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79–463 PDF 2013

U.S. DIRECT ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN: 

ENSURING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2013 

Serial No. 113–1 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

MARK POCAN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

VACANCY 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on February 13, 2013 ....................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz, a Member of Congress from the State of 

Utah, Opening Statement ................................................................................... 33 

(1) 

U.S. DIRECT ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN: 

ENSURING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

Wednesday, February 13, 2013, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND

DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:59 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Gowdy, 

Woodall, Bentivolio, and Tierney. 

Staff Present: Alexia Ardolina, Majority Assistant Clerk; Brien A. 

Beattie, Majority Professional Staff Member; Molly Boyl, Majority 

Parliamentarian; Caitlin Carroll, Majority Deputy Press Secretary; 

John Cuaderes, Majority Deputy Staff Director; Adam P. Fromm, 

Majority Director of Member Services and Committee Operations; 

Linda Good, Majority Chief Clerk; Michael R. Kiko, Majority Staff 

Assistant; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Majority Counsel; Mark D. Marin, 

Majority Director of Oversight; Scott Schmidt, Majority Deputy Director of Digital Strategy; Devon Hill, Minority Research Assistant; 

Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Rory Sheehan, Minority New 

Media Press Secretary. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight Committee’s mission statement. We exist to secure two fundamental 

principles. First, Americans have a right to know that the money 

Washington takes from them is well spent and, second, Americans 

deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. Our 

duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to 

protect these rights. 

Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to 

taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they get 

from their government. We will work tirelessly in partnership with 

citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and 

bring genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is the mission of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. 

I want to welcome everybody here this morning for today’s hearing, which is entitled U.S. Direct Assistance in Afghanistan: Ensuring Transparency and Accountability. I would like to welcome 

Ranking Member Tierney, members of the Subcommittee and 

2 

members of the audience to the Subcommittee’s first hearing of the 

113th. I look forward to working with everyone during this Congress. 

Today’s proceedings continue the Subcommittee on National Security’s oversight of approximately 100 billion of U.S. taxpayer dollars spent in support of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. A few 

weeks ago, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, also known as SIGAR, released a report entitled ‘‘Afghan National Army: Controls over Fuel for Vehicles, Generators and Power 

Plants Need Strengthening to Prevent Waste, Fraud and Abuse.’’ 

This report provided the Secretary of Defense with an update in 

SIGAR’s continuing audit of the Afghan National Army’s logistics 

capability for petroleum, oil and lubricants, also known as POL. 

From fiscal years 2007 to 2012, the Department of Defense has provided approximately $1.1 billion in funding to purchase petroleum, oil and lubricants for the Afghan National Army. In fiscal 

year 2013, the U.S. Government will purchase roughly $343 million 

more in POL. However, the SIGAR has found the Department of 

Defense does not have accurate support information on how much 

U.S. funding is in fact needed for ANA fuel, where and how the 

fuel is actually used and how much fuel has been lost or stolen. 

Despite the lack of records and justification for fuel purposes, the 

Department of Defense proposes an increase in funding for POL. 

From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018, the Department of Defense plans to provide $2.8 billion, or roughly $555 million worth 

of POL per year. But instead of the Department of Defense purchasing the fuel for the Afghan National Army, this administration 

plans to give one-third of that, or roughly $1 billion, directly to the 

Afghan government. 

Many similar direct assistance efforts in Afghanistan by the 

United States Government, both previous and ongoing, have resulted in rampant waste, fraud and abuse, and even tragedy. For 

example, during the 112th Congress, this subcommittee held a 

hearing to examine the mismanagement, theft and human suffering at the Dawood National Military Hospital in Afghanistan. 

For years, Afghan officials pilfered nearly $175 million in cash and 

medical supplies. Legitimate pharmaceuticals were replaced with 

counterfeits, and wounded Afghan soldiers were made to suffer and 

in some cases died without proper medical care. This was a U.S. 

taxpayer-funded program operated by the Afghan government. 

Direct assistance from the United States to Afghanistan comes 

from both the Department of Defense and the United States Agency for International Development, also known as USAID. USAID 

has embarked on an effort to significantly boost the amount of 

funding that goes directly to foreign governments and non-U.S. organizations. The agency’s stated objective is to ‘‘strengthen the 

local actors and institutions that are ultimately responsible for 

transforming their countries.’’ 

Without the necessary planning and safeguards, programs like 

those envisioned in USAID forward all too often result in funneling 

grants directly to unaccountable and often corrupt foreign governments. For instance, in Afghanistan, following a 2010 agreement 

with international donors, U.S. direct assistance, most of it from 

USAID, tripled from $665 million in 2009 to $2 billion in 2010. Yet 

3 

the United States Government Accountability office has identified 

a variety of severe weaknesses in accountability measures for those 

funds. 

Meanwhile, we have a number of reports detailing unbridled corruption in Afghanistan. In one such case, the New York Times recently reported that the Kabul Bank, one of the largest commercial 

banks created in the wake of the Taliban, lost an estimated $900 

million to fraud and highly questionable lending practices. Despite 

those known challenges, since February 2012, as Mr. Sopko’s written statement points out, the ‘‘United States was dispersing more 

than 40 percent of its aid funds to the Afghan government in the 

form of direct assistance.’’ 

We continue to provide direct assistance worth billions of dollars 

to one of the most corrupt nations in existence, with little or no effort to ensure transparency or proper accountability measures. This 

has broad implications, too. The limited accountability of POL import controls increases the risk that U.S. taxpayer-funded fuel purchases are violating the U.S. economic sanctions with Iran. 

