DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY

Better Information 

Needed to Determine 

If Nonmajor Projects 

Meet Performance 

Targets

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2012

GAO-13-129

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-129, a report to 

congressional committees

December 2012

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Better Information Needed to Determine If 

Nonmajor Projects Meet Performance Targets

Why GAO Did This Study

As of February 2011, EM and NNSA 

remained on GAO’s high-risk list for 

contracting and project management. 

These two offices manage numerous 

construction and cleanup projects that 

each cost less than $750 million and 

are called nonmajor projects. DOE 

requires its program offices to establish 

performance targets for the expected 

scope, cost, and completion date of 

each project before starting 

construction or cleanup. GAO has 

encouraged federal agencies to use 

strategic workforce planning to help 

them meet present and future mission 

requirements. Two key elements of 

workforce planning are to identify 

mission-critical occupations and skills 

and any current and future shortfalls in 

these areas. GAO was asked to 

examine the (1) extent to which EM 

and NNSA nonmajor projects have met 

their scope, cost, and completion date 

targets, (2) factors affecting EM’s and 

NNSA’s management of nonmajor 

projects, and (3) extent to which EM’s 

workforce plans identify mission-critical 

occupations and skills and any current 

and future shortfalls in these areas. 

GAO reviewed DOE documents and 

project data, examined EM workforce 

plans, toured selected DOE facilities, 

and interviewed DOE officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that EM and NNSA 

clearly define, document, and track the 

scope, cost, and completion date 

targets for each of their nonmajor 

projects and that EM clearly identify 

critical occupations and skills in its 

workforce plans. EM and NNSA 

agreed with GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found

Of the 71 nonmajor projects that the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of 

Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) completed or had under way from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, 21 met or 

are expected to meet their performance targets for scope, cost, and completion 

date. These projects included a $22 million EM project to expand an existing 

waste disposal facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee and a $199

million NNSA project to equip a radiological laboratory and office building at the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Another 23 projects did not 

meet or were not expected to meet one or more of their three performance 

targets for scope, cost, and completion date. Among these, 13 projects met or 

are expected to meet two targets, including a $548 million NNSA project to shut 

down a nuclear reactor in Russia for nonproliferation purposes; 8 projects met or 

are expected to meet one target; 1 project did not meet any of its targets; and 1 

project was cancelled. Of the remaining 27 projects, many had insufficiently 

documented performance targets for scope, cost, or completion date, which 

prevented GAO from determining whether they met their performance targets. 

EM and NNSA often did not follow DOE requirements for documenting these 

performance targets, making it more difficult for GAO and DOE to independently 

assess project performance.

Several factors affected EM’s and NNSA’s management of their nonmajor 

projects that were completed or ongoing from fiscal years 2008 to 2012. These 

factors included the suitability of a project’s acquisition strategy, contractor 

performance, and adherence to project management requirements. For example, 

EM officials managing an ongoing project to remediate soil and water at the 

Idaho National Laboratory used an acquisition strategy that tied incentives for the 

contractor to different performance milestones across the multiple subprojects 

within the contract, which will help the project meet its performance goals, 

according to EM officials. In contrast, NNSA encountered problems meeting its 

performance goals for a project to build an office building and radiological 

laboratory at the Los Alamos National Laboratory partly due to its acquisition 

strategy. According to NNSA project officials at the Los Alamos site office, the 

project team should have hired one contractor to design the project and solicited 

bids from other contractors to build the project rather than using the same 

contractor for both activities. The former strategy might have resulted in a more 

mature project design and more time to evaluate various contractors’ 

qualifications to construct the project, according to the NNSA project officials.

EM’s workforce plans do not consistently identify mission-critical occupations and 

skills and current and future shortfalls in these areas for its federal workforce. In 

addition, many EM workforce plans indicate that EM may soon face shortfalls in a 

number of important areas, including project and contract management. EM 

officials said that they recognize these issues and have taken a number of steps 

to address them, including conducting a skills assessment to identify key 

occupational series to target for succession planning. However, the inconsistent 

terms used to describe mission-critical occupations and skills in EM’s workforce 

plans make it difficult for GAO and DOE to understand EM’s most critical needs 

regarding its workforce.

View GAO-13-129. For more information, 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Letter 1 

Background 5

Some Projects Have Met or Are Expected to Meet Their 

Performance Targets, but EM and NNSA Did Not Clearly 

Document Information Needed to Determine the Performance of 

Others 13

Several Factors Affect EM and NNSA in Managing Nonmajor 

Projects 24

EM’s Workforce Plans Do Not Consistently Identify MissionCritical Occupations and Skills or Shortfalls in These Areas 30

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments 35

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II Summary of Office of Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed 41

Appendix III Summary of National Nuclear Security Administration 

Nonmajor Projects Reviewed 46

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Energy 52

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54

Tables

Table 1: Number of EM FTE Employees at EM Sites as of August 

2012 12

Table 2: Expected or Completed Performance of 44 EM and NNSA 

Nonmajor Projects 13

Table 3: NNSA’s Criticality Experiments Facility Project, Nevada 

National Security Site 21

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Table 4: Extent to Which EM Workforce Plans Identify MissionCritical Occupations and Skills and Shortfalls in These 

Areas 30

Table 5: Variations among Selected EM Workforce Plans in 

Identifying Mission-Critical Occupations and Skills 31

Table 6: Performance of 17 EM Nonmajor Projects 41

Table 7: Six EM Nonmajor Projects with No Performance Targets 43

Table 8: Four EM Nonmajor Projects with Incomplete 

Documentation of Performance Targets 43

Table 9: Three EM Nonmajor Projects with Modified Scope Targets 45

Table 10: Performance of 27 NNSA Nonmajor Projects 46

Table 11: Two NNSA Nonmajor Projects with No Performance 

Targets 49

Table 12: Seven NNSA Nonmajor Projects with Incomplete 

Documentation of Performance Targets or Final Cost 49

Table 13: Five NNSA Nonmajor Projects with Modified Scope 

Targets 50

Figures

Figure 1: NNSA Sites 6

Figure 2: EM Sites 8

Figure 3: The Five Critical Decisions in DOE’s Project Management 

Process 9
Page iii GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Abbreviations

CD critical decision

DOE Department of Energy

EM Office of Environmental Management

FTE full-time equivalent

M&O management and operations

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

OAPM Office of Acquisition and Project Management

PARS Project Assessment and Reporting System

PBS Project Baseline Summary

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

December 19, 2012

The Honorable Fred Upton

Chairman

The Honorable Henry Waxman

Ranking Member

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Cliff Stearns

Chairman

The Honorable Diana DeGette

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

Since 1990, we have reported that the Department of Energy (DOE) has 

suffered from substantial and continual weaknesses in effectively 

overseeing contractors and managing large, expensive, and technically 

complex projects. As of February 2011, DOE’s two largest program 

offices—the Office of Environmental Management (EM) and the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—remained on our list of areas at 

high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement for contracting and 

project management.1 Our recent reviews of these offices focused on 

major system acquisitions (or major projects), which include construction 

and environmental cleanup projects that each cost $750 million or more.2

 

1

See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, 

However, these two offices also manage numerous projects that are 

smaller, less expensive, and less technically complex, called nonmajor 

projects, that each cost less than $750 million.

GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16,

2011).

2

See GAO, Department of Energy: Major Construction Projects Need a Consistent 

Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays, 

GAO-07-336 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2007); and GAO, Nuclear Waste: Action 

Needed to Improve Accountability and Management of DOE’s Major Cleanup Projects, 

GAO-08-1081 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008). Environmental cleanup projects 

decontaminate and demolish buildings, remove and dispose of contaminated soil, treat 

contaminated groundwater, and stabilize and dispose of solid and liquid radioactive 

wastes.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

EM and NNSA must manage their projects, including nonmajor projects, 

in accordance with DOE’s order on project management, Order 413.3.3

The order defines DOE’s project management principles and process, 

which consist of a series of management reviews and approvals, called 

“critical decisions,” that are required to move a project forward from 

project planning and design to implementation. One important step in this 

process is the establishment and approval of a project’s performance 

baseline, which represents DOE’s commitment to complete a project with 

a specific scope of work at a certain cost and by a specific date. The 

performance baseline consists of three interrelated targets—scope, cost, 

and completion date. A project’s scope defines its technical goals and 

includes targets for specific technical requirements that the project is to 

deliver at completion.4

In our 2011 high-risk update, we noted that one of the top 10 issues 

facing DOE is having sufficient people and other resources to resolve its 

contract and project management problems.

For example, for a construction project, the scope 

defines in general terms what facilities and equipment will be purchased 

or upgraded, as well as the project’s minimum capability to perform the 

desired function at completion. DOE program offices are to establish and 

approve a project’s performance baseline before work can start.

5

 

3

Order 413.3 was issued in 2000 and was revised, most recently in November 2010. It is 

now referred to as Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of 

Capital Assets. In this report, we use DOE Order 413.3 to refer to the version of DOE 

Order 413.3B in effect at the time. This order applies only to capital asset projects, which 

have defined start and end points and exclude operational activities such as repair and 

maintenance.

Specifically, we reported 

that, according to the department’s analysis, DOE lacks an adequate 

number of federal contracting and project management personnel with 

the appropriate skills (such as cost estimating, risk management, and 

technical expertise) to plan, direct, and oversee the completion of a 

project. To help ensure that federal agencies have the personnel with the 

appropriate skills they need now and in the future, we and other 

organizations have encouraged federal agencies to use strategic 

4

DOE Order 413.3 uses the term “key performance parameters” to describe a project’s 

specific technical requirements, which can be expressed in terms of capacity, quantity, or 

processing rate, among other things.

5

GAO-11-278. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

workforce planning.6 In particular, in its Human Capital Assessment and 

Accountability Framework, the Office of Personnel Management 

specified, among its key elements of workforce planning, the need to 

develop workforce plans that identify (1) “mission-critical” occupations 

and skills that are essential to achieving an agency’s strategic goals and 

(2) current and future potential shortfalls in these areas.7 In April 2012, we 

reported on issues related to NNSA’s workforce planning efforts.8

In this context, you asked us to look at DOE’s management of nonmajor 

projects. Our report objectives were to examine the (1) extent to which 

EM and NNSA nonmajor projects that were completed or ongoing for 

fiscal years 2008 to 2012 met their scope, cost, and completion date 

targets; (2) factors affecting EM’s and NNSA’s management of nonmajor 

projects during this period; and (3) extent to which EM’s workforce plans 

identify mission-critical occupations and skills, as well as any current and 

future shortfalls in these areas.

Specifically, we reported that NNSA and its site contractors face 

shortages in qualified critically skilled candidates and an aging workforce. 

NNSA and its site contractors told us that they are engaged in workforce 

planning to avoid potential critical skill gaps, but NNSA did not expect to 

complete NNSA-wide workforce plans until 2013.

To determine the extent to which EM and NNSA nonmajor projects met 

their scope, cost, and completion date targets, we reviewed project 

performance information for 30 EM and 41 NNSA nonmajor projects that 

were either completed or ongoing from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 

2011 and for which EM and NNSA had established performance targets. 

We also collected performance information for ongoing projects for fiscal 

year 2012. The total estimated cost of these 71 projects is approximately 

$10.1 billion. We excluded (1) EM projects funded by the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 because of a separate review 

 

6

See GAO, Workforce Planning: Interior, EPA, and the Forest Service Should Strengthen 

Linkages to Their Strategic Plans and Improve Evaluation, GAO-10-413 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 31, 2010).

7

OPM’s framework can be found at 73 Fed. Reg. 23012-49 (Apr. 28, 2008). OPM issued 

proposed regulations that would treat the material in the framework as guidance (see 76 

Fed. Reg. 47516-18 (Aug. 5, 2011)); the proposed regulations have not been finalized.

