area handbook series

Japan

a country study



Japan

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Ronald E. Dolan and

Robert L. Worden

Research Completed

September 1990
On the cover: The sun rises over the islands of Japan.

Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1992.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Japan : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA

pam ; 550-30)

"Supersedes the 1983 ed."—Pref. Includes bibliographical references (pp. 511-571) and index.

ISBN 0-8444-0731-3

1. Japan. I. Dolan, Ronald E., 1939- . II. Worden,

Robert L., 1945- . III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam ; 550-30.

DS806.J223 1991 91-29874

952—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-30

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by

the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under

the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program sponsored by the

Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other

published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

iii

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of

information from various chapters in the 1983 edition ofJapan: A

Country Study, edited by Frederica M. Bunge. The authors are also indebted to a number of individuals and organizations who gave

their time and special knowledge of Japanese affairs to provide

research data and perspective. Among those who gave generous

and timely help were Warren M. Tsuneishi, Chief of the Asian

Division, Library of Congress, who commented on the completed

manuscript. Also instrumental in providing timely and useful data were Shojo Honda and other staff members of the Japanese Section of the Asian Division.

Others who provided insight and research materials to the authors were Haruyuki Furukawa of the Japanese National Diet staff and

Col. Isao Mukunoki of the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

Yoriyoshi Naito of the Asahi Shimbun and Rikuo Sato of the Mainichi

Newspapers, both in Washington, were extremely helpful in providing photographs for use in the book.

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division

of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book.

Timothy Merrill reviewed the maps and geographical references

in the book. David P. Cabitto prepared the artwork for the cover

illustration and coordinated the production of all maps and figures.

Alberta J. King provided research and word processing assistance

for sections of the book and contributed to the final proofreading.

Janie L. Gilchrist provided word processing assistance on parts of

the book, and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson performed fi- nal word processing for the completed manuscript. Sandra W.

Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of all parts of

the book and coordinated work with Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies—Area Handbook program for the Department of the Army. Marilyn L. Majeska managed editing and

production of the book, with assistance from Andrea T. Merrill

and Martha E. Hopkins.

Other Library of Congress staff who assisted with the preparation of the book were Ewen Allison and Carol Winfree, both of

the Congressional Research Service, who provided research as- sistance and word processing support, respectively, for the chapter on foreign relations. Malinda B. Neale of the Library of

Congress Composing Unit prepared camera-ready copy, under the

direction of Peggy F. Pixley.

v
The authors also want to thank other individuals who contributed

to the preparation of the manuscript: Marcie D. Rinka of John

Carroll University for word processing support for the chapter on

society and environment; Greenhorne and O'Mara for preparation of the map drafts; Reiko I. Seekins and Marti Ittner, who

designed the illustrations on the tide pages of chapters one and chapters two through eight, respectively; and Wayne Home for his

graphics support. Additionally, special thanks go to Ann H. Covalt,

who edited the manuscript; Catherine Schwartzstein, who per- formed the final prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook,

who prepared the index.

Finally, the authors are especially grateful to those individuals

and organizations who donated photographs and artwork for the

illustrations used in the book, many of which are original work

not previously published. They are acknowledged in the illustra- tion captions.

VI
Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xv Table A. Chronology of Major Historical

Periods xvii Country Profile xix

Introduction xxvii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Robert L. Worden

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 4 Ancient Cultures 4

Kofun Period, ca. A.D. 300-710 6

NARA AND HEIAN PERIODS, A.D. 710-1185 10 Economic, Social, and Administrative

Developments 10 Cultural Developments and the Establishment

of Buddhism 11 The Fujiwara Regency 12 The Rise of the Military Class 15 KAMAKURA AND MUROMACHI PERIODS,

1185-1573 17 The Bakufu and the Hqjo Regency 17 The Flourishing of Buddhism 19 Mongol Invasions 20

Civil War 21 Ashikaga Bakufu 21 Economic and Cultural Developments 22

Provincial Wars and Foreign Contacts 23

REUNIFICATION, 1573-1600 25

TOKUGAWA PERIOD, 1600-1867 27

Rule of Shogun and Daimyo 27

Seclusion and Social Control 29

Economic Development 30

Intellectual Trends 31 Decline of the Tokugawa 32

vii
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN JAPAN, 1868-1919 36

The Meiji Restoration 36

Foreign Relations 40

Opposition to the Meiji Oligarchy 41 The Development of Representative Government .... 41 Modernization and Industrialization 45

Overseas Expansion 46

Political Rivalries 48

World War I 50

BETWEEN THE WARS, 1920-36 51 Two-Party System 51 Diplomacy 53

The Rise of the Militarists 55

WORLD WAR II AND THE OCCUPATION,

1941-52 60

TOWARD A NEW CENTURY, 1953-84 61 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 69

Susan 0. Long

PHYSICAL SETTING 72 Composition, Topography, and Drainage 72 Geographic Regions 77 Climate 82

Earthquakes 83

Pollution 84

POPULATION 86

Population Density 86

Age Structure 87

Migration 89

Minorities 90

VALUES AND BELIEFS 93

Values 93

Religious and Philosophical Traditions 99

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 110

Family Ill Neighborhood 114

Workplace 115

Popular Culture 117 Gender Stratification and the Lives of Women 118

Age Stratification and the Elderly 121 HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 123

Health Care 123

Social Welfare 125

Vlll
Chapter 3. Education and the Arts 129

EDUCATION 132

Robert L. August

Historical Background 133

Education Reform 136

Contemporary Setting 137

Preschool and Day Care 141 Primary and Secondary Education 141

After- School Education 151 Higher Education 152

Social Education 161 THE ARTS 162

Jane T. Griffin

Visual Arts 168

Performing Arts 180

Literature 187

Films and Television 191 Chapter 4. The Character and Structure of the

Economy 195

Daniel A. Metraux and Kellie Ann Warner

PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 198

Revolutionary Change 198

The Evolving Occupational Structure 204

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 204

Industrial Policy 206

Monetary and Fiscal Policy 207

THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 209

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 212

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 213

THE CULTURE OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 216

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS 218

Employment, Wages, and Working Conditions 219

The Structure of Japan's Labor Market 220

Aging and Retirement of the Labor Force 223

Social Insurance and Minimum Wage Systems 224

Labor Unions 225

INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY 226

Construction 227

Mining 227

Energy 228

Research and Development 229

ix
INDUSTRY 231

Basic Manufactures 232

Domestic Trade and Services 234

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 236

Railroads and Subways 236

Roads 239

Maritime Transportation 240

Civil Aviation 240

Telecommunications 243

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 244

LIVING STANDARDS 247

Chapter 5. International Economic Relations 253

Edward J. Lincoln

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT 256

TRADE AND INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS 258

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry ... 258

The Japan External Trade Organization 259

Trading Companies 260

Financial Institutions 261

Foreign Aid Institutions 262

International Trade and Development Institutions . . . 262

FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES 264

Export Policies 264

Import Policies 265

LEVEL AND COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF

TRADE 267

Exports 267

Imports 269

Balance of Merchandise Trade 272

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ACCOUNTS 273

Services and the Current Account 273

Capital Flows 275

The Value of the Yen 280

TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS 282

United States and Canada 283

Noncommunist Asia 285

Western Europe 286

The Middle East 287

Oceania 288

Latin America 289

Africa 290

Communist Countries 290

x
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

AND AID 292

MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES 294

Motor Vehicles 294

Consumer Electronics 296

Computers 298

Semiconductors 299

Iron and Steel 300

Industries of the Future 301

Chapter 6. The Political System 303

Donald M. Seekins

THE POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 306

The Status of the Emperor 308

The Article 9 "No War" Clause 312

Rights and Duties of Citizens 313

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 314

The Legislature 314

The Cabinet and Ministries 317

Local Government 318

The Electoral System 320

The Judicial System 324

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL VALUES 329

Community and Leadership 330

Consensus Building 334

INTEREST GROUPS 335

Business Interests 337

Small Business 338

Agricultural Cooperatives 339

Labor Organizations 339

Professional Associations and Citizen and

Consumer Movements 340

THE MASS MEDIA AND POLITICS 341

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 343

Party History and Basic Principles 343

Party Structure 344

The Liberal Democratic Party in National

Elections 347

BUREAUCRATS AND THE POLICY-MAKING

PROCESS 350

The Civil Service 351

Policy-Making Dynamics 354

The Budget Process 356

xi
THE OPPOSITION PARTIES 356

Japan Socialist Party 358

Komeito 360

Japan Communist Party 361

Democratic Socialist Party 362

Other Parties and Independents 362

POLITICAL EXTREMISTS 363

Chapter 7. Foreign Relations 367

Robert G. Sutter MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND

STRATEGIES 371

Early Developments 371

Postwar Developments 375

FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 378

Institutional Framework 378

The Role of Domestic Politics 381

AN OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ... 384

Relations with the United States 384

Relations with China 393

Relations with the Soviet Union 400

Relations with Other Asia-Pacific Countries 406

Relations with Other Countries 412

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 414

United Nations 414

Other Organizaitons 415

International Banks 415

Policy after the Cold War 416

Chapter 8. National Security 419

Ronald E. Dolan

MILITARISM BEFORE 1945 422

The Bushido Code 422

The Modernization of the Military, 1868-1931 423

World War II 424

THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES 427

Early Development 428

Strategic Considerations 429

Place in National Life 431

Missions 434

Organization, Training, and Equipment 435

Recruitment and Conditions of Service 444

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 447

Defense Spending 447

Xll
The Defense Industry 451

Military Relations with the United States 454

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 456

The Police System 456

The Criminal Justice System 465

Crime 467

Civil Disturbances 469

Criminal Procedure 471

The Penal System 473

Appendix. Tables 477

Bibliography 511

Glossary 573

Index 577

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Japan, 1990 xxvi

2 The Japanese Empire During World War II 62

3 Topography and Drainage 76

4 Age-Sex Distribution, 1988 88

5 Structure of the Education System, 1987 142

6 Transportation Network, 1989 242

7 Structure of National Government, 1990 316

8 Structure of Local Government, 1990 320

9 House of Representatives Elections, 1958-90 348

10 Principal Organizations, Foreign Policy Formulation and

Execution, 1988 380

11 Northern Territories Dispute, 1990 402

12 Organization of the Defense Establishment, 1990 438

13 Deployment of the Ground, Maritime, and Air

Self-Defense Forces, 1990 440

14 Ranks and Insignia of the Self-Defense Forces, 1990 449

15 Organization of the National Police Agency, 1989 460

Xlll

Preface

This edition supersedes the fourth edition of Japan: A Country

Study, published in 1983. It provides updated information on one

of the most economically powerful nations in the world in a period

of significant economic change. Although much of what was re- ported in 1983 has remained the same in regard to traditional behavior and organizational dynamics, world events have continued

to shape Japanese domestic and international policies. Improved

relations with virtually all countries of the Asia-Pacific region,

democracy movements in Eastern Europe, the general improvement in East-West relations, volatile changes in the Middle East,

economic uncertainty throughout the world, competition for in- ternational markets, high-technology developments, and the whole

panoply ofJapanese relations with its major business and security

partner, the United States, have all affected Japan as it moves

toward a new century.

The aim of the authors of the new edition of Japan: A Country

Study has been to analyze Japanese society with respect to its ancient traditions and postwar transformation. Both its long historical and societal evolution and its emergence in the second half of

the twentieth century as a major actor on the international politi- cal and economic scene are considered in depth.

The Hepburn system of romanization is used for Japanese per- sonal names, which generally appear in standard order, with the

family name first. In cases of certain well-known historical figures,

such as Tokugawa Ieyasu (Ieyasu), or members of famous families, such as the Fujiwara, the individual is referred to by given name. The spelling of place names follows usage of the United States Board on Geographic Names. The pinyin system of romanization

is used for most Chinese names and terms. Measurements are given

in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix).

Users of this book are encouraged to consult the chapter bibliographies at the end of the book. Selected specialized bibliographies

have been listed in the Bibliography for those wishing to do fur- ther reading and research. Additionally, users may wish to use other

bibliographies, such as the Japan Foundation's Catalogue of Books

in English on Japan, 1945-81 (Tokyo, 1986) and An Introductory BibliographyforJapanese Studies (4 vols. , Tokyo, 1975-82), which covers Japanese-language materials; the Association for Asian Studies'

Bibliography ofAsian Studies (Ann Arbor, annual) and Frank Josephxv
Shulman'sJapan (World Bibliography Series, 103; Santa Barbara,

California: ABC-CLIO, 1989), both of which include entries in

English, Japanese, and other languages; and the Kokusai Bunka

Shinkokai's K.B.S. Bibliography of Standard Reference Books for Japanese Studies (Tokyo, semiannual editions), a comprehensive listing

of Japanese-language materials. Other useful bibliographies of

Japanese-language sources are John W. Hall's Japanese History: A

Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials (1954) and Naomi

Fukuda'sJapanese History: A Guide to Survey Histories (1984-86), both

of which were published by the Center for Japanese Studies at the

University of Michigan.

xvi
Table A. Chronology of Major Historical Periods

Dates Period *

ca 10 000-300 B C! Jomon

ca. 300-B.C.-A.D. 300 Yayoi

ca. A.D. 300-710 Kofun (also called Yamato)

A.D. 710-94 .... Nara

A.D. 794-1185 Heian

1185^1333 Kamakura

1333-36 1336-1573 1573-1600 Azuchi-Momoyama

1600-1867

1868-1912 Meiji (Mutsuhito) 1912-26 Taisho (Yoshihito) 1926-89

1989- Heisei (Akihito)

* The last four periods are identified by reign titles; the name of the emperor is given in parentheses. Reign titles are used only after the death of the emperor.

XVII

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Japan (Nihon Koku or Nippon Koku, literally,

Source of the Sun Country or Land of the Rising Sun).

Short Form: Japan.

Term for Citizens: Japanese.

Capital: Tokyo

Geography

Size: Total 377,835 square kilometers, land area 374,744 square

kilometers.

xix
Topography: Mountainous islands with numerous dormant and

active volcanos. Four main islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku,

and Kyushu) and numerous smaller islands to north and south,

all prone to earthquakes. Highest point Mount Fuji (3,776 meters).

Numerous, rapidly flowing rivers largely unnavigable but provide

water for irrigation and hydroelectric-power generation.

Climate: Generally rainy, high humidity. Diverse climatic range:

warm summers, long, cold winters in north; hot humid summers,

short winters in center; long, hot, humid summers, mild winters

in southwest.

Society

Population: 124,225,000 in July 1990; in 1988 about 77 percent

in urban areas. High population density—324 persons per square

kilometer for total area, 1,523 persons per square kilometer for habitable land, more than 50 percent of population lives on 2 per- cent of land.

Ethnic Groups: 99.2 percent Japanese, 0.8 percent other, mostly

Korean, some Chinese. Ainu and burakumin comprise native

Japanese minority groups.

Language: Japanese. Emphasis on English as second language.

Religion: Most (84 percent) observe both Shinto and Buddhist rites, 16 percent other religions, including 0.7 percent Christian.

Health: In 1988 life expectancy 81.3 for women, 75.5 for men,

mortality rate 6 per 1,000. Health-care system in late 1980s in- cluded 8,700 general hospitals, 1,000 mental hospitals, and 1,000

comprehensive hospitals with total capacity 1.5 million beds, plus

79,000 outpatient clinics and 48,000 dental clinics. More than

190,000 physicians, nearly 67,000 dentists, and 333,000 nurses, primarily in urban areas. Education: Compulsory, free nine-year education (elementary

grades one through six; lower-secondary—grades seven through

nine) followed by public and private upper-secondary schools

attended by about 94 percent of all lower-secondary school graduates (grades ten through twelve); supplemented by preschool and

after- school education. In 1988, 490 universities of which 357 were

private, formed the top echelon of the 7,430 institutions of postsecondary education. Supervised by Ministry of Education, Science,

and Culture. Literacy rate 99 percent in 1990.

xx
Economy

Gross National Product (GNP): US$2.9 trillion in 1989. Per capita

GNP (US$23,616), first among major industrial nations in 1989.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): ¥343.2 trillion in 1987 (for value

of the yen—¥—see Glossary).

Resources: Coal reserves in north and southwest; otherwise minerals negligible. Most resources, including almost all non-renewable

energy sources, imported.

Industry: 32.6 percent of GDP in 1987. Basic industries: automobile manufacturing, consumer electronics; nonferrous metals,

petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, bioindustry, aerospace, textiles,

and processed foods also important; older heavy industries

mining, steel, and shipbuilding—in decline but still important

worldwide; high-technology industries prevalent (for example, semiconductors, computers, optical fibers, optoelectronics, video discs,

facsimile and copy machines, industrial robots).

Services: 56.6 percent of GDP in 1987. Wholesale and retail trade

dominant; advertising, data processing, publishing, tourism, leisure industries, entertainment grew rapidly in 1980s.

Agriculture: 2.8 percent of GDP in 1987. Intense cultivation of

diminishing arable land, already in short supply. Rice grown on

most farmland, intercropping common. Heavy use of fertilizers,

mechanization, experimental high-yield crops. Wood abundant

about 70 percent of country covered with forests; large lumber in- dustry. World's largest fishing nation; seafood essential to food in- dustry.

Exports: Approximately US$265 billion in 1988. Major partners

United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Korea,

Taiwan.

Imports: Approximately US$187 billion in 1988. Major partners

United States, Republic of Korea, Australia, China, Indonesia,

Taiwan.

Balance of Payments: Large and growing positive trade balance

since early 1980s. Exports represented 59 percent, imports 41 per- cent of total annual trade in 1988.

Transportation and Communications

Maritime: Primarily on coastal seas. Inland Sea (Seto Naikai)

serves major industrial areas of central Japan.

xxi
Railroads: In late 1980s, about 18,800 kilometers of routes run by Japan Railways Group; another 3,400 kilometers operated by

private companies; and small, new companies financed with pri- vate and local government funds. Electric-powered Shinkansen

'bullet' trains operate at speeds up to 240 kilometers per hour on

special track. Key bridges and tunnels carrying trains and automotive transportation link four major islands.

Subways: Major cities served by full metro systems, Tokyo largest. Supplemented by light rail in suburbs.

Roads: In 1987 some 1,098,900 kilometers of road, 65 percent

paved. Extensive expressway and highway network.

Ports: Largest at Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe; other major facil- ities at Chiba, Hakodate, Kitakyiishu, Kushiro, Osaka, Tokyo,

and Yokkaichi.

Airports: International facilities at Tokyo (Narita and Haneda),

Osaka, Nagoya, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Kagoshima, and Naha. Japan

Airlines and All Nippon Airways major world carriers. Both, along

with Japan Air System and South-West Air Lines, also serve domestic routes. Telecommunications: World-class radio and television systems

available to virtually all citizens, those living in remote and mountainous areas via satellite. There were 64 million telephones in use

in 1989.

Government and Politics

Government: Constitutional monarchy with emperor symbol of

state. Parliamentary form of government, elected bicameral legislature (Diet: House of Councillors—upper house, House of Representatives—lower house), majority party president serves as prime

minister. General elections every four years or upon dissolution

of lower house, triennially for half of upper house.

Administrative Divisions: Country has forty- seven administrative divisions: forty-three rural prefectures {ken), two urban prefectures (fu—Kyoto and Osaka), one metropolitan district (to—Tokyo),

and one district (do —Hokkaido). Large cities (shi) divided into wards

(ku), then into precincts (machi or cho) or subdistricts (shicho) and

counties (gun).

Justice: Civil law system heavily influenced by British and American law. Independent judiciary with Supreme Court, high courts,

district courts, and family courts in late 1980s.

xxii
Politics: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority party, with numerous factions, since 1955; other major parties: Japan Socialist

Party (held majority in House of Councillors in 1990), Democratic

Socialist Party, Komeito (Clean Government Party).

Foreign Affairs: A major aid donor to developing countries. Maintains diplomatic relations with virtually all countries of world.

Closely aligned since World War II with United States policies but

neutral and independent stand on some issues. Member of Asian

Development Bank, Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and

Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, International Whaling Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations and its affiliated agencies, and

a number of other internaitonal organizations.

National Security

Armed Forces: Article 9 of Constitution precludes existence of

offensive military forces. Self-Defense Forces numbered about

247,000 in 1989: Ground Self-Defense Force 156,200, Maritime

Self-Defense Force 44,400, and Air Self-Defense Force 46,400.

Reserves 48,000.

Military Units: Five armies, five maritime districts, three air

defense forces. Main bases in Hokkaido, eastern Honshu, central

and western Honshu and Shikoku, and Kyushu.

Equipment: Ground forces: medium tanks, reconnaissance vehicles,

armored personnel carriers, towed and self-propelled howitzers, mortars, single rocket and multiple rocket launchers, air-defense guns,

surface-to-surface missiles, antitank missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, at- tack helicopters, and transport helicopters. Maritime forces: submarines, guided missile destroyers, frigates with helicopters, frigates,

patrol and coastal combatants, mine warfare ships, amphibious ships,

auxiliaries, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters. Air forces: ground

attack aircraft, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, airborne earlywarning aircraft, transport aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, air-to- air missiles, and air-defense control and warning units. Military Budget: Approximately US$2.8 billion in FY 1990. Efforts made for political reasons to keep direct defense expenses at around 1 percent of GNP.

Foreign Military Treaties: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and

Security with United States (1960); can be revoked on one-year's

notice by either party, updated by minutes periodically.

xxiii
Police Forces: Independent municipal and local police forces; National Rural Police at prefectural level; all under supervision of

National Police Agency in 1990.

xxiv
I

I

!

!

I

\

i
Divisions

tf (45)

i err;

to" f40;

»;

7a (37; a r*7J

43)

20;

e(35)

:a (22)

(13)

ma (33)

18)

<30)

(10)

\ma (34)

tta (5)

ichi (39)

ishi (16)
Introduction

JAPAN IN 1990 WAS a modern, thriving democracy, yet it re- tained a long and esteemed imperial tradition. The Japanese took

great pride in being "unique," yet much ofJapanese civilization was composed of selective borrowings, from the Chinese written

language in the sixth century to United States semiconductors in

the latter half of the twentieth century. Although Japan lacked

almost all raw materials, it was a highly urbanized and industrialized economic power supplying vast export markets. Yet farming

interests still exerted a strong influence on the ruling Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) and its trade policies. Japan was a rich

country, ranking first among major industrial nations in per capita gross national product (GNP—see Glossary), but many of its people were crowded into inadequate housing lacking such basic

amenities as indoor plumbing. Although the bushido (way of the

warrior) legacy of the feudal era still exerted a definite influence on modern society, the ultranationalism that it had spawned was

repudiated and the military machine that earlier in the twentieth

century had conquered much of the Asia-Pacific region had been

replaced by streamlined Self-Defense Forces, well trained but underequipped and barely able to defend the home islands.

Japan consists of the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu,

Shikoku, and Kyushu, along with a plethora of smaller islands,

and is separated from the Asian mainland by the Sea ofJapan and

bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1). Nearly 75

percent of the country's land surface is covered by mountains, and

the climate, although generally humid, ranges from cool in the north

to subtropical in the south. Historically, when Japan was a pre- dominantly agricultural country, its varied climate made for re- gional diversity in economy and culture, and its insular geography

and rugged terrain helped it limit and control foreign access. Since

World War II, however, as Japanese society has become over- whelmingly urban, industrial, and internationalized, climatic and

geographical effects have become much less significant.

The origins of Japanese civilization are buried in legend, with

the country's first written records dating from the sixth to the eighth

centuries A.D., after Japan had adopted the Chinese writing sys- tem. Early in the sixth century, Chinese Buddhism was introduced

to Japan by way of Korea, and with it came many Chinese governmental and fiscal practices. A society of individual military rulers,

each responsible for his own area, evolved into an imperial system xxvn
Figurt 1. Administratis Divisions of Japan, 1990

Japan: Administrative Divisions — PREFECTURES —

Aichi (21) Miyazaki (45)

[<JJ Nagano (11)

Aomori (2) MzirinaiUi /AD)

r^hf'ho (OA\

nnimG \Of) Niigaia ( /

j

Fiikiii (14) Hitft td?\

rUnUOKci {H 1

)

KjK&yaiiia (01/

FukushifTiB (8) Okinawa (47)

KJlIU (

/ D) DcaUa /Oft)

KjUllllllcl (/ d.) oaga Qana {^oj /AD

nirubfuiffa l-limchima f1R\ \oo/ OaiiafTId ( 1 / / nOKKaluu ( / ) Shiga (20)

Hydgo (27) Shimane (35) Ibaraki (19) Shizuoka (22)

Ishikawa (9) Tochigi (13) Iwate (4) Tokushima (33)

Kagawa (32) Tokyo (18)

Kagoshima (46) Tottori (30)

Kanagawa (23) Toyama (10)

Kochi (38) Wakayama (34)

Kumamoto (44) Yamagata (5) Kyoto (25) Yamaguchi (39)

Mie (26) Yamanashi (16)

Miyagi (6)


Introduction

JAPAN IN 1990 WAS a modern, thriving democracy, yet it re- tained a long and esteemed imperial tradition. The Japanese took

great pride in being "unique," yet much ofJapanese civilization was composed of selective borrowings, from the Chinese written

language in the sixth century to United States semiconductors in

the latter half of the twentieth century. Although Japan lacked

almost all raw materials, it was a highly urbanized and industrialized economic power supplying vast export markets. Yet farming

interests still exerted a strong influence on the ruling Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) and its trade policies. Japan was a rich

country, ranking first among major industrial nations in per capita gross national product (GNP—see Glossary), but many of its people were crowded into inadequate housing lacking such basic

amenities as indoor plumbing. Although the bushidd (way of the

warrior) legacy of the feudal era still exerted a definite influence on modern society, the ultranationalism that it had spawned was

repudiated and the military machine that earlier in the twentieth

century had conquered much of the Asia-Pacific region had been

replaced by streamlined Self-Defense Forces, well trained but underequipped and barely able to defend the home islands.

Japan consists of the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu,

Shikoku, and Kyushu, along with a plethora of smaller islands,

and is separated from the Asian mainland by the Sea ofJapan and

bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1). Nearly 75

percent of the country's land surface is covered by mountains, and

the climate, although generally humid, ranges from cool in the north

to subtropical in the south. Historically, when Japan was a pre- dominantly agricultural country, its varied climate made for re- gional diversity in economy and culture, and its insular geography

and rugged terrain helped it limit and control foreign access. Since

World War II, however, as Japanese society has become over- whelmingly urban, industrial, and internationalized, climatic and

geographical effects have become much less significant.

The origins of Japanese civilization are buried in legend, with

the country's first written records dating from the sixth to the eighth

centuries A.D., after Japan had adopted the Chinese writing sys- tem. Early in the sixth century, Chinese Buddhism was introduced

to Japan by way of Korea, and with it came many Chinese governmental and fiscal practices. A society of individual military rulers,

each responsible for his own area, evolved into an imperial system

xxvii
codified in the Taiho-ryoritsu (Great Treasure Code) of 701. Imperial control was gradually spread throughout the main island of

Honshu and eventually to all ofJapan by military conquest. The

leaders of these conquests were rewarded with large landholdings.

By the tenth century, these military leaders had evolved into a warrior class—the bushi or samurai—that supplanted the central

authority of the emperor; and Japanese society evolved into a feudal economy with the large landholdings of the samurai supported

by local peasants, artisans, and merchants. Beginning in the seven- teenth century, the Tokugawa shoguns, like earlier military rulers

under the same title, asserted control over a newly reunified Japan.

They also closed the country to outside influences and developed

the national premodern economy.

When Japan was reopened in the middle of the nineteenth century, the traditional political, military, and economic systems were no match for powerful foreign intruders, and the shogun's government failed. It was replaced by a new oligarchy of strong regional

leaders who brought about the Meiji Restoration—the ostensible

restoration of imperial power—in 1868. The Meiji rulers carried

out wholesale radical reforms. The government hired thousands

of foreigners to teach modern science, mathematics, and foreign

languages and sent a multitude of students and envoys to Europe

and North America to learn the lessons that had bypassed them

during the years of exclusion. They returned to combine foreign

ideology and modern methods with Japanese traditions, devising a governmental and economic system that was totally new yet

uniquely Japanese. The government also built factories and shipyards to help private businesses get started. These businesses developed rapidly into large conglomerates, some of which dominated

the world of business in the early 1990s. Transportation and in- dustry were modernized; the military was reorganized and equipped

with up-to-date weapons; and under the 1889 constitution, Japan

took the first steps toward representative government.

For the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the economy grew at a moderate rate although it remained heavily dependent on agriculture. After the development

of a strong economic and industrial base at home, successful wars

annexing Taiwan and Korea, and the growth of spheres of influence over a large part of the Chinese mainland, Japan began to exert

its influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region. In the late 1920s,

industry outstripped agriculture, and in the 1930s industry, little affected by the Great Depression plaguing the rest of the industrialized world, continued to grow. Using the strong Japanese econ- omy to support their imperialistic designs, ultranationalist military

xxvm
officers succeeded in stifling the young democracy and took control of the government in the name of the emperor. With their power

unchecked, the militarist government led the nation into a series of military conflicts that culminated in the almost total destruction of the nation during World War II. World War II destroyed nearly half ofJapan's industry. Japan's

economy was completely disrupted, and the country was forced

to rely on United States assistance and imports of essential food

and raw material. Large-scale procurements by United States armed

forces during the Korean War (1950-53) revived Japanese industry, and the country invested heavily in replacing the destroyed

factories with modern, well-equipped factories. By the mid-1950s,

modern plants staffed by a well-educated, disciplined work force

had brought the Japanese economy back to pre-World War II levels. For the remainder of the 1950s, however, Japan endured chronic

trade deficits. Unhampered by large military expenditures, the

Japanese economy continued to grow at a rapid pace into the next

decade. Japanese trade relations improved dramatically during the

1960s, attaining a favorable balance, and Japanese industry felt confident enough to compete in the international market in such

heavy industrial products as automobiles, ships, and machine tools. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),

formed in 1949, played a major role in the 1950s and 1960s in for- mulating and implementing Japan's international trade policy, as- sisting the development of domestic industry and protecting it from

foreign competition. MITI's authority gradually decreased as pri- vate industry and other ministries took more responsibility on themselves. By the late 1980s, MITI's control over international trade

policy was greatly reduced. The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) was established by MITI in 1958 to promote Japan's

external trade. Over the years JETRO's role diversified; it went

from promoting exports to fostering all aspects of Japan's trade

relations and enhancing understanding with trading partners.

In the immediate postwar period, the operations of Japanese

financial institutions were severely restricted. In the 1970s, controls began to loosen, and these institutions rapidly expanded their

international activities. By the late 1980s, they were major international players, opening branches abroad to foster foreign investments and making Tokyo a world financial center. During the late 1980s, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation and was home to some of the world's largest banking and financial institutions. Japanese securities firms played a major role in international

finances and were members of major world stock exchanges. In

1988 the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange became the world's

xxix
largest, while the Osaka Stock Exchange ranked third behind Tokyo

and the New York Stock Exchange. Beginning in 1986, the Tokyo

exchange permitted foreign brokerage firms to be members. Japan

also played an increasing role in international economic organizations and agreements, especially the Asian Development Bank and

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Japan has a strong

private enterprise economy, although public corporations played

a very important role in the early postwar period. By the 1980s,

however, their role was considerably decreased, and some of the

largest were privatized. The thriving private enterprise sector was

dominated by large corporations with affiliated smaller firms.

Labor-management relations were generally harmonious, and labor

productivity was high.

In the late 1980s, Japan squeezed nearly 124 million people into

less than 400,000 square kilometers of land, much of which was

uninhabitable. But population growth, rapid in the last half of the

nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, had

slowed drastically by the 1980s. This low fertility rate, combined

with high life expectancy, was making Japan a rapidly aging soci- ety, placing an increasing burden on the shrinking working-age

population.

Women traditionally had occupied an inferior position in

Japanese society. Even though they were given the right to vote

in 1946 and were accorded equal rights under the 1947 Constitution and the Civil Code of 1948, their general status did not significantly improve. As Japan faced a shrinking work force in the

1980s and 1990s, however, increasing numbers of women were

brought into the labor market, resulting in improved educational,

political, and economic opportunities. Nevertheless, women's status

still remained far short of that for men.

Japan promoted exports by developing world-class industries and

providing incentives for firms to export. In the postwar period,

export incentives mainly took the form of tax relief and government assistance to build export industries along with heavy import barriers. As Japanese industry regained its strength in the

1960s, the government gradually liberalized its trade policy, and

tax incentives were eliminated. In the 1970s, a strong rise in the

value of the yen (for value of the yen—see Glossary) under the new

system of floating exchange rates and the oil price shocks of 1973

and 1979 brought large trade deficits. The situation spurred Japan

to reduce its dependence on unreliable foreign petroleum by conservation and diversification of sources and to sharply increase its exports to offset the high costs of raw materials. In the 1980s, with

the dramatic drop in the cost of raw materials, Japan developed xxx
a large trade surplus. Export policy shifted to export restraints on

certain products that were causing the greatest tensions with trading partners, and Japan greatly increased its foreign investment.

This trend continued through the 1980s. Japan continued to be

the target of complaints from trading partners, however, especially for nontariff barriers such as standards, testing procedures, and

restrictive distribution practices.

In the 1980s, manufactured imports still made up a share of the

gross national product far below that of other developed countries,

and in 1989 Japan was named an unfair trading partner by the

United States government. Although certain Japanese industries,

such as automobile manufacturing, were heavily export oriented,

Japan exported a lower percentage of its GNP than most major

industrialized nations. During the 1960s and 1970s, import growth

kept up with exports, but in the 1980s, import growth fell off drastically, leading to large trade surpluses. The United States was the

largest single destination ofJapanese exports (34 percent in 1988)

as well as its largest single source of imports (22.4 percent). Japan's

major international industries in the late 1980s were motor vehicles, consumer electronics, computers, semiconductors and other

electronic components, and iron and steel. The rapid increase in

the value of the yen in the late 1980s made Japanese exports less price competitive and imports more price competitive, but it was

unclear in 1990 what effect the increased value of the yen would

have on the balance of trade in the long term.

Japan has traditionally run a deficit in services: transportation,

insurance, travel expenditures, royalties, licensing fees, and income

from investment. In the early 1980s, however, this deficit was some- what offset by the rapid growth of Japanese foreign investment.

In the late 1980s, increased travel expenses again produced a marked increase in the services deficit despite a rapid growth in

foreign investments. Although most barriers to foreign investment were removed in the 1980s, Japan's heavy investment in other countries remained a major cause of tension with those countries.

Japan's foreign aid program, begun in the 1960s as World War

II reparations to other Asian countries, grew rapidly during the

1980s. In the late 1980s, Japanese assistance consisted of bilateral

grants and loans as well as support to multilateral aid organizations.

Japan, one of the world's most literate nations, places great value on education. It provides children with compulsory free education

from first grade through ninth grade. A high percentage of chil- dren also attends preschools and continues through into uppersecondary and higher education. Educational standards are high,

and Japanese students consistently finish at or near the top in

xxxi
international academic tests. Teachers are held in great esteem by

Japanese society and are charged with imparting sound moral values

to their students along with academic information. Any antisocial

behavior on or off campus is considered to reflect on the teacher.

Entrance to higher education is by examination and is extremely

competitive, causing great stress to students trying to get into the

"right" school. Education rarely ends with graduation from the

formal school system. Japan also has extensive, well-utilized adult

education.

The Japanese have shown widespread interest in their tradi- tional culture: the tea ritual, calligraphy, flower arranging, and No,

Kabuki, and bunraku (puppet) theater, as well as classical works

of art. At the same time, educated Japanese are expected to have

a good understanding of classical Western music and art, and

modern Western music, drama, and art have been imported and

adapted to develop distinctive new Japanese forms. In addition,

extensive print and broadcast media provide information and en- tertainment.

The Japanese do not consider themselves a religious people. Their

world view, however, is guided by a basic philosophy deeply rooted

in ancient Shinto beliefs on human origins and relations with the

spirit world, modified by later adaptations of Confucian ideas on

societal relationships and order and Buddhist concepts of karmic

causation and an afterlife. Japanese are very conscious of their position in society and the various roles that they are expected to play

throughout their lives. They put a high premium on social harmony and will go to great pains to avoid bringing disgrace on their

families and other groups with which they are associated by dis- rupting that harmony. For this reason, more than any other, in

1990 the overall crime rate remained quite low in comparison with

other major industrialized nations, and Japanese cities were among

the safest in the world.

The 1947 Constitution, with its stipulation of a symbolic role

for the emperor, guarantees of civil and human rights, and renunciation of war, remained the operative basis for Japanese government in 1990. By pragmatic collaboration with big business, small

business, agriculture, and professional groups, the LDP has dominated Japanese politics since it was formed as a coalition of smaller

conservative groups in 1955. Although LDP fortunes have risen

and ebbed over the years since its establishment, no opposition party

has been able to oust it from power. On occasions, such as the Lockheed bribery scandal in the mid-1970s and the Recruit influencepeddling scandal of 1988-89, LDP dominance appeared to be in

danger. In the upper house (House of Councillors) elections ofJuly xxxn
1989, the LDP actually became the minority party behind the Japan

Socialist Party and a coalition of smaller opposition groups. But

voters have continued to give the LDP control of the more powerful lower house (House of Representatives). This fact results as much from the opposition's inability to present a viable alternative as from popular support for the LDP. The voters have preferred

to chastise the LDP for its mistakes rather than to oust the party.

In the postwar period, Japan concentrated on rebuilding its econ- omy, attempted to cultivate friendly ties with all nations, and re- lied on the United States for military security. By the 1970s, this foreign policy began to be called into question as Japan came into

its own as a world economic power. In the 1980s, Japan became

a leading industrial nation, the world's largest creditor nation and

largest donor of foreign aid, and a major actor in international financial institutions such as the World Bank (see Glossary) and the In- ternational Monetary Fund (see Glossary). As it entered the 1990s,

people at home and abroad expected Japan to play a diplomatic

role proportionate to its economic power and its role in foreign as- sistance, trade, and investment. But popular sentiment in Japan

and its Asian neighbors continued strongly to oppose Japan's as- suming the military role expected of a world power.

Because of their tragic experience with a military-controlled

government before and during World War II, the Japanese people readily accepted the military restrictions written into the 1947

Constitution at the insistence of occupation forces and, even in 1990,

generally interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution as forbidding

the Japanese Self-Defense Forces from being deployed outside of

the country or possessing nuclear weapons. Japan still depended on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the

United States, which mandated the United States to come to its aid in the event of a large-scale invasion and allowed for United

States provision of a nuclear umbrella. There is little popular sen- timent for change in this arrangement.

As Japan moved toward the twenty-first century, it was faced

with a series of dilemmas. How could it continue to grow as a world

economic leader without assuming a greater political role? And,

how could it be considered a political leader when it could not even

provide for the security of its own territory without foreign as- sistance? Its trading partners complained that Japan enjoyed an

unfair advantage. Yet when Japanese firms invested in their econ- omies, they raised the specter of Japanese domination. Each in- ternational crisis found Western powers calling on Japan to "contribute its fair share" to the peacekeeping forces. At the same

time, the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors, remembering

xxxiii
the terrible lessons of World War II, demanded that there be no

foreign projection ofJapanese military power. With less than ten years until the next century, Japan had yet to come to grips with

these questions. The answers seemed far off. January 22, 1991

* * * As the manuscript for this book was being completed, the

Japanese economy continued to grow at a healthy rate. After a weak

2.6 percent annualized growth in GNP in the fourth quarter of

1990, the GNP jumped to an 11.2 percent annualized growth in

the first quarter of 1991. But the fact that more than half of this increase came from exports seemed to indicate that overall growth

for 1991 would slow considerably from the first quarter figure.

Japan's tardiness in providing promised support to the United

States-led coalition forces opposing the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait

exacerbated already tense Japanese-United States trade relations.

In March 1991, Japan's legislature, the National Diet, finally ap- proved the US$13 billion promised several months earlier, reliev- ing some of the tension in Japanese-United States relations. With

the attention of Congress and the American public diverted to other

areas of the world, Japanese and United States government offi- cials were able to quietly negotiate a trade agreement on semiconductors and an agreement to open Japanese construction projects

to United States companies. Japan's refusal to open up its rice market

to foreign suppliers remained a serious problem for agricultural trade. Although the Kaifu administration in November 1990 was unsuccessful in getting Diet authorization for the Self-Defense Forces

to participate in peacekeeping operations, in early February 1991

the Japanese government dispatched military transport aircraft to evacuate refugees from the Persian Gulf war from Jordan and Syria

to Egypt at the request of the United Nations International Organization for Migration. After the war, Japan sent a small flotilla of four Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers and two

support ships to the Gulf to clear Iraqi mines. In the summer of

1991 , the Kaifu administration drafted a new proposal setting aside a force of 1,000 troops and 50 cease-fire monitors to be available

for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The proposal appeared

to have substantial public support.

On July 18,1991, after several months of difficult negotiations,

Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki signed a joint statement with the

xxxiv
Dutch prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, head of the European Community Council, and the European Commission president, Jacques

Delors, pledging closer Japanese-European Community consultations on foreign relations, scientific and technological cooperation,

assistance to developing countries, and efforts to reduce trade conflicts. Japanese foreign ministry officials hoped that this agreement

would help to broaden Japanese-European Community political

links and raise them above the narrow confines of trade disputes.

The much heralded visit to Japan of Soviet president and general

secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail

Gorbachev occurred in April 1991. Although Gorbachev and Kaifu

signed several low-level agreements on environmental protection,

nuclear energy, and cultural exchanges, they made no progress in

resolving the main obstacle to Japanese-Soviet relations, the Soviet

Union's continued occupation of Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri,

and the Habomai Islands north of Hokkaido. In September 1991,

Gorbachev resigned as general secretary of the communist party

and his government was in transition, causing further uncertainties about that government's relations with Japan and other nations.

In the early 1990s, the Japanese government was making a concerted effort to enhance its diplomatic stature, especially in Asia.

Kaifu 's much publicized spring 1991 tour of five Southeast Asian

nations—Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines—culminated in a May 3 major foreign policy address in Singapore, in which he called for a new partnership with the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and pledged that Japan would

go beyond the purely economic sphere to seek an "appropriate role in the political sphere as a nation of peace." As evidence of this new role, Japan took an active part in promoting negotiations to resolve the Cambodian conflict. In Northeast Asia, Japan conducted lengthy negotiations with

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) aimed

at establishing diplomatic relations with P'yongyang while maintaining its relations with Seoul. The Japanese government also re- vived Sino-Japanese exchanges and offered support to Mongolia's

political and economic restructuring. In January 1991, Japan began

normalization talks with P'yongyang with a formal apology for its 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. The negotiations were aided by Tokyo's support of a proposal for simultaneous entry to the United Nations by North Korea and the Republic of

Korea (South Korea); the issues of international inspection of North

Korean nuclear facilities and the nature and amount of Japanese

economic assistance, however, proved more difficult to negotiate.

xxxv
Japan took the lead in restoring trade and economic agreements

with China, suspended following Beijing's June 1989 Tiananmen

Incident. Japan-China trade, which began to recover in September 1990, increased rapidly in 1991. In March 1991, the Japan

Export-Import Bank resumed loans to China, and in April Japan

announced its support for restoration of Asian Development Bank

loans to China. A series of unilateral and multilateral loans followed.

Frequent meetings between high-level Japanese and Chinese

government officials also took place in 1991. In March Japanese

foreign ministry officials met in Tokyo with Chinese foreign ministry

officials to discuss a wide range of bilateral and international is- sues; in May former prime ministers Nakasone Yasuhiro and

Takeshita Noboru, in Beijing to attend the opening of a JapanChina youth center, met with leading Chinese officials; and in June

the Chinese minster of foreign affairs, Qian Qichen, visited Tokyo.

The culmination of government-to-government exchanges came

with Prime Minister Kaifu's August 1991 visit to Beijing, the first by a leader of a major industrialized nation since the Tiananmen

Incident. During the visit, Kaifu discussed a full range of bilateral

and international issues with Chinese leaders and offered substantial economic assistance. Kaifu also visited Ulaanbaatar and offered

Japanese encouragement and financial support to Mongolia's ef- forts to reorganize its government and economy.

The political fortunes of leading Japanese political figures changed

in 1991. Doi Takako, who in late 1989 and early 1990 had been

considered a possible candidate for prime minister on the strength

of her Japan Socialist Party's victory in the July 1989 House of Councilors election, resigned her post in late July 1991 following the party's

crushing defeat in local elections. And, in October Prime Minster

Kaifu, despite his high rating with the Japanese public, announced

that he would not run for another term as president of the LDP

when he failed to attain Diet passage of a political reform bill and

lost the support of powerful LDP factions. Miyazawa Kiichi, a strong

political figure whose career dates from World War II and the United

States occupation, was elected president of the LDP on October 27,

1991, and prime minister on November 5. On December 7, Prime

Minister Miyazawa indicated that Japan felt 'deep responsibility' for the suffering that it inflicted in World War II, but believed that

it had atoned for its conduct by its contribution to peace and prosperity since the war. It remained to be seen, however, what general

policy changes the Miyazawa administration would bring to Japan

and its relations with the rest of the world.

December 9, 1991 Ronald E. Dolan

XXXV
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
The ideograph wa, translated as "harmony, " considered a basic Japanese

social value; written by Reiko I. Seekins
'

' NOTHING SIMILAR MAY be found in foreign lands,

'

' wrote

Kitabatake Chikafusa when he described Japan in his fourteenthcentury Jinno shoto ki (Chronicle of the Direct Descent of the Divine Sovereigns). Although Japan's culture developed late in Asian

terms and was much influenced by China and later the West, its history, like its art and literature, is special among world civiliza- tions. As some scholars have argued, these outside influences may

have "corrupted" Japanese traditions, yet once absorbed they also enriched and strengthened the nation, forming part of a vibrant

and unique culture.

Early in Japan's history, society was controlled by a ruling elite of powerful clans. The most powerful emerged as a kingly line and

later as the imperial family in Yamato (modern Nara Prefecture or possibly in northern Kyushu) in the third century A.D. , claiming descent from the gods who created Japan. An imperial court and government, shaped by Chinese political and social institu- tions, were established. Often powerful court families effected a

hereditary regency, having established control over the .emperor.

The highly developed culture attained between the eighth and the

twelfth centuries was followed by a long period of anarchy and civil war, and a feudal society developed in which military overlords ran the government on behalf of the emperor, his court, and the

regent. Although the Yamato (see Glossary) court continued control of the throne, in practice a succession of dynastic military re- gimes ruled the now-decentralized country. In the late sixteenth

century, Japan began a process of reunification followed by a period

of great stability and peace, in which contact with the outside world was limited and tightly controlled by the government.

Confronted by the West—inopportunely during the economically

troubled late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—Japan

emerged gradually as a modern, industrial power, exhibiting some

democratic institutions by the end of World War I. Beginning in

the mid-nineteenth century, phenomenal social upheaval, accompanied by political, military, and economic successes, led to an over- abundance of nationalist pride and extremist solutions, and to even

faster modernization. Representative government was finally replaced

by increasingly authoritarian regimes, which propelled Japan into

World War II. After the cataclysm of nuclear war, Japan rebuilt

itself based on a new and earnest desire for peaceful development,

3
Japan: A Country Study

becoming an economic superpower in the second half of the twentieth century.

Early Developments

Ancient Cultures

The literature of Shinto (Way of the Gods; see Religious and

Philsophical Traditons, ch. 2) employs much mythology to describe

the supposed historical origins ofJapan. According to the creation

story found in the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters, dating from

712 A. D.) and the Nihongi or Nihon shoki (Chronicle ofJapan, from

720 A.D.), the Japanese islands were created by the gods, two of

whom— the male Izanagi and the female Izanami—descended from

heaven to carry out the task. They also brought into being other

kami (deities or supernatural forces), such as those influencing the

sea, rivers, wind, woods, and mountains. Two of these deities, the

Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, and her brother, the Storm

God, Susano-o, warred against each other, with Amaterasu emerging victorious.

Subsequently Amaterasu sent her grandson, Ninigi, to rule over

the sacred islands. Ninigi took with him what became the three

imperial regalia—a curved jewel (magatama), a mirror, and a "sword

of gathered clouds" —and ruled over the island of Kyushu (see

fig. 1). Ninigi's great-grandson, Jimmu, recognized as the first human emperor ofJapan, set out to conquer Yamato. On the main

island of Honshu, according to tradition, he established the un- broken line of imperial descent from the Sun Goddess and founded

the Land of the Rising Sun in 660 B.C.

Archaeological evidence shows some human activity as early

as 30,000 B.C., when the islands were connected glacially to the

Asian mainland. The first modern inhabitants ofJapan, however,

are thought to have been relative latecomers, arriving from diverse

points of the eastern Pacific rim by around 10,000 B.C.

Of these prehistoric people, those who left the clearest record were members of the heterogeneous Jomon culture (ca. 10,000-

300 B.C.) who made by 3,000 B.C. clay pottery impressed with

rope or cord patterns (Jomon means "patterns of plaited cord")

with a growing sophistication. These people also used chipped stone

tools and were hunters, gatherers, and skillful coastal and deepwater fishermen. They practiced a rudimentary form of agriculture

and lived in caves and later in temporary shallow pit dwellings,

leaving rich kitchen middens for modern anthropological study.

Many elements ofJapanese culture, such as Shinto mythology, marriage customs, and architectural styles, may date from the end

4
Ancient ornaments, including several magatama, or "curved jewels"

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

of this period and reflect a mingled migration from northern Asian

and southern Pacific areas. Some developments of the next cultural period, the Yayoi, are at- tributed to Chinese and Korean influences. The Yayoi culture

(named after the section of Tokyo where archaeological investigations uncovered its traces) flourished between about 300 B.C. and

A.D. 300 from southern Kyushu to northern Honshu. The earli- est of these people, who are thought to have migrated from Korea

to northern Kyushu and intermixed with the Jomon, also used

chipped stone tools. Although the pottery of the Yayoi was more

technologically advanced—produced on a potter's wheel—it was more simply decorated than Jomon ware. The Yayoi made bronze

ceremonial nonfunctional bells, mirrors, and weapons, and by the

first century A.D., iron agricultural tools and weapons. They wove

cloth, lived in permanent farming villages, constructed buildings

of wood and stone, accumulated wealth through land ownership

and the storage of grain, and developed distinct social classes. Their

irrigated, wet-rice culture was similar to that of central and south

China, requiring a heavy input of human labor, which led to the

development and eventual growth of a highly sedentary society.

Unlike China, which had to undertake massive public works and

water-control projects, leading to a highly centralized government,

5
Japan: A Country Study

Japan had abundant water. In Japan, then, local political and social developments were relatively more important than the activities of the central authority and a stratified society.

Kofun Period, ca. A.D. 300-710

New continental influences, such as the extensive use of iron,

characterized the next historical period. The Kofun, or old tomb,

period (ca. A.D. 300-710, also known as the Yamato period), takes

its name from the culture's distinctive earthen funeral mounds with

large stone burial chambers, many of which were keyhole shaped.

During this time, a highly aristocratic society with militaristic rul- ers developed. Its horse-riding warriors wore armor, carried swords

and other weapons, and used advanced military methods like those

of Northeast Asia. Evidence of these advances is seen in haniwa

(literally, clay rings) funerary figures found in thousands of tombs

scattered throughout the area. The figures are portrayed using a wide variety of musical instruments, weapons, modes of conveyance, and so forth. Another funerary piece, the magatama, became

one of the symbols of the power of the imperial house.

The Kofun period was a critical stage in Japan's evolution toward

a more cohesive and recognized state. This society was most developed in the easternmost part of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), and

its armies established a foothold on the southern tip of Korea.

Japan's rulers of the time even petitioned the Chinese court for confirmation of royal titles; the Chinese, in turn, recognized

Japanese military control over parts of the Korean Peninsula. The

earliest written records about Japan are from Chinese sources from

this period. Wa (the Japanese pronunciation of an early Chinese

name for Japan) was first mentioned in A.D. 57. Early Chinese

historians described Wa as a land of hundreds of scattered tribal communities, not the unified land with a 700-year tradition as laid

out in the Nihongi, which puts the foundation ofJapan at 660 B.C.

Third-century Chinese sources reported that the Wa people lived on raw vegetables, rice, and fish served on bamboo and wooden

trays, had vassal-master relations, collected taxes, had provincial

granaries and markets, clapped their hands in worship (something

still done in Shinto shrines), had violent succession struggles, built

earthen grave mounds, and observed mourning. Himiko, a female

ruler of an early political federation known as Yamatai, flourished

during the third century. While Himiko reigned as spiritual leader,

her younger brother carried out affairs of state, which included

diplomatic relations with the court of the Chinese Wei Dynasty

(A.D. 220-65).

The Yamato polity, which emerged in the mid-Kofun period, was distinguished by powerful great clans or extended families, each

6
Haniwa ship excavated at Osaka in 1988

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

with its dependents. Each clan was headed by a patriarch who per- formed sacred rites to the clan's kami to ensure the long-term welfare of the clan. Clan members were the aristocracy, and the kingly

line that controlled the Yamato court was at its pinacle.

By the fifth century A.D., the Yamato court was concentrated

in Asuka, near modern Nara, and exercised power over clans in

Kyushu and Honshu, bestowing titles, some hereditary, on clan

chieftains. The Yamato name became synonomous with all ofJapan

as the Yamato rulers suppressed the clans and acquired agricultural lands. Based on Chinese models (including the adoption of

the Chinese written language), they developed a central administration and an imperial court attended by subordinate clan chieftains but with no permanent capital. By the mid-seventh century,

the agricultural lands had grown to a substantial public domain,

subject to central policy. The basic administrative unit was the

county, and society was organized into occupation groups. Most

people were farmers; other were fishers, weavers, potters, artisans, armorers, and ritual specialists.

More exchange occurred between Japan and the continent of

Asia late in the Kofun period. Buddhism was introduced from

Korea, probably in A.D. 538, exposing Japan to a new body of

religious doctrine. The Soga, a Japanese court family that rose to
Japan: A Country Study

prominence with the accession of the Emperor Kimmei about A.D.

531, favored the adoption of Buddhism and of governmental and

cultural models based on Chinese Confucianism. But some at the

Yamato court—such as the Nakatomi family, which was responsible for performing Shinto rituals at court, and the Mononobe, a

military clan—were set on maintaining their prerogatives and re- sisted the alien religious influence of Buddhism. The Soga in- troduced Chinese-modeled fiscal policies, established the first national treasury, and considered the Korean Peninsula a trade route rather than an object of territorial expansion. Acrimony con- tinued between the Soga and the Nakatomi and Mononobe clans

for more than a century during which the Soga temporarily emerged

ascendant.

The Soga intermarried with the imperial family and by A.D.

587 Soga Umako, the Soga chieftain, was powerful enough to install his nephew as emperor and later to assassinate him and replace

him with the Empress Suiko. Suiko, the first of eight sovereign

empresses, was merely a figurehead for Umako and Prince Regent Shotoku Taishi (A.D. 574-622). Shotoku, recognized as a great

intellectual of this period of reform, was a devout Buddhist well- read in Chinese literature. He was influenced by Confucian principles, including the Mandate of Heaven, which suggested that the

sovereign ruled at the will of a supreme force. Under Shotoku 's direction, Confucian models of rank and etiquette were adopted,

and his Seventeen Article Constitution (Kenpojushichijd) prescribed

ways to bring harmony to a society chaotic in Confucian terms. In addition, Shotoku adopted the Chinese calendar, developed a system of highways, built numerous Buddhist temples, had court

chronicles compiled, sent students to China to study Buddhism and

Confucianism, and established formal diplomatic relations with

China.

Numerous official missions of envoys, priests, and students were

sent to China in the seventh century. Some remained twenty years or more; many of those who returned became prominent reformers. In a move greatly resented by the Chinese, Shotoku sought

equality with the Chinese emperor by addressing a memorial "From

the Son of Heaven in the Land of the Rising Sun to the Son of

Heaven of the Land of the Setting Sun." Shotoku's bold step set a precedent: Japan never again accepted a subordinate status in

its relations with China. Although the missions continued the trans- formation of Japan through Chinese influences, the Korean in- fluence on Japan declined despite the close connections there had

been during the early Kofun period.

8
Historical Setting

About twenty years after the deaths of Shotoku (in A.D. 622),

Soga Umako (in A.D. 626), and Empress Suiko (in A.D. 628), court intriques over the succession and the threat of a Chinese in- vasion led to a palace coup against the Soga oppression in 645.

The revolt was led by Prince Naka and Nakatomi Kamatari, who

seized control of the court from the Soga family and introduced

the Taika Reform (Taika means great change) to centralize the

state. The Taika Reform—influenced by Chinese practices—started

with land redistribution, aimed at ending the existing landholding

system of the great clans and their control over domains and oc- cupational groups. What were once called "private lands and pri- vate people' ' became ' 'public lands and public people, '

' as the court now sought to assert its control over all ofJapan and to make the

people direct subjects of the throne. Land was no longer hereditary but reverted to the state at the death of the owner. Taxes were

levied on harvests and on silk, cotton, cloth, thread, and other

products. A corvee (labor) tax was established for military conscription and building public works. The hereditary titles of clan chieftains were abolished, and three ministries were established to advise

the throne (the minister of the left, minister of the right, and minister

of the center, or chancellor). The country was divided into provinces

headed by governors appointed by the court, and the provinces were further divided into districts and villages.

Naka assumed the position of minister of the center, and

Kamatari was granted a new family name—Fujiwara—in recognition of his great service to the imperial family. Fujiwara Kamatari

became the first in a long line of court aristocrats. Another, longlasting change was the use of the name Nippon or Nihon (see Glossary), or sometimes Dai Nippon (Great Japan) in diplomatic documents and chronicles. Following the reigns of Naka's uncle and

mother, Naka assumed the throne as Emperor Tenji in 662, taking the additional title tenno (heavenly sovereign). This new title was intended to improve the Yamato clan's image and to emphasize

the divine origins of the imperial family in the hope of keeping it above political frays, such as those precipitated by the Soga clan. Within the imperial family, however, power struggles continued

as the emperor's brother and son vied for the throne. The brother,

who later reigned as Emperor Temmu, consolidated Tenji' s re- forms and state power in the imperial court. Reforms were further consolidated and codified in A.D. 701

under the Taiho-ryoritsu (Great Treasure Code, known as the

Taiho Code), which, except for a few modifications and being

relegated to primarily ceremonial functions, remained in force until

9
Japan: A Country Study

1868. The Taiho Code provided for Confucian-model penal provisions (light rather than harsh punishments) and Chinese-style central administration through the Department of Rites, which was

devoted to Shinto and court rituals, and the Department of State,

with its eight ministries (for central administration, ceremonies,

civil affairs, the imperial household, justice, military affairs, people's affairs, and the treasury). A Chinese-style civil service ex- amination system based on the Confucian classics was also adopted.

Tradition circumvented the system, however, as aristocratic birth

continued to be the main qualification for higher position. The

Taiho Code did not address the selection of the sovereign. Several

empresses reigned from the fifth to the eighth centuries, but after 770 succession was restricted to males, usually from father to son, although sometimes to brother or uncle.

Nara and Heian Periods, A.D. 710-1185

Economic, Social, and Administrative Developments

Before the Taiho Code was established, the capital was custo- marily moved after the death of an emperor because of the ancient

belief that a place of death was polluted. Reforms and bureaucratization of government led to the establishment of a permanent imperial capital at Heijokyo, or Nara, in A.D. 710. (Previously the

capital had been about twenty-five kilometers south of Nara, in

and around Asuka, the name given by some historians to the pre- Nara period [538-710] and art style.) The capital at Nara, which

gave its name to the new period (710-94), was styled after the grand

Chinese Tang Dynasty (618-907) capital at Chang' an and was the

first truly urban center in Japan. It soon had a population of

200,000, representing nearly 4 percent of the country's population, and some 10,000 people worked in government jobs.

Economic and administrative activity increased during the Nara

period. Roads linked Nara to provincial capitals and taxes were

collected more efficiendy and routinely. Coins were minted, if not

widely used. Outside the Nara area, however, there was little commercial activity, and in the provinces the old Shotoku land reform

systems declined. By the mid-eighth century, shoen (landed estates), one of the most important economic institutions in medieval

Japan, began to rise as a result of the search for a more managable form of landholding. Local administration gradually became more self-sufficient while the breakdown of the old land distri- bution system and the rise of taxes led to the loss or abandonment of land by many people who became the ''wave people,"

or ronin (see Glossary). Some of these formerly "public people" were

10
Historical Setting

privately employed by large landholders, and "public lands" in- creasingly reverted to the shoen. Factional fighting at the imperial court continued throughout

the Nara period. Imperial family members, leading court families, such as the Fujiwara, and Buddhist priests all contended for influence. In the late Nara period, financial burdens on the state increased, and the court began dismissing nonessential officials. In 792 universal conscription was abandoned, and district heads were allowed to establish private militia forces for local police work.

Decentralization of authority became the rule despite the reforms

of the Nara period. Eventually, to return control to imperial hands,

the capital was moved in 784 to Nagaoka and in 794 to Heiankyo

(Capital of Peace and Tranquility) or Heian, about twenty-six kilometers north of Nara. By the late eleventh century, the city was popularly called Kyoto (Capital City), the name it has had

ever since.

Cultural Developments and the Establishment of Buddhism

Some of Japan's literary monuments were written during the

Nara period including the Kojiki and Nihongi, the first national his- tories compiled in 712 and 720 respectively; the Man'yoshu (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves), an anthology of poems; and the

Kaifuso (Fond Recollections of Poetry), an anthology written in

Chinese by Japanese emperors and princes. Another major cul- tural development of the era was the permanent establishment of

Buddhism in Japan. Buddhism had been introduced in the sixth

century, but had a mixed reception until the Nara period, when

it was heartily embraced by the Emperor Shomu. Shomu and his

Fujiwara consort were fervent Buddhists and actively promoted the

spread of Buddhism, making it the "guardian of the state" and

strengthening Japanese institutions through still further Chinese

acculturation. During Shomu's reign, the Todaiji (Great East Temple) was built and within it was placed the Buddha Dainichi (Great

Sun Buddha), a sixteen-meter-high, gilt-bronze statue. This Buddha

was identified with the Sun Goddess, and from this point on a

gradual syncretism of Buddism and Shinto ensued. Shomu declared

himself the "Servant of the Three Treasures" of Buddhism: the

Buddha, the law or teachings of Buddhism, and the Buddhist community.

Although these efforts stopped short of making Buddhism the

state religion, Nara Buddhism heightened the status of the imperial

family. Buddhist influence at court increased under the two reigns

of Shomu's daughter. As Empress Koken from 749 to 758, she

brought many Buddhist priests into court. Koken abdicated in 758

11
Japan: A Country Study

on the advice of her cousin, Fujiwara Nakamaro. When the re- tired empress came to favor a Buddhist faith healer named Dokyo,

Nakamaro rose up in arms in 764 but was quickly crushed. Koken

charged the ruling emperor with colluding with Nakamaro, and

had him deposed and reascended the throne as Empress Shotoku

from 764 to 770. It was at this point that she commissioned the

printing of 1 million prayer charms, many examples of which sur- vive, and which were known as the earliest printing in the world

until an earlier example dating 751 was discovered in Korea in 1966.

Shotoku had the charms printed to placate the Buddhist clergy.

She may even have wanted to make Dokyo emperor, but she died

before she could act. Her actions shocked Nara society and led to the exclusion of women from imperial succession and the removal

of Buddhist priests from positions of political authority.

Despite such machinations, Buddhism began to spread throughout Japan during the ensuing Heian period (794-1 185) primarily

through two major esoteric sects, Tendai (Heavenly Terrace) and

Shingon (True Word). Tendai originated in China and is based on the Lotus Sutra. Shingon is an indigenous sect with close affilia- tions to original Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist thought

founded by Kukai (also called Kobo Daishi), who gready impressed

the emperors following Emperor Kammu (782-806) and generations ofJapanese, not only with his holiness, but also with his poetry,

calligraphy, painting, and sculpture. Kammu himself was a notable patron of the otherworldly Tendai sect, which rose to great

power over the ensuing centuries. A close relationship developed

between the Tendai monastery complex on Mount Hiei and the

imperial court in its new capital at the foot of the mountain and,

as a result, Tendai emphasized great reverence for the emperor

and the nation.

The Fujiwara Regency

When Kammu moved the capital to Heian (Kyoto), which re- mained the imperial capital for the next 1 ,000 years, he did so not

only to strengthen imperial authority but also to improve his seat of government geopolitically. Kyoto had good river access to the

sea and could be reached by land routes from the eastern provinces.

The early Heian period (794-967) continued Nara culture; the

Heian capital was patterned on the Chinese capital at Chang' an,

as was Nara, but on a larger scale. Despite the decline of the TaikaTaiho reforms, imperial government was vigorous during the early

Heian period. Indeed, Kammu's avoidance of drastic reform

decreased the intensity of political struggles, and he became recog- nized as one of Japan's most forceful emperors.

12
The eighth-century Nara Daibutsu, Todaiji

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

Although Kammu had abandoned universal conscription in 792,

he still waged major military offensives to subjugate the Ainu, a north Asian caucasoid people, sometimes referred to as Emishi,

living in northern and eastern Japan. After making temporary gains

in 794, in 797 Kammu appointed a new commander under the

title seii taishogun (barbarian-subduing generalissimo, often referred

to as shogun). By 801 the shogun had defeated the Ainu and ex- tended the imperial domains to the eastern end of Honshu. Imperial control over the provinces was tenuous at best, however, and

in the ninth and tenth centuries much authority was lost to the great

families who disregarded the Chinese-style land and tax systems

imposed by the government in Kyoto. Stability came to Heian

Japan, but, even though succession was ensured for the imperial

family through heredity, power again concentrated in the hands

of one noble family, the Fujiwara.

Following Kammu's death in 806 and a succession struggle

among his sons, two new offices were established in an effort to adjust the Taika-Taiho administrative structure. Through the new

Emperor's Private Office, the emperor could issue administrative

edicts more directly and with more self-assurance than before. The

new Metropolitan Police Board replaced the largely ceremonial

imperial guard units. While these two offices strengthened the

13
Japan: A Country Study

emperor's position temporarily, soon they and other Chinese-style

structures were bypassed in the developing state. Chinese influence

effectively ended with the last imperial-sanctioned mission to China

in 838. Tang China was in a state of decline, and Chinese Buddhists were severely persecuted, undermining Japanese respect for Chinese institutions. Japan began to turn inward.

As the Soga had taken control of the throne in the sixth century, the Fujiwara by the ninth century had intermarried with the

imperial family, and one of their members was the first head of

the Emperor's Private Office. Another Fujiwara became regent for

his grandson, then a minor emperor, and yet another was appointed

kanpaku (regent for an adult emperor). Toward the end of the ninth

century, several emperors tried, but failed, to check the Fujiwara.

For a time, however, during the reign of Emperor Daigo (897-930),

the Fujiwara regency was suspended as he ruled directly.

Nevertheless, the Fujiwara were not demoted by Daigo, but ac- tually became stronger during his reign. Central control ofJapan

had continued to decline, and the Fujiwara, along with other great

families and religious foundations, acquired ever larger shoen and

greater wealth during the early tenth century. By the early Heian

period, the shoen had obtained legal status, and the large religious

establishments sought clear titles in perpetuity, waiver of taxes,

and immunity from government inspection of the shoen they held.

Those people who worked the land found it advantageous to transfer

title to shoen holders in return for a share of the harvest. People

and lands were increasingly beyond central control and taxation, a de facto return to conditions before the Taika Reform.

Within decades of Daigo' s death, the Fujiwara had absolute control over the court. By the year 1000 Fujiwara Michinaga was able

to enthrone and dethrone emperors at will. Little authority was

left for traditional officialdom, and government affairs were handled through the Fujiwara family's private administration. The

Fujiwara had become what historian George B. Sansom has called "hereditary dictators."

Despite their usurpation of imperial authority, the Fujiwara

presided over a period of cultural and artistic flowering at the imperial court and among the aristocracy. There was great interest

in graceful poetry and vernacular literature. Japanese writing had

long depended on Chinese ideograms (kanji), but these were now

supplemented by kana, a phonetic Japanese script based on simplified Chinese ideograms; katakana, a mnemonic device using parts

of Chinese ideograms; and hiragana, a cursive form of katakana writing and an art form in itself (see Arts, ch. 3). Hiragana gave writ- ten expression to the spoken word and, with it, to the rise in Japan's

14
Historical Setting

famous vernacular literature, much of it written by court women

who had not been trained in Chinese as had their male counterparts. Three late tenth-century and early eleventh-century women

presented their views of life and romance at the Heian court in

Kagero nikki (The Gossamer Years) by "the mother of Michitsuna,

Makura no soshi (The Pillow Book) by Sei Shonagon, and Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji)—the world's first novel—by Murasaki Shikibu

(see Literature, ch. 3). Indigenous art also flourished under the

Fujiwara after centuries of imitating Chinese forms. Vividly colored

yamato-e (Japanese style) paintings of court life and stories about

temples and shrines became common in the mid- and late Heian

periods, setting patterns for Japanese art to this day (see Art, ch. 3). As culture flourished, so did decentralization. Whereas the first phase of shorn development in the early Heian period had seen the

opening of new lands and the commending of lands to aristocrats

and religious institutions, during the second phase patrimonial

"house governments," as in the old clan system, arose. (In fact,

the form of the old clan system had remained largely intact within

the great old centralized government.) New institutions were now

needed in the face of social, economic, and political changes. The

Taiho Code lapsed, its institutions relegated to ceremonial functions. Family administrations now became public institutions. As

the most powerful family, the Fujiwara governed Japan and determined the general affairs of state, such as succession to the throne.

Family and state affairs were thoroughly intermixed, a pattern fol- lowed among other families, monasteries, and even the imperial

family. Land management became the primary occupation of the

aristocracy, not so much because direct control by the imperial family or central government had declined but more from strong family solidarity and a lack of a sense of Japan as a single nation.

The Rise of the Military Class

Under the early courts, when military conscription had been centrally controlled, military affairs had been taken out of the hands

of the provincial aristocracy. But as the system broke down after 792, local power holders again became the primary source of military strength. Shoen holders had access to manpower and, as they

obtained improved military technology (such as new training

methods, more powerful bows, armor, horses, and superior swords)

and faced worsening local conditions in the ninth century, military service became part of shoen life. Not only the shoen, but also

civil and religious institutions formed private guard units to protect themselves. Gradually, the provincial upper class was trans- formed into a new military elite based on the ideals of the bushi

15
Japan: A Country Study

(warrior) or samurai (literally, "one who serves"; see The Bushido

Code, ch. 8).

Bushi interests were diverse, cutting across old power structures

to form new associations in the tenth century. Mutual interests,

family connections, and kinship were consolidated in military groups

that became part of family administration. In time, large regional

military families formed around members of the court aristocracy

who had become prominent provincial figures. These military

families gained prestige from connections to the imperial court and

court-granted military tides and access to manpower. The Fujiwara,

Taira, and Minamoto were among the most prominent families

supported by the new military class. Decline in food production, growth of the population, and competition for resources among the great families all led to the gradual

decline of Fujiwara power and gave rise to military disturbances

in the mid-tenth and eleventh centuries. Members of the Fujiwara,

Taira, and Minamoto families—all of whom had descended from

the imperial family—attacked one another, claimed control over

vast tracts of conquered land, set up rival regimes, and generally

broke the peace of the Land of the Rising Sun.

The Fujiwara controlled the throne until the reign of Emperor

Go-Sanjo (1068-73), the first emperor not born of a Fujiwara

mother since the ninth century. Go-Sanjo, determined to restore imperial control through strong personal rule, implemented reforms

to curb Fujiwara influence. He also established an office to compile and validate estate records with the aim of reasserting central

control. Many shoen were not properly certified, and large landholders, like the Fujiwara, felt threatened with the loss of their lands. Go-Sanjo also established the Incho, or Office of the Cloistered

Emperor, which was held by a succession of emperors who abdicated to devote themselves to behind-the-scenes governance, or inset (cloistered government).

The Incho filled the void left by the decline of Fujiwara power.

Rather than being banished, the Fujiwara were mostly retained

in their old positions of civil dictator and minister of the center while being bypassed in decision making. In time, many of the

Fujiwara were replaced, mosdy by members of the rising Minamoto

family. While the Fujiwara fell into disputes among themselves and

formed northern and southern factions, the inset system allowed

the paternal line of the imperial family to gain influence over the

throne. The period from 1086 to 1156 was the age of supremacy

of the Incho and of the rise of the military class throughout the

country. Military might rather than civil authority dominated the

government.

16
Historical Setting

A struggle for succession in the mid-twelfth century gave the

Fujiwara an opportunity to regain their former power. Fujiwara

Yorinaga sided with the retired emperor in a violent battle in 1 158

against the heir apparent, who was supported by the Taira and

Minamoto. In the end, the Fujiwara were destroyed, the old sys- tem of government supplanted, and the inset system left powerless

as bushi took control of court affairs, marking a turning point in

Japanese history. Within a year, the Taira and Minamoto clashed

and a twenty-year period of Taira ascendancy began. The Taira were seduced by court life and ignored problems in the provinces.

Finally, Minamoto Yoritomo (1147-99) rose from his headquarters at Kamakura (in the Kanto region, southwest of modern Tokyo)

to defeat the Taira, and with them the child emperor they controlled, in the Genpei War (1180-85).

Kamakura and Muromachi Periods, 1185-1573

The Bakufu and the Hojo Regency

The Kamakura period (1185-1333) marks the transition to the

Japanese "medieval" era, a nearly 700-year period in which the

emperor, the court, and the traditional central government were

left intact, but were largely relegated to ceremonial functions. Civil,

military, and judicial matters were controlled by the bushi class,

the most powerful of whom was the de facto national ruler. The

term feudalism is generally used to describe this period, being ac- cepted by scholars as applicable to medieval Japan as well as medieval Europe. Both had land-based economies, vestiges of a

previously centralized state, and a concentration of advanced mili- tary technologies in the hands of a specialized fighting class. Lords

required the loyal services of vassals, who were rewarded with fiefs of their own. The fief holders exercised local military rule and public

power related to the holding of land. This period in Japan differed

from the old shoen system in its pervasive military emphasis.

Once Minamoto Yoritomo had consolidated his power, he es- tablished a new government at his family home in Kamakura. He

called his government a bakufu (tent government), but because he was given the title sett taishogun by the emperor, it is often referred

to in Western literature as the shogunate. Yoritomo followed the

Fujiwara form of house government and had an administrative

board, a board of retainers, and a board of inquiry. After confiscating Taira estates in central and western Japan, he had the imperial court appoint stewards for the estates and constables for the

provinces. As shogun, Yoritomo was both the steward and the

constable-general. The Kamakura bakufu was not a national regime,

17
Japan: A Country Study

however, and although it controlled large tracts of land, there was

strong resistance to the stewards. The regime continued warfare

against the Fujiwara in the north, but never brought either the north

or the west under complete military control. The old court resided

in Kyoto, continuing to hold the land over which it had jurisdiction, while newly organized military families were attracted to Kamakura.

Despite a strong beginning, Yoritomo failed to consolidate the

leadership of his family on a lasting basis. Intrafamily contention

had long existed within the Minamoto, although Yoritomo had

eliminated most serious challengers to his authority. When he died

suddenly in 1 199, his son Yoriie became shogun and nominal head

of the Minamoto, but Yoriie was unable to control the other eastern

bushi families. By the early thirteenth century, a regency had been

established for the shogun by his maternal grandparents—members

of the Hqjo family, a branch of the Taira that had allied itself with

the Minamoto in 1 180. Under the Hqjo, the bakufu became powerless, and the shogun, often a member of the Fujiwara family or even an imperial prince, was merely a figurehead.

With the protector of the emperor a figurehead himself, strains

emerged between Kyoto and Kamakura, and in 1221 a war—the

Jokyu Incident—broke out between the cloistered emperor and the

Hqjo regent. The Hqjo forces easily won the war, and the imperial court was brought under direct bakufu control. The shogun's constables gained greater civil powers, and the court was obliged to seek Kamakura's approval for all of its actions. Although deprived

of political power, the court was allowed to retain extensive estates with which to sustain the imperial splendor the bakufu needed to help sanction its rule. Several significant administrative achievements were made during the Hqjo regency. In 1225 the Council of State was established,

providing opportunities for other military lords to exercise judicial and legislative authority at Kamakura. The Hqjo regent presided over the council, which was a successful form of collective

leadership. The adoption of Japan's first military code of law

the Joei Code—in 1232 reflected the profound transition from court

to militarized society. While legal practices in Kyoto were still based on 500-year-old Confucian principles, the Joei Code was a highly

legalistic document that stressed the duties of stewards and constables, provided means for settling land disputes, and established

rules governing inheritances. It was clear and concise, stipulated

punishments for violators of its conditions, and remained in effect for the next 635 years.

18
Burning of the Sanjo Palace, detail from illustration from

Heike monogatari (Tale of Heike), thirteenth century

Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

As might be expected, the literature of the time reflected the unsettled nature of the period. The Hojoki (An Account of My Hut)

describes the turmoil of the period in terms of the Buddhist concepts of impermanance and the vanity of human projects. The Heike

monogatari (Tale of the Heike) narrated the rise and fall of the Taira

(also known as the Heike), replete with tales of wars and samurai

deeds. A second literary mainstream was the continuation of

anthologies of poetry in the Shin kokinshu wakashu (New Collection

of Ancient and Modern Times), of which twenty volumes were produced between 1201 and 1205.

The Flourishing of Buddhism

In the time of disunity and violence, deepening pessimism in- creased the appeal of the search for salvation. Kamakura was the

age of the great popularization of Buddhism with two new sects, Jodo (Pure Land) and Zen (Meditation), dominating the period.

The old Heian sects had been quite esoteric and more appealing

to intellectuals than to the masses. The Mount Hiei monasteries

had become politically powerful but appealed primarily to those

capable of systematic study of the sect's teachings. This situation

gave rise to the Jodo sect, based on unconditional faith and devotion

19
Japan: A Country Study

and prayer to Amida Buddha. Zen rejected all temporal and scriptural authority, stressing moral character rather than intellectual

attainments, an emphasis that appealed to the military class. Zen

masters, regarded as embodiments of truth, were turned to by growing numbers of the military class. Mongol Invasions

The repulsions of two Mongol invasions were momentous events

in Japanese history. Japanese relations with China had been ter- minated in the mid-ninth century after the deterioration of late Tang

China and the turning inward of the Heian court. Some commercial contacts were maintained with southern China in later centuries, but Japanese pirates made the open seas dangerous. At a time

when the bakufu had little interest in foreign affairs and ignored

communications from China and Koryo (as Korea was then known), news arrived in 1268 of a new Mongol regime in Beijing. Its leader,

Khubilai Khan, demanded that the Japanese pay tribute to the new

Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) and threatened reprisals if they failed

to do so. Unused to such threats, Kyoto raised the diplomatic counter of Japan's divine origin, rejected the Mongol demands, dis- missed the Korean messengers, and started defensive preparations.

After further unsuccessful entreaties, the first Mongol invasion took

place in 1274. More than 600 ships carried a combined Mongol,

Chinese, and Korean force of 23,000 troops armed with catapults,

combustible missiles, and bows and arrows. In fighting, these sol- diers grouped in close cavalry formations against samurai ac- customed to one-on-one combat. Local Japanese forces at Hakata, on northern Kyushu, defended against the superior mainland force,

which, after one day of fighting was decimated by the onslaught

of a sudden typhoon. Khubilai realized that nature, not military

incompetence, had been the cause of his forces' failure so, in 1281,

he launched a second invasion. Seven weeks of fighting took place

in northwestern Kyushu before another typhoon struck, again destroying the Mongol fleet. Although Shinto priests attributed the two defeats of the Mongols to a "divine wind" (kamikaze), a sign of heaven's special protection ofJapan, the invasion left a deep impression on the bakufu

leaders. Long-standing fears of the Chinese threat to Japan were

reinforced, and the Korean Peninsula became regarded as "an

arrow pointed at the heart ofJapan." The Japanese victory, however, gave the bushi a sense of fighting superiority that remained

with Japan's soldiers until 1945. The victory also convinced the

bushi of the value of the bakufu form of government.

20
Historical Setting

The Mongol war had been a drain on the economy, and new

taxes had to be levied to maintain defensive preparations for the

future. The invasions also caused disaffection among those who

expected recompense for their help in defeating the Mongols. There

were no lands or other rewards to be given, however, and such

disaffection, combined with overextension and the increasing

defense costs, led to a decline of the Kamakura bakufu. Additionally, inheritances had divided family properties, and landowners

increasingly had to turn to moneylenders for support. Roving bands

of ronin further threatened the stability of the bakufu. Civil War

The Hojo reacted to the ensuing chaos by trying to place more

power among the various great family clans. To further weaken

the Kyoto court, the bakufu decided to allow two contending imperial lines—known as the Southern Court or junior line and the

Northern Court or senior line—to alternate on the throne. The

method worked for several successions until a member of the

Southern Court ascended to the throne as Emperor Go-Daigo

(1318-39). Go-Daigo wanted to overthrow the bakufu and openly

defied Kamakura by naming his own son his heir. In 1331 the bakufu exiled Go-Daigo, but loyalist forces rebelled. They were aided by

Ashikaga Takauji (1305-58), a constable who turned against

Kamakura when dispatched to put down Go-Daigo's rebellion. At

the same time, another eastern chieftain rebelled against the bakufu,

which quickly disintegrated, and the Hojo were defeated.

In the swell of victory, Go-Daigo endeavored to restore imperial

authority and tenth-century Confucian practices. This period of

reform, known as the Kemmu Restoration (1333-36), aimed at strengthening the position of the emperor and reasserting the primacy of the court nobles over the bushi. The reality, however, was

that the forces who had arisen against Kamakura had been set on

defeating the Hojo, not on supporting the emperor. Ashikaga

Takauji finally sided with the Northern Court in a civil war against

the Southern Court represented by Go-Daigo. The long War Between the Courts lasted from 1336 to 1392. Early in the conflict,

Go-Daigo was driven from Kyoto, and the Northern Court con- tender was installed by Ashikaga, who became the new shogun.

Ashikaga Bakufu

The ensuing period of Ashikaga rule (1336-1573) was called

Muromachi for the district in which its headquarters were in Kyoto

after 1378. What distinguished the Ashikaga bakufu from that of

Kamakura was that, whereas Kamakura had existed in equilibrium

21
Japan: A Country Study

with the Kyoto court, Ashikaga took over the remnants of the imperial government. Nevertheless, the Ashikaga bakufu was not as strong as the Kamakura had been and was greatly preoccupied by

the civil war. Not until the rule of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (as third

shogun, 1368-94, and chancellor, 1394-1408) did a semblance of

order emerge.

Yoshimitsu allowed the constables, who had had limited powers during the Kamakura period, to become strong regional rulers, later called daimyo (from dai, great, and mydden, named lands).

In time a balance of power evolved between the shogun and the

daimyo; the three most prominent daimyo families rotated as deputies

to the shogun at Kyoto. Yoshimitsu was finally successful in re- unifying the Northern and Southern courts in 1392, but, despite

his promise of greater balance between the imperial lines, the North- ern line maintained control over the throne thereafter. The line

of shoguns gradually weakened after Yoshimitsu and increasingly

lost power to the daimyo and other regional strongmen. The shogun' s decisions about imperial succession became meaningless, and

the daimyo backed their own candidates. In time, the Ashikaga family had its own succession problems, resulting finally in the Onin

War (1467-77), which left Kyoto devastated and effectively ended

the national authority of the bakufu. The power vacuum that en- sued launched a century of anarchy (see Provincial Wars and Foreign Contacts, this ch.).

Economic and Cultural Developments

Contact with Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) China was renewed

during the Muromachi period after the Chinese sought support

in suppressing Japanese pirates, or wako, who controlled the seas and pillaged coastal areas of China. Wanting to improve relations

with China and to rid Japan of the wako threat, Yoshimitsu ac- cepted a relationship with the Chinese that was to last for half a

century. Japanese wood, sulfur, copper ore, swords, and folding

fans were traded for Chinese silk, porcelain, books, and coins in

what the Chinese considered tribute but the Japanese saw as profitable trade.

During the time of the Ashikaga bakufu, a new national culture,

called Muromachi culture, emerged from the bakufu headquarters

in Kyoto to reach all levels of society. Zen Buddhism played a large

role in spreading not only religious but also artistic influences, es- pecially those derived from Chinese painting of the Chinese Song

(960-1279), Yuan, and Ming dynasties. The proximity of the imperial court and the bakufu resulted in a comingling of imperial family members, courtiers, daimyo, samurai, and Zen priests. Art of

22
Historical Setting

all kinds, architecture, literature, No drama, comedy, poetry, the

tea ceremony, landscape gardening, and flower arranging, all flourished during Muromachi times.

There also was renewed interest in Shinto, which had quietly

coexisted with Buddhism during the centuries of the latter'

s

predominance. In fact, Shinto, which lacked its own scriptures and

had few prayers, as a result of syncretic practices begun in the Nara

period had widely adopted Shingon Buddhist rituals and, between

the eighth and fourteenth centuries, was nearly totally absorbed

by Buddhism and became known as Ryobu Shinto (Dual Shinto)

.

The Mongol invasions in the late thirteenth century, however, had

evoked a national consciousness of the role of the kamikaze in defeat- ing the enemy. Less than fifty years later (1339-43), Kitabatake

Chikafusa (1293-1354), the chief commander of the Southern Court

forces, wrote the Jinno shoto ki (Chronicle of the Direct Descent of

the Divine Sovereigns). This chronicle emphasized the importance

of maintaining the divine descent of the imperial line from Amaterasu to the current emperor, a condition that gave Japan a special national polity (kokutai). Besides reenforcing the concept of the

emperor as a deity, theJinno shoto ki provided a Shinto view of his- tory, which stressed the divine nature of all Japanese and the country's spiritual supremacy over China and India. As a result, a change gradually occurred in the balance between the dual

Buddhist-Shinto religious practice. Between the fourteenth and

seventeenth centuries, Shinto reemerged as the primary belief sys- tem, developed its own philosophy and scripture (based on Confucian and Buddhist canons), and became a powerful nationalistic

force. Provincial Wars and Foreign Contacts

The Onin War led to serious political fragmentation and obliter- ation of domains: a great struggle for land and power ensued among

bushi chieftains until the mid-sixteenth century. Peasants rose against

their landlords and samurai against their overlords as central control virtually ceased. The imperial house was left impoverished,

and the bakufu was controlled by contending chieftains in Kyoto.

The provincial domains that emerged after the Onin War were

smaller and easier to control. Many new small daimyo arose from

among the samurai who had overthrown their great overlords.

Border defenses were improved and well-fortified castle towns began

to be built to protect the newly opened domains, for which land

surveys were made, roads built, and mines opened. New house

laws provided practical means of administration, stressing duties

and rules of behavior. Emphasis was put on success in war, estate

23
Japan: A Country Study

management, and finance. Threatening alliances were guarded

against through strict marriage rules. Aristocratic society was over- whelmingly military in character, the rest of society controlled in a system of vassalage. The shoen were obliterated, and court nobles and absentee landlords were dispossessed. The new daimyo

directly controlled the land, keeping the peasantry in permanent

serfdom in exchange for protection.

Most wars of the period were short and localized, though they

occurred throughout Japan. By 1500 the entire country was en- gulfed in civil wars. Rather than disrupting the local economies,

however, the frequent movement of armies stimulated the growth

of transportation and communications, which in turn provided additional revenues from customs and tolls. To avoid such fees, commerce shifted to the central region, which no daimyo had been able

to control, and to the Inland Sea. Economic developments and the

desire to protect trade achievements brought about the establishment of merchant and artisan guilds.

By the end of the Muromachi period, the first Europeans had

arrived. The Portuguese landed in southern Kyoshu in 1543 and

within two years were making regular port calls. The Spanish ar- rived in 1587, followed by the Dutch in 1609. The Japanese began

to attempt studies of European civilization in depth, and new opportunities were presented for the economy along with serious political challenges. European firearms, fabrics, glassware, clocks,

tobacco, and other Western innovations were traded for Japanese

gold and silver. Wealth was accumulated on a major scale through

trade, and lesser daimyo, especially in Kyushu, greatiy increased

their power. Provincial wars were made more deadly with the in- troduction of firearms, such as muskets and cannons, and greater use of infantry.

Christianity had an impact on Japan, largely through the efforts of the Jesuits, led first by Saint Francis Xavier (1506-52), who ar- rived in Kagoshima in southern Kyushu in 1549. Both daimyo and

merchants seeking better trade arrangements as well as peasants were among the converts. By 1560 Kyoto had become another

major area of missionary activity in Japan. In 1568 the port of

Nagasaki was established by a Christian daimyo, and turned over

to Jesuit administration in 1579. By 1582 there were as many as 150,000 converts (2 percent of the population) and 200 churches.

But bakufu tolerance for this alien influence diminished as the country became more unified and the openness of the period decreased.

Proscriptions against Christianity began in 1587 and outright perse- cutions in 1597. Although foreign trade was still encouraged, it was closely regulated, and by 1640 the exclusion and suppression

24
Historical Setting

of Christianity had become national policy (see Tokugawa Period,

1600-1867, this ch.; Religious and Philosophical Traditions, ch. 2). Reunification, 1573-1600

Between 1560 and 1600, powerful military leaders arose to defeat

the warring daimyo and unify Japan. Three major figures dominated

the period in succession: Oda Nobunaga (1534-82), Toyotomi

Hideyoshi (1536-98), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), each of

whom emerged as a major overlord with large military forces under

his command. As their power increased, they looked to the imperial court in Kyoto for sanction. In 1568 Nobunaga, who had

defeated another overlord's attempt to attack Kyoto in 1560,

marched on the capital, gained the support of the emperor, and

installed his own candidate in the succession struggle for shogun.

Backed by military force, Nobunaga was able to control the bakufu.

Initial resistance to Nobunaga in the Kyoto region came from

the Buddhist monks, rival daimyo, and hostile merchants. Surrounded by his enemies, Nobunaga struck first at the secular power

of the militant Tendai Buddhists, destroying their monastic center

at Mount Hiei near Kyoto and killing thousands of monks in 1571

.

By 1573 he had defeated the local daimyo, banished the last Ashikaga

shogun, and ushered in what historians call the Azuchi-Momoyama

period (1573-1600), named after the castles of Nobunaga and

Hideyoshi. Having taken these major steps toward reunification,

Nobunaga then built a seven-story castle surrounded by stone walls

at Azuchi on the shore of Lake Biwa. The castle was able to withstand firearms and became a symbol of the age of reunification.

Nobunaga' s power increased as he enfeoffed the conquered daimyo,

broke down the barriers to free commerce, and drew the humbled

religious communities and merchants into his military structure. He secured control of about one-third of the provinces through the use of large-scale warfare and he institutionalized administrative practices, such as systematic village organization, tax collection, and stan- dardized measurements. At the same time, other daimyo, both those

Nobunaga had conquered and those beyond his control, built their

own heavily fortified castles and modernized their garrisons. In 1577

Nobunaga dispatched his chief general, Hideyoshi, to conquer twelve

western Honshu provinces. The war was a protracted affair, and

in 1582, when Nobunaga led an army to assist Hideyoshi, he was

assassinated.

After destroying the forces responsible for Nobunaga' s death,

Hideyoshi was rewarded with a joint guardianship of Nobunaga'

s

heir, who was a minor. By 1584 Hideyoshi had eliminated the three

other guardians, taken complete control of Kyoto, and become the

25
Japan: A Country Study

undisputed successor of his late overlord. A commoner by birth

and without a surname, Hideyoshi was adopted by the Fujiwara

family, given the surname Toyotomi, and granted the tide kanpaku,

representing civil and military control of all Japan. By the following year, he had secured alliances with three of the nine major daimyo

coalitions and continued the war of reunification in Shikoku and

northern Kyushu. In 1590, with an army of 200,000 troops,

Hideyoshi defeated his last formidable rival, who controlled the

Kanto region of eastern Honshu. The remaining contending daimyo

capitulated, and the military reunification ofJapan was complete.

All of Japan was controlled by the dictatorial Hideyoshi either

directly or through his sworn vassals, and a new national government structure had evolved: a country unified under one daimyo

alliance but still decentralized. The basis of the power structure was again the distribution of territory. A new unit of land measurement and assessment—the koku—was instituted. One koku was

equivalent to about 180 liters of rice; daimyo were by definition those

who held lands capable of producing 10,000 koku or more of rice. Hideyoshi personally controlled 2 million of the 18.5 million koku

total national assessment (taken in 1598). Tokugawa Ieyasu, a powerful central Honshu daimyo (not completely under Hideyoshi' s control), held 2.5 million koku. Despite Hideyoshi 's tremendous strength and the fear in which

he was held, his position was far from secure. He attempted to re- arrange the daimyo holdings to his advantage, for example, reas- signing the Tokugawa family to the conquered Kanto region and

surrounding their new territory with more trusted vassals. He also adopted a hostage system for daimyo wives and heirs at his castle town at Osaka and used marriage alliances to enforce feudal bonds.

He imposed the koku system and land surveys to reassess the entire nation. In 1590 Hideyoshi declared an end to any further class mobility or change in social status, reinforcing the class distinctions between cultivators and bushi (only the latter could bear arms).

He provided for an orderly succession in 1591 by taking the title taiko, or retired kanpaku, turning the regency over to his son

Hideyori. Only toward the end of his life did Hideyoshi try to for- malize the balance of power by establishing the five-member Board

of Regents (one of them Ieyasu), sworn to keep peace and support

the Toyotomi, the five-member Board of House Administrators

for routine policy and administrative matters, and the three-member

Board of Mediators, who were charged with keeping peace between

the first two boards.

Momoyama art (1573-1615), named after the hill on which

Hideyoshi built his castle at Fushima, south of Kyoto, flourished

26
Historical Setting

during this period. It was a period of interest in the outside world,

the development of large urban centers, and the rise of the merchant and leisure classes. Ornate castle architecture and interiors

adorned with painted screens embellished with gold leaf reflected

daimyo power and wealth of the period. Depictions of the "southern

barbarians" —Europeans—were exotic and popular.

In 1577 Hideyoshi had seized Nagasaki, Japan's major point

of contact with the outside world. He took control of the various

trade associations and tried to regulate all overseas activities. Although China rebuffed his efforts to secure trade concessions,

Hideyoshi succeeded in sending commercial missions to the Philippines, Malaya, and Siam (present-day Thailand). He was suspicious of Christianity, however, as potentially subversive to daimyo

loyalties and he had some missionaries crucified.

Hideyoshi' s major ambition was to conquer China, and in 1592,

with an army of 200,000 troops, he invaded Korea, then a Chinese

vassal state. His armies quickly overran the peninsula before los- ing momentum in the face of a combined Korean-Chinese force. During peace talks Hideyoshi demanded a division of Korea, free- trade status, and a Chinese princess as consort for the emperor.

The equality with China sought by Japan was rebuffed by the

Chinese and peace efforts ended. In 1597 a second invasion was

begun, but it abruptly ended with Hideyoshi 's death in 1598.

Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867

Rule of Shogun and Daimyo

An evolution had taken place in the centuries from the time of

the Kamakura bakufu, which existed in equilibrium with the imperial court, to the Tokugawa, when the bushi became the unchallenged rulers in what historian Edwin O. Reischauer has called a ''centralized feudal" form of government. Instrumental in the

rise of the new bakufu was Tokugawa Ieyasu, the main beneficiary

of the achievements of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. Already powerful, Ieyasu profited by his transfer to the rich Kanto area. He maintained 2.5 million koku of land, had a new headquarters at Edo,

a strategically situated castle town (the future Tokyo), and had an

additional 2 million koku of land and thirty-eight vassals under his

control. After Hideyoshi 's death, Ieyasu moved quickly to seize

control from the Toyotomi family.

Ieyasu 's victory over the western daimyo at the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) gave him virtual control of all Japan. He rapidly

abolished numerous enemy daimyo houses, reduced others, such

as that of the Toyotomi, and redistributed the spoils of war to his

27
Japan: A Country Study

family and allies. Ieyasu still failed to achieve complete control of

the western daimyo, but his assumption of the title of shogun helped

consolidate the alliance system. After further strengthening his

power base, Ieyasu was confident enough to install his son Hidetada

(1579-1632) as shogun and himself as retired shogun in 1605. The

Toyotomi were still a significant threat, and Ieyasu devoted the

next decade to their eradication. In 1615 the Toyotomi stronghold

at Osaka was destroyed by the Tokugawa army.

The Tokugawa (or Edo) period brought 200 years of stability to Japan. The political system evolved into what historians call bakuhan, a combination of the terms bakufu and han (domains) to describe the government and society of the period. In the bakuhan,

the shogun had national authority and the daimyo had regional

authority, a new unity in the feudal structure, which had an in- creasingly large bureaucracy to administer the mixture of centralized and decentralized authorities. The Tokugawa became more

powerful during their first century of rule: land redistribution gave

them nearly 7 million koku, control of the most important cities,

and a land assessment system reaping great revenues. The feudal hierarchy was completed by the various classes of

daimyo. Closest to the Tokugawa house were the shinpan or "related houses." They were twenty-three daimyo on the borders of

Tokugawa lands, daimyo all direcdy related to Ieyasu. The shinpan

held mostly honorary titles and advisory posts in the bakufu. The

second class of the hierarchy were the fudai, or "house daimyo"

rewarded with lands close to the Tokugawa holdings for their faithful service. By the eighteenth century, 145fudai controlled such smaller

han, the greatest assessed at 250,000 koku. Members of the fudai

class staffed most of the major bakufu offices. Ninety-seven han

formed the third group, the tozama (outside vassals), former opponents or new allies. The tozama were located mostly on the peripheries of the archipelago and collectively controlled nearly 10 million

koku of productive land. Because the tozama were least trusted of

the daimyo, they were the most cautiously managed and generously treated, although they were excluded from central government positions.

The Tokugawa not only consolidated their control over a reunified Japan, they also had unprecedented power over the emperor,

the court, all daimyo, and the religious orders. The emperor was

held up as the ultimate source of political sanction for the shogun,

who ostensibly was the vassal of the imperial family. The Tokugawa

helped the imperial family recapture its old glory by rebuilding its palaces and granting it new lands. To ensure a close tie between

28
The six-story Himeji Castle, built in 1601-9, considered one of the grandest of the surviving castles, Hyogo Prefecture Courtesy Eliot Frankeherger

the imperial clan and the Tokugawa family, Ieyasu's granddaughter was made an imperial consort in 1619.

A code of laws was established to regulate the daimyd houses. The

code encompassed private conduct, marriage, dress, and types of

weapons and numbers of troops allowed; required alternate-year resi- dence at Edo; prohibited the construction of ocean-going ships;

proscribed Christianity; and stipulated that bakufu regulations were

the national law. Although the daimyd were not taxed per se, they were regularly levied for contributions for military and logistical sup- port and such public works projects as castles, roads, bridges, and

palaces. The various regulations and levies not only strengthened

the Tokugawa but depleted the wealth of the daimyd, thus weakening their threat to the central administration. The han, once militarycentered domains, became mere local administrative units. The dai- myd did have full administrative control over their territory and complex systems of retainers, bureaucrats, and commoners. Loyalty was

exacted from religious foundations, already greatly weakened by

Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, through a variety of control mechanisms.

Seclusion and Social Control

Like Hideyoshi, Ieyasu encouraged foreign trade but also was

29
Japan: A Country Study

suspicious of outsiders. He wanted to make Edo a major port, but once he learned that the Europeans favored ports in Kyushu and

that China had rejected his plans for official trade, he moved to control existing trade and allowed only certain ports to handle specific kinds of commodities.

The ' ' Christian problem" was, in effect, a problem in controlling both the Christian daimyo in Kyushu and trade with the Europeans. By 1612 the shogun's retainers and residents of Tokugawa

lands had been ordered to foreswear Christianity. More restric- tions came in 1616 (the restriction of foreign trade to Nagasaki and

Hirado, an island northwest of Kyushu), 1622 (the execution of

120 missionaries and converts), 1624 (the expulsion of the Spanish), and 1629 (the execution of thousands of Christians). Finally,

in 1635, an edict prohibited any Japanese from traveling outside

Japan or, if someone left, from ever returning. In 1636 the Portuguese were restricted to Deshima, a man-made islet—and thus,

not true Japanese soil—in Nagasaki's harbor.

The Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-38, in which discontented

Christian samurai and peasants rebelled against the bakufu—and

Edo called in Dutch ships to bombard the rebel stronghold—marked

the end of the Christian movement. Soon thereafter the Portuguese were permanently expelled, members of the Portuguese diplomatic

mission were executed, all subjects were ordered to register at a Buddhist or Shinto temple, and the Dutch and Chinese were re- stricted respectively to Deshima and a special quarter in Nagasaki.

Besides small trade of some outer daimyo with Korea and the Ryukyu

Islands, to the southwest ofJapan's main islands, by 1641 foreign

contacts were limited to Nagasaki.

Japanese society of the Tokugawa period was influenced by Confucian principles of social order. At the top of the hierarchy, but

removed from political power, were the imperial court families at Kyoto. The real political power holders were the samurai followed

by the rest of society, in descending hierarchical order: farmers,

who were organized into villages, artisans, and merchants. Urban

dwellers, often well-to-do merchants, were known as chonin (townspeople) and confined to special districts. The individual had no

legal rights in Tokugawa Japan. The family was the smallest legal

entity, and the maintenance of family status and privileges was of

great importance at all levels of society.

Economic Development

Economic development during the Tokugawa period included

urbanization, more shipping of commodities, a significant expansion of domestic and, initially, foreign commerce, and a diffusion

30
Historical Setting

of trade and handicraft industries. Edo had a population of more

than 1 million and Osaka and Kyoto each had more than 400,000

inhabitants by the mid-eighteenth century. Many other castie towns

grew as well. Osaka and Kyoto became busy trading and handicraft

production centers while Edo was the center for the supply of food

and essential urban consumer goods. The construction trades

flourished along with banking facilities and merchant associations.

Increasingly, han authorities oversaw the rising agricultural production and the spread of rural handicrafts.

Intellectual Trends

The flourishing of neo-Confucianism was the major intellectual

development of the Tokugawa period. Confucian studies had long

been kept active in Japan by Buddhist clerics, but during the

Tokugawa period, Confucianism emerged from Buddhist religious

control. This system of thought increased attention to a secular view

of man and society. The ethical humanism, rationalism, and historical perspective of neo-Confucian doctrine appealed to the official

class, and by the mid-seventeenth century, it was Japan's dominant

legal philosophy and contributed direcdy to the development of the

kokugaku (national learning) school of thought.

Advanced studies and growing applications of neo-Confucianism

contributed to the transition of the social and political order from

feudal norms to class-and large- group-oriented practices. The rule

of the people or Confucian man was gradually replaced by the rule

of laws. New laws were developed and new administrative devices were instituted. A new theory of government and a new vision of

society emerged as a means ofjustifying more comprehensive gover- nance by the bakufu. Each person had a distinct place in society and

was expected to work to fulfill his mission in life. The people were

to be ruled with benevolence by those whose assigned duty it was

to rule. Government was all-powerful but responsible and humane.

Although the class system was influenced by neo-Confucianism, it was not identical to it. Whereas soldiers and clergy were at the bottom of the hierarchy in the Chinese model, in Japan some members of these classes constituted the ruling elite. Members of the samurai class adhered to bushi traditions with a renewed interest in Japanese history and cultivating the ways of Confucian scholar-administrators, resulting in the development of the

concept of bushido (the way of the warrior—see Glossary). Another

special way of life

chonindo—also emerged. Chonindo (the way of

the townspeople) was a distinct culture that arose in cities such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo. It encouraged aspiration to bushido

qualities—diligence, honesty, honor, loyalty, and frugality—while

31
Japan: A Country Study

blending Shinto, neo-Confucian, and Buddhist beliefs. Study of

mathematics, astronomy, cartography, engineering, and medicine were also encouraged. Emphasis was placed on quality of workmanship, especially in the arts. For the first time, urban populations had the means and leisure time to support a new mass culture. Their search for enjoyment became known as ukiyo (the floating

world), an ideal world of fashion and popular entertainment. Professional female entertainers (geisha), music, popular stories, Kabuki

and bunraku (puppet) theater, poetry, a rich literature, and art, ex- emplified by beautiful woodblock prints (known as ukiyo-e), were

all part of this flowering culture (see Visual Arts, ch. 3). Litera- ture also flourished with the talented examples of the playwright

Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1724) and the poet, essayist, and

travel writer Matsuo Basho (1644-94).

Buddhism and Shinto were both still important in Tokugawa

Japan. Buddhism, combined with neo-Confucianism, provided

standards of social behavior. Although not as powerful politically as it had been in the past, Buddhism was espoused by the upper

classes. Proscriptions against Christianity benefited Buddhism in

1640 when the bakufu ordered everyone to register at a temple. The

rigid separation of Tokugawa society into han, villages, wards, and

households helped reaffirm local Shinto attachments. Shinto provided spiritual support to the political order and was an important

tie between the individual and his community. Shinto also helped

preserve a sense of national identity.

Shinto eventually assumed an intellectual form as shaped by neo- Confucian rationalism and materialism. The kokugaku movement

emerged from the interactions of these two belief systems. Kokugaku

contributed to the emperor-centered nationalism of modern Japan

and the revival of Shinto as a national creed in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries. The Kojiki, Nihongi, and Man'yoshu were all studied anew in the search for the Japanese spirit. Some purists in

the kokugaku movement even criticized the Confucian and Buddhist

influences—in effect, foreign ones—for contaminating Japan's ancient ways. Japan was the land of the kami and, as such, had a special destiny.

Knowledge of the West during the early Tokugawa was restricted to a tiny school of thought known as Rangaku (Dutch Learning).

Its adherents were mostly in Nagasaki, where the Dutch outpost was located on Deshima Island.

Decline of the Tokugawa

The Tokugawa did not eventually collapse simply because of in- trinsic failures. Foreign intrusions helped to precipitate a complex

32
Historical Setting

political struggle between the bakufu and a coalition of its critics. The continuity of the anti-bakufu movement in the mid-nineteenth

century would finally bring down the Tokugawa. From the outset, the Tokugawa attempted to restrict families' accumulation of

wealth and fostered a "back to the soil" policy, in which the farmer,

the ultimate producer, was the ideal person in society. Despite these

efforts to restrict wealth, and partly because of the extraordinary

period of peace, the standard of living for urban and rural dwellers

alike grew significantiy during the Tokugawa period. Better means

of crop production, transportation, housing, food, and entertainment were all available, as was more leisure time, at least for urban

dwellers. The literacy rate was high for a preindustrial society, and

cultural values were redefined and widely imparted throughout the

samurai and chonin classes. Despite the reappearance of guilds, eco- nomic activities went well beyond the restrictive nature of the guilds,

and commerce spread and a money economy developed. Although

government heavily restricted the merchants and viewed them as unproductive and usurious members of society, the samurai, who

gradually became separated from their rural ties, depended greatly on the merchants and artisans for consumer goods, artistic interests,

and loans. In this way, a subtle subversion of the warrior class by

the chonin took place.

A struggle arose in the face of political limitations that the shogun

imposed on the entrepreneurial class. The government ideal of an

agrarian society failed to square with the reality of commercial dis- tribution. A huge government bureaucracy had evolved, which now

stagnated because of its discrepancy with a new and evolving social order. Compounding the situation, the population increased

significantly during the first half of the Tokugawa period. Although

the magnitude and growth rates are uncertain, there were at least 26 million commoners and about 4 million members of samurai

families and their attendants when the first nationwide census was

taken in 1721. Drought, followed by crop shortages and starvation, resulted in twenty great famines between 1675 and 1837.

Peasant unrest grew, and by the late eighteenth century, mass protests over taxes and food shortages had become commonplace. Newly landless families became tenant farmers while the displaced rural

poor moved into the cities. As the fortunes of previously well-todo families declined, others moved in to accumulate land, and a new, wealthy farming class emerged. Those people who benefited were able to diversify production and to hire laborers, while others were left discontented. Many samurai fell on hard times and were

forced into handicraft production and wage jobs for merchants.

33
Japan: A Country Study

Western intrusions were on the increase in early nineteenth century. Russian warships and traders encroached on Karafuto (today

the Soviet island of Sakhalin) and the Kuril Islands, the southernmost of which are considered by the Japanese as the northern islands

of Hokkaido. A British warship entered Nagasaki Harbor searching for enemy Dutch ships in 1808, and other warships and whalers were seen in Japanese waters with increasing frequency in the

1810s and 1820s. Whalers and trading ships from the United States

also arrived on Japan's shores. Although the Japanese made some

minor concessions and allowed some landings, they largely at- tempted to keep all foreigners out, sometimes using force. Rangaku became crucial not only in understanding the foreign

£ 'barbarians" but in using the knowledge gained from the West

to fend them off. By the 1830s, there was a general sense of crisis. Famines and

natural disasters hit hard, and unrest led to a peasant uprising

against officials and merchants in Osaka in 1837. Although it lasted

only a day, the uprising made a dramatic impression. Remedies came in the form of traditional solutions that sought to reform moral

decay rather than institutional problems. The shogun's advisers

pushed for a return to the martial spirit, more restrictions on for- eign trade and contacts, suppression of Rangaku, censorship of liter- ature, and elimination of "luxury" in the government and samurai

class. Others sought the overthrow of the Tokugawa and espoused

the political doctrine of sonnd-joi (revere the emperor, expel the barbarians), which called for unity under imperial rule and opposed

foreign intrusions. The bakufu persevered for the time being amidst

growing concerns over Western successes in establishing colonial

enclaves in China following the Opium War of 1839-42. More re- forms were ordered, especially in the economic sector, to strengthen

Japan against the Western threat. Japan turned down a demand from the United States, which was greatly expanding its own presence in the Asia-Pacific region,

to establish diplomatic relations when Commodore James Biddle

appeared in Edo Bay with two warships in July 1846. However,

when Commodore Matthew C. Perry's four-ship squadron appeared in Edo Bay in July 1853, the bakufu was thrown into tur- moil. The chairman of the senior councillors, Abe Masahiro

(1819-57), was responsible for dealing with the Americans. Having no precedent to manage this threat to national security, Abe

tried to balance the desires of the senior councillors to compromise

with the foreigners, of the emperor who wanted to keep the foreigners out, and of the daimyo who wanted to go to war. Lacking consensus, Abe decided to compromise by accepting Perry's demands

34
Historical Setting

for openingJapan to foreign trade while also making military preparations. In March 1854, the Treaty of Peace and Amity (or Treaty

of Kanagawa) opened two ports to American ships seeking provisions, guaranteed good treatment to shipwrecked American sailors,

and allowed a United States consul to take up residence in Shimoda,

a seaport on the Izu Peninsula, southwest of Edo. A commercial

treaty, opening still more areas to American trade, was forced on

the bakufu five years later. The resulting damage to the bakufu was significant. Debate over government policy was unusual and had engendered public cri- ticism of the bakufu. In the hope of enlisting the support of new

allies, Abe, to the consternation of the fudai, had consulted with

the shinpan and tozama daimyd, further undermining the already

weakened bakufu. In the Ansei Reform (1854-56), Abe then tried

to strengthen the regime by ordering Dutch warships and arma- ments from the Netherlands and building new port defenses. In

1855 a naval training school with Dutch instructors was set up at Nagasaki, and a Western- style military school was established at Edo; by the next year, the government was translating Western

books. Opposition to Abe increased withinfudai circles, which opposed opening bakufu councils to tozama daimyd, and he was replaced

in 1855 as chairman of the senior councillors by Hotta Masayoshi

(1810-64).

At the head of the dissident faction was Tokugawa Nariaki, who

had long embraced a militant loyalty to the emperor along with

antiforeign sentiments, and who had been put in charge of national

defense in 1854. The Mito school—based on neo-Confucian and

Shinto principles—had as its goal the restoration of the imperial

institution, the turning back of the West, and the founding of a world empire under the divine Yamato Dynasty.

In the final years of the Tokugawa, foreign contacts increased

as more concessions were granted . The new treaty with the United

States in 1859 allowed more ports to be opened to diplomatic

representatives, unsupervised trade at four additional ports, and

foreign residences in Osaka and Edo. It also embodied the concept of extraterritoriality (foreigners were subject to the laws of their

own countries but not to Japanese law). Hotta lost the support of

key daimyd, and when Tokugawa Nariaki opposed the new treaty,

Hotta sought imperial sanction. The court officials, perceiving the

weakness of the bakufu, rejected Hotta' s request and thus suddenly

embroiled Kyoto and the emperor in Japan's internal politics for the first time in many centuries. When the shogun died without an heir, Nariaki appealed to the court for support of his own son, Tokugawa Yoshinobu (or Keiki), for shogun, a candidate favored

35
Japan: A Country Study

by the shinpan and tozama daimyb. Thefudai won the power struggle, however, installing Tokugawa Yoshitomi, arresting Nariaki

and Keiki, executing Yoshida Shoin (1830-59, a leading sonnb-jbi

intellectual who had opposed the American treaty and plotted a

revolution against the bakufu), and signing treaties with the United

States and five other nations, thus ending more than 200 years of

exclusion.

The strong measures the bakufu took to reassert its dominance

were not enough. Revering the emperor as a symbol of unity, ex- tremists wrought violence and death against the bakufu and han

authorities and foreigners. Foreign naval retaliation led to still another concessionary commercial treaty in 1865, but Yoshitomi was unable to enforce the Western treaties. A bakufu army was

defeated when it was sent to crush dissent in Satsuma and Choshu

han in 1866. Finally, in 1867, the emperor died and was succeeded

by his minor son Mutsuhito; Keiki reluctantly became head of the

Tokugawa house and shogun. He tried to reorganize the government under the emperor while preserving the shogun's leadership

role. Fearing the growing power of the Satsuma and Choshu daimyb,

other daimyo called for returning the shogun's political power

to the emperor and a council of daimyo chaired by the former

Tokugawa shogun. Keiki accepted the plan in late 1867 and

resigned, announcing an "imperial restoration." The Satsuma,

Choshu, and other han leaders and radical courtiers, however,

rebelled, seized the imperial palace, and announced their own resto- ration on January 3, 1868. The bakufu was abolished, Keiki was

reduced to the ranks of the common daimyb, and the Tokugawa

army gave up without a fight (although other Tokugawa forces

fought until November 1868, and bakufu naval forces continued

to hold out for another six months).

The Emergence of Modern Japan, 1868-1919

The Meiji Restoration

Those people who wanted to end Tokugawa rule did not envision a new government or a new society; they merely sought the

transfer of power from Edo to Kyoto while retaining all their feudal

prerogatives. Instead, a profound change took place. The emperor

emerged as a national symbol of unity in the midst of reforms that were much more radical than had been envisioned.

The first reform was the promulgation of the Charter Oath in

1868, a general statement of the aims of the Meiji leaders to boost

morale and win financial support for the new government. Its five provisions were the establishment of deliberative assemblies, the

36
Historical Setting

involvement of all classes in carrying out state affairs, freedom of

social and occupational mobility, replacement of "evil customs"

with the "just laws of nature," and an international search for knowledge to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. Implicit

in the Charter Oath was an end to exclusive political rule by the

bakufu and a move toward more democratic participation in government. To implement the Charter Oath, an eleven-article constitution was drawn up. Besides providing for a new Council of State,

legislative bodies, and systems of ranks for nobles and officials, it limited office tenure to four years, allowed public balloting, provided

for a new taxation system, and ordered new local administrative

rules. The Meiji government assured the foreign powers that it would

abide by the old treaties negotiated by the bakufu and announced

that it would act in accordance with international law. Mutsuhito,

who was to reign until 1912, selected a new reign title —Meiji, or Enlightened Rule—to mark the beginning of a new era in Japanese

history. To further dramatize the new order, the capital was relo- cated from Kyoto, where it had been situated since 794, to Tokyo

(Eastern Capital), the new name for Edo. In a move critical for

the consolidation of the new regime, most daimyd voluntarily sur- rendered their land and census records to the emperor, symbolizing that the land and people were under the emperor's jurisdiction.

Confirmed in their hereditary positions, the daimyd became governors, and the central government assumed their administrative

expenses and paid samurai stipends. The han were replaced with

prefectures in 1871 , and authority continued to flow to the national

government. Officials from the favored former han, such as Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, staffed the new ministries.

Formerly out-of-favor court nobles and lower-ranking but more

radical samurai replaced bakufu appointees, daimyd, and old court nobles as a new ruling class appeared.

Inasmuch as the Meiji Restoration had sought to return the emperor to a preeminent position, efforts were made to establish a

Shinto-oriented state much like the state of 1,000 years earlier. An

Office of Shinto Worship was established, ranking even above the

Council of State in importance. The kokutai ideas of the Mito school were embraced, and the divine ancestry of the imperial house emphasized. The government supported Shinto teachers, a small but

important move. Although the Office of Shinto Worship was demoted in 1872, by 1877 the Home Ministry controlled all Shinto

shrines and certain Shinto sects were given state recognition. Shinto was at last released from Buddhist administration and its properties restored. Although Buddhism suffered from state sponsorship

37
Japan: A Country Study

of Shinto, it had its own resurgence. Christianity was also legalized and Confucianism remained an important ethical doctrine.

Increasingly, however, Japanese thinkers identified with Western

ideology and methods.

The Meiji oligarchy, as the new ruling class is known to histori- ans, was a privileged clique that exercised imperial power, sometimes despotically. The members of this class were adherents to kokugaku and believed they were the creators of a new order as grand

as that established by Japan's original founders. Two of the major

figures of this group were Okubo Toshimichi (1832-78), son of a Satsuma retainer, and Satsuma samurai Saigo Takamori (1827-77),

who had joined forces with Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen to overthrow

the Tokugawa. Okubo became minister of finance and Saigo a field marshal; both were imperial councillors. Kido Koin (1833-77), native

of Choshu, student of Yoshida Shoin, and coconspirator with Okubo and Saigo, became minister of education and chairman of the

Governors' Conference and pushed for constitutional government.

Also prominent were Iwakura Tomomi (1825-83), a Kyoto native

who had opposed the Tokugawa and was to become the first ambassador to the United States, and Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922),

of Hizen, a student of Rangaku, Chinese, and English, who held

various ministerial portfolios, eventually becoming prime minister

in 1898.

To accomplish the new order's goals, the Meiji oligarchy set out

to abolish the Tokugawa class system through a series of economic

and social reforms. Bakufu revenues had depended on taxes on Tokugawa and other daimyo lands, loans from wealthy peasants and

urban merchants, limited customs fees, and reluctantly accepted

foreign loans. To provide revenue and develop a sound infrastructure, the new government financed harbor improvements, lighthouses, machinery imports, schools, overseas study for students,

salaries for foreign teachers and advisers, modernization of the army

and navy, railroads and telegraph networks, and foreign diplomatic

missions.

Difficult economic times, manifested by increasing incidents of

agrarian rioting, led to calls for social reforms. Besides the old high

rents, taxes, and interest rates, the average citizen was faced with

cash payments for new taxes, military conscription, and tuition

charges for compulsory education. The people needed more time

for productive pursuits while correcting social abuses of the past.

To achieve these reforms, the old Tokugawa class system of

samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant was abolished by 1871,

and, even though old prejudices and status consciousness continued, all were theoretically equal before the law. Actually helping

38
Emperor Meiji and Empress Haruko in Western garb, a sign of the reform taken under his rule (1868-1912)

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

to perpetuate social distinctions, the government named new social divisions: the former daimyo became nobility, the samurai be- came gentry, and all others became commoners. Daimyo and

samurai pensions were paid off in lump sums, and the samurai

later lost their exclusive claim to military positions. Former samurai

found new pursuits as bureaucrats, teachers, army officers, police

officials, journalists, scholars, colonists in the northern parts of

Japan, bankers, and businessmen. These occupations helped stem some of the discontent this large group felt; some profited immensely, but many were not successful and provided significant

opposition in the ensuing years (see Opposition to the Meiji Oligarchy, this ch.).

Additionally, between 1871 and 1873, a series of land and tax laws were enacted as the basis for modern fiscal policy. Private

ownership was legalized, deeds were issued, and lands were as- sessed at a fair market value with taxes paid in cash rather than

in kind as in pre-Meiji days and at slightly lower rates. Undeterred by opposition, the Meiji leaders continued to modernize the nation through government-sponsored telegraph cable links

39
Japan: A Country Study

to all major Japanese cities and the Asian mainland, and the construction of railroads, shipyards, munitions factories, mines, textile manufacturing facilities, factories, and experimental agriculture

stations. Much concerned about national security, the leaders made

significant efforts at military modernization, which included es- tablishing a small standing army and a large reserve system, and

compulsory militia service for all men (see Militarism Before 1945,

ch. 8). Foreign military systems were studied, foreign advisers

brought in, and Japanese cadets sent abroad to European and

United States military and naval schools.

Foreign Relations

The Meiji leaders also modernized foreign policy, an important

step in making Japan a full member of the international community. The traditional East Asia world view was based not on an

international society of national units but on cultural distinctions

and tributary relationships; monks, scholars, and artists, rather than

professional diplomatic envoys, had generally served as the con- veyors of foreign policy. Foreign relations were related more to the sovereign's desires than to the public interest. For Japan to emerge from the feudal period, it had to avoid the fate of other

Asian countries by establishing genuine national independence and

equality. The Meiji oligarchy was aware of Western progress, and

' 'learning missions" were sent abroad to absorb as much^>f it as

possible. One such mission, led by Iwakura, Kido, and Okubo,

and containing forty-eight members in total, spent two years

(1871-73) touring the United States and Europe, studying government institutions, courts, prison systems, schools, the import-export

business, factories, shipyards, glass plants, mines, and other enterprises. Upon returning, mission members called for domestic

reforms that would help Japan catch up with the West. The revision of unequal treaties forced onJapan became a top priority. The

returned envoys also sketched a new vision for a modernized Japan's

leadership role in Asia, but they realized that this role required

that Japan develop its national strength, cultivate nationalism

among the population, and carefully craft policies toward potential enemies. No longer could Westerners be seen as "barbarians,"

for example. In time, Japan formed a corps of professional

diplomats.

Although he never assumed a government post, another influential Meiji period figure was Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). He

was a prolific writer on many subjects, the founder of schools and

a newspaper, and, above all, an educator bent on impressing his

fellow Japanese with the merits of Westernization.

40
Historical Setting

Japan was shortly to test its new world outlook. Disputes with

China over sovereignty of the Ryukyii Islands, with Russia over

sovereignty of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, and with Korea over

the Korean court's refusal to recognize the new Meiji government

and its envoys were all settled diplomatically between 1874 and

1876. Military threats had been made in the Chinese and Korean

affairs, and it seemed to many that Japan would soon use military means to achieve its goals.

Opposition to the Meiji Oligarchy

The 1873 Korean crisis resulted in the resignation of militaryexpedition proponents Saigo and Councillor of State Eto Shimpei

(1834-74). Eto, the founder of various patriotic organizations, conspired with other discontented elements to start an armed insurrection against government troops in Saga, the capital of his native

prefecture in Kyushu in 1874. Charged with suppressing the revolt,

Okubo swiftly crushed Eto, who had appealed unsuccessfully to Saigo for help. Three years later, the last major armed uprising

but most serious challenge to the Meiji government—took shape

in the Satsuma Rebellion, this time with Saigo playing an active

role. The Saga Rebellion and other agrarian and samurai uprisings mounted in protest to the Meiji reforms had been easily put

down by the army. Satsuma' s former samurai were numerous,

however, and they had a long tradition of opposition to central

authority. Saigo, with some reluctance and only after more

widespread dissatisfaction with the Meiji reforms, raised a rebel- lion in 1877. Both sides fought well, but the modern weaponry and

better financing of the government forces ended the Satsuma Rebellion. Although he was defeated and committed suicide, Saigo was not branded a traitor and became a heroic figure in Japanese

history. The suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion marked the end

of serious threats to the Meiji regime but was sobering to the oligarchy. The fight drained the national treasury, led to serious infla- tion, and forced land values—and badly needed taxes—down. Most

importantly, calls for reform were renewed.

The Development of Representative Government

The major institutional accomplishment after the Satsuma Rebellion was the start of the trend toward developing representative

government. People who had been forced out or left out of the

governing apparatus after the Meiji Restoration had witnessed or heard of the success of representative institutions in other countries of the world and applied greater pressure for a voice in

government.

41
Japan: A Country Study

A major proponent of representative government was Itagaki

Taisuke (1837-1919), a powerful leader of Tosa forces who had

resigned from his Council of State position over the Korean affair in 1873. Itagaki sought peaceful rather than rebellious means to gain a voice in government. He started a school and a movement

aimed at establishing a constitutional monarchy and a legislative

assembly. Itagaki and others wrote the Tosa Memorial in 1874

criticizing the unbridled power of the oligarchy and calling for the

immediate establishment of representative government. Dissatisfied with the pace of reform after having rejoined the Council of

State in 1875, Itagaki organized his followers and other democratic

proponents into the nationwide Aikokusha (Society of Patriots) to push for representative government in 1878. In 1881, in an action

for which he is best known, Itagaki helped found the Jiyuto (Liberal

Party), which favored French political doctrines. In 1882 Okuma

established the Rikken Kaishinto (Constitutional Progressive Party),

which called for a British- style constitutional democracy. In re- sponse, government bureaucrats, local government officials, and

other conservatives established the Rikken Teiseito (Imperial Rule

Party), a progovernment party, in 1882. Numerous political demonstrations followed, some of them violent, resulting in further government restrictions. The restrictions hindered the political parties and

led to divisiveness within and among them. The Jiyiito, which had

opposed the Kaishinto, was disbanded in 1884, and Okuma re- signed as Kaishinto president.

Government leaders, long preoccupied with violent threats to

stability and the serious leadership split over the Korean affair,

generally agreed that constitutional government should someday

be established. Kido had favored a constitutional form of government since before 1874, and several proposals that provided for constitutional guarantees had been drafted. The oligarchy, however,

while acknowledging the realities of political pressure, was determined to keep control. Thus, modest steps were taken. The Osaka

Conference in 1875 resulted in the reorganization of government

with an independent judiciary and an appointed Council of Elders

(Genronin) tasked with reviewing proposals for a legislature. The

emperor declared that "constitutional government shall be established in gradual stages" as he ordered the Council of Elders to draft a constitution. Three years later, the Conference of Prefectural Governors established elected prefectural assemblies. Although

limited in their authority, these assemblies represented a move in

the direction of representative government at the national level,

and by 1880 assemblies also had been formed in villages and towns. In 1880 delegates from twenty-four prefectures held a national

42
Historical Setting

convention to establish the Kokkai Kisei Domei (League for Establishing a National Assembly).

Although the government was not opposed to parliamentary rule,

confronted with the drive for "people's rights," it continued to try to control the political situation. New laws in 1875 prohibited

press criticism of the government or discussion of national laws.

The Public Assembly Law (1880) severely limited public gatherings by disallowing attendance by civil servants and requiring police

permission for all meetings. Within the ruling circle, however, and

despite the conservative approach of the leadership, Okuma con- tinued as a lone advocate of British- style government, a government with political parties and a cabinet organized by the majority

party, answerable to the national assembly. He called for elections

to be held by 1882 and for a national assembly to be convoked by

1883; in doing so, he precipitated a political crisis that ended with an 1881 imperial rescript declaring the establishment of a national

assembly in 1890 and dismissing Okuma.

Rejecting the British model, Iwakura and other conservatives

borrowed heavily from the Prussian constitutional system. One of

the Meiji oligarchy, Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), a Choshu native

long involved in government affairs, was charged with drafting

Japan's constitution. He led a Constitutional Study Mission abroad

in 1882, spending most of his time in Germany. He rejected the

United States Constitution as "too liberal" and the British sys- tem as too unwieldy and having a parliament with too much control over the monarchy; the French and Spanish models were

rejected as tending toward despotism.

On Ito's return, one of the first acts of the government was to establish new ranks for the nobility. Five hundred persons from

the old court nobility, former daimyo, and samurai who had provided

valuable service to the emperor were organized in five ranks: prince,

marquis, count, viscount, and baron. Ito was put in charge of the

new Bureau for Investigation of Constitutional Systems in 1884,

and the Council of State was replaced in 1885 with a cabinet headed

by Ito as prime minister. The positions of chancellor, minister of

the left, and minister of the right, which had existed since the

seventh century as advisory positions to the emperor, were all abolished. In their place, the Privy Council was established in 1888,

to evaluate the forthcoming constitution and to advise the emperor.

To further strengthen the authority of the state, the Supreme War

Council was established under the leadership of Yamagata Aritomo

(1838-1922), a Choshu native who has been credited with the founding of the modern Japanese army and was to become the first constitutional prime minister. The Supreme War Council developed

43
Japan: A Country Study

a German-style general staff system with a chief of staff who had

direct access to the emperor and could operate independently of

the army minister and civilian officials. When finally granted by the emperor as a sign of his sharing

his authority and giving rights and liberties to his subjects, the 1889

Constitution of the Empire ofJapan (the Meiji Constitution) provided for the Imperial Diet (Teikoku Gikai), composed of a popularly elected House of Representatives with a very limited franchise

of male citizens who paid ¥15 (for value of the yen—see Glossary)

in national taxes, about 1 percent of the population; the House

of Peers, composed of nobility and imperial appointees; and a cabi- net responsible to the emperor and independent of the legislature.

The Diet could approve government legislation and initiate laws,

make representations to the government, and submit petitions to the emperor. Nevertheless, in spite of these institutional changes,

sovereignty still resided in the emperor on the basis of his divine

ancestry. The new constitution specified a form of government that was still authoritarian in character, with the emperor holding the

ultimate power and only minimal concessions made to popular

rights and parliamentary mechanisms. Party participation was

recognized as part of the political process. The Meiji Constitution was to last as the fundamental law until 1947.

The first national election was held in 1890 and 300 members

were elected to the House of Representatives. The Jiyuto and

Kaishinto parties had been revived in anticipation of the election

and together won over half of the seats. The House of Representatives soon became the arena for disputes between the politicians

and the government bureaucracy over large issues, such as the budget, the ambiguity of the constitution on the Diet's authority, and

the desire of the Diet to interpret the "will of the emperor" versus

the oligarchy's position that the cabinet and administration should

"transcend" all conflicting political forces. The main leverage the

Diet had was in its approval or disapproval of the budget, and it successfully wielded its authority henceforth.

In the early years of constitutional government, the strengths

and weaknesses of the Meiji Constitution were revealed. A small

clique of Satsuma and Choshu elite continued to rule Japan, becoming institutionalized as an extraconstitutional body ofgenro (elder

statesmen). Collectively, the genro made decisions reserved for the

emperor, and the genro, not the emperor, controlled the government politically. Throughout the period, however, political problems were usually solved through compromise, and political parties

gradually increased their power over the government and held an

ever larger role in the political process as a result.

