Strategic Forum

No. 227

September 2007

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 227, September 2007

The Country Team: 

Restructuring America’s 

First Line of Engagement

by Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr.

U.S. Embassies are confronting unprecedented challenges that do not fall neatly into 

diplomacy’s traditional categories of political, 

economic, and consular affairs. A rising tide 

of transnational threats coupled with weak 

governance in fragile states poses serious 

risks that demand concerted action.

U.S. Embassy staffs—our Country 

Teams—are ideally positioned as the first 

lines of engagement to face challenges to U.S. 

national interests. Yet effective interagency 

collaboration is often a hit-or-miss proposition, 

due to diluted authority, antiquated organizational structures, and insufficient resources.

The Ambassador is not sufficiently 

empowered to act effectively as the Country 

Team’s leader. Despite longstanding policy to 

the contrary, the Ambassador often is regarded 

not as the President’s representative but as the 

State Department’s envoy. Thus, personnel from 

other U.S. agencies tend to pursue their own 

lines of communication and operation, with 

inadequate coordination among them.

Civilian resource deficiencies exacerbate the problems emerging from agencycentric structures and behaviors. In practice, 

it is difficult for the U.S. Government to 

allocate resources to strategic priorities at 

the country level.

Given the critical challenges, it is time 

to reinvigorate the Country Team’s role in 

achieving U.S. national security objectives. The team must be reconfigured as a 

cross-functional entity with an empowered 

and recognized single leader for all agencies. The Country Team’s makeover must 

be holistic—to include new strategy and 

planning approaches, decisionmaking procedures, personnel training and incentives, 

and resource-allocation flexibility.

Expansion of Engagement

U.S. Embassies face unprecedented 

challenges. The kinds of issues that confound governments today—from organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism to nuclear proliferation, human rights, 

ethnosectarian conflict, global disease, 

and climate change—no longer fit within 

diplomacy’s traditional categories.1 Just 

as nonstate actors everywhere are becoming more powerful, regions of geostrategic importance in the developing world 

find themselves beset by weak or dysfunctional governments and increasingly perilous socioeconomic situations. While some 

might reasonably question the categorical 

quality of the 2002 National Security Strategy’s assertion that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are 

by failing ones,” there is still plenty of reason to be concerned about the trends.2

What does this mean for Embassies? 

First and foremost, Embassy staffs—our 

U.S. Country Teams—must continue to 

engage with allied, partner, and competitor countries, even as the terms of these 

engagements grow more complex. Indeed, 

the number of programs operated out of 

Embassies is expanding. A Country Team in 

Paris, for example, must partner with local 

authorities on counterterrorism, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 

the European Union, as well as countryspecific operations such as Afghanistan and 

Kosovo. The team must also further commercial interests and cooperation within 

regional and international financial institutions. In Moscow, the Country Team must 

promote democratic reform efforts while 

enhancing opportunities for U.S. businesses in a dynamic emerging market, as 

well as improve nuclear security initiatives 

and monitor avian flu. It must do this while 

working on global and regional energy 

problems as well as traditional diplomacy. 

In Abuja, Nigeria, the Country Team must 

monitor and help to deal with instabilities in the Niger Delta, engage in HIV/AIDS 

relief and economic development programs, 

and assist in the first civilian transfer of 

political power. In Bogotá, Colombia, the 

Country Team faces major counternarcotic 

and counterinsurgency problems as well as 

regional political problems.

All of these tasks must be coordinated 

and deconflicted, and the Country Team 

must work with unified purpose. In 

practice, this often does not happen. This is especially true in 

the area of stabilization and 

reconstruction missions, National Security

Reform Series
 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic 

Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. Michael Casey, Jr., is a Research Assistant in INSS. The 

authors welcome critical feedback. Comments may be addressed to Ambassador Oakley at oakleyr@ndu.

edu or Mr. Casey at caseym@ndu.edu. 

where the wars in Afghanistan and, more 

acutely, Iraq, revalidate the sacrosanct principle of unity of effort. However, this principle can be applied more broadly. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice notes, “More 

and more, solutions to the challenges we 

face lie not in the narrow expertise of one 

agency acting in one country, but in partnerships among multiple agencies working 

creatively together to solve common problems across entire regions.”3

Despite some positive steps toward this 

objective, senior policymakers in and out 

of office in both the executive and legislative branches lament the continued inability of the United States to integrate all elements of national power. Their frustrations 

apply not only to the national level, but also 

to the Country Team, the critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and 

personalities all come together. The Country Team builds the American image abroad 

and implements strategy. Without an effective 

Country Team, there can be no prospect of 

success in achieving national security objectives. The question is whether Country Teams 

are structured properly and resourced sufficiently to be effective. A brief examination 

of the Country Team’s evolution helps dispel some common misconceptions about the 

answer to this question.

Evolution of the Country 

Team

The struggle to gain control over 

unwieldy interagency activities at the country level is not of recent vintage.4

 As the United 

States emerged from World War II, it engaged 

in massive nationbuilding and foreign assistance efforts to reconstruct European states 

and to counter Soviet influence. To undertake 

this commitment, U.S. Government agencies, such as the Departments of Agriculture, 

Defense, and Treasury, as well as the Economic Cooperation Administration, dispatched 

personnel overseas to accomplish U.S. objectives. With the proliferation of agencies and 

personnel overseas, the execution of U.S. foreign policy—heretofore led by the Department 

of State—became more complex.

Among the first instances in which one 

can find the problem of interagency coordination in the field is President Harry Truman’s 

declaration of economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947. Interestingly, the State Department—to which 

President Truman delegated authority of the 

programs—administered the program differently for each country. In Turkey, the U.S. 

Ambassador also served as the chief of the 

American Mission for Aid to Turkey. In Greece, 

however, “Dwight P. Griswold was appointed 

. . . to be Chief of the American Mission for 

Aid to Greece, and his mission was outside and 

independent of the embassy at Athens and of 

Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh.”5 Inevitably, 

the Greeks observed that Griswold controlled 

the resources, so they bypassed the Ambassador and dealt directly with him. The Ambassador’s authority diminished, and a conflict 

within the Embassy emerged. Rather than 

reconfirming the Ambassador’s authority in 

the matter, the State Department recalled 

both Mr. Griswold and Ambassador MacVeagh, 

and then deployed a new Ambassador who 

also served as chief of the aid mission. This 

course of action revealed two longstanding 

Department of State tendencies: the assumption that effective diplomats can avoid such 

contretemps, and the default position that the 

Ambassador is ultimately responsible for all 

Embassy activities.

By 1951, with Defense Department and 

economic aid programs expanding overseas, 

President Truman saw the need to specify 

mechanisms for coordination at the country and regional levels. General Lucius Clay, 

who served as Military Governor in postwar Germany and helped create the Marshall Plan, undertook negotiations among 

government agencies to identify the best 

means to achieve coordination overseas. 

Along with establishing the concept of the 

Country Team, the resulting Memorandum 

of Understanding Between the Departments 

About This Study

Since late 2006, INSS has worked in partnership with the Project on National Security Reform. 

Hosted by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the project is a nonpartisan initiative dedicated 

to improving the ability of the U.S. Government to integrate all elements of national power in pursuit 

of national security. Toward this end, the project is conducting a study of the interagency process to 

support a reform agenda that would parallel the historic Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986, which helped to transform the American military and its world-class 

capability for joint warfare. INSS will feature analyses in this area in a Strategic Forum series on 

National Security Reform. 

This report presents initial findings from the Project’s Structure Working Group, specifically from 

the country-level issue team led by Robert Oakley. Ambassador Oakley’s team investigated how the 

United States organizes itself for integrated efforts at the Embassy, or Country Team, level.

While assuming sole responsibility for the opinions expressed in this article, the authors wish to 

acknowledge the contributions of other team members: John Agoglia, Gary Anderson, Michael S. 

Bell, Robert Feidler, Robert Grenier, Donald Hays, Princeton Lyman, John McLaughlin, Robert Pearson, 

Anthony Quainton, David Rhoad, Michael Welken, Anne Witkowsky, and Casimir Yost. 

For more information on the Project on National Security Reform and its bipartisan leadership, 

visit www.pnsr.org.
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum 

of State and Defense and the Economic 

Cooperation Administration—commonly 

referred to as the “Clay Paper”—concluded:

To insure the full coordination of the U.S. 

effort, U.S. representatives at the country level shall constitute a team under 

the leadership of the Ambassador. . . . The 

Ambassador’s responsibility for coordination, general direction, and leadership shall be given renewed emphasis, and 

all United States elements shall be reindoctrinated with respect to the Ambassador’s 

role as senior representative for the United 

States in the country [emphasis added].

6

The Country Team concept, mentioned 

first in the Clay Paper, is a construct not codified in law. It is an executive measure to 

grant the Ambassador the means to coordinate all U.S. Government activities to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in 

the country to which he or she is assigned.

Despite the efforts of Presidents Truman 

and Dwight Eisenhower through Executive 

orders and memoranda such as the Clay Paper, 

interagency coordination at the country level 

remained elusive. Shortly after arriving in the 

White House, President John F. Kennedy decided 

to solve the problem definitively by dispatching 

a letter to all Ambassadors in which he outlined 

his expectations for the Country Team, as well 

as the authorities at the Ambassadors’ disposal.

President Kennedy also granted Ambassadors complete authority over the composition 

of the Country Team, with the proviso that 

employees of every agency had the right to 

appeal to Washington if they found themselves 

in disagreement with the Ambassador. Additionally, President Kennedy addressed the issue 

of military forces engaged in military operations. In such instances, Kennedy declared 

that the Ambassador “should work closely with 

the appropriate area military commander 

to assure the full exchange of information.” 

If the Ambassador felt “that activities by the 

United States military forces may adversely 

affect our over-all relations with the people 

or government of [country],” the Ambassador 

“should promptly discuss the matter with the 

military commander and, if necessary, request 

a decision by higher authority.”7 In contrast, to this day the military is not routinely 

enjoined to work with Ambassadors or to elevate differences of opinion to higher levels.

Vignettes

Often, those investigating the problem of 

integrating elements of national power at the 

country level conclude that the authority of the 

Ambassador must be reinforced. However, as 

the brief overview of the Country Team concept 

illustrates, Presidents repeatedly have reasserted 

the Ambassador’s authority, which suggests a 

recurring problem with the Ambassador’s ability to generate integrated interagency support 

for U.S. objectives and interests. A closer look at 

some historical vignettes suggests some reasons 

for why this is so.

Vietnam: The Strategic Hamlets 

Program. Despite President Kennedy’s intervention, agencies at the Country Team level 

in the Republic of South Vietnam continued 

to operate along their own lines of effort. The 

1962 Strategic Hamlets Program in Vietnam 

underscored this fact. The program required 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), military advisors, Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 

and other U.S. Government personnel to deploy 

into the provinces of South Vietnam and work 

together. However, the Ambassador to Vietnam 

believed in allowing each agency full authority over its own programs.8

 The result was that 

each agency in the field pursued its own objectives without regard to the larger mission. It 

quickly became apparent that the civilian and 

military approaches to the war in Vietnam during this period were fundamentally at odds with 

one another.

These two diverging approaches were 

not reconciled. As the military increased its 

use of bombs and artillery, civilian casualties mounted, thus undermining the objectives 

of the Strategic Hamlets Program. The program muddled along until the U.S. Government 

developed a new, more successful structure. 

Several lessons are illustrated:

■ Even with high stakes, Presidential 

attention, and ostensibly clear lines of authority, agencies worked at cross purposes.

■ It is particularly difficult to reconcile 

military and other agency objectives.

■ The Ambassador’s laissez-faire 

approach was ineffective, but not atypical, 

and in fact understandable.

Vietnam: CORDS. In 1966, President 

Lyndon Johnson intervened to correct the persistent inability of U.S. Government agencies to act in concert. He appointed the Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, Ambassador 

William Porter, to lead the pacification effort 

there. Likewise, President Johnson appointed 

a National Security Council (NSC) staff member, Robert Komer, to ensure that all agencies 

in Washington coordinated to provide full support to Ambassador Porter.9

 Nevertheless, the 

United States failed to achieve unity of effort 

with the assignment of two individuals; structural changes were still needed. Ambassador 

Henry Cabot Lodge and military commander 

General William Westmoreland simply did 

not work closely together, nor did their staffs. 

