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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Airpower in the Context of a

 Dysfunctional Joint Doctrin

Carl R. Pivarsky Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 7

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

February 1997
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

This important research deals with the intellectual fou

dation of the American profession of arms—our jo

doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USA

argues that the current doctrine development proc

has become a zero-sum game driven by the cha

man of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring jo

doctrine to be “authoritative.” The resultant interse

ice competition has produced a keystone joint doctr

publication, Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine 

Joint Operations, that unfortunately has been corrupted 

serve parochial service interests.

This research focuses on that document and the imp

it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventio

combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corr

tion of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to se

parochial land force interests. The author shows in de

how definitions and terms have destroyed the comma

authority of the joint force air component comman

(JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities so

to the support of surface maneuver commanders.

Lieutenant Colonel Pivarsky believes the lack of in 

lectual integrity of Joint Pub 3-0 debases the entire jo

doctrine process; it must be corrected. The author’s r

ommended solution is to revise the joint definitions 

maneuver and interdiction to preclude their owners

by a specific type of military organization and to give 

Air Force its rightful and earned place at the doctr

table. A rewrite of Joint Pub 3-0 is required to refl

joint force capabilities for full-dimensional operatio

not simply land force dominance of the entire bat

field. Sea, air, and space force dominance dese

equal discussion in this keystone joint op erati

doctrine.

iii
The author also calls for the CJCS to review the ba

paradigm used in joint doctrine. The current struct

leads to rigidity by design, producing a cookbook (a set 

recipes), not a book on cooking (an intellectual framew

for thinking about joint warfare). Finally, this stu

proposes areas for additional doctrinal study.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr. became involved in the stu

of joint and combined doctrine as a fighter pilot and No

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plans officer with 

78th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force, Wo

bridge, United Kingdom, in 1980. Since that time he h

been involved in teaching air employment tactics and d

trine at the squadron and wing level, as well as serving 

chief, theater air warfare instruction, at the US Army Co

mand and General Staff College from 1992 through 19

During his tour at Fort Leavenworth, his article, “Dang

ous Doctrine,” an earlier look at the problems with jo

doctrine, appeared in the Military Review, Septem

1993.

A joint specialty officer, Lieutenant Colonel Pivar 

is a distinguished graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapo

Instructor Course and a graduate of the US Army Co

mand and General Staff College and the Armed For

Staff College. He has served as instructor pilot during fo

separate flying assignments, amassing over 3,000 hours 

the A-10 and F-15E. Lieutenant Colonel Pivarsky is 

graduate of the Air War College, class of 1996.

v
Airpower in the Context of a

Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine

Joint warfare is team warfare.

 —Joint Pub 1

This research paper is about team warfare—more s

cifically, the intellectual foundation that makes joint w

fare work. To build on the sports metaphor used in Jo

Publication (Pub) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces 

the United States, each member of the joint war-fight

team occupies a skill position determined by his or 

core competence. Integrating, not simply synchronizi

the actions of these players is mostly an intellectual ex

cise that defines the art of joint war fighting. Ideally, t

intellectual framework, free of bias, is provided for us 

joint doctrine.

The work required to establish a national doctrinal ba

for the development and employment of the armed forc

our joint doctrine, is critical in equipping the joint fo

commander (JFC) and his or her subordinates with 

intellectual foundation required to make informed jo

force decisions. As in any team activity, this intellect

framework has to adequately address all the elements 

the game. A short list would include, but not be limited 

the capabilities and limitations of the players on each si

how the teams are organized, trained, and equipped; h

the members execute as a team; the terrain and weath

air support; the rules of the game; the length of the c

test; and the desired result. In the world of sports, 

intellectual integrative power is supplied by the coach. 

joint war fighting, the coach is the theater commander 

chief (CINC) or JFC.

Since joint warfare is team warfare, it is important 

understand what holds the team together. The values 

joint warfare as outlined in Joint Pub 11

is the logical st

ing point. “First and always is integrity.”2

 It is the corn

stone for building trust between the components; with

trust there is no team. Building upon integrity, competen

and moral courage are dual values that allow team play

1
to do the right thing regardless of personal risk. Trust a

confidence are linked by the “integrity, ability, and go

character” of each team member. In joint war fighting, d

gation of authority “commensurate with responsibility” 

a recurring requirement in building and maintaining 

team atmosphere. Cooperation, which is naturally in t

sion with competition, must prevail if the team is to s

ceed. Actions taken to win an interservice battle can l

the war for the joint team.

These values of joint warfare, presented in the capsto

publication, Joint Pub 1, are essential to building effect

fighting teams. Amid the myriad of dangers facing 

armed forces of the United States, it seems curious that 

create for ourselves a doctrine of team warfare that und

mines rather than builds trust between team members

joint doctrine that minimizes demonstrated dimensio

supremacy in pursuit of more limited objectives. Our c

rent doctrine does not assign, but in fact actually inhib

assigning, authority commensurate with responsibility 

certain mission areas.

Current joint doctrine is charting a dangerous cours

one that limits the options available to a joint force co

mander by providing an intellectually constraining view 

high-intensity, conventional combat operations. The p

cess has been incremental; yet the emergence of a do

nant land maneuver bias, fueled by parochial interests a

sustained by its own internal logic, threatens to corr

the intellectual foundation of the American profession 

arms.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the most gl

ing examples of parochial interests manifested in our c

rent joint doctrine. It highlights instances of intellect

dishonesty at the very core of the keystone publicati

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. The doctri

center of gravity is the concept of maneuver. How man

ver is defined and used creates an internal logic that c

rupts command relationships and battle-space geome

destroys the trust required in joint warfare, and crea

seams in joint operations that are exploitable by the 

emy. This paper examines instances where surface fo

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are elevated 

2 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
doctrinal concepts while previous core doctrinal issu

specifically sea and air control, are relegated to support

publications. We will also investigate how doctrinally 

posed convoluted command relationships increase inter

friction on the joint team, specifically in regard to the a

of interdiction.