8

GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Strategies and Challenges in 

Sustaining Critical Skills in Federal and Contractor Workforces, GAO-12-468 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 26, 2012).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

looking at these projects, (2) information technology projects, and (3) 

operational activities.9

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

We relied on DOE Order 413.3 for requirements on 

how scope, cost, and completion date targets are to be specified in a 

project’s performance baseline. In assessing whether projects had 

achieved their scope, cost, and completion date targets, we followed 

Office of Management and Budget guidance and DOE performance 

metrics. Taken together, these sources state that a project achieves a 

satisfactory performance if it completes its scope target at less than 10 

percent above its cost target and at less than 10 percent past its 

completion date target. To evaluate factors affecting EM’s and NNSA’s 

management of nonmajor projects, we conducted structured interviews 

with EM and NNSA project officials for a subset of the 71 projects: a 

nonprobability sample of 10 EM projects and 10 NNSA projects that 

included completed and ongoing projects, with a wide range of project 

costs. While we cannot generalize from these interviews to all EM and 

NNSA projects, we chose these projects to provide examples of factors 

that affected EM’s and NNSA’s management of these projects. The 

interviews focused on aspects of project management, such as the 

preparation of project designs, risk assessments, and cost and schedule 

baselines, as well as adherence to DOE project management 

requirements. As part of these interviews, we conducted tours of two 

DOE facilities near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. To evaluate the extent to 

which EM’s workforce plans identify mission-critical occupations and skills 

and any current and future shortfalls in these areas, we examined EM’s 

strategic workforce plans for its headquarters and site office staff, DOE’s 

corrective action plan for contract and project management, and the 

Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Assessment and 

Accountability Framework. We also interviewed DOE and EM officials 

with knowledge of EM’s practices in workforce planning, including officials 

in EM’s Office of Acquisition and Project Management and its Office of 

Human Capital and Corporate Services (Office of Human Capital). 

Appendix I presents a more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology.

 

9

See GAO, Recovery Act: Most DOE Cleanup Projects Are Complete, but Project 

Management Guidance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-13-23 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 

2012).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

NNSA—a separately organized agency within DOE—has primary 

responsibility for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the 

nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile.10 NNSA carries out these activities at 

eight government-owned, contractor-operated sites: three national 

laboratories, four production plants, and one test site (see fig. 1). These 

sites, taken together, have been a significant component of U.S. national 

security since the 1940s. Contractors operate these sites under 

management and operations (M&O) contracts.11

 

10NNSA was created in 1999 under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 3201 et seq.

These contracts provide 

the contractor with broad discretion in carrying out the mission of the 

particular contract, but grant the government the option to become much 

more directly involved in day-to-day M&O. Currently, NNSA’s workforce is 

made up of about 34,000 M&O contractor employees across the eight 

sites, and about 2,400 federal employees directly employed by NNSA in 

its Washington headquarters, at offices located at each of the eight sites, 

and at its Albuquerque, New Mexico, complex.

11M&O contracts are agreements under which the government contracts for the operation, 

maintenance, or support, on its behalf, of a government-owned or -controlled research, 

development, special production, or testing establishment wholly or principally devoted to 

one or more of the major programs of the contracting federal agency. Federal Acquisition 

Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 17.601.

Background 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Figure 1: NNSA Sites

DOE established EM in 1989 to address the legacy of 50 years of nuclear 

weapons production and government-sponsored nuclear energy research 

in the United States during the cold war. These activities generated large 

amounts of radioactive wastes, spent nuclear fuel, excess plutonium and 

uranium, thousands of contaminated facilities, and contaminated soil and 

groundwater. EM currently manages cleanup activities at 17 sites across

the United States (see fig. 2). EM’s work at a single site can involve 

multiple activities to retrieve, characterize, treat, package, store, 

transport, and dispose of the waste, among other things. EM is also 

responsible for activities to disassemble, treat, package, store, transport, 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

and dispose of the contaminated containers or processing 

lines/equipment used for weapons production or for storing or treating the 

waste. EM oversees and implements these activities through agreements 

with contractors who operate the nuclear weapons research and 

production sites and conduct cleanup activities at those sites. Some of 

EM’s cleanup activities are located at DOE sites administered by NNSA.

Currently, EM’s workforce is made up of about 18,100 contractor 

employees at 17 sites, and about 1,500 federal employees directly 

employed by EM at its Washington headquarters, site offices, and its 

Cincinnati, Ohio, Consolidated Business Center.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Figure 2: EM Sites

As discussed earlier, EM and NNSA are required to manage their 

projects, including nonmajor projects, in accordance with DOE Order 

413.3. This order requires projects to pass through a series of critical 

decisions (CD), as illustrated in figure 3. In general, DOE management 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

reviews and approvals at these decision points are to ensure that the 

project requirements are met.

Figure 3: The Five Critical Decisions in DOE’s Project Management Process

As figure 3 shows, at CD-2, DOE approves a project’s performance 

baseline, which includes interrelated targets for scope, cost, and 

completion date. Scope is interrelated with cost and schedule because 

changes in one will affect the other two. Therefore, to determine whether 

a project has met its performance baseline at CD-4—which marks a 

project’s completion—it is essential to have information on all three 

performance targets documented and approved at CD-2. For that reason, 

the order on project management requires DOE management to clearly 

identify a project’s performance baseline in the document approving CD2. In addition, the order requires projects to undergo an independent 

review—such as a review led by DOE’s Office of Acquisition and Project 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Management (OAPM)—that assesses each project’s cost estimate,

schedule, and technical issues before CD-2 approval.12

Over the past decade, EM has revised its approach to managing its 

cleanup activities in accordance with DOE Order 413.3. Historically, EM 

has organized and managed its work around similar waste types and 

activities. For example, EM organized soil and water remediation 

activities at each site under one project category—which EM referred to 

as a Project Baseline Summary (PBS). EM designated other PBSs for 

other activities at each site, such as decontaminating and 

decommissioning nuclear facilities and emptying radioactive waste from 

storage tanks. Each PBS had a numerical designation; for example, all 

activities for soil and water remediation were grouped under PBS 30. In 

2003, EM began applying the project management principles contained in 

Order 413.3 to its PBSs. In 2007, EM, in conjunction with OAPM, issued 

guidance to better tailor Order 413.3 requirements to its PBSs. This 

guidance directed EM project managers to establish a life cycle baseline 

for PBSs that included the following three key parts:

• prior year costs—the costs associated with completed cleanup work 

(starting in 1997),

• near-term baseline—the cost and scope of planned cleanup work over 

a 5-year period (or for the duration of the cleanup contract if it was 

less than or exceeded 5 years), and

• out-year estimate—out-year estimates for cleanup work that extended 

beyond the near-term baseline.

Using this approach, EM, in conjunction with OAPM, established nearterm baseline performance targets for 60 PBSs and 5 construction 

projects in 2007 and 2008. EM estimated that the total cost of these 

activities and projects was $50 billion.

 

12OAPM is located within DOE’s Office of Management and is responsible for issuing 

guidance related to DOE Order 413.3 and conducting independent project reviews for 

projects costing $100 million or more, among other things. Before a departmental 

reorganization in June 2012, the Office of Program Management within OAPM was 

referred to as the Office of Engineering and Construction Management. We use OAPM to 

refer to the Office of Engineering and Construction Management in this report.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

In 2009, EM began a restructuring process that divided its PBSs into 

smaller units of work—capital asset projects13 (which are required to 

follow DOE Order 413.3) and operations.14

Regarding workforce planning, EM uses a decentralized process under 

which EM’s Office of Human Capital prepares a workforce plan for federal 

employees at its headquarters office and issues guidance to the EM site 

offices for them to use in developing site-specific workforce plans for their 

federal workforce. The guidance directs EM’s site managers to develop 

workforce plans consistent with the requirements of Office of Personnel 

Management’s Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 

Framework. The guidance also specifies that workforce plans should 

describe shortfalls and surpluses in skills that have been identified 

through ongoing analysis of site mission requirements and occupations 

most critical to site performance, among other things. EM’s Office of 

Human Capital does not consolidate its headquarters plan and its site 

plans into a single plan. Instead, according to Office of Human Capital 

officials, all of its plans taken together comprise EM’s overall strategic 

workforce plan. For fiscal year 2012, EM issued or planned to issue a 

According to its 2009 

guidance, capital asset projects included construction and cleanup 

projects involving the construction phase of environmental restoration 

(such as soil and water remediation) and facility decommissioning and 

demolition. EM completed its restructuring effort by June 2010, at which 

point it had restructured its portfolio of PBSs into 70 capital asset projects 

and 92 operations. EM estimated that the total cost of these projects and 

operations was $52.9 billion.

 

13DOE defines capital asset projects as projects with defined start and end points in which 

the federal government acquires or uses land, structures, equipment, or intellectual 

property (for 2 years or more). Capital asset projects include the environmental 

remediation of land to make it useful. 

14EM defines operations, which we did not review in this report, as noncapital asset 

activities such as (1) the stabilization, packaging, storage, transportation, and disposition 

of waste and nuclear materials; (2) the operation of environmental remediation systems, 

such as groundwater treatment systems; (3) postconstruction and postclosure care of 

remediated land burial sites; (4) long-term environmental stewardship, including 

environmental monitoring and institutional controls; and (5) facility shutdown and 

deactivation activities.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

total of 8 workforce plans covering 1,460 full-time equivalent (FTE) 

federal employees, as shown in table 1.15

Table 1: Number of EM FTE Employees at EM Sites as of August 2012

Site Location 

Number of FTE EM 

employees covereda

Richland Operations Office/Office of 

River Protection

Washington State 398

EM Headquartersb District of Columbia 329

Savannah River Site South Carolina 291

Consolidated Business Center and 

small sitesc Ohio 194

Oak Ridge Site Tennessee 74

Carlsbad Field Office New Mexico 57

Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office Ohio 50

Idaho Operations Office Idaho 47

Total 1,460

Source: EM Office of Human Capital.

a

The FTEs are as of August 23, 2012.

b

Because the EM headquarters office had not issued its workforce plan, as of September 2012, we 

used the fiscal year 2011 workforce plan for this office to complete our analysis.

c

The EM Consolidated Business Center supports the safe cleanup of EM sites throughout the United 

States. The Consolidated Business Center’s workforce plan covers EM federal employees at the 

Cincinnati, Ohio, location of the Center itself, as well as a small number of employees at sites with a 

minimal EM federal presence.

 

15An FTE consists of one or more employed individuals who collectively complete 2,080 work hours in 

a given year. Therefore, both one full-time employee and two half-time employees equal one FTE. 

Because the EM headquarters office had not issued its workforce plan, as of September 2012, we 

used the fiscal year 2011 workforce plan for this office to complete our analysis.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Of the 71 EM and NNSA nonmajor projects we reviewed that were 

completed or ongoing for fiscal years 2008 to 2012, we were able to 

determine performance for 44 projects. Among these 44 projects, 21 have 

met or are expected to meet all three of their performance targets for the 

scope of work delivered, cost, and completion date, while 23 have not 

met or are not expected to meet one or more of their three targets. The 

remaining 27 of the 71 projects we reviewed had insufficiently 

documented performance targets or had modified scope targets, among 

other things, which prevented us from determining whether they met or 

were expected to meet their performance targets, according to our 

analysis of DOE data. Determining whether projects fully met or partially 

met performance targets was difficult because EM and NNSA did not 

always follow DOE requirements for documenting these targets. DOE has 

taken steps to ensure that EM and NNSA more clearly document 

performance targets for their projects, but some problems persist.

Of the 71 nonmajor projects we reviewed, 44 projects—17 EM projects 

and 27 NNSA projects—had documented targets for scope, cost, and 

completion date, enabling us to determine their performance. Table 2 

shows the expected or completed performance of these 44 EM and 

NNSA nonmajor projects.

Table 2: Expected or Completed Performance of 44 EM and NNSA Nonmajor Projects

Met all three 

targets 

Met two out of 

three targets

Met one out of 

three targets

Did not meet any 

targets Total

EM Completed projects 5 5 2 1 13 

Ongoing projectsa 1 2 0 1b 4 

EM total 6 7 2 2 17

NNSA Completed projects 12 5 3 0 20

Ongoing projectsa 3 1 3 0 7 

NNSA total 15 6 6 0 27

Total 21 13 8 2 44

Sources: GAO analysis of EM and NNSA project documentation.

a

For purposes of this report, projects designated as “ongoing” had not reached CD-4 as of Aug. 29, 

2012. However, EM provided updated information for three projects completed between Aug. 29, 

2012, and Nov. 19, 2012.

b

One EM project was cancelled, which we counted as an ongoing project for purposes of this table.

As the table shows, of the 44 projects for which we were able to 

determine performance, 21 projects met or are expected to meet their 

Some Projects Have 

Met or Are Expected 

to Meet Their 

Performance Targets, 

but EM and NNSA Did 

Not Clearly Document 

Information Needed 

to Determine the 

Performance of 

Others

EM and NNSA Have Met or 

Are Expected to Meet All 

Performance Targets for 

Some Nonmajor Projects
 

Page 14 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

performance targets for scope, cost, and completion date. Specifically, 17 

completed projects—5 EM and 12 NNSA projects—met all three of their 

performance targets. These projects included a $22 million EM project to 

expand an existing waste disposal facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation in 

Tennessee and a $469 million NNSA project to construct chemical, 

electrical, and other laboratories and workspaces at the Sandia National 

Laboratories in New Mexico. In addition, as of August 29, 2012, 4 

ongoing projects—1 EM and 3 NNSA projects—were expected to meet all 

three of their performance targets, according to DOE estimates. These 

projects included a $77 million EM project to construct two disposal units 

for storing waste at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and a 

$199 million NNSA project to equip the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/ 

Office Building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico to 

make it suitable for performing programmatic work. 