The U.S. Government reorganized on multiple occasions to assert civilian control over the 

pacification mission, but to no avail. Finally, 

Komer proposed a new structure—the Civil 

Operations and Revolutionary Development 

Support (CORDS) program—which was 

enacted on May 1, 1967.

the Country Team concept 

is an executive measure 

to grant the Ambassador 

the means to coordinate 

all U.S. Government 

activities to maximize 

the effectiveness of U.S. 

foreign policy in the 

country to which he or 

she is assigned
 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007

CORDS successfully unified the efforts of 

the U.S. Government by placing the program 

in the Headquarters of Military Assistance 

Command–Vietnam (MACV). Komer was 

assigned as the Deputy Commander of MACV 

for CORDS and given the rank of Ambassador. 

Ambassador Komer “had status equivalent to 

a three-star general and ranked third in the 

MACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his 

military deputy, General Creighton Abrams.”10

Yet he was also under the authority and had 

the full support of U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, 

Ellsworth Bunker. A combined staff of military 

and civilian personnel supported Ambassador Komer at Headquarters of MACV, and this 

structure was replicated down to the district 

level in all 250 districts in South Vietnam.11

Ironically, “subordinating civilian capabilities to the military chain of command 

actually realized the principle of the primacy 

of civil power. This unique placement gave 

civilian entities greater influence than they 

ever had before because it provided resources 

they did not previously have.”12 It also helped 

to ensure that the political objectives took 

precedence over those of the military. One of 

the key means by which civilians were able to 

control military activities was their newfound 

responsibility to write performance reports for 

their military colleagues.

Ambassador Komer developed the concept for CORDS, but Ambassador William Colby 

institutionalized it in MACV and synergized its 

activities with Ambassador Bunker. In doing 

so, Ambassador Colby prevented major conflicts among civilian and military leaders that 

might have trickled down and complicated collaboration in the field. CORDS’ successes began 

to mount, but not before U.S. public opinion 

turned decidedly against the war. Nevertheless, 

the case of CORDS demonstrated that:

■ Formal integration mechanisms at 

multiple levels are necessary even with good 

individual leadership.

■ Changing individual behaviors 

requires more than policy pronouncements 

from higher authority; it requires control of 

personal incentives.

■ The ingrained desire for unity of purpose in military culture can be used to support 

interagency collaboration in the right decisionmaking structure.

Unfortunately, the lessons from CORDS 

were lost after the withdrawal from Vietnam 

and not highlighted again until a series of 

limited interventions in the 1980s and 1990s.

Somalia: Operation Restore Hope.

Ambassador Robert Oakley, as the Presidential 

Special Representative for Somalia, and Combined Joint Task Force Commander Lieutenant General Robert Johnston had a close, collaborative relationship, as did their staffs. At 

the time, their relationship was widely identified as a major contribution to the success 

of the united task force phase of the Somalia 

operations.13 Since the U.S. Liaison Office was 

too small for a formal Country Team structure, Oakley and Johnston agreed on alternative informal coordination mechanisms. One 

of Johnston’s senior officers attended all USIA 

meetings; Oakley’s deputy chief of mission was 

Johnston’s political advisor and attended all 

unified task force meetings; and Oakley and 

Johnston met at least once a day. By dint of 

shared past experience (for example, Vietnam 

and Lebanon) and a common commitment to 

collaboration, the critical civil-military relationships and complex issues requiring coordination were managed successfully. The question of who was senior never arose, as Oakley 

and Johnston identified and resolved any differences quickly. It also helped that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally told 

both that mission success depended on their 

working well together. This same attitude was 

reflected in formal communications with the 

Departments of State and Defense.

Later, under more trying circumstances 

and different leadership, civil-military collaboration deteriorated in a manner that 

ultimately contributed to a precipitous drop 

in public and congressional support, withdrawal of U.S. forces, and mission failure. 

The United States and United Nations tried 

to pursue a two-track policy of fighting and 

negotiating with a Somali warlord without 

sufficient unity of effort in either Washington 

or Mogadishu. Somalia and the checkered 

record of interagency collaboration illustrate 

several points:

■ Informal coordination mechanisms 

can work well if backed up by good leaders 

and their personal commitment.

■ Senior civilian and military leader 

guidance in favor of civil-military collaboration is helpful.

■ Without a standing system designed to 

reward interagency collaboration, successful 

interagency coordination may prove as fleeting as individual leader assignments.

Afghanistan and Iraq. In 

September 2003, facing a difficult transition from a counterterrorism focus to a more 

robust nationbuilding/counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush 

appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. Khalilzad said he deployed 

to Afghanistan to “ensure the concerted use of 

all instruments of U.S. power to accelerate the 

defeat of the Taliban insurgency and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.”14 Khalilzad shared 

this view with the U.S. military commander, 

Lieutenant General David Barno, and they were 

successful in integrating not only U.S. Government agencies but also international partners 

and nongovernmental organizations. One way 

that Khalilzad and General Barno drove the 

spirit of unity of effort throughout the Country 

Team was by locating their offices adjacent to 

one another in the Embassy.

without a standing system 

designed to reward 

interagency collaboration, 

successful interagency 

coordination may prove 

as fleeting as individual 

leader assignments
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum 

When Ambassador John Negroponte 

arrived in Iraq, he and General George 

Casey also established adjacent offices to 

ensure a coordinated, unified approach to 

U.S. policy. This was a stark change from 

the practice of Ambassador Paul Bremer 

and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, 

whose offices were in different buildings 

and who did not routinely coordinate with 

one another, thereby setting a poor example 

for the Country Team.

Under the current Embassy structure in 

Baghdad:

The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ambassador Ryan Crocker) has full authority for the 

American presence in Iraq with two exceptions: 1—military and security matters 

which are under the authority of General 

Petraeus, the U.S. Commander of the Multinational Force–Iraq, and 2—staff working for international organizations. In areas 

where diplomacy, military, and/or security 

activities overlap, the Ambassador and the 

U.S. commander continue cooperating to 

provide co-equal authority regarding what’s 

best for America and its interests in Iraq 

[emphasis added].

15

These brief overviews of ongoing operations, along with the previous vignettes, illustrate several key conclusions about the state of 

interagency collaboration at the country level:

■ Military authorities retain substantial independent freedom of action during 

military operations.

■ Proximity, informal coordination 

mechanisms, and senior leader attitudes can 

increase the chances for successful civil-military integration but do not offer a reliable systemic solution to the problem.

■ The United States has not had a structured 

solution for civil-military integration in irregular 

conflict at the country level since CORDS.

