobacco products. We would note in this regard that every regulated consumer product is governed by a statutory standard reflecting Congress’ policy judgment as to the values governing the rulemaking process. Just as medical devices need to be ‘‘safe and effective’’, a motor vehicle standard

may only be imposed if it is ‘‘reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle . . .’’, and standards under the Consumer Products Safety Act require a finding regarding ‘‘. . . the probable effect of such rule upon the utility, cost, or availability of such products to meet such need.’’

Our view is that FDA’s performance standard authority should recognize tobacco

products as legitimate for adults to use if they wish; that the agency should operate

within some reasonable boundaries making it clear that its mission is not to phase

them out entirely. To us it seems entirely plausible that, under a pure ‘‘public

health’’ standard, FDA could (or could be forced to) conclude that it is better for public health overall to ban tobacco products; that Prohibition would result in millions

of people quitting, and that having millions more seeking black market products is

an acceptable trade-off. Even if valid from a health perspective, this conclusion

would not be good policy.

11

3Written statement of Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, to Senate HELP Committee (September 19, 2002).

The opposition by some to any notion of ‘‘consumer acceptability’’ for tobacco products has been justified by concerns that the term’s vagueness will lead to ‘‘endless

litigation’’, and that ‘‘a reduction of tobacco consumption by 1% or less could be the

basis for an industry claim that a new performance standard has left the product

unacceptable to adults.’’ 3 There are responses to these concerns: many countries

around the world have clearly demonstrated that it is possible to gradually impose

performance standards on cigarettes that governments deem beneficial within the

realm of what adults will accept; for example, the European Union has, over the

past several years and taking a step-by-step approach, established increasingly

lower ceilings on tar, nicotine and, more recently, carbon monoxide yields as measured by machine tests. Moreover, it is unclear why ‘‘consumer acceptability’’ should

be any more susceptible to court challenge than equally-vague standards endorsed

by the same advocates (and included in both S. 2626 and H.R. 140), such as ‘‘the

increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of tobacco products will stop

using such products’’, and, under the well-known Chevron doctrine, FDA would be

afforded substantial deference by the courts in determining what the language

means. In any case, there surely ought to be some language that can be worked out

that would introduce some notion of reasonableness into the FDA’s performance

standard calculus, avoid unintended consequences, and serve the public health objective of tough, meaningful authority that will lead over time to real changes in

tobacco products, and a significant reduction in the harm that they cause.

IOM Principle #10

The Principle. The regulatory agency should have enforcement powers commensurate with its mission, including power to issue subpoenas. • Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle. We have spoken extensively about the need for meaningful and effective regulation of tobacco products;

such regulation can be neither ‘‘meaningful’’ nor ‘‘effective’’ without adequate enforcement powers for the FDA. • Translation into Legislative Language. H.R. 140, like S. 2626 before it, fully incorporates the existing enforcement authorities that the FDA is provided under the

Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, and applies those powers to enforcement of the new

tobacco products chapter that the bill would create. We would respectfully suggest,

in light of the recent influx of inexpensive foreign tobacco products—some of which

are not in compliance with existing Federal and State laws applicable to all tobacco

products, domestic or foreign—into our country, that these mechanisms be examined

to ensure that the FDA will be both authorized and directed to ensure that all manufacturers and importers are required to fully comply with the full panoply of restrictions, requirements and standards that the agency decides to impose.

IOM Principle #11

The Principle. Exposure reduction claims for drugs that are supported by appropriate scientific and clinical evidence should be allowed by the FDA. • Philip Morris USA’s Position. We support this principle. Our belief in the ability

of adults to make their own decisions about smoking—and not smoking—encompasses cessation of tobacco use, including the use of pharmaceutical therapies for

those smokers who want to quit, are having difficulty, and believe that the treatments might help. • Translation into Legislative Language. IOM correctly notes that, under current

U.S. law, the FDA already has authority in this area for drugs and medical devices;

this issue need not be addressed legislatively as Congress considers a new chapter

of the law relating to tobacco products. We believe strongly that cigarettes should

be regulated as cigarettes, and not as medical products. This means that, as both

H.R. 140 and S. 2626 provide, cigarettes should be regulated by FDA, but under a

separate chapter of its governing statute. We’re convinced that any legislation that

attempts to shoehorn tobacco products into the existing medical categories is, as the

Supreme Court has already found, simply taking the wrong approach.

III. OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP TOBACCO PRODUCTS THAT COULD EVENTUALLY REDUCE

THE HARM CAUSED BY SMOKING

Having described the regulatory regime that we believe should be built to apply

to all tobacco products—both conventional and novel—we now turn to the status of

Philip Morris USA’s efforts to develop products that we hope will be subject to these

new regulations. One of our highest priorities today continues to be the development

of cigarettes that have the potential to reduce the harm caused by smoking. The

12

IOM Report exhaustively examines many of the issues involved in attempting to

achieve this goal by reducing smokers’ exposure to harmful compounds in cigarette

smoke.

Simply put, the public health community has identified a number of compounds—

out of the thousands present in cigarette smoke—that are potentially harmful to

smokers, without definitively settling on any specific one (or combination of them)

as the recognized cause of lung cancer or other smoking-related disease. Accordingly, our basic strategy is to reduce smokers’ exposure to as many of these compounds as we can, by means of products that will provide continued enjoyment to

our consumers. If we’re successful in finding ways of both reducing potentially

harmful compounds and reducing smokers’ actual exposure to them under realworld conditions, we believe that—although it will take some time—the FDA will

be in position to help us evaluate whether our product development efforts are actually reducing the risk of tobacco-related diseases among current smokers. Then, determinations can ultimately be made about whether any reduced-risk tobacco product results in overall harm reduction across the population, because its risk-reduction potential is not offset by other factors, such as changes in smoking behavior,

discouraging current smokers from quitting or encouraging nonsmokers to start.

Our goal—which we believe provides both societal and shareholder value—is to

design the best products that we can, and then, ideally under the regulatory oversight of the FDA, to convince as many adult smokers (who don’t quit) as possible

to use them. It seems clear to us that we will not be able to make progress in this

area unless two critical conditions are met: first, that manufacturers such as ourselves are successful at developing and making available tobacco products that reduce smokers’ exposure to harmful compounds compared to conventional cigarettes,

and second, that current smokers are given a reason—through the communication

of truthful, non-misleading information that avoids unintended consequences—to

switch to these products, even though they may be less enjoyable than the cigarettes

that most adults smoke today. For people who continue to smoke, we believe that

this is the best way to assure that the overall harm caused by smoking will be

meaningfully reduced.

We have extensive research programs, both external and internal, that are focused on advancing our knowledge about tobacco smoke, including the compounds

of smoke and smokers’ actual exposure to them, to support our efforts to develop

new product designs. We are continuing to devote substantial research and development efforts to develop and launch cigarettes that significantly reduce smokers’ exposure to compounds that have been identified by public health authorities as harmful or potentially harmful. We are making progress in this area, and hope to introduce new products with appropriate consumer communications as quickly as possible.

For example, one current result of our efforts is the introduction of an electrically

heated cigarette smoking system (EHC), called Accord, in a limited test market

without communications to consumers regarding reductions in potentially harmful

compounds. The specially-designed lighter heats the EHC to a lower temperature

than that at which a lit cigarette burns; the lower the temperature of the tobacco,

the lower the quantities of certain harmful compounds. In comparing the EHC to

a standard lit-end industry reference cigarette, we first made evaluations of smoke

chemistry, Ames activity (a measure of damage to DNA), cytotoxicity (a measure of

cell damage and tissue irritation), and inhalation exposure in laboratory rats. Philip

Morris USA scientists have shared many of these results with their colleagues in

the scientific community; examples of their presentations are available on online at

http://www.ehcss-science.com.

More recently, we have conducted tests—including both clinical studies to assess

the levels of potentially harmful compounds that smokers are actually exposed to,

and machine tests that we believe more closely approximate actual smokers’ behavior than the existing FTC method—comparing the results of smoking the EHC to

those of smoking various commercially available conventional cigarettes. While we

are still in the process of evaluating these tests, we hope that they will show that

smokers of the EHC were exposed to substantially lower amounts of certain harmful

compounds present in tobacco smoke than smokers of the conventional brand styles

that were tested.

In addition, we are working very hard on the development of a conventional litend cigarette which includes a state-of-the-art filter, that uses activated carbon that

we hope will be shown to reduce certain harmful compounds in smoke. It works like

a carbon water filter, which reduces some of the unwanted things in the water that

people drink. This prototype cigarette design also includes flavor components to add

flavor to replace tobacco flavors trapped by the carbon.

13

Neither the EHC nor the cigarette with the new filter has been proven to reduce

the risk of smoking-related disease, and smokers of these products would still be

inhaling many compounds that are potentially harmful. But we believe that these

product technologies show promise for the future, and that the FDA should be empowered as quickly as possible so that the agency can begin to work with us to

evaluate their potential for reducing the risk of contracting smoking-related disease,

and the overall harm to the population caused by smoking.

As we consider the details of the various legislative proposals that are active

today, we respectfully urge Congress to keep in mind that innovation in developing

new products are crucial to their ultimate success. In order to have any real impact,

reduced exposure products must be acceptable to adult smokers. We see little overall benefit to consumers or society if harm reduction is not pursued in the context

of cigarettes that adult consumers will continue to enjoy smoking. As the 1998 Canadian Experts’ Committee on this subject concluded, ‘‘[i]f smokers would not buy

these products, product modification initiatives would fail.’’

IV. THE WISDOM OF THE IOM PRINCIPLES, AND THE NEED FOR ACTION.

We now turn to a general overview of the policy issues relating to potentially reduced exposure and reduced risk tobacco products. This portion of our statement

discusses our strong belief that FDA regulation—in line with the IOM Report’s recommendations—is an essential component to an effective overall harm reduction

strategy, the debate over whether this strategy is a good one, and the consequences

of simply preserving the status quo.

The Need for FDA Regulation of Innovative Tobacco Products

We strongly agree with the IOM Report that governments should help determine

what is, and what is not, a ‘‘reduced exposure’’ or ‘‘reduced risk’’ tobacco product.

Clearly, the best approach is for regulatory authorities to make such determinations, based on the best available scientific information. As the IOM Report indicates, a product should be designated and marketed as ‘‘reduced exposure’’ or ‘‘reduced risk’’ upon an adequate showing of potential exposure or risk reduction to current smokers. Whether a product offers potentially reduced exposure or risk to an

individual smoker is a purely scientific (as opposed to a policy) question that FDA

should determine based on the data; the policies of encouraging quitting, discouraging nonsmokers from starting and assessing overall harm reduction across populations is a separate question, and can and should be dealt with through post-market surveillance, educational programs and appropriate labeling.

Moreover, we believe that the purpose of regulation in this area—and the specific

details of the FDA’s legislative mandate—should be to encourage innovation, not to

stifle competition and the development of potentially beneficial new technologies.

We hope that everyone can agree that the FDA should not inadvertently be directed

or permitted to actually inhibit the development of these products, and in the process to deny millions of today’s smokers a genuine opportunity to potentially reduce

their chance of contracting smoking-related diseases.

Once, as a matter of science, the FDA concludes that a new product has the potential to offer reduced exposure or reduced risk, the best approach would be for the

agency to play an important role in overseeing any claims—explicit or implied—

made about it by its manufacturer regarding exposure or risk-reduction.

Crafting appropriate claims regarding these tobacco products is an undertaking

requiring great care and attention; we are mindful of the critical need for manufacturers to work with the FDA so that marketing messages clearly communicate that

all smoking can be harmful, and that the best option from a health perspective is

to quit. Once again, as with determinations regarding the scientific issues of potential exposure and risk-reduction, we believe that the best approach is for the FDA

to decide what communications to consumers are appropriate on this subject.

On the one hand, regulation should ensure that consumers are not mistakenly led

to believe that a particular product may be an acceptable alternative to quitting

from a health perspective. On the other hand, regulation should not be utilized as

a tool to suppress legitimate, accurate and objective information about product developments that individuals may find to be beneficial or important. The key here

is for all communications to consumers to be truthful and not misleading in the context of the fact that there is no safe cigarette.

The Debate Over Harm Reduction as a Strategy

The IOM Report was commissioned by the FDA to (in the Report’s words) ‘‘address the science base for harm reduction from tobacco. The committee concluded

early in its deliberations that the science base for harm reduction will evolve over

time.’’

14

We’re keenly aware that some members of the public health community are opposed to the very concept of developing and offering ‘‘reduced exposure’’ or ‘‘reduced

risk’’ tobacco products, because they are concerned that their availability might discourage smokers from quitting or encourage them to start smoking. These advocates

appear to believe that the only acceptable message for the government to communicate, irrespective of potential alternatives, is a directive to not consume tobacco

products at all. Philip Morris USA respectfully disagrees with this way of thinking,

and strongly believes that it would be wrong, if products that could ultimately reduce the harm caused by smoking are developed, to deny adult smokers access to

information about their potential benefits. We’re convinced that information about

potentially reduced-exposure or reduced-risk products—that is truthful and not misleading—should be disclosed to consumers, so that they can consider the information and then decide for themselves which path to take.

The IOM Report has some important things to say about the debate over whether

‘‘reduced exposure’’ and ‘‘reduced risk’’ tobacco products should be pursued:

Some public health officials oppose the adoption of harm reduction strategies

because of concerns that promoting this approach will not, over the long term,

prove to be beneficial to public health or to the individual tobacco users who

might otherwise have quit. Whatever the merits of this position, marketplace

forces already at work have put this issue on the policy agenda, and new products are being developed and offered as harm-reducing alternatives to conventional tobacco products... Manufacturers should be permitted to market tobacco-related products with exposure reduction or risk reduction claims only

after [FDA] approval based on scientific evidence (a) that the product substantially reduces exposure to one or more tobacco toxicants and (b) if a risk reduction claim is made, that the product can reasonably be expected to reduce the

risk of one or more specific diseases or other adverse health effects, compared

with whatever benchmark product [FDA] requires to be stated in the labeling . . .[The] regulatory process should not discourage or impede scientifically

grounded claims of reduced exposure, so long as steps are taken to ensure that

consumers are not misled...

The IOM Report recommends, among other things, that manufacturers be given ‘‘the

necessary incentive to develop and market products that reduce exposure to tobacco

toxicants’’; that consumers be ‘‘fully and accurately informed’’ about the health consequences of these products; that claims about their potential for reducing harm be

regulated; and that research be conducted to ascertain the products’ ‘‘potential for

harm reduction for individuals and populations.’’

In the absence of the regulatory oversight recommended by the IOM Report, Philip Morris USA is, as discussed in section III of this statement, making a genuine

effort to develop potentially reduced exposure products in accordance with the Report’s recommendations, recognizing that there is currently no regulatory agency to

validate Philip Morris USA’s research and development efforts, or any independent

scientific experts available to fully assess these efforts without funding from either

the government or ourselves.

The Status Quo is Unacceptable

The questions regarding the IOM Report’s recommendations and harm reduction

as a strategy are important ones, worthy of thorough discussion, and we urge Congress to find the common ground and to pass legislation which will finally resolve

them.

Without Congressional action, Philip Morris USA will continue to face a genuine

dilemma. We’re aware that it would not be ideal to begin to communicate to consumers about our new products’ potential benefits in the absence of FDA regulation;

this is an important reason that we have been seeking it for such a long period of

time. However, without new legislation and the regulatory oversight that would follow, we are faced with the choice of making good faith communications about our

new products based solely on our rigorous internal and external scientific processes

and our scientists’ engagement with external stakeholders, or not communicating information that may prove to be important to over 40 million consumers across the

country. We note in this regard that time is not standing still—many of Philip Morris USA’s competitors are already communicating directly with consumers about

their new product designs; as the IOM itself said in its report, ‘‘marketplace forces

already at work have put this issue on the public policy agenda, and new products

are being developed and offered as harm-reducing alternatives to conventional tobacco products.’’

Without new legislation that implements the IOM Report’s principles, we would

undoubtedly face criticism no matter which path we choose to take—but it is truly

the millions of adult smokers in this country who have the most at stake here; we

15

strongly believe that we would all be doing them a real disservice if we fail to come

together to support the passage of legislation that will implement the IOM Report’s

recommendations, and place the FDA in the center of the critical decisions about

tobacco products that, with or without regulation, are going to need to be made in

the months and years ahead.

V. CONCLUSION

We believe that Congress has the opportunity to forge a new national tobacco policy that will create substantial new authority for the FDA to adopt regulations for

tobacco products in accordance with the principles articulated in the IOM Report,

while continuing to permit adults who wish to use them to do so legally. The issues

you are considering today could make a substantial contribution to progress towards

that goal. We hope this statement provides you with helpful input, and makes it

clear that our company truly is supportive of a comprehensive and effective new regulatory regime that includes every area addressed by the IOM Report, and in practice will actually result in what we think everyone should be able to agree upon as

a primary objective: reduced harm from tobacco consumption for both current and

future generations.

We also hope that you agree with our conclusion that the status quo simply is

not serving the needs of American smokers, and that, as the IOM Report has noted,

novel tobacco products are being—and will continue to be—marketed under whatever regulatory regime is in place. The issue before us is not whether such products

will come into being; but rather what the degree of the governmental oversight of

them will be. These issues are complex and controversial, but we pledge to work

with anyone and everyone who wishes to join in this challenge, and commend this

subcommittee for the progress this hearing represents as a critical next step.

ANNEX 1

THE DEBATE OVER REDUCED-EXPOSURE AND REDUCED-RISK TOBACCO PRODUCTS: FULL

DISCLOSURE VS. GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSION OF TRUTHFUL AND NON-MISLEADING INFORMATION

Competing proposals to give FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products take

different approaches to regulating potentially ‘‘reduced-exposure’’ and ‘‘reduced-risk’’

tobacco products. These products have the potential to reduce the health risks associated with conventional tobacco products by, for example, lowering the smoker’s exposure to toxic substances in the smoke. This paper takes the view that the approach most consistent with sound public policy and First Amendment protections

is that which provides consumers with more information, rather than less or none

at all. The public health safeguard in this approach is that FDA would decide both

whether a product does indeed present reduced exposure or reduced risks, and what

marketing claims may be made about the product. But once this determination is

made, neither FDA nor any other government body could gag truthful and non-misleading information about the product.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The debate over how to regulate these products has resulted in a debate over consumer communications. On one side are those who share the view that the government should simply evaluate claims based on their scientific merits and deal with

any public health concerns by providing for full disclosure to consumers and through

other public health measures. On the other side are those who fear that the very

existence of these products, despite the fact that FDA would review, approve and

regulate any accompanying claims, would have a net adverse public health impact

by encouraging more people to start smoking in the first place and/or by discouraging from quitting people who adopt the misguided view that smoking is now

‘‘safe.’’ Therefore, this contingent supports giving the government authority to suppress reduced-exposure and reduced-risk claims about tobacco products.

The government suppression tact flies in the face of the First Amendment and

sound public policy. The Supreme Court has made clear that suppression of information is not a useful or suitably tailored restriction on commercial speech.

The notion that benefits would result from suppressing truthful and non-misleading information tobacco products is premised on the speculation that adults

might use this information in a manner that is disfavored by the government. A

benefit deriving from this kind of paternalistic assumption, however, is not one that

the Constitution recognizes as legitimate. Further, even if suppressed by the government, information concerning novel tobacco products is likely to reach consumers

16

4See e.g., H.R. 936, 108th Cong. § 572(a)(1), (2) (stating that FDA must determine that ‘‘based

on the best available scientific evidence the product significantly reduces the overall health risk

through any number of alternative sources. And FDA or another government agency

will not have scientifically vetted this information.

Moreover, suppressing information on reduced-exposure and reduced-risk tobacco

products would not necessarily advance the government’s interest in protecting public health. In order to provide this speculative benefit to certain individuals, the government would have to impose clear harms on others—specifically, on those people

who will use tobacco products regardless and who, because of the suppression of information, would be denied the ability to select products with demonstrated potential benefits. Thus, a significant part of the population may be denied crucial information in order to ‘‘protect’’ a speculative segment of the population.

In addition, the government has available to it more narrowly tailored means of

advancing its public health interests. For example, it could:

• ensure that consumers are given all necessary information to ensure that they are

not misled regarding the health risks that remain with reduced-exposure and

reduced-risk tobacco products, or that quitting or not starting is still the most

risk-free approach; and • stress other public health programs to encourage smoking cessation and prevention.

In short, to quote the Supreme Court, ‘‘the preferred remedy is more disclosure,

rather than less,’’ Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (emphasis

added), and ‘‘[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating

speech must be a last—not first—resort.’’ Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 1507 (2002) (emphasis added). Indeed, ‘‘if the [g]overnment [can]

achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less

speech, the [g]overnment must do so.’’ Id. at 1506 (emphasis added). Accordingly,

legislation should task FDA with reviewing claims based on their scientific merits.

FDA also should have ample authority to ensure that consumers are provided with

full disclosure regarding such products. Other public health tools should supplement

these efforts by continuing to encourage smoking cessation and prevention. This approach is consistent with the approach outlined by the Institute of Medicine: ‘‘The

regulatory process should not discourage or impede scientifically grounded claims of

reduced exposure, as long as steps are taken to ensure that consumers are not misled . . .’’ Institute of Medicine, ‘‘Clearing the Smoke: Assessing the Science Base for

Tobacco Harm Reduction’’ (2001), at 7-13.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2001, the Committee to Assess the Science Base for Tobacco Harm Reduction

(the ‘‘Committee’’) of the Institute of Medicine (‘‘IOM’’) issued a report on reducedexposure and reduce-risk tobacco products commissioned by the Food and Drug Administration (‘‘FDA’’).

The Committee made clear that it recommends a regulatory approach based on

sound science and full consumer disclosure. Prior to detailing its principles for the

regulation of reduced-exposure and reduced-risk tobacco products (which the Committee referred to as ‘‘potential reduced-exposure products,’’ or ‘‘PREPs’’), the Committee stated:

‘‘The committee did come to conclude that regulation of PREPs is necessary and

feasible...[R]egulation is needed to ensure that the product labeling and advertising do not mislead consumers and accurately describe the products’ risks, including the uncertainties that can only be resolved after long-term use. Consumers should not use these new products on the basis of explicit or implicit

claims that these products carry less risk than traditional tobacco products unless such claims are true. Absent careful regulation of industry claims about

these products, informed choices by consumers will not be possible, the potential

benefit of harm reduction strategy is likely to go unrealized, and the long and

unsettling saga of light cigarettes may well be repeated.’’

IOM Report, at 7-2 (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding IOM’s recommendations, however, certain legislative proposals

to grant FDA authority to regulate tobacco products appear to authorize FDA to

suppress information about PREPs even if FDA has verified that these products actually have the potential to present potential benefits for consumers. For example,

some proposals would permit manufacturers to make reduced-exposure or reducedrisk health claims only if FDA determines that the product actually reduces the risk

of harm to individuals as a matter of science and is otherwise ‘‘appropriate’’ for the

‘‘public health.’’ 4

17

to the public when compared to other tobacco products,’’ and that in approving reduced-risk

claims, FDA must ‘‘ensure [the claim’s] accuracy and, in the case of advertising,... prevent such

statement from increasing, or preventing the contraction of, the size of the overall market for tobacco products’’ (emphasis added). 5For example, H.R. 936 provides that FDA must prevent reduced-risk advertising claims from

‘‘increasing, or preventing the contraction of, the size of the overall market for tobacco products.’’

H.R. 936 § 575(a)(2).

This type of two-prong standard—with a ‘‘scientific merits prong’’’ and an ‘‘appropriateness’’ prong—appears to respond to those segments of the public health community that have called for FDA discretion to suppress reduced-risk claims, notwithstanding their veracity, based on their potential effect on consumer behavior.

See, e.g., National Cancer Society et al., Why the FDA Should Regulate Tobacco

Products (June 27, 2002) (stating that FDA should have the authority ‘‘to prohibit

or restrict... claims that discourage people from quitting or encourage them to start

using tobacco’’); Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, Critical Elements of FDA Authority Over Tobacco (Feb. 18, 2000) (‘‘FDA should have the authority to prohibit... health claims that have an adverse effect on the overall risk to the American public . . .’’).5

Thus, under this two-prong standard, even if valid scientific evidence demonstrates to FDA’s satisfaction that a product presents potential benefits, the agency could prohibit truthful and non-misleading information about the product’s reduced-exposure or reduced-risk potential from being communicated to consumers in

the marketplace.

II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRECLUDES THIS KIND OF SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION

This approach to the regulation of PREPs would violate the First Amendment and

sound public policy. First, the suppression of information would not materially and

directly advance the government’s legitimate interests in encouraging tobacco cessation and prevention. Instead, the suppression of information would harm a clearly

identifiable group of individuals. Second, the government has far more tailored

means at its disposal to address any impact of PREPs on the rates of smoking cessation and initiation. Such alternatives include the mandatory use of public health

disclaimers to ensure that PREPs are not perceived as safe, and the pursuit of other

public health programs to encourage tobacco cessation and prevention.

The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that once a product is legally sold in the

United States, the government may not deny adults truthful and non-misleading information about the product. Rather, the government must adopt more tailored restrictions to achieve its legitimate purposes. As the Supreme Court stated in its

seminal commercial speech case:

‘‘There is, of course, an alternative to [a] highly paternalistic approach [to regulating commercial speech]. That alternative is to assume that this information

is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only

they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open

the channels of communication rather than to close them . . . It is precisely this

kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers

of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.’’

Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,

770 (1976).

‘‘[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech... usually rest solely

on the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘‘irrationally’’ to the truth.

The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek

to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.’’

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 1508 (2002), citing 44

Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality opinion).

In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), the Supreme Court struck

down certain restrictions on the advertising of tobacco products because those restrictions were not sufficiently tailored to fit the government’s objective of protecting

children. This holding reaffirmed that the Court will carefully scrutinize commercial

speech restrictions, including in the case of tobacco products, to determine if less

restrictive means are available to achieve the government’s purpose. The Reilly

Court also made clear that commercial speech restrictions continue to be subject to

the following four-part inquiry developed by the Supreme Court in the Central Hudson case:

‘‘For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must

concern a lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted government interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
18

ment interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary

to serve that interest.’’

447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). ‘‘We have said that the last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the ‘fit’ between the legislature’s

ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.’’ Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,

514 U.S. 476, 486 (1995).

Simply put, the suppression of information about PREPs does not fit the government’s interest in encouraging tobacco cessation and prevention.

A. The Suppression of Reduced-Risk Information Would Elevate Presumed

Paternalistic Benefits for Some Over Real Harms for Others

The premise behind providing FDA with authority to suppress truthful and nonmisleading information appears to be that the costs associated with the possible

changes in the rates of cessation and initiation might outweigh the benefits resulting from communications about PREPs. To tilt the balance in this fashion, however,

one would have to value the presumed benefits that may be provided to some individuals over the real costs that would be imposed on others. Such conjecture, however, cannot justify the suppression of truthful and non-misleading commercial

speech under the First Amendment. ‘‘Such speculation certainly does not suffice

when the [government] takes aim at accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends.’’ 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.

Moreover, as detailed below, an abstract discussion about costs and benefits fails

to illuminate the serious consequences of suppressing truthful information about

PREPs.

1. The Paternalistic and Speculative Benefits Provided by the Suppression of Information Are Insufficient to Pass Constitutional Muster

The suppression of information presumably would be intended to benefit that segment of the population that would quit or never initiate smoking if information

about PREPs is not available, but who would choose to switch to or begin using

them if they were made aware of these products. Viewed from a ‘‘paternalistic’’ perspective, this segment of the population would be benefited by the suppression of

information. Attempting to justify the suppression of information on this basis, however, is at odds with the Constitution, because paternalism is not a legitimate governmental interest, and because the realization of this paternalistic benefit would

be impermissibly speculative.

The government ‘‘does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes . . . ’’ 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has ‘‘rejected the notion that the [g]overnment has an

interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order

to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the information.’’

Western States, 122 S.Ct. at 1507. ‘‘[T]he argument [for suppression] assumes that

the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and

that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete

information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the public . . .[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public

ignorance.’’ Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374-375 (1977). ‘‘To endeavor to support a restriction upon speech by alleging that the recipient needs to be

shielded from that speech for his or her own protection . . . is practically an engraved

invitation to have the restriction struck.’’ Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.

Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998) (judgment vacated on other grounds). ‘‘[T]he government may not restrict speech because it fears, however justifiably, that the speech

will persuade those who hear it to do something of which the government disapproves.’’ David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91

Colum. L. Rev. 334, 334 (1991).

Moreover, this justification for suppression of information would fail the third

prong of the Central Hudson test because it would require the court ‘‘to engage in

the sort of ‘‘speculation or conjecture’’ that is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial speech directly advances the [government’s] asserted interest.’’ 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507. For example, in Rubin

v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), the Court concluded that the government’s prohibition on displaying alcohol content on beer labels failed the third prong

of Central Hudson because it would not sufficiently advance the government’s interests in preventing ‘‘strength wars’’ in the marketing of alcoholic beverages. The

Court reasoned that the government’s burden ‘‘is not satisfied by mere speculation

or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate the harms it recites are real and that its restricVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
19

6When viewed from a more ‘‘utilitarian’’ perspective, these individuals are not benefited at

all by the suppression of information. From this perspective, adults are better off if they are

left free to make their own decisions based on full information. As University of Chicago Law

School Professor Cass Sunstein puts it, ‘‘people should be allowed to select their preferred mixes

of risk, employment, salary, medical care, and so forth.’’ Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America:

Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 653, 659 (1993); see also Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 589, 592 (1996)

(‘‘The asserted justifications for such regulation of the truthful promotion of a lawful product

derive exclusively from a premise of governmental paternalism that is fundamentally inconsistent with both the purposes served by free speech and the democratic system of which free

speech is a central element.’’) 7Drug compounding, a ‘‘traditional component of the practice of pharmacy,’’ is a process by

which a pharmacist or doctor combines or alters drug ingredients to create a medication typically not commercially available and which is tailored to the needs of a particular individual,

e.g., an individual that is allergic to an ingredient in a mass-produced product. Id. at 1500. 8 In response to the Western States decision, FDA issued a Federal Register notice seeking

comments to ‘‘ensure that its regulations, guidances, policies, and practices continue to comply

with the governing First Amendment case law.’’ 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942 (May 16, 2002).

tion will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.’’ Id. at 487, quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-771 (1993).6

It is far from clear that suppressing information would ‘‘in fact alleviate’’ the perceived harms that might arise from the introduction of PREPs. Any information

suppressed by the government likely would find its way to consumers through other

channels, though almost certainly in a less accurate form that has not been subject

to scientific verification. As the IOM Report notes, ‘‘marketplace forces already at

work have put this issue on the public policy agenda,’’ and consumers will seek out

PREPs ‘‘with or without scientific guidance.’’ IOM Report at 7-1, 7-2. Moreover, as

discussed below, any advance in the public health that purportedly results from the

suppression of information would be undermined by the adverse effects of such suppression on individuals who would have used PREPs had the suppressed information been available to them.

2. Real Harms Would Be Imposed by the Suppression of Information

Though the benefits to be derived from the suppression of information about

PREPS are speculative, it is clear that a separate group of individuals would be

harmed by the suppression of such information. This group consists both of smokers

who would have switched to PREPs instead of continuing to use conventional tobacco products, and nonsmokers who would have begun using PREPs instead of conventional tobacco products if they had been provided with information about PREPs.

Regardless of one’s philosophical bent, everyone should agree that this group, which

ends up taking on more risks solely because of the suppression of information, is

substantially harmed by that suppression.

It is neither sound public policy nor constitutionally permissible for the government knowingly to harm a certain group of individuals by suppressing information

for the presumed benefit of others. The Supreme Court held in the Western States

decision that such a suppression of commercial speech cannot be reconciled with the

First Amendment. Western States, 122 S.Ct. at 1508-09. In this decision, the Court

invalidated provisions of the Food and Drug Modernization Act (‘‘FDAMA’’) that prohibited advertising of ‘‘compounded drugs,’’ 7 which the government argued were

necessary to ensure that drug compounding was not used to circumvent the new

drug approval requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (‘‘FDCA’’).

Id. at 1504-06.

The Supreme Court found that the prohibition on advertising of compounded

drugs was impermissible, inter alia, because of ‘‘the amount of beneficial speech’’

that it prohibited without furthering the asserted governmental objective. Id. at

1508.8 Specifically, the Court pointed out that the prohibition would prevent pharmacists with ‘‘no interest in mass-producing medications’’ in circumvention of FDCA

from telling doctors about alternative drugs available through compounding that

would be useful in treating patients with special medical needs. Id. at 1508-09. The

fact that such ‘‘useful speech’’ would be suppressed even though doing so would not

‘‘directly further’’ the government’s asserted objective was ‘‘enough to convince’’ the

Court that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional. Id. at 1509.

Following Western States, the suppression of information about PREPs would be

unconstitutional because it would result in real harm for certain groups of people

without furthering a substantial governmental interest. The suppression of truthful,

non-misleading claims clearly would redound to the detriment of certain individuals—i.e., those who, had they been exposed to the claims, would have switched to

PREPs from conventional tobacco products. Moreover, the only motivation for suppressing truthful and non-misleading reduced-risk information would be the governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
20

ment’s desire to prevent people from using the information to make choices that the

government disfavors. Yet, as discussed above, the Constitution does not recognize

such a motivation as a legitimate basis for restricting commercial speech. Under

these circumstances, not only would the government impermissibly be saying that

it knows what is best for certain of its citizens, but in doing so, it would affirmatively harm other citizens.

The government’s decision to suppress reduced-risk information also has severe

consequences for the individual and, indeed, for our system of government as a

whole:

[T]he fundamental premise of the First Amendment—indeed, of the very democratic system of which the First Amendment is such an important part—is that

citizens must be trusted to make their own lawful choices on the basis of a free

and open competition of ideas, opinions, and information. If government is permitted paternalistically to shield its citizens from such open debate as a means

of controlling their behavioral choices, it will have simultaneously affronted individual dignity and stunted the individual’s personal and intellectual growth,

a developmental process that lies at the heart of the free speech right. It will

simultaneously have contributed to an intellectual atrophy of the citizen that

ultimately will undermine her effective participation in the democratic system.

Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, supra, at 636.

B. More Targeted Approaches Are Available to Address Public Health Concerns About PREPs

Far more targeted approaches are available for the government to address concerns about the impact that PREPs might have on the rates of smoking cessation

and initiation. FDA should ensure that information about the product’s reduced-exposure or reduced-risk potential is presented to consumers in a truthful and nonmisleading manner. Indeed, authority to prevent false and misleading product information is a standard FDA regulatory tool that currently applies to all product labeling and promotional materials regulated under FDCA, and that would be extended

to tobacco products by proposals granting FDA authority to regulate such products.

In addition, other public health tools to encourage tobacco cessation and prevention

are available and currently in use.

1. FDA Should Consider Appropriate Use of Disclaimers to Address Public Health

Concerns

The Supreme Court held in Western States that ‘‘if the [g]overnment can achieve

its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech,

the [g]overnment must do so.’’ Western States, 122 S.Ct. at 1506-07 (emphasis

added) (holding that the government failed to demonstrate that preserving the integrity of the FDCA drug approval process could not be achieved through means

that imposed a lesser burden on speech than the FDAMA prohibition on advertising

compounded drugs). Consequently, the advertising prohibition challenged in that

case failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requiring that the

restrictions not be more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest. Id. See also Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (there cannot

be ‘‘an absolute prohibition on... potentially misleading information . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive’’); Wash. Legal Found.

v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (FDA restrictions on particular forms of manufacturer promotion of off-label uses for FDA-approved drugs were considerably more extensive than necessary, and ‘‘[t]he most obvious alternative is full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer’’).

In Western States, the Supreme Court identified the use of so-called ‘‘disclaimers’’

as an alternative way to ensure that consumers are not misled by advertisements.

Western States, 122 S.Ct. at 1508 (a governmental interest in preventing misleading

advertising could be achieved by ‘‘the far less restrictive alternative’’ of requiring

compounded drugs to bear warnings stating that the drugs are not FDA-approved

and that their risks are unknown). The D.C. Circuit made the same conclusion in

Pearson, stating that ‘‘we are skeptical that the government could demonstrate with

empirical evidence that disclaimers... would bewilder consumers and fail to correct

for deceptiveness... ’’. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659-660; see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.

191, 203 (1982) (‘‘[T]he remedy in the first instance is not necessarily a prohibition

but preferably a requirement of disclaimers or explanation.’’). Furthermore, this

principle is ‘‘consistent with a well-established body of law that points to First

Amendment limits on federal agencies’ restrictions on commercial speech where less

restrictive alternatives are available.’’ Steven B. Steinborn & Kyra A. Todd, The

End of Paternalism: A New Approach to Food Labeling, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 401,

402 (1999). ‘‘Pearson stands as [a] reminder that regulatory agencies in general, and

21

9Of course, FDA could prohibit any reduced-risk or health claims for tobacco products that

have not been approved by FDA. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 239 F.Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C.

Jan. 3, 2003) (holding that claims concerning the therapeutic effects of a dietary supplement

on an existing disease condition that were not approved as permissible reduced-risk claims for

the product were unlawful health claims). 10The Supreme Court ruled in Western States that the government must consider non-speech

related alternatives before resorting to restrictions on commercial speech. In the decision, the

Court identified several non-speech alternatives to FDAMA’s compounded drug advertising prohibition that might be effective in achieving the government’s interest of ensuring the integrity

of FDCA’s drug approval process. Id. at 1506. These were (1) banning the use of commercial

scale manufacturing or testing equipment for compounding drug products; (2) prohibiting pharmacists from compounding more drugs in anticipation of receiving prescriptions than in response to prescriptions already received; (3) prohibiting pharmacists from offering compounded

drugs at wholesale to other state licensed persons or commercial entities for resale; (4) limiting

the amount of compounded drugs that a pharmacist may sell out of State or sell or make in

a given period of time; or (5) relying on the non-speech related provisions of FDAMA, which

include requiring that compounding only be conducted in response to a prescription or a history

of receiving a prescription, and limiting the percentage of a pharmacy’s total sales that out-ofstate sales of compounded drugs may represent. Id. at 1506. The government’s failure to explain

why these alternatives would not be adequate led the Court to conclude that FDAMA’s advertising prohibition was more extensive than necessary. Id. at 1506-07.

FDA in particular, must adopt a regulatory approach that recognizes the consumer’s

right to receive pertinent information.’’ Id. at 413-414.

Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission has long supported the position that disclaimers must be considered as an alternative when determining whether health

claims about a product are misleading. See Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC,

570 F.2d 157, 164 (7th Cir. 1977); Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and

Drug Law, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 815, 827 (2000); see also FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,388, 28,393 (1994) (noting that the ‘‘significant scientific agreement’’ standard in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act

of 1990 (NLEA) is the appropriate standard to determine if health claims are misleading only in situations where the claims are unqualified).

Providing consumers with additional information, such as through the use of disclaimers, is thus a more tailored means to address the potential impact of PREPs

on smoking cessation and initiation. ‘‘Any ‘interest’ in restricting the flow of accurate information because of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema to

the First Amendment; more speech and a better informed citizenry are among the

central goals of the Free Speech Clause.’’ Rubin, 514 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). FDA could require, for example, that every tobacco product

designated as a PREP include labeling that reminds consumers that no tobacco

product is safe and that the best option is to quit or not to start in the first place.9

2. Other Public Health Tools are Available to Address Concerns Related to Smoking

Cessation and Prevention

An FDA-imposed restriction on the communication of information about PREPs is

not the only policy tool available to address concerns related to tobacco use. As the

Institute of Medicine noted, the regulatory system should not be viewed in isolation,

but rather ‘‘as an essential component of a package of public policy initiatives (including research, education and surveillance) that this committee believes is necessary to realize whatever benefit tobacco or pharmaceutical product innovation can

offer in reducing the nation’s burden of tobacco-related illness and death.’’ IOM Report at 7-21, 22. ‘‘Harm reduction [should be] implemented as a component of a comprehensive national tobacco control program that emphasizes abstinence-oriented

prevention and treatment.’’ Id. at 7-21.

In this regard, Congress appropriated more than $100 million to the Centers for

Disease Control for its tobacco control efforts in FY—2003. Further, many states

have increased their spending on tobacco control efforts in the wake of the state attorneys general tobacco settlements (the ‘‘MSA’’). These state and federal tobacco

control programs are in addition to the $1.5 billion that was earmarked in the MSA

to fund tobacco control efforts through a national public health foundation, the

American Legacy Foundation, which is overseen by the state attorneys general.

Indeed, the government would have the burden of demonstrating that programs

such as these could not adequately address the public health concerns raised by

PREPs, which would obviate the need to suppress truthful, non-misleading information. ‘‘If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech

must be a last—not first—resort.’’ Western States, 122 S.Ct. at 1507.10

22

III. CONCLUSION

Based on these precedents and the IOM Report’s recommendations, proposals to

grant FDA authority over tobacco products should ensure that adult consumers are

provided with truthful and non-misleading information about PREPs. ‘‘[P]erhaps the

first and most basic problem is that Americans lack the necessary information . . .[P]erhaps the first goal ought to be to ensure genuinely informed choices,

rather than to dictate outcomes from Washington.’’ Sunstein, supra, at 654.

An outright ban on such information concerning PREPs would be inappropriate

and unconstitutional. Instead, FDA should be empowered to assess and approve

PREPs based on the scientific merits of the claims and then ensure that consumers

are not misled about the risks associated with those products. Additional public

health programs should continue to encourage smoking cessation and prevention.

Mr. STEARNS. At this point I would invite other members to do

the same if they wish to enter documents into the record, and with

that, I welcome my ranking member for an opening statement.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see

you again.

Well, you have got to hand it to the tobacco lobby. If there were

such a thing as a chutzpa award, which roughly translates into

brazen gall, the effort today, in my humble opinion, would be worthy of a prize.

Under the guise of concern for public health, the tobacco industry

has us here to discuss its efforts to gain advanced government approval or a marketing campaign that would promote tobacco products and their bottom line.

‘‘Smokeless tobacco’’—I put that in quotes—is a dressed up name

for dip, chew or spit tobacco, U.S. Tobacco, UST, wants to market

its spit tobacco as a safer alternative to smoking cigarettes. Smokeless tobacco is a threat to our Nation’s public health and especially

to the health of our children. Any type of claim that spit tobacco

as a safer alternative to smoking requires a substantive body of

evidence and an independent regulatory body capable of examining

the claims.

Such evidence and regulation does not exist. UST cannot back up

their campaign slogans, and that is why they have asked the FTC,

not the FDA, the FTC being a nonscientific regulatory agency, to

review the claims they want to make.

Tobacco causes cancer and other diseases, whether you smoke it,

chew it, suck it, put it up your nose. It can and after sustained use

probably will kill you.

UST’s argument that smokeless tobacco use is a healthier alternative to smoking is analogous to suggesting that one is better off

jumping off the fifth floor of the building rather than the 20th because, of course, both are likely to cost you your life. They want to

convince smokers who may be trying to quit or have quit, nonsmokers, children and others that their product is okay to use.

If we allow them to make these false claims, then the Congress

will share the blame for more lives lost to tobacco related diseases.

The government has no business endorsing media campaigns for

products like spit tobacco that lead to disease and premature

death. First we should do no harm. If we send a message to the

American public that it is okay to chew tobacco, we will be doing

harm. If we, instead, want to truly discuss ways to reduce harm

and promote health, we should spend time and money on legitimate ways to end the use of tobacco in any form, period.

23

Today, along with Congressman Waxman, I will be releasing a

report entitled ‘‘The Lessons of ‘Light’ and Low Tar Cigarettes.’’

Without effective regulation, reduced risk tobacco products, socalled reduced risk tobacco products, threaten the public health.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this report into

the record.

Mr. STEARNS. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

[The report appears at the end of the hearing.]

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I think it is an important document to include

in the official record because it underscores parallels documented

by the Government Reforms Committee Democratic staff between

the efforts of the tobacco industry to mislead the public into believing that so-called light and low tar cigarette products are a healthy

alternative to regular cigarettes and the efforts currently underway

by UST to convince the Congress the FTC, and the public of the

virtues of its spit tobacco products.

This report includes previously undisclosed internal industry documents and demonstrates that the products that are marketed as

light and low tar are, in fact, not. We know that the tobacco industry duped the FTC’s tests by designing cigarettes that only appeared healthier when tested by machines, but did not provide

lower amounts of tar and nicotine to smokers.

We know that the industry has for some time been well aware

of the dangers these products pose. An internal company E-mail included in this report, a senior research scientists at British-American Tobacco stated, ‘‘Our main problem appears to be the notion

that the technology exists to make cigarettes which are appreciably

less lethal. The technology does not exist. It will not exist.’’

The report also demonstrates that tobacco industry officials continue to deceive the public with information from industry, the National Cancer Institute, and the Department of Justice. The report

provides clear examples of current ‘‘reduced risk’’ product marketing, including the marketing of spit tobacco specifically designed

to counter health fears, deceive consumers, deter quitting, and exploit the absence of effective regulation.

The FTC allowed for the marketing of light and low tar products

in the past, and the public was harmed. Now major lawsuits have

ensued. In my home State of Illinois, a court recently ruled against

Philip Morris and found that its creation of these brands was ‘‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous.’’

And UST is here today trying to present a case that their spit

tobacco products are not as harmful as smoking and, therefore, the

company should be allowed to make such statements on their packaging. UST’s representatives want us to believe that they are offering a product that will improve overall health in the United States.

Quite the opposite is true. We know from industry documents

that UST has purposely targeted tobacco consumers in an effort to

promote ‘‘dual consumption,’’ not cessation of smoking.

We should not even be entertaining UST’s claims absent a comprehensive review and serious regulation by the FDA. The FDA

should have authority over all tobacco products, including spit tobacco, and authority to oversee the content, manufacture, sale, and

marketing of the product. Absent this regulation, allowing marVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
24

keting strategies that include comparative health claims will lure

more kids into smokeless tobacco use and addiction, discourage current users from quitting, and may increase the overall amount of

tobacco products being used in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence in letting me go

over. I think this is a very, very serious issue, and I appreciate the

opportunity to discuss this important issue today with our witnesses.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentlelady, and I will now recognize

the Chairman of the full committee, who probably will not agree

with you when you mention Tabasco sauce. The chairman, distinguished chairman of the committee, Mr. Tauzin.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would not recommend you smoke Tabasco sauce though. It is

not necessarily a good idea.

Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing,

and I want to thank the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Surgeon General for coming to join us, and I hope it

will be a very instructive session, particularly as we move to the

second panel as well and get some insights as to this extraordinary

issue.

We have held hearings, as you know, in this committee on tobacco in the past, but this particular issue of tobacco harm reduction is not one I think that has been the subject of a great deal of

congressional debate, frankly, a good understanding yet. It was

back in 1964 that the Surgeon General released a report finding

that cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance

to the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.

And we now know that smoking kills over 400,000 people annually in the United States alone, and that is more deaths each year

than from AIDS, from alcohol, cocaine, heroin, homicide, suicide,

motor vehicle crashes, and fires combined. You cannot ignore those

kinds of statistics.

And during the past 4 decades we have made unprecedented

gains in preventing and controlling tobacco use. However, despite

the massive education campaigns and years of litigation, and substantial price hikes designed to curb smoking, it has picked up.

And when asked, most smokers say they want to quit. I think over

80 percent will say that in most surveys. Unfortunately very few

of them are able to break the habit.

There is no debate that the best option for any person using tobacco products is to stop, to stop using tobacco products, and particularly we need to continue to do all we can to discourage the use

of these products by children.

But we also know that nicotine is a remarkably addictive drug.

Some have likened the addictive qualities of nicotine to the intense

grip of cocaine or heroin. Unfortunately there are people who, try

as they may, are unable or unwilling to kick the smoking addiction.

Some in the medical community argue that we are giving these

hardened smokers only one uninviting option: quit or die. Increasingly there are calls for options other than the quit or die approach,

such as tobacco harm reduction. There are studies now that have

found that some tobacco products, such as smokeless tobacco, are

25

less hazardous than cigarettes, not unhazardous or safe, but less

hazardous.

These studies have resulted in a call for campaigns that would

encourage smokers to switch from cigarettes to smokeless tobacco,

which arguably could save many of the 400,000 people who will die

every year, and that is an intriguing concept, and if science bears

out these conclusions, we are faced with a myriad of questions that

I hope we begin to think about and perhaps begin to answer today

or at least set up a process whereby we might have the type of forums and discussions with officials and citizens of our country to

find the answers to these questions.

They include: should we communicate this reduced risk information to the consumer? Is a person who is faced with a quit or die

option one of my children? Is that person to entitled to know that

there is another option that can reduce the risk of death and perhaps even be a bridge to stopping smoking?

If so, how should we communicate this information. Obviously

the concern is if you communicate it improperly, you might encourage people to continue using tobacco, and that is not the goal obviously. So how do you do it properly?

Will promotion of certain tobacco products as reduced risk dilute

the anti-tobacco, anti-smoking message that we are sending children, in particular? And that is a deep concern.

Finally, does a consumer have a right to know about safer tobacco products, about reduced risk products? We know in other

countries, such as Sweden, they made that decision, that consumers were entitled to know, and there have been some remarkable results as a result of simply communicating that information

to people who were faced with the quit or die option.

So these are questions I hope we will answer today. The hearing

is especially timely because the Federal Trade Commission is currently faced with a petition from the United States Tobacco Company that requests an advisory opinion on whether, based on current science, it may advertise its smokeless product as a safer alternative to smoking. I hope the Federal Trade Commission examines the issue carefully.

I urge Chairman Muris to invest the commission’s time and energy in a tobacco harm reduction workshop to more thoroughly

evaluate these claims. I think it is time for that, just to have a very

open and informative workshop so that we can understand whether

we need to make some new policy decisions in this country.

Few medical questions have stirred more public interest or created more scientific debate than the tobacco health controversy.

The relationship between tobacco and health does not lead to easy

answers.

Nevertheless, there are 400,000 deaths in the United States attributed to smoking. It is increasingly apparent that we must continue to search for new and novel solutions.

I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing and look forward to hearing from our two distinguished witnesses today.

Mr. STEARNS. And I thank the Chairman.

The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.

26

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much and thank

you for holding this hearing.

To say that smokeless tobacco is a safer alternative to smoking

cigarettes is very misleading. Smokeless tobacco products have

known carcinogens and that are linked to oral cancer and they are

addictive. This method of harm reduction may simply be trading

one vice for another.

A few years ago I introduced the Cigars Are No Safe Alternative

Act that would impose restrictions on the sale of cigars because

cigar use is not a safe alternative to smoking cigarettes either. People need to be informed of all of the risks of tobacco products.

Just as with cigars and cigarettes, children especially must not

be influenced by misleading advertising that glorifies the use or

these tobacco products. Three thousand young people begin smoking in the United States every day. One thousand of these 3,000

will die from some lung related disease. Twenty percent of all

Americans who die each year, die from some lung related smoking

related disease. Obviously our goal should be to just stop it dead

in its tracks.

I believe that people should make informed decisions for themselves as to which is a better alternative and safer for them. However, people cannot make informed decisions about smokeless tobacco products because we do not even know all of the additives

that these products contain and what harm they may cause.

In fact, when the State of Massachusetts asked that these ingredients be disclosed, the tobacco industry sued them and won. So we

do not even know all of the ingredients in these products.

There are safe, FDA approved nicotine based products that are

safe, and when Massachusetts used them in an advertising campaign it helped to reduce smoking from 20 percent to 14 percent

in the male population. But I do not believe that any governmental

agency, the food and drug agency, the Department of Health and

Human Services, or the Federal Trade Commission, should promote the use of tobacco products, especially when we know they are

addictive, cancer causing, and gateways to further tobacco use.

The U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company continued to advertise in

youth magazines despite signing a master settlement agreement in

1998 which prohibited indirect or direct advertising that targets

youth. In Massachusetts, the Attorney General was sued by the tobacco industry after trying to implement regulations that would

prevent advertising of smokeless tobacco products near schools or

playgrounds.

It is immoral to enhance a company’s sales by targeting children

to use an addictive substance that is detrimental to their health

and is also illegal.

I think that we have a very important subject that we are debating here today, but there is no greater cause of illness in the

United States than tobacco. It is central to the responsibilities of

this committee that we do nothing that enhances the likelihood

that young people will embrace this as a life style habit.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Edward J. Markey follows:]

27

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Chairman thank you for holding a hearing on such an important issue. To

say that smokeless tobacco is a ‘‘safer’’ alternative to smoking cigarettes is misleading. Smokeless tobacco products have known carcinogens, are linked to oral cancer, and are addictive. This method of ‘‘harm reduction’’ may simply be trading one

vice for another.

A few years ago I introduced the CANSA Act (Cigar Are No Safe Alternative Act)

that would impose restrictions on the sale of cigars, because cigar use is not a safe

alternative to smoking cigarettes either. People need to be informed of all the health

risks for all tobacco products. Just as with cigars and cigarettes, children especially

must not be influenced by misleading advertising that glorifies the use of these tobacco products.

I believe that people should make informed decisions for themselves as to which

is a better alternative and safer for them. However, people can not make informed

decisions about smokeless tobacco products because we do not even know all the additives that these products contain and what harm they may cause. In fact when

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts asked that these ingredients be disclosed, the

tobacco industries sued them and won, so we still do not know of all the ingredients

in these products.

There are safe FDA approved nicotine based products on the market which are

made for the purpose of terminating a smoking habit. When Massachusetts promoted the use of these nicotine-based products to stop smoking the number of males

who smoked daily was reduced from 20% to 14%. The nicotine-based products are

also more likely to be used by women, who make up a very small portion of the

users of smokeless tobacco products. These nicotine-based products are a safe and

effective way to end smoking. Let’s work to enhance and promote this safe alternative instead of cancer-causing smokeless tobacco products.

Smoking and tobacco use is a tremendous public health problem. Studies have

shown that smokeless tobacco use is a gateway to smoking. We must end smoking,

not shift the use of tobacco products.

I do not believe that any governmental agency, the Food and Drug Agency, The

Department of Health and Human Services, or the Federal Trade Commission

should promote the use of a tobacco products, especially when we know they are addictive, cancer causing, and gateways to further tobacco use.

The U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company (USSTC) continued to advertise in youth

magazine despite signing a Master’s Settlement Agreement in 1998 which prohibited indirect or direct advertising that targets youth. In Massachusetts the Attorney

General was sued by the tobacco industries after trying to implement regulations

that would prevent advertising of smokeless tobacco products near schools or playgrounds. It is immoral to enhance a companies’ sales by targeting children to use

an addictive product that is detrimental to their health and it is illegal.

Promoting alternatives to smoking is a truly important endeavor and worthy

cause but only when these products are safe, and will not enhance the use of tobacco

products.

I am glad that we are having this hearing today and happy to hear the testimony

from our witnesses. I hope that we continue to work together to stop smoking by

the most effective but safest means.

Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentleman.

And the gentleman, Mr. Whitfield.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I guess we still have the policy

of 8 minutes if you forego your——

Mr. STEARNS. We do if you want to forego your opening statement.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I forego my opening statement.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. The gentleman forgoes his opening statement.

Ms. McCarthy.

MS. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to be very brief and put my remarks in the record.

I do want to thank you for this hearing, and I am glad to see

the panel that we have before us.

28

I am personally shocked by the tobacco industry and their gross

misunderstanding of what an addiction is, and I certainly hope

today that we can shed some light on that gross misunderstanding.

I really believe their commitment should be to just fund program

that dissuade our children from this addiction that their product

causes and that they should be leading the effort to find and

produce funds to help with programs that will actually get individuals to quit.

You cannot address an addiction successfully by saying, ‘‘Just

have a little bit.’’ It will not work.

And so I look forward to the panel’s testimony, and hopefully

that will help us help the industry understand that their gross misunderstanding of what an addiction is is not acceptable to this Congress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass.

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate

this interesting and quite controversial hearing.

First of all, I do not smoke cigarettes and I do not chew tobacco.

In fact, as a State senator, I introduced a bill to tax smokeless tobacco.

However, from my perspective there are policymakers in government and in Congress who, if they had their choice, would chisel

off the tobacco leaves on the podium in the Congress because somehow it would pollute and kill Members of Congress who happened

to walk nearby. And the issue that we are going to have a hearing

on today is not whether tobacco is safe for somebody to pick up and

take up, but whether or not somebody who is smoking cigarettes,

who may die of lung cancer, who other remedial means such as

stopping smoking completely or using some of these other products

which are advertised all over the place, whether those individuals

ought to be able or ought to at least know that if you have a cigarette or a pack or two of cigarettes a day or you have a can of

smokeless tobacco, which is going to be better for you?

