GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 8, 2013

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives 

Subject: Security Force Assistance: DOD’s Consideration of Unintended Consequences, 

Perverse Incentives, and Moral Hazards 

This letter formally transmits the enclosed briefing that we presented to your staff on 

November 30, 2012. The House Committee on Armed Services report 112-479 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to 

review the procedures the Department of Defense (DOD) has in place to control for the 

challenges inherent to the provision of military-to-military and security force assistance to 

foreign partners.1 In response to the mandate, we addressed the following objectives: (1) 

What policies, procedures, and guidance does DOD use to consider certain potential risks, 

such as unintended consequences and perverse incentives, when planning for security 

force assistance? (2) To what extent does DOD consider the input of the Department of 

State (State) in evaluating certain potential risks, such as unintended consequences and 

perverse incentives, when planning for security force assistance?

To conduct this work, we interviewed DOD and State officials, and reviewed DOD joint 

publications, directives, instructions, and program and planning guidance to identify 

considerations to control for unintended consequences, perverse incentives, and moral 

hazards when planning security force assistance.2

 

1

For the remainder of the report, we refer to “security force assistance” for brevity. Security force assistance 

consists of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of 

the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (DOD Instruction 5000.68 

Security Force Assistance).

We reviewed authorizing and 

appropriations language for selected authorities that can yield corollary security force 

assistance benefits to identify the level of input State was requested to provide to DOD in 

evaluating certain potential risks, such as unintended consequences, perverse incentives, 

and moral hazards when planning security force assistance. We selected these authorities 

to include ones that are DOD-led and offer a range of U.S. government priorities such as 

counterterrorism and counternarcotics, as well as an emphasis on specific countries. For 

each of the selected authorities, we identified the level of input State provides: (1) 

concurrence—the legislation explicitly calls for concurrence from State; and (2) 

consultation—the legislation explicitly calls for consultation with State. We also interviewed 

2

For definitions of these three terms, see page 4 of the attached briefing slides. 
Page 2 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD and State officials to obtain information on coordination—the level of input provided by 

DOD and State when the legislation does not specifically require either concurrence or 

consultation. 

We did not review the legislation for all authorities that can yield security force assistance 

benefits, directly or indirectly, nor did we review all such authorities for which State might 

provide input. Thus, the results we obtained cannot be generalized to the universe of 

authorities that can support security force assistance activities. We conducted this review 

from August 2012 to January 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In summary, we identified three DOD joint publications and two guidance documents that 

call for the consideration of unintended consequences, moral hazards, or risk mitigation 

procedures in planning for security force assistance. For example, Joint Publication 5-0, 

Joint Operations Planning, explicitly advises commanders to consider undesired 

consequences when planning operations and to refine plans to mitigate any undesired 

effects. This joint publication also includes procedures, such as the mission analysis and 

course of action analysis, to mitigate risks, which could include unintended consequences. 

Further, the Security Force Assistance Handbook, a guidance document, explains that site 

surveys serve to determine the suitability of the foreign security force for training, which may 

include considerations for potential unintended consequences and moral hazards, according 

to DOD officials. In addition to DOD joint publications and guidance, we reviewed a DOD 

directive and an instruction that DOD identified as relevant for our review and found that 

neither document specifically calls for consideration of unintended consequences or similar 

risks. However, DOD officials noted that they may incorporate considerations for unintended 

consequences and similar risks in a subsequent update to DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD 

Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation. 

In addition, we found that DOD receives input from State for the seven authorities we 

reviewed that can yield security force assistance benefits: four required concurrence of the 

Secretary of State or the Chief of Mission; one required consultation between DOD and 

State; and two relied on coordination mechanisms other than concurrence or consultation. 

According to State officials, authorities that require the concurrence of the Secretary of State 

are reviewed by all of the department’s relevant experts and bureaus, and thus have the 

best chance of identifying and considering the potential for unintended consequences 

compared to other forms of coordination. See the enclosed briefing slides for additional 

information. 

We provided a draft of the briefing slides to DOD and State. Both agencies provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State and 

appropriate congressional committees. This report will also be available at no charge on our

website at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 3 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 

were Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Claude Adrien; Kyerion Printup; Ashley Alley; 

Mary Moutsos; Martin De Alteriis; and Robert Pollard. David Dayton provided technical 

support.

