1 

Filed 6/16/15 City of Roseville v. Zisk CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Placer) 

CITY OF ROSEVILLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JOHN WILLIAM ZISK, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C073496 

(Super. Ct. No. 

S-CV-0032376) 

 Defendant John William Zisk appeals from an order granting a workplace violence 

restraining order to the City of Roseville (City) on behalf of its city manager, Ray 

Kerridge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8.)1 Zisk contends that there is insufficient evidence 

that he made a credible threat of violence, and the injunction impermissibly burdens his 

rights to petition government for redress of grievances and travel under the federal and 

state Constitutions. We shall affirm the order. 

 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
2 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 For the past four decades, Zisk and his parents (now deceased) have been in a 

dispute with the City over certain real property. 

 On January 3, 2013, Zisk sent a two-page, single-spaced e-mail to Kerridge 

expressing his extreme frustration over the City’s failure to respond to a list of complaints 

Zisk had provided to Kerridge and a purported offer by Kerridge to mediate that was 

subsequently revoked. After listing dozens of issues and actions by the City, many of 

which Zisk claimed were “beyond criminal,” Zisk stated: “This is very ugly and will lead 

to more national attention than recent school shootings. Please do not force me down 

this messy path that may consume more lives.” (Italics added.) 

 On January 16, 2013, the City initiated the instant action to obtain a temporary 

restraining order and injunction on behalf of Kerridge, alleging that Zisk made a credible 

threat of violence against Kerridge that would place a reasonable person in fear for his 

safety. The City submitted Kerridge’s declaration in support of its petition. In his 

declaration, Kerridge explained that Zisk “has been involved in a longstanding battle 

against the City that began with his father – now deceased – regarding the City’s 

acquisition of certain real property interests at or near 205 Thomas Street in Roseville, 

California . . . .” Zisk told Kerridge that he believes that the City is responsible for the 

deaths of his parents. Kerridge understood Zisk’s reference to “ ‘recent school 

shootings’ ” in the January 3, 2013, e-mail to “refer to the mass shooting at the Sandy 

Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut on December 14, 2012” and 

“considered his language to be very threatening.” 

 Kerridge read e-mails Zisk sent to other City officials that contained what he 

considered to be “threatening language.” He reviewed an e-mail Zisk sent to Assistant 

Planning Director Kevin Payne in May 2009, in which Zisk stated: “if they [(City 

officials)] are patronizing me, they are messing with the wrong person,” and “[i]f my life 

must end, it will not end like my parents. My children will not have this legacy. My 
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methods will be different. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Please do not force me to do what we both 

will lose at.” Kerridge also reviewed an e-mail Zisk sent to then councilwoman Susan 

Rohan in August 2011, in which he stated: “Silence and stonewalling will not work 

anymore. Cannot take much more. Please help me understand before a war occurs.” 

 Kerridge also was aware of an encounter between Assistant City Manager John 

Sprague and Zisk at Costco in April 2010, which Sprague summarized in an e-mail to 

Zisk. Among other things, Zisk told Sprague about an attorney who did not represent 

Zisk’s father in a professional manner and stated that if he had been treated in this 

manner, he would have probably shot the attorney. While Sprague did not feel threatened 

by Zisk, he said that Zisk “is very angry toward the City and very focused on trying to 

right what he believes are wrongs committed against his father, mother and family by the 

City of Roseville.” 

 On January 17, 2013, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order which, 

among other things, prohibited Zisk from contacting Kerridge “directly or indirectly, by 

any means” and required Zisk stay at least 150 yards away from Kerridge and Kerridge’s 

workplace (Roseville City Hall). 

 On January 30, 2013, Zisk filed his response to the petition, in which he denied 

doing the things described therein. Zisk submitted a declaration in support of his 

response. In his declaration, Zisk claimed that Kerridge and City officials had “used 

statements in my e-mails to manufacture ‘credible evidence of a threat of violence’ ” and 

“simply want to avoid their duties as public officials to listen to and attempt to address 

the concerns and inquiries of a citizen of the community of Roseville.” He indicated that 

he is not a violent person and had no intention of carrying out any alleged threats. He 

summarized the long standing issues between himself and his family on the one hand, 

and the City on the other, and stated that he was on friendly terms with the recipients of 

the various e-mails referenced in Kerridge’s declaration. He denied ever stating that he 

would shoot someone, explaining that he was referring to his father and not himself when 
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speaking to Sprague at Costco. He said that his reference to “ ‘national attention’ . . . was 

taken completely out of context” and that his reference to “ ‘school shootings’ was in 

connection with my assertion that my plight would lead to national attention, not to any 

threatened violence by me.” 

 Prior to the hearing on the petition, the City submitted the declaration of Michael 

Doane, a lieutenant with the Roseville Police Department, in support of its petition. One 

of Doane’s primary responsibilities is overseeing the City’s critical incident negotiations 

team, which “assess[es] threats in all critical incidents involving people in distress and 

crisis situations.” He reviewed various e-mails sent by Zisk “to determine whether the 

statements [contained therein] constitute a credible threat of violence to City employees.” 

In addition to the e-mails referenced in Kerridge’s declaration, Doane reviewed an e-mail 

sent by Zisk to City Bikeway Planner Mike Dour, in which Zisk explained that his father 

“submitted truthful information and gave his concerns [regarding a bike trail] for over 35 

years until it took his life. . . . For a caring, credible, man like my father whom told 

nothing but truth, his respect, character, and admiration were taken advantage of. I have 

lived this since I was 9 years of age. My methods will be different.” Doane also 

reviewed an e-mail Zisk sent to Placer County Flood Control and Water Conservation 

District employee Carrie Diller in October 2009, concerning a flood study, which stated 

in part: “People do wrong and say they are just doing their job even if it kills someone 

else. I hear it every day. This is wrong. People have a choice. Please be part of the truth 

so this does not kill me too. And then my children.” Based on his training and 

experience, Doane opined that the statements contained in the e-mails he reviewed 

“constitute a credible threat of violence and there is valid reason for concern.” He 

reasoned that Zisk’s “stress points appear to have progressed and worsened as they relate 

to his anger towards the City,” and that his belief that the City is responsible for the death 

of his parents “is leading him to make statements that are gradually becoming more 

threatening and violent.” 
5 

On February 11, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the City’s petition. The 

City submitted the matter on the pleadings, including the declarations of Kerridge and 

Doane. Zisk testified on his own behalf. He explained that a portion of his family’s 

property was “taken by a Condemnation Judgment many years ago.” After taking the 

property, the City failed to use it for many years, which upset Zisk. The City eventually 

constructed a bike trail through the property, but according to Zisk, the trail also “crosses 

. . . [Zisk’s] property which was not subject to the condemnation suit.” While Zisk was 

upset, he denied making any threats of violence or intending to cause harm to anyone. 

More particularly, he denied that he intended to imply in his e-mails that he was going to 

use violence or cause harm to anyone. When asked what he meant when he said, “My 

methods will be different,” he explained that “[t]he questions that [his father] presented to 

the City [were] . . . never . . . answered. And they have never followed any due process. 

I am asking those same questions and I’m not getting anywhere. So I planned on 

bringing it to the people, to the media, to higher authorities per se.” As for his dealings 

with Kerridge, he stated that he has only met him twice, both times at Kerridge’s request. 

They met eight or nine months before the hearing in Kerridge’s office and again a month 

later at Zisk’s property, where Zisk “showed him the issues.” The meeting at the Zisk’s 

property was “very . . . pleasant,” and before Kerridge left, he told Zisk, “John, we’re 

getting old. Get me that list.” Thereafter, Zisk supplied Kerridge with a list of 40 to 50 

items, but Kerridge never responded. 

 On cross-examination, Zisk said that he was aware that children had been shot and 

killed at an elementary school in December 2012. He heard about it on the news, 

although he did not know where it was. He also heard of similar shootings in New York, 

Virginia, and Los Angeles. He acknowledged sending the January 3, 2013, e-mail to 

Kerridge, which stated: “This is very ugly and will lead to more national attention than 

recent school shootings. Please do not force me down this messy path that may consume 

more lives.” 
6 

 On redirect, Zisk explained, “When I said [t]his is ugly, the word this refers to the 

paragraph prior. There are hundreds of issues within that, and I am trying to simplify it 

with [Kerridge], which is what I had a meeting with Mayor Roccucci about . . . just prior 

to meeting with [Kerridge]. [¶] The [c]onsume more lives, as I said, with my father and 

mother, we’ve lived this for so many years, and I saw it consume their lives. And I was 

talking about my life. [¶] And the e-mail that I sent to [Kerridge] actually states that as 

Item No. One, [c]onsume my life. And [Kerridge] knew that. And I stated that to him on 

the property, so he understood that very well.” When Zisk referred to the “recent school 

shootings,” he did not mean that he was going to do anything like that, explaining, “I was 

stating that I was going to reach national attention. I did not want to tell them the 

direction I was going. But I’ve seen my mother and father and the City battle in the 

courts. If it needs to go there and if I could afford a million dollars to hire a law firm to 

do so, I might try that again. [¶] But I care about my kids. And I made a decision to 

help them through school and not take this to the Court. So I’m pushing for an 

investigation.” 

 The trial court took the matter under submission until later that morning, at which 

time it read its decision into the record. The court acknowledged that “[t]he right of 

people to petition for redress of grievances is a central and vital part of our representative 

democracy” but found that “statements such as those that [Zisk] has made do not have a 

legitimate purpose. They have no purpose except to frighten the hearers.” With respect 

to Zisk’s testimony that he did not intend to threaten Kerridge or anyone else, the court 

observed that “[a] willful intent to frighten is not one of the elements of the Statute.” The 

court “determine[d] that the conduct that is attributed to . . . Zisk in the Petition does in 

fact constitute by clear and convincing evidence [an] actionable threat of workplace 

violence under Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.8.” Accordingly, the court issued an 

order granting an injunction against Zisk on behalf of Kerridge. In relevant part, the 

order prohibits Zisk from doing the following things to Kerridge: (1) harass, molest, 
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assault, or disturb the peace of the person; (2) commit acts of violence or make threats of 

violence against the person; (3) follow or stalk the person during work hours or while 

going to or from the place of work; (4) contact the person, directly or indirectly, by any

means; (5) enter the person’s workplace; and (6) take any action to obtain the person’s 

addresses or locations. It also requires Zisk stay at least 150 yards away from Kerridge 

and Kerridge’s workplace, namely Roseville City Hall, located at 311 Vernon Street, 

Roseville. “Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or a process server or other person 

for service of legal papers related to a court case is allowed and does not violate the[e] 

order.” The restrictions placed on Zisk expire three years after the date of issuance.2

DISCUSSION 

 Section 527.8 “authorize[s] any employer to pursue . . . an injunction on behalf of 

its employees to prevent threats or acts of violence by either another employee or third 

person.” (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 333 (Scripps).) It 

provides in relevant part: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful 

violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be 

construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a 

temporary restraining order and an injunction on behalf of the employee . . . .” (§ 527.8, 

subd. (a).) If there is good cause to grant the petition, the court must hold a hearing and 

“receive any testimony that is relevant and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.8, 

subd. (j); see § 527.8, subd. (h).) “If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the [defendant] engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence, 

an injunction shall issue prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence.” 

(§ 527.8, subd. (j).) A section 527.8 protective order must be limited to a three-year 

 

2 The City incorrectly states that “[t]he injunction issued applies to Kerridge and other 

City employees.” The sole “employee (protected person)” identified in the order is 

Kerridge. No “additional protected persons” are listed. 
8 

period and cannot be issued if it “prohibit[s] speech or other activities that are 

constitutionally protected . . . .” (§ 527.8, subds. (c), (k)(1).) 

 On appeal, the appropriate test is whether the findings (express and implied) that 

support the trial court’s entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence. 

(R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) However, whether the facts, as found 

by the trial court, are legally sufficient to constitute a “credible threat of violence” under 

section 527.8, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, are subject 

to independent review. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634; DVD Copy Control 

Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 890.) 

I 

Zisk’s Statements Which Referenced “Recent School Shootings” and the Possible 

“Consum[ption] [of] More Lives” Constituted a Credible Threat of Violence Under 

Section 527.8 

 Zisk claims that “no reasonable person” would believe his references to “recent 

school shootings” and the “consum[ption] [of] more lives” were anything but “obvious 

hyperbole,” and that such protected comments could not be used as evidence to support 

the issuance of a restraining order. We disagree. 

 As previously noted, a “ ‘[c]redible threat of violence’ is a knowing and willful 

statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her 

safety . . . and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) “[I]n 

determining whether a threat occurred, the entire factual context, including the 

surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners, must be considered.” (People v. 

Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 298.) The defendant’s subjective intent is “not 

required for his conduct to be deemed a credible threat. . . . [There is no] requirement 

that the defendant intend to cause the person to believe that he or she had been threatened 

with death or serious injury. It . . . requires only a statement made knowingly and 

willfully, which would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety. 
9 

[Citations.]” (City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 538-539 

(Garbett).) 

 Applying these legal principles, we conclude that Zisk’s statements amounted to a 

credible threat of violence. Zisk told Kerridge: “This is very ugly and will lead to more 

national attention than the recent school shootings. Please do not force me down this 

messy path that may consume more lives.” These statements were made three weeks 

after the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School, which garnered national attention. 

Zisk claimed that his reference to “ ‘school shootings’ was in connection with [his] 

assertion that [his] plight would lead to national attention, not to any threatened violence 

by [him],” but his claim begs the question, how did he intend to obtain national attention 

other than by committing an act of violence akin to the recent school shootings? 

Moreover, Zisk’s subjective intent is irrelevant. (See Garbett, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 338-339.) The salient question is whether Zisk’s statements were sufficient to “place 

a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety . . . and . . . serve[] no legitimate 

purpose.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).) The answer is yes. As we noted in Brekke v. Wills

(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1413, “[I]n our post-Columbine High School world, 

fantastical threats that once were taken lightly as fancies of immature youth now cause 

reasonable persons to pause and even to become fearful.” Considering the timing of the 

statements and the entire factual context, including Zisk’s decades-long dispute with the 

City and growing frustration as evidenced in his communications with other City 

officials, we have no trouble concluding that Zisk’s statements constituted a credible 

threat of violence within the meaning of section 527.8.3

 

3 Zisk complains that “[t]he City included only selected portions of the series of emails 

between [himself] and the City Manager’s offices.” We note that copies of all e-mails 

relied on by the City were part of the record below, and the trial court indicated that it 

had “read and considered the materials provided by the City,” including the e-mails. We, 

too, have reviewed the e-mails in their entirety. 
10 

 Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Watts v. United States 

(1969) 394 U.S. 705 [22 L.Ed.2d 664] (Watts), Zisk argues that “no reasonable person 

can be expected to believe that [his] comment in the e-mail [to Kerridge] could be 

anything but hyperbole.” In Watts, the defendant was at public rally on the Washington 

Monument grounds, during the time of the Vietnam War, when he stated that he had just 

received his draft notice to report for induction, declared he would not go, and said that 

“ ‘If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.’ ” 

His listeners laughed. (Id. at pp. 706-707.) Reversing the defendant’s conviction for 

threatening the life of the President, the United States Supreme Court said that the 

defendant’s speech, considered in context, was “political hyperbole” rather than a “true 

‘threat’ ” and was therefore constitutionally protected. (Id. at p. 708.) 

 The circumstances here differ from those in Watts. Unlike Watts, which involved 

a threat against the President of the United States made during a public political rally 

opposing the Vietnam War, Zisk’s statements were directed to a City official in a private 

communication with the intent to obtain of settlement of ongoing issues between himself 

and the City. For the reasons previously discussed, a reasonable person could understand 

Zisk’s statements as a credible threat and not mere political hyperbole. 

II 

The Injunction Does Not Impermissibly Infringe Upon Zisk’s Constitutional Rights 

 Zisk contends his rights to petition the government for redress of grievances and to 

travel are impermissibly abrogated by the trial court’s order. Again, we disagree. 

 As the trial court acknowledged, the right to petition for redress of grievances is a 

“ ‘fundamental’ ” first amendment right. (Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, 

406). “A content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it 

advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech 

and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. 

[Citation.]” (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1997) 520 U.S. 180, 189 [137 
11 

L.Ed.2d 369].) Here, the government has an important interest in preventing workplace 

violence. (Scripps, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.) Nor does the injunction burden 

substantially more speech than necessary. The injunction bars Zisk from communicating 

with one individual -- Kerridge. It does not prevent him from communicating with the 

City, nor does it bar him from filing complaints or exercising any other petitioning 

activity. While the injunction also prohibits him from entering City Hall, there is no 

evidence that this restriction will have any impact upon his petitioning activity. To the 

contrary, in his declaration, he acknowledged that his meeting with Kerridge was the only 

time he had been to City Hall in the past two years. On this record, we have no trouble 

concluding that the injunction does not impermissibly impinge upon Zisk’s right to 

petition. 

 Zisk also contends that “the order . . . prohibiting [him] from traveling through the 

City of Roseville to reach the United States Post Office located across from 311 Vernon 

Street (Roseville City Hall), violates his right to travel . . . .” “Although no provision of 

the federal Constitution expressly recognizes a right to travel among and between the 

states, that right is recognized as a fundamental aspect of the federal union of states. ‘For 

all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, 

with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of 

the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it 

without interruption, as freely as in our own States.’ [Citation.]” (Tobe v. City of Santa 

Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1096-1097.) Assuming for argument’s sake that the right to 

travel is implicated by the injunction’s stay away provision, we note that “[l]ike all 

constitutional rights the right of free movement is not absolute and may be reasonably 

restricted in the public interest. Conditions which infringe on constitutional rights are not 

automatically invalid. Certain intrusions by government which would be invalid under 

traditional constitutional concepts may be reasonable at least to the extent that such 

intrusions are required by legitimate governmental demands.” (In re White (1979) 97 
12 

Cal.App.3d 141, 149-150.) Here, Zisk may travel anywhere he chooses, except he must 

stay 150 yards away from Kerridge and Kerridge’s workplace, City Hall. These 

restrictions are reasonably related to the legislative goal of providing a safe workplace, 

and a zone of safety around Kerridge, as the Legislature intended when enacting section 

527.8. (Scripps, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 334.) 

 Zisk asserts for the first time in his reply brief that the injunction is “unreasonable” 

to the extent it prohibits him from visiting the United States Post Office, which is within 

150 yards of City Hall, because “the facts of this case do not concern the United States.” 

Assuming for argument’s sake that this issue is properly before us, Zisk fails to explain 

how his inability to access this particular post office infringes upon his rights in any way. 

Absent any such explanation, we are unable to determine whether the restriction is 

unreasonable as Zisk contends. That the facts of this case do not concern the United 

States is of no consequence. The point is to keep a zone of safety around Kerridge; that a 

post office falls within that zone alone does not make the restriction unreasonable. 

Should other reasons exist or should Zisk wish to propose a less restrictive alternative, he 

is free to bring a motion to modify the injunction. (§ 527.8, subd. (k).) 

DISPOSITION 

 The order is affirmed. The City shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).) 

 BLEASE , Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 NICHOLSON , J. 

 HOCH , J.