Now, they both may not be good for you, but I do not think you

can escape the conclusion that if you have a choice between these

two products that smokeless tobacco is probably going to be a better alternative that will prolong your life.

And as I understand it, the Federal Trade Commission has a procedure underway to address this issue as to whether or not this industry can advertise in this manner, not bringing children in, not

talking about lung cancer. Nobody ever suggested that chewing tobacco caused lung cancer or anything like that, but whether or not

individuals who are addicted to cigarettes and have no other option

might be able to see advertising that indicates that chewing tobacco might be a better alternative.

I think it is a fair issue, and I am looking forward to hearing testimony from both our Surgeon General and the FTC, as well as the

succeeding panels.

And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.

29

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to thank

you and our ranking member for holding this hearing on tobacco

harm reduction and the Federal Trade Commission’s role in determining the appropriate advertising of smokeless tobacco.

There is no question that smoking and tobacco use is hazardous

to our health. That is hopefully one issue that all of us in the room

can agree on. I represent an area where smokeless tobacco is used

by a lot of our young men as a right of passage. Now, this may not

be the case in New York or San Francisco, but when we discuss

how to help Americans quit smoking and what warnings our tobacco products should display, the debate is bound to heat up.

One thing is certain in my mind. Our efforts to discourage Americans from smoking cigarettes should not include advocating the

use of smokeless tobacco products. Tobacco kills, whether it is inhaled or whether it is chewed, and that is a message that I think

most folks would want our FTC and our government to send.

Since the mid-1980’s we have known that smokeless tobacco

causes oral cancer, and to decrease one’s risk of lung cancer by increasing his or her risk of oral cancer is not in the interest of public

health.

In resolving this marketing issue, the FTC is charged with ensuring that we do not send mixed messages to the consumer. Currently three rotating warning labels appear on smokeless tobacco

packages, and they read:

One, the warning ‘‘this product may cause mouth cancer.’’

Another warning, ‘‘this product may cause gum disease and tooth

loss.’’

A warning, ‘‘this product is not a safe alternative to cigarettes.’’

These warnings all send the same message. Smokeless tobacco is

hazardous to your health. For the FTC to consider a label effectively promoting smokeless tobacco as a lower risk alternative to

cigarette smoking, however, sends a very different message. It says

that if you are going to use tobacco products but you also worry

about your health, smokeless tobacco is the way to go.

Not only is this message mixed. It also is based on questionable

science. A policy shift of this magnitude should not be based on the

study of the Swedish smokeless tobacco which contains fewer cancer causing agents, is regulated by the government and cannot be

advertised. There simply are no parallels to be drawn.

While the FTC has limited jurisdiction over tobacco, its mission

is clear. It ensures that companies do not market their products in

misleading or deceptive ways. To advertise smokeless tobacco as

healthier for you than cigarettes is, in my mind, both misleading

and deceptive because it holds the consumer’s hand as it leaps to

the rationalization that smokeless tobacco use is somehow okay. I

do not believe that we should be in the business of promoting that

mindset.

Mr. Chairman, a former Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, a few

years ago had reconstructive surgery at M.D. Anderson in Texas

because of jaw cancer. I happened to see Speaker Wright after that

and talked to him while he was in the hospital.

I do not know the reason, like a lot of times things develop, but

having been to M.D. Anderson and some of our great cancer faciliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
30

ties, I also know that cancer is not something we want to see,

whether it is in a former Speaker of the House or in our children.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

The gentleman from Arizona, the Vice Chairman of the committee, Mr. Shadegg.

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And other than to express my appreciation for your holding this

hearing to enlighten us all on this subject and to welcome Dr.

Carmona, who is a resident of my State of Arizona and who came

to his current position from the faculty of the University of Arizona, my alma mater, I will waive my opening statement and take

my 8 minutes of questioning.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman waives his opening statement.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will reserve my time for questions.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman reserves the balance of his time.

Mr. Terry, welcome. An opening statement?

Mr. TERRY. No opening statement.

Mr. STEARNS. No opening statement.

Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER. I reserve.

Mr. STEARNS. Reserve the balance.

The gentlelady, Mrs. Cubin.

Mrs. CUBIN. I will submit my statement for the record.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Barbara Cubin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA CUBIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today and sparking continued

Congressional debate over what is right in educating consumers, reducing public

health risks and proper regulation in communicating the truth about tobacco.

I would also like to thank the distinguished panelists for joining us. Your diverse

insight and expertise will certainly guide the continued examination of the tobacco

harm reduction debate.

The issue of tobacco related death and disease is one that deserves a fair, honest

and scientifically-based debate. It is probable that each one of us here has a story

to tell of a friend or loved one negatively affected by the dangers of smoking.

Progress undoubtedly has been made in the research on the impacts of tobacco

use. We have come a long way in educating consumers—both young and old—about

the risks involved and ways to quit.

There are also a growing number of options available to those addicted to nicotine

with a desire to end their smoking habit by way of gradual or immediate means.

These breakthroughs have opened new doors in overcoming addiction and new

ground lies ahead that is worth continued exploration.

Regardless of what product there is to sell or potential profit that exists, we must

hold in the highest regard the human lives at stake here. Knowledge is power and

should not be withheld in the constraints of perhaps an outdated paradigm in the

battle to reduce smoking related fatalities and disease.

According to the Centers for Disease Control, hundreds of Wyomingites die from

diseases caused by smoking every year. If there is information available that would

save the lives of hundreds of my constituents who smoke, then we have a responsibility to disseminate this life saving knowledge. To refrain from doing so would be

deceitful.

Today I hope the debate will be balanced, passionate and committed to the scientific data available to us. The people of my home state deserve to know all of the

facts about tobacco use, further empowering their decisions as consumers and potentially saving their lives. I look forward to determining how best this should be done.

31

I thank the Chairman again and yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Ferguson, an opening statement?

Mr. FERGUSON. I will make an opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay.

Mr. FERGUSON. Thank you very much.

I would like to begin by thanking you for holding this hearing on

a subject that is really terribly important to the public health of

our Nation. It is an undisputed fact that smoking is a killer, and

according to the American Lung Association, smoking related diseases claim an estimated 430,700 American lives each year, and it

is directly responsible for 87 percent of lung cancer cases and

causes most cases of emphysema and chronic bronchitis.

I have had several family members, including grandparents, who

have died of lung disease, emphysema, lung cancer, and other ailments related to their smoking. This list of ailments that smoking

causes or hastens is well founded and it is alarming, and it has

proven that smoking contributes to cancer of the lungs, the oral

cavity, the esophagus, the larynx, and is a contributing cause of

cancer in the pancreas, bladder, kidney, and cervix.

Finally, smoking costs the United States approximately $97 billion each year in health care costs and lost productivity. We need

to do all that we can to help current smokers to quit and to insure

that our children do not fall victim to this deadly habit.

Increased education and various other public health initiatives

have brought a gradual decline in smoking rates over the past 20

years. Studies have shown that 70 percent of smokers say that they

are interested in quitting. Thirty-four percent of smokers actually

attempt to quit.

However, only less than 10 percent of those people and only 2.5

percent of total smokers actually end up quitting. I think it is safe

to say that if someone close to us has given up smoking or has

tried, we all know how tough it actually is to break the habit.

There are many products on the market that are specifically designed to help smokers break the habit. It is vital that the people

of our country are fully informed of the risks involved not only by

smoking, but of the various treatments and alternatives that help

to wean someone off the habit.

Many of the alternatives have undergone rigorous testing by the

FDA, but we must be mindful of those alternatives that may actually lead to smoking or that actually may be harmful in their own

right.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank the members

of this committee, and I want to thank our panelists who are here

today.

I yield back.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back. I thank the gentleman.

As is customary, we allow our colleagues who are not a member

of the subcommittee, who are a member of the full committee for

an opening statement, and that is Mr. Waxman from California. I

welcome him.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing

me to participate in this hearing.

32

Let me state at the outset I am not opposed in principle to harm

reduction strategies that are targeted toward addicted smokers, but

as we explore these possibilities, we need to remember that unsubstantiated health claims for tobacco products can have disastrous

consequences, keeping smokers from quitting and encouraging

teenagers to start.

These are not abstract concerns. We have had a failed experiment with light and low tar cigarettes, and the advent of new reduced risk products poses similar risks. The report we are releasing today with Representative Schakowsky finds disturbing parallels between the public health disaster of light and low tar cigarettes and what companies like U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, UST, are

trying to do now.

Today the subcommittee is considering their request to market

its dangerous and addictive product as safer than cigarettes. In November 1994, I chaired the last congressional hearing to focus on

smokeless tobacco. We heard indisputable evidence that UST manipulated nicotine levels in its products to hook young users and

then graduate them to stronger products. And we heard UST deny

that smokeless tobacco is addictive.

Nearly 9 years later UST still argues that smokeless tobacco is

not a proven cause of disease and denies smokeless tobacco is addictive. UST claims its goal is to help smokers quit, but one of the

company’s strategic objectives is to promote dual consumption of

cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, the very opposite of cessation.

In a recent response, UST wrote to a ‘‘Dear Colleague’’ I sent out,

they denied some of the points that I made. They said it was baseless to suggest the company added cherry flavoring to some of its

products to appeal to children, but according to a 1980 memo,

UST’s Senior Vice President said that younger and lighter users

prefer flavor and older users prefer tobacco taste.

They wrote that they never employed a strategy to graduate

young users to a more addictive product. This same document,

however, shows that the company’s objective was to provide new

users with an easy graduation process.

UST said it was misleading or inaccurate to suggest the company

ever marketed to children, but a memo from a regional sales manager to the national sales manager indicates that UST had marketed smokeless tobacco to children as young as 13 or 14 years of

age.

Mr. Chairman, because these documents speak to the clear need

for an effective and comprehensive regulation prior to any health

claims for smokeless tobacco, I would like to ask unanimous consent to include in the record a letter I have written to Chairman

Tauzin that describes and attaches these documents.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered.

[The material appears at the end of the hearing.]

Mr. WAXMAN. And I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. STEARNS. And I thank the gentleman.

No one else seeks recognition.

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

33

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ED TOWNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, and fellow Members, today’s hearing raises an important issue

do—‘‘harm reduction’’ products have a role in addressing the health issues associated with smoking.

This issue of public health policy is of great importance. More than 50 million

adult Americans smoke. The question we seek to address in this hearing is how may

we, as policymakers, improve the health of those 50 million individuals. It should

go without saying that public health policy of this nature cannot be made in a vacuum; we must take into account the ability, and indeed the rights, of individuals to

make their own choices regarding their health.

The Constitution recognizes that individuals should be allowed to hear and evaluate product information for themselves. In no other area of life is this right more

important than in the area of personal behavior and health. These choices may affect not only the health and well being of the individual, but also the health and

well being of family members. As such, those decisions should be well informed,

based on accurate, uncensored, truthful and nonmisleading information.

That is what is at the heart of this hearing today-the right of individuals to know

the facts about products that impact their behavior and health. Today’s witnesses

have suggested in their written testimony that the facts are in dispute about the

ability of tobacco ‘‘harm reduction’’ products to improve the health of those smokers

who have not been able to quit smoking. Even if the research is unsettled on this

issue, it does not mean that discussions should not begin on this matter. Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that today’s hearing will be the beginning of a dialogue on the

question of ‘‘harm reduction’’ products and their relationship to health improvements for smokers.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

A man is driving home on a busy boulevard, going 50 miles an hour through a

residential neighborhood, swerving from lane to lane and blowing through stop

signs. He likes to speed and has no intention of slowing down, but when a warning

light on his dashboard flashes on, he decides to buckle his seat belt. So, is his behavior ‘‘less harmful’’ than before he buckled up? Less harmful to himself? Less

harmful to the other motorists and pedestrians on the road?

Can you imagine a public service announcement saying ‘‘Reckless driving is dangerous, but if you do choose to drive recklessly, remember to wear your seat belt?’’

Fundamentally, the same grim choice was implicit in the Federal Trade Commission’s consideration of a petition by U.S. Smokeless Tobacco (UST) for an advisory

opinion concerning the marketing of smokeless tobacco products as ‘‘less harmful’’

than cigarettes.

The simple fact is that both cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are dangerous and often deadly. To focus exclusively on whether one is more or less harmful than the other is to obscure the truth that both are potentially lethal.

Because such a claim would obscure the truth, it would appear to be a textbook

case of deceptive marketing. I was pleased to learn UST has withdrawn its petition.

I hope, should UST or another manufacturer decide to revive it, FTC will reject

it as fundamentally inconsistent with the legal prohibition on deceptive marketing.

But the UST petition raised more than technical questions about commercial practices. It also reinvigorated debate over America’s Quixotic and counterintuitive approach to the regulation of nicotine delivery systems.

In the United States, the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must approve products designed and marketed to help Americans kick the habit of nicotine

addiction. FDA must—and should—verify that such products are safe and effective,

because their use is recognized to have important public health consequences. But

products designed and marketed to feed that same nicotine addiction are not regulated by FDA, ignoring the simple fact that their use has equal or greater consequences for public health.

20,000 Ohioans die every year from tobacco-related illnesses, according to the

Ohio Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Foundation. 17% of Ohio’s Medicaid dollars are spent on treatment for tobacco-related disease, effectively imposing an annual tax of over $500 on every Ohio household. With these grave costs in mind,

surely we should be working to end tobacco addiction, not perpetuate it.And approving misleading health-related marketing claims for smokeless tobacco would do just

that: perpetuate America’s addiction to tobacco.

34

Our experience with the marketing of filtered and ‘‘low-tar’’ cigarettes amply illustrates the perils of marketing some tobacco products as ‘‘safer’’ alternatives to others.

Clever marketing got consumers to try these products, but because they changed

the way people smoked, they may well have been as harmful or more harmful than

traditional cigarettes. Health claims for smokeless products may be even more dangerous, in that it is likely some consumers—including kids—will see smokeless products as supplements to, not substitutes for, smoking.

Claims that smokeless tobacco products are less harmful than cigarettes raise

very expansive questions with profound public health consequences. These questions

are much too sweeping a decision to answer based only on the narrow scope of the

FTC Act’s unfair and deceptive marketing standard. In addition, a meaningful evaluation of any health claim requires technical and medical expertise well beyond the

FTC, which is chiefly a consumer protection agency.Fortunately, we have a federal

agency that has just that technical expertise: the FDA. The Institute of Medicine

has maintained for years that all tobacco products should be regulated by the federal government, to facilitate responsible research and meaningful evaluation of

health-related claims. If sound science and the protection of public health are our

objectives, we should take the IOM’s advice and give the job to an agency equipped

to meet the challenge.

Today’s hearing raises important issues with broad implications for public health

and responsible business practices. I welcome a lively discussion of these issues, and

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. Then we will welcome our two distinguished panelists, the Honorable Timothy Muris, Chairman of the Federal Trade

Commission; Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, U.S. Surgeon General and Acting Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services.

Welcome, and, Chairman Muris, we will start with you.

STATEMENTS OF HON. TIMOTHY MURIS, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL

TRADE COMMISSION; AND VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD H.

CARMONA, U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Mr. MURIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I would just ask that the commission’s full statement be

placed in the record.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered.

Mr. MURIS. I am Tim Muris, the Chairman of the Federal Trade

Commission. I am certainly pleased to appear here today to discuss

the FTC’s role in the potential advertising of reduced risk tobacco

products.

The FTC’s mission is to prevent unfair competition and unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the marketplace. The Commission

does this by insuring that advertising and marketing claims are

truthful and not misleading.

Our jurisdiction over advertising and marketing claims includes

jurisdiction over claims for cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and other

tobacco products. Indeed, the FTC’s law enforcement activities involving tobacco advertising and promotion date back to the 1930’s.

Congress has given the Commission administrative responsibilities for the health warnings required on cigarette packaging and

advertising under the Cigarette Act. We also have both administrative and enforcement responsibilities for the health warning required on smokeless tobacco packaging and advertising under the

Smokeless Tobacco Act.

35

The Commission does not pre-screen advertising or marketing

claims for tobacco or any other product. Instead, the agency addresses deception through post market law enforcement. Health

claims in advertising are particularly important to us, and I welcome your interest in the role we play in the marketing of potential

reduced risk tobacco products.

This is a very important question. Despite the efforts of the government and the public health community, millions of Americans

smoke today and are addicted to nicotine. Many of these smokers

will ultimately die of smoking related illnesses if they do not

change their behavior.

In an ideal world, we would wish that all of these people would

choose to quit smoking and would be able to do so once they tried.

The real world is quite different, however. If truthful and substantiated, marketing claims that a product will significantly reduce

the health risk associated with smoking while satisfying the addicted smoker’s craving for nicotine could provide a substantial

health benefit to those consumers who cannot or will not quite.

Conversely, if those claims were untruthful, unsubstantiated, or

misrepresent the extent of the benefit, they would harm consumers.

For these reasons, we would review advertising for potential reduced risk tobacco products on a case-by-case basis to try to insure

that the information consumers receive about those products is accurate and substantiated. This review would be conducted using

the same legal framework that we use for all consumer products

under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

First, we ask what messages consumers take away from the advertising in question.

The next issue is whether the claims are truthful, including

whether they are substantiated.

The Commission typically requires that health claims be supported by reliable scientific evidence. In determining whether harm

reduction claims are substantiated, the Commission would turn to

experts, both inside and outside the government’s science-based

agencies, for assistance in evaluating scientific evidence.

Let me close by mentioning that in my view, the discussion of potential harm reduction tobacco products should also encompass the

question of whether so-called nicotine replacement products, which

currently are marketed only for smoking cessation purposes, have

a larger role to play in the harm reduction arena.

These products, which contain only nicotine and no tobacco,

should certainly be further evaluated for use by consumers addicted to nicotine.

In conclusion, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Commission’s role in this important and evolving public health issue.

I would be happy to answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Timothy Muris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIMOTHY J. MURIS, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Timothy J. Muris, Chairman

of the Federal Trade Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FTC’’. The Commission is

pleased to have this opportunity to provide information concerning the potential adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
36

1The written statement presents the views of the Federal Trade Commission. Oral testimony

and responses to questions reflect my views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any Commissioner. 2See, e.g., Julep Tobacco Co., 27 F.T.C. 1637 (1938) (stipulation prohibiting claims that Julep

cigarettes help counteract throat irritations due to heavy smoking and never make the throat

dry or parched). 3See Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354 (1964). 4Pub. L. No. 8992, 79 Stat. 282 (1965), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98474, 98 Stat. 2204

(1984), and by Pub. L. No. 9992, § 11, 99 Stat. 393, 40204 (1985), current version at 15 U.S.C.

§ 1331 (1994).

5See Lorillard et al., 80 F.T.C. 455, 46065 (1972) (consent orders). Under the orders entered

into with six tobacco manufacturers, the companies were required to disclose the Surgeon General’s warning in identified forms of advertising. The consent orders were modified in 1981,

when the Commission sought civil penalties in federal district court against each of the cigarette

companies for failure to comply with the 1972 orders. See United States v. Lorillard, No. 76Civ.

814 (JMC) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1981).

In 1982, the Bureau of Consumer Protection notified the House Committee on Energy and

Commerce that the staff supported a new system of rotational health warnings. Letter from

Timothy J. Muris, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, to The

Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 1, 1982). In May 1984, the Commission sent letters to Congress endorsing

the concept of federal legislation to require a system of rotational health warnings that would

appear in cigarette advertisements and on cigarette packages. Shortly thereafter, Congress

amended the Cigarette Act to require rotational warnings for both advertising and package labeling. 6 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408. 7 Although the Commission administers the Cigarette Act, the Department of Justice enforces

it.8 16 C.F.R. § 307. 9 In addition, the Commission issued a report on cigar advertising and promotion in 1999.

vertising of reduced risk tobacco products.1 This statement discusses the Commission’s mission, our activities in the tobacco area, and then addresses the process the

Commission would use in examining the advertising of these products.

FTC JURISDICTION OVER TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND MARKETING

The FTC’s mission is to prevent unfair competition and unfair or deceptive acts

or practices in the marketplace. The Commission regulates national advertising, including the advertising and promotion of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and other tobacco products, pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15

U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts and practices in or affecting

commerce.’’ The Commission’s activities promote informed consumer choice.

The FTC’s law enforcement activities involving tobacco advertising and promotion

date back to the 1930s.2 In 1962, the FTC’s request for technical guidance from the

U.S. Public Health Service was among the factors that led the then-Surgeon General of the United States to establish an advisory panel to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the data on smoking and health. The work of the advisory panel,

in turn, led to the historic 1964 Report of the Surgeon General finding that cigarette

smoking presented significant health risks. In that same year, the Commission

issued a regulation requiring tobacco companies to include health warnings in cigarette advertising and on packages.3 The FTC’s regulation was superseded in 1965,

before it went into effect, by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

(‘‘Cigarette Act’’),4 which required such warnings on cigarette packages.

In 1972, the Commission once again addressed the issue of health warnings in

cigarette advertising. Pursuant to its Section 5 authority, the FTC issued consent

orders mandating for the first time that the major cigarette manufacturers place

health warnings in cigarette advertisements.5

Today, the Commission administers the Cigarette Act, and administers and enforces the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act (‘‘Smokeless Tobacco Act’’).6 The Cigarette Act instructs the Commission to take certain steps to

implement the mandated Surgeon General’s health warnings.7 The Smokeless Tobacco Act directs the FTC to promulgate regulations governing the health warnings

on packaging and advertising for smokeless tobacco products. The Commission’s regulations specify the placement and rotation of the warnings, and require companies

to submit plans to the Commission setting forth their rotation schedules.8 Finally,

the FTC enforces the ban in the Smokeless Tobacco Act on broadcasting smokeless

tobacco advertisements on radio and television.

The Commission also publishes periodic reports on advertising and promotion activities in the cigarette and smokeless tobacco industries.9 Those reports provide information on sales and on expenditures for various categories of marketing expendiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
37

10F.T.C. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 580 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part,

remanded in part, 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 11 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 127 F.T.C. 49 (1999). The Commission’s complaint was issued

on May 28, 1997. On January 26, 1999, the Commission dismissed the complaint without prejudice because the relief sought had been achieved through, inter alia, the master settlement between the major tobacco companies and the attorneys general for 46 states. 12Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., Docket No. C-3952 (2000) (consent); Alternative Cigarettes,

Inc., Docket No. C-3956 (2000) (consent); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Docket No. C-3892 (1999)

(consent). 13 Alternative Cigarettes, Inc., Docket No. C-3956 (June 14, 2000) (consent). See also Alan V.

Phan, 116 F.T.C. 162 (1993) (consent order settling allegations that advertisements misrepresented the health risks of smoking certain nontobacco cigarettes). 14Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission to the Honorable Donna

E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (Nov. 19, 1998). 15Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress For 1998 Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette

Labeling and Advertising Act 6 (2000) (‘‘the Commission strongly recommends that Congress

give cigarette testing authority to one of the Federal government’s science-based, public health

agencies’’); Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress For 1997 Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 5-6 (1999).

tures. The Commission issued its first report on the cigarette industry in 1967 and

on the smokeless tobacco industry in 1987.

In addition to its administrative and law enforcement responsibilities under the

Cigarette Act and the Smokeless Tobacco Act, the Commission also has authority

under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prevent unfair or deceptive acts and practices

in connection with the marketing and sale of tobacco products. Pursuant to that authority, the Commission has taken a number of law enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive tobacco advertising and promotional practices. For example, in

1983, the Commission sued the Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corporation over ads

that continued to describe Barclay as a 1 mg. of tar brand, even though the Commission had revoked Barclay’s 1 mg. rating because the cigarette’s unusual design

prevented the cigarette test method from measuring Barclay’s yields on a basis comparable to other cigarettes.10 Moreover, in 1997, the Commission issued a complaint

against the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. alleging that the company’s Joe Camel advertising campaign caused or was likely to cause many young people to begin or continue to smoke, thereby exposing them to significant health risks.11 In 1999 and

2000, the Commission entered into consent agreements with several cigarette manufacturers, resolving charges that their advertisements implied that their ‘‘no additive’’ cigarettes were safer than otherwise comparable cigarettes because they did

not contain additives.12 In 2000, the Commission also entered into a consent agreement with a company claiming reduced health risks for its herbal cigarettes.13

Testing for the tar and nicotine yields of cigarettes is also conducted by the tobacco industry under a methodology adopted by the Commission in 1967. For the

past several years, the FTC has also actively sought the views of the Federal government’s public health agencies about what changes should be made in that methodology.14 The agency has also recommended to Congress that authority for cigarette testing be given to one of the government’s science-based public health agencies 15 and we renew that recommendation here.

‘‘REDUCED RISK’’ TOBACCO CLAIMS

As with other products, the Commission’s primary role for tobacco products is to

ensure that products are marketed in a manner that is truthful, not misleading, and

adequately substantiated. The Commission does not prescreen advertising claims for

tobacco or any other product. Instead, the agency addresses deception in the marketing of tobacco largely through postmarket law enforcement actions targeted

against specific false or misleading claims or unfair practices, just as it does for

other products.

Despite coordinated efforts of the government and the public health community,

tobacco use in the United States continues to cause substantial health risks. Products that could significantly reduce those risks could provide a substantial health

benefit. For example, products that satisfy a smoker’s craving for nicotine with substantially fewer risks to health than cigarettes would have the potential to benefit

consumers. At the same time, consumers may be injured if advertisers make harm

reduction claims that turn out to be untrue or that exaggerate the benefits or safety

of their products.

There are currently a variety of products being developed or already in test markets that are intended to reduce the risks associated with smoking. These products

include Eclipse (an R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company product that heats, rather than

burns, tobacco) and Accord (a Philip Morris USA system in which special cigarettes

38

16The messages consumers take away from a particular statement in an advertisement depend on the overall context in which that statement appears. Accordingly, the Commission ordinarily evaluates each advertisement in its entirety. It is difficult to determine what messages

consumers take away from a generic statement about a particular class of products without

placing that statement in the context of an actual advertisement. 17The history of low tar cigarettes provides an example. One recent survey of current evidence

concludes that although low tar cigarettes were initially marketed as safer alternatives than

regular cigarettes, recent evidence suggests that they may convey no such benefit. See National

Cancer Institute, Risks Associated with Smoking Cigarettes with Low Machine-Measured Yields

of Tar and Nicotine, Smoking and Tobacco Control Monograph No. 13, at 9 (2001) (‘‘When all

of the epidemiological evidence is considered in the context of what is currently known about

cigarette design and compensation, it does not support the conclusion that a reduction in disease

are smoked in an electronic lighter); cigarettes and other tobacco products with reduced levels of nitrosamines (one category of constituents in tobacco that have been

classified as known carcinogens), such as that developed by Star Scientific, Inc.; and

Omni, which Vector Tobacco, Inc. has marketed as ‘‘the first reduced carcinogen cigarette.’’

There are also products termed ‘‘nicotine replacement therapies’’ (‘‘NRT’’) that the

Food and Drug Administration currently allows to be marketed for smoking cessation purposes: nicotine gums, transdermal patches, lozenges, inhalers, and nasal

sprays. These nicotine delivery devices have been studied and approved only for

short-term use to help smokers quit smoking, rather than for long-term ‘‘harm reduction’’ use by people who are unable or unwilling to quit smoking.

Finally, in February 2002, the United States Smokeless Tobacco Company

(‘‘USST’’) petitioned the Commission for an advisory opinion regarding the acceptability of communicating in advertising a harm reduction claim for smokeless tobacco. USST withdrew the petition in August 2002, stating that it would provide

the Commission with information from two upcoming scientific conferences that

would be addressing issues relevant to the petition. On May 9, 2003, USST provided

this additional information to the Commission, and asked that the Commission

place this new information on the public record and hold a ‘‘public forum’’ to discuss

these issues.

In considering advertising or other marketing claims by potential reduced risk tobacco products, the Commission would consider whether harm reduction claims may

be deceptive using the same legal framework that it uses for all consumer products

under Section 5 of the FTC Act: whether the advertising conveys a message that

is likely to mislead reasonable consumers to their detriment, including claims for

which the advertiser did not have adequate substantiation. The Commission’s experience suggests that harm reduction claims are likely to raise difficult questions of

advertising interpretation, as well as complex scientific and public health issues.

In examining a harm reduction claim, the first question that the Commission

would address is what messages consumers take away from the advertising in question. Taking into account the full context of the advertising in which the claim appears, 16 the Commission would seek to identify the range of messages—both express and implied—that consumers would take from the advertisement. These

would include: (1) whether claims about a reduction in carcinogens and toxins in

the product conveys risk reduction messages; and (2) whether consumers might take

away from a harm reduction representation the message that a product containing

known carcinogens was not just safer than cigarettes, but that it poses no risk or

only a minimal risk.

Once the Commission has determined what messages consumers take away from

a particular ad, the next issue is whether those claims are truthful and substantiated. The FTC Act requires that objective claims about products and services be

substantiated before the ad is disseminated. When the advertisement does not claim

to have a specific level of substantiation supporting its claims, the Commission determines what constitutes a reasonable basis for those claims by analyzing the socalled ‘‘Pfizer factors’’: the type of claim; the benefits if the claim is true; the consequences if the claim is false; the ease and cost of developing substantiation for

the claim; the type of product; and the level of substantiation experts in the field

would agree is reasonable. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). In the context of safety

claims, the FTC has typically required a substantiation standard of ‘‘competent and

reliable scientific evidence.’’

Analyzing the evidence whether any particular tobacco product is safer than traditional cigarettes, or whether a reduction in exposure to known carcinogens is associated with reduced health risks, requires expertise in biology, chemistry, toxicology,

and epidemiology, among other fields. Moreover, the scientific issues raised by purported reduced risk products are often not only extremely complex, but may take

years to develop.17 The Commission brings a unique market-based expertise to its

39

risks has occurred in the population of smokers due to the design changes that have occurred

in cigarettes over the last 50 years.’’). 18Tobacco is not the only category of products for which the Commission turns to other federal

entities that possess specialized scientific expertise. For example, the FTC works closely with

the Food and Drug Administration in the dietary supplement field, and with the Environmental

Protection Agency in the areas of energy conservation, gasoline marketing, and claims for pesticides. 19 E.g., Institute of Medicine, Clearing the Smoke: Assessing the Science Base for Tobacco

Harm Reduction 6 (2001) (potential reduced-exposure products ‘‘are potentially beneficial, but

the net impact on population health could, in fact, be negative. The effect on public health will

depend upon the biological harm caused by these products and the individual and community

behaviors with respect to their use.’’). 20 E.g., Letter from Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids to The

Honorable Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 25, 2002) (comparative

health claims made for smokeless tobacco must not only be truthful, but should promote the

public health); Letter from Henry A. Waxman, U.S. House of Representatives and Senator Richard J. Durbin, United States Senate to The Honorable Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal

Trade Commission (June 4, 2002) (noting that the potential health benefits that might result

from smokers switching to smokeless tobacco were offset by the risks that some smokers who

would have quit might, instead, switch to smokeless tobacco; that smokeless tobacco might become more attractive to nonsmokers; and that some of those nonsmokers—once addicted to nicotine—might switch to cigarettes). See also, e.g., WHO Scientific Advisory Committee on Tobacco

Product Regulation, Recommendation on Smokeless Tobacco Products 3 (2003) (listing arguments against the use of smokeless tobacco for purposes of harm reduction). 21 E.g., Letter from Matthew L. Myers, supra note 17 (despite USST’s stated interest in making harm reduction claims to addicted adult smokers, FTC approval of petition would permit

it ‘‘to disseminate these claims in ads whose primary appeal could be to young non-tobacco

users’’); Letter from Dileep G. Bal, M.D., Chief, Cancer Control Branch, State of California

Health and Human Services Agency—Department of Health Services to The Honorable [Donald]

S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (March 8, 2002) (‘‘While USSTC [sic] claims that

this health advisory is mean to claim harm reduction for the benefit of addicted adults, it would

allow USSTC [sic] and other companies to market their products with this claim to young, nontobacco users as well). 22L. Kozlowski, Harm reduction, public health, and human rights: Smokers have a right to

be informed of significant harm reduction options, Nicotine & Tobacco Research S55-S60 (2002)

(noting that nicotine replacement therapies and snus [Swedish moist snuff] are much safer than

cigarettes; that there is a basic human right to information that affects one’s health; and that

when the health risks from a product are relatively small, ‘‘the level of increased use needed

to maintain a public health equilibrium (no changes in population-level problems) becomes very

high.’’) (citation omitted). See also Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians,

Protecting smokers, saving lives: The case for a tobacco and nicotine regulatory authority 2-5

(2002) (supporting comprehensive regulatory approach to tobacco in order to promote public

health and noting that emergence of reduced risk products presents multiple challenges for regulators; smokeless tobacco is ‘‘10-1,000 times less hazardous than smoking, depending on the

product’’ but its potential marketing as a harm reduction option raises various questions that

must be addressed, including minimizing its use as a starter product for young smokers).

scrutiny of consumer protection matters and our work often requires review and

analysis of scientific literature. Because the Commission is an agency of lawyers and

economists, however, and not a science-based agency, we rely on assistance from

other experts in evaluating scientific evidence.18 Just as the Commission has requested the assistance of the Department of Health and Human Services in connection with the test method that produces cigarette tar and nicotine ratings, the Commission would require similar assistance in evaluating the substantiation for advertising claims made for reduced-risk tobacco products.

Finally, although a determination that an individual risk reduction claim is truthful and substantiated would end the Commission’s deception inquiry, broader public

health issues may remain.19 For example, some commenters on the USST petition

focused on the overall impact on public health from the marketing of these products;

these comments argued that smokeless tobacco promoted as a reduced risk product

might degrade overall public health, depending on how consumers react.20 Similarly,

some commenters questioned whether such advertising and promotion might promote more widespread use of smokeless tobacco, rather than just as a replacement

for smoking.21 Others, however, believe that notwithstanding this empirical question, the potential harm to public health is not clear enough to justify depriving individuals of information they might use to reduce risks to their own health.22 This

debate on the public health effects of these alternative tobacco products is an important one the appropriate science-based agencies of the government need to address.

Health claims in advertising, including tobacco advertising, are of particular importance to the Commission. The Commission welcomes the Committee’s interest in

the role that this agency will play in ensuring that the marketplace works efficiently

to provide consumers with information that may enable them to reduce their risks

of smoking-related disease, while protecting them from claims that are not supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
40

ported by sound scientific evidence. The agency is committed to reviewing advertising for potential reduced risk tobacco products on a case-by-case basis to try to

ensure that the information consumers receive about reduced risk products is truthful and non-misleading.

CONCLUSION

The Commission thanks this Committee for focusing attention on this important

and evolving public health issue, and for giving us an opportunity to present our

views.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the Chairman, and we welcome the U.S.

Surgeon General.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD H. CARMONA

Mr. CARMONA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing.

My name is Richard Carmona, and I am the Surgeon General of

the United States.

Let me start with a few statements that were once accepted

throughout society that have now been relegated to the status of

myth.

Men do not suffer from depression.

Domestic violence is a family or private matter.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic is of no concern to most Americans.

All of us here know that these three statements are very dangerous public health myths. My remarks today will focus on a

fourth public health myth which could have severe consequences in

our Nation, especially amongst our youth. Smokeless tobacco is a

good alternative to smoking. It is a myth. It is not true.

As the Nation’s Surgeon General, my top responsibility is to insure that Americans are getting the best science based information

to make decisions about their health. So I very much appreciate

the opportunity to come before this subcommittee today and help

refute this dangerous idea.

First, let me emphasize this. No matter what you may hear

today or read in the press reports later, I cannot conclude that the

use of any tobacco product is a safer alternative to smoking. This

message is especially important to communicate to young people

who may perceive smokeless tobacco as a safe form for tobacco use.

Smokeless tobacco is not a safe alternative to cigarettes. Smokeless tobacco does cause cancer. Our Nation’s experience with low

tar cigarettes yields valuable lessons for the debate over smokeless

tobacco.

Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in the

United States. Each year 440,000 people die of diseases caused by

smoking or other forms of tobacco use. That is about 20 percent of

all deaths in the United States.

The office I lead as Surgeon General has long played a key role

in exposing the risks of tobacco use. In 1986, the Surgeon General’s

report, the Health Consequences of Using Smokeless Tobacco,

reached four major conclusions about the oral use of smokeless tobacco.

First, smokeless tobacco represents a significant health risk.

Next, smokeless tobacco can cause cancer in a number of noncancerous oral conditions.

41

Third, smokeless tobacco can lead to nicotine addiction and dependence.

And, fourth, smokeless tobacco is not a safe substitute for cigarette smoking.

Recognizing these serious health consequences, Congress passed

a Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act in 1986.

This law required the placement of Surgeon General’s warnings on

all smokeless tobacco products.

Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, I respectfully

submit that smokeless tobacco remains a known threat to public

health just as it was when Congress acted in 1986. Time has only

brought more disease, death, and destroyed lives.

A national toxicology program of the National Institutes of

Health continues to classify smokeless tobacco as a known human

carcinogen, proven to cause cancer in people. As Surgeon General,

I cannot recommend use of a product that causes disease and death

as a lesser evil to smoking. My commitment and that of my office

to safeguard the health of the American people demands that I provide information on safe alternatives to smoking where they exist.

I cannot recommend the use of smokeless tobacco products because there is no scientific evidence that smokeless tobacco products are both safe and effective aids to quitting smoking.

Smokers who have taken the courageous step of trying to quit

should not trade one carcinogenic product for another, but instead

could use Food and Drug Administration approved methods, such

as nicotine gum, nicotine patches, or counseling.

While it may be technically feasible to create a reduced harm tobacco product, the Institute of Medicine recently concluded that no

such product exists today.

When and if such a product ever is constructed, we would then

have to take a look at the hard scientific data of that particular

product. Our Nation’s experience with low tar, low nicotine cigarettes is instructive to the issue at hand. Low tar, low nicotine

cigarettes were introduced in the late 1960’s and widely endorsed

as a potentially safer substitute for the typical cigarette on the

market at that time.

Within a decade the low tar brands dominated the cigarette market. Many smokers switched to them for their perceived health

benefits.

Unfortunately, the true health effects of these products did not

become apparent for another ten to 20 years. We now know that

low tar cigarettes not only did not provide a public health benefit,

but they also may have contributed to a natural increase in death

and disease among smokers.

This has taught us that we must move cautiously in recommending any supposedly safer alternative for people trying to quit

smoking because now with more knowledge and the benefit of hindsight, the science does not support early recommendations on low

tar cigarettes.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I will shortly ask that the

remainder of my statement and the scientific information contained

in it be considered as read and made part of the record.

Mr. STEARNS. Without objection, so ordered.

42

Mr. CARMONA. But before I do that, I would like to ask for this

subcommittee and the Congress to help in getting the message out

about the dangers and myths of smokeless tobacco.

All of us in this rom are very concerned about our Nation’s

youth. Kids growing up today have a tough time of it. In addition

to the normal struggles of puberty, many kids are facing a host of

other challenges. Many, especially minority kids, must struggle to

find their way in unsafe neighborhoods.

So the temptation to engage in behavior that is not healthy and

the opportunity to do so is very hard for our young people to resist.

According to a 2000 survey by the Substance Abuse and Mental

Health Services Administration, SAMHSA, and this is the national

household survey on drug abuse, about 1 million kids from ages 12

to 17 smoke every day. Another 2 million kids smoke occasionally.

And we know that smoking is often not a stand-alone risk behavior. It travels with others. The SAMHSA found that youth who

were daily cigarette smokers or heavy drinkers were more likely to

use illicit drugs than either daily smokers or heavy drinkers from

other age groups. More than half of 12 to 17 year olds who were

daily smokers had also used illicit drugs within the past month.

Every day more than 2,000 kids in the U.S. will start to smoke,

and more than 1,000 adults will die because of smoking. We have

to get youth to stop starting, but the answer is not smokeless tobacco. We have evidence to suggest that instead of smokeless tobacco being a less dangerous alternative to smoking, just as smoking is a gateway to other drugs, smokeless tobacco is a gateway to

smoking.

So we must redouble our efforts to get our youth to avoid tobacco

in all forms.

We have some real work to do on the culture of smokeless tobacco, which is glamorized by some sports stars. Chicago Cub

Sammy Sosa, who has made a public commitment to avoiding

smokeless tobacco, is a great example for kids. Past baseball great

Joe Garagiola is now Chairman of the National Spit Tobacco Education Program and regularly lectures young players against the

dangers of smokeless tobacco.

As Members of Congress, you can lead by example, too, not just

in legislation, but in your own lives. I encourage you to avoid tobacco in all of its forms. Do not fall for the myth, a very dangerous

public health myth that smokeless tobacco is preferable to smoking.

Do not let America’s youth fall to this myth either.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my written testimony be made part of

the record and I thank you and I would be happy to answer any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Richard Carmona follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. CARMONA, SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. PUBLIC

HEALTH SERVICE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing. My name is Richard Carmona

and I am the Surgeon General of the United States of America.

Let me start with a few statements that were once accepted throughout society

that have now been relegated to the status of myth.

• Men do not suffer from depression.

• Domestic violence is a ‘‘family’’ or ‘‘private’’ matter.

43

• The HIV-AIDS epidemic is of no concern to most Americans.

All of us here know that these three statements are very dangerous public health

myths.

My remarks today will focus on a fourth public health myth which could have severe consequences in our nation, especially among our youth: smokeless tobacco is

a good alternative to smoking. It is a myth. It is not true.

As the nation’’s Surgeon General, my top responsibility is to ensure that Americans are getting the best science-based information to make decisions about their

health. So I very much appreciate the opportunity to come before this Subcommittee

today and help refute this dangerous idea.

First, let me emphasize this:

• No matter what you may hear today or read in press reports later, I cannot conclude that the use of any tobacco product is a safer alternative to smoking. This

message is especially important to communicate to young people, who may perceive smokeless tobacco as a safe form of tobacco use.

• There is no significant scientific evidence that suggests smokeless tobacco is a

safer alternative to cigarettes.

• Smokeless tobacco does cause cancer.

• Our nation’s experience with low-tar cigarettes yields valuable lessons for the debate over smokeless tobacco.

• Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in the United States.

Each year, 440,000 people die of diseases caused by smoking or other form of tobacco useCthat is about 20 percent of all deaths in our nation.

The office I lead as Surgeon General has long played a key role in exposing the

risks of tobacco use. In 1986, the Surgeon General’s Report The Health Consequences of Using Smokeless Tobacco reached four major conclusions about the oral

use of smokeless tobacco:

1. Smokeless tobacco represents a significant health risk;

2. Smokeless tobacco can cause cancer and a number of non-cancerous oral conditions;

3. Smokeless tobacco can lead to nicotine addiction and dependence; and

4. Smokeless tobacco is not a safer substitute for cigarette smoking.

Recognizing these serious health consequences, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act in 1986. This law required the placement of Surgeon General’s warnings on all smokeless tobacco products.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I respectfully submit that

smokeless tobacco remains a known threat to public health just as it was when Congress acted in 1986.

Conversely, time has only brought more disease, death and destroyed lives.

The National Toxicology Program of the National Institutes of Health continues

to classify smokeless tobacco as a known human carcinogenCproven to cause cancer

in people.

As Surgeon General I cannot recommend use of a product that causes disease and

death as a ‘‘lesser evil’’ to smoking. My commitment, and that of my office, to safeguard the health of the American people demands that I provide information on safe

alternatives to smoking where they exist.

I cannot recommend the use of smokeless tobacco products because there is no scientific evidence that smokeless tobacco products are both safe and effective aids to

quitting smoking.

Smokers who have taken the courageous step of trying to quit should not trade

one carcinogenic product for another, but instead could use Food and Drug Administration -approved methods such as nicotine gum, nicotine patches, or counseling.

While it may be technically feasible to someday create a reduced-harm tobacco

product, the Institute of Medicine recently concluded that no such product exists

today. When and if such a product is ever constructed, we would then have to take

a look at the hard scientific data of that particular product.

Our nation’s experience with low-tar, low-nicotine cigarettes is instructive to the

issue at hand. Low-tar, low-nicotine cigarettes were introduced in the late 1960’s

and widely endorsed as a potentially safer substitute for the typical cigarette on the

market at that time. Within a decade, the low-tar brands dominated the cigarette

market. Many smokers switched to them for their perceived health benefits.

Unfortunately, the true health effects of these products did not become apparent

for another 10 to 20 years. We now know that low-tar cigarettes not only did not

provide a public health benefit, but they also may have contributed to an actual increase in death and disease among smokers.

First, many smokers switched to these products instead of quitting, which continued their exposure to the hundreds of carcinogens and other dangerous chemicals

44

in cigarettes. Second, to satisfy their bodies’’ craving for nicotine, many smokers unwittingly changed the way they smoked these low-tar cigarettes: they began inhaling more deeply, taking more frequent puffs, or smoking more cigarettes per day.

In fact, we now believe that low-tar cigarettes may be responsible for an increase

in a different form of lung cancer, adenocarcinoma, which was once relatively rare.

This cancer is found farther down in the lungs of smokers, indicating deeper

inhalations, and appears linked to a specific carcinogen particularly present in lowtar brands.

We must learn the lessons of the low-tar cigarette experience. Not only did they

fail to reduce an individual’s risk of disease, but they also appear to have increased

population risk by delaying quitting and potentially contributing to initiation among

young people. This has taught us that we must move cautiously in recommending

any supposedly safer alternative for people trying to quit smokingCbecause now,

with more knowledge and the benefit of hindsight, the science does not support

early recommendations on low-tar cigarettes.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I will shortly ask that the remainder of my

statement and the scientific information contained in it be considered as read and

made part of the record. But before I do that, I would like to ask for this Subcommittee and the Congress’ help in getting the message out about the dangers of

the myth of smokeless tobacco.

All of us in this room are very concerned about our nation’s youth. Kids growing

up today have a tough time of it. In addition to the normal struggles of puberty,

many kids are facing a host of other challenges. Many, especially minority kids,

must struggle to find their way in unsafe neighborhoods.

So the temptation to engage in behavior that is not healthy, and the opportunity

to do so, is very hard for our young people to resist.

According to a 2000 survey by the Substance and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse), about 1 million kids from age 12-17 smoke every day. Another 2 million kids smoke occasionally.

And we know that smoking is often not a ‘‘stand-alone’’ risk behavior; it travels

with others. The SAMHSA survey found that youth who were daily cigarette smokers or heavy drinkers were more likely to use illicit drugs than either daily smokers

or heavy drinkers from older age groups. More than half of 12-17 year olds who

were daily smokers had also used illicit drugs within the past month.

Every day, more than 2,000 kids in the U.S. will start to smoke, and more than

1,000 adults will die because of smoking. We have to get youth to stop starting. But

the answer is not smokeless tobacco.

We have evidence to suggest that instead of smokeless tobacco being a less dangerous alternative to smoking, just as smoking is a gateway to other drugs, smokeless tobacco is a gateway to smoking.

So we must redouble our efforts to get our youth to avoid tobacco in all forms.

We have some real work to do on the ‘‘culture’’ of smokeless tobacco, which is

glamorized by some sports stars. Chicago Cub Sammy Sosa, who has made a public

commitment to avoiding smokeless tobacco, is a great example for kids. Past baseball great Joe Garagiola is now Chairman of the National Spit Tobacco Education

program, and regularly lectures young players against the dangers of smokeless tobacco.

As Members of Congress, you can lead by example too, not just in legislation, but

in your own lives. I encourage you to avoid tobacco in all its forms. Do not fall for

the myth—a very dangerous public health myth—that smokeless tobacco is preferable to smoking. Do not let America’s youth fall for it, either.

From the perspective of individual risk, the cumulative effect on smokers of

switching to smokeless tobacco is simply not known. But we clearly know that use

of smokeless tobacco has serious health consequences. Overall, smokeless tobacco

products have been classified as a known human carcinogen. And limited scientific

data indicate that former smokers who switch to smokeless tobacco may not have

as great a decrease in lung cancer risks as quitters who do not use smokeless tobacco.

From the perspective of population risk, there are even more unanswered questions. Even if there was some decreased risk for smokers who switch to smokeless

tobacco, that benefit may be more than offset by increased exposure of the overall

population to this known carcinogen.

The marketing of smokeless tobacco as a potentially safer substitute for cigarettes

could lead to:

• More smokers switching to smokeless tobacco instead of quitting tobacco use completely;

45

• A rise in the number of lifetime smokeless tobacco users if more youth begin using

smokeless tobacco;

• A rise in the number of cigarette smokers as a result of more youth starting to

use smokeless tobacco and then switching to cigarette use; and

• Some former smokers returning to using tobacco if they believe that smokeless tobacco is a less hazardous way to consume tobacco.

Concerns about youth initiation are especially troubling. The scientific evidence

is clear that use of smokeless tobacco is a gateway to cigarette use. Young people

may be especially attracted to smokeless tobacco if they perceive it to be safer than

cigarettes. Studies show that more than one in five teenage males have used smokeless tobacco, with age 12 being the median age of first use. Surveys also show that

more than two in five teenagers who use smokeless tobacco daily also smoke cigarettes at least weekly. Finally, independent research and tobacco company documents show that youth are encouraged to experiment with low-nicotine starter products and subsequently graduate to higher-level nicotine brands or switch to cigarettes as their tolerance for nicotine increases.

Finally, we simply do not have enough scientific evidence to conclude that any tobacco product, including smokeless tobacco, is a means of reducing the risks of cigarette smoking. At this time, any public health recommendation that positions

smokeless tobacco as a safer substitute for cigarettes or as a quitting aid would be

premature and dangerous. With the memory of our experience with low-tar cigarettes fresh in our minds, we must move extremely cautiously before making any

statement or endorsement about the potential reduced risk of any tobacco product.

Finally, my strong recommendation as Surgeon General is a call for sound evidence about tobacco products and their individual and population based health effects. We need more research. We need to know more about the risks to individuals

of switching from smoking to smokeless; and we need to know more about the risks

to the entire population of a promotion campaign that would position smokeless tobacco as a safer substitute for smoking.

Until we have this science base, we must convey a consistent and uncompromised

message: there is no safe form of tobacco use.

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. STEARNS. Again, without objection, so ordered.

I will start the questions, and Admiral, I think I will start with

you.

The European Union has a policy on smokeless tobacco, and it

has been written by the leading tobacco control public health advocates in the European Union, and they stated that on the average

that ‘‘Scandinavian and American smokeless tobaccos are at least

90 percent safer than cigarettes.’’

Now, I respect your position. It is a lot different than all of ours,

but do you agree with the European Union policy that what they

said, 90 percent safer than cigarettes? I mean just yes or no.

Mr. CARMONA. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. We know that the Institute of Medicine report states that smokeless tobacco, ‘‘the overall risk is lower than

for cigarette smoking and some products, such as Swedish snus

may have no increased risk.’’

Now, this is the Institute of Medicine report. So I ask you: do you

agree with the Institute of Medicine?

Mr. CARMONA. That particular statement, no.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. You know, the heart of our hearing today is

smokeless as an alterative for people who cannot stop smoking, and

I will give you an example. Let us say your son just turned 16 and

he had to drive a car, and you had a small sports car in your garage and you also had a brand new Volvo. And I think all of us

in this room would agree that the Volvo is safer than a very small

sports car.

46

And you knew your son was just starting out and you had to look

at the two products. Would you not say the Volvo is a lot safer for

your 16 year old son to drive than a very small sports car?

Mr. CARMONA. I think it is actually an unfair analogy, sir. In

most cases, probably so.

Mr. STEARNS. Yes. But, I mean, they both are dangerous, but you

know, what we are trying to do is just see if there are degrees here,

and then work off of the Institute of Medicine report, as well as

some of the European Union policy positions.

Chairman Muris, how does the FTC evaluate an advertising

claim? For example, if there is dueling science like there might be

here, and a great respect for the Surgeon General, how do you actually reach a conclusion when there is this advertising claim and

you have dueling science involved?

Mr. MURIS. Well, the first thing that we do is look to see the

message the advertising claim communicates to a reasonable person in the intended audience, and that is a very, very important

step because, depending on how the various disclosures would be

made, it would not surprise me if an audience understood them differently. I have not seen copy testing of such particular advertising

claims. I do not know that they exist, but they would be viewed by

the intended audience quite differently.

Once we understand what we call the take-away is, then we

would look in terms of substantiation at what we thought was competent and reliable scientific evidence, and again, it partly depends

on what the claim is.

If the claim is one that is unqualified, it would not surprise me

if people interpreted it as something close to a scientific consensus

or at least the majority scientific view. So that would be relevant.

We also look at what we call the Pfizer factors. Pfizer was an

FTC opinion about the substantiation doctrine about 30 years ago.

One of the crucial factors in that case trying to balance the impact

of making mistakes, and you can make two sorts of mistakes here.

You can make the mistake of allowing false advertising or preventing truthful advertising, and we try to look at the consequences of those mistakes.

Mr. STEARNS. The FTC has brought a number of cases against

companies making health claims related to cancer treatments,

weight loss, and cures for HIV/AIDS, arthritis, hepatitis, Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, and many other diseases. How has the

FTC proceeded on those cases and how do these cases differ from

advertising claims made by tobacco companies?

Mr. MURIS. Well, most of the cases that we brought involve fraud

where there is no scientific controversy. In weight loss advertising,

for example, we have—and the Surgeon General has helped us in

this area—we have a very aggressive campaign against deceptive

and fraudulent weight loss advertising. We held a workshop at

which we both participated last November, where one of the things

we were trying to do is to get advertisers or—I am sorry—the

media to police some of the more obviously false claims.

So it is an area in which we spend a lot of resources, but it is

an area in which we do not have to make difficult scientific choices.

Mr. STEARNS. Just to conclude, Admiral, let us say we all know

that smoking is the leading cause of preventable death in the

47

United States, but I have seen some people here in the House,

Members of Congress, who cannot seem to stop smoking. What do

we do?

I mean, a person cannot stop smoking. How do we approach

those people?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, I think there is a wide range of possibilities

that include substitution therapy, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, behavioral therapy and behavioral modification, and of

course, we need to continue to do research in that area.

But I think what we do not do is substitute one carcinogen for

another.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. Thank you.

The ranking member.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You referred to the Institute of Medicine, and I have that report

in front of me, and I would just like to read Conclusion Five for

Dr. Carmona.

It says, ‘‘Regulation of all tobacco products, including conventional ones as recommended in IOM 1994, as well all other

PREPs.,’’ and PREPS. stand for potential reduced exposure products; so we are talking about spit tobacco, ‘‘is a necessary precondition’’—we are talking about regulation—‘‘is a necessary precondition for assuring a scientific basis for judging the effects of

using PREPs and for assuring that the health of the public is protected.’’

So they are making their conclusions by stating that all tobacco

should be regulated. And so I am wondering then if in terms of the

IOM report if you find any contradictions in what they say and if

you would find anything in what they say as, in fact, recommending the use as a harm reduction alternative.

Mr. CARMONA. No, ma’am. The IOM report I think is a very good

report, and I think one of its conclusions that is most important is

that they found that there really were no products that were available today that had been scientifically tested, such as smokeless tobacco products that would be safe to recommend or use.

So I think their study was a very good one overall.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Muris, if the FTC were to regulate the advertising of spit tobacco and such an advertising campaign had an incidental appeal

to minors, would the FTC be able to regulate the advertisements

on that basis alone?

Mr. MURIS. Well, first of all, the FTC has two bases to proceed.

One is on the basis of deception, and we would obviously need to

know a lot more. So this answer is necessarily very, very qualified.

I think in terms of appeal to youth, the Commission would be

much more likely to proceed as it did in the Camel case, based on

its unfairness jurisdiction. At least in that case the allegations

were that the appeal to youth was far more than incidental.

I think, again, I would have to know a lot more, but that fact,

the fact if the appeal was just incidental, would make it very hard

to use the unfairness jurisdiction.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Right, and if such an advertising campaign

were to result in more people using smokeless tobacco in addition

48

to cigarettes rather than instead of using cigarettes, would the FTC

be able to regulate the advertisements on that basis alone?

Mr. MURIS. It would be very hard for us to make public health

judgments outside of the context of whether the advertising was

deceptive or not. That is primarily what we do.