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosure
Enclosure

Page 4 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD’s Consideration of Unintended Consequences, Perverse Incentives, and Moral Hazards in 

Security Force Assistance

DOD’s Consideration of Unintended 

Consequences, Perverse Incentives, and Moral 

Hazards in Security Force Assistance 

A Briefing to the Staff of the 

House Committee on Armed Services 

November 30, 2012

For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Page 1
Enclosure

Page 5 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Table of Contents

• Introduction

• Definition of Terms 

• Scope and Methodology

• Objective 1: What policies, procedures, and guidance does the Department of Defense 

(DOD) use to consider certain potential risks, such as unintended consequences and 

perverse incentives, when planning military-to-military and security force assistance?

• Objective 2: To what extent does DOD consider the input of the Department of State 

(State) in evaluating certain potential risks, such as unintended consequences and 

perverse incentives, when planning for military-to-military and security force 

assistance?*

*Note: For the remainder of the slides, we refer to “security force assistance” for brevity. Security force assistance consists of DOD 

activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of

foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (DOD Instruction 5000.68 Security Force Assistance). 

Page 2
Enclosure

Page 6 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Introduction

• This briefing responds to the mandate in House Report 112-479 accompanying H.R. 

4310 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013. 

• The mandate directs GAO to brief the House Committee on Armed Services by 

November 30, 2012. 

• The briefing should outline the extent to which DOD, either alone or in conjunction 

with other agencies, considers and evaluates the potential for perverse incentive 

structures and negative unintended consequences due to moral hazard issues or 

similar factors when providing assistance to foreign partners.

• The briefing may focus on a sample of such DOD programs.

Page 3
Enclosure

Page 7 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Definition of Terms Used in the Mandate

• Unintended consequences are negative outcomes that are not intended by the 

provision of U.S. security force assistance to foreign security forces. 

• A perverse incentive is an incentive in an assistance program that produces an 

adverse consequence due specifically to the actions undertaken to receive the 

assistance. 

• A moral hazard occurs when a party that receives security force assistance is 

insulated from risk or believes it is insulated from risk, and behaves differently 

than if it were fully exposed to the risk. For example, moral hazards may occur 

when recipient governments or militaries engage in riskier behavior (political 

oppression of their citizens, military aggression against their neighbors) than they 

would in the absence of the assistance. 

Page 4

Note: These definitions were developed for the purposes of this review. GAO does not ascribe any legal meaning to them.
Enclosure

Page 8 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Scope and Methodology 

For Objective 1—Policies, Procedures, and Guidance:

• We interviewed DOD and State officials, and reviewed DOD joint publications, 

directives, instructions, and program and planning guidance to identify considerations 

to control for unintended consequences, perverse incentives, and moral hazards when 

planning security force assistance. 

• As part of our analysis of DOD documents, we systematically reviewed electronic 

databases containing the directives, instructions, joint publications, and DOD manuals. 

Specifically, we conducted key word searches of the electronic documents for (1) 

references to the terms “unintended consequences,” “perverse incentives,” and “moral 

hazard”; and (2) references to related terms, including “risk,” “assessment,” “security 

cooperation,” “undesired effects,” “security force assistance,” “estimates,” and “human 

rights.” We also read the documents for context. 

Page 5
Enclosure

Page 9 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Scope and Methodology

For Objective 2—DOD Input from State:

• Based on our review of DOD’s Security Cooperation Toolkit and interviews with DOD and State 

officials, we selected a judgmental sample of authorities and identified the level of input State 

provides for each: (1) concurrence—the legislation explicitly calls for concurrence from State; and 

(2) consultation—the legislation explicitly calls for consultation with State.

• We reviewed the legislation for these authorities and identified the level of input required in the 

laws. We searched for the terms “concurrence” and “consultation” in the legislation. We did not 

review the legislation for all security force assistance authorities, nor did we review all of the 

authorities for which State might provide input. Thus, the results we obtained cannot be 

generalized to the universe of such authorities.

• We also interviewed DOD and State officials to obtain information on coordination—the level of 

input provided by State and DOD when the legislation does not specifically require either 

concurrence or consultation.

• We conducted this review from August 2012 to November 2012 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Page 6
Enclosure

Page 10 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Several DOD Documents Address Considerations of 

Unintended Consequences and Other Risks 

Page 7

Objective 1: DOD Policies, Procedures, Guidance 

DOD documents Document overview 

Joint doctrine Overarching 

joint 

publications

Joint Publication 5-0, 

Joint Operation 

Planning; August 11, 

2011

Authoritative, keystone publication that reflects current doctrine 

for planning military operations and forms the core of joint 

doctrine for joint operation planning for all military operations. 

Joint Publication 3-0, 

Joint Operations; 

August 11, 2011

Authoritative, keystone publication that provides the doctrinal 

foundation and fundamental principles that guide the U.S. 

armed forces in joint operations across the range of military 

operations. 

Operation 

specific 

publication

Joint Publication 3-22, 

Foreign Internal 

Defense; 

July 12, 2010

Authoritative publication that establishes joint doctrine for U.S. 

forces involved in or supporting foreign internal defense. It 

discusses how joint and interagency operations support host 

nation efforts to build capability and capacity to free and protect 

its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Program and 

planning 

guidance 

Theater Campaign Planning: Planners’ 

Handbook, February 2012

Handbook based on Joint Publication 5-0 that provides 

combatant command planners with a conceptual approach to 

developing theater campaign plans.

Security Force Assistance Handbook, 

June 2012

Handbook that provides a reference for U.S. forces involved in 

or supporting Security Force Assistance, and discusses how 

joint and interagency operations support partner efforts to build 

security force capability and capacity. 
Enclosure

Page 11 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD Doctrine Calls for Consideration of Unintended 

Consequences and Risk Mitigation Procedures

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

• Explicitly advises commanders to consider undesired consequences (unintended consequences) 

when planning operations and to refine plans to mitigate any undesired effects (unintended 

consequences).

• Includes procedures to mitigate risks, which could include unintended consequences. Procedures 

include:

• Mission analysis – Part of this process involves developing a risk assessment which 

identifies obstacles or actions that may inhibit successful completion of the mission, and then 

assessing the impact of these risks to the mission.

• Course of action analysis – Commanders’ staff develop several scenarios for the 

commander, which are focused on accomplishing the mission. Each course of action should 

provide flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may arise during execution.

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

• Advises commanders and staff on the challenges of understanding the operational environment 

for which staff are creating plans, and the greater challenge of considering intended and 

unintended consequences when planning military actions. 

• Also advises commanders and staff to develop a risk management process that is specific to the 

mission, which includes operations such as security force assistance.

Page 8

Objective 1: DOD Policies, Procedures, Guidance 
Enclosure

Page 12 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD Doctrine Calls for Consideration of Unintended Consequences, 

Moral Hazards, and Risk Mitigation Procedures 

Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense

• Advises staff that when planning foreign internal defense operations for partner nations, they 

should include the following considerations, among others:

• the long-term societal implications of U.S. assistance efforts (for example, the potential 

effects of improved military forces on existing regional, ethnic, and religious divisions); and

• the impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power. 

• Advises personnel providing training to consider the ability of the host nation to use its 

relationship with the U.S. government to bolster the position of the host nation government with 

its own people, which we would categorize as a moral hazard consideration.

• Discusses the site survey process, which is a risk mitigation process, according to DOD officials, 

that is conducted by program officials to determine if the recipients of assistance have the 

capacity to absorb such assistance. As part of this process, officials ensure that forces receiving 

training from U.S. forces have been vetted for human rights violations. 

Page 9

Objective 1: DOD Policies, Procedures, Guidance 
Enclosure

Page 13 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD Guidance Calls for Consideration of Unintended 

Consequences and Other Risks

• DOD handbooks call for the consideration of unintended consequences and other risk 

mitigation procedures in planning security force assistance.

• Theater Campaign Planning: Planners’ Handbook advises commanders to consider 

political, military, economic, and social factors, among other factors, when identifying 

challenges in the planning process. 

• Security Force Assistance Handbook explains that site surveys serve to determine the suitability of the foreign security force for training, which may include considerations for 

potential unintended consequences and moral hazards, according to DOD officials.

• In addition to DOD joint doctrine and guidance previously discussed in the slides, we 

reviewed a DOD directive and an instruction that DOD identified as relevant to our 

engagement and found that neither document specifically calls for consideration of 

unintended consequences or other risks. 

• DOD officials noted that they may incorporate considerations for unintended consequences 

and other risks in a subsequent update to DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and 

Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.

Page 10

Objective 1: DOD Policies, Procedures, Guidance 
Enclosure

Page 14 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD Receives Input from State for Authorities that 

Can Yield Security Force Assistance Benefits

• State provides some input on the seven authorities we reviewed that yield corollary 

security force assistance benefits through concurrence or consultation as required by 

law, or through coordination (see slide 12).

• Our review found that four required concurrence and one required consultation.

• State provides input for the remaining two authorities that do not require either 

concurrence or consultation through interagency coordination.

Page 11

Objective 2: DOD Input from State 
Enclosure

Page 15 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Examples of Input from the State Department

Authority Input from State 

Concurrence 

required by law

Consultation 

required by law

Coordination

reported

Afghan Security Forces Fund 

Coalition Support Funds 

Global Train and Equip (1206) 

Joint Combined Exchange Training 

Additional Support for Counterdrug Activities (1004) 

Counterdrug Support to Other Countries (1033) 

Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism (1208) 

Page 12

Objective 2: DOD Input from State 

Note 1: According to DOD, these authorities are not "security force assistance authorities." The principal purpose of each is as follows:

• Coalition Support Funds -- reimburse other countries for their logistics and combat support of U.S. military operations;

• Joint Combined Exchange Training -- U.S. Special Operations Forces readiness training;

• Section 1004 -- support counter-drug activities of any other U.S. department or agency or any State, local, tribal or foreign law enforcement agency. 

• Section 1033 -- equip specific foreign partners to support their counter-drug activities.

• Section 1208 -- enable foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating U.S. Special Operations Forces 

...operations to combat terrorism.

Note 2: DOD provides input to many of State’s authorities, including Foreign Military Financing, the International Military Education and Training Program, the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, and the Global Security Contingency Fund.
Enclosure

Page 16 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Legally Required Concurrence

Concurrence: We found that four of the seven authorities we reviewed required concurrence of the Secretary of State or the Chief of Mission. For example: 

• The legislation for section 1206 projects reads in part: “The Secretary of Defense, 

with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may conduct or support a program 

or programs as follows... .”

• The legislation for the 1208 projects reads in part: “The Secretary of Defense may, 

with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission, expend up to...to provide 

support to foreign forces...”

• State officials noted that activities requiring Secretary of State concurrence undergo a 

deliberate, inclusive review process that brings in multiple functional and regional 

bureaus; however, according to these officials, activities requiring the concurrence of 

the Chief of Mission do not necessarily receive the same broad review, nor will they 

necessarily be understood and applied in a regional or global context.

• According to State Department officials, activities that require the concurrence of the 

Secretary of State are reviewed by all of the department’s relevant experts and 

bureaus, and thus have the best chance of identifying and considering the potential for 

unintended consequences compared to other forms of coordination.

Page 13

Objective 2: DOD Input from State 
Enclosure

Page 17 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

Legally Required Consultation

Consultation: We found that one of seven authorities we reviewed required 

consultation between DOD and State (see slide 12). According to State officials:

• The legislative requirement for consultation does not necessarily precipitate the 

same formal review process that concurrence does because consultation can 

mean many things and take many forms.

• Authorities requiring consultation do not receive the same level of review as those 

requiring concurrence.

Page 14

Objective 2: DOD Input from State 
Enclosure

Page 18 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

DOD Coordination with the State Department

Coordination: We found that for two of the seven authorities we reviewed, State 

provided input to DOD through means other than concurrence or consultation:

• According to DOD officials, all section 1004 support for foreign nations must 

originate from U.S. officials outside DOD. State officials said that this coordination 

is particularly helpful for projects such as fuel and construction that otherwise 

might be difficult to fund through State authorities.

• For Joint Combined Exchange Training events, the U.S. Special Operations 

Command Directive 350-3, Joint Combined Exchange Training, specifies that 

planners coordinate with ambassadors and country teams during the planning 

process, and with State during the approval process, before the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense provides authorization for Joint Combined Exchange 

Training events to proceed.

Page 15

Objective 2: DOD Input from State 
Enclosure

Page 19 GAO 13-241R Considerations in Security Force Assistance

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