44
ltd Hirobumi, major statesman of the Meiji era Courtesy Prints and Photographs

Division, Library of Congress

Between 1891 and 1895, Ito served as prime minister with a cabi- net composed mostly of genro who wanted to establish a government party to control the House of Representatives. Although not

fully realized, the trend toward party politics was well established.

Modernization and Industrialization

Japan emerged from the Tokugawa-Meiji transition as the first Asian industrialized nation. Domestic commercial activities and

limited foreign trade had met the demands for material culture in

the Tokugawa period, but the modernized Meiji era had radically

different requirements. From the onset, the Meiji rulers embraced

the concept of a market economy and adopted British and North

American forms of free enterprise capitalism. The private sector—in a nation blessed with an abundance of aggressive entrepeneurs

welcomed such change.

Economic reforms included a unified modern currency based on the yen, banking, commercial and tax laws, stock exchanges,

and a communications network. Establishment of a modern institu- tional framework conducive to an advanced capitalist economy took

time, but was completed by the 1890s. By this time, the government had largely relinquished direct control of the modernization process, primarily for budgetary reasons. Many of the former

daimyd, whose pensions had been paid in a lump sum, benefited

greatly through investments they made in emerging industries, while

45
Japan: A Country Study

those who had been informally involved in foreign trade before the

Meiji Restoration also flourished. Old bakufu-serv'mg firms that

clung to their traditional ways failed in the new business en- vironment.

The government was initially involved in economic modernization, providing a number of "model factories" to facilitate the transition to the modern period. After the first twenty years of the Meiji

period, the industrial economy expanded rapidly through to about

1920 with inputs of advanced Western technology and large pri- vate investments. Stimulated by wars and through cautious eco- nomic planning, Japan emerged from World War I as a major

industrial nation.

Overseas Expansion

Historically, Japan's main foreign preoccupation has been China.

The Korean Peninsula, a strategically located feature critical to the defense of the Japanese archipelago, greatly occupied Japan's

attention in the nineteenth century. Earlier tension over Korea had

been settled temporarily through the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876,

which opened Korean ports to Japan, and in 1885 the Tianjin Convention had provided for the removal from Korea of both Chinese

and Japanese troops sent to support contending factions in the

Korean court. In effect, the convention had made Korea a co- protectorate of Beijing and Tokyo at a time when Russian, British, and United States interests in the peninsula also were on the

increase. A crisis was precipitated in 1894 when a leading proJapanese Korean political figure was assassinated in Shanghai with

Chinese complicity. Prowar elements in Japan called for a punitive expedition, which the cabinet resisted. With assistance from

several Japanese nationalistic societies, the illegal Tonghak (Eastern

Learning) nationalistic religious movement in Korea staged a re- bellion that was crushed by Chinese troops. Japan responded with

force and quickly defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War

(1894-95). After nine months of fighting, a cease-fire was called

and peace talks were held. The victor's demands were such that a Japanese protectorate over China seemed in the offing, but an

assassination attempt on Li Hongzhang, China's envoy to the peace

talks, embarrassed Japan, which then quickly agreed to an ar- mistice. The Treaty of Shimonoseki recognized Korean independence; the end of Korean tribute to China; a 200-million-tael

(Chinese ounces of silver, the equivalent in 1895 of US$150 million) indemnity; the ceding of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and

the Liaodong Peninsula (the southern part of Manchuria) to Japan;

and the opening of ChangJiang (Yangtze River) ports to Japanese

46
Historical Setting

trade. It also assured Japanese rights to engage in industrial enterprises in China.

Having their own imperialist designs on China and fearing its impending disintegration, Russia, Germany, and France jointly

objected to Japanese control of Liaodong. Threatened with a tripartite naval maneuver in Korean waters, Japan decided to give back

Liaodong in return for a larger indemnity from China. Russia

moved to fill the void by securing from China a twenty-five-year

lease of Dalian (Dairen in Japanese, also known as Port Arthur)

and rights to the South Manchurian Railway Company, a semiofficial Japanese company, to construct a railroad. St. Petersburg

also wanted to lease more Manchurian territory, and, although

Japan was loath to confront Russia over this issue, it did move to use Korea as a bargaining point: Japan would recognize Russian

leaseholds in southern Manchuria if Russia would leave Korean

affairs to Japan. The Russians only agreed not to impede the work

of Japanese advisers in Korea, but Japan was able to use diplomatic initiatives to keep St. Petersburg from leasing Korean terri- tory in 1899. At the same time, Japan was able to wrest a concession

from China that the coastal areas of Fujian Province, across the

strait from Taiwan, were within Japan's sphere of influence and

could not be leased to other powers. In 1900 Japanese forces participated in suppressing the Boxer Uprising, exacting still more in- demnity from China.

Japan then succeeded in attracting a Western ally to its cause. Japan and Britain, both of whom wanted to keep Russia out of

Manchuria, signed a Treaty of Alliance in 1902, which was in ef- fect until 1921, when the two signed the Four Power Treaty on

Insular Possessions, which took effect in 1923. The British recognized Japanese interests in Korea and assured Japan they would

remain neutral in case of a Russo-Japanese war but would become more actively involved if another power (probably an allusion to France) entered the war as a Russian ally. In the face of this joint

threat, Russia became more conciliatory toward Japan and agreed

to withdraw its troops from Manchuria in 1903. The new balance

of power in Korea favored Japan and allowed Britain to concentrate its interests elsewhere in Asia. Hence, Tokyo moved to gain

influence over Korean banks, opened its own financial institutions

in Korea, and began constructing railroads and obstructing Russian and French undertakings on the peninsula.

When Russia failed to withdraw its troops from Manchuria by

an appointed date, Tokyo issued a protest. St. Petersburg replied

that it would agree to a partition of Korea at the thirty-ninth parallel,

with a Japanese sphere to the south and a neutral zone to the north.

47
Japan: A Country Study

But Manchuria was to be outside Japan's sphere, and Russia would

not guarantee the evacuation of its troops. Despite the urging of

caution by most genro, Japan's hardliners issued an ultimatum to Russia, which showed no signs of further compromise. War broke

out in February 1904 with Japanese surprise attacks on Russian

warships at Dalian and Chemulpo (in Korea, now called Inch' on).

Despite tremendous loss of life on both sides, the Japanese won

a series of land battles and then decisively defeated Russia's Baltic

Sea Fleet (renamed the Second Pacific Squadron) at the Battle of

Tsushima in May 1905. At an American-mediated peace conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Russia acknowledged

Japan's paramount interests in Korea and agreed to avoid * 'mili- tary measures" in Manchuria and Korea. Both sides agreed to evacuate Manchuria, except for the Guandong Territory, a lease- hold on the Liaodong Peninsula, and restore the occupied areas

to China. Russia transferred its lease on Dalian and adjacent ter- ritories and railroads to Japan, ceded the southern half of Sakhalin

to Japan, and granted Japan fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk

and the Bering Sea. Japanese nationalism intensified after the Russo-Japanese War

and a new phase of continental expansion began after 1905. Politically and economically, Korea became a protectorate ofJapan and

in 1910 was formally annexed as a part of the empire. By means

of the South Manchurian Railway, Japanese entrepreneurs vigorously exploited Manchuria. By 1907 Russia had entered into a

treaty arrangement with Japan whereby both sides recognized the

other's sphere of influence in Manchuria.

Political Rivalries

After the bitter political rivalries between the inception of the

Diet and 1894, when the nation was unified for the war effort against

China, there followed five years of unity, unusual cooperation, and

coalition cabinets. From 1900 to 1912, the Diet and the cabinet

cooperated even more directly, with political parties playing larger

roles. Throughout the entire period, the old Meiji oligarchy re- tained ultimate control, but steadily yielded power to the opposition parties. The major figures of the period were Yamagata

Aritomo, whose long tenure (1868-1922) as a military and civil leader, including two terms as prime minister, was characterized

by his intimidation of rivals and resistance to democratic procedures; and Ito, who was a compromiser and, although overruled

by the genro, wanted to establish a government party to control the

House during his first term. When Ito returned to the prime

ministership in 1898, he again pushed for a government party, but

48
Historical Setting

when Yamagata and others refused, Ito resigned. With no willing successor among the genro, the Kenseito (Constitutional Party) was

invited to form a cabinet under the leadership of Okuma and

Itagaki, a major achievement in the opposition parties' competition with the genro. This success was short-lived: the Kenseito split

into two parties, the Kenseito led by_ Itagaki and the Kensei Honto

(Real Constitutional Party) led by Okuma, and the cabinet ended

after only four months. Yamagata then returned as prime minister with the backing of the military and the bureaucracy. Despite

broad support of his views on limiting constitutional government,

Yamagata formed an alliance with Kenseito. Reforms of electoral

laws, an expansion of the House to 369 members, and provisions

for secret ballots won Diet support for Yamagata' s budgets and

tax increases. He continued to use imperial ordinances, however,

to keep the parties from fully participating in the bureaucracy and

to strengthen the already independent position of the military. When

Yamagata failed to offer more compromises to the Kenseito, the

alliance ended in 1900, beginning a new phase of political development.

Ito and a protege, Saionji Kimmochi (1849-1940), finally suc- ceeded in forming a progovernment party—the Seiyukai (Association of Friends of Constitutional Government)—in September

1900, and a month later Ito became prime minister of the first Seiyukai cabinet. The Seiyukai held the majority of seats in the House,

but Yamagata' s conservative allies had the greatest influence in

the House of Peers, forcing Ito to seek imperial intervention. Tiring

of political infighting, Ito resigned in 1901. Thereafter, the prime

ministership alternated between Yamagata' s protege, Katsura Taro

(1847-1913; prime minister 1901-5 and 1908-11), and Saionji

(prime minister 1905-8 and 1911-12). The alternating of political

power was an indication of the two sides' ability to cooperate and

share power and helped foster the continued development of party

politics.

The Meiji era ended with the death of the emperor in 1912 and

the accession of Crown Prince Yoshihito as emperor of the Taisho

period (Great Righteousness, 1912-26). The end of the Meiji era was marked by huge government domestic and overseas investments and defense programs, nearly exhausted credit, and a lack

of foreign exchange to pay debts. The beginnning of the Taisho

era was marked by a political crisis that interrupted the earlier

politics of compromise. When Saionji tried to cut the military budget, the army minister resigned, bringing down the Seiyukai cabinet. Both Yamagata and Saionji refused to resume office and the

genro were unable to find a solution. Public outrage over the military

49
Japan: A Country Study

manipulation of the cabinet and the recall of Katsura for a third

term led to still more demands for an end to genro politics. Despite

old guard opposition, the conservative forces formed a party of their

own in 1913, the Rikken Doshikai (Constitutional Association of

Friends), a party that won a majority in the House over the Seiyukai

in late 1914.

World War I Seizing the opportunity of Berlin's distraction with the Europe- an War, and wanting to expand its sphere of influence in China,

Japan declared war on Germany in August 1914 and quickly oc- cupied German-leased territories in China's Shandong Province

and the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands in the Pacific.

With its Western allies heavily involved in the war in Europe, Japan

sought further to consolidate its position in China by presenting

the Twenty-One Demands to China in January 1915. Besides ex- panding its control over the German holdings, Manchuria, and

Inner Mongolia, Japan also sought joint ownership of a major mining and metallurgical complex in central China, prohibitions on

China's ceding or leasing any coastal areas to a third power, and

miscellaneous other political, economic, and military controls, which

if achieved, would have reduced China to a Japanese protectorate.

In the face of slow negotiations with the Chinese government,

widespread anti-Japanese sentiments in China, and international

condemnation, Japan withdrew the final group of demands, and

treaties were signed in May 1915.

Japan's hegemony in northern China and other parts of Asia was facilitated through other international agreements. One with

Russia in 1916 helped further secure Japan's influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and agreements with France, Britain,

and the United States in 1917 recognized Japan's territorial gains

in China and the Pacific. The Nishihara Loans (named after Nishihara Kamezo, Tokyo's representative in Beijing) of 1917 and 1918,

while aiding the Chinese government, put it still deeper into Japan's

debt. Toward the end of the war, Japan increasingly filled orders

for its European allies' needed war materiel, thus helping to diversify

the country's industry, increase its exports, and transform Japan

from a debtor to a creditor nation for the first time.

Japan's power in Asia grew with the demise of the tsarist re- gime in Russia and the disorder the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution

left in Siberia. Wanting to seize the opportunity, the Japanese army

planned to occupy Siberia as far west as Lake Baykal. To do so, Japan had to negotiate an agreement with China allowing the transit of Japanese troops through Chinese territory. Although the force

50
Historical Setting

was scaled back to avoid antagonizing the United States, more than

70,000 Japanese troops joined the much smaller units of the Allied Expeditionary Force sent to Siberia in 1918.

The year 1919 saw Japan sitting among the ' 'Big Five" powers

at the Versailles Peace Conference. Tokyo was granted a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, and the peace

treaty confirmed the transfer to Japan of Germany's rights in Shandong, a provision that led to anti-Japanese riots and a mass politi- cal movement throughout China. Similarly, Germany's former

Pacific islands were put under a Japanese mandate. Despite its small

role in World War I (and the Western powers' rejection of its bid

for a racial equality clause in the peace treaty), Japan emerged as a major actor in international politics at its close. Between the Wars, 1920-36

Two-Party System

The two-party political system that had been developing in Japan

since the turn of the century finally came of age after World War

I. This period has sometimes been called that of "Taisho democracy," after the reign title of the emperor. In 1918 Hara Takashi

(1856-1921), a protege of Saionji and a major influence in the

prewar Seiyukai cabinets, had become the first commoner to serve

as prime minister. He took advantage of long-standing relationships he had throughout the government, won the support of the

surviving genrd and the House of Peers, and brought into his cabi- net as army minister Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929), who had a greater

appreciation of favorable civil-military relations than his predecessors. Nevertheless, major problems confronted Hara: inflation, the

need to adjust the Japanese economy to postwar circumstances,

the influx of foreign ideas, and an emerging labor movement.

Prewar solutions were applied by the cabinet to these postwar

problems, and little was done to reform the government. Hara

worked to ensure a Seiyukai majority through time-tested methods,

such as new election laws and electoral redistricting, and embarked

on major government-funded public works programs.

The public grew disillusioned with the growing national debt

and the new election laws, which retained the old minimum tax

qualifications for voters. Calls were raised for universal suffrage

and the dismantling of the old political party network. Students,

university professors, and journalists, bolstered by labor unions

and inspired by a variety of democratic, socialist, communist, anarchist, and other Western schools of thought, mounted large but

orderly public demonstrations in favor of universal male suffrage

51
Japan: A Country Study

in 1919 and 1920. New elections brought still another Seiyukai

majority, but barely so. In the political milieu of the day, there was a proliferation of new parties, including socialist and communist

parties.

In the midst of this political ferment, Hara was assassinated by

a disenchanted railroad worker in 1921 (see Diplomacy, this ch.).

He was followed by a succession of nonparty prime ministers and

coalition cabinets. Fear of a broader electorate, left-wing power,

and the growing social change engendered by the influx of Western

popular culture together led to the passage of the Peace Preservation Law (1925), which forbade any change in the political struc- ture or the abolition of private property.

Unstable coalitions and divisiveness in the Diet led the Kenseikai

(Constitutional Government Association) and the Seiyu Honto

(True Seiyukai) to merge as the Rikken Minseito (Constitutional

Democratic Party) in 1927. The Minseito platform was committed to the parliamentary system, democratic politics, and world

peace. Thereafter, until 1932, the Seiyukai and the Rikken Minseito

alternated in power.

Despite the political realignments and hope for more orderly

government, domestic economic crises plagued whichever party

held power. Fiscal austerity programs and appeals for public support of conservative government policies like the Peace Preservation Law—including reminders of the moral obligation to make

sacrifices for the emperor and the state—were attempted as solutions. Although the world depression of the late 1920s and early

1930s had minimal effects on Japan—indeed Japanese exports grew

substantially during this period—there was a sense of rising dis- content that was heightened with the assassination of Minseito prime

minister Hamaguchi Osachi in 1931,

The events flowing from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 had seen not only the fulfillment of many domestic and foreign economic

and political objectives—without Japan's first suffering the colonial

fate of other Asian nations—but also a new intellectual ferment,

in a time when there was interest worldwide in socialism and an urban proletariat was developing. Universal male suffrage, social

welfare, workers' rights, and nonviolent protest were ideals of the

early leftist movement. Government suppression of leftist activities, however, led to more radical leftist action and even more suppression, resulting in the dissolution of the Japan Socialist Party

(Nihon Shakaito), only a year after its 1906 founding, and in the

general failure of the socialist movement.

The victory of the communists in Russia in 1917 and their hopes

for a world revolution led to the establishment of the Comintern

52
Historical Setting

(a contraction of Communist International, the organization founded

in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate the world communist movement).

The Comintern realized the importance ofJapan in achieving successful revolution in East Asia and actively worked to form the Japan

Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto), which was founded in July

1922. An end to feudalism, the abolition of the monarchy, withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia, Sakhalin, China, Korea,

and Taiwan, and recognition of the Soviet Union were the an- nounced goals of the Japan Communist Party in 1923. A brutal

suppression of the party followed. Radicals responded with an as- sassination attempt on Prince Regent Hirohito. The 1925 Peace

Preservation Law was a direct response to the "dangerous thoughts"

perpetrated by communist elements in Japan.

The liberalization of election laws, also in 1925, benefited communist candidates even though the Japan Communist Party itself was banned. A new Peace Preservation Law in 1928, however,

further impeded communist efforts by banning the parties they had

infiltrated. The police apparatus of the day was ubiquitous and

quite thorough in attempting to control the socialist movement (see

The Police System, ch. 8). By 1926 the Japan Communist Party

had been forced underground, by the summer of 1929 the party

leadership had been virtually destroyed, and by 1933 the party had

largely disintegrated.

Diplomacy

Emerging Chinese nationalism, the victory of the communists

in Russia, and the growing presence of the United States in East

Asia all worked against Japan's postwar foreign policy interests. The four-year Siberian expedition and activities in China, combined with big domestic spending programs, had depleted Japan's

wartime earnings. Only through more competitive business practices, supported by further economic development and industrial

modernization, all accommodated by the growth of the zaibatsu

(wealth groups—see Glossary), could Japan hope to become pre- dominant in Asia. The United States, long a source of many imported goods and loans needed for development, was seen as becoming a major impediment to this goal because of its policies

of containing Japanese imperialism.

An international turning point in military diplomacy was the

Washington Conference of 1921-22, which produced a series of

agreements that effected a new order in the Pacific region. Japan's

economic problems made a naval buildup nearly impossible and,

realizing the need to compete with the United States on an eco- nomic rather than a military basis, the Japanese government came

53
Japan: A Country Study

to see rapprochement as inevitable. Japan adopted a more neutral

attitude toward the civil war in China; joined the United States,

Britain, and France in encouraging Chinese self-development; and

dropped efforts to expand its hegemony into China proper.

In the Four Power Treaty on Insular Possessions (December 13,

1921), Japan, the United States, Britain, and France agreed to recognize the status quo in the Pacific, andJapan and Britain agreed

to terminate formally their Treaty of Alliance. The Five Power

Naval Disarmament Treaty (February 6, 1922) established an in- ternational capital ship ratio (5, 5, 3, 1.75, and 1.75, respectively,

for the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) and limited

the size and armaments of capital ships already built or under construction. In a move that gave the Japanese Imperial Navy greater

freedom in the Pacific, Washington and London agreed not to build

any new military bases between Singapore and Hawaii.

The goal of the Nine Power Treaty (February 6, 1922), signed

by Belgium, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal along with the

original five powers, was the prevention of war in the Pacific. The

signatories agreed to respect China's independence and integrity,

not to interfere in Chinese attempts to establish a stable government, to refrain from seeking special privileges in China or threatening the positions of other nations there, to support a policy of equal

opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in China,

and to reexamine extraterritoriality and tariff autonomy policies.

Japan also agreed to withdraw its troops from Shandong, relin- quishing all but purely economic rights there, and to evacuate its troops from Siberia.

In 1928 Japan joined fourteen other nations in signing the

Kellogg-Briand Pact, which denounced "recourse to war for the

solution of international controversies." Thus, whenJapan invaded

Manchuria only three years later, its pretext was the defense of

its nationals and economic interests there. The London Naval Conference in 1930 came at the time of an economic recession in Japan,

and the Japanese government was amenable to further, cost-saving

naval reductions. Although Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi

(1870-1931) had civilian support, he bypassed the Naval General

Staff and approved the signing of the London Naval Treaty.

Hamaguchi's success was pyrrhic: ultranationalists called the treaty a national surrender, and navy and army officials girded themselves for defense of their budgets. Hamaguchi himself died from

wounds suffered in an assassination attempt in November 1930,

and the treaty, with its complex formula for ship tonnage and numbers aimed at restricting the naval arms race, had loopholes that

made it ineffective by 1938.

54
Historical Setting

The Rise of the Militarists

Ultranationalism had characterized right-wing politicians and

conservative military men since the inception of the Meiji Restoration, contributing greatly to the prowar politics of the 1870s. Disenchanted former samurai had formed patriotic societies and

intelligence-gathering organizations, such as the Gen'yosha (Black

Ocean Society, founded in 1881) and its later offshoot, the Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society, or Amur River Society, founded in

1901). These groups became active in domestic and foreign politics, helped foment prowar sentiments, and supported ultranationalist causes through the end of World War II. After Japan's victories over China and Russia, the ultranationalists concentrated on domestic issues and perceived domestic threats, such as socialism and com- munism.

After World War I and the intellectual ferment of the period,

nationalist societies became numerous but had a minority voice

during the era of two-party democratic politics. Diverse and angry

groups called for nationalization of all wealth above a fixed minimal

amount and for armed overseas expansion. The emperor was highly

revered by these groups, and when Hirohito was enthroned in 1927

initiating the Showa period (Bright Harmony, 1926-89), there were

calls for a "Showa Restoration" and a revival of Shinto. Emperorcentered neo-Shintoism, or State Shinto, which had long been developing, came to fruition in the 1930s and 1940s. It glorified the

emperor and traditional Japanese virtues to the exclusion of the

Western influences perceived as greedy, individualistic, bourgeois,

and assertive. The ideals of the Japanese family-state and self- sacrifice in service of the nation were given a missionary interpretation, being thought by their ultranationalist proponents to be applicable to the modern world.

The 1930s were a decade of fear in Japan, characterized by the

resurgence of right-wing patriotism, the weakening of democratic

forces, domestic terrorist violence (including an assassination at- tempt on the emperor in 1932), and stepped-up military aggression abroad. A prelude to this state of affairs was Tanaka Giichi's

term as prime minister from 1927 to 1929. Twice he sent troops

to China to obstruct Chiang Kai-shek's unification campaign, and,

in June 1928, adventurous officers of the Guandong Army, the

Imperial Japanese Army unit stationed in Manchuria, embarked

on unauthorized initiatives to protect Japanese interests, including the assassination of a former ally, Manchurian warlord Zhang

Zuolin. The perpetrators hoped the Chinese would be prompted

to take military action, forcing the Guandong Army to retaliate.

55
Japan: A Country Study

The Japanese high command and the Chinese, however, both re- fused to mobilize. The incident turned out to be a striking example of unchecked terrorism. Even though press censorship kept the

Japanese public from knowing about these events, they led to the

downfall of Tanaka and set the stage for a similar plot, the Manchurian Incident, in 1931.

A secret society founded by army officers seeking to establish a military dictatorship—the Sakurakai (Cherry Society, the cherry

blossom being emblematic of self-sacrifice) —plotted to attack the

Diet and political party headquarters, assassinate the prime

minister, and declare martial law under a "Showa Restoration"

government led by the army minister. Although the army cancelled

its coup plans (to have been carried out in March 1931), no reprisals were taken and terrorist activity was again tacitly condoned.

The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 did not fail and

it set the stage for the eventual military takeover of the Japanese

government. Guandong Army conspirators blew up a few meters

of South Manchurian Railway Company track near Mukden (now

Shenyang), blamed it on Chinese saboteurs, and used the event

as an excuse to seize Mukden. One month later, in Tokyo, military figures plotted the October Incident, which was aimed at set- ting up a national socialist state. The plot failed, but again the news was suppressed and the military perpetrators were not punished.

Japanese forces attacked Shanghai in January 1932 on the pretext

of Chinese resistance in Manchuria. Finding stiff Chinese resistance

in Shanghai, the Japanese waged a three-month undeclared war

there before a truce was reached in March 1932. Several days later,

Manchukuo was established. Manchukuo was a Japanese puppet

state headed by the last Chinese emperor, Puyi, as chief executive

and later emperor. The civilian government in Tokyo was powerless to prevent these military happenings. Instead of being con- demned, the Guandong Army's actions enjoyed popular support

back home. International reactions were extremely negative,

however. Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, and the

United States became increasingly hostile. The Japanese system of party government finally met its demise

with the May 15th Incident in 1932, when a group ofjunior naval

officers and army cadets assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi

(1855-1932). Although the assassins were put on trial and sentenced

to fifteen years' imprisonment, they were seen popularly as having

acted out of patriotism. Inukai's successors, military men chosen

by Saionji, the last surviving genro, recognized Manchukuo and

generally approved the army's actions in securing Manchuria as an

industrial base, an area for Japanese emigration, and a staging

56
Hirohito, the Emperor Showa,

124th Japanese sovereign, and

Empress Nagako in full ceremonial dress, at their 1927

enthronement

Courtesy Prints and Photographs

Division, Library of Congress
Japan: A Country Study

ground for war with the Soviet Union. Various army factions con- tended for power amid increasing suppression of dissent and more

assassinations. In the February 26th Incident of 1936, about 1,500

troops went on a rampage of assassination against the current and

former prime ministers and other cabinet members, and even

Saionji and members of the imperial court. The revolt was put down

by other military units and its leaders executed after secret trials. Despite public dismay over these events and the discredit they

brought to numerous military figures, Japan's civilian leadership

capitulated to the army's demands in the hope of ending domestic

violence. Increases were seen in defense budgets, naval construction (Japan announced it would no longer accede to the London

Naval Treaty), and patriotic indoctrination as Japan moved toward

a wartime footing.

In November 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact, an agreement to exchange information and collaborate in preventing communist activities, was signed by Japan and Germany (Italy joined a year

later). War was launched against China after the Marco Polo Bridge

Incident of July 7, 1937, in which an allegedly unplanned clash

took place near Beiping (as Beijing was then called) between Chinese

and Japanese troops and quickly escalated into full-scale warfare.

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) ensued, and relations

with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union deteriorated.

The increased military activities in China—and Japan's idea of

establishing "Mengukuo" in Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian

People's Republic—soon led to a major clash over rival MongoliaManchukuo border claims. When Japanese troops invaded eastern Mongolia, a major ground and air battle with a joint SovietMongolian army took place between May and September 1939 at the Battle of Halhin Gol. The Japanese were severely defeated,

sustaining as many as 80,000 casualties, and thereafter Japan concentrated its war efforts on its southward drive in China and

Southeast Asia, a strategy that helped propel Japan ever closer to war with the United States, Britain, and their allies. Under the prime ministership of Konoe Fumimaro (1891-

1945)—the last head of the famous Fujiwara house—the government was streamlined and given absolute power over the nation's

assets. In 1940, the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan

according to tradition, Konoe's cabinet called for the establishment

of a * 'Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," a concept building on Konoe's 1938 call for a "New Order in Greater East Asia,"

encompassing Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Southeast Asia. The

Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was to integrate Asia politically and economically—under Japanese leadership—against

58
Historical Setting

Western domination. It was developed in recognition of the changing geopolitical situation emerging in 1940, and, eventually, a Greater East Asia Ministry was established (in 1942) and the

Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo in 1943. Also

in 1940, political parties were ordered to dissolve, and the Imperial

Rule Assistance Association, comprising members of all former parties, was established to transmit government orders throughout

society. In September 1940, Japan joined the Axis alliance with

Germany and Italy when it signed the Tripartite Pact, a military

agreement to redivide the world that was directed primarily against

the United States. There had been a long-standing and deep-seated antagonism between Japan and the United States since the first decade of the twentieth century. Each perceived the other as a military threat, and

trade rivalry was carried on in earnest. The Japanese greatly re- sented the racial discrimination perpetuated by United States immigration laws, and the Americans became increasingly wary of

Japan's interference in the self-determination of other peoples.

Japan's military expansionism and quest for national self-sufficiency

eventually led the United States in 1940 to embargo war supplies,

abrogate a long-standing commercial treaty, and put greater re- strictions on the export of critical commodities. These American

tactics, rather than forcing Japan to a standstill, made Japan more

desperate. After the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact

in April 1941, and while still actively making war plans against

the United States, Japan participated in diplomatic negotiations

with Washington aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement. Washington was quite concerned about Japan's role in the Tripartite

Pact and demanded the withdrawal ofJapanese troops from China

and Southeast Asia. Japan countered that it would not use force

unless "a country not yet involved in the European war" (that is, the United States) attacked Germany or Italy, and demanded that

the United States and Britain not interfere with a Japanese settle- ment in China (a pro-Japanese puppet government had been set up in Nanjing in 1940). Because certain Japanese military leaders were working at cross-purposes with officials seeking a peaceful set- tlement (including Konoe, other civilians, and some military

figures), talks were deadlocked. On October 15, 1941, army minister Tqjo Hideki (1884-1948) declared the negotiations ended.

Konoe resigned, replaced by Tqjo, and after one final United States rejection of Japan's terms of negotiation, on December 1, 1941,

the Imperial Conference (an ad hoc meeting convened—and then

rarely—in the presence of the emperor) ratified the decision to

59
Japan: A Country Study

embark on a war of "self-defense and self-preservation" and to attack the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor.

World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52

After initial battlefield success and a tremendous overextension

of its resources in the war (known to Japan as the Greater East

Asia War, to the United States as the Pacific War) against a quickly

mobilizing United States and Allied war effort, Japan was unable

to sustain "Greater East Asia" (see fig. 2). As early as 1943, Konoe

led a peace movement, and Tqjo was forced from office in July

1944. His successors sought peace mediation (Sweden and the Soviet

Union were approached for help in such a process), but the enemy

offered only unconditional surrender. After the detonation of atomic

bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, 1941,

respectively, the emperor asked that the Japanese people bring peace

to Japan by "enduring the unendurable and suffering what is in- sufferable" by surrendering to the Allied powers. The documents

of surrender were signed on board the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo

Bay, on September 2, 1945 (see World War II, ch. 8). The terms

of surrender included the occupation of Japan by Allied military

forces, assurances that Japan would never again go to war, restriction ofJapanese sovereignty to the four main islands "and such

minor islands as may be determined," and surrender of Japan's

colonial holdings.

A period of demilitarization and democratization followed in

Japan (1945-47). Under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),

Japan's army and navy ministries were abolished, munitions and

military equipment were destroyed, and war industries were converted to civilian uses. War crimes trials found 4,200 Japanese offi- cials guilty; 700 were executed, and 186,000 other public figures were purged. State Shinto was disestablished, and on January 1, 1946, Emperor Hirohito repudiated his divinity. MacArthur pushed

the government to amend the 1889 Meiji Constitution, and on May 3, 1947, the new Japanese Constitution (often called the

"MacArthur Constitution") came into force (see The Postwar Constitution, ch. 6). Constitutional reforms were accompanied by eco- nomic reforms, including agricultural land redistribution, the

reestablishment of trade unions, and severe proscriptions on zaibatsu (see Patterns of Development, ch. 4). Relatively rapid stabilization ofJapan led to a relaxation of SCAP

purges and press censorship. Quick economic recovery was en-, couraged, restrictions on former zaibatsu members eventually were

lifted, and foreign trade was allowed. Finally, fifty-one nations met

60
Historical Setting

in San Francisco in September 1951 to reach a peace accord with

Japan (formally known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan; China,

India, and the Soviet Union participated in the conference but did

not sign the treaty). Japan renounced its claims to Korea, Taiwan,

Penghu, the Kuril Islands, southern Sakhalin, islands it gained by

League of Nations mandate, South China Sea islands, and Antarctic territory, while agreeing to settle disputes peacefully according

to the United Nations Charter. Japan's rights to defend itself and

to enter into collective security arrangements were acknowledged.

The 1952 ratification of the Japan-United States Mutual Security

Assistance Pact also ensured a strong defense for Japan and a large

postwar role in Asia for the United States (see Relations with the

United States, ch. 7; Early Developments, ch. 8). Toward a New Century, 1953-84

Political parties had begun to revive almost immediately after the occupation began. Left-wing organizations, such as the Japan

Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party quickly reestablished themselves, as did various conservative parties. The old

Seiyiikai and Rikken Minseito came back as, respectively, the

Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyuto) and the Japan Progressive Party

(Nihon Shimpoto). The first postwar elections were held in 1946

(women were given the franchise for the first time), and the Liberal

Party's vice president, Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), became prime

minister. For the 1947 elections, anti-Yoshida forces left the Liberal

Party and joined forces with the Progressive Party to establish the

new Democratic Party (Minshuto). This divisiveness in conservative ranks gave a plurality to the Japan Socialist Party, which was

allowed to form a cabinet that lasted less than a year. Thereafter

the socialist party steadily declined in its electoral successes. After

a short period of Democratic Party administration, Yoshida re- turned in late 1948 and continued to serve as prime minister until

1954.

Even before Japan regained full sovereignty, the government

had rehabilitated nearly 80,000 people who had been purged, many

of whom returned to their former political and government positions. A debate over limitations on military spending and the

sovereignty of the emperor ensued, contributing to the great reduction in the Liberal Party's majority in the first postoccupation elec- tions (October 1952). After several reorganizations of the armed

forces, in 1954 the Self-Defense Forces were established under a

civilian director (see The Self-Defense Forces, ch. 8). Cold War

realities and the hot war in nearby Korea also contributed significantly to the United States-influenced economic redevelopment,

61
Japan: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from Kodansha Encyclopedia ofJapan, 8, Tokyo, 1983, 274.

Figure 2. The Japanese Empire During World War II

the suppression of communism, and the discouragement of or- ganized labor in Japan during this period.

Continual fragmentation of parties and a succession of minority governments led conservative forces to merge the Liberal Party

62
Historical Setting

(Jiyuto) with the Japan Democratic Party (Nihon Minshuto), an

offshoot of the earlier Democratic Party, to form the Liberal

Democratic Party (Jiyo-Minshuto; LDP) in November 1955. This

party has continuously held power from 1955 through 1990 (see

63
Japan: A Country Study

The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6). Its leadership was drawn

from the elite who had seen Japan through the defeat and occupation; it attracted former bureaucrats, local politicians, businessmen, journalists, other professionals, farmers, and university

graduates. In October 1955, socialist groups reunited under the

Japan Socialist Party, which emerged as the second most powerful political force. It was followed closely in popularity by the

Komeito (Clean Government Party), founded in 1964 as the political arm of the Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), a lay or- ganization of the Buddhist sect Nichiren Shoshu (see Komeito,

ch. 6). The Komeito emphasized traditional Japanese beliefs and

attracted urban laborers, former rural residents, and many women.

Like the Japan Socialist Party, it favored the gradual modification

and dissolution of the Japan-United States Mutual Security Assistance Pact. Japan's biggest postwar political crisis took place in 1960 over

the revision of this pact. As the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was concluded, which renewed the United States

role as military protector ofJapan, massive street protests and political upheaval occurred, and the cabinet resigned a month after the Diet's ratification of the treaty. Thereafter political turmoil subsided. Japanese views of the United States, after years of mass protests over nuclear armaments and the mutual defense pact,

improved by 1972, with the reversion of United States-occupied

Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and the winding-down of the Sec- ond Indochina War (1954-75).

Japan had reestablished relations with the Republic of China

after World War II, and cordial relations were maintained with

the nationalist government when it was exiled to Taiwan, a policy

that won Japan the enmity of the People's Republic of China, which was established in 1949. After the general warming of relations between China and Western countries, especially the United States,

which shocked Japan with its sudden rapprochement with Beijing

in 1971 , Tokyo established relations with Beijing in 1972 and close cooperation in the economic sphere followed (see Communist Countries, ch. 5; Relations with China, ch. 7). Japan's relations with the Soviet Union continued to be

problematic long after the war. The main object of dispute was

the Soviet occupation of what Japan calls its Northern Territories,

the two most southerly islands in the Kurils (Etorofu and Kunashiri)

and Shikotan and the Habomai Islands (northeast of Hokkaido),

which were seized by the Soviets in the closing days of World War

II (see Soviet Union, ch. 7).

64
Historical Setting

Throughout the postwar period, Japan's economy continued to boom, with results far outstripping expectations. Japan rapidly

caught up with the West in foreign trade, gross national product

(GNP—see Glossary), and general quality of life (see Living Standards, ch. 4; Postwar Development, ch. 5). These achievements were underscored by the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games and the

Osaka International Exposition (Expo '70) world's fair in 1970.

The high economic growth and political tranquility of the midto-late 1960s were tempered by the quadrupling of oil prices by

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973. Almost

completely dependent on imports for petroleum, Japan experienced

its first and only recession since the war. Despite its wealth and central position in the world economy,

Japan has had little or no influence in global politics for much of

the postwar period. Under the prime ministership of Tanaka Kakuei

(1972-74), Japan took a stronger but still low-key stance by steadily increasing its defense spending and easing trade frictions with

the United States. Tanaka' s administration was also characterized

by high-level talks with United States, Soviet, and Chinese leaders, if with mixed results. His visits to Indonesia and Thailand

prompted riots, a manifestation of long-standing anti-Japanese sen- timents (see Relations with other Asian Countries, ch. 7). Tanaka

was forced to resign in 1974 because of his alleged connection to financial scandals and, in the face of charges of involvement in the

Lockheed bribery scandal, he was arrested andjailed briefly in 1976.

By the late 1970s, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party

had come to accept the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and the Democratic Socialist Party even came to support a

small defense buildup. The Japan Socialist Party, too, was forced

to abandon its once strict antimilitary stance. The United States kept up pressure on Japan to increase its defense spending above

1 percent of its GNP, engendering much debate in the Diet, with

most opposition coming not from minority parties or public opinion but from budget-conscious officials in the Ministry of Finance

(see Defense Spending, ch. 8).

The fractious politics of the LDP hindered consensus in the Diet

in the late 1970s. The sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira

Masayoshi just before the June 1980 elections, however, brought

out a sympathy vote for the party and gave the new prime minister,

Suzuki Zenko, a working majority. Suzuki was soon swept up in a controversy over the publication of a textbook that appeared to many of Japan's former enemies as a whitewash of Japanese ag- gression in World War II. This incident, and serious fiscal

65
Japan: A Country Study

problems, caused the Suzuki cabinet, composed of numerous LDP

factions, to fall. Nakasone Yasuhiro, a conservative backed by the still-powerful

Tanaka and Suzuki factions, who once served as director general

of the Defense Agency, became prime minister in November 1982.

Several cordial visits between Nakasone and United States president Ronald Reagan were aimed at improving relations between

their countries. Nakasone 's more strident position on Japanese

defense issues made him popular with some United States officials but not, generally, in Japan or among Asian neighbors. Although

his characterization ofJapan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier,"

his noting the "common destiny" ofJapan and the United States,

and his calling for revisions to Article 9 of the Constitution (which

renounced war as the sovereign right of the nation), among other

prorearmament statements, produced negative reactions at home

and abroad, a gradual acceptance emerged of the Self-Defense

Forces and the mutual security treaty with the United States in

the mid-1980s.

Another serious problem was Japan's growing trade surplus,

which reached record heights during Nakasone's first term (see For- eign Trade Policies; Trade and Investment Relations, ch. 5). The

United States pressured Japan to remedy the imbalance, demanding

that Tokyo raise the value of the yen and open its markets further

to facilitate more imports from the United States. Because Japan

aids and protects its key industries, it was accused of creating an

unfair competitive advantage. Tokyo agreed to try to resolve these

problems, but generally defended its industrial policies and made

concessions on its trade restrictions very reluctantly.

In November 1984, Nakasone was chosen for a second term as LDP president. His cabinet received an unusually high rating, a 50 percent favorable response in polling during his first term, while

opposition parties reached a new low in popular support. As he

moved into his second term, Nakasone thus held a strong position

in the Diet and the nation. Despite being found guilty of bribery

in 1983, Tanaka in the early to mid-1980s remained a power behind the scenes through his control of the party's informal apparatus

and continued as an influential adviser to the more internationally

minded Nakasone. Fluctuation in the popularity of the LDP and

charges of corruption among political leaders continued as the decade progressed.

Many histories of Japan are available to Western readers. H.

Paul Varley's A Syllabus ofJapanese Civilization provides a structure

66
Historical Setting

for studying Japanese history while suggesting useful additional

readings. Short general overview histories include Edwin O.

Reischauer'sJapan: The Story ofa Nation, Reischauer and Albert M.

Craig'sJapan: Tradition and Transformation, Richard Storry's^4 History

of Modern Japan, and Conrad Totman's Japan Before Perry. More

detailed studies are John Whitney Hall's Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times, Arthur E. Tiedemann's An Introduction to Japanese

Civilization, and George B. Sansom's three-volume History ofJapan.

Feudalism in Japan by Peter Duus provides an excellent overview

of the evolution from tribal rule to premodern Japan, while Studies

in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, edited by Hall and

Marius B. Jansen, is an excellent analytical collection on the

Tokugawa period. A similar collection, covering the Meiji, Taisho,

and Showa periods, is Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy'sJapan Examined. Books by Donald Keene {The Japanese Discovery of Europe,

1720-1830) and Michael Cooper (They Came to Japan) are useful

in understanding the dynamics ofJapanese-Western relations start- ing in the sixteenth century. The Rise ofModernJapan by Duus, The

Modern History ofJapan by W.G. Beasley, and Political Development

in ModernJapan by Robert E. Ward provide useful information on

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Analyses and translations of historical works are found in

Ryusaku Tsunoda and colleagues' Sources of Japanese Tradition. Another excellent reference is the nine-volume Kodansha Encyclopedia ofJapan. The Cambridge History ofJapan, three of the six volumes

of which have been published, provides in-depth analyses of many

topics. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

67

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Family crest using plum blossoms (ume), a sign of beauty and imperviousness to late winter weather
JAPAN IS KNOWN throughout the world for its economic successes, yet Japanese society remains an enigma to many outside

its borders. Those people who stress the nation's uniqueness, in- cluding many Japanese, often overlook the common human traits that make cross-cultural communication possible and rewarding.

Those who stress Japan's convergence with the West miss the deeper

differences that have allowed Japan to chart its own path through

the unknowns of the postindustrial period.

Geography and climate do not determine social organization or

values, but they do set parameters for human action. Leaders of

this island nation historically have exerted close political control over their people and limited foreign influence to degrees not possible elsewhere. Mountainous terrain and wet-rice agriculture

fostered—but did not ensure—attitudes of cooperation within the

social unit and a sense of separateness from the outside. Extending nearly 3,800 kilometers from northeast to southwest, Japan has

a generally mild, temperate climate with a rich variety of local habitats. This expansiveness resulted in regional variations in cul- ture and economic development historically, but these differences

decreased in importance (or were relegated to tourist attractions)

in the twentieth century. With 77 percent of the population living

in urban areas and a large majority of farm families earning most

of their income from nonfarm labor, regional and rural-urban differ- ences in life-style were minimal in the early 1990s. The large and

stable national population, with low fertility and mortality rates, was aging rapidly.

Japanese society underwent great social changes after 1945. Families became smaller, women increasingly participated in paid labor,

and urban life replaced the rural community as the common en- vironment in which children were raised and human interaction

took place. The changes brought new problems, such as industrial

pollution, the entrance examination ' 'hell," and social anomie. The

government responded with new policies, and ordinary citizens uti- lized traditional customs to give meaning to the present. Japanese

cities in the late twentieth century were convenient and safe. Surface prosperity masked an unequal distribution of wealth and

discrimination against those perceived to be "different." Films,

television, nightlife, and comic books (manga), sometimes garish

and violent, offered an escape from the pressures of contemporary

life. Categorization of social problems as medical syndromes tended

71
Japan: A Country Study

to focus attention on personal-problem solving and away from

societal-level causes, such as poverty, gender roles, or the lack of

assistance in caring for ill elderly relatives. The pace and rhythm of life in 1990 Japan would have seemed

familiar to Westerners. Yet the Japanese approached them with

a world view eclectically derived from a variety of religious and

secular traditions, emphasizing human relations. Many Japanese were willing to delay rewards, to put forth their best efforts for their

teams, and to avoid open conflict. The outside world was an arena

of intense competition. Family, neighborhood, and workplace rep- resented ever-widening circles of social relations to which individuals

adjusted and through which they grew as human beings.

Japan, with the world's second largest gross national product

(GNP—see Glossary) and seventh largest population, played an

increasingly important part in world affairs. As the government

embarked on a policy of internationalization, individual Japanese

creatively combined elements from their own history with foreign

influences and new inventions, as they adapted to the postindustrial world.

Physical Setting

Composition, Topography, and Drainage

The mountainous islands of the Japanese Archipelago form a

crescent off the eastern coast of Asia (see fig. 1). They are separated from the mainland by the Sea of Japan, which historically

served as a protective barrier. Japan's insular nature, together with

the compactness of its main territory and the cultural homogeneity of its people, enabled the nation to remain free of outside domination until its defeat in World War II (see World War II and

the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1). The country consists of four principal islands: Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu; more than

3,000 adjacent islands and islets, including Oshima in the Nampo

chain; and more than 200 other smaller islands, including those

of the Amami, Okinawa, and Sakishima chains of the Ryiikyu

Archipelago. The national territory also includes the small Bonin

Islands (called Ogasawara by the Japanese), Iwo Jima, and the Vol- cano Islands (Kazan Retto), stretching some 1,100 kilometers from

the main islands. A territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, dating from the end of World War II, over the two southernmost of

the Kuril Islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri, and the smaller Shikotan

and Habomai island groups northeast of Hokkaido remained

a sensitive spot in Japan-Soviet Union relations throughout the

1980s (see Relations with the Soviet Union, ch. 7). Excluding

72
At the summit of Mount Fuji, overlooking Lake Yamanaka

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

disputed territory, the archipelago covers about 377,000 square

kilometers. No point in Japan is more than 150 kilometers from

the sea. The four major islands are separated by narrow straits and form

a natural entity. The Ryukyii Islands curve 970 kilometers southward from Kyushu.

The distance between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, the nearest point on the Asian continent, is about 200 kilometers at the Korea Strait. Japan has always been linked with the continent

through trade routes, stretching in the north toward Siberia, in

the west through the Tsushima Islands to the Korean Peninsula,

and in the south to the ports on the south China coast. The Japanese islands are the summits of mountain ridges uplifted near the outer edge of the continental shelf. About 75 per- cent of Japan's area is mountainous, and scattered plains and

intermontane basins (in which the population is concentrated) cover only about 25 percent. A long chain of mountains runs down the

middle of the archipelago, dividing it into two halves, the ''face,"

fronting on the Pacific Ocean, and the "back," toward the Sea

of Japan. On the Pacific side are steep mountains 1,500 to 3,000

meters high ,with deep valleys and gorges. Central Japan is marked

by the convergence of the three mountain chains—the Hida, Kiso,

73
Japan: A Country Study

and Akaishi mountains—that form the Japanese Alps (Nihon

Arupusu), several of whose peaks are higher than 3,000 meters. The highest point in the Japanese Alps is Kitadake at 3, 192 meters. The highest point in the country is Mount Fuji (Fujisan, also called Fujiyama in the West but not in Japan), a volcano dormant since

1707 that rises to 3,776 meters above sea level in Shizuoka Prefecture. On the Sea ofJapan side are plateaus and low mountain districts, with altitudes of 500 to 1,500 meters. None of the populated plains or mountain basins is extensive in area. The largest, the Kanto Plain, where Tokyo is situated, covers only 13,000 square kilometers. Other important plains are

the Nobi Plain surrounding Nagoya, the Kinki Plain in the OsakaKyoto area, the Sendai Plain around the city of Sendai in northeastern Honshu, and the Ishikari Plain on Hokkaido. Many of these

plains are along the coast, and their areas have been increased by

reclamation throughout recorded history.

The small amount of habitable land prompted significant human

modification of the terrain over many centuries. Land was reclaimed

from the sea and from river deltas by building dikes and drainage,

and rice paddies were built on terraces carved into mountainsides.

The process continued in the modern period with extension of shorelines and building of artificial islands for industrial and port

development, such as Port Island in Kobe and the new Kansai In- ternational Airport, which was under construction in Osaka Bay

in 1 990 . Hills and even mountains have been razed to provide flat areas for housing.

Rivers are generally steep and swift, and few are suitable for navigation except in their lower reaches. Most rivers are less than

300 kilometers in length, but their rapid flow from the mountains

provides a valuable, renewable resource: hydroelectric power generation. Japan's hydroelectric power potential has been exploited

almost to capacity. Seasonal variations in flow have led to extensive development of flood control measures. Most of the rivers are very short. The longest, the Shinano, which winds through Nagano

Prefecture to Niigata Prefecture and flows into the Sea of Japan,

is only 367 kilometers long. The largest freshwater lake is Lake

Biwa, northeast of Kyoto.

Extensive coastal shipping, especially around the Inland Sea (Seto

Naikai) compensates for the lack of navigable rivers. The Pacific

coastline south of Tokyo is characterized by long, narrow, gradually shallowing inlets produced by sedimentation, which has created

many natural harbors. The Pacific coastline north of Tokyo, the

coast of Hokkaido, and the Sea of Japan coast are generally unindented, with few natural harbors (see fig. 3).

74


The Society and Its Environment

Geographic Regions

The country's forty-seven prefectures are grouped into eight

regions frequently used as statistical units in government documents

(see Local Government, ch. 6). The islands of Hokkaido, Shikoku,

and Kyushu each form a region, and the main island of Honshu

is divided into five regions.

Hokkaido

Hokkaido, about 83,500 square kilometers in area, constitutes more than 20 percent of Japan's land area. Like the other main

islands, Hokkaido is generally mountainous, but its mountains are lower than in other parts of Japan; many have leveled summits,

and hills predominate. Valleys cut through the terrain, and communications are comparatively easy. Hokkaido was long looked

upon as a remote frontier area, and until the second half of the

nineteenth century was left largely to the indigenous Ainu (see

Minorities, this ch.). The Ainu in the 1980s numbered fewer than

20,000, and they were being rapidly assimilated into the main

Japanese population. Since the movement of modern technology

and development into the area in the late nineteenth century,

Hokkaido has been considered the major center ofJapanese agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining. Hokkaido, with about 90 per- cent of Japan's pastureland, produced the same proportion of its dairy products in the late 1980s. Manufacturing industry played

a smaller role compared to the other regions.

Hokkaido's environmental quality and rural character were

altered by industrial and residential development in the 1980s, with

developments such as the completion of the Seikan Tunnel link- ing Hokkaido and Honshu. Hokkaido was both an important

agricultural center and a growing industrial area, with most in- dustrial development near Sapporo, the prefectural capital.

Tdhoku

The northeastern part of Honshu, called Tohoku (literally "the

northeast"), includes six prefectures. Tohoku, like most ofJapan,

is hilly or mountainous. Its initial historical settlement occurred

between the seventh and ninth centuries A.D., well after Japanese

civilization and culture had become firmly established in central

and southwestern Japan. Although iron, steel, cement, chemical,

pulp, and petroleum-refining industries began developing in the

1960s, Tohoku was traditionally considered the granary of Japan

because it supplied Sendai and the Tokyo-Yokohama market with

rice and other farm commodities. Tdhoku provided 20 percent of

77



The Society and Its Environment

Geographic Regions

The country's forty-seven prefectures are grouped into eight

regions frequently used as statistical units in government documents

(see Local Government, ch. 6). The islands of Hokkaido, Shikoku,

and Kyushu each form a region, and the main island of Honshu

is divided into five regions.

Hokkaido

Hokkaido, about 83,500 square kilometers in area, constitutes more than 20 percent of Japan's land area. Like the other main

islands, Hokkaido is generally mountainous, but its mountains are lower than in other parts of Japan; many have leveled summits,

and hills predominate. Valleys cut through the terrain, and communications are comparatively easy. Hokkaido was long looked

upon as a remote frontier area, and until the second half of the

nineteenth century was left largely to the indigenous Ainu (see

Minorities, this ch.). The Ainu in the 1980s numbered fewer than

20,000, and they were being rapidly assimilated into the main

Japanese population. Since the movement of modern technology

and development into the area in the late nineteenth century,

Hokkaido has been considered the major center ofJapanese agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining. Hokkaido, with about 90 per- cent of Japan's pastureland, produced the same proportion of its dairy products in the late 1980s. Manufacturing industry played

a smaller role compared to the other regions.

Hokkaido's environmental quality and rural character were

altered by industrial and residential development in the 1980s, with

developments such as the completion of the Seikan Tunnel link- ing Hokkaido and Honshu. Hokkaido was both an important

agricultural center and a growing industrial area, with most in- dustrial development near Sapporo, the prefectural capital.

Tdhoku

The northeastern part of Honshu, called Tohoku (literally "the

northeast"), includes six prefectures. Tohoku, like most ofJapan,

is hilly or mountainous. Its initial historical settlement occurred

between the seventh and ninth centuries A.D., well after Japanese

civilization and culture had become firmly established in central

and southwestern Japan. Although iron, steel, cement, chemical,

pulp, and petroleum-refining industries began developing in the

1960s, Tohoku was traditionally considered the granary of Japan

because it supplied Sendai and the Tokyo-Yokohama market with

rice and other farm commodities. Tohoku provided 20 percent of

77
Japan: A Country Study

the nation's rice crop (see Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, ch. 4). The climate, however, is harsher than in other parts of Honshu

and permits only one crop a year on paddy land.

The inland location of many of the region's lowlands has led to a concentration of much of the population there. Coupled with

coastlines that do not favor port development, this settlement pat- tern resulted in a much greater than usual dependence on land and

railroad transportation. Low points in the central mountain range

fortunately make communications between lowlands on either side

of the range moderately easy. Tourism became a major industry

in the Tohoku region, with points of interest including the islands

of Matsushima Bay, Lake Towada, the Rikuchu Coasdine National

Park, and the Bandai-Asahi National Park.

Kantd

The Kanto ("east of the barrier") region encompasses seven

prefectures around Tokyo on the Kanto Plain. The plain itself, however, makes up only slighdy more than 40 percent of the region.

The rest consists of the hills and mountains that border it except on the seaward side. Once the heartland of feudal power, the Kanto

became the center of modern development (see Tokugawa Period,

1600-1867, ch. 1). Within the Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area, the Kanto housed not only Japan's seat of government, but also the largest group of universities and cultural institutions in addition to the greatest population and a large industrial zone. Although

most of the Kanto Plain was used for residential, commercial, or

industrial construction, it was still farmed in the early 1990s. Rice was the principal crop, although the zone around Tokyo and Yokohama had been landscaped to grow garden produce for the

metropolitan market.

The Kanto region in the late twentieth century was the most

highly developed, urbanized, and industrialized part of Japan.

Tokyo and Yokohama formed a single industrial complex with a

concentration of light and heavy industry along Tokyo Bay. Smaller

cities, farther away from the coast, housed substantial light industry. The average population density reached 5,471 persons per

square kilometer in 1987 (see Population Density, this ch.).

Chubu

The Chubu or central region encompasses nine prefectures in

the midland ofJapan, west of the Kanto region. The region is the

widest part of Honshu and is characterized by high, rugged mountains. The Japanese Alps divide the country into the sunnier Pacific side, known as the front of Japan or Omote-Nihon, and the

78
The Society and Its Environment

colder Sea of Japan side, or Ura-Nihon, the back of Japan. The

region comprises three distinct districts: Hokuriku, a coastal strip on the Sea ofJapan that is a major wet-rice producing area; Tosan,

or the Central Highlands; and Tokai, or the eastern seaboard, a nar- row corridor along the Pacific Coast.

Hokuriku lies west of the massive mountains that occupy the

central Chubu region. The district has a very heavy snowfall and

strong winds. Its turbulent rivers are the source of abundant hydroelectric power. Niigata Prefecture is the site of domestic gas and

oil production. Industrial development is extensive, especially in

the cities of Niigata and Toyama. Fukui and Kanazawa also have

large manufacturing industries. Hokuriku developed largely in- dependently of other regions, mainly because it remained relatively

isolated from the major industrial and cultural centers on the Pacific Coast. Because port facilities were limited and road transport

hampered by heavy winter snows, the district relied largely on rail- road transportation (see Railroads and Subways, ch. 4).

The Tosan district is an area of complex and high rugged

mountains—often called the roof ofJapan—that include the Japanese Alps. The population is* chiefly concentrated in six elevated

basins connected by narrow valleys. Tosan was long a main silk- producing area, although output declined after World War II. Much of the labor formerly required in silk production was absorbed by the district's diversified manufacturing industry, which

included precision instruments, machinery, textiles, food processing, and other light manufacturing.

The Tokai district, bordering the Pacific Ocean, is a narrow cor- ridor interrupted in places by mountains that descend into the sea. Since the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), this corridor has been

important in linking Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. One of old Japan's

most famous roads, the Tokaido, ran through it connecting Edo

(Tokyo, since 1868) and Kyoto, the old imperial capital; in the

twentieth century it became the route of new super-express highways and high-speed railroad lines. A number of small alluvial plains are found in the corridor sec- tion. A mild climate, favorable location relative to the great

metropolitan complexes, and the availability of fast transportation

have made them truck-gardening centers for out-of- season vegetables. Upland areas of rolling hills are extensively given over to the

growing of mandarin oranges and tea. The corridor also has a number of important small industrial centers. The western part of Tokai

includes the Nobi Plain, where rice was grown by the seventh cen- tury A.D. Nagoya, facing Ise Bay, is a center for heavy industry,

including iron and steel and machinery manufacturing.

79
Japan: A Country Study

Kinki

The Kinki region lies to the west of Tokai and consists of seven

prefectures forming a comparatively narrow area of Honshu,

stretching from the Sea ofJapan on the north to the Pacific Ocean

on the south. It includes Japanjs second largest industrialcommercial complex, centered on Osaka and Kobe, and the two

former capital cities of Nara and Kyoto, seats of the imperial family from the early eighth century A.D. until the Meiji Restoration

in 1868 (see The Meiji Restoration, ch. 1). The area is rich in imperial and cultural history and attracts many Japanese and foreign

tourists

._ The Osaka Plain is the site of Osaka, Kobe, and a number of

intermediate-sized industrial cities, which together form the Hanshin commercial-industrial complex. The suburbs of Osaka were

given over to farming, including vegetables, dairy farming, poultry

raising, and rice cultivation in the 1980s. These areas were progressively reduced as the cities expanded and residential areas, including numerous so-called "new cities," were built, such as the developments north of Osaka resulting from the Osaka International Exposition (Expo '70) world's fair. Chugoku

The Chugoku region, occupying the western end of Honshu en- compasses five prefectures. It is characterized by irregular rolling

hills and limited plain areas and is divided into two distinct parts

by mountains running east and west through its center. The northern, somewhat narrower, district is known as San'in, or "shady

side of the mountain," and the southern district, as San'yo, or "sunny side," because of their marked differences in climate. The

whole Inland Sea region, including San'yo underwent rapid development in the late twentieth century. The city of Hiroshima,

rebuilt after being destroyed by the atomic bomb in 1945, was an

industrial metropolis of more than 2.8 million people by 1987. Overfishing and pollution reduced the productivity of the Inland Sea

fishing grounds, and the area concentrated on heavy industry.

San'in, on the other hand, was less industrialized and relied on

agriculture.

Shikoku

The Shikoku region—comprising the entire island of Shikoku—

covers about 18,800 square kilometers and consists of four prefectures. It is connected to Honshu by ferry and air, and since 1988

by the Seto-Ohashi bridge network. Until completion of the bridges,

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The Society and Its Environment

the region was isolated from the rest ofJapan, and the freer move- ment between Honshu and Shikoku was expected to promote eco- nomic development on both sides of the bridges.

Mountains running east and west divide Shikoku into a narrow

northern subregion, fronting on the Inland Sea, and a southern

part facing the Pacific Ocean. Most of the population lived in the

north in the 1980s, and all but one of the island's few larger cites were located there. Industry was moderately well developed and

included the processing of ores from the important Besshi copper

mine. Land was used intensively. Wide alluvial areas, especially

in the eastern part of the zone, were planted with rice and subsequently double cropped with winter wheat and barley. Fruit was grown throughout the northern area in great variety, including

citrus fruits, persimmons, peaches, and grapes. The larger southern section of Shikoku is mountainous and

sparsely populated. The only significant lowland is a small alluvial

plain at Kochi, a prefectural capital. The section's mild winters

stimulated some truck farming, specializing in growing out-of- season vegetables under plastic covering. Two crops of rice can

be cultivated annually in the southern portion. The pulp and paper

industry took advantage of the abundant forests and hydroelectric

power.

Kyushu

Kyushu, meaning "nine provinces" (from its ancient administrative structure), is the southernmost of the main islands and in

modern times comprises seven prefectures. It was the stepping stone

to Honshu for early migrants from the Korean Peninsula and a channel for the spread of ideas from the Asian mainland (see Early

Developments, ch. 1). Kyushu lies at the western end of the In- land Sea. Its northern extremity is only about 1 .6 kilometers from

Honshu, and the two islands are connected by the Kammon Bridge

and by three tunnels, including one for the Japan Railways Group's

Shinkansen (bullet train). The region is divided not only geographically, but economically, by the Kyushu Mountains, which run di- agonally across the middle of the island. The north, including

Kitakyushu industrial region, became increasingly urbanized and

industrialized after World War II, while the agricultural south be- came relatively poorer. The hilly northwestern part of the island

has extensive coal deposits, the second largest in Japan, which

formed the basis for a large iron and steel industry. An extensive

lowland area, in the northwest, between Kumamoto and Saga, was

an important farming district in the late 1980s.

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Japan: A Country Study

The climate of Kyushu is generally warm and humid, and the

cultivation of vegetables and fruits was supplemented by cattle rais- ing. The cities of Kitakyushu and Sasebo were noted for iron and

steel production, and Nagasaki for manufacturing. Nagasaki is a

city of historical and cultural importance, a center for Chinese and

Western influences from the sixteenth century on, and the only

port open to foreign ships during most of the Tokugawa period.

Like Hiroshima, it also was rebuilt after being devastated by an

atomic bomb attack in 1945.

Ryukyu Islands

The Ryukyu Islands include more than 200 islands and islets

some little more than coral outcrops—of which fewer than half are populated. They extend in a chain generally southwestward from

the Tokara Strait, which separates them from the oudying islands

of Kyushu, to within 120 kilometers of Taiwan. The Ryukyus are considered part of the Ryushu region but historically have been

quite distinctively separate from the rest of the region.

The islands are the tops of mountain ranges along the outer edge

of the continental shelf. They are generally hilly or mountainous,

with active volcanos occurring mainly in the northern part of the

archipelago. Okinawa is the largest and economically the most important of the Ryukyus. There was little industry in the 1980s, and

the economy relied heavily on tourism. Northern Okinawa is quite

rugged and forested, while the southern part consists of rolling hills. Although agriculture and fishing remained the occupations of most

of the population in the Ryukyus, the region experienced considerable industrial expansion during the period of United States occu- pation from 1945 to 1972.

Climate

Lying in the middle latitudes, covering about 22° of latitude in

the northern hemisphere, Japan is generally a rainy country with

high humidity. Because of its wide range of latitude, Japan has

diverse climates, with a range often compared to that of the east coast of North America, from Nova Scotia to Georgia. Tokyo's

latitude is about 36° north, comparable to that of Tehran, Athens,

or Los Angeles. The generally humid, temperate climate exhibits

marked seasonal variation celebrated in art and literature, as well

as regional variations ranging from cool in Hokkaido to subtropical in Kyushu. Climate also varies with altitude and with location on the Pacific Ocean or on the Sea ofJapan. Northern Japan has

warm summers but long, cold winters with heavy snow. Central

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The Society and Its Environment

Japan has hot, humid summers and short winters, and southwestern

Japan has long, hot, humid summers and mild winters.

Two primary factors influence Japanese climate: a location near

the Asian continent and the existence of major oceanic currents. The climate from June to September is marked by hot, wet weather

brought by tropical airflows from the Pacific Ocean and Southeast

Asia. These airflows are full of moisture and deposit substantial

amounts of rain when they reach land. There is a marked rainy

season, beginning in early June and continuing for about a month.

It is followed by hot, sticky weather. Five or six typhoons pass over

or near Japan every year from early August to early September,

sometimes resulting in significant damage. Annual precipitation,

which averages between 100 and 200 centimeters, is concentrated

in the period between June and September. In fact, 70 to 80 per- cent of the annual precipitation falls during this period. In winter, a high-pressure area develops over Siberia, and a low-pressure area over the northern Pacific Ocean. The result is a flow of cold air eastward across Japan that brings freezing temperatures and heavy

snowfalls to the central mountain ranges facing the Sea of Japan,

but clear skies to areas fronting on the Pacific.

Two major ocean currents affect this climatic pattern. The warm

Kuroshio Current (Black Current; also known as the Japan Current) and the cold Oyashio Current (Parent Current; also known

as the Okhotsk Current). The Kuroshio Current flows northward on the Pacific side ofJapan and warms areas as far north as Tokyo;

a small branch, the Tsushima Current, flows up the Sea ofJapan

side. The Oyashio Current, which abounds in plankton beneficial

to cold-water fish, flows southward along the northern Pacific, cool- ing adjacent coastal areas. The meeting point of these currents at latitude 36° north is a bountiful fishing ground.

Earthquakes

Ten percent of the world's active volcanos—40 in the 1980s

(another 148 were dormant)—are found in Japan, which lies in a zone of extreme crustal instability. As many as 1 ,500 earthquakes

are recorded yearly, and magnitudes of four to six on the Richter

scale are not uncommon. Minor tremors occur almost daily in one

part of the country or another, causing slight shaking of buildings.

Major earthquakes occur infrequently; the most famous in the twentieth century was the great Kanto earthquake of 1923, in which

130,000 people died. Undersea earthquakes also expose the Japanese coastline to danger from tsunami.

Japan has become a world leader in research on causes and

prediction of earthquakes. The development of advanced technology

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Japan: A Country Study

has permitted the construction of skyscrapers even in earthquakeprone areas. Extensive civil defense efforts focus on training in protection against earthquakes, in particular against accompanying

fire, which represents the greatest danger.

Pollution

As Japan changed from an agricultural society to an urbanized

industrial power, much of its natural beauty was destroyed and

defaced by overcrowding and industrial development. However,

as the world's leading importer of both exhaustible and renewable

natural resources and the second largest consumer of fossil fuels,

Japan came to realize that it had a major international responsibility to conserve and protect the environment. By 1990 Japan had some of the world's strictest environmental protection regulations.

These regulations were the consequence of a number of well publicized environmental disasters. Cadmium poisoning from industrial waste in Toyama Prefecture was discovered to be the cause

of the extremely painful itai-itai disease {itai-itai means ouch-ouch),

which causes severe pain in the back and joints, contributes to britde

bones that fracture easily, and brings about degeneration of the

kidneys. Recovery of cadmium effluent halted the spread of the

disease, and no new cases have been recorded since 1946. In the

1960s, hundreds of inhabitants of Minamata City in Kumamoto

Prefecture contracted "Minamata disease," a degeneration of the

central nervous system caused by eating mercury-poisoned seafood

from Minamata Bay (nearly 1 ,300 cases of Minamata disease had

been diagnosed by 1979). In Yokkaichi, a port in Mie Prefecture,

air pollution caused by sulfur oxide and nitrogen oxide emissions

led to a rapid increase in the number of people suffering from

asthma and bronchitis. In urban areas, photochemical smog from

automotive and industrial exhaust fumes also contributed to the

rise in respiratory problems. In the early 1970s, chronic arsenic

poisoning attributed to dust from local arsenic mines (since shut

down) was experienced in Shimane and Miyazaki prefectures. The

incidence of polychlorobiphenyl (PCB) poisoning, caused by polluted cooking oil and food, particularly seafood, was also problematic.

Grass-roots pressure groups were formed in the 1960s and 1970s

as a response to increasing environmental problems. These groups were independent of formal political parties and focused on single, usually local, environmental issues. Such citizens' movements

were reminiscent of earlier citizen protests in the 1890s. As a result of this pressure, Japan began in the early 1970s to combat pollution on an official governmental level, with the establishment of

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The Society and Its Environment

the Environmental Agency. Although the agency lacked strong public influence and political power, it established effective regulations

to curb pollution from photochemical smog through strict automotive emissions standards. It also worked to reduce noise from trains

and airplanes, to remove mining, forestry, and tourist debris left on mountainsides and in national forests, and to monitor noise and

air pollutant levels in major cities. Groups also pressured the government and industry for a sys- tem of compensation for pollution victims. A series of lawsuits in

the early 1970s established that corporations were responsible for damage cause by their products or activities. The Pollution Health

Damage Compensation Law of 1973 provides industry funds for

victims. Compensation, however, was slow, and awards small, while

the establishment of a government fund helped industry diffuse

public outrage. In 1984, it was reported that Japan had more than

85,000 recognized victims of environmental pollution, with an esti- mated rate of increase of 6 percent a year. The regulations aimed

at business were not enough to solve Japan's environmental

problems, according to the Environmental Agency's 1989 White

Paper on the Environment, although public awareness and interest had

grown and a number of civic and public interest groups had been

established to combat pollution. Fewer public interest groups were engaged in the environmental debate than in antinuclear issues,

and the peak of public interest in the environment occurred in the

1970s and early 1980s.

Japan had still not addressed worldwide environmental issues

adequately. Japanese whaling continued in the late 1980s to be the

object of international protest, and Japanese corporate involvement

in the deforestation of Southeast Asia created concern among

domestic and international groups.

The late 1980s saw the beginnings of change. In a 1984 public

opinion poll conducted by the government, Japanese citizens had

indicated less concern for environmental problems than their European counterparts. In the same year, the Environmental Agency

had issued its first white paper calling for greater participation by

Japan's public and private sectors in protecting the global environment. That challenge was repeated in the 1989 study. When citizens were asked in 1989 if they thought environmental problems had

improved compared with the past, nearly 41 percent thought things

had improved, 31 percent thought that they had stayed the same,

and nearly 21 percent thought that they had worsened. Some 75

percent of those surveyed expressed concern about endangered species, shrinkage of rain forests, expansion of deserts, destruction of

the ozone layer, acid rain, and increased water and air pollution

85
Japan: A Country Study

in developing cquntries. Most believed that Japan, alone or in

cooperation withbther industrialized countries, had the responsibility to solve environmental problems. Although environmental

public interest groups were not as numerous or active as they had

been in the 1970s, the increased awareness of global environmental issues was likely to result in increased grass-roots activism.

Since the 1960s, Japan has made slow but significant progress

in combating environmental problems. Efforts made in the late 1980s created a base of technology and concern that was expected

to help the Japanese face the environmental issues of the 1990s.

Population

With a population of 122.6 million in 1988, Japan was three times more densely populated than Europe as a whole and twelve times more densely populated than the United States. The population

has grown more than threefold since 1872, when it stood at 34.8

million. Beginning in the 1950s the birth rate declined, however,

and by the late 1980s the rate of natural increase was 0.5 percent,

the lowest in the world outside Europe. Both the density and the

age structure ofJapan's population are likely to influence the country's future.

Population Density

Japan had an average of 324 persons per square kilometer in

1988, high compared with China (115), the United States (26), or

the Soviet Union (13), but lower than in some other Asian countries, such as the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which had 428

people per square kilometer. The population per square kilometer

of habitable land in 1988 was 1,523 persons, however, compared

with 384 in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany),

165 in France, and 54 in the United States. About 77 percent of

the population lived in urban areas, and the Pacific Coast from

Tokyo to Osaka was particularly densely populated. Well over 50

percent of the Japanese population lived on slightly over 2 percent

of its land.

Japan's population density has helped promote extremely high

land prices. Between 1955 and 1989, land prices in the six largest

cities increased 15,456 percent. Urban land prices generally in- creased 40 percent from 1980 to 1987; in the six largest cities, the

price of land doubled over that period. For many families, this trend

put housing in central cities out of reach. The result was lengthy

commutes for many workers; daily commutes of up to two hours

each way were not uncommon in the Tokyo area in the late 1980s.

Despite the large amount of forested land in Japan, parks in cities

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The Society and Its Environment

were smaller and scarcer than in major European or United States

cities, which averaged ten times the amount of parkland per in- habitant. However, despite the high cost of urban housing, more

people were likely to move back into central city areas, especially

as the price of transportation and commuting time increased. National and regional governments devoted resources to making

regional cities and rural areas more attractive by developing trans- portation networks, social services, industry, and education insti- tutions in attempts to decentralize settlement and improve the

quality of life. Nevertheless, major cities, especially Tokyo, re- mained attractive to young people seeking education and jobs.

Age Structure

Like other postindustrial countries, Japan in the 1980s faced the

problems associated with an aging population (see Patterns of Development, ch. 4). In 1988, only 11.2 percent of the population was sixty-five years or older, but projections were that nearly 24

percent would be in that age category by 2020 (see table 2, Appendix). That shift will make Japan one of the world's most el- derly societies, and the change will have taken place in a shorter

span of time than in any other country.

This aging of the population was brought about by a combination of low fertility and high life expectancies. In 1988, the fertil- ity rate was 11.9 per 1,000, and the average number of children

born to a woman over her lifetime had been fewer than two since

the late 1970s (the average number was 1 .7 in the mid-1980s). Family planning was nearly universal, with condoms and legal abortions

the main forms of birth control. A number of factors contributed

to the trend toward small families: late marriage, increased participation of women in the labor force, small living spaces, and the

high costs of children's education. Life expectancies at birth, 81.3

years for women and 75.5 years for men in 1988, were the highest

in the world. (The expected life span at the end of World War II, for both men and women, was fifty years.) The mortality rate in

1988 was 6 per 1,000. The leading causes of death were cancer, heart disease, and cerebrovascular disease, a pattern common to postindustrial societies (see Health Care, this ch.).

Public policy, the media, and discussions with private citizens

revealed a high level of concern for the implications of one in four

persons in Japan being sixty-five or older. By 2025 the dependency ratio (the ratio of people under fifteen years plus those sixtyfive and older to those aged fifteen to sixty-five, indicating in a general way the ratio of the dependent population to the working

population) was expected to be two dependents for every three

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Japan: A Country Study

Figure 4. Age-Sex Distribution, 1988

workers. The aging of the population was already becoming evi- dent in the aging of the labor force and the shortage of young workers in the late 1980s, with potential impacts on employment

practices, wages and benefits, and the roles of women in the labor

force (see The Structure of Japan's Labor Markets, ch. 4). The

increasing proportion of elderly people in the population also had

a major impact on government spending. As recently as the early

1970s, social expenditures amounted to only about 6 percent of

Japan's national income. In 1989, that portion of the national budget was 18 percent, and it was expected that by 2025, 27 percent

of national income would be spent on social welfare.

In addition, the median age of the elderly population was rising

in the late 1980s (see fig. 4). The proportion of people aged seventyfive to eighty-five was expected to increase from 6 percent in 1985

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The Society and Its Environment

to 15 percent in 2025. Because the incidence of chronic disease in- creases with age, the health-care and pension systems, too, were

expected to come under severe strain. The government in the

mid-1980s began to reevaluate the relative burdens of government

and the private sector in health care and pensions, and it established policies to control government costs in these programs.

Recognizing the lower probability that an elderly person will be

residing with an adult child and the higher probability of any daughter or daughter-in-law's participation in the paid labor force, the

government encouraged establishment of nursing homes, day-care

facilities for the elderly, and home health programs. Longer life spans were altering relations between spouses and across generations, creating new government responsibilities, and changing vir- tually all aspects of social life. Migration

Between 6 million and 7 million people moved their residences

each year during the 1980s. About 50 percent of these moves were

within the same prefecture; the others were relocations from one

prefecture to another. During Japan's economic development in

the twentieth century, and especially during the 1950s and 1960s,

migration was characterized by urbanization as people from rural areas in increasing numbers moved to the larger metropolitan areas

in search of better jobs and education. Out-migration from rural

prefectures continued in the late 1980s, but more slowly than in

previous decades.

In the 1980s, government policy provided support for new urban

development away from the large cities, particularly Tokyo, and

assisted regional cities to attract young people to live and work there. Regional cities offered familiarity to those from nearby areas, lower

costs of living, shorter commutes, and, in general, a more relaxed

life-style then could be had in larger cities. Young people continued

to move to large cities, however, to attend universities and find

work, but some returned to regional cities (a pattern known as U-turn) or to their prefecture of origin (a pattern known as J-turn).

Government statistics show that in the 1980s significant numbers of people left the largest cities (Tokyo and Osaka). In 1988, more than 500,000 people left Tokyo, which experienced a net loss through migration of nearly 73,000 for the year. Osaka had a net

loss of nearly 36,000 in the same year. However, the prefectures

showing the highest net growth were located near the major urban

centers, such as Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, and Kanazawa around

Tokyo, and Hyogo, Nara, and Shiga near Osaka and Kyoto. This

pattern suggests a process of suburbanization, people moving away

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Japan: A Country Study

from the cities for affordable housing but still commuting there for work and recreation, rather than a true decentralization.

Japanese economic success has led to an increase in certain types

of external migration. In 1988, about 8.5 million Japanese went

abroad. Over 80 percent of these people traveled as tourists, especially visiting other parts of Asia and North America. However,

about 548,000 Japanese were living abroad, 48,000 of whom had

permanent foreign residency, about four times the number who

had that status in 1975. Nearly 200,000 Japanese went abroad in

1988 for extended periods of study, research, or business assignments. As the government and private corporations have stressed

internationalization, greater numbers of individuals have been

directly affected, decreasing Japan's historically claimed insularity.

Despite the benefits of experiencing life abroad, individuals who have

lived outside of Japan for extended periods often faced problems

of discrimination upon their return because others might no longer

consider them fully Japanese. By the late 1980s, these problems,

particularly the bullying of returnee children in the schools, had be- come a major public issue both in Japan and in Japanese communities abroad (see Primary and Secondary Education, ch. 3). Minorities

Japanese society, with its ideology of homogeneity, has traditionally been intolerant of ethnic and other differences. People identified as different might be considered "polluted" —the category

applied historically to the outcasts of Japan, particularly the

burakumin—and thus not suitable as marriage partners or employees.

Men or women of mixed ancestry, those with family histories of

certain diseases, atomic bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

and their descendants, foreigners, and members of minority groups

faced discrimination in a variety of forms.

Foreign Residents

If Japanese society was reluctant to readmit returnees in the

1980s, it was even less willing to accept those people who were not

ethnic Japanese as full members of society. In 1988 there were

941,000 foreign residents in Japan, less than 1 percent ofJapan's

population (if illegal aliens were counted, the number of foreigners might be several times higher than the quoted figure). Of this number, 677,000 (about 72 percent) were Koreans, and 129,000

(some 14 percent) were Chinese. Many of these people were descendants of those brought to Japan during Japan's occupation of Taiwan (1895-1945) and of Korea (1905-45) to work at unskilled jobs,

such as coal mining. Because Japanese citizenship was based on

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The Society and Its Environment

the nationality of the parent rather than the place of birth, subsequent generations were not automatically Japanese and had to be

naturalized to claim citizenship, despite being born and educated

in Japan and speaking only Japanese, as was the case with most

Koreans in Japan. Until the late 1980s, people applying for citizen- ship were expected to use only the Japanese renderings of their names and, even as citizens, continued to face discrimination in

education, employment, and marriage. Thus, few chose naturalization, and they faced legal restrictions as foreigners as well as ex- treme social prejudice.

All non-Japanese were required by law to register with the

government and carry alien registration cards. From the early

1980s, a civil disobedience movement encouraged refusal of the

fingerprinting that accompanied registration every five years. Those

people who opposed fingerprinting argued that it was discriminatory since the only Japanese who were fingerprinted were criminals. The courts upheld fingerprinting, but the law was changed

so that fingerprinting was done once rather than with each renewal of the registration. Some Koreans, often with the support of either

the Republic of Korea (South Korea) or the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (North Korea), attempted to educate their chil- dren in Korean language, history, and culture and to instill pride

in their Korean heritage. Most Koreans in Japan in 1990, however,

had never been to the Korean Peninsula, and did not speak Korean.

Many were caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and discrimination in a society that emphasized Japan's homogeneity and cultural uniqueness. Other Asians, too, whether students or permanent

residents, faced prejudice and a strong "we-they" distinction. Europeans and North Americans might be treated with greater hospitality but nonetheless found it difficult to become full members of

Japanese society. Public awareness of the place of foreigners (gaijiri) in Japanese society was heightened in the late 1980s in debates over

the acceptance of Vietnamese and Chinese refugees and the importing of Filipino brides for rural farmers.

Burakumin

Despite Japan's claim of homogeneity, two Japanese minority

groups can be identified. The largest is known as burakumin (liter- ally, residents of buraku, hamlets), descendants of premodern outcast hereditary occupational groups, such as butchers, leatherworkers,

and certain entertainers. Discrimination against these occupational

groups arose historically because of Buddhist prohibitions against

killing and Shinto notions of pollution, as well as governmental at- tempts at social control. During the Tokugawa period, such people

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Japan: A Country Study

were required to live in special buraku and, like the rest of the population, were bound by sumptuary laws based on the inheritance

of social class. The Meiji government abolished derogatory names

applied to burakumin in 1871, but the new laws had little effect on

the social discrimination faced by the former outcasts and their

descendants. The laws, however, did eliminate the economic monopoly they had over certain occupations.

Burakumin in 1990, although physically indistinguishable from

other Japanese, often lived in urban ghettoes or in the traditional

special hamlets in rural areas. Some attempted to pass as ordinary

Japanese, but the checks on family background that were often part

of marriage arrangements and employment applications made this

difficult. Estimates on the number of burakumin ranged from 2 million to 4 million, or about 2 to 3 percent of the national population.

Ordinary Japanese claimed that burakumin status can be sur- mised from the location of the family home, occupation, dialect, or mannerisms, and, despite legal equality, continued to discriminate against people they surmised to be burakumin. Past and cur- rent discrimination had resulted in lower educational attainment

and socioeconomic status among burakumin than among the majority

ofJapanese. Movements with objectives ranging from "liberation"

to encouraging integration have tried over the years to change this situation. As early as 1922, leaders of the burakumin community or- ganized a movement, the Levelers Association ofJapan (Suiheisha),

to advance their rights. After World War II, the National Committee for Burakumin Liberation was founded, changing its name to the Burakumin Liberation League in the 1950s. The league, with

the support of the socialist and communist parties, pressured government into making important concessions in the late 1960s and 1970s.

One concession was the passing of a Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects, which provided financial aid for burakumin communities. Another was the closing of nineteenth-century family

registers, kept by the Ministry ofJustice for all Japanese, which re- vealed the outcaste origins of burakumin families and individuals.

These records could now be consulted only in legal cases, making

it more difficult to identify or discriminate against burakumin. Even

into the 1980s, however, the subjects of burakumin discrimination

and liberation were taboo in public discussion. In the late 1970s,

the Sayama incident, which involved a murder conviction of a

burakumin based on circumstantial evidence, focused public atten- tion on the problems of the burakumin. In the 1980s, some educators and local governments, particularly in areas with relatively large

burakumin populations, began special education programs, which they

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The Society and Its Environment

hoped would encourage greater educational and economic success

for young burakumin and decrease the discrimination they faced.

Ainu

The second minority group amongJapanese citizens is the Ainu,

who are thought to be related to Tungusic, Altaic, and Uralic peoples of Siberia. Historically, the Ainu (Ainu means human in the

Ainu language) were an indigenous hunting and gathering population who occupied most of northern Honshu as late as the Nara

period (A.D. 710-94). As Japanese settlement expanded, the Ainu

were pushed northward, until by the Meiji period, they were confined by the government to a small area in Hokkaido, in a manner similar to the placing of native Americans on reservations.

Characterized as remnants of a primitive circumpolar culture, the

fewer than 20,000 Ainu in 1990 were considered racially distinct

and thus not fully Japanese. Disease and a low birth rate had se- verely diminished their numbers over the past two centuries and

intermarriage had brought about an almost completely mixed population.

Although no longer in daily use, the Ainu language in 1990 was

preserved in epics, songs, and stories transmitted orally over suc- ceeding generations. Distinctive rhythmic music and dances and some Ainu festivals and crafts were preserved, but mainly in order

to take advantage of tourism.

Values and Beliefs

Contemporary Japan is a secular society. Creating harmonious

relations with others through reciprocity and the fulfillment of social obligations is more significant for most Japanese than an in- dividual's relationship to a transcendent God. Harmony, order,

and self-development are three of the most important values that

underlie Japanese social interaction. Basic ideas about self and the

nature of human society are drawn from several religious and

philosophical traditions. Religious practice, too, emphasizes the

maintenance of harmonious relations with others (both spiritual

beings and other humans) and the fulfillment of social obligations

as a member of a family and a community.

Values

Empathy and Human Relations

In Japanese mythology, the gods display human emotions, such

as love and anger. In these stories, behavior that results in positive

relations with others is rewarded, and empathy, identifying oneself

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Japan: A Country Study

with another, is highly valued. By contrast, those actions that are

antisocial, or that harm others, are condemned. Hurtful behavior

is punished in the myths by ostracizing the offender.

No society can exist that tolerates significant antisocial behavior

in the long term, but Japan is among the societies that most strongly

rely on social rather than supernatural sanctions and emphasize

the benefits of harmony. Japanese children learn from their earli- est days that human fulfillment comes from close association with

others. Children learn early to recognize that they are part of an

interdependent society, beginning in the family and later extending to larger groups such as neighborhood, school, community,

and workplace. Dependence on others is a natural part of the human

condition; it is viewed negatively only when the social obligations

it creates are too onerous to fulfill. In interpersonal relationships, most Japanese tend to avoid open

competition and confrontation. Working with others requires self- control, but it carries the rewards of pride in contributing to the

group, emotional security, and social identity. Wa, the notion of

harmony within a group, requires an attitude of cooperation and

a recognition of social roles. If each individual in the group understands personal obligations and empathizes with the situations of

others, then the group as a whole benefits. Success can come only

if all put forth their best individual efforts. Decisions are often made

only after consulting with everyone in the group. Consensus does

not imply that there has been universal agreement, but this style

of consultative decision making involves each member of the group

in an information exchange, reinforces feelings of group identity,

and makes implementation of the decision smoother. Cooperation

within a group also is often focused on competition between that

group and a parallel one, whether the issue is one of educational

success or market share. Symbols such as uniforms, names, banners, and songs identify the group as distinct from others both to outsiders and internally. Participation in group activities, whether

official or unofficial, is a symbolic statement that an individual

wishes to be considered part of the group. Thus, after-work bar

hopping provides not only instrumental opportunities for the ex- change of information and release of social tensions, but also opportunities to express nonverbally a desire for continued affiliation. Working in a group in Japan requires the development of successful channels of communication, which reinforce group interdependence and the sense of difference from those who are not

members of the group. Yet social interaction beyond that which

occurs with individuals with whom one lives and works is a necessity in contemporary society. If the exchange is brief and relatively

94
Practitioners of Kendo

the "way oj the sword"—a form of spiritual

discipline combined with ancient Chinese fencing techniques

Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger

insignificant, such as buying a newspaper, anonymity will be maintained. But if the relationship is expected to continue over a long

period, whether in business, marriage, employment, or neighborhood, great care is likely to be invested in establishing and maintaining good relationships. Such relationships are often begun by

using the social networks of a relative, friend, or colleague who

can provide an introduction to the desired person or serve as nakodo

(go-between). The nakodo most often refers to the person (or people) who negotiates marriage arrangements, including checking each

family's background, conveying questions and criticisms, and

smoothing out difficulties. But this kind of personal mediation is common in many aspects of Japanese life. Group membership in Japan provides enjoyment and fulfillment,

but also causes tremendous tension. An ideology of group harmony

does not ensure harmony in fact. Japan is an extremely competitive society, yet competition within the group must be suppressed.

Minor issues are sometimes dealt with by appeals to higher authority, but they may well smolder unresolved for years. Major problems

may be denied, especially to outsiders, but may result in factions or in the fissioning of the group (see Interest Groups, ch. 6). It

is often the individual, however, who bears the burden of these

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Japan: A Country Study

interpersonal tensions. This burden is reflected in high rates of al- cohol consumption and of minor, sometimes psychosomatic, ill- ness. Many Japanese cope with these stresses by retreating into

the private self or by enjoying the escapism offered by much of

the popular culture (see The Arts, ch. 3). The Public Sphere: Order and Status

It is difficult to imagine a Japanese vision of the social order

without the influence of Confucianism, because prior to the advent of Chinese influence in the sixth century, Japan did not have

a stratified society (see Religious and Philosophical Traditions, this ch.). Confucianism emphasizes harmony among heaven, nature,

and human society achieved through each person's accepting his or her social role and contributing to the social order by proper

behavior. An often quoted phrase from the Confucian essay "Da

Xue" (The Great Learning) explains, "Their persons being cul- tivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly

governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy."

This view implies that hierarchy is natural. Relative status differ- ences define nearly all social interaction. Age or seniority, gender,

educational attainment, and place of employment are common dis- tinctions that guide interaction. Without some knowledge of the

other's background, age and gender may be an individual's only

guidelines. A Japanese person may prefer not to interact with a

stranger to avoid potential errors in etiquette. The business cards

or calling cards so frequently exchanged in Japan are valuable tools of social interaction because they provide enough information about

another person to facilitate normal social exchange. Japan scholar

Edwin O. Reischauer noted that whereas Americans often act to minimize status differences, Japanese find it awkward, even un- becoming, when a person does not behave in accordance with sta- tus expectations.

The Japanese language is one means of expressing status differ- ences and contributes to the assumption that hierarchy is natural.

Verb endings regularly express relationships of superiority or in- feriority. Japanese has a rich vocabulary of honorific and humble

terms that indicate a person's status or may be manipulated to ex- press what the speaker desires the relationship to be. Men and

women employ somewhat different speech patterns, with women

making greater use of polite forms. Certain words are identified

with masculine speech and others with feminine. For example, there are a number of ways to say the pronoun "I," depending on the

formality of the occasion, the gender of the speaker, and the relative

96
People and goods being ferried from Nagasaki

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

status of the speaker and listener. As is appropriate in a culture

that stresses the value of empathy, one person cannot speak without

considering the other.

The term hierarchy implies a ranking of roles and a rigid set of

rules, and Japan has its share of bureaucracy. But the kind of

hierarchical sense that pervades the whole society is of a different

sort, which anthropologist Robert Smith calls "diffuse order." For

example, in premodern times, local leaders were given a great deal

of autonomy in exchange for assuming total responsibility for af- fairs in their localities. In contemporary Japan also, responsibility

is collective and authority diffuse. The person seeming to be in

charge is, in reality, bound into the web of group interdependence

as tightly as those who appear to be his subordinates. Leadership

thus calls not for a forceful personality and sharp decision-making

skills, but for sensitivity to the feelings of others and skills in mediation. Even in the early 1990s, leaders were expected to assume

responsibility for a major problem occurring in or because of their

groups by resigning their posts, although they may have had no

direct involvement in the situation.

Status in Japan is based on specific relationships between in- dividuals, often relationships of social dependency between those

of unequal status. Girt (duty), the sense of obligation to those to

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Japan: A Country Study

whom one is indebted, requires deferential behavior and eventually repayment of the favor, which in turn calls forth future favors.

Relations of social dependence thus continue indefinitely, with their

very inequality binding individuals to each other. Rules of hierarchy are tempered by the relationship itself. This tempering is known as ninjo (human emotion or compassion). The potential conflict between giri and ninjo has been a frequent theme in Japanese

drama and literature (see Performing Arts; Literature, ch. 3). Although young Japanese in 1990 were less likely to phrase a per- sonal dilemma in those terms, claiming that the concept of gin was

old-fashioned, many continued to feel stress in doing what they

should when it was not what they wanted. Social order exists in

part because all members of the society are linked in relationships

of social dependency, each involved in giving and receiving.

The Private Sphere: Goals and Self

Relative status may be seen as the basis of social organization

and affiliation with others may be considered desirable, but these

assumptions by no means negate a concept of self. An ideology

of harmony with others does not automatically create a congruence

of individual with group or institutional goals. Anthropologist Brian

Moeran distinguishes Japanese attitudes toward individuality and

individualism. Individuality, or the uniqueness of a person, is not

only tolerated, but often admired if the person is seen as sincere, as acting from the heart. A work of art conveys strength as well

as beauty from its * 'individuality." Individualism, on the other

hand, is viewed negatively, for it is equated with selfishness, the

opposite of the empathy that is so highly valued. While many

modern Japanese deny the relevance of the concept of seishin (self- less spiritual strength, as in World War II soldiers), selfishness (especially "selfish mothers," because the behavior of mothers is commonly thought to effect the mental and physical health of chil- dren) takes the blame for many social problems of modern soci- ety. These problems include ones categorized as psychosomatic

medical syndromes, such as kitchen syndrome (dadokoro shokogun),

in which formerly meticulous housewives suddenly adopt odd behaviors and complain of aches and pains, nonverbally expressing

their frustration with or rejection of the "good wife-wise mother"

role, or school-refusal syndrome (toko kyohi), in which children complain of somatic problems, such as stomachaches, and thus miss

school in an attempt to avoid academic or social failure. Japan, like all other societies, has conflicts between individual

and group. What is different from North American society is not

that the Japanese have no sense of self, but rather that the self is

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The Society and Its Environment

defined through its interaction with others and not merely through

the force of individual personality.

According to Japan scholar Edwin O. Reischauser, "The cooperative, relativistic Japanese is not thought of as the bland product

of a social conditioning that has worn off all individualistic cor- ners, but rather as the product of firm inner self-control that has

made him master of his . . . anti- social instincts .... Social con- formity . . . is no sign of weakness but rather the proud, tempered

product of inner strength." This mastery is achieved by overcoming hardship, through self-discipline, and through personal striv- ing for a perfection that one knows is not possible but remains a worthy goal. In this view, both the self and society can be improved,

and in fact are interrelated, since the ideal of selfhood toward which

many Japanese strive is one in which consideration of others is para- mount. Whereas Americans attempt to cultivate a self that is unique, most Japanese place greater emphasis on cultivating "a

self that can feel human in the company of others," according to David Plath. Maturity means continuing to care about what others are thinking but feeling confident in one's ability to judge and act

effectively, acknowledging social norms while remaining true to self. Religious and Philosophical Traditions

The values described in the preceding section are derived from

a number of religious and philosophical traditions, both indigenous

and foreign. Taken together, these traditions may be considered

the Japanese world view, although the personal beliefs of an in- dividual Japanese may incorporate some aspects and disregard

others. The Japanese world view is eclectic, contrasting with a Western view in which religion is exclusive and defines one's identity. Contemporary Japanese society is highly secular. Cause and

effect relations are frequently based in scientific models, and ill- ness and death are explained by modern medical theories. Yet the

scientific view is but one of the options from which an individual

may draw in interpreting life's experiences.

The Japanese world view is characterized also by a pragmatic

approach to problem solving, in which the technique may be less important than the results. Thus a Japanese who is ill may simultaneously or sequentially seek the assistance of a medical doctor,

obtain medication from a person trained in the Chinese herbal tra- dition, and visit a local shrine. Each of these actions is based on

a different belief in causation of the illness: the physician may say

that the illness is due to a bacterial infection; the herbalist regards

the body as being out of balance; and the basis of the shrine visit

is the belief that the mind must be cleansed to heal the body. In

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Japan: A Country Study

the West, these explanations might be viewed as mutually exclusive, but the Japanese patient may hold all of these views simultaneously without a sense of discord. Similarly, a student studying

for university entrance examinations knows that without extraor- dinary hard work, admission is impossible. Yet the student will probably also visit a special shrine to ask for the help of the spiritual

world in assuring success. The roots of the Japanese world view can be traced to several

traditions. Shinto, the only indigenous religion ofJapan, provided

the base. Confucianism, from China, provided concepts of hierarchy, loyalty, and the emperor as the son of heaven. Daoism, also from China, helped give order and sanction to the system of government implied in Shinto. Buddhism brought with it not only its con- templative religious aspects but also a developed culture of art and

temples, which had a considerable role in public life. Christianity

brought an infusion of Western ideas, particularly those involving

social justice and reform.

Shinto

Shinto (Way of the Gods) is the term used to refer to an assort- ment of beliefs and practices indigenous to Japan that predate the

arrival of Buddhism, but have in turn been influenced by it. The

Shinto world view is of a pantheistic universe of kami, spirits or gods with varying degrees of power.

Although each person is expected to continue existence as a kami

after death, Shinto is concerned with this world rather than with

the afterlife. This world contains defiling substances, and Shinto

ritual often involves mental and physical purification of a person

who has come into contact with a pollutant, such as death. Water

or salt commonly serve as purifying agents. Some kami are guardian deities for villages, and thus they symbolize the unity of the

human community as well as mediating in its relationship with the

natural and supernatural worlds.

Japanese legends describe the activities and personalities of the

kami. The most well-known legends describe the creation of the

human world and trace the origins of the Japanese imperial family to the gods (see Ancient Cultures, ch. 1). The latter legend

formed the basis of the wide acceptance of the concept of the emperor's divine descent in pre- 1945 Japan.

In the fifth and sixth centuries, Shinto came under the influence

of Chinese Confucianism and Buddhism. From the former, it borrowed the veneration of ancestors, and from the latter it adopted

philosophical ideas and religious rites. Because of the popularity

of things Chinese and the ethical and philosophical attraction of

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The Society and Its Environment

Buddhism for the court and the imperial family, Shinto became

somewhat less influential than Buddhism for more than a millennium. Many people, however, were adherents to both systems of

belief. By the seventeenth century, Shinto began to emerge from

Buddhism's shadow through the influence of neo-Confucian ra- tionalism (see Intellectual Trends, ch. 1). The emerging nationalism of the late Tokugawa period combined with the political needs of the Meiji Restoration (1868)

oligarchs to reform Shinto into a state religion, and it flourished

as such until 1945 under government patronage. Japan's defeat

in World War II and the emperor's denial of his divinity brought an end to State Shinto (see The Status of the Emperor, ch. 6). Sometimes considered synonymous with State Shinto before 1945 was

Shrine Shinto (Jinja Shinto), but after the war most Shinto traditions were observed in the home rather than in shrines. Most

shrines, which had previously benefited from state sponsorship, were

organized into the Association of Shinto Shrines after 1946. Sect Shinto (Kyoha Shinto) consists of more than eighty private reli- gious sects, which conduct services in houses of worship or lecture

halls rather than in shrines.

In 1987 there were more than 81,350 Shinto shrines and 102,000

clergy in Japan. After World War II, the requirement of membership in a shrine parish was revoked, but in 1990 local shrines

still served as focal points for community identity for many

Japanese, and occasional informal or ritual visits are common.

Nearly 95 million Japanese citizens professed adherence to some

form of Shinto. Some of the Sect Shinto groups are considered new

religions.

Buddhism

Buddhism, which originated in India, was introduced into Japan

in the sixth century A.D. from Korea and China. Buddhism in- troduced ideas into Japanese culture that have become inseparable from the Japanese world view: the concept of rebirth, ideas of

karmic causation, and an emphasis on the unity of experience. It gained the patronage of the ruling class, which supported the building of temples and production of Buddhist art (see Cultural Developments and the Establishment of Buddhism, ch. 1). In the early

centuries of Buddhism in Japan, scholarly esoteric sects were popular, and the Buddhist influence was limited mainly to the upper

class. From the late Heian period (A.D. 794-1185) through the

Kamakura period (1185-1333), Pure Land (Jodo) and Nichiren

Shoshu sects, which had much wider appeal, spread throughout

all classes of society (see The Flourishing of Buddhism, ch. 1). These

101
4^

102
The 160-meter-high torii gate at Itsukushima Shrine, in Hiroshima

Bay, dedicated to Shinto kami, who protect seafarers and oversee fishing

Courtesy Jane T. Griffin

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Japan: A Country Study

sects stressed experience and faith, promising salvation in a future

world. Zen Buddhism, which encourages the attainment of enlightenment through meditation and an austere life style, had wide appeal among the bushi or samurai—the warrior class—who had come

to have great political power (see The Rise of the Military Class,

ch. 1). Under the sponsorship of the ruling military class, Zen had

a major impact on Japanese aesthetics. In addition, Japan scholar

Robert Bellah has argued, Buddhist sects popular among com- moners in the Tokugawa period encouraged values such as hard

work and delayed rewards, which, like Protestantism in Europe,

helped lay the ideological foundation for Japan's industrial success. Buddhist funerary and ancestral rites remained pervasive in

Japan in the late 1980s. Although regular attendance at Buddhist

temples was rare, partly because many Buddhist sects did not observe community worship, there were in 1987 more than 77,000

temples and 274,000 clergy. Buddhist as well as Shinto priests marry

and often sons inherit the responsibility for their father's parish

at his death. The Nichiren school, based on belief in the Lotus Sutra and its doctrine of universal salvation, was the largest sect in Japan

in 1989, with 35,541,430 members. Its wide appeal was based on

the broad range of religious and social thought and the lay activities it incorporates.

Confucianism

Although not practiced as a religion, Confucianism from China

has deeply influenced Japanese thought. In essence, Confucianism is the practice of proper forms of conduct, especially in social

and familial relationships. It is derived from compilations attributed

to the fifth-century B.C. Chinese philosopher Kong Fuzi or Kongzi

(Confucius; in Japanese, Koshi). Confucian government was to be a moral government, bureaucratic in form and benevolent

toward the ruled. Confucianism also provided an hierarchical sys- tem, in which each person was to act according to his or her status

to create a harmoniously functioning society and ensure loyalty to the state. The teachings of filial piety and humanity continue to form the foundation for much of social life and ideas about family

and nation.

Neo-Confucianism, introduced to Japan in the twelfth century,

is an interpretation of nature and society based on metaphysical

principles, and influenced by Buddhist and Daoist ideas. In Japan,

where it is known as Shushigaku (Shushi School, after the Chinese

neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi—Shushi in Japanese), it brought

the idea that family stability and social responsibility are human

obligations. The school used various metaphysical concepts to

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Japan: A Country Study

explain the natural and social order. Shushigaku, in turn, influenced

the kokutai (national polity) theory, which emphasized the special

national characteristics of Japan.

Daoism

Daoism (literally, the way) from China has also influenced

Japanese thought, and has a special affinity for Zen Buddhism.

Zen's praise of emptiness, exhortations to act in harmony with nature, and admonitions to avoid discrimination and duality all are

parallel in Daoist beliefs. The lunar calendar, the selection of auspicious days for special events, the siting of buildings, and numerous folk medicinal treatments also have origins in Daoism and

continue as customs to varying degrees in contemporary Japanese

society. Daoism has also influenced native shamanistic traditions

and rituals. Christianity

Christianity was introduced in the sixteenth century by Portuguese and Spanish Roman Catholic missionaries, but, because

it was associated with Western imperialism and considered a threat

to Japanese political control, it was banned from the midseventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century (see Seclusion

and Social Control, ch. 1). With the reopening of Japan in the

mid- 1850s, missionaries again arrived. While fewer than 900,000

people (less than 1 percent of the population) considered themselves

Christian in the late 1980s, Christianity was respected for its contributions to society, particularly in education and social action.

In the late 1980s, about 64 percent of all Christians belonged to Protestant churches, about 32 percent to the Roman Catholic

Church, and about 4 percent to other Christian denominations.

There were more than 3,200 places of Christian worship in Japan.

New Religions

A number of religious organizations are generally labeled "new

religions" {shinko shukyo), although some date back to the early

nineteenth century. The largest are Soka Gakkai (Value Creation

Society), Rissho Koseikai (Society for the Establishment of Justice and Community for the Rise [of Buddhism]), and Tenrikyo

(Religion of Divine Wisdom), with more than 17 million, 6 million, and about 2.5 million members, respectively, in the late 1980s.

Both Soka Gakkai and Rissho Koseikai are offshoots of the Nichiren

Shoshu sect of Buddhism. Tenrikyo was once considered an off- shoot of Sect Shinto but is now regarded as independent of other

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The Society and Its Environment

divisions of Shinto. Some of the larger of these new religions were

active internationally as well as in Japan.

No one category can be used to describe all of the new religions.

What distinguishes them from popular or folk religions is their claim

to an organizational status equivalent to Shinto or Buddhism. Their

teachings are diverse, but most syncretize elements of Buddhist,

Shinto, Christian, and other beliefs. Most emphasize the dependence of the living on kami, the Buddha or Buddhist figures, or

ancestors. Some, such as Tenrikyo, are monotheistic and stress in- dividual salvation. For example, Rissho Koseikai adherents gather

in small groups to discuss religious issues and problems of daily

life. Most of the new religions provide special support to their adherents through small group meetings, and encourage solving

problems through ritual and proper behavior. Many stress harmonious relations with others, hard work, and sincerity as the way

to a better life. Most of the new religions were founded by charismatic lay people, often women, who had experienced transforming spiritual episodes and felt called upon to convey these experiences to others.

They stressed lay participation, involving small, local, face-to-face

groups as well as national organizations. They encouraged direct contact with the supernatural, and some groups practiced faith healing and mutual support techniques. People who joined these groups

often did so in response to personal problems, but many found con- tinuing fulfillment through their emphasis on returning to traditional values.

Religious Practice

Most Japanese participate in rituals and customs derived from

several religious traditions (see table 3, Appendix). Life cycle events

are often marked by visits to a Shinto shrine. The birth of a new

baby is celebrated with a formal shrine visit at the age of about one month, as are the third, fifth, and seventh birthdays and the

official beginning of adulthood at age twenty. Wedding ceremonies are often performed by Shinto priests, but Christian weddings

are also popular. In the early 1980s, more than 8 percent of weddings were held in a shrine or temple and nearly 4 percent in a

church. The most popular place for a wedding ceremony—chosen

by 41 percent—was a wedding hall. Funerals are most often performed by Buddhist priests, and

Buddhist rites are also common on death day anniversaries of deceased family members. Some Japanese do not perform ancestral

ceremonies at all, and some do so rather mechanically and awkwardly. But there have also been changes in these practices, such

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Japan: A Country Study

as more personal and private ceremonies and women honoring their

own as well as their husband's ancestors, that make them more

meaningful to contemporary participants.

There are two categories of holidays in Japan: matsuri (festivals),

which are largely of Shinto origin and relate to the cultivation of

rice and the spiritual well-being of the community; and nenchu gyd

(annual events), mainly of Chinese or Buddhist origin. The matsuri were supplemented during the Heian period with more festivals added, and they were organized into a formal calendar. In addition to the complementary nature of the different holidays, there were later accretions during the feudal period. Very few matsuri or nenchu gyd are national holidays, but they are included in the

national calendar of annual events (see table 4, Appendix).

Most holidays are secular in nature, but the two most significant for the majority ofJapanese—New Year's Day for Shinto believers

and Obon (also call Bon Festival) for Buddhists, which marks the

end of the ancestors' annual visit to their earthly home—involve

visits to Shinto shrines or Buddhist temples. The New Year's holi- day (January 1-3) is marked by the practice of numerous customs

and the consumption of special foods. These customs include time

for getting together with family and friends, for special television

programming, and for visiting Shinto shrines to pray for family bless- ings in the coming year. Dressing in a kimono, hanging out special

decorations, eating noodles on New Year's Eve to show continuity

into the new year, and playing a poetry card game are among the more "traditional" practices. During Obon season, in mid-August

(or mid-July depending on the locale), bon (spirit altars) are set up

in front of Buddhist family altars, which, along with ancestral graves, are cleaned in anticipation of the return of the spirits. As with the

New Year holiday, people living away from their family homes return

for visits with relatives. Celebrations include folk dancing and prayers

at the Buddhist temple as well as family rituals in the home.

Many Japanese also participate, at least as spectators, in one

of the many local matsuri celebrated throughout the country. Matsuri

may be sponsored by schools, towns, or other groups, but are most

often associated with Shinto shrines. As religious festivals, these

strike a Western observer as quite commercialized and secular, but

the many who plan the events, cook special foods, or carry the floats on their shoulders, find renewal of self and of community through

participation.

Religion and the State

Article 20 of the 1947 Constitution states that, "Freedom of

religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive

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Japan: A Country Study

any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority . . (see The Postwar Constitution, ch. 6). Contemporary re- ligious freedom fits well with the tolerant attitude of most Japanese

toward other religious beliefs and practices. Separation of religion

and the state, however, is a more difficult issue. Historically, there was no distinction between a scientific and

a religious world view. In early Japanese history, the ruling class was responsible for performing propitiatory rituals, which later came

to be identified as Shinto, and for the introduction and support

of Buddhism. Later, religious organization was used by regimes

for political purposes, as when the Tokugawa government required

each family to be registered as a member of a Buddhist temple for purposes of social control. In the late nineteenth century, rightists

created State Shinto, requiring that each family belong to a shrine

parish and that the concepts of emperor worship and a national

Japanese "family" be taught in the schools.

In the 1980s, the meaning of the separation of state and religion

again became controversial. The issue came to a head in 1985 when

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro paid an official visit to Yasukuni

Shrine, which honors Japanese war dead, including leaders from

the militarist period in the 1930s and 1940s (see The Rise of the

Militarists, ch. 1). Supporters of Nakasone's action (mainly on the

political right) argued that the visit was to pay homage to patriots;

others claimed that the visit was an attempt to revive State Shinto

and nationalistic extremism. The visit was protested by China,

North Korea, South Korea, and other countries occupied by Japan

in the first half of the twentieth century, and domestically by leftists, intellectuals, and the Japanese news media. Similar cases have oc- curred at local levels, and courts increasingly often have been asked

to clarify the division between religion and government. Separating religious elements of the Japanese world view from what is merely "Japanese" is not easy, especially given the ambiguous role of the emperor, whose divinity was denied in 1945, but who con- tinued to perform functions of both state and religion.

Social Organization

From birth Japanese are recognized as autonomous human beings.

However, from the beginning infants are influenced by society's emphasis on social interdependence. In fact, Japanese human development may be seen as a movement toward mastery of an ever- expanding circle of social life, beginning with the family, widening

to include school and neighborhood as children grow, and incorporating roles as colleague, inferior, and superior. Viewed in this perspective, socialization does not culminate with adolescence, for

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The Society and Its Environment

the individual must learn to be, for example, a section chief, a parent-teacher association member, or a grandparent at various

points in life. Many Westerners ask whether there is a Japanese self that exists apart from identification with a group. The answer lies in the

Japanese distinction between uchi (inside) and soto (outside). These

terms are relative, and the "we" implied in uchi can refer to the

individual, the family, a work group, a company, a neighborhood,

or even all of Japan. But it is always defined in opposition to a "they." The context or situation thus calls for some level of defi- nition of self. When an American businessman meets a Japanese

counterpart, the Japanese will define himself as a member of a particular company with which the American is doing business.

However, if the American makes a cultural mistake, the Japanese

is likely to define himself as Japanese as distinguished from a

foreigner. The American might go away from his encounter with

the belief that the Japanese think of themselves only as members

of a group. The same person attending a school event with one

of his children might be defined at the level of his family or household. Viewed relaxing at home or playing golf with former class- mates, he would perhaps have reached a level of definition more

similar to an American concept of self. From childhood, however, Japanese are taught that this level of self should not be assertive, but rather considerate of the needs

of others; the private emotions and perhaps the fun-loving, relaxed

side ofJapanese individuals are tolerated and even admired as long

as these do not interfere with the performance of more public

responsibilities. The proper performance of social roles is necessary to the smooth functioning of society. Individuals, aware of

private inner selves (and even resistance to the very roles they per- form), use a shifting scale of uchi and soto to define themselves in

various situations.

Family

The family is the earliest locus of social life for an individual

and provides a model of social organization for most later encounters with the wider world. Yet, as uchi, the Japanese family does

not have clear boundaries. At times the term family may refer to a nuclear family of parents and unmarried children. On other oc- casions it refers to a line of descent, and on still others it refers

to the household as a unit of production or consumption.

A great variety of family forms have existed historically in Japan,

from the matrilocal customs of the Heian elite, which are described

in Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji), to the extreme patrilineality of

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Japan: A Country Study

the samurai class in the feudal period. Numerous family forms,

through which ran a common belief in the existence of the familyhousehold beyond the life of its current members, coexisted, particularly in the countryside. Among the upper classes and wealthier merchant and artisan urban households of the Tokugawa period,

the chonin, providing for household continuity, and if possible enriching the household's estate, represented duty to one's ancestors and appreciation toward one's parents.

With the promulgation of the Domestic Relations and Inheritance

Law in 1898, the Japanese government institutionalized more rigid

family controls than most people had known in the feudal period.

Individuals were registered in an official family registry. In the early

twentieth century, each family was required to conform to the ie (household) system, with a multigenerational household under the

legal authority of a household head. In establishing the ie system,

the government moved the ideology of family in the opposite direction of trends resulting from urbanization and industrialization.

The ie system took as its model for the family the Confucianinfluenced pattern of the Tokugawa period upper classes. Authority

and responsibility for all members of the ie lay legally with the household head. Each generation supplied a male and female adult, with

a preference for first son inheritance and patrilocal marriage. When

possible, daughters were expected to marry out and younger sons

to establish their own households. Women could not legally own

or control property or select spouses. The ie system thus artifici- ally restricted the development of individualism, individual rights,

women's rights, and the nuclearization of the family. It formalized patriarchy and emphasized lineal and instrumental rather than

conjugal and emotional ties within the family.

After World War II, the Allied occupation forces established a new family ideology based on equal rights for women, equal in- heritance by all children, and free choice of spouse and career. From

the late 1960s, most marriages in Japan have been based on the

mutual attraction of the couple and not the arrangement of parents. Moreover, arranged marriages in the 1980s might have begun

with an introduction by a relative or family friend, but actual negotiations did not begin until all parties, including the bride and groom, were satisfied with the relationship.

Under the ie system, only a minority of households included three

generations at a time, since nonsuccessor sons (those who were notheirs) often set up their own household. From 1970 to 1983, the

proportion of three- generation households fell from 19 percent to 15 percent of all households, while two-generation households consisting of a couple and their unmarried children increased only

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The Society and Its Environment

slightly, from 41 percent to 42 percent of all households. The

greatest change has been the increase in couple-only households

and in elderly single-person households.

Public opinion surveys in the late 1980s seemed to confirm the

statistical movement away from the three- generation ie family

model. Half of the respondents did not think that the first son had

a special role to play in the family, and nearly two-thirds rejected

the need for adoption of a son in order to continue the family. Other

changes, such as an increase in filial violence and school refusal

suggest a breakdown of strong family authority.

Official statistics, however, indicate that Japanese concepts of

family continued to diverge from those in the United States in the

1980s. The divorce rate, although increasing slowly, remained at 1.3 per 1,000 marriages in 1987, low by international standards.

Strong gender roles remained the cornerstone of family responsibilities. Most survey respondents said that family life should emphasize parent-child ties over husband-wife relations. Nearly 80

percent of respondents in a 1 986 government survey believed that

the ancestral home and family grave should be carefully kept and

handed on to one's children. Over 60 percent thought it best for

elderly parents to live with one of their children. This sense of family as a unit that continued through time was stronger among people who had a livelihood to pass down, such as farmers, merchants, owners of small companies, and physicians, than among urban sal- ary and wage earners. Anthropologist Jane Bachnik noted the con- tinued emphasis on continuity in the rural families she studied.

Uchi (here, the contemporary family) were considered the living

members of an ie, which had no formal existence. Yet, in each

generation, there occurred a sorting of members into permanent

and temporary members, defining different levels of uchi. Various family life-styles exist side by side in contemporary

Japan. In many urban families, the husband may commute to work

and return late, having little time with his children except for Sundays, a favorite day for family outings. The wife might be a "professional housewife," with nearly total responsibility for raising

children, assuring their careers and marriages, running the household, and managing the family budget. She also has primary responsibility for maintaining social relations with the wider circles of

relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances, and for managing the family's reputation. Her social life remains separate from that of her

husband. It is increasingly likely that in addition to these family

responsibilities, she would also have a part-time job or participate

in adult education or other community activities. The closest emotional ties within such families are between the mother and children.

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Japan: A Country Study

In other families, particularly among the self-employed, husband

and wife work side by side in a family business. Although genderbased roles are clear cut, they might not be as rigidly distinct as

in a household where work and family are more separated. In such

families, fathers are more involved in their children's development

because they have more opportunity for interacting with them.

As women worked outside of the home with increasing frequency

in the 1970s and 1980s, there was pressure on their husbands to take on more responsibility for housework and child care. Farm

families, who depended on nonfarm employment for most of their

income, were also developing patterns of interaction different from

those of previous generations.

Neighborhood

Beyond the family, the next group to which children are in- troduced is the neighborhood. Although the loose, informal groups

of children who wandered through villages of the past had no counterpart in contemporary heavily trafficked city streets, neighborhood playgrounds and the grounds of local shrines and temples are

sites where young children, accompanied by mothers, begin to learn

to get along with others.

Among neighbors, there is great concern for face. In old urban

neighborhoods or rural villages, families might have been neighbors for generations, and thus expect relationships of assistance

and cooperation to continue into the future. In newer company

housing, neighbors represent both competition and stress at the

workplace, which cannot be expressed. Extra care is taken to maintain proper relations while maximizing family privacy. Participation

in neighborhood activities is not mandatory, but nonparticipants

might lose face. If a family plans to stay in an area, people feel strong pressures to participate in public projects such as neighborhood cleanups or seasonal festivals. Concern for the family's

reputation is real because background checks for marriage and employment might include asking neighbors their opinions about a

family. More positively, neighbors become uchi for certain purposes,

such as local merchants providing personal services, physicians

responding to calls for minor ailments and emergency treatment,

and neighbors taking care of children while their mother goes out. People who work in the neighborhood where they live often have

a different attitude from those who spend most of their waking hours

at distant workplaces, creating differences in character between the

central city and the suburbs. Central city areas, dominated by the

old middle class of artisans, merchants, and small business owners, generally have more active neighborhood associations and other

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The Society and Its Environment

local groups, such as merchant associations and shrine associations.

The neighborhood association's activities include public sanitation

and health, volunteer firefighting, disaster preparedness, crime

prevention, information exchange, and recreational activities, particularly for children and the elderly. In new urban or suburban

developments, local governments might take a more active role in

performing these functions. In neighborhoods with mixtures of new

and old middle class residents, it is people with the time and interest, most likely those with businesses in the area, who are active in neighborhood affairs. The activities of women and children,

however, might cut across such class distinctions. The emphasis on good relations with neighbors helps counteract the potential depersonalization of urban living. Working together on community

projects, exchanging information, and cooperating in community

rituals, such as festivals, helps maintain a sense of community.

The consequences of economic growth were examined more

closely by 1980s consumers, who began to demand higher quality

social services, more libraries and cultural centers, greater access

to sports facilities, and more parkland. Attention was increasingly

focused on the adverse effects of urban life on families: modern

children were seen as more demanding and less disciplined than

their forebears, who had experienced war and poverty.

Despite these problems, urban life was much safer and more con- venient than in many other countries in the late twentieth century.

In contrast to most industrialized nations, urban crime rates were

declining. The streets of Tokyo were safe even at night, and a public

campaign was more likely to urge residents to lock their doors than

to suggest they install deadbolts. Public transportation was congested but convenient, clean, punctual, and relatively inexpensive

(see Transportation and Communications, ch. 4). Complaints were

heard, however, that railroad station parking lots were too small

to accommodate all commuter bicycles. In urban areas, houses were

close together; but at the same time shops were close by, and housewives could easily purchase fresh vegetables and fish daily. Urban

life was made more attractive for many by a wide variety of cul- tural and sports activities, including the symphony orchestra, theater, sumo, professional baseball, museums, and art galleries (see

The Arts, ch. 3). Workplace

Entry into the labor force widens the circle of social relationships. For many adults, these contacts are important sources of

friendships and resources. For men especially, the workplace is the

focus of their social world. Many both in and outside ofJapan share

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Japan: A Country Study

an image of the Japanese workplace that is based on a lifetimeemployment model used by large companies. These employment

practices came about as the result of labor shortage in the 1920s,

when companies competed to recruit and retain the best workers

by offering better benefits and job security. By the 1960s, employment at a large prestigious company had become the goal of

children of the new middle class; the pursuit of which required

mobilization of family resources and great individual perseverance

in order to achieve success in the fiercely competitive education

system.

Lifetime employment referred not to a worker's lifetime, but to the time from school graduation until mandatory retirement, in

1990 at age sixty for most men. Workers were recruited directly

out of school, and large investments were made in training. Employees were expected to work hard and demonstrate loyalty to the

firm, in exchange for some degree ofjob security and benefits, such

as housing subsidies, good insurance, the use of recreational facilities, and bonuses and pensions. Wages began low, but seniority was rewarded with promotions based on a combination of seniority and ability. Leadership was not based on assertiveness or quick

decision making, but on the ability to create consensus, taking into

account the needs of subordinates. Surveys indicated continued

preference for bosses who were demanding but showed concern

for workers' private lives over less-demanding bosses interested only

in performance on the job. This system rewarded behavior demonstrating identification with the team effort, indicated by singing

the company song, not taking all of one's vacation days, and sharing credit for accomplishments with the work group. Pride in one's work was expressed through competition with other parallel sec- tions in the company and between one's company and other companies in similar lines of business. Thus, individuals were motivated

to maintain wa (harmony) and participate in group activities, not

only on the job, but in after-hours socializing as well. The image

of group loyalty, however, might have been more a matter of ideol- ogy than practice, especially for people who did not make it to the

top.

Every worker did not enjoy the benefits of such employment practices and work environments in the 1980s. Although 64 percent

of households in 1985 depended on wages or salaries for most of

their income, most of these workers were employed by small and

medium-sized firms that could not afford the benefits or achieve

the successes of the large companies, despite the best intentions

of owners. Even in the large corporations, distinctions between per- manent and temporary employees made many workers, often

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The Society and Its Environment

women, ineligible for benefits and promotions. These workers were

also the first to be laid off in difficult business conditions. Japan

scholar Dorinne K. Kondo compares the status of permanent and

temporary workers with Bachnik's distinctions between permanent

and temporary members of an ie, creating degrees of inside and

outside within a firm. Traditions of entrepreneurship and of in- heritance of the means of livelihood continued among merchants,

artisans, farmers, and fishermen, still nearly 20 percent of the work

force in 1985. These workers gave up security for autonomy, and

when economically necessary, supplemented household income with

wage employment. Traditionally, such businesses used unpaid family labor, but in 1990 wives or even husbands were likely to go

off to work in factories or offices and leave spouses or retired parents to work the farm or mind the shop. Policies of decentralization provided factory jobs locally for families that farmed part-time; on the other hand, unemployment created by deindustrialization

affected rural as well as urban workers. Unemployment was low

in Japan compared to other industrialized nations (less than 3 per- cent through the late 1980s), but an estimated 400,000 day laborers

shared none of the security or affluence enjoyed by those employees

with lifetime-employment benefits.

Although Japanese workers are known worldwide for their hard

work and dedication to their firms, more than 50 percent of respondents of a 1988 government survey said that they would rather have more free time than increased income. The proportion preferring

free time to increased income was greater among professionals, su- pervisors, and white-collar workers. There was also evidence of

increased interfirm mobility among some types of workers in the

late 1980s, as a result of a labor shortage and changing attitudes

toward work among young people.

Popular Culture

Japanese popular culture not only reflects the attitudes and concerns of the present, but also provides a link to the past. Popular

films, television programs, comics, and music all developed from

older artistic and literary traditions, and many of their themes and

styles of presentation can be traced to traditional art forms. Contemporary forms of popular culture, like the traditional forms,

provide not only entertainment, but also an escape for the con- temporary Japanese from the problems of an industrial world.

When asked how they spent their leisure time, 80 percent of a sample of men and women surveyed by the government in 1 986 aver- aged about two and one-half hours per weekday watching television,

listening to the radio, and reading newspapers or magazines. Some

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Japan: A Country Study

16 percent spent an average of two and one-quarter hours a day

engaged in hobbies or amusements. Others spent leisure time participating in sports, socializing, and personal study. Teenagers and

retired people reported more time spent on all of these activities than other groups.

In the late 1980s, the family was the focus of leisure activities,

such as excursions to parks or shopping districts. Although Japan

is often thought of as a hard-working society with little time for

pleasure, the Japanese seek entertainment wherever they can. In

the 1980s, it was common to see Japanese commuters riding the

train to work, enjoying their favorite comic book or listening

through earphones to the latest in popular music on cassette players.

In the mid-1980s, Japan had about 71 million television sets in

use, and television was the main source of home entertainment and

information for most of the population. The Japanese had a wide

variety of programs to choose from, including the various dramas

(police, crime, home, and samurai), cartoons, news, and game,

quiz, and sports shows provided by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK) general station, the NHK

educational station, and numerous commercial and independent

stations. The violence of the samurai and police dramas and the

scatological humor of the cartoons drew criticism from mothers and

commentators. Characters in dramas and cartoons often reflected

racial and gender stereotypes. Women news anchors were not given

equal exposure in news broadcasts, and few women were portrayed on television in high career positions.

Individuals also could choose from a variety of types of popular

entertainment. There was a large selection of musical tapes, films,

television programs, and the products of a huge comic book in- dustry, among other forms of entertainment, from which to choose

in the late 1980s (see Performing Arts; Literature; and Films and

Television, ch. 3). Gender Stratification and the Lives of Women

Gender has been an important principle of stratification throughout Japanese history, but the cultural elaboration of gender differ- ences has varied over time and among different social classes. In

the twelfth century, for example, women could inherit property

in their own names and manage it by themselves. Later, under

feudal governments, the status of women declined. Peasant women

continued to have de facto freedom of movement and decisionmaking power, but upper-class women's lives were subject to the

patrilineal and patriarchal ideology supported by the government

as part of its efforts at social control. With early industrialization,

118
The fourteenth-century Golden Pavilion in Kyoto

Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger

St. Mary's Cathedral in Tokyo, designed by Tange Kenzo

Courtesy St. Mary's Cathedral

119
Japan: A Country Study

young women participated in factory work under exploitative and

unhealthy working conditions without gaining personal autonomy.

In the Meiji period, industrialization and urbanization lessened the

authority of fathers and husbands, but at the same time the Meiji

Civil Code denied women legal rights and subjugated them to the

will of household heads. Peasant women were less affected by the

institutionalization of this trend, but it gradually spread even to re- mote areas. In the 1930s and 1940s, the government encouraged

the formation of women's associations, applauded high fertility, and

regarded motherhood as a patriotic duty to the Japanese Empire.

After World War II, the legal position of women was redefined

by the occupation authorities, who included an equal rights clause

in the 1947 Constitution and the revised Civil Code of 1948. In- dividual rights were given precedence over obligation to family.

Women as well as men were guaranteed the right to choose spouses

and occupations, to inherit and own property in their own names,

to initiate divorce, and to retain custody of their children. Women

were given the right to vote in 1946. Other postwar reforms opened

education institutions to women and required that women receive

equal pay for equal work. In 1986, an Equal Employment Opportunity Law took effect. Legally, few barriers to women's equal participation in the life of society remained.

Gender inequality, however, continued in family life, the workplace, and popular values. The notion expressed in the proverbial

phrase "good wife, wise mother," continued to influence beliefs about gender roles. Most women may not have been able to re- alize that ideal, but many believed that it was in their own, their

children's, and society's best interests that they stay home to de- vote themselves to their children, at least while the children were

young. Many women found satisfaction in family life and in the

accomplishments of their children, gaining a sense of fulfillment

from doing good jobs as household managers and mothers. In most

households, women were responsible for their family budgets and

made independent decisions about the education, careers, and life- styles of their families. On the other hand, women took the social

blame for problems of family members.

Women's educational opportunities have increased in the twentieth century. Among new workers in 1989, 37 percent of women

had received education beyond upper-secondary school, compared

with 43 percent of men, but most women had received their postsecondary education in junior colleges and technical schools rather

than in universities and graduate schools (see Higher Education,

ch. 3). Forty- seven percent of all women over fifteen years of age

participated in the paid labor force in 1987. Two major changes

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The Society and Its Environment

in the female work force were under way. The first was a move

away from household-based employment. Peasant women and those

from merchant and artisan families had always worked. With self- employment becoming less common, however, the more usual pat- tern was separation of home and workplace, creating new problems

of child care, care of the elderly, and housekeeping responsibilities. The second major change was the increased participation of

married women in the labor force. In the 1950s, most women employees were young and single; 62 percent of the female labor force

in 1960 had never been married. In 1987, 66 percent of the fe- male labor force was married, and only 23 percent was made up

women who had never married. Some women continued working

after marriage, most often in professional and government jobs,

but their numbers were small. Others started their own businesses, or took over family businesses. More commonly, women left paid

labor after marriage, then returned after their youngest children were in school. These middle-age recruits generally took low-paying,

part-time service or factory jobs. They continued to have nearly

total responsibility for home and children, and often justified their

employment as an extension of their responsibilities for the care of their families. Despite legal support for equality and some improvement in their status, married women understood that their

husbands' jobs demanded long hours and extreme commitment.

Because women earned an average of only 60 percent as much as men, most did not find it advantageous to take full-time, responsible jobs after marriage, if doing so left no one to manage the household and care for children (see Working Women, ch. 4).

Yet women's status in the labor force was changing in the late 1980s, most likely as a result of changes brought about by the aging

of the population. Longer life expectancies, smaller families and

bunched births, and lowered expectations of being cared for in old

age by their children have all led women to participate more fully

in the labor force. At the same time, service job opportunities in

the postindustrial economy expanded, and there were fewer new

male graduates to fill them.

Some of the same demographic factors—low birth rates and high

life expectancies—also changed workplace demands on husbands.

For example, men recognized their need for a different kind of rela- tionship with their wives in anticipation of long post-retirement

periods.

Age Stratification and the Elderly

Another key principle in the stratification of Japanese society

is age. "Acting one's age" may be more important in Japan than

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Japan: A Country Study

in some other societies, resulting in relatively narrow age ranges

for such life cycle events as university education, first job, or marriage. This pattern fits with the value placed on playing social roles appropriately.

Old age ideally represents a time of relaxation of social obligations, assisting with the family farm or business without carrying

the main responsibility, socializing, and receiving respectful care from family and esteem from the community. In the late 1980s,

high (although declining) rates of suicide among older people and

the continued existence of temples where one could pray for quick

death indicated that this ideal was not always fulfilled. Japan has

a national holiday called Respect for the Aged Day, but for most

people it is merely another day for picnics or an occasion when

the commuter trains run on holiday schedules. True respect for the elderly may be questioned when buses and trains carry signs

above specially reserved seats to remind people to give up their

seats for elderly riders. Although the elderly might not have been

accorded a generalized respect based on age, many older Japanese

continued to live full lives that included gainful employment and

close relationships with adult children.

Although the standard retirement age in Japan throughout most

of the postwar period was fifty-five, people aged sixty-five and over

in Japan were more likely to work than in any other developed

country in the 1980s. In 1987, 36 percent of men and 15 percent

of women in this age-group were in the labor force. With better

pension benefits and decreased opportunities for agricultural or other self-employed work, however, labor force participation by

the elderly has been decreasing since 1960. In 1986, 90 percent

of Japanese surveyed said that they wished to continue working

after age sixty-five. They indicated both financial and health rea- sons for this choice. Other factors, such as a strong work ethic and

the centering of men's social ties around the workplace, may also be relevant. Employment was not always available, however, and

men and women who worked after retirement usually took substantial cuts in salary and prestige. Between 1981 and 1986, the

proportion of people sixty and over who reported that a public pension was their major source of income increased from 35 percent

to 53 percent, while those relying most on earnings for income fell from 31 to 25 percent, and those relying on children decreased from

16 to 9 percent (see Aging and Retirement of the Labor Force,

ch. 4). As the 1990s approached, there was a major trend toward the

elderly maintaining separate households rather than co-residing with

the families of adult children. The proportion living with children

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The Society and Its Environment

decreased from 77 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 1985, although

this rate was still much higher than in other industrialized countries. The number of elderly living in Japan's retirement or nurs- ing homes also increased from around 75,000 in 1970 to more than

216,000 in 1987; still, this group was a small portion of the total elderly population. People living alone or only with spouses constituted 32 percent of the sixty-five-and-over group. Less than half

of those responding to a government survey believed that it was

the duty of the eldest son to care for parents, but 63 percent re- plied that it was natural for children to take care of their elderly

parents. The motive of co-residence seems to have changed, from

being the expected arrangement of an agricultural society to being an option for coping with circumstances such as illness or widowhood in a postindustrial society.

In the late 1980s, concern for the health of the aged continued

to receive a great deal of attention, and nearly free medical care

for people over seventy years of age was a national policy. Responsibility for the care of the aged, bedridden, or senile, however, still devolved mainly on family members, usually daughters-in-law.

Health Care and Social Welfare

While most postwar Japanese relied on personal savings and the

support of family, both the government and private companies have

long provided assistance for the ill or otherwise disabled, and for the old. Beginning in the 1920s, the government enacted a series of welfare programs, based mainly on European models, to provide medical care and financial support. Government expenditures

for all forms of social welfare increased from 6 percent of national

income in the early 1970s to 18 percent in 1989. The mixtures of

public and private funding have created complex pension and in- surance systems.

Health Care

A person who becomes ill in Japan has a number of options.

One may visit a Buddhist temple or Shinto shrine, or send a family member in their place. There are numerous folk remedies, in- cluding hot springs baths and chemical and herbal over-the-counter

medications. A person may seek the assistance of traditional healers, such as herbalists, masseurs, and acupuncturists. However,

Western biomedicine has dominated Japanese medical care in the

postwar period.

Public health services, including free screening examinations for particular diseases, prenatal care, and infectious disease control were provided by national and local governments. Payment for

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Japan: A Country Study

personal medical services was offered through a universal medical

insurance system that provided relative equality of access, with fees

set by a government committee. People without insurance through

employers could participate in a national health insurance program

administered by local governments. Since 1973, all elderly persons were covered by government-sponsored insurance. Patients were

free to select physicians or facilities of their choice.

There were more than 1,000 mental hospitals, 8,700 general

hospitals, and 1 ,000 comprehensive hospitals with a total capacity

of 1.5 million beds. Hospitals provided both out-patient and in- patient care. In addition, 79,000 clinics offered primarily out-patient

services, and there were 48,000 dental clinics. Most physicians and

hospitals sold medicine directly to patients, but there were 36,000

pharmacies where patients could purchase synthetic or herbal medication.

National health expenditures rose from about ¥1 trillion (for

value of the yen—see Glossary) in 1965 to over ¥18 trillion in 1987, or from slightly more than 5 percent to almost 7 percent ofJapan's

national income. In addition to cost control problems, the system was troubled with excessive paperwork, long waits to see physicians, assembly-line care for out-patients (because few facilities made

appointments), overmedication, and abuse of the system because

of low out-of-pocket costs to patients. Another problem in the late 1980s was an uneven distribution of health personnel, with cities favored over rural areas. In the late 1980s, government and professional circles were considering changing the system so that primary, secondary, and ter- tiary levels of care would be clearly distinguished within each

geographical region, and facilities might be designated by level of

care, with referrals required to obtain more complex care. Policy

makers and administrators also recognized the need to unify the

various insurance systems and control costs. There were nearly 191,400 physicians, 66,800 dentists, and

333,000 nurses, plus more than 200,000 people licensed to practice

massage, acupuncture, moxibustion, and other East Asian therapeutic methods. Since around 1900, Chinese-style herbalists have been

required to be licensed medical doctors. Training was professionalized and, except for East Asian healers, was based on a biomedical

model of disease. However, the practice of biomedicine was in- fluenced as well by Japanese social organization and cultural ex- pectations concerning education, the organization of the workplace,

and social relations of status and dependency, decision-making styles,

and ideas about the human body, causes of illness, gender, individualism, and privacy. Anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney notes

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The Society and Its Environment

that "daily hygienic behavior and its underlying concepts, which

are perceived and expressed in terms of biomedical germ theory,

in fact are directly tied to the basic Japanese symbolic structure." Although the number of cases remained small by international

standards, public health officials were concerned in the late 1980s

about the worldwide epidemic of acquired immune deficiency syn- drome (AIDS). The first confirmed case of AIDS in Japan was

reported in 1985. By August 1989, there were 108 confirmed cases and between 1,000 and 2,500 others infected with the virus. Officials anticipated a fourfold increase by 1992. Japanese statistics on

patterns of transmission of the disease differ greatly from those of

other countries. Fifty-eight percent of AIDS patients were hemophiliacs, who were infected with the AIDS virus by receiving tainted

imported blood products. Another 29 percent were homosexual and

the remaining 13 percent were infected through heterosexual in- tercourse. While frightened by the deadliness of the disease yet sympathetic to the plight of hemophiliac AIDS patients, most Japanese

were unconcerned with contracting AIDS themselves. Various levels of government responded to the introduction of AIDS into the heterosexual population by establishing government committees, mandating AIDS education, and advising testing for the general public

without targeting special groups. A fund, underwritten by pharmaceutical companies that distributed imported blood products, was established in 1988 to provide financial compensation for AIDS

patients.

Social Welfare

The futures ofJapan's health and welfare systems in 1990 were

being shaped by the rapid aging of the population. Medical insur- ance, health care for the elderly, and public health expenses constituted about 60 percent of social welfare and social security costs in 1975, while government pensions accounted for 20 percent. By

the early 1980s, pensions accounted for nearly 50 percent of social

welfare and social security expenditures because people were liv- ing longer after retirement. A fourfold increase in workers' individual contributions was projected by the twenty-first century.

A major revision in the public pension system in 1986 unified

several former plans into a single Employee Pension Insurance Plan. In addition to merging the former plans, the 1986 reform attempted

to reduce benefits to hold down increases in worker contribution

rates. It also established the right of women who did not work outside the home to pension benefits of their own, not only as a dependent of a worker. Everyone aged between twenty and sixty was

a compulsory member of this Employee Pension Insurance Plan.

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Japan: A Country Study

Despite complaints that these pensions amounted to little more

than "spending money," an increasing number of people planning for their retirement counted on them as an important source

of income. Benefits increased so that the basic monthly pension was about US$420 in 1987, with future payments adjusted to the consumer price index. Forty percent of elderly households in 1985

depended on various types of annuities and pensions as their only

sources of income.

Some people were also eligible for corporate retirement al- lowances. About 90 percent of firms with thirty or more employees

gave retirement allowances in the late 1980s frequently as lump

sum payments, but increasingly often in the form of annuities.

Japan also had public assistance programs benefiting about 1 percent of the population. About 33 percent of recipients were el- derly people, about 45 percent were households with sick or dis- abled members, about 14 percent were fatherless families, and about

8 percent were in other categories.

Japanese often claim to outsiders that their society is homogeneous. By world standards, the Japanese enjoy a high standard of

living, and nearly 90 percent of the population consider themselves

part of the middle class. Most people express satisfaction with their

lives and take great pride in being Japanese and in their country's

status as an economic power on a par with the United States and

Western Europe. In folk crafts and in right-wing politics, in the

new religions and in international management, the Japanese have

turned to their past to interpret the present. In doing so, however,

they may be reconstructing history as a common set of beliefs and

practices that make the country look more homogeneous than it is. In a society that values outward conformity, individuals may

appear to take a back seat to the needs of the group. Yet it is in- dividuals who create for themselves a variety of life-styles. They

are constrained in their choices by age, gender, life experiences,

and other factors, but they draw from a rich cultural repertoire

of past and present through which the wider social world of families, neighborhoods, and institutions gives meaning to their lives. As Japan set out to internationalize itself in the 1990s, the identification of inherent Japanese qualities took on new significance,

and the ideology of homogeneity sometimes masked individual decisions and life-styles of postindustrial Japan.

* * * A good general introduction to Japanese society is Edwin O.

Reischauer's TheJapanese Today. The Kodansha Encyclopedia ofJapan

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The Society and Its Environment

contains articles on numerous aspects of Japanese society. The

Japanese government publishes excellent information in English on a variety of subjects as well as statistical reports, such as the

Japan Statistical Yearbook. Japan's physical setting and its relation

to society are discussed in Martin Collcutt and others' Cultural Atlas ofJapan. Hori Ichiro and others' Japanese Religion and H. Byron

Earhart'sJapanese Religion: Unity and Diversity provide good introductions to religious life. Analyses ofJapanese culture and values can be found inJapanese

Society by Robert J. Smith, Long Engagements by David Plath, The

Monkey as Mirror by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, a variety of articles in Japanese Culture and Behavior edited by Takie Sugiyama Lebra

and William P. Lebra, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth

Benedict, and Conflict inJapan, edited by Ellis S. Krauss and others. Social organization is described by Nakane Chie in Japanese Society, Ezra F. Vogel in Japan's New Middle Class, Harumi Befu in

Japan: An Anthropological Introduction, and Joy Hendry in Understanding

Japanese Society. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

127

Chapter 3. Education and the Arts
Artist's rendition of Great Wave off the Coast of Ka.na.gawa., from the

series Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji by ukiyo-e artist Hokusai

Katsushika (1760-1849)
JAPANESE CULTURAL VALUES are deeply imbedded in the

country's richly varied, ancient past. Rooted in the native religion

of Shinto (Way of the Gods), these values are also heavily indebted

to the continental influences of Buddhism and Confucianism. In

Shinto, gods permeate the universe and are perceived as embodied

in specific places, such as sacred Mount Fuji and the Nachi Falls, or as tutelary spirits of rocks and trees. Therefore, a reverence for nature and admiration for particular scenic places are pervasive

in Japanese art, echoed in literary descriptions, and expressed in

architectural concepts that remove walls to allow the outside in and

in avant-garde smoke sculptures, which recreate mists. Shinto concepts of ritual cleanliness, purification, and renewal have played

a role in preserving the forms of ancient shrines like that at Ise and have nurtured handicrafts. They also have shaped some fu- nereal practices, for example, the clay sculptures or haniwa in the

Kofun period (ca. A.D. 300-710), which provided the first real likeness of the ancient Japanese.

Buddhist thought was fundamental to the formulation of most

ofJapan's arts, blending and absorbing elements from the protohistoric Shinto. Basic to Buddhist thought is the comprehension

of the universe as in constant flux, which results in emphasis on

the idea that all living things perish or are transformed in the chain

of existence. From this view comes a feeling for ''the poignancy

of things" {mono no aware), a frequent element in literature beginning in the Heian period (794-1185). Cherry blossoms are appreciated for their short-lived beauty, which symbolizes the samurai

ideal of a brilliant life with a sudden, dramatic end. Zen Buddhism

affirms the values of rustic simplicity and finding pleasure in the

ordinary or minimal; it stresses austerity, simplicity, and brevity

in all things and a life of solitude and contemplation, ideas which,

together with Zen teaching devices, found expression in the tea ceremony, short poems, spontaneous ink paintings, and meditation gardens.

Chinese artistic forms and philosophical concepts have been variously integrated and modified over the centuries by the Japanese.

Confucianism glorifies the cultivation of wisdom: the scholarly life

is its ideal, as are the virtues of ethical behavior, sincerity, and

a desire for social harmony. All these elements were embodied in

the gentleman-scholar and his successors, the teacher-scholar and

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Japan: A Country Study

the artist-writer, whose proficiency in language and use of the brush

made literature and calligraphy the most admired art forms.

Japanese children are taught a reverence for learning and trained

in the traditional arts both within the school system and outside.

Instruction in music, calligraphy, flower arrangement, and the tea

ritual may begin at home, but soon the child studies with a skilled practitioner. Only the martial arts, such as judo or Japanese fencing (kendo), are generally limited to men. Men often practice the

other arts as well. Such early introduction to and widespread participation in different expressions ofJapanese heritage lead to support for traditional cultural values and the appreciation throughout

society of artistic qualities.

Education

Many of the historical and cultural characteristics that shape

Japanese arts shape its education as well. Japanese tradition stresses respect for society and the established order and prizes group goals

above individual interests. In the early 1990s, schooling emphasized in addition diligence, self-criticism, and well-organized study

habits. More generally, the belief was ingrained that hard work

and perseverance would yield success in life. Much of official school

life was devoted directly or indirectly to teaching correct attitudes

and moral values and to developing character, with the aim of creat- ing a citizenry that was both literate and attuned to the basic values

of culture and society.

At the same time, the academic achievement ofJapanese students was extremely high by international standards. Japanese children

consistentiy ranked at or near the top in successive international tests of mathematics. The system was characterized by high enrollment

and retention rates throughout. An entrance examination system,

particularly important at the college level, exerted strong influences

throughout the entire system. The structure did not consist exclusively of government-sponsored, formal official education institu- tions. Private education also formed an important part of the

educational landscape, and the role of schools outside the official school system could not be ignored.

A majority of children began their education by attending

preschool, although it was not part of the official system. The offi- cial structure in the early 1990s provided compulsory free schooling and a sound and balanced education to virtually all children

from grade one through grade nine. Upper-secondary school, from

grades ten through twelve, though also not compulsory, attracted

about 94 percent of those who completed lower-secondary school.

About one-third of all Japanese upper- secondary school graduates

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Education and the Arts

advanced to postsecondary education—to full four-year universities, two-year junior colleges, or to other institutions.

Japan in the early 1990s remained a highly education-minded

society. Education was esteemed, and educational achievement was

often the prerequisite for success in work and in society at large.

Historical Background

Japan has had relations with other cultures since the dawn of

its history (see Early Developments, ch. 1). Foreign civilizations

have often provided new ideas for the development ofJapan's own

culture. Chinese teachings and ideas, for example, flowed into Japan

from the sixth to ninth centuries. Along with the introduction of

Buddhism came the Chinese system of writing and its literary tra- dition, and Confucianism (see Religious and Philosophical Traditions, ch. 2). By the ninth century, Kyoto, the imperial capital, had five in- stitutions of higher learning, and during the remainder of the Heian

period (794-1185), other schools were established by the nobility

and the imperial court. During the medieval period (1185-1600),

Zen Buddhist monasteries were especially important centers of

learning, and the Ashikaga School (Ashikaga Gakko) flourished

in the fifteenth century as a center of higher learning.

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Japan ex- perienced intense contact with the major European powers. Jesuit

missionaries, who accompanied Portuguese traders, proselytized

Christianity, opening a number of religious schools. Japanese stu- dents thus began to study Latin and Western music, as well as their

own language.

By 1603 Japan had been reunified by the Tokugawa regime, and

by 1640 foreigners had been ordered out of Japan, Christianity

banned, and virtually all foreign contact prohibited. The nation

then entered a period of isolation and relative domestic tranquility, which was to last 200 years. When the Tokugawa period began,

few common people in Japan could read or write. By the period's

end, learning had become widespread. Tokugawa education left a valuable legacy: an increasingly literate populace, a meritocratic ideology, and an emphasis on discipline and competent perfor- mance. Under subsequent Meiji leadership, this foundation would

facilitate Japan's rapid transition from feudal country to modern

nation (see Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867, ch. 1). During the Tokugawa period, the role of many of the bushi, or samurai, changed from warrior to administrator, and as a conse- quence, their formal education and their literacy increased proportionally. Samurai curricula stressed morality and included both

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Japan: A Country Study

military and literary studies. Confucian classics were memorized,

and their reading and recitation were common methods of study.

Arithmetic and calligraphy were also studied. Most samurai at- tended schools sponsored by their han (domains), and by the time

of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, more than 200 of the 276 han

had established schools. Some samurai and even commoners also attended private academies, which often specialized in particular

Japanese subjects or in Western medicine, modern military science,

gunnery, or Rangaku (Dutch studies), as European studies were

called (see Intellectual Trends; The Emergence of ModernJapan,

1868-1919, ch. 1). Education of commoners was generally practically oriented,

providing basic training in reading, writing, and arithmetic, emphasizing calligraphy and use of the abacus. Much of this education was conducted in so-called temple schools (terakoya), derived

from earlier Buddhist schools. These schools were no longer reli- gious institutions, nor were they, by 1867, predominantly located

in temples. By the end of the Tokugawa period, there may have

been more than 14,000 such schools. Teaching techniques included

reading from various textbooks, memorizing, and repeatedly copying Chinese characters and Japanese script.

After 1868 new leadership set Japan on a rapid course of modernization. Realizing from the outset that education was fundamental

to nation building and modernization, the Meiji leaders established a public education system to help Japan catch up with the West.

Missions were sent abroad to study the education systems of leading Western countries. These missions and other observers returned

with the ideas of decentralization, local school boards, and teacher

autonomy. Such ideas and ambitious initial plans, however, proved

very difficult to carry out. After some trial and error, a new national education system emerged. As an indication of its success, elementary school enrollments climbed from about 40 or 50 per- cent of the school-age population in the 1870s to over 90 percent

by 1900.

By the 1890s, after earlier intensive preoccupation with Western,

particularly United States, educational ideas, a much more conservative and traditional orientation evolved: the education sys- tem became more reflective ofJapanese values. Confucian precepts were stressed, especially those concerning the hierarchical nature

of human relations, service to the new state, the pursuit of learning, and morality. These ideals, embodied in the 1890 Imperial

Rescript on Education, along with highly centralized government

control over education, largely guided Japanese education until the

end of World War II.

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Education and the Arts

In the early twentieth century, education at the primary level was egalitarian and virtually universal, but at higher levels it was

multitracked, highly selective, and elitist. College education was

largely limited to the few national universities, where German in- fluences were strong. Three of the imperial universities admitted

women, and there were a number of women's colleges, some quite

prestigious, but women had relatively few opportunities to enter higher education. During this period, a number of universities were founded by Christian missionaries, who also took an active role in expanding educational opportunities for women, particularly at the secondary level. After 1919 several of the private universities received official sta- tus, being granted government recognition for programs they had

conducted, in many cases, since the 1880s. In the 1920s, the tra- dition of liberal education briefly reappeared, particularly at the

kindergarten level, where the Montessori method attracted a fol- lowing. In the 1930s, education was subject to strong military and

nationalistic influences.

By 1945 the Japanese education system had been devastated,

and with the defeat came the discredit of much prewar thought.

A new wave of foreign ideas was introduced during the postwar

period of military occupation (see World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1). Occupation policy makers and the United States Education

Mission, set up in 1946, made a number of changes aimed at democratizing Japanese education: instituting the six-three-three

grade structure (six years of elementary school, three of lowersecondary school, and three of upper-secondary school) and ex- tending compulsory schooling to nine years. They replaced the

prewar system of higher- secondary schools with comprehensive

upper-secondary schools (high schools). Curricula and textbooks were revised, the nationalistic morals course was abolished and

replaced with social studies, locally elected school boards were in- troduced, and teachers unions established (see Contemporary Setting, this ch.).

With the abolition of the elitist higher education system and an

increase in the number of higher education institutions, the opportunities for higher learning grew. Expansion was accomplished

initially by granting university or junior college status to a number of technical institutes, normal schools, and advanced secon- dary schools.

After the restoration of full national sovereignty in 1952, Japan

immediately began to modify some of the changes in education,

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Japan: A Country Study

to reflect Japanese ideas about education and educational administration. The postwar Ministry of Education regained a great deal

of power. School boards were appointed, instead of elected. A course

in moral education was reinstituted in modified form, despite substantial initial concern that it would lead to a renewal of heightened nationalism.

By the 1960s, postwar recovery and accelerating economic growth

brought new demands to expand higher education and greater stress related to higher education quality and finances. In general, the

1960s was a time of great turbulence in higher education. Late in

the decade especially, universities in Japan were rocked by violent

student riots that disrupted many campuses. Campus unrest was

the confluence of a number of factors, including the anti-Vietnam

War movement in Japan, ideological differences between various

Japanese student groups, disputes over campus issues such as dis- cipline, student strikes, and even general dissatisfaction with the

university system itself. The government responded with the University Control Law

in 1969, and in the early 1970s, with further education reforms.

New laws governed the founding of new universities and teachers'

compensation, and public school curricula were revised. Private

education institutions began to receive public aid, and a nationwide standardized university entrance examination was added for the national universities. Also during this period, strong disagreement developed between the government and teachers groups.

Despite the numerous educational changes that have occurred

in Japan since 1868, and especially since 1945, the education sys- tem in 1990 still reflected long-standing cultural and philosophical

ideas: that learning and education are esteemed and to be pursued

seriously, and that moral and character development are integral

to education. The meritocratic legacy of the Meiji period has en- dured, as has the centralized education structure. Interest remains

in adapting foreign ideas and methods to Japanese traditions and

in improving the system generally.

Education Reform

In spite of the admirable success of the education system since

World War II, there were still problems in the 1980s. Some of these

difficulties as perceived by domestic and foreign observers included

rigidity, excessive uniformity, lack of choices, undesirable influences

of the university examinations, and overriding emphasis on for- mal educational credentials. There was also a belief that education was responsible for some social problems and for the general

academic, behavioral, and adjustment problems of some students.

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Education and the Arts

There was great concern too that Japanese education be responsive to the new requirements caused by international challenges

of the changing world in the twenty-first century.

Flexibility, creativity, internationalization (kokusaika), individuality, and diversity thus became the watchwords ofJapan's momentous education reform movement of the 1980s, although they echoed

themes heard earlier, particularly in the 1970s (see Higher Education, this ch.). The proposals and potential changes of the 1980s were so significant that some are comparing them to the educational changes that occurred when Japan opened to the West in

the nineteenth century and to those of the occupation.

Concerns of the new reform movement were captured in a series of reports issued between 1985 and 1987 by the National Council on Educational Reform. The final report outiined basic emphases

in response to the internationalization of education, new information technologies, and the media; and emphases on individuality,

lifelong learning, and adjustment to social change. To explore these

new directions, the council suggested that eight specific subjects

be considered: designing education for the twenty-first century,

organizing a system of lifelong learning and reducing the emphasis on the educational background of individuals, improving and

diversifying higher education, enriching and diversifying elementary and secondary education, improving the quality of teachers,

adapting to internationalization, adapting to the information age, and conducting a review of the administration and finance of education. These subjects reflected both educational and social aspects

of the reform, in keeping with the Japanese view about the rela- tionship of education to society. Even as debate over reform took

place, the government quickly moved to begin implementing

changes in most of these eight areas. Contemporary Setting

The late twentieth-century Japanese education system had a

strong legal foundation. Three documents in particular—the Fundamental Law of Education, the School Education Law, and the

new Constitution, all adopted in 1947 —provided this legal basis

(see The Postwar Constitution, ch. 6). The system was highly centralized, although three levels of government administration

national, prefectural, and municipal—had various responsibilities for providing, financing, and supervising educational services for the nation's more than 65,000 schools and the nearly 27 million

students in 1989 (see table 5, Appendix). At the top of the system

stood the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture (hereafter,

the Ministry of Education, or Monbusho), which had significant

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Japan: A Country Study

responsibility for funding, curricula, textbooks, and national education standards.

More general responsibilities of the Ministry of Education were

the promotion and dissemination of education, scientific knowledge,

academic research, culture, and sports. The ministry was supported

by advisory bodies and standing councils, such as the Central Council on Education, and by ad hoc councils, such as the National

Council on Educational Reform.

The ministry's authority and responsibilities were not limited

to public institutions. Most of its regulations, particularly concern- ing compulsory education, also applied to private institutions. The

ministry had power to approve the founding of universities and

supervised the national universities. In addition, it provided financial assistance and guidance to lower levels of government on educational matters and was empowered to mandate changes in local

policies.

The ministry drafted its annual budget and education-related

legislation and submitted them to the Diet (see The Legislature,

ch. 6). Monbusho administered the disbursement of funds and

cooperated with other agencies concerned with education and its finance. In 1990 a main area of ministry activity was implementing reforms based on the reports and recommendations of the National Council on Educational Reform, whose final report was

submitted to the prime minister in 1987.

Each of the forty-seven prefectures had a five-member board of

education appointed by the governor with the consent of the prefectural assembly. The prefectural boards administered and operated

public schools under their supervision, including most of the public upper-secondary schools, special schools for the handicapped,

and some other public institutions in the prefecture (see Local

Government, ch. 6). Prefectural boards were the teacher-licensing

bodies; with the advice of municipal governments, they appointed

teachers to public elementary and lower-secondary schools; they

also licensed preschools and other schools in their municipalities

and promoted social education.

Municipal-level governments operated the public elementary and

lower-secondary schools in their jurisdictions. Supervision was con- ducted by the local board of education, usually a five-member or- ganization appointed by the mayor with the consent of the local assembly. The board also made recommendations to the prefec- tures about the appointment or dismissal of teachers and adopted

textbooks from the list certified by the Ministry of Education.

Mayors also were charged with some responsibilities for municipal

universities and budget coordination.

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Education and the Arts

All three levels of government—national, prefectural, and

municipal—provided financial support for education. National

government was the largest source of direct funding, through the

budget of the Ministry of Education, and a significant source of

indirect funding of local education through a tax rebate to local government, in a tax allocation grant. The national government

bore from one-third to one-half of the cost of education in the form

of teachers' salaries, school construction, the school lunch program,

and vocational education and equipment.

The ministry's budget between fiscal year (FY—see Glossary)

1980 and FY 1988 increased a total of about 7 percent (see The

Role of Government and Business, ch. 4). But, as a percentage

of the total national budget (before the deduction of mandated ex- penses and debt service), the ministry's share actually declined steadily throughout the 1980s, from about 10 percent in 1980 to about

7.7 percent in the budget proposed for FY 1989. The proposed FY

1989 budget asked for ¥4.637 trillion (for value of the yen—see Glossary), an increase of 1.34 percent over FY 1988's ¥4.576 trillion. Teaching remained an honored profession, and teachers had high

social status, stemming from the Japanese cultural legacy and public

recognition of their important social responsibilities. Society ex- pected teachers to embody the ideals they were to instill, particularly because teaching duties extended to the moral instruction and

character development of children. Formal classroom moral education, informal instruction, and even academic classes were all viewed as legitimate venues for this kind of teaching. Teachers'

responsibilities to their schools and students frequently extended

beyond the classroom, off school grounds and after school hours.

In the 1980s, teachers were well paid, and periodic improvements

also were made in teachers' salaries and compensation. Starting

salaries compared favorably with those of other white collar professionals, and in some cases were higher. In addition to salary, there were many types of special allowances and a bonus (paid in three

installments), which in the late 1980s amounted to about five months' salary. Teachers also received the standard health and

retirement benefits available to most Japanese salaried workers.

Whether for economic reward, social status, or the desire to teach,

the number of people wishing to enter teaching exceeded the number of new openings by as many as five or six applicants to every one position. Prefectural boards and other public bodies were able

to select the best qualified from a large pool of applicants.

By the late 1980s, the great majority of new teachers were entering the profession with a bachelor's degree, but about 25 per- cent of the total teaching force at the elementary school level did

139
Japan: A Country Study

not have a bachelor's degree. The program for prospective teachers

at the undergraduate level included study in education as well as concentration in academic areas. Most new teachers majored in a subject other than education, and graduates of colleges of education were still in the minority. After graduation, a teacher had

to pass a prefectural-level examination to be licensed by a prefectural board of education.

Changes also occurred during the 1980s in in-service training

and supervision of new teachers. In-service training, particularly

that conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Education,

had been questioned for many years. After considerable debate,

and some opposition from the Japan Teachers Union (Nihon

Kyoshokuin Kumiai—Nikkyoso), a new system of teacher training was introduced in 1989. The new system established a one- year training program, required new teachers to work under the

direction of a master teacher, and increased the required number

of both in-school and out-of-school training days and the length

of time new teachers were under probationary status. The Japan Teachers Union, established in 1947, was the largest teachers union in the late 1980s. The union functioned as a

national federation of prefectural teachers unions, although each

of these unions had considerable autonomy and its own strengths

and political orientation. Historically, there had been considerable antagonism between the union and the Ministry of Education,

owing to a variety of factors. Some were political, because the stance of the union had been strongly leftist and it often opposed the more

conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Another factor was

the trade union perspective that the teachers union had on the

profession of teaching (see The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6). Additional differences on education issues concerned training re- quirements for new teachers, decentralization in education, school

autonomy, curricula, textbook censorship, and, in the late 1980s,

the reform movement.

The union tended to support the Japan Socialist Party, while

a minority faction supported the Japan Communist Party (see The

Opposition Parties, ch. 6). In the late 1980s, internal disagreements

in the Japan Teachers Union on political orientation and on the

union's relationships to other national labor organizations finally

caused a rupture. The union thus became less effective than in previ- ous years at a time when the national government and the ministry were moving ahead on reform issues. The union had opposed

many reforms proposed or instituted by the ministry, but failed to forestall changes in certification and teacher training, two is- sues on which it was often at odds with the government. The new

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Education and the Arts

union leadership that emerged after several years of internal dis- cord seemed to take a more conciliatory approach to the ministry

and reform issues, but the union's future directions were not clear. Preschool and Day Care

Early childhood education began at home, and there were numerous books and television shows aimed at helping mothers of

preschool children to educate their children and to ''parent" more

effectively. Much of the home training was devoted to teaching

manners, proper social behavior, and structured play, although

verbal and number skills were also popular themes. Parents were

strongly committed to early education and frequently enrolled their

children in preschools.

Preschool education provided the transition from home to for- mal school for most children. Children's lives at home were characterized by indulgence, and the largely nonacademic preschool

experience helped children make the adjustment to the grouporiented life of school and, in turn, to life in society itself (see Values,

ch. 2). Preschools (ydchien), predominantly staffed by young female junior

college graduates, were supervised by the Ministry of Education

in the 1980s, but were not part of the official education system.

In addition to preschools, a well-developed system of governmentsupervised day-care centers (hoikuen), supervised by the Ministry

of Labor, was an important provider of preschool education.

Together, these two kinds of institutions enrolled well over 90 per- cent of all preschool-age children prior to their entrance into the

formal system at first grade. The Ministry of Education's 1990

Course of Study for Preschools, which applied to both kinds of institutions, covered such areas as human relationships, environment,

words (language), and expression. The 58 percent of preschools

that were private accounted for 77 percent of all children enrolled.

Primary and Secondary Education

Education in postwar Japan was compulsory and free for all school children from the first through the ninth grades (see fig. 5). The school year began on April 1 and ended on March 3 1 of the

following year. Schools used a trimester system demarcated by vacation breaks. Japanese children attended school five full weekdays

and one-half day on Saturdays. The school year had a legal minimum of 210 days, but most local school boards added about 30 more days for school festivals, athletic meets, and ceremonies with

nonacademic educational objectives, especially those encouraging

cooperation and school spirit. With allowance made for the time

141
Japan: A Country Study

Age

25

24

2322

2120

19

18

17

16

1514

13

12

1110

9

87

6

54

3

2

1

Grade

Level

MISCEL- LANEOUS

SPECIAL

TRAINING SCHOOLS

GRADUATE

STUDIES

UNIVERSITY

JUNIOR COLLEGE

UPPER- SECONDARY

SCHOOL

(HIGH SCHOOL)

UPPER- SECONDARY

DEPARTMENT

(COMPULSORY) LOWER- LOWER SECONDARY SECONDARY

SCHOOL DEPARTMENT

(JUNIOR HIGH)

(COMPULSORY) ELEMENTARY ELEMENTARY DEPARTMENT SCHOOL

TECHNICAL COLLEGE

I Ikindergarten!

Source: Based on information from Robert Leestma et al., Japanese Education Today, Washington, 1987, 6; and Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Education

in Japan: A Graphic Presentation, Tokyo, 1982, 14.

Figure 5. Structure of the Education System, 1987

devoted to such activities and the half day of school on Saturday,

the number of days devoted to instruction was about 195 per year. The Japanese hold several important beliefs about education,

especially compulsory schooling: that all children have the ability to learn the material; that effort, perseverance, and self-discipline,

not academic ability, determine academic success; and that these

study and behavioral habits can be taught. Thus, students in

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Education and the Arts

elementary and lower-secondary schools were not grouped or taught on the basis of their ability, nor was instruction geared to individual

differences.

The nationally designed curricula exposed students to balanced,

basic education, and compulsory schooling was known for its equal

educational treatment of students and for its relatively equal dis- tribution of financial resources among schools. However, the demands made by the uniform curricula and approach extracted a

price in lack of flexibility, including expected conformity of behavior. Little effort was made to address children with special needs

and interests. Much of the reform proposed in the late 1980s, particularly that part emphasizing greater flexibility, creativity, and

opportunities for greater individual expression, was aimed at changing these approaches.

Textbooks were free to students at compulsory school levels. New

texts were selected by school boards or principals once every three

years from the Ministry of Education's list of approved textbooks

or from a small list of texts that the ministry itself published. The

ministry bore the cost of distributing these books, in both public

and private schools. Textbooks were small, paperbound volumes

that could easily be carried by the students and that became their

property.

Almost all schools had a system of access to health professionals. Educational and athletic facilities were good; almost all elementary schools had an outdoor playground, roughly 90 percent had

a gymnasium, and 75 percent an outdoor swimming pool.

Elementary School

In the late 1980s, more than 99 percent of elementary schoolage children were enrolled in school. All children entered first grade

at age six, and starting school was considered a very important

event in a child's life. Virtually all elementary education took place in public schools;

less than 1 percent of the schools were private. Private schools tended

to be costly, although the rate of cost increases in tuition for these

schools had slowed in the 1980s. Some private elementary schools were prestigious and served as a first step to higher-level private

schools with which they were affiliated, and thence to a university. Competition to enter some of these "ladder schools" was quite

intense.

Although public elementary education was free, some school ex- penses were borne by parents, for example, school lunches and supplies. For many families, there were also nonschool educational

expenses, for extra books, or private lessons, orjuku (see Glossary).

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Japan: A Country Study

Such expenses rose throughout the decade, reaching an average

of ¥184,000 (US$1,314) in FY 1987 for each child. Costs for pri- vate elementary schools were substantially higher.

Elementary school classes were large, about thirty-one students

per class on average, but higher numbers were permitted. Students were usually organized into small work groups, which had both

academic and disciplinary functions. Discipline also was maintained, and a sense of responsibility encouraged, by the use of stu- dent monitors and by having the students assume responsibility

for the physical appearance of their classroom and school.

The ministry's Course of Study for Elementary Schools was composed of a wide variety of subjects, both academic and nonacademic, including moral education and "special activities." "Special

activities" referred to scheduled weekly time given over to class

affairs and to preparing for the school activities and ceremonies

that were used to emphasize character development and the importance of group effort and cooperation. The standard academic

curriculum included Japanese language, social studies, arithmetic, and science. Nonacademic subjects taught included art and

handicrafts, music, homemaking, physical education, and moral

education. Japanese language was the subject most emphasized.

The complexity of the written language and the diversity of its spoken forms in educated speech require this early attention.

A new course of study was established in 1989, partly as a result of the education reform movement of the 1980s and partly because

of ongoing curriculum review. Important changes scheduled were

an increased number of hours devoted to Japanese language, the

replacement of the social sciences course with a daily life course

instruction for children on proper interaction with the society and

environment around them—and an increased emphasis on moral

education. While evidence was still inconclusive, it appeared that

at least some children were having difficulties with Japanese language. New emphasis also was to be given in the curriculum to the national flag and the national anthem. The ministry suggested

that the flag be flown and the national anthem be sung at important school ceremonies. Because neither the flag nor the anthem

had been legally designated as national symbols, and because of

the nationalistic wartime associations the two had in the minds of some citizens, the suggestion from the ministry was greeted with some opposition. The revised history curriculum was to emphasize cultural legacies and events and the biographies of key figures.

The ministry provided a proposed list of biographies, and there was some criticism surrounding particular suggestions.

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Education and the Arts

Elementary teachers were generally responsible for all subjects,

and classes remained in one room for most activities. Teachers were

well prepared in the subjects they taught. Most teachers, about 60

percent of the total, were women; but most principals and head

teachers in elementary schools were men.

Teachers had ample teaching materials and audiovisual equipment. There was an excellent system of educational television and

radio, and almost all elementary schools used programs prepared

by the School Education Division of Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK). In addition to broadcast

media, schools increasingly were equipped with computers.

Although only 6.5 percent of public elementary schools had per- sonal computers in 1986, by 1989 the number had passed 20 percent. The ministry was greatly concerned with this issue and

planned much greater use of such equipment.

Virtually all elementary schoolchildren received a full lunch at school. Although heavily subsidized by government, both directly

and indirectiy, the program was not altogether free. Full meals

usually consisted of bread (or increasingly, of rice), a main dish,

and milk. Though the program grew out of concern in the immediate postwar period for adequate nutrition, the school lunch was

also important as a teaching device. Because there were relatively

few cafeterias in elementary schools, meals were taken in the class- room with the teacher, providing another informal opportunity for teaching nutrition and health and good eating habits and social

behavior. Frequently, students also were responsible for serving

the lunch and cleanup.

Japanese elementary schooling was acknowledged both in Japan

and abroad to be excellent, but not without some problems, notably increasing absenteeism and a declining but troublesome number of cases of bullying. In addition, special provision for the many

young children returning to Japan from long absences overseas was

an issue of major interest. The government also was concerned with

the education ofJapanese children residing abroad and sent teachers overseas to teach in Japanese schools.

Elementary school education was seen in Japan as fundamental

in shaping a positive attitude toward lifelong education. Regardless of academic achievement, almost all children in elementary

school were advanced to lower-secondary schools, the second of

the two compulsory levels of education.

Lower-Secondary School

Lower-secondary school covered grades seven, eight, and nine

children between the ages of roughly twelve and fifteen—with

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Japan: A Country Study

increased focus on academic studies. Although it was still possible

to leave the formal education system after completing lowersecondary school and find work, fewer than 4 percent did so by

the late 1980s.

Like elementary schools, most lower-secondary schools in the

1980s were public, but 5 percent were private. Private schools were

costly, averaging ¥558,592 (US$3,989) per student in 1988, about

four times more than the ¥130,828 (US$934) that the ministry

estimated as the parental cost for students enrolled in public lowersecondary schools.

The teaching force in lower-secondary schools was two-thirds

male. Schools were headed by principals, 99 percent of whom were men in 1988. Teachers had often majored in the subjects they

taught, and more than 80 percent had graduated from a four-year

college. Classes were large, with thirty-eight pupils per class on

average, and each class was assigned a homeroom teacher who doubled as counselor. Unlike elementary students, lower-secondary

school students had different teachers for different subjects. The

teacher, however, rather than the students, moved to a new room

for each fifty-minute period.

Instruction in lower- secondary schools tended to rely on the lec- ture method. Teachers also used other media, such as television

and radio, and there was some lab work. About 45 percent of all public lower-secondary schools had computers, including schools

that used them only for administrative purposes. Classroom or- ganization was still based on small work groups, although no longer

for reasons of discipline. By lower-secondary school, students were

expected to have mastered daily routines and acceptable behavior.

All course contents were specified in the Course of Study for

Lower-Secondary Schools. Some subjects, such as Japanese language and mathematics, were coordinated with the elementary cur- riculum. Others, such as foreign-language study, usually English,

began at this level. The curriculum covered Japanese language,

social studies, mathematics, science, music, fine arts, health, and

physical education. All students also were exposed to either industrial arts or homemaking. Moral education and special activities continued to receive attention.

Students also attended mandatory club meetings during school

hours, and many also participated in after-school clubs. Most lowersecondary students said they liked school, although it was the chance

to meet their friends daily—not the lessons—that was particularly

attractive to them.

The ministry recognized a need to improve the teaching of all foreign languages, especially English. To improve instruction in

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Education and the Arts

spoken English, the government invited many young native speakers of English to Japan to serve as assistants to school boards and

prefectures under its Japan Exchange and Teaching Program. By

1988, participants numbered over 1,000.

As part of the movement to develop an integrated curriculum

and the education reform movement of the late 1980s, the entire

Course of Study for Lower-Secondary Schools was revised in 1989

to take effect in the 1991-93 school years. A main aim of the re- form was to equip students with the basic knowledge needed for citizenship. In some measure, this meant increased emphasis on

Japanese history and culture, as well as understanding Japan as a nation and its relationships with other nations of the world. The

course of study also increased elective hours, recommending that

electives be chosen in light of individual student differences and

with an eye toward diversification.

Two problems of great concern to educators and citizens began

to appear at the lower-secondary level in the 1980s: bullying, which

seemed rampant in the mid-1980s but had abated somewhat by

the end of the decade, and the school-refusal syndrome (toko kyohi—

manifested by a student's excessive absenteeism), which was on

the rise. Experts disagreed over the specific causes of these phenomena, but there was general agreement that the system offered little individualized or specialized assistance, thus contributing to dis- affection among those who could not conform to its demands or who were otherwise experiencing difficulties. Another problem con- cerned Japanese children returning from abroad. These students,

particularly if they had been overseas for extended periods, often

needed help not only in reading and writing, but in adjusting to rigid classroom demands. Even making the adjustment did not

guarantee acceptance: besides having acquired a foreign language,

many of these students had also acquired foreign customs of speech,

dress, and behavior that marked them as different.

Special Education

Japanese special education at the compulsory level was highly

organized in the late 1980s, even though it had been nationally

mandated and implemented only in 1979. In 1990 there was still controversy over whether children with special needs could or should

be "mainstreamed." In a society that stressed the group, many

parents desired to have their children attend regular schools. Mainstreaming in Japan, however, did not necessarily mean attending regular classes; it often meant attending a regular school that

had special classes for handicapped students. There were also special public schools for the handicapped, which had departments

147
Japan: A Country Study

equivalent to the various levels of elementary and secondary schools,

including kindergarten and upper-secondary departments in some

cases. There were few private institutions for special education.

Some students attended regular classes and also special classes for training for their particular needs. Some teachers were also dis- patched to children who could not attend schools (see table 6, Appendix) . Upper-Secondary School

Even though upper-secondary school was not compulsory in

Japan, 94 percent of all lower-secondary school graduates entered

upper-secondary schools in 1989. Private upper-secondary schools

accounted for about 24 percent of all upper-secondary schools, and

neither public nor private schools were free. The Ministry of Education estimated that annual family expenses for the education of a child in a public upper-secondary school were about ¥300,000

(US$2,142) in both 1986 and 1987 and that private upper-secondary

schools were about twice as expensive.

All upper-secondary schools, public and private, were informally

ranked, based on their success in placing graduates in freshman

classes of the most prestigious universities. In the 1980s, private

upper-secondary schools occupied the highest levels of this hierarchy, and there was substantial pressure to do well in the examinations that determined the upper-secondary school a child entered.

Admission also depended on the scholastic record and performance

evaluation from lower-secondary school, but the examination results largely determined school entrance. Students were closely counseled in lower-secondary school, so that they would be relatively

assured of a place in the schools to which they applied.

The most common type of upper-secondary schools had a full- time, general program that offered academic courses for students

preparing for higher education and also technical and vocational courses for students expecting to find employment after graduation. More than 70 percent of upper-secondary school students enrolled in the general academic program in the late 1980s. A small

number of schools offered part-time or evening courses or correspondence education.

The first-year programs for students in both academic and commercial courses were similar. They included basic academic courses, such as Japanese language, English, mathematics, and science. In

upper-secondary school, differences in ability were first publicly

acknowledged, and course content and course selection were far more individualized in the second year. However, there was a core

of academic material throughout all programs.

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Education and the Arts

Vocational-technical programs included several hundred specialized courses, such as information processing, navigation, fish farming, business English, and ceramics. Business and industrial courses were the most popular, accounting for 72 percent of all students

in full-time vocational programs in 1989.

The upper-secondary curriculum also underwent thorough re- vision; and in 1989 a new Course of Study for Upper-Secondary

Schools was announced that would be phased in beginning in 1994.

Among noteworthy changes was the requirement that both male

and female students take a course in home economics. The government was concerned with instilling in all students an awareness

of the importance of family life, the various roles and responsibilities of family members, the concept of cooperation within the family, and the role of the family in society. The family continued to be an extremely important part of the social infrastructure, and

the ministry clearly was interested in maintaining family stability

within a changing society. Another change of note was the divi- sion of the old social studies course into history, geography, and

civics courses. Most upper- secondary teachers in the late 1980s were university graduates. Upper-secondary schools were organized into departments, and teachers specialized in their major fields although they

taught a variety of courses within their disciplines. Although women

composed about 20 percent of the teaching force, only 2.5 percent

of principals were women.

Teaching depended largely on the lecture system, with the main

goal of covering the very demanding curriculum in the time allot- ted. Approach and subject coverage tended to be uniform, at least in the public schools. As in lower- secondary school, the teachers, not the students, moved from room to room after each fifty-minute

class period.

Upper-secondary students were subject to a great deal of supervision by school authorities and school rules even outside of school.

Students' behavior and some activities were regulated by school

codes that were known and obeyed by most children. School regulations often set curfews and governed dress codes, hairstyles, stu- dent employment, and even leisure activities. The school frequently was responsible for student discipline when a student ran afoul of

the regulations, or occasionally, of the law. Delinquency, generally,

and school violence, in particular, were troubling to Japanese

authorities. Violations by upper-secondary school students included

smoking and some substance abuse (predominantly of amphetamines). Use of drugs, although not a serious problem by international standards, was of concern to the police and civil authorities

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Japan: A Country Study

(see Public Order and Internal Security, ch. 8). Bullying and the

drop-out rate were also subjects of attention. Upper-secondary stu- dents dropped out at a rate of between 2.0 and 2.5 percent per

year. The graduation rates for upper-secondary schools stood at 87.5 percent in 1987.

Discrimination in education was prohibited, but the burakumin

(outcast people), a group of people racially and culturally Japanese

who had been discriminated against historically, were still dis- advantaged in education to some degree (see Minorities, ch. 2). Their relatively poor educational attainment through the uppersecondary level in the 1960s was said to have been largely corrected

by the 1980s, but reliable evidence was lacking.

There were some private schools for the children of the foreign

community in Japan, and some Korean schools for children of

Japan's Korean minority population, many of whom were secondgeneration or third- generation residents in Japan. Graduates of

Korean schools faced some discrimination, particularly in enter- ing higher education. Observers estimated that 75 percent of Korean

children were attending Japanese schools in the early 1980s.

Training of handicapped students, particularly at the uppersecondary level, emphasized vocational education, to enable stu- dents to be as independent as possible within society. Vocational

training varied considerably depending on the student's handicap,

but the options were limited for some. It was clear that the government was aware of the necessity of broadening the range of possibilities for these students. Advancement to higher education was

also a goal of the government, and it struggled to have institutions

of higher learning accept more handicapped students.

Upper-secondary school students returning to Japan after liv- ing overseas presented another problem. The ministry was trying

to get upper-secondary schools to accept these students more readily,

and in the late 1980s had decided to allow credit for one uppersecondary school year spent abroad.

Upper-secondary school graduates choosing to enter the world

of work were supported by a very effective system of job placement, which, combined with favorable economic conditions, kept

the unemployment rate among new graduates quite low (see The

Structure ofJapan's Labor Market, ch. 4). For those students going on to college, the final phases of school life became increasingly

dedicated to preparing for examinations, particularly in some of

the elite private schools. About 31 percent of upper-secondary

graduates advanced to some form of higher education direcdy after graduation.

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Education and the Arts

After-school clubs provided an important upper-secondary school

activity. Sports, recreational reading, and watching television were

popular daily leisure activities, but schoolwork and other studies

remained the focus of the daily lives of most children. The college

entrance examinations greatly influenced school life and study

habits, not only for college-bound students, but indirectly for all; the prospect of the examinations often imparted a seriousness to the tone of school life at the upper-secondary level. After-School Education

Much debated, and often criticized in the late twentieth century,

juku were special private schools that offered highly organized les- sons conducted after regular school hours and on the weekends.

Although best known and most widely publicized for their role as "cram schools," where children (sent by concerned parents) could

study to improve scores on upper-secondary school entrance ex- aminations, academicjtt£w actually performed several educational

functions. They provided supplementary education that many chil- dren needed just to keep up with the regular school curriculum,

remedial education for the increasing numbers of children who

fell behind in their work, and preparation for students striving to improve test scores and preparing for the all-important uppersecondary and university entrance examinations. In many ways,

juku compensated for the formal education system's inability or unwillingness to address particular individual problems. Half of all compulsory school-age children attended academic juku, which

offered instruction in mathematics, Japanese language, science,

English, and social studies. Many other children, particularly

younger children, attended nonacademic7'w£tt for piano lessons, art instruction, swimming, and abacus lessons. To some observers,

juku represented an attempt by parents to exercise a meaningful measure of choice in Japanese education, particularly for children

attending public schools. Somejuku offered subject matter not avail- able in the public school curricula, while others emphasized a special philosophical or ethical approach.

Juku also played a social role, and children in Japan said they

liked going to juku because they were able to make new friends;

many children asked to be sent because their friends attended. Some

children seemed to like juku because of the closer personal contact they had with their teachers.

Juku attendance rose from the 1970s through the mid-1980s; participation rates increased at every grade level throughout the compulsory education years. This phenomenon was a source of great concern to the ministry, which issued directives to the regular

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Japan: A Country Study

schools that it hoped would reduce the need for after- school les- sons, but these directives had little practical effect. Somejw^w even had branches in the United States and other countries to help children living abroad to catch up with students in

Japan. Because of the commercial nature of mostjuku, some crit- ics argued that they had profit rather than education at heart, and

not all students could afford to attend. Juku introduced some in- equality into what had been a relatively egalitarian approach to education, at least in public schools through ninth grade. Yet, while some juku were expensive, the majority were affordable for most

families \juku could not price themselves beyond the reach of their

potential clientele. If rising enrollments in juku were any indication, costs were not yet a limiting factor for most parents, andjw/rw

clearly were given some priority in family budgeting.

If a student did not attendjuku, it did not mean that he or she was necessarily at a disadvantage in school. Other avenues of as- sistance were available. For example, self-help literature and supplemental texts and study guides, some produced by publishing

houses associated with juku, were widely available commercially.

Most of these items were moderately priced. A correspondence

course of the Upper-Secondary School of the Air was broadcast

almost daily on the NHK educational radio and television channels. These programs were free, and costs for accompanying text- books were nominal. In addition, about 1 percent of elementary

school students and 7.3 percent of lower-secondary school students

took extra lessons at home with tutors. Higher Education

College Entrance

College entrance was based largely on the scores that students

achieved in entrance examinations. Private institutions accounted

for 73 percent of all university enrollments in 1988, but with a few

exceptions, the public national universities were the most highly

regarded. This distinction had its origins in historical factors—the

long years of dominance of the select imperial universities, such

as Tokyo and Kyoto universities, which trained Japan's leaders

before the war—and also in differences in quality, particularly in

facilities and faculty ratios. In addition, certain prestigious employers, notably the government and select large corporations, continued

to restrict their hiring of new employees to graduates of the most

esteemed universities. There was a close link between university

background and employment opportunity. Because Japanese so- ciety placed such store in academic credentials, the competition

152
An elementary-level juku poetry-reading class Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

Mathematics class, Fukuoka Upper-Secondary School, Iwate Prefecture Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger

153
Japan: A Country Study

to enter the prestigious universities was keen. In addition, the

eighteen-year-old population was still growing in the late 1980s,

increasing the number of applicants.

Students applying to national universities took two entrance ex- aminations, first a nationally administered uniform achievement

test and then an examination administered by the university that

the student hoped to enter. Applicants to private universities needed

to take only the university's examination. Some national schools

had so many applicants that they used the first test, the Joint First

Stage Achievement Test, as a screening device for qualification to their own admissions test. Such intense competition meant that many students could not

compete successfully for admission to the college of their choice.

An unsuccessful student could either accept an admission elsewhere,

forego a college education, or wait until the following spring to take

the national examinations again. A large number of students chose

the last option. These students, called ronin (see Glossary), spent an entire year, and sometimes longer, studying for another attempt

at the entrance examinations.

Yobiko (see Glossary) are private schools that in current times,

like manyjuku, help students prepare for entrance examinations.

Whileyobiko have many programs for upper-secondary school stu- dents, they are best known for their specially designed full-time,

year-long classes for ronin. The number of applicants to four-year

universities totalled almost 560,000 in 1988. Ronin accounted for about 40 percent of new entrants to four-year colleges in 1988. Most

ronin were men, but about 14 percent were women. The ronin ex- perience was so common in Japan that the Japanese educational

structure was often said to have an extra ronin year built into it. Yobiko sponsored a variety of programs, both full-time and parttime, and employed an extremely sophisticated battery of tests, stu- dent counseling sessions, and examination analysis to supplement

their classroom instruction. The cost oiyobiko education was high,

comparable to first-year university expenses, and some specialized courses at yobiko were even more expensive. Someyobiko published

modified commercial versions of the proprietary texts they used

in their classrooms through publishing affiliates or by other means,

and these were popular among the general population preparing

for college entrance exams. Yobiko also administered practice ex- aminations throughout the year, which they opened to all students

for a fee. In the late 1980s, the examination and entrance process were

the subjects of renewed debate. In 1987 the schedule of the Joint

First Stage Achievement Test was changed, and the content of the

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Education and the Arts

examination itself was revised for 1990. The schedule changes for the first time provided some flexibility for students wishing to apply to more than one national university. The newJoint First Stage

Achievement Test was prepared and administered by the National

Center for University Entrance Examination and was designed to accomplish better assessment of academic achievement.

The ministry hoped many private schools would adopt or adapt

the new national test to their own admissions requirements and

thereby reduce or eliminate the university tests. But, by the time

the new test was administered in 1990, few schools had displayed

any inclination to do so. The ministry urged universities to increase

the number of students admitted through alternate selection

methods, including admission of students returning to Japan from

long overseas stays, admission by recommendation, and admission of students who had graduated from upper-secondary schools more than a few years before. Although a number of schools had

programs in place or reserved spaces for returning students, only

5 percent of university students were admitted under these alter- nate arrangements in the late 1980s.

Other college entrance issues were proper guidance for college

placement at the upper-secondary level and better dissemination

of information about university programs. The ministry provided

information through the National Center for University Entrance

Examination's on-line information access system and encouraged

universities, faculties, and departments to prepare brochures and

video presentations about their programs.

Universities

In 1989 there were just over 2 million students enrolled in Japan's

490 universities. At the top of the higher education structure, these

institutions provided four-year training leading to a bachelor's

degree, and some offered six-year programs leading to a professional degree. There were two types of public four-year colleges:

the 95 national universities (including the University of the Air)

and the 38 local public universities, founded by prefectures and

municipalities. The 357 remaining four-year colleges were private

(see table 7, Appendix).

The overwhelming majority of college students attended full-time

day programs. In 1988 the most popular courses, enrolling almost

40 percent of all undergraduate students, were in the social sciences,

including business, law, and accounting. Other popular subjects were engineering (20 percent), the humanities (15 percent), and

education (7.5 percent).

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Japan: A Country Study

The average costs (tuition, fees, and living expenses) for a year

of higher education in 1986 were ¥1.4 million (US$10,000), of

which parents paid a little less than 80 percent, or about 20 per- cent of the average family's income in 1986. To help defray ex- penses, students frequently worked part-time or borrowed money

through the government-supported Japan Scholarship Association.

Assistance also was offered by local governments, nonprofit cor- porations, and other institutions.

In 1988 women accounted for about 26 percent of all university

undergraduates, and their numbers were slowly increasing. Women's choices of majors and programs of study still tended to follow

traditional patterns, with more than two-thirds of all women enrolled in education, social sciences, or humanities courses. Only

15 percent studied scientific and technical subjects, and women

represented less than 3 percent of students in engineering, the most

popular subject for men.

Junior Colleges

Junior colleges—mainly private institutions—were a legacy of

the occupation period; many had been prewar institutions upgraded

to college status at that time. More than 90 percent of the students

in junior colleges were women, and higher education for women

was still largely perceived as preparation for marriage or for a short- term career before marriage. Junior colleges provided many women

with social credentials as well as education and some career opportunities. These colleges frequently emphasized home economics, nursing, teaching, the humanities, and social sciences in their

curricula.

Special Training Schools

Advanced courses in special training schools required uppersecondary-school graduation. These schools offered training in

specific skills, such as computer science and vocational training,

and they enrolled a large number of men. Some students attended

these schools in addition to attending a university; others went to qualify for technical licenses or certification. The prestige of special training schools was lower than that of universities, but graduates, particularly in technical areas, were readily absorbed by the

job market.

Miscellaneous Schools

In 1988 there were about 3,700 predominantly private "miscellaneous schools," whose attendance did not require uppersecondary school graduation. Miscellaneous schools offered a variety

156
Students at Shokutoku Junior College

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

of courses in such programs as medical treatment, education, social welfare, and hygiene, diversifying practical postsecondary train- ing and responding to social and economic demands for certain

skills. Technical Colleges

Most technical colleges were national institutions established to train highly skilled technicians in five-year programs in a number

of fields, including the merchant marine. Sixty-two of these schools

had been operating since the early 1960s. About 10 percent of technical college graduates transferred to universities as third-year stu- dents, and some universities, notably the University of Tokyo and

Tokyo Institute of Technology, earmarked entrance places for these

transfer students in the 1980s.

Graduate Education and Research

Graduate schools became a part of the formal higher education

system only after World War II and were still not stressed in 1990.

Even though 60 percent of all universities had graduate schools,

only 7 percent of university graduates advanced to master's programs, and total graduate school enrollment was about 4 percent

of the entire university student population.

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Japan: A Country Study

The pattern of graduate enrollment was almost the opposite of

that of undergraduates: the majority (63 percent) of all graduate

students were enrolled in the national universities, and it appeared

that the disparity between public and private graduate enrollments was widening. Graduate education was largely a male preserve,

and women, particularly at the master's level, were most heavily

represented in the humanities, social sciences, and education. Men,

on the other hand, were frequently found in engineering programs

where, at the master's level, women comprised only 2 percent of

the students. At the doctoral level, the two highest levels of female

enrollment were found in medical programs and the humanities,

where in both fields 30 percent of doctoral students were women.

Women accounted for about 13 percent of all doctoral enrollments.

The generally small numbers of graduate students and the graduate enrollment profile resulted from a number of factors, especially

the traditional employment pattern of industry. The private sec- tor frequently preferred to hire and train new university graduates, allowing them to develop their research skills within the

corporate structure. Thus, the demand for students with advanced

degrees was low.

The Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture

The Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture was the primary

authority over higher education. It approved the establishment of

all new institutions, both public and private, and directly controlled

the budgets of all national institutions and their affiliated research

institutes. In addition, the ministry regulated many aspects of the

university environment, including standards for academics and

physical plants and facilities. The ministry also provided subsidies

to private higher education institutions for both operation and

equipment and made long-term loans for physical plant improvement.

Government appropriations were the largest source of funds for national universities (over 75 percent), and tuition and fees provided

most revenues for private schools (about 66 percent), with subsidies accounting for another 10 to 15 percent for the private schools. The 1975 Private School Promotion Law allowed the government

to subsidize private education and increased the ministry's authority over private schools, but the ministry's own budgetary limits and

general fiscal restraint have tended to limit such subsidies, which

remained relatively low. In FY 1988, for example, only ¥244 bil- lion of the total ministry budget of ¥4.6 trillion went for this purpose.

The Ministry of Education had two major areas of responsibility related to graduate education and research. In addition to being

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Education and the Arts

generally responsible for the national universities and establishing

their research institutes, the ministry also promoted the research

conducted at universities and funded both institutions and individuals. About a half-dozen research institutes, such as the National Institute for Educational Research and the National Institute

for Special Education, were also under direct ministry supervision.

Several types of research organizations were affiliated with universities: the national research institutes attached to national universities, independent research facilities affiliated with national

universities but open to researchers from universities throughout

Japan, other research centers, and other facilities at national, local,

public, and private universities.

The ministry was not the exclusive agent for funding and promoting research, but it accounted for about half of the entire government budget for research throughout most of the 1980s. In addition

to providing funds for research institutes and national universities, the ministry gave smaller amounts for scientific grants and

programs in other public and private institutions.

The ministry could devote funds to particular areas of research

that it considered important. In FY 1988, space science, particularly scientific satellites, rockets, and astronomy, high-energy physics and accelerator experiments, and the construction of a national

research and development information network were programs that

the ministry emphasized in its budget.

Reform

The quality of undergraduate and graduate education was the

subject of widespread criticism in the 1980s, and its improvement

was one of the focal points of university reform. One complaint was that students, once admitted, had little incentive to study be- cause graduation was virtually automatic. There were few atten- dance requirements and, except for examinations, students were

free to come and go as they pleased. There was poor teaching, and

little study. Students and the system were accused of squandering

the four years. In response to the call for university reform in the reports of the

National Council on Educational Reform, the ministry founded

the University Council in 1987. High on the council's agenda were

the diversification and reform of graduate education, improvement

in the management and organization of universities, and the development of a policy for lifelong education and diversification in

educational activities. The recommendations that had emerged by

1989 included improvements in the provision of private financial

support to universities and modified personnel practices for college

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Japan: A Country Study

instructors in the national schools. There were calls for better in- formation and data-processing education and for the establishment or reorganization of departments and research faculties in those

fields. Finally, in the area of lifelong education, changes under dis- cussion were the provision of more public lectures, expansion of

university entrance opportunities for the general adult population,

improvements in the University of the Air, and better schoolcommunity links. The University of the Air, which had no entrance requirements, was originally designed to give all Japanese access to higher education through radio and television broadcasts. Although it was hampered by limited broadcast radius and frequencies, it had a

potential leading role in promoting lifelong learning (see Social Education, this ch.).

Internationalization was an issue for every education level, but

particularly for higher education. The number of students studying in Japan from foreign countries, especially Asian countries, was increasing, and the higher education structure was not particularly well-equipped to deal with them. In 1988 approximately

25,000 foreign students from more than 100 countries were studying in Japanese universities and colleges, and the ministry expected

the figure to be 100,000 by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The ministry was also working to regulate and improve the

standards for teaching Japanese to foreign students and trying to improve their financial and living arrangements. During the 1980s,

Japanese universities established branches in the United States,

and many American schools also set up Japanese branches. At least one Japanese women's university began to require its undergraduates to spend a semester on the campus of an affiliated school in

the United States. As in virtually every other area of education, debate over re- form of graduate education and research was widespread at the

end of the 1980s. The University Council established a subcommittee on graduate schools consisting of academics, researchers,

and corporate executives. The subcommittee identified a number

of critical issues: establishing graduate schools that were independent of traditional university structures, founding new and specialized graduate schools, reconsidering entrance and graduation

criteria, increasing the international student population and inter- nationalizing graduate education, addressing the qualifications of

graduate school faculties, modifying the mission of doctoral courses, arranging for flexibility in admissions to graduate school, stan- dardizing the length of graduate programs and reconciling the variations between degrees awarded by different schools and in different

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Education and the Arts

disciplines, establishing an accreditation and evaluation system,

and reviewing the financial situation of graduate students. These

recommendations were acknowledged in the ministry's FY 1988

budget, which included funds for expanding student aid programs,

reforming graduate programs, and establishing a new Graduate

School for Advanced Studies. Proposed reform of the research sys- tem concentrated on improving cooperation between universities

and the private sector, and between universities and other insti- tutions.

Finally, the subcommittee recommended greater Japanese participation and cooperation in international projects and greater

efforts to make Japanese scientific and technical literature available in English. Although there were more programs for international scholarly exchange and more foreign researchers and foreign

graduate students in Japan than in the past, Japanese society and

education institutions were still having some difficulties in accom- modating them smoothly.

Some of the urgency behind considering reforms in graduate education and research came from the recognition that Japan was in- creasingly involved in advanced research and was no longer assured

of having foreign models to study. To remain competitive and to guarantee its future, Japan would need to make serious changes

in its education and research structures. Its institutions would have

to be more flexible and diverse, and encourage the creativity in

education that would foster new technology. This need was seen

to require a national effort, one not limited to the graduate sector. Social Education

Modern Japan is unquestionably a society that values education highly. Nowhere in the 1980s was this better reflected than

in "social education," as the Japanese called nondegree-oriented

education. Diverse institutions, such as the miscellaneous schools,

provided these services. Large newspaper companies sponsored cul- tural centers that offered ongoing programs of informal education,

department stores organized curricula covering everything from

cooking classes to music, English conversation, and Japanese poetry.

"Lifelong learning," another term for social education, was also a key phrase in the education reforms of the late 1980s. The responsibility for social education was shared by all levels of government,

but especially local government. Local governments also were

largely responsible for such public facilities as libraries and museums, basic resources in social education (see table 8, Appendix).

The ministry was interested in increasing the use of public school

facilities for lifelong learning activities, increasing the number of

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Japan: A Country Study

social education facilities, training staff, and disseminating information about lifelong learning opportunities.

The Japanese are voracious readers. In the 1980s, well-known

bookstores were full from the moment they opened their doors each

day with readers seeking books from a staggering range of foreign

as well as Japanese titles. The top four national newspapers alone

had a combined daily circulation (with two editions each day) of over 35 million, and there were four daily English-language papers

as well. Although education in Japan in 1990 was in transition in many

regards, it still retained its postwar organizational structure. Even

with growing pressure for reforms and for more emphasis on in- dividuality and internationalization in education, it was clear that

educational changes would be a unique amalgam of traditional

values and modern innovations.

The Arts

The introduction of Western cultural values, which had flooded

Japan by the late nineteenth century, led to a dichotomy developing between traditional values and the attempts to duplicate and

assimilate a variety of clashing new ideas. This split remained evi- dent in the late twentieth century, although much synthesis had

occurred, which had created an international cultural atmosphere

and stimulated contemporary Japanese arts toward ever more in- novative forms.

Japan's aesthetic conceptions, deriving from diverse cultural tra- ditions, have been formative in the production of unique art forms,

all of which are characterized by an overwhelming technical perfection. Over the centuries, a wide range of artistic motifs developed and were refined, becoming imbued with symbolic significance

and acquiring many layers of meaning. Japanese aesthetics provide a key to understanding artistic works perceivably different from

those coming from Western traditions.

Within the East Asian artistic tradition, China has been the ac- knowledged teacher and Japan the devoted student. Nevertheless,

Japanese arts developed their own style, which can be clearly differen- tiated from the Chinese. The monumental, symmetrically balanced,

rational approach of Chinese art forms became miniaturized, irregular, and subdy suggestive in Japanese hands. Miniature rock gardens,

diminutive plants (bonsai), and flower arrangements, in which the

selected few represented a garden, were the favorite pursuits of re- fined aristocrats for a millennium, and they have remained a part

of contemporary cultural life.

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i 4

Daisen-in rock garden, Kyoto

Courtesy Jane T. Griffin

The diagonal, reflecting a natural flow, rather than the fixed tri- angle became the favored structural device, whether in painting,

architectural or garden design, dance steps, or musical notations.

Odd numbers replace even ones in the regularity of a Chinese

master pattern, and a pull to one side allows a motif to turn the corner of a three-dimensional object, thus giving continuity and

motion that is lacking in a static frontal design. Japanese painters

used the devices of the cutoff, close-up, and fade-out by the twelfth

century in yamato-e, or Japanese-style, scroll painting, perhaps one

reason why modern filmmaking has been such a natural and

successful art form in Japan. Suggestion is used rather than direct statement; oblique poetic hints, allusive, inconclusive melodies and

thoughts—all have proved frustrating to the Westerner trying to penetrate the meanings of literature, music, painting, and even

everyday language.

The Japanese began defining such aesthetic ideas in a number

of evocative phrases by at least the tenth or eleventh centuries. The

courtly refinements of the aristocratic Heian period evolved into

the elegant simplicity seen as the essence of good taste in the understated art that is called shibui (see Nara and Heian Periods, 710-

1185, ch. 1). Two terms originating from Zen Buddhist meditative practices describe degrees of tranquility: one, the repose found

in humble melancholy (wabi), the other, the serenity accompanying the enjoyment of subdued beauty (sabi). Zen thought also

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Japan: A Country Study

contributed a penchant for combining the unexpected or startling,

used to jolt one's consciousness toward the goal of enlightenment:

in art, this approach was expressed in combinations of such unlikely materials as lead inlaid in lacquer and in clashing poetic imagery. Unexpectedly humorous and sometimes grotesque images

and motifs also stem from the Zen koan (conundrum). Although

the arts have been mainly secular since the Tokugawa period, tradi- tional aesthetics and training methods, stemming generally from

religious sources, continue to underlie artistic productions (see

Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867, ch. 1). In the Meiji period (1868-1912), Western art forms came into

Japan and were studied with intense interest by Japanese artists,

who quickly imitated a variety of European models. By the early

twentieth century, a period of assimilation began as techniques were

mastered and the new forms of literature and the visual and per- forming arts were adapted. Artists divided into two main camps,

those continuing in traditional Japanese style and those who wholeheartedly studied the new Western culture. By the late 1920s, a generation of Japanese artists had synthesized Western and

Japanese artistic conceptions. Oil painters used the calligraphic,

black lines of traditional Japanese brushwork, and musicians used

the Asian tonal system and instruments to create a concerto, while

new theaters dealt with social themes in the allusive traditional liter- ary style. Artists employing Western forms were accused of imitating rather than innovating. Yet, the age-old Asian cultural

tradition has always entailed copying a master's style until it has

been perfected, which explains why so much so-called "imitative

art" was produced. Japan produced much vibrant and unique new

art through such exchanges.

After World War II, many artists began working in art forms

deriving from the international scene, moving away from local artistic developments into the mainstream of world art. But traditional Japanese conceptions endured, particularly in the use of

modular space in architecture and certain spacing intervals in music

and dance, and a propensity for certain color combinations and

characteristic literary forms. The wide variety of art forms available to the Japanese in the 1990s reflected the vigorous state of

the arts, widely supported by the Japanese people and promoted

by the government.

Traditionally, the artist was a vehicle for expression and was per- sonally reticent, in keeping with the role of an artisan or enter- tainer of low social status. The calligrapher—a member of the

Confucian literati class, or samurai—did have a higher status, while

artists of great genius were often recognized in the medieval period

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by receiving a name from a feudal lord and thus rising socially (see

The Kamakura and Muromachi Periods, 1185-1573, ch. 1). The

performing arts, however, were generally held in less esteem, and

the purported immorality of actresses of the early Kabuki theater

caused the Tokugawa government to bar women from the stage;

female roles in Kabuki and No thereafter were played by men (see

The Bakufu and the Hqjo Regency, ch. 1). In the early 1990s, there were a number of specialized universities for the arts, led by the national universities. The most important was the prestigious Tokyo Arts University, said to be the most

difficult of all national universities to enter. Another seminal center was Tama Arts University in Tokyo, which produced many of

Japan's late twentieth-century innovative young artists. Traditional

training in the arts remained: experts taught from their homes or headed schools working within a master-pupil relationship. A pupil

did not experiment with a personal style until the top level of training, or graduation, or becoming head of a school. Many young

artists have criticized this system as stifling creativity and individuality. A new generation of the avant-garde has broken with this tradition, often receiving its training in the West. In the traditional

arts, however, the master-pupil system preserved the secrets and

skills of the past. Some master-pupil lineages could be traced to the medieval period, from which they continued to use a great

master's style or theme. Japanese artists considered technical vir- tuosity as the sine qua non of their professions, a fact recognized

by the rest of the world as one of the hallmarks of Japanese art. The national government has actively supported the arts through

the Agency for Cultural Affairs, set up in 1968 as a special body

of the Ministry of Education. The agency's budget for FY 1989

rose to ¥37.8 billion after five years of budget cuts, but still represented much less than 1 percent of the general budget. The

agency's Cultural Affairs Division disseminated information about

the arts within Japan and internationally, and the Cultural Properties Protection Division protected the nation's cultural heritage.

The Cultural Affairs Division was concerned with such areas as

art and culture promotion, arts copyrights, and improvements in

the national language. It also supported both national and local

arts and cultural festivals, and funded traveling cultural events in

music, theater, dance, art exhibitions, and filmmaking. Special

prizes were offered to encourage young artists and established practitioners, and some grants were given each year to enable them

to train abroad. The agency funded national museums of modern

art in Kyoto and Tokyo and the Museum of Western Art in Tokyo,

which exhibited both Japanese and international shows. The agency

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Japan: A Country Study

also supported the Japan Academy of Arts, which honored eminent persons of arts and letters, appointing them to membership

and offering ¥3.5 million in prize money. Awards were made in

the presence of the emperor, who would personally bestow the

highest accolade, the Cultural Medal. In 1989 the fifth woman ever

to be so distinguished was cited for Japanese-style painting, while

for the first time two women—a writer and a costume designer

were nominated for the Order of Cultural Merit, another official honor carrying the same stipend.

The Cultural Properties Protection Division originally was es- tablished to oversee restorations after World War II. In 1989 it was responsible for over 2,500 historic sites, including the ancient

capitals of Asuka, Heijokyo, and Fujiwara, more than 275 scenic

places, and nearly 1,000 national monuments, and for such in- digenous fauna as ibis and storks. As of 1989, some 1,000 buildings, paintings, sculptures, and other art forms had been designated

National Treasures. In addition, about 1 1 ,500 items had the lesser designation of Important Cultural Properties, with buildings ac- counting for the largest share, closely followed by sculpture and

craft objects.

The government also protected buried properties, of which some

300,000 had been identified. During the 1980s, many important

prehistoric and historic sites were investigated by the archaeological institutes that the agency funded, resulting in about 2,000 ex- cavations in 1989. The wealth of material unearthed shed new light on the controversial period of the formation of the Japanese state (see Early Developments, ch. 1). A 1975 amendment to the Cultural Properties Protection Act

of 1897 enabled the Agency for Cultural Affairs to designate traditional areas and buildings in urban centers for preservation. From

time to time, various endangered traditional artistic skills were added to the agency's preservation roster, such as the 1989 inclusion of a kind of ancient doll making.

One of the most important roles of the Cultural Properties Protection Division was to preserve the traditional arts and crafts and

performing arts through their living exemplars. Individual artists and groups, such as a dance troupe or a pottery village, were designated as mukei bunkazai (intangible cultural assets) in recognition of

their skill. Major exponents of the traditional arts have been designated as ningen kokuhd (living national treasures). About seventy per- sons are so honored at any one time; in 1989 the six newly designated

masters were a kyogen (comic) performer, a chanter of bunraku (puppet) theater, a performer of the nagauta samisen (a special kind of

stringed instrument), the head potter making Nabeshima decorated

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porcelain ware, the top pictorial lacquer-ware artist, and a metalwork expert. Each was provided a lifetime annual pension of ¥2

million and financial aid for training disciples.

The national museums of Japanese and Asian art in Tokyo,

Kyoto, Nara, and Osaka, the cultural properties research institutes

at Tokyo and Nara, the national theaters, the Ethnological Museum, the National Museum of History and Folk Culture, and the

National Storehouse for Fine Arts all came under the aegis of the

Cultural Properties Protection Division. During the 1980s, the National No Theater and the National Bunraku Theater were constructed by the government.

Arts patronage and promotion by the government were broadened to include a new cooperative effort with corporate Japan to provide funding beyond the tight budget of the Agency for Cultural Affairs. Many other public and private institutions participated, especially in the burgeoning field of awarding arts prizes.

A growing number of large corporations joined major newspapers

in sponsoring exhibitions and performances and in giving yearly

prizes. The most important of the many literary awards given were

the venerable Naoki Prize and the Akutagawa Prize, the latter being

the equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize in the United States. In 1989 an effort to promote cross-cultural exchange led to the establishment of a Japanese " Nobel Prize" for the arts—the Premium Imperiale —by the Japan Art Association. This prize of US$100,000

was funded largely by the mass media conglomerate Fuji-Sankei

and awarded on a world-wide selection basis.

A number of foundations promoting the arts arose in the 1980s,

including the new Cultural Properties Foundation set up to preserve

historic sites overseas, especially along the Silk Route in Inner Asia

and at Dunhuang in China. Another international arrangement was made in 1988 with the United States Smithsonian Institution

for cooperative exchange of high-technology studies of Asian arti- facts. The government played a major role by funding the Japan

Foundation, which provided both institutional and individual

grants, effected scholarly exchanges, awarded annual prizes, supported publications and exhibitions, and sent traditional Japanese

arts groups to perform abroad. The Arts Festival held for two

months each fall for all the performing arts was sponsored by the

Agency for Cultural Affairs. Major cities also provided substantial support for the arts; a growing number in the 1980s had built

large centers for the performing arts and, stimulated by government funding, were offering prizes such as the Lafcadio Hearn Prize

initiated by the city of Matsue. There were also a number of new

municipal museums providing about one-third more facilities in

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Japan: A Country Study

the 1980s than were previously available. In the late 1980s, Tokyo

added more than twenty new cultural halls, notably, the large Cultural Village built by Tokyu Corporation and the reconstruction

of Shakespeare's Globe Theater. All these efforts reflected a rising

popular enthusiasm for the arts. Japanese art buyers swept the

Western art markets in the late 1980s, paying record highs for impressionist paintings and US$51.7 million alone for one blue pe- riod Picasso.

After World War II, artists typically gathered in arts associations, some of which were long-established professional societies

while others reflected the latest arts movement. The Japan Artists

League, for example, was responsible for the largest number of

major exhibitions including the prestigious annual Nitten (Japan

Art Exhibition). The P.E.N. Club of Japan (P.E.N, stands for prose, essay, and narrative)—a branch of an international writers'

organization—was the largest of some thirty major authors' associations. Actors, dancers, musicians, and other kinds of performing

artists boasted their own major and minor societies, including the

Kabuki Society, organized in 1987 to maintain this art's traditional

high standards, which were thought to be endangered by modern

innovation. By the 1980s, however, avant-garde painters and sculptors had eschewed all groups, and were "unattached" artists. Visual Arts

Architecture

With the introduction of Western building techniques, materials,

and styles into Meiji Japan, new steel and concrete structures were

built in strong contrast to traditional styles. Japan played some role in modern skyscraper design because of its long familiarity with

the cantilever principle to support the weight of heavy tiled temple roofs. Frank Lloyd Wright was strongly influenced by Japanese

spatial arrangements and the concept of interpenetrating exterior

and interior space, long achieved in Japan by opening up walls

made of sliding doors. In the late twentieth century, however, only

in domestic and religious architecture was Japanese style commonly

employed. Cities bristled with modern skyscrapers, epitomized by

Tokyo's crowded skyline, reflecting a total assimilation and trans- formation of modern Western forms.

The widespread urban planning and reconstruction necessitated

by the devastation of World War II produced such major architects as Maekawa Kunio and Tange Kenzo. Maekawa, a student of

world-famous architect Charles LeCorbusier, produced thoroughly

international, functional modern works. Tange, who worked at first

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for Maekawa, supported this concept. Both were notable for in- fusing Japanese aesthetic ideas into starkly contemporary buildings, returning to the spatial concepts and modular proportions

of tatami (sleeping mats), using textures to enliven the ubiquitous

ferroconcrete and steel, and integrating gardens and sculpture into

their designs. Tange used the cantilever principle in a pillar and

beam system reminiscent of ancient imperial palaces; the pillar

a hallmark of Japanese traditional monumental timber construction—became fundamental to his designs. Maki Fumihiko advanced

new city planning ideas based on the principle of layering or cocoon- ing around an inner space (oku), a Japanese spatial concept that was adapted to urban needs. He also advocated the use of empty

or open spaces (ma), a Japanese aesthetic principle reflecting Buddhist spatial ideas. Another quintessentially Japanese aesthetic concept was a basis for Maki designs, which focused on openings onto

intimate garden views at ground level while cutting off ugly skylines. A dominant 1970s architectural concept, the "metabolism"

of convertibility, provided for changing the functions of parts of

buildings according to use, and has remained influential in the

1990s.

A major architect of the 1970s and 1980s was Isozaki Arata, originally a student and associate of Tange' s, who also based his style on the LeCorbusier tradition and then turned his attention toward

the further exploration of geometric shapes and cubic silhouettes.

He synthesized Western high-technology building concepts with

peculiarly Japanese spatial, functional, and decorative ideas to create a modern Japanese style. Isozaki' s predilection for the cubic grid

and trabeated pergola in large-scale architecture, for the semicircular

vault in domestic-scale buildings, and for extended barrel vaulting in low, elongated buildings led to a number of striking variations. New Wave architects of the 1980s were influenced by his

designs, either pushing to extend his balanced style, often into mannerism, or reacting against them.

A number of avant-garde experimental groups were encompassed

in the New Wave of the late 1970s and the 1980s. They reexamined

and modified the formal geometric structural ideas of modernism

by introducing metaphysical concepts, producing some startling

fantasy effects in architectural design. In contrast to these innovators, the experimental poetic minimalism of Ando Tadao embodied the postmodernist concerns for a more balanced, humanistic

approach than that of structural modernism's rigid formulations.

Ando's buildings provide a variety of light sources, including ex- tensive use of glass bricks and opening up spaces to the outside

air. He adapted the inner courtyards of traditional Osaka houses

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to new urban architecture, using open stairways and bridges to lessen the sealed atmosphere of the standard city dwelling. His ideas

became ubiquitous in the 1980s, when buildings were commonly

planned around open courtyards or plazas, often with stepped and

terraced spaces, pedestrian walkways, or bridges connecting building complexes. In 1989 Ando became the third Japanese to receive

France's Prix de L'Academie d' Architecture, an indication of the

international strength of the majorJapanese architects, all of whom

produced important structures abroad during the 1980s. Japanese

architects were not only skilled practitioners in the modern idiom

but also enriched postmodern designs worldwide with innovative

spatial perceptions, subtle surface texturing, unusual use of industrial materials, and a developed awareness of ecological and topographical problems.

Sculpture

Japanese sculpture derived from Shinto funerary and Buddhist

religious arts, and developed portrait sculpture only as a memorial

to a shrine patron or temple founder. Materials traditionally used were metal—especially bronze—and, more commonly, wood, often

lacquered, gilded, or brightiy painted. By the end of the Tokugawa

period, such traditional sculpture—except for miniaturized works

had largely disappeared because of the loss of patronage by Buddhist temples and the nobility.

The stimulus of Western art forms returned sculpture to the

Japanese art scene and introduced the plaster cast, outdoor heroic

sculpture, and the school of Paris concept of sculpture as an "art

form." Such ideas adapted in Japan during the late nineteenth century, together with the return of state patronage, rejuvenated sculpture. After World War II, sculptors turned away from the figurative

French school of Rodin and Maillol toward aggressive modern and

avant-garde forms and materials, sometimes on an enormous scale. A profusion of materials and techniques characterized these new

experimental sculptures, which also absorbed the ideas of international "op" (optical illusion) and "pop" (popular motif) art. A number of innovative artists were both sculptors and painters or printmakers, their new theories cutting across material boundaries.

In the 1970s, the ideas of contextual placement of natural objects of stone, wood, bamboo, and paper into relationships with

people and their environment were embodied in the mono-ha school. These artists emphasized materiality as the most important aspect

of art and brought to an end the antiformalism that had dominated

the avant-garde in the preceding two decades. This focus on the

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Contemporary outdoor sculpture by Isamu Noguchi, Kagawa Prefecture Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

relationships between objects and people was ubiquitous throughout the arts world and led to a rising appreciation of "Japanese"

qualities in the environment and a return to native artistic principles and forms. Among these precepts were a reverence for nature

and various Buddhist concepts brought into play by architects to

treat time/space problems. Western ideology was carefully re- examined, and much was rejected as artists turned to their own

environment—both inward and outward—for sustenance and in- spiration. From the late 1970s through the late 1980s, artists began

to create a vital new art, which was both contemporary and Asian

in sources and expression but still very much a part of the international scene. These artists focused on projecting their own individualism and national styles rather than on adapting or synthesizing

Western ideas exclusively.

Outdoor sculpture, which came to the fore with the advent of the

Hakone Open-Air Museum in 1969, was widely used in the 1980s,

and cities supported enormous outdoor sculptures for parks and

plazas, and major architects planned for sculpture in their buildings and urban layouts. Outdoor museums and exhibitions

burgeoned, stressing the natural placement of sculpture in the en- vironment. Since hard sculpture stone is not native to Japan, most

outdoor pieces were created from stainless steel, plastic, or aluminum

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Japan: A Country Study

for "tension and compression" machine constructions of mirrorsurfaced steel or for elegant, polished- aluminum, ultramodern

shapes. The strong influence of modern high technology on the

artists resulted in experimentation with kinetic, tensile forms, such

as flexible arcs and "info-environmental" sculptures using lights.

Video components and video art developed rapidly from the late 1970s throughout the 1980s. The new Japanese experimental sculptors could be understood as working with Buddhist ideas of permeability and regeneration in structuring their forms, a contrast to the general Western conception of sculpture as something with finite and permanent contours. In the 1980s, wood and natural materials were used prominently

by many sculptors, who now began to place their works in inner

courtyards and enclosed spaces. Also, a Japanese feeling for rhythmic motion, captured in recurring forms as a "systematic gestural

motion," was used by both long-established artists like Kiyomizu

Kyubei and Nagasawa Hidetoshi and the younger generation

spearheaded by Toya Shigeo. The 1970s search for a national identity led to a renewed understanding of Japanese forms, spatial

perceptions, rhythms, and philosophical conceptions, which re- invigorated Japanese sculpture in the 1980s.

Painting

Painting is one of the oldest and most highly refined ofJapanese

arts, stemming from classic continental traditions of the early historical period (sixth- seventh centuries A.D.). Native Japanese traditions reached their apex in the Heian period (794-1 185), producing

many artistic devices still in use in the 1990s. During periods of

strong Chinese influence, new art forms were adapted, such as Buddhist works in Nara, ink painting in the Muromachi period,

and landscape painting by literati in the Tokugawa era. When

Western painting theories were introduced in the Meiji period,

Japan already had a long history of adaptation of imported ideas

and had established a copy process ranging from emulation to synthesis. But it was not until well into the twentieth century that the

Japanese were able to assimilate the new medium of oil paints with

new ideas of three-dimensional projections on flat surfaces.

Most contemporaryJapanese artists could be divided into those

who worked in a broadly international style and those who maintained Japanese artistic traditions, though usually within a modern

idiom. After World War II, painters, calligraphers, and printmakers

flourished in the big cities, particularly Tokyo, and became pre- occupied with the mechanisms of urban life, reflected in the flick- ering lights, neon colors, and frenetic pace of their abstractions. All

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the "isms" of the New York-Paris art world were fervently embraced. After the abstractions of the 1960s, the 1970s saw a return

to realism strongly flavored by the "op" and "pop" art movements, embodied in the 1980s in the explosive works of Shinohara

Ushio. Many such outstanding avant-garde artists worked both in

Japan and abroad, winning international prizes. These artists felt that there was "nothing Japanese" about their works, and indeed

they belonged to the international school. By the late 1970s, the

search for Japanese qualities and a national style caused many artists to reevaluate their artistic ideology and turn away from what some felt were the empty formulas of the West. Contemporary

paintings within the modern idiom began to make conscious

use of traditional Japanese art forms, devices, and ideologies. A

number of mono-ha artists turned to painting to recapture traditional nuances in spatial arrangements, color harmonies, and

lyricism.

Japanese-style painting (nihongd) had continued in a modern

fashion, updating traditional expressions while retaining their in- trinsic character. Some artists within this style still painted on silk or paper with traditional colors and ink, while others used new

materials, such as acrylics. Many of the older schools of art, most

notably those of the Tokugawa period, were still practiced. For ex- ample, the decorative naturalism of the rimpa school, characterized by brilliant, pure colors and bleeding washes, was reflected

in the work of many postwar artists and in the 1980s art of Hikosaka

Naoyoshi. The realism of the Maruyama-Okyo school and the calli- graphic and spontaneous Japanese style of the gentlemen-scholars were both widely practiced in the 1980s. Sometimes all of these

schools, as well as older ones, such as the Kano ink traditions, were drawn on by contemporary artists in the Japanese style and in the

modern idiom. Many Japanese-style painters were honored with

awards and prizes, as the late 1970s and the 1980s saw a renewed

popular demand for Japanese-style art. More and more, the in- ternational modern painters also drew on the Japanese schools as they turned away from Western styles in the 1980s. The tendency

had been to synthesize East and West. But new artistic approaches were less in favor of a conscious blending than of recapturing the

Japanese spirit within a modern idiom. Thus, the 100-year split

between Japanese-style and Western-style art began to heal. Some

artists had already leapt the gap between the two, as did the out- standing painter, Shinoda Toko. Her bold sumi ink abstractions were inspired by traditional calligraphy but realized as lyrical ex- pressions of modern abstraction.

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Japan: A Country Study

Calligraphy

Calligraphy, the art of beautiful writing, had long been highly

esteemed, intensively studied, and avidly collected. The writing

of Chinese ideograms (kanji) in a wide variety of styles was inherited

from the Chinese scholarly tradition, which at one extreme became

the nearly indecipherable grass-style writing and at the other geometric abstractions. There are famous exponents of all these styles

in contemporary Japan who have spent lifetimes perfecting their

skills. The most widely used mode is called kana, referring to the

Japanese syllabary, which provides an opportunity to depict both

ideograms and Japanese phonetic sounds in set phrases. There are many ways in which this kind of writing may be done: with fine,

delicate strokes or bold, splashy ones, carefully controlled or in uninhibited freedom, and on a scale ranging from large to minuscule.

Traditional Japanese poetry is usually classified in the kana group,

while modern poetry is placed in a group by itself. Zen Buddhism

promoted a spontaneous style of writing in its koan, which includes some pictorial additions.

Because calligraphy lends itself so well to modern abstract painting, some artists have used it in this form; the Bokusho abstract

school has developed some outstanding masters. Calligraphers are

greatly revered not only for their skill and scholarship but also for

their attainment of a high spiritual level, which produces the meditative calm considered necessary for truly creative brushwork. Calligraphy is widely collected at enormous prices. Even those who

cannot read the script, which is not uncommon because some is nearly abstract, treasure writing by well-known persons in vari- ous fields, such as politics or the military.

Prints

Outstanding among the contemporary arts for vitality and originality are the works of the creative printmakers, which have brought

worldwide recognition. The twentieth-century Japanese print

evolved from the Western idea of a single artist's conceiving, ex- ecuting, and producing one individual work. In contrast, the classic ukiyo-e (floating world art) print approach was of a team

production by an artist designer, craftsman carver, colorist, printer,

and publisher, who promoted sales of multiple copies. The modern

print movement so stressed the creative process that even in the

1980s, editions of prints were seldom very large and were apt to

differ in color or even design elements from one printing to the next. In the late twentieth century, a broad spectrum of artistic styles

from traditional to experimental was practiced in a multiplicity of

media and techniques. Munakata Shiko, a major force in gaining

174
Aristocratic lady reading, early Edo period, ukiyo-e school, attributed to Iwasa Matabei (1578-1650)

Courtesy Freer Gallery ofArt (69. 15), Smithsonian Institution, Washington

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Japan: A Country Study

recognition for creative printmaking, drew deeply on Japanese

artistic sources, from folk art to Zen poetry-paintings, combining

kanji with free-floating Chagall-like figures. He influenced many

other celebrated print artists who drew on folk art and used natural earth and mineral colors to depict traditional village scenes and

lively local festivals. Artists such as Sekino Jun'ichiro and Saito

Kiyoshi were inspired to update famous views, as of the Tokaido,

while others played with traditional themes derived from sumo,

the theater, or geisha. At the opposite pole are the works of the

abstractionists, the exponents of all the "isms" of the day, and

the experimental essays of some consummate designers. Most avant- garde artists worked in mixed media, often using engraving techniques with silk-screened colors or monochromatic metal prints with

soldered wires. They experimented freely with photomontage,

photo-prints made with an electric scanner, and lithographs. Photography as an art form came into its own in the 1980s, and major

international exhibitions displayed the stunning products of artist photographers such as Namikawa Banri, Kurigama Kazumi, and

Hashi. In the 1980s, a trend among many young printmakers was

towards the use of black and white for somber, often superrealistic, themes, captured with exquisite technical and artistic precision.

Ceramics

One of Japan's oldest art forms, ceramics, reaches back to the

Neolithic period (ca. 10,000 B.C.), when the earliest soft earthen- ware was coil-made, decorated by hand-impressed rope patterns

(Jomon ware), and baked in the open. Continental emigrants of

the third century B.C. introduced the use of the wheel along with

the metal age (Yayoi) and, eventually (in the third to fourth centuries A.D.), a tunnel kiln in which stoneware fired at high temperatures embellished with natural ash glaze was produced.

Medieval kilns enabled more refined production of stoneware, which was still produced in the late twentieth century at a few famous

sites, especially in central Honshu around the city of Seto, the wares

of which were so widely used that Seto-mono became the generic

term for ceramics in Japan. The overlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi's

Korean campaigns of the late sixteenth century were dubbed the

"ceramic wars," since the importation of Korean potters appeared

to be their major contribution. These potters introduced a variety

of new techniques and styles in their artifacts that were greatly admired for the tea ceremony. They also discovered in northern

Kyushu the proper ingredients needed to produce porcelain and

were soon dazzling the guests at daimyo banquets with the first Japanese-made porcelain (see Ashikaga Bakufu, ch. 1).

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Education and the Arts The modern masters of these famous traditional kilns still bring

the ancient formulas in pottery and porcelain to new heights of

achievement at Shiga, Ige, Karatsu, Hagi, and Bizen. Yamamoto

Masao of Bizen and Miwa Kyusetsu of Hagi were designated as mukei bunkazai. By 1989 only a half-dozen potters were so honored,

either as representatives of famous kiln wares or for the creation

of superlative techniques in glazing or decoration, while two groups were designated for preserving the wares of distinguished ancient

kilns. In the old capital of Kyoto, the Raku family continued to produce the famous rough tea bowls that had so delighted Hideyoshi,

while experiments continued to reconstruct the classic formulas of

Momoyama-era Seto-type tea wares at Mino, such as the famous

Oribe copper-green glaze and Shino ware's prized milky glaze.

Artist potters experimented endlessly at the Kyoto and Tokyo arts universities to recreate traditional porcelain and its decorations

under such outstanding ceramic teachers as Fujimoto Yoshimichi,

a mukei bunkazai. Ancient porcelain kilns around Arita in Kyushu

were still maintained by the lineage of the famous Sakaida Kakiemon and Imaizume Imaiemon, hereditary porcelain makers to the

Nabeshima clan; both were heads of groups designated mukei

bunkazai.

By the end of the 1980s, many master potters no longer worked

at major or ancient kilns, but were making classic wares in vari- ous parts of Japan or in Tokyo, a notable example being Tsuji

Seimei, who brought his clay from Shiga but potted in the Tokyo

area. A number of artists were engaged in reconstructing famous

Chinese styles of decoration or glazes, especially the blue-green

celadon and the watery-green qingbai. One of the most beloved

Chinese glazes in Japan is the chocolate-brown tenmoku glaze that

covered the peasant tea bowls brought back from Southern Song

China (in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) by Zen monks. For

their Japanese users, these chocolate-brown wares embodied the

Zen aesthetic of wabi (rustic simplicity). Interest in the humble art of the village potter was revived in a folk movement of the 1920s by such master potters as Hamada

Shqji and Kawai Kanjiro. These artists studied traditional glazing techniques to preserve native wares in danger of disappearing. The kilns at Tamba, overlooking Kobe, continued to produce

the daily wares used in the Tokugawa period, while adding modern

shapes. Most of the village wares were made anonymously by local potters for utilitarian purposes. Local styles, whether native or imported, tended to be continued without alteration into the present.

In Kyushu, kilns set up by Korean potters in the sixteenth century,

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Japan: A Country Study

such as at Koishibara and its offshoot at Onta, perpetuated

sixteenth-century Korean peasant wares. In Okinawa, the production of village ware continued under several leading masters, with

Kaneshiro Jiro honored as a mukei bunkazai.

Handicrafts

The many and varied traditional handicrafts of Japan enjoyed

official recognition and protection and, owing to the folk art movement, were much in demand. Each craft demanded a set of specialized skills. Textile crafts, for example, included silk, hemp, and

cotton, woven (after spinning and dyeing) in forms ranging from

timeless folk designs to complex court patterns. Village crafts evolving from ancient folk traditions also continued in weaving and in- digo dyeing in Hokkaido by the Ainu peoples, whose distinctive

designs had prehistoric prototypes and by other remote farming

families in northern Japan. Silk-weaving families can be traced to the fifteenth century in the famous Nishijin weaving center of

Kyoto, where elegant fabrics worn by the emperor and the aristocracy were produced. In the seventeenth century, designs on textiles were applied using stencils and rice paste, in the yuzen or

paste-resist method of dyeing. Theyuzen method provided an imitation of aristocratic brocades, which were forbidden to commoners

by sumptuary laws. Moriguchi Kako of Kyoto has continued to create works of art in hisyuzen-dyed kimonos, which were so sought

after that the contemporary fashion industry designed an industrial method to copy them for use on Western-style clothing. Famous designers, such as Hanae Mori, borrowed extensively from

kimono patterns for their couturier collections. By the late 1980s, an elegant, handwoven, dyed kimono had become extremely costiy,

running to US$25,000 for a formal garment. In Okinawa, the fa- mous yuzen-dyeing method was especially effective where it was

produced in the bingata stencil-dyeing techniques, which produced

exquisitely colored, striking designs as artistic national treasures. Lacquer, the first plastic, was invented in Asia, and its use in

Japan can be traced to prehistoric finds. Lacquer ware is most often

made from wooden objects, which receive multiple layers of re- fined lac juices, each of which must dry before the next is applied.

These layers make a tough skin impervious to water damage and

breakage-resistant, providing lightweight, easy to clean utensils

of every sort. The decoration on such lacquers, whether carved

through different colored layers or in surface designs, applied with

gold or inlaid with precious substances, has been a prized art form

since the Nara period (A.D. 710-94).

Papermaking is another contribution of Asian civilization; the

Japanese art of making paper from the mulberry plant is thought

178
Rimpa school painting, Edo period, showing a screen, garments, and other objects

Courtesy Freer Fallery ofArt (07. 127), Smithsonian Institution, Washington

to have begun in the sixth century. Dyeing paper with a wide

variety of hues and decorating it with designs became a major

preoccupation of the Heian court, and the enjoyment of beautiful paper and its use has continued thereafter, with some modern

adaptations. The traditionally made paper called Izumo (after the

shrine area where it is made) was especially desired for fusuma

(sliding panels) decoration, artists' papers, and elegant letter paper.

Some printmakers have their own logo made into their papers,

and since the Meiji period, another special application has been

Western marbleized end papers (made by the Atelier Miura in

Tokyo).

Metalwork is epitomized in the production of the Japanese sword,

of extremely high quality. These swords originated before the first century B.C. and reached their height of popularity as the chief

possession of warlords and samurai. The production of a sword

has retained something of the religious quality it once had in embodying the soul of the samurai and the martial spirit of Japan.

For many Japanese, the sword, one of the "three jewels" of the

nation, remained a potent symbol; possessors would treasure a sword and it would be maintained within the family, its loss signifying their ruin (see Ancient Cultures, ch. 1).

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Japan: A Country Study

Performing Arts

A remarkable number of the traditional forms of music, dance,

and theater have survived in the contemporary world, enjoying some popularity through reidentification with Japanese cultural

values. Traditional music and dance, which trace their origins to ancient religious use—Buddhist, Shinto, and folk—have been pre- served in the dramatic performances of No, Kabuki, and bunraku

theater. Ancient court music and dance forms deriving from continental sources were preserved through imperial household musicians and temple and shrine troupes. Some of the oldest musical

instruments in the world have been in continuous use in Japan from

the Jomon period, as shown by finds of stone and clay flutes and

zithers with between two and four strings, to which Yayoi-period

metal bells and gongs were added to create early musical ensembles. By the early historical period (sixth to seventh centuries A.D.),

there were a variety of large and small drums, gongs, chimes, flutes, and stringed instruments, such as the imported mandolin-like biwa,

and the flat six- stringed zither, which evolved into the thirteenstringed koto. These instruments formed the orchestras for the

seventh-century continentally derived ceremonial court music,

which, together with the accompanying bugaku (a type of court dance), are the most ancient of such forms still performed at the

imperial court, ancient temples, and shrines. Buddhism introduced

the rhythmic chants, still used in the 1990s, that were joined with

native ideas and underlay the development of vocal music, such

as in No.

The oldest dramatic form preserved in Japan is No theater, which

attained its contemporary form at the fourteenth-century Ashikaga

court. In the 1980s, there were five major No groups and a few

notable regional troupes performing several hundred plays from

a medieval repertoire for a popular audience, not just for an elite. A No play unfolds around the recitation and dancing of a principal and secondary figure, while a seated chorus chants a story,

accentuated by solemn drum and flute music. The dramatic ac- tion is mimed in highly stylized gestures symbolizing intense emotions, which are also evoked by terse lyrical prose and dance.

Standardized masks and brilliant costumes stand out starkly against

the austere, empty stage with its symbolic pine tree backdrop. The

stories depict legendary or historical events of a tragic cast, infused

with Buddhist ideas. The foreboding atmosphere is relieved by

comic interludes (kyogen) played during the intermission. A few ex- perimental plays have been developed by authors such as Mishima

Yukio (1925-70), and in the 1980s a Christian No play was written

180
Shinoda Toko, a leading modern

abstract painter, at work

Courtesy The Phillips Collection,

Washington

''Unseen Forms, " a two-panel

sumi screen by Shinoda Toko

Courtesy Chase Manhattan Bank

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Japan: A Country Study

by a Sophia University philosophy professor and daringly performed

at the Vatican for Pope John Paul II . The National No Theater

has revived popular interest in this ancient art form by supporting

experimental No plays in the late 1980s.

Kabuki and bunraku theater developed as popular forms of en- tertainment in the seventeenth century. Kabuki combined contemporary music, acrobatics, and mimicry like that of No, and was

originally performed by troupes that included actresses. Women

were soon barred from appearing, so the often large casts consisted

entirely of male performers. Classical Kabuki somewhat resembles Western drama, except that dialogue is supplemented by chanting and accompanied by music provided by the samisen, a threestringed lute perfected during the seventeenth century. The plot was often clarified by the use of a storyteller who recounted the

major action, as was also customary in No.

Kabuki conventions include the use of artificially high-pitched

voices, exaggerated gestures and miming, and flamboyant costumes

and makeup, but no masks. Elaborate stage devices—trapdoors,

revolving stages, and runways through the theater—heighten the

excitement. Historical and legendary themes were extended to in- clude events from the urban life of the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries, such as a townsman's dislike for the samurai. A com- mon theme in the late seventeenth-century and early eighteenthcentury works of Chikamatsu Monzaemon, "the Shakespeare of

Japan," is the conflict between personal desires and the Confucian sense of loyalty and duty. By the early 1990s, there were two

national Kabuki theaters in Tokyo, as the major performance

centers for this classical art, featuring a growing repertoire of

lesser known as well as classic work. Among contemporary masters

working to "update" Kabuki and attract modern audiences were

Ichikawa Ennosuke III, whose deft acting, clever acrobatics, and

swift costume changes evoked nearly magical illusions, and

Tamasaburo Bando, the top player of a wide range of feminine

roles. These and other superb Kabuki actors brought record au- diences to performances in the late_1980s.

Bunraku, puppet theater native to Osaka, was regarded as a seri- ous dramatic medium for adults (unlike puppetry in many Western countries), and has flourished along with Kabuki since the

Tokugawa period. Chikamatsu turned to writing for the bunraku

when he became dissatisfied with the liberties some Kabuki actors took with his plays. A narrator, who sings all the parts, and a

samisen-play'mg chorus are the main elements of bunraku. The

narrator-singer conveys the emotional content of the play and generates the illusion of life into the large puppets, who move realistically

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Education and the Arts

in complex roles, manipulated by a master and black-hooded, robed

assistants. These narrator- singers derive from the ancient tradition of storytellers, whose exponents continue to flourish in modern

forms, now including women and such uproarish comics as Katsura

Shijaku.

Traditional music, song, and dance have been performed by

women, notably the geisha of Tokyo and Kyoto. Theatrical per- formances by Kyoto geisha can be seen in the spring and autumn

Miyako Odori dance performances. A nagauta (lyric music) singing group has a full orchestral ensemble, consisting of drums, flutes,

samisen, and koto. The traditional musical notation is based on a

five-tone scale, with semitones often ending on a rising note. Famous performers may play the samisen or koto only, or play together

with a singer or dancer. The dances come from No, Kabuki, and

folk sources, featuring large ensemble dances as highlights of these

brilliant spectacles.

Folk music and dance deriving from regional festivals and

ceremonies began to become well-known in Japan through radio,

television, and recordings. Folk festivals, concerts, and contests,

and taverns specializing in folk singing contributed to the rising

popularity of these ancient forms, revitalized by the growing desire

of the young in the 1980s to learn traditional agrarian songs and

dances, while the Japan Folkloric Dance Ensemble performed them

internationally. Some thirty outstanding performers from all the

traditional performing arts were designated as mukei bunkazai at the

end of the 1980s.

Classical Western music has become a fundamental part of

Japanese musical education since its introduction in the nineteenth

century. The Toho School of Music in Tokyo has produced many

outstanding international performers on the piano and stringed in- struments. Children commonly studied piano or violin, and the

famous Suzuki violin method of training children from the age of

two had produced a generation of virtuosos, some, such as Midori,

enjoyed an international reputation.

Symphony orchestras played in Tokyo and most major cities, also making international tours. Japanese musicians and conductors gained international recognition, some performing regularly

with top foreign orchestras overseas and on tour in Japan. Contemporary Japanese composers have experimented widely with in- struments: using Japanese and Western instruments together, using

only Asian instruments, and capturing traditional sounds with elec- tronic synthesizers and Western instruments. The Ensemble

Nipponica, Music Today, and Sound Space Ark were among the

major groups promoting modern Japanese music.

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Japan: A Country Study

Classical Western opera enjoyed a boom, with many foreign companies performing, and even local companies rose to new heights

with the development of leading operatic singers. Further evidence

of interest in Japanese themes was shown by a major competition

to write a new opera about Chikamatsu, with music composed by

Hara Kazuko, a Doshisha University professor.

Popular music was enjoyed in many forms. Musical comedies

and revues were standard urban entertainment. Broadway and London hits were quickly adapted by Tokyo theater troupes, often using

foreign directors for notable productions and sometimes featuring

Western actors who spoke their lines in Japanese. Japanese youth

everywhere enjoyed popular music: highly international jazz, rock,

heavy metal, folk, new music, pop, synthesized music, instrumental

music, and Japanese folk songs. Springing from popular music were

the works of experimental composers like Hosono Haruomi and

Sakamoto Ryuichi, who blended Middle Eastern or Chinese sounds

for the huge recording industry and film sound tracks. In 1988

Sakamoto was Japan's first Oscar-winning musician for his score

for The Last Emperor.

Live jazz in concert halls, open air, and hundreds of disco coffee

shops and pianobars was enthusiastically embraced. While American jazz greats were acclaimed, veteran Japanese instrumentalists

Watanabe Sadao and Hino Teramasu also commanded major au- diences at jazz festivals. Kitaro was the leading composer in synthesized sounds, providing sometimes exotic, but generally soothing,

music dear to the frazzled urbanite. While percussionist Tsuchitori

Toshi recreated the Mahabharata and other ethnic works, an in- digenous kind of jazz poured from the Sado Island Kodo drummers, whose prodigious athletic performances mesmerized all and

made their home a new music festival center. Singing and dancing at amateur open nights {karaoke) at a growing number of pubs was an activity in which everyone could shine by singing along with

prerecorded tapes. In the late 1980s, the hawaiko-chan, the new girl

singers, also were popular. Records, tapes, and compact discs spread

every type of music nationwide and provided common experience

for music appreciation.

Twentieth-century Japanese dance draws on various traditional

styles and Western classical and avant-garde forms, all interpretated

with the high standards ofJapanese schools. Many famous dance

studios grew from training centers for Kabuki actor-dancers or derived from famous Kabuki families. Women dancers drawing

their art from butoh (classical Japanese dance) were trained by the

Hanayagi school, whose top dancers performed internationally.

Ichinohe Sachiko choreographed and performed traditional dances

184
Kyogen master Shigeyama

Sengoro in Kyoto, 1989

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

in Heian court costumes, characterized by the slow, formal, and

elegant motions of this classical age of Japanese culture.

Western schools covered classical ballet, jazz-dance, and modern

dance, and influenced the butoh avant-garde dance movement. Ballet was said to have replaced traditional Japanese arts, such as flower

arrangement and the tea ceremony in the hearts of young girls.

Prima ballerina Morishita Yoko sat on the jury for the Prix de

Lausanne Ballet Competition in 1989, held for the first time in

Tokyo, and marking the arrival of Japanese classical ballet in the

international community. Horiuchi Gen, a 1980 Prix de Lausanne

winner, became a major soloist with the New York City Ballet,

and Japanese performers noted for their superb technique were members of many major international companies. Modern dance was performed early after the war and was later taught by such

famous dancers as Eguchi Takaya. The Tokyo Modern Dance

School and the Ozawa Hisako Modern Dance Company also promoted avant-garde modern dance. A wide experimental range

within modern dance occurred from which choreographer

Teshigawara Saburo skillfully drew to create multifaceted works

for his KARAS Company.

The vital avant-garde butoh dance was a major development after the war: at least five major schools performed in the 1985 Butoh

Festival, and there were numerous creative offshoots. Hijikata

Tatsumi was a charismatic dancer who experimented with different

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Japan: A Country Study

kinds of creative dance to capture expressive motions he considered

expressly suited to the Japanese physiognomy and psyche. He combined eroticism, social criticism, and avant-garde theater ideas, and

considered the body to be a repository for "stored memories,"

which could be metamorphosed into dance forms. His theories and

choreography were carried on by a number of famous dancers, who

eventually formed their own major companies, which were strong

in the 1980s and made tours abroad.

Modern drama in the late twentieth century consisted of shingeki

(experimental Western-style theater), which employed naturalistic acting and contemporary themes in contrast to the stylized

conventions of Kabuki and No. In the postwar period, there was

a phenomenal growth in creative new dramatic works, which in- troduced fresh aesthetic concepts that revolutionized the orthodox

modern theater. Challenging the realistic, psychological drama fo- cused on "tragic historical progress" of the Western-derived shingeki,

young playwrights broke with such accepted tenets as conventional

stage space, placing their action in tents, streets, and open areas, and, at the extreme, in scenes played out all over Tokyo. Plots be- came increasingly complex, with play-within-a-play sequences,

moving rapidly back and forth in time, and intermingling reality

with fantasy. Dramatic structure was fragmented, with the focus on the performer, who often used a variety of masks to reflect differ- ent personae. Playwrights returned to common stage devices perfected in No and Kabuki to project their ideas, such as employing

a narrator, who could also use English for international audiences.

Major playwrights in the 1980s were Kara Joro, Shimizu Kunio,

and Betsuyaku Minoru, all closely connected to specific companies. In the 1980s, stagecraft was refined into a more sophisticated,

complex format than in the earlier postwar experiments but lacked

their bold critical spirit.

Many Western plays, from those of the ancient Greeks to Shakespeare and from those of Fyodor Dostoevsky to Samuel Beckett, were performed in Tokyo. An incredible number of performances,

perhaps as many as 3,000, were given each year, making Tokyo

one of the world's leading theatrical centers. The opening of the

replica of the Globe Theater was celebrated by importing an entire British company to perform all of Shakespeare's historical plays,

while other Tokyo theaters produced other Shakespearean plays

including various new interpretations of Hamlet and King Lear. Suzuki Tadashi's Togo troupe developed a unique kind of

"method acting," integrating avant-garde concepts with classical No and Kabuki devices, an approach that became a major creative

186
Botoh dance group Sankai Juku performing "Jomon Sho"

Courtesy Kiyomi Yamaji, Sankai Juku, and Jomon Sho

force in Japanese and international theater in the 1980s. Another

highly original East-West fusion occurred in the inspired production Nastasya, taken from Dostoevsky's The Idiot, in which Bando

Tamasaburo, a famed Kabuki onnagata (female impersonator),

played the roles of both the prince and his fiancee.

Literature

Japanese literature dates from about the fifth century A.D., when

the Chinese writing system began to be used by scribes at the

Yamato court. As soon as the Japanese courtiers learned to read,

they began to write, compiling between the sixth century and the

eighth century both a state history of epic proportions, the Kojiki

(Record of Ancient Matters) and one of the world's oldest poetry

anthologies, the Man'yoshu (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves),

both of which contain many older works. They also composed

Chinese-style poetry, which they found suitable for more difficult,

lengthy, and profound thoughts. By the eighth century, the elite had already come to grips with the problem of assimilating difficult foreign ideas in a complex new language. The dichotomy between

native expression and the use of prestigious imported forms be- came a pattern ofJapanese artistic life. Buddhist commentary appeared after several centuries of copying, translation, and study.

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Japan: A Country Study

In the ninth century it found a strong voice and skilled brush in

the monk Kukai, through whose inspiration religious themes be- came a part of the literary fabric. Prose works had reached a high level by the tenth century, when

the literary diary made its appearance, and in the eleventh the

world's first novel, Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji), was composed

by a court lady, Murasaki Shikibu. Her acute psychological observations molded by a subtle feminine sensibility wove a deft pic- ture of the hothouse Heian court society. It remains a matchless

source for all subsequent writers and an important part of the classical education of every Japanese. In the medieval period, women's vernacular writing dominated prose in the form of diaries of

court ladies, supplemented by recollections of courtiers, the wry

comments and musings of monks, and a wide variety of tales and

legends, both secular and profane. Heike monogatari (Tale of the

Heike) captured the samurai spirit of the Kamakura warriors' age, while the melancholy thirty-one syllable waka poems (in a five-sevenfive- seven-seven syllables-per-line arrangement) of the twelfthcentury monk Saigyo reflected the mood of a militant era. Exiles

from the capital and monastic authors who contemplated the fleeting

vanities of this world, and the theme of death and the spirit world

characterized writing of the Muromachi period, setting the tone

for the No plays of Zeami Motokiyo (1363-1443). Comic relief was

provided by kyogen, using the vernacular to reveal something of

the life of the commoner. The peace and prosperity of the Tokugawa age produced a new

mercantile class—the chonin—whose antics were humorously described in the vigorous seventeenth-century novels of Ihara Saikaku,

dispelling the lingering melancholy of the late feudal period. A major

poet of this age, Matsuo Basho, lifted his voice to extol the qualities of loneliness, of getting away from the new crowded towns by

taking the "narrow road to the deep north," a celebrated journey

whose three-hundredth anniversary was widely commemorated in

the late 1980s. Basho' s matchless renku (linked poems) of thirty-six verses and his lighthearted seventeen-syllable haiku (five- seven-five)

set a norm for modern emulators. A third literary genius of this period was the great dramatist, Chikamatsu Monzaemon, whose

historical and domestic plays formed the soul of the Kabuki theater. In the eighteenth century, Chinese novels were translated into

Japanese, the poet Yosa Buson infused a new romantic spirit into

haiku poems, and Kobayashi Issa made interesting subjects out

of the "ordinariness" of the common folk and the ugly, starveling

sparrow.

188
A noble spying on two princesses playing a koto and a lute. Watercolor,

nineteenth century, Tosa school, from Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji)

Courtesy Barbara L. Dash

Japanese literature clearly draws on a tradition rich in poetic

and prose forms. The writing of poetry in both the classic thirty- one syllable waka and the seventeen- syllable haiku remained a national pastime and a skill expected of the educated, among whom

competitions were frequently held. Japanese renga parties, at which

poets and the intelligentsia composed poetry in groups, continued

as a major literary pursuit. Haiku poets were among the most honored of all creative artists, and a haiku museum was established

in 1976 as a public center for poetry study. The ancient waka in

modern usage is called a tanka, or short song (also with a five-sevenfive-seven-seven syllabic formula). Many writers continued to use

this form for less profound thoughts. Even more striking were the

modern permutations of older literary forms: such experiments as two syllable haiku, tanka in romaji (romanized form of kana), and

Zen ideas expressed in Western-style "free verse."

The introduction of European literature in the late nineteenth

century brought "free verse" into the poetic repertoire; it became

widely used for longer works embodying new intellectual themes.

Young Japanese prose writers and dramatists have struggled with

a whole galaxy of new ideas and artistic schools, but novelists were

the first to successfully assimilate some of these concepts. A new

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Japan: A Country Study

colloquial literature developed centering around the "I novel," with some unusual protagonists as in Natsume Soseki's Wagahai wa neko

de aru (I Am a Cat). Two modern literary giants whose works were

deeply rooted in Japanese sensibilities were Tanizaki Jun'ichiro,

who captured the East-West value struggle in Japanese life prior

to World War II and Kawabata Yasunari, a master of psychological

fiction during the mid-century and a Nobel Prize winner. Capturing the immediate postwar atmosphere were Dazai Osamu and

Mishima Yukio, both of whom committed suicide. Dazai' s writing reflected the quiet desperation of living with defeat, while

Mishima provided a glowing vision of traditional morality, gradually overcome by new Western values.

Prominent writers of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Oe Kensaburo, were identified with intellectual and moral issues in their attempts

to raise social and political consciousness. Inoue Mitsuaki had long

been concerned with the atomic bomb and continued in the 1980s

to write on problems of the nuclear age, while Endo Shusaku depicted the religious dilemma of Roman Catholics in feudal Japan,

as a springboard to address spiritual problems. Inoue Yasushi also turned to the past in masterful historical novels of Inner Asia and

ancient Japan, in order to portray present human fate. Avant-garde writers, such as Abe Kobo, who wanted to express

the Japanese experience in modern terms without using either in- ternational styles or traditional conventions, developed new inner

visions. Furui Yoshikichi tellingly related the lives of alienated urban

dwellers coping with the minutiae of daily life, while the psychodramas within such daily life crises have been explored by a rising

number of important women novelists. The 1988 Naoki Prize went

to Todo Shizuko for Ripening Summer, a story capturing the complex psychology of modern women. Other award-winning stories

at the end of the decade dealt with current issues of the elderly in

hospitals, the recent past {Pure-Hearted Shopping District in Koenji,

Tokyo), and the life of a Meiji ukiyo-e artist. In international litera- ture, Ishiguro Kazuo, a native of Japan, had taken up residence

in Britain and won Britain's prestigious Booker Prize.

Although modern Japanese writers covered a wide variety of subjects, one particularly Japanese approach stressed their subjects'

inner lives, widening the earlier novel's preoccupation with the narrator's consciousness. In Japanese fiction, plot development and

action have often been of secondary interest to emotional issues. In keeping with the general trend toward reaffirming national

characteristics, many old themes reemerged, and some authors

turned consciously to the past. Strikingly, Buddhist attitudes about

the importance of knowing oneself and the poignant impermanence

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Education and the Arts

of things formed an undercurrent to sharp social criticism of this material age. There was a growing emphasis on women's roles,

the Japanese persona in the modern world, and the malaise of com- mon people lost in the complexities of urban culture.

Popular fiction, nonfiction works, and children's literature all flourished in urban Japan in the 1980s. Many popular works fell between "pure literature" and pulp novels, including all sorts of

historical serials, information-packed docudramas, science fiction,

mysteries, business stories, war journals, and animal stories. Bestsellers in the late 1980s were several books by a young woman,

"Banana" Yoshimoto, and Murakami Haruki's spectacularly successful Norwegian Wood and A Wild Sheep Chase. Nonfiction covered

everything from crime to politics. Although factual journalism

predominated, many of these works were interpretive, reflecting a high degree of individualism. Children's works reemerged in the

1950s, and the newer entrants into this field, many of them younger

women, brought new vitality to it in the 1980s. Manga (comic books)

have penetrated almost every sector of the popular market. Widely

used for soft pornography, they also have included a multivolume

high- school history of Japan and, for the adult market, a manga

introduction to economics, which was also available in English.

Manga represented between 20 and 30 percent of annual publications at the end of the 1980s, in sales of some ¥400 billion per year. Films and Television

Reeling from television's overwhelming success, the cinema in- dustry retreated in the 1980s to the tried-and-true formulas, the

comedies, romances, detective stories, and youth films that always

had sure audiences. Production at the four major film companies

dwindled to some 200 films a year, of which only a handful were

quality productions. Pornographic films grew to constitute about

half of films made. The animated format used for children's films

did show promising originality, but truly creative productions could

be found only among independent film directors. A burgeoning

number of art films, both domestic and imported, found homes

in intimate art theaters in the cities. Foreign films were often the

major draws in urban areas, which had record runs for European

and North American hits. Some top directors produced major films

with foreign funding or in foreign locations. In a return to Japanese

production at the end of the 1980s, Akira Kurosawa, the ac- knowledged old master of cinematic art, summarized his remembrance of things past in his movie Dreams. A nostalgic look at past

views of family life was seen in Ichikawa Kon's remake of Tanizaki

Jun'ichiro's The Makioka Sisters, a visually beautiful color film

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Japan: A Country Study

portraying the nearly vanished world of early twentieth-century

upper-class women. A major historical offering was Teshigawara

Hiroshi's Rikyu (1989), which marked the return of this major direc- tor after a seventeen-year absence from films, in a pictorially magnificent presentation of the life of the famous Momoyama tea master

and his moral conflict with the political overlord Hideyoshi.

Although there was virtually no market in Japan for documentaries, a major docudrama, Tokyo saiban (Tokyo Judgment), directed

by Kobayashi Masaki, and taken directly from footage of tribunal

proceedings against alleged Japanese war criminals, had a rapt audience. Outstanding among the newer independent directors were

Itami Juzo and Morita Yoshimitsu, whose The Family Game set a new pattern for satirical comedies on urban dilemmas. By the

mid-1980s, Itami's savage new satires showed unprecedented originality. Although these films addressed the anomalies and excesses of Japanese life, their subjects were mirrored around the world,

and they had a strong international following.

Popular comedy was led by the beloved Tora-san series about

the travel adventures of an avuncular, bumbling everyman, played

by the ever-popular Atsumi Kiyoshi, whose forty-first feature film

in 1989 took the hero to Vienna in a telling display of internationalization. Another hoary favorite was the monster series starring

Godzilla. The most sophisticated youth movie of the 1980s may

have been Yamakawa Naoto's The New Morning of Billy the Kid, a fantasy set in a Tokyo theme-bar, which was embraced by the

young worldwide. A much-loved children's classic Kaze no matasaburo

(Children of the Wind) written by Miyazawa Kenji, was filmed

by award-winning director Ito Shunya as a skillful fantasy. Animated full-length features ranged from a gorgeously interpreted

selection from Tale of Genji to Otomoto Katsushiro's Akira, a violent, provocative futuristic fantasy. Such animated features had

their origins in the wildly popular manga action cartoons. Television also produced a substantial number of cartoons, including the ever popular ' 'Sazae-san,

'

' which had the highest rating in the late 1980s.

Television had attained virtually 100 percent penetration by 1990,

and only 1 percent of households were without a color television

set, makingJapan a major information society. Programming consisted of about 50 percent pure entertainment and nearly 25 per- cent cultural shows, the remainder being news reports and

educational programs. There were two main broadcasting systems:

the public NHK and five private networks. The major system,

NHK, was publicly subsidized by mandatory subscription fees. Leading newspapers were among the financial supporters of the

192
Education and the Arts

most important private channels. International programs were

transmitted by satellite for instant replay after the government, in

1979, set up the Communications and Broadcasting Satellite Organization. Japan's first operational broadcast satellite was launched

in 1984. Commercial television stations had become a major vehicle for advertising in place of newspapers and received huge

revenues, far surpassing those of NHK.

Samurai and yakuza (Japanese underworld) themes were now

almost solely the provenance of television, as were those of family

life, ubiquitous in daytime soaps. The biggest hit of the 1980s overall was the television drama "Oshin," a tale of a mother's struggles

and suffering. The longest-running series since 1981 was "From

the North Country," in which a divorced father and his two chil- dren survive in the backwoods of Hokkaido.

Criticisms continued concerning the vulgarity of some commercial programs, but these programs still appeared in the early 1990s.

Major problems perceived were the high level of violence and the

lack of moral values in children's shows. All television and radio

stations, however, were required to devote a certain proportion of

broadcast time to educational programs to retain their licenses, and

these programs grew steadily in response to popular demand. All

networks have to comply with the Broadcasting Law of 1950, while

several councils oversee general programming, although compli- ance with their recommendations is voluntary.

Japan's traditional arts and their modern counterparts found wide

expression at home and internationally in the 1980s, reflecting the

strong continuing creativity of its artists, performers, and writers.

Major trends were seen in the search for characteristic cultural

values and modes of expression, on the one hand, and the growing awareness of internationalism, on the other, affirming Japan's

strong economic position in the world.

* * * A good general work on contemporary education isJapanese Education Today, by Robert Leestma and others. Both Benjamin Duke's

TheJapanese School and Educational Policies in Crisis, by William K.

Cummings and others, offer useful insights into the Japanese educational system and its differences from that of the United States. Historical information can be found in Ronald S. Anderson's Education in Japan and Ronald P. Dore's Education in Tokugawa Japan.

Of particular interest is the winter 1989 special issue of the Journal

of Japanese Studies, containing a symposium devoted largely to preschool and early education. On secondary education, Thomas P.

193
Japan: A Country Study

Rohlen's Japan's High Schools provides excellent coverage. The

Ministry of Education is a rich source of statistical data; in English, information can be obtained from the annual Statistical Abstract of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, but the Japaneselanguage annual Gakko kihon chosa hokokusho (Fundamental School

Survey) is more complete.

A useful work on the arts is Sources of Japanese Tradition, by

Tsunoda Ryusaku and others, which translates primary materials on cultural and aesthetic values. Cultural Affairs and Administration

in Japan, 1988 from the Agency for Cultural Affairs and Artist and

Patron in PostwarJapan and "Government and the Arts in Contemporary Japan" by Thomas R.H. Havens oudine the government's

participation in the arts. Helpful specialized works include

Takashina Shuji, Yoshiaki Tono, and Nakahara Yusuke's Art in Japan, David B. Stewart's The Making of a Modern Japanese Architecture, Kodansha's Contemporary Japanese Prints, the Library of Congress's Words in Motion: ContemporaryJapanese Calligraphy, Hayashiya

Seizo'sJapanese Ceramics Today, J. Thomas Rimer's A Reader's Guide

to Japanese Literature, the essays on Japan in Cinema and Cultural Identity

edited by Wimal Dissanayake, Makoto Ueda's ModernJapanese Poets, the P.E.N. Club's Survey ofJapanese Literature Today, edited by Isoda

Koichi, and The Handbook of Japanese Popular Culture edited by

Richard Gid Powers and Kato Hidetoshi. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

194
Chapter 4. The Character and Structure

of the Economy
Family crest with a flying phoenix (ho'o), the bird of immortality
THE JAPANESE ECONOMY entered the 1990s in excellent

shape. Japan had the world's second largest gross national product

(GNP—see Glossary) throughout the 1970s and ranked first among

major industrial nations in 1989 in per capita GNP, at US$23,616,

up sharply from US$8,900 in 1980. After a mild economic slump

in the mid-1980s, Japan's economy began a period of expansion

in 1986 that was continuing in 1990. Economic growth averaging

5 percent between 1987 and 1989 revived industries, such as steel and construction, which had been relatively dormant in the mid1980s, and brought record salaries and employment (see table 9,

Appendix). Unlike the economic booms of the 1960s and 1970s,

however, when increasing exports played the key role in economic

expansion, domestic demand propelled the Japanese economy in

the late 1980s. This development involved fundamental economic

restructuring, from export dependence to reliance on domestic demand. The boom that started in 1986 was generated by the decisions of companies to increase private plant and equipment spending

and of consumers to go on a buying spree. Japan's imports grew

at a faster rate than exports.

During the 1980s, the Japanese economy shifted its emphasis

away from primary and secondary activities (notably agriculture,

manufacturing, and mining) to processing, with telecommunications and computers becoming increasingly vital. Information be- came an important resource and product, central to wealth and

power. The rise of an information-based economy was led by major

research in highly sophisticated technology, such as advanced computers. The selling and use of information became very beneficial

to the economy. Tokyo became a major financial center, home of some of the world's major banks, financial firms, insurance companies, and the world's largest stock exchange.

A national effort in the 1980s involved both government and busi- ness in increasing Japan's influence in the area of high technology. One important development area was industrial automation.

Automotive producers, such as Toyota and Nissan, relied increasingly on robotics in their factories. Japan planned a much-touted

Fifth Generation artificial intelligence computer project, boasted

a new but active space program, and designated new towns as research centers and production hubs for new technologies. In the area of semiconductors, by 1989 Japan was outproducing the United

States, which had enjoyed a nearly two-to-one lead in world market

197
Japan: A Country Study

share in the mid-1980s. Japan became a world leader in technological research and production.

Japanese postwar technological research was carried out for the

sake of economic growth rather than military development. The

growth in high-technology industries in the 1980s resulted from

heightened domestic demand for high-technology products and for higher living, housing, and environmental standards, better health,

medical, and welfare opportunities, better leisure-time facilities,

and improved ways to accommodate a rapidly aging society.

The development of a postindustrial economy did not mean the

end ofJapan's importance as a major manufacturing center. Traditional industries, such as iron and steel, automobiles, and construction, experienced strong growth in the late 1980s, and there was

every indication that these industries would continue to grow in

the 1990s. Only the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fish- ing) and mining showed signs of decline in the 1980s.