On the other hand, clearly when you are balancing my answer

to the Chairman’s question, when you are balancing the two kinds

of risk, the consequence here of allowing advertising that is, in fact,

fraudulent, that is part of those consequences. So we would consider it in that sense.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. If such an advertising campaign were to result

in a dramatic reduction in the number of people who quit tobacco

completely, would the FTC be able to regulate the advertisements

on that basis alone?

Mr. MURIS. Again, I think my answer is identical. We would not

look at this in the first instance under our statutes in terms of a

simple public health calculation. However, that would be a very important fact in terms of weighing the consequences of the substantiation, as I just indicated to the last question.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And would that be true then of such an advertising campaign were to result in a dramatic increase in the number of new tobacco users; would the FTC be able to regulate advertisements on that basis alone?

Mr. MURIS. I think my answer would be the same, and I would

direct you in more detail to our testimony, particularly page 9

where we discuss some of those issues.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So despite the fact that the advertisements

were not directly aimed at children, despite the fact that they said

that you should use it as a substitute, if negative consequences occurred, you are saying that, in fact, you could?

I do not read your mandate that way.

Mr. MURIS. Well, first of all and most importantly, and asking

any question does not provide a full context of what the advertising

campaign would look like, and that full context would be essential

and possibly dispositive in what we could do.

It is true, as our testimony states, that—let me just quote it to

you. ‘‘Although a determination that an individual risk reduction

claim as truthful and substantiated would end the Commission’s

deception inquiry, broader public health issues may remain,’’ and

that is the sense in which I was talking about how we do not under

our statutes make simply a public health determination, if that determination could ever be simple.

It is true, however, in looking at substantiation that the Pfizer

factors require a balance of what statisticians call Type 1 and Type

2 errors, which, as I explained, we try to look at the consequences

of us making a mistake, and the factors that you are talking about

are consequences of a mistake. We would certainly consider those,

and the presence of those factors would require us to want a higher

level of substantiation before we allowed the claims.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

49

Let me see if I can do something that I have tried with my staff

to understand. I have got the best experts in the country here in

front of me now.

Dr. Carmona, first of all, let me thank you for your strong and,

I think, extraordinary advocacy to help Americans understand the

dangers of smoking tobacco. I do not think anybody quarrels with

you on those issues today.

What we are focusing on, obviously, is a question of whether or

not there are other options other than the quit or die option that

Americans unfortunately are faced with when it comes to tobacco.

In regard to that, I have tried to have an understanding with my

staff on the nature of nicotine. I am not a smoker. So I have never

had this addiction problem for nicotine. My body does not crave it.

I do not desire it. I do not smoke, and I do not want to smoke. And

so I am trying to understand it as a non-smoker.

And I am trying to place nicotine in the category of substances

that are addictive that I do understand. I understand cocaine and

heroin and what it does to lives in my district and in this country.

I understand that when people start on these kinds of addictive

substances it can ruin their lives, and they crave it to the point

where it can even kill them.

I am a caffeine addict. I drink coffee all day long. I confess. I

know what that addiction feels like. I know I have to have my cup

of coffee in the morning, and I have got to have it all day long to

keep me going.

But I also know that caffeine is not likely to kill me in the sense

that cocaine and heroin might kill me. It might not be good for me.

It might make me overactive. It might make me hypertensive. I do

not know what, but it is not likely to do the damage that cocaine

and heroin do.

Where do you place nicotine in that scale? Is it closer to caffeine

or is it closer to cocaine and heroin?

Mr. CARMONA. It is hard to put it in a scale in that comparison,

but although they are both addictive, they have different mechanisms of action, and the caffeine works by modifying certain enzymes, xanthene oxidase, I think, specifically, and it works through

phosphodiesterase mechanism they call it, and what it does is it

works on your cardiovascular system. It will speed up your heart,

and it will have cardiovascular effects that you become dependent

on.

And so——

Chairman TAUZIN. How about nicotine?

Mr. CARMONA. Nicotine works by a different mechanism, but nicotine has direct adverse cardiovascular effects that are tied to accelerating cardiovascular disease. It has bad effects on your heart,

bad effects on the blood vessels and can accelerate atherosclerotic

disease, and so on.

So that we are not just talking about cancer here. We are talking

about other effects on the body that can be found.

Chairman TAUZIN. It has other negative effects.

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, sir.

Chairman TAUZIN. Does it have any positive effects? I was told

by staff that there is at least some scientific evidence that it has

50

some positive effects on some categories of human conditions. Is

that true or false?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, only if you are talking about, you know, biochemistry of the body, but——

Chairman TAUZIN. How about Tourette’s syndrome?

Mr. CARMONA. Oh, you are talking about as a treatment.

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes.

Mr. CARMONA. As a treatment now.

Chairman TAUZIN. That is what I am saying. Isn’t it used positively in some cases, like treatments of——

Mr. CARMONA. I have never used it, and if it is, then it is probably not very common, but I would imagine in the literature people

have tried to use it.

Chairman TAUZIN. Here is where I am going and I want your

feedback on it. If Americans who have become accustomed to, addicted to the habit of getting nicotine into their body were able to

get it into their body in some other fashion other than the use of

tobacco, would that be a positive social development in America in

terms of the Nation’s health or would it be a negative one?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, again, you know, I am less inclined to comment on social developments than I am on science.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, on science then. Would it be good for

Americans’ health, for people who need nicotine or believe they

have to have it or are addicted to it to get it in some other fashion

other than to having to burn tobacco to get it?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, we have mechanisms presently available

through nicotine products that——

Chairman TAUZIN. I know we do. I am asking you is that good.

Mr. CARMONA. It is an option that is available. I mean, the best

of all options obviously is not to smoke at all and not to become

addicted.

Chairman TAUZIN. Nobody disagrees with that.

Mr. CARMONA. Okay.

Chairman TAUZIN. But if the option is quit or die, and what I am

saying is if you have to get nicotine in your system because you are

addicted to it and you cannot quit—I mean, the quit rate is like

2 to 3 percent a year in this country, and we know people are having a pretty difficult time quitting. Recognizing that, knowing that

we are going to lose an awful lot of people to the effects of not quitting, if these folks can get their nicotine in some other way other

than burning tobacco and sucking all of the nitrosamines and all

of the other substances into their lungs, would that be a positive

thing for the health of the country?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, yes, and it already is where you have patch.

We have gum. We have mechanisms that have been tested and

found to be safe and effective means.

Chairman TAUZIN. Right. Let me turn to the FTC Chairman.

If, in fact, people come up with products, tobacco products or

non-tobacco products that can, in fact, deliver nicotine to folks who

have been addicted to it and cannot seem to quit using it, is your

department the right agency to regulate the truth of those ads?

Mr. MURIS. Our mission is certainly to evaluate the truthfulness

of and including substantiation of advertising. That can require us,

and in this case it would, to work with scientists both in and out

51

of the government because the issues here in the substantiation

arena are issues on which their experts——

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes, you get thrown into the health arena

here.

Mr. MURIS. And we are not, right.

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes, and you are not health officials. But nevertheless, your agency’s function is to examine the truthfulness or

lack of truthfulness of advertising of American products. Is that

part of your agency’s mission?

Mr. MURIS. Yes, but what I am saying is the substantiation

issues here turn on scientific issues to which we——

Chairman TAUZIN. Therefore, you would have to turn to people

like——

Mr. MURIS. [continuing] seek help.

Chairman TAUZIN. [continuing] Health Department officials to

help you.

Mr. MURIS. Absolutely.

Chairman TAUZIN. And if science was available to help you understand whether or not an advertisement was, in fact, truthful or

not truthful, that gave people in America better information about

options that might be available to them when it comes to getting

nicotine, would it not be in the interest of this country for you and

our health officials to conduct some public forums and to see

whether or not all of this is a good avenue to approach or not?

Mr. MURIS. Well, in the abstract, Mr. Chairman, I certainly

think that is a good idea. Again, because the issues are ultimately

scientific, they would need to take the lead, the scientific agencies.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, except they tell us it should be your

lead because you end up being the one to say yes or no on the

truthfulness of the ads. If they can help you understand that and

help you conduct forums that all of us in America, scientists, consumers, advocates, pro and con, all kinds of people can come and

debate it and discuss it. Why wouldn’t you want to help create that

type of forum for us?

Mr. MURIS. Well, that is a different issue than taking the lead.

I would certainly think that we would—I know, speaking for myself. Obviously my colleagues would have to vote—be willing to participate in such fora not just to talk about particular products, although that would be important, but to talk about what endpoints,

what kind of scientific evidence is relevant.

I mean, I agree with the premise here that we have somewhere

near 50 million people who smoke, and it is a very addictive product. I obviously defer to the scientists on that, but it obviously is

a very addictive product. Many people have difficulty quitting, and

I think there are potential—and the key word is ‘‘potential’’—public

health benefits from addressing that issue, and it is one of——

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, we at least ought to hear about it and

talk about it.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just want to make the point. If

you do not take the lead and the Health Department says you

should take the lead and they do not want to take the lead, we

never get these forums going. Somebody has got to take the lead

to organize it, and I do not know whether you or Tommy ThompVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
52

son. We need to put you in a room together, and you all can flip

a coin to see who calls the meeting.

But my guess is it would help us immeasurably in this country

if one or both of you would take the lead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURIS. I understand. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the Chairman.

The gentlelady, Ms. McCarthy is recognized for her questions.

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I pass.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady passes.

Mr. Whitfield.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Muris, it is my understanding that UST, U.S. Tobacco, had

asked your agency, I guess back in February 2002, for an advisory

opinion to make certain statements in its advertising about their

smokeless tobacco products. Is that advisory opinion still pending

or what is the status of that?

Mr. MURIS. Well, it is not what they asked us to do. They did

not give us advertising on which they asked an opinion. They gave

us a general statement without the context of advertising, and as

explained in our—I cannot obviously talk about non-public proceedings in a public forum—but as explained in our testimony, generically presenting something to us in that manner caused us

problems.

They withdrew the petition. They have recently sent us additional information and asked that we hold a public forum, but the

petition has been withdrawn.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, what would be the purpose of the public

forum?

Mr. MURIS. I think, although they can speak for themselves, my

understanding is the public forum would involve some of the

issues, many of the issues I was just discussing with Chairman

Tauzin.

Mr. WHITFIELD. One of the statements made evidently in their

letter to your agency was that the Surgeon General in 1986 concluded that smokeless tobacco is not a safe substitute for smoking

cigarettes. While not asserting that smokeless tobacco is safe,

many researchers in the public health community have expressed

the opinion that the use of smokeless tobacco involves significantly

less risk of adverse health effects than smoking cigarettes.

Now, does your agency have the capability to render a decision

on whether or not advertising based on that type of a statement

would be accurate or truthful?

Mr. MURIS. The question with such advertising would be whether

it was substantiated. We do not have expertise to evaluate the substantiation, the scientific evidence. We would turn to scientific experts within and without the government.

I cite a few very briefly. We cite in our footnotes to our testimony

just very brief introductions to some of the scientific evidence, but

that is where we would have to turn.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you would be able to do that?

Mr. MURIS. Sure. We would be able to ask for cooperation and

assistance. Obviously it would be in the discretion of the people we

asked as to how much they participated and what they told us.

53

Mr. WHITFIELD. And going to the scientists to come up with a scientific analysis of the claims under the current system that you

would do that, you would feel comfortable with the conclusion said?

I mean the process.

Mr. MURIS. Well, let me, again, put the process in context. When

you have advertising, we look to see if the advertising in the first

instance is deceptive. Advertising of this nature would almost certainly be advertising that contained an explicit or implicit claim

that there was substantiation for the risk reduction.

We, again, are not experts on the science necessary to evaluate

that claim. So that is why we would turn to the scientific community. I have confidence in the process in general. How it would

work in this particular case, you know, we would have to see.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes. Admiral Carmona, would you support the

abolition of all tobacco products?

Mr. CARMONA. I would at this point, yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So you would support a law in Congress that all

tobacco products would be illegal?

Mr. CARMONA. No, sir, I did not say that. You asked me would

I support banning or abolishing tobacco products. Yes.

Legislation is not my field. If Congress chose to go that way, that

would be up to them, but I see no need for any tobacco products

in society.

Mr. WHITFIELD. But if Congress were to pass legislation making

tobacco an illegal product, you would be comfortable with that?

Mr. CARMONA. I would have no problem with that.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. Now, the purpose of this hearing today, if

oral tobacco is to play a role in harm reduction, would you agree

it is not necessarily to show that it does not cause cancer, but it

simply needs to be substantially less hazardous than smoking?

Mr. CARMONA. If I understand your question correctly, sir, I

would say that we already know it is a carcinogen, one. And if we

were looking to test any other theories, certainly the fact that it is

a carcinogen would be important, and in my mind, you do not need

to do any further testing. If you already know it is a carcinogen,

it would not be an acceptable substitute.

Mr. WHITFIELD. So whether or not it is less harmful would not

make any difference to you then?

Mr. CARMONA. I if there are those who are doing research in this

area and they have thought of unique ways that this can be helpful, I am always willing to listen to research.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay.

Mr. CARMONA. But right now substituting one carcinogen for another, I do not see a benefit.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay, and I understand that, but you are saying

if there is scientific evidence there that shows that it is less harmful, that that is something that you would be willing to look at.

Mr. CARMONA. I would always be willing to look at any scientific

evidence, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. Now, the Royal College of Physicians in

December 2002, which is England’s oldest medical institution, and

among its functions is to advise the government, the public, and

the medical community on health care issues, stated that as a way

54

of using nicotine, the consumption of noncombustible tobacco is of

the order of 10 to 1,000 times less hazardous than smoking.

Would you agree with that or not?

Mr. CARMONA. I would not, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Are you aware of any scientific data that would

disagree with that statement?

Mr. CARMONA. Sir, not so much disagree, but I do not think they

have enough scientific data to justify making that statement.

Mr. WHITFIELD. You do not think they have enough data to justify it?

Mr. CARMONA. That statement, yes.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you have read this report that they have

rendered?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, I have, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, on this issue of smokeless tobacco as a

gateway to increased smoking, do you have any evidence to show

that it is a gateway to increased use of tobacco products?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, sir. There are studies to demonstrate that it

does act as a gateway and can eventually increase smoking in all

individuals.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, what about there was reference earlier to

this European Union study about smokeless tobacco, and in that

study, they make all sorts of statements. They said Sweden has the

lowest level of tobacco related mortality in the developed world by

some distance, approximately half the tobacco related mortality of

the rest of the European Union. Sweden has the lowest male smoking prevalence in Europe. Half of the tobacco in Sweden is now consumed as a smokeless tobacco product, and this share has steadily

grown since 1970.

They go on and on and on, and they make all sorts of arguments

that one of the reasons that there is less mortality in Sweden is

because of these so-called smokeless products, and I am sure you

have read those reports as well.

But do you have any scientific evidence that would refute that

report?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, on those reports, sir, I think there are many

potential confounding factors that have not been fully looked at.

People smoke or chew for a variety of reasons, and to assume that

a decreased morbidity and mortality in a population is solely due

to the fact that somebody is chewing tobacco, I am sure they all

drink milk also or have a cup of coffee, and you could equally attribute changes to other variables that maybe have not been looked

at.

So it is a much more complex problem.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I see my time has expired.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Carmona, during the previous Congress members of this

committee have introduced legislation which would give the FDA

a broad authority to regulate tobacco products, including strong restrictions on advertising and marketing tobacco products, protection for young people against exposure to environmental tobacco

smoke and tough company specific surcharges to encourage compaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
55

nies to reduce youth smoking. Do you think it is important for our

Congress this time to enact legislation to give the FDA that authority to regulate these tobacco products?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, sir, I appreciate the question, but not being

in the regulation business, I think it is important that Congress

looks at this and makes determination if it is something that they

want to move ahead with that would be in the best interest of the

protection of the American public.

Whether or not the FDA does it, I think strong oversight and

scrutiny is important by whatever mechanism you all choose to do.

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Thank you.

I understand the position you are in, and I appreciate the best

answer you could give.

Mr. Muris, one of the rotating warnings on packages of smokeless tobacco reads ‘‘Warning, this product is not a safe alternative

to cigarettes.’’ Let us say that you are a cigarette smoker who saw

an ad promoting smokeless tobacco as a product with reduced risk,

if that was allowed, and you go to your local convenience store and

decide to try it out.

Yet ripping open the top of it, you read the warning that this

product is not a safe alternative to cigarettes. Would you feel as if

you received a mixed message as to the health benefits of that

package of smokeless tobacco?

Mr. MURIS. Well, it obviously depends—and this is just to preface

this. This is a very important part of what we would do, is to look

at the take-away as to what a reasonable person in the intended

audience understood. It obviously depends on what the advertising

said.

It is quite possible that even though couched in the language of

‘‘safer,’’ that people would receive, you know, depending on how it

was written and what all was in the ad and the totality of the circumstances, it is possible that people would receive a message of

safe in which case they would be conflicting.

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Thank you.

The Federal Trade Commission Act provides that an act or practice is illegal if it ‘‘causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to

consumers which is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to

consumers or to competition.’’

Even if we were to assume that scientific evidence were true that

smokeless tobacco use can reduce the number of deaths associated

with smoking, in your opinion does this outweigh the substantial

injury caused to consumer?

Mr. MURIS. Well, you are now turning to a second part of our

statute, which is unfairness, and I talked about this briefly a little

while ago.

In the context that we would be looking at, and this is part of

balancing in a different way than I was mentioning before, but

similarly of balancing the benefits and the costs, and that is what

that part of the statute requires.

I think it is a factual question on which, you know, we would

have to seek evidence.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I yield back my time.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

56

The gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass.

Mr. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have heard comments about young men using smokeless tobacco as a right of passage. We have heard a possible connection between health problems with the former Speaker of the House and chewing tobacco,

although I do not know whether that is true or not.

The Surgeon General has recommended that perhaps Members

of Congress need behavioral modifications. I would definitely agree

with that.

But the real issue here today is a narrow one, and my first question is for Chairman Muris.

Understanding, sir, that the FTC has a difficult mission protecting consumers from deceptive and misleading advertising, it involves judgment calls, and reasonable person standards. Given that

you already do this currently for weight loss products and other

such items based on a comparative advantage, which is the subject

of this hearing, could the FTC establish guidelines that would offer

needed protection and more accurate information, in your opinion?

Mr. MURIS. Well, in general I think you have to take advertising

in its context and as you find it. There is the issue I was just mentioning, the issue of how consumers understand claims, and then

there is the issue on which we spent most of the time in the questions you have asked me about the substantiation.

Because one of the claims that would be in these ads would be

an explicit or an implicit claim that there is scientific substantiation for a risk reduction claim.

I think we would have to emphasize both things. I do not think

we are ready to do guidelines particularly involving the second

issue because we would need to have a much greater discussion

with the scientific community about what risk reduction claims

mean, about the appropriate endpoints for measuring them, about

evidence from around the world, about a whole host of issues.

Mr. BASS. But it is perfectly legitimate or reasonable for the FTC

to conduct studies involving comparative advantages of one product

over another. It does not have to be an absolute.

Mr. MURIS. There is nothing in principle that prevents comparative claims. The Commission with my predecessor, one of the best

things he did more than 30 years ago when he was at the FTC,

he got the networks to eliminate their restrictions on comparative

advertising.

Comparative claims are important kinds of claims.

Mr. BASS. Okay. Admiral Carmona, I appreciate your testimony,

and my colleague from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, brought up the

issue of the English or the British report that in essence drew a

conclusion regarding the relative benefit or whatever of smokeless

tobacco versus cigarettes.

I would be interested in if you would be willing to provide the

subcommittee with a further explanation as to exactly what scientific evidence you find in that report invalid.

I will say now I have never heard of it, and I have not read it,

but you have basically disputed the claims that are made in this

report and said they are invalid and they are not based upon adequate science and if you were an officer, you would be willing to

57

analyze those claims and explain exactly what mistakes they made

that led to that particular conclusion.

I would be interested to read about it.

Mr. CARMONA. We would be happy to provide you with the information, sir, and generally it is not that it is invalid. We felt that

there was not enough information to support their thesis, that

more research needed to be done before you could come to that conclusion.

Mr. BASS. Okay. I do not think anybody here is suggesting, sir,

that you recommend one product over the other, but suppose, but

I do not like to use hypotheticals, but would you agree that advertising that explains the mortality rates of one product over another,

that infers a conclusion that smokeless tobacco was less harmful

than cigarette smoking, would that fairly describe an aspect of the

harm reduction that we are all seeking?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, we are all seeking harm reduction. I do not

think that fairly describes quite a complex problem because where

you might be able to argue that a product has one component that

may reduce risk, when you look at the product broadly and all of

its risk factors, there may be more harm or less harm than others.

So I do not think, sir, it is as simple as just describing that because there are many variables that we are looking at in these

comparisons.

Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and the point

that I am trying to drive at in this line of questioning is that there

is no perfect product for any problem, and there is probably no substance in this country or no issue or product that is more controversial, with the possible exception guns, than tobacco.

However, within the context of this debate if a public good is

being achieved, albeit not a perfect one, is it not a good idea for

policymakers and agency heads to examine this realistically and

objectively because ultimately we are all seeking the same goal,

which is reduction in deaths due to this particular substance.

And I will yield back.

Mr. STEARNS. And I thank the gentleman, and we have had a

hearing dealing with guns, too.

Mr. BASS. I know.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

I do have a bias in this field. My father died from lung cancer,

and he died 3 years ago. And although he smoked two packs of

Camels a day from the age of 12 until 67, it never caught him until

he was 89, and then it just showed up even though he was otherwise perfectly healthy, and then he died from lung cancer 3 years

ago, although the doctor had said, until it showed up, that he was

going to live to 100.

So that is a big loss in our family to have a guy in perfectly

healthy condition mentally and physically to die because of it.

But what I remember most is that when I was 13, he told me

because I was the oldest, that he started smoking at 12 and that

he knew I would be starting in the next couple of years because

every boy smoked, all right, but that he should not expect him to

pay for the Camels; that I was going to have to earn the money.

Just do not take the money out of his pockets or anything.

58

But he knew that we would all smoke. That was his message to

me when I was a 13 year old boy.

So because of the Surgeon General’s decision in the mid-sixties

and the continuation of public education, we have been partially at

least able to stem that tide of the inevitable deaths that occur from

young boys and girls starting to smoke because they feel like they

have to.

So one of my concerns here from a public health perspective is

the secret additives that are included not only in cigarettes, but

also in the smokeless tobacco kind of products that are sold, and

I know that HHS is one of the only entities to have the secret list

of ingredients.

Do you think that it would be helpful for there to be a release

of the secret additives to the public so that even if smokeless tobacco is advertised as being safer than smoking tobacco that the

public would then still be able to see what the additives were and

to be able to judge that it is still much too big of a risk to undertake at all and help mothers and fathers to convince their kids not

to start?

Doctor?

Mr. CARMONA. Sir, I am not aware of the legal complexities involving the release of such information, but I know that our scientists have looked at it, and in aggregate they have published information as to many carcinogenic agents, as well as other factors

that are contained within smoke products that can cause not only

cancer, but other disease.

But as far as the release of that, I think that it is out of the

scope of my practice, sir, and I am not sure of the legalities of that,

but certainly——

Mr. MARKEY. If it was within our power, would you make the list

of the secret additives public?

Mr. CARMONA. I think that I would ask my colleagues who were

actually at the bench doing the research to ascertain if there was

any benefit, additional benefit to that that would be released within the research, and then I would make my decision on that.

Mr. MARKEY. Any additional benefit?

Mr. CARMONA. Knowing the specifics, yes.

Mr. MARKEY. If the public knew what the additives were and it

was determined that they would be more likely not to start using

it if they knew, would you then be supportive of releasing the additive information?

Mr. CARMONA. Again, sir, that is one of the factors I would consider, but also looking at the entire context of how this information

is being used by our scientists and if there was some health status

that could be achieved by releasing this information, then certainly

that would move me in that direction.

Mr. MARKEY. So there are carcinogens in these additives. You

also mentioned other diseases caused by these additives. What are

they?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, acceleration of cardiovascular disease, you know, stroke, heart attacks, things like that. So not all necessarily cancer related, but

very significant diseases also.

59

Mr. MARKEY. So let me ask you, Chairman Muris. If the public

does not have access to information about secret ingredients and

additives in smokeless tobacco, aren’t claims regarding the potential health benefits of smokeless tobacco likely to be deceptive or

misleading because the information about the additives that are in

the smokeless tobacco are not available for the public to make that

determination themselves?

Mr. MURIS. Well, let me preface with two general statements.

One, I have never looked explicitly at what this information is,

but from the standpoint of what we do, there would obviously be

a heavy presumption in favor of more information and not less, and

someone would have to make a very good argument, and you know,

not having looked at it, I do not know what that argument might

be, to withhold information.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Shimkus. No, Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Shadegg.

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding this hearing.

I will tell you I am mystified by it all, and I kind of wonder

where it is taking us.

Let me start with the issue of your jurisdiction at the FTC. As

I understand it, you have jurisdiction arising out of the concept of

deception and the concept of unfairness; is that correct?

Mr. MURIS. Yes.

Mr. SHADEGG. On the concept of deception, as I understand your

testimony, before you could allow a label to say this product is

safer than, that is, smokeless tobacco is a safer alternative to cigarette smoking, you would have to have evidence which substantiated that point; is that correct?

Mr. MURIS. Among other things, yes, sir.

Mr. SHADEGG. Okay. Dr. Carmona, it is your belief that while

there have been studies done on that point, they simply are not

sufficient, that is, not enough studies or not enough subjects, not

enough contrasting information to reach that conclusion; is that

right?

Mr. CARMONA. In the particular instance of smokeless tobacco?

Mr. SHADEGG. Yes, to reach the conclusion that smokeless is

safer than.

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, that is correct, sir.

Mr. SHADEGG. Okay. So you believe the FTC could not, in fact,

substantiate that first threshold criteria of whether or not it is

safer than; is that right?

Mr. CARMONA. That is right, sir.

Mr. SHADEGG. The whole topic puzzles me. For example, this is

a can of smokeless tobacco. This particular can has the warning

that says, ‘‘This product may cause gum disease and tooth loss.’’

One of the issues I hear in the testimony here today is a relative

one, which is if we say or if we allow the claim to be made that

smokeless tobacco is safer than cigarettes, which you believe cannot be substantiated, but others believe could be substantiated, are

we then deceiving people into using smokeless tobacco as a safe alternative?

60

Now, we know that one of the labels that is already on smokeless

tobacco says this product is not a safe alternative to cigarettes.

That raises the issue of, okay, what is the truth. If you give less

than all of the truth, are you somehow deceiving people?

And, Dr. Carmona, that is your concern, is it not?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, sir. My concern is that, you know, that definition of the word ‘‘safer’’ as it relates to these products, that, in

fact, if you take one piece out of context and make an assumption

that, well, because there is less of a certain chemical, therefore, it

is safer where the science is not there to support it, and we ignore

the fact that, as you just pointed out, sir, gum disease, tooth problems and so on are also problematic, it is very difficult to say that,

and that is why I view that substitution argument as oversimplified for a very complex problem and one that I could not support

because it is still detrimental to the American public.

Mr. SHADEGG. Let me ask you both. As I read the information

I am provided, right now although the warning on cigarettes is a

Surgeon General’s warning and the warning on smokeless tobacco

is not a Surgeon General’s warning, it just says a warning; both

are as a result of congressional actions and neither are as a result

of FTC action standing alone or Surgeon General action standing

alone; is that correct?

Mr. CARMONA. I believe so, sir.

Mr. MURIS. Yes. The FTC got the ball rolling, but then Congress

stepped in 40 years ago or almost 40 years ago.

Mr. SHADEGG. And so it is going to be our job to try to spell out

at least currently what should be specified on the label, if anything.

Dr. Carmona, if the Congress does not step in and specify what

should be spelled out, do you have the jurisdiction to issue your

own warning?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, I think that one of the things I have probably that is most important is the so-called bully pulpit. I can certainly speak out regularly on the hazards of all tobacco products,

and I would certainly intend to do that along with my colleagues

where the scientific basis allows me to do so.

Mr. SHADEGG. and I suppose it would be your position that if

someone were to propose that they wanted to advertise smokeless

tobacco as safer than cigarettes, you would want to add ‘‘but not,

in fact, safe’’ because of these other dangers; is that right?

Mr. CARMONA. I would be opposed to such advertising.

Mr. SHADEGG. And you would like to see the Congress, if the

Congress were to step into this field and specify what had to be put

on claims about smokeless tobacco, to make sure if anyone had

wanted to make a claim that smokeless tobacco was safer than

cigarettes, but they would go beyond that and say, ‘‘But, however,

still not safe because it causes all of these issues, the potential for

mouth cancer, potential for gum decay, tooth disease, other things’’;

is that right?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, sir, my intent would never be to attempt behavioral modification on the Congress.

Mr. SHADEGG. But we look to you for expertise and we should.

Mr. CARMONA. But what I would strongly support is that Congress take into account all of the scientific evidence before us, some

61

of which you have completely outlined right now, in making their

decision to protect the American public.

Mr. SHADEGG. One of the things that concerns me is that of the

three labels Congress has specified for smokeless tobacco, and I understand they rotate. So my understanding is that one third of all

cans would have to contain one of these; one third the second; and

one third the third. One of them, quite frankly, I think you could

make the claim that it is deceptive precisely because it does not go

far enough.

One of the three labels is, ‘‘This product may cause gum disease

and tooth loss.’’ I would suggest that if I were a young kid picking

up this can and read this particular can, which says it may cause

gum disease and tooth loss, I would be a lot less concerned about

its use than if read, ‘‘This product may cause mouth cancer,’’ which

raises the next question of, well, why does it say mouth cancer.

Why doesn’t it say this product may cause cancer? Because if you

want to scare somebody and you warn them this product may

cause cancer, I suggest that is going to have a greater impact on

them than perhaps any of the other three alternatives that are

there.

So one of my concerns is what we will have when we start down

the slippery slope, when it is the U.S. Congress that decides what

the precise wording of any warning ought to be.

Mr. CARMONA. Well, we are certainly concerned, my colleagues

and I, sir, that any references to ‘‘safer’’ that are not clearly spelled

out, are not scientifically justified may, in fact, just do that, cause

young people to start earlier and feel that it is a safe thing to do;

that there is relatively little risk; and as you have pointed out, the

whole story is not being told.

Mr. SHADEGG. Let me go back to the FTC on the issue of, okay,

one issue would be the issue of deception, and that is would it be

deceptive to claim that smokeless tobacco is safer than cigarettes.

Your second element of jurisdiction is that of unfairness. Under

the second rubric, unfairness, would you consider it necessary to go

on and provide the disclosure however not safe?

Mr. MURIS. Well, the Commission has rarely, and I mean rarely,

used unfairness to evaluate advertising. It almost always uses deception. There is a tremendous First Amendment problem from

saying an advertisement is truthful, yet we can stop it. So we

would much more likely use on the unfair—I mean our deceptive

authority.

It is clear that in any of these ads we would be concerned with

the take-away. By that I mean an understanding by the intended

audience that no matter what the word said, that a lot of people

thought that it meant safe, and that would be a big concern.

Mr. SHADEGG. You would be concerned that an implication that

safer might cause somebody to conclude it was safe.

Mr. MURIS. Sure, depending on, you know, how the disclosure

was made and what else was in the end.

Mr. SHADEGG. Before my time expires, I simply want to conclude

by pointing out that according to the information that I have in

1981, the FTC issued a report to Congress that concluded that

health warning labels had little effect on public knowledge and attitudes about smoking. So it says public labels do not do anything.

62

Congress responded by enacting a law requiring health warning

labels. I think it is quite interesting what we do here.

Thank you very much.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Davis is recognized.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Muris, in reviewing your written statement on page 8,

you suggest that in the context of safety claims, the FTC has typically required a substantiation standard of competent and reliable

scientific evidence. In my opinion, this issue ultimately boils down

to respect. How much respect are we going to have for our consumers, for our citizens in terms of how high the standard we set

as far as judging the accuracy and truthfulness of any disclosure

you would approve or this Congress would approve so people can

make safe decisions, not necessarily the right decision.

Can you elaborate a little bit as to exactly how high the standard

is you would employ if you were to find yourself in a proceeding

judging the marketing of smokeless tobacco?

Mr. MURIS. Well, yes, sir. The first question obviously turns on

what the ads would say in their full context and, therefore, what

the take-away from consumers would be. The more qualified the

take-away that the consumers received, the lesser the substantiation.

On the other hand, as I mentioned, the so-called Pfizer factors

before, because I personally believe, again, just speaking for myself—obviously my colleagues could have different views—because

the consequences of making a mistake here are so serious in terms

of, you know, the potential adverse effects on public health, people

who might otherwise have quit, what the effects might be on children; that would indicate that the bar should be very high.

Mr. DAVIS. The debate here today seems to center upon the word

‘‘safer.’’ It seems to me as a lay person that by its very nature in

whatever context the word ‘‘safer’’ is used, and it invariably is a

vague term; it is not a qualitative connotation.

Under what circumstances could safer ever constitute a sufficiently acceptable standard under this very high standard you have

just described?

Mr. MURIS. Well, again, there are two questions that I think you

really have to keep distinct. One is how consumers understand the

words, and I believe it is possible to communicate safer as opposed

to safe, but then the second question is about the scientific evidence.

And the scientific evidence, I believe, would have to be very high,

but we do not even know. I mean, again, we are not scientists. The

scientific community, I think it would be very useful for them to

do more work on issues involving what sort of evidence is it that

they would want, what sort of evidence that they would look at.

Because I do agree with the general premise that some members

have made that we do have upwards of 50 million people who

smoke. Many of them find it very difficult to quit. The simplest

place to start, if I could just end, I believe, and I would like to explore with the FDA, the potential for broader-based claims for the

gums and the patches that the Surgeon General mentioned.

63

Right now those can only be used for very narrow purposes. They

can only be marketed as part of quitting. They cannot be marketed

as sort of a long run replacement. It seems to me, again, it would

be up to the FDA ultimately because they regulate this, but it

would seem to me that there are very large potential benefits from

being able to tell people about the longer run possibility.

Mr. DAVIS. And I commend you on that. I do not think we should

be afraid of the risk reduction. The Surgeon General has said that.

I think we need to be painfully objective about this.

But it just seems to me as a lay person that the question is not

whether a safer type of marketing could ever be acceptable under

this very high standard, but that it really would be a disclosure as

to how much safer or how less safer, don’t you think?

Mr. MURIS. Oh, well, absolutely you would need to understand

the question of quantity in that sense, not just the question of a

qualitative difference, and I agree with that.

It even may be true, a complication of the nicotine products, the

gums and patches, and why I used the word ‘‘potential’’ is there is

some evidence, and, again, I am not a scientist. The scientists

would have to explore it. There is some evidence of potential dangers from nicotine itself beyond addiction.

Mr. DAVIS. In the Footnote 17 on page 8, you seem to acknowledge the possibility that evidence that is presented to you that you

rely upon for approval later proves to be faulty. That is a problem.

Do you have the authority to go back and revisit any approval

of the disclosure that has been made on a product if subsequent

scientific evidence reveals it is not sufficiently accurate?

Mr. MURIS. Absolutely, and the basis of the substantiation doctrine by its very nature recognizes that when the science changes,

then the ability to make the claims changes.

Mr. DAVIS. I would like to give the Surgeon General an opportunity to comment on any of these points if he would care to.

Mr. CARMONA. Well, sir, simply I agree with where you are going

with this. I think there is qualitative and quantitative aspect to the

word ‘‘safe’’ or ‘‘safer,’’ and certainly quantitatively we have to be

able to define that, but also in its entirety as I alluded to earlier

in my remarks.

Taking one variable out of context and simply stating that there

is an improvement or it is simply safer does not address the spectrum of risk, of which there are many variables.

So I think it is to the public’s benefit that we are very clear on

how that word is used.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might preface this by saying I am a recovering smoker of 13-

plus years. So I am very aware and every day think about the error

of my smoking in my youth and my not so youth judging from

when I finally quit, but I do have some questions because I do not

think we are dealing with tobacco here. We are dealing with the

question of a blank substance relative to other blank substances,

claims, interpretation for whether or not they are allowed versus

other claims.

64

And hopefully we can forget the word ‘‘tobacco’’ in the discussion

today for purposes of thinking about whether or not safer, which

does seem to be the key word, is appropriate or inappropriate to

be considered.

And what I would like to, first of all, do is ask the Surgeon General one question, which is what is the health benefit of butter.

Mr. CARMONA. Let’s see. There are nutrients within butter.

Mr. ISSA. Butter is basically fat; is that right?

Mr. CARMONA. No, no.

Mr. ISSA. What are the benefits of fat then perhaps is a better

question.

Mr. CARMONA. Fat is necessary. It is essential to our growing everything from making steroids in your body to new cells require

fats.

Mr. ISSA. And isn’t the excess consumption of fat the No. 1

health problem in America, in combination with not enough exercise.

Mr. CARMONA. It certainly contributes to obesity, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. Okay, and yet the low fat butters and the alternate

butters appear to be able to claim that they are better and safer.

I have read enough packaging to get this idea that this plasticized

butter that tastes marginal at best, not margarine, but marginal,

gets to make that claim.

And, Chairman Muris, I guess the question is: how do they get

to make the claim that they are better if essentially the difference

is less fat, which the Surgeon General has said is okay? It is essential.

Mr. MURIS. Well, health claims are regulated by a statute that

Congress passed in 1991, the NLEA, and there are a variety of

hoops through which you have to jump. So even though we are involved in that area and, in fact, Dr. McClellan, the head of the

FDA, and I made an announcement last year where he is hoping,

given the way science is changing, he is hoping that advertising

and labeling can keep up with the changes in science.

But there is a special, you know, regulatory regime for those.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So the fact that butter is essentially not bad and

fat is not bad, then if you have less of it claiming that it is better

would be probably inappropriate on the face of it all, forgetting

about the taste of butter, forgetting about what we all put on.

Then, in fact, we have a different standard for tobacco than we

have for fat.

Doctor, I guess my next question is you support banning tobacco.

Does that allow you to be an honest broker in the question of less

bad and more bad?

I would personally say that I would have a hard time if I supported outright banning something. We would be happy to see Congress passing a law that would do that.

And then I was asked: well, are we going to allow the good instead of the perfect if the good might, in fact, perpetuate consumption of this for a while?

I would probably inherently say, ‘‘Well, geez, I do not want to

have anything that might lower a little bit the health risk, but perpetuate the consumption.’’

65

Is that something that you are having to deal with in your testimony today?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, no, sir, and let me elaborate. First, I want

to respectfully disagree with your analogy with butter because it is

much more complex than is presented, and I think it is an unfair

analogy.

Second, I am not having any problem with it because the driving

factor in what I have testified to is that the substance we are talking about is a proven carcinogen. It causes cancer. So that——

Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time from the witness, I guess the problem we have is we are talking about less and more and trying to

understand whether or not less or more is an honest statement,

and that is why I am trying to get to the bottom of this.

It appears to me as though other than tobacco we have this theory that you are innocent until proven guilty. In tobacco you are

guilty until proven innocent, and so for the Chairman, I guess, my

question to you would be, because my time is evaporating here, we

have made a big point in this country, and accurately so, that we

are concerned about second hand smoke, sufficiently that, in fact,

it has been found to be something that one has to get rid of, and

that is why we ban smoking in public areas in State after State.

If, in fact, second hand smoke is clearly bad, then aren’t you better if you have no second hand smoke because you have no first

hand smoke? The risk to people around a smokeless tobacco consumer is by definition zero versus whatever you have with cigars,

pipes and cigarettes.

Would that not meet the first threshold of a claim?

Mr. MURIS. Well, sure, but now you are addressing a different

question. If smokeless tobacco made a claim based on no secondhand smoke, you know, we would evaluate that on it its merits.

That is obviously different than the earlier claim we were talking

about.

Mr. ISSA. So just one last follow-up. So what I am hearing is that

even though there is no smoke and anybody could figure out that

it must be safer, you are saying that if they made that claim, then

you would think about evaluating it. Do we need science to

determine——

Mr. MURIS. Well, no. I am saying——

Mr. ISSA. [continuing] that smoke has no second hand smoke

claim?

Mr. MURIS. The evaluation could be very quick, but obviously if

someone asks us, let us go back to the premise. The premise was

we were asked about these claims. I cannot give an answer without

an evaluation, even if the evaluation occurs in a twinkling of an

eye.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired, and the

gentlelady from California, Ms. Solis.

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Carmona for being here. It is good to see you. I

know on occasion we talked about some of these chronic illnesses

that face our communities, especially minority communities and

the Latino community.

And I wanted to ask you, and I do not know if this has come up,

what the cost is in terms of prevention for tobacco use now that

66

you know of in terms of government trying to combat the use, trying to get youth to stay out of, you know, going into that bad habit

of smoking.

Mr. CARMONA. I do not have a dollar amount for you. I certainly

can get that, but whatever it is, I know that when we look at prevention across the board, we spend far, far too little on all prevention activities in this country.

Ms. SOLIS. Would you say that the number of youth, particularly

minority youth in terms of smoking, has gone up in the last 10

years or it has gone down?

Mr. CARMONA. I think it has slightly increased where other areas

or other subsets have decreased. This is still a population that is

at greater risk.

Ms. SOLIS. I saw some information regarding, I guess, a percentage decrease for young Latinas in terms of smoking. I kind of understand why that is happening, because more women at least are

going in for prenatal care and are being advised of low birth weight

that their child would experience if they continue to smoke.

Is that something that your office is also advocating?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, the epidemiology and demographics of smoking are tracked very carefully by CDC on a routine basis, and they

have all of those numbers broken down, again, by ethnicity, by geographic location, by age, and so on.

So it really depends which group you are speaking of. In some

areas it has plateaued out, but in some there are still subgroups,

Latinos specifically, who are at slightly increased risk, and every

once in a while we see a little increase.

Ms. SOLIS. One of the explanations that we were given is that,

in fact, if you were advocating for use of smokeless tobacco, that

that probably or could lead to use of tobacco, cigarettes. What is

your opinion on that?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, we do look at smokeless products as being a

gateway to smoking. It can be still a sense of security that, again,

as I have said earlier, this is a lesser threat. It is a safer means

to get your nicotine and chew, and we are definitely concerned

about that for the reasons I have already mentioned.

Ms. SOLIS. One of the other questions I have is women, I think,

overall, my understanding is that the rate has actually gone up; is

that correct, in terms of cigarettes?

Mr. CARMONA. It depends on the age group, and I would have to

look at that data, but the aggregate, if it has, it is very slightly in

aggregate. But, again, breaking down the populations, minority

populations’ age and demographics you will have peaks and leveling off periods that are different than the aggregate data when

you just lump all women together, for instance nationally.

Ms. SOLIS. The information I have is that women account now

for about 39 percent of all smoke related deaths in the U.S.

Mr. CARMONA. That is correct.

Ms. SOLIS. I guess one of the questions I would have is if we are

trying to get women to stop smoking and using an alternative

measure here, in this case smokeless tobacco, I cannot think of too

many women who would want to chew tobacco, you know, and I

would love to hear more about that. Because I think that is a real

67

issue that we are really skirting the issue here, and how do you

deal with that?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, I think that is, you know, a social and cultural part of our society where young men embrace that and most

women reject it.

Ms. SOLIS. Well, wouldn’t that have an impact on modifying

maybe their behavior?

Mr. CARMONA. Oh, yes, ma’am. Absolutely, yes.

Ms. SOLIS. So I am still very skeptical about the direction of

where we are going with all of this because I know that in our community, and especially in California, the State of California is pretty progressive in terms of prevention, tobacco smoking and all of

that, and restricting where you can use cigarettes.

In fact, we have an initiative that was passed, Prop. 10, that you

are probably aware of that is a dedicated source of funding strictly

for prevention.

So my question goes to while we are spending a lot of money to

try to treat the illness, cancer, respiratory, emphysema, at the

same time we are raising revenue to try to tell youth to give them

the message and young people not to smoke.

Mr. CARMONA. Yes.

Ms. SOLIS. And then we are saying, on the other hand, well, it

is okay to chew tobacco when, in fact, studies, I guess, are not clear

on how severe that might be.

My question is, you know: where are we going with this in terms

of giving accurate information that smokeless tobacco may be

harmful, could be maybe in different degrees obviously. Maybe you

do not get cancer in 10 years. Maybe you suffer from tooth decay

a lot faster, which we see in our community, by the way.

And I would ask, you know, what your opinion is on that.

Mr. CARMONA. Congresswoman, my opinion is that, as I have

stated, irrespective of the debate here today, I see no scientific evidence to support the use of smokeless products for any reason, and

they are hazardous to your health, from causing cancer to causing

oral disease, including gingivitis, tooth decay, as well as a host of

other diseases.

So without further evidence to refute that, I could not support its

use in any fashion.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

conducting this hearing.

Let me say first having spent most of my adult life up until the

political side of things encouraging people to stop smoking and

using tobacco products, I think it is interesting that we come to

today where we are talking about relative risk of different products.

There is no question as we look at the IOM report, 180,000

deaths from the cardiovascular disease, 150,000 from cancer, about

85,000 from respiratory disease related to tobacco use, and so there

is no question that if we had a perfect world, that no one would

smoke or use products that are harmful to their health.

68

But, in fact, that is not the case. We do have a free society, and

I think in a free society it is very important to remember that a

couple of things are important.

One, I think it is extremely important to be intellectually honest

with the population so that they can make choices. Some people

choose to smoke even though they know the risk is there. I think

75 percent of the people that are smoking would like to quit. That

means there is 25 percent that do not even want to quit.

So outside of prohibition, which even though some may support

that, I think we probably have it nigh to impossible to control and

regulate. We went through prohibition in the early part of the last

century with some abysmal results.

But given that, let me look, and I want to present a couple of

things. I have looked over these reports, and I know the Surgeon

General has commented on that. One was the Royal College of Physicians of London, and these are, you know, pretty reputable folks.

In fact, they have been around a lot longer that probably most of

our even Harvard and some of our early medical institutions. I

mean these are folks that spend their life doing research.

And they come up and say a way of using nicotine, the consumption of noncombustible tobacco is on the order of 10 to 1,000 times

less hazardous than smoking, depending on the product. Some

manufacturers want to market smokeless tobacco’s harm reduction

option for nicotine users, and they may find support for that in the

public health community.

But the bottom line is it is a pretty big spectrum. So the science

is pretty unclear. It is 10 to 1,000 times. Even 10 is pretty significant if that is the low balling side.

Now, I do not support and have certainly found it intolerable

that companies in the past have made marketing attempts toward

younger individuals and maybe not always been truthful in what

they said they would market and things. And so I think it is clear

that we have some sort of guidelines for advertising, for marketing

a product.

But I also look at given the fact that Royal College is 10 to 1,000

times less, there is also the European. These are some pretty reputable people, too, that have spent a lifetime just in research. They

said oral tobacco may play a role in harmful reduction. It is not

necessary to show that it does not cause cancer. It just needs to

be substantially less hazardous than smoking, even allowing for

the cautious assumption about health impact.

So that is what you were talking about, the European, I guess.

The smokeless tobacco and other oral tobaccos are a very substantially less dangerous way to use tobacco than cigarettes, and it goes

on to talk about a number of different other things, but it does at

least acknowledge, and this is a study of some physician researchers that smokeless tobacco has reduced health.

Now, the Scandinavian study—and I know the Surgeon General

mentioned that some of the factors were not controlled—there was

one of those studies where they were controlled fairly well. Let me

read those to you.

This was a Lagergin study. It was a case controlled study, patients with adenocarcinoma of the esophagus, gastric, cardio, and

esophageal squamous cell carcinoma. It said many potential conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
69

founders were considered, including age, sex, education, cigarette

smoking, alcohol consumption, dietary intakes. It did not mention

coffee specifically. Dietary intakes of fruit and vegetables and energy intake, BMI, reflux symptoms, physical activities.

It talked about the substantial reduction. I agree that the science

is not totally—I mean there are a lot of studies that can be done,

and the science is not totally complete in this area. But one of the

questions I have got for both of you is if we could have certainly

an initiative for regulating tobacco products, whether it be FDA or

whether it be FTC on the marketing of it, and it was marketed in

such a way that it was very clear to not use the word ‘‘safe’’ or

‘‘safer,’’ but say you had a relative scale from 1 to 10, and say you

could say, well, given the current knowledge that we have, you

know, filterless cigarettes, maybe a 10; smokeless, somewhere less

there.

And, by the way, I come from a district that produces burley,

which is for cigarettes, not for smokeless tobacco.

Given the fact that we live in a free society and it is important

to get information out, and given the fact that I know some people

feel that this gateway issue may promote more people, but wouldn’t

it be incumbent upon us to provide that information to them, that

there is a relative risk?

And I say that because I have got a brother that I tried to get

to stop smoking. He was smoking. We got him to stop. He started

dipping snuff. Finally when we could not get him to stop altogether, we just kind of quit, and, yes, he went back to smoking. But

I never told him about reduced risk.

And I just wonder that given the fact that even second hand

smoke causes some injuries of what we might do if we give the

public intellectually honest information about the relative risk, and

I would just like both of you to comment on that.

Mr. CARMONA. Well, if I might, I will just comment on the

science first, and then I will pass off to my colleague on the advertising.

I certainly respect your opinions as a colleague, as a fellow physician, sir, but the Swedish study, I know that they looked at an endpoint of oral cancer risk and not cardiovascular disease or other

causes of mortality in a more broad sense. So it is only one endpoint.

So I think variables also in outcome, as well as the inputs for the

research I think are equally important.

Mr. FLETCHER. May I interrupt you just to ask you a question?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLETCHER. Do you believe that smoking has the same cardiovascular risk as smokeless tobacco, say, the Swedish smokeless?

Mr. CARMONA. I would have to review the data more specifically,

but I know there is risk. If it is the same or lesser, then we get

into that issue again of is it safer.

Mr. FLETCHER. Yes, relative risk. That is what studies are about.

There is no absolute there.

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, and so the other issue is when we are talking

about the amount of nicotine, for instance, and you do not also talk

about carcinogenicity, then you just negate the fact that we know

that these are cancer causing compounds, and so if you just adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
70

dress the issue of, well, is this a safe way of using this to withdraw

somebody from their nicotine addiction.

Well, again, my premise is that if I know that this is a carcinogen, then I really could not in good faith recommend it for any

other use when I know no matter what else you are using it for——

Mr. FLETCHER. I agree. We do not recommend it for use, period,

but I am talking about a relative scale, just getting information out

to the public. It is kind of like on HPV and cervical cancer. You

know that. We talk about the use of condoms does not totally prevent HPV and cervical cancer, but it reduces the risk, and there

are a lot of folks on different sides of the aisle that have a different

approach to that.

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, I understand, and I can understand where

you are coming from and some of the research is looking at this a

little bit different as a matter of policy. But, again, it comes back

to the cancer causing effects or carcinogenicity of this for me, that

when you say on a relative risk and you say, ‘‘Okay. Well, smoking

let us say is a ten and maybe this product is a five, but it still

causes cancer.’’

So if you say the relative risk is lower, all right, I cannot argue

with you if we show that statistically, but it is still a cancer causing agent, which is why I am concerned.

Mr. FLETCHER. I agree.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlelady, Ms. Cubin.

Ms. CUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling

this hearing today.

I was one of those members that did request because I believe

that knowledge is power, and I want to point out that we are not

here today talking about the ills of smoking. We all know that. We

all believe it, and we accept it.

We are also not talking about marketing tobacco products to children. If I had three wishes and I found the bottle on the shore and

the genie popped out, I would probably wish for enough money to

take care of myself and my family and meet our needs until we die.

I would probably ask for good health for myself and my family. And

the third thing would be that I would wish for all children to make

decisions that were beneficial to their bodies as far as health is

concerned.

So, you know, I am a mother, and I actually have a son that

chews smokeless tobacco, and I hate it. When I was a little girl,

my grandfather chewed smokeless tobacco. I am from Wyoming,

and probably we have as many people that use smokeless tobacco

as anyone.

But what I am thinking about are the 10 million adults that are

going to die in the next 10 years or the next two decades I should

say, that are going to die from actions related to smoking, conditions related to smoking.

I have a degree in chemistry, and whenever we would be arguing

an issue in science, the first thing we would always do is challenge

the studies that were cited by—I was also in debate—the studies

that were challenged by the other side.

71

And so, Dr. Carmona, you do not accept as valid because it is not

comprehensive enough the study by Britain’s Royal Academy of

Medicine; is that correct? Was that the reason you gave during

your questioning and statement?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes. Not that it was invalid, but that to make a

decision you need much more information, and my colleagues also

who study this——

Ms. CUBIN. Yes. Okay. Well, then does it follow that the same

level of comprehensiveness must be followed to support the statement you made that smokeless tobacco is a gateway to smoking?

Is there a study that you can cite that has more comprehensive

basis than the Royal Academy’s?

And if so, would you please furnish that?

I would like a comparison actually of the studies themselves and

why the study that you are quoting as far as the gateway to smoking is concerned is superior to the basis of this study by the Royal

Academy. Would you provide that to us?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. CUBIN. Thank you.

Mr. CARMONA. I did not mean to imply that it was superior, but

I would be happy to provide the information to you.

Ms. CUBIN. Sure. You did not say it was superior, but you base

your opinion on something, and I am just curious to know how you

substantiate that in your own mind, and I would appreciate it if

you would provide that to us.

Another point that I wanted to bring up is that science is changing. Mr. Muris brought that up earlier in response to a question

that science is changing. In the 1986 Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, Congress ordered that three messages

be alternated on snus cans. You notice I call it snus because that

is what my grandpa always called it. That is politically correct to

me.

Anyway, one of those statements is this product is not a safe alternative to cigarettes. Well, since your agency did not come up

with that language that it is not a safe alternative to cigarettes,

Mr. Muris, I wonder if you have a responsibility.

I mean, obviously the Congress did that, but trying to decide who

has a responsibility to get this information forward, I mean, it is

your agency’s responsibility that the correct information be out

there. This language was done in 1986. Isn’t there information that

would cause you to at least look at that and make a recommendation to the Congress if they are the ones to do the language, which

I do not think, frankly, that Congress should be doing that? I think

it should be done in your agency.

Mr. MURIS. Well, the history of this issue is many, many years

ago, in the mid-1960’s, my agency tried to do something, and Congress immediately stepped in, and my agency has had the wisdom

since the to——

Ms. CUBIN. To stay out?

Mr. MURIS. Well, we have issued reports and we have done other

things, but we have not tried to by rulemaking do something that

Congress has made it pretty clear that it wants to do.

Look. In the bigger——

72

Ms. CUBIN. But that is really not my point. My point really is

if this statement is factually wrong, I mean, if we cannot make the

statement that non-tobacco products—well, let me see. Where did

I write this down? I wish I could keep track.

Go ahead and answer what you were going to say.

Mr. MURIS. Well, in the very large context, and I do not want to

lose sight of that here in the specifics, this hearing is very important because potentially—and that is obviously the key word—

there are very large public health benefits to be made from addressing the problem of people who cannot or will not quit smoking.

And that is why I said a place to start where I think we can do

more, and again, it is potential, and the FDA already regulates

this, and that is why I said I would obviously need to talk to them,

is with the non-tobacco risk reduction products, the gums and the

patches.

They right now can only be marketed for a very limited purpose.

So consumers cannot be told about their potential for that group

of smokers who are unwilling to go off of nicotine entirely.

Ms. CUBIN. So what I have drawn from this hearing today so far

is that if more people were using snus instead of smoking cigarettes, that our national health care bill would be lower; that there

would not be people suffering from second hand smoke from other

smokers; that improvement would be seen in our national health

picture.

And I just think it seems to me, General, or I mean Admiral—

excuse me.

Mr. CARMONA. No problem.

Ms. CUBIN. But it is something that we should consider. I do not

think anyone is saying that the use of snus is a healthy thing to

do, but I certainly do not think that we can say that it is not a

healthier thing to do than smoke cigarettes.

So my time is up, and if you would like to respond to that, that

would be great.

Mr. CARMONA. I think my remarks, ma’am, have been directed

to the science that we have at hand today, that there is no evidence

at this point to use that as a substitute. What we do know about

the product is that it can cause cancer and other diseases.

I also stated earlier though if there is research to the contrary,

if there is research that can define some role, my colleagues and

I are always happy to look at that to see if there is a possibility,

but as of this date we have seen none.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The gentleman

from Idaho, Mr. Otter.

Mr. OTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I along with the rest of the panel want to thank you very

much for calling this most important hearing.