The vignettes also illustrate that coordination is difficult even when the stakes are high 

enough to merit use of force. Counterintuitively, some might wonder if interagency coordination is better when there are less compelling reasons for it. The answer is no. As the case 

of aid in Greece and innumerable other anecdotes could illustrate, tensions among Ambassadors and other government agencies’ representatives, USAID directors, and representatives 

from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and other agencies are commonplace 

when the Ambassador tries to lead in anything other than a laissez-faire manner. This 

does not mean, however, that Country Teams 

cannot succeed in effectively integrating their 

efforts when they have the right leadership and 

focused policy support.

South Africa is a case in point. During 

the transition period from Apartheid (1992–

1994), the U.S. Ambassador successfully built 

a cross-agency working group, which the 

political counselor chaired. USAID transferred $1 million each year to the U.S. Information Agency to fund more short-term visitor 

training programs; the Defense Attachés went 

beyond their normal roles to liaison (with 

Washington’s permission) with the African 

National Congress “armed forces” leadership 

to facilitate integration into a national army, 

and the Agricultural Attaché provided invaluable feedback on the farming communities’ 

attitudes toward the political transition. In 

sum, the entire team focused on the primary 

U.S. objective: to help see a successful, relatively peaceful transition out of Apartheid.16

While such examples exist, the fact is that all 

too often, representatives from different agencies pursue their organizational interests at the 

expense of a broader, integrated approach for 

reasons that must be identified if reasonable 

remedies are to be found.

Enduring Problems

Interagency collaboration is a hit-or-miss 

proposition despite the ostensible authority of 

the Ambassador and the longstanding convention of the Country Team. The core problem, summed up well by the Department of 

State’s Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, is 

that “Other agencies often view the Ambassador as the Department [of State’s] representative, rather than the President’s. The 

Ambassador is left with the responsibility, but 

not the authority, to coordinate the activities and address the often competing needs of 

the mission.”17 Seeing the Ambassador as a 

Department of State representative who either 

ignores or willingly sacrifices other agency 

objectives in favor of State objectives legitimates other organization-centric behavior 

that creates major obstacles to unity of effort. 

These obstacles may be grouped in three overlapping categories to facilitate examination: 

authority, structure, and resources.

Diluted Authority. Ambassadors do 

not have adequate explicit authorities to unify 

the efforts of the Country Team, and their task 

has only grown more difficult in recent years. 

Not only must Ambassadors coordinate major 

government activities such as diplomacy, commercial relations, use of force, and intelligence 

activities, but they also must provide interagency coordination for numerous sub-specialties within a given area. With over 30 government agencies now dispatching employees 

overseas, non–State Department personnel often 

outnumber diplomats.18 As noted earlier, the 

Presidential letter to Ambassadors lays out their 

overarching authority but does not spell out the 

specific responsibilities of other agencies visà-vis the Ambassador. Personnel from government agencies often deploy to the Country Team 

without understanding the Ambassador is the 

President’s representative. They do not receive 

because the Ambassador 

is often not seen as the 

overarching national 

representative, agencies 

encourage their 

personnel on the Country 

Team to pursue their 

own objectives and lines 

of operation, without 

adequate consultation or 

coordination
 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007

adequate guidance from their agencies on relationships with the Ambassador and with other 

agencies, nor do they receive thorough briefings on the Presidential letter and its intent. 

This is particularly true of personnel from the 

Departments of Defense, Justice, and Treasury, 

as well as other government agencies. In particular, Ambassadors lack the proper tools to exert 

their authority, such as effective control over 

employee performance reports.

Because the Ambassador is often not 

seen as the overarching national representative, agencies encourage their personnel on the Country Team to pursue 

their own objectives and lines of operation, without adequate consultation 

or coordination. Some of these agency 

personnel, as the late George Kennan 

observed, “seem to operate directly or 

indirectly under the authority of Washington bosses, some in the State Department, some elsewhere.”19 This state of 

affairs, he added, “invites . . . the foreign 

ambassador and ambassadorial staff stationed in Washington to take their problems directly to other departments and 

agencies, bypassing the State Department 

entirely.”20 Without an adequate voice in 

the performance assessment of agency 

leads and vice versa, there are no built-in 

incentives to putting the priorities of the 

Country Team above those of individual 

agencies. When rare exceptions to this 

general rule have been made—as in the 

administration of the CORDS program 

during Vietnam—results were positive.21

The White House, and to some degree 

the Department of State, do not pay sufficient attention to the Ambassador’s authority 

vis-à-vis other agencies, thereby compounding the problem. In many cases, support for 

the Ambassador from State depends largely 

on the importance of the post, personal 

influence of the Ambassador, or critical 

nature of the issue, rather than on the institutional role of the Ambassador as the President’s representative. The mistaken assumption is that the Ambassador and Country 

Team are not necessary to tee up feasible 

policy options for Washington. Their opinions and insights usually are not valued 

highly enough when it comes to designing 

policies and setting priorities. In addition, 

since Washington does not do a good job of 

integrating its priorities, Ambassadors lack a 

framework for balancing valid, but competing, interests. Currently, for example, counterterrorism often overwhelms other issues, 

no matter what the country, and “new” but 

important issues such as health and the 

environment do not receive adequate attention or recognition in Washington.

Another manifestation of the independence of other agencies in the field and a 

major reason the Ambassador finds it difficult to provide effective oversight is informal 

parallel communications. The proliferation 

of email and cellular phones has created 

new channels outside of formal communications schemes. As agency representatives 

bypass the Ambassador and obtain guidance 

directly from Washington bureaus, Ambassadors are isolated from the operations of other 

agencies, and the de facto autonomy of other 

agencies grows. Direct communications with 

superiors in the home agency without the 

Ambassador’s knowledge also reinforce an 

informal incentive system that rewards individual agency-centric behaviors.

The increasing reliance upon contractors rather than direct-hire government personnel can lead to a serious diminution in the effectiveness, timeliness, and accountability of U.S. 

activities if direct Embassy oversight is not provided (for example, police training in Iraq and 

Afghanistan). Contractors and subcontractors are 

not viewed as an extension of the Country Team 

and, in fact, are not even counted in the mission’s complement of U.S. personnel in-country, except for security purposes. As a result, the 

Ambassador’s ability to oversee the operations 

of these personnel while in-country is largely 

dependent upon the funding agency’s availability 

and commitment of direct-hire supervisory staff 

to the Embassy who can provide accountability to the Country Team. This problem applies to 

civilian and military contractors.

