Docket No. 100956.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STAT E OF IL LI NOIS, Appellant, v. WOODROW BROWN, Appellee.

Opinion filed April 5, 2007.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judg ment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurr ed in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Defendant, Woodrow

Brown, is an inmate in the Department of Correction s, where he is serving a 28-y ear sentence for attempted murder of a police offi cer, a c rim e he com mitt ed in 1 997 at the age of 16. The issu e prese

nted by this case is whethe

r defen dant shoul d be granted postconviction relief on the grounds that the statute under whichhe was transferred from juvenile custody to criminal court and subseque ntly sentenced

was declared invalid by

our court inPeople

v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999). The circuit court of Cook County fou nd defenda nt’s clai m to be fri

volous and

patently without merit

. The appellate court reversed and remanded for

a new transfer hearing inaccordance with the law curre ntly in effect. 358 Ill. App. 3d 5 6

. The State petitioned

for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we-2- allowed. Defendant then asked for cross-re lief, c laiming that the appella te court erred in determining which statute should g overn his transfer hearing on remand. For the r easons that follow, the judgment of the appe llate cou

rt is affirmed in part and reversed in par t, and the
cause is reman ded to t he circ

uit court f

or furth er proc eeding s, with directions. The ev ents giving rise to this case bega n in October of 19 97 , when Chicag o Housing

Authority

Office r Will i am Henderson was shotin the fac e with a .2 2-calib er rifle at close range , breaki

ng his jaw. Defendant

was arr ested for the cr

ime. Bec ause he was 16 ye ars old at the time , he was i nitially the subje ct of a pe

titio n f or adjudicationof

wardship pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 IL CS 405/1–1 et

seq. (West 1996)). The State’s petition alleged that defenda nt had com

mitted th e off

enses of attempted murder, aggravated

battery with a fir

earm , and aggravated disc harge of a weapon. InFebruary

of 1998, the State petitioned to have defendant tried
as anadult under this state’s criminal laws. Pursuant to that petition,

a transfer hear ing was conducted by the circuit court in accordance with the standards set forth in section 5–4(3.3)of the Juve

nile Court Act of 1987 (705 IL CS 405/5–4(3.3) (West 1996)), which had been enacted as part of Public Act

88–680, e ff. Janua

ry 1, 1995, c ommonly knownas the Safe Neighborhoods L aw. That provision stated tha t if

a juvenile was charged with a Class X felony (other than arm ed violence) or

various other serious offenses and the court determined that there wa s probabl e cause to believe that the allegations were true, there was a rebu

ttable p resumption that the minor was not a fit and proper subject to be dealt

with under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and that t he cause should to be

transfe rred to c riminal c ourt. The circuit cou

rt allow ed the petition and ordered defendant’s
caseto be heard under this state’s criminal laws. D efendant was subseque ntly indicted on two counts of attempted first de gr ee murder,
one co unt of aggravated ba ttery with a fire arm and four coun ts o f ag gr av at ed ba tt er y. The following October, defendant ag ree d to p lead guilty to one count of attemp ted first

degre e murder

of a pea ce offi cer, a C lass X felony ( 720 IL CS 5/8 –4(c)(1) (West 1996)), in exchange for dismissal of all other charges andimposition o f a sente nce of 28 ye ars’-3- imprisonmen t. Def

endant never moved to withdraw his plea or sentence, nor did he bring a direct appeal. I n March of 1999, however, he filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearin g Act (725 IL CS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 1998)) alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of

counsel because one of the public defenders who r epresented him had misled him about the circumstances regarding his guilty plea and the

length of the prison termhe would receive. Defendant’s petition

was summarily dismissed by the trial court
on the grounds that it was frivolous and patently without merit. See 725 I LCS 5/ 122–2.1( a)(2) ( West 1998) . Defen

dant fai led to time ly appeal from the circuit court’s judgment, and his motion for

leave to file a late notice of appeal was denied. The re wer

e nofur ther de vel opm ent s in

the cas e un til J u ne o f 2003, when d efenda nt fil ed a new post convi ction petit ion. Alth ough
suc cessive postconvi ction pet itions are gener ally not permit

ted (se e 725 IL CS 5/122–3 (West 1998)), defendant argued that funda mental fairne ss called for relaxation of that rule in this case (see People v. Morgan , 212 Ill. 2d