I have always been adverse to putting the fist of government into

the glove of courtesy. I know many times when I was in my State

legislature we passed no smoking in public places even though it

was not a government building or was not a government called

meeting, and I always voted against those kind of bills because I

felt that I had a personal responsibility, if I did not want to be in

part of that environment, that I should go to the restaurant owner

73

and say, ‘‘I am not going to eat here any longer as long as you do

not have a no smoking section or as long as I cannot avoid second

hand smoke.’’

But I want to make an admission like my colleague from California, Mr. Issa, that I, too, am a recovering smoker. I quit for my

son’s first birthday 34 years ago, and it is probably one of the

smarter things that I have ever done, but I did it because I recognized that it is personal responsibility.

And it is unfortunate that so many of the things that we do in

Congress, and I have only been here a little over 2 years and a few

months, but so many of the things that we do here in Congress is

we try to substitute the national consciousness and the national

Treasury for personal choice, and of course, I have to look right

back on the immediate past of the tobacco lawsuits that we had.

And even when I did smoke 35 years ago, I never bought a pack

of cigarettes that probably did not have that warning on it. And I

say ‘‘probably’’ because I doubt if I read it more than once or twice,

only as a novelty, I guess, when it first appeared.

But I made that choice. I made that choice to smoke, and I

watched as the generation just before us, as many of the folks in

my generation watched as that generation just before us that had

smoked 10 years more than we had started suffering the consequences of that behavioral choice.

Well, I think we have sent a far more dangerous message to our

youth about smoking or not smoking or choosing to use tobacco in

any form or not to use it when we have substituted the national

Treasury and the national consciousness through Congress action,

through the Judiciary Department’s action of bringing a lawsuit

against the tobacco companies.

They were warned: do not smoke. Then we go back and sue them

anyway and say we are going to hold you responsible. That is past

history. I disagree with that.

I suspect when I was in the military, and you could have called

me General, Barbara, I was in the armored calvary, and it was not

unusual for us during training or during OJT or AIT to stop the

column and break and say, ‘‘Smoke them if you have got them.’’

And sometimes they were supplied in our food packets. Anyway,

I suspect that got a lot of people smoking.

But anyway, what I would like to ask, I guess, both of you, it has

not been unusual for the government, as Congresswoman Cubin

made the point earlier, that knowledge is power, and one of the responsibilities this republic, this government does have to its citizens is to make them as knowledgeable as possible and then stay

out of their way and allow them to use that knowledge for choices.

And it seems to me that if there is evidence and whether or not

you disagree with these early on reports, it has not been unusual,

Mr. Muris, for the FTC to allow cigarette makers to say, ‘‘This new

filter that we have got on here allows for less tars and less nicotine. This new cigarette is a little less of this and a little less of

that,’’ and thereby enhancing the possibility that it is probably not

as dangerous as the one without a filter or is the one referred to

earlier, and I don’t want to pick on any particular company, but the

Camel cigarette.

74

And I know when I first stated smoking if you could smoke a

camel, you were tough. You know, you probably got off a little easier with something with a filter on it, but my point is: why isn’t it

your responsibility to make people more knowledgeable and, therefore, more free to make the right decision by adding up and subtracting the causes and the amount of danger there is in different

products?

We do it all the time, less salt, less sugar, less fat. We hear it

all the time. Why isn’t that our responsibility irrespective of your

feeling and the Admiral’s feeling about all of them being bad?

And with that I will yield back.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Would you like to answer the question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MURIS. Sure, if you want.

Mr. STEARNS. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. MURIS. I do believe in the importance of knowledge, and as

I mentioned just a few minutes ago, in the potential of public

health benefits from risk reduction products. There are obviously

important attributes here. This is a product that used as intended

causes you great damage, and I think everybody recognizes that.

And our experience with the tar reduction has not been a particularly happy one because of the phenomenon called compensation by which people smoke the cigarettes harder and, therefore,

get more damage than if they smoked them on some relative level.

So that just shows us that we need caution.

Mr. CARMONA. I would just briefly comment that I agree with

your premise, sir, as far as the right of people to choose, and in a

perfect world, we would hope that armed with the appropriate information that people would make the right decisions, but often

their individual decisions have impact on a population at large, and

sometimes I think where markets fail or common sense fails regulation sometimes is essential.

We do it with speed laws because we know people drive too fast,

and we have been able to demonstrate that by slowing them down

there are less accidents.

We know that seatbelts save lives, and in many states people felt

it was their right not to wear one. Yet the impact to the population

and the cost of health care on the whole was significant. So we had

regulation for that and helmets and a number of other things.

And I think, again, in a perfect world I would agree with you

that it would be nice that people would make prudent decisions

based on the information before them, which is part of my job to

bring that scientific information forward. However, they do not always make the right decisions. And their poor decisions can adversely impact the population as a whole.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first would like to recognize Dr. Carmona, whom I shared a podium with at the American Public Health Association meeting in

Philadelphia and was very impressed with his words then and all

that he shared with us.

75

Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield my time to Mr. Waxman,

who has alerted Americans to the dangers of all forms of tobacco

more than anyone in this body. So Mr. Waxman, if I could.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.

Thirty years ago the FTC was fooled by the tobacco companies

into allowing them to advertise low tar and light cigarettes, and as

a result millions of Americans switched to those products because

they thought it would protect their health.

As a result of that, millions of American died because they were

not safer products. In fact, they were not even what they claimed

to be.

Now I think what we have before the FTC is another attempt by

an industry to commit a fraud on the American people, and that

is to try to present smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative. Now,

the first question is: is it a safer alternative?

And, Dr. Carmona, you have been so clear on every question that

has been raised on that point, the safer alternative. Is that a fair

statement?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, let us say for argument purposes it was

safer, slightly, harmful but safer. Well, it is only safer if people will

use it instead of smoking, not if they use it in addition to smoking.

Is there any evidence that anybody can show that people will

give up cigarette smoking because they have got a safer alternative? I submit there is no evidence at all, none.

Now, another theory. If you advertise this product as a safer alternative to cigarettes, kids might start using this product. In fact,

I think this is what this is all about. Kids are not using this smokeless tobacco as much because they have caught onto the fact that

it does them a great deal of harm. When it says cancer of the jaw,

kids start picturing what cancer of the jaw means, and more and

more of them are giving up smokeless tobacco.

But if they are told it is a safe alternative, they might say, ‘‘Well,

I will try this safer alternative.’’

But we do have evidence, don’t we, Dr. Carmona, that people

who use smokeless tobacco are starting to get the nicotine habit

and then they can move on to cigarettes? Isn’t that an accurate

statement?

Mr. CARMONA. Yes, sir, there is scientific evidence to support

that.

Mr. WAXMAN. So the question that Mr. Muris said is is there a

potential public health benefit. Well, it is hard for me to see that

there is a potential public health benefit.

So the FTC allows this advertising. We will have to see 20 years

down the road what harm we have done because the FTC operates

to allow advertising, unlike the FDA, which would screen any kind

of claim in advance.

I really am struck by the fact that it has been a long time since

the Congress has held any hearings about tobacco. Today two committees are holding hearings on tobacco. We are not looking at the

Institute of Medicine recommendations, which said that they had

a strategy. This was an HHS advisory committee, that they

thought could lead to a cessation of smoking and lead to 3 million

lives being saved. Five million people could quit within 1 year.

76

Instead, what the two committees of Congress are looking at is

what the industries want. Today we are looking at what U.S. Tobacco would like. This afternoon we are going to look at what U.S.

Tobacco and Philip Morris would like.

That is what the Congress has come to. We respond to the industry pressure to bring this issue up. Mr. Muris, this is a hearing for

you. This is a hearing to impress you that a lot of Members of Congress would like you to be receptive to U.S. Tobacco’s attempt to

rejuvenate their market.

Well, I would hope that we rely on science, and the science is not

there. The science is not there. The politics may be because tobacco

is rich and powerful, but the science is not there, and I would hope

that you look at the science very, very carefully.

And I am awfully nervous when a bunch of lawyers are making

the decision on science when it ought to be up to something like

the FDA or the Surgeon General or the Institute of Medicine to

make the decision. I know you will consult with them.

I do not know if you are aware, either of you, that Philip Morris

once surveyed 85 former users of smokeless tobacco and found that

53 were now smoking, and I would like to introduce for the record

Philip Morris’ report on how people who were using smokeless tobacco didn’t wean themselves off from cigarette smoking, that they

are either back to smoking or moved on to smoking, and I would

hope we can get that in the record.

Mr. STEARNS. Fine. By unanimous consent, so order.

[The report appears at the end of the hearing.]

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity you

have afforded me to participate in this hearing, and I just hope

that people do not get fooled a second time the way the FTC was

fooled 30 years ago and then we look back 20 years from now and

think about all of the people that got cancer of the jaw and moved

on to cigarettes and used cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, and

rather than the potential public health benefit, we ended up with

a potential public health disaster.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman from Ohio’s time has expired.

Mr. Shimkus is recognized.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am going to be

brief. We have already been here a long time, and I think we are

going in cyclical debates on this issue.

I will just say that we have a debate over words, and basically

it is an agreement that there is a risk to smokeless tobacco, but

the real question is: is there a lower risk than smoking and whether that is second hand smoke or whether that is all of these other

things?

Have we considered—and I would think I would go to Dr.

Carmona first—have we as a country considered commissioning our

own study that would address many of the questions that were

broached today to insure that we have factual, scientific evidence?

And if we have not so far, would we consider doing so? And if

not, why?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, sir, there are many studies that have been

done in the literature. I mean literally hundreds of studies on a

broad range of issues regarding smoking cessation and so on and

including smokeless products, and there are ongoing studies now

77

both at CDC that are ongoing as we speak and programs that are

funded throughout the United States at universities and other

areas that NIH funds that are addressing many of these questions.

Now, if there are specific questions that are not being answered

or that you felt that needed to be addressed, certainly we would be

willing to entertain that, and I would pass it on to my colleagues

who are doing the research.

But there is a broad range of research that has taken place and

continues to take place on these subjects.

Mr. SHIMKUS. So I guess the question for me is based upon the

current research that you have available to review, and obviously

you do not have the information from the ongoing research, nothing

that has been said with respect to the IOM report—that still does

not provide enough information to make a determination whether

there is any significant benefit for someone going from tobacco used

in cigarettes versus smokeless?

Mr. CARMONA. Well, I think the IOM report was fairly clear and

said that there was no evidence and there are no products on the

market today to advocate for that type of substitution. So the IOM

report is fairly clear, I think, in its conclusion.

Mr. SHIMKUS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentleman.

I want to thank both of you for your patience, and we appreciate

your testimony.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask unanimous consent? I would like to submit one other question to Admiral

Carmona relating to the Center for Disease Control.

Mr. STEARNS. Unanimous consent request is granted.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you.

One minute? Oh, submit it for the record, oh, by unanimous consent.

I would say in just conclusion that Mr. Waxman talked about a

study that suggests that smokeless tobacco is a gateway to cigarettes, but I think also he should have been fair and pointed out

that there is also a study that refutes that gateway theory stating

that the gateway study that was made was flawed.

And Mr. Waxman, of course, will be in the second hearing this

afternoon on the same subject.

So we welcome now the second panel. The second panel consists

of Dr. Robert Wallace, M.D., Institute of Medicine, Vice Chair,

Committee to Assess the Science Base for Tobacco Harm Reduction.

Dr. Scott L. Tomar, editor, Journal of Public Health Dentistry,

University of Florida College of Dentistry, Division of Public Health

Services and Research.

Dr. Brad Rodu, professor, Department of Pathology, University of

Alabama at Birmingham.

Mr. Steven Burton, Vice President of Smoking Controls Strategic

Development and Switch, Glaxo SmithKline Consumer Health care.

Mr. Richard H. Verheij, Executive Vice President, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company.

Mr. Matthew L. Myers, President and CEO, National Center for

Tobacco Free Kids.

78

And Mr. David T. Sweanor, Counsel, Non-smokers Rights Association.

I urge the members to stay for the second panel because if we

are talking about the science, then we have people who can actually speak to that science, and so it would be very helpful for members if they can to come back to continue our discussion.

We have an order in my witness list that I will use if you do not

mind, and so I am going to ask Dr. Wallace to start off with his

opening statement. Five minutes, and if you want to take less and

make your opening statement part of the record, obviously that

would be appreciated. We have a large panel here.

So we will start off with you, Dr. Wallace, and welcome and

thank you.

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT B. WALLACE, VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE TO ASSESS THE SCIENCE BASE FOR TOBACCO

HARM REDUCTION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE; SCOTT L.

TOMAR, EDITOR, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH DENTISTRY,

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA COLLEGE OF DENTISTRY, DIVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES AND RESEARCH; BRAD

RODU, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF PATHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM; STEVEN L. BURTON,

VICE PRESIDENT, SMOKING CONTROLS STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT AND SWITCH, GLAXO SmithKLINE CONSUMER

HEALTH CARE; RICHARD H. VERHEIJ, EXECUTIVE VICE

PRESIDENT, U.S. SMOKELESS TOBACCO COMPANY; MATTHEW L. MYERS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NATIONAL CENTER

FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS; AND DAVID T. SWEANOR, COUNSEL, NON-SMOKERS RIGHTS ASSOCIATION

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you, Congressman.

I was the Vice Chair of the committee that put the Clearing the

Smoke report together, and just for the record, I am a professor of

epidemiology and internal medicine at the University of Iowa.

I am going to paraphrase my remarks, and I would like them to

be entered into the record, along with the report itself.

Mr. STEARNS. Your opening statement will be part of the record.

By unanimous consent, so ordered.

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you.

Let me first say in part because I responded to the earlier testimony this morning that we dealt with a range of harm reduction

products and tobacco and not particularly related to smokeless tobacco. In fact, we did consider smokeless, but we also considered

other tobacco devices and delivery systems, and we also considered

nicotine replacement therapy as well.

We basically had four conclusions in our report, and one is that

we think that for many diseases attributable to tobacco use reducing the risk by reducing exposure to tobacco toxicants is, in fact,

feasible.

However, while we think that manufacturers of these products

should have an incentive to make claims, this incentive could only

be done in the context of a comprehensive national tobacco control

program that has emphasized abstinence oriented prevention and

treatment and only if the harm reduction assessment has been

thoroughly scientifically vetted.

79

We also concluded that these potential reduced exposure products have not yet been evaluated, as others have said, and certainly not comprehensively enough to provide a scientific basis for

concluding that they are associated with reduced risk compared to

convention tobacco use.

We concluded that regulation of all tobacco products is necessary

in order to assure a scientific basis for judging the effects of particular products versus others.

We concluded also that from a public health perspective, and it

has been said several times this morning that it is very important

to understand the public health impact of introducing new products

and making claims about products, and therefore, the health and

behavioral effects of all of these products must be monitored on a

continuing basis.

We suggested a regulatory framework. It is long and detailed,

and I would just highlight just four of the many principles. They

included disclosure of product ingredients, toxicity testing, pre-market approval of claims, and issues relating to labeling, advertising,

and promotion, and also post marketing surveillance so that, in

fact, we can find out what happens to Americans when these products are released both in terms of their behaviors and with respect

to these products and in terms of their health.

Finally then I just have three public health messages that I have

culled from the report. One is that the committee strongly felt that

the best strategy, of course, is to never use tobacco at all, and if

you are using it, to quit and I think that needs emphasis.

Second, with appropriate and comprehensive research, surveillance, education, and regulation, we do feel that these products

could possibly, emphasize ‘‘possibly,’’ reduce the some of the risk of

tobacco related disease, but the net health impact, again, is unknown, and although the products may be risk reducing for an individual, they may, in fact, increase the risk to populations.

And then finally, our third public health message is that we pled

for a comprehensive and verifiable surveillance system being the

crucial link to understand the relationship between the availability

of these products and reduced risk both to individuals and reduced

harm to the public health in general.

So I very much appreciate your willingness to hear me out, and

I would be happy to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Robert Wallace follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. WALLACE, VICE-CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE TO ASSESS THE SCIENCE BASE FOR TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE/

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is Robert

Wallace. I am Professor of Epidemiology and Internal Medicine at the College of

Public Health, University of Iowa. I served as Vice-Chairman of the Committee to

Assess the Science Base for Tobacco Harm Reduction of the Institute of Medicine.

The Institute of Medicine operates under the 1863 charter by Congress to the National Academy of Sciences to advise the government on matters of science, technology, and health.

The work of the committee was conducted under a contract initiated by the Food

and Drug Administration. The committee began its work in December 1999 and released its report, Clearing the Smoke: Assessing the Science Base for Tobacco Harm

Reduction, in February 2001. For the purposes of this report and in keeping with

general definitions, tobacco harm reduction refers to decreasing the burden of death

and disease, without completely eliminating nicotine and tobacco use. The comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
80

mittee was asked to provide a framework for the assessment of tobacco and pharmaceutical products that might be used for tobacco harm reduction. However, the committee did not review specific products.

I’d like to emphasize several of the committee’s principal objectives, conclusions

and recommendations.

1. For many diseases attributable to tobacco use, reducing the risk of disease by

reducing exposure to tobacco toxicants is feasible. Therefore, manufacturers should

have the necessary incentive to develop and market products that reduce exposure

to tobacco toxicants and that have a reasonable prospect of reducing the risk of tobacco-related disease.

This incentive is the ability of manufacturers to make exposure-reduction or riskreduction claims. However, I must note that the report is supportive of such claims

only if made in the context of a comprehensive national tobacco control program

that emphasizes abstinence-oriented prevention and treatment, and if under the

harm reduction assessment and regulatory framework outlined by the committee,

such as illustrated in my next three points.

2. These potential reduced-exposure products have not yet been evaluated comprehensively enough to provide a scientific basis for concluding that they are associated with a reduced risk of disease compared to conventional tobacco use. Consumers therefore should be fully and accurately informed of all the known, likely,

and potential consequences of using these products. The promotion, advertising, and

labeling of these products should be firmly regulated to prevent false or misleading

claims, explicit or implicit.

3. Regulation of all tobacco products is a necessary precondition for assuring a scientific basis for judging the effects of using the potential reduced-exposure products

and for assuring that the health of the public is protected.

4. Finally, and most importantly, the public health impact of these products is all

but unknown. They are potentially beneficial, but the net impact on population

health, or public health, could, in fact, be negative. Therefore, the health and behavioral effects of using these products must be monitored on a continuing basis. Basic,

clinical, and epidemiological research must be conducted to establish their potential

for harm reduction for individuals and populations.

The committee outlined several general principles for regulating these products.

These principles address, for example:

• disclosure of product ingredients,

• toxicity testing,

• premarket approval of claims, and issues related to labeling, advertising, and promotion, and

• postmarketing surveillance.

I’d like to conclude my testimony by summarizing three key public health messages about the potential for improving health in the face of the availability of the

potential reduced exposure products:

1. The committee unanimously and strongly held that the best strategy to protect

human health from the dangers of tobacco is to quit—or not to start tobacco use

in the first place.

2. With appropriate and comprehensive research, surveillance, education, and regulation, these products could possibly reduce the risk of tobacco-related disease.

However, the net health impact is all but unknown. Claims of reduced risk to the

individual may well not translate into reduced harm to the population. Although a

product might be risk-reducing for the individual using it compared to conventional

tobacco products, the availability of these products might increase harm to the population. This could occur if:

• tobacco users who might otherwise have quit do not,

• former tobacco users resume use, or

• some people who would have not otherwise initiated tobacco use do so because of

perceptions that the risk with these ‘‘new’’ products is minimal and therefore

acceptable.

3. A comprehensive and verifiable surveillance system is the crucial link between

the availability of reduced exposure products and reduced risk to the individual and

reduced harm to public health. It is imperative that we understand what the American people are doing with regard to these products and what is happening to their

health.

I thank you for the opportunity to address you on this important topic. A copy

of my testimony and a copy of the report, Clearing the Smoke, have been submitted

for the record. I am happy to answer any questions about the report.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank Dr. Wallace.

81

Dr. Tomar.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT L. TOMAR

Mr. TOMAR. Good morning. My name is Scott Tomar, and for the

record, I am an associate professor with the University of Florida

College of Dentistry.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify on the issue of marketing smokeless tobacco as a potential harm reduction strategy for

cigarette smoking. I think this is an important public health area,

but it represents a tobacco industry marketing strategy that is both

highly flawed and potentially dangerous, and I will outline these.

First, smokeless tobacco causes cancer and is addictive. It is a

mistake to promote it as safer, as a safer alternative to smoking

while safe sources of nicotine are available, such as gum and path.

In the mid-1980’s, the U.S. Surgeon General and the International Agency for Research on Cancer concluded that snuff use

causes oral cancer, gum disease, and nicotine addiction. Based on

available evidence, UST’s products are still carcinogenic.

More recent research suggests that snuff use may increase the

risk of cardiovascular disease, including heart attack. Smokers

should be encouraged to use proven, safe sources of nicotine to

quite smoking and not snuff.

Second, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company has a long history of

marketing oral snuff to young males with no history of tobacco use,

including promotion of low nicotine starter products. Allowing them

to make safety claims may increase nicotine addiction among

youth.

Heavy promotion of oral snuff led to huge increases in use by

young males from the early 1970’s until the mid-1990’s. Between

1970 and 1991, the prevalence of snuff use among men 18 to 24

years old increased more than 8-fold. This increase was no accident, but was the result of a sophisticated marketing campaign

that developed, advertised, and promoted use of oral snuff starter

products with low levels of free nicotine as part of a graduation

strategy that encouraged new users to move up to brands higher

in nicotine as tolerance developed.

The high nicotine brands are highly addictive and high in cancer

causing nitrosamines.

Public health groups work aggressively to educate young people

on the dangers of oral snuff. In 2001, 14.8 percent of male high

school students reported current use of smokeless tobacco, which is

down from 20.4 percent in 1993.

That decline was accompanied by an increase in the proportion

of high school students who perceive that regular use of smokeless

tobacco carries great risk of harm. Allowing UST to make claims

that these products are relatively safe could reverse this trend and

result in an increase in use by youth.

Third, UST has failed to protect consumers by failing to inform,

by not lowering known cancer causing agents in its product or informing consumers about their toxic and addictive properties.

Oral snuff contains dangerously high levels of cancer causing

agents called tobacco specific nitrosamines, to TSNAs. USDA does

not acknowledge or inform their consumers that conventional oral

snuff causes cancer or is addictive.

82

In addition, UST refuses to report brand specific product content,

nicotine dosing, or the levels of TSNAs. A recent study conducted

by the American Health Foundation found that snuff brands manufactured by UST had TSNA levels that were 15 to 23 times higher

than those found in a popular Swedish brand, and that TSNA levels in UST’s products, such as Copenhagen, increased as much as

137 percent after the products were stored at room temperature for

6 months.

In contrast, no significant changes were observed in the TSNA

levels of brands made by Swedish Match. That study demonstrates

that it is technologically feasible to produce oral snuff products that

are significantly lower in TSNAs than those that are currently ont

he market. UST has the manufacturing technology to reduce the

level of nitrosamines in all of its brands, yet has not done so.

UST has refused to voluntarily reveal the amount of free nicotine

in its products. When I was an epidemiologist with the Office on

Smoking and Health, we asked the company to provide this information to the American people. They flatly refused and denied that

they were able to manipulate the nicotine dosing properties of its

snuff products.

UST’s contentions are strongly contradicted by peer reviewed

science and by sworn depositions of its own chemists.

When Massachusetts passed a law requiring brand specific disclosure of additives that affect toxicity and addiction, UST and the

other tobacco companies sued the state.

Fourth, promotion of oral snuff as a safer alternative to smoking

may have unintended public health consequences. I recently published two studies on this topic. The first looked at smoking initiation among U.S. males age 12 to 17 and found that young males

who were not smokers at baseline but used smoker’s tobacco were

three times more likely than young males who never used smokeless tobacco to be smokers 4 years later.

In contrast, only 2.4 percent of current smokers and 1.5 percent

of ‘‘never smokers’’ became smokeless tobacco users by the 4-year

follow-up.

The second study looked at adult male tobacco users and found

that U.S. men were 2.5 times more likely to be former snuff users

who now smoked than to be former smokers who currently use

snuff. One in 5 males who were daily snuff users also smoked, as

were 40 percent of occasional snuff users.

These studies suggest that smokeless tobacco may be a gateway

for adolescent smoking. Males in the United States are far more

likely to switch from snuff to cigarette smoking than vice versa,

and many men who use snuff are still smoking.

In UST’s current advertising for Revel, the brand is marketed as

a complement to smoking, not as a complete substitute or as way

to quit smoking. The product is marketed for use in settings when

smoking is barred and, therefore, undermines the impact of clean

indoor air laws on smokers’ decision to quit.

UST uses similar marketing messages for its Skoal products.

These products can actually delay or prevent smoking cessation.

Fifth, there is no evidence that the oral snuff use is effective in

helping smokers to quit either in the United States or in Sweden.

83

Not a single randomized controlled trial has been reported that

shows——

Mr. STEARNS. Dr. Tomar, your time has expired. You are over by

a minute. You are welcome if you can to finish up.

Mr. TOMAR. I will save the rest for questions.

Just concluding that smokeless tobacco causes cancer; that its

promotion might actually increase cigarette use, and many states

in the United States have actually been able to reduce both smoking and smokeless tobacco use without promoting one substitute for

the other.

[The prepared statement of Scott L. Tomar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT L. TOMAR, EDITOR, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH

DENTISTRY

1. Smokeless tobacco causes cancer and is addictive. To promote it as a ‘‘safer’’ alternative to smoking while safe sources of nicotine (patch and gum) are available

is a mistake.

Oral snuff is a finely cut, processed tobacco that the user typically places between

the lip and gum. Nicotine is released from the tobacco and absorbed by the membranes of the mouth. In 1986, the US Surgeon General concluded that use of this

product causes oral cancer, gum disease, and nicotine addiction. More recent research suggests that snuff use increased the risk of cardiovascular disease, including heart attack. Swedish research shows that male snuff users have twice the rate

of cardiovascular death as non-users. Smokers should be encouraged to use proven,

safe sources of nicotine to quit smoking not be encouraged to use snuff. There is

no evidence that smokers who switch to oral snuff use have a lower risk of disease

or death; they are still exposed to high levels of carcinogens.

2. USSTC has a long history of marketing oral snuff to young males with no history

of tobacco use including promotion of low nicotine ‘‘starter’’ products. Allowing

them to make ‘‘safety’’ claims may increase nicotine addiction among youth.

Use of oral snuff has risen dramatically among young men. From 1970 to 1991,

the prevalence of snuff use among men aged 18 and older rose from 1.5% to 3.3%;

among men 18-24 years old, it increased more than eightfold from 0.7% to 6.2%,

making this age group the heaviest users of the product among those surveyed.

In the 1980s, USSTC operated a college marketing program on over 200 campuses. The company continues to routinely sponsor fraternity and college events

today. In 1998, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company (USSTC) signed the Smokeless

Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (STMSA) settling lawsuits against USSTC

and agreed not to directly or indirectly target youth in their advertising and promotion. USSTC continued to heavily advertise in youth magazines after signing the

STMSA and USSTC annual advertising expenditure rose from $5.4 million preSTMSA to $6.1 post. It was only after the Attorney General threatened legal action

did the company drop ads in youth magazines. When Massachusetts banned smokeless tobacco advertising in 1999 near schools and playgrounds, USSTC and other

tobacco companies successfully sued the state.

A 1989 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) survey of college athletes

found a 40% increase (from 20% to 28%) in smokeless tobacco use from 1985 to

1989. Among NCAA baseball players, an alarming 57% were users. There is new

evidence that suggests that these increases are no accident, but the result of a sophisticated marketing campaign that developed, advertised, and promoted use of

oral snuff starter products with lower levels of free (un-ionized) nicotine as part of

a graduation strategy that intended new users to move up to brands higher in nicotine as tolerance developed. The high nicotine brands are highly addictive and high

in cancer-causing nitrosamines.

Public health groups aggressively worked to educate young people on the dangers

of oral snuff. In 2001, 14.8% of male high school students reported current use of

smokeless tobacco, down from 20.4% in 1993. According to the University of Michigan, that decline was due to an increase in their knowledge about the dangers of

smokeless tobacco. Allowing USSTC to make claims that these products are ‘‘safer’’

than cigarettes could reverse this and result in an increase by youth.

84

3. USSTC has failed to protect consumers by failing to inform by not lowering known

cancer-causing agents in its products or informing consumers about their toxic

and addictive properties.

Oral snuff contains dangerously high levels of cancer casing agents called tobacco

specific nitrosamines (TSNAs). Unlike the major cigarette companies, who now

admit that their products cause cancer and are addictive, USSTC doesn’t acknowledge or inform their consumers that conventional oral snuff causes cancer or is addictive. In addition, USSTC refuses to report product content, nicotine dosing, or the

levels of TSNAs by brand. In 2000, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health

contracted with the American Health Foundation to determine how new and existing technologies affect the levels of tobacco specific nitrosamines in six brands of

oral snuff. The Department obtained brands of snuff sold in the state as well as one

brand, Ettan, sold in Sweden. The America Health Foundation research found that

the Swedish Match brand and its U.S. subsidiary brand had total TSNA levels between 2.8 ug/g (Ettan) and 7.5 ug/g (TimberWolf). These levels were far lower than

that found for the standard brands available in the state. UST, Swisher and

Conwood brands ranged from16.6 ug/g to 127.9 ug/g. The same study examined the

effect of product aging over two, four and six months. Product aging involves placing

the tobacco product on a shelf at room temperature and retesting the TSNA levels

at the specified time periods. The study found that certain U.S. brands had large

increases in TSNA levels. Copenhagen increased 137% over the six-month time period and Skoal increased 20%. Silver Creek increased 9% over a four month time

period. No significant changes were observed in the levels of Swedish Match or its

subsidiary brands.

The study shows that the levels in the brands manufactured under new technologies were significantly lower than levels of TSNAs in those brands that were

produced under the standard manufacturing processes. Also, brands that employed

the new processes show no increase in TSNAs when aged. The study demonstrates

that it is technologically feasible to produce oral snuff products for adults that are

significantly lower in TSNAs than many of those currently on the market.

USSTC has the manufacturing technology to reduce the level of nitrosamines to

the same level as those found in Swedish products in all of their brands, yet they

have not done so. According to the 2000 Surgeon General’s Report, ‘‘if a new technology exists that can significantly reduce levels of known carcinogens in a tobacco

product, then that technology should be used.’’ Before manufacturers make claims

that oral snuff is a ‘‘safer’’ alternative to cigarette smoking, TSNA levels should be

lowered to the maximum extent possible for all products. Biomarkers should also

be developed to determine if a reduction in TSNAs actually reduces cancer risk and

the research and any claim of reduced harm approved by an independent health

regulatory agency.

USSTC has refused to disclose the levels of TSNAs in their brands, warn consumers about possible TSNA formation and aging or voluntarily reveal the amount

of free nicotine (additive potential) in their product to consumers. I met with USSTC

attorneys and representatives several years ago, when I was an epidemiologist with

the Office on Smoking and Health, and asked the company to provide to this information to the American people; they not only refused to provide it, they denied that

they are able to manipulate the nicotine dosing properties of their snuff products.

It has been firmly documented in the scientific literature that USSTC can, and does,

control the nicotine dosing properties of its products, and has used that ability to

promote addiction among young people. When Massachusetts passed a law requiring

the disclosure by brand of additives that effect toxicity and addiction, USSTC and

the other tobacco companies successfully sued Massachusetts.

4. Promotion of oral snuff as a ‘‘safer’’ alternative to smoking may have unintended

public health consequences.

I recently published two studies on this topic. The first looked at a smoking initiation among U.S. males aged 12-17 and found that young males who were not smokers at baseline but smokeless tobacco users were three times as likely to be smokers

four years later (23.9% vs. 7.6%) as young males who never used smokeless tobacco.

In contrast only a 2.4% of current smokers and 1.5% of never smokers became

smokeless tobacco users by follow-up.

The second study looked at adult male tobacco users and found that U.S. men

were 2.5 times more likely to be former snuff users who now smoked than to be

former smokers who currently used snuff. One in five males who were daily snuff

users also smoked. This combined use of tobacco products may undermine the impact that smoke-free policies have on quitting smoking. This research suggests that

smokeless tobacco may be a gateway for adolescent smoking and males in the

85

United States are far more likely to switch from snuff to cigarette smoking than vice

versa. In USSTC’s current advertising for its low TSNA snuff brand, Revel, the brand

is marketed as a complement to smoking, not as a complete substitute or as a way

to quit smoking. There is no information included in the ads or packaging on the

dangers of smoking including lung cancer, no advice on how to quit smoking or information about smoking cessation programs. Rather the product is marketed for

use in settings when smoking is barred and in doing so result in undermining the

impact of clean indoor air laws on smokers’ decision to quit. USSTC use similar

marketing messages for its SKOAL snuff products. These products can actually

delay or prevent smoking cessation.

5. There is no evidence that oral snuff use is effective in helping smokers to quit, either in the United States or Sweden.

Not a single randomized controlled trial has been reported that shows that oral

snuff is effective in helping smokers to quit. Such evidence is required before the

manufacturers of any other drug can make health claims about their products. In

contrast, USSTC has presented no credible evidence that their products are effective

smoking cessation devices, yet their proposed marketing strategy clearly implies

that smokers can switch to their snuff products. USSTC’s proposed marketing strategy amounts to a widespread, unregulated experiment on human populations. Such

an experiment may have very serious negative side-effects, including promotion of

tobacco initiation by young people and reduced rates of smoking cessation among

adult smokers.

Even in Sweden, where claims have been made that oral snuff use is responsible

for its declining smoking rates, there is no evidence that snuff played a major role.

In fact, careful examination of the data from Sweden reveals the following: (1) per

capita consumption of cigarettes remained constant in Sweden during the 1970s

while snuff use was rapidly increasing, suggesting that the growth in snuff use was

not the result of substitution of cigarettes for snuff; (2) nearly all of the growth in

oral snuff use in Sweden since the 1970s has been among males who started using

these products when they were 16-24 years old, the group that also had the lowest

smoking cessation rates in Sweden, and not among adult smokers trying to quit; (3)

the prevalence of daily smoking has been declining among men and women in Sweden since 1980, although less than 2% of Swedish women use snuff and the prevalence of daily snuff use among men has remained relatively constant; (4) several

large studies that followed cohorts of Swedish adults over time found that smokers

who also used snuff were no more likely than smokers who did not use snuff to quit

smoking; (5) a very small proportion of Swedish smokers who quit did so by switching to snuff; and (6) tobacco control measures implemented in Sweden, including

bans on all tobacco advertising in periodicals and electronic media, prohibition of

free products and industry sampling practices, dissemination of health information

about smoking, increased taxation on cigarettes, and widespread clean indoor air

policies are probably responsible for most of the decline in smoking in Sweden.

6. Major health bodies have carefully looked at this issue and recommended that

smokeless tobacco not be promoted as reduced harm products until more research is done and the research and claims are approved by a health, regulatory

agency.

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the World Health Organization have both reviewed this issue and have concluded that smokeless tobacco should not be promoted as a ‘‘safer’’ alternative to smoking. IOM concluded that more research is

needed and according to IOM, research and claims on ‘‘reduced’’ harm products, including smokeless tobacco, should be reviewed and approved by an independent

health regulatory agency before they are marketed.

Sweden has lowered smoking rates but this is due to the Swedish comprehensive

tobacco control program and not the availability of snuff. Massachusetts and California have reduced male smoking far below that of Sweden (14% MA, CA daily

smoking vs. 18% Sweden). This has been done without promoting snuff as a safe

substitute to smoking. In fact, we have been able to reduce the use of cigarettes and

snuff among young people and adults in the United States in the past decade. Safe

forms of nicotine are available including nicotine gum and patches that have been

approved as effective smoking cessation medications by the Food and Drug Administration. These should be promoted as ways to quit smoking, not smokeless tobacco.

7. Research on the advertising for other ‘‘reduced risk’’ tobacco products shows that

advertising may be deceptive and misleading.

The Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program (MTCP) has conducted two studies

on advertising claims for other ‘‘safer’’ tobacco products. The first was R.J.R’s

86

Eclipse cigarette, which made a claim that there was no cigarette like Eclipse based

on a comparison of smoke carcinogens between Eclipse and a ‘‘typical’’ ultralight cigarette, Merit Ultra Light. RJR claimed that the level of carcinogens was 80% lower

than Merit. MTCP commissioned research comparing Eclipse to two other ultra

light cigarettes, Now and Carlton, and found that Eclipse actually had higher levels

of certain carcinogens. Eclipse had 734% more acetaldehyde than Now and 475%

more acreolein. Also, as RJR redesigned this product from its 1988 predecessor, Premier, to present, levels of NNK increased by 1200% from 2.4 ng/g to 32 ng/g and

NNN increased 160%. Based on this research, MTCP has concluded that the claim

by RJR that ‘‘There is No Cigarette Like Eclipse’’ is deceptive since MTCP found

two existing brands, Now and Carlton, that had similar levels of smoke carcinogens.

A second study MTCP commissioned was a Mall Intercept Survey of 600 smokers

who reviewed ads for Omni and ADVANCE cigarette brands compared to ads for

regular and light cigarettes. The Institute of Medicine has called these products

PREPS, potential reduced exposure products. Study results are based on a convenience sample of 600 smokers 18-65 years old. Respondents were asked to examine

selected advertisements for Regular cigarettes, Light cigarettes, and the new tobacco

products (ADVANCE, Eclipse, and Omni) and answer questions regarding their perceptions of the products advertised and the messages conveyed by the specific advertisements.

In side-by-side comparisons, smokers indicated that they thought PREP products

posed fewer tobacco-related health risks, lower levels of carcinogens, and lower tar

levels. Specifically:

• Smokers perceived PREP tobacco products as having lower health risks than

Light or Regular cigarettes.

• Smokers perceived PREP tobacco products as having a lower level of things that

might cause cancer than Light or Regular cigarettes.

• Smokers perceived PREP tobacco products as having a lower level of tar than

Regular cigarettes, and a similar level to Lights.

• Perceptions of PREP tobacco product’s health risks relative to Light cigarettes

were generally consistent across subgroups of the study population.

• Men, people with lower educational attainment, and white non-Hispanic individuals were more likely than others to perceive that PREP tobacco products pose

lower health risks than do Regular cigarettes.

Prior to participating in this study, only a few smokers had seen advertisements

for or had smoked PREP tobacco products. For the vast majority, the primary source

of information for assessing PREP tobacco products’ properties, including their

health and safety, were the advertisements viewed during the study. Their opinions

regarding the advertisements included the following:

• Most smokers interpreted the PREP tobacco product advertisements as conveying

positive messages about health and safety.

• Many smokers interpreted the PREP advertisements as saying that these products would be helpful in quitting smoking.

• Most smokers believed that claims made in cigarette advertisements must be approved by a government agency.

In conclusion, smokeless tobacco causes oral cancer, and if promoted as a ‘‘safer’’

alternative to smoking may actually increase cigarette use. Florida, Massachusetts,

and California have reduced smoking rates without promoting smokeless tobacco

and safe forms of nicotine such as gum and patch already exist. These should be

promoted as ways to quit smoking as part of comprehensive tobacco control campaigns.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay, and I thank you very much, especially coming from the University of Florida, which I represent. So I certainly

welcome you and appreciate your participating.

Dr. Rodu.

STATEMENT OF BRAD RODU

Mr. RODU. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am

honored to appear here today.

Despite limited success, the 40 year old American anti-smoking

campaign is an astounding failure in one crucial respect. It has

helped too few adult smokers to quit.

87

National statistics reveal the magnitude of this failure: 404,000

deaths a year. The campaign fails inveterate smokers in two ways.

First, they are counseled merely to change their behavior. For example, a government smoking cessation manual tells doctors to recommend ineffective coping tips, such as ‘‘keep your hands busy,

doodle, knit, type a letter.’’

‘‘Keep a daydream ready to go.’’

Second, smokers are told that they must achieve nicotine abstinence in order to quit. They are advised to use nicotine medications

temporarily. These medicines are expensive and unsatisfying.

As a result, they rarely work. A recent review reported a 7 percent success rate for over-the-counter nicotine medications. The authors called this result ‘‘modest’’ and even ‘‘efficacious.’’

We call programs with 7 percent success rates abject failures.

Over the past decade we have developed an alternative quit

smoking strategy for inveterate smokers based on permanent nicotine maintenance. Nicotine is addictive, but can be consumed as

safely as caffeine. It is tobacco smoke that kills. Eliminate the

smoke, and you eliminate virtually all the risk.

We recommend that smokers permanently switch to other products containing nicotine, including smokeless tobacco. Ours is a

harm reduction strategy because we are focused on reducing disease and deaths instead of tobacco and nicotine abstinence.

We recommend smokeless tobacco because it has three attributes

for long-term maintenance. First, smokeless delivers nicotine nearly as rapidly and as efficiently as smoking. Yes, it is just as addictive as smoking, which is why it is an effective substitute.

Second, smokeless is 98 percent safer than smoking. Our research documents that the average smoker loses 8 years of life. The

average smokeless user loses only 15 days. The only consequential

risk from long-term smokeless tobacco use is mouth cancer. Even

this risk is very low, proven by more than 20 epidemiologic studies

over the past 50 years. In fact, the risk of death from long-term

smokeless use is about the same as that from automobile use.

Third, smokeless actually works for smokers. In 1998, we published the first clinical trial testing smokeless as a cigarette substitute. Most of our subjects had failed repeatedly to quit using

gum and patches. Twenty-five percent of them quit with smokeless.

We have 7 years of follow-up now, and the substitution is sustainable.

Population studies from Sweden prove that smokeless is an effective substitute. For 50 years Swedish men have had the lowest

smoking rate and the highest smokeless usage rates in Europe. The

result, rates of lung cancer, the sentinel disease of smoking, among

Swedish men are the lowest of 20 European countries.

Not so for Swedish women whose lung cancer rate ranks fifth

highest in Europe. I understand tobacco use patterns in Sweden.

I lived there for 6 months last year, conducting research on this

subject. I published two studies with Swedish colleagues that clearly demonstrate that smokeless was primarily responsible for a decline in smoking among men from 19 percent in 1986 to 11 percent

in 1999.

88

Throughout this entire period, men smoked less frequently than

women, a pattern different from that of every other society in the

world where men invariably have higher smoking rates.

Our strategy has evoked criticisms that are inaccurate, irrelevant, or both. The usual complaints involve protecting children. We

emphasize that our strategy is tailored to adult smokers. This is

not a children’s issue. Eliminating children’s access to tobacco is

important, but the 10 million Americans who will die from smoking

over the next two decades are now adults. Withholding life saving

information from these adults in the name of protecting children is

shortsighted, even immoral.

For 10 years we have been portrayed as lone advocates of our

harm reduction strategy, but now good company has joined us. Last

year Britain’s Royal College of Physicians reported that products

like smokeless are safer than cigarettes. Their report stated, ‘‘As a

way of using nicotine, the consumption of noncombustible tobacco

is on the order of 10 to 1,000 times less hazardous than smoking,

depending on the product.’’ The report suggested that some smokeless manufacturers may want to market their products ‘‘as a harm

reduction options for nicotine users, and they may find support for

that in the public health community.’’

A growing number of public health experts now agree with our

harm reduction strategy because the antiquated quit or die approach is increasingly recognized as insufficient. For 48 million

American adults cigarette smoke is the problem. To answer the

question posed by this hearing, smokeless tobacco can be part of

the solution.

[The prepared statement of Brad Rodu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRAD RODU, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF PATHOLOGY,

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM AND PHILIP COLE,

PROFESSOR EMERITUS, DEPARTMENT OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC

HEALTH, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report that 440,000 Americans

die from smoking-related illnesses every year. However, even this enormous number

does not adequately describe the extraordinary burden that cigarette smoking imposes on American society. Our research provides additional perspective: If smokingrelated lung cancer did not occur, cancer mortality rates in the United States would

have declined continuously since 1950 (Figure 1).1 Thus, for the past 50 years the

American cancer ‘‘epidemic’’ has primarily consisted of one disease, cancer of the

lung, and has been due to one dominant lifestyle factor, cigarette smoking. It is compelling evidence that the anti-smoking campaign in the United States, now nearly

40 years old and of ever-increasing intensity, has failed to help adult smokers to

quit.

Conventional approaches to cessation have failed because they offer smokers only

behavioral therapy. An excellent example is a 1993 NCI smoking cessation manual,

How to Help Your Patients Stop Smoking, which advises physicians to recommend

coping tips such as ‘‘Keep your hands busy—doodle, knit, type a letter;’’ ‘‘Cut a

drinking straw into cigarette-sized pieces and inhale air;’’ ‘‘Keep a daydream ready

to go.’’ 2 Such advice has little effect on adult smokers because they need nicotine.

Conventional programs also fail because they offer adult smokers only temporary

nicotine replacement. But these products are expensive and provide low doses of nicotine at doses too low to prevent craving and withdrawal. A recent review of overthe-counter nicotine medications revealed that their success rate is 7%.3 The authors characterized this result as ‘‘efficacious’’ and ‘‘modest.’’ We characterize programs with 7% ‘‘success’’ rates as abject failures.

All these programs are failures because they require smokers to quit nicotine completely. This is incorrect, as well as ineffective. Over the past decade we published

epidemiologic and clinical studies that provide the scientific foundation for a new

smoking cessation strategy. It involves permanent nicotine maintenance using prodVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
89

ucts other than cigarettes.4,5,6,7,8) Our strategy is based on the fact that nicotine,

while addictive, is about as safe as caffeine, another widely consumed addictive

drug. It is tobacco smoke, with its thousands of toxic agents, that leads to cancer,

heart disease and emphysema. Eliminate the smoke, and you eliminate virtually all

of the risk.

We recommend many types of nicotine delivery systems, including smokeless tobacco (SLT) products. These products are well suited to replace cigarettes because

they have four key characteristics: 1) They provide nicotine levels similar to those

from smoking; 2) They are vastly safer than smoking; 3) They are socially acceptable and are cost-comparable to cigarettes; and 4) there is evidence that they help

smokers quit. No other products have this combination of features to help smokers

quit now.

Nicotine Delivery: SLT rapidly delivers a dose of nicotine comparable to that

from smoking (Figure 2). Thus, smokeless tobacco satisfies smokers, a necessary

criterium for any agent intended as a permanent substitute. In comparison, nicotine

medications provide only about one-third to one-half the peak nicotine levels of tobacco products, which is unsatisfying for many smokers.

Safety: SLT use has been the subject of intensive research for over 50 years. The

only consequential adverse health effect from long-term SLT use is oral cancer.

However, more than twenty epidemiologic studies over the past 50 years have established that this risk is very low.9 Our research documents that SLT use imposes

only about 2% of the mortality risk of smoking.4,7 We found that the average reduction in life expectancy from SLT use is only 15 days.5 In contrast, the average smoker loses almost 8 years. For further context, the risk of death from long-term use

of smokeless tobacco (12 deaths in every 100,000 users per year) is about the same

as that from automobile use (15 deaths in every 100,000 users per year).10

Social Acceptability: Opponents of our strategy often argue that smokers will

never use disgusting ‘‘spit’’ tobacco. That term is insensitive and inappropriate when

used by health professionals. First, it is demeaning and degrading both to current

SLT users and to smokers who may wish to try this strategy. Second, and more importantly, the term is incorrect, because new SLT products can be used invisibly and

are more discreet than chewing gum.

Evidence that SLT products work: In 1998 we published the first trial assessing SLT substitution as a quit-smoking method.11 After one year 25% of inveterate

smokers, most of whom had failed repeatedly to quit even with prescription nicotine

gum or patches, had successfully substituted SLT for cigarettes. We have followed

this group for seven years, and our results suggest that SLT substitution is sustainable (manuscript submitted).

Data from Sweden support the role of SLT in harm reduction at the population

level. For 50 years men in Sweden consistently have had the lowest smoking rate

and the highest SLT usage rate in Europe. The result: Rates of lung cancer—the

sentinel disease of smoking—among Swedish men have been the lowest in Europe

for 50 years. World Health organization statistics reveal that Swedish men have the

lowest rates of lung cancer among 20 European countries (Figure 3). Not so for

Swedish women, whose lung cancer rate ranks fifth highest in Europe (Figure 4).

One of us (BR) is very familiar with tobacco use patterns in Sweden. He lived there

for six months last year conducting research on this subject, resulting in two published studies with Swedish colleagues that demonstrate that SLT was primarily responsible for a decline in smoking among men from 19% in 1986 to 11% in 1999 12,13

(Figure 5). This figure reveals the lower rate of smoking among men than among

women for the entire period of study. We emphasize that this is the reverse of the

pattern seen in virtually every other society in the world, where men invariably

have higher smoking rates than those of women.

Our strategy has evoked criticisms that are inaccurate, irrelevant or both. The

usual complaint is that providing risk information about SLT to adults will prompt

children to use these products. We painstakingly point out that our strategy is tailored to adult smokers. This is not a children’s issue. Eliminating children’s access

to tobacco is important, but the 10 million Americans who will die from smoking

over the next two decades are now adults. Withholding life-saving information from

these adults, in the name of children, is shortsighted, even immoral.

An extension of the children’s theme is that SLT could serve as a gateway to

smoking. This notion never had a sound basis, and current research shows it to be

wrong. Furthermore, and most unfortunately, for twenty years the dominant public

health message has been that SLT use and smoking are equally risky. In fact, this

erroneous message is reinforced by the mandated warning on packages of SLT

(‘‘This product is not a safe alternative to cigarettes’’). Regrettably, surveys show

that 80% of smokers believe that smokeless tobacco is as dangerous as smoking, and

90

continue to smoke. This message may also cause some SLT users to switch to cigarettes, an unfortunate and lethal behavior.

Finally, for ten years we have been portrayed as lone advocates of a flawed public

health strategy. But now good company has joined us. Last year Britain’s Royal College of Physicians, one of the world’s most prestigious medical societies, issued a report on tobacco regulation in the United Kingdom called ‘‘Protecting Smokers, Saving Lives’’.14 This report marked the first time a major health organization acknowledged that products like smokeless tobacco are safer than cigarettes. The report

stated ‘‘As a way of using nicotine, the consumption of non-combustible [smokeless]

tobacco is on the order of 10-1,000 times less hazardous than smoking, depending

on the product.’’ The report continued with an even bolder statement, acknowledging that some smokeless tobacco manufacturers may want to market their products ‘‘as a ‘harm reduction’ option for nicotine users, and they may find support for

that in the public health community.’’

A growing number of public health experts now agree with our harm reduction

strategy, because the antiquated quit-or-die strategy is increasingly recognized as

a failure. Cigarette smoke is the problem for 48 million adult smokers. To answer

the question posed by this hearing, smokeless tobacco can be part of the solution.

References

1 Rodu B, Cole P. The fifty-year decline of cancer in America. Journal of Clinical Oncology,

Volume 19: pp 239-241, 2001. UAB-TRF 2Glynn TJ, Manley MW. How to help your patients stop smoking: a National Cancer Institute

manual for physicians. NIH Publication No. 93-3064. Bethesda, MD; 1993. 3 Hughes JR, Shiffman S, Callas P, Zhang J. A meta-analysis of the efficacy of over-thecounter nicotine replacement. Tobacco Control, Volume 12, pp 21-27, 2003. 4 Rodu B. An alternative approach to smoking control. The American Journal of the Medical

Sciences, Volume 308, pp 32-34, 1994. 5 Rodu B, Cole P. Tobacco-related mortality. Nature, Volume 370, p 184, 1994. 6 Rodu B, Cole P. The rewards of smoking cessation. Epidemiology, Volume 7, pp 111-112,

1996. 7 Rodu B, Cole P. Nicotine maintenance for inveterate smokers. Technology, Volume 6, pp 17-

21, 1999. 8 Rodu B. For Smokers Only: How Smokeless Tobacco Can Save Your Life. Sumner Books, Los

Angeles, ISBN 0-9666239-0-8. 9 Rodu B, Cole P. Smokeless tobacco use and cancer of the upper respiratory tract. Oral Surgery, Volume 93, pp 511-515, 2002. UAB-TRF. 10 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Traffic Safety Facts 2001. Available at:

http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF2001.pdf 11Tilashalski K, Rodu B, Cole P. A pilot study of smokeless tobacco in smoking cessation. The

American Journal of Medicine, Volume 104, pp 456-458, 1998. 12 Rodu B, Stegmayr B, Nasic S, Asplund K. Impact of smokeless tobacco use on smoking in

northern Sweden. Journal of Internal Medicine, Volume 252, pp 398-404, 2002. UAB-TRF 13 Rodu B, Stegmayr B, Nasic S, Cole P, Asplund K. Evolving patterns of tobacco use in northern Sweden. Journal of Internal Medicine, Volume 253, pp 660-665, 2003. UAB-TRF 14 Royal College of Physicians. Protecting Smokers, Saving Lives. Available at: http://

www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/books/protsmokers/index.asp 15Sullum J. For Your Own Good: The Anti-Smoking Crusade and the Tyranny of Public

Health, pp 67-70, The Free Press, New York, 1998.

91

92

93

94

95

96

Mr. STEARNS. Thank you Dr. Rodu.

At this time, Mr. Burton, would you give your statement, please?

STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. BURTON

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Steve Burton, and I am responsible for the over-thecounter stop smoking aids that are marketed by Glaxo SmithKline

Consumer Health Care. I have been involved in this field since

1996, and currently our products include the Niccoderm nicotine

patch, Nicorette gum, and more recently the Commit lozenge.

GSK’s chief concern is that unproven health claims for tobacco

products threaten efforts to help smokers quit. The distinction between so-called reduced risk products and FDA approved medicines

could not be clearer to us.

The reduced risk products are designed to perpetuate tobacco use

and our products are designed to end tobacco use, and the emergency of novel tobacco products must not obscure the fact that

there is only one proven way today to reduce the harm of tobacco

use, and that is to quit completely.

I have heard the term today about the committed smoker, and

I have to tell you that in my experience with consumers and the

research that we have done, we do not have very many committed

smokers. Over 70 percent of smokers want to quit at any one point

in time, and nearly all smokers have tried to quit. And over the

past decade we have made substantial progress in reducing the

prevalence of smoking.

Prevention efforts have stopped millions of our young people

from starting to use tobacco, and courageous and motivated smokers who make multiple quit attempts on their way to becoming tobacco free are also heros in the fight against tobacco use.

Our plea today is to reject the policy that would discourage

smokers from quitting. We do not accept the proposition that smokers do not want to quit and that more cannot be done to increase

the acceptance and effectiveness of the quitting options.

As we have already heard today, and I am not going to repeat

comments from other members of the panel, there has been no reduction in the death and disease burden from tobacco from the use

of light cigarettes, and the same may be true of the so-called reduced risk products that are before this panel today.

As we learned with lights, the way in which consumers actually

use a tobacco product in the real world largely determines its risk,

as much or more than the product’s inherent toxicity.

For example, it is very plausible that smokeless products would

be used in addition to existing cigarette consumption rates that

would delay quitting, leading not to a decline, but an increase in

risk.

In fact, dual use of cigarettes of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco

products has apparently been one of the marketing objectives of the

smokeless tobacco industry.

Our own market research of Eclipse, one of the so-called reduced

risk products, brings this point home. In a consumer survey, GSK

found that most a quarter, 24 percent of smokers considered

Eclipse to be completely safe, with 3/4 expecting that Eclipse would

reduce health risks by at least 50 percent.

97

After hearing about Eclipse, there was a net decrease of 19 percent in smokers who were contemplating quitting within 6 months

and 15 percent of young adults who had recently quit smoking

were interested in buying Eclipse.

Thus, with the emergence of so-called reduced risk tobacco products ex-smokers may start smoking again, and likewise those who

never smoked, particularly adolescents, may take up smoking for

the first time. And millions of smokes who otherwise might have

quit completely could delay or miss opportunities to become tobacco

free.

In light of these threats we need a regulatory body that evaluates the public health impact of so-called reduced risk products before they enter the market. That agency must have the in-house

scientific expertise to determine the appropriate design and evaluation of the studies to be done before approval. That regulatory body

is the Food and Drug Administration.

It should decide whether there is an adequate scientific basis to

support the so-called reduced risk claims that tobacco manufacturers seek sot make.

As to the treatment of tobacco dependence, we have certainly not

exhausted our opportunities collectively to innovate in this area.

Addiction experts agree that the appeal and effectiveness of currently marketed treatments could be enhanced dramatically. FDA

should encourage sponsors to develop new indications and uses for

current products and work flexibly with sponsors to accelerate development of new and innovative treatments.

