Affirmed; Opinion Filed February 22, 2018.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-16-01210-CV

RODNEY SHARP AND/OR ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 7501 ASHCREST DRIVE,

DALLAS, TEXAS 75249, Appellants

V.

WOODRIDGE INVESTMENTS, L.P., TEXAS AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE, 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED 

RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2005-OPI, MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-OPI, Appellees

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-05996

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Brown, and Stoddart

Opinion by Justice Stoddart

Appellants Rodney Sharp and/or all other occupants of 7501 Ashcrest Drive, Dallas, Texas 

75249 (“Sharp”) appeal a summary judgment in favor of appellees Woodridge Investments, L.P., 

Texas American Home Mortgage, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee for Securitized Asset 

Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OPI, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-OPI. 

In a single issue, Sharp argues the trial court erred by granting appellees’ traditional motion for 

summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sharp signed a deed of trust to secure a promissory note for a property located at 7501 

Ashcrest Drive, Dallas, Texas 75249. H&R Block Mortgage Corporation, the original mortgagor, 
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transferred the deed of trust and note to Wells Fargo. After Sharp defaulted on the loan, Wells 

Fargo foreclosed. Wells Fargo bought the property at the foreclosure sale and subsequently sold 

it to Woodridge Investments. Sharp sued appellees for negligent misrepresentation, violation of 

the Texas Theft Liability Act, fraud, breach of contract, suit to quiet title, declaratory judgment, 

and injunctive relief. In his petition, Sharp “contends that the Note and Deed of Trust were not 

validly assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee of the Securitized Asset backed Receivables 

LLC Trust 2005-OPI, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-OPI, and that Wells Fargo 

had no authority to foreclose.” Appellees filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary 

judgment, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. First United Pentecostal Church v. 

Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017). When, as here, a party moves for no-evidence summary 

judgment, the court “must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment 

evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Thus, to defeat a noevidence motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant is required to produce more than a 

scintilla of probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element 

of its claim. See Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009); see also TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(i). 

Although appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on 

appellants’ claims, the record shows that Sharp, who was represented by counsel, did not respond

to the motion. To defeat the no-evidence motion, Sharp needed to file a response and produce 

summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. See Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 

310; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (“The court must grant the motion unless the respondent 

produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.”). Because Sharp 
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failed to file a response supported by summary judgment evidence, we conclude the trial court

correctly granted the no-evidence motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

If, as here, the trial court’s order does not state the grounds on which it granted summary 

judgment, we will affirm if any of the theories advanced by the summary judgment movant are 

meritorious. Pain Control Inst., Inc. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2014, no pet.). Because we affirm the trial court’s judgment on the ground that it properly 

granted the no-evidence motion for summary judgment, we need not consider the merits of 

appellees’ traditional motion for summary judgment. We overrule appellants’ sole issue and 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

161210F.P05

/Craig Stoddart/

CRAIG STODDART

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

RODNEY SHARP, Appellant

No. 05-16-01210-CV V.

WOODRIDGE INVESTMENTS, L.P., 

TEXAS AMERICAN HOME 

MORTGAGE, WELLS FARGO BANK, 

N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR SECURITIZED 

ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC 

TRUST 2005-OPI, MORTGAGE PASS 

THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 

2005-OPI, Appellees

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-05996.

Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. 

Justices Francis and Brown participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees WOODRIDGE INVESTMENTS, L.P., TEXAS 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR 

SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2005-OPI, MORTGAGE 

PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-OPI recover their costs of this appeal from 

appellant RODNEY SHARP.

Judgment entered this 22nd day of February, 2018.