Now, about moral courage. As defined in Joint Pub 

moral courage “includes the willingness to stand up 

what we believe is right even if that stand is unpopular 

contrary to conventional wisdom.”4

 The issues addres

here are controversial; although they raise charges of pa

chialism, they have also provoked charges of parochiali

in return. Since this issue can easily be clouded by em

tion, it is incumbent upon both the author and the rea

to approach this discussion with the head and not 

heart. The issues presented here must be resolved if we 

to develop an effective war-fighting team that capitalizes 

the unique capabilities of each of the players.

This research is presented in three main parts. First, 

demonstrate how the core concept of maneuver has be

corrupted to increase the relative importance of cert

members of the joint team. In the process, we show h

the logic required to support a corrupt maneuver definit

impacts the whole of Joint Pub 3-0, and therefore a

corrupts all its supporting doctrinal publications. Seco

we show how the problems with maneuver impact the c

cept of interdiction, creating an untenable command a

control situation and unacceptable friction between co

ponents. Finally, we recommend specific measures to c

rect the major discrepancies and suggest areas for furt

study.

The Joint Concept of Maneuver

Within the current doctrinal debate there is a single c

ter of gravity: the concept of maneuver. As we will dem

strate, maneuver forms the basis for all comma

relationships; establishes all control relationships; and h

become the foundation upon which forces are organiz

trained, and equipped to fulfill their wartime missions.

PIVARSKY 
Airpower is critical within the maneuver context. Ho

ever, the perennial conflict between the services over h

airpower is controlled (centralized versus decentralized), 

whom (a surface commander or an air commander), a

where it will be focused (close air support or independ

air operations) has led to a joint doctrinal definition t

specifically excludes the Air Force from the concept of m

neuver. It has produced a doctrine for joint operations t

is riddled with contradictions, is intellectually dishone

and creates exploitable seams. This is unacceptable by a

standard, and it gets worse with every revision of joint d

trine.

Maneuver is a powerful concept, yet airmen, more s

cifically Air Force airmen, are the only shooters on 

battlefield who are not included in the joint maneuver c

cept. The importance of this deliberate exclusion of 

Force-supplied airpower needs to be understood and 

posed, not only by airmen but by anyone wishing to h

ness the potential of joint force capabilities.

To better appreciate the complexities of this joint d

trine discussion, it is necessary to fully explain the l

guage and implications of the definition of maneuver.

Maneuver Definition and Intent

Maneuver is a principle of war that appears in all serv

basic doctrinal publications like Air Force Manual (A

1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Fo

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare; and Ar

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations.

5 According to Jo

Pub 3-0, “the principal purpose of maneuver is to gain 

positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity 

order to control or destroy those centers of gravity.” 6

 I

important to understand from the start that maneuve

distinguished from sheer movement by its relationship 

the enemy. Maneuver is defined by its in tent to gain p

tional7

 advantage relative to the enemy through wh

control is exercised by force or the threat of force.

This concept of maneuver implies a number of tas

First, you must identify an enemy center of gravity. Th

you must locate it within your battle space, avoid ene

defenses to get into a position to control that center 

4 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
gravity through the threat of force, or if necessary, poss

the forces required to destroy that center of gravity. At f

value, maneuver does not require a specific force type 

mix and is, therefore, applicable to any military force: la

sea, air, or special operations forces, as long as they c

accomplish these tasks.

The importance of maneuver is further refined in Jo

Pub 3-0:

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy t

secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—o

threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of th

maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balanc

and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in

exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducin

vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy. 8

This additional implied task of security is accomplish

by attacking from a direction or means unexpected by 

enemy and altering those means to remain unpredictab

Airpower, which is unencumbered by the problems of s

face movement, can maneuver with great speed to a po

tional advantage relative to the enemy. It can apply b

direct and indirect fires from great range and altitude. A

power’s tempo, timing, and attack means can be contin

ally adjusted to keep an enemy off balance while protect

the force. In many ways, airpower appears to be the c

summate maneuver instrument.9

 The concept of aerial 

neuver is at the core of the views expressed by airm

since the days of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. This 

where the good news ends. Our joint doctrine recogni

only certain types of forces as maneuver.

Joint doctrine’s further refinement of maneuver dem

strates a puzzling doctrinal schizophrenia. Although m

neuver would appear logically to apply to all forces, and 

dimensions of the battle space (it in fact does), joint d

trine recognizes only land and naval surface maneuve

Tying the concept of maneuver to a type of force is in 

way supported by the definition of maneuver intent; a

the impact is to immediately limit the options available 

the JFC. This is the root cause of all the problems 

address from here forward—restricting maneuver to la

and naval forces.

PIVARSKY 
The problem created by excluding airpower from man

ver is immediately apparent. Since both land and na

forces have considerable investments in air assets, gr

pains are taken to include air assets that are owned a

controlled by surface maneuver forces within the man

ver context, while specifically excluding Air Force-suppl

airpower. The reason for separating Air Force-supplied 

assets from maneuver will be addressed shortly. First, 

have to see how the maneuver concept is defined to se

parochial surface force interests.

The answer is provided in Joint Pub 3-0. According 

our joint doctrine, “land and naval maneuver ( wh

includes the action of air assets organic to the surface fo

[emphasis added]) is required to control population, te

tory, and key waters.”11 This additional modification of 

maneuver definition acknowledges that control can be 

tained by air assets that are organic to the surface fo

since they are part of land and naval maneuver. What t

means is that a Marine Corps F/A-18, since it is organic 

the surface force, is considered to be capable of land a

naval maneuver. Air action by that fighter, therefore, c

control, or contribute to the control of, population, te

tory, and key waters. Following this logic, Navy air is 

ganic to the surface naval force, and Army attack aviat

is an integral part of the land surface maneuver force; th

also qualify as maneuver-capable forces. However, an 

Force fighter, squadron of bombers, or the entire Air Fo

for that matter, is not maneuver because it is not orga

to a surface force. Air Force air assets cannot “cont

population, territory, and key waters” because they are 

organic to the surface force, not because they exhibit a

other limitation in the definition of maneuver.

Although this distinction between air assets that 

organic to a surface force and other air assets fails a

common sense test and is intellectually dishonest; it 

pears throughout joint doctrine and thoroughly corrupts 

The integrity of the entire joint doctrine process is 

stroyed by imposing this artificial distinction between 

asset capabilities depending solely on who owns or c

trols them. All subsequent attempts to derive a joint d

6 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
trine that is capable of fighting a team and exploiting 

true capabilities is lost.

However, this distinction between surface force orga

air assets and Air Force air assets is required to establ

the conditions to exclude Air Force commanders fr

actually commanding. It is required to force Air Force ass

back into the fire support roles that surface command

understand and desire to control. This distinction minimi

airpower on a theater scale and is supported only within 

logic of current and emerging joint doctrine. It has no hist

cal basis and is patently dishonest.

The reason to keep Air Force air assets from be

treated as maneuver forces is tied to the fact that the 

Force is a proponent of a theater-wide joint force air co

ponent commander (JFACC). If the JFACC was conside

to be a maneuver commander, it would alter the comma

dynamics of the theater at the expense of surface man

ver commanders. This is because maneuver command

are assigned an area of operations (AO) by the JFC. 12 T

is accomplished by the JFC’s establishing boundaries 

those forces within the theater. Boundaries are a cont

measure that define “surface areas to facilitate coordi

tion and deconfliction of operations.”13

Inside a maneuver commander’s boundary, he or she 

the supported commander for all operations and can dict

what happens down to the “when, where, why, what, h

and by whom.” This determination of who is in charge 

no small matter and is a considerable source of frict

within the surface component as well as between fu

tional components.

How much of the surface battle space is controlled 

each maneuver commander is determined by the wi

and depth of the AO assigned by the JFC. In designing 

theater structure, JFCs may use “forward” 14 boundaries 

limit the depth controlled by the subordinate maneu

commanders. However, a forward boundary is not requi

by joint doctrine, is rarely used, and should not be c

fused with a limit of advance.

What this means is that the air component comman

(ACC), since he or she is not a maneuver commander, d

not own any part of the JFC’s surface battle space unl

PIVARSKY 
specifically given an AO by the JFC. But this would 

problematic since AOs are doctrinally assigned to man

ver commanders and the air component does not qua

(by joint definition). Consequently, since the air compon

owns no part of the battlefield, the ACC does not cont

any part of the battlefield in the sense that a sup por

maneuver commander does. Since the air component can

exercise control inside a maneuver commander’s AO, the 

component has no need for command per se. The lo

runs: if you don’t command and don’t control, you mi

as well be commanded and controlled. This same lo

supports the argument for redesignating the JFACC as 

joint force air component coordinator, instead of the jo

force air component commander.

The issue of who controls friendly forces is resolved 

the maneuver definition. It results in the piecemealing 

air component capabilities (specifically Air Force ass

based on the relative strength (both political and milita

of surface maneuver commanders in the theater. The l

guage required to support this doctrinal position becom

twisted and difficult enough in peacetime. It leaves un

swered the question of how ownership by a surface fo

changes the essential character and capability of air as sets

many ways, the discussion of the capabilities of one type 

air asset as opposed to another seems schizophrenic.

Demonstrating the notion of doctrinal schizophrenia 

not difficult. Three pages after the Air Force is exclud

from maneuver, Joint Pub 3-0 presents a vignette ab

how land-based airpower controlled key waters in the Ba

of the Bismarck Sea.15 Maneuver, by definition, is “requi

to control population, territory, and key waters.”

16 In t

battle, it was air action by land-based Army Air Forces t

caused the Japanese to abort their “second projected off

sive against Wau, New Guinea”17 by controlling key wat

The Japanese could not get through key waters becau

fixed wing air controlled it, and maneuver is required 

control key waters. Every criterion in the maneuver def

tion was met by land-based air assets. Doesn’t it logica

follow that air action in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea w

maneuver by definition? The joint doctrine answer is no

8 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
Air action during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was 

maneuver—our doctrine says it was interdiction. It 

called interdiction even though General MacArthur sta

that “our decisive success cannot fail to have the m

important results on the enemy’s strategic and tacti

plans.”18 Joint doctrine calls it interdiction even thou

successful air action against a Japanese operational cen

of gravity disrupted his strategic and tactical plans. Ev

though success in this case was accomplished through 

ability to “concentrate forces at decisive points” 19 throu

the use of airpower, it curiously does not qualify as m

neuver. We call the Battle of the Bismarck Sea interdict

even though one of the three types of joint force maneuv

defined in Joint Pub 3-0, “sustained action at sea and fr

the sea,”20 was demonstrated by land-based airpower. T

reason to call it something other than maneuver is fa

clear if you see the logic of our current joint doctrine. 

operations that are not owned and controlled by the s

face maneuver commander as organic assets cannot be 

lowed to execute maneuver independent of the surface for

Keeping an Air Force commander from being a maneu

commander has become a joint doctrinal imperative.

In the joint doctrine definition, interdiction simply “dive

disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface or su

surface military potential before it can be used effectiv

against friendly forces.”21 Nowhere in the definition of 

terdiction will you see the words decisive or control. Althou

it may be important to the overall success of an operat

or campaign, interdiction simply sets the conditions 

successful maneuver. Although “maneuver by land or 

val forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surf

potential,”22 interdiction-capable forces are not necessa

maneuver forces by definition. On closer examination, y

will find that only Air Force interdiction forces do not a

perform as maneuver forces. I won’t sugarcoat it; this d

tinction is intellectually dishonest, but is consistent w

the internal logic of our joint doctrine.

Being considered a maneuver force is critical in jo

doctrine. The implications of the apparently astigma

exclusion of the Air Force are evident in support

publications currently under development. They are beg

PIVARSKY 
ning to border on the absurd as proponents appear c

sumed by the illogical arguments required to support 

joint maneuver definition and to exclude the Air Force fr

any part of maneuver. If the current second draft of Jo

Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, is approved 

written, strategic offensive forces (SOF) will “by name” 

added to maneuver. “The appropriate SOF commander 

the supported commander and is responsible for synch

nizing his maneuver and supporting fires. He does so 

designating the target priority, desired effects, and tim

of such operations.”23 This means that seven guys w

rifles and some radios in a spider hole somewhere outs

another maneuver commander’s AO are maneuver, but 

entire Air Force is not. The only thing that supports t

exclusion of Air Force airpower is our current joint d

trine; common sense and honest appraisal of battlefi

effects do not apply here.

The most powerful Air Force in history is barred fr

equal participation in the joint maneuver paradigm by c

rent joint doctrine. Its logic is carefully crafted to keep 

air component from command of any portion of the JF

battle space. The air component is denied the comma

authority that can be exercised by any other shooter on 

battlefield. This corrupt intellectual baggage is in dir

conflict with the Joint Pub 1 discussion of “values in jo

warfare.” It undermines trust and confidence, “one of 

most important ingredients in building strong teams.” 24

Interdiction

The joint doctrine discussion on maneuver clearly 

cludes Air Force airpower. However, the intellectual c

ruption of the maneuver argument also impacts the jo

discussion of interdiction. Joint Pub 3-0 defines interd

tion as “an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy 

enemy’s surface military potential before it can be u

effectively against friendly forces.”25 Like the initial def

tion of maneuver, interdiction does not require any p

scribed force type or mix. How to interdict is left to 

imagination of the commander; therefore, the definition 

not intellectually constraining.

10 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
Where the definitions of interdiction and maneuver 

verge is in their focus. The maneuver definition places 

focus on enemy centers of gravity, which can be milita

political, economic, geographic, and so forth. By contra

interdiction is enemy-force oriented without a qualifier 

to the importance of that particular enemy’s force or 

capabilities. Where maneuver is defined in relation to 

enemy’s national capabilities, interdiction is defined by 

relation of friendly forces to enemy surface military ca

bility. This relationship has two variables: distance and tim

The distance variable is the easiest to understand. It c

quickly lead to a comparison of the relative ranges 

weapon systems. The side with the longest range weapon 

capable of interdicting the other side’s surface military 

tential by engaging outside the range of the enem

weapon systems. The assumption here is that enemy t

gets can be acquired and engaged inside the range adv

tage enjoyed by the interdicting force. The desire 

out-range the adversary has a direct impact on how y

organize and equip the force. Ideally, you want to give yo

forces every advantage of range you can afford to ma

them capable of interdiction. Airpower, in all of its forms

an excellent interdiction means.

The time variable is harder to quantify. The time availa

may be determined by the enemy’s ability to close w

friendly forces. In this case, interdiction may be an en

neering, countermobility operation, or other action to de

or divert the enemy. Time could also be defined in relat

to John Boyd’s OODA [observe, orient, decide, act] loop

you are able to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making cy

denying him the ability to organize and act, you can d

rupt the entire operation, thereby increasing the security 

your own force.

Although distance and time may be interrelated, the 

tellectual framework of the definition of interdiction it

does not limit how the commander attacks the proble

Interdiction categorized by the medium in which it is e

cuted causes problems. Drawing a doctrinal line betw

air interdiction and other means of interdiction crea

considerable friction in joint cooperation and degra

team performance.

PIVARSKY 
The reason to distinguish between air interdiction a

other forms of interdiction is centered around the issue 

control. The perturbations of the maneuver discussion 

extended to the area of interdiction to provide a doctri

basis for the surface commander owning the missions t

prove ultimately decisive. Interdiction, historically a c

competence of airpower, has become both more import

and more attainable in the context of conventional, hi

intensity combat because of technology. Consequently, t

main factors are currently driving surface maneuver co

manders to perform interdiction and, if possible, to wr

control of the mission from the air component throu

doctrine.

The dominant factor is the laudable desire to win de

sively with minimum casualties. If you are successfully 

terdicting the enemy, by definition he cannot bring for

to bear against you; therefore, either low or no casualt

will result. The definition of interdiction has many of 

elements of the definition of maneuver discussed earl

and for that reason there is little friction in a maneu

commander’s performing that mission. Attacking the 

emy before his forces can be brought to bear on frien

forces provides the protection and security that maneu

provides.

What is missing from the interdiction definition is 

focus on an integrating concept or strategy such as cente

gravity. Lack of this type of focus can cause serious pr

lems. For example, a targeting methodology that stres

shortening the time between detecting a target and deliv

ing ordnance could easily commit precious resour

against unimportant targets. The second factor is t

technology has provided the surface maneuver comman

with the ability to see and, to a limited degree, use orga

assets to strike targets at interdiction ranges or wit

interdiction time windows. When you add these two fact

together, the close fight (the core competency of the surf

force) is becoming less important than the interdict

fight. In theory, a perfectly executed interdiction eff

would obviate the need for close combat or maneuver. T

surface commander therefore wants to get control of 

interdiction fight within the maneuver paradigm to ma

12 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
tain control of the forces winning the decisive victory. 

terdiction, and not close combat, is truly the road to de

sive victory in accordance with American expectations. 

what does joint doctrine tell us about interdiction and h

it is commanded and controlled in a theater of war?

For starters, according to joint doctrine, the air co

mander is the supported commander for the “JFC’s ove

air interdiction effort.”26 Great, but what does that re

mean, and does it really matter? The short answer was p

vided earlier in the maneuver discussion entitled The Jo

Concept of Maneuver; without an air AO it means noth

and does not matter. Joint doctrine makes the air interd

tion issue purposefully fuzzy. The reason is to place contro

interdiction-capable air assets under the direct control of 

surface maneuver commander. Here is how.

Air interdiction is simply a subset of overall theater 

terdiction. The JFC is the supported commander for 

theater interdiction effort. Forces for this effort are gen

ated by all commanders who have interdiction-capa

forces, including special operations commanders. In ad

tion to JFC priorities, all maneuver commanders, includ

special operations, have interdiction priorities in their A

Without a forward boundary specified, it is impossible 

determine where air interdiction, which is under the co

mand of the air component, occurs without some ad

tional control measure specified by the JFC or the surf

maneuver commander(s). Joint Pub 3-0 provides ad

tional weight to surface maneuver commander contro

interdiction by stating that, within their AOs, the man

ver force commander is the supported commander for 

interdiction.27

Again, falling into its own internal logic, Joint Pub 

makes both the JFACC and the surface maneuver co

mander the supported commander for air interdiction. T

real determinant of who is the supported commander 

air interdiction is which AO it occurs in. Since the JFA

does not have an AO, the supported commander is the J

or the surface maneuver commander. The JFACC is sim

executing air interdiction as a supporting commander. He 

she is not a commander in this case, but simply a fo

provider. His or her command authority is usurped wit

PIVARSKY 
the confines of the maneuver commander’s AO by the m

neuver commander who is so empowered by the JFC.

The JFACC has no command authority since he or s

does not synchronize maneuver and supporting fires, wh

a commander does by designating the “target prior

effects, and timing of interdiction operations within th

AOs.”28 This type of convoluted command relationship 

curs nowhere else in joint doctrine. It impacts only 

assets (read, the Air Force) that are not organic to, or c

trolled by, the surface force. Without an AO, or recogni

command authority commensurate with responsibil

how do you hold the JFACC responsible for the theater 

interdiction effort success or failure when he or she is 

ing told what to do by multiple surface maneuver co

manders, not the JFC? The JFACC is not given 

authority commensurate with the responsibility assign

in Joint Pub 3-0 as the supported commander for air int

diction. But the JFACC is still held responsible.

Certain Victory, the US Army’s official account of Des

Storm, avidly recounts the air component’s “failure” 

support the surface maneuver commander’s scheme 

maneuver. In many ways, Certain Victory is a frontal 

sault on the integrity of the JFACC as defined in Joint P

1. However, that attack displays a puzzling lack of und

standing of existing joint doctrine. What the corps co

manders failed to understand, and the Army as 

institution fails to recognize, is that the JFACC worked 

the theater commander. If the theater commander wan

the corps commander’s interdiction priorities to be thea

priorities, he simply told the air component command

and that decision would be reflected in his apportionm

decision. In Desert Storm, the joint force commander 

not place the theater priority for interdiction on grou

maneuver commander-specified priorities until just bef

the execution of the ground operation; yet, Certain Vict

lays the blame on the JFACC. This institutional fin

pointing is reinforced by a corrupt joint doctrine.

Within this doctrinal discussion, airmen have to be ca

ful not to confuse air interdiction with deep operations 

deep maneuver. For Army attack aviation, operations t

disrupt, delay, divert, and destroy enemy military capa

14 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
ity before it can be brought to bear against friendly forces 

under either deep operations or maneuver. Although t

type of operation looks like, smells like, and sounds l

interdiction, it is not interdiction. According to joint doctr

it is not interdiction and certainly is not air inter diction

is maneuver! It is maneuver because attack aviation is 

ganic to the surface force, and by that simple fact Ar

attack aviation forces are maneuver forces. Joint Pub 

boldly states that “land force attack aviation, if able to st

at the opponent’s centers of gravity [emphasis added], a

has positional advantage.”29 The sufficient condition to 

maneuver, the ability to strike a center of gravity, dis

guishes attack helicopter operations from air interdiction.

By this point, it is easy to see why surface maneu

force assets (attack helicopters) are excluded from any d

cussion of interdiction. If helicopter deep operations w

termed interdiction, they might logically fall under 

JFACC who, according to joint doctrine, is the suppor

commander for air interdiction. Additionally, keeping th

out of the interdiction discussion by cloaking them in m

neuver language avoids the coordination with the JFA

in executing his or her responsibility for planning and e

cuting the “theater-wide interdiction effort,”30 keeps th

off the air tasking order (ATO) and out of its plann

process, and relieves them of significant airspace coordi

tion order processes and procedures.

Extreme measures are taken to call air interdiction 

Army aviation “maneuver in the ground environment.” 

interdiction by Army attack aviation assets is called m

neuver and not interdiction to keep it away from air co

ponent command; intellectually dishonest—yes, b

consistent with joint doctrine. Keeping attack aviation 

clusively maneuver by definition allows the surface co

mander to project control over more of the surfa

battlefield and avoid having to actually support the JFA

in the theater air interdiction effort. This runs counter 

the desire to generate teamwork and trust in team warfa

but is doctrinally sanctioned in Joint Pub 3-0.

Certain Victory goes a long way toward destroying 

integrity, trust, and confidence in joint doctrine. This Ar

official history teaches us that control can only be achie

PIVARSKY 
by surface forces, even if those forces are aviation for

organic to the surface force. Quite arrogantly it states t

“by flying low and slow and by maintaining constant clo

up observation of the ground, the 101st maintained con

over an area of Iraq 160x380 kilometers.” 31 Therefore, c

trol of terrain by air assets organic to the surface force h

been demonstrated and acknowledged by the US Army. H

ever, in the Army view, as well as current joint doctrine d

nitions, control of terrain, like control of key waters, can

be accomplished by air assets that are independent of 

surface force. JFACC-controlled air assets do not have 

capability to control terrain but the attack aviation of 

101st does. This self-aggrandizing doublespeak deba

jointness and seriously calls into question the intellect

integrity of the US Army and our joint doctrine.

Army aviation forces are maneuver forces, even thou

airborne, because they are not part of the air compone

Army aviation doctrinal publications go to the extreme 

stating that although attack aviation breaks friction w

the surface of the earth, they operate in the ground en

ronment and not the aerospace environment. 32 This d

tinction is required to keep Army aviation independent 

an ACC. Once the Army takes control of the depth of 

battlefield, previously the domain of the Air Force, the re

vance of a separate air component is diminished. The pr

lem with this approach is that it seriously limits 

synergy of joint operations and denies the JFC the use o

true full-dimensional maneuver force. Joint Pub 3-0 h

established the doctrinal foundation for limiting the imp

of the most powerful air force in the history of the world.

Doctrinal Friction

This doctrinal doublespeak creates obvious problems

is an acknowledged source of friction between componen

Joint Pub 3-0 states that “JFCs alleviate this frict

through clear statements of intent for theater/JAO-le

interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relativ

independent of surface maneuver operations).”33 This 

tempt to clarify the interdiction issue makes matters ev

worse. The phrase “relatively independent” is not defin

On the issue of “communicated intent,” we are again 

16 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
with the possibility of alternate interpretations that o

exacerbate the problem of component friction by creat

unanswered questions and gray areas and provide a fer

field for the breakdown of trust between components.

QUESTION: Does theater interdiction occur strictly o

side the surface maneuver commander’s AO or sim

“relatively independent of surface maneuver operations

From a surface maneuver commander perspective, “re

tively independent” could mean beyond the fire supp

coordination line (FSCL) where actions by others requ

only coordination. If theater interdiction occurs inside 

FSCL, it could be in direct conflict with the surface man

ver commander. So in this case, does the JFC usurp 

authority previously given to the surface maneuver co

mander in the execution of the theater interdiction miss

or does he or she hand over responsibility for that miss

to the surface maneuver commander?

QUESTION: How is theater air interdiction integra

into theater interdiction and who controls it? As alrea

discussed in Joint Pub 3-0, there are three different s

ported commanders for air interdiction: the JFC, JFAC

and the surface maneuver commander. Which one is ac

ally the supported commander is more subject to interp

tation politics than to military wisdom. It is clear, howev

that only the JFACC’s authority is always subject to 

acquiescence of the surface maneuver commander.

What is required here is the delineation of comma

authority—a command decision by the JFC, not fuzzy inte

We do not need convoluted definitions that produce “int e

as a dodge for the JFC. The commander in chief (CINC

trusted with making, not avoiding, the hard decision 

drawing the optimum boundary between functional com

nent commanders when and where it is appropriate to 

so. Everyone understands a boundary. Anything short 

one creates confusion and distrust between components, 

most importantly, provides sanctuaries for the enemy 

creating exploitable seams in our operations.

Sanctuaries for the Enemy

This concept of a sanctuary for the enemy was dram

cally illustrated during Desert Storm. The sequence 

PIVARSKY 
events creating that sanctuary was a direct result of 

erosion of JFACC authority, the desire to control the “de

sive engagement,” and adherence to the convoluted lo

trail required by current joint doctrine. The sad truth 

that it was also perfectly consistent with joint doctrine.

With the start of the ground offensive, the JFC failed 

establish a forward boundary for surface maneuver forc

This action de facto abdicated to unspecified subordina

responsibility for deconflicting component fires. To fill t

void, multiple surface maneuver commanders, at a le

below that of a component commander, established FSC

within their AOs. Due to fratricide concerns and the lack 

JFC guidance, the FSCL was treated as a boundary 

tween surface and air components. The JFACC, Lt G

Charles A. Horner, was in essence told by VII and XV

Corps commanders where he would be allowed to oper

as a commander. Their action was totally consistent w

joint doctrine.

The mission of the VII Corps was to destroy the Repu

can Guard Forces Command (RGFC). For total contro

that fight, an FSCL was placed past them (the RGFC). T

VII Corps’ plan required three heavy divisions that it h

trouble bringing on line. The FSCL was deeper than 

Corps could reach with anything but attack helicopters

which there were insufficient numbers for the mission. 

Corps could not get additional aviation from XVIII Co

since they had plans for their organic helicopter for

and, also, because the Army does not have a theater v

for employment of their organic “aerial maneuver.” 35 To 

airman, this sounds a lot like North Africa in 1942, wh

airpower was organic to the surface force and was org

ized, trained, and equipped to operate only in that surf

commander’s AO. Abundant additional airpower was re

ily available from the air component, but the FSCL pla

ment precluded any air component-supplied miss

other than close air support (CAS). The required con

mechanisms were not put in place to allow that to happ

The result was that the air component could not hit 

Republican Guard at the optimum time—that is, when it w

repositioning.

18 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
Doctrine supported this attempt to get control of 

mission by the surface maneuver commander. VII Co

bit off more than it could chew and the ACC could 

nothing about it but advise the JFC of the problem. T

JFC forced the Corps to establish some control meas

because he failed to do so. Subsequently, he failed to m

ify it from a theater perspective until it was too late.

It is easy to assign blame with the perfect vision afford

by hindsight. However, with one exception (mentioned 

low), every player’s action was consistent with, and su

ported by, joint doctrine. Doctrine is supposed to help y

navigate the unknowns of future combat operations, a

there was no departure from it. It did not work. I t w

doctrinally correct in the command climate of D es

Storm to allow a surface maneuver commander to pu

the JFACC—who possessed an overwhelming prepond

ance of force—out of the fight. When your doctrine allo

this to happen, your doctrine is broken.

A commander can depart from joint doctrine “when 

ceptional circumstances exist.”36 Our flawed doctrine dr

us to the point that “ultimately, CENTCOM [Central Co

mand] took over the setting of the FSCL and used it a

boundary, assigning all terrain on one side to the grou

commanders and all terrain and airspace on the other 

the air component commander.”37 But according to jo

doctrine, the FSCL is not a boundary.

CENTCOM’s use of the FSCL as a boundary proves t

points. First, the CINC acknowledged the need to draw 

boundary between functional components, which he 

sentially did, albeit too late. Second, the FSCL, which 

definition implies ownership of an AO by the surface man

ver commander, was not used as defined in joint doctrine.

The FSCL is a fire support coordination measure t

tacitly acknowledges that the surface maneuver co

mander is responsible for portions of an AO he or s

cannot influence to the extent that other commanders c

Yet rather than relinquish control of that portion of his 

her AO to another component or maneuver commander, 

FSCL justifies holding on to his or her portion of the AO 

not inhibiting anyone’s fires in that area. This act

suboptimizes all fires past the FSCL because no one 

PIVARSKY 
“designating the target priority, desired effects, and tim

of such operations.”38 In other words, no one is in comman

XVIII Corps also established a FSCL to allow the enga

ment of the enemy exclusively by organic aviation. But 

enemy was also too deep. The plan in this case was 

logistically supportable. Lucky War: Third Army in Des

Storm was remarkably candid in its assessment of the si

ation and provides a joint view not found in Certain Victory.

In retrospect, the commitment of Army Aviation beyond Basrah

where distinct water lines constituted the best available line o

separation between ground and air interdiction, was a poo

solution. The Air Force capabilities, combining JSTARS observation

with sophisticated attack tools, would seem likely to have been

much more effective.39

XVIII Corps created an additional sanctuary for 

enemy along the escape routes at Al-Basrah that could 

be appreciated at the time. The actions of XVIII Corps, l

those of VII Corps, were doctrinally correct. The retrosp

tive assessment of that action in Lucky War embraces 

spirit of jointness and is refreshing for that reason if no oth

Although the official US Army version of the events o

lined in Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf Wa

blames the CINC for interfering with Corps commanders 

well as the air component for the escape of the Republic 

Guard, more current information revealed in The Gener

War41 contradicts the Army official position. The fixing 

blame throughout Certain Victory diverts attent

from our fundamental problem: a dysfunctional jo

doctrine rooted in the concept that only surfa

maneuver forces (read US Army forces) should co

mand and control the battlefield. Unless this issue 

confronted and resolved, the integrity of joint doctrine w

remain subject to the politics and friction of compon

competition and not component cooperation. The idea

team war fighting will remain at odds with the reality o

corrupt doctrine.

Conclusion

Joint Pub 3-0 is corrupt and must be corrected. Fail

to deal honestly with the issue of airpower’s exclusion fr

maneuver threatens the intellectual integrity of all US jo

20 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
doctrine and undermines the trust and confidence 

quired to fuse disparate components into a joint team. U

til airpower is acknowledged as maneuver in joint doctri

under the command of an air commander who has act

command authority, airpower will be consistently mis

plied and suboptimized.

Much of the blame for the current state of affairs re

with the Air Force. Institutionally, the Air Force does 

take doctrine seriously and will begin to pay a serious pr

because of the new authoritative nature of joint doctri

Joint doctrine now has teeth that are eating away at a

claim an airman may make on dimensional superiority 

the ability to dominate in specific combat situations. T

failure of the Air Force to lead in the doctrinal debate 

paid for by reducing the credibility of airmen at the jo

war-fighting table.

The Air Force has misplaced its priorities in the jo

arena. We have become enamored with the technology 

connectivity and lost sight of the substance of the deba

Any fancy window dressing applied to the ATO or JFA

staff process will not alter that simple fact. Any prerogat

currently assumed to belong to the JFACC as a co

mander will be siphoned away by joint boards, committe

panels, and doctrinally directed, corporate-style air app

tionment decisions designed to direct airpower into a su

porting role.42 This creates a situation in which the 

component comes to the war-fighting table with a bla

sheet of paper to record taskings rather than with a w

articulated plan for optimizing airpower’s contribution

joint warfare is team warfare, it’s time for the Air Force 

join the team.

The surface warfare perspective of joint doctrine is qu

different from that of an airman—not better or worse, j

different. That is because soldiers and airmen operate 

different environments with fundamentally different vie

of the battlefield. The airman, from his perch above 

battlefield, has an operational and strategic view borne 

the range, speed, and flexibility of his or her environme

The airman implicitly understands how quickly effort c

be shifted across the theater—not over the course of d

but from mission to mission and even within the sa

PIVARSKY 
mission. Our bomber heritage has driven us to think 

terms of a maneuver force in the third dimension. As 

have matured, we have come to understand how th

maneuver complements the joint effort when it is allow

to participate as an equal partner.

Conversely, a corps is a maneuver unit and has a ta

cal focus. At corps and below, commanders concentrate 

land force dominance within their AO, not the theater a

whole. However, joint doctrine empowers them to inh

and indeed prohibit, third-dimensional maneuver they 

not own. Corps now plan at what they consider to be ope

tional depths; but those plans invariably have a tacti

focus of closing with and destroying the enemy surf

forces. It is simply interdiction disguised as deep operati

or operational maneuver. Calling interdiction “operatio

level warfare” is supported by a joint doctrine that crea

CINCdoms within CINCdoms forcing Corps commanders 

compete for theater assets they should not control.

History provides ample examples of the results of comp

ing surface maneuver commanders—Patton v. Montgom

MacArthur v. Nimitz, and possibly even Franks v. Luck. H

ever, there are no similar competitions in airpower. Tha

because properly organized airpower has a theater focus, 

an Army group or corps lane focus. Properly organized 

power has a single ACC with access to all airpower assets 

support a theater plan.

General Ronald R. Fogleman, the Air Force chief of st

has said “air and space power alone cannot win our natio

wars.”43 We need to fight as part of a team. Our mission 

“to defend the United States through control and explo

tion of air and space.” The Army “talks that talk” in the jo

arena, but the stated job of the Army is to “win the natio

wars.” With this perspective, only the Army can prov

ultimate victory. Any other operation only supports est

lishing the conditions for decisive ground combat. Jo

Pub 3-0 surrenders the doctrinal high ground to the Arm

It’s time for airmen to stop working at the margins a

devoting so much time and effort to tactics, techniqu

and procedures. Airmen have to get actively involved 

the current and future joint doctrine debates.

22 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
Recommendations

1. An authoritative joint doctrine is also a zero s

game. The problems discussed in this paper are a dir

result of component desires to dominate the theoreti

battle space in an effort to organize, train, and equip th

way to the next high-intensity, conventional conflict. Jo

doctrine must not be held hostage to parochial interests

must honestly communicate the best ideas for integrat

the distinctive capabilities of the services. Joint doctrin

a place for ideas and concepts—not power struggles a

parochial agendas. The power to make joint doctrine 

place of ideas resides with the individual who made 

authoritative, that is, the chairman of the joint chiefs 

staff. This research has made the clear case for a change 

what we call joint doctrine.

2. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, must 

rewritten to eliminate the convoluted and dishonest d

cussion of maneuver. If Joint Pub 3-0 fails to speak 

maneuver terms about airpower, this keystone docum

will poison all supporting doctrinal publications.

The following is a list of areas that must be addressed:

• Remove any caveat associated with maneuv

Maneuver remains appropriate as a principle of w

but not as a means of dividing up the battlefield. T

concept of maneuver forces as a separate and disti

grouping, although consistent with the US Arm

Battlefield Operating System44 approach to land co

bat, has no place in assigning command responsi

ity on a joint battlefield. Maneuver provides a way 

thinking about battle-space dynamics; it is not a ve

cle for task organizing in joint warfare.