Promising drugs should, for example, be fast tracked under

FDA’s existing authority, and there are new treatments on the

way.

On the tobacco side, GSK welcomes tobacco based products proven to meaningfully reduce the risks of smoking. Of course, health

claims, either express or implied, must be approved by FDA before

being exposed to the most vulnerable within our society: those who

have recently quit, or are highly motivated to quit or are tempted

to begin smoking.

At GSK we stand ready to assist the subcommittee today in any

way that we can. We thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I would certainly be happy to answer any questions that you may have for me later.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Steven L. Burton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. BURTON, VICE PRESIDENT, SMOKING CONTROL,

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT AND SWITCH, GLAXOSMITHKLINE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Chairman Stearns. My name is Steve Burton and I am the Vice President of Smoking Control, Strategic Development and Switch for GlaxoSmithKline

Consumer Healthcare (GSK). I have had responsibility for marketing over-thecounter nicotine replacement therapy products (Nicorette gum, NicoDerm CQ patch,

and most recently the Commit lozenge) since they were switched from prescription

status in 1996. On behalf of GSK, let me thank you and members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing and to share

GSK’s views on the matter before Congress and the public health community at

large. GSK applauds the subcommittee for holding this hearing titled ‘‘Can Tobacco

Cure Smoking—A Review of Tobacco Harm Reduction.’’ My testimony will concentrate on what can be done to help smokers who are concerned about their health

98

and interested in reducing the risk of smoking. In particular, I want to offer what

we have learned through our research with consumers to help illustrate what they

expect novel tobacco products to provide and how they might be used in a real world

setting. I will also comment on the adverse public health consequences that could

arise when smokers have the new choice to use novel tobacco products instead of

FDA approved medicines and other scientifically proven methods of quitting. We believe that an understanding of consumer beliefs and behavior can play a critical role

in the design and effective implementation of public health programs and that will

be our principal contribution today.

SMOKING AS THE LEADING CAUSE OF PREVENTABLE DEATH AND TOBACCO CONTROL

POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

You are familiar with the staggering statistics associated with the use of tobacco.

440,000 Americans die prematurely each year because of tobacco use (CDC 2002a).

More than 6 million of our children alive today will die prematurely later in life because of their use of tobacco (CDC 2002b). The use of this deadly and addictive product constitutes the leading preventable cause of death and disease in the United

States each year. While we need to accelerate our progress in reducing the harm

of smoking, we should be proud of the fact that millions of smokers have been able

to quit completely, youth initiation has been on the decline, and overall prevalence

of smoking is slowly trending downward. These significant public health gains are

the result of a combination of environmental factors and changes in public health

policy led by our elected officials, our regulatory community and the public health

field. Examples of these efforts include higher tobacco taxes, restrictions on smoking

in the workplace and public places, greater availability of proven treatments, and

successful state-based and national youth prevention programs. These and other factors have encouraged more smokers to make serious quit attempts and to be more

successful in achieving a smoke free status. GSK has played a small but important

part in the overall effort to help adult smokers become tobacco free, and our primary

mission remains to reduce the mortality and morbidity associated with smoking by

offering smokers proven methods of quitting completely—the ultimate way to reduce

risk.

NEW CHALLENGES TO RECENT PROGRESS IN HELPING SMOKERS QUIT

It is well established that overcoming an addiction to tobacco is one of the most

daunting and enduring medical challenges an individual can face. In fact, it usually

takes multiple attempts for most smokers to become abstinent, and each effort takes

a high degree of motivation and personal courage to overcome the psychological and

physiological effects of withdrawal from the highly addictive and often socially rewarding use of a cigarette.

To overcome this powerful addiction, smokers need encouragement and support to

promote quit attempts and to convert these attempts into positive health outcomes.

This includes making effective use of available treatments. Smokers receive this encouragement in a number of ways—from their friends, their health care professional, and also from their government and other public institutions. The decision

to quit is easily influenced by smokers’ beliefs in their own ability to quit and by

their understanding of the alternatives they have to mitigate the risks of smoking.

Our research with smokers suggests that the unregulated availability of so-called

reduced risk products could lead millions of smokers to delay or reconsider quitting.

A perception that novel tobacco products have the endorsement of our public institutions would discourage smokers’ commitment to quitting and introduce the confounding and potentially very deceptive notion that smokers can now reduce their

risk or even ‘‘quit’’ by continuing to smoke with these novel tobacco products, a socalled ‘‘harm reduction’’ approach. While the health benefits of a harm reduction approach have yet to be proven and remain largely theoretical, the risks of unregulated access to novel tobacco products are clear and present dangers that could undo

years of progress by Congress, the FDA and the public health community of which

we are a part.

As you no doubt have heard, the great fear held by many public health experts

is that these new tobacco products may be nothing more than a scientifically sophisticated version of the ‘‘light’’ cigarette. The introduction of ‘‘light’’ and ‘‘ultra light’’

cigarettes is an object lesson in how policy decisions can unwittingly mislead the

public and undermine cessation. Public health officials now believe, many decades

too late to be of any help to the health-concerned smoker who switched to lights

over the last thirty years, that lights appear to have been deliberately designed so

as not to reduce tar and nicotine deliveries when smoked by human beings.

99

As the National Cancer Institute recently stated, in the definitive study from the

federal government on the deception linked with ‘‘lights,’’ ‘‘Marketing this illusion

of risk reduction would have been of concern even if the target for these brands had

been confined to continuing smokers. Instead, these brands were targeted at those

smokers who were thinking of quitting in an effort to intercept the smokers and

keep them smoking cigarettes.’’ (USDHHS, 2001, page 5)

Due in large part to the deliberate design of ‘‘lights,’’ there was no reduction in

the death and disease burden from tobacco as a result of the marketing of ‘‘light’’

cigarettes. NCI concluded that ‘‘The absence of meaningful differences in smoke exposure when different brands of cigarettes are smoked and the resultant absence

of meaningful differences in risk make the marketing of these cigarettes as lowerdelivery and lower-risk products deceptive for the smoker. The reality that many

smokers chose these products as an alternative to cessation—a change that would

produce real reductions in disease risks—makes this deception an urgent public

health issue.’’ (USDHHS, 2001, page 1)

Thirty years ago, well-intentioned public health officials encouraged health-concerned smokers who could not quit smoking to switch to ‘‘lights.’’ At all costs, we

must avoid repeating the mistakes with today’s products that were made thirty

years ago with ‘‘lights.’’

CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF RISK OF AND INTEREST IN NOVEL TOBACCO PRODUCTS

At the outset, one critical fact must be recognized. Complete abstinence is the only

method that reduces the future health risk of smoking to almost zero, and allows

for an ex-smoker to achieve a long-term prognosis essentially equivalent to a never

smoker after 10-15 years of abstinence (USDHHS, 1990). The emergence of novel

tobacco products does not change this fact. Novel tobacco products have not been

studied with the same rigor of smoking cessation medicines and methods. Nor have

the studies that have been conducted on these products been submitted to FDA for

evaluation. There is only one proven way to reduce the harm from tobacco, and that

is to quit.

On the other hand, consumers are all too willing to grasp at the belief that novel

tobacco products are indeed safe and effective alternatives to smoking their current

cigarettes. As an example, we fielded a large consumer survey that exposed the

Eclipse concept (a novel cigarette design that is claimed to primarily heat rather

than burn tobacco) to 1000 smokers and 499 ex-smokers. In the survey, after hearing a brief account of claims for Eclipse, almost all current smokers (91.4%) thought

Eclipse was safer than Regular cigarettes. Moreover, almost a quarter (23.9%) considered Eclipse to be completely safe. On average, participants expected that Eclipse

would reduce smoking risk by 62.1% compared to Regular cigarettes, with three

quarters (75.9%) expecting that Eclipse would reduce health risks by at least 50%.

Eclipse was also regarded as significantly safer than current Light or Ultra Light

cigarettes. Compared to the 23.9% who regarded Eclipse as completely safe, only

9.4% and 11.3% regarded Lights and Ultra Lights, respectively, as completely safe.

The fact that consumers perceive novel tobacco products to carry less health risk

than smoking even light or ultra light cigarettes should be troubling to those who

are concerned with the death and disease caused by tobacco products.

We know that approximately 70% of smokers are interested in quitting (CDC,

2002c). GSK’s mission is to reduce death and disease by inspiring more smokers to

become tobacco, and ultimately, nicotine free. The scientific data behind our treatments, such as Nicorette gum, NicoDerm CQ patch, the Commit lozenge, and the

prescription smoking cessation drug Zyban, has been evaluated and approved by the

Food and Drug Administration. These products have been approved as being both

safe and effective for use in trying to quit. With the help of our products and those

of other treatment providers, millions of smokers in this country have successfully

stopped smoking and eliminated all of the risk of continued tobacco use.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NOVEL TOBACCO PRODUCTS—CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE

From a public health perspective, we should be concerned about the new crop of

tobacco products bearing unproven claims to reduce exposure and risk. The greatest

danger is that these products may pose a significant threat to cessation efforts—

regardless of whether a smoker would have used one of our products in a quit attempt or chosen another quit method. Smokers who see the claims for products like

Eclipse may now think that a safer cigarette genuinely exists. This may make them

less interested or inclined to try to quit smoking entirely.

There is the added concern that ex-smokers may start smoking again, thinking

that they can now safely consume tobacco products. Likewise, those who never

100

smoked, particularly adolescents, may take up smoking for the first time, using one

of these new products under the assumption that a safe cigarette exists.

The consumer survey data commissioned by GSK on smoker and ex-smoker attitudes towards Eclipse, one of the new generations of tobacco products sold by R. J.

Reynolds, confirms these concerns (Shiffman, Pillitteri, Burton, et al, unpublished

manuscript). Reynolds makes explicit health claims about reductions in disease

risks for Eclipse, including ‘‘less risk of cancer,’’ and ‘‘a lower risk of chronic bronchitis, possibly even emphysema’’ (www.eclipse.rjrt.com, December 2002).

The survey found that 57.4% of smokers said they were ‘‘somewhat likely’’ or

‘‘very likely’’ to purchase Eclipse within the next six months. Most importantly, after

hearing about Eclipse, there was a net decrease of 19% in smokers who were contemplating quitting within 6 months. Furthermore, 15% of the young adults who

had recently quit smoking were interested in buying Eclipse.

In a second study focusing on a novel smokeless tobacco product among smokers

interested in quitting, similarly high levels of purchase interest were reported.

Around 41% of the sample were very or somewhat likely to want to use the novel

smokeless product. Purchase intent (46%) was higher in consumers with an interest

in using nicotine replacement therapy to quit, a surrogate for smokers more likely

to actually commit to a serious quit attempt. When asked how they would use these

smokeless products, 15% of the sample reported they would use the smokeless tobacco product as a substitute for cigarettes at times when they could not smoke,

29% as a way to reduce their smoking rate, and another 36% as a way to cut back

on their smoking in preparation for quitting.

These results suggest that Eclipse, and its new brethren of tobacco-based products

that have not been proven to reduce the risk of smoking in any meaningful way,

are a threat to cessation and risk converting ex-smokers back to their deadly addiction.

Do these products genuinely reduce exposure and risk? We do not know because

exposure and risk are determined by the overall pattern and years of use by smokers in real world conditions, not just by physical makeup of the product. Nor do we

know how these products perform in the laboratory. But here are a few observations

that should be of profound concern to the public health community of which you are

a part. Eclipse advertising declares that exposure to carbon monoxide may be higher

than traditional cigarettes. Eclipse has been shown to contain filaments of glass particles not found in traditional cigarettes that would be inhaled deeply into the lungs

(IOM 2001). The new Quest cigarette offers a program claiming to reduce levels of

nicotine consumption while keeping the level of cancer-causing tar unchanged—and

the tar levels are higher than the majority of low tar brands consumed today. Many

experts would argue that, as was the case with ‘‘light’’ cigarettes, smokers of Quest

would consume a greater number of the reduced nicotine cigarettes in order to avoid

withdrawal and maintain the reinforcing effects of their nicotine addiction. These

smokers could end up consuming more tar with the reduced nicotine cigarette than

their traditional brand of cigarette.

SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE—THE RISK/BENEFIT EQUATION FOR NOVEL TOBACCO

PRODUCTS

I expect the scientific community and tobacco control experts to provide their view

on the potential risks and benefits of expanded use of novel tobacco products. They

believe the tobacco industry’s motivation is to perpetuate the use of tobacco-based

products by introducing a new generation of tobacco products. By offering promises

of reduced exposure to toxins in tobacco smoke, and even making claims to reduce

the risk of cancer and other diseases, these products raise profound and troubling

public health policy questions for our partners in the tobacco control community.

We should consider carefully the recent findings published in the American Journal of Epidemiology, that reductions in cigarette use, as measured by daily smoking

rates, had no impact on health risks from smoking among a large population of

heavy smokers (Godtfredsen et al, 2002). Smokers who attempt to reduce the harm

of smoking by cutting down on the number of cigarettes they smoke compensate in

the same way that smokers of so-called light cigarettes compensated by smoking

each cigarette more deeply. Smokers who attempt to reduce their smoking rates

without the support of pharmacotherapy experienced the same degree of harm as

smokers who did not reduce their smoking rates.

The novel tobacco products take various forms. Some burn tobacco or employ

novel technologies to burn or heat tobacco. Others are tobacco-based but do not

burn. The combusting products include Omni and Advance, and promise to reduce

or eliminate exposure to a subset of toxins in tobacco smoke. The novel products include Eclipse and Accord, and claim to reduce toxin levels or secondhand smoke.

101

The non-combusting (i.e. smokeless) products include Ariva, Revel, and Exalt, promise tobacco satisfaction in situations (e.g. at work or on a plane) where smoking is

not possible or permitted.

Whether they combust or not, all of these products are aimed squarely at the

health-concerned smoker. They have entered the marketplace in the absence of any

independent scientific evaluation of their claims, and without any governmental

scrutiny of the products or their claims.

Equally troubling are the claims for the smokeless products, like the Ariva tobacco

lozenge. In isolation, one could argue that a tobacco-based product that does not

burn tobacco leaf has a lower risk profile than one that does. But this could be a

short-sighted view to take given the historical behavior of the smokeless tobacco industry operating outside of a credible regulated environment. Reviews of past marketing practices report that this industry deliberately targeted young males, particularly athletes, in the 1970s and revived lagging sales by promoting use of smokeless

among teenage boys who had not previously used tobacco. Further, these same reports note that this industry specifically designed and promoted products with varying levels of nicotine delivery, perceived strength and a range of flavors (including

‘‘candy-like’’ flavors) so as to facilitate early use by adolescents and their progression

to more addicting, higher nicotine products (FDA Proposed and Final Rule, 1995

and 1996; Bonnie and Lynch, 1994).

Furthermore, the health benefits of products like Ariva presumably result in part

from the assumption that Ariva would be used to completely replace all cigarette

use and thus overall exposure to toxins would decrease. It is equally plausible that

smokeless tobacco products would be used in addition to a smoker’s typical level of

cigarette consumption, and this is precisely the type of real world consumer behavior that must be assessed prior to market entry, not years after this unfortunate

consequence has been documented retrospectively.

Smokers who might have otherwise been inclined to try to quit, may latch on to

a smokeless product bearing an ‘‘Anytime. Anywhere.’’ or a ‘‘WHEN YOU CAN’T

SMOKE’’ claim, and use it to perpetuate their smoking through the dual use of combusting and non-combusting tobacco. In fact, the United States Smokeless Tobacco

Company expressed the view in their 2000 annual report that the dual use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco ‘‘represents great potential for future expansion of the

business’’ (UST, Inc, Annual Report, 2000, page 9).

In the absence of public health-based regulation of these products, and well controlled studies of actual patterns of consumer use completed prior to market entry,

we have no way of knowing whether this new generation of products will reduce

exposure and risk in any meaningful way when used by smokers under normal or

typical conditions of use. Nor do we understand the impact on quitting behavior

amongst those smokers who otherwise would have achieved complete abstinence

when they are exposed to the unsubstantiated claims of these novel tobacco products. Even more of a concern, we will not know what effect this marketing will have

on the possibility of young people initiating tobacco use. The unfettered access to

the marketplace for these products has created a massive, uncontrolled clinical trial,

with commercialization and hefty promotion and advertising preceding a scientifically credible demonstration that there is adequate proof to support the marketing

claims and expected public health outcomes of these products.

REGULATORY APPROACHES FOR NOVEL TOBACCO PRODUCTS: RECOMMENDATIONS

The most appropriate way to assess the potential risks and benefits of these products is through a regulatory system that assures the public of comprehensive regulation of all tobacco products; a system where a public health-based regulatory agency

evaluates products and claims before they enter the marketplace. As this Subcommittee goes forward with its consideration of the role of tobacco-based products

in a harm reduction framework, we need to ensure that an appropriate degree of

scientific and regulatory accountability is brought to bear on any tobacco products

that purport to reduce exposure or risk. One way to achieve this accountability is

by insisting that no product or claim should appear in the marketplace until it has

been evaluated by an independent, public health-based regulatory authority. Such

an agency, and we believe it should be FDA, should decide whether there is an adequate scientific basis to support whatever claims the manufacturer seeks to make.

Whereas the tobacco-based products are carefully designed to perpetuate tobacco

use, or at least could have that real world effect, in contrast GSK and other providers of treatment interventions offer quitting programs rigorously studied and

evaluated for their safety and efficacy by FDA prior to appearing in the marketplace. We are proud of the collaboration we entered into with Congress, the FDA

and the public health community in the mid-1990s to expand access and utilization

102

of nicotine replacement therapies by marketing them as over-the-counter medications starting in 1996. , , , . We have been encouraged by the evidence that offering

treatments directly to consumers can significantly increase utilization of these products to support quit attempts.

Yet, we have not exhausted our opportunities to innovate in the area of tobacco

dependence treatment through the use of pharmaceuticals and other public health

interventions that expand utilization while also improving outcomes, as recent success in the area of quit lines have shown. We believe it should be the policy of our

government to encourage sponsors to develop new indications and uses for current

products, and to work with sponsors to accelerate development of a range of novel

treatment products. GSK has a number of new products that offer the promise of

more consumer acceptable formulations and regimens and a range of experimental

drugs are in development within industry and academia. For instance, over-thecounter nicotine replacement therapy products are limited to up to 12 weeks of use

as compared to six months or more under their former prescription status. Addiction

experts have argued that the appeal and effectiveness of currently marketed treatments could be enhanced dramatically should we consider new uses and indications

such as combination therapy, use of intensive behavioral interventions alongside

pharmacotherapy, reduction of cigarettes alongside a gradual increase in medicinal

nicotine administration, and use of NRT for relapse prevention and long term maintenance of cessation. Promising drugs and interventions like these should be fast

tracked when judged by the FDA to qualify for such status.

Finally, GSK welcomes scientifically validated and regulated claims for tobaccobased products. It is not our position that novel tobacco products cannot be marketed today under existing tobacco regulations or that it is unconceivable that such

products might make a public health contribution. Our position is that any health

claim, expressed or implied, should be scientifically demonstrated and reviewed by

FDA before such claims are exposed to the most vulnerable within our society—

those who have recently quit, are highly motivated to quit, or are tempted to begin

smoking. For a marketplace flooded with unproven and unregulated health claims

for novel tobacco products will not only undo years of progress in the tobacco control

effort but also damage our capacity to bring even more effective and consumer accepted treatments to the millions of consumers who want and deserve meaningful

improvements in their health status.

Today half of ever smokers have become former smokers. Our challenge and yours

is to ensure that successful quitters are not lured back to smoking and the vast majority of smokers who can and will eventually quit completely are not discouraged

from reducing the harm of smoking to zero. As to the remainder of smokers who

may not be able to quit, and we would argue that we have many opportunities yet

before us to reduce this number further, we need to find interim and credible solutions to reducing harm to their health. The current cadre of novel tobacco products,

if allowed to remain in the market absent scientific evidence of a positive health

impact within the population, should nonetheless be prohibited from making implied

or expressed claims of health improvement until such time as adequate proof and

public health regulatory approval has been obtained.

At GSK, we stand ready to assist the Subcommittee in any way that we can on

these critically important and challenging questions of how to reduce the extraordinary death and disease toll caused by the use of tobacco products.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be happy to

answer any questions that the subcommittee might have.

References

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1997). Impact of promotion of the Great American Smokeout and availability of over-the-counter nicotine medications, 1996. Morbidity and

Mortality Weekly Report, 46, 868-871.

Centers of Disease Control and Prevention. (2000). Use of FDA-approved pharmacologic treatments for tobacco dependence. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 49, 665-668.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2002a). Annual smoking-attributable mortality,

years of potential life lost, and economic costs—United States 1995-1999. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 51, 300-3.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2002b). Tobacco control state highlights 2002:

Impact and opportunity. Atlanta, GA: Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health

Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2002c). Cigarette smoking among adults—United

States, 2000. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports, 49, 642-5.

Food and Drug Administration. (1995). 21 CFR Part 801, et al. Regulations restricting the

sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products to protect children and adolescents; proposed rule analysis regarding FDA’s jurisdiction over nicotine-containing cigarettes

and smokeless tobacco products; notice. Federal Register, 60 (155), 41314-41792.

103

Food and Drug Administration. (1996). 21 CFR Part 801, et al. Regulations restricting the

sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to protect children and adolescents;

final rule. Federal Register, 61 (168), 44396-45318.

Godtfredsen NS, Holst C, Prescott E, Vestbo J, Osler M. (2002). Smoking reduction, smoking

cessation, and mortality: a 16-year follow-up of 19,732 men and women from The Copenhagen

Centre for Prospective Population Studies. American Journal of Epidemiology, 156 (11), 994-

1001.

Institute of Medicine. (2001). Clearing the smoke: Assessing the science base for tobacco harm

reduction. Stratton K, Shetty P, Wallace R, Bondurant S (eds). Institute of Medicine.

Keeler TE, Hu TW, Keith A, Manning R, Marciniak MD, Ong M, & Sung HY. (2002). The

benefits of switching smoking cessation drugs to over-the-counter status. Health Economics, 11,

389-402.

Lynch BS, & Bonnie RJ. (Eds.). (1994). Growing up tobacco free: preventing nicotine addiction

in children and youths. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Shiffman S, Gitchell J, Pinney J M, Burton SL, Kemper KE, & Lara EA. (1997). Public health

benefit of over-the-counter nicotine medications. Tobacco Control, 6, 306-310.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). Risks associated with smoking cigarettes with low machine-measured yields of tar and nicotine. Monograph Number 13. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Public Health Service. National Institutes of Health.

National Cancer Institute.

UST Annual Report, 2000.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1990) The health benefits of smoking cessation: A report of the Surgeon General. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Public

Health Service. Centers for Disease Control. Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health

Promotion. Office on Smoking and Health. DHHS Publication No. CDC) 90-8416.

Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

And at this time, Mr. Verheij, if you would give your opening

statement.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD VERHEIJ

Mr. VERHEIJ. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. I am Richard Verheij, Executive Vice President, External Affairs, for U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company.

I would like to thank this committee for convening this hearing

to examine the issue of tobacco harm reduction. We see this hearing as a significant step in the country’s ongoing efforts to address

the issues raised by the continued use of tobacco products by millions of Americans.

Indeed, 50 million Americans smoke. The Institute of Medicine

has predicted that a significant proportion of those individuals will

continue to do so despite a multitude of approaches with the ultimate objective of total tobacco cessation. This prediction has

prompted the public health community to consider new complementary strategies, including tobacco harm reduction.

As we proceed today, it is helpful to keep a couple of things in

mind. First, this debate is not about whether smokeless tobacco is

considered to be safe. Rather, it is about the increasing consensus

in the public health community that smokeless tobacco is significantly less harmful.

Second, this debate is not about whether smoking cessation is

the best public health strategy. Rather, it is about whether there

are complementary strategies which public health advocates believe will save millions of lives.

We are here today because of the millions of adult smokers who

do not quit and do not use medicinal nicotine products. Many in

the public health community believe that a harm reduction strategy based on communicating to adult smokers truthful information

about other options can have a significant impact on both those individual adult smokers and public health generally. Simply stated,

many researchers have expressed the opinion that use of smokeless

tobacco is significantly less harmful than cigarette smoking. Based

104

on that judgment, these same researchers advocate that adult

smokers who do not quit and do not use medicinal nicotine products switch completely to smokeless tobacco.

There is increasing consensus on this crucial issue among members of the public health community some of whom are testifying

before this committee today. However, despite this increase in consensus, it is documented that the vast majority of adult smokers

are unaware of this information.

One researcher has stated that ‘‘until smokers are given enough

information to allow them to choose products because of lower

health risks, then the status quo will remain.’’

Our company, along with those public health advocates, believes

that it is crucial that this information be made available to adult

smokers. Such communication will help adult smokers make more

informed choices.

We look forward to discussing the real question: how best to communicate this important information. We know there are a variety

of opinions on this topic. We welcome a serious and open dialog

that brings to the table all relevant parties to express their viewpoints and concerns.

That is why we urge the Federal Trade Commission to initiate

a forum that would bring together all of these parties to examine

the most appropriate means for communicating this important information to adult smokers.

Let me state clearly for the record that U.S. Smokeless Tobacco

Company is committed to restricting tobacco use to adults only.

This commitment is not just rhetoric. It is backed by concrete action.

In 1997, we were the only smokeless tobacco company to support

the proposed tobacco resolution. When that proposal failed, we became the only smokeless tobacco company to enter into the smokeless tobacco master settlement agreement with Attorneys General

of 45 states and various territories.

We are providing more than $100 million to the American Legacy

Foundation for programs to reduce youth usage of tobacco. Our

company is committed to proceeding in a responsible and deliberate

manner that reflects the current state of the science and addresses

the concerns of the public health community.

This debate presents a broad societal question. How should we

collectively communicate information to adult smokers that many

in the public health community believe will prolong and save lives.

this is truly an unprecedented opportunity. Public health advocates, researchers, tobacco control activists, and tobacco product

manufacturers all agree on the fundamental principle that a harm

reduction strategy could represent an important component of a

comprehensive public health policy on tobacco.

There may be disagreement on how best to implement this strategy. Nevertheless, given the stakes, this issue deserves serious consideration. We believe this hearing represents a significant step in

that process Thank you for holding this very timely hearing. May

I ask that U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company’s written statement,

which was submitted to the committee on May 30th, be incorporated in its entirety into the hearing record after my statement

today?

105

1 Youth usage of smokeless tobacco, as reported in surveys conducted by various federal government agencies and by the University of Michigan, has declined substantially in recent years.

For example, in 2001 the authors of the report on the University of Michigan’s Monitoring the

Future national survey noted that ‘‘[t]he use of smokeless tobacco by teens has been decreasing

gradually from recent peak levels in the mid-’90s, and the overall declines have been substantial.’’ Johnston LD, O’Malley PM, Bachman JG. (2001) Monitoring the Future national results

on adolescent drug use: Overview of key findings 2000. (NIH Publication No. 01-4923). Bethesda,

MD: National Institute of Drug Abuse, at p. 34. More recently, these same authors reaffirmed

their earlier findings, noting that the overall declines in teen use of smokeless tobacco have been

‘‘substantial’’ and that ‘‘teen use of smokeless tobacco is down by about one-half from the peak

levels reached in the mid-1990s.’’ Johnston LD, O’Malley PM, Bachman JG. (2003). Monitoring

the Future national results on adolescent drug use: Overview of key findings, 2002. (NIH Publication No. 03-5374). Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse, at p. 34.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Richard Verheij follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. VERHEIJ, EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT, U.S.

SMOKELESS TOBACCO COMPANY

U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company (‘‘USSTC’’) welcomes the opportunity to participate in this hearing regarding tobacco harm reduction. This issue is of immense importance to the 50 million adult tobacco consumers in the United States, to the public health community, to medical practitioners and to tobacco manufacturers.

For decades, the public health community in the United States has asserted that

cigarette smoking is the most deadly epidemic of modern times. For almost as long,

the message of the public health community to cigarette smokers has been monolithic: stop all use of tobacco. Over the past several years, however, an increasing

number of public health advocates have voiced doubts about what some have called

the ‘‘quit or die’’ approach to smoking cessation.

Rather than rely entirely on programs intended to achieve total cessation of tobacco use, this segment of the public health community is urging that a more pragmatic goal be adopted—that of tobacco ‘‘harm reduction.’’ One method of achieving

tobacco harm reduction, according to a growing number of researchers, is to encourage those cigarette smokers who do not quit and do not use medicinal nicotine products to switch completely to smokeless tobacco products. This strategy, however, is

complicated by the fact that the vast majority of adult cigarette smokers in the

United States—despite the generally accepted scientific view to the contrary—believe that cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use involve the same risk of adverse health effects.

The issue of tobacco harm reduction and the potential role of smokeless tobacco

products in that effort is at a crossroads. The debate is no longer about whether

smokeless tobacco is considered by the scientific community to be a significantly reduced risk alternative compared to cigarette smoking. The question now is whether

that information should be communicated to adult cigarette smokers or whether it

should be suppressed.

Set forth below is a brief description of USSTC and its smokeless tobacco products, followed by a review of some of the more significant issues relating to smokeless tobacco in the context of tobacco harm reduction.

I. USSTC

USSTC is the leading U.S. producer and marketer of moist smokeless tobacco or

moist snuff. Copenhagen and Skoal—two of USSTC’s brands—are America’s bestselling moist snuff products. Two other brands—Rooster and Red Seal—were introduced within the last five years, and hold established positions in the marketplace.

A new pouch product—Revel—has been test marketed. USSTC maintains manufacturing and processing facilities in Franklin Park, Illinois; Hopkinsville, Kentucky;

and Nashville, Tennessee.

In 1997, USSTC was the only smokeless tobacco company to support the proposed

tobacco resolution. When the proposal failed to pass the Congress, USSTC became

the only smokeless tobacco company to enter into the Smokeless Tobacco Master

Settlement Agreement (‘‘STMSA’’) with Attorneys General of various states and U.S.

territories. Pursuant to the STMSA, USSTC is providing up to $100 million (plus

an inflation adjustment), over a 10-year period, to the American Legacy Foundation

for programs to reduce youth usage of tobacco and combat youth substance abuse,

and for enforcement purposes.1 Moreover, USSTC agreed to limitations on its adverVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
106

2These restrictions include, among other things, eliminating outdoor advertising of smokeless

tobacco products, such as billboards and signs in arenas, stadiums, shopping malls, video-game

arcades, and on public transit. In addition, USSTC voluntarily limited itself to one brand-name

sponsorship in any 12-month period, and agreed to discontinue distribution to the public of nontobacco merchandise, such as caps and T-shirts, bearing the brand name, logo, or trademark

of any smokeless tobacco product. 3 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Smoking and Health. Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service. 1964. 4Stratton K, Sherry P, Wallace R, Bondurant S (eds.). Clearing the smoke. Assessing the

science base for tobacco harm reduction. Institute of Medicine. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 2001, at pp. 367-68. 5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years

of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs—United States, 1995-1999. MMWR 2002; 51: 300-

303. 6 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People:

A Report of the Surgeon General (1994); see also Smoking As A Health Hazard, American College of Cardiology Position Statement, available at http://www.acc.org/clinical/position/72565.pdf. 7The National Center For Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion estimates that

47 million adults in the United States smoke cigarettes. Targeting Tobacco Use: The Nation’s

Leading Cause of Death, Tobacco Information and Prevention Source (2001). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that more than 57 million Americans currently

smoke cigarettes. Preventing Death and Disease From Tobacco Use, Fact Sheet (Jan. 8, 2001).

Other reports suggest that the number of smokers in the United States is between 46.5 and

50 million. Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United States, 1999, MMWR Highlights (Oct. 12,

2001) Vol. 50, No. 40; Treating Tobacco Use and Dependence, U.S. Public Health Service, Fact

Sheet (June 2000). 8 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, The Health Consequences of Using Smokeless

Tobacco: A Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General (1986). 9 Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408.

tising and marketing efforts, even though this put USSTC at a competitive disadvantage with other smokeless tobacco manufacturers.2

As these facts and the remainder of this statement will make clear, USSTC is

truly a ‘‘distinctly different’’ tobacco company. Annexed as Attachment A to this

statement are copies of excerpts from UST Inc.’s (USSTC’s parent company) annual

reports for 2000, 2001 and 2002 that discuss the ways in which USSTC is a ‘‘distinctly different’’ tobacco company.

II. SMOKELESS TOBACCO IN THE CONTEXT OF TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION

A. Introduction

Since the Surgeon General’s Report in 1964,3 there has been substantial public

health discussion about the potential health effects of tobacco use. Various public

health organizations have identified the risks of cigarette smoking as including cancer (e.g., lung, oral cavity, esophagus, larynx, pancreas, bladder, kidney), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, myocardial infarction, and stroke.4 The Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (‘‘CDC’’) estimates that cigarette smoking caused

approximately 442,000 premature deaths in the United States in 1999.5 The Surgeon General has indicated that the ideal way to avoid such health risks is to abstain from cigarette smoking.6 Nonetheless, 47 to 50 million adults in the U.S. continue to smoke cigarettes. This number represents approximately 25 percent of all

U.S. adults.7

The Surgeon General reached a judgment in 1986 that use of smokeless tobacco

products ‘‘can cause cancer.’’ 8 Federally-mandated rotating warnings on smokeless

tobacco product packaging and advertising state:

WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER

WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH

LOSS

WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIGARETTES.9

Numerous methods have been suggested by public health advocates for achieving

tobacco harm reduction, including urging cigarette smokers to smoke fewer cigarettes, developing ‘‘less hazardous’’ cigarettes and creating alternative sources of nicotine, such as nicotine inhalers. A growing number of tobacco harm reduction proponents, however, are arguing for an additional method for achieving their goal.

Based on the generally accepted view in the scientific community that smokeless tobacco use involves significantly less risk of adverse health effects than cigarette

smoking, they would encourage those cigarette smokers who do not quit and do not

use medicinal nicotine products to switch completely to smokeless tobacco products.

107

10Stratton K, et al. (2001) at p. 201. 11 Id. at p. 2. 12 Id. at. p. 434. 13 Bates C. Clearing the smoke or muddying the water? (Editorial) Tobacco Control 2001; 10:

87-88.

B. The IOM Report

A logical starting point for discussion of smokeless tobacco in the context of tobacco harm reduction is the 600 page report issued in 2001 by the Institute of Medicine (‘‘IOM’’) entitled: Clearing the Smoke. Assessing the Science Base for Tobacco

Harm Reduction (‘‘IOM Report’’). The IOM was established in 1970 by the National

Academy of Sciences to examine policy matters pertaining to public health, and acts

under the Academy’s congressional charter to be an advisor to the federal government and to assess issues relating to medical care, research and education. The

IOM tobacco harm reduction project was undertaken at the request of, and was supported by, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The IOM Report explains the

need for a tobacco harm reduction strategy as follows:

Despite overwhelming evidence and widespread recognition that tobacco use

poses a serious risk to health, some tobacco users cannot or will not quit. For

those addicted tobacco users who do not quit, reducing the health risks of tobacco products themselves may be a sensible response. This is why many public

health leaders believe that what has come to be called ‘‘harm reduction’’ must

be included as a subsidiary component of a comprehensive public health policy

toward tobacco.10

Tobacco ‘‘harm reduction’’ is defined in the IOM Report as follows:

For the purposes of this report, a product is harm-reducing if it lowers total tobacco-related mortality and morbidity even though use of that product may involve continued exposure to tobacco related toxicants. Many different policy

strategies may contribute to harm reduction. However, this report focuses on tobacco products that may be less harmful or on pharmaceutical preparations that

may be used alone or concomitantly with decreased use of conventional tobacco.

(Original emphasis). 11

It is clear from this definition of ‘‘harm reduction’’ that, in the view of the IOM,

it is not necessary to demonstrate that a product is ‘‘safe’’ or ‘‘harmless’’ in order

for that product to play a role in tobacco harm reduction.

The IOM Report had the following to say with respect to smokeless tobacco products:

Smokeless tobacco products are associated with oral cavity cancers, and a doseresponse relationship exists. However, the overall risk is lower than for cigarette smoking, and some products such as Swedish snus may have no increased

risk. It may be considered that such products could be used as a PREP [Potential Reduced-Exposure Product] for persons addicted to nicotine, but these products must undergo testing as PREPs using the guidelines and research agenda

contained herein.12

There has been criticism of the IOM Report’s recommendation that all products

proposed for use in the context of a tobacco harm reduction strategy require substantial and elaborate scientific testing to demonstrate their harm reduction benefits. For example, Clive Bates, former Director of the United Kingdom’s Action on

Smoking and Health, has made the following comments:

The report places very substantial evidential requirement on those seeking to

bring PREPs to the market with a health related claim. The easiest approach

for the public health and regulatory community is to demand near complete certainty before approving the marketing of any PREPs. At first sight this appears

prudent, but it is actually a transfer of risk from the regulator to the smoker.

With insurmountable evidential hurdles in place, the regulator may sleep easy

in a cocoon of professional skepticism.13

The IOM Report’s focus on the need for further research and demonstration of

harm reduction benefits may be understandable in the context of new or novel tobacco products or so-called ‘‘safer’’ cigarettes. When it comes to smokeless tobacco,

however, there is considerable agreement in the scientific community that the use

of smokeless tobacco involves significantly less risk of adverse health effects than

cigarette smoking.

As Professor Lynn Kozlowski, Head of the Pennsylvania State University Department of Biobehavioral Health, has stated in a commentary published last year in

the journal Nicotine and Tobacco Research:

The failure of governments to establish any effective regulation of tobacco products can be seen as arguably the greatest failure of public health policy for the

past 100 years. I have recently been in a meeting with several distinguished

108

14Kozlowski LT. Harm reduction, public health, and human rights: Smokers have a right to

be informed of significant harm reduction options. Nicotine and Tobacco Res 2002; 4 Suppl 2: 55-60 at p. 58. 15Throughout this statement reference will be made to USSTC’s February 5, 2002 and May

9, 2003 submissions to the Federal Trade Commission and attachments thereto. Those documents and their attachments can be found at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/otherpubliccomments.htm

and http://www.ussmokeless.com. Hereafter, documents that are part of these submissions will

be indicated as follows: ‘‘See Website.’’ 16Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians. Protecting smokers, saving lives.

Royal College of Physicians of London, 2002. See Website. 17 Id. at p. 24. 18 Id. at p. 5

scientists and opinion leaders interested in smoking-related public policy and

regulation. The majority of these individuals expressed an unwillingness to express any public opinion about would-be harm reduction products for tobacco,

until such time as proper regulatory/evaluation systems were in place to unequivocally judge the degree of harm reduction afforded by the products as used

by society. (This might be viewed as in keeping with the position of the Institute of Medicine report.) Clearly the best of all possible research has not yet

been done on snus or medicinal nicotine, but, equally clearly, it is wrong to assume that we lack practical scientific bases for estimating that there will be

harm reduction to individual smokers from these products. Though it is important to attain proper regulation over tobacco and harm reduction products, this

goal is logically and ethically independent of the need to provide smokers today

with what information we do have about the risks of various products. (Emphasis supplied).14

C. There is General Agreement in the Scientific Community Regarding the

Comparative Health Risks of Cigarette Smoking and Smokeless Tobacco Use

USSTC’s February 5, 2002 Request to the Federal Trade Commission (‘‘FTC’’) for

an advisory opinion 1515, which is discussed below, contains excerpts from 50 scientific publications, many of which were peer-reviewed, that assert or support the

proposition that the use of smokeless tobacco involves significantly less risk of adverse health effects than cigarette smoking. Additional scientific information and

publications that became available subsequent to February 5, 2002 is reviewed in

USSTC’s May 9, 2003 submission to the FTC, which is also discussed below. Two

of the publications referenced in that supplemental submission reflect the generally

held view in the public health community regarding the comparative health risks

of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use. Those publications can be expected

to have a significant impact on the tobacco harm reduction debate, and therefore

merit some discussion.

i. Royal College of Physicians Report

In December 2002, the Royal College of Physicians (‘‘RCP’’) issued a landmark report entitled Protecting Smokers, Saving Lives,16 which assessed various issues relating to future tobacco regulation in the United Kingdom. The RCP is England’s

oldest medical institution; among its main functions is to advise the government,

the public and the medical profession on health care issues.

The 2002 RCP Report recognized that tobacco harm reduction must be an essential element of any tobacco regulation program:

A tobacco and nicotine regulatory authority should have a clear objective:

...to reduce the overall burden of tobacco-related disease by contributing to a reduction in smoking prevalence and by regulating to reduce the harm caused to

continuing nicotine users.’’ (Original emphasis) 17

The 2002 RCP Report also recognized that smokeless tobacco would be a key component of any tobacco harm reduction strategy:

Smokeless Tobacco:

As a way of using nicotine, the consumption of non-combustible tobacco is of the

order of 10-1,000 times less hazardous than smoking, depending on the product.

Some manufacturers want to market smokeless tobacco as a ‘harm reduction’

option for nicotine users, and they may find support for that in the public

health community.18

The issuance of the RCP’s 2002 Report is not the first time that the RCP has led

the way on tobacco and health issues. In March 1962, the RCP issued a report on

smoking and health which concluded that cigarette smoking caused lung cancer.

Shortly after the issuance of that report, the U.S. Surgeon General, Dr. Luther L.

Terry, established the Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on Smoking and

109

19 Bates C, Fagerstro ̈m K, Jarvis M, Kunze M, McNeill A, Ramstrom L. European Union policy

on smokeless tobacco. A statement in favour of evidence-based regulation for public health. February 2003. See Website. 20 Id. at p. 2. 21 Id. at p. 3. 22 Id. at pp. 3-4.

Health to produce a similar report for the United States. That report was released

in January 1964 and is generally referred to as the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report.

Its conclusions were similar to those of the 1962 RCP Report.

ii. White Paper on European Union Smokeless Tobacco Policy

In February 2003, a group of tobacco and health researchers and public health

advocates from the United Kingdom, Sweden and Austria published a white paper

entitled European Union policy on smokeless tobacco. A statement in favour of evidence-based regulation for public health.19 The authors recommend that the current

European Union ban of smokeless tobacco be replaced with a regulatory program

based on the recognition that smokeless tobacco is substantially less harmful than

cigarette smoking and could play a significant role in tobacco harm reduction. The

group summarized the ‘‘public health case’’ favoring smokeless tobacco as follows:

We believe that the partial ban applied to some forms of smokeless tobacco in

the European Union should be replaced by regulation of the toxicity of all

smokeless tobacco. We hold this view for public health reasons: smokeless tobacco is substantially less harmful than smoking and evidence from Sweden

suggests it is used as a substitute for smoking and for smoking cessation. To

the extent there is a ‘‘gateway’’ it appears not to lead to smoking, but away from

it and is an important reason why Sweden has the lowest rates of tobacco-related disease in Europe. We think it is wrong to deny other Europeans this option for risk-reduction and that the current ban violates rights of smokers to

control their own risks. For smokers that are addicted to nicotine and cannot

or will not stop, it is important that they can take advantage of much less hazardous forms of nicotine and tobacco—the alternative being to ‘quit or

die’ . . . and many die. (Original emphasis) 20

Among other points made in the white paper are the following:

[F]or oral tobacco to play a role in harm reduction it is not necessary to show

that it does not cause cancer—it just needs to be substantially less hazardous

than smoking. Even allowing for cautious assumptions about the health impact,

snus—and other oral tobaccos—are a very substantially less dangerous way to

use tobacco than cigarettes. Smokeless tobaccos are not associated with major

lung diseases, including COPD and lung cancer, which account for more than

half of smoking-related deaths in Europe. If there is a CVD risk, which is not

yet clear, it appears to be a substantially lower CVD risk than for smoking.

Smokeless tobacco also produces no environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and

therefore eliminates an important source of disease in non-smokers and children. These are very substantial benefits in reduced risk to anyone that switches from smoking to smokeless tobacco and we believe the public health community has a moral obligation to explore this strategy. It is likewise ethically

wrong to actively deny users the option to reduce their risk in this way.21

***

The risk to the user arising from use of a smokeless tobacco product varies by

product and is to some extent uncertain—notably in the area of heart disease

(though at worst the heart disease impact appears to be substantially less than

smoking). However, we are confident that the evidence base suggests that it is

reasonable to formulate the overall relative risk as follows: on average Scandinavian or American smokeless tobaccos are at least 90% less hazardous than

cigarette smoking. In a spectrum of risk, snus is much closer to NRT [nicotine

replacement therapy] than it is to cigarette smoking. (Original emphasis) 22

D. Individual Risk Versus Population Risk

One concern raised by some in the public health community with respect to ‘‘reduced risk’’ tobacco products is that, while a product might reduce the health risk

to an individual, the aggregate public health impact on the population might be negative. Thus, for example, it is argued that if a ‘‘safer’’ cigarette reduced the health

risks associated with cigarette smoking by 10 percent, but resulted in a 20 percent

increase in cigarette use (either through new smokers or by causing some smokers

who otherwise would have quit to continue smoking), the aggregate public health

110

23Warner KE. Reducing harm to smokers: Methods, their effectiveness and the role of policy.

In: Regulating Tobacco. Rabin RL, Sugarman SD (eds.) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2001.

Chapter 5, at pp. 133-134. 24Kozlowski L, Strasser AA, Giovino GA, Erickson PA, Terza JV. Applying the risk/use equilibrium: use medicinal nicotine now for harm reduction. (Editorial). Tobacco Control 2001; 10: 201-203. 25Kozlowski LT (2002) at p. 58. 26 Henningfield JE, Fagerstro ̈m KO. Swedish Match Company, Swedish snus and public

health: a harm reduction experiment in progress? Tobacco Control 2001; 10: 253-257, at p. 254. 27 Adapted from Swedish Match’s Third Quarter Results, October 23, 2001, as posted on Company’s web site. The figures cited reflect reported taxable shipments of snuff and cigarettes,

measured in tons.

impact would be negative. Professor Kenneth E. Warner of the University of Michigan gives the following example:

[C]onsider the implications of Star Enterprise’s advertising that its new cigarette, Advance, yields fewer nitrosamines than conventional cigarettes. Informed that most cigarette smoke contains nitrosamines and that nitrosamines

are carcinogenic, would smokers preparing to quit flock to the new cigarette instead, believing that it would greatly reduce their risk of smoking-induced lung

cancer? The net health consequences are unclear: for those smokers who would

have continued smoking anyway, switching to Advance might well reduce risk.

For smokers who would have quit, or former smokers induced to start smoking

again by the availability of this purportedly ‘‘safer’’ product, the active marketing of a low-nitrosamine cigarette clearly would increase risk. The net impact would depend on the unpredictable balance between such effects.23

Professor Kozlowski has developed a ‘‘risk/use equilibrium’’ chart 24 to assess the

issue of individual risk reduction versus aggregate population impact. The chart

compares the ‘‘decrease in danger (%)’’ displayed on the horizontal axis to the ‘‘multiplier to achieve equal risk’’ on the vertical axis.

According to Professor Kozlowski’s analysis, a tobacco product that reduces risk

by only 10 percent raises a difficult public health issue because an 11 percent increase in use of the product would offset the risk reduction in the population as a

whole, and an increase in excess of 11 percent would result in a negative public

health impact on the population as a whole. On the other hand, a tobacco product

that results in a reduced risk in excess of 90 percent presents a relatively easy public health issue since the increase in usage necessary to offset the reduction in risk

is so substantial—more that 1,000 percent—that it is highly unlikely to occur.

Given the predominant view in the public health community that the risk of adverse health effects associated with smokeless tobacco products is slight compared

to that of cigarette smoking, researchers believe it is highly unlikely the public

health benefit of cigarette smokers switching to smokeless tobacco would ever be offset by increased usage of smokeless tobacco.

Professor Kozlowski expressed his agreement with this conclusion in a recent publication entitled Harm Reduction, public health, and human rights: Smokers have

a right to be informed of significant harm reduction options, in which he applied his

‘‘risk/use equilibrium’’ analysis to smokeless tobacco:

When risks from a product are relatively small, the level of increased use needed to maintain a public health equilibrium (no changes in population-level problems) becomes very high (Kozlowski, Strasser, Giovino, et al., 2001)...For a

product like snus, if the risk is even 1% that of cigarettes, use would have to

increase 100 times to equal the problems from cigarettes. If the risk from snus

were as much as 5% that of cigarettes, use would still have to increase an unlikely 20 times for the public health problems to equal those from cigarettes.25

E. The Swedish Experience

Proponents of encouraging ‘‘inveterate’’ cigarette smokers to switch to smokeless

tobacco products point to the history of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use

in Sweden as support for their view. Swedish males have the highest rate of smokeless tobacco use and the lowest rate of cigarette smoking of any Western country,

and the daily use of smokeless tobacco by Swedish males now exceeds that of cigarettes (18.2 percent daily smokeless tobacco users versus 17.1 percent daily cigarette

smokers).26 The following chart illustrates the changing pattern of tobacco use in

Sweden during most of the past century, including the fact that smokeless tobacco

use has overtaken cigarette smoking in recent years for the first time since World

War II.27

Tobacco and health researchers have linked Sweden’s low rate of ‘‘tobacco-related

mortality’’ to its high prevalence of smokeless tobacco use and low prevalence of cigarette smoking:

111

28 Balfour DJK, Fagerstro ̈m KO. Pharmacology of nicotine and its therapeutic use in smoking

cessation and neurodegenerative disorders. Pharmacol Ther 1996; 72: 51-81, at p. 71. 29Wilson C. My friend nicotine. New Scientist 2001; 10: 28-31, at p. 29. 30 Id. at p. 30. 31Dr. Ramstro ̈m noted that the total exceeds 100% because some smokers used more than one

aid. 32 Ramstrom L. Press summary entitled: Snus as a substitution for smoking—the Swedish Experience. See Website. 33 Bates C. Presentation: Harm reduction and smokeless tobacco. See Website.

Sweden, with a long tradition of smokeless tobacco use (16% of adult males use

smokeless tobacco daily) and the highest penetration of NRT [nicotine replacement therapy] use, is the only European country that has reached (19%) the

World Health Organization’s target of 20% smokers in the adult population by

the year 2000; about 35% of all nicotine consumed comes from nonsmoked

deliver[y] forms. The tobacco-related mortality in Sweden is by far lower than

in any other European or North American country, although nicotine consumption may not be lower than in other countries.28

In 2001, a New Scientist article summarized the Swedish experience in the context of tobacco harm reduction:

[S]mokers [in Sweden] aren’t faced with the quit-or-die dilemma. Instead of

using a nicotine replacement therapy with the aim of quitting both smoking and

ultimately nicotine, they can continue using tobacco as a recreational drug, safe

in the knowledge that it probably won’t kill them. It’s all down to a product

called ‘snus,’ a form of moist ground tobacco that you pop between your lip and

gum.29

***

The ‘Swedish experiment,’ as it has come to be known, has inspired some health

campaigners to press for a more enlightened approach to the smoking epidemic.

It’s a concept they call ‘harm reduction.’ ‘If you look at Sweden, we have a living

example of the concept in action,’ says Clive Bates, director of ASH.30

Also of interest is Swedish survey data regarding the use of smokeless tobacco as

a smoking cessation aid presented at two scientific conferences in late 2002. At the

3rd International Conference on Smokeless Tobacco: Advancing Science and Protecting Public Health, held in Stockholm, Sweden in September 2002, Dr. Lars M.

Ramstro ̈m, Director of Stockholm’s Institute for Tobacco Studies, reported on a recent nationwide survey of a representative sample 6,700 adults in Sweden sponsored by the Swedish National Institute of Public Health. Dr. Ramstro ̈m reports the

following in the press summary of his presentation:

‘‘Among males snus is the most commonly used and most effective smoking cessation aid.’’ In support of this conclusion, Dr. Ramstro ̈m cites survey data indicating that ‘‘76% of male Ever Daily Smokers have made at least one attempt

to quit smoking. Around 40% of the ‘‘triers’’ report that at their latest attempt

they have used some kind of smoking cessation aid. 36% of these males have

used nicotine gum, 20% nicotine patch and 55% have used snus as a smoking

cessation aid. No other kind of cessation aid has been used by as much as

10%.31 The proportion of those who have succeeded to quit smoking completely

is 50% for gum users, 34% for patch users, 65% for snus users.’’ 32

At the 4th European Conference of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco: Improving Knowledge and Treatments of Nicotine Addiction, held in

Santander, Spain in October 2002, Clive Bates made a presentation entitled ‘‘Harm

Reduction and Smokeless Tobacco.’’ One of the points made was that ‘‘snus is an

important factor in the low smoking prevalence in Sweden. It is used for cessation

and as an alternative to smoking.’’ He cited data from a 2001 survey commissioned

by the Swedish Cancer Society reporting that, among 1,000 ex-smokers, 33% used

snus as a smoking cessation aid, compared to 17% who used nicotine replacement

therapies.33

The European Union white paper also points to smokeless tobacco as the explanation for Sweden’s low rate of tobacco-related mortality:

Evidence from Sweden suggests snus plays a positive public health role as a

substitute for smoking and as an aid to smoking cessation. It is impossible to

be definitive about this, because it is impossible to run a controlled trial on a

whole nation.

However, consider the following:

• Sweden has the lowest levels of tobacco-related mortality in the developed

world by some distance—approximately half the tobacco related mortality of the

rest of the EU.

112

34 Johnson N. Tobacco use and oral cancer: A global perspective. J Dent Educ 2001; 65: 328-

339, at p. 328. 35 Id., at pp. 332-333. 36 Andersson G, Bjornberg G, Curvall M. Oral mucosal changes and nicotine disposition in

users of Swedish smokeless tobacco products: A comparative study. J Oral Pathol Med 1994;

23: 161-167 (1993 Swedish data); Djordjevic MV, Brunnemann KD, Hoffmann D. The need for

regulation of carcinogenic N-Nitrosamines in oral snuff. Food Chem Toxicol 1993; 31: 497-501

(1992 U.S. data and all earlier data); Hoffmann D, Djordjevic MV, Fan J, Zang E, Glynn T,

Connolly GN. Five leading U.S. commercial brands of moist snuff in 1994: assessment of carcinogenic N-Nitrosamines. J Natl Cancer Inst 1995; 87: 1862-1869 (1994 U.S. data). 37 Ahlbom A, Olsson UA, Pershagen G. Health hazards of moist snuff. SoS Report 1997; 11:3-

29, at p. 7.

• Sweden has the lowest male smoking prevalence in Europe (16% daily) and

low female (c. 22%) prevalence.

• However, it has comparable male tobacco prevalence and total consumption

to neighbours Norway and Denmark—suggesting the big difference is in the

type of tobacco used, rather than overall propensity to use tobacco or consume

nicotine.

• About half of tobacco in Sweden is now consumed as snus—this share has

steadily grown since 1970s.

• 33% of ex-smokers report use of snus—almost twice the number that report

use of a pharmaceutical treatment (17%). Among males who have used a single

aid to stop daily smoking, and succeeded to do so, some 70% had used snus and

some 30% had used some kind of NRT.

Some have raised a question as to whether the Swedish experience is applicable

to the United States, asserting that Swedish moist snuff products contain lower levels of so-called tobacco-specific nitrosamines (some of which have been reported to

be laboratory carcinogens) than U.S. moist snuff products. For example, Professor

Newell Johnson in an article published in 2001 entitled ‘‘Tobacco Use and Oral Cancer: A Global Perspective’’ conceded that ‘‘on present evidence, snuff habits as they

exist in Scandinavia and probably in the United States carry lower risk of serious

health hazards’’ 34 than cigarette smoking, but also made the following comment:

In Scandinavia it is clear that local snuff is not a major risk factor: two recent

case-control studies of oral cancer cases in Sweden have failed to show an association. This is because Swedish snus is not fermented and contains much lower

nitrosamine levels than fermented tobaccos. The view that smokeless tobacco

use may be associated with a lower risk of oral cancer in the United States has

led to a movement to advocate the practice as a less dangerous alternative to

smoking and an aid to nicotine withdrawal in those addicted to smoking.35

In fact, there is currently no significant difference in tobacco-specific nitrosamine

(TSNA) levels in U.S. moist snuff products compared to Swedish moist snuff. Data

reported in scientific literature by researchers from the American Health Foundation, together with data published by Swedish researchers, 36 show that the average

levels of TSNAs in the major U.S. the moist snuff products decreased 77% between

1980 and 1994 (the last time that data for both of these products was reported in

the scientific literature), and that currently there is no significant difference between the levels of TSNAs in those products compared to Swedish moist snuff products. A chart depicting this data follows:

This view is supported by a report issued in 1997 by the Swedish National

Board of Health and Welfare, which concluded:

Recent data suggest that the differences [in TSNA levels reported in American

and Swedish moist snuff] have grown smaller, and that it is now questionable to

make a sharp distinction between use of American and Swedish moist snuff when

assessing risks—at least where TSNA content is concerned.37

F. The Gateway Issue

One argument relied upon by those who oppose the use of smokeless tobacco as

a component of a tobacco harm reduction strategy is that smokeless tobacco may

be a causal ‘‘gateway’’ to cigarette smoking, that is, smokeless tobacco use may

cause consumers to later take up cigarette smoking.