The Ambassador, understandably, has 

no authority over nongovernmental organizations or U.S. businessmen. Yet many 

Ambassadors ignore the opportunities these 

organizations and individuals present for 

improving and spreading U.S. influence in 

a more cohesive fashion. The private sector 

in particular is a valuable asset in promoting U.S. values and policies, but it is often 

ignored by the Country Team for other than 

commercial or security issues.

Finally, in crisis situations, such as the 

recent devastating tsunami in Southeast Asia 

or the earthquake in Pakistan, diverse ad 

hoc organizational structures further undermine the Ambassador’s ability to coordinate 

activities. There is no commonly accepted 

and established mechanism for the Ambassador to use when multiple agencies and 

their personnel surge into the country. Each 

agency in Washington has its own office or 

offices to respond to emergencies, conflict, 

or failed states, and they often do so without 

adequate coordination. Civilian policy and 

civil-military coordination at the regional 

level is underpowered, so Ambassadors and 

their country-level programs cannot be coordinated across the region for greater effects. 

In these respects, inadequate regional and 

emergency decisionmaking structures compound the problems already inherent in the 

Embassy’s organizational structure.

Antiquated Organizational Structures. The complexity and number of 

demands facing the Country Team often outstrip the capacity of the existing Embassy organizational structure to deal with them. The 

current staff structure often encourages individual agencies to go their own way rather 

many Ambassadors ignore 

the opportunities NGOs 

and U.S. businesses 

present for improving and 

spreading U.S. influence in 

a more cohesive fashion, 

even though the private 

sector in particular is a 

valuable asset
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum 

than to strive for unity of effort, particularly in 

larger posts. Embassy structure tends to be built 

around political and economic affairs, and 

these traditional lenses for viewing the world 

insufficiently encompass U.S. policy objectives. 

Moreover, direct reporting to the Ambassador 

makes him or her a bottleneck for information 

exchange, which needs to occur more routinely 

among different agencies in the Embassy. Likewise, coordination between and among clusters 

of agency representatives with common or complementary programs is insufficient.

Resources. Resource deficiencies 

exacerbate the problems emerging from 

agency-centric structures and behaviors. To 

begin with, Washington generally does not 

recognize the Country Team’s ideal position to allocate resources to priority programs. Washington does not provide an 

agreed interagency statement on overall 

U.S. objectives and priorities and grants its 

Ambassadors only limited—if any—control over resources. This leaves the Ambassador and Country Team no real opportunity to evaluate ends, ways, and means in 

the context of a strategy. Thus, if Country Team plans are done, they are written loosely because the lack of control over 

resources severely limits control over outcomes. Ambassadors simply allow each 

organization to pursue broad, generic 

objectives. Any attempt to investigate interagency resource tradeoffs would inevitably 

incline agencies to withhold their resources 

or openly defy the Ambassador’s authority.

In essence, this means that the government cannot allocate funds to rank-order 

priorities at the country level or administer resources in an integrated manner for 

maximum effect. On rare occasions when 

resources are provided, the lack of budget 

authority means they cannot be redistributed when circumstances and priorities dictate. Even in emergencies, Congress places 

restrictions that severely hamper a unified 

approach to the use of operational funds by 

different agencies. There is no single individual or office in Washington with the requisite knowledge and authority to assist the 

Ambassador in managing surge resources 

across multiple programs, both civilian 

and military. State and USAID consolidated 

their foreign assistance programs for each 

country, but the programs are developed 

in Washington rather than initiated in the 

Country Teams. Even resources contained 

in the State Department budget are subject 

to so many constraints due to the cumbersome and decentralized approval process in 

Washington that they offer the Ambassador 

little flexibility.

An additional challenge to the Country Team is that in Washington, policy is 

conducted in one place, while resources 

are located in others. This necessarily has an impact on the unity of effort of 

the Country Team. This problem inhibits “the synchronization of [administration 

and budget] with the priorities and initiatives of U.S. foreign policy. The bifurcation of policymaking and budget management within the [State Department] has 

rendered it administratively and financially less responsive to the changing realities of international affairs.”22 This applies 

equally to other agencies, and therefore 

compounds the difficulty of assembling the 

resources to implement policy objectives.

While inadequate fungible resources are 

a major problem, poorly managed human 

resources are an even greater problem, beginning with the Ambassador. The Ambassador’s 

job is becoming much more complicated, yet 

Ambassadors frequently lack the skills necessary to harness all elements of national 

power. This is due to problems in selection as 

well as the absence of a career professional 

training program for Department of State or 

other civilian government agency personnel 

assigned abroad. Ambassadors are not necessarily trained in critical management or leadership skills, nor are they trained in planning.

The selection process for Ambassadors 

does not insist that individuals selected—

career or noncareer—have proven track 

records of successful involvement in foreign affairs, or management experience, 

nor does it require prior experience of service abroad with a proven track record of 

effectively representing U.S. interests. The 

selection process for Ambassadors also often 

ignores language and cultural skills. They 

do not receive adequate training to compensate for these lacunae. The same care is 

often lacking in the selection and training 

of agency heads.

Obtaining trained personnel to support 

the Country Team is also a problem. In the 

special case of postconflict stabilization, the 

State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is making an effort 

to develop a roster of capable civilian personnel. President Bush also has called for a Civilian Reserve Corps. This is meant to compensate, partially, for an inadequate number of 

permanent employees. Incentives provided 

for personnel from some civilian agencies—

including the State Department—for deployment abroad are not nearly sufficient in relation to need, and the inability of agencies 

to compel nonmilitary employees to accept 

certain assignments or to be called up and 

assigned on a timely basis for a long enough 

period of time to learn to do the job remains 

a major problem. At one point in Afghanistan, 

the Country Team had only a single representative responsible for a program involving 

hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of 

civilian contract personnel, and hundreds of 

U.S. military personnel. It was almost totally 

reliant upon contractors, who had little or 

no supervision.

Even when the Country Team is composed of highly qualified personnel, security restrictions upon the movement of civilian personnel are a severe obstacle to their 

effectiveness in the field. State Department 

Embassy structure 

tends to be built 

around political and 

economic affairs, and 

these traditional lenses 

for viewing the world 

insufficiently encompass 

U.S. policy objectives
 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007

and other U.S. Government personnel are not 

trained to operate in semipermissive environments. Ambassadors, understandably, are 

cautious because they are held accountable 

for the safety of personnel. More often, however, Washington will dictate policies that 

restrict freedom of movement for Embassy 

personnel when security threats are high.