• Remove any reference or inference that there is a 

ference between the capabilities of air assets due 

their association with surface forces. Being organic 

a surface force adds no special value to air assets a

may in fact limit their effectiveness in the joint fight

• Remove the interdiction trilogy and its convoluted d

cussion; maintaining the current system with thea

interdiction, air interdiction, and interdiction under 

PIVARSKY 
command of the surface maneuver commander is 

solete. Like maneuver, interdiction should be d

cussed as an approach to defeating the enemy a

not as a mission area to be controlled by a spec

unit or component. Interdiction is simply a means 

an end.

• Remove the extensive discussion of the FSCL fr

Joint Pub 3-0. As it is currently used, the FSCL i

tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) and not a k

stone doctrinal issue. Its relevance on a future bat

field is also quite dubious. If we have the moral co

age to fix the problems with maneuver a

interdiction, the FSCL becomes totally inappropria

The inclusion of the FSCL in Joint Pub 3-0 is mor

testament to the political power of the US Army Fi

Artillery Branch than to the intellectual rigor a

honesty of joint doctrine.

The FSCL acknowledges the acceptance of uncoordina

and uncontrolled fires violating the principles of war

also plainly acknowledges the increased risk of fratrici

In today’s world, preventing fratricide is a zero-defects 

eration; accepting increased risk by use of “permissive 

support coordination measures” is a nonstarter. 45 T

FSCL is currently perceived to be required because the J

habitually gives the land maneuver commander contro

too much of the fight.

Areas for Further Study

The following areas should be included in future doctri

debates and provide fertile ground for continuing research

1. The concepts of interdiction and maneuver need 

be combined. The current distinction is contrived and p

duces unacceptable friction inside the joint team. A sin

coherent concept of maneuver is not a great leap of fai

Interdiction is simply maneuver that is force oriented a

separated by time or distance from classical close com

between surface forces. Like maneuver, interdiction is e

cuted by soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and spe

forces. Like maneuver, individual interdiction engageme

have the same cumulative effect on campaign design a

24 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
execution. The false distinctions drawn in current doctr

are simply a means to wrest control of battle space fr

the air component. As a joint team we need to mature 

of that paradigm.

2. Information technology is critical to a revised bat

field framework. The antiquated AO structure can only 

discarded when the means to rapidly, securely, and ac

rately change boundaries between responsible comma

ers is available. This is not seen as a revolution

development but simply a means to allow the JFC the fle

bility to properly integrate joint force capabilities.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (Pub) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of 

United States, 10 January 1995, vi–vii.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., vii.

5. NDP 1, Naval Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Department of the N

1994), 45; Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of 

United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Fo

1992), 1; Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Dep

ment of the Army, 14 June 1993), 2–5.

6. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, IV

7. Positional advantage refers to a geometric relationship that un

essarily restricts the concept of maneuver; it frames maneuver 

reference to spatial relationships only. This may be appropriate in 

game of chess or traditional land combat but is unnecessarily restric

in full-dimensional operations. The concepts of time and information 

vantage are not included in this concept of maneuver; however, t

should be included.

8. Ibid., A-2.

9. Edward C. Mann, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and 

Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air University Press, 1995), 117.

10. Joint Pub 3-0, IV- 8–9.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., IV-14.

13. Ibid., III-33.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., IV-12.

16. Ibid., IV-9.

17. Ibid., IV-12.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., IV-9.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., IV-11.

PIVARSKY 
22. Ibid., IV-13.

23. Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support: Second Draft, I-

24. Joint Pub 1, II-6.

25. Joint Pub 3-0, GL-7.

26. Ibid., IV-17.

27. The answer is in Joint Pub 3-0. Within their AOs, “land and n

operational force commanders are designated the supported comman

and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and in

diction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders desig

the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations wi

their AOs.” This surface interdiction priority can be reflected in the JF

apportionment decision. Air interdiction apportioned to the land c

mander is simply battlefield air interdiction.

28. Joint Pub 3-09, IV-15.

29. Joint Pub 3-0, IV-9.

30. Ibid., xiii.

31. Brig Gen Robert H. Scales Jr., USA, Certain Victory: The US A

in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Un

States Army, 1993), 305.

32. United States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) P

phlet 525-XXX, US Army Operational Concept for Aviation, Septem

1993, 6.

33. Joint Pub 3-0, IV-13

34. Ibid.

35. Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm 

Leavenworth, Kans: US Army Command and General Staff College Pr

1994), 228.

36. Joint Pub 3-0, iii.

37. Swain, 228.

38. Joint Pub 3-09, I-6.

39. Ibid.

40. Scales.

41. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E Trainor, USMC Ret, 

General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: L

Brown and Co., 1995), 464–65.

42. Joint Pub 3-0, III-26–27.

43. Policy letter, Teamwork, from the Office of the Secretary of the 

Force, January 1995.

44. For an extensive discussion of the battlefield operating syst

see US Army FM 100-20.

45. The FSCL concept is unacceptable for the following the reasons

 (1) Militarily, it violates the principles of war—specifically, u

of command. This is because no one is in command or in control of 

area beyond the FSCL; there is simply ownership of an AO. Econom

force is violated because multiple forces could be engaging the s

target. The coordination requirement beyond the FSCL is no substitute 

control of the fight beyond the FSCL. Simplicity is violated due to lia

requirements and mass because effort is dissipated throughout a la

area, not focused for maximum effect.

26 AIRPOWER ... A DYSFUNCTIONAL JOINT DOCTRINE
 (2) Politically, the FSCL is indefensible in the event of a frien

fire incident. Today’s military cannot go on Cable News Network to exp

that our sons or daughters, or those of our allies or coalition partners, 

dead because our coordination measures don’t coordinate anything. H

do we explain in peacetime that our doctrine openly acknowledges 

increased risk of fratricide because no one was in command but we s

anyway?

 (3) Economically, we cannot afford to be engaging targets w

one-shot multimillion dollar systems like Tomahawk land attack miss

(TLAM) and Army tactical missile systems (ATACM) which at the s

time might be engaged by other systems. The Army cannot afford 

develop another robust deep battle structure of major weapon syst

and command and control that duplicate air component capabilities

though redundant capabilities are desirable for providing options to 

JFC, we simply cannot afford to fund them.

 (4) Morally, the FSCL creates a free-fire zone with no implied 

possibly no actual constraints on the use of force to minimize civi

casualties or collateral damage.

PIVARSKY