J-S05041-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JULIETTE ANN MARTIN,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 996 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 22, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-44-SA-0000024-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: APRIL 30, 2020

Juliette Ann Martin (“Martin”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following her guilty plea, following a summary appeal, to driving while 

operating privilege is suspended, her seventeenth offense.

1

 We affirm.

Martin pled guilty, before a magisterial district judge, to driving while 

operating privilege is suspended on November 29, 2018.2 The district judge

sentenced Martin to a term of 90 days in county jail, plus a $1,000 fine. Martin 

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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).

2 The typewritten traffic citation indicates that Martin was charged under 

subsection 1543 (b) (concerning a violation where the license suspension was 

the result of a DUI offense). However, the citation under subsection 1543(a) 

is handwritten next to it, and signed by Granville Township Police Officer 

Thomas Wilson. The traffic docket indicates that Martin pled guilty to the 

lesser charge arising out of section 1543(a). 
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subsequently filed a summary appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin 

County.

On May 22, 2019, the matter proceeded before the trial court. At the 

start of the hearing, Martin’s counsel admitted that Martin drove on the day 

in question, and asked to proceed with the issue of sentencing. The trial court 

found Martin guilty under section 1543(a),3 and sentenced Martin to serve 30 

days in county jail, to begin on June 5, 2019, plus a fine of $1,000.4

On May 29, 2019, Martin, represented by new counsel, filed a postsentence Motion to withdraw her guilty plea and extend her surrender date. 

Specifically, Martin argued that her plea counsel had entered a guilty plea on 

her behalf, and therefore, her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary. The trial court scheduled a hearing for June 6, 2019, and stayed 

Martin’s surrender date pending the resolution of her Motion. The 

Commonwealth filed an Answer to Martin’s post-sentence Motion. 

Prior to the commencement of the scheduled hearing on the postsentence Motion, Martin filed a Petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

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3

In its Order and Sentence, the trial court states that Martin entered a guilty 

plea.

4 During the hearing, Martin’s counsel acknowledged that this was Martin’s 

seventeenth offense, and the 90-day jail term imposed by the district judge

would have been appropriate for a conviction under section 1543(b). See

N.T. (Summary Appeal), 5/22/19, at 3, 7. However, the parties indicated 

their prior agreement that Martin be allowed to plead to the lesser charge 

under section 1543(a). See id. at 2, 6-7.
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Act (“PCRA”), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Therein, Martin sought to 

withdraw her post-sentence Motion, and again asserted her claim that plea 

counsel had entered a guilty plea on her behalf without her agreement. At 

the start of the hearing, Martin’s counsel and the trial court discussed Martin’s 

intention to withdraw her post-sentence Motion, and instead submit the PCRA 

Petition for review. See N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 6/6/19, at 2; see also 

id. at 3 (wherein counsel explained that the post-sentence Motion was a legal 

nullity, because such motions are not permitted in summary appeals); 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) (providing that “[t]here shall be no post-sentence motion 

in summary appeals....”). Counsel then clarified that Martin wished to present 

mitigation evidence, i.e., that Martin’s autistic son began having an emotional 

meltdown while he was at his vocational program; his uncle did not answer 

his phone call; and Martin drove to pick up her son.5 N.T. (Post-Sentence 

Motion), 6/6/19, at 10. The trial court granted Martin’s oral Motion to 

withdraw both her post-sentence Motion and her PCRA Petition, and denied 

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5 The trial court also expressed concerns regarding the procedural propriety 

of the PCRA Petition. See N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 6/6/19, at 3, 15. The 

trial court agreed to consider the exchange as an oral Motion to Reconsider

her sentence based on the court’s inherent authority to amend sentences 

within 30 days. Id. at 17; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, 

cmt. (stating that “[a]lthough there are no post-sentence motions in summary 

appeals ..., nothing in this rule is intended to preclude the trial judge from 

acting on a defendant’s petition for reconsideration.”).
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Martin’s oral Motion to Reconsider. The trial court additionally directed that

Martin’s sentence would commence on June 21, 2019. 

Martin filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 19, 2019, requesting 

that the trial court modify her sentence to include two separate 15-day terms. 

Martin alleged that her son’s medical issues require “constant daily oversight,” 

and for his need to maintain a daily routine. The trial court granted Martin’s 

Motion for Reconsideration. 

On June 21, 2019, Martin filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the trial 

court’s May 22, 2019 judgment of sentence.6 The trial court subsequently 

ordered Martin to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters 

complained of on appeal, and Martin timely complied.