148, 153 (2004)) because the Safe Neighborhoods Law, which added the r e butt able presumption provision under

which he was transferred to criminal cour t, had since been declar ed uncon stitutiona

l and void ab initio by o ur court in People v. Cervantes , 189 I ll. 2d 80 (1 999), on the grou nds that it violated the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I

V, §8(d)). The circuit c ourt reje cted def endant’ s argument. As it had with defe ndant’s initial postconviction petition, it dismissed his successive petition as frivolous and

patently without merit. Defe ndant appealed. The appellate court

unanimously reverse d. In so doing, it did not re ly
on the fundamental fairness exception to the normal prohibition agains t succe ssive postconviction petitions. Rather, based on a previo us d ecision by the appe llate court in People v. Pena , 321 I ll. App

. 3d 538 (2001), the court reasoned that because the stat utor y provisions under which defendant was transfer red from j uvenile t

o crimin al court a

nd then sentenced were found to be void ab initio , defendant’s transfe

r, plea a nd conviction were

lik ewis e void. Invoking the pri nciples that a claim that a judgment is void is not subject t o waiver

and may be raise d at any

time, eith er dire ctly

o r-4- co ll at er al ly, and that courts have an indepe ndent duty

to vacate void orders and may vac ate a void order sua spont e even if it is not challenged

by the parties (se e People v. Thompson , 209 I ll. 2d 19, 27 (2004)), the court concluded that it was obliged to vacate defendant’s convictionand remand

for a new transfer hearing . 358 Ill. App. 3d at 60. Having reac hed th at conclusion, the court next considered what law should govern the new transfer hear ing following remand. The
reason this was pr

oblematic was t ha t after our court invalidated the Safe Neighborhoods Law in People v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 90–590, eff. January 1, 1999, commonly

known as the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998. The new law, codified at 705 ILCS 405/5–805(2)(a) (West 1998), contains a pre sumptive transfer provision virtually identica l to the Safe Neighborhoods Law provision under which defendant’s original transfer was carried out. For the pu rposes of this appe al, the on

ly difference is that un like the Sa fe Neig hborhood s Law , the Juveni le Justice Reform

Pr ovisions of 1998 have not been challenged on single- subject g

rounds. While the new law was not a departure from the standards which governed defendant’s original transfer, it di d repres ent a change as
c ompared to the law in effect before the Safe N eighborhoo ds La w
w as enacte d. Under

the forme

r law, the re was no presump tion in favor of trans fer. See

705 I LCS 405 /5–4 (West 1 992). Exce pt in certain circumstances not

present in this cas e, the de

terminat ion as to whether a juveni le should b e tried u nder the criminal laws was

a matter for the court’s sound discreti on based on its assessment of various statutory factors and any other relevant matter s. See People

v. Clark , 119 Ill. 2d 1, 12-14 (1987). I n light of this difference, defendant argued that if he is subject to the new law on remand rather than th e law as it existed before the Safe Neighborhoods L aw too k effec t, it will be significantly ea sier for the State to obtain his transfer to criminal

court an

d grea tly i n c rease the possibility that the punishmenthe ultimately rece ives will be more severe. According to defenda nt, such a re sult

would contravene the intent of the legislature1 Article I, section 9, clause 3, of the Uni ted Sta tes Constitution states thatno “ex post facto L aw shall be passed.” Article I, section 10, clause 1, provides that “[n]o S tate shall *** pass any *** ex post facto L aw ***.”

-5- and violate the prohibi

tions ag ainst ex post facto laws set forth in the United States Constitution. 1 The appella

te court disagr eed. I t h eld tha t application of the presumptive -tra nsfer

provision would not violate the prohibition agains t ex post fa cto laws bec ause the provision does not provide for

a greater punishm ent . It merely af fects the procedure by

which pu nishmentis determined. Similarly, the court re asoned that the whil e the provision does contain a burden of proof standar d not pres ent in the prior law, ex post facto conc e rns are not implicated because the
ne w burden does not affect the determination of g uilt or innoce nce , does not make it easier