Patterns of Development

Revolutionary Change

Since the mid-nineteenth century, when the Tokugawa government first opened the country to Western commerce and influence,

Japan has gone through two periods of economic development (see

Decline of the Tokugawa; The Emergence of Modern Japan,

1868-1919; and World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1). The first began in 1854 and extended through World War II; the

second began in 1945 and continued into the early 1990s. In both

periods, the Japanese opened themselves to Western ideas and in- fluence; experienced revolutionary social, political, and economic

changes; and became a world power with carefully developed spheres

of influence. During both periods, the Japanese government en- couraged economic change by fostering a national revolution from

above, planning and advising in every aspect of society. The national goal each time was to make Japan so powerful and wealthy

that its independence would never again be threatened.

In the Meiji period (1868-1912), leaders inaugurated a new

Western-based education system for all young people, sent thousands of students to the United States and Europe, and hired more

than 3,000 Westerners to teach modern science, mathematics, tech- nology, and foreign languages in Japan (see Historical Background,

ch. 3). The government also built railroads, improved roads, and

inaugurated a land reform program to prepare the country for fur- ther development.

To promote industrialization, government decided that, while

it should help private business to allocate resources and to plan,

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The Character and Structure of the Economy

the private sector was best equipped to stimulate economic growth.

The greatest role of government was to help provide the economic

conditions in which business could flourish. In short, government was to be the guide, and business the producer. In the early Meiji

period, the government built factories and shipyards that were sold

to entrepreneurs at a fraction of their value. Many of these busi- nesses grew rapidly into the larger conglomerates that still dominated much of the business world in the early 1990s. Government

emerged as chief promoter of private enterprise, enacting a series of probusiness policies, including low corporate taxes. Before World War II, Japan built an extensive empire that in- cluded Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and parts of northern China

(see Diplomacy, ch. 1). The Japanese regarded this sphere of in- fluence as a political and economic necessity, preventing foreign

states from strangling Japan by blocking its access to raw materials and crucial sea-lanes. Japan's large military force was regarded

as essential to the empire's defense. The colonies were lost as a

result of World War II, but since then the Japanese have extended

their economic influence throughout Asia and beyond. Japan's Constitution, promulgated in 1947, forbids an offensive military force,

but Japan still maintained its formidable Self-Defense Forces and

ranked third in the world in military spending behind the United

States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s (see The Postwar

Constitution, ch. 6; Defense Spending, ch. 8). Rapid growth and structural change have characterized Japan's

two periods of economic development since 1868. In the first period, the economy grew only moderately at first and relied heavily on traditional agriculture to finance modern industrial infrastructure. By the time the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) began, 65 per- cent of employment and 38 percent of gross domestic product

(GDP—see Glossary) was still based on agriculture, but modern

industry had begun to expand substantially. By the late 1920s,

manufacturing and mining contributed 23 percent of GDP, compared to 21 percent for all of agriculture. Transportation and communications had developed to sustain heavy industrial development.

In the 1930s, the Japanese economy suffered less from the Great

Depression than other industrialized nations, expanding at the rapid

rate of 5 percent of GDP per year, while manufacturing and mining came to account for more than 30 percent of GDP, more than

twice the value for the agricultural sector. Most industrial growth,

however, was geared toward expanding the nation's military power.

World War II wiped out many ofJapan's gains since 1868. About

40 percent of the nation's industrial plants and infrastructure was

destroyed, and production reverted to levels of about fifteen years

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Japan: A Country Study

earlier. The people were shocked by the devastation and swung

into action. New factories were equipped with the best modern

machines, giving Japan an initial competitive advantage over the

victor states, who now had older factories. As Japan's second period

of economic development began, millions of former soldiers joined

a well-disciplined and highly educated work force to rebuild Japan.

Japan's highly acclaimed postwar education system contributed

strongly to the modernizing process. The world's highest literacy rate and high education standards were major reasons for Japan's

success in achieving a technologically advanced economy. Japanese

schools also encouraged discipline, another benefit in forming an

effective work force. The early postwar years were devoted to rebuilding lost industrial capacity: major investments were made in electric power, coal,

iron and steel, and chemical fertilizers. By the mid-1950s, production matched prewar levels. Released from the demands of militarydominated government, the economy not only recovered its lost momentum, but also surpassed the growth rates of earlier periods.

Between 1953 and 1965, GDP expanded by over 9 percent per year, manufacturing and mining by 13 percent, construction by 1 1 percent, and infrastructure by 12 percent. In 1965 these sectors employed over 41 percent of the labor force while only 26 percent

remained in agriculture.

The mid-1960s ushered in a new type of industrial development

as the economy opened itself to international competition in some

industries and developed heavy and chemical manufactures.

Whereas textiles and light manufactures maintained their profitability internationally, other products, such as automobiles, ships,

and machine tools, assumed new importance. Manufacturing and

mining value-added grew at the rate of 17 percent per year between 1965 and 1970. Growth rates moderated to about 8 percent

and evened out between the industrial and service sectors between

1970 and 1973, as retail trade, finance, real estate, information,

and other service industries streamlined their operations.

Japan faced severe economic challenge in the mid-1970s. The

world oil crisis in 1973 shocked an economy that had become vir- tually dependent on foreign petroleum (see The Value of the Yen,

ch. 5). Japan experienced its first postwar decline in industrial

production together with severe price inflation. The recovery that

followed the first oil crisis revived the optimism of most business

leaders, but the maintenance of industrial growth in the face of

high energy costs required shifts in the industrial structure. Changing price conditions favored conservation and alternative sources of industrial energy. Although the investment costs were

200
The Character and Structure of the Economy

high, many energy-intensive industries successfully reduced their

dependence on oil during the late 1970s and 1980s and enhanced

their productivity. Advances in microcircuitry and semiconductors in the late 1970s and 1980s also led to new growth industries

in consumer electronics and computers and to higher productivity

in already established industries. The net result of these adjustments was to increase the energy efficiency of manufacturing and

to expand so-called knowledge-intensive industry. The service in- dustries expanded in an increasingly postindustrial economy.

Structural economic changes, however, were unable to check the

slowing of economic growth, as the economy matured in the late 1970s and 1980s, attaining annual growth rates no better than 4

to 6 percent. But, these rates were remarkable in a world of ex- pensive petroleum and in a nation of few domestic resources. Japan's average growth rate of 5 percent in the late 1980s, for ex- ample, was far higher than the 3.8 percent growth rate of the United

States. Despite more petroleum price increases in 1979, the strength of

the Japanese economy was apparent. It expanded without the

double-digit inflation that afflicted other industrial nations and that

had bothered Japan itself after the first oil crisis in 1973. Japan

experienced slower growth in the mid-1980s, but its demandsustained economic boom of the late 1980s revived many troubled

industries.

Complex economic and institutional factors affected Japan's post- war growth. First, the nation's prewar experience provided several

important legacies. The Tokugawa period (1600-1867) bequeathed

a vital commercial sector in burgeoning urban centers, a relatively

well-educated elite (although one with limited knowledge of European science), a sophisticated government bureaucracy, productive agriculture, a closely unified nation with highly developed

financial and marketing systems, and a national infrastructure of

roads. The buildup of industry during the Meiji period to the point

where Japan could vie for world power was an important prelude

to postwar growth and provided a pool of experienced labor fol- lowing World War II. Second, and more important, was the level and quality of in- vestment that persisted through the 1980s. Investment in capital

equipment, which averaged more than 1 1 percent of GNP during

the prewar period, rose to some 20 percent of GNP during the 1950s

and to more than 30 percent in the late 1960s and 1970s. During

the economic boom of the late 1980s, the rate still kept to around

20 percent. Japanese businesses imported the latest technologies

to develop the industrial base. As a latecomer to modernization,

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Japan: A Country Study

Japan was able to avoid some of the trial and error earlier needed

by other nations to develop industrial processes. In the 1970s and

1980s, Japan improved its industrial base through technology licens- ing, patent purchases, and the imitation and improvement of for- eign inventions. In the 1980s, industry stepped up its research and

development, and many firms became famous for their innovations and creativity.

Japan's labor force contributed importandy to economic growth,

not only because of its availability and literacy, but also because

of its reasonable wage demands. Before and immediately after World War II, the transfer of numerous agricultural workers to modern industry resulted in rising productivity and only moderate wage increases. As population growth slowed and the nation

became increasingly industrialized in the mid-1960s, wages rose

significantly. But labor union cooperation generally kept salary in- creases within the range of productivity gains.

High productivity growth played a key role in postwar economic

growth. The highly skilled and educated labor force, extraordinary

savings rates and accompanying levels of investment, and the low

growth of Japan's labor force were major factors in the high rate of productivity growth.

The nation has also benefited from economies of scale. Although

medium-sized and small enterprises generated much of the nation's

employment, large facilities were most productive. Many industrial enterprises consolidated to form larger, more efficient units.

Before World War II, large holding companies formed wealth

groups, or zaibatsu (see Glossary), which dominated most industry. The zaibatsu were dissolved after the war, but keiretsu—large

and modern industrial enterprise groupings—emerged. The coor- dination of activities within these groupings and the integration

of smaller subcontractors into the groups enhanced industrial effi- ciency.

Japanese corporations developed strategies that contributed to their immense growth. Growth-oriented corporations that took

chances competed successfully. Product diversification became an

essential ingredient of the growth patterns of many keiretsu. Japanese

companies added plant and human capacity ahead of demand. Seeking market share rather than quick profit was another powerful

strategy.

Finally, circumstances beyond Japan's direct control contributed

to its success. International conflicts tended to stimulate the Japanese

economy until the devastation at the end of World War II. The

Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), World War I (1914-18), the Korean

War (1950-53), and the Second Indochina War (1954-75) brought

202
The Character and Structure of the Economy

economic booms to Japan. In addition, benign treatment from the

United States after World War II facilitated the nation's reconstruction and growth. The United States occupation of Japan

(1945-52) resulted in the rebuilding of the nation and the creation

of a democratic state. United States assistance totaled about US$1 .9 billion during the occupation, or about 15 percent of the nation's

imports and 4 percent of GNP in that period. About 59 percent

of this aid was in the form of food; 15 percent in industrial materials, and 12 percent in transportation equipment. United States grant

assistance, however, tapered off quickly in the mid-1950s. United

States military procurement from Japan peaked at a level equivalent to 7 percent ofJapan's GNP in 1953 and fell below 1 percent

after 1960. A variety of United States-sponsored measures during

the occupation, such as land reform, contributed to the economy's

later performance by increasing competition. In particular, the post- war purge of industrial leaders allowed new talent to rise in the

management of the nation's rebuilt industries. Finally, the econ- omy benefited from foreign trade, as it was able to expand exports

rapidly enough to pay for imports of equipment and technology

without falling into debt as have a number of developing nations

in the 1980s, (see Level and Commodity Composition of Trade,

ch. 5). The consequences ofJapan's economic growth were not always

positive. Large advanced corporations existed side-by-side with the

smaller and technologically less-developed firms, creating a kind

of economic dualism in the late twentieth century. Often the smaller

firms, which employed more than two-thirds ofJapan's workers,

worked as subcontractors directly for larger firms, supplying a nar- row range of parts and temporary workers. Excellent working conditions, salaries, and benefits, such as permanent employment, were

provided by most large firms, but not by the smaller firms. Temporary workers, mostly women, received much smaller salaries and

had less job security than permanent workers. Thus, despite the

high living standards of many workers in larger firms, Japan in

1990 remained in general a low-wage country whose economic

growth was fueled by highly skilled and educated workers who ac- cepted poor salaries, often unsafe working conditions, and poor

living standards (see table 10, Appendix).

Additionally, Japan's preoccupation with boosting the rate of

industrial growth during the 1950s and 1960s led to the relative

neglect of consumer services and also to the worsening of industrial pollution. Housing and urban services, such as water and sew- age systems, and social security benefits, lagged behind the

development of industry, and despite considerable improvement

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Japan: A Country Study

in the 1970s and 1980s, still lagged well behind other industrialized nations at the end of the 1980s. Agricultural subsidies and

a complex and outmoded distribution system also kept the prices

of some essential consumer goods very high by world standards

(see Living Standards, this ch.). Industrial growth came at the ex- pense of the environment. Foul air, heavily polluted water, and

waste disposal became critical political issues in the 1970s and again

in the late 1980s (see Pollution, ch. 2). The Evolving Occupational Structure

As late as 1955, some 40 percent of the labor force still worked

in agriculture, but this figure had declined to 17 percent by 1970

and to 8.3 percent by 1988. The government estimated in the late 1980s that this figure would decline to 4.9 percent by 2000, as Japan

imported more and more of its food and small family farms disappeared.

Japan's economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was based on

the rapid expansion of heavy manufacturing in such areas as au- tomobiles, steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, and electronics. The

secondary sector (manufacturing, construction, and mining) ex- panded to 35.6 percent of the work force by 1970. By the late 1970s,

however, the Japanese economy began to move away from heavy

manufacturing toward a more service-oriented (tertiary sector) base.

During the 1980s, jobs in wholesaling, retailing, finance and in- surance, real estate, transportation, communications, and government grew rapidly, while secondary sector employment remained

stable. The tertiary sector grew from 47 percent of the work force

in 1970 to 58 percent in 1987 and was expected to grow to 62 per- cent by 2000, when the secondary sector will probably employ 33

percent of Japan's workers.

The Role of Government and Business

Although Japan's economic development was primarily the

product of private entrepreneurship, the government has directly

contributed to the nation's prosperity. Its actions have helped initiate new industries, cushion the effects of economic depression,

create a sound economic infrastructure, and protect the living stan- dards of the citizenry. Indeed, so pervasive has government in- fluence in the economy seemed that many foreign observers have

popularized the term ' 'Japan Incorporated' ' to describe its alliance

of business and government interests. Whether Japan in 1990 actually fit this picture seemed questionable, but there was little doubt

that government agencies continued to influence the economy

through a variety of policies.

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The Character and Structure of the Economy

Japanese attitudes towards government have historically been

shaped by Confucianism (see Cultural Developments and the Es- tablishment of Buddhism, ch. 1; and Religious and Philosophical

Traditions, ch. 2). Japan often has been defined as a Confucian

country, but one in which loyalty is more important than benevolence. Leadership stemmed from the government and authority

in general, and business looked to government for guidance. These

attitudes, coupled with the view of the nation as a family, allowed

government to influence business, and businesses worked hard not

only for their own profits, but also for national well-being. There was a national consensus that Japan must be an economic power

and that the duty of all Japanese was to sacrifice themselves for

this national goal. Thus, the relationship between government and

business was as collaborators rather than as mutually suspicious

adversaries.

Government-business relations were conducted in many ways

and through numerous channels. The most important conduits in

the postwar period were the economic ministries: the Ministry of

Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry,

known as MITI (see Trade and Investment Institutions, ch. 5). The Ministry of Finance had operational responsibilities for all fiscal affairs, including the preparation of the national budget (see table

11, Appendix). It initiated fiscal policies and, through its indirect

control over the Bank ofJapan, the central bank, was responsible

for monetary policy as well. The Ministry of Finance allocated public investment, formulated tax policies, collected taxes, and regulated foreign exchange.

The Ministry of Finance established low interest rates, and by

thus reducing the cost of investment funds to corporations, promoted industrial expansion. MITI was responsible for the regulation of production and the distribution of goods and services. It was the "steward" of the Japanese economy, developing plans con- cerning the structure ofJapanese industry. MITI had several special functions in the late 1980s: controlling Japan's foreign trade

and supervising international commerce, ensuring the smooth flow

of goods in the national economy, promoting the development of

manufacturing, mining, and distribution industries, and supervising

the procurement of a reliable supply of raw materials and energy

resources. The Ministry of Transportation was responsible for oversight

of all land, sea, and air transport. The Ministry of Construction was charged with supervising all construction in Japan and Japanese-supported construction abroad. Its responsibilities also included

land acquisition for public use and environmental protection as it

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Japan: A Country Study

related to construction. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was

responsible for supervising and coordinating all health and welfare services, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was responsible for the postal service and electronic communications.

Industrial Policy

After World War II and especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the

Japanese government devised a complicated system of policies to promote industrial development and cooperated closely for this purpose with private firms. The objective of industrial policy was to

shift resources to specific industries, to gain international competitive advantage for Japan. These policies and methods were used

primarily to increase the productivity of inputs and to influence,

directly or indirectly, industrial investment.

Administrative guidance (gydsei shido) was a principal instrument

of enforcement used extensively throughout the Japanese government to support a wide range of policies. Influence, prestige, advice, and persuasion were used to encourage both corporations and

individuals to work in directions judged desirable. The persuasion was exerted and the advice was given by public officials, who often

had the power to provide or withhold loans, grants, subsidies,

licenses, tax concessions, government contracts, import permits,

foreign exchange, and approval of cartel arrangements. The

Japanese used administrative guidance to buffer market swings,

anticipate market developments, and enhance market competition

(see Foreign Trade Policies, ch. 5). Mechanisms used by the Japanese government to affect the econ- omy typically related to trade, labor markets, competition, and tax

incentives. They included a broad range of trade protection measures, subsidies, de jure and de facto exemptions from antitrust

statutes, labor market adjustments, and industry- specific assistance

to enhance the use of new technology. Rather than producing a broad range of goods, the Japanese selected a few areas in which

they could develop high-quality goods that they could produce in vast quantities at competitive prices. A good example is the camera

industry, which since the 1960s has been dominated by Japan.

Historically, there have been three main elements in Japanese

industrial development. The first was the development of a highly

competitive manufacturing sector. The second was the deliberate

restructuring of industry toward higher value-added, high-productivity industries. In the late 1980s, these were mainly knowledgeintensive tertiary industries. The third element was aggressive

domestic and international business strategies.

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The Character and Structure of the Economy

Japan has few natural resources and depends on massive imports of raw materials. It must export to pay for its imports, and

manufacturing and the sales of its services, such as banking and

finance, were its principal means of doing so. For these reasons,

the careful development of the producing sector was a key concern of both government and industry throughout most of the twentieth century. Government and business leaders generally agreed

that the composition ofJapan's output must continually shift if living

standards were to rise. Government played an active role in making these shifts, often anticipating economic developments rather

than reacting to them.

After World War II, the initial industries that policy makers and

the general public felt Japan should have were iron and steel, shipbuilding, the merchant marine, machine industries in general,

heavy electrical equipment, and chemicals. Later they added the

automobile industry, petrochemicals, and nuclear power, and in the 1980s, such industries as computers and semiconductors. Since

the late 1970s, the government has strongly encouraged the development of knowledge-intensive industries. Government support

for research and development grew rapidly in the 1980s, and large

joint government-industry development projects in computers and

robotics were started. At the same time, government promoted the

managed decline of competitively troubled industries, including

textiles, shipbuilding, and chemical fertilizers, through such measures as tax breaks for corporations that retrained workers to work

at other tasks. Although industrial policy remained important in Japan in the

1970s and 1980s, thinking began to change. Government seemed

to intervene less and become more respective of price mechanisms

in guiding future development. During this period, trade and direct

foreign investment were liberalized, tariff and nontariff trade barriers were lowered, and the economies of the advanced nations be- came more integrated, with the growth of international trade and

international corporations. In the late 1980s, knowledge-intensive

and high-technology industries became prominent. The government showed little inclination to promote such booming parts of

the economy as fashion design, advertising, and management consulting. The question at the end of the 1980s was whether the

government would become involved in such new developments or whether it would let them progress on their own. Monetary and Fiscal Policy

Monetary policy pertained to the regulation, availability, and cost of credit, while fiscal policy dealt with government expenditures,

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Japan: A Country Study

taxes, and debt. Through management of these areas, the Ministry of Finance regulated the allocation of resources in the econ- omy, affected the distribution of income and wealth among the

citizenry, stabilized the level of economic activities, and promoted

economic growth and welfare.

The Ministry of Finance played an important role in Japan's

postwar economic growth. It advocated a "growth first" approach,

with a high proportion of government spending going to capital

accumulation, and minimum government spending overall, which

kept both taxes and deficit spending down, making more money

available for private investment. Most Japanese put money into

savings accounts (see table 12, Appendix).

In the postwar period, the government's fiscal policy centered on the formulation of the national budget, which was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The ministry's Budget Bureau

prepared expenditure budgets for each fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) based on the requests from government ministries and af- filiated agencies. The ministry's Tax Bureau was responsible for adjusting the tax schedules and estimating revenues. The ministry also issued government bonds, controlled government borrowing, and administered the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program,

which is sometimes referred to as the "second budget."

Three types of budgets were prepared for review of the National

Diet each year (see The Legislature, ch. 6). The general account

budget included most of the basic expenditures for current government operations. Special account budgets, of which there were about

forty, were designed for special programs or institutions where close accounting of revenues and expenditures was essential: for public

enterprises, state pension funds, and public works projects financed

from special taxes. Finally, there were the budgets for the major

public enterprises, including public service corporations, loan and

finance institutions, and the special public banks (see table 13, Appendix). Although these budgets were usually approved before the

start of each fiscal year, they were usually revised with supplemental

budgets in the fall. Local jurisdiction budgets depended heavily on transfers from the central government.

Government fixed investments in infrastructure and loans to public and private enterprises were about 15 percent of GNP. Loans

from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, which were outside the general budget and funded primarily from postal savings,

represented more than 20 percent of the general account budget,

but their total effect on economic investment was not completely

accounted for in the national income statistics. Taxes, representing 14 percent of GNP in 1987, were low compared to those in

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The Character and Structure of the Economy

other developed economies. Taxes provided 87.8 percent of revenues in 1990. Income taxes were graduated and progressive.

The principal structural feature of the tax system was the tre- mendous elasticity of the individual income tax. Because inheritance

and property taxes were low, there was a slowly increasing

concentration of wealth in the upper tax brackets. In 1989, the

government introduced a major tax reform, including a 3 percent

consumption tax. The Financial System

In the mid-1980s, while the United States was becoming a debtor

nation, Japan became the world's largest creditor and Tokyo a major international financial center. Four of the biggest banks in

the world were Japanese at that time and Japan had the world's

largest insurance company, advertising firm, and stock market.

In the remainder of the 1980s, Japan's financial and banking in- dustries grew at unprecedented rates. The main elements of Japan's financial system were much the same as those of other major industrialized nations: a commercial

banking system, which accepted deposits, extended loans to businesses, and dealt in foreign exchange; specialized governmentowned financial institutions, which funded various sectors of the

domestic economy; securities companies, which provided brokerage services, underwrote corporate and government securities, and

dealt in securities markets; capital markets, which offered the means

to finance public and private debt and to sell residual corporate

ownership; and money markets, which offered banks a source of

liquidity and provided the Bank ofJapan with a tool to implement

monetary policy.

Japan's traditional banking system was segmented into clearly

defined components in the late 1980s: commercial banks (thirteen

major and sixty-four smaller regional banks), long-term credit banks

(seven), trust banks (seven), mutual loan and savings banks (sixtynine), and various specialized financial institutions. During the

1980s, a rapidly growing group of nonbank operations, such as consumer loan, credit card, leasing, and real estate organizations

began performing some of the traditional functions of banks, such

as the issuing of loans.

In the early postwar financial system, city banks provided shortterm loans to major domestic corporations while regional banks

took deposits and extended loans to medium-sized and small businesses. Neither engaged much in international business. In the

1950s and 1960s, a specialized bank, the Bank of Tokyo, took care

of most of the government's foreign exchange needs and functioned

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Japan: A Country Study

as the nation's foreign banking representative. Long-term credit

banks were intended to complement rather than to compete with

the commercial banks. Authorized to issue debentures rather than

take ordinary deposits, they specialized in long-term lending to major kaisha, or corporations. Trust banks were authorized to con- duct retail and trust banking and often combined the work of commercial and long-term credit banks. Trust banks not only managed

portfolios but also raised funds through the sale of negotiable loan

trust certificates. Mutual loan and savings banks, credit associations, credit cooperatives, and labor credit associations collected

individual deposits from general depositors. These deposits were

then loaned to cooperative members and to the liquidity-starved

city banks via the inter-bank money markets or were sent to central cooperative banks, which in turn loaned the funds to small busi- nesses and corporations. More than 8,000 agricultural, forestry,

and fishery cooperatives performed many of the same functions

for the cooperatives. Many of their funds were transmitted to their

central bank, the Norinchukin Bank, which was the world's largest bank in terms of domestic deposits.

A group of government financial institutions paralleled the pri- vate banking sector. The Japan Export-Import Bank, the Japan

Development Bank, and a number of finance corporations, such

as the Housing Loan Corporation, promoted the growth of specialized sectors of the domestic economy. These institutions derived

their funding from deposits collected by the postal savings system

and deposited with the Trust Fund Bureau. The postal savings sys- tem, through the 24,000 post offices, accepted funds in various

forms, including savings, annuities, and insurance. The post offices offered the highest interest rates for regular savings accounts (8

percent for time deposits in 1990) and tax free savings until 1988,

thereby collecting more deposits and accounts than any other in- stitution in the world.

Japan's securities markets increased their volume of dealings

rapidly during the late 1980s, led by Japan's rapidly expanding

securities firms. There were three categories of securities companies in Japan, the first consisting of the "Big Four" securities houses

(among the six largest such firms in the world): Nomura, Daiwa,

Nikko, and Yamaichi. The Big Four played a key role in international financial transactions and were members of the New York

Stock Exchange. Nomura was the world's largest single securities

firm; its net capital, in excess of US$10 billion in 1986, exceeded

that of Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Shearson Lehman

combined. In 1986 Nomura became the first Japanese member of

the London Stock Exchange. Nomura and Daiwa were primary

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A busy moment on the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

dealers in the United States Treasury bond market. The second

tier of securities firms contained ten medium-sized firms and the

third all the smaller securities firms registered in Japan. Many of

these smaller firms were affiliates of the Big Four, while some were

affiliated with banks. In 1986 eighty-three of the smaller firms were members of the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange. Japan's securities firms derived most of their incomes from brokerage fees, equity

and bond trading, underwriting, and dealing. Other services in- cluded the administration of trusts. In the late 1980s, a number

of foreign securities firms, including Salomon Brothers and Merrill

Lynch, became players in Japan's financial world.

Japanese insurance companies became important leaders in in- ternational finance in the late 1980s. More than 90 percent of the

population owned life insurance, and the amount held per person was at least 50 percent greater than in the United States. Many

Japanese used insurance companies as savings vehicles. Insurance

companies' assets grew at a rate of over 20 percent per year in the

late 1980s, reaching nearly US$694 billion in 1988. These assets permitted the companies to become major players in international

money markets. Nippon Life Insurance Company, the world's largest insurance firm, was reportedly the biggest single holder of United

States Treasury securities in 1989.

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Japan: A Country Study

The Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange became the largest

in the world in 1988, in terms of the combined market value of

outstanding shares and capitalization, while the Osaka Stock Exchange ranked third after those of Tokyo and New York. Although

there are eight stock exchanges in Japan, the Tokyo stock exchange

represented 83 percent of the nation's total equity in 1988. Of the

1,848 publicly traded domestic companies in Japan at the end of

1986, about 80 percent were listed on the Tokyo stock exchange.

Two developments in the late 1980s helped in the rapid expansion of the Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange. The first was

a change in the financing of company operations. Traditionally,

large firms obtained funding through bank loans rather than capital markets, but in the late 1980s they began to rely more on direct

financing. The second development came in 1986 when the Tokyo

exchange permitted non-Japanese brokerage firms to become members for the first time. By 1988 the exchange had sixteen foreign

members. The Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange had 124 member companies all told in mid- 1990.

Japan's stock market dealings exploded in the 1980s, with in- creased trading volume and rapidly rising stock prices. The Nikkei

Stock Average grew from 6,850 in October 1982 to nearly 39,000

in early 1990. During one six-month period in 1986, total trade

volume on the Tokyo exchange increased by 250 percent with wild

swings in the Nikkei average. After the plunge of the New York

Stock Exchange in October 1987, the Tokyo average dropped by

15 percent, but there was a sharp recovery by early 1988. In 1990

five types of securities were traded on the Tokyo exchange: stocks,

bonds, investment trusts, rights, and warrants alone.

Public Corporations

Although the Japanese economy is largely based on private enterprise, it does have a number of government-owned (public) cor- porations, which are more extensive and, in some cases, different

in function from what exists in the United States. In 1988 there were 97 public corporations, reduced from 111 in the early 1980s

as a result of administrative reforms. Public companies at the national level were normally affiliated with one of the economic ministries, although the extent of direct management and supervision

varied. The government divided the national-level corporations into

several categories. The first included the main public service and

monopoly corporations: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Japanese National Railways, and Japan Tobacco and

Salt Public Corporation. However, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation was privatized in 1985, the Japanese National

212
The Character and Structure of the Economy

Railways in 1987, and the Japan Tobacco and Salt Corporation

in 1988. The second category included the major development

corporations devoted to housing, agriculture, highways, water re- sources, ports, energy resources, and urban development projects.

Other categories of corporations included those charged with special government projects, loans and finance, and special types of

banking. Local public corporations were involved with utilities. Public corporations benefited the economy in several ways. Some,

like Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation before privatization, were important sources of technology development funds

or centers around which private industry could cluster. Others

provided vital public services that private industry would find impossible to finance. The development banks, particularly the Japan

Development Bank, were sources of long-term investment funds

and instrumental in shaping the pattern of industry, especially in

the early postwar period. Because public corporations also added

revenue to the national budget and were, theoretically, self- financing, they required litde from the government in the way of financial

support. They also provided employment for retired bureaucrats.

The reemployment of retired bureaucrats as advisors to these cor- porations as well as many private-sector firms was rather common,

especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, under the tide amakudari

(descent from heaven). The practice was most prevalent in the highregulated banking, steel, and transportation industries, but was

found throughout the Japanese economy.

Public corporations also had a negative side. Their operations were apt to be less efficient than those of the private sector, and

in some corporations, close government supervision impeded cor- porate responsibility. Conflicts between corporate heads, who were

retired from competing ministries, and envy among career employees, who saw their advancement blocked by the influx of re- tired officials, also created frequent management problems. Labor

relations were also less harmonious in the public sector than the

private sector. Some ofJapan's most debilitating strikes and work

slowdowns have been launched by public transportation workers.

Private Enterprise

The engine of Japanese economic growth has been private initiative and enterprise, together with strong support and guidance

from the government and from labor. The most numerous enterprises were single proprietorships, of which there were over 4 million in the late 1980s. The dominant form of organization, however, was the corporation: in 1988 some 2 million corporations employed more than 30 million workers, or nearly half of the total labor force

213
Japan: A Country Study

of 60.1 million people. Corporations ranged from large to small,

but the favored type of organization was the joint- stock company,

with directors, auditors, and yearly stockholders' meetings.

Japan's postwar business order dates back to the dissolution of

the zaibatsu during the Allied occupation. Central holding companies were dissolved and families and other owners were compensated

with non-negotiable government bonds. Individual operating firms were then freed to act independentiy. At the same time, the government instituted antimonopoly legislation and formed the Fair Trade

Commission. Together with agricultural land reform and the start of the labor movement, these measures helped introduce a degree

of competition into markets that had not previously existed.

It was not long, however, before the spirit and letter of these

reform laws were neglected. During the 1950s, government guid- ance of industry often sidestepped the provisions of the law. While

market forces determined the course of the vast majority of enterprise activities, adjustments in the allocation of bank credit and

the formation of cartels favored the reemergence of conglomerate

groupings. These groups competed vigorously with one another

for market shares both within and outside Japan, but they dominated lesser industry.

In contrast to the dualism of the prewar era—featuring a giant

gap between modern, large enterprises and the smaller, traditional

firms—the postwar system was more graduated. Interlocking production and sales arrangements between greater and smaller enterprises characterized corporate relations in most markets. The

average Japanese business executive was well aware of the firms

that led production and sales in each industry and sensitive to minute differentiations of rank among the many corporations.

At the top of the corporate system were three general types of

corporate groupings. The first included the corporate heirs of the

zaibatsu (including many of the same firms), and the second consisted of corporations that formed around major commercial banks.

The nation's six largest groupings were in these categories. Mitsui,

Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo were former zaibatsu, while other groupings were formed around the Fuji-Sankei, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi

Kangyo banking giants. A third type of corporate grouping developed around large industrial producers.

The relations among the members of the first two types of groups were flexible, informal, and quite different from the holding com- pany pattern of the prewar days. Coordination took place at periodic gatherings of corporation presidents and chief executive

officers. The purpose of these meetings was to exchange information and ideas rather than to command group operations in a formal

214
The Character and Structure of the Economy

way. The general trading firms associated with each group could

also be used to coordinate group finance, production, and marketing policies although none of these relationships was entirely

exclusive (see Trading Companies, ch. 5). The practice of cross- holding shares of group stock further cemented these groups, and

such holdings usually made up about 30 percent of the total group

equity. Member corporations would typically, though not exclusively, borrow from group banks.

Similar relationships characterized the third type of corporate

group, which established around a major industrial producer. Members of this group were often subsidiaries or affiliates of the parent

firm, or regular subcontractors. Subsidiaries and contracting cor- porations normally built components for the parent firm and, be- cause of their smaller size, afforded several benefits to the parent.

The larger firm could concentrate on final assembly and high valueadded processes, while the smaller firm could perform specialized

and labor-intensive tasks. Cash payments to the subcontractors were supplemented by commercial bills whose maturity could be postponed when the need arose. In the late 1980s, subcontracting firms

accounted for over 60 percent of Japan's 6 million small and

medium-sized enterprises (those having fewer than 300 employees).

This characterization of the economy as consisting of neat, hierarchical corporate groupings is somewhat simplistic. In the 1970s

and 1980s, a number of independent middle-sized firms—especially

in the services and retail trade—were busy catering to increasingly

diversified and specialized markets. Unaffiliated with the nation's

large conglomerates, these corporations dueled each other in a highly competitive market. Bankruptcies among such companies and

the smaller firms were much more common than among the large

enterprises. Small business was the main provider of employment

for the Japanese—two-thirds ofJapanese workers were employed

by small firms throughout the 1980s—and thereby the source of consumer demand; it engaged in almost half of business investment as well. The issue of who controlled the enterprise system was complex.

While theoretically corporations were owned by stockholders, in- dividual stock-ownership fell throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and

in 1990 was less than 30 percent. Financial corporations accounted

for the remaining 70 percent or so. Relative to capital, almost all large corporations carried enormous debt, a phenomenon known

as overborrowing. Such an unbalanced capital structure resulted

from the easy availability of credit from the main group bank and

the network of corporate relations, which reduced the need to resort

to capital markets. Corporate shareholder meetings were often only

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Japan: A Country Study

window dressing. Thugs sometimes terrorized stockholders, demanding payments to vote for management or refrain from ex- posing scandals. The auditing system also was not well developed.

Until the late 1980s, few companies engaged outside auditors, and

accounting practices gave corporations room to mislead both the

public and shareholders. The law was changed in 1981 to control

this kind of excess, to enhance the power of auditors, and to reduce

the number of stockholders in the employ of management. But in

general, it seemed that business management held the reins of cor- porate control, often with little public accountability. The corporate

system maintained itself by smoothing relations with the government bureaucracy, expanding benefits to workers and consumers,

and public relations and philanthropy.

The Culture of Japanese Management

The culture ofJapanese management so famous in the West was

generally limited to Japan's large corporations. These flagships of

the Japanese economy provided their workers with excellent salaries and working conditions and secure employment. These companies and their employees were the business elite ofJapan. A career with such a company was the dream of many young people in

Japan, but only a select few attained the jobs. Qualification for employment was limited to the men and the few women who graduated from the top thirty colleges and universities in Japan.

In the late twentieth century, placement and advancement of

Japanese workers was heavily based on educational background.

Students who did not gain admission to the most highly rated col- leges only rarely had the chance to work for a large company. Instead, they had to seek positions in small and medium-sized firms

that could not offer comparable benefits and prestige. The quality

of one's education and, more importantly, the college attended,

played decisive roles in a person's career (see Higher Education,

ch. 3). Few Japanese attended graduate school, and graduate training

in business per se was rare in the 1980s. There were only a few

business school programs in Japan. Companies provided their own

training and showed a strong preference for young men who could

be trained in the company way. Interest in a person whose atti- tudes and work habits were shaped outside the company was low.

When young men were preparing to graduate from college, the

attempt to find a suitable employer began. This process had been

very difficult: there were only a few positions in the best government ministries, and quite often entry into a good firm was determined by competitive examination. In the 1990s, the situation was

216
The Character and Structure of the Economy

becoming less competitive with a gradual decrease in the number

of candidates. New workers enter their companies as a group on

April 1 each year. One of the prominent features ofJapanese management was the

practice of permanent employment {shushin koyo). Permanent employment covered the minority of the work force that worked for the major companies. Management trainees, traditionally nearly

all of whom were men, were recruited directly from colleges when

they graduated in the late winter and, if they survived a six-month

probationary period with the company, were expected to stay with

the companies for their entire working careers. Employees were

not dismissed thereafter on any grounds, except for serious breaches

of ethics. Permanent employees were hired as generalists, not as specialists

for a specific positions. A new worker was not hired because of

any special skill or experience; rather, the individual's intelligence,

educational background, and personal attitudes and attributes were

closely examined. On entering a Japanese corporation, the new

employee would train from six to twelve months in each of the firm's

major offices or divisions. Thus, within a few years a young employee would know every facet of company operations, knowledge

which allowed companies to be more productive.

Another unique aspect ofJapanese management in the late twentieth century was the system of promotion and reward. An important criterion was seniority. Seniority was determined by the year an employee's class entered the company. Career progression was

highly predictable, regulated, and automatic. Compensation for young workers was quite low, but they accepted low pay with the

understanding that their pay would increase in regular increments

and be quite high by retirement. Compensation consisted of a wide

range of tangible and intangible benefits, including housing as- sistance, inexpensive vacations, good recreational facilities, and,

most importantly, the availability of low-cost loans for such things

as housing and a new car. Regular pay was often augmented by

generous semiannual bonuses. Members of the same graduating

class usually started with similar salaries, and salary increases and

promotions each year were generally uniform. The purpose was

to maintain harmony and avoid stress and jealousy within the

group.

Individual evaluation, however, did occur. Early in a worker's

career (by age thirty) distinctions were made in pay and job as- signments. During the latter part of a worker's career another weeding took place: the best workers were selected for accelerated

advancement into upper management. Those employees who failed

217
Japan: A Country Study

to advance were forced to retire from the company in their mid-to

late fifties. Retirement did not necessarily mean a life of leisure. Poor pension benefits and modest social security meant that many

people had to continue working after retiring from a career. Many

management retirees worked for the smaller subsidiaries of the large

companies, with another company, or with the large company it- self at substantially lower salaries. A few major corporations in the late 1980s were experimenting

with variations of permanent employment and automatic promotion. Some rewarded harder work and higher production with

higher raises and more rapid promotions, but most retained the more traditional forms of hiring and advancement. A few companies that experienced serious reverses laid off workers, but such

instances were rare. Another aspect ofJapanese management was the company union,

which most regular company employees were obliged to join. The

worker did not have a separate skill identification outside of the

company. Despite federations of unions at the national level, the

union did not exist as an entity separate from, or with an adversarial relationship to, the company. The linking of the company

with the worker put severe limits on independent union action and

the worker did not wish to harm the economic well-being of the

company. Strikes were rare and usually brief. Japanese managerial style and decision making in large companies emphasized the flow of information and initiative from the

bottom up, making top management a facilitator rather than the source of authority, while middle management was both the impetus

for and shaper of policy. Consensus was stressed as a way of arriving at decisions, and close attention was paid to workers' well-being.

Rather than serve as an important decision maker, the ranking

officer of a company had the responsibility of maintaining harmony

so that employees could work together. A Japanese chief executive officer was a consensus builder.

Employment and Labor Relations

Rising labor productivity, particularly in the manufacturing

industries, contributed significantly to the nation's economic

development. Labor productivity was unusually high in the late 1970s, when Japan's wages first became competitive with other

industrialized nations. But, productivity rose at an annual average

rate of only 2.6 percent between 1978 and 1987 (see table 14, Appendix). At the same time, Japan was able to keep its unemployment

rate between 2.3 and 3.0 percent from 1985 to 1990. The struc- ture of the nation's employment system and relatively harmonious

218
The Character and Structure of the Economy

labor-management relations were two of the reasons for this enviable performance.

Employment, Wages, and Working Conditions

Japan's work force grew by less than 1 percent per year in the

1970s and 1980s. In 1990 it stood at nearly 63 percent of the total population over fifteen years of age, a level little changed since 1970.

Labor force participation differed within age and gender groupings and was similar to that in other industrialized nations in its relative distribution among primary, secondary, and tertiary in- dustries. The percentage of people employed in the primary sec- tor (agriculture, forestry, and fishing) dropped from 17.4 in 1970

to 8.3 in 1987 and was projected to fall to 4.9 by 2000. The per- centage of the Japanese labor force employed in heavy industry was 33.7 in 1970; it dropped to 33.1 in 1987 and was expected

to be 27.7 in 2000. Light industry employed 47 percent of the work

force in 1970 and 58 percent in 1987. The sector was expected to employ 62 percent by 2000. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, well over 95 percent of all men between the ages of twenty-five and fiftyfour were in the work force, but the proportion dropped sharply

after the usual retirement age of fifty-five (by 1990 the retirement

age for most men had risen to sixty). Women participated most

actively in the job market in their early twenties and between the

ages of thirty-five and fifty-four (see Gender Stratification and the

Lives of Women, ch. 2). The unemployment rate (2.3 percent in

1989) was considerably lower than in the other industrialized

nations.

Wages varied by industry and type of employment. Regular

workers in firms with more than thirty employees, those in finance,

real estate, public service, petroleum, publishing, and emerging

high-technology industries earned the highest wages. The lowest

paid were those in textiles, apparel, furniture, and leather products

industries. The average farmer fared even worse. During the period

of strong economic growth from 1960 to 1973, wage levels rose

rapidly. Nominal wages increased an average of 13 percent per

year while real wages rose 7 percent each year. Wage levels then

stagnated as economic growth slowed. Between 1973 and 1987 an- nual nominal and real wage increases dropped to 8 percent and

2 percent, respectively. Wages began rising in 1987 as the value

of the yen sharply appreciated. In 1989 salaried workers receiving

the highest average pay hikes over the previous year were newspaper

employees (6.7 percent), followed by retail and wholesale workers

(6 percent) and hotel employees (5.7 percent). Workers in the steel

219
Japan: A Country Study

(2.5 percent) and shipbuilding (4.2 percent) industries fared worse. The salaries of administrative and technical workers were about

20 percent higher than those of production workers. In the late 1980s, with wages in manufacturing firms having 500 or more workers indexed at 100, enterprises with 100 to 499 employees were

indexed at 79, those with 30 to 99 employees at 64, and those with

5 to 29 employees at 56.6. The gap between wages paid to secondary school and college graduates was slight, but widened as they

grew older and peaked at the age of fifty-five, when the former

received only 60 to 80 percent of the wages of the latter. Workers received two fairly large bonuses as well as their regular salary, one mid-year and the other at year's end. In 1988 workers in large companies received bonuses equivalent to their pay

for 1 .9 months while workers in the smallest firms gained bonuses

equal to 1 .2 months' pay. In addition to bonuses, Japanese workers received a number of fringe benefits, such as living allowances,

incentive payments, remuneration for special job conditions, al- lowances for good attendance, and cost-of-living allowances.

Working conditions varied from firm to firm. On average, employees worked a forty-six-hour week in 1987; employees of most

large corporations worked a modified five-day week with two Satur- days a month, while those in most small firms worked as much

as six days each week. In the face of mounting international criti- cism of excessive working hours in Japan, in January 1989 public

agencies began closing two Saturdays a month. Labor unions made

reduced working hours an important part of their demands, and

many larger firms responded in a positive manner. In 1986 the

average employee in manufacturing and production industries

worked 2,150 hours in Japan, compared to 1,924 hours in the

United States and 1,643 in France. The average Japanese worker was entitled to fifteen days of paid vacation a year, but actually

took only seven days.

The Structure of Japan's Labor Market

The structure of Japan's labor market was experiencing gradual change in the late 1980s and was expected to continue this trend

throughout the 1990s. Labor market structure was affected by the

aging of the working population, increasing numbers of women

in the labor force, and workers' rising education level. There was

the prospect of increasing numbers of foreign nationals in the labor

force. And, finally, the labor market faced possible changes owing

to younger workers who sought to break away from traditional career paths to those that stressed greater individuality and

creativity.

220
11*

Japan Airlines Boeing 747

Courtesy Japan Airlines

Working Women

In the early 1990s, Japanese women were joining the labor force

in unprecedented numbers. In 1987 there were 23.6 million working women (40 percent of the labor force), and they accounted for 59 percent of the increase in employment from 1975 to 1987. The

participation rate for women in the labor force (the ratio of those

working to all women aged fifteen and older) rose from 45.7 per- cent in 1975 to 48.6 percent in 1987 and was expected to reach

50 percent by 2000.

The growing participation of women reflected both supply and

demand factors. Industries such as wholesaling, retailing, banking,

and insurance have expanded, in large part because of the effective use of women as part-time employees (see Age Structure; ch. 2). Foreign Workers

Traditionally Japan has had strict laws regarding the employment of foreigners, although exceptions were made for certain

occupational categories. Excepted categories have included executives and managers engaged in commercial activities, full-time

scholars associated with research and education institutions, professional entertainers, engineers and others specializing in advanced

221
Japan: A Country Study

technology, foreign-language teachers, and others with special skills unavailable among Japanese nationals.

The problems of foreign workers in the labor force were expected

to continue in the 1990s. Despite the long-term upward trend in

the unemployment rate, many unpopular jobs went unfilled and

the domestic labor market was sluggish. Imported labor was seen

as a solution to this situation by some employers, who hired lowpaid foreign workers, who were, in turn, enticed by comparatively

high Japanese wages. The strict immigration laws were expected

to remain on the books, however, although the influx of illegal aliens from nearby Asian countries to participate in the labor market was

likely to increase (see table 16, Appendix).

Workers 9 Changing Attitudes

The success of corporations in Japan was attributable to the

remarkable motivation of its workers. Also behind this corporate

prosperity was the workers' strong sense of loyalty to and identifi- cation with their employers. While many theories have evolved to explain the extraordinary attitude of Japanese workers, perhaps

the most noteworthy is that of personnel management. This view

holds that loyalty to the company has developed as a result of job

security and a wage system in which those with the greatest seniority

reap the highest rewards. Such corporate structure presumably

fostered not only a determined interest in the company, but a low

percentage of workers who changed jobs.

During the postwar economic reconstruction, the backbone of

the labor force was, of course, made up of people born before World

War II. These people grew up in a Japan that was still largely an

agriculturally based economy and had little material wealth.

Moreover, they suffered the hardships of war and accepted hard

work as a part of their lives. In the late twentieth century, these

people were being replaced by generations born after the war, and

there were indications that the newcomers had different atti- tudes toward work. Postwar generations were accustomed to prosperity, and they were also much better educated than their

elders. As might be expected, these socioeconomic changes have affected workers' attitudes. Prior to World War II, surveys indicated that

the aspect of life regarded as most worthwhile was work. During

the 1980s, the percentage of people who felt this way was declining. Workers' identification with their employers was weakening

as well. A survey by the Management and Coordination Agency

revealed that a record 2.7 million workers changed jobs in the one- year period beginning October 1 , 1986, and the ratio of those who

222
The Character and Structure of the Economy

switched jobs to the total labor force matched the previous high

recorded in 1974. This survey also showed that the percentage of

workers indicating an interest in changing jobs increased from 4.5

percent in 1971 to 9.9 percent in 1987.

Another indication of changing worker attitudes was the number of people meeting with corporate scouts to discuss the possibility of switching jobs. Corporations' treatment of older workers also affected attitudes: there were fewer positions for older workers, and

many found themselves without the rewards that their predecessors had enjoyed.

Aging and Retirement of the Labor Force

Japan's population was aging in the late twentieth century. During the 1950s, the percentage of the population in the sixty-fiveand-over group remained steady at around 5 percent. Throughout subsequent decades, however, that age-group expanded, and

by 1987 it had grown to almost 11 percent of the population. It was expected to have reached 16 percent by 2000 and almost 24

percent by 2020 (see Population, ch. 2). Perhaps the most outstanding feature of this trend was the speed with which it was occurring

in comparison to trends in other industrialized nations. In the

United States, expansion of the sixty-five-and-over age-group from

7 percent to 14 percent took seventy-five years; in Britain and the

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) this expansion took

forty-five years. The same expansion in Japan was expected to take

only twenty-six years. As Japan's population aged, so did its work force. In 1988 the

Ministry of Labor projected that, by 1990, 20 percent of the work

force would be made up of workers aged fifty-five and over. By

2000, the ministry predicted, 24 percent of the working population (almost one in four workers) would be in this age-group. This

demographic shift was expected to bring about both macroeconomic

and microeconomic problems. At the national level, Japan may

have trouble in financing the pension system. At the corporate level,

problems will include growing personnel costs and the shortage of

senior positions. If such problems become severe, government will be forced to develop countermeasures.

In most Japanese companies, salaries rose with worker age. Because younger workers were paid less, they were more attractive

to employers, and the difficulty in finding employment increased

with age. This pattern was evidenced by the unemployment rates

for different age-groups and by the number of applicants per job

vacancy for each age-group in openings handled by public employment offices. As the Japanese population ages, such trends may grow.

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Japan: A Country Study

Most Japanese companies required that employees retire upon

reaching a specified age. During most of the postwar period, that

age was fifty-five. Since government social security payments nor- mally began at age sixty, workers were forced to find reemployment to fill the five-year gap. However, in 1986 the Diet passed

the Law Concerning the Stabilization of Employment for Elderly

People, to provide various incentives for firms to raise their retire- ment age to sixty. Many Japanese companies raised the retirement

age they set, partly in response to this legislation. And despite mandatory retirement policies, many Japanese companies allowed their

employees to continue working beyond the age of sixty—although

generally at reduced wages. Reasons that people over sixty con- tinued to work varied: some did so to supplement inadequate pension incomes, while others simply wanted to give meaning to their

lives or to keep in touch with society (see table 17, Appendix).

As Japan's population aged, the financial health of the public

pension plan deteriorated. To avoid massive premium increases,

government reformed the system in 1986 by cutting benefit levels and raising the plan's specified age at which benefits began from

sixty to sixty-five. Under the revised system, contributions paid

in equal share by employer and employee were expected to be

equivalent to about 30 percent of wages, as opposed to 40 percent

of wages under the old system. However, problems now arose in

securing employment opportunities for the sixty-to- sixty-five agegroup.

In 1990, some 90 percent of companies paid retirement benefits

to their employees in the form of lump-sum payments and pensions. Some companies based the payment amount on the employee's base pay, while others used formulas independent of base

pay. Since the system was designed to reward long service, payment rose progressively with the number of years worked.

Social Insurance and Minimum Wage Systems

Companies in Japan were responsible for enrolling their employees

in various social insurance systems, including health insurance, employee pension insurance, employment insurance, and workers' ac- cident compensation insurance. The employer covered all costs for workers' accident compensation insurance, but payments to the other

systems were shared by both employer and employee.

The Minimum Wage Law, introduced in 1947 but not enacted

until 1959, was designed to protect low-income workers. Minimum

wage levels have been determined, according to both region and

industry, by special councils composed of government, labor, and

employment representatives.

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The Character and Structure of the Economy

Labor Unions

Japan's over 74,500 trade unions were represented by four main

labor federations in the mid-1980s: the General Council of Trade

Unions of Japan (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai, commonly

known as Sohyo), with 4.4 million members—a substantial per- centage representing public sector employees; the Japan Confederation of Labor (Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or Domei for short),

with 2.2 million members; the Federation of Independent Labor

Unions (Churitsu Roren), with 1.6 million members; and the National Federation of Industrial Organizations (Shinsanbetsu), with

only 61,000 members. In 1987 Domei and Churitsu Roren were

dissolved and amalgamated into the newly established National Federation of Private Sector Unions (Rengo); and in 1990 Sohyo affiliates merged with Rengo to form a new entity, Shin Rengo. Local

labor unions and work unit unions, rather than the federations,

conducted the major bargaining. Unit unions often banded together

for wage negotiations, but federations did not control their policies or actions. Federations also engaged in political and public re- lations activities (see Interest Groups, ch. 6).

The rate of labor union membership, which was 35.4 percent

in 1970, had declined considerably by the end of the 1980s. The

continuing long-term reduction in union membership was caused

by several factors, including the restructuring ofJapanese industry away from heavy industries. Many people entering the work

force in the 1980s joined smaller companies in the tertiary sector,

where there was a general disinclination toward joining labor or- ganizations.

The relationship between the typical labor union and the com- pany was unusually close. Both white- and blue-collar workers

joined the union automatically in most major companies. Temporary and subcontracting workers were excluded, and managers

with the rank of section chief and above were considered part of

management. In most corporations, however, many of the managerial staff were former union members. In general, Japanese

unions were sensitive to the economic health of the company, and

company management usually briefed the union membership on

the state of corporate affairs. Any regular employee below the rank of section chief was eligible to become a union officer. Management, however, often pres- sured the workers to select favored employees. Officers usually

maintained their seniority and tenure while working exclusively on union activities and being paid from the union's accounts, and

union offices were often located at the factory site. Many union

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Japan: A Country Study

officers went on to higher positions within the corporation if they were particularly effective (or troublesome), but few became active in organized labor activities at the national level. During prosperous times, the spring labor offensives were highly

ritualized affairs, with banners, sloganeering, and dances aimed more at being a show of force than a crippling job action. Meanwhile, serious discussions took place between the union officers and

corporate managers to determine pay and benefit adjustments. If the economy turned sour, or if management tried to reduce the

number of permanent employees, however, disruptive strikes often

occurred. The number of working days lost to labor disputes peaked

in the economic turmoil of 1974 and 1975 at around 9 million workdays in the two-year period. In 1979, however, there were fewer

than 1 million days lost. Since 1981 the average number of days

lost per worker each year to disputes was just over 9 percent of

the number lost in the United States (see table 18, Appendix). After

1975, when the economy entered a period of slower growth, an- nual wage increases moderated, and labor relations were conciliatory. During the 1980s, workers received pay hikes that on average

closely reflected the real growth of GNP for the preceding year. In 1989, for example, workers received an average 5.1 percent pay

hike, while GNP growth had averaged 5 percent between 1987 and

1989. The moderate trend continued in the early 1990s, as the country's national labor federations were reorganizing themselves.

Infrastructure and Technology

A mountainous, insular nation, Japan has inadequate natural

resources to support its growing economy and large population (see

Energy, this ch.). Although many kinds of minerals were extracted

throughout the country, most mineral resources had to be imported

in the postwar era. Local deposits of metal-bearing ores were

difficult to process because they were of a low grade. The nation's

large and varied forest resources, which covered 70 percent of the

country in the late 1980s, were not utilized extensively. Because

of the precipitous terrain, underdeveloped road network, and high

percentage of young trees, domestic sources were able to supply

only between 25 and 30 percent of the nation's timber needs.

Agriculture and fishing were the best developed resources, but only

through years of painstaking investment and toil. The nation there- fore built up the manufacturing and processing industries to convert raw materials imported from abroad. This strategy of economic

development necessitated the establishment of a strong economic

infrastructure to provide the needed energy, transportation, communications, and technological know-how.

226
The Character and Structure of the Economy

Construction

The mainstay of infrastructure development was the construction industry, which employed slightly less than 10 percent of the

labor force in 1985 and contributed some 8.5 percent of GDP. After

the two oil crises in the 1970s, construction investment turned sluggish and the share of construction investment in GNP decreased

gradually. In 1987, however, business expanded through investors' confidence, continued increase in corporate earnings, improvement of personal income, and rapid rise in land prices. The share

of construction investment in GNP rose sharply, especially for more

sophisticated and higher value-added private housing and private

nonhousing structures. Construction starts in FY 1988 covered a total area of 258 million square meters, the second highest area on record, while housing starts numbered 1.66 million, the third highest on record. Total

investment in construction exceeded US$483 billion. Growing demand for private housing and new industry plants and equipment

led to Japan's fifty largest construction companies experiencing

double-digit growth in FY 1988.

Although demand for new private housing was expected to grow

in the early 1990s, even greater growth was expected for new urban

office buildings. A number of large urban development projects,

including those for Tokyo's waterfront, other urban redevelopment,

highway construction, and new or expanded airports, suggested

continued work for the construction industry through the 1990s.

Japan's construction technology, which includes advanced earthquake-resistant designs, was among the most developed in the world

(see Visual Arts, ch. 3). Major firms competed to improve quality

control over all phases of design, management, and execution.

Research and development focused especially on energy-related facilities, such as nuclear power plants and liquid natural gas (LNG)

storage tanks. The largest firms were also improving their underwater construction methods.

Mining

Mining was a rapidly declining industry in the 1980s. Domestic

coal production shrank from a peak of 55 million tons in 1960 to

slightly more than 16 million tons in 1985, while coal imports grew

to nearly 91 million tons in 1987. Domestic coal mining companies faced cheap coal imports and high production costs, which

caused them chronic deficits in the 1980s. In the late 1980s, Japan's

approximately 1 million tons of coal reserves were mostly hard coal

227
Japan: A Country Study

used for coking. Most of the coal Japan consumed was used to produce electric power.

Japanese coal is found at the extreme ends of the country, in

Hokkaido and Kyushu, which have, respectively, 45 and 40 per- cent of the country's coal deposits. Kyushu's coal is generally of

poor quality and hard to extract, but the proximity of the Kyushu

mines to ports facilitates transportation. In Hokkaido, the coal seams are wider and can be worked mechanically, and the quality

of the coal is good. Unfortunately, these mines are located well

inland, making transportation difficult. In most Japanese coal

mines, inclined galleries, which extended in some places to 9.7

kilometers underground, were used instead of pits. This arrangement was costly, despite the installation of moving platforms. The

result was that a miner's daily output was far less than in Western

Europe and the United States and domestic coal cost far more than

imported coal. Energy

Japan lacks any significant domestic sources of energy except

coal and must import substantial amounts of crude oil, natural gas, and other energy resources, including uranium. In 1986 the country's dependence on imports for primary energy stood at nearly

92 percent. Its rapid industrial growth since the end of World War

II had doubled energy consumption every five years. The use of

power had also changed qualitatively. In 1950, coal supplied half

ofJapan's energy needs, hydroelectricity one-third, and oil the rest. In 1987 oil provided Japan with 56.6 percent of energy needs. Coal

provided 18 percent of energy needs, natural gas 9.7 percent,

nuclear power 10 percent, hydroelectic power 4.1 percent, geothermal 0.1 percent, and 1.5 percent came from other sources. During the 1960-72 period of accelerated growth, energy consumption

grew much faster than GNP, doubling Japan's consumption of

world energy. By 1976, with only 3 percent of the world's population, Japan was consuming 6 percent of global energy supplies.

After the two oil crises of the 1970s, the pattern of energy con- sumption in Japan changed from heavy dependence on oil to some

diversification to other forms of energy resources. Japan's domestic oil consumption dropped slightly, from around 5.1 million barrels of oil per day in the late 1970s to 4.9 million barrels per day in

1990. While the country's use of oil was declining, its consumption of nuclear power and LNG rose substantially. Because domestic

natural gas production is minimal, rising demand was met by

greater imports. Japan's main LNG suppliers in 1987 were Indonesia (51.3 percent), Malaysia (20.4 percent), Brunei (17.8 percent),

228
The Character and Structure of the Economy

Abu Dhabi (7.3 percent), and the United States (3.2 percent).

Several Japanese industries, including electric power companies

and steelmakers, switched from petroleum to coal, most of which was imported.

In 1987, the latest year for which complete statistics were available, Japan's total energy requirements were tabulated at 372 million tons of petroleum equivalent. Of this total, 85 percent was

imported. Consumption totalled 263.8 million tons, 45.9 percent

of which was used by industry; 23.6 percent by the transportation

sector; 26.8 percent for agricultural, residential, services, and other

uses; and 3.7 percent for non-energy uses, such as lubricating oil or asphalt.

In 1989 Japan was the world's third largest producer of electricity. Most of the more than 3,300 power plants were thermoelectric. About 75 percent of the available power was controlled by

the ten major regional power utilities, of which Tokyo Electric

Power Company was the world's largest. Electricity rates in Japan

were among the world's highest.

The Japanese were working to increase the availability of nuclear

power in 1985. Although Japan was a late starter in this field, it finally imported technology from the United States and obtained

uranium from Canada, France, South Africa, and Australia. By

1987 the country had thirty-three nuclear reactors in operation,

with seventeen additional reactors planned or under construction.

The ratio of nuclear power generation to total electricity production increased from 2 percent in 1973 to 26 percent in 1987.

During the 1980s, Japan's nuclear power program was strongly

opposed by environmental groups, particularly after the Three Mile

Island accident in the United States. Other problems for the program were the rising costs of nuclear reactors and fuel, the huge

investments necessary for fuel enrichment and reprocessing plants, reactor failures, and nuclear waste disposal. Nevertheless, Japan

continued to build nuclear power plants. Of alternative energy

sources, Japan has effectively exploited only geothermal energy.

The country had six geothermal power stations with a combined

capacity of 133,000 kilowatts per hour in 1989 (see table 19, Appendix).

Research and Development

As its economy matured in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan gradually shifted away from dependence on foreign research. Japan's

ability to conduct independent research and development became

a decisive factor in boosting the nation's competitiveness. As early

as 1980, the Science and Technology Agency, a component of the

229
Japan: A Country Study

Office of the Prime Minister, announced the commencement of

"the era ofJapan's technological independence." By 1986 Japan

had come to devote a higher proportion of its GNP to research and

development than the United States. In 1989 nearly 700,000

Japanese were engaged in research and development, more than

the number of French, Britons, and West Germans combined. At

the same time Japan was producing more engineers than any country except the Soviet Union and the United States. Similar trends were seen in the use of capital resources. Japan spent US$39. 1 bil- lion on government and private research and development in 1987,

equivalent to 2.9 percent of its national income (the highest ratio

in the world). Although the United States spent around US$108.2

billion on research and development in 1987, only 2.6 percent of

its income was devoted to that purpose, ranking it third behind

Japan and West Germany.

The Japanese reputation for originality also increased. Of the

1.2 million patents registered worldwide in 1985, 40 percent were

Japanese, and Japanese citizens took out 19 percent of the 120,000

patent applications made in the United States. In 1987, around

33 percent of computer-related patents in the United States were

Japanese, as were 30 percent of aviation-related and 26 percent

of communications patents.

Despite its advances in technological research and development

and its major commitment to applied research, however, Japan

significantly trailed other industrialized nations in basic scientific research. In 1989 around 13 percent ofJapanese research and development funds were devoted to basic research. The proportion

of basic research expenses borne by government was also much

lower in Japan than in the United States, as was Japan's ratio of

basic research expenses to GNP. In the late 1980s, the Japanese

government attempted to rectify national deficiencies in basic

research through a broad "originality" campaign in schools, generously funding research, and encouraging private cooperation in

various fields. Most research and development was private, although government support to universities and laboratories aided industry gready.

In 1986, private industry provided 76 percent of the funding for research and development, which was especially strong in the late 1980s in electrical machinery (with a ratio of research costs to total sales of 5.5 percent in 1986), precision instruments (4.6 percent),

chemicals (4.3 percent), and transportation equipment (3.2 percent).

As for government research and development, the national com- mitment to greater defense spending in the 1980s translated into

230
The Character and Structure of the Economy

increased defense-related research and development. Meanwhile,

government moved away from supporting large-scale industrial

technology, such as shipbuilding and steel. Research emphases in

the 1980s were in alternative energy, information processing, life sciences, and modern industrial materials.

Industry

The nation's industrial activities (including mining, manufacturing, and power, gas, and water utilities) contributed 46.6 of total domestic industrial production in 1989, up slightly from 45.8 per- cent in 1975. This steady performance of the industrial sector in

the 1970s and 1980s was a result of the growth of high-technology

industries (see table 20, Appendix). During this period, some of

the older heavy industries, such as steel and shipbuilding, either

declined or simply held stable. Together with the construction in- dustry, those older heavy industries employed 34.9 of the work force in 1989 (relatively unchanged from 34.8 percent in 1980). The ser- vice industry sector grew the fastest in the 1980s in terms of GNP,

while the greatest losses occurred in agriculture, forestry, mining,

and transportation. Most industry catered to the domestic market, but exports were important for several key commodities. In

general, industries relatively geared toward exports over imports

in 1988 were transportation equipment (with a 24.8 percent ratio

of exports over imports), motor vehicles (54 percent), electrical machinery (23.4 percent), general machinery (21.2 percent), and

metal and metal products (8.2 percent).

Industry was concentrated in several regions, which were in order

of importance: the Kanto region surrounding Tokyo, especially

the prefectures of Chiba, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Tokyo (the

Keihin industrial region); the Nagoya metropolitan area, including Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Shizuoka prefectures (the Chukyo-Tokai

industrial region); Kinki (the Keihanshin industrial region); the

southwestern part of Honshu and northern Shikoku around the

Inland Sea (the Setouchi industrial region); and the northern part

of Kyushu (Kitakyushu). In addition, a long narrow belt of industrial centers was found between Tokyo and Hiroshima, established

by particular industries, that had developed as mill towns. These

included Toyota City, near Nagoya, the home of the automobile

manufacturer.

The fields in which Japan enjoyed relatively high technological

development included semiconductor manufacturing, optical fibers,

optoelectronics, video discs and videotex, facsimile and copy machines, industrial robots, and fermentation processes. Japan lagged

slightly in such fields as satellites, rockets, and large aircraft, where

231
Japan: A Country Study

advanced engineering capabilities were required, and in such fields as computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing

(CAD/CAM), databases, and natural resources exploitation, where

basic software capabilities were required.

Basic Manufactures

Japan's major export industries included automobiles, consumer

electronics, computers, semiconductors, and iron and steel (see

Major International Industries, ch. 5). Additionally, key industries in Japan's economy were mining, nonferrous metals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, bioindustry, shipbuilding, aerospace,

textiles, and processed foods.

As the coal-mining industry declined, so did the general importance of domestic mining in the whole economy. Only 0.2 percent

of the labor force was engaged in mining operations in 1988, and

the value added from mining was about 0.3 percent of the total for all mining and manufacturing. Domestic production contributed

most to the supply of such nonmetals as silica sand, pyrophyllite

clay, dolomite, and limestone. Domestic mines were contributing

declining shares of the requirements for the metals zinc, copper,

and gold. Almost all of the ores used in the nation's sophisticated

processing industries were imported.

The nonferrous metals industry fared very well in the late 1980s,

as domestic demand for these metals reached record levels. Japan's

consumption of the main nonferrous metals, such as copper, lead,

zinc, and aluminum, was the second highest in the noncommunist

world after the United States. In 1989, sales of copper products

exceeded 1.5 million tons for the first time. Production of electric wire and cable, which accounted for 70 percent ofJapan's copper

demand, and brass mills, which use the other 30 percent, ex- perienced sharp growth, as did the demand for aluminum.

The petrochemical industry experienced moderate growth in the

late 1980s because of steady economic expansion. The highest

growth came in the production of plastics, polystyrene, and polypropylene. Prices for petrochemicals remained high because of in- creased demand in the newly developing economies of Asia, but

the construction of factory complexes to make ethylene-based

products in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Thailand

by 1990 was expected to increase supplies and reduce prices. In

the long term, the Japanese petrochemical industry was likely to face intensifying competition due to the integration of domestic and

international markets, and efforts by other Asian countries to catch

up with Japan.

232
The Character and Structure of the Economy

The pharmaceutical industry and bioindustry experienced strong

growth in the late 1980s. Pharmaceuticals production grew an es- timated 8 percent in 1989, because of increased expenditures by

Japan's rapidly aging population. Leading producers actively developed new drugs, such as those for degenerative and geriatric

diseases, while internationalizing operations. Pharmaceutical companies were establishing tripolar networks connecting Japan, the

United States, and Western Europe to coordinate product development. They also increased merger and acquisition activity overseas. Biotechnology research and development was progressing

steadily, including the launching of marine biotechnology projects,

with full-scale commercialization expected to take place in the early

1990s. Biotechnology research covered a wide variety of fields: agriculture, animal husbandry, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food

processing, and fermentation. Human hormones and proteins for pharmaceutical products were sought through genetic recombination using bacteria. Biotechnology also was used to enhance bacterial enzyme properties to further improve amino-acid fermentation

technology, a field in which Japan was the world leader. The government cautioned Japanese producers, however, against over- optimism regarding biotechnology and bioindustry. The research

race both in Japan and abroad intensified in the 1980s, leading

to patent disputes and forcing some companies to abandon research.

Also, researchers began to realize that such drug development continually showed new complexities, requiring more technical breakthroughs than first imagined. Yet despite these problems, research

and development, especially in leading companies, were still ex- pected to be successful and end in product commercialization in

the mid-term.

Japan dominated world shipbuilding in the late 1980s, filling more than half of all orders worldwide. Its closest competitors were

South Korea and Spain, with 9 percent and 5.2 percent of the market, respectively. Japan's shipyards replaced their West European

competitors as world leaders in production, through advanced design, fast delivery, and low production costs. The Japanese shipbuilding industry was hit by a lengthy recession from the late 1970s

through most of the 1980s, which resulted in a drastic cutback in

the use of facilities and in the work force, but there was a sharp

revival in 1989. The industry was helped by a sudden rise in demand from other countries that needed to replace their aging fleets and from a sudden decline in the South Korean shipping industry. In 1988 Japanese shipbuilding firms received orders for 4.8

million gross tons of ships, but this figure grew to 7.1 million tons

in 1989.

233
Japan: A Country Study

The aerospace industry received a major boost in 1969 with the

establishment of the National Space Development Agency, which was charged with the development of satellites and launch vehicles (see Telecommunications, this ch.). Japan's aircraft industry was only one-twentieth the size of that of the United States and

one-twelfth that of Western Europe, and its technological level lagged as well. However, in the late 1980s Japan began to participate in new international aircraft development projects as its technical capabilities developed. The Asuka fanjet-powered short takeoff

and landing (STOL) aircraft made a successful test flight in 1985.

In 1988 Japan signed an accord with the United States to cooperate in building Japan's next- generation fighter aircraft, the FSX

(see Defense Industry, ch. 8).

The textile industry showed a strong revival in the late 1980s

because of increased domestic demand from the construction, automobile, housing, and civil engineering industries for various synthetic fibers. The clothing industry also fared well in the late 1980s,

thanks to the expansion of consumer demand, especially in the area

of women's apparel. Production of high value-added fashionable

clothes became the mainstay of this industry.

The production value of the food industry ranked third among

manufacturing industries after electric and transport machinery.

It produced a great variety of products, ranging from traditional

Japanese items, such as soybean paste (miso) and soy sauce, to beer and meat. The industry as a whole experienced mild growth

in the 1980s, primarily from the development of such new products

as "dry beer" and precooked food, which was increasingly used

because of the tendency of family members to dine separately, the

trend toward smaller families, and convenience. A common fea- ture of all sectors of the food industry was their internationalization. As domestic raw materials lost their price competitiveness

following the liberalization of imports, food makers more often

produced foodstuffs overseas, promoted tie-ups with overseas firms,

and purchased overseas firms.

Domestic Trade and Services

The nation's service industries were the major contributor to GNP and employment, generating about 58 percent of the national

totals in 1987. Moreover, services were the fastest growing sector,

outperforming manufacturing in the 1980s. The service sector cov- ered many diverse activities. Wholesale and retail trade was

dominant, but advertising, data processing, publishing, tourism,

leisure industries, entertainment, and other industries grew rapidly

in the 1980s. Most service industries were small and labor-intensive,

234
The Character and Structure of the Economy

but became more technologically sophisticated as computer and

electronic products were incorporated by management.

The operation of wholesale and retail trades has often been

denigrated by other nations as a barrier to foreign participation

in the Japanese market, as well as being called antiquated and inefficient. Small retailers and "mom-and-pop" stores predominated.

In 1985 there were 1 .6 million retail outlets in Japan, slightly more

than the total number of retail outlets in the United States (1.5

million in 1982), even though Japan has only half the population

of the United States and is smaller than California.

There were several changes in wholesaling and retailing in the

1980s. Japan's distribution system was becoming more efficient. Retail outlets and wholesale establishments both peaked in number in 1982 and were down 5.4 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, in 1985. The main casualties were sole proprietorships,

especially mom-and-pop stores and wholesale locations with fewer

than ten employees. Almost 96,000 of the 1,036,000 mom-andpop stores in operation in 1982 were out of business three years

later. Government estimates for the late 1980s show additional consolidation in both wholesale and retail sectors, including a continued

sharp decline in mom-and-pop store operations. A further decline

in mom-and-pop stores was expected as a result of the Large-Scale

Retail Store Law of 1990, which greatly reduced the power of small

retailers to block the establishment of large retail stores. Soaring

land prices were a major cause of the decline of mom-and-pop

stores, but an even more important reason was the growth of con- venience and discount stores. Discount stores were not much bigger than the traditional small shops, but their distribution networks

gave them a big pricing edge. Moreover, Japanese consumers were

discovering the advantages of catalog shopping, which offered not

only convenience, but also greater selection and lower prices. According to a Nikkei survey, the mail-order business expanded 13

percent between April 1987 and March 1988 to more than US$8.9

billion in annual sales. Specialty chains, particularly those handling

men's and women's clothing, shoes, and consumer electronics, were

also doing better than the overall industry. Department stores, su- permarkets, and superstores (hybrid supermarket-discount stores)

and other big retail operations were gaining business at the expense

of small retailers, although their progress was quite slow. Between

1980 and 1988, department stores increased their share of total retail sales by only 1 percentage point to 8.4 percent. Supermarkets and

superstores increased in market share from 6.5 to 7.3 percent. Between 1980 and 1988, the number of department stores grew from

235
Japan: A Country Study

325 to just 371, and other big self-service stores only increased in

number by 62 units between 1984 and 1988.

Among service industries, the restaurant, advertising, real estate, hotel and leisure business, and data-processing industries grew

rapidly in the 1980s. The fast-food industry has been profitable

for both foreign and domestic companies. By 1989 family restau- rants and fast-food chains had grown into a US$138 billion business. Overall growth declined in the late 1980s because of the sharp

rise of rents and a proliferation of restaurants in many areas. The

number of hotel and guest rooms grew from 189,654 in 1981 to 342,695 in 1988.

Because much of the sales competition in Japan was of the nonprice variety, advertising was extremely important. Consumers had

to see the suitability of products and services for their lifestyles.

The intense competition for the domestic market spurred the growth

of the world's largest advertising agency, Dentsu, as well as other

advertisers.

Transportation and Communications

Railroads and Subways

Railroads were long the most important means of passenger and

freight transportation, ever since they were established in the late nineteenth century, but from the 1960s they were rivalled in usage

by road transportation (see Roads, this ch.; table 21, Appendix).

The relative share of railroads in total passenger-kilometers fell from

66.7 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1978, and to 37.1 percent

in 1987. By contrast, passenger cars and domestic airlines were

carrying ever-larger shares of the passenger traffic in the late 1980s

(see Civil Aviation, this ch.; table 22, Appendix).

At the heart of Japan's railroad system is the Japan Railways

Group, a government-subsidized group of eight companies that took over most of the assets, operations, and liabilities of the governmentowned Japanese National Railways in 1987. Initially, the companies remained in the public domain with privatization planned, at

least for some of the companies, by the early 1990s. There were

six passenger companies: the East Japan, West Japan, and Central

Japan railway companies, which operated in Honshu, and the

Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido railway companies, which operated on the islands for which the companies were named. In addition, the East Japan Railway Company, since the opening of the

Seikan Tunnel between Honshu and Hokkaido in 1988, also pro- vided express service to Sapporo. Similarly, the Central Japan Railway Company started serving Shikoku after the 1990 completion

236
A trunk line of the Japan Railways Group, opened in 1986

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

The Tokyo subway, one of the world's busiest metro systems

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

237
Japan: A Country Study

of the Seto-Ohashi bridges, a system of seven bridges linking Honshu

and Shikoku. The six companies had 18,800 kilometers of routes (mosdy 1.1-meter track) in use in the late 1980s. About 25 percent

of the routes were in double-track and multi-track sections, and the

rest were single-track. In 1988, 51 percent of the six companies'

1,000 locomotives were diesel and the rest were electric. Another

company, Japan Freight Railway Company, owned its locomotives

(295 diesel and 569 electric locomotives in 1988), rolling stock, and

stations but hired track from the six passenger companies. It ran

fewer trains on less track than Japanese National Railways freight

service did before its demise but at increased revenues and higher

productivity. The eighth company, the Shinkansen Property Corporation, leased Shinkansen ("bullet" train) railroad facilities

including 2,100 kilometers of 1.4-meter gauge high-speed track—to the passenger companies on Honshu. Some of the Shinkansen

electric-powered trains operated at speeds up to 240 kilometers per

hour.

Another nearly 3,400 kilometers of routes, mostly 1.1 -meter- gauge, were operated by major private railroads, and by what are known in Japan as third sector railroads—new companies, financed

with private and local government funds—that absorbed some of

Japanese National Railways' rural lines. There were twenty-seven

private and third sector companies in 1989.

What remained of the debt-ridden Japanese National Railways

after its 1987 breakup was named the Japanese National Railways

Setdement Corporation. Its purpose was to dispose of assets not absorbed by the successor companies and to execute other activities relating to the breakup, such as reemployment of former personnel. The demise of the government-owned system came after charges

of serious management inefficiencies, profit losses, and fraud. By

the early 1980s, passenger and freight business had declined, and

fare increases failed to keep up with higher labor costs. The new

companies introduced competition, cut their staffing, and made re- form efforts. Initial public reaction to these moves was good: the

combined passenger travel on the Japan Railways Group passenger

companies in 1987 was 204.7 billion passenger-kilometers, up 3.2

percent from 1986, while the passenger sector previously had been

stagnant since 1975. The growth in passenger transport of private

railroads in 1987 was 2.6 percent, which meant that the Japan Railways Group's rate of increase was above that of the private-sector

railroads for the first time since 1974. Demand for rail transport was improved, although it still accounted for only 37 percent of pas- senger transportation and only 5 percent of cargo transportation in

1987. Rail passenger transportation was superior to automobiles in

238
The Character and Structure of the Economy

terms of energy efficiency and on speed of long-distance transportation.

In addition to its extensive railroads, Japan has an impressive

number of subway systems. The largest was in Tokyo, where the

subway network in 1989 consisted of 21 1 kilometers of track serv- ing 205 stations. Two subway systems served the capital: one run by the Teito Rapid Transit Authority, with seven lines (the oldest

of which was built in 1927), and the other operated by the Tokyo

metropolitan government's Transportation Bureau, with three lines. Outlying and suburban areas were served by seven private rail- road companies whose lines intersected at major stations with the

subway system. More than sixty additional kilometers of subway

were under construction in 1990 by the two companies. As of 1989,

there also were full subway systems in Fukuoka, Kobe, Kyoto,

Nagoya, Osaka, Sendai,_and Yokohama. Hiroshima and Kobe had

light rail systems, and Osaka, in addition to its subway, had an

intermediate capacity transit system (rubber-tired motor cars run- ning on concrete guideways). Like Tokyo, all of these cities also were well served by public and private railroads.

Roads

Road passenger and freight transport expanded considerably during the 1980s as private ownership of motor vehicles greatly in- creased along with the quality and extent of the nation's roads.

Passenger transport by motor vehicles in 1987 totaled 540.7 bil- lion passenger-kilometers, up 8.2 percent over the previous year. The Japan Railways Group companies operated long-distance bus

service in the late 1980s on the nation's expanding expressway net- work. In addition to relatively low fares and deluxe seating, the

buses were well utilized because they continued service during the

night when air and train services were limited. The cargo sector

also grew rapidly in the 1980s, recording 224. 1 billion ton-kilometers

in 1987. The freight handled by motor vehicles, mainly trucks, in

1989, was over 5 billion tons, accounting for 90 percent of domestic freight tonnage and about 50 percent of ton-kilometers.

The total length of roads in Japan reached about 1 ,098,900 kilo- meters in 1987 (see fig. 6). Sixty-five percent of the roads were

paved, compared to only about 40 percent in 1978. Efforts to upgrade roads, however, have not kept up with increases in automobile ownership. In the late 1980s, many roads had reached a

saturation point and traffic jams were especially serious in large

urban areas. There was a vigorous government plan to improve

the situation by constructing an additional 14,000 kilometers of

239
Japan: A Country Study

highways in the 1990s. The 1988 opening of the Seto-Ohashi section

of the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge project provided a long-awaited

direct link between Honshu and relatively undeveloped Shikoku.

Maritime Transportation

In 1986 the Japanese merchant fleet included 10,011 ships with

a total displacement of 38.5 million gross tons, a steady decrease

from 10,425 ships with a total gross tonnage of 40.4 million in 1984.

Of the nearly 1 ,200 Japanese ships of 1,000 gross registered tons and over, there were more than 300 bulk carriers; more than 250

petroleum, oils, and lubricants tankers; some 240 vehicle and cargo

carriers; and more than 150 refrigerated cargo ships. The remainder were passenger and passenger-cargo ships, container ships, roll- on/roll-off cargo ships, chemical tankers, combination ore and oil carriers, and other specialized types of large ships.

Japanese ports, mainly Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kobe, received

40,129 ships in 1986, loaded 88.1 million tons of cargo, and unloaded 598.9 million tons. Other major ports included Chiba, Hakodate, Kitakyushu, Kushiro, Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokkaichi.

Almost all shipping operated from coastal ports. Japans' rivers were short and were unnavigable except in the lower reaches.

Civil Aviation

The civil aviation industry grew steadily during the 1980s, with

increased demand for both domestic and international services. In- creases in the number of passengers on each type of route reached more than 10 percent per year. Direct service was provided between the New Tokyo International Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka,

seventy kilometers northeast of Tokyo, and nearly every country

in the world via Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airways, and most

other international carriers. Tokyo International Airport at Haneda

and Osaka, Nagoya, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Kagoshima, and Naha

airports also handled some international flights in the late 1980s,

and the new Kansai International Airport was under construction

in Osaka Bay with a projected completion date of 1993. Japan

Airlines, All Nippon Airways, and Japan Air System also provided

connections between most major Japanese cities, and South-West

Air Lines operated scheduled flights to major islands in the Ryukyus.

In 1986 Japanese carriers served more than 53.6 million passengers. Although air cargo accounted for only for a small proportion of all cargo transported both domestically and internationally—approximately 3.5 trillion ton-kilometers in 1986—the rate of air cargo

growth was very high.

240

pacific

International boundary

® National capital • Populated place

Road

Railroad Major port 4* Airport

Occupied by the Soviet Union

since 1945, claimed by Japan

100 200 Kilometers 100 200 Miles
The Character and Structure of the Economy

Telecommunications

In 1990 no other nation in the world was as literate (with a liter- acy rate of 99 percent) and dominated by the mass media as Japan

(see Literature; Films and Television, ch. 3; The Mass Media and

Politics, ch. 6). Japan's telecommunications system is excellent both

in domestic and foreign service. The rapid spread of television sets in the 1960s, and advances in satellite communications in the 1970s,

which permitted rapid improvements in television broadcasting, were major postwar factors in Japan's new information society.

The broadcast industry has been dominated by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK) since its founding in 1925. It operated two public television and three radio

networks nationally, producing about 1,700 programs per week

in the late 1980s. Its general and education programs were broadcast through more than 6,900 television and nearly 330 AM and more than 500 FM radio transmitting stations. Comprehensive ser- vice in twenty-one languages was available throughout the world.

Although NHK's budget and operations are under the purview

of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Broadcasting Law of 1950 provides for independent management and programming by NHK.

Television broadcasting began in 1953, and color television was

introduced in 1960. Cable television was introduced in 1969. In

1978 an experimental broadcast satellite with two color television

channels was launched. Operational satellites for television use were

launched between 1984 and 1990. Television viewing spread so rapidly that, by 1987, 99 percent of Japan's households had color

television sets and the average family had its set on at least five hours a day. Starting in 1987, NHK began full-scale experimental broadcasting on two channels using satellite-to-audience signals, thus bringing service to remote and mountainous parts of the

country that earlier had experienced poor reception. The new sys- tem also provided twenty-four hours a day, nonstop service. In the late 1980s, Japan also had more than 100 commercial tele- vision companies, which operated more than 6,300 stations, and

the country had more than 140 commercial radio companies operating about 630 medium wave, short wave, and FM stations, in- cluding several national as well as many local stations. Broadcasting

innovations in the 1980s included sound multiplex (two-language

or stereo) broadcasting, satellite broadcasting, and in 1985 the

University of the Air and teletext services were inaugurated.

Rapid improvements, innovations, and diversification in communications technology, including optical fiber cables, communications satellites, and facsimile machines, led to rapid growth of

243



The Character and Structure of the Economy

Telecommunications

In 1990 no other nation in the world was as literate (with a liter- acy rate of 99 percent) and dominated by the mass media as Japan

(see Literature; Films and Television, ch. 3; The Mass Media and

Politics, ch. 6). Japan's telecommunications system is excellent both

in domestic and foreign service. The rapid spread of television sets in the 1960s, and advances in satellite communications in the 1970s,

which permitted rapid improvements in television broadcasting, were major postwar factors in Japan's new information society.

The broadcast industry has been dominated by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK) since its founding in 1925. It operated two public television and three radio

networks nationally, producing about 1,700 programs per week

in the late 1980s. Its general and education programs were broadcast through more than 6,900 television and nearly 330 AM and more than 500 FM radio transmitting stations. Comprehensive ser- vice in twenty-one languages was available throughout the world.

Although NHK's budget and operations are under the purview

of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Broadcasting Law of 1950 provides for independent management and programming by NHK.

Television broadcasting began in 1953, and color television was

introduced in 1960. Cable television was introduced in 1969. In

1978 an experimental broadcast satellite with two color television

channels was launched. Operational satellites for television use were

launched between 1984 and 1990. Television viewing spread so rapidly that, by 1987, 99 percent ofJapan's households had color

television sets and the average family had its set on at least five hours a day. Starting in 1987, NHK began full-scale experimental broadcasting on two channels using satellite-to-audience signals, thus bringing service to remote and mountainous parts of the

country that earlier had experienced poor reception. The new sys- tem also provided twenty-four hours a day, nonstop service.

In the late 1980s, Japan also had more than 100 commercial tele- vision companies, which operated more than 6,300 stations, and

the country had more than 140 commercial radio companies operating about 630 medium wave, short wave, and FM stations, in- cluding several national as well as many local stations. Broadcasting

innovations in the 1980s included sound multiplex (two-language

or stereo) broadcasting, satellite broadcasting, and in 1985 the

University of the Air and teletext services were inaugurated.

Rapid improvements, innovations, and diversification in communications technology, including optical fiber cables, communications satellites, and facsimile machines, led to rapid growth of

243
Japan: A Country Study

the communications industry in the 1980s. Nippon Telegraph and

Telephone Corporation, government-owned until 1985, had dominated the communications industry until April 1985, when new

common carriers, including Daini Denden, were permitted to enter

the field. Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company lost its monopoly hold on international communications activities in 1989, when Nihon

Kokusai Tsushin and other private overseas communications firms

began operations.

Japan's first satellite was launched in 1970, followed by subsequent launches of experimental and applications satellites in fields such as communications, broadcasting, meteorology, and earth observation. Satellites were launched from Japan's Tanegashima

Space Center on the island of Tanegashima in Kagoshima Prefecture. Japanese space scientists have successfully launched three H-I

rockets that accommodate a payload of 550 kilograms each. Japan

also cooperated with the United States, Western Europe, and Canada to construct an earth-orbiting space station. In 1990 a consor- tium of Japanese firms led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was

planning to enter the commercial rocket industry by the mid-1990s,

but unexpectedly high costs and the need to further improve the

H-II booster, the first rocket designed and developed entirely in

Japan, meant that Japanese commercial launch services would probably not begin until the late 1990s.

Japan's burgeoning high-technology communications system in- cluded the widespread use of telephones. In 1989 there were 64

million telephones in Japan, nearly one for every two people.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing dominated the Japanese econ- omy through the 1940s, but thereafter declined in relative importance. In the 1870s, these sectors accounted for more than 82 percent

of employment. Employment in agriculture declined in the prewar

period, but the sector was still the largest employer (about 50 per- cent of the work force) by the end of World War II. It further

declined to 23.5 percent in 1965, 11.9 percent in 1977, and to 8.3

percent in 1988. The importance of agriculture in the national econ- omy later continued its rapid decline, with the share of net agricultural production in GNP finally reduced between 1975 and 1989

from 4.1 to 3 percent. In the late 1980s, 85.5 percent of Japan's

farmers were also engaged in occupations outside of farming, and

most of these part-time farmers earned most of their income from

nonfarming activities (see table 23, Appendix).

Japan's economic boom that began in the 1950s left farmers far behind both in income and agricultural technology. Farmers were

244
The Character and Structure of the Economy

determined to close this income gap as quickly as possible. They

were attracted to the government's food control policy under which

high rice prices were guaranteed and farmers were encouraged to increase the output of any crops of their own choice. Farmers be- came mass producers of rice, even turning their own vegetable

gardens into rice fields. Their output swelled to over 14 million tons in the late 1960s, a direct result of greater cultivated acreage

and increased yield per unit area owing to improved cultivation

techniques.

Three types of farm households developed: those engaging exclusively in agriculture (14.5 percent of the 4.2 million farm households in 1988, down from 21.5 percent in 1965); those deriving more than half their income from the farm (14.2 percent, down

from 36.7 percent in 1965); and those mainly engaged in jobs other

than farming (71.3 percent, up from 41 .8 percent in 1965). As more

and more farm families turned to nonfarming activities, the farm

population declined (down from 4.9 million in 1975 to 4.8 million

in 1988). The rate of decrease slowed in the late 1970s and 1980s,

but the average age of farmers rose to fifty-one years by 1980, twelve

years older than the average industrial employee.

The most striking feature ofJapanese agriculture was the shortage of farmland. The 4.9 million hectares under cultivation constituted just 13.2 percent of the total land area in 1988. However,

the land was intensively cultivated. Rice paddies occupied most

of the countryside, whether on the alluvial plains, the terraced

slopes, or the swampland and coastal bays. Nonrice farmlands

shared such terraces and lower slopes and were planted with wheat

and barley in the autumn and with sweet potatoes, vegetables, and

dry rice in the summer. Intercropping was common: such crops were alternated with beans and peas. Japanese agriculture has been characterized as a "sick" sector because it must contend with a variety of constraints, such as the

rapidly diminishing availability of arable land and falling agricultural incomes. Nevertheless, the Japanese managed production at high levels. Agriculture was maintained through the use of technically advanced fertilizers and farm machinery, and a vast array

of price supports. The nation's many agricultural cooperatives were

in charge of purchasing grain according to prices indexed to the

average wage rates in the nonagricultural sector. As a result, rice,

wheat, and barley prices followed productivity trends in industry

rather than in agriculture. This type of support system, enacted

in 1960 along with the Basic Agricultural Law, resulted in large

government rice stockpiles and high agricultural prices. Excessive

rice production had an adverse effect on other crop production.

245
Japan: A Country Study

Japan's self-sufficiency ratio for grains other than rice fell below

10 percent in the 1970s and but rose to 14 percent in the mid- to

late 1980s. The problem of surplus rice was further aggravated by

extensive changes in the diets of many Japanese in the 1970s and

1980s. Even a major rice crop failure did not reduce the accumulated stocks by more than 25 percent of the reserve. In 1987, Japan

was 71 percent self-sufficient in food, but only provided about 30

percent of its cereals and fodder needs.

Livestock raising was a minor activity. Demand for beef rose strongly in the 1980s and farmers often shifted from dairy farming to production of high-quality (and high-cost) beef. Throughout the 1980s, domestic beef production met over 60 percent of

demand. In 1991, as a result of heavy pressure from the United

States, Japan ended import quotas on beef as well as citrus fruit (see Import Policies, ch. 5). Milk cows were numerous in Hokkaido,

where 25 percent of farmers ran dairies, but milk cows were also raised in Iwate, in Tohoku, and near Tokyo and Kobe. Beef cattle were mostly concentrated in western Honshu, and Kyushu.

Hogs, the oldest domesticated animals raised for food, were found

everywhere. Pork was the most popular meat.

The nation's forest resources, although abundant, had not been

well developed to sustain a large lumber industry. Of the 24.5 million hectares of forests, 19.8 million were classified as active forests. Most often forestry was a part-time activity for farmers or small

companies. About a third of all forests were owned by the government. Production was highest in Hokkaido and in Aomori, Iwate,

Akita, Fukushima, Gifu, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima prefectures.

Nearly 33.5 million cubic meters of roundwood were produced in

1986, of which 98 percent was destined for industrial uses. Japan was the world's largest fishing nation in tonnage of fish caught—12.5 million tons in 1987, up from 9.3 million tons in 1970

and 11.12 million tons in 1980. After the 1973 energy crisis, deepsea fishing in Japan declined, with the annual catch in the 1980s

averaging 2 million tons. Offshore fisheries accounted for an average

of 50 percent of the nation's total fish catches in the late 1980s,

although they experienced repeated ups and downs during that period. Coastal fisheries had smaller catches than northern sea fish- eries in 1986 and 1987. As a whole, Japan's fish catches registered a slower growth in the late 1980s. By contrast, Japan's import of

marine products increased greatly in the 1980s, surpassing 2 million tons in 1987. Japan also introduced the "culture and breed"

fishing system or sea farming. In this system, artificial insemination and hatching techniques are used to breed fish and shellfish,

246
Mechanized agriculture at harvesttime Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

which are then released into rivers or seas. These fish and shellfish are caught after they grow bigger. Salmon was one cultured fish. Japan is also one of the world's few whaling nations. As a member of the International Whaling Commission, the government

pledged that its fleets would restrict their catch to international

quotas, but it attracted international opprobrium for its failure to sign an agreement placing a moratorium on sperm whaling. Japan

has more than 2,000 fishing ports, including Nagasaki, in southwest Kyushu; Otaru, Kushiro, and Abashiri in Hokkaido; and

Yaezu and Misaki on the east coast of Honshu.

Living Standards

In general, Japanese consumers have benefited from the nation's

economic growth, while in turn they have stimulated the econ- omy through demand for sophisticated products, loyalty to domestically produced goods, and saving and pooling investment funds.

But personal disposable income has not risen as fast as the econ- omy as a whole in many years—at 1 percentage point less than

average GNP growth in the late 1980s. Despite the hard work and

sacrifice that have made Japan one of the wealthiest nations in the

world, some Japanese feel they are "a rich nation, but a poor people." Such a negative view of the economy was prompted by the

247
Japan: A Country Study

fact that the average consumer had to pay dearly for goods and

services that were much cheaper elsewhere.

Real household expenditures did rise during Japan's economic

growth. Living standards improved sharply in the 1970s and 1980s.

The share of total family living expenses devoted to food dropped

from 35 percent in 1970 to 27 percent in 1986, while net household savings, which averaged slightly over 20 percent in the

mid-1970s, averaged between 15 and 20 percent in the 1980s.

Japanese households thus had greater disposable income to pay for improved housing and other consumer items. The increase in dis- posable income partly explained the economic boom of the 1980s,

which was pushed by explosive domestic demand.

Japanese income distribution in the 1980s, both before and after taxes, was among the most equitable in the world. An important

factor in income distribution was that the lower income group was

better off than in most industrialized countries.

Japanese homes, although they were relatively new, were much

smaller and often had fewer amenities than those in other industrialized nations. Even though the percentage of residences with

flush toilets jumped from 31.4 percent in 1973 to 65.8 percent in

1988, this figure was still far lower than in other industrialized states. In some primarily rural areas of Japan, it was still under 30 percent. Even 9.7 percent of homes built between 1986 and 1988 did

not have flush toilets. People in other industrialized countries took

central heating and either a shower or bath for granted, but many

Japanese homes were lacking in all three. However, by 1988 only

9 percent ofJapanese residences had no bathtub, a figure that had

improved from nearly 27 percent in 1973. The alternative for many

Japanese remained public baths, although these were gradually dis- appearing. Additionally, 81 percent of Japanese households used

kerosene heaters as the main source of heat.

Japanese housing in the early 1990s was very expensive relative

to annual income, but the high cost was somewhat offset by low

interest rates and probable future income gains, making Japanese

housing more affordable than it might appear. There were also many urban apartments found near public transportation that

rented for as little as US$600 to US$800 a month in early 1990.

The Westernization of many areas ofJapanese life included con- suming a greater diversity of foods. After World War II, Japanese

dietary patterns changed radically and came to resemble those of

the West. While older Japanese still preferred a breakfast with tradi- tional dishes—boiled rice, miso soup, and pickled vegetables

younger Japanese had toast and coffee. The Japanese diet improved

along with other living standards. Average intake per day was 2,084

248
With more than 5 million units in use, vending machines have

become a ubiquitous feature ofJapanese daily life. Courtesy Kenji Nachi and Hitachi

calories and 77.9 grams of protein, in the late 1980s. Of total protein intake, 26.5 percent came from cereals (including 18.4 per- cent from rice), 9.6 percent from pulses, 23.1 percent from fish,

14.8 percent from livestock products, 11 percent from eggs and

milk, and 15 percent from other sources. Before World War II, the average annual consumption of rice was 1 40 kilograms per capita, but it fell to 72 kilograms in 1987. This development further

exacerbated the problem of rice oversupply, leading to a huge rice stock and creating great deficits in the government's foodstuff control account. The government inaugurated several policies to switch

to nonrice crops, but they met with limited success and rice re- mained in oversupply.

A negative aspect ofJapan's economic growth was industrial pollution. Until the mid-1970s, both public and private sectors pursued economic growth with such single-mindedness that prosperity was accompanied by severe degradation of both the environment

and quality of life (see Pollution, ch. 2). Typically, Japanese consumers have been savers as well as buyers, partly because of habit, but by 1980 the consumer credit in- dustry began to flourish. Younger families were particularly prone

to take on debt. Housing was the largest single item for which

249
Japan: A Country Study

consumers contracted loans. In 1989 families annually borrowed

an estimated US$17,000 or about 23 percent of their average savings. Those who wished to buy houses and real estate needed an

average US$242,600, of which they borrowed about US$129,000.

But many younger families in the 1980s were giving up the idea

of ever buying a house. This change led many young Japanese to spend part of their savings on trips abroad, expensive consumer

items, and other luxuries. As one young worker put it, "If I can

never buy a house, at least I can use my money to enjoy life now.

'

As credit card and finance agency facilities expanded, the use of

credit to procure other consumer durables was spreading. By 1989

the number of credit cards issued in Japan reached virtual parity

with the population.

Japanese families still feel that saving for retirement is critical because of the relative inadequacy of official social security and

private pension plans. The average family in 1989 had US$76,500

in savings, a figure far short of what was needed to cover the liv- ing expenses for retired individuals, although official pensions and

retirement allowances did help cover the financial burdens of senior

citizens. The annual living expenses for retired individuals in 1989 were estimated at US$22,800, half of which was received from

government pensions and the rest from savings and retirement al- lowances. Senior citizens in their seventies had the largest savings,

including deposits, insurance, and negotiable securities worth an

estimated US$1 13,000 per person. In 1989 individuals in their twenties had savings amounting to US$23,800, while salaried workers

in their thirties had US$66,000 in savings.

The Japanese consumer benefited most from the availability of

compact, sophisticated consumer products that were popular exports. Television sets, watches, clothing, automobiles, household

appliances, and personal computers were quality items that industry

provided in quantity. In the late 1980s, virtually every Japanese

family had one or more television sets, a washing machine, a

refrigerator, small space heaters, and cameras. Sixty percent of

Japanese homes in 1989 had air conditioning of some kind. Other

popular items in the 1980s included electric ranges, video cassette recorders, video cameras, compact disc players, and personal computers. Most families had an automobile.

It is difficult to make cross-cultural comparisons, but one Japanese social scientist ranked Japan among a group of ten other in- dustrialized nations according to a variety of variables. In this comparison, for which there is data from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, Japan was better than average in terms of overall income

distribution, per capita disposable income, traffic safety and crime,

250
The Character and Structure of the Economy

life expectancy and infant mortality, proportion of owner-occupied

homes, work stoppages and labor unrest, worker absenteeism, and

air pollution. Japan was below average for wage differentials by

gender and firm size, labor's share of total manufacturing income,

social security and unemployment benefits, weekly workdays and

daily work hours, overall price of land and housing, river pollution, sewage facilities, and recreational park areas in urban centers. Some of these variables, especially pollution and increased leisure

time, improved in the 1980s, and, in general, living standards in

Japan were comparable to those of the world's wealthiest economies.

* * * There are numerous excellent works on the Japanese economy

from a variety of perspectives. Studies charting the nation's modernization from the prewar era include William W. Lockwood's The

State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, G. C. Allen's Japan's Eco- nomic Policy, and Allen's A Short Economic History of Modern Japan.

The best source for prewar data is Patterns ofJapanese Economic Development, edited by Ohkawa Kazushi and Miyohei Shinohara.

Among general works on the postwar economy are Asia 's New Giant,

edited by Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, and TheJapanese Eco- nomic System, by Haitani Kanji. Both works are out of date, but

give an accurate appraisal of the Japanese economy through the

1970s. More up-to-date works include The Political Economy ofJapan,

edited by Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, Frank Gibney's

Miracle by Design, Daniel A. Metraux's The Japanese Economy and

the American Businessman, EdwardJ. Lincoln'sJapan: Facing Economic

Maturity, and Kunio Yoshihara's Japanese Economic Development.

Rodney Clark's The Japanese Company is an excellent summary of

research on the Japanese corporate system and labor-management

relations. Some of the better books on Japanese management and

labor include Michael A. Cusumano's The Japanese Automobile Industry, W. Mark Fruin's Kikkoman: Company, Clan, and Community,

R. P. Dore's classic, British Factory, Japanese Factory, Andrew Gordon's

The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan, and Taishiro Shirai's Contemporary Industrial Relations in Japan. An excellent study of government-business relations is found in Industrial Policy ofJapan, edited

by Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno, and Kotaro Suzumura. An

equally comprehensive work is Chalmers Johnson's MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Excellent coverage ofJapan's financial and corporate

worlds is found in Robert J. Ballon and Iwao Tomita's The Financial Behavior ofJapanese Corporations, Aron Viner's InsideJapan

3s Financial Markets, and James C. Abeggleu and George Stalk, Jr.' s Kaisha:

251
Japan: A Country Study

TheJapanese Corporation. The Japan Statistical Yearbook produced by

Japan's Management and Coordination Agency provides up-todate statistics. For up-to-date and sophisticated analyses, see the

publications of the Washington-based Japan Economic Institute

of America (JEI). Regular JEI publications include the monthly

Japan Economic Survey and the weekly JEI Report. For a Japanese

perspective on the economy, see articles in the English-language

Japan EconomicJournal, Journal ofJapanese Trade &Industry, Mitsubishi

Bank Review, Japan Times Weekly, Japan Echo, and The Japan Eco- nomic Review [all published in Tokyo] . There are frequent articles on the Japanese economy in Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong

Kong] and Asian Survey. (For further information and complete ci- tations, see Bibliography).

252
Chapter 5. International Economic Relations
Family crest using bamboo (take) leaves and stems, symbols of endurance

and resilience
JAPAN IS BOTH a major trading nation and one of the largest

international investors in the world. In many respects, international

trade is the lifeblood of Japan's economy, and it is the window

through which most people in the United States view Japan. Imports and exports totaling the equivalent of US$452 billion in 1988

meant that Japan was the world's third largest trading nation after the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Trade was once the primary form ofJapan's international

economic relationships, but in the 1980s, its rapidly rising foreign

investments added a new and increasingly important dimension,

broadening the horizons ofJapanese businesses and giving Japan

new world prominence.

Japan's international economic relations in the first three decades after World War II were shaped largely by two factors: a

relative lack of domestic raw materials and a determination to catch

up with the industrial nations of the West. Because ofJapan's lack

of raw materials, its exports have consisted almost exclusively of

manufactured goods, and raw materials have represented a large

share of its imports. The country's sense of dependency and vulnerability has also been strong because of its lack of raw materials.

Japan's determination to catch up with the West encouraged policies to move away from simple labor-intensive exports toward more

sophisticated export products (from textiles in the 1950s to automobiles and consumer electronics in the 1980s), and pursue protectionist policies to limit foreign competition for domestic industries.

The sense of dependence on imported raw materials was especially strong in Japan during the 1970s, when crude petroleum and

other material prices rose and supply was uncertain. Throughout

much of the postwar period, in fact, Japanese government policy

has aimed at generating sufficient exports to pay for raw material

imports. During the 1980s, however, raw material prices fell and

the feeling of vulnerability lessened. The 1980s also brought rapidly

rising trade surpluses, so that Japan could export far more than was needed to balance its imports. With these developments, some

of the resistance to manufactured imports, long considered luxuries in the relative absence of raw materials, began to dissipate.

By the 1980s, Japan had caught up. Now an advanced industrial nation, it faced new changes in its economy, on both domestic and international fronts, including demands to supply more

foreign aid and to open its markets for imports. It had become a

255
Japan: A Country Study

leader in the international economic system, through its success

in certain export markets, its leading technologies, and its growth

as a major investor around the world. These were epochal changes

for Japan, after a century in which the main national motivation was to catch up with the West. These dramatic changes also fed

domestic developments that were lessening the society's insularity

and parochialism.

The processes through which Japan was becoming a key member of the international economic community were expected to continue in the 1990s—productivity continued to grow at a healthy

pace, the country's international leadership in a number of industries remained unquestioned, and investments abroad continued

to expand. Pressures were likely to lead to further openness to imports, increased aid to foreign countries, and involvement in the

running of major international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary). As Japan achieved

a more prominent international position during the 1980s, it also generated considerable tension with its trade partners, and especially with the United States. These tensions will likely remain,

but should be manageable as both sides continue to see economic

benefits from the relationship.

Postwar Development

After the end of World War II, Japan's economy was in a shambles, and its international economic relations almost completely dis- rupted. Initially, imports were limited to essential food and raw

materials, mostly financed by economic assistance from the United

States. Because of extreme domestic shortages, exports did not begin

to recover until the Korean War (1950-53), when special procurement by United States armed forces created boom conditions in

indigenous industries. By 1954 economic recovery and rehabilitation were essentially complete. For much of the 1950s, however,

Japan had difficulty exporting as much as it imported, leading to chronic trade and current account deficits. Keeping these deficits under control, so that Japan would not be forced to devalue its currency under the Bretton Woods System (see Glossary) of fixed

exchange rates that prevailed at the time, was a primary concern

of government officials. Stiff quotas and tariffs on imports were

part of the policy response. By 1960, Japan accounted for 3.6 per- cent of all exports of noncommunist countries.

During the 1960s, the dollar value of exports grew at an aver- age annual rate of 16.9 percent, more than 75 percent faster than

the average rate of all noncommunist countries. By 1970 exports

had risen to nearly 6.9 percent of all noncommunist-world exports.

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International Economic Relations

The rapid productivity growth in manufacturing industries made

Japanese products more competitive in world markets at the fixed

exchange rate for the yen (for value of the yen—see Glossary) during

the decade, and the chronic deficits that the nation faced in the

1950s had disappeared by the middle of the 1970s. International

pressure to dismantle quota and tariff barriers mounted, and Japan

began moving in this direction.

The 1970s brought major, wrenching changes for Japan's ex- ternal relations. The decade began with the end of the fixed ex- change rate for the yen (a change brought about mainly by rapidly

rising Japanese trade and current account surpluses) and with a

strong rise in the value of the yen under the new system of floating

rates. Japan also faced sharply higher bills for imports of energy

and other raw materials. The new exchange rates and the rise in raw material prices meant that the surpluses of the decade's beginning were lost, and large trade deficits followed in the wake of

the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979. Expanding the country's

exports remained a priority in the face of these raw material supply shocks, and during the decade exports continued to expand at a high annual average rate of 2 1 percent (see Balance of Merchandise Trade, this ch.).

Most of the concerns of the 1970s diminished in the 1980s. Oil

and other raw material prices fell dramatically, and Japan's trade

deficits turned quickly to enormous trade surpluses by the middle

of the decade. In response to these surpluses, the value of the yen

rose against that of other currencies in the last half of the decade,

but the surpluses proved surprisingly resilient to this change. The

large surpluses, combined with foreign perceptions that Japan's

import markets were still relatively closed, exacerbated tension

between Japan and a number of its principal trading partners, es- pecially the United States. A rapid increase in imports of manufactured goods after 1987 eased some of these tensions, but as the

decade ended friction still continued.

Through most of the postwar period, foreign investment was not a significant part ofJapan's external economic relations. Both in- ward and outward investments were carefully controlled by government regulations, which kept the investment flows small. These

controls applied to direct investment in the creation of subsidiaries

under the control of a parent company, portfolio investment, and

lending. Controls were motivated by the desire to prevent foreigners

(mainly Americans) from gaining ownership of the economy when

Japan was in a weak position after World War II, and by concerns over the balance of payments deficits (see Capital Flows, this ch.).

Beginning in the late 1960s, these controls were gradually loosened,

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Japan: A Country Study

and the process of deregulation accelerated and continued throughout the 1980s. The result was a dramatic increase in capital movements, with the biggest change occurring in outflows—investments

by Japanese in other countries. By the end of the 1980s, Japan had

become a major international investor. Because the country was

a newcomer to the world of overseas investment, this development

led to new forms of tension with other countries, including criti- cism of highly visible Japanese acquisitions in the United States and elsewhere.

Trade and Investment Institutions

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry

Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)

was formed in 1949 from the union of the Trade Agency and the

Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in an effort to curb postwar

inflation and provide government leadership and assistance for the

restoration of industrial productivity and employment.

MITI has held primary responsibility for formulating and implementing international trade policy, although it has done so by

seeking a consensus among interested parties, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance (see The Role

of Government and Business, ch. 4). MITI has also coordinated

trade policy with the Economic Planning Agency, the Bank of

Japan, and the ministries of agriculture, forestry and fisheries,

health and welfare, construction, transportation, and posts and

telecommunications on issues affecting their interests. As trade is- sues broadened in scope, these other ministries became more important in international negotiating, so that in the late 1980s MITI

had less control in formulating international trade policy than it had had in the 1950s and 1960s. The prime minister, the National

Diet (Japan's legislature), and the Fair Trade Commission have

also circumscribed MITI's operations.

MITI has been responsible not only in the areas of exports and

imports, but also for all domestic industries and businesses not specifically covered by other ministries, for investments in plant and

equipment, pollution control, energy and power, some aspects of

foreign economic assistance, and consumer complaints. This span

has allowed MITI to integrate conflicting policies, such as those on pollution control and export competitiveness, to minimize damage to export industries.

MITI has served as an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter on industrial problems and disputes, and a regulator. A major

objective of the ministry has been to strengthen the country's

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International Economic Relations

industrial base. It has not managed Japanese trade and industry

along the lines of a centrally planned economy, but it has provided

industries with administrative guidance and other direction, both

formal and informal, on modernization, technology, investments

in new plants and equipment, and on domestic and foreign competition.

The close relationship between MITI and Japanese industry has

led to foreign trade policy that often complements the ministry's

efforts to strengthen domestic manufacturing interests. MITI facili- tated the early development of nearly all major industries by providing protection from import competition, technological intelligence,

help in licensing foreign technology, access to foreign exchange,

or assistance in mergers.

These policies to promote domestic industry and to protect it from international competition were strongest in the 1950s and

1960s. As industry became stronger and as MITI lost some of its policy tools, such as control over allocation of foreign exchange,

MITFs policies also changed. The success ofJapanese exports and

the tension it has caused in other countries led MITI to provide

guidance on limiting exports of particular products to various countries. Starting in 1981, MITI presided over the establishment of

voluntary restraints on automobile exports to the United States, to allay criticism from American manufacturers and their unions.

Similarly, MITI was forced to liberalize import policies, despite

its traditional protectionist focus. During the 1980s, the ministry

helped to craft a number of market-opening and import-promoting

measures, including the creation of an import promotion office within the ministry. The close relationship between MITI and in- dustry allowed the ministry to play such a role in fostering more

open markets but conflict remained between the need to open markets and the desire to continue promoting new and growing domestic industries.

The Japan External Trade Organization

The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) was established by MITI in 1958 to consolidate Japan's efforts in export pro- motion. The government has provided more than half ofJETRO's annual operating budget. As of 1989, JETRO maintained seventyeight offices in fifty-seven countries, as well as thirty offices in Japan,

with a total staff of 1,200.

Initially, JETRO's activities focused mainly on promoting ex- ports to other countries. As exporters established themselves in

world markets and the balance of trade turned from deficit to surplus, however, JETRO's role shifted to encompass more varied

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Japan: A Country Study

activities. These have included the furtherance of mutual understanding with trading partners, import promotion, liaison between

small businesses in Japan and their overseas counterparts, and data

dissemination. Import promotion services have included publications, promotion of trade fairs, seminars, and trade missions.

Trading Companies

A majorJapanese innovation in international trade has been the

development of large integrated general trading companies. These

corporations were first organized during the late nineteenth century as part of the effort to replace the foreign companies dominating

Japan's trade and to provide foreign marketing services to Japanese

firms unfamiliar with the outside world.

At first, trading companies acted as specialized wholesalers for Japanese manufacturers in domestic and foreign markets and

bought raw materials and other inputs for manufacturing operations. Later, trading companies also served as financial intermediaries, absorbed foreign exchange risk for their customers, provided

technical advice to small firms whose products might be exported,

and engaged in direct investment overseas, often to secure stable sources of supply.

After World War II, the trading companies developed some third- country trade, some of which did not involve Japanese products

or firms. Such transactions included arranging for the sale of a United States chemical plant to the Soviet Union and importing

Romanian urea into Bangladesh. By 1988, such offshore trade ac- counted for almost 20 percent of total sales of the nine largest trading

companies in Japan.

In the 1980s, several thousand trading companies existed in

Japan. The top nine companies, however, accounted for the bulk

of the transactions. In fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1988, C. Itoh

led with sales of ¥15.6 trillion, followed by Mitsui (¥14.8 trillion),

Sumitomo (¥14.6 trillion), Marubeni (¥14.2 trillion), and Mitsubishi (¥13.8 trillion). Others in the top nine were Nissho Iwai,

Tomen, Nichimen, and Kanematsu-Gosho. These companies were

very important in Japan's foreign trade: in 1988 they together handled 42 percent of exports and 74 percent of imports.

These companies were best at handling large-volume bulk

products, such as raw materials. They faced some difficulties in

the 1970s and 1980s with fluctuations in international raw material markets, but they continued to play a very important role in

Japan's international trade. During the 1980s, they increasingly

acted through direct investment.

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International Economic Relations

Financial Institutions

For most of the postwar period, Japan's financial institutions

operated in a severely regulated environment: most interest rates were controlled, the type of business these institutions could en- gage in was narrowly circumscribed, and few international trans- actions were possible. Beginning in the 1970s, these controls began

to loosen, and financial institutions rapidly expanded their international activities. By the end of the 1980s, they were major international players.

The major international players were "city" banks (the thirteen

largest banks in Japan, which operated nationwide branches), in- vestment houses, and life insurance companies, which invested

heavily in pension funds abroad in the 1980s (see The Financial

System, ch. 4). In 1988, the nine largest banks in the world, measured by total assets, were Japanese banks. These banks opened

branches abroad, acquired existing foreign banks, and became en- gaged in new activities, such as underwriting Euro-yen bond is- sues. The investment houses also increased overseas activities,

especially participating in the United States Treasury bond market (where as much as 25 to 30 percent of each new issue was purchased by Japanese investors in the late 1980s). The life insurance

companies moved heavily into foreign investments as deregulation

allowed them to do so and as their resources increased through the

spread of fully funded pension funds.

As of March 1989, the five largest city banks in Japan (in order

of total fund volume) were Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Sumitomo Bank,

Fuji Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, and Sanwa Bank. The four largest

investment houses, which dominated the securities business, were Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and Yamaichi.

Besides these private institutions, there were a number of government-owned financial institutions in the late 1980s. Of these,

the Japan Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) was the only one with an international focus. The Exim Bank provided financing for trade

between Japan and developing countries, performing the function

of export-import banks run by governments in other countries (including the United States), although its participation was possibly

greater.

As Japan became a more important international financial power,

Tokyo became a world financial center. In April 1989, the aver- age daily volume of transactions in the Tokyo foreign exchange

market was US$115 billion, not far behind the US$129 billion in

New York. The Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange also rivaled

the New York Stock Exchange in daily volume, overtaking New

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Japan: A Country Study

York in 1988 to become the world's largest stock exchange in terms

of the combined market value of outstanding shares and capitalization.

Foreign Aid Institutions In 1990 Japan had three government institutions involved in dis- bursing foreign aid: the Japan International Cooperation Agency

QICA), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and

the Exim Bank. JICA was responsible for technical cooperation;

the OECF was responsible for soft loans; and the Exim Bank had

not only a trade-financing role but also became increasingly in- volved in lending for aid programs. The Exim Bank, for example, was the government agency chosen to carry out US$10 billion in

cofinancing with the World Bank (see Glossary) and IMF in the

1989 Brady Plan for partial relief of Mexico's international debt.

International Trade and Development Institutions

Japan was a member of the United Nations (UN), IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),

and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—see Glossary). It also participated in the international organizations focusing on economic development, including the World Bank and the

Asian Development Bank.

As a member of the IMF and World Bank, for example, Japan

played a role in the effort during the 1980s to address the international debt crisis brought on by the inability of certain developing

countries to service their foreign debts as raw material prices fell and their economies stagnated. As a member of the IMF, Japan

also cooperated with other countries in moderating the short-run

volatility of the yen and participated in discussions on strengthening the international monetary system.

Japan's membership in the OECD has constrained its foreign

economic policy to some extent. When Japan joined the OECD

in 1966, it was obliged to agree to OECD principles on capital liber- alization, an obligation that led Japan to begin the process of liber- alizing its many tight controls on investment flows into and out

of Japan. Japan was also a participant in the OECD's "gentlemen's agreement" on guidelines for government-supported export

credits, which placed a floor on interest rates and other terms for loans to developing countries from government-sponsored exportimport banks.

GATT has provided the basic structure through which Japan

has negotiated detailed international agreements on import and

262
A Japanese tuna-fishing ship on the open sea Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

export policies. Although Japan had been a member of GATT since

1955, it retained reservations to some GATT articles, permitting

it to keep in place stiff quota restrictions until the early 1960s. Japan

took its GATT obligations seriously, however, and a number of

American disputes with Japan over its import barriers were successfully resolved by obtaining GATT rulings, with which Japan

complied. Japan also negotiated bilaterally with countries on eco- nomic matters of mutual interest. The international organization with the strongest Japanese pres- ence has been the Asian Development Bank, the multilateral lending

agency established in 1966 that made soft loans to developing Asian

countries. Japan and the United States have had the largest vot- ing rights in the Asian Development Bank and Japan has traditionally filled the presidency.

As Japan became a greater international financial power in the

1980s, its role in financing these trade and development institu- tions grew. Previously, the government had been a very quiet participant in these organizations, but as its financial role increased,

pressure to expand voting rights and play a more active policy role mounted. By the end of the 1980s, Japan's voting rights in the

World Bank had increased, and discussions were proceeding on

a similar change in the IMF.

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Japan: A Country Study

Foreign Trade Policies

Export Policies

For many years, export promotion was a large issue in Japanese

government policy. Government officials recognized that Japan

needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed to generate

exports to pay for those imports. After the war, Japan had difficulty

exporting enough to pay for its imports until the mid-1960s, and

resulting deficits were the justification for export promotion programs and import restrictions.

The belief in the need to promote exports was strong and part

of Japan's self-image as a "processing nation." A processing nation must import raw materials, but is able to pay for the imports

by adding value to them and exporting some of the output. Nations grow stronger economically by moving up the industrial ladder to produce products with greater value added to the basic inputs.

Rather than letting markets accomplish this movement on their

own, the Japanese government felt the economy should be guided

in this direction through industrial policy.

Japan's methods of promoting exports took two paths. The first was to develop world-class industries that could initially substitute

for imports and then compete in international markets. The sec- ond was to provide incentives for firms to export.

During the first two decades after World War II, export incentives took the form of a combination of tax relief and government

assistance to build export industries. After joining the IMF in 1964,

however, Japan had to drop its major export incentive—the total exemption of export income from taxes—to comply with IMF proce- dures. It did maintain into the 1970s, however, special tax treat- ment of costs for market development and export promotion.

Once chronic trade deficits came to an end in the mid-1960s,

the need for export promotion policies diminished. Virtually all export tax incentives were eliminated over the course of the 1970s.

Even JETRO, whose initial function was to assist smaller firms

with overseas marketing, saw its role shift toward import promotion and other activities. In the 1980s, Japan continued to use in- dustrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated

industries, but direct export promotion measures were no longer

part of the policy package.

The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain

exports in certain industries. The great success of some Japanese

export industries created a backlash in other countries, either be- cause of their success per se or because of allegations of unfair

competitive practices. Under GATT guidelines, nations have been

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International Economic Relations

reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import quotas—quotas violate

the guidelines and raising tariffs goes against the general trend

among industrial nations. Instead, they have resorted to convincing the exporting country to "voluntarily" restrain exports of the

offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry

out such export restraints. Among Japan's exports to the United

States, steel, color television sets, and automobiles all were subject to such restraints at various times.

Import Policies

Japan began the postwar period with heavy import barriers. Virtually all products were subject to government quotas, many faced

high tariffs, and MITI had authority over the allocation of the for- eign exchange companies needed to pay for any import. These poli- cies were justified at the time by the weakened position ofJapanese

industry and the country's chronic trade deficits. By the late 1950s, Japan's international trade had regained its prewar level, and its balance of payments displayed sufficient

strength for its rigid protectionism to be increasingly difficult to

justify. The IMF and GATT strongly pressured Japan to free its commerce and international payments system. Beginning in the

1960s, the government adopted a policy of gradual trade liberali- zation, easing import quotas, reducing tariff rates, freeing trans- actions in foreign exchange, and admitting foreign capital into

Japanese industries, which has continued through the 1980s.

The main impetus for change throughout has been international

obligation, response to foreign, rather than domestic, pressure. The

result has been a prolonged, reluctant process of reducing barriers,

which has frustrated many of Japan's trading partners.

Japan has been a participant in the major rounds of tariff-cutting

negotiations under the GATT framework—the Kennedy Round

completed in 1967, the Tokyo Round completed in 1979, and the

Uruguay Round, which began in the 1980s and was scheduled for completion in 1990. As a result of these agreements, tariffs in Japan

fell to a low level on average. Upon complete implementation of

the Tokyo Round agreement, Japan had the lowest average tariff level among industrial countries—2.5 percent, compared with 4.2

percent for the United States and 4.6 percent for the European

Community.

Japan's quotas also dropped. From 490 items under quota in

1962, Japan had only 27 items under quota in the mid-1980s, and

that number dropped again late in the decade to 22 with further

agreements scheduled to come into effect in the early 1990s, which

would reduce the number again. But those products still under

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Japan: A Country Study

quota proved to be highly visible and were the object of complaints

by exporting countries. The reduction of controlled items in the

late 1980s resulted from Japan's loss of a GATT case brought by

the United States concerning import restrictions on twelve agricultural products. In addition, heavy pressure from the United States led to an agreement that Japan would end import quotas on beef

and citrus fruit in 1991. The one restricted product that continued

to prompt objections from other countries at the end of the decade was rice, imports of which were prohibited. Rice has traditionally

been the mainstay of the Japanese diet, and farm organizations

have played upon the theme's deep cultural importance as a rea- son for prohibiting imports. Farm organizations also have a dis- proportionate political voice because of the shift of the population

to the cities without any significant redistricting for seats in the

Diet (see The Electoral System, ch. 6). Even on rice, however, it appeared by 1990 that political forces were moving, under foreign

pressure, in the direction of a gradually opening to trade.

Despite Japan's rather good record on tariffs and quotas, it con- tinued to be the target of complaints and pressure from its trading

partners during the 1980s. Many complaints revolved around nontariff barriers other than quotas—standards, testing procedures,

government procurement, and other policies that could be used

to restrain imports. These barriers, by their very nature, were often

difficult to document, but complaints were frequent.

In 1984 the United States government initiated intensive talks with Japan on four product areas: forest products, telecommunications equipment and services, electronics, and pharmaceuticals

and medical equipment. The Market Oriented Sector Selective

(MOSS) talks aimed at routing out all overt and informal barriers

to imports in these areas. The negotiations lasted throughout 1985

and achieved modest success. Supporting the view that Japanese markets remained difficult to penetrate, statistics showed that the level of manufactured imports

in Japan as a share of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) was still far below the level in other developed countries during the

1980s. Frustration with the modest results of the MOSS process and

similar factors led to provisions in the United States Trade Act of

1988 aimed at Japan. Under the "Super 301" provision, nations were to be named as unfair trading partners and specific

products chosen for negotiation, as appropriate, with retaliation

against the exports of these nations should negotiations fail to provide

satisfactory results. Japan was named an unfair trading nation in 1989, and negotiations began on forest products, supercomputers,

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International Economic Relations

and telecommunications satellites (see United States and Canada,

this ch.).

By the end of the 1980s, however, some internally generated

changes in import policy appeared to be under way in Japan. The

rapid appreciation of the yen after 1985, which made imports more

attractive, stimulated a domestic debate over nontariff barriers and

other structural features of the economy impeding imports. Greater

openness in policies and structures began to be sought in response

to domestic pressures rather than in response to foreign pressure

and international obligation.

External pressure for change also increased when the United

States initiated a series of bilateral talks in 1989 parallel to negotiations under the "Super 301" provision. These new talks, known

as the Structural Impediments Initiative, focused on structural fea- tures in Japan that seemed to impede imports in ways outside the

normal scope of trade negotiations. Issues raised in the Structural

Impediments Initiative, and by the Japanese themselves in domestic

discussions, included the distribution system (in which manufacturers continued to have unusually strong control over wholesalers

and retailers handling their products, inhibiting newcomers, es- pecially foreign ones) and investment behavior that made it very

difficult for foreign firms to acquire Japanese firms. These discussions highlighted some of the fundamental differences in the

Japanese and United States economies, but how quickly change

might result from the talks was unclear.

Level and Commodity Composition of Trade

Exports

Japanese exports grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, but growth

slowed considerably during the 1980s. Over these decades, both

the composition and the reputation of products from Japan changed

profoundly.

Because of the success of certain exports, Japan was often viewed

as a heavily export-dependent nation. As a percentage of GNP,

however, the country exports less than other major trading countries of the world. In 1988, for example, it exported 9.3 percent

of its GNP compared with 15.6 percent for Italy, 16.9 percent for

France, 17.8 percent for Britain, 24.4 percent for Canada, 26.8

percent for West Germany, and 43.4 percent for the Netherlands.

The United States exported a smaller share of its GNP at 6.6

percent. Japan was, therefore, less dependent on foreign trade than

many other industrialized countries of the world. In certain

industries, however, export dependence was high. In 1988, for

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Japan: A Country Study

example, just over half of all automobiles produced in Japan were

exported.

The growth ofJapanese exports during the 1960s and 1970s was

truly phenomenal. Beginning in 1960 at US$4.1 billion, merchandise exports grew at an average annual rate of 16.9 percent in the

1960s and at one of 21 percent in the 1970s. From 1981 to 1988,

however, export growth was 7.4 percent, about one-third the level of the 1970s. By 1988 merchandise exports reached US$264.9 bil- lion (see table 24, Appendix).

The growth in exports can be viewed in terms of both pull and

push factors. The pull came from increasing demand for Japanese

products as the United States and other foreign markets grew and

as trade barriers in major market countries were reduced. Another

pull factor was the price competitiveness ofJapanese products. From

1960 to 1970, Japan's export price index increased by only 4 percent, reflecting the high rate of productivity growth in the manufacturing industries producing export products. Inflation was higher

in the 1970s, but export prices were still only 45 percent higher

in 1980 than in 1970 (growing at an average annual rate of less than 4 percent), considerably lower than world inflation. The 1980s

began with another short burst of inflation because of oil price in- creases in 1979, but by 1988 Japanese export prices were actually

23 percent lower than in 1980, offsetting much of the price increase

of the 1980s. This record enhanced the international price competitiveness of Japanese products.

During the 1950s, Japanese export products had a reputation

for poor quality. However, this image changed dramatically during the 1970s. Japanese steel, ships, watches, television receivers,

automobiles, semiconductors, and many other goods developed a

reputation for being manufactured to high standards and under

strict quality control. The Japanese were the acknowledged world

leaders for quality and design in the 1980s for some of these

products. This rise in product quality also increased demand for Japanese exports.

The push behind Japan's exports came from manufacturers.

Many recognized that to reach efficient levels of production they

needed to adopt a global approach. Manufacturers concentrated on the domestic market (often protected from foreign products) until they reached internationally competitive levels and domestic markets were saturated. Often helped by the large general trading companies, manufacturers aggressively attacked foreign markets when

they felt able to compete globally. This push factor partially ac- counted for the extraordinarily high level of export growth in the

1970s, when the domestic economy slowed; increasing exports was

268
JT-60 critical plasma equipment used in nuclear fusion testing

Courtesy Embassy ofJapan, Washington

a way for manufacturers to continue expanding despite the more

sluggish domestic market.

Exports included a wide variety of products, virtually all of which were processed to some degree (see table 25; table 26, Appendix).

After the war, the composition of exports shifted through technological progression. Primary products, light manufactures, and

crude items, which predominated during the 1950s, were gradually eclipsed by heavy industrial goods, complex machinery and

equipment, and consumer durables, which required large capital

investments and advanced technology to produce. This process was

illustrated vividly in the case of textiles, which composed more than

30 percent ofJapanese exports in 1960, but less than 3 percent by

1988. Iron and steel products, which grew rapidly in the 1960s to become nearly 15 percent of exports by 1970, also declined to less than 6 percent of exports by 1988. Over the same period, however,

exports of motor vehicles rose from under 2 percent to over 18 per- cent of the total. In 1988 Japan's major exports were motor vehicles, office machinery, iron and steel, semiconductors and other

electronic components, and scientific and optical equipment.

Imports

During the 1960s and 1970s, imports grew in tandem with

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Japan: A Country Study

exports, at an average annual rate of 15.4 percent during the 1960s

and 22.2 percent during the 1970s. In a sense, import growth over much of this period was constrained by exports because exports

generated the foreign exchange to purchase the imports. During

the 1980s, however, import growth lagged far behind exports, at an average annual rate of only 2.9 percent from 1981 to 1988. This

low level of import growth led to the large trade surpluses that

emerged in the 1980s.

In general, Japan has not imported an unusually large amount

as a share of its GNP, but it has been highly dependent on imports for a variety of critical raw materials. Japan has by no means

been the only industrialized nation dependent on imported raw

materials, but it has depended on imports for a wider variety of

materials, and often for a higher share of its needs for these materials. The country imported, for example, 50 percent of its caloric

intake of food and about 30 percent of the total value of food con- sumed in the late 1980s. It also depended on imports for about

85 percent of its total energy needs (including all of its petroleum

and 89 percent of its coal) and nearly all of its iron, copper, and

lead ore and nickel.

The long-term growth in imports was facilitated by several major

factors. The most important was general growth in the Japanese

economy and income levels. Rising real incomes increased demand

for imports, both those consumed directly and those entering into

production. Another factor was the shift in the economy toward

greater reliance on imported raw materials. Primary energy sources

in the late 1940s, for example, were domestic coal and charcoal.

The shift to imported oil and coal as major energy sources did not come until the late 1950s and 1960s. The small size and poor quality

of many of the mineral deposits in Japan, combined with innovations in ocean transportation, such as bulk ore carriers, meant that

as the economy grew, demand outstripped domestic supply and

cheaper imports were utilized. The price of imports was also a factor in their growth. In 1973

Japan's import price index was at essentially the same level as in

1955, partly because of the appreciation of the yen after 1971 , which

reduced the yen price of imports, but also because of the reduced

costs of ocean shipping and stable prices for food and raw materials. For the rest of the 1970s, however, import prices skyrocketed,

climbing 219 percent from 1973 to 1980. This dramatic price rise,

especially for petroleum but by no means confined to it, was responsible for the rapid growth of the dollar value of imports during the

1970s, despite the slower growth of the economy. During the 1980s,

import prices fell again, especially for petroleum, dropping by 44

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International Economic Relations

percent from 1980 to 1988. Reflecting these price movements, the

dollar value of petroleum imports rose from about US$2.8 billion

in 1970 to nearly US$58 billion in 1980, and then fell by half, to

less than US$26 billion by 1988 (see table 27; table 28, Appendix).

A third factor affecting imports was trade liberalization. Reduced

tariff rates and a weakening of other overt trade barriers meant

that imports should have been able to compete more fully in Japan's

markets. The extent to which this was true, however, was subject

to much debate among analysts. The share of manufactured imports in the GNP changed very little from 1970 to 1985, suggesting that falling import barriers had little impact on the propensity

to purchase foreign products. Falling trade barriers might become more significant in the 1990s as liberalization continues.

Yet another factor determining import levels was the exchange

rate. After the ending of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, the

yen appreciated against the dollar and other currencies. The appreciation of the yen made imports less expensive to Japan, but

it had a complex effect on total imports. Demand for raw material

imports was not affected much by price changes (at least in the

short run). Demand for manufactured goods, however, was more

responsive to price changes. Much of the rapid increase in imports

of manufactures after 1985, when the yen began to appreciate rapidly, can be attributed to this exchange rate effect. All factors combined led to the rapid growth of imports in the

1960s and 1970s and their very slow growth in the 1980s. Rapid

economic growth combined with stable import prices and the shift toward imported raw materials brought high import growth in the

1960s. The big jump in raw material prices in the 1970s kept import growth high despite lower economic growth. In the 1980s, fall- ing raw material prices, a relatively weak yen, and continued modest

economic growth kept import growth low in the first half of the

decade. Import growth finally accelerated in the second half of the

1980s, when raw material prices stopped falling and as the rise in

the value of the yen encouraged manufactured imports.

Japan imported a wide range of products, although energy

sources, raw materials, and food were the major items. Mineral

fuels, for example, rose from under 17 percent of all imports in

1960 to a high of nearly 50 percent in 1980. They had declined

to under 21 percent by 1988. These shifts show the enormous impact of price changes on imports. Swings in imports of other raw

materials were far less dramatic, and many declined over time as a share of total imports. Metal ores and scrap, for example, declined

steadily from 15 percent in 1960 to less than 5 percent in 1988,

reflecting the changing structure of the economy, which moved away

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Japan: A Country Study

from basic metal manufactures to higher value-added industries.

Textile materials also dropped from 1 7 percent of total imports in

1960 to under 2 percent in 1988, as the textile industry became

less important and imports of finished textiles increased. Foodstuffs, on the other hand, were relatively steady as a share of imports,

rising from just over 12 percent in 1960 to less than 16 percent

in 1988.

Manufactured goods—chemicals, machinery and equipment, and

miscellaneous commodities—gained as a share of imports, but the

variation among them was considerable. Manufactures were about

22 percent of total imports in 1960, remained at just under 23 per- cent in 1980, and then expanded to 49 percent by 1988. Imports

of textiles, nonferrous metals, and iron and steel products all showed

significant gains, for the same reasons that the raw material imports to produce them had declined. However, chemical and machinery and equipment imports showed little increase in share until after 1985.

The heavy dependency on raw materials that characterized Japan

until the mid-1980s reflected both their absence in Japan and the

process of import-substitution in which Japan favored domestic in- dustries over imports. The desire to restrict manufactured imports was intensified by the knowledge that the nation needed strong

manufacturing industries to generate exports to pay for needed raw

material imports. Only with the appreciation of the yen after 1985,

and the drop in petroleum and other raw material prices, did this sense of vulnerability ease. These trends were reflected in the ris- ing share of manufactures in imports in the late 1980s.

Balance of Merchandise Trade

Between 1960 and 1964, Japan incurred annual trade deficits (based on a customs clearance for imports) ranging from US$0.4

billion to US$1.6 billion. The era of chronic trade deficit ended

in 1965, and by 1969, with a positive balance of almost US$1 bil- lion, Japan was widely regarded as a surplus trading nation. In

1971 the surplus reached US$4 billion, and its rapid increase was

a main factor behind the United States decision to devalue the dollar and pressure Japan to revalue the yen—events that led quickly to the end of the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates. By

1972 Japan's surplus had climbed to US$5 billion, despite the

revaluation of the yen in 1971.

The jump in prices of petroleum and other raw materials during 1973 plunged the balance of trade into deficit, and in 1974 the

deficit reached US$6.6 billion. With strong export growth, however,

this was reversed to a surplus of US$2.4 billion by 1976. The surplus

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reached a record US$18.2 billion in 1978, promoting considerable

tension between the United States and Japan.

In 1979 petroleum prices jumped again, and Japan's trade

balance again turned to deficit, reaching US$10.7 billion in 1980.

Once again rapid export growth and stagnant imports returned

Japan quickly to surplus by 1981. From that time through 1986,

Japan's trade surplus grew explosively, to a peak of US$82.7 bil- lion. This unprecedented trade surplus resulted from the moderate

annual rise in exports and drop in imports noted above. Underlying these trade developments was the weakness of the yen against

other currencies, which enhanced export price competitiveness and

dampened import demand.

After 1986 the dollar value of Japan's trade surplus declined,

to US$77.6 billion in 1988. This decline came as the yen finally

appreciated strongly against the dollar (beginning in 1985) and as a rapid rise in manufactured imports began to offset the large drop

in the value of raw material imports. Nevertheless, the surplus

showed surprising resilience in the face of the strengthening of the

yen.

Underlying trends throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the fundamental strength of Japan's export sector. Under the fixed ex- change rates of the 1960s, exports became progressively more

competitive on world markets, lifting the country out of the persistent trade deficits that had continued into the early years of the

decade. During the 1970s, rapid export expansion extricated the

country from the deficits immediately following the two oil price

shocks of 1973 and 1979. Continuing export strength then drove

the nation to the extraordinary trade surpluses of the 1980s, as the

temporary burden of costly oil imports waned.

Japan's fundamental strength in world markets required its fear

of vulnerability and opposition to manufactured imports to be re- assessed. In the early 1980s, fear of vulnerability remained strong

and fed the continuation of policies and behavior that kept manufactured imports unusually low compared with those of other industrial nations. Only with the large decline in raw material prices

and the explosion of trade surpluses did policies and behavior begin

to change. These changes would not necessarily bring down the

trade surplus, but would help diminish tension between Japan and

its trading partners.

Balance of Payments Accounts

Services and the Current Account

Japan has traditionally run a deficit in services. Trade in services

includes transportation (freight and passenger fares), insurance, travel

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Japan: A Country Study

expenditures, royalties, licensing fees, and income from investments. The steadily rising deficit in services from 1960 through

1980, from US$99 million in 1960, to nearly US$1.8 billion in 1970

and to more than US$11 billion in 1980, can be attributed to ris- ing royalty and licensing payments for Japan's acquisition of technology from other industrial countries and to rising deficits in the

trade-related services of transportation and insurance. The trans- portation deficit rose after the 1960s, as rapidly climbing labor costs made Japanese-flag vessels less competitive, leading to greater use

of foreign-flag carriers (including many flag-of-convenience vessels actually owned by Japanese interests).

Beginning in the late 1970s, however, rapidly growing overseas investments began to increase the inflow of investment income.

The investments themselves are part of capital flows in the balance

of payments, but repatriation of earnings on those investments is part of the services account. From a small surplus of US$900 million in 1978, the balance on investment income (earnings from

abroad minus the earnings of foreigners in Japan) grew to US$21

billion by 1988. The tremendous growth in Japanese investments

abroad had not been matched by any such growth of foreign in- vestment in Japan.

Despite the rapid growth in Japan's investment income surplus,

the country's total services account remained in deficit in the 1980s.

It did diminish in the first half of the decade, but then total deficits increased again, from US$4.9 billion in 1986 to nearly US$11.2

billion in 1988. Offsetting the rising surpluses in investment in- come were an enormous jump in the deficit on overseas travel and

purchases by Japanese citizens while abroad. The net balance on

passenger transportation deteriorated from a net deficit of US$1.3

billion in 1985 to US$3.7 billion by 1988, and foreign travel and

spending (purchases of goods and services by individuals while

abroad) increased from US$3.7 billion to US$15.8 billion over the same short time. This burst of overseas travel and spending came

as the movement in the exchange rate made foreign travel more

attractive to the Japanese. It also reflected the rising perception

amongJapanese consumers that prices for a wide range of manufactured items were substantially lower abroad than at home, giving

them an incentive to purchase these items while out of their country. By the end of the decade, the number ofJapanese taking overseas trips approached 10 million annually.

One other nonmerchandise transaction is included in the cur- rent account balance—net transfers. These represent the flow of

foreign aid from Japan. As the country supplied more foreign aid,

the deficit in this account rose. Much of the change occurred in

the 1980s, with the deficit growing from US$1.5 billion in 1980

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to US$4.1 billion by 1988. It was expected to grow further, with

Japan's foreign aid expanding in the 1990s.

Adding net exports of services and net transfers to the merchandise trade balance, with imports measured free on board (f.o.b.),

rather than as customs, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.), gives the

balance on current account. Movements in Japan's current account

balance have generally mirrored those of the merchandise trade

balance considered above, although deficits in services and net transfers have offset the surpluses somewhat. Japan began to register

surpluses in the current account in 1965, which later continued

to rise, though they were punctuated by short-term deficits following

the two oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979.

During the 1980s Japan's current account balance shot from a

record deficit of US$10.7 billion in 1980 to a record surplus of

US$87 billion in 1987. As a share of GNP, this surplus reached

a peak of 4.4 percent in 1985, a large value for a current account

surplus. The appreciation of the yen against the dollar and other

currencies beginning in 1985 was slow to have any impact on the

dollar value of the current account surplus, although it did decline

by US$8 billion in 1988.

Capital Flows

Capital movements offset the surpluses or deficits in the current

account. A current account surplus, for example, implies that rather

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Japan: A Country Study

than using all the foreign currency earned by selling exports to buy

imports, corporations and individuals chose to invest the money

in foreign-currency-denominated assets instead. As measured in

Japan's balance of payments data, capital movements consist of

long- and short-term investments, and movements in official for- eign exchange reserves and private bank accounts. Capital movements include loans, portfolio investments in corporate stock, and

direct investment (establishment or purchase of subsidiaries abroad).

A capital outflow occurs when a Japanese individual or corporation makes a loan, buys foreign stock, or establishes a subsidiary

abroad. A capital inflow occurs when foreigners engage in these

operations in Japan.

After World War II, Japan's return to world capital markets

as a borrower was slow and deliberate. Even before the war, Japan

did not participate in world capital markets to the same extent as the United States or West European countries. Caution and control remained strong until well into the 1970s, when the nation was

no longer a net debtor. Since that time, deregulation has proceeded

steadily and capital flows have grown rapidly. The rapid growth

of investment abroad in the 1980s had made Japan the largest net

investor in the world by the end of the decade.

As might be expected of a country recovering from a major wartime defeat, Japan remained a net debtor nation until the mid1960s, although it was never as far in debt as many of the more

recently developing countries. By 1967, however, Japanese investments overseas had begun to exceed foreign investments in Japan,

changing Japan from a net debtor to a net creditor nation. The

country remained a modest net creditor until the 1980s, when its creditor position expanded explosively, altering Japan's relationship to the rest of the world. In the Japanese balance of payments data, these changes are most

readily seen in the long-term capital account. During the first half

of the 1960s, this account generally showed small net inflows of

capital (as did the short-term capital account). From 1965 on, however, the long-term capital account consistently showed an outflow, ranging from US$1 billion to US$12 billion during the 1970s.

The sharp shift in the balance of payments brought about by the

oil price hike at the decade's end produced an unusual net inflow

of long-term capital in 1980 of US$2.3 billion, but thereafter the

outflow resumed and grew enormously. From nearly US$10 bil- lion in 1981, the annual net outflow of long-term capital reached

nearly US$137 billion in 1987 and then dropped slightly, to just over US$130 billion, in 1988 (see table 29, Appendix).

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Short-term capital flows in the balance of payments do not show

so clear a picture. These more volatile flows have generally added

to the net capital outflow, but in some years movements in international differentials in interest rates or other factors led to a net

inflow of short-term capital.

The other significant part of capital flows in the balance of payments is the movement in gold and foreign exchange reserves held

by the government, which represent the funds held by the Bank

ofJapan to intervene in foreign exchange markets to affect the value

of the yen. In the 1970s, the size of these markets became so large

that any government intervention was only a small share of total transactions, but Japan and other governments used their reserves

to influence exchange rates when necessary. In the second half of

the 1970s, for example, foreign exchange reserves rose rapidly, from

a total of US$12.8 billion in 1975 to US$33 billion by 1978, as the Bank ofJapan sold yen to buy dollars in foreign exchange markets to slow or stop the rise in the yen's value, fearful that such

a rise would adversely affect Japanese exports. The same operation occurred on a much larger scale after 1985. From US$26.5

billion in 1985 (a level little changed from the decade's beginning),

exchange reserves had climbed to almost US$98 billion by 1988.

This intervention was similarly inspired by concern about the yen's

high value.

The combination of net outflows of long- and short-term capital

and rising holdings of foreign exchange by the central government

produced enormous change in Japan's accumulated holdings of for- eign assets, compared to foreigners' holdings of assets in Japan.

As a result, from a net asset position of US$11.5 billion in 1980

(meaning that Japanese investors held US$1 1.5 billion more in for- eign assets than foreigners held in Japan), Japan's international net assets had grown to nearly US$292 billion by 1988 (see table

30, Appendix). Japanese assets abroad grew from nearly US$160

billion in 1980 to almost US$1.5 trillion by 1988, a ninefold in- crease. Liabilities—investments by foreigners in Japan—expanded

somewhat more slowly, about sevenfold, from US$148 billion in

1980 to US$1 . 1 trillion in 1988. Dramatic shifts were seen in portfolio securities purchases—stocks and bonds—in both directions.

Japanese purchases of foreign securities went from only US$4.2

billion in 1976 to over US$21 billion in 1980 and to US$427 bil- lion by 1988. Although foreign purchases of Japanese securities

also expanded, the growth was much slower, and the total was still under US$255 billion in 1988.

Capital flows have been heavily affected by government policy.

During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, when Japan faced

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Japan: A Country Study

chronic current account deficits, concern over maintaining a high

credit rating in international capital markets and fear of having

to devalue the currency and of foreign ownership ofJapanese companies all led to tight controls over both inflow and outflow of capital. As part of these controls, for example, government severely

restricted foreign direct investment in Japan, but encouraged licens- ing agreements with foreign firms to obtain access to their technology. As Japan's current account position strengthened in the

1960s, however, the nation came under increasing pressure to liber- alize its tight controls.

When Japan became a member of the OECD in 1966, it also had to agree to liberalize its capital markets. This process began

in 1967 and continued in the early 1990s. Decontrol of international capital flows was aided in 1980, when the new Foreign Exchange and Foreign Control Law went into effect. In principle,

all external economic transactions were free of control, unless specified otherwise. In practice, a wide range of transactions continued

to be subject to some form of formal or informal control by the

government.

Because of continuing capital controls, negotiations between

Japan and the United States were held, producing an agreement

in 1984, the Yen-Dollar Accord. This agreement led to additional

liberalizing measures that were implemented over the next several

years. Many of these changes concerned the establishment and functioning of markets for financial instruments in Japan (such as a

short-term treasury bill market) rather than the removal of international capital controls per se. This approach was taken because

of American concerns that foreign investment in Japan was impeded

by a lack of various financial instruments in the country and by

the government's continued control of interest rates for many of

those instruments that did exist. As a result of the agreement, for

example, interest rates on large bank deposits were decontrolled,

and the minimum denomination for certificates of deposit was

lowered.

By the end of the 1980s, barriers to capital flow were no longer

a major issue in United States-Japan relations. However, imbalances in the flows and in accumulated totals of capital investment, with Japan becoming a large world creditor, were emerging

as new areas of tension. This tension was exacerbated by the fact that the United States became the world's largest net debtor at the same time that Japan became its largest net creditor. Nevertheless, no policy decisions had been made by the end of the 1980s

that would restrict the flow ofJapanese capital to the United States.

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International Economic Relations

One important area of capital flows is direct investment—outright

ownership or control (as opposed to portfolio investment). Japan's

direct foreign investment has grown rapidly, although not as dramatically as portfolio investment. Data collected by its Ministry

of Finance show the accumulated value ofJapanese foreign direct

investment growing from under US$3.6 billion in 1970 to US$36.5

billion in 1980 and to over US$186 billion by 1988 (see table 31,

Appendix). Direct investment tends to be very visible, and the rapid

increase of Japan's direct investments in countries such as the

United States, combined with the large imbalance between Japan's

overseas investment and foreign investment in Japan was a primary

cause of tension at the end of the 1980s.

The location ofJapan's direct investments abroad has been shift- ing. In 1970, 21 percent of its investments were in Asia and nearly

22 percent in the United States. By 1988, the share of investments

in Asia had dropped slightly, to under 18 percent, while that in

the United States had risen sharply, to nearly 39 percent of the

total. During this period, Japan's share of investments in Latin

America held rather steady (from nearly 16 percent in 1970 to nearly

17 percent in 1988), as it did in Europe (down slightly from nearly

18 percent to over 16 percent in that period), and Africa (where

it was under 3 percent in both years). Both the Middle East (down

from over 9 percent to under 2 percent) and the Pacific (down from

roughly 8 percent to 5 percent) became relatively less important

locations for Japanese investments. However, because of the rapid

growth in the dollar amounts of the investments, these shifts were

all relative. Even in the Middle East, the dollar value ofJapanese

investments had grown.

The drive to invest overseas stemmed from several motives. A

major reason for many early investments was to obtain access to raw materials. As Japan became more dependent on imported raw

materials, energy, and food during the 1960s and 1970s, direct in- vestments were one way of ensuring supply. The Middle East, Australia, and some Asian countries (such as Indonesia) were major

locations for such investments by 1970. Second, rising labor costs during the 1960s and 1970s led certain labor-intensive industries,

especially textiles, to move abroad.

Investment in other industrial countries, such as the United

States, was often motivated by barriers to exports from Japan. The

restrictions on automobile exports to the United States, which went

into effect in 1981, became a primary motivation for Japanese auto- makers to establish assembly plants in the United States. The same

situation had occurred earlier, in the 1970s, for plants manufacturing television sets. Japanese firms exporting from developing

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Japan: A Country Study

countries, moreover, often received preferential tariff treatment in

developed countries (under the Generalized System of Preferences).

In short, protectionism in developed countries often motivated

Japanese foreign direct investment.

After 1985, a new and important incentive materialized for such

investments. The rapid rise in the value of the yen seriously undermined the international competitiveness of many products manufactured in Japan. While this situation had been true for textiles in

the 1960s, it now also affected a much wider range of more sophisticated products. Japanese manufacturers began actively seeking

lower cost production bases. This factor, rather than any increase

in foreign protectionism, appeared to lie behind the acceleration

of overseas investments after 1985.

This cost disadvantage also led more Japanese firms to think of

their overseas factories as a source of products for the Japanese

market itself. Except for the basic processing of raw materials,

manufacturers had previously regarded foreign investments as a

substitute for exports rather than as an overseas base for home markets. The share of output from Japanese factories in the lower-wagecost countries of Asia that was destined for the Japanese market

(rather than for local markets or for export) rose from 10 percent

in 1980 to 16 percent in 1987.

The Value of the Yen

The relative value of the yen is determined in foreign exchange

markets by the forces of demand and supply. The demand for the

yen is governed by the desire of foreigners to buy goods and ser- vices in Japan and by their interest in investing in Japan (buying

yen-denominated real and financial assets). The supply of the yen

in the market is governed by the desire of yen holders to exchange

their yen for other currencies to purchase goods, services, or assets. In 1949 the value of the yen was set at ¥360 per US$1 through an American plan, which was part of the Bretton Woods System,

to stabilize prices in the Japanese economy. That exchange rate was maintained until 1971 , when the United States abandoned the

convertibility of the dollar to gold, which had been a key element

of the Bretton Woods System, and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, and set in motion changes that eventually led to float- ing exchange rates in 1973.

By 1971 the yen had become undervalued (see table 32, Appendix). Japanese exports were costing too little in international markets, and imports from abroad were costing the Japanese too much.

This undervaluation was reflected in the current account balance,

which had risen from the deficits of the early 1960s to a then-large

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International Economic Relations

surplus of US$5.8 billion in 1971 . The belief that the yen, and several other major currencies, were undervalued motivated the United

States actions in 1971.

Following the United States measures to devalue the dollar in

the summer of 1971, the Japanese government agreed to a new,

fixed exchange rate as part of the Smithsonian Agreement, signed

at the end of the year. This agreement set the exchange rate at ¥308 per US$1 . However, the new fixed rates of the Smithsonian

Agreement were difficult to maintain in the face of supply and demand pressures in the foreign exchange market. In early 1973, the

rates were abandoned, and the major nations of the world allowed

their currencies to float. In the 1970s, Japanese government and business people were

very concerned that a rise in the value of the yen would hurt ex- port growth by making Japanese products less competitive and

would damage the industrial base. The government, therefore, con- tinued to intervene heavily in foreign exchange marketing (buying or selling dollars), even after the 1973 decision to allow the yen

to float. Despite intervention, market pressures caused the yen to continue climbing in value, peaking temporarily at an average of ¥271

per US$1 in 1973 before the impact of the oil crisis was felt. The

increased costs of imported oil caused the yen to depreciate to a range of ¥290 to ¥300 between 1974 and 1976. The reemergence

of trade surpluses drove the yen back up to ¥211 in 1978. This

currency strengthening was again reversed by the second oil shock,

with the yen dropping to ¥227 by 1980.

During the first half of the 1980s, the yen failed to rise in value even though current account surpluses returned and grew quickly.

From ¥221 in 1981 , the average value of the yen actually dropped

to ¥239 in 1985. The rise in the current account surplus generated stronger demand for yen in foreign exchange markets, but

this trade-related demand for yen was offset by other factors. A

wide differential in interest rates, with United States interest rates much higher than those in Japan, and the continuing moves to deregulate the international flow of capital, led to a large net out- flow of capital from Japan. This capital flow increased the supply

of yen in foreign exchange markets, as Japanese investors changed

their yen for other currencies (mainly dollars) to invest overseas. This situation kept the yen weak relative to the dollar and fostered

the rapid rise in the Japanese trade surplus that took place in the

1980s.

In 1985 a dramatic change began. Finance officials from major

nations signed an agreement (the Plaza Accord) affirming that the

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Japan: A Country Study

dollar was overvalued (and, therefore, the yen undervalued). This

agreement, and shifting supply and demand pressures in the markets, led to a rapid rise in the value of the yen. From its average

of ¥239 per US$1 in 1985, the yen rose to a peak of ¥128 in 1988,

virtually doubling its value relative to the dollar. After 1988 the

yen's value declined slightly to ¥145 in September 1989, but re- mained much stronger than in 1985.

The yen's increased value madeJapanese exports less price competitive and imports more price competitive, which should have

brought down the value of trade and current account surpluses.

The current account figures discussed above, however, indicated

that such a response was slow. The strong appreciation of the yen

began in 1985, but the current account continued to rise until 1987,

and its decline in 1988 was rather small.

Trade and Investment Relations

Japan was engaged in trade and investment with nearly every

country in the world. Generally speaking, however, its greatest eco- nomic interaction was with other developed countries, and over time this interaction grew.

In 1988 about 61 percent of exports went to developed countries, 34 percent to developing countries, and 5 percent to communist countries. The largest single destination ofJapanese exports was the United States, which accounted for an extraordinary 33.8

percent of all exports. The United States was the major growth

market for Japanese exports in the 1980s; it had accounted for only

24 percent of the total in 1980. West Germany, Britain, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Taiwan were the next largest markets, at the much lower level of about 6 percent each (see table

33, Appendix).

Of imports, 51 percent came from developed countries in 1988,

42 percent from developing countries, and 7 percent from communist countries, with the developed countries' share rising over

the course of the 1980s as raw materials, which predominate in

developing country sales to Japan, declined in price. Despite Japan's

dependence on foreign sources of energy and raw materials, the

United States was the largest single source of imports, accounting

for 22.4 percent in 1988, larger than the combined share (10 percent) for all Middle Eastern countries, the suppliers of much of

Japan's oil. Over time, however, dependence on United States imports had slipped rather steadily, from 34.6 percent in 1960, as sources of supply diversified. Other major sources of 1988 imports were South Korea (6.3 percent), Australia (5.5 percent), China (5.3

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International Economic Relations

percent), Indonesia (5.1 percent), Taiwan (4.7 percent), Canada

(4.4 percent), and West Germany (4.3 percent).

Historically, Japan has had trade deficits with raw material suppliers and surpluses with other countries. In the 1980s, however,

balances with all trading partners shifted somewhat in Japan's favor.

Its surplus in trade with developed countries rose from US$12 bil- lion in 1980 to US$67 billion by 1988, while the balance with developing countries shifted from a deficit of US$25 billion in 1980

to a surplus of nearly US$11 billion in 1988. Its deficit in trade

with the Middle East, peaked at about US$30 billion in 1980, sinking to only US$10.5 billion by 1988.

Partly because of this rapid shift toward surplus, and because

of continued problems of access to Japanese markets, Japan faced

increased tensions with a number of its trading partners during

the 1980s. The decade was marked by contentious negotiations es- pecially with the United States. Complicating the nature of all these

relationships was the very swift rise of Japan as a major investor

in the domestic assets of its major trading partners.

United States and Canada

The United States has been Japan's largest economic partner,

taking 33.8 percent of its exports, supplying 22.4 percent of its imports, and accounting for 38.6 percent of its direct investment

abroad in 1988. The United States also supplied 47 percent ac- cumulated direct investment by foreign firms in Japan.

Japanese imports from the United States included both raw

materials and manufactured goods. American agricultural products were a leading import in 1988 (US$9.1 billion as measured by

United States export statistics), made up of meat (US$1 .4 billion),

fish (US$1 .6 billion), grains (US$2.3 billion), and soybeans (US$1 .0 billion). Imports of manufactured goods were mainly in the category

of machinery and transportation equipment, rather than consumer

goods. In 1988 Japan imported US$6.9 billion of machinery from

the United States, of which computers and computer parts (US$2.4

billion) formed the largest single component. In the category of

transportation equipment, Japan imported US$2.2 billion of air- craft and parts (automobiles and parts accounted for only US$500

million).

Japanese exports to the United States were almost entirely

manufactured goods. Automobiles were by far the largest single

category, amounting to US$21 billion in 1988, or 23 percent of

total Japanese exports to the United States. Automotive parts ac- counted for another US$5 billion. Other major items were office machinery (including computers), which totaled US$10.6 billion

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Japan: A Country Study

in 1988, telecommunications equipment (US$10.4 billion), power

generating equipment (US$3.3 billion), iron and steel (US$2.9 bil- lion), and metalworking machinery (US$1.7 billion).

From the mid-1960s, the trade balance has been in Japan's favor. According to Japanese data, its surplus with the United States grew

from US$380 million in 1970 to nearly US$48 billion in 1988.

United States data on the trade relationship (which differ slightly

because each nation includes transportation costs on the import

but not the export side) also show a rapid deterioration of the imbalance in the 1980s, from a Japanese surplus of US$10 billion

in 1980 to one of US$60 billion in 1987, with a slight improvement, to one of US$55 billion, in 1988.

This general deterioration, and the very modest improvement

in trade balance after the yen rose in value after 1985, contributed

greatly to strained economic relations. The United States had pres- sured Japan to open its markets since the early 1960s, but the in- tensity of the pressure increased through the 1970s and 1980s.

Tensions were exacerbated by issues specific to particular industries perhaps more than by the trade imbalance in general. Beginning with textiles in the 1950s, a number of Japanese exports to the United States were subject to opposition from American in- dustry. These complaints generally alleged unfair trading practices,

such as dumping (selling at a lower cost than at home, or selling

below the cost of production) and patent infringement. The result of negotiations was often Japan's agreement "voluntarily" to re- strain exports to the United States. Such agreements applied to a number of products, including color television sets in the late 1970s and automobiles in the 1980s.

Some innovative approaches emerged in the 1980s as United

States companies strove to achieve greater access to Japanese markets. MOSS negotiations in 1985 addressed access problems re- lated to four industries: forest products, pharmaceuticals and

medical equipment, electronics, and telecommunications equipment

and services.

Problems of access to Japanese markets were among the motivations for the United States Trade Act of 1988, which included

a provision calling on the president to identify unfair trading part- ners of the United States and to specify products for negotiation

with these countries. In the spring of 1989, Japan was named under

this provision and three areas—forest products, telecommunications satellites, and supercomputers—were selected for negotiations.

This action exemplified the continuing mood of dissatisfaction over

access to Japanese markets at the end of the decade (see Import

Policies, this ch.).

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International Economic Relations

At the same time, the United States initiated broad talks con- cerning the structural factors inhibiting manufactured imports in Japan, in the Structural Impediments Initiative. These talks addressed such areas as the law restraining the growth of large dis- count store chains in Japan, weak antitrust law enforcement, land

taxation that encouraged inefficient farming, and high real estate

prices.

As elsewhere, Japanese direct investment in the United States expanded rapidly and had become an important new dimension

in the countries' relationship. The total value of cumulative in- vestments of this kind was US$8.7 billion in 1980; it had grown

by more than eight times by 1988 to US$71.9 billion. United States data identified Japan as the second largest investor in the United

States; it had about half the value of investments of Britain, but more than those of the Netherlands, Canada, or West Germany.

Much ofJapan's investment in the United States in the late 1980s was in the commercial sector, providing the basis for distribution

and sale of Japanese exports to the United States. Wholesale and

retail distribution accounted for 35 percent of all Japanese investments in the United States in 1988, while manufacturing accounted

for 23 percent. Real estate became a popular investment during

the 1980s, with cumulative investments rising to US$10 billion by

1988, 20 percent of the total. Japan's balance of trade with Canada tended to be in deficit be- cause Canada was a supplier of raw materials to Japan. In 1988

Canada was the destination for 2.4 percent ofJapan's exports and

the source of 4.4 percent of its imports. Canada was a major supplier of food (particularly wheat), wood and wood pulp, and coal. Japan's deficit with Canada in 1988 was US$1.9 billion. Noncommunist Asia

The developing nations of Asia grew rapidly as suppliers to and

buyers from Japan. In 1988 these countries (including South Korea,

Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries

in Southeast Asia) accounted for 25 percent of Japan's exports, a share well below the 34 percent value of 1960, but one that had

been roughly constant since 1970. In 1988 developing Asian countries provided 26 percent ofJapan's imports, a share that had risen

slowly, from 16 percent in 1970 and 23 percent in 1980.

As a whole, Japan had run a surplus with noncommunist Asia,

and this surplus rose quickly in the 1980s. From a minor deficit in 1980 of US$841 million (mostly caused by a peak in the value

of oil imports from Indonesia), Japan showed a surplus of nearly

US$3 billion with these countries in 1985 and of over US$19 billion

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Japan: A Country Study

in 1988. The shift was caused by the fall in the prices of oil and

other raw materials that Japan imported from the region and to the rapid growth in Japanese exports as the region's economic

growth continued at a high rate. Indonesia and Malaysia both continued to show a trade surplus

because of their heavy raw material exports to Japan. However,

falling oil prices caused trade in both directions between Japan and

Indonesia to decline in the 1980s. Trade similarly declined with

the Philippines, owing to the political turmoil and economic contraction there in the 1980s.

South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore constituted

the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia, and all four

exhibited high economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Like

Japan, they lacked many raw materials and mainly exported

manufactured goods. Their deficits with Japan increased from 1980

to 1988 when the deficits of all four were sizeable. Over the 1970s

and 1980s, they evolved a pattern of importing components from

Japan and exporting assembled products to the United States. Japanese direct investment in Asia also expanded, with the total cumulative value reaching over US$32 billion by 1988. Indonesia, at US$9.8 billion in 1988 was the largest single location for these investments. As rapid as the growth of investment was, however, it did not keep pace with Japan's global investment, so the share of Asia in total cumulative investment slipped, from 26.5

percent in 1975 to 17.3 percent in 1988.

Western Europe

Japan's trade with Western Europe grew steadily, but had been

relatively small well into the 1 980s considering the size of this market. In 1980 Western Europe supplied only 7.4 percent ofJapan's

imports and took 16.6 percent of its exports. However, the rela- tionship began to change very rapidly after 1985. West European

exports to Japan increased two and one-half times in just the three

years from 1985 to 1988 and rose as a share of all Japanese imports to 16 percent. (Much of this increase came from growing

Japanese interest in European consumer items, including luxury

automobiles.) Likewise, Japan's exports to Europe rose rapidly after 1985, more than doubling by 1988 and accounting for 21 percent

of all Japanese exports. In 1988 the major European buyers of Japanese exports were West Germany (US$15.8 billion) and Britain (US$10.6 billion) (see table 34, Appendix). The largest European suppliers to Japan were West Germany (US$8. 1 billion), France (US$4 billion), and Britain (US$4.2 billion) (see table 35, Appendix). Traditionally, West

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European countries had trade deficits with Japan, and this con- tinued to be the case in 1988, despite the surge in Japan's imports

from them after 1985. From 1980 to 1988, the deficit of the West

European countries as a whole expanded from US$11 billion to US$25 billion, with much of the increase coming after 1985.

Trade relations with Western Europe were strained during the

1980s. Policies varied among the individual countries, but many

imposed restrictions on Japanese imports. Late in the decade, as discussions proceeded on the trade and investment policies that

would prevail with European economic integration in 1992, many

Japanese officials and business people became concerned that protectionism directed against Japan would increase. Domestic content requirements (specifying the share of local products and value

added in a product) and requirements on the location of research

and development facilities and manufacturing investments appeared

likely.

Fear of a protectionist Western Europe accelerated Japanese

direct investment in the second half of the 1980s. Total accumulated Japanese direct investments in the region grew from US$4.5

billion in 1980 to over US$30 billion in 1988, from 12.2 percent

to more than 16 percent of such Japanese investments. Rather than

being discouraged by protectionist signals from Europe, Japanese

businesses appeared to be determined to play a significant role in

what promised to be a large, vigorous, and integrated market in

the 1990s. Investment offered the surest means of circumventing

protectionism, and Japanese business appeared to be willing to comply with whatever domestic content or other performance requirements the European Communities might impose.

The Middle East The importance of the Middle East expanded dramatically in

the 1970s with the jumps in crude oil prices. Japan was deeply con- cerned with maintaining good relations with these oil-producing

nations to avoid a debilitating cut in oil supplies. During the 1980s,

however, oil prices fell and Japan's concerns over the security of

its oil supply diminished greatly.

The Middle East represented only 7.5 percent of total Japanese

imports in 1960 and 12.4 percent in 1970, with the small rise result- ing from the rapid increase in the volume of oil consumed by the

growing Japanese economy. By 1980, however, this share had

climbed to a peak of 31.7 percent because of the two rounds of

price hikes in the 1970s. Falling oil prices after 1980 brought this share back down to 10.5 percent by 1988—actually a lower per- centage than in 1970, before the price hikes had started. The major

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Japan: A Country Study

oil suppliers to Japan in 1988 were Saudi Arabia and the United

Arab Emirates. Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait were also significant, but

smaller, sources. These three countries became less important oil suppliers after 1980 because of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and

resulting damage to loading facilities and shipping.

As imports from the Middle East surged in the 1970s, so did

Japanese exports to the region. Paralleling the pattern for imports,

however, this share fell in the 1980s. Equalling 1.8 percent in 1960,

exports to this region rose to 11.1 percent of total Japanese exports

in 1980, but then declined to 3.6 percent by 1988.

Part ofJapan's strategy to assure oil supplies was to encourage

investment in oil-supplying countries. However, such investment never kept pace with Japan's investments in other regions. The

country's expanding need for oil helped push direct investment in

the Middle East to 9.3 percent of total direct investments abroad

by Japanese companies in 1970, but this share had fallen to 6.2

percent by 1980 and to only 1.8 percent by 1988. The Iran-Iraq war was a major factor in the declining interest ofJapanese investors, exemplified by the fate of a large US$3 billion petrochemical

complex in Iran, which was almost complete when the revolution

took place in 1979. Completion was delayed first by political concerns (when United States embassy personnel were held hostage)

and then by repeated Iraqi bombing raids. The project was finally

cancelled in 1989, with losses for both Japanese companies and the

Japanese government, which had provided insurance for the project.

Oceania

Australia and New Zealand were predominantly sources of food

and raw materials for Japan. In 1988 Australia accounted for 5.5

percent of total Japanese imports, a share that held relatively steady

in the late 1980s, while New Zealand accounted for less than 1 percent. Because they provided raw materials, both nations had trade

surpluses with Japan. Australia was the largest single supplier of

coal, iron ore, wool, and sugar to Japan in 1988, while New Zealand was the second largest supplier of wool.

Resource development projects in Australia attracted Japanese

capital, as did trade protectionism by necessitating local production for the Australian market. Investments in Australia totaled

US$8. 1 billion in 1988, accounting for 4.4 percent ofJapanese direct investment abroad. But, because of the broadening reach ofJapan's

foreign investment, this share had been declining, down from 5.9

percent in 1980. During the 1980s, Japanese real estate investment

increased in Australia, particularly in the ocean resort area known

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International Economic Relations

as the Gold Coast, where Japanese presence was strong enough

to create some backlash.

The trade of both Australia and New Zealand had shifted away

from other Commonwealth of Nations countries toward Asia. Japan

in particular had emerged as the leading trading partner for these

two countries. Faced with growing interdependence with Asia, Australia joined Japan in actively calling for greater consultation and

cooperation among Pacific nations. Still, Australia and New Zealand faced quotas, high tariffs, and unusual standards barriers in

exporting agricultural products including beef, butter, and apples,

to Japan.

Latin America

In the 1970s, Japan briefly showed enthusiasm over Brazilian

prospects. A vast territory richly endowed with raw materials and

with a sizable Japanese-Brazilian minority in the population, Brazil

appeared to Japanese business to offer great opportunities for trade

and investment. However, none of those expectations have been

realized, and Japanese financial institutions became caught up in

the international debt problems of Brazil and other Latin American countries.

In 1988 Japan received US$8.3 billion of imports from Latin

America as a whole, and exported US$9.3 billion to the region,

for a surplus of US$1 billion. Although the absolute value of both

exports and imports had grown over time, Latin America had

declined in importance as a Japanese trading partner. The share

ofJapan's total imports coming from this region dropped from 7.3

percent in 1970 to 4.1 percent in 1980, remaining at 4.4 percent

in 1988. Japanese exports to Latin America also declined, from

6.9 percent in 1980 to 3.5 percent in 1988.

Despite this relative decline in trade, Japanese direct investment

in the region continued to grow quickly, reaching US$31 .6 billion

in 1988, or 16.9 percent ofJapan's total foreign direct investment.

This share was only slightly below that ofl975(18.1 percent) and was almost equal to the share in Asian countries. However, over US$11 billion of this investment was in Panama—mainly for Panamanian-flag shipping, which does not represent true investment in the country. The Bahamas also attracted US$1.9 billion

in investment, mainly from Japanese financial institutions, but in

arrangements to secure favorable tax treatment rather than real investments. Brazil absorbed US$5 billion in Japanese direct in- vestment, Mexico US$1 .6 billion, and other Latin American countries amounts below US$1 billion in the late 1980s.

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Japan: A Country Study

Latin American countries lie at the heart of the Third World

debt problems that plagued international financial relations in the

1980s. Japanese financial institutions became involved as lenders

to these nations, although they were far less exposed than United

States banks. Because of this financial involvement, the Japanese

government was actively involved in international discussions of

how to resolve the crisis. In 1987, Minister of Finance Miyazawa

Kiichi put forth a proposal on resolving the debt issue. Although

that initiative did not go through, the Brady Plan that emerged

in 1989 contained some elements of the Miyazawa Plan. The

Japanese government supported the Brady Plan by pledging US$10

billion in cofinancing with the World Bank and IMF.

Africa

Africa has been the least important world region for Japanese

trade and investment. Japan had little historical experience with

Africa and little interest in economic ties with the region, except

for development of raw material supplies.

In 1988 Africa accounted for just over 1 percent ofJapan's imports and for 1 percent of its exports. Japan's largest trading part- ner in Africa in 1988 was South Africa, which accounted for 34

percent of Japanese exports to Africa and 45 percent of Japan's

imports from the region. Because of trading sanctions imposed on

South Africa by the United States and other countries, Japan

emerged as South Africa's largest trading partner during the 1980s.

This position proved embarrassing to Japan and led it to downgrade some diplomatic and economic relations with the country.

Despite the fact that South Africa remained Japan's largest trading partner in the region, both exports and imports in 1988 had

declined by more than one-third from their value in 1980.

Africa was the location of only US$4.6 billion or 2.5 percent of

Japanese foreign direct investment in 1988, of which most (US$3.6

billion) was in Liberia. As in Panama, this investment was mainly

in the form of flag-of-convenience shipping. Japanese data showed

virtually no direct investment in South Africa (US$1 million), and

no new investment in this country during the 1980s.

Communist Countries

Japan's experience with communist countries was quite limited

in the years after the war. In the 1980s, its patterns of interaction

with China and the Soviet Union diverged sharply, its relations

with China growing quickly, those with the Soviet Union stagnating. Other communist areas, such as Eastern Europe, continued

to be only tiny trade and investment partners for Japan.

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International Economic Relations

Exports to communist countries totaled US$13.8 billion in 1988, or 5.2 percent of Japan's exports. Imports from these countries

totaled nearly US$13.9 billion, yielding a virtual balance in trade.

Imports from the Soviet Union declined during the first half of the

1980s, from nearly US$1.9 billion to less than US$1.5 billion, and

then recovered to almost US$2.8 billion by 1988, representing a modest growth for the entire period. Imports from China, on the

other hand, more than doubled in this time, from just over US$4.3

billion in 1980 to nearly US$9.9 billion in 1988. Export trade fol- lowed a similar pattern: exports to the Soviet Union stagnated and

then grew modestly, to over US$3.1 billion in 1988, while those

to China expanded rapidly, from nearly US$5.1 billion in 1980

to just under US$9.5 billion in 1988.

China and Japan have geographic proximity, extensive cultural

ties, and a long history of commercial relations. However, Japan's

trade relationship with China was severely constrained in the 1950s

and 1960s because of its support for the United States policy of

containment. Japanese business did not expand such commercial

relations significantly until the United States-China rapprochement

in the early 1970s and Japan's subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with China (see Relations with China, ch. 7). Japan

recognized the Beijing government in 1972. After Mao Zedong's

death in 1976, China pursued economic contacts with the West,

and trade with Japan expanded rapidly. The new relationship was

reinforced by the signing of a Long-Term Trade Agreement in

1978. In 1980 Japan granted China reduced tariff treatment under

the Generalized System of Preferences.

Investment in China also expanded once relations improved in

the 1970s. Japanese data show some US$2 billion of cumulative

direct investment in China by 1988. China also became the largest single recipient of foreign aid from Japan during the 1980s.

However, a treaty establishing a firm legal framework for direct

investment, remained to be completed at the end of the 1980s. Furthermore, the massacre of Chinese prodemocracy demonstrators

in Beijing's 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and subsequent political

and economic tightening in China discouraged new Japanese in- vestment.

Commercial relations with the Soviet Union also paralleled stra- tegic developments. Japan was very interested in Siberian raw

materials in the early 1970s as prices were rising and detente persisted. The challenges to detente, especially the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and falling raw material prices, put strong

constraints on Japanese trade and investment relations with the

Soviet Union. Only after Soviet policy began to change under

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Japan: A Country Study

Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, beginning in 1985, did Japanese

trade resume its growth.

Further complicating economic relations with the Soviet Union

was the dispute over four small northern islands occupied by the

Soviets toward the end of World War II. No progress had taken

place on this issue during three decades of intermittent negotiations. However, the 1980s ended with new hope that a settlement

would emerge. Were this to occur, economic relations with the

Soviet Union might expand more rapidly (see Relations with the

Soviet Union, ch. 7). Japan's trade was also constrained by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which controlled

exports of strategic high technology. In 1987 the United States dis- covered that Toshiba Machine Tool had shipped machine tools on

the restricted list to the Soviet Union, tools used to manufacture

quieter submarine propellers. Although the Japanese government

moved reluctantly to punish Toshiba (and the United States imposed sanctions on Toshiba exports to the United States in

response), the final outcome was stronger surveillance and punishment for CoCom violations in Japan.

Japanese investment loans and trade credits went mainly to Siberian resource development. But this development never ex- panded as originally expected. Soviet interest in revitalizing the

economy in the late 1980s suggested that future Japanese investment would be concentrated in the western regions of the Soviet

Union rather than in Siberia.

Japan's trade and investment relations with other communist

countries in Eastern Europe and Asia were very limited. In 1988

exports to Eastern Europe were less than US$1 billion, as were

imports from the region. The reunification of Germany and the

rapid disintegration of communist regimes in other East European

countries may open the prospect of expanded trade and investment

during the 1990s, but economic problems within the region as these

nations grappled with moving toward market-oriented economies were likely to continue to limit trade with Japan. Trade with other

Asian communist countries was even less significant. The Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) is geographically close to Japan, but that nation's default on trade debt in the 1960s, combined with the political tension between it and the Republic of Korea

(South Korea) kept North Korean trade with Japan at a minimum.

International Economic Cooperation and Aid

Japan emerged as one of the largest aid donors in the world during the 1980s. In 1988 Japan was the second largest foreign aid

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donor worldwide, behind the United States. Japan's ratio of for- eign aid to GNP in this year was 0.32 percent behind the 0.35 per- cent average for the OECD's Development Assistance Committee

member countries, but ahead of the United States ratio of 0.20

percent.

The foreign aid program began in the 1960s out of the reparations payments Japan was obliged to pay to other Asian countries

for war damage. The program's budget remained quite low until

the late 1970s, when Japan came under increasing pressure from

other industrial countries to play a larger role. During the 1980s,

Japan's foreign aid budget grew quickly, despite the budget constraints imposed by the effort to reduce the fiscal deficit. From 1984

to 1988, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget in- creased at an average annual rate of 22.5 percent, reaching US$9.

1

billion by 1988. Part of this rise was due to exchange rate movements (with given yen amounts committed in the budget becoming larger dollar amounts). In the Japanese government budget,

foreign aid rose at a lower, but still strong rate, of between 4 per- cent and 12 percent each year during the 1980s, with an average

annual rate of growth from 1979 to 1988 of 8.6 percent.

Such assistance consisted of grants and loans, and support for multilateral aid organizations. In 1988 Japan allocated US$6.4 bil- lion of its aid budget to bilateral assistance and US$2.7 billion to multilateral agencies. Of the bilateral assistance, US$2.9 billion

went for grants and US$3.5 billion for concessional loans.

Japan's foreign aid program has been criticized for better serv- ing the interests of Japanese corporations than those of developing countries. In the past, tied aid (grants or loans tied to the

purchase of merchandise from Japan) was high, but untied aid ex- panded rapidly in the 1980s, reaching 71 percent of all aid by 1986.

This share compared favorably with other Development Assistance

Committee countries and with the United States corresponding

figure of 54 percent. Nevertheless, complaints continued that even

Japan's untied aid tended to be directed toward purchases from

Japan. Aid in the form of grants (the share of aid disbursed as grants

rather than as loans) was low relative to other Development Assistance Committee countries, and remained so late in the 1980s.

Bilateral assistance was concentrated in the developing countries

of Asia, although modest moves took place in the 1980s to expand

the geographical scope of aid. In 1988 some 62.8 percent of bilateral development assistance was allocated to Asia, 13.8 percent to Africa,

9.1 percent to the Middle East, and 6.2 percent to Latin America.

Asia's share was down somewhat, from 75 percent in 1975 and

70 percent in 1980, but still accounted for by far the largest share

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Japan: A Country Study

of bilateral aid. During the 1980s, increased aid went to Pakistan

and Egypt, partly in response to pressure from the United States

to provide such aid for strategic purposes. Japan had little involvement in Africa, but the severe drought of the 1980s brought an

increase in the share of development assistance for that continent.

The five largest recipients ofJapanese ODA in 1988 were in Asia:

Indonesia (US$985 million), China (US$674 million), the Philippines (US$535 million), Thailand (US$361 million), and Bangladesh (US$342 million). Earlier in the 1980s, China had been the

largest single recipient for several successive years. These large aid

amounts made Japan the largest single source of development as- sistance for most Asian countries. For the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, for example, Japan supplied

55 percent of net ODA received in 1987, compared with 11 per- cent from the United States and only 10 percent from the multilateral aid agencies.

The largest use ofJapan's bilateral aid was for economic infra- structure (transportation, communications, river development, and

energy development), which accounted for 39 percent of the total in 1988. Smaller shares went to development of the production sec- tor (19 percent) and social infrastructure (16 percent). In general,

large construction projects predominated in Japan's bilateral for- eign aid. Even within the category of social infrastructure, water

supply and sanitation, which involved major construction projects,

absorbed the largest amount of money (5.8 percent of the bilateral

aid in 1988, compared with 4.7 percent for education and only 2 percent for health). Food aid (0.5 percent of total bilateral aid in

1988) and debt relief (2.7 percent) were not important parts of

Japan's official development assistance.

Major International Industries

As in most countries, a relatively small number of industries

dominated Japan's trade and investment interaction with the rest of the world. In the late 1980s, those industries were motor vehicles, consumer electronics, computers, semiconductors and other

electronic components, and iron and steel. Motor Vehicles

The motor vehicle industry was the most successful industry in

Japan in the 1980s. In 1988 Japan produced 8.2 million passenger

cars, making it the largest producer in the world (the United States

in that year produced 7.1 million), and 54 percent of that output was exported. Passenger cars, other motor vehicles, and automotive parts were the largest class ofJapanese exports throughout the

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1980s. In 1988 they accounted for 18 percent of all Japanese exports, a meteoric rise from only 1.9 percent in 1960.

Fear of protectionism in the United States also led to major direct

foreign investments there by Japanese auto producers. By the end

of the decade, all the major Japanese producers had automotive

assembly lines operating in the United States: Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mazda, and Isuzu (in a joint plant with Subaru). Following

the major assembly firms, Japanese auto parts producers also began

investing in the United States in the late 1980s.

Automobiles were a major area of contention for the United

States-Japan relationship during the 1980s. When the price of oil rose in 1979, demand for small automobiles increased, which

worked to the advantage ofJapanese exports in the United States market. As the Japanese share of the market increased, to 21.8

percent in 1981, pressures rose to restrict imports from Japan. The

result of these pressures was a series of negotiations in early 1981

,

which produced a "voluntary" export agreement limiting Japanese

shipments to the United States to 1 .68 million units (excluding cer- tain kinds of specialty vehicles and trucks). This agreement re- mained in effect for the rest of the decade, with the limit reset at 2.3 million units in 1985. As Japanese assembly lines in the United

States came on line, imports ofJapanese automobiles in 1988 ac- tually fell below the limit. Similar restraints on Japanese exports were imposed by Canada and several West European countries. Japan's investment in- creased in Western Europe as well, but it faced pressure to achieve

high local value added as discussion proceeded on the European

Economic Community unification slated for 1992.

Foreign penetration of the automotive market in Japan was less successful. Imports of foreign automobiles were very low during

the forty years prior to 1985, never exceeding 60,000 units annually, or 1 percent of the domestic market. Trade and investment

barriers restricted imported cars to an insignificant share of the

market in the 1950s, and as barriers were finally lowered, strong

control over the distribution networks made penetration difficult. The major American automobile manufacturers acquired minority interests in some Japanese firms when investment restrictions were relaxed, Ford obtaining a 25 percent interest in Toyo Kogyo

(Mazda), General Motors a 34 percent interest in Isuzu, and Chrysler a 15 percent interest in Mitsubishi Motors. This ownership did

not provide a means for American cars to penetrate the Japanese

market until the end of the 1980s.

After the strong appreciation of the yen in 1985, however,

Japanese demand for foreign automobiles increased. The greater

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Japan: A Country Study

sense of affluence in Japanese society was accompanied by a ris- ing interest in European design. In 1988 automobile imports to- taled 150,629 units, of which 127,309 were European, mostly West

German. Only 21 , 124 units were imported from the United States

in 1988.

Consumer Electronics

The industries producing consumer electronics—audio receivers,

compact disc players, and other audio components; tape recorders,

television receivers, video cassette recorders, and video cameras

were major exporters, and in the 1980s they invested overseas as

well. In 1988, 34 percent of color televisions produced in Japan

were exported, as were 79 percent of video cassette recorders. Some

of these products had too small an export share to show up separately

in summary trade data, but audio tape recorders represented 2.9

percent of total Japanese exports in 1988, video cassette recorders

2.3 percent, radio receivers 0.8 percent, and television receivers

0.7 percent, for a total of 6.7 percent.

All of these industries built onJapan's success in developing commercial applications for the transistor in the 1950s and the suc- ceeding generations of semiconductor devices of the 1970s and

1980s. Most of this output came from large integrated electronics

firms, which manufactured semiconductor devices, consumer elec- tronics, and computers. Their international success came from continually pushing miniaturization and driving down manufacturing

costs through innovations in the manufacturing process. Mainly because of Japanese industry's success, the American

consumer electronics industry withered. During the 1970s, Japanese

inroads in the American market for color television receivers sparked

charges of dumping and other predatory practices. These disputes

led to an orderly marketing agreement or voluntary export restraint

by Japan in 1977, which limited exports of color televisions to 1 .75 million units annually between 1977 and 1980. While this agreement afforded some protection to the domestic industry, Japanese

firms responded by investing in the United States. By the end of

the 1980s, only one American-owned television manufacturer re- mained; the others had disappeared or been bought by West European or Japanese firms.

Other products for the consumer electronics market did not

become as controversial as color televisions, partly because the

Japanese had pioneered the products. Video cassette recorders,

video cameras, and compact disc players were all developed for the consumer market by Japanese firms, and no American-owned

firms were involved in their manufacture in the 1980s.

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Japan: A Country Study

Japanese overseas investment in the consumer electronics industry was motivated by protectionism and labor costs. Protectionism was the main motivation for Japanese firms to establish color tele- vision plants in the United States. By 1980, after the three years

of voluntary export restraints, seven Japanese firms had located

plants in the United States. In addition, Japanese firms retained

production of the most technologically advanced products at home,

while shifting production of less advanced products to developing

countries such as Taiwan. For these reasons, Japanese export of

color televisions fell during the 1980s, from 2 percent of total ex- ports in 1970 to only 0.7 percent in 1988.

Computers

Japan was a latecomer to computer manufacturing. IBM Japan,

a wholly owned subsidiary of IBM, along with other foreign subsidiaries, originally dominated the Japanese market. Until the

1980s, Japanese computer manufacturers viewed their marketing

battle as one of capturing Japan's domestic market from IBM

Japan, not of penetrating world markets. However, Japan's in- dustry developed with extraordinary speed and moved into international markets. The leading computer manufacturers in Japan

at the end of the 1980s (by sales in the domestic market) were

Fujitsu, IBM Japan, Hitachi, NEC, and Unisis, in mainframes,

and NEC, Fujitsu, Seiko Epson, Toshiba, and IBM Japan in per- sonal computers. Despite the benefits extended by Japanese industrial policy to the domestic computer industry, IBM was able to maintain a significant market position in Japan—a 24 percent share

of the mainframe market and a 6 percent share of the personal computer market in 1988.

In 1988 Japan exported US$1.5 billion of computer equipment,

up more than twelve-fold from the US$122 million in 1980.

Japanese firms were not very successful in exporting mainframe

computers, but did very well in peripheral equipment, such as printers and tape drives. In the rapidly growing personal computer

market, the Japanese achieved a modest market share in the United

States during the 1980s. Imports of computer equipment, in 1988, came to US$3.2 billion (including parts). However, much of the

computer equipment produced by foreign-owned firms that was

used in Japan was manufactured domestically by subsidiaries rather

than imported.

The special treatment extended to the computer industry became

the subject of trade disputes with the United States in the 1980s,

in particular, government procurement practices for supercomputers (the fastest, top-of-the-line computers). At issue was the

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International Economic Relations

inability of American manufacturers to sell these machines to government-funded agencies in Japan. Some rules were changed

in 1987, but supercomputers remained one of three products sin- gled out for further negotiation by the United States in 1989 under

the provisions of the 1988 Trade Act. Earlier, conflict ensued over

a Japanese proposal to protect computer software under patent law

rather than under copyright law, a move that the United States

felt would reduce protection for American-designed software in the

Japanese market. This issue was resolved when the patent law

proposal was dropped.

Semiconductors

Semiconductor devices are the key components of computers and

of a wide variety of other electronic equipment. Inasmuch as the

entire electronics industry was considered vital to the health and

growth of the economy, semiconductors received significant atten- tion in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of the 1980s,

Japanese firms dominated world production and trade in certain

segments of the semiconductor industry. In particular, they came

to dominate the world market in dynamic random-access memory

units (DRAMs). The Japanese share of the world merchant market for 1 -megabit DRAMs at the end of the decade, for example, was estimated at 90 percent, while other estimates put the Japanese

share of all semiconductor devices at 48 percent. Trade data showed

that in 1988 Japan exported more than US$12 billion in semiconductor devices (and vacuum tubes), representing a dramatic in- crease from US$6 million in 1960 and just over US$2 billion in

1980. Such imports, on the other hand, totaled only US$2.2 bil- lion in the same year. The rise of Japanese competition and the decline in the world

market share held by American manufacturers, coupled with alle- gations of unfair trade practices, made semiconductors a contentious issue between the United States and Japan throughout the

1980s. The allegations included charges of dumping in the United

States market and of import barriers artificially limiting the market share of American firms selling in Japan. Negotiations in 1986

produced an agreement that led to an increase in Japanese DRAM

export prices and that also included a provision to increase the

American share of the Japanese market (from the 10 percent that

prevailed at that time to 20 percent by 1991). United States complaints that the Japanese failed to carry out the agreement in good

faith led to retaliation, the imposition of punitive 100 percent tariffs on US$300 million ofJapanese exports to the United States. Evidence that the export prices of DRAMs had risen led to partial

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Japan: A Country Study

elimination of the sanctions, but others remained until compliance was seen in increasing the American market share in Japan. This

entire episode remained very controversial at the end of the decade, particularly the question of specifying an acceptable market

share for American products in Japan.

Iron and Steel

Iron and steel had been a leading industry in Japan and had

been considered critical to economic growth by the Japanese government in the 1950s. This attitude, exemplified by government loans

offered at favorable rates, led to rapid modernization and expansion of the domestic industry. By 1970 iron and steel were the leading exports from Japan, accounting for over US$2.8 billion or 14.7

percent of total exports. This export share peaked in 1974, at 19

percent. Because of both the domestic industry's strength and import barriers, imports of iron and steel represented a minimal

US$276 million in 1974. Japan's success in this industry, however,

did generate large imports of raw materials—iron ore and concentrates, and coking coal. Iron and steel were a classic case of a

processing trade, with Japan importing raw materials, building

state-of-the-art, integrated steel plants at harborside, and exporting part of the output to the rest of the world.

Iron and steel products were the object of major trade disputes

in the 1970s. The United States steel industry alleged that the

Japanese engaged in dumping to increase their market share in

the United States. These disputes led to various responses. In 1978,

the United States government instituted the "trigger price mechanism": when iron and steel imports reached a certain low price

it would initiate dumping investigations, effectively setting a minimum price for imports. These prices were based on estimates of

Japanese production costs because the Japanese were assumed to be the lowest-cost producer in the world. This system lasted until

the early 1980s and was replaced in 1984 by a set of voluntary ex- port restraints negotiated separately with major suppliers of iron

and steel to the United States. Japanese shipments to the United

States remained subject to these restraints for the rest of the decade.

Despite the emphasis placed on the iron and steel industry in

the Japanese economy and its export success, the industry proved

to be mature and declining in the 1980s. Its share of totalJapanese

exports slipped to only 5.8 percent by 1988. Imports of iron and

steel to Japan rose rapidly in the 1980s, reaching US$4.6 billion or 2.5 percent of total imports. South Korea, for example, was

rapidly moving into certain parts of the industry and managed to penetrate Japanese markets despite opposition from the Japanese

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International Economic Relations

industry. As a leader in steelmaking technology by the late 1970s,

Japan had also become an important source of technology for South

Korea, China, and other developing nations building their own

steel industries.

Industries of the Future

The Japanese government remained actively involved in shaping Japan's economic future. Electronics were in the forefront in

the 1980s, but the importance of other industries appeared to be

rising by the end of the decade. These industries included composite materials, industrial ceramics, space development (including

satellites and launch vehicles), and superconductors (and products

using them, such as magnetic levitation trains). The government's

strong belief that such industries will be critical for the nation's

future will likely foster active participation in these industries by

Japanese firms. As these industries develop, they are also likely to become the subject of trade disputes insofar as industrial policy concerns might limit imports and result in an export push that other

nations would resent. On the other hand, because Japan is at the

technological frontier with other nations in these industries, Japanese development might produce more original technologies that

other nations would be eager to acquire, perhaps creating greater

mutual dependence.

* * *

Information and analysis in English on Japanese international

economic relations are widely available. Excellent survey articles can be found in The Political Economy ofJapan: Vol. 2, The International Dimension, edited by Takeshi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto.

Bela Belassa and Marcus Noland's Japan in the World Economy dis- cusses both macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of

Japan's foreign economic relations, and Edward J. Lincoln'sJapan's

Unequal Trade focuses on Japanese import behavior. Each year the

Ministry of International Trade and Industry publishes a review

of international economic relations in its Tsusho Hakusho (Trade

White Paper), abridged versions of which are available in English

translation.

Current information is also available in a variety of specialized

periodicals, including the Japan Economic Journal, Tokyo Business

Today, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asian Wall Street Journal.

Detailed trade and other international data are published in both

Japanese and English in the Bank ofJapan's Economic Statistics Annual, and the Japan Statistical Yearbook of the Prime Minister's Office.

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Japan: A Country Study

Balance of payments data are available through the Bank ofJapan's

Balance ofPayments Monthly (which also gives annual data), and trade

data are available in the Japan Tariff Association's Summary Report,

Trade ofJapan. More detailed trade data are provided by the Japan

Tariff Association'sJapan's Exports and Imports. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

302
Chapter 6. The Political System
Family crest ofa double-petal chrysanthemum (kiku), a blossom that symbolizes

nobility and purity; used by the imperial family
IN 1990, JAPAN'S oldest living person was Fujisawa Mitsu, 113

years old. In the year of her birth, 1876 (the ninth year of the

1868-1912 Meiji era), the government ended the special status of

the samurai, taking away their stipends and prohibiting them from

wearing swords. Members of the new ruling elite traveled to Europe

and the United States to study Western political ideas and institutions. Mitsu was thirteen when the Meiji Constitution was promulgated, a constitution combining traditional nationalistic thought

with German legal and political concepts. The most influential

Meiji-era advocate of Anglo-American liberalism, Fukuzawa

Yukichi, died in 1901 when Mitsu was twenty-five. She was middleaged when political parties controlled the government during the

"Taisho democracy" era of the early to middle 1920s and revolutionary Marxism was popular among university students and intellectuals. The "Showa fascism" of the 1930s and 1940s was in

large measure a reaction against these Westernizing trends. When

General Douglas MacArthur landed in Japan and began the United

States occupation in 1945, Mitsu was sixty-nine years old. Her

robust old age witnessed the reintroduction of Western-style

liberalism, the emergence of a stable parliamentary system under

the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP—JiyuMinshuto), the rise of the new left, and postwar Japan's most dramatic episode of romantic rightist theater, writer Mishima Yukio's

self-immolation in 1970.

That the lifespan of a single person could encompass such dramatic and abrupt changes suggests the heterogeneity of contemporary Japanese political values. The country has been host to a wide range of often conflicting foreign influences: Prussian sta- tism, French radicalism, Anglo-American liberalism, Marxism and

Marxism-Leninism, and European fascism. Mitsu lived to see the

kokutai (national polity) ideology enshrined in the Meiji Constitution and overthrown in the postwar Constitution. The fact that a person living in 1990 had been born in the twilight ofJapan's feu- dal regime suggests that some of the older values remained viable.

Certainly Japan's economic dynamism is often explained in terms

of the coupling of feudal values with the efficiency of modern or- ganization. Political scientists seeking to describe the distinctive

features ofJapanese politics also point to the feudal legacy behind

them. These features include the nature of decision making, the

generally pragmatic spirit ofJapanese politics and, especially, the

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Japan: A Country Study

post- 1955 successes of the conservative LDP, which has epitomized

feudal personalism.

Maintaining power uninterruptedly for nearly four decades, the

LDP was able to promote a highly stable policy-making process.

Its leaders functioned as brokers, joining the expertise of the elite

civil service with the demands of important interest groups. The

role of these leaders, however, was not passive. Since the 1960s,

the party's policy-making power has increased while that of the

bureaucracy has declined. Although political scandals were frequent,

tarnishing the general image of politicians, the system succeeded

in providing most groups in society with adequate representation

and a share of prosperity. The Japanese middle-class in the early

1990s was large and stable. At the same time, opposition parties were divided and generally ineffectual. Although they performed an important monitoring function, they seemed in the early 1990s incapable of joining

forces or providing a credible alternative to the ruling party. The

general election of February 18, 1990 still gave the scandal-shaken

LDP a stable majority in the lower house, making it likely that not only Mitsu's great-great-grandchildren, but also her great-greatgreat grandchildren, would grow to maturity under a LDP prime

minister.

The Postwar Constitution

On July 26, 1945, Allied leaders Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman, and Joseph Stalin issued the Potsdam Declaration, which

demandedJapan's unconditional surrender. This declaration also defined the major goals of the postsurrender Allied occupation:

"The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival

and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese

people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established" (Section 10). In addition, this document stated: "The occupying forces

of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in ac- cordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a

peacefully inclined and responsible government" (Section 12). The

Allies sought not merely punishment or reparations from a militaristic foe, but fundamental changes in the nature of its political

system. In the words of political scientist Robert Ward: "The oc- cupation was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed political change in world

history."

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The Political System

The wording of the Potsdam Declaration—"The Japanese

Government shall remove all obstacles . . ." —and the initial postsurrender measures taken by MacArthur, the Supreme Commander

for the Allied Powers (SCAP), suggest that neither he nor his

superiors in Washington intended to impose a new political sys- tem on Japan unilaterally. Instead, they wished to encourage new

Japanese leaders to initiate democratic reforms on their own. But

by early 1946, MacArthur' s staff and Japanese officials were at odds over the most fundamental issue, the writing of a new constitution. Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro and many of his colleagues were extremely reluctant to take the drastic step of replacing the

1889 Meiji Constitution with a more liberal document. In late 1945,

Shidehara appointed Matsumoto Joji, state minister without portfolio, head of a blue-ribbon committee of constitutional scholars

to suggest revisions. The Matsumoto Commission's recommendations, made public in February 1946, were quite conservative

(described by one Japanese scholar in the late 1980s as "no more

than a touching-up of the Meiji Constitution"). MacArthur re- jected them outright and ordered his staff to draft a completely new

document. This was presented to surprised Japanese officials on

February 13, 1946.

The MacArthur draft, which proposed a unicameral legislature, was changed at the insistence of the Japanese to allow a bicameral

legislature, both houses being elected. In most other important

respects, however, the ideas embodied in the February 13 document were adopted by the government in its own draft proposal

of March 6. These included the Constitution's most distinctive fea- tures: the symbolic role of the emperor, the prominence of guarantees of civil and human rights, and the renunciation of war. The

new document was approved by the Privy Council, the House of

Peers, and the House of Representatives, the major organs of

government in the 1889 constitution, and promulgated on November 3, 1946, to go into effect on May 3, 1947. Technically, the

1947 Constitution was an amendment to the 1889 document rather

than its abrogation.

The new Constitution would not have been written as it was had

MacArthur and his staff allowed Japanese politicians and constitutional experts to resolve the issue as they wished. The document's

foreign origins have, understandably, been a focus of controversy

since Japan recovered its sovereignty in 1952. Yet in late 1945 and

1946, there was much public discussion on constitutional reform,

and the MacArthur draft was apparently greatly influenced by the

ideas of certain Japanese liberals. The MacArthur draft did not

attempt to impose an American-style presidential or federal system.

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Japan: A Country Study

Instead, the proposed Constitution conformed to the British model

of parliamentary government, which was seen by the liberals as the most viable alternative to the European absolutism of the Meiji

Constitution.

After 1952 conservatives and nationalists attempted to revise the

Constitution to make it more

' 'Japanese," but these attempts were

frustrated for a number of reasons. One was the extreme difficulty

of amending it. Amendments require approval by two-thirds of

the members of both houses of the National Diet (see Glossary;

The Legislature, this ch.), before they can be presented to the people

in a referendum (Article 96). Also, opposition parties, occupying more than one-third of the Diet seats, were firm supporters of the

constitutional status quo. Even for members of the ruling LDP,

the Constitution was not disadvantageous. They had been able to fashion a policy-making process congenial to their interests within

its framework. Nakasone Yasuhiro, a strong advocate of constitutional revision during much of his political career, for example,

downplayed the issue while serving as prime minister between 1982

and 1987.

The Status of the Emperor

In the Meiji Constitution, the emperor was sovereign and the

locus of the state's legitimacy: as the preamble stated, "The rights

of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants." In the

postwar Constitution, the emperor's role in the political system was

drastically redefined. A prior and important step in this process was Emperor Hirohito's 1946 New Year's speech, made at the

prompting of MacArthur, renouncing his status as a divine ruler. Hirohito declared that relations between the ruler and his people

cannot be based on "the false conception that the emperor is di- vine or that the Japanese people are superior to other races." In the first article of the new Constitution, the newly "humanized" ruler is described as "the symbol of the State and of

the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the

people with whom resides sovereign power. " The authority of the

emperor as sovereign in the 1 889 constitution was broad and undefined. His functions under the postwar system are narrow, specific, and largely ceremonial, confined to such activities as convening

the Diet bestowing decorations on deserving citizens, and receiving foreign ambassadors (Article 7). He does not possess "powers

related to government" (Article 4). The change in the emperor's

status was designed to preclude the possibility of military or bureaucratic cliques exercising broad and irresponsible powers "in

308
Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko at a press conference, 1989

Courtesy The Mainichi Newspapers

the emperor's name" —a prominent feature of 1930s extremism.

The Constitution defines the Diet as the "highest organ of state power" (Article 41), accountable not to the monarch but to the

people who elected its members.

The use of the Japanese word shocho, meaning symbol, to describe

the emperor is unusual and—depending upon one's viewpoint

conveniently or frustratingly vague. The emperor is neither head

of state nor sovereign, as are many European constitutional

monarchs, although in October 1988 Japan's Ministry of Foreign

Affairs claimed, controversially, that the emperor is the country's

sovereign in the context of its external relations. Nor does the emperor have an official priestly or religious role. Although he continues to perform ancient rituals, such as ceremonial planting of

the rice crop in spring, he does so in a private capacity.

Laws relating to the imperial house must be approved by the

Diet. Under the old system, the Imperial House Law was separate

from and equal with the constitution. After the war, the imperial

family's extensive estates were confiscated and its finances placed

under control of the Imperial Household Agency, part of the Office

of the Prime Minister and theoretically subject to the Diet. In practice, the agency in the early 1990s remained a bastion of conser- vatism, its officials shrouding the activities of the emperor and his

309
Japan: A Country Study

family behind a "chrysanthemum curtain" (the chrysanthemum

being the crest of the imperial house) to maintain an aura of sanctity. Despite knowledge of his illness among the press corps and

other observers, details about the late Emperor Hirohito's state of

health in 1988 and 1989 were tightly controlled. In the early 1990s,

the use of the masculine pronoun to describe the emperor was appropriate because the Imperial Household Law still restricted the

succession to males—despite the fact that in earlier centuries some

ofJapan's rulers had been women (see Nara and Heian Periods,

A.D. 710-1185, ch. 1). The emperor's constitutional status became a focus of renewed

public attention following news of Hirohito's serious illness in late 1988. Crown Prince Akihito became the first person to ascend the

throne under the postwar system. One important symbolic issue was the choice of a new reign title under the gengo system—borrowed originally from imperial China and used before 1945—which

enumerates years beginning with the first year of a monarch's reign.

Thus 1988 was Showa 63, the sixty-third year of the reign of

Hirohito, the Showa Emperor. The accession of a new monarch

is marked by the naming of a new era that consists of two auspicious Chinese characters. Showa, for example, means bright harmony. Critics deplored the secrecy with which such titles were

chosen in the past, the decision being left to a government-appointed

committee of experts, and advocated public discussion of the choice

as a reflection of Japan's democratic values. Although the gengo system was accorded official status by a bill the Diet passed in June

1979, some favored the system's abandonment altogether in

favor of the Western calendar. But on January 7, 1989, the day

of Hirohito's death, the government announced that Heisei (Achieving Peace) was the new era name. The first year of Heisei thus was 1989, and all official documents were so dated.

Still more controversial were the ceremonies held in connection

with the late emperor's funeral and the new emperor's accession. State support of these activities would have violated Article 20 of

the Constitution on the separation of state and religious activities. Rightists, such as members of the Society to Protect Japan (Nihon

o Mamoru Kai), a nationwide lobbying group, demanded full public support of the ceremonies as expression of the people's love for

their monarch. Walking a tightrope between pro-Constitution and

rightist groups, the government chose to divide Hirohito's state funeral, held February 24, 1989, into official and religious components. Akihito 's accession to the throne in November 1990 also had religious (Shinto) and secular components: the Sokui-norei, or Enthronement Ceremony, was secular; the Daijosai, or Great

310
The Political System

Thanksgiving Festival—traditionally, a communion between the

new monarch and the gods in which the monarch himself became

a deity—was religious. The government's decision to use public

funds not only for the Sokui-no-rei but also for the Daijosai, justified in terms of the "public nature" of both ceremonies, was seen by religious and opposition groups as a serious violation of Article

20.In the early 1990s, an array of such symbolic political issues

brought attention to the state's role in religious or quasi-religious

activities. Defenders of the Constitution, includingJapanese Christians, followers of new religions, leftists, and many members of

the political opposition, considered any government involvement

in religious aspects of the enthronement to be a conservative at- tempt to undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution. They also strongly criticized the 1989 Ministry of Education,

Science, and Culture's controversial directive, which called for the

playing of the prewar national anthem ("Kimigayo," or "The

Sovereign's Reign") and display of the rising sun flag (Hinomaru,

the use of which dates to the early nineteenth century) at public

school ceremonies. Although since the late 1950s, these activities had been described by the ministry as "desirable," neither had

legal status under the postwar Constitution.

Another issue was state support for the Yasukuni Shrine. This

shrine, located in Tokyo near the Imperial Palace, was established

during the Meiji era as a repository for the souls of soldiers and

sailors who died in battle, thus a holy place rather than simply a war memorial. Conservatives introduced bills five times during the

1970s to make it a "national establishment," but none was adopted.

On the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II, August 15,

1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and members of his cabi- net visited the shrine in an official capacity, an action viewed as a renewed conservative effort, outside the Diet, to invest the shrine

with official status. Despite the veneer of Westernization and Article 20 's prohibition of state support of the emperor's religious or ceremonial

activities, his postwar role was in some ways more like that

of traditional rather than prewar emperors. During the Meiji

(1868-1912), Taisho (1912-26), and early Showa (1926-89) eras, the emperor himself was not actively involved in politics. His political authority, however, was immense, and military and bureaucratic elites acted in his name. The "symbolic" role of the emperor

after 1945, however, recalled feudal Japan, where political power

was monopolized and exercised by the shoguns, and the imperial

court carried on a leisurely, apolitical existence in the ancient capital

311
Japan: A Country Study

of Kyoto and served as patrons of culture and the arts (see

Kamakura and Muromachi Periods, 1185-1573, ch. 1; Religious

and Philosophical Traditions, ch. 2). Emperor Akihito, in an effort to put a modern face on the

Japanese monarchy, held a press conference on August 7, 1989,

his first since ascending to the throne. He expressed his determination to respect the Constitution and promote international understanding.

The Article 9 "No War" Clause

Another distinctive feature of the Constitution, and one that has

generated as much controversy as the status of the emperor, is the

Article 9 "No War" clause. It contains two paragraphs: the first states that the Japanese people "forever renounce war as a sover- eign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means

of settling international disputes," the second that "land, sea, and

air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.

Some historians attribute the inclusion of Article 9 to Charles Kades, one of MacArthur's closest associates, who was impressed by the

spirit of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war (see

Diplomacy, ch. 1). MacArthur himself claimed that the idea had

been suggested to him by Prime Minister Shidehara. The article's acceptance by the Japanese government may in part be explained

by the desire to protect the imperial throne. Some Allied leaders saw the emperor as the primary factor in Japan's warlike behavior.

His assent to the "No War" clause weakened their arguments in

favor of abolishing the throne or trying the emperor as a war criminal.Article 9 has had broad implications for foreign policy, the in- stitution ofjudicial review as exercised by the Supreme Court, the

status of the Self-Defense Forces, and the nature and tactics of opposition politics (see Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies,

ch. 7; The Self-Defense Forces, ch. 8). During the late 1980s, in- creases in government appropriations for the Self-Defense Forces

averaged more than 5 percent per year. By the early 1990s, Japan

was ranked third, behind the Soviet Union and the United States,

in total defense expenditures, and the United States urged Japan

to assume a larger share of the burden of defense of the western

Pacific. Given these circumstances, some have viewed Article 9 as increasingly irrelevant. It has remained, however, an important

brake on the growth of Japan's military capabilities. Despite the

fading of bitter wartime memories, the general public, according

to opinion polls, continued to show strong support for this constitutional provision.

312
The cenotaph for victims of the atomic bomb, Peace Memorial Park,

Hiroshima. The Atomic Bomb Dome, at the epicenter of the 1945

detonation, is seen through the arch. Courtesy Jane T. Griffin

Rights and Duties of Citizens

"The rights and duties of the people" are prominently featured

in the postwar Constitution. Altogether, 31 of its 103 articles are devoted to describing them in considerable detail, reflecting the

commitment to "respect for the fundamental human rights" of

the Potsdam Declaration. Although the Meiji Constitution had a

section devoted to the "rights and duties of subjects," which guaranteed "liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings, and

associations," these rights were granted "within the limits of law."

Freedom of religious belief was allowed "insofar as it does not in- terfere with the duties of subjects" (all Japanese were required to acknowledge the emperor's divinity, and those, such as Christians,

who refused to do so out of religious conviction were accused of

lese-majeste).

Such freedoms are delineated in the postwar Constitution without

qualification. In addition, the later Constitution guarantees free- dom of thought and conscience; academic freedom; the prohibition of discrimination based on race, creed, social status, or family

origin; and a number of what could be called welfare rights: the

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Japan: A Country Study

right to "minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living,"

the right to "equal education," the "right and obligation to work"

according to fixed standards of labor and wages, and the right of

workers to organize. Equality of the sexes and the right of marriage based on mutual consent (in contrast to arranged marriage

in the most traditional sense, in which families decide on the match)

are also recognized. Limitations are placed on personal freedoms

only insofar as they are not abused (Article 12) or interfere with

public welfare (Article 13). The bestowal of the power of judicial

review on the Supreme Court (Article 81) is in part meant to serve

as a means of defending individual rights from infringement by

public authorities (see The Judicial System, this ch.).

Some United States origins of the Constitution are revealed in

the phraseology of Article 13, which states that the right of the people

to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" shall be the "supreme

consideration in legislation and other governmental affairs." It was

with some awkwardness that such concepts were translated into

Japanese. Yet the document goes further in enumerating rights

than do the United States and many other Western constitutions.

For example, the article pertaining to equality of the sexes (Article 14) bans sexual (as well as racial, religious, and social) discrimination "in political, economic, or social relations" as clearly as the proposed United States equal rights amendment, which failed to be ratified during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike their Japanese

counterparts, United States schoolteachers and university professors are not protected by a special provision on academic freedom

(Article 23). Instead, American teaching and research activities are subsumed under the more general guarantee of freedom of speech

in the First Amendment.

The Structure of Government

The Legislature

Article 41 of the Constitution describes the National Diet, or

national legislature, as "the highest organ of state power" and "the

sole law-making organ of the State" (see fig. 7). This statement

is in forceful contrast to the Meiji Constitution, which described

the emperor as the one who exercised legislative power with the

consent of the Diet. The Diet's responsibilities include not only

the making of laws but also the approval of the annual national

budget that the government submits and the ratification of treaties.

It can also initiate draft constitutional amendments, which, if approved, must be presented to the people in a referendum. The Diet

may conduct "investigations in relation to government" (Article

314
The Political System

62). The prime minister must be designated by Diet resolution,

establishing the principle of legislative supremacy over executive

government agencies (Article 67). The government can also be dis- solved by the Diet if it passes a motion of no confidence introduced

by fifty members of the House of Representatives, the lower chamber. Government officials, including the prime minister and cabi- net members, are required to appear before Diet investigative

committees and answer inquiries. The Diet also has the power to impeach judges convicted of criminal or irregular conduct.

Japan's legislature is bicameral. Both the upper house, the House

of Councillors, and the lower house, the House of Representatives,

are elective bodies. The Constitution's Article 14 declares that

' 4 peers and peerages shall not be recognized." Upon its enactment,

the old House of Peers was abolished. Members of the two new

houses are elected by universal adult suffrage, and secrecy of the

ballot is guaranteed (Article 15). The term of the House of Representatives is four years. It may be dissolved earlier, however, if the prime minister or members of the House of Representatives

decide to hold a general election before the expiration of that term

(Article 7). Multiple representatives are elected from 130 constituencies based theoretically on population (see The Electoral

System, this ch.). In 1990 the House of Representatives had 512

members.

Members of the House of Councillors have six-year terms. One

half of these terms expire every three years. There are two types

of constituencies in the upper house: prefectural constituencies, for the forty-seven prefectures and districts, represented by 152 councillors, apportioned according to the district populations; and a national "proportional representation" constituency, represented by

100 councillors, which yields a total of 252. The proportional

representation system, introduced in 1982, was the first major elec- toral reform under the postwar Constitution. Instead of choosing

national constituency candidates as individuals, as had previously

been the case, voters cast ballots for parties. Individual councillors, listed officially by the parties before the election, are selected on the basis of the parties' proportions of the total national constituency vote. The system was introduced to reduce the excessive

money spent by candidates for the national constituencies. Critics

charged, however, that this new system benefited the two largest

parties, the LDP and Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaito), which

in fact had sponsored the reform.

The House of Representatives has the greater power of the two

contemporary houses, in contrast to the prewar system in which

the two houses had equal status. According to Article 59, a bill

315
Japan: A Country Study

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The Political System

that is approved by the House of Representatives but turned down

by the House of Councillors returns to the House of Representatives. If the latter passes the bill with a two-thirds or higher majority on this second ballot, the bill becomes law. However, three important exceptions to the principle exist, covering the approval of

the budget, adoption of treaties with foreign countries, and the selec- tion of the prime minister. In all three cases, if the upper and lower

houses have a disagreement that is not resolved by a joint committee of the two houses, then after a lapse of thirty days "the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the

Diet" (Articles 60, 61, and 67). Budgeting is an important annual

political function, setting both taxes and the allowable expenditures

of all segments of the central government, and the impotence of

the upper house has been demonstrated on a number of occasions.

Nevertheless, the House of Councillors, with its fixed terms, can- not be dissolved by the prime minister. In times of emergency,

the cabinet may convene the House of Councillors rather than the

House of Representatives (Article 54).

In the July 23, 1989, election for half the members of the House

of Councillors, the LDP lost its majority. It won only 36 of the

126 seats contested in the prefectural and national constituencies,

while the opposition parties together won 90; the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, won 46 (see table 36, Appendix). This result gave an admittedly unstable coalition of

opposition groups the opportunity to use the limited powers of the

upper house to delay or frustrate initiatives taken in the LDPdominated lower house. On August 9, 1989, for the first time in

forty-one years, the two houses nominated two different candidates

for prime minister—Kaifu Toshiki of the LDP and Doi Takako

of the Japan Socialist Party. Although Kaifu was finally chosen

because of the principle of lower house supremacy, the events showed how opposition control of the upper house could complicate the political process. In March 1990, the upper house rejected a supplementary budget bill for fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1989

that had been proposed by the lower house. Although the bill was

eventually approved despite upper house rejection, the wrangling

caused some minor inconvenience to the country's more than 1 million national civil servants whose monthly salary payments were

delayed. The more serious upheaval, that might have occurred had

there been a real deadlock or a potential shift in fiscal policies

brought about by the opposition parties, was avoided.

The Cabinet and Ministries

In the postwar political system, executive power is vested in the

cabinet. The cabinet head is the prime minister, responsible for

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Japan: A Country Study

appointing and dismissing other cabinet members. Cabinet

ministers include those appointed to head the ministries, twelve

in number, and ministers of state placed in charge of the commissions and agencies of the Office of the Prime Minister, which itself has the status of a ministry. They include the director general of

the Defense Agency, equivalent to a minister of defense but lacking ministerial status (a reflection of the Article 9 renunciation of

war). Also among the ministers of state are the chief cabinet secretary, who coordinates the activities of the ministries and agencies,

conducts policy research, and prepares materials to be discussed

at cabinet meetings, and the director of the Cabinet Legislative

Bureau, who advises cabinet members on drafting the legislation to be proposed to the Diet. Although the chief cabinet secretary

does not have ministerial rank, the position is influential within

the cabinet because of its coordination role. The Board of Audit reviews government expenditures and submits an annual report to the Diet. The 1947 Board of Audit Law

gives this body substantial independence from both cabinet and

Diet control. The Security Council advises the prime minister on

salaries and other matters pertaining to national government civil servants. Semiautonomous public corporations—including public

housing corporations, financial institutions, and Japan Broadcasting

Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK, which was the sole,

noncommercial public radio and television broadcasting system)

had been reduced in number by the privatization ofJapan Airlines,

the Japanese National Railways, the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public

Corporation, and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

during the 1980s, but there still remained ninety-seven such or- ganizations in 1988.

National government civil servants are divided into "special"

and "regular" categories. Appointments in the special category

are governed by political or other factors and do not involve ex- aminations. This category includes cabinet ministers, heads of in- dependent agencies, members of the Self-Defense Forces, Diet

officials, and ambassadors. The core of the civil service is composed of members of the regular category, who are recruited through

competitive examinations. This group is further divided into junior

service and upper professional levels, the latter forming a well- defined civil service elite (see The Civil Service, this ch.).

Local Government

As of 1990, Japan was divided into forty-seven administrative

divisions: one metropolitan district {to—Tokyo), two urban prefec- tures (fu—Kyoto and Osaka), forty-three regular prefectures (ken),

318
The Political System

and one district (do —Hokkaido) (see fig. 8). Large cities were subdivided into wards (ku), and further split into precincts (machi or

cho), or subdistricts (shicho) and counties (gun).

Each of the forty-seven local jurisdictions has a governor and

a unicameral assembly, both elected by popular vote every four

years. All are required by national law to maintain departments

of general affairs, finance, welfare, health, and labor. Departments

of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, commerce, and industry are optional, depending on local needs. The governor is responsible for

all activities supported through local taxation or the national

government.

Cities (shi) are self-governing units administered independently

of the larger jurisdictions within which they are located. In order

to attain shi status, a jurisdiction must have at least 30,000 inhabitants, 60 percent of whom are engaged in urban occupations. City

government is headed by a mayor elected for four years by popular vote. There are also popularly elected city assemblies. The wards

(ku) of larger cities also elect their own assemblies, which select ward

superintendents

.

The terms machi and cho designate self-governing towns outside

the cities as well as precincts of urban wards. Like the cities, each

has its own elected mayor and assembly. Villages (son or mura) are the smallest self-governing entities in rural areas. They often consist of a number of rural hamlets (buraku) containing several thousand people connected to one another through the formally imposed

framework of village administration. Villages have mayors and

councils elected to four-years terms. Japan has a unitary rather than federal system of government,

in which local jurisdictions largely depend on national government

both administratively and financially. Although much less powerful than its prewar counterpart, the Home Ministry, the postwar

Ministry of Home Affairs, and other national ministries as well,

have the authority to intervene significandy in regional and local government. The result of this power is a high level of organizational and policy standardization among the different local governments. Because local tax revenues are insufficient to support

prefectural and city governments, these bodies depend on central

government for subsidies. The term "30 percent autonomy" is fre- quently used to describe local government because that amount

of revenues is derived from local taxation. Yet local governments

are not entirely passive. People have a strong sense of local community, are highly suspicious of central government, and wish to preserve the uniqueness of their prefecture, city, or town. Some

of the more progressive jurisdictions, such as Tokyo and Kyoto,

319
Japan: A Country Study

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

METROPOLIS

(TO) TOKYO

(KU) WARDS | SUBDISTRjCTS

(SHICHO)

f

CITIES | COUNTIES

(SHI) | (GUN)

URBAN

PREFECTURES

_ (FU) KYOTO, OSAKA

CITIES

(SHI)

COUNTIES

(GUN)

SUBDISTRJCTS

(SHICHO) COUNTIES

(GUN)

TOWNS

(CHO or MACHI) CHOKA1

VILLAGES r 1 (SON or "4 BURAKU \ MURA) L j

L.J INDICATES ADMINISTRATIVE

UNITS THAT LACK

LEGAL STATUS

Figure 8. Structure of Local Government, 1990

have experimented with policies in such areas as social welfare that

later were adopted by the national government.

The Electoral System

The Japanese political system has three types of elections: general

elections to the House of Representatives held every four years (unless the lower house is dissolved earlier), elections to the House

of Councillors held every three years to choose one-half of its members, and local elections held every four years for offices in prefectures, cities, and villages. Elections are supervised by election

committees at each administrative level under the general direction of the Central Election Administration Committee. The minimum voting age for persons of both sexes is twenty years; voters must satisfy a three-month residency requirement before being

320
The Political System

allowed to cast a ballot. For those seeking office, there are two sets of age requirements: twenty-five years of age for admission to the

House of Representatives and most local offices, and thirty years

of age for admission to the House of Councillors and the prefectural governorship.

In the general election of February 18, 1990, the thirty-ninth

held since the first parliamentary election in July 1890, the 130

multiple-seat election districts of the House of Representatives

returned two to five representatives, depending on their population. There were two exceptions: the district encompassing the

Amami Islands, south of Kyushu, elected only one representative

to the lower house, while the first district of Hokkaido elected six. Successful candidates were those who won at least the fifth largest

aggregation of votes in a five-person district, the fourth largest in a four-person district, and so on. Voters cast their ballots for only one candidate. Competition for lower house seats in the February

1990 general election varied from district to district. Tokyo's fourth

district had seventeen candidates running for five seats, while the

second district in Ibaraki Prefecture had only four persons run- ning for three seats. In Okinawa Prefecture's single five- seat district, there were only six candidates.

In House of Councillors elections, the prefectural constituencies

elect from two to eight councillors depending on their population.

Each voter casts one ballot for a prefectural candidate and a sec- ond one for a party in the national constituency system.

Percentages of eligible voters casting ballots in postwar elections

for the House of Representatives have varied within a rather nar- row range, from 76.9 percent in May 1958 to 67.9 percent in December 1983. The figure for the February 18, 1990, general election was 72.4 percent. Although interest in politics is greater in urban

than rural areas, voter turnout in the latter is generally higher,

probably because constituents have a greater personal stake in such

elections.

Elections and Political Funding

Partly as a result of revelations following the Recruit scandal

of 1988-89, the problem of political funding was intensely debated

during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The scandal arose through

the dealings of Ezoe Hiromasa, ambitious chairman of the board

of the Recruit Corporation (a professional search service that had

diversified into finance and real estate, and had become involved

in politics), who sold large blocks of untraded shares in a subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos, to seventy-six individuals. When the stock

321
Japan: A Country Study

was traded over the counter in 1986, its price jumped, earning

individual investors as much as ¥100 million (for value of the

yen—see Glossary) in after-sales profits. The persons involved in- cluded the most influential leaders of the LDP (usually through

their aides or spouses) and a smaller number of opposition party

figures. Although such insider trading was not strictly illegal, it caused public outrage at a time when the ruling party was considering a highly controversial consumption tax. Before the scandal ran its weary course, Takeshita Noboru was obliged to resign

as prime minister in April 1989, a senior aide committed suicide

in expiation for his leader's humiliation, and former Prime Minister

Nakasone Yasuhiro resigned from the LDP—becoming an ''in- dependent" Diet member—to spare the much-tainted party fur- ther shame.

Regarding the background issue of political funding, a group

of parliamentarians belonging to the ruling LDP estimated in 1987

that annual expenses for ten newly elected members of the Diet

averaged ¥120 million each, or about $US800,000 (see table 34,

Appendix). This figure, which included expenses for staff and constituent services in a member's home district, was less than the aver- age for Diet members as a whole, because long-term incumbents

tend to incur higher expenses. Yet in the late 1980s, the government provided each Diet member with only ¥20 million for an- nual operating expenses, leaving ¥100 million to be obtained

through private contributions, political party faction bosses, or other means (see The Liberal Democratic Party, this ch.). The lack of

public funding meant that politicians—especially, but not exclusively, members of the LDP—needed constant infusions of cash

to stay in office. Maintaining staff and offices in Tokyo and the home district constituted the biggest expense. Near-obligatory attendance at the weddings and funerals of constituents and their families, however, was

another large financial drain: the Japanese custom requires that

attendees contribute cash, handed over discreetly in elaborately

decorated envelopes, to the parents of the bride and groom or to the bereaved.

After revelations of corrupt activities forced the resignation of

Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, postwar Japan's most skillful practitioner of "money politics," in 1974, the 1948 Political Funds Control Law was amended to establish ceilings for contributions from

corporations, other organizations, and individuals. This change

forced Diet members to seek a larger number of smaller contributions to maintain cash flow. Fund-raising parties to which tickets were sold were a major revenue source during the 1980s, and the

322
The Political System

abuse of these ticket sales became a public concern. Another re- lated problem was the secrecy surrounding political funds and their use. Although many politicians, including members of newly appointed cabinets, voluntarily disclosed their personal finances, such

disclosure was not compulsory in the early 1990s and many sources of revenue remained obscure.

Proposals for system reform in the early 1990s included compulsory full disclosure of campaign funding, more generous public allowances for Diet members to reduce (or, ideally, to eliminate)

their reliance on under-the-table contributions, and stricter penalties

for violators, including lengthy periods of being barred from run- ning for public office. Some commentators advocated replacement

of the lower house's multiple-seat election district system with single- seat constituencies like those found in Britain and the United States.

It was argued that the multiple- seat districts made election campaigning more expensive because party members from the same

district had to compete among themselves for the votes of the same

constituents. It was hoped that the smaller size of single-seat districts would also reduce the expense of staff, offices, and constituent ser- vices. Critics argued, however, that the creation of single- seat constituencies would virtually eliminate the smaller opposition parties

and would either create a United States-style two-party system or

give the LDP an even greater majority in the lower house than

it enjoyed under the multiple-seat system.

In contrast with multimillion-dollar United States political campaigns, direct expenses for the comparatively short campaigns before

Japanese general, upper house, and local elections were relatively

modest. The use of posters and pamphlets was strictly regulated,

and candidates appeared on the noncommercial public television

station, NHK, to give short campaign speeches. Most of this activity was publicly funded. Campaign sound-trucks wove their way

through urban and rural streets, often bombarding residents with

earsplitting harangues from candidates or their supporters. No politician, however, could expect to remain in office without considering

expenses for constituent services the most important component

of campaign expenses.

Electoral Districts

The apportionment of electoral districts in the early 1990s still reflected the distribution of the population in the years following

World War II, when only one-third of the people lived in urban

areas and two-thirds lived in rural areas. In the next forty-five years, the population became more than three-quarters urban, as people

deserted rural communities to seek economic opportunities in Tokyo

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Japan: A Country Study

and other large cities (see Migration, ch. 2). The lack of reapportionment led to a serious underrepresentation of urban voters. Urban

districts in the House of Representatives were increased by five in

1964, bringing nineteen new representatives to the lower house; in

1975, six more urban districts were established, with a total of twenty

new representatives allocated to them and to other urban districts. Yet great inequities remained between urban and rural voters. In the early 1980s, as many as five times the votes were needed

to elect a representative from an urban district, as compared to a rural district. Similar disparities existed in the prefectural constituencies of the House of Councillors. The Supreme Court had

ruled on several occasions that the imbalance violated the constitutional principle of one person-one vote. The Supreme Court mandated the addition of eight representatives to urban districts and

the removal of seven from rural districts in 1986. Several lower

house districts' boundaries were redrawn. Yet the disparity was

still as much as three urban votes to one rural vote in the early 1990s.

After the 1986 change, the average number of total persons per

lower house representative was 236,424. However, the figure varied

from 427,761 persons per representative in the fourth district of

Kanagawa Prefecture, which contains the large city of Yokohama,

to 142,932 persons in the third district of largely rural and mountainous Nagano Prefecture. A major reapportionment seemed unlikely in the near future, since rural voters remained a major source of support for the LDP (see Interest Groups, this ch.).

The Judicial System

In contrast to the prewar system, in which executive bodies had

much control over the courts, the postwar Constitution guarantees that "all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their

conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the

Laws" (Article 76). They cannot be removed from the bench "unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to per- form official duties" and they cannot be disciplined by executive

agencies (Article 78). A Supreme Court justice, however, may be

removed by a majority of voters in a referendum that occurs at the first general election following the justice's appointment and

every ten years thereafter. As of the early 1990s, however, the elec- torate had not used this unusual system to dismiss a justice.

The Supreme Court, the highest court, is the final court of appeal in civil and criminal cases. The Constitution's Article 81 desig- nates it "the court of last resort with power to determine the

constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act." The

Supreme Court is also responsible for nominating judges to lower

courts, determining judicial procedures, overseeing the judicial

324
fiiii

77z£ Zh>/ building completed in 1936; the House of Representatives is in

the left wing, the House of Councillors in the right. Courtesy Jane T. Griffin

system including the activities of public prosecutors, and disciplining

judges and other judicial personnel. It renders decisions from either a grand bench of fifteen justices or a petty bench of five. The grand

bench is required for cases involving constitutionality. The court

includes twenty research clerks, whose function is similar to that

of the clerks of the United States Supreme Court.

The judicial system is unitary: there is no independent system

of prefectural level courts equivalent to the state courts of the United

States. Below the Supreme Court, the Japanese system included

eight high courts, fifty district courts, and fifty family courts in the

late 1980s. Four of each of the last two types of courts were located

in Hokkaido, and one of each in the remaining forty- six rural prefectures, urban prefectures, and the Tokyo Metropolitan District.

Summary courts, located in 575 cities and towns in the late 1980s,

performed the functions of small courts and justices of the peace

in the United States, having jurisdiction over minor offenses and

civil cases. Judicial Review

The Supreme Court was generally reluctant to exercise the

powers of judicial review given to it by the Constitution, in large

325
Japan: A Country Study

part because of unwillingness to become involved in politically sensitive issues. When decisions were rendered on such matters as the

constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces, the sponsorship of

Shinto ceremonies by public authorities, or the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture's right to determine the content of

school textbooks or teaching curricula, the court generally took a

conservative, progovernment stance. In the words of political scientist T.J. Pempel, the Supreme Court

4 'has been an important, if frequently unrecognized, vehicle for preserving the status quo in Japan and for reducing the capacity

of the courts to reverse executive actions." Important exceptions

to this conservative trend, however, were the rulings on the unconstitutionality of the electoral district apportionment system, dis- cussed above.

The Role of Law in Japanese Society

As in other industrialized countries, law plays a central role in

Japanese political, social, and economic life. Fundamental differ- ences between Japanese and Western legal concepts, however, have

often led Westerners to believe that Japanese society is based more

on quasi-feudalistic principles of paternalism (the oyabun-kobun rela- tionship) and social harmony, or wa, (see Values, ch. 2). Japan

has a relatively small number of lawyers, about 13,000 practicing

in the mid-1980s compared with 667,000 in the United States, a country with only twice Japan's population. This fact has been

offered as evidence that the Japanese are strongly averse to upsetting human relationships by taking grievances to court. In cases of liability, such as the crash of a Japan Airlines jetliner in August

1985, which claimed 520 lives, Japanese victims or their survivors were more willing than their Western counterparts would be to ac- cept the ritualistic condolences of company presidents (including

officials' resignations over the incident) and nonjudicially determined compensation, which in many cases was less than they might

have received through the courts. Factors other than a cultural preference for social harmony,

however, explain the court-shy behavior of the Japanese. The

Ministry of Justice closely screened university law faculty graduates and others who wished to practice law or serve as judges. Only

about 2 percent of the approximately 25,000 persons who applied

annually to the Ministry's Legal Training and Research Institute

two-year required course were admitted in the late 1980s. The institute graduated only a few hundred new lawyers each year. Plagued by shortages of attorneys, judges, clerks, and other per- sonnel, the court system was severely overburdened. Presiding

326
The Political System

judges often strongly advised plaintiffs to seek out-of-court settle- ments. The progress of cases through even the lower courts was

agonizingly slow, and appeals carried to the Supreme Court could

take decades. Faced with such obstacles, most individuals chose

not to seek legal remedies. If legal personnel were dramatically in- creased, which seemed unlikely in the early 1990s, use of the courts might approach rates found in the United States and other Western

countries.

In the English-speaking countries, law has been viewed traditionally as a framework of enforceable rights and duties designed

to protect the legitimate interests of private citizens. The judiciary

is viewed as occupying a neutral stance in disputes between in- dividual citizens and the state. Legal recourse is regarded as a fundamental civil right. The reformers of the Meiji era (1868-1912),

however, were strongly influenced by legal theories that had evolved

in Germany and other continental European states. The Meiji

reformers viewed the law primarily as an instrument through which

the state controls a restive population and directs energies to achieving the goals of fukoku kyohei (wealth and arms).

The primary embodiment of the spirit of the law in modern Japan

has not been the attorney representing private interests but the

bureaucrat who exercises control through what the sociologist Max

Weber has called "legal-rational" methods of administration. Competence in law, acquired through university training, consists of

implementing, interpreting, and, at the highest levels, formulating law within a bureaucratic framework. Many functions per- formed by lawyers in the United States and other Western countries are the responsibility of civil servants in Japan. The majority of

the country's ruling elite, both political and economic, has been

recruited from among the graduates of the Law Faculty of the

University of Tokyo and other prestigious institutions, people who

have rarely served as private attorneys.

Legal-bureaucratic controls on many aspects of Japanese soci- ety were extremely tight. The Ministry of Education, Science, and

Culture, for example, closely supervised both public and private

universities. Changes in undergraduate or graduate curricula, the

appointment of senior faculty, and similar actions required ministry approval in conformity with very detailed regulations. Although

this "control-oriented" use of law did not inhibit the freedom of

teaching or research (protected by Article 23 of the Constitution),

it severely limited the universities' scope for reform and innovation. Controls were even tighter on primary and secondary schools

(see Education, ch. 3).

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Japan: A Country Study

Human Rights

Compared to most of its Asian neighbors and countries in most

other parts of the world, Japan's record on human rights was commendable, if not exemplary. With some important exceptions, most

observers considered informal social pressures a greater factor in

limiting individual freedom than the coercive actions of the authorities. The ancient Japanese adage that "the nail that sticks up gets

hammered down" captures the sense that Japanese people are pressured more to conform than are people in the more "individualistic" societies of the West. Some Japanese lower- and uppersecondary schools, for example, have adopted extremely strict dress

codes, determining not only apparel but also the length of hair to the exact centimeter. Although defended by conservative educators

as a way of cultivating discipline and self-control, these codes have

been widely criticized as violations of students' rights. In another

example, shopkeepers and local community groups throughout

Japan canceled sales promotions and festivals in the wake of Emperor Hirohito's illness in late 1988, for fear of being labelled unpatriotic. This self-restraint movement cost them billions of yen.

Although freedom of expression was, for the most part, respected,

certain matters—particularly those relating to the emperor—were

widely considered taboo subjects for public figures. Nagasaki City

mayor Motoshima Hitoshi, a member of the LDP, said in December 1988 that Hirohito bore some responsibility for World War

II; he was later ostracized by influential, mainstream politicians,

his life was threatened on several occasions, and in January 1990,

he was seriously wounded outside his office by a right-wing extremist. Despite the affront to his father, Emperor Akihito visited

Motoshima after the attempt on his life. Despite Article 14's guarantee of sexual equality, women faced

systematic discrimination in the workplace. They were generally

expected to quit work after getting married or having children.

However, the number of lifelong career women grew steadily during

the 1980s and early 1990s. The Diet's passage of the Law for Equal

Opportunity in Employment for Men and Women in 1985 was

of some help in securing women's rights, even though the law was

a "guideline" and entailed no legal penalties for employers who

discriminated. The law has, however, been used by women in several court cases seeking equal treatment in such areas as retire- ment age (see Gender Stratification and the Lives of Women, ch. 2). Human rights had also become an issue because of the police

practice of obtaining confessions from criminal suspects. Although

torture was rarely used, suspects were placed under tremendous

328
The Political System

psychological and physical pressures to confess. In several cases, the courts acknowledged that confessions were forced and ordered

prisoners released (see The Criminal Justice System, ch. 8). The greatest controversy concerning human rights, however, has

focused on the social and legal treatment of minorities. Although

the Japanese considered themselves to be a homogeneous people,

minorities did exist, and they often suffered severe discrimination.

The largest group, numbering from 2 million to 4 million in the

1980s, was the burakumin, descendants of the outcast communities of feudal Japan. The Ainu, indigenous inhabitants of north- ern Japan; the people of Okinawa; and ethnic Koreans also have

suffered discrimination (see Minorities, ch. 2). Contemporary Political Values

Japanese politics are generally described as pragmatic, limited

by particularistic loyalties, and based on human relations rather

than ideology or principles. The quintessential Japanese leader is a network builder rather than the embodiment of charisma or ideals; more like the crafty and resourceful founder of the Tokugawa bakufu,

Tokugawa Ieyasu, than the ruthless but heroic Oda Nobunaga (see

Reunification, 1573-1600; Tokugawa Period, 1600-1867, ch. 1). Such political dynamics are evident, for example, in the workings

of the LDP, which has held power without interruption since 1955.

Yet the pragmatic, personalistic view of politics cannot explain

Japan's militaristic past, the political crises of the 1960s, the controversies surrounding the emperor, Article 9, or the unwillingness of many in the Japan Socialist Party, despite a huge political

cost, to abandon their antiwar and revolutionary commitment in

the early 1990s. It also fails to account for the apparently sincerely

held ideological beliefs of the wartime period. The "New Order

in Greater East Asia' ' was legitimized on the basis of universal principles, such as "pan-Asianism," "international justice," and "permanent peace," even if the results were quite the opposite (see The

Rise of the Militarists, ch. 1). The nonideological nature of mainstream Japanese politics in the postwar period reflects defeat in war,

the failure after 1945 to find a national ideological consensus to replace discredited wartime beliefs, and the commitment of both

elite and ordinary Japanese to expanding the economy and rais- ing living standards. As these goals were attained, a complacent,

largely apolitical "middle mass society" (a term coined by economist Murakami Yasusuke) emerged, in which 90 percent of the

people in opinion polls consistently classified themselves as "middle class."

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Japan: A Country Study

Community and Leadership

Certain distinctive features of Japanese politics can be identified, although this is not to say that they are unique to Japan.

Rather, qualities also found in other political systems, such as the

importance of personal connections and consensus building, played an extraordinarily important role in Japanese politics. These fea- tures have deep historical roots and reflect values that pervade the

society as a whole.

In both feudal and modern eras, a major problem for Japanese

political leaders has been reconciling the goals of community sur- vival and the welfare and self-respect of individuals in an environment of extreme scarcity. In recent centuries, Japan lacked the

natural resources and space to accommodate its population comfortably. With the exception of Hokkaido and colonial territories in Asia between 1895 and 1945, there was no "frontier" to absorb excess people. One solution was to ignore the welfare of large

sectors of the population (poor peasants and workers) and to use

force when they expressed their discontent. Such coercive measures, common during both the Tokugawa and World War II periods,

largely, although not entirely, disappeared in the postwar "welfare state" (for example, farmers were evicted from their land to construct the New Tokyo International Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka

in the 1970s after long negotiations failed). But noncoercive, or mostly noncoercive, methods of securing popular compliance had

developed to an extraordinary degree in social and political life. The most important such method is the promotion of a strong

sense of community consciousness and group solidarity. Japanese

individuals are often characterized as having a strong sense of self- sacrifice and community dedication. Historians and sociologists note

that both traditional and modern Japanese communities—the

buraku, the feudal domain with its retinue of samurai, the large commercial houses found in Edo (the future Tokyo), Osaka, and Kyoto

before 1868, and modern corporations and bureaucracies with their

cohorts of lifetime employees—have striven to be all-inclusive. Such

groups serve a variety of functions for the individual, providing

not only income and sustenance but also emotional support and

individual identity. Japanese called such community inclusive- ness the "octopus-pot way of life" (takotsubo seikatsu). Large pots

with narrow openings at the top are used by fishermen to capture

octopuses, and the term is used to refer to people so wrapped up

in their particular social group that they cannot see the world outside its confines.

The "group consciousness" model ofJapanese social life, however, has been overstressed at times. A person may often go along

330
Grass-roots politics, a candidate's parade in Iwate Prefecture Courtesy Eliot Frankeberger

with group demands because they serve self-interest in the long run (for example, political contributions may help secure future

favors from those in office). Historically, democratic concepts of

individual rights and limited government have been deeply appealing because they, too, promise protection of individual autonomy.

Despite very different ethical and political traditions, the Japanese

people were very receptive to imported liberal ideas both before

and after 1945. John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty, for example, was extremely popular during the Meiji era. Because individual, usually passive, resistance to group demands

occurred, Japanese leaders have found the creation of a strong com- munity sense to be a difficult and time-consuming task. Harmony

(wa), that most prized social value, is not easily attained. One

mechanism for achieving wa is the use of rituals to develop a psychological sense of group identity. Political parties and factions,

the offices of national and local governments, businesses, university departments, research groups, alumni associations, and other

groups sponsor frequent ceremonies and more informal parties

for this purpose. A group's history and identity are carefully constructed through the use of songs and symbols (often resembling,

in miniature, the Meiji government's creation of symbols of kokutai in the late nineteenth century). Often, an organization's founder,

331
Japan: A Country Study

especially if deceased, is regarded as something of a Confucian sage or a Shinto kami (deity). Group members, however, may find that

pervasive ritualism allows them to "go through the motions" (such

as the chanting of banzai (ten thousand years) at the end of politi- cal rallies, without having to make a deeper commitment to the

group.

A second mechanism to promote community solidarity is the

building of hierarchical relationships. In this practice, the influence

of premodern ethics is readily apparent. In what the anthropologist Nakane Chie calls Japan's "vertical society," human relationships are defined in terms of inequality, and people relate to each

other as superiors and inferiors along a minutely differentiated

gradient of social status, not only within bureaucratic organizations, where it might be expected, but also in academic, artistic,

and especially, political worlds.

Hierarchy expresses itself along two dimensions: first, an internal community differentiation of rank by seniority, education, and

occupational status; and second, the distinction between "insiders"

and "outsiders," between members and nonmembers of the community, along with the ranking of whole groups or communities

along a vertical continuum. Although internal hierarchy can cause

alienation as inferiors chafe under the authority of their superiors,

the external kind of hierarchy tends to strengthen group cohesion

as individual members work to improve their group's relative ranking. The Japanese nation as a whole has been viewed as a single

group by its people in relation to other nations. Intense nationalism has frequently been a manifestation of group members' desire

to "catch up and overtake" the advanced ("superior") nations of

the West, while the rights of non-Western nations, like China or Korea, often viewed as "inferior," have been ignored.

Like group consciousness, however, the theme of hierarchy has

been overstressed. Contemporary Japanese politics show a strong

consciousness of equality, and even traditional communities, such

as rural villages, were often egalitarian rather than hierarchical.

Citizens' movements of the 1960s and 1970s differed from older

political organizations in their commitment to promoting intragroup

democracy. In addressing the nation, Emperor Akihito used col- loquial Japanese terms that stressed equality, rather than the for- mal, hierarchy-laden language of his predecessors.

Two mechanisms for lessening the hierarchy- generated tensions

are the seniority principle and early retirement. As men or women

grow older, gaining seniority within an organization, they acquire

authority and higher status. The seniority principle is reinforced

by the traditional reluctance to place younger persons in positions

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The Political System

of authority over older ones. The institution of early retirement

(top-ranked businesspeople and bureaucrats commonly retired at age fifty-five or sixty) helps to the keep the promotion of others

smooth and predictable. The system also helps to enable talented

individuals to succeed to the most responsible positions and pre- vents a small group of older persons (what the Japanese call "oneman leaders") from monopolizing leadership positions and imposing increasingly outmoded ideas on the organization. Elite retirees,

however, often continue to wield influence as advisers and usually

pursue second careers in organizations affiliated with the one from

which they retired.

The circulation of elites that results from the seniority and early

retirement principles ensures that everyone within the upper ranks

of the hierarchy has a turn at occupying a high-status position, such

as a cabinet post in the national government. This principle, in

turn, enables people to reward their followers. There has been, for example, a regular turnover of LDP leaders. No individual has

served as party president (and prime minister) longer than Sato

Eisaku, the incumbent between 1964 and 1972. The average ten- ure of party presidents/prime ministers between 1964 and 1987 was

slightly more than three years. Frequent cabinet reshuffling meant

that the average tenure of other cabinet ministers in the same period was a little less than a year. Japan has not been beset with leaders

in their seventies and eighties unwilling to give up their powerful

positions.

Another mechanism reducing intragroup tensions is the strong

personal, rather than legalistic or ideological, ties between superior and subordinate. These ties are typically characterized in terms

of fictive familial relationships, analogous to the bonds between

parents and children (the oyabun-kobun relationship). The ideal leader

is viewed as a paternalistic one, with a warm and personal con- cern for the welfare of his followers. For followers, loyalty is both

morally prescribed and emotionally sustained by the system. In

the political world, oyabun-kobun relationships are pervasive despite

the formal commitment to universalistic, democratic values. At the same time, younger people find such relationships less appealing

than their elders. The so-called shinjinrui (new human beings), born

in the affluent 1960s and 1970s, were often criticized by older

Japanese for being self-absorbed, egoistic, and "cool," in the 1980s.

The younger generation is inclined to view with disdain the emotional expression of paternalistic ties, such as in the 1989 televi- sion broadcasts of former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's

supporters weeping profusely over his political retirement.

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Japan: A Country Study

Consensus Building

The community is often demanding, but it is also fragile, be- cause social ties are sustained not only through legal norms and

common self-interest, but also through the affective patron-client

relationship. Open conflict poses a danger to the survival of this sort of community, and thus policy making requires elaborate consultation and consensus building, usually involving all the parties

concerned. According to political scientist Lewis Austin, "Every- one must be consulted informally, everyone must be heard, but

not in such a way that the hearing of different opinions develops

into opposition. The leader and his assistants 'harmonize opinion'. . . in advance, using go-betweens to avert the confrontation

of opposing forces.

'

' After a preliminary agreement among all has

been reached, a formal meeting is held in which the agreed-upon

policy will be proposed and adopted.

This process is called nemawashi (root trimming or binding), evoking the image of a gardener preparing a tree or shrub for trans- planting, that is, a change in policy. Austin points out that a common Japanese verb meaning "to decide" (matomeru) literally means to gather or bring together. Decisions are "the sum of the

contributions of all." Although consensus building is, for leaders, a time-consuming and emotionally exhausting process, it is nec- essary not only to promote group goals but also to respect and

protect individual autonomy. In fact, the process represents reconciliation of the two. In the political system as a whole, most groups

played some role in the nemawashi process in the early 1990s. Exceptions were those groups or individuals, such as Koreans or

burakumin, who were viewed as outsiders.

Political leaders have to maintain solidarity and harmony within a single group and also secure the cooperation of different groups

who are often in bitter conflict. Takotsubo seikatsu can promote destructive sectionalism. During World War II, rivalry between the

Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy was so intense that it was

nearly impossible to coordinate their strategic operations. In the

postwar political system, prime ministers have often been unable

to persuade different ministries, all self-sufficient and intensely

jealous "kingdoms," to go along with reforms in such areas as trade

liberalization. Observers such as journalist Karel G. van Wolferen,

have concluded that Japan's political system is empty at the center,

lacking real leadership or a locus of responsibility: "Statecraft in

Japan is quite different from that in the rest of Asia, Europe, and

the Americas. For centuries it has entailed the preservation of a

careful balance of semiautonomous groups that share power. . . .

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The Political System

These semiautonomous components, each endowed with great dis- cretionary powers, are not represented in one central ruling body."

This view is probably exaggerated. Leadership in other countries,

including the United States, has been paralyzed from time to time

by powerful interest groups and some policies in Japan requiring

decisive leadership, such as the creation of social welfare and energy

conservation policies in the 1970s and the privatization of state enterprises in the 1980s, have been reasonably successful. Interest Groups

The emphasis on consensus in Japanese politics is seen in the

role of interest groups in policy making. In the early 1990s, these

groups ranged from those with economic interests, such as occupational and professional associations, to those with strong ideological commitments, such as the right-wing Society to Protect Japan

and the left-wing Japan Teachers Union (Nihon Kyoshokuin

Kumiai—Nikkyoso). There were groups representing minorities

(the Burakumin Liberation League, the Central Association of

Korean Residents in Japan [Chosoren], and Utari Kyokai in

Hokkaido, representing the Ainu community), groups representing war veterans and postwar repatriates from Japan's overseas

colonies (the Military Pensions Association and the Association of

Repatriates), the victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, and women opposed to prostitution and the threat to public morals posed by businesses offering "adult" entertainment

(the Japan Mothers League). Mayors' and prefectural governors'

associations promoted regional development. Residents' movements

near United States military installations in Okinawa and elsewhere

pressured local authorities to support reductions in base areas and

to exert more control over United States military personnel off base.

The great majority ofJapanese were connected, either directly or

indirectly, to one or more of these bodies. In the postwar period, extremely close ties emerged among major

interest groups, political parties, and the bureaucracy. Many groups

identified so closely with the ruling LDP that it was often difficult to discern the borders between party and group membership.

Officers of agricultural, business, and professional groups were

elected to the Diet as LDP legislators. Groups of LDP parliamentarians formed zoku (tribes), which represented the interests of

occupational constituencies, such as farmers, small businesses, and

the construction industry. The zoku, interest groups, and bureaucrats worked together closely in formulating policy in such areas

as agriculture (see Bureaucrats and the Policy-making Process, this ch.).

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Japan: A Country Study

In the case of the Japan Socialist Party, Democratic Socialist

Party, Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto), and Komeito

(Clean Government Party), the links with interest groups were even more intimate. Before the Japanese Trade Union Confederation

(Shin Rengo) was established in 1989, most leaders of the Japan

Socialist Party and Democratic Socialist Party and many socialist Diet members had been officers of the confederation's predecessors, the General Council of Trade Unions ofJapan (Nihon Rodo

Kumiai Sohyogikai, or Sohyo for short) founded in 1950, and the

Japan Confederation of Labor (Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or Domei for short), established in 1964. Despite repeated disavowals,

the Komeito remained, in the early 1990s, related to its parent body,

the Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), an organization of lay

followers of the Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shoshu, founded before

World War II and one of Japan's most successful new religions

(see Komeito, this ch.; Religious and Philosophical Traditions,

ch. 2). The communists had their own unions and small business

groups, which competed with conservative small business associations. Japan's relatively few lawyers divided their allegiance among

three professional groups separately affiliated with the LDP, the

Japan Socialist Party, and the Japan Communist Party.

Both the LDP and the opposition parties, which had weak re- gional organizations, depended on the interest groups to win elec- tions. The interest groups provided funding, blocks of loyal voters (although these could not be manipulated as easily as in the past),

and local organizational networks.

One important question concerning interest groups in any country is how well they represent the diverse concerns of all the citizens. A second is whether government responds evenhandedly to their

demands. Japan's postwar record on both counts was generally

good. Both major and minor groups in society were well represented. And the government has implemented policies to spread

the blessings of economic growth among the population at large.

Such arrangements helped to ensure political stability, and to ex- plain why, in repeated public opinion polls, 90 percent of respondents viewed themselves as "middle class."

After the war, for example, there were major policy changes on

agriculture. Despite prewar nationalistic idealization of the rural

village, the government at that time squeezed the farmers for taxes and rice. Political scientist Kent Calder observed that "the prewar

state took heavily from the countryside, without providing much

in return." Historians describe how many farm families starved, or were forced to sell their daughters into prostitution. Responding to the threat of vigorous leftist movements in the countryside,

336
The Political System

conservative governments after 1945 initiated price supports for

rice and other measures that brought the farmers not just a decent

standard of living but affluence. By the 1970s, it was not uncom- mon to encounter group tours of farmers who had never visited

Tokyo taking holidays in Hawaii or New York City. In Calder's

view, conservative governments were stoutly probusiness but were

also willing to coopt other interests such as agriculture at the ex- pense of business to ensure social stability and prevent socialist elec- toral victories. Sometimes government adopted policies first espoused by the opposition (for example, medical insurance and

other social welfare policies).

Business Interests Links between the corporate world and government were maintained through three national organizations: the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keizai Dantai Rengokai—Keidanren),

established in 1946; the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyu Kai), established in 1946; and the Japan

Federation of Employers Association (Nihon Keieishadantai

Renmei—Nikkeiren), established in 1948. In the early 1990s,

Keidanren was considered the most important. Its membership in- cluded 750 of the largest corporations and 110 manufacturers as- sociations. Its Tokyo headquarters served as a kind of "nerve

center" for the country's most important enterprises, and it worked

closely with the powerful Ministry of International Trade and In- dustry (MITI). There was evidence, however, suggesting that the

federation's power in the 1990s was not what it had been, partly

because major corporations, which had amassed huge amounts of

money by the late 1980s, were increasingly capable of operating

without its assistance.

Nikkeiren was concerned largely with labor-management rela- tions and with organizing a united business front to negotiate with

labor unions on wage demands during the annual "Spring Struggle." The Keizai Doyu Kai, composed of younger and more liberal business leaders, assigned itself the role of promoting business'

s

social responsibilities. Whereas Keidanren and Nikkeiren were "peak organizations," whose members themselves were associations, members of the Keizai Doyu Kai, were individual business

leaders (see Labor Unions, ch. 4). Because of financial support from companies, business interest

groups were generally more independent of political parties than

other groups. Both Keidanren and the Keizai Doyu Kai, for ex- ample, indicated a willingness to talk with the socialists in the wake

of the political scandals of 1 988-89 and also suggested that the LDP

337
Japan: A Country Study

might form a coalition government with an opposition party. Yet

through an organization called the People's Politics Association

(Kokumin Seiji Kyokai), they and other top business groups provided the LDP with its largest source of party funding.

Small Business

Japan's streets are lined with small shops, grocery stores, restaurants, and coffeehouses. Although supermarkets and large discount

department stores were more common in the early 1990s than a decade earlier, the political muscle of small business associations was reflected in the success with which they blocked the rationalization of the country's distribution system. The Large-Scale Retail Store Law of 1973, amended in 1978, made it very difficult in the late 1980s for either Japanese or foreign retailers to establish large, economically efficient outlets in local communities.

Many light industrial goods, such as toys, footwear, pencils, and

kitchen utensils, were still manufactured by small local companies

rather than imported from the Republic of Korea (South Korea),

Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Traditional handicrafts, such as pottery,

silk weaving, and lacquerware, produced using centuries-old

methods in small workshops, flourished in every part of the country. Apart from protectionism of the "nontariff barrier" variety,

the government assured the economic viability of small enterprises

through lenient tax policies and access to credit on especially favorable terms. Major associations representing small and medium-sized enterprises included the generally pro-LDP Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoko Kaigisho, or Nissho for short),

which was established in 1922 but whose origins are traced to the

establishment of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry

in 1878, the National Central Association of Medium and Small

Enterprise Associations, the Japan League of Medium and Small

Enterprise Organizations, and the Japan Communist Partysponsored Democratic Merchants and Manufacturers Association.

Although small enterprises in services and manufacturing

preserved cultural traditions and enlivened urban areas, a major

motivation for government nurture of small business was social welfare. In Kent Calder's words, "Much of small business, particularly in the distribution sector, serves as a labor reservoir. Its inefficiencies help absorb surplus workers who would be unemployed if distribution, services, and traditional manufacturing were

uniformly as efficient as the highly competitive and modernized

export sectors."

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The Political System

Agricultural Cooperatives

Observers have suggested that the great influence of the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Nokyo) in policy making

partly resulted from a widespread feeling of gratitude to the dwindling agricultural sector, which in the past supported the country's

industrial modernization. Nokyo spokespersons were vociferous in

their claims that agriculture is somehow intimately connected with

the spirit of the nation. They argued that self-sufficiency, or near

self-sufficiency, in food production, resulting from government sup- port of the nation's farmers, was central to Japan's security. The

public in general was receptive to their arguments: an opinion poll

in 1988, for example, revealed that 70 percent of respondents

preferred paying a higher price for rice to importing it. Nokyo, organized in 1947 at the time of the land reform, had

local branches in every rural village in the late 1980s. Its constituent local agricultural cooperatives included practically all of the

population for which farming was the principal occupation. Since

its founding, Nokyo had been preoccupied with maintaining and

increasing government price supports on rice and other crops and

with holding back the import of cheaper agricultural products from

abroad. Self-sufficient in rice, Japan in the late 1980s imported

only a tiny quantity. A special variety of Thai rice, for example,

is used specifically to make the traditional Okinawan liquor,

awamori. Nokyo's determination to preserve "Fortress Japan" in

the agricultural realm had brought it into conflict with business

groups such as Keidanren, which advocated market liberalization

and cheaper food prices.

Although closely allied to the LDP in the past, Nokyo and other

agricultural groups were outraged by the government's concessions

to the United States on imports of oranges and beef in 1988. Local

cooperatives threatened to defect to the Japan Socialist Party if government continued to give in to American demands. The Japan

Socialist Party chairwoman, Doi Takako, made agricultural protectionism a major component of her party's platform.

Labor Organizations

Postwar labor unions were established with the blessings of the

occupation authorities. The mechanism for collective bargaining was set up, and unions were organized by enterprise: membership

was determined by company affiliation rather than by skill or in- dustry type. In general, membership was also limited to permanent, nonsupervisory personnel. Observers in the late 1980s viewed

labor unions' role in the policy-making process as less powerful

339
Japan: A Country Study

than that of business and agricultural organizations because the

unions' enterprise-based structure made national federations weak

and unions were closely associated with parties that remained out

of power.

The Japan Socialist Party largely depended on Sohyo for funding, organizational support, and membership during most of the

postwar period. Domei performed similar functions for the Democratic Socialist Party. Sohyo was composed primarily of public

sector unions such as those organized for national civil servants,

municipal workers, and public school teachers. Domei's constituent

unions were principally in the private sector. In the late 1980s,

however, the labor movement saw significant change. In November 1987, the National Federation of Private Sector Trade Unions

(Rengo), an amalgamation of Domei and smaller groups, was

formed with a membership of 5.5 million workers. After two years

of intense negotiations, it joined with 2 . 5 million members of public

sector unions largely affiliated with Sohyo to establish a new entity, Shin Rengo. With 8 million members, Shin Rengo included

65 percent ofJapan's unionized workers and was, after the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations

(AFL-CIO) and the British Trades Union Congress, the world's

third largest noncommunist union federation.

Shin Rengo was a moderate, nonideological movement that

shunned involvement with Marxist Japan Communist Partyaffiliated unions. Two leftist union confederations emerged in the

wake of Shin Rengo: the 1.2 -million-member Japan Confederation of Trade Unions (Zenroren), and the 500,000-member National Trade Union Council (Zenrokyo). The powerful Nikkyoso,

with 675,000 members in the country's public primary and secondary schools, was divided between adherents and opponents of Shin

Rengo.

In the early 1990s, the relationship of Shin Rengo to the socialist

political parties remained somewhat unclear. It was likely that many

old support networks would remain in place. Some noted the new

confederation's potential for promoting opposition party unity be- cause it encompassed supporters of the two socialist parties and

the small Social Democratic League. In the House of Councillors

election onJuly 23, 1989, the three parties agreed to support twelve

Shin Rengo candidates. Eleven of them won.

Professional Associations and Citizen and Consumer Movements

Physicians, dentists, lawyers, academics, and other professionals organized associations for the exchange of knowledge, supervision of professional activities, and influence of government policy,

340
The Political System

like those found in other developed countries. The Japan Medical

Association has used its influence to preserve a highly profitable

system in which physicians, rather than pharmacists, sell prescription drugs.

Citizens and consumer movements, which became prominent

during the 1960s and 1970s, were organized around issues relat- ing to the quality of life, the protection of the environment from

industrial pollution, and the safety (although not the cost) of con- sumer goods. In the late 1960s, industrial pollution, symbolized

by the suffering of victims of mercury poisoning caused by the pollution of Minamata Bay in Kumamoto Prefecture by a chemical

company, was viewed as a national crisis. The Sato government

responded by establishing the Environmental Agency in the Office

of the Prime Minister in 1970, instituting tough penalties for polluters, and extending compensation to the victims of pollution. In

the early 1990s, environmental issues continued to be the focus of

intense local activity. Communities on Ishigaki Island in Okinawa

Prefecture were divided over whether to construct a new airport

to handle wide-bodied aircraft on land reclaimed from the sea. Supporters viewed the project as essential to the island's tourist development, while opponents claimed that construction would

destroy offshore colonies of rare blue coral and would ruin the local fishing industry. Another environmental issue in many parts of

Japan was the use of powerful chemicals on golf courses, which

in some cases harmed nearby residents (see Pollution, ch. 2). Women's groups were in the forefront of the consumer movement. In the early 1990s, they included the National Federation

of Regional Women's Associations, the Housewives Association,

and the National Association of Consumer Cooperatives. Their

activities depended on the support of neighborhood women's as- sociations, the women's sections of local agricultural and fishing

cooperatives, and government-sponsored consumer education

groups. Although boycotts had been organized against companies

making products that the groups viewed as dangerous (for example, canned foods containing carcinogenic cyclamates), they did

not, for the most part, demand lower prices for food or other goods.

In tandem with agricultural interests, consumer groups opposed

increased food imports on the grounds that supply was unpredictable and that they were laced with dangerous additives.

The Mass Media and Politics

Japan is a society awash in information. In the early 1990s,

newspaper readership was, by a wide margin, the highest in the

world. The six largest and most influential newspapers were Yomiuri

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Japan: A Country Study

Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Seikyo Shimbun, Sankei

Shimbun, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun. There were also more than 100

local newspapers. The population, almost 100 percent literate, also consumed record numbers of books and magazines. The latter ranged from high-quality comprehensive general circulation intellec- tual periodicals such as Sekai (World), Chuo Koron (Central Review),

and Bungei Shunju (Literary Annals) to sarariman manga (salaryman

comics), comic books for adults that depict the vicissitudes and fantasies of contemporary office workers, and weeklies specializing

in scandals. Japan probably also led the world in the translation

of works by foreign scholars and novelists. Most of the classics of

Western political thought, such as The Republic by Plato and

Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, for example, were available in

Japanese.

News programs and special features on television, moreover, gave

viewers detailed reports on political, economic, and social developments both at home and abroad. The sole noncommercial public

radio and television broadcasting network, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK) provided generally balanced coverage. Unlike their counterparts in the United

States, however, Japanese newscasters on NHK and commercial

stations usually confined themselves to relating events and did not

offer opinions or analysis.

The major magazines and newspapers were vocal critics of

government policies and took great pains to map out the personnel and financial ties that held the conservative establishment

together. Readers were regularly informed of matrimonial alliances

between families of top politicians, civil servants, and business leaders, which in some ways resembled those of the old European

aristocracy. The important print media were privately owned.

Observers in the early 1990s, however, pointed out that the in- dependence of the established press had been compromised by the

pervasive "press club" system. Politicians and government agencies each had one of these clubs, which contained from 12 to almost

300 reporters from the different newspapers, magazines, and broadcast media. Club members were generally described as being closer

to each other than they were to their employers. They also established a close and collaborative working relationship with the political figures or government agencies to which they were attached.

There was little opportunity for reporters to establish a genuinely

critical, independent stance because reporting distasteful matters

might lead to exclusion from the club and thus inability to gain

information and write. Although the media has played a major role in exposing political scandals, some critics have accused the large

342
The Political System

newspapers, ostensibly oppositionist, of being little more than a conduit of government ideas to the people. Free-lance reporters,

working outside the press club system, often made the real breakthroughs in investigative reporting. For example, a free-lance journalist published the first public accounts of Tanaka Kakuei's

personal finances in a monthly magazine in 1974, even though the

established press had access to this information.

The Liberal Democratic Party

The LDP has dominated the political system since 1955, when

it was established as a coalition of smaller conservative groups. All

of Japan's prime ministers since then have come from its ranks

as have, with one exception, other cabinet ministers. The party's

fortunes have risen and ebbed: a low point was reached in the July

23, 1989, election to the upper house, when it became, for the first time, a minority party (see The Structure of Government, The

Liberal Democratic Party in National Elections, this ch.). But no

opposition party, whether singly or in coalition, was able to oust

the LDP from power and form a government of its own. By the early 1990s, the LDP's nearly four decades in power al- lowed it to establish a highly stable process of policy formation.

This process would not have been possible if other parties had se- cured parliamentary majorities. LDP strength was based on an en- during, although not unchallenged, coalition of big business, small

business, agriculture, professional groups, and other interests. Elite bureaucrats collaborated closely with the party and interest groups

in drafting and implementing policy. In a sense, the party's success was a result not of its internal strength but of its weakness.

It lacked a strong, nationwide organization or consistent ideology

with which to attract voters. Its leaders were rarely decisive, charismatic, or popular. But it has functioned efficiently as a locus for

matching interest group money and votes with bureaucratic power

and expertise. This arrangement resulted in a great deal of cor- ruption, but the party could claim credit for helping to create eco- nomic growth and a stable, middle-class Japan.

Party History and Basic Principles

The LDP has a complex genealogy. Its roots can be traced to the groups established by Itagaki Taisuke and Okuma Shigenobu

in the 1880s (see The Development of Representative Government,

ch. 1). It attained its present form in November 1955, when the

conservative Liberal Party (Jiyuto) and Japan Democratic Party

(Nihon Minshuto) united in response to the threat posed by a unified Japan Socialist Party, which had been established the month

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Japan: A Country Study

before. The union of the two has often been described as a "shotgun marriage. ' ' Both had strong leaders and had previously competed with each other. The Japan Democratic Party, which had

been established only a year before, in November 1954, was itself a coalition of different groups in which farmers were prominent.

The result of the new amalgamation was a large party that repre- sented a broad spectrum of interests but had minimal organization compared with the socialist and other leftist parties. In 1976,

in the wake of the Lockheed bribery scandal, a handful of younger LDP Diet members broke away and established their own party,

the New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyu Kurabu). A decade later, however,

it was reabsorbed by the LDP.

Unlike the leftist parties, the LDP did not espouse a well-defined

ideology or political philosophy. Its members held a variety of positions that could be broadly defined as being to the right of the

opposition parties, yet more moderate than those ofJapan's numerous rightist splinter groups (see Political Extremists, this ch.). The

LDP traditionally identified itself with a number of general goals:

rapid, export-based economic growth, close cooperation with the

United States in foreign and defense policies, and several newer

issues, such as administrative reform. Administrative reform en- compassed several themes: simplification and streamlining of

government bureaucracy, privatization of state-owned enterprises,

and the adoption of measures, including tax reform, needed to pre- pare for the strain on the economy posed by an aging society. Other

priorities in the early 1990s included promoting a more active and

positive role for Japan in the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific region,

internationalizing Japan's economy by liberalizing and promoting domestic demand, creating a high-technology information

society, and promoting scientific research. A business-inspired com- mitment to free enterprise was tempered by the insistence of important small business and agricultural constituencies on some form

of protectionism.

Party Structure

At the apex of the LDP's formal organization was the president,

who served a two-year renewable term. Because of the party's

parliamentary majority, the president has been the prime minister.

The choice was formally that of a party convention composed of

Diet members and local LDP figures, but in most cases, they merely

approved the joint decision of the most powerful party leaders. To

make the system more democratic, Prime Minister Miki Takeo

introduced a "primary" system in 1978, which opened the ballot- ing to some 1.5 million LDP members. The process was so costly

344
The Political System

and acrimonious, however, that it was subsequently abandoned

in favor of the old "smoke-filled room" method.

The LDP was the most "traditionally Japanese" of the political

parties because it relied on a complex network of patron-client

(pyabun-kobun) relationships on both national and local levels. Nationally, a system of factions in both the House of Representatives

and the House of Councillors tied individual Diet members to powerful party leaders. Locally, Diet members had to maintain koenkai

(local support groups) to keep in touch with public opinion and gain

votes and financial backing. The importance and pervasiveness of

personal ties between Diet members and faction leaders and between

citizens and Diet members gave the party a pragmatic, "you scratch

my back, I'll scratch yours" character. Its success depended less on generalized mass appeal than onjiban (a strong, well-organized

constituency), kaban (a briefcase full of money), and kanban (prestigious appointment, particularly on the cabinet level).

Factions

In a sense, the LDP was not a single organization but a con- glomeration of competitive factions, which, despite the traditional

emphasis on consensus and harmony, engaged in bitter infighting. Over the years, factions numbered from 6 to 13, with as few

as 4 members and as many as 120, counting those in both houses.

The system was operative in both houses, although it was more

deeply entrenched in the House of Representatives than in the less powerful House of Councillors. Faction leaders usually were vet- eran LDP politicians. Many, but not all, had served as prime

minister.

Faction leaders offered their followers services without which the

followers would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to sur- vive politically. Leaders provided funds for the day-to-day operation of Diet members' offices and staff as well as financial support

during expensive election campaigns. As discussed earlier, the operating allowances provided by the government were inadequate. The

leader also introduced his followers to influential bureaucracts and

business people, which made it much easier for the followers to

satisfy their constituents' demands.

Historically, the most powerful and aggressive faction leader in

the LDP was Tanaka Kakuei, whose dual-house strength in the

early 1980s exceeded 110. His followers remained loyal despite the

fact that he had been convicted of receiving ¥500 million (nearly

US$4 million) in bribes from the American aircraft manufacturer,

Lockheed, to facilitate the purchase of its passenger aircraft by All

Nippon Airways, and had formally withdrawn from the LDP.

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Japan: A Country Study

Tanaka and his bitterest factional rival, Fukuda Takeo, were a study

in contrasts. Tanaka was a rough-hewn wheeler-dealer with a primary school education who had made a fortune in the construction industry; Fukuda was an elite product of the University of

Tokyo Law Faculty and a career bureaucrat.

In the face of Fukuda's strong opposition, Tanaka engineered

the selections of prime ministers Ohira Masayoshi (1978-80) and

Suzuki Zenko (1980-82). The accession of Nakasone Yasuhiro to the prime ministership in 1982 would also not have occurred without

Tanaka' s support and, as a result, Nakasone, at that time a politically weak figure, was nicknamed "Tanakasone." But Tanaka's

faction was dealt a grave blow when one of his subordinates,

Takeshita Noboru, decided to form a breakaway group. Tanaka

suffered a stroke in November 1985, but four years passed before

he formally retired from politics.

The LDP faction system was closely fitted to the House of

Representatives' medium-sized, multiple-member election districts. The party usually ran more than one candidate in each of these

constituencies to maintain its lower house majority, and these candidates were from different factions. During an election campaign,

the LDP, in a real sense, ran not only against the opposition but

also against itself. In fact, intraparty competition within one elec- tion district was often more bitter than interparty competition, with

two or more LDP candidates vying for the same block of conservative votes. For example, in the general election of February 18,

1990, three LDP and three opposition candidates competed for five seats in a southwestern prefecture. Two of the LDP candidates publicly expressed bitterness over the entry of the third, a son of the

prefectural governor. Local television showed supporters of one

of the LDP candidates cheering loudly when the governor's son was edged out for the fifth seat by a Komeito candidate.

Local Support Groups

In the early 1990s, kdenkai (local support groups) were perhaps even more important than faction membership to the survival of

LDP Diet members. These kdenkai served as pipelines through which

funds and other support were conveyed to legislators and through

which the legislators could distribute favors to constituents in return. To avoid the stringent legal restrictions on political activity outside of designated campaign times, kdenkai sponsored year-round

cultural, social, and "educational" activities. In the prewar years, having an invincible, or "iron," constituency depended on gaining the support of landlords and other local notables. These people delivered blocks of rural votes to the candidates they favored.

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The Political System

In the more pluralistic postwar period, local bosses were much weaker and building a strong constituency base much more difficult and

costly. Tanaka used his "iron constituency" in rural Niigata Prefec- ture to build a formidable, nationwide political machine; but other

politicians, like Ito Masayoshi, were so popular in their districts that they could refrain, to some extent, from money politics and

promote a "clean" image. Kdenkai remained particularly important in the overrepresented rural areas, where paternalistic, oldstyle politics flourished and where the LDP, despite disaffection

during the late 1980s over agricultural liberalization policies, had

its strongest support.

In the classic oyabun-kobun manner, local people who were consistently loyal to a figure like Tanaka become favored recipients

of government largesse. In the 1980s, his own third electoral district in Niigata was the nation's top beneficiary in per capita public works spending. Benefits included stops on the Shinkansen bullet train to Tokyo and the cutting of a tunnel through a mountain to serve a hamlet of sixty people (see Transportation and Communications, ch. 4). Another fortunate area was Takeshita Noboru's

district in Shimane Prefecture on the Sea of Japan.

The importance of local loyalties was also reflected in the

widespread practice of a second generation's "inheriting" Diet seats from fathers or fathers-in-law. This trend was found predominandy,

though not exclusively, in the LDP. In the February 1990 general

election, for example, forty-three second- generation candidates ran: twenty-two, including twelve LDP candidates, were successful.

They included the sons of former prime ministers Suzuki Zenko

and Fukuda Takeo, although a son-in-law of Tanaka Kakuei lost in a district different from his father-in-law's.

The Liberal Democratic Party in National Elections

Election statistics show that, while the LDP had been able to secure a majority in the twelve House of Representatives elections

from May 1958 to February 1990, with only three exceptions (December 1976, October 1979, and December 1983), its share of the

popular vote had declined from a high of 57.8 percent in May 1958

to a low of 41 .8 percent in December 1976, when voters expressed

their disgust with the party's involvement in the Lockheed scandal (see fig. 9; table 37, Appendix). The LDP vote rose again between 1979 and 1990. Although the LDP won an unprecedented

300 seats in the July 1986 balloting, its share of the popular vote remained just under 50 percent. The figure was 46.2 percent in

February 1990. Following the three occasions when the LDP found

itself a handful of seats shy of a majority, it was obliged to form

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The Political System

alliances with conservative independents and the breakaway New

Liberal Club. In a cabinet appointment after the October 1983 balloting, a non-LDP minister, a member of the New Liberal Club, was appointed for the first time.

In the upper house, the July 1989 election represented the first time that the LDP was forced into a minority position. In previ- ous elections, it had either secured a majority on its own or recruited

non-LDP conservatives to make up the difference of a few seats. The political crisis of 1988-89 was testimony to both the party's

strength and its weakness. In the wake of a succession of issues

the pushing of a highly unpopular consumption tax through the

Diet in late 1988, the Recruit insider trading scandal, which tainted

virtually all top LDP leaders and forced the resignation of Prime

Minister Takeshita Noboru in April (a successor did not appear

until June), the resignation in July of his successor, Uno Sosuke,

because of a sex scandal, and the poor showing in the upper house

election—the media provided the Japanese with a detailed and embarrassing dissection of the political system. By March 1989, popular support for the Takeshita cabinet as expressed in public opinion

polls had fallen to 9 percent. Uno's scandal, covered in magazine

interviews of a "kiss and tell" geisha, aroused the fury of female

voters. Yet Uno's successor, the eloquent if obscure Kaifu Toshiki, was

successful in repairing the party's battered image. By January 1990,

talk of the waning of conservative power and a possible socialist government had given way to the realization that, like the Lockheed affair of the mid-1970s, the Recruit scandal did not signal a significant change in who ruled Japan. The February 1990 general

election gave the LDP, including affiliated independents, a comfortable, if not spectacular, majority: 286 of 512 total representatives. In light of radical changes in other parts of the world during the

late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly the collapse of the communist status quo in Eastern Europe, the LDP's durability seemed

odd to outsiders. One explanation is that the LDP has grown quite

skillful in manipulating the rituals of repentance. In 1989 Takeshita

and other leaders expressed kejime (a very difficult term to translate, although "knowing how to act under the circumstances" in- dicates some of its meaning), begging the voters to accept their

promise that they would do better in the future and would implement "political reform." Before the general election, the ruling

party also promised to consider revision, although not abolition,

of the consumption tax. The overall economic well-being of most

of the population, particularly in comparison with their own lives,

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or those of their parents, in the immediate postwar period, is another

factor contributing to LDP sustainability. But the election results suggested to many that, despite the furor, the voters were less in- terested in "throwing the rascals out" than, in the quintessentially

Confucian way, having them "reflect" on their errors. An additional factor of major importance was the perceived in- ability of the opposition parties, some of whom were also tarnished

by the Recruit scandal, to form a competent alternative government (see The Opposition Parties, this ch.). The strongly interest- oriented nature ofJapanese politics, moreover, meant that many

people were tied to local patronage networks that would suffer if the socialists or other opposition groups gained power. Many voters admitted, "I don't like the LDP, but I really had no choice."

Bureaucrats and the Policy-Making Process

The Japanese had been exposed to bureaucratic institutions at

least by the early seventh century A.D., when the imperial court adopted the laws and government structure of Tang China (see

Nara and Heian Periods, A.D. 710-1185, ch. 1). The distinctive

Chinese institution of civil service examinations never took root,

and the imported system was never successfully imposed on the

country at large. But by the middle of the Tokugawa period

(1600-1867), the samurai class functions had evolved from warrior to clerical and administrative functions. Following the Meiji

Restoration (1868), the new elite, which came from the lower ranks

of the samurai, established a Western-style civil service (see The

Emergence of Modern Japan, 1868-1919, ch. 1). Although the United States occupation dismantled both the mili- tary and zaibatsu (see Glossary) establishments, it did little, outside of abolishing the prewar Home Ministry, to challenge the power

of the bureaucracy. There was considerable continuity—in insti- tutions, operating style, and personnel—between the civil service

before and after the occupation, partly because MacArthur's staff ruled indirectly and depended largely on the cooperation of civil servants. A process of mutual cooptation occurred. Also, United

States policy planners never regarded the civil service with the same

opprobrium as the military or economic elites. The civil service's

role in Japan's militarism was generally downplayed. Many of the

occupation figures themselves were products of President Franklin D.

Roosevelt's New Deal and had strong faith in the merits of civil service "professionalism." Finally, the perceived threat of the Soviet

Union in the late 1940s created a community of interests for the

occupiers and conservative, social order-conscious administrators.

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The Civil Service

In trying to discover "who's in charge here," many analysts have

pointed to the elite bureaucracy as the people who really governed

Japan, although they composed only a tiny fraction of the country's more than 1 million national government employees. In the

early 1990s, several hundred of the elite were employed at each

national ministry or agency. Although entry into the elite through

open examinations did not require a college degree, the majority

of its members were alumni of Japan's most prestigious universities. The University of Tokyo Law Faculty remained in the early

1990s the single most important source of elite bureaucrats. After

graduation from college and, increasingly, some graduate-level

study, applicants took a series of extremely difficult higher civil service examinations: in 1988, for example, 28,833 took the tests, but only 1,814, or 6.3 percent, were successful. Of the successful

number, 721 were actually hired. Like the scholar-officials of imperial China, successful candidates were hardy survivors of a grueling education and testing process that necessarily began in early

childhood and demanded total concentration. The typical young

bureaucrat, who in the early 1990s was in most cases male, was

an intelligent, hardworking, and dedicated individual. Some bureaucrats lacked imagination and, perhaps, compassion for people whose way of life was different from their own. The public's attitude toward the elite was ambivalent. The elite enjoyed tremendous social prestige, but members were also re- sented. They lived in a realm that was at least partly public yet

far removed from the lives of ordinary people. Compared with politicians, they were generally viewed as honest. Involvement of top

officials in scandals such as the Recruit affair, however, had, to some extent, tarnished their image.

Japan's elite bureaucrats were insulated from direct political pres- sure because there were very few political appointments in the civil service. Cabinet ministers were usually career politicians, but they were moved in and out of their posts quite frequentiy (with an aver- age tenure of under a year), and usually had little opportunity to develop a power base within a ministry or force their civil service

subordinates to adopt reforms. Below the cabinet minister was the

administrative vice minister. Administrative vice ministers and their subordinates were career civil servants whose appointments were

determined in accordance with an internally established principle

of seniority. In a 1975 article, political scientist Chalmers Johnson quotes a

retired vice minister of the Ministry of International Trade and

Industry (MITI), who said that the Diet was merely "an extension

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Japan: A Country Study

of the bureaucracy." The official claimed that "the bureaucracy

drafts all the laws. . . . All the legislature does is to use its powers

of investigation, which for about half the year keeps most of the

senior officials cooped up in the Diet."

In the years since this official made his proud boast, however,

it has become apparent that there are limits to the bureaucrats'

power. The most important check was the LDP's growing role in

policy formation. Political scientist B.C. Koh suggested that in many

cases members of the LDP policy-oriented tribes (zoku) had greater

expertise in their fields than elite bureaucrats. Before the latter drafted legislation, they had to consult and follow the initiatives of the party's Policy Research Council. Many analysts consider

the role of the bureaucracy in drafting legislation to be no greater

than that of its counterparts in France, the Federal Republic of

Germany (West Germany), and other countries. Also, the decision of many retired bureaucrats to run as LDP candidates for the

Diet might not reflect, as had been previously assumed, the power

of the officials but rather the impatience of ambitious men who

wanted to locate themselves, politically, "where the action is."

An intense rivalry among the ministries came into play whenever

major policy decisions were formulated. Elite civil servants were

recruited by and spent their entire careers in a single ministry. As

a result, they developed a strong sectional solidarity and zealously

defended their turf. Nonbureaucratic actors—the politicians and

interest groups—could use this rivalry to their own advantage.

The Ministry of Finance was generally considered the most

powerful and prestigious of the ministries. Its top officials were

regarded as the cream of the elite. Although it was relatively unsuccessful in the 1970s when the deficit rose, the ministry was very

successful in the 1980s in constraining government spending and

raising taxes, including a twelve-year battle to get a consumption

tax passed. The huge national debt in the early 1990s, however,

may turn out to be evidence that this budget-minded body had been

unsuccessful in the previous decade in curbing demands for popular policies such as health insurance, rice price supports, and the

unprofitable nationwide network of the privatized Japan Railways

Group. MITI frequently encountered obstacles in its early postoccupation plans to reconsolidate the economy. It was not always

successful in imposing its will on private interests, politicians, or other ministries. According to law professor John O. Haley, writing in the late 1980s, MITI's practice of gyosei shido, or administrative guidance, often described as evidence of the bureaucracy's

hidden power, was in fact a second-best alternative to "express

statutory authority that would have legitimated its exercise of

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The Political System

authority." Administrative reform policies in the 1980s imposed

ceilings on civil service staff and spending that probably contributed

to a deterioration of morale and working conditions.

Still another factor limiting bureaucratic power was the emergence of an affluent society. In the early postwar period, the scarcity of capital made it possible for the Ministry of Finance and MITI

to exert considerable influence over the economy through control

of the banking system (see The Financial System, ch. 4). To a decreasing extent, this scarcity remained until the 1980s because

most major companies had high debt-equity ratios and depended on the banks for infusions of capital. Their huge profits and in- creasing reliance on securities markets in the late 1980s, however,

meant that the Ministry of Finance had less influence. The wealth,

technical sophistication, and new confidence of the companies also made it difficult for MITI to exercise administrative guidance. The

ministry could not restrain aggressive and often politically controversial purchases by Japanese corporate investors in the United

States, for example, Mitsubishi Estate's October 1989 purchase

of Rockefeller Center in New York City, which, along with the

Sony Corporation's acquisition of Columbia Pictures several weeks

earlier, heated up trade friction between the two countries.

The whole issue of trade friction and foreign pressure tended

to politicize the bureaucracy and promote unprecedented divisive- ness in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the Structural Impediments Initiative talks held by Japan and the United States in

early 1990, basic changes in Japan's economy were discussed: re- forms of the distribution and pricing systems, improvement of the

infrastructure, and elimination of official procedures that limited

foreign participation in the economy (see Trade and Investment

Relations, ch. 5). Although foreign pressure of this sort was resented

by many Japanese as an intrusion on national sovereignty, it also provided an opportunity for certain ministries to make gains at the

expense of others. There was hardly a bureaucratic jurisdiction in

the economic sphere that was not in some sense affected. Repeatedly, internationally minded political and bureaucratic

elites found their market-opening reforms, designed to placate

American demands, sabotaged by other interests, especially agricul- ture. Such reactions intensified American pressure, which in turn

created a sense of crisis and a siege mentality within Japan. The

"internationalization" ofJapan's society in other ways also divided

the bureaucratic elite. MITI, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry ofJustice had divergent views on how to respond to the influx

of unskilled, usually South Asian and Southeast Asian, laborers

into the labor-starved Japanese economy. An estimated 300,000

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to 400,000 of them worked illegally for small Japanese firms in the

late 1980s. Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture revision

of guidelines on the writing of history textbooks, ostensibly a domestic matter, aroused the indignation ofJapan's Asian neighbors be- cause the changes tended to soften accounts of wartime atrocities. Policy-Making Dynamics

Despite an increasingly unpredictable domestic and international

environment, policy making in the early 1990s conformed to well- established postwar patterns. The close collaboration of the ruling

party, the elite bureaucracy, and important interest groups often

made it difficult to tell who exactly was responsible for specific policy

decisions. The tendency for insiders to guard information on such

matters carefully compounded the difficulty, especially for foreigners

wishing to understand how domestic decision making could be in- fluenced to reduce trade problems.

The Human Factor

The most important human factor in the policy-making process was the homogeneity of the political and business elites. In the early

1990s, they still tended to be graduates of a relatively small number of top-ranked universities. Regardless of these individuals'

regional or class origins, their similar educational backgrounds en- couraged their feeling of community, as was reflected in the finely

meshed network of marriage alliances between top official, LDP

and financial circle (zaikai) families. The institution of early retire- ment also fostered homogeneity. In the practice of amakudari, or descent from heaven, as it is popularly known, bureaucrats retir- ing in their fifties often assumed top positions in public corporations and private enterprise. They also became LDP politicians.

By the late 1980s, most postwar prime ministers had had civil service

backgrounds.

This homogeneity facilitated the free flow of ideas among members of the elite in informal settings. Bureaucrats and business people

associated with a single industry, such as electronics, often held

regular informal meetings in Tokyo hotels and restaurants. Politi- cal scientist T.J. Pempel has pointed out that the concentration

of political and economic power in Tokyo—particularly the small

geographic area of its central wards—made it easy for leaders, who

were almost without exception denizens of the capital, to have

repeated personal contact. Another often overlooked factor was the

tendency of elite males not to be family men. Late night work and

bar-hopping schedules gave them ample opportunity to hash and

rehash policy matters and engage in haragei (literally, belly art),

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The Political System

or intimate, often nonverbal communication. Like the warriors of

ancient Sparta, who lived in barracks apart from their families during much of their adulthood, the business and bureaucratic elites were expected to sacrifice their private lives for the national good.

Formal Policy Development

After a largely informal process within elite circles in which ideas were discussed and developed, steps might be taken to institute more formal policy development. This process often took place in

deliberation councils {shingikai). There were about 200 shingikai,

each attached to a ministry; their members were both officials and

prominent private individuals in business, education, and other

fields. The shingikai played a large role in facilitating communication among those who ordinarily might not meet. Given the ten- dency for real negotiations in Japan to be conducted privately (in

the nemawashi, or root binding, process of consensus building), the

shingikai often represented a fairly advanced stage in policy formulation in which relatively minor differences could be thrashed out

and the resulting decisions couched in language acceptable to all. These bodies were legally established, but had no authority to oblige governments to adopt their recommendations.

The most important deliberation council during the 1980s was

the Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform, established

in March 1981 by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko. The commission

had nine members, assisted in their deliberations by six advisers,

twenty-one "expert members," and around fifty "councillors"

representing a wide range of groups. Its head, Keidanren pres- ident Doko Toshio, insisted that government agree to take its recommendations seriously and commit itself to reforming the administrative structure and the tax system. In 1982 the commission

had arrived at several recommendations that by the end of the decade had been actualized. These implementations included tax re- form; a policy to limit government growth; the establishment, in

1984, of the Management and Coordination Agency to replace the

Administrative Management Agency in the Office of the Prime

Minister; and privatization of the state-owned railroad and tele- phone systems. In April 1990, another deliberation council, the

Election Systems Research Council, submitted proposals that in- cluded the establishment of single- seat constituencies in place of

the multiple- seat system.

Another significant policy-making institution in the early 1990s was the LDP's Policy Research Council. It consisted of a number

of committees, composed of LDP Diet members, with the committees corresponding to the different executive agencies. Committee

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Japan: A Country Study

members worked closely with their official counterparts, advancing the requests of their constituents, in one of the most effective means through which interest groups could state their case to the

bureaucracy through the channel of the ruling party.

The Budget Process

Despite the increasingly apparent limits of bureaucratic power,

the Budget Bureau of the Ministry of Finance was at the heart of

the political process because it drew up the national budget each

year. This responsibility made it the ultimate focus of interest

groups, through the medium of the LDP and of other ministries

that competed for limited funds. The budgetary process generally

began soon after the start of a new fiscal year on April 1 . Ministries and government agencies prepared budget requests in consultation with the Policy Research Council. In the fall of each year, Budget Bureau examiners reviewed these requests in great detail,

while top Ministry of Finance officials worked out the general contours of the new budget and the distribution of tax revenues. During the winter, after the release of the ministry's draft budget,

campaigning by individual Diet members for their constituents and

different ministries for revisions and supplementary allocations be- came intense. LDP and Ministry of Finance officials consulted on

a final draft budget, which was generally passed by the Diet in late winter.

In broad outline, the process revealed a basic characteristic of

Japanese political dynamics: that despite the oft-stated ideals of

"harmony" and "consensus," interests, including bureaucratic

interests, were in strong competition for resources. LDP leaders

and Budget Bureau officials needed great skill to reach mutually

acceptable compromises. The image of "Japan Incorporated," in

which harmony and unanimity were virtually automatic, belied

the reality of intense rivalry. The late twentieth-century system was

successful insofar as superior political skills and appreciation of com- mon interests minimized antagonisms and maintained an acceptable balance of power among groups. Whether this system would

continue, as Japan faced such problems as growing social inequality, an aging society, and the challenge of "internationalization"

of its society and economy, in the early 1990s remained unclear.

The Opposition Parties

With the exception of the period from May 1947 to March 1948,

when a socialist, Katayama Tetsu, was prime minster, heading a

coalition of socialists and conservatives, opposition parties failed

to gain enough national electoral support to participate in forming

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The Political System

a cabinet or to form one of their own. In 1990, major opposition

parties with representation in the Diet were the Japan Socialist

Party, the Komeito, the Japan Communist Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshato). Two smaller opposition parties were the Socialist Democratic League and the Progressive Party

(Shimpoto). None had a sufficiently broad base of support to challenge the LDP at the polls, and in the early 1990s, they had

not been able to form workable coalitions. An exception occurred

in some local elections, where "progressive" coalitions were more

effective in electing opposition candidates than on the national level. The opposition parties were separated by ideology, with the Japan

Communist Party and a significant faction of the Japan Socialist

Party espousing Marxist revolution; the others were moderate and

pragmatic. In many cases, the programs of the Komeito and

Democratic Socialist Party differed little from those of the LDP.

Unlike the Japan Socialist Party, smaller opposition parties lacked

the resources to run candidates in all the country's constituencies.

On occasions in the 1970s and 1980s, it seemed that the end of

conservative power was at hand. One such time was following the

Lockheed scandal of the mid-1970s (a journalist at the time

described it as "conservative power self-destructs"); another was

the combined furor over the 3 percent consumption tax and the

Recruit scandal in 1988-89. When the LDP was pushed into the

minority in the July 1989 upper-house election, many commentators believed that Doi Takako, chairwoman and leader of the Japan

Socialist Party, was within striking distance of forming a government, probably in coalition with other opposition groups, in the

upcoming, more important general election for the lower house.

That this situation failed to materialize suggested not so much popular contentment with the LDP as the opposition's inability to present a viable alternative to voters. The opposition was important if only because its existence

legitimized Japan's claim to be a modern, democratic state. Moreover, the Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party

played a major role in the 1950s and 1960s in protecting the

democratic institutions promoted by the United States occupation.

The opposition's control of more than one-third of the seats in the

Diet meant that amendments revising the Constitution (such as the proposed rewording or abolition of Article 9) could not be

passed. If conservatives had had their way in the early postwar

years, some ofJapan's prewar symbols and military power would

have been restored, a move that most likely would have greatly

affected relations with East Asian and Southeast Asian countries,

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Japan: A Country Study

where bitter memories ofJapanese wartime occupation remained

fresh. In a political system where the ruling party habitually swept embarrassing matters under the carpet and the established press club

system inhibited investigative reporting, the opposition functioned

reasonably well, to use film scholar Donald Richie's phrase, as "car- pet picker-uppers." They exposed and demanded parliamentary

investigations of scandals like the Recruit affair. Routinely, they

used meetings of the Budget Committee and other committees in

the Diet to question cabinet ministers and government officials,

and these sessions received wide media publicity.

Ideas first proposed by the opposition, such as national health

insurance and other social welfare measures, were frequently

adopted and implemented by the ruling party. The ' 'Eda Vision'

of moderate socialist leader Eda Saburo in the early 1960s—"An

American standard of living, Soviet levels of social welfare, a British parliamentary system, and Japan's peace constitution" —were

largely realized under LDP auspices.

Although opposition control of the upper house after the July

1989 election represented a change, the opposition had little impact on the legislative process. Regulations in the Diet Law and

the rules of the two houses gave presiding House of Representatives officers the power to convene plenary sessions, fix agendas,

and limit debates. Because these officers were elected by the LDP

majority, they used these powers to constrain opposition party activity. Although the opposition could not filibuster, the lack of a time limit for formal balloting allowed them to use the gyuho senjutsu

(cow's pace tactics) to cause excruciating delays in the passage of

LDP-sponsored bills, walking so slowly to cast their individual votes

that the process took several hours, sorely trying the tempers of

LDP Diet members.

Japan Socialist Party

The Japan Socialist Party was the largest opposition party in

the early 1990s. Like the LDP, it resulted from the union of two

smaller groups in 1955. The new opposition party had its own fac- tions, although organized according to left- right ideological commitments rather than what it called the "feudal personalism" of

the conservative parties. In the House of Representatives election

of 1958, the Japan Socialist Party gained 32.9 percent of the popular

vote and 166 out of 467 seats. After that, its percentage of the popular vote and number of seats gradually declined. In the double elec- tion of July 1986 for both Diet houses, the party suffered a rout by the LDP under Nakasone: its seats in the lower house fell from

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The Political System

112 to an all-time low of 85 and its share of the vote from 19.5

percent to 17.2 percent. But its popular chairwoman, Doi Takako,

led it to an impressive showing in the February 1 990 general elec- tion: 136 seats and 24.4 percent of the vote. Some electoral districts had more than one successful socialist candidate. Doi's

decision to put up more than one candidate for each of the 130

districts represented a controversial break with the past, because,

unlike their LDP counterparts, manyJapan Socialist Party candidates did not want to run against each other. But the great majority

of the 149 socialist candidates who ran were successful, including seven of eight women.

Doi, a university professor of constitutional law before entering

politics, had a tough, straight-talking manner that appealed to voters

tired of the evasiveness of other politicians. Many women found

her a refreshing alternative to submissive female stereotypes, and

in the late 1980s the public at large, in opinion polls, voted her

their favorite politician (the runner-up in these surveys was equally

tough-talking conservative LDP member Ishihara Shintaro). Doi's

popularity, however, was of limited aid to the party. The powerful Shakaishugi Kyokai (Japan Socialist Association), which was

supported by a hard-core contingent of the party's 76,000-strong

membership, remained committed to doctrinaire Marxism, impeding Doi's efforts to promote what she called perestroika and a more

moderate program with greater voter appeal. In 1983 Doi's predecessor as chairman, Ishibashi Masashi, began

the delicate process of moving the party away from its strong opposition to the Self-Defense Forces. While maintaining that these

forces were unconstitutional in light of Article 9, he claimed that,

because they had been established through legal procedures, they

had a "legitimate" status (this phrasing was changed a year later to say that the Self-Defense Forces "exist legally"). Ishibashi also

broke past precedent by visiting Washington to talk with United

States political leaders.

By the end of the decade, the party had accepted the Self-Defense

Forces and the 1962 Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as facts of life. It advocated strict limitations on military spending (no more than 1 percent of GNP annually), a suspension of joint military exercises with United States forces,

and a reaffirmation of the "three nonnuclear principles" (no

production, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons into

Japanese territory). Doi expressed support for "balanced ties" with

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the

Republic of Korea (South Korea). In the past, the Japan Socialist

Party had favored the Kim II Song regime in P'yongyang, and in

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Japan: A Country Study

the early 1990s it still refused to recognize the 1965 normalization

of relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In domestic policy, the party

demanded the continued protection of agriculture and small busi- ness in the face of foreign pressure, abolition of the consumer tax,

and an end to the construction and use of nuclear power reactors. As a symbolic gesture to reflect its new moderation, at its April

1990 convention the party dropped its commitment to "socialist

revolution" and described its goal as "social democracy": crea- tion of a society in which "all people fairly enjoy the fruits of technological advancement and modern civilization and receive the

benefits of social welfare." Delegates also voted Doi a third term

as party chairwoman.

Because of the party's self-definition as a class-based party and

its symbiotic relationship with Sohyo, the public sector union confederation, few efforts were made to attract nonunion constituencies. Although some Sohyo unions supported the Japan Communist

Party, the Japan Socialist Party remained the representative of

Sohyo's political interests until the merger with private sector unions

formed the noncommunist Shin Rengo in 1989. Because of declining union financial support during the 1980s, some Japan Socialist

Party Diet members turned to dubious fund-raising methods. One

was involved in the Recruit affair. The Japan Socialist Party, like others, sold large blocks of fund-raising party tickets, and the LDP

even gave individual Japan Socialist Party Diet members funds

from time to time to persuade them to cooperate in passing difficult legislation.

Komeito

In 1990, the Komeito (the euphemistic English translation of the

Japanese name is Clean Government Party) was the second largest opposition party, with forty-five legislators in the House of

Representatives after the February election, although the party lost eleven seats compared with its July 1986 showing. The Komeito

was an offshoot of the Soka Gakkai, which had been founded in

1930 as an independent lay organization of the Nichiren Shoshu

sect of Buddhism, whose numbers were estimated at 750,000 in

1958 and more than 35 million in the late 1980s. In 1962 the Soka

Gakkai, established a League for Clean Government, which be- came a regular political party, the Komeito, two years later. Ties

between the Komeito and the Soka Gakkai were formally dissolved

in 1970, and the image of an "open party" was projnoted. But the

resignation in 1989 of a Komeito Diet member, Ohashi Toshio,

following his criticism of the religious leader Ikeda Daisaku, sug- gested that the Soka Gakkai' s influence over the party remained

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The Political System

substantial. Public suspicions concerning the religious connection

(in principle a violation of the Constitution's Article 20), and the

involvement of several Komeito Diet members in the Recruit scan- dal accounted for the party's poor electoral showing in February

1990.

The party's supporters tended to be people who were largely outside the privileged labor union and "salarymen" circles of lifetime

employment in large enterprises. The Komeito 's programs were

rather vague. They emphasized welfare and quality of life issues. In foreign policy, they had dropped their previous opposition to the Japan-United States security treaty and the Self-Defense Forces. Given the party's aversion to the leftism of the Japan Socialist Party,

and despite its occasional cooperation with the leftists, it was judged

unlikely to enter into a lasting coalition with the largest opposition

group, despite protracted negotiations. In fact, the LDP worked

hard to gain the Komeito 's cooperation in the upper house to pass

legislation, and most commentators considered the Komeito, along

with the Democratic Socialist Party, as a likely coalition partner

should the LDP lose its parliamentary majority in the lower house.

Japan Communist Party

The Japan Communist Party was first organized in 1922, in the

wake of the Russian Revolution, and remained part of the international, Moscow-controlled communist movement until the early

1960s. Although the party won a large percentage of the popular

vote in Diet elections in 1949, it became extremely unpopular after 1950, when Moscow ordered it to cease being a "lovable party"

and to engage in armed struggle. It was forced to go underground,

and in the election lost all its seats in the Diet. A self-reliant party

line, stressing independence from both Moscow and Beijing, evolved

during the 1960s. The party's chairman, Miyamoto Kenji, a tough

veteran of prewar struggles and wartime prisons, promoted the

"parliamentary road" of nonviolent, electoral politics. Thereafter,

the fortunes of the Japan Communist Party gradually revived.

Representation in the lower house reached a high point of thirtynine in the 1979 election, but declined to between twenty-six and

twenty-nine seats in the 1980s and to sixteen in the February 1990

election. The party's program promoted unarmed neutrality, the

severing of security ties with the United States, defense of the post- war Constitution, and socialism. It also voiced concern for welfare

and quality of life issues. Both organizationally and financially, the party was stronger than

its opposition rivals and even the LDP. Revenues from its publishing enterprises, especially the popular newspaper Akahata (Red

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Japan: A Country Study

Flag), which had the eighth largest circulation in the country,

provided adequate support for its activities. As a result, the Japan

Communist Party was the party least mired in money politics. This

fact earned it the reluctant respect of voters. But suspicions about

its ultimate intentions remained strong in the early 1990s. It was

excluded from opposition party negotiations on coalitions. Its loss of ten seats in the February 1990 general election was partly the

result of voter disgust with the party's Chinese counterpart following

repression of prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen

Incident in 1989. In the election campaigns of 1989-90, the LDP

eagerly smeared the party with this association, forcing the communists in their publicity to emphasize that the Chinese and

Japanese parties were different and that the Japanese party sin- cerely supported the struggle for democracy in China and Eastern

Europe. Ironically, the Japan Communist Party had strongly con- demned the Beijing incident, while the LDP government, ever conscious of business interests with big investments in China, had

reacted lamely to the killings by describing them as

4 'regrettable."

Democratic Socialist Party

The Democratic Socialist Party was established in January 1960

when right-wing members of the Japan Socialist Party broke away

to form their own group. In the past, the Democratic Socialist Party

derived much of its financial and organizational support from the

Domei private sector labor confederation. Like the LDP and the

Komeito, it supported the security treaty with the United States and the Self-Defense Forces. As the most conservative of the opposition parties, it had formed coalitions with the LDP and viewed an opposition coalition with the Japan Socialist Party with distaste. In the February 1990 general election, the Democratic Socialist

Party won fourteen seats, down from the twenty-six won in the

July 1986 election. The party's chairman, Tsukamoto Saburo, was

forced to resign in 1988, after it was revealed that he received 5,000

shares of stock from Recruit.

Other Parties and Independents

Like the Democratic Socialist Party, the tiny Social Democratic

League was formed, in 1978, by defectors from the Japan Socialist

Party. A non-Marxist party in the social democratic tradition, it won four seats in the February 1990 general election. In February

1990, the Progressive Party (Shimpoto) won one seat. Largely to contest upper house elections, a large number of ' 'miniparties" had emerged. In the July 1989 election, these included the

Salaryman's New Party, which supported a more equitable tax

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The Political System

system for salaried workers; the Global Club, devoted to women's

rights; the Pension Party, concerned with inequities in the national

pension system; and the People Opposed to Nuclear Power Party.

The UFO Party advocated a government project to make contact with intelligent beings from outer space. A relatively large number of candidates ran as independents in

general elections. Twenty-one of them were elected in the February 1990 balloting, but the majority later affiliated themselves with

the LDP, as was the custom. Their number has included powerful

former members of the LDP such as Tanaka Kakuei and Nakasone

Yasuhiro, who had resigned from the party because of scandals

but continued to lead LDP factions.

Political Extremists

According to the 1989 Asahi Nenkan, there were 14,400 activist members of the "new left" organized into five major "currents"

(ryu) and 27 or 28 different factions. Total membership was about

35,000. New left activity focused on the New Tokyo International

Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka. In the early 1970s, radical groups and

normally conservative farmers formed a highly unusual alliance

to oppose expropriation of the latter' s land for the airport's construction. Confrontations at the construction site, which pitted thousands of farmers and radicals against riot police, were violent but

generally nonlethal. Although the airport was completed and began

operations during the 1980s, the resistance continued, on a reduced

scale, in the early 1990s. Radicals attempted to halt planned ex- pansion of the airport by staging guerrilla attacks on those directly or indirectly involved in promoting the plan. By 1990, this activity had resulted in some deaths. There were also attacks against

places associated with the emperor. In January 1990, leftists fired

homemade rockets at imperial residences in Tokyo and Kyoto.

In terms of terrorist activities, the most important new left group was the Japanese Red Army (Nihon Sekigun). Formed in 1969,

it was responsible for, among other acts, the hijacking of a Japan

Airlines jet to P'yongyang in 1970 and the murder of twenty-six

people at Lod International Airport in Tel Aviv in 1977. Its activists developed close connections with international terrorist

groups, including Palestinian extremists (see Civil Disturbances,

ch. 8). The Japanese Red Army also had close ties with the Kim

II Song regime in North Korea, where several of its hijackers resided

during the early 1990s. The group was tightiy organized, and one

scholar has suggested that its "managerial style" resembled that

of major Japanese corporations.

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Japan: A Country Study

Right-wing extremists were diverse. In 1989 there were 800 such

groups with about 120,000 members altogether. By police count,

however, only about 50 groups and 23,000 individuals were considered active. Right-wing extremists indulged in a heady romanticism with strong links to the prewar period. They tended to be

fascinated with the macho charisma of blood, sweat, and steel, and

promoted (like many nonradical groups) traditional samurai values

as the antidote to the spiritual ills of postwar Japan. Their prefer- ence for violent direct action rather than words reflected the ex- ample of the militarist extremists of the 1930s and the heroic "men

of strong will" of the late Tokugawa period of the 1850s and 1860s.

The modern right-wing extremists demanded an end to the post- war "system of dependence" on the United States, restoration of

the emperor to his prewar, divine status, and repudiation of Article 9. Many, if not most, right-wingers had intimate connections

with Japan's gangster underground, the yakuza.

The ritual suicide of one of Japan's most prominent novelists,

Mishima Yukio, following a failed attempt to initiate a rebellion

among Self-Defense Forces units in November 1970 shocked and

fascinated the public. Mishima and his small private army, the

Shield Society (Tate no Kai), hoped that a rising of the Self-Defense

Forces would inspire a nationwide affirmation of the old values and

put an end to the postwar "age of languid peace." Although rightists were also responsible for the assassination of socialist leader

Asanuma Inejiro in 1960 and an attempt on the life of former prime

minster Ohira Masayoshi in 1978, most of them, unlike their prewar

counterparts, largely kept to noisy street demonstrations, especially

harassment campaigns aimed at conventions of the leftist Japan

Teachers Union. In the early 1990s, however, there was evidence

that a "new right" was becoming more violent. In May 1987, a

reporter working for the liberal Asahi Shimbun was killed by a gunman belonging to the Nippon Minzoku Dokuritsu Giyugun Betsudo

Sekihotai (Blood Revenge Corps of the Partisan Volunteer Corps

for the Independence of the Japanese Race), known as Sekihotai

(Blood Revenge Corps). The Sekihotai also threatened to assas- sinate former Prime Minister Nakasone for giving in to foreign

pressure on such issues as the revision of textbook accounts of

Japan's war record. In January 1990, a member of the Seikijuku

(translatable, ironically, as the Sane Thinkers School) shot and seri- ously wounded Nagasaki mayor Motoshima Hitoshi. The attack

may have been provoked by the leftist rocket attacks on imperial

residences in Tokyo and Kyoto a few days earlier as well as the

mayor's critical remarks concerning Emperor Hirohito.

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The Political System

Despite the threat from political extremists on both left and right,

periodic increases in the strength of opposition parties, and fac- tionalism and the taint of scandal in its own ranks, the LDP con- tinued to maintain a strong government. In the February 1990

election, Japan's economically stable citizenry continued to support the government that had ruled for nearly forty years.

* * *

DemocratizingJapan, a collection of essays edited by Robert Ward

and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, describes the writing of the postwar Constitution and other effects of the United States occupation on Japan's

political system. Theodore Cohen's Remaking Japan, and From a Ruined Empire, edited by Otis Cary, depict the occupation from participants' points of view. Although most of the essays in Maruyama

Masao's Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics were composed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this volume still provides

perhaps the best discussion of Japanese political values. Authority

and the Individual in Japan, edited by J. Victor Koschmann, discusses

changes in values from the Meiji period to the 1970s and has many

interesting things to say about how Japanese view authority. Against

the State by David Apter and Nagayo Sawa challenges the conventional view of the value placed on harmony (wa) in describing farmer

and radical resistance to the construction of the New Tokyo In- ternational Airport. Although published in 1969, Nathaniel B. Thayer's How the Conservatives RuleJapan remained relevant in the

early 1990s. More recent discussions of the political system include

Bradley M. Richardson's The Political Culture ofJapan, Kyogoku

Jun'ichi's The Political Dynamics ofJapan, T.J. Pempel's Policy and

Politics in Industrial States, and J. A. A. Stockwin and others' Dynamic

and Immobilist Politics in Japan. Kent E. Calder's Crisis and Compensation, however, is especially illuminating because of its avoidance

of cultural explanations (which are typically overused) and its abundance of comparisons with other countries. B.C. Koh'sJapan's Administrative Elite provides a clear and concise discussion of the elite

civil service and its policy-making role. Karel G. van Wolferen's

controversial The Enigma ofJapanese Power, which Japanese critics have called "a textbook for Japan-bashing," is filled with interesting

details, even if its main thesis about the leaderless nature of the

political system is questionable.

English-language journals and periodicals with useful articles on

the political system include Journal ofJapanese Studies, Journal ofAsian

Studies, Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], Japan Quarterly

[Tokyo] , Japan Echo [Tokyo] , and Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong

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Japan: A Country Study

Kong]. One of the best, Japan Interpreter [Tokyo], ceased publication in 1980 but its articles from the 1960s and 1970s are still il- luminating. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

366
Chapter 7. Foreign Relations
Family crest using Chinese seal-style ideographfor longevity and stylized old pine trees (matsu)
JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY was facing new challenges and

difficult decisions in 1990. The 1980s had seen enormous changes

in the distribution of international economic power and the politi- cal influence that accompanies it. Japan had become the world's

largest creditor nation and the second largest donor of foreign aid. Japanese industries and enterprises were among the most capable

in the world. High savings and investment rates and high-quality

education were expected to solidify the international leadership of

these enterprises in the decade to come. Its economic power gave

Japan a steadily growing role in the World Bank (see Glossary),

the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), and other

international financial institutions. Investment and trade flows gave

Japan by far the dominant economic role in Asia, and Japanese

aid and investment were widely sought after in other parts of the

world. It appeared to be only a matter of time before such eco- nomic power would be translated into greater political power.

The collapse of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and

the growing Soviet preoccupation with internal political and eco- nomic problems increased the importance of economic competition, rather than military power, to Japan. The Soviet Union, a

military superpower, was often depicted as a large Third World

country trying desperately to stave off economic disaster and anxiously seeking aid, trade, and technical benefits from the developed

countries, such as Japan. The power of Japan's ally, the United

States, was also seen by many as waning. The United States's sta- tus in the 1980s had gone from the world's largest creditor to the

world's largest debtor, and its economic position had weakened

relative to some other developed countries, notably Japan. The

United States was forced to look increasingly to Japan and others

to shoulder the financial burdens entailed in the transformation

of former communist economies in Eastern Europe and other ur- gent international requirements that fall upon the shoulders of world

leaders.

Inside Japan, both elite and popular opinion expressed growing support for a more prominent international role, proportionate to the nation's economic power, foreign assistance, trade, and

investment. But the traditional post-World War II reluctance to take a greater military role in the world remained. A firm consensus continued to support the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

and Security and other bilateral agreements with the United States

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Japan: A Country Study

as the keystones ofJapan's security policy. However, Japanese offi- cials were increasingly active in using their economic and financial resources in seeking a greater voice in international financial

and political organizations, and in shaping the policies of the developed countries toward international trouble spots, especially in

Asia. Meanwhile, there was some doubt in both Japan and the

United States as to whether Japan-United States security arrangements, predicated on the Soviet threat, could be transformed to meet the new strategic realities of the 1990s.

Throughout the post-World War II period, Japan concentrated on economic growth. It accommodated itself flexibly to the regional

and global policies of the United States while avoiding major initiatives of its own; adhered to pacifist principles embodied in the

1947 Constitution, referred to as the * 'peace constitution"; and

generally took a passive, low-profile role in world affairs. Relations

with other countries were governed by what the leadership called

"omnidirectional diplomacy," which was essentially a policy of

maintaining political neutrality in foreign affairs while expanding

economic relations wherever possible. This policy was highly successful and allowed Japan to prosper and grow as an economic

power, but it was feasible only while the country enjoyed the security and economic stability provided by its ally, the United States. The need for a revamping ofJapan's foreign policy posture had

become apparent during the 1970s and particularly following the

middle of the decade, as major changes in the international situation and the nation's own development into an economic world

power made the old diplomacy obsolete. Japan's burgeoning eco- nomic growth and expansion into overseas markets had given rise to foreign charges of "economic aggression" and demands that

it adopt more balanced trade policies. Changes in the power rela- tionships in the Asia-Pacific quadrilateral—made up of Japan,

China, the United States, and the Soviet Union—also called for reexamination of policies. The deepening Sino-Soviet split and confrontation, the dramatic rapprochement between the United States and China, the rapid reduction of the United States military

presence in Asia following the Second Indochina War (1954-75),

and the 1970s expansion of Soviet military power in the western

Pacific all required a reevaluation ofJapan's security position and

overall role in Asia. Finally, the oil crises of the 1970s sharpened

Japanese awareness of the country's vulnerability to cutoffs of raw

material and energy supplies, underscoring the need for a less passive, more independent foreign policy.

Japanese thinking on foreign policy was also influenced by the

rise of a new postwar generation to leadership and policy-making

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Foreign Relations

positions. The differences in outlook between the older leaders still in positions of power and influence and the younger generation

that was replacing them complicated formulation of foreign policy.

By 1990 Japan's foreign policy choices often challenged the

leadership's tendency to avoid radical shifts and to rely on incremental adjustments. Although still generally supportive of close ties, including the alliance relationship with the United States, Japanese

leaders were well aware of strong American frustrations with

Japanese economic practices and Japan's growing economic power

relative to the United States in world affairs. Senior United States leaders were calling upon Japanese officials to work with them in

crafting 4 'a new conceptual framework" for Japan-United States

relations that would take account of altered strategic and economic

realities and changes in Japanese and United States views about

the bilateral relationship. The results of this effort were far from

clear. Some optimistically predicted "a new global partnership"

in which the United States and Japan would work together as truly

equal partners in dealing with global problems. Pessimists predicted

that negative feelings generated by the realignment in United States and Japanese economic power and persistent trade frictions would

prompt Japan to strike out more on its own, without the ' 'guidance'

of the United States. Given the growing economic dominance of

Japan in Asia, Tokyo was seen as most likely to strike out independently there first, translating its economic power into political and

perhaps, eventually, military influence.

Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies

Japan's geography—particularly its insular character, its limited endowment of natural resources, and its exposed location near

potentially hostile giant neighbors—has played an important role in the development of its foreign policy. In premodern times,

Japan's semi-isolated position on the periphery of the Asian mainland was an asset (see Physical Setting, ch. 2). It permitted the

Japanese to exist as a self-sufficient society in a secure environment. It also allowed them to borrow selectively from the rich civili- zation of China while maintaining their own cultural identity.

Insularity promoted a strong cultural and ethnic unity, which underlay the early development of a national consciousness that has in- fluenced Japan's relations with outside peoples and cultures

throughout its history.

Early Developments

In the early sixteenth century, a feudally organized Japan came

into contact with Western missionaries and traders for the first time.

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Japan: A Country Study

Westerners introduced important cultural innovations into Japanese

society during more than a century of relations with various feu- dal rulers. But when the country was unified at the beginning of

the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa government decided to expel the foreign missionaries and strictly limit intercourse with

the outside world. National seclusion—except for contacts with the

Chinese and Dutch—was Japan's foreign policy for more than two

centuries (see Seclusion and Social Control, ch. 1). When the Tokugawa seclusion was forcibly breached in 1853-

54 by Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States Navy,

Japan found that geography no longer ensured security—the country was defenseless against military pressures and economic exploitation by the Western powers. After Perry's naval squadron had

compelled Japan to enter into relations with the Western world,

the first foreign policy debate was over whether Japan should embark on an extensive modernization to cope with the threat of the

"eastward advance of Western power," which had already violated the independence of China, or expel the "barbarians" and

return to seclusion. The latter alternative—although it appealed

to many—was never seriously considered. Beginning with the Meiji

Restoration of 1868, which ushered in a new, centralized regime,

Japan set out to "gather wisdom from all over the world' ' and embarked on an ambitious program of military, social, political, and

economic reforms that transformed it within a generation into a modern nation- state and major world power.

Modern Japan's foreign policy was shaped at the outset by its need to reconcile its Asian identity with its desire for status and

security in an international order dominated by the West. The principal foreign policy goals of the Meiji period (1868-1912) were to protect the integrity and independence of the nation against Western

domination and to win equality of status with the leading nations

of the West by reversing the unequal treaties. Since fear of Western

military power was the chief concern of the Meiji leaders, their

highest priority was building up the basic requirements for national

defense, under the slogan "wealth and arms" (Jukoku kyohei). They

saw that a modern military establishment required national conscription drawing manpower from an adequately educated population, a trained officer corps, a sophisticated chain of command,

and strategy and tactics adapted to contemporary conditions (see

The Modernization of the Military, 1868-1931, ch. 8). Finally,

it required modern arms together with the factories to make them,

sufficient wealth to purchase them, and a transportation system

to deliver them (see The Emergence of Modern Japan, 1868-1919,

ch. 1).

372
A Japanese view of the West, an 1850s woodblock print of a

contemporary American merchant ship by Hiroshige II

Courtesy Chadbourne Collection, Library of Congress

An important objective of the military buildup was to gain the

respect of the Western powers and achieve equal status for Japan

in the international community. Inequality of status was symbolized by the treaties imposed on Japan when the country was first opened to foreign intercourse. The treaties were objectionable to the Japanese not only because they imposed low fixed tariffs on

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Japan: A Country Study

foreign imports and thus handicapped domestic industries, but also because their provisions gave a virtual monopoly of external trade

to foreigners and granted extraterritorial status to foreign nationals in Japan, exempting them fromJapanese jurisdiction and placing

Japan in the inferior category of uncivilized nations. Many of the

social and institutional reforms of the Meiji period were designed

to remove the stigma of backwardness and inferiority represented

by the "unequal treaties," and a major task of Meiji diplomacy was to press for early treaty revision.

Once created, the Meiji military machine was used to extend

Japanese power overseas, for many leaders believed that national

security depended on expansion and not merely a strong defense.

Within thirty years, the country's military forces had fought and

defeated imperial China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-

95), winning possession of Taiwan and Chinese recognition of

Korea's independence. Ten years later, in the Russo-Japanese War

(1904-5), Japan defeated tsarist Russia and won possession of

southern Sakhalin as well as a position of paramount influence in

Korea and southern Manchuria. By this time, Japan had been able

to negotiate revisions of the unequal treaties with the Western powers and had in 1902 formed an alliance with the world's leading

power, Britain. After World War I, in which it sided with the

Western Allies, Japan, despite its relatively small role in the war

(with little effort it gained possession of former German territories in the Pacific), sat with the victors at Versailles and enjoyed the

status of a great power in its own right.

Between World War I and World War II, the nation embarked

on a course of imperialist expansion, using both diplomatic and

military means to extend its control over more and more of the

Asian mainland. It began to see itself as the protector and champion of Asian interests against the West, a point of view that brought

it increasingly into conflict with the Western powers (see Diplomacy,

ch. 1). When its aggressive policies met firm resistance from the

United States and its allies, Japan made common cause with the

Axis partnership of Germany and Italy and launched into war with

the United States and the Western Alliance (see World War II, ch. 8). After Japan's devastating defeat in World War II, the nation came under an Allied occupation in which the United States, as the principal occupying power, was charged with the demilitarization and democratization of the state. Major changes were made

in political, social, and economic institutions and practices. During the seven-year occupation, the country had no control over its foreign affairs and became in effect the ward of the United States

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Foreign Relations

on the international scene. It adopted a new Constitution whereby, in Article 9, the "Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as mean

of settling international disputes" (see The Postwar Constitution,

ch. 6). Postwar Developments

When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and reentered the

international community as an independent nation, it found itself in a world dominated by the Cold War between East and West,

in which the Soviet Union and the United States headed opposing

camps. By virtue of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed in San

Francisco on September 8, 1951 (effective April 28, 1952), ending

the state of war between Japan and most of the Allied powers ex- cept the Soviet Union and China, and the Mutual Security Assistance Pact between Japan and the United States, signed in San

Francisco the same day, Japan was now essentially a dependent

ally of the United States, which continued to maintain bases and

troops on Japanese soil. Japan's foreign policy goals during most of the early postwar

period were essentially to regain economic viability and establish

its credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. National security was entrusted to the protective shield and nuclear

umbrella of the United States, which was permitted under the security pact that came into effect in April 1952, to deploy its forces

in and about Japan. The pact provided a framework governing

the use of United States forces against military threats—internal or external—in the region. A special diplomatic task was to assuage

the suspicions and alleviate the resentments of Asian neighbors who

had suffered from Japanese colonial rule and imperialist aggression in the past. Japan's diplomacy toward its Asian neighbors,

therefore, tended to be extremely low-key, conciliatory, and nonassertive. With respect to the world at large, the nation avoided

political issues and concentrated on economic goals. Under its omnidirectional diplomacy, it sought to cultivate friendly ties with all nations, proclaimed a policy of "separation of politics and eco- nomics," and adhered to a neutral position on some East-West

issues. During the 1950s and 1960s, foreign policy actions were guided

by three basic principles: close cooperation with the United States

for both security and economic reasons; promotion of a free trade

system congenial to Japan's own economic needs; and international

cooperation through the United Nations (UN)—to which it was

admitted in 1956—and other multilateral bodies. Adherence to these

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Japan: A Country Study

principles worked well and contributed to phenomenal economic

recovery and growth during the first two decades after the end of

the occupation.

In the 1970s, the basic postwar principles remained unchanged,

but were approached from a new perspective, owing to the pres- sure of practical politics at home and abroad. There was growing

domestic pressure on the government to exercise more foreign policy

initiatives independent of the United States, without, however, compromising vital security and economic ties. The so-called Nixon

''shock," involving the surprise United States opening to China

and other regional issues, also argued for a more independent

Japanese foreign policy. The nation's phenomenal economic growth

had made it a ranking world economic power by the early 1970s

and had generated a sense of pride and self-esteem, especially among

the younger generation. The demand for a more independent for- eign policy reflected this enhanced self-image.

Changes in world economic relations during the 1970s also en- couraged a more independent stance. Japan had become less dependent on the Western powers for resources. Oil, for example, was obtained directly from the producing countries and not from

the Western-controlled multinational companies. Other important

materials also came increasingly from sources other than the United

States and its allies, while trade with the United States as a share

of total trade dropped significantly during the decade of the 1970s.

Thus, political leaders began to argue that in the interests of eco- nomic self-preservation, more attention should be paid to the financial and development needs of other countries, especially those that

provided Japan with vital energy and raw material supplies.

The move toward a more autonomous foreign policy was ac- celerated in the 1970s by the United States decision to withdraw

troops from Indochina. Japanese public opinion had earlier favored some distance between Japan and the United States involvement

in war in Vietnam. The collapse of the war effort in Vietnam was

seen as the end of United States military and economic dominance

in Asia and brought to the fore a marked shift in Japanese atti- tudes about the United States. This shift, which had been developing

since the early 1970s, took the form of questioning the credibility

of the United States 's nuclear umbrella, as well as its ability to underwrite a stable international currency system, guarantee Japanese

access to energy and raw materials, and secure Japanese interests

in a stable political order. The shift therefore required a reassess- ment of omnidirectional diplomacy.

Japan's leaders welcomed the reassertion of United States mili- tary power in Asian and world affairs following the revolution in

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Foreign Relations

Iran, the United States hostage crisis, and the Soviet military in- vasion of Afghanistan, all of which occurred in 1979. Japanese leaders played a strong supporting role in curbing economic and other

interaction with the Soviet Union and its allies, to help check the

expansion of Soviet power in sensitive Third World areas. Under

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan built up a close politicalmilitary relationship with the United States as part of a de facto

international front of a number of developed and developing countries intent on checking Soviet expansion. Japan's defense spending continued to grow steadily despite overall Japanese budget

restraint. Japan became increasingly active in granting foreign as- sistance to countries of strategic importance in East-West competition (see Strategic Considerations; Defense Spending, ch. 8). The realignment of United States and Japanese currencies in

the mid-1980s increased the growth of Japanese trade, aid, and

investment, especially in Asia. It also accelerated the reversal of

the United States fiscal position, from one of the world's largest

creditors in the early 1980s to the world's largest debtor at the end

of the decade. Japan became the world's largest creditor, an in- creasingly active investor in the United States, and a major contributor to international debt relief, financial institutions, and other

assistance efforts. The crucial issue for the United States and many other world

governments in the 1990s centered on how Japan would employ

this growing economic power. The strategic framework of the

Japan-United States alliance also was called into question by the

ending of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet empire. Could

a new rationale be found to sustain the active security tie that had

been the basis for Japan's foreign affairs in the postwar period?

Had Japan's foreign interactions become so broad and multifaceted

that new mechanisms were needed? Were new ways of thinking

about Japan's foreign policy being formulated and implemented

in Japan? It appeared clear to observers in Japan in 1990 that the

majority of the Japanese public and elite were satisfied with the

general direction ofJapanese foreign policy. That policy direction was characterized by continued close ties with the United States, to sustain world stability and prosperity that were so beneficial to Japan, and incrementally more assertive Japanese policies, especially regarding international economic and political institutions

and Asian affairs. Yet, the world order was changing rapidly, and

there were deep frustrations in some quarters in the United States,

China, and Western Europe over Japanese practices. There also was some evidence of deep frustrations in Japan over Tokyo's seeming slowness in taking a more active world role. The possibility

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Japan: A Country Study

of more radical change in Japanese foreign policy, perhaps in directions more independent of the United States, remained a distinct

possibility.

Foreign Policy Formulation

Institutional Framework

Under the 1947 Constitution, the cabinet exercises the primary

responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, subject to the overall supervision of the Diet (see The Legislature, ch. 6). The prime

minister is required to make periodic reports on foreign relations

to the Diet, whose upper and lower houses each have a foreign af- fairs committee. Each committee reports on its deliberations to plenary sessions of the chamber to which it belongs. Ad hoc committees

are formed occasionally to consider special questions. Diet members have the right to raise pertinent policy questions—officially

termed interpellations—to the minister of foreign affairs and the

prime minister. Treaties with foreign countries require ratification

by the Diet. As the symbol of the state, the emperor performs the

ceremonial function of receiving foreign envoys and attesting to foreign treaties ratified by the Diet.

As the chief executive and constitutionally the dominant figure

in the political system, the prime minister has the final word in

major foreign policy decisions. The minister of foreign affairs, a

senior member of the cabinet, acts as the prime minister's chief

adviser in matters of planning and implementation. The minister

in 1990 was assisted by two vice ministers: one in charge of administration, who was at the apex of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs structure as its senior career official, and the other in charge

of political liaison with the Diet. Other key positions in the ministry included members of the ministry's Secretariat which in 1989

had divisions handling consular, emigration, communications, and

cultural exchange functions, and the directors of the various regional

and functional bureaus in the ministry (see fig. 10).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff included an elite career

foreign service corps, recruited on the basis of a competitive ex- amination and thereafter trained by the ministry's Foreign Service Training Institute. The handling of specific foreign policy issues was usually divided between the geographic and functional bureaus

to minimize overlaps and competition. In general, bilateral issues were assigned to the geographic bureaus, and multilateral problems

to the functional bureaus. The Treaties Bureau, with its wideranging responsibilities, tended to get involved in the whole spec- trum of issues. The Information Analysis, Research, and Planning

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Foreign Relations

Bureau in the ministry's Secretariat engaged in comprehensive and

coordinated policy investigation and planning.

Long a profession of high social prestige, diplomatic service from

the Meiji period through World War II was a preserve of the upper

social strata. In addition to formal qualifications, proper social ori- gin, family connections, and graduation from Tokyo Imperial

University were important prewar requirements for admission.

After World War II, these requirements were changed as part of

democratic reform measures but foreign service continued to be

a highly regarded career. Most career foreign service officers had

passed the postwar Higher Foreign Service Examination before

entry into the service. Many of these successful examinees were

graduates of the prestigious Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo.

Almost all ambassadorial appointments since the 1950s have been

made from among veteran diplomats.

Diplomacy in postwar Japan was not a monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the overriding importance of economic

factors in foreign relations, the ministry worked closely with the

Ministry of Finance on matters of customs, tariffs, international

finance, and foreign aid; with the Ministry of International Trade

and Industry (MITI) on exports and imports; and with the Ministry

of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries on questions of foreign

agricultural imports and fishing rights. The Ministry of Foreign

Affairs also consulted other agencies, such as the Defense Agency,

the Fair Trade Commission, the Japan Export-Import Bank, the

Japan External Trade Organization, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency.

On many issues affecting the country's foreign economic activities—and thus its diplomatic relations as well—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sometimes MITI and the Ministry of Finance were known to favor liberalizing import restrictions. On the other hand,

the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries and other

domestic ministries took a more protectionist stand, evidently be- cause of pressures from special interest groups (see Trade and In- vestment Institutions, ch. 5). The vital importance of foreign affairs expanded to affect virtually every aspect of national life in postwar Japan, and the multiplicity of agencies involved in external affairs continued to be a source of confusion and inefficiency in the formulation of foreign

policy. On the other hand, as the postwar generation of leaders

and policymakers began to assume a greater role in government

decision making and as public attitudes on foreign policy issues

matured, there were indications that foreign affairs were being con- ducted on the basis of a more stable consensus.

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Japan: A Country Study

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380
Foreign Relations

The Role of Domestic Politics

The influence of Japanese domestic politics on the conduct of

foreign affairs changed in the mid-1970s. Up to that time, the for- eign policy debate in Japan had been between "progressives," who

favored advances toward socialist countries and more independence

from the United States, and "conservatives," who tended to identify

Japanese interests closely with the United States-led alignment of

Western countries. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

was closely associated with the conservative, pro-United States position, while opposition parties often staked out positions at odds

with the status quo (see The Liberal Democratic Party, ch. 6). General satisfaction in Japan with the peace and prosperity that

had been brought to the country made it hard for opposition parties to garner much support for a radical move to the left in Japan's

foreign policy. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and

the widely publicized brutalities of communist regimes in Asia in

the late 1980s further dampened popular Japanese interest in shift- ing foreign policy to the left. Meanwhile, the ruling LDP modified its base of political power.

By the 1980s, it had markedly shifted the social composition of LDP

support away from the traditional conservative reliance on busi- ness and rural groups, to include every category of the electorate. This shift resulted from efforts by LDP politicians to align various

local interests in mutually advantageous arrangements in support

of LDP candidates. The LDP had brought together various candidates and their supporting interest groups and had reached a policy consensus to pursue economic development while depending

strongly on the United States security umbrella.

Domestic political challenges to LDP dominance waxed and

waned later in the 1980s as the party faced major influence-peddling

scandals with weak and divided leadership. In 1989 the opposition Japan Socialist Party won control of the Diet's House of Councillors. But the Japan Socialist Party's past ideological positions on foreign policy appeared to be more of a liability than an asset going into the lower-house elections in 1990, and the party at- tempted to modify a number of positions that called for pushing

foreign policy to the left. In contrast, the LDP standard bearer,

Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, used identification with the United

States and the West to his advantage in the successful LDP effort

to sustain control of the House of Representatives in February 1990

(see The Electoral System, ch. 6). In 1990 the government, under the LDP, continued to popularize its policy of economic and security ties with the United States; of responding to domestic and international expectations of greater

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Japan: A Country Study

Japanese political and economic contributions; and of international

cooperation through the UN and other international organizations

in the cause of world peace, disarmament, aid to developing countries, and educational and technical cooperation. Foreign policy

speeches by the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs were widely disseminated, and pamphlets and booklets on major

foreign policy questions were issued frequently.

Political groups opposing the government's foreign policy

presented their views freely through political parties and the mass

media, which took vocal and independent positions on wide-ranging

external issues. Some of the opposing elements were leftists who

sought to exert influence through their representatives in the Diet,

through mass organizations, and sometimes through rallies and

street demonstrations. In contrast, special interest groups supporting

the government—including the business community and agricultural interests—brought pressure to bear on the prime minister,

cabinet members, and members of the Diet, usually through behindthe-scenes negotiations and compromises (see Interest Groups; The

Mass Media and Politics, ch. 6). Partisan political activities of all ideological tendencies were

undertaken freely and openly, but the difference in foreign policy

perspectives appeared increasingly in the 1980s to derive less from

ideology than from more pragmatic considerations. Broadly stated,

the partisan disagreement among the various groups competing

for power had centered on the question ofJapan's safety from external threat or attack. The dominant view was that, although the

Japanese should be responsible for defending their homeland, they

should continue their security ties with the United States, at least until they could gain sufficient confidence in their own self-defense

power, which has been interpreted as not being proscribed by Article 9 of the Constitution. Proponents of this view agreed that this self-defense capability should be based on conventional arms and

that any nuclear shield should be provided by the United States under the 1960 security treaty.

The Sino-United States rapprochement of the 1970s and the

stiffening ofJapan-Soviet relations in the 1980s caused the opposition parties to be less insistent on the need to terminate the security treaty. The Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito (Clean

Government Party) indicated their readiness to support the treaty,

while the Japan Socialist Party dropped its demand for immediate

abrogation. Only the Japan Communist Party remained adamant.

Despite partisan differences, all political parties and groups were

nearly unanimous during the 1970s and 1980s that Japan should

exercise more independence and initiative in foreign affairs and

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not appear so ready to follow the United States on matters affect- ing Japan's interests. They also agreed that Japan should continue

to prohibit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country.

These shared views stemmed from the resurgence of nationalism

during the post-World War II era and from Japanese people's pride

in their own heritage and in the economic achievements of the post- war decades. Although there were indications that the "nuclear

allergy" produced by Japan's traumatic experience with the atomic

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was beginning to moderate, nuclear weapons remained a sensitive political

issue in 1990.

Except for security-related matters, most foreign affairs issues

involved economic interests and mainly attracted the attention of

the specific groups affected. The role of interest groups in formulating foreign policy varied with the issue at hand. Because trade and

capital investment issues were involved, for example, in relations

with China and with the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the

business community increasingly became an interested party in the

conduct of foreign affairs. Similarly, when fishing rights or agricultural imports were being negotiated, representatives of the industries affected worked with political leaders and the foreign affairs bureaucracies in shaping policy.

Because of the continuous control of the government enjoyed

by the LDP since its formation in 1955, the policy-making bodies

of the LDP had become the centers of government policy formulation. Because the unified will of the majority party almost in- variably prevailed in the Diet, some observers believed that that

body, had been reduced to a mere sounding board for government

policy pronouncements and a rubber-stamp ratifier of decisions

made by the prime minister and his cabinet. This situation meant

that significant debate and deliberations on foreign policy matters

generally took place not in the Diet but in closed-door meetings

of the governing LDP, for example, between representatives of the

Foreign Affairs Section of the LDP's Policy Research Council and

officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MITI, or leaders of

major LDP support groups, such as the Federation of Economic

Organizations (Keizai Dantai Rengokai—better known as Keidanren; see Business Interests, ch. 6). The role of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy

throughout the postwar period has been difficult to determine. Japan

continued to be extremely concerned with public opinion, and opinion polling became a conspicuous feature of national life. The large

number of polls on public policy issues, including foreign policy matters, conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister, the

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Japan: A Country Study

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government organizations, and

the media led to the presumption by analysts that the collective

opinions of voters do exert significant influence on policymakers.

The public attitudes toward foreign policy that had held throughout much of the postwar period appeared to have shifted in the

1980s. Opinion polls reflected a marked increase in national pride

and self-esteem. Moreover, public discussion of security matters

by government officials, political party leaders, press commentators, and academics had become markedly less volatile and doctrinaire and more open and pragmatic, suggesting indirectly that

public attitudes on this subject had evolved as well. The mass media, and particularly the press, as the champion

of the public interest and critic of the government, continued to mold public attitudes strongly. The media was the chief source of

demands that the government exercise a more independent and

less "weak-kneed" diplomacy in view of the changing world situ- ation and Japan's increased stature in the world.

An Overview of Japan's Foreign Relations

Relations with the United States

Japan-United States relations were more uncertain in 1 990 than

at any time since World War II. As long-standing military allies and increasingly interdependent economic partners, Japan and the

United States cooperated closely to build a strong, multifaceted

relationship based on democratic values and interests in world sta- bility and development. Japan-United States relations improved

enormously in the 1970s and 1980s, as the two societies and econ- omies became increasingly intertwined. In 1990 their combined

gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) totaled about one third

of the world's GNP. Japan received about 11 percent of United

States exports (a larger share than any other country except Canada), and the United States bought about 34 percent of Japan's

exports (see United States and Canada, ch. 5). Japan had US$65

billion in direct investment in the United States in 1990, while the

United States had more than US$17 billion invested in Japan. Some

US$100 billion in United States government securities held by institutions in Japan helped finance much of the United States budget

deficit. Economic exchanges were reinforced by a variety of scientific, technical, tourist, and other exchanges. Each society continued

to see the other as its main ally in Asia and the Pacific. Certain

developments in the late 1980s damaged bilateral relations. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys continued to reveal that substantial majorities ofJapanese and Americans believed that the bilateral relationship was vital to both countries.

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Foreign Relations

Growing interdependence was accompanied by markedly changing circumstances at home and abroad that were widely seen to have created a crisis in Japan-United States relations in the late 1980s. United States government officials continued to emphasize

the positive aspects of the relationship but warned that there was

a need for ' 4 a new conceptual framework. " The Wall StreetJournal

publicized a series of lengthy reports documenting changes in the

relationship in the late 1980s and reviewing the considerable debate in Japan and the United States over whether a closely co- operative relationship was possible or appropriate for the 1990s.

An authoritative review of popular and media opinion, published

in 1990 by the Washington-based Commission on US-Japan Relations for the Twenty First Century, was concerned with preserving a close Japan-United States relationship. It warned of a "new orthodoxy" of "suspicion, criticism and considerable self-justification,"

which it said was endangering the fabric of Japan-United States

relations.

Three sets of factors stood out as most important in explaining

the challenges facing Japan-United States relations in the 1990s.

They were economic, political-military, and domestic in nature. The relative economic power ofJapan and the United States was

undergoing sweeping change, especially in the 1980s. This change

went well beyond the implications of the United States trade deficit with Japan, which had remained between US$40 billion and US$48

billion annually since the mid-1980s. The persisting United States trade and budget deficits of the early 1980s led to a series of decisions in the middle of the decade that brought a major realignment

of the value ofJapanese and United States currencies. The stronger

Japanese currency gave Japan the ability to purchase more United

States goods and to make important investments in the United

States. By the late 1980s, Japan was the main international creditor. Japan's growing investment in the United States—it was the sec- ond largest investor after Britain—led to complaints from some

American constituencies. Moreover, Japanese industry seemed well

positioned to use its economic power to invest in the high-technology

products in which United States manufacturers were still leaders.

The United States' s ability to compete under these circumstances was seen by many Japanese and Americans as hampered by heavy

personal, government, and business debt and a low savings rate. In the late 1980s, the breakup of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the growing preoccupation of Soviet leaders with massive internal political and economic difficulties forced the Japanese

and United States governments to reassess their longstanding alli- ance against the Soviet threat. Officials of both nations had tended

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Japan: A Country Study

to characterize the security alliance as the linchpin of the relationship, which should have priority over economic and other disputes.

Some Japanese and United States officials and commentators con- tinued to emphasize the common dangers to Japan-United States

interests posed by the continued strong Soviet military presence

in Asia (see Relations with the Soviet Union, this ch.). They stressed that until Moscow followed its moderation in Europe with major

demobilization and reductions in its forces positioned against the

United States and Japan in the Pacific, Washington and Tokyo

needed to remain militarily prepared and vigilant.

Increasingly, however, other perceived benefits of close JapanUnited States security ties were emphasized. The alliance was seen

as deterring other potentially disruptive forces in East Asia, nota- bly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

Ironically, some United States officials noted that the alliance helped

keep Japan's potential military power in check and under the su- pervision of the United States. The post-Cold War environment strengthened the relative importance of economic prowess over military power as the major

source of world influence in the 1990s. This shift affected the per- ceived relative standing ofJapan, the United States, and other powers. Increasingly, Japan was expected to shoulder international aid

and economic responsibilities that in the past were discharged by

the United States and other Western countries.

The declining Soviet threat, the rising power of the Japanese

economy, increasingly close United States interaction (and related

disputes) with Japan, and other factors led by 1990 to a decided

shift in United States opinion about Japan, and less marked but

nonetheless notable shifts in Japanese opinion. In the United States,

this shift was reflected in questions about which was the more seri- ous, the military threat from the Soviets or the economic challenge

from Japan. In a series of polls in 1989 and 1990, most respondents considered the challenge from Japan the more serious. Similarly, poll data from early 1990 showed that most Japanese

considered negative United States attitudes toward Japan a re- flection of United States anger at "America's slipping economic

position." Meanwhile, Japanese opinion was showing greater confidence in Japan's ability to handle its own affairs without constant reference—as in the past—to the United States. Japanese belief in United States reliability as a world leader also lessened. In both countries, new or "revisionist" views of the Japan-United

States relationship were promoted. In Japan, some commentators

argued that the United States was weak, dependent on Japan, and

unable to come to terms with world economic competition. They

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Foreign Relations

urged Japan to strike out on a more independent course. In the

United States, prominent commentators warned of a Japanese eco- nomic juggernaut, out of control of the Japanese government, which

needed to be "contained" by the United States. At the same time, it was easy to overstate the changes in opinion in both countries. Japanese still considered the United States

positively as their closest friend, the principal guardian of their external security, their most important economic partner and market, and the exemplar of a life- style that had much to offer—and

much to envy. Moreover, the vast majority of Americans still viewed

Japan positively, had high respect for Japanese accomplishments,

and supported the United States defense commitment to Japan.

In the years after World War II, Japan's relations with the United

States were placed on an equal footing for the first time at the end

of the occupation by the Allied forces in April 1952. This equality, the legal basis of which was laid down in the peace treaty signed

by forty-eight Allied nations and Japan, was initially largely nominal, because in the early postoccupation period Japan required

direct United States economic assistance. A favorable Japanese

balance of payments with the United States was achieved in 1954,

mainly as a result of United States military and aid spending in

Japan.

The Japanese people's feeling of dependence lessened gradually

as the disastrous results of World War II subsided into the background and trade with the United States expanded. Self-confidence

grew as the country applied its resources and organizational skill to regaining economic health. This situation gave rise to a general

desire for greater independence from United States influence. During the 1950s and 1960s, this feeling was especially evident in the

Japanese attitude toward United States military bases on the four

main islands ofJapan and in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying the

southern two-thirds of the Ryukyu Islands (see fig. 1). The government had to balance left-wing pressure advocating

disassociation from the United States against the realities of the

need for military protection. Recognizing the popular desire for the return of the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands (also known as the Ogasawara Islands), the United States as early as 1953 voluntarily relinquished its control of the Amami Island group at the

northern end of the Ryukyus. But the United States made no com- mitment to return Okinawa, which was then under United States military administration for an indefinite period as provided in Article 3 of the peace treaty. Popular agitation culminated in a unanimous resolution adopted by the Diet in June 1956, calling for a return of Okinawa to Japan.

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Japan: A Country Study

Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact began in 1959,

and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed

in Washington on January 19, 1960. When the pact was submitted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it became the subject of bitter debate over the Japan-United States relationship and

the occasion for violence in an all-out effort by the leftist opposition to prevent its passage. It was finally approved by the House

of Representatives on May 20. Japan Socialist Party deputies boycotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the LDP deputies

from entering the chamber; they were forcibly removed by the

police. Massive demonstrations and rioting by students and trade

unions followed. These outbursts prevented a scheduled visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and precipitated the

resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not before the

treaty was passed by default on June 19, when the House of Councillors failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days

after lower house approval.

Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese

administration. (It was understood, however, that Japan could not come to the defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces overseas. In particular, the

Constitution forbids the maintenance of ''land, sea, and air forces."

It also expresses the Japanese people's renunciation of "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Accordingly, the Japanese find it difficult to send their "self-defense"

forces overseas, even for peace-keeping purposes.) The scope of

the new treaty did not extend to the Ryukyu Islands, but an appended minute made clear that in case of an armed attack on the

islands, both governments would consult and take appropriate

action. Notes accompanying the treaty provided for prior consultation between the two governments before any major change oc- curred in the deployment of United States troops or equipment

in Japan. Unlike the 1952 security pact, the new treaty provided

for a ten-year term, after which it could be revoked upon one year's

notice by either party. The treaty included general provisions on

the further development of international cooperation and on improved future economic cooperation.

Both countries worked closely to fulfill the United States promise,

under Article 3 of the peace treaty, to return all Japanese territories acquired by the United States in war. In June 1968 the United

States returned the Bonin Islands (including Iwo Jima) to Japanese

administrative control. In 1969 the Okinawa reversion issue and

Japan's security ties with the United States became the focal points

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of partisan political campaigns. The situation calmed considerably when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku visited Washington in

November 1969, and in a joint communique signed by him and

President Richard M. Nixon, announced the United States agreement to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In June 1971, after eigh- teen months of negotiations, the two countries signed an agreement

providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.

The Japanese government's firm and voluntary endorsement of

the security treaty and the settlement of the Okinawa reversion question meant that, two major political issues in Japan-United States

relations were eliminated. But new issues arose. In July 1971, the

Japanese government was surprised by Nixon's dramatic announce- ment of his forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China.

Many Japanese were chagrined by the failure of the United States

to consult in advance with Japan before making such a fundamental

change in foreign policy. The following month, the government was again surprised to learn that, without prior consultation, the

United States had imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, a

decision certain to hinder Japan's exports to the United States. Relations between Tokyo and Washington were further strained by

the monetary crisis involving the December 1971 revaluation of

the Japanese yen (for value of the yen—see Glossary).

These events of 1971 marked the beginning of a new stage in

relations, a period of adjustment to a changing world situation that was not without episodes of strain in both political and economic

spheres, although the basic relationship remained close. The political issues between the two countries were essentially securityrelated and derived from efforts by the United States to induce

Japan to contribute more to its own defense and to regional security. The economic issues tended to stem from the ever-widening

United States trade and payments deficits with Japan, which began

in 1965 when Japan reversed its imbalance in trade with the United

States and, for the first time, achieved an export surplus.

The United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1975 and the

end of the Second Indochina War meant that the question ofJapan's

role in the security of East Asia and its contributions to its own

defense became central topics in the dialogue between the two countries. United States dissatisfaction with Japanese defense efforts began to surface in 1975 when Secretary of Defense James A.

Schlesinger publicly stigmatized Japan as a passive defense partner.

United States pressures continued and intensified, particularly

as events in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East after 1979 caused

the United States to relocate more than 50 percent of its naval

strength from East Asian waters to the Indian Ocean. Japan was

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Japan: A Country Study

repeatedly pressed not only to increase its defense expenditures and

build up its antisubmarine and naval patrol capabilities, but to play a more active and positive security role generally.

The Japanese government, constrained by constitutional limitations and strongly pacifist public opinion, responded slowly to pressures for a more rapid buildup of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

It steadily increased its budgetary outlays for those forces, however,

and indicated its willingness to shoulder more of the cost of maintaining the United States military bases in Japan. In 1976 the

United States and Japan formally established a subcommittee for defense cooperation, in the framework of a bilateral Security Consultative Committee provided for under the 1960 security treaty.

This subcommittee, in turn, drew up new Guidelines for JapanUnited States Defense Cooperation, under which military plan- ners of the two countries have conducted studies relating to joint

military action in the event of an armed attack on Japan.

On the economic front, Japan sought to ease trade frictions by

agreeing to Orderly Marketing Arrangements, which limited

exports on products whose influx into the United States was creat- ing political problems. In 1977 an Orderly Marketing Arrangement limiting Japanese color television exports to the United States was signed, following the pattern of an earlier disposition of the

textile problem. Steel exports to the United States were also curtailed, but the problems continued as disputes flared over United

States restrictions on Japanese development of nuclear fuel- reprocessing facilities, Japanese restrictions on certain agricultural imports, such as beef and oranges, and liberalization of capital

investment and government procurement within Japan.

To respond to the call, from its allies and from within the country as well, for a greater and more responsible role in the world,

Japan developed what Ohira Masayoshi, after he became prime

minister in December 1978, called a "comprehensive security and

defense strategy to safeguard peace." Under this policy, Japan

sought to place its relations with the United States on a new

footing—one of close cooperation but on a more reciprocal and

autonomous basis, and on a global scale. This policy was put to the test in November 1979, when radical

Iranians seized the United States embassy in Tehran, taking sixty

hostages. Japan reacted by condemning the action as a violation

of international law. At the same time, Japanese trading firms and

oil companies reportedly purchased Iranian oil that had become

available when the United States banned oil imported from Iran. This action brought sharp criticism from the United States of

Japanese government "insensitivity" for allowing the oil purchases

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Foreign Relations

and led to aJapanese apology and agreement to participate in sanctions against Iran in concert with other United States allies. Following that incident, the Japanese government took greater care to support United States international policies designed to preserve stability and promote prosperity. Japan was prompt and

effective in announcing and implementing sanctions against the

Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In 1981, in response to United States requests, it accepted greater responsibility for defense of seas around Japan,

pledged greater support for United States forces in Japan, and persisted with a steady buildup of the SDF.

A qualitatively new stage ofJapan-United States cooperation in

world affairs appeared to be reached in late 1982 with the election

of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. Officials of the Ronald Reagan administration worked closely with their Japanese counterparts

to develop a personal relationship between the two leaders based on their common security and international outlook. Nakasone re- assured United States leaders ofJapan's determination against the

Soviet threat, closely coordinated policies with the United States toward such Asian trouble spots as the Korean Peninsula and

Southeast Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States

in developing China policy. The Japanese government welcomed

the increase of United States forces in Japan and the Western Pacific, continued the steady buildup of the SDF, and positioned Japan

firmly on the side of the United States against the threat of Soviet

international expansion. Japan continued to cooperate closely with

United States policy in these areas following Nakasone 's term of

office, although the political leadership scandals in Japan in the

late 1980s made it difficult for newly elected President George Bush

to establish the same kind of close personal ties that marked the

Reagan years. A specific example ofJapan's close cooperation with the United

States included its quick response to the United States call for greater

host nation support from Japan following the rapid realignment

ofJapan-United States currencies in the mid-1980s. The currency

realignment resulted in a rapid rise of United States costs in Japan,

which the Japanese government, upon United States request, was

willing to offset. Another set of examples was provided by Japan's

willingness to respond to United States requests for foreign as- sistance to countries considered of strategic importance to the West.

During the 1980s, United States officials voiced appreciation for Japan's "strategic aid" to countries such as Pakistan, Turkey,

Egypt, and Jamaica. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki's pledges of

support for East European and Middle Eastern countries in 1 990

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Japan: A Country Study

fit the pattern of Japan's willingness to share greater responsibility for world stability.

Despite complaints from some Japanese businesses and diplomats, the Japanese government remained in basic agreement with

United States policy toward China and Indochina. The government held back from large-scale aid efforts until conditions in China

and Indochina were seen as more compatible with Japanese and

United States interests. Of course, there also were instances of limited Japanese cooperation. Japan's response to the United States decision to help to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf during the

Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s was subject to mixed reviews. Some

United States officials stressed the positive, noting that Japan was

unable to send military forces because of constitutional reasons but

compensated by supporting the construction of a navigation sys- tem in the Gulf, providing greater host nation support for United

States forces in Japan, and providing loans to Oman and Jordan

(see The Article 9 "No War" Clause, ch. 6). Japan's refusal to join even in a mine-sweeping effort in the Gulf was an indication

to some United States officials of Tokyo's unwillingness to cooperate

with the United States in areas of sensitivity to Japanese leaders

at home or abroad.

The main area of noncooperation with the United States in the

1980s was Japanese resistance to repeated United States efforts to get Japan to open its market more to foreign goods and to change

other economic practices seen as adverse to United States economic

interests. A common pattern was followed here. The Japanese

government was sensitive to political pressures from important

domestic constituencies that would be hurt by greater openness.

In general, these constituencies were of two types—those repre- senting inefficient or "declining" producers, manufacturers, and

distributors, who could not compete if faced with full foreign competition; and those up-and-coming industries that the Japanese

government wished to protect from foreign competition until they

could compete effectively on world markets. To deal with domestic pressures while trying to avoid a break with the United States,

the Japanese government engaged in protracted negotiations. This

tactic bought time for declining industries to restructure themselves

and new industries to grow stronger. Agreements reached dealt

with some aspects of the problems, but it was common for trade or economic issues to be dragged out in talks over several years, involving more than one market-opening agreement. Such agreements were sometimes vague and subject to conflicting interpretations in Japan and the United States (see Import Policies, ch. 5).

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During the 1970s and 1980s, United States administrations had

favored an issue-by-issue approach in negotiating such economic

disputes with Japan. This approach ostensibly limited the areas of dispute. But it resulted in widespread negative publicity, at a time when changing economic and security circumstances were

causing both countries to reevaluate the relationship. Notable out- pourings of United States congressional and media rhetoric criti- cal ofJapan accompanied the disclosure in 1987 that Toshiba had

illegally sold sophisticated machinery of United States origin to the

Soviet Union, which reportedly allowed Moscow to make submarines quiet enough to avoid United States detection, and the United

States congressional debate in 1989 over the Japan-United States agreement to develop a new fighter aircraft—the FSX—for Japan's

Air Self-Defense Force (see The Defense Industry, ch. 8). A new approach was added in 1989. The so-called Structural

Impediments Initiative was a series of talks designed to deal with

domestic structural problems limiting trade on both sides. After

several rounds of often contentious talks, agreements were reached

in April and July 1990 that promised major changes in such sensitive areas as Japanese retailing practices, land use, and investment

in public works. The United States pledged to deal more effectively

with its budget deficit and to increase domestic savings. United

States supporters saw the Structural Impediments Initiative talks as addressing fundamental causes ofJapan-United States economic

friction. Skeptics pointed to them as ways for officials to buy time

and avoid an acute crisis in Japan-United States relations.

Relations with China

The priority that policy toward China has commanded in

Japanese foreign affairs has varied over time. During the period

of United States-backed "containment" of China, there was a sharp

divergence between official policy and popular attitudes in Japan.

As a loyal ally of the United States, the Japanese government was

committed to nonrecognition, whereas popular sentiments favored

diplomatic relations and expanded trade. The Japan Communist

Party and the Japan Socialist Party sought to capitalize on this sit- uation in their propaganda efforts to promote closer relations with

Beijing. Pro-Chinese sentiment found support not only in the desire

of the business community for a new source of raw materials and

a profitable market, but also in the popular feeling of cultural af- finity with the Chinese. Japanese leaders spent considerable effort trying to manage this tension.

The unanticipated United States opening to China in 1971 undermined the administration of Prime Minister Sato, but the subsequent government of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei quickly

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Japan: A Country Study

adjusted policy by normalizing diplomatic relations in 1972.

Throughout the next decade, policy toward China continued to receive high priority as Japanese officials dealt with competing pres- sures from the Chinese and Soviet governments. Beijing and

Moscow pressed Tokyo to side with their respective positions in

the intense Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Asia following the substantial United States military withdrawal and the fall of United States-backed regimes in Indochina.

China's economic importance to Japanese policymakers rose in

tandem with the market-oriented reforms and increased foreign

interaction associated with the post-Mao Zedong policies of Chinese

leader Deng Xiaoping. Unrealistic Japanese expectations of eco- nomic benefit in China were ended by the zigzag course of Chinese

development in the 1980s. Japanese decision makers by the end

of the decade were able to settle on a balanced policy toward China

that required less attention from Japanese leaders and received lower

priority than in the past. The massacre of prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Incident and collapse of communist

regimes in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia in 1989 discredited

China's communist leaders in the minds of Japanese people and

made it more difficult for Chinese officials or opposition Japanese

politicians to raise China-related issues in Japanese domestic politics. The effect was to reduce further the need to make special

government concessions on China-related issues. The early post-World War II political differences between the

two countries related especially to China's insistence that Japan

end its official relations with the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) government on Taiwan and abrogate its security treaty

with the United States. Initially, neither country allowed its political differences to stand in the way of broadening unofficial contacts, and in the mid-1950s they exchanged an increasing number

of cultural, labor, and business delegations.

In 1958, however, China suspended its trade with Japan—ap- parentiy convinced that trade concessions were ineffective in achieving political goals. Thereafter, in a plan for improving political

relations, China requested that the Japanese government not be

hostile toward it, not obstruct any effort to restore normal rela- tions between itself and Japan, and not join in any conspiracy to create two Chinas.

Coincident with its dispute with the Soviet Union, China resumed

its trade with Japan in late 1960. Important provisions were at- tached to the arrangement, however, stipulating that trade was to be based on formal government-to-government agreements and

private trade was to be sanctioned indirectly by the Japanese

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government. Only Japanese firms that pledged to support the three

political principles of 1958 were to be allowed to participate. In November 1962, Sino-Japanese relations were elevated to semiofficial status—still far short of diplomatic recognition—with

the signing in Beijing of a five-year trade memorandum (1963-67),

better known as the Liao-Takasaki Agreement. Under its terms,

Chinese purchases of industrial plants were to be financed partly

through medium-term credits from the Japan Export-Import Bank.

The accord also permitted China to open a trade mission in Tokyo

and in 1963 paved the way for Japanese government approval of

the export to China of a synthetic textile manufacturing plant valued

at around US$20 million, guaranteed by the bank. Subsequent protest from Taiwan caused Japan to shelve further deferred-payment

plant exports. China reacted to this change by downgrading its Japan trade and intensified propaganda attacks against Japan as a

4 'lackey" of the United States. Relations cooled noticeably during the massive political and eco- nomic chaos that prevailed during the radical phases of the Cultural Revolution in China, from 1966 to 1969. As the turmoil

subsided, however, the Japanese government—-already under pres- sure both from the pro-China factions in the LDP and from opposition elements—sought to adopt a more forward posture. Japan's

efforts to set its own China policy became particularly evident after July 1971 when Nixon, according to Japanese sources, ''shocked"

the Japanese by announcing his forthcoming visit to Beijing. Relations remained complicated, however, because ofJapan's diplomatic and substantial economic ties with Taiwan and the presence

of a powerful pro-Guomindang faction in the LDP.

The September 1972 visit to Beijing of Japan's newly elected

prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, culminated in the signing of a

historic joint statement that ended nearly eighty years of enmity

and friction between the two countries. In this statement, Tokyo

recognized the Beijing regime as the sole legal government of China,

stating at the same time that it understood and respected China's

position that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of the territory of

the People's Republic of China." For its part, China waived its demand for war indemnities from Japan. (This demand was first made in the mid-1950s; the war reparations claims totaled as much

as the equivalent of US$50 billion.) Diplomatic relations were to be established as of September 29, 1972. Japan and China also agreed to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion not only of a

treaty of peace and friendship but also at agreements on trade, shipping, air transportation, and fisheries. Sino-Japanese trade grew

rapidly after 1972. In January 1974, a three-year trade agreement

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Japan: A Country Study

the first of several working agreements covering civil air transportation, shipping, fisheries, and trademarks—was signed. Arrangements for technical cooperation, cultural exchange, and consular

matters were also undertaken.

Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty also began in 1974 but soon encountered a political problem Japan

wished to avoid. China insisted on including in the treaty an antihegemony clause, clearly directed at the Soviet Union. Japan,

wishing to adhere to its "equidistant" or neutral stance in the SinoSoviet confrontation, objected. The Soviet Union made clear that a Sino-Japanese treaty would prejudice Soviet-Japanese relations.

Japanese efforts to reach a compromise with China over this issue

failed, and the talks were broken off in September 1975.

Matters remained at a standstill until political changes in China

after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought to the fore a leadership dedicated to economic modernization and interested in accom- modation with Japan, whose aid was essential. A changing climate

of opinion in Japan that was more willing to ignore Soviet warnings and protests and accept the idea of "antihegemonism" as an

international principle also helped lay the groundwork for new ef- forts to conclude the treaty.

In February 1978, a long-term private trade agreement led to an arrangement by which trade between Japan and China would

increase to a level of US$20 billion by 1985, through exports from

Japan of plants and equipment, technology, construction materials,

and machine parts in return for coal and crude oil. This long-term

plan, which gave rise to inflated expectations, proved overly ambitious and was drastically cut back the following year as China

was forced to reorder its development priorities and scale down

its commitments. However, the signing of the agreement reflected the wish on both sides to improve relations. In April 1978, a dis- pute involving the intrusion of armed Chinese fishing boats into

the waters off the Senkaku Islands, a cluster of barren islets north

of Taiwan and south of the Ryukyu Islands, flared up and threatened to disrupt the developing momentum toward a resumption

of peace treaty talks. Restraint on both sides led to an amicable resolution. (The Senkakus are claimed by Japan, China, and

Taiwan, but the question of territorial rights was finessed in this case.) Talks on the peace treaty were resumed in July, and agreement was reached in August on a compromise version of the antihegemony clause. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed on August 12 and came into effect October 23, 1978.

Chinese domestic political problems and uneven progress in

China's reform programs at times dampened Japanese enthusiasm

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for economic relations with China. Yet Sino-Japanese relations

made considerable progress in the 1980s. In 1982 there was a seri- ous political controversy over revision ofJapanese textbooks dealing with the history of imperial Japan's war against China in the

1930s and 1940s. Beijing also registered concern in 1983 about the

reported shift in United States strategic emphasis in Asia, away

from China and in favor of more reliance on Japan, under the

leadership of the more * 'hawkish" Prime Minister Nakasone

Yasuhiro, warning anew against possible revival of Japanese

militarism. By mid- 1983, however, Beijing had decided—coincidentally with its decision to improve relations with the Reagan

administration—to solidify ties with Japan. Chinese Communist

Party general secretary Hu Yaobang visited Japan in November

1983, and Prime Minister Nakasone reciprocated by visiting China

in March 1984.

The Chinese had long looked on Japan—by then a major trading partner—as a leading source of assistance in promoting eco- nomic development in China. The growth of Soviet military power

in East Asia in the early 1980s prompted them to consult with Japan more frequently on security issues and to pursue parallel foreign

policies designed to check Soviet influence and promote regional

stability. While Japanese enthusiasm for the Chinese market waxed

and waned, broad strategic considerations in the 1980s steadied

Tokyo's policy toward Beijing. In fact, Japan's heavy involvement

in China's economic modernization reflected in part a determination to encourage peaceful domestic development in China, to draw

China into gradually expanding links with Japan and the West,

to reduce China's interest in returning to its more provocative for- eign policies of the past, and to obstruct any Sino-Soviet realignment against Japan.

Thus, common strategic concerns, as well as economic interests,

held the two nations together. Until the late 1970s, the Chinese

appeared more alarmed than Japan about the Soviet military buildup in Asia. But as Moscow increasingly sought to impede stra- tegic cooperation among Japan, the United States, and possibly

China, in part by stepped-up intimidation ofJapan, the Nakasone

government became more concerned about the Soviet military

buildup.

Many of Tokyo's concerns about the Soviet Union duplicated

Chinese worries. They included the increased deployment in East

Asia of Soviet SS-20 missiles, Tu-22M Backfire bombers, and ballistic missile submarines; the growth of the Soviet Pacific fleet; the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the potential threat it posed

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Japan: A Country Study

to Persian Gulf oil supply routes; and an increased Soviet military

presence in Vietnam.

In response, Japan and China adopted strikingly complementary foreign policies, designed to isolate the Soviet Union and its allies politically and to promote regional stability. In Southeast Asia,

both countries provided strong diplomatic backing for the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary) to bring about a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.

Japan cut off all economic aid to Vietnam and provided substantial economic assistance to Thailand to help with resettling Indochinese refugees. China was a key supporter of Thailand and of

the Cambodian resistance groups. In Southwest Asia, both nations

backed the condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,

refused to recognize the Soviet-backed Kabul regime, and sought

through diplomatic and economic means to bolster Pakistan. In

Northeast Asia, Japan and China sought to moderate the behavior

of their Korean partners—South Korea and North Korea,

respectively—to reduce tensions. In 1983 both China and Japan

strongly criticized the Soviet proposal to redeploy some of their

European-based SS-20 missiles to Asia.

Complementary economic interests also strengthened SinoJapanese relations. Japan was a major source of capital, technol- ogy, and equipment for China's modernization drive. In fact, Japan

had been China's largest trading partner since the mid-1960s, ac- counting for more than 20 percent of China's total trade. Bilateral

trade exploded in the 1970s and early 1980s, from US$1 billion

in the early 1970s to over US$8 billion in 1982. Japan became

China's largest creditor, accounting for nearly half of the estimated

US$30 billion in credit China lined up from 1979 to 1983.

Although its share ofJapan's global trade was still small (3 per- cent in 1982), China became Japan's sixth largest trading partner. Japan regarded China as a significant source of coal, oil, and

strategic minerals, such as tungsten and chromium, and as an important market for Japanese steel, machinery plant equipment,

chemical products, and synthetic textile fibers. The optimism that marked the economic relationship in the late 1970s had given way to a greater degree of realism on both sides

by the early 1980s. China's decision to curtail imports of heavy

industrial goods in 1981 and 1982 had a sobering effect on the

Japanese. Businesspeople in Japan came to appreciate the problems

China faced, and revised their expections of the growth of economic

ties as the Chinese experimented with various economic policies.

The Japanese continued to hope that they would profit from China's

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Foreign Relations

potentially huge domestic market, whenever its modernization

began to pick up speed.

Japanese economic interests in China focused on developing

energy resources and infrastructure and on promoting commercial trade. As of 1983, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund,

Tokyo's official aid organization, had agreed to grant US$3.5 bil- lion in loans to China for basic infrastructure projects, such as port

and rail modernization. In addition, the Japan Export-Import Bank

extended US$2 billion for oil exploration and coal mining at a 6.25

percent annual interest rate, the lowest rate China had gained from

any country at that time. The Japanese were heavily involved in

China's oil industry, and Japanese drilling in the Bohai Gulf appeared promising.

Japan encountered a number of episodes of friction with China

during the rest of the 1980s. In late 1985, Chinese officials complained harshly about Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the

Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan's war dead, and in

mid- 1986 they complained about the latest revision ofJapan's his- tory textbooks to soften accounts of World War II atrocities. Economic issues centered on Chinese complaints that the influx of

Japanese products into China had produced a serious trade deficit for China. Nakasone and other Japanese leaders were able to reduce

these official concerns during visits to Beijing and in other talks with Chinese officials. Notably, they assured the Chinese ofJapan's

continued large-scale development and commercial assistance. At

the popular level in China, it was not easy to allay concerns.

Student-led demonstrations against Japan, on the one hand, helped

reinforce Chinese officials' warnings to their Japanese counterparts.

On the other hand, it was more difficult to change popular opinion in China than it was to change the opinions of the Chinese

officials. Meanwhile, the removal of party chief Hu Yaobang in early 1987 was detrimental to smooth Sino-Japanese relations, since

Hu had built personal relationships with Nakasone and other

Japanese leaders.

The Chinese government's harsh crackdown on prodemocracy

demonstrations in the spring of 1989 caused Japanese policymakers to realize that the new situation in China was extremely deli- cate and required careful handling to avoid Japanese actions that

would push China farther away from reform. At the same time,

these policymakers were loathe to break ranks with the United States and other Western countries, where popular opinion and domestic pressures to varying degrees required that officials condemn the

crackdown and take action to restrict economic or other interaction

of benefit to the Chinese regime. Beijing leaders reportedly judged

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Japan: A Country Study

at first that the industrialized countries would relatively quickly resume normal business with China after a brief period of complaint over the Tiananmen Incident. When that did not happen,

the Chinese officials made strong suggestions to Japanese officials that they break from most industrialized nations by pursuing nor- mal economic intercourse with China, consistent with Tokyo's longterm interests in China. Japanese leaders—like West European and

United States leaders—were careful not to isolate China, and con- tinued trade and other relations generally consistent with the policies of other industrialized democracies. But they also followed the

United States lead in limiting economic relations notably advantageous to China. In particular, they held back for one year the

disbursement of ¥810 billion in aid, which Japan had promised

in 1988 to give China in the 1990-95 period.

Relations with the Soviet Union

The 1980s saw a decided hardening in Japanese attitudes toward

the Soviet Union. Japan was pressed by the United States to do more to check the expansion of Soviet power in the Third World

following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It responded by cutting off contacts beneficial to the Soviet regime

and providing assistance to "front line" Third World states, such

as Pakistan and Thailand. Under Nakasone, Japan worked hard

to demonstrate a close identity of views with the Reagan administration on the Soviet threat. Japan steadily built up its military

forces, welcomed increases in United States forces in Japan and

the Western Pacific, and pledged close cooperation to deal with

the danger posed by Soviet power.

Although public and media opinion remained skeptical of the

danger to Japan posed by Soviet forces in Asia, there was strong

opposition in Japan to Moscow's refusal to accede to Japan's claims

to the Northern Territories, known to the Japanese as Etorofu and

Kunashiri, at the southern end of the Kuril Island chain, and the

smaller Shikotan Island and the Habomai Islands, northeast of

Hokkaido, which were seized by the Soviets in the last days of World

War II (see fig. 11). The stationing of Soviet military forces on

the islands gave tangible proof of the Soviet threat, and provocative maneuvers by Soviet air and naval forces in Japanese-claimed

territory served to reinforce Japanese official policy of close identification with a firm United States-backed posture against Soviet

power. In 1979, the Japanese government specifically protested a build up in Soviet forces in Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan.

The advent of the Mikhail Gorbachev regime in Moscow in the

mid-1980s saw a replacement of hard-line Soviet government

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Foreign Relations

diplomats who were expert in Asian affairs with more flexible spokesmen calling for greater contact with Japan. Gorbachev took

the lead in promising new initiatives in Asia, but the substance

of Soviet policy changed more slowly. In particular, throughout

the rest of the 1980s, Soviet officials still seemed uncompromising

regarding the Northern Territories, Soviet forces in the Western

Pacific still seemed focused on and threatening to Japan, and Soviet

economic troubles and lack of foreign exchange made prospects

for Japan-Soviet Union economic relations appear poor. By 1990,

Japan appeared to be the least enthusiastic of the major Westernaligned developed countries in encouraging greater contacts with

and assistance to the Soviet Union.

Strains in Japan-Soviet Union relations had deep historical roots going back to the competition of the Japanese and Russian empires for dominance in Northeast Asia. In 1990, forty-five years

after the end of World War II, a state of war between Japan and

the Soviet Union existed technically because the Soviet Union had

refused in the intervening years to sign the 1951 peace treaty. The

main stumbling block in all Japan's subsequent efforts to establish

bilateral relations on what it called ''a truly stable basis" was the

territorial dispute over the Northern Territories.

During the first half of the 1950s, other unsettled problems in- cluded Japanese fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and off the

coast of the Soviet maritime provinces and repatriation ofJapanese

prisoners of war, who, the Japanese claimed, were still being held

in the Soviet Union. Negotiation of these issues broke down early

in 1956 because of tension over territorial claims.

Negotiations soon resumed, however, and the two countries is- sued a joint declaration in October 1956 providing for the restoration of diplomatic relations. The two parties also agreed to continue

negotiations for a peace treaty, including territorial issues. In addition, the Soviets pledged to support Japan for UN membership

and waive all World War II reparations claims. The joint declaration was accompanied by a trade protocol that granted reciprocal

most-favored-nation treatment and provided for the development

of trade.

Except for admission to the UN in 1956, Japan derived few apparent gains from the normalization of diplomatic relations. The

second half of the 1950s saw an increase in cultural exchanges.

Soviet propaganda, however, had little success in Japan, where it encountered a longstanding antipathy stemming from the RussoJapanese rivalry in Korea, Manchuria, and China proper in the

late nineteenth century, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5,

and from the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in the last days

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Foreign Relations

diplomats who were expert in Asian affairs with more flexible spokesmen calling for greater contact with Japan. Gorbachev took

the lead in promising new initiatives in Asia, but the substance

of Soviet policy changed more slowly. In particular, throughout

the rest of the 1980s, Soviet officials still seemed uncompromising

regarding the Northern Territories, Soviet forces in the Western

Pacific still seemed focused on and threatening to Japan, and Soviet

economic troubles and lack of foreign exchange made prospects

for Japan-Soviet Union economic relations appear poor. By 1990,

Japan appeared to be the least enthusiastic of the major Westernaligned developed countries in encouraging greater contacts with

and assistance to the Soviet Union.

Strains in Japan-Soviet Union relations had deep historical roots going back to the competition of the Japanese and Russian empires for dominance in Northeast Asia. In 1990, forty-five years

after the end of World War II, a state of war between Japan and

the Soviet Union existed technically because the Soviet Union had

refused in the intervening years to sign the 1951 peace treaty. The

main stumbling block in all Japan's subsequent efforts to establish

bilateral relations on what it called "a truly stable basis" was the

territorial dispute over the Northern Territories.

During the first half of the 1950s, other unsettled problems in- cluded Japanese fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and off the

coast of the Soviet maritime provinces and repatriation ofJapanese

prisoners of war, who, the Japanese claimed, were still being held

in the Soviet Union. Negotiation of these issues broke down early

in 1956 because of tension over territorial claims.

Negotiations soon resumed, however, and the two countries is- sued a joint declaration in October 1956 providing for the restoration of diplomatic relations. The two parties also agreed to continue

negotiations for a peace treaty, including territorial issues. In addition, the Soviets pledged to support Japan for UN membership

and waive all World War II reparations claims. The joint declaration was accompanied by a trade protocol that granted reciprocal

most-favored-nation treatment and provided for the development

of trade.

Except for admission to the UN in 1956, Japan derived few apparent gains from the normalization of diplomatic relations. The

second half of the 1950s saw an increase in cultural exchanges.

Soviet propaganda, however, had little success in Japan, where it encountered a longstanding antipathy stemming from the RussoJapanese rivalry in Korea, Manchuria, and China proper in the

late nineteenth century, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5,

and from the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in the last days

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Japan: A Country Study

of World War II, in violation of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality

Pact of 1941.

The Soviet Union sought to induce Japan to abandon its ter- ritorial claims by alternating threats and persuasion. As early as 1956, it hinted at the possibility of considering the return of the

Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island ifJapan abandoned its alli- ance with the United States. In 1960 the Soviet government warned

Japan against signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, and after the treaty was signed declared

that it would not hand over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan

Island under any circumstances unless Japan abrogated the treaty

forthwith. In 1964 the Soviet government offered to return these

islands unconditionally if the United States ended its military

presence on Okinawa and the main islands of Japan.

Despite divergence on the territorial question, on which neither

side was prepared to give ground, Japanese relations with the Soviet

Union improved appreciably after the mid-1960s. The Soviet

government began to seek Japanese cooperation in its economic

development plans, and the Japanese responded positively. The

two countries signed a five-year trade agreement in January 1966

and a civil aviation agreement as well. Economic cooperation expanded rapidly during the 1970s, despite an often strained political relationship. The two economies were

complementary, for the Soviet Union needed Japan's capital, technology, and consumer goods, while Japan needed Soviet natural

resources, such as oil, gas, coal, iron ore, and timber. By 1979

overall trade had reached US$4.4 billion annually and had made

Japan, next to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany),

the Soviet Union's most important nonsocialist trading partner.

This economic cooperation was interrupted by Japan's decision

in 1980 to participate in sanctions against the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan and by its actions to hold in abeyance a number of projects being negotiated, to ban the export of some

high-technology items, and to suspend Siberian development loans. Subsequently, Japanese interest in economic cooperation with the

Soviet Union waned as Tokyo found alternative suppliers and re- mained uncertain about the economic viability and political sta- bility of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Japan-Soviet trade

in 1988 was valued at nearly US$6 billion. Japan-Soviet political relations during the 1970s were characterized by the frequent exchange of high-level visits to explore the

possibility of improving bilateral relations and by repeated discussions of a peace treaty, which were abortive because neither side was prepared to yield on the territorial issue. Minister of Foreign

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Foreign Relations

Affairs Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet Union visited Tokyo in January 1972 —one month before United States president Nixon's historic visit to China—to reopen ministerial-level talks after a six-year

lapse. Other high-level talks, including an October 1973 meeting

between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Leonid I. Brezhnev,

general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were

held in Moscow during the next three years, but the deadlock on

the territorial issue continued and prospects for a settlement

dimmed. Moscow began to propose a treaty of friendship and goodwill as an interim step while peace treaty talks were continued. This

proposal was firmly rejected by Japan.

After 1975 the Soviet Union began openly to warn that the

Japanese peace treaty with China might jeopardize Soviet-Japan

relations. In January 1976, Gromyko again visited Tokyo to re- sume talks on the peace treaty. When the Japanese again refused

to budge on the territorial question, Gromyko, according to the

Japanese, offered to return two of the Soviet-held island areas

the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island—if Japan would sign a treaty of goodwill and cooperation. He also reportedly warned

the Japanese, in an obvious reference to China, against "forces

which come out against the relaxation of tension and which try to complicate relations between states, including our countries."

The signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty in mid- 1978 was

a major setback to Japanese-Soviet relations. Despite Japanese protestations that the treaty's antihegemony clause was not directed

against any specific country, Moscow saw it as placing Tokyo with

Washington and Beijing firmly in the anti- Soviet camp. Officially,

both sides continued to express the desire for better relations, but

Soviet actions served only to alarm and alienate the Japanese side. The 1980s Soviet military buildup in the Pacific was a case in point.

Changes in Soviet policy carried out under Gorbachev beginning in the mid-1980s, including attempts at domestic reform and

the pursuit of detente with the United States and Western Europe,

elicited generally positive Japanese interest, but the Japanese

government held that the Soviet Union had not changed its policies on issues vital to Japan. The government stated that it would

not conduct normal relations with the Soviet Union until Moscow

returned the Northern Territories. The government and Japanese

business leaders stated further that Japanese trade with and investment in the Soviet Union would not grow appreciably until the

Northern Territories issue was resolved.

By 1990 the Soviet government had altered its tactics. The Soviets

now acknowledged that the territorial issue was a problem and

talked about it with Japanese officials at the highest levels and in

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Japan: A Country Study

working-level meetings. Soviet officials reportedly floated a proposal

to lease the Northern Territories and part of Sakhalin—once a

colonial holding ofJapan's—to Japan. Gorbachev and others also referred to a 1956 Soviet offer to return one of the three main is- lands (Shikotan, the smallest of the three) and the Habomai Is- lands, and there were indications that Moscow might be prepared

to revive the offer. The Soviets emphasized that they would not

return all the islands because of Soviet public opposition and the

possible reawakening of other countries' territorial claims against

the Soviet Union. The Soviet military reportedly opposed a return,

because the Kuril chain provided a protective barrier to the Sea

of Okhotsk, where the Soviet navy deployed submarines carrying

long-range ballistic missiles.

The Soviet government also stepped up its diplomacy toward

Japan with the announcement in 1990 that Gorbachev would visit Japan in 1991 . Soviet officials asserted that their government would

propose disarmament talks with Japan and might make more

proposals on the Northern Territories in connection with the visit. Observers believed that Gorbachev might propose a package dealing

with the islands, arms reduction, and economic cooperation. In

January 1990, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs shifted its position, which previously had rejected negotiations with the Soviet

Union on arms reductions, indicating that Japan would be willing

to negotiate. Ministry officials stated that the government would

formulate policy on arms reduction in close coordination with the

United States. Relations with Other Asia-Pacific Countries

Japan's rapid rise as the dominant economic power in Asia in

the 1980s helped to define Japanese policy toward this diverse

region, stretching from South Asia to the islands in the South Pacific Ocean. The decline in East-West and Sino-Soviet tensions during the 1980s suggested that economic rather than military power

would determine regional leadership. During the decade, Japan

displaced the United States as the largest provider of new business

investment and economic aid in the region, although the United

States market remained a major source of Asia-Pacific dynamism.

Especially following the rise in value of the yen relative to the dollar in the late- 1980s, Japan's role as a capital and technology ex- porter and as an increasingly significant importer of Asian

manufactured goods made it the core economy of the Asia-Pacific

region.

From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, Japan's relations with the

rest of Asia were concerned mainly with promoting its far-flung,

406
Poster protesting the Soviet presence in the Northern

Territories, Tokyo. The date on the poster—August 9—recalls the Soviet Union's 1945 entry

into war against Japan.

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

multiplying economic interests in the region through trade, technical assistance, and aid. Its main problems were the economic

weakness and political instability of its trading partners and the

growing apprehension of Asian leaders over Japan's "overpresence" in their region.

Japan began to normalize relations with its neighbors during the

1950s after a series of intermittent negotiations, which led to the

payment of war reparations to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines,

and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Thailand's reparations claims were not settled until 1963. Japan's reintegration

into the Asian scene was also facilitated early by its joining the

Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development

in Asia and the Pacific in December 1954 and by its attendance

at the April 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia.

In the late 1950s, Japan made a limited beginning in its aid program. In 1958 it extended the equivalent of US$50 million in credits to India, the. first Japanese loan of its kind in post-World War II years. As in subsequent cases involving India, as well as Sri Lanka,

Malaysia, Taiwan, Pakistan, and South Korea, these credits were

rigidly bound to projects that promoted plant and equipment purchases from Japan. In 1960 Japan officially established the Insti- tute of Asian Economic Affairs (renamed the Institute of Developing

Economies in 1969) as the principal training center for its specialists

in economic diplomacy.

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Japan: A Country Study

In the early 1960s, the government adopted a more forward

posture in seeking to establish contacts in Asia. In 1960 the Insti- tute of Asian Economic Affairs was placed under the jurisdiction

of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In

1961 the government established the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund as a new lending agency. The following year the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency made its debut.

By the mid-1960s, Japan's role had become highly visible in Asia

as well as elsewhere in the world. In 1966 Japan became a full member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD—see Glossary). As economic and trade expansion

burgeoned, leaders began to question the propriety and wisdom

of what they variously described as ''mere economism," an

"export-first policy," and the "commercial motives of aid." They

wanted to contribute more to the solution of the North-South

problem, as they dubbed the issue—the tenuous relationship between the developed countries and the developing countries.

Efforts since the beginning of the 1970s to assume a leading role

in promoting peace and stability in Asia, especially Southeast Asia,

by providing economic aid and by offering to serve as a mediator

in disputes, faced two constraints. Externally there was fear in parts

of Asia that Japan's systematic economic penetration into the region

would eventually lead to something akin to its pre-World War II scheme to exploit Asian markets and materials. Internally, foreign

policymakers were apprehensive that Japan's political involvement

in the area in whatever capacity would almost certainly precipitate an anti-Japanese backlash and adversely affect its economic

position.

After a reassessment of policy, the Japanese leadership appeared

to have decided that more emphasis ought to be given to helping

the developing countries of the region modernize their industrial

bases to increase their self-reliance and economic resilience. In the

late 1970s, Japan seemed to have decided that bilateral aid in the

form of yen credits, tariff reductions, larger quota incentives for manufactured exports, and investments in processing industries,

energy, agriculture, and education would be the focus of its aid

programs in Asia.

By 1990, Japan's interaction with the vast majority of Asia-Pacific

countries, especially its burgeoning economic exchanges, was multifaceted and increasingly important to the recipient countries. The

developing countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Thailand; Singapore was treated as a newly in- dustrialized economy, or NIE) regarded Japan as critical to their

development. Japanese aid to the ASEAN countries totaled US$1 .9

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Foreign Relations

billion in Japanese fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1988 versus about

US$333 million for the United States during United States FY 1988.

Japan was the number one foreign investor in the ASEAN countries, with cumulative investment as of March 1989 of about

US$14.5 billion, more than twice that of the United States. Japan's

share of total foreign investment in ASEAN countries ranged from

70-80 percent in Thailand to 20 percent in Indonesia.

South Asia

In South Asia, Japan's role was mainly that of an aid donor.

Japanese aid to seven South Asian countries totaled US$1.1 bil- lion in 1988, about the same as the United States gave. Except

for Pakistan, which received heavy inputs of aid from the United

States, all other South Asian countries received most of their aid

from Japan. Four South Asian nations—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—were in the top ten list of Tokyo's aid recipients worldwide.

Prime Minister Kaifu signaled a broadening ofJapan's interest

in South Asia with his swing through the region in April 1990. In an address to the Indian parliament, Kaifu stressed the role of free markets and democracy in bringing about "a new international

order, '

' and emphasized the need for a settlement of the Kashmir

territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, and for economic

liberalization to attract foreign investment and promote dynamic

growth. To India, which was very short of hard currency, Kaifu

pledged a new concessional loan of ¥100 billion (about US$650

million) for the coming year. Newly Industrialized Economies

Japan's relationships with the NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong

Kong, and Singapore—often called the Four Tigers) were marked

by both cooperation and competition. After the early 1980s, when

Tokyo extended a large financial credit to South Korea for essentially political reasons, Japan avoided significant aid relationships

with the NIEs. Relations instead involved capital investment, technology transfer, and trade. Increasingly, the NIEs came to be

viewed as Japan's rivals in the competition for export markets for manufactured goods, especially the vast United States market (see

International Economic Cooperation and Aid, ch. 5). Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands

Japan's economic involvement in Australia was heavily tilted toward extraction of natural resources and in-country manufacturing for the Australian domestic market. Japanese investment

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Japan: A Country Study

by 1988 made Australia the single largest source of Japanese re- gional imports. Japan's trade with New Zealand was a small frac- tion of its trade with Australia.

Politically, Japan's relations with Australia and New Zealand

had elements of tension as well as acknowledged mutuality of interest. Memories of World War II lingered among the public, as did a contemporary fear ofJapanese economic domination. At the same time, government and business leaders saw Japan as a vital export market and an essential element in Australia's and New

Zealand's future growth and prosperity.

By 1990 commercial and strategic interests prompted a strong

surge in Japanese involvement in the newly independent island nations of the Pacific. Japan's rapidly growing aid to the South Pacific was seen by many as a response to United States calls for greater burden-sharing, and to the adoption of the 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, which gave states legal control over fish- ery resources within their 200-nautical-mile economic zones. Japan

was second after Australia as an aid donor to the region. The US$93

million it provided in 1988 was more than three times the United

States aid of US$26.7 million in FY 1988. Japanese companies also invested heavily in the tourism industry in the island nations.

The Koreas

Japan's policies toward the two Koreas reflected the importance

this area had for Asian stability, which was seen as essential to Japanese peace and prosperity. In 1990 Japan remained one of four

major powers (along with the United States, the Soviet Union, and

China) that had important security interests on the Korean Peninsula. However, Japan's involvement in political and security is- sues on the Korean Peninsula was more limited than that of the

other three powers. Japan's relations with North Korea and South

Korea had a legacy of bitterness stemming from harsh Japanese

colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945. Polls during the post- war period in Japan and South Korea showed that the people of

each nation had a profound dislike of the other country and people.

Article 9 ofJapan's Constitution is interpreted to bar Japan from

entering into security relations with countries other than the United

States. Consequently, Japan had no substantive defense relationship with South Korea, and military contacts were infrequent. The

Japanese government supported noncommunist South Korea in

other ways. It backed United States contingency plans to dispatch

United States armed forces in Japan to South Korea in case of a North Korean attack on South Korea. It also acted as an intermediary between South Korea and China. It pressed the Chinese

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Foreign Relations

government to open and expand relations with South Korea in the

1980s.

Japan's trade with South Korea was US$27.25 billion in 1988,

with a surplus of US$3.63 billion on the Japanese side. Japanese

direct private investment in South Korea totaled US$3.25 billion

in 1988. Japanese and South Korean firms often had interdependent relations, which gave Japan advantages in South Korea's

growing market. Many South Korean products were based on Japanese design and technology. A surge in imports of South Korean

products into Japan in 1990 was due partly to production by

Japanese investors in South Korea.

Japan-North Korean relations remained antagonistic in the late 1980s. The two governments did not maintain diplomatic relations

and had no substantive contacts. The opposition Japan Socialist

Party, however, had cordial relations with the North Korean

regime

.

Issues in Japan-North Korean relations that produced tensions

included North Korean media attacks on Japan, Japan's imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea for terrorist acts against

South Korea in the 1980s, and unpaid North Korean debts to Japanese enterprises of about US$50 million. Japan allowed trade

with North Korea through unofficial channels. This unofficial trade

reportedly came to more than US$200 million annually in the 1980s.

Vietnam and Cambodia

Stability in Indochina also was very important to Japanese interests. During the Vietnam war of the 1960s and 1970s, Japan

had consistently encouraged a negotiated settlement at the earliest possible date. Even before the hostilities ended, it had made contact with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

government and had reached an agreement to establish diplomatic relations in September 1973. Implementation, however, was

delayed by North Vietnamese demands that Japan pay the equivalent of US$45 million in World War II reparations in two yearly

installments, in the form of "economic cooperation" grants. Giving in to the Vietnamese demands, Japan paid the money and

opened an embassy in Hanoi in October 1975 following the unification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam into the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam. Recognition of the communist Khmer Rouge

regime in Cambodia came in 1975, and diplomatic relations with

that country were established in August 1976.

This Indochina policy was justified at home and to the member

countries of ASEAN—some of which were hostile to and suspicious

of Vietnam—on the grounds that official contacts and eventually

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Japan: A Country Study

aid to Vietnam would promote the peace and stability of Southeast

Asia as a whole. In December 1978, after a visit to Tokyo by Vietnam's minister of foreign affairs, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Japan agreed

to give Vietnam US$195 million in grant aid, as well as commodity

loans and food shipments. When Vietnam launched its invasion

of Cambodia later that same month, Japan was embarrassed and

irritated. It joined ASEAN in condemning the invasion, supported

the UN resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese

forces, and suspended the aid commitments it had made with

Hanoi.

Japan and the United States shared common ground in opposing the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Japan's policy of restricting aid and other economic

cooperation with Vietnam reinforced international pressures on Hanoi to pull back its forces and seek a comprehensive Cambodian

settlement. Faced with international isolation, waning Soviet bloc

support, continued armed resistance in Cambodia, and large-scale

economic problems at home, Hanoi withdrew most if not all of its combat troops from Cambodia in 1989. It appealed to developed

countries to open channels of economic cooperation, trade, and

aid. Although some Japanese businesses were interested in investment and trade with Vietnam and Cambodia, the Japanese government still opposed economic cooperation with those countries until

there was a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. This stand was basically consistent with United States policy of the time.

Meanwhile, Japan gave informal assurances that Tokyo was pre- pared to bear a large share of the financial burden to help with

reconstruction aid to Cambodia, whenever a comprehensive set- tlement was reached, and to help fund UN or other international

peacekeeping forces, should they be required.

Relations with Other Countries

Japan had diplomatic relations with nearly all independent nations and had been an active member of the UN since December

1956. Its relations with countries other than those discussed above were mainly commercial and economic. It had few major political

differences with any of them but was under continuing pressure

from many to limit its exports and to remove restrictions imposed on the import of foreign goods and capital. It was also being pressed

to contribute more to the socioeconomic betterment of the nations

of the Third World.

During the 1970s, the government took positive measures to in- crease its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing

countries and to contribute to the stabilization of the international

412
Prime ministers Kaifu Toshiki and Margaret Thatcher in Tokyo, 1989

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

trade and monetary system. These measures were generally welcomed abroad, although some countries felt that the steps taken were not executed as rapidly or were not as extensive as similar

efforts by some other advanced industrialized nations. Japan's ODA

increased tenfold during the decade and stood at US$3.3 billion

in 1980, but this ODA as a percentage of GNP was still below the

average of other donor countries.

In the 1980s, Japan's ODA continued to rise rapidly. ODA net disbursements, in nominal terms, averaged around US$3 billion

per year in the early 1980s, and jumped to US$5.6 billion in 1986

and US$9.1 billion in 1988. Japan's share of total disbursements

from major aid donors also grew significantly, from 1 1.76 percent

in 1979 to about 15 percent in the mid-1980s, and to nearly 19

percent in 1988. Japan's ODA as a percentage of its GNP, however,

did not increase substantially during the 1980s, remaining at about

0.3 percent.

Japan continued to concentrate its economic assistance in Asia

(about 72 percent of total commitments in 1987-88), reflecting its historical and economic ties to the region. Japan made modest in- creases in aid to Africa with the announcement in 1989 of a US$600

million grant program for the next three years. In early 1990, Japan

also pledged large amounts of assistance to Eastern Europe, but

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Japan: A Country Study

most of that aid was to be in the form of market rate credits and

investment insurance, which did not qualify as ODA. In other

regions, Japan appeared likely to continue allocating relatively small

shares of assistance. Nevertheless, by 1987 Japan had become the

largest bilateral donor in twenty-nine countries, nearly double the

number in which that had been the case ten years earlier. The continued growth ofJapan's foreign aid appeared to be motivated by two fundamental factors. First, Japanese policy aimed

at assuming international responsibilities commensurate with its position as a global economic power. Second, many believed, the

growing Japanese foreign aid program came largely in response

to pressure from the United States and other allies for Japan to take on a greater share of the financial burdens in support of shared

security, political, and economic interests. Although cultural and noneconomic ties with Western Europe

grew significantly during the 1980s, the economic nexus remained

by far the most important element ofJapanese-West European re- lations throughout the decade. Events in West European relations, as well as political, economic, or even military matters, were topics

of concern to most Japanese commentators because of the immediate implications for Japan. The major issues centered on the effect of the coming West European economic unification on Japan's

trade, investment, and other opportunities in Western Europe.

Some West European leaders were anxious to restrict Japanese ac- cess to the newly integrated European Community, but others appeared open to Japanese trade and investment. In partial response

to the strengthening economic ties among nations in Western Europe and to the 1989 United States-Canada free trade agreement,

Japan and other countries along the Asia-Pacific rim began moving in the late 1980s toward greater economic cooperation.

International Cooperation

United Nations

At the beginning of the 1990s, Japan continued to regard international cooperation within the UN framework as a basic foreign

policy principle. WhenJapan joined the UN in 1956, it did so with

great enthusiasm and broad public support, for the international

organization was seen to embody the pacifist country's hopes for a peaceful world order. Membership was welcomed by many

Japanese who saw the UN as a guarantor of a policy of unarmed

neutrality for their nation. To others, support for the UN would

be useful in masking or diluting Japan's almost total dependence on the United States for its security. The government saw the UN

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Foreign Relations

as an ideal arena for its risk-minimizing, omnidirectional foreign

policy.

After the late 1950s, Japan participated actively in the social and

economic activities of the UN's various specialized agencies and

other international organizations concerned with social, cultural,

and economic improvement. During the 1970s, as it attained the

status of an economic superpower, Japan was called on to play an

increasingly large role in the UN. As Japan's role increased and

its contributions to UN socioeconomic development activities grew,

many Japanese began to ask whether their country was being given an international position of responsibility commensurate with its economic power. There was even some sentiment, expressed as early as 1973, that Japan should be given a permanent seat on the

UN Security Council with the United States, the Soviet Union,

Britain, France, and China.

By 1990 Japan's international cooperation efforts had reached

a new level of involvement and activism. Japan contributed about

11 percent of the regular UN budget, second only to the United

States, which contributed 25 percent. Japan was particularly active in UN peacekeeping activities and in 1989, for the first time,

sent officials to observe and participate in UN peacekeeping ef- forts (in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Namibia). Japan sent a small

team to observe the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua, and

planned to offer more than 100 people to help supervise elections

in Cambodia if the UN were to establish a presence there.

Other Organizations

In addition to its UN activities and its participation in Asian

regional groupings, such as the Colombo Plan and the Asian Development Bank, Japan was also involved, beginning in the 1950s,

in worldwide economic groupings largely made up of, or dominated by, the industrialized nations of Western Europe and North

America. In 1952 Japan became a member of the IMF and of the

World Bank, where it played an increasingly important role. In

1955, it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT—see Glossary). In 1966 Japan was admitted to the OECD,

which brought it into what was essentially a club of leading industrialized nations. Japan has participated actively since 1975 in the

annual summit meetings of the seven largest capitalist countries—the Group of Seven—Canada, Federal Republic of Germany,

France, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the United States. International Banks

Based on its economic power and performance, Japan steadily ex- panded its role in the World Bank, the IMF, and other international

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Japan: A Country Study

financial institutions. Investment and trade flows made Japan by

far the dominant economic nation in Asia. Japanese aid and in- vestment became widely sought after in other parts of the world,

and it appeared to be only a matter of time before such economic

power would translate into greater political influence. In the multilateral development banks, Japan's financial and policy positions became more prominent. Tokyo had assumed a leading

role at the Asian Development Bank for a number of years. At the

World Bank, Japan's voting share represented about 9.4 percent,

compared with 16.3 percent for the United States. Japan also made

several "special" contributions to particular World Bank programs

that raised its financial status but did not alter its voting position.

Japan planned to participate in the East European Development

Bank, making a contribution of 8.5 percent, the same as the United

States and major West European donors. Japan also displayed a growing prominence in IMF deliberations, helping ease the massive

debt burdens of Third World countries, and generally supported

efforts at the GATT 1990 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations

to liberalize world trade and investment.

Policy after the Cold War

The post-Cold War world promised an important position for Japan. Japanese leaders and popular opinion remained tentative

and uncertain as to how Japan would use its remarkable economic

power in order to preserve and enhance Japanese national interests. There seemed to be little alternative to a continued close strategic

relationship with the United States and a general international out- look designed to promote global peace, development, and access

to world markets and resources. Japanese leaders and public opinion were often anxious to see Japan assert a more pronounced position in world affairs, but the tradition of caution in Japanese for- eign policy was reinforced by the still unclear outlines of the

post-Cold War environment that would affect Japanese foreign policy in the years ahead.

* * * There is voluminous literature in English on Japan's postwar

foreign policy. James W. Morley'sJapan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941,

Frank C. Langdon'sJapan's Foreign Policy, Reinhard Drifte'sJapan's

Foreign Policy, Robert A. Scalapino's The Foreign Policy of Modern

Japan, and William R. Nester's Japan's Growing Predominance Over East Asia and the World Economy are worthwhile monographs. The

most useful current assessments appear in publications such as the

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Foreign Relations

Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian Survey, Current History, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy. Feature articles also appear in such important news sources as the Asian Wall Street Journal. Among United

States government publications, the most useful are the Foreign

Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia and vari- ous publications of the United States Congress. (For further in- formation and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

417

Chapter 8. National Security
Family crest consisting of three Chinese-style roundfans (uchiwa), once used

to direct troops in battle and the symbol of the god of war
JAPAN IN THE EARLY 1990s was in the unusual position of

being a major world economic and political power, with an aggressive military tradition, resisting the development of strong

armed forces. A military proscription is included as Article 9 of

the 1947 Constitution, which states, "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. " In 1990

that article, along with the rest of the "Peace Constitution," re- tained strong government and citizen support and was interpreted

as permitting the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but prohibiting those

forces from possessing nuclear weapons or other offensive arms or being deployed outside of Japan.

The SDF were under control of the civilian Defense Agency,

subordinate to the prime minister. Although highly trained and

fully qualified to perform the limited missions assigned to them,

the SDF were small, understaffed, and underequipped for more

extensive military operations, and as of 1990 had never seen ac- tion in any operation other than disaster relief. Japan's national defense policy has been based on maintaining

the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the

United States, under which Japan assumed unilateral responsibility for its own internal security and the United States agreed to join in Japan's defense in the event that Japan or its territories were

attacked. Although the size and capability of the SDF have always

limited their role, until 1976 defense planning focused on developing forces adequate to deal with the conventional capabilities of

potential regional adversaries. Beginning in 1976, government policy held that the SDF would be developed only to repel a smallscale, limited invasion and that the nation would depend on the

United States to come to its aid in the event of a more serious in- cursion.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the buildup of

military forces in the Soviet Far East, including a group of islands

to the north of Hokkaido, which are occupied by the Soviet Union

but claimed by Japan, led Japan to develop a program to modernize and improve the SDF in the 1980s, especially in air defense

and antisubmarine warfare. In 1990 the government was reevaluating its security policy based on reduced East-West tensions and

improving Soviet-Japanese relations.

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Japan: A Country Study

The Japanese government valued its close relations with the

United States and remained dependent on the United States nuclear

umbrella. Thus, it worked to facilitate military contacts and to support the United States diplomatically whenever possible. Both the

government and the public, however, supported only limited in- creases in self-defense capability. National security, it was believed,

is fostered by international diplomacy and economic aid as much

as by militai/ might.

There were few critical issues for Japan's internal security in

1990. Conditions of public order compared favorably with those

elsewhere in the world. The crime rate was remarkably low, kept

that way by well-organized and efficient police assisted by general

citizen cooperation and support.

Militarism Before 1945

The BushidO Code

Japanese aversion for things military is of recent origin. For centuries before 1945, military men and a strong martial tradition ex- erted a powerful and, at times, dominant influence on national life. Although the development of a modern army and navy came only

during the Meiji period (1868-1912), reverence for the art of war

and its practitioners had long been characteristic ofJapanese society.

In the middle of the seventh century, under the Taika Reform,

the Yamato court used military forces, conscripted from the peasants

and led by court-appointed aristocrats, to extend its realm and maintain order (see Early Developments, ch. 1). Military leaders initially were loyal to the emperors, but with the rise of the great private

estates, or shoen, in the mid-eighth century, imperial control waned

(see Nara and Heian Periods A.D. 710-1 185, ch. 1). National conscription was abandoned in A.D. 792. Decreased imperial authority

gave rise to chaotic conditions and lawlessness in the countryside.

Provincial officials and shoen holders used local militias, civil offi- cials under arms, and soldiers of the shoen holders to secure their

land and compete for power.

By the mid-twelfth century, these local armed forces had developed into a distinct warrior class (bushi, or samurai), completely

overshadowing the military strength of the imperial government.

Empowered by a nationwide, feudal, military dictatorship, the chief

national figure, the shogun, ruled in the name of a figurehead emperor. By the end of the sixteenth century, samurai dominated the

social and political hierarchy that existed under the shogun and

developed into a hereditary elite. After 1603 they alone were granted

the right to bear the sword, which subsequently became the symbol

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National Security

of their superior status. During the sixteenth century, a wide variety of firearms also was introduced from Europe, and used quite

effectively, particularly against some of the outer daimyo, or feudal

lords. In time, a customary ethical code, bushido (see Glossary), was

developed. According to this doctrine, the samurai was bound to accept death in battle rather than flight or surrender and, seeing

corruption or disloyalty in another, was expected to slay the guilty

party and then commit seppuku (see Glossary) lest his honorable

intentions be questioned. As an ideal of conduct, the code emphasized personal honesty, reverence and respect for parents, willing- ness to sacrifice oneself for family honor, consideration for the

feelings of others, indifference to pain, loyalty to one's superiors,

and unquestioning obedience to duty in the face of any hardship

or danger. Although a reality that often fell short of the ideal, bushido

had a profound and lasting impact on the nation. Its effects were

still seen in the conduct of battle in World War II. Banzai (a rallying cry meaning 10,000 years) charges against stronger enemy forces and the tenacity of resistance under severe duress testified to the

strength and persistence of the samurai tradition.

The Modernization of the Military, 1868-1931

When Western powers began to use their superior military

strength to press Japan for trade relations in the 1850s, the country's decentralized and, by Western standards, antiquated military forces were unable to provide an effective defense against their

advances. After the fall of the Tokugawa government in 1867 and

the restoration of the Meiji emperor, de facto political and administrative power shifted to a group of younger samurai who had been

instrumental in forming the new system and were committed to modernizing the military. They introduced drastic changes, which

cleared the way for the development of modern, European-style

armed forces. Conscription became universal and obligatory in 1872 and,

although samurai wedded to the traditional prerogatives of their

class resisted, by 1880 a conscript army was firmly established. The

Imperial Army General Staff Office was established directly under

the emperor in 1878 and given broad powers for military planning

and strategy. The new force eventually made the samurai spirit

its own. Loyalties formerly accorded to feudal lords were trans- ferred to the state and to the emperor. Upon release from service,

soldiers carried these ideals back to their home communities, ex- tending military-derived standards to all classes.

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Japan: A Country Study

An imperial rescript of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to the emperor by the new armed forces and asserted that commands

from superior officers were equivalent to commands from the emperor himself. Thenceforth, the military existed in an intimate and

privileged relationship with the imperial institution. Top-ranking

military leaders were given direct access to the emperor and the

authority to transmit his pronouncements direcdy to the troops. The

sympathetic relationship between conscripts and officers, particularly junior officers, who were drawn mostly from the peasantry,

tended to draw the military closer to the people (see The Meiji Restoration, ch. 1). In time, most people came to look more for guidance

in national matters to military commanders than to political leaders. The first test of the nation's new military capabilities, a successful

punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874, was followed by a series of military ventures unmarred by defeat until World War II. Japan

moved against Korea, China, and Russia, to secure by military means the raw materials and strategic territories it believed necessary for the development and protection of the homeland. Territorial

gains were achieved in Korea, the southern half of Sakhalin (renamed Karafuto), and Manchuria. As an ally of Britain in World

War I, Japan assumed control over Germany's possessions in Asia,

notably in China's Shandong Province, and the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands in the Pacific Ocean (see World War I, ch. 1). The Naval General Staff, independent from the supreme com- mand from 1893, became even more powerful after World War I. At the 1921-22 Washington Conference, the major powers signed

the Five Power Naval Disarmament Treaty, which set the international capital ship ratio for the United States, Britain, Japan, France,

and Italy at 5, 5, 3, 1.75, and 1.75 respectively. The Imperial Navy

insisted that it required a ratio of seven ships for every eight United

States naval ships, but settled for three to five, a ratio acceptable

to the Japanese public (see Diplomacy, ch. 1). The London Naval

Treaty of 1930 brought about further reduction but, by the end of

1935, Japan had entered a period of unlimited military expansion

and ignored its previous commitments. By the late 1930s, the proportion of Japanese to United States naval forces was 70.6 percent in

total tonnage and 94 percent in aircraft carriers, and Japanese ships

slightly outnumbered those of the United States. World War II Establishment of Manchukuo

The power of the military grew when, in September 1931, without

the knowledge or approval of the civil government, members of the

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National Security

Imperial Army unit stationed in Manchuria—the Guandong, or Kwantung, Army—dynamited a short section of the South Manchurian Railway near Shenyang (called Mukden by the Japanese).

Blaming the incident on Chinese saboteurs, the Guandong Army

declared a state of emergency and quickly occupied all the principal cities in the region. In March 1932 this army formed the puppet state of Manchukuo (see Rise of the Militarists, ch. 1). At home,

this quick and inexpensive victory greatly increased the confidence

of the young nationalist officers, who could rightly claim credit for

it, but other officers were sobered by the precedent for insubordination. Their apprehension was well founded: in the early 1930s

a series of assassinations and conspiracies occurred within the nation and armed forces. In 1936 a force from the Tokyo garrison

rose in open revolt. Although the rebels were suppressed on orders

of the emperor, the stage was set for more radical military leaders

to assume gradual control of the government, a process that was

completed by 1940 and lasted until a few weeks before Japan's 1945

surrender in World War II. Sino-Japanese War

OnJuly 17, 1937, a new wave of expansion on the Asian mainland began with a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese troops

at Marco Polo Bridge outside of Beiping (now Beijing). Although

the Japanese commander had committed his troops without prior

knowledge or consent of the government in Tokyo, he was promptiy

provided with reinforcements by the general staff, which by this time was strongly influenced by the younger officers. The fighting

quickly spread, and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) had

begun. On July 28 Chinese forces evacuated Beiping. Two days

later the Japanese army occupied Tianjin, and on August 13

Japanese forces attacked China's financial center, Shanghai.

Chinese forces resisted for three months, but finally succumbed

to the better-armed and better-trained Japanese forces. The fall of Shanghai left China's capital, Nanjing, unprotected, and the

Chinese government moved its capital to the southwestern mountain city of Chongqing. Japanese forces quickly occupied Nanjing, indiscriminately massacring about 100,000 civilians in the in- famous "Rape of Nanjing." In mid- 1938 the Japanese set their

sights on the central Chinese industrial city of Wuhan. Wuhan held

out for four and one-half months, but finally surrendered on December 25, 1938. The fall of Wuhan, coupled with the earlier fall of Guangzhou on October 2 1

, left most urban areas in central and

eastern China in the hands of the Japanese. To the north, however,

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Japan: A Country Study

Japanese forces were defeated after a protracted battle with a joint

Soviet-Mongolian force in 1939.

At home, the Japanese armed forces were portrayed as benevolent crusaders striving to free Asia from European colonial domination. The military's control over almost every phase ofJapanese

life was by now complete, and opposition to its policies was tanta- mount to treason. The top military commanders enjoyed direct access to the emperor, bypassing civilian authority completely.

War in the Pacific

In September 1940, with the permission of the pro-Nazi Vichy

government of France, Japan moved into northern Indochina, es- tablishing a foothold in strategically important Southeast Asia. A

few days later, Japan signed a mutual defense agreement, the

Tripartite Pact, with Germany and Italy, putting it on a collision course with the United States. The German invasion of the Soviet

Union in June 1941 relieved the Japanese of the Soviet threat in East Asia. As a result, in July 1941 Japan decided to move its troops

into southern Indochina for possible operations against the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. The United States responded by freezing

Japanese assets in the United States and imposing an oil embargo

on Japan. Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations countries, and the government of the Dutch East Indies quickly followed

suit, cutting 90 percent ofJapan's oil imports. Faced with a choice

of submitting to United States demands for a return to the pre- 1931

status quo or confronting the United States, Japan determined to

strike out boldly. Beginning with a devastating attack against the

United States fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941,

it quickly took advantage of superior air and naval power to oc- cupy the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Singapore. An overland offensive brought Burma and Thailand under

Japanese control, and a string of amphibious operations established

Japan's control of the South Pacific. By mid- 1942 Japanese forces

appeared to be in control of most of their objectives (see fig. 2).

It was at this point that the superior economic and industrial

power of the United States began to turn the tide. In June 1942

the Japanese directed the bulk of their navy to Midway, a tiny atoll at the northern tip of the Hawaiian chain, expecting to destroy the

rest of the United States Pacific fleet. Instead, the Americans, fore- warned of the attack, used carrier-based aircraft to devastate the

Japanese fleet. The United States counteroffensive had begun. In

the South Pacific, after six months of heavy fighting, Japanese forces evacuated Guadalcanal in February 1943. From there, revitalized

United States and Allied forces retook most of the South Pacific

426
Japanese marines and armored cars, Shanghai, 1937

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

islands occupied by the overextended Japanese forces. By June

1944, United States and Allied forces had reached Saipan, in the

Mariana Islands, putting their bombers within range of the Japanese

homeland.

When United States air, ground, and sea power began to reverse the tide ofJapanese victories, the authority of the Japanese forces

began to wane in the captured territories. At home in Japan,

however, respect remained high until intensive United States aerial bombardment there raised popular doubt about the military's

ability to win the war. It was not until the last days of the war,

after the United States had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, that the emperor, in an unprecedented political act, compelled the general staff to accept the terms for surrender.

The Self-Defense Forces

Japan's defeat in World War II, the only major military defeat

in the country's history, had a profound and lasting effect on national attitudes toward war, the armed forces, and military involvement in politics. These attitudes were immediately apparent in the

public's willing acceptance of total disarmament and demobilization after the war and in the alacrity with which all military leaders were removed from positions of influence in the state. Under

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Japan: A Country Study

General Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army, serving

as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and in concert with the wishes of most Japanese, occupation authorities were committed to the demilitarization and democratization of the nation.

All clubs, schools, and societies associated with the military and

martial skills were eliminated. The general staff was abolished, along

with army and navy ministries and the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy. Industry serving the military also was dismantled.

The trauma of defeat produced strong pacifist sentiments that

found expression in the United States-fostered 1947 Constitution,

which forever renounces war as an instrument for setding international disputes and declares that Japan will never again maintain

"land, sea, or air forces or other war potential" (see The Postwar

Constitution, ch. 6). Later cabinets interpreted these provisions as not denying the nation the right to self-defense and, with the en- couragement of the United States, developed the SDF. Antimilitarist

public opinion, however, remained a force to be reckoned with on

any defense-related issue. The constitutional legitimacy of the SDF

was challenged well into the 1970s, and even in the 1980s government acted warily on defense matters lest residual antimilitarism

be aggravated and a backlash result. Early Development

Deprived of any military capability after 1945, the nation had

only occupation forces and a few domestic police on which to rely

for security. Rising Cold War tensions in Europe and Asia, coupled with leftist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in Japan,

prompted some conservative leaders to question the unilateral

renunciation of all military capability. These sentiments were in- tensified in 1950 when most occupation troops were transferred

to the Korean War (1950-53) theater, leaving Japan virtually helpless to counter internal disruption and subversion, and very much

aware of the need to enter into a mutual defense relationship with

the United States to guarantee the nation's external security. Encouraged by the occupation authorities, the Japanese government

in July 1950 authorized the establishment of the National Police

Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men equipped with light infantry

weapons.

Under the terms of the Mutual Security Assistance Pact, rati- fied in 1952 along with the peace treaty Japan had signed with the

United States and other countries, United States forces stationed

in Japan were to deal with external aggression against Japan while

Japanese forces, both ground and maritime, would deal with in- ternal threats and natural disasters. Accordingly, in mid- 1952 the

428
National Security

National Police Reserve was expanded to 1 10,000 men and named

the National Safety Force. The Coastal Safety Force, which had

been organized in 1950 as a waterborne counterpart to the National Police Reserve, was transferred with it to the National Safety

Agency to constitute an embryonic navy (see Military Relations

with the United States, this ch.).

As Japan perceived a growing external threat without adequate

forces to counter it, the National Safety Force underwent further

development that entailed difficult political problems. The war re- nunciation clause of the Constitution was the basis for strong political objections to any sort of force other than conventional police. In 1954, however, separate land, sea, and air forces for purely defensive purposes were created, subject to the Office of the Prime

Minister (see The Cabinet and Ministries, ch. 6).

To avoid the appearance of a revival of militarism, Japan's leaders emphasized constitutional guarantees of civilian control of the

government and armed forces and used nonmilitary terms for the

organization and functions of the forces. The overall organization was called the Defense Agency rather than the Ministry of Defense.

The armed forces were designated the Ground Self-Defense Force

(GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air

Self-Defense Force (ASDF), instead of the army, navy, and air force. Although possession of nuclear weapons is not forbidden in the

Constitution, Japan, as the only nation to experience the devastation of atomic attack, early expressed its abhorrence of nuclear arms and determined never to acquire them. The Basic Atomic Energy

Law of 1956 limits research, development, and utilization of nuclear

power to peaceful uses, and from 1956 national policy has embodied "three non-nuclear principles" —forbidding the nation to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or to allow them to be

introduced into the nation. In 1976 Japan ratified the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted by the United

Nations Security Council in 1968) and reiterated its intention never

to develop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons

through its territory.

Strategic Considerations

The expansion of military capabilities in the Soviet Far East beginning in 1970 was of grave concern to Japan, and Japanese

authorities regularly monitored the activities of the Soviet Pacific

fleet and Soviet aircraft in the waters and air space around Japan.

Despite a general lessening of world tensions and Soviet overtures

for improved bilateral relations, in 1990 the Soviet Union still

429
Japan: A Country Study

maintained a variety of units, including a division headquarters, on the southernmost Kuril Islands claimed by Japan as its Northern Territories. The Soviet Union also operated about 100 major

surface war ships and 140 submarines (about 75 nuclear powered)

out of Vladivostok and other Pacific ports. Soviet naval combatants had passed through the Soya, Tsugaru, and Korea straits and

had sailed in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk and in Pacific Ocean areas adjacent to Japan (see fig. 1). Japan also was

within range of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and sea- and air- launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons based in the

Soviet Union.

Another area of strategic interest to the nation was the Korean

Peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North

Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) had remained

implacable enemies since the Korean War, and in 1990 the border between them was one of the most heavily fortified in the world.

Stable and peaceful relations between the two were considered vital to Japan's interest: an outbreak of hostilities would involve United

States forces stationed in Japan, presenting political and possibly

security problems for the nation, in addition to interrupting flourish- ing trade with South Korea. Although Japan maintained formal

diplomatic relations only with South Korea, it had refused to contribute to that nation's defense, stating that any aid to a foreign

military establishment would violate its own Constitution.

Events on the Asian mainland could also affect Japan. From the

early 1970s, China possessed a nuclear force capable of striking

Japan and a large standing army and substantial navy, even if the

latter were geared primarily to coastal defense. China itself was

unlikely to present a direct military threat to Japan, but Chinese

internal unrest or China's conflicts with its neighbors could have an indirect impact on Japanese security and trade (see Trade and

Investment Relations, ch. 5). The nation was vitally dependent on maintaining access to re- gional and worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas, but it was

incapable of defending the sea routes on which it relied. Its energy

supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern sources, and its tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca,

and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable to hostilities in Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to interception of oceangoing trade

remained the country's greatest strategic weakness. Efforts to over- come this weakness, beginning with Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's

statement in May 1981 that Japan would attempt to defend its sea

lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of 1,000 nautical

miles, met with controversy. Within the Defense Agency itself, some

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National Security

viewed a role for the MSDF in defending the SLOC as "unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible," Even the strongest supporters of this program allowed that constitutional and other legal

restrictions would limit active participation of the MSDF to cases where Japan was under direct attack. Japan could, however, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search and

rescue support to United States naval forces. Japan's small size, its geographically concentrated industry, and

the close proximity of potentially hostile powers all rendered the

country vulnerable to a major nuclear strike. As for defense against

conventional aggression, strategy was determined by the nation's

elongated insular geography, its mountainous terrain, and the nearness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favors local defense against

invasion by ground forces, but protection of the approximately

15,800 kilometer coastiine of the four main islands would present

unique problems in the event of a large-scale invasion. Potentially

hostile aircraft and missile bases were so close that timely warning

even by radar facilities might be difficult to obtain.

Maneuver space was limited to such an extent that ground

defenses would have to be virtually in place at the onset of hostilities. No point of the country is more than 150 kilometers from the

sea. Moreover, the straits separating Honshu from the other main

islands restrict the rapid movement of troops from one island to another, even though all major islands are now connected by bridges

and tunnels. Within each island, mountain barriers and narrow

roads restrict troop and supply movements. The key strategic region was densely populated and highly industrialized central Honshu,

particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe (see Physical Setting,

ch. 2). Place in National Life

The Defense Agency, aware that it could not accomplish its programs without popular support, paid close attention to public opinion. Although the people retained a lingering suspicion of the armed

services, in the late 1980s antimilitarism had moderated, compared

to its form in the early 1950s when the SDF was established. At

that time, fresh from the terrible defeat of World War II, most

people had ceased to believe that the military could maintain peace

or serve the national interest. By the mid-1970s, memories of World

War II had faded, and a growing number of people believed that

Japan's military and diplomatic roles should reflect its rapidly growing economic strength. At the same time, United States-Soviet stra- tegic contention in the area around Japan had increased. In 1976

Defense Agency Director General Sakata Michita called upon the

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Japan: A Country Study

cabinet to adopt the National Defense Program Outline to improve

the quality of the armed forces and more clearly define their strictly

defensive role. For this program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to agree to a ceiling on military expenditures of 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) and a prohibition on exporting weapons and military technology. The outiine was adopted by

the cabinet and, according to public opinion polls, was approved

by approximately 60 percent of the people. Throughout the re- mainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the quality of the SDF

improved and public approval of the improved forces went up.

In November 1982, when the Defense Agency's former direc- tor general, Nakasone Yasuhiro, became prime minister, he was

under strong pressure from the United States and other Western

nations to move toward a more assertive defense policy in line with

Japan's status as a major world economic and political power.

Strong antimilitarist sentiment remained in Japanese public opinion, however, especially in the opposition parties. Nakasone chose a compromise solution, gradually building up the SDF and steadily increasing defense spending while guarding against being drawn

beyond self-defense into collective security. In 1985 he developed

the Mid-Term Defense Estimate (see Missions, this ch.). Although

that program had general public backing, its goals could not be

met while retaining the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP on military

spending, which still had strong public support. At first the government tried to get around the problem by deferring payment, budgeting only the initial costs of major military hardware. But by late 1986, it had become obvious that the 1 percent ceiling had to be

superseded. Thus, on January 24, 1987, in an extraordinary night

meeting, the cabinet abandoned this ceiling. A March 1987 Asahi

Shimbun poll indicated that this move was made in defiance of public

opinion: only 15 percent approved the removal of the ceiling and

61 percent disapproved. But a January 1988 poll conducted by the

Office of the Prime Minister reported that 58 percent approved

the defense budget of 1 .004 percent of GNP for Fiscal Year (FY

see Glossary) 1987.

During 1987 the Japanese government reviewed ways in which

it could assist friendly forces in protecting shipping in the Persian

Gulf. Several possibilities were seriously considered, including sending minesweepers to the gulf. But, in the end, the government determined that sending any military forces to the gulf would be

unacceptable to the Japanese people. Instead the Japanese government agreed to fund the installation of radio navigation guides for gulf shipping.

432
Armored exercises in Shizuoka Prefecture Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

Appreciation of the SDF continued to grow in the 1980s, with

over half of the respondents in a 1988 survey voicing an interest

in the SDF and over 76 percent indicating that they were favorably impressed. Although the majority (63.5 percent) of respondents were aware that the primary purpose of the SDF was maintenance

of national security, an even greater number (77 percent) saw dis- aster relief as the most useful SDF function. The SDF therefore

continued to devote much of its time and resources to disaster relief and other civic action. Between 1984 and 1988, at the request of

prefectural governors, the SDF assisted in approximately 3,100 dis- aster relief operations, involving about 138,000 personnel, 16,000

vehicles, 5,300 aircraft, and 120 ships and small craft. In addition,

the SDF participated in earthquake disaster prevention operations

and disposed of a large quantity of World War II explosive ord- nance, especially in Okinawa. The forces also participated in public

works projects, cooperated in managing athletic events, took part

in annual Antarctic expeditions, and conducted aerial surveys to report on ice conditions for fishermen and on geographic formations for construction projects. Especially sensitive to maintaining

harmonious relations with communities close to defense bases, the

SDF built new roads, irrigation networks, and schools in those

areas. Soundproofing was installed in homes and public buildings

433
Japan: A Country Study

near airfields. Despite these measures, in some areas local resistance

to military installations remained strong.

Missions

Despite the nation's status as a major world power, Japan es- chewed responsibility for regional defense. Having renounced war,

the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the

possession of nuclear weaponry, it held the view that it should possess only the minimum defense necessary to face external threats. Within those limits, the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 provides

the basis from which various formulations of SDF missions have

been derived. The law states that ground, maritime, and air forces are to preserve the peace and independence of the nation and to maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect

aggression.

The general framework through which these missions are to be

accomplished was set forth in the Basic Policy for National Defense

adopted by the cabinet in 1957; it remained in force in 1990. According to this document, the nation's security would be achieved

by supporting the United Nations (UN) and promoting international cooperation, by stabilizing domestic affairs and enhancing

public welfare, by gradually developing an effective self-defense

capability, and by dealing with external aggression on the basis

of Japan-United States security arrangements, pending the effec- tive functioning of the UN.

The very general terms in which military missions were couched

left specifics open to wide interpretation and prompted the criti- cism that the nation did not possess a military strategy. In the 1976

National Defense Program Outline, the cabinet sought to define

missions more specifically by setting guidelines for the nation's readiness, including specific criteria for the maintenance and operation of the SDF. Under these guidelines, in cases of limited and

small-scale attack, Japanese forces would respond promptly to control the situation. If enemy forces attacked in greater strength than

Japan could counter alone, the SDF would engage the attacker until the United States could come to its aid. Against nuclear threat,

Japan would rely on the nuclear deterrence of the United States. To accomplish its missions, the SDF would maintain surveillance,

be prepared to respond to direct and indirect attacks, be capable

of providing command, communication, logistics, and training support, and be available to aid in disaster relief. The outline specified quotas of personnel and equipment that were deemed necessary for each force to meet its tasks. Particular

434
National Security

elements of each force's mission were also identified. The GSDF

was to defend against ground invasion and threats to internal security, be able to deploy to any part of the nation, and protect the

bases of all three services of the Self-Defense Forces. The MSDF

was to meet invasion by sea, guard and defend coastal waters, ports,

bays, and major straits, sweep mines, and patrol and survey the sur- rounding waters. The ASDF was to render aircraft and missile in- terceptor capability, provide support fighter units for maritime and

ground operations, supply air reconnaissance and air transport for

all forces, and maintain airborne and stationary early warning units. The Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990

envisioned a modernized SDF with an expanded role. While maintaining Japan-United States security arrangements and the exclusively defensive policy mandated by the Constitution, this program

undertook moderate improvements in Japanese defense capabilities. Among its specific objectives were bettering air defense by

improving and modernizing interceptor-fighter aircraft and surfaceto-air missiles, improving antisubmarine warfare capability with

additional destroyers and fixed-wing antisubmarine patrol aircraft,

and upgrading intelligence, reconnaissance, and command, control, and communications.

The SDF disaster relief role is defined in Article 83 of the Self- Defense Forces Law of 1954, requiring units to respond to calls for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in fire fighting,

earthquake disasters, searches for missing persons, rescues, and

reinforcement of embankments and levees in the event of flooding. As of 1990, the SDF had not been used in police actions nor was it likely to be assigned any internal security tasks in the future.

Organization, Training, and Equipment

Based on the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, the nation's

defense establishment was organized to ensure civilian control of

the armed forces. The result has been a unique military system.

All SDF personnel were technically civilians: those in uniform were

classified as special civil servants and were subordinate to the

ordinary civil servants who ran the Defense Agency. There was

no military secrets law, and offenses committed by military per- sonnel—whether on base or off base, on duty or off duty, of military or nonmilitary nature—were all adjudicated under normal

procedures by civil courts in appropriate jurisdictions (see The

Criminal Justice System, this ch.).

The Defense Agency

In 1990 the Defense Agency, as part of the Office of the Prime

Minister, was required by Article 66 of the Constitution to be

435
Japan: A Country Study

completely subordinate to civilian authority. Its head, the director

general, had the rank of minister of state. He was assisted by two

vice directors general (vice ministers), one parliamentary and one

administrative; the Defense Facilities Office; and the Internal

Bureaus (see fig. 12). The highest figure in the command struc- ture was the prime minister, who was responsible directly to the

Diet (see Glossary; The Legislature, ch. 6). In a national emergency, the prime minister was authorized to order the various components of the Self-Defense Forces into action, subject to the consent of the Diet. In times of extreme emergency, that approval might

be obtained after the fact. In July 1986, the Security Council was established. The council was presided over by the prime minister and included the ministers

of state specified in advance in Article 9 of the Cabinet Law, the

foreign minister, the finance minister, the chief cabinet secretary,

the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, the director

general of the Defense Agency, and the director general of the Economic Planning Agency. The chairman of the Security Council

also could invite the chairman of the Joint Staff Council and any

other relevant state minister or official to attend. Replacing the

National Defense Council, which had acted as an advisory group on defense-related matters since 1956, the Security Council addressed a wider range of military and nonmilitary security issues,

including basic national defense policy, the National Defense Program Outline, the outline on coordinating industrial production

and other matters related to the National Defense Program Outline, and decisions on diplomatic initiatives and defense operations.

The internal bureaus, especially the Bureau of Defense Policy,

Bureau of the Finance, and the Bureau of Equipment, were often

headed by officials from other ministries and were the main centers of power and instruments of civilian control in the Defense Agency.

The Bureau of Defense Policy was responsible for drafting defense

policy and programs, for determining day-to-day operational activities, and for information gathering and analysis in the SDF.

The Bureau of Finance was instrumental in developing the Defense

Agency budget and in establishing spending priorities for the

Defense Agency and the SDF. The Bureau of Equipment, organized

into subunits for each of the military services, focused on equipment procurement. Before any major purchase was recommended

to the Diet by the Defense Agency, it had to be reviewed by each

of these important bureaus.

Below these civilian groups was the uniformed SDF. In 1990

its senior officer was the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, a body

that included the chiefs of staff of the ground, maritime, and air

436
National Security

arms of the Self-Defense Forces. Its principal functions were to advise the director general and to plan and execute joint exercises.

The three branches maintained staff offices to manage operations

in their branches. Although rank established echelons of command

within the SDF, all three branches were immediately responsible

to the director general and were coequal bodies with the Joint Staff

Council and the three staff offices. This structure precluded the concentration of power of the

pre- 1945 general staffs, but it impeded interservice coordination,

and there were few formal exchanges among commanders from

various branches. Moreover, some dissatisfaction was reported by

high-ranking officers who felt they had little power compared with

younger civilian officials in the bureaus, who most often had no

military experience. To rectify this situation and to increase input

by the SDF in policy matters, in the early 1980s the Joint Staff

Council was enlarged to establish better lines of communication

between the internal bureaus and the three staff offices. A computerized central command and communications system and

various tactical command and communications systems were

established, linking service and field headquarters with general

headquarters at the Defense Agency and with one another.

In the 1980s, efforts were also under way to facilitate a clear and

efficient command policy in the event of a crisis. The government

stood by the principle that military action was permitted only under

civilian control, but in recognition that delay for consultation might

prove dangerous, ships of the MSDF began to be armed with live torpedoes, and fighter-interceptors were allowed to carry missiles

at all times. Although aircraft had long been allowed to force down

intruders without waiting for permission from the prime minister,

ships were still required to receive specific orders before interdicting invading vessels. The Defense Agency had recommended drawing up more complete guidelines to clarify what action SDF combat

units could take in emergencies.

Cooperation between the SDF and other civilian agencies in con- tingency planning was limited. No plans existed to ensure the support of civilian aircraft and merchant fleets in times of crisis, even though the SDF transportation capabilities were generally judged

inadequate. In 1990 legislation was being studied to provide the

SDF with the ability to respond in emergency situations not specifically covered by Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

SDF training included instilling a sense of mission. Personnel were provided with the scientific and technical education to operate and maintain modern equipment and with the physical training necessary to accomplish their missions.

437
Japan: A Country Study

438
National Security

Modern equipment was gradually replacing obsolescent materiel

in the SDF. In 1987 the Defense Agency replaced its communications system (which formerly had relied on telephone lines of the

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) with a microwave

network incorporating a three-dimensional transmission system

using a communications satellite. Despite efforts to increase stocks,

however, supplies of ammunition and maintenance and repair parts

in 1990 remained at less than satisfactory levels. The Ground Self-Defense Force

The largest of the three services, the GSDF, operated under the

command of the chief of the ground staff, based in the city of

Ichikawa, east of Tokyo. Although allotted 180,000 slots for uniformed personnel, in 1989 the force was maintained at about

86 percent of that level (with approximately 156,200 personnel),

because of funding constraints. The GSDF consisted of one armored

division, twelve infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, two combined brigades, one training brigade, one artillery brigade with

four groups, eight antiaircraft artillery groups, one helicopter

brigade with twenty-four squardrons, and two antitank helicopter

squadrons, with a third being formed, and five engineer brigades

(see table 38, Appendix).

In 1989 the GSDF was divided into five regional armies, each

containing two to four divisions, antiaircraft artillery units, and

support units (see fig. 13). The largest, the Northern Army, was

headquartered on Hokkaido, where population and geographic constraints were less limiting than elsewhere. It had four divisions and

artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and engineering brigades. The Northeastern and Eastern armies, headquartered in Sendai and Ichikawa,

respectively, each had two divisions, and the Central Army, headquartered in Itami, had three divisions in addition to a combined

brigade located on Shikoku. The Western Army, with two divi- sions, was headquartered at Kengun and maintained a combined

brigade on Okinawa.

Intended to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide

a holding action until reinforced by United States armed forces,

the ground element in 1990 was neither equipped nor staffed to

offer more than a show of conventional defense by itself. Antitank

artillery, ground-to- sea firepower, and mobility were being improved and surface-to-ship missiles were being acquired in the MidTerm Defense Program scheduled for completion in FY 1990 (see

table 39, Appendix). The number of uniformed personnel was in- sufficient to enable an immediate shift onto emergency footing. Instead, the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel was high, requiring

439
Japan: A Country Study

Ground Self-Defense Force # Army headquarters

• Division headquarters

Maritime Self-Defense Force i District headquarters

Air Self-Defense Force

Air Defense Command headquarters

Air Defense Force headquorters

N

. Ominafo Ominato Maritime

District

(Northeaster Army

Maizuru

Maritime District Somagahora/

Eastern Army

Nerimc

A"f

Fukuokj. Saseho •

Sasebo nt,

K( Maritime 0/r.# .

CentrallArmy

Iruma

Fu 1®, Mchiiawa

Moriyamay Senzo

'Yolcosuka

Yokosuka

Maritime District

K/fa-

. Kumamofc

Kure Maritime

District

<7

1st Composite

Brigade

Army boundary

Maritime defense boundary

Air defense boundary 50 100 150 Miles 50 100 150 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from Japan, Defense Agency, Defense ofJapan, 1990, Tokyo,

1990, 309.

Figure 13. Deployment of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, 1990

440
National Security

augmentation by reserves or volunteers in times of crisis. In late 1989, however, GSDF reserve personnel, numbering 48,000, had

received little professional training.

In 1989 basic training for lower- secondary and upper-secondary

school graduates began in the training brigade and lasted approximately three months. Specialized enlisted and noncommissioned

officer (NCO) candidate courses were available in branch schools,

and qualified NCOs could enter an eight-to-twelve-week second

lieutenant candidate program. Senior NCOs and graduates of an

eighty-week NCO pilot course were eligible to enter officer candidate schools, as were graduates of the National Defense Academy

at Yokosuka and of four-year universities. Advanced technical,

flight, medical, and command staff officer courses were also run by the GSDF. Like the maritime and air forces, the GSDF ran

a youth cadet program offering technical training to lower-secondary

school graduates below military age in return for a promise of enlistment.

Because of population density on the Japanese islands, only limited areas were available for large-scale training and, even in these

areas, noise restrictions were a problem (see Population, ch. 2). The GSDF tried to adapt to these conditions by conducting com- mand post exercises and map maneuvers and by using simulators

and other training devices. In live firing during training, propellants were reduced to shorten shell ranges. Such restriction

diminished the value of combat training and troop morale.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force

The MSDF had an authorized strength in 1989 of 46,000 and

maintained some 44,400 personnel and operated 149 major combatants, including 14 submarines, 56 destroyers and frigates, 47

mine warfare vessels, 14 patrol craft, and 6 amphibious ships. It also flew some 181 fixed-wing aircraft and 102 helicopters. Most

of these aircraft were used in antisubmarine and mine warfare operations.

The MSDF was commanded by the chief of the maritime staff and included the maritime staff office, the self-defense fleet, five regional district commands, the air-training squadron, and vari- ous support units, such as hospitals and schools. The maritime staff

office, located in Tokyo, served the chief of staff in command and

supervision of the force. The self-defense fleet, headquartered at Yokosuka, was charged with defense of all waters around the

Japanese Archipelago. It commanded four escort flotillas (two based

in Yokosuka and one each in Sasebo and Maizuru), the fleet air force headquartered at Atsugi, two submarine flotillas based at Kure

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Japan: A Country Study

and Yokosuka, two mine-sweeping flotillas based at Kure and

Yokosuka, and the fleet training command at Yokosuka.

Five district units acted in concert with the fleet to guard the

waters of their jurisdictions and provide shore-based support. District headquarters were located in Ominato, Maizuru, Yokosuka,

Kure, and Sasebo.

MSDF recruits received three months of basic training followed

by courses in patrol, gunnery, mine sweeping, convoy operations,

and maritime transportation. Flight students, all upper-secondary

school graduates, entered a two-year course. Officer candidate

schools offered six-month courses to qualified enlisted personnel

and those who had completed flight school. Graduates of four-year

universities, the four-year National Defense Academy, and particularly outstanding enlisted personnel underwent a one-year officer course at the Officer Candidate School at Eta Jima (site of the

former Imperial Naval Academy). Special advanced courses for

officers were also available in such fields as submarine duty and

flight training. The MSDF operated its own staff college in Tokyo

for senior officers. The large volume of coastal commercial fishing and maritime

traffic limited in-service sea training, especially in the relatively

shallow waters required for mine laying, mine sweeping, and submarine rescue practice. Training days were scheduled around slack fishing seasons in winter and summer—providing about ten days

during the year. The MSDF maintained two oceangoing training

ships and conducted annual long-distance on-the-job training for graduates of the one-year officer candidate school.

The naval force's capacity to perform its defense missions varied

according to the task. MSDF training emphasized antisubmarine

and antiaircraft warfare. Defense planners believed the most ef- fective approach to combating submarines entailed mobilizing all available weapons, including surface combatants, submarines, air- craft, and helicopters, and the numbers and armament of these

weapons were being increased in the Mid-Term Defense Program.

A critical weakness remained, however, in the ability to defend

such weapons against air attack. Because most of the MSDF's air

arm was detailed to antisubmarine warfare, the ASDF had to be

relied on to provide air cover, an objective that competed unsuccessfully with the ASDF's primary mission of air defense of the

home islands. Extended patrols over sea lanes were also beyond

the ASDF's capabilities. The fleet's capacity to provide ship-based

anti-air-attack protection was limited by the absence of aircraft carriers and the inadequate number of shipborne long-range surfaceto-air missiles and close-range weapons. The fleet was also short

442
Maritime

Self-Defence Force ships on

patrol in Tokyo Bay

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

of underway replenishment ships and seriously deficient in all areas of logistic support (see table 40, Appendix). These weaknesses seri- ously compromised the ability of the MSDF to fulfill its mission

and to operate independently of the United States Air Force and

the United States Seventh Fleet. The Air Self-Defense Force

The ASDF was the major aviation arm of the SDF. It had an

authorized strength of 47,000 and maintained some 46,400 per- sonnel and approximately 390 combat aircraft in 1989. Front-line

formations included three ground-attack squadrons, nine fighter

squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and five transport

squadrons.

Major units of the ASDF were the Air Defense Command, the

Flight Support Command, Flying Training Command, Air Developing and Proving Command, and Air Materiel Command. The Air

Support Command was responsible for direct support of operational

forces in rescue, transportation, control, weather monitoring, and

inspection. The Flying Training Command was responsible for basic

flying and technical training. The Air Developing and Proving Command, in addition to overseeing equipment research and development, was also responsible for research and development in such

areas as flight medicine. The Air Defense Command had Northern, Central, and Western regional commands located at Misawa,

443
Japan: A Country Study

Iruma, and Kasuga, and a Southwestern Composite Air Division

based at Naha on Okinawa. All four regional headquarters controlled surface-to-air missile units of both the ASDF and the GSDF

located in their respective areas. For its air defense of the nation, the ASDF in 1989 maintained an integrated network of twenty-eight radar installations and air defense direction centers known as the Basic Air Defense Ground

Environment. In the late 1980s, the system was modernized and

augmented with E-2C airborne early-warning aircraft. The nation relied on fighter-interceptor aircraft and surface-toair missiles to intercept hostile aircraft. In 1989 both of these sys- tems were undergoing improvement. Outmoded aircraft were being

replaced with more sophisticated models, and Nike-J missiles were

being replaced with new Patriot systems (see table 41 , Appendix).

Essentially, however, the nation relied on United States forces to provide interceptor capability.

The ASDF also provided air support for ground and sea operations of the GSDF and the MSDF and air defense for bases of all the forces. Although support fighter squadrons were being modernized in 1989, they lacked precision- guided weapons for support

of ground operations and attacks on hostile ships, and ASDF pilots received little flight training over oceans to prepare for maritime operations. The ASDF had a poor base defense capability,

consisting mainly of outmoded antiaircraft guns and portable

shelters to house aircraft. Base defenses were being upgraded in

the late 1980s with new surface-to-air missiles, modern antiaircraft

artillery, and new fixed and mobile aircraft shelters. After passing an entrance examination, recruits could enter several training programs. Lower-secondary school graduates were

eligible to enter the ASDF's four-year youth cadet program to earn

upper-secondary school equivalency and NCO status, or they could

undergo twelve-week recruit training courses followed by technical training lasting from five to fifty weeks. Upper-secondary school

graduates could also enter either two-year NCO or four-year flight courses. Specialized training was available for all NCOs, as were

opportunities to enroll in officer and flight officer candidate courses. Graduates of the four-year National Defense Academy or four-year

universities received thirty to forty weeks of instruction in officer

candidate schools. Advanced technical, flight, and command staff officer programs were available for officers. Recruitment and Conditions of Service

The total authorized strength in the three branches of the SDF

was approximately 274,000 in 1989. In addition, the SDF maintained

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National Security

a total of about 48,000 reservists attached to the three services. Even

when Japan's active and reserve components were combined,

however, the country maintained a lower ratio of military personnel to its population than did any member nation of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact). Of the major Asian nations, only India

and Indonesia kept a lower ratio of personnel in arms. The SDF was an all- volunteer force. Conscription per se was

not forbidden by law, but many citizens considered Article 18 of

the Constitution, which proscribes involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime, as a legal prohibition of any form of conscription. Even in the absence of so strict an interpretation, however,

a military draft appeared politically impossible.

SDF uniformed personnel were recruited as private, E-l, sea- man recruit, and airman basic for a fixed term. Ground forces

recruits normally enlisted for two years; those seeking training in

technical specialties enlisted for three. Naval and air recruits nor- mally enlisted for three years. Officer candidates, students in the

National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College, and candidate enlisted students in technical schools were enrolled for an indefinite period. The National Defense Academy and

enlisted technical schools usually required an enrollment of four

years and the National Defense Medical College six years. When the SDF was originally formed, women were recruited

exclusively for the nursing services. Opportunities were expanded

somewhat when women were permitted to join the GSDF communication service in 1967 and the MSDF and ASDF communication services in 1974. In 1989 about 77 percent of service areas were open to women, and there were 4,924 women in the SDF:

1,046 nurses, 35 physicians, and 3,843 general service personnel.

In the face of some continued post-World War II public apathy

or antipathy toward the armed services, the SDF in 1990 had

difficulties in recruiting personnel. The forces had to compete for qualified personnel with well-paying industries and most enlistees were ''persuaded" volunteers who signed up after solicitation from

recruiters. Predominantly rural prefectures supplied military enlistees far beyond the proportions of their populations. In areas such

as southern Kyushu and Hokkaido, where employment opportunities were limited, recruiters were welcomed and supported by

the citizens. In contrast, little success or cooperation was encountered in urban centers such as Tokyo and Osaka.

Because the forces were all volunteer and legally civilian, members could resign at any time, and retention was a problem. Many

enlistees were lured away by the prospects of highly paying civilian

445
Japan: A Country Study

jobs, and Defense Agency officials complained of private industries looting their personnel. The agency attempted to stop these

practices by threats of sanctions for offending firms that held defense

contracts and by private agreements with major industrial firms.

Given the nation's labor shortage, however, the problem promised

to continue.

Some older officers considered the members of the modern forces unequal to personnel of the former Imperial Army and Imperial

Navy, but the SDF were generally regarded as professional and

able. Compared with their counterparts in other nations, members of the SDF were remarkably well educated and in good physical condition. Literacy was universal, and school training extensive.

Personnel were trained in the martial arts, judo and kendo, and physical standards were strict. The SDF probably did not attract the same high level of personnel as other institutions in Japan. Graduates of the top universities rarely entered the armed forces, and

applicants to the National Defense Academy were generally considered to be on the level of those who applied to second-rank local universities.

In 1990 general conditions of military life were not such that a career in the SDF seemed an attractive alternative to one in pri- vate industry or the bureaucracy. The conditions of service provided

less dignity, prestige, and comfort than they had before World War

II, and for most members of the defense establishment, military

life offered less status than did a civilian occupation. Those people

who entered the SDF were often unfairly perceived by the citizenry as unable to find a better job.

As special civil servants, SDF personnel were paid according to

civilian pay scales that did not always distinguish rank. At times

SDF salaries were greater for subordinates than for commanding

officers; senior NCOs with long service could earn more than newly

promoted colonels. Pay raises were not included in Defense Agency

budgets and could not be established by military planners. Retirement ages for officers below flag rank ranged from fifty-three to

fifty-five years, and from fifty to fifty-three for enlisted personnel.

Limits were sometimes extended because of personnel shortages. In the late 1980s, the Defense Agency, concerned about the difficulty

of finding appropriate postretirement employment for these early

retirees, provided vocational training for enlisted personnel about

to retire and transferred them to units close to the place where they

intended to retire. Beginning in October 1987, the Self-Defense

Forces Job Placement Association provided free job placement and

reemployment support for retired SDF personnel. Retirees also received pensions immediately upon retirement, some ten years

446
National Security

earlier than most civil service personnel. Financing the retirement

system promised to be a problem of increasing scope in the 1990s,

with the aging of the population.

SDF personnel benefits were not comparable to such benefits

for active-duty military personnel in other major industrialized nations. Health care was provided at the SDF Central Hospital, 14

regional hospitals, and 165 clinics in military facilities and on board

ship, but only covered physical examinations and the treatment

of illness and injury suffered in the course of duty. There were no

commissary or exchange privileges. Housing was often substandard, and military appropriations for facilities maintenance often

focused on appeasing civilian communities near bases rather than on improving on-base facilities. Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

In 1990 uniforms in all three SDF branches were similar in style to those worn by United States forces. GSDF uniforms were grayblue; MSDF personnel wore traditional blue dress, white service,

and khaki work uniforms; and ASDF personnel wore the lighter

shade of blue worn by the United States Air Force. The arm of

service to which members of the ground force were attached was

indicated by piping of distinctive colors: for infantry, red; artillery,

yellow; armor, orange; engineers, violet; ordnance, light green;

medical, green; army aviation, light blue; signals, blue; quartermaster, brown; transportation, dark violet; airborne, white; and

others, dark blue. The cap badge insignia for all displayed a dove

of peace.

There were nine officer ranks in the active SDF, along with a warrant officer rank; five NCO ranks; and three enlisted ranks (see

fig. 14). The highest NCO rank, first sergeant (senior chief petty

officer in the MSDF and senior master sergeant in the ASDF), was

established in 1 980 to provide more promotion opportunities and

shorter terms of service as sergeant first class, chief petty officer, or master sergeant. Under the earlier system, the average NCO

was promoted only twice in approximately thirty years of service

and remained at the top rank for almost ten years. Defense Spending

According to Japanese security policy, maintaining a military

establishment was only one method—and by no means the best—to achieve national security. Diplomacy, economic aid and development, and a close relationship with the United States under the

terms of the 1960 security treaty were all considered more important. Even in the 1980s, defense spending was accorded a relatively

447
Japan: A Country Study

448
National Security

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Japan: A Country Study

low priority. For FY 1986 through FY 1990, defense's share of the

general budget was around 6.5 percent, as compared to approximately 28 percent for the United States. In 1987 Japan ranked sixth

in the world in total defense expenditures behind the Soviet Union,

the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West

Germany), and Britain. By 1989 it ranked third after the United

States and the Soviet Union, mainly because of the increased value

of the yen.

In addition to annual budgets, the Defense Agency prepared a

series of cabinet-approved build-up plans beginning in 1957, which

set goals for specific task capabilities and established procurement

targets to achieve them. Under the first three plans (for 1958-60,

1962-66, and 1967-71), funding priorities were set to establish the

ability to counter limited aggression. Economic difficulties following the 1973 oil crisis, however, caused major problems in achieving the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-76) and forced funding

to be cut, raising questions about the basic concepts underlying

defense policies (see Monetary and Fiscal Policy, ch. 4). In 1976 the government recognized that substantial increases in

spending, personnel, and bases would be virtually impossible. In- stead a "standard defense concept" was suggested, one stressing

qualitative improvements in the SDF, rather than quantitative ones.

It was decided that defense spending would focus on achieving a

basic level of defense as set forth in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline. Thereafter, the government ceased to offer buildup

plans that alarmed the public by their seemingly open-ended nature and switched to reliance on single fiscal year formulas that

offered explicit, attainable goals.

Defense spending increased slightly during the late 1970s, and

in the 1980s only the defense and Official Development Assistance

budgets were allowed to increase in real terms. In 1985 the Defense

Agency developed the Mid-Term Defense Estimate objectives for FY 1986 through FY 1990, to improve SDF front-line equipment

and upgrade logistic support systems. For the GSDF, these measures included the purchase of advanced weapons and equipment

to improve antitank, artillery, ground-to- sea firepower, and mobile capabilities. For the MSDF, the focus was on upgrading antisubmarine capabilities, with the purchase of new destroyer escorts equipped with the Aegis system and SH-60J antisubmarine heli- copters, and on improving antimine warfare and air defense sys- tems. ASDF funds were concentrated on the purchase of fighter

aircraft and rescue helicopters. The entire cost of the Mid-Term

Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 was projected at

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National Security

approximately ¥18.4 trillion (approximately US$83.2 billion, at the 1985 exchange rate).

In FY 1989 the ¥3.9 trillion defense budget accounted for 6.49

percent of the total budget, 1 .006 percent of the GNP. In addition

to the Defense Agency itself, the defense budget supported the

Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the Security Council. Defense Agency funding covered GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF,

and the internal bureaus, the Joint Staff Council, the the National

Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Technical Research and

Development Institute, and the Central Procurement Office.

The FY 1990 defense budget, at 0.997 percent of the forecasted

GNP, dipped below the 1 percent level for the first time since it was reached in 1987. But the more than ¥4.1 trillion budget still marked a 6.1 percent increase over the FY 1989 defense budget

and provided virtually all of the ¥104 billion requested for research

and development, including substantial funds for guided-missile

and communications technologies. Although some ¥34.6 billion was authorized over several years for joint Japan-United States research and development of the experimental FSX fighter plane,

disputes over this project were believed to have convinced the

Defense Agency to strengthen the capability of the domestic arms

industry and increase its share of SDF contracts. After originally

being cut, funds were also restored for thirty advanced model tanks

and the last Aegis multiple-targeting-equipped destroyer escort needed to complete the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. The 6. 1 per- cent defense increase was accompanied by an even larger (8.2 percent) increase in Official Development Assistance funding.

Officials resisted United States pressure to agree formally that

Japan would support more of the cost of maintaining United States troops, claiming that such a move would require revision of agreements between the two nations. But in FY 1989 the Japanese

government contributed US$2.4 billion—roughly 40 percent—of

the total cost. The contribution slated for FY 1990 was increased

to US$2.8 billion—nearly 10 percent of the total defense budget

and by the end of FY 1 990 the Japanese government expected to assume all expenses for utilities and building maintenance costs

for United States troops stationed in Japan.

The Defense Industry

Dismantled by occupation authorities after World War II, ar- maments production resumed in 1952 when the nation's manufacturers began repairing and maintaining equipment for United States

forces operating in Asia. Individual producers emerged as affiliates

451
Japan: A Country Study

of larger industrial conglomerates, including the former zaibatsu

(see Glossary) of Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. After 1954 the defense

industry began to arm the SDF, at first making only slight improvements on United States-designed equipment manufactured for local use. The Japanese defense industry received about US$10 billion

worth of advanced technology from the United States between 1950

and 1983.

In July 1970, Defense Agency Director General Nakasone Yasuhiro established five objectives for the defense industry: to maintain Japan's industrial base for national security, to acquire

equipment from Japan's domestic research and development and

production efforts, to use civilian industries for domestic arms

production, to set long-term goals for research and development

and production, and to introduce competition into defense production. By the late 1970s, indigenous suppliers had developed and

produced an almost complete range of modern equipment, including aircraft, tanks, artillery, and major surface and underwater

naval combatants. Certain types of highly sophisticated weaponry,

including F-15 fighters, P-3C Orion antisubmarine aircraft, and

8-inch howitzers, were produced under license. Except for the most

complex and costiy items, such as the E-2C airborne early-warning

aircraft, little was purchased complete from foreign suppliers.

Over 25 percent of the ¥18.4 trillion Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through 1990 was allocated for equipment

procurement, most of it domestically produced; but the most lucrative defense contract was for the FSX. Envisioned as a successor

to the F-l support fighter in the ASDF inventory, the FSX was

expected to take ten years to develop at an estimated cost of ¥200

billion. In October 1985, the Defense Agency began by considering three development options for the FSX: domestic development,

adoption of an existing domestic model, or adoption of a foreign

model. The agency originally favored domestic development. But

by late 1986, after consultation and much pressure from the United

States, it decided to consider a coproduction agreement with the

United States. And in October 1987, Japanese and United States defense officials meeting in Washington decided on a joint project

to remodel either the F-15 or the F-l 6. The Defense Agency se- lected the F-16. Once the agreement was reached, it came under

heavy criticism from members of the United States Congress

concerned about loss of key United States technologies and technological leadership, risks ofJapanese commercialization of technology at United States expense, and insufficient work share for American firms. As a result of the controversy, in early 1989 the

United States demanded and obtained a review and revision of the

452
F-15J interceptor at airbase in Fukuoka Prefecture Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

agreement, restricting technology transfer and specifying that

American firms would receive 40 percent of the work. The controversy left bitterness on both sides, and Japanese industrialists,

convinced that a Japanese-designed and Japanese-developed FSX

would be superior to a modified F-16 codeveloped by Japan and

the United States and irritated at United States pressure to renegotiate an agreement they considered already favorable to the United

States, seemed in 1990 to be inclined to go it alone on future

weapons research.

In the late 1980s, the defense industry, limited by the lack of

research and development, inadequate testing equipment, restricted exports, and no economies of scale, accounted for only 0.5 per- cent of Japan's total industrial output. The Defense Production

Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keizai

Dantai Rengokai—Keidanren) was an important element in defense

production, negotiating with the Defense Agency and coordinating activities among defense firms. Keidanren disseminated defense

information and informally limited competition by promoting agree- ments between companies. Nearly 60 percent ofJapanese defense

contracts were awarded to five large corporations: Mitsubishi Heavy

Industries, Toshiba Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy

Industries Corporation. Competition for contracts nonetheless in- tensified in the 1980s, as larger portions of the defense budget were

allotted to procurement. But for the Japanese defense industry to become efficient it had to depend on economies of scale that could

only be achieved through export. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy

Industries indicated an interest in the arms export market when

it changed its articles of incorporation to include arms in its list of products in June 1987 and later asked that weapons export

453
Japan: A Country Study

restrictions be eased during the 1990s. A secret memorandum cir- culating among defense contractors in 1988 estimated that lifting

the export ban (that existed by general interpretation of Article 9

of the Constitution) would result in Japan's capturing 45 percent

of the world tank and self-propelled artillery market, 40 percent

of military electronic sales, and 60 percent of naval ship construction. In 1989 a Keidanren committee headed by Kanamori Masao,

chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, called for increasing

defense research and development to 5 percent of the total defense

budget. The FY 1990 defense budget allotted approximately 2 per- cent for this purpose. In the 1990s, Japanese corporations might

be expected to market mainly dual-use electronics subcomponents,

vehicles, and transport and communications equipment offshore or through front companies and to provide components for missiles and aircraft produced overseas, especially in the United States. Military Relations with the United States

The 1952 Mutual Security Assistance Pact provided the initial basis for the nation's security relations with the United States (see

World War II and the Occupation, 1941-52, ch. 1; Relations with

the United States, ch. 7). The pact was replaced in 1960 by the

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which declares that

both nations will maintain and develop their capacities to resist armed attack in common and that each recognizes that an armed

attack on either one in territories administered by Japan will be

considered dangerous to the safety of the other. The Agreed Minutes

to the treaty specified that the Japanese government must be consulted prior to major changes in United States force deployment

in Japan or to the use ofJapanese bases for combat operations other

than in defense of Japan itself. However, Japan was relieved by

its constitutional prohibition of participating in external military

operations from any obligation to defend the United States if it were attacked outside ofJapanese territories. In 1990 the Japanese

government expressed its intention to continue to rely on the treaty's

arrangements to guarantee national security.

The Agreed Minutes under Article 6 of the 1 960 treaty contain a status-of-forces agreement on the stationing of United States forces in Japan, with specifics on the provision of facilities and areas for their use and on the administration ofJapanese citizens employed on the facilities. Also covered are the limits of the two countries'

jurisdictions over crimes committed in Japan by United States mili- tary personnel.

The Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952 initially involved

a military aid program that provided for Japan's acquisition of

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National Security

funds, materiel, and services for the nation's essential defense.

Although Japan no longer received any aid from the United States by the 1960s, the agreement continued to serve as the basis for purchase and licensing agreements assuring interoperability of the two

nations' weapons and for the release of classified data to Japan,

including both international intelligence reports and classified technical information.

A major issue for military relations between the two nations was

resolved in 1972 when the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa,

reverted to Japanese control, and the provisions of the 1960 security treaty were extended to cover them. The United States retained

the right to station forces in these islands. In 1990, 30,000 United

States troops still occupied 20 percent of Okinawa's land, a source

of friction with the local population. Military relations improved

after the mid-1970s. In the early 1960s, a Security Consultative

Committee, with representatives from both countries, had been

set up under the 1960 security treaty to discuss and coordinate security matters concerning both nations. In 1976 a subcommittee of

that body prepared the Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense

Cooperation that were approved by the full committee in 1978 and

later approved by the National Defense Council and cabinet. The

guidelines authorized unprecedented activities in joint defense planning, response to an armed attack on Japan, and for cooperation on situations in Asia and the Pacific region that could affect Japan's

security.

Under the framework of the guidelines, the Japanese Joint Staff

Council and the commander of United States Forces, Japan, drew

up a long-range program for joint exercises to encompass all three

services of both nations. Every year during the 1980s, the GSDF

conducted command post and field-training exercises involving units

from each of the regional armies in combined training with United

States forces. Although the MSDF had participated in exercises

with the United States Navy since 1955, in 1980 Japan, in an unprecedented move, permitted a task force of ships and aircraft to train in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) comprehensive naval

exercise with naval forces from the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Japan also participated in RIMPAC '88

with eight destroyers and frigates, one submarine, eight P-3C anti- submarine aircraft, and one supply ship. The ASDF also conducted numerous air defense, fighter, rescue, and command post training exercises with United States Air Force units. In 1990 over 50,000 members of the United States armed forces were stationed in Japan, including almost 24,000 marines, 16,200

air force personnel, 8,100 members of the navy, and 2,400 army

455
Japan: A Country Study

personnel, who were deployed at several locations on Honshu,

Kyushu, and Okinawa. These numbers represented a substantial

increase—more than 10 percent—over 1980 figures, but the number

of United States troops maintained on Japanese soil was expected

to be reduced to the 1980 level by 1993.

Public Order and Internal Security

Conditions of public order in 1990 compared favorably with those

in other industrialized countries. The overall crime rate was low

by North American and West European standards and had shown

a general decline since the mid-1960s. The incidence of violent crime was especially low, owing in part to effective enforcement of strin- gent firearms control laws. Problems of particular concern were

those associated with a modern industralized nation, including

juvenile delinquency, traffic control, and white-collar crime.

Civil disorders occurred from the early 1950s, chiefly in Tokyo,

but did not seriously threaten the internal security of the state. Far

less frequent after the early 1970s, they were in all cases effectively

countered by efficient and well-trained police units employing the

most sophisticated techniques of riot control.

In 1990 the police were an apolitical body under the general su- pervision of independent agencies, free of direct central government executive control. They were checked by an independent

judiciary and monitored by a free and active press. The police were

generally well respected and could rely on considerable public

cooperation in their work.

Officials involved in the criminal justice system were usually

highly trained professionals interested in preventing crime and re- habilitating offenders. They were allowed considerable discretion

in dealing with legal infractions and in 1 990 appeared to deserve

the trust and respect accorded to them by the general public. Constitutionally guaranteed rights of habeas corpus, protection against

self-incrimination, and the inadmissability of confessions obtained

under duress were enforced by criminal procedures.

The prison system in 1990 was generally modern and conducted

from the viewpoint of resocialization. Prisoners were treated on

an individualized basis, and education was emphasized. Special

attention was given to juvenile offenders who were normally housed

separately from adult prisoners. A well-organized parole and probation program employed numerous citizen volunteers.

The Police System

The Japanese government established a European-style civil police system in 1874, under the centralized control of the Police

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Bureau within the Home Ministry, to put down internal disturbances and maintain order during the Meiji Restoration. By the

1880s, the police had developed as a nationwide instrument of

government control, providing support for local leaders and enforcing public morality. They acted as general civil administrators,

implementing official policies, and thereby facilitating unification

and modernization. In rural areas especially, the police had great

authority and were accorded the same mixture of fear and respect

as the village head. Their increasing involvement in political af- fairs was one of the foundations of the authoritarian state in Japan

in the first half of the twentieth century.

The centralized police system steadily acquired responsibilities,

until it controlled almost all aspects of daily life, including fire prevention and mediation of labor disputes. The system regulated

public health, business, factories, and construction, and issued per- mits and licenses. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 gave police

the authority to arrest people for ' 'wrong thoughts. ' ' Special Higher

Police were created to regulate motion pictures, political meetings,

and election campaigns. Military police operating under the army

and navy and the justice and home ministries aided the civilian

police in limiting proscribed political activity. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931 , military police assumed more authority, leading to friction with their civilian counterparts (see World War II, this ch.). After 1937 police directed business activities for the war

effort, mobilized labor, and controlled transportation.

After Japan's surrender in 1945, occupation authorities retained

the prewar police structure until a new system was implemented

and the Diet passed the 1947 Police Law. Contrary to Japanese

proposals for a strong, centralized force to deal with postwar unrest, the police system was decentralized. About 1,600 independent municipal forces were established in cities, towns, and villages

with 5,000 inhabitants or more, and a National Rural Police was

organized by prefecture. Civilian control was to be ensured by placing the police under the jurisdiction of public safety commissions

controlled by the National Public Safety Commission in the Office

of the Prime Minister. The Home Ministry was abolished and

replaced by the less powerful Ministry of Home Affairs, and the

police were stripped of their responsibility for fire protection, public

health, and other administrative duties.

When most occupation forces were transferred to Korea in

1950-51, the 75,000 strong National Police Reserve was formed

to back up the ordinary police during civil disturbances, and pres- sure mounted for a centralized system more compatible with

Japanese political preferences. The 1947 Police Law was amended

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Japan: A Country Study

in 1951 to allow the municipal police of smaller communities to merge with the National Rural Police. Most chose this arrangement, and by 1954 only about 400 cities, towns, and villages still had their own police forces. Under the 1954 amended Police Law,

a final restructuring created an even more centralized system in

which local forces were organized by prefectures under a National

Police Agency.

The revised Police Law of 1954, still in effect in 1990, preserved some strong points of the postwar system, particularly measures

ensuring civilian control and political neutrality, while allowing

for increased centralization. The National Public Safety Commission system was retained. State responsibility for maintaining public

order was clarified to include coordination of national and local

efforts, centralization of police information, communications, and

recordkeeping facilities, and national standards for training, uniforms, pay, rank, and promotion. Rural and municipal forces were

abolished and integrated into prefectural forces, which handled basic

police matters. Officials and inspectors in various ministries and

agencies continued to exercise special police functions assigned to them in the 1947 Police Law.

National Organization

In 1990 the mission of the National Public Safety Commission

was to guarantee the neutrality of the police by insulating the force

from political pressure and to ensure the maintenance of democratic

methods in police administration. The commission's primary function was to supervise the National Police Agency, and it had the

authority to appoint or dismiss senior police officers (see fig. 15).

The commission consisted of a chairman, who held the rank of

minister of state, and five members appointed by the prime minister

with the consent of both houses of the Diet. The commission operated independently of the cabinet, but liaison and coordination with

it were facilitated by the chairman's being a member of that body.

As the central coordinating body for the entire police system,

the National Police Agency determined general standards and policies; detailed direction of operations was left to the lower echelons.

In a national emergency or large-scale disaster, the agency was

authorized to take command of prefectural police forces. In 1989

the agency was composed of around 1,100 national civil servants,

empowered to collect information and to formulate and execute

national policies. The agency was headed by a commissioner general who was appointed by the National Public Safety Commission with the approval of the prime minister. The central office included the Secretariat, with divisions for general operations,

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National Security

planning, information, finance, management, and procurement

and distribution of police equipment, and five bureaus. The Police

Administration Bureau was concerned with police personnel, education, welfare, training, and unit inspections. The Criminal In- vestigation Bureau was in charge of research statistics and the

investigation of nationally important and international cases. This

bureau's Safety Department was responsible for crime prevention,

combating juvenile delinquency, and pollution control. In addition, the Criminal Investigation Bureau surveyed, formulated, and

recommended legislation on firearms, explosives, food, drugs, and

narcotics. The Communications Bureau supervised police communications systems.

The Traffic Bureau licensed drivers, enforced traffic safety laws,

and regulated traffic. Intensive traffic safety and driver education

campaigns were run at both national and prefectural levels. The

bureau's Expressway Division addressed special conditions of the

nation's growing system of express highways.

The Security Bureau formulated and supervised the execution

of security policies. It conducted research on equipment and tactics for suppressing riots and oversaw and coordinated activities of the riot police. The Security Bureau was also responsible for security intelligence on foreigners and radical political groups, in- cluding investigation of violations of the Alien Registration Law

and administration of the Entry and Exit Control Law. The bureau

also implemented security policies during national emergencies and

natural disasters.

In 1990 the National Police Agency maintained seven regional

police bureaus, each responsible for a number of prefectures.

Metropolitan Tokyo and the island of Hokkaido were excluded from

these regional jurisdictions and run more autonomously than other

local forces, in the case of Tokyo, because of its special urban situ- ation, and of Hokkaido, because of its distinctive geography (see

Geographic Regions, ch. 2). The National Police Agency maintained police communications divisions in these two areas to handle any coordination needed between national and local forces. Local Organization

In 1987 there were 223,000 police officers nationwide, most

affiliated with local police forces. Local forces included fortythree prefectural {ken) police forces; one metropolitan (to) police

force, in Tokyo; two urban prefectural (fit) police forces, in Osaka

and Kyoto; and one district (do) police force, in Hokkaido. These

forces had limited authority to initiate police actions. Their most

important activities were regulated by the National Police Agency,

459
Japan: A Country Study

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National Security

which provided funds for equipment, salaries, riot, escort, and

natural disaster duties, and internal security and multiple jurisdiction cases. National police statutes and regulations established

the strength and rank allocations of all local personnel and the

locations of local police stations. Prefectural police financed and

controlled the patrol officer on the beat, traffic control, criminal

investigations, and other daily operations.

Each prefectural police headquarters contained administrative

divisions corresponding to those of the bureaus of the National

Police Agency. Headquarters were staffed by specialists in basic

police functions and administration and were commanded by an

officer appointed by the local Office of the National Public Safety

Commission. Most arrests and investigations were performed by

prefectural police officials (and in large jurisdictions, by police as- signed to substations), who were assigned to one or more central

locations within the prefecture. Experienced officers were organized

into functional bureaus and handled all but the most ordinary

problems in their fields. Below these stations, police boxes {koban)—substations near major

transportation hubs and shopping areas and in residential

districts—formed the first line of police response to the public. In

the late 1980s, about 20 percent of the total police force was as- signed to koban. Staffed by three or more officers working in eighthour shifts, they served as a base for foot patrols and usually had

both sleeping and eating facilities for officers on duty but not on

watch. In rural areas, residential offices usually were staffed by

one police officer who resided in adjacent family quarters. These

officers endeavored to become a part of the community, and their

families often aided in performing official tasks. Officers assigned to koban had intimate knowledge of their jurisdictions. One of their primary tasks was to conduct twice-yearly

house-by-house residential surveys of homes in their areas, at which

time the head of the household at each address filled out a resi- dence information card detailing the names, ages, occupations, busi- ness addresses, and vehicle registration numbers of household

occupants and the names of relatives living elsewhere. Police took

special note of names of the aged or those living alone who might

need special attention in an emergency. They conducted surveys

of local businesses and recorded employee names and addresses,

in addition to such data as which establishments stayed open late and which employees might be expected to work late. Participation in the survey was voluntary, and most citizens cooperated,

but in the late 1980s an increasing segment of the population had come to regard the surveys as invasions of privacy.

461
Japan: A Country Study

Information elicited through the surveys was not centralized but was stored in each police box, where it was used primarily as an

aid to locating people. When a crime occurred or an investigation was underway, however, these files were invaluable in establishing background data for a case. Specialists from district police sta- tions spent considerable time culling through the usually poorly

filed data maintained in the police boxes.

Riot Police

Within their security divisions, each prefectural level police

department and the Tokyo police maintained special riot units.

These units were formed after riots at the Imperial Palace in 1952,

to respond quickly and effectively to large public disturbances. They

were also used in crowd control during festival periods, at times

of natural disaster, and to reinforce regular police when necessary.

Full-time riot police could also be augmented by regular police

trained in riot duties.

In handling demonstrations and violent disturbances, riot units were deployed en masse, military style. It was common practice

for files of riot police to line streets through which demonstrations

passed. If demonstrators grew disorderly or deviated from officially

countenanced areas, riot police stood shoulder-to- shoulder, sometimes three and four deep, to push with their hands to control the

crowds. Individual action was forbidden. Three-person units sometimes performed reconnaissance duties, but more often operations were carried out by squads of nine to eleven, platoons of twentyseven to thirty-three, and companies of eighty to one hundred. Front

ranks were trained to open to allow passage of special squads to rescue captured police or to engage in tear gas assaults. Each per- son wore a radio with an earpiece to hear commands given simultaneously to the formation.

The riot police were committed to using disciplined, nonlethal

force and carried no firearms. They were trained to take pride in

their poise under stress. Demonstrators also were usually restrained

(see Civil Disturbances, this ch.). Police brutality was rarely an

issue. When excesses occurred, the perpetrator was disciplined and

sometimes transferred from the force if considered unable to keep

his temper.

Extensive experience in quelling violent disorders led to the development of special uniforms and equipment for the riot police

units. In the 1980s, riot dress consisted of a field-type jacket, which

covered several pieces of body armor and included a corselet hung

from the waist, an aluminum plate down the backbone, and shoulder pads. Armored gauntlets covered the hands and forearms.

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National Security

Helmets had faceplates and flared padded skirts down the back to protect the neck. In case of violence, the front ranks carried

1 .2-meter shields to protect against staves and rocks and held nets on high poles to catch flying objects. Specially designed equipment

included water cannons, armored vans, and mobile tunnels for protected entry into seized buildings.

Because riot police duties required special group action, units were maintained in virtually self-sufficient compounds and trained

to work as a coordinated force. The overwhelming majority of

officers were bachelors who lived in dormitories within riot police

compounds. Training was constant and focused on physical

conditioning, mock battles, and tactical problems. A military at- mosphere prevailed—dress codes, behavior standards, and rank

differentiations were more strictly adhered to than in the regular

police. Esprit de corps was inculcated with regular ceremonies and

institutionalization of rituals such as applauding personnel dis- patched to or returning from assignments and formally welcoming senior officers to the mess hall at all meals.

Riot duty was not popular because it entailed special sacrifices and much boredom in between irregularly spaced actions. Although

many police were assigned riot duty, only a few were volunteers.

For many personnel, riot duty served as a stepping stone because

of its reputation and the opportunities it presented to study for the

advanced police examinations necessary for promotion. Because

riot duties demanded physical fitness—the armored uniform

weighed 6.6 kilograms—most personnel were young, often serv- ing in the units after an initial assignment in a koban. Special Police

In addition to regular police officers, there were several thousand officials attached to various agencies who performed special

duties relating to public safety. They were responsible for such matters as railroad security, forest preservation, narcotics control, fish- ery inspection, and enforcement of regulations on maritime, labor,

and mine safety.

In 1990, the largest and most important of these ministrysupervised public safety agencies was the Maritime Safety Agency, an external bureau of the Ministry of Transportation established

to deal with crime in coastal waters and to maintain facilities for safeguarding navigation. The agency operated a fleet of patrol and

rescue craft in addition to a few aircraft used primarily for antismuggling patrols and rescue activities. In the mid-1980s, the Maritime Safety Agency annually rescued around 500 people and

arrested another 500 for violations of fishing and smuggling laws.

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Japan: A Country Study

Other agencies with limited public safety functions included the

Labor Standards Inspection Office of the Ministry of Labor, rail- road police of Japan Railways Group, immigration agents of the

Ministry ofJustice, postal inspectors of the Ministry of Posts and

Telecommunications, and revenue inspectors in the Ministry of

Finance.

A small intelligence agency, the Public Security Investigation

Office of the Ministry of Justice, handled national security matters both inside and outside the country. Its activities were not

generally known to the public.

Police-Community Relations

Despite legal limits on police jurisdiction, many citizens retained

their views of the police as authority figures to whom they could

turn for aid. The public often sought police assistance to settle family quarrels, counsel juveniles, and mediate minor disputes. Citizens

regularly consulted police for directions to hotels and residences—an

invaluable service in cities where streets were often unnamed and

buildings were numbered in the order in which they had been built

rather than consecutively. Police were encouraged by their superiors

to view these tasks as answering the public's demands for service

and as inspiring community confidence in the police. Public atti- tudes toward the police were generally favorable, although a se- ries of incidents of forced confessions in the late 1980s raised some

concern about police treatment of suspects held for pretrial detention.

Conditions of Service

Education was highly stressed in police recruitment and promotion. Entrance to the force in the late 1980s was determined by ex- aminations administered by each prefecture. Examinees were divided

into two groups: upper-secondary-school graduates and university

graduates. In 1985 there were ten examinees with upper-secondary

diplomas and six with university degrees for every job opening.

Recruits underwent rigorous training—one year for upper-secondary-school graduates and six months for university graduates—at the residential police academy attached to the prefectural headquarters. On completion of basic training, most police officers were as- signed to local police boxes. Promotion was achieved by examination

and required further course work. In-service training provided mandatory continuing education in more than 100 fields. Police officers with upper-secondary-school diplomas were eligible to take the ex- amination for sergeant after three years of on-the-job experience.

University graduates could take the examination after only one year. University graduates were also eligible to take the examination for

464
Policewoman directing traffic in Tokyo

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

assistant police inspector, police inspector, and superintendent after shorter periods than upper-secondary-school graduates. There were

usually five to fifteen examinees for each opening.

About fifteen officers per year passed advanced civil service ex- aminations and were admitted as senior officers. Officers were groomed for administrative positions and, although some rose through the ranks to become senior administrators, most such positions were held by specially recruited senior executives.

The police forces were subject to external oversight. Although

officials of the National Public Safety Commission generally

deferred to police decisions and rarely exercised their powers to check police actions or operations, police were liable for civil and

criminal prosecution, and the media actively publicized police misdeeds. The Human Rights Bureau of the Ministry ofJustice solic- ited and investigated complaints against public officials, including

police, and prefectural legislatures could summon police chiefs for questioning. Social sanctions and peer pressure also constrained

police behavior. As in other occupational groups in Japan, police

officers developed an allegiance to their own group and a reluc- tance to offend its principles.

The Criminal Justice System

Three basic features of the nation's system of criminal justice

characterized its operations in 1990. First, the institutions—police,

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Japan: A Country Study

government prosecutor's offices, courts, and correctional organs

maintained close and cooperative relations with each other, consulting frequently on how best to accomplish the shared goals of

limiting and controlling crime. Second, citizens were encouraged

to assist in maintaining public order and they participated extensively in crime prevention campaigns, apprehension of suspects,

and offender rehabilitation programs. Finally, officials who administered criminal justice were allowed considerable discretion in

dealing with offenders.

Until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the criminal justice system was controlled mainly by daimyo (see Rule of Shogun and Daimyo,

ch. 1). Public officials, not laws, guided and constrained people

to conform to moral norms. In accordance with the Confucian ideal,

officials were to serve as models of behavior; the people, who lacked

rights and had only obligations, were expected to obey. Such laws

as did exist were transmitted through local military officials in the

form of local domain laws. Specific enforcement varied from domain to domain, and no formal penal codes existed. Justice was

generally harsh, and severity depended upon one's status. Kin and

neighbors could share blame for an offender's guilt: whole families and villages could be flogged or put to death for one member's

transgression.

After 1868 the justice system underwent rapid transformation.

The first publicly promulgated legal codes, the Penal Code of 1880

and the Code of Criminal Instruction of 1880, were based on French

models. Offenses were specified, and set punishments were established for particular crimes. Both codes were innovative in that they

treated all citizens as equals, provided for centralized administration of criminal justice, and prohibited punishment by ex post facto law. Guilt was held to be personal; collective guilt and guilt by as- sociation were abolished. Offenses against the emperor were spelled

out for the first time.

Innovative aspects of the codes notwithstanding, certain provisions reflected traditional attitudes toward authority. The prosecutor represented the state and sat with the judge on a raised

platform—his position above the defendant and the defense counsel suggesting their relative status. Under a semi-inquisitorial sys- tem, primary responsibility for questioning witnesses lay with the

judge, and defense counsel could question witnesses only through

the judge. Cases were referred to trial only after a judge presided over a preliminary fact-finding investigation in which the suspect was not permitted counsel. Because in all trials available evidence

had already convinced the court in a preliminary procedure, the

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National Security

defendant's legal presumption of innocence at trial was undermined

and the legal recourse open to his counsel was further weakened.

The Penal Code was substantially revised in 1907 to reflect the

growing influence of German law in Japan, and the French practice of classifying offenses into three types was eliminated. More

importantly, where the old code had allowed very limited judicial

discretion, the new one permitted the judge to apply a wide range

of subjective factors in sentencing.

After World War II, occupation authorities initiated reform of

the Constitution and laws in general. Except for omitting offenses

relating to war, the imperial family, and adultery, the 1947 Penal

Code remains virtually identical to the 1907 version. The criminal procedure code, however, was substantially revised to incorporate rules guaranteeing the rights of the accused. The system

became almost completely accusatorial, and the judge, although

still able to question witnesses, decided a case on evidence presented

by both sides. The preliminary investigative procedure was suppressed. The prosecutor and defense counsel sat on equal levels,

below the judge. Laws on indemnification of the wrongly accused,

juveniles, prisons, probation, and minor offenses were also passed

in the postwar years to supplement criminal justice administration.

Crime

The National Police Agency divided crime into six main categories. Felonious offenses—the most serious and carrying the stiffest penalties—included murder and conspiracy to murder, robbery,

rape, and arson. Violent offenses consisted of unlawful assembly

while possessing dangerous weapons, simple and aggravated assault, extortion, and intimidation. Larceny encompassed burglary,

vehicle theft, and shoplifting. Crimes classified as intellectual in- cluded fraud, embezzlement, counterfeiting, forgery, bribery, and

breach of trust. Moral offenses included gambling, indecent ex- posure, and the distribution of obscene literature. Miscellaneous

offenses frequently involved the obstruction of official duties, negligence with fire, unauthorized entry, negligent homicide or injury

(often in traffic accidents), possession of stolen property, and destruction of property. Special laws defined other criminal offenses,

among them prostitution, illegal possession of swords and firearms,

customs violations, and possession of controlled substances including

narcotics and marijuana.

In 1986 the police identified over 2.1 million Penal Code violations. Two types of violations—larceny (64.7 percent of total violations) and negligent homicide or injury as a result of accidents

(25.6 percent)—accounted for over 90 percent of criminal offenses

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Japan: A Country Study

in Japan in 1986. Major crimes occurred in Japan at a very low

rate. Japan experienced 1 .6 robberies per 100,000 population, compared with 46.8 for West Germany, 60.1 for Britain, and 225.1

for the United States; and 1.4 murders per 100,000 population,

compared with 4.5 for West Germany, 4.3 for Britain, and 8.6

for the United States. Japanese authorities also solved a high per- centage of robbery cases (78.5 percent compared with 48.4 per- cent for West Germany, 20.4 percent for Britain, and 24.7 percent

for the United States) and homicide cases (96.7 percent compared

with 93.9 percent for West Germany, 76.7 percent for Britain, and

70.2 percent for the United States).

An important factor keeping crime low was the traditional emphasis on the individual as a member of groups to which he or she

must not bring shame. Within these groups—family, friends, as- sociates at work or school—a Japanese had social rights and obli- gations, derived valued emotional support, and met powerful

expectations to conform. In 1990 these informal social sanctions

continued to display remarkable potency despite competing values

in a changing society. Other important factors keeping the crime

rate low were the prosperous economy and a strict and effective

weapons control law. Ownership of handguns was forbidden to the

public, hunting rifles and ceremonial swords were registered with

the police, and the manufacture and sale of firearms were regulated. The production and sale of live and blank ammunition were

also controlled, as were the transportation and importation of all weapons. In the late 1980s, crimes were seldom committed with

firearms.

Despite Japan's status as a modern, urban nation—a condition

linked by many criminologists to growing rates of crime—the nation did not suffer from steadily rising levels of criminal activity.

Although crime continued to be higher in urban areas, in the 1980s

rates of crime remained relatively constant nationwide, and rates of violent crime continued to decrease.

The nation was not problem-free, however; of particular con- cern to the police were crimes associated with modernization. In- creased wealth and technological sophistication brought new

white-collar crimes, such as computer and credit card fraud, larceny

involving coin dispensers, and insurance falsification. Incidence

of drug abuse was minuscule compared with other industrialized

nations and limited mainly to stimulants. Japanese law enforcement authorities endeavored to control this problem by extensive

coordination with international investigative organizations and

stringent punishment of Japanese and foreign offenders. Traffic

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National Security

accidents and fatalities in the late 1980s continued to consume substantial law enforcement resources. Juvenile delinquency, although not nearly as serious as in most

industrialized nations, was a great concern to authorities. In 1986

over 46 percent of persons arrested for criminal offenses (other than

negligent homicide or injuries) were juveniles. Over 75 percent of

the juveniles arrested were charged with larceny, mainly shoplifting and theft of motorcycles and bicycles. The failure of the Japanese

education system to address the concerns of nonuniversity-bound

students was cited as an important factor in the rise ofjuvenile crime

(see Primary and Secondary Education, ch. 3). Yakuza (underworld) groups were estimated to number more than

3,100 and together contained almost 86,000 members. Although

concentrated in the largest urban prefectures, yakuza operated in

most cities and often received protection from high-ranking offi- cials in exchange for their assistance in keeping the crime rate low

by discouraging criminals operating individually or in small groups.

Following concerted police pressure in the 1960s, smaller gangs

either disappeared or began to consolidate in syndicate-type or- ganizations. In 1986 three large syndicates dominated underworld

crime in the nation and controlled more than 1,000 gangs and

29,000 gangsters.

Yakuza had existed in Japan well before the 1800s and followed

codes based on bushido. Their early operations were usually closeknit, and the leader and gang members had father- son relationships. Although this traditional arrangement continued to exist,

yakuza activities were increasingly replaced by modern types of gangs

that depended on force and money as organizing concepts. Nonetheless, yakuza often pictured themselves as saviors of traditional

Japanese virtues in a postwar society, sometimes forming ties with

right-wing groups espousing the same views and attracting dissatis- fied youths to their ranks.

Civil Disturbances

The public and government appeared to tolerate certain forms

of public disorder as inherent to a properly functioning democracy.

Demonstrations usually followed established forms. Groups received

legal permits and kept to assigned routes and areas. Placards and

bullhorns were used to express positions. Traffic was sometimes

disrupted, and occasional shoving battles between police and protesters resulted. But arrests were rare and generally made only in cases involving violence.

Political extremists have not hesitated to use violence and were

held responsible for bombings in connection with popular causes.

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Japan: A Country Study

In January 1990 the mayor of Nagasaki was shot by a member

of the right-wing Seikijuku (Sane Thinkers School), presumably

for a statement he had made that was perceived as critical of the

late Emperor Hirohito. That attack came two days after the left- wing Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction), opposed to the imperial

system, claimed responsibility for firing a rocket onto the grounds

of the residence of the late emperor's brother and a day before the

government announced the events leading to the enthronement of

Emperor Akihito in November 1990. The enthronement ceremonies were considered likely targets for extremist groups on the left and

the right who saw the mysticism surrounding the emperor as being

overemphasized or excessively reduced, respectively. Although

membership in these groups represented only a minute portion of

the population and presented no serious threat to the government,

authorities were concerned about the example set by the groups'

violence, as well as by the particular violent events. Violent protest by radicals also occurred in the name of causes apparently iso- lated from public sentiments. Occasional clashes between leftist factions and between leftists and rightists have injured both participants and bystanders. Security in the early 1990s remained heavy

at New Tokyo International Airport at Narita-Sanrizuka in Chiba

Prefecture, the scene of violent protests in the 1970s by radical

groups supporting local farmers opposed to expropriation of their

land.

The most notorious extremists were the Japanese Red Army,

a Marxist terrorist group (see Political Extremists, ch. 6). This

group was responsible for an attack on Lod International Airport

in Tel Aviv, Israel, in support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1972. It participated in an attack on a Shell

Oil refinery in Singapore in 1974 and seized the French embassy

in The Hague that same year and the United States and Swedish

embassies in Kuala Lumpur in 1975. In 1977 the Japanese Red

Army hijacked a Japan Airlines jet over India in a successful demand for a US$6 million ransom and the release of six inmates

in Japanese prisons. Following heavy criticism at home and abroad

for the government's "caving in" to terrorists' demands, the

authorities announced their intention to recall and reissue approximately 5.6 million valid Japanese passports to make hijacking more

difficult. A special police unit was formed to keep track of the ter- rorist group, and tight airport security measures were instigated.

Despite issuing regular threats, the Japanese Red Army was rela- tively inactive in the 1980s. In 1990 its members were reported

to be in North Korea and Lebanon undergoing further training

and available as mercenaries to promote various political causes.

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National Security

Criminal Procedure

In 1990 the nation's criminal justice officials followed specified

legal procedures in dealing with offenders. Once a suspect was ar- rested by national or prefectural police, the case was turned over

to attorneys in the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, who were

the government's sole agents in prosecuting lawbreakers. Although

under Ministry of Justice's administration, these officials worked

under Supreme Court rules and were career civil servants who could

be removed from office only for incompetence or impropriety.

Prosecutors presented the government's case before judges in the

Supreme Court and the four types of lower courts: high courts,

district courts, summary courts, and family courts. Penal and probation officials administered programs for convicted offenders under

the direction of public prosecutors (see The Judicial System, ch. 6). After identifying a suspect, police had the authority to exercise some discretion in determining the next step. If, in cases pertaining to theft, the amount was small or already returned, the offense

petty, the victim unwilling to press charges, the act accidental, or

the likelihood of a repetition not great, the police could either drop

the case or turn it over to a prosecutor. Reflecting the belief that

appropriate remedies were sometimes best found outside the for- mal criminal justice mechanisms, in 1987 approximately 49 per- cent of criminal cases were not sent to the prosecutor.

Police also exercised wide discretion in matters concerning

juveniles. Police were instructed by law to identify and counsel

minors who appeared likely to commit crimes, and they could refer juvenile offenders and nonoffenders alike to child guidance centers

to be treated on an outpatient basis. Police could also assign

juveniles or those considered to be harming the welfare ofjuveniles

to special family courts. These courts were established in 1949 in

the belief that the adjustment of a family's situation was sometimes

required to protect children and prevent juvenile delinquency. Family courts were run in closed sessions, tried juvenile offenders under

special laws, and operated extensive probationary guidance programs. Young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty

could, at the judgment of police, be sent to the public prosecutor

for possible trial as adults before a judge under the general criminal law.

Safeguards protected the suspects' rights. Police had to secure warrants to search for or seize evidence. A warrant was also neces- sary for an arrest, although if the crime were very serious or the

perpetrator likely to flee, it could be obtained immediately after

arrest. Within forty-eight hours after placing a suspect under

471
Japan: A Country Study

detention, the police had to present their case before a prosecutor,

who was then required to apprise the accused of the charges and

of the right to counsel. Within another twenty-four hours, the prose- cutor had to go before a judge and present a case to obtain a detention order. Suspects could be held for ten days (extensions were

granted in special cases), pending an investigation and a decision

whether or not to prosecute. In the 1980s, some suspects were

reported to have been mistreated during this detention to exact a

confession.

Prosecution could be denied on the grounds of insufficient evi- dence or on the prosecutor's judgment. Under Article 248 of the

Code of Criminal Procedures, the prosecutor, after weighing the

offender's age, character, and environment, the circumstances and

gravity of the crime, and the accused's rehabilitative potential, did

not have to institute public action, but could deny or suspend and

ultimately drop the charges after a probationary period. Because

the investigation and disposition of a case could occur behind closed

doors and the identity of an accused person who was not prosecuted was rarely made public, an offender could successfully reenter

society and be rehabilitated under probationary status without the

stigma of a criminal conviction.

Institutional safeguards checked the prosecutors' discretionary

powers not to prosecute. Lay committees were established in con- junction with branch courts to hold inquests on a prosecutor's decisions. These committees met four times yearly and could order

that a case be reinvestigated and prosecuted. Victims or interested

parties could also appeal a decision not to prosecute.

Most offenses were tried first in district courts before one or three

judges, depending on the severity of the case. Defendants were protected from self-incrimination, forced confession, and unrestricted

admission of hearsay evidence. In addition, defendants had the right to counsel, public trial, and cross-examination. Trial by jury was

authorized by the 1923 Jury Law but was suspended in 1943. It had not been reinstated as of 1990, chiefly owing to defendants'

distrust of jurors, who were believed to be emotional and easily

influenced, and the generally greater public confidence in the competence of judges.

The judge conducted the trial and was authorized to question

witnesses, independently call for evidence, decide guilt, and affix a sentence. The judge could also suspend any sentence or place a convicted party on probation. Should a judgment of not guilty

be rendered, the accused was entitled to compensation by the state based on the number of days spent in detention.

472
National Security

Criminal cases from summary courts, family courts, and district courts could be appealed to the high courts by both the prosecution and the defense. Criminal appeal to the Supreme Court was

limited to constitutional questions and a conflict of precedent between the Supreme Court and high courts. The criminal code set minimum and maximum sentences for offenses to allow for the varying circumstances of each crime and

criminal. Penalties ranged from fines and short-term incarceration

to compulsory labor and the death penalty. Heavier penalties were meted out to repeat offenders. Capital punishment consisted of

death by hanging and could be imposed on those convicted of leading an insurrection, inducing or aiding foreign armed aggression,

arson, or homicide.

The Penal System

Prisons, in existence in some feudal domains as early as the late sixteenth century, originally functioned to hold people for trial or

prior to execution. Because of the costs and difficulties involved

in long-term incarceration and the prevailing standards of justice

that called for sentences of death or exile for serious crimes, life imprisonment was rare. Facilities were used sometimes for shorter

confinement. Prisoners were treated according to their social sta- tus and housed in barracks-like quarters (see Seclusion and Social

Control, ch. 1). In some cases the position of prison officer was

hereditary, and staff vacancies were filled by relatives. During the Meiji period (1868-1912), the country adopted

Western-style penology along with systems of law and legal administration. In 1888 an aftercare hostel (halfway house) was opened

for released prisoners. Staffed mainly by volunteers, this institu- tion helped ex-convicts reenter society. Many ex-convicts had been

ostracized by their families for the shame they had incurred and

had literally nowhere to go. The Prison Law of 1908 provided basic

rules and regulations for prison administration, stipulating separate

facilities for those sentenced to confinement with and without labor,

and for those detained for trial and short sentences. The Juvenile Law of 1922 established administrative organs to handle offenders under the age of eighteen and recognized volunteer workers officially as the major forces in the community-based

treatment ofjuveniles. After World War II juvenile laws were re- vised to extend their jurisdiction to those under the age of twenty.

Volunteer workers were reorganized under a new law and in 1990

remained an indispensable part of the rehabilitation system.

The Correctional Bureau of the Ministry ofJustice administered

the adult prison system as well as the juvenile correctional system

473
Japan: A Country Study

and three women's guidance homes (to rehabilitate prostitutes).

The ministry's Rehabilitation Bureau operated the probation and

parole systems. Prison personnel were trained at an institute in

Tokyo and in branch training institutes in each of the eight regional

correctional headquarters under the Correctional Bureau. Professional probation officers studied at the Legal Training and Research

Institute of the Ministry of Justice.

In the late 1980s, Japan's prison population stood at somewhat more than 55,000 (about 44 per 100,000 general population), nearly

9,000 in short-term detention centers, the remaining 46,000 in pri- sons. Approximately 45 percent were repeat offenders. The United

States during that period had a prison population of approximately

1 million (about 500 per 100,000 general population) with nearly

90 percent repeat offenders. While the high recidivism in the United

States prison system was blamed on its failure to reform offenders,

Japanese recidivism was attributed mainly to the discretionary powers of police, prosecutors, and courts, and the tendency to seek

alternative sentences for first offenders.

The penal system was intended to resocialize, reform, and re- habilitate offenders. On confinement, prisoners were first classi- fied according to sex, nationality, kind of penalty, length of

sentence, degree of criminality, and state of physical and mental

health. They were then placed in special programs designed to treat individual needs. Vocational and formal education were emphasized, as was instruction in social values. Most convicts engaged

in labor for which a small stipend was set aside for use on release. Under a system stressing incentives, prisoners were initially assigned

to community cells, then earned better quarters and additional

privileges based on their good behavior.

Although a few juvenile offenders were handled under the general

penal system, most were treated in separate juvenile training

schools. More lenient than the penal institutions, these facilities provided correctional education and regular schooling for delinquents under the age of twenty.

According to the Ministry ofJustice, the government's responsibility for social order did not end with imprisoning an offender,

but also extended to aftercare treatment and to noninstitutional

treatment to substitute for or supplement prison terms. A large

number of those given suspended sentences were released to the

supervision of volunteer officers under the guidance of professional

probation officers. Adults were usually placed on probation for a

fixed period and juveniles until they reached the age of twenty.

Volunteers were also used in supervising parolees, though professional probation officers generally supervised offenders considered

474
National Security

to have a high risk of recidivism. Volunteers hailed from all walks

of life and handled no more than five cases at one time. They were

responsible for overseeing the offenders' conduct to prevent the occurrence of further offenses. Volunteer probation officers also offered guidance and assistance to the ex-convict in assuming a law-abiding place in the community. Although volunteers were

sometimes criticized for being too old compared to their charges

(more than 70 percent were retired, aged fifty-five or over) and

so unable to understand the problems they faced, most authorities

believed that the volunteers were critically important in the nation's criminal justice system.

Public support and cooperation with law enforcement officials helped in holding down Japan's crime rate, with little or no threat

to internal security. The external security threat in 1990 was also considerably reduced from previous years. The Japanese government was confident that diplomatic activity and a limited SDF,

backed by United States treaty commitments, would be sufficient to deter any potential adversary.

* * * The most comprehensive treatment of the SDF is available in

Jieitai nenkan (Self-Defense Forces Yearbook), the annual white paper

published by Defense Daily, and Defense ofJapan, published by the

Japanese Defense Agency. Other sources include James H. Buck's

The ModernJapanese Military System, Harrison M. Holland's Managing

Defense: Japan's Dilemma, and Malcolm Mcintosh'sJapan Re-armed.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual, The Military Balance, provides current data on the size, budget, and equipment inventory of the armed forces. Reinhard Drifte's Arms

Production in Japan gives insight into Japan's developing defense in- dustry.

The Police offapan, published by the National Police Agency, gives an excellent overview of the police system and Keisatsu hakusho (Police

White Paper), published annually by the same agency, gives updated law enforcement information and crime figures.

Journals such as Japan Quarterly [Tokyo], Far Eastern Economic

Review [Hong Kong] , and Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines

(issued monthly by the United States Embassy in Tokyo) frequently cover issues in defense and internal security and public order. (For

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

475

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population Growth, Selected Years, 1920-2030

3 Adherents of Religious Traditions, 1989

4 Public Holidays and Festival Days

5 Number of Schools and Students, 1989

6 Enrollment in Special Classes in Compulsory Education, 1989

7 Postsecondary Institutions and Enrollment, by Type of Insti- tution, 1988

8 Combined Social and Education Facilities, 1987

9 Average Age and Salary for Selected Positions, 1988

10 Average Monthly Earnings by Firm Size, Selected Years,

1960-87

11 National Budget and Fiscal Investment and Loan Program,

Fiscal Year (FY) 1990

12 Personal Investment, 1989

13 National Government and Affilliated Agencies' Budgets,

Selected Years, 1960-88

14 Labor Productivity and Wage Cost Indexes, 1977-87

15 Work Status of the Population, 1985-88

16 Foreign Nationals in the Technical and Skilled-Labor Work

Force, Selected Groups, Selected Years, 1970-87

17 Labor Force Over Fifty-Five Years of Age by Sex and Age,

Selected Years, 1970-87

18 Index of Labor Productivity for Selected Economic Sectors,

Selected Years, 1960-87

19 Energy Consumption, Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 and FY 1995

20 High-Technology Sector Developments, 1987

21 Inland Freight Transportation by Sector and Volume, 1960

and 1987

22 Passenger Transportation by Sector and Volume, 1970 and

1987

23 Self- Sufficiency Rates for Agricultural Products, Selected

Years, 1975-87

24 Merchandise Exports, Imports, Trade Balance, and Annual

Rate of Export Growth, 1960-88

25 Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88

26 Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88

27 Composition of Imports, Selected Years, 1960-88

477
Japan: A Country Study

28 Composition of Exports, Selected Years, 1960-88

29 Balance of Payments, Capital Flows, Official Settlements, and

Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1961-88

30 External Assets and Liabilities, Selected Years, 1976-88

31 Geographical Distribution of Cumulative Direct Investment,

Selected Years, 1970-88

32 Exchange Rate Between Yen and United States Dollar, 1970-

90

33 Trade Balance with Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1960-

88

34 Exports to Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1960-88

35 Imports from Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1960-88

36 Candidates Elected to House of Councillors by Party, Elections, 1956-89

37 Candidates, Elected to House of Representatives by Party,

Elections 1958-90

38 Order of Battle for Self-Defense Forces, 1989

39 Major Ground Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989

40 Major Maritime Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989

41 Major Air Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989

478
Appendix

lable 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches 39 inches

3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 0.26 gallons

2.2 pounds

0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

Table 2. Population Growth, Selected Years, 1920-2030 * (in thousands)

Total Population Percentage Year Population 65 and Over 65 and Over

1920 55,963 2,941 5.3 1930 64,450 3,064 4.8 1950 83,200 4,109 4.9 1960 93,419 5,350 5.7 1970 103,720 7,331 7.1 1980 117,060 10,647 9.1 1987 122,264 13,322 10.9 1990

.

124,225 14,819 11.9 2000 131,192 21,338 16.3 2010 135,823 27,104 20.0 2020 135,304 31,880 23.6 2030 134,067 31,001 23.1

* As projected by Management and Coordination Agency.

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo,

1989, 25, 38.

479
Japan: A Country Study

Table 3. Adherents of Religious Traditions, 1989

Religion Branch Adherents *

Shinto Shrine Shinto 86,585,845

Sect Shinto 5,146,574

Shinto-oriented new religions 3,000,344

Total Shinto 94,732,763 Buddhist

Nichiren Shoshu 35,541,430 Jodo 20,441,569 Shingon 15,607,203 Zen 9,523,505 Tendai 3,079,357 Nara sects 2,397,251 Other 78,370

Total Buddhist 86,668,685

Christian New sects 484,868 Old sects 410,692

Total Christian 895,560

* Many people observe both Shinto and Buddhist rites. Source: Based on information from Shukyo nenkan, Showa 63 (Religion Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo, 1989, 32-135.

480
Appendix

Table 4. Public Holidays and Festival Days

Holiday Date New Year's Day 1 January 1 First Writing Day January 2

First Business Day January 4 Day of Mankind Janaury 7 Adults' Day 1 January 15 Bean-Scattering Ceremony February 3 or 4 Risshun 2 February 4 or 5 Needle Memorial Service February 8 National Foundation Day 1 February 11 Doll Festival March 3 Spring higan 3 March 17-24 Vernal Equinox Day 1 March 21 or 22 Flower Festival April 8 Eighty-Eighth Night 4 May 2 or 3 Constitution Memorial Day 1 May 3 Children's Day 1 May 5 Summer Solstice Day June 21 or 22 Tanabata Festival 5 July 7 Bon Festival July 13-15

210th Day 6 September 1 Chrysanthemum Festival September 9 Respect for the Aged Day 1 September 15 Autumn higan 3 September 17-20 Autumnal Equinox Day 1 September 23 or 24 Moon-Viewing Night Night of full moon

Sports Day 1 October 10 Culture Day 1 November 3 Seven-Five-Three Festival 7 November 15 Labor Thanksgiving Day 1 November 23 Winter Solstice Day December 21 or 22 Emperor's Birthday 1 December 23 New Year's Eve December 31

1 National holiday.

2 Beginning of spring, based on old solar calendar.

3 Higan means the other shore and is observed as a Buddhist memorial centered on the vernal equinox and the autumnal equinox.

4 Eighty-eighth day after Old Solar New Year (February 3 or 4).

5 Based on Chinese Weaving Maid-Cowherd legend.

6 The 210th Day after Old Solar New Year, first day of typhoon season.

7 Presentation at local Shinto shrines of three-year-old, five-year-old, and seven-year-old girls and boys

to pray for a safe and healthy future. Source: Based on information from Kodansha Encyclopedia ofJapan, 2, Tokyo, 1983, 262.

481
Japan: A Country Study

Table 5. Number of Schools and Students, 1989

Type of School Schools Students

15,080 2,037,618

24,851 9,606,786

11,264 5,619,297 5,644,376 70 6,006

Schools for the deaf 108 8,319 760 80,683 62 51,966 584 461,849 499 2,066,962

3,252 741,080 Other 3,572 444,381 TOTAL 65,613 26,769,323

* Does not include day-care centers operated by the Ministry of Welfare. Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Monbujiho (Education Review) [Tokyo], No. 1353, October 1989, 64; and Japan,

Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Gakko kihon chosa hokokusho, 1989 (Fun- damental School Survey, 1989), Tokyo, 1989, 7-11.

Table 6. Enrollment in Special Classes in Compulsory Education, 1989

Category Elementary Lower secondary

24,851 11,264 317,259 154,054

9,606,627 5,619,297

10,288 5,260 14,420 6,893

52,701 28,352

41.4 46.7

0.5 0.5 Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Gakko kihon chosa hokokusho, 1989 (Fundamental School Survey, 1989), 1989, 7-10,

30, 31, 63, 122, 123.

482
Appendix

Table 7. Postsecondary Institutions and Enrollment,

by Type of Institution, 1988

Number

Type of Institution of Institutions Enrollment

Universities National 95 491,539

Local public 38 59,216

Private 357 1,443,861 Total universities 490 1,994,616 Junior colleges National 40 19,110

Local public 54 22,024

Private 477 409,302

Total junior colleges 571 450,436

Technical colleges 1 National 54 16,080 Local public 4 1,558

Private 4 1,257 Total technical colleges 62 18,895

Special training colleges 2 National 158 16,939 Local public 163 23,582

Private 2,301 481,053

Total special training colleges 2,622 521,574 Other

National 7 19 Local public 92 5,122

Private 3,586 148,161 Total other 3 3,685 153,302 TOTAL 7,430 3,138,853

1 Fourth-year and fifth-year enrollments only.

2 Includes only special training colleges offering advanced courses that had an entrance requirement

of upper-secondary school completion.

3 There were 3,685 miscellaneous schools in 1988, with an actual total enrollment of 451,988 students. The figures in the enrollment column here show only students whose entrance required at least graduation from an upper-secondary school program. Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Monbutdkeiyoran (Statistical Abstract of Education), Tokyo, 1989, 70, 73-75, 104,

106.

483
Japan: A Country Study

Table 8. Combined Social and Education Facilities, 1987

Type National Prefectural Municipal 1 Private Total 62 808 870

Children's culture centers 2

. 1 44 45

Children's nature centers 2

. 10 93 153 256

17,422 18 17,440

55 727 782

28 100 254 355 737

69 1,699 33 1,801 Sports centers 2 2,266 32,143 34,409 Women's education centers . 11 62 126 200 Youth centers 2 13 110 157 280

10 150 160

Total youth centers . . . 13 120 307 440 TOTAL 52 2,777 53,619 532 56,980

1 Includes municipal syndicates.

2 Private facilities not included. Source: Based on information from Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Monbusho, 1989, Tokyo, 1989, 38; and Japan, Ministry of Education, Science, and

Culture, Monbu tokeiyoran (Statistical Abstract of Education), Tokyo, 1989, 111-17.

Table 9. Average Age and Salary for Selected Positions, 1988

Position Average Age Salary *

50.4 5,019

50.5 4,558

45.7 3,717

29.7 1,800

51.2 4,251 49.5 4,271 44.9 3,503

31.2 2,156

* In United States dollars per month. Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Compensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 122.

484
Appendix

Table 10. Average Monthly Earnings by Firm Size, Selected Years, 1960-87

(in thousands of yen)

Number of Regular Employees Year 1 to 4 5 to 29 30 or more

1960 9 15 24

1965 20 30 39 1970 37 56 76 1975 85 133 177 1980 129 193 263

1985 153 228 317

1987 158 243 336

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo,

1989, 92.

Table 11. National Budget and Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 1990

(in billions of United States dollars)

Category Amount Revenues Tax revenues 414.2 Other revenues 8.6 Receipts from NTT * stock sale 9.3 Public bonds 41.4 Total revenues 473.5 Expenditures

Discretionary expenditures 253.0

Transfers to local governments 109.1

Social infrastructure 9.3 Debt service 102.1 Total expenditures 473.5

* Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. Source: Based on information from Japan Economic Institute of America, Japan Economic

Survey [Washington], October 1989, 3.

485
Japan: A Country Study

Table 12. Personal Investment, 1989

(in trillions of yen and billions of United States dollars)

Type of Institution Yen Dollars 130 929

126 900

58 414

48 342

26 185

6 43

Source: Based on information from "Japanese Utilize Postal Savings, "Japan EconomicJournal [Tokyo], February 24, 1990, 5.

Table 13. National Government and Affiliated Agencies'

Budgets, Selected Years, 1960-88

(in billions of yen)

National Government GovernmentGeneral Special Affiliated Year Accounts Accounts Agencies Total Revenues

1960 1,570 3,750 1,537 6,857 1965 3,658 7,215 3,237 14,110 1970 7,950 18,403 6,076 32,429 1975 21,289 39,723 12,645 3,657 1980 42,589 95,121 20,311 158,021 1985 52,500 125,744 13,235 191,479 1988 56,700 167,301 5,185 229,186

xpenditures 1960 1,570 3,549 1,383 6,502 1965 3,658 6,708 3,090 13,456 1970 7,950 16,988 5,808 30,746 1975 21,289 36,412 12,234 69,935 1980 42,589 89,771 20,438 152,798 1985 52,500 119,531 13,307 185,338 1988 56,700 156,804 5,246 218,750

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo,

1989, 438.

486
Appendix

Table 14. Labor Productivity and Wage Cost Indexes, 1977-87 1 (index: 1980 = 100)

Labor Productivity Wage Cost Year Index Index 2

1977 83.7 101.6 1978 90.3 99.6 1979 96.5 97.4 1980 100.0 100.0 1981 100.5 106.1 1982 100.2 110.8 1983 102.0 111.8 1984 108.2 109.1 1985 110.0 109.1 1986 109.4 109.6 1987 113.4 114.0

1 The average annual rate of increase in the years between 1978 and 1987 was 2.6 percent for labor

productivity and 1.2 percent for the wage cost index.

2 The wage cost index is the wage index divided by the labor productivity index. Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Compensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 128.

Table 15. Work Status of the Population, 1985-88

1985 1986 1987 1988

Population over fifteen years * Male . . 4,602 4,662 4,726 4,790

. . 4,863 4,925 4,994 5,059 9,465 9,587 9,720 9,849 Labor force *

, . 3,596 3,626 3,655 3,693 Female . . 2,367 2,394 2,429 2,473

. . 5,963 6,020 6,084 6,166 Employed people * 3,503 3,526 3,551 3,602 Female . . 2,304 2,327 2,360 2,409

5,807 5,853 5,911 6,011

2.6 2.8 2.8 2.5 Labor force (as percentage of total population) . . . . 63.0 62.8 62.6 62.6

* In units of 10,000. Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Compensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 116.

487
Japan: A Country Study

Table 16. Foreign Nationals in the Technical and Skilled-Labor

Work Force, Selected Groups, Selected Years, 1970-87 1

Year Technical Skilled Labor 1970 35 182 1975 29 610

1980 59 1,035 1985Asian 16 1,009 European 17 170 North Americans 9 4 Others 2 3 Total 1985 42 1,186 1987Asian 9 1,235 European 19 261 North Americans 30 1 Others 2 4 Total 1987 58 1,501

1 Based on legal entries.

2 From Oceania and "non-nationality." Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 61 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986), Tokyo,

1987, 61; and Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo,

1989, 71.

Table 1 7. Labor Force over Fifty-Five Years of Age

by Sex and Age, Selected Years, 1970-87

(in tens of thousands of persons)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 Males Age 55-64 331 344 379 478 523 Age 65 and over 158 169 184 187 190 Females Age 55-64 193 215 253 298 313 Age 65 and over 73 76 95 113 122 TOTAL 755 804 911 1,076 1,148

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Nihon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo,

1989, 71.

488
Appendix

Table 18. Index of Labor Productivity for Selected Economic

Sectors, Selected Years, 1960-87

(1985 average =100)

Total Public Mining and

Year Productivity Utilities Manufacturing Manufacturing 1960 15.4 17.3 15.3 15.4 1965 22.6 27.0 22.4 22.2 1970 42.2 47.7 41.8 40.7 1975 55.0 62.4 54.5 54.4 1980 82.1 79.2 82.2 82.1 1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1987 107.6 105.6 107.8 107.7

Source: Based on information from Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Nikon tokei nenkan, Showa 63 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1988), Tokyo,

1989, 113.

Table 19. Energy Consumption, Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 and FY 1995 1 FY 1986 FY 1995 Category Amount 2 Percentage 3 Amount Percentage 3 Demand

(kiloliters) 433.0 n.a. 490.0 n.a. Supply Coal (in tons) 103.9 18.3 121.0 18.3 Nuclear

(in kilowatts) 25.8 9.5 41.5 13.4 Natural gas

(in kiloliters) 42.8 9.9 55.0 11.1 Hydroelectric General

(in kilowatts) 20.2 n.a. 23.0 n.a. Pumped

(in kilowatts) 15.6 n.a. 19.5 n.a. Total hydroelectric 35.8 4.2 42.5 4.5 Geothermal

(in kiloliters) 0.4 0.1 2.0 0.4 New energy

(in kiloliters) 5.5 1.3 12.5 2.5 Oil

(in kiloliters) 246.0 56.8 245.0 49.7 Total supply

(in kiloliters) 460.2 100.0 519.5 100.0

n.a. —not available.

1 Projected.

2 In millions.

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon: A Charted

Survey ofJapan, 1989/90, Tokyo, 1989, 243.

489
Japan: A Country Study

Table 20. High- Technology Sector Developments, 1987

Technical Field Kind of Product New materials Composite materials Amorphous alloys High-molecular separation films

Electronics Semiconductor memory chips Charge-coupled devices Data and communications Computer switching boards

Digital circuit Laser printers Processing and manufacturing .... Laser processors Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided

Manufacturing (CAD/CAM)

Hydraulic control valves

Analytical and measuring

instruments Accelerometers Spectrum analyzers Biotechnology Biotechnology products utilizing cellular material from animals

Biotechnology products utilizing microorganisms

Aeronautical and space Communications satellites Large building structures Ultra-high-rise buildings Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Compensation, Nippon 1987: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1987, 27.

Table 21. Inland Freight Transportation

by Sector and Volume, 1960 and 1987

I960 1987

Millions Millions

Millions of Ton- Millions of Tonof Tons Kilometers of Tons Kilometers

Railroads 238 54,515 83 20,561 Motor vehicles 1,156 20,801 5,046 224,053

Coastal shipping 139 63,659 463 201,386

Air transport 6 0.7 634 TOTAL 1,553 138,981 5,582.7 446,634

Source: Based on information from Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon: A Charted

Survey ofJapan, 1989/90, Tokyo, 1989, 267.

490
Appendix

Table 22. Passenger Transportation

by Sector and Volume, 1970 and 1987

(in millions)

Passengers carried Passenger -kilometers Sector 1970 1987 1970 1987

16,445 19,972 288,816 344,729

11,812 8,470 102,894 102,895

12,221 28,615 181,335 437,837

15 50 9,319 38,534

174 155 4,814 5,850 TOTAL 40,667 57,262 587,178 929,845

Source: Based on information in Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon: A Charted Survey ofJapan, 1989/90, Tokyo, 1989, 267.

Table 23. Self-Sufficiency Ratio for Agricultural Products,

Selected Years, 1975-87

(in percentages)

Product 1975 1980 1985 1987 *

. . . . 110 87 107 100 Wheat 4 10 14 14

Fruit , , , , 84 81 77 75

. . . . 82 82 85 78 Beef 81 72 72 64 Pork . . . . 86 87 86 80

. . . . 77 81 81 76

15 27 33 34

Overall self-sufficiency

. . . . 77 75 74 71

Self-sufficiency for cereals

. . . . 40 33 31 30

* Estimated. Source: Based on information from Japan, National Personnel Authority, Bureau of Compensation, Nippon 1989: JETRO Business Facts and Figures, Tokyo, 1989, 28.

491
Japan: A Country Study

Table 24. Merchandise Exports, Imports, Trade Balance,

and Annual Rate of Export Growth, 1960-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Annual Rate Trade of Export Growth

Year Exports Imports 1 Balance 2 (in percentage) 1960 4 055 4 491 -437 17.3 1961 4 236 5,810 -1,574 4.5 1962 4,916 5^637 -720 16.1 1963 5,452 6,736 -1,284 10.9 1964 6 673 7,938 -1,264 22.4 1965 8 452 8 169 283 26.7 1966 9 776 9,523 254 15.7 1967 10,442 11^663 -1,222 6.8 1968 12,972 12,987 -16 24.2 1969 15 990 15 024 967 23.3 1970 19 318 18,881 437 20.8 1971 24 019 19,712 4,307 24.3 1972 28,591 23^471 5420 19.0 1973 36,930 38,314 -1,384 29.2 1974 55 536 62 110 -6 574 50.4 1975 55 753 57 863 -2 110 0.4 1976 67,226 64,799 2,427 20.6 1977 80,495 70,809 9,686 19.7 1978 97,543 79,343 18,200 21.2 1979 103,032 110,672 -7,641 5.6 1980 129,807 140,528 -10,721 26.0 1981 152,030 143,290 8,740 17.1 1982 138,831 131,931 6,900 8.7 1983 146,927 126,393 20,534 5.8 1984 170,114 136,503 33,611 15.8 1985 175,638 129,539 46,099 3.2 1986 209,151 126,408 82,743 19.1 1987 229,221 149,515 79,706 9.6 1988 264,917 187,354 77,563 15.6

1 Customs-clearance basis.

2 Figures may not result in balances because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo,

1978, 207; Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1980, Tokyo, 1981, 223; and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 250.

492
Appendix

Table 25. Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 256 648 1,588 1,316 1,696

. 1,223 2,408 6,296 6,263 6,908 Chemicals

Plastics 14 436 1,867 2,261 4,002

143 377 127 137 Other 107 655 4,524 5,310 9,825

1,234 6,767 7,698 13,964 Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 169 372 1,863 2,147 2,936 Metals

Iron and steel products 2,844 15,454 13,566 15,321 Fabricated metal products . . . 155 714 3,947 3,458 4,287 26 248 1,917 1,467 2,142

3,805 21,319 18,491 21,750 Machinery and equipment

1,337 23,273 34,377 48,787 329 2,280 7,785 18,406 Semiconductors and other 400 2,307 4,753 12,327

Scientific and optical 498 4,526 6,831 10,835 451 3,305 8,440 7,802 Power-generating machinery OA ooo 2,548 3,789 6,738

1,983 6,625 6,203

1,410 4,682 5,929 3,947 116 1,743 2,599 3,927

Electric generators and

22 157 1,503 2,058 3,405 Watches and clocks 4 130 1,734 1,730 2,365

145 695 3^009 2^654 2^212 48 196 871 1,007 2,161

3 384 1,660 2,625 1,779 55 129 466 524 980 Other . 251 2,471 25,591 34,453 65,091

Total machinery and

. 1,035 8,941 81,481 126,179 196,965 Other commodities

23 162 1,382 1,545 2,219 90 138 335 484 241 Other . 508 1,609 8,776 11,515 18,237 Total other commodities * . . 622 1,909 10,494 13,544 20,697 TOTAL * 4,054 19,317 129,808 175,638 264,917

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade

ofJapan, December 1985, Tokyo, 1986, 146-49; Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade ofJapan, December 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 146-49; and Bank ofJapan,

Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 250-51.

493
Japan: A Country Study

Table 26. Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988

Foodstuffs 262 3,026 4,610 10,461 145 1,523 1,927 4,313

78 294 1,507 1,363 1,490 Wheat 177 318 1,229 974 1,034

111 284 1,225 210 456 Other 182 1,678 6,156 6,463 11,366 548 2,981 14,666 15,547 29,120

Textile materials Wool 265 348 689 670 1,447 431 471 1,359 1,049 1,318 Other 65 144 346 436 544

Total textile materials * ... . 762 963 2,393 2,155 3,309 Metal ores and scrap

. 156 1,064 3,731 2,229 4,104

Iron ore and ferrous scrap . . . . 443 1,549 3,946 3,452 3,289 Other 74 83 753 551 1,095 Total metal ores and scrap

*

. 673 2,696 8,430 6,232 8,488 Other raw materials Wood 170 1,572 6,909 3,700 7,122 107 366 1,310 1,206 1,426

. 126 115 603 408 762 Other . 370 964 4,115 4,343 6,933

Total other raw materials *

. 774 3,017 12,937 9,657 16,243 Mineral fuels

. 600 2,786 57,851 40,574 25,807 Coal 141 1,010 4,458 5,196 5,375 Other 110 7,682 10,020 7,174

741 3,906 69,991 55,790 38,356 265 1,000 6,202 8,073 14,830 Machinery and equipment

53 322 1,032 1,545 3,279

12 12 483 571 3,165

Precision instruments 27 166 1,087 1,265 2,358 OQ 9Q4 QQ1 1 4.04. 9 H94 Other . 326 1,560 6,733 7,507 15,835 Total machinery and

447 2,354 10,326 12,372 26,661 Miscellaneous commodities

19 314 3,180 3,886 10,631 118 945 4,480 4,041 9,312 Iron and steel products 88 276 894 1,479 4,625 Other 68 891 7,511 10,307 25,779

Total miscellanenous 294 2,427 16,066 19,713 50,347 TOTAL * 4,501 19,343 141,011 129,539 187,354

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo,

1989, 253-54; Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade ofJapan, December 1980, Tokyo, 1981, 129; and Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade

ofJapan, December 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 162-65.

494
Appendix

Table 27. Composition of Imports, Selected Years, 1960-88

(in percentages)

Commodity 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988

Foodstuffs Fish and shellfish 0.0 2.2 3.6 5.6 Meat 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.5 2.3

1.7 1.6 1.1 0.8 Wheat 3.9 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.6

2.5 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.2 Other 4.1 8.9 4.3 5.0 6.0

12.2 13.7 10.5 12.2 15.5

Textiles materials Wool 5.9 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.8 9.6 2.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 Other 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.3

I Vit Q 1 f/=» 1 1 f=» TY"I atpn 51 1 c * 17 5.1 1.7 1.6 1.8 Metal ores and scrap Nonferrous metal ores 3.5 5.6 2.7 1.7 2.2 9.9 8.2 2.8 2.7 1.8 Other 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 Total metal ores scrap * 15.0 14.3 6.0 4.8 4.5 Other raw materials Wood 3.8 8.3 4.9 2.9 3.8

2.4 1.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 Natural rubber 2.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 Other 8.2 5.1 2.9 3.4 3.7 Total other raw materials * 17.2 15.9 9.2 7.5 8.7 Mineral fuels Petroleum and products 13 4 14.8 41.2 31.3 13.8 Coal 3.1 5.3 3.2 4.0 2.9 Other 0.0 0.6 5.4 7.7 3.8 Total mineral fuels * 16.5 20.7 49.8 43.0 20.5 Chemicals 5.9 5.3 4.4 6.2 7.9 Machinery and equipment

Office machines . . . 1 2 1.7 0.7 1.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.3

1.3 0.7 1.1 1.1 Other . 7.3 8.3 4.5 5.8 8.3 Total machinery and equipment * . . 9.7 12.2 7.0 9.5 14.2 Miscellaneous commodities

. 0.4 1.7 2.3 3.0 5.7

. 2.6 5.0 3.2 3.1 5.0

. 2.0 1.5 0.6 1.1 2.5 Other 1.5 4.7 5.3 8.0 13.7 Total miscellaneous commodities * . 6.5 12.9 11.4 15.2 26.9 TOTAL * . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo,

1989, 253-54; and Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade ofJapan,

December 1980, Tokyo, 1981, 129; and Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report, Trade ofJapan, December 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 162-65.

495
Japan: A Country Study

Table 28. Composition of Exports, Selected Years, 1960-88

(in percentages)

Commodity 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988

6.3 3.4 1.2 0.7 0.6 30.2 12.5 4.9 3.6 2.6 Chemicals

. 0.4 2.3 1.4 1.3 1.5

1.5 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 Other 2.6 3.4 3.5 3.0 3.7 Total chemicals 4.5 6.4 5.2 4.4 5.3

. 4.2 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.1 Metals

9.6 14.7 11.9 7.7 5.8 Fabricated metal products 3.8 3.7 3.0 2.0 1.6

. 0.6 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.8

. 14.0 19.7 16.4 10.5 8.2 Machinery and equipment Motor vehicles 1.9 6.9 17.9 19.6 18.4 0.0 1.7 1.8 4.4 6.9 Semiconductors and other electronic

. 0.1 2.1 1.8 2.7 4.7

2.3 2.6 3.5 3.9 4.1 Audiotape recorders 0.2 2.3 2.5 4.8 2.9

. 0.6 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.5

. 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.8 2.3

7.1 7.3 3.6 3.4 1.5 Metalworking machinery . 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 Electric generators and equipment . . . 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.9

3.6 3.6 2.3 1.5 0.8

1 1 n n 7 U. / u.o U.o

. 0.1 2.0 1.3 1.5 0.7

1.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 Other . 6.2 12.8 19.7 19.4 24.6 Total machinery and equipment . . . 25.5 46.3 62.8 71.8 74.3 Other commodities

0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.8

. 2.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 Other . 12.5 8.3 6.7 6.6 6.9

. 15.3 9.8 8.1 7.8 7.8 TOTAL * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo,

1989, 227-30.

496
Appendix

Table 29. Balance of Payments, Capital Flows,

Official Settlements, and Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1961-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Errors Gold and Foreign

Capital Flows and Overall Exchange Reserves Year Long-term Short-term Omissions Balance 1 Changes Level

1961 -11 21 20 -952 338 1,486 1962 . .

.

172 107 6 237 355 1,841 1963 . .

.

467 107 45 -161 37 1,878 1964 . . . 107 234 10 -129 121 1,999 1965 . .

.

-415 -61 -51 405 108 2,107 1966 -808 -64 -45 337 -33 2,074 1967 . .

.

-812 506 -75 -571 -69 2,005 1968 . .

.

-239 209 84 1,102 886 2,891 1969 . . , -155 178 141 2,283 605 3,496 1970 . .

.

-1,591 724 271 1,374 903 4,399

1971 . .

.

-1,082 2,435 527 7,677 10,836 15,235 1972 . .

.

-4,487 1,966 638 4,741 3,130 18,365 1973 . .

.

-9,750 2,407 -2,595 -10,074 -6,119 12,246 1974 -3,881 1,778 -43 -6,839 1,272 13,518 1975 . .

.

-272 -1,138 -584 -2,676 703 12,815 1976 , , , -984 111 117 3,024 3,789 16,604 1977 . , , . . . -3,184 -648 657 7,743 6,244 22,848 1978 , , -12,389 1,538 267 5,950 -10,171 33,019 1979 -12,618 2,377 2 2,333 -16,662 -12,692 20,327 1980 . . . 2,324 3,141 -3,115 -8,396 4,905 25,232

1981 , , , -9,672 2,265 493 -2,144 3,171 28,403 1982 . .

.

-14,969 1,579 4,727 -1,813 -5,141 23,262 1983 . .

.

. . . -17,700 23 2,055 5,177 1,234 24,496 1984 . . . . . . -49,651 -4,295 3,743 -15,200 1,817 26,313 1985 . .

.

. . . -64,542 -936 3,991 -12,318 197 26,510 1986 -131,461 -1,609 2,458 -44,767 15,729 42,239

1987 . .

.

. . . -136,532 -23,865 -3,893 -77,275 39,240 81,479 1988 . . . . . . -130,326 19,536 2,320 -28,982 16,183 97,662

1 Overall balance equals the current account balance plus the balance on long- and short-term capital flows plus errors and omissions.

2 In 1979, gensaki transactions (short-term capital transactions using long-term government bonds as

collateral) moved from the long-term capital account to the short-term capital account. Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo,

1989, 244-58.

497
Japan: A Country Study

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Japan: A Country Study

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501
Japan: A Country Study

Table 32. Exchange Rate Between Yen and United States Dollar, 1970-90

Year Rate Year Rate 1970

1971 1972 1973 1974

1975 1976

1977 1978

1979 1980

360

351 303

271

291 292 297 269

211 219

227

1981 1982

1983 1984

1985 1986

1987 1988

1989 1990

221 249

238 238

239

169

145

128

143

147

1 Rates are the average market rate for the year.

2 As of August 1990. Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1989, Washington, 1989, 442-43; and "Prices and Trends," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], August 30, 1990, 66.

Table 33. Trade Balance with Selected Countries,

Selected Years, 1960-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988

Australia . , -200 -28 -1,593 -2,073 -3,605

21 -449 1,828 2,906 6,439

... -85 168 -2,287 -253 -1,884

... -18 315 755 5,994 -383

... 133 608 4,192 5,742 9,597

... -15 -287 -99 407 278

Indonesia , , 40 -321 -9,709 -7,947 -6,443

... -192 -253 -1,410 -2,162 -1,650

-5 -79 -268 -306 -304

73 336 2,404 2,266 5,972

81 589 2,372 3,005 3,630

... -65 -140 918 1,322 364

38 449 2,853 1,639 5,611 46 259 798 1,003 2,411

. . . -452 380 6,959 39,485 47,597

... -57 -958 3,255 4,010 7,692

Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo,

1978, 207-10; Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1981, 229; and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 247-50.

502
Appendix

Table 34. Exports to Selected Countries,

Selected Years, 1960-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988

... 144 589 3,389 5,379 6,680

, , , 120 480 3,782 4,723 10,632

... 119 563 2,437 4,520 6,424

3 569 5,078 12,477 9,476

156 700 4,761 6,509 11,706

. , . Ill 103 915 1,596 2,082

... 110 316 3,458 2,172 3,054

32 166 2,061 2,168 3,060

... 154 454 1,683 937 1,740 87 423 3,911 3,860 8,311 South Korea , , 100 818 5,368 7,097 15,441 60 341 2,778 2,751 3,130 Taiwan . . , 102 700 5,146 5,025 14,354 Thailand 118 449 1,917 2,030 5,162

. . . 1,101 5,940 31,367 65,278 89,634

66 550 5,756 6,938 15,793

Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo,

1978, 207-10; Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1981, Tokyo, 1982, 229; and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 247-50.

Table 35. Imports from Selected Countries,

Selected Years, 1960-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 344 617 6,982 7,452 10,285 99 929 1,954 1,817 4,193

, , , 204 395 4,724 4,773 8,308

21 254 4,323 6,483 9,859

23 92 569 767 2,109

... 126 390 1,014 1,189 1,804 70 637 13,167 10,119 9,497 Malaysia . . . . 224 419 3,471 4,330 4,710

. . . . 159 533 1,951 1,243 2,044

14 87 1,507 1,594 2,339

19 229 2,996 4,092 11,811

... 125 481 1,860 1,429 2,766 64 251 2,293 3,386 8,743

72 190 1,119 1,027 2,751 United States 1,553 5,560 24,408 25,793 42,037 West Germany . . . 123 1,508 2,501 2,928 8,101

Source: Based on information from Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, Tokyo,

1978, 207-10; Bank ofJapan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1981, Tokyo, 1982, 229; and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Tokyo, 1989, 247-50.

503
Japan: A Country Study

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504
Appendix

Table 37. Candidates Elected to House of

Representatives by Party, Elections, 1958-90

Year LDP 1 JSP 2 Komeito DSP 3 JCP* NLC 5 Other Independents Total

1958 . . . 287 166 1 1 12 467

1960 . . . , 296 145 — 17 3 — 1 5 467

1963 . . . ... 283 144 23 5 12 467

1967 , , , 277 140 25 30 5 9 486

1969 . . . 288 90 47 31 14 16 486

1972 ... 271 118 29 19 38 2 14 491 1976 . . . ... 249 123 55 29 17 17 21 511 1979 . . . ... 248 107 57 35 39 4 2 19 511 1980 , , , ... 284 107 33 32 29 12 3 11 511 1983 , . . 250 112 58 38 26 8 3 16 511 1986 300 85 56 26 26 6 4 9 512 1990 . . . ... 275 136 45 14 16 5 21 512 —Means party did not exist at time of election.

1 Liberal Democratic Party.

2 Japan Socialist Party.

3 Democratic Socialist Party.

4 Japan Communist Party.

5 New Liberal Club. Source: Based on information from Japan Foreign Press Center, The Diet, Elections and Political Parties, Tokyo, 1985;Japan Times [Tokyo], February 20, 1990, 1, and February 27, 1990, 1; and Asahi nenkan, 1990 (Asahi Yearbook, 1990) Tokyo, 1990, 94.

Table 38. Order of Battle for Self-Defense Forces, 1989

Branch and Units Personnel or Units Ground Self-Defense Force

Personnel 156,200 Armored division 1 Infantry divisions 12

Anti-aircraft artillery groups 8 Airborne brigades 1 Combined brigades 2 Artillery brigade 1 Artillery groups 4 Training brigade 1 Helicopter brigade 1 Helicopter squadrons 24

Antitank helicopter squadrons 2 Engineer brigades 5 Maritime Self-Defense Force Personnel 44,400

Air Self-Defense Force Personnel 46,400

Total Self-Defense Forces personnel 247,000

Total reserves 48,000

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 162-64.

505
Japan: A Country Study

Table 39. Major Ground Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989

Country of Type and Description Origin Armored vehicles T-61 medium tanks, 90mm gun, 35 tons, modeled on United States M-48 tanks . . . Japan

T-74 medium tanks, 105mm gun, 38 tons . . -do- T-82 and T-87 reconnaissance vehicles .... -do- T-60 and T-73 armored personnel

carriers . . -doArtillery 105mm, 155mm, and 203mm guns and United States howitzers Japan T-74 105mm, T-75 155mm, and 203mm

self-propelled howitzers -doMortars 81mm and 107mm United States

Estimated Number in Inventory

300 870

230

700

500

300

1,360 Rocket launchers 75mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, and 106mm .... Japan T-75 130mm multiple rocket launchers -doAir-defense guns 35mm, 37mm, and 40mm United States

Surface-to-surface missiles T-30 Japan

Antitank missiles T-64, T-79, and T-87 -doSurface-to-air guided missiles Stinger United States Improved HAWK -do- T-81 Tan Japan

Aircraft Fixed-wing

LR-1 Japan

TL-1 -doAttack helicopters AH-IS United States Transport helicopters AS-332L(VIP) Japan

CH-47J -do- V-107/A -do- OH-6J/D -do- UH-1B/H -do- TH-55 (training) -doSource: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-90, London, 1989,

2,750

70

75

50

500

180 200

40

17

2 40

3949

163 13920

162-64.

506
Appendix

Table 40. Major Maritime Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989

Estimated Country of Number in Type and Description Origin Inventory Submarines (SS) Y5shio class with 533mm torpedo tubes, 7 with Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles . . Japan 10 Uzushio class with 533mm torpedo tubes . . . -do- 4 Guided missile destroyers (DDG)

Hatakaze class with SM-1MR Standard

surface-to-air missile, Harpoon surface-to- surface missile, ASROC antisubmarine

system, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 2 Tachikaze class with SM-1MR Standard

surface-to-air missile, Harpoon surface-to- surface missile, ASROC antisubmarine

system, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 3 Amatsukaze class with SM-1MR Standard

surface-to-air missile, ASROC anti- submarine system, and antisubmarine

torpedo tubes -do- 1 Frigates with helicopters (FFH)

Shirane class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- submarine warfare helicopters, ASROC

antisubmarine system, antisubmarine

torpedo tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 2 Haruna class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- submarine warfare helicopters, ASROC

antisubmarine system, antisubmarine

torpedo tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 2 Asagiri class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- submarine warfare helicopter, Harpoon

surface-to-surface missiles, ASROC anti- submarine system, and antisubmarine

torpedo tubes -do- 4 Hatsuyuki class with HSS-2B Sea King anti- submarine warfare helicopter, Harpoon

surface-to-surface missiles, ASROC anti- submarine system, and antisubmarine

torpedo tubes -do- 12

Frigates (FF) Takatsuki class with Harpoon surface-to- surface missiles, antisubmarine warfare

rocket launcher, antisubmarine torpedo

tubes, and 127mm guns -do- 4 Yamagumo class with ASROC antisubmarine

system, antisubmarine warfare rocket launcher, and antisubmarine torpedo tubes -do- 6 Minegumo class with ASROC antisubmarine

system, antisubmarine warfare rocket launchers, and antisubmarine torpedo

tubes -do- 3

507
Japan: A Country Study

Table 40. —Continued

• ±iiStima.tcci v^ountry ot ^Jumber in Type find Description. Ongin Inventory Yuban class with Harpoon surface-to-suriace

missiles, antisubmarine warfare rocket launchers, and antisubmarine torpedo

Japan 2 Ishikari class with Harpoon surface-to-surface

nmccilf*c anticunmann*1 warfare YCioitf^t llllooJJCo, aJ.lU.oU.LIIlla.XJJ.lC Walldi C ILIL-JVCL launcher, and antisubmarine torpedo tubes -do- 1 WlUAUcU Ucloo Willi iiul\\y\J (UlllOUUlllcU lilt system and antisubmarine torpedo tubes . . -do- 11

Tqiitii io u/j u rlaQQ tiaoo witH vv 1 tj. i aiiiiouuiiicii anti«!iiKmflnnp iiic warfarp vvaiiai t rrirlrpt iu^iv^i. launcher and antisubmarine torpedo tubes -do- 2 K.3ton clciss with 3,ntisiibrn.3.rin.c w3.rf3.rc rocket launcher and antisubmarine torpedo tubes -do- -UO- 1 A -UO- t / -ao- c

O

... . -ao- 1 9

Fixed-wing aircraft United States DU P-2J -do- 29 EP-y -do- 2 TTP-9T -Hr>- 3

J _ -aoj„ -ao- 99 TO on. /t to qa j„ -ao- 90

V<s_ 1 1 \A Japan 4

T TO 1 /1 A -do- Q KM-2 -do- 30 YS-11T -do- 10

Helicopters

HSS-2A/B -do- 74 V-107/A -do- 4 S-80 -do- 2 OH-6D/J -do- 10 SH-60 United States 2 S-61 -do- 10 Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-90, London, 1989, 162-64.

508
Appendix

Table 41. Major Air Self-Defense Force Equipment, 1989

Estimated Country of Number in Type and Description Origin Inventory Ground- attack aircraft Mitsubishi F-l Japan 74

Fighters F-15J/DJ United States 120 F-4EJ -do- 125 Reconnaissance aircraft RF-4EJ -do- 15 Airborne early-warning aircraft E-2C -do- 8 Transport aircraft C-l Japan 27 YS-11 -do- 10 C-130H United States 10

Surface-to-air missiles Nike-J (being replaced by Patriots) -do- 180

Air-to-air missiles Sparrow -do- n.a. Sidewinder -do- n.a. Air-defense systems Base Air Defense Ground Environment Japan 28 (BADGE) control and warning units United States

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-90, London, 1989, 162-64.

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569
Japan: A Country Study

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571
L
Glossary

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Established in

1967 to foster cooperation in food production, industry and

commerce, civil aviation, shipping, tourism, communications,

meteorology, science and technology, and Southeast Asian

studies. The charter members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei was admitted

in 1984. Papua New Guinea has observer status. Bretton Woods System—A structure of fixed exchange rates developed at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which established the International Monetary Fund (q. v. ) and the World

Bank (q.v.), and was in effect until 1971.

bushido—Literally, the way of the warrior (samurai), a term applied to the principles of loyalty and honor; a code of stoic en- durance, scorn of danger and death, religious worship of

country and sovereign, and proper social relationships; an aesthetic life- style.

Diet—The national legislature. From 1890 to 1947, known as the

Imperial Diet (in Japanese, Teikoku Gikai) with the appointed

House of Peers and the elected House of Representatives; since

1947, the National Diet or Diet (in Japanese, Kokkai) with the

House of Councillors and the House of Representatives, both

of which are elected. The word diet comes from the Latin dies (day), a reference to the period of time for which a court or assembly met.

FY—Fiscal year. April 1 through March 31.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—An international instrument, under United Nations (UN) auspices, es- tablishing rules of trade accepted by countries responsible for most of the world's trade; came into effect in 1948. Since 1968

has operated in conjunction with the UN Conference on Trade

and Development (UNCTAD) to provide information and

training on export markets, marketing techniques, and trade

policy issues. GATT members have met in a series of "rounds"

for multilateral trade negotiations since 1964.

GDP—Gross domestic product. The total value of all final (consumption and investment) goods and services produced by an economy in a given period, usually a year. GNP—Gross national product. GDP (q.v.) plus income from overseas investments minus the earnings of foreign investors in the

home economy.

573
Japan: A Country Study

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- ing international exchange loans to its members (including in- dustrialized and developing countries) when they experience

balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry

conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

juku—Privately established schools that teach either academic or nonacademic subjects. Academic^a offer tutorial, enrichment,

remedial, and examination preparatory classes that supplement

regular school work. Most hold classes after school and/or on

weekends.

Nihon (or Nippon)—The official pronunciation of the two Chinese

ideographs (rtben in pinyin romanization, literally, source of

the sun) comprising the name Japan, as designated by the

Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, is Nippon (or

in full, Nippon Koku—Nippon country). The common pronunciation in everyday usage, however, is Nihon (Nihon Koku).

The use of Nihon antedates Prince Shotoku's seventh-century

reference to himself as the Son of Heaven of the Land of the

Rising Sun and possibly dates from the establishment of the

Nihon-fu (Japan Office) in the Yamato (q. v. ) colony in southern

Korea that served as a liaison office of the Yamato court to the Chinese court, probably as early as the sixth century. Marco

Polo, or his scribe, referred to Zipangu (Ribenguo in pinyin

romanization), which has variously appeared as Cipango,

Jipangu, and Jipan, from which the current spelling ofJapan

undoubtedly descends.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD)—Established in 1961 to promote economic and social welfare among member countries (in 1990, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic

of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,

Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,

Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United

States) by assisting member governments in the formulation

and coordination of policy; and to encourage member-nation

support of developing (Third World) nations.

ronin—Originally, a "wave person" or a masterless samurai, who

has left the service of his lord, either by choice or forced cir- cumstances, and serves others with his bold and sometimes

desperate deeds. In contemporary Japan, a student who has

failed the entrance examination to the institution of choice and

574
Glossary

has chosen to spend an additional year or more in study to take

the examination again.

seppuku —either voluntary (to expiate serious failure) or obligatory

suicide (instead of execution) to regain one's honor in death.

A privilege reserved for the samurai class. Commonly referred

to as hara-kiri.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but

administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu- tions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,

member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF

q.v.).

Yamato—Refers to the country ofJapan or things Japanese, such

as yamato-e (Japanese painting) and to the ancient court from

which the imperial family rose. The Yamato court was situated

either in modern Nara Prefecture, from the early fourth cen- tury A.D. , or in northern Kyushu, starting perhaps in the early

third century A.D.

yen (¥)—The national currency, in coins of 1, 5, 10, and 100 yen

and notes of 500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 yen. From 1945

to 1971, Japan maintained a fixed parity to the United States

dollar of US$1 = ¥360. After a period of adjustment during the

financial crises of the 1971-73 period, the value has floated ac- cording to movements in the international capital markets. The

exchange rate in August 1990 was ¥147 = US$1 . Fluctuations

in recent years have been considerable, producing exchange

rates for US$1 of ¥142 (August 1989), ¥134 (August 1988),

¥149 (August 1987), ¥155 (August 1986), and ¥239 (August

1985)

yobiko—A type of private school that specializes in preparing highschool graduates for university-entrance examinations, often

through intensive full-time programs.

575
Japan: A Country Study

zaibatsu—Literally, ' 'wealth group." Zaibatsu were powerful industrial or financial combines that merged during the Meiji era and were implicated in the militarist regimes of the 1930s and

1940s. They were an amalgamation of sometimes hundreds of

businesses controlled by a holding company owned by a single

family. The major zaibatsu were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto,

and Yasuda. The zaibatsu were abolished in 1945 and 1946.

After 1947, numerous companies formerly controlled by zaibatsu came together as keiretsu (enterprise groups)—conglomerates no longer controlled by a singe family and whose individual

member companies had greater autonomy than they had had

as part of a zaibatsu.

576
Index

Abe Kobo, 190 Abe Masahiro, 34, 35; opposition to, 35 Abu Dhabi, 229

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 125

Administrative Management Agency, 355

administrative reform, 344, 353

aerospace industry {see also space pro- gram), 232, 234

Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 291, 377, 391, 398, 400, 404, 421 AFL-CIO. See American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations

Africa: aid to, 293-94; direct investment

in, 279, 290; exports to, 290; imports

from, 290

Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung), 407 Agency for Cultural Affairs, 165, 167; budget, 165; Cultural Affairs Division,

165; preservation roster, 166

age stratification, 121-23

aging: of Japanese population, 223; of labor force, 223

agriculture, 82, 199, 226, 337; labor force

in, 204, 244; performance of, 231, 245;

subsidies for, 204, 245

Agriculture, Ministry of, 258

agricultural cooperatives, 339

agricultural production, 33, 245; crops, 79, 81, 82; livestock, 246; self-sufficiency in, 246

agricultural products: import restrictions on, 266, 339; imported from United

States, 283 AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

Aikokusha (Society of Patriots), 42 Ainu, 13, 93, 329, 335; handicrafts of, 178; population of, 77 Air Defense Command, 443-44

Air Developing and Proving Command,

443

airlines, 236, 240

Air Materiel Command, 443

airports, 240

Air Self-Defense Force, 429, 451, 452,

455; materiel, 444; missions, 435, 444;

number of, 443; training, 444; units of, 443

Air Support Command, 443

Akahata (Red Flag), 361-62

Akihito (Heisei emperor), 310, 332; ac- cession of, 310, 312, 470

Akira (Otomoto), 192 Akutagawa Prize, 167

Alien Registration Law, 459

Allied Expeditionary Force, 51

All Nippon Airways, 240, 345

amakudari, 213, 354 Amami Islands, 72, 387 Amaterasu Omikami (Sun Goddess), 4, 11 American Federation of Labor-Congress

of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),

340 Ando Tadao, 169-70

Ansei Reform, 35 Anti-Comintern Pact, 58

archaeology, 4, 166

architecture, 168-70; in Meiji period, 168;

in Muromachi culture, 23; New Wave,

169; origins of Japanese style of, 4; skyscraper design, 168; synthesis of Western and traditional, 169; traditional

styles, 168 armed forces. See military

art {see also under art forms): Chinese in- fluence on, 162; facilities for, 167-68;

imitative, 164; individuality in, 98; in- ternational, 164; miniature forms, 162; patronage for, 167; schools, 165; struc- tural devices, 163; suggestion in, 163; synthesized Western and traditional, 164; Zen Buddhist influence on, 164

art, traditional, xxxii; endangered, on pres- ervation roster, 166; as mukei bunkazai, 166-67; in Muromachi culture, 22-23;

in popular culture, 117; taught to chil- dren, 132; technical virtuosity as hall- mark of, 165; training in, 165; under Tokugawa, 32

art, Western, xxxii; in Meiji period, 164

Article 9 ("no war" clause), 312, 375, 421, 428

artisans, 30 577
Japan: A Country Study

artist, social status of, 164-65

Arts Festival, 167

Asahi Shimbun, 342, 364, 432 Asanuma Inejiro, 364 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Ashikaga court, 180 Ashikaga School (Ashikaga Gakko), 133 Ashikaga Takauji, 21 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 22; restoration of order under, 22; reunification of north and south under, 22; trade with Chinese

under, 22

Asia: aid to, 293-94, 409, 413; exports

to, 285; imports to, 285; investment in, 286; trade surplus with, 286

Asia, Southeast: Chinese support for, 398; Japanese support for, 398; deforestation

of, 85; strategic position of, 391

Asia, Southwest: Chinese support for, 398; Japanese support for, 398

Asian Development Bank, xxx, 262, 263, 415, 416

Asia-Pacific: balance of power in, 370;

direct investment in, 279

Association of Repatriates, 335

Association of Shinto Shrines, 101 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), xxxv, 294, 398, 408; aid to, 408-9

associations: merchant, 115; neighborhood, 115; shrine, 115; women's, 120 Asuka, 7, 10, 166 Asuka STOL jet, 234

Atelier Miura, 179 Atsumi Kiyoshi, 192

Austin, Lewis, 334

Australia, 455; economic involvement in, 409- 10; imports from, 282; investment

in, 288-89; nuclear technology imported

from, 229; trade surplus with Japan, 288 automobile manufacturing (see also motor

vehicles), xxxi, 198, 204, 207, 232

automobiles, 236, 250; exports of, 259, 268, 279, 283

aviation, civil, 240; passengers, 240

awamori, 339

Axis powers, 374

Azuchi, 25 Azuchi-Momoyama period, 25

Bachnik, Jane, 113, 117

Bahamas, 290

bakufu, Ashikaga, 21-22, 23, 25; art under, 172; Muromachi culture under, 22

bakufu, Kamakura, 17-18, 21; attempt to expand, 18; control of imperial court

by, 18; decline of, 21; foreign affairs under, 20; loss of power, 18

bakufu, Tokugawa, 27, 34, 329; abolished, 36, 37; damage to, 35; disruption of, 34; increase in government by, 31

bakuhan, 28

balance of payments, 265, 273-82, 276, 387; capital flows in, 274; deficit, 257; long-term capital account, 276

balance of power: in Asia-Pacific, 370

Bandai-Asahi National Park, 78 Bando Tamasaburo, 187 Bangladesh, 294 banking system: commercial banks, 209, 214; control of, 353; long-term credit banks, 209, 210; mutual loan and sav- ings banks, 209, 210; trust banks, 209, 210 Bank of Japan, 205, 209, 258, 277 Bank of Tokyo, 209

bar hopping, 94, 116

Basic Agricultural Law, 245

Basic Air Defense Ground Environment, 444

Basic Atomic Energy Law, 429

Basic Policy for National Defense, 434

Baykal, Lake, 50

Beckett, Samuel, 186 Beiping (see also Beijing), 58, 425

Bellah, Robert, 104

Bering Sea, 48

Besshi copper mine, 81 Betsuyaku Minoru, 186

Biddle, James, 34

biotechnology, 232, 233

biwa, 180 Biwa, Lake, 25, 74 Board of Audit, 318 Board of Audit Law, 318 Board of House Administrators, 26 Board of Mediators, 26 Board of Regents, 26

Bolshevik Revolution, 50 Bon Festival, 108 Bonin Islands (Ogasawara Islands), 72, 387, 388 Booker Prize, 190 578
Index

books, 342 Boxer Uprising, 47 Brady Plan (1989), 262, 290

Brazil, 289

Bretton Woods System, 256, 271, 272, 280

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 405

Britain, 223; agreements with, 50; deteri- oration of relations with, 58; exports, 282, 286; exports as percentage of GNP, 267; imports from, 286; invest- ment by, in United States, 285; Japan

as ally of, 54, 374; political relations with, 47

British Trades Union Congress, 340

Broadcasting Law (1950), 193, 243

Brunei, xxxv, 228, 408 Buddha, Amida, 20 Buddha Dainichi, 11 Buddhism, xxvii, 31, 32, 100, 101-4; adoption of, 8, 11; ancestral and funer- ary rites, 104, 107-8; and art, 131;

clergy, 104; festivals, 108; in Kamakura

period, 19-20; influence of, xxxii, 101,

131; introduction of, xxvii, 7, 133; music

in, 180; origin of, 101; "poignancy of

things," 131, 190-91; prohibitions

against killing, 91; resistance to, 8; resurgence of, 37-38; spread of, 12; syn- creted with Shinto, 11; temples, 104;

three treasures of, 11; values, 104; world

view, 101 Buddhism, Heian, 18-20 Buddhism, Jodo (Pure Land), 19-20, 101-4 Buddhism, Nara, 11 Buddhism, Nichiren Shoshu, 64, 101-4,

106, 336, 360 Buddhism, Shingon (True Word), 12, 23 Buddhism, Tendai (Heavenly Terrace), 12 Buddhism, Zen, 18-20, 106; appeal of, for samurai, 104; artistic forms in, 131, 176; importance of education in, 133; in- fluences of, 22; influence of, on art, 163-64, 174; in poetry, 189; priests, 22 Buddhist commentary, 187 budget process, 356

bugaku, 180

bullying, 145, 147, 150

Bungei Shunju (Literary Annals), 342

bunraku (puppet) theater, xxxii, 32, 180, 182-83; elements of, 182; women in, 183

burakumin, 90, 91-93, 329, 334; discrimi- nation against, 91; identification of, 92;

isolation of, 92; liberation of, 92-93 Burakumin Liberation League, 92, 335

bureaucracy. See civil service Bureau for Investigation of Constitutional Systems, 43

burial chambers, 6 Burma, 407

buses, 239

Bush, George, 391

bushi. See samurai

bushido. See also under samurai, 422-23; de- velopment of, 31, 423; legacy of, xxvii, 422, 423

butoh dance, 185-86

cabinet, 317-18, 458; responsibilities of, for foreign affairs, 378

Cabinet Law, 436

Cabinet Legislative Bureau, 318

Calder, Kent, 336, 337, 338

calligraphy, xxxii, 174; Bokusho abstract school of, 174; incorporated into painting, 173, 174; styles of, 174; Zen Buddhist influence on, 174 Cambodia, xxxv, 398, 411-12 Canada, 455; balance of trade with Japan,

285; cooperation of, in space program,

244; exports as percentage of GNP, 267; imports from, 282; investment by, in United States, 285; limits by, on Japanese imports, 295; nuclear technology

imported from, 229

capital flows, 275-80, 281; controls on, 278; decontrol of, 278; direct invest- ment, 279; effect of government policy on, 277-78; foreign-exchange reserves, 277; gold reserves, 277; growth of, 276; long-term, 276; short-term, 277

capital markets: liberalization of, 278; participation in, 276

capital movements, 276

Caroline Islands, 50, 424

casties, 25

Central Association of Korean Residents

in Japan, 335

Central Council on Education, 138

Central Japan Railway Company, 236

Central Procurement Office, 451

Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, 339 579
Japan: A Country Study

ceramics, 176-78; Chinese influence, 177;

folk movement in, 177; glazes, 177; Jomon ware, 176; Korean influence, 176, 177-78; porcelain, 176; stoneware,

176; Yayoi ware, 176 "ceramic wars," 176 Chang'an, 10, 12 Chang Jiang (Yangtze River), 46 Charter Oath: implementation of, 37; provisions of, 36-37

chemicals, 204, 207, 398 Chemulpo (Inch' on), 48

cherry blossoms, 56, 131 Chiang Kai-shek, 55 Chikamatsu Monzaemon, 32, 182, 184, 188

children: arts training of, 132; custody of, 120; inheritance by, 112; marriage by, 112; neighborhood activities of, 115 China (see also under individual dynasties; see also China, People's Republic of; Sino- Japanese War; Taiwan), 23, 53, 73, 110; anti-Japanese riots in, 51; disputes with, 41; end ofJapan's subordination

to, 8; Hideyoshi's desire to conquer,

27; neutrality toward, 54; as part of Japanese empire, 199, 424; relations with, 20, 46; Russo-Japanese rivalry over, 403

China, People's Republic of: aid to, 294,

392; containment of, 393; cultural revo- lution in, 395; economic development

in, 397; imports from, 282; investment

in, 291, 301; nuclear force, 430; policy toward, 394; rapprochement with United States, 64, 389, 393; security

problem, 430; trade deficit, 399; trade

with, xxxvi, 290-91, 395-96; war reparations demands, 395

Chinese: discrimination against, 90; refu- gees, 91 Chinese influence, xxvii, 13-14; end of, 14; on Japanese culture, 3, 22, 133; on

Japanese expansion, 6; on Japanese

government, 3, 6, 13; on literature, 188; on Yamato culture, 7, 8; on Yayoi

culture, 5 Chinese traders, 30 Chinese writing system, xxvii, 133, 187

chonin class, 33, 188

chonindo, 31-32 Choshu, 36, 37, 38, 44

Christianity, 27, 30, 100, 106; impact of,

24; legalized, 38; suppression of, 24-25,

29, 30, 32, 106

Christians: execution of, 30; number of, 106; persecution of, 30

Chronicle of the Direct Descent of the Di- vine Sovereigns. See Jinno shoto ki Chrysler, 295 Chubu, 78-79; Hokuriku district, 79; Tokai district, 79; Tosan district, 79 Chugoku, 80 Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction), 470

Chuo koron (Central Review), 342

Churchill, Winston, 306

Churitsu Roren. See Federation of Inde- pendent Labor Unions

C. Itoh, 260

citizen movements, 341

Civil Code of 1948: women's rights in, xxx, 120

civil disturbances, 456, 462, 469-70;

decrease in, after occupation, 64; demonstrations for universal male suffrage, 51; under Meiji oligarchy, 41; peaceful demonstrations, 469; put down by

force, 330; under Tokugawa, 33, 34,

36, 330

civil rights, 307

civil servants, 350-54; categories of, 318;

typical, 351

civil servants, elite, 343, 346, 351, 353;

administrative vice ministers, 351; cir- culation of, 333; private lives sacrificed by, 355; public's attitude toward, 351

civil service, 97, 350, 351-54; examinations, 351; politicization of, 353; as power behind National Diet, 352; ties

of, with interest groups and parties, 335, 354; under Tokugawa, 33

clans (see also under names of individualfamilies), 3; power of, under Hqjo, 21

clan system, 15

climate, xxvii, 82-83; influencing factors, 83; precipitation, 83; seasons, 82-83

coal, 81, 200, 227-28, 398, 399 CoCom. See Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls Code of Criminal Instruction (1880), 466 Code of Criminal Procedures, 472 Cold War, 61, 375, 428; end of, 377 Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic

and Social Development in Asia and the

Pacific, 407, 415 Columbia Pictures, 353 580
Index

comic books. See manga

Comintern. See Communist International Commerce and Industry, Ministry of, 258 Commission on US-Japan Relations for the Twenty First Century, 385

communications: in feudal period, 24; modernization of, 39-40 Communications and Broadcasting Satellite Organization, 193 communist countries: exports to, 291; imports from, 291 Communist International (Comintern), 52-53 community: consciousness, 330; egalitar- ian, 332; hierarchical, 332; inclusive- ness, 330; survival, 330 company song, 116

competition: avoidance of, 94; suppression of, 95 computers, xxxi, 207, 232, 298-99; artificial intelligence project, 197; develop- ment of industry, 298; export of, 283,

298; growth of, 201; imports of, 298; in lower-secondary schools, 146; manufacturers, 298; in primary schools, 145; as subject of trade disputes, 298-99

Conference of Prefectural Governors, 42

confessions, forced, 328-29, 464, 472

Confucianism {see also neo-Confucianism),

38, 100, 104-6; in education, 134; emphasis of, 96; essence of, 104; ideals of, 131-32; influence of, xxxii, 8, 96, 104, 131, 205; in Tokugawa period, 31 Confucius, 104

conscription: established, 423; in Nara

period, 11 consensus: importance of, 94; process, 334

constables, 22

Constitutional Study Mission, 43

Constitution of 1947, xxxii, 60, 306-14,

435; academic freedom under, 313, 314; Article 9 ("no war" clause), 312,

312, 428; attempts to revise, 308; Diet under, 309, 314; duties and rights in, 313-14; education in, 137; foreign af- fairs under, 378; MacArthur draft of, 307-8; proscription of military in, 199, 312; welfare rights, 313-14; women's

rights in, xxx, 120, 314

construction, 198, 200, 227; investment

in, 227; projects, 227; starts, 227; tech- nology, 227; trade agreement on, xxxiv

Construction, Ministry of, 258; responsibilities of, 205-6

consumer: credit industry, 249; movements, 341; products, 250; services, neglect of, 203-4

Constitution of the Empire ofJapan. See Meiji Constitution (1889) Convention on Law of the Sea, 410

cooperation: importance of, 94; self-control

in, 99

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), 292

corporate system: elite in, 354; groupings, 214; and government, 337

corporations, large, 216; competitive ex- aminations for, 216-17; employees of, 216; training by, 216

corporations, private, 213-16; auditing

system, 216; corporation, 213-14; cross- holding of stock by, 215; number of, 213; overborrowing by, 215; relations among, 214-15, 215; relationship of, with labor union, 225; research and

development funded by, 230; single proprietorships, 213

corporations, public, 212-13, 318; benefits of, to economy, 213; development

corporations, 213; number of, 212; problems with, 213; public service cor- porations, 212-13

cost of living, 86-87, 247-48; food prices, 248; household expenditures, 248

Council of Elders, 42 Council of State, 18, 37, 42, 43 Course of Study for Elementary Schools, 144 Course of Study for Lower-Secondary

Schools, 146, 147 Course of Study for Preschools, 141 Course of Study for Upper-Secondary

Schools, 146, 147

court system, 435; appeal in, 473; family courts, 471; judges in, 472; lower

courts, 471; overburdened, 326-27;

penalties, 473

crime, 467-69; categories, 467; juvenile

delinquency, 469, 473; most common,

467-68; white-collar, 468; yakuza, 469

crime rate, xxxii, 422, 456; decreasing, 456, 468; factors in, 468

criminal justice procedure, 471-73

criminal justice system, 456, 465-67; agency cooperation, 466; citizen partici- pation, 466; confessions, forced, 328-29, 581
Japan: A Country Study

464, 472; courts in, 471; discretion of

officials, 466; German influence on,

467; juveniles in, 471, 473; under Meiji

Restoration, 466-67; prosecution, 472;

prosecutors, 472; rights of accused, 467, 471-72

Cultural Medal, 166

Cultural Properties Foundation, 167

Cultural Properties Protection Act (1897), 166

Cultural Properties Protection Division,

166, 167

Cultural Village, 168

culture, traditional {see also under individ- ual activities), xxxii current account balance, 282; formula for, 275; net transfers, 274; surplus, 281; value of yen in, 280-81

Daigo (emperor), 14

Dai-Ichi Kangyo, 214

Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, 261

daimyo, 22, 23, 34, 176; assumption of government by, 37; classes of, 28; control of land by, 24; conversion to Christianity by, 24; criminal justice under,

466; defeat of, 25; investment by, 45-

46; laws regulating, 29, 30; under Meiji

Restoration, 39

Daini Denden, 244 Daiwa, 210-11, 261 Dalian (Port Arthur), 47, 48

dance: ballet, 185; butoh, 184; jazz, 185; Kabuki, 184; modern, 195; traditional, 184-85 Daoism, 100, 104, 106

Darien. See Dalian, 47 Dazai Osamu, 190

death, causes of, 87 Defense Agency, 66, 318, 379, 421, 429, 430-31, 435-39, 446, 450, 453; duties

of, 436; members of, 436; structure of, 436, 437; subordinate to civilian authority, 436

Defense Facilities Administration Agency,

451 Defense Facilities Officer, 436

defense industry, 451-54; contracts in, 453; dismantled, 428; equipment, 452;

objectives for, 452; origins of post-war, 451-52; output, 453; weapons for export, 453-54

Defense Policy, Bureau of, 436

defense spending, 65, 199, 230-31, 447-51; budget, 451; build-up plans, 450; ceiling, 432; ceiling abandoned,

432; increase in, 450; lower priority, 450; qualitative improvements, 450; share of budget, 450

Delors, Jacques, xxxv

Democratic Merchants and Manufacturers Association, 338 Democratic Party (Minshuto), 61, 63 Democratic Socialist Party, 65, 336, 340, 357, 361, 362, 382 Deng Xiaoping, 394 Department of Rites, 10 Department of State, 10 dependency ratio, 87-88 Deshima: Rangaku school in, 32; trade

restricted to, 30

diet, 248-49

Diet (legislature). See Imperial Diet; National Diet diplomatic service, requirements for ad- mission to, 379

diplomacy: toward Asia, 375; omnidirectional, 375

diplomats, 40, 318

discipline, 200; in school, 144, 149

discrimination, 71, 90-93; against Ainu,

93; against burakumin, 90, 150; in education, 147, 150; against foreign resi- dents, 90-91; against Japanese who

have lived abroad, 90, 147

divorce: rate, 113; and women, 120 Doi Takako, xxxvi, 317, 339, 357, 360; background of, 359; popularity of, 359; support of, for ties with Koreas, 359 Doko Toshio, 355 Domei. SeeJapan Confederation of Labor

Domestic Relations and Inheritance Law

(1898), 112 Doshisha University, 184

Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 186, 187 DRAMs. See dynamic random-access memory units Dreams (Kurosawa), 191 Dunhuang, China, 167 Dutch: arrival of, 24; restriction on trade by, 30 Dutch East Indies, 426 dynamic random-access memory units (DRAMs), 299 582
Index

earthquakes, 83-84

East Japan Railway Company, 236

East European Development Bank, 416 economic activity, 33 economic aggression, 370

economic development, 198, 226; goal of, 198; government influence in, 204;

post-World War II, 200, 256; and sense of vulnerability, 272, 273 economic exchanges, 384 economic growth, xxviii, 65, 408; Ministry of Finance role in, 208; problems

with, 203 Economic Planning Agency, 258, 436 economic power, 386, 406 economic problems, 52, 53 economic reforms, 372 economic relations, factors shaping, 255 economic restructuring, 197 economy: changes in domestic, 255-56; changes in international, 255-56; emphasis, 197; government mechanisms

to affect, 206; rising power of, 386 Eda Saburo, 358 Edo {see also Tokyo), 27, 29, 35; chonindo culture in, 31-32; population of, 31 Edo Bay, 34

education (see also under type ofschool), xxxixxxii, 200; academic achievement, 132;

adult, xxxii; beliefs about 142-43; of commoners, in Tokugawa period, 134;

curricula, 143, 144, 145; demands made

by, 143; democratization of, 135; fund- ing for, 139, 158; health care in, 143; Japanese values in, 134; lifelong, xxxii, 160, 161; literature in, 188; moral

values in, xxxii, 135; reform of, 159; of samurai, 133-34; school year, 141-

42; textbooks, 143; twentieth century,

135; Western style, 134

education, early childhood: day care, 141;

at home, 141; Montessori method, 135; preschool, 1414

education, graduate, 157-58, 158-59,

216; and competitiveness, 161; enroll- ment, 157-58; issues in reform of, 160-

61; women in, 158

education, higher (see also universities), xxxii, 133; admissions processes, 155; campus unrest, 136, 388; college entrance, 152-55; competition, 152-54;

elitism in, 135; entrance examinations

for, 152, 154; internationalization of,

160; junior college, 156; liberal, 135; miscellaneous schools, 156-57; private

institutions, 152; public national

universities, 152; quality of, 159; re- form, 159-61; special training schools, 158; technical college, 157; universities, 155-56; for women, 135

education, moral, xxxii, 144, 146; abolished, 135; reinstated, 136; venues for, 139

education, public: development of, 134

education reform, 136-37, 159-61; educational aspects, 137; recommendations

for, 159-60; social aspects, 137 Education, Science, and Culture, Ministry of (Monbusho), 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 158-59, 165, 311, 354; budget,

139; conflict of, with Japan Teachers Union, 140-41; control by, 327; powers of, 138; reform implemented by,

138; responsibilities of, 138, 158-59;

right to determine curriculum, 326

education, social, 161-62; availability of, 161-62; miscellaneous schools for, 161;

responsibility for, 161

education, special, 147-48; mainstreaming, 147; private schools, 148; public

schools, 147-48

education system: legal foundation of, 137; local boards in, 138; prefectural boards in, 138; problems in, 136; struc- ture of, 132 Eguchi Takaya, 185 Egypt: aid to, 294, 391 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 388

elderly, 121-23; employment of, 122, 224;

health insurance for, 124; living arrange- ments, 122-23; medical care, 123;

respect for, 122; suicide among, 122

elections: first national, 44; House of Representatives, 347; Liberal Democratic

Party in, 347

Election Systems Research Council, 355

electoral districts, 323-24; distribution, 323; reapportionment, 324

electoral system, 320-24; age require- ments for candidates, 321; campaigns,

323, 346; elections, 321-23; political funding, 321-23, 360; types of elec- tions, 320; voting age, 320

electronic components, xxxi

electronics, 204; import restrictions on, 266 583
Japan: A Country Study

electronics, consumer, xxxi, 232, 296-98;

export of, 296; foreign investment in, 296-98; growth of, 201

Emishi. See Ainu

emperor, xxviii, 166, 422, 470; divinity

repudiated, 60, 101, 110, 308; revering, 36, 55; role of, 110, 307, 308-12;

as symbol of unity, 36, 307; succession,

10, 310; Tokugawa power over, 28-29 Emperor's Private Office, 13, 14 empire, twentieth century, xxviii-xxix, 199 Employee Pension Insurance Plan, 125

employees, permanent, 217; bonuses, 220; changing attitudes, 222-23; compensation for, 217, 223; evaluation of, 217;

fringe benefits, 220; job switching by, 222-23; of large corporations, 216;

layoffs of, 218; loyalty, 222; promotion

of, 217, 218; qualifications, 217; retire- ment, 218, 223-24; training of, 217; working conditions, 220; working hours, 220 employment, 116, 197; in agriculture, 244; bosses, 116; lifetime model, 116, 117, 330; mandatory retirement, 116,

122; permanent, 217; small business as provider of, 215; team effort, 116; and

university background, 152, 216 Endo Shusaku, 190

energy, 228-29; coal, 228, 270; consumption, 228, 229; electric, 200, 228, 229; geothermal, 229; hydroelectric, 74, 81, 228; importation of, 271; natural gas, 79, 227, 228-29; nuclear, 207, 227,

228, 229; oil, 79, 228, 270; price in- crease in, 257 Ensemble Nipponica, 183

entertainment, 118; bar hopping as, 94;

in late twentieth century, 71; under Tokugawa, 33 Enthronement Ceremony, 310

entrance examinations, 152, 154; debate

over, 154-55; kinds of, 154; preparation for, 154 Entry and Exit Control Law, 459

Environmental Agency, 85, 341 environmental disasters, 84, 341 environmental issues, 204; citizens' movements regarding, 84-85, 229; public

perception of, 85-86

Equal Employment Opportunity Law,

120

Equipment, Bureau of, 436

Ethnological Museum, 167 Etorofu (see also Kuril Islands), xxxv, 72, 400-3

Eto Shimpei, 41 Europe: "learning mission" to, 40; stu- dents in, 198 European Commission, xxxv

European Community, xxxv; cooperation

with, xxxv; trade with Japan after EC92, 287, 295, 414

Europe, Eastern: aid to, 413-14; collapse of communism in, 349, 369, 381, 385; support for, 391; trade with, 290

Europe, Western: cooperation of, in space program, 244; direct investment in, 287; exports to, 286; imports from,

286; involvement in Japanese product

development, 233; relations with, 414;

restrictions by, on Japanese imports,

287, 295; trade deficits with Japan, 287 exchange rate: determining import levels, 271; fixed, 257, 281; in 1971, 281; in 1973, 281 Exim Bank. See Japan Export-Import

Bank

Expo '70. See Osaka International Exposition export policy, xxi, 264-65; incentives, 264; restraining, 264-65

export products, 269; demand for, 268;

price competitiveness of, 268; quality

of, 268

exports, xxx, 267-69; aggressive backing

of, 268-69; destinations of, 282; growth

of, 257, 267, 268; importance of, 207;

limits on, 295; nature of, 255; to pay

for imports, 255; as percentage of GNP, xxxi, 267; promotion of, 264; to the United States, 265, 282, 384; value

of, during 1960s, 256; and value of yen, 277 Ezoe Hiromasa, 321

face, 114

factions in Liberal Democratic Party, 345;

in election campaigns, 346; funding by, 345; leaders, 345; number of, 345; ser- vices, 345

Fair Trade Commission, 214, 258, 379

family, 111-14; beyond life of current members, 112, 113; business, 117; 584
Index

changes in, after World War II, 71; as focus of leisure activities, 118; forms, 111-12; gender roles in, 113, 114; households, 112-13; mother-child ties in, 113; planning, 87; rural, 114; size, 87; uchi and, 111 Family Game, The (Morita), 192

farm: households, 245; population, 245

farmers, 30; income of, 219, 244; rice production by, 245; riots by, 38, 41 farmland, 245 February 26th Incident, 58

Federal Republic of Germany. See West Germany

Federation of Economic Organizations

(Keidanren), 337, 339, 355, 383, 453,

454; Defense Production Committee,

453

Federation of Independent Labor Unions

(Churitsu Roren), 225

fertility rate, 87

festivals. See matsuri feudal economy, xxviii feudal period, 17, 23-24; emperor in, 311; foreign policy in, 371; hierarchy,

28; infrastructure in, 23; legacy of, 305-6; society, 3; trade in, 24

film, 71; animated, 191; foreign, 191; por- nographic, 191; production, 191; Torasan series, 192 Finance, Bureau of, 436

Finance, Ministry of, 65, 208, 258, 279,

352, 379, 464; Budget Bureau, 208, 356;

responsibilities of, 205, 353; role of, in economic growth, 208; Tax Bureau, 208

financial institutions, xxix, 261-62, 318,

377, 415; city banks, 261; controls, 261; government-owned, 261; investment

houses, 261; life insurance companies,

261; loans by, to Latin America, 290

financial system, 209

Fiscal Investment and Loan Program,

208

fiscal policy, 207-8

fishing, 82, 83, 226; catches, 246; sea farming, 246-47

Five Power Naval Disarmament Treaty,

54, 424

flower arranging, xxxii; in Muromachi

culture, 23 Flying Training Command, 443

folk: art movement, 177, 179; dance, 183; music, 183

food: imports of, 271; processing, 232,

234; under Tokugawa, 33

Ford, 295

foreign affairs: economic nature of, 383; independence in, 382-83, 387; influ- ence of domestic policies on, 381 Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, 258, 309,

379, 379, 383, 384, 406; Foreign Service Training Institute, 378; Information Analysis, Research, and Planning Bureau, 378-79; staff, 378; Treaties Bureau, 378

foreign aid, 274-75, 369; bilateral, 293,

408; budget, 293; components of, 293; conduct of, 378; constraints, 408; dis- tribution of, 293-94; growth, 293, 414; motivation for, 414; responsibility for, 386; strategic, 377; tied, 293; untied, 293; use of, 294

foreign aid institutions, 262

foreign aid program, xxxi, 292-94; reparations payments as original, 293

foreign exchange: marketing, 281; markets, 277; reserves, 277; Tokyo market, 261; and value of yen, 280

Foreign Exchange and Foreign Control Law, 278

foreign influence, 305

foreign policy, xxxiii, 369; close cooperation with United States in, 375; consensus in, 379; economic independence

and, 375; feudal, 371; goals of, 375; groups opposing, 382; independent of United States, 376; influence of new

generation on, 370; international co- operation in, 375; Japan Socialist Party

position on, 381; Liberal Democratic

Party's role in, 383; need to revamp,

370, 377-78; public opinion of, 383;

responsibilities for, 378-79; role of geo- graphy in, 371; after World War I, 53

foreign relations, xxxv; independence in, 371; under Meiji oligarchy, 40

foreign residents: alien registration cards

for, 91

forest products: import restrictions on, 266

forestry: performance of, 231

Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of, 258

forests, 81, 226, 246 Four Power Treaty on Insular Possessions, 47, 54 585
Japan: A Country Study

France, 50; exports as percentage of GNP, 267; imports from, 286; Japan

as ally of, 54; nuclear technology imported from, 229

Francis Xavier (saint), 24

freight, 239 FSX, 234, 393, 451, 452; controversy, 452-53

fudai, 28, 35, 36

Fuji Bank, 261 Fujimoto Yoshimichi, 177

Fuji, Mount, 74, 131 Fujian Province (China), 47

Fujisan. See Fuji, Mount

Fuji-Sankei, 167, 214

Fujisawa Mitsu, 305

Fujitsu, 298

Fujiwara, 166 Fujiwara family, 11, 17, 58; destruction

of, 17; growth of power of, 14; support

of, by samurai, 16; war against, 18 Fujiwara Kamatari, 9 Fujiwara Michinaga, 14 Fujiwara Nakamaro, 12 Fujiwara regency, 12-15; art under, 15; culture under, 14; decline of, 16 Fujiwara Yorinaga, 17 Fukuda Takeo, 346, 347

Fukui, 79 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 40, 305 Fundamental Law of Education, 137

funeral mounds, 6

funerals, 107 Furui Yoshikichi, 190 Fushima, 26

fusuma, 179

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP. See gross domestic product

geisha, 32, 183 gender roles, 113 gender stratification, 118-21

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), xxx, 262, 265, 415, 416;

guidelines, 264-65; tariff-cutting under, 265

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), 225, 336, 340, 360

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),

280, 291 General Motors, 295

gengo system, 310

Genji monogatari (Tale of Genji) (Murasaki), 15, 111, 188, 192 Genpei War, 17

genro, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51 Gen'yosha (Black Ocean Society), 55 geography: artificial islands, 74; natural harbors, 74; Omote-Nihon (face of Japan), 73, 78; regions, 77-82; role of, in foreign policy, 371 ; Ura-Nihon (back of Japan), 73, 79 Germany (see also East Germany; West

Germany), 58; influence of, on Meiji

Constitution, 43

giri (duty), 97-98; conflict of, with ninjo, 98

Global Club, 363 Globe Theater, 168, 186 GNP. See gross national product

Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxxv, 292, 400, 405 Go-Daigo, 21; exiled, 21; rebellion, 21 Godzilla, 192 Go-Sanjo (emperor), 16 government: attitudes toward, 205; and

business, 337; cabinet, 317-18; control on family by, 112; mechanisms of, for affecting economy, 206; ministries, 317-18; National Diet, 314-17; reor- ganization of, 42, 43; research and de- velopment funded by, 230-31; unitary

system of, 319

government-business relations, conduct

of, 205 government, local, 318-20; administrative divisions, 318-19; assembly, 319;

cities, 319; governor, 319; mayor, 319;

subsidies, 319; towns, 319; villages, 319 Governors' Conference, 38 Graduate School for Advanced Studies, 161 Great Depression, xxviii, 199 Greater East Asia Conference, 59

Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, 58-59; inability to sustain, 60

Greater East Asia Ministry, 59 Great Thanksgiving Festival, 310-11 Gromyko, Andrei, 405

gross domestic product (GDP), 200

gross national product (GNP), 72, 197; exports as percentage of, xxxi; growth

in, xxxiv, 65; of Japan, 384; loans as percentage of, 208; ODA as percentage

of, 413; research and development as 586
Index

percentage of, 230; of United States, 384 Ground Self-Defense Force, 429, 439- 41, 451, 455; missions, 435; number of, 439, 441; organization of, 439; struc- ture of, 439; training, 441

group: bar hopping and, 94; conflict, 334-35; consciousness, 330-31; ideol- ogy of harmony in, 95; importance of, 94; and individual, conflicts between,

98; Japanese nation as, 332; problems

within, 95-96; in school, 144; solidarity, 330; symbols of, 94; requirements

for working in, 94 group identity: hierarchical relations in, 332; use of rituals to develop, 331-32 Group of Seven, 415 growth rate: factors affecting, 201; in 1980s, 201 growth strategies, 202 GSP. See Generalized System of Pref- erences Guadalcanal, 426 Guandong Army: international reaction

to, 56; popular support for, 56; ultra- nationalist activities of, 55, 56, 425 Guandong Territory, 48

Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation, 390, 455

guilds, 24

gun-control laws, 456, 468 Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party), 394

gyosei shido (administrative guidance), 352

gyuho senjutsu, 358

Habomai Islands {see also Kuril Islands), xxxv, 64, 72, 404, 405 Hakone Open-Air Museum, 171 Haley, John O., 352 Halhin Gol, Battle of, 58 Hamada Shqji, 177 Hamaguchi Osachi, 52, 54; assassinated, 54

Hamlet (Shakespeare), 186

han, 37

handicrafts, 178-79; lacquer, 178; metal- work, 179; papermaking, 178-79; textiles, 178 Hanae Mori, 178 Hanayagi school, 184

haniwa, 6

Hara Kazuko, 184

Hashi, 176 Hara Takashi, 51; assassinated, 52; as prime minister, 51; problems confronting, 51 harmony. See wa

Hawaii, 54, 337; Japanese attack on, 426

Health and Welfare, Ministry of, 258;

responsibilities of, 206

health care, 123-25; expenditures, 124,

125; facilities, 124; Japanese approach

to, 99-100; options for, 123; prenatal, 123; system, 124

health care personnel: distribution of, 124; number of, 124

health insurance, 124, 352, 358

health, public, 123; acquired immune deficiency syndrome, 125; environmental diseases, 84; kitchen syndrome, 98; school-refusal syndrome, 98, 113 Heian (Heiankyo) (see also Kyoto), 1 1

; as imperial capital, 12 Heian court, 20, 188 Heian period, 12; art in, 163 Heijokyo. See Nara

Heike monogatari (Tale of the Heike), 19, 188

Hideyoshi. See Toyotomi Hideyoshi

Hiei, Mount, 12, 19

hierarchy: early retirement, 332-33; in- terdependence in, 97; internal, 332;

loyalty in, 333; as natural, 96; seniority principle, 332-33; vertical bonds in, 333; we/they in, 332 Higher Foreign Service Examination, 379 Higher Police, 457

high technology, 197; growth in, 198

Hijikata Tatsumi, 185-86 Hikosaka Naoyoshi, 173 Himiko, 6 Hinomaru (rising sun flag), 311 Hino Teramasu, 184 Hirado, 30

Hirohito (Showa emperor), 55, 310, 328,

364; assassination attempt on, 53; state funeral of, 310; repudiation of divinity

by, 60, 101, 110, 308

Hiroshima, 383; atomic bomb detonation

over, 60, 427; atomic bomb survivors,

90; population of, 80

Hitachi, 298

Hizen, 37, 38 Hobbes, Thomas, 342 587
Japan: A Country Study

Hojo family, 18

Hojoki (An Account of My Hut), 19 Hojo regency: achievements of, 18; defeat

of, 21; literature under, 19 Hokkaido, xxvii, 72, 77; area, 77; industry, 77, 228 Hokkaido Railway Company, 236 Home Affairs, Ministry of, 319, 457 Home Ministry, 37, 319, 350, 457, 457 Honda, 295 Hong Kong, 286; exports to, 285; imports

from, 285 Honshu, xxvii, 4, 5, 7, 13, 72, 77; stra- tegic importance of, 43 1 ; United States armed forces stationed on, 456

Horiuchi Gen, 195 Hosono Haruomi, 184 Hotta Masayoshi, 35 House of Councillors, xxxii, xxxvi, 315,

317, 340; constituencies in, 315, 324;

factions in, 345; foreign policy position

of, 381, 388; number of councillors, 315; proportional representation, 315; terms in, 315 House of Peers, 44, 49, 51, 307; abolished, 315 House of Representatives, xxxiii, 44, 45, 49, 50, 307, 381, 388; constituencies, 315, 324; disputes in, 44; elections to, 44; factions in, 345, 346; power of, 315-17, 358; term in, 315; vote of no

confidence, 315 Housewives Association, 341

housing: corporations, 318; cost of, 248; loans for, 249-50; starts, 227; under Tokugawa, 33 Housing Loan Corporation, 210 human rights, 307, 313, 328-29; discrimi- nation in workplace, 329; forced confessions, 328-29; treatment of minorities, 329; women's rights, 328 Human Rights Bureau, 465 Hu Yaobang, 397, 399

IBM Japan, 298

Ichikawa Ennosuke III, 182 Ichikawa Kon, 191 Ichinohe Sachiko, 184

Idiot, The (Dostoevsky), 187

ie system, 112; households in, 112; workplace as, 117 Ihara Saikaku, 188

Ikeda Daisaku, 360

illegal aliens, 222 Imaizume Imaiemon, 177 IMF. See International Monetary Fund

immigration laws, 222

Imperial Army, 334; abolished, 428; control of government by, 426; General

Staff Officer, 423; revolt, 425

Imperial Conference, 59

imperial court, 3, 12; families, 30

Imperial Diet, 44

imperial expansion, 374

imperial family, 23, 28; estates of, confiscated, 309

imperial government, 3; Chinese influ- ence on, 3; and the military, 424

Imperial Household Agency, 309

Imperial House Law, 309, 310

Imperial Japanese Army, 55

Imperial Navy, 334; abolished, 428; General Staff, 424

imperial regalia, 4 Imperial Rescript on Education, 134

Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 59 Important Cultural Properties, 166 import policies, 265-67; barriers, 265, 266; changes in, 267; liberalization of, 265; quotas, 265-66

import products, 271-72

imports, 269-72; demand for, 270; deter- mined by exchange rate, 271; growth,

269-70, 271; manufactured, xxxi, 272, 283; nature of, 255; price of, 270-71;

of raw materials, 270, 271, 282, 300;

restrictions on, 266; sense of depen- dence on, 255; sources of, 282-83; of

textiles, 272; trade liberalization, 271; from United States, 282, 384

Incho (Office of the Cloistered Emperor);

role of, 16 Inch'on, 48

India, 23, 101, 407, 409, 445

Indian Ocean, 430

individual: and group, conflicts between,

98; welfare, 330

individualism, 98

individuality, 98

Indochina, 411-12; aid to, 392; invasion

of, 426; refugees from, 398; United

States withdrawal from, 376, 389, 394

Indochina War, Second, 64, 370; effect

of, on economy, 202-3; end of, 389

Indonesia, 65, 228, 445; aid to, 294; 588
Index

direct investment in, 286, 409; exports

to, 285; imports from, 282, 285; rela- tions with, 408; trade surplus with, 286; war reparations for, 407

industrial: automation, 197; base, 201-2,

259; energy, 200-1; expansion, 205; growth, 200, 204; producers, 214, 215;

productivity, 257

industrial development, 200, 206; main

elements in, 206

industrial policy, 206; administrative guidance, 206; decrease of government

role in, 207

industrialization, xxviiii, 45-46; govern- ment promotion of, 198-99

industry, 79, 231-36; destruction of, in World War II, 199; geared toward

exports, 231; high-technology devel- opment, 231-32; leadership in inter- national, 256; performance of, 231;

regions, 231; women in, 118-20

industry, primary sector: decline in, 198, 219, 231; employment in, 219

industry, tertiary sector, 206, 231; growth

in, 234-35, 236; move toward, 204

information, 197

infrastructure, 200, 226-29; destruction of, in World War II, 199; investment in, 208

infrastructure development, 227; employ- ment in, 227; participation of SDF in, 433-34; as percentage of GDP, 227

inheritance, 112 Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), 6, 24, 74, 80 Inoue Mitsuaki, 190 Inoue Yasushi, 190

insei system, 16

Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, 407-8

Institute of Developing Economies, 407

insurance, xxxi; as savings vehicle, 211;

social, for employees, 224

insurance companies, 211

interest groups, 335-41, 352; distribution

of, 336; examples of, 335; and foreign

policy, 382, 383; response to, 336; role

of, in elections, 336; role of, in policy

making, 335; ties with parties and

bureaucracy, 335-36, 354

Internal Bureaus, 436, 451

international: cooperation with United Nations, 382; debt relief, 377

international affairs, 374-75; economic and

financial resources in shaping, 370; political neutrality in, 370; status in, 373-74; support for more prominent

role in, 369

internationalization: of society, 353

International Monetary Fund (IMF),

xxxiii, 256, 262, 264, 265, 290, 369, 415, 416; voting rights in, 263

International Whaling Commission, 247

interpersonal relationships, 94

Inukai Tsuyoshi, 56

investment: direct, 279, 285, 287, 384; by

foreigners in Japan, 280; industrial, 206;

in infrastructure, 208; interest rates for, 205

investment flows, 369, 416; liberalizing controls on, 262

investment, foreign, 201, 260, 274; ac- cumulated holdings, 277; by auto producers, 295; controls on, 257-58; growth

of, xxxi, 256, 258, 276; by life insurance companies, 261; motives for, 279-80; as overseas base for home markets, 280;

securities, 277; in United States, 377, 384, 385; value of, 285; value of yen

and, 280

investment income, xxxi, 274; surplus, 274

investment in Japan, 276

investment relations, 282-92; with Africa, 290; with Asia, 285-86; with Canada,

285; with Communist countries, 290-

92; with Latin America, 289-90; with Middle East, 287-88; with Oceania,

288-89; with United States, 283-85;

with Western Europe, 286-87

Iran, 288; hostage crisis in, 377, 390; revo- lution in, 377

Iran-Iraq War, 288, 392; support for ship- ping during, 432

Iraq, 288

iron and steel, xxxi, 81, 198, 200, 204,

207, 232, 300-1, 398; charges of dumping, 300; decline in, 300; export of, 269,

284, 300; import of, 272, 300; minimum

price, 300; trade disputes, 300, 390

Ise Bay, 79

Ishibashi Masashi, 359

Ishiguro Kazuo, 190

Ishihara Shintaro, 359

Ishikari Plain, 74 Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, 453

Isozaki Arata, 169

Isuzu, 295 589
Japan: A Country Study

Itagaki Taisuke, 42, 49, 343

Italy, 58; exports as percentage of GNP,

267 Itamijuzo, 192

Ito Hirobumi, 43, 45, 48

Ito Masayoshi, 347

Ito Shunya, 192 Iwakura Tomomi, 38, 40, 43

Iwo Jima, 72, 38

Izanagi, 4

Izanami, 4

Izu Peninsula, 35

Jamaica, 391 Japan, Sea of, xxvii, 72, 74, 430 Japan Academy of Arts, 166 Japan Airlines, 240 Japan Air System, 240 Japan Art Association, 167 Japan Artists League, 168 Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK), 118, 192, 243, 318, 342; campaign speeches on, 323;

public radio networks, 243; public tele- vision networks, 243; School Education

Division, 145 Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 338 Japan Committee for Economic Develop- ment (Keizai Doyu Kai), 337 Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto),

53, 61, 140, 336, 357, 360; funding of, 361; goals of, 53; origins of, 361; party

line, 361; representation, 361; role of, 357; support of, for relations with China, 393 Japan Confederation of Labor (Domei),

225, 336, 340 Japan Confederation of Trade Unions

(Zenroren), 340 Japan Democratic Party {see also Liberal Democratic Party), 63, 343-44 Japan Development Bank, 210, 213 Japanese Alps (Nihon Arupusu), 74, 79 Japanese Imperial Navy, 54 Japanese Joint Staff Council, 455 Japanese language, 165; difficulties with, 144; as school subject, 144, 146; status differences in, 96-97; teaching of, to foreign students, 160 Japanese National Railways, 212-13,

236, 238, 318

Japanese National Railways Settlement Corporation, 238 Japanese Red Ary, 363, 470

Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, 59, 404 Japanese Trade Union Confederation

(Shin Rengo), 225, 336, 340, 360 Japan Exchange and Teaching Program,

147 Japan Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank),

xxxvi, 210, 261, 262, 379, 395, 399 Japan External Trade Organization

(JETRO), xxix, 259-60, 379 Japan Federation of Employers Association (Nikkeiren), 337 Japan Folkloric Dance Ensemble, 183 Japan Foundation, 167 Japan Freight Railway Company, 238 Japan International Cooperation Agency

(JICA), 262 Japan League of Medium and Small Enterprise Organizations, 338 Japan Medical Association, 341 Japan Mothers League, 335

Japan Progressive Party (Nihon Shimpoto),

61 Japan Railways Group, 81, 236, 238-39,

352, 464

Japan, Sea of, xxvii, 72, 74, 430 Japan Scholarship Association, 156 Japan Socialist Association (Shakaishugi

Kyokai), 359 Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaito),

xxxiii, xxxvi, 52, 61, 64, 65, 140, 315,

317, 329, 336, 339, 343, 357; control of House of Councillors, 381; demands

of, 360; and foreign policy, 382; goal

of, 360; labor unions and, 340; origin

of, 358; position on foreign policy, 381;

representation, 358; role of, 357; support of, for relations with China, 393 Japan Teachers Union, 335, 364; conflicts

of, with Education Ministry, 140-41;

functions of, 140; support of, for political parties, 140 Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation, 212-13, 318 Japan-United States security arrange- ments, 370

Jesuits, 24, 133 JETRO. See Japan External Trade Organization JICA. See Japan International Cooperation Agency

590
Index

Jimmu, 4

Jinno shoto ki (Chronicle of the Direct Descent of the Divine Sovereigns)

(Kitabatake), 3, 23

Jiyiito (Liberal Party), 42, 44 Jodo sect. See Buddhism, Jodo

Joei Code, 18 Johnson, Chalmers, 351

Joint First Stage Achievement Test, 154; content of, 154-55; schedule of, 154-55

Joint Staff Council, 436, 451; members

of, 436-37; reorganization of, 437

Jokyii Incident, 18 Jomon culture, 4-5; era, 4; musical in- struments of, 180; pottery of, 4 Jordan, 392

judges: appointment and removal of, 324

judicial system, 324-29; courts in, 324-

25; judges in, 324; structure of, 325

juku, 143, 151-52; academic,151; atten- dance, 151; educational functions of, 151; expense, 152; nonacademic, 151;

self-study materials published by, 152;

social role of, 151

Justice, Ministry of, 92, 326, 353, 465, 471; Correctional Bureau, 473-74;

Legal Training and Research Institute, 326; Public Security Investigation

Office, 464; Rehabilitation Bureau, 474

Juvenile Law (1922), 473

Kabuki Society, 168 Kabuki theater, xxxii, 180, 18, 1882; conventions, 182, 186; dance in, 183; themes in, 182, 186; women barred from performing in, 165, 182 Kades, Charles, 312

Kagero nikki (The Gossamer Years)

("Mother of Michitsuna"), 15 Kagoshima, 24

Kaifuso (Fond Recollections of Poetry), 1

1

Kaifu Toshiki, xxxiv, xxxvi, 317, 349,

381, 391, 409

Kaishinto (Constitutional Study Party), 44 Kamakura, 17 Kamakura period, 17, 188

kami, 7, 32, 100, 332; defined, 4 kamikaze, 20, 23 Kammon Bridge, 81 Kammu (emperor), 12; avoidance of re- form, 12; military offensives, 13; suc- cession to, 13

kana, 14, 174; hiragana, 14; katakana, 14 Kanamori Masao, 454 Kanazawa, 79 Kanematsu-Gosho, 260 Kaneshiro Jiro, 178

kanji, 14, 174, 176 Kano ink painting, 173

kanpaku, 14, 26 Kansai International Airport, 74, 240

Kanto, 78; industry, 78; population density, 78 Kanto Plain, 74 Karafuto (see also Sakhalin), 34 Kara Joro, 186

karaoke, 184 KARAS Company, 185 Katayama Tetsu, 356 Katsura Shijaku, 183 Katsura Taro, 49, 50 Kawabata Yasunari, 190 Kawai Kanjiro, 177 Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 453 Kazan Retto. See Volcano Islands Kaze no matasaburo (Children of the Wind)

(Miyazawa), 192 Keidanren. See Federation of Economic

Organizations

keiretsu, 202

Keizai Doyu Kai. See Japan Committee

for Economic Development

kejime, 349

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 54, 312 Kemmu Restoration, 21 Kenseikai (Constitutional Government

Association), 52 Kenseito (Constitutional Party), 49

Khubilai Khan, 20; demand for tribute, 20 Kido Koin, 38, 40, 42 "Kimigayo," 311 Kimmei (emperor), 8 King Lear (Shakespeare), 186

Kinki, 80 Kinki Plain, 74 Kishi Nobusuke, 388

Kitabatake Chikafusa, 23 Kitadake mountain, 74 Kitakyushu, 81, 82

Kitaro, 184 Kiyomizu Kyiibei, 172

koan, 164, 174 Kobayashi Issa, 188 Kobayashi Masaki, 192 591
Japan: A Country Study

Kobe, 74, 80 Kobo Daishi. See Kukai

Kochi, 81 Kofun period. See Yamato period

Koh, B.C., 352

Kojiki, 11, 32, 187; creation story in, 4 Koken (empress), 11-12, 12 Kokkai Kisei Domei (League for Establishing a National Assembly), 43

koku, 26

kokugaku movement, 31; reverence for emperor in, 32 Kokumin Seiji Kyokai. See People's Politics Association Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society, Amur

River Society), 55 Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, 244

kokutai, 23, 37, 106, 305, 331 Komeito, (Clean Government Party), 64, 65, 336, 357, 382; background of, 360; programs of, 360; representatives, 360;

ties of, with Soka Gakkai, 360 Kondo, Dorinne K., 116, 117 Kong Fuzi. See Confucius Kongzi. See Confucius Konoe Fumimaro, 58, 60 Korea (see also North Korea, South

Korea), 6, 41, 53, 90; annexed, 48, 199; Buddhism introduced by, xxvii, 7; Hideyoshi's invasion of, 27; indepen- dence of, 374; as Japanese protectorate,

48, 424; renunciation ofJapanese claim

to, 61; Russo-Japanese rivalry over, 403; trade with, 30 Korean influence: on Yamato culture, 8; on Yayoi culture, 5 Korean Peninsula, 8, 81; foreign policy

regarding, 391; Japanese construction

of railroads on, 47; Japanese occupation of, xxxv, 6; proximity to, 73; security problems, 430; strategic position of, 46

Koreans: discrimination against, 90, 329, 334; as Japanese citizens, 91 Korean War, xxix, 61 ; effect of, on econ- omy, 202-3, 256, 428 Korea Strait, 73 Koshi. See Confucius

koto, 180, 183 Kukai (Kobo Daishi), 12, 188 Kumamoto, 81 Kunashiri (see also Kuril Islands), xxxv,

72, 400-3

Kurigama Kazumi, 176

Kuril Islands (see also Northern Territories), 34, 41, 64; area, 73; dispute with

Soviet Union over, 72, 292, 406, 421,

430; renunciation ofJapanese claim to, 61 Kurosawa, Akira, 191 Kuroshio Current, 83 Kuwait, 288

kwaiko-chan, 184

kyogen, 188 Kyoto, 11, 18, 21, 30, 133, 319; capital moved from, 37; chonindo culture in, 31-32; migration patterns around, 89; missionary activity in, 24; population

of, 31 Kyushu, xxvii, 4, 5, 7, 24, 41, 72, 73, 77, 81-82; climate, 82; industry, 81, 228; United States armed forces stationed on, 456 Kyushu Mountains, 81 Kyushu Railway Company, 236

labor: market, 220; movement, 214

Labor, Ministry of, 141, 223, 353, 464

labor force, 202, 213-14; aging of, 223-

24; in agriculture, 204; distribution of, 219; foreign workers, 221-22, 353-54; number of, 214; participation in, 219; women in, 221 Labor Standards Inspection Office, 464

labor unions, 218, 339-40, 388; bargaining, 225, 226; demands, 220; membership, 225, 339; officers of, 225-26; pay

increases, 226; relationship of, with company, 225; role of, in policy-making

process, 339-40; strikes, 226

Lafcadio Hearn Prize, 167

land: distribution, 28; prices, 86; recla- mation, 74 Land of the Rising Sun, 4 land reform, 9, 10, 39, 60, 339; in Meiji

period, 198; under occupation, 203, 214

landscape gardening, 23 Large-Scale Retail Store Law, 235, 338

Last Emperor, The, 184

Latin America, 289-90; aid to, 293; direct investment in, 279, 289; exports to, 289; imports from, 289; lending to, 290

law: control-oriented use of, 327; role of, 326-27 592
Index

Law Concerning the Stabilization of Employment for Elderly People, 224 Law for Equal Opportunity in Employ- ment for Men and Women, 328

lawyers: functions performed by, 317; number of, 326 LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party

leadership, 97, 333 League of Nations: Japan as member of, 51; withdrawal from, 56

"learning missions," 40

LeCorbusier, Charles, 168, 169

leisure activities, 117; family as focus of, 118

Levelers Association ofJapan (Suiheisha), 92

Leviathan (Hobbes), 342 Liaodong Peninsula, 46, 47, 48

Liao-Takasaki Agreement, 395

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), xxvii,

xxxii, xxxvi, 63, 140, 305, 315, 323, 343-50; budget process, 356; in elections, 347-49; factions, 345; feudal per- sonalism in, 306; foreign affairs under,

381; interest groups affiliated with, 336, 338; leadership, 64; local support

groups, 346-47; as minority party,

xxxiii, 317; national elections, 347-50;

party history, 343-44; Policy Research

Council, 352, 355-56, 383; principles, 344; problems in, 349; Recruit scandal and, 322, 350; resiliency of, 349-50;

structure, 344-47; turnover of leaders

in, 333

Liberal Party (see also Liberal Democratic

Party), 61, 62-63, 343

Liberia, 290

licensing fees, xxxi

life expectancy, 87

Li Hongzhang, 46

literacy rate, 33, 162, 200, 243

literature, 187-91; Buddhist influence on, 190-91; diary as, 188; European, 189; under Hojo, 19; "I novel," 190; kinds

of, 191; in Muromachi culture, 23, 188; novels, 188; origins of, 187; themes in, 98, 131, 188, 190; under Tokugawa,

32, 188; tradition, 189

literature, vernacular, 188; diaries, 188; under Fujiwara, 14; by women, 15

living standards, 203, 247-51; cost of liv- ing, 86-87, 247-48; cross-cultural comparisons, 250-51; household savings,

248; income distribution, 248; sanitary

amenities, 248; under Tokugawa, 33

loans as percentage of GNP, 208 Lockheed scandal, xxxii, 65, 344, 345, 347, 357 London Naval Conference, 54 London Naval Treaty, 58, 424 London Stock Exchange, 210 Long-Term Trade Agreement (JapanChina), 291 Lubbers, Ruud, xxxv

MacArthur, Douglas, 60, 305, 307, 428 MacArthur Constitution. See Constitution of 1947 machine industry, 207 Maekawa Kunio, 168-69

magatama, 6 magazines, 342

Mahabharata, 184

Mainichi Shimbun, 342 Maki Fumihiko, 169 Makioka Sisters, The (Ichikawa), 191-92 Makura no soshi (The Pillow Book) (Sei), 15 Malaya, 27; occupation of, 426

Malaysia, xxxv, 228, 407, 408; trade sur- plus with, 286 Management and Coordination Agency,

222, 355 management culture, 216-18; company

union, 218; employee advancement, 218

managerial style: consensus-building as, 218; emphasis of, 218 Manchukuo, 56; establishment of, 424-25 Manchuria, 47, 50, 374; evacuation of, 48; Guandong Army in, 55, 56; Japanese invasion of, 54; as part ofJapanese

empire, 199; Russian leaseholds in, 47; Russo-Japanese rivalry over, 403 Manchurian Incident, 56, 425, 457 Mandate of Heaven, 8 manga (comic books), 71, 118, 191, 192, 342

manufacturing, 200; growth in, 232-34 Man 'yoshu (Collection of Ten Thousand

Leaves), 11, 32, 187 Mao Zedong, 291 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 58 Mariana Islands, 50, 424 Maritime Safety Agency, 463 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF),

593
Japan: A Country Study

xxiv, 429, 451, 455; capabilities of, 442; equipment, 441; missions, 435; number of, 441; organization of, 441-

42; role of, 431; structure of, 439; train- ing, 441; weaknesses, 442-43 Market Oriented Sector Selective (MOSS) talks, 266

marriage: arranged, 112; ceremonies,

107; customs, origins of, 4; under ie sys- tem, 112; by mutual consent, 314; tim- ing of, 87 Marshall Islands, 50, 424 Maruyama-Okyo school, 173 Marubeni, 260 Matsue, 167 Matsumoto Commission, 307 Matsumoto Joji, 307 Matsuo Basho, 32, 188

matsuri (festivals), 108 Matsushima Bay, 78 May 15th Incident, 56 Mazda, 295

media: books, 342; foreign policy opinions of, 384; magazines, 342; newspapers, 341-42

medical equipment, import restrictions on, 266

medieval period, 17 Meiji Constitution (1889), 44, 60, 305, 307; emperor under, 308, 311, 314; government under, 44; provisions of, 37; rights and duties of subjects under,

313; strengths and weaknesses of, 44

Meiji oligarchy, 43, 331; abolition of class system, 38; art under, 164, 172; education under, 198; establishment of nobility under, 43; foreign relations under,

40, 372; goals of, 38; industry under,

201; legal theories under, 327; members

of, 38; military machine, 374; modernization of infrastructure under, 40; opposition to, 39, 41; public education

established by, 134; reforms by, xxviii, 38, 198; social divisions under, 39;

treaties revised, 374; use of symbols, 331 Meiji Restoration, xxviii, 36-40, 423, 457; burakumin in, 92; civil service in, 350; end of, 49; legacy of, 52; legal codes, 466; purpose of, 37; religious resurgence under, 37-38; structure of, 37; trials, 466-67 Mengukuo, 58 merchant marine, 207, 240

merchants, 30

Merrill Lynch, 210, 211 Metropolitan Police Board, 13 Mexico, 289

middle class, 336 Middle East, 287-88, 389; aid to, 293, 391; exports to, 288; imports from,

282, 287; investment in, 288

Midori, 183 Mid-Term Defense Estimate, 435; cost of, 450-51; equipment procurement, 452 Mid-Term Defense Program, 439, 442

migration: Japanese living abroad, 90; number of migrants, 89; patterns of, 89 Miki Takeo, 344

military: dismantied, 350, 428; modernization of, 40, 372, 423; power, 386, 406; relationship of, with imperial

government, 424; reorganization of, 61; role, 369

military buildup, 400; objective of, 373

military, restriction on (see also Article 9); international criticism of, xxxiii; popular acceptance of, xxxiii, 427

military class, rise of, 15-17

military families, 16

military government (twentieth century), xxix

military materiel: funding for, 451; pro- duction of, 50

Military Pensions Association, 335

Mill, John Stuart, 331 Minamoto family, 17; support of, by

samurai, 16 Minamoto government, 17 Minamoto regency, 18 Minamoto Yoriie, 18 Minamoto Yoritomo, 17; failure to consolidate, 18; powers of, 17 Ming Dynasty, 22 Minimum Wage Law, 224

mining, 200, 226, 227-28, 232; decline

in, 227; performance of, 231

ministers, cabinet, 351; rotation in and

out of posts, 351

ministries, 317-18; rivalry among, 352

Ministry of International Trade and In- dustry (MITI), xxix, 258-59, 353, 383; business links with, 337; import policies, 265; influence, 353; responsibilities of, 205, 258, 353, 408; role of, in international affairs, 379; trade balance under, 259 594
Index

minorities, 90-93; Ainu, 93; burakumin, 90; Chinese, 90; intolerance of, 90; Koreans, 90 Mishima Yukio, 180, 190, 305, 364

missionaries, 24, 371 MITI. See Ministry of International Trade and Industry

Mito school, 35, 37

Mitsubishi, 214, 260, 452

Mitsubishi Bank, 261

Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, 453

Mitsubishi Estate, 353

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 453, 454

Mitsui, 214, 260 Miwa Kyusetsu, 177 Miyako Odori, 183 Miyamoto Kenji, 361 Miyazawa Kenji, 192 Miyazawa Kiichi, xxxvi, 290 Miyazawa Plan, 290

modernization, xxviii, 3, 45-46, 372; gov- ernment involvement in, 46 Moeran, Brian, 98 Momoyama art, 26-27 Monbusho. See Education, Science, and

Culture, Ministry of monetary policy, 207-8

Mongolia, Inner, 50, 58 Mongolian People's Republic, xxxv, 58 Mongol invasions, 20-21; first, 20; leg- acy of, 20-21, 23; second, 20 Mononobe family, 8 Moriguchi Kako, 178 Morishita Yoko, 185 Morita Yoshimitsu, 192

mortality rate, 87 MOSS. See Market Oriented Sector Selective talks motor vehicles, xxxi, 294-96; export of, 269, 294-95, 295; imports of, 295; in- vestment restrictions on, 295; Japanese

demand for foreign, 295-96; Japan's market share, 295; production of, 294; trade barriers on, 295 Motoshima Hitoshi, 328, 364, 470

mountains, xxvii, 73-74, 81; Akaishi

chain, 74; Hida chain, 73; Kiso chain, 73 MSDF. See Maritime Self-Defense Force Mukden, 56

muhei bunkazai, 166-67, 177, 178, 183 Munakata Shiko, 174-76 Murakami Haruki, 191

Murakami Yasusuke, 329 Murasaki Shikibu, 15, 188 Muromachi culture, 22-23 Muromachi period. See bakufu, Ashikaga

Museum of Western Art, 165 museums, 167 musical theater, 184 Music Today, 183 music, traditional, 32; instruments, 180

music, Western, xxxii, 183; jazz, 184; opera, 184; popular, 184 Mutsuhito (emperor), 36; as Meiji emperor, 37 Mutual Security Assistance Pact, 61, 64, 375, 428, 454-55; military aid program

in, 454-55

mythology: creation of the world in, 100;

divinity of imperial family in, 100; kami

in, 100; values in, 93-94

Nabeshima clan, 177 Nachi Falls, 131 Nagano Prefecture, 74 Nagaoka, 11 Nagasaki, 24, 27, 82, 328, 383; atomic bomb detonation over, 60, 427; atomic bomb survivors, 90; military school at, 35; naval training school at, 35; Rangaku school in, 32; trade restricted to, 30 Nagasawa Hidetoshi, 172

nagauta singing, 183 Nagoya, 74, 79 Naka (prince) (see also Tenji), 9 Nakane Chie, 332 Nakasone Yasuhiro, xxxvi, 66, 308, 322,

346, 363, 432; objectives for defense in- dustry, 452; official visit to Yasukuni

Shrine, 110, 311, 399; relations with China under, 397; relations with United States, 391 Nakatomi family, 8 Nakatomi Kamatari, 9

nakodo, 95 Namikawa Banri, 176 Nampo islands, 72 Naoki Prize, 167, 190 Nara, 7, 166; commercial activity in, 10; model for, 10; as permanent capital, 10; population of, 10 Nara culture, 12 Nara period, 10-11; establishment of 595
Japan: A Country Study

Buddhism in, 11; handicrafts in, 178;

literature in, 11

Nastasya, 187 National Association of Consumer Cooperatives, 341

National Bunraku Theater, 167

National Central Association of Medium

and Small Enterprise Associations, 338

National Center for University Entrance

Examination, 155

National Committee for Burakumin Liberation, 92

National Council on Educational Reform,

137, 138, 159 National Defense Academy, 441, 442, 444, 451

National Defense Council, 455

National Defense Medical College, 451

National Defense Program Oudine, 432, 434, 436, 450

National Diet, 208, 258, 308, 309, 314-

17, 458; Budget Committee, 358; civil servants in, 318; foreign affairs committees in, 378; prime minister designated

by, 315; responsibilities, 314

National Federation of Industrial Organizations (Shinsanbetsu), 225

National Federation of Private Sector Unions (Rengo), 225, 340

National Federation of Regional Women's Associations, 341 National Institute for Defense Studies, 451 National Institute for Educational Research, 159 National Institute for Special Education, 159 National Museum of History and Folk

Culture, 167 National No Theater, 167, 182 National Police Agency, 458, 467; bureaus of, 459; duties, 458; number of, 458; structure of, 458-59

National Police Reserve, 428, 429, 457

National Public Safety Commission, 436, 457, 458, 461, 465; members of, 458; mission of, 458

National Rural Police, 457, 458

National Safety Force, 429

national security: entrusted to United

States, 375, 381, 386, 434; increased

responsibility for, 389, 390, 410, 432;

military to achieve, 447; policy, 436;

role of United Nations in, 434

National Space Development Agency, 234

National Storehouse for Fine Arts, 167

national symbols, 144

National Trade Union Council (Zenrokyo), 340

National Treasures, 166 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Natsume Soseki, 190 Naval General Staff, 54 NEC, 298

neighborhood, 114-15; activities, partic- ipation in, 114; associations, 115; central city, 114; company housing, 114;

socialization in, 114

nemawashi (consensus building), 334; in policy-making process, 355

neo-Confucianism, 35, 104-6; contribution of, 31; influences on, 104

Netherlands: exports as percentage of GNP, 267; investment by, in United

States, 285 New Deal, 350 New Liberal Club (Shin Jiyii Kurabu),

344, 349 newly industrialized economies (NIEs),

408, 409 New Morning of Billy the Kid, The (Yamakawa), 192 New Order in Greater East Asia, 58 new religions, 101, 106-7, 336; founded,

107 New Tokyo International Airport (Narita- Sanrizuka), 240; protests against, 330, 363, 470

newspapers, 341-42 New Year's Day, 108 New York City, 337 New York City Ballet, 185 New York Stock Exchange, xxx, 210, 212, 261-62; October 1987 crash of, 212 New Zealand, 288-89, 455; economic in- volvement in, 410 Nguyen Duy Trinh, 412 NHK. See Japan Broadcasting Corporation Nichimen, 260

NIEs. See newly industrialized economies Nihon (see also Nippon); origin of, as name

of Japan, 9 596
Index

Nihon Arupusu. See Japanese Alps

Nihongi, 11, 32; creation story in, 4; foun- dation of Japan in, 6 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 342 Nihon Kokusai Tsushin, 244 Nihon Shakaito. See Japan Socialist Party Nihon shoki. See Nihongi

Niigata, 79

Niigata Prefecture, 74, 347

Nikkei Stock Average, 212

Nikkeiren. See Japan Federation of Employers Association Nikko, 210, 261 Nine Powers Treaty, 54

Ninigi, 4

ninjo (compassion), 98 Nippon {see also Nihon); origin of, as name

of Japan, 9 Nippon Life Insurance Company, 211 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 212, 244, 318, 439

Nishihara Kamezo, 50 Nishihara Loans, 50

Nishijin weaving center, 178

Nissan, 197, 295 Nissho Iwai, 260 Nixon, Richard M., 389 "Nixon shock," 376, 389, 395 Nobi Plain, 74, 79 Nomura, 210-11, 261

nonferrous metals industry, 232; import

of, 272 Norinchukin Bank, 210 North Adantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 445 Northern Court, 21 Northern Territories, 64, 400-3, 405-6,

430; proposals on, 406 North Korea (People's Democratic Republic of Korea), xxxv, 110, 292, 386,

398; mutual bitterness, 410; policies toward, 410; security interests in, 410;

tensions with, 411

Norwegian Wood (Murakami), 191 No theater, xxxii, 180-82, 188; dance in, 183; in Muromachi culture, 23; themes

in, 186; women barred from performing in, 165

nuclear: strike, vulnerability to, 431; war,

3-4; weapons, 383, 429

Obon festival, 108

occupation, 60-61, 305, 374-75; effect of, on economy, 203; goals of, 306; land reform under, 203; United States financial assistance, 203; zaibatsu dissolved under, 188, 214 October Incident (1931), 56 ODA. See Official Development Assistance Oda Nobunaga, 25, 329; accomplish- ments of, 25; assassination of, 25; resistance to, 25; rise to power, 25 OECD. See Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development

OECF. See Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund

Oe Kensaburo, 190

Officer Candidate School, 442

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

budget, 293, 412-13, 450, 451; as per- centage of GNP, 413 Ogasawara Islands. See Bonin Islands Ohashi Toshio, 360 Ohira Masayoshi, 65, 346, 364, 30 Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, 124-25

oil crisis, 200, 281, 281 Okhotsk, Sea of, 48, 406, 430; Japanese

fishing rights in, 403 Okinawa, 72, 82, 329, 341; crafts in, 178; military installations on, 335; returned

to Japan, 389, 404; United States oc- _ cupation of, 64, 387, 388-89, 455, 456 Okubo Toshimichi, 38, 40, 41 Okuma Shigenobu, 38, 42, 43, 48, 343 Oman, 392 Omote-Nihon. See geography

Onin War, 22; legacy of, 23-24 On Liberty (Mill), 331

onnagata, 187 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries Opium War, 34

Orderly Marketing Arrangements, 390 Order of Cultural Merit, 166

Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD), 262, 278,

408, 415; Development Assistance Committee, 293 Organization of Petroleum Exporting

_ Countries (OPEC), 65 Osaka, 26, 28, 35, 80; chonindo culture in, 31-32; migration patterns around, 89; peasant uprising in (1837), 34; population of, 31 Osaka Bay, 74 597
Japan: A Country Study

Osaka Conference, 42 Osaka International Exposition (Expo

_

'70), 65, 80 Osaka Plain, 80 Osaka Stock Exchange, xxx, 212 Oshima, 72 Otomoto Katsushiro, 192 Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund

(OECF), 262, 379, 398, 408

Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency,

379, 408

oyabun-kobun relationship, 333, 334, 347;

in Liberal Democratic Party, 345 Oyashio Current, 83 Ozawa Hisako Modern Dance Company,

185

Pacific Islands, 410

Pacific Ocean, xxvii painting (see also calligraphy), 172-73;

Buddhist influence on, 172; Chinese in- fluence on, 172; ink painting, 172, 173; international style, 172, 173; Kano

style, 173; landscape painting, 172; Maruyama-Okyo school, 1 73 ; mono-ha, 173; nihonga, 173; "op," 173; "pop,"

173; rimpa, 173; traditional, 172, 173; Western theories of, 172

Pakistan, 294, 391, 391, 400, 407 papermaking, 178-79; Izumo, 179; marbleized, 179

patents, 230 Peace Preservation Law (1925), 52, 53, 457 Peace Preservation Law (1928), 53 peasant uprising (1837), 34 Pempel, T.J., 326, 354

Penal Code (1880), 466

penal system, 456, 473-75; aftercare

hostels, 473, 474; history of, 473; in- tention of, 474; prison population, 474;

professional probation officers in, 474-75; recidivism rate, 474; volunteer workers in, 473, 474-75 P.E.N. Club of Japan, 168 Penghu Islands, 46; renunciation of Japanese claim to, 61 Pension Party, 363

People Opposed to Nuclear Power Party, 363

People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

See North Korea

People's Politics Association (Kokumin

Seiji Kyokai), 338

performing arts (see also under individual form), 180-87; religious influence on, 180

Perry, Matthew C, 34, 372

Persian Gulf War: Japan's support in, xxxiv

petrochemicals industry, 232

petroleum, 200, 398; dependence on for- eign, 201, 376; imports, value of, 271;

prices, 257, 272, 273, 287, 295; suppliers, 288, 430

pharmaceuticals: import restrictions on, 266; industry, 232, 233

Philippines, xxxv, 27; aid to, 294; brides imported from, 91 ; occupation of, 426;

relations with, 408; trade with, 286; war reparations for, 407

pirates, 22

Plato, 342

Plaza Accord, 281-82

poetry, 174; Chinese influence on, 187; European influence on, 189; free verse, 189; under Fujiwara, 14; haiku, 188, 189; under Hqjo, 19; in Muromachi

culture, 23; renku, 188, 189; tanka, 189; waka, 188, 189

police, 53, 456; accidents and fatalities in- vestigated by, 469; discretion of, 471; involvement in political affairs, 457;

oversight, 465; promotion, 464; recruit- ment, 464; relations of, with community, 464; responsibilities, 457;

training, 464

police boxes, 464; function, 461; primary

tasks, 461; surveys, 461-62

Police Bureau, 457

Police Law (1947), 457-58

Police Law (1954), 458

police, riot, 459, 462-63; assignments,

463; operations, 462; temperament,

462; training, 463; uniforms and equip- ment, 462-63

police, special, 463-64; responsibilities, 463

police system, 456-65; divisions, 461; decentralized, 457, 458; established, 457-58; local organization, 459-62; national organization, 458-59

policy-making process, 306, 308, 343,

350, 354-56; collaboration of bureaucracy, interest groups, and party, 354; 598
Index

consensus building in, 334, 355; role of interest groups in, 335; role of labor unions in, 339-40

political: elite, 353; extremists, 469-70;

instability, 56-58; machines, 347; re- form, 349; repression, 42, 43, 52, 53,

58, 462; scandals, 342-43

political funding: corruption in, 322-23;

expenses for, 322; proposals for reform

of, 323; secrecy surrounding, 323

Political Funds Control Law, 322

political leaders: characteristics of, 329

political parties, 52; ordered to dissolve, 59; revival of, 61 ; ties of, with bureaucracy and interest groups, 335, 353

political parties, opposition, 306, 356-63; impact of, 358; importance of, 357; as nonviable alternative, 357; progressive

proposals by, 358

political system: two-party, 51, 56

politicians, 352, 354

politics: features of, 330; nonideological nature of, 329

pollution, 84-86; citizens' pressure against, 85; health problems from, 84; industrial, 249; worsening of, 203

Pollution Health Damage Compensation

Law (1973), 85

popular culture, 117-18; leisure activities, 117-18; traditional art forms in, 117

population, xxx, 72; age structure, 87-89; aging of, 223; migration of, 89-90;

minorities, 90-93; under Tokugawa, 33 population density, 86-87; comparisons, 86

population distribution, 86, 87

Port Arthur. See Dalian

Port Island, 74

ports, 240

Portuguese, 133; arrival of, 24; expulsion

of, 30

postal savings system, 210

Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry

of, 243, 258, 464 Potsdam Declaration, 306, 307, 313

prehistoric people, 4 Premium Imperiale, 167

president, 344

press club system, 342-43, 358 prime minister, 248, 315, 354, 458; elec- tion of, 344; Office of, 230, 309, 318,

341, 355, 383, 429, 435, 457; responsibilities, 317-18, 436; tenure of, 333

prints, 174-76; avant-garde, 176; photography, 176; themes in, 176; twentieth- century, 174; ukiyo-e, 174

Prison Law (1980), 473

Private School Promotion Law, 158 Privy Council, 43, 307

Prix de L'Academie d' Architecture, 170

Prix de Lausanne Ballet Competition, 185

productivity, 202, 218-19; growth, 256, 257; rate, 218

professional associations, 340-41

Progressive Party (Shimpoto), 357, 362

Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform, 355

Public Assembly Law, 43

public opinion polling, 383-84

Pure-Hearted Shopping District in Koenji, Tokyo, 190

Puyi, 56

Qian Qichen, xxxvi

radio: educational, 146

railroads, 79, 236; construction of, in Meiji

period, 198; Japanese construction of, in Korea 47; passenger, 237-38; privati- zation of, 355; Shinkansen (bullet train), 81 Raku family potters, 177 Rangaku, 32, 38, 134; importance of, 34 Reagan, Ronald, 66, 391 rearmament, 66

Recruit Corporation, 321

Recruit Cosmos, 321

Recruit scandal, xxxii, 321-22, 349, 350, 351, 357, 358, 360, 361, 362 reemployment, 224

reform: constitutional, under occupation,

60; economic, under Meiji govern- ment, 45; economic, under occupation,

60; under Go-Sanjo, 16; under Meiji

Restoration, 36, 38

Reischauser, Edwin O., 27, 96, 99

religion, 107-10; freedom of, 108-10,

313; history of state involvement in, 110; required temple registration, 30, 32; ritual visits to Shinto shrine, 107; and the state, 108-10, 311 Rengo. See National Federation of Private Sector Unions

representative government: efforts to es- tablish, 42-43 599
Japan: A Country Study

Republic (Plato), 32 Republic of China. See Taiwan

Republic of Korea. See South Korea

research and development, 229-31; bio- technology, 232, 233; energy-related, 227; independent, 229; originality in, 230; as percentage of GNP, 230; scientific, 230

research institutes, 159, 161 Respect for the Aged Day, 122

retail stores: changes in operations of, 235; department, 235-36; discount, 235; mail order, 235; mom-and-pop,

235; specialty, 235; supermarkets, 235-36; superstores, 235-36

retailing, 235

retirement, 223-24; corporate retirement

allowance, 126, 224; employment after, 213; government pensions for, 125-

26, 224; mandatory, 224; saving for, 250

reunification, 25-27

rice, 5, 78, 81; closed market for, xxxiv; consumption of, 249; cultivation of, 74; excessive production of, 245; import

restrictions on, 266, 339; mass production of, 245; price supports for, 337, 339, 352

Richie, Donald, 358

right-wing extremists, 364 Rikuchu Coastline National Park, 78 Rikken Doshikai (Constitutional Association of Friends), 50 Rikken Minseito (Constitutional Democratic Party) {see also Japan Progressive

Party), 52; platform, 52, 61 Rikken Teiseito (Imperial Rule Party), 42 Rikyu (Teshigawara), 192 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, 455

Ripening Summer (Todo), 190

Rissho Koseikai (Society for the Establish- ment ofJustice and Community for the Rise [of Buddhism]), 106

rivers, 74

roads, 23, 201, 226, 239-40; construction

of, 239-40; length of, 239; passenger

transport on, 239

Rockefeller Center, 353

romaji, 189

ronin (university applicants), 154

ronin ("wave people"), 10-11

royalties, xxxi

rural life: changes in, after World War II, 71; family in, 114

Russia, 50, 53 Russo-Japanese War, 48, 199, 403, 424;

effect of, on economy, 202-3 Ryukyii Islands, 72, 73, 82, 387, 388,

455; dispute with China over, 41, 396;

trade with, 30

sabi, 163 Sado Island Kodo drummers, 184

Saga, 41, 81 Saga Rebellion, 41 Saigo Takamori, 38, 41 Saigy6,193, 188

Saipan, 427

Saito Kiyoshi, 176

Saionji Kimmochi, 49, 51, 56 Sakaida Kakiemon, 177 Sakamoto Ryiiichi, 184 Sakata Michita, 431

Sakhalin (see also Karafuto), 34, 41, 48,

53, 374; renunciation ofJapanese claim

to, 61 Sakishima islands, 72 Sakurakai (Cherry Society), 56

salaries, 197 Salaryman's New Party, 362-63 Salomon Brothers, 210, 211

samisen, 182, 183

samurai, xxviii, 22, 26, 33, 112; as calli- graphers, 164; control by, of court

affairs, 17, 30; curricula, 133-34; de- velopment of bushido, 31; interests, 16; under Meiji Restoration, 39, 305; oc- cupations of, 39; opposition of, to Meiji

oligarchy, 39, 41; origins of, 15-16, 422; population of, 33; role of, 133, 350; sti- pends paid to, 37; ultranationalism of, 55; Zen Buddhism and, 104, 131

Sankei Shimbun, 342 Sansom, George B., 14 Sanwa, 214 Sanwa Bank, 261 Sapporo, 77

Sasebo, 82

Sato Eisaku, 333, 389, 393 Satsuma, 36, 37, 44 Satsuma Rebellion, 41 Saudi Arabia, 288

savings, 211 Sayama incident, 92 600
Index

scandals, 381, 391

Schlesinger, James A., 389

school, business, 216

school, Korean, 150

school, lower-secondary, 132, 145-48;

classroom organization, 146; class size, 146; expenses, 146; foreign language

classes, 146-47; Japanese language

classes, 146; mandatory club meetings,

146; moral education, 146; private, 146; public, 146; special activities, 146;

teachers, 146; teaching methods, 146

school, primary, 141-47; administration

of, 145; class size, 144; computers in, 145; curriculum, 144; egalitarian style

of, 135; expenses, 143-44; history cur- riculum, 144; Japanese language class, 144; lunch, 145; moral education, 144;

private, 143; problems in, 145; public, 143; special activities, 144; teachers, 145; teaching methods, 145; work

groups in, 144

school, temple, 134

school, upper-secondary, 132, 148-51; academic track, 148; admission to, 148;

after- school clubs, 151; bullying in, 160; commercial track, 148; curriculum, 149; drop-out rate, 150; elitist style of, 15; English language class, 148; expenses

for, 148; family life class, 149; Japanese

language class, 148; private, 148; public, 148; ranking of, 148; students, 149; teachers in, 149; teaching methods in, 149; vocational-technical program, 149 School Education Law, 137

school-refusal syndrome, 98, 113, 147

Science and Technology Agency, 229

scientific view, 99

sculpture, 170-72; environment in, 171; influence of Buddhist art on, 170, 171, 172; influence of high technology on,

172; influence of Shinto art on, 170; in- fluence of Western art on, 170; monoha school, 170-71; "op," 170; outdoor, 171-72; "pop," 170; rhythm in, 172;

traditional, 170; video components in, 172

sea lines of communication (SLOC), 430-

31

securities houses, 210-11

securities markets, 210

Security Consultative Committee, 390, 455

Security Council, 318, 436, 451

security, internal, 421

seii taishogun. See shoguns

Seikan Tunnel, 77, 236

Seikijuku, 364, 470

Seiko Epson, 298

Seikyo Shimbun, 342

seishin, 98

Sei Shonagon, 15

Seiyii Honto (True Seiyukai), 52 Seiyukai (Association of Friends of Constitutional Government) (see also Liberal

Party), 49, 50, 61

Sekai (World), 342

Sekigahara, Battle of, 27

Sekihotai (Blood Revenge Corps), 364

Sekino Jun'ichiro, 176

self, 98-99; as individual, 111; as member of a group, 111; soto and, 111; uchi and, 111

self-control, 99, 328

Self-Defense Forces, xxvii, xxxiii, 199, 312, 362, 364, 382, 421, 427-47; authorized strength of, 444; buildup of, 391;

as civil servants, 318, 429; conditions, 446; constitutionality of, 326; disaster

relief by, 435; equipment of, 435, 439;

established, 61, 428; functions, 433,

437; government appropriations for, 312; insignia, 447; missions of, 434-35,

437; modernization of, 421; opposition

to, 359, 361; organization of, 435; public opinion on, 431, 432, 433; quotas, 434-35; ranks, 447; reservists, 445; role

of, in Persian Gulf War, xxxiv; struc- ture, 437; training of, 435, 437; uni- forms, 447

Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, 447

Self-Defense Forces Job Placement Association, 446

Self-Defense Forces Law (1954), 434, 435

Self-Defense Forces personnel: benefits, 447; as civil servants, 445; demographic

profile, 445; difficulties in recruiting, 445; education, 446; health care, 447;

pay, 446; postretirement employment,

446; retention of, 445-46; retirement, 446; training, 446; women as, 445

semiconductors, xxxi, 197, 207, 232, 299-300; charges of dumping, 299; ex- port of, 269, 299; imports of, 299; sanctions on trade in, 299-300; success of, 296; trade agreement on, xxxiv 601
Japan: A Country Study

Sendai Plain, 74 Senkaku Islands, 396

services: deficit, xxxi, 273-74; examples

of, xxxi; overseas travel and spending, 274

Seto, 176

Seto Naikai. See Inland Sea) Seto-Ohashi bridge network, 80-81, 238

Seventeen Article Constitution, 8 Shakaishugi Kyokai. See Japan Socialist Association Shakespeare, William, 186 Shandong Province, 50, 51, 424; with- drawal of troops from, 54

Shanghai, 56, 425

Shearson Lehman, 210 Shenyang. See Mukden

shibui, 163 Shidehara Kijiiro, 307, 312

Shield Society, 364

Shikoku, xxvii, 72, 77, 80-81; area, 80; industry, 81; mountains, 81 Shikoku Railway Company, 236

Shikotan (see also Kuril Islands), xxxv, 64, 72, 400-3, 404, 405 Shimabara Rebellion, 30 Shimane Prefecture, 347 Shimizu Kunio, 186 Shimoda, 35 Shimpoto. See Progressive Party

Shinano River, 74

shingikai, 355 Shingon Sect. See Buddhism, Shingon

shinjinrui, 333

Shin Jiyu Kurabu. See New Liberal Club

Shinsanbetsu. See National Federation of

Industrial Organizations

Shinkansen (bullet train), 81, 238 Shinkansen Property Corporation, 238

Shin kokinshu wakashu (New Collection of Ancient and Modern Times), 19 Shinoda Toko, 173 Shinohara Ushio, 173

shinpan, 28, 35, 36 Shin Rengo. Japanese Trade Union

Confederation

Shinto, 32, 100-101, 326; Buddhist in- fluence on, 100-101, 131; Confucian

influence on, 100-101, 131; customs,

6; festivals, 108; gods, 131; importance

of, 37, 55; influence of, xxxii; music in, 180; mythology, 4; origins ofJapan in, 4; pollution notions of, 91; purification

in, 100; resurgence of, 23; ritual visits to shrines, 107; shrines, 101; syncreted with Buddhism, 11; world view, 100

Shinto, Ryobu, 23

Shinto, Sect, 101; as new religions, 101, 106

Shinto, Shrine, 101

Shinto, State, 55, 101, 110; disestablish- ment of, 60, 101 Shinto Worship, Office of, 37

shipbuilding, 204, 207, 232, 233 Shizuoka Prefecture, 74

shorn,, 10, 11, 15, 16, 422; destroyed, 24; expansion of, 14

shoen holders: military service by, 15

shoen system, 17 shoguns, Fujiwara, 13 shoguns, Minamoto, 17, 18 shoguns, Tokugawa, xxviii, 28, 33, 36 Shomu (emperor), 11 Shotoku (empress), 12 Shotoku Taishi, 8 Showa (emperor). See Hirohito "Showa fascism," 305 "Showa Restoration," 55, 56; role of emperor under, 311 Shushigaku, 104 Siam (see also Thailand), 27

Siberia, 50, 51, 53, 73, 83, 292; aid for, 404; withdrawal of troops from, 54

silk production, 79

Silk Route, 167

Singapore, xxxv, 54, 286, 408; exports to, 285; imports from, 285; occupation of, 426

Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 405; antihegemony clause, 396,

405; negotiations for, 396; and Soviet- Japanese relations, 405

Sino-Japanese relations, 64, 65, 383, 393-

400; bilateral trade, 398; complementary economic policies in, 398; complementary foreign policies in, 398;

friction in, 399; in the 1980s, 397, 398;

Soviet interference in, 397; trade, 394-95; unofficial, in the 1950s, 394

Sino-Japanese War, First, 46, 374; reparations for, 46-47

Sino-Japanese War, Second, 58, 425-26;

justification for, 425

Sino-Soviet competition, 394

Sino-United States rapprochement, 382 SLOC. See sea lines of communication

602
Index

small business, 215, 338; benefits of, 338;

political muscle of, 338

Smith, Robert, 97 Smithsonian Agreement, 281 Smithsonian Institution, 167

Social Democratic league, 340, 357, 362

social interaction: giri in, 97-98; protocol

for, 94-95; socialization for, 110-11;

status differences defining, 96

socialist movement, 52

social organization, 110-23; age stra- tification in, 121-23; family, 111-14; gender stratification in, 118-21; neighborhood, 114-15; popular culture, 117-

18; workplace, 115-17

social welfare, 125-26; spending on, 88-

89, 125

Society to Protect Japan (Nihon o Mamoru Kai), 310, 335 Soga family, 7-8 Soga Umako, 8

Sohyo. See General Council of Trade

Unions of Japan

Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society), 64, 106, 336, 360 Song Dynasty, 22, 177

sonno-joi, 34, 36 Sony Corporation, 353

soto, 111 Sound Space Ark, 183 South Africa, 290; nuclear technology im- ported from, 229 South China Sea, 430

Southern Court, 21, 23 South Korea (Republic of Korea), xxxv,

110, 233, 286, 292, 300-1, 398; aid to, 407; exports, 282, 285; imports from,

282, 285; mutual bitterness, 410; policies toward, 410; relations with, 383;

security interests in, 410; support for, 410-11; trade with, 411 South Manchurian Railway, 48, 425 South Manchurian Railway Company,

47, 56 South Pacific, 426 South-West Air Lines, 240

Soviet-Japanese relations, 400-6; cultural exchanges, 403; economic cooperation, 404; fishing rights, 403; history of, 403;

in 1970s, 404-5; problems in, 382;

reciprocal most-favored-nation treat- ment, 403; and Sino-Japanese rela- tions, 405; territorial dispute in, 72,

400-3; trade relations, 404

Soviet Union, 58; commercial relations with, 291-92, 377, 393; defense spending, 199, 312; dispute over Kuril Is- lands, 292; financial aid to, 292; German invasion of, 426; invasion of Afghanistan, 291, 377, 391, 398, 400,

404, 421; military presence of, in Asia, 386; perceived threat from, 350, 369,

386, 397-98, 421, 429-30; relations with, 58, 64, 65; trade with, 290

space program, 197, 232, 234, 244

space station, 244

Spain, 233

Spanish, 24

Special Measures Law for Assimilation

Projects, 92 "Spring Struggle," 337

Sri Lanka, 407

Stalin, Joseph, 306

status differences: giri in, 97-98; importance of, 96; in Japanese language, 96-97; in social interaction, 96

steel. See iron and steel stock: corporate cross-holding of, 215;

stockholders, 215-16

Strait of Malacca, 430

stress, 96

strikes, 213, 218, 226

Structural Impediments Initiative, 267, 284, 353, 393

students: delinquency among, 149; dis- cipline for, 149; handicapped, 147-48,

150; job placement for, 150; returning from abroad, discrimination against, 150; supervision of, 149; tutoring of, 152 Subaru, 295 subway systems, 239

suffrage, 44; calls for universal, 51, 52; universal adult, 315

Suiheisha. See Levelers Association of Japan

Suiko (empress), 8 Sumitomo, 214, 260, 452 Sumitomo Bank, 261 Supreme Court, 324, 327, 471; judicial review exercised by, 312, 314, 325-26,

473; responsibilities of, 324-25 Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, 471 Supreme War Council, 43-44

Susano-o (Storm God), 4 Suzuki violin method, 183 603
Japan: A Country Study

Suzuki Tadashi, 186 Suzuki Zenko, 65, 346, 347, 355, 430

Taiho-ryoritsu (Great Treasure Code),

xxvii, 9-10, 15 Taika Reform, 422; abandonment of, 14; administration under, 9; consolidated, 9-10; decline of, 12; land redistribution under, 9; taxes, 9

taiko, 26 Taira family, 17, 18, 19; estates of, confiscated by, Minamoto, 17-18; support

of, by samurai, 16 Taisho period, 49, 305; role of emperor

during, 311 Taiwan, 46, 47, 53, 90, 286, 396; exports, 282, 285; imports from, 282, 285; in- dependence of, 374; investment in, 298;

as part of Japanese empire, 199; rela- tions with, 64, 395; renunciation of Japanese claim to, 61 Takeshita Noboru, xxxvi, 322, 346, 347; downfall of, 349

takotsubo seikatsu, 334 Tama Arts University, 165 Tamasaburo Bando, 182 Tanaka Giichi, 51; downfall of, 56; as prime minister, 55 Tanaka Kakuei, 65, 66, 322, 333, 343,

347, 363; political machine of, 346-47;

relations with China under, 393-94,

395; relations with Soviet Union under,

405; role of, in Lockheed scandal, 345-46 Tanegashima Space Center, 244 Tang Dynasty, 10, 20, 350 Tange Kenzo, 168, 169 Tanizaki Jun'ichiro, 190, 191

taxes, 10, 39; consumption, 349, 352, 357; income, 209; as percentage of GNP,

208-9; reform of, 355

tea ceremony, xxxii, 176; in Muromachi

culture, 23

teachers, xxxii; elementary school, 145;

fringe benefits, 139; lower-secondary

school, 146; salaries, 139; social responsibilities of, 139; social status of, 139; supervision of, 140; training, 139-40;

training, in-service, 140

teaching, 139; competition for jobs, 139-40; materials, 145; methods, 145,

/146

Technical Research and Development Institute, 451 technology (see also high technology):

cooperation on, xxxv; research in, 198

Teito Rapid Transit Authority, 239

telecommunications, 243-44; equipment,

export of, 284; equipment, import re- strictions on, 266

telephones, 244

telephone system, privatization of, 355

television, 71, 118, 192-93, 243; broadcasting systems, 192; educational, 145, 146, 193; experimental broadcasting,

243; "From the North Country," 193; growth of, 243-44; innovations, 243; news programs, 342; "Oshin," 193; problems, 193; programming, 192;

satellite, 244; "Sazae-san," 192; themes, 193 Temmu (emperor), 9-10 Tendai monastery, 12, 19, 25 Tendai Sect. See Buddhism, Tendai

Tenji (emperor) (see also Naka), 9

tenno, 9 Tenrikyo (Religion of Divine Wisdom),

106

terrorism, 55, 56 Teshigawara Hiroshi, 192 Teshigawara Saburo, 185

textiles, 232, 234, 398; crafts, 178; dyeing, 178; export of, 269, 284, 390; import of, 272 Thailand (see also Siam), xxxv, 65, 408;

aid to, 294, 398, 400; investment in, 409

theater (see also under kind of theater), xxxii;

classical Greek, 186; drama, 186-87;

shingeki, 186; themes in, 98; women

barred from performing in, 165 Tiananmen Incident, 291, 362, 394; reac- tion to, 399-400

Tianjin, 425

Tianjin Convention, 46

Todaiji (Great East Temple), 11 Todo Shizuko, 190 Togo troupe, 186 Tohoku, 77-78; as granary ofJapan, 77; industry, 77-78 Toho School of Music, 183 Tojo Hideki, 59, 60 Tokaido road, 79 Tokara Strait, 82 Tokugawa family, 28 604
Index

Tokugawa Hidetada, 28 Tokugawa Ieyasu, 25, 26, 329; consoli- dation of power, 27-28; control of

trade, 30; encouragement of trade, 29-30 Tokugawa Nariaki, 35, 36 Tokugawa period: art in, 170, 172, 173, 177; burakumin in, 91-92; bureaucracy

in, 33, 350; bushidd developed in, 31;

class system established in, 26, 38;

chonindo developed in, 31-32; Confucian studies in, 31; decline of, 32-36; economic development during, 30-31;

education in, 133; government, 372; legacy of, 201; living standards in, 33; missionaries expelled by, 372; population in, 33; seclusion, 372; shoguns,

xxviii, 28, 33, 36 Tokugawa society: Confucian influence, 30; hierarchy, 30 Tokugawa Yoshinobu (Keiki), 35, 36 Tokugawa Yoshitomi, 36 Tomen, 260 Tonghak religious rebellion, 46

Tosa, 37, 38, 42 Tosa Memorial, 42 Tokyo, 27, 78, 319; capital moved to, 37; migration patterns around, 89 Tokyo Arts University, 165, 177 Tokyo Bay, 78 Tokyo Electric Power Company, 229 Tokyo Imperial University, 379 Tokyo Institute of Technology, 157 Tokyo International Airport, 240 Tokyo Modern Dance School, 185 Tokyo Olympic Games (1964), 65

Tokyo saiban (Kobayashi), 192 Tokyo Securities and Stock Exchange,

xxix-xxx, 211; expansion of, 212; types of securities traded on, 212; world's

largest, 212, 261-62 Tokyu Corporation, 168 Toshiba Corporation, 298, 453 Toshiba Machine Tool, 292 Toshiba scandal, 292, 393

tourism, 78; in Ryiikyu Islands, 82 Towada, Lake, 78 Toyama, 79 Toya Shigeo, 172 Toyo Kogyo (Mazda), 295 Toyota, 197, 295 Toyotomi family, 27; destruction of, 28 Toyotomi Hideyori, 26

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 25, 29, 176, 192;

distribution of territory, 26; invasion of Korea by, 27; rise to power, 25-26

tozama, 28, 35, 36

trade, 260; with Chinese, 22; control of, 30; effect of, on economy, 203; en- couraged by Ieyasu, 29-30; expansion,

45, 408; with Europeans, 24; in feudal

period, 24; and foreign affairs, 383,

390; importance of, 255; liberalization, 271; relations, 282-92; restriction of, 30; routes, 73; with United States, 35, 284 Trade Act of 1988, 199 Trade Agency, 258

trade, balance of, 272-73, 283; under MITI, 259

trade competition, protection from, 259

trade flows, 369, 416

trade policy, 264-67; MITI's role in, 258

trade surplus, xxxi, 66, 255, 257, 270; in- crease in, 281; value of, 273

trading companies, 268; roles of, 260;

sales figures of, 260; top nine, 260

transportation, xxxi, 78; deficit, 274; in feudal period, 24; performance of, 231;

public, 115; under Tokugawa, 33 Transportation Bureau, 239

transportation, maritime, 240

Transportation, Ministry of, 258, 463;

responsibilities of, 205

travel: expenditures, xxxi; prohibition

against, 30

treaties, 378

Treaty of Alliance, 47; terminated, 54 Treaty of Kanagawa. See Treaty of Peace and Amity, 35 Treaty of Kanghwa, 46

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, xxxiii, 64, 65, 359, 361, 362, 369, 388, 404, 421; Agreed Minutes, 454

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 429

Treaty of Peace and Amity, 35 Treaty of Peace with Japan, 61, 375

Treaty of Shimonoseki, 46

Tripartite Pact, 59, 426 Truman, Harry S., 306

Trust Fund Bureau, 210

Tsuchitori Toshi, 184 Tsukamoto Saburo, 362

Tsuji Seimei, 177 Tsushima, Battle of, 48 605
Japan: A Country Study

Tsushima Current, 83 Tsushima Islands, 73 Turkey, 391 Twenty-One Demands, 50

uchi, 111; neighbors as, 114 UFO Party, 363

ukiyo, 32

ukiyo-e, 32 Ulaanbaatar, xxxvi

ultranationalism: in the 1930s, 55; of samurai, 55; after World War I, 55 unemployment, 117, 150; rate, 218, 219

unions. See labor unions

Unisis, 298 United Arab Emirates, 288 United Nations, xxxv, 262, 429; admission to, 375, 403, 414; Charter, 61; cooperation with, 382; increased role

in, 415; International Organization for Migration, xxxiv; peacekeeping activities, 415; Security Council membership

proposed, 415; support for, 414-15, 434

United States, 38, 50, 197, 211, 223; au- tomobile exports to, 259, 283; charges

by, of unfair trading practices, xxxi, 300; Constitution, 43; cooperation of, in space program, 244; criminal recidi- vism rate, 474; as debtor nation, 209; defense spending, 199, 312; denial of diplomatic relations with, 34; direct in- vestment in, 279; economic assistance from, 256; economic ties with, 381; ex- ports to, 265, 282, 384; exports as percentage of GNP, 267; gross national product of, 384; growth rate of, 201;

as impediment to development, 53; imports from, 282, 296, 384; imports,

surcharge on, 389; involvement in Japanese product development, 233; Japan

as ally of, 54; Japanese plants located

in, 295, 298; "learning mission" to, 40; liquid natural gas supplied by, 229;

military cooperation with, 375, 376-77;

military defense of Japan by, xxxiii, 376; military presence of, in Japan,

375, 387, 390, 451; nuclear technolo- gy imported from, 229; opinion of Japan, 386; payment deficit, 389; power of, waning, 369; presence of, in Asia,

53; prison population, 474; rapprochement with People's Republic of China,

64, 291, 376; security ties with, 381,

387; students in, 198; Tanaka's talks with, 65; trade deficit, 385, 389; with- drawal from Indochina, 376 United States-Canada free trade agree- ment, 414 United States Education Mission, 135 United States-Japan relations, xxxiii, 59, 371, 384-93; changes in, 385; cooperation and independence in, 390, 391; debate over, 388; deterioration of, 58, 384; economic factors in, 385; mutual

assistance in, 388; necessity of, 384;

political-military factors in, 385; rela- tive value of currencies, 391; views of, 386, 387 United States-Japan security relations, 435, 454-56; benefits of, 386; Japanese

support for, 451; joint exercises, 455;

military aid program, 454-55; troops

stationed in Japan, 454, 455-56

United States-Japan trade relations, 256, 278, 283-85, 384; access problems,

284; balance, 284, 386; closed markets

in, 392; disputes in, 298-99, 353; dumping charged, 284, 296; finance is- sues in, 278; negotiations with, 392-93;

patent infringement charged, 284; ten- sions in, 257, 284 United States-Soviet relations, 431 United States Trade Act (1988), 266-67,

284; retaliation under, 266 United States Treasury: bond market,

211, 261; securities, 211

universities, 155-56; costs, 156; courses,

155, 156; national, 155; number of stu- dents in, 155; private, 155; public, 155;

tuition assistance, 156

University Control Law, 136

University Council, 159, 160

University of the Air, 160, 243

University of Tokyo, 157, 39; Law

Faculty, 327, 346, 351 Uno Sosuke, 349 Upper-Secondary School of the Air, 152 Ura-Nihon. See geography urban life: changes in, after World War

II, 71; convenience of, 115; cultural

activities, 115; safety of, 115; sense of community in, 115; sports activities, 115

Utari Kyokai, 335 606
Index

values, 93-99 van Wolferen, Karel G., 334

Versailles Peace Conference, 51, 374 Vietnam, 398, 407, 411-12 Vietnamese refugees, 91 Volcano Islands (Kazan Retto), 72

volcanos, 83 Wa (ancient Japan), 6 wa (social harmony), xxxii, 94; and legal system, 326; mechanism for achieving, 331-32; in the workplace, 116

wabi, 163, 177 Wagahai wa neko de am (I Am a Cat) (Natsume). 190 wage demands, 202

wages, 219-20; minimum, 224

wako. See pirates war: among prominent feudal families,

16; rejection of, 427 War Between the Courts, 21 war in the Pacific, 426-27 war of reunification, 25-26 Ward, Robert, 306 Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw

Pact), 445 Washington Conference (1921-22), 53, 424 Watanabe Sadao, 184

wealth, distribution of, 71 Weber, Max, 327 Wei Dynasty, 6 West, desire to catch up with, 255 Western influence, xxvii, xxviii, 3, 372; European, 24; under Meiji Restoration, 38; repulsion of, 35

Westernization: of industry, 46; Japanese

desire for, 40 Western traders, 34, 371 West Germany, 223; exports to, 282, 286; exports as percentage of GNP, 267; imports from, 282, 286, 296; investment

by, in United States, 285; trade with, 255 West Japan Railway Company, 236

whaling, 85, 247

White Paper on the Environment, 85

wholesaling, 235 Wild Sheep Chase, A (Murakami), 191 women, 118-21; artists, 166; barred from

imperial succession, 10, 12, 310; barred from performing in theater, 165; educational opportunities, 120, 135, 156, 158; equal rights, xxx, 112, 120; under feudal system, 118; geisha, 32, 183; under ie system, 112; neighborhood activities of, 115; as news anchors, 118; novelists, 190; peasant, 118, 120, 121; political af- filiation of, 64; portrayal of, on tele- vision, 118; as professional housewife,

113, 120; restricted rights of, 112, 117;

as rulers of Japan, 310; in Self-Defense

Forces, 445; suffrage for, xxx, 61, 120;

as teachers, 145, 149; in twelfth century, 118; upper class, 118; vernacular liter- ature by, 15, 188 women in paid labor force, 71, 87, 88, 114, 117, 118-21, 203; career, 328; changes in, 121, 220; demographics of, 219; discrimination against, 328; married women in, 121; number of, 221;

participation rate of, 221; pension

benefits for, 125, 203; status in, 121;

suits by, for equal treatment, 328

workplace, 115-17; demands of, on hus- bands, 121; in ie, 117; inequities in, 116-17; lifetime employment model,

116, 117 World Bank, xxxiii, 262, 290, 369, 415, 416; voting rights in, 263 world view, 72; characteristics of, 99;

scientific models in, 99 World War I, 50-51 ; effect of, on econo- my, 202-3 World War II, 60-61 , 424-27; defeat in, 374; destruction of economy by, xxix; destruction of infrastructure by, 199; recovery from, xxix; terms of sur- render, 60, 307 Wright, Frank Lloyd, 168

yakuza (underworld), 364, 469 Yamagata Aritomo, 43, 48, 49 Yamaichi, 210, 261 Yamakawa Naoto, 192 Yamamoto Masao, 177 Yamatai, 6 Yamato, 3, 4 Yamato clan, 9 Yamato court, 3, 422; Chinese influence

on, 7, 187; domain of, 7 Yamato Dynasty, 35

yamato-e, 15, 163 Yamato period, 6-10; characteristics of, 6 607
Japan: A Country Study

Yamato polity, 6-8; great clans of, 6-7; organization of, 7 Yasukuni Shrine, 110, 311, 399

Yayoi: era, 5; location, 5; musical instru- ments of, 180; pottery of, 5; wet-rice

culture, 5 yen, value of, xxx, 257; appreciation of, 270, 271, 295, 406; demand for, 290; determined by, 280; effect of, on exports, 277; effect of, on investment,

280; floating, 281; in 1949, 280; relative to the dollar, 282, 377, 385; revaluation of, 389; supply of, 280; undervaluation of, 280-81 Yen-Dollar Accord, 278

yobiko, 154; cost of, 154; programs of, 154 Yokohama, 78

Yomiuri Shimbun, 341-42

Yosa Buson, 188 Yoshida Shigeru, 61 Yoshida Shoin, 36, 38

Yoshihito (Taisho emperor), 49 Yoshimoto, "Banana," 191 Yuan Dynasty, 20, 22

zaibatsu: dissolution of, 188, 214, 350; suc- cessors of, 202, 214 Zeami Motokiyo, 188 Zenroren. See Japan Confederation of Trade Unions

Zenrokyo. See National Trade Union

Council Zhang Zuolin, 55

zoku (tribes), 335

608
Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-87 Greece

J JU jO r\l UcLllla. 550-78 V_T LLalC lllcila. Algeria JJU 1 /

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550-169 Australia 550-165 Hungary

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Belgium J JU—J j Indonesia JJU— DO Bolivia JJU oo Iran 550-20 Brazil 550-31 Iraq 550-168 Bulgaria 550-25 Israel

J JU-01 Burma J JU— 10Z Italy

J JU-JU Cambodia J JU— JU Japan

JJU 1 UU oexilici uuii 550-34 Jordan

550-159 Chad 550-56 Kenya

550-77 Chile 550-81 Korea, North

J JU— DU bllllla JJU Tl Korea, South 550-26 JJU 550-58JO Laos

JJU— J J Commonwealth Caribbean, J JU— Zt .Lebanon

Islands of the 550-91 Congo 550-38 Liberia 550-90 Costa Rica 550-85 Libya

550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 550-172 A/f ala wi JJu 550-11 Ja, 52 Cuba 550-45 IVlaJct y old. JJU A £, JJU ^0-11 fi1 U

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550-36 Dominican Republic and 550-76 Mongolia

Haiti 550-52 Ecuador 550-49 Morocco

550-43 Egypt 550-64 Mozambique

550-150 El Salvador 550-35 Nepal and Bhutan

550-28 Ethiopia 550-88 Nicaragua 550-167 Finland 550-157 Nigeria 550-155 Germany, East 550-94 Oceania

550-173 Germany, Fed. Rep. of 550-48 Pakistan 550-153 Ghana 550-46 Panama

609
DDU-lOD Paraguay DOU—Do Thailand 550-185 Persian Lruli states 550-89 Tunisia 550-42 Peru 550-80 Turkey

550-72 Philippines 550-74 Uganda

550-162 Poland 550-97 Uruguay

550-181 Portugal 550-71 Venezuela DjO-IdO Romania Vietnam

550-37 Rwanda and Burundi 550-183 V7 ""PI Yemens, Ihe

550-51 Saudi Arabia ooo-yy Yugoslavia 550-70 Senegal 550-67 Zaire DOU-loU Sierra Leone oou- / Zambia

550-184 Singapore 550-171 Zimbabwe

550-86 Somalia

ccn QQ ooutn Ainca

550-95 Soviet Union

550-179 Spain 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-27 Sudan

550-47 Syria 550-62 Tanzania

610



PIN: 004197-000