The authors of the EU white paper reject the notion of a causal ‘‘gateway’’ from

smokeless tobacco to cigarette smoking based upon their assessment of empirical

data from Sweden and their analysis of the studies relied upon by those who argue

that there is a ‘‘causal’’ gateway effect. Indeed, the authors of the EU white paper

conclude that the Swedish data suggest that smokeless tobacco prevents rather than

promotes cigarette smoking:

Gateway effects. There is concern that smokeless tobacco will function as a

lead-in to smoking for people that would not otherwise smoke. Such ‘gateway

113

38 Rodu B, Stegmayr B, Nasic S, Cole P, Asplund K. Evolving patterns of tobacco use in northern Sweden. J Intern Med 2003; 253: 660-665. 39 Id. at p. 660. 40Presentation by Dr. K. Michael Cummings at the National Conference on Tobacco or Health

in November 2001.

effects’ are always contentious, and they are hard to demonstrate for the simple

reason that we do not know what smokeless users would have done in the absence of smokeless tobacco—they may have simply moved straight to smoking.

Gateways can act in the opposite direction too—they can be ‘exits’ rather than

‘entrances’. Smokers may move to smokeless tobacco or use smokeless tobacco

to quit, where they would otherwise have continued to smoke. Starters on

smokeless tobacco may continue as smokeless users but otherwise have started

with cigarettes, so that smokeless tobacco is a diversion from smoking. In both

the US and Sweden, most smokeless tobacco use cannot be a gateway to smoking, either because smokeless users never started smoking or because they

started smoking first. For the minority who started using smokeless before cigarettes they may or may not have had their smoking caused by smokeless use.

Exit or entrance gateway? Understanding the order in which tobacco users

take up different products is an important and necessary factor in establishing

a gateway effect and whether the gateway is an exit from or entrance to smoking, but it is not in itself sufficient to establish a gateway from smokeless to

cigarettes. The basic problem is that it is difficult to know whether those that

start with smokeless tobacco would otherwise have started on cigarettes in the

absence of smokeless tobacco. The data from Sweden suggest that the gateway

is more likely to be an ‘exit’ from smoking than an ‘entrance’. Among Swedish

males with a primary use of snus no more than 20% ever started smoking,

while 45% of other males did become smokers. In addition to this compelling

evidence from the pattern of transitions, Sweden has the lowest rate of male

smoking in Europe, combined with high levels of snus use. There is no other

credible explanation for such low male smoking prevalence than the displacement and cessation of smoking through smokeless tobacco use. In total therefore, the Swedish data suggest that uptake of snus use prevents rather than

promotes smoking and therefore contributes a net public health benefit. There

have been studies in the United States that claim to show a gateway effect from

smokeless tobacco use to smoking for a minority of smokeless users. However,

these studies or related commentary have generally drawn causal inferences

based on observation of transitions between often poorly defined categories of

tobacco use, and sometimes from groups that are unrepresentative of the general population, such as the military. Psychosocial predictors of smoking initiation (school performance, parental smoking, risk taking etc.) can be used to assess which smokeless tobacco users might otherwise have been smokers. When

these confounding factors are taken into account, the data do not show that initial smokeless tobacco use adds to the propensity to become a smoker.

Additional data from Sweden contradicting the theory of a causal ‘‘gateway’’ from

smokeless tobacco to cigarette smoking was recently published by Rodu et al. in a

paper entitled Evolving patterns of tobacco use in northern Sweden.38 The researchers report on their analysis of data from a prospective follow-up study of approximately 3,400 men and women in northern Sweden, and describe the evolving patterns of tobacco use in this population over the period 1986 to 1999. While the researchers conclude that ‘‘the use of snus played a major role in the decline of smoking rates amongst men in northern Sweden,’’ 39 some of their data is of particular

relevance to the ‘‘gateway’’ issue. They report that among men who used moist snuff

but had never smoked at the beginning of the study, not a single person switched

to cigarette smoking during the follow-up period of 5 to 13 years, and only 1 percent

of these men used both moist snuff and cigarettes during the follow-up period.

G. Cigarette Smokers’ Misperception that Smokeless Tobacco and Cigarettes Involve Equal Health Risks and Their Right to Accurate Information

At the November 2001 meeting of the National Conference on Tobacco or Health

in New Orleans, Louisiana, Dr. K. Michael Cummings of New York’s Roswell Park

Cancer Institute, and his colleagues, presented results of a survey of a nationally

representative sample of over 1,000 adult cigarette smokers regarding their beliefs

about tobacco products. Of particular interest was the fact that 82% of adult cigarette smokers responded that they believed smokeless tobacco was just as likely to

cause cancer as smoking cigarettes.40

114

41 Cummings KM. Can capitalism advance the goals of tobacco control? Addiction 2002; 97:

957-958 at p. 957. 42Kozlowski LT. (2002) at p. 59.

Given these survey results, it was not surprising that in a 2002 publication, Dr.

Cummings made the following comments regarding the comparative health risks of

smokeless tobacco and cigarettes, and the need to provide adult cigarette smokers

sufficient information to permit them to make informed choices regarding the tobacco products they choose to use:

Competition to produce more consumer-acceptable medicinal nicotine products

would be helped by educating consumers about what factors in tobacco products

really contribute to disease risk. Ironically, many smokers do not perceive much

difference in health risk between smokeless tobacco products, nicotine medications and cigarettes. Yet if all nicotine products were put on a risk continuum

the actual difference between smokeless and nicotine medications would be seen

as fairly minor compared to the difference in disease risk between smoked and

smokeless products (Stratton et al. 2001). Until smokers are given enough information to allow them to choose products because of lower health risks, then the

status quo will remain. Capitalism, and not governmental regulation, has the

greatest potential to alter the world-wide epidemic of tobacco-related disease.

(Emphasis supplied) 41

Professor Kozlowski has also commented recently concerning the urgent need to

provide cigarette smokers with information regarding risk reduction options and

their right to receive such information:

Cigarettes kill about half of those who smoke them . . . It is urgent to inform

smokers about options they have to reduce risk. This needs to be done in ways

that inform smokers as fully as possible that never starting and complete quitting as soon as possible are the best choices to promote health, while also indicating that snus or medicinal nicotine (the latter more than the former) would

be preferable to continued smoking. Also, complete substitution of these products should be encouraged over mixing them with continued smoking. The harm

reduction message will be complex. There will be many ways to give it. Some

will misinterpret even the most artfully framed message. Notwithstanding, public health policy in this instance lacks compelling justification to override the

human rights of the individual. Individuals have the right to such health relevant information.42

H. USSTC’s Request for FTC Guidance

On February 5, 2002, USSTC filed a request with the FTC seeking issuance of

an advisory opinion regarding the acceptability of communicating in advertising

that smokeless tobacco products are considered to be a significantly reduced risk alternative as compared to cigarette smoking (See Website). USSTC noted in its request that issuance of an advisory opinion by the FTC would address an issue of

significant public interest to adult tobacco consumers, USSTC, and other smokeless

tobacco manufacturers. USSTC explained the rationale behind its request as follows:

USSTC requests that the Commission issue an advisory opinion supporting the

use of statements in advertising that provide the public with truthful and substantiated information about the harm reduction that a growing number of public health advocates believe can result from switching from cigarettes to smokeless tobacco products. The benefits of making such information available to consumers would be twofold: it would provide ready access to scientific opinion that

otherwise would be difficult or costly to obtain, and it would help adult consumers make better educated choices about the tobacco products they use. As

the federal agency with authority over tobacco advertising, the FTC should act

affirmatively to provide guidance in this area.

USSTC believes that the types of information it proposes to communicate in advertising are truthful, non-misleading and substantiated. At the same time,

USSTC recognizes that cross-category (i.e., smokeless tobacco advertisements

directed at adult smokers) comparative advertising of reduced risk tobacco products raises issues which currently are the subject of ongoing public health debate. Providing USSTC with an advisory opinion would inform USSTC and

other smokeless tobacco manufacturers of the criteria the FTC will apply when

considering such statements. At a minimum, FTC consideration of these issues

would advance the public debate on the issue of tobacco harm reduction, and

increase the amount of information available to the public regarding reduced

risk alternatives to cigarette smoking. Indeed, as part of its consideration of this

request, the FTC may wish to hold a public workshop or similar forum to facilitate a full exchange of views on the issues involved.

115

USSTC’s request made clear that any statement USSTC made would be truthful

and non-deceptive, and gave an example of the type of statement contemplated:

USSTC proposes to disseminate advertisements with the following or similar

statements:

The Surgeon General in 1986 concluded that smokeless tobacco ‘‘is not a safe

substitute for smoking cigarettes.’’ While not asserting that smokeless tobacco

is ‘‘safe,’’ many researchers in the public health community have expressed

the opinion that the use of smokeless tobacco involves significantly less risk

of adverse health effects than smoking cigarettes. For those smokers who do

not quit, a growing number of researchers advocate switching to smokeless

tobacco products.

Following the submission of its request to the FTC, USSTC representatives met

with FTC staff representatives on May 21, 2002 in order to present an overview of

various issues relating to its request, as well as to answer any questions that might

be raised by the FTC staff. Following the presentation and discussion, USSTC provided to the FTC staff additional information and documentation responsive to their

requests. A similar meeting was held with representatives of Department of Health

and Human Services public health agencies on May 30, 2002. Copies of the presentation materials relating to these meetings are annexed as Attachments B and C.

In the spring and summer of 2002, smokeless tobacco and tobacco harm reduction

was the topic of discussion and debate at various scientific conferences and public

policy forums in the United States and abroad. On May 16, the subject was discussed at a scientific conference in London entitled Harm Reduction, Smoking and

Smokeless Tobacco; on May 29, the issue was the subject of a forum entitled Marketing Highly Regulated Products at Northwestern University in Chicago; on June

20 through 22, the issue was discussed at the Third European Conference on Tobacco or Health in Warsaw, Poland; on June 26, the issue was debated at a seminar

sponsored by the American Council on Science and Health in New York City; and

on July 16, the issue was the subject of debate at the CATO Institute in Washington, DC.

In the summer of 2002, USSTC became aware of the scheduling of two very important scientific conferences that would include a public debate directly relevant

to USSTC’s request. On September 22 through 25, 2002, the Centers for Disease

Control, the National Cancer Institute, and the Stockholm Center of Public Health,

Center For Tobacco Prevention, would sponsor the 3rd International Conference on

Smokeless Tobacco: Advancing Science & Protecting Public Health, in Stockholm,

Sweden. The conference would bring together leading experts on smokeless tobacco,

and feature a session on tobacco harm reduction. Similarly, the 4th European Conference of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco was to be held on October 3 through 5, 2002, in Santander, Spain. This conference would also include discussion and presentations of research findings on current scientific issues relating

to smokeless tobacco, including harm reduction. In view of the pendency of these

scientific conferences, on August 12, 2002, USSTC temporarily withdrew its request

for an advisory opinion so that it would have the opportunity to provide for the

FTC’s consideration significant new information expected to be presented at these

conferences.

On May 9, 2003, USSTC submitted to the FTC information regarding smokeless

tobacco as a reduced risk alternative to cigarette smoking that had been presented

or published subsequent to the August 2002 temporary withdrawal of its request for

FTC guidance. As expected, the Stockholm and Santander conferences produced important new information relevant to USSTC’s request. More significantly, however,

two publications had appeared in late 2002 or early 2003 that will have a major

impact on the public debate regarding smokeless tobacco in the context of tobacco

harm reduction. Those publications, discussed above, are a report from London’s

Royal College of Physicians and a white paper prepared by a group of European tobacco and health researchers and public health advocates. In addition, several other

scientific publications or documents had appeared that were relevant to USSTC’s request for FTC guidance.

Significant new information from the above-referenced scientific conferences and

publications was reviewed in USSTC’s May 9, 2003 filing, submitted together with

copies of the referenced materials (See Website).USSTC suggested in its submission

to the FTC that the Commission may wish to consider holding a workshop or other

forum to address the appropriateness of conveying tobacco harm reduction information as part of smokeless tobacco advertising. USSTC continues to believe that such

a workshop would afford all of the participants in this public health debate an opportunity to present their views in a constructive and productive manner. It might

also help form a consensus as to how we move forward on this important public

116

health issue and could provide guidelines to ensure that any comparative risk communication is directed at adult smokers to avoid any unintended consequences.

III. CONCLUSION

Some tobacco control activists have taken the position that USSTC should be prevented from communicating to adult cigarette smokers the prevailing view in the

scientific community regarding the comparative health risks of tobacco products. Interestingly, they also believe that neither the federal government nor the public

health community has any responsibility to undertake that task.

On the other hand, some in the public health community believe that communication of that vital information could have a significant positive impact on the lives

of adult cigarette smokers. Indeed, some in the public health community believe

that USSTC must confront the question of whether it has a responsibility to step

forward and communicate this critical information to adult cigarette smokers in

light of the vacuum created by the federal government and the tobacco control activists.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Myers.

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MYERS

Mr. MYERS. My name is Matthew Myers. I am the President of

the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, and I am here today representing my organization.

Today this committee has bene given a false choice. It is not

about whether more should be done to reduce the harms of tobacco

but how. This committee and its members do not face the Hobsean

choice, do nothing or choose to use smokeless tobacco. The choice

is not quit or die.

Every one of the major public health organizations in this nation

have an agenda for how we can reduce the death toll of tobacco.

This committee, if it is serious about reducing the death toll of tobacco, has a prominent role to play.

Let me start out by saying there are constructive things that we

can and should do together. Despite the rhetoric, this nation has

never funded a sustained, national, preventive public education

campaign aimed at tobacco, either at children or to help people

quit. If we want to reduce the number of people who smoke, States

like Massachusetts, California, and Mississippi have shown we can

do a great deal that we are not doing.

Two, the Department of Health and Human Services Interagency

Council on Smoking and Health have come up with a comprehensive report on smoking cessation. If we want to help those smokers

quit, the answer is not to throw up our hands, as Mr. Rodu suggested. We have learned in states that have adopted aggressive

programs with quit lines and access to smoking cessation programs

that we can dramatically reduce the number of people who smoke.

We all say that there are people out there who cannot quit, and

there are, but there are many people out there who can quit who

we have not helped.

Three, there are proven smoking cessation products out there

that have been shown to be safe and effective. We are doing far too

little to encourage their broader use for harm reduction, to encourage their development in a manner that will make a major difference.

And, fourth, our organization and every one of the major organizations in this nation have come before this committee before and

have urged this committee to grant the Food and Drug AdministraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
117

tion comprehensive regulatory authority over all tobacco products.

If we want to do harm reduction based on science, not rhetoric; if

we want to make the truism that knowledge if power, then we will

insure that there is a government agency that has regulatory authority over the product so that we will know and consumers will

know what is in that product; so that we will know and consumers

will know truthfully not just what the manufacturers want us to

know but the truth, the full truth about the relative harmful effects

of those products.

We will be in a position where we will be able to control the advertising. So we will not have to have a rhetorical debate in the

abstract about whether marketing of relative health claims will

make a difference in terms of the number of people who start or

stop. We will have the authority of the agency to accomplish the

goal we set out in this case.

So that if this committee is truly serious about reducing the

harms caused by tobacco, let me suggest there are three things we

can do right off the bat. Let me also ask that we have this debate

today about the use of smokeless tobacco in the real world, and the

real world is this.

As Dr. Carmona has said, smokeless tobacco as used in the

United States has been conclusively shown to be a cancer causing

agent. Smokeless tobacco as used in the United States is different

than smokeless tobacco as a produce used in Sweden. It has far

higher levels of nitrosamines, and in my testimony I have provided

you specific studies that have been done that demonstrate that

smokeless tobacco in the United States has infinitely higher levels

of nitrosamine. The two most popular products, both made by UST

fall into that category.

Second, smokeless tobacco product or snus, as Congressman

Cubin referred to it, in Sweden is controlled for other things. It is

controlled for cadmium, lead, arsenic, nickel, chromium,

benzopyrene. It is controlled for none of those things in the United

States.

If Sweden has a different experience, it is because they have a

different regulatory regime. They have a different product.

Three, Sweden is different for another reason that we need to

think about seriously. Sweden bans tobacco advertising. Smokeless

tobacco companies in Sweden did not make health claims on advertisements. That is not what happened. The scientific community

communicated accurate, helpful information to consumers in the

absence of consumers being bombarded by uncontrolled advertising,

and that is what I really want to talk about here.

In the United States today, in the absence of FDA regulation

over this industry and this product, what are we really talking

about when we are talking about this. Well, let me show you the

reality of where we will see advertisements for smokeless tobacco

products with claims that they are safer.

Off to my left are two ads. The first ad on the far right is ‘‘Cocka-Doodle Freakin’ Do.’’ When we met with U.S. Smokeless Tobacco

and said is this the kind of advertisement that under current law

you would be permitted to make this claim in, the answer was yes.

When we asked would the FTC have the authority to prohibit

you from making such a claim in that ad if you got what you wantVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
118

ed, the answer to that was no. They did say, however, that that ad

embarrassed them because of its obvious appeal to kids, and on

February 28, 2002, wrote to us to say that ad would never appear

again.

Well, it did not. The ad on the left did. The reality is in the absence of meaningful regulation over tobacco marketing, it is not a

guess. It is a virtual guarantee that we will do the same thing that

we did in the 1980’s, use this kind of advertising to expand the

number of children who use tobacco products.

And let me suggest when it is a child who uses smokeless tobacco, we are not talking about reduction of risk. We are talking

about a cause of cancer.

Now, a second thing that is very important and a very real

concern——

Mr. STEARNS. I just need you to sum up.

Mr. MYERS. And I will.

The risk of using smokeless tobacco to discourage quitting of

those who cannot is also very real. Two thousand, the President of

UST in describing his marketing strategy explicitly said the goal

is dual use.

For people who might otherwise quit because of clean indoor air

restrictions, we want them to be able to use this product. For people who switch to dual use, they increase the risk of disease.

And let me just finish with one critical last point. It is nice to

have this debate in the abstract. We have to have it in the reality.

There may be a place to discuss the role of smokeless tobacco, but

it should take place only after this committee has worked with the

rest of the Congress to grant the Food and Drug Administration

the kind of regulatory authority to accomplish the goals you have

all talked about.

We heard a great deal today about 400,000 people dying. There

is much we can do to solve that problem.

[The prepared statement of Matthew Myers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MYERS, PRESIDENT, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCOFREE KIDS

Good morning Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. My name is Matthew Myers. I am the President of the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, a national organization created to protect children from tobacco by raising awareness

that tobacco use is a pediatric disease, by changing public policies and by actively

countering the special interest influence of the tobacco industry.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for inviting me to testify on the question of

whether tobacco, and specifically smokeless tobacco, can cure smoking. The question

seems simple and straightforward enough, and so deserves a simple and straightforward response. The answer today is the same as it was almost twenty years ago

when the House Energy and Commerce Committee last held hearings on the health

effects of smokeless tobacco products. In the absence of the kind of meaningful regulation of both the content and marketing of smokeless tobacco products that could

be provided by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the answer is no.

SMOKELESS TOBACCO IS A CAUSE OF SERIOUS DISEASE

Let us start with a basic premise: smokeless tobacco products as sold in the

United States have been found to increase the risk of oral cancer and other serious

diseases. The Surgeon General, the National Cancer Institute, the American Cancer

Society, the American Dental Association, the Scientific Advisory Committee to the

World Health Organization and numerous other scientific bodies have all determined that there is conclusive evidence that smokeless tobacco products as sold in

119

the United States increase the risk of serious disease. This conclusion is no surprise.

Scientists have identified twenty-eight cancer-causing chemicals in these products.

Today we are seeing history repeat itself. Just as we had the last time this committee met to discuss smokeless tobacco, we have a smokeless tobacco industry that

refuses to acknowledge the health effects of its products seeking government approval to use health-related claims in advertising whether or not that advertising’s

primary appeal is to children. In 1985 the then President of the Smokeless Tobacco

Counsel testified before this Committee ‘‘it has not been scientifically established

smokeless tobacco is a cause of any human disease.’’ In April 1999, a spokesperson

for the United States Smokeless Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of U.S. Tobacco

(UST) was quoted in the Providence Journal as claiming that it has not been ‘‘scientifically established’’ that smokeless tobacco is ‘‘a cause of oral cancer.’’ This statement resulted in the Rhode Island Attorney General suing UST for violating the

multi-state settlement agreement’s prohibition on making false statements about

the health effects of its tobacco products. UST was required to pay $15,000 to the

Attorney General’s office to fund efforts to prevent youth tobacco use and to formally

acknowledge that the Surgeon General and other public health authorities have concluded that smokeless tobacco is addictive and can cause oral cancer.

Just last year, UST claimed in a letter to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

that ‘‘smokeless tobacco has not been shown to be a cause of any human disease.’’

UST would have this committee think that it is new evidence that has motivated

it to seek approval to market its products as a safer alternative to cigarettes. The

unfortunate reality is that this is a company that has never acknowledged that its

products cause harm. How can you have a meaningful discussion about the potential

to use a cancer-causing product to reduce the harm from smoking with an industry

that won’t acknowledge that its products cause harm and hasn’t agreed to meaningful government regulation?

SMOKELESS TOBACCO ADVERTISING HAS INCREASED YOUTH USE

There is a second basic point about which there can be no dispute. Twenty-five

years ago few young people in this country used smokeless tobacco products. However, in large part in response to a massive marketing campaign that in part portrayed smokeless tobacco use as safer than cigarette smoking, the number of people

who used these products and the demographics of who used these products changed

in the early 1980’s. Smokeless tobacco usage among young males rose dramatically.

As a nation we experienced a sixty percent upswing in smokeless tobacco use among

young men resulting from a decade of smokeless advertising. The lesson is clear:

in the absence of meaningful government regulation, our children are vulnerable to

smokeless tobacco marketing that portrays smokeless tobacco use in a manner that

kids find acceptable. Largely because the major smokeless tobacco manufacturers

have fought FDA regulation of both their products and their marketing, our kids

are as vulnerable today as they were 25 years ago.

Was it an accident that smokeless tobacco use rose in the 1980’s even as the leading smokeless tobacco companies argued that they didn’t market to kids? The answer from their own documents is no. According to internal company documents,

UST developed a graduation strategy some time ago for hooking kids as new smokeless tobacco users. As one document states:

‘‘New users of smokeless tobacco attracted to the product for a variety of reasons

are most likely to begin with products that are milder tasting, more flavored,

and/or easier to control in the mouth. After a period of time, there is a natural

progression of product switching to brands that are more full-bodied, less flavored, have more concentrated ‘tobacco taste’ than the entry brand.’’

UST has also used the addition of flavorings to increase the appeal of its products

to children. In 1993, cherry flavoring was added to UST’s Skoal Long Cut, an entry

or starter product. A former UST sales representative revealed that, ‘‘Cherry Skoal

is for somebody who likes the taste of candy, if you know what I’m saying.’’

Many had hoped that when the United States Smokeless Tobacco Company

signed its settlement agreement with the states in 1998 its marketing practices

would change dramatically. It did not happen because UST has apparently interpreted the broad prohibition against targeting youth as not requiring it to change

the kind of advertising and youth oriented imagery that it has previously used that

has made its products so appealing to children. A May 2002 study by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health found that UST’s overall magazine advertising

increased 135% from 1997 to 2001. The study also found that UST’s advertising in

magazines with high youth readership increased 161% during the same time period.

For the period 1997-2001, UST’s expenditures in youth magazines increased from

$3.6 million to $9.4 million. Thus, smokeless tobacco advertising that appeals to

120

children has continued unabated. One only has to look at the images projected by

this advertising to understand its appeal to children. While UST may increase or

decrease its advertising in certain magazines for its own purposes when it chooses,

the evidence is that the MSA has not provided the legal club that was anticipated.

In addition, although the multi-state settlement agreement has limited UST’s ability to continue to do brand name sponsorships of some events and teams, UST continues to be a promotional sponsor of both professional motor sports and rodeo and

bull riding.

There is a legitimate concern that in the absence of meaningful government regulation of smokeless tobacco products, and how they are marketed the disastrous experience of the early 1980’s could be duplicated again today. If that occurred, more

lives would be needlessly lost as the result of an effort that started out seeking to

reduce the harm caused by tobacco products.

NOT ALL SMOKELESS PRODUCTS ARE ALIKE

There is a third fundamental point—not all smokeless tobacco products are alike.

UST has continued to market products far higher in one cancer-causing class of

agents—nitrosamines—than its counterparts in Sweden, despite the technical ability to produce low nitrosamine products. Data concerning Swedish snus is often

cited by UST in support of its desire to market its products—all of its products, including its products with very high nirtrosamine levels—as a way to reduce the

risks of tobacco use because of some data that indicates that it has not been associated with an increase in cancer in Sweden.

Swedish smokeless products are much lower in cancer-causing nitrosamines than

U.S. products. In 1995 the average Tobacco Specific Nitrosamines (TSNA) in Swedish Snus was approximately 5 mg/kg. By 2000 that number had been reduced to

2 mg/kg. An independent study conducted for the State of Massachusetts by the

American Health Foundation in 2001 found, in contrast, that while the Swedish

snus it tested contained 2.8 ug/g TSNA’s, UST’s two largest selling products—Skoal

and Copenhagen contained 64 ug/g and 41.1ug/g TSNA levels, respectively.

Even more disturbing, a new study just conducted by the American Health Foundation for the Massachusetts Department of Health that examined nitrosamine levels in snuff over the last three decades found that nitrosamine levels actually rose

in one of the two most popular American brands in 2003 after declining in 2002.

The American Health Foundation found that the TSNA levels in these brands this

year were 22.0 and 27.9 ug/g respectively—levels far higher than those found in

Sweden at any time in the last thirteen years. These findings are critical to the

Committee’s consideration because TSNA’s are widely accepted as the most serious

carcinogens in oral snuff made in the United States.

The American Health Foundation discovered another distinction between American smokeless tobacco products and Swedish snus. The nitrosamine levels of U.S.

smokeless products increase once they leave the manufacturing plant and continue

to increase the longer they sit on the shelf, in one case by an amazing 137 percent

over six months. Swedish snus does not. It is clear that American manufacturers

like UST know how to produce low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco products, but

have chosen not to do so in their most popular products.

Nitrosamines are not the only harmful component in smokeless tobacco products

and this is another distinction between American smokeless tobacco products and

those in Sweden. Swedish snus is also controlled for heavy metals found in smokeless tobacco products, like cadmium, lead, nickel and chromium, as well as substances such as arsenic, BaP’s, and pesticides. None of those controls apply to American products. It is for these reasons that organizations like the Scientific Advisory

Council to the World Health Organization in November 2002 distinguished between

the evidence that it found conclusively linked U.S. smokeless tobacco products and

oral cancer and the evidence that it found that the health effects of Swedish Snus

were more uncertain.

There is a third distinction between what is described as the Swedish experience

and the likely result in the U.S. The marketing and advertising of smokeless products in the United States and Sweden is completely different. Sweden forbids the

marketing and advertising of all tobacco products, and no claims in advertising

about relative safety of these products are permitted. In the United States there are

few restrictions on the advertising and marketing of smokeless tobacco products,

and UST wants to make explicit claims about the relative safety of its products.

The difference in the laws governing marketing in the two countries is critical.

When our organization met with representatives of UST and asked if they believed

that there was anything to prevent UST from using ads featuring roosters with

what we perceived to be youth oriented slogans placed in youth oriented magazines

121

to promote their products as less hazardous than cigarettes, they were quick to say

no. They went further. UST said that if they were given permission to claim that

their products were less hazardous than cigarettes, it was their belief that the FTC

did not have the legal authority to tell them what kinds of ads or magazines those

claims could appear in.

CLAIMS OF REDUCED RISK COULD DISSUADE SMOKERS FROM QUITTING

There is a fourth fundamental point. Another potential risk to permitting smokeless tobacco to be marketed as a harm reduction mechanism in the absence of meaningful government regulation is that claims of risk reduction could lead smokers

who would otherwise quit not to do so. The risk is real. In August 2001, UST announced plans to market a new smokeless tobacco product called Revel. UST is marketing the new product as a way to consume tobacco in places or situations when

smoking is not allowed or is not socially acceptable. Many smokers quit after the

enactment of restrictions on smoking in the workplace. There is legitimate concern

that in the absence of any regulation of where and how smokeless tobacco products

are marketed, some current cigarette smokers who would otherwise quit will switch

instead to Revel or other smokeless products. This concern is compounded by studies

that show that claims of reduced risk can lead consumers to falsely underestimate

the relative benefits of quitting versus switching.

THERE IS MUCH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CAN AND SHOULD DO TO REDUCE THE

HARM OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS

My fifth point: There is a great deal that can and should be done to reduce the

harm caused by tobacco. It is a misplaced priority to focus so much attention on

smokeless tobacco in the current environment when there is so much that everyone

agrees on that will make a real difference. Let me highlight some of the actions this

Congress and the executive branch could take that will reduce the harms currently

being caused by tobacco use in our society.

1) The federal government is doing far too little to fund programs or adopt policies

that have been proven effective in reducing tobacco use. Comprehensive tobacco prevention programs have been proven to work in every state that has tried them. Yet,

the federal government has not funded a meaningful national sustained public education campaign.

2) The federal government is doing far too little to fund cessation programs or to

promote and make available the cessation tools that have been proven to help smokers quit. A recent Report conducted at the request of the Department of Health and

Human Services laid out a comprehensive plan to encourage and assist smokers to

quit. It should be adopted and implemented.

3) The FDA already has authority over FDA approved medicinal nicotine products. These products have been proven to be safe, at least for short-term use, but

little has been done to encourage their improvement or to explore their long-term

use and potential for harm reduction. Before we turn to a cancer-causing agent as

a tool to reduce the harms caused by tobacco, shouldn’t we first make sure we have

done everything we can to maximize the potential role of safe products that our government has already reviewed and approved? FDA can initiate a review of the use

of nicotine replacement products without the need for further legislation, and it

should do so.

COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS BY THE FDA IIS A NECESSITY

My sixth and, perhaps, my most important point: The single most important action this Congress can take to reduce the harm that current tobacco products are

causing is to provide the FDA with meaningful authority over all tobacco products.

In case we needed further proof, a study conducted by scientists at the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention published in the journal Nicotine & Tobacco Research just last Friday demonstrated once again that without a federal agency that

has oversight over tobacco products consumers are being deprived of critical information about the risks of individual products and are being sold products that contain more toxins than are necessary. The study found that even while tar levels in

Marlboros have gone down over the last several decades, nitrosamine levels in

Marlboros have increased and are higher, in fact, than most locally produced popular brands in other countries throughout the world.

The high nitrosamine levels may provide at least a partial explanation for why

cancer rates have not declined as expected when tar levels declined. Don’t be confused; the importance of this study is not that we can save lives if we just reduce

nitrosamine levels in Marlboros. The real importance of this study is that there are

dozens of known carcinogens and toxic substances in current tobacco products that

122

we are not controlling and about which the public is not being informed. This study

proves that the reduction of any one toxin may have little impact if you don’t control

the level of other toxic substances, and that you cannot count on manufacturers on

their own to provide this information truthfully and completely to consumers. The

lesson is clear—what you don’t know will kill you. In the absence of government regulation tobacco manufacturers—smokeless and cigarette—will not produce the least

hazardous product possible and consumers will not have the type of complete information needed to make a truly informed choice.

The latest study reminds us that in the absence of a governmental agency with

the authority to require manufacturers to test and disclose the toxic substances in

their products, claims that any tobacco products reduce the risk of tobacco-related

disease should not be trusted or permitted. Our experience with both light and low

tar products demonstrates why this is so important. For decades tobacco manufacturers have advertised light and low tar products in a manner that they knew led

consumers to believe that these products were safer than traditional cigarettes. The

evidence is now conclusive that these light and low tar products have not in fact

reduced the overall risk of disease. This public health tragedy could have been

avoided if tobacco manufacturers had been required to disclose to the FDA the levels

of different toxins in their products and their knowledge about the actual levels of

tar and other harmful substances that consumers were receiving.

Mr Chairman, this hearing dramatically underscores the pressing need for Congress to give the Food and Drug Administration the authority to regulate tobacco

products effectively. A discussion about harm reduction has to begin with a discussion about providing the FDA with the kind of authority that is necessary to protect

consumers, verify claims, and require that all reasonable steps are taken to reduce

the harm caused to smokers. Is there a role for smokeless tobacco in a comprehensive effort to reduce the death toll from tobacco overseen by the FDA? No one has

the information to make that decision today. The FDA should be open to all strategies that are scientifically based and that will save lives. The decision about what

role smokeless tobacco plays in that overall scheme is a decision that can only be

made by the FDA after it has all of the relevant information before it.

Why the FDA? The FTC lacks both the authority and the expertise to do the job

by itself. I worked at the Federal Trade Commission and was responsible for that

agency’s tobacco-related activities. The job of the FTC is to stop false, deceptive or

misleading advertising. It is not a science-based agency. It lacks the authority to

restrict smokeless tobacco marketing that appeals to children or to prevent claims

of reduced risk to be used to make these products more attractive to children. It

further lacks the authority to evaluate different smokeless tobacco products for relative safety, to require smokeless tobacco manufacturers to disclose to it changes in

the product that could impact its relative harm or to require smokeless tobacco

manufacturers to lower the level of toxic substances in their products. The FTC is

most effective when it is able to work with the FDA with regard to products over

which both have jurisdiction. If FDA is given this authority over tobacco products,

the two agencies working together could make a very positive difference.

Mr. Chairman, if UST and the other smokeless tobacco companies are serious

about reducing the harm caused by tobacco and about assuring that the marketing

of its products as less hazardous contributes to public health, they would support

giving FDA the strong authority it needs to regulate tobacco products as outlined

by the major public health groups. I have no doubt that FDA would have had this

authority already but for the opposition of the major cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers. They should not now be rewarded for their opposition to

meaningful government regulation by being permitted to make health-related claims

that we lack the ability to verify only because of the lack of such regulation.

Mr. STEARNS. And I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sweanor.

STATEMENT OF DAVID SWEANOR

Mr. SWEANOR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am David Sweanor. I am a lawyer based in Canada. I spent the

last 20 years working full time on a broad range of tobacco control

activities both in Canada, where I am very pleased with a lot of

what we have accomplished, including the last 12 months. We appear to have knocked per capita consumption down by over 12 percent, which is a world precedent setting rate of decline.

123

I have also been very involved in activities globally, although the

views I express today are going to be those of mine and not for any

of the organizations I have worked for.

The public policy goal, public health goal of tobacco control is important to keep in mind. What we are trying to do is to reduce

death and disease, and there is three broad ways we can do that.

We can reduce tobacco onset. We can facilitate cessation, and we

can reduce toxicity for those who use the product.

This is important because the status quo is truly horrible. We

have got a product that dominates the market that kills half of its

long term users. Among these long term users we have people who

believe that nicotine itself is what causes cancer. Many people do

not want to use medicinal nicotine products because of the fear of

cancer. They are less likely to use them. They will not use them

as long as they should or as much as they should.

They believe smokeless tobacco causes cancer at least at as great

a rate as smoking. And perhaps most importantly, they believe

light cigarettes are significantly less hazardous.

Well, what do we do with a mess like this? And I think that a

key part of understanding potential solutions is to recognize that

though nicotine is a primary reason people would be smoking, combustion is a primary reason that they are dying.

So that in theory at least reduced risk products make a tremendous amount of sense, and I think properly regulated by a body

like FDA, these products have the potential to complement the

other aspects of what we are doing in tobacco control of supporting

what we are doing to prevent onset and to encourage cessation.

But this is not merely theoretical. We do have examples of elsewhere in the world where medicinal products are given a broader

range of indicated uses. We have examples of people who have used

medicinal products for years with no apparent ill effects.

We do have the example from Sweden where there has been a

massive transformation in their market from one dominated by

cigarettes to one dominated by smokeless tobacco, with a concomitant decline in the rates of disease that follows smoking. It does

not follow tobacco use.

In theory at least, there is a spectrum of risk here, and there

would be the ability to offer products with information so that consumers get to decide where in that spectrum they want to be. I

think to work though, you do need to have some form of comprehensive regulation. Without it, you cannot guarantee public

health. You cannot give consumers protection, and I would argue

you cannot effectively allow the operation of a marketplace because

there is a whole lot of questions that come out, such as how do we

know that a product really does reduce risk on a one for one basis

compared to a standard cigarette.

I would say that is fairly easy. There is no problem dealing with

that dealing with medicinal nicotine. I don’t think there is any

problem with that dealing with low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco.

The Surgeon General clearly does.

How would we know that a product might only reduce some or

what would be the impact if it only reduces some of the cigarettes

somebody might otherwise smoke? Where does the product fit on

that spectrum of risk? How does it impact on things like cessation

124

and youth uptake, and how do you communicate a message to the

public?

Because one of the problems we have now is that even totally

truthful communications from a tobacco company will probably not

be believed. There has to be some way that people can get honest

communications that are believable so that they are in a position

to do something that their own health.

I think these are very difficult issues, but I think that there is

also a need for prompt action. You have got roughly 1,300 Americans dying every day as a direct result of cigarette smoking. What

do we do?

Well, we do need that broad regulatory framework for all tobacco

products, and in the meantime, we need to look at things like what

should we do with medicinal nicotine. I mean, one of the clear

consensuses that I have been hearing here today is that everybody

seems to think we should have broader access to these products.

Well, surely there can be some way that your committee can

alert the FDA and the FTC that you want them to do that. You

want them to examine the role of these products in harm reduction.

While they are at it, what can they do to set something in place

that allows the manufacturers of smokeless products to come forward and say, ‘‘Here is what we have got on offer as well.’’

There ought to be more discussion about this. There needs to be

a way that people can dialog and discuss what is happening because I do not think it is any longer a question of will there be alternative products or should we give information to consumers. It

is a question of how are we going to evaluate those products and

how are we going to get truthful information to consumers in a way

that is actually going to allow them to make more informed decisions about their own health.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of David Sweanor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID SWEANOR, COUNSEL, NON-SMOKERS’ RIGHTS

ASSOCIATION

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee to talk

about a truly critical issue for global public health.

My name is David Sweanor, and I am counsel to the Non-Smokers’ Rights Association [NSRA] in Canada, an organization I have worked for for over 20 years.

NSRA has been a primary driver for a very full range of public health policies aimed

at reducing the toll from tobacco. These include health-oriented tobacco tax policies,

restrictions on tobacco sales, comprehensive restrictions of tobacco advertising and

promotion, detailed package-based heath information—including picture-based

warnings covering 50% of packages and package inserts giving additional health information, comprehensive disclosure of additives and sales data, and regulatory authority over tobacco manufacturing standards. These policies have played a key role

in very significant drops in Canadian tobacco consumption, which have outpaced US

declines. Last year alone, and largely due to very significant cigarette tax increases,

per capita consumption in Canada fell by 8%. I believe that this is two to three

times the rate of decline in the US.

In addition to my work in Canada I have, for many years, been very involved in

tobacco control issues in this country, and globally. It is because of my interest in

global public health, combined with the policy interactions between Canada and the

United States, that I welcome the opportunity to speak to you today.

THE PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS FOR TOBACCO POLICY

It is possible to articulate a concise view of the public health goals of tobacco control activities. The ultimate goal is to reduce death and disease as much as is practically possible within the constraints of law and with respect for human rights. To

125

achieve this goal there are essentially three broad areas of intervention. We can expand current efforts to prevent smoking onset and that encourage and facilitate cessation but we must also reduce the toxicity for those who continue to use tobacco.

While many nations have done much to try to prevent onset of smoking, far fewer

have made significant strides in promoting and facilitating cessation, and almost

none have moved significantly on issues of toxicity reduction. This is a major concern to me since preventing the uptake of smoking, even when successful, will not

have a significant impact on disease rates for another 20-30 years due to the lag

between the onset of smoking and the development of the resulting diseases. To put

this into an American perspective, the World Health Organization estimates that

roughly 10 million Americans will die as a direct result of cigarette smoking in the

next 20 to 25 years. All of these people are currently smokers, most say they’d rather not be smoking, and only cessation and toxicity reduction can impact on this unfolding tragedy.

In short, the status quo is horrible. Cigarettes dominate the market, and will kill

roughly 50% of their long-term users. Few consumers turn to FDA approved Nicotine Replacement Therapies such as the patch, oral inhaler, and lozenge. FDA-approved products have slowly increased in sales but consumers currently have far too

few choices to replace their cigarettes and inadequate information to facilitate

changes in their delivery system. The development of long-term replacement products appears to have been stymied by the FDA, and there has been no meaningful

consideration of using these products for long-term harm reduction. It makes no

sense that so little consideration has been given to how to better use products that

the FDA has reviewed and approved as safe—at least for short term use—to address

the broader problems of how best to help more people quit and how to help about

smokers who have tried to quit and can’t. It also makes no sense that there has

not been more discussion about whether or under what conditions smokeless tobacco

products might be used to reduce the disease risk for smokers who cannot quit. The

fact that prestigious bodies such as the Royal College of Physicians have pointed

out that smokeless tobacco can be between 90% and 99.9% less hazardous than cigarettes cries out for serious examination of how these products can be used as part

of an overall effort to reduce tobacco’s health toll.

THERE MAY BE A WAY OUT OF THIS MESS.

Nicotine is the primary reason for tobacco use. It provides various pharmacological effects sought by many smokers. But it is also, especially when delivered

through cigarette smoking, highly addictive. Yet nicotine itself is apparently responsible for only a very small part of the health damage caused by tobacco use. The

reason smokers are dying in such great numbers is that they are obtaining their

nicotine through the repeated inhalation of smoke. Nicotine provides the demand for

tobacco, but it is combustion that is the principal reason for the morbidity and mortality.

Simply put, cigarettes are an exceedingly ‘‘dirty’’ delivery system for the drug nicotine. If Americans got their nicotine by brewing tobacco leaves and their caffeine

by smoking tea leaves we would be looking at a very different national disease profile, with tea likely responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths per year and

tobacco very likely a sidelight on the broader health picture.

Replacing ‘‘dirtier’’ delivery systems with cleaner ones is an obvious measure to

take in efforts to reduce toxicity for those who are going to continue using nicotine.

Different nicotine delivery devices will have differing levels of risk. Theoretically we

could place all these products on a spectrum and look at ways to give information

and other incentives that would encourage consumers to move toward the lowest

risk products that can still meet their needs. And one could also imagine a system

of incentives that would encourage manufacturers to work to create products with

lower and lower toxicity levels.

But, like most seemingly straightforward public policy solutions it gets rather

complicated in the real world. If it were truly easy to prevent a half million deaths

a year in this country I am sure these hearings would not even be necessary since

the corrective measures would have been taken many years ago.

THE COMPLICATING ISSUES

We need to avoid making or reinforcing the mistakes of the past. Millions of

smokers smoke ‘‘light’’ and ‘‘mild’’ cigarettes in the false believe that they are actually safer. It took years for independent scientists and governments to discover that

these products are actually part of a massive consumer deception on relative risk.

An effective harm reduction strategy must begin with an end to all forms of deception on relative risk and comprehensive science based regulation of all tobacco prodVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
126

ucts and the marketing for those products. There needs to be a governmental agency

that knows the whole truth about the relative health risks of different products and

that is in a position to insure that consumers are provided the whole truth in a nonmisleading way that promotes the overall public health. Without comprehensive regulation both the government and consumers cannot be sure they have complete information or the tools to best protect the public health.

Regulation is only a first step, and is not an end in itself. It needs to be based

on clear goals. Here, briefly, are some of the issues I think we need to consider when

looking at potential reduced-risk products:

1. What is the degree of certainty that we want to have that a product truly

does reduce risk compared to standard cigarettes? On a one-for-one basis

this is not a difficulty when looking at medicinal nicotine products such as the

patch and nicotine gum that are already fully regulated. It should also not be

a difficulty with low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco, given the massive differences in potential disease risk compared to cigarettes, if there was a mechanism that could stipulate the actual level of nitrosamines and other harmful

substances in these products. If all cigarette use were simply replaced by medicinal nicotine and low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco products the death rates

would be massively lower. But there are many products, especially combustionbased products, where the degree of risk reduction is by no means understood.

There needs to be some system in place that can credibly evaluate the relative

risks of all tobacco products.

2. What about the risk from a product that only replaces some cigarettes?

It is quite possible that a product could be far less hazardous than cigarettes,

but replace so few of the cigarettes that someone smokes that it would have no

appreciable impact on risk. Yet if smokers believe such a product to have significant health benefits they are, once again, being deceived. How can we develop guidance on issues of ‘‘smoking reduction’’?

3. How can we effectively place various current and future products on a

‘‘continuum of risk’’ so that we can communicate to users the information they need to make fully informed decisions? Many smokers believe

that ‘‘light’’ cigarettes are significantly less hazardous than regular cigarettes,

which is perhaps the greatest consumer deception of our time. Consumers also

believe that the ‘‘tar’’ and nicotine listed on ads is what they actually get from

smoking various cigarettes. As shown in Appendix 1, many also believe that nicotine causes cancer and that using smokeless tobacco is as deadly as smoking.

In addition most harbor misunderstandings about the workings and potential

risks from medicinal nicotine that only serve to keep them from availing themselves of these proven safe and effective means of quitting smoking. This level

of confusion about such a critical public health issue is truly alarming, and

could possibly even worsen as new and unregulated products hit the market.

4. How can we prevent efforts at toxicity reduction from undermining our

efforts on cessation and prevention of uptake? The main planks of good

public policy should be complementary rather than adversarial. If the promise

of toxicity reduction reduces quitting or encourages more people to enter [or reenter] the market the unintended consequences could negate any potential

health gains from the intervention. This is the reason that meaningful regulation of both claims and how potential harm reduction products are marketed is

critical.

5. Who should communicate messages to the public? One of the realities of the

present environment, and one borne out by the history of foods and drugs prior

to the existence of the FDA, is that without strong government oversight those

with a vested interest in selling products should not be trusted to communicate

full and truthful information. With foods and pharmaceuticals there are now

stronger grounds to believe claims due to the intervention of a credible, objective and expert third party. Such third party validation is as important to tobacco companies as it is to public health. Even a tobacco company that tried

to tell the truth about a massively reduced-risk product would probably not be

believed in today’s environment. It is critical that FDA be given effective authority over all tobacco products in order to ensure that consumers are not misled about the relative risks of different products, including reduced risk tobacco/

nicotine products.

6. How can we be assured that the messages conveyed to the public are

being appropriately interpreted? What if smokers believed that smokeless

tobacco was something they could switch to after they developed a smoking related disease like lung cancer? What if they believed that all smokeless tobacco

[including, say, that sold in Sudan or Central Asia] had the same risks? There

127

appears to be a strong need for an institutionalized form of post-marketing surveillance, both to assess attitudes and behaviors.

7. How do we stay on top of what could be a rapidly changing environment? Approximately 45 million Americans spend roughly $80 billion a year

buying a dirty drug delivery system that is killing over 400,000 of them—and

tens of thousands of non-smokers—annually. If this market were subject to effective FDA regulation that actually promotes competition based on good

science and marketing that is not misleading, private enterprise and informed

consumers would cause a marketplace revolution. Just as did the legal reforms

on foods and drugs in 1906 and 1938.

These are tough issues. But the need to address them is truly monumental. Your

fellow citizens are dying from tobacco use, but they are also dying for want of truthful information on relative risks and from a lack of viable alternatives to cigarettes.

There is a need for prompt action. The FDA and FTC already have authority over

medicinal nicotine. I would hope that they would begin an immediate examination

of how they might use their existing authority to expand the availability of these

products and to explore their potential for harm reduction. Smokeless tobacco products could also be a key part of a harm reduction strategy if a federal agency were

given the authority to regulate the content of these products and how they are advertised. I would hope that this, too, could be done quickly.

There are no easy answers. There is, instead, a need to balance potential risks

and benefits. There is a need to assess the science behind new products and the best

way to communicate relevant information to consumers, and how best to regulate

a market in order to give maximum protection for consumers. There is also a great

need to stimulate discussion on how to proceed. It is no longer a question of whether

there will be alternatives to cigarettes or whether truthful information on relative

risks should be communicated to consumers. It is, instead, an issue of how to evaluate products and of how to communicate information in a way that complements

public health goals and provides consumers with much needed information about

the relative risks of alternative products.

Thank you for your time,

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentleman.

We are in the process of having three votes. We have about a little over 7 minutes left on the first vote, and we have two 5 minute

votes. And I will come back by voting early on the third vote.

So I think we have got about a 15 to 18 minute break. So I appreciate that if you will be patient with us, the committee is going

to be recessed for 15 to 20 minutes.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. STEARNS. Will the subcommittee reconvene?

I think at this point we have finished the opening statements. So

I will start with some questions. Let me get right to this question.

Dr. Rodu, oral cancer is a risk of using smokeless tobacco products. What is the risk of using such products, and how does that

oral cancer risk compare to the use of cigarettes? That is the bottom line.

Mr. RODU. Oral cancer is a risk of smokeless tobacco use. That

risk has been well defined by 20 epidemiologic studies. The risk

can be quantified and was quantified by a 1981 study in the New

England Journal of Medicine.

Of 100,000 long term, that is, above 40 years or so, use of smokeless tobacco, of 100,000 users, 26 of them will develop oral cancer

every year. Of that number, about 12 or 13, unfortunately, it is

tragic, but they will die.

Now, we also know the risks of smoking, and the risks of mouth

cancer from smoking are somewhere in the range of double that

risk. So the point I always make is that the smoker who switches

to smokeless tobacco also reduces his or her risk for that disease

as well.

128

Mr. STEARNS. You heard the Surgeon General when I tried to

talk to him about the degree of risk between cigarette smoking and

the smokeless tobacco, and the Surgeon General noted in his testimony that there is no significant scientific evidence that suggests

smokeless tobacco is a safer alternative to cigarettes.

And I even tried to push the idea of the Volvo versus the Miata,

the very small sports car.

Do you agree with his statement?

Mr. RODU. Quite frankly, I am dumbfounded by his statement.

The scientific evidence that is out there both from the 20 epidemiologic studies, from four cardiovascular disease studies in Sweden,

from our work over 10 years published in numerous journals, including high quality journals like Nature, American Journal of

Medicine; I just do not know how a Surgeon General can come to

that conclusion, and in fact, I would be willing to submit a portfolio

of research to him for his review and response because I am quite

surprised.

Mr. STEARNS. Dr. Wallace, what additional issues need to be researched before you would be comfortable allowing companies to

claim reduced risk product, whether it be a cigarette, smokeless

product, or a medicinal nicotine?

Mr. WALLACE. Sure. There are many. We laid out in the report

a long term research agenda, but some of the things that need to

be done more quickly are to begin to understand how it affects the

behavior. If you were to make a claim like that, how does it affect

children’s behavior? How does it affect physician behavior in making recommendations, but most importantly adult behavior?

How does it change their habits? How do they use tobacco products? And what happens to them in the long term?

All of these tobacco products may have outcomes that include

things other than cancer, and we have to pay attention to those.

So there is a whole menu of things to do. So there is a lot of research left to be done.

A very important bit of the research agenda finally then would

be to try to identify indicators in the body that future risks of cancer, heart disease, small fetuses, whatever the outcomes happen to

be, in fact, might be different and reliably predict in advance. Otherwise you have to wait a very long time to see the effects of some

of these products.

Mr. STEARNS. Dr. Tomar, you have heard Mr. Waxman talk, and

in your opening statement we talked about this report that you

have. In a study conducted by Dr. Lynn Kozlowski recently published in Nicotine and Tobacco Research, he indicated your gateway theory to be statistically unreliable because he argues you fail

to take into account well known psychosocial predictors of smoking

initiation, such as below average school performance, depressive

symptoms or fighting.

Now, this is your chance to give your side. So how do you respond to what he said about your report?

Mr. TOMAR. Well, there are two approaches. One, in the original

paper that Dr. Kozlowski supposedly refuted, the argument I made

in that paper is that if there are common psychosocial risk factors

that account for moving from one tobacco product to another,

wouldn’t we expect it to move in both directions?

129

And in fact, what we found was that 40 percent of young males

who were using smokeless tobacco at the beginning of that study

4 years later had either added cigarettes to their use of smokeless

tobacco or had switched to smokeless. We found almost no movement from cigarettes to smokeless tobacco.

So that was the first one, and then actually you need to read the

reply that has been accepted for publication in that same journal

to Dr. Kozlowski’s analysis. As I read his analysis using the same

variables that he claimed were so critical and that I had omitted,

and in fact, when I did the analysis limited to the group that actually uses the products, non-Hispanic white males and those who

were under 16 at the beginning of the study, in fact, smokeless tobacco was not only a statistically significant predictor of subsequent smoking. It was a stronger effect than the risk behavior predictors that he felt were such a critical omission.

Mr. STEARNS. I will let someone else. Dr. Rodu, you may want

to comment based upon the study from Sweden.

Mr. RODU. Yes. We have a study of tobacco use among adults in

Sweden, and we saw, in essence, no effect of gateway from smokeless tobacco use to smoking, and that is among adults. Largely, the

predominant public health message in Sweden, of course, is that

snus is safer than smoke. I do not think there is anyone that

doubts that in the Swedish environment.

In the United States, the dominant public health message is that

smokeless tobacco is just as dangerous as smoking, and that is seen

in Mr. Sweanor’s testimony. And so we have an open gate. It is an

open gate for transition back and forth between smoking and

smokeless tobacco use based on convenience, not based on health.

So that you know, the other thing about gateway is that it is a

convenient issue when you look at smoking is a gateway to smokeless or vice versa and drinking and sex and all kinds of behaviors,

when, in reality, these behaviors are all grouped; they are all associated; and they are all present in a small proportion of our teenagers, and it is unfortunate, but it is association instead of causation.

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, could I just make two quick points

with regard to that because I think they are vitally important?

One is Sweden does not permit the kind of advertising I showed

before so that the interaction between different products is really

quite different because you do not have the same market forces. As

a matter of fact, in Sweden, the same company for a long time

owned both the major cigarette company and the same smokeless

company.

The second, and the reason we have a real life example in the

United States is, you know, in the mid-1970’s virtually no kids

used smokeless tobacco products. The kind of marketing that I

showed you that UST was engaging in through 2002 kicked in

around the late 1970’s, early 1980’s, and what we saw was a little

explosion of smokeless tobacco use.

And part of the ad themes in those cases was a safer message,

implicit safer message. So that when we talk about a concern about

kids in this country, we are not talking some sort of ephemeral

thing. We are talking about a real life example of what happened

here.

130

Now, we do not have any different kind of regulation today. We

had all hoped in 1997 that the master settlement agreement would

bring about a change in tobacco marketing by companies like UST,

and instead what we saw was a dramatic up-tick in marketing,

particular in youth oriented magazines until several Attorneys

General threatened them.

When they got out of those magazines, they used carefully the

word ‘‘we are suspending advertising in magazines like Rolling

Stone,’’ not ‘‘we are getting out permanently.’’

So the concern that we all have is that in the absence of government regulation that controls the kind of marketing, that puts in

place the kinds of regulations that they have in Sweden, that the

effort to promote health reduction will, in fact, result in an explosion in youth smoking.

Is it possible to deal with that? Perhaps if the FDA had full and

comprehensive regulatory authority, we could, but that is what we

ought to really be talking about here.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. My time has expired.

The ranking member.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Dr. Rodu, is it not true that in 1999 the University of Alabama

at Birmingham received $1.25 million unrestricted research grant

from the United States Tobacco Company of Greenwich, Connecticut?

Mr. RODU. That is correct.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And is it also not true that the award supports

the UIB Tobacco Research Fund, and you are the principal investigator?

Mr. RODU. That is correct.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I wanted to ask Mr.—I want to say it right—

Verheij?