Table 2 also shows that 23 EM and NNSA projects did not meet or are 

not expected to meet one or more of their three performance targets. Of 

these 23 projects, 13 projects met or are expected to meet two of their 

three performance targets, and eight met or are expected to meet one of 

their three performance targets (see apps. II and III for more details). In 

addition, one project did not meet any of its performance targets. 

Specifically, EM’s project to decontaminate and decommission the Main 

Plant Process Building in West Valley, New York, did not complete all of 

its planned scope of work when it was completed in October 2011, almost 

4 months after its completion date target and more than $50 million over 

its cost target of $46 million. EM cancelled the remaining project—

Uranium-233 Disposition project, at the Oak Ridge Reservation in 

Tennessee—in December 2011 after spending approximately $225 

million. (See apps. II and III for more details.)

In assessing whether projects had achieved their scope, cost, and 

completion date targets, we followed DOE and Office of Management and 

Budget performance metrics.16

 

16For DOE’s performance metrics, see U.S. Department of Energy, Contract and Project 

Management: Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action Plan Closure Report: Final

(Washington, D.C.: February 2011). In this report, we use the phrase “scope target” to 

include targets for key performance parameters, as specified in DOE Order 413.3. For 

Office of Management and Budget performance metrics, see Capital Programming Guide: 

Supplement to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: August 2011). 

For the scope, DOE states that projects 

must be completed within their original scope target. For cost targets, 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Office of Management and Budget guidance and DOE performance 

metrics regard projects completed at less than 10 percent above their 

original cost targets as having achieved satisfactory performance. 

Regarding completion date, DOE’s performance metrics do not address 

targets for completion. However, because Office of Management and 

Budget guidance includes performance standards for project schedule, 

we considered projects to be on time if they were or are expected to be 

completed at less than 10 percent past their original completion date 

targets.

We encountered two major problems in assessing the performance of the 

44 projects described above, which made it more difficult for us and DOE 

to independently assess project performance. First, EM and NNSA did 

not consistently follow DOE requirements for documenting scope targets 

and tracking these targets using DOE’s performance database. Second, 

EM did not always establish credible completion date targets or conduct 

required independent reviews when it restructured its PBSs in 2010. 

Establishing a clearly defined target for scope is critical for an agency to 

accurately track and assess a project’s overall performance. In particular, 

a project’s scope of work directly affects estimates of the project’s cost 

and completion date. If the scope target is too broad or vaguely stated, it 

can be difficult to track whether or to what extent certain aspects of 

project scope were reduced or eliminated between CD-2 (when the 

baseline was established) and CD-4 (when the project was completed), 

potentially affecting cost and completion date targets. Accordingly, since 

2003, DOE Order 413.3 has required that information on scope targets be 

documented in a project execution plan as part of CD-2. The current 

order also requires a project’s acquisition executive to sign a 

memorandum approving CD-2 that contains this information.17

 

17According to DOE Order 413.3, an acquisition executive is the individual designated by 

the Secretary of Energy to integrate and unify the management system for a program 

portfolio of projects and implement prescribed policies and practices. The acquisition 

executive is also responsible for approving the appointment of a project’s federal project 

director, among other things.

In addition, 

the order requires that information on scope targets, as well as other 

critical performance information, be entered into DOE’s centralized 

database on project performance—the Project Assessment and 

Inconsistent 

Documentation of Scope 

Targets, Among Other 

Things, Made Assessment 

of the 44 Projects’ 

Performance Difficult

EM and NNSA Often Did Not 

Follow DOE Requirements for 

Documenting Scope Targets 

and Tracking These Targets in 

DOE’s Performance Database 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Reporting System (PARS).18

However, EM and NNSA did not always follow the order’s requirement on 

documenting scope targets, and we encountered the following problems 

when we attempted to identify scope targets for EM and NNSA projects:

This database, which is administered by 

OAPM, is used to track and report on project performance.

• Key project documents associated with CD-2 and identified in Order 

413.3—project execution plans and CD-2 approval memorandums—

often did not contain information on scope targets. Instead, we had to 

obtain and review a variety of other project documents to try and

locate this information. For example, we obtained information on 

scope targets for several EM and NNSA projects from briefing slides 

(i.e., a PowerPoint presentation) prepared for a DOE advisory board 

involved in reviewing and approving projects. We also used 

independent project review reports, documents describing the 

functional and operational requirements of the projects, and contractor 

documents that provided detailed descriptions of a project’s scope of 

work, among other documents. (See app. I for more details on our 

scope and methodology.)

• The additional project documents that EM and NNSA provided to 

verify scope targets were often dated several months (or more) before 

or after the approval of CD-2. Because these documents were often 

not contemporaneous with the date when CD-2 was approved, we 

had difficulty determining whether any scope targets had changed 

during the interval. For example, we obtained information on scope 

targets for two EM projects from a project execution plan that was 

signed and dated almost 9 months after the CD-2 approval 

memorandum had been signed.19 (If documents were not dated within 

1 year of CD-2 approval, we did not consider them sufficient and 

reliable for purposes of determining scope targets.)

• EM and NNSA often did not clearly or uniformly identify scope targets 

in their documents, instead providing this information in a variety of 

 

18DOE introduced PARS in 2001 as a Web-based system for collecting and analyzing 

current performance data for projects costing more than $5 million. In October 2010, 

according to DOE officials, DOE introduced an updated version of PARS.

19These projects are the Saltstone Disposal Unit 2 and the Saltstone Disposal Units 3 & 5 

projects.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

ways. For example, a NNSA project provided this information in 

briefing slides for a project advisory board under the headings 

“programmatic requirements summary” and “physical design 

summary.” In cases where we were unable to clearly identify scope 

targets, we relied on EM and NNSA officials to identify the information 

that they considered to represent scope targets.

OAPM has encountered similar problems in trying to identify scope 

targets for projects at CD-2 and track how well completed projects had 

met these targets at CD-4. Specifically, OAPM officials told us that DOE 

program offices may have documented a project’s scope targets in a 

variety of project documents, such as a project execution plan or an 

acquisition strategy plan, rather than in an approval memorandum at CD2. As a result, OAPM officials said they occasionally must reconstruct a 

project’s scope targets from other contemporaneous planning documents 

near the time of the CD-2 approval. In a few instances, they said that no 

audit trail exists to compare scope targets established at CD-2 with the 

scope targets cited in a project’s CD-4 approval memorandum. In 

addition, an OAPM official told us that OAPM has not completed the 

process of locating and entering these data into PARS and continues to 

work with EM and NNSA to reconstruct project scope targets near the 

time of CD-2 approval.

We found two problems with the performance baselines of many projects 

that EM restructured from its portfolio of PBS activities in 2009 and 2010. 

First, several projects did not have a credible completion date target. For 

example, EM’s April 2010 memorandum approving CD-2 for the Zone 1 

Remedial Actions project, located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, gave a 

target completion date of fiscal year 2017, which meant that the target 

completion date was at the end of the fiscal year (September 30, 2017), 

according to EM officials. However, EM approved the formal completion 

of this project, via a CD-4 approval memorandum, on September 30, 

2011—6 years ahead of the completion date target identified in the CD-2 

approval memorandum. In explaining this difference, EM officials stated 

that they had linked the target completion date for this project to the end 

of the existing PBS near-term baseline, which had been established 

before the restructuring process. According to EM officials, EM used this 

method because it already had a contract in place to conduct work 

activities associated with the PBS near-term baseline. Since the end of 

the PBS near-term baseline was to coincide with the end of the contract 

period, EM officials said that they did not think it would be appropriate to 

change the target completion dates. In addition, EM officials told us that 

they were more focused on finishing the scope of work for a given project 

EM Did Not Establish Credible 

Completion Date Targets or 

Conduct Required Independent 

Reviews for Some Projects 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

within a specific dollar amount, and that it was not worth the additional 

expenditure of time and dollars to modify contracts to change the 

completion date. EM used this same methodology in establishing target 

completion dates for several other projects we examined.

When we found that EM’s practice of establishing target completion dates 

did not provide a meaningful benchmark for assessing project 

performance, we had to locate additional documentation to establish a 

more credible completion date target. For example, for the Zone 1 

Remedial Actions project, we reviewed additional documentation and 

decided that a more credible completion date target was December 15, 

2011. As a result, for this and other projects, the completion date targets 

we used to evaluate the performance of some projects are different than 

the ones that DOE uses in its PARS database.

Second, EM often established a new performance baseline and approved 

CD-2 for a project without having the baseline reviewed by an 

independent team of experts, as DOE Order 413.3 requires. Among other 

things, the review team is responsible for examining a project’s cost and 

completion date targets to ensure that they are credible and valid. 

However, EM did not conduct such reviews when it restructured some of 

the projects we examined. Instead, according to EM officials, EM relied 

on independent reviews conducted in the 2007 to 2008 time frame as part 

of the CD-2 approval process for PBS activities. In addition, EM officials 

said that it was not worth the additional expenditure of time and dollars to 

conduct new independent reviews for these projects.

If EM had conducted new reviews as part of its restructuring process, it is 

possible that these reviews would have uncovered problems with some of 

the performance targets that EM had to correct later. Specifically, we 

identified two projects—the decontamination and decommissioning of the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky, and the Main 

Plant Process Building in West Valley, New York—for which EM had to 

significantly increase the cost targets it had approved 10 and 5 months 

earlier, respectively. In both cases, these cost increases were due to 

errors that EM project officials made in calculating total project cost. For 

example, for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant project, the project 

team did not incorporate additional project costs, including funds for 

contingencies and the contractor’s fee, into the project’s cost estimate. 

This omission resulted in underestimating the project’s cost target by 

about $8 million, or about 21 percent. In both cases, these errors 

increased the projects’ cost targets and caused EM to miss the original 

cost targets, according to our assessment of performance.
 

Page 19 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

We were unable to determine the extent to which 27 of the 71 nonmajor 

projects that EM and NNSA completed or had under way from fiscal year 

2008 through fiscal year 2012 had met their scope, cost, and completion 

date targets for four reasons. First, EM and NNSA did not establish a 

performance baseline for eight projects. Second, EM and NNSA did not 

provide documentation that fully identified one or more performance 

targets—including targets for scope, cost, and completion date—for eight 

projects. Third, NNSA did not fully document a final project cost or a 

current completion date for three projects. Fourth, EM and NNSA 

modified the scope targets of eight projects after CD-2, rendering the 

original performance targets unusable for purposes of assessing 

performance.

EM and NNSA did not establish a performance baseline for a total of 8 of 

the 71 nonmajor projects we reviewed that were completed or ongoing for 

fiscal years 2008 to 2012. Without a performance baseline, a project’s 

performance cannot be assessed. Specifically, we found the following:

• EM. EM did not establish a performance baseline for 6 of the 30 EM 

nonmajor projects we reviewed. According to EM documentation, 

when the office established near-term baselines for its PBS activities 

in the 2007 time frame, it decided that it would not establish a 

baseline for a few projects that were near completion or for which 

physical work was essentially complete, and remaining costs were 

low. Because EM had essentially completed all physical work before 

fiscal year 2008 on the 6 projects we identified, EM never established 

a performance baseline for these projects, according to EM officials. 

However, we included these projects in our review because EM did 

not formally approve the completion of these projects (via a CD-4 

approval memorandum) until the 2010 to 2011 time frame, which 

meant that these projects would have been ongoing until that time. 

The combined cost of these 6 projects is approximately $1.5 billion. 

(See app. II for more details.)

• NNSA. NNSA did not establish a performance baseline for 2 of the 41 

NNSA nonmajor projects we reviewed. According to NNSA 

documents and project officials, after a May 2000 wildfire damaged 

lands and buildings at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, NNSA 

formally authorized two emergency recovery efforts in July 2000. 

Because this authorization was granted outside of the critical decision 

process, NNSA did not establish formal performance targets for these 

projects. The combined cost of these two projects is $145 million. 

(See app. III for more details.)

Limited Documentation or 

Changing Performance 

Baselines Complicates 

Evaluation of 27 Projects’ 

Performance

EM and NNSA Did Not 

Establish a Performance 

Baseline for Eight Projects 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

For 8 of the 71 nonmajor construction projects we reviewed, EM and 

NNSA did not fully define and document one or more performance targets 

for scope, cost, and completion date when they established and approved 

performance baselines for these projects at CD-2. Specifically, we found 

the following:

• For EM, 2 of the 30 EM nonmajor projects we reviewed did not have 

clearly defined and documented targets for scope and completion 

date, 1 project did not have a clearly defined and documented scope 

target, and 1 project did not have a clearly defined and documented 

completion date target. The combined cost of these 4 projects, 2 of 

which are ongoing, is estimated to be at least $182 million. (See app. 

II for more details.)

• For NNSA, 4 of the 41 NNSA nonmajor projects we reviewed did not 

have clearly defined and documented scope targets. The combined 

cost of these 4 projects, 2 of which are ongoing, is estimated to be 

$122 million. (See app. III for more details.)

For 2 of the 71 nonmajor projects we reviewed, NNSA did not fully 

document the final project cost at CD-4. The final cost has not yet been 

settled for these 2 projects due to pending litigation with the contractor. 

NNSA estimated the combined cost of these 2 projects, both of which 

have been completed, to be $195 million. In addition, for the Nuclear 

Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades, Phase II project at the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, NNSA and contractor officials have 

determined that the project’s remaining construction costs will exceed the 

existing funds for the project and have halted work on the project. As a 

result, NNSA has not determined what the project’s revised completion 

date target will be.

EM and NNSA modified the scope targets of 8 of the 71 projects we 

reviewed after approving them at CD-2. EM and NNSA used procedures 

to control and approve these modifications but did not establish new CD-2 

performance targets. As a result, the scope modifications rendered the 

original CD-2 performance targets unusable for assessing project 

performance. We consider a project’s scope target to have been modified 

if, among other things, EM or NNSA increased the scope of the project 

after approving it at CD-2 or reduced the scope for programmatic reasons 

and provided a sound justification for this reduction. In contrast, if EM or 

NNSA reduced project scope solely to meet a project’s cost target, we did 

not consider the scope target to have been modified; rather, we 

EM and NNSA Did Not Fully 

Define and Document 

Performance Targets for Eight 

Projects 

NNSA Did Not Fully Document 

Final Project Cost or Current 

Completion Date Target for 

Three Projects 

EM and NNSA Modified Scope 

Targets for Eight Projects After 

Establishing Performance 

Targets 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

considered the scope target not to have been met. (See apps. II and III 

for more information.)

Projects for which EM or NNSA had modified the scope target sometimes 

exceeded expectations. For example, an NNSA project to build a highway 

at the Nevada National Security Site had an original scope target of 19.2 

miles of highway and a cost target of about $14 million, but the project 

team completed an additional 12 miles of highway at an incremental cost 

of about $4 million, ahead of the original completion date target. However, 

because the scope target changed, the total cost of the project also 

changed, which made it unfair to judge the project’s performance against 

its original cost target.

Table 3 provides an example of a NNSA project for which we consider the 

scope target to have been modified.

Table 3: NNSA’s Criticality Experiments Facility Project, Nevada National Security Site

Dollars in millions

Date Document Cost target

Completion 

date target Scope target

Dec. 2005 NNSA 

memorandum 

approving CD-2 

$145 1Q FY 2010 The scope includes the following:

• modifications of part of the unoccupied portion of the 

Device Assembly Facility to (1) accommodate the 

installation of four critical assembly machines that 

will be transferred from Technical Area 18 of the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, (2) provide office space 

and a 60-seat conference room, (3) provide two 

vault rooms for storage of materials, and (4) provide 

two control rooms;

• disassembly and decontamination of critical 

assembly machines, then transporting and 

reassembling them at the Device Assembly Facility; 

and

• modifying the Entry Guard Station to accommodate 

additional personnel during construction.

Mar. 2006 Project execution 

plan

$145 Nov. 2009 The scope includes work associated with buildings in the 

Device Assembly Facility, each of the four critical 

assembly machines, and the Entry Guard Station, among 

other things.

Feb. 2007 NNSA 

memorandum 

approving CD-3D

$149 Not specified The 60-seat conference room, part of the baseline scope, 

is eliminated. NNSA originally needed the conference 

room to host the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 

training and exercise activities. Later, NNSA decided to 

host these activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory 

facilities, eliminating the need for the conference room.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Date Document Cost target

Completion 

date target Scope target

Aug. 2007 NNSA 

memorandum 

approving a 

baseline change

$150 3Q FY 2010 The memo notes the elimination of the 60-seat 

conference room and “the associated scope of work, 

such as the leach field,” from the project’s scope. 

Attachments to the memo note that other, new scope 

was added to the project and that therefore additional 

scope deletion may be needed to “realign the cost and 

the schedule with the available funds.” 

Mar. 2011 NNSA 

memorandum 

approving a 

baseline change

$154 June 15, 2011 The memo states that project scope includes the 

successful completion of all design/engineering, 

construction, machine relocation, control system 

installation, acceptance testing and operational readiness 

reviews for four criticality assembly machines.

May 2011 NNSA 

memorandum 

approving CD-4 

$151 May 11, 2011 The memorandum contains contradictory information. It 

lists the full scope approved at CD-2 and states that the 

60-seat conference room was eliminated from project 

scope, but it also states that the full project scope 

approved at CD-2 was completed.

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA project documentation.

We have previously reported on problems with the way DOE documents 

and tracks the scope of its projects, and DOE has taken actions to 

address this issue. In a 2008 report on DOE’s Office of Science, we noted 

concerns within DOE that projects sometimes had overly broad definitions 

of scope, making it difficult to determine the effects of a change in project 

scope.20

 

20GAO, Department of Energy: Office of Science Has Kept Majority of Projects within 

Budget and on Schedule, but Funding and Other Challenges May Grow, 

To address this issue, we recommended that DOE consider 

whether it could strengthen its project management guidance to help 

ensure that each project’s scope is clearly and sufficiently defined. DOE 

generally agreed with our recommendation and revised Order 413.3 in 

November 2010 to establish clearer requirements for identifying and 

documenting project scope at CDs 2 and 4. Specifically, the revised order 

requires a project’s acquisition executive to clearly identify the scope 

target in the documentation approving CD-2. In the documentation 

approving CD-4, when a project is declared complete, this official must 

clearly identify the scope accomplished and compare this scope with the 

target established at CD-2.

GAO-08-641 

(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2008).

DOE Has Taken Steps to 

Ensure Its Projects Have 

Better Defined and 

Documented Scope 

Targets, but Problems 

Persist
 

Page 23 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

To determine whether NNSA and EM had improved their documentation 

of scope targets since DOE revised Order 413.3, we identified two 

nonmajor projects for which NNSA and EM established performance 

targets in 2011. These projects are NNSA’s Sanitary Effluent Reclamation 

Facility Expansion project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and 

EM’s Purification Area Vault project at the Savannah River Site. In 

reviewing project documentation, we found that both NNSA and EM had 

provided information on targets for scope, cost, and completion date in 

their memorandums approving CD-2. In particular, NNSA’s approval 

memorandum identified the following scope targets: (1) expand the 

existing Sanitary Effluent Reclamation Facility capacity to treat 300 

gallons per minute of product water in an 18-hour day; (2) provide a 

400,000-gallon product water storage tank, which provides a consistent 

supply of water to the cooling towers in the event the facility is off-line for 

maintenance; and (3) provide additional evaporation capacity. These 

scope targets provide a quantitative measure of how the project is to 

perform at completion, as required by DOE’s order.

However, we found problems with the way EM documented the scope 

target for its Purification Area Vault project. EM’s approval memorandum 

provided a high-level description of the project’s scope, stating that the 

project will modify an existing portion of the K-Area Complex at the 

Savannah River Site in South Carolina to accommodate a vault; 

implement passive and active fire protection features as identified in the 

project fire hazards analysis; and install a new heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning system. However, the scope target cited in the approval 

memorandum did not provide sufficient detail for measuring scope 

performance at project completion and, therefore, it may be difficult for an 

independent reviewer to accurately assess project performance. 

Specifically, we found the following:

• The first part of the scope target—construct a secure storage location 

for holding at least 500 containers—provides a quantitative measure 

of how the project is to perform at completion, as required by DOE’s 

order. The second part of the scope target—attain CD-4 approval for 

storage of containers—does not provide a quantitative measure and 

instead reflects a stage in DOE’s critical decision framework. 

Therefore, only one part of the scope target can be used to 

independently measure project performance regarding scope.

• The scope target only captures some of the elements of scope 

contained in the high-level scope description. As a result, the effect of 

any changes to these other elements of scope on project performance 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

is unclear. For example, if EM decided not to fully implement the fire 

protection features identified in its hazards analysis, it is not clear 

whether EM or an independent reviewer would consider the project to 

have met its scope target.

• Only the scope target—as opposed to the other elements of scope in 

the high-level scope description—is currently being tracked in DOE’s 

centralized database for project performance. Given the other issues 

we identified with this scope target, an independent reviewer relying 

solely on information in DOE’s database may not have enough 

information to assess the project’s performance accurately.

Several factors affected EM and NNSA in managing their nonmajor 

projects that were completed or ongoing from fiscal years 2008 to 2012. 

According to our interviews with project officials, these factors included 

the suitability of the acquisition strategy, contractor performance, and 

adherence to project management requirements.

Because EM and NNSA carry out their work primarily through 

agreements with private contractors, a project’s acquisition strategy is a 

critical factor that affects the ability of these offices to properly manage 

their nonmajor projects. According to DOE guidance, an acquisition 

strategy is the high-level business management approach chosen to 

achieve project objectives within specified resource constraints. The 

acquisition strategy is the framework for planning, organizing, staffing, 

controlling, and leading a project. As part of this framework, agency 

officials have to choose the most appropriate contract alternative for a 

given project. Alternatives can include the use of multiple contractors to 

perform different tasks or the use of a prime contractor (such as the M&O 

contractor at a DOE site), who would be responsible for awarding 

subcontracts for different tasks. In addition, agency officials should 

identify the use of special procedures, such as the use of a “design-build” 

contract, whereby a single contract is awarded for both design work and 

construction, or the use of a “design-bid-build” contract, whereby separate 

contracts are awarded for the design and construction.

Some EM and NNSA officials told us that the acquisition strategy was an 

important factor in the successful management of their projects. For 

example, EM retained a prime contractor to manage the Soil and Water 

Remediation–2012 project at the Idaho National Laboratory using a 

contract containing incentives based on cost and schedule performance. 

According to project officials, the fee structure under this acquisition 

Several Factors Affect 

EM and NNSA in 

Managing Nonmajor 

Projects 

Acquisition Strategy
 

Page 25 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

strategy is relatively simple and gives the project team flexibility to tie 

incentives to different performance milestones across the multiple 

subprojects within the contract. These officials said that this contract 

structure has been a very effective tool in achieving performance goals. 

EM expects this project to meet its cost target of $743 million and its 

completion date target of September 2012, and officials said that they 

expect the contractor to receive its incentive fee, as called for in the 

contract.

Other EM and NNSA officials cited the existence of an inadequate 

acquisition strategy as having a negative effect on the performance of 

their projects. For example, according to NNSA project officials at the Los 

Alamos site office, the M&O contractor at the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory decided to construct the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office 

Building project using a design-build acquisition strategy with a single 

prime subcontractor responsible for both design and construction. This 

approach was chosen based on the M&O contractor’s experience with 

constructing office buildings. However, the project also involved the 

construction of a radiological laboratory, which entailed the use of 

rigorous documentation standards to show that the project can meet 

nuclear quality assurance standards, among other things. Officials of the 

NNSA site office said that one of their key lessons learned would be to 

use a design-bid-build acquisition strategy if they had to manage a similar 

project in the future. The use of a design-bid-build contract would have 

offered several advantages over a design-build contract, according to 

these officials. First, it would have allowed NNSA staff more time to 

develop more robust project specifications and a more mature project 

design before having contractors bid on the construction of that design. 

Second, NNSA staff might have had more time to evaluate bids from 

contractors to see if they had the skills to construct the project. Third, with 

a more mature design, NNSA might have been able to reduce the number 

of federal staff and the time spent overseeing the project. This project 

was completed in June 2010, a few months after its completion date 

target. Its cost target was $164 million; however, the final cost of this 

project has not been determined because of ongoing litigation. According 

to the officials of the site office, NNSA withheld the M&O contractor’s 

performance incentive fee as a result of less than desirable contractor 

and subcontractor management during the design and construction of the 

facility.