for the State to obtain a conviction, and does notalter any a

vailable defenses. 358 I ll. App. 3d at 63-64. The court therefore held that the new p r esumptive -transf er provi sion set fo

rth inthe Juvenile Justice Reform A ct may be applie d to defe

ndant’s c ase on remand. 358 Ill. App. 3d at 64-65. Inits ap peal t o our c ourt, the S tate a rgu es that t he appe llate court’s analy

sis of def endant’ s claims is

errone ous. As pr

eviously indicated, the appellate c ourt’s decision was predicated on our holding in People v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999), that Public Act 88–6 80, the statute pursuant to which defendant was transferr ed t o criminal court and subsequently se ntenced, is void. The St ate does not take issue with

that holdin

g. Rather, i

t contend s that the a

ppellate court applied the h o lding inc orrect ly. Specific ally , it arg

ues that w hile the statute itself may be void, def endant’s transfer, convi cti on and sentence ar e m er el y vo id ab le . A s a re su lt , d ef en da nt ma y not ava il himself of the rule that void judgments may be attacked at

any time. Inste ad, th e challe

nge to h is transf er, conv iction and sentenc e must meet the n ormal requirements governing suc cessive petitions for postconviction relief. The State contends that th ose requirements have not been satisfied by de fendant

in this cas e. I

n the State ’s view, t

he arg uments upo n whichdefendant’s postconviction petition is premised have been waived. While the waiver rule may be relaxed based o n-6- considerations of “fundamental fairness,” the State arg ues that under People v. Pitsonbarger , 205 I ll. 2d 444 (2002), establishing fu ndamental fairness requires a showing that there was a legal l y cogniza ble cause for defendant’s failure to raise t he claim i

n his i ni tial postconvi ction pro ceeding and that a

ctual pr ejudice would result if defendant were denied considera tion of the claimed error. According

to the State, defendant has failed t o meet either prong of this test. It asserts that the circuit court wa s ther efor e corre ct in summarily deny

ing defendant’s postconviction petition. Defend ant, for his pa

rt, contends that the circuit court’s judgment
was properly re

versed by the

appellate court. In his v iew, the appellate court was correct in holding that the constitutional defect s inthe Safe Neighborhoods L awrender ed his transfer, conviction and sentence void, not merely voidable, and tha t he was entitled to a new transfer hearing on remand. Where de fendant parts co mpany

with the appella te court is with res pec t to the law which should govern the proceeding s on remand. Defendant asserts that the appellate court erred in rejecting his ex post fa cto claims an d that his c ase should be governed by the law as it existed prior to enactment of the Safe Neighborhoods Law

and Juvenil e Justice Reform Provisions of 1998. Inanalyzing the pa

rties’ respective arguments, we beg in by noting that our revi ew of this

case is de novo . That is so because the matter
comes before

us on revi ew of the

summary

dismissal o f a postconviction petition a nd prese nts only questions of law. See People v. Bocla ir , 202 Ill. 2d 89, 97 (20 02); People v . Daniels , 187 Ill. 2d 301, 307 (1999). The first question we must address is whether the appellate court
was correc t in conclu

ding tha t defend ant’s tra nsfer f rom juven

ile to criminal court was void. We believe that it was. As indicated earlier inthi s opini on, the statutory provisions pursuant to which def endant’s transfer was carried out were enac ted as part of the Safe Neighborhoods Law (Public Act 88–680), a statute which we found to be unconstitutional in People v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999). Under the established precedent of this court, a statute which violates the single-subject

clause i s void in itsentirety. People v . Carrera , 203 Il l. 2d 1, 16 (2002). As a result, all of the provisions of the Safe Neighborhoods Law, including the specific provisions amending the JuvenileCourt Act

o f 1987 pursuant to which defendant was-7- transferred

to criminal court, are invalid. More tha n that, they

are void ab initio . As such, they have no force or effect. I

t is as if they had never been passed. People v . Carrera , 203 Ill. 2d at 14. When a court exercises its authority ove r a minor pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act

of 1987, as the court did here in entertaining the State’s transfe r petition, it must proceed within the confines of that law and has no authority to ac t except as tha t law pr ovides. See People v. Jaime P. , 223 Ill. 2d 526, 540 (2 00 6). Because the particular statutory provisions under which de fendant wa s transferred
are void ab initio and have never ha

d any valid leg al forc e, it
necessa rily foll ow s that the transfer itself can be afforde d no legal recognition

The tran sfer is void just as the transfer statute is void. Defend ant mu st th erefor e be gran ted a n ew tran sfer he aring. The s ame c onclusion was reached by the appellate court and conceded by the State under similar circumstances in People v. Pena , 321 Ill. App. 3d 538, 540-41 (2001), a dec i sion upon which the appella te court in th

is case relied. Unlike Pena , in which the valid ity of the transfer was challenge d on dire ct review of a judgment imposed following a bench

trial, the attack on the transfer here comes inthe context of a successive postconviction petition following entry of judgment

based on a guilty

plea. These distinctions, however, do notalter our analy sis. A gui lty p le a does not preclude a defendant fromchallenging

a circu it court’ s judgme

nt as void ab initio (

People

v. Gu evara , 216 I ll. 2d 533, 5 42-43 (20 05)), an d, as the a

ppellate court in this case correctly

pointed out, anattack on

a void judgment may be raised at any

time. It does not depend on the Post-Conviction Hearing Act for its viability

. People v. Thompson , 209 Ill. 2d 19, 26 (2004). Having concluded tha t defendant is entitled to a new transfer hearin g, we must next consider what statute sh ould govern that procee ding. Because the Safe Neig hborhoods Law

is void ab initio , the versionof Juvenile Court Act in existence prior to its amendment by that legislation remained in effect. Harshman v. DePhillips , 218 Ill. 2d 482, 489 n.1 (2006). The pre-SafeNeighborhoods Law version of the statut

e was th erefore the controlling law in 1997, when defendant committed the offenses which ga ve rise to this case. The Juvenile Just

ice Reform Provisions of 1998, which reinstituted

the rebu

ttable pr esumption

standar d of th e Saf

e-8- Neighborhoods Law, w ere not enacted until the following y ear and did not take effect until the y ear after that. As we have indica ted, defendant argues that to apply

the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions to his case would violate the United States Constitution’s prohibition agains t ex post fa cto laws. He further asse rts that su bjecting his case to the new statute would contravene the intent of the legislature as set forth in the statute. Statutes are presume d constitu tional, a nd the cou

rts of this state have a duty

to constr ue enactments by t

he Gene ral Asse mbly so as to uphold their validity if there is any r

easonable way

to do so. People

v. Jones , 223 I ll. 2d 569, 5 95-96 (20 06). Consi st en t with this obligation, our court will not consider a constitutional question if the
casecan be decided on other gro und s. If

a court can resolve a case on non-constitutional grounds, it should do so. People v. Lee , 214 Ill. 2d 476, 482 (2005 ). Constitu tional issu

es sh ould be reac

hed only as a last resort. In the E. H. , No. 1 00202, slip op. at 4 (December 21, 2006). Inthe case before us today , the appellate court elected to resolve the parties’ disagreement

regar ding whi ch versi on of the l aw should apply by focusing on

defenda nt’s ex post facto challenge. Under the principles we have just reviewed, this approach was improper. Rather thanaddressing the ex post facto claims, the court should have begun its analysis with considera tion of de fen dant’s nonconstitutional contention, namely, that

application of the new law t o his case would be contr ary to the legislature ’s intent. Where, as here, a

case imp licates a

statute e nacted a fter the events givingrise to the litig ation, Illinois cou rts evaluate the temporal reach of the newla w in accordance with the standards set forth by the United States Supr

eme Court in Landgraf v

. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (2001). Under the Landgraf

standards, the threshold inqu i ry is whether the legislature has expressly prescribe d the statute’s temporal reach. If it has, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect absent
some constitutional prohibition against doing so. Allegis Re alty Investors v. Novak

, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006). The Juven ile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 contain such a p rovision. Althoug

h the law was enacted in June o f 1998, se cti o n-9- 4001–99 of the sta

tute call ed for its

delay ed imp lemen tation. The pr ovi sions containe d in artic le 1001 we re not to ta

ke effe ct until January 1, 2000. The rema

ining se ctions of the law, including the provisions containing the rebuttable presumption on transfers, were to take effect on January

1, 1999. In l i ght of these terms, it is clear that the law was intended to have only prospective application. The State has not directed our attention to any thing in the United

States or Illinois Constitution

which wou

ld prohibi tthe law from being applied in tha t way . We must therefore give effec tto the legislature’s intent and conclude that the rebuttable transfer provisions of the Juve nile Justice Reform Pr

ovisions of

1998 are applica ble only to ju veni le proceedings which commenced on or a fter January 1, 1999. The juvenile proceedings involving the defenda

nt in this ca se clearly do not fal l within

that category

of cases. As discussed earlier inthis opinion, those proceedings were initiated in late 199 7 , more thana yea

r before the pert inent portions of the Juvenile Justice Reform Pr ovision s of 1998 became operative. Giving ef fect to the intention of the legislature, as we must, we therefore conclude that

the JuvenileJustice Reform Provisions of 1998 are inappl icable to this matter. On reman

d, defen dant’s tr ansf er he aring should, instead, be governed by the version of the

Juvenile Justice Act of 1987 in effect prior to enactment of the Saf

e Neig hborhood s Law . In li ght of th is determination, there is n o ne ed to reach defendant’s claim that subjecting him to a re

buttable presumpt ion under the Juvenile

Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 wo

uld contr avene the prohibi

tion aga inst

ex post facto laws. See People v . Ramsey , 192 Ill. 2d 154, 159-74 (2000) (Biland

ic, J., spec ially

concurr ing). T o the exten

t that t he appella te court addressed that

argument and reached

a contra ry result regarding whichlaw will

control on remand, its judgment is reversed. We also reverse the appellate court’s judgment to the extent that it vacated defendant’s conviction outright. Proper disposition of the convictiondepends on the outcome of the ne w trans fer hearing f ol lowing remand. If, a

fter ap ply ing the v ersion of

the Juvenile Justice Act of 1987 in effect prior to enactment of the Safe Neighborhoods Law , the cir cuit cour t determi n es th at defendant’s
c ase shou ld not be transferred to criminal court, there ca n be no question that defenda

nt’s origina

l convict ion canno t be allow ed to stand. That is sobecause absent a transfer, there is no lawful basis for-10- a conviction und er th is state’s criminal laws. The same is true of defendant’s sentence. Without a valid transfer and subs equ ent convictionunder our criminal laws, the legal predica te for the sentenc e evapo rates. The situation w

ill be diff erent, however , should the circuit c ould ultimat ely

conc lude that transfer for trial under the state’s cr iminal laws is appropriate. Unlike the t ransfer provisions of the Safe Neighborhoods Law, the s tatut ory provi sion s defi ning th e criminal offenses with

whichdefendant was charge d and the attempted murder charge for

which he was convicted

were not affected by

this court’s decis i on in People v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80. The substantive offenses remain

unchanged, and

their validity remains unquestioned. If the circuit c ourt rea

ches the same con clusion a s it

did originally and rules that the case is ap p ropriate ly h andled un der the c riminal la ws, defendant would the

refore have no b asis for a ssailing his conviction on the grounds that it is void. Withrespect to defendant’s sentenc e, the iss ue is somewhat more comp lex. When defendant en tered into the negotiated plea, which included a sentence of 28 y

ears’ imprisonment, defendant and the State believe d that his c ase was subject to

a provisi on in th e Safe Neighborhoods Law that had amended se ction 8–4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 IL CS 5/8–4 (West 1996)) to i ncrease the authorized

sentence for defendant’s offe nse from the pr eviou s range of 15 to 60 years t o a new r ange of 20 to 80 years. I

n light of People

v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80, how ever, th is assumpti on was inc orrect

. When Cervantes held the Safe Ne ighbo rhoods Law to be void ab initio , the Act’s amendment to the sentencing rang e was also rend e red void ab initio . For reasons we have already explained, that meant that t he old 15- to 60-year

sentencing range re

mained in effect and was controlling at the time the plea agree ment was reached. A sentence which excee ds statutory maximums or violates the constitution is void

from its inception and subject to challenge at any tim e, even whe

re, as he re, the s entence

is imposed a s p art of a negotiated

plea. See People v

. Guevar a , 216 Ill. 2d 533, 542-43 (2005) ; People v. Pullen , 192 Ill. 2d 36, 40, 43 (2000); People v. Williams , 179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997). I n this cas e, however, defendant’s 28-y

ear sentence was well within the old 15- to 60-year-11- sentencingrange

which g overned

defenda nt’s cas e. Accordingly

, it did not exceed the governing statutory maximum for the offense. Where a defen

dant’s se ntence c omplies wi

th th e mandatory
se ntencing guidelines in effect when the sentenc e was imposed, th e defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing merely because
some aspect of the sentencing law was subse quently determined to be void on the g rounds tha

t it v iolated the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. People v. Reedy , 186 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17 (1999). Applying this principle, our a ppellate court has he ld tha t where, as here, a

defenda nt’s sente nce is proper under the version of section8–4 of t he C rim in al C ode of 1 961 (72 0 ILC S 5/8–4 (West 1996)) in effect prior to enactment of the Safe Neighborhoods L aw, the fact that the amended

version o f the stat

ute was su bsequen tly held to be vo id by People v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999 ), does no t entitle the defendant to a ne w senten cing hearing. See People v. Cundiff , 322 Ill. App. 3d 426, 438-39 (2001). Panels of the Ap

pellate C ourt, First Distr ict, reached a different conclusionin People v . Eng lish , 334 Ill. App. 3d 156 (2002), and People v. Ruiz , 312 I ll. App. 3d 49 (2000). They held that defenda nts who were se

ntenced to imprison

ment for a

tte mpted murder of a police office

r under t he 20- to 8 0-year sen

te ncing range established by the now-invalidated Safe Neighborhoods Lawshould be granted
newsentencing hearings eve n though t

he s entence s originally imposed were within the 15- to 60-y ear range imposed under the pr ior versionof the law. At

the core of these two decis ions is the p

rinciple that in crimina

l cases, the rec ord must

establish that the sentence was ba sed on a proper understanding of the applica ble law. People

v

. English , 334 I ll. App. 3d at 170; People v. R ui

z , 312 Ill. App. 3d at 58. Ineach instance, it was apparent that such an understanding was lacki ng. Becau se the Sa fe Ne ighborhoods Law had not y et been invalidated

when the sentences were imposed, the cir cuit cour

t, throu gh no fault of

its own, did not appreciate that the law’s stiffer sentencing provisions were inapplicable. That a tri a l judge m

ust prope rly understa nd the app licable sentencinglaw is a pri

ncip le tha

t can scar cely be doubte d. We neverth eless believe that the analysis in the English and Ruiz cases is nothelpful to the resolution of this case. That is so for several
reasons

. First, English and Ruiz f ail to take into

accoun t the well

--12- established

principle that

a trial court’s failure to apply a sentencing statute correctly d

oes not ne cessar

il y render the sen

tence w holly inva lid as a matte

r of law. Where the

court impo ses an exc essi v e sentence because of a mistake of l aw or fa ct, the se ntence i s merely voidable, and the error can be waived. See People v . Fouts , 319 I ll. App. 3d 550 , 552 ( 2001) , citi ng People v . Davis , 156 Ill. 2d 149 (1993). Second, while a sen t ence, or portion thereof, not authorized by statute is void (People v. Thompson , 209 I ll. 2d at 23 ), it is void only to the exte nt that it exceeds wh at the law permits. T

he lega lly authorized

portion of the sentence remains valid. In re T.E. , 85 I ll. 2d 326, 333 (1981); see People v. Patterson , 276 Ill. App. 3d 107, 111 (1995). In thi s case, no aspect of defendant’s sentence e xceeds the terms autho r ized by the law in effe ct prior to enactment of the Safe Neighborhoods Law. As we have al ready pointed out, the 28-year termimposed under his plea agreement was squa rely within the

old 15- to 60 -year

s entenci ng ran ge whic h should ha

ve gove rned the se procee dings. Fi na ll y, unlike the

sente nces in English and Ruiz , defendant’s sentence was not

imposed by the court

following trial. Rather, it was the product of a fully ne gotiated plea ag reement between the defendant and the Sta

te. Ther e is nothing in the transcript of the hearing on the plea and sentence to sugg est that there was any a ctual misunderstanding of the governing sentencing standards or that such misunder standing