Mr. VERHEIJ. That is right.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Verheij a question. UST has indicated that it

is a company that can be trusted not to use health claims for

smokeless tobacco to attract children or to deter people from quitting. I want to talk a little bit about the ads, but I would like to

ask whether you have told the whole truth today to Congress about

levels of carcinogens called tobacco specific nitrosamines in your

product.

In your written testimony, you stated today, ‘‘There is currently

no difference in tobacco specific nitrosamine levels in U.S. moist

snuff compared to Swedish moist snuff.’’ However, your testimony

only includes data on U.S. brands up to 1994, and if you will look

at this chart, which is based on data provided by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health based on research by the Institute for Cancer Prevention, it shows that the levels of tobacco specific nitrosamines in your two leading products doubled between

1994 and today.

The average level in the last 4 years has been 26.7 micrograms

compared to an average level of less than 10 in Swedish products

for the last 20 years.

Why did you not share any more recent data than 1994 with the

committee today?

131

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, we would be happy to share recent data. The

fact is that products that we have introduced into the market over

the past year, they have some of the lowest nitrosamine levels of

any product in the world, including as a comparison to Swedish

product.

The data you have there is from the State of Massachusetts. We

met with the State of Massachusetts with respect to their methodology. In fact, I had a phone call with Dr. Connolly probably 3

weeks ago where he was giving me current data on some of our

leading brands.

Our objective——

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you talking about your moist product?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Yes, indeed, and including two new pouch products

that we have introduced.

The fact is I think as we have indicated in our submission, we

have reduced nitrosamine levels more than 80 percent in our products over the last 20 years to the point that a Swedish government

report in 1997 concludes that the differences were so small at this

point that the differences in relative risk were negligible.

Our objective is to reduce nitrosamine levels to the lowest levels

possible. In the context——

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Let me just say that my understanding is that

the 2000 data, which you were given on August 16th, 2001, says

that it is now 52.7 micrograms for that year.

Mr. VERHEIJ. And I would have to go back and look particularly

at the timing of that. They were taking data 6 months out from

when the product was introduced on the shelf. Those products are

not on the shelves after 6 months at all.

And in fact, looking at data that we have, and again, I would be

happy to provide the committee, in terms of our leading brands, we

are talking about levels of 12 to 14 parts per million. We continue

to work to reduce those to the lowest level possible.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Did you put any shelf life or expiration data

on your productions?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Actually we do. On the Copenhagen product, there

is a made date, and within 30 days of that made date that product

is either purchased or taken off the shelf by our sales people.

We have guaranteed to be fresh dates on our other products,

which indicate the optimum period within which we think consumers should purchase the product. So we do have made dates on

it.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So I understand that you refuse to accept a

maximum shelf life for your product, that is, any kind of requirement to have a shelf life.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Not at all. We had a good discussion with Dr.

Connolly at the time; showed him the fact that our products turn

52 times a year, the most made dates, the most shopped product

other than milk in terms of date, and in fact, these products were

coming off the shelves, and any significant increase in nitrosamine

levels were toward the end of the 6-month period when these products are not available to consumers.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Okay. Let me ask you this. In a letter the

company wrote February 5, 2002, it says, ‘‘It is UST’s position that

smokeless tobacco has not been shown to be a cause of any human

132

disease.’’ That was in a letter from Brian Cave, LLP, to the Federal

Trade Commission. That is your submission to the FTC.

Mr. VERHEIJ. And I think we have also made clear in our public

filings that based on the scientific literature taken as a whole, the

company has not taken the position that the product is safe, and

the question on the table in the context of the debate we have all

been talking about here is the fact that smokeless tobacco is considered to be considerably less harmful than cigarette smoking, and

whether that information——

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. No, no. That is not what I am asking. ‘‘Has

not been shown to be a cause of any human disease.’’ Mr. VERHEIJ.

I do not think that statement is inconsistent with the position that

we have taken, which is that we have not taken a position that the

product is safe.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Dr. Tomar, would you respond to that?

Mr. TOMAR. Well, it seems to be contradicted by Dr. Rodgers’ earlier statement, where he acknowledged that these products cause

cancer. It has certainly been established by the International Agency for Research on Cancer and the U.S. Surgeon General.

Mr. VERHEIJ. If I may follow up on that, the fact is that based

on studies that were available in 1986, the Surgeon General

reached the judgment that smokeless tobacco can cause oral cancer.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. You know, actually I have gone over my time

already and want to make one other point.

I just think that this is an astonishing statement given the unanimous actually, including Dr. Rodu’s statement about disease.

Now, why anyone would think that this magazine with Britney

Spears on the cover might be read by young boys I have no idea,

but I just want to say this is December 2001, and in it is an ad

showing a fire fighter putting out a fire, clearly one of the heroes

of 9/11, ‘‘a bit braver, a pinch better,’’ and it is for Skoal.

I just want to say that given that and the ad for Rooster, it is

not credible to say that these products are not pitched to children.

Thank you.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Yes?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Mr. Chairman, if I may for 1 second.

Mr. STEARNS. Sure, yes.

Mr. VERHEIJ. I think there has been a lot of focus on old ad campaigns some of which, you know, once certain concerns were

brought to our attention like the rooster ads that Mr. Myers

showed, we discontinued those once we took a second look.

The fact is what we are talking about in this debate is communications to adults about information that there is an increasing

consensus in the scientific community that smokeless tobacco is

considerably less harmful than cigarette smoking.

And we are urging a workshop where all of these parties can participate so that we can come up with guidelines that will address

everybody’s concerns before those communications are made. And,

frankly, you could take our company out of it entirely.

That means the remaining issue is to what degree does the government and the public health community have an obligation to

133

communicate this important information to adult smokers who are

not quitting.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Myers, you made the point several times that we tend to be

debating this in the abstract and we ought to look at real world information and real life conditions, and I think that is a good point.

One of the things you have pointed out to us, however, was that

the story in the Washington Post over the weekend that said smoking is projected to kill a billion people worldwide this century and

that one out of two long term users of cigarettes will die, that is

not abstract. That is real. And that is pretty awful.

And I think what we are beginning to have here is a debate on

whether or not we can do something about those real life statistics.

I want to tell you a real life example and the reason why I have

got such an interest in here in this debate and why I want to see

this indeed, not just workshops but forums and discussions and

more hearings, and I want to see the scientific evidence debated

and the policy issues debated.

One of the people I love dearest in my life is the former chief of

my local staff who served me four times as chief of staff. He has

two sons. One is a Navy Seal and the other is a college student

right now, he and his son both addicted to smoking.

They were able to use the product called Revel, which is one of

the newest, I think, products you were talking about, the pouch

spitless variety of smokeless tobacco. It has made the difference for

them. Both of these people used it where they have never been able

to quit smoking before, and they quit smoking, and now they have

quit using this product, and they are completely off of tobacco.

That is a real life example. I have got a couple of kids I would

love to see quit smoking. They try, and they cannot quit, and if

there are products like this Revel, if there are products that are

being developed that not only are considerably less harmful than

the cigarettes my children are smoking——

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TAUZIN. Let me just finish.

If there are products like that and there are products like that

that can be a bridge for people like my dear friend and his son who

went from smoking cigarettes to using these products, to using no

tobacco products; if there are products like that, doesn’t it make

sense for us to find some way to allow someone, if not the company,

someone to communicate the existence of those products to the

adults of this world, the billion people worldwide who are going to

die in this century if we do not give them another option?

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, let me response.

Chairman TAUZIN. Please.

Mr. MYERS. Because the organizations with which I work spend

day and night trying to figure out how we can reduce the death toll

from tobacco.

Chairman TAUZIN. I know you do.

Mr. MYERS. We do it at all levels. We try to help prevent kids

from starting, which is the best way.

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes.

134

Mr. MYERS. We try to make more funds available to help people

to quit. And you know, sadly in most states we are not doing that.

So that your friends, your colleagues, your loved ones should have

more resources available to you, and I would hope we would work

together.

Third, based on your statement this morning, I know you share

our concern, that you do not want to see the unintended consequences of this action, and for us to avoid the unintended consequences that will occur by the kinds of ads that I have shown,

the only way we can do that and make sure that your loved ones

are provided the best tools available to quit, whatever they may be,

is to make sure that we have a comprehensive regulatory system.

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes, but I have limited time, Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. Well, let me——

Chairman TAUZIN. No, no. You opened it up. I have limited time.

Mr. MYERS. To ahead.

Chairman TAUZIN. That is a good debate, and we are having it.

We have been having that one for years, whether the Food and

Drug Administration ought to regulate tobacco, and that debate is

going to go on, I suspect, for a long time, but in the meantime my

children are smoking cigarettes.

Mr. MYERS. Well——

Chairman TAUZIN. In the meantime there are 400,000 citizens

who are going to die because they cannot quit smoking even though

they want to.

I have got some examples of what is going on in Europe. These

are what is required in the EU on cigarettes. These are the warnings they put out in the EU. ‘‘Smokers die younger.’’ ‘‘Smoking

kills.’’ ‘‘Smoking seriously harms you and others around you.’’

‘‘Smoking clogs your arteries and cause heart attacks and strokes.’’

‘‘Smoking kills.’’ ‘‘Smoking can damage the sperm and decrease its

fertility.’’

I mean, the EU puts out warnings like we do not even think

about putting out on cigarettes, and the EU is now saying, leading

tobacco experts in the EU are saying information to us telling us

they think they made a mistake when they partially banned

smokeless tobacco products because they are looking at Sweden

and they are seeing how Sweden is really seriously reducing the

deaths from lung cancer to males who have been able to use something other than a cigarette to get their nicotine habit satisfied.

Answer, please.

Mr. MYERS. Two quick points, and they are very important ones.

One, we would welcome to work with you to improve the health

warning on tobacco products.

Chairman TAUZIN. Good.

Mr. MYERS. So that it is serious.

Two, the recommendations——

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes, but wait a minute.

Mr. MYERS. Wait, wait. Let me respond.

Chairman TAUZIN. No, no.

Mr. MYERS. Go ahead.

Chauirman TAUZIN. I have got the time, and I am not going to

let you do that to me.

135

I am not telling you we do not have these warnings. I am telling

you the EU is telling us these warnings are not working.

Mr. MYERS. No, that is not what they are saying.

Chairman TAUZIN. No, I am reading their report, and they are

telling us that they are seriously considering repealing their

ban——

Mr. MYERS. No, no.

Chairman TAUZIN. [continuing] because they are looking at the

only country in the EU that met the World Health Organization’s

target of reducing smoking prevalence to 20 percent. The only

country was Sweden.

Mr. MYERS. May I just have the opportunity——

Chairman TAUZIN. Where, in fact, they promoted the use of

something other than smoking cigarettes.

Mr. MYERS. I think it is very important to understand exactly.

The report you are referring to is written by five people for the EU,

not the EU. What it recommends, just as the Royal College of Physicians recommends, is that no health claims be permitted in the

absence of a comprehensive regulatory system like we are proposing for FDA. That is what the EU recommendation is.

Now, the EU has banned smokeless tobacco, and they said, ‘‘We

should go back and relook at that.’’ But what they have said about

health claims is that health claims should only be permitted within

the context of a comprehensive regulatory system so that we do not

have the unintended consequences, so that we do not market them

to kids, and——

Chairman TAUZIN. My time is up.

Mr. MYERS. [continuing] so that we know what is in them.

Chairman TAUZIN. My time is up.

I accept the fact that we ought to be very, very careful how we

regulate these health claims.

Mr. MYERS. But we are not doing that now.

Chairman TAUZIN. But wait, wait. Let me make the point.

But we are never going to get there if the Surgeon General has

never ever read some of these reports that look at that there are

alternatives that are less harmful than smoking tobacco.

We are never going to get there if the head of the FTC, who has

jurisdiction to verify the validity of claims, is not willing to lead a

forum, a discussion; if the Health Department in this country is refusing to lead it because they think the FTC ought to lead it.

And if you are going to keep insisting that the Food and Drug

Administration ought to do it, we are going to have this debate forever while alternative options that should be discussed, that should

be available to my children and to my dearest friend who finally

found one of these, used it, and got off of cigarettes, are never even

discussed publicly because we are too scared to talk about the truth

about where the science is really going.

If the science is really going there, if people in this country can

know that there are alternatives for them to use to get off of smoking cigarettes to get the nicotine highs, and they are not finding

out about it because we are too afraid, too unwilling to lead and

have some open discussions and debates about them to figure out

how to regulate it properly to make it work well, then shame on

us.

136

And I agree with you. We ought to have that great debate. Help

us have that debate.

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, my most important point——

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MYERS. [continuing] is that in the absence of comprehensive

regulation your desire to do good will produce a public health tragedy.

Chairman TAUZIN. That is a fair concern.

Mr. MYERS. It will turn into a marketing tool for the tobacco industry.

Chairman TAUZIN. That is a fair concern, and that ought to be

part of the debate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. The Chairman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate the line of questioning from our Chairman. I

think our children or smokers know the alternatives because, like

our Chairman, I have had a father-in-law who died of lung cancer

and a brother-in-law who died of lung cancer, and they tried everything. And in fact, they even chewed, too, and they still died of

lung cancer, but that was because of smoking.

But I think our children know alternatives just like they know

alternatives already that we do not want to tell them about the use

of condoms, but that is a debate that this committee has had other

times.

Let me ask Mr. Sweanor, and having read your testimony where

you talk about placing dirtier delivery systems with cleaner systems, and I know we talk about different ways, but obviously you

have never sat next to someone who chewed and had to spit in a

cup next to you, but let me ask you some questions.

Does Canada recognize smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative?

Mr. SWEANOR. As far as I know, that is a debate that simply has

not happened in Canada. Smokeless tobacco is actually rarely used

in Canada.

Mr. GREEN. Okay. You mean not even in the western provinces?

Mr. SWEANOR. Alberta actually does have use of smokeless tobacco, and that is now a debate emerging with the Drugs Education Agency in Alberta.

Mr. GREEN. Because we have rodeos in Texas and the Midwest

like in Canada and Alberta and other parts. But what tobacco control measures are in place in Sweden that are not in place in the

United States? For example, the tax rates; the smoke free indoor

air law includes restaurants effective the first of next year in advertising. Is there a difference on how Sweden treats all tobacco

products?

Mr. SWEANOR. Yes, in different ways. There will actually be less

protection from second hand smoke in Sweden than what I find

many places in the United States now, but Sweden does have a ban

on tobacco advertising. It has a fairly comprehensive——

Mr. GREEN. Is that both a print ban and an electronic ban?

Mr. SWEANOR. Yes, yes. It is like Canada or the rest of the European Union. It has much larger warnings on packages, further disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
137

closure to consumers, restrictions on how the product is displayed

at retail.

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Let me go on. Are Swedish customers or consumers told by companies or the government that smokeless tobacco is a safer alternative to cigarettes?

Mr. SWEANOR. I found that to be a very interesting thing because

they are——

Mr. GREEN. Is it a program by the companies or the government

that allows them to say that it is a safer alternative? Does Sweden

do that?

Mr. SWEANOR. No. My experience is that the government has not

told them that. The companies have not explicitly told them that,

but that information is got to them through the scientific community and through simply word of mouth.

Mr. GREEN. Okay.

Mr. SWEANOR. I think similar to——

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Let me because I only have a couple of minutes left.

Are you aware that Sweden has an active program to reduce

snuff tobacco use and that the Swedish Health Ministry aims primarily to get people to quit tobacco entirely?

Mr. SWEANOR. Yes, that is certainly their goal, is to reduce tobacco use entirely.

Mr. GREEN. Okay, and so all of this study that has been talked

about the science that we are quoting a Swedish study, even the

Swedish health ministry has an active program to reduce snuff tobacco use.

Mr. SWEANOR. It is aimed at overall reduction of death and disease by reducing tobacco use in all forms as much as possible Mr.

GREEN. Mr. Chairman, let me introduce into the record and I ask

consent to introduce into the record information from the Swedish

Health Ministry about their handling of smokeless tobacco, and it

is addressed to Mr. Sharfenstein, and it says your question number

1, whether advertising claims on reduced risk are permitted for

smokeless tobacco in Sweden and the regulation of tobacco products

in Sweden are contained in Tobacco Act, and I will put the whole

letter in the record.

It concludes it is not permitted to use advertising claims on reduced risk as the legislation does not permit for advertising for tobacco products as was defined as commercial advertisement, according to the Swedish constitution, and no, that the Ministry of

Health and Social Affairs does not have a campaign to switch to

smokeless tobacco in the meaning of the product or snuff.

I would like to ask unanimous consent to have that placed in the

record.

Mr. STEARNS. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

SWEDEN

2 June 2003

Dear Mr Sharfstein, I’ve been appointed by Mr Magnusson to answer your questions on the Swedish tobacco legislation and policy.Your question no (1). Whether

advertising claims on reduced risk are permitted for smokeless tobacco in Sweden

The regulations of tobacco products in Sweden are contained in the Tobacco Act.

This Act does not distinguish between different tobacco products, no matter which

138

area of legislation concerned. Therefore the prohibition of the advertising for tobacco

products remains the same no matter the product would be a cigarette or any other

tobacco products, such as oral tobacco.

To conclude on this matter, it is not permitted to use advertising claims on reduced risk, as the legislation does not permit for advertising for tobacco products

in what is defined as commercial advertisement according to the Swedish Constitution. When marketing tobacco products a businessman shall observe particular moderation. In particular, advertising or other marketing may not be invasive, actively

seeking new areas of trade nor encourage the use of tobacco.

Your question no (2) and (3)

No, the Ministry for Health and Social Affaires does not have a campaign to

switch to smokeless tobacco, in the meaning of the product of snuff.

On the issue of cessation there is a national telephone line The Stop Smoking

Line, which is given national resources, in order to offer a national competent advice

on cessation. The main focus for this branch of the County of Stockholm is smoke

cessation, even though there are a significant number of users of oral tobacco as

well who make use of their service.

In a recent Government Bill the government concluded that one of 10 public

health goals would be to raise the ambition on tobacco prevention. The main focus

are:

—a tobacco free start in life for all children by 2014

—a decrease by half of the groups of adults who are smoking most by 2014

—a decrease by half of children, under 18 according to Swedish legislation, who use

tobacco cigarettes or oral tobacco, i.e. snuff at the year of 2014,

—no person should be subjected against his will to smoking by those around him

or her.

In the same Bill the Government underlined the need for further research into

the health aspects of oral tobacco, and it was also considered that this was already

a task for the National Institute for Public Health.

The Government has also directed 30 million Swedish Crowns (cirka 3 800 000

US dollar) to the area of tobacco prevention, each year during a period of 3 year

from 2002 to 2004. The Government has also underlined smoking cessation as being

one of the areas of prevention where the health care has a specific responsibility.

The resources directed to tobacco prevention in the health care sector are managed

by the County Council, and as tobacco prevention is an integrated part of the health

care system it is difficult to a specified on how much is spent on tobacco prevention.

During the past three years there has been an influx of new and cheaper cigarettes in Sweden. These so called low price cigarettes, which hold a price that has

been around 10 Swedish crowns (circa 1.27 US dollar) lower than the most popular

tobacco brand in the most sold category of cigarettes, is taxed according to an ECdirective. The consumer price on the most popular brand in the most sold category

is 38.50 Swedish crowns, (circa 4.9 US dollar). As the EC-legislation has been

changed the Swedish government has taken the opportunity to raise the taxation

on this group of cigarettes to 90 percent of the tax on the most popular brand in

the category of the most sold cigarettes. The Swedish government has chosen the

level of 90 percent as it has been shown in the past that sudden increases in the

taxation might affect the level of smuggled goods into Sweden. The reason for the

increase was among other things the knowledge that a low price on cigarettes might

trigger the consumption. Therefore a survey has also been started on a monthly

basis in order to improve knowledge on the consumption of tobacco.

Since 1997 Sweden has an age limit on the sale of tobacco products of 18 years

of age, no matter being cigarettes or oral tobacco. There is no sanction according

to this legislation on the person under the age limit, as the sanction was to be

placed on the seller.

Even though it is prohibited by the law to sell tobacco products to persons under

the age of 18, it has been shown that there are still a considerable number of persons under the age of 18 that are able to buy tobacco there has been an introduction

of a notification system of sellers of tobacco. This has been introduced in order to

improve the compliance of the Tobacco Act. The National Institute for Public Health

was according asked to give a report in the beginning of 2004 on the consumption

of tobacco by persons under the age of 18 years.

In the Swedish Tobacco Act there is a catalogue of premises that are to be smoke

free. In practice the only public premise that is not smoke free is the restaurants

and cafe ́s. From January 1, 2003 every restaurant or cafe ́ have to provide for that

a part of the premise is smoke free. The Swedish parliament has also stated that

the goal is smoke free restaurants from January 1, 2004. There is a report from the

Swedish National Institute on what it takes to fulfill the parliaments goal on smoke

free restaurants. This report is no distributed for consultation with national authoriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
139

ties, organizations and other interested parties. Finally, what can be said on the

catalogue of smoke free premises in the Swedish Tobacco Act, it does not regulate

outdoor environments, except for school playground.

The Swedish Council on Technology Assessment in Health Care has confirmed

that the use of nicotine replacement products is a major part of a successful cessation policy. As these are approved as pharmaceutical products these are sold the

sales places of the Swedish Pharmaceutical Monopoly.

Yours Sincerely,

ULRIKA LINDBLOM,

desk officer

Mr. GREEN. And with the brief time I have left, Mr. Verheij, UST

uses a Swedish study as a foundation for its argument that should

be able to advertise that smokeless tobacco is less harmful. However, Mr. Myers points out that snus products in Sweden are very

different than the products marketed here. For example, he states

that the levels of cancer causing nitrosamines in Swedish products

are much lower than the United States.

Could you comment on that in what brief time I have left?

Mr. VERHEIJ. I would be happy to.

The fact is that we have successfully reduced nitrosamine levels

in our products to extraordinarily low levels, and some of the products we have introduced recently have levels much lower than any

other smokeless tobacco product in the world.

Another reason why we believe the Swedish model is applicable

is I think as Mr. Sweanor pointed out, the fact is that culturally

and through the public health community, the type of communication we are talking about today is actually reaching adult smokers.

Mr. GREEN. Okay.

Mr. VERHEIJ. That is not happening here in the United States.

Mr. GREEN. Let me talk about it because I think there is a new

study, I understood, from the State of Massachusetts which indicates that nitrosamine levels are increased in U.S. products.

Is that you all’s products?

And I would like Mr. Myers if he had a brief comment on that.

Mr. MYERS. Sure. Yes, the sad reality is that in several independent studies done by the American Health Foundation for the

State of Massachusetts, they found something quite inconsistent

with what Mr. Verheij said. What they found was that for the two

most popular products from UST, one study done in 2001 found

that the comparable Swedish product had 2.8 parts per million of

nitrosamines, whereas Copenhagen had 41.1 and Skoal had 64.0.

Those products are not comparable by any remote imagination.

And also attached to my testimony is an updated report, again,

done for the State of Massachusetts, not done exclusively in Massachusetts. Samples were picked up around the country by one of the

most respected labs.

And what it found there, too is that in 2003 nitrosamine levels

in the two most popular brands by UST remain about 10 times

higher than those that we are comparing in Sweden. It is a very

disturbing thing because the numbers for these two are 22.0 and

27.9 compared to under 2 for the comparable products in Sweden.

So we are talking not apples and oranges even, but apples and

grapefruits is the difference here. Unfortunately when the State of

Massachusetts asked U.S. Tobacco if they would agree to a 10

parts per million, much higher than in Sweden, the answer was no.

140

I think what it is time for us to do is to compare apples to apples,

and if we are really interested in low nitrosamine, what we need

to do is have a regulatory agency that can set standards for it so

that we can protect consumers and accomplish the goals of this

committee.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Mr. Chairman, if I just may——

Mr. STEARNS. Sure.

Mr. VERHEIJ. [continuing] because I think Mr. Myers is comparing apples and refrigerators. The fact is——

Mr. GREEN. I would think more like apples to gasoline maybe.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, at least if it is apples at least they are

healthful.

No, I think that the fact is the appropriate comparison between

the data that Mr. Myers cited from Sweden is comparison to the

types of products that Chairman Tauzin was pointing out, which

is the Revel product, which has the lowest levels of nitrosamines

of any smokeless tobacco product in the world, and that is the appropriate comparison.

Because pouch products are 50 percent of the market in Sweden,

unlike here, which is about 3 percent. So the notion is not to compare Copenhagen with a pouch product in Sweden. They should be

comparing a pouch product in Sweden with a pouch product in the

United States, and, in fact, the levels are comparable or lower.

Mr. MYERS. What is stunning is that UST has demonstrated in

Revel that it can produce a low nitrosamine product, but what it

sells to most Americans, Copenhagen and Skoal, it has nitrosamine

levels multiples of that.

If they can produce it for Revel, why don’t they produce for every

one of their products? Why should some people be in more jeopardy

than others?

Mr. STEARNS. One last word here before we move on.

Mr. VERHEIJ. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

The fact is that we are working to reduce the levels of every

product we had. In Revel we are working with a product that was

newly introduced last year with new technology. We can now take

that technology and start applying it to products like Copenhagen

that have been on the market for 180 years, and that does not happen overnight without dramatically changing Copenhagen.

The overall goal is to reduce the levels to the lowest levels possible in the world in such products as Revel.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Myers, you have made some comments and Mr. Verheij

made some products about their product, Revel, and comparing

that with snus, and a number of people have indicated in their testimony today that if the U.S. had a similar regulatory system, as

they have in Sweden, that that would make a difference.

So is it your position that if the U.S. had a similar regulatory

system that you would have no objection to products like snus or

Revel?

Mr. MYERS. If the U.S. had a comprehensive regulatory system,

then scientists with full knowledge about the product would be able

141

to make appropriate comparative science claims. We are not in a

position to do that.

You know, we just learned how little we really know. There was

a recent study done on Marlboro that we thought had reduced tar

levels for many years that discovered, in fact, Marlboros have

among the highest nitrosamine levels of products anywhere in the

world.

What we need is an agency that can control each of the potential

toxic substances and then make a scientific decision. We will abide

by the science, whatever that is.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, do you think that in Sweden and the European Union they have valid science on this issue?

Mr. MYERS. There are widespread disputes about both what the

cause of the Swedish experience is and what the impact of the

Swedish experience is, but you know, one of the very documents

that you cited this morning, the one written by the five scientists

to the European Union, had an explicit sentence in it that says,

‘‘We do not know if the experience in Sweden would apply anywhere outside of that experience because of the full maze of regulatory mechanisms they have in place and the difference in the

product.’’

What I would be willing to say to you is let us give an agency

like the FDA the kind of authority over it so that it can make sure

that if these products can, in fact, reduce the harm to disease, then

there is an agency to control so that they accomplish the goal.

Step one is giving an agency the authority to do the job.

Mr. WHITFIELD. How many of you on the panel agree that there

is sufficient scientific evidence already in Sweden or elsewhere that

smokeless tobacco is safer to use than cigarettes?

Mr. MYERS. I would be happy to start that if you want.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, I think I know how you——

Mr. MYERS. Well, let me just say because I think it is important.

For the——

Mr. WHITFIELD. Let me get——

Mr. MYERS. [continuing] overwhelming majority of Americans.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Let me get Dr. Rodu in on this. Dr. Rodu, you

raised your hand.

Mr. RODU. Well, yes, I raised my hand to agree with your statement that smokeless tobacco use is on the order of 98 percent safer

than smoking. I think that the epidemiologic research published by

others over the last 50 years substantiates that. Our own epidemiologic models substantiate that.

Mr. STEARNS. Will the gentleman yield just for a second?

Dr. Wallace, I understand you are on the first panel of another

committee. So we want to thank you for coming, and you are welcome to leave now so that our colleagues can share your wisdom.

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it.

Mr. STEARNS. Sure.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Sweanor, did you want to make a comment?

Mr. SWEANOR. Certainly my view is on a one-for-one basis, there

is no doubt that smokeless tobacco products such as is sold in Sweden or the United States is going to be much, much less risky than

getting your nicotine by smoking a cigarette.

142

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, Mr. Myers, do you accept Mr. Verheij’s

statement that Revel has nitrosamines equal to the level of snus

or do you have any basis of knowing that?

Mr. MYERS. it is exactly why we need a regulatory agency, so

that we can have a regulatory agency that tests it and we do not

have to depend on what U.S. Tobacco tells us.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. I notice that in the European Union evidently they recently changed their warnings and they said this tobacco product can damage your health and is addictive as it applies

to smokeless tobacco, but they removed the warning about cancer.

Is anyone aware of that?

Mr. MYERS. That is in Sweden, not in the European Union, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. That was in Sweden?

Mr. MYERS. Yes.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay.

Mr. MYERS. Sweden does not permit the sale of smokeless tobacco. I mean the European Union does not permit the sale of

smokeless tobacco.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Sweanor?

Mr. SWEANOR. Yes, it is an EU role that applies to Sweden,

which still has the ability to sell smokeless tobacco. My understanding is it was removed because the evidence simply was not

there to substantiate it. The evidence coming out of Sweden could

find no conclusive proof that the product was causing cancer at all.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Recently CDC came out with a study about

nitrosamines and the content in certain American products, and

the bottom line to that is I know since that report has come out

or since the beginning of it, the way you dry this tobacco has

changed. The technology has been changed.

But would you make the argument that tobacco grown in foreign

countries is safer than the tobacco grown in the U.S.?

Mr. MYERS. I am glad you raised that issue. The study done by

the CDC was of Marlboros manufactured both abroad and here. So

it is an American brand, but it includes foreign made cigarettes

under Philip Morris International as well.

What it found was that Marlboro had higher levels of

nitrosamines in the vast majorities of countries in which it was

sold not matter where it was manufactured. The problem was not

American tobacco. It was not American manufacturers. The problem was how Philip Morris chose to manufacture that product,

which was particularly disturbing because a study by British

American Tobacco showed that when Philip Morris actually enters

countries with Marlboro, they initially produce low nitrosamine

products equal to the level in the country and then gradually they

raise them up so that there is a conscious decision going on, or at

least a noncaring decision going on, that has nothing to do with

American tobacco.

American tobacco is the best in the world.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr.Rodu?

Mr. RODU. Could I make one quick comment about nitrosamines

to place it in perspective?

The epidemiologic studies performed between the 1950’s and

1980’s that show a relative risk of smokeless tobacco mouth cancer

143

association at about 2 to 4 were conducted in people who were

using products where the nitrosamine levels were in the 100’s.

Now we are talking about nitrosamine levels in the single digits

and teens, and we are arguing differences that are very, very small

compared to products used 40 years ago.

Mr. WHITFIELD. I would like to ask Mr. Myers just one other

question if I could.

You have been pretty emphatic about this, which I understand.

I did not see this, but recently they said on C-SPAN that you replied to someone who called in, and that you made the comment

cigarettes are the most dangerous form of tobacco used. Literally

one out of two long term users of cigarettes will die from tobacco

use. Smokeless tobacco, cigars are harmful but not to the same

magnitude.

Did you say that?

Mr. MYERS. It sounds like an accurate quote of what I would

have said. The important issue here is whether or not the government is going to put a stamp of approval to make a health claim

in an unregulated environment that could have tragic marketing

consequences.

The position I take that these claims should not be permitted in

the absence of meaningful regulation reflects the absolute consensus of every single major American public health organization,

from the American Medical Association to the American Cancer Society, the American Lung Association, to the American Public

Health Association, the American Dental Society.

There is no emerging consensus on the other side. This is the

view of the public health community.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I would say to the gentleman from Kentucky I heard Mr. Myers

say that U.S. tobacco is the best in the world. So I think you can

take that back to your constituents.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Maybe you could go down and visit with my

farmers.

Mr. MYERS. I actually do all of the time.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for being

late, but I did catch some of this in between meetings. So just a

couple of questions, if I can.

Is there any profile or high risk individuals who should not use

tobacco?

Mr. MYERS. Humans.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, I mean besides humans. But I mean is there

certain characteristics that you look for? In some drugs there are

considered high risk patients for this use. Is there anything like

that? No profile like that has been done?

Mr. MYERS. Not to the best of my knowledge. It is true that one

out of two long term users of tobacco products will eventually die

from the disease. That means that one out of two do not, but it is

worse than playing Russian roulette. The real concern is that virtually every one of them start as a child, and what we need to do

is break that step.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Rodu, in answer to my friend’s question over

there, you are talking about when the study was done between the

144

fifties and the sixties that certain parts were in the 100’s and you

said now it is down to single digits and it really did not make any

difference from a health risk area? Can you explain that a little bit

more?

Mr. RODU. Yes, okay. Let me clarify that.

When most of the epidemiologic studies were performed it was

between the 1950’s and the 1980’s. They measured smokeless tobacco associated risks in users during that period, and during that

period nitrosamine levels were in the range of the hundreds. They

were quite a bit higher than they are today.

So we have a relative risk from that period in the range of two

to four, and that is what we have based all of our epidemiologic

models on.

Now we are talking about products that are substantially lower,

and in fact, the American Health Foundation has said that they

are at least 70 percent lower than they were in the 1970’s. So we

are talking about a shift downward in risk from the 1950’s through

the 1980’s. So we go from two to four down. We are going toward

one, and one being the risk of a nonuser of tobacco.

Mr. STUPAK. Is it fair to say then, as maybe UST would argue

then, that it is safer now than it was in the fifties to eighties?

Mr. RODU. Well, Mr. Verheij can respond for UST. I believe that

products are safer now than they were in the 1980’s.

Mr. STUPAK. Because of this nitrosamine?

Mr. RODU. Yes, because of nitrosamine level reduction.

Now, when you have a relative risk to start with of around two

to four, it is very difficult to show without enormous populations

and huge studies any more reduction in risk. So that reduction is

going to be very difficult to quantify, but in fact, the safer products

can be the better off we all are.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Mr. Verheij, UST petitioned the FTC to advertise this as safer, correct? And then that was withdrawn, that

petition?

Mr. VERHEIJ. We actually petitioned the FTC for an advisory

opinion. We thought that instead of going out and communicating

this information to adult smokers who were not quitting that we

would get some guidance from the Federal Government. It was unlike anything any other tobacco company had done.

Mr. STUPAK. But did you withdraw the petition?

Mr. VERHEIJ. We have temporarily withdrawn the petition. We

have supplemented the record probably 3 weeks ago.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay, and there has been some talk about doing a

workshop on this issue now, right, with the FTC?

Mr. VERHEIJ. That is certainly what we are urging, a workshop.

We believe this is a process. The Institute of Medicine report was

a process. Our filing with the FTC was a process. This hearing

today is part of the process, and we think a workshop would be a

very important part of the process.

Mr. STUPAK. If you did a workshop, would FDA be invited to that

workshop?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Absolutely. We would encourage that.

Mr. STUPAK. The Centers for Disease Control?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Absolutely.

Mr. STUPAK. Should FDA regulate smokeless tobacco then?

145

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, there have been a lot of proposals about fda

regulating cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. Historically we are opposed to that because the fact was it was going to regulate——

Mr. STUPAK. Right.

Mr. VERHEIJ. [continuing] it as a medical device.

Mr. STUPAK. But if you are talking about it being safer, smokeless tobacco would be safer, and if FDA regulates nicorette and all

of this other stuff to help you reduce your smoking, if this is a

product that is safer and encourages less smoking, shouldn’t they

also regulate smokeless tobacco then?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, as we have laid out in our public filings, we

believe that if there was a regulatory regime that recognized this

concept of tobacco harm reduction and the distinct differences between smokeless tobacco and cigarettes, that is something the company would seriously consider supporting.

Mr. STUPAK. But if it is tobacco harm reduction, shouldn’t we

also know that not only from an advertising point of view but also

health point of view, and that is where the FDA, CDC and others,

NIH, would come in?

Mr. VERHEIJ. I think that is implicit in the process. I think what

you see here along the panel, however, is a difference of viewpoint,

is when, in fact, we are going to begin communicating to adults

this information about the fact that smokeless tobacco is considerably less harmful. Mr. Myers would say 5 years in the future when

we get FDA regulation.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Dr. Rodu says we should have started this 10 years

ago. So you see a range of views, and that would be a part of the

discussion at the forum.

Mr. STUPAK. But aren’t you really saying that we should advertise first and then let the FDA look at it second? Isn’t that what

you are saying?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, I think the broader societal question is as we

move through this process, what are we going to communicate?

And I believe Chairman Tauzin raised the concern about what

are we doing today. Yes, everyone is moving toward some increased

regulation, but I think a number of people on the panel here are

saying what should be done today. What type of communication?

And, again, take the company out of it, but what type of communication should come from the public health community to adult

smokers who are not quitting today?

Mr. STUPAK. But should the public health concern be addressed

before you advertise? I mean, there is advertising for smokeless tobacco in Sports Illustrated, the USA Today’s sports page. It seems

like the advertising is getting ahead of the health concerns.

Mr. VERHEIJ. And I think, Congressman, that the underlying assumption that there would be some broad based advertising in

Sports Illustrated or some publication that has some concern,

again, take the company out of it. Say there is no communication

from the company.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay.

Mr. VERHEIJ. The remaining question is: what type of communication will come either from the government or from the public

146

health community about truthful, accurate information about the

significant differences between smokeless tobacco and cigarettes.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentlelady is recognized.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It troubles me that I have heard today in this hearing that, to

paraphrase, we will not even consider a possible action that could

benefit smokers unless we have Federal regulation of that. In fact,

we will not even consider looking at whether or not a product is

beneficial unless we have Federal regulation.

I disagree with that very much. I do not think that the first

thing that we ever should do is look to Federal regulation to solve

our problems, although there certainly is a point in our society

when that is appropriate.

As far as Federal regulation of these tobacco products, tobacco,

whether you smoke it or whether you use snus, is a legal product.

Now, if this should ever happen that it does become regulated

under the FDA, then what is the next thing? Are we going to be

regulating cream gravy or white sauce, as it might be called here

in the northeast?

It just bothers me that some people think the only way to solve

a situation is that the government has to take control. Historically

they do not do that good a job.

So I do not think that you can rule out listening to scientists who

have done studies. You cannot rule out listening to information and

facts that are presented to you simply because the Federal Government does not have regulation over that area.

I would like to start by asking a question, just kind of a general

question about truth in advertising. Commercial advertising is protected by the First Amendment, provided that it is truthful——

Mr. STEARNS. Will the gentlelady just move her mic a little closer

to her.

Mrs. CUBIN. Oh, yes. Thank you.

—providing that it is truthful and not mislead. The government

may regulate commercial speech if it has a compelling interest in

doing so and its regulation is reasonably tailored to directly advance that interest.

In relation to the promotion of tobacco reduction products, what

compelling State interest is directly advanced by suppressing truthful, reasonably tailored messages to the public?

Do you understand the question?

Mr. MYERS. I will start with you because it is based on a misconception, and that is——

Mrs. CUBIN. No, you will not start. You have talked more here

today than everyone, and we know how you feel.

Mr. MYERS. But the government does not——

Mrs. CUBIN. No, sir. I would like to address someone else.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady controls the time.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you.

I do not care. The question I want to ask is that the government

can regulate commercial speech if it has a compelling interest in

doing that and the regulation is reasonably tailored to directly advance that interest that the Federal Government has.

147

So in relation to the promotion of tobacco harm reduction products, is there then a compelling State interest directly advanced by

suppressing this truthful, non-misleading advertising?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Congresswoman, if I may start with that, and then

maybe others will chime in.

The fact is we believe there is no compelling interest by the

state, particularly when you look at the offsetting potential benefit

to public health that people like Mr. Sweanor and Dr. Rodu and

many others have articulated, to the fact that this information

through some mechanism—and again, I think everyone focuses on

our company as proposing we would be the only avenue.

Frankly, we would like to get out of the middle of that fight because of concerns and go back to if we are taken out of the equation, what obligation does the government or the public health community have to communicate this information——

Mrs. CUBIN. Exactly.

Mr. VERHEIJ. [continuing] to adult smokers.

Mrs. CUBIN. Exactly, and there are scientists and researchers

that are available that are nonbiased. Like you said, take tobacco

out of the equation. They could produce good information that we

could base decisions on without Federal oversight and without Federal regulation.

If the information is accurate and fairly presented, doesn’t the

public have a right to receive that information and evaluate for

themselves the usefulness of that information?

Yes, Dr. Rodu.

Mr. RODU. Ms. Cubin, we have tried for 10 years to publish

strongly scientifically based research in order to help, and I believe

your husband is a practicing physician.

Mrs. CUBIN. That is correct.

Mr. RODU. In order to help people like him help their patients

because we believe knowledge is power, and it can help him help

patients to make decisions that allow them to lead longer and

healthier lives.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you.

I do appreciate that, and that is exactly the course that my husband has tried to follow because that is one thing he tells every

single patient that comes in there that smokes, carte blanche. You

must stop smoking.

And they tell him, ‘‘I cannot stop smoking.’’

And at that point, he needs help in dealing with them when they

have tried gum and when they have tried patches. You know, anything else would be a benefit to him and especially to his patients.

Mr. RODU. Ma’am, we would like to say he is in the trenches.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you.

Mr. RODU. And the closer you are to real patients and real problems the more likely you are to consider an option like smokeless

tobacco.

Mrs. CUBIN. And that is the truth. I agree with you.

Mr. BURTON. Congresswoman, could I weigh in?

Mrs. CUBIN. I do not see who is weighing in.

Mr. BURTON. I am sorry.

Mrs. CUBIN. Yes, you bet, Mr. Burton.

148

Mr. BURTON. I guess I will come back to a comment that I think

I heard the Surgeon General make this morning, which was in the

presence of truthful and accurate information, nonetheless consumers might be incapable of making the right decision in their

own interest, as well as the interest of the public health.

Mrs. CUBIN. Excuse me. Would you repeat that?

Mr. BURTON. Certainly. I guess the point I am making or want

to make is harking back to something that the Surgeon General

said, and I think I have this from my own experience in being before the agency, the FDA, on drug applications. One of the burdens

we as a drug supplier have to meet is a demonstration that information can be correctly interpreted. Can it be understood by the

average consumer and can the net behavior actually be within the

bounds of what we expect and what we know to be a safe and efficacious use of that product?

So I think in part my answer and I think part of the answer of

the Surgeon General was that even information—and I am not accepting that the information as you framed it is necessarily truthful and accurate—but were it to be found to be so, I think the question is can consumers take that information, interpret it, and act

accordingly.

And I think from our research and from what we have heard

from other public health experts, it is not only an individual decision, but it is also a public health population impact that we need

to be concerned about. If that information is targeted to a different

group of people, like young adults who might otherwise not start

smoking, upon hearing what may be truthful and accurate information to a so-called committed smoker, if that young adult decides

to begin using those tobacco products on the assumption that that

is a safe alternative, I think that is a public harm that I think

counters the public interest of providing that accurate information.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you.

I appreciate that, but that is a very weak response when you

consider the 10 million people that are going to die over the next

2 decades because we are worried about children starting to use a

tobacco product, when in fact we do not even know—and I have

heard no source that quotes that smokeless tobacco is a gateway

drug.

Just real quickly.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Mrs. CUBIN. Just real quickly. I have been waiting all day.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. Do you want to take unanimous consent?

Mrs. CUBIN. Well, what are you going to do, Markey?

No, I would like to ask one other question. I would like to ask

for unanimous consent for one question.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady has asked for unanimous consent

for one question. Is there any objections?

Mr. Myers, I understand you have been waiting patiently and

you have to be on this other panel. So I think you are welcome to

leave. You have given yeoman’s service here since 10 o’clock. So if

you have to be on another panel.

Mr. MYERS. I am not on another panel, but I do have an emergency that I have to go to.

149

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. Well, that is fine. That is fine. We appreciate your staying this long and your patience and so forth.

Mr. MYERS. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady is recognized.

Mrs. CUBIN. I do not want to be redundant and most of the questions that I wanted to ask have been asked and answered, but I

would like to as Mr. Verheij a question.

Back to the Swedish study that males are reported to have the

highest rate of smokeless tobacco use and the lowest rate of cigarette smoking in any Western country, and the daily use of smokeless tobacco by Swedish males now, as has been stated, is that of

the use of cigarettes. Tobacco related mortality in Sweden is reported to be lower than any other European or American country.

From the point of view of comparative health risk, comparing cigarette smoking to smokeless tobacco or snus, as we call it, would

you describe your company’s Revel product and what your marketing plans for that are?

Mr. VERHEIJ. I would be happy to. The fact is that a number of

researchers believe that the Swedish model is, indeed, applicable

here in the United States. The difference is that, as I think one of

the panel members noted, there is a cultural acceptance there as

to the fact that smokeless tobacco is considered to be significantly

less harmful than smoking.

And, yes, it is not a communication from a tobacco company to

consumers in a newspaper, but when I was there in September for

a conference on smokeless tobacco, there was a full page ad in the

primary newspaper signed by four leading Swedish researchers,

talking about this conversion from smoking to smokeless tobacco,

and the fact is how fortunate they thought Sweden was to have

smokeless tobacco as an alternative for those smokers who do not

quit.

So I think that is a good example where the communication does

not have to come from a tobacco company.

When we began marketing Revel or at least test marketing

Revel, it was advertised as a product for the times: you cannot

smoke. The fact is we would prefer to market Revel to adult smokers who are not quitting on the basis of completely switching from

smoking to smokeless tobacco because what we have found out in

the research is that to convince a smoker to switch to smokeless

tobacco, they need a very compelling reason, and they need a very

compelling reason because an overwhelming percentage of them

have been taught over decades now that smokeless tobacco is as

dangerous as cigarette smoking, and so they think they are trading

oral cancer for lung cancer.

They are shocked when they are provided truthful, accurate information about research in this country and other countries concluding that smokeless tobacco is significantly less harmful than

cigarette smoking.

Once they hear about that research and actually accept it, then

they have that compelling reason, and Revel is designed to attract

adult cigarette smokers, adult cigarette smokers only, and I think

any communication we plan in conjunction to that will be directed

to only that audience.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you.

150

Mr. STEARNS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Mrs. CUBIN. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

I do not think anyone is going to debate that it is less dangerous.

I think we are going to accept the fact that it is less dangerous,

but that is a little bit like saying, well, you know, we have been

playing Russian roulette with three bullets in a six-chamber gun

and now we are going to reduce it down to only one bullet in the

six-chamber gun. So it is obviously a safer game playing Russian

roulette with only one bullet rather than three bullets in a six-bullet chamber.

But eventually if you play the game long enough, then enough

people are going to get harmed that most people would say that is

too dangerous a game to be played. And I think that is, you know,

why you have the level of concern that members are indicating, Mr.

Verheij, today.

Let me ask this. The Massachusetts Attorney General and others

wanted to examine and reveal to the public the additives that are

being put into smokeless tobacco products. Why can’t the public

know what those ingredients are so they can make up their own

mind as to whether or not they or their family members would use

that product?

Mr. VERHEIJ. As you know, Congressman, under the 1986 act we

as a company and an industry are required to report all of our ingredients to HHS, which I think the Surgeon General confirmed

this morning indicated that they had an ability to look at that list,

and every year we dutifully file that list, and to the extent that

HHS has a concern, it is explicitly authorized to report to Congress

about the concerns they have.

In connection with that, however, there are measures taken to

protect the proprietary interests that the companies have in unique

ingredients used in the product.

As for another state, for example, Texas has adopted a similar

statute and, in fact, the industry reports its ingredients to Texas.

I think where the difference was in Massachusetts, that in our

view and the industry’s view, that the statute at the time that was

put into place was really not a disclosure statute, but it was really

a forfeiture statute where we would have forfeited the proprietary

value of the ingredients we used, and the court of appeals agreed

with that argument.

Mr. MARKEY. I understand that, but the problem is from a consumer perspective, as the Surgeon General said today, there are

carcinogens in your product and those carcinogens also contribute

to other types of diseases, cardiac disease in addition to respiratory.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, I think now, if I understand your question

correctly, we have shifted from ingredients, which are those items

that are added to the product by the company, all of which are approved for use in food or food grade, unlike other tobacco products,

and I think by your question, I understand you want to switch to

constituent levels of nitrosamines.

And as indicated earlier, the Massachusetts Department of

Health has conducted at least one survey. We have met with the

151

department in terms of trying to evaluate that data. Dr. Connolly

of your State called me about 3 weeks ago. He was particularly

concerned about levels in competitor’s product, gave me some idea

of the levels of the constituent levels in our product in the current

survey. He is very concerned about the fact of being able to continue that testing, although his budget has been cut dramatically.

And we actually engaged in a discussion about industry funding

of that survey for him on an annual basis so that the State of Massachusetts can actually do that.

Mr. MARKEY. Well, would U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company support a regulation which mandates that all smokeless tobacco products contain nitrosamine levels below 10 micrograms per gram if

this were implemented in Massachusetts?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, I think we had an agreement with Dr.

Connolly that everyone was moving in the direction of trying to reduce it to the lowest levels possible. I guess I would have some

questions about the level of 10 parts per 1,000,000 because when

Dr. Connolly proposed that, when he was advised by a newspaper

reporter about the levels of nitrosamines in the Revel product,

which is around 2 to 3 parts per million, his response was, ‘‘Well,

there is no magic about 10.’’

So I think it would be worthwhile for everyone, the industry in

your State and Dr. Connolly to get together and work out some

standards that he perhaps as an encouragement to the industry,

goals and targets which we would be happy to sit down and work

with him to do that.

Mr. MARKEY. I think in general that the American public has become acclimated to knowing what is inside of the products which

they purchase. My father late in life became a health food nut. I

would have sworn that a guy that used to just put a whole can of

sardines and slice off 12 heads at once and then pop them all in

his mouth when I was a boy would become a health food fanatic

at 70 and 75, 80 and 85, but he did.

And so here is a product thought that——

Ms. CUBIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARKEY. I will be glad to.

Ms. CUBIN. Are you supposed to cut the heads off of sardines before you eat them?

Mr. MARKEY. Well, my father thought it was fun if they all

squirted toward my brother’s head.

Ms. CUBIN. Oh.

Mr. MARKEY. And it was just kind of——

Ms. CUBIN. Being from Wyoming.

Mr. MARKEY. My father was a milkman for the Hood Milk Company.

Ms. CUBIN. Well, thank you.

Mr. MARKEY. And his form of humor was lost on my mother, although my brothers and I thought it was very funny.

Ms. CUBIN. I can relate to that.

Mr. MARKEY. But anyway, I am just saying his eating habits

were not the best, but he later just became a fanatic in studying

every single ingredient in every single thing that he put into his

system, and but for smoking the doctor said he would have gone

on indefinitely over the age of 100.

152

And here is a product though that we know is inherently, you

know, dangerous because of the carcinogens that are in it, and the

more information which is out there, I think the more likely that

there would be an abstinence that was total. That is not to be an

unimaginably high goal a generation ago, but the whole culture has

changed.

If my father could change, anyone could change, and all I am

saying to you is that that information is what you are denying the

public under the guise of proprietary information, competitive advantage, but in fact, in my opinion it is to deny the public the

knowledge of the danger which their bodies are being exposed to

by having these kinds of products put near their bodies.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Mr. Chairman, if I may just respond to that last

point, the fact is that I heard the Surgeon General this morning

very strongly indicating that, in fact, as these ingredients are reported to the Federal Government, they have mechanisms, including his bully pulpit, if there was a concern to educate the public

about ingredients in tobacco products.

We share your concern about educating the public, but in the

context of educating the public about the fact that there are dramatic differences between the relative risks between smokeless tobacco and cigarettes, and they are not getting that information either.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. TOMAR. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. We will allow you to answer. Do you want to reply

also?

Mr. TOMAR. Yes. I just wanted to speak to the issue of the additives to smokeless tobacco products. I used to be an epidemiologist

with the Office on Smoking and Health, and so I was able to see

that list of more than 500 chemicals that are added to smokeless

tobacco products. When we were there, we asked them to provide

brand specific information on that, and they refused.

They also do not provide any information on concentration or

quantity on any of those 500 chemicals, and a number of the

chemicals that are added to those products are specifically to affect

the nicotine dosing properties of those products. That feeds into

their whole graduation strategy of being able to manipulate the

nicotine dosing properties. We ask them to provide information on

pH. The degree of alkalinity of the product affects the rate of nicotine absorption. They refuse to provide brand specific information.

If the company really wants to disclose truthful information to

the public, they can start with what they already have.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from New Hampshire.

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to emphasize that we are here today to talk about

relativity, not absolutes, and I do not think any member of this

subcommittee believes that smoking cigarettes or the use of tobacco

products is good for your health or should be condoned, especially

amongst minors, and a lot of the debate today has revolved around

accusations that somehow minors are going to get into the business

of chewing tobacco or smoking cigarettes, which has always been

153

a problem, and in my home state, it is a misdemeanor to possess

tobacco products of any sort under the age of 18. There are criminal penalties for that, and the local law enforcement community

enforces that, and nobody here today is advocating that.

And so the issue is for those individuals that cannot terminate

the use of cigarettes, what other options exist, and we have talked

about a lot of different opportunities, and the other issue of whether or not the smokeless tobacco industry can advertise or discuss

in an advertisement any kind of relative benefit of their product

versus any other.

I have two questions, one for Mr. Verheij and another one for Dr.

Tomar.

Mr. Verheij, if U.S. Tobacco were to advertise smokeless tobacco

products as being less harmful than cigarettes, how would you advertise that fact under government guidelines, without influencing

minors to use the product?

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, we have given that some thought, and there

are a number of ways that we communicate directly to adults. We

have adult only facilities where people are carded or only 18 and

over are admitted. In fact, we get information about the tobacco

habits of those particular individuals. We find out if they are smokers, and we could make a communication right there.

There are also direct mail lists of adult smokers. I mean, I think

people envision some broad based advertising program, and frankly, it would not be very effective because it would be so diffuse

when you are really trying to address adult smokers who are not

quitting.

The optimal from our standpoint would be take us out of the

equation. If as Dr. Rodu indicated all of those physicians in the

trenches, if it was physicians were advised by the government that,

in fact, here you have a patient who is a smoker who they have

tried the gum, they have tried the patch, and they are not quitting,

that they could advise that patient of smokeless tobacco as a significantly less harmful option, then the company would not have to

make any type of communication if that is the type of communication the government and the public health community were giving

to these adult smokers who do not quit.

Mr. BASS. Dr. Tomar, I understand that you were listed as an

expert witness in an action brought by the Washington State Attorney General to recover the health care costs of tobacco use, and

that you prepared a report estimating that the health care costs related to smokeless tobacco used were less than 1 percent of those.

Is that true?

Mr. TOMAR. I would have to go back and look at the figures, and

it has been a number of years. I do not remember the exact figure.

Mr. BASS. Okay. Well, you would be kind enough to check up on

that and advise the committee I would be very grateful to you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. STEARNS. Do you mind yielding the balance to the gentleman?

Mr. BASS. I would like to yield to the gentlelady from Wyoming.

Ms. CUBIN. Thank you very much.

The question I wanted to ask, and maybe, Mr. Burton, you will

know or, Mr. Verheij, maybe you will know: are physicians right

154

now prevented from telling their patients that they believe smokeless tobacco is a healthier alternative, is healthier than smoking,

although not a healthy alternative?

And, Dr. Rodu, you may know that answer. Anyone, just speak

up.

Mr. VERHEIJ. Well, let me start. Just based on our conversations

with physicians, which we do on a frequent basis in terms of trying

to identify the issues related to smokeless tobacco, and I believe

there have been some submissions for the record from treating physicians and head and neck surgeons, what is taught in public

health school is that smokeless tobacco is as dangerous as cigarette

smoking, and they are stunned to find out that many researchers

believe that smokeless tobacco is significantly less harmful.

Ms. CUBIN. But do you know, Dr. Rodu, is there a prohibition

against physicians telling their patients that?

Mr. RODU. No, none whatsoever. It is called informed consent.

Ms. CUBIN. Correct.

Mr. RODU. As long as we provide both the risks and the benefits

of any treatment that we recommend, we are fulfilling our obligations as health professionals in letting people make choices.

Ms. CUBIN. And, Mr. Burton, is that the sort of thing that doctors also have to do when they are recommending a prescription

that perhaps your company might manufacture when they are prescribing the medication?

Mr. BURTON. Certainly physicians would advise their patients of

the risk and benefits of a particular course of action. Certainly I

think a significant difference being the fact that when you are talking about pharmaceuticals or medicines, they have been reviewed

by the agency, the FDA. They have been proven to be safe and effective, and the physician within that context can go beyond based

on his understanding or her understanding of the science to maybe

amplify what is in the approved labeling for that particular drug.