DOE has previously identified ineffective acquisition strategies as being 

among its top 10 management challenges. Specifically, in its 2008 root 

cause analysis, DOE reported that its acquisition strategies and plans 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

were often ineffective.21 DOE also reported that it does not begin 

acquisition planning early enough in the process or devote the time and 

resources to do it well.

Because contractors carry out the work associated with EM and NNSA 

nonmajor projects, contractor performance is a fundamental factor 

affecting EM’s and NNSA’s management of these projects. According to 

EM and NNSA project officials, poor contractor performance was a 

significant factor impeding their ability to successfully manage nonmajor 

projects. Among other things, officials cited concerns with finding qualified 

contractors that understood DOE’s nuclear safety requirements and 

maintained adequate internal control processes. Examples are as follows:

• Nuclear Facility Decontamination & Decommissioning – High Flux 

Beam Reactor Project, Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York: 

This project was completed in December 2010, more than a year 

ahead of its completion date target, and at a cost of $16 million, which 

was 31 percent higher than its cost target of $12 million. EM officials 

stated that the major factor increasing costs was that the contractor 

did not properly prepare for and pass internal safety reviews, which 

were necessary to demonstrate the contractor’s readiness to begin 

removal and disposal of key reactor components. Because the 

contractor required more time than originally planned to prepare for 

and pass internal safety reviews, work on the project was delayed, 

and the total project cost increased. Officials did not explain why the 

project was completed well ahead of its completion date target despite 

the delays encountered. Officials stated that one of the most important 

lessons learned was to better ensure earlier in the process that the 

contractor had a rigorous process in place (e.g., procedures and 

training) to demonstrate that their personnel were ready to perform 

the decontamination and decommissioning work. Because EM’s 

cleanup work at Brookhaven National Laboratory is performed under 

the Laboratory Management and Operations Contract under the 

purview of DOE’s Office of Science, EM officials said that they have 

provided information to the Office of Science to be included in the 

contractor’s overall performance evaluation.

 

21DOE, Root Cause Analysis: Contract and Project Management (Washington, D.C.: April 

2008).

Contractor Performance
 

Page 27 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

• Nuclear Facility Decontamination & Decommissioning – Separations 

Process Research Unit Project, Niskayuna, New York: EM 

established a cost target of $79 million for this ongoing project.22 In 

September 2010, a contamination incident occurred while the 

contractor was performing open air demolition of a building at the site. 

According to DOE’s incident report, the contamination incident had 

two root causes: (1) the contractor failed to fully understand, 

characterize, and control the radiological hazard; and (2) the 

contractor failed to implement a work control process that ensured 

facility conditions supported proceeding with the work. As a result of 

this incident, as well as weather-related issues, the project has 

exceeded its cost target, and the project’s final cost and completion 

date depend on the outcome of negotiations between DOE and the 

contractor, according to project officials.

• Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades Project, Phase 

II, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico: This ongoing project 

is expected to meet its cost target of $245 million but not its 

completion date target of January 2013. NNSA used a design-bidbuild acquisition strategy for this project, with one contractor 

responsible for designing the project, and another contractor 

responsible for construction activities. According to project officials, 

during the construction phase, the building contractor had to stop 

work when it discovered errors with the design of the project. 

Specifically, officials told us the designs contained an erroneous 

elevation drawing that did not adequately account for the presence of 

a canyon and a pipeline containing radioactive liquid waste on the 

north side of the project site. In addition, other construction 

subcontractors, whose work was to be performed in sequence, had to 

wait to begin their work. As a result of these problems, the design 

contractor spent considerable time redesigning the project, according 

to project officials, and NNSA has had to award additional funding and 

schedule time to the construction contractors to compensate for the 

inadequate design. All told, officials told us the additional costs 

resulting from redesign and the delay of construction ranged from $15 

million to $20 million. In addition, NNSA and contractor officials 

recently determined that the project’s remaining construction costs will 

exceed the existing funds for the project and have halted work. As a 

 

22According to EM officials, this project has a target completion date of fiscal year 2012. 

Based on our review of project documentation, we did not find this target to be credible but 

were unable to locate a more credible target. 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

result, NNSA has not determined what the project’s revised 

completion date target will be.

Effective project management also depends on having project officials 

consistently follow DOE’s project management requirements. Among 

other things, these requirements are aimed at ensuring that projects 

(1) have a sufficiently mature design before establishing performance 

targets and beginning construction activities; (2) have had their earned 

value management systems certified for more accurate reporting on 

performance;23

We found a similar problem with adherence to DOE project management 

requirements in some of the projects we reviewed, although these 

problems were more often associated with EM projects than with NNSA 

projects. Specifically, in half of the 10 EM projects we reviewed in depth, 

officials cited a lack of adherence to project requirements, particularly not 

having a sufficiently mature design when establishing performance 

targets and beginning work activities, as a significant factor impeding their 

ability to manage projects within the performance baseline.

(3) undergo a review by an independent group of experts 

before beginning construction activities; and (4) maintain an adequate 

process to account for any significant changes to the project’s scope, 

cost, or completion date targets (known as a change control process). 

DOE has previously identified adherence to project management 

requirements as among its top 10 management challenges, stating in its 

2008 root cause analysis that the agency has not ensured that these 

requirements are consistently followed. That is, in some instances, 

projects are initiated or carried out without fully complying with the 

processes and controls contained in DOE policy and guidance.

For example, EM’s project to convert depleted uranium hexafluoride into 

a more stable chemical form at two locations—Paducah, Kentucky and 

Portsmouth, Ohio—was completed in November 2010, more than 2 years 

after its completion date target and more than $200 million over its cost 

target of $346 million. A lessons-learned report, completed in 2009 at the 

request of DOE, concluded that DOE’s critical decision process had 

 

23An earned value management system is an integrated set of policies, procedures and 

practices to objectively track true performance on a project or program. It represents an 

integration methodology that is able to provide an early warning of performance problems 

while enhancing leadership decisions for successful corrective action. 

Adherence to Project 

Management Requirements
 

Page 29 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

become a “mere rubber stamp of approval.”24

In contrast, among the 10 NNSA projects we reviewed in depth, several 

NNSA project managers credited adherence to project management 

processes as contributing positively to project performance. The 

advantages of adhering to project management processes are illustrated 

by one of the projects we reviewed—the Ion Beam Laboratory project at 

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. This project—to use ion 

beams to qualify electronics and other nonnuclear weapon components 

for use in the nuclear stockpile—was completed ahead of schedule in 

September 2011 at a cost of $31 million, which was 22 percent lower than 

its cost target of $40 million. Project officials stated that implementing a 

procedure to control any changes to the performance baseline and a 

Baseline Change Control Board served as the foundation to manage all 

changes to ensure that cost, schedule, and technical aspects were 

evaluated to meet the mission of the project. In addition, project officials 

made active use of earned value management data, with several officials 

noting that applying earned value management principles on a regular 

basis assisted the project team in taking management actions to keep the 

project on track. For example, the Sandia Project Manager provided 

monthly reports to Sandia senior managers and the federal project 

director to communicate the project’s progress, the accomplishment of 

milestones, financial outlays, project issues, and appropriate corrective 

actions. Owing to the project’s success in meeting its performance 

targets, NNSA did not withhold any fee from the contractor.

It stated: “In the end, the ... 

Project had results consistent with its level of definition at the time of 

project commitment and execution start. Future DOE projects will likely 

demonstrate similar performance unless they are better defined at the 

start of detailed design and they follow not only the letter of DOE’s [critical 

decision] process, but also its spirit.” According to EM officials, EM 

withheld the construction contractor’s incentive fee due to its poor 

performance.

 

24Independent Project Analysis, Incorporated, A Lessons Learned Evaluation of the DUF 

6 Project: 2nd Revised Final (Ashburn, VA: March 2009).
 

Page 30 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

EM’s eight workforce plans for its federal workforce do not consistently 

identify (1) mission-critical occupations and skills and (2) current and 

future shortfalls in these areas. As shown in table 4, of the eight EM 

workforce plans, one fully identifies both mission-critical occupations and 

mission-critical skills; another four plans identify either mission-critical 

occupations or mission-critical skills, but not both; and four of the eight 

plans identify current and future shortfalls in mission-critical occupations.

Table 4: Extent to Which EM Workforce Plans Identify Mission-Critical Occupations and Skills and Shortfalls in These Areas

Office submitting plan

Does the plan identify missioncritical occupations and skills?a

Does the plan identify current and 

future shortfalls in mission-critical 

occupations?b

EM Headquarters Partially Yes 

Savannah River Operations Office Partially Yes 

Portsmouth/Paducah Site Office Yes Yes 

Richland Operations Office and Office of River 

Protectionc No No

Carlsbad Field Office No No

Idaho Operations Office Partially No

Oak Ridge Office No No

Consolidated Business Center Partially Yes

Source: GAO analysis of EM workforce plans.

a

”Yes” means that a plan identified both mission-critical occupations and mission-critical skills; 

“partially” means that a plan identified either mission-critical occupations or mission-critical skills, but 

did not identify both; and “no” means that a plan did not identify either mission-critical occupations or 

mission-critical skills. Because not all of the plans used the exact terms “mission-critical occupations” 

or “mission-critical skills,” we considered other phrases used in the plans when determining whether 

to apply a “yes,” “partially,” or “no” designation.

b

”Yes” means that a plan identified current and future shortfalls for “mission-critical occupations” or 

functions described in equivalent terms.

c

These collocated offices submitted their plans jointly. The plans present information separately for 

each office.

EM’s workforce plans may not consistently identify mission-critical 

occupations and skills and shortfalls in these areas in part because EM’s 

Office of Human Capital has not established a consistent set of terms that 

all EM sites use to define and describe mission-critical occupations and 

skills, according to our analysis. Instead, the five EM workforce plans that 

EM’s Workforce Plans 

Do Not Consistently 

Identify MissionCritical Occupations 

and Skills or 

Shortfalls in These 

Areas 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

identified or partially identified these occupations and skills (as shown in 

table 4) used different terms to identify them. The plans also differed in 

the number and type of occupations or skills identified as mission-critical. 

For example, two plans identified three such occupations and skills, while 

another identified 20 different job series associated with 40 different 

position titles. Table 5 shows the variations in mission-critical occupations 

and skills identified in these five EM workforce plans.

Table 5: Variations among Selected EM Workforce Plans in Identifying Mission-Critical Occupations and Skills

Office plan

Terminology used 

in plan Description

EM Headquarters Mission-critical area The plan identifies 3 mission-critical areas (and their associated job series): engineer 

(series 801); physical scientist (series 1301); and contracting and acquisition specialist 

(series 1102). 

Savannah River 

Operations Office

Mission-critical 

occupation

The plan identifies 10 different job series associated with mission-critical occupations: 

0110 (“Economist”); 0201 (“Human Resources Specialist”); 0511 (“Auditor”) 0801 

(“General Engineer” / “General Engineer (Facility Representative)”); 0804 (“Fire 

Protection Engineer”); 0840 (“Nuclear Engineer” / “Nuclear/Criticality Safety Specialists 

and Facility Engineers”); 0850 (“Electrical Engineer”); 1102 (“Contract Specialist”); 1301 

(“Physical Scientist / “Physical Scientist (Facility Representative)”); and 2210 

(“Information Technology Specialist/Series”). 

Portsmouth/ 

Paducah Project 

Office

Critical technical 

capabilities / areas 

requiring additional 

support

In the workforce plan’s section on Critical Technical Capabilities, the plan identifies 

“[t]he areas requiring additional support” and requests additional staff in each. It 

identifies 7 such areas: (1) Project/Program Management, (2) Contracting, (3) 

Safeguards and Security, (4) Environment, Safety and Health, (5) Quality Assurance, 

(6) Technical Writer/Editor, and (7) Human Resources.

Idaho Operations 

Office

Mission-critical 

position

The plan identifies 3 mission-critical positions: deputy manager, assistant manager, and 

federal project director. The plan also identifies 25 “competencies” but does not list any 

as being critical or mission-critical.

Consolidated 

Business Center

Mission-critical 

occupation

The plan identifies 20 different job series as constituting “mission-critical occupations.” 

These job series, in turn, are associated with 40 different position titles. The position 

titles identified include Program Manager, General Engineer, and Contract Specialist.

Source: GAO analysis of EM workforce plans.