affec ted the te

rms of the

plea ag reemen t. Becaus e defe ndant ’s sen tence i s not void , his right t o brin g a postconviction challenge to that sentence must conform to the normal require ments gover

ning pos tconvict

ion proce edings. D efendant cannot meet those requirements. As noted earlier in this opinion, defendant’s challen

ge to his sen tence is

raised f or the fir st time in this, his second, postco nvic tion petiti on. Where , as here , the dea th penalty is not involv ed and the

defenda nt makes no claim o f actual innocence, Illinois law prohibits the defendant from raising an issue ina succe ssiv e postc onviction petition unless the defendant can establish a lega lly c ognizabl e cause

for his or her fai lure to raise that issue in an ear

lier proc eedin g and actual prejudic e would r esult if defendant were denied considera tion of the claimed error. People v. Pitsonbarger , 205 Ill. 2d at 459-60.-13- Defendant’s challen

ge to the length o f his sentence is predicated exclusive ly

on the court’s determination that the Safe Neighborhoods Law, which raised the sentencing rang e, was unconstitutional and of
no effect. Al tho ugh this court’s decision in People v. Cervantes , whichdeclared

the statute in

valid, wa s not filed

until appr

oximately six months after defendant brought his initial postconviction petition inMarch of

1999, Cervantes was not the first judicial pronouncement
on the ma

tter . I n Sept embe r of 1 998, a

ppro xi mately

five months before defenda

nt’s firs tpostconviction proceeding was initiated, the Appellat e Court, Thi

rd Distric t, also dec lared th e statute invalid. See People v. Dainty , 299 Ill. App. 3d 235 (1998). The Second District followed suit in February of 1999. See People v. Williams , 302 I ll. App. 3d 975 (1999). Between 1998 and 1999, when Cervantes was issued, the vali di ty o f the Saf e Neig hborhood s Law

was, in fa

ct, addressed in pub lished decisions by ever y appellate district e

xcept the Fifth. As we noted in Cervantes , the d istricts split on the question. People v. Cervantes , 189 Ill. 2d at 85. While the First District, from whichthis case arose, took the view that thestatute did not offend the single-subject

rule (see Peopl e v. Wiggins , 298 Ill. App. 3d 766 (1998)), it is clear

that legal precedent supporting de fendant’s singlesubject chall enge existed and could have been invoked by him at the time he filed

his initial postconviction petition. This is therefore not

a situation where the legal basis for the claim was not y et reas onably available. See People v. Pitsonbarger , 205 Ill. 2 d at 460. Whi le it is true that our c ourt had n

ot y et defin

itively resolved the question, that
was not sufficient cause under thecause-and-prejudice test to excu se defendant’s failure

to challenge the validity of his sentence whe n he first sought postconviction relief. As we indi cated e arlier i n this opinio

n, the Stat

e conten ds tha t defendant’s claim als o fails the prejudice prong of the cause- andprejudice test. In light of

our conclusion that defendant has faile d to establish a lega lly c ognizabl e cause for his fa

ilure to c halleng e his sentence inthe earlier proceeding, howe ver, it is not necessary

for our court to reach t hat arg ument. B ecause

both caus e and pre

judice mu st be shown under Pitsonbarger ( People v. Morgan , 212 Ill. 2d 148, 153 (2004)), defendant’s failureto establish cause is sufficient to preclude him from attacking his sentenc e through successive postconviction procee dings. The issue has been procedurally defa ulted. Should the-14- circuit court conclude, on remand, that defenda nt’s cas e was prop erly transferred

to criminal court, it should therefore leave undisturbed

not only his orig inal conv

iction but a

ls o the 28-year

term of imprisonmentto whichdefenda nt agre ed under

his plea b argai

n with the State. For the fore going

reasons , the judgment of the appella te court is affirmed in part and reversed

in part, the judgment of

the circuit court is affirmed

in part a nd rever sed in par t, and the c ause is r

emanded to the circuit court for fur th er proceedings in accor dance with the directions set forth in this opinion.

Appellate court affir

med in par

t and reve rsed in par

t; circuit c ourt affirm ed in part a nd rever sed in part

;

cause re manded wit

h directio ns.