Ms. CUBIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Bass.

Mr. STEARNS. And the gentleman’s time has expired, and our

hearing has expired, and we are completing.

By unanimous consent, all members will have 5 working days to

enter any extraneous material they wish to put in.

I think it has been an excellent debate, and I want to thank the

witnesses sincerely for this long afternoon. We need to focus on the

science of this debate. The science should lead the way, and if the

science tells us that lives can be saved, we need to investigate

these options.

I hope the Federal Trade Commission will seriously consider putting together a workshop on tobacco harm reduction. If we can save

even a handful of people out of the 400,000 people who die every

year, it will be worthwhile to do.

I also want to thank staff for getting all of this balanced, I think

a very balanced hearing, and I think the thesis of our hearing has

been accomplished, namely, that smokeless tobacco needs to be explored as an alternative for persons who cannot stop smoking, and

we need more research on that.

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned.

155

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee meeting was adjourned.]

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

AMERICAN LEGACY FOUNDATION

June 10, 2003

The Honorable CLIFF STEARNS

Chairman

Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection

Energy & Commerce Committee

Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection

Energy & Commerce Committee

Washington, DC 20515

DEAR CHAIRMAN STEARNS AND RANKING MEMBER SCHAKOWSKY: I am writing

today to clarify the record with regard to testimony offered by U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company (USSTC) regarding its payments to the American Legacy Foundation as part of the Smokeless Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. The testimony

was offered during a hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and

Consumer Protection of the Energy & Commerce Committee on June 3, 2003 entitled ‘‘Can Tobacco Cure Smoking? A review of Tobacco Harm Reduction.’’

The American Legacy Foundation (Foundation) is an independent public health

foundation that addresses the health effects of tobacco use on our nation through

research, grants, technical training and assistance, youth activism, counter-marketing and grass roots outreach. Our mission is to build a world where young people

reject tobacco and anyone can quit. The Foundation is a 501(c)(3) organization and

was established in March 1999 as a result of the Master Settlement Agreement

(MSA) between the attorneys general in 46 states and five U.S. territories and the

tobacco industry. I serve as the Foundation’s President and CEO.

During the hearing, USSTC offered testimony regarding its company’s smokeless

tobacco products. In so doing, it sought to allay concerns members might have regarding the marketing of these products to youth by pointing to USSTC’s support

of the American Legacy Foundation. Specifically, USSTC testified that:

‘‘ . . . USSTC became the only smokeless tobacco company to enter into the

Smokeless Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (‘‘STMSA’’) with Attorneys

General of various states and U.S. territories. Pursuant to the STMSA, USSTC

is providing up to $100 million (plus an inflation adjustment), over a 10-year

period, to the American Legacy Foundation for programs to reduce youth usage

of tobacco and combat youth substance abuse, and for enforcement purposes.’’

(citations omitted)

While we commend USSTC for entering into the STMSA, we would like the record

to clearly reflect the history and underpinnings of the settlement agreement to

which it refers.

Along with the larger MSA reached with the cigarette manufacturers, the STMSA

was the result of protracted litigation brought by the states to recoup the billions

of dollars the states were forced to spend as a direct result of a wide range of illegal

activities undertaken by the tobacco industry. It was the states, and not the tobacco

companies, that introduced the concept of the Foundation into the settlement discussions. Moreover, it was the states that earmarked a portion of their recovery to

create the Foundation. Indeed, the agreement specifically states that the payments

are ‘‘made at the direction and on behalf of Settling States.’’ It also states that the

manufacturers ‘‘do not undertake and expressly disclaim any responsibility with respect to the creation [or], operation . . .’’ of the Foundation.

Accordingly, while USSTC quite accurately represents that it entered into the settlement agreement and has made payments pursuant to that agreement, it is not

accurate to state that USSTC is funding the American Legacy Foundation or to suggest that it is responsible for its successes in reducing youth smoking or that, because of its connection to the Foundation, members of Congress should not be concerned about smokeless tobacco products being marketed to America’s youth.

I would also like to take this opportunity to inform the Subcommittee of the

American Legacy Foundation’s successes in countering youth tobacco usage. Indeed,

on June 4, Legacy was honored to receive both the Gold and Grand Prize EFFIE

awards for its truth  campaign. The EFFIE Awards recognize advertising campaigns that deliver superior results in meeting the objectives they were designed to

156

achieve. Legacy was just the second nonprofit organization to earn this top honor

in the EFFIE’s 35-year history.

With its frank approach and blunt messaging, truth  was specifically cited in a

recent Monitoring the Future Report released by the National Institute on Drug

Abuse as one of the reasons behind sharp declines in teen smoking. See Johnston,

L.D., O’Malley, P.M. & Bachman, J.G. (2002), p. 126-127. Monitoring the Future national survey results on drug use, 1975-2001. (NIH Publication No. 02-5106). Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Indeed, a table presented during the

release of a subsequent report shows a striking trend in the reduction of cigarette

use among eighth, tenth and twelfth graders, which corresponds to the launch of

our truth  campaign, as well as other important tobacco control efforts including

increases in cigarette prices, increased prevention activities in a number of states,

efforts by the FDA in conjunction with states to reduce youth access to tobacco, and

removal of certain types of advertising nationwide, such as billboards. See Johnston,

L.D., O’Malley, P.M. & Bachman, J.G. (2002). Monitoring the Future national results

on adolescent drug use: Overview of key findings, 2002. (NIH Publication No. 03-

5374). Bethesda, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse.

Legacy has received what is likely to be its last payment for public education pursuant to the MSA, which could mean that we will forced to scale back or eliminate

our truth  campaign. States with award winning youth tobacco control and counter

marketing efforts are also eliminating these programs because of budget woes. Increasingly, campaigns like truth  and state counter marketing campaigns are

being challenged in the courts by tobacco companies. Now, more than ever, we urge

you and your colleagues to remain vigilant when it comes to our children’s health.

We respectfully request that the entire contents of this letter be included in the

official record for the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

CHERYL G. HEALTON. DR. P.H.

President & CEO

cc: Mr. Richard H. Verheij, USSTC

Members, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection,

House Energy and Commerce Committee

FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM

FAIRFAX, VA

May 29, 2003

The Honorable CLIFF STEARNS

House Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcommittee

2125 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

DEAR CHAIRMAN STEARNS: Please accept the following testimony for the June 3rd

Subcommittee hearing entitled, ‘‘Can Tobacco Cure Smoking?—A Review of Tobacco

Harm Reduction.’’

On behalf of Frontiers of Freedom I would also like to take this opportunity to

applaud the Subcommittee for looking into this issue and encourage other parts of

the government, including the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of

Health and Human Services, to work together to explore this issue in further formal

settings.

The Frontiers of Freedom Institute has been on the forefront of promoting sound

science in public policy. It is our belief that sound science must be the bedrock foundation for public policy decisions. This is particularly true when public health is involved. To divorce sound science from public policy is legislative and regulatory malpractice.

The Institute has reviewed a wide array of studies and experts and it appears

that the great weight of the evidence indicates that using smokeless tobacco instead

of smoking tobacco provides a better, safer and healthier alternative. Many of these

experts have a long history of speaking out against tobacco for health reasons.

It is not our opinion that the use of tobacco in any form is healthy, but if sound

science and medicine indicate that using smokeless tobacco instead of smoking cigarettes provides a significant reduction in health risks, the public has a right to know

this important fact. This is useful information to those who currently smoke and

want to reduce their health risks.

Some argue against permitting the public to have this information and argue that

people should simply stop smoking. However, in practice many people have been unsuccessful in their attempts to stop smoking. The adult smoking public should be

made aware of their options. To prohibit consumers from having access to this

157

knowledge is more than bad policy. It is malfeasance. In the corporate world, such

a decision would expose executives to untold liability to those who would have benefited from this information but were denied it.

Much has been made of the Enron scandal on grounds that employees, investors,

and the public were not given access to the best and most accurate information

about the company’s financial health. Throughout recent history, there have been

a wide variety of scandals when government or corporate officials withheld factually

accurate information from the public. Congress should NOT place itself in the center

of a future scandal by preventing the public from obtaining accurate and factual information that can help smokers improve their health. Political correctness is no

substitute for factual correctness.

For these reasons, the Institute appreciates the attention the Subcommittee is

giving this subject, and urges Congress to continue to look into this issue and work

to permit consumers to have access to information and scientific studies regarding

the potential health benefits of using smokeless tobacco as compared to smoking tobacco.

Sincerely,

GEORGE LANDRITH

President

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURE

DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL COMMENTS

The Alliance for Health Economic and Agriculture Development (AHEAD) appreciates the opportunity to submit this testimony to the House Committee on Government Reform as well as to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer

Protection ( House Committee on Energy and Commerce). AHEAD was formed

shortly following the issuance of the historic report Tobacco at a Crossroad,

which laid out a series of recommendations for policy changes affecting the production, manufacture and marketing of tobacco products.

The Alliance is an informal coalition of individuals, organizations, business,

churches and other interests working cooperatively to implement the principles and

recommendations in the commission report. The Alliance builds on nine years of dialogue and discussion between tobacco producers, public health organizations and

others and provides a neutral setting where non-traditional partners can resolve

differences and work together to achieve mutual goals.

Tobacco growers, the public health community and manufacturers are indeed at

a crossroads. There are unique challenges and opportunities before us that are going

to require that all parties set aside the rhetoric and to focus on substantive issues.

On the one hand, the attitude that we have to change everything overnight or not

at all is unrealistic. But the attitude on the part of some that nothing should change

is not only unrealistic but irresponsible. Dogmatic views, entrenchment and an unwillingness to find solutions must be substituted with open dialogue, discussion and

transparency. We need to be able to recognize and work through the things that

represent legitimate issues and to circumvent those that are used merely to stall

what is inevitable and necessary. The Alliance recognizes that no one party alone

can solve the challenges confronting us from the use of tobacco.

The future of tobacco and tobacco products will require a more integrated system

that encompasses the production, processing, manufacturing, labeling, advertising,

and marketing of tobacco. For example, the current tobacco program with its system

of quotas must be a replaced with a new system of production controls that brings

the growing of tobacco into the 21st century, taking into account technological opportunities and consideration of health and safety issues. These authorities should

be based within the USDA and coordinated with the FDA. The future will require

a more active research agenda, more effective monitoring and surveillance and an

effective regulatory system (FDA) that is flexible enough to be able to deal with unforeseen issues and to take advantage of opportunities when they arise. It should

involve incentives for tobacco growers, researchers and responsible manufacturers

to develop new methods of production and new products that reduce exposure to tobacco toxicants and which have a reasonable prospect of reducing tobacco related

disease. Government, public health organizations, researchers, tobacco growers and

even industry must find a way to work constructively and cooperatively to address

the challenges and to find meaningful, effective and workable solutions. What we

do here in the United States could set an example for the rest of the world in light

of the recently approved FCTC.

158

Tobacco and tobacco products come in a variety of forms. For decades there has

been a tendency to equate all tobacco and tobacco products as being equally harmful

when in fact this is not the case. There are many types of tobacco leaf that go into

making a tobacco product. These include such varieties as burley, flue-cured, darkfired, and oriental. As with any agricultural plant, most tobacco is treated with pesticides, and cured and processed in different ways. All of these things can and do

affect the quality (including health and safety) and composition of the leaf. In addition, as much as 50% of the tobacco used in US manufactured cigarettes (both domestic and foreign export) comes from overseas where there are fewer regulatory

controls in place. This alone can result in added and unforeseen risks. Similarly

there are many types of manufactured tobacco products—cigarettes, cigars, pipes,

and smokeless. Each of these carries their own set of risks—some greater than others. And even within each of these categories there are and can be significant variations of risks. Risk will vary depending on whether the product is burned or not,

what type of tobacco is used, how it is treated, where that tobacco came from, and

what additives and chemicals are used in its manufacture. Lowering risks from tobacco will also depend on the development of new technologies that are based on

science and not public relations gimmicks. The challenge that we face is how to best

assess these risks so that the public and consumers of tobacco fully understand the

consequences of using tobacco products and understand the relative risks that various products present.

DEVELOPMENT OF LOWER RISK PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE RISK

The Alliance believes, as do most others, that risk reduction can be a viable and

effective means in reducing the disease caused by the tobacco products currently on

the market. Statements by the Surgeon General, the IoM, and other public health

authorities all advocate that reducing toxins in tobacco products and ‘‘encouraging

the development of products that reduce consumer health risks or serve as less

harmful alternatives’’ should be done undertaken. There is enough science to begin

to make changes and to recognize that there are technologies in existence that can

reduce the levels of toxins that are known to be associated with disease. While

clearly unique, tobacco products are consumer products and like other products in

society where we consider ‘‘risks’’ we can and should do the same with tobacco. The

issue no longer seems to be whether scientifically based lower risk products should

be developed and made available, the issue and challenge is how. Development of

science-based tobacco products that can lower risk through both regulation and competition can also force the more toxic products off the market. We could see a significant shift in not only the development of new products but the removal or replacement of the older ones.

As the Tobacco at a Crossroad noted:

Given the number of Americans who use tobacco today, prohibition would not

protect the public health because it would drive many smokers to use unregulated black market products. Therefore, a statutory standard designed to promote the ‘public health’ rather than one that requires a tobacco product to be

‘‘safe’’ best protects everyone’s interests. It also recognizes that the ‘‘status quo’’

for current products is not in anyone’s interest if it is possible to reduce the

harm that tobacco products cause (p.43).

Independent science based decisions by FDA designed to protect public health

by taking reasonable steps to reduce the harm of tobacco products now being

sold and promote the introduction of less harmful products will also create fair

standards and will provide predictability to farmers and to industry. (p.43)

The Institute of Medicine Report, Clearing the Smoke noted:

For many diseases attributable to tobacco use, reducing risk of disease by reducing exposure to tobacco is feasible. This conclusion is based on studies demonstrating that for many diseases, reducing tobacco smoke exposure can result

in decreased disease incidence with complete abstinence providing the the

greatest benefit.

There are obviously many unknowns that will have to be addressed. For example,

concerns have been raised that we may find ourselves making the same mistakes

that were made in the development and marketing of low tar and low nicotine cigarettes. What was believed to be in the interests of public health turned out to be

an abusive marketing tool for the tobacco companies. One of the primary reasons

for this was the absence any kind of regulatory oversight. These kinds of mistakes

(and others) can be resolved and avoided if the FDA is given the authority it needs

to prescribe the labeling and marketing requirements for all tobacco products—including prescribing the manner in which claims can be made and preventing the

use of claims that are false or misleading. A science-based regulatory structure can

159

not only ensure that products are properly labeled and marketed, but it can also

serve to stimulate competition to develop new technologies and products that will

lower risks associated with tobacco use. These efforts however, must been carried

out under an effective regulatory scheme and with greater transparency.

THE CRITICAL NEED FOR AND ROLE OF THE FDA

FDA will provide the level playing field under which all tobacco products should

be regulated—governing their manufacture, sale, distribution, labeling and marketing.

FDA’s authority must be comprehensive but at the same time flexible enough to

be able to deal with what will most likely be a rapidly changing environment. Issues

related to risk reduction will be but one component of FDA’s authorities. Other

things that the agency will need to focus on include:

• Prohibiting and restricting advertising and marketing that is misleading and deceptive(all tobacco products).

• Restricting the sale, advertising and promotion of tobacco products to children and

adolescents.

• Disclosing additives, toxins, ingredients, country of origin and other information

that adult users of tobacco are entitled to have.

The research and science base will need to be expanded by both the public and

private sectors. Industry science must be held to the same level of standards and

peer review and transparency that is required in other industries.

Consideration should also be given to undertaking a major educational campaign

designed to educate the public about the new regulatory authorities and to help

them read and understand the warnings and labeling requirements (not unlike

what was needed when food labeling reforms were instituted).

In addition, there will be a need to have a monitoring and surveillance system

in place that will allow governmental agencies to effectively track tobacco use by

the public and to take the necessary corrective steps if certain goals and objectives

are not being met.

Some argue that existing authorities of the Federal Trade Commission are sufficient to ensure effective and proper regulation of tobacco products including lower

risk products. We disagree. Although we believe that the FTC should retain its section 5 governing unfair trade practices, the FDA, as a science-based agency, is best

suited to deal with the complex scientific and medical issues relating to tobacco ‘‘including reduced risk products.

For a more detailed list of what the Alliance believes to be the ‘‘Core Principles’’

of FDA regulation see attached.

CONCLUSION

Reducing risk associated with tobacco and tobacco use must move forward but it

must do so carefully and with the full participation of all parties. We believe the

Commission report Tobacco at a Crossroad represents a blueprint for change—

change that must be made and accepted by all stakeholders. Preserving the ‘‘status

quo’’, whether its on the part of manufacturers, tobacco growers and even public

health is in the best interests of no one. The kind of open dialogue and discussion

that resulted in the issuance of a set of Core Principles in 1998 between growers

and health organizations as well as the commission report, Tobacco at a Crossroad (2001) must now be the model upon which we enter the final phase of ensuring effective but fair regulation of tobacco by the FDA.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCIE G. MARZULLA ON BEHALF OF DEFENDERS OF

PROPERTY RIGHTS

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for allowing Defenders

of Property Rights an opportunity to present testimony concerning the impact of

communicating to American consumers important health-related information about

tobacco risk reduction. I am Nancie G. Marzulla, President of Defenders of Property

Rights, the only public interest legal foundation devoted exclusively to constitutionally protected property rights. Defenders of Property Rights was founded in 1991

to counterbalance the governmental threat to private property as a result of a broad

range of regulations. We believe that society can achieve important social objectives

such as protection of our environment and our health while respecting fundamental

constitutional rights like those of private property and freedom of speech. As such,

we continue our efforts to protect victims of over-zealous regulations in court, to

help government regulators better realize the limits on their power, and to work

160

closely with elected representatives to ensure that property owners have a say in

the laws that govern their ability to make use of their property.

Mr. Chairman, we come before your Subcommittee today to remind you that commercial speech, like all other lawful expression in this nation, is constitutionally

protected, a point which is often overlooked in the heat of debate over how best to

protect the consumer against false or misleading advertising. We are here to underscore the fact that, just as a manufacturer may not disseminate false or misleading

information about its product, neither may Congress prohibit the dissemination of

truthful information by that same manufacturer. Because this commercial expression carries First Amendment protection, Congress bears the burden of making certain that any statement it prohibits is, in fact, untrue. If Congress cannot demonstrate, based on sound scientific evidence, that a particular statement is false or

misleading, Congress cannot prohibit that statement consistent with the First

Amendment.

The Founders understood that the free exchange of commercial information makes

free enterprise possible by enhancing competition and educating consumers. Indeed,

the origins of our right to free expression are as much commercial as they are political for, in the end, our economic freedoms are the true source of our political freedoms as well. Judge Loren Smith of the Court of Federal Claims rightly observed

that:

Without extensive property rights, jealously defended, only the government

would have the resources needed to organize political campaigns or parties of

any size. Without property rights, no individual would have a base to run for

office other than those who hold governmental power. Without property and

contract rights, litigation in the courts would be a very limited and ineffective

tool for protecting anything. The judiciaries of every former socialist country are

a stark testimony to the weakness and ineffectiveness of a dependent judiciary.

Without the right to advertise profit-making products, the free press and media

necessary for effective free speech, would be a mere illusion... Underlying all

of our political and intellectual freedoms which make for a civilized society is

a foundation of widely dispersed private property, and all the attributes of that

system that Madison so clearly understood: freedom to contract, free markets,

and personal security. Without this foundation, political liberty and the ability

to exercise those rights guaranteed by the First Amendment would be a mere

sham.

Loren A. Smith, Allen Chair Symposium 1996: The Future of Environmental and

Land-use Regulation: Essay: Life, Liberty & Whose Property?: An Essay on Property

Rights, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1060 (1996).

For example, the Constitution places such a strong emphasis on protecting private

property rights, among other economic freedoms, because the right to own and use

property is critical to the maintenance of a free society. Properly understood, property is more than land. Property is buildings, machines, retirement funds, savings

accounts and even ideas. In short, property is the fruits of one’s labors. The ability

to use, enjoy and exclusively possess the fruits of one’s own labors is the basis for

a society which individuals are free from oppression. Indeed, there can be no true

freedom for anyone if people are dependent upon the state (or an overreaching bureaucracy) for food, shelter and other basic needs. Where the fruits of your labors

are owned by the state and not by you, nothing is safe from being taken by a majority or a tyrant. As a government dependent, the individual is ultimately powerless

to oppose any infringement of his rights (much less degradation of the environment)

because the government has total control over them. People’s livelihoods, possibly

even their lives, can be destroyed at the whim of the state. Private property thus

acts as a barrier to the arbitrary and tyrannical exercise of government power.

With proper appreciation for this strong relationship between our economic and

political freedoms, the Supreme Court recently stated that, ‘‘so long as we preserve—a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in

large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a

matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and

well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.’’ See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1996) (citing

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.

748, 765 (1976)). The Court further explained that ‘‘a paternalistic assumption that

the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot

justify a decision to suppress it.’’ See id. at 498. While government may have an

interest in consumer protection, regulating truthful, non-misleading commercial information does not serve to protect that interest. Rather, protecting commercial

speech empowers consumers to make informed decisions and allows business to

compete effectively.

161

1 ...

Those who contend that commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment

protection rely on a two-page 1942 decision of the Supreme Court in which the

Court disposed of commercial speech in one sentence. See Valentine v. Chrestensen,

316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (‘‘We are... clear that the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising’’). As Judge

Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has pointed out in his penetrating law review article,

this opinion ‘‘cites no authority’’. See Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid

of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 627 (1990) (‘‘Without citing any cases,

without discussing the purposes or values underlying the First Amendment, and

without even mentioning the First Amendment except in stating Chrestensen’s contentions, the Court found it clear as day that commercial speech was not protected

by the First Amendment’’). Realizing its folly, the Supreme Court reversed itself 34

years later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976), when

it then accorded First Amendment protection to commercial speech:

Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other

ways . . . But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely

lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering. In this sense, the justifications Virginia has offered for suppressing the flow of prescription drug

price information, far from persuading us that the flow is not protected by the

First Amendment, have reinforced our view that it is. We so hold.

The Court recognized that commercial expression belonged as much in the marketplace of ideas as did other forms of expression. Producers now convey and consumers now receive information about goods and services without fear of severe restrictions, strengthening the foundations of our free society and our free market

economy.

Advocates of regulating commercial speech blithely ignore the important role that

commercial speech plays in a free society and in a free market, instead brandishing

flimsy rationales for limiting First Amendment protection for commercial speech.

None of these rationales withstand scrutiny. For example, the California Supreme

Court in Nike v. Kasky, a case now pending before the United States Supreme

Court, thought it had distilled from the Supreme Court’s opinions three reasons for

the commercial speech exclusion from full First Amendment protection: (1) that

commercial speech was more easily verifiable by the speaker than news reporting

or political commentary; (2) that commercial speech was hardier than noncommercial speech in the sense that commercial speakers, because they act from a profit

motive, are less likely to experience a chilling effect from speech regulation; and (3)

that governmental authority to regulate commercial transactions to prevent commercial harms justifies a power to regulate speech that is ‘linked inextricably’ to

those transactions.’’ See Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d at 252-53 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc.,

517 U.S. at 499; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 fn. 24)

First, objective verifiability is not a characteristic unique to commercial speech.

As Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit also pointed out in his aforementioned law

review article:

[T]here are many varieties of noncommercial speech that are just as objective

as paradigmatic commercial speech and yet receive full first amendment protection. Scientific speech is the most obvious; much scientific expression can easily

be labeled true or false, but we would be shocked at the suggestion that it is

therefore entitled to a lesser degree of protection. If you want, you can proclaim

that the sun revolves around the earth, that the earth is flat, that there is no

such thing as nitrogen, that flounder smoke cigars, that you have fused atomic

nuclei in your bathtub—you can spout any nonsense you want, and the government can’t stop you.

Kozinski, supra, at 635.

Second, the notion that profit is a stronger motivation to speak than, e.g., religious, philosophical or political conviction, contradicts the history of this nation’s

founding and the sacrifices of our founding fathers themselves. George Washington

and John Adams neglected their farming businesses to serve the revolution, while

Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and the others risked hanging for treason as the price of signing the Declaration of Independence. Pasternak

and Solzhenitsyn continued to write, and Shostakovich to compose, under the very

real threat of being sent to the Gulag. Humankind throughout the ages has proved

that it is not the love of money, but the love of truth and right that appears to be

the strongest motivation of our race.1 See Kozinski, supra, at 637 (‘‘History teaches

that speech backed by religious feeling can persist in extraordinarily hostile climates; sacred texts survive in places where dire consequences attend their possesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00169 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
162

sion, consequences that would easily overcome a mere profit motive. Artistic impulses can also cause expression to persist in the face of hostile government regulation’’).

Third, although government may certainly act to prevent commercial fraud, restrictions on commercial speech often do not link the speech at issue to a proposed

or completed fraudulent transaction. Were the speech so linked, First Amendment

protections would certainly not obtain because it is the transaction, not the speech,

which is unlawful. Restricting fraudulent or misleading speech with no connection

to actual resulting fraud abandons the marketplace of ideas for the majesty of the

courtroom, placing judges in the role of arbiter of the truth. Advocates of restricting

the free flow of commercial information apparently consider the relative merits of

laundry detergent or pickup tricks, for example, too important to be left to the consuming public.

Having dispensed with these rationales, it is clear to see that there is no compelling rationale for restricting commercial speech. Indeed, any attempt to distinguish

between commercial and noncommercial speech for the purposes of determining the

‘‘appropriate’’ level of First Amendment protection (and the ‘‘appropriate’’ degree of

speech restriction) is bound for failure. Commercial motivations are invariably and

inextricably intertwined with all forms of expression. See Loren A. Smith, supra, at

1062-63 (‘‘The desire to make a buck and the desire to write a poem appear very

similar’’). Many motives, including profit, can prompt expression on any issue, and

‘‘human motives cannot be separated by any objective test.’’ See id. at 1062-63. See

also John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First

Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 55 (1996):

Moreover, research into our evolutionary heritage confirms that the human faculty of speech evolved to improve economic well-being, both by facilitating the

exchange of goods and by creating another product for exchange—namely information itself. Information production of all kinds is thus increasingly seen as

directed toward the acquisition of wealth and status... Expressive man is economic man.

Indeed, as I noted earlier, commercial speech has played a leading role in the establishment of our right to freedom of expression. In 17th and 18th century England, printers faced loss of income when government suppressed publication. See

McGinnis, supra, at 60 (‘‘Printers [who convinced Parliament to end the licensing

system]... naturally sought to protect their interests and limit the prerogatives of

government [to suppress publication]’’). Accordingly, the printers relied on property

rights arguments in their successful efforts to convince Parliament to end the licensing system and the general warrants by which government seized printed material.

See id. at 61 (‘‘The notion of information as property came naturally to printers and

played a prominent part in their arguments for freedom’’). In defending freedom of

the press, these Whig printers couched their arguments in the language of economic

rights, rightly understanding that economic motives often drive and enable the dissemination of information on matters political, commercial, and otherwise. See id.

Accordingly, no court has held that there exists a commercial press exception to the

Free Press Clause.

Other forms of expression demonstrate a similarly close relationship between commercial motivations and the resulting expression. See Kozinski, supra, at 641 (providing example that fully protected music videos promote record sales). Newspapers

and broadcast television, the heirs of the aforementioned Whig printers, disseminate

information on political affairs with a view to increasing sales, attracting paying advertisers, and generating ratings. In these cases, profit motivation and economic

transactions are essential to the transmission of the resulting expression. See

McGinnis, supra, at 91. Excluding ‘‘commercial speech’’ from the ambit of First

Amendment protection thus undermines the very foundations of free speech.

Congress must therefore exercise the utmost caution in considering whether to

regulate the transmission of commercial information about the health benefits and

risks of smokeless tobacco. The First Amendment guarantees our freedom to give

and receive information to ensure that we are a self-governing people. A well-informed basis for decision-making, aided by the free exchange of information, is an

essential ingredient of that self-government, both at the ballot box and at the supermarket. A well-informed basis for decision-making is even more essential when it

comes to making decisions about one’s health. Before taking action, Congress should

keep in mind the importance of self-government and the role that commercial

speech plays in maintaining it.

Thank you for the opportunity to address this important issue here today. I would

be happy to answer any questions you may have.

163

1This statement is the scientific opinion of the author, and does not necessarily represent the

views of the University of Texas School of Public Health, the University of Texas Health Science

Center at Houston or the University of Texas system.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL V. PHILLIPS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF

TEXAS SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1

Cigarette smoking is widely described as the greatest preventable cause of morbidity and mortality. I have always found this a rather tortured definition of ‘‘preventable’’—after all, if it is so preventable, why do U.S. smoking rates remain high,

with the total number of smokers in the world increasing? It is reasonable to say

that smoking is theoretically preventable. But the current methods—education,

warning, regulating sales and advertising, prohibiting smoking in many places, and

pharmaceutical nicotine replacements—despite their effectiveness over the last half

century, seem to have had most of the effect as they are going to. Even if those

methods become even more effective at discouraging people from taking up smoking,

the tens of millions of current smokers in the U.S. remain at risk.

Last year, I was retained by U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company to analyze and

give my opinion on what the scientific research had to say about the health risks

of using smokeless tobacco (ST). As a professor of public health (Assistant Professor,

University of Texas School of Public Health and University of Texas Medical School)

specializing in methods for interpreting data and study results, I had much to say

about the science. As a public policy analyst (Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard

University and Masters in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government

at Harvard), I find myself particularly interested in the potential life-saving policy

of harm reduction.

Like most everyone who has not personally reviewed the science, I believed that

ST was a major risk factor for life-threatening illness, perhaps not as risky as cigarettes, but of similar magnitude. It quickly became clear to me that the risk from

smokeless tobacco was tremendously lower than that from cigarettes. Indeed, even

for the one disease most commonly linked to ST, oral cancer, the evidence of any

risk at all was highly equivocal. I was distressed that the public health community,

a community I am part of, had perpetuated such misinformation. More than that,

I was impressed by the potential to reduce the devastating health effects of cigarettes by encouraging smokers to switch to ST. I came to consider this one of the

greatest untapped resources for improving the health of the U.S. population, and

have made ST my major substantive area of academic research.

Many areas of health research offer large speculative payoffs, but it is not clear

what will really be discovered. Many potential interventions offer great health benefits in theory, but it is not clear they could really be implemented. ST has scientifically proven potential to reduce harm from cigarettes and a proven track record in

Sweden, where ST consumption has increased while smoking has dropped dramatically. It is difficult to imagine any other policy as likely to further reduce the health

costs of smoking in the U.S., if only policy makers and public health leaders will

let it work. This would require no complicated and expensive intervention; it would

probably be enough for the government to tell the truth about the risks or allow

ST manufacturers to do so.

Much less harmful than cigarettes

The potential of ST use to reduce harms from smoking follows immediately from

its role as an alternative source of nicotine and its relative safety. Despite the popular belief to the contrary, there is no genuine scientific disagreement with the

claim that ST is much less harmful than cigarettes. Biology and chemistry would

tend to predict this (for example, ST does not produce carbon monoxide buildup or

cause chemical insult to the lungs), but it is the study of actual results for actual

people (the science of epidemiology) that makes it clear. Of the various cancers, cardiovascular diseases, and other life threatening diseases that smoking has been

shown to cause, the only persistent claim about risk from ST is for oral cancer (OC).

The elimination of clearly smoking-specific hazards—lung cancer and other lung diseases, fires, and environmental (‘‘second hand’’) tobacco smoke—alone reduce the

risks by half. But there has also been no conclusive link to cardiovascular disease

and most other cancers. Even for OC, which account for about 1% of deaths attributable to smoking, smoking is associated with greater risk than the worst plausible

claims about the risk from ST.

The bottom line is that a cigarette smoker who switches to ST reduces his risk

of disease from tobacco use by more than 90%, and quite possibly more than 99%.

There is legitimate scientific uncertainty about whether the reduction is 98%, 99.9%,

or some other value, but it clear that it is better than 90%. The remaining uncerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00171 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
164

tainty should not dissuade us from acting immediately. One of the most important

points I teach my students in my health policy classes is that if you perform a careful scientific analysis of a proposed policy, you will often find that you do not need

to resolve the remaining uncertainty about some values. Even though they are

somewhat uncertain, you know enough to know that any plausible value leads to

the same policy recommendation. In the case of ST, if the reduction in risk of life

threatening disease was possibly as low as 50% or even 75% compared to cigarettes,

the question might be more difficult. But our current information, that the risk of

using ST is much less than 10% of that from smoking, is sufficient to show that

telling the truth about ST is a promising harm reduction strategy

How do we know?

The scientific literature fails to establish a link between ST use and any life

threatening disease. Scientifically demonstrating that something does not exist,

such as showing there is no substantial health risk from ST, is usually more difficult than demonstrating that it does exist. A common observation is that ‘‘the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.’’ This is an important point when evidence is absent because there has been little attempt to find the evidence. But when

researchers have looked hard for evidence of a health risk and have not found it,

we have compelling evidence that the risk is close to zero. This is the case for ST.

This does not mean that the risk from ST for any particular disease is exactly

zero—such a thing can never be proven—but it does give the best possible evidence

that it is either zero or very low.

The active effort by many organizations and researchers in the health community

to show that ST is unhealthy has created attitudes that are a barrier to the suggested harm reduction strategy. But that same active effort is very helpful for drawing scientific conclusions, because we can be confident that if there were any clear

associations to be found, they would have been found. The health science literature

contains only a few papers that look at risk of diseases other than OC from ST use.

One reason for this might be that no one has looked for such associations. However,

there are many well-studied datasets that would allow such analyses and there is

huge demand for findings that ST is associated with disease. Given that there is

demand and potential supply, we can conclude that the lack of findings is not for

lack of trying to find something. It is not surprising that there are not a lot of published papers that show a lack of association, because such findings tend to not get

published (the phenomenon is called ‘‘publication bias’’). We can further conclude

that if there was a large risk for a disease from ST, it would be noticed; large effects

are difficult to miss. Finally, we can observe that the opponents of ST focus almost

entirely on the risk of oral cancer, and energetic advocates can usually be counted

on to come up with the strongest possible case for their claims, suggesting that even

they do not think there is support for the claim that ST causes other diseases.

But even the case for OC risk is not very strong. It is widely reported that there

is a causal link between ST and OC, most notably in a Surgeon General’s Report

[1986]. There is evidence that smokeless products that contain other major ingredients (particularly betel nut in South Asia) are risk factors for OC. There is one large

U.S. study [Winn et al., 1981], that found an association between the use of earlyand mid-20th century dry snuff and oral cancer. (The Surgeon General Report conclusions hinged largely on this study.)

But the dominant product in the industrialized world, modern moist snuff, has not

been associated with OC. The two major published studies on the topic [Lewin et

al., 1998; Schildt et al., 1998] did not find an association, and provide convincing

evidence that there is no strong association. Furthermore, my own research (which

I will present this June at the Society for Epidemiologic Research meeting, the

major U.S. epidemiology meeting) shows that Winn et al. and most others of the

few modern studies that purport to find an association of ST and OC have reported

their results in ways that tend to exaggerate the association, or make it appear that

there is an association in the data when there really is not. In particular, they

picked out subgroups of their population (such as only reporting results for nonsmoking women, or certain individuals who had used ST for more than 50 years),

and reported numbers for them, omitting numbers for other groups who had much

lower association or even showed reductions in cancer rates. The conclusion from

all this is not that modern American and Swedish ST is proven to not cause oral

cancer, but there is clearly no proof that it does cause it.

A (so far) missed opportunity for harm reduction

Even if we accept the main finding from the Winn et al. study about OC risk,

the worst case scenario there is any evidence to support, and allow for some small

risk of others diseases (so small that it has not been detected), the risk from ST

165

is only about 1% of that from smoking. Our current scientific knowledge allows us

to be fairly confident that ST has about 99% less risk of life threatening disease

than smoking. We are as confident as is ever possible in health research that the

reduction is greater than 90%. The implication of that is clear: Anyone who uses

ST rather than cigarettes will be much safer, eliminating almost all the risk of lifethreatening disease from his or her tobacco use.

Having learned this in the last year, I have found myself thinking about my

grandmother, a lifelong smoker, who died a few years ago following a series of

smoking-related cancers. She tried to quit using tobacco and failed. The message

from the public health community to her and to current smokers was ‘‘quit or die.’’

She could not quit. As an Appalachian woman of her age group, the use of ST would

not have been unusual or socially unacceptable. Had she gotten the message that

she would have been so much safer using ST rather than cigarettes, she might be

alive today.

Health authorities in other countries are starting to come around. Most notably,

the United Kingdom’s oldest medical organization, the Royal College of Physicians

[2002], issued a report on tobacco regulation that acknowledged that ST is ‘‘10-1000

times less hazardous than smoking’’ and suggested that a harm reduction strategy

might be appropriate. Many public health advocates and researchers are speaking

up in favor of using ST as part of a harm reduction strategy. The changes in policy

attitudes will come too late for millions who have already died, but millions of others can be saved.

Misleading the public

Why did my grandmother never learn that ST offered such a huge reduction in

risk? Why do tens of millions of literate and well-informed smokers not know it

now? Why did I, a well-read expert in public health not know this a year and a half

ago? The consistent message from public health authorities, including state and federal government agencies, advocacy groups, and medical organizations, is that ST

is as unhealthy as cigarettes. Sometimes this claim is stated in so many words, despite being clearly false. More often, the message is that ST is not a safe alternative

to cigarettes. When this message is presented without further qualification, people

tend to assume that the two products have comparable levels of risk, making the

claim clearly misleading.

My colleagues and I just completed a review of the over four hundred public-service-oriented Web sites that were found with a Google search for statements about

the health risk from ST. Less than 1% of these say anything about ST offering a

major risk reduction compared to smoking or acknowledge that it has not been

shown to be very harmful. Many sites contain specific numbers that make their

claims more misleading, while giving the appearance of greater accuracy. A fairly

common claim is that ST ‘‘can lead to a 50-fold increase in oral cancer risk.’’ This

result traces to one number reported in Winn et al., for extremely high exposure

among a small subgroup of the population, and is not meaningful out of context.

This number, the largest reported in the paper for any subgroup or exposure definition, clearly does not summarize the results from Winn et al. Furthermore, having

re-analyzed the original unpublished Winn data, I found that the specific statistical

choices used to produce that number appear to have been chosen to produce the

largest number possible, which is a scientifically invalid method of analysis.

Our major finding from our analysis of the Web sites (which we will also be presenting at the epidemiology meetings) is that most of them repeat the same overstated or false claims, reporting the same few numbers from Winn and the Surgeon

General, and ignoring the substantial scientific literature that contradicts these

claims. When they attribute their claims to any source, they cite the Surgeon General, the American Cancer Society, and a few other sources, all of which trace their

claims primarily to pre-1980 research, which is not up to modern methodologic

standards and studies people who used a different product from modern moist snuff.

Furthermore, with the exception of two Web sites that deal with harm reduction,

the sites that showed up in our search provide no absolute risk number that would

allow readers to realize that, even the worst case scenario, ST is tremendously safer

than smoking. What looks like a huge amount of mutually-confirming information

about substantial risk turns out to be a lot of groups citing each other and repeating

the same small body of misleading and often incorrect information.

Given these patterns of systematic misinformation, it is not surprising that when

people learn the truth about the risk of ST, they are almost always extremely surprised. Of the hundreds of people, usually highly educated and often health professionals, that my colleagues and I have told this information to, only one (my dentist)

already knew the truth. It is little wonder that the harm reduction message, as

strong as it is, has not taken off on its own.

166

Attempts to justify the misinformation

The health advocates who defend the misinforming of the public offer several arguments, all of which seem difficult to defend. No one who hopes to preserve any

credibility will deny that using ST rather than cigarettes leads to a dramatic risk

reduction. Instead, other arguments are usually offered. They turn out to be equally

unconvincing, but more subtly so.

Advocates sometimes argue that honest information about ST should be denied

to the public because it might cause tobacco nonusers to take up ST, and their increased risk could exceed the benefit experienced by smokers switching to ST. Simple arithmetic shows this to be wrong. If ST offers a 99% reduction compared to

smoking, it would be necessary for 99 tobacco nonusers to take up ST for every

smoker who switches. Even if the reduction were as little at 90%, it would require

9 for every 1. It is implausible that such a large increase in tobacco use could occur.

An occasional retort to this arithmetic is that there is an ethical concern when

one person experiences a benefit (the smoker who switches to ST) and another suffers a health cost (the nonuser who takes up ST upon learning it is relatively safe—

assuming, of course, that ST does create some risk). But a much clearer ethical argument is that it is unacceptable in a free society for public officials to filter information to protect people from their own free choices, especially when someone else

(the smoker who never learns the value of switching) pays a high price for it.

A second argument used to justify the misinformation is that even though it is

arithmetically implausible that increased ST use could directly cause an increase in

the total health impact of tobacco, honest information about ST would lead to more

tobacco users, and some of them would take up smoking. If this phenomenon—that

ST would act as a ‘‘gateway’’ to smoking—did occur, the net benefits would indeed

be reduced. However, even though this possibility can be stated, there is no reason

to believe it would actually occur. Several studies have attempted to show that there

is a tendency to switch from ST to cigarettes, but they have merely shown that

many of the same people who might use one form of tobacco might use another, just

as we would expect. But even if a pattern of switching from ST to cigarettes does

exist in the U.S. currently, it would say nothing about what would happen if people

had good information. Believing that the two products are comparably unhealthy,

people might be equally likely to switch in either direction. But when people learn

that ST is much less harmful, they will increase their switching from cigarettes to

ST and decrease their switching from ST to cigarettes. To claim otherwise is to say

that tobacco users do not care about their health, which is clearly not the case.

Furthermore, the logic of the gateway argument is fundamentally flawed. The argument requires that there is a group of tobacco nonusers who are avoiding tobacco

because of health concerns, but who would start using ST if they knew it was not

very risky. But then, these same people—who were originally motivated to avoid tobacco due to health concerns—somehow decide to switch to cigarettes, which they

know are much less healthy. Thus, since honest information about ST would tend

reduce the switching from ST to cigarettes, and it is difficult to imagine any new

ST users switching to smoking, honest information about ST would tend to decrease

any role that ST plays as a gateway to smoking. Anyone concerned with the gateway effect should be in favor of honest information about the lower risk from ST.

When the preceding arguments are shown to not hold up, anti-tobacco advocates

sometimes offer a third argument that does not depend on logic or science: the goal

of our society should be to eliminate all tobacco use, and telling the truth about ST

is not compatible with this goal. It is not clear exactly whose goal this is and what

justification they have for imposing it on the rest of society. The legitimate goal of

health advocates is to improve health, and denying people a great harm reduction

opportunity clearly does not do this. It is certainly true that eliminating all tobacco

use would improve health (almost all the gain coming from eliminating cigarettes),

but this goal, whether legitimate or not, will be unrealistic for many decades.

Conclusions

Advocating the use of ST to reduce the harm from cigarettes is a minority position

in the U.S. But scientific truth and ethical duties are not decided by counting votes.

The science is clear: ST is much less harmful than cigarettes, and there is no realistic scenario that leads to any increase in health risks by telling the truth. In my

opinion, health officials have an affirmative ethical duty to make the truth known,

both because it is the truth and because it would save lives. It is difficult to justify

keeping the truth from people, even when it might be harmful; it is clearly unjustified when it would be beneficial. In other countries these points have been appreciated at the highest levels in the health community. And many other American

health researchers, notably including Professor Lynn Kozlowski of Penn State UniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00174 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
167

versity, who has presented the ethical arguments in greater detail than I can here,

have come to the same conclusions.

It is not clear whether those who would prevent this harm reduction strategy are

motivated by an unrealistic vision of eliminating all tobacco use in the short term

or by something else. Whatever their motives, there should be a strong burden on

them to present some logical argument, based on realistic scientific claims and

clearly stated ethical positions, that we should deny people truthful information that

could save their lives. In my extensive studies of the scientific and popular literature, I have found no such argument. We are not faced with a need for more

scientific information. We have enough information to know that the harm reduction

strategy responds to a huge health problem, has the potential for substantial reduction of risks, is likely to be implementable, and has not been shown to be costly or

likely to have major unintended consequences. It is difficult to imagine a more compelling case for harm reduction.

References

Lewin F, Norell SE, Johansson H, Gustavson P, Wennerberg J, Biorklund A, Rutqvist LE.

Smoking tobacco, oral snuff, and alcohol in the etiology of squamous cell carcinoma of the head

and neck; a population-based case-referent study in Sweden. Cancer. 1998;82:1367-1375.

Royal College of Physicians. Protecting smokers, saving lives; the case for a tobacco and nicotine regulatory authority. London: Royal College of Physicians, 2002

Schildt EB, Eriksson M, Hardell L, Magnuson A. Oral snuff, smoking habits and alcohol consumption in relation to oral cancer in a Swedish case-control study. International Journal of

Cancer. 1998;77:341-346.

Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on the Health Consequences of Using Smokeless Tobacco. The health consequences of using smokeless tobacco. U.S. National Institutes of Health

Publication No. 86-2874. Washington: United States Public Health Service, 1986.

Winn DM, Blot WJ, Shy CM, Pickle LW, Toledo A, Fraumeni JF. Snuff dipping and oral cancer among women in the southern United States. New England Journal of Medicine.

1981;304:745-749.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID W. EISELE, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF

OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

With this letter, I would like to provide you and your committee with a clinical

perspective on the issue of tobacco harm reduction, an issue that is presently being

debated amongst public health experts, dentists, and other health care professionals. The scientific information regarding the relative health risks of various tobacco products is important information, which should be made available to tobacco

consumers, the public, and the health care community. Dissemination of this information will assist individuals who use tobacco products to make informed decisions

regarding tobacco use.

On this issue, I offer you the perspective of a head and neck cancer surgeon with

significant experience with the clinical problems encountered by patients who use

tobacco products. I am an academic clinician-educator and I presently serve as Professor and Chairman of the Department of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery

at the University of California, San Francisco. I also direct the Head and Neck Oncology Program at the UCSF Mt. Zion Cancer Center, an NCCN Comprehensive

Cancer Center. Formerly, I founded and directed the Johns Hopkins Head and Neck

Cancer Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. A copy of my curriculum

vitae is attached.

My postgraduate training consisted of residency training in General Surgery and

Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery. My clinical practice consists of the care

of patients afflicted with head and neck cancer as well as other tumors of the head

and neck. I have cared for such patients in three geographically distinct regions of

the United States including the Pacific Northwest, the Middle Atlantic region, and

the San Francisco Bay Area. These regions of the United States have varied tobacco

product usage patterns. It is my understanding that, in particular, the use of smokeless tobacco is especially prevalent in the Pacific Northwest.

In order to supplement my personal clinical experience and perspective, I have reviewed the body of epidemiological literature regarding smokeless tobacco and oral

cancer. In addition, I have examined literature relevant to the issue of the potential

role of smokeless tobacco in the context of harm reduction. My experience of nineteen years in the care of head and neck cancer patients has demonstrated that approximately 80% to 90% of patients with head and neck cancer are present or

former smokers of cigarettes. A smaller proportion are cigar or pipe smokers. On

numerous occasions, I have observed benign reversible oral lesions (hyperplasia) in

users of smokeless tobacco. To date, however, I have never seen a patient with an

oral cancer that can be attributed to the use of smokeless tobacco.

168

The medical literature supports my clinical observations. The literature clearly

demonstrates significant differences in the relative risks for the development of

head and neck and other cancers for different tobacco products. Of notable importance is the markedly diminished risk for the development of cancer of the head and

neck and the elimination of the risk of cancers in other body locations for smokeless

tobacco compared to cigarettes. The medical literature provides clear and

undebatable data indicating that smokeless tobacco is a safer form of tobacco use

relative to cigarettes.

There is general consensus that physicians and public health authorities have an

obligation to inform patients and tobacco consumers regarding the adverse health

risks associated with the use of the various tobacco products. Because the health

risks associated with tobacco use vary according to their form, this information is

additionally relevant and important information that should be disseminated. Patients must have this information in order to make an informed decision regarding

tobacco product usage and product choices. In my practice, patients demonstrate interest in understanding these relative risks. For example, cigar smokers will often

inquire about the relative risk of smoking cigars compared to smoking cigarettes.

An analogous practice by physicians already exists. Physicians already advise patients regarding the comparative risks of drinking alcoholic beverages. All reasonable physicians acknowledge that excessive consumption of alcohol is deleterious to

one’s health. Recent data, however, show that alcohol use in moderation has beneficial health effects. A physician can only be effective in the care of a patient who

consumes alcohol if the physician understands and transmits this information about

alcohol. In addition, those of us in academic medicine have an obligation to our students and trainees regarding the unbiased transmission of this relevant information.

In addition, physicians must understand the data relating to relative risk of tobacco forms in order to fully educate patients regarding tobacco use risks and smoking cessation. Presently, the general public health message to consumers has been

that all tobacco products are hazardous to one’s health. Although this dictum is generally correct, the various forms of tobacco carry with them significant risk difference with regard to health. These relative risks should be known by patients,

physicians, and other health care providers. Public health authorities should disseminate this information to the public so that consumers of tobacco products can

make informed, personal decisions.

June 20, 2003

The Honorable CLIFF STEARNS

Chairman

Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection

Committee on Energy and Commerce

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your invitation to testify on June 3 before

the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection. I appreciate the

opportunity to address the Subcommittee regarding the dangers of allowing the tobacco industry to make ‘‘reduced risk’’ health claims absent comprehensive and

meaningful regulation of all tobacco products by the Food and Drug Administration

(FDA).

We at the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids are also grateful for the hard work

and many efforts of Committee staff, especially Counsel Kelly Zerzan, to assist us

in preparing for the hearing. Below are the answers to the questions submitted by

Representative Whitfield for my response.

Q1. Do you believe that as your press release strongly suggests, Marlboro cigarettes are more dangerous than other American blend brands? Then foreign brands?

The first question does not accurately represent what we said in response to the

important new study conducted by scientists at the Centers for Disease Control

(CDC). I have attached our actual statement on the study and would request that

it be included as an attachment to this letter. The study conducted by the scientists

from the CDC found that Marlboros have higher levels of nitrosamines than do the

most local popular brands in most countries sampled. In response, we said that

while most people assume that cigarettes from highly sophisticated manufacturers,

such as Philip Morris are ‘‘better’’ than other cigarettes, this may not be true because of the presence of high levels of certain known carcinogens in Marlboro. The

thrust of our statements is that consumers should be wary of tobacco manufacturers’ representations in the absence of concrete, objective and independent informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 Sep 04, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00176 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87489.TXT HCOM1 PsN: HCOM1
169

tion about the actual levels of the many known toxins in tobacco and tobacco smoke.

Without this information neither consumers, nor the public health community can

know for sure whether one brand is more harmful than others.

The study shows that knowledge of tar levels tells us little about the relative

harm of different products. There have been 69 different known carcinogens and

hundreds of other harmful substances identified in tobacco smoke. We need to know

about the level of each of these harmful substances. We do know that Philip Morris

possesses the technology to reduce the level of nitrosamines in Marlboro cigarettes,

has had the technology to do so for many years, and should have done so long before

now. The real lesson from this study is that consumers will receive accurate and

complete information about the different levels of harmful substances in tobacco

products only through comprehensive and meaningful regulation of tobacco products

by the FDA. Similarly, the study shows that companies such as Philip Morris can

be counted on to reduce the level of toxic substances only when their failure to do

so becomes public knowledge.

Q2. Keeping in mind that I know your advice is to quit smoking, would you recommend to people who don’t quit that, instead of Marlboro, they switch to Winston?

To Newport? Camel? Kool? Let me move to some international brands that don’t

contain much American tobacco, would you recommend that smokers switch to

Gauluoise from France? To 555 from the UK? Mild Seven from Japan? Are any of

these brands less dangerous than Marlboro?

The lesson of the study described above and our experience with light and low

tar is that it has not been shown that any of the tobacco products now on the market significantly reduce the risk of tobacco-caused disease. The recommendations

that we would make to a smoker are to quit or to switch to a scientifically proven

smoking cessation aid that has been reviewed and approved by the FDA. We do not

recommend that Marlboro smokers switch to Winston or that Winston smokers

switch to Marlboro. Both are deadly. The same is true with regard to foreign

brands.

Q3. How would you feel if you learned that a consumer read your press release,

or the misleading headlines that it generated, and switched to another brand from

Marlboro, having been convinced that they were making a good decision by switching to a less risky product?

I do not believe that any smoker, based on our press release, would take the

course of action implied by the question. Our message is clear: Marlboro and other

cigarettes kill one in two long-term users. Smokers concerned about their health

should quit in the absence of scientific proof that any alternative dramatically reduces their risk of disease. Anyone concerned about providing smokers who cannot

quit a real alternative should endorse the kind of government regulation that we

have proposed. Meaningful FDA regulation of tobacco products, including tobacco

products claiming to be less harmful, is essential to protect consumers looking for

less harmful alternatives. In the interim, we recommend that smokers discuss their

individual situations with their doctors.

Q4. Your release concludes by saying that ‘‘no company should be free to make

a claim that a product is safer simply by reducing a single poison.’’ I agree. By the

same token, having just put out a release with the headline of ‘‘Marlboro Shows

Higher Levels of Key Carcinogens,’’ do you think that advocacy groups such as yours

should be able to claim that a product is more dangerous simply because of increased levels of a single poison? If you don’t think smokers will take away that

message and that there won’t be any confusion, why would you have a problem with

claiming that a single poison had been reduced?

We agree that no company should be free to make a claim that a product is safer

simply by reducing a single poison in it. The Campaign has not stated that one tobacco product is more harmful than others. In fact, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free

Kids makes no claims regarding the relative dangers posed by the cocktail of lethal

chemicals found, in varying combinations, in currently marketed tobacco products.

For decades consumers have assumed that tobacco products low in tar reduce their

risk of tobacco-caused disease. New studies show that this assumption was not correct, perhaps in part because some or all of the low-tar products had higher levels

of specific toxic substances, such as nitrosamines. The new study by the CDC, combined with our experiences with low-tar should be a caution that without knowing

the levels of other toxic substances we cannot assume that the removal of one

known harmful substance alters the overall health impact of the product. It also

makes clear that we need to know the levels of all of the toxic substances in these

products before we will have any reason to believe that we can assess relative risk.

Thus, even if Philip Morris lowers the levels of nitrosamines in Marlboros, we will

not know if consumers are exposed to fewer toxic substances without knowing the

levels of the other toxic substances in the cigarette and its smoke. Our earnest hope

170

is that the takeaway message of our press release is that if Congress is concerned

about ensuring that consumers get the information they need to make rational decisions, Congress should enact comprehensive and meaningful regulation of tobacco

products by the FDA immediately.

Q5. Finally, you have been the leading advocate in Washington for unlimited Food

and Drug Administration authority over tobacco products, and have repeatedly characterized any effort by members to respond to those of us who are skeptical of this

initiative, and concerned about its consequences, by crafting some kind of compromise approach as ‘‘worse that nothing.’’ Your ‘‘my way or the highway’’ approach

has significantly contributed to the stalemate on this issue for over five years now;

according to you, on every day in each of those years, another 3,000 kids have started to smoke. If this problem is in such urgent need of resolution, how can you justify

remaining so inflexible? Which is more important to you resolving this issue, or

keeping it alive?

We have supported repeatedly, and in various forms, compromise legislation to

grant FDA meaningful authority to regulate tobacco products. We have also stated

that the enactment of legislation that only provides the illusion of meaningful regulation of tobacco products would indeed be worse than no regulation because it

would remove the pressure on Congress to act. Unfortunately, it is our assessment

and the assessment of every other major organization in the public health community that the FDA bills supported by Philip Morris would do more harm than good

because they are riddled with loopholes that would make it impossible for the FDA

to protect consumers effectively. They do not represent a step forward. Instead, they

simply remove the pressure for Congress to act. We continue to be willing to work

with any member of Congress interested in enacting legislation that will give FDA

effective authority over all tobacco products. Progress has been stymied by the unwillingness of the tobacco industry to endorse such legislation.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to address these issues so important to the nation’s, and particularly our children’s, health.

Respectfully,

MATTHEW L. MYERS

President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids

Enclosures

cc: The Honorable Edward Whitfield

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

367

368

369

370

371

372

373

374

375

376

377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

386

387

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

Æ