Martin now raises the following issue for our review: “Did not the [trial] 

court abuse its discretion when it denied [Martin’s] request for a new 

sentencing hearing at which she would present relevant evidence of mitigation 

that prior counsel failed to present?” Brief for Appellant at 3.

Martin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her 

request for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 9. Specifically, Martin claims 

that

[s]he requested to call witnesses who would have established her 

motivation for getting behind the wheel despite having a 

suspended license. As an offer of proof, [Martin] represented 

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6 Martin also filed a Motion for stay of sentence pending appeal, which the trial 

court granted.
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through counsel that her autistic adult son was having an 

emotional meltdown while at an adult education center. 

Testimony in support would have included confirmation that he 

was there, that he was in emotional crisis, the danger his 

meltdowns pose to himself and others, and whether anyone but 

[] Martin is capable of calming him in those times.

Id. Additionally, Martin asserts that the trial court improperly referenced an 

unsworn representation, which was not made part of the record. Id. at 10. 

According to Martin, the trial court failed to consider that she had acted under 

strong provocation.7 Id. 

Trial courts are generally granted broad discretion in sentencing 

matters. See Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 

2007). Therefore, we will review Martin’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. 

See id. “An abuse of discretion ... requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of 

support as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. 

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7 We observe that Martin’s argument includes a statement of the law regarding 

a trial court’s discretion in imposing a sentence, and the statutory factors a 

trial court must consider in sentencing a defendant. See Brief for Appellant 

at 8-9. To the extent that Martin’s argument could be construed as an 

allegation that the trial court failed to appropriately consider these sentencing 

factors, Martin has waived a specific challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

her sentence, because such claim was not adequately preserved or developed. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s argument shall include 

“such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”), (f) 

(stating that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in a separate section of the brief 

a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.”).
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Initially, as motions for reconsideration do not properly lie from 

summary appeals, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D), the trial court was not required to 

consider any additional arguments related to sentencing. Our review of the 

transcripts of the summary appeal hearing reveals that Martin did not 

specifically request a new sentencing hearing, nor did she request to present 

additional witnesses. Rather, Martin’s counsel pointed to the court’s inherent 

authority to amend its sentence8 and explained that Martin wished to exercise 

her right to allocution and explain her actions. N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 

6/6/19, at 9. Martin’s counsel then stated as follows:

As an offer of proof, the shortest version is that [Martin’s] 

son ..., who is Autistic, was at a vocation program when he began 

experiencing an emotional meltdown while there; that [Martin’s 

son] called his Uncle David[,] who was his ride and when David 

did not answer, he called [Martin,] and [Martin], you know, her 

child is in extreme emotional distress, knowing that she is not 

allowed to drive, got into the car to go get [her son] and take him 

home.

You know, [Martin] didn’t try calling David herself, which is 

a reason why we’re here saying ... [w]e just want to present this 

at sentencing. And, you know, it was basically the next shuttle 

that would have been able to take [Martin’s son] home from the 

facility was hours away. So it was just a matter of, you know, a 

mother going to her suffering child.

Again, I’m not trying to do the sentencing right now[,] 

but an offer of proof. ...

Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added). 

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8 Relevantly, “a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any 

order within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from such order has been 

taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.
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Further, as a repeat offender, Martin was subject to a mandatory 

minimum sentence of 30 days in jail. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503(a.1) (providing 

that “[a] person convicted of a sixth or subsequent offender under section 

1543(a) shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $1,000 and to 

imprisonment for not less than 30 days but not more than six months.”); see 

also N.T., 6/6/19, at 9 (wherein Martin’s counsel stated that Martin 

understood that there is a 30-day mandatory minimum, “but also understands 

that [the court] does have discretion to order that the time be served through 

electronic monitoring.”). 

Moreover, to the extent the trial court could exercise discretion in this 

matter, our review confirms that the court considered several mitigating 

factors in imposing Martin’s sentence. Prior to imposing sentence during the 

summary appeal hearing, the trial court acknowledged its awareness, based 

on personal knowledge that Martin’s son had medical needs. See N.T.

(Summary Appeal), 5/22/19, at 5 (wherein the trial court stated, “I’ll just take 

judicial notice that I know there are some issues....”). The trial court also 

noted the fact that seven years had elapsed since Martin’s last violation of 

section 1543(a). See id. at 8, 9. The court ultimately decided that electronic 

monitoring would be insufficient in light of the high number of offenses in 

Martin’s history. See id. at 9-10. Additionally, the court reiterated its 

consideration of such potentially mitigating circumstances during the hearing 

on Martin’s post-sentence Motion. See N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 6/6/19, 

at 14-15. Thus, we cannot grant Martin relief on this claim.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/30/2020