Restructuring Country 

Teams

Given the evolving security environment and critical challenges confronting 

our nation, it is time to revalidate the Country Team’s critical role in achieving U.S. 

national security objectives and to rethink 

the concept of the Country Team as a committee working for a lead agency. Instead, 

the Country Team of the future must be 

reconfigured as a cross-functional team with 

an empowered national leader. The Country Team’s makeover must be done holistically—to include new strategy and planning 

approaches, decisionmaking procedures, personnel training and incentives, and resource 

allocation flexibility.

Authorities. First and foremost, the White 

House must augment the Ambassador’s de jure 

authority with some practical de facto authorities 

that will provide the means to lead the national 

security team in-country effectively. Ambassadorial authority should be clarified and strengthened both in the Presidential letter to Ambassadors and in guidance from agencies to agency 

representatives in-country, but the Department of 

State also must select, train, and reward Ambassadors for asserting their authority appropriately 

within the new Country Team concept. In short, 

the Ambassador must acknowledge and strongly 

support all agencies, not just the Department of 

State. The chief of mission should work with State 

and other agencies to ensure that individuals 

and supporting personnel selected for the Country Team have the requisite expertise needed for 

success and also should have a major input in 

the performance evaluations of agency heads and 

their subordinates. Likewise, other agency personnel should be able to rate the Ambassador’s 

performance, and the Ambassador should be 

held accountable for meeting the Country Team’s 

planned objectives.

A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report recommends that the 

Ambassador have the authority “to approve 

all military-related programs implemented in 

country.”23 It is prudent that such Ambassadorial authority should go beyond purely military programs and include all agencies. However, this authority should contain a provision 

for appeal to Washington in the event that there 

is a difference of view that cannot be resolved 

at the Embassy level. Whereas the Ambassador and Country Team will have a better feel 

for country relations, the Washington level has 

broader perspectives on regional and global 

issues that may determine decisions on country 

policy, as well as providing a longer-term viewpoint. The SFRC report also recommends that 

in the case of special operations forces, there 

should be a memorandum of understanding 

with the relevant regional combatant command 

making clear the Ambassador’s authority. This 

also should be implemented.

Washington should provide integrated 

policies and priorities for regions and individual countries and then allow more 

authority and operational autonomy for 

Ambassadors and Country Teams to pursue 

those objectives. At the same time, the State 

Department and the NSC need to ensure 

that all agencies support agreed policy and 

Country Team objectives and that the mission is provided with timely policy guidance. 

In most situations and for most Embassies, 

State Department–led interagency working 

groups can provide interagency oversight. 

For crisis situations or where there are major 

programs by a non-State agency (for example, Defense, Justice, or CIA), there should be 

an NSC-led interagency group.

In some situations (conflict and immediate postconflict), there will need to be shared, 

but explicitly delineated, authority between the 

Ambassador (or Presidential special advisor) 

and the military (Combined Joint Task Force) 

commander as well as the regional combatant command. This can alternate depending 

on the situation. The Ambassador should have 

authority over not only civilian agencies but 

also civilian functions carried out by military 

forces. There should be a clear delineation of 

authority and an institutionalized process for 

dealing with nongovernmental organizations 

and international humanitarian aid agencies in both routine and crisis situations, by 

all government agencies. The same should be 

true for businessmen and contractors.

Reforming Structures. The Ambassador should have the latitude to structure the Embassy to meet local circumstances and U.S. priorities. For example, in 

Bogotá, the high priority of counternarcotics 

and counterinsurgency programs would be 

reflected in the organizational structure. In 

other countries, the structure would reflect 

the importance of counterterrorism, military-to-military relations, or environmental 

and economic issues.

One option to improve Country Team 

effectiveness is to create two deputy chiefs 

of mission (DCM) in larger Embassies one 

for substantive issues and one for program 

management. The DCM for management 

would be in charge of all administrative 

resource allocation in support of the Country Team and its policy agenda. The person need not necessarily be a State Department foreign service officer. The DCM for 

policy would perform the executive secretariat and chief of staff functions for the 

Ambassador, supervising the various functional components, as well as serving as 

the Ambassador’s alter ego. There should 

be a small staff with deep knowledge of all 

Washington should 

provide integrated 

policies and priorities for 

regions and individual 

countries and then allow 

more authority and 

operational autonomy 

for Ambassadors and 

Country Teams to pursue 

those objectives
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum 

agency operations and procedures to support the DCM(s). This staff would monitor 

all incoming and outgoing communications 

to ensure that they are properly distributed, that action responsibilities are clearly 

assigned, and that they conform to existing policy. Particularly sensitive outgoing 

messages should be discussed by the agency 

head directly with the DCM or the Ambassador. In certain situations where there is a 

high degree of military participation, consideration could even be given to an Active 

duty military officer serving as DCM.

Concomitant with the need for two DCMs 

is the critical requirement to restructure the 

Embassy into functional components. Examples of such components could include law 

enforcement (to include the consular function); trade promotion/development; economic 

analysis; political/intelligence analysis and 

coordination; antiterror programs; crisis planning and response; public information/public 

affairs/cultural activities; and democracy promotion and social sector activities. Employees of all agencies—as appropriate—would 

populate each functional cluster to ensure an 

integrated approach. Agency participation in 

these components should be broad rather than 

restrictive. Each component would have a designated chairperson—in some cases the DCM, 

in others an agency head reporting to the 

DCM and Ambassador. This would facilitate 

interagency communication and coordination. 

To promote information sharing, a truly unified communications architecture should be 

created. The use of agency proprietary systems 

and back-channel communications should 

be limited.

All Defense offices and personnel should be consolidated under a single office with a designated officer in 

charge. Similarly, all intelligence personnel (including military) should be coordinated under a single authority. Law 

enforcement elements should also be collocated and coordinated.

There should be a clear delineation 

of responsibilities for communicating with 

representatives of local and other governments (Embassies) and international organizations. Any fixes of the Country Team 

must be complemented by changes at the 

regional level. There needs to be an alignment of authorities between State and 

Defense at the regional level. As the President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission dictates, the Ambassador has authority over all personnel “except those under 

command of a U.S. area military commander.”24 It is clearly appropriate for 

combatant commanders to have the independent authority to act in the context of 

deployed forces engaged in active hostilities, but the letter of instruction leaves gaps 

with respect to political-military activities, such as bilateral training and exercises, conducted by U.S. forces stationed 

in a country in peacetime; and the status 

of military forces falling under functional 

combatant commanders, particularly Special Operations Command. The subjection 

of military elements assigned to diplomatic 

missions to the authority of the Ambassador must be reiterated and enforced, but its 

scope also needs to be expanded and more 

clearly defined. Particularly in the case of 

special operations or intelligence-related 

military personnel, experience shows that 

they are most effectively employed when 

placed, at the direction of the Ambassador, 

under the delegated coordinating authority 

of an established mission element.

