ARMY NETWORKS

Size and Scope of 

Modernization 

Investment Merit 

Increased Oversight

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 2013

GAO-13-179

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-179, a report to 

congressional requesters

January 2013 

ARMY NETWORKS 

Size and Scope of Modernization Investment Merit 

Increased Oversight

Why GAO Did This Study

For nearly 20 years, the Army has had 

limited success in developing an 

information network—sensors, 

software, and radios—to give soldiers 

the exact information they need, when 

they need it, in any environment. Such 

a network is expected to improve 

situational awareness and decision

making in combat. Under its network 

modernization strategy, the Army is 

implementing a new agile process

intended to leverage industry 

technology solutions. The Army 

estimates that it will require about $3.8 

billion in fiscal 2013. As requested, this 

report addresses the extent to which 

(1) the Army’s network strategy and 

agile process addresses cost, 

technology maturity, security, and 

readiness; and (2) the Army’s strategy 

faces other risks and challenges. To 

conduct this work, GAO analyzed key 

documents, observed testing activities, 

and interviewed acquisition officials. 

What GAO Recommends

To help ensure adequate oversight, 

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Defense (1) define quantifiable 

outcome-based performance metrics 

for network equipment; (2) develop a 

plan for future network evaluations to 

determine if those measures have 

been met; and (3) evaluate fielded 

network performance and make 

recommendations for adjustments, as 

necessary. GAO also recommends 

that the Secretary of Defense

consolidate Army tactical network

budget elements and justifications into 

a single area of the Army budget 

submittal. DOD generally concurred 

with these recommendations and

stated that it has initiated actions to 

address several of the challenges

identified in the report.

What GAO Found

The Army has taken a number of steps to begin executing its network strategy 

and agile process, including establishing a baseline network architecture for 

Army communications. The Army’s agile process involves seven phases and 

three decision points to allow officials to quickly evaluate emerging networking 

technologies to determine if they address capability gaps and can be deployed to 

the field. However, the network strategy is still evolving and the Army has not yet 

executed one full cycle of the agile process. The Army’s strategy addresses 

some aspects of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, but as 

implementation is still under way, data for assessing progress are not available at 

this time. Nevertheless, the Army is beginning to spend billions of dollars netting 

together dozens of disparate systems to form a network that is intended to 

enhance warfighter effectiveness and survivability. Specifically, the Army has 

identified that over $3 billion will be needed each year on an indefinite basis for 

investments in networking capabilities, potentially making it one of the Army’s 

most costly investments. To help determine that technologies meet prescribed 

levels of technical maturity, the Army has established a laboratory-based 

screening process for evaluating technologies, and those that show promise

move to evaluations in a realistic environment with soldiers and testers. To help 

provide security and information assurance, the Army is working with contractors 

and the National Security Agency to obtain appropriate certifications prior to 

fielding new networking technologies. Furthermore, the Army is attempting to 

align the procurement and fielding of networking systems with the relatively fixed 

schedules for equipping and training units before they are deployed. The 

challenge will be to ensure that the equipment being sent to the field has been 

thoroughly demonstrated and that fielding decisions are not made solely to 

accommodate deployment cycles.

The overall scope and cost of the Army’s new network strategy, as well as other 

factors unique to the strategy, present significant risks and challenges and 

deserve high-level oversight attention by both the Army and the Department of 

Defense (DOD). For example, the Army wants to field smaller quantities with 

greater frequency to be able to take advantage of new and improved capabilities 

as they become available, thus avoiding long-term procurements of outdated 

technology and potentially helping to realize savings in development, testing, and 

maintenance costs. However, the Army is still weighing funding and contracting 

options that would allow it to accomplish this goal while adhering to established

acquisition and budget processes that may require long lead time to acquire

these technologies. DOD guidance calls for measuring actual contributions of 

information technology portfolios, which includes the Army network, against 

established outcome-based performance measures to determine improved 

capability and allow for adjustments in the mix of portfolio investments. Senior 

DOD officials provided extensive input on the soundness of individual network 

components and the schedule for fielding equipment and have offered that future 

evaluations in an operational environment present a good opportunity to evaluate 

the overall performance of the network. However, the Army and DOD have not 

yet fully defined quantifiable network performance measures or plans to 

periodically review and evaluate the actual effectiveness of new Army network 

capabilities. Inadequate oversight of the portfolio could put the investment at 

risk. Finally, budget justification and other planning materials for network 

equipment—over 50 research and development and procurement budget 

elements—are not organized to provide insight into the budget for and 

affordability of the entire network. Given the magnitude and financial commitment 

envisioned, a consolidated reporting and budgeting framework could yield more 

consistency and clarity in the justifications for Army network initiatives and 

facilitate congressional oversight.

View GAO-13-179. For more information, 

contact Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or 

martinb@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Letter 1 

Background 2

Army Moving Ahead but Its Network Strategy Is Still Evolving 6

Army’s Network Modernization Strategy and Agile Process Face 

Other Risks and Challenges 18

Conclusions 25

Recommendations 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II Army Mission Command Essential Capabilities 32

Appendix III Highest Priority Army Network Capability Gaps and 

Descriptions 33

Appendix IV Technology Readiness Levels 34

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 37

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2013 Requested Funding for Network-Enabled 

Mission Command 10

Table 2: Capability Set 13 Systems 17

Table 3: Technology Readiness Levels 34

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Figures

Figure 1: The Agile Process 5

Figure 2: Army Force Generation Model 15

Abbreviations

COE Common Operating Environment

DOD Department of Defense

DP Decision Point

IT Information Technology

JIIM Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

 Multinational

NIE Network Integration Evaluation

TRL Technology Readiness Level

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 Technology, and Logistics

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

January 10, 2013

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Adam Smith

House of Representatives 

For nearly two decades, the Army has had various initiatives under way to 

improve situational awareness and enhance the decision making of 

soldiers and commanders through the increased use of information 

technology. While these initiatives resulted in some capability 

advancements in the Army’s network capabilities, they fell far short of 

their objectives, resulting in what the Army believes is a loosely 

coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, and services as 

opposed to a networked system of weapons and other equipment. The 

Army is now implementing a new agile process, through which it will seek 

to leverage industry solutions with less systems development by the Army 

in modernizing its tactical network to give soldiers the exact information 

they need, when they need it, in any environment. Under this process, the 

Army plans to field smaller quantities more frequently, allowing it to 

procure and field new and improved capabilities as they become 

available. Army officials believe this would allow the Army to avoid longterm procurements of outdated technology and potentially help realize 

savings in development, testing, and maintenance costs. Army leadership 

has identified the network as the service’s number one modernization 

priority and estimates that it will require $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013 funding 

for its network initiatives.

Because of the network’s importance, the ambitious nature of the current 

network modernization strategy, and the department’s track record with 

system acquisitions over the past decade, you asked us to examine 

various elements of the new process the Army is using to acquire network 

capabilities. As agreed with committee staff, we will address issues 

related to the acquisition process, evaluation of new and current network 

capabilities, and current plans to purchase radios and other 

communications equipment in phases. In this first report, we address (1) 

the extent to which the Army’s network modernization strategy and agile 

process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness; 

and (2) other risks and challenges facing implementation of the Army’s 

network strategy and agile process.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

To conduct this work, we reviewed the Army’s approach to modernizing 

network equipment and evaluated it against DOD policies and best 

practices. We observed testing, visited laboratory facilities, interviewed 

acquisition and test officials, and analyzed key documentation. A detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to January 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Over the last two decades, the Army began transforming its warfighting 

capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of 

potential threats with smaller, adaptable, more agile and deployable 

brigade combat teams. The Army wanted the force components—

soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors—to be “net-centric,” that is, 

closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together. The Army took 

initial steps toward transformation through its Digitization program in the 

1990s by installing computers, software, and interfaces to 

communications systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and 

other vehicles in selected units that enable both in-theater and higher 

commands to share battlefield data with lower-level units.

About 10 years ago, the Army envisioned the Future Combat System as 

the culminating stage in the Army’s ongoing transformation to a lighter, 

more agile and capable force. Future Combat System was a large and 

complex development effort to provide a networked family of weapons 

and other systems for the future force. Ultimately, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) issued

an acquisition decision memorandum that canceled the Future Combat 

System development effort. Subsequently, the Army established the 

Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team program to demonstrate, among 

other things, improved network technology and sensors that had been 

part of the Future Combat System. However, faced with disappointing test 

results and high costs, DOD directed the Army to cease these 

developmental efforts, eventually canceling the program in February 

2011.

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Over the last decade, most network improvements fielded by the Army 

were focused on supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and were 

expensive and time consuming. The Army’s development and fielding 

efforts for network technologies were not well synchronized. Funding and 

timelines for network-related programs were rarely, if ever, aligned. 

Capabilities were fielded piecemeal and integration with existing 

technology was largely the responsibility of the user. Current battle 

command network components were developed to address a range of 

capabilities and have resulted in what the Army believes is a loosely 

coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, services, and transport 

(i.e., the means of moving information). The decade of conflict also 

provided the Army with a set of “lessons learned” that have shaped the 

adoption of the new approach intended to accelerate the introduction of 

advanced information technology capabilities to the warfighter, especially 

those engaged at the tactical edge (i.e., the forward battle lines). In 

December 2011, Army leaders finalized the Network-enabled Mission 

Command Initial Capabilities Document, which serves as a foundational 

document in support of Army Network Modernization and describes the 

essential network capabilities required. We have included a listing of the 

essential network capabilities in appendix II. These capabilities support 

an Army mission command capability defined by a coherent network of 

command posts, aerial and ground platforms, manned and unmanned 

sensors, and dismounted soldiers that are linked by an integrated suite of 

mission command systems and connected by a robust transport layer 

capable of delivering voice, data, imagery, and video to the tactical edge. 

The Initial Capabilities Document also defined scores of capability gaps 

that exist with current Army networks. We have included a listing of the 

highest priority capability gaps in appendix III.

The Army’s network modernization strategy focuses on addressing four 

factors that Army leaders believe are at the root of the Army’s network 

challenges:

• a lack of common technical standards,

• unsynchronized acquisition timelines,

• no visibility at the enterprise (top) level, and

• test and acquisition processes that they believe result in the fielding of 

outdated technology.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

In response, the Army has fundamentally changed the way it develops, 

evaluates, tests, and delivers networked capability to its operating forces. 

The Army is shelving its inadequate, disjointed process in favor of an 

approach it calls capability set management.

Under capability set management, the Army evaluates the current 

operational environment and then designs a suite of systems and 

equipment, a “capability set,” to answer the projected requirements of a 1-

year period. Instead of developing an ultimate capability and buying 

enough to cover the entire force, the Army plans to buy only what is 

needed for units preparing to deploy. Every year, the Army will integrate 

the next capability set, which will reflect any changes or advances in 

technology realized since the last set was fielded. The Army is using this 

approach to manage network capabilities as a cohesive portfolio and 

synchronize all supporting activities. The Army numbers these sets to 

coincide with its upcoming training and fielding schedule to give units 

ample time to (1) integrate the new capabilities and (2) train with the 

systems before deploying to theater. For example, network capabilities 

being ready for fielding in 2013 are labeled capability set 13.

In support of capability sets, the Army has formulated an agile process 

that will rely heavily on industry to fill those networking capability gaps 

using nondevelopmental items or commercial-off-the-shelf options, 

meaning the Army will do less system development.1

 

1

The Army’s agile capabilities life cycle process should not be confused with the Agile

software development approach for Information Technology (IT) systems. Although they 

share similar practices, the Army’s agile process is being used, at least initially, to identify 

and evaluate new networking capabilities for brigade combat teams. 

The Army’s agile 

process involves seven phases and three decision points intended to 

identify proposed solutions that can be evaluated for feasibility to address 

an identified need and can be deployed to the field. This approach is also 

designed to help the Army cull out network system candidates that either 

may not be an appropriate solution or may not be technically ready for 

evaluation. Figure 1 illustrates the agile process. The Army believes this 

process will allow for both large- and small-scale industry involvement 

that could lead to increased competition and lower costs.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Figure 1: The Agile Process

To implement this agile process, the Army sends out sources sought 

notices to attract proposed solutions to identified network capability gaps 

and evaluates each of the proposed solutions at decision points after key 

phases.2

Equipped with every vehicle platform currently in the Army inventory, the 

2nd brigade, 1st armored division assigned to Brigade Modernization 

Command leads phases III to V of the process and is responsible for 

executing the Network Integration Evaluations (NIE), which are held semiannually and typically last for approximately 6 weeks.

The Army initially screens proposals at Phase I to determine 

which systems will proceed further into the process. The Army screens 

systems again during a laboratory validation in Phase II. The Army 

notifies contractors as to whether their systems will be allowed to 

advance to the evaluation phase, where candidate systems are integrated 

with existing network capabilities and tested with a full Army brigade. If 

the system performs well at the evaluation, the Army decides whether or 

not to buy and field it.

3

 

2

The sources sought notice is a synopsis posted by a government agency seeking 

possible sources for a project. It is not a solicitation for work or a request for proposal.

The NIEs are 

designed to replicate current real-world conditions and include systems 

3

NIEs are sequentially numbered—NIE 13.1 and 13.2 are the two events to be held in 

fiscal year 2013.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

already fielded to the operational theater. Soldiers, combat developers, 

training developers, materiel developers, and engineers participate in 

each event, providing feedback as the evaluation progresses. NIEs 

provide a venue for operational testing of formal acquisition programs and 

for demonstrating government and industry provided systems under 

evaluation in an operational environment. Army leaders use information 

from NIEs to inform decisions on what to send to the field. With this largescale and centralized testing process, the Army intends to validate new 

technology as it becomes available; select the best candidates for quick 

insertion into operational units; and refine tactics, techniques, and 

procedures very quickly to eventually relieve or reduce the integration 

burden of new equipment on operational forces.

The standard operating procedure for the agile approach states that it is 

not a substitute for existing DOD acquisition policy. Rather, the agile 

process applies only to the testing, assessment, and evaluation during 

NIE events and does not address any subsequent development or 

procurement actions. Nevertheless, the standard operating procedures 

state that changes to DOD policy may be considered as the Army 

develops additional guidance for broader implementation of the agile 

process. Further, the Army believes this agile process addresses a 

portion of the information technology reform called for in Section 804 of 

the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, in which 

Congress directed DOD to formulate a new approach for acquiring 

information technology systems.4 In the meantime, the Army expects to 

comply with procurement aspects of DOD acquisition policy when it 

decides to buy systems that proceed through the agile process.

The Army has begun a number of initiatives intended to define a desired 

baseline network, enhance the ability of industry to develop networking 

systems, and streamline the acquisition of those systems. In particular, 

the Army is implementing a new overall network strategy and agile 

process, but details are still evolving. Through these initiatives, the Army 

has developed preliminary plans to address the areas of cost, technology 

maturity, security, and readiness. However, the ongoing implementation 

of the agile process makes it difficult to assess potential effectiveness of 

the Army’s preliminary plans, and additional data to inform such an 

 

4

Pub. L. No. 111-84.

Army Moving Ahead 

but Its Network 

Strategy Is Still 

Evolving 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

assessment will likely not be available until after the Army begins fielding 

new network capabilities. The Army has identified near-term funding 

needs for network investments and established a process for screening 

proposed networking capabilities before they are tested. The Army also 

recognized the need to protect the network and its content and is working 

with the National Security Agency and vendors to ensure systems are 

certified for integration into the network. The Army is also attempting to 

align network capability fielding with its relatively fixed schedule for 

deploying forces to ensure soldiers are trained with new equipment prior 

to deployment.

The Army is beginning to execute its network strategy and implement its 

agile process. However, the network strategy is still evolving, 

implementation has only recently started, and the Army has not yet 

executed one full cycle of the agile process. While the Army indicated that 

systems evaluated at the NIE in fiscal year 2012 and to be fielded in 

capability set 13 completed the entire agile process, some of those 

systems were not evaluated in the laboratory. A full cycle would include 

going through all phases of the process. The Army is using the agile 

process to quickly evaluate emerging networking capabilities. At this 

point, it is unclear what impact some of these actions will have on network 

modernization. The following examples detail steps the Army has taken to 

implement the new approach.

• Since 2011, the Army has solicited proposals from both industry 

sources and existing programs of record to address recognized 

capability gaps.5 Industry participation in the agile process generally, 

and in the NIEs specifically, is critical to the success of the Army 

network modernization strategy. Under the agile process, the Army 

has decided to buy only one system from industry after having 

evaluated more than 100.6

 

5

A program of record is an acquisition effort that has either been recorded as such in the 

programming and budgeting process or one that has successfully achieved formal

program initiation, which typically means it has entered the engineering and manufacturing 

development phase of the acquisition management process.

While the Army anticipates contracting, as 

appropriate, for solutions to fill capability gaps, industry is making a 

sizable investment to take part in an NIE, and it remains to be seen if 

6

In October 2012, the Army issued a request for proposals for a vehicular-mounted, 

software-defined radio after having evaluated similar systems at prior NIEs.

Army Executing Network 

Strategy and Implementing 

Agile Process
 

Page 8 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

industry will continue to participate in this strategy over the longer 

term while purchases to date have been minimal.

• The Army is learning lessons from the use of the agile process. For 

instance, the Army issued an initial sources sought notice for the 

second NIE in fiscal year 2012—NIE 12.2. Army officials stated that 

some of the gaps were too broad, which resulted in too many 

responses that were not targeted to the specific gap the Army was 

hoping to fill. Consequently, the Army issued a second, more targeted

sources sought notice for NIE 12.2 that resulted in fewer submissions, 

yet they were better targeted to the specific gaps. 

• After the fiscal year 2012 NIEs, the Army established a baseline 

network architecture, which is essentially the logical and structural 

design of the Army’s network and includes capabilities such as onthe-move communications, battle command, and position location. 

This baseline architecture incorporates both programs of record and 

commercial technologies. This architecture provides the foundation 

upon which the Army will add future networking capabilities. The Army 

now has an expanded network design that will inform network 

investment decisions; enable the development of tactics, techniques, 

and procedures; and serve as the next baseline for future 

development efforts. Army and DOD planning documents include 

notional enhancements to the baseline architecture, which implement 

a number of design considerations that are intended to reduce 

capability gaps and mitigate risks while enhancing the capability of the 

brigade combat teams. The Army is utilizing its new agile process to 

evaluate systems that could fill identified capability gaps, enhance 

networking, and thus add to the network architecture over time.

• The Army has screened and evaluated government and industry 

proposals in various ways and recently implemented a laboratory 

screening process, from which it accepted and subsequently 

forwarded many candidate solutions for evaluation at an upcoming 

NIE. The Army has conducted four NIEs to date and is implementing 

lessons learned from those events to improve future evaluations. For 

instance, past NIEs included systems that were immature and simply 

not technically ready for the evaluation. The Army believes that its 

enhanced screening efforts will identify systems that are not 

technically ready for the events.

• The Army is already procuring many of the systems planned for its 

first capability set and additional procurements are pending. Based on 

testing and evaluations during prior NIEs, the Army determined the 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

content of capability set 13 and began procuring this equipment this 

past October. All but one of the capability set 13 systems was 

developed through a program of record. In many cases, funding had 

already been identified for these systems. In other cases, the Army 

had to find additional funding for some equipment through 

reprogramming. Soldiers at Fort Drum, New York and Fort Polk, 

Louisiana are receiving capability set 13 equipment and have begun 

training in preparation for deployment later this year. While a detailed 

description of capability set 14 systems is not yet available, they will 

likely include many systems from capability set 13, plus potentially 

other capabilities tested at recent NIEs.

Because the Army’s network modernization effort is a portfolio and not a 

single acquisition program, the Army has not been required to compile an 

estimate of the total costs to develop and field its tactical network across 

the entire Army force structure. However, those costs will be substantial—

at an estimated $3 billion annually, this level of effort could total in excess 

of $60 billion over a 20-year period. For fiscal year 2013, the Army plans 

to invest about $3.8 billion in its network-enabled mission command 

portfolio—about $1 billion in research and development and $2.8 billion in 

procurement (see table 1).

Army Network Strategy 

Expected to Be Very 

Costly Over the Long Term
 

Page 10 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2013 Requested Funding for Network-Enabled Mission 

Command 

Then-year dollars in millions

Program

Research and 

development Procurement Total

Warfighter Information NetworkTactical Increment 2 2.8 785.9 788.7

Joint Tactical Radio System Manpack 

Radio 441.5 441.5

Warfighter Information NetworkTactical Increment 3 275.2 0 275.2

Single Army Logistics Enterprise 120.9 112.7 233.6

Brigade Combat Team Equipment 

Evaluation/NIE 214.3 0 214.3

Defense Satellite Communications 5.7 157.2 162.9

Joint Battle Command-Platform 20.8 141.4 162.2

Nett Warrior 46.8 103.3 150.1

Tactical Battle Command 68.3 52.9 121.2

Mid-tier Networking Vehicular Radio 12.6 86.2 98.8

Warfighter Information NetworkTactical Increment 1 98.3 98.3

Joint Tactical Radio System/Airborne, 

Maritime, Fixed Station Radio 74.0 74.0

Tactical Electric Power 13.6 59.5 73.1

Joint Tactical Radio System Rifleman 

Radio 40.7 40.7

Others $175.5 $649.7 825.2

Mission Command Total 956.5 2803.3 3759.8

Source: U.S. Army.

Those investments are intended for communications transport, 

applications, and network services capabilities. Funding for 

communications transport equipment such as radios and Warfighter

Information Network-Tactical makes up a significant portion of network 

funding.7

 

7

We are currently assessing the Army’s radio and waveform initiatives.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

The Army estimates a need for this level of funding to continue 

indefinitely. In planning documents, the Army assumes that its spending 

within the mission command portfolio—at least out to the 2030s—will be 

about $3 billion annually for procurement plus about $0.5 billion to $1.0 

billion for research and development.8

As the Army prepared to buy and field the first network capability set in 

fiscal year 2013, it did not have funds to complete certain tasks. In June 

2012, it requested a total of $139.4 million in reprogrammed funds from 

other accounts to cover unplanned costs, including vehicle modifications 

to enable network integration ($59.4 million); procurement of various 

radios and ancillary equipment ($51.3 million); and procurement of a 

variety of equipment for tactical operations centers ($28.7 million). Army 

officials have told us that funding for these costs in fiscal year 2014 and 

beyond will be accounted for in future Army budgets.

That level of spending would fund 

the fielding of full capability sets to four brigade combat teams per year 

and basic network capabilities to other operational forces to ensure 

interoperability. The Army would continue to roll out capability sets to 

initially cover all operating forces through the late 2020s and additional 

upgraded capabilities are expected after that. In 2013, the expected level 

of funding is greater than that provided to all but one of the nine Army 

equipment portfolios.

As the Army gets actual cost data on procuring and fielding improved 

network capabilities, it will be in a better position to estimate future costs.

 

8

The mission command portfolio consists of three distinct capability areas: Transport, 

Applications, and Network Services. The Warfighter Information Network—Tactical and 

the Joint Tactical Radio Systems are the primary transport programs; Tactical Battle 

Command, Joint Battle Command—Platform and Global Command Support System—

Army are the key application programs; and communications security with key 

management infrastructure and network management are the key network service 

programs. According to Army officials, the Army integrates these elements into a coherent 

network of sensors, soldiers, platforms, and command posts linked by a robust transport 

network.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Acquisition best practices and DOD policy both emphasize the need for 

the use of mature technologies in acquisition programs. Our prior work 

has found technology readiness levels to be a valuable decision-making 

tool because they can presage the likely consequences of incorporating a 

technology at a given level of maturity into a product’s development.9

Army officials have multiple opportunities to reject a proposed capability 

based on technical maturity and other factors. Interested vendors are 

instructed to submit a detailed white-paper description of their proposed 

solutions and those solutions are evaluated on a variety of factors, 

including technical maturity, compatibility with the Army’s network 

architecture, demonstration in a relevant environment, and ability to meet 

schedule and provide field support for testing. Successful candidate 

systems will then proceed to laboratory-based testing to determine, 

among other things, whether the system is mature enough to be fielded 

and supported, whether the system performs as intended, and whether it 

fits into the network architecture. Successful laboratory-based validation 

results in selected government and industry systems proceeding to the 

NIE.

 To 

date, all the sources sought notices issued as part of the agile process 

have required proposed network solutions to have achieved technology 

readiness level 6, which means a high-fidelity prototype demonstrated in 

a relevant environment, in order to be considered for filling a capability 

gap. Appendix IV contains a complete listing and description of 

technology readiness levels. The Army has established a screening 

process to validate the contractors’ assertions regarding technology 

maturity. Army officials believe this validation process will improve upon 

multiple critiques of previous NIE activities by soldiers and testers, 

including the burdensome number of systems being evaluated, perceived 

military utility of systems, and overall performance of the network 

architecture.

NIE 13.1, which the Army conducted in the fall of 2012, was the first NIE 

for which all systems have been subjected to the entirety of the agile 

process, including the various laboratory exercises. Army officials believe 

the rigor they have built into the agile process will filter out many systems 

that are not quite ready for the NIEs, thus reducing the soldier burden and 

 

9

Technology readiness levels are measures pioneered by the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration and adopted by DOD to determine whether technologies were 

sufficiently mature to be incorporated into a weapon system.

Army Laboratory Expected 

to Validate Technologies in 

Relevant Environment, but 

Effectiveness Uncertain
 

Page 13 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

improving the scores for individual systems and the overall network. 

However, the real success of this approach can only be determined by 

NIE results—particularly whether systems perform as advertised, how 

well they integrate with the network, and the level of military utility 

determined by soldiers and operational testers. The Army received 

preliminary results from NIE 13.1 in December 2012.

The Army defines information assurance as the protection of systems and 

information in storage, processing, or transit from unauthorized access or 

modification; denial of service to unauthorized users; or the provision of 

service to authorized users. It also includes those measures necessary to 

detect, document, and counter such threats, as well as measures that 

protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 

availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. 

This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 

incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

The Army collaborates with the National Security Agency to ensure that 

information assurance issues are addressed early in the NIE process. 

Vendors understand that they need to secure certification from the 

National Security Agency, and the Army has a customer service advocate 

to help in this regard. To implement the certification process, vendors 

complete a product summary questionnaire, detailed proposal, and 

security evaluation, which eventually lead to a security certification from 

the National Security Agency. Vendors must also get certification from 

DOD for communications-security-related equipment.10

One of the specific objectives for NIE 12.2 was to assess and evaluate 

network vulnerabilities. According to Director, Operational Test and 

For over-the-air 

transmissions of communications-security-related items, the NIE requires 

the National Security Agency to issue an over-the-air or interim-approvalto-operate that sets the parameters of how and where the testing can be 

performed on the system. After the NIE, programs of record will work with 

the National Security Agency to make sure any devices that have not 

completed National Security Agency certification complete the tasks 

before systems are fielded.

 

10DOD requires “information systems” to receive DOD Information Assurance Certification 

and Accreditation Process certification with a Designated Accrediting Authority signature 

accepting risks, if any.

Army Plans to Address 

Information Assurance and 

Security Issues during 

Network Integration 

Evaluations 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Evaluation officials, the Army continues to improve threat operations 

during NIEs. NIE 12.2 was the first NIE in which threat information 

operations—for example, when a mock opposition force uses electronic 

warfare tactics such as jamming and network intrusion to try and disrupt 

Army network operations—were fully integrated into the threat 

commander’s allowable tactics. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

officials also noted that an aggressive, adaptive threat that is intent on 

winning the battle is an essential component of good operational testing 

and that the Army should continue to ensure that future NIEs contain a 

robust threat force to include threat information warfare capabilities.

To achieve its tactical network objectives, the Army is changing the way it 

delivers capability to its operating forces. Previous Army efforts to 

develop and field network technologies were seldom coordinated. 

Program funding, developmental timelines, and testing for networkrelated programs were rarely, if ever, aligned. Network capabilities were 

fielded piecemeal and frequently for only one element of the operational 

force, such as at the company, battalion, or brigade level versus an entire 

brigade combat team. In the past, the Army has sent network systems to 

operational units already in theater, leaving soldiers to figure out how to 

use them, resulting in frustrated soldiers and ineffectively utilized 

systems—all of which had negative effects on unit readiness.

The Army is shelving this approach in favor of capability set management, 

where it treats tactical network capability as a cohesive portfolio. After 

evaluating its current operational environment, identifying capability gaps, 

and designing a suite of systems and equipment to address these gaps, 

the Army will procure any elements of the set not already in the Army 

inventory and distribute them throughout a combat formation, from the 

brigade command post, to the commander on-the-move, to the 

dismounted soldier. Capability set management also diverges from the 

past practice of conducting limited user tests of individual systems. The 

Army plans to test the entire capability set to assess its collective 

functionality and interoperability, each component’s individual 

performance and compliance with architectural standards, and whether 

the set works with technology already in use and can accommodate the 

rapid pace of emerging technologies.

The Army plans to integrate fielding of the capability set with the Army’s 

Force Generation process that prepares forces for deployment through 

three force pools: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available (See figure 2).

Army Plans to Synchronize 

Integration of New 

Technology with 

Deployment of Forces
 

Page 15 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Figure 2: Army Force Generation Model

Through capability set management, the Army will align program funding 

and timelines so that operational units—brigade combat teams and other 

operating units—receive an integrated network capability set prior to or 

during the train/ready phase of the Army’s Force Generation cycle.11

 

11For example, two of the units scheduled to receive capability set 2013 are brigades from

the 10th Mountain Division located at Fort Drum, New York and Fort Polk, Louisiana.

The 

Army expects to buy and integrate the elements of capability set 13 with 

the existing Army network and later field it to eight brigade combat teams 

and other operating units. Capability sets will go only to those units in the 

Army’s Force Generation queue available for deployment and will be 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

fielded during the train/ready phase so that operational units are prepared 

when they land in theater. Additionally, rather than committing to 

purchasing any given system or capability in quantities sufficient to outfit 

the entire force at once, the Army will procure only what is needed by 

units entering the deployment pool.

The NIE conducted from late May to early June of 2012 included the 

systems for capability set 13, which is composed of vehicles, network 

components, and associated equipment and software that are intended to 

deliver an integrated voice and data capability throughout the Brigade 

Combat Team. This capability set, illustrated in table 2, will field a 

foundational network baseline, which is based on the integration of 

available satellite-based communications and land radios, upon which 

future capability sets will build.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Table 2: Capability Set 13 Systems 

Satellite based

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2

Tactical Communication Node

Point of Presence 

Soldier Network Extension 

Highband Network Radio 

Tactical Communication Node 

Vehicle Wireless Package

Software 

Blue Force Tracker 2/Joint Capability Release software

Multiple Mission Command system improvements through software upgrades 

Tactical radios

Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit Manpack radio 

PRC 117G radio 

Dismounted Soldier Radio (152A or Rifleman Radio) 

Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué radio 

Soldier networking

Nett Warrior 

Other

Company Command Post Capability

Tactical Operations Center Kit 

Command Post of the Future/Tactical Battle Command 

Tactical Ground Reporting 

Source: U.S. Army.

Fielding for capability set 13 started at the beginning of fiscal year 2013, 

to align with the Army’s deployment cycle. This equipment will provide a 

baseline network solution until the Army’s intended networking radio 

hardware and waveforms are ready for fielding.12

 

12A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the frequency, modulation, 

type, message format, and/or transmission system.

The Army’s deployment 

cycle is schedule driven in that the operating units are expected to arrive 

at their destination in a ready and trained status at predetermined times. 

However, the technical maturity and integration of network capabilities 

may not always occur as expected. In the future, the challenge for the 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Army will be to ensure that the network equipment to be sent to operating 

units has been thoroughly demonstrated and integrated in advance, that 

fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate the deployment 

schedule, and that the process is delivering mature and militarily useful 

capabilities.

The Army’s network strategy and agile process face several other risks 

and challenges as implementation continues. For instance, the Army is 

still weighing different funding approaches and contracting strategies to 

enable rapid production of capabilities. The Army is challenged with (1) 

the inability of some current force vehicles to accommodate new 

networking capabilities, (2) encouraging both industry and existing 

programs to implement new computing technologies and standards that 

will shape future development efforts, and (3) continuing other initiatives 

aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness of the network. The 

network strategy also presents oversight challenges in that the Army has 

not yet (1) fully defined performance metrics that would allow decision 

makers to gauge progress in the portfolio and make informed investment 

decisions and (2) created a consolidated reporting and budgeting 

framework for the network portfolio.

As part of the agile process, Army officials are testing and evaluating 

systems presented at the NIEs for forthcoming capability sets at a rapid 

pace. They are also striving to identify funding methods and contracting 

strategies that allow rapid procurement and fielding of these systems, yet 

are consistent with established acquisition regulations. The processes for 

procuring systems that are already part of a program of record are 

understood. Those programs go through various acquisition steps that 

include developing a requirement, developing and procuring systems to 

meet the requirement, and identifying funds to procure those systems 

through the traditional budgeting process. However, the processes for 

buying systems that are not already established programs is less clear 

due to the fact that items to be bought are not yet known and it can take 2 

years to complete the budget cycle.

The Army has identified a number of possible funding scenarios for 

systems under evaluation that are chosen for procurement after an NIE. 

One option would be to reprogram unobligated funds from other 

programs. Another option available is to procure initial quantities of 

chosen systems from a $25 million procurement fund the Army worked 

into the fiscal year 2013 budget, and obtain follow-on procurements 

Army’s Network 

Modernization 

Strategy and Agile 

Process Face Other 

Risks and Challenges

Army Considering a 

Variety of Options For 

Funding and Procuring 

New Network Capabilities
 

Page 19 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

through the traditional budgeting process. However, the Army seems to 

realize that the reprogramming option may not be available in all cases 

and that the $25 million procurement fund may not be sufficient. 

According to Army officials, a third option would be to allow continued 

development of the proposed capability to proceed in conjunction with 

similar efforts to develop new technologies under DOD’s science and 

technology line of effort. In any event, the Army may face challenges 

given the long lead time for getting items in the budget (up to 2 years), 

and items the Army wants to buy may not be known at the time the 

budget is prepared.

Finally, the Army is looking at various contracting strategies available 

under existing acquisition regulations to enable it to rapidly procure a 

capability. If the capability originated from a program of record, 

procurement would proceed according to the program’s acquisition 

strategy. However, if the capability is not linked to a program of record or 

if multiple contractors could provide a comparable system, the Army will 

most likely look to competitively procure the capability, which could be 

time consuming. If the capability in question is available under a General 

Services Administration schedule, the Army could proceed to order off the 

schedule. However, the Army noted that acquiring such a capability 

without adequate evaluation and testing adds risk that it will not work 

properly in a combat environment.

The Army is still formulating plans for funding and procuring networking 

equipment in capability sets planned for combat brigades in fiscal years 

2014 and beyond. Planning documents we reviewed reflect uncertainty 

about the source of future funding over the next 2 years, noting that 

funding strategies could require reprogramming above thresholds 

allowable at the DOD’s discretion, which would require congressional 

approval. For fiscal years 2016 and beyond, capability sets could be 

included in the fiscal years 2015-2019 planning budget and future budget 

submittals.

A number of the Army’s current fleet of combat and tactical vehicles—the 

Abrams, Bradley, and Paladin—have reached or exceeded their size, 

weight, power, and cooling limit. The Army is managing upgrades to 

these vehicles based on technical advances, cost benefit analyses, and 

alignment with vehicle modernization opportunities. These vehicles will 

receive moderate capability improvements, or interim solutions, until 

modernized vehicles are available to receive full network capabilities. 

Operational needs and changes to combat vehicle modernization plans 

Army Addressing Size, 

Weight, Power, and 

Cooling Challenges of 

Heavy Forces
 

Page 20 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

have led the Army to focus on initially fielding its new network capabilities 

to infantry and Stryker brigades.13

The integration and fielding of network capabilities to the heavy brigades 

cannot occur until the heavy combat vehicles are network-ready. The 

Abrams and Bradley upgrades are expected to begin production in fiscal 

year 2017 and the Paladin upgrade program started developmental 

testing in May 2011 with its first production delivery scheduled for June 

2015. According to the Army, the Stryker, particularly the Double V-Hull 

variant, has proven protection and size, weight, and power capacities to 

accept some of the capability set 13 network-related equipment. Under 

the capability set management process, the Army will complete some 

initial Stryker Brigade Combat Team network modernization two years 

faster than originally planned. The Army is also developing a new ground 

combat vehicle and a joint light tactical vehicle. The challenge for the 

Army will be to align new network technologies with the upgraded and 

newly procured vehicles in a cost effective and efficient manner.

A key component of the Army’s tactical network development strategy is 

to establish technical standards to guide the computing environment. The 

Army has defined and begun to implement a set of computing 

technologies and standards to which the network, all applications, and all 

network systems must comply. The Army believes this Common 

Operating Environment (COE) will reduce development time, lower costs, 

improve interoperability, and ease system maintenance. The value of 

having a COE is that industry will know in advance the standards to which 

it must build solutions, cutting acquisition timelines and, possibly, cost. 

The COE is expected to reduce the complexities of configuration, support, 

and training, making integration of new capabilities with existing 

technology much easier and faster.

The COE, which includes the current network architecture, is intended to 

reduce duplication and redundancy. For example, rather than asking for 

proposals to provide a new network capability that complies with various 

standards and interfaces, the Army would specify that the new capability 

should assume that certain capabilities already reside within the network. 

 

13A brigade combat team is the U.S. Army’s basic deployable unit of maneuver. A Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team is a mechanized infantry force structured around the lightweight 

armored Stryker vehicle.

Army Focusing on Having 

Industry and Programs of 

Record Implement 

Common Operating 

Environment 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

One of the key issues stemming from this initiative is how and when to 

get current programs of record, which number in the hundreds, to fully 

implement the COE. The initial implementation of this convergence has 

already begun and the Army’s goal is to ensure full implementation by all 

programs in 5 years. The Army has already acknowledged some 

challenges it will face in getting current programs of record to fully 

implement the COE, including

• Securing funding—COE convergence is an unfunded requirement at 

present;

• Managing up front and transition costs, which are expected to be high;

• Aligning implementation to lessen potential for disruption to schedule 

and cost of Army acquisition programs;

• Aligning requirements and acquisition processes; and

• Revising current testing methodologies to help facilitate the desired 

pace of technological change.

Technical standardization is necessary to speed development and fielding 

of new capabilities. The COE provides industry the parameters within 

which Army technology (hardware and applications) must fit. The Army 

also mandated a single mode for transmission of information, regardless 

of format; text, voice, video, signal, or other type of data. That mode of 

transmission—which is called “everything over Internet protocol”—brings 

the Army in line with commercial-sector norms and expands the 

possibility of using commercial-off-the-shelf, or near-commercial-off-theshelf solutions, especially for hardware, such as radios. Pre-existing 

standards and nonproprietary Internet protocol and waveforms will enable 

industry to develop products more quickly than previously possible. In 

addition, technology built to common standards will make the testing 

process simpler, and integration with existing systems and software, 

including those of U.S. allies, much easier and faster. However, a 

drawback to the “everything over Internet protocol” policy is that such a 

policy makes Army networks more vulnerable to widely-proliferating, 

Internet-based attacks.

If implemented properly, COE could facilitate improved efficiency for the 

Army’s network development effort including lower costs, lower risks, and 

improved performance. However, COE implementation also represents a 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

potential bottleneck or chokepoint if the challenges discussed above are 

not addressed in an effective and timely manner by the Army.

Over the next several years, to improve efficiency and effectiveness, the 

Army plans to pursue a number of network improvement initiatives such 

as consolidating several separate sensor networks; consolidating a 

number of network planning, monitoring, and other tools; moving toward a 

single set of network tools; and improving the efficiency of command 

posts because commanders need a converged voice, data, imagery, and 

video transport system capability that is reliable and secure in a cyber 

and electronic warfare environment. The Army has also started an 

initiative to identify and manage the costs—including operating and 

support costs—of the Army tactical network. Each of these initiatives 

could be challenging in that it is expected to impact multiple components 

of the emerging network at the same time that the Army is proceeding 

with integration and fielding.

• The Army has identified benefits of taking several existing but 

separate sensor networks and consolidating their capabilities for 

improved efficiency and effectiveness. These networks have separate 

operation centers and employ many different satellites. As a result, 

according to the Army, there is inefficient network utilization and 

limited operational utility. The goal is to consolidate to far fewer 

operational centers and to employ fewer satellites. Among other 

benefits, the consolidation is expected to provide more 

responsiveness, agility, and quality of service. This initiative will begin 

soon and initial parts of the consolidation will be demonstrated in NIE 

13.2.

• The Army has identified a need to consolidate various network 

planning, monitoring, and other tools for better efficiency and 

effectiveness. Currently, network operations tools such as network 

planning, monitoring, and loading devices reside in many individual 

network systems and each are used independently. The consolidation 

initiative will move toward the use of a single set of network tools that 

can deal with issues throughout the network. According to the Army, 

the potential benefits include more network visibility and reduced cost 

and complexity. As the Army identifies opportunities to use common 

tools, officials will adjust the network architecture. The Army plans to 

evaluate the converged tools at forthcoming NIEs.

Army Is Pursuing Other 

Network Initiatives to 

Improve Efficiency and 

Effectiveness
 

Page 23 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

• Another Army initiative involves the integration of existing and new 

elements of command posts, which are made up of many different 

systems and subsystems. Currently, most of the command post 

elements are not integrated, resulting in inefficiencies for the network 

as a whole. This initiative is to incrementally integrate the current 

command post systems and other systems demonstrated at NIEs. As 

a part of that demonstration, the command post architecture will be 

examined closely and standardization implemented wherever 

possible. The Army will also develop new command post operational 

procedures as well as training materials and processes. As it moves 

forward, the Army plans to evaluate the updated command posts at 

the NIEs.

• The initiative, called Resourcing the Portfolio, is to identify and 

manage the costs of the Army network enterprise in various ways. 

During the recent capability portfolio review, the Army looked at the 

operating and support requirements and funding for the various 

mission command systems and found that the projected annual costs 

would be far beyond the current expected funding levels. Those 

additional costs, coupled with the expected costs of future NIEs, 

capability set fielding, and the other new initiatives would have to be 

appropriately addressed in the fiscal years 2014-2018 budget 

planning deliberations. At the same time, the Army wants to find ways 

to reduce the operating and support costs of the various systems that 

are already in the current network as well as those expected to be 

introduced in coming years.

In February 2011, USD(AT&L) designated the Army Tactical Network as 

a special interest portfolio consisting of a set of acquisitions. As part of 

this special designation, the USD(AT&L) directed the Army to provide a 

comprehensive network acquisition strategy to ensure the alignment, 

adaptation, and synchronization of acquisition efforts, including network 

integration and testing. The USD(AT&L) directed the Overarching 

Integrated Product Team Chair for Network to provide periodic portfolio 

reviews. According to USD(AT&L) officials, the Chair for Network 

conducted an initial review in 2011 of the Army’s proposed network 

architecture and its strategy for acquiring, integrating, and fielding the 

network. In that review and subsequent collaboration with the Army, the 

USD(AT&L) officials and staff have (1) provided extensive technical input 

on the soundness of individual network components and whether they are 

in synch with the rest of the capability set and the existing network as a 

whole, and (2) reviewed the acquisition schedules of all the network 

programs of record within the capability set to ensure that they are 

Information and Insights 

from NIEs and 

Consolidated Budgeting 

Could Benefit DOD and 

Congressional Oversight
 

Page 24 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

properly aligned. Also, USD(AT&L) officials and staff have provided input 

as part of acquisition milestone reviews for major programs that are a part 

of the Army network.

DOD has also issued guidance for the measurement of outcomes from IT 

investment portfolios, which would include the network portfolio. DOD’s 

directive, issued in 2005, calls for responsible authorities to “measure[ ]

actual contributions of the portfolio against established outcome-based 

performance measures to determine improved capability as well as to

support adjustments to the mix of portfolio investments, as necessary.” 14

Subsequently, the expectation is that capability set 13 and the entire 

Army network will be evaluated at future NIEs. Optimally, based on those 

evaluations, the Army and USD(AT&L) would have the necessary 

information to determine how capability set 13—as fielded in operational 

units—has actually affected (1) overall network performance, (2) identified 

capability gaps, and (3) essential network capabilities. That could provide 

a basis to determine if any adjustments need to be made to future 

capability sets. However, it is not yet clear whether and how the NIE can 

provide the necessary data and insights on the performance of the 

network as a whole. To date, the NIEs have been focused primarily on 

the operational testing of selected major acquisition programs and the 

operational evaluation of emerging network capabilities. While 

USD(AT&L); Army; and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation officials 

offer that the NIEs present a good opportunity to evaluate the overall 

performance of the network, they concede that they have not designed 

the NIEs to fully focus on that task.

The Army and DOD consider the fielding of capability set 13 as the initial 

output from the Army’s network modernization portfolio but have yet to 

fully define outcome-based performance measures to evaluate the actual 

contributions of the capability set. The Army and USD(AT&L) officials 

point to a set of design considerations that drove the definition of 

capability set 13 as appropriate sources for outcome-based performance 

measures. Those design considerations include (1) robust network 

connectivity from the command post down to the soldier; (2) access to 

unclassified, classified, and coalition networks; and (3) planning, 

configuration, and monitoring of the network.

 

14Department of Defense Directive 8115.01, Information Technology Portfolio 

Management (Oct. 10, 2005).
 

Page 25 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Although the Army is managing its network modernization initiatives as a 

portfolio, the individual programs and initiatives are spread out over a 

variety of research and development and procurement accounts. Budget 

justification and other planning materials for these individual programs 

and initiatives focus mostly on planned activities to move the individual 

system along in the development effort and little on how that system may 

relate to the network as a whole. For the fiscal year 2013 request, the 

network portfolio was made up of over 50 research and development and 

procurement budget elements. At present, these materials do not provide 

insight into the budgets and activities for the tactical network capability 

sets as a whole, which could stymie oversight of the Army network 

development and fielding by congressional committees. A consolidated 

reporting and budgeting framework for all of the programs that are part of 

the tactical network portfolio could yield more consistency and clarity in 

the justifications for Army network initiatives as well as facilitate oversight 

of the strategy’s affordability.

Given less-than-successful past efforts to modernize its information 

network, the Army is making a good faith effort to take a more realistic, 

lower-risk strategy to getting the capability it desires. Specifically, 

leveraging private sector innovation to quickly and incrementally deliver 

technology has advantages over the Army trying to define and develop an 

ultimate long-term solution. Yet, this strategy is only in its initial stages 

and there are a number of implementation challenges that lie ahead. 

Looking ahead, although the Army network strategy is more modest from 

a technology standpoint, it is still a huge transformational effort that will 

affect all aspects of Army operations. The size and scope of the Army’s 

modernization investment deserves high-level oversight attention by both 

the Army and DOD. Effective oversight can reduce risk and improve 

outcomes.

Regarding implementation, DOD and the Army collaborated extensively 

on the technical design of capability set 13 and the Army has proceeded 

with the procurement and fielding of those capabilities. To facilitate 

oversight of the latter phase, it is important for the Army and DOD to 

assess the actual contributions of the initial capability set to be fielded in 

fiscal year 2013 and use the results to inform future investments. 

Establishing outcome-based performance measures will allow the Army 

and DOD to assess progress of network development and fielding and be 

in a position to determine the cost-effectiveness of their investments in 

capability set 13. It will also be important for the Army to assess the cost 

effectiveness of individual initiatives before and during implementation. 

Conclusions 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

The Army and DOD are expecting a lot from future NIEs in terms of 

providing information and insights on the capability sets and the Army 

network as a whole; however, these officials have yet to put a plan in 

place to make this a reality. Finally, as the NIE process begins to provide 

the needed information and insights, DOD oversight would be enhanced 

by an Office of the Secretary of Defense-level review of the actual 

effectiveness and suitability of capability set 13. Such a review should 

consider how capability set 13 actually affected overall network 

performance, capability gaps, and essential network capabilities. This

level of review would be part of the intended periodic reviews and be 

more targeted than the initial review conducted in 2011 and could help to 

ensure that available resources are managed effectively.

It is important for the Army to take the steps necessary to ensure that the 

technologies it procures are fully mature and ready for integration and 

fielding; immature technology delivered faster still puts the Army at risk for 

less than optimum results. Considering nondevelopmental items or 

commercial-off-the-shelf options has the potential benefit of substantially 

lower development time and cost. However, those options may not be 

available to address all of the capability gaps, and some development 

investments may be needed over time. Also, given the realities of the 

federal budgeting process and the time commitments associated with full 

and open competition, it may not be possible to procure all emerging 

technologies immediately. However, if the Army can find a way to procure 

and field new technologies within 2 to 3 years, that is still considerably 

better than a typical development effort that in the past has taken a 

decade or longer. Industry participation may be a lynchpin to the 

continued availability of cutting edge network capabilities, but to date, 

Army procurement of new network technologies from other than programs 

of record has been very limited. The Army/industry relationship will have 

to be carefully monitored and nurtured—that should be a priority for both 

DOD and the Army.

Regarding oversight, the Army’s network investment is a dispersed 

portfolio of efforts funded in a number of places in the budget. While 

network modernization is not defined as a major acquisition program, it is 

a substantial level-of-effort investment that will encompass on the order of 

$3 billion a year indefinitely. The magnitude and duration of the financial 

commitment command attention regarding the affordability of the strategy. 

Increased congressional and DOD oversight of the Army network portfolio 

would benefit from an integrated budget encompassing the Army tactical 

network elements.
 

Page 27 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

In order to enhance oversight of Army network initiatives by the Army, 

DOD, and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretary of the Army to

• define an appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance 

measures to evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and 

future components under the network portfolio, and

• develop and implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the 

necessary information and insights to determine if those performance 

measures have been met.

As additional information is provided, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense identify an oversight body to

• determine how capability set 13—as fielded in operational units—has 

actually impacted overall network performance, capability gaps, and 

essential network capabilities and make recommendations for 

adjustments, as may be necessary, and

• determine how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and militarily 

useful network capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining 

robust industry participation in the process.

To facilitate congressional oversight of the overall affordability of this 

important Army initiative, we also recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate tactical network 

budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget 

submittal.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. Of the five 

recommendations, DOD concurred with two and partially concurred with 

the three other recommendations. DOD’s comments appear in appendix 

V. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated 

as appropriate in the report.

DOD concurred with our recommendations that the Army (1) define an 

appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance measures to 

evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and future 

components under the network portfolio and (2) develop and implement a 

plan for future Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs) to provide the 

necessary information and insights to determine if those performance 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

measures have been met. However, DOD noted that the complexity of 

NIEs will change in the future and that those changes will result in 

outcome-based performance measures changing accordingly. DOD also 

noted that the Army, as well as other military departments and several 

major components, are working collaboratively to define the architecture 

and standards for a Joint Information Environment, which will help focus 

DOD engineering efforts on five specific operational capabilities, including 

network normalization and single security architecture. DOD further noted 

that it is defining metrics and associated minimum values for each 

capability and that the Army’s network modernization strategy and NIEs 

will need to conform to the Joint Information Environment architecture and 

standards. The development of Joint Information Environment 

architecture and standards will be noteworthy to the extent that they 

enhance oversight, reduce risk, and improve outcomes. Regarding our 

recommendation to develop a plan to use future NIEs to provide 

information and insights into how well performance metrics have been 

met, DOD noted that NIEs are not static events and that plans will evolve 

over time. We recognize the dynamic nature of the NIEs and agree 

adjustments to the plan will be necessary and we will monitor the Army’s 

progress in developing and implementing its plan in our continuing review 

of the Army’s tactical network strategy.

DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations regarding an 

oversight role for the Overarching Integrated Product Team Chair for 

Network to determine (1) how capability set 13 has actually impacted 

overall network performance, capability gaps, and essential network 

capabilities; and (2) how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and 

military useful network capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining 

robust industry participation in the process. While noting that the specific 

integrated product team we referenced no longer exists, DOD agreed that 

an Office of the Secretary of Defense-level oversight body needs to be 

identified and chartered to review the Army system-of-systems NIEs.

Such a body would provide oversight of the NIEs and inform the 

acquisition and budget processes. In response to DOD comments, we 

have modified our recommendation to reflect the need for an Office of the 

Secretary of Defense-level oversight body instead of the Overarching 

Product Team Chair for Network that no longer exists. DOD also agreed 

to work with the Army to maintain industry support and participation in the 

agile process. Because the Army is moving out to field capabilities, we 

believe that the oversight body needs to be established expeditiously in 

order to evaluate in near real time the results of NIE 13.1 and the initial 

fielding of capability set 13.
 

Page 29 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate 

network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army 

budget. DOD stated that this recommendation was too broad and unclear, 

noting that the complete Army Network Portfolio is broader than the 

tactical segment addressed in our report. We agreed to clarify and narrow 

the recommendation to consolidate “tactical” network budget elements 

and justifications into a single area of the Army budget. DOD notes that 

the Army has already consolidated many elements of the network in its 

Mission Command portfolio and is developing a structure to align all 

network assets. The purpose of the recommendation is to facilitate 

congressional oversight; therefore, we support actions by the Army to 

increase clarity and visibility to improve congressional oversight of the 

Army’s tactical and other network initiatives.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and 

other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Belva M. Martin

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Our objectives were to (1) examine the extent to which the Army’s agile 

process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness; 

and (2) identify other risks and challenges facing implementation of the 

Army’s agile process and networking in general.

To examine the extent to which the Army’s agile process addresses cost, 

technology maturity, security, and readiness, we interviewed officials from 

the Army’s System of Systems Integration Directorate; the Army Training 

and Doctrine Command; the Army’s Program Executive Office for 

Command, Control, Communications—Tactical; the Army’s Program 

Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors; 

Communications—Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering 

Center; Army G-8; and the Army Test and Evaluation Command. We also 

interviewed officials from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Developmental Test and Evaluation; the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation; and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We analyzed the Army’s 

emerging agile process and evaluated it against acquisition best 

practices, and we toured lab facilities to understand how the Army is 

validating and selecting technologies for network evaluations. We 

reviewed Army programmatic documentation to understand cost 

projections for testing and procuring network equipment under the new 

approach and we analyzed current and prior budget documentation in 

order to evaluate how the Army would resource this approach. We also 

analyzed the Army’s emerging plans for ensuring networking hardware 

receives proper security certifications and reviewed the Army’s 

assessments of recent testing for information assurance and network 

protection. Finally, we reviewed the Army’s agile process to identify the 

fielding strategy for equipping units with emerging networking capabilities.

To identify other risks and challenges, we compared the Army’s agile 

process and overall networking strategy against established policies for 

managing a portfolio of capabilities. We reviewed Army decisions to defer 

network improvements to certain legacy platforms due to acknowledged 

size, weight, and power limitations. We attended test events and an 

industry day and spoke with contractor officials about their experiences 

with the agile process. We also interviewed Army officials to identify other 

networking challenges the Army is addressing concurrent with 

implementation of the agile process.

We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from the 

Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as a 

result.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to January 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Army Mission Command Essential 

Capabilities

Page 32 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Essential network capability Description

Robust Network Transport Capability A converged voice, data, imagery, and video transport layer consisting of line-of-sight and 

beyond line-of-sight means that are reliable, protected, layered, secure, and defended in a 

cyberspace and electronic warfare environment.

Execute Tactical Network Operations Efficient and dynamic allocation of transport resources to maximize mission command 

application and service performance in all conditions and through all phases of operations.

Standard and Sharable Geospatial 

Foundation

Enable all elements of the force to operate on the same map and support real-time 

coordination and collaboration.

Display/Share Relevant Tactical 

Information

Enable the receipt and dissemination of essential information from dismounted soldier to all 

higher echelon command posts.

Enable Collaboration Sharing of ideas and situational awareness within the tactical, operational, and/or strategic 

community of interest.

Create, Communicate, and Rehearse 

Orders 

Collaboratively create, change, distribute and rehearse mission orders (voice, written, and 

graphical) between command posts, platforms, dismounted leaders, and soldiers.

Command and Control on-the-Move Maintain situational awareness and communications while away from the command post 

and moving on the ground or in the air.

Execute Running Estimate Continuously gather, track, and fuse logistic and intelligence and operational information to 

support tactical decision making and continuous assessments.

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, 

and Multinational Interoperability

Coordinate and collaborate with authenticated partners to exchange relevant intelligence 

and operational information

Training Support Support live-virtual-constructive-gaming training environments and enhance mission 

rehearsals

Source: U.S. Army.

Appendix II: Army Mission Command

Essential Capabilities
Appendix III: Highest Priority Army Network 

Capability Gaps and Descriptions

Page 33 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Capability Gap Description

Fusing Operations and Intelligence at 

the Tactical Edge

Commanders and leaders engaged at the tactical edge have very little capability to combine 

local information/intelligence, position location information, processed sensor data and 

intelligence, and higher-level environmental information together to define contextual 

significance/implications and inform understanding, decisions, and actions.

Executing Command and Control Onthe-MoveCommanders and leaders engaged in full spectrum operations require the capability to 

access, filter, share, display, and collaborate on fused operations and intelligence 

information, while operating away from their command post, in air or ground platforms, and 

while dismounted at the tactical edge.

Building a Common Operating Picture Commanders and leaders...have limited capability to access, select, integrate, display and 

share relevant information (geospatially rectified and time stamped) from multiple sources.

Connecting Joint, Interagency, 

Intergovernmental, and Multinational 

(JIIM) Partners

Commanders and leaders engaged in full spectrum operations have limited capability to 

digitally integrate JIIM partners during planning and execution.

Tailoring Network Transport Commanders and leaders lack the capability to dynamically adapt network architecture and 

resources to match network transport capability with the commander’s priorities in support of 

full spectrum operations

Source: U.S. Army.

Appendix III: Highest Priority Army Network 

Capability Gaps and Descriptions
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 34 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and adopted by 

the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine whether technologies 

were sufficiently mature to be incorporated into a weapon system. Our 

prior work has found TRLs to be a valuable decision-making tool because 

they can presage the likely consequences of incorporating a technology 

at a given level of maturity into a product development. The maturity level 

of a technology can range from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that 

can be tested in a realistic environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that 

has proven itself in mission operations (TRL 9). According to DOD 

acquisition policy, a technology should have been demonstrated in a 

relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational environment (TRL 

7) to be considered mature enough to use for product development. Best 

practices of leading commercial firms and successful DOD programs 

have shown that critical technologies should be mature to at least a TRL 

7 before the start of product development.

Table 3: Technology Readiness Levels

Technology readiness level Description

Hardware and

software

Demonstration

environment

1. Basic principles observed 

and reported.

Lowest level of technology readiness. 

Scientific research begins to be translated 

into applied research and development. 

Examples might include paper studies of a 

technology’s basic properties.

None (paper studies and analysis). None.

2. Technology concept 

and/or application 

formulated.

Invention begins. Once basic principles are 

observed, practical applications can be 

invented. The application is speculative and 

there is no proof or detailed analysis to 

support the assumption. Examples are still 

limited to paper studies.

None (paper studies and analysis). None.

3. Analytical and 

experimental critical 

function and/or 

characteristic proof of 

concept.

Active research and development is initiated. 

This includes analytical studies and 

laboratory studies to physically validate 

analytical predictions of separate elements 

of the technology. Examples include 

components that are not yet integrated or 

representative.

Analytical studies and 

demonstration of non-scale 

individual components (pieces of 

subsystem).

Lab.

4. Component and/or 

breadboard. Validation in 

laboratory environment.

Basic technological components are 

integrated to establish that the pieces will 

work together. This is relatively “low fidelity” 

compared to the eventual system. Examples 

include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in a 

laboratory.

Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration 

of non-scale components to show 

pieces will work together. Not fully 

functional or form or fit but 

representative of technically feasible 

approach suitable for flight articles.

Lab.

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 35 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Technology readiness level Description

Hardware and

software

Demonstration

environment

5. Component and/or 

breadboard validation in 

relevant environment.

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 

significantly. The basic technological 

components are integrated with reasonably 

realistic supporting elements so that the 

technology can be tested in a simulated 

environment. Examples include “high fidelity” 

laboratory Integration of components.

High-fidelity breadboard. 

Functionally equivalent but not 

necessarily form and/or fit (size, 

weight, materials, etc.). Should be 

approaching appropriate scale. May 

include integration of several 

components with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate functionality.

Lab 

demonstrating 

functionality but 

not form and fit. 

May include 

flight 

demonstrating 

breadboard in 

surrogate 

aircraft. 

Technology 

ready for 

detailed design 

studies. 

6. System/subsystem 

model or prototype 

demonstration in a 

relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype system, 

which is well beyond the breadboard tested 

for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 

environment. Represents a major step up in 

a technology’s demonstrated readiness. 

Examples include testing a prototype in a 

high-fidelity laboratory environment or in 

simulated operational environment.

Prototype—Should be very close to 

form, fit, and function. Probably 

includes the integration of many new 

components and realistic supporting 

elements/subsystems if needed to 

demonstrate full functionality of the 

subsystem. 

High-fidelity lab 

demonstration 

or 

limited/restricted 

flight 

demonstration 

for a relevant 

environment. 

Integration of 

technology is 

well defined. 

7. System prototype 

demonstration in an 

operational environment.

Prototype near or at planned operational 

system. Represents a major step up from 

TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an 

actual system prototype in an operational 

environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle, 

or space. Examples include testing the 

prototype in a test bed aircraft.

Prototype. Should be form, fit, and 

function integrated with other key 

supporting elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate full functionality of 

subsystem.

Flight 

demonstration 

in 

representative 

operational 

environment 

such as flying 

test bed or 

demonstrator 

aircraft. 

Technology is 

well 

substantiated 

with test data.

8. Actual system completed 

and “flight qualified” 

through test and 

demonstration.

Technology has been proven to work in its 

final form and under expected conditions. In 

almost all cases, this TRL represents the 

end of true system development. Examples 

include developmental test and evaluation of 

the system in its intended weapon system to 

determine if it meets design specifications.

Flight-qualified hardware. Developmental 

test and 

evaluation in the 

actual system 

application.
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 36 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Technology readiness level Description

Hardware and

software

Demonstration

environment

9. Actual system “flight 

proven” through 

successful mission 

operations.

Actual application of the technology in its 

final form and under mission conditions, 

such as those encountered in operational 

test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this 

is the end of the last “bug fixing” aspects of 

true system development. Examples include 

using the system under operational mission 

conditions.

Actual system in final form. Operational test 

and evaluation 

in operational 

mission 

conditions.

Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 37 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 38 GAO-13-179 Army Networks
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 39 GAO-13-179 Army Networks
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 40 GAO-13-179 Army Networks
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 41 GAO-13-179 Army Networks
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-13-179 Army Networks

Belva M. Martin, (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, William R. Graveline, Assistant 

Director; William C. Allbritton; Marcus C. Ferguson; Kristine Hassinger; 

Sean Seales; Robert S. Swierczek; and Paul Williams made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

121030
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