When we brought the issue of inconsistent terminology to the attention of 

EM officials, they agreed that it would be useful to establish a consistent 

set of terms for mission-critical occupations and skills and told us that 

they plan to address this issue in the fiscal year 2013 planning cycle. 

However, we note that EM’s guidance to its site offices already instructed 

them to describe shortfalls and surpluses in the skills most critical to site 

performance; nonetheless, not all site offices did so.

Notwithstanding the variations in terms for mission-critical occupations 

and skills in EM’s workforce plans, many of the plans indicate that EM’s 

federal workforce may soon face shortfalls in a number of important 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

areas, including project and contract management. Examples are as 

follows:

• The Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office’s plan states that the office 

will need more staffing, including in project management and 

contracting, to meet mission needs in future years. Specifically, the 

plan notes that 31 percent of its current federal workforce could retire 

by fiscal year 2017, including up to 67 percent of its contract 

specialists and up to 64 percent of its general engineers.

• The workforce plan for EM headquarters, issued in July 2011, stated 

that 26 percent of its federal workforce was currently eligible to retire, 

with an additional 22 percent of the workforce projected to become 

eligible for retirement by fiscal year 2015. The EM headquarters plan 

projected that 60 percent of contracting officers would be eligible for 

retirement by fiscal year 2015.

• The Idaho Operations Office workforce plan states that a significant 

number of federal employees in leadership and mission-critical 

positions were already eligible for retirement at the end of fiscal year 

2011, but the plan does not specify the number or positions of these 

employees.

• The Carlsbad Field Office workforce plan indicates that both of that 

office’s “contract/procurement specialists” will be eligible to retire by 

fiscal year 2017, along with 10 of its 15 general engineers.

• The workforce plan for the Office of River Protection, which manages 

the storage, retrieval, treatment, and disposal of tank waste at the 

Hanford Site in Washington State, projects that the office will face a 

61 percent shortfall in “contracting” and a 53 percent shortfall in 

“project management” by fiscal year 2017.

EM officials said that they recognize the need to better identify missioncritical occupations and skills and shortfalls in these areas, and that they 

have taken a number of steps to address these issues. For example, 

officials in EM’s Office of Human Capital told us that they conducted a 

skills assessment in 2010 that helped EM identify key occupational series 

to target in its succession planning efforts. In addition, officials in this 

office told us that they are actively engaged in mitigating the risk of having 

a large number of EM federal employees retire in the near future by 

developing a voluntary separation incentive plan and voluntary early 

retirement plan. If employees eligible for retirement participate in this 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

plan, EM could fill vacated positions with younger employees who could 

develop their skills in future years. Moreover, officials in EM’s Office of 

Acquisition and Project Management told us that to ensure that each 

project team has the skilled staff it needs to meet project goals, they 

consult with the EM officials in charge of each project team, consider the 

project’s execution plan, and use DOE staffing guidance as a tool to 

inform staffing decisions.25

EM officials also said that EM sites serve diverse functions and that, 

therefore, some variation in the workforce plans and their descriptions of 

mission-critical occupations and competencies is to be expected. 

Nonetheless, without a workforce plan or summary document presenting 

a consistent set of occupations and skills that are critical to every site 

office’s mission, such as project and contract management, it is difficult 

for DOE and us to understand EM’s most critical current and future 

human capital needs.

The 71 nonmajor projects that we reviewed cost an estimated $10.1 

billion and are critical to DOE’s mission to secure the nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile and manage the radioactive waste and contamination 

that resulted from the production of such weapons. EM and NNSA are 

making some progress in managing these projects. For example, we 

identified some NNSA and EM nonmajor projects that used sound project 

management practices, such as the application of effective acquisition 

strategies, to help ensure the successful completion of these projects. 

However, some contract and project management problems persist. 

Specifically, both EM and NNSA have approved the start of construction 

and cleanup activities for some nonmajor projects without clearly defining 

and documenting performance targets for scope, cost, or completion date 

in the appropriate CD-2 documentation, as required by DOE’s project 

management order. In addition, EM and NNSA have not consistently 

tracked project performance, particularly for scope, in DOE’s centralized 

database for tracking and reporting project performance, as required by 

DOE’s project management order. Moreover, EM has approved new 

 

25EM’s project teams consist of federal project directors, scientists, and others who 

manage each individual EM project. DOE’s staffing guidance (DOE Guide 413.3-19, Oct. 

12, 2011) includes a staffing model, which provides a recommended range of project 

staffing, based on specific project attributes, and a proposed distribution of staffing by 

project functions, based on the project type and project phase. 

Conclusions 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

performance targets for projects without ensuring that these targets are 

reviewed by an independent team of experts, as required by DOE’s 

project management order. Without clearly defining and documenting a 

project’s performance targets and tracking performance against these 

targets through project completion, and without ensuring that projects are 

independently reviewed, neither DOE nor we can determine whether the 

department is truly delivering on its commitments when its contractors 

complete work on its projects.

Problems also persist regarding DOE’s workforce—specifically, its current 

and potential shortfalls in federal personnel with the skills necessary to 

manage its contracts and projects, an issue that has received attention in 

our high-risk list. EM recognizes the need to address this issue and has 

taken steps to do so, such as conducting succession planning based on 

an assessment of key skills, as well as having EM’s Office of Project 

Management consult with EM’s project teams to ensure that the project 

teams have the skilled personnel they need to execute projects 

successfully. However, EM does not consistently identify in its workforce 

plans the occupations and skills most critical to the agency’s mission, as 

well as current and future shortfalls in these areas. This issue is 

compounded by EM’s decentralized planning process, in which site 

offices produce their own workforce plans that do not use consistent 

terminology and are not aggregated centrally by EM headquarters into a 

single workforce plan or summary document. Some variation among sitespecific workforce plans is to be expected, but EM officials have stated 

that it would be useful to establish a consistent set of terms for missioncritical occupations and skills and told us that they plan to address this 

issue in the fiscal year 2013 planning cycle. That said, previous EM 

guidance for workforce planning specified that the plans describe 

shortfalls and surpluses in the skills most critical to site performance, but 

not all of EM’s plans did so. Without a summary document or single 

workforce plan presenting a consistent set of occupations and skills that 

are critical to every site office’s mission, such as project and contract 

management, using consistent terms, it is difficult for DOE or us to 

understand EM’s most critical current and future human capital needs.

To ensure that DOE better tracks information on its nonmajor projects, 

including the extent to which these projects meet their performance 

targets, and that EM consistently identifies mission-critical occupations 

and skills, as well as any current and future shortfalls in these areas, in its 

workforce plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the 

following five actions:

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 35 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

• Ensure that the department clearly defines performance targets—

including targets for scope, cost, and completion date—for each of its 

projects and documents the targets in appropriate CD-2 

documentation, as is required by DOE’s project management order.

• Ensure that the department tracks the performance of its projects 

using the performance targets, particularly scope, it establishes for its 

projects, as is required by DOE’s project management order.

• Ensure that each project is reviewed by an independent team of 

experts before the department approves performance targets, as is 

required by DOE’s project management order.

• Direct EM to develop a summary document or a single workforce plan 

that contains information on mission-critical occupations and skills, as 

well as current and potential future shortfalls in these areas, for all EM 

sites. 

• Ensure that EM follows through on its plan to address the use of 

consistent terms across all EM sites for mission-critical occupations 

and skills.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE for review and comment. In 

written comments, DOE agreed with our recommendations. DOE’s written 

comments are reprinted in appendix IV. DOE also provided technical 

clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Energy, 

the appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments
 

Page 36 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix V.

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) nonmajor projects have met their scope, cost, and 

completion date targets, we obtained performance information on 71 

nonmajor projects. These 71 nonmajor projects included 30 EM projects 

and 41 NNSA projects that were either: (1) completed (i.e., reached 

critical decision 4) from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2011 or (2) ongoing 

from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2011 and for which EM and NNSA had 

established performance baselines at critical decision 2. We also 

collected performance information for ongoing projects for fiscal year 

2012. The total estimated cost of these 71 projects is approximately $10.1 

billion. The names and locations of these 71 projects are provided in 

apps. II and III. We excluded the following types of projects from our 

review: (1) major projects, or those projects that each cost more than 

$750 million; (2) EM projects funded entirely by the American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act of 2009 because of a separate GAO review looking 

at these projects; (3) information technology acquisitions; and (4) 

operational activities.1

For the 71 nonmajor projects, we reviewed selected documents providing 

information about the projects’ targets for scope, cost, and completion 

date. We relied on DOE Order 413.3 for requirements on (1) specifying 

the scope, cost, and schedule targets for a project’s performance 

We identified these projects using DOE’s Project 

Assessment and Reporting System (PARS). To assess the reliability of 

PARS data, we interviewed officials about the system and reviewed 

relevant documents. On the basis of this information, we determined that 

the system has adequate and sound controls for entering and maintaining 

data. We also conducted electronic testing on the specific data fields of 

interest, including cost, schedule, and scope targets. We determined that 

the cost and schedule data were complete and sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes; however, we found the scope data to be incomplete. Through 

interviews with officials, we ascertained that the scope data were not 

missing because of a system or data entry problem; instead, because EM 

and NNSA had not consistently identified and documented scope targets 

for the 71 projects we reviewed, these data could not be entered into 

PARS. Therefore, we obtained data on project scope, cost, and schedule 

directly from EM and NNSA officials.

 

1

See GAO, Recover Act: Most DOE Cleanup Projects Are Complete, but Project 

Management Guidance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-13-23 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 

2012).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

baseline and (2) documenting the performance baseline.2

In keeping with our prior work, and in recognition of Office of 

Management and Budget guidance and DOE’s project performance 

goals, we characterized nonmajor projects that met or exceeded (or are 

expected to meet or exceed) their cost and schedule targets by less than 

10 percent as completed within budget and on time, whereas we 

considered projects that exceeded (or will exceed) their targets by 10 

Using these 

requirements, we reviewed the relevant documentation (including critical 

decision memoranda and project execution plans) and compared the 

performance targets established for scope, cost, and schedule with the 

actual performance of completed projects and the expected performance 

of ongoing projects. For completed projects, we compared the 

performance targets for scope, cost, and schedule—as documented in 

critical decision 2 (CD-2) approval memorandum and project execution 

plans—with the completed scope, actual costs, and approval dates as 

documented in critical decision 4 (CD-4) approval memorandum. For 

ongoing projects, we compared the performance targets for scope, cost, 

and schedule with DOE project performance reports; we also had officials 

from EM, NNSA, and DOE’s Office of Acquisition and Project 

Management review performance information as of August 29, 2012. In 

cases where key project documents—including the CD-2 and CD-4 

approval memoranda and project execution plans—did not identify all 

three performance targets for scope, cost, and completion, we requested 

and reviewed alternative project documents. These included, among 

other things: independent project review reports; briefing slides prepared 

for DOE advisory boards; contractor work packages; DOE documents 

listing the functional and operational requirements of projects; 

memoranda used to request approval of changes to project baselines; 

final acceptance reports documenting that contractors delivered project 

requirements; and DOE quarterly and monthly status reports on ongoing 

projects. When reviewing alternative project documents, we requested 

documents dated as close to CD-2 and CD-4 as possible. If documents 

were not dated within 1 year of CD-2 approval, we did not consider them 

sufficient and reliable for purposes of determining scope targets.

 

2

DOE has revised Order 413.3 several times over the past decade. We reviewed five 

versions of DOE Order 413.3, the earliest of which is dated October 2000. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

percent or more to be over cost or late.3

To evaluate factors affecting EM’s and NNSA’s management of nonmajor 

projects, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 20 out of the 71 

projects—including 10 EM projects and 10 NNSA projects—for more 

detailed review. The names of these 20 projects are provided in apps II 

and III. Results from nonprobability samples, including our sample of 20 

projects, cannot be used to make inferences about EM’s and NNSA’s 

overall project performance or generalized to projects we did not include 

in our sample. We were interested in gathering information on the 

selected projects to identify material factors that may not exist across all 

projects but could help us understand EM’s and NNSA’s organization 

strengths and potential challenges. We selected these 20 projects to 

ensure that our sample included completed and ongoing projects, with a 

wide range of project costs. Together, the 20 projects represented about 

$4.1 billion, or approximately 41 percent, of the total value of the 71 

projects.

In addition, we considered 

whether a project had successfully met its scope target. Projects that 

reduced their scope target to meet their cost targets were considered not 

to have met their scope targets. In a few cases, EM and NNSA increased 

the scope of work associated with a project after establishing 

performance targets at CD-2; in these cases, we noted that these projects 

had been modified and did not calculate whether they had met or 

exceeded their original cost and schedule targets.

