* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

1 Arredondo’s wife, Aurora Arredondo, is also an appellant in

this action but, for the sake of convenience, will not be referred

to in this opinion.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-40304

_____________________

SIXTO ARREDONDO and AURORA ARREDONDO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Texas

(B-91-CV-51)

_______________________________________________________ January 28, 1997

Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge: *

Sixto Arredondo appeals the district court’s order granting

Southwestern Bell Telephone’s motion for summary judgment. 1

Arredondo argues that the district court erred b y: (1) not

remanding the action to state court; (2) denying Arredondo leave to

amend his complaint; (3) granting summary judgment on his wrongful2

termination claim when there existed a genuine fact issue; and (4)

applying the wrong legal standard. We hold that the district court

did not err and affirm.

On March 8, 1987, Sixto Arredondo, an employee of Southwestern

Bell, suffered an injury while riding a bus to a training seminar.

Arredondo received disability benefits under Southwestern Bell’s

Sickness and Accident Disability Be nefit Plan, supplemented by

workers’ compensation benefits, until May 20, 1987 when Arredondo

returned to work on light duty status. On August 24, 1988,

Arredon do claimed a relapse of the original injury and ceased

working. Southwestern Bell’s Employee Benefit Committee received

some me dical information from Arredondo’s doctor regarding his

injury, but this information indicated that Arredondo was not

totally disabled and could engage in light duties. Southwestern

Bell repeatedly requested a second medical opinion, but the benefit

committee never received sufficient medical substantiation of

Arredondo’s inability to work as required by the company’s benefit

plan.

On June 15, 1989, the Employee Benefit Committee denied

Arredondo disability benefits for the alleged relapse because he

failed to comply with its requests for additional medical

information and because the medical information available indicated

that Ar redondo could perform certain duties. Arredondo’s

supervisor advised him to return to work, which Arredondo did, but

the supervisor sent him home beca use he seemed unable to work.2 F ormerly Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307c § 1 (Vernon

1992); now codified at Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon 1993).

3 Arredondo was informed that he could still get a second medical

opinion regarding his injury, but he never did. Arredondo was

given a final opportunity to return to work, but his lawyer called

to inform the company that his client was suffering from chest

pains and would not be able to return. After Arredondo failed to

appear for work, Southwestern Bell terminated his employment.

Arredondo was notified of his termination on September 25, 1989,

effective as of February 21, 1989.

Arredondo filed suit is state court alleging that Southwestern

Bell had wrongfully terminated his employment in retaliat ion for

filing a workers’ compensation claim in violation of Article 8307c

of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. 2 Arredondo also alleged

that Southwestern Bell had “breached the agreement” and wrongfully

discharged him “in violation of the contract.” In addition to

actual and exemplary damages, Arredondo soug ht reimbursement of

employee benefits which would have accrued, including pension and

retirement benefits. Southwestern Bell removed the action to

federal court based up on federal question jurisdiction, and

diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

On appeal, Arredondo contends that his sole cause of action

arose u nder the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and, because the

claim was non-removable, the district court erron eously retained

jurisdiction. Ordinarily, a cause of action arising under state4

workers’ compensation laws cannot be removed to federal court. 28

U.S.C. § 1445(c). However, Arredondo’s complaint combined

intertwined federal claims with the otherwise non-removable cause

of action, and the cause must either go to state or federal court.

We conclude that the federal district court could deter mine all

issues contained there. In his original pleading, Arredondo

asserted a claim against Southwestern Bell for violating the terms

of the “agreement.” This portion of Arredondo’s petition clearly

refers to the c ompany’s collective bargaining agreement with the

Communications Workers of America, Arredondo’s Union. Breach of

contract claims with respect to col lective bargaining agreements

are a utomatically preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). P arham v. Carrier Corp.

,

9 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1993).

Arredondo also sought damages in the form of pensio n and

retirement benefits for the alleged breach of contract. In order

to calculate the amount of these damages, the court would

necessarily have to refer to Southwestern Bell’s employee benefit

plan. A claim is preempted by § 514(a) of the Employment

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), if it

relates to an employee benefit plan. A claim relates to an ERISA

plan if it has some connection with or reference to such a plan.

