www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 1 

On the eve of the January 1, 2011, inauguration of Brazilian President 

Dilma Rousseff, the State Department noted that the United States 

“is committed to deepening our relationship on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues with Brazil’s government and people.” President 

Rousseff herself declared shortly thereafter, “We will preserve and deepen the 

relationship with the United States.” During President Barack Obama’s March 

2011 visit to Brazil, both leaders cited “the progress achieved on defense issues in 

2010” and stated their commitment to “follow up on the established dialogue in 

this area, primarily on new opportunities for cooperation.” While these rhetorical commitments are important, will they lead to greater cooperation on defense 

issues and improve U.S.-Brazil ties?

The established dialogue on defense is part of a movement toward greater 

U.S.-Brazil defense cooperation. On April 12, 2010, U.S. Defense Secretary 

Robert Gates and Brazil’s Defense Minister Nelson Jobim initialed the first 

Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two nations in over 25 years. It 

endorsed multiple interactions already under way between both militaries, but 

it also broadened the scope of potential cooperation. The agreement endorsed 

cooperation related to defense technology including research and development 

(R&D), logistics support, technology security, military systems and equipment, 

acquisition of defense products and services, and the sharing of operational and 

defense technology experiences. The agreement also called for the “facilitation 

of commercial initiatives related to defense matters” and cooperation on “implementation and development of programs and projects on defense technology 

applications.” In November 2010, Gates and Jobim signed a second accord, a 

Trust, Engagement, and 

Technology Transfer: 

Underpinnings for U.S.-Brazil 

Defense Cooperation

by E. Richard Downes

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. E. Richard Downes, Lt Col, 

USAF (Ret.), is an Independent 

Researcher who has previously 

served as a Brazil Desk Officer on 

the Joint Staff and Associate Dean 

of Academics at the Center for 

Hemispheric Defense Studies.

Key Points

◆ As Brazil’s power and international standing grow, so does the 

importance to the United States of 

a close relationship with Brazil.

◆ Among emerging powers, Brazil is 

politically and culturally the closest to the United States. For this 

South American neighbor, defense 

technology has become a critical 

aspect of strategic reorientation 

and force modernization. Sharing 

U.S. defense technology, including 

know-how, would strengthen U.S.-

Brazil relations.

◆ The two nations have taken initial 

steps to strengthen defense relations, including the 2010 Defense 

Cooperation Agreement and the 

first U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation Dialogue.

◆ Full implementation of 2010 agreements, pursuit of a shared vision of 

deeper defense cooperation, and 

development of a bilateral plan to 

advance the transfer of defense 

technology (and know-how) based 

on Brazil’s National Defense Strategy can improve defense collaboration and provide each country with 

important benefits.

August 2012

Center for Strate

gic R

eSEARCH
2 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

General Security of Military Information Agreement, 

designed to facilitate the exchange of classified military 

information essential for commercial sales and operational cooperation.

These agreements reaffirm that the United States 

and Brazil have important common regional and global 

interests best served by sweeping aside past suspicions, 

smoothing strained relations, and nurturing consultation on security matters. Foreseeable strategic results of 

improved U.S.-Brazilian relations and heightened collaboration include the enhancement of Brazilian military 

capabilities, which are central to Brazil’s ability to secure 

its borders and coastline and operate effectively in a dangerous world, and increased U.S. opportunities to collaborate with an important new global actor on a range 

of international security issues. Achieving robust defense 

cooperation, however, will take time and political will. 

To make progress, each government must develop 

higher levels of mutual trust and confidence. A practical 

catalyst and test of U.S. commitment in the near term is 

Washington’s willingness to transfer defense technology to 

Brasilia in support of its forward-looking 2008 National 

Defense Strategy. Brazilian and U.S. political and military 

leaders see long-term strategic and commercial benefits 

flowing from implementation of this defense plan. 

U.S. Interests in Closer Defense 

Cooperation

For the United States, a stronger defense relationship could strengthen bilateral political ties and improve 

cooperation on multiple regional and global security issues. The U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010) cited Brazil as one of the “Emerging Centers of Influence” 

and expressed a commitment to work together “to move 

beyond dated North-South divisions to pursue progress 

on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues.”1 The scope 

of shared strategic interests in the hemisphere include 

peacefully managing challenges posed by national instabilities and local conflicts, democratic development, and 

the need to defeat transnational organized criminal networks. Looking globally, common interests include alternative energy development, trade, peacekeeping, cybersecurity, nuclear nonproliferation, international terrorism, 

narcotics-trafficking, the environment, and development 

in Africa. According to a veteran Washington analyst of 

the country, Brazil has become “a respected player and 

interlocutor with both the emerging market countries 

and the industrial states.”2

Defense Engagement. A closer U.S. defense relationship with Brazil serves the strategic interests of both 

nations and reduces the potential for misunderstandings 

and antagonism. Sustained bilateral engagement reinforces mutual trust, broadens nascent cooperation, and 

underscores respect for national sovereignty and international law. In a recent study, Ambassador Luigi Einaudi 

observed that “[b]oth countries need to take a new look 

at each other, recognize their mutual interest in more intimate relations, and make achieving them a priority.”3

Bilateral cooperation in disaster relief and other 

humanitarian missions and exposure of intermediategrade and senior U.S. and Brazilian military officers to 

each other’s concerns would lead to deeper mutual understanding. A closer military relationship would also 

further opportunities for language training, cultural exposure, and exchanges of operational experiences in nontraditional security environments.

Arms Sales. The Obama administration is determined to help U.S. companies pursue the new market 

opportunities Brazil represents. With Brazil’s defense 

spending and foreign acquisitions increasing and over 

USD 2.3 billion expended for weapons imports from all 

suppliers between 2000 and 2010, it should be an emerging market for U.S. defense businesses. The Department 

of State and U.S. industry are seeking to increase the 

meager 16 percent U.S. share of Brazil’s foreign purchases of weapons and boost sales of defense services.4

Brazilian Interests in Closer 

Defense Cooperation

Agreements on defense cooperation define a path 

to acquire expertise and capabilities integral to Brazil’s 

attainment of its international aspirations. Ratification 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 3 

of the bilateral 2010 Defense Cooperation and General 

Security of Military Information Agreements with the 

United States by Brazil’s congress will help the government implement its 2008 National Defense Strategy vision of a complete overhaul of the defense establishment 

and military capabilities plus the resuscitation of national 

defense industries. Bolstered by a strong economy, political stability, and cultural vitality, Brazil’s leaders are convinced that their country can finally assume its “rightful” 

place as an influential regional and global power. Economic performance, high commodity prices, and higher 

government revenues have made increased defense expenditures possible and revived the nation’s militaryindustrial complex. To achieve its ambitious international 

goals and develop domestic defense industries, however, 

the National Defense Strategy acknowledges that Brazil has to consider “strategic partnerships with countries 

that may contribute to the development of state-of-theart technologies in the interest of defense.”5

 The United 

States is just such a country.

International Aspirations. In South America, Brazil is at the center of attention in such areas of looming 

importance as energy (oil, biofuels, and nuclear power), 

fresh water, foodstuffs, the environment, and international organized crime. With unprecedented presidential 

diplomacy, former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 

(2003–2010) encouraged greater continental unity, an 

effort to create a “consensual hegemony” to safeguard 

Brazil’s regional interests and gain support for a greater 

role in international politics and high-level participation 

in global organizations. In 2003, Brazil led the push for 

expansion of the G-7 into the G-20 to make it more 

inclusive of emerging economies and the 2008 founding 

of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). 

Six months later, after consultations with counterparts, 

Lula’s administration announced the creation of UNASUR’s South American Council of Defense.6

 The National Defense Strategy underscores the country’s intention to rise to the first stage in the world but emphasizes 

that Brazil has no intention of promoting hegemony or 

domination.

Defense Reform: The Background. While Brazil has 

risen in global economic and political influence, its military forces have remained hampered by deficiencies in 

equipment, planning, force distribution, and resource 

allocation. The National Defense Strategy asserts that 

Brazil’s sovereignty, domestic security, and international aspirations are partly predicated on a modern and 

Hundreds of million USD 

France

USA

Germany

Sweden

Italy

Spain

Israel

Canada

Russia

United Kingdom

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Trade Registers, available at <www.sipri.org>.

Brazilian Weapons Imports by Country of Origin, 2000–2010
4 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

capable defense sector. Driving defense reform are three 

elite groups: civilian policymakers committed to providing political direction to the nation’s security strategy, 

military leaders pressuring for high technology weapons systems and other capabilities after decades of nogrowth budgets, and a domestic defense industry seeking to expand further into both domestic and especially 

international markets.

Defense Modernization: A Mixed Record. Civilian 

political leaders have long advocated funding the scientific and technological development of the armed forces 

not only to ensure Brazil’s autonomy but also to increase 

domestic economic growth. In the 1990s, unprecedented 

changes in international geopolitics left the Brazilian 

military without an identifiable enemy and severely reduced budgets. Establishment of a civilian-led Ministry 

of Defense in 1999 centralized control and guidance of 

the armed forces, with an emphasis on technological advancement. In 2003, the ministry expressed support for 

“scientific-technological solutions and innovations . . . 

related to defense and national development” and subsequently joined the Ministry of Science and Technology to create a national system of Science, Technology, 

and Innovation of Interest to National Defense. Senior 

military officers judged “scientific and technological 

expression” that “conceives and coordinates the development of weapons systems together with industry” as 

one of the gauges of national power.7

 The 2008 National 

Defense Strategy specifically links technology, security, 

and national development. Nothing less than “national 

independence” is to be achieved through an “autonomous 

technological capacity” since “whoever does not master 

critical technologies is neither independent for defense 

nor for development.”8

In practice, however, during the last 20 years the 

uniformed services’ quest for scientific and technological 

development has fallen victim to budget cuts that have 

resulted in operational weakness and low morale. By 

1993, the defense share of all government spending had 

fallen to the lowest level since 1822.9 Limited resources 

undermined accomplishment of the most routine tasks 

and, together with the low salary scale for even senior 

officers, contributed to an overall feeling that Brazilian 

society viewed the military with “injustice and lack of 

appreciation.”10 Increases in the military budget from 

1995 forward went largely to pay increases, but morale 

remained so low that in 2006 an influential Brasilia 

newspaper reported that more than 600 army, navy, and 

air force officers had abandoned the services during the 

previous 6 years because of low pay.11

Operations and equipment modernization also 

suffered. In 2004, the navy withdrew major ships from 

service because of a lack of maintenance funds. In 2005, 

the air force suspended a buy of advanced fighter aircraft, under way for 5 years, and instead purchased a 

dozen 25-year-old French Mirage 2000-Cs. That same 

year, the navy commander stated that he lacked the 

means to defend Brazil’s coastline, and the government 

announced the completion of a prototype nuclear reactor for a nuclear submarine on land only, since funds 

were unavailable for tests at sea. Two years later, the 

air force commander reportedly testified behind closed 

doors that 63 percent of his aircraft were immobilized 

for financial reasons. The Brazilian army had become 

a “living military museum” with combat vehicles used 

during the Korean War and American equipment discarded after Vietnam.12

Reequipping the armed forces to perform even minimal missions in a changing security environment became 

a political issue. President Lula increased the defense 

budget annually so that by 2010 the Defense Ministry’s 

budget ranked third among all ministries, leading one 

analyst to conclude that democratization was followed 

“by a massive effort to maintain the power of the military, 

not the contrary.”13 Presidential commitments to reequip 

the armed forces and increase export sales breathed new 

life into the defense industry, which by 2007 included 

300 companies employing 30,000 persons with a net 

contribution of USD 208 million to Brazil’s gross national product.14 By 2009, the total value of its production had grown to nearly USD 2 billion, with exports 

nearing USD 1 billion. Three domestic trade associations 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 5 

lobby the government to increase the use of Brazilian 

firms to meet domestic defense needs, constantly citing 

the potential benefits of spin-offs of defense technology. 

Especially prominent is COMDEFESA, a committee of 

the powerful Federação de Industrias do Estado de São 

Paulo (The São Paulo State Federation of Industries), 

representing companies that produce 95 percent of domestic defense output. COMDEFESA teaches defense 

resources management at the National War College, the 

Escola Superior de Guerra, with the objective of “aligning civilian and military interests in Brazil’s affairs.” It 

also sponsors the Latin American Aerospace Conference, an annual defense trade show. The 2011 edition attracted over 25,000 visitors and featured 121 Brazilian 

companies among the 542 exhibitors. According to the 

Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, Brazil’s defense 

expenditures, measured in constant 2009 USD, nearly 

quadrupled between 1992 and 2010.15

Brazil’s National Defense Strategy 

Beyond additional defense funding, a rising Brazil 

needed a disciplined assessment of the country’s security 

and defense requirements and an examination of existing 

capabilities. The defense strategy that emerged focused 

on three thematic areas: transforming the ministry and 

modernizing the armed forces for peace and war, reorganizing the nation’s defense industry to reduce reliance on 

foreign sources, and adopting compulsory military service and improving the mobilization system.

Its implementation poses challenges for civilian leaders in addition to those created by perennially 

underfunding acquisitions. Leaders cannot ignore the 

historic independence and political strength of military forces. Traditional service cultures will influence 

the integration of new technology and its utilization 

within new, complex organizational arrangements. The 

strategy accepts an unavoidable tension between the 

traditional power and prerogatives of the army, navy, 

and air force and today’s recognized need for joint 

planning and unification of the “operations of the three 

branches of the armed forces, far beyond the limits imposed by joint exercise protocols.” The strategy allows 

each service to specify its own strategic guidelines and 

equipment priorities and separates service-based plans 

under the direction of the respective service commanders. Traditional autonomy is further maintained as each 

commander retains the authority to “perform the direction and management tasks of the respective branch” 

Indexed Brazilian Defense Expenditures, 1992–2010

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at <www.sipri.org>.

19921993

199419951996

199719981999

20002001

2002

2003

2004

200520062007200820092010

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

1992 = 1.00 (Constant 2009 USD)
6 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

and “propose its policies and doctrines.” One awkward 

provision allows naval districts, regional commanders, 

and “Regional Joint Staffs” to have “common jurisdiction areas” and directs their “operational unity” through 

periodic meetings among themselves and advisors. It is 

fair to presume that time-consuming negotiations and 

suboptimal decisionmaking may result.

On the other hand, the strategy strengthens the Ministry of Defense role in guiding the equipping, training, 

and structuring of the uniformed services. The minister 

has direct authority over the joint staff, charged to unify 

service doctrine, strategy, and operations. The strategy 

calls on the army to transform itself based on concepts of 

mobility, flexibility, and daring (innovation). All services 

are directed to increase their abilities to plan and conduct 

joint operations. Military research centers will be linked 

to academic institutions and private companies to support 

increased technology development. The core of the document mandates service organizational changes needed to 

transform today’s technological innovations into desired 

capabilities, whether for the conduct of peacekeeping operations; “power projection in the areas of strategic interest”16; the defense of Brazil’s territory, especially the Amazon region; or the protection of the “Blue Amazon” region 

of oil reserves lying off the Atlantic coast. The wide-ranging scope of the organizational changes foreseen by the 

National Defense Strategy are:

1. improve search and rescue capabilities

2. reorganize the navy into underwater, surface, and 

aerospace components

3. transform the army based on mobility, flexibility, 

and elasticity

4. conduct joint land, sea, and air planning and 

operations

5. strengthen Brazilian Aerospace Defense Command

6. link military research centers, academic institutions, and private companies

7. decentralize the business and technology complex of São José dos Campos

8. enhance the role for the Ministry of Defense in 

weapons development and acquisition

9. increase support for national defense industry

10. increase support for defense studies at national 

universities

11. reorient National War College under joint staff 

and services

12. enhance interagency cooperation

13. enhance planning responsibility for Ministry of 

Defense

14. raise academic level of National War College

15. enlarge curriculum of service educational institutions

16. integrate military intelligence activities under 

Ministry of Defense

17. expand peacekeeping training and operations

18. improve national crisis planning and management.

Implementing the Strategy. Achieving the twin 

goals of modernizing the armed forces for peace and war 

and reorganizing the nation’s defense industry requires 

funding, education, and time, but especially technology. 

Achieving the first goal requires an innovative transformation of operational practices and extensive capacity 

building to be conducted according to a “technological 

timeline.” Reaching the second goal ultimately must be 

based on foreign as well as national technologies that are 

to be “unconditionally mastered domestically.”17 Recent 

increases in funding have allowed defense reform to begin, but Brazil must look well into the future for foreign 

partners for technology and financing.

Resource requirements are demanding, especially 

because the strategy prioritizes three high-cost technology sectors: space, cybernetics, and nuclear. The 

modernizing the armed forces for 

peace and war and reorganizing the 

nation’s defense industry requires 

funding, education, and time, but 

especially technology 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 7 

navy is to develop a versatile defense and attack aircraft, conventional and nuclear submarines, and multipurpose ships that can also be used as aircraft carriers. The army is to monitor or control the development 

of satellite launch vehicles, low and high altitude 

satellites, a new and independent global positioning 

system, and cybernetic communications systems. The 

air force is to educate civilian and military “technoscientists” and achieve technological independence; 

conduct transformational technological projects; create ties between its technological centers and private 

companies; build up technological capabilities by simultaneously purchasing an advanced fighter aircraft 

while developing the prototype of its own advanced 

crewed fighter aircraft; develop network-centric warfare capabilities; advance unmanned vehicle programs; 

and integrate space activities into air force operations. 

The strategy commits the Minister of Defense to establish “special financial resources” for the development of 13 costly, highly technical weapons systems.

The strategy recognizes the need for foreign partnerships and appears to allow foreign roles in developing most systems. In several cases, and even for the 

cybernetics, space, and nuclear sectors, the document 

explicitly recognizes the need for foreign partnerships, 

at least as a transition measure toward technological 

independence. In the near term, the source of original and development technology for all 27 programs 

cited in the strategy is reasonably expected to rely on 

foreign partners.

Complexity of Technology 

Transfer

Any foreign commercial or government entity 

contemplating a defense partnership with Brazil immediately confronts the issue of transfer of technology, a complex process encompassing many disciplines 

and practices often misunderstood as simply the 

transfer of a specific product. Technology transfer is a 

“profoundly human endeavor” based on sharing “systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, 

for the application of a process, or for the rendering 

of a service.” It incorporates not just technological 

specifications but also “entrepreneurial expertise and 

professional know-how.”18As a knowledge-centric interaction between two or more parties, it also implicitly involves a negotiation of terms.19 In the Brazilian 

case, potential defense partners must respond to four 

Brazilian priorities: funding arrangements, creation of 

a defense industrial base, human capital development, 

and integration of legacy systems and organizations.

Funding Arrangements. Developing new weapons 

systems through foreign partnership and high degrees 

of technology transfer is one way for Brazil to overcome funding shortages throughout its military acquisitions cycle, especially for R&D. The Ministry of 

Defense wants to take “advantage of foreign savings 

without depending upon them.” A study of defense 

budgets from 1995 to 2008 showed that personnel 

costs consumed 80 percent of the defense budget, with 

63 percent of those costs supporting pensions for retirees and “inactive” former uniformed members. Acquisitions—termed “investments”—received only 6.7 

percent of the overall budget during the 13 years in 

the study. While there recently was a budgetary increase in investments from a mere USD 725 million 

in 2006 to USD 2.3 billion for 2009, in reality budget 

allocations are merely authorizations. Major portions 

of the defense budget are not spent but held in “contingency” to meet other government needs. Between 

2006 and 2008, an average of nearly 13 percent of the 

authorized defense budget was never spent.20 Complicating funding arrangements, in February 2011 

any foreign commercial or 

government entity contemplating 

a defense partnership with Brazil 

confronts the issue of transfer of 

technology
8 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

President Rousseff announced a USD 2.4 billion cut 

in the defense budget as part of a government-wide 

program to slow inflation.

The Ministry of Defense is due additional funding 

from other ministries and agencies, but these amounts 

are generally small and often partially withheld. The 

navy, for example, receives compensation from the state 

oil company Petrobras for providing security for offshore oil platforms although, at least in 2007, over 62 

percent of the USD 771 million in royalties due were 

withheld from the navy’s account. Government spending for defense R&D is subject to an interministerial 

process through which the Ministry of Defense solicits project funding from the Ministry of Science and 

Technology. Total funding support for defense-related 

R&D from the “Integrated Program of Science Technology and Innovation in Strategic Areas” for 2008 

stood the equivalent of only USD 147 million, including subsidies for private sector “Science, Technology 

and Innovation” projects.21 The Ministry of Defense 

reciprocates by supporting teaching and scientific and 

technological research related to national defense. The 

12 projects of its “Pro-defesa” program received over 

USD 2.2 million between 2006 and 2010.22

Other subsidies benefit defense-related private business and educational programs. The Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade is active in this sector. The 

National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolviment) funds private-sector projects to strengthen 

engineering and technical capabilities in the petroleum, 

gas, automotive, shipbuilding, aeronautics, nuclear, and 

“national defense” industries. This activity had an overall 

budget of over USD 2.2 billion for 2010, but the amount 

actually committed to national defense technologies is 

difficult to determine.

The size and scope of financial commitments from 

partners can therefore become important, as indicated 

by the Franco-Brazilian arrangements to advance the 

most ambitious projects yet undertaken to implement 

the strategy. The governments signed a defense cooperation agreement in January 2008, followed by a “Strategic 

Partnership” agreement in December that committed 

the two nations to cooperate to build four conventionally powered Scorpène submarines and the hull for a nuclear-powered submarine, as well as construct the naval 

shipyard to build the five submarines and eventually be 

the naval base for submarine operations. The agreement 

includes provisions for the transfer of technology related 

to automation, hydrodynamics, acoustics, and combat 

systems to Brazil. The acquisition of other military systems, such as 50 EC-725 Super Cougar helicopters, will 

advance joint production in Brazil. The helicopters will 

be assembled in country by Helibras, a company partially 

owned by Eurocopter, an EADS subsidiary.

External financing is of central importance to each 

major program. For the submarine project, the Brazilian 

congress approved an overall budget of USD 10 billion, of 

which 63 percent will be provided by external bank funding. 

The helicopter agreement depends even more on external 

financing, with French banks providing 96 percent of the 

USD 2.7 billion required. In addition, Eurocopter, which 

holds a 45 percent equity stake in Helibras, reportedly will 

invest USD 300–$400 million in the Helibras plant.

Defense Industrial Base. A basic premise of the National Defense Strategy is that foreign partners must be 

willing to transfer technology to Brazilian institutions and 

agree that a substantial part of research and manufacturing 

be accomplished in Brazil. The strategy illustrates how the 

transfer of technology advances Brazilian capabilities by 

linking the purchase of defense products with the stimulation of indigenous research and development. Aside from 

increasing sales for commercial partners, this would crethe Franco-Brazilian “Strategic 

Partnership” agreement includes 

provisions for the transfer of 

technology related to automation, 

hydrodynamics, acoustics, and 

combat systems to Brazil
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 9 

ate economies of scale for domestic and non-Brazilian 

customers through an integration of various countries’ 

defense industrial bases. In this way, an internationalized 

national defense industry advances the consolidation of 

regional integration under Brazilian leadership.23

For Brazil’s approach to technology transfer to be viable, foreign commercial partners will have to agree not 

only to share technology as an accelerator of Brazil’s indigenous industrial capabilities but also to be convinced 

that the partnership will lead to future company profits on 

sales to third parties. In the process, foreign partners may 

be able to help the Brazilian defense industry to overcome 

its Achilles’ Heel: the lack of market size and consequent 

high unit cost. Under the military government, the domestic defense industry grew and prospered when it was seen 

as “the maximizing instrument of national autonomy . . . 

to fulfill, in the long run, the old ambition of establishing 

the bases of a great power with global projection.” The defense industry benefited from government sponsorship as 

an “island of excellence” and grew through a combination 

of tax incentives, import relief, and promotion schemes. In 

the 1990s, however, the international market for weapons 

using mid-level technology collapsed, domestic military 

sales plummeted, and democratic governments withdrew 

preferential treatment. Brazil did not have the institutional 

resiliency to adapt to changing market and political conditions. Major arms producers reoriented their production 

to civilian goods to survive.24

This approach differs sharply from the approach of 

the United States and China, both of which adopted 

a “dual-use” policy through which industry produces 

both civilian and military-oriented goods. This model 

provides common technologies, processes, labor, equipment, material, and facilities to meet both defense and 

commercial needs. It links designs and component 

specifications to commercial standards and buys commercial items directly whenever possible. Defenseunique industrial capabilities and products are created 

only when absolutely necessary.

Brazil continues to emphasize the “island of excellence” model for its defense industries and foreign 

partners, presenting significant risk. The strategy calls 

for a “special legal, regulatory and taxation regime” to 

protect companies with defense products from “the 

risks of the mercantile immediacy.” The document 

continues the strong hand for the state in defense industries by proposing a special legal regime to retain 

“strategic power” over these enterprises. An unknown 

factor is the size of the South American or other markets for defense goods. In a recent study, a Brazilian 

expert on the nation’s defense industry estimated the 

demand within South America for weapons systems 

of intermediate technology to be only $100 million 

per year, a market 400 times smaller than the market 

of Europe’s four major arms producers. The study concludes that forming an international cooperative venture based on the sale of defense items to the South 

American market, while offering possible political 

benefits and access to additional research and development, may not be profitable enough to warrant “important initiatives.”25

Human Capital Development. Foreign partners are 

asked to respond to the strategy’s need for investments 

in human capital usually through arrangements with 

foreign academic institutions. These ties are intended to 

facilitate the assimilation of new technology, whether 

transferred from foreign partners or developed within 

Brazil. The strategy envisions both education and training programs at foreign schools to enhance the technical 

skills of the armed forces, especially in the core strategic 

areas of nuclear, space, and cybernetics.

Integrating Legacy Systems. Throughout this process, foreign partners must introduce new technologies 

foreign partners may be able to 

help the Brazilian defense industry 

to overcome its Achilles’ Heel: 

the lack of market size and 

consequent high unit cost
10 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

and effect organizational change in the face of powerful 

legacy systems and cultures that condition all aspects of 

their operational employment. With the construction 

of the French-designed Scorpène submarines, for example, Brazil’s submarine fleet will consist of a mixture of 

conventionally powered German- and French-designed 

craft: four German-designed diesel-electric Tupi-class 

U-209s commissioned between 1989 and 1999; one 

improved Tupi class designated the Tikuna class and 

commissioned in 2005; and the four new French-designed, conventionally powered Scorpènes; and a single 

nuclear-powered vessel with a French-designed hull 

and a Brazilian-designed reactor powerplant. Adding 

to the inherent logistical and operational challenges, 

the Tupi-class submarines are being modernized by 

a U.S. contractor, Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems, under a USD 35.3 million contract awarded in 

January 2008.

Roadmap to Closer U.S.-Brazil 

Defense Cooperation

Ample opportunities exist, therefore, for a fully understood and mutually beneficial concept of technology 

transfer between the United States and Brazil to serve 

as the foundation for a stronger cooperative relationship. 

The focus on technological advances and organizational 

change in Brazil’s National Defense Strategy, coupled 

with six decades of U.S. experience in integrating technological innovations with institutional change, could 

open the door for a more robust defense interchange. 

A bilateral approach could support the recognition that 

technology transfer inherently requires the preparation of 

human capital and changes in organizational portfolios 

to best assimilate the knowledge transferred. The United 

States could become more than a provider of technical 

knowledge by lending extensive support to modernizing 

the country’s defense structure. Brazil’s strategy leaves 

open the possibility of a strong official nexus between 

its Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense precisely because the technology transfer process 

foreseen in the National Defense Strategy will have a 

broad impact on defense organization and operational 

doctrine, areas of unique U.S. expertise.

A stronger U.S.-Brazil relationship must overcome 

a long list of mutual irritants. The post–World War II 

“brotherhood of arms” that spanned three decades fell 

victim to tensions related to Brazil’s nuclear program 

and to the Carter administration’s enforcement of human rights sanctions against the military government in 

1977. The Reagan administration sought to revive the 

relationship in the 1980s without success.

Brazil searched for greater autonomy on foreign 

policy and defense issues through the 1990s and into today’s contemporary security challenges. The country sat 

on the sidelines during the 1991 Gulf War and spoke out 

strongly against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. While militaryto-military contacts presently are vibrant and evidence 

good will and mutual respect, some senior Brazilian 

military leaders and intelligence officials still suspect that 

the United States seeks to foment regional discord and 

might try to internationalize the Amazon to control its 

fresh-water resources out of concern for the environment 

since preserving the rain forest is a delicate issue. Brazil’s 

founding of the South American Council of Defense 

symbolized a Brazilian drive to address South American 

security issues without U.S. interference. Defense Minister Jobim affirmed in 2010 that “the South American 

defense system is our affair, [as] one of the countries in 

the region.” The current minister, Celso Amorim, has expressed similar sentiments.26 An important irritant has 

been Washington’s refusal to cooperate with Brasilia’s 

space and nuclear programs, thus encouraging a Brazilian diplomat to claim to a U.S. defense audience in 2008 

that the United States has carried out a “technological 

embargo against Brazil for the last 20 years.” 

The 2010 Defense Cooperative Agreement’s terms 

and related statements and actions hint that major 

changes are feasible, with important implications for 

Brazil’s defense industries. At the signing ceremony for 

the agreement, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that 

the resulting cooperation not only will strengthen both 

countries’ military capabilities, but will also provide 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 11 

“opportunities for industry.” Defense Minister Jobim 

claimed that closer defense ties would facilitate the sale 

of Brazilian aircraft to the United States. The timing of 

the 2010 Defense Cooperative Agreement—in the midst 

of an intense competition among French, Swedish, and 

U.S. aircraft manufacturers to sell advanced fighters to 

the Brazilian air force—can be seen as indicative of both 

the Obama administration’s support for selection of the 

U.S. competitor—Boeing—and a Brazilian determination to link any sale to greater access to proven defense 

technology. 

Deep-seated tensions on security related issues remain despite friendly dialogue among general officers 

and substantive exchanges between senior defense officials and policy experts. Some Brazilian military officers 

are suspicious of U.S. global intentions and actions. One 

naval officer writing in a professional military journal 

even suggested that the United States may actually have 

been responsible for sinking Brazilian ships to encourage Brazil’s entry into World War II. References in the 

National Defense Strategy to actions against an “enemy 

force [that] is much more powerful” and to the defense 

of the Amazon against a “military enemy with a far superior power” are thinly veiled references to uncertainty 

about U.S. intentions.27 As pointed out by the Brazilian-American scholar Thomaz Guedes da Costa, the 

The Incremental Steps of Technology Transfer: “The Technology 

Transfer Pyramid”

Source: Charles G. Jameson, “The Technology Transfer Pyramid and How to Climb It,” The DISAM Journal of 

International Security Assistance Management, Fall 2000, 75.

Advanced 

Theoretical and

Applied Research

Underlying Engineering

and Design Philosophy

Design and Analysis

Integration

Manufacturing

Build/Design to Specs

Build/Design-to-Print

Assembly

Public Domain
12 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

establishment of trust requires major efforts by civilian 

and uniformed service leaders. Particularly sensitive are 

end-use issues on which the nations have not reached 

an agreement. These include guidelines for the export of 

transferred technology to third parties. This issue has a 

long history. It led to the breakdown of relations under 

the 1984 agreement and a recurring complaint by Brazilian military officers resentful of the U.S. decision to 

disapprove a prospective sale of Brazilian Tucano aircraft 

to Venezuela in 2006.28

Both countries will therefore have to work to build 

higher levels of trust. The U.S. administration and potential commercial partners have been making concerted efforts to convince Brazil that the United States can be a 

reliable defense partner. Recent high-level exchange visits 

of senior military officers, bilateral discussions among U.S. 

and Brazilian defense staffs, and participation in joint exercises and simulations have produced encouraging results. 

Stronger ties between the National Defense University 

and Brazil’s National War College could lead to better understanding of today’s globalized security environment by 

future national military leaders of both countries.

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Dr. Frank A. 

Mora, “U.S.-Brazil defense cooperation is closer today 

than at any time since 1977.”29 Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy assured Brazilian civilian and military officials during 

a May 2011 visit to Brasilia that Washington seeks 

“increased high-tech defense trade, flowing in both 

directions between our two countries.” She reminded 

Brazil that the potential sale of the Boeing F-18 Super Hornet includes “an unprecedented offer to release 

significant technology to Brazil.” Staff experts in the 

U.S. State and Defense Departments insist that the 

decision not to concur in the Tucano sale to Venezuela represented a rare exception to U.S. policy. They 

point out that the United States denied only 17 of 

the 6,900 defense-related export license applications 

for Brazil between 2007 and 2011, a disapproval rate 

of only 0.2 percent. Furthermore, they state that the 

United States approved 2,019 applications for export 

of military articles and services to Brazil in 2011 and 

that only two license applications were denied.30 The 

total value of authorized defense sales to Brazil for 

2010 surpassed USD 209 million and included nearly 

every category of goods: firearms, ammunition, missiles, torpedoes, bombs, mines, explosives, naval vessels, tanks, military vehicles, aircraft, training, spacecraft systems, electronics, guidance control equipment, 

and submersible vessels, among others.31 Continuing 

discussions during 2012 to resolve the possibility that 

the U.S. Air Force might purchase Brazilian Super 

Tucanos for its Light Aircraft Support platform have 

demonstrated the difficulties as well as the potential 

of closer defense relationships between the countries. 

The high rate of approval of licenses to export U.S. 

defense goods to Brazil indicates U.S. willingness to 

consider transferring defense technology as well. Like 

all recipients of U.S. defense sales, Brazil can receive 

varying levels of access to knowledge associated with 

each product, ranging from what is available in the 

public domain to co-development rights. Important 

to high levels of technology transfer are the recipients’ 

ability to prevent technology diversion, the sellers’ intentions regarding possible coproduction and research 

arrangements, the sensitivity of the technology, and the 

absorptive capacity of the recipient. One U.S. company 

has devised a “technology transfer pyramid” to highlight the degrees of exchange possible through international collaboration.32 Implementation of the U.S.-

Brazil Defense Cooperation and General Security of 

Military Information agreements will foster broad engagement and high levels of trust related to technology 

like all recipients of U.S. defense 

sales, Brazil can receive varying 

levels of access to knowledge 

associated with each product
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 13 

transfer, leading the way for increased benefits for both 

sellers and buyers.

On a broader level, U.S.-Brazil security cooperation 

could encompass the nuclear and energy sectors. According to President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue Peter Hakim, “U.S. technology could contribute a 

great deal to accelerate Brazil’s development of a worldclass nuclear energy industry—and could, over time, help 

increase Brazil’s support of non-proliferation.” Such collaboration would reflect a U.S. determination to “align 

Brazilian and U.S. interests and priorities on specific issues of concern” instead of attempting to restrain Brazil, 

with potentially counterproductive results.33

Building trust is not a one-way process. On the U.S. 

side, there are questions whether Brazilian intentions 

for the use of advanced technology are consistent with 

technology control regimes, especially the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology 

Control Regime. Brazil’s refusal to agree to the additional 

protocol of the NPT, which would provide greater access 

to national nuclear programs, raises speculation about 

the long-term intentions of its nuclear program despite 

repeated Brazilian assurances about its peaceful nature. 

Ambiguous language in the National Defense Strategy, 

lamenting that “Brazil was deprived of the option of employing nuclear power for any non-peaceful purposes,” 

may also cause unease within nonproliferation circles. 

The former director of the planning staff in the German 

Defense Ministry from 1982 to 1988 recently speculated 

that Brazil may in fact be developing a nuclear weapons 

program.34 President Lula’s 2010 personal diplomatic 

initiative to find an alternative to United Nations (UN) 

sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program put a spotlight 

on such concerns. Now observers at the United Nations 

surely are scrutinizing President Rousseff ’s policy toward 

Iran. Furthermore, any proposal to assist the Brazilian 

space program may stir not-so-dormant memories of the 

role Brazilian defense experts played in modernizing Iraqi 

missiles prior to the regime’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait.

These are formidable political hurdles, but President 

Rousseff ’s commitment to sustain defense initiatives undertaken by her predecessor and support the long-range 

perspective of the defense strategy mean that preliminary 

bilateral work is not lost. Her foreign policy goals seem 

more traditional than those of her predecessor, with a focus on protecting Brazilian offshore oil deposits and the 

nation’s Amazon borders as well as sustaining ties with 

its South American neighbors. She has been more critical and less supportive of Iran, supporting an April 2011 

UN resolution to send a human rights investigator to Iran. 

Under the leadership of Defense Minister Amorim, senior-level bilateral dialogue on defense issues is moving 

forward with reciprocal visits and meetings of the Defense 

Bilateral Working Group. President Rousseff ’s decision to 

reopen competition for selection of an advanced fighter 

aircraft improves the odds for selection of the Boeing offer. Together with President Obama’s emphasis on engaging Brazil as a strategic partner, the stage may be set for 

substantive upgrading of the relationship.

Decisions by the United States and Brazil either 

to continue the current level of dialogue and engagement on defense and security issues or enhance the 

relationship will define future bilateral security cooperation both globally and within the Americas. Only 

a conviction by political leaders and senior defense 

officials in both countries that major benefits will accrue to each nation’s posture can move the reinvigorated relationship to higher levels. President Obama 

and President Rousseff took such a step during their 

April 2012 Washington meeting by establishing a 

U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation Dialogue. The presidents noted the importance of enhanced dialogue in 

enabling closer bilateral cooperation, based on mutual 

respect and trust, and providing a forum for exchanging views and identifying opportunities for collaboU.S.-Brazil security cooperation 

could encompass the nuclear and 

energy sectors
14 SF No. 279 www.ndu.edu/inss

ration on defense issues around the world. The first 

meeting of the Defense Cooperation Dialogue took 

place in Brasilia 2 weeks later. Consistent with the 

2010 Defense Cooperation Agreement, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Defense Minister Amorim 

stated that they intend for defense cooperation to focus on six priority categories of activity during 2012: 

science, innovation, and technology transfer; logistics; 

communications; humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response; cooperation in support of African nations; 

and cybersecurity.35

If Brazil gains confidence that a powerful northern 

neighbor is its partner in defense, instead of an indifferent bystander or worse, the South American state can 

focus on advancing its national security and development without unnecessary defense burdens. The United 

States benefits from having the trust and confidence 

of a new international and regional power, although 

there may not be full agreement on every matter of 

policy. The United States can focus on ways to achieve 

“real progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues” through a more constructive relationship with an 

emerging regional player. A more fluid transfer of U.S. 

defense technology, by understanding Brazilian terms, 

can be a catalyst and a test case for interactive cooperation. Given appropriate levels of political will on both 

sides, increasing the intensity of defense engagement 

and cooperation between “friends at the same level,” in 

the words of former Minister Jobim,36 could result in a 

major transformation in Brazil-U.S. security relations 

and bring important benefits to both countries.

The United States should welcome Brazil as a true 

and equal partner in international affairs. Each shares a 

vital interest in hemispheric prosperity and peace and 

in a strong normative antiproliferation regime. With no 

territorial or imperial ambitions, the two powers ought 

to see each other as equally interested in bolstering international peace and security as the best way to buttress the world against terrorism, crime, and the threat 

of nuclear war. It is long past time for the two giants 

of the Western Hemisphere to increase their defense 

cooperation, whatever may be the titles given to agreements between them. 

The author appreciates the constructive comments 

of Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi, Dr. Gabriel Marcella, 

and Col. John A. Cope, USA (Ret.). Brazilian budget 

allocations are expressed in dollars according to the existing interbank exchange rate when announced as indicated by <www.oanda.com>.

Notes 1 Available at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=5A-JJ_jg6yQ>; 

National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 

May 2010), 44, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/

rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>. 

2 Riordon Roett, The New Brazil (Washington: The Brookings 

Institution, 2010), 152.

3 Luigi R. Einaudi, Brazil and the United States: The Need for 

Strategic Engagement, INSS Strategic Forum 266 (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, March 2011), 12.

4 Weapons import data reflect sales as compiled by the 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Trade Registers, available at <www.sipri.org,US>. Department of State figures 

include both sales and services and also sales authorized but not yet 

consummated. U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Brazil: A Strong 

Defense Technology Partnership,” talking points paper provided to 

author, January 2012. 

5 Brazil, Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” 55, 

available at <www.defesa.gov.br/eventos_temporarios/2009/estrategia/

arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf>.

6 Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluna, Brazilian Foreign Policy 

in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula, trans. 

Leandro Maura (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), xiv; Jeffrey 

W. Cason and Timonthy J. Power, “Presidentialism, Pluralization and 

the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign 

Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era,” International Political Science Review, no. 30 (2009), 122–124, 130.

7 Mauricio Pazini Brandão, “Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovação e a 

Defesa Nacional,” 3a Conferência Nacional de Ciência, Tecnologia 

e Inovação, October 2005, 798, available at <http://cncti3.cgee.org.

br/Documentos/Seminariosartigos/Areasinternacional/DrMauricioPaziniBrandao.pdf>.

8 “National Defense Strategy.”

9 Scott D. Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The 

Myth of Tutelary Democracy,” (1995), available at <www.lanic.utexas.

edu/project/lasa95/tollefson.html>.

10 Lourival Sant’Anna, “Desprestigio leva à ‘angustia’ das Forças,” 

O Estado de São Paulo, March 14, 1999.

11 Correio Braziliense (Brasilia) Web site, March 12, 2006.

12 Folha de S. Paulo and O Estado de S. Paulo, reported in 

“Observatório cone sul de defesa e forças armadas, Informe Brasil 

no 270 Período: 13/10/07 a 19/10/”; Saint-Pierre, 9; Correio 

Brazilienese.

13 Jorge Zaverucha and Flavio da Cunha Rezende, “How the 

Military Competes for Expenditures in Brazilian Democracy: Argu-
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 279 15 

ments for an Outlier,” International Political Science Review, no. 30 

(2009), 418–419.

14 “Dr. Jairo Cândido da FIESP fala com ALIDE,” January 20, 

2010, available at <www.alide.com.br/joomla/index.php/capa/75-

extra/1015-dr-jairo-candido-da-fiesp-fala-com-alide>.

15 Calculated from data available at <www.sipri.org/databases/

milex>. For estimates of exports, see <www.estadao.com.br/noticias/

nacional.dilma-assina-mp-para-desonerar-industria-da0-defesa,779195.htm>.

16 “National Defense Strategy,” 52.

17 Ibid., 5, 10, 11.

18 Chandra Malairaja and Girma Zawdie, “The ‘black box’ 

syndrome in technology transfer and the challenge of innovation in 

developing countries: The case of international joint ventures in Malaysia,” International Journal of Technology Management and Sustainable Development 3, no. 3 (2004). Robert L. Paarlberg, “Knowledge as 

Power: Science, Military Dominance and U.S. Security,” International 

Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 142.

19 See Tae Kyung Sung and David V. Gibson, “Knowledge 

and Technology Transfer: Level and Key Functions,” IC2 Institute, 

University of Texas at Austin, n.d., 1; United Nations Conference on 

Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Transfer of Technology (Geneva: 

UNCTAD, 2001), 5–6.

20 See Jair Candido, “Aula Inaugural—FIESP, Curso de Gestão 

de Recursos de Defesa,” FIESP, May 12, 2009, slides 25, 26; “Pesquisa 

mostra que Brasil investe pouco em estratégia na FAB,” Jornal do 

Globo, December 11, 2009, available at <http://g1.globo.com/jornaldoglobo>; “Um projeto de potência para o Brasil do século XXI,” 

April 22, 2010, available at <www.monitormercantil.com.br/mostranoticia.php?id=77992>.

21 OECD figures cited in “A Agenda Brasileira,” Industria 

Brasileira 9, no. 99 (November 2009), 19; “Informe Brasil, No 269, 

06/10/07 a 12/10/07,” Observatorio Cone Sul de Defesa e Forças 

Armadas; “Defesa entregará ao MCT lista de projetos tecnológicos 

prioritários para as Forças Armadas,” Tecnologica e Defesa, October 10, 

2008, available at <www.tecnodefesa.com.br>; “Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação para o Desenvolvimento Nacional,” “Plano de Ação 

2007–2010,” available at <http://www.mct.gov.br>.

22 Brazil, Ministry of Defense, “Pro-Defesa 2006–2010,” 13.

23 “National Defense Strategy,” 35, 17.

24 Fernando Bustamante, “La Transferencia de Tecnologica 

Militar desde Estados Unidos al Brasil,” Documento de Trabajo, 

FLACSO, no. 335, April 1987, 42. Patrice Franko-Jones, Review of 

“Manufacturing Insecurity: The Rise and Fall of Brazil’s Military 

Industrial Complex,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs

40, no. 4 (Winter 1998), 136; Patrice Franko-Jones, The Brazilian 

Defense Industry (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 83. A viable model is 

Embraer’s extensive use of Pratt and Whitney engines for its military 

and civilian aircraft.

25 “National Defense Strategy,” 18; Renato Peixoto Dagnino and 

Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos Filho, “A revitalização da indústria 

de defesa brasileira: análise da alternativa Cooperação Sul-americana/

européia,” Vértices 9, no. 1/3 ( January/December 2007), 41.

26 See Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United 

States Military Relations 1945–1977 (Boulder: University of Colorado 

Press, 1996); Monica Hirst, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road 

of Unmet Expectations (New York: Routledge, 2005), xviii; Interview, 

La Nación, November 20, 2008. One exception to this trend was 

Brazilian-U.S. military cooperation along the Peruvian-Ecuadorian 

border following the 1995 War of the Cenepa. Even so, this collaboration was the product of an earlier era, implementing a mechanism 

designed in 1942.

27 “National Defense Strategy,” 22, 27.

28 Thomaz Guedes da Costa, “Grand Strategy for Assertiveness: 

International Security and U.S.-Brazil Relations,” March 24, 2010 

available at <www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Task_Force_Papers/Costa-Grand_Strategy_for_Assertiveness.pdf>.

29 Frank A. Mora, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics, The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” February 17, 2011.

30 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Brazil: A Strong Defense 

Technology Partnership,” talking points paper, n.d., provided to 

author, January 2012. 

31 U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, “Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2010, 

5, available at <www.pmddtc.state.gov/reports/655.htm>.

32 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Arming 

Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology,” 

May 1990, 77–78; Charles G. Jameson, “The Technology Transfer 

Pyramid and How to Climb It,” The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Assistance Management, Fall 2000, 75. 

33 Peter Hakim, “Brazil and the U.S. Security Agenda,”Política 

Externa, February 6, 2012, available at <http://www.thedialogue.org/

recentpubs>. 

34 For reference in the strategy to nuclear weapons, see National 

Defense Strategy, 33; the Der Spiegel article available at <www.spiegel.

de/international/world/0,1518,693336,00.html>.

35 Department of Defense, news release 306-12, April 24, 

2012, “Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Brazilian Minister of 

Defense Celso Amorim Define, in Dialogue, New Areas of Defense 

Cooperation between Brazil and the United States.”

36 Nelson Jobim, “Brazil’s Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine,” speech, U.S. Army War College, October 20, 2010, 4.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

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Raising Our Sights: RussianAmerican Strategic Restraint in 

an Age of Vulnerability 

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(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 274, 

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Sino-American Strategic Restraint 

in an Age of Vulnerability 

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Forum 273, January 2012) 

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December 2011)

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