For these 20 projects, we developed a structured interview template to 

identify the key factors that affected the management of these projects. 

We used three primary sources in developing this structured interview 

template—GAO’s cost guide, DOE’s Order 413.3, and DOE’s guidance 

document on conducting project reviews.4

 

3

See 

The structured interview 

GAO-08-641; Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide: 

Supplement to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: August 2011); and U.S. Department of 

Energy, Contract and Project Management: Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action 

Plan Closure Report: Final (Washington, D.C.: February 2011).

4

See GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing 

and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009); 

U.S. Department of Energy, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of 

Capital Assets, Order 413.3B (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2010); and U.S. Department of 

Energy, Project Review Guide for Capital Asset Projects, Guide 413.3-9 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 23, 2008).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

template focused on certain aspects of project management, such as the 

preparation of project designs, risk estimates, and cost and schedule 

targets, as well as the adherence to DOE project management 

requirements. We pretested the structured interview template during a 

site visit to the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Oak Ridge 

Reservation near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. At each site, we selected six 

projects and interviewed relevant EM and NNSA federal project directors 

and other knowledgeable staff using the structured interview template. 

Based on our pretesting, we revised the structured interview template and 

conducted 20 interviews with the relevant EM and NNSA federal project 

directors and other knowledgeable staff to gather their perspectives on 

their projects’ performance and reasons for it.

To evaluate the extent to which EM’s workforce plans identify missioncritical occupations and skills and any current and future shortfalls in 

these areas, we examined EM’s strategic workforce plans for its 

headquarters and site office staff, DOE’s corrective action plan for 

contract and project management, and the Office of Personnel 

Management’s Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 

Framework. Specifically, we obtained the eight EM workforce plans, 

prepared by EM headquarters, the Consolidated Business Center, the 

Richland Operations Office and Office of River Protection (which manage 

operations at the EM site in Hanford, Washington), the 

Portsmouth/Paducah Site Office, the Savannah River Operations Office, 

the Idaho Operations Office, the Carlsbad Field Office, and the Oak Ridge 

Office. We reviewed these plans in their entirety, and also searched for 

relevant terms, to determine the extent to which the plans identified 

mission-critical occupations and skills and any current and future 

shortfalls in these areas. In addition to our document review, we 

interviewed DOE and EM officials with knowledge of EM’s practices in 

workforce planning, including officials in EM’s Office of Acquisition and 

Project Management and Office of Human Capital and Corporate 

Services. We conducted these interviews to determine how EM develops 

its workforce plans and to obtain EM officials’ points of view regarding the 

state of the EM workforce.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Summary of Office of 

Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed

Page 41 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

We obtained and reviewed performance information on 30 EM nonmajor 

projects that were either completed or ongoing from fiscal year 2008 

through fiscal year 2012. Table 6 summarizes this information for 17 EM 

projects for which we could determine performance. Table 7 summarizes 

this information for 6 projects for which EM did not establish performance 

targets. Table 8 summarizes this information for 4 EM projects with 

incomplete documentation of their performance targets, which meant that 

we could not determine performance. Table 9 summarizes this 

information for 3 projects for which EM modified the scope after 

establishing performance targets for these projects, rendering the original 

performance targets unusable for purposes of assessing performance.

Table 6: Performance of 17 EM Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois

Building 301 Hot Cell 

Decontamination and Demolition

Complete Met target Target: $18

Final: $14

(19) Target: 5/20/2009

Final: 2/23/2010

28

Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York

Brookhaven Graphite Research 

Reactor, Nuclear Facility 

Decontamination and 

Decommissioning 

Complete Met target Target: $54

Final: $74

37 Target: 9/30/2012

Final: 8/31/2012

(2) 

High Flux Beam Reactor, Nuclear 

Facility Decontamination and 

Decommissioningd

Complete Met target Target: $12

Final: $16

31 Target: 9/30/2012

Final: 12/20/2010

(57)

Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho

Sodium Bearing Waste Treatmentd Complete Met target Target: $462

Final: $571

24 Target: 7/31/2010

Final: 4/11/2012

32

Soil and Water Remediation–2012d Complete Met target Target: $743

Final: $480

(35) Target: 9/30/2012

Final: 9/26/2012

0 

Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Solid Waste Stabilization and 

Disposition

Complete Met target Target: $30

Final: $29

(4) Target: 9/30/2008

Final: 11/23/2009

63

Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee

Cell 6 Expansiond Complete Met target Target: $31

Final: $22

(29) Target: 6/24/2011

Final: 6/24/2011

0 

Appendix II: Summary of Office of 

Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed
Appendix II: Summary of Office of 

Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed

Page 42 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

K-25 Decontamination and 

Decommissioning

Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $479

Current: 

$1,397

191 Target: 9/30/2017

Current: 

12/31/2015

(31)

Soil and Water Remediation–Offsites Complete Met target Target: $13

Final: $11

(22) Target: 9/30/2012

Final: 9/10/2010

(80)

Tank W1A Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $48

Current: $51

7 Target: 6/7/2011

Current: 9/30/2012

52

U-233 Disposition–Building 3019d Cancelled Target not 

met

Target: $240

Final: $225

Not 

applicable

Target: 12/18/2014

Final: not 

applicable

Not 

applicable

Zone 1 Remedial Actions Complete Met target Target: $19

Final: $19

1 Target: 12/15/11

Final: 9/30/2011

(14)

Paducah, Kentucky

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 

Conversiond, e Complete Met target Target: $346

Final: $580

68 Target: 6/30/2008

Final: 11/12/2010

46

Nuclear Facility Decontamination and 

Decommissioning—Paducah 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Complete Met target Target: $30

Final: $35 

17 Target: 12/12/2012

Final: 9/27/2012

(8) 

Savannah River Site, South Carolina

Saltstone Disposal Unit 2 Complete Met target Target: $32

Final: $33

3 Target: 11/30/2012

Final: 6/27/2012

(19)

Saltstone Disposal Units 3 & 5d Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $77

Current: $77

0 Target: 7/31/2014

Current: 7/31/2014

0 

West Valley, New York

Main Plant Process Building 

Decontamination and 

Decommissioningd

Complete Target not 

met

Target: $46

Final: $100

117 Target: 6/30/2011

Final: 10/26/2011

22

Source: GAO analysis of EM project documentation.

a

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish a performance target for scope at critical decision 2. 

In cases where these targets were not clearly documented, we worked with agency officials to identify 

equivalent targets. For completed projects, “met target” means that the project completed all work 

associated with its scope target as documented at critical decision 4; “target not met” means that the 

project did not complete all work associated with its scope target as documented at critical decision 4. 

For ongoing projects, “meeting target” means that the project is expected to meet its scope target, 

based on DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.

b

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish performance targets for cost and completion date at 

critical decision 2. In cases where completion date targets were not clearly documented, we worked 

with agency officials to identify equivalent targets. For completed projects, the final cost is 

documented at critical decision 4, and the date of the memorandum approving critical decision 4 

reflects the formal completion of the project. For ongoing projects, the current cost and completion 

date reflect DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.
Appendix II: Summary of Office of 

Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed

Page 43 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

c

To determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish under or over its target 

cost, we computed the percentage change from the target cost to the final or current cost. To 

determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish before or after its target 

completion date, we computed the percentage change from the planned project length (the period 

between DOE’s approval of critical decision 2, which is not shown in the table, and the target 

completion date) to the actual or projected project length (the period between critical decision 2 and 

critical decision 4).

d

Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 10 EM nonmajor projects selected for in-depth review.

e

This project also includes construction activities at Portsmouth, Ohio.

Table 7: Six EM Nonmajor Projects with No Performance Targets

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Cost Completion date

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California

Soil and Groundwater Remediation, 

Operable Units 1-8 

Complete $125 6/10/2010

Miamisburg, Ohio

Nuclear Facility Decontamination and 

Decommissioning

Complete $505 4/25/2011

Soil and Water Remediation Complete $250 4/25/2011

Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposal Complete $265 4/25/2011

Pantex Site, Texas

Soil and Water Remediation Complete $76 2/1/2010

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Soil and Water Remediation Complete $235 6/10/2010

Source: GAO analysis of EM project documentation.

Table 8: Four EM Nonmajor Projects with Incomplete Documentation of Performance Targets

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Grand County, Utah

Moab Uranium Mill 

Tailings – Capital Assetsd Complete Met target Target: $41

Final: $39

(3) Target: 

undefined

Final: 7/16/2010

Unable to 

determine
Appendix II: Summary of Office of 

Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed

Page 44 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion 

dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Niskayuna, New York

Nuclear Facility 

Decontamination and 

Decommissioning–

Separations Process 

Research Unitd

Ongoing Target 

undefined

Target: $79

Current: to 

be 

determined

Unable to 

determine

Target: 

undefined

Current: to be 

determined

Unable to 

determine

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico

Corrective Actions–

Canon de Valle

Ongoing Target 

undefined

Target: $53

Current: 

$53

0 Target: 

undefined

Current: 

undefinede

Unable to 

determine

Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee

ETTP Main Plant Area 

Decontamination and 

Decommissioning

Complete Target 

undefined

Target: $19

Final: $11

(43) Target: 

9/30/2011

Final: 9/30/2011

0 

Source: GAO analysis of EM project documentation.

a

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish a performance target for scope at critical decision 2. 

In cases where these targets were not clearly identified and documented at critical decision 2, we 

listed these targets as “undefined.” For ongoing projects, “meeting target” means that the project is 

expected to meet its scope target, based on DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.

b

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish performance targets for cost and completion date at 

critical decision 2. In cases where these targets were not clearly identified and documented at critical 

decision 2, we listed these targets as “undefined.” For completed projects, the final cost is 

documented at critical decision 4, and the date of the memorandum approving critical decision 4 

reflects the formal completion of the project. For ongoing projects, the current cost and completion 

date reflects DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.

c

To determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish under or over its target 

cost, we computed the percentage change from the target cost to the final or current cost. To 

determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish before or after its target 

completion date, we computed the percentage change from the planned project length (the period 

between DOE’s approval of critical decision 2, which is not shown in the table, and the target 

completion date) to the actual or projected project length (the period between critical decision 2 and 

critical decision 4). In cases where we were unable to make these calculations, we listed the 

percentage as “unable to determine.” 

d

Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 10 EM nonmajor projects selected for in-depth review.

e

Because we were unable to determine the completion date target for this ongoing project, we listed 

the current estimate of the completion date target as “undefined.” 
Appendix II: Summary of Office of 

Environmental Management Nonmajor 

Projects Reviewed

Page 45 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Table 9: Three EM Nonmajor Projects with Modified Scope Targets

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scope modification Costa Completion datea

Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho

Nuclear Material 

Stabilization and 

Disposition

Complete The original scope target was to dispose of around 300 

items of special nuclear material. The project was able to 

refurbish and reuse existing containers to ship two 

subsets of the original scope off-site, which resulted in 

significant cost savings. EM used these savings to 

dispose of additional special nuclear material items. EM 

decided to continue storage of one item when the only 

receipt location (Nevada National Security Site) could not 

receive the item within the project period. According to EM 

officials, the item will be disposed of in fiscal year 2013.

Final: $6 Final: 4/30/2010

Miamisburg, Ohio

Soil and Water 

Remediation–OU-1 

Complete In 2005, Congress directed DOE to perform additional 

remediation and appropriated $30 million. DOE believed 

this amount to be inadequate to complete full excavation 

of the OU-1 area and directed the contractor to sequence 

the remediation in accordance with a list of priorities. 

Additional funding was provided in 2007 and 2009 to 

completion additional remediation work. 

Final: $47 Final: 4/25/2011

Savannah River Site, South Carolina

Purification Area Vault Ongoing The original scope target was to modify a room in an 

existing facility to accommodate at least 500 containers of 

special nuclear material. Subsequently, EM decided to 

increase the amount of storage space associated with this 

project, which increased the project’s overall completion 

date target.

Current: $27 Current: 

12/31/2014

Source: GAO analysis of EM project documentation.

a

For completed projects, the final cost is documented at critical decision 4, and the date of the 

memorandum approving critical decision 4 reflects the formal completion of the project. For ongoing 

projects, the current cost and completion date reflects DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.
Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed

Page 46 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

We obtained and reviewed performance information on 41 NNSA 

nonmajor projects that were either completed or ongoing from fiscal year 

2008 through fiscal year 2012. Table 10 summarizes this information for 

27 NNSA projects for which we could determine performance. Table 11 

summarizes this information for 2 projects for which NNSA did not 

establish performance targets. Table 12 summarizes this information for 7 

NNSA projects with incomplete documentation of their performance 

targets or final cost, which meant that we could not determine 

performance. Table 13 summarizes this information for 5 projects for 

which NNSA modified the scope after establishing performance targets 

for these projects, rendering the original performance targets unusable for 

purposes of assessing performance.

Table 10: Performance of 27 NNSA Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California

Tritium Facility 

Modernization

Complete Met target Target: $13

Final: $13

0 Target: 8/31/2009

Final: 9/30/2009 

2 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico

Demolition of Building South 

Mesa-43

Complete Met target Target: $30

Final: $15

(50) Target: 8/31/2012

Final: 10/11/2011

(55)

TA-55 Reinvestment Phase I Complete Met target Target: $27

Final: $19

(28) Target: 12/31/2010

Final: 6/30/2010

(14)

Dual Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test Facility, 

2nd Axis Refurbishment & 

Commissioning

Complete Did not 

meet target

Target: $90

Final: $90

0 Target: 5/16/2008

Final: 5/16/2008

0 

Demolition of PF-41 Complete Met target Target: $13

Final: $11

(15) Target: 10/18/2008

Final: 9/30/2008

(5) 

National Security Sciences 

Building Phase II Site Office 

Building Replacement

Complete Met target Target: $12

Final: $12

2 Target: 9/30/2008

Final: 9/30/2008

0 

Radiological Laboratory/ 

Utility/Office Building 

Equipment Installation

Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $199

Current: $199

(0) Target: 6/30/2013

Current: 6/30/2013

0 

Sanitary Effluent 

Reclamation Facility

Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $16

Current: $16

0 Target: 9/30/2012

Current: 12/21/2012

14

Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed
Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed

Page 47 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Building B-3 Remediation, 

Restoration, and Upgrade

Complete Met target Target: $19

Final: $17

(12) Target: 3/31/2008

Final: 3/20/2008

(2) 

Replace Fire Stations No. 1 

& No. 2

Complete Did not 

meet target

Target: $32

Final: $35

8 Target: March 2009

Final: 9/30/2010

32

Pantex Site, Texas

Electrical Distribution 

System Upgrade 

Complete Met target Target: $13

Final: $16

25 Target: 9/22/2008

Final: 12/28/2009

31

Gas Main and Distribution 

System Upgrade

Complete Met target Target: $11

Final: $10

(9) Target: 3/31/2010

Final: 6/4/2010

7 

High Explosive Pressing 

Facility

Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $81

Current: $145

80 Target: 6/30/2012

Current: 9/30/2016

43

Rochester, New York

OMEGA Extended 

Performancee Complete Met target Target: $99

Final: $99

0 Target: 4/30/2008

Final: 5/6/2008

0 

Russia

Seversk Plutonium 

Production Elimination 

Program 

Complete Did not 

meet target

Target: $387

Final: $363

(6) Target: 12/31/2008

Final: 9/26/2008

(7) 

Zheleznogorsk Plutonium 

Production Elimination 

Programd

Complete Did not 

meet target

Target: $571

Final: $548

(4) Target: 12/31/2010

Final: 7/5/2011

9 

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Ion Beam Laboratoryd Complete Met target Target: $40

Final: $34

(14) Target: 6/30/2012

Final: 9/7/2011

(22)

Microsystems and 

Engineering Sciences 

Applications

Complete Met target Target: $519

Final: $469

(10) Target: 5/31/2011

Final: 4/11/2008

(57)

Test Capabilities 

Revitalization (Phase II)

Ongoing Not meeting 

target

Target: $53

Current: $58

10 Target: 9/30/2013

Current: 3/17/2014

8 

Z-Machine Refurbishment 

Projectd Complete Met target Target: $90

Final: $91

1 Target: 11/30/2006

Final: 10/2/2007

28

Savannah River Site, South Carolina

Waste Solidification Buildingd Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $345

Current: $380

10 Target: 9/30/2013

Current: 6/30/2014

13
Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed

Page 48 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Y-12 National Security Site, Tennessee

Beryllium Capability Project Complete Met target Target: $36

Final: $35

(3) Target: 4/21/2010

Final: 10/14/2010

12

Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility

Complete Met target Target: $251

Final: $549

119 Target: 4/30/2008

Final: 3/12/2010

29

Nuclear Facility Risk 

Reduction

Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $76

Current: $76

0 Target: 12/7/2015

Current: 12/7/2015

0 

Potable Water System 

Upgrade

Complete Met target Target: $62

Final: $58

(6) Target: 9/29/2010

Final: 9/23/2010

(0) 

Security Improvements 

Project 

Ongoing Meeting 

target

Target: $72

Current: $51

(29) Target: 6/30/2014

Current: 10/01/2013

(18)

Steam Plant Life Extension Complete Met target Target: $62

Final: $60

(3) Target: 9/30/2010

Final: 6/14/2010

(11)

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA project documentation.

a

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish a performance target for scope at critical decision 2. 

In cases where these targets were not clearly documented, we worked with agency officials to identify 

equivalent targets. For completed projects, “met target” means that the project completed all work 

associated with its scope target as documented at critical decision 4; “target not met” means that the 

project did not complete all work associated with its scope target as documented at critical decision 4. 

For ongoing projects, “meeting target” means that the project is expected to meet its scope target, 

based on DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.

b

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish performance targets for cost and completion date at 

critical decision 2. For completed projects, the final cost is documented at critical decision 4, and the 

date of the memorandum approving critical decision 4 reflects the formal completion of the project. 

For ongoing projects, the current cost and completion date reflect DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 

2012.

c

To determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish under or over its target 

cost, we computed the percentage change from the target cost to the final or current cost. To 

determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish before or after its target 

completion date, we computed the percentage change from the planned project length (the period 

between DOE’s approval of critical decision 2, which is not shown in the table, and the target 

completion date) to the actual or projected project length (the period between critical decision 2 and 

critical decision 4).

d

Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 10 NNSA nonmajor projects selected for in-depth review.

e

NNSA approved CD-2 for this project in August 2004. However, in February 2006, NNSA expanded 

the scope of the project and increased its cost and completion date targets, in accordance with 

congressional direction. We used the new congressionally directed performance targets in measuring 

the performance of this project.
Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed

Page 49 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Table 11: Two NNSA Nonmajor Projects with No Performance Targets

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Cost

Completion 

date 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico

Cerro Grande Rehabilitation-1.1: Physical 

Damage & Destruction

Complete $95 10/30/2007

Cerro Grande Rehabilitation -1.2: Restoring 

Services 

Complete $50 10/30/2007

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA project documentation.

Table 12: Seven NNSA Nonmajor Projects with Incomplete Documentation of Performance Targets or Final Cost

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scopea Costb

Percentage 

over (under) 

cost targetc Completion dateb

Percentage 

over (under) 

completion 

targetc

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico

Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement 

Radiological 

Laboratory/Utility/ Office 

Buildingd

Complete Met target Target: $164

Final: to be 

determinede

Unable to 

determine

Target: 1/31/2010

Final: 6/24/2010

8 

Nuclear Materials Safeguards 

and Security Upgrades 

Project Phase IId

Ongoing Meeting target Target: $245

Current: $245

0 Target: 1/24/2013

Current: to be

determined

Unable to 

determine

Power Grid Infrastructure 

Upgraded

Complete Target 

undefined

Target: $20

Final: $16

(22) Target: 12/31/2007

Final: 10/18/2007

(8) 

Waste Management Risk 

Mitigationd Complete Did not meet 

target

Target: $31

Final: to be 

determinede

Unable to 

determine

Target: 9/30/2004

Final: 3/25/2010

77

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Heating System 

Modernization, TA-1 

Complete Target 

undefined

Target: $59

Final: $56

(5) Target: 1/17/2011

Final: 12/16/2010

(2) 

Y-12 National Security Site, Tennessee

Oven Consolidation Ongoing Target 

undefined

Target: $23

Current: $29

27 Target: 8/30/2012

Current: 5/21/2013

20

Production Microwave 

Deployment

Ongoing Target 

undefined

Target: $18

Current: $22

23 Target: 9/8/2011

Current: 12/31/2012

35 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA project documentation.

a

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish a performance target for scope at critical decision 2. 

In cases where these targets were not clearly identified and documented at critical decision 2, we 
Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed

Page 50 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

listed these targets as “undefined.” For ongoing projects, “meeting target” means that the project is 

expected to meet its scope target, based on DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.

b

DOE Order 413.3 requires a project to establish performance targets for cost and completion date at 

critical decision 2. For completed projects, the final cost is documented at critical decision 4, and the 

date of the memorandum approving critical decision 4 reflects the formal completion of the project. 

For ongoing projects, the current cost and completion date reflects DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 

2012.

c

To determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish under or over its target 

cost, we computed the percentage change from the target cost to the final or current cost. To 

determine the extent to which each project finished or is expected to finish before or after its target 

completion date, we computed the percentage change from the planned project length (the period 

between DOE’s approval of critical decision 2, which is not shown in the table, and the target 

completion date) to the actual or projected project length (the period between critical decision 2 and 

critical decision 4). In cases where we were unable to make these calculations, we listed the 

percentage as “unable to determine.” 

d

Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 10 NNSA nonmajor projects selected for in-depth review.

e

The final cost of this project has not been determined due to ongoing litigation.

Table 13: Five NNSA Nonmajor Projects with Modified Scope Targets

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scope modification Costa Completion datea

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico

TA-55 Reinvestment 

Phase II A

Ongoing The original scope target included an upgrade of fire 

protection features for multiple gloveboxes at Technical 

Area 55. Subsequently, a new safety analysis indicated 

that only one glovebox needed to be upgraded, 

prompting NNSA to reduce the scope and cost of this 

project.

Current: $14 Current: 9/27/2013

TA-55 Reinvestment 

Phase II B

Ongoing The original scope target included an upgrade of fire 

protection features for multiple gloveboxes at Technical 

Area 55. Subsequently, a new safety analysis indicated 

that only one glovebox needed to be upgraded, 

prompting NNSA to reduce the scope and cost of this 

project.

Current: $11 Current: 12/16/2013

Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Criticality Experiments 

Facilityb Complete The original scope target included a 60-seat conference 

room. Subsequently, NNSA eliminated the conference 

room and added new fire suppression features to the 

scope target.

Final: $151 Final: 5/11/2011
Appendix III: Summary of National Nuclear 

Security Administration Nonmajor Projects 

Reviewed

Page 51 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Dollars in millions

Site and project Status Scope modification Costa Completion datea

Mercury Highway 

Construction

Complete The original scope target called for the construction of a 

19.2-mile highway at an estimated cost of $14 million. 

The project team completed the original scope plus an 

additional 12 miles at an additional cost of $4 million but 

ahead of the original completion date target. According 

to NNSA officials, the original bid submittals exceeded 

the available budget allowance. The project scope was 

reduced, and the project was issued for proposal. 

During this period, the construction market was much 

more favorable to NNSA and, as a result, NNSA was 

able to increase the scope for considerably less cost.

Final: $18 Final: 12/16/2009

Pantex Site, Texas

High Pressure Fire 

Loopb Ongoing The original scope target included the replacement of 16,000 feet of piping, valves, and hydrants. 

Subsequently, NNSA added the replacement of highpressure tanks, pumps, and pump houses, as well as 

an additional 3,350 feet of piping, to the original scope 

target. According to NNSA officials, when the project 

was initially issued for proposals, the construction 

market was unfavorable to NNSA, and the bid prices 

were higher than the budget allowance. This resulted in 

a reduction in scope. When the reduced scope was 

issued for proposal, market conditions had changed and 

were more favorable to NNSA, and the bids were lower 

than the budget allowance. The scope that was 

originally removed was reinserted into the project.

Current: $42 Current: 12/23/2013

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA project documentation.

a

For completed projects, the final cost is documented at critical decision 4, and the date of the 

memorandum approving critical decision 4 reflects the formal completion of the project. For ongoing 

projects, the current cost and completion date reflects DOE’s projections as of Aug. 29, 2012.

b

Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 10 NNSA nonmajor projects selected for in-depth review.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 52 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Energy
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 53 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 54 GAO-13-129 DOE Nonmajor Projects

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Dan Feehan, Assistant 

Director; Sandra Davis; Robert Grace; and Jason Holliday made key 

contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were John 

Bauckman; Jennifer Echard; Cindy Gilbert; Steven Lozano; Minette 

Richardson; Cheryl Peterson; and Carol Hernnstadt Shulman.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361309)
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