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon , 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990). Where

a court must refer to an ERISA plan to determine retirement

benefits and calculate damages in accordance therewith, the claim5

relates to an ERISA plan and is preempted. S ee Christopher v.

Mobil Oil Corp. , 950 F.2d 1209, 1218-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

,

113 S.Ct. 68 (1992) ; Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co. , 871 F.2d 1290,

1294 (5th Cir. 1989).

A rredondo contends that the district court erred by denying

him leave to amend his complaint so as to delete any references to

the collective bargaining agreement or the employee benefit plan.

Whether a party should be allowed to am end his pleadings is a

decision left to the sound discretion of the district court and

reviewed for abuse of discretion. M oody v. FMC Corp.

, 995 F.2d 63,

65 (5th Cir. 1993). Arredondo did not seek leave to amend his

complaint unt il three years after the action had been filed. By

that time, discovery had closed, the deadline for dispositive

motions had passed, and summary judgment had been granted. In

light of the excessive delay and the potential prejudice to

Southwestern Bell, we find that the district court did not abuse

its discretion by denying Arredondo leave to amend.

Arred ondo argues that the district court erred by granting

summary judgment to Southwestern Bell on his wrongful termination

claim. Arredondo contends that he presented sufficient

circumstantial evidence to raise a genuine fact issue as to whether

Southwestern Bell terminated his employment in retaliation for

filing a workers’ compensation claim. In pursuing an article 8307c

claim, the plaintiff has the burden of “establishing a causal nexus

between his filing of a workers’ compensation claim and his6

discharge by his em ployer.” P arham

, 9 F.3d at 386. Arredondo

failed to present evidence linking his filing of a workers’

compensation claim and his termination.

Arredondo argues that Southwestern Bell’s repeated requests

for medical substantiation constitute “discriminatory and excessive

demands” and are proof of retaliation. Arredondo states that “[i]f

he had not filed the claim, Defendant would not have required the

additional documentation and exhaustive medical opinions.”

Arredondo presents no evidence to support this assertion, and the

undisputed evidence shows that medical substantiation is required

by the terms of the employee benefit plan. Arredondo contends that

the requests were excessive. However, there is no evidence that

these requests were inordinate in light of the benefit plan’s

requirements or the particulars of th e situation. Arredondo

asserts that other employees were not subjected to the same demands

for medical information, but he fails to show that other employees

in his position, namely employees sufferi ng an alleged relapse

after fifteen months, were not required to provide similar

documentation. Furthermore, Arredondo presents no support for the

contention that Southwestern Bell only required extensive

documentation from employees who filed workers’ compensation

claims. Finally, Arredondo claims that he complied with

Southwestern Bell’s request s for medical substantiation, yet the

record clearly shows that Southwestern Bell never received adequate7

documentation of a total inability to work as required by the

benefit plan.

Arredondo asserts that he presented sufficient circumstantial

evidence to survive summary judgment. We disagree. Viewing all

evidence in the light most favorable to Arredondo, and making all

reasonable inferences therefrom, there is simply no evidence of a

causal connection between Arredondo’s termination and his filing a

workers’ compensation claim over two years earlier.

Finally, Arr edondo contends that the district court applied

the wrong legal standard in granting Southwestern Bells’ motion for

summary judgment. Arredondo argues that the district court

erroneously applied an “arbitrary and capricious” standard to his

sole claim of retaliation. This argument is without merit. The

dist r ict court properly applied an “arbitrary and capricious”

standard in uph olding Southwestern Bell’s denial of disability

benefits. S ee Duhon v. Texaco, Inc.

, 15 F.3d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir.

1994 )(holding that where a plan administrator is given full and

final authority with respect to claims for employee benefits, final

decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion or “arbitrary

and cap ricious” standard). This determination, however, had no

relation to Arredondo’s wrongful termination claim.

AFFIRMED.