On issues of formulating and implementing regional priorities, it is critical that 

the State Department’s cadre of regional 

assistant secretaries enjoy good two-way 

communication with Defense’s five (soon to 

be six) regional combatant commanders, 

while taking steps, however, not to bypass 

their equivalents at the Joint Staff and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. The socalled Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

system in fact was intended to improve sharing of knowledge, but it has been less than 

adequate for unified action or for planning. The Integration Planning Cell of the 

proposed Interagency Management System 

would provide for much better interagency 

coordination with the combatant commands 

but would still be advisory in nature, if it 

were activated.

The incipient new U.S. Africa Command 

is planned to be much more integrated on an 

interagency basis than any previous combatant command, with a State Department officer serving as the deputy to the military commander and similar integration at lower levels. 

If successful, this integration could provide a 

solution for routine interagency regional cooperation, including the role of the combatant 

command. A State Department deputy assigned 

to each of the combatant commanders could 

be dual-hatted as a deputy assistant secretary of 

state. There should not be a permanent regional 

Ambassador. However, in crisis situations, either 

an Ambassador or a Presidential special representative should serve as the coordinator for all 

U.S. Government activities.

Resources. The methods of selecting and training Ambassadors and agency 

heads must change. An interagency training program for Ambassadors and agency 

heads is required. Annual offsites for all 

agency heads could improve the prospects 

for unity of effort. Senior managers from 

all agencies should receive periodic ethics training to ensure that the functioning 

of the Embassy and their own actions are 

held to the highest standards.

Personnel systems must adapt to incentivize people to serve in high-risk countries. 

All agencies must strengthen their personnel numbers to assure effective management 

and coordination of grantee- and contractor-implemented programs in-country. This 

is particularly true with regard to USAID, 

which has experienced a steady decline in 

direct-hire numbers. There must be a reserve 

any fixes of the 

Country Team must 

be complemented by 

changes at the regional 

level, and there needs 

to be an alignment of 

authorities between State 

and Defense at this level
10 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007

personnel or “surge” capacity for civilian 

agencies beginning with State, but including 

other key agencies as well. Defense and, to 

a lesser degree, USAID already have a surge 

capacity for crises. Ambassadors must be able 

to call upon everyone and employ all available resources in response to exigencies. In 

Embassies and in Washington, there needs to 

be routine coordination of all resources—

military and civilian.

On the funding side, there must be a 

rationalization of existing contingency funds 

and capacity to act on supplementals. There 

should be a resource push with Congress 

for the appropriation of all-purpose reserve 

funds. Current congressional restrictions 

upon a unified approach to the utilization of 

operational funds by different agencies need 

to be removed so that the Country Team can 

achieve unity of effort and respond rapidly to 

changing local conditions.

A single officer answering to the 

Ambassador (normally the DCM or USAID 

mission director) should be responsible for 

coordinating the expenditure of all operational civilian funds—including for development, disaster relief, refugees, postconflict reconstruction, counternarcotics, and 

law enforcement programs—as well as 

military funds with an essentially civilian objective, such as civic assistance or 

capacity-building. This officer will require 

extensive interagency training to understand operations and procedures, including funding for military-related education, 

training, and equipping programs. If there 

are differences of view that the Ambassador cannot resolve, personnel would 

appeal to Washington.

More flexibility needs to be built in at the 

Country Team and Washington levels for the 

movement of funds from one function to another 

and for the management of contingency funds 

and personnel. The chief of mission should have 

the authority to allocate funds from all sources 

for priority projects. Additionally, Ambassadors 

should be much more aggressive in advocating 

for resources for non-State agencies included in 

their Country Teams. The Ambassador should 

have the authority to terminate funds if the project is clearly failing to deliver expected results.25

A new approach to the Country Team 

plan can facilitate these changes. As called 

for in the new Joint State–USAID Strategic 

Framework and the new Strategic Planning 

Process, the Mission Program Plan (MPP) 

also would be reformulated to become interagency, emphasizing the primacy of an integrated policy planning process in which all 

agencies provide input and endorse the final 

plan, including recommendations for the 

amount and allocation of operational funds.

An agreed interagency policy document that clearly spells out objectives and 

programs should accompany the MPP. The 

Country Team should initiate the document 

with the personal approval of the Ambassador, who should be responsible for settling 

differences of opinion. The interagency 

document most likely will need to have 

compartmented annexes to accommodate 

intelligence-related functions. Although it 

needs to be comprehensive, there should 

be an effort to keep it as short as possible, 

focusing on objectives. The office in Washington that oversees this process should be 

staffed by an interagency team to ensure 

proper representation and coordination.

Members of the Country Team should 

understand that they will be judged based on 

personal performance in meeting the objectives of the plan and that the Ambassador/

DCM will have a heavy formal input into individual performance ratings. This will mean 

giving much more thought to leveraging the 

capabilities of other agencies and being leveraged in return, in pursuit of overall mission 

objectives. Agency heads should be rewarded 

for meeting objectives when doing so requires 

investing some of their agency’s resources and 

energy in other agency programs.

Washington should develop an agreed 

interagency policy document and should 

give priority to Country Team recommendations in deciding upon resources for the 

field. The Country Team should review the 

document annually, starting with input 

from the Ambassador. The Ambassador and 

Country Team should use the interagency 

document to tee up the areas of policy conflict so that Washington is forced to make 

policy decisions.

Conclusion

The critical challenges to our nation’s 

interests demand a new Country Team concept 

the future Ambassador 

must be, and be seen as, 

a national representative 

empowered to make 

tradeoffs among 

instruments of power 

and to develop clear 

strategies to advance 

U.S. national interests

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

James A. Schear David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum 11

and a more effective structure capable of tackling the challenges of the 21st century. The signal mark of success for the new Country Team 

will be changing the way other members of 

the Country Team perceive the Ambassador. 