The American taxpayer deserves better. In the State of the 

Union last night, the President announced the upcoming withdrawal of 34,000 troops from Afghanistan. With removal of U.S. 

troops approaching, it becomes even more imperative that we implement better accountability measures for U.S. funding that is 

headed directly to the Afghan government. 

Mr. Sopko, you recently noted, referring to your visiting reconstruction projects in Afghanistan that ‘‘Even in Kabul, we cannot 

get the protection we need.’’ You also mentioned, ‘‘Reconstruction 

projects exist with no U.S. oversight.’’ 

Today I would like your testimony to also focus on the withdrawal of troops that will affect the oversight of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan as it relates to U.S. direct assistance. I would 

also like to thank you and your staff for this report that you issue 

on a regular basis. But this one in particular, the January 30th 

SIGAR report, the quarterly report, is full of a lot of great information. I hope it doesn’t simply go up on the shelf. I can’t thank you 

enough for it. I have gone through every page of this. It is great 

material. I appreciate the effort that you and your staff have put 

into this and look forward to a good, candid discussion today. I 

thank the members for being here. 

I would now like to recognize the distinguished ranking member, 

the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Sopko, for again joining us here today, and your staff for the work 

that they do as well. 

I want to take a moment to recognize, we have some new members on this side of the aisle on the subcommittee, and welcome 

them and hope that they participate in a rigorous manner for the 

work that is being done. 

As chairman of the subcommittee in the 111th Congress, we 

acted on a bipartisan basis, we investigated a number of different 

issues on there, one being the United States Army’s multi-billion 

dollar host nation trucking program in Afghanistan. We uncovered 

the contractors who were making protection payments to our enVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Mar 08, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\79463.TXT APRIL
4 

emies, using U.S. taxpayer funds to do so. We investigated the lack 

of oversight and the potential corruption in jet fuel contracts in 

Kurdistan. 

During the last Congress, Chairman Chaffetz continued the tradition by examining mismanagement and waste in Iraq and Afghanistan and the transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq. Continuing our work from the last Congress, both the chairman and 

I are leading a bipartisan investigation into a multi-billion dollar 

food contract in Afghanistan that led the government to demand 

more than $750 million in overpayments over five and a half years 

of failed negotiations. 

So going forward, I look forward to working with members on 

both sides of the aisle on oversight investigations into these and 

other important matters. Mr. Sopko, your group’s work on that is 

going to be very informative and helpful to us on that. 

So this is our first hearing on oversight in this Subcommittee 

this year. Sadly, our hearing concerns an all too familiar topic of 

the continuing challenges to adequate oversight of our assistance 

programs in Afghanistan. Since 2005, Congress has appropriated 

more than $50 billion to train, equip and sustain Afghan national 

security forces. As we will hear today, training and equipment missions continue to lack proper oversight. This is not a case of only 

exposing taxpayer funds to the risk of loss, but can exacerbate the 

likelihood of mission failure by fanning the flames of corruption in 

Afghan insurgencies. 

These risks become heightened as the military continue its withdrawal, reducing both its management and oversight expertise on 

the ground and the security that is provided to the United States 

Government personnel that evaluate and monitor programs and 

projects in the field. So we will talk a little bit about that, I think, 

before the hearing is over. 

I welcome the opportunity to discuss the challenges that face our 

reconstruction efforts and the current plans to increase direct assistance to the Afghan government with the Special Inspector General John Sopko. During Mr. Sopko’s tenure as SIGAR, he has already appeared before this Committee twice. As I said, we appreciate your being here again. Apparently this will be a regular routine, you can schedule us in. 

Last month, the Special Inspector General released its final report on the Afghan army’s fuel logistics that confirmed what we 

had long suspected, that the United States lacks oversight and accountability for over more than a billion dollars in fuel that it has 

provided to the Afghan army over the last five years. The final report highlights the lack of complete and accurate records of fuel 

purchased, delivered and consumed. 

Today, the United States military cannot provide nearly a year’s 

worth of fuel records and cannot account for fuel lost to spillage or 

theft. Meanwhile, the lack of complete and accurate data means 

that the United States military cannot justify or support its current 

estimate that $3 billion will be required to fund purchases for the 

Afghan army over the next six years. They can’t do that, because 

they do not have complete consumption data to show what the Afghans actually use or need. 

5 

Last, I continue to have concerns over the military’s plans, at 

least until last month, to transfer direct control for the fuel logistics system to the Afghan government. That would have provided 

them with a virtual blank check without any assurance whatsoever 

that they would have the capacity to manage and account for the 

fuel. 

On the eve of our last hearing on this topic, the Defense Department decided that it would reduce the amount of on-budget assistance to the Afghan government. Just last month, the Defense Department decided that it would release these funds incrementally. 

While these are welcome steps, I am still concerned that they don’t 

go far enough and they will be ineffective in holding the Afghan 

government accountable. 

In the next six years, the United States taxpayer will cut a check for more than $1 billion directly to the Afghan government without 

tested and proven mechanisms to ensure that that government will 

be a responsible steward of that money. To prevent this undisciplined spending, last month Chairman Chaffetz and I introduced 

bipartisan legislation that would prevent any more money or fuel 

from flowing until strict accountability and oversight measures are 

put in place. 

I welcome the Chairman’s attention to this matter and look forward to working with him to continue protecting taxpayer funds 

and reducing waste, fraud and abuse. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

and look forward to today’s hearing. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the Ranking Member, Mr. Tierney. He is 

passionate about this issue and I appreciate working with him in 

a bipartisan way on this. 

Now I would like to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I want to take just a second to express my 

appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, and also the ranking member, 

for holding this hearing. 

This appears to be just the tip of the iceberg in waste and incredible abuse of taxpayer funds. I don’t propose or claim to be an expert on Afghanistan. I visited last year and I was really stunned 

by the open commentary, both from Afghani officials and also our 

military on the ground who told me of the waste, fraud and abuse. 

It is blatant. They pointed out things that they were paying four 

and five times the market value for. 

I looked at the budget and I had a copy of the Afghan budget. 

I guess their budget is $3.96 billion. The Chairman said we poured 

$100 billion in here in aid. This is just one small area we are looking at, Mr. Chairman, this committee, of incredible waste, lack of 

documentation. Afghanistan is turning into a huge black hole for 

the American taxpayers, and almost a bottomless pit of expenditures. I think someone has to first expose this, which I think we 

are doing, and then call a halt to it. 

The theft, the overcharging, the waste, I think we have to somehow apply the brakes to this and bring some accountability to bear. 

I really appreciate the efforts of the Chairman to focus on one detail. When I was there, they told me we had $5 billion in USAID 

assistance. And then we paid most of the UN’s additional, about $5 

billion. I just checked and they received $15.7 billion between 2010 

6 

and 2011, $15.7 billion, in a country whose entire budget is only 

$3.9 billion. 

Then you heard the Chairman also cite the money going through 

the primary banking, the capital, like a sieve. Again, I think the 

United States’ days of financing this fiasco have to be brought to 

a halt. I appreciate your again calling attention to it in the form 

of this hearing. I look forward to the Special Inspector General’s report. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman and now recognize the 

gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling 

this very important hearing. I would like to say that I appreciate 

the work that I read about that our witness, Mr. Sopko, has been 

doing. 

A few days ago, I read this story in the Washington Examiner 

which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has 

spent more than $51 billion to help Afghanistan feed, clothe, arm 

and house the national security force. But the Special Inspector 

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said Monday that Washington doesn’t even know the size of the Afghan force it is paying 

for. And in a shocking statement, the IG, John Sopko, said that the 

numbers the U.S. is relying on from Afghan officials could be a 

sham, resulting in billions of dollars in waste. 

I remember about a year or so ago, President Karzai telling the 

ABC national news that he thought the United States should have 

a significant presence in Afghanistan for at least another 15 or 20 

more years. What he really wants is our money gravy train. I send 

out a very detailed newsletter to my district on a regular basis, and 

I mentioned in a brief way this Afghan fuel thing that we are supposed to talk about today. I tell about the $1.1 billion, and how the 

Inspector General said there is no proof the fuel is being used for 

the Army’s mission and it is unknown how much has been lost, stolen or diverted to the insurgency. 

Mr. Sopko’s report said this program needs immediate attention 

before being turned over and scheduled to Afghan officers. I sometimes wonder if there are any fiscal conservatives at the Defense 

Department, the way the money is being wasted. I think fiscal conservatives should be the ones most horrified by all the waste that 

has gone on in both Afghanistan and Iraq. I for one think we 

should have been out of Afghanistan a long time ago. But I certainly appreciate the efforts of this Committee to try to stay on top 

of this. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Do any other members wish to make an opening statement? 

Otherwise, we will introduce our witness. 

Members will have seven days to submit opening statements for 

the record. We will now introduce Mr. Sopko, who is the Special 

Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. Mr. Sopko, we appreciate your being here today. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. If you will please rise and raise your right hand. 

7 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth? 

Mr. SOPKO. I do. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Let the record reflect that the witness 

answered in the affirmative. 

We will be fairly generous with your time, Mr. Sopko. We will 

turn it over to you and appreciate your opening statement, and 

then open it up for members to ask questions. Mr. Sopko? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Tierney and members of the 

subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results 

of our POL, that is the Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants audits, and 

more importantly, the broader implications from that audit for reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

But first, I want to thank the chairman and this committee for 

focusing attention on this important issue, and for holding the first 

hearing of the 113th Congress on the Afghanistan reconstruction 

effort. 

The impending end of the combat mission in Afghanistan has led 

some to erroneously believe that the Afghan reconstruction effort 

is waning. On the contrary, I think it is safe to say that the next 

two years and beyond will be the most critical period for reconstruction in Afghanistan. As mentioned, at least $20 billion has been appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction that still remains to be spent. It has been 

appropriated but has not been spent. And it is my job and the job 

of my staff to ensure that these precious fund are spent wisely and 

safeguarded from waste, fraud and abuse. 

Let me first, before discussing that, provide you and update on 

our work regarding the Afghan fuel audit. Let me start by saying 

this, Mr. Chairman, we still don’t have the records. As you recall, 

there were promises made, I believe, as of the end of the last hearing, we would get the records. They still have not been able to find 

the records. 

Now, in that audit, we found that there are weaknesses in the 

U.S. Army’s process for providing petroleum, oil and lubricants to 

the Afghan army. The lack of accountability there has increased 

the risk that U.S. funds and fuel will be stolen. We found that the 

U.S. Army’s processes were beset by major vulnerabilities. 

Our report, our file report, which I would ask to be made part 

of the record, includes six recommendations to the U.S. Army. I am 

pleased to report that the Army concurred with all of these recommendations, including one of the most important: to revise its 

strategy for providing direct contributions to the Afghan government for future fuel purchases. So that further assistance is contingent upon the Afghan government demonstrating transparency and 

accountability without Coalition assistance. 

More importantly, I believe our audit of the petroleum, oil and 

lubricants contract for the Afghan national army highlights a number of challenges and concerns that we repeatedly encounter 

8 

throughout our work all through Afghanistan. First and foremost, 

the POL audit exemplifies the risks inherent to direct assistance. 

Now, direct or on-budget assistance is funding provided to another government’s national budget to be used by that government. 

Direct assistance is designed to allow the Afghans more freedom to 

manage their own budget and to build their capacity for doing so. 

However, direct assistance creates a number of significant concerns, including that the Afghan government does not appear to 

have the capacity to manage the $8 billion pledged by the international community in direct assistance, and that funds provided 

through direct assistance are typically subject to less oversight 

than funds provided through projects implemented by U.S. and 

other donor government agencies. 

This lower level of oversight is especially problematic because of 

the pervasiveness of corruption in Afghanistan, an issue I know 

this committee is well aware of. 

Now, my agency has a number of ongoing and planned audits of 

direct assistance programs. As we conduct these audits, we will 

carefully examine the extent to which controls have been built in 

to each direct assistance program. We will also, as we do with all 

of our audits, ask the following questions as detailed in my recent 

quarterly report to Congress: Does the project or program make a 

clear and identifiable contribution to our national strategic interests? Do the Afghans want the program and do they need it? Has 

that program or project been coordinated with other U.S. agencies, 

with the Afghan government or our allies? Do security conditions 

permit effective implementation and oversight? Do the programs 

have adequate state safeguards to detect, deter and prevent corruption? 

Probably the most important is, do the Afghans have the financial resources, the technical capability and political will to sustain 

those programs? And lastly, have our implemented agencies established meaningful, measurable metrics for determining success and 

are they applying them? 

Now, finally, SIGAR will continue to do all it can to get into the 

field to inspect and examine programs in person. That leads me to 

the last concern I would like to leave with you today. SIGAR’s ability, as well as the ability of every implementing agency to conduct 

onsite inspections, audits and investigations may be hindered in 

the very near future by security restrictions. 

As you know, it is the policy of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to provide military security only in areas within an hour of a facility that 

can provide emergency medical care. This means the safe zone, or 

bubble, around these medical facilities extends about the distance 

of a 20-minute helicopter ride. 

As our U.S. troops continue to withdraw, the amount of territory 

in Afghanistan that falls outside of the bubble will increase. Accordingly, the amount of programs and number of projects that can 

be monitored and overseen by U.S. personnel will decrease. 

I have referenced in my quarterly report that SIGAR has already 

seen limitations caused by this bubble. Recently in northern Afghanistan, we were prevented from visiting a site because it was 

too dangerous because it was outside the bubble. As a result, 38 

9 

projects and over $72 million in U.S. taxpayer money is beyond our 

inspection. 

In closing, let me reiterate that I believe, our agency believes 

that we are at a critical juncture in Afghanistan. Our nation is intensely focused on two interrelated and important tasks. First, as 

we have seen a lot in the press and heard about, it is the transferring of the security responsibilities to the Afghans by the end of 

2014. But at the same time, we are trying to strengthen the Afghan government’s ability to manage the country’s continued reconstruction during its transition period and beyond. 

I think it is fair to say that the success or failure of our entire 

ten-year engagement in Afghanistan is teetering on whether these 

two interrelated and very important and ambitious goals can be 

met. SIGAR is committed to providing the most robust oversight it 

can and to work closely with the Administration and Congress to 

provide information that they need to make the tough decisions 

that need to be made in the years to come. 

Thank you very much. I am open to any questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:] 

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Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

I believe there is ample evidence to suggest that the Afghan Government may perhaps be the most corrupt government on the face 

of the planet. It bothers me to no end that we continue to insist 

on giving them more direct payments, payments we ought to be 

just making straight to Dubai and get rid of the middle man. Because to suggest that all this money is going to get to the finish 

line and truly go to its intended purpose I think is certainly without warrant. 

Can we go back, Mr. Sopko? Let’s go to 60,000 feet, if you will. 

We have a decreasing number of troops, so the bubble is shrinking. 

We have an increasing amount of projects. Can you give us just the 

size and the scope of this? I believe that we are starting, starting 

more projects than we ever have within Afghanistan. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, that is our concern. On my last trip 

to Afghanistan, I was particularly concerned by a number of statements by senior U.S. officials. They were saying that they were 

going to be embarking or they knew that there was going to be embarking upon more work and spending more of that $20 billion now 

than ever before. I heard that from somebody referring to the Army 

Corps of Engineer projects, that there may be more Army Corps of 

Engineer projects coming down the pike than we have before in the 

last 10 years. I also heard that about AID. 

My concern, and I think you have probably seen it before, I know 

I have seen it before, is the desire to get the money pumped out 

before the clock runs out. Now, as a result, Mr. Chairman, I just 

want you to know that we will shortly be sending out letters to 

every agency operating in Afghanistan, asking for them to give a 

list of every project, what is the extent of the completion, and in 

particular, which projects have not been started. Because we think 

that is where Congress and the Administration ought to look first 

and make the determination and ask those questions that I pose. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, that could be tens of billions of dollars, correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. It definitely could, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I am concerned that you don’t have the proper 

documentation for the Department of Defense’s justification for the 

extension of the POL program. We are talking about $343 million 

this year in a direct payment to support the POL. They want to 

expand it to $555 million. We had a hearing on this September 

20th of 2012. I asked if they had the documentation of that, of General Bash and Mr. Estevez, on page 25 of the transcript, Mr. 

Estevez says, ‘‘I will commit to give you a date, sir.’’ I said, ‘‘Within 

a week, is that fair?’’ Mr. Estevez: ‘‘Within a week.’’ 

Have you received that information? 

Mr. SOPKO. No, sir, no, Mr. Chairman. Actually, a senior official 

told me when I was in Afghanistan, a bit chagrined, saying, ‘‘You 

are never going to see those records.’’ Not that they were criminally 

hidden. I think they were just, were destroyed, they put it on a disc 

and they can’t find it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We will need to get the Department of Defense 

back up here, because they promised us they had it. To not have 

23 

those, to actually shred those documents, which I believe you have 

evidence that they were shredded, to not have and provide to this 

Congress, they promised that they had it, they said they’d have it 

within the week. It has been since September. You have been asking for it, it is totally inexcusable. And here the Department of Defense believes that there is justification by sending hundreds of 

millions of dollars of taxpayer money. We have billions of dollars 

in the pipeline and we don’t even have the most basic things here. 

I need to ask you two quick questions. I may go a bit over my 

time here. According to a report by the Afghan Independent Joint 

Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, the story 

of what happened at the Kabul Bank and the role of the government and the international community has never been fully told. 

In addition, the report claims that there has not ‘‘been a comprehensive effort to identify changes that are required to ensure 

that such an event never happens again, and to ensure that those 

responsible for the crisis face real consequences for their actions.’’ 

This report relied heavily on the forensic audit conducted by the 

investigative firm known as Kroll, which found that approximately 

900 million U.S. dollars had been embezzled. According to the high 

likelihood that U.S. taxpayer funds provided for Afghan reconstruction were deposited in the bank, have you done any sort of investigation of the bank? Have you read the Kroll report? And could 

you provide a copy of the Kroll report to this body? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the Kroll investigation. 

I am also aware of the report by what we call the MEC, which is 

the Afghan Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and 

Evaluation Committee, which is actually a fascinating group of 

international experts as well as Afghans who are seriously committed to doing something about corruption. 

I am at a little loss to discuss the Kroll report in an open session. 

And I would be more than happy to speak with you or your staff 

offline on that. But I know of the Kroll report, and I have seen reports about the Kroll report. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let me just finish by saying here, it is my understanding that the Afghan regulators, aided by American officials, 

first discovered the extent of the fraud at the Bank in the summer 

of 2010. Qadir Fitrat, who at the time was the governor of the 

Bank of Afghanistan, the country’s central bank, has said, ‘‘We 

never imagined that the criminality was as deep as it was, that it 

was so widespread and that it included high-ranking officials and 

their relatives.’’ 

Mr. Sopko, in the case of the Kabul Bank, do you think the U.S. 

Government has been provided the appropriate level of insight and 

access to the details of the events surrounding the Bank’s massive 

fraud? And considering the Bank’s scandal implicated members of 

the Afghan president’s family and the inner circle, do you believe 

this impacted the United States’ government’s ability to investigate 

the matter fully? 

Mr. SOPKO. I cannot comment on the Kroll report. But it is serious loss. I also don’t know who else in the government has been 

or is privy to that information. So it is hard for me to answer that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I think our concern is not only the Kabul Bank, 

but the Azizi Bank as well. Here we are talking about $900 million. 

24 

When I went to Afghanistan last, I was told in general, as a sweeping generality, well, once we give the money over to Afghans, hey, 

there is nothing we can do. Well, that is the deep-seated concern 

that we are seeing played out in the POL and other types of things. 

My time is gone, but we will continue to pursue this. I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I sense that you were going to make a response, 

Mr. Sopko. 

Mr. SOPKO. I was just going to say, Mr. Chairman, I share your 

concerns. I particularly share concerns when I was told by a senior 

U.S. official that part of our plan for AID money was just deposited 

in an Afghan bank and hopefully they will spent it over the next 

five to ten years. In light of the briefings I received about the 

Kabul Bank and other banking issues, I was a bit shocked to hear 

that we would do that, without proper safeguards, to make certain 

that there is money there. 

So as for whether there was U.S. money in the Kabul Bank when 

it failed, I am not privy to that information. I really don’t know. 

But my concern is, going forward, we don’t make that mistake. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I think we would appreciate your looking into 

this. 

Mr. SOPKO. I would be happy to do that, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I’m sorry, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thanks. 

So I guess this going forward business is what has us all here. 

We have had some debates with President Karzai at length in his 

office, complaining about the corruption, family, other high-ranking 

officials, whatever. His general rebuttal is always, well, look, 40 

percent of the money disappears when you give it to contractors 

and non-governmental outfits. You lose some on K Street in Washington, you lose some more before it hits the turf out there in Afghanistan, and they don’t get enough on their end on the projects 

out there. 

Assuming that we all think accountability is an essential thing, 

what is the path forward here? If we don’t think they have the capacity to manage this money and to be accountable for it, then is 

it your recommendation or thought that fist, you would think before we put any money over to them we would get some sort of certification along the line of those things you put forward in page 10 

of your testimony, does the project or program make a clear and 

identifiable contribution to national interests and strategic objectives and so on down the line. 

Would you think that requiring a pre-certification with positive 

answers on all those questions would be required before the money 

be dispersed, as an initial step? And if so, who would make that 

certification, in your mind? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Tierney, there are a number of conditions and 

a number of safeguards we can insert above and beyond my seven 

questions. I think the first thing we need to do is we need to make 

certain when we negotiate and we sign a contract that we don’t forget these things when we negotiate. My fear is that somebody may 

leave oversight out of the negotiation as we go forward. I think the 

important thing is to negotiate that we get access to records, that 

records are maintained, that we can get there and not only do the 

25 

financial audit, but we are also able to get out there and do a programmatic review. 

What we have seen before, especially with assistance to a number of the funds, particularly with the U.N. and the World Bank, 

there were very poor controls. But even when there were financial 

controls, there was no ability or no willingness for the World Bank 

to go out there and actually see if the money went to the soldiers 

or if the money went to the project. And I will cite as an example, 

we are looking at a project, a road project right now, people are 

doing a nice financial audit, taking a look at a record and seeing 

if there is justification. But nobody is going out to check and see 

if the road is actually there. So it is simple things like that. 

Mr. TIERNEY. We have that problem in Pakistan as well. We 

went around and around with USAID and others on that because 

of the dangerousness of getting people out there to check the scope 

of the work, particularly up in some of the more rural, remote 

areas and dangerous areas in there. If we can’t do that, should we 

be giving the money? 

Mr. SOPKO. I am an old economist, went to the Wharton School. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So if put you and all your colleagues end to end, 

what would be the conclusion? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SOPKO. What is a marginal cost versus marginal return. We 

have to make a determination. That is what we are saying to the 

Executive Branch. We are saying also to Congress, now is the time. 

We have this opportunity. It is a limited amount of opportunity. It 

is an important opportunity to stop and reassess all of that money 

that hasn’t been spent and make a determination, is it worth the 

risk. 

For example, Mr. Tierney, if the Afghans can’t sustain a hospital, 

why build it? What do we accomplish other than some contractors 

are wealthy? 

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, if they can’t disburse and manage and account for a billion dollars, why give them a billion dollars? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is the question, Mr. Tierney. That is the question that the Executive Branch has to ask. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So the Executive Branch already has authority to 

make all of these terms part of any negotiation and any contract? 

Mr. SOPKO. Absolutely. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Our fear is that they are not doing it. You are telling us that they are not doing it. So I guess the real question for 

us becomes whether or not we decide to act legislatively to put a 

halt on things and disbursement of money until then, which means 

wrestling with our Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee and all those people who love to give money out on 

just a trust factor on that. 

But I really take to heart what you are telling us. We have seen 

this in Iraq, we have seen it in Pakistan and we see it here in Afghanistan. The question comes down to, why would we ever, ever 

put out for money without any assurance it is going to get paid on 

that basis, and let it go into the treasury? We let enormous 

amounts of money go, when President Bush and the Shah put it 

in together, right into that treasury. We lost all insight to it on 

that basis. We found out afterwards that helicopters that were supVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Mar 08, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\79463.TXT APRIL
26 

posed to be repaired were still sitting on the ground unrepaired, 

and other horror stories. Now we are starting to see a repeat of it 

here. 

Mr. SOPKO. And Mr. Tierney, that is the point. We have an opportunity to hit the pause button or at least say, justify why you 

are doing it. Because as I say in the quarterly report, there may 

be a reason to push the money out the door for a particular project 

or program, regardless of the fact that they answer the questions, 

the seven questions in the negative. But at least justify it to you. 

There may be a reason, because the marginal return, it is really 

important to national security. So we are running a very big risk 

we are going to lose that money, but we have to do it. But at least 

justify it. And then hold that agency accountable for that justification. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I just go one second over? 

So here is a question for you on that. If we have an area that 

is outside the bubble, in fact, considerably outside the bubble, very 

dangerous, and a project that we think is important enough to 

fund, but obviously then we have the problem, do we risk our personnel to go out there and make the kinds of assessments that 

need to be made on site or not. If not, what is the alternative way 

of getting accountability? Do you trust others to take a helicopter 

flight over and make it make a visual? Do you trust others to come 

back and just take their word for it? 

What are the alternatives? 

Mr. SOPKO. There are other alternatives. None of them are as 

good as an American trained auditor, investigator, going out there 

and kicking the tires. That is one reason why I go out to Afghanistan every quarter, because I like to kick the tires. It is amazing 

how honest people are to you when you get outside the Kabul bubble and start talking to people in the various locations. 

But we can use geospatial. If you recall from the press, we just 

issued a report on geospatial, because we found out that an AID 

program which was supposed to be the gold standard for a list of 

all our sites, they couldn’t verify 19 percent of the sites. But you 

could use geospatial. You look down and see, is that a school? 

Looks like a school. Maybe that is good enough. 

You can do overflights. You can also use third country nationals. 

Now, our concern is that this isn’t something new. This shouldn’t 

have been a shock or surprise to AID and State and the Justice Department and all those government agencies that we were going to 

have a reduction in troops. The Administration’s been talking 

about a reduction in troops way before the last election. I think the 

Republican candidate talked about a reduction in troops. Everybody knew it was coming. 

But when you go to Kabul, it is like this was a shock. We are 

concerned about how much planning has gone into this beforehand. 

I was particularly shocked when we found out that AID was going 

to be doing a test, a pilot program on using third country nationals 

to check out sites in dangerous locales. 

But they haven’t issued the contract. The contract won’t come 

out until September to do the pilot or test project. Why wasn’t that 

done a year ago? 

27 

So that is my concern. We have an opportunity, let’s not lose the 

opportunity to ask those simple questions and try to save the taxpayer some money here. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 

Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As bad as all these things are that you have uncovered, I read 

that you just looked at the 150 out of 2,922 fuel orders. Also, there 

are many areas that you can’t go to because of safety. So as was 

mentioned a few minutes ago, I guess that what you are finding 

out is just sort of the tip of that iceberg, is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And when you used the example of, why build a 

hospital that you can’t sustain, haven’t we just built a new hospital, or are we in the process of building a new hospital over 

there? Have we built several hospitals? 

Mr. SOPKO. We are building several hospitals and several clinics. 

Actually, we have an audit ongoing right now which should come 

out next month, which I think will be a very important audit for 

this whole issue. Because we are looking at direct assistance to the 

Ministry of Health in Afghanistan. I will be quite honest with you, 

some of the initial findings, these are preliminary, give me pause. 

Because we don’t think the Afghan Ministry is prepared. 

The other thing, Mr. Duncan, which is that we are finding evidence of clinics being built and it looks like the Afghans don’t even 

know they are being built for them, which again goes back to my 

second question, have we coordinated it. So we are finding problems in a lot of places. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I would be very interested in that. I think it is really sad that we have many people in this Country going without 

medical care. In fact, I have a remote area medical charity that has 

been featured on 60 Minutes in my district. Everytime they go hold 

free medical clinics all around the Country, they are just swamped 

with people who need medical care. Yet we are building all these 

hospitals and clinics over in Afghanistan that we don’t even know 

how many and so forth. 

I would like a little more detail. I think you have made a good 

suggestion on stopping these new projects that haven’t been started 

yet. Do you have any idea, are there many of these or quite a few? 

Mr. SOPKO. We think there are, sir. But we don’t have a good 

handle on it. That is why today I am announcing we are sending 

a letter out to every U.S. Government agency to give us a complete 

list of every project you have on the books, what is the status. Because what we would like to do, Mr. Duncan, is we want to give 

you an interactive map. We want to give you and the rest of the 

Congress an interactive map that you can actually push on a site 

and know what we are buying and what state it is in. And also 

overlay the bubble, the security bubble. 

And we also want the Executive Branch. They don’t even have 

this now. So as our troops move back and close down military 

bases, we are going to show on that map what is the implication 

of getting a U.S. person out to that site. So we are going to try to 

28 

develop this. I apologize, I can’t give you more detail on that. I am 

not technically sophisticated enough to explain. 

But we think this is a useful tool to visualize to policy makers, 

you here on the Hill also, as to what that bubble is going to mean 

in the number of projects and the amount of taxpayer dollars at 

risk. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I would be very interested in that, too. I have 

been concerned about it since several weeks ago I read in the 

Washington Post that they were letting a new contract, it was just 

for $25 million, but $25 million to improve or expand a base over 

there that was brand new in 2009. And I had the same concern 

that you mentioned, that some people, or a lot of people, maybe 

even most people, think that because we are pulling the troops out 

that all our spending and activities over there is stopping, yet they 

are letting these new projects start and these new contracts. It 

looks like to me that we are going to be over there spending an unbelievable amount of money for a long time to come, unless the 

Congress does something about it. 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Duncan, if I can reply, I think you and I are of 

the generation that we appreciate the wise sayings of Senator 

Everett Dirksen, who said, ‘‘A million here, a million there, after 

a while you are talking big bucks.’’ 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO. And I am of that opinion. When I see a million dollars wasted, and I keep adding it up, I appreciate what that means 

for taxpayers. 

Unfortunately, we have some people who, a million is nothing, 

you have to talk billions or trillions. But let’s start with millions 

and save the taxpayers some money. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, this is my 25th year in the Congress. When 

we first came here, we were talking about billions, thinking that 

was high. Then we started talking about trillions. Then we started 

about one year things, then we started talking about ten year 

things. I wish we had more people like you in our government, Mr. 

Sopko. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I was almost ready to tell Mr. Duncan, we are now 

into gazillions with a G, where the money goes up on that basis. 

It is very disturbing, the chairman and I are up here kibitzing 

on how we try to get our colleagues on the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services Committee to really focus on this issue 

as well, because they are going to have a lot to say about the how 

and when the money gets spent. It needs so much attention, and 

the work that you are doing is difficult. But we have to put it to 

some use. 

Just to maybe draw a finer point on the aspect of the petroleum 

and oil and lubricants aspect of that, we have seen this lack of 

oversight and whatever, there is a part of your report that the Defense Department couldn’t answer some of the simple questions on 

that. The real question was whether the Department had indirectly 

funded the purchase of Iranian oil, in violation of the United 

29 

States’ economic sanctions on that. That would be a serious lack of 

oversight, I should think. 

Were you shocked when you first learned of that lack of oversight 

when you read the report? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. And in a way, I have to give you and the chairman credit for us doing that alert. It was in the course of preparing 

for the testimony. I started asking a lot of questions about how we 

get oil and how do we get oil into Afghanistan. It just dawned on 

me when one of my auditors said, well, Iran supplies a large percentage of the oil to Afghanistan. And then remember the questions, I think either you or Mr. Lynch asked, about what was the 

price, what is the going rate and all that. We started looking and 

we found out that Iranian oil is the cheapest oil. 

So then we started thinking, hold it. We had no controller over 

the subs. We don’t know where they are buying the oil. And I just 

raised the question and this is why we created this unit, this fast 

response unit. I said, let’s take a look at it. We could be violating, 

the United States could be the biggest violator of the oil embargo. 

So they went out and took a look. What we found is, nobody 

knows. We weren’t keeping records. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, that is not new. We did that in Kurdistan. 

We went up there, looked at the oil deliveries up there, and the 

final thing, no insight and the Department of Defense couldn’t tell 

us where it was coming from or didn’t want to tell us, whichever. 

But they claimed they didn’t know on that. 

So are you satisfied with the response the Department has given 

you since you raised this issue with them? 

Mr. SOPKO. No, sir. Because again, going back to the question of 

when we turn the money over to the Afghan government to buy the 

oil, we have no real controls in place. The ones that the military 

has instituted, and we are glad they instituted them, are pretty 

weak. For example, even CSTC–A itself recognized that the real 

measures they should be using, the gold standard, is independent 

random laboratory testing of fuel. But they are not going to do it. 

And they may not have the personnel to do it, either. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So it is a personnel issue, not a cost issue with 

them? 

Mr. SOPKO. I think it is both, probably, personnel costs in the 

bubble and direct assistance. Once you do the direct assistance, you 

are going to have even less visibility, unless you write the contracts 

in. Right now, the only verification we require, at least we are requiring something, is somebody sends an email back saying that 

there is no Iranian oil. 

Mr. TIERNEY. One question here is whether or not this is a conscious policy decision, that they are willing to take that risk. The 

other is that it is not, that they just don’t have a grip around this 

and have no idea what the consequences are or what is going on. 

Do you have an opinion as to which it is here? 

Mr. SOPKO. I can’t infer guilt. I always used to believe there was 

a conspiracy, until I started working in the Executive Branch. 

When I was on your side, I always thought people were withholding evidence from me because it was some grand conspiracy. 

Then I went and worked for the Department of Commerce, which 

30 

I used to call the Department of Comedy. And it wasn’t a conspiracy, it was just incompetence. So I think that is what it is. 

And again, Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to make light of this, I 

think the problem is, how do we reward people in the government? 

The big problem is, your performance review is not on whether you 

catch crooks, if you are a contracting officer. You get bonuses, you 

get pay raises by pumping the fuel out, getting the contracts let. 

And the real answer to all this is go back to the performance 

standards you put on contracting officers or anybody dealing with 

the taxpayers’ money. They should get bonuses based on how much 

money they save, and fraud that they detect. I don’t want to filibuster you, but Mr. Tierney, I ran into two soldiers, and I think 

I identify them in one of my speeches, from the Iowa National 

Guard. These were citizen soldiers. Came from the Guard, one was 

a school teacher, a lieutenant colonel. The other, a sergeant, was 

a mayor of a little town in Iowa. 

And they saw, all of a sudden, they got control, they were supposed to run a fuel depot. They looked at it and they said, there 

is something wrong here. Based upon their experience, based on 

his experience running a water treatment plant back in Iowa, he 

said, there is something wrong, I know a million gallons, and there 

is no million gallons here. 

But that American soldier, that sergeant, started pulling the 

strings. And fortunately for all of us, he remembers running across 

a SIGAR agent, because we put our agents all over the place, more 

places than any other law enforcement agency. He remembered 

this SIGAR guy. He called him up, our guy helicoptered in and we 

started pulling the thread. 

And lo and behold, they found there were millions of gallons stolen. We were able to arrest a number of Afghans. We were able to 

arrest a very big political person in the northern area of Afghanistan. And we actually went to the Afghan prosecutor’s office and 

they even indicted and convicted him. He is serving two years. This 

is all because of a sergeant who asked serious questions. 

And that is what we need, and his lieutenant colonel, who stood 

by him. I don’t know if he is going to get an award in his performance review, but I am sending him a letter. I talked to General 

Longo at Task Force 2010. He is giving him an award. We need 

to reward people like that. Above and beyond the call of duty, he 

put his neck on the line. Because usually in the military, you are 

in for six months, nine months, get out of here, don’t create any 

problems. He created problems and he saved the taxpayers millions 

of dollars. 

Mr. TIERNEY. That, rewarding people like that and getting a 

much better legal team in there, everything from procurement contracts all the way through the implementation aspect of it. Thank 

you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I don’t believe there are any more questions. I have a few closing 

comments that I would like to make, Mr. Sopko. I want to give you 

one more opportunity, if there is anything that you want to share 

with the Congress in your concerns. 

31 

Mr. SOPKO. The only thing I want to share, Mr. Chairman, is to 

thank you again for allowing us to talk about this. We are happy 

to answer any other questions you may have. 

And I would like to submit for the record the name of that sergeant, Sergeant George Toubekis, Iowa National Guard, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Golden. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We like to properly thank those who 

are brave enough to stand up and do what they do. I appreciate 

the work that so many of your people do out there in a thankless, 

difficult situation. 

A couple of closing comments, if I may. I really do appreciate 

joining with Congressman Tierney here. We have introduced H.R. 

327, which would slow down what the Department of Defense is 

trying to do with these direct payments specific to the POL accounts. The deep concern here is that we are literally throwing 

hundreds of millions of dollars into what is the most corrupt government on the face of the planet. We know this. They have a history of it. 

Without the proper checks, without the proper balances, without 

the proper oversight, this money will be pilfered and lost, and we 

are increasing the amount of doing that. To compound a bad problem, the concern is that a lot of this money, millions of dollars, is 

potentially going to the country of Iran, to purchase this fuel. It is 

totally unacceptable. As is highlighted here, we may be one of the 

worst violators of the Iran Sanctions Act, because we are funding 

what we know could be a potential violation of that. And that 

needs to be looked into. I encourage you and others to do it. 

But when you purposely and knowingly give the Afghan government the money directly and excuse yourself from the oversight, 

you can understand why there would be a deep concern. 

I really do think that, particularly in this quarterly report, the 

seven questions that should be asked of each and every development project are the right seven questions. I think that should be 

the standard by which USAID and the Department of Defense and 

all the other agencies that want to go spend money in Afghanistan 

and other countries, quite frankly, that those are the ones that 

should be asked. Because we have a duty, right and responsibility 

to make sure the American taxpayer money is dealt with appropriately. 

We have tens of billions of dollars that are potentially going to 

go out the door in Afghanistan. At the same time, here in the 

United States, we are looking at sequestration and there are Americans working who are going to lose their jobs. We have to cut 

spending. This sequestration is going to force the cutting of that 

spending. 

So what is just not palatable is to send tens of billions of dollars 

overseas without proper oversight, without proper controls in place, 

knowing that it is probably going to go into somebody’s pocket 

without getting the work and the services needed. At the same 

time, that American who is here paying those taxes is going to lose 

their job. That is just not acceptable. 

So I will continue to work with both sides of the aisle. The committee is deeply concerned about this, and we will continue to pursue it. 

32 

We applaud your efforts and thank you for your insight, and for 

joining us here today. The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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