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80–089 PDF 2013

S. HRG. 110–1216 

PROTECTING OUR SHORES FROM OIL SPILLS— 

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND SHIP DESIGNS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 

AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 4, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

PAUL NAGLE, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT 

MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Ranking 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 4, 2008 .............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 48 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Smith ................................................................................... 13 

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

WITNESSES

Allen, Admiral Thad W., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Kirchner, Paul G., Executive Director, American Pilots’ Association ................. 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Page, Captain Edward, Executive Director, Marine Exchange of Alaska .......... 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Tikka, Dr. Kirsi, Vice President, Global Technology and Business Development, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) ....................................................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

APPENDIX

Response to written question submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to Admiral 

Thad W. Allen ...................................................................................................... 51 

(1) 

PROTECTING OUR SHORES FROM 

OIL SPILLS—OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 

AND SHIP DESIGNS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND

MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I will call the Committee to order, and 

start the proceedings. 

The lack of attendance has nothing to do with a lack of interest 

in the subject, I can assure you. It has something to do with a little 

bit of over-scheduling—not here, but elsewhere. So, thank all of you 

for being here, and I am particularly pleased to see the Commandant of the Coast Guard here, Commandant Allen. 

You’ve done a very good job, as have your people. We’re very 

proud of the Coast Guard. We consider them somewhat magical, 

because they keep managing to do more with less. And I don’t 

know how we can continue to expect that, by assigning you more 

responsibilities. And, you name it—you’ve got it. 

Whether it’s pollution patrol, whether it’s refugees, whether it’s 

navigation assistance, whether it’s ship registry, everything imaginable that could happen, or that should happen at sea, is taken 

care of by the Coast Guard. And we’re particularly proud of the organization, but we’re also proud of our Cape May Station, where 

we train people and get a chance to visit with a degree of frequency. 

I want to welcome everyone to today’s hearing as we work to better protect our shores, our wildlife, our families, and our economy 

from deadly and toxic effects of oil spills. This week is a particularly good time for this hearing, because right now the Supreme 

Court is considering a final appeal by Exxon, over its catastrophic 

oil spill in Valdez, Alaska. 

And I was up there, early on, I was Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee then that dealt with Coast Guard, and I managed to thumb a ride up to the site, and saw the EXXON VALDEZ 

2 

floundering in the water, and saw the kind of magic color scheme 

that went out, looking harmless. But you could see that the birds 

and the marine life, and everything else was terribly affected. 

Sometimes we get questions about the quality of service we get 

from government employees. And I’ll tell you something—I saw 

those islands, and I was up not more than 2 or 3 days after the 

ship ran aground, and we had people from Fish and Wildlife, and 

other departments up there, cleaning up the ducks and the seals 

and the other wildlife. 

So, Exxon did pay some part of its obligation, compensation for 

lost wages, and damages. But there’s a case just heard by the Supreme Court and not a decision made yet, as a result of an assessment of $5 billion in punitive damages that were awarded. Exxon 

has refused to step up to its citizenship obligation. Exxon kept 

fighting the payment, and kept getting it reduced and so forth— 

that $5 billion got down to $2 billion. It’s the only thing that hasn’t 

gone up in the last 5 years. And it forced me to look at their earnings. Five years ago Exxon made $21 billion. In the last year, they 

made $40 billion—that’s pretty good growth, I would say. 

And so, 19 years after the spill, Exxon is still fighting a damage 

award that would cost them about 3 weeks worth of profit. 

And while they continue to fight, the environment continues to 

suffer. The Alaska coastline, as well as the local economy, is still 

reeling from the oil spill, that material that remains. 

In the aftermath of the Valdez disaster, Congress passed the Oil 

Pollution Act of 1990—one of the most powerful oil spill laws on 

the books. And as a Senator from a coastal State, I was proud to 

be an original co-sponsor of that law, which required mandatory response plans, double-hulling of tanker ships, and provided a fair 

way to ensure that spills were cleaned up. 

But, in the year 2004, a single-hull oil tanker spilled more than 

260,000 gallons of crude oil into the Delaware River, along the New 

Jersey/Pennsylvania border. That spill devastated our environment, and shut down some of the busiest ports in the country. 

So, 2 years ago, I worked with this committee to update the Oil 

Pollution Act by nearly tripling the liability limits which polluters 

must pay for spills from single-hull tankers, and doubling liabilities 

for non-tank vessels. 

But while the number of oil spills from tankers has declined, 

spills continue to occur from fuel tanks of cargo and fishing vessels. 

Last year, for instance, San Francisco Bay was deluged with 53,000 

barrels of fuel oil from a ship that wasn’t an oil tanker. That fuel 

was there to operate the ship. And we had that kind of a spill. 

These, and other recent spills, make it clear that we’ve got to do 

more to protect our shores. Fuel tanks on container ships can hold 

up to 4 million gallons of oil—which is more than some oil tankers 

carry as cargo. 

The international community has already put in place better ship 

design requirements, and it’s time for the United States to catch 

up. 

Now, we need to use the Coast Guard’s vessel tracking assistance 

services to help prevent collisions and improve our response to oil 

spills. We need to look at how the Coast Guard licenses mariners, 

including what medical standards are used to determine their fitVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\80089.TXT JACKIE
3 

ness to operate these vessels, and we need to increase Federal oil 

spill liability limits for ships that we know have higher risks of 

causing devastating spills. 

So, today I’m introducing legislation that will address these 

needs, because the environment—and our economy—depend on our 

work to prevent another major catastrophe. 

So, I look forward to working with my colleagues on this, and 

other legislation to better protect our shores. 

And with that, Commandant Allen, we welcome you here, and 

look forward to your testimony and I ask you to please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT, 

U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral ALLEN. Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg, and 

thank you for your remarks. I will reinforce some of your points in 

my opening statement. 

I have full testimony submitted for the record and I have a brief 

opening statement if that is okay, sir. 

The risks carried by fuel aboard vessels—whether as cargo or as 

propulsion—have been recognized for some time as a risk. The recent COSCO BUSAN spill in San Francisco underscores the need 

to identify the causes and prevent such spills, while focusing on 

vessel manning, design, rulemaking capacity, and Vessel Traffic 

Services. 

Let me be clear at the onset, sir, there’s no better approach to 

this problem than prevention. Once oil has been discharged into 

the environment, there are no winners, and the best any response 

can do is mitigate the impact. 

The San Francisco spill highlighted the threat from non-tank 

vessels, such as the COSCO BUSAN. I’d like to provide the Committee with some current data framing the size of the fleet, and the 

threat we are discussing. 

Based on data through February 2008, the Coast Guard has received and reviewed response plans for more than 14,700 non-tank 

vessels on call in U.S. ports. That is up from approximately 13,000, 

when I testified in December 2007. 

Of this number, more than 8,300 are classified as ocean-going 

freight vessels, such as the COSCO BUSAN. The majority of these 

vessels have a fuel capacity of between ten and twenty thousand 

barrels. Each barrel contains approximately 42 gallons, so the 

range is 420,000 to 840,000 gallons. 

However, there are 360 vessels that carry for than 50,000 barrels, and there are 100 that carry more than 70,000 barrels, sir. 

And to correct one statement you made—you may not be aware of 

this, sir—the highest-capacity freight ship listed in our records is 

173,000 barrels, or 7.3 million gallons. The COSCO BUSAN had a 

capacity of 52,000 barrels, or 2.2 million gallons. 

To address the threat posed by non-tank vessels, there have been 

several international and domestic steps taken, and more planned. 

Under the provisions of MARPOL Annex I, double hulls, or other 

protective arrangements, double hulls or other protective arrangements for fuel tanks are required for ship contracts awarded after 

August 2007, or for ships delivered after August 2010. These provisions also require ship-board oil emergency plans. 

4 

Domestically, as you have stated, we have gone further than the 

international standards. The Coast Guard Maritime Transportation 

Act of 2004 and 2006, established a response plan requirement for 

non-tank vessels greater than 400 gross tons. 

The legislation created an August 2005 deadline for the implementation of these plans. The Coast Guard issued interim guidance 

in February 2005, providing interim authorization for non-tank 

vessels to operate under Coast Guard-reviewed response plans, 

pending development of implementing regulations. 

We are currently developing temporary non-tank vessel response 

plan enforcement measures to be used until the final non-tank rule 

can be published. We anticipate the final rule will be complete in 

2010, but these temporary measures will enforce the non-tank vessel response requirements on the highest risk non-tank vessels, including those over 1,600 gross tons, under our existing authority of 

the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. 

It involved prescreening of vessel arrival data, and examination 

of response plans during Coast Guard inspections. Vessels not 

found in compliance will be subject to Captain of Port control measures. 

This enforcement regime marks a change in policy from previous 

Coast Guard guidance, which did not impose enforcement mechanisms. We will provide advanced notice to the marine industry 

through the Federal Register, before implementation. 

The appropriate temporary enforcement measures for vessels between 400 and 1,600 gross tons is also under development and will 

be shaped by the range of risk posed from offshore supply vessels, 

towing vessels, private yachts, fishing vessels, and others falling 

below this tonnage category. 

As I noted earlier, plans for over 14,700 vessels had been received and reviewed by the Coast Guard. By comparison, we’ve reviewed response plans for 8,319 tank vessels. Clearly, the number 

and increasing fuel capacity of large freight ships justify a review 

of all aspects of spill prevention, and response. 

Another significant area is a limit of liability of a responsible 

party under the provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. For a 

number of years, the limits of liability remain as established at the 

time OP 90 was implemented. As you noted, they were significantly 

increased under Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Act of 2006. 

The Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking to 

amend Certificate of Financial Responsibility regulations to reflect 

those increased liability limits, and it working to publish a final 

rule as early as Fall 2008. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 

2006 also required an annual report to Congress on the adequacy 

of oil spill liability limits, including impacts on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Our reports have concluded increasing liability limits per incident for single-hull tank ships, tank barges and nontank vessels greater than 300 gross tons would result in a more 

balanced cost share between responsible parties, and the Trust 

Fund. 

The COSCO BUSAN casualty also caused us to look closer at our 

roles and responsibilities regarding our VTS systems. They serve 

as an important component of a comprehensive waterway system. 

The VTS is designed primarily as an information service that imVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\80089.TXT JACKIE
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proves safety by advising pilots and vessel masters of significant 

events, conditions or other vessel movements or operations. 

Through the Ports and Waterway Safety Act, we have adequate authority to provide these advisories or direct traffic, when needed. 

We’re also taking important steps to improve Coast Guard rulemaking. As you know, the current backlog of rules to be developed 

by the Coast Guard is in excess of 90. On 9/11/2001, it was approximately 50. Despite tremendous effort by our Coast Guard personnel, we are not gaining ground, and many important rules have 

been cued, awaiting required resources. This situation is unsatisfactory to me, and it should be unsatisfactory to you, sir. 

As I said, I am taking important and aggressive measures to improve. I have tasked the Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Council to assess the current situation, and provide me options 

to reduce this backlog. 

I have also ordered they meet, at least quarterly, and provide 

early visibility on significant projects. Under their oversight, I’ve 

also chartered a rulemaking review and reform project, to conduct 

a top to bottom review of our rulemaking processes, and facilitate 

increases in capacity that will be assisted by organizational consultants. 

Additionally, we have streamlined our internal business processes, and targeted efforts to the most critical projects. I’m confident these measures will deliver the improvements that we require and you should expect. 

Finally, I am grateful for Congressional support for rulemaking. 

During the Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations process, we will receive $3.1 million for 31 personnel to increase our regulatory capacity. 

The Fiscal Year 2009 President’s budget seeks an additional in- crease of $2.6 million for contractor support to expedite high-priority rulemaking projects. I would appreciate your support for this 

request, as it provides enhanced capacity to address our backlog. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to close with a comment regarding the 

COSCO BUSAN incident Specific Performance Review. As I testified in December, I have initiated a Performance Review which involved third parties. Phase I of the report was released on January 

28, 2008. It addresses the first 2 weeks of the response, and provided 110 lessons learned, and 128 recommendations to improve 

preparedness and response in the San Francisco Bay community. 

The recommendations follow the several broad categories, and include emphasis on the area, contingency planning process, the use 

of exercises and drills and incorporation of local response capabilities and information sharing throughout the incident command 

structure. 

The second phase of the report will address the remainder of the 

response, and is due to me on May 7, 2008. I will provide the results of my plans in the way ahead to the Congress. 

Beyond the performance review, we are partnering closely with 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General and 

their audit of the response. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will be 

happy to take your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen follows:] 

6 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT, 

U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. It 

is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss issues related to commercial vessel manning, design standards, and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). The Coast Guard 

is committed to protection of the environment and safety of the maritime pubic 

through ensuring vessels are properly manned, designed and operated on U.S. waterways. 

Vessel Manning 

International Standards 

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter V, 

Regulation 14 requires that vessels be sufficiently and effectively manned, and requires Administrations (i.e., flag states) to issue minimum safe manning documents 

to vessels they register. The Safe Manning Certificate establishes and documents 

manning requirements for vessels. Administrations must also ensure that mariners 

serving on their ships meet competency requirements established in the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 

Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW) Code. The International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS or Rules of the Road) requires that ships 

maintain an effective lookout while operating in restricted waters or conditions of 

reduced visibility. Although not specific, additional international guidelines have 

been created which establish principles in keeping a navigational watch, lookout requirements, watch arrangements, procedures for taking over a watch, performing a 

watch and watch keeping under varying conditions in different areas which are all 

intended to promote safe navigation. 

Safe manning is a function of the number of qualified and experienced seafarers 

necessary for the safety of the vessel, and its crew passengers, and cargo. The Principles of Safe Manning adopted by United Nations’ International Maritime Organization (IMO) resolution A.890 (21) as Amended by resolution A.955(23) notes the 

ability of seafarers to meet the requirements also depends upon conditions relating 

to training, hours of work and rest, health, and occupational safety. This Resolution 

provides recommendations to aid in determining the minimum manning for safe 

navigation, including situations involving transiting in restricted waters/ports. 

Coast Guard Enforcement 

Vessel manning is as important to overall vessel safety as vessel condition and 

safety management. The Safety Management Regulations (33 CFR Part 96) provide 

general requirements for vessel safety management systems. Companies must include instructions for the safe operation of vessels into their safety management system including proper manning and operational procedures for transits in restricted 

waters and in conditions of restricted visibility. 

The safety management system aboard a vessels are validated during both inspection and record audits conducted by the cognizant Administration, ultimately resulting in the issuance of the international Safety Management Certificate. Upon receiving an Advanced Notice of Arrival for a vessel, the Coast Guard reviews vessel 

records to ensure the Safety Management Certificate and other required documents 

are valid. A vessel without a valid Safety Management Certificate is detained prior 

to entry into port and the vessel’s Administration is then required to ascertain the 

vessel safety management system and issue a valid certificate in compliance with 

SOLAS requirements. 

While in port, the Coast Guard verifies STCW compliance during Port State Control (PSC) examinations on foreign vessels including checks of the following: minimum safe manning, crew certificates and endorsements, watch arrangements and 

schedules, new crewmember familiarization procedures, and the overall safety management system. 

The Coast Guard assesses whether a vessel is in apparent compliance with the 

requirements of the Conventions to ensure that the crew can respond to emergency 

situations and perform the vital functions necessary for safe operation and prevention or mitigation of pollution. The STCW Code contains the specifications for the 

minimum international standard of competence for seafarers. The United States has 

adopted STCW requirements and 46 Subchapter B, Parts 10–16 contain equivalent 

requirements for U.S. mariners. 

Coast Guard Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) gauge crew competency by observing fire and abandon ship drills and other shipboard operations. If the PSCO 

observes inadequate skills during drills or other operations, indicating a lack of crew 

7 

competency in essential shipboard operations, a detention of the vessel is warranted 

until the safety deficiency can be resolved. 

Crew competency and the number of crewmembers are major aspects of vessel 

manning. Adequate manning allows for appropriate crew rest periods and STCW 

provides specific rest period requirements; however, vessels may deviate from the 

required rest periods for emergencies, drills or other overriding operational conditions (for example restricted visibility) which may require more people on watch. At 

times mariners will not have ample rest prior to their arrival and/or departure from 

the U.S. due to enhanced navigational watches inbound/outbound port, and quick 

turn-around for unloading and offloading cargo. If a PSCO observes potential fatigue 

issues with crew, corrective actions will be taken before allowing the vessel to get 

underway. 

Vessel Design Standards 

Vessel oil pollution prevention standards have evolved over the years. The primary focus has been on tank vessels, which have historically posed the greatest risk 

for oil pollution. As a result, tank vessel hull design standards have progressed from 

dedicated clean ballast tanks, to segregated ballast tanks, to complete double hull 

protection of the cargo tank block following the Exxon Valdez casualty in 1989. U.S. 

leadership at IMO has been instrumental over the years in upgrading international 

oil pollution prevention standards, and there is generally close alignment between 

U.S. and IMO tank vessel design standards. 

Until recently, protective measures for the location of fuel tanks were generally 

considered unwarranted by both the United States and IMO. The Oil Spill Pollution 

Act of 1990s Double Hull Interim Final Rule preamble indicated that fuel oil represented only a relatively small risk to the environment compared with cargo oil 

and therefore double hulling of fuel tanks was unnecessary. This perception began 

to change through the 1990s as a number of prominent fuel spills in U.S. waters 

(Enif—1995; Kure—1997; and New Carissa—1999) raised awareness of the risk of 

oil spills from fuel tanks. Then with European environmental concerns very high 

after the Erika casualty off France in 1999, the IMO decided to establish strong new 

requirements for the protection of fuel tanks which culminated in the 2006 adoption 

of MARPOL Annex I regulation 12A—Oil Fuel Tank Protection. 

New Fuel Tank Protection Requirements for Oceangoing Freight Ships 

Nontank vessels are vulnerable to spills caused by groundings, collisions, and 

allisions due to the location and capacity of onboard fuel tanks. Fuel is generally 

carried in tanks located in the bottom or side of the vessels without double hull protection. 

Current U.S. requirements regarding the location of fuel tanks are located in 33 

CFR Subchapter O (Pollution) and essentially prohibit oil from being carried in a 

forepeak tank or any tank forward of the collision bulkhead. There is no restriction 

on locating fuel tanks adjacent to the outer hull plating. 

However, oceangoing freight vessels on international voyages are subject to the 

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships otherwise referred to as MARPOL 73/78. New MARPOL Annex I regulation 12A—Oil Fuel Tank 

Protection has entered into force and applies to all ships with an aggregate oil fuel 

capacity of 600 cubic meters (this equates to approximately 158,500 gallons) and 

above with a building contract after July 31, 2007, or which are delivered after July 

31, 2010. The regulation provides two options for the protection of fuel tanks with 

volumes greater than 30 cubic meters (approximately 7,925 gals): 

1. a prescriptive double hull requirement; or 

2. a probabilistic accidental oil outflow performance requirement. 

Vessels meeting the first option must have fuel tanks with double bottoms and 

double sides, which provide separation from the outer skin of the vessel ranging 

from 0.76 to 2.0 meters. 

Vessels falling under the second option must meet an accidental oil fuel outflow 

performance requirement, which provides the equivalent of double-hull protection 

while allowing for some fuel tank arrangement flexibility. The performance requirement considers historical casualty statistics to determine optimal fuel tank arrangements in order to minimize the risk of oil fuel outflow from hull damage. 

The Coast Guard published a Notice of Policy in the August 27, 2007 Federal Register regarding our compliance policy, pending a rulemaking project to harmonize 

existing U.S. regulations with the new MARPOL regulation. The policy states that 

vessels (U.S. or foreign) required by MARPOL to hold an International Oil Pollution 

Prevention (IOPP) certificate must meet regulation 12A. U.S. vessels not required 

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quired to hold an IOPP certificate if it is over 400 gross tons (over 150 gross tons 

for oil tankers) and engages on international voyages to other MARPOL signatory 

countries. 

Rulemaking 

The Coast Guard is undertaking substantial steps to improve our rulemaking capability. These improvements will allow the Coast Guard move forward expeditiously with rulemaking projects that will enhance our core missions of marine safety, security, and stewardship. 

• Marine Safety and Security Council: The Marine Safety and Security Council 

(MSSC) is the Coast Guard’s senior rulemaking oversight body. We have revamped the MSSC membership to better reflect our current organizational 

structure and to provide more responsive, cross-cutting oversight. The MSSC 

will meet at least quarterly to oversee the rulemaking development system and 

progress of the top priority projects. This will ensure early visibility on significant rulemaking issues, and best utilization of Coast Guard resources to serve 

the public as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

• Rulemaking Review and Reform Project (RRRP): A Rulemaking Review and Reform Project is underway to conduct a top to bottom review of our rulemaking 

processes and to facilitate increases in capacity. The RRRP is assisted by a 

group of Organizational Performance Consultants who will assist in identifying, 

defining and improving our rulemaking processes. The RRRP is assessing the 

current state of rulemaking to determine root causes of rulemaking delays and 

identify specific opportunities for improvement. 

Other Environmental Initiatives 

The Coast Guard is working domestically and in conjunction with the IMO to improve environmental standards and compliance. Several concurrent initiatives are 

underway and progress is being made on several fronts: 

• Reduction of air emissions from ships (MARPOL Annex VI). The Coast Guard, 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and maritime representatives from 

several countries have been actively engaged with the IMO to establish new and 

more stringent international standards addressing air emissions from ships. Air 

pollution from ships already significantly contributes to the air quality problems 

in the U.S. and emissions are expected to quadruple by 2030. The U.S. Government has played a leading role in shaping the current standards, but our influence could be compromised if we fail to pass legislation and submit our instrument of ratification to MARPOL Annex VI before final IMO negotiations conclude at the end of March 2008. Your Committee presently has the implementing legislation for consideration, in the form of H.R. 802, which passed the 

House last year under suspension of the rules. I personally request that you 

give urgent consideration to H.R. 802, which the Administration fully supports, 

in order to allow the United States to succeed in our efforts to enhance the air 

emissions standards for ships both domestically and throughout the world. 

• Nontank Vessel Response Plans (NTVRP). The Coast Guard and Maritime 

Transportation Act of 2004 required the preparation and submission of oil spill 

response plans for nontank vessels. The Coast Guard is working to publish regulations on the development and submission of Nontank Vessel Response Plans 

(NTVRP) plans. In the interim, the Coast Guard published Navigation and Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01–05, which assists nontank vessel owners and operators with the development of interim NTVRPs. To date, the Coast Guard has 

reviewed interim NTVRPs covering over 14,700 foreign and domestic nontank 

vessels. However, vessels are not required to follow the guidance contained in 

NVIC 01–05. The Coast Guard is currently revising to the interim enforcement 

strategy which would clarify the requirements for all covered vessels to have 

prepared and submitted a NTVRP prior to operating in U.S. waters. This enforcement will be limited to those portions of the authorizing statute that are 

self-executing. 

• Ballast Water Discharge Management Regulation. The Coast Guard is engaged 

in a rulemaking that would set a performance standard for the quality of ballast water discharged in U.S. waters. We believe such a standard is the most 

effective way to approve Ballast Water Management Systems (BWMS) that are 

environmentally protective and scientifically sound. This rulemaking would also 

establish rigorous testing requirements BWMS would undergo to ensure they 

work under shipboard conditions. The Coast Guard is committed to approving 

BWMS that will prevent aquatic nuisance species introductions into U.S. waters. 

9 

Vessel Traffic Services Cuts 

Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) 

As authorized by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA), the Coast Guard 

established VTS in certain ports and waterway areas to maximize the safe and efficient use of waterways by preventing marine accidents and their associated environmental damage. In order to carry out these duties, VTSs use a variety of communications, surveillance equipment, and operating systems to collect, process, and disseminate navigation safety information and exercise regulatory authority when necessary. VTSs also use their capabilities to support other Coast Guard mission areas 

such as maritime security, aids to navigation, search and rescue (SAR), and law enforcement. 

VTS Operations 

VTSs operate as an active part of a comprehensive waterways management system, which includes passive measures such as the COLREGS or Rules of the Road, 

aids to navigation such as buoys and lights, other regulations, and vessel routing 

schemes. In areas determined to present a high level of navigational risk, VTSs act 

in conjunction with these passive measures and the skill of professional mariners 

to ensure safe navigation. VTS procedures are developed in conjunction with maritime community stakeholders and in alignment with international guidance from 

the IMO and the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). This includes a formal training program for VTS 

watchstanders consisting of national certification, local qualification, and continuing 

professional development. 

The PWSA grants the Coast Guard extensive authority to establish VTS and control or supervise vessel traffic. The Coast Guard may require vessels to participate 

in VTS and carry certain navigation safety equipment. The PWSA authorizes the 

Coast Guard to control vessel traffic in hazardous circumstances and to direct vessel 

operations if they violate regulations or it is necessary in the interest of safety. We 

have issued regulations implementing these authorities and delegating authority to 

individual VTSs. 

VTS procedures have been developed to carry out these authorities in alignment 

with international guidelines and recommendations. In general, a VTS will monitor 

their area of responsibility to build a traffic image and, having analyzed the data 

collected, inform mariners of pertinent information to assist them in navigational 

decisionmaking. In certain circumstances the VTS will recommend a course of action, and in the event of a violation of regulations or in the interest of safety, a VTS 

may direct a vessel to take certain action. Per current doctrine, procedures, and 

training, orders to vessels are issued in an ‘‘outcome-based’’ manner; in which the 

vessel is ordered to do something (e.g., do not proceed past a point) but not told specifically how to do it (e.g., specific speed or course to steer). However, the Coast 

Guard has the authority to issue more specific orders to vessels, and in very rare 

circumstances has exercised it. Under international guidelines, VTSs generally act 

as a navigational aid to the mariner, but the ultimate responsibility for safe navigation of the ship remains with the master of the vessel. VTSs assist in vessel navigation decision-making, not ship handling, particularly when a vessel is facing an ‘‘in 

extremis’’ situation. When direction is provided, the VTS refrains from issuing ship 

handling instructions because it would create an extremely hazardous situation to 

direct emergency vessel maneuvers from a remote location. 

We are committed to the marine safety mission and the safety and security of the 

maritime public. 

During my State of the Coast Guard address, I emphasized the Coast Guard’s 

longstanding commitment to honoring and serving professional mariners. Moreover, 

my plan to enhance the Coast Guard’s marine safety program is a hallmark of this 

commitment. We have already requested significant increases to our marine inspector work force; planned Centers of Excellence that will match our skills with those 

of the maritime industry in certain regions; and made other program enhancements 

intended to improve customer service. 

On February 8, I met with representatives of the maritime industry at Coast 

Guard Headquarters for the first of many Marine Industry Forums. I am initiating 

these forums to facilitate discussion and dialogue on a broad range of marine safety 

matters. I recently traveled to maritime industry events in Houston and Cleveland, 

and will continue to hold these meetings as we move forward so that the Coast 

Guard’s planned enhancements are both effective and responsive to the needs of industry and professional mariners. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

10 


304ALLEN1.eps

USCGC ACHUSHNET 

1946 2006 

USCGC RUSH 

USCGC ALEX HALEY 

1971 2003 
11 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Commandant. 

Senator I’m joined by Senator Stevens, the Co-Chairman of the 

full Committee, as well as Senator Gordon Smith from Oregon. And 

both of these Senators feel, as I do, about the Coast Guard. We admire it, respect it, and want to support it. Senator Stevens has a 

statement he wanted to put in the record. 

Senator Stevens? 


304ALLEN2.eps 304ALLEN3.eps
12 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Admiral, I’m sorry to 

be late. I’m helping manage the bill on the floor, and I did want 

to pay my respects to you, and ask that my statement appear in 

the record. 

I have some questions I’d like to submit to you for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

I have seen firsthand the devastation that can be caused by oil spills. Just one 

significant spill in a sensitive area of our coastline can be extremely destructive to 

the ocean, environment and those who depend on its resources. 

In 1989, the EXXON VALDEZ spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil in Prince William Sound. The fishermen and communities devastated by this spill have yet to 

fully recover from its impacts. It was just last week, nearly 18 years after the spill, 

that the Supreme Court finally heard oral arguments on whether those injured 

would be able to recover punitive damages. 

The legal process has been so drawn out that nearly 8,000 of the original 30,000 

plaintiffs have since passed away. 

After the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 

1990. This act has done much to reduce the risk of oil spills and improve our response efforts. But I remain concerned about the adequacy of our prevention resources. We need to make sure the Coast Guard has the tools it needs to help vessels avoid accidents that may cause an oil spill. 

Initiatives like the vessel tracking system used in areas of Alaska need to be expanded so we can track all the cargo ships and oil tankers sailing in our waters. 

As Captain Ed Page will testify, these tracking systems show, in real time, the location of possible response vessels and give us the greatest chance to prevent or contain an oil spill and protect our valuable coastlines. 

I thank Captain Ed Page for making the long journey from Alaska to be here 

today and I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. But, I would say to you, I think I have before, 

that I flew into the EXXON VALDEZ spill with Admiral Yost, your 

predecessor. I don’t think I’ve ever seen anything like that in my 

life, neither one of us. We were both stunned by what we saw. 

And the aftermath of that was really a development that no one 

expected, because when we flew over the vessel, the tanker, it was 

on the island, it was up out of the water, really, because it was low 

tide. And it had, I recall, one of the segments of the vessel had 

been punctured by the island as it struck the island. I think fourfifths of the oil was still on board. 

The management decisions that were made, right then, led to 

this spill being the worst spill in the history of the world. 

Now, I just throw that out to you, because I do think that what 

we really have to have, and you’ve got more things now in Valdez 

than anybody realizes in terms of be able to track those tankers 

down. 

But we need to be assured that there’s training of the people to 

operate those systems to make sure that we don’t have another catastrophe of that kind. We also need to have some people be 

trained about the actions that can be taken to protect the environment. 

At that time, I called my old friend Senator Bellman, Henry Bellman of Oklahoma, who had been a Senator for two terms, went 

back and he was Governor. And I said, ‘‘Henry, what would you do 

13 

if you had something like this in your backyard?’’ And he said, ‘‘I’d 

call the Army and tell them to drop Napalm on it, burn it.’’ 

I went ashore, and made that suggestion to the crowd there, both 

officials from government and from the industry, and they all said, 

‘‘You can’t do that, think of that, there’d be a Clean Air violation.’’ 

And I’ll never forget that if I live to be 100. They were afraid of 

the Clean Air violation, rather than protecting the waters of Prince 

Williams Sound. 

Now, I think that we have to have people trained to make judgments and to understand the circumstances, and while alternatives 

are available to prevent the catastrophe that we subsequently saw. 

So, I hope you’ll answer my questions, and I look forward to visiting with you again, and maybe you might come up and do a little 

marine research with me in the Prince William Sound. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Senator Stevens. 

Senator STEVENS. You can come, too. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I’d like it, I love Alaska. You know, we all 

take pride in our coastlines. 

Senator Smith, Co-Chairman of the Subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral it’s great to have you here, and I thank you for your testimony, most of which I was about to hear. 

We’ve talked in my office, and also about the important role that 

I believe the Coast Guard plays for the state of Oregon, and I want 

to join in the comments of others, how much I appreciate the Coast 

Guard and your very significant presence in Oregon. 

And let me just simply say that the Columbia River is really a 

lifeline for Oregon, for both shallow and deep draft vessels and 

ports—whether you’re talking wheat or cattle, or timber or hightech products they move in and out of Port of Portland in a tremendous volume. It’s a growth engine for our whole state. 

Hearing Senator Stevens speak of EXXON VALDEZ, I’m reminded that it isn’t just oil tankers that pose a potential difficulty. 

In 1999, a ship by the name of the New Carissa was grounded off 

the Oregon Coast, spilling roughly 70,000 gallons of fuel into Oregon waters, and obviously it had a devastating impact on wildlife 

and oyster beds and recreation—all of these things were lost. And 

so, I do hope that you’re focused, as well, on vehicles that are not 

necessarily transporting oil, because it’s very, very important. 

But, the main point I want to make, in light of Federal legislation that is being proposed here, legislation to which I remain open, 

but I want to specifically talk about the pilotage issue, which has 

gained a great deal of attention in the wake of the spill that occurred, I guess it was in November, in San Francisco Bay. 

I think it’s very important to remember that these pilotage program are often—in my case, in the case of Oregon—governed by 

State regulations. And this allows states to structure a system that 

is suited to the particular needs and circumstances of their own 

waters. Oregon’s a perfect example of that. 

14 

Since 1846, 13 years before Oregon was officially admitted to the 

Union, the Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots has worked to ensure 

the safety of our maritime system by ensuring that only well-qualified persons are licensed to pilot vessels, entering and leaving Oregon ports. And Oregon pilot training and expertise is so specific 

that it takes two pilots to bring a ship into the Port of Portland. 

One to steer the ship across the Columbia River bar, and a second 

to navigate the river channel. 

Since the spill in San Francisco Bay, a lot of ideas have been 

floated to make changes to the current piloting system, with some 

calling for a much greater Federal role. And again, while I will remain open to good ideas, I believe that we need to be very careful 

that we don’t needlessly and inadvertently jeopardize safety by 

shaking up a system that for hundreds of years is already proven 

highly effective. 

So, thank you Mr. Chairman. That’s what I want to say as part 

of my testimony, and again welcome the Admiral. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith raises a point about how well things went for so 

many years, but the size of vessels has changed so radically. 

As a matter of fact, not wanting to date myself, but I sailed 

across the Atlantic during World War II on a ship that was considered pretty good size, it was called the America, and in its origination, it was the largest passenger ship built in America and then 

it was converted to the West Point, it became a troop ship. 

And I had staff check—just for old times’ sake—the size of that, 

and it was 700 feet. That’s like a launch on some of these boats 

that we see now. 

Commandant, thanks very much for the statement you made, 

and for the forward-looking steps that the Coast Guard is making 

to try and keep abreast of things. 

But one of the things that concerns me is whether or not the vessels applying our ports, our shores, have the financial ability to 

cover the costs of a spill that’s up to their liability limit. 

Now, there was new regulation anticipated to cover that. Can 

you give us an idea when these new regulations regarding the financial conditions of the company that has that ship afloat might 

be published? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Actually, there are two regulations that 

are in progress. One of the is to be able to adjust limits of liability 

in the future based on a consumer price index, something that had 

not been done before the legislation. And the second one is to issue 

regulations that would create requirements for certificates of financial responsibility would match the liability limits. 

On the COFRs—the Certificate of Financial Responsibility, we 

are poised to issue that rule later on this Fall, and the other one 

is under development right now, but they are both in progress, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It’s an important step, don’t you think? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Especially with some of the flags that are 

flown—they are not always reliable, and—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. For an example, the limits of liability 

for the COSCO BUSAN under the new liability limits went from 

somewhere in the thirties, to $61 million. But, without the rule to 

15 

change the Certificate of Financial Responsibility, that remains at 

the lower limit in the $30,000 range—that needs to be adjusted, 

sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thirty million? Yes. 

You just talked about adjusting the oil spill liability limits, and 

that should be accounting for inflation. Is the Coast Guard authorized to introduce that into the licensing requirement? To adjust for 

inflation? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir—that’s the intent of the rulemaking that’s underway right now. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The GAO has found that the average cost 

of spills from single-hull barges and non-tank vessels are higher 

right now than current limits. Do you think that these liability limits should be adjusted beyond changes for inflation, to ensure that 

polluters pay fair amounts for the spills they’ve caused? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir, we do. We’ve submitted two reports 

since the passage of the legislation indicating that there’s a larger 

share of liability against the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund from 

single-hull ships or tankers, and barges. And, while we have not 

quantified that, yet, that is something that is worth discussing in 

the future, and whether or not an adjustment should be made, because it is inequitable in the current form, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Generally speaking, ships with doublehulls around their fuel tanks improve the chances of surviving an 

accident. So, do you agree with that? The fact that double hulls 

around the fuel tanks protect us from spills that otherwise might 

not occur? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. That’s absolutely correct, and as was 

stated in my statement through our work at International Maritime Organization, we now have procedures in effect that will require those tanks to be double-hulled in the future. That is the 

right way to go, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And, I would ask this—should ships without these protected fuel tanks be required to pay more of their spill 

costs, given that they present a greater liability? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I think that’s something that should be 

considered. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because I’ve had a look at the design recommendations by the international body to see where fuel tanks 

might be installed in the vessel, and getting them away from the 

bottom of the hull, but rather lifting them up—I have a question 

that tells you what an old-time sailor would ask. And that is, does 

that increase the instability in heavy seas? There’s a lot of weight 

attached to those tanks when they’re filled. 

Admiral ALLEN. Not necessarily, sir. The liquid loading of a ship 

should allow for transfer between tanks, whether it is shifting fuel 

as it’s being used, and there are also tanks that are used for 

ballasting that can keep the ship stable. This is within the extreme 

art of the possible in ship design, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The Delaware River Oil Spill Advisory 

Commission was authorized in 2006. When might the Coast Guard 

actually create it? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, we’re in the process of doing that right now. 

We’ve got the nominations of the personnel that are going to be 

16 

part of the Advisory Committee. They’re at the Department of 

Homeland Security being reviewed right now. On approval of those 

nominations, there is a requirement for them to hold their first 

meeting within 60 days, so as soon as those nominations are approved, we will notify your office, and you can expect a meeting 

within 60 days, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And the Vessel Identification System— 

when might the Coast Guard have that system operational? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, we have automated identification systems 

that are operating right now, sir, around the country, achieving 

coverage in accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security 

Act. 

We’re also implementing agreements that have been made at 

IMO where long-range tracking will come into effect over the next 

18 to 24 months. Our goal is to have coverage, ultimately, between 

AIS and long-range tracking out to 2,000 miles, if you declared 

your intent to the United States, if you’re subject to Safety In Life 

At Sea Convention, or if you’re in transit 1,000 miles off the coast, 

sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Now, that’s not new technology, I assume. 

What is there, if anything, that impedes progress on that project? 

Admiral ALLEN. Only establishing the technical standards, and 

getting the equipment out there, establishing data centers and distributing the information. The AIS system has been around for 

some period of time, originally used as a collision avoidance and 

navigation support system for pilots and so forth. That is a lineof-sight system. We are currently in the process of building out the 

national AIS system, which will give us coverage around the entire 

United States and then also the ability to transmit data out to 24 

miles. We’ll move beyond that with long-range tracking, which is 

the new agreement that was reached last year at IMO, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So other, other seafaring countries will be 

required, as well, to participate in that program? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Signatories to the IMO Convention, 

once it’s ratified, will be required to carry the equipment, and we 

can require that of signatory countries, as well, sir. There will have 

to be an international data center that will be stood up that collects 

the data, distributes it. There’s still a decision to be made at IMO, 

where that will happen. We, in the Coast Guard, have volunteered 

to do that for the first 2 years, and fund that while the decision 

is made on the ultimate location, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Last, you required the pilot in the COSCO 

BUSAN incident to turn in his Federal Merchant Marine Officer’s 

License on the ground that he was not physically able to perform 

the pilot’s duties. And, if that was the case—why was he granted 

a Coast Guard pilot’s license in the first place? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, he was granted a license, and then he was 

granted a waiver on his medical condition, because that determination was made at the port level in San Francisco at the Regional 

Exam Center. 

As of October 2007, we have centralized the review of all medical 

examinations at our National Maritime Center in West Virginia, 

we actually have qualified public health doctors there, they’re reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\80089.TXT JACKIE
17 

viewing these records, rather than our people that work in the port 

level. 

His medical examination and the waiver associated with that, 

came before we had transferred the centralized review of medical 

files in West Virginia. When we did the review at that level, we 

found out that his current medical condition was not waiverable, 

and was something that would potentially impede his ability to 

perform. He has voluntarily surrendered his license, and that is an 

administrative procedure that we are taking, pending any kind of 

medical evidence he might want to give us that shows that he’s 

qualified to carry out his duties. As it stands right now, he’s surrendered his license, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Is the Coast Guard therefore taking steps 

to improve the medical review process for mariners’ licensing, generally? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. There are several things that are happening. First of all, we have centralized the review of all the physical exam reports in one location, with a medical staff that’s qualified to do that. 

Second, we are issuing new regulations on merchant mariner 

documentation that will improve the medical standards and the 

screening for individuals that are applying for licenses. 

Third, we are putting out a navigational circular that will provide further guidance to the field on what the standards are. These 

three in combination, I think, are going to position us very well, 

and we expect to have the new guidance out sometime later on in 

the year after our advisory committee, the Towing Safety Advisory 

Committee, and our Maritime Personnel Advisory Committee, meet 

and finalize their input to those new policies, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Very good. 

Senator Smith? 

Senator SMITH. Again, Admiral, thank you for all that you do, 

and your great branch of our service. 

You have worked with the public and private sector trade sectors, and the transportation interests in my state. I’m aware of— 

this has been quite successful in using existing technologies in 

business relationships and new and unique ways to improve navigation safety, and therefore the economic competitiveness of my 

part of the world. 

The—apparently the system developed and currently being used 

on the Columbia River not only provides pilots with real-time vessel tracking information, but it is continually updated with the 

most recent channel survey information provided by the Army 

Corps of Engineers. 

This system—which was developed by the private sector—clearly 

has some very important public safety and security applications. I 

understand in some testimony we will hear later in this hearing, 

that these ideas are spreading to other ports and parts of the country. So, I wonder what the Coast Guard sees as its role in fostering 

these private sector initiatives that improve the safety for the public sector? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I think it’s important to draw information from wherever it exists, that can improve the safety and security of the operation of our waterways. Our ultimate goal in the 

18 

Coast Guard is to create something what we called ‘‘maritime domain awareness.’’ And that’s a combination of information, sensor 

data, what’s held in the private sector, what is available through 

law enforcement, and to share this to improve the transparency— 

not only to improve safety, but also to be able to detect anomalies— 

who is obeying the rules, and who isn’t—so we, there’s a target of 

interest we can deal with them as far offshore as possible. 

Your maritime leadership in the Columbia River Basin briefed 

me several years ago when I was Chief of Staff, before I became 

Commandant, and I actually linked them up with our Maritime 

Domain Awareness Staff at that time, and we look forward to 

working with any community. 

The issue we have is—it sometimes gets down to bits and bytes 

and wires and how do you fuse everything together. A lot of times 

it’s not a technology problem—it’s how you put it all on the same 

screen, sir. 

Senator SMITH. Do you see that as the Coast Guard’s role, is 

helping to fuse everything together, then? 

Admiral ALLEN. To develop a common operating picture in and 

around a port environment is vital for us to conducting our mission, and I do see that as our role, sir. 

Senator SMITH. Very good, well, I would certainly encourage that, 

because I think it’s working and your leadership in that effort, 

bring publics and privates together, I think that that’s commendable and I would say more, more of the same would be great, wherever in the country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Senator Smith. 

Commandant Allen, one morning, not too long ago—I was listening to a broadcast on National Public Radio, and heard a man 

named John Devons, who was mayor of Valdez at that time of 

EXXON VALDEZ accident. And, a statement was made that the 

lingering oil of the running aground of the EXXON VALDEZ is insignificant, not a threat, but a response was, the oil residue is not 

bio-accessible—that means it’s not posing any ecological risks to 

any of the species that remain in the Sound. 

Well, Mr. Devons, former Mayor, now Executive Director of the 

Prince Williams Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council said, 

‘‘Exxon can say all they want, and I mean, they have bought a lot 

of scientists who have said it’s not causing any more problems. But 

the people live out there, and I mean, subsistence users, they know 

good and well that there’s oil on those beaches,’’ and before that it 

was said that those who once harvested wildly from the Sound now 

pick their spots warily. It may look Sierra Club Calendar perfect, 

but there’s oil just beneath the surface. And the Mayor has been 

angry for 18 years, and we’re still wrestling with that, and I’m hoping that we’ve learned so much from that spill, it had to do with 

the skipper’s condition, as well as how the course was set, and why 

we couldn’t track that from a station on the land, and sound an 

alarm. 

Thank you, Commander Allen for your good work, and for the 

Coast Guard, generally. We appreciate, greatly, the work that they 

do, and we still have so much confidence in your abilities, that I’m 

19 

afraid you’ll get another assignment for the Coast Guard to handle. 

We’ll try to prevent it, unless the money comes with it. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

And now, we want to hear from the second panel, Mr. Paul 

Kirchner, who is the Executive Director and General Counsel for 

the American Pilots Association, Captain Ed Page, the President of 

the Maritime Exchange of Alaska, and Dr. Kirsi Tikka of Paramus, 

New Jersey, who serves as the Vice President of Global Technology 

and Business Development for the American Bureau of Shipping 

and I note for the benefit of my colleague and friend, it’s an inland 

station in New Jersey where they’re looking at the development of 

the American Bureau of Shipping. 

So, we thank all of you for being here, for sharing your expertise 

with us, and I would ask for your testimony, limit it to 5 minutes, 

please. 

And once settled, Mr. Kirchner? 

STATEMENT OF PAUL G. KIRCHNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

AND GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN PILOTS’ ASSOCIATION 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. 

My name is Paul Kirchner, I’m the Executive Director and General Counsel of the American Pilots’ Association. The APA appreciates the invitation to testify today. 

In my written testimony, I provided some information about pilotage in the United States—perhaps more information than the 

Subcommittee really wanted—but I have, particularly, tried to address questions that have been raised in connection with the 

COSCO BUSAN incident. In addition, I will be happy to answer 

any questions that the Subcommittee might have today, or any 

time in the future. 

I do have a few short remarks, here. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Please do. 

The pilotage system in this country is a system of State regulation. This reflects a specific judgment, made by Congress in 1789, 

that because of the unique nature of pilotage as well as the variation in navigation conditions and piloting demands in the different 

ports and waterways in the country, pilotage is best regulated at 

the State and local level. 

That judgment has been reaffirmed many times since, and the 

State pilotage system that has developed from that judgment, has 

served, and continues to serve, the interests of this country extremely well. The U.S. has the safest, most technologically advanced, and most efficient system of pilotage in the world. 

Any system, however, should constantly seek improvement. Although vessel accidents are very rare, when an accident does occur, 

pilot associations and State pilotage authorities recognize the need 

to examine their practices, to see if they can do a better job. The 

COSCO BUSAN incident provides U.S. pilotage with that challenge. 

What can the pilotage profession and the pilotage system learn 

from COSCO BUSAN, and are there changes that can be made to 

help prevent similar accidents in the future? 

20 

The pilot community has already taken actions in response to the 

COSCO BUSAN incident. These address such matters as fog policies, training, and pilot carry-aboard equipment. As more is 

learned about the details of the accident, and its causes, there will 

be additional actions by various segments of the U.S. pilotage system—pilots, pilot associations, pilotage Commissioners, and State 

legislatures. 

The APA and its pilot members are also ready and willing to 

work with Congress and with the Coast Guard to find ways to improve the National Marine Safety Programs, upgrade the infrastructure associated with those programs, and generally enhance 

navigation safety. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirchner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL G. KIRCHNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

AND GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN PILOTS’ ASSOCIATION

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Paul 

Kirchner, Executive Director—General Counsel of the American Pilots’ Association. 

The APA appreciates the invitation to testify today to discuss pilotage in the United 

States and the role U.S. pilots play in the prevention of oil spills from vessels. 

The APA has been the national association of the piloting profession since 1884. 

Today, there are approximately 1,200 individual pilots working in the 60 APA-member pilot groups. These APA members pilot about 95 percent of all oceangoing foreign trade vessels moving in U.S. waters. Virtually all state-licensed pilots belong 

to an APA member group as well as all of the U.S. Coast Guard registered pilots 

working in the Great Lakes. 

The pilotage system in this country is a system of state regulation. State pilots 

are also subject to Federal navigation safety laws, hold Federal pilot licenses, and 

work closely with the Coast Guard. In every coastal state, however, the primary 

source of regulatory oversight of pilotage operations is a state governmental authority, typically a pilot commission. This system of state responsibility reflects a specific judgment made by Congress in 1789 that pilotage is best regulated at the state 

and local level. The judgment has been reaffirmed many times since, and the state 

pilotage system has served, and continues to serve, the interests of this country extremely well. The U.S. has the safest, most technologically advanced, and most efficient system of pilotage in the world. 

Any system, however, should constantly seek improvement. Indeed, one of the 

major benefits of state and local level control of pilotage is the ability of the system 

to evolve and adjust to changing conditions and developments in vessel navigation. 

It also is able to respond quickly to lessons learned from accidents. Although vessel 

accidents are very rare, when an accident does occur, pilots, pilot associations, and 

state pilotage authorities recognize the need to examine their practices to see if they 

can do a better job. The COSCO BUSAN incident presents U.S. pilotage with that 

challenge. What can the piloting profession and the pilotage system learn from 

COSCO BUSAN, and are there changes that can be made to help prevent similar 

accidents in the future? 

Despite considerable speculation and opinions offered in news reports and other 

sources, we do not yet know what happened on the bridge of the COSCO BUSAN 

on the morning of November 7, 2007. Clearly, something went wrong in the navigation of that vessel. Typically, it takes a combination of things to produce this kind 

of result. In Bridge Resource Management terms, it appears that there was a lack 

of situational awareness and a chain of errors. Modern bridge procedures, including 

cross-monitoring and information sharing, are designed to prevent such problems 

from occurring, and if they do occur, from reaching a point where the result is an 

accident. Until we know exactly what errors were made and the specific reasons for 

the lack of situational awareness by the pilot and the bridge crew, we will not know 

why the normal fail safe mechanisms did not work on the COSCO BUSAN that 

morning. 

We do know, however, that the accident and its causes are being thoroughly investigated by a number of bodies. The Coast Guard and the NTSB are conducting 

casualty investigations to determine the causes of the accident. The Department of 

Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General is investigating certain aspects of 

21 

the accident and the resulting oil spill. The U.S. Attorneys office is reportedly considering criminal charges. 

The pilot’s performance is being examined by the state authorities. His state license was summarily suspended after the accident by the Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisun. On December 6, 2007, 

the Pilot Commission’s Incident Review Committee filed an ‘‘accusation’’ against the 

pilot charging him generally with negligence and listing a number of asserted errors 

including his decision to get underway despite the fog conditions and a loss of situational awareness during the voyage. 

This is a formal license suspension or revocation proceeding under state statute 

and commission regulations. The matter is set for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The hearing, which the ALJ has estimated may take 15 days, was 

recently postponed until September due to difficulties that the pilot and his attorneys are having securing evidence necessary for his defense. The ongoing criminal 

investigation was cited as a source of those difficulties. Meanwhile, the pilot’s state 

license will remain suspended. 

The pilot has also surrendered his Federal pilot license to the Coast Guard. That 

action was taken in response to a notification from the Coast Guard that it has determined that he is not medically fit for the duties of a pilot, based on information 

that he had previously disclosed in connection with the Coast Guard’s normal medical review program for pilots and other mariners. The Coast Guard has indicated 

that it will not return the license unless the pilot demonstrates that he is fit for 

duty. 

In addition to these investigations and actions taken against the pilot, various 

components of the pilotage system have already taken some steps to respond to several of the immediate issues that have been raised by the accident. For example, 

the San Francisco Bar Pilots Association is conducting a complete review of its operations. It has developed a new set of guidelines for moving in fog. Those guidelines 

have been submitted to the Coast Guard, and the expectation is that the Association 

and the Coast Guard will jointly submit them to the local Harbor Safety Committee 

for adoption and implementation in the region. The Association has established a 

committee of its members to work with a similar committee established by the San 

Francisco Pilot Commission to review the content of the Commission’s training programs, particularly continuing training. 

The Pilot Commission has set up a Navigation and Technology Committee to 

study carry aboard electronic piloting units. The committee has been directed to 

issue a report to the Commission by June 1 with recommendations on whether all 

pilots should be required to use such units, which types of units and capabilities 

should be selected, how and when they should be used, and what training should 

be required. Over the last 2 months, that committee has evaluated and ‘‘test-driven’’ 

several different types of portable units, ancillary equipment, and navigation software programs. 

The Pilot Commission has also initiated a thorough review of its operations. The 

California State Legislature is considering several bills calling for reviews of, and 

in some cases changes to, the Commission’s procedures and operations. 

The American Pilots’ Association has conducted an in-depth survey of its member 

groups regarding their use of carry aboard units. Results of that survey should be 

available in another week or two. The APA also expects to issue a ‘‘Best Practices’’ 

paper on pilot carry aboards in the same timeframe. The Best Practices project was 

begun a number of months before the COSCO BUSAN accident, but the accident 

has accelerated the project’s schedule. 

As more is learned about the details of the accident and its causes, there will be 

additional actions by various segments of the U.S. pilotage system—pilots, pilot associations, pilotage commissions, state legislatures—in response to the lessons of the 

COSCO BUSAN incident. The APA and its pilot members are also ready and willing 

to work with Congress and the Coast Guard to find ways to improve the national 

marine safety programs, upgrade the infrastructure associated with those programs, 

and generally enhance navigation safety. 

In order to assist the Subcommittee in its review of COSCO BUSAN and the subject of preventing oil spills from vessel casualties, we are providing the following information about pilotage in the U.S. The information is particularly addressed to 

questions that have been raised by the COSCO BUSAN incident. 

U.S. Pilotage—An Overview 

Pilotage of international trade vessels in the United States is regulated by the individual states, each of which maintains a pilotage system that is suited to the particular needs and circumstances of its own waters. In 1789, the first Congress of 

the United States enacted a law giving the states the right to regulate pilotage in 

22 

their waters. That created the state pilotage system, which remains in effect today. 

Every foreign-flag vessel and every United States-flag vessel engaged in international trade moving in the waters of a state is required by the state to take a 

pilot licensed by the state. 

Although each state has its own pilotage statute and regulatory system, there are 

substantial similarities in their systems. In all but one state, pilots are licensed and 

otherwise regulated by a pilot commission, which is a governmental entity that is 

part of a state agency or of a local municipality or port authority. Most pilot commissions have a mixed membership composed of representatives of ship operators, 

port interests, environmental groups, pilots, government agencies, and the public. 

The commission selects individuals for admission to a training program, oversees 

the training process, issues licenses, investigates accidents involving pilots or complaints filed against pilots, and oversees various aspects of the pilotage operation. 

Each U.S.-flag coastwise vessel is required by Federal law to use a pilot holding 

a Federal license issued by the Coast Guard. Unlike the comprehensive state systems, Federal regulation is limited to licensing and disciplinary enforcement. The 

Federal license has much lower qualification requirements and standards (for example, no prior training as a pilot or continuing training is required) than a state license and is similar to a pilotage exemption certificate issued under systems in 

other parts of the world. Each state pilot also holds a Federal license, however. In 

this respect, the Federal license serves as a national minimum standard. 

State and Federal License Jurisdiction 

The states and the Coast Guard have reciprocal and mutually supportive roles in 

overseeing the professional activities of pilots. This is a carefully balanced system 

equally accommodating the need for comprehensive state pilotage regulation as well 

as the important Federal marine safety functions of the Coast Guard. 

When a state pilot is working on a vessel subject to a state compulsory pilotage 

requirement (i.e., a foreign flag vessel or a U.S.-flag vessel operating under a registry endorsement), the pilot is considered to be ‘‘working under the state license.’’ 

As a consequence, the state pilotage authority (the applicable Pilot Commission) has 

the primary role in overseeing the pilot’s performance. The state authority will investigate the pilot’s performance and has a range or available remedial or disciplinary actions, including letters of warning, fines, remedial training, and suspension 

or revocation of the state license. 

The Coast Guard also has several forms of disciplinary measures that it can take 

against a state pilot for actions by the pilot while working under the state license. 

For example, the Coast Guard can initiate a license suspension or revocation proceeding against the pilot’s Federal license if the pilot committed an ‘‘act of incompetence relating to the operation of a vessel,’’ 46 U.S.C. 7703(A)(4), even if that act 

occurred while working under the state license. Under Coast Guard regulations, ‘‘incompetence is the inability on the part of a person to perform required duties, 

whether due to professional deficiencies, physical disability, mental incapacity or 

any combination thereof.’’ 46 CFR 5.31. This license authority in the case of incompetence, for example, is the basis for the demand that the Coast Guard made for 

the surrender of the COSCO BUSAN pilot’s license. The Coast Guard also has a 

wide range of civil penalties that can be assessed for a variety of violations and actions, including the negligent operation of a vessel. 

When a state pilot is working on a vessel subject to the Federal compulsory pilotage requirement (46 U.S.C. 8502 and 8503), the pilot is considered to be ‘‘working 

under the Federal license.’’ In that case, the Coast Guard is primarily responsible 

for overseeing the pilot’s performance and taking appropriate responsive action, including letters of warning, civil penalties, remedial training, and suspension or revocation of the Federal license. In most states, the state pilotage authority may also 

take action against the pilot and his state license. 

There is one important limitation on the Coast Guard’s authority to suspend or 

revoke a state pilot’s Federal license. Under 46 U.S.C. § 7703, the Coast Guard can 

suspend or revoke a Federal license for negligence, misconduct or a violation of 

Coast Guard marine safety regulations only if the asserted offense occurred while 

the holder was acting under the authority of the Federal license. In the case of a 

state pilot, this Federal law bars the Coast Guard from proceeding against the Federal license of the pilot for asserted offenses of those types while working under the 

pilot’s state license. This result is a necessary consequence of the system of state 

pilotage that has existed in this country for over 215 years. 

Removing that limitation to permit the Coast Guard to proceed against a state 

pilot’s Federal pilot license for all types of asserted offenses while acting under the 

authority of the pilot’s state license would interfere with and undermine the state’s 

regulatory role. Virtually every state pilot is required by state statute, commission 

23 

regulation, or association rules to have a Federal pilot license. The loss of a state 

pilot’s Federal license, therefore, would effectively mean the loss of the pilot’s ability 

to work as a state pilot. That would have the Coast Guard, not the state pilotage 

authority, exercise the ultimate control over state pilots. 

The courts have recognized the critical role that this limitation on the Coast 

Guard license authority plays in preserving the state pilotage system and the destructive impact that removing the limitation would have. For example, in Soriano 

v. United States, 495 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974), the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Coast Guard attempt to avoid the limitation and proceed 

against the Federal pilot license of a pilot licensed by the State of Washington. The 

Coast Guard tried to use its regulation, currently at 46 CFR § 5.57(a), providing that 

an individual is considered to be acting under the authority of a Federal license 

when the license is required by law or is a condition of employment (a Washington 

pilot is required by law to hold a Federal pilot license). The Court held that the regulation could not be used to obtain jurisdiction over a state pilot: 

The Commandant’s condition of employment regulation leads to precisely this 

result: it affects the power of the states to regulate pilots of foreign-flag, merchant vessels in state waters. . . . [E]ven though it chooses to require a Federal 

pilot’s license as a condition for the issuance of a state license, the state of 

Washington still might not wish to see its own pilots investigated and reprimanded for alleged misconduct while serving as compulsory pilots pursuant 

to state law. 

. . . The Commandant’s regulation, which purports to place state pilots under 

Coast Guard discipline, infringes upon an area specifically reserved by Congress 

for 185 years for regulation by the states and acknowledged by the Supreme 

Court for more than 120 years to be a subject of peculiarly local concern. See 

Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 

L.Ed 996 (1851). The regulation is void. 

Id. at 684. 

Another attempt to avoid the limitation of 46 U.S.C. § 7703 was struck down 2 

years after the Soriano decision in Dietze v. Siler, 414 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. La. 

1976). Again, the importance of the limitation in preserving the state pilotage system was recognized. The Dietze court observed: 

Thus retained [in the predecessor of 46 U.S.C. § 7703] is the traditional right 

of each state to enforce the standards of state pilotage as to acts under state 

licenses, free from the possibility that the same acts will be subject to Federal 

investigation and the same pilots subject to sanction under Federal law. 

Id. at 1113. In addition, the court described the limiting phrase, ‘‘acting under the 

authority of his license’’ in the predecessor of 46 U.S.C. § 7703 as the product of the 

‘‘historical attempt by Congress to preserve the integrity of state regulation even 

while promoting public safety.’’ Supra at 1112. 

This rather limited limitation on the Coast Guard’s license authority in the case 

of state pilots has no effect on marine safety. The Coast Guard retains considerable 

authority to take action against a state pilot, including the very important authority 

to take away the Federal license of a state pilot who is incompetent—physically, 

mentally or professionally. Moreover, as a practical matter, the possibility of an action against a state pilot’s Federal license for negligence or misconduct would provide no additional incentive for doing a good job. There is no lack of severe consequences for a pilot who is involved in an accident or has a substandard performance during a piloting assignment. State disciplinary and license actions, Federal 

and state civil penalties, uninsurable damages claims in civil suits, criminal 

charges, and potentially crippling legal fees provide incentive enough. 

The reality is that every time a pilot boards a ship, he or she knows that a moment’s inattention, complacency, confusion, or a wrong decision could lead to a potentially catastrophic vessel casualty with hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and/or loss of life, the end of the pilot’s career, and financial ruin for the pilot 

and the pilot’s family. Coupled with the physical dangers involved in the job of piloting, no other occupation or profession presents such risks to its practitioners in the 

normal course of their activities. 

Role of the Compulsory Pilot 

In 1997, the Board of Trustees of the APA adopted the following as the official 

statement of the piloting profession on the role of the compulsory state pilot and 

the relationship between the pilot and the master and bridge crew of a vessel. This 

statement has guided the profession ever since: 

24 

Navigation of a vessel in U.S. pilotage waters is considered to be a shared responsibility between the pilot and the master/bridge crew. The compulsory state 

pilot directs the navigation of the vessel subject to the master’s overall command 

of the vessel and the ultimate responsibility for its safety. The master has the 

right, and in fact the duty, to intervene or to displace the pilot in circumstances 

where the pilot is manifestly incompetent or incapacitated or the vessel is in immediate danger (‘‘in extremis’’) due to the pilot’s actions. With that limited exception, international law requires the master and/or the officer in charge of the 

watch to ‘‘cooperate closely with the pilot and maintain an accurate check on the 

ship’s position and movement.’’ 

State-licensed pilots are expected to act in the public interest and to maintain 

a professional judgment that is independent of any desires that do not comport 

with the needs of maritime safety. In addition, licensing and regulatory authorities, state and Federal, require compulsory pilots to take all reasonable actions 

to prevent ships under their navigational control from engaging in unsafe operations. Because of these duties, a compulsory state pilot in the U.S. is not considered a member of the ‘‘bridge team.’’ Nevertheless, a pilot is expected to develop 

and maintain a cooperative, mutually supportive working relationship with the 

master and the bridge crew in recognition of the respective responsibility of each 

for safe navigation. 

Pilots and Advanced Navigation Technology: Carry Aboard Electronic 

Units 

APA-member pilots are supporters of advanced navigation technology, extremely 

knowledgeable about it, and experienced practitioners in its use. Whether through 

the use of their own carry-aboard electronic navigation units or of equipment installed on ships’ bridges, today’s pilots understand and are familiar with the latest 

types of advanced navigation technology. 

With their knowledge and training, and their experience seeing all different types 

of ships with all different types of navigation technology, pilots are in a unique position to assess the strengths and weaknesses and the benefits and dangers in modern 

navigation technology. Pilots bring a very practical approach to navigation technology, one firmly rooted in what actually happens on the bridge of ship and what 

they need in order to make the best navigation decisions. This then can be described 

as a dual attitude of pilots toward advanced navigation technology. They support 

and embrace technology but with a full awareness of the cautions that must surround its use. 

There is one area in particular in which U.S. pilots have distinguished themselves 

in the practical application of advanced navigation technology. APA-member pilots 

in the U.S. have been the world leaders in the developing practice of pilot carry 

aboard units (also referred to as portable piloting units or PPUs). State pilots on 

the Bay and River Delaware are believed to have been the first pilots in the world 

to use carry aboard units over 25 years ago. 

The APA has played a major role in supporting this program in the U.S. The association has sponsored and conducted research on the subject. It has also made recommendations on the selection and use of carry aboard units as well as on training 

in not only the operation of the units but also in their incorporation into piloting 

practices and effective Bridge Resource Management principles. 

Today, approximately 55–60 percent of the 1200 pilots belonging to APA member 

pilot groups use some type of carry aboard unit. These pilots, often in conjunction 

with state pilotage authorities, have made the decision to use such units after considerable research and a determination that a particular type of unit could be of 

benefit as an additional source of navigation information under the conditions of piloting in their area. 

In places where units are not used today, it is because the pilots there have made 

an informed professional judgment that such a practice would not be appropriate 

at this time with the types of units currently available. As the technology evolves, 

the quality of electronic data improves, and new units become commercially available, the local pilots may decide to use carry aboard units at some point in the future. There will probably remain some locations, however, where carry aboard units 

will never be appropriate. The units may not be necessary or provide any benefits 

under the local conditions and types of piloting required or they could even have 

a negative effect on safety. 

Even where pilot groups use the units, including places where they have used the 

units for many years, the units are not used for every piloting assignment or task. 

For example, pilots might not use the units for shift jobs or other short movements, 

particularly in clear weather, or during certain operations, such as docking and 

undocking. The units may not be necessary or helpful for such assignments or may 

25 

act as an unsafe distraction during an operation that requires the pilot’s full attention to other navigation demands. Also, units are not used in some locations where 

the hydrographic data or satellite signal on which the unit depends may be unreliable. 

A large part of the success of the pilot carry aboard program in the U.S. can be 

attributed to the fact that it has been driven by the pilots themselves. The program 

has grown incrementally as pilots have developed units based on their intimate 

knowledge of the particular conditions and needs in their area—not on regulatory 

mandates or vendors’ marketing claims. Pilots have also learned how best to use 

the units. For these reasons, the pilots are wary of potentially overwhelming governmental regulation, especially at the national level, which could seriously interfere 

with the growth and development of the program. 

There are ways, however, for the Federal Government to support the piloting profession’s carry aboard program. The Coast Guard, for example, should be provided 

with adequate resources to maintain the DGPS and AIS infrastructure on which 

most units depend for their raw data. The recent decision by the Administration to 

request funding for a fully deployed eLoran system is a welcome development. A robust eLoran would provide a valuable terrestrial backup source of position, navigation and timing (PNT) data on which AIS and pilot carry aboard units depend. In 

addition, NOAA should be provided with full funding for a national program of 

Physical Oceanographic Real Time Systems, which provide valuable tide, current 

and water level data. In several places, pilots are seeking to have PORTS data included in their unit displays. That development is threatened, however, by the persistent underfunding of the PORTS program. 

Pilots and VTS 

Pilots, as the principal users of VTS services and, for most vessels, the point of 

contact between the VTS and the vessel, value the information provided by VTS systems. That information is one of the resources that pilots use in maintaining situational awareness and making critical navigation decisions. The primary mission of 

the VTS, therefore, is to give pilots and other mariners the information that they 

feel is useful in making those decisions. Other functions and benefits, such as traffic 

management, traffic monitoring, interventions in navigation emergency situations, 

or other regulatory activities, are secondary, although important. 

Except in emergency situations or hazardous conditions, navigation decisions 

must be made on the bridge of the ship by the master, pilot, and other mariners 

involved in directing the movement of the ship. Nevertheless, there may be specific 

circumstances where the current role of VTS and its range of interactions with a 

vessel could be expanded. The APA and its members are certainly willing to discuss 

with the Coast Guard ways in which the VTS and pilots could better work together 

to prevent vessel accidents, particularly in conditions such as fog, when own-ship 

and other-ship position information may be compromised. 

It would be unrealistic, however, to think that vessels could ever, as a normal 

practice, be safely navigated by personnel in a VTS center. Information available 

from the current technology in VTS centers, particularly with respect to AIS indications of vessel location, is simply not accurate or reliable enough to justify attempts 

at directing a vessel’s navigation. As result, interventions from a VTS center should 

be kept to a minimum and reserved for true emergencies and hazardous conditions 

where the normal risks of such action are outweighed by the exigencies of the situation. 

Even if the quality and quantity of the equipment in a VTS were significantly improved over what is found today, there is no way that the virtual information available in the VTS center could provide situational awareness of all the forces that affect a vessel or must be considered in making correct navigational decisions. Simply, 

the view from a VTS center is much different from the view from the bridge of a 

vessel. 

Watchstanders in Coast Guard VTS centers are not mariners and have little, if 

any, understanding of hydrodynamic or mechanical forces affecting a vessel, 

shiphandling techniques, or navigation practices. This is not meant as a criticism 

of VTS personnel—they are information providers, not vessel navigators. Even if the 

personnel were replaced or supplemented with experienced mariners who receive 

VTS training, it would still not be a safe practice to direct a vessel’s navigation from 

a VTS center. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I hope the information we have provided is helpful, and 

I would be pleased to answer any questions that the Subcommittee may have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirchner, we’ll 

have a chance to ask some questions. 

26 

And now, if you would, Captain Page? 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD PAGE, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA 

Captain PAGE. Yes, sir. Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking 

Member Smith, it’s my honor to have the opportunity to appear before you today to tell you about how the Maritime Industry is using 

vessel tracking technology to help prevent oil spills, and more effectively respond to marine casualties and environmental emergencies. 

My name is Ed Page, I’m Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska, previously served as Commissioned Officer in the 

United States Coast Guard. 

For the last 40 years, I’ve been committed to maritime safety, 

and throughout that time, I’ve learned firsthand that vessel tracking technology is critically important in preventing oil spills and responding to other maritime emergencies. 

Over the years, I’ve been involved in hundreds of maritime casualties that have resulted in loss of life, loss of property, disruption 

of trade, and environmental harm. My 3 years of involvement in 

the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill made me realize we needed better 

prevention and response capabilities, and the best tool was having 

the ability to track the locations of vessels. 

Fifteen years ago, I was assigned as the Captain of the Port of 

Los Angeles, Long Beach. Upon my arrival, I was concerned I did 

not have the capabilities I needed, in order to do my job. I didn’t 

know where our vessels were, and was told that a Coast Guard 

Vessel Traffic Service would not be available for 6 years. 

As a field commander, that was unacceptable. I therefore worked 

at the local marine exchange, the port community and the State of 

California to develop a Vessel Tracking System then. This Coast 

Guard-marine industry partnership that applied vessel tracking 

technology was—and continues to be—the reason why one of the 

largest ports in our Nation is also one of the safest. 

Marine Exchange of Alaska is a non-profit maritime organization 

established to provide information, communications and services to 

help ensure safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible 

maritime operations. It is one of the 13 Marine Exchanges around 

the United States that collectively make up the Maritime Information Services of North America—or MISNA—that has used satellite 

and other technologies to track vessels throughout the United 

States, and in some cases, around the world. 

In 2004, the International Maritime Organization, or IMO, required vessels to be equipped with Automatic Identification Systems, or AIS, which is similar to airplane transponders. The Marine Exchanges that make up MISNA realized there was no national network of receivers to process the information broadcast by 

vessels that could aid safe and efficient maritime operations, so we 

therefore built and presently operate over 100 AIS receiving stations around the United States that are tracking thousands of vessels every day. 

In fact, to make this easier to understand, this graphic to the 

right of me shows where the 100 some-odd sites that MISNA has 

developed over the last several years, are located. And, of course, 

27 

you can see your states are represented—New Jersey and Delaware 

Bay and New York, and of course, Oregon. 

Our sites extend, as you can see, from Maine, to Hawaii, to Alaska, and even above the Arctic Circle—we’re ubiquitous. 

The next graphic will show you how we use this information, and 

how we can play back and examine vessel track lines to determine 

risk. This particular slide shows you the Unimak Pass and Aleutian Islands of Alaska and Bering Sea where vessels from around 

the world transit our waters. We can identify risk situations and 

manage that risk, and identify anomalies that would be of concern, 

and bring that to the attention of the United States Coast Guard. 


304PAGE1.eps 304PAGE2.eps
28 

The next graphic shows how we use that technology to help ensure environmentally responsible and sound maritime operations. 

This graphic is actually off the coast of Washington, the ‘‘area to 

be avoided,’’ the sensitive area, and we have put an electronic 

fence, if you will, using the AIS information, so if a vessel strays 

into a bad area, or wrong area, it automatically sends e-mail and 

phone messages off so we can correct the action. 

We do similarly up in Alaska’s Glacier Bay—when a vessel exceeds a speed limit in Glacier Bay, where we’re trying to protect 

whales—it automatically sends an e-mail and message off to the 

Park Service, who can notify the vessel to slow down. 

So, it’s used in several different ways to protect environmental 

havoc that may be caused by vessels. 

And the last slide shows an emergency response where a cruise 

ship ran aground this last summer in Alaska, and this information 

provided the Coast Guard the location of other vessels to carry out 

abandon ships operations, salvage, and oil spill response, thus mitigating the impacts of that incident that happened in Alaska. 


304PAGE3.eps
29 

Going back to my experiences as the Captain of the Port of Los 

Angeles, Long Beach, and my years in the Coast Guard, I want to 

reiterate that this public-private partnership model that fully employs vessel tracking technologies is the most expedient and effective way to prevent oil spills, and respond to other maritime emergencies. 

I continue to urge the Coast Guard to fulfill their commitment 

to public-private partnerships, as articulated in the Coast Guard’s 

‘‘Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship,’’ and embrace these capabilities developed by the maritime industry. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I stand by to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Page follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD PAGE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA

Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Subcommittee 

Members, it is my honor to have the opportunity to appear before you today to tell 

you about how the maritime industry is using vessel tracking technology to help 

prevent oil spills and more effectively respond to marine casualties and environmental emergencies. My name is Edward Page and I am the Executive Director of 

the Marine Exchange of Alaska, a non-profit maritime organization established to 

provide information, communications and services to aid safe, secure, efficient and 

environmentally responsible maritime operations. 

The Marine Exchange of Alaska is a member of the Maritime Information Service 

of North America (MISNA), a national coalition of maritime information organizations that represents the commercial maritime community’s shared commitment to 

proactively address the challenges faced by the maritime industry, the U.S. Coast 

Guard, their respective states, and other Federal and state agencies in a cooperative 

and cost effective manner. MISNA membership also includes maritime exchanges in 

New England, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Virginia, Florida, New Orleans, 

Houston, Los Angeles-Long Beach, San Francisco and Seattle. Several of the people 

who oversee the operations of these maritime exchanges are former Coast Guard 

Captains of the Port, and all the people who run these maritime exchanges have 

extensive maritime experience, including as licensed master mariners and senior 

maritime industry executives. MISNA, whose membership is comprised of over 


304PAGE4.eps
30 

8,000 maritime organizations is recognized as an honest broker of maritime information and collectively serves as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ of the maritime community. 

As a representative of the maritime industry, and just like Congress, I want to 

identify the best ways to prevent oil spills and environmental harm and improve 

the effectiveness of oil spill responses when maritime accidents occur. I am confident 

that substantial improvements to current practice can be made quickly and at minimal cost by expanding the application of existing vessel tracking technologies that 

have been developed through joint efforts by the Coast Guard, the Marine Exchange 

of Alaska, and the entire marine industry. 

Prior to establishing the Marine Exchange of Alaska 7 years ago, I served as an 

officer in the U.S. Coast Guard for 29 years. After serving as the Chief of the Coast 

Guard’s Marine Environmental Protection branch for Alaska, I served as the Captain of the Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach. During this time, I responded to numerous search and rescue cases, maritime accidents and oil spills. My three-year involvement in the EXXON VALDEZ response in particular convinced me that considerable resources should be devoted to the prevention of oil spills, as the recovery 

of oil is a daunting and costly challenge that historically has limited effectiveness. 

The phrase, ‘‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’’ has clearly proven 

to apply to oil spills. 

During my time as Captain of the Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach, my strongest 

and most effective ally in preventing maritime accidents was the Marine Exchange 

of Los Angeles, along with the pilots, towing industry and vessel operators, and everyone who shared the same commitment and goal of ensuring safe and environmentally sound maritime operations. Our single most important and effective prevention resource was the vessel tracking information obtained from the expedited 

stand up of a vessel tracking system at the marine exchange. The information we 

obtained on vessels’ movements was an eye opener; it provided me with important 

information that I did not have before we established the vessel tracking system, 

and it quickly led to the implementation of several risk mitigation measures including tug escort requirements in certain areas, relocation of pilot boarding areas, 

speed restrictions, changing of traffic lanes, special operating procedures for fog conditions, and many others. Cumulatively these changes turned one of the world’s 

busiest ports into one of the world’s safest. 

I am proud to say that this joint Coast Guard/Marine Exchange LA/LB vessel 

traffic center that we established in 1994 is still going strong, and in fact was recognized by the National Academy of Sciences and by Congress as an industry/Coast 

Guard joint venture that should be replicated to save costs and increase effectiveness in ensuring safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible maritime 

operations. 

The lesson I learned from my 40 years in the Coast Guard and working in the 

marine industry is that the most powerful tool for protecting our shores from oil 

spills and other environmental disasters is the information on vessels’ locations provided by vessel tracking systems. Analysis of historical vessel tracks aid risk assessment and risk management, and the ability to see vessel positions in real-time aids 

prevention of incidents and emergency response. The Coast Guard calls this Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), or the effective understanding of anything in the 

maritime environment that can affect the safety, security, economy, or environment 

of the United States. 

The best way to achieve maritime domain awareness quickly and effectively is 

through strong public-private partnerships. This is recognized in The U.S. Coast 

Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship which states that 

‘‘Government and private stakeholders must establish an unprecedented level of information sharing and intelligence integration’’ in order to enhance maritime domain awareness. This document also states that prevention efforts ‘‘work best when 

implemented through strong partnerships with the commercial and recreational 

users of the Nation’s ports and waterways.’’ 

I have learned first hand that the marine industry is more effective than the government when it comes to providing vessel tracking capabilities, and is also best 

suited for ensuring that information obtained from their vessel tracking systems is 

effectively shared with those in the marine industry and government. I took these 

lessons with me when I retired from the Coast Guard to stand up the marine exchange for Alaska to help address the challenges of ensuring safe and environmentally sound operations in the largest and most daunting maritime region in the 

U.S. 

When the International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated in 2004 that all 

vessels be equipped with Automatic Identification Systems (AIS)—which are like 

airplane transponders—the Marine Exchange of Alaska, and other marine exchanges around the country realized that AIS would not improve maritime safety 

31 

unless there were also receiving stations on shore able to receive, process and disseminate the information. As a result, we constructed a network of AIS receiving 

stations around the country, and today marine exchanges operate a network of more 

than 100 AIS receiving sites on all three coasts and in Hawaii. 

In Alaska, we went one step further, and along with our extensive network of 

maritime stakeholders, my staff of five people deployed a tracking system that uses 

both satellite (long range) and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) network of 

over 50 receiving sites extending from the Arctic, 1,500 miles west through the 

Aleutian Islands, and 1,200 miles south to Ketchikan. In Alaska, we have shared 

the information obtained from our tracking system with the State of Alaska, the 

Coast Guard and the marine industry. Our vessel tracking system has been used 

to assist vessels in distress, aid oil spill response operations by locating rescue and 

oil spill recovery vessels, and to compliment maritime security efforts. The Coast 

Guard, State of Alaska and the marine industry have all invested in the establishment and operation of this vessel tracking network which we plan to expand into 

areas of the Arctic, Chukchi, and Bering Seas that currently lack AIS coverage. 

While the Coast Guard recognizes the importance of having this capability in 

Alaska and other regions of the US, their focus has been on establishing a National 

AIS network that is projected to be fully operational after 2014. We in the marine 

industry believe that utilization of the vessel tracking system currently operated by 

marine exchanges across the country provides a today solution that should be 

tapped right now to serve as a bridging and complementary solution until the Coast 

Guard’s national AIS system is in place. 

There are many examples of how the vessel tracking system established and operated by the Marine Exchange of Alaska has been used to aid maritime safety. For 

example: 

• In order to minimize whale ship strikes, e-mail alerts are automatically transmitted in real-time to the U.S. Park Service when vessels are exceeding speed 

limits imposed in regions of Glacier Bay, Alaska where humpback whales are 

present; 

• Erratic and high risk vessel operations in Alaska waters are graphically provided to the Coast Guard for investigation and follow-up; 

• The historical tracklines and detailed information on vessels transiting Alaska 

waters and traveling to and from the Far East are provided to the Coast Guard 

for risk assessment; 

• The locations of oil exploration vessels in the Arctic have been tracked in real 

time and shared with the Coast Guard and State agencies; 

• The location of oil spill response vessels responding to the SELENDANG AYU 

oil spill in the Aleutian Islands was provided in real time with satellite transponders to the Coast Guard, State of Alaska agencies and commercial spill responders; 

• The location of a grounded tanker SEABULK PRIDE in Cook Inlet Alaska and 

the locations and transits of response vessels was provided to the Coast Guard, 

State of Alaska agencies and the commercial tugs and response vessels; and 

• The location of Good Samaritan vessels used to rescue passengers from the 

grounded cruise ship EMPRESS OF THE NORTH in Alaska was provided to 

the Coast Guard this past summer. 

Similar capabilities are being provided around the U.S. by other maritime exchange organizations that are networked together by MISNA. Off the coast of Washington State, for instance, e-mail alerts are automatically transmitted when vessels 

enter a NOAA established ‘‘Area To Be Avoided.’’ 

In closing, I would like to reiterate that vessel tracking technologies are critical 

in protecting our shores from oil spills and other environmental disasters. I urge the 

Coast Guard to utilize the vessel tracking network developed by the marine industry and that is operational today to help prevent and respond to oil spills as well 

as aid the execution of the services’ search and rescue and maritime security missions. Such efforts will help achieve our common goal of providing for safe, secure, 

efficient and environmentally sound maritime operations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity 

to testify today on behalf of the Marine Exchange of Alaska and the Maritime Information Service of North America. I look forward to answering any questions you 

may have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very, very much. 

Dr. Tikka? 

32 

STATEMENT OF DR. KIRSI TIKKA, VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL 

TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN 

BUREAU OF SHIPPING (ABS) 

Dr. TIKKA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of 

the Committee, good afternoon. 

My name is Dr. Kirsi Tikka, I am Vice President, Global Technology and Business Development, at the American Bureau of 

Shipping. I am appearing before you today, at your request, to provide you with factual information relating to the international requirements for the protective location of fuel oil tanks on ships. 

ABS is a not-for-profit organization whose mission is to promote 

the security of life, property, and the natural environment, primarily through the development and verification of standards for 

the design, construction and operational maintenance of marine-related facilities. 

The principal safety and environmental standards for the international shipping industry are established through the International Maritime Organization—IMO—the specialized agency of 

the United Nations. These include the Safety of Life at Sea, 

SOLAS, Convention, and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Ships, MARPOL. 

This international approach is essential if commercial ships are 

to be able to trade across all oceans, and to all nations under a consistent set of statutory requirements. 

Concerned about the potential for pollution from a ruptured fuel 

oil space, in 2006 IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee—MEPC—adopted an amendment to the revised MARPOL 

Annex I, that includes the new Regulation 12A on oil fuel tank protection. 

It applies to all new ships and major conversions with an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600 cubic meters and above, for which either the contract for construction between shipbuilder and ship 

owner was placed on or after 1 August 2007, or the ship is delivered on or after 1 August 2010. 

The initiative to develop this regulation started with a proposal 

by the Netherlands in the working group on oil tanker safety and 

environmental matters in December 2000. The Netherlands pointed 

out that large ships often carry large quantities of fuel oil. In the 

case of pollution incidents involving fuel oil, it would be appropriate to require a similar degree of protection against collision or 

grounding, as in oil tankers. Those affected by oil pollution will not 

accept any distinction as to the source of the oil. 

The proposal was subject to several years of review, ultimately 

culminating in the new amendment, the objective of which is to reduce the frequency and volume of fuel oil spills, in the event of collision or grounding. The regulations, as adopted, apply to tanks 

greater than 30 cubic meters in capacity in which oil fuel is carried. 

Designers and owners are given two alternative approaches to 

apply with the new requirements. In both approaches, the maximum individual tank capacity of 2,500 cubic meters is imposed. 

It is expected that most owners of most ship types will opt for 

the first, prescriptive alternative, which protectively locates the 

33 

bunker tanks in board of, and above double-side and double-bottom 

spaces, respectively. 

The second alternative is an accidental oil fuel out-flow performance standard. It is inherent in the new regulations that the fuel 

oil piping shall also be located in protected positions. 

On the basis of the new designs that have been reviewed by ABS, 

it appears that the most common approach adopted by shipyards 

is to provide protected location in the engine room, in protected locations in topside tanks, and deep tanks between the transverse 

bulkheads, between the cargo holds. 

Incorporating the required protectively located spaces will incur 

additional bulkheads, and associated structural costs. With the possible exception of container ships, cargo-carrying capacity is not expected to be materially affected. 

I have provided, as handout to the Committee, some illustrations 

of the impact of this regulation, that I’m happy to explain, if needed. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been my pleasure to address you today, I 

am more than happy to answer any relevant questions the Committee Members may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Tikka follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KIRSI TIKKA, VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY

AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING (ABS) 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, good afternoon. 

My name is Dr. Kirsi Tikka. I am Vice President, Global Technology and Business 

Development of the American Bureau of Shipping or ABS, as we are more commonly 

called. 

I am appearing before you today, at your request, to provide you with factual information relating to the international requirements, both statutory and those required by the self-regulating mechanism for international shipping known as classification, for the protective location of fuel oil tanks on ships. 

ABS is a not-for-profit organization. Founded in 1862, it is one of the world’s leading classification societies. The Mission of ABS is to serve the public interest as well 

as the needs of our clients by promoting the security of life, property and the natural environment primarily through the development and verification of standards 

for the design, construction and operational maintenance of marine-related facilities. 

The U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 officially recognized ABS as the classification body for U.S. Government owned vessels. We continue to act in this manner 

to this day. 

International Maritime Standards 

Technical standards for the international shipping industry are principally established through two complementary mechanisms. Paramount is the International 

Maritime Organization (IMO) the specialized agency of the United Nations charged 

with responsibility for the development and maintenance of a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping. Its remit includes both safety and environmental 

concerns. It is an inter-governmental agency with 167 Member States, including the 

United States of America. 

It has long been accepted that it is the role of government to determine the overall level of risk to which its citizens should be exposed from the conduct of international shipping. 

Because of the international nature of shipping, this evaluation has been carried 

out within the IMO which has developed, and amended as necessary, the principal 

Conventions that apply to the industry, most notably the Safety of Life at Sea 

(SOLAS) Convention, the International Convention on Load Lines (ICLL) and the 

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the 

provisions of which are then adopted into national law, as appropriate, by the individual member States. This international approach is essential if commercial ships 

34 

1 264.17 U.S. gallons/m3

are to be able to trade across all oceans and to all nations under a consistent set 

of statutory requirements. 

Complementing this regulatory approach is the self-regulatory practice of classification which can trace its history back more than 200 years. Growing out of a need 

of the marine underwriting community to have an impartial, independent mechanism for establishing detailed technical standards for the design, construction and 

maintenance of ships, classification societies such as ABS work closely with governments and industry to establish these standards, known as Rules. 

In view of this, and responding to the request of this Committee for information 

with respect to the current regulatory requirements relating to the protective location of fuel oil tanks on commercial vessels, ABS is pleased to provide the following 

summary. 

It should be noted that, for the sake of clarity, the following remarks address the 

standards for ships. The IMO requirements also consider specialized offshore units, 

such as some of those in operation in the U.S. waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Information relating to these units can be found in the text of the MARPOL amendment 

that appears as an appendix to this statement. ABS would be pleased to provide 

subsequent written information on this specialized application if the Committee 

deems it useful. 

IMO Regulations 

Concerned about the potential for pollution from a ruptured fuel oil tank, in 2006 

IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) adopted an amendment 

to the revised MARPOL Annex I (Prevention of Pollution by Oil) that includes a new 

regulation (12A) on fuel oil tank protection. (The full text of the amendment is attached to this statement as Appendix I.) 

It applies to all new ships and major conversions with an aggregate fuel oil capacity of 600 m3 (158,502 U.S. gallons 1 or about 570 tons of Marine Fuel Oil (MFO)) 

and above for which either the contract for construction between shipbuilder and 

shipowner was placed on or after 1 August 2007 or, if no contract, the keel is laid 

on or after 1 February 2008 or the ship is delivered on or after 1 August 2010. 

The initiative to develop this regulation started with a proposal by the Netherlands in the Working Group on Oil Tanker Safety and Environmental Matters at 

a meeting of the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), in December 2000; one 

of many safety and environmental initiatives taken up by IMO following the sinking 

of the oil tanker ERIKA off the coast of France in 1999. 

The Netherlands pointed out that: 

• large ships often carry quantities of fuel oil that exceed the cargo oil deadweight 

limits of MARPOL for the protection of cargo tanks in oil tankers. 

• in the case of a pollution incident involving a ship carrying a large quantity of 

fuel oil in its fuel oil tanks it would therefore be appropriate to require a similar 

degree of protection against collision or grounding as in oil tankers. 

• those affected by oil pollution will not accept any distinction as to the source 

of the oil pollution. 

The Netherlands proposed double-side and double-bottom protection for fuel oil 

tanks in line with those required for cargo oil tanks of oil tankers. The proposal was 

subject to several years of investigation, review and debate, ultimately culminating 

in the new Amendment, the objective of which is to reduce the frequency and volume of fuel oil spills in the event of a collision or grounding. 

The regulations, as adopted, apply to tanks greater than 30 m3 (7,925.1 U.S. gallons) in capacity in which fuel oil is carried but excludes those tanks which would 

not contain fuel oil in normal operation such as overflow and sludge tanks. 

Designers and owners are given two alternative approaches to comply with the 

new requirements. In both approaches a maximum individual tank capacity of 2,500 

m3 (660,425 U.S. gallons) is imposed. 

It is expected that most owners of most ship types will opt for the first, prescriptive alternative which protectively locates the fuel oil tanks inboard of and above 

double side and double bottom spaces respectively. The double bottom height 

ranges, as a function of ship breadth, from a minimum of 0.76 meters to a maximum of 2.0 meters, in line with newly adopted SOLAS regulations. The double side 

width ranges, as a function of total fuel oil capacity, from a minimum of 1.0 meter 

to a maximum of 2.0 meters; with the exception of a minimum double side width 

of 0.76 meters for individual fuel oil tanks with a capacity of less than 500 cubic 

meters (132,085 U.S. gallons). 

35 

The second alternative is an accidental fuel oil outflow performance standard that 

allows the designer to locate fuel oil tanks based on a calculated ‘‘mean oil outflow 

parameter’’, in the event of a collision or grounding, as compared to a maximum allowable value. Specific procedures are given for the calculation of the oil outflow 

from each tank, due to side damage and bottom damage, based on its probability 

of being breached in the event of a collision or grounding. 

This probabilistic approach also takes into account the density of the fuel oil, the 

location of each fuel oil tank relative to the side shell and bottom shell and the tank 

size. These are used to determine the mean oil outflow parameter for the ship. In 

the event that a double bottom or double side is fitted to reduce the mean oil outflow, the dimensions of those spaces are to be not less than those required under 

the prescriptive alternative. 

Mr. Chairman, I realize that while the protective location under the first approach 

is easy to grasp, this very brief explanation of the probabilistic approach may sound 

complex. It was adopted by the IMO, after discussion with industry, in order to give 

designers the freedom to optimize fuel oil tank arrangements and to deal with the 

design constraints encountered in different ship types. The approach was developed 

by a Panel of the U.S.-based Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 

(SNAME) based on, and in line with, the recently adopted accidental oil outflow performance requirements related to spills from cargo oil tanks in the event of collisions or groundings contained in MARPOL Annex I regulation 23. 

It is inherent in the new regulations that the fuel oil piping shall also be located 

in protected positions. Where the piping must be placed closer to the ships bottom 

or side than specified, MARPOL Annex I regulation 12A requires the fitting of 

valves or similar closing devices within, or immediately adjacent to, the protected 

fuel tank. The valves must be capable of being operated remotely from either the 

bridge or machinery control position, they must fail in a closed position in the event 

of a remote control system failure and they are to be kept closed at sea except during the transfer of fuel oil. 

On the basis of the new designs that have been reviewed by ABS, it appears that 

the most common approach adopted by shipyards for tanker designs is to provide 

protected locations in the engine room and in way of the pump room. For oil tankers, it is noted that in accordance with MARPOL Annex I, regulation 19.3, double 

bottom and double side tanks that are used to protect cargo oil tanks are not allowed to hold oil of any kind, including fuel oil, even if the probabilistic approach 

were to indicate otherwise. 

To date, bulk carrier designers are largely choosing to locate fuel oil tanks in the 

engine room, in protected locations in topside tanks and in protected spaces between 

the engine room and the aftermost cargo hold. 

LNG carrier designers are tending toward providing protected space in the engine 

room or in protected locations between the collision bulkhead and the cofferdam 

bulkhead of the No. 1 cargo tank. 

Large containerships pose a particular challenge given the very large quantity of 

fuel oil that must be carried to maintain the preferred high service speeds. The most 

common arrangement to date is to use protectively located deep tanks between the 

transverse bulkheads between the cargo holds. An alternative arrangement is to 

provide fuel oil tanks above the double bottom in one or more cargo holds which, 

however, reduces cargo capacity. 

For all ship types, incorporating the required protectively located spaces will incur 

additional bulkheads and associated structural costs. With the possible exception of 

containerships, cargo carrying capacity is not expected to be materially affected. 

ABS Standards 

To encourage owners to consider incorporating protectively located fuel oil tanks 

into new ship designs, ABS introduced the optional class notation POT (Protection 

of Fuel and Lubricating Oil Tanks) effective 1 July 2003, more than 4 years in advance of the implementation date of the new MARPOL regulation. ABS has been 

gratified that several shipowners have chosen to adopt the ABS optional notation 

in advance of the regulatory requirements taking effect. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been my pleasure to address you today. I am more than 

happy to answer any relevant questions the Committee members may have. 

Thank you. 

36 

APPENDIX

ANNEX 2 

Resolution MEPC.141(54) 

Adopted on 24 March 2006 

Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 

(Amendments to regulation 1, addition to regulation 12A, consequential amendments 

to the IOPP Certificate and amendments to regulation 21 of the revised Annex 

I of MARPOL 73/78) 

The Marine Environment Protection Committee, 

RECALLING article 38(a) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Marine Environment Protection Committee 

(the Committee) conferred upon it by international conventions for the prevention 

and control of marine pollution, 

NOTING article 16 of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 

from Ships, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘1973 Convention’’) and article VI 

of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention 

of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘1978 Protocol’’) which 

together specify the amendment procedure of the 1978 Protocol and confer upon the 

appropriate body of the Organization the function of considering and adopting 

amendments to the 1973 Convention, as modified by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 

73/78), 

NOTING ALSO that the revised Annex I to MARPOL 73/78 was adopted by resolution MEPC.117(52) and is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2007, 

HAVING CONSIDERED proposed amendments to regulation 1, proposed new 

regulation 12A, consequential amendments to the Supplement (Forms A and B) of 

the IOPP Certificate, and proposed amendments to regulation 21 of the revised 

Annex I to MARPOL 73/78, 

1. ADOPTS, in accordance with article 16(2)(d) of the 1973 Convention, the 

amendments to the revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, the text of which is set out 

at Annex to the present resolution; 

2. DETERMINES, in accordance with article 16(2)(f)(iii) of the 1973 Convention, 

that the amendments shall be deemed to have been accepted on 1 February 2007, 

unless prior to that date, not less than one-third of the Parties or Parties the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet, have communicated to the Organization their objection to the amendments; 

3. INVITES the Parties to note that, in accordance with article 16(2)(g)(ii) of the 

1973 Convention, the said amendments shall enter into force on 1 August 2007 upon 

their acceptance in accordance with paragraph 2 above; 

4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General, in conformity with article 16(2)(e) of the 

1973 Convention, to transmit to all Parties to MARPOL 73/78 certified copies of the 

present resolution and the text of the amendments contained in the Annex; and 

5. REQUESTS FURTHER the Secretary-General to transmit to the Members of 

the Organization which are not Parties to MARPOL 73/78 copies of the present resolution and its Annex. 

ANNEX

Amendments to the Revised MARPOL Annex I 

1 Addition of paragraph 28.9 to regulation 1 

The following new paragraph 28.9 is added after the existing paragraph 28.8 of 

regulation 1: 

‘‘28.9 ship delivered on or after 1 August 2010 means a ship: 

.1 for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 August 2007; or 

.2 in the absence of a building contract, the keels of which are laid or which 

are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 February 2008; or 

.3 the delivery of which is on or after 1 August 2010; or 

.4 which have undergone a major conversion: 

.1 for which the contract is placed after 1 August 2007; or 

37 

.2 in the absence of contract, the construction work of which is begun after 

1 February 2008; or 

.3 which is completed after 1 August 2010.’’ 

2 Addition of new regulation 12A on oil fuel tank protection 

The following new regulation 12A is added after the existing regulation 12: 

‘‘Regulation 12A—Oil fuel tank protection 

1 This regulation shall apply to all ships with an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 

600 m3 and above which are delivered on or after 1 August 2010, as defined in regulation 1.28.9 of this Annex. 

2 The application of this regulation in determining the location of tanks used to 

carry oil fuel does not govern over the provisions of regulation 19 of this Annex. 

3 For the purpose of this regulation, the following definitions shall apply: 

.1 ‘‘Oil fuel’’ means any oil used as fuel oil in connection with the propulsion 

and auxiliary machinery of the ship in which such oil is carried. 

.2 ‘‘Load line draught (dS)’’ is the vertical distance, in metres, from the moulded baseline at mid-length to the waterline corresponding to the summer 

freeboard draught to be assigned to the ship. 

.3 ‘‘Light ship draught’’ is the moulded draught amidships corresponding to 

the lightweight. 

.4 ‘‘Partial load line draught (dP)’’ is the light ship draught plus 60 percent of 

the difference between the light ship draught and the load line draught dS. The 

partial load line draught (dp) shall be measured in metres. 

.5 ‘‘Waterline (dB)’’ is the vertical distance, in metres, from the moulded baseline at mid-length to the waterline corresponding to 30 percent of the depth DS. 

.6 ‘‘Breadth (BS)’’ is the greatest moulded breadth of the ship, in metres, at 

or below the deepest load line draught (dS). 

.7 ‘‘Breadth (BB)’’ is the greatest moulded breadth of the ship, in metres, at 

or below the waterline (dB). 

.8 ‘‘Depth (DS)’’ is the moulded depth, in metres, measured at mid-length to 

the upper deck at side. For the purpose of the application, ‘‘upper deck’’ means 

the highest deck to which the watertight transverse bulkheads except aft peak 

bulkheads extend. 

.9 ‘‘Length (L)’’ means 96 percent of the total length on a waterline at 85 percent of the least moulded depth measured from the top of the keel, or the length 

from the foreside of the stem to the axis of the rudder stock on that waterline, 

if that be greater. In ships designed with a rake of keel the waterline on which 

this length is measured shall be parallel to the designed waterline. The length 

(L) shall be measured in metres. 

.10 ‘‘Breadth (B)’’ means the maximum breadth of the ship, in metres, measured amidships to the moulded line of the frame in a ship with a metal shell 

and to the outer surface of the hull in a ship with a shell of any other material. 

.11 ‘‘Oil fuel tank’’ means a tank in which oil fuel is carried, but excludes those 

tanks which would not contain oil fuel in normal operation, such as overflow 

tanks. 

.12 ‘‘Small oil fuel tank’’ is an oil fuel tank with a maximum individual capacity not greater than 30 m3. 

.13 ‘‘C’’ is the ship’s total volume of oil fuel, including that of the small oil fuel 

tanks, in m3, at 98 percent tank filling. 

.14 ‘‘Oil fuel capacity’’ means the volume of a tank in m3, at 98 percent filling. 

4 The provisions of this regulation shall apply to all oil fuel tanks except small 

oil fuel tanks, as defined in 3.12, provided that the aggregate capacity of such excluded tanks is not greater than 600 m3. 

5 Individual oil fuel tanks shall not have a capacity of over 2,500 m3. 

6 For ships, other than self-elevating drilling units, having an aggregate oil fuel 

capacity of 600 m3 and above, oil fuel tanks shall be located above the moulded line 

of the bottom shell plating nowhere less than the distance h as specified below: 

h = B/20 m or, 

h = 2.0 m, whichever is the lesser. 

The minimum value of h = 0.76 m 

38 

In the turn of the bilge area and at locations without a clearly defined turn of 

the bilge, the oil fuel tank boundary line shall run parallel to the line of the 

midship flat bottom as shown in Figure 1. 

Figure 1—Oil fuel tank boundary lines for the purpose of paragraph 6 

7 For ships having an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600 m3 or more but less than 

5,000 m3, oil fuel tanks shall be located inboard of the moulded line of the side shell 

plating, nowhere less than the distance w which, as shown in Figure 2, is measured 

at any cross-section at right angles to the side shell, as specified below: 

w = 0.4 + 2.4 C/20,000 m 

The minimum value of w = 1.0 m, however for individual tanks with an oil fuel 

capacity of less than 500 m3 the minimum value is 0.76 m. 

8 For ships having an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 5,000 m3 and over, oil fuel 

tanks shall be located inboard of the moulded line of the side shell plating, nowhere 

less than the distance w which, as shown in Figure 2, is measured at any crosssection at right angles to the side shell, as specified below: 

w = 0.5 + C/20,000 m or 

w = 2.0 m, whichever is the lesser. 

The minimum value of w = 1.0 m 

Figure 2—Oil fuel tank boundary lines for the purpose of paragraphs 7 and 8 


304ANNEX1.eps 304ANNEX2.eps
39 

9 Lines of oil fuel piping located at a distance from the ship’s bottom of less than 

h, as defined in paragraph 6, or from the ship’s side less than w, as defined in paragraphs 7 and 8 shall be fitted with valves or similar closing devices within or immediately adjacent to the oil fuel tank. These valves shall be capable of being brought 

into operation from a readily accessible enclosed space the location of which is accessible from the navigation bridge or propulsion machinery control position without 

traversing exposed freeboard or superstructure decks. The valves shall close in case 

of remote control system failure (fail in a closed position) and shall be kept closed 

at sea at any time when the tank contains oil fuel except that they may be opened 

during oil fuel transfer operations. 

10 Suction wells in oil fuel tanks may protrude into the double bottom below the 

boundary line defined by the distance h provided that such wells are as small as 

practicable and the distance between the well bottom and the bottom shell plating 

is not less than 0.5 h. 

11 Alternatively to paragraphs 6 and either 7 or 8, ships shall comply with the 

accidental oil fuel outflow performance standard specified below: 

.1 The level of protection against oil fuel pollution in the event of collision or 

grounding shall be assessed on the basis of the mean oil outflow parameter as 

follows: 

OM < 0.0157–1.14E–6.

C 600 m3 ≤ C < 5,000 m3

OM < 0.010 C ≥ 5,000 m3

Where OM = mean oil outflow parameter; 

C = total oil fuel volume. 

.2 The following general assumption shall apply when calculating the mean oil 

outflow parameter: 

.1 the ship shall be assumed loaded to the partial load line draught dP

without trim or heel; 

.2 all oil fuel tanks shall be assumed loaded to 98 percent of their volumetric capacity; 

.3 the nominal density of the oil fuel (ρn) shall generally be taken as 1,000 

kg/m3. If the density of the oil fuel is specifically restricted to a lesser value, 

the lesser value may be applied; and 

.4 for the purpose of these outflow calculations, the permeability of each 

oil fuel tank shall be taken as 0.99, unless proven otherwise. 

.3 The following assumptions shall be used when combining the oil outflow parameters: 

.1 The mean oil outflow shall be calculated independently for side damage 

and for bottom damage and then combined into a non-dimensional oil outflow parameter OM, as follows: 

OM = (0.4 OMS + 0.6 OMB)/C 

where: 

OMS = mean outflow for side damage, in m3

OMB = mean outflow for bottom damage, in m3

C = total oil fuel volume. 

.2 For bottom damage, independent calculations for mean outflow shall be 

done for 0 m and 2.5 m tide conditions, and then combined as follows: 

OMB = 0.7 OMB(0) + 0.3 OMB(2.5)

where: 

OMB(0) = mean outflow for 0 m tide condition, and 

OMB(2.5) = mean outflow for minus 2.5 m tide condition, in m3. 

.4 The mean outflow for side damage OMS shall be calculated as follows: 


304MATH1.eps
40 

where: 

i = represents each oil fuel tank under consideration; 

n = total number of oil fuel tanks; 

PS(i) = the probability of penetrating oil fuel tank i from side 

damage, calculated in accordance with paragraph 

11.6 of this regulation; 

OS(i) = the outflow, in m3, from side damage to oil fuel tank 

i, which is assumed equal to the total volume in oil 

fuel tank i at 98 percent filling. 

.5 The mean outflow for bottom damage shall be calculated for each tidal condition as follows: 

.1

where: 

i = represents each oil fuel tank under consideration; 

n = total number of oil fuel tanks; 

PB(i) = the probability of penetrating oil fuel tank i from 

bottom damage, calculated in accordance with 

paragraph 11.7 of this regulation; 

OB(i) = the outflow from oil fuel tank i, in m3, calculated 

in accordance with paragraph 11. 5.3 of this regulation; and 

CDB(i) = factor to account for oil capture as defined in paragraph 11.5.4. 

.2

where: 

i, n, PB(i) and CDB(i) = as defined in subparagraph .1 above 

OB(i) = the outflow from oil fuel tank i, in 

m3, after tidal change. 

.3 The oil outflow OB(i) for each oil fuel tank shall be calculated based on pressure balance principles, in accordance with the following assumptions: 

.1 The ship shall be assumed stranded with zero trim and heel, with the 

stranded draught prior to tidal change equal to the partial load line 

draught dP. 

.2 The oil fuel level after damage shall be calculated as follows: 

hF = {(dP + tC¥Zl)(ρS)}/ρn

where: 

hF = the height of the oil fuel surface above Zl, in m; 

tC = the tidal change, in m. Reductions in tide shall be 

expressed as negative values; 

Zl = the height of the lowest point in the oil fuel tank 

above the baseline, in m; 

ρS = density of seawater, to be taken as 1,025 kg/m3; 

and, 

ρn = nominal density of the oil fuel, as defined in 11.2.3. 

.3 The oil outflow OB(i) for any tank bounding the bottom shell plating 

shall be taken not less than the following formula, but no more than the 

tank capacity: 

OB(i) = HW . A 


304MATH2.eps 304MATH3.eps
41 

where: 

HW = 1.0 m, when YB = 0 

HW = BB/50 but not greater than 0.4 m, when YB is greater 

than BB/5 or 11.5 m, whichever is less 

‘‘HW’’ is to be measured upwards from the midship flat bottom 

line. In the turn of the bilge area and at locations without a 

clearly defined turn of the bilge, HW is to be measured from a 

line parallel to the midship flat bottom, as shown for distance 

‘‘h’’ in Figure 1. 

For YB values outboard BB/5 or 11.5 m, whichever is less, HW is to be 

linearly interpolated. 

YB = the minimum value of YB over the length of the oil 

fuel tank, where at any given location, YB is the 

transverse distance between the side shell at waterline dB and the tank at or below waterline dB. 

A = the maximum horizontal projected area of the oil 

fuel tank up to the level of HW from the bottom of 

the tank. 

Figure 3—Dimensions for calculation of the minimum oil outflow for the purpose of subparagraph 11.5.3.3 

.4 In the case of bottom damage, a portion from the outflow from an oil 

fuel tank may be captured by non-oil compartments. This effect is approximated by application of the factor CDB(i) for each tank, which shall be taken 

as follows: 

CDB(i) = 0.6 for oil fuel tanks bounded from below by 

non-oil compartments; 

CDB(i) = 1 otherwise. 


304ANNEX3.eps
42 

1For symmetrical tank arrangements, damages are considered for one side of the ship only, 

in which case all ‘‘y’’ dimensions are to be measured from that side. For asymmetrical arrangements reference is made to the Explanatory Notes on matters related to the accidental oil outflow performance, adopted by the Organization by resolution MEPC.122(52). 

.6 The probability PS of breaching a compartment from side damage shall be 

calculated as follows: 

.1 PS = PSL . PSV . PST

where: 

PSL = (1¥PSf¥PSa) = probability the damage will extend into 

the longitudinal zone bounded by Xa and Xf; 

PSV = (1¥PSu¥PSl) = probability the damage will extend into 

the vertical zone bounded by Zl and Zu; 

PST = (1¥PSy) = probability the damage will extend transversely beyond the boundary defined by y; 

.2 PSa, PSf, PSu and PSl shall be determined by linear interpolation from 

the table of probabilities for side damage provided in 11.6.3, and PSy shall 

be calculated from the formulas provided in 11.6.3, where: 

PSa = the probability the damage will lie entirely aft of 

location Xa/L; 

PSf = the probability the damage will lie entirely forward of location Xf/L; 

PSl = probability the damage will lie entirely below the 

tank; 

PSu = probability the damage will lie entirely above the 

tank; and 

PSy = probability the damage will lie entirely outboard 

the tank. 

Compartment boundaries Xa, Xf, Zl, Zu and y shall be developed as follows: 

Xa = the longitudinal distance from aft terminal of L to 

the aft most point on the compartment being considered, in m; 

Xf = the longitudinal distance from aft terminal of L to 

the foremost point on the compartment being considered, in m; 

Zl = the vertical distance from the moulded baseline to 

the lowest point on the compartment being considered, in m. Where Zl is greater than DS, Zl shall be 

taken as DS; 

Zu = the vertical distance from the moulded baseline to 

the highest point on the compartment being considered, in m. Where Zu is greater than DS, Zu shall be 

taken as DS; and, 

y = the minimum horizontal distance measured at right 

angles to the centreline between the compartment 

under consideration and the side shell, in m.1

In way of the turn of the bilge, y need not to be considered below a 

distance h above baseline, where h is lesser of B/10, 3 m or the top of 

the tank. 

43 

.3 Table of Probabilities for side damage 

Xa/L PSa Xf/L PSf Zl/DS PSl Zu/DS PSu

0,00 0,000 0,00 0,967 0,00 0,000 0,00 0,968 

0,05 0,023 0,05 0,917 0,05 0,000 0,05 0,952 

0,10 0,068 0,10 0,867 0,10 0,001 0,10 0,931 

0,15 0,117 0,15 0,817 0,15 0,003 0,15 0,905 

0,20 0,167 0,20 0,767 0,20 0,007 0,20 0,873 

0,25 0,217 0,25 0,717 0,25 0,013 0,25 0,836 

0,30 0,267 0,30 0,667 0,30 0,021 0,30 0,789 

0,35 0,317 0,35 0,617 0,35 0,034 0,35 0,733 

0,40 0,367 0,40 0,567 0,40 0,055 0,40 0,670 

0,45 0,417 0,45 0,517 0,45 0,085 0,45 0,599 

0,50 0,467 0,50 0,467 0,50 0,123 0,50 0,525 

0,55 0,517 0,55 0,417 0,55 0,172 0,55 0,452 

0,60 0,567 0,60 0,367 0,60 0,226 0,60 0,383 

0,65 0,617 0,65 0,317 0,65 0,285 0,65 0,317 

0,70 0,667 0,70 0,267 0,70 0,347 0,70 0,255 

0,75 0,717 0,75 0,217 0,75 0,413 0,75 0,197 

0,80 0,767 0,80 0,167 0,80 0,482 0,80 0,143 

0,85 0,817 0,85 0,117 0,85 0,553 0,85 0,092 

0,90 0,867 0,90 0,068 0,90 0,626 0,90 0,046 

0,95 0,917 0,95 0,023 0,95 0,700 0,95 0,013 

1,00 0,967 1,00 0,000 1,00 0,775 1,00 0,000 

PSy shall be calculated as follows: 

PSy = (24.96¥199.6 y/BS) (y/BS) for y/BS ≤ 0.05 

PSy = 0.749 + {5¥44.4 (y/BS¥0.05)} {(y/BS)¥0.05} for 0.05 < y/BS < 0.1 

PSy = 0.888 + 0.56 (y/BS¥0.1) for y/BS ≤ 0.1 

PSy is not to be taken greater than 1. 

.7 The probability PB of breaching a compartment from bottom damage shall 

be calculated as follows: 

.1 PB = PBL . PBT . PBV

where: 

PBL = (1¥PBf¥PBa) = probability the damage will extend into 

the longitudinal zone bounded by Xa and Xf; 

PBT = (1¥PBp¥PBs) = probability the damage will extend into 

transverse zone bounded by Yp and Ys; and 

PBV = (1¥PBz) = probability the damage will extend vertically 

above the boundary defined by z; 

.2 PBa, PBf, PBp and PBs shall be determined by linear interpolation from 

the table of probabilities for bottom damage provided in 11.7.3, and PBz 

shall be calculated from the formulas provided in 11.7.3, where: 

PBa = the probability the damage will lie entirely aft of location Xa/L; 

PBf = the probability the damage will lie entirely forward 

of location Xf/L; 

PBp = probability the damage will lie entirely to port of the 

tank; 

PBs = probability the damage will lie entirely to starboard 

the tank; and 

PBz = probability the damage will lie entirely below the 

tank. 

44 

Compartment boundaries Xa, Xf, Yp, YS and z shall be developed as follows: 

Xa and Xf as defined in 11.6.2; 

Yp = the transverse distance from the port-most point on 

the compartment located at or below the waterline 

dB, to a vertical plane located BB/2 to starboard of 

the ship’s centreline; 

YS = the transverse distance from the starboard-most 

point on the compartment located at or below the 

waterline dB, to a vertical plane located BB/2 to starboard of the ship’s centreline; and 

z = the minimum value of z over the length of the compartment, where, at any given longitudinal location, 

z is the vertical distance from the lower point of the 

bottom shell at that longitudinal location to the 

lower point of the compartment at that longitudinal 

location. 

.3 Table of probabilities for bottom damage 

Xa/L PBa Xf/L PBf Yp/BB PBp Ys/BB PBs

0,00 0,000 0,00 0,969 0,00 0,844 0,00 0,000 

0,05 0,002 0,05 0,953 0,05 0,794 0,05 0,009 

0,10 0,008 0,10 0,936 0,10 0,744 0,10 0,032 

0,15 0,017 0,15 0,916 0,15 0,694 0,15 0,063 

0,20 0,029 0,20 0,894 0,20 0,644 0,20 0,097 

0,25 0,042 0,25 0,870 0,25 0,594 0,25 0,133 

0,30 0,058 0,30 0,842 0,30 0,544 0,30 0,171 

0,35 0,076 0,35 0,810 0,35 0,494 0,35 0,211 

0,40 0,096 0,40 0,775 0,40 0,444 0,40 0,253 

0,45 0,119 0,45 0,734 0,45 0,394 0,45 0,297 

0,50 0,143 0,50 0,687 0,50 0,344 0,50 0,344 

0,55 0,171 0,55 0,630 0,55 0,297 0,55 0,394 

0,60 0,203 0,60 0,563 0,60 0,253 0,60 0,444 

0,65 0,242 0,65 0,489 0,65 0,211 0,65 0,494 

0,70 0,289 0,70 0,413 0,70 0,171 0,70 0,544 

0,75 0,344 0,75 0,333 0,75 0,133 0,75 0,594 

0,80 0,409 0,80 0,252 0,80 0,097 0,80 0,644 

0,85 0,482 0,85 0,170 0,85 0,063 0,85 0,694 

0,90 0,565 0,90 0,089 0,90 0,032 0,90 0,744 

0,95 0,658 0,95 0,026 0,95 0,009 0,95 0,794 

1,00 0,761 1,00 0,000 1,00 0,000 1,00 0,844 

PBz shall be calculated as follows: 

PBz = (14.5¥67 z/DS) (z/DS) for z/DS ≤ 0.1 

PBz = 0.78 + 1.1 {(z/DS –0.1)} for z/DS > 0.1 

PBz is not to be taken greater than 1. 

.8 For the purpose of maintenance and inspection, any oil fuel tanks that 

do not border the outer shell plating shall be located no closer to the bottom 

shell plating than the minimum value of h in paragraph 6 and no closer 

to the side shell plating than the applicable minimum value of w in paragraph 7 or 8. 

12 In approving the design and construction of ships to be built in accordance 

with this regulation, Administrations shall have due regard to the general safety 

aspects, including the need for maintenance and inspection of wing and double bottom tanks or spaces.’’ 

45 

3 Consequential amendments to the Supplement of the IOPP Certificate 

(Forms A and B) 

The following new paragraph 2A is added to the Supplement of the IOPP Certificate (Forms A and B): 

‘‘2A.1 The ship is required to be constructed according to regulation 12A and 

complies with the requirements of: 

paragraphs 6 and either 7 or 8 (double hull construction) b 

paragraph 11 (accidental oil fuel outflow performance). b 

2A.2 The ship is not required to comply with the requirements of regulation 

12A. b’’ 

4 Amendments to regulation 21 

The text of existing paragraph 2.2 of regulation 21 on Prevention of oil pollution 

from oil tankers carrying heavy grade oil as cargo is replaced by the following: 

‘‘oils, other than crude oils, having either a density at 15 °C higher than 900 

kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at 50 °C higher than 180 mm2/s; or’’ 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. Thank all of you. 

I want to ask Mr. Kirchner—what’s the process of becoming a 

State pilot? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Each state has its own system for selecting people to become trainees to become a state pilot. I can describe the 

situation in New Jersey as a representative example. 

The system in New Jersey is conducted and administered by the 

New Jersey Pilot Commission. That’s 6 individuals who are appointed by the Governor, all of whom are required to have some 

kind of a maritime background. None of whom are allowed to have 

any connection or interest in a pilotage operation. 

Every 2 years, they advertise in trade publications, they go to the 

maritime schools, and they solicit applications. Those applications 

are received, they’re reviewed to make sure that the individuals 

comply with the prerequisites for the system—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks—I just wanted to get an outline of 

the fact that states have their own organizations, because in our 

harbor, and harbors in New Jersey, the Sandy Hook Pilots Association, and I don’t know whether they are represented by the 6 people who are appointed by the State of New Jersey. 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Right. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are the waters covered, are there overlapping organizations? Is there a New Jersey Pilots Association, 

Sandy Hook, and New York Pilots Association? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. In the Port of New York, there is a New York 

Pilot Commission, and a New Jersey Pilot Commission. There is a 

New York/Sandy Hook Pilot Association, and a New Jersey/Sandy 

Hook Pilot Association—they work together. The two pilot associations work out of the same office, and so the pilotage there is 

shared between the two states. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And so it’s just one after the other? Because the waters are—awfully close in those harbors, and I’m just 

curious as to who makes the decision, and these are private organizations, is this right? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Right, Senator. 

The two associations maintain a joint rotation system, so whichever pilot is first on-turn when a ship arrives—whether it’s a New 

York or a New Jersey pilot—will handle that ship, no matter where 

it goes in the Port of New York. 

46 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because I’m an Honorary Pilot Member of 

the Sandy Hook Pilots Association. 

Mr. KIRCHNER. That’s what I understand. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And so far, I haven’t gotten my call. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But I want to ask you this about the license that was surrendered to the Coast Guard. This was the pilot 

from the COSCO BUSAN. He surrendered his license, the action 

was taken in response to a notification from the Coast Guard that 

it determined he’s not medically fit for the duties of a pilot, based 

on information that he previously disclosed, in connection with the 

Coast Guard’s normal medical review program for pilots and other 

mariners. 

Now, why would the Coast Guard issue a license to someone unqualified? Do you have an answer? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Senator, I don’t know. He disclosed his medical 

conditions. The Coast Guard has told me that what it was looking 

at to make the determination in December was information that it 

had had for a number of years. So, because of changes in the process, I guess they caught whatever it is they felt was a problem, 

which they were not able to catch earlier. 

But, I don’t know exactly what the medical condition is that’s the 

basis for that action. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. No, but how can we improve the process 

by which pilots are licensed by the Coast Guard? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Well, with the medical review program, as the 

Commandant said, that’s undergoing a complete top to bottom revision, we’ve been working, and the rest of the maritime community 

has been working, with the Coast Guard to try and develop a process that makes sense, that gives the Coast Guard the information 

they need, but also is a program that the Coast Guard has the resources to administer. And that’s the real challenge there. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So, will the Coast Guard have final say— 

regardless of which pilot association it is—to approve or veto an application, in your judgment? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Of the pilot’s Federal license, yes, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. 

Dr. Tikka, are current ship designs adequate to protect against 

fuel oil spills? Or do we have to move to a new international standard to protects ourselves? 

Dr. TIKKA. Well, the international standard that has been adopted by IMO provides additional protection to the fuel oil tanks, so 

it is a change to the current design requirements. Whether the current designs are adequate or not, that really is more of a policy 

question than a design question. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, how quickly are other countries moving to a standard that requires this protective layer, double hull, 

around their fuel tanks? 

Dr. TIKKA. Well, the international—the IMO Requirement 12A is 

applicable to vessels with a contract signed on or after 1 August 

2007 or for vessels that are delivered after 1 August 2010. So, this 

is the time schedule that the member States of the IMO are subject 

to. 

47 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You heard me raise the question about 

stability—if the fuel tanks are on the upper level of the vessel, are 

there any stability issues? Or what weight offset do they have to 

put into other areas of the vessel? 

Dr. TIKKA. Right, if the fuel oil tanks are at the, say, in the 

upper wing tanks or in deep tanks, it has to be taken into account 

in the design of the vessel from the stability point of view, but it’s 

nothing that could not be handled from a design point of view. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. From a design point of view. 

Dr. TIKKA. And operational point of view, if I may add. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I just wonder whether the use of ballast, 

or otherwise, is needed to offset these? 

Dr. TIKKA. Mr. Chairman, that depends on the vessel type. On 

container ships, if—again, depending on the size of the container 

ships, it will probably require some use of ballast to compensate for 

the higher center of gravity of the fuel oil tanks. But, it is a very 

design-specific question. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Captain Page, what fees do you charge to 

the private sector to subscribe to your VTS? 

Captain PAGE. There’s a variety of rates there, Mr. Chairman. In 

some cases, vessels pay the equivalent of a latte a day, or $3 a day, 

to track anywhere in the world, every few hours. And that would 

also include AIS data when they come closer to shore. 

In some cases, it may be a port that needs to see all of the vessels, and they might pay $100 a month. The Coast Guard even 

pays, in some areas, for access to our system, so they can see vessels. Because about 50 percent of our sites around the country have 

coverage that the Coast Guard doesn’t. 

So, there’s a variety of pricing schemes, depending on how many 

people use it, much like a cable TV service—how many people are 

going to see it. And ultimately, we’re all non-profit maritime organizations, we’re just trying to cover our operating costs, and make 

it fair that those who use it the most, pay a higher percentage. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Tell me something, would the average 

speed of a ship—if you go out 2,000 miles, you’re talking about a 

fair amount of time before that ship hits our waters, or comes into 

our ports and harbors—what’s the value there? 

Captain PAGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, we use this right now, for instance, on tankers and cruise ships and ferries, no matter where 

they are—if there’s a situation that they might get in distress, you 

can quickly find them, and other vessels that can render assistance. 

We can also see anomalies in vessels’ transits. If a vessel is disabled, such as the SELENDANG AYU, off the coast of Alaska, that 

elected to wait about 24 hours before they called the Coast Guard 

and said they were in trouble—which was too late. In this case, led 

to the vessel running aground, and a helicopter crashing in the 

process of rescue, and what have you. 

So, it gives you early notification of a problem waiting—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. 

Captain PAGE. Instead of waiting to extremis. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It sounds like a great idea, but I was just 

trying to figure out what value there is to be sizing up a ship that 

48 

might be 5 days off the coast. But it’s certainly good and you can 

see emergencies, et cetera. 

Captain PAGE. It also has security connotations. We can tell—we 

can see a vessel’s voyage for the last year, we can tell you which 

ports they called on, to see if it’s a port we’re concerned with, and 

we also can see if there’s any anomalies in transit from the Far 

East—was it really their last port of call since Singapore? Or did 

they stop somewhere else? Or did they stop in the ocean for a couple of days? So, it really validates that the vessel coming to our 

shores has a unremarkable voyage. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So, but that’s data that is available to anyone operating a system, it would not just be the United States, it 

could be the U.K. in the same distance, when we’re talking about 

2,000 miles. 

Captain PAGE. It depends which system your using. Right 

now—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. General—— 

Captain PAGE. Sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. General information that’s using. 

Thanks very much. 

We’re joined by Senator Klobuchar. Now, her sea is an important 

body of water, but it’s much too big to be called a lake, I think. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I think so, you can’t see across it. 

Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg. 

Well, what he didn’t tell you, on another Subcommittee I’m on, 

the Oceans Subcommittee, when I went to my first meeting—OK, 

maybe it wasn’t my first choice—but I went to the first meeting 

and I looked around the room, and I saw Olympia Snowe, and 

Trent Lott and John Kerry, and I wrote a note, actually, it was one 

of my first weeks on the job, to Senator Lautenberg, and I said, 

‘‘Everyone on this Subcommittee has an ocean, except me.’’ 

And Senator Lautenberg wrote back and said, ‘‘Well, next year, 

just come back and ask for one.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. But in any case, I actually have been pleasantly surprised to find out that the Oceans Subcommittee—which 

we’re not on today—covers the Great Lakes. And so, I’ve become 

the voice of the Great Lakes on the Committee. 

And I just wanted to thank you all for coming today, as many 

of my colleagues have alluded to, we are almost 20 years removed 

from the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill that irreparably harmed the 

pristine environment in the Prince William Sound, but 2 decades 

later, that incident still is very much with us—whether it’s with 

the environmental repercussions or with the legal case that’s still 

pending, which actually, the fishermen were represented by a Minnesota law firm, so we hear about it more than you would think 

in Minnesota. 

And I’m pleased that the Coast Guard is in the process of developing new strategies, I met with the Admiral yesterday, to minimize the frequency and environmental fallout from oil spills of nontanker vessels. But, I think that Congressional action may be necVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\80089.TXT JACKIE
49 

essary to build upon the successful maritime safety legislation 

passed in the last 20 years. 

And, again, from a Minnesota standpoint, the dangers are not 

isolated to oceans. While the Great Lakes have been fortunate to 

escape a significant spill, a large cargo ship run aground could 

wreak havoc on the contained environment of the Great Lakes. And 

so, my interest from a state point of view lies with that. 

Mr. Kirchner, I heard about half of your testimony, I had another 

meeting, and I wanted to commend the American Pilots’ Association for its role in promoting maritime safety. 

But there was one issue in your written testimony—that I wanted to explore more, where you discuss the proposals that would require pilots to carry aboard portable piloting units, laptop computers that provide electronic navigation programs. 

I think in your testimony—I don’t want to misstate it—but you 

said you don’t want those requirements, because you think the 

portable piloting units should be voluntary. Among the reason you 

cite are that the units may not be necessary, or provide any benefits, and that there could be problems. 

And I understand, clearly, that the piloting is a human task. But 

I wondered why we wouldn’t be doing everything we can to promote the use of technologically-assisted instruments. 

So, could you talk about what your views are on this and why 

you wouldn’t see that as something we should require? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. The use of portable piloting equipment is a very 

important program that’s been under development for the last 20 

years in the U.S. We are strong believers in the value of those, but 

they’re not for every place. There are some types of piloting assignments, and some type of operations where they wouldn’t help, and 

in fact, they could be a distraction, they could create a problem. 

So, it’s really up to the local pilotage authorities, working with 

the pilots, to make that determination on a local level. And even 

where portable units are used, they are much different from one 

place to the other. The pilot units that are used on the Columbia 

River in Oregon, for example, are much different than the ones 

that are used on the Delaware River. 

So, we are wary of a national or a Federal standard or some type 

of a national program that would not be able to take into account 

the local variations. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And now, if you don’t support a mandate, 

do you think there are other initiatives that you’d support to try 

to encourage the use of the these kind of units? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. Well, we mentioned, it’s important to have the 

AIS and DGPS infrastructure maintained. The units rely on those 

items, and that would be a big help. 

Units are used by our pilots in the Great Lakes, for example, and 

frankly, we had some difficulty getting the Coast Guard to accept 

them, or to recognize them, and to include the costs in the rate 

base. 

So, anyplace—well, all pilotage fees are regulated—so that we 

would encourage all of the entities that regulate the rates to include money in the rates to pay for the units. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. 

50 

You’ve also spoken strongly in favor of maintaining the system 

of State regulation of pilot certification and licensing. The Federal 

pilot license is currently the bare minimum standard, and would 

you support efforts to increase the Federal standards for a pilot license, while not infringing on the individual states’ authority? 

Mr. KIRCHNER. I can’t imagine a particular type of increase or 

raising of standards that we would oppose. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK, thank you. 

Doctor, Senator Lautenberg talked to you about the technology 

with the ships and I know that the double-hull technology has 

proven effective in reducing oil spills by tankers, and should 

produce similar results for non-tankers. 

Do you believe that this is the final solution for minimizing the 

incidents of oil spills? Or do you think that there is other ship technology changes that would reduce oil spills even further? 

Dr. TIKKA. That’s a difficult question to answer. Well, we all— 

certainly we always hope that there is progress in technology that 

further improves the performance of the vessels. So, I wouldn’t like 

to rule these new regulations to be the final say. 

But, immediately doesn’t—nothing comes to mind that I would 

say that there is some development ongoing from a design point of 

view that would increase the environmental performance of tankers, but of course there are a lot of, also, operational aspects that 

have to be considered from an environmental performance point of 

view. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Captain Page, speaking of technology, the 

Marine Exchange’s use of the Vessel Traffic Services and Automatic Identification System shows how technology can help with 

maritime safety. Do you believe we should be doing more to promote the use of that technology, to help manage busy ports and 

harbors, and do you believe the Coast Guard should assume a 

greater responsibility for managing shipping traffic? 

Captain PAGE. Well, I do believe that we need to move further 

on the application of technology. You could look at some areas 

around the country where they push very, very hard these technologies as a force multiplier to improve maritime safety, and it’s 

used by pilots to get a virtual bridge team, in some areas, where 

they add another person, virtually, on the bridge during fog conditions, what have you. 

So, I think the marine industry has a big role in that, and I 

think that the Coast Guard needs to foster, and promote, and work 

closely with the maritime industry, and take advantage of these existing technologies, and promote them further. It’s one of the several pieces that need to be done. Certainly, there’s the design aspect of ships, there’s a human factor—the pilots—and then there’s 

a technological solution. And all three of those need to be moving 

forward, I believe, if we want to reduce risk of oil spills and other 

disasters. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Do any of the other two of you have anything more you want to 

add in answer to my questions? I’ll give you that opportunity. 

[No response.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. All right. Thank you very much. 

51 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And with that, I call the meeting of this 

Subcommittee to a close, and I note that the record will be open 

for 5 days so that other Members may submit questions for any of 

you that have appeared this day. 

Thank you for your excellent testimony and patience in our getting to you, but we’re glad to see you. 

Captain PAGE. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. TIKKA. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN

Question. The new draft rules for tug escort of tankers reduces by 97 percent the 

number of days of training required for operators. How does this comport with the 

Coast Guard’s promise to strengthen oil spill prevention measures, especially in lowvisibility situations? Why is Coast Guard considering rulemaking to cut the training 

for tugboat pilots from 30 months to 30 days? 

Answer. There has been no suggestion that the sea service required to obtain 

mate (pilot) of towing vessels should be reduced to 30 days, and the Coast Guard 

is not contemplating a reduction of the sea service for this license. 

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published on September 17, 2007, 

proposes that in order to obtain a mate (pilot) of towing vessels license, the alternate progression candidate needs a total of 36 months of service as master of steam 

or motor vessels not more than (NMT) 200 GRT, i.e., any tonnage master of steam 

or motor vessels license not exceeding 200 GRT. This is in addition to the sea service required to obtain the underlying master NMT 200 GRT license, which is at 

least 12–36 months, depending on the specific type of NMT 200 GRT master license 

held. To obtain a mate (pilot) of towing vessels license under the proposed alternate 

progression, this represents a total of 4–6 years of sea service, at least 3 years of 

which must be as a master of a NMT 200 GRT vessel, depending on the specific 

type of NMT 200 GRT master license held. 

Alternate progression candidates must also complete a Towing Officer Assessment 

Record (TOAR) or approved course in lieu of TOAR, pass an examination, and complete at least 30 days training and observation on towing vessels in order to obtain 

a mate (pilot) of towing vessels license. 

Æ