Instead of a Department of State representative, 

the future Ambassador must be, and be seen as, 

a national representative empowered to make 

tradeoffs among instruments of power and to 

develop clear strategies to advance U.S. national 

interests. Simply reasserting the Ambassador’s 

national authority is inadequate. Instead, the 

Ambassador must be empowered as a team 

leader with authority to generate national 

security team outcomes and must be selected, 

trained, and rewarded accordingly. Undertaking these reforms and changes in the authorities and procedures for planning and resource 

allocation will require an enormous effort. In 

fact, it will require a top-down, executive-legislative partnership for reform. Given the vested 

interests in favor of the status quo, this will be 

an arduous undertaking, but the changes are 

long past overdue.

Notes

1

 In addition to working group members, the authors 

wish to thank James A. Schear, Christopher J. Lamb, and Matthew Shabat for their reviews. 2

 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of 

the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White 

house, September 17, 2002), 1; available at <www.whitehouse.

gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. 3

 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks on Transformational 

Diplomacy,” Washington, DC, February 8, 2007; available at 

<www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/feb/80989.htm>. 4

 See U. Alexis Johnson, “The Country Team in Operation,” speech delivered to the Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces, November 14, 1963; available at <www.ndu.edu/

library/ic4/L64-066.pdf>. 5

 See U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security 

Staffing and Operations, The Ambassador and the Problem 

of Coordination, 88th Congress, September 13, 1963, 8.

6

 See extract of the Clay Paper in The Ambassador 

and the Problem of Coordination, 60–61. 7

 Ibid.

8

 Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: 

U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New 

York: The Free Press, 1977), 117.

9

 Richard W. Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and 

Pacification,” research paper, National War College, 2006, 16. 10 Ross Coffey, “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity 

of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq,” Military Review 86, no. 2 

(March/April 2006), 28. 11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 30.

13 See Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia: Not 

Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995). 14 As quoted in Robert Killebrew, Erin Simpson, Christopher Griffin, and Kate Bateman, “The Country Team in 

American Strategy” (Washington, DC: Department of State/

Department of Defense, December 2006), 24. 15 Susan B. Epstein, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, CRS Report 

for Congress (RS21867), April 3, 2007, CRS-2.

16 The authors thank Princeton Lyman for this anecdote.

17 See the Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory 

Panel, “America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century,” 

November 1999, 64; available at <http://ftp.fas.org/irp/

threat/rpt-9911_opap.pdf>. 18 Frank Carlucci and Ian Brzezinski, “State Department 

Reform,” Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by 

the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, 2001, 9; available at <www.cfr.org/

content/publications/attachments/state_department.pdf>.

19 George F. Kennan, “Diplomacy Without Diplomats?” 

Foreign Affairs (September/October) 1997. 20 Ibid.

21 See Stewart.

22 Carlucci and Brzezinski.

23 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as 

Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” 109th Cong., 

2d Sess., December 15, 2006, 3; available at <www.fas.org/

irp/congress/2006_rpt/embassies.html>. 24 Department of State, “Guide for U.S. Government 

Agencies Planning Overseas Representation,” September 18, 

2006; available at <www.state.gov/m/r/rls/72366.htm>. 25 The Iraq Study Group, The Iraq Study Group 

Report, 59; available at <www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_

group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf>.

For further reading on the Country Team, see:

Arnas, Neyla, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley. Harnessing the 

Interagency for Complex Operations. Defense and Technology 

Paper No. 16. Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, August 2005.

Blaufarb, Douglas S. The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and 

Performance, 1950 to the Present. New York: The Free Press, 1977.

Carlucci, Frank, and Ian Brzezinski. “State Department Reform,” Report 

of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on 

Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2001.

Coffey, Ross. “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to 

Secure Victory in Iraq.” Military Review 86, no. 2 (March/April 

2006): 24–34.

Hamlin, Ross E. “The Country Team—A Model for Coordination.” 

Air University Review, July/August 1967.

Johnson, Alexis. “The Country Team in Operation,” speech presented to 

the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, November 14, 1963.

Kennan, George F. “Diplomacy Without Diplomats?” Foreign Affairs 

76, no. 5 (September/October 1997).

Killebrew, Robert, Erin Simpson, Christopher Griffin, and Kate Bateman. “The Country Team in American Strategy.” Washington, DC: 

Department of State/Department of Defense, December 2006.

Laipson, Ellen, with Olga Romanova. “Improving the Interagency 

Process to Face 21st Century Security Challenges.” Henry L. 

Stimson Center Workshop Report, October 2005.

Schnaubelt, Christopher M. “After the Fight: Interagency Operations.” Parameters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005–2006): 47–61.

Stewart, Richard W. “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification.” 

Research paper, National War College, 2006.

Strachan, Hew. “Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after 

Iraq.” Survival 48, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 59–82.

U.S. Department of State, Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. “America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century,” 

November 1999.

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 109th Congress. “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” December 15, 2006.

U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and 

Operations, 88th Congress. “The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination,” September 13, 1963.

Winant, John H. “Who’s in Charge Here? The Roles of the Joint 

Task Force Commander and the Chief of Mission in Complex 

Stability and Reconstruction Operations.” Research paper, U.S. 

Army War College, 2007.
12 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007

Privatizing While Transforming

Marion E. “Spike” Bowman

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 57,

July 2007)

China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and 

Implications

Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes

(INSS Special Report, June 2007)

Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot 

of NATO’s Readiness for CBRN Attacks

Michael Moodie and Robert E. Armstrong with 

Tyler Merkeley

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 56,

June 2007)

Counterintelligence and National 

Strategy

Michelle Van Cleave

(School for National Security Executive Education Report, April 2007)

Sino-Japanese Rivalry: Implications for 

U.S. Policy

(INSS Special Report, April 2007)

Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of 

Euroatlantic Institutions

Jeffrey Simon

(Strategic Forum No. 226, April 2007)

The Future Nuclear Landscape

Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and 

John F. Reichart

(Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 5,

April 2007)

Can Deterrence Be Tailored?

M. Elaine Bunn

(Strategic Forum No. 225, January 2007)

Combating Opium in Afghanistan

Ali A. Jalali, Robert B. Oakley, and Zoe Hunter

(Strategic Forum No. 224, November 2006)

China, Russia, and the Balance of Power 

in Central Asia

Eugene B. Rumer

(Strategic Forum No. 223, November 2006)

China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, 

and Tools

Philip C. Saunders

(INSS Occasional Paper 4, October, 2006)

Southeast Asian Security Challenges: 

America’s Response?

Marvin C. Ott

(Strategic Forum No. 222, September 2006)

Other recent titles from 

NDU Press

For on-line access to NDU Press publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu