BORDER PATROL

Key Elements of New 

Strategic Plan Not Yet 

in Place to Inform 

Border Security Status 

and Resource Needs

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2012

GAO-13-25

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-13-25, a report to 

congressional requesters 

December 2012 

BORDER PATROL

Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place 

to Inform Border Security Status and Resource 

Needs 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol has 

primary responsibility for securing the 

border between ports of entry, and 

reported that with its 18,500 agents it 

apprehended over 327,000 illegal 

entrants at the southwest border in 

fiscal year 2011. Across Border 

Patrol’s nine southwest border sectors, 

most apprehensions occurred in the 

Tucson sector in Arizona. GAO was 

asked to review how Border Patrol 

manages resources at the southwest 

border. This report examines 

(1) apprehension and other data 

Border Patrol collects to inform 

changes in border security for the 

southwest border and the Tucson 

sector, in particular; (2) how the 

Tucson sector compares with other 

sectors in scheduling agent 

deployment and to what extent data 

show that deployments have been 

effective; and (3) the extent to which 

Border Patrol has identified 

mechanisms to assess resource needs 

under its new strategic plan. GAO 

analyzed DHS documents and data 

from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and 

interviewed officials in headquarters 

and five southwest border sectors 

selected based on cross-border illegal 

activity, among other things. Results 

cannot be generalized across the 

southwest border, but provided insights 

into Border Patrol operations. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO recommends that CBP ensure 

Border Patrol develops milestones 

and time frames for developing 

border security goals and measures 

to assess progress made and 

resource needs. DHS concurred with 

these recommendations.

What GAO Found 

In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported data 

meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions; our 

data analysis showed that apprehensions decreased within each southwest 

border sector and by 68 percent in the Tucson sector from fiscal years 2006 to 

2011, due in part to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border 

Patrol strategic objectives. These data generally mirrored the decrease in 

estimated known illegal entries across locations. Other data are used by Border 

Patrol sector management to assess efforts in securing the border against the 

threat of illegal migration, drug smuggling, and terrorism; and Border Patrol may 

use these data to assess border security at the national level as the agency 

transitions to a new strategic plan. Our analysis of these data indicated that in the 

Tucson sector, there was little change in the percentage of estimated known 

illegal entrants apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years, and 

the percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border 

illegally declined across the southwest border by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 

to 2011. Additionally, the number of drug seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal 

year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011, and apprehensions of aliens from 

countries determined to be at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism increased 

from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 309 in fiscal year 2010, but decreased to 253 in 

fiscal year 2011. 

The Tucson sector scheduled more agent workdays in fiscal year 2011 for 

enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other sectors; 

however, data limitations preclude comparison of overall effectiveness in how 

each sector has deployed resources to secure the border. In fiscal year 2011 the 

Tucson sector scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays for enforcement 

activities, and of these activities, 71 percent were scheduled for patrolling within 

25 miles of the border. Other sectors scheduled from 44 to 70 percent of agent 

enforcement workdays for patrolling the border. Border Patrol sectors assess 

how effectively they use resources to secure the border, but differences in how 

sectors collect and report the data preclude comparing results. Border Patrol 

issued guidance in September 2012 to improve the consistency of sector data 

collection and reporting, which may allow future comparison of performance. 

Border Patrol is developing key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan needed 

to define border security and the resources necessary to achieve it, but has not 

identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing 

performance goals and measures in accordance with standard practices in 

program management. Border Patrol officials stated that performance goals and 

measures are in development for assessing the progress of agency efforts to 

secure the border between the ports of entry, and since fiscal year 2011, DHS 

has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border as an interim 

goal and measure. However, as GAO previously testified, this interim measure 

does not inform program results and therefore limits DHS and congressional 

oversight and accountability. Milestones and time frames could assist Border 

Patrol in monitoring progress in developing goals and measures necessary to 

assess the status of border security and the extent to which existing resources 

and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Border Patrol expects to 

implement other key elements of its strategic plan over the next 2 fiscal years. 

View GAO-13-25. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Letter 1 

Background 6

Apprehensions Have Decreased across the Southwest Border; 

However, Other Data on Illegal Migration, Drug Seizures, and 

Terrorism Also Provide Insights into Border Security 11

Southwest Border Sectors Scheduled Agents Differently across 

Border Zones and Enforcement Activities; Data Limitations 

Preclude Comparison of Overall Effectiveness 24

Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for 

Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the 

New Strategic Plan 31

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 42

Appendix II General Information about Border Patrol Sectors along the 

Southwest Border 50

Appendix III General Information about Border Patrol Stations and 

Zones in the Tucson Sector 54

Appendix IV Comparison of Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy and 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan 59

Appendix V Border Patrol Estimated Known Illegal Entries and 

Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011 60

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Appendix VI Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and 

Distance from the Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 70

Appendix VII Border Patrol Nonenforcement Activities by Southwest 

Border Sector, Fiscal Year 2011 72

Appendix VIII Estimated Illegal Entries by Data Element (Apprehensions, 

Estimated Turn Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 74

Appendix IX Identification Sources for Turn Backs and Got Aways by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011 83

Appendix X Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 85

Appendix XI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 87

Tables

Table 1: Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and Stations Visited by 

GAO, by Border Patrol Sector 44

Table 2: Description of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest 

Border, Including Border Miles and Size, Terrain, and 

Stations 50

Table 3: Descriptions of Border Patrol Stations and Zones in the 

Tucson Sector, including Border Mileage and Size, Terrain, 

and Number of Zones by Distance from the Border 54

Figures

Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border 7
Page iii GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 2: Border Patrol Stations and Zones in Tucson Sector, as of 

April 2012 9

Figure 3: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 

2011 12

Figure 4: Number and Percentage of Border Patrol Apprehensions 

by Distance from the Border in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal 

Years 2010 and 2011 15

Figure 5: Recidivism Numbers and Percentages for Border Patrol 

Apprehensions across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, 

Fiscal Year 2011 17

Figure 6: Number and Percentage of Seizures of Drugs and Other 

Contraband across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, 

Fiscal Year 2011 19

Figure 7: Number and Percentage of Seizures across Southwest 

Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal 

Year 2011 20

Figure 8: Number of Aliens from Special Interest Countries 

Apprehended across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, 

Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 21

Figure 9: Number and Percentage of Aliens from Special Interest 

Countries Apprehended across Southwest Border Patrol

Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011 23

Figure 10: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Deployed to Border 

Zones and Interior Zones across Southwest Border 

Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011 26

Figure 11: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Scheduled across 

Enforcement Activities across Southwest Border Sectors, 

Fiscal Year 2011 27

Figure 12: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, 

Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated 

Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 29

Figure 13: Example of Terrain in the Yuma Sector 52

Figure 14: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Sector 52

Figure 15: Example of Terrain in the El Paso Sector, with the 

United States on the Left of the Border Fence and Mexico 

on the Right 53

Figure 16: Example of Terrain in the Rio Grande Valley Sector 53

Figure 17: Example of Terrain in the Ajo Station Area of 

Responsibility 55
Page iv GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 18: Example of Terrain in the Casa Grande Station Area of 

Responsibility, with the United States on the Right Side of 

the Border Fence and Mexico on the Left 56

Figure 19: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Station Area of 

Responsibility 56

Figure 20: Example of Terrain within the Nogales Station Area of 

Responsibility, with the United States on the Left Side of 

the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right 57

Figure 21: Example of Terrain in the Sonoita Station Area of 

Responsibility near the U.S. Border with Mexico 57

Figure 22: Example of Terrain in the Naco Station Area of 

Responsibility near the U.S. Border with Mexico 58

Figure 23: Example of Terrain in the Douglas Station Area of 

Responsibility with the United States on the Left Side of 

the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right 58

Figure 24: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the San Diego Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 61

Figure 25: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the El Centro Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 62

Figure 26: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the Yuma Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 63

Figure 27: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 64

Figure 28: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the El Paso Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 65

Figure 29: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the Big Bend Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 66

Figure 30: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the Del Rio Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 67

Figure 31: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the Laredo Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011 68

Figure 32: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011 69
Page v GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 33: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the 

Border, Fiscal Year 2010 70

Figure 34: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the 

Border, Fiscal Year 2011 71

Figure 35: Percentage of Border Patrol Agent Nonenforcement 

Workdays Scheduled for Nonenforcement Activities 

across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011 73

Figure 36: Number of San Diego Sector Border Patrol 

Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a 

Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011 74

Figure 37: Number of El Centro Sector Border Patrol 

Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a 

Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011 75

Figure 38: Number of Yuma Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, 

Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated 

Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 76

Figure 39: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, 

Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated 

Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 77

Figure 40: Number of El Paso Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, 

Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated 

Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 78

Figure 41: Number of Big Bend Sector Border Patrol 

Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a 

Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011 79

Figure 42: Number of Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, 

Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated 

Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 80

Figure 43: Number of Laredo Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, 

Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated 

Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 81

Figure 44: Number of Rio Grande Valley Sector Border Patrol 

Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a 

Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011 82
Page vi GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 45: Source of Data Collection for Turn Back and Got Away 

Data across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 

2011 84

Abbreviations

ASIC aliens from special interest countries

BPETS Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EID Enforcement Integrated Database

IMAT Integrated Mission Analysis Tool

OIP Operational Implementation Plan

POE port of entry

SBI Secure Border Initiative

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Page 1 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

December 10, 2012

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ron Barber

House of Representatives

In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported spending over $4 billion 

to secure the U.S. border with Mexico.1 Border Patrol, within CBP, is the 

federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national 

borders between the designated U.S. land border ports of entry (POE).2

In fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol reported apprehending over 327,000 

illegal entrants and making over 17,150 seizures of drugs along the 

southwest border, with Border Patrol’s Tucson sector accounting for the 

greatest percentage of apprehensions and drug seizures.3

Border Patrol is moving to implement a new strategy for securing the 

border. Border Patrol’s 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 

Strategy) focused on improving border security by increasing resources—

 The Tucson 

sector, which has primary responsibility for addressing cross-border 

illegal activity in Arizona, reported making over 38 percent of 

apprehensions and more than 28 percent of all drug seizures reported 

across Border Patrol’s nine southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011.

 

1

This figure represents the estimated percentage of net costs applied to the southwest 

border for CBP’s Border Security and Control Between the Ports of Entry and Border 

Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology programs. 

2

Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide for the arrival at, or departure 

from, the United States.

3

CBP has divided geographic responsibility for border security operations along the 

southwest border among nine sectors, each of which has a headquarters with 

management personnel; these sectors are further divided geographically into varying 

numbers of stations, with agents assigned to patrol defined geographic areas. Border 

Patrol’s Yuma sector is also responsible for patrolling portions of Arizona and California; 

however, the majority of enforcement statistics for Arizona are reported by the Tucson 

sector, which reported apprehending over 124,000 illegal entries and making over 4,800 

seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2011.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

including personnel, infrastructure, and technology—and deploying these 

resources using an approach that provided for several layers of Border 

Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas up to 100 miles 

(referred to as defense in depth).4

You asked us to review the approach used by Border Patrol to deploy and

manage resources along the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona compared 

with approaches used at other southwest border locations. This report 

addresses the following questions: (1) What do data show about 

apprehensions across the southwest border, and in the Tucson sector in 

particular, and what other types of data, if any, does Border Patrol collect 

that inform changes in the status of border security? (2) How does the 

Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared with deployment in 

other southwest border sectors and to what extent do the data show 

these deployments have been effective in securing the border? (3) To 

what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to identify 

resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic plan?

In May 2012 the Border Patrol issued 

the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan). 

Citing the buildup in border resources and the need to use these 

enhanced capabilities most effectively, this new strategic plan 

emphasizes using intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats 

of cross-border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across 

locations; integrating border security operations with other law 

enforcement partners to address threats; and developing rapid response 

capabilities to deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.

In conducting our work, we analyzed agency data related to Border Patrol 

performance and cross-border threats, planning documents, sector 

operational assessments, reports, guidance, and agency strategic plans, 

and held discussions with relevant headquarters and field officials 

concerning border strategy, border enforcement operations, the 

deployment of resources—personnel, technology, and infrastructure—

 

4

Border Patrol operates under several statutes and regulations that set forth the powers of 

immigration and customs officers. For example, Border Patrol agents have the authority, 

without a warrant, to enter private lands (but not dwellings) within 25 miles of the border to 

prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States and to search a railway car, 

aircraft, or vehicle for aliens within 100 miles of the border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), 

8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2); for additional authorities, including those not specifically limited by 

distance from the border, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1357; 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1581, 1589a, 

1595(b); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

and data used to assess the status of border security.5

To assess trends in apprehensions and other types of data used by 

Border Patrol to inform changes in the status of border security across the 

southwest border, and Tucson sector in particular, we obtained relevant 

data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006 through 

2011. We analyzed data on apprehensions, seizures, apprehensions of 

repeat offenders (recidivist rates), and apprehensions of aliens from 

special interest countries (ASIC) by sector to obtain an overall view of 

We obtained 

relevant data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006 

through 2011. We chose this time period because fiscal year 2006 was 

the first full year for which data were available following Border Patrol’s 

implementation of its 2004 Strategy. To assess the reliability of these 

data, we spoke with Border Patrol headquarters officials who oversee the 

maintenance and analyses of the data and with selected sector and 

station officials regarding guidance and processes for collecting and 

reporting data in regard to apprehensions of illegal entrants, seizures of 

drugs and other contraband, and scheduling the deployment of agents 

tracked in Border Patrol databases. We determined that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted visits 

and observed station and checkpoint operations within five Border Patrol 

sectors on the southwest border: San Diego sector, California; Yuma 

sector, Arizona; Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas; and Rio 

Grande Valley sector, Texas. We selected these sectors based on a 

range of factors, including (1) threat level, (2) agency priorities for 

resource deployment, (3) the use of enforcement strategies deemed 

successful by Border Patrol in reducing cross-border illegal activity, and 

(4) varied terrain and operational conditions. Among these five sectors, 

we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to visit based on factors such as 

the level of cross-border illegal activity as defined by Border Patrol data 

and unique characteristics, such as terrain. While the results from our 

visits are not representative of operations and conditions across the 

southwest border, they provided us with an overall understanding of 

Border Patrol operations.

 

5

Border Patrol sectors biannually develop operational assessments that identify and justify 

requests for additional resources to maintain or increase security in their areas of 

responsibility. These assessments are part of Border Patrol’s Operational Requirements 

Based Budget Process, a standardized national planning process that links sector- and 

station-level planning, operations, and budgets.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

changes in cross-border illegal activity.6 For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, 

we also analyzed data for apprehensions, seizures, and apprehensions of 

ASICs by location, in terms of distance from the border.7 Further, we 

analyzed data used by Border Patrol to estimate the number of known 

illegal entries by sector.8

To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment 

compared with deployment in other southwest border sectors and the 

extent to which the data showed these deployments had been effective in 

Although estimated known illegal entry data can 

be compared within a sector over time, these data cannot be compared or 

combined across sectors, as discussed later in this report. We also spoke 

or corresponded with 13 ranchers who operated in the Tucson sector at 

the time of our review to discuss border security issues. We selected 

these ranchers based on input from various entities, including Border 

Patrol and select organizations that are knowledgeable about border 

security issues. While the views of these individuals are not 

representative of those of all ranchers within the Tucson sector, they 

provided us with insights on ranchers’ perspectives.

 

6

For the purposes of this report, apprehensions data include only individuals arrested and 

identified as deportable aliens, in keeping with Border Patrol’s definition. The data do not 

include individuals arrested for illegally crossing the border but determined to be 

nondeportable. Special interest countries are countries determined to represent a potential 

terrorist threat to the United States. While people from these countries may not have ties 

to terrorist activities, Border Patrol agents detain aliens from special interest countries if 

they are in the United States illegally and report these encounters to the local sector 

intelligence agent and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force, 

among others, for further questioning and screening. Apprehension and seizure data for 

fiscal years 2006 through 2009 were queried (i.e., obtained from relevant databases) as of 

April 2012, and data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 were queried as of March 2012. 

Border Patrol officials stated that any differences in our apprehension and seizure 

numbers and those of Border Patrol are due to variances in when the data were 

reported—i.e., Border Patrol reports apprehension and other data on an “end-of-year” 

basis, and therefore agency data do not reflect adjustments or corrections made after that 

reporting date.

7

Fiscal year 2010 was the first full year Border Patrol mandated that the latitude and 

longitude of each apprehension and seizure be recorded. 

8

Border Patrol defines estimated illegal entries as the total number of deportable aliens 

who were apprehended, in addition to the number of entrants who illegally crossed the 

border but were not apprehended either because they crossed back to Mexico—”turn 

backs”—or continued traveling to the U.S. interior and Border Patrol was no longer 

actively pursuing them—”got aways.” We defined these illegal entries as estimated 

“known” illegal entries to clarify that the estimates do not include illegal entrants for which 

Border Patrol does not have reasonable indications of cross-border illegal activity. Turn 

back and got away data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 were queried as of April 2012. 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

securing the border, we analyzed data on Border Patrol’s scheduled 

deployment of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

including the scheduling of agents near the border and the percentage of 

workdays scheduled for enforcement-related activities.9 We interviewed 

Border Patrol headquarters officials regarding agency guidance and 

practices for deploying resources and conducted interviews with Border 

Patrol sector and station officials regarding the processes used and 

factors considered when determining the deployment and redeployment 

of resources. We also analyzed data Border Patrol uses to calculate 

overall effectiveness within sectors to determine if the appropriate mix of 

assets is being deployed and used effectively and efficiently.10

To assess to what extent Border Patrol had developed mechanisms to 

identify resources needed to secure the border under its new 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials from 

the Planning, Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches, and 

analyzed relevant documents, such as Border Patrol planning and policy 

documents, necessary to gain an understanding of Border Patrol’s 

processes for developing and implementing key elements of the strategic 

plan necessary to inform resource requirements for securing the border. 

We compared these processes with standard practices in program 

management for documenting the scope of a project, including the need 

for milestones or time frames for project completion and 

implementation.11

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

To assess to what extent Border Patrol sectors and 

stations had identified the need for additional resources, we analyzed 

southwest border sector operational assessments for fiscal years 2010 

and 2012 and interviewed sector and station officials.

 

9

Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of agent deployment in the field, 

which is to be updated to reflect the most recent deployment changes. Scheduled 

deployment data for fiscal year 2011 were queried as of March 2012, and data for fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010 were queried as of April 2012. 

10Border Patrol’s formula for calculating overall effectiveness adds the number of 

apprehensions and turns backs in a specific sector and divides this total by the total 

number of estimated known illegal entries.

11For example, see the Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 

Management © (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006). 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides further 

details on our scope and methodology.

CBP has divided geographic responsibility for the southwest border 

among nine Border Patrol sectors, as shown in figure 1 (see app. II for 

general information about Border Patrol sectors). Each sector has a 

varying number of stations, with agents responsible for patrolling within 

defined geographic areas. Within these areas, Border Patrol has reported 

that its primary mission is to prevent terrorists and weapons of terrorism 

from entering the United States and also to detect, interdict, and 

apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or smuggle any person or 

contraband across the nation’s borders. 

Background
Page 6 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan

Source: GAO (analysis and photos), Mapinfo (map), Border Patrol (data).

Sector boundry

State line

Sector name

State names

Legend

California Nevada

Arizona New Mexico Oklahoma

Texas

Oceanside

San Diego

Tijuana

Yuma

Tucson

Nogales

Las Cruces

El Paso

Fort Hancock Van Home

Alpine

Marfa

Del Rio

Eagle Pass

Laredo

Rio Grande City

Brownsville

Kingsville

Corpus Christi

Rio Grande Valley

Big Bend

Tucson El Paso

San Diego

Del Rio

El Centro

Laredo

Yuma

Interactive graphic Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border 

Move mouse over the sector name to learn more about the sector.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Each Border Patrol sector is further divided into stations. For example, 

the Tucson sector has divided geographic responsibility across eight 

stations, seven of which have responsibility for miles of land directly on 

the U.S.-Mexico border. Within the station areas Border Patrol refers to

“border zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior 

zones”—those without international border miles. According to Border 

Patrol officials, zones allow sectors to more effectively analyze border 

conditions, including terrain, when planning how to deploy agents. Zone 

dimensions are largely determined by geography and topographical 

features, and zone size can vary significantly. See figure 2 for Tucson 

sector station and zone boundaries (see app. III for general information 

about the Tucson sector stations).
Page 9 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan

Source: GAO (analysis and photos), Border Patrol (data and photo), Mapinfo (map).

Station boundry

Zone boundry

Border zone

Interior zone

Ajo

station

Douglas

station

Naco

stationa

Sonoita

station

Nogales

station

Tucson

station

Casa Grande

station Willcox 

station

0 100.0

miles

Legend

25 miles from border

a

In May 2012 Naco Station was renamed the “Brian A. Terry Border Patrol Station” (Brian A. Terry 

Memorial Act, Pub. L. No 112-113, 126 Stat. 334 (2012)).

Interactive graphic Figure 2: Border Patrol Stations and Zones in Tucson Sector, as of April 2012

Move mouse over the station name to learn more about the station.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and 

types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the 

land border POEs, including collecting estimates on the total number of 

identified—or “known”—illegal entries.12

Border Patrol developed its 2004 Strategy following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, as a framework for the agency’s new priority 

mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the 

United States and to support its traditional mission of preventing aliens, 

smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from crossing U.S. borders 

illegally. The 2004 Strategy was designed to facilitate the buildup and 

deployment of agency and border resources with a focus on ensuring the 

agency had the right mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure 

across locations to secure the border. From fiscal years 2004 through 

2011, the number of Border Patrol agents on the southwest border nearly 

doubled, from about 9,500 to about 18,500; and DHS reported that since 

fiscal year 2006, about $4.4 billion has been invested in southwest border 

technology and infrastructure. Through fiscal year 2010, these resources 

were used to support DHS’s goal to achieve “operational control” of the 

nation’s borders by reducing cross-border illegal activity. The extent of 

operational control—also referred to as effective control—was defined as 

the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to 

detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. At the end of 

fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol reported that across the nearly 2,000 

southwest border miles, resources were in place to apprehend illegal 

activity at the immediate border for 129 southwest border miles, or at 

some distance from the border for an additional 744 southwest border 

miles.

Border Patrol collects these data 

composed of the total number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got 

aways as an indicator of the potential border threat across locations.

13

 

12Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through various sources such as direct 

agent observation, referrals from credible sources (such as residents), camera monitoring, 

and detection of physical evidence left on the environment from animal or human 

crossings. 

At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS transitioned from using 

operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security in 

13Border Patrol reported that for nearly two-thirds of the remaining 1,120 southwest border 

miles, resources were in place to achieve a high probability to detect illegal activity, but 

the ability to respond may be compromised by insufficient resources or inaccessible 

terrain; while for the remaining border miles, insufficient resources or infrastructure 

inhibited detection or apprehension of illegal activity. 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report. DHS established 

an interim performance measure until a new border control goal and 

measure could be developed.

Border Patrol issued its new 2012-2016 Strategic Plan in May 2012, 

stating that the buildup of its resource base and the operations conducted 

over the past two decades would enable the Border Patrol to focus on 

mitigating risk rather than increasing resources to secure the border. In 

contrast to the 2004 Strategy, which also recognized the importance of 

rapid mobility, the leveraging of partnerships, and accurate and useful 

intelligence, the new strategic plan places a greater emphasis on the 

integration of partner resources into operational planning and 

enforcement efforts, particularly partners external to DHS. (See app. IV 

for strategic goals and objectives presented in Border Patrol’s 2004 

Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic Plan.)

Border Patrol apprehensions have decreased in the Tucson sector and 

across the southwest border, and DHS has reported data meeting its goal 

to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. The 

decrease in apprehensions mirrored the decrease in estimated known 

illegal entries within each southwest border sector. Border Patrol officials 

attributed the decrease in apprehensions and estimated known illegal 

entries within southwest border sectors to multiple factors, including 

changes in the U.S. economy. While changes in apprehension levels 

provide useful insight on activity levels, other types of data may also 

inform changes in the status of border security, including changes in the 

percentage of estimated known illegal entries who are apprehended and 

who repeatedly cross the border illegally (recidivist rate), increases in 

seizures of drugs and other contraband, and increases in apprehensions 

of aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) that have been 

determined to be at a potential increased risk of sponsoring terrorism.

Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of 

apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim 

measure for border security as reported in its Annual Performance 

Report. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data meeting its goal to secure 

the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. These data show that 

Border Patrol apprehensions within each southwest Border Patrol sector 

decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring the 

decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each sector. In the 

Tucson sector, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that 

Apprehensions Have 

Decreased across the 

Southwest Border; 

However, Other Data 

on Illegal Migration, 

Drug Seizures, and 

Terrorism Also 

Provide Insights into 

Border Security

Apprehensions Decreased 

at about the Same Rate as 

Estimated Known Illegal 

Entries in the Tucson 

Sector and across the 

Southwest Border
 

Page 12 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

apprehensions decreased by 68 percent from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, 

compared with a 69 percent decrease in estimated known illegal entries, 

as shown in figure 3. (See app. V for additional information.)

Figure 3: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in

Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011

Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and 

estimated known illegal entries within southwest border sectors to 

multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy and successful 

achievement of its strategic objectives.14

 

14Specifically, objectives to (1) deter illegal entries through improved enforcement—

defined as increasing the certainty of apprehensions through the proper mix of assets and

implementing prosecution strategies that establish a deterrent effect in targeted 

locations—and (2) leverage “smart border” technology to multiply the effect of 

enforcement personnel. Border Patrol defines “smart border” technology to include 

camera systems for day/night/infrared operations, sensors, aerial platforms, and other 

systems. 

Border Patrol’s ability to address 

objectives laid out in the 2004 Strategy was strengthened by increases in 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

personnel and technology, and infrastructure enhancements, according to 

Border Patrol officials. For example, Tucson sector Border Patrol officials 

said that the sector increased manpower over the past 5 years through an 

increase in Border Patrol agents that was augmented by National Guard 

personnel, and that CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) provided border 

fencing and other infrastructure, as well as technology enhancements.15

Border Patrol officials also attributed decreases in estimated known illegal 

entries and apprehensions to the deterrence effect of CBP consequence 

programs—programs intended to deter repeated illegal border crossings 

by ensuring the most efficient consequence or penalty for individuals who 

illegally enter the United States. One such multiagency initiative, 

Streamline, is a criminal prosecutions program targeting aliens who 

illegally enter the United States through designated geographic 

locations.16

Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector 

management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the border 

against the threats of illegal migration, smuggling of drugs and other 

contraband, and terrorism. These data show changes in the (1) 

percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) 

percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended 

more than once (repeat offenders), (3) number of seizures of drugs and 

other contraband, and (4) number of apprehensions of persons from 

countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. In addition, 

apprehension and seizure data can be analyzed in terms of where they 

occurred relative to distance from the border as an indicator of progress 

in Border Patrol enforcement efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we 

visited, and our review of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational 

assessments, indicated that sectors have historically used these types of 

 

15The number of Border Patrol agents in Tucson sector increased from nearly 2,600 in 

fiscal year 2006 to about 4,200 in fiscal year 2011, augmented by 9,000 National Guard 

personnel deployed periodically from June 2006 through July 2008 under Operation Jump 

Start. Under SBI, CBP expended approximately $850 million on technology in Arizona

such as wide-area and mobile surveillance systems, to augment Tucson sector 

operations. Other infrastructure as of March 2012 included installation of 352 miles of 

pedestrian fencing and 299 miles of vehicle fencing along the southwest border, for a 

combined total of 651 miles of fencing. 

16Federal entities participating in Streamline are CBP, the U.S. Attorneys’ Office, the U.S. 

Marshals Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Department of 

Justice Executive Office of Immigration Review.

Other Border Patrol Data 

Provide a Broader 

Perspective on Changes in 

Border Security Related to 

Illegal Migration, 

Smuggling of Drugs and 

Other Contraband, and 

Terrorism
 

Page 14 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

data to inform tactical deployment of personnel and technology to 

address cross-border threats; however, the agency has not analyzed 

these data at the national level to inform strategic decision making, 

according to Border Patrol headquarters officials. These officials stated 

that greater use of these data in assessing border security at the national 

level may occur as the agency transitions to the new strategic plan.

The 2004 Strategy recognized that factors in addition to apprehensions 

can be used to assess changes in Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts to 

secure the border, including changes in the percentage of estimated 

known illegal entrants who are apprehended (apprehensions as a 

percentage of estimated known illegal entrants), and changes in the 

number and percentage of apprehensions made closer to the border.17

Our analysis of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed little 

change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who were 

apprehended by the Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years. 

Specifically, our analysis showed that of the total number of estimated 

known aliens who illegally crossed the Tucson sector border from Mexico 

each year, Border Patrol apprehended 62 percent in fiscal year 2006 

compared with 64 percent in fiscal year 2011, an increase of about 2 

percentage points. Results varied across other southwest border sectors, 

as shown in appendix V.

Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the percentage of estimated 

known illegal entrants who are apprehended is primarily used to 

determine the effectiveness of border security operations at the tactical—

or zone—level but can also affect strategic decision making. The data are 

also used to inform overall situational awareness at the border, which 

directly supports field planning and redeployment of resources.

Over the last fiscal year, however, Border Patrol apprehensions across 

the southwest border and in the Tucson sector have occurred closer to 

the border. In the Tucson sector, for example, the percentage of 

apprehensions occurring more than 20 miles from the border was smaller 

in fiscal year 2011 than in fiscal year 2010, while a greater percentage of 

 

17In February 2011 we testified that “number of apprehensions” is an output measure and 

as such is a useful indicator of activity levels but does not necessarily reflect an 

improvement in enforcement effectiveness. See GAO, Border Security: Preliminary 

Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2011).

Apprehensions Compared with 

Estimated Known Illegal 

Entries
 

Page 15 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

apprehensions in fiscal year 2011 occurred more than 5 to 20 miles from 

the border, as shown in figure 4. There was little change in the 

percentage of apprehensions within 1 mile of the border. Similarly, 

apprehensions across the southwest border have also moved closer to 

the border over time, with the greatest percentage of apprehensions 

occurring more than 5 to 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011. 

(See app. VI for additional information.)

Figure 4: Number and Percentage of Border Patrol Apprehensions by Distance from

the Border in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

Of the 13 ranchers we spoke or corresponded with in the Tucson sector, 

6 said they would like to see Border Patrol enforce closer to the border to 

prevent illegal entry and trespass on their properties. Generally, these 

ranchers indicated that the level of illegal migrants coming across their 

properties had declined, but said the level of drug smuggling had 

remained constant. They were most concerned about safety, but cited 

considerable property damage and concerns that illegal trafficking had 

affected land values and driven up costs in the ranching industry. Border 

Patrol officials in the Tucson sector said that some factors precluding 

greater border presence included terrain that was inaccessible or created 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

a tactical disadvantage, the distance from Border Patrol stations to the 

border, and access to ranches and lands that were federally protected 

and environmentally sensitive. Border Patrol officials also said they have 

taken steps to address factors that prevent closer access to the border, 

such as establishing forward operating bases—permanent facilities in 

remote locations near the border—and substations closer to the border, 

and working with ranchers and the federal government to ensure access 

to protected lands.

The 2004 Strategy stated that changes in the percentage of persons 

apprehended who have repeatedly crossed the border illegally (referred 

to as the recidivism rate) is a factor that Border Patrol considers in 

assessing its ability to deter individuals from attempting to illegally cross 

the border. Our analysis of Border Patrol apprehension data showed that 

the recidivism rate has declined across the southwest border by about 6 

percentage points from fiscal year 2008 to 2011 in regard to the number 

of apprehended aliens who had repeatedly crossed the border in the prior 

3 years.18 Specifically, our analysis showed that the recidivism rate 

across the overall southwest border was about 42 percent in fiscal year 

2008 compared with about 36 percent in fiscal year 2011.19

 

18We used a rolling 3-fiscal year time period to determine the percentage of 

apprehensions of deportable aliens in a given year who had previously been apprehended 

for illegally crossing the border in any of the previous 3 years, at any southwest border 

location. We used four rolling 3-fiscal year time periods because our analysis covered a 5-

year period and required comparable time periods to assess recidivism in each fiscal year. 

Using a single time period would result in a bias given that some apprehensions in earlier 

years would be incorrectly classified as nonrecidivist. 

The Tucson 

sector had the third highest recidivism rate across the southwest border in 

fiscal year 2011, while the highest rate of recidivism occurred in El Centro 

sector, as shown in figure 5. According to Border Patrol headquarters 

officials, the agency has implemented various initiatives designed to 

19Changes in the recidivism rate could be due to factors other than the deterrent effect of 

Border Patrol’s enforcement activities, such as changes in the U.S. economy.

Repeat Offenders 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

address recidivism through increased prosecution of individuals 

apprehended for crossing the border illegally.20

Figure 5: Recidivism Numbers and Percentages for Border Patrol Apprehensions

across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011

The 2004 Strategy identifies the detection, apprehension, and deterrence 

of smugglers of drugs, humans, and other contraband as a primary 

objective. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that data regarding 

seizures of drugs and other contraband are good indicators of the 

effectiveness of targeted enforcement operations, and are used to identify 

trends in the smuggling threat and as indicators of overall cross-border 

 

20Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan emphasizes the importance of the application 

of appropriate consequences to illegal entrants. As previously discussed, Border Patrol 

has developed a new Consequence Delivery System that guides management and agents 

in evaluating each individual apprehended and identifying the ideal consequence to break 

the smuggling cycle. Consequences delivered under the system include administrative, 

criminal prosecution, and programmatic elements that are designed to stem the flow of 

illegal activity. 

Seizures of Drugs and Other 

Contraband
 

Page 18 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

illegal activity, in addition to potential gaps in border coverage, risk, and 

enforcement operations. However, these officials stated that these data 

are not used as a performance measure for overall border security 

because while the agency has a mission to secure the border against the 

smuggling threat, most smuggling is related to illegal drugs, and that drug 

smuggling is the primary responsibility of other federal agencies, such as 

the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations.21

Our analysis of Border Patrol data indicated that across southwest border 

sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83 percent 

over the past 5 fiscal years, with drug seizures accounting for the vast 

majority of all contraband seizures. Specifically, the number of drug and 

contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 

in fiscal year 2011. Most seizures of drugs and other contraband occurred 

in the Tucson sector, with about 28 percent, or 5,299, of the 18,898 

southwest border seizures occurring in the sector in fiscal year 2011, as 

shown in figure 6.

 

22

 

21According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, increasing and sustaining certainty of 

arrest is critical to the success of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, as it places 

emphasis on applying capabilities against the greatest risk. By managing risk, the agency 

can better respond to transnational criminal organizations and their efforts. A key objective 

is to increase and sustain certainty of arrest of illegal border crossers regardless of their 

intent or cargo.

22Drugs accounted for the vast majority of all contraband seizures. Although drug seizures 

increased 81 percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, the percentage of all 

contraband seizures that were drug seizures compared with the percentage of all 

contraband seizures remained nearly constant, averaging about 93 percent over this time 

period.
 

Page 19 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 6: Number and Percentage of Seizures of Drugs and Other Contraband 

across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011

Further analysis of these data in the Tucson sector showed that the 

percentage of drugs and other contraband seized closer to the border— 

5 miles or less—decreased slightly from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 

2011. Specifically, the Tucson sector made 42 percent of drug and other 

contraband seizures within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2010, and 

38 percent within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. Across other 

southwest border sectors, the distance from the border where seizures 

occurred varied, as shown in figure 7. For example, about 49 percent of 

the seizures in the El Centro sector occurred within 1 mile of the border in 

fiscal year 2011 compared with less than 7 percent of seizures within 1 

mile of the border in the El Paso sector. Border Patrol headquarters 

officials stated that variances in data across sectors reflect geographical 

and structural differences among Border Patrol sectors—each sector is 

characterized by varying topography, unique ingress and egress routes, 

land access issues, and differing technology and infrastructure 

deployments, all of which affect how a sector operates and therefore the 

ability to make seizures at or near the border.
 

Page 20 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 7: Number and Percentage of Seizures across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal 

Year 2011

The 2004 Strategy identified the detection and prevention of terrorists and 

their weapons from entering the United States between the ports of entry 

as a primary objective. ASICs are considered to pose a greater potential 

risk for terrorism than other aliens, and Border Patrol headquarters 

officials said that they collect data on the number of ASIC apprehensions 

in accordance with the reporting and documentation procedures outlined 

in policy and guidance. However, Border Patrol headquarters officials 

stated that they did not consider changes in the number of ASICs 

apprehended in their assessment of border security because until 

recently, they had been primarily focused on reducing the overall number 

of illegal entries, and that terrorism was addressed by multiple agencies 

besides the Border Patrol, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

within the Department of Justice.

Apprehensions of Aliens Posing 

a Potential Increased Risk for 

Terrorism
 

Page 21 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions of ASICs 

across the southwest border increased each fiscal year from 239 in fiscal 

2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011. 

The Rio Grande Valley sector had more than half of all ASIC 

apprehensions across the southwest border in both fiscal years 2010 and 

2011, as shown in figure 8.

Figure 8: Number of Aliens from Special Interest Countries Apprehended across 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
 

Page 22 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Further analysis of these data showed differences in progress to 

apprehend ASICs closer to the border in support of Border Patrol’s overall 

intention to prevent potential terrorist threats from crossing U.S. borders. 

For example, Rio Grande Valley sector nearly doubled the percentage of 

ASICs apprehended within 1 mile of the border from the preceding fiscal 

year, from 26 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 48 percent in fiscal year 2011. 

In contrast, ASIC apprehensions within 1 mile of the border in Tucson 

sector decreased from 26 percent in fiscal 2010 to 8 percent in fiscal year 

2011.23

 

23Most—85 percent—of Tucson sector ASIC apprehensions occurred more than 20 miles 

from the border.

Across the southwest border, the greatest percentage of ASICs 

was apprehended more than 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011, 

as shown in figure 9. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they are 

transitioning to a new methodology to identify the potential terrorist risk in 

fiscal year 2013. This new methodology will replace the use of a countryspecific list with a range of other factors to identify persons posing an 

increased risk for terrorism when processing deportable aliens.
 

Page 23 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 9: Number and Percentage of Aliens from Special Interest Countries Apprehended across Southwest Border Patrol 

Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011
 

Page 24 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

The Tucson sector scheduled a higher percentage of agent workdays to 

enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other 

southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011.24 However, until recently 

sectors have differed in how they collect and report data that Border 

Patrol used to assess its overall effectiveness in using resources to 

secure the border, precluding comparison across sectors. In September 

2012, Border Patrol issued new guidance on standardizing data collection 

and reporting practices that could increase data reliability and allow 

comparison across locations.

Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy provided for increasing resources and 

deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several 

layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas 

100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as defense in depth). 

According to CBP officials, as resources increased, Border Patrol sought 

to move enforcement closer to the border over time to better position the 

agency to ensure the arrest of those trying to enter the country illegally.25

 

24Although the Border Patrol deployment database uses the term “manday” when referring 

to the scheduled deployment of agents, for the purposes of this report we use the term 

“agent workday.” Both refer to the measure of staff hours equal to those of an agent who 

works a shift of 8 hours per day. Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of 

agent deployment in the field, which is to be updated to reflect the most recent 

deployment changes. Deployment figures referred to in this report therefore may be for 

scheduled, not actual, agent deployment.

Headquarters and field officials said station supervisors determine (1) 

whether to deploy agents in border zones or interior zones, and (2) the 

types of enforcement or nonenforcement activities agents are to perform. 

Border Patrol officials from the five sectors we visited stated that they 

used similar factors in making deployment decisions, such as intelligence 

showing the presence of threat across locations, the nature of the threat, 

and environmental factors including terrain and weather.

25According to Border Patrol officials, enforcement includes efforts of Border Patrol agents 

to deter cross-border illegal activity, apprehend aliens who illegally cross the border, and 

seize drugs and other contraband.

Southwest Border 

Sectors Scheduled 

Agents Differently 

across Border Zones 

and Enforcement 

Activities; Data 

Limitations Preclude 

Comparison of 

Overall Effectiveness

Factors Affecting Agent 

Deployment in Border 

Zones Include Local

Terrain, Infrastructure, and 

Technology, but Most 

Sectors Schedule Agents to 

Patrol the Border
 

Page 25 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed differences across sectors in 

the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border zones and 

interior zones in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, our analysis showed that 

while Tucson sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to border 

zones in fiscal year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border zones by 

other southwest border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the Yuma 

sector to 53 percent in the El Centro sector, as shown in figure 10.26

 

26For the Tucson sector specifically, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that there 

had been a slight increase in the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border 

zones compared to interior zones in the last 5 fiscal years. Specifically, our analysis 

showed that 43 percent of Tucson sector agent workdays were scheduled for deployment 

in border zones in fiscal year 2011 compared with 39 percent in fiscal year 2006.

Border Patrol officials attributed the variation in border zone deployment

to differences in geographical factors among the southwest border 

sectors—such as varying topography, ingress and egress routes, and

land access issues, and structural factors such as technology and 

infrastructure deployments—and stated that these factors affect how 

sectors operate and may preclude closer deployment to the border. 

Additionally, many southwest border sectors have interior stations that 

are responsible for operations at some distance from the border, such as 

at interior checkpoints generally located 25 miles or more from the border, 

which could also affect their percentage of agent workdays scheduled for 

border zones.
 

Page 26 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 10: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Deployed to Border Zones and Interior 

Zones across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011

Southwest border sectors scheduled most agent workdays for 

enforcement activities during fiscal years 2006 to 2011 and the activity 

related to patrolling the border accounted for a greater proportion of 

enforcement activity workdays than any of the other activities. Sectors 

schedule agent workdays across various activities categorized as 

enforcement or nonenforcement.27

 

27The percentage of total agent workdays scheduled for deployment across enforcement 

activities compared to nonenforcement activities in fiscal year 2011 ranged from a low of 

66 percent in the Yuma sector to a high of 81 percent in the Big Bend sector. The Tucson 

sector scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays across enforcement activities in fiscal year 

2011.

Across enforcement activities, our 

analysis of Border Patrol data showed that all sectors scheduled more 

agent workdays for “patrolling the border”—activities defined to occur 

within 25 miles of the border—than any other enforcement activity, as 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

shown in figure 11.28 Border Patrol duties under this activity include 

patrolling by vehicle, horse, and bike; patrolling with canines; performing 

sign cutting; and performing special activities such as mobile search and 

rescue. Other enforcement activities to which Border Patrol scheduled 

agent workdays included conducting checkpoint duties, developing 

intelligence, and performing aircraft operations. (See app. VII for a listing 

of nonenforcement activities.) 

Figure 11: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Scheduled across Enforcement Activities 

across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011 

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

 

28Data on the extent to which these activities occurred at the immediate border were not 

available. 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall 

effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and placement 

of personnel and assets are being deployed and used effectively and 

efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol headquarters. Border 

Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a formula in which it 

adds the number of apprehensions and turn backs in a specific sector 

and divides this total by the total estimated known illegal entries—

determined by adding the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and got 

aways for the sector.29

Our analysis of Tucson sector apprehension, turn back, and got away 

data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 showed that while Tucson 

sector apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60 percent of 

estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported turn backs 

increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while the percentage 

of reported got aways decreased from about 33 percent to about 13 

percent, as shown in figure 12. As a result of these changes in the mix of 

turn backs and got aways, Border Patrol data showed that enforcement 

effort, or the overall effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20 

percentage points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67 

percent to 87 percent. (See app. VIII for additional information.)

Border Patrol sectors and stations report this 

overall effectiveness rate to headquarters. Border Patrol views its border 

security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs 

as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the 

number of got aways as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries 

has decreased.

 

29Border Patrol officials stated that only entrants who can be traced back to a cross-border 

entry point in a border zone are to be reported as got aways. These officials also noted 

that while the agency strives to minimize variance in the collection of these data by using 

standard terminology and consistent collection and reporting methods, in many cases the 

determination of a turn back or got away depends on agent judgment. Patrol agents-incharge are responsible for ensuring that Border Patrol agents are aware of the integrity of 

data collection at their respective stations and field commanders must ensure the accurate 

counting of got away data for reconciling possible inconsistencies in data between 

operational boundaries.

Data Limitations Preclude 

Comparing Effectiveness 

of Resource Deployment 

across Locations
 

Page 29 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 12: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and 

Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011

Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the nine 

sectors on the southwest border improved from fiscal years 2006 through 

2011. The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease 

in the overall effectiveness rate, from 86 percent to 68 percent, during this 

time period. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in 

how sectors define, collect, and report turn back and got away data used 

to calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude comparing 

performance results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials 

stated that until recently, each Border Patrol sector decided how it would 

collect and report turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices 

for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors and stations 

based on differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and 

terrain. In terms of defining and reporting turn back data, for example, 

Border Patrol headquarters officials said that a turn back was to be 

recorded only if it is perceived to be an “intended entry”—that is, the 

reporting agent believed the entrant intended to stay in the United States, 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

but Border Patrol activities caused the individual to return to Mexico.30

According to Border Patrol officials, it can be difficult to tell if an illegal 

crossing should be recorded as a turn back, and sectors have different 

procedures for reporting and classifying incidents. In terms of collecting 

data, Border Patrol officials reported that sectors rely on a different mix of 

cameras, sign cutting, credible sources, and visual observation to identify 

and report the number of turn backs and got aways.31

According to Border Patrol officials, the ability to obtain accurate or 

consistent data using these identification sources depends on various 

factors, such as terrain and weather. For example, data on turn backs 

and got aways may be understated in areas with rugged mountains and 

steep canyons that can hinder detection of illegal entries. In other cases, 

data may be overstated—for example, in cases where the same turn back 

identified by a camera is also identified by sign cutting. Double counting 

may also occur when agents in one zone record as a got away an 

individual who is apprehended and then reported as an apprehension in 

another zone. As a result of these data limitations, Border Patrol 

headquarters officials said that while they consider turn back and got 

away data sufficiently reliable to assess each sector’s progress toward 

border security and to inform sector decisions regarding resource 

deployment, they do not consider the data sufficiently reliable to 

compare—or externally report—results across sectors.

 (See app. IX for 

additional information.)

Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012 

to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection 

and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors. 

Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence to 

the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected that once 

the guidance is implemented, data reliability will improve. This new 

 

30Officials said that sometimes illegal entrants can be “drop offs” or “decoys” to lure 

agents away from a specific area so others can cross, such as smugglers returning to 

Mexico to pick up another load, or an individual crossing the border to steal an item and 

take it back to Mexico.

31“Camera” indicates that one of the remote cameras caught sight of an individual; “sign 

cut” indicates that an agent encountered foot prints that led him/her to believe that an 

unauthorized crossing took place; “credible source” indicates a report by a non-Border 

Patrol witness, who could be a local law enforcement agent, a citizen, or a ground sensor; 

“visual” indicates an agent actually witnessed an unauthorized crossing. 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and inform 

decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the southwest 

border.

Border Patrol does not yet have performance goals and measures in 

place necessary to define border security and determine the resources 

necessary to achieve it. Border Patrol officials said that they had planned 

to establish such goals and measures by fiscal year 2012, but these 

efforts have been delayed, and are contingent on developing and 

implementing key elements of its strategic plan. Further, Border Patrol is 

in the process of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the 

2012-2016 Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs 

across locations, and expects to begin developing a process for 

assessing resource needs and informing deployment decisions across 

the southwest border once key elements of its strategic plan have been 

implemented in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.

Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of 

developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress 

of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the 

identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but 

has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and 

implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of 

apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim 

performance goal and measure for border security as reported in its 

Annual Performance Report. In February 2011, we testified that DHS 

intended to use this indicator as an interim performance goal and 

measure until it completed development of new border control 

performance goals and measures, which DHS officials expected to be in 

place by fiscal year 2012.32

 

32See GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for 

the Southwest Border, 

However, as of September 2012, DHS had 

not yet issued new performance goals and measures for assessing 

border security or identified revised milestones and time frames for 

developing and implementing them.

GAO-11-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2011).

Border Patrol Has Not 

Yet Developed Goals 

and Measures for 

Assessing Efforts and 

Identifying Resource 

Needs under the New 

Strategic Plan

Border Patrol Has Not 

Established Milestones 

and Time Frames for 

Developing Performance 

Goals and Measures
 

Page 32 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

We previously testified that the interim goal and measure of number of 

apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides 

information on activity levels, but it does not inform program results or 

resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore until new 

goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience 

reduced oversight and DHS accountability.33 Further, studies 

commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of 

apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency 

officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border 

illegal activity.34

According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time 

frames for the development of performance goals and measures is 

contingent on the development of key elements of the 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan, such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency’s time 

frames for implementing these key elements—targeted for fiscal years 

2013 and 2014—are subject to change. Specifically, under the 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan, the Border Patrol plans to continuously evaluate border 

security—and resource needs—by comparing changes in risk levels 

against available resources across border locations. Border Patrol 

officials stated the agency is in the process of identifying performance 

goals and measures that can be linked to these new risk assessment 

tools that will show progress and status in securing the border between 

POEs, and determine needed resources, but has not established 

milestones and time frames for developing and implementing goals and 

measures because the agency’s time frames for implementing key 

elements of the plan are subject to change.35

 

33See GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts, 

Standard practices in 

program management call for documenting the scope of a project as well 

as milestones and time frames for timely completion and implementation 

GAO-12-688T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012).

34For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona 

Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005). 

35Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol have established a 

performance goal—linked to relevant measures—addressing border security that, as of 

October 2012, was being used as an internal management indicator. However, a DHS 

official said it has not been decided whether this goal and the associated measures will be 

publicly reported or used as an overall performance goal and measures for border 

security. 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

to ensure results are achieved.36 These standard practices also call for 

project planning—such as identifying time frames—to be performed in the 

early phases of a program and recognize that plans may need to be 

adjusted along the way in response to unexpected circumstances. Time 

frames for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan 

can change; however, milestones and time frames for the development of 

performance goals and measures could help ensure that goals and 

measures are completed in a timely manner. Moreover, milestones and 

time frames could better position CBP to monitor progress in developing 

and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and 

Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the 

border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and 

capabilities are appropriate and sufficient.

Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they were in the process 

of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs across 

locations, and expect to begin developing a process for assessing 

resource needs and informing deployment decisions across the 

southwest border once those key elements have been implemented. 

Border Patrol officials said that they planned to develop and implement 

key elements of the new strategic plan in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.

According to Border Patrol officials, the Border Patrol 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan identifies several key elements that are to inform agency 

resource needs and deployment decisions. Border Patrol officials 

reported in September 2012 that they were in the process of developing 

an implementation plan that is to lay out how key elements of the new 

strategic plan are to be implemented. Border Patrol officials reported that, 

in general, key elements of the strategic plan are to be developed and 

implemented during fiscal years 2013 and 2014. According to agency 

officials, key strategic plan elements to be addressed by the 

implementation plan that are to inform agency resource needs and 

deployment decisions include (1) a process for identifying risk that is to

inform resource decisions, (2) the enhancement of mobile response 

capabilities to redeploy resources to address the shifts in threat, and (3) 

 

36The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management© (Newtown 

Square, Penn., 2006). 

Border Patrol Is in the 

Process of Implementing 

Key Elements of the 

Strategic Plan and a 

Process for Assessing 

Resource Needs

Implementation of the New 

Strategic Plan 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

an approach to integrate partner resources and contributions to enhance 

Border Patrol capabilities (“whole-of-government” approach).37

• Risk assessment tools. In September 2012, Border Patrol officials 

said they were in the process of developing two tools that are to be 

used in the field to identify and manage risk under the agency’s new 

risk management approach. The first tool for assessing risk is the 

Operational Implementation Plan (OIP), a qualitative process that 

prioritizes sector evaluations of border security threats and identifies 

potential responses. Border Patrol is developing a second tool—a 

quantitative model called the Integrated Mission Analysis Tool 

(IMAT)—that is to, among other things, assess risk and capability by 

predicting and identifying the need for various courses of action, such 

as the rapid response of resources to the highest risks. Actions are to 

be assessed based on a comparison of agency capability with risk. In 

contrast to the OIP, the IMAT is to be completed at the zone level by 

stations; consolidated station outputs may then be used by sectors to 

inform the OIP process. The IMAT is to use data from various sources 

to develop a “Border Assessment of Threat” of known or potential 

threats by zone and compare that assessment with a point-in-time 

operational assessment of each sector’s capability to determine to 

what extent current capability—including resources—matches the 

 Border 

Patrol officials told us that these elements are interdependent and must 

be developed, refined, and disseminated to the field to strengthen the 

effectiveness of the new strategic plan. According to these officials, 

delays in the development of one element would likely affect the 

development of others. For example, delays in implementing the new risk 

assessment tools could affect sectors’ ability to identify appropriate 

responses to changing levels of risk.

 

37Other key elements of the new strategic plan that might inform resource decision making 

are “Change Detection Capability” (a tactical strategy to evaluate low-threat areas for 

changes in threat levels and increase situational awareness), “Leverage Technology” (the 

process whereby Border Patrol manages requirements for existing and emerging 

technology based on mission and capability gaps), and “Targeted Enforcement” (the use 

of intelligence and analysis to focus deployment of capabilities to prevent and disrupt 

terrorist and transnational threats). According to Border Patrol officials, these elements are 

to be developed through the application of multiple processes, such as the agency’s new 

risk model and its overall process for assessing resource needs. 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

perceived risk.

38 On the basis of the outcome, the station can then 

choose from various predetermined courses of action to address the 

perceived level of risk, such as reallocating resources or leveraging 

external—law enforcement partner—resources.39

According to Border Patrol officials, both the OIP and the IMAT are to 

identify risk and potential responses at the sector level. However, 

these tools will not allow Border Patrol to assess and prioritize risks 

and response options across sectors.

Once the IMAT is 

fully implemented, Border Patrol plans for the resulting outputs to be 

used to reassess and inform OIP decision making; information from 

both systems is to be used to inform resource needs and deployment 

decisions after the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan has been implemented.

40

 

38According to Border Patrol officials, the IMAT is to be developed by surveying stations to 

assess capabilities and assets. Once it is implemented, the field surveys are to be 

updated once every quarter, or as needed, with threat intelligence and other data to 

assess risk levels. CBP components and law enforcement partners are to be identified in 

“partnership” assessments, and their resources and capabilities are to be considered but 

not specifically assessed. 

Moreover, agency officials 

said that when the IMAT is fully deployed, in fiscal year 2014, it will 

not have the capacity to differentiate among threats related to 

terrorists and their weapons, drugs and other illegal contraband, and 

illegal migration (such as recidivism, in which individuals repeatedly 

cross the border illegally). Border Patrol officials said the agency 

plans to explore mechanisms for developing these capabilities—

assessing risk across sectors and differentiating threat—once OIP 

and IMAT have been developed and implemented in fiscal year 2014. 

According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, as of August 2012, 

the agency was in the process of pilot testing the OIP and the IMAT in 

the field and expected to begin to initially implement the OIP and 

populate the IMAT through a web-based program that will record 

baseline data on threat and operational conditions throughout fiscal 

year 2013.

39For example, if risk is greater than sector capability, Border Patrol could choose to 

deploy urgent solutions or develop new capabilities based on the nature of the risk. 

40According to Border Patrol officials, the IMAT can aggregate risks and capabilities at the 

station, sector, and agency levels, but zones, stations, and sectors must be adjacent to 

one another to allow comparison.
 

Page 36 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

• Rapid deployment of resources. A second key element of the 2012-

2016 Strategic Plan is to increase mobility and rapid deployment of 

personnel and resources to quickly counter and interdict threats 

based on shifts in smuggling routes and tactical intelligence. As we 

testified in May 2012, CBP reported expanding the training and 

response capabilities of the Border Patrol’s specialized response 

teams to support domestic and international intelligence-driven and 

antiterrorism efforts as well as other special operations.41 Additionally, 

Border Patrol officials stated that in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol 

allocated 500 agent positions to provide a national group of 

organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are 

capable of rapid movement to regional and national incidents in 

support of high-priority CBP missions. However, we testified in May 

2012 that Border Patrol officials had not fully assessed to what extent 

the redeployment of existing resources would be sufficient to meet 

security needs, or when additional resources would need to be 

requested.42

• Integrated partner resources. A third key element of the 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan is the capability of Border Patrol and federal, state, 

local, and international partners working together to quickly and 

appropriately respond to changing threats through the timely and 

effective use of personnel and other resources.

In September 2012, Border Patrol officials said they had 

not yet developed a process for assessing the need for, or 

implementation of, rapid deployment of existing resources to mitigate 

changing risk levels along the border, but expected to do so after 

programs and processes—key elements—identified in the strategic 

plan have been more fully developed. In the interim, deployment 

decisions—such as the redeployment of agents and mobile 

technology to border areas identified as having greater, or 

unacceptable, levels of risk—are to be made at the sector level.

43

 

41GAO-12-688T. 

According to the 

42Our review of Border Patrol operational assessments showed that Border Patrol 

reported difficulty maintaining border control in areas from which resources had been 

redeployed. Border Patrol stations within six of the nine southwest border sectors reported 

that agent deployment to other stations have affected their own deployment and 

enforcement activities. See GAO-12-688T. 

43Border Patrol officials stated that he 2012-2016 Strategic Plan is predicated on Border 

Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners working together to use a 

risk-based approach to secure the border, and therefore an assessment of capability is to 

include the leveraging of all partner resources, including CBP component resources.
 

Page 37 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

new strategic plan, this “whole of government” approach will be 

achieved through various efforts, including the expansion of 

operational integration (the combining of best practices, capabilities 

and strategies among partners) and jointly planned targeted 

operations (the leveraging of combined partner assets to address 

risks), the development and fusion of intelligence, and the creation of 

integrated partnerships (the sharing of resources, plans, and 

operations among partners). In December 2010, we recommended 

that CBP develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess, 

and integrate available partner resources in its operational 

assessments and resource planning documents.44 CBP concurred 

with this recommendation, but as of June 2012, Border Patrol had not 

yet required partner resources to be incorporated into operational 

assessments or into documents that inform the resource planning 

process.45

According to Border Patrol officials, since the beginning of fiscal year 

2011, as the agency began transitioning from the 2004 resource-based 

strategy to the 2012-2016 risk-based strategic plan, the Border Patrol has 

been using an interim process for assessing the need for additional 

personnel, infrastructure, and technology in agency sectors. Border Patrol 

officials said that resource needs using this interim process are intended 

to maintain the current status of border security, and will be used until key 

elements of the strategic plan—such as the OIP and the IMAT—that are 

necessary to develop a new process have been implemented in fiscal 

years 2013 and 2014. Under this interim process, Border Patrol has 

maintained, with some exceptions, personnel and resource levels 

Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the agency 

has yet to finalize interim milestones for integrating partner resources 

into Border Patrol operational assessments and resource planning 

documents because it is still in the process of determining how 

partner resources are to be integrated; however, Border Patrol plans 

to have a process in place for that purpose in fiscal year 2014.

 

44GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency 

Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO-11-97 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 

2010).

45According to Border Patrol officials, CBP components and law enforcement partners are 

identified in “partnership assessments”; partner resources and capabilities are taken into 

account, but not specifically assessed. 

Process for Assessing Resource 

Needs 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

established in fiscal year 2010, the last year in which operational control 

was used as a performance goal and measure for border security.46

According to Border Patrol officials, under the new risk management 

approach, the need for additional resources will be determined in terms of 

unacceptable levels of risk caused by illegal activity across border 

locations. Moreover, in considering ways to mitigate elevated risk levels, 

Border Patrol will look to mechanisms other than resource enhancement 

for expanding capacity, such as the rapid redeployment of resources from 

locations with lower risk levels and the leveraging of partner resources 

(i.e., a “whole of government” approach). Border Patrol officials said that 

use of the new risk assessment tools—the OIP and the IMAT—in making 

decisions for resource requests will be made at the sector level. Until a 

new process for identifying resource needs has been developed, sectors 

will continue to use annual operational assessments to reflect specific 

objectives and measures for accomplishing annual sector priorities, as 

well as identifying minimum budgetary requirements necessary to 

maintain the current status of border security in each sector.

Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the resource levels 

established at the end of fiscal year 2012 are to serve as a baseline 

against which future needs are assessed, and that the personnel and 

infrastructure in place across the southwest border by the end of fiscal 

year 2012 should be sufficient to support the agency’s transition to a riskbased strategy for securing the border. Key elements—such as the OIP 

and the IMAT—of the strategic plan are necessary to evaluate the need 

for resources; until these elements are in place, Border Patrol sectors are 

to continue to request resources they have identified as necessary to 

maintain the current status of border security. However, our review of 

Border Patrol’s fiscal year 2012 operational assessments showed that 

sectors have continued to show concerns about resource availability. For 

example, all nine southwest border sectors reported a need for new or 

replacement technology to detect and track illegal activity, six southwest 

border sectors reported a need for additional infrastructure (such as all-

 

46According to Border Patrol officials, in fiscal year 2011, some sectors received additional 

resources that were allocated in prior years as part of Border Patrol’s plans to attain 

operational control at the southwest border. Of these, Tucson sector was the largest 

recipient, receiving an additional 500 agent positions and additional technology and border 

infrastructure. Border Patrol officials said that beginning in fiscal year 2010, Tucson sector 

was designated as a high-priority area, with an emphasis on reducing the high levels of 

estimated known illegal entries, apprehensions, and seizures. 
 

Page 39 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

weather roads), and eight southwest border sectors reported a need for 

additional agents to maintain or attain an acceptable level of border 

security.47 Border Patrol officials stated that at the time these operational 

assessments were developed—in fiscal year 2011—the agency had yet 

to transition to the new risk-management approach under the 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan and sectors were continuing to assess resource needs 

according to the 2004 resource-based model.48 According to these 

officials, Border Patrol has determined that for fiscal year 2013 resource 

levels for most of the southwest border will remain constant, with the 

exception of the Tucson and Rio Grande Valley sectors, because of 

budget constraints. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency 

recognizes the need to develop a new process for assessing resource 

needs under the new risk management focus of the 2012-2016 Strategic 

Plan and that this process will be different from the prior system, which 

focused on increasing resources and activities at the border rather than 

using existing resources to manage risk. As Border Patrol is in the initial 

stages of developing and implementing the key elements of its 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan, it is too early to assess how Border Patrol will identify the 

level of resources needed to secure the border under the new plan.

Securing the nation’s borders against the evolving threat of terrorism and 

transnational crime is essential to the protection of the nation. 

Recognizing the importance of establishing secure national borders, DHS 

has dramatically increased resources and activities at the southwest 

border over the past several years to deter illegal border crossings and 

secure the border.

With increased levels of resources and activities now in place, Border 

Patrol intends to transition from a resource-based approach to securing 

the nation’s borders to a risk management approach that seeks to 

leverage existing resources to manage risk. Given the nation’s ongoing 

need to identify and balance competing demands for limited resources, 

linking necessary resource levels to desired outcomes is critical to 

 

47For example, one southwest border station reported a need for fixed and movable 

technology to secure the remote and rugged terrain, reporting that without this technology, 

rapid response was often impossible. 

48According to Border Patrol officials, under the operational control performance goal and 

measure, sector operational assessments were used to identify resources needed in the 

following fiscal year to attain operational control at the border. 

Conclusions
 

Page 40 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

informed decision making. Accordingly, milestones and time frames—

established as soon as possible—for the development of performance 

goals that define the levels of security—or risk—to be achieved at the 

border could help ensure that goals are developed in a timely manner. 

The establishment of such goals could help guide future border 

investment and resources decisions. Similarly, milestones and time 

frames for developing and implementing performance measures under 

the new strategic plan that are linked to the Border Patrol’s goal for 

securing the border could better ensure accountability and oversight of 

the agency’s programs by better positioning it to show progress in 

completing its efforts. Once established, border security performance 

goals and measures would also support Border Patrol’s efforts to assess 

whether the key elements—programs and processes—of its new strategic 

plan have brought the agency closer to its strategic goal of securing the 

border.

To support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic 

Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the nation’s strategic 

goal for securing the border, we recommend that the Commissioner of 

Customs and Border Protection ensure that the Chief of the Office of 

Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for developing

• a performance goal, or goals, for border security between the POEs 

that defines how border security is to be measured and

• a performance measure, or measures—linked to a performance goal 

or goals—for assessing progress made in securing the border 

between POEs and informing resource identification and allocation 

efforts.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS 

provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix X, 

and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS 

concurred with our recommendations for the agency to establish 

milestones and time frames for developing performance goals and 

measures for border security between the POEs, and stated that it plans 

to establish such milestones and time frames by November 30, 2013. 

Establishing these milestones and time frames would meet the intent of 

our recommendations, but doing so as soon as possible, as we reported, 

would better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and 

implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 41 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the 

border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and 

capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Further, DHS indicated that 

Border Patrol cannot unilaterally develop a performance goal for border 

security and define how it is to be measured, but can develop 

performance goals that will likely become key components of an 

overarching goal for border security. Since our recommendations were 

directed at Border Patrol establishing milestones and time frames for 

developing such goals and measures focused on border security between 

the POEs, we believe that DHS’s proposed actions for Border Patrol in 

this area would meet the intent of our recommendations, as Border Patrol 

has primary responsibility for securing the border between POEs. Such 

actions would help provide oversight and accountability for border 

security between the POEs, support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 

2012-2016 Strategic Plan, and help identify the resources needed to 

achieve the goal for securing the border. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees, as 

appropriate. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix XI.

Rebecca Gambler

Acting Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

The report addresses the following three questions:

• What do data show about apprehensions across the southwest 

border, and in the Tucson sector in particular, and what other types of 

data, if any, does Border Patrol collect that inform changes in the 

status of border security?

• How does the Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared 

with deployment in other southwest border sectors and to what extent 

do the data show these deployments have been effective in securing 

the border?

• To what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to identify 

resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic plan?

In conducting our work, we gathered information and interviewed officials 

from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) and the Office of Border Patrol. Specifically, we 

analyzed agency data related to Border Patrol performance and crossborder threats; policy, planning, and budget documents; sector 

operational assessments; border security reports; operations manuals; 

and strategic plans provided by Border Patrol.1

 

1

According to Border Patrol officials, Border Patrol sectors biannually develop operational 

assessments that identify and justify requests for additional resources to maintain or 

increase security in their areas of responsibility. These assessments are part of Border 

Patrol’s Operational Requirements Based Budget Process, a standardized national 

planning process that links sector- and station-level planning, operations, and budgets. 

These assessments are developed by Border Patrol sectors; CBP has divided geographic 

responsibility for the southwest border—between land ports of entry (POE)—among nine 

Border Patrol sectors. Each sector has a headquarters staffed with management 

personnel and each includes a varying number of stations, with agents responsible for 

patrolling within defined geographic areas. 

We interviewed Border 

Patrol headquarters officials regarding data collection and analysis 

procedures, strategic planning, operational assessments, and border 

security programs and activities. We obtained relevant data from DHS 

and Border Patrol databases for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We 

chose this time period because fiscal year 2006 was the first full year for 

which data were available following Border Patrol’s implementation of its 

2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). To assess the 

reliability of these data, we spoke with Border Patrol headquarters 

officials who oversee the maintenance and analyses of the data and with 

select sector and station officials regarding guidance and processes for 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

collecting and reporting data in regard to apprehensions of illegal 

entrants, seizures of drugs and other contraband, and scheduling the 

deployment of agents tracked in a Border Patrol database. We 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report.

We conducted visits to five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the 

southwest border—San Diego sector, California; Yuma sector, Arizona; 

Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas; and Rio Grande Valley 

sector, Texas. We selected these sectors based on differences in (1) the 

level of threat as defined by Border Patrol data, (2) agency priorities for 

resource deployment, (3) the level of operational control achieved in fiscal 

year 2010, (4) the use of enforcement strategies deemed successful by 

the Border Patrol in reducing cross-border illegal activity, and (5) varied 

terrain.2

 

2

From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DHS used operational control as its performance 

goal and outcome measure for assessing security of the border between the ports of 

entry. The extent of operational control—also referred to as effective control—was defined 

as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond 

to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. We analyzed the operational control status for 

each of the southwest border sectors as of the end of fiscal year 2010, the last year for 

which DHS used operational control as a measure of border security.

Within these sectors we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to 

visit based on factors such as the level of cross-border illegal activity as 

defined by Border Patrol data and unique characteristics such as terrain 

and topography. We visited both “border stations”—those having 

international border miles—and “interior stations”—those without 

international border miles. Because Border Patrol officials identified the 

Tucson sector as the highest-priority sector for resource deployment in 

fiscal year 2011 and it had the highest level of cross-border illegal activity, 

we conducted site visits to each of the eight stations. (See table 1 for the 

Border Patrol sectors and stations we visited and the location of each 

station relative to the border.) While we cannot generalize the conditions 

we found at these Border Patrol sectors and stations to all southwest 

border locations, they provided us with an overall understanding of the 

range of operating conditions across the southwest border, as well as 

differences in how sectors and stations assess border security and deploy 

resources.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Table 1: Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and Stations Visited by GAO, by Border 

Patrol Sector

Sector Stations 

San Diego • Chula Vista (border station)

• Brown Field (border station)

• San Clemente (interior station)

Yuma • Yuma (border station)

• Wellton (border station)

Tucson • Ajo (border station)

• Casa Grande (border station)

• Tucson (border station)

• Nogales (border station)

• Sonoita (border station)

• Naco (border station)

• Douglas (border station)

a

• Willcox (interior station)

El Paso • Lordsburg (border station)

• El Paso (border station)

• Fabens (border station)

• Fort Hancock (border station)

Rio Grande Valley • Rio Grande City (border station)

• McAllen (border station)

• Harlingen (border station)

• Brownsville (border station)

Source: GAO.

a

In each location we observed conditions, including the use of personnel, 

technology, and infrastructure, and conducted semistructured interviews 

with Border Patrol sector and station officials.

In May 2012 the Naco station was renamed the Brian A. Terry Border Patrol Station (Brian A. Terry 

Memorial Act, Pub. L. No 112-113, 126 Stat. 334 (2012)). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

To assess trends in apprehensions,3 seizures, and other types of data 

Border Patrol uses to inform changes in the status of border security 

across the southwest border and in the Tucson sector, we obtained 

Border Patrol data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 from DHS and 

Border Patrol databases—apprehensions and seizure data from the 

Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and estimated cross-border 

illegal activity data from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System 

(BPETS).4 Because of the complexity and amount of the data sets we 

requested, Border Patrol queried apprehension and seizure data in two 

groups, with different run dates.5

 

3

Although Border Patrol arrests both deportable aliens and nondeportable individuals 

whom they encounter during patrol activities, for the purposes of this report we define 

“apprehensions” to include only deportable aliens, in keeping with Border Patrol’s 

definition. According to the Immigration and Nationalization Act, deportable aliens include 

those who are inadmissible to the United States or present in violation of U.S. law, who 

have failed to maintain their status or violated the terms of their admission, or who have 

committed certain criminal offenses or engaged in terrorist activities, among others. (See 

8 U.S.C. § 1227 for a complete list of the classes of deportable aliens.) In some cases, 

Border Patrol apprehends a deportable alien but turns the individual over to another 

agency prior to initiating a removal. Aliens with lawful immigration status and U.S. citizens 

would be considered nondeportable.

We analyzed Border Patrol 

apprehension and seizure data by sector for each fiscal year to obtain an 

overall view of cross-border illegal activity over time and the types of 

threats in each sector. In addition, we analyzed apprehension data to 

identify the number of repeat offenders (recidivism rate) and aliens from 

special interest countries (ASIC) apprehended across years by sector, as 

indicators of the extent to which deportable aliens with increased levels of 

4

The EID is a DHS-shared common database repository for several DHS law enforcement 

and homeland security applications. Data on apprehensions and seizures are held in the 

EID; data on scheduled deployment of agents are held in BPETS. 

5

Fiscal years 2010 and 2011 apprehension and seizure data were queried as of March 

2012; data for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 data were queried as of April 2012. Border 

Patrol officials stated that any differences in our apprehension and seizure numbers and 

those of Border Patrol are due to variances in when the data were “queried,” or reported—

i.e., Border Patrol reports apprehension and other data on an “end-of-year” basis, and 

therefore agency data do not reflect adjustments or corrections made after that reporting 

date.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 46 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

associated risk were apprehended.6 For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, we 

also analyzed data showing the location of apprehensions, seizures, and 

apprehensions of ASICs relative to their distance from the border.7

We also analyzed data Border Patrol uses to assess estimated known 

illegal entries (cross-border illegal activity) within each sector.8 Although 

estimated known illegal entry data can be compared within a sector over 

time, these data cannot be compared or combined across sectors as 

discussed in this report. Because of the complexity and amount of data 

we requested, Border Patrol provided these data in two queries, with 

different run dates.9

 

6

Our measurement of recidivism, using a rolling 3-fiscal year time period, is the 

percentage of apprehensions of deportable individuals in a given year who had previously 

been apprehended for illegally crossing the border in any of the previous 3 years, at any 

southwest border location. In contrast, Border Patrol calculates recidivism by dividing the 

total number of recidivists (individuals who have two or more apprehensions during a 

specified time period) by the total number of unique subjects (individuals who may 

account for one or multiple apprehensions, but are counted only once within a specified 

time period and location). We used four rolling 3-fiscal year time periods rather than 

Border Patrol’s methodology because our analysis covered a 5-year period and required 

comparable time periods to assess recidivism in each fiscal year. Using a single time 

period would result in a bias given that some apprehensions in earlier years would be 

incorrectly classified as nonrecidivist. 

We also interviewed relevant Border Patrol 

7

Border Patrol began mandating the collection of longitude and latitude coordinates for all 

apprehensions and seizures in May 2009, therefore fiscal year 2010 was the first full year 

for which these data were available. We used these data to determine how far away from 

the border apprehensions and seizures occurred within each southwest border sector in 

fiscal years 2010 and 2011. To perform these analyses, we compared Border Patrol data 

on the longitude and latitude of apprehensions and seizures with agency mapping data, 

which allowed us to determine distance from the border. Although we determined that the 

latitude and longitude coordinates for some apprehensions and seizures were invalid—

e.g., they were identified as occurring outside U.S. national boundaries—the numbers 

were not significant and we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. Location data that were determined to be invalid were not included 

in our analysis. 

8

Border Patrol’s estimate includes the number of deportable aliens who were apprehended 

as well as the number of individuals who illegally crossed the border but were not 

apprehended (individuals who either crossed back to Mexico—”turn backs”—or continued 

traveling to the U.S. interior and Border Patrol was no longer actively pursuing them—”got 

aways”). Border Patrol refers to these data as “estimated illegal entries”—it does not identify 

the data as “known” entries because the agency does not estimate illegal entries for which it 

does not have reasonable support (“unknown” entries). However, to clarify that these 

estimates are based on what Border Patrol deems to be reasonable indications of crossborder illegal activity, we refer to them as “estimated known illegal entries.” 

9

Apprehensions, turn back, and got away data for fiscal years 2006-2010 were queried on 

April 9, 2012. These data for fiscal year 2011 were queried on April 20, 2012.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 47 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

headquarters and field officials regarding the maintenance of these data, 

and how the agency analyzes the data to inform the status of border 

security. In addition, we spoke or corresponded with 13 ranchers who 

operated in the Tucson sector at the time of our review to discuss border 

security issues. We selected these ranchers based on input from various 

entities, including Border Patrol and select organizations that are 

knowledgeable about border security issues. Because this selection of 

ranchers was a nonprobability sample, the results from our discussions 

cannot be generalized to other ranchers; however, what we learned from 

the ranchers we contacted provided a useful perspective on the issues 

addressed in this report.

To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment 

compared with other southwest border sectors and to what extent the data 

showed these deployments had been effective in securing the border, we 

analyzed Border Patrol BPETS data regarding the scheduled deployment 

of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also 

analyzed to what extent agents were scheduled for deployment in “border 

zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior zones”—

those without international border miles.10 Because of the complexity and 

amount of the data sets we requested, Border Patrol queried deployment 

data in two groups, with different run dates.11

We also interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials in the Planning, 

Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches regarding agency guidance 

and practices for allocating and deploying resources—personnel, 

technology, and infrastructure. In addition, we conducted semistructured 

interviews with Border Patrol sector and station officials regarding the 

processes used and factors considered when determining the deployment 

and redeployment of resources. Further, we analyzed data from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011 that Border Patrol uses to calculate overall 

effectiveness within sectors and to determine if the appropriate mix of 

 

 

10Border Patrol stations are geographically divided into border and interior zones. 

11Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of agent deployment in the field, 

which is to be updated to reflect the most recent deployment changes. Scheduled 

deployment data for fiscal year 2011 were queried as of March 2012, and data for fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010 were queried as of April 2012.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 48 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

assets is being deployed and used effectively and efficiently.12

To assess to what extent Border Patrol has identified mechanisms for 

assessing resource needs under the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic 

Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan), we analyzed key elements of the 

strategic plan defined by Border Patrol. To gain a better understanding of 

Border Patrol’s plans for developing and implementing key elements of 

the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, including processes for identifying resource 

needs and the extent to which officials have identified interim milestones 

and time frames, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials from 

the Planning and Analysis Branches, and analyzed relevant documents, 

such as Border Patrol planning and policy documents. We also reviewed 

standard practices in program management for documenting the scope of 

a project, including milestones or time frames for project completion and 

implementation.

We also 

interviewed Border Patrol headquarters and station officials regarding 

agency practices for collecting and recording these data and how those 

practices may vary across sectors. As previously discussed, because of

potential inconsistencies in how the data are collected, these data cannot 

be compared across sectors but can be compared within a sector over time 

as discussed in more detail in this report. In addition, we reviewed Border 

Patrol guidance issued in September 2012 regarding the collection and 

reporting of effectiveness data.

13 To assess to what extent Border Patrol sectors and 

stations had identified the need for additional resources, we interviewed 

sector and station officials and analyzed southwest border sector 

operational assessments for fiscal years 2010 and 2012. We analyzed 

operational assessments for fiscal year 2010 because that was the last 

fiscal year in which DHS used operational control as a performance goal 

and measure, and for fiscal year 2012 because it was the most current 

fiscal year available at the time we conducted our analysis.

 

12Border Patrol’s formula for calculating overall effectiveness adds the number of 

apprehensions and turns backs in a specific sector and divides this total by the total 

number of estimated known illegal entries, determined by adding total apprehensions, 

turns backs, and got aways for the sector. 

13For example, The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 

Management© (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 49 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: General Information about Border 

Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border

Page 50 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 1. Table 2 

describes, for each of the nine sectors on the southwest border, the (1) 

number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of terrain; and 

(3) number and type (border or interior) of stations. Figures 13 through 16 

illustrate the types of terrain that can be found in four of the nine sectors.

Table 2: Description of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border, Including Border Miles and Size, Terrain, and 

Stations 

Sector Border miles and size Terrain Stations 

San Diego About 60 land border miles 

and 114 coastal miles; 

approximately 56,830 

square miles

The San Diego sector contains one of the most densely 

populated areas in the United States with more than 7 

million people and includes the sixth largest city (San 

Diego) in the nation. Sector terrain includes beaches, 

estuaries, coastal plains, steep canyons and ravines, high 

desert, mountains over 6,000 feet in elevation, and 

sparsely populated remote and rural wilderness areas. 

The sector also includes environmentally sensitive and 

protected areas. 

Eight Border Patrol stations 

(six border and two interior)

El Centro About 70 land border miles; 

approximately 107,750 

square miles

The El Centro sector contains many different 

environments from mountains on the west side to sand 

dunes on the east side of the sector. Terrain is largely 

composed of rugged mountains, agricultural areas, and 

low-lying desert areas. In addition, the geography of the 

sector also Includes a designated wilderness area and 

several military reservations, as well as large areas of 

desert that have been designated as critical habitat for 

threatened species. 

Four Border Patrol stations 

(two border and two 

interior)

Yuma About 126 land border 

miles; approximately 

181,670 square miles

The Yuma sector contains sandy desert terrain, 

mountains, and river valleys, as shown in figure 13. There 

are sand dunes and several mountain ranges with 

elevations over 4,000 feet. In addition, large portions of 

the Yuma sector fall within federal land and military 

reservations. The federal land and military ranges are 

highly sensitive areas, because of environmental issues 

and range safety concerns. During the monsoon season 

in late summer and early fall, rains and flash flooding 

normally occur. 

Three Border Patrol 

stations (two border and 

one interior)

Tucson About 260 land border 

miles; approximately 90,500 

square miles

The Tucson sector contains many different environments, 

including mountain ranges and valleys, as shown in figure 

14. Two major metropolitan areas exist within the sector’s 

geography—Tucson and Phoenix. There are also several 

protected areas (federal lands) within the sector totaling 

approximately 12,080 square miles; some of these public 

lands are adjacent to the border (approximately 178 

miles). The sector also contains two American Indian 

reservations, with one that includes 63 miles of border 

with Mexico. 

Eight Border Patrol stations 

(seven border and one 

interior); one substation

Appendix II: General Information about 

Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest 

Border 
Appendix II: General Information about Border 

Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border

Page 51 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Sector Border miles and size Terrain Stations 

El Paso About 268 border miles

(land and river border); 

approximately 125,000 

square miles

The El Paso sector contains various types of terrain, 

including mountains and arid desert—with canyons, rocky 

hills, and mountains—rivers and deep, swift-moving 

irrigation canals and an urban metropolitan area, as 

shown in figure 15. The sector covers border miles in 

both New Mexico and Texas. The El Paso sector has 

responsibility for 88 miles of river border and 180 miles of 

land border. The washes and playas (dry lakebeds) in the 

sector are susceptible to flash flooding during the JulyOctober monsoon season.

Eleven Border Patrol 

Stations (seven border and 

four interior)

Big Bend About 510 land border 

miles; approximately 

165,150 square miles

The Big Bend sector contains terrain that varies from dry 

sandy desert to cedar- and oak-covered hills and also 

includes remote and rugged mountainous terrain, ranging 

from elevations of 2,800 to 8,000 feet above sea level. 

The sector also contains a border river area, which 

includes areas of thick vegetation. The Big Bend sector 

contains the most border miles of all the Border Patrol 

sectors on the southwest border. 

Ten Border Patrol stations 

(seven border and three 

interior); two substations 

(one border and one 

interior)

Del Rio About 210 border miles 

(river border); approximately 

59,540 square miles

The Del Rio sector contains terrain that varies from 

rugged canyons and steep hills to rolling hills and flatland. 

The Rio Grande cuts through deep canyons within the 

sector and the Rio Grande, which establishes the 

international boundary, is oriented predominantly north to 

south. The greater part of the Del Rio sector is sparsely 

populated and consists of mostly farms and ranches.

Nine Border Patrol stations 

(five border and four 

interior); one interior 

substation

Laredo About 171 border miles 

(river border); approximately 

88,460 square miles

The Laredo sector contains terrain that varies from rolling 

to steep hills, generally covered with brush. Elevations 

range from 400 feet at the international border to 900 feet 

in the northern part of the sector. Several deep arroyos, 

washouts, and creeks provide drainage into the Rio 

Grande, which runs along the international border. The 

area in the northern part of the sector—including the 

Dallas/Fort Worth area—is mostly an urban environment 

containing over 5 million inhabitants.

Nine Border Patrol stations 

(four border and five 

interior)

Rio Grande 

Valley

About 316 border miles

(river and coastal border); 

approximately 18,580 

square miles

The Rio Grande Valley sector contains terrain that varies 

from a mixture of rural farmland and ranchland to densely 

populated metropolitan areas, as shown in figure 16. The 

sector includes a large coastal shoreline, a large 

population base, and a well-established infrastructure on 

both sides of its international border. The Rio Grande 

Valley sector’s easternmost boundary is composed 

entirely of Gulf of Mexico shoreline.

Nine Border Patrol stations 

(seven border and two 

interior) 

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol operational assessments.
Appendix II: General Information about Border 

Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border

Page 52 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 13: Example of Terrain in the Yuma Sector

Figure 14: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Sector
Appendix II: General Information about Border 

Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border

Page 53 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 15: Example of Terrain in the El Paso Sector, with the United States on the 

Left of the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right

Figure 16: Example of Terrain in the Rio Grande Valley Sector
Appendix III: General Information about Border 

Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson 

Sector

Page 54 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 2. Table 3 

describes, for each of the eight stations in the Tucson sector, the (1) 

number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of terrain; and 

(3) number and type (border or interior) of zones, and their distance from 

the border. Figures 17 through 23 illustrate the types of terrain that can be 

found in seven of the eight stations in the Tucson sector.

Table 3: Descriptions of Border Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson Sector, including Border Mileage and Size, Terrain, 

and Number of Zones by Distance from the Border

Station Border miles and size Terrain

Zones by distance from 

the border

Ajo About 68 border miles; 

approximately 9,240 square 

miles

The Ajo station contains a vast desert with 

mountainous terrain with varying amounts of 

undergrowth, as shown in figure 17. The Ajo station 

terrain also includes environmentally sensitive and 

protected lands. Portions of the station area of 

responsibility also include an American Indian 

reservation.

Nine border zones; 0 to 68 

miles from the border

Three interior zones; 24 to 

159 miles from the border

Casa Grande About 40 border miles; 

approximately 41,500 square 

miles

The Casa Grande station contains terrain that varies 

from rocky terrain and mountainous regions to flat 

desert, as shown in figure 18. There are only a few 

small villages or ranches on both sides of the border. 

The majority of the Casa Grande station area of 

responsibility also includes an American Indian 

reservation.

Six border zones; 0 to 37 

miles from the border

Five interior zones; 17 to 

392 miles from the border

Tucson About 24 border miles; 

approximately 3,790 square 

miles

The Tucson station contains terrain that varies from 

open valleys to rugged mountains and is covered 

with various forms of desert shrubs, as shown in 

figure 19. The majority of the station area of 

responsibility also contains federal lands and 

portions of an American Indian reservation. A major 

metropolitan area exists within the station’s 

geography—Tucson.

Three border zones; 0 to 42 

miles from the border

Four interior zones; 25 to 81 

miles from the border

Nogales About 30 border miles; 

approximately 1,800 square 

miles

The Nogales station contains terrain that varies from 

high desert terrain with rugged mountains to rolling 

hills with numerous deep canyons, as shown in 

figure 20. The station area of responsibility also 

includes small rural communities and individual 

ranch houses with a significant portion of the 

station’s area of responsibility on federal lands.

Four border zones; 0 to 28 

miles from the border

One interior zone; 11 to 29 

miles from the border

Sonoita About 27 border miles; 

approximately 665 square miles

The Sonoita station contains terrain that varies from 

mountain ranges to hilly terrain, including a 

grassland valley with many arroyos and creeks, as 

shown in figure 21. The station’s area of 

responsibility includes federal lands and the majority 

of the land in the Sonoita area of responsibility is 

under federal or private ownership.

Four border zones; 0 to 37 

miles from the border

No interior zones

Appendix III: General Information about 

Border Patrol Stations and Zones in the 

Tucson Sector
Appendix III: General Information about Border 

Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson 

Sector

Page 55 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Station Border miles and size Terrain

Zones by distance from 

the border

Naco About 33 border miles; 

approximately 1,175 square 

miles

a The Naco station contains terrain that varies from 

deep desert washes that form an extensive drainage 

network during monsoon season, to rugged 

mountains that consist of heavy brush and steep, 

rocky canyons, and a mixture of sparse vegetation 

and desert grasslands, as shown in figure 22. The 

elevation within the station area of responsibility 

ranges from 3,600 feet to 9,466 feet.

Five border zones; 0 to 12 

miles from the border

Three interior zones; 3 to 37 

miles from the border

Douglas About 41 border miles; 

approximately 1,385 square 

miles 

The Douglas station contains terrain that includes 

rugged, steep, rocky, high-elevation desert terrain 

and low-lying valleys of moderate vegetation, as 

shown in figure 23. A large mountain range splits the 

Douglas station area of responsibility in half. The 

station area of responsibility also includes the city of 

Douglas and rural areas where houses and ranches 

are present.

Six border zones; 0 to 29 

miles from the border

Six interior zones; 3 to 37 

miles from the border

Willcox No border miles; approximately 

33,600 square miles 

The Willcox station contains terrain that varies from 

valleys to flat low-lying desert, to rugged and steep 

mountain ranges. The Willcox station area of 

responsibility is bordered on either side by mountain 

ranges.

No border zones

Four interior zones; 37 to 

392 miles from the border

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol operational assessments and data.

a

In May 2012 Naco Station was renamed the “Brian A. Terry Border Patrol Station” (Brian A. Terry 

Memorial Act, Pub. L. No 112-113, 126 Stat. 334 (2012)). 

Figure 17: Example of Terrain in the Ajo Station Area of Responsibility
Appendix III: General Information about Border 

Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson 

Sector

Page 56 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 18: Example of Terrain in the Casa Grande Station Area of Responsibility, 

with the United States on the Right Side of the Border Fence and Mexico on the Left

Figure 19: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Station Area of Responsibility
Appendix III: General Information about Border 

Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson 

Sector

Page 57 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 20: Example of Terrain within the Nogales Station Area of Responsibility, 

with the United States on the Left Side of the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right

Figure 21: Example of Terrain in the Sonoita Station Area of Responsibility near the 

U.S. Border with Mexico
Appendix III: General Information about Border 

Patrol Stations and Zones in the Tucson 

Sector

Page 58 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 22: Example of Terrain in the Naco Station Area of Responsibility near the 

U.S. Border with Mexico

Figure 23: Example of Terrain in the Douglas Station Area of Responsibility with the 

United States on the Left Side of the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right
Appendix IV: Comparison of Border Patrol’s 

2004 Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic Plan 

Page 59 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

2004 National Border Patrol Strategy 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan

Strategic goal 1: Establish and maintain operational control 

of national borders 

Strategic goal 1: Secure America’s borders

Objectives:

• Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists 

and their weapons

• Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement with 

focus on priority areas identified by threat analysis

• Detect, apprehend, deter smugglers

• Leverage smart border technology as force multiplier

• Reduce crime in border communities and improve quality 

of life and economic vitality through personnel 

deployment and community outreach

Objectives:

• Prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the 

United States between the ports of entry (POE) through 

improved and focused intelligence-driven operations, and 

operational integration, planning, and execution with law 

enforcement partners

• Manage risk through the introduction and expansion of 

sophisticated tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as 

increased mobile response

• Disrupt and degrade transnational criminal organizations by 

targeting enforcement efforts against highest-priority threats 

and expanding programs that reduce smuggling and 

smuggling-related crimes

• Expand CBP’s situational awareness at and between POEs 

and employ a “whole of government” approach

• Increase community engagement by participating in 

community programs and engaging the public 

Strategic goal 2: Not applicable Strategic goal 2: Strengthen the Border Patrol

Objectives: Not applicable Objectives:

• Strengthen investment in people and capabilities through 

improved education, training, and support of personnel

• Reinforce employee support initiatives and programs that 

continue Border Patrol traditions

• Address threats to organizational integrity and remain vigilant 

in training and promoting anticorruption initiatives

• Improve organizational processes, systems, and doctrine by 

standardizing reporting and planning processes

• Introduce improved tools to collect and analyze data to 

develop outcome measures

• Enhance efficiency by improving planning, resource allocation, 

and acquisition processes

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Border Patrol documents.

Appendix IV: Comparison of Border Patrol’s 

2004 Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic Plan
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 60 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and 

types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the 

land border ports of entry, including estimates on the total number of 

identified—or “known”—illegal entries. Border Patrol’s estimate of known 

illegal entries includes the number of illegal entrants who were 

apprehended as well as estimates of the number of entrants who illegally 

crossed the border but were not apprehended (individuals who either 

crossed back to Mexico—turn backs—or continued traveling to the U.S. 

interior and who Border Patrol ceased pursuing—got aways). These data 

are collectively referred to as known illegal entries because Border Patrol 

officials have what they deem to be a reasonable indication that the 

cross-border activity occurred.1

Border Patrol apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries 

decreased significantly across all nine southwest border sectors from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011, as shown in figures 24 through 32. 

Apprehensions decreased by 46 percent or more across all the southwest 

border sectors. Over this same time period, the number of estimated 

known illegal entries also decreased by 28 percent or more across all 

southwest border sectors. Apprehensions as a percentage of estimated 

known illegal entries increased for six sectors over this time period.

Border Patrol uses the estimated known 

illegal entry data to inform tactical decision making within each of the nine 

southwest border sectors.

 

1

Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through various sources such as direct agent 

observation, referrals from credible sources (such as residents), camera monitoring, and 

detection of physical evidence left on the environment from animal or human crossings. 

Border Patrol’s estimate of known illegal entries does not include estimates of illegal 

entries for which Border Patrol does not have reasonable support (collectively referred to 

as “unknown”), such as the number of illegal entries conducted through illicit cross-border 

tunnels. In such instances, no reasonable indication of an illegal crossing is identified. 

Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known Illegal 

Entries and Apprehensions by Southwest Border 

Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 61 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 24: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

San Diego Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 62 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 25: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

El Centro Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 63 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 26: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

Yuma Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 64 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 27: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 65 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 28: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

El Paso Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 66 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 29: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

Big Bend Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 67 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 30: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

Del Rio Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 68 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 31: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

Laredo Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known 

Illegal Entries and Apprehensions by 

Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011 

Page 69 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 32: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the 

Rio Grande Valley Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix VI: Apprehensions by Southwest 

Border Patrol Sectors and Distance from the 

Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 70 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy recognized that both apprehensions and 

apprehending individuals closer to the border affect border security. Our 

analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions across the 

southwest border decreased by 69 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal 

year 2011. Across the southwest border, from fiscal year 2010 to 2011, 

apprehensions within 5 miles of the border increased slightly, from 54 

percent to 55 percent of total apprehensions. Apprehensions that 

occurred more than 20 miles from the border decreased slightly from 

fiscal year 2010 to 2011, from 28 percent to 26 percent across the 

southwest border. See figures 33 and 34 for apprehensions by southwest 

Border Patrol sector and distances from the border, for fiscal years 2010 

and 2011.

Figure 33: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, 

Fiscal Year 2010

Appendix VI: Apprehensions by Southwest 

Border Patrol Sectors and Distance from the 

Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
Appendix VI: Apprehensions by Southwest 

Border Patrol Sectors and Distance from the 

Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 71 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 34: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, 

Fiscal Year 2011 
Appendix VII: Border Patrol Nonenforcement 

Activities by Southwest Border Sector, Fiscal 

Year 2011 

Page 72 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Border Patrol schedules the deployment of agents to various activities, 

which are categorized as either enforcement or nonenforcement.1

 

1

Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of agent deployment in the field, 

which is to be updated to reflect the most recent deployment changes. Deployment figures 

referred to in this report therefore may be for scheduled, not actual, agent deployment. 

Agents are assigned to activities in 8-hour shifts, referred to as agent workdays in this 

report. According to Border Patrol officials, agent activities are categorized as 

enforcement- or nonenforcement-related based on the subject matter expertise of 

headquarters officials. 

In fiscal 

year 2011 the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for 

nonenforcement activities varied by southwest border sector, from 19 

percent for the Big Bend sector to 34 percent for the Yuma sector. The 

percentage of nonenforcement agent workdays scheduled to individual 

activities in fiscal year 2011 varied across sectors, as shown in figure 35, 

with “administration” accounting for a greater proportion of agent 

workdays than any other nonenforcement activities across all southwest 

border sectors. Border Patrol officials stated that examples of 

administrative activities include remote-video surveillance, public and 

congressional affairs duties, asset forfeiture duties, and employee support 

duties. Agent workdays scheduled to administration ranged from about 39 

percent of all nonenforcement agent workdays in the Rio Grande Valley 

sector to almost 65 percent in the Laredo sector. Within the Tucson 

sector–our focus sector–training, intelligence support, and agent 

nonenforcement duties (defined to include duties such as brush removal; 

facility, fence, and vehicle maintenance; and video surveillance system 

operations) each accounted for a greater proportion of agent workdays 

than any other nonenforcement activity after administration. The 

percentage of agent workdays scheduled to these activities in other 

sectors varied, as shown in figure 35. “Other nonenforcement activities” 

includes duties such as litigation, camera operations, and public relations.

Appendix VII: Border Patrol Nonenforcement 

Activities by Southwest Border Sector, Fiscal 

Year 2011
Appendix VII: Border Patrol Nonenforcement 

Activities by Southwest Border Sector, Fiscal 

Year 2011 

Page 73 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 35: Percentage of Border Patrol Agent Nonenforcement Workdays 

Scheduled for Nonenforcement Activities across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal 

Year 2011

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 74 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figures 36 through 44 show the number of apprehensions, turn backs, 

and got aways as percentages of total estimated known illegal entries for 

each southwest border sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.

Figure 36: Number of San Diego Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, 

and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011

Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn Backs, 

and Estimated Got Aways) by Border Patrol Sector, 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 75 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 37: Number of El Centro Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, 

and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 76 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 38: Number of Yuma Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and 

Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 77 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 39: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and 

Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 78 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 40: Number of El Paso Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and 

Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 79 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 41: Number of Big Bend Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, 

and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 80 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 42: Number of Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and 

Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 81 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 43: Number of Laredo Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and 

Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 

through 2011
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data 

Element (Apprehensions, Estimated Turn 

Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by Border 

Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 

Page 82 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 44: Number of Rio Grande Valley Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn 

Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal 

Years 2006 through 2011
Appendix IX: Identification Sources for Turn 

Backs and Got Aways by Southwest Border 

Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011 

Page 83 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Border Patrol sectors rely on a different mix of cameras, sign cutting, 

credible source, and visual observation to identify and report the number 

of turn backs and got aways used to determine the number of estimated 

known illegal entries across locations. Figure 45 shows the breakdown by 

source of data that sectors used to estimate got aways and turn backs in 

fiscal year 2011.

Appendix IX: Identification Sources for Turn 

Backs and Got Aways by Southwest Border 

Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011
Appendix IX: Identification Sources for Turn 

Backs and Got Aways by Southwest Border 

Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011 

Page 84 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Figure 45: Source of Data Collection for Turn Back and Got Away Data across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 

2011
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 85 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix X: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 86 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 87 GAO-13-25 Border Patrol Strategic Plan 

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Lacinda Ayers (Assistant 

Director); Joshua S. Akery; Frances A. Cook; Barbara A. Guffy; Eric D. 

Hauswirth; Stanley J. Kostyla; Brian J. Lipman; John W. Mingus, Jr.; 

Jessica S. Orr; Susan A. Sachs; and Jerome T. Sandau made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(440977)
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