IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 25, 2019

ANTHONY TODD GHORMLEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County

No. C-24084 Don R. Ash, Senior Judge

___________________________________

No. E2018-01625-CCA-R3-PC

___________________________________

The Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of 

attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count 

of especially aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault and resulting 

effective sentence of one hundred five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he 

received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court was 

impermissibly biased against him. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Gerald L. Gulley, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Anthony Todd Ghormley.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Assistant 

Attorney General; Michael L. Flynn, District Attorney General; and Ellen L. Berez and

Tyler B. Parks, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

The Petitioner’s trial began on September 15, 2009. On direct appeal of his 

convictions, this court gave the following factual account of his crimes:

11/15/2019
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[O]n September 17, 2007, Ghormley and his wife, Karen Van 

Dyke, had an argument while they were at the home of 

Gaynell Head, Van Dyke’s grandmother. Ghormley returned 

to his residence, and Van Dyke remained at Head’s home, 

spending the night with Head and Candy Bussey, Van Dyke’s 

cousin. Early in the morning of the next day, while the 

women were asleep, Ghormley returned to the home. He 

forced his way through the locked front door and attacked the 

three women. He struck them each repeatedly with a baseball 

bat and cut them with a knife. Van Dyke escaped by jumping 

out a window, and she called police from a neighbor’s house. 

Bussey fled out the front door, which Ghormley had blocked 

with a chair to prevent entry into the house. When police 

arrived, Ghormley took Head hostage and locked himself in 

the bathroom. After a standoff that lasted several hours, 

Ghormley surrendered and was arrested.

State v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. E2010-00634-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 171940, at 

*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 20, 2012). 

The jury convicted the Petitioner of two counts of attempted first degree 

premeditated murder, a Class A felony; one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a 

Class A felony; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; and three 

counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony.

1

 After a sentencing hearing, the trial court 

ordered that he serve an effective sentence of one hundred five years in confinement. 

On direct appeal of his convictions to this court, the Petitioner argued that the trial 

court erred by refusing to conduct a competency hearing or reset the trial when his

competency to stand trial was questioned two weeks before the trial date. Id. at *1. The 

Petitioner also claimed that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself for 

several months during the pretrial proceedings and by allowing the State to amend the 

indictment on the first day of trial. Id. This court held that the trial court erred by not 

holding a hearing to determine the Petitioner’s competency to stand trial and remanded 

the case for a retrospective competency hearing. Id. at *4-5. This court noted that if the 

 

1 We note that the parties’ briefs and this court’s prior opinions state that the Petitioner was 

convicted of two counts of especially aggravated burglary. See State v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. 

E2013-01932-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5699517, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Nov. 5, 2014); 

Anthony Todd Ghormley v. State, No. E2014-00363-CCA-R3-ECN, 2014 WL 7010774, at *1 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. at Knoxville, Sept. 12, 2014); State v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. E2010-00634-CCA-R3-

CD, 2012 WL 171940, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville Jan. 20, 2012). However, the trial record 

shows that the Petitioner was indicted for and convicted of one count of especially aggravated burglary.
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trial court determined that the Petitioner was competent at the time of trial, then the trial 

court’s failure to hold the hearing was harmless error; however, if the trial court 

determined that the Petitioner was not competent at the time of trial, then the trial court 

was required to vacate the judgments and grant a new trial. Id. at *5. As to the 

Petitioner’s remaining issues, this court held that he was not entitled to relief. Id. at *6-9.

The trial court held the retrospective competency hearing on June 14, 2013. State 

v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. E2013-01932-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5699517, at *1 

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Nov. 5, 2014), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 19, 2015). 

At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, that he 

was prescribed Paxil and Depakote, and that he refused to take any medication in the two 

weeks before trial. Id. The Petitioner said he thought his trial was a conspiracy that 

involved trial counsel, the trial court, the prosecutor, and “a woman who worked for the 

DA’s office designed to ‘railroad [him] on through the system.’” Id. at *2. He also said 

that during the trial, he began seeing “‘shadow people.’” On cross-examination, the 

Petitioner acknowledged filing a petition for an order of protection to prevent jail 

officials from making him take his medication. Id. Moreover, in the summer of 2008, he 

filed “a number of pro se motions, each of which was titled aptly and filed in the correct 

court and each of which cited appropriate legal authorities and asked for specific legal 

relief.” Id. He also filed a pro se motion on August 15, 2008, requesting a forensic 

evaluation. Id.

Dr. Rokeya Farooque, a forensic psychiatrist from the Middle Tennessee Mental 

Health Institute (MTMHI), testified that she evaluated the Petitioner in 2007 and 

diagnosed him with “‘intermittent explosive disorder’” because “‘he is not able to control 

his behavior. He gets upset, he gets agitated. . . . [H]is practice is that he [loses] his 

temper.’” Id. She did not find that the Petitioner had any psychotic disorder, including 

bipolar disorder. Id. The Petitioner was of average intelligence with no cognitive 

impairments, was aware of the charges, and understood that he would likely be 

incarcerated for the rest of his life if convicted. Id. He also “showed the ability to work 

with his attorneys and to recognize and distinguish inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, 

as well as an ‘adequate understanding of the adversarial nature of the adjudication 

process and the roles of the participants.’” Id. 

Senior Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood, who presided over the Petitioner’s trial, 

testified that the Petitioner had been evaluated at MTMHI and declared competent; 

therefore, he did not order another evaluation two weeks before trial. See id. at *4. 

Judge Blackwood “‘never had any doubt that [the Petitioner] was [anything] but 

competent’” and thought the Petitioner was “‘very intelligent, very articulate.’” Id. 

Judge Blackwood allowed the Petitioner to represent himself for a period of time, but 

then the Petitioner wrote a letter to the trial court stating that he would accept appointed 
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counsel. Id. Judge Blackwood said that the Petitioner named well-known criminal 

defense attorneys in Knoxville that he would accept to represent him and that the 

Petitioner “had enough sense about that to know that he wanted one of the best 

[attorneys] in Knox County.’” Id. The Petitioner also “asked to be transferred to the 

penitentiary so that he would be afforded a better law library for legal research.”

2

 Id. 

Staci Lawhorn, the Blount County Jail Medical Unit Supervisor and a nurse 

practitioner, testified at the hearing about the Petitioner’s refusal to take his medication. 

Id. at *5. She described the Petitioner as “‘always cooperative and alert, oriented’” and 

said that he did not appear to be depressed, delusional, or out of touch with reality. Id. 

On July 28, 2008, the Petitioner asked to see a mental health doctor. Id. The clinical 

social worker at the jail, who acted as a clearing house for those requests, wrote that the 

Petitioner had a history of demanding medications and then refusing them. Id. The 

Petitioner was taken off the mental health waiting list on December 11, 2008. See id. 

On July 23, 2013, the trial court ruled that the Petitioner was competent at the time 

of trial. The Petitioner challenged the trial court’s ruling, and this court affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court. Id. at *7. As this court explained,

Doctor Farooque testified that the defendant was competent 

and that he did not require medication to maintain his 

competence. The defendant presented no evidence to the 

contrary. No evidence indicated that the defendant was, at 

any time, unable “‘to understand the nature and object of the 

proceedings against him [or her], to consult with counsel[,] 

and assist in preparing his [or her] defense.’” [State v. 

Johnson, 401 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting State Reid, 

164 S.W.3d 286, 306 (Tenn. 2005)).] Evidence concerning 

the defendant’s behavior and demeanor evinced his 

competence, as did all of the medical testimony. Finally, the 

defendant’s pro se pleadings, though vituperative, suggested a 

familiarity with the legal system and an above average ability 

to assist in the preparation of his defense.

Id. 

 

2 The trial record reflects that the trial court denied the Petitioner’s request for a transfer but that 

the Petitioner ultimately was transferred to the Tennessee Department of Correction before trial due to 

safety concerns.
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On February 22, 2016, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief, claiming, in pertinent part, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel

because trial counsel (“Counsel”) failed to file his notice of insanity defense in a timely 

manner; failed to prepare a defense and discuss that defense with him; failed to 

investigate possible witnesses and subpoena them for trial; and failed to investigate his 

case.

3

 The Petitioner also alleged that “Judge Blackwood was clearly biased against 

[him]” because Judge Blackwood “made many decisions out of spite or anger that 

harmed [him].” The post-conviction court appointed post-conviction counsel, and postconviction counsel filed an amended petition. 

Counsel testified for the State that he had been an attorney for more than thirty 

years and first worked in the district attorney’s office. He then worked as an assistant 

public defender and went into private practice. Counsel’s general practice included 

criminal defense, so he had been practicing criminal law his entire career. The trial court 

appointed Counsel to represent the Petitioner in 2009. At the time of the appointment, 

Counsel had participated in more than one hundred trials involving misdemeanors and 

felonies. 

Counsel testified that he was the fourth or fifth attorney appointed to the 

Petitioner’s case. Counsel received discovery, shared it with the Petitioner, and went 

over discovery materials with the Petitioner “in great detail.” The Petitioner was a “very 

intense” client, wanted to know what was happening in his case, and wrote at least three 

letters per week to Counsel. Counsel said he spoke with the Petitioner more than any 

other client he ever represented in a criminal case. The State asked if Counsel had a good 

relationship with the Petitioner, and Counsel answered,

I would say, yes, I did, although, [the Petitioner] reported me

to the board I think, at least, five times during my

representation of him, so that part was not so good, but, yes, 

we communicated regularly. [The Petitioner], from time to 

time, would make little gifts from either the jail or the pen 

and send them to me as just a token of thanks, so I felt, for the 

most part, it was a good relationship.

 

3 The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The one-year statute of limitations 

expired on February 19, 2016, and the pro se petition bears a file-stamped date of February 22, 2016. The 

Petitioner signed and dated the petition on February 17, 2016, but the petition was not notarized. At the 

post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner testified that he put the petition into the prison mailbox 

on the night of February 17, 2016; therefore, the petition was timely by two days “[p]er the mailbox rule.” 

The post-conviction court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, and the State does not contest that ruling 

on appeal.
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Counsel said that the Petitioner’s filings with the Board of Professional Responsibility 

did not affect his representation of the Petitioner because the Petitioner wrote letters to 

the Board, apologizing and wanting Counsel to continue representing him. The Petitioner 

was moved from the county jail to prison before trial, and he continued to write letters to 

Counsel on a regular basis.

Counsel testified that the Petitioner was evaluated at MTMHI after his arrest and 

that Counsel obtained a large amount of records from MTMHI. Counsel and the 

Petitioner had “differences of opinions” about defense strategies. The State’s evidence 

was “overwhelming” and showed that the Petitioner committed the acts alleged. 

Therefore, Counsel and the Petitioner considered whether the Petitioner was competent to 

assist with his own defense. Counsel also raised the competency issue on direct appeal, 

and this court remanded the case for a competency hearing. The trial court found that the 

Petitioner was competent, and Counsel appealed the ruling to this court. The appeal 

concluded Counsel’s representation of the Petitioner. 

Counsel testified that he briefly considered an insanity defense but that the 

Petitioner initially did not want to “go down the path of insanity.” Counsel “did not think 

that would be a good choice anyway” because a defendant had to prove insanity by clear 

and convincing evidence. The facts in this case did not support an insanity defense, so 

Counsel decided not to pursue it. 

Counsel testified that he may have filed a motion for Judge Blackwood to recuse 

himself. The Petitioner insisted that Counsel try to have Judge Blackwood removed from 

the case based upon a constitutional defect in how Judge Blackwood was appointed, but 

Counsel “saw no merit to that.” The Petitioner suggested some witnesses to subpoena to 

trial. Counsel said that he could not remember their names but that “they would have 

added nothing to his defense.” The Petitioner was “caught red handed” and was 

“surrounded by the SWAT team and members of law enforcement while he was holding 

the grandmother hostage at knifepoint.” Therefore, Counsel’s strategy was to “try to 

lessen that charge.” The State did not make any significant plea offers to the Petitioner, 

and, in any event, the Petitioner did not want to plead guilty.

Counsel testified that the Petitioner’s wife “had issues” and that another witness 

had some mental disabilities. Therefore, Counsel tried to lessen the impact of their 

testimony through cross-examination. Counsel said that he hoped the jury “would see fit 

to dismiss some of the charges or to find a lesser included offense” but that the Petitioner 

“made representation unbelievably difficult.” Upon being questioned by the postconviction court, Counsel stated, “I felt that much of his behavior was intentionally 

designed to create chaos and to create, hopefully, appealable issues and, you know, turn it 
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into the [B]oard.” Nevertheless, Counsel wanted to give the Petitioner “the best defense 

he could have” and “tried to find every legitimate issue and pursue that.”

On cross-examination, Counsel testified that he worked on four, first degree 

murder cases prior to representing the Petitioner. After Counsel’s predecessor was 

relieved from the Petitioner’s case, the Petitioner was unrepresented for “a period of 

time.” Counsel was appointed, met with the Petitioner numerous times, and heard a lot of 

complaints from the Petitioner about the Petitioner’s previous attorney. The Petitioner 

told Counsel that he did not have a copy of his indictment. Although Counsel knew he 

had given the Petitioner a copy of the indictment, he gave the Petitioner another copy. 

The Petitioner filed a complaint with the Board of Professional Responsibility soon after 

Counsel’s appointment, and the Petitioner continued to file complaints periodically until 

trial. Counsel filed at least one motion to withdraw, but the trial court denied the motion.

Counsel testified that he and the Petitioner discussed an insanity defense “early 

on.” However, regarding the Petitioner’s ability to appreciate right from wrong, Counsel 

“did not think there was anything for us to work with.” Counsel thought, though, that 

“there was a legitimate issue with [the Petitioner’s] behavior.” The Petitioner was “very 

disruptive” in that he filed pro se motions during Counsel’s representation and filed 

complaints with the Board of Professional Responsibility “for very bogus reasons.” 

Counsel said that the Petitioner seemed to be “working against” Counsel and that the 

Petitioner was “being his own worst enemy.”

Counsel testified that he also “looked into” a diminished capacity defense but that 

he “did not see a legitimate issue with diminished capacity.” Post-conviction counsel 

asked Counsel to explain the difference between insanity and diminished capacity, and 

Counsel responded,

Well, insanity, I mean, you’ve got to prove that by clear and 

convincing evidence, which it’s a much higher standard and 

it’s the result of a mental disease or defect that affects the 

ability to tell right from wrong. Diminished capacity might 

somehow affect the knowing element of this, you know, that 

his intentional acts, knowing acts that he took such that if he 

was suffering from some mental illness, but not to the level of 

right and wrong, that that may have affected him. But in 

looking at the information that we had from [MTMHI], and I 

believe that Cherokee briefly looked at him even before that, 

[I] did not see anything that I thought could -- could help us.
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Counsel acknowledged that he may have filed a notice to rely on an insanity 

defense just before trial. He said that if he did so, the notice was improper and was filed 

“based upon [the Petitioner’s] behavior at that time and his request.” Counsel did not 

think the jury would acquit the Petitioner; therefore, his strategy was to show that the 

Petitioner was incompetent so that the Petitioner would not go to trial or to convince the 

jury to convict the Petitioner of lesser-included offenses. Counsel did not remember 

trying to obtain an independent mental evaluation for the Petitioner and did not know of 

any witnesses who could have testified about a diminished capacity defense. The 

Petitioner talked to a woman on the telephone and wanted her to testify at trial. Counsel 

tried to contact the woman but “did not see any benefit that she would have to this case 

whatsoever.” The woman may have had information that the defense could have used to 

impeach the Petitioner’s wife. Nevertheless, Counsel impeached the Petitioner’s wife’s 

credibility “the best that [he] could as far as her past and her conduct.” 

Counsel testified that a private investigator named “Jessica” worked on the 

Petitioner’s case but that she “did not stay on the case for very long.” The private 

investigator identified some of the State’s witnesses and tried to get background 

information about them. Counsel did not recall working with any other private 

investigators. He said that the Petitioner “despised” anyone associated with the 

Petitioner’s case, including the assistant district attorney and the trial judge, and that the 

Petitioner “was sure they were trying to poison him at the jail in his medicine, and, yes, 

he was sure that the Judge was trying to do something like that.” The Petitioner “also 

accused Judge Blackwood of other inappropriate acts that were just ridiculous.” 

On redirect examination, Counsel testified that the Petitioner wanted Counsel 

removed from his case so that he could have another attorney he hoped to have 

appointed. However, the Petitioner’s complaints to the Board of Professional 

Responsibility made Counsel want to prove that “no matter what [the Petitioner] said or 

did, that he was going to get good representation.” Regarding witnesses, Counsel said he 

“did not intentionally overlook anyone” who might have helped the Petitioner’s defense. 

After the Petitioner’s trial, Counsel continued to represent the Petitioner on two separate 

appeals. The first appeal was successful in that this court remanded the case to the trial 

court for a retrospective competency hearing. 

Relevant to this appeal, the Petitioner testified that Counsel never gave him a copy

of his indictment and that Counsel was lying because “he’s trying to save his reputation

and not [be] deemed ineffective.” The Petitioner said he filed four or five complaints 

with the Board of Professional Responsibility against Counsel because “[i]t was the only 

time I could get him to do anything.” Counsel filed three motions to withdraw from the 

Petitioner’s case, but the Petitioner asked the trial court to deny the motions. The 

Petitioner said he had “no choice” but to keep Counsel because Counsel sent him a letter 
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stating that the trial court was not going to appoint another attorney. The Petitioner said 

he did not want a “local attorney” because “[t]hey play ball with the DA.” 

The Petitioner testified that Counsel met with him in jail only two times and that 

their meetings lasted thirty minutes to one hour. They had two or three “short” 

conversations on the telephone. The Petitioner “wanted a crime of passion defense,” but

Counsel was “saying insanity defense and it’s all the same thing.” Although the 

Petitioner said that he no longer had a copy of the letter because he gave it to postconviction counsel, he recalled that Counsel sent a letter to the Petitioner in which he 

stated that he did not take advice from clients and that he knew more about the law than 

the Petitioner. Counsel and the Petitioner did not discuss the difference between insanity 

and incompetence, and Counsel did not talk with the Petitioner about a diminished 

capacity defense or try to find an expert to testify about diminished capacity. Counsel 

also did not file the notice of insanity defense in a timely manner, which denied the 

Petitioner his right to a fair trial. 

The Petitioner testified that Counsel failed to contact his “star” witness, Christina 

Michelle Small. Small “nursed the victim back to health,” lived with the victim, and 

“knew all the things that the victim was doing before . . . this case and afterwards.” 

Small filed a complaint on the Petitioner’s behalf with the Board of Professional 

Responsibility against the district attorney. Subsequently, the district attorney’s wife, 

who was an assistant district attorney, had Small’s children taken away from her and 

placed in the temporary custody of “some lady.” Small visited the Petitioner in jail, told 

him that she had to protect her children, and told him that “I’ve got to get off your case 

because they’re going to keep my kids.” The Petitioner said Small “got her kids on a 

weekend visitation” and “fled the State.” At the time of the post-conviction evidentiary 

hearing, Small was living in Oklahoma. 

The Petitioner testified that he told Counsel eleven days before trial that he was 

not receiving his medication; however, Counsel did not do anything about the situation. 

Post-conviction counsel asked how the Petitioner’s not receiving his medication affected 

his ability to work with Counsel, and the Petitioner answered, “Well, of all [my] 

attorneys, you’re the only one I’ve never filed a board complaint on. . . . I think I’ve 

worked real good with you, I mean, [I’ve] tried to be as helpful as I can.” The Petitioner 

said that when he was not receiving his medication, “sometimes I got the grand 

conspiracy scheme going stuck in my head, I’m having anxiety or panic attacks.” At that 

point, the post-conviction court stated, “If I recall, . . . you were refusing to take your 

medications.” The Petitioner responded that he refused to take his medication while he 

was in the Blount County Jail because “[t]hey were trying to poison me.” When he was 

moved to prison, though, he would have taken his medication if it had been given to him. 

The Petitioner also did not receive any medication during his trial. 
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The Petitioner testified that Judge Blackwood “committed perjury” at the 

retrospective competency hearing. Specifically, Judge Blackwood testified that he 

received a report from MTMHI, which showed that the Petitioner had been evaluated for 

insanity and incompetency. However, the Petitioner made a public records request to 

MTMHI, and MTMHI responded that it had never released his medical records to Judge 

Blackwood. Judge Blackwood also stated at the competency hearing that he began 

reading the Petitioner’s letters to the Petitioner’s attorneys, which meant that Judge 

Blackwood improperly “intercepted and copied” the Petitioner’s letters to Counsel and

determined the Petitioner’s competency based on what the Petitioner said in the letters. 

Judge Blackwood stated at the competency hearing that he had a “long” colloquy with the 

Petitioner about the Petitioner’s knowledge of the legal system, but the Petitioner thought 

the colloquy was “too short” for Judge Blackwood to determine that he could represent 

himself.

The Petitioner testified that he was “billed for [a] law library fee” but that he was 

denied access to the jail law library. He stated, “Once I raised a motion for access they 

cut off all access to the law library. The other inmates’ requests would get answered, 

mine would not. I was the only inmate in that jail that was denied one hundred percent 

access to a law library.” The Petitioner said that Counsel should have obtained a private 

investigator for his case and that a female private investigator never met with him. 

The Petitioner testified that Dr. Farooque said at the competency hearing that she 

saw her clients every forty-eight hours. The Petitioner kept a ledger of the amount of 

time he spent with his doctors, and his ledger showed that her testimony was untrue. Dr. 

Farooque also stated at the hearing that the Petitioner asked for an insanity defense many 

times, but nothing in the Petitioner’s file showed that he ever asked for an insanity 

defense. Staci Lawhorn testified at the Petitioner’s motion for new trial hearing that she 

was not qualified to diagnose him but then testified at his competency hearing that he did 

not appear depressed, delusional, or out of touch with reality. She also said she did not 

think he needed to be taking anti-psychotic drugs. The Petitioner stated, “That’s a mental 

health diagnosis and class B misdemeanor.” Ms. Lawhorn said at the competency 

hearing that she saw the Petitioner three or four times per month. The Petitioner said that 

Ms. Lawhorn’s statement was false and that “I never talked to her.” Counsel did not 

cross-examine Dr. Farooque or Ms. Lawhorn at the competency hearing about any 

discrepancies in their testimony. 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that he may have told the trial 

court at trial that Counsel was “very moral,” ethical, and “very competent” but that he did 
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not remember saying those things.4 The Petitioner stated that after he received his trial 

transcripts and saw what Counsel did not do at trial, “that changed everything.” The 

Petitioner acknowledged that he wanted other attorneys he wanted to represent him at 

trial but denied filing complaints against his trial attorneys so that those attorneys would 

be appointed to represent him. Instead, the Petitioner filed the complaints because his 

attorneys were not doing what he asked of them. The Petitioner acknowledged that while 

Counsel should have called certain witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial, none of those 

witnesses were present at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, no doctors were present at 

the hearing to testify about his insanity defense or competency at trial. The Petitioner 

acknowledged that Counsel may have met with him when he came to court but said that

Counsel met with him in jail only three times. The Petitioner also acknowledged that he 

never told the trial court that he did not receive a copy of his indictment.

In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction 

relief. Regarding the Petitioner’s claim that Counsel failed to investigate and prepare an 

insanity defense and failed to file a timely notice of insanity, the post-conviction court 

noted that Counsel filed a notice of insanity on September 14, 2009, and that the motion 

“focused on Petitioner’s competency argument and his not having been on his 

medications.” The post-conviction court accredited Counsel’s testimony that he filed the 

notice just before trial because the Petitioner advised him that the Petitioner was not 

receiving his medications. The trial court also accredited Counsel’s testimony that he 

considered an insanity defense early in his appointment, that he discussed the defense 

with the Petitioner, and that the Petitioner did not want to pursue the defense. The postconviction court noted that in October 2008, while the Petitioner was acting pro se, he 

indicated that he would not be relying on an insanity defense. Thus, the post-conviction 

court concluded that the Petitioner failed to show that Counsel was deficient or that he 

was prejudiced by any deficiency. 

As to the Petitioner’s claim that Counsel failed to investigate, prepare, and present 

a defense, the post-conviction court accredited Counsel’s testimony that the evidence 

against the Petitioner was overwhelming but that he tried to show the Petitioner was 

guilty of lesser-included offenses. The post-conviction court noted that Counsel 

requested a diminished capacity instruction at trial but that the trial court denied the 

request. The post-conviction court also noted that Counsel pursued a claim of 

incompetence even though the Petitioner “was found to be competent to stand trial by 

MTMHI prior to [Counsel’s] appointment.” The Petitioner received a retrospective

competency hearing and was found to be competent, and he did not present any evidence 

at the evidentiary hearing to rebut that finding. Thus, the post-conviction court 

 

4 Our review of the trial transcript confirms that the Petitioner told the trial court, “[Trial counsel] 

is a very moral and ethical attorney and very competent.”
- 12 -

determined that the Petitioner failed to show that Counsel was deficient or that he was 

prejudiced by any deficiency. 

Next, the post-conviction court addressed the Petitioner’s claim that Counsel 

should have had Judge Blackwood removed from his case. The post-conviction court 

accredited Counsel’s testimony that the Petitioner wanted to challenge Judge 

Blackwood’s appointment on constitutional grounds but that Counsel thought the issue 

was without merit. The post-conviction court noted that Counsel nevertheless filed a 

motion to recuse Judge Blackwood on constitutional grounds on May 14, 2009, and that 

the trial court addressed the issue at a hearing on August 5, 2009. Thus, the postconviction court concluded that the Petitioner failed to show deficient performance or 

prejudice. 

As to the Petitioner’s claims that Counsel was ineffective by failing to discuss a 

defense with him, by failing to investigate and subpoena possible witnesses for trial, and 

by failing to hire an investigator, the post-conviction court accredited Counsel’s 

testimony that he talked with the Petitioner about the case, that the Petitioner was very 

involved in the case, and that Counsel spent more time with the Petitioner than any other 

client he had in a criminal case. The post-conviction court also accredited Counsel’s 

testimony that he investigated all information provided by the Petitioner and that he used 

an investigator “for a period of time.” The post-conviction court noted that the Petitioner 

did not present any witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and did not present any evidence 

at the hearing that an investigator would have discovered. Thus, the post-conviction 

court found that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief.

Finally, the post-conviction court addressed the Petitioner’s claim that Counsel 

was ineffective for failing to file motions related to his access to the law library. The 

post-conviction court stated as follows:

[T]he record indicates the trial court held a hearing related to 

Petitioner’s alleged lack of access to a law library at which a 

member of the Blount County Sheriff’s Department testified 

concerning the limited availability of legal resources at the 

Blount County Jail. The evidence established there was no 

law library but only an officer who could look up information 

on Lexis Nexis as resources permitted upon receiving 

request[s] from jail inmates. The officer testified Petitioner 

made more requests tha[n] any other inmate and his 

assistance in looking matters up had to be done for other 

inmates, as well as Petitioner. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it held 
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Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to access to a law 

library even when not represented by counsel. However, the 

trial court did order the jail to allow Petitioner access to any 

available legal research per the jail’s policies and as resources 

permitted. In addition, Petitioner’s rights were satisfied 

through the representation of counsel.

Therefore, the post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner was not entitled to 

relief.

II. Analysis

The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief because Counsel was ineffective in that Counsel failed 

to file a timely notice of insanity; never clearly articulated or discussed a coherent or 

consistent defense with him; did not contact any witnesses who could have assisted with 

his defense; failed to use or employ a private investigator; failed to cross-examine Dr. 

Farooque about the number of meetings she had with him and other inconsistencies in her 

testimony; failed to impeach Staci Lawhorn about her legal inability to diagnose him; and 

allowed the jail to deny him access to the law library. He also contends that the 

cumulative effective of Counsel’s deficiencies deprived him of his right to a fair trial and 

that the trial court was biased against him. The State argues that the post-conviction 

court properly denied the petition. We agree with the State.

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the 

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). “‘Clear and convincing evidence means 

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the 

conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 

1992)). Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded 

their testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be 

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 

572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court’s findings of fact are entitled 

to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against those 

findings. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 

See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction 

court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See 
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Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court’s 

conclusions of law purely de novo. Id.

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. 

State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel's 

performance was below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Further,

[b]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a 

failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a 

sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance 

claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in any 

particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] makes 

an insufficient showing of one component.

Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

First, the Petitioner claims that Counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a 

timely notice of insanity. However, the post-conviction court accredited Counsel’s 

testimony that he considered an insanity defense early in his appointment, that he 

discussed the defense with the Petitioner, and that the Petitioner did not want to pursue 

the defense. Moreover, the record demonstrates that MTMHI evaluated the Petitioner 

before trial and that medical personnel did not find him to be insane or incompetent. The 

Petitioner did not present any evidence at the post-conviction hearing regarding his being 

insane at the time of the crimes. Therefore, the Petitioner has failed to show that Counsel 

was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any deficiency.

The Petitioner also contends that Counsel never articulated a clear defense 

strategy. However, the post-conviction court accredited Counsel’s testimony that the 

evidence against the Petitioner was overwhelming; therefore, Counsel’s strategy was to 

show that the Petitioner was incompetent so that the Petitioner would not go to trial or to 

convince the jury that the Petitioner was guilty of lesser-included offenses. Thus, the 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced 

by any deficiency.
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Next, the Petitioner contends that Counsel was ineffective because he did not 

contact any witnesses or hire a private investigator to assist with his defense. The

Petitioner failed to present any witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Generally, “[w]hen a 

petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or present witnesses in 

support of his defense, these witnesses should be presented by the petitioner at the 

evidentiary hearing.” Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The 

Petitioner also failed to present any additional evidence that an investigation would have 

revealed that would have made a difference at his trial. Accordingly, he failed to 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Counsel’s alleged deficiencies. 

The Petitioner asserts that Counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Dr. 

Farooque about inconsistencies in her testimony regarding “the number of visits with 

[him], her presence for purported meetings with [him], changing diagnoses, and her 

incorrect statements regarding his claims of insanity” and that Counsel was ineffective 

for failing to impeach Ms. Lawhorn with “her legal inability diagnoses about [his] 

competency.” However, the Petitioner did not question Counsel about these claims at the 

evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, although he contends that Counsel’s deficiencies 

prevented him from successfully asserting that he was not competent to stand trial, he did 

not present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing to contradict the trial court’s ruling 

that he was competent. Accordingly, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 

Counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any deficiency.

As to the Petitioner’s claim that Counsel was ineffective for allowing him to be 

denied access to the jail law library, the post-conviction court found that the trial court 

held a hearing on the Petitioner’s alleged lack of access to a law library and that the trial 

court ordered the jail to allow the Petitioner access to any legal research that the jail’s 

policies permitted. Our review of the trial record confirms the findings of the postconviction court. In any event, the Petitioner has not explained how his lack of access to 

the jail law library changed the outcome of his case. Therefore, we find no merit to this 

claim. Likewise, we find no merit to his claim that the cumulative effect of Counsel’s 

errors warrants a reversal of his convictions. 

Finally, as to the Petitioner claim that the trial court was biased against him, he has 

made no argument to support the issue. Therefore, it is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 

36(a).

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.
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_________________________________ 

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE