iii NUREG-1714

ABSTRACT

Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (PFS), proposes to construct and operate an independent spent fuel

storage installation on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians. The Reservation

is located geographically within Tooele County, Utah. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) would be transported

by rail from existing U.S. commercial reactor sites to Skull Valley. To transport the SNF from the

existing rail line to the proposed facility, PFS proposed to construct and operate a rail siding and a

51 m (32 mile) rail line from the rail line near Low, Utah to the reservation.

This final environmental impact statement evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the PFS

proposal. The document discusses the purpose and need for the PFS proposed facility, describes the

proposed action and its reasonable alternatives, describes the environment potentially affected by the

proposal, presents and compares the potential environmental impacts resulting from the proposed

action and its alternatives, and identifies mitigation measures that could eliminate or lessen the

potential environmental impacts. 

The PFS proposal requires approval from four federal agencies: the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, the U.S. Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs and Bureau of Land

Management, and the U.S. Surface Transportation Board. The actions required of these agencies are

administrative. The environmental issues that each of these agencies must evaluate pursuant to the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) are interrelated; therefore; the agencies have

cooperated in the preparation of this final environmental impact statement, and this document serves

to satisfy each agency's statutory responsibilities under NEPA. 
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December 2001

v NUREG-1714

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX G

PUBLIC COMMENTS AND RESPONSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

G.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

G.2 Major Issues and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-3

G.3 Specific Comments and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-17

G.3.1 Purpose and Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-19

G.3.1.1 Basis for Project Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-19

G.3.1.2 Conflict with the NWPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-24

G.3.1.3 Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-25

G.3.1.4 Economic Development and BIA Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-25

G.3.1.5 Support for Purpose and Need for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-26

G.3.2 The Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-27

G.3.2.1 Permanence of Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-27

G.3.2.2 Impacts of Reactor Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-30

G.3.2.3 Waste Confidence Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-30

G.3.2.4 Management of Proposed PFSF and Effects on States and Other

 Reactor Licensees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-31

G.3.2.5 The Proposed Cask System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-31

G.3.2.5.1 Inadequate Cask Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-31

G.3.2.5.2 Inadequate Analysis of Cask Design in the EIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-33

G.3.2.5.3 Specific Questions Regarding the Cask Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-34

G.3.2.5.4 Adequate Cask Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-35

G.3.2.5.5 Handling and Use of Proposed Cask System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-36

G.3.2.5.6 Design Compatibility with DOE Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-37

G.3.2.5.7 Inadequate Cask and Proposed PFSF Thermal Design . . . . . . . G-38

G.3.2.5.8 Lack of Procedures for Detection of Helium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-40

G.3.2.5.9 Use of Improperly Constructed Casks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-41

G.3.2.6 The Proposed Storage Facility Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-41

G.3.2.6.1 DEIS Inadequately Describes the Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . G-41

G.3.2.6.2 Design of the Proposed Storage Facility is Inadequate . . . . . . . G-43

G.3.2.6.3 Design of the Proposed Storage Facility is Adequate . . . . . . . . . G-44

G.3.2.6.4 Facility Storage Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-45

G.3.2.6.5 Storage of Greater-than-Class C Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-46

G.3.2.6.6 Need for Additional Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-47

G.3.2.6.7 Inadequate Quality Assurance Program Description . . . . . . . . . G-47

G.3.2.6.8 Need for Hot Cell at the Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-48

G.3.2.7 Location of the Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-49

G.3.2.8 Railroad Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-50

G.3.2.8.1 Design of the Proposed New Rail Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-50

G.3.2.8.2 Design of the Proposed ITF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-51

G.3.2.8.3 Feasibility of Rail Spur Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-51

G.3.2.8.4 Location of the Proposed Skunk Ridge Rail Corridor . . . . . . . . . G-52

G.3.2.8.5 Rowley Junction ITF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-52

G.3.3 Permits and Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-53

G.3.3.1 Federal Regulations and Executive Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-53

G.3.3.1.1 Nuclear Waste Policy Act Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-53
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

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G.3.3.1.2 International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . G-53

G.3.3.1.3 Regulations Regarding Transfer of Waste to Sovereign

Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-54

G.3.3.1.4 Transport Regulations are Adequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-54

G.3.3.1.5 NRC Safety Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-55

G.3.3.1.6 Hazardous Waste Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-55

G.3.3.1.7 Community Right-to-Know and Emergency Planning

Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-56

G.3.3.1.8 Fuel Tanks and Spill Prevention Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-56

G.3.3.1.9 Air Quality Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-56

G.3.3.1.10 Water Quality Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-57

G.3.3.1.11 National Defense Authorization Act Requirements . . . . . . . . . . G-58

G.3.3.1.12 BLM Resource Management Plan Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . G-59

G.3.3.1.13 BIA Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-59

G.3.3.1.14 EPA Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-60

G.3.3.2 State Jurisdiction and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-60

G.3.3.2.1 NRC Coordination with the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-60

G.3.3.2.2 General Comments on State Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-61

G.3.3.2.3 State Jurisdiction on Skull Valley Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-62

G.3.3.2.4 State Approval for PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-64

G.3.3.2.5 State Approvals Related to Waste Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-64

G.3.3.2.6 Regulations Regarding Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-66

G.3.3.2.7 State Approval for Air Pollutant Permits (& Title V Permit) . . . . . G-70

G.3.3.2.8 Other State Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-72

G.3.3.2.9 Land Use Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-72

G.3.4 Decommissioning and Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-73

G.3.4.1 Proposed Period of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-73

G.3.4.1.1 Duration of NRC License Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-73

G.3.4.1.2 Timing of SNF Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-74

G.3.4.1.3 Cask Shipment Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-75

G.3.4.2 Decommissioning Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-75

G.3.4.2.1 Adequacy of Preliminary Decommissioning Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . G-75

G.3.4.2.2 Execution of Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-76

G.3.4.2.3 Available Technology for Decommissioning and Closure . . . . . . G-77

G.3.4.2.4 Time Required for Decommissioning and Removal of SNF . . . . G-77

G.3.4.2.5 Reclamation of Rail Spur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-78

G.3.4.2.6 Decommissioning in the Environmental Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-78

G.3.4.3 Decommissioning Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-78

G.3.4.3.1 Availability of Permanent Repository and Contingent Costs . . . . G-78

G.3.4.3.2 Adequacy of Decommissioning Funding Plan and Cost

Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-79

G.3.4.3.3 Displacement of Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-81

G.3.4.4 Impacts of Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-81

G.3.4.4.1 Impacts from Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-81

G.3.4.4.2 Impacts from Improper Decommissioning and Closure . . . . . . . G-81

G.3.4.4.3 Limited Liability Issues Regarding Decommissioning and

Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-82

G.3.4.4.4 Impacts on Future Generations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-82
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

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vii NUREG-1714

G.3.5 Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-83

G.3.5.1 The Range of Alternatives Covered in the DEIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-83

G.3.5.1.1 Range of Alternatives in DEIS is Inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-83

G.3.5.1.2 Specific Technological Alternatives Analysis is Inadequate . . . . G-85

G.3.5.1.3 Specific Storage Site Alternatives Analysis is Inadequate . . . . . G-86

G.3.5.1.4 At-Reactor Storage Evaluation is Inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-88

G.3.5.1.5 Consideration of Yucca Mountain as an Alternative . . . . . . . . . . G-89

G.3.5.1.6 Inadequate Consideration of Transportation Alternatives . . . . . . G-90

G.3.5.1.7 Inadequate Evaluation of Economic Development Alternatives

for the Skull Valley Band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-91

G.3.5.2 Alternatives Dismissed from Detailed Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-92

G.3.5.2.1 Process for Dismissing Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-92

G.3.5.2.2 The DOE Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-93

G.3.5.3 The Applicant’s Site Selection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-95

G.3.5.3.1 Range of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-95

G.3.5.3.2 Adequacy of Site Selection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-97

G.3.5.3.3 Evaluation of Nearby Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-98

G.3.5.3.4 Site Selection and Discriminatory Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-98

G.3.5.4 The ITF Alternative and the Use of Heavy-Haul Vehicles on Skull Valley

 Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-99

G.3.5.4.1 Opposition to Multiple Rights-of-Way and Heavy-Hauling . . . . . G-99

G.3.5.5 Consideration of the Wyoming Alternative is Inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-100

G.3.5.6 The No Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-101

G.3.5.6.1 General Support for the No Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-101

G.3.5.6.2 Impacts of the No Action Alternative Compared to the

Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-102

G.3.5.6.3 Adequacy of Evaluation of No Action Alternative Impacts on

Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-105

G.3.5.6.4 Support for the No Action Alternative based on Equity Issues . G-107

G.3.5.6.5 Adequacy of Discussion of No Action Alternative in

Environmental Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-108

G.3.5.6.6 Discussion of Adverse Operational and Environmental

Impacts of the No Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-109

G.3.6 Agency Actions and Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-111

G.3.6.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-111

G.3.6.1.1 Agency Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-111

G.3.6.1.2 Agency Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-111

G.3.6.1.3 Support for Agency Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-112

G.3.6.1.4 Review Process in Light of Lawsuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-112

G.3.6.1.5 Agency Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-112

G.3.6.1.6 Executive Order 11514 – National Environmental Policy Act,

Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality . . . . . . G-113

G.3.6.2 The NRC Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-114

G.3.6.2.1 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-114

G.3.6.2.2 The NRC’s Authority Under NWPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-114

G.3.6.2.3 The NRC Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-116

G.3.6.2.4 Public Health and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-119

G.3.6.2.5 Fiduciary Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-120

G.3.6.2.6 Review of Safety Evaluation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-120
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

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G.3.6.2.7 The NRC’s Credibility and Objectivity in the Decision-Making

Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-121

G.3.6.2.8 Preceding Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-123

G.3.6.2.9 Seismic Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-123

G.3.6.2.10 Public Acceptance of Risks from Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . G-124

G.3.6.2.11 Commission Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-124

G.3.6.2.12 Financial Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-125

G.3.6.2.13 State Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-125

G.3.6.2.14 Rowley Junction Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-126

G.3.6.3 The BIA Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-127

G.3.6.3.1 The BIA Process and General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-127

G.3.6.3.2 The BIA Responsibility/Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-130

G.3.6.3.3 Statement by Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs G-130

G.3.6.3.4 The BIA Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-131

G.3.6.3.5 Trust Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-132

G.3.6.3.6 BIA Statutory Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-134

G.3.6.3.7 Native American Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-135

G.3.6.3.8 Long-term Financial Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-136

G.3.6.4 The BLM Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-136

G.3.6.4.1 Consistency with Mission Statement and Management Plan . . G-136

G.3.6.4.2 Legacy Highway, Native Plants, and Wild Horses . . . . . . . . . . G-138

G.3.6.4.3 Need for Study of Military Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-139

G.3.6.4.4 Inappropriate Influence of Native Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-140

G.3.6.4.5 Clarification of Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-140

G.3.6.4.6 Inconsistency with State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-140

G.3.6.4.7 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-141

G.3.6.4.8 Fair Market Value for Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-141

G.3.6.5 The STB Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-142

G.3.6.5.1 Rail Licensing Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-142

G.3.6.5.2 Application of the STB Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-142

G.3.6.6 Tribal Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-143

G.3.6.6.1 Ethical Concerns about Siting Facility on the Goshute

Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-143

G.3.6.6.2 Tribal Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-144

G.3.6.7 Agency Consultations and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-146

G.3.6.7.1 Agency Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-146

G.3.6.7.2 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-148

G.3.7 Public Participation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-149

G.3.7.1 Scope and Scale of the Public Participation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-149

G.3.7.2 Accessibility of the Public Participation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-150

G.3.7.3 Community Awareness and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-151

G.3.7.4 Availability of DEIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-153

G.3.7.5 Length of Comment Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-153

G.3.7.6 Requests for Additional Public Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-154

G.3.7.7 Public Notification and Meetings Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-156

G.3.7.8 Adequacy of Project Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-158

G.3.7.9 Fairness of the Decision-making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-159

 G.3.7.10 Agency Responsiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-160

 G.3.7.11 Support for Public Participation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-161
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G.3.8 Adequacy of the EIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-163

G.3.8.1 NEPA Procedural Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-163

G.3.8.1.1 Adequacy of Information and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-163

G.3.8.1.2 Compliance with NEPA Implementing Regulations . . . . . . . . . . G-164

G.3.8.1.3 Consideration of Connected Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-166

G.3.8.1.4 State and Local Consistency and Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-167

G.3.8.1.5 Rail Line Impacts on Regional Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-168

G.3.8.1.6 Other Impacts in NEPA Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-169

G.3.8.1.7 Additional Natural Resources Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-169

G.3.8.1.8 Military Training Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-170

G.3.8.2 Clarity of the Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-171

G.3.8.2.1 Use of Plain English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-171

G.3.8.2.2 Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-173

G.3.8.3 Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-174

G.3.8.3.1 Typographical Errors (General) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-174

G.3.8.3.2 Editorial Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-174

G.3.8.3.3 General Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-175

G.3.8.3.4 Inconsistencies in the DEIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-175

G.3.8.3.5 Inconsistencies in References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-176

G.3.8.3.6 Executive Summary and Chapter 1 Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-177

G.3.8.3.7 Chapter 2 Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-178

G.3.8.3.8 Chapter 3 Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-179

G.3.8.3.9 Chapter 4 Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-179

G.3.8.3.10 Appendix C Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-180

G.3.8.3.11 Appendix D Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-180

G.3.8.3.12 Appendix F Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-180

G.3.9 Geology, Minerals, and Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-183

G.3.9.1 Lack of Subsurface Investigations and Geologic Features Information . . . G-183

G.3.9.2 Accuracy and Completeness of Soil Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-183

G.3.9.3 Seismic Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-184

G.3.9.3.1 Seismic Analysis of the Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-184

G.3.9.3.2 Seismic Analysis of the Proposed Rail Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-186

G.3.9.3.3 Public Accessibility of Seismic Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-187

G.3.9.3.4 Fault History and Ground Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-188

G.3.9.3.5 Floods and Waves Generated by Earthquake and Landslide . . G-189

G.3.9.3.6 Subsurface Soils Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-189

G.3.9.3.7 Effect of Collapsible Soils on Proposed Rail Corridor . . . . . . . . G-191

G.3.9.4 Mineral Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-191

G.3.9.5 Effects of Weather on Soil and Rock at the Proposed Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-192

G.3.10 Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-193

G.3.10.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-193

G.3.10.1.1 Existing Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-193

G.3.10.2 Surface Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-194

G.3.10.2.1 Affected Surface Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-194

G.3.10.2.2 Surface Water Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-194

G.3.10.2.3 Water Supply and Water Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-196

G.3.10.2.4 Storm Water Permits and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-197

G.3.10.2.5 Impacts to the Great Salt Lake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-199
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G.3.10.3 Water Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-200

G.3.10.3.1 Facility Water Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-200

G.3.10.4 Groundwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-202

G.3.10.4.1 Groundwater Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-202

G.3.10.4.2 Groundwater Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-206

G.3.10.4.3 Groundwater Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-209

G.3.10.5 Flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-213

G.3.10.5.1 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-213

G.3.10.5.2 100-Year Flood Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-215

G.3.10.5.3 Flood Potential and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-216

G.3.10.5.4 Flooding Impacts on the ITF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-218

G.3.10.5.5 Impact of Flood Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-218

G.3.10.6 Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-219

G.3.10.6.1 Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan . . . . . . . G-219

G.3.10.6.2 Groundwater Monitoring Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-219

G.3.11 Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-221

G.3.11.1 Air Quality Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-221

G.3.11.2 Permits and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-221

G.3.11.3 Fugitive Dust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-222

G.3.11.4 Other Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-222

G.3.12 Ecological Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-225

G.3.12.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-225

G.3.12.1.1 Species and Ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-225

G.3.12.1.2 Habitats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-226

G.3.12.1.3 Biological Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-227

G.3.12.1.4 Herbicide Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-227

G.3.12.2 Vegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-228

G.3.12.2.1 Native Plants and Vegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-228

G.3.12.2.2 Revegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-229

G.3.12.3 Wildlife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-230

G.3.12.3.1 Impacts on Habitats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-230

G.3.12.3.2 Impacts on Wildlife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-232

G.3.12.3.3 Radiation Effects on Wildlife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-234

G.3.12.4 Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-236

G.3.12.4.1 Wetlands Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-236

G.3.12.4.2 Wetlands Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-237

G.3.12.4.3 Permits and State Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-238

G.3.12.5 Threatened, Endangered, and Other Species of Special Concern . . . . . . G-238

G.3.12.5.1 Special Status Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-238

G.3.12.5.2 Plant Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-240

G.3.12.6 Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-240

G.3.12.7 Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-241

G.3.13 Socioeconomic and Community Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-243

G.3.13.1 Reservation Socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-243

G.3.13.1.1 General Socioeconomic Issues on the Reservation . . . . . . . . G-243

G.3.13.1.2 Tribal Culture and Traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-245

G.3.13.1.3 Support for Tribal Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-246
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

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G.3.13.2 Regional, State, and National Socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-247

G.3.13.2.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-247

G.3.13.2.2 Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-249

G.3.13.2.3 Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-250

G.3.13.2.4 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-250

G.3.13.2.5 Sanitary Waste Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-250

G.3.13.2.6 Transportation and Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-251

G.3.13.2.7 Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-255

G.3.13.2.8 Economic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-257

G.3.13.3 Indirect Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-262

G.3.13.3.1 Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-262

G.3.13.3.2 Other Indirect Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-265

G.3.13.4 Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-265

G.3.14 Cultural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-269

G.3.14.1 Cultural Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-269

G.3.14.2 Native American Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-271

G.3.14.3 Effects on Plants and Animals on the Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-272

G.3.15 Human Health Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-273

G.3.15.1 Adequacy of Evaluation of Human Health Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-273

G.3.15.2 Background Radiological Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-274

G.3.15.2.1 Comparison of Radiological Impacts to Background

 Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-274

G.3.15.3 Radiological Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-275

G.3.15.3.1 Adequacy of Radiological Impacts Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-275

G.3.15.3.2 Accumulation of Radioactive Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-276

G.3.15.3.3 Proposed Yucca Mountain Radiation Standards . . . . . . . . . . . G-277

G.3.15.3.4 Magnitude of Radiological Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-277

G.3.15.3.5 Radiological, Chemical, and Heavy Metal Contaminants . . . . G-278

G.3.15.3.6 Owner Controlled Area Boundary Dose Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . G-279

G.3.15.3.7 Testing of Rain and Snow Melt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-279

G.3.15.3.8 Compliance with NRC Radiation Exposure Limits . . . . . . . . . G-279

G.3.15.3.9 Airborne Radioactive Effluents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-280

G.3.15.3.10 Safety and Viability of SNF Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-281

G.3.15.4 Impacts to Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-281

G.3.15.4.1 Magnitude of Impacts to Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-281

G.3.15.4.2 Conclusions Regarding the Proposed ITF and High Doses

 to Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-282

G.3.15.5 Impacts to Members of the General Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-284

G.3.15.5.1 Magnitude of Impacts to the General Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-284

G.3.15.5.2 Radiological Impacts to Children and Other Special

 Populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-286

G.3.15.5.3 Psychological and Human Health Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-288

G.3.15.5.4 Radiological Impacts Other than Latent Cancer Fatalities . . . G-289

G.3.15.6 Impacts from Off-Normal Operations or Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-290

G.3.15.6.1 Adequacy of Accident Scenarios Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-290

G.3.15.6.2 Analysis of Emergency Response Capabilities is Inadequate G-297

G.3.15.6.3 Leaking and Contaminated Canister Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-302

G.3.15.6.4 Facility Design and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-303
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G.3.15.7 Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-304

 G.3.15.7.1 Inadequate Analysis of Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-304

G.3.15.8 Positive Comments on Human Health Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-307

G.3.15.8.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-307

G.3.15.8.2 Minimal Radiological Exposure to Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-308

G.3.15.8.3 Safety of ISFSIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-308

G.3.15.8.4 Extremely Low Probability of Aircraft, Bomb or Missile

 Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-309

G.3.16 Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-311

G.3.16.1 Incident-Free Transportation Analysis Methodology and Assumptions . . G-311

G.3.16.1.1 Need for a Site-Specific Transportation Risk Assessment . . . G-311

G.3.16.1.2 The EIS Should Rely on Table S-4, Not Site-Specific

 Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-312

G.3.16.1.3 Inadequate Methodology in the Applicant’s ER . . . . . . . . . . . . G-313

G.3.16.1.4 Different Methodology in DEIS as Compared to the

 Applicant’s ER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-314

G.3.16.1.5 Additional Routes Should Be Specified Instead of One

 Representative Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-314

G.3.16.1.6 Reliance Should Not Be Placed on the DOE Yucca Mountain

 DEIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-315

G.3.16.1.7 Comparison of Proposed PFSF DEIS and Yucca Mountain

 DEIS Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-316

G.3.16.1.8 The EIS Transportation Analysis Should Be Comprehensive . G-316

G.3.16.1.9 NRC Regulations for Cask Designs and Their Bases Are

 Inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-317

G.3.16.1.10 The EIS Should Have Relied Upon Other Studies . . . . . . . . G-318

G.3.16.2 Intermodal Facility Operations and Transport Segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-319

G.3.16.2.1 The DEIS Overlooks the Need to Use Heavy-Haul Trucks

 Near Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-320

G.3.16.2.2 Truck Transport of SNF to the Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . G-322

G.3.16.2.3 Proposed Intermodal Operations Are in Conflict with

 Timeliness Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-323

G.3.16.2.4 EIS Should Compare Dedicated Trains, General Rail Freight,

 and Truck Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-324

G.3.16.2.5 Proposed Action Adversely Affects the DOE’s Repository

 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-325

G.3.16.2.6 Accidents on Skull Valley Road or the ITF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-327

G.3.16.3 Estimates of Incident-Free Radiological Impacts and Risks of

 Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-327

G.3.16.3.1 The EIS Results Are Inadequate Because They Are Not

 Project Specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-327

G.3.16.3.2 Regional Impacts Are Understated and Overlook Important

 Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-328

G.3.16.3.3 Issues Related to Shipments from the Proposed PFSF Are

 Overlooked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-330

G.3.16.3.4 The Risk is Lower if the SNF is Not Transported from its

 Current Locations Until a Permanent Repository Is Available G-331

G.3.16.3.5 Risk of Large SNF Shipping Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-332

G.3.16.3.6 Comments on the Radionuclide Inventory of Spent Fuel to

 Be Shipped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-333
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

xiii NUREG-1714

G.3.16.3.7 The EIS Contains Premature Assumptions for the Proposed

 Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-333

G.3.16.3.8 Nevada-Specific Impacts Are Not Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . G-335

G.3.16.3.9 Dose Rates from Casks Inadequately Identified . . . . . . . . . . . G-336

G.3.16.3.10 Magnitude of the Shipping Campaign Is Unprecedented . . . G-338

G.3.16.3.11 DEIS Transport Worker Doses Not Adequately Defined . . . . G-338

G.3.16.3.12 Effects on Populations More Sensitive to Radiation . . . . . . . G-339

G.3.16.3.13 Comments That Generally Agree with EIS Assessments/

 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-339

G.3.16.4 Route Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-341

G.3.16.4.1 Identification of Specific Routes Is Necessary for this EIS . . . G-341

G.3.16.4.2 DEIS Should Consider Route Possibilities from All Reactors . G-342

G.3.16.4.3 DEIS Lacks Criteria for the Selection of Routes and Modes . . G-343

G.3.16.4.4 Shipping Distances Must Be Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-344

G.3.16.4.5 DEIS Does Not Satisfy Federal Highway Administration

 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-344

G.3.16.4.6 The EIS Overlooks Demographics along the Routes . . . . . . . G-344

G.3.16.4.7 The DEIS Should Include a Detailed Transportation Plan . . . G-345

G.3.16.4.8 Additional States Could Be Affected If Additional Reactor

 Licensees Ship to PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-345

G.3.16.5 Transportation Safety Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-346

G.3.16.5.1 Consistent Safety Standards Should Apply to All Spent Fuel

 Shipments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-346

G.3.16.5.2 DEIS Does Not Recognize Inadequacies in DOT Regulatory

 Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-346

G.3.16.5.3 Buffer Cars Between Cask-Carrying Railcars Are Not

 Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-347

G.3.16.6 Economic Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-347

G.3.16.6.1 Economic Impacts of Severe Transportation Accidents in

 Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-347

G.3.16.6.2 Economic Impacts of Severe Accidents in Salt Lake City . . . . G-349

G.3.16.6.3 Cost of a Severe Accident in Rural Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-350

G.3.16.6.4 Responsibility for Accident Costs and Clean-up . . . . . . . . . . . G-351

G.3.16.6.5 Economics of Transporting Fuel to PFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-351

G.3.16.6.6 Computer Codes That Estimate Accident Costs . . . . . . . . . . . G-352

G.3.16.6.7 Accidents Could Disrupt Commerce in Certain Areas . . . . . . . G-353

G.3.16.6.8 Economic Impacts to Transportation Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . G-354

G.3.16.6.9 Costs of Training and Providing for Emergency Response

 Functions on the Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-354

G.3.16.7 Comments Related to Fuel Behavior, or Cask and Carriage

 Performance, During a Transportation Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-355

G.3.16.7.1 Transport Cask Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-355

G.3.16.7.2 Testing of Transport Casks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-356

G.3.16.7.3 Human Error in Cask Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-358

G.3.16.7.4 Railcar Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-358

G.3.16.7.5 Shipment of Damaged Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-360

G.3.16.7.6 Return of Damaged, Leaking, and Contaminated Casks . . . . G-360

G.3.16.8 Comments Related to Transportation Accident Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-362

G.3.16.8.1 General Comments on the Accident Risks of Proposed

 Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-362

G.3.16.8.2 SNF Can Be Transported Safely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-363
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

NUREG-1714 xiv

G.3.16.8.3 Assumptions Input in the EIS’ RADTRAN Accident Analysis . G-364

G.3.16.8.4 DEIS Release Fraction for CRUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-366

G.3.16.8.5 Transportation Accident Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-368

G.3.16.8.6 Derailments Due to Specific Localized Conditions . . . . . . . . . G-368

G.3.16.8.7 Estimate of Transport Accident Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-369

G.3.16.8.8 Impacts of Natural Occurrences on Transport Accidents . . . . G-371

G.3.16.8.9 Impacts of Flooding and Impacts to the Great Salt Lake . . . . G-372

G.3.16.8.10 Shipping Damaged Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-372

G.3.16.9 Maximum Credible Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-373

G.3.16.9.1 Consequences of a Maximum Credible Accident . . . . . . . . . . G-373

G.3.16.9.2 Worst-Case Transportation Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-374

G.3.16.10 Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-375

G.3.16.10.1 Impacts of Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-375

G.3.16.10.2 NRC Sabotage Studies Out of Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-377

G.3.16.10.3 Economic Impacts of Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-379

G.3.16.11 Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-380

G.3.16.11.1 DEIS Does Not Adequately Address Emergency Response G-380

G.3.16.11.2 Methods to Avoid Rail Transport Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-382

G.3.16.11.3 Community Notification of SNF Shipments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-382

G.3.16.11.4 PFS Emergency Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-382

G.3.16.11.5 Emergency Response for Accidents at the ITF or on Skull

 Valley Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-383

G.3.16.11.6 DEIS Does Not Discuss Contingency Plans for Spills . . . . . . G-384

G.3.16.12 Non-Radiological Transportation Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-385

G.3.16.12.1 Impact to Transportation Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-385

G.3.16.12.2 SNF Transportation Standards and Impacts to Rail Traffic . . G-386

G.3.16.12.3 Impact of Further Railroad Consolidation on PFS Project . . . G-387

G.3.16.12.4 BMPs and Emergency Response to Spills at ITF and

 Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-387

G.3.16.12.5 Impact of Proposed Rail Line on Wildfire Risk and Impacts . G-388

G.3.16.12.6 Acceptable Risks vs. Unacceptable Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-389

G.3.16.13 Indirect and Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-389

G.3.18.13.1 Potential Transportation Accidents Resulting from Aircraft

 Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-389

G.3.16.13.2 The DEIS Should Consider the Cumulative Impacts of

 Shipping Hazardous Materials Through the State of Utah . . G-390

G.3.16.13.3 Possible Transportation Impacts Resulting from Other

 Nearby Hazardous Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-391

G.3.17 Other Environmental Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-393

G.3.17.1 Scenic Qualities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-393

G.3.17.1.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-393

G.3.17.1.2 Landscaping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-394

G.3.17.1.3 Visual Impact of Transportation Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-394

G.3.17.2 Recreation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-395

G.3.17.3 Wildfire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-396

G.3.17.3.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-396

G.3.17.3.2 Military Activity and Wildfires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-397

G.3.17.3.3 Rail Transportation and Wildfires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-397

G.3.17.4 Livestock Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-398

G.3.17.4.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-398
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

xv NUREG-1714

G.3.17.4.2 Impacts on Livestock and Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-399

G.3.17.5 Monitoring and Control of Exotic and Noxious Weeds . . . . . . . . G-399

G.3.17.6 Wilderness Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-400

G.3.17.7 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and

 Long-Term Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-401

G.3.17.7.1 Economic Benefits vs. Environmental Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-401

G.3.18 Environmental Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-403

G.3.18.1 Scope of Environmental Justice Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-403

G.3.18.2 Compliance with Environmental Justice Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-403

G.3.18.3 Environmental Justice Impacts on Native Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-405

G.3.18.4 Environmental Justice Analysis of Native American Culture . . . . . . . . . . G-406

G.3.18.5 Environmental Justice Impacts on Individuals Along Rail Corridors . . . . . G-407

G.3.18.6 Consideration of Positive Economic Benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-408

G.3.18.7 Environmental Justice Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-409

G.3.19 Economic Benefits and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-411

G.3.19.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-411

G.3.19.1.1 Objectivity of Benefits and Costs Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-411

G.3.19.1.2 Applicant’s Benefits and Costs Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-411

G.3.19.1.3 General Comments Related to the Benefits and Costs Analysis

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-413

G.3.19.1.4 General Comments Supporting the Benefits and Costs Analysis

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-417

G.3.19.2 Economic Benefits and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-418

G.3.19.2.1 Assumed Market for SNF Storage at the Proposed PFSF . . . G-418

G.3.19.2.2 Assumption Regarding Storage in Pools in the No Action

 Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-420

G.3.19.2.3 Assumption Regarding A Permanent Repository . . . . . . . . . . G-420

G.3.19.2.4 Assumption Regarding Discount for Overpacks and

 Canisters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-421

G.3.19.2.5 Assumed License Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-422

G.3.19.2.6 Construction Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-422

G.3.19.2.7 Sensitivity of the Benefits to a Delay in Opening the

 Proposed PFSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-423

G.3.19.2.8 Lack of Small Throughput Scenario Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . G-424

G.3.19.2.9 Impact of a Second Off-Site ISFSI on PFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-425

G.3.19.2.10 Intra-Licensee Transfers of SNF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-426

G.3.19.2.11 SNF Shipping Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-426

G.3.19.2.12 Cost of Railroad Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-427

G.3.19.2.13 Utah Regulatory Costs and Bonding Requirements Omitted G-427

G.3.19.2.14 Economic Costs of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-427

G.3.19.3 Environmental Benefits and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-428

G.3.19.3.1 Regional/State Environmental Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-428

G.3.19.3.2 Economic Costs of Floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-430

G.3.19.3.3 Earthquake and Seismic Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-430

G.3.19.4 Societal Benefits and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-430

G.3.19.4.1 Benefits: Site or Local Socioeconomic Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . G-430

G.3.19.4.2 Inadequate Data on Benefits and Costs of the Lease

 Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-433

G.3.19.4.3 Other State or National Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-434
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

NUREG-1714 xvi

G.3.19.4.4 Costs Related to Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-436

G.3.19.4.5 Costs Related to Sabotage/Terrorist/Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . G-436

G.3.20 General Environmental Comments (not Resource-Specific) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-439

G.3.20.1 Adequacy of DEIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-439

G.3.20.2 Accuracy of DEIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-440

G.3.20.3 Incomplete License Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-441

G.3.20.4 ITF Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-441

G.3.20.5 General Comments on Direct Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-441

G.3.20.6 Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-443

G.3.20.7 Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-444

G.3.21 Financial Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-447

G.3.21.1 Compliance with NRC Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-447

G.3.21.2 Applicant’s Financial Qualifications in the Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-448

G.3.21.3 Applicant’s Status as a Limited Liability Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-450

G.3.21.4 Liability Limitations in the Proposed Lease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-451

G.3.21.5 Location and Timing of Financial Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-452

APPENDIX H

INDEX OF COMMENTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1

H.1 Index by Commenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1

H.2 Index by Commenter Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-11
December 2001

G-1 NUREG-1714

APPENDIX G

PUBLIC COMMENTS AND RESPONSES

G.1 Overview

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies (the BIA, the BLM, and the STB) made the DEIS (June 2000)

available for public review and comment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.74 and 40 CFR 1503.1. The

NRC and the other Cooperating Agencies provided a 90-day public comment period on the DEIS. 

The length of the comment period exceeded the minimum of 45 days specified in 10 CFR 51.73 and

the STB regulations in 49 CFR 1105.10. The comment period also exceeded the recommended 60-

day comment period in the BIA NEPA guidance (30 BIA Manual Supplement 1, 1993), and met the

90-day period required for EISs involving BLM resource plan amendments (43 CFR 1610.2(c)). 

During the public comment period, the NRC and the other Cooperating Agencies held four public

meetings in Utah to receive oral comments regarding the contents of the DEIS. These public

meetings were held on July 27, 2000, in Salt Lake City; July 28, 2000, in Grantsville; and August 21,

2000, (afternoon and evening) in Salt Lake City. The NRC provided notice of these meetings in the

Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000 and 65 Fed. Reg. 49029, August 10, 2000) and

provided notice of all the meetings on its website and in local newspapers.

Approximately 145 people provided oral comments at the public meetings. A certified court reporter

recorded these oral comments and prepared written transcripts of the meetings. The transcripts of the

public meetings are part of the public record for the proposed project and were used in developing the

comment summaries contained in this Appendix. In addition to oral comments received at the public

meetings, the NRC received 264 written comments, letters, facsimile transmittals, and e-mails. The

comment period closed on September 21, 2000.

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have reviewed each comment letter and all transcripts of the

public meetings and grouped together comments relating to similar issues and topics, as permitted by

the CEQ NEPA regulations and the NRC regulations at 10 CFR 51.91 and 40 CFR 1503.4(b). 

Because the comments were exceptionally voluminous, this appendix provides summaries of all

substantive comments received on the DEIS. When the agencies received more than one comment

raising a particular topic or issue, or when the comments were voluminous, the staff prepared a

summary of the comments. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies then prepared responses to

each of the comments or summaries of comments. Commenters are identified in each summary with

a commenter number. Appendix H is an index of commenter names and commenter numbers.

Many of the comments specifically addressed the scope of the environmental review, analyses, and

issues contained in the DEIS, including comments about existing conditions, potential impacts,

proposed mitigation, the agency review process, and the public comment period. Detailed responses

to each of these comments are provided in this Appendix.

Many comments addressed topics and issues that are not part of the environmental review process for

the proposed action. These comments included questions about the NRC’s safety evaluation, general

statements of support or opposition to nuclear power, observations regarding national nuclear waste

management policies, comments on the NRC regulatory process in general, and comments on the

NRC and Cooperating Agencies’ policies. This Appendix includes summaries of these comments, but

does not include detailed responses to such comments since they address
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-2

issues that do not directly relate to the environmental effects of the proposed action and are outside

the scope of the NEPA review of the proposed action.

In some instances, many general comments and several detailed, specific comments addressed a

particular subject. In such situations, the general comments did not provide any information in

addition to that included in the specific comments. Accordingly, the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies responded to the detailed, specific comments but did not provide an additional response to

the general comments. The NRC staff nonetheless listed the general comments as directed to the

particular subject. 

The following sections present the comments, or summaries of those comments, along with the NRC

and Cooperating Agencies’ responses to them. When comments have resulted in modification or

supplementation of information presented in the DEIS, those changes are noted. In some cases the

comments do not warrant a detailed response and in these cases an explanation of why no further

response is necessary is provided. In all cases, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies sought to

respond to all comments received during the public comment period. Appendix H provides a list of

commenters identified by name and comment number.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-3 NUREG-1714

G.2 Major Issues and Responses

More than 400 individuals and organizations provided approximately 4,000 written and oral comments

on the DEIS. As indicated above, many of the comments were related to similar concerns or topics. 

To provide the reader with a quick reference regarding the major issues raised during the DEIS public

comment period, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies prepared summaries of the major issues. 

These summaries and the agencies’ responses to these major issues are set forth below. 

The summaries of major issues and the responses to them do not include verbatim, the entire range of

issues raised during the public comment period. However, in this Appendix, the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies have summarized the complete range of issues raised in all the comments

submitted during the public comment period, and have addressed those issues. The NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies encourage members of the public to review all the comments, summaries, and

responses to the comments.

The major issues raised during the public comment period for the DEIS included questions and

comments about the following subjects:

C NRC’s regulatory process;

C NRC’s safety evaluation;

C Policies and responsibilities of the Cooperating Agencies;

C Project purpose and need;

C Impacts on human health:

C Transportation analysis and potential impacts;

C Socioeconomic impacts; and

C Public participation process.

NRC Regulatory Process

A number of comments questioned the NRC review process for the license application for the

proposed PFSF. Some of the concerns deal with the NRC’s relationship with the nuclear power

industry. Many comments questioned the NRC’s ability to review such a proposal independently and

impartially. Other comments expressed concern that the NRC review process was proceeding too

quickly for a project of this magnitude. Still other comments expressed concern that the NRC review

process did not adequately evaluate alternative locations and stated that alternatives such as

continuing to store SNF at its source would have less environmental impact.

Response

The commenters questioned many aspects of the NRC’s process for considering license applications. 

The NRC staff’s responses to many of these comments are based on the specific NRC procedures for

considering applications. Accordingly, the following first describes the NRC licensing procedures, and

then responds to the commenters’ more specific concerns with the process.

Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (hereinafter the Act), as amended, has authorized the

NRC to establish safety standards and procedures for licensing various kinds of facilities. The NRC

regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2, 51, and 72 govern the submission of an application for an ISFSI. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.16, the NRC staff assigns a docket number to an application upon receipt, and

publishes a notice of receipt in the Federal Register. The notice of receipt may include a notice of

proposed action and notice of opportunity for a hearing, or the NRC staff may issue the notice of

proposed action and opportunity for a hearing later, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.105 and 72.46.

Upon publication of a notice of opportunity for hearing, as described in 10 CFR 2.714, any person

whose interest may be affected by the proposed action may request a hearing. Normally, the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-4

Commission refers requests for hearings to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) Panel, and

the Chairman of the ASLB Panel designates an ASLB to preside over the proceeding. A person other

than the applicant or the NRC staff who wishes to participate in the proceeding is said to seek

“intervention,” must petition for intervention, and, if admitted as a party to the proceeding, is called an

“intervenor.” The Executive Summary of this FEIS sets forth the dates on which the NRC staff

published the notices identified above in the Federal Register for this proposed action.

Section 2.714 of the NRC’s regulations requires a person seeking to intervene (called a “petitioner”) to

establish “standing” by identifying an interest in the proceeding and showing how that interest might be

affected by the proposed action before being admitted as a party. That section also requires the

petitioner to identify an admissible contention, i.e., a specific issue of law or fact that the petitioner

would controvert, and provide a brief explanation of the bases for each proposed contention. A

contention may relate to safety or environmental issues. Under section 2.714, a petitioner for

intervention must support each contention by alleging facts or providing expert opinion. If the

petitioner does not do so, or if he or she does not provide sufficient information to show that a genuine

dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of fact or law, the particular contention for which

this information is lacking is not admissible. Finally, section 2.714 requires the ASLB to refuse to

admit a contention if it would not entitle the petitioner to relief even if the contention were proven. That

is, the ASLB must deny admission if the contention, if proven, would not provide a basis for the ASLB

to deny the application or require a condition on the issuance of the requested license. 

The parties (NRC, applicant, and intervenors) may litigate the proceeding during the period that NRC

staff is conducting its safety review. Typical actions might include written or aural depositions and

requests for disposition of contentions. However the litigation process may not be completed

(hearings conducted and ASLB findings issued) until the NRC staff completes its safety review of the

application and documents that review in an SER. The NRC staff, in addressing other general

comments, has described the purpose of the SER (See the following response). The NRC will not

issue a license unless an applicant satisfies the safety requirements established in the NRC’s

regulations, or satisfies the standards in 10 CFR 72.7 for the granting of an exemption. The NRC may

not grant any such exemption unless it determines that the exemption will not endanger life or

property.

The NRC’s environmental review also begins with the receipt and docketing of an application, which is

described above. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.61, the applicant must submit an environmental report to

the NRC with the application. If the NRC determines that an EIS is required for a particular action, the

NRC staff also issues, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.26, a notice of intent to prepare an EIS, which is

published in the Federal Register. In the notice of intent, the NRC staff describes, among other

things, the scoping process proposed for the requested action. While a public meeting on the scoping

process is not required under 10 CFR 51.27, should the NRC staff decide that such a meeting is

appropriate, the notice of intent identifies its time and place, or when the time and place will be

announced. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.28, the NRC staff invites designated persons to participate in the

scoping process, including any person who has requested to participate. The Executive Summary to

this FEIS describes how the NRC staff implemented this process for the proposed PFSF.

Once the NRC staff has completed the scoping process, defined the proposed action, and determined

the scope of the EIS, the staff prepares a DEIS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.72, the NRC staff then makes

the DEIS publically available, publishes notice of the DEIS’s availability in the Federal Register, and

requests public comment on it. 10 CFR 51.73 specifies the minimum public comment period as 45

days. The NRC staff also distributes copies of the DEIS to the persons or organizations identified in

10 CFR 51.74, including the EPA, certain State and local agencies, and American Indian Tribes, and,

upon written request and to the extent copies are available, to any other person. The Executive

Summary describes how the NRC staff implemented this process with respect to the DEIS for the

proposed PFSF.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-5 NUREG-1714

Some commenters questioned whether the NRC had authority to enforce its safety regulations on the

Reservation should the license be issued. Federal law generally applies to American Indian

Reservations. In this instance Section 81 of the Act, 42 USC 2111, provides that no person may

possess byproduct material, except to the extent that the NRC may authorize a person to do so. (The

Act defines byproduct material in Section 11, 42 USC 2014, and this definition includes SNF.) 

Because the NRC issues licenses to authorize activities including possession of such nuclear

material, the NRC has jurisdiction over all its licensees, regardless of where within the U.S. a licensee

performs those activities. Accordingly, should the NRC ultimately determine to grant the application

for the proposed PFSF, the NRC retains jurisdiction to enforce the NRC’s safety regulations even on

the Reservation. 

NRC’s Safety Evaluation

Many comments were related to the NRC’s safety evaluation, which includes preparation of a Safety

Evaluation Report (SER). Many of the comments questioned the adequacy of the SER, and indicated

that the public should be able to review and comment on the SER’s contents and analyses.

Response

The NRC staff evaluates a license application to determine whether an applicant has demonstrated

compliance with the regulatory requirements which pertain to the type of license being sought. In the

case of the PFS license application, the NRC staff evaluated this license application against the

Commission’s regulations found at 10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste.” The Commission’s regulations

are developed through an open public process. The public’s comments are sought on these

regulations before they are promulgated and the resolution of the comments is documented and made

publicly available. The NRC staff’s evaluation of an applicant’s demonstration of compliance with the

regulations is documented in an SER. The NRC staff evaluates an applicant’s attempt to demonstrate

compliance with the regulations by reviewing the license application against the regulations. This

review is performed in an open public manner. Meetings between the NRC staff and the applicant are

open to the public. Requests by the NRC staff for additional information from the applicant are made

publicly available. The license application and all information, other than proprietary information,

submitted by the applicant are docketed and are also publicly available. The public is free to comment

on any information provided by the applicant and on any SER which is published by the NRC. 

However, there is no requirement for a formal public comment resolution process for SERs.

Cooperating Agency Policies and Responsibilities

Many commenters expressed concern about the policies and responsibilities of the Cooperating

Agencies that are working with the NRC in preparing the EIS. Commenters raised general concerns

that the Cooperating Agencies were not following their own regulations and laws with regard to the

processing and evaluation of the PFS application before them. Specifically, commenters expressed

concern that the BIA had conditionally approved the lease between the applicant and the Skull Valley

Band of Goshute Indians without completing a NEPA review. Commenters questioned whether the

BLM was adhering to its mission, which is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the public

lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. Commenters also expressed

concern that the STB had not conducted a comprehensive environmental evaluation as required by its

regulations.

Response

The BIA, the BLM, and the STB are participating in preparation of the EIS for the proposed PFSF in

accordance with the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1501.6). The NRC requested that

these Federal agencies participate in the development of this EIS because each of these agencies
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NUREG-1714 G-6

has jurisdiction by law over some portion of the proposed project. In addition, the Cooperating

Agencies also have special expertise with regard to the environmental impacts that could result from

the proposed PFSF.

Each of the Cooperating Agencies has actively participated in developing the EIS by providing input

and analysis to the NRC. Each Cooperating Agency has also reviewed the EIS and its associated

analyses to ensure that the EIS contains the necessary information, in accordance with each agency's

implementing procedures under NEPA. One purpose of this coordination is to ensure that the views

and analysis requirements of each Cooperating Agency have been included in the EIS. Another

purpose of this coordination is to ensure that the information contained in the EIS is sufficient for the

Cooperating Agencies to determine whether to approve or deny the required permits, licenses, service

agreements, and lease necessary for the applicant to construct and operate the proposed PFSF. 

The EIS is an informational document and each Cooperating Agency will consider the EIS in preparing

its own ROD, which will explain each Cooperating Agency’s reasons for approval or denial of the

permits or licenses requested for the project.

The BIA is participating as a Cooperating Agency because it has jurisdiction over the approval of any

lease on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians and because of its special

expertise relative to American Indian issues. Leases and permits on Tribal lands are issued in

accordance with 25 CFR 162 and other applicable Federal regulations, and no lease is approved

without consent of the American Indian owners (with some exceptions not relevant here). In this case,

the proposed lease is for land located on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians,

and a resolution by the recognized governing body of the Skull Valley Band authorizing approval is

sufficient. A majority of the Skull Valley Band members approved a resolution granting authority to the

Executive Committee of the Skull Valley Band to negotiate and enter into the lease. Skull Valley Band

members also gave the Executive Committee the authority to approve future amendments. The BIA

has not yet given final approval to the proposed lease between the Skull Valley Band of Goshute

Indians and the applicant. Final approval of the lease will be considered after completion of the NEPA

process and if the NRC grants a license.

The BLM is participating as a Cooperating Agency because it has jurisdiction over the lands needed

for a ROW for the proposed rail line or intermodal transfer facility. As a result, the BLM is responsible

for approving or denying a ROW grant under 43 CFR 2800. The BLM’s Mission Statement provides

for the use of public lands by qualified right-of-way applicants. The ROW, if approved, would be

subject to stipulations necessary to reduce or avoid environmental harm to the public lands. The BLM

has worked closely with the NRC during the EIS process to assure compliance with NEPA. The BLM

is presently considering a land use plan amendment to the Transportation and Utility Corridor Decision

of the Pony Express RMP, to determine if the ROW for the proposed rail line is an appropriate use of

public land. If amended, construction of a rail line outside a currently designated corridor would be

allowed. The proposed ROWs are not in conflict with the remaining RMP decisions. However, the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 has constrained the BLM from completing the

amendment at this time until the DOD has prepared its study or the act has been rescinded, amended

or clarified in a manner which would allow the BLM to proceed with the necessary planning and

decision-making.

The STB has jurisdiction over the construction and operation of new rail lines in the United States. 

The STB will consider whether to approve or deny a license for the construction and operation of the

applicant’s proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge to the proposed PFSF site. The STB has worked

closely with the NRC in developing the EIS analysis related to construction and operation of the

proposed rail line and believes that the analysis is comprehensive with regard to these issues and in

conformance with STB’s environmental rules (49 CFR Part 1105). As a result, no additional NEPA

review or analysis will be necessary for the STB to issue a ROD regarding the license application for

construction and operation of the proposed rail line.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-7 NUREG-1714

Project Purpose and Need

Many commenters expressed concern about the purpose and need for the project. In general, many

did not see the need for interim storage of SNF since the Federal government is characterizing a

potential site for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Commenters also

questioned why the SNF cannot continue to be stored at reactors and current storage facilities, and

some stated that the GAO had concluded that such on-site storage was feasible. Commenters

pointed out that the NRC has approved expanded and continued storage of SNF at existing reactors

and storage sites. Other commenters questioned whether a centralized interim storage facility for

SNF was even allowed under NWPA. Some commenters stated that the proposed PFSF could

become a permanent storage facility if the proposed Yucca Mountain project continues to be delayed. 

For this reason, many argued, the proposed PFSF should be designed as a permanent storage

facility.

Response

The NRC agrees that SNF can be safely stored at reactor sites. The NRC staff is aware that several

at-reactor ISFSIs have been constructed and several more are intended to be constructed at other

reactor sites. The GAO report referenced by several commenters evaluates the feasibility of the no

action alternative (i.e., not to build the proposed PFSF and maintain the status quo, which includes

constructing at-reactor ISFSIs). The NRC staff does not question the feasibility of the no action

alternative and evaluates the environmental impacts of the no action alternative in section 6.7 of the

FEIS. The NRC staff concluded that the environmental impacts from building at-reactor ISFSIs are

small. Furthermore, the NRC Waste Confidence Decision (10 CFR 51.23) states that “if necessary,

spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored... without significant environmental impacts for at

least 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation ... of that reactor at ... on-site or off-site [ISFSIs].”

Although the Federal government is planning for a permanent geological repository, the applicant

desires an alternative to at-reactor storage that can be implemented before a permanent geological

repository becomes available. The proposed PFSF would be an away-from-reactor ISFSI and would

serve as an alternative to at-reactor storage. Section 1.3 of the FEIS discusses specific reasons why

the applicant is requesting an alternative to at-reactor storage.

The applicant requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, a license for an away-from-reactor

ISFSI. As a regulatory agency, the NRC will review the license application and will either grant the

license without conditions, grant the license with conditions, or deny the license. The five

presidentially -appointed NRC commissioners will appropriately consider the information provided in

the NRC staff’s SER and the FEIS. In making this decision, NEPA allows Federal agencies to select

the proposed action even if other alternatives can satisfy the purpose and need, or can satisfy the

need with less environmental impact. NEPA is intended to assure that Federal agencies are informed

of the environmental impacts before making decisions. The decision-maker should have an

understanding of how the proposed action or any other alternative selected affects the environment. 

This is to assure that each Federal agency’s decision-making process appropriately considers the

environment, as well as economic and technical issues and the particular agency’s statutory mission.

Regarding the NWPA, the applicant requested a license for an ISFSI, not a monitored retrievable

storage (MRS) facility (i.e., a DOE-owned central interim storage facility permitted by the NWPA or a

permanent storage facility). The regulatory requirements governing the licensing of an ISFSI are

promulgated in 10 CFR Part 72. These regulations do not require the NRC or any other entity to

comply with the requirements for an MRS in the NWPA when licensing an ISFSI. An MRS could only

be built by DOE. The applicant’s proposed PFSF is a commercial facility. If the DOE were to request

a license for an MRS, then the requirements of the NWPA would apply. Likewise, the NWPA governs

the requirements for siting a permanent repository.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-8

Regarding the concern that the proposed PFSF will become permanent and should be designed as a

permanent facility, the NRC staff disagrees. As discussed in Section 1.2 of this FEIS, the Commission

determined in the Waste Confidence Decision that there is reasonable assurance that at least one

geologic high-level waste repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century. 

Therefore, the NRC staff analysis assumes a repository will be available to receive SNF from the

proposed PFSF after its 40-year life (if the NRC grants a license for 20 years and renews it for an

additional 20 years). 

Although the staff assumes in its analysis that a permanent geological repository will be available, the

owners of the power facilities storing SNF at the proposed PFSF would continue to retain ownership

and responsibility of their SNF if licensed operations ceased before a repository is available (e.g.,

through NRC modification or expiration of the initial 20-year license). Because the requirements in 10

CFR 72.54 would require the applicant to decommission the proposed PFSF, the owners of the SNF

would be responsible for maintaining the SNF in a safe condition and bearing the cost for its continued

storage at a different location.

Human Health Impacts

Many commenters expressed concern about potential health effects from living near the proposed

PFSF and the shipping of SNF to the proposed PFSF. These concerns ranged from exposure to

radiation downwind of the proposed PFSF and from normal shipments along the proposed shipping

routes, to the leakage of radiation in the event of a terrorist attack on the proposed PFSF or a

shipment. In general, many commenters stated concerns that the potential health effects from

shipping SNF would be too great for the project to go forward. Commenters also expressed concerns

about the health effects of an accident and concerns that large areas would become contaminated

and clean-up costs would be astronomical. Commenters also stated that there would be no way to

protect against possible terrorist attacks, especially during transportation of the SNF, and that

emergency response equipment and facilities are not adequate to deal with an accidental or

intentional release of radiation.

Response

The human health impacts of the proposed action are discussed in Sections 4.7, 5.7 and 6.1.7 of the

EIS. As discussed in Sections 4.7.2 and 5.7.2 of the EIS, the staff determined that the radiological

and non-radiological health impacts from the proposed PFSF, including shipment of the SNF, would

be small. The EIS considered potential human health impacts of ionizing radiation (e.g., radiation

dose and latent cancer fatalities) received by the public from possible ingestion or inhalation of

radioactive materials and from possible exposure to radiation (e.g., gamma rays and neutrons) that

would be directly emitted from the SNF. The EIS also considered the radiological impacts from

incident-free (routine) SNF shipment and from potential transportation accidents involving SNF.

In its analysis of radiological impacts, the NRC staff considered the inherent ability of the cask designs

to confine SNF and minimize direct radiation during normal operations, off-normal operations, and

credible accidents. As discussed in Section 2.1.2 of the EIS, the SNF would be completely sealed

(welded shut) in steel canisters during its entire stay at the proposed PFSF. The exterior of each

canister would be decontaminated prior to shipment to the proposed PFSF in order to remove any

significant amounts of radioactive material. Each steel canister would be surrounded by a robust

transportation cask (overpack of thick layers of steel) at all times during shipment to the proposed

PFSF and would then be surrounded by a robust storage cask (overpack of thick layers of concrete

and steel) during storage at the proposed PFSF. The staff further considered the effect on the storage

cask and proposed PFSF of several potential hazards, such as nearby military activities, and credible

accidents, such as tornados, wildfires, and earthquakes in the vicinity of the proposed site. The NRC

staff also considered the ability of the proposed PFSF Physical Protection Plan to protect against acts

of sabotage and provide for the common defense and security and protection of the public health and

safety (10 CFR Part 73).
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-9 NUREG-1714

As discussed in the EIS, the design of the welded canister would prevent the release of its radioactive

contents during normal operations and credible accident scenarios at the proposed PFSF. Therefore,

there would not be any accumulation or movement of the radioactive contents in the environment that

would impact the public. The EIS also determined that the health impact from direct radiation to the

public would be minimal and a small fraction (approximately 2 percent) of the radiation impacts that

would be expected from natural background radiation. The EIS also determined that the health impact

to workers at the proposed PFSF would be small and below radiation safety limits for workers as

required by the NRC (10 CFR Part 20). Finally, the EIS determined that the radiological impacts from

incident-free transportation or potential transportation accidents during transport to the proposed

PFSF would be small. 

The EIS did not directly consider the adequacy of emergency response plans for the proposed PFSF. 

The required contents of emergency response and contingency plans are described by Federal

regulations applicable to the proposed PFSF. However, the staff evaluated the applicant’s Emergency

Plan in its safety review of the proposed PFSF. The staff’s evaluation is documented in the SER. The

Emergency Plan described the means and equipment that would be provided to mitigate the

consequences of potential emergencies at the proposed PFSF. The Emergency Plan even

considered the consequences and planned response to a hypothetical breach of a canister and

release of radioactive contents, even though such an event is considered non-credible. The

Emergency Plan also considered coordination with off-site organizations and arrangements for

requesting and effectively using off-site assistance. The staff noted that the Emergency Plan was

reviewed by the applicable off-site response organization that would be expected to respond to an

accident. As documented in Chapter 16 of the SER, the staff found that the Emergency Plan was

acceptable and satisfied regulatory safety requirements.

Safety of Transporting SNF 

Several commenters expressed concerns about the safety of transporting SNF across the country to

the proposed PFSF. Commenters questioned the safety and potential risks of the transportation cask,

as well as the methodology used by the NRC to estimate the transportation related radiological

impacts. 

Several comments addressed the methodology the NRC staff used to estimate the transportation

impacts. Several commenters believed that the NRC could not rely on previous studies and had to

perform a project-specific analysis. These commenters asserted that while the NRC appropriately

used RADTRAN, the assumptions used by the NRC staff were not conservative; therefore, the

commenters concluded that the analysis underestimated the risk of transporting SNF. Other

commenters stated that the NRC should have relied on past generic studies, including 10 CFR 51.52,

Table S-4, to estimate the radiological impacts of transporting SNF from reactor sites. 

Several commenters stated that the DEIS was deficient because it did not discuss the economic

impacts of transportation accidents or sabotage.

Several commenters stated that the analysis in the DEIS underestimated the risk of a severe

transportation accident. Commenters stated that many of the key parameters used in the analysis are

not conservative and result in understating the risk. Commenters also stated that the presentation of

the radiological impacts of an accident in terms of dose-risks is inappropriate and the EIS should be

revised to discuss the consequences of a maximum reasonably foreseeable accident.

Response

The transportation analysis in the FEIS adequately estimates the radiological impacts associated with

the transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF. For the following reasons, as set forth below, the

assumptions used in the analysis are conservative. The NRC staff has performed a number of

generic studies on the transportation of SNF. Notable among these studies are the 1972 WASH-1238
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-10

study and the 1977 NUREG-0170 study. Overall, these earlier studies show that the incident-free

impacts from transportation are small, and that the risks from accidents are lower than the incidentfree impacts.

WASH-1238, "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear

Power Plants," (December 1972), and Supplement 1, NUREG-75/038 (April 1975), led to codification

of the environmental impacts of shipping fuel and waste to and from a reactor. These impacts are

codified in Table S-4 in 10 CFR Part 51. In nuclear reactor licensing, an applicant for a license to

operate a nuclear power plant may refer to Table S-4 in its environmental report and the NRC staff

may rely on it in environmental impact statements, in lieu of a specific assessment of transportation

impacts, provided the reactor design and operation satisfy a specific set of conditions. These

conditions are set forth in 10 CFR 51.52(a). The NRC reviewed 10 CFR 51.52(a) and determined that

the proposed PFSF did not satisfy all of the conditions; therefore, consistent with 10 CFR 51.52(b), the

NRC staff performed an assessment of the proposed PFS transportation activities. The NRC staff

could have used a less rigorous approach; however, part of the reason the NRC staff chose to

perform a RADTRAN analysis was to provide readers with an understanding of the magnitude of the

radiological impacts from transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff has compared

the results of this assessment with the results from NUREG-0170, another previous generic

assessment that explicitly considered the impacts of shipping SNF from multiple reactor sites. 

The DEIS only provided a comparison of the estimated radiological impacts from the proposed action

with NUREG-0170. Based on comments received, the FEIS has been revised to include a

comparison to the environmental impacts from transportation of fuel and waste from one light-water

cooled reactor as codified in 10 CFR 51.52, Table S-4. The comparison demonstrates that the

impacts associated with the transportation activities connected with the proposed PFSF fall within the

impacts stated in either Table S-4 or NUREG-0170. Information has also been added to the FEIS

transportation analysis to explain and clarify the revised analysis.

Regarding economic consequences, the NRC staff does not claim or imply in the FEIS that a severe

transportation accident resulting in a release of radioactive material would have small economic

consequences. However, the NRC staff has employed a qualitative argument rather than an explicit,

quantitative estimate of economic costs of transportation accidents.

Only a small fraction of accidents would result in any release of radioactive material and the probability

of a significant release is very small. For example, in NUREG/CR-4829, Shipping Container

Response to Severe Highway and Rail Accident Conditions, February 1987, (frequently referred to as

the Modal Study), the NRC estimates that (1) 99.4 percent of potential rail transportation accidents

involving SNF shipments would not result in any release of radioactive material, (2) that 99.98 percent

of potential rail transportation accidents would not result in a release that exceeds the allowable limits

in 10 CFR Part 71, and (3) only a small fraction of the remaining 0.02 percent of potential rail

transportation accidents would result in a significant release of radioactive material.

As set forth below, an attempt to calculate the economic costs of these unlikely accidents with any

precision is speculative and difficult. The methods available to calculate the economic cost are

dependent upon several uncertain variables and the calculated cost can vary significantly depending

upon the location of the accident. Some of the key variables include spread of contamination,

including contamination dispersion and deposition; land use (including human consumption of fruits

and vegetables grown on the land as well as grains, milk, and meat from sources within the area of

the accident); and cleanup standards. Because of the uncertainty in the variables, results from these

methods are conservative and can only be considered rough estimates. A quantitative estimate of

cost would require the NRC to speculate on many of the key variables, one of which would be the

location of the accident. Therefore, the NRC staff has not attempted to quantify the economic cost of

any particular accident in this FEIS. Nevertheless, in view of the above the NRC staff believes that for

the majority of possible accidents, members of the public would incur little to no economic cost. 

Moreover, accidents resulting from transportation of SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF are
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-11 NUREG-1714

covered under the Price-Anderson Act. One of the objectives of the Price-Anderson Act is to ensure

that adequate funds are available to satisfy liability claims in the unlikely event that an accident

occurs. The NRC has specific indemnity and insurance requirements for the transport of SNF to and

from reactor sites. As a result of the Price-Anderson Act, the nuclear power industry is insured to a

maximum per-incident dollar level of $9.1 billion. This Act is now structured so that the entire $9.1

billion would come from private sources. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation in 1988 that

developed a method to promptly consider compensation claims of the public for liabilities resulting

from nuclear accidents that exceed the $9.1 billion limit (NUREG/CR-6617).

Concerning the transportation accident analysis, the DEIS adequately discusses the consequences of

a severe transportation accident associated with the proposed PFSF. NEPA does not require the

consideration of the consequences of an event without any consideration of the probability (i.e.,

likelihood) of the event. As documented in the DEIS, the NRC staff used RADTRAN to calculate the

impact of transportation accidents. RADTRAN expresses the results of the accident analysis in terms

of a dose risk. A dose risk is the product of the radiological consequences of an accident and the

likelihood of the accident occurring. 

The existing analysis considers a broad range of accidents. The range of accidents considered in the

analysis spans from those with little to no radiological consequences but with relatively high

probabilities of occurrence as well as accidents with high radiological consequences but with very low

probabilities of occurrence. Based on continuing study of cask response in accidents, the NRC staff

believes that it is very unlikely that any transportation accident involving an SNF shipment to the

proposed PFSF would result in the release of radioactive material. The probability of an accident

resulting in a significant release of material is so low that the staff does not believe such an accident is

credible. Nevertheless, the consequences and conservative probabilities of such accidents have been

included in the FEIS. 

The NRC staff used data from the Modal Study to calculate the accident risk included in the FEIS. 

The assumptions used in the Modal Study contribute to a conservative estimate of SNF cask

response to accident conditions. For example, the analysis in the Modal Study was based on leadshielded representative package designs for both the truck and rail SNF casks. The package designs

used for the proposed PFSF shipments are not lead-shielded, and are a more robust design and

intrinsically more resistant to accident forces than the lead-shielded cask designs evaluated in the

Modal Study. 

Consequently, the SNF shipment accident impacts contained in this FEIS are based on a conservative

prediction of the performance of the cask design that would be used for shipping SNF to the proposed

PFSF. 

In addition, as documented in the Modal Study, the NRC staff analysis is conservative in at least three

aspects. First the NRC staff estimated the magnitude and frequency of rail cask impact velocity based

on train velocity, disregarding the fact that the railcar carrying the cask, as well as the rest of the train,

would absorb energy in an accident, which would reduce the impact velocity of the cask. Second, the

NRC staff’s analysis in the Modal Study assumes that the impact angle and cask orientation are both

head-on in all accidents, and that the impact occurs at the cask mid-plane; these conditions would

result in the most damage to the cask. Third, the Modal Study includes a worst-case evaluation of

cask seal performance by presuming, rather than modeling, the loss of function of the seal which

results in a release of radioactive material. That is, rather than identifying mechanisms for seal failure

and estimating the probabilities under varying conditions, the NRC staff evaluation is based on the

seals always failing. Notwithstanding these conservative assumptions, the NRC has concluded that

dose risk estimates stated in the FEIS are small. Therefore, the NRC concludes that the potential

impacts from transportation accidents for the proposed PFSF are small.

To date, more than 1,300 SNF shipments have been made in the United States and no accident

resulting in a radiological release has occurred. The requirements that cask designs must meet to be
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-12

certified in 10 CFR Part 71 and the compliance with the DOT regulations (various Parts of 49 CFR),

provide a reasonable level of assurance that SNF can be safely shipped. In the Modal Study, as

discussed above, the NRC staff concluded that 99.98 percent of all potential transportation accidents

would not result in a release of radioactive material greater than that permitted by 10 CFR Part 71

acceptance criteria, and only a small fraction of the remaining 0.02 percent of accidents could result in

a significant release of radioactive material. 

Socioeconomic Impacts

Many commenters indicated that the proposed PFSF and the shipment of SNF to the proposed site

would adversely affect property values in Tooele County, Utah and along all shipping routes. The

commenters urged the NRC and Cooperating Agencies to evaluate and mitigate such an impact on

property values. Many of the commenters also believed that the project would adversely affect the

economy of Tooele County and Utah because of the stigma attached to the storage of nuclear waste

and could result in people moving out of the County and State. Many commenters also believed that

the presence of the proposed PFSF would require restrictions on activities at Hill AFB and the Utah

Test and Training Range (UTTR), and that reductions in operations at these facilities could have

drastic economic impacts on the State. Others pointed out that if one of the purposes of the proposed

action is to provide economic development opportunities to the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians,

there are better options with less impact on the environment.

Response

The NRC staff notes that some commenters believe that the mere presence of SNF (whether at the

proposed PFSF or along the rail transportation routes) can create perceptions that adverse impacts

will occur. To warrant consideration in an EIS, environmental effects must have a reasonably close

causal relationship to a change in the physical environment. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People

Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (PANE). Therefore, this EIS must consider any

effects on property values from the proposed action and alternatives only if those effects are caused

by a change in the physical environment. The Supreme Court specifically ruled in PANE, however,

that “risk of an accident is not an effect on the physical environment.” PANE, 460 U.S. at 775

(emphasis in original). In a causal chain from any accident to an effect on property values, risk and its

perception are necessary links. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in PANE, these links

lengthen the causal chain beyond the scope of NEPA. The NRC staff and the cooperating agencies

are not, therefore, required to consider in the EIS matters such as stigma and perceived risk, and any

potential impacts on property values.

Regarding adverse impacts on Hill AFB and the UTTR, the NRC staff has conducted an independent

assessment of the impact of construction and operation of the proposed PFSF on Hill AFB, the UTTR,

Dugway Proving Ground, Tooele Army Depot, and the Deseret Chemical Facility, and has met with

the USAF about the potential for impacts to the test range or the mission of Hill AFB. The NRC staff

has not identified any impact on the operations on any of these facilities, from the presence of the

proposed PFSF. The NRC staff evaluated potential hazards to the proposed PFSF from military

operations and other facilities in the Skull Valley area. These operations included military aircraft

operations and cruise missile testing in the UTTR and other past and present military operations. The

staff determined from its review and the applicant’s analyses that an accident at the proposed PFSF,

such as F-16 air crash, resulting from these activities is extremely unlikely (approximately one in a

million per year).

The USAF will be aware of the presence of the proposed PFSF when planning future activities. The

USAF has indicated they will not require any significant restrictions on military operations within the

UTTR due to the presence of the proposed PFSF. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the

proposed PFSF would not pose any significant limitation or other impacts on nearby military

installations and other military operations. As a result, the staff has not identified any socioeconomic

or national security impacts on nearby military operations from the proposed PFSF.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-13 NUREG-1714

The NRC staff is not aware of any overflight restrictions being contemplated to accommodate the

proposed SNF storage facility. There appears to be no basis for the types of cumulative or

socioeconomic impacts described in the comments.

Regarding economic development opportunities for the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, the

NRC staff notes that many comments were made that expressed concern with the choice made by the

Skull Valley Band to bring economic benefits to themselves through the leasing of part of their

Reservation to the applicant for the construction and installation of an SNF storage facility. The

purpose and need discussion in the EIS addresses, from the BIA's perspective, how to assist the Skull

Valley Band's economic development. Any such assistance must be in the context of both the

government-to-government relationship between the United States and the Skull Valley Band and the

trust responsibility of the United States to the Skull Valley Band. The government-to-government

relationship means that the consideration of alternatives is limited to those that the government of the

Skull Valley Band has presented to the Secretary of the Interior for his approval. Among the ways that

the lead and Cooperating Agencies facilitate their exercise of the trust responsibility of the United

States is by analyzing the positive and negative impacts of the proposed PFSF on the quality of the

human environment in this FEIS.

It is the Skull Valley Band's decision to allow construction of the proposed PFSF on the Reservation

rather than some other suggested development to generate revenue such as a casino, a plant

nursery, or a Polynesian cultural center. If the State of Utah or other organizations are willing to work

with the Skull Valley Band to assist them in finding a viable solution to their economic needs with other

options, the BIA is available to the Skull Valley Band for technical assistance concerning other

economic development opportunities and conducting appropriate NEPA review for such proposals. 

Public Participation

Many commenters indicated dissatisfaction with the NRC’s and Cooperating Agencies’ efforts to solicit

public participation in the NEPA process for the proposed action, given its scope. In particular,

commenters expressed dissatisfaction with the availability of the DEIS, the number of public meetings

for submitting comments on the DEIS, and the length and extent of public notice of the public

meetings. In addition, many commenters stated their belief that the NRC and Cooperating Agencies

should have solicited comments on the DEIS by holding public meetings in communities along

potential routes for transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF. Many commenters, including a large

number of people who signed petitions, requested that the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies extend

the time for submitting comments on the DEIS.

Response

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies conducted an open public EIS development process,

consistent with the requirements of NEPA and the NRC’s and Cooperating Agencies’ regulations. 

See detailed discussions below. The NRC held two sets of public scoping meetings early in the

environmental review process (June 1998 and April 1999) and four public meetings on the DEIS

during the public comment period (July 27 and 28, and two meetings on August 21, 2000). The

agencies provided a 90-day public comment period for agencies and the public to review the DEIS

and provide comments. This FEIS considers and addresses nearly 4,000 individual comments the

NRC received, including more than 250 letters, facsimile transmittals, and e-mails, and more than

150 oral comments. There has been ample opportunity for public involvement in the development of

the EIS. 

Initial Notification and Formal Proceeding. When the NRC received the PFS application for the

proposed PFSF and accepted it for docketing, the NRC staff placed a public notice in the Federal

Register (62 Fed. Reg. 41099) on July 31, 1997. This notice began the process that resulted in the

State of Utah and others being admitted as parties to the formal NRC licensing proceeding on the PFS

application. Therefore, since the summer of 1997, the interests of the citizens of Utah have been
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-14

directly represented through the participation of their State government in the formal NRC licensing

proceeding on the application. An ASLB, which is independent of the NRC staff, is presiding over this

formal proceeding. 

Public Scoping. The NRC and Cooperating Agencies conducted a public scoping process before

preparing the DEIS. The agencies held scoping meetings for the EIS in Salt Lake City, Utah (June,

1998 and April 1999) and Tooele, Utah (April 1999). At these meetings, the agencies discussed the

proposed schedule and solicited input from the general public on environmental concerns related to

the proposed PFSF. The NRC published notice of the scoping meetings in the Federal Register (63

Fed. Reg. 24197; 64 Fed. Reg. 18491) and advertised the meeting in the Salt Lake Tribune, the

Deseret News, and the Tooele Transcript Bulletin. 

Comment Period. The NRC staff published a notice on June 23, 2000, that it had made the DEIS

publicly available (65 Fed. Reg. 39206), and that the NRC and Cooperating Agencies had provided a

90-day comment period on the DEIS. This period exceeded the 45-day comment period required

under the NRC regulations and those of the STB. The comment period also exceeded the 60-day

comment period recommended in the BIA NEPA guidance, and met the 90-day comment period

required for EISs involving the BLM resource plan amendments. In view of the already expanded

opportunities for public comment on the DEIS, earlier NRC staff efforts to solicit public involvement in

the environmental impact statement scoping process, and public meetings held during the comment

period, the Cooperating Agencies concluded that an extension to the comment period was not

warranted. Since the NRC received thousands of comments from several hundred commenters by

the September 21, 2000, comment period closing date, it appears that the length of the comment

period did not preclude meaningful public comment on the DEIS.

Draft EIS Availability. In accordance with NRC regulations, the NRC staff published a notice of

availability for the DEIS in the Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000). In the notice,

the NRC staff provided information on how to obtain a free copy of the DEIS, and also informed the

public that the DEIS was available on the NRC web page. The NRC distributed approximately 700

copies of the DEIS to Federal, Tribal, State, and local government officials, as well as members of the

general public. The NRC staff also provided multiple copies of the DEIS to the University of Utah

Marriott Library. In view of the above, the NRC staff concluded that the availability and distribution of

the DEIS were adequate.

Public Meetings. During the public comment period, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

scheduled two public meetings on the DEIS (July 27, 2000 in Salt Lake City, Utah, and July 28, 2000

in Grantsville, Utah) to receive oral public comments on the DEIS. The agencies selected Grantsville

because it is near the proposed site and Salt Lake City because it is the largest population center in

Utah and is located 58 miles by direct distance (75 miles by highway) from the proposed site. In

response to concerns expressed at these public hearings, the agencies scheduled two additional

public meetings on August 21, 2000, in Salt Lake City, to allow for additional public comment. The

NRC published notice of these meetings in the Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000,

and 65 Fed. Reg. 49029, August 10, 2000) and as requested provided written notification to interested

members of the public. The NRC staff also advertised these meetings in Utah newspapers, and

issued nationwide press releases. The meetings received substantial coverage in the Salt Lake City

area media. In view of the above, the agencies concluded the public meeting notification process was

adequate.

Additional Meetings on Transportation Routes. The NRC staff reviewed several requests to hold

additional meetings along "the proposed transportation routes" and concluded that the requested

additional meetings were not warranted. Although the transportation of SNF is considered in the

analysis documented in the this FEIS, specific routes have not yet been identified for SNF shipments

to the proposed PFSF. Therefore, it would be premature for the NRC staff to begin to hold public

meetings along transportation corridors in areas that may or may not be on a route to the proposed

PFSF. Should the facility be licensed and become operational, persons living along actual
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-15 NUREG-1714

transportation corridors may contact the NRC and request additional information. Nevertheless, the

NRC staff analysis concluded that the environmental impacts from transportation of SNF to the

proposed SNF are small.
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December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-17 NUREG-1714

G.3 Specific Comments and Responses

The NRC received over 4,000 comments from more than 400 individuals and organizations. In view

of this large number of commenters and comments, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have

created an index for easy cross-referencing of the comments. Accordingly, the agencies assigned

numbers to each commenter and to each comment received, as described below. 

For written comments, the commenter number corresponds to the number assigned to each letter

received. With respect to the oral comments recorded on the transcripts of the public meetings, the

agencies assigned commenter numbers by first establishing a prefix for each public meeting, as

follows:

Salt Lake City, Utah, July 27, 2000: SL1

Grantsville, Utah, July 28, 2000: GR

Salt Lake City, Utah, August 21, 2000 (afternoon): SL2

Salt Lake City, Utah, August 21, 2000 (evening): SL3

The individual commenter number for each speaker at a public meeting corresponds to the order in

which the speakers were called.

Because an individual commenter may have multiple comments, the agencies designated each such

comment with an additional number attached as a suffix to the commenter number. (Some

commenter or comment numbers also include letters.) Each comment summary in Section G.3 of this

Appendix ends with a parenthetical notation of the identifying numbers for the individual comments

covered by that summary. If an individual or organization made a comment more than once, e.g.,

orally and in writing, the summary identifies only one reference (comment number) for that comment.

Appendix H provides a list of commenters identified by name and comment number.
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December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-19 NUREG-1714

G.3.1 Purpose and Need

G.3.1.1 Basis for Project Need

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters opposed the construction and operation of an ISFSI on the Goshute Reservation. 

They stated that the DEIS failed to substantiate the need for the project and that there are no

economic, health, or safety reasons for transporting the SNF. (0007, 0015, 0018, 0019, 0039, 0041,

0042, 0043, 0044, 0048, 0053, 0056, 0057, 0067, 0074, 0075, 0077, 0093, 0096, 0101, 0103, 0111,

0112, 0115, 0121, 0127, 0128, 0135, 0136, 0141, 0147, 0156, 0157, 0158, 0166, 0180, 0189, 0194,

0197, 0198, 0198h, 0208, 0210a, 0217, 0224, 0242, 0249, 0256, 0257, GR-01, GR-06, GR-13, GR22, GR-23, SL1-06, SL1-07, SL1-09, SL1-10, SL1-11, SL1-13, SL1-14, SL1-15, SL1-16, SL1-18, SL1-

38, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL3-04, SL3-18, SL3-19, SL3-23, SL3-25, SL3-26, SL3-32, SL3-33, SL3-36,

SL3-38, SL3-41, SL3-43, SL3-47, SL3-49) 

Need for the Facility

Comment Summary:

Many commenters opposed the construction and operation of an ISFSI on the Goshute Reservation,

stating reasons such as the DEIS failed to substantiate the need for the project. (0007, 0015, 0018,

0019, 0039, 0041, 0042, 0043, 0044, 0048, 0053, 0056, 0057, 0067, 0074, 0075, 0077, 0093, 0096,

0101, 0103, 0111, 0112, 0115, 0121, 0127, 0128, 0135, 0136, 0141, 0147, 0156, 0157, 0158, 0166,

0180, 0189, 0194, 0197, 0198, 0198h, 0208, 0210a, 0217, 0224, 0242, 0249, 0256, 0257, GR-01,

GR-06, GR-13, GR-22, GR-23, SL1-06, SL1-07, SL1-09, SL1-10, SL1-11, SL1-13, SL1-14, SL1-15,

SL1-16, SL1-18, SL1-38, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL3-04, SL3-18, SL3-19, SL3-23, SL3-25, SL3-26, SL3-32,

SL3-33, SL3-36, SL3-38, SL3-41, SL3-43, SL3-47, SL3-49) 

One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to demonstrate the need for the proposed PFSF because

the three reasons for the proposed PFSF (DEIS page 1-11, lines 1-12) fail to address a current need

of any of the applicant’s participants or other customers for the proposed PFSF. (0018) Another

commenter said that statements of need in the DEIS included words such as “many,” “some,” and

“several.” The commenter stated further that these words are too vague to form any justifiable basis

for a conclusion of need. (0156)

Response:

The NRC regulations require that an EIS briefly state the purpose and need for the proposed action. 

10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix A. NEPA does not define “purpose and need,” nor does it state

that the proposed action be absolutely required to avoid some adverse outcome. In practice, an

action is proposed because it is an attempt to satisfy some underlying need. The underlying need can

be a desire for something wanted, to take advantage of an opportunity, or to solve a problem. An EIS

discusses the purpose and need for the proposed action to establish a range of reasonable

alternatives, in addition to the proposed action, that can satisfy the underlying need. 

Section 1.3 of this FEIS discusses the underlying need for the proposed PFSF. The applicant’s

underlying need for the proposed PFSF is to satisfy a desire for an alternative to at-reactor storage,

and the applicant provided specific reasons why it desires an alternative to at-reactor storage. As a

result of this underlying need, the applicant requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, a

license for an away-from-reactor ISFSI. With regard to the comment that words such as “many,”

“some,” and “several,” are too vague to justify the basis for a conclusion of need, the NRC staff

determined that these terms were adequate to provide a general description of the current SNF

storage environment. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-20

Contradicting Statements on Loss of On-Site Storage Space

Comment Summary:

Another commenter identified apparent contradictory statements in the DEIS. The commenter

indicated that the DEIS stated that power plants will run out of space for on-site storage of SNF by

2010, yet the DOE may complete a permanent repository location by 2010. (page xxx, lines 18 and

30 of the Executive Summary, and page 1-7, lines 11 and 12 of the DEIS) The commenter stated that

text on page xli (lines 26 to 29) of the Executive Summary stated that continued on-site storage is a

safe and feasible alternative for 30 more years, and claims that this contradicted the previous

statements. (0039, 0077) 

Response:

Regarding the comment that the DEIS includes contradictory statements, the NRC staff did not intend

to imply that SNF could not be safely stored at reactor sites as described in the Commission’s Waste

Confidence Decision. The sentence referenced by the commenter recognizes that the storage

capacity for most reactor SNF pools is becoming limited and reactor licensees are being faced with

decisions about how they will provide additional SNF storage. The Executive Summary in this FEIS

was revised to clarify that the NRC staff projects that most nuclear reactors will lose full core off-load

capability in spent fuel pools by 2010 unless another form of SNF storage is developed. However, the

statement in the Waste Confidence Decision that “if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor

can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the

licensed life for operation ... of that reactor ... at either on-site or off-site [ISFSIs]” does not mean that

all reactor storage facilities have adequate on site existing storage capacity for 30 years, but that the

technology exists to allow SNF to be safely stored on or off each reactor site for at least 30 years

beyond the facility’s licensed life.

Termination of Operations

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that in several different instances the DEIS refers to the assertion, sometimes

attributed to the applicant and other times unattributed, that some (unidentified) commercial power

reactors would be forced to terminate operations prior to the expiration of their reactor licenses if their

available SNF storage capacity is filled. The commenter stated that there is no basis for this

assertion, and no supporting evidence is provided for it in the DEIS. The commenter states that while

it is reasonable to assume that a few operating reactors could be required to make alternative

arrangements for some of their SNF due to lack of space for expansion, it is unlikely that any reactor

will be forced to shut down prematurely as a result of the lack of SNF storage capacity. (0204)

Response:

Section 6.7 was revised to be consistent with other parts of the FEIS where the staff recognized

premature shutdown as a possible outcome, but not a certain outcome. Other sections of the DEIS

appropriately characterized this situation.

Applicant Preference for Centralized Versus Decentralized Storage

Comment Summary:

One commenter requested that the analysis of the proposed PFSF be revised to more fully state the

reasons (along with supporting analysis) for why the applicant prefers centralized versus decentralized

storage. The commenter said that such an analysis would provide decision-makers and the public
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-21 NUREG-1714

complete information concerning the alternatives, and that several recent NRC and DOE NEPA

documents may contain similar analyses. (0089) 

Response:

Section 1.3 of the FEIS discusses three reasons the applicant identified as to why it prefers

centralized storage. The NRC regulations do not require that an EIS provide more reasons and

supporting analysis for an applicant’s preference for a proposed action than what has been provided in

the DEIS and NEPA only requires a brief statement of the purpose and need. The discussion in the

FEIS provides the statement required by NEPA.

Storage Capacity at Reactors

Comment Summary:

One commenter noted that the DEIS should include a more thorough or detailed analysis of storage

capacity at reactors, including existing and potential storage capacity for both the members of PFS

and other reactor owners and the timing for Yucca Mountain to become operational. The commenter

said that this analysis should also consider the 15 to 20 ISFSIs that have been proposed. (0156,

SL1-07) 

Several commenters noted that a GAO study has found that there is adequate storage at the plants

themselves. “Nuclear Waste: Operating Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility Unlikely by 1998,”

1991 GAO/RCED 91-194. (0042, 0054, 0090, 0096, 0198, 0198h, 0201, SL1-20, SL1-39, SL3-18) 

One commenter stated that the DEIS does not demonstrate a need for the proposed PFSF, citing the

GAO report, which identifies adequate existing storage for SNF. The same commenter stated that the

GAO report’s findings should have been included in the DEIS discussion, and the findings should

have been utilized or specifically refuted with facts. In the limited case where space was not available,

the utility could build its own dry cask storage on-site or contract with the DOE to manage the SNF. 

(0198)

Some commenters stated that the NRC said in 1984, and reaffirmed in 1990 and 1999, that SNF

generated in any reactor can be stored without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years

beyond the licensed life for operation of that reactor at on-site or off-site independent SNF storage

installations. 10 CFR 51.23, 49 Fed. Reg. 34688. (0090, 0142, 0166, 0204, 0215, SL1-38) Two

commenters stated that the NRC reported a finding of no significant impact in 1984, 1989, 1990, and

1999; on-site storage of SNF has been licensed eight times at eight reactor sites with an

environmental assessment finding of no significant impact in each case. (0156, SL3-23) One

commenter cited testimony submitted on February 10, 1999, before the U.S. House of

Representatives Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy and Power by NRC Chairman Dr.

Shirley Ann Jackson that continued at-reactor storage, for an interim period, will continue to protect

public health and safety. (0142) One commenter stated that despite the “running out of space”

claims, it is clear that some existing sites can be expanded with no risk. (0007) One commenter

stated that there is no reason dry cask storage cannot be used at the reactor sites where the waste is

currently located. (0246) 

One commenter stated that if the proposed PFSF is not built, and if reactors continue to produce SNF,

numerous reactor sites across the country will have to build dry storage facilities (i.e., decentralized

rather than centralized ISFSIs). The commenter stated that the proposed PFSF would store only half

of the nation’s anticipated commercial SNF, so the other half would have to remain at reactors. As a

result, nuclear power plant licensees must commit to on-site storage, regardless of whether the

proposed PFSF is built. The commenter noted that the DEIS stated that the NRC has approved eight

specific at-reactor ISFSI applications, the NRC has never denied a license amendment for an ISFSI,

and the NRC does not consider decentralized ISFSIs unsafe. (0198g)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-22

Response:

Based on the applicant’s underlying need, the NRC staff identified a reasonable range of alternatives,

as discussed in Section 2.2 of the FEIS. This range of alternatives includes the no action alternative

(i.e., not building the proposed PFSF thus maintaining the status quo). The NRC staff did not include

a detailed analysis of the potential storage capacity for each reactor site. Accordingly, the additional

level of detail in such an analysis would not further specify the degree of environmental impact of the

no action alternative, because such an analysis is not necessary to evaluate the no action alternative. 

In Section 6.7, “Impacts of No Action Alternative,” of the DEIS, the staff assumed that licensees of

reactors at sites with available space would build at-reactor ISFSIs, and concluded that the impacts

would be small. Furthermore, in the EA for the 1990 rulemaking in which the NRC issued a general

license for the storage of SNF in ISFSIs at reactor sites, the NRC concluded that constructing atreactor ISFSIs at U.S. nuclear power plants would result in small environmental impacts. Based on

this understanding, the NRC staff does not believe that the benefits gained from a detailed analysis of

each reactor site’s SNF storage capacity and each utility’s plans for managing its site’s SNF match the

requisite effort and resources required to complete such an analysis. Furthermore, the NRC staff

determined that it is not necessary to include the GAO report referenced by the commenter. The GAO

report essentially evaluates the feasibility of the no action alternative. The NRC staff does not

question the feasibility of the no action alternative and evaluates the environmental impacts of the no

action alternative in Section 6.7 of the FEIS.

Local Opposition at Reactors

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that in some cases local laws or local political pressure could prevent

expansion of on-site or near-site storage, thus shutting down a facility. The commenter said that the

Cooperating Agencies must not mistake these local choices for a need for additional storage space. 

(0198) Another commenter claimed that the only reason on-site storage is not seen as a long-term

solution is because many of the communities that use nuclear energy have passed laws against

permanent storage in their communities. (SL3-33)

Response:

Regarding the comment that local laws and political pressure should not be mistaken as a need for

additional storage, the applicant identified political constraints as one of its reasons for filing an

application for the proposed PFSF. While political pressures and local laws are clearly some of the

reasons why the applicant filed an application for an away-from-reactor ISFSI, the NRC regulatory

decision will be based on the technical adequacy of the proposal, and the NRC’s consideration of the

environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF. This decision will consider, but not rely exclusively on,

the applicant’s stated purpose and need.

Other Reasons for Project Need

Comment Summary:

Two commenters said that the DEIS is deceptive and false because the actual need of the proposed

PFSF is to address the lawsuit against the DOE by the nuclear industry. (0077, SL2-05) Another

commenter stated that the absence of a national policy for nuclear waste storage is the reason behind

the applicant’s proposal. (SL3-49) One commenter stated that contentions made by the industry that

they are running out of space for storage are driven by economics. (SL1-05)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-23 NUREG-1714

Response:

Consideration of any lawsuits against the DOE was not a factor in the NRC staff’s conduct of the

NEPA review. The NRC is not a proponent of the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff is evaluating the

application for the proposed PFSF as part of its regulatory responsibility, based on the requirements of

NEPA and the NRC regulations. With respect to the comment concerning economics, the applicant’s

reasons for its license application are described in Section 1.3 of this FEIS, and some of these

reasons include economic considerations. (For a detailed explanation of the NWPA, see Section 1.3

of the FEIS.) In regard to the comment indicating an absence of a national waste storage policy, such

policies are set forth in the NRC Waste Confidence Decision (10 CFR 51.23) and the NWPA.

Other General Comments

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that it is the responsibility of the reactor licensees to handle the SNF they

generate until a long-term storage facility can be approved and built. (0053, 0087, 0090, 0096, 0208,

GR-14, SL1-06, SL1-18, SL3-16, SL3-18, SL3-29, SL3-36, SL3-46) Other commenters indicated that

the reactor licensees should stop producing nuclear waste or at least stop production until they find a

way to store the waste. (0027, 0030, 0057, 0061, 0076, 0208, 0249, SL3-26) 

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments. However, the comments do not identify any specific

concerns with the DEIS or an environmental issue, and therefore no further response is required.

General Opposition

Comment Summary:

Other commenters assert that elected officials, the people of Utah, grass-roots organizations, and

one-third of the members of the Skull Valley Band do not support the proposed PFSF. (0053, 0065,

0134, 0142, 0246, GR-01, GR-22, SL1-34, SL3-11, SL3-57) 

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the opposition to the proposed PFSF.

Fairness and Recipients of Benefits

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the need for the proposed PFSF has only been considered in the context

of a math problem. The commenter stated that consideration of need should include questions of

fairness, who benefits, and why. Also, the commenter indicated that the DEIS is not the appropriate

avenue for this discussion and stated that consideration of need for the proposed PFSF should involve

a vigorous civic dialogue. (GR-13)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment that the consideration of need should include questions of

fairness, who benefits, and why, and that a vigorous civic dialogue is the best avenue for that

discussion, not the EIS. The NRC staff agrees that a discussion of fairness and benefits would not be

appropriate for an EIS when addressing the need for a proposed action. The NEPA regulations

require a brief discussion of need (40 CFR 1502.13). The NRC’s regulations for reviewing ISFSI
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-24

license applications under Part 72 provide an opportunity for public comments during the rulemaking

and licensing processes. In addition the NRC held meetings in Utah to gather scoping information

and comments for its EIS preparation.

G.3.1.2 Conflict with the NWPA

Comment Summary: 

Three commenters stated that the NWPA and NWPAA did not authorize central interim storage. 

(0018, SL1-13, SL1-14) One commenter stated that the DEIS incorrectly stated that “Both the original

NWPA and the NWPA of 1987 (NWPAA) recognized that some form of centralized interim storage

would be a component of the national program” (pages 1-7, lines 1-2). The commenter said that this

statement is incorrect because, while both Acts set out a siting process for an MRS facility, neither Act

authorized such a facility. The commenter stated that the such a facility could be a component of the

national program, if approved by Congress. (0018) Commenters said that there is no indication that

such a facility was considered an integral component of the national nuclear waste program, and that

numerous reviews have concluded that there are no outstanding safety issues that would lead to the

need for a centralized storage facility. (0018, SL1-13) 

One commenter stated that the NRC must comply with Federal statutes and policies in drafting its

EIS. In particular, the commenter said that the EIS must consider whether the need for a centralized

national private ISFSI is a violation of the intent and the policies contained in the NWPA (42 USC

10101 to 10270). Referring to 42 USC 10155, “Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” subsection (d)(2), the

commenter said that under the NWPA, the state in which a Federally-owned interim disposal facility is

located is guaranteed involvement in “all stages of planning, development, modification, expansion,

operation, and closure of storage capacity at a site or facility within such State for the interim storage

of spent fuel from civilian nuclear power reactors.” The commenter noted that according to 42 USC

10155(d)(1), the governor and the state legislature are involved in the site selection investigation and

that cooperative agreements between the DOE and the state are available for state funding and

involvement, according to 42 USC 10155(d)(3). Furthermore, the commenter noted that equipment,

funds, and training are available to states along the transportation corridor routes as well as to the

state in which the site is located. The commenter said that the EIS must evaluate the environmental

consequences that result from the applicant’s proposal, which has none of the state participation and

involvement contemplated by NWPA, and must evaluate whether the applicant’s proposal is a

deliberate effort to avoid NWPA requirements. (0198h)

The commenter also stated that the State of Utah had to expend resources to participate as a party to

the NRC proceeding on the PFS application, and that this was not the role envisioned for states under

the NWPA. (State participation provisions in the siting procedures for storage of SNF under the

NWPA are found in 42 USC 10155(d).) In addition, the commenter stated that the State submitted to

the NRC two petitions for action under 10 CFR 2.206 that raised some of its issues and claimed that

the NRC ignored these petitions. (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC staff disagrees with the comment that the DEIS incorrectly characterizes the national policy

with regard to a central interim storage facility. The statements in the DEIS concerning the MRS are

included only to provide background information to the reader about SNF storage. The applicant

requested a license for a privately-owned ISFSI, not an MRS or a Federal ISFSI. The regulatory

requirements that govern the licensing of an ISFSI are promulgated by 10 CFR Part 72 under the

authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The NWPA is not applicable to a privatelyowned ISFSI under 10 CFR Part 72. The content of the DEIS is consistent with the NWPA. An MRS

would be a DOE-owned facility rather than a commercial facility as the applicant proposed. If the DOE

were to request a license for an MRS or a federally-owned ISFSI, then the requirements of the NWPA

would apply.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-25 NUREG-1714

Regarding the comment on state participation requirements in the NWPA, the NRC staff responded to

the State of Utah’s petitions dated June 27, 1997, and July 21, 1997, by letter dated August 6, 1997. 

As explained in that letter, the purpose of 10 CFR 2.206 is to permit members of the public to request

that the NRC take some type of enforcement action. As explained in the NRC’s August 1997 letter,

the State’s petitions requested that the NRC reject the license application, a licensing action, and did

not request enforcement action. The comments are beyond the scope of the EIS.

G.3.1.3 Costs and Benefits

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters expressed concern that the evaluation of the need for the proposed PFSF did

not consider the social costs or benefits, but rather focused on the economic benefits to the reactor

licensees. The commenters also stated that a determination of the need for the proposed PFSF

should consider the overall public costs and benefits for Utah and the general public. (0096, 0121,

0198h, SL1-06) 

Response: 

Section 1.3 of the EIS presents a discussion of the applicant’s justification for constructing the

proposed PFSF. The societal benefits and costs of the proposed PFSF are evaluated in Chapter 8 of

the EIS. This analysis is in compliance with the NRC’s NEPA implementation regulations (10 CFR

51.71). Also see Section G.3.19 of this Appendix.

G.3.1.4 Economic Development and BIA Responsibilities

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters expressed concern about the purpose and need for economic development of

the Reservation. Three commenters stated that the economic struggle of the Goshute Indian

Reservation is a poor reason to locate a high-level radioactive waste storage facility on the

Reservation. (GR-06, SL1-05, SL1-15) One commenter said that the proposed PFSF cannot be

justified on the basis of moral integrity and the ethics recently acknowledged by the BIA regarding its

responsibilities for Native Americans. (0112)

One commenter stated that the statement of purpose for the BIA’s action is inappropriate. The NRC

suggests in the DEIS that the purpose of the BIA’s decision is to promote economic development

objectives of the Skull Valley Band. The commenter stated that the Cooperating Agencies have

precluded a meaningful assessment of the proposed PFSF by beginning the analysis with an

artificially restrictive statement regarding the purpose and need for the proposed PFSF. By

characterizing the purpose of the project in that way, the BIA has foreclosed objective consideration of

any other alternative that would not accomplish exactly what the applicant and the Skull Valley Band

have proposed. It is also not clear that the economic or other well-being of the Skull Valley Band

members is analogous to the economic development objectives of the Skull Valley Band. (0158)

Response: 

A discussion of the BIA Federal Action is included in Section 1.5.2 of the EIS. The purpose and need

of the EIS addressed the question of how and where to store SNF and, from the BIA’s perspective,

how to assist the Skull Valley Band’s economic development. Any such assistance must be in the

context of both the government-to-government relationship between the United States and the Skull

Valley Band and the trust responsibility of the United States to the Band. The government-togovernment relationship means that the consideration of alternatives is limited to those that the

government of the Skull Valley Band has presented to the Secretary of the Interior for approval. 

Among the ways that the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies exercise the trust responsibility of the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-26

United States is by analyzing in this FEIS the positive and negative impacts of the proposed PFSF on

the quality of the human environment. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 provide evaluations of environmental

justice and cumulative impacts of the proposed PFSF. Neither analysis concluded that the proposed

PFSF would result in any significant adverse impact to the Skull Valley Band. It is the Skull Valley

Band’s decision whether to allow construction and operation of the proposed PFSF.

A commenter also stated that the economic or other well-being of the Skull Valley Band members is

not clearly analogous to the economic development objectives of the Skull Valley Band. Because the

Skull Valley Band is composed of members of the Band, the economic development objectives of the

Skull Valley Band are intended to promote the economic well-being of the Band members. 

G.3.1.5 Support for Purpose and Need for Action

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters supported the construction and operation of an ISFSI on the Reservation. (0014,

0016, 0020, 0070, 0122, 0132, 0143, 0179, 0235, 0236, 0255, 0259, GR-02, GR-07, GR-10, GR-12,

GR-24, SL1-03, SL1-08, SL1-19, SL1-23, SL1-33, SL1-40, SL1-41, SL2-03, SL2-04, SL2-10, SL3-01,

SL3-03, SL3-50, SL3-51, SL3-53, SL3-58) Others supported the proposed action because no

permanent repository currently exists. (0014, 0179, 0236, 0259, GR-12, SL1-40, SL2-10)

Several commenters supported the proposed action and expressed support for the use of nuclear

power. (0016, 0017, 0020, 0109, 0122, 0143, 0170, 0179, GR-12, GR-19, GR-24, SL1-08, SL1-23,

SL1-33, SL1-40, SL2-04, SL2-10, SL3-03, SL3-51, SL3-53, SL3-58)

A few commenters supported the proposed action and stated that the proposed action would provide

economic benefits to the Skull Valley Band, the State of Utah, reactor licensees, and consumers. 

(0016, 0017, 0070, 0179, 0236, 0255, GR-02, GR-10, SL1-03) 

Response: 

The general statements of support for the proposed action did not provide new information, request a

change in the DEIS, or request any other action on the part of the NRC staff. Therefore, the

comments did not warrant any change to the EIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-27 NUREG-1714

G.3.2 The Proposed Action

G.3.2.1 Permanence of Facility

Comment Summary:

A few commenters stated that the licensing of the proposed ISFSI does not lessen the need for a

permanent disposal facility. (0179, GR-12, SL3-58)

Many commenters expressed concern that the proposed ISFSI could become a permanent storage

facility. (0005, 0006, 0012, 0015, 0018, 0021, 0039, 0042, 0047, 0053, 0063, 0071, 0077, 0096,

0112, 0118, 0121, 0126, 0127, 0135, 0136, 0139, 0142, 0153, 0157, 0158, 0166, 0180, 0185, 0189,

0194, 0195, 0198, 0198h, 0198i, 0201, 0204, 0210a, 0217, 0236, 0246, 0257, GR-01, GR-04, GR-05,

GR-13, GR-14, GR-15, GR-18, SL1-01, SL1-02, SL1-05, SL1-06, SL1-09, SL1-10, SL1-13, SL1-14,

SL1-15, SL1-16, SL1-18, SL1-20, SL1-31, SL1-33, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL2-13, SL2-17, SL3-06, SL3-

11, SL3-18, SL3-25, SL3-26, SL3-31, SL3-36, SL3-47, SL3-49) 

Several other commenters supported the no action alternative because they doubted that the

proposed PFSF would be temporary. (0005, 0034, 0053, 0174, 0237, 0246, GR-01, SL1-06, SL1-18,

SL2-13, SL2-15, SL3-02)

Commenters expressed concern for the following specific reasons: 

• Numerous commenters opposed the creation of the proposed PFSF until a permanent repository

is built, fearing that without a permanent high level waste repository the proposed PFSF would

become a permanent storage facility. Commenters indicated that there are problems with the

proposed Yucca Mountain site, such as technical flaws, opposition by the state and public, and

capacity limits, and stated that the DEIS (p. 5-39 and 5-40, lines 41-20) incorrectly assumes that a

permanent facility at [the proposed site at] Yucca Mountain will be available. (0015, 0018, 0042,

0096, 0112, 0135, 0136, 0139, 0142, 0157, 0166, 0194, 0195, 0198, 0198h, 0201, 0204, 0246,

0257, GR-01, GR-05, GR-13, SL1-01, SL1-06, SL1-14, SL1-16, SL2-12, SL2-17, SL3-06, SL3-11,

SL3-25, SL3-26, SL3-31, SL3-36) 

• One commenter stated that in the DEIS for the [proposed] Yucca Mountain Site, DOE projected

that 105,000 metric tons will be generated and require storage, and the commenter expressed

concern that 40,000 metric tons will remain at the proposed PFSF due to the lack of capacity at

Yucca Mountain. (0198)

• The commenter also stated that the DEIS for the proposed PFSF omits discussion on whether a

proposed repository at Yucca Mountain would have room to store mixed-oxide SNF or would even

accept such SNF stored at the proposed PFSF. (0198) Therefore, the commenter asserted that

the proposed PFSF could become a permanent storage facility for mixed-oxide SNF.

• One commenter asked what would happen if, during the term of the “temporary” storage license or

permit, the NRC or Congress decides to make the facility permanent. (0096) 

• One commenter stated that BIA and BLM need to address temporary versus permanent storage

at the proposed PFSF in the event that [the proposed site at] Yucca Mountain is not approved. 

(0166) 

• Another commenter stated that because a permanent repository is scheduled for 2010 and PFS is

scheduled for 2003, there is only a seven-year advantage to completing the proposed PFSF. In

addition, the commenter asserted that many obstacles could interfere with opening a permanent

repository such as the willingness of DOE to recommend the repository to Congress and NRC to
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-28

approve, and the possibility that Congress could legislate perpetual above-ground storage of SNF. 

(SL1-16)

• Several commenters stated that the DEIS should address the possibility of the proposed PFSF

becoming a permanent facility at the expiration of the 20-year license. Commenters expressed

concern that the proposed PFSF is not designed to be operated as a permanent facility, which

would be subject to more stringent requirements. (0012, 0015, 0018, 0039, 0077, 0084, 0096,

0118, 0121, 0127, 0136, 0153, 0158, 0180, 0189, 0195, 0198, 0198h, 0198i, 0204, 0210a, 0236,

GR-01, GR-04, GR-13, GR-15, GR-18, SL1-01, SL1-09, SL1-13, SL1-31, SL2-05, SL3-06, SL3-

49) 

• One commenter stated that the expected life of the PFSF is not defined in the DEIS, and the

methods used to avoid radiation leaks for a temporary facility will not be adequate for a facility that

exists for several hundred years. (0047)

• One commenter said that the DEIS should evaluate the impacts of very long term (100 years or

more) above-ground storage at the proposed site. (0204)

• Another commenter stated that the DEIS should evaluate all potential impacts based on a worstcase scenario where the applicant does not abide by its commitments or permit conditions

causing the SNF to remain in the above-ground storage casks indefinitely. (0215) 

• Two commenters stated that it would take 20 years to ship 4,000 casks to the proposed PFSF,

which coincides with the expiration of a 20-year NRC license for the proposed PFSF. (SL1-33,

SL3-47) One commenter asserted the reason for this is because the proposed PFSF would not

be a temporary facility. (SL3-47)

• One commenter stated that if the proposed PFSF cannot be demonstrated to be temporary, then

the facility would operate beyond the scope of the NRC license and beyond the scope of the EIS,

irrespective of the NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision. (0198, 0198h) 

• Two commenters claimed that the DEIS did not adequately consider that the SNF stored at the

proposed PFSF will remain radioactive for thousands of years. (0189, SL1-01)

• Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed PFSF might become permanent

because there is no back-up plan in the event that the [proposed] Yucca Mountain facility or

another site does not open, asserting that there are no measures in place to ensure that the

proposed PFSF will not become permanent. (0012, 0018, 0039, 0077, 0198i, GR-13, SL1-16,

SL3-18)

C One commenter said that the citizens of Utah would end up permanently storing the SNF

generated by the citizens of other states who do not want to temporarily store the SNF in their own

states. (0090)

• One commenter asserted that if the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository is not approved, the

siting process for a permanent repository would continue, leaving the proposed PFSF as a de

facto permanent storage site. (0198)

• One commenter stated that the proposed PFSF would become permanent, asserting that Oak

Ridge and Hanford storage facilities and other sites in Idaho have existed for years beyond their

original permits. (SL1-18)

C A few commenters addressed the duration of the proposed action. One commenter suggested

that the NRC should specify a time limit for the proposed action. The commenter added that the

difference between the requirements for temporary SNF storage and permanent SNF disposal is
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-29 NUREG-1714

that temporary fuel storage is monitored, whereas with permanent SNF storage, people hope to

forget about the material after burial. (0016) One commenter stated that the expected life of the

SNF storage site is not defined, and that there are no guarantees that the stored SNF will be

moved. The commenter stated that the longer SNF is stored in one location, the higher the

potential for unanticipated release of radioactivity. The commenter thought it unrealistic to

assume that the methods now used to avoid radiation leaks or contamination will be sufficient for

several hundred or several thousand years. (0089) 

C A few commenters stated that the proposed PFSF will be a temporary storage facility that will

meet interim SNF storage needs until a permanent disposal facility is available. (0014, 0179, GR12, SL3-58) 

Response: 

As set forth in Section 1.2 of the FEIS, the NRC would license the proposed PFSF under 10 CFR

Part 72 to operate as an interim storage facility for SNF for up to 20 years. Before the expiration of an

initial license, the applicant may submit an application to the Commission to renew the license. This

renewal process would include a separate, thorough safety and environmental review. Ultimately, the

SNF at the proposed PFSF would be relocated to a permanent geologic repository, and the existence

of the proposed PFSF would not lessen the need for a permanent repository. For detailed information

on long-term safety implications of SNF storage, refer to Section 4 of this FEIS titled “Environmental

Consequences of Constructing and Operating the Proposed PFSF.”

The applicant did not design or propose the PFSF to become a permanent repository, and, should the

NRC grant the PFS application, it would not be approving the permanent storage of SNF at the

proposed PFSF. Geologic repositories are designated as permanent sites for SNF and high-level

radioactive waste. The proposed Yucca Mountain facility would be designed to be a permanent

disposal site for such waste; if DOE were to submit a license application for the proposed Yucca

Mountain site as a geologic repository, it would need to demonstrate compliance with the applicable

regulations. Regarding the correctness of the EIS in its assumption that a geological repository will be

made available and the comment that obstacles could interfere with its opening, the Commission, in

its Waste Confidence Decision, has determined that there is reasonable assurance that at least one

mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Section

1.2, “The Proposed Action,” of the FEIS presents this discussion. Based on current DOE projections,

a permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010. Regardless of the capacity of the proposed

permanent geological repository, if the NRC grants the PFS application, all SNF must be removed

from the proposed PFSF before completion of decommissioning. In addition, a permanent repository

would accept mixed-oxide SNF, in accordance with agreements between DOE and reactor licensees.

Due to the requirement for the creation of a permanent geological repository for ultimate disposal of

SNF and the limits placed on the applicant through its lease agreement with the Skull Valley Band, the

proposed PFSF cannot be used as a permanent SNF storage facility. As indicated previously, under

10 CFR 72.42, the duration of a license for an ISFSI cannot exceed 20 years from the date of its

issuance. Although the proposed lease for the PFSF site could extend to a maximum of 50 years, the

initial license for the proposed PFSF is limited to 20 years, with the possibility of license renewal. The

maximum license period anticipated for the proposed PFSF is 40 years, as was evaluated in the FEIS. 

Also, see Sections G.3.4.2.4 and G.3.4.3.1.

With respect to the comments regarding a scenario in which the NRC or Congress makes the PFSF a

permanent facility during its licensed period, such a scenario would appear to conflict with current

statutory provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA). The NWPA

directs DOE to phase out site-specific activities at all candidate sites for a permanent repository other

than the proposed Yucca Mountain site (see 42 USC 10172). Accordingly, such a scenario is not

reasonably foreseeable, and need not be evaluated in this FEIS..
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-30

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding the existence of the DOE Hanford and Oak

Ridge facilities. However, DOE facilities do not necessarily comply with the NRC regulations and,

therefore, DOE activities cannot be compared to NRC licensee activities.

G.3.2.2 Impacts of Reactor Decommissioning

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern that if a power plant ships SNF to the proposed PFSF and is

subsequently decommissioned, there will be no place to return the SNF if a permanent repository is

not opened. (0012, 0158, 0198, 0198h, GR-04, SL1-01, SL2-05, SL2-17) One commenter stated that

NRC should thoroughly examine the implications of the return of all SNF to the facilities that ship SNF

to Utah. (SL2-17)

Response: 

The NRC staff considers the scenario presented by the commenters unlikely and speculative. As

stated in the FEIS, the NRC Waste Confidence Decision concludes that there is reasonable

assurance that at least one mined geological repository will be available within the first quarter of the

twenty-first century. However, if the scenario presented in the comment were to occur, reactor

licensees storing SNF at the proposed PFSF will retain ownership of the SNF, and would be required

to move SNF from the proposed PFSF to another facility where the fuel can be safely stored. This

could be at another existing or new ISFSI at a reactor, or at another location. Section 5.7 of the FEIS

considers the impacts of transporting SNF from the proposed PFSF.

G.3.2.3 Waste Confidence Decision

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS relied on the NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision, 10 CFR 51.23

(55 Fed. Reg. 38474; Sept.18, 1990) to support its incorrect assumption that the proposed PFSF

would be temporary (DEIS, p. xxxii), and the DEIS provided no other support or basis for the

assumption. The commenter stated that the Waste Confidence Decision should not be applied to the

proposed PFSF at all. (0198) The commenter asserted that there is no indication in the Waste

Confidence Decision that the Commission considered that waste would be removed off site to an

away-from-reactor ISFSI. The commenter stated that the Commission cites the PFS application in

further support of its Waste Confidence Decision, (64 Fed. Reg. 68005, Dec. 6, 1999). The

commenter stated that other nuclear facilities may have confidence that they will not have to store

SNF for extended periods of time, because SNF will be stored at the proposed PFSF. According to

the commenter this indicates an expectation on the part of the Commission that the proposed PFSF is

not temporary.

Response: 

The NRC’s decision on whether to issue a license is based on a facility’s ability to comply with 10 CFR

Part 72, under which the agency may only approve interim storage, not permanent storage. The NRC

would provide a license to operate the proposed PFSF for up to 20 years and PFS could apply to the

Commission to renew the license before the expiration of the initial license term. This renewal

process would include both a thorough safety and environmental review. The proposed PFSF license

would authorize interim storage, and the Commission does not consider a 20-year ISFSI license to be

the basis for establishing a permanent storage facility. This is consistent with the NRC’s Waste

Confidence Decision. As discussed in FEIS Section 1.2, “The Proposed Action,” the Commission in

its Waste Confidence Decision believes there is reasonable assurance that at least one mined,

permanent geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-31 NUREG-1714

G.3.2.4 Management of Proposed PFSF and Effects on States and Other Reactor Licensees

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of the applicant to manage the proposed

PFSF. (SL3-02) One commenter stated that the applicant would not proceed with the proposed

action if it could not be accomplished safely. (SL3-58) One commenter asked what the long-term

implications of prioritization of nuclear waste management are relative to the Federal government’s

intent on managing irradiated fuel. (0211) Another commenter expressed concern that the facility

would be privatized and the public would bear the cost while a private company profits. (SL3-40)

One commenter objected to the “72 to 1" slogan used by the applicant in referring to the removal of

waste from 72 sites for placement at one site. The commenter believes this is misleading, since the

proposed action allows for continued generation of SNF at these sites. (SL1-37)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment questioning the applicant’s ability to manage the facility

and the comment from the applicant stating that the project would not proceed if it could be

accomplished safely. The ability of the applicant to manage the proposed PFSF in a safe manner is a

consideration in the license application review process conducted by the NRC. Some of the PFS

member reactor licensees have experience managing reactor site ISFSIs. The FEIS presents the

projected environmental impacts of the proposed action based on the facility design, operating

conditions, and the environment in which it would operate. The NRC staff notes that the purpose of

the proposed PFSF is to provide an interim storage facility for SNF before it is transferred for final

disposal in an underground geologic repository. This is consistent with the NRC’s Waste Confidence

Decision, 10 CFR 51.23 (55 Fed. Reg. 38474; Sept. 18, 1990), which states that at least one mined

geological repository will be available by the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century.

Regarding the concern that additional power plants around the country may begin to ship to the

proposed PFSF, the applicant’s slogan “72 to 1,” was not used as a basis for the analysis contained in

this EIS. The FEIS only indicates that SNF may continue to be generated at reactor sites from which

SNF would be removed to the proposed PFSF. See Section 1.3 of the FEIS.

The comments about prioritization of SNF management and privitization of the PFSF are not related to

the environmental impacts of the PFSF and therefore no response is required.

G.3.2.5 The Proposed Cask System

G.3.2.5.1 Inadequate Cask Design 

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters asserted that the casks are not properly designed. (0012, 0089, 0096, 0174, 0198,

0211, 0215, 0230, SL1-01, SL1-10, SL1-20, SL1-21, SL1-36, SL1-40) Commenters indicated that the

storage and/or transportation cask designs were inadequate for several reasons, including the

following:

• Two commenters stated that the casks are not designed for long-term storage, the effects of

earthquakes or fires, or a plane crash. (0012, SL1-01, SL1-10) 

• One commenter stated that there is no evidence that the casks will remain stable under prolonged

exposure to the heat and radiation from the SNF. (0174) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-32

• A few commenters stated that the casks have only been in use for 14 years, but their use would

be licensed for over 20 years. (0230, SL1-10, SL1-20) 

• A few commenters stated that the proposed casks have not undergone any full-scale testing. 

(0198, SL1-20, SL2-12) 

• One commenter stated that casks are 10 to 15 years old before they are placed into use because

of a long curing process. (0096, SL1-21) 

• A few commenters stated that some of the casks in use today have problems with hairline

fractures that occurred during manufacturing, explosions from chemical reaction during loading,

and weld failures. (0198, 0230, SL1-20) 

• One commenter stated that there have been welding flaws, defective casks, leakage of helium

gas, and problems with dry cask storage at the Palisades Nuclear Plant. (SL1-36)

• One commenter stated that the Holtec cask system that PFS proposes to use is not approved for

storage of mixed oxide fuel. (0198)

• One commenter stated that placing spent fuel rods in a cask that has not cured properly might

result in a pressure buildup, cracking, sealing failures, or breakage. (SL1-21) 

• One commenter stated that the cask system has not been tested to failure so failure modes are

not known and protocols to manage failure scenarios cannot be devised. (0211)

• One commenter stated that the cask fabrication quality assurance and quality control protocol do

not exist to ensure that the casks meet specific design criteria. This commenter also stated that

an oversight mechanism is needed to ensure that the storage casks are of high integrity. (0211)

• One commenter stated that there is no demonstration that supports the claim that neutron flux

levels generated by SNF would be too low to activate the storage casks or pads. (0215)

One commenter stated that both contaminated and defective casks are a real occurrence in the U.S.,

and that the higher risks associated with these casks are not considered in the DEIS. The commenter

indicated that there were 49 incidents of “accidental surface contamination” of casks between 1965

and 1992 according to DOE, with more occurring overseas. In addition, the commenter stated that

defects and degradation in dry casks indicate problems with the NRC cask certification process and

poor quality assurance and quality control in the cask manufacturing and nuclear power industries. 

(0194)

Response:

The EIS considered the impacts that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100 storage cask

design would have on the environment. The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask

and proposed PFSF design to safely store SNF during normal operations and to withstand potential

natural phenomena or manmade hazards. The staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as

updated. The EIS analyzed these risks to determine the impact to the environment (see FEIS Section

4.7.2) to the extent that the NRC safety evaluation indicated that the storage cask design would affect

the environment, such as by releasing radioactive material or emitting direct radiation. Specific

responses to similar comments regarding human health impacts from potential accidents are

addressed in Section G.3.15.6. Because the comments are directed to a safety issue that is not

directly related to the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, they are beyond the scope of the

FEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-33 NUREG-1714

Notwithstanding that these issues are beyond the scope of the FEIS, the NRC staff considered these

general design issues in its safety evaluation. The NRC staff evaluated the cask design, proposed

PFSF design, and SNF contents against established acceptance criteria (see NUREG-1567) that are

used to verify that the cask and facility designs satisfy safety standards for SNF storage facilities in 10

CFR Part 72. The NRC staff evaluation considered the thermal, radiological, and material

characteristics (such as cladding degradation) for the range of SNF types proposed for storage at

PFSF. The NRC staff also noted that several of the DEIS comments regarding cask design were

similar in nature to public comments received during the NRC rulemaking process for the generic

design approval of the HI-STORM 100 storage cask and were addressed by the staff (see 65 Fed.

Reg. 25421). Information on the NRC’s cask certification process is available on the NRC Internet site

(www.nrc.gov) and certification standards are set forth in 10 CFR Part 72.

Furthermore, in response to some of the specific issues, the NRC staff noted the following:

• Fabrication of SNF storage casks must be performed under an NRC-approved quality assurance

program. This includes vendor oversight to ensure that the casks are produced and loaded in

accordance with design specifications and with the specific design criteria included in the SAR for

the cask design and the license approved by the NRC. The cask concrete shield must be

fabricated (including the curing process) under an NRC approved quality assurance program and

must meet the design requirements of the concrete shield described in the cask SAR. The NRC

staff found the cask design and PFSF quality assurance program to be acceptable. The NRC

staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated.

• NRC did not require full-scale destructive testing of a HI-STORM 100 prototype storage cask in

order to demonstrate compliance with NRC safety standards. In accordance with NRC

regulations, the NRC staff accepted the use of scale models, computer simulations, and other

types of analyses, as appropriate, to demonstrate the proposed PFSF and cask design satisfied

NRC safety standards. These methods were based on sound scientific principles and have

generally been validated by past experience with similar casks and other similar nuclear devices

that operate safely.

• Acceptance criteria used by the staff to review the cask design account for recent experience

gained from hydrogen generation and burn events, welding flaws, and other operational problems

that have occurred with other storage cask designs. None of these past events resulted in a

release of radioactive material to the environment or increased direct radiation exposure to the

public. The NRC staff also concluded that the overall safety record of other NRC-approved

storage cask designs continued to validate these acceptance criteria (see NUREG-1536).

• The NRC determined that specific types of mixed oxide SNF can be safely stored in the

HI-STORM 100 storage cask design at the proposed PFSF. Because of the neutron flux levels

that would be generated by the SNF, hypothetical activation of storage cask or pad, if any, would

not pose a radiological hazard to the environment during operation of the proposed PFSF. The

vendor of the HI-STORM 100 cask performed conservative calculations based on high neutron

flux levels produced by the SNF over a 40-year period. The calculations indicated that

hypothetical activation levels of the storage cask and pad materials would be very low. The

applicant indicated in its Decommissioning Plan that there will be no anticipated activation, but

conservatively assumed possible activation of the storage cask and partial contamination of the

storage pads in its decommissioning cost analysis for low-level radioactive waste disposal.

G.3.2.5.2 Inadequate Analysis of Cask Design in the EIS

Comment Summary:

Several commenters indicated the DEIS was inadequate regarding analysis of the cask design for the

following reasons:
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-34

• One commenter stated that the DEIS did not discuss the risk of cask sliding or tipover resulting

from an earthquake. (0198) 

• Another commenter stated that the DEIS did not address heat and pressure buildup in a cask that

would lead to valve failures and the release of isotopes to the environment. (0096, SL1-21) 

• One commenter stated that the DEIS was not complete without information on failure modes and

protocols to manage failure scenarios. (0211) 

• The same commenter stated that the DEIS should have discussed protocols to manage oversight

of cask fabrication and quality control. (0211) 

• This commenter also stated that the DEIS should have included a reasonable analysis of waste

assembly degradation during storage and management protocol during a failure event. There was

no analysis in the DEIS of the potential for SNF degradation and failure (fuel assembly cladding

failure due to faulty fabrication, corrosion, metal creep, liquid metal embrittlement, biodegradation,

and helium penetration) or discussion on irradiated fuel management protocol in the event of such

a failure. (0211) 

• This commenter also stated that the DEIS would not be complete until it includes a reasonable

analysis of waste assembly degradation during storage, and management protocol during a failure

event. (0211)

• One commenter stated that the ER (used as a source of information for the DEIS) failed to

consider the risks posed by a blockage of the cooling vents on the storage casks, and added that 

the concrete storage casks utilize passive, natural convective air movement for cooling. SAR at

5.1-10, 5.4-1. The commenter stated that although the applicant maintained that the ducts will be

cleaned, this relies on human intervention, which is subject to error. The commenter asserted that

it was reasonable to anticipate that the cleaning of ducts would be delayed or overlooked, or that

an evacuation or fire would make it impossible to perform this function. Therefore, the commenter

concluded that the applicant was required to assess the consequences of an inadvertent blockage

of the cooling ducts by animal or plant infestation or by snow and ice during the winter. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask and proposed PFSF design to safely store

SNF during normal operations (including heat generation, cladding degradation, and fabrication

issues) and to withstand potential natural phenomena or manmade hazards. Because the comments

are directed to a safety issue that is not directly related to the environmental impacts of the proposed

PFSF, they are beyond the scope of the FEIS. The NRC concluded that the FEIS described the

proposed cask design for use in the proposed action and there is no requirement to further address

specific design issues. As discussed in the response to G.3.2.5.1, the EIS considered the impacts

that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100 storage cask design would have on the

environment. 

G.3.2.5.3 Specific Questions Regarding the Cask Design

Comment Summary:

Several commenters had specific questions about the cask design described for the proposed action. 

One commenter asserted that there were conflicting reports about the testing of the casks and asked

several questions about cask testing and fabrication. The commenter also asserted that there was a

weakening of process for the NRC certification of cask designs and industry pressures to make

changes. (SL3-04) Two commenters posed the following specific questions:
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-35 NUREG-1714

• Are casks tested to destruction? (SL3-04) 

• Do the manufacturers fabricating the casks use generic cask design, or are they reviewed with

site specific criteria? (SL3-04)

• What are the factors of any site specific criteria? For instance, what would a cask design be for a

Utah site, knowing there was active seismic activity, the possible UTTR misfired missile, or are the

casks a generic design? (SL3-04) 

• How are checks and balances concerning safety design compliance managed? Are there any

conflicts of interest? (SL3-04)

• How does the NRC handle casks design criteria concerning hydrogen build-up and cracking of the

fuel cladding and criticality accidents? (SL3-04)

• Is there documentation for the public to review regarding these design questions? (SL3-04)

• What are the quality control procedures for ensuring that the storage casks are of high integrity

and there is no threat of release? (0215)

• What is the temperature of casks and the cooling temperature effect on the integrity of the storage

casks, particularly if the cooling vents are blocked? (0215)

• Can dust or other materials accumulated near the vents on the casks could become activated by

irradiation? (0215)

Response:

The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask and proposed PFSF design to safely store

SNF during normal operations and to withstand potential natural phenomena or manmade hazards. 

The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated. The NRC staff also noted that

documentation such as the SAR and SER is available for public review. As discussed in the response

to G.3.2.5.1, the EIS considered the impacts that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100

storage cask design would have on the environment. These questions involve safety issues and are

beyond the scope of the EIS. The NRC concludes that the EIS adequately describes the basic cask

design and its function for use with the proposed action and that there is no requirement to further

address specific questions about the cask design or other issues (e.g., checks and balances and

conflicts of interest).

G.3.2.5.4 Adequate Cask Design

Comment Summary:

A few commenters stated that the design of the casks is sufficient to protect public health. (0014,

0163, SL1-40, SL2-10) Commenters indicated that the cask design is adequate for the following

reasons:

• One commenter stated that the casks are designed in a manner similar to black boxes on

airplanes that absorb the shock from an accident. (SL2-10) 

• Another commenter stated that proven, independently reviewed container technology is used to

safely store fuel rods. (0014, SL1-40) 

• One commenter indicated that the casks have been certified by the NRC to meet Federal safety

standards. (0014) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-36

• Two commenters stated that no releases, injuries, or fatalities have occurred during the last

35 years from shipments of radioactive material. (0014, SL2-10) 

• According to one commenter, the DEIS correctly stated that, in order to demonstrate compliance

with 10 CFR 72.106(b), the applicant performed a “bounding” calculation, which assumed a

canister leak rate of 1 E-4 cm3/sec, and then correctly provides the doses calculated by the

applicant from this bounding accident. In addition, the commenter stated that the FEIS should

note that the doses calculated in SAR Section 8.2.7 for a postulated leaking HI-STORM canister

are much lower that those associated with the bounding accident (2.7 mrem TEDE vs. the 76

mrem TEDE mentioned in the DEIS, and 28.4 mrem organ vs. the 824 mrem organ mentioned in

the DEIS). (0163)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges these comments, but they involve safety issues that do not directly

affect the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, and are beyond the scope of the EIS. The

storage cask and proposed PFSF satisfies NRC safety requirements. The NRC staff evaluation is

documented in the SER, as updated. Accordingly, the NRC staff did not determine the validity of

these specific comments, beyond what was evaluated in the SER and EIS. See the response to

G.3.2.5.1.

G.3.2.5.5 Handling and Use of Proposed Cask System

Comment Summary

Several commenters addressed the use of the proposed cask system. (0183, 0194, 0198, 0198g,

0198h, 0215, SL1-20, SL1-23, SL1-36, SL3-04)

C One commenter stated that PFS has no track record transporting, handling, or managing a large

quantity of SNF in these casks. (SL1-20)

C Another commenter requested documentation on the safety of unloading casks and asked

whether such unloading has ever been done in the U.S. The same commenter asked what

measures would be used to monitor and assess casks, and whether the emergency response

infrastructure will be sufficient to handle any accidents. (SL3-04) 

C One commenter stated that the ER fails to consider the safety risks and costs if the applicant fails

to provide adequate means for inspecting and repairing the contents of SNF canisters or for

detecting and removing contamination on the canisters. The commenter asserted that these

include risks posed to workers handling or inspecting casks with contaminated or defective

contents during receipt, storage, or in preparation for shipment to a repository, and also include

health risks and increased costs during the decommissioning process. (0198a)

C One commenter stated that the explosion at the Point Beach Reactor in Wisconsin is evidence

that the handling and storage of nuclear waste must be conducted very carefully. (SL1-36) 

Response:

If the NRC grants the license, the applicant will be required to meet regulations in 10 CFR Part 72,

Subpart I for training, proficiency testing, and certification of personnel. The NRC staff evaluated the

applicant’s program for training, proficiency testing, and certification of personnel in the license

application and found it acceptable as documented in Chapter 10 of the SER. The NRC will also

inspect implementation of this program to ensure compliance with NRC regulations. The NRC staff

also noted that the NRC evaluates and certifies the design of the shipping casks used to transport

spent fuel (HI-STAR 100) and the DOT regulates the vehicles and drivers during transport.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-37 NUREG-1714

The NRC staff also has found that the proposed storage and transportation cask designs can be

loaded and unloaded at the proposed PFSF so as to provide adequate protection of the public health

and safety. A number of reactor licensees associated with the applicant have many years of

experience of handling SNF, including the handling and management of dry storage casks containing

SNF. The NRC acceptance criteria for conduct of operations, including loading and unloading casks,

are discussed in Chapters 3 and 10 of NUREG-1567; Chapter 8 of NUREG-1536; and Chapter 7 of

NUREG-1617.

The staff also notes that operations at the proposed PFSF would not include handling of un-canistered

SNF and the applicant would not be authorized to perform such operations during the licensed life of

the proposed PFSF. The SNF would be sealed (the canister is welded-closed) at the originating

nuclear power plant prior to shipment to the proposed PFSF. Therefore, the applicant would be

limited to handling the canisters which contain the SNF. The NRC staff agrees with the comment that

the hydrogen burn event at Point Beach provides evidence that handling and storage of SNF should

always be performed in a careful manner and in accordance with NRC regulations. As discussed in

G.3.2.5.1, the acceptance criteria used by the NRC staff to review the cask design accounted for

experience gained from the hydrogen burn event at Point Beach.

G.3.2.5.6 Design Compatibility with DOE Criteria

Comment Summary:

One commenter asked whether the proposed PFSF storage characteristics, cask designs, and

transportation issues would be generally compatible with the DOE requirements for permanent

storage at the [proposed] Yucca Mountain site. The comments include the following:

C The commenter stated that there is no basis for concluding that the applicant has taken any

measures to facilitate the decommissioning of the ISFSI by ensuring compatibility of its storage

casks with DOE acceptance criteria. The commenter quotes the SAR as stating that, “when the

storage period for any particular canister of spent fuel is completed, the canister shall be

transferred into a shipping cask and shipped offsite.” (Commenter references SAR at 3.5-2). The

commenter stated that no further details are provided, except a reference to Section 2.4 of the HISTORM and TranStor applications, and Appendix B of the License Application mentioned above. 

According to this commenter, Section 2.4 of the TranStor application does not address the issue

of compatibility with DOE requirements at all. The commenter stated that Section 2.4 of the HISTORM application states that the HI-STORM canister is “designed to be completely congruent

with the multipurpose canister (MPC) concept, as articulated by The U.S. Department of Energy.” 

However, the commenter stated that the HI-STORM application provides no information regarding

the nature of the “MPC concept,” how it relates to DOE waste acceptance criteria, or how exactly

the HI-STORM system is “congruent” with the concept. (0198a)

C The commenter also stated that although the DOE has not yet issued its design criteria, currently

available information shows a significant potential for disparities between the waste acceptance

criteria and the specifications for the applicant’s storage canisters. For instance, this commenter

asserted that the DOE will have requirements on thermal limits per unit area, and limits on the size

and weight of shipping containers. According to the commenter, Sierra Nuclear and Holtec

storage casks may be incompatible with these acceptance criteria. 

C The commenter also stated that the DOE may place limits on the acceptable physical state of

irradiated fuel (i.e., by requiring a demonstration that there are no gross cladding defects). The

commenter states that it is reasonable to anticipate that in connection with such a requirement,

the DOE will require that a representative canister of irradiated fuel be opened to demonstrate that

irradiated fuel is acceptable. Although 10 CFR § 72.122(h) requires the proposed PFSF to

confine SNF in a way that degradation of fuel during storage will not pose operational safety

problems with respect to its removal from storage, the commenter argued that the proposed PFSF
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-38

has no means of inspecting the interior of SNF canisters to determine the condition of the fuel for

purposes of complying with this requirement. (0198a)

C The commenter stated that it is unreasonable to rely on a facility to transfer individual fuel

assemblies at the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository. According to the commenter, there is no

reason to believe that the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository will be equipped with the

necessary equipment to handle inspections and inter-cask transfers for the many cask designs

that are now and will be in use when it is opened. The commenter asserted that it is far more

reasonable for the DOE to require all potential users of the [proposed] repository to properly

package their waste before shipping it to the facility. (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges the concerns raised, but notes that these concerns involve safety issues that

do not directly relate to the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF. Nonetheless, the NRC staff

has concluded that the applicant was not required to verify that the storage canister design would be

compatible with proposed or future Yucca Mountain repository design criteria. Compatibility of storage

and transportation cask designs with the disposal requirements of a geologic repository have been

addressed generally in the DOE DEIS for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. The DOE intends

to process and repackage, upon receipt if necessary, all SNF transported to the proposed Yucca

Mountain repository. Therefore, there would be no requirements to repackage or process SNF at the

proposed PFSF or to transfer individual fuel assemblies to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. 

The adequacy of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to inspect and conduct inter-cask transfers

of fuel is beyond the scope of this EIS. The NRC staff noted that the proposed action does not include

the use of the TranStor storage cask design.

G.3.2.5.7 Inadequate Cask and Proposed PFSF Thermal Design

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that according to the SAR, record high temperatures in Skull Valley range from 

105/F to 109/F (SAR, 2.3-5), and this commenter also stated that the applicant has established a site

design ambient temperature of 110/F (SAR, 4.2-15). However, according to the commenter, the

applicant plans to use HI-STORM and TranStor storage casks, which are designed for lower ambient

temperatures. According to the commenter, the applicant recognized that the off-normal cask design

temperature of 100/F is below the design ambient temperature of 110/F (SAR, 4.2-15). However, the

commenter stated that the applicant argued that the 100/F condition “represents a maximum daily

average temperature over a period of several days and nights required for the system to reach thermal

equilibrium” (SAR, 4.2-15). According to the commenter, the applicant stated that while daily ambient

temperatures could exceed 100/F, the average daily temperature would not exceed 100/F, averaging

day and night temperatures (SAR, 4.2-15). In support of this assertion, the commenter stated that the

applicant cited the maximum average daily ambient temperature of 93.2/F for cities in Utah nearest

the site (SAR, 4.2-15). (0198a) This commenter stated that this analysis is faulty, and gave the

following reasons: 

• The commenter argued that temperatures in unnamed cities somewhere in Utah do not

necessarily correspond to the conditions in Skull Valley. Therefore, the commenter stated that the

applicant should provide information on actual temperatures at the Skull Valley site, using

measurements taken at the distance from the ground that is comparable to the location of intake

vents on the storage casks, where air will be drawn into the casks. (0198a)

• The commenter stated that the applicant’s projection that average daily temperatures will not

exceed 100/F fails to take into account the heat stored and radiated by the concrete pad and by

the concrete cylinders in which each cask will be stored. According to the commenter, these

massive concrete structures will serve as reservoirs that will trap and radiate heat throughout the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-39 NUREG-1714

day and night, thus having a potentially significant effect on average ambient temperatures. 

(0198a)

• In projecting ambient temperatures, the commenter stated that the applicant failed to consider the

heat generated by the casks themselves. The commenter stated that the TranStor casks would

be placed at a center-to-center distance of 15 feet. Since the diameter of each TranStor cask is

11.3 feet, the commenter asserted that the spacing between casks on the pad would be only 3.7

feet (TranStor SAR, Rev. B, 1-17). Additionally, the commenter stated that the Holtec cask is 11

feet in diameter and therefore the spacing between Holtec casks would be 4 feet (Holtec HISTORM 100 TSAR Rev. 2, 1.2-1). The commenter stated that given the close proximity of the

casks, it is likely that additional heat from an adjacent cask would increase the external and

internal temperatures of the concrete storage cylinders, and therefore increase the maximum

cladding temperature. (0198a)

• The commenter asserted that the applicant has not considered the thermal impact of the

temperature differential between the level of the concrete pad and the level of the tops of the

storage casks (15 feet above). The commenter stated that because of the heat-retaining nature of

the concrete pad, the air temperature near the ground will be higher than the air temperature 15

feet above. According to the commenter, this will affect the ventilation system for the casks, which

relies on convection, in which cool air is drawn into the cask inlets and heated by the inner

canister, causing the air to rise. The commenter stated that this “chimney effect” depends on a

difference in temperature between the incoming and outgoing air. If the temperature of air going

into the vents is higher than the temperature of the air 15 feet off the pad, the commenter asserted

that the buoyancy and velocity of air through the ducts is reduced. According to the commenter,

air moving more slowly through the ducts, and at a higher temperature, will cool the canisters

more slowly than cooler air. Thus, the commenter concluded that the design temperature for the

casks (and the cladding inside them) could be exceeded because of the reduced effectiveness of

convection cooling. (0198a)

The commenter stated that the applicant’s design of the proposed PFSF is inadequate, because it

fails to consider these factors in establishing the temperature-related design limits for storage casks,

or to establish measures to ensure that the manufacturer’s design limits will not be exceeded during

storage. According to the commenter, the NRC should require the applicant to perform the requisite

calculations and re-evaluate the temperature-related design limits of the facility. (0198a)

The commenter also expressed concern about the design temperature limits for the concrete storage

cylinders. The commenter stated that the NRC policy on temperature limits for the concrete structures

in which storage casks are housed recommends a maximum allowable temperature of 150/F for

normal operation for bulk concrete (assumed here to be inner concrete), 200/F for local areas, and

350/F for accident or other short-term periods. The commenter argued that the limits prevent

degradation and cracking due to unacceptably high heat levels. The commenter stated that

information submitted by Sierra Nuclear Corporation and Holtec in support of their applications for

Certificates of Compliance shows that projected temperatures for concrete either exceed or are very

close to the NRC’s recommended limits, thus compromising the integrity of the concrete. The

commenter suggested that these calculations probably underestimate the concrete temperatures,

because they do not appear to take into account the heat generated by the casks themselves and the

storage pads. (0198a)

This commenter further stated that in a request for information sent to Sierra Nuclear Corporation

(SNC) during licensing review, the NRC staff noted that for the TransStor cask, some design

temperatures for off-normal conditions either exceeded or came close to NRC-recommended limits. 

The commenter stated that it appears this licensing issue remains open. (0198a)

The commenter also stated that the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask design also exceeds NRCrecommended values. (0198a)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-40

Further, this commenter stated that the applicant had not demonstrated that concrete structures for

SNF storage were designed to withstand the temperatures that can be expected at the proposed

PFSF, or that it has taken measures to ensure protection of the concrete from excessive

temperatures. (0198a)

The commenter stated that the application gives inadequate consideration to the potential adverse

impacts of on-site SNF storage. The commenter also stated that the ER failed to consider the impacts

of overheating of casks due to the facility’s inadequate thermal design. (0198a) 

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges these comments regarding the thermal design of the cask and PFSF,

but they involve safety issues that do not directly affect the environmental impacts of the proposed

PFSF, and are beyond the scope of the EIS. As discussed in Section G.3.2.5.1, the EIS considered

the impacts that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100 storage cask design would have

on the environment. The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask and proposed PFSF

design to safely store SNF during normal operations (including internal heat generation, ambient

temperatures, and other thermal issues) and to withstand potential natural phenomena or manmade

hazards. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated. Specific responses to

comments regarding human health impacts from potential accidents are addressed in Section

G.3.15.6. The staff noted that the proposed action does not include the use of the TranStor storage

cask design.

G.3.2.5.8 Lack of Procedures for Detection of Helium

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant has not provided procedures or measures to verify the

presence of helium in SNF storage casks. The commenter further stated that the design does not

comply with 10 CFR 72.122(f), 72.128(a), and 72.128(a)(1), and does not follow the guidance in

Regulatory Guide 3.48, Section 4.7. In addition, the commenter suggested that the applicant lacks

adequate control over the process of filling casks with helium and will not be able to open casks to

check for the presence of helium. The commenter also stated that the casks should be inspected

after transport to the ISFSI to identify any weld cracks that occurred during shipment. (0198a)

Response:

These comments involve safety issues that do not directly affect the environmental impacts of the

proposed PFSF, and are beyond the scope of the EIS. As discussed in Section G.3.2.5.1, the FEIS

considered the impacts that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100 storage cask design

would have on the environment. The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask and

proposed PFSF design to safely store SNF during normal operations (including the internal helium

environment and generic leak testing requirements) and to withstand potential natural phenomena or

manmade hazards. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated. As discussed

in Section G.3.2.5.5, the NRC staff also notes that operations at the proposed PFSF would not include

the opening of canisters to check for helium and the applicant would not be authorized to perform

such operations during the licensed life of the proposed PFSF. The SNF would be sealed (the

canister is welded-closed) at the originating nuclear power plant prior to shipment to PFSF. 

Therefore, the applicant would only be limited to handling the canisters which contain the SNF. The

proposed design evaluated by the NRC staff satisfies all applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 72.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-41 NUREG-1714

G.3.2.5.9 Use of Improperly Constructed Casks

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to discuss canister end accidents involving improperly

constructed casks. The commenter questioned whether the TranStor cask is subject to the same

quality of fabrication as the VSC-24 (SAR, 8.2-34). The commenter stated that the NRC issued a

Demand for Information to Sierra Nuclear Corporation on October 7, 1997, as a result of numerous

NRC inspection findings indicating that, since 1992, Sierra Nuclear’s quality assurance and corrective

action programs have failed to identify and correct design control and fabrication deficiencies. The

commenter stated that a canister with fabrication deficiencies could fail, and if it contained failed fuel,

fission products could be released. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding the use of improperly constructed casks, but

they involve safety issues that are not directly related to the environmental impacts of the proposed

PFSF, and are beyond the scope of the EIS. The NRC staff notes that the proposed action does not

include the use of the TranStor cask design. As discussed in Section G.3.2.5.1, the EIS considered

the impacts that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100 storage cask design would have

on the environment. The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask and proposed PFSF

design to safely store SNF during normal operations and to withstand potential natural phenomena or

manmade hazards. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated. If the proposed

PFSF is licensed, the casks would be required to meet design specifications in the applicant’s SAR

(including proper welds) and would be required to be constructed in accordance with an NRCapproved Quality Assurance Program.

G.3.2.6 The Proposed Storage Facility Design

G.3.2.6.1 DEIS Inadequately Describes the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the DEIS is inadequate in describing specific proposed PFSF

parameters for the following reasons:

• One commenter stated that the DEIS provides no construction schedule. The commenter stated

that on page 2-3, the DEIS indicated that the applicant is planning to start construction after the

NEPA and licensing process have been completed, but the ER says that construction will begin in

September, 2000. (0198) 

• One commenter asserted that the DEIS, on page 1-5, line 43, does not contain a thorough

discussion of all construction activities required under NUREG-1555 (page 1.1.-5). The

commenter also stated that the DEIS includes details for Phase 1 construction, but omits Phases

2 and 3. According to the commenter, the DEIS should discuss the duration and nature of all

phases. (0039, 0077)

• The same commenter stated that the DEIS does not state the number of workers that would be

employed for facility or rail line construction or the workers’ assignments. The commenter noted

that although the DEIS states that 225 workers will be employed for construction and 43

permanent workers for operations, the commenter asked whether the 125 railroad construction

workers mentioned on page 5-34, line 5, reflect workers for the rail line construction only, and the

225 workers comprise rail line and other construction. The commenter believed that the DEIS

should identify much earlier in the document the breakdown of this proposed small workforce. 

(0039, 0077)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-42

• This commenter also stated that the DEIS does not contain best management practices (BMPs)

for the proposed PFSF construction or facility operations. The commenter indicated that NUREG

1555, page 12, states that BMPs are “construction and maintenance practices that limit adverse

impacts,” which also entail operations. According to the commenter, the DEIS interpreted BMPs

to apply to construction and not to operations. (0039, 0077) 

• Another commenter stated that the DEIS indicates on page 2-10 that the proposed PFSF will have

a back-up diesel generator, but it did not provide information regarding the possible consequences

of a loss of power if the back-up power systems fail. (0198)

• This commenter also stated that the DEIS indicates that soil stabilization will be easily engineered

during the design process to meet the “necessary strength requirements,” but these requirements

are not described. (0198)

Response: 

The construction schedule presented in the applicant’s ER of construction beginning in September

2000 is out-of-date. The EIS accurately states that the construction would begin only after the FEIS is

issued and only if the necessary licenses and regulatory approvals have been issued to the applicant. 

Section 2.1.2 of the FEIS was revised to indicate construction would be completed in 18 months and

the proposed PFSF would become operational 4 months later.

The EIS presents sufficient detail (such as water use) on Phases 2 and 3 of construction such that an

assessment of potential impacts could be developed. Also, while the guidance in NUREG-1555

applies specifically to power reactors and not to the type of storage facility under consideration in this

EIS, Section 2.1 of the EIS provides an adequate description of the construction activities associated

with the proposed PFSF.

Regarding the request for information on the proposed number of workers, Table 2.1 of the EIS

presents this information. In developing the EIS, the specific job descriptions or skills of these workers

were not relevant to developing the analyses of environmental impacts (specifically economic impacts)

in this EIS.

The BMPs described for the construction of the proposed PFSF would also apply in part during

operation. However, it should be noted that many of the practices included in Table 2.7 of the EIS,

“Best Management Practices as Proposed by the Applicant During the Construction of the PFSF,” are

specific to construction activities.

Regarding the comment about the diesel generator, the NRC addressed back-up power systems in

the SER. As discussed in Chapter 3 of the SER, the proposed PFSF design does not require utility

systems during SNF cask storage on the pad, and the proposed PFSF design does not require

continuous electric power to safely maintain the SNF within the storage or transfer casks. However, a

reliable electrical source is needed to maintain the physical protection system for the PFSF. As

specified in 10 CFR 73.51(b)(3), “the physical protection system must be designed to protect against

loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause a radiation exposure exceeding the dose

as described in §72.106.” The NRC reviewed the design of the physical protection system, including

the primary and backup power supplies, and determined that it meets the NRC regulations through the

commitments and design features described in the Physical Protection Plan. The use of a diesel

generator to provide on-site backup power is sufficient to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51.

Regarding the regulatory description of soil stabilization requirements, the NRC notes that soil

stabilization is addressed routinely during the engineering design process and is beyond the scope of

the EIS. The necessary strength requirements for the soil are design specific issues that are

developed as a part of the NRC safety review and the detailed engineering design. These specific
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-43 NUREG-1714

strength requirements are not necessary to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed action. 

The FEIS describes how the soil will be engineered (i.e., use of soil cement); therefore, soil

stabilization requirements were not included in the FEIS.

G.3.2.6.2 Design of the Proposed Storage Facility is Inadequate

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the proposed PFSF design is inadequate. (0036, 0047, 0090, 0198,

GR-23, SL3-02, SL3-16) Commenters provided the following specific comments:

• Several commenters stated that the storage design is not adequate to withstand weather,

earthquakes, terrorist attacks, or sabotage, and the technology is not well understood because

there is limited history of its use. (0047, GR-23, SL2-08, SL3-02, SL3-16) 

• One commenter asserted that the DEIS did not address the adequacy of the design to withstand

earthquakes. The commenter stated that the applicant has not constructed such a facility before

in an active, seismic region like Skull Valley. (0090) 

• Another commenter stated that the long-term impacts of weather, earthquakes, and other factors

at the proposed PFSF are not predictable since the SNF will be stored for hundreds of years. 

(SL3-16) 

• One commenter argued that the concrete slab proposed to house the casks will not withstand a

seismic event. This commenter proposed that a better design would be to have the supporting

part of the assembly be a base-isolated structure that would be minimally affected by the rolling

liquefaction characteristics of a seismic event. (0036) 

• The same commenter stated that the structure will not withstand friendly fire or terrorist attacks

and should use bomb-resistant materials. (0036) 

C Another commenter asked how the proposed PFSF will prevent releases from entering the

building’s ventilation system during the transfer of waste between transportation and storage

casks. (0215)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledged these comments regarding the design of the proposed PFSF, but they

involve safety issues that are not directly related to the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF

and are beyond the scope of the EIS. As discussed in Section G.3.2.5.1, the EIS considered the

impacts that the proposed PFSF and associated HI-STORM 100 storage cask design would have on

the environment. The NRC has evaluated the adequacy of the storage cask and proposed PFSF

design to safely store SNF during normal operations and to withstand potential natural phenomena or

manmade hazards. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated. The EIS

analyzed these risks to determine the impact to the environment (see FEIS Section 4.7.2.3) to the

extent that the result of the NRC safety evaluation indicated that the storage cask design would affect

the environment such as by releasing radioactive material or emitting direct radiation. 

However, in response to some of the specific issues, the NRC notes the following:

• The proposed PFSF would be initially licensed by the NRC to operate as a temporary facility for

up to 20 years. The license may be renewed by the Commission before the expiration of the

license term, upon application by the applicant. This renewal process would include both a

thorough safety and environmental review. The applicant has anticipated that it would renew the

license for an additional 20 years. Therefore, the NRC staff analyzed many aspects of the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-44

impacts of the proposed PFSF assuming an anticipated 40-year life. As discussed in Section 1.2

of the EIS (“The Proposed Action”), the Commission in its Waste Confidence Decision believes

there is reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be available within

the first quarter of the twenty-first century to receive SNF. Specific responses to other similar

comments regarding the life of the proposed PFSF are addressed in Section G.3.2.1 through

G.3.2.3 of the FEIS. 

• The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analyses of potential hazards to the proposed PFSF and

the consequences of credible accidents. These credible accidents included earthquakes and

weather phenomena (e.g., tornadoes) in the surrounding area. Military operations in the

surrounding area were determined not to pose an unacceptable hazard to the proposed PFSF. 

The NRC staff determined that the proposed PFSF was adequately designed such that credible

accidents would not result in a release of SNF contents. The NRC staff also evaluated the

proposed physical protection plan and determined that it would provide for the common defense

and security and adequate protection of the health and safety of the public when fully

implemented. The NRC staff evaluations were described in detail in Chapter 15 of the SER, as

updated. Specific responses to other similar comments regarding human health impacts from

potential accidents are addressed in Section G.3.15.6 of the FEIS.

C Specific responses to comments on the radiological health impacts from normal operations and

accidents at the proposed PFSF are addressed in Section G.3.15 of the FEIS.

G.3.2.6.3 Design of the Proposed Storage Facility is Adequate

Comment Summary:

Many commenters stated that the proposed PFSF design is adequate. (0014, 0016, 0020, 0090,

0198, 0236, GR-12, GR-17, GR-23, SL1-23, SL1-40, SL3-02, SL3-16) Several commenters stated

that the design is adequate and any problems with the storage facility design will be dealt with

appropriately. (0014, 0016, 0236, GR-12, GR-17, SL1-23, SL1-40) One commenter stated that the

storage technology is well understood and has been demonstrated to be safe at 21 nuclear plants with

similar facilities that have operated since the late 1980s. One commenter stated that the proposed

PFSF is designed to be passive, environmentally benign, and safe. The commenter indicated that

there are no cooling systems, no moving parts, and no fans. (SL1-23) Another commenter stated that

SNF storage facilities use proven, independently reviewed container technology and that experience

shows that such facilities provide the highest level of protection for public health and safety.

One commenter stated that the heat generated by the waste will be very small, and is not enough to

cause evaporation or dispersion of any material. According to this commenter, the heat generated will

be less than 0.01 percent of the fission power generated by electricity production and is less than one

millionth of the power in the “excursion” that blew apart the Chernobyl reactor. The commenter also

stated that the radioactive material in the fuel rods is solid. (0016) Another commenter stated that

many of the design features include proven performance characteristics and the site is superior to the

typically constrained reactor site where the SNF is currently stored. (0236) 

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges these comments regarding the adequacy of the proposed design, but

they involve safety issues that are not directly related to the environmental impacts of the proposed

PFSF and are beyond the scope of the EIS. The NRC staff agrees that the storage cask and

proposed PFSF design would provide adequate protection of the public health and safety, as

documented in the SER and analyzed in the EIS. The NRC staff did not determine the validity of

these specific comments, beyond that evaluated in the SER, as updated. The NRC concludes that

the EIS adequately describes the proposed cask design for use in the proposed action and that there

is no requirement to further address specific design issues. Responses to similar comments on the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-45 NUREG-1714

health impacts from normal operations and accidents at the proposed PFSF are addressed in Section

G.3.15 of the EIS.

G.3.2.6.4 Facility Storage Capacity

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern about the unprecedented capacity of the proposed PFSF. (SL1-

02) A few commenters indicated that the planned capacity of 4,000 casks or 40,000 metric tons is ten

times the amount currently stored in dry casks in the entire United States. (0012, 0198, SL1-01, SL1-

02) One commenter stated that currently there are only 436 storage units or casks for commercial

spent fuel in the entire U.S., which is one-tenth the number of storage casks proposed for the

proposed PFSF. The commenter also stated that 12 of the 15 U.S. storage sites are within 0.75 mile

of a nuclear power plant. (0198)

Several commenters expressed concern that the applicant would accept waste from non-member

reactor licensees at the proposed PFSF and stated that this would increase the storage capacity at

the proposed PFSF. The commenters expressed concern about provisions for non-members to

assume liability for non-member waste stored at the proposed PFSF. The commenters requested that

the DEIS address this issue. (0052, 0053, 0077, 0112, 0156) One commenter stated that the DEIS

did not specify which non-member reactor licensees could store their spent fuel at the proposed

PFSF, and the DEIS did not consider the impacts of construction and operation of Phases 2 and 3 of

the proposed PFSF. (0156)

One commenter stated that the DEIS represents that “on average, the proposed PFSF would receive

one to two trains each week carrying three or four loaded shipping casks per train” (page 2-19, lines

3-4). According to the commenter, this would account for 52 shipments per year of up to 312 casks

(up to six loaded casks can be accommodated by each “single-purpose” train) and this would involve

up to 12,480 casks during the next 40 years. However, this commenter asserted that recent

legislation supported by the nuclear industry would enable an unprecedented increase in yearly

shipments and the total number of casks that could conceivably be shipped in 40 years, as is

indicated in the following table:

Table G.3.2.1. Estimated cask shipments

Year Shipments/Yr. Casks Subtotal

2001-06

2007-08

2009

2010

2011

2012-14

2015-30

2031-41

52

1,200

2,600

4,200

6,200

6,600

6,800

7,900

312

77,200

15,600

25,200

12,066

39,600

40,800

46,900

1,560

14,400

15,600

25,200

12,066

118,800

612,000

790,000

1,579,626 total casks 

The commenter stated that notwithstanding the likelihood that the nuclear power industry could

probably not produce such incredible amounts of SNF, the nuclear industry has nevertheless been

successful in supporting legislation for such an increase. The commenter asked, given the predictable

increase in SNF, what additional rationale could have caused the industry and Congress to allow for

such an unprecedented increase in shipments of nuclear wastes and what other types of nuclear

waste are enabled for shipment to Skull Valley? (0112)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-46

Response: 

The NRC’s regulations for the licensing of SNF storage facilities at 10 CFR Part 72 do not set limits on

the size of an ISFSI, but instead set standards that all such facilities must meet regardless of size. 

The applicant proposed the size of the facility in its license application and associated documents. If a

license is granted by NRC, the capacity of the proposed PFSF would be limited by that license to

40,000 MTU or 4,000 casks.

The EIS presents the NRC’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF based on

a proposed maximum capacity of 4,000 casks, or 40,000 MTU (see Section 1.2). The environmental

effects of the proposed PFSF do not depend on the relative sizes of other similar facilities. No

regulatory requirements specify the location of a storage facility in relation to a reactor site. As shown

in the FEIS, the NRC expects the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF to be small. The NRC

also evaluated the safety of the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff’s position is that the proposed PFSF

would meet all applicable regulatory requirements. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the

SER, as updated.

The proposed PFSF would be able to accept SNF from reactor licensees that are not PFS members. 

As part of its analysis, the NRC staff analyzed shipment of a maximum 40,000 MTU of SNF to the

proposed PFSF, regardless of ownership. (The PFS member reactor licensees do not own this much

SNF.) All SNF shipped to the proposed PFSF would remain under the ownership of the originating

reactor licensee, until such time as the Department of Energy takes title to this SNF to relocate the

waste to a permanent repository. The liability associated with such SNF would also remain with the

originating reactor licensee.

Chapter 4 of this EIS addresses the effects of Phases 2 and 3 of construction, as well as operation of

the proposed PFSF. The types of impacts addressed include water use, socioeconomic impacts, and

worker health and safety.

The comment about the nuclear industry projection on the number of SNF shipments is speculative

and is not what has been proposed by the applicant and, therefore, is beyond the scope of the EIS. 

Further, the types of SNF that are expected to be shipped to the proposed PFSF are discussed in the

SAR.

G.3.2.6.5 Storage of Greater-than-Class C Waste

Comment Summary:

Three commenters expressed concern about other types of nuclear-related waste that would be

stored at the proposed PFSF. (0112, 0198, GR-04) Other commenters expressed concern regarding

the possibility that greater-than-Class C radioactive waste could be stored at the proposed PFSF. 

Two commenters stated that the DEIS should evaluate the impact of the facility becoming a

permanent storage facility for greater-than-Class C waste. (0198, GR-04)

Response: 

As discussed in Section G.3.2.1, the proposed PFSF would be a temporary facility, and not

permanent. The proposed PFSF would be authorized to store only SNF, and not greater-than-Class C

waste. The HI-STORM 100 is not approved to store greater-than-Class C waste, and the applicant

could not do so at the proposed PFSF without requesting an amendment (see below), if licensed. The

NRC would evaluate such a license amendment request, which would include a safety evaluation

review and environmental review.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-47 NUREG-1714

The NRC staff notes that changes to the regulations that would allow ISFSIs to store greater-thanClass C waste have been proposed. However, the applicant has applied for a license to store only

SNF, but not separated greater-than-Class C waste (PFS/RAI1 1999).

G.3.2.6.6 Need for Additional Research

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that funding should be provided for research and demonstration of: an

integrated transport, storage, monitoring, and retrieval system for casks containing SNF; a dry-pool

canister transport, storage, monitoring, and retrieval system; a crane load drop cushion, critical

material fall protection, and varying height under load support for a monitoring, storage, and retrieval

system; and a proven storage pad design for easy decommissioning. (0020)

Response: 

The NRC staff considered the ability of the PFSF design to satisfy NRC safety regulations using

existing techniques for safety assessments. The NRC determined the design of the proposed PFSF

was acceptable as discussed in the SER, as updated. Additional research on the topic identified by

the commenter is not directly related to the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF and is

beyond the scope of the EIS.

G.3.2.6.7 Inadequate Quality Assurance Program Description

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant’s quality assurance program as described is inadequate for

the following reasons. 

C The commenter asserted that the applicant’s program is a general summary and is a conceptual

description which lacks sufficient detail to show how the program will meet regulatory

requirements including those in 10 CFR Part 72, Sections 72.24(n), 72.140(c), 72.146, 72.144,

72.154, 72.156, 72.159, and 72.166. (0198a)

C According to the commenter the PFS quality assurance program description in the SAR is

inconsistent with the description of that program in QA Docket 71-0829. (0198a)

C The commenter also argued that the SAR fails to describe the interrelationships between the

Architect/Engineer group and the Quality Assurance Committee and how the relationship

enhances quality assurance. In addition, the commenter states that the SAR fails to identify who

is responsible for pre-licensing “day to day activities, costs, or schedules,” and how the

organizational structure ensures quality assurance in quality- and safety-related activities. 

(0198a)

• Finally, this commenter stated that the SAR briefly describes broad quality assurance

responsibilities for the Board of Managers and Lead Quality Assurance Technician, though it fails

to provide any meaningful description of the licensing and construction, operational functional

responsibilities interrelationships, and various authority for performing quality- and safety-related

activities. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s Quality Assurance Program and found it acceptable if fully

implemented, as documented in Chapter 12 of the SER. As stated in Section 11.1.2 of the SAR, “QA

Program,” the applicant’s Quality Assurance Program is composed of the QAPD and Quality
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-48

Assurance Procedures. The QAPD presents the applicant’s commitments to establish and execute a

Quality Assurance Program that meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G, and defines

the framework for conducting those activities affecting quality and safety. The NRC does not expect

the QAPD to include the detailed procedures that implement the QAPD. As discussed in Section 12.1

of NUREG 1567, “Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Storage Facilities,” the Quality Assurance

Program for the development, licensing, construction, and operation of an ISFSI provides a high level

(i.e., general) description of the control of activities affecting quality. The scope of the NRC staff

review of an applicant’s Quality Assurance Program during the licensing process does not include a

review of the detailed procedures that will be used to implement the program.

The applicant must develop and implement the Quality Assurance procedures that address the QAPD

commitments before any quality- and safety-related activities are performed. The NRC staff will verify

the effectiveness of the applicant’s Quality Assurance Program implementation through inspection

activities following the issuance of a license. The NRC staff will use these inspections to determine

whether the procedures support the implementation of an effective Quality Assurance Program and

whether the procedures have been implemented adequately. Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.172, licensees

are required to take timely corrective action to resolve any conditions adverse to quality that the NRC

staff identifies during its inspections. The NRC uses this approach because it evaluates the

effectiveness of a Quality Assurance Program according to licensee performance.

Based on its review, the NRC staff determined that the applicant’s QAPD is acceptable. The QAPD

adequately addresses all of the elements required in 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G, and the guidance

presented in NUREG 1567. Because the comments involve safety issues that are not directly related

to the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, they are beyond the scope of the EIS.

G.3.2.6.8 Need for Hot Cell at the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

A few commenters stated that the proposed PFSF should have a hot cell. (0198, 0198a, 0198h, 0211,

GR-05, SL3-04) The comments included the following:

• One commenter stated that in order for the proposed PFSF to transfer fuel to casks that are

compatible with DOE requirements, a hot cell is needed. This commenter asserted that the

proposed PFSF design makes no provision for a hot cell. Instead, the commenter claimed that

the applicant apparently expects that these operations will take place at the originating reactor or

at the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository. (0198a)

• Many commenters expressed concern that canisters would leak and there would not be a hot cell

available to test the canisters. Their concern is related to the statement in the DEIS that a

damaged or contaminated canister would be returned to the sender (and would be transported

across the country) without first addressing the problem or storing the damaged canister on site. 

The commenters concerns are that this would create significant risks during transport if

radioactive material were to leak out of the casks. (0198, 0198h, 0211, GR-05, SL3-04)

• One commenter stated that the applicant does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.122(f)

and 72.128(a) because it would not provide a hot cell at another facility for opening casks to

inspect fuel conditions. The commenter further stated that not having a hot cell is inconsistent

with NUREG 1092, “Environmental Assessment of 10 CFR Part 72, Licensing Requirements for

the Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (1984),” in that the

applicant would not be able to verify the material integrity of the spent fuel during its storage

lifetime without a hot cell. The commenter stated that a hot cell would also reduce risk to public

health and safety. The commenter also mentioned that although the applicant stated that fuel

shipped to the proposed PFSF would be in good condition, this may not always be the case. The
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-49 NUREG-1714

commenter claimed that materials problems associated with misloading fuel have occurred

recently. (0198a)

• The same commenter stated that it is possible to damage the canister so that it no longer fits

within a storage or transport cask. In this case, the commenter argued that the proposed PFSF

would have no means for inspecting or repairing a damaged canister or of transferring its contents

to another canister. (0198a)

• The commenter also asserted that if cladding degraded, a hot cell would be needed to verify the

condition of the canister. Without a hot cell, the commenter argued that it is impossible to take

smear samples of the whole canister because it would be too radioactive for workers to approach. 

Moreover, even assuming the canister is “clean” during the initial packaging at the reactor,

according to the commenter, it is likely that vibrations on the rail or highway could shake loose

radioactive contamination from metal pores. Finally, the commenter stated that the levels of

smearable contamination on the outside of a canister could rise after transit from a process called

“weeping.” (0198a)

• One commenter said that the PFSF, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 72.130, was not

designed to facilitate decommissioning because the facility does not have the capability to

repackage canisters by transferring individual fuel assemblies. (0198a)

• Three commenters stated that the EIS should examine the alternative of providing a hot cell or

pool where damaged SNF can be retrieved, to avoid the risk from shipping the SNF back to the

original power plant. (0198h, 0211, SL3-04)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding the need for a hot cell, but as noted by one

commenter, the proposed PFSF design does not require a hot cell. The issue raised by the

commenters is related to the technical adequacy of the PFSF design and is not directly related to the

environmental review and, therefore, is beyond the scope of this EIS. The NRC staff reviewed and

approved the proposed PFSF design. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in the SER, as

updated. The commenters should note that operations at the proposed PFSF will not include handling

of un-canistered SNF, and the applicant will not be authorized to perform such operations during the

licensed life of the proposed PFSF. The SNF will be sealed (the canister is welded-closed) at the

originating nuclear power plant prior to shipment to the proposed PFSF. The proposed PFSF would

handle the canisters that contain the SNF with the use of the transfer cask. The NRC staff reviewed

the design of the HI-STORM 100 cask and determined that a “leaking” cask is not a credible event

during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. See Section G.3.15.6.3 of the EIS for similar

comments regarding “leaking” casks. Because such an event is not reasonably foreseeable,

modification of the analysis is not warranted.

G.3.2.7 Location of the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

Three commenters expressed concern about locating the proposed PFSF near populated areas,

important resources and activities, families in a developing community, precious and sensitive

ecosystems, and Department of Defense facilities. (GR-23, SL2-08, SL3-40) One commenter was

specifically concerned about populations downwind of the selected location. (0002) 

One commenter stated that the authors of the DEIS must comply with NUREG-1555, Volume 2, page

1.1-2, which states that the proposed action must describe the site location with respect to nearby

towns and natural features. The commenter recommended that Figure 1.2, “The Proposed Project
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-50

Area in Skull Valley, Utah,” be revised to show the nearest residents (e.g., residents in Low, the Skull

Valley Band’s village), and to reflect the local population. (0039, 0077)

One commenter expressed support for the location of the proposed PFSF on the Reservation of the

Skull Valley Band as one of many scientifically acceptable locations. (0016, SL1-19) Another

commenter stated that the proposed location provides both an ideal climate for safe storage and close

proximity to a reprocessing center in Idaho. (SL3-50)

Response: 

The NRC staff reviewed the number and location of people in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF. 

Reservation and non-Reservation residents number about 150 people for all of Skull Valley. Nearby

communities in the Tooele and Rush Valleys (as well as nearby Department of Defense installations)

are separated from the proposed site by mountains reaching elevations of over 1,950 meters (6,400

feet) above the proposed site. Thus, the site appears to be relatively isolated.

The nearest environmentally sensitive area of concern to the proposed PFSF would be Horseshoe

Springs, which is approximately 23 kilometers (14 miles) from the site. As described in detail in

Chapters 4, and 5 of this FEIS, there would be no impacts to this area.

The proposed PFSF would emit no airborne pollutants during normal operations, therefore, the

concern about populations downwind from the proposed PFSF appears to be related to an accidental

release of radioactive materials. The NRC staff has considered such accident scenarios in its safety

review and determined there would not be a release of SNF after a credible accident. The NRC staff

evaluation is documented in Chapter 15 of the SER, as updated. See the responses to G.3.15.6 of

the EIS for similar comments regarding the impacts of accidents at the proposed PFSF. Because the

events postulated by the commenter are not reasonably foreseeable, modification of the analysis is

not warranted.

G.3.2.8 Railroad Lines

G.3.2.8.1 Design of the Proposed New Rail Line

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant is working closely with the American Association of

Railroads and will petition the Technology Center of Pueblo, Colorado to incorporate technology

improvements in shipping spent nuclear fuel. (SL2-10)

One commenter indicated an inconsistency between the ER (Section 5.2.1.1, page 5-6, line 8) and the

DEIS (page 2-14, line 35) regarding the number of culverts (10 per the ER and 32 per the DEIS) that

would be installed for the proposed rail line. This commenter stated that a sufficient number of

culverts need to be built to maintain drainage and allow the proposed rail line to pass through the 100-

year floodplain. (0163)

Another commenter stated that the DEIS (Section 3.2.1.5) lacks design and performance

specifications regarding the rail alternative/rail spur, specifically: whether the rail meets Class 2 track

rating established by AAR Circular OT-55 for hazardous materials; the switching needs at interline

connections and facilities; signaling capabilities; and travel grades. The commenter also asserted

that, in contrast to the DEIS (Section 2.1.1.3 page 2-14), active warning devices will be needed,

because the rail line will cross many unpaved public roads between Low and the Reservation, creating

hazards. The commenter added that the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) would determine

whether warning devices are necessary, and the builders of the track must provide UDOT with all the

necessary information regarding road crossings. (0198, 0198i)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-51 NUREG-1714

In addition, two commenters addressed the design of the proposed new rail line. (0163, 0198, 0198i)

Response: 

The EIS contains current information regarding facility design and indicates a variety of local, state,

and Federal permits and agency coordination that would take place as part of the construction and

operation of the proposed PFSF. The Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) requires the applicants to

obtain applicable permits for culvert construction. As part of their enforcement of the Clean Water Act

(CWA), the ACE requires that all culverts be designed to accommodate the 100-year floodplain. In

response to the comment on warning devices, the Cooperating Agencies reviewed the proposed use

of passive warning devices and determined that they were adequate for public safety, due to the low

level of both rail and vehicle traffic.

The applicant must receive approvals from both the BLM and the STB to construct the proposed rail

line. The applicant has submitted information to BLM for the approval of a right-of-way including

detailed design and “plan of development.” The description of the proposed rail line in Section 2.1.1.3,

“New Rail Line,” of this EIS reflects the detailed designs, which include discussion of applicable

Federal Rail Administration standards, and is sufficient to determine environmental impacts for this

EIS. Furthermore, the applicant has committed to construct and operate the proposed rail line in

accordance with AAR standards, “Performance Standards for Spent Nuclear Fuel Trains.” Both the

DEIS and the FEIS reflect the total number of culverts that would be required.

G.3.2.8.2 Design of the Proposed ITF

Comment Summary:

One commenter asserted that the DEIS is missing crucial design and construction information for the

proposed ITF that is relevant to the spent fuel transfer and transportation and required by 49 CFR

1105.7(e)(11)(i), (ii), and (iii) . Specifically, the commenter requested information regarding the size,

location, and capacity of the crane, building dimensions, locations and operation of any siding

switches, fence/barrier locations, and the size and location of any storage docks. Furthermore, the

commenter stated that because the proposed ITF is part of the transportation section of the proposed

PFSF operations, it should be evaluated by the DOT. (0198g)

Response: 

The NRC staff reviewed the level of design detail included in the DEIS for the proposed ITF and

determined that the description is sufficient for evaluation of any environmental impacts from the

transportation and transfer operation. Section 5.7.2 of the EIS provides the radiological impacts of

SNF transport to the proposed PFSF, including the use of the proposed ITF.

As described in the DEIS, the DOT and the NRC regulate the transport of SNF in the United States. If

the use of the proposed ITF is approved, the facility would be constructed and operated in accordance

with relevant Federal regulations, including DOT regulations. The STB is reviewing the construction

and operation of the proposed rail line, consistent with its regulatory responsibilities; however, the STB

does not have jurisdiction over construction and operation of intermodal transfer facilities. Similarly,

the NRC does not approve ITF designs.

G.3.2.8.3 Feasibility of Rail Spur Construction

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant has not shown that it will be feasible to construct a rail spur

from the Union Pacific mainline to the proposed ISFSI. (0198a)
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NUREG-1714 G-52

Response:

The applicant submitted a right-of-way (ROW) application to the BLM and a request to construct and

operate the rail line to STB. These applications included a detailed engineering design, including

information regarding construction activities, alignment, area of disturbance, culvert locations, at-grade

crossings, and other related information. The BLM and the STB have reviewed the applications,

conducted site visits along the rail corridor, and reviewed relevant information to evaluate the potential

impacts of the construction and operation of the proposed rail line. This analysis was presented in the

EIS, and the BLM and the STB concluded that with appropriate mitigation, construction and operation

of the rail line are feasible. 

G.3.2.8.4 Location of the Proposed Skunk Ridge Rail Corridor

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS discussion of the proposed rail spur ignores the BLM Resource

Management Plan (RMP), which states, “Public lands will not be made available for inappropriate

uses, such as storage or use of hazardous materials.” (SL3-33) 

Response:

The BLM reviewed the RMP regarding the issue of hazardous materials. The sentence quoted in the

comment was taken out of context from a decision regarding National Guard permits on public lands. 

The RMP decision on Hazardous Waste Management states, “BLM will not authorize placement or

processing of hazardous wastes on public lands.” The proposed PFSF is not located on public lands. 

The BLM is considering a ROW application for the proposed rail line that would cross public land. The

RMP decision does not preclude the transportation of hazardous wastes across public lands. 

Therefore, the proposed right-of-way would not conflict with the RMP.

G.3.2.8.5 Rowley Junction ITF

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern that rail shipments of up to 200 casks of nuclear waste would be

arriving at Rowley Junction ITF annually, and the applicant has not provided proof of its legal

entitlement to build a transfer facility at Rowley Junction or whether the facility can handle the

expected number of casks. In addition, the commenter stated that the applicant has not identified the

number of casks expected on each shipment or explained the effects of rail congestion at Rowley

Junction. Furthermore, according to this commenter, the applicant has not shown that Union Pacific

Railroad is capable or willing to handle the shipments coming into Rowley Junction. Finally, the

commenter stated the applicant has not demonstrated that it has the right to use a terminal at Rowley

Junction. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment. The issue of whether the applicant is legally entitled to

build an ITF at Rowley Junction (Timpie) is not directly related to the environmental review and,

therefore, beyond the scope of the EIS. However, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have not

identified a legal reason that would prohibit the applicant from building an ITF, assuming the applicant

obtains all applicable permits and approvals. The other issues in this comment are addressed in

Section G.3.16 of this FEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-53 NUREG-1714

G.3.3 Permits and Regulations

G.3.3.1 Federal Regulations and Executive Orders

Comment Summary:

One commenter asserted that the ER does not list all Federal permits, licenses, approvals, and other

entitlements that must be obtained in connection with the license application, nor does it describe the

status of compliance with these requirements. The commenter asserted that under NEPA, the NRC

must fully assess any other permit, license, approval, or other entitlement the applicant is required to

obtain in connection with this license application, and address applicable environmental quality

standards and requirements. Because the applicant has not addressed all of these requirements, the

commenter added, the NRC cannot assess the requirements adequately, nor can the petitioners and

general public assess the scope and effect of granting the license sought by the applicant. (0198a,

0198h)

Response:

The NRC staff reviewed the DEIS and concluded that the analysis complies with 10 CFR 51.45(d)

“Status of Compliance.” In Section 1.6.2, “Required Permits and Approvals,” this FEIS lists the known

Federal permits, licenses, approvals and other entitlements which the applicant must obtain in

connection with the proposed action.

G.3.3.1.1 Nuclear Waste Policy Act Requirements

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the NWPA provides that persons owning or operating civilian nuclear

power reactors have the primary responsibility for providing interim storage of their SNF. The

commenter stated that this responsibility must not be shifted. (SL1)

One commenter stated that the approval of the proposed PFSF is illegal and contradictory to DOE

policy pertaining to temporary storage of SNF. (0090)

Response: 

The NRC’s regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 do not prohibit away-from-reactor storage of SNF. No

responsibility for storage of the SNF has been shifted by the proposal. The individual reactor

licensees will maintain ownership and responsibility for the safe storage of the SNF while it is located

at the proposed PFSF. The storage of SNF in an away from reactor ISFSI by private reactor licensees

is legal pursuant to 10 CFR Part 72 and does not contradict the NWPA or any Federal policies.

G.3.3.1.2 International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter asserted that the proposed PFSF is an installation subject to international safeguards

as described in the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and that under the Agreement the NRC must

designate the proposed PFSF as subject to IAEA safeguards and require the applicant to establish,

maintain, and follow written material accounting and control procedures. (The commenter referenced

10 CFR 75.21, and 75.41). The commenter added that 10 CFR Part 75 must be addressed as part of

the 10 CFR Part 72 license application, and the applicant must supplement its submittal with relevant

10 CFR Part 75 information. (0198a)
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NUREG-1714 G-54

Response: 

This comment discusses an issue outside of the scope of the EIS because safeguards issues are

addressed in the NRC staff’s safety evaluation. However, the NRC staff notes that U.S. safeguards

requirements have been found to meet or exceed IAEA requirements. The NRC’s regulations in 10

CFR Part 75 include a procedure through which the IAEA may select designated facilities in the

United States for inspection for compliance with IAEA safeguards requirements. Therefore, an ISFSI

could be subject to IAEA inspection. If that were to occur, the licensee would need to provide to the

IAEA material accounting and control information prior to the inspection. The NRC has found that the

proposed PFSF application has met all applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 as documented in

the SER. Unless the IAEA selects the proposed PFSF for the application of IAEA safeguards, there is

no basis for having the applicant address 10 CFR Part 75 requirements.

G.3.3.1.3 Regulations Regarding Transfer of Waste to Sovereign Nations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that there are international policies that prohibit the United States or its

representatives from dumping hazardous or toxic waste in sovereign nations that do not meet, at a

minimum, U.S. environmental standards. The commenter stated that the SNF is the property of the

United States or its representatives, and the Skull Valley Band is a sovereign nation that does not

currently have the available resources to meet U.S. environmental protection standards. The

commenter also questioned the legality of shipping hazardous or radioactive waste to sovereign

nations that do not have the ability to protect their environmental and human health to U.S. standards. 

(0096)

Response:

It is assumed that the commenter is referring to the Basel Convention, an international treaty on

hazardous wastes that controls the trans-boundary movement of such wastes. As one of the ratifiers

of the Convention, the United States is banned from exporting hazardous wastes to other parties of

the Convention. Since the Reservation is a sovereign nation within the borders of the United States,

the Basel Convention does not apply. However, the Reservation is subject to Federal environmental

regulations, including the requirements of RCRA, which regulates hazardous waste, the CAA (42 USC

7401, et seq. [see, e.g., 40 CFR Parts 49 and 50]), the CWA (33 USC 1251, et seq.), and the SDWA

(42 USC 300f, et seq. [see, e.g., 40 CFR Parts 121, 122, 141, 145, and 147]). The applicant will be

responsible for meeting these standards for the proposed PFSF. Accordingly, storage of SNF on the

Reservation will meet U.S. environmental protection standards. Therefore, the comment does not

warrant changing the analysis or conclusions in the EIS.

G.3.3.1.4 Transport Regulations are Adequate

Comment Summary: 

One commenter cited specific NRC and DOT regulations that govern the shipment of SNF and other

radioactive material. The commenter stated that these regulations are sufficient to ensure that the

chance of radioactive release in transport is minimal. (0014)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment on the adequacy of the transportation regulations. No

response is required.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-55 NUREG-1714

G.3.3.1.5 NRC Safety Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that training and certification of the proposed PFSF personnel fail to satisfy

Subpart I of 10 CFR Part 72, and therefore will not ensure that the proposed PFSF is operated in a

safe manner. The commenter added that under 10 CFR 72.192, the applicant must establish a

program for training, proficiency testing, and certification of personnel. The program must then be

submitted to the NRC for approval with the license application. Finally, under 10 CFR 72.194, the

physical condition of the operators must be monitored to ensure that their physical condition will not

cause operational errors. The commenter stated that the SAR did not satisfy the minimum NRC

requirements for a pre-operational testing program (Section 9.2), testing program (Section 9.3), and

responsibilities and qualifications (Section 9.1); does not satisfy the minimal NRC requirements; and

does not provide assurance that the proposed PFSF will be operated in a same manner. The

commenter also stated that the applicant has not submitted a training and certification program with

the license application, nor has the applicant submitted a listing of physical conditions that would bar a

person from employment in specific positions. (0198a)

The commenter stated that the applicant has not complied with the NRC’s emergency planning

regulations in 10 CFR 70.22, nor has it followed Regulatory Guide 3.67, “Standard Format and

Content for Emergency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Facilities,” or NUREG-1567, “Standard

Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities.” (0198a)

Response: 

The comments regarding the NRC safety requirements and the material provided in the SAR are

directly related to the NRC safety evaluation which was prepared as part of the licensing process. 

The details of this safety evaluation are published in the SER. The publicly available SER includes

the NRC’s review of technical issues such as the adequacy of the facility design to withstand external

events; radiological safety of facility operation, including doses from normal operations and accidents;

emergency response plans; physical security of the facility; fire protection; maintenance and operating

procedures; and decommissioning. These comments do not require changes to the text of the EIS

since the issues raised are addressed in the SER.

G.3.3.1.6 Hazardous Waste Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter noted that the applicant projected that it would not generate sufficient quantities of

RCRA regulated hazardous waste to require classification as a Small Quantity Generator. However,

to manage and track off-site disposal of its de minimus quantities of generated RCRA wastes, the

applicant represents that it may still file for a RCRA identification number. The state is the delegated

authority to administer the complete RCRA program and administration of the rules would depend on

state and EPA determination of jurisdiction. Lead, dye, penetrant materials, fluorine, ultrasonic

inspection solutions, and hydraulic and miscellaneous lubricants are substances of concern. (0198)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the information offered in the comment. The applicant has stated that it

will not generate sufficient quantities of the identified wastes to require registration as a Small Quantity

Generator under the RCRA program. As discussed in Section 1.6.2 of the FEIS, “Required Permits

and Approvals,” if the applicant elects to file for a RCRA identification number, the EPA is the

governing agency for the Reservation. The State does not have authority for enforcing RCRA on the

Reservation of a Federally-recognized Indian Tribe. Filing for a RCRA identification number is a

simple procedural activity and this requirement does not warrant any changes to the FEIS.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-56

G.3.3.1.7 Community Right-to-Know and Emergency Planning Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the aboveground storage tanks referred to in the DEIS on page 4-12, lines

41-43, will also have to comply with the provisions of EPCRA (42 USC Sections 11001 to 11050). 

(0096)

Response: 

EPCRA stipulates that if a facility has an extremely hazardous substance in an amount greater than

the appropriate threshold planning quantity, then the facility must designate a facility Emergency

Coordinator to participate in the local planning process. The proposed PFSF would not have any

extremely hazardous substances present in amounts equal to or greater than the threshold planning

quantities specified in 40 CFR Part 355 Appendix A, “The List of Extremely Hazardous Substances

and Their Threshold Planning Quantities.”

The applicant’s emergency plan lists quantities, location, use, and storage of all hazardous materials

used at the proposed PFSF and describes procedures that would be implemented in the event of a

spill or release. The NRC staff evaluation of the emergency plan is documented in the SER. PFS has

committed to developing a Best Management Plan to deal with spills on site or along the rail line. See

Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS.

G.3.3.1.8 Fuel Tanks and Spill Prevention Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that if tanks for storage of petroleum products are underground (see p. 4-12 of

the DEIS, which refers to on-site vehicle fuel tanks), they are subject to Utah State law (UCA 19-6-401

et seq. and implementing regulations, Utah Administrative Code 311-200 et seq.), or Federal law if the

state does not have jurisdiction. (0198)

The commenter also stated that the applicant is subject to the diesel fuel spill prevention requirements

of 40 CFR 112.3(b). (0198)

Response: 

No underground storage tanks are being proposed for this project. Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS states

that the fuel storage tanks will be above-ground. PFS has committed to developing a Best

Management Practices Plan that would include a spill response procedure for appropriately

responding to a spill of oil or fuel at the proposed PFSF or related transportation facilities. This

procedure would address spills on site, at the rail siding, or along the rail line. To ensure that

construction and operational activities will not lead to contamination of groundwater, the Cooperating

Agencies have proposed that PFS be required to implement this BMP, and be required to be

responsible for clean-up of spills or accidents on the facility, at the rail siding, and along the right-ofway for the rail line site in conformance with applicable standards. See Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS.

G.3.3.1.9 Air Quality Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the proposed PFSF would be subject to regulation under Section 111 of

the CAA. The commenter stated that the applicant failed to adequately analyze whether the proposed

PFSF will be in compliance with health-based NAAQS. The commenter added that the proposed

PFSF may require a PSD permit and construction will entail an on-site asphalt batch plant used for the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-57 NUREG-1714

construction of storage pads, cask shielding, and concrete building(s). The asphalt batch plant would

be subject to Section 111 of the CAA, and to 40 CFR 60, Subpart I, “New Source Performance

Standards for Hot Mix Asphalt Facilities.” The proposed PFSF would be considered a major

stationary source of air pollution required to obtain a PSD permit. Lastly, the commenter stated that if

the proposed PFSF is required to obtain a PSD permit, it would also be required to obtain a Title V

permit. (0198, 0198a)

Response: 

The proposed PFSF would not be a “major stationary source” of air emission as defined in 40 CFR

52.21(b) or a significant air emission source under 40 CFR 51.166(b)(23)(i). Whether a permit is

required for such small sources of air emissions would be decided by the appropriate regulatory

agency. The EPA, not the State of Utah, is the responsible agency for air emissions on the

Reservation of the Skull Valley Band. The NRC staff acknowledges the regulatory information on Title

V of the CAA offered in the comment.

Descriptions of planned emissions sources are included in Chapter 9, “Environmental Approvals and

Consultation,” of the applicant’s ER. As described in the FEIS Section 4.3, “Air Quality,” facility

operations would not result in air emissions of sufficient magnitude to qualify as major stationary

source or warrant analysis for PSD or New Source Performance Standards permits under the CAA.

Sections 4.3.2 and 5.3 of the FEIS discuss the proposed PFSF compliance with NAAQS.

G.3.3.1.10 Water Quality Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated, regarding Section 404 Permits, Stream Alteration Permits, and State

Certification under the CWA:

C A Section 404 permit is required from the ACE for discharge of dredged or fill materials into waters

of the United States, 33 USC 1344. State certification of 404 permits is required under Section

401 of the CWA, 33 USC 1341. The State must certify that the permit will not cause an

exceedance of State water quality standards or otherwise be in violation of a State requirement. 

State certification is not discussed in the DEIS. (0198)

C There has been no official delineation of wetlands by the ACE in the area of the rail corridor,

proposed PFSF or proposed ITF. To adequately assess wetland impacts, such delineation must

formally occur. (0198)

C As currently proposed, the PFSF will disturb wetlands in the transportation corridor, and the EIS

must address how the applicant will comply with Section 404 dredge and fill permit requirements. 

(0198h)

C The applicant’s analysis of other required water permits lacks specificity and does not satisfy the

requirements of 10 CFR 51.45. In Sections 9.1-3 and 9.2 of the ER, the applicant merely states

that it “might” need a CWA Section 404 dredge and fill permit for wetlands along the Skull Valley

transportation corridor, and that it will be required to consult with the State concerning the effects

of the proposed ITF on the neighboring Timpie Springs Wildlife Management Area. The fact that

an American Indian Tribe may be treated as a State under the CWA is irrelevant to the permits

because the Skull Valley Band has not applied for delegation of any CWA programs. (The

commenter referenced information in the ER.) The commenter stated that the applicant must

specifically describe the wetlands affected by its operation, the point source discharges, and the

activities that may require control under a stormwater permit. (0198a)
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NUREG-1714 G-58

C The commenter noted that the DEIS indicates that the rail route will cross 32 streams with

ephemeral flows (page xxxiv of the Executive Summary of the DEIS). Any stream relocation,

alteration, or change of the beds and/or banks of any natural stream must receive written approval

of the State Engineer in accordance with UCA 73-3-29. The DEIS incorrectly identifies the Utah

Department of Environmental Quality (UDEQ) as the State agency having jurisdiction over stream

alteration permits (page 1-23 of DEIS). (0198)

Response: 

For construction activities on the Reservation, the ACE and the EPA are the responsible agencies for

Section 404 and stormwater permits, respectively. As described in Section 1.6.2.1 of the FEIS, the

applicant would obtain the necessary permits from these agencies prior to construction.

The commenter is correct that the Skull Valley Band has not sought delegation of these jurisdictions to

it. Therefore, the ACE and the EPA remain the responsible agencies for CWA programs. As

described in Section 4.4.1.3 of the FEIS, the proposed PFSF would not affect any wetlands and would

not have any point source discharges.

For the construction of the proposed rail line, the applicant completed a survey in October 2000 to

determine if the rail line would cross jurisdictional streams or wetlands, which would require a Section

404 permit from the ACE. The initial conclusions of the survey confirmed that the proposed rail line

would not cross perennial or seasonal streams, playa wetlands, or other isolated wetlands. However,

two channels along the proposed rail corridor that could be considered as ephemeral are still under

evaluation. If either the ACE or the State of Utah determines that these channels are ephemeral, they

may be considered jurisdictional, which would therefore require a permit from the agency claiming

jurisdiction. Sections 1.6.2.1 and 1.6.2.3 of this FEIS have been revised to correct appropriate

information including the roles of the State agencies. Section 1.6.2.3 of this FEIS also describes that

the applicant would file a NOI under the State of Utah’s General Stormwater Permit to manage

stormwater impacts during construction.

G.3.3.1.11 National Defense Authorization Act Requirements

Comment Summary: 

One commenter referred to Section 2815, Section 202, and Part A of the 1999 National Defense

Authorization Act (NDAA), which directed that a study be conducted to evaluate how any proposed

changes in land management for certain lands in Utah might affect the UTTR. The same commenter

referred to an assessment that the BLM must conduct regarding any such change, and said that the

law specifically provides that the project cannot move forward until the study is complete. The

commenter recommended that the BLM and the BIA look at this statute in detail. (GR-01) 

Response: 

The BLM reviewed the issue of Section 2815 of the NDAA for FY 2000 (Pub. L. 106-65, October 5,

1999) and concluded that the BLM is not precluded from environmental studies on proposed projects. 

Paragraph (c) of Section 2815 states: “The Secretary of Defense shall conduct the study in

cooperation with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army.” The DOI was not

directed by the NDAA to be a partner in the study. The prohibition in paragraph (d) of Section 2815

states that “the Secretary of the Interior may not proceed with the amendment of any individual

resource management plan for Utah national defense lands, or any statewide environmental impact.” 

While the statute does not refer specifically to this proposal, the BLM does not intend to finalize the

amendment to the RMP until the study has been completed.

The NEPA implementing regulation, 40 CFR 1502.4(a), states: “proposals or parts of proposals which

are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-59 NUREG-1714

a single impact statement.” Section 2815 of Pub. L. 106-65, October 5, 1999, does not preclude the

BLM from meeting the requirements of NEPA. The BLM is not precluded by any provision of the

NDAA from evaluating environmental impacts on proposals presented to it.

The commenter also suggested that the NDAA statutory provision referenced in the comment applies

to the BIA’s decision to approve or disapprove the proposed lease. Although the legislation refers

broadly to the Secretary of the Interior, as noted above, it specifically prohibits amendments to RMPs. 

The BIA does not prepare RMPs or amendments to such plans, and the proposed lease is not an

RMP. The BIA is not precluded from approving lease agreements by any provision of the NDAA.

G.3.3.1.12 BLM Resource Management Plan Requirements

Comment Summary: 

One commenter indicated that existing restrictions in the BLM RMP regarding hazardous waste

transport are not addressed in the DEIS. (0012, SL1-01)

Response:

The BLM reviewed the issue of transport of hazardous wastes across public lands and concluded that

the commenter has misinterpreted the land use plan decision. The RMP Decision on Hazardous

Waste Management states, “BLM will not authorize placement or processing of hazardous waste on

public lands.” This does not preclude the transportation of hazardous waste across public lands. The

proposed ROW, therefore, is not in conflict with the RMP. The BLM is not precluded by any existing

restrictions from evaluating environmental impacts of proposals presented to it.

G.3.3.1.13 BIA Regulations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter referred to a legal investigation that will examine the BIA’s compliance with Federal

law and the BIA and DOI regulations. (GR-01) 

Another commenter stated that it is not appropriate for the BIA to use the Waste Confidence Decision

to avoid doing an analysis of the permanence of this proposed PFSF. The commenter said that those

analyses need to be made in light of the BIA’s statutory and regulatory mandates and obligations to

evaluate the effects on the environment from the use of leased lands, citing 25 USC 415(a). This

reflects a trustee’s obligation to ensure that the trustor’s land will not be saddled with problems at the

end of the lease. The commenter added that the BIA must perform its own analysis to ensure that is

the case. (0198)

Response: 

Regarding the comment about a legal investigation, the BIA’s reviews, conclusions, and actions are in

compliance with relevant laws and regulations. If any such investigation on its practices is initiated,

the DOI and the BIA would cooperate fully.

The BIA is not using the Waste Confidence Decision to “avoid” conducting any analysis. The scope of

the BIA’s NEPA review of the proposed lease is limited to the terms of the proposed lease. The lease

requires, by its terms, that all radioactive material be removed from the Reservation within its 50-year

term. The analysis required under 25 USC 415 of the impacts of the lease and the decommissioning

of the proposed PFSF with respect to environmental issues is contained in this EIS.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-60

G.3.3.1.14 EPA Regulations

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated the following regarding the EPA’s jurisdiction and review process:

C The commenter stated that the EPA’s jurisdiction over the proposed project is limited to several

specific requirements which include: 1) stormwater controls under CWA, 2) an SPCC plan for

above-ground diesel fuel tanks under the EPA’s Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations under the

CWA, 3) ensuring that the drinking water wells are safe for human consumption under the SDWA,

4) notification to the EPA that the septic leach field is a Class V injection well under the SDWA,

and 5) qualification as small quantity generator of hazardous waste under RCRA. These are

routine environmental compliance controls for industrial facilities and the EPA will process these

applications as appropriate. The commenter said that the DEIS adequately describes these

components of the EPA’s jurisdiction. (0240)

C The commenter also stated that the EPA does not usually specifically notify the lead agency or

other parties of circumstances where the EPA lacks authority, but it may be important for all

parties to understand that the EPA has no authority regarding radiation control, release, or design

over the proposed PFSF. This is in contrast to the EPA’s role, as required by Congress in the

Energy Policy Act of 1992, to develop site-specific radiation protection standards for the

permanent geologic repository, including SNF, at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. At the proposed

geologic repository near Yucca Mountain, the EPA is obligated to define standards to protect

public health and the environment from harmful exposure to the radioactive waste that would be

stored and disposed of in that facility in perpetuity. Implementing the standards developed by the

EPA for Yucca Mountain is the responsibility of the NRC. However, for any facility that provides

interim, above-ground storage of SNF, including this proposed PFSF and all other at-reactor or

near-reactor ISFSIs, the NRC is the sole agency responsible for site-specific radiation protection

standards for SNF, including implementation of these criteria at this proposed PFSF. (0240)

Response:

The NRC acknowledges the commenter’s statements. No response is required because this EIS

reflects the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies’ review of the proposed action in accordance with

NEPA requirements. It should be noted that the EPA has jurisdiction over tribal lands and also

reviewed the DEIS.

G.3.3.2 State Jurisdiction and Requirements

G.3.3.2.1 NRC Coordination with the State

Comment Summary: 

One commenter provided comments regarding expectations of NRC cooperation: 

C The commenter stated that the NRC has the obligation to write an EIS that addresses the effects

of the proposed PFSF, including construction, operation, transportation, and long-term effects on

the State of Utah’s overall environmental plans and regulatory/legal requirements. (0198h)

C The commenter also said that the State of Utah expects cooperation and coordination from the

NRC and its contractors by showing them that they are willing to openly discuss with appropriate

State officials the full extent of the State of Utah’s legal and regulatory authority involving the

proposed action. (0198h)
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G-61 NUREG-1714

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges the comments on the scope and content of the EIS. This comment was

submitted during scoping and resubmitted in response to the issuance of the DEIS. Regarding

comments on the cooperation between the NRC and the State of Utah, the NRC staff has consulted

with the State of Utah. To the extent that the State has requested consultation, the NRC has

conferred with the State to discuss issues relevant to the environmental review. The NRC staff has

also reviewed and considered all of the State of Utah’s EIS scoping comments and any contentions

admitted to the licensing proceeding that are relevant to the environmental analysis. This comment

does not address any specific aspect of the DEIS, and, therefore, does not warrant changing the

analysis or conclusions in the FEIS. The relevance of specific Utah regulations provided in comments

from the State of Utah is addressed in other comments and responses in this section. 

G.3.3.2.2 General Comments on State Requirements

Comment Summary: 

One commenter noted that the EIS does not include some State permits and approvals for activities

that will not take place on the Reservation. There are State requirements that apply to activities on

the Reservation that are not listed in the EIS because the Skull Valley Band has no environmental

regulations. The commenter added that the Federal government, in many of the listed circumstances,

does not have regulations which govern the applicant’s proposed activities. The NRC and this FEIS

are primarily concerned with radiological pollution. Because of this void in regulatory oversight, the

commenter added that the State’s interests are potentially directly affected; therefore, State approvals

must be obtained and State requirements must be met to protect State interests. This is particularly

true for sources of pollution or resources not regulated by the EPA (e.g., septic tanks and

groundwater). (0198, 0198h)

The commenter indicated that the State of Utah has requirements in place for management of the

State’s air resources (UCA 19-2-104), radioactive waste (UCA 19-3-107), solid waste (UCA 19-6-104),

and comprehensive emergency planning and response (UCA 53-2-104). Also, Utah is a member of

the North West Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste. Low-level waste generated in

the State may be disposed of at the Compact site. However, the commenter stated that it is unclear

whether waste generated on an Indian reservation would be eligible for disposal. The commenter

added that the EIS should evaluate all of the previous requirements, and determine how to ensure that

those requirements would be met, what the impacts of not meeting those requirements would be, and

what impacts could not be mitigated. (0198h)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the regulatory information offered in the comment. As discussed in

Section G.3.3.2.3 of this FEIS, “State Jurisdiction on Skull Valley Reservation,” State of Utah

regulations do not apply to activities or facilities on the Reservation. The commenter identified

particular licenses, permits, and approvals that commenter believed the applicant needed to obtain. 

The NRC staff has responded to those specific comments in Section G.3.3.1.6, “Hazardous Waste

Regulations,” through G.3.3.1.10, Water Quality Regulations.” The above comment provides only one

general observation in addition to the commenter’s specific remarks, as follows which is that the ER

does not describe the status of compliance with these requirements. However, the applicable

regulations and permits, and their status, are described in Section 1.6.2 of the FEIS. The DEIS did

not identify any non-regulated environmental pollutants as asserted by the commenter. Low-level

waste generated at the proposed PFSF is the responsibility of the applicant. As stated in Section 6.1

of the SAR, the applicant intends to ship low-level radioactive waste to an off-site commercial disposal

facility.
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NUREG-1714 G-62

G.3.3.2.3 State Jurisdiction on Skull Valley Reservation

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated the following regarding the State of Utah’s jurisdiction over the Reservation: 

C According to the commenter, the applicant has challenged the State’s authority to enforce State

regulations because the proposed PFSF would be located on the Reservation. The applicant has

asserted that State law has no application to activities on Indian lands. The commenter stated

that this is a misleading statement of the pertinent law, which recognizes State civil-regulatory

authority in the case of some on-Reservation activities, particularly where those activities have offReservation effects. (0198)

C The commenter indicated that State civil regulatory authority over Tribes and Tribal members has

been recognized in a variety of circumstances. (0198)

C According to the commenter, Federal preemption will only be found where there is express

statutory language signaling an intent to preempt and the courts infer such intent when Congress

has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the

States to supplement Federal law, or where the State law at issue conflicts with Federal law,

either because it is impossible to comply with both or because the State law stands as an obstacle

to the accomplishment and execution of Congressional objectives. (0198)

C In making the necessary preemption analysis, the commenter stated that the following points

should be considered:

(1) Even though comprehensive Federal pollution control statutes have been enacted, the

legislation gives States the right to adopt programs that parallel or exceed Federal pollution

standards. These provisions constitute a clear recognition by Congress that State authority in the

area is not excluded. 

(2) Tribes have the right to seek authority to administer some Federal pollution control programs,

to adopt pollution standards, and to organize a regulatory capability of their own. However, the

Skull Valley Band has taken none of these steps, and thus its interest in preserving selfgovernment will not be a factor.

(3) State interests are substantial - the potential sources of pollution are located very close to

important off-Reservation resources and the State has a direct interest in consistent,

comprehensive regulation of resources within the State. The effectiveness of State programs

could be undermined if less stringent Federal standards are applied to Tribal lands, and especially

if potentially pollution-emitting sources are located within Indian Reservations as a way of evading

State regulations. The argument that pertinent State air quality and groundwater regulations have

no application because the proposed PFSF is located on an Indian Reservation is incorrect. 

(0198)

C Where a variety of State, Federal and Tribal interests are involved, the Supreme Court has held

that, “there is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be

applied to an Indian Reservation or to Tribal members” (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,

448 US 136, 142, 65 L.Ed.2d 665, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980)) and that what is needed is a

“particularized inquiry into the nature of the State, Federal and Tribal interests at stake, an inquiry

designed to determine whether in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate

federal law.” (Id. at 145) In connection with such a preemption analysis, “any applicable

regulatory interest of the State must be given weight.” (Id. at 144) (0198)
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G-63 NUREG-1714

C In connection with the balancing of Federal, Tribal and State interests required to determine

whether State civil-regulatory authority can be enforced on an Indian Reservation, the courts have

held that an important consideration is whether the on-Reservation activity in question has

potentially serious off-Reservation effects. “A state’s regulatory interest will be particularly

substantial if the state can point to off-Reservation effects that necessitate state intervention.” 

(New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336, 76 L.Ed.2d 611, 103 S.Ct. 2378

(1983); accord Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724,77 L.Ed.2d 961,103 S.Ct. 329 (1983).) (0198)

C State interest may also be greater where a third party locates a pollution source on Tribal trust

lands primarily to avoid State regulation. The courts recognized that State claims to jurisdiction

are stronger where the Tribe is primarily marketing an exemption from State laws. (0198)

Response: 

The NRC staff and the BIA acknowledge the regulatory information offered in the comment; however,

State of Utah regulations do not apply on the Reservation.

The exercise of State authority over an Indian Reservation is limited by two barriers: (1) it may be

preempted by Federal law or (2) it may infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own

laws and be ruled by them. (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)) 

While the commenter is correct that there is no rigid rule for this analysis, in two of the cases the

commenter cites, the Supreme Court found that there was no State jurisdiction over the Tribe’s

administration of its own natural resources on its reservation. See, White Mountain Apache, supra,

and New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). (The third case cited by the

commenter, Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) involved regulation of liquor sales on a reservation,

and has been limited to that situation by the Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission

Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (Cabazon).)

In the case of State environmental law (which Utah seeks to apply to the Reservation) the Federal

role, as noted in Section G.3.3.1.14 of this FEIS, is so pervasive that it preempts the State. New

Mexico, supra, and Washington Department of Ecology v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (state law pre-empted in view of Federal agency’s reasonable

interpretation of act in question). The State is also preempted by the Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107

(1894), which provides that “Indian lands [within the State] shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction

and control of the Congress of the United States.” If the State wishes to exert jurisdiction over the

Skull Valley Band, it may only do so with the consent of the Skull Valley Band under UCA 9-9-202

(1994). The Skull Valley Band has not consented to such jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction would still not

include civil regulatory jurisdiction of the type asserted by the State (Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.

373 (1976)).

The commenter also claims that, because the Skull Valley Band has not yet applied to administer

Federal environmental programs, State jurisdiction would not infringe on their right to self-governance. 

The right of self-governance, however, necessarily includes the right not to legislate at all in a

particular area or to simply adopt Federal standards. It should be noted that the EPA also has

jurisdiction over tribal lands. Furthermore, the PFSF was not sited on the Reservation solely to avoid

State law. The Skull Valley Band is engaging in an economic development project to generate funds

from its land and water resources. The contribution of the land of the Skull Valley Band for 50 years is

not a small or insignificant contribution. (New Mexico, supra, and Cabazon, supra)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-64

G.3.3.2.4 State Approval for PFSF

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated the following regarding State of Utah jurisdiction for the proposed PFSF:

C The State of Utah enacted new legislation in the 1998 General Legislative Session, the High Level

Nuclear Waste Disposal Act, S.B. 196, inter alia, which places certain restrictions on the

placement of high level nuclear waste and greater than class C radioactive waste in the State of

Utah, establishes siting criteria, and requires certain findings and approvals be made by the

UDEQ. The commenter stated that there is no mention in the DEIS of the construction and

operating license from the UDEQ with approval from the Legislature and the Governor that is

required for a high level nuclear waste transfer, storage, decay in storage, treatment, or disposal

facility. UCA 19-3-304, UCA 19-3-305, UCA 19-3-307. (0198) Application requirements and

annual fees are listed in UCA 19-3-308. (0198)

Response: 

The NRC staff has amended the list of State permits in Section 1.6.2.3 in this FEIS, “State of Utah

Permits and Approvals for Activities Off the Reservation,” to include the information offered in the

comment. The NRC and the BIA acknowledge the regulatory information offered in the comment. 

However, as described in G.3.3.2.3, State of Utah regulations do not apply on the Reservation. The

State legislation referred to by the commenter is also being challenged by the Skull Valley Band and

PFS. (Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians and Private Fuel Storage v. Leavitt, Civil No.

2:01CV00270C (D. Utah, filed April 19, 2001))

G.3.3.2.5 State Approvals Related to Waste Transport

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters indicated that the State of Utah must give approval for SNF transport:

C One commenter indicated that the State of Utah has jurisdiction and control over the applicant’s

proposed transportation route from a Rowley Junction ITF to the proposed PFSF. UDOT UCA 72-

7-102 requires that no person dig or excavate within a ROW of any State highway without

approval from the State, and may require a security bond or other security. The commenter

requested that the FEIS show whether it is feasible for the applicant to undertake any road

widening or rail spur construction activities involving the road and public ROW along Skull Valley

Road. (0198h) Additionally, as is noted in the DEIS (page xxxviii of the Executive Summary and

in Section 2.2.4.2, special permits would be required from the State of Utah because of the size

and weight of heavy-haul vehicles. (0198)

C The commenter stated the applicant has not shown that it is entitled to use or control the offloading site and the proposed ITF at Rowley Junction (or wherever else the applicant intends to

locate its ITF). (0198h)

C The commenter stated that any road improvements must be performed in cooperation with the

State of Utah and must meet State requirements, including stormwater permits for construction. 

Prior to making any road improvements, impacts to stream/drainage crossings, rare and

endangered species, and cultural and historic resources need to be addressed. (0198, 0198b)

C The commenter stated that once the applicant has informed the NRC, the State, and the public of

its final and detailed plan for transporting and routing the casks to the proposed PFSF, the route

will need to be examined to determine if approvals from the State, the county or the Federal

government (e.g., U.S. military departments, the BLM, U.S. Forest Service) are required. The
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-65 NUREG-1714

route chosen, if it involves these entities, may trigger a “major Federal action” and the need for an

additional independent EIS. (0198h) 

C The commenter stated that the applicant’s statement, under Item 9 in the BLM application, is

incorrect when it says that no State government approval is required. The applicant needs to

obtain permission from UDOT and UDEQ regarding a number of design, construction, and

operational requirements for its transportation proposal and approvals where vehicles exceed

State size and weight restrictions. The FEIS should address these issues. (0198i)

C The commenter stated that heavy-haul vehicles would require oversize/overweight permits for

each trip. A separate permit for hauling the SNF would be required. The hauling and permitting

are governed by provisions of the UCA and Utah Administrative Code. (0198)

C The commenter stated that no railroad track may be constructed across a public road, highway, or

street at grade without the permission of UDOT. (UCA 54-4-15) The requirements in UAC

R930-5 must be met. The DEIS does not state whether the rail line would cross any State

roadways. (0198)

C In its scoping comments, the commenter noted that State lands are located throughout the

proposed area. If any State lands are to be used or impacted, such as through easements or

rights-of-way, such uses of State lands would be regulated by the Division of Forestry, Fire and

State Lands. (UCA 65A-I-I et seq.) (0198)

C Another commenter pointed out that while the State can prohibit the transport of SNF on Skull

Valley Road, it cannot prohibit the transport of SNF on interstate highways. (GR-08)

Response: 

The applicant’s current proposal for transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF is to construct a rail line

from the Union Pacific mainline at Skunk Ridge, near Low, Utah. The EIS evaluates heavy-haul

transport of SNF along Skull Valley Road from a proposed ITF as an alternative route. If heavy-haul

vehicles were used to transport SNF casks on Skull Valley Road, the applicant would have to obtain

an appropriate road-use permit from UDOT due to the size and the weight of the vehicles that would

be used on that road as stated in the comment and in Section 1.6.2.3 of this FEIS. The applicant has

indicated that if the proposed ITF were constructed and operated, specially designed heavy-haul

vehicles with multiple axles to appropriately distribute the weight of the vehicle and its load would be

used on the Skull Valley Road. The applicant indicated that the use of these special vehicles would

not require any modifications to the Skull Valley Road. Any requirement by the State of Utah for the

applicant to obtain permits for heavy-haul vehicles is a matter of State regulation and does not affect

the conclusions of the EIS. The proposed BIA lease does not address the proposed ITF at Rowley

Junction. If the proposed ITF is approved as the transportation method, the applicant would lease the

land from the BLM, subject to the BLM’s approval.

The NRC staff acknowledges the regulatory information offered in the comment. However, the

proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge to the proposed PFSF would not cross any public roads or

highways; hence, this FEIS does not discuss the requirements of UCA R930-5 or of the UDOT

approval. Neither the proposed PFSF nor the proposed new rail line from Skunk Ridge would use

State lands, including easements or rights-of-way.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-66

G.3.3.2.6 Regulations Regarding Water Resources

Comment Summary: 

One commenter identified a number of issues related to regulations regarding water rights, surface

water, stormwater, groundwater, drinking water, and septic tanks. Specific comments in each of these

topical areas are presented below and are immediately followed by the respective responses.

Water Rights:

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that the State of Utah has jurisdiction over the water within the State,

including water on or under the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band, contrary to the statement in

the DEIS page 1-23. (0198)

C The commenter also stated that the reserved rights of the Reservation have not been determined

either in quantity or priority through a State general adjudication proceeding. It is clear that all

water, both surface water and groundwater, on and within the Reservation is held in trust by the

State of Utah, UCA 73-1-1. (0198)

Response: 

The information offered in the comment about water rights is acknowledged. In response to the

comment, text has been added to Section 3.2.3 in this FEIS to discuss water rights. The revised text

describes the origin of the water rights for the Reservation. The BIA concludes that the Reservation

holds sufficient water rights to support the proposed action. As described in Section 4.2 of this FEIS,

the water used during construction will come primarily from off-site wells with sufficient capacity. The

section also describes that the water use from wells on the Reservation would not result in significant

impacts to water use on or off the Reservation. The legal aspects of obtaining, assigning, transferring

or exercising water rights are beyond the scope of this FEIS.

Surface Water:

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that under UAC R317-2-13.14, unclassified waters are presumptively

Class 213, 3D with water quality standards and numeric criteria. (0198)

Response: 

The comment is noted; however, no surface water in Skull Valley would be used for the proposed

PFSF. In addition, this FEIS concludes that the proposed PFSF would not impact the quality of

surface waters in Skull Valley. The process and details of classifying surface waters in the state of

Utah is beyond the scope of this EIS.

Stormwater: 

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that in the applicant’s ER, page 4.2-8, the applicant indicates no possibility

of discharge to waters of the United States because the stormwater flows into an on-site retention

pond. The commenter stated that the DEIS, page 4-10, describes the proposed PFSF incorrectly

as a zero release facility. The commenter further stated that the proposed PFSF will be
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-67 NUREG-1714

discharging to water of the State of Utah because the stormwater detention basin will be seeping

into the ground and water under the Reservation is water of the State. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that the DEIS, page 4-12, indicates that the applicant would sample

and analyze standing water in the basin to determine if radiological contaminants are present. 

The commenter also stated that the applicant does not plan to sample for non-radiological

contaminants. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that a permit is required to construct, install, modify, or operate any

water treatment works, if the operation would result in a discharge. The commenter stated that an

NPDES permit is required under UAC R317-8-2.1(1)(a) if there will be a stormwater discharge. 

The commenter also stated that treatment works include disposal fields and lagoons under UCA

19-5-102(15). (0198)

C The commenter stated that UAC R317-8-3.8(6)(d)10 requires a State UPDES permit for

stormwater discharges where construction activities will disturb five acres or more. The

commenter also asserted that construction activities for the Low rail corridor, the proposed ITF,

and the proposed PFSF involve more than 5 acres each. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that UAC R317-3 contains design requirements for retention ponds. 

The commenter also stated that the applicant describes the proposed retention pond as being

free-draining and sized to accommodate a 100-year storm event. The commenter asserted that

because water dissipates by evaporation and percolation into the subsoils, this would not meet the

State design requirements unless the stormwater is known to be uncontaminated. (0198)

C The commenter stated that UAC R317-8-3.1(2) requires facilities proposing new discharges of

stormwater associated with industrial activity submit applications 180 days before a facility

commences activity. (0198)

C The commenter stated that the DEIS, page 2-10, indicates that water in the detention basin will be

pumped out if it accumulates. The commenter further stated that there is no indication in the DEIS

where the water will be discharged after pumping. (0198)

Response: 

Regarding the comment about a “zero release” facility, the referenced text from the DEIS regarding a

"zero release" facility has been changed in Section 4.2.2.1 of this FEIS. The term "zero release"

refers only to the proposed PFSF's ability to retain all radioactive materials (i.e., SNF) without their

release. The term does not apply to effluent (such as stormwater) that would be discharged from the

proposed PFSF. This FEIS has been revised to avoid any inferences about the lack of gaseous

and/or liquid discharges (which would, in fact, accompany the proposed PFSF; see Section 2.1.5 of

the FEIS).

The commenter has correctly summarized the information in the applicant’s ER regarding the plan to

sample water in the detention basin. That is, the applicant would sample and analyze water from the

basin when freestanding water is present to determine if radiological contaminants are present. In

response to the comment, Section 4.2.2.4 of this FEIS has been revised to more clearly state the

applicant’s plans for sampling stormwater.

As described in Section 1.6.2.1 of this EIS, an NPDES permit from EPA would be required for the

proposed PFSF. However, as discussed in Section G.3.3.2.3, State of Utah regulations do not apply

on the Reservation. For the proposed rail line and the alternate Proposed ITF, Section 1.6.2.3 of this

EIS describes the specifics of a UPDES permit from the state of Utah that would be required for all

construction activities off the Reservation. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-68

The commenter is correct in noting that in the event freestanding water collects in the detention basin,

the applicant proposes to pump it out. After freestanding water in the basin is surveyed, the water

would be pumped to the north of the proposed storage pads. This would allow the water to flow in a

generally northward direction, away from the proposed PFSF and along the same pathways that

would exist if the proposed PFSF or detention basin were never constructed.

Groundwater:

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that the DEIS indicates in Section 3.2.2 that groundwater is approximately

125 ft below the surface. The commenter stated that the applicant also indicated in the ER that

the volume of water in the cask storage area produced by a typical rainstorm will probably settle

into the one foot thick compacted gravel surface surrounding the storage pads and would not

drain to the retention pond, raising additional permit and groundwater protection issues. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that UAC R317-6-6 requires a groundwater permit for a new facility

discharging pollutants directly or indirectly into groundwater, including ponds and lagoons,

whether lined or not. The commenter further stated that the Executive Secretary of the Utah

Water Quality Board called for an application from the applicant under UAC R317-6-6.2(c) as an

exception to any permit by rule which may be applicable. The commenter stated that the

applicant must use the best available technology to minimize the discharge of any pollutant, and

there must be no impairment of present and future beneficial uses of the groundwater UAC R317-

6-6.4(A). (0198)

C The commenter stated that the DEIS did not address the requirement to obtain a Utah

Groundwater Discharge Permit in accordance with UCA 19-5-107 and UAC R317-6. According to

the commenter, an American Indian Tribe may have an implied reservation of water under the

Winters doctrine, however, an implied right to the use of water under certain conditions does not

restrict state jurisdiction over groundwater quality nor does NRC’s authority under the Atomic

Energy Act preempt state regulation of groundwater. (The commenter referenced 42 USC

Section 2021(k) State Regulation of Activities for Certain Purposes; Pacific Gas & Electric v.

Energy Resources Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Kerr-McGee v. City of West Chicago, 914

F.2d. 820 (7th Cir. 1990).) Furthermore, the commenter stated, off-reservation effects caused by a

non-Tribal member lends added support to the state’s jurisdiction and control of groundwater

quality. (0198a)

C The same commenter stated that UCA 73-3-1 et seq. requires an application and certificate to

appropriate any waters of the state, including groundwater on the Reservation. (0198)

C The commenter also stated that UCA 73-3-3 requires an application for any changes of place of

diversion or use or change of purpose for which the water was originally appropriated. (0198)

Response: 

Because the facility is a “zero release” facility (see the response on stormwater, above), there would

be no expected radioactive contaminants in any rainwater or snowmelt that collected in the storage

pad area. Furthermore, the proposed site receives only about 26 cm (10 in) of rainfall annually, and

the depth to groundwater below the proposed PFSF is approximately 125 ft. The concern about

potential impacts to groundwater beneath the storage pads appears to be unwarranted. See the

comment response above regarding the potential impacts from water that collects in the detention

basin.
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G-69 NUREG-1714

The list of relevant state permits and approvals is included in Section 1.6.2.3 of this FEIS. The

regulatory information provided in the comment is acknowledged. However, as discussed in Section

G.3.3.2.3, State of Utah regulations do not apply on the Reservation.

Drinking Water:

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that UCA 19-4-104(1)(b), requires the submission of plans and

specifications for approval prior to construction of any public water system. The commenter

stated that the applicant has indicated it will employ more than the 25 person threshold of the

requirement. The commenter further stated that the applicant will be providing water for human

consumption and other domestic uses that meet state requirements. The commenter asserted

that neither the Skull Valley Band nor the EPA have comparable construction standards and

approval processes. (0198)

C The commenter stated that even if the applicant is determined not to be subject to state

requirements, the proposed PFSF potable water system would qualify as a public drinking water

system under the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 41 USC 300g et seq. (0198)

C The commenter also stated that the DEIS (page xxxv and page 2-11) indicates that the “large

quantities” of water needed for dust control, soil compaction, and concrete case manufacturing

may require new on-site wells and that UCS 73-3-25 requires a permit for drilling wells. (0198)

Response: 

The SDWA, as described in the comment, is included in Section 1.6.2.1 of this EIS, which lists the

Federal permits and approvals that would be required for the proposed PFSF. The necessary

registrations under the SDWA would be secured from EPA Region VIII.

In regard to the need for a permit to drill wells on the Reservation, see Section G.3.3.2.3 for a

discussion of how the State of Utah regulations do not apply on the Reservation. 

Septic Tanks:

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that regarding construction permits for septic tank systems, if the domestic

wastewater discharges exceed 5,000 gpd, then the requirements of UAC R317-5 must be met and

a construction permit must be issued by the state. UAC R317-5-1.3. The commenter also stated

that if the discharges are less than 5,000 gpd, the requirements of UAC R317-4 et seq. must be

met and approval of plans and specifications must be given by the local health department having

jurisdiction. UAC R317-4-3. The commenter stated that both state and local approvals require

construction inspections to ensure compliance with state requirements. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that the DEIS at page 4-12 indicates that drains from process

systems are kept separate from septic systems, and that no indication is given as to where drains

from the process system are discharged. The commenter stated that discharges would require

state and Federal permitting. (0198)

C The commenter stated that UAC R317-7-1 et seq. regulates underground injections. The

commenter stated that under state jurisdiction, the septic tank/leach fields are Class V wells under

UAC R317-7-3.5(l) because they are used to inject the waste or effluent from a multiple dwelling,

business establishment, community, or regional business establishment septic tank. The

commenter stated that the systems are not exempted by UAC R317-1-3.5(i) because they have
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-70

the capacity to serve more than 20 persons per day or there is the potential they would not be

used solely for the disposal of sanitary waste. The commenter asserted that while new Class V

injection wells are authorized by rule and are not required to obtain a UIC permit under UAC

R317-7-6, the Executive Secretary of the Utah Water Quality Board may require the owner or

operator of a Class V well to apply for and obtain an individual permit for specific circumstances to

include, where appropriate, protection of Underground Sources of Drinking Water (USDW). The

commenter further asserted that the groundwater in the area of the Skull Valley Reservation is a

USDW by definition. UAC R317-7-2.47. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that the EPA requirement for the applicant septic tank/leach fields

which serve 20 or more people, 40 CFR 144.26(a), is simply registration. The commenter also

stated that the state would request that the EPA call for a UIC permit if the EPA asserts

jurisdiction. (0198)

Response: 

The regulatory information offered regarding septic tanks in the comment is acknowledged. However,

as discussed in Section G.3.3.2.3, State of Utah regulations do not apply on the Reservation. 

Section 2.1.1.2 of the FEIS describes how a sanitary drainage system, using underground pipes,

would be installed to serve the proposed PFSF and to transmit liquid wastes to the underground septic

system. In response to the comment, additional text has been added to Sections 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.3 of

this FEIS to describe the design for the process area drains. That is, drain sumps would be provided

in the cask load/unload bay of the Canister Transfer Building. These sumps would catch and collect

any water that drips from the shipping casks (e.g., from rainfall or melting snow) onto the floor. Water

collected in these drain sumps would be sampled and analyzed to verify it is not radioactively

contaminated prior to its release. In the event contaminated water is detected, it would be collected in

a suitable container, solidified by the addition of an agent (such as cement) so that it qualifies as solid

waste, staged in a low-level waste holding cell while awaiting shipment offsite, and transported to a

licensed low-level waste disposal facility. 

Section 2.1.1.2 of the FEIS describes two septic systems, each with a capacity less than 5,000 gpd. 

Because of the size of these systems, they would be classified as Class V injection wells. As stated in

Section 1.6.2.1 of the EIS, an Underground Injection Control inventory form would have to be filed with

the EPA before the systems are placed into service. The filing of such a form would subject the

proposed PFSF septic systems to review by the EPA for minimum requirements to prevent

underground injection that endangers drinking water sources.

G.3.3.2.7 State Approval for Air Pollutant Permits (& Title V Permit)

Comment Summary: 

C One commenter stated that any person intending to construct, modify, or relocate a new

installation which would or might reasonably be expected to become a source or an indirect

source of air pollution or any person intending to install a control apparatus or other equipment

intended to control emission of air contaminants is required to submit to the Executive Secretary a

notice of intent and receive an approval order prior to initiation of construction, installation,

modification or relocation. (UCA 19-2-108 and UAC R307- 401-1) The commenter further stated

that the applicant has indicated that it would use a concrete batch plant, diesel generator, and

space heating furnaces, all of which would require an approval order from the State Division of Air

Quality. (0198)

The same commenter stated that even if a PSD permit is not required, a state air quality approval

order issued under UCA 19-2-108 would most likely be required. The commenter asserted that

the concrete batch plant, asphalt batch plant, and other air emission sources, even if located on
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-71 NUREG-1714

the Reservation, because of the limited size of the Reservation, would have a significant impact

on state air resources. Consequently, the commenter stated that a state approval order would be

required. (0198, 0198a)

C The same commenter stated that it is unclear from the DEIS (pages 4-13 to 4-16) the time and

extent of operation of the concrete batch plant during construction and operation of the facilities. 

The commenter also stated that a state PSD permit may be required if emission thresholds are

exceeded. (UAC R307-405-6) (0198)

C The commenter stated that the concrete batch plant (p. 2-5 of DEIS) is potentially regulated by

Federal New Source Performance Standards, and, therefore, a 40 CFR Part 70 Source. (UAC

R307-415-4(l)(b) and R307-415- 5a(3)(c), 40 CFR 71.3(a)(2) and 71.4(b) (Tribal area)) The

commenter further stated that to the extent the State of Utah has jurisdiction, the applicant would

be required to apply for and obtain a Title V Permit. (40 CFR 70.3(a)(2)) (0198) 

C The commenter stated that use of a diesel generator, depending on the amount of nitrogen oxides

emissions, may trigger a requirement for a Title V permit. (UAC R307-415-4) The commenter

also stated that 40 CFR Part 116 may be applicable to diesel tanks and would need to be

documented in a Title V permit application. (0198) 

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the regulatory information about the State of Utah’s requirements for air

emission sources, as offered in the comment. However, as described in Section G.3.3.2.3, the state

does not have jurisdiction over activities on the Reservation. Therefore, a state air quality approval

order under UCA 19-2-108 is not required for the proposed PFSF. Even if the state had jurisdiction,

however, as set forth below, an order would not be required.

UCA 19-2-108 implements the Federal CAA with respect to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration

of Air Quality (40 CFR Part 52). No permit would be required under 40 CFR Part 52 unless the

proposed PFSF were a “major stationary source” of air emissions as defined in 40 CFR 52.21(b). The

proposed PFSF would not be a major stationary source; therefore, no permit would be required.

The commenter asserted that the proposed PFSF would have a “significant” impact on state air

resources. As described in Section 4.3 of this FEIS, “Air Quality,” the effect of the proposed PFSF on

air quality would not be “significant,” as that term is defined in 40 CFR 52.21(b)(23). The anticipated

proposed PFSF emissions rates of the pollutants listed in 40 CFR 52.21(b)(23)(i) would not exceed

the threshold “significant” emissions rates listed there, and the commenter did not suggest that the

proposed PFSF would release some other regulated air pollutant in significant quantities. Accordingly,

the proposed PFSF’s effect on air quality would not be significant, and the applicant would not be

required to obtain an approval order or permit under UCA 19-2-108. 

The duration of concrete batch plant operations would be for the life of the proposed PFSF, due to the

need for concrete used to manufacture the on-site storage pads and casks. To the extent that the

concrete batch plant would be operating during the lifetime of the proposed PFSF, its expected PM-10

(particulate matter) emissions would be about 3.2 tons per year. Neither the concrete batch plant nor

the proposed PFSF as a whole would be classified as a major stationary source under 40 CFR 52.21

or a significant emission source under 40 CFR 51.166.

The expected emissions of criteria pollutants (pollutants regulated by NAAQS) and hazardous air

pollutants are not of sufficient magnitude to require a Title V permit. The applicant has stated its

intention to purchase asphalt locally. There are no plans to construct or operate an on-site asphalt

plant. As discussed in Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS, asphalt would be one of the materials imported

and used in the construction of the proposed PFSF (see Table 2.2).
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-72

G.3.3.2.8 Other State Requirements

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant would have to comply with additional state requirements,

provisions, and implementing rules of UCA 53-7-301 regarding Liquified Petroleum Gas, UCA 53-7-

201 regarding Fire Prevention, and (depending on the nature of activities) UCA 40-8-1 requiring

permits from the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. (0198)

Another commenter asserted that there are laws in Utah governing ultra-hazardous activities,

prohibiting conduct of activities on private property that can harm other property or people. (SL2-13) 

One commenter stated that the proposed PFSF will leave the Utah government with no power to

regulate the storage of SNF for at least 20 years. (SL3-11)

Response: 

The DEIS identified the applicable regulations, permits, licenses, and approvals required for

construction and operation of the proposed PFSF. The list of known permits, licenses, and approvals

is included in Section 1.6.2 of the FEIS. The NRC staff acknowledges the regulatory information

offered in the comment. However, as discussed in Section G.3.3.2.3, State of Utah regulations do not

apply on the Reservation.

Regarding ultra-hazardous activities, the NRC staff assumes the commenter is referring to UCA 19-

3.302 addressing the siting and operation of SNF storage in Utah, also cited above, which does not

apply to the Reservation. It is the position of the NRC staff that the AEA (as amended) and the NWPA

(as amended) and other relevant Federal statutes and regulations are the governing statutes for this

proposal.

G.3.3.2.9 Land Use Requirements

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant has failed to show that it is entitled to use the land for the

proposed PFSF, and if it does have such a right whether there are any legal constraints imposed on

the use and control of the land. (0198a) 

Response:

The applicant has entered into a 25-year lease agreement (with an irrevocable option for a second 25

years) with the Skull Valley Band to use the Reservation land to construct and operate the proposed

PFSF. The entitlement to use the land for the expressed purpose of storage of SNF involves the

regulatory approval by the NRC, the BIA, and the BLM. Each of these regulatory bodies has or will

issue official documentation of their evaluation on the suitability of the site and the safety of the

proposed PFSF design. See discussion in Sections G.3.6.2, G.3.6.3, and G.3.6.4.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-73 NUREG-1714

G.3.4 Decommissioning and Closure

G.3.4.1 Proposed Period of Operations

G.3.4.1.1 Duration of NRC License Period

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters requested an evaluation of consequences if there is not a permanent repository

at the time of expiration of the applicant’s 20-year license. (0018, SL1-15, SL2-05, SL3-47)

One commenter stated that it is not sufficient for the EIS to simply indicate a possible 20-year license

renewal period. (0018) Another commenter expressed concern that by waiting until five years before

the license expires to submit plans for the removal of SNF, as suggested by the DEIS, the license

could be extended based on unforeseen circumstances. The commenter asked how much further

beyond 40 years the license can be extended. (GR-14) Other commenters stated that there is no

guarantee the SNF would ever be moved and that the full 20 years would be needed to place the SNF

at the proposed PFSF. (SL1-05, SL1-15, SL1-33, SL3-46)

Response: 

For the reasons set forth below, the NRC staff concludes that the DEIS adequately addressed the

issue of the availability of a permanent repository. As discussed in Section 1.2, “The Proposed

Action,” the Commission, in its Waste Confidence Decision, 10 CFR 51.23 (55 Fed. Reg. 38474, Sept.

18, 1990) found that there is reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be

available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Based on current DOE projections, a

permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010, which would be within the initial 20-year license

term proposed for the PFSF. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that an evaluation of the potential

consequences suggested by the commenter is beyond the scope of the EIS. If approved, the

proposed PFSF would be licensed to operate for up to 20 years. If the applicant is unable to renew

the license or chooses not to renew the license, then service agreements (i.e., contracts) between the

applicant and the licensees storing SNF at the proposed PFSF will require that the owner of the SNF

(the licensees) remove all of the SNF from the proposed PFSF upon expiration or revocation of the

NRC license. The DEIS acknowledges the fact that a license for an ISFSI can be renewed by the

Commission before the expiration of the license term upon a timely request from the licensee. The

regulations in 10 CFR 72.54 define a renewal application as timely if it is filed not less than 24 months

before expiration of the existing license. The NRC regulation does not specify the maximum number

of times a license can be renewed. However, the applicant would have to demonstrate that the SNF

can be safely stored for each renewal period requested. The NRC decision on whether to renew the

license, if requested, would be based on the results of the NRC staff’s safety and environmental

reviews. The NRC staff is uncertain as to what unforeseen circumstances could affect future NRC

staff reviews. The NRC staff believes the time periods for submitting a request to renew a license or

request to decommission the proposed PFSF are adequate to perform the necessary technical and

environmental reviews. As discussed in Section 4.9 of the FEIS, if a licensee does not submit a timely

application to renew its license, the licensee must submit a Decommissioning Plan at least one year

prior to license expiration. (The DEIS erroneously stated that the Decommissioning Plan would be

due five years before expiration.) This plan must describe how the licensee will decommission the

site, including removal of the SNF. This Decommissioning Plan as per 10 CFR Part 72 is subject to

an NRC safety and environmental review.

The NRC staff disagrees with any conclusions that the proposed PFSF would become a permanent

above-ground repository. Also, see Sections G.3.2.1 through G.3.2.3.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-74

G.3.4.1.2 Timing of SNF Removal

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern regarding the possibility that the facility will not be

decommissioned. Specifically:

C One commenter stated that it is likely that the proposed PFSF will become a permanent facility. 

The commenter also stated that it is most likely that it will take longer than 20 years to identify

sites for relocation of the SNF from the proposed PFSF. (0112) One commenter stated that once

the SNF casks are stored at the proposed PFSF, they would remain there beyond the expected

license term because there are no off-site shipment options. The commenter said that fuel

shipments to Morris, Illinois, and West Valley, New York, offer two examples of the plausibility of

this occurrence. (0198a)

C One commenter said that the DEIS is silent on risks associated with removing waste from the

proposed PFSF, and since the plans for removal of SNF are not required until five years before

license expiration, the site most likely would become permanent. (GR-14, SL3-47)

C One commenter stated that because the extent of decommissioning is left to the discretion of the

Skull Valley Band, the DEIS cannot make any representation other than the worst case scenario

that the proposed PFSF would become a permanent above-ground repository for radioactive

waste. (0215)

C One commenter said that use of the phrase “SNF is expected to be shipped off-site” in the DEIS is

an indefinite statement and suggests that the proposed PFSF would be permanent. Further, the

commenter said that the DEIS does not adequately address or recognize the importance of

decommissioning. (0112, SL1-11)

C One commenter said that it is most likely that the decommissioning of the proposed PFSF would

be delayed because the applicant has not provided sufficient data about the design of the storage

casks to ensure compatibility with the DOE’s high level waste repository specifications and the

applicant has no ability to repackage SNF. According to the commenter, if the fuel cannot be

removed from the site because the DOE specifications are not met, decommissioning would be

delayed. The commenter also said that the FEIS should analyze the impacts on trust lands,

including economic impacts, associated with decommissioning delays. (0198h)

Response:

If the NRC grants a license, the proposed PFSF would operate for up to 20 years. The applicant may

submit an application to the NRC to renew its license before the expiration of the license term. This

renewal process would include both a thorough safety and environmental review. As discussed in

Section 1.2 of this FEIS, the Commission in its Waste Confidence Decision, 10 CFR 51.23 (55 Fed.

Reg. 38474, Sept. 18, 1990) believes there is a reasonable assurance that at least one mined

geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century to receive the

stored SNF. The NRC staff disagrees with the comment that the proposed PFSF would become a

permanent above-ground repository. As discussed in this FEIS, the SNF would have to be removed

from the proposed PFSF upon expiration of its license. Also, see Section G.3.2.1.

The specific activities associated with decommissioning are discussed in Section 2.1.6, “Facility

Closure and Decommissioning,” of the DEIS, and the potential impacts from decommissioning are

discussed in Section 4.9. The extent of radiological decommissioning will not be independently

determined by the applicant or the Skull Valley Band. The applicant would independently address

only the specific details for dismantling buildings and structures. Removal of all SNF and

radiologically contaminated materials would be controlled by an NRC-approved facility
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-75 NUREG-1714

Decommissioning Plan and NRC’s regulations for decommissioning the proposed PFSF, as discussed

in Section 2.1.6 of the FEIS. The types of detailed information requested in the comment are more

appropriate for that final Decommissioning Plan. The NRC staff concluded that the analysis of

decommissioning has been adequately addressed in Section 4.9 of this FEIS.

The NRC staff also notes that the DOE will be responsible for unloading and repackaging casks for

permanent disposal at its geologic repository. The applicant would not be required to repackage

casks in order to ship SNF to a permanent repository.

G.3.4.1.3 Cask Shipment Rates

Comment Summary: 

One commenter asserted that the proposed 20-year period of operations is insufficient for the scope of

the project. The commenter stated that SNF cannot be shipped to, stored at, and removed from the

proposed PFSF in the 20-year time period considered in the DEIS. The commenter stated that a

smaller amount of SNF would need to be stored in order to complete the project within the license

period. (0018)

Commenters noted that the proposed cask delivery and removal rates would require the facility to be

in operation for 40 years, which would require that the NRC renew the license. (GR-14, SL1-13, SL3-

46) One of the commenters also stated that the DEIS does not document what would happen to the

SNF stored at the proposed PFSF if the NRC grants the initial license application and an application

for renewal. (GR-14)

One commenter questioned the estimate of the time necessary to remove SNF from the proposed

PFSF. (SL1-33) 

Response: 

The 40,000-MTU (and 4,000-cask) capacity for the proposed PFSF is the maximum capacity

proposed by the applicant for licensing. As described in Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS, the proposed

PFSF would be constructed in phases; hence, the full capacity may or may not be constructed or

utilized. The NRC staff evaluated several scenarios involving the receipt and shipment of some

smaller quantity of SNF within a 20-year license period. The receipt of 4,000 casks over a 20-year

shipping campaign, however, would result in the greatest environmental impacts that could arise from

operation of the proposed PFSF. Accordingly, as documented in Section 5.7 of this FEIS, the NRC

staff evaluated that scenario. The NRC staff also evaluated in Section 5.7 the removal of these SNF

casks. In that section, the NRC indicates that the licensee could remove all stored SNF within 10

years. Section 5.7 also states that, assuming 10 years of on-site storage after the 20-year shipping

campaign with no incoming or outgoing shipments, it can be inferred that the proposed PFSF would

be operational for a total of 40 years. The NRC staff agrees that with this scenario the applicant would

need to request a license renewal. The analysis documented in Section 5.7 bounds the impacts

associated with any lesser capacity of the facility because it assumes a maximum number of stored

casks and a maximum-duration shipping campaign.

G.3.4.2 Decommissioning Plan

G.3.4.2.1 Adequacy of Preliminary Decommissioning Plan 

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the information in the applicant’s Preliminary Decommissioning Plan did

not provide reasonable assurance that the decontamination or decommissioning of the proposed
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NUREG-1714 G-76

PFSF at the end of its useful life would provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the

public, as required by 10 CFR 72.30(a).

The commenter also said that the applicant failed to identify the types of wastes that would be

generated at the proposed PFSF, and failed to propose decontamination and disposal practices for

the waste. (0198a) 

Response: 

The adequacy of the applicant’s Preliminary Decommissioning Plan with respect to satisfying 10 CFR

72.30 regulations does not directly affect the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF and is

beyond the scope of the EIS. Instead, the NRC evaluated the Preliminary Decommissioning Plan

during its safety review and found it to be acceptable, as documented in Chapters 13 and 17 of the

SER. The NRC staff also determined that the EIS adequately addresses the environmental impacts of

decommissioning, based on information provided in the Preliminary Decommissioning Plan. The

analysis of the impacts of decommissioning is discussed in Section 2.1.6 and Section 4.9 of this FEIS.

Section 2.1.3 of the FEIS discusses effluents and solid wastes that could be generated at the

proposed PFSF and general methods of disposal. Also see FEIS Section 4.2.2.4. In addition, PFS

stated in Chapter 6 of its preliminary decommissioning plan that minimal non-radioactive hazardous

materials may be used or stored at the PFSF, and any that are needed to support PFSF operations

will be identified and controlled in accordance with procedures.

G.3.4.2.2 Execution of Decommissioning

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant’s measures for facilitating decommissioning under 10 CFR

72.130 and Reg. Guide 3.48 “Standard Format and Content for the Safety Analysis Report for an

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation and Monitored Retrieval Storage Installation” are

inadequate. The commenter stated that the applicant cannot properly execute decommissioning for

the following reasons:

C The applicant did not ensure that the cask design was compatible with the DOE’s disposal

requirements with respect to failed fuel, thermal design, size, weight, and capacity.

C The applicant did not ensure that the SNF would meet the DOE’s acceptance criteria because the

facility design does not include an on-site hot cell facility. Therefore, SNF can not be inspected

nor failed fuel encapsulated. Lack of such a facility, the commenter stated, is inconsistent with

NRC-approved designs and poses a shipping risk. (0198a1)

Response:

The adequacy of the applicant’s Preliminary Decommissioning Plan with respect to satisfying specific

regulations does not directly affect the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF and is beyond

the scope of the EIS. However, the NRC found that the applicant adequately addressed these issues

in the application. The NRC staff has evaluated the Preliminary Decommissioning Plan and found it to

be acceptable, as documented in Chapters 13 and 17 of the SER. The NRC staff also concluded that

these issues have been adequately considered and addressed in the FEIS, as appropriate. Sections

2.1.6 and 4.9 of the FEIS address the specific activities and environmental effects associated with

decommissioning the proposed PFSF. There is no regulatory requirement to have an on-site hot cell. 

The responses to G.3.2, “The Proposed Action,” also provide additional information regarding facility

design issues. In addition, design issues related to compatibility with the DOE disposal requirements

are beyond the scope of the EIS. See Sections G.3.2.5.6 and G.3.2.6.8.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-77 NUREG-1714

G.3.4.2.3 Available Technology for Decommissioning and Closure

Comment Summary:

Two commenters indicated that there is no adequate technology to clean up the site after operations

cease. These commenters referred to a report from the National Research Council, “Long-Term

Institutional Management of U.S. Department of Energy Legacy Waste Sites,” August 2000, which

states that contaminated facilities across the country cannot be adequately cleaned up for future

public use. (SL3-06, SL3-47) 

Response:

The NRC staff has extensive experience in reviewing and approving Decommissioning Plans for other

commercial nuclear facilities. The NRC staff notes that the National Research Council study

addresses the clean up of facilities that had been part of the DOE weapons programs, but the study is

not relevant to a temporary SNF storage facility such as the proposed PFSF. These DOE facilities are

of a different nature, and were not licensed by the NRC or required to meet associated NRC

regulations. The NRC staff concludes that the technology is currently available and will be available to

safely and fully decommission (which includes all necessary radiological decontamination) the

proposed PFSF for unrestricted use.

A hot cell is a facility (such as a shielded room) that is used to physically examine, test, and/or work

with nuclear fuel or other radioactive materials. A hot cell includes shielding, an isolated air handling

system, and other protective measures that would enable workers to perform their tasks with minimum

exposure to radiation.

G.3.4.2.4 Time Required for Decommissioning and Removal of SNF

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters indicated that the removal of all SNF canisters within 90 days of the lease expiration

was discussed in the DEIS. (0163, SL1-33) One commenter suggested that consideration should be

given to the number of canisters that can be removed in 90 days, because this would limit the number

of canisters that can be stored on-site at the time the lease expires. (SL1-33)

One of the commenters indicated that radiological decommissioning must be completed prior to lease

termination, as stated in Section 4.C of the lease, but not within 90 days of the lease expiration as

stated in Section 2.1.6, “Facility Closure and Decommissioning,” of the DEIS. The commenter stated

that in addition to the principal activities listed in Section 2.1.6 of the DEIS, the storage casks must be

removed from the site. (0163)

Response: 

The NRC staff agrees and has revised Section 2.1.6 of the DEIS to clarify that the deadline for

completing decommissioning activities is not within 90 days of expiration of the lease. The licensee

must complete decommissioning prior to termination of the license. Under NRC regulations,

decommissioning is not tied to lease expiration or termination. Rather, the timing of decommissioning

depends on when an NRC license expires (as explained below, NRC license termination has a

particular meaning, and is different from license expiration). SNF may be received at the proposed

PFSF until the NRC license expires and the SNF need not be removed from the proposed PFSF until

after the license expires. In the absence of a timely application to renew its license, a licensee of an

ISFSI must submit a decommissioning plan to the NRC at least one year before the license expires. 

The regulations require completion of decommissioning, under most circumstances, within 24 months

of NRC approval of the final decommissioning plan. The licensee would decommission the facility

after license expiration, and this would include removal of all SNF from the site. Only when
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-78

decommissioning is complete and the site is suitable for release would the NRC terminate the license. 

Under normal circumstances, the NRC’s action to terminate the license ends the NRC’s authority over

the licensee with respect to the activities authorized by the license.

G.3.4.2.5 Reclamation of Rail Spur

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to commit the applicant to decommissioning or reclaiming

the proposed rail line. The commenter also stated that if the proposed PFSF is not temporary, the

proposed rail line and ITF also cannot be temporary. (0198)

Response: 

Decommissioning of the proposed rail line was discussed in Section 2.1.6.3 of the DEIS. 

Abandonment or decommissioning of the proposed rail line would require STB review and approval,

including an environmental reivew. Section 2.1.6.3 of this FEIS states that the BLM would require the

removal and reclamation of the rail line upon the expiration of the right-of-way grant. Also, the NRC

staff notes that if the NRC grants a license to the applicant, the NRC would only authorize the

proposed PFSF as a temporary facility.

G.3.4.2.6 Decommissioning in the Environmental Report

Comment Summary:

One commenter asserted that the ER failed to consider the health and safety risk and costs

associated with the decommissioning process. (0198a)

Response:

The comment is based on the applicant’s ER. The NRC staff concluded that this comment is

adequately addressed in FEIS Sections 2.1.6 and 4.9 and in Chapter 17 of the NRC SER. The FEIS

adequately evaluates the environmental impact, including health impacts, from decommissioning the

proposed PFSF. The SER addresses decommissioning costs.

G.3.4.3 Decommissioning Costs

G.3.4.3.1 Availability of Permanent Repository and Contingent Costs

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the Federal government has not provided a disposal facility to which SNF

could be sent after the proposed PFSF is decommissioned, and simply assumes it will be available. 

The commenter stated that the applicant has failed to identify contingent costs in the realistic event

that the proposed PFSF cannot be decommissioned at the end of the license term.

The commenter also said that the license application states that decommissioning would be preceded

by off-site shipment of the canisters containing the SNF. The commenter stated that the applicant

contradicts this possibility in its discussion in the “Need for the Facility” in the ER. The commenter

said that shipment of the SNF back to owner reactors from the proposed PFSF would not be possible,

because the owners’ reactors would have already been decommissioned. (0198a)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-79 NUREG-1714

Response: 

As set forth below, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts of decommissioning have

been adequately addressed in this FEIS. Sections 2.1.6 and 4.9 of this FEIS address the specific

activities and environmental effects associated with decommissioning the proposed PFSF. The

applicant requested the NRC to license the proposed PFSF to receive and store SNF at the proposed

PFSF for an interim (temporary) storage period of 20 years. If the NRC grants the license, the

applicant may request that the license be renewed in the future in accordance with 10 CFR 72.42(a).

Because the NRC staff considers the adequacy of financial assurance for decommissioning in its

safety review of the application, the financial assurance is not part of the environmental review. The

NRC staff evaluation is documented in Chapter 17 of the SER. The NRC staff found that the applicant

has proposed adequate financial assurance for decommissioning. Therefore, the NRC did not

address this issue for the FEIS.

As discussed in Section 1.2 of this FEIS, the Commission determined in the Waste Confidence

Decision, 10 CFR 51.23 (55 Fed. Reg. 38474, Sept. 18, 1990) that there is reasonable assurance that

at least one geologic high level waste repository will be available within the first quarter of the twentyfirst century. Therefore, the NRC staff analysis assumes a repository will be available to receive SNF

from the proposed PFSF after its 40-year life (if the NRC grants a license for 20 years and renews it

for an additional 20 years).

Although the NRC staff assumes in its analysis that a permanent repository will be available, the

licensees of the power facilities storing SNF at the proposed PFSF would continue to retain ownership

and responsibility for the SNF if licensed operations were to cease (e.g., due to expiration or the

NRC’s revocation of the initial 20-year license) before a repository is available. Based on current DOE

projections, a permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010, which would be within the initial 20-

year license term proposed for the PFSF. In addition, because the requirements in 10 CFR 72.54

would require the applicant to decommission the proposed PFSF, the owners of the SNF would be

responsible for maintaining the SNF in a safe condition and would bear the cost for its continued safe

storage at a different location. The NRC staff notes that a new storage facility, other than the original

reactor site, would require the NRC’s approval (including an environmental review) to store the SNF. 

G.3.4.3.2 Adequacy of Decommissioning Funding Plan and Cost Estimates

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the FEIS should present the NRC’s license conditions, specific terms,

minimum specifications for the “decommissioning fund,” and permit conditions in the case of a

business dissolution. (0215) 

One commenter said that the decommissioning funding discussion did not contain sufficient

information to provide reasonable assurance that the necessary funds would be available to

decommission the proposed PFSF, as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b). (0198a) The commenter

asserted that the applicant’s discussions of decommissioning and funding for decommissioning were

deficient in the following respects:

C The commenter stated that the applicant has failed to provide reasonable assurance, as required

by 10 CFR 72.30(b), that funds would be available to decommission the proposed PFSF. The

commenter said that the applicant intends to obtain a letter of credit for $1,631,000 to cover the

estimated costs of decommissioning the proposed PFSF and site. However, the commenter

stated that the applicant offers no reasonable assurance that it would be qualified to obtain such a

letter of credit.
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NUREG-1714 G-80

C The commenter also said that the financial assurance regulations for decommissioning allow for

use of an external sinking fund coupled with a surety method or insurance. The commenter said

that the applicant specified that a surety would be in the form of a letter of credit but did not

provide the wording for the letter or state that it would be irrevocable. The commenter said that

this does not comply with the guidance in Regulatory Guide 3.66, “Standard Format and Content

of Financial Assurance Mechanisms,” required for decommissioning under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40,

70, and 72.

C The commenter said that the applicant failed to justify the basis and provide sufficient detail for all

decommissioning cost estimates in its Preliminary Decommissioning Funding Plan. The

commenter stated that estimates of $17,000 per cask and $1,631,000 total should be broken

down in some detail and in accordance with NUREG-1567, should be tied to a base year to

address inflation. 

C The commenter said that the applicant omitted a level of detail for funding cost estimates for

decommissioning, using the excuse that these costs cannot be currently quantified.

C The commenter said that a number of the estimates are inconsistent, including the costs for

decontamination of the Canister Transfer Building, the costs to decontaminate the cask surfaces,

the costs for disposal, and the incremental cost for decontamination of casks.

C The commenter said that the license application lacks consideration of the direct and indirect

decommissioning costs. In addition, the commenter said that the plan was not compared with

present funds to identify any projected shortfalls, and the applicant did not conservatively estimate

the total costs for decommissioning.

C The commenter stated that the decommissioning cost estimate totally ignored the potential for

large accidents and resulting releases and contamination at the site.

C The commenter said that the Preliminary Decommissioning Plan should provide procedures and

cost estimates that reflect realistic consideration of the potential need for the decommissioning of

a facility with significant contamination from canister releases.

C The commenter stated that the Preliminary Decommissioning Plan and cost estimate did not

adequately consider the decontamination of casks and cask liners and ignored the need to

dismantle casks.

C The commenter said that the applicant failed to describe the type of site survey (estimated to cost

$250,000) and sampling protocol that would be used. The commenter also said that the generic

description of the survey did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.30(a).

C The commenter stated that the applicant failed to provide decommissioning procedures and costs

for the ITF and failed to provide significant details about the planned structures and operations at

that facility. (0198a)

Response:

These issues regarding decommissioning funding and cost estimates are beyond the scope of the EIS

because this type of information is not required to analyze the environmental impact of performing

decommissioning activities at the proposed PFSF. The applicant provided decommissioning funding

and cost estimate information in its application. The NRC staff evaluated this information during its

safety review and found it acceptable, as documented in Chapter 17 of the SER. The NRC staff

concluded that the applicant adequately considered decontamination and facility design issues with

respect to determining decommissioning costs. Furthermore, the Commission directed that a license

condition be established to provide reasonable assurance that adequate funds would be available to
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-81 NUREG-1714

decommission the proposed PFSF. The response to G.3.4.1 provides additional information

regarding decommissioning and removal of SNF from the proposed PFSF.

G.3.4.3.3 Displacement of Cost

Comment Summary:

One commenter requested that the displacement of cost for decommissioning of a temporary site be

assessed. (0096)

Response:

The NRC has determined that the applicant provided reasonable assurance that adequate funds will

be available for decommissioning as reflected in Chapter 17 of the SER. This comment involves a

safety issue that does not directly affect the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, and is

beyond the scope of the EIS. Therefore, no further response to this comment is required.

G.3.4.4 Impacts of Decommissioning

G.3.4.4.1 Impacts from Decommissioning

Comment:

One commenter stated that potential impacts from decommissioning need to be incorporated into the

EIS in order to provide details on the methods for dismantling the contaminated parts from the storage

casks and transfer building. The commenter stated the FEIS should specify how storage casks are

decommissioned and the level of radioactivity considered safe for unrestricted use/disposal of

decontaminated materials. (0215)

Response:

Sections 2.1.6 and 4.9 of this FEIS address the specific activities and environmental impacts

associated with decommissioning the proposed PFSF. This information is based on the Preliminary

Decommissioning Plan provided by the applicant and accepted by the NRC. As described in Section

2.1.6 of this FEIS, the applicant would have to prepare and submit a final Decommissioning Plan to

the NRC. This plan would contain additional details of the decontamination activities and updated

techniques that would be required to safely decommission the proposed PFSF. Radiological criteria

for license termination are specified in Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20. A site is considered suitable for

unrestricted use if the residual radioactivity, which is distinguishable from background radiation,

results in a whole body dose to an average member of the public that does not exceed 25 mrem

(0.25mSv) per year. The proposed PFSF must meet this regulation. Accordingly, the NRC staff

concludes it has adequately addressed these issues and the environmental impacts of

decommissioning in the FEIS.

G.3.4.4.2 Impacts from Improper Decommissioning and Closure

Comment Summary:

Two commenters indicated that the FEIS should discuss the impacts resulting from improperly

decommissioning the proposed PFSF. (0158, 0215)

Response:

The comment is not clear on what specific activities or consequences would constitute “improper”

decommissioning. Therefore, the NRC staff cannot provide a specific response. As set forth in
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NUREG-1714 G-82

Sections 2.1.6 and 4.9 of the FEIS, the NRC staff concludes that technology would be available to

safely and completely decommission the proposed PFSF. 

G.3.4.4.3 Limited Liability Issues Regarding Decommissioning and Closure

Comment Summary: 

One commenter suggested an analysis of the impacts of limited liability on decommissioning, because

the applicant is a limited liability company. (0096) 

Response: 

Sections 2.1.6 and 4.9 of the FEIS address the NRC staff’s analysis of the specific activities and

environmental effects associated with decommissioning the proposed PFSF. Adequacy of

decommissioning funding and limited liability issues are addressed in Section G.3.4. The fact that the

applicant is a limited liability company has no impact on the requirement that the applicant have

adequate financial assurance for decommissioning. The NRC staff has reviewed the applicants’

proposed Decommissioning Funding Plan and the staff’s analysis is reported in the SER. Accordingly,

the NRC staff concludes that the environmental impacts of decommissioning have been adequately

addressed in the FEIS.

G.3.4.4.4 Impacts on Future Generations

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern that future generations will not be aware of the location of these

nuclear waste dumps. (0024) 

Response:

The proposed PFSF would be an above-ground, temporary facility and would not be authorized as a

permanent disposal facility. The proposed PFSF would be decommissioned in accordance with the

NRC’s regulations and a final Decommissioning Plan, which would be approved by the NRC. All SNF

and radioactive waste would be removed from the proposed PFSF and the proposed site would be

released for unrestricted use at the end of the decommissioning process. Furthermore, all future NRC

regulatory actions for the proposed PFSF would be documented and be available to the public to

review during the proposed PFSF’s lifetime.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-83 NUREG-1714

G.3.5 Alternatives

G.3.5.1 The Range of Alternatives Covered in the DEIS

G.3.5.1.1 Range of Alternatives in DEIS is Inadequate

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the NRC has not comprehensively considered, explored, or evaluated

an adequate range of alternatives. (0005, 0039, 0096, 0113, 0166, 0198, 0198h, 0198i, 0212, 0215,

GR-14, SL1-04, SL1-06, SL1-28, SL3-32, SL1-39, SL3-46, SL3-50) Specific comments include:

C Two commenters stated that the NRC has not provided a reasonable range of alternatives as

required by NEPA and 40 CFR 1502.14, or enough detailed information on each alternative for

reviewers to consider their merits adequately. (SL1-04, SL1-28) Two commenters stated that the

applicant’s funds should be used to explore several other alternatives, including either storing the

SNF or finding other sources of energy. (SL1-39, SL3-32) Another commenter expressed

dissatisfaction with the NRC’s consideration of alternatives, stating that if the NRC had seriously

considered other proposed interim storage sites it would have conducted safety evaluations of

other sites (such as Wyoming). (GR-14) Another commenter rejected the NRC’s analysis and

urged the NRC to find a better solution than the proposed project. (0005) One commenter

expressed concern that only two alternatives were considered in the DEIS, when the project

affects the entire country. (SL3-50) One commenter suggested that another range of alternatives

be proposed that considers the views of the residents of Utah. (SL1-04) 

C Other commenters stated that safe, alternative energy sources must be examined and developed. 

(0034, 0242, SL1-29, SL1-34, SL1-35, SL3-36, SL3-46) One commenter stated that if the Federal

government gave more money to energy-related problems, it would need to give less money to

public health-related problems. (0165) 

C One commenter stated that a discussion of the range of alternatives is considered the “heart” of

an EIS, (40 CFR 1502.14), and its purpose is to sharply define the issues and provide a clear

basis for choice among options by the decision-maker and the public. Yet, the commenter

asserted that the applicant presents only one option: a centralized national storage facility on the

Skull Valley Reservation. (0198h, 0198i)

C One commenter stated that the EIS must present the environmental and other impacts of the

proposed action, and all reasonable alternatives, including the no action alternative, in a

comparative format. (0198i)

C One commenter stated that the purpose of the alternatives discussion is to address the feasibility

of alternatives different from the proposed action, and to consider the issues, such as economic,

social, health, and environmental justice issues associated with each alternative. However, the

commenter states that the DEIS ignored all other alternatives, including the feasibility of on-site

storage of SNF rods, which the DEIS includes, but negates as an alternative. The commenter

stated that this is because nuclear industries do not want their stockholders to lose profits. (0096)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to openly and honestly evaluate all of the legitimate

alternatives. The commenter specifically stated that the DEIS presented data showing that the no

action alternative is the safest, cheapest, most technically feasible, and most logical choice; yet

the DEIS presented the preferred alternative, which is documented to have the most adverse

impact with the least evenly distributed economic impact for Utah. The commenter stated that

Utah does not use or generate nuclear waste, and it should not be expected to store it. The

commenter added that the DEIS’s preferred alternative is the highest risk alternative and that it is

irrational because it proposes: the transport of a never-tested, unprecedented volume of highly
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-84

radioactive SNF cross country for at least 20-40 years; and the storage of this SNF beneath

restricted airspace for active military testing. The commenter concluded that these proposed

actions would be performed by a limited liability corporation with no assets to assist in significant

cleanup activities if an accident occurs. (0166)

C One commenter stated that the NRC should consider reasonable alternatives even if they are not

within the jurisdiction of the NRC, according to CEQ regulations in 40 CFR 1502.14(c) and NRC

regulations in 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix A, Section 5 [incorporated through 10 CFR

51.70(b)]. (0198-183) Another commenter stated that 40 CFR 1502.14 requires that a

reasonable range of alternatives be considered. The commenter also stated that the NRC’s own

guidance specifies that an applicant submit a slate of alternatives, but that the DEIS does not

present and analyze a reasonable range of alternatives as the law requires. The commenter said

that the only other alternative site that the NRC evaluated is in Wyoming, but that the analysis did

not “devote a substantial treatment” to this alternative. The commenter also stated that the DEIS

did not present a detailed analysis of the no action alternative, and the range of alternatives did

not address the stated purpose and need for the project. (0113)

C One commenter urged the NRC to take time to explore all of the issues, and then to create an

official policy regarding how to handle SNF. (0224)

C One commenter asserted that the ER failed to comply with NEPA because it did not adequately

evaluate the range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that

“NEPA requires consideration of all reasonable alternatives (40 CFR 1502.14), and it is well

established that alternatives are at the heart of an EIS (Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee,

Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, DC Cir. 1971).” (0198a)

Response: 

One of the purposes of the FEIS is to evaluate the proposed PFSF. The applicant identified a

purpose and need for this proposed PFSF, which the NRC describes in Section 1.3 of this FEIS,

“Need for the Proposed Action.” The reasonable range of alternatives includes alternate methods to

satisfy the need for the proposed action. For a more detailed discussion on the purpose and need,

see Section G.3.1 of this FEIS.

Chapter 2 of the DEIS, “Alternatives Including the Proposed Action,” discussed many different

alternatives and explained why the NRC did or did not consider them further in the DEIS. Although

the commenters asserted that the range of alternatives was not complete, most commenters did not

identify other alternatives for the NRC staff to consider. Without suggested alternatives, the NRC staff

and the Cooperating Agencies were unable to perform further analysis.

While some commenters did identify alternatives, many of these alternatives would not satisfy the

stated purpose and need for the proposed PFSF. The purpose and need is for an interim facility that

would provide a safe, efficient, and economical alternative to continued SNF storage at reactor sites. 

Many of the alternatives in the comments presented issues that involve national energy policy (e.g.,

finding other sources of energy). Alternatives that propose changes in national energy policy would

not satisfy the need for the proposed action, as there would still be a need to store the SNF already

generated. Therefore, such alternatives are beyond the scope of the EIS.

One commenter requested that the NRC consider the views of the residents of Utah. The NRC and

the Cooperating Agencies held public meetings in Utah for the proposed PFSF, received the

residents’ and others’ comments, and considered the comments seriously. In accordance with NEPA

and the NRC environmental regulations, this FEIS includes a summary of public comments and the

Cooperating Agencies’ responses to them.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-85 NUREG-1714

A detailed comparison of the environmental impacts of the alternatives considered is included in

Chapter 9 of this FEIS. As stated in the FEIS, the NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies conclude

that the environmental impacts associated with the proposed action would not result in any adverse

impact that could not be mitigated. For the proposed action, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

are either regulatory or permitting agencies. As such, the agencies can either grant the applicant’s

request, deny the request, or approve the request with conditions. Therefore, from an environmental

standpoint, the agencies did not identify any reason to recommend denying the application. 

Commenters stated that the DEIS presents only one alternative (the proposed action), and ignores,

negates, or inadequately treats the no action alternative. Section 6.7 of the DEIS discusses the

environmental impacts of the no action alternative and Table 9.1 of the DEIS sets forth a comparison

of the environmental effects of the proposed action and alternatives, including the no action

alternative. Notwithstanding the discussion in the DEIS, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have

revised the text of Chapter 9 of the FEIS to (1) specifically explain the differences between the

proposed action and the no action alternative, and (2) discuss why the no action alternative was not

selected as the preferred alternative. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have included this

discussion in Section 9.3 of this FEIS. That section documents the environmental impacts of the no

action alternative, as compared to the proposed action.

One commenter requested that the NRC conduct a safety evaluation for all of the reasonable

alternatives, such as the Wyoming site. The NRC only conducts safety evaluations when it receives

an application for a proposed project. In such cases, the NRC evaluates the proposed facility design

and operation to ensure that they would meet all standards and requirements of the NRC safety

regulations. These standards and requirements do not vary according to the geographic location of

the facility. Therefore, the proposed PFSF must adhere to the same NRC safety regulations as an

ISFSI located anywhere else in the United States. The NRC considered alternative sites to determine

whether the applicant’s site selection process was reasonable, and whether one of the applicant’s

alternate sites was obviously superior to the proposed site. The purpose of this review was to

determine whether the proposed site is environmentally acceptable and to determine whether any

alternative sites that the applicant considered are substantially preferable from an environmental

standpoint. The NRC staff concluded that the Wyoming site was not substantially preferable from an

environmental standpoint and, therefore, not obviously superior to the proposed site.

G.3.5.1.2 Specific Technological Alternatives Analysis is Inadequate

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the technological alternatives analysis is inadequate. (0002, 0020,

0024, 0045, 0096, 0112, 0122, 0170, SL2-03, SL2-14, SL2-19, SL3-36, SL3-50, SL3-57) Specific

comments include:

C Several commenters supported an alternative of reprocessed or neutralized SNF. (0020, 0112,

0122, 0170, SL2-19, SL3-36, SL3-50) One commenter suggested that the construction of

reprocessing/recycling facilities close to the generating reactor licensees be considered as an

alternative, and the commenter suggested using the $60 billion from the reactor licensees’ escrow

for construction. (SL3-57) One commenter supported reprocessing SNF in Utah and stated that

such an opportunity should serve as a well thought-out SNF reprocessing and recycling plan for

the country. (SL2-03) The same commenter stated that reprocessing would offer several

benefits: a) provide a great amount of energy for the future, b) drastically reduce the amount of

waste that must be stored, c) reduce the required storage time from 10,000 years to only 600

years, and d) provide the best way to get rid of plutonium from old weapons by burning it in

reactors for energy. (0020)

C One commenter stated that the NRC should address the other current dry storage system design

described in Section 2, “Alternatives Including the Proposed Action,” of the DEIS (page 2-33, lines

4-5) under NEPA’s alternative requirement criteria. (0096)
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NUREG-1714 G-86

C One commenter urged the NRC to consider the reduction of SNF waste in the future, and to

create a better industrial vision for the United States and the world. (0002) Another commenter

encouraged states to retrofit and repair their infrastructures to conserve water and electricity. 

(SL2-14)

C One commenter stated that the money nuclear facilities put in an escrow account for the disposal

of SNF should actually be spent to reprocess the material. (SL3-57)

Response: 

The NRC staff reviewed the technological alternatives analysis in the DEIS and concluded that it is

adequate. A detailed comparison of the environmental impacts of each alternative evaluated in the

EIS is included in Chapter 9 of the FEIS.

Commenters suggested that the NRC further explore the SNF reprocessing alternative, but SNF

reprocessing is contrary to the existing national energy policy. The United States did not develop a

policy to reprocess SNF because natural uranium is relatively abundant; also, there are concerns that

plutonium from reprocessed civilian SNF potentially could be used for nuclear weapons production. 

On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced that the United States would defer indefinitely the

reprocessing of SNF from commercial nuclear power reactors and discourage reprocessing of SNF

abroad. President Clinton reiterated the United States’ position on reprocessing in a statement on

Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy saying that, “the United States does not encourage the

civil[ian] use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either

nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary’s Fact

Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, September 29, 1993) Since the consideration of a

reprocessing alternative would require a change in U.S. nonproliferation policy and could introduce

foreign policy and national security concerns, the NRC staff did not consider reprocessing to be a

reasonable alternative and, therefore, did not discuss it in the FEIS.

The NRC staff considered the comment that the EIS should consider other dry storage technologies,

and refers to Section 2.2.2.1 of the DEIS, “Dry Storage Systems.” In that section, the NRC staff

indicated that other dry storage systems would be constructed of materials similar to those used for

the proposed system, and stated that the environmental impacts of other dry storage technologies

would not be substantially different from those associated with the proposed system. As a result, the

NRC determined that additional analyses of dry storage technologies was not necessary in this EIS.

A few commenters stated that the NRC should explore waste minimization as an alternative to the

proposed PFSF. While the NRC staff agrees that all licensees should explore methods to decrease

SNF production, a reduction in SNF generation is unlikely at this time. Using current, known

technologies, reactors must use fuel to operate; the fuel remains radioactive after use and must be

stored. However, in recent years, improvements in fuel design have led to longer fuel cycles, which

reduce the amount of SNF generated over a finite period of time. Private industry and the DOE

perform nuclear reactor design. However, neither industry nor government waste minimization

initiatives would affect the existing SNF inventory. Therefore, an alternative that explores waste

reduction would not satisfy the purpose and need for the proposed action. For facilities which

generate SNF, the proposed PFSF would provide an alternative to on-site storage of SNF until a

permanent repository is opened. Based on current DOE projections, a permanent repository is

scheduled to open by 2010.

G.3.5.1.3 Specific Storage Site Alternatives Analysis is Inadequate

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the specific storage site alternatives analysis is inadequate. (0036,

0096, 0112, 0156, 0163, 0168, 0198, 0198h, 0236, SL1-07, SL1-11, SL1-21, SL2-09)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-87 NUREG-1714

Two commenters asserted that alternatives 2 through 4 (p. xxiii, lines 1-13) are not really alternatives,

but variations of options that lead to the disposal of high-level radioactive waste at the same location

within the same region. (0112, 0156) One commenter stated that the EIS must analyze the option of

alternative site locations, whether presently feasible or infeasible in the future. (0198h) Commenters

stated that Site A and the alternative location on the Reservation (Site B) cannot be real alternatives

(as the DEIS states on p. 4-1, lines 42-44) if there is only a half-mile distance between them. (0096,

0198, SL1-07, SL1-21) One commenter urged the NRC to allocate a share of the SNF to each state. 

(0036) One commenter suggested that the SNF should be stored at a site in a remote area closer to

its generation. The commenter stated that it should be placed in the middle of the country, where it

would be easier to protect. (SL2-09) Another commenter stated that the EIS must explore the

development of private regional ISFSIs as an alternative, because the transportation distances and

volume of fuel consumed would be less. (0198h)

Box Elder Fuel Storage Alternative

One commenter identified the potential for an alternative ISFSI in Box Elder County, Utah (Box Elder

Fuel Storage), and stated that the NRC failed to consider it. The commenter indicated that the Pigeon

Spur site proposed in the Box Elder Fuel Storage initiative is more practical than the proposed Skull

Valley site and provided several reasons to support this position. (0168) 

Owl Creek Alternative

One commenter identified an alternative ISFSI proposed for Owl Creek, Wyoming, and stated that

although the Owl Creek project is in a preliminary planning stage, it is likely that both Skull Valley and

Owl Creek will be needed. (0236) Another commenter stated that Owl Creek is offered up as a nonalternative, and it undermines the credibility of the entire process and reinforces the perception that

the NRC is acting as an advocate for the applicant. (0156, SL1-07)

Another commenter stated that the DEIS (Pg 2-31, section 2.2.1.1, line 37) indicates that no other

commercially owned away-from-reactor dry cask storage system ISFSIs “have been proposed,” and

omits the Owl Creek Project in Wyoming and the Pigeon Spur Fuel Storage Facility in Box Elder

County, Utah. The commenter stated that although technical papers and presentations have

addressed the Owl Creek project, the NRC has not yet received an application. Therefore, the project

would require state legislative action to proceed. Given this status, the commenter asserted that the

Owl Creek Project is not a probable alternative to the proposed PFSF. Similarly, the Pigeon Spur Fuel

Storage Facility is not a probable alternative to the proposed PFSF, because it is subject to State of

Utah jurisdiction and the Utah Governor is opposed to such facilities. (0163)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding the potential Owl Creek (the site referred to as

the Wyoming Alternative) and Box Elder (Pigeon Spur) sites. The NRC’s alternative analysis identifies

a reasonable range of alternatives based on the purpose and need for the proposed action. Neither

Owl Creek nor Pigeon Spur has either an operating ISFSI or an application before the NRC. 

Therefore, these potential ISFSIs are not considered practicable or feasible alternatives to the

proposed PFSF. See Section 7 of this FEIS for a discussion of the Alternative Site Analysis. 

Furthermore, regarding the Pigeon Spur site, the NRC staff informed the sponsor for the Pigeon Spur

Storage Facility, by letter dated January 8, 1999, that its application, submitted October 19, 1998, was

insufficient for review in accordance with 10 CFR Part 72. As a result, the NRC staff rejected the

application. 

Although another commenter indicated that the NRC should have considered private regional SNF

storage, no private entity has proposed facilities of this kind, and any attempt by the NRC staff to

determine where “regional” SNF storage facilities should be located would be speculative. The NRC

acknowledges the comment that shorter transportation distances to the facility would reduce the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-88

amount of fuel consumed during SNF transport to the SNF storage facility so that regional ISFSIs

have fewer environmental impacts. However, the NRC staff disagrees, because it determined that the

environmental impacts from transportation of SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF are small. 

In addition, the total distance and number of shipments of SNF would depend upon where the regional

facilities are located. When considering the environmental impacts in the aggregate, the NRC staff

determined that the impacts would not differ appreciably. The NRC staff also concluded that the

construction of regional facilities would disturb several geographically different areas. Depending

upon the location and design, the construction of regional facilities could lead to more significant

environmental impacts than the proposed action.

The NRC staff conducted an analysis of potential environmental consequences of constructing the

proposed PFSF at the Skull Valley site. Chapter 9 of the FEIS, “Comparison of Alternatives,”

identifies nearby activities and the potential impacts from these activities.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments that the breadth of alternatives was inadequate, but it

disagrees. The DEIS identified the process that the applicant followed to eliminate alternate sites from

further consideration. While the NRC staff recognizes that Site A and Site B are very similar, the NRC

staff evaluated Site B in the DEIS to present the BIA decision-makers with a full discussion of the

environmental impacts of the proposed action.

G.3.5.1.4 At-Reactor Storage Evaluation is Inadequate

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters stated that the NRC staff evaluation of at-reactor storage is inadequate. (0007,

0089, 0090, 0096, 0112, 0113, 0142, GR-01, GR-14, SL1-28, SL2-13) One commenter asserted that

more examination must be conducted for the no action alternative. (0113) Several commenters

expressed concern that the DEIS does not include an evaluation of alternatives that would continue or

expand storage capacity at existing reactor sites or storage facilities. (0007, GR-01, GR-14, SL1-28) 

One commenter stated that the NRC staff should further investigate a permanent storage site and

temporary storage sites that are closer to the points of origin. (SL2-13) Some commenters stated that

the NRC staff should more fully provide the reasons why at-reactor storage of SNF is not practical, in

order to provide the entire range of alternatives to the decision-makers and the public. (0089, 0096) 

One commenter argued that the proposed PFSF could be built at one of the reactor sites in the

eastern United States to save costs and to transport the SNF a shorter distance. (0090) Two

commenters indicated that the FEIS should include the option of utility companies shipping their SNF

to other reactor sites in this group with sufficient additional storage. According to the commenters, this

would reduce potential transportation, environmental, and human health impacts. (0090, 0142) 

Another commenter stated that the FEIS should consider the option of constructing an interim facility

near the alternatives for permanent storage to mitigate transportation risks. (0112)

One commenter stated that reactor licensees could ship SNF from sites reaching capacity limits to

those with available capacity. The commenter acknowledged that this would require that both plants

agree to the move, which might be possible if they were both owned by the same utility. The

commenter indicated that about half of the reactor sites will have run out of on-site storage for their

own fuel by the time the proposed PFSF is opened in 2004, and by 2010, about 80 percent will have

run out of capacity. The commenter stated that this is not a practical alternative to the extent that it

does not reduce the need for interim storage away from reactor sites. (0236)

Response: 

The NRC staff analyzed the at-reactor storage alternative as part of its analysis of the no action

alternative. Based on this analysis, the NRC staff concluded that continued or expanded at-reactor

storage is possible at many power reactor sites. However, continued storage at some sites could
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-89 NUREG-1714

become difficult and some reactors might shut down prior to the end of their licensed lives if there is

not sufficient on-site storage capacity available. Based on its analysis of the no action alternative, the

NRC staff concluded that SNF could continue to be stored at reactor sites without significant

environmental impact.

Contrary to the point implied by the commenter, the proposed PFSF could be approved regardless of

whether the no action alternative is feasible. NEPA requires that an agency consider the

environmental impacts of a proposed action and reasonable alternatives be considered so that an

informed decision can be made. NEPA does not prohibit a proposed action simply because the no

action alternative is feasible. The NRC staff addressed the no action alternative in Chapters 2, 6, and

9 of the FEIS, and the environmental impacts of constructing additional at-reactor ISFSIs were

discussed in Section 6.7 of the DEIS, “Proposed Impacts of the No Action Alternative.” The NRC staff

concluded that the environmental impacts are small as defined in Chapter 4 of the DEIS,

“Environmental Consequences of Constructing and Operating the Proposed PFSF.”

Section 2.2.1.2 of the DEIS, “Shipment of SNF Between Reactor Sites,” did consider shipment of SNF

between reactor sites. The NRC staff concluded that the alternative of shipping SNF between reactor

sites would not likely satisfy the interim SNF storage needs for the applicant and the environmental

impacts would be similar to the no action alternative with the exception of some transportation

impacts. The FEIS also states that the transportation impacts would be bounded by the analysis in

Section 5.7.2. Regarding the comment that the NRC should further investigate a temporary storage

site closer to the points of origin, no such site has been proposed and the NRC staff does not select

such sites. In this light, and because the NRC considers alternative sites to determine whether an

applicant’s site selection process is reasonable and whether one of an applicant’s alternative sites is

obviously superior to the proposed site, consideration of a temporary storage site closer to the point of

SNF origination is not necessary. As for a permanent repository closer to the point of SNF origin,

pursuant to the NWPA, site selection for a permanent repository is the responsibility of DOE. DOE

has been directed by Congress to study only the proposed Yucca Mountain site. Based on current

DOE projections, a permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010. See Sections G.3.5.1.5,

G.3.5.2.2.

G.3.5.1.5 Consideration of Yucca Mountain as an Alternative

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters stated that the NRC should consider [the proposed] Yucca Mountain site as a

temporary alternative for a storage site. (0156, 0198h) Another commenter stated that an SNF

storage facility should be at least 1 mile below ground at [the proposed] Yucca Mountain or some

similar alternative, not above ground. (0013) 

One commenter stated that the EIS must explore how the proposed PFSF fits into the overall Federal

plan for disposing of high-level nuclear waste. The commenter stated that recent proposed legislation

to site an MRS indicates that this alternative is within the range of reasonable alternatives that the EIS

must consider. Thus, the NRC staff must evaluate the environmental effects, including transportation

risks of the applicant’s proposed PFSF against those same risks associated with an MRS. The

commenter stated that the FEIS must also address the effect of the applicant’s proposal on a

comprehensive national plan to deal with the disposal of high-level nuclear waste. (0198h)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments, but clarifies that it is a regulatory agency and does not

pursue, site, construct, or manage facilities such as those suggested by the comments to be used for

specific purposes. The NRC staff cannot request that private or government entities submit license

applications for specific sites for temporary storage, including the Yucca Mountain site proposed for a

permanent repository.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-90

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) requirements for MRSs do not apply to privately owned and

operated facilities. Pursuant to NWPA, the DOE cannot select a site for an MRS until the DOE

recommends to the President approval of a site for the development of a permanent repository. 

Based on current DOE projections, a permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010. Congress

has not passed new Federal legislation for MRSs and previous regulations for this type of facility have

expired. Therefore, an MRS is not a reasonable alternative at this point in time, and no change to the

EIS is necessary.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding a comprehensive national plan for SNF storage. 

However, the comment does not apply to the environmental review for the proposed PFSF and the

acceptability of that proposal.

G.3.5.1.6 Inadequate Consideration of Transportation Alternatives

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to consider the difficulty of rail access to [the proposed]

Yucca Mountain site using a proposed ITF and heavy-haul truck transport, although it correctly

acknowledged that heavy-haul truck transport “is not considered a viable option for cross-country

transportation to the proposed PFSF and is not analyzed in detail” (page 2-34). Likewise, heavy-haul

truck transport of dual-purpose canisters from the proposed PFSF to a potential repository at Yucca

Mountain would not be viable because of the number of shipments, the shipment distance (more than

400 miles), and likely route characteristics (mountainous terrain and highly populated areas). (0204)

The same commenter stated that the DEIS incorrectly ignored the difficulty of moving large rail casks

from an ITF in Nevada to the proposed PFSF. The commenter said that the DOE identified three

potential ITF sites in Nevada and potential heavy-haul truck routes ranging in length from 114 to

330 miles. The commenter stated that the United States has no experience with such long-distance

heavy-haul truck transportation of SNF or high-level waste, and only limited experience with moving

smaller rail casks (70 tons loaded weight) short distances by truck. The commenter added that

Europe has only limited experience with short heavy-haul truck movements of large rail casks. The

commenter stated that moving SNF hundreds of miles by heavy-haul truck through mountainous

terrain and/or highly populated areas, such as the Las Vegas Valley, has never been performed. The

commenter also added that, according to the NDOT, Nevada has permitted only two comparable

heavy-haul truck movements of any cargo during the past three years, both large mining autoclaves. 

(0204)

The commenter stated that, based on this information, the DEIS should not assume that loaded dualpurpose canisters could be shipped from the proposed PFSF to [the proposed] Yucca Mountain site,

either entirely by heavy-haul truck or via rail to an ITF followed by heavy-haul truck transport. The

commenter concluded that the DEIS should consider an alternative mode of transportation to a

repository, such as legal weight trucks, and that absent this analysis, the DEIS is deficient. (0204)

One commenter stated that until the applicant can provide documented evidence that it will have the

technical, legal, and financial capability to construct a rail line, the NRC staff should assume that the

applicant will offload shipments at the ITF at Rowley Junction and transfer the shipments from rail to

truck (see SAR Fig. 4.5-1). (0198a)

One commenter noted that if a direct rail line to the proposed PFSF could be built in both an

economically feasible and environmentally safe manner, it would make more sense than the proposed

ITF alternative. DEIS Chapter 5, “Transportation Impacts of the Proposed Action,” indicated that the

proposed rail line does not exceed the STB-established environmental effects thresholds. (0236)
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G-91 NUREG-1714

Response: 

FEIS Section 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts,” presents the NRC staff’s assessment of the impacts of

eventual rail transportation of SNF away from the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff’s analysis of

transportation impacts utilized a conservative population and route from the proposed PFSF to the

Utah border. As the NRC staff states in the FEIS, the plans for transportation of SNF beyond the Utah

border are subject to decisions that have not yet been made and, therefore, are outside the scope of

the FEIS. However, the NRC staff considers it reasonable to assume that SNF could be transported

by rail directly to a proposed permanent repository at Yucca Mountain; or else, transported first to an

ITF, and then to the proposed repository via heavy-haul vehicles. The NRC staff finds this to be

reasonable based on the DOE’s analysis contained in the Yucca Mountain DEIS, in which the DOE

considered a mostly rail scenario and discussed several intermodal transfer points. For a more

detailed response see Section G.3.16 of this FEIS.

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies completed a thorough evaluation of the applicant’s proposed

action, which included transportation from the proposed rail line from Low, Utah to the proposed

PFSF. The agencies also evaluated the ITF as a transportation alternative in the DEIS. The NRC,

the BLM, and the STB all considered the applicant’s capability to construct the proposed rail line as

part of their respective decisions on the license application and lease proposal.

G.3.5.1.7 Inadequate Evaluation of Economic Development Alternatives for the

 Skull Valley Band

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters stated that the DEIS inadequately evaluates economic development alternatives

for the Skull Valley Band. (0029, 0050, 0112, 0113, 0114, 0158, 0203, GR-15, GR-16, SL1-02, SL1-

05, SL1-10, SL1-28, SL1-30, SL2-06, SL2-09, SL2-13, SL2-18, SL3-26, SL3-22, SL3-35)

Several commenters suggested that new alternatives should be developed to assist the Skull Valley

Band to obtain financial independence. (0029, 0050, GR-16, SL1-05, SL1-10, SL1-28, SL2-06, SL2-

09, SL2-13, SL2-18, SL3-26, SL3-22, SL3-35) Commenters expressed concern that if the purpose

and need of the DEIS is to provide economic development for the Skull Valley Band, then the range of

alternatives should address other economic development and land use alternatives. (0112, 0113,

SL1-28) One commenter suggested an alternative that involves the development of a reclamation

company and consulting firm that would hire Skull Valley Band members as employees. The

commenter suggested that the land be used as a technological testbed for learning techniques to

restore the soil and clean up the land. (SL2-06) Several commenters stated that a gambling casino

would be a more desirable source of revenue than a nuclear waste disposal facility. (0114, GR-15,

SL2-09) One commenter suggested that the Goshute Indian Reservation should establish a plant

nursery or a Polynesian cultural center along with an American Indian festival to generate revenues. 

(SL2-09) One commenter suggested that the State of Utah provide financial compensation to the

Skull Valley Band not to put the proposed PFSF on their Reservation. (0114) Another commenter

stated that the State of Utah has a budget surplus of approximately $114 million, and if the State

offered the Skull Valley Band a portion of the surplus, the Skull Valley Band would accept the money

and cease negotiations with the NRC and the applicant. (0212) Another commenter supported the

creation of a tax to help the Skull Valley Band learn to work in technological or scientific fields. (GR15) Another commenter suggested that money should be invested in training, education, jobs, and

businesses for the Skull Valley Band rather than the proposed PFSF. (SL3-26)

Some commenters stated that the Skull Valley Band had determined that some alternative proposals

for economic development were not feasible because of other facilities near the Reservation. 

Notwithstanding this determination, the commenters concluded that the Skull Valley Band’s decision

to enter into the lease is not justified given the long-lasting negative human health and environmental

impacts of hazardous material storage facilities. (0203, SL1-05, SL2-09) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-92

One commenter stated that the Skull Valley Band would end negotiations with the applicant in

exchange for the State’s budget surplus. (SL1-02) Another commenter stated that the DEIS did not

evaluate economic development alternatives for the Skull Valley Band, other than giving them the

State’s budget surplus. If this were the chosen alternative, the commenter questioned how long the

State would give the Skull Valley Band the budget surplus. (SL1-30) Another commenter stated that

the DEIS does not adequately consider substantial trust funds that exist to promote agricultural

development on the Reservation. This commenter stated that the DEIS should analyze the potential

impacts associated with the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF on

the ability of the Skull Valley Band members to use or access these development funds. (0158)

One commenter suggested that since the reactor licensees are apparently offering many millions of

dollars in bribes to the Skull Valley Band to lease 820 acres of the Reservation of the Skull Valley

Band, these funds should be invested to secure a safe house, a safe job, and a safe alternative

community - away from the toxic air, land, and water of Tooele County - for each of these long-abused

Native Americans. (0203)

One commenter stated that when this project gets defeated, the people of the Reservation should be

helped with their economic development, including housing and safe jobs. (GR-16, SL1-36) 

Response: 

Many comments expressed concern about the Skull Valley Band’s decision to lease part of their

Reservation to the applicant for the construction and installation of an SNF storage facility. The FEIS

addresses the question of how and where to store SNF and, from the BIA’s perspective, how to assist

the Skull Valley Band’s economic development. Any such assistance must occur within the context of

the government-to-government relationship between the United States and the Skull Valley Band, and

the trust responsibility of the United States to the Skull Valley Band. The government-to-government

relationship requires that the alternatives be limited to those that the government of the Skull Valley

Band has presented to the Secretary of the Interior for approval. The evaluation of other economic

activities is beyond the scope of this EIS. One of the ways in which the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies exercise the trust responsibility of the United States is by analyzing in this FEIS the positive

and negative impacts of the proposed PFSF on the quality of the human environment. 

The Skull Valley Band must decide whether to allow construction of the proposed PFSF on the

Reservation to generate revenue. If the State of Utah or other organizations are willing to work with

the Skull Valley Band to find another viable economic solution, the BIA would be available to provide

the Tribe with technical assistance to evaluate other economic development opportunities and conduct

NEPA reviews. 

G.3.5.2 Alternatives Dismissed from Detailed Evaluation

G.3.5.2.1 Process for Dismissing Alternatives

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters questioned the process used to eliminate alternatives from further evaluation. One

commenter stated that the elimination of Alternative 3 based on the additional radiation doses that

workers would incur during SNF transfers contradicts previous statements that the radiation is “within

acceptable levels.” The commenter critiqued the process by assigning values to each impact and

adding up the scores, and then concluded that the no action alternative is the best option, followed by

the Wyoming alternative, and then the preferred alternative. The commenter asserted that

Alternative 1 was the only alternative considered, and alleged that the reason was money. (SL3-46) 

Another commenter stated that the DEIS was based on false information when it referred to seismicity

concerns as being “reason for rejection” of the site on the Mescalero Reservation in New Mexico. The

commenter stated that this was reason for rejection at a different site. (SL3-52)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-93 NUREG-1714

Response: 

The discussion in the Executive Summary refers to Alternative 3 as less desirable than Alternative 1

(the proposed action), but the FEIS fully evaluates the impacts from Alternative 3 in both Chapters 4,

“Environmental Consequences of Constructing and Operating the Proposed PFSF,” and 5,

“Transportation Impacts of the Proposed Action.” The additional worker dose associated with

Alternative 3 would come from an extra step in the handling process that is not part of the activities

under Alternative 1. Under Alternative 3, the use of an ITF would require the transportation casks to

be transferred from rail cars onto trucks, which would expose workers to an additional dose from this

handling step. Under Alternative 1, this handling step is eliminated because the transportation cask

would move by rail all the way to the proposed PFSF. Under either Alternative 1 or 3, the

transportation cask would be unloaded from the transport vehicle once it arrived at the proposed

PFSF. 

As discussed in Section G.3.15.4.2, NRC regulations require worker doses to be within specified limits

and require that doses be maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Also, as discussed

in Section 4.7.4 of this FEIS, the occupational doses to workers could be mitigated and maintained

ALARA by means of active programs that involve administrative controls, engineering controls,

measurements, and worker training.

The NRC staff acknowledges and appreciates the commenter’s efforts to assign a score to each

alternative. However, the NRC staff does not agree that each potential environmental impact should

be evaluated equally to develop a single numerical value for each alternative. An agency must

evaluate each environmental impact to determine its potential to cause immediate or future harm to

people or the environment. Some environmental impacts are temporary, while others are long term or

permanent. The extent of harm or damage associated with different impacts also varies. 

Furthermore, NEPA does not require that the alternative with the least impact be selected.

The comment about the Mescalero Reservation referred to Appendix F of the DEIS, “Site Selection/

Evaluation Forms,” which displays data sheets used by the applicant in its site selection process. 

The NRC staff neither developed this information/data nor relied upon it in this FEIS. The applicant

eliminated the Mescalero Reservation site from further evaluation because of seismicity and because

the applicant could not reach agreement with the controlling entity (see Section 7.1, “Site Selection

Process”).

G.3.5.2.2 The DOE Alternative

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the NRC should consider an alternative in which the DOE would take

title and possession of the utility companies’ SNF at the reactor sites until a permanent repository is

approved. (0089, 0090, 0096, 0171, 0198, 0198i, 0212) The commenters provided several reasons

for exploring this option:

C Two commenters disagreed with the NRC staff’s decision not to evaluate the DOE’s proposal

because it is speculative and because “critical issues” have not been considered. (0171, 0212) 

One commenter stated that DOE policy currently prohibits the approval of a temporary site prior to

selection and approval of a final repository, thereby making this option more viable than the

proposed site. (0090) One commenter argued that the DOE proposal should be analyzed as an

alternative because the other aspects of the nuclear waste transportation and disposal program

are just as speculative. (0171) 

C One commenter stated that no analysis of the environmental impacts of SNF storage can be

complete without considering the DOE-preferred management program. The commenter stated

that under that management program, the DOE would take title to SNF while that SNF remains in
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-94

on-site facilities associated with the reactors that generate the SNF. The commenter expected

that on a case-by-case basis, according to the preference of the utility, the DOE would either

undertake responsibility for managing these on-site storage facilities or would reimburse the utility

for its management costs. The commenter referred to the March 12, 1999, testimony of Bill

Richardson, Secretary of Energy, before the United States House Subcommittee on Energy and

Power of the Committee on Commerce. (0198, 0198i)

C The commenter indicated that the DOE prefers the on-site storage option to a centralized DOE

interim storage facility, because it would postpone the costs and potential hazards of SNF

transport until a permanent repository site has been selected, thus avoiding any unnecessary

transport in the event a site other than the proposed Yucca Mountain site is finally approved. The

commenter stated that the DOE also prefers this option, because it avoids the additional costs

associated with building a new, temporary DOE repository. The commenter stated that both of

these reasons apply to a privately owned temporary repository as well. (0198, 0198i) The

commenter stated that it is arbitrary and capricious for the NRC to dismiss the DOE proposal,

which has sufficient credibility and detail. Moreover, the commenter indicated that the program

was formulated, in part, to avoid some of the impacts that the proposed PFSF would create. 

(0198)

Some commenters opposed the DOE proposal. Referring to page 2-32, lines 16-30, Section 2.2.1.3

of the DEIS, “Alternatives That, in Effect, Eliminate the Need for the Proposed PFSF,” one commenter

stated that this option is subject to uncertainties concerning legal authority, liability, and financial and

operational responsibilities. The commenter indicated that the DOE option is similar to the no action

alternative and does not by itself increase on-site storage or allow decommissioning to be complete. 

(0163) 

Another commenter indicated that Congress has not authorized an approach in which DOE would

“take title” and possession of SNF at reactor sites, as the Secretary of Energy proposed in 1999. The

commenter stated that several governors are opposed to the move because it would create de facto

indefinite storage on sites that were never designed for extended use, and this use would be beyond

the jurisdiction of the states. According to the commenter, there is little difference between this

alternative and the no action alternative, other than that the government would have financial

responsibility, instead of the reactor licensees. (0236)

Another commenter stated the NRC staff should more closely examine the alternative that would

eliminate the need for concentrated waste storage. Specifically, the commenter stated that “despite

the fact that the latter proposal was made by the Secretary of Energy, the NRC simply sweeps it off in

the DEIS.” (0045)

Another commenter stated that the DEIS should not determine “ripeness” (p. 2-23, lines 21-31), rather

it should provide an analysis of the feasibility of alternatives. (0096)

Response: 

The NRC staff’s reasons for not including a detailed analysis of the DOE proposal in the FEIS are

discussed in Section 2.2.1.3 of the FEIS. The Secretary of Energy has stated that “we would still have

to address a range of issues, including liability, financial, and operational responsibilities.” As a result,

the NRC staff concluded that the Secretary’s proposal was not ripe for evaluation as an alternative

because it would require the NRC to speculate on its key aspects, and these uncertainties remain. A

recent contract amendment that included a provision to transfer title of SNF to the DOE, signed by the

DOE and PECO, highlights the uncertainty of this proposal (Amendment to Contract DE-CR01-83

NE44405 Between U.S. Department of Energy and PECO Energy Company, from www.rw.doe.gov). 

This contract amendment identifies specific terms and agreements that would need to be finalized if

the contract provision were to be executed. Furthermore, the contract amendment clearly identifies

the uncertainty with regard to the legal authority of the DOE to take title to the Peach Bottom storage
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-95 NUREG-1714

casks and ISFSI. The FEIS has been updated to include a discussion of the DOE and PECO contract

amendment.

The NRC staff also points out that the basic environmental impacts associated with the former

Secretary’s proposal would be analogous to the environmental impacts of the no action alternative. 

As stated in the DEIS, the SNF would continue to be stored at the reactor sites under the Secretary’s

proposal.

The NRC is a regulatory agency and does not pursue, site, construct, or manage facilities to be used

for specific purposes. The DOE is the Federal agency that would own and operate a permanent

repository. The fact that the DOE has proposed to take title to and possession of SNF does not affect

the applicant’s right to submit a license application for the proposed PFSF or the NRC’s obligation to

review the license application. Any DOE internal policy regarding the location or operation of

permanent repositories or temporary SNF storage facilities does not affect what types of facilities the

NRC can license.

NEPA does not require the NRC to evaluate alternatives that are speculative, and the NRC considers

the DOE proposal to take title to and possession of SNF to be speculative. As one commenter

indicated, it is not clear whether the DOE has legislative authority to implement this proposal. Further,

the proposal is not detailed enough for the NRC to conduct a detailed assessment of impacts, as the

specific locations to which the proposal would apply and the reactor storage sites (if any) that would

be expanded have not been identified. Absent this information, the DOE proposal is in fact similar to

the no action alternative analyzed in the EIS. The DOE proposal does not in and of itself increase

SNF storage space at reactor facilities.

G.3.5.3 The Applicant’s Site Selection Process

G.3.5.3.1 Range of Alternatives

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the discussion of siting alternatives in Chapter 8, “Facility Siting and

Design Alternatives,” of the ER was inadequate. The applicant first identified a list of 38 potential sites

using the original list of applicants to the Nuclear Waste Negotiator’s office and entities that expressed

an interest. (The commenter referenced the ER at 8.1-2 and Table 8.1-1.) At least 20 of the sites

appear to be located on an Indian Reservation. The commenter concluded that the applicant’s basis

for coarse screening could be summarized as: a willing jurisdiction, public acceptability, reasonable

distance to known capable seismic faults and reasonable known ground accelerations, reasonable

site flooding conditions, and favorable proximity to transportation access. Any jurisdictional restriction

that would prohibit the proposed facility was used as an exclusion factor. (The commenter referenced

the ER at 8.1-4.) (0198a)

The commenter stated that the applicant’s second screening phase involved regulatory criteria, but

there was no discussion or tabulation of the results from this second screening phase. The

commenter indicated that the most confusing part of the site selection process is the third phase in

which the applicant apparently used a questionnaire to determine site suitability (ER Table 8.1-2). The

commenter stated that the ER did not mention whether the applicant sent the questionnaire to all 38

site owners or just to the Skull Valley Band, nor did it discuss any of the responses to the

questionnaire. The commenter added that the applicant discussed “the remaining (3) candidate sites,”

but that the reader could not identify which sites the applicant meant, because the only sites

mentioned by name were the 38 initial sites and the two sites located on the Reservation of the Skull

Valley Band. The commenter stated that the final screening phase seemed to choose between two

sites on the Reservation that were almost contiguous. (The commenter referenced ER Fig. 8.1-2.) 

(0198a)
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NUREG-1714 G-96

In the opinion of the commenter, the applicant’s most important criterion seemed to be a willing

jurisdiction, such that its “screening” process narrowed from 38 sites to two sites located almost next

to each other on the Reservation. In addition, the commenter asserted that the ER did not apply 10

CFR 72.90-108, “Site Evaluation Factors,” to the candidate sites, and that other major omissions

included failure to consider the adequacy of transportation corridors as well as accident and risk

analyses.

The commenter stated that the NRC staff cannot rely on the applicant’s site selection criteria because

they did not apply at all levels of screening. The commenter also stated that information used in the

screening process was not described or tabulated. The commenter concluded that the siting criteria

in the ER were flawed and failed to demonstrate that the applicant fully and objectively considered the

range of alternative sites available to it. (0198a)

The same commenter stated that the discussion of alternative sites in the ER is deficient. The

commenter asserted that Section 8.1 of the ER lists 38 potential sites, but provides no reason, other

than a willing host, to explain why the Skull Valley Reservation was the only siting alternative

discussed in any detail. The commenter stated that the EIS must rigorously explore and objectively

evaluate all the 38 potential sites listed in the ER, and asserted that the fact that the 38 sites are listed

in the ER demonstrates that these sites are all reasonable alternatives to a site on the Skull Valley

Reservation. (0198h) 

Response:

Chapter 7 of the FEIS, “Evaluation of an Alternative Site in Wyoming,” includes an alternate site

analysis. Chapter 7 also provides a detailed description of the applicant’s site-selection process,

which differs from the commenter’s summary. Chapter 7 further incorporates additional information to

describe the applicant’s process to identify the two site locations that the applicant retained for field

investigation. See Section G.3.5.1.3, “Specific Storage Site Alternatives Analysis is Inadequate,” for

further explanation of the range of alternatives considered.

The NRC staff thoroughly reviewed the applicant’s site selection process. The applicant started its

site selection process by reviewing the sites identified in the NWN MRS siting process, and then

added sites whose controlling entities expressed an interest in the proposed action. The applicant did

not actively pursue any of the proposed sites without the approval and willingness of the potentially

affected controlling entities.

The NRC staff's decision is limited to the applicant’s proposal, which includes the proposed location

for the project. The NRC staff does not have the authority to require an applicant to submit a totally

different proposal, such as building a proposed facility on a different site. Rather, the NRC may make

one of three determinations on an application for a proposed action. The NRC may:

(a) grant the application (i.e., authorize the proposed action),

(b) grant the application subject to certain conditions, or

(c) deny the application.

The purpose of the review is to determine whether the proposed site is environmentally acceptable

and whether an alternate site the applicant considered is obviously superior to the proposed site (i.e.,

substantially preferable from an environmental standpoint). Also, see the next section for further

discussion of the site selection process.
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G-97 NUREG-1714

G.3.5.3.2 Adequacy of Site Selection Process

Comment Summary: 

One commenter raised several concerns about the results from the initial screening form used in the

site selection process (Appendix F, Exhibit F.3). The commenter asserted that the DEIS did not

explain the purpose, meaning, intent, or weight of the initial screening form, and stated that the form

was completed by an entity that favors the proposal because the facts are falsely slanted. (0039,

0077)

The commenter asked about the purpose of Appendix F and asked if it is considered to be supporting

information that has any bearing on the NRC’s issuing a license. (0077) The commenter stated that:

C The form contains false screening information regarding the proposed site’s distance from a

capable fault, which cannot be used to support or approve the proposed project. (0077)

C Because the majority of the responses on the form from the various sites were “unknown,” the

commenter said that the little available data are not meaningful or useful for the selection process. 

(0039)

C The area is not “free of pro-active anti-nuclear referenda” as the form states, noting that Governor

Leavitt and the Utah Legislature have provided for referenda, and Downwinders has been an

organized pro-active anti-nuclear organization for 20 years. (0039, 0077)

Another commenter stated that even if there were no referenda, there is clear opposition to the

project, which is not included in Appendix F. (SL1-07)

Another commenter asserted that the proposed PFSF site was chosen based only on economic

viability. (0212) One commenter stated that the financial relationship between the Skull Valley Band

and the applicant is currently under investigation, which raises concerns about financial improprieties. 

(SL3-06)

Another commenter suggested that the applicant selected the Reservation to attempt to avoid state

and local environmental regulations and tax requirements. (0198)

Another commenter stated that the applicant should not state that the Skull Valley Band has

voluntarily pursued the location of the proposed site on their Tribal land because one-third of the Skull

Valley Band opposes the plan. (SL1-10)

One commenter referred to Section 6.2 of the DEIS, “Environmental Justice,” which stated that the

siting of the proposed PFSF on the Reservation is the result of a voluntary choice by the Skull Valley

Band. The commenter explained that the Skull Valley Band began investigating interim storage

technology before their involvement with the applicant and negotiations regarding the lease. In

addition, the commenter stated that the Skull Valley Band has been an active participant in the

voluntary siting effort initiated under the NWPA by the NWN and is acting under its own governing

procedures as overseen by the BIA. (0163)

Response: 

The purpose of Appendix F is to display the information and the process used by the applicant to

select a site for the proposed PFSF. Section 7.1 of the DEIS, “Site Selection Process,” described the

applicant’s site selection process. As stated in the DEIS, the initial screening forms in Appendix F

were based on the information the applicant gathered for phases 1 and 2 of the site selection process. 

The applicant eliminated many of the sites with “unknown” information during the first phase of the site

selection process, because the applicant determined that the host jurisdiction was no longer willing to
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-98

site an ISFSI or because the DOE denied further funding in support of an MRS site. Section 7.1 also

discussed other information considered during the site selection process, including information from

field investigations of the final two candidate sites. The NRC staff did not use the information in

Appendix F to prepare the environmental analysis in the DEIS or any other technical reviews.

The commenter expressed concern regarding the information on the proposed site’s distance to a

capable fault. The NRC staff’s analysis of the site specific seismic characteristics and the proposed

PFSF’s design to withstand an earthquake are documented in the SER, as updated. The NRC staff

did not base its safety evaluation and conclusion on the information in Appendix F.

As stated above, the NRC staff did not use the information in Appendix F to prepare the DEIS. 

Therefore, the accuracy of the information provided in Appendix F as to “free of proactive anti-nuclear

referenda” opposition to the project is not germane to the environmental review, because the NRC

staff did not analyze it.

G.3.5.3.3 Evaluation of Nearby Population

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the proposed PFSF site is inappropriate because it is too close to a

major city, specifically the Salt Lake City metropolitan area. (0095, 0097, 0098, 0113, SL1-15, SL3-

57) One commenter stated that the area is not “remote” and that urban development in Tooele

County is increasing rapidly. (0198h)

Response: 

There are no NRC requirements that designate population density as a factor to consider in siting

ISFSIs. The NRC reviewed the environmental impacts of siting the proposed PFSF in Skull Valley. 

The NRC staff did not identify any significant environmental impact.

G.3.5.3.4 Site Selection and Discriminatory Effects

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant’s site selection process does not satisfy the demands of the

President’s Executive Order 12898 or NEPA, and the NRC staff must be directed to conduct a

thorough and in-depth investigation of the applicant’s site selection process. According to the

commenter, the NRC’s responsibility under the President’s Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions

to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations” (Feb. 11,

1994), is to make achieving environmental justice part of its mission. The commenter states that the

Executive Order further directs agencies to conduct their activities without discriminating against low

income and minority populations. According to the commenter, the Commission has voluntarily

agreed to implement the President’s directive on environmental justice.

In addition, the commenter stated that NEPA mandates that the NRC must evaluate the applicant’s

siting process to ensure the site selection is free from discrimination. The commenter also stated that

NEPA guarantees procedural protections to “all” persons and does not tolerate subjecting some

people to environmental impacts not suffered by others (see 42 USC 4331(b)(2) and (c), and 4332). 

Furthermore, the commenter stated that courts have made it clear that biased decision-making will not

be tolerated (Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115, D.C. Cir. 1971). The

commenter concluded that any discriminatory effects in the site selection process must be evaluated

under both NEPA and the President’s Executive Order.

The commenter stated that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) left no doubt in Louisiana

Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-97-8, 45 NRC 367 (1997), that the NRC is
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G-99 NUREG-1714

obligated to carry out, in good faith, the President’s Executive Order on Environmental Justice in its

activities that substantially affect human health and the environment. The commenter stated that

ASLB found the President’s Executive Order applicable to NRC licensing actions because those

actions substantially affect human health and the environment.

The commenter argued that progression of the site selection process and narrowing of the search

raised the level of minority representation in the population, and the applicant focused

disproportionately on areas of high minority populations. The commenter stated that the applicant

started its site selection with 38 sites, over 20 of which were located on Indian reservations, and

ended up with two closely located sites on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band, which raises an

inference of discrimination in the site selection process. The commenter stated that the NRC may not

approve the selection of the proposed Skull Valley site without conducting a thorough and in-depth

investigation of the applicant’s siting process to ensure the site selection was not discriminatory. (The

commenter referenced 45 NRC at 391.) (0198a)

Response: 

The commenter cited an ASLB decision in the Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. proceeding as

requiring NRC staff review of the applicant’s siting process for racial bias. (See Louisiana Energy

Services, L.P. (Claiborne Energy Center), LBP-97-8, 45 NRC 367 (1997).) The Commission,

however, reversed that portion of the ASLB’s decision in the Louisiana Energy Services, L.P.

proceeding that would have required such an NRC staff review, holding that no such review is

required. (See Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Energy Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77,

100-106 (1998).) Rather, the Commission ruled that the NRC staff, in the course of its environmental

review pursuant to NEPA, is required to evaluate whether a proposed facility would have a disparate

impact on minority and impoverished citizens. See id., at 106-110. With respect to the PFS

application, the NRC staff made precisely this inquiry, considering whether the proposed PFSF would

cause any such disparate impacts, as set forth below.

Executive Order 12898 requires Federal agencies to evaluate whether proposed actions could create

disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects upon minority or lowincome populations. Chapter 4 of this FEIS, “Environmental Consequences of Constructing and

Operating the Proposed PFSF,” presents the NRC staff’s evaluation of the impacts of the proposed

PFSF on the Skull Valley Band and concludes that no significant adverse impacts would occur. 

Section 6.2 of this FEIS, “Environmental Justice,” specifically addresses environmental justice

concerns, as related to Executive Order 12898, and concludes that the proposed action would not

result in a disproportionately high and adverse impact to low-income or minority populations. The

commenter did not identify any specific deficiencies in the FEIS regarding environmental justice, and

changes to the FEIS are not required. Also, see the discussion in Section G.3.18.

G.3.5.4 The ITF Alternative and the Use of Heavy-Haul Vehicles on Skull Valley Road

G.3.5.4.1 Opposition to Multiple Rights-of-Way and Heavy-Hauling

Comment Summary: 

One commenter asserted that the applicant has two requests for rights-of-way before the BLM, one for

an ITF and one for the rail line from Skunk Ridge (near Low, Utah). The commenter stated that the

BLM must consider at least three alternatives: granting one or the other of the proposed rights-of-way,

granting both rights-of-way, or some other combination. This commenter stated that granting one

right-of-way would have fewer environmental impacts and lower costs than granting both rights-ofway. The commenter also stated that both rights-of-way serve identical functions, so there would be

no additional benefit to granting both. (0198i) 
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NUREG-1714 G-100

Another commenter commended the DEIS statements that there would be no truck transport of

materials if the proposed PFSF opens, and that there would be a separate NEPA proceeding if the

truck transportation alternative were adopted. (SL3-09) 

Response: 

The NRC staff received the comment urging the BLM to approve only one, but not both, of the

proposed applicant rights-of-way during the scoping process. As stated in Section 1.5.3 of the DEIS,

“BLM Federal Action,” the BLM intends to approve either one or neither of the applicant’s rights-of way

requests, but not both. The action proposed by the applicant and described in the DEIS is to transport

SNF by rail to a new rail siding north of the proposed site. A new rail line would provide local

transportation of the SNF to the proposed PFSF. The DEIS also examined the impacts of operating

an ITF, including the use of heavy-haul trucks. If the applicant uses heavy-haul vehicles to transport

SNF transportation casks on Skull Valley Road, the applicant would need to obtain a road-use permit

from the Utah Department of Transportation due to the size and weight of the vehicles that it would

use. Further NEPA action would not likely be required if the applicant used heavy-haul trucks.

With respect to the comment on truck transportation, as stated in Section 2.2.4.1 of the DEIS,

“National Transportation Options,” for long distance transport of SNF the applicant would need to

obtain a license amendment from the NRC to use a different type of dual-purpose canister than

currently proposed and approved, including one that could be transported by truck. The NRC agrees

that it would need to conduct a NEPA review in order to make a decision on such a license

amendment.

G.3.5.5 Consideration of the Wyoming Alternative is Inadequate

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the NRC did not consider the Wyoming alternative seriously. (0090,

0096, 0112, 0113, 0158, 0198, 0215, GR-01, GR-14, SL1-07, SL1-11, SL1-28) Specific comments

are summarized below:

C One commenter stated that the Wyoming site was discounted because a Native American Tribe

would not benefit economically. However, the commenter stated that the Wyoming alternative has

fewer impacts since it only requires 1 mile of new rail line, whereas the proposed action requires

32 miles of new rail. (0090) 

C One commenter stated that the DEIS does not comply with requirements of NEPA to analyze the

feasible alternatives, because the only alternatives that the NRC staff analyzed were the proposed

action and the no action alternative. The commenter stated that there were little to no data for the

determination of the impact of the Wyoming site, referring to pages 9-2 and 9-3 in Section 9.3 of

the DEIS, “Comparison of Potential Impacts.” (0096) Another commenter, referring to the

Executive Summary (page xxxiii, lines 20-33), said that the Wyoming alternative has not been

adequately studied, which contradicts the intent of NEPA. (0112) The commenter stated that the

DEIS lacks credibility because it did not consider the Wyoming alternative. Referring to the

Executive Summary, page xxxviii, lines 4-44, the commenter asked how the Wyoming alternative

could be compared to the proposed action if a detailed design for an ISFSI in Wyoming does not

exist. The commenter also asked why an indefinite site in Wyoming was included and other viable

options such as permanent alternatives were excluded. (0112, SL1-11)

C One commenter stated that if the NRC is seriously considering this alternative, it should have

performed a detailed safety evaluation of the proposed site. (GR-14) 
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G-101 NUREG-1714

Response: 

Chapter 7 in the DEIS, “Evaluation of an Alternative Site in Wyoming,” identified the process the

applicant used to select the proposed site. From this process, it is clear that the applicant did, in its

final decision, consider the legislative uncertainty associated with the Wyoming site. As previously

stated, the NRC does not select sites or participate with an applicant to identify proposed sites.

The NRC staff evaluated the Wyoming site as an alternative to the proposed site and discussed this

evaluation in the FEIS. Although the Wyoming alternative was not the preferred alternative, it was

evaluated in sufficient detail to determine whether the site was obviously superior to the proposed site. 

Chapter 9 in the DEIS, “Comparison of Alternatives,” compares the potential impacts of the Skull

Valley Site A alternative with those of the Wyoming alternative. The NRC staff concluded that the

Wyoming site was not substantially preferable from an environmental standpoint and, therefore, not

obviously superior to the proposed site. The NRC staff can only perform a safety evaluation on a site

for which it has an application, and the NRC has not received an application involving the Wyoming

site.

G.3.5.6 The No Action Alternative

G.3.5.6.1 General Support for the No Action Alternative

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters supported the no action alternative, or the option of not building the proposed

PFSF. (0004, 0005, 0006, 0007, 0008, 0009, 0010, 0012, 0013, 0015, 0018, 0019, 0022, 0023, 0028,

0030, 0032, 0033, 0035, 0036, 0037, 0038, 0039, 0041, 0042, 0044, 0045, 0046, 0050, 0051, 0053,

0054, 0055, 0056, 0057, 0058, 0059, 0060, 0063, 0064, 0065, 0071, 0072, 0073, 0074, 0075, 0076,

0077, 0078, 0080, 0081, 0083, 0087, 0090, 0091, 0092, 0093, 0094, 0096, 0097, 0101, 0102, 0103,

0104, 0105, 0106, 0113, 0114, 0126, 0129, 0134, 0140, 0141, 0142, 0156, 0160, 0164, 0165, 0166,

0167, 0172, 0174, 0176, 0178, 0180, 0188, 0189, 0190, 0194, 0196, 0197, 0198g, 0198h, 0201, 0204,

0210, 0210a, 0211, 0212, 0214, 0215, 0217, 0224, 0225, 0227, 0228, 0229, 0230, 0232, 0237, 0239,

0246, 0247, 0249, 0253, 0256, 0257, 0260, 0264, GR-01, GR-05, GR-09, GR-13, GR-14, GR-20, GR21, GR-22, GR-23, SL1-01, SL1-04, SL1-05, SL1-06, SL1-09, SL1-10, SL1-12, SL1-14, SL1-15, SL1-

17, SL1-18, SL1-20, SL1-21, SL1-24, SL1-26, SL1-28, SL1-31, SL1-34, SL1-35, SL1-36, SL1-37,

SL1-38, SL1-39, SL2-02, SL2-05, SL2-09, SL2-13, SL2-14, SL2-15, SL2-16, SL2-18, SL2-19, SL3-02,

SL3-04, SL3-05, SL3-06, SL3-07, SL3-08, SL3-09, SL3-10, SL3-11, SL3-12, SL3-13, SL3-14, SL3-15,

SL3-16, SL3-17, SL3-18, SL3-20, SL3-21, SL3-22, SL3-23, SL3-24, SL3-25, SL3-26, SL3-27, SL3-28,

SL3-29, SL3-31, SL3-32, SL3-33, SL3-34, SL3-35, SL3-36, SL3-37, SL3-38, SL3-40, SL3-41, SL3-42,

SL3-43, SL3-44, SL3-45, SL3-46, SL3-47, SL3-48, SL3-49, SL3-54, SL3-57) 

One commenter stated that the NRC should evaluate the possibility of expanding existing at-reactor

storage sites or building new at-reactor storage sites. (0018) A few commenters indicated that

temporary storage should not be undertaken anywhere or that SNF should stay at the point of origin. 

(0019, 0189, 0210a, 0217, SL2-15)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges all comments supporting the no action alternative.

The alternative proposed by the commenter of expanding existing at-reactor storage sites or building

new at-reactor storage sites, is the no action alternative. The impacts of the no action alternative are

discussed in Section 6.7, “Potential Impacts of the No Action Alternative” of the FEIS and in Section

9.3, “Comparison of Potential Impacts,” and in Table 9.1, “Summary and Comparison of Potential

Environmental Impacts.” As a regulatory agency, the NRC reviews applications for at-reactor ISFSIs

or away-from reactor ISFSIs such as the proposed PFSF. The NRC will issue a license for such
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NUREG-1714 G-102

activities only if an applicant provides reasonable assurance that it will implement its proposal so as to

provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. To the extent comments addressed

particular aspects of the NRC staff’s evaluation of the no-action alternative, such comments are

addressed below.

G.3.5.6.2 Impacts of the No Action Alternative Compared to the Proposed Action

Selection of the No Action Alternative as the Preferred Alternative

Comment Summary: 

Some commenters stated that the DEIS failed to explain adequately why the no action alternative was

not selected as the preferred alternative. (0018, 0096, 0142, 0198, 0198g, 0198h, 0201, 0204, 0215,

SL1-04, SL1-07, SL1-21, SL1-28, SL2-12, SL3-23) Other commenters argued that the no action

alternative was the most technically feasible, cost-effective, and safe alternative for storing SNF. 

(0039, 0077, 0166, 0215, SL1-04) One commenter stated that the NRC must approve only the no

action alternative and cited the DEIS Executive Summary (page xli, lines 26 through 49), which states

that SNF can be stored on site without significant environmental impact for at least 30 years. (0039,

0077) Several commenters asserted that the data in the DEIS are insufficient to support the proposed

alternative but show that the no action alternative is the only reasonable option. (0039, 0077, 0142,

0156, SL2-02) One commenter claims that dry cask storage until a permanent storage solution, such

as [the proposed] Yucca Mountain can be completed is clearly the safer and less expensive

alternative. The commenter stated that a temporary high-level storage facility should not be

considered before final determination of the permanent repository location. The commenter added

that the DEIS notes that DOE policy requires that a permanent storage site be completed by 2010,

and that there would be minimal impact to energy supplies and no negative impact on health or safety

if on-site storage continues until then. (GR-01) 

Several commenters stated that if the waste is safe, as the NRC contends, then it should stay where it

is. (0012, 0028, 0034, 0035, 0037, 0049, 0060, 0076, 0098, 0101, 0126, 0128, 0212, 0225, 0229,

0246, SL1-01, SL1-04, SL1-09, SL1-20, SL2-15, SL3-06, SL3-16, SL3-18, SL3-38, SL3-43)

Commenters provided various reasons for supporting the no action alternative. Some commenters

asserted that the proposed PFSF would create safety risks (0029, 0039, 0053, 0054, 0055, 0056,

0063, 0064, 0077, 0103, 0106, 0129, 0131, 0160, 0166, 0172, 0174, 0198, 0237, 0246, 0257, 0260,

GR-01, GR-21, SL1-06, SL1-20, SL1-21, SL1-38, SL1-39, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL2-13, SL2-15, SL3-02,

SL3-04, SL3-06, SL3-25, SL3-35, SL3-36, SL3-38, SL3-42, SL3-43), health risks (0007, 0022, 0029,

0044, 0063, 0114, 0115, 0141, 0151, 0160, 0260, GR-21, SL1-37, SL2-05, SL3-02, SL3-04, SL3-36),

environmental impacts (0090, 0114, 0115, 0151, 0156, 0160, SL3-46), and financial risks. (0005,

0029, 0039, 0077, 0090, 0104, 0141, 0156, 0160, 0237, GR-01, SL1-04, SL1-39, SL2-05, SL2-16,

SL3-02) Other commenters stated that the impacts from new or expanded at-reactor SNF storage

facilities would be small. (0007, 0142) One commenter cited the DEIS Executive Summary (page

lviii), and stated that the impact of the no action alternative on nuclear power plants would be

substantially smaller than the expected impact of the proposed PFSF, due to the smaller quantity of

SNF that would need to be stored at each individual plant. (0090) Two commenters stated that the

no action alternative would have minimal impact on energy supplies because reactors would continue

to store SNF at their sites, and no negative, incremental environmental impacts would result. (0051,

0090) Specific comments included:

• One commenter indicated that the NRC has stated publicly and in the DEIS that at-reactor storage

is safe and would have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment, but failed to

adequately address why at-reactor storage cannot be expanded. The commenter suggested the

following reasons why storage cannot be expanded: some reactors may not have sufficient room

to expand their storage facilities or to construct new storage areas; and if the reactor has room to

expand, several state legislatures or other governmental entities have expressed strong
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G-103 NUREG-1714

opposition to such expansion. The commenter stated that the FEIS should present a more

detailed discussion of these reasons. (0089)

• One commenter referred to Chapter 6, “Summary of Impacts,” of the DEIS and stated that

continued SNF storage at either existing at-reactor storage facilities or in new or expanded atreactor SNF storage facilities would create no significant impacts on human health, ecological

resources, cultural resources, air quality, water resources, noise, scenic qualities, or recreation. 

(0142) One commenter referred to Chapter 9 of the DEIS, “Comparison of Alternatives,” Section

9.4.1.5, “The No Action Alternative,” and stated that no health or safety risks would be eliminated

by the proposed action. (0007) Another commenter stated that placing highly radioactive SNF on

an earthquake-susceptible site exposed to the weather is not acceptable. (SL1-31)

• Another commenter stated that storing SNF at the place of generation is the most logical

approach in the management of high level waste because on-site storage reduces the public’s

exposure to high level waste, reduces the health risk posed by high level waste, presents a more

manageable and controlled environment should an accident occur, provides a site secure from the

public, includes employees of generators of high level waste trained in evacuation procedures,

includes trained personnel and specialized equipment, facilitates prevention or containment of

contamination, and occurs where the site has undergone extensive scientific studies and been

deemed suitable for activities involving radioactive material. (0198h) According to the

commenter, storing SNF at the reactor site longer would significantly decrease the dose rates

outside of shipping casks, thus greatly reducing radiation exposures to workers and the public

during an accident or during incident-free transport. (0198g) Another commenter asserted that

dry casks already in use at reactors have suffered from early degradation and manufacturing

defects. The commenter indicated that this is a good reason to support the no action alternative. 

Also, the commenter stated that the longer high-level wastes are allowed to cool down at the

reactors the more they will radioactively decay and the less dangerous they will be for transport in

the future. (0257) Another commenter stated that compared to the no action alternative, the

proposed action will result in greater release of radioactivity from cask handling, increased waste

generation, increased air pollution, and more negative impacts. (0215)

• One commenter supported the no action alternative due to concern about the DEIS groundwater

assessment. (SL2-16) 

• Another commenter supported the no action alternative noting the accident potential of aircraft

flying in the area of the proposed PFSF. (SL2-01) Another commenter supported the no action

alternative because expansion of at-reactor SNF storage would occur at sites already disturbed by

construction activities. (0051)

• One commenter referred to the Executive Summary, page xli, lines 24-45 of the DEIS and stated

that the no action alternative would seem to have favorable cost benefits compared to the costs of

transportation, necessary radiological remediation team, training of such a team, etc. for the

proposed site. (0096) One commenter stated that the only answer to the nuclear waste problem

is on-site storage and deactivation of the material. (0196) 

• Another commenter stated that dry cask storage technology could be safe for on-site storage and

notes that such a technology did not exist when Yucca Mountain was considered as the only site

to be studied for a possible repository. (SL2-12) 

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that SNF can be safely stored at facilities on or near the site of production. 

However, NRC regulations (10 CFR Part 72) allow for the storage of SNF in away-from-reactor

facilities as well. The applicant has requested a license for an away-from-reactor ISFSI, under the

provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, and that application is being reviewed on its own merit. Although it may
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NUREG-1714 G-104

be true that reactor licensees could choose to develop on-site storage for the SNF, they have the right,

in accordance with the regulations, to pursue other options. The proposed PFSF is one such option.

The NRC has reviewed the application for the proposed PFSF. In addition to reviewing the technical

aspects of the application and determining whether the application complies with NRC safety

requirements (10 CFR Part 72), the NRC staff reviewed the environmental impacts of the proposed

action. After these reviews are completed, the five Commissioners will consider the information in the

FEIS, the SER, and the record of the proceeding before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and

will make a decision whether or not to license the proposed PFSF.

The at-reactor storage alternative was analyzed in the EIS under the no action alternatives analysis. 

This analysis concluded that at-reactor storage is a possibility for many power reactor sites, although

continued storage at some sites will become difficult and could result in some reactors shutting down

prior to the end of their licensed lives if sufficient on-site storage capacity is not available. Based on

its analysis of the no action alternative, the NRC staff concludes that SNF could continue to be stored

at reactor sites without significant environmental impact. The no action alternative was discussed in

Chapters 2, 6, and 9 of the DEIS. Commenters stated that the DEIS presents only one alternative

(the proposed action), and ignores, negates, or inadequately treats the no action alternative. Section

6.7 of the DEIS discusses the environmental impacts of the no action alternative and Table 9.1 of the

DEIS sets forth a comparison of the environmental effects of the proposed action and alternatives,

including the no action alternative. Notwithstanding the discussion in the DEIS, the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies have revised the text of Chapter 9 in the FEIS to (1) specifically explain the

differences between the proposed action and the no action alternative, and (2) discuss why the no

action alternative was not selected as the preferred alternative. The NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies have included this discussion in Section 9.3 of this FEIS. That section documents the

environmental impacts of the no action alternative, as compared to the proposed action.

Transportation Benefits of No Action Alternative

Comment Summary:

Several commenters raised transportation concerns as a reason not to build the proposed PFSF. 

(0033, 0035, 0039, 0061, 0063, 0077, 0083, 0103, 0105, 0128, 0151, 0172, 0174, 0198g, 0203, 0214,

0217, 0246, 0249, 0257, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL2-13, SL3-06, SL3-36, SL3-43) One commenter stated

that transportation distances would be reduced by the no action alternative, which would be one of its

highly significant benefits. The commenter stated that by waiting to ship SNF until a final repository is

available, the number of transport miles would be reduced and the number of intermodal transfers

would be reduced, thus eliminating radiation doses from incident-free transportation and reducing the

chance of accidents involving radiological releases. (0198g) One commenter stated that the no

action alternative would have significantly fewer impacts because it does not require the transportation

of SNF through numerous states and hundreds of communities, with all the risks and costs such an

unprecedented transportation campaign would entail. (0204) Three commenters who support the no

action alternative stated that shipping nuclear waste through cities and towns increases the risk of

accidents. (0051, 0151, 0174) Other commenters stated that it would be extremely dangerous to

move the waste twice. (0051, 0063, 0103, 0166, 0198g, GR-01) Another commenter stated that the

NRC has been reluctant to address the option of storing the SNF on site of the generating facilities,

thereby avoiding the risks and costs of transporting hundreds to thousands of shipments of waste half

way across the country, only to later incur the risks and costs of moving that waste again into the

repository. (0185)

One commenter stated that the evaluation of the no action alternative should include the impacts,

risks, and costs that would be avoided if SNF were stored at existing nuclear power plant sites until a

permanent repository becomes available, arguing that the applicant’s proposal doubles the number of

times that SNF must be transferred to and from storage casks to shipping casks, increases the

distance that the SNF must be shipped, and increases the time that SNF would be moving across the
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G-105 NUREG-1714

country, subject to accidents or sabotage. This commenter asserted that some transportation

corridors, including the I-80 Union Pacific Railroad transportation corridor east-west through Tooele

and Salt Lake Counties, are not designated transportation corridors for other shipments of high level

nuclear waste, and except for the pending proposal would not be subject to the risks of transportation

of high level nuclear waste. The same commenter argues that the NWPA requires the Federal

government, when selecting interim storage sites, to minimize the transportation of SNF. (42 USC

10155(a)(3)). The commenter believes that as part of the EIS, if the NRC determines that the

proposed PFSF would result in excess transportation of SNF rods, the EIS must recommend that the

proposed PFSF alternative is flawed and unacceptable under NEPA. (0198h)

Response: 

Regarding transportation risk, the NRC staff evaluated the risk of transporting SNF to and from the

proposed PFSF and concluded that the risk is small. For more a detailed response, see Section

G.3.16.

G.3.5.6.3 Adequacy of Evaluation of No Action Alternative Impacts on Reactor Sites

Comment Summary: 

Some commenters stated that the DEIS needs additional analysis and explanation of the no action

alternative as it would affect existing reactor sites. (0007, 0142, 0198h, 0204) One commenter stated

that the EIS must address more fully the alternative of storing high level nuclear waste as it is currently

being stored, under the control of the generator or operator, until a permanent repository is available. 

One commenter stated that, in accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR 1502.14(d), evaluation of

this no action alternative should assess the impacts and risks that could be avoided if the SNF

continues to be stored at the existing reactor sites. (0198h, 0198i) One commenter cited page 2-43,

lines 38-48 of the DEIS and stated that the no action alternative needs to include analysis, such that

the public can compare the proposed action with the no action alternative. (0096) Another

commenter stated that the DEIS needs to examine the feasibility of SNF storage at existing sites for

an additional 10 years until the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada, facility is completed. (0007) One

commenter stated that the impact on transportation of the no action alternative was not evaluated. 

(0198g) The commenter stated that the DEIS failed to evaluate the impact of numerous other actions,

which would extend the dates of loss of full core offload capacity. The commenter added that all of

those actions are part of the no action alternative and should be evaluated. (0198) 

One commenter argued that Section 6.7 of the DEIS, “Purpose and Impacts of No Action Alternative,”

should have addressed the impacts of the delay in decommissioning shut down reactors under the no

action alternative, and the added costs of building ISFSIs at reactor sites that would be avoided by the

proposed PFSF. Referring to page 6-45 of the DEIS, the commenter indicated that activities at

existing reactor sites may have additional impacts beyond those discussed in existing NEPA

documentation for those sites, since additional land may need to be cleared for an ISFSI. The

commenter stated that cumulatively the impacts at existing sites would probably be as large as, or

even larger than, those at the proposed PFSF, even if the impacts at existing sites are small at each

site. This commenter also argued that the discussion of the no action alternative should include the

possibility that some reactors may have to cease operations because of state or local restrictions on

SNF storage, in addition to ceasing operation due to physical constraints on SNF storage. (0163)

Commenters argued that the DEIS failed to describe the potential impacts of the no action alternative

on the individual applicant participants. (0018, 0198) 

One commenter cited pages xlix through lxxiii and Table ES.2 of the Executive Summary, as well as

pages 9-15 through 9-39, and Table 9.1 of the DEIS, and stated that the evaluation of the

environmental impacts for the no action alternative was based on impacts at an individual reactor site

rather than at many reactor sites. Comparing the impacts of the proposed PFSF to the impacts at one
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NUREG-1714 G-106

reactor site would generally result in lower impacts at the individual reactor site due to its size. The

commenter indicated that it would be more appropriate to assume that the impacts occur at those

reactor sites that would depend upon the proposed PFSF throughput scenario, arguing that the same

quantity of SNF would be stored either at the proposed PFSF or at reactor sites (as was done for the

cost-benefit analysis). This commenter argued that the population impacts at reactor sites would likely

be higher than those for the proposed PFSF because many reactor sites have higher population

densities than the proposed site. Therefore, the commenter recommended that the NRC re-examine

its results for the no action alternative to ensure that these results appropriately reflect potential

impacts at many reactor sites rather than at a single reactor site. (0163)

Another commenter stated that there is no justification for evaluating the potential impacts of the no

action alternative in a manner that “is limited to broad observations about the nuclear power industry.”

(Page 6-44, lines 42-44 of the DEIS) (0018-3, 0198-83) The same commenter also suggested that the

EIS should evaluate the storage of SNF at other reactor sites under the no action alternative. (0018)

One commenter stated that the DEIS is not consistent because page 6-43 (lines 27-28) stated that the

no action alternative could lead to impacts at other locations, while page 6-44 (lines 13-26) stated that

the storage of SNF in casks will not have a significant incremental effect on the quality of the human

environment. (0096)

Response: 

The no action alternative describes the situation in which the current system for managing SNF

continues to be implemented. Under the no action alternative, reactor licensees would continue to

store SNF at their reactor sites in facilities such as SNF pools or at-reactor dry cask ISFSIs until the

SNF is transferred to a permanent geological repository. The no action alternative is described in

Section 2.2.5 of the FEIS, “No Action Alternative.” An analysis of environmental impacts of the no

action alternative is included in Section 6.7 of the FEIS, “Potential Impacts of the No Action

Alternative.” The environmental effects of the no action alternative are compared to those of the

proposed action in Section 9.3 and Table 9.1 of the FEIS.

As discussed in the FEIS, under the no action alternative, reactor licensees could expand the on-site

storage capacity for SNF by constructing and operating at-reactor ISFSIs under a site-specific or

general license, or, if possible, by expanding the capacity of their SNF pools. Some reactor licensees

have already initiated or completed such expansions under their existing licenses and may be unable

to expand such capacity further. Under this option, all SNF would be stored at existing sites until such

time as a permanent repository or DOE interim storage facility becomes available. For other sites

where expansion of on-site storage cannot be accommodated either economically or because of

physical constraints, reactor licensees could propose developing an ISFSI at different locations away

from the reactor sites, or the licensees could shut down the reactors prior to expiration of their

operating licenses. For reactor licensees that can construct at-reactor ISFSIs, the NRC staff

concluded that the environmental impacts would be small. See FEIS Section 9.4.1.5. In reaching this

determination, the NRC staff appropriately referenced past studies that evaluated the environmental

impacts of at-reactor dry storage ISFSIs. With the exception of the site-specific ISFSI environmental

assessments, the other studies considered the cumulative impacts of building at-reactor dry storage

ISFSIs at multiple reactor sites. While storage of SNF in casks at an individual reactor site will not

have a significant incremental impact on the quality of the human environment, this does not mean

such storage will not have any impact. The statements in Chapter 9 of the DEIS noted by the

commenter are not inconsistent.

Commenters suggested that the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies analyze impacts on individual

PFS members of the no action alternative. The no action alternative involves the impacts of the

current system for managing SNF, which is continued storage in at-reactor facilities. The NRC staff

cannot speculate what actions specific reactor licensees would take in the event that the proposed

PFSF is not licensed. There are literally hundreds of permutations of specific actions for SNF
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G-107 NUREG-1714

management that could be analyzed, and such analysis is impracticable. Any request for a specific

licensing action concerning management of SNF at a particular site would be subject to NRC

licensing, and the NRC would evaluate the site-specific impacts of any such proposals as part of the

licensing process. Moreover, the NRC is not aware of the specific business decisions any licensee

would make with respect to nuclear fuel storage at their reactor sites.

The NRC is a regulatory agency that is responsible for licensing and regulating reactors and SNF

storage facilities. The NRC does not have the authority to develop or impose upon an individual

reactor licensee, or upon the nuclear power industry as a whole, a specific program for managing

SNF. It is the responsibility of the reactor licensees to manage their SNF until a permanent geologic

repository becomes available, or DOE otherwise takes title to the SNF.

Regarding the comment that the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF should be compared to

the cumulative impacts of multiple at-reactor ISFSIs, the previous environmental assessment

completed for the 10 CFR Part 72 general licensing rulemaking was in fact based on the impacts of

constructing ISFSIs at multiple sites. Consistent with the results of that analysis and the Waste

Confidence Decision, the FEIS concludes that the environmental impacts from multiple at-reactor

ISFSIs is small.

G.3.5.6.4 Support for the No Action Alternative based on Equity Issues

Comment Summary:

A number of commenters argued that because the waste was created in other parts of the country, it

should stay where it was generated. (0027, 0028, 0029, 0030, 0031, 0034, 0035, 0053, 0061, 0063,

0067, 0076, 0085, 0093, 0094, 0098, 0101, 0103, 0105, 0111, 0114, 0115, 0126, 0131, 0140, 0147,

0167, 0176, 0198, 0203, 0208, 0210b, 0211, 0212, 0247, GR-01, GR-14, GR-21, SL1-02, SL1-06,

SL1-10, SL1-18, SL1-20, SL1-29, SL1-35, SL1-37, SL1-38, SL1-39, SL2-15, SL2-18, SL2-19, SL3-02,

SL3-04, SL3-24, SL3-26, SL3-38, SL3-43) 

Several commenters stated that the SNF should stay where the benefits are derived and the tax

dollars are enjoyed. (0030, 0063, 0071, 0167, SL1-06) 

One commenter stated that shipping SNF to Utah would lead to more government distrust and

heartache for the citizens of Utah. (0098) 

One commenter stated that the impacts implied in the Executive Summary (page xli, lines 9-18) of the

DEIS are the responsibility of the nuclear industries. The commenter stated that if this intent is

implied, then it should be the responsibility of the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies to state that the

nuclear industries are the only industries that do not have to be responsible for the waste they

generate. (0096)

Response:

As stated in Chapter 7 of the DEIS, “Evaluation of an Alternative Site in Wyoming,” the NRC neither

selects sites nor participates with an applicant in selecting proposed sites. NRC regulations in 10

CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste,” do not contain requirements related to the geographic proximity of ISFSIs

and the reactors that generated the SNF. Applicants are free to propose sites of their choosing for

ISFSIs, and the NRC is required to review safety and environmental issues related to any particular

application. To obtain a license, an applicant must comply with the NRC’s safety requirements, which

shows that the applicant will provide adequate protection of the public health and safety, as required

by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). Under the AEA and the NWPA, each licensee

is responsible for the safety of waste it generates. The AEA, NWPA, and NEPA, however, do not
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NUREG-1714 G-108

impose any geographic requirements for SNF storage in relation to the location at which the SNF was

generated.

G.3.5.6.5 Adequacy of Discussion of No Action Alternative in Environmental Report

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the ER does not comply with NEPA because it does not adequately

discuss the no action alternative. The commenter stated the basis for this assertion as follows:

C NEPA requires a discussion of the no action alternative (the commenter referenced 40 CFR

1502.14(2)). To satisfy NEPA, the NRC must consider the environmental consequences of not

undertaking the action at all, or of continuing with the current plans and management regime. The

applicant’s ER cannot be used to meaningfully discuss the no action alternative, because the

applicant focused solely on the perceived disadvantages of the no action alternative. NEPA

requires that the no action alternative be included in the analysis to serve as a baseline and basis

of comparison with the proposed action and other alternatives. By not properly considering the no

action alternative, the applicant failed to provide a balanced comparison of environmental

consequences among alternatives. For example, the ER did not consider the advantages of: not

transporting 4,000 casks of SNF rods through thousands of miles across the country; not

enhancing the potential for sabotage at a centralized storage facility; not increasing the risk of

accidents from additional cask handling, etc.

The commenter quoted the following statement by the applicant: “The construction of additional onsite ISFSIs at plant sites will result in more sites disturbed and greater environmental impact than

constructing one site in a remote, desert environment.” (The commenter referenced the ER at 8.1-3). 

The commenter stated that the “remote desert environment” referred to by the applicant is thousands

of miles from any domestic nuclear power reactor and twenty-four miles from the nearest railhead. 

The commenter asserted that the applicant failed to discuss the considerable safety advantages of

storing SNF near the reactors, whose SNF pools would be available for transfers or inspections of

degraded fuel. The commenter stated that, in contrast to expansion of on-site storage capacity within

the reactor basin and any environmental disturbance that may entail, the “remote desert site” chosen

by the applicant is an undisturbed site used primarily for grazing and an area of cultural and historical

significance to a number of groups, including Native Americans.

The commenter stated that the NRC cannot rely on the applicant’s inadequate and one-sided

discussion of the no action alternative. The commenter concluded that the NRC would not satisfy

NEPA if it does not adequately address all sides of the no action alternative the commenter

referenced. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment was received prior to the publication of the DEIS and was directed at the ER that was

submitted to the NRC as part of the license application. This FEIS represents the NRC staff’s

evaluation of the environmental impacts of the proposed action. Specifically, the no action alternative

is discussed in Section 2.2.5 of this FEIS, “No Action Alternative;” potential impacts of the no action

alternative are evaluated in Section 6.7, “Potential Impacts of the No Action Alternative;” and the

environmental effects of the no action alternative are compared to that of the proposed action in

Section 9.3 and Table 9.1.
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G-109 NUREG-1714

G.3.5.6.6 Discussion of Adverse Operational and Environmental Impacts of the

 No Action Alternative

Comment Summary:

Commenters referred to the discussion of the no action alternative in the Executive Summary (page

xli, line 19) and stated that the discussion of the no action alternative should include the possibility that

some reactors may have to terminate operations because of state or local restrictions on SNF storage,

in addition to termination due to physical constraints on SNF storage. (0016, 0163) One of these

commenters asserted that coal-fired power plants might replace the closed facilities, which would

result in increased particulate levels downwind of the plants. (0016) Another commenter said that

termination of the operation of nuclear reactor licenses and expansion of on-site storage are also

alternatives to current operations at these sites. (0096)

Response:

The NRC staff has changed the Executive Summary to reflect the commenters’ point.
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G.3.6 Agency Actions and Decisions

G.3.6.1 General Comments

G.3.6.1.1 Agency Responsibility

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern for the ethical implications of the action, in combination with

previous actions that have led to the current land uses around Skull Valley. (0011) 

One commenter stated that the DEIS did not clearly define the regulatory responsibility of each of the

Federal agencies to comply with NEPA. The same commenter expressed concern about the purpose

of the DEIS and the limited participation and analysis of the DEIS by the public. The commenter

noted that Section 102 of NEPA states: “1) [T]he Federal Government shall ... (A) utilize a systematic,

interdisciplinary approach which will ensure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and

the environmental design arts in planning and decision-making which may have an impact on man’s

environment; (B) identify and develop methods and procedures... which will insure that presently

unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration along with

economic and technical consideration...” The commenter stated that the DEIS was developed by the

NRC, the BIA, the BLM, and the STB, and that although each of these agencies are significantly

different from each other, the DEIS does not state what each agency’s responsibility will be in the

decision-making process for this proposed action. Thus, the commenter stated that the public’s ability

is limited on the determination of “what is the impact” of the proposed action. For example, the

commenter said that the BLM, the NRC, and the STB have different regulations to assure that

remediation of incidents will occur, and that each agency differs on how the remediation is to occur. 

(0096) 

Response:

This FEIS evaluates the cumulative impacts of the proposed action in Section 6.3. This analysis

evaluates how the incremental environmental impacts of the proposed action add to the impacts from

past, present, and reasonable foreseeable actions within the vicinity of the proposed PFSF. The other

commercial facilities in that area of Utah have been permitted and licensed by the State of Utah. 

As stated in the DEIS, the cumulative impacts of the proposed PFSF are small. The Cooperating

Agencies are unaware of and the commenter does not identify a requirement for an evaluation of

perceived ethical implications of past actions.

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge the commenter’s concern that the DEIS

does not clearly define the regulatory responsibility of each agency. However, Section 1.5 of the DEIS

describes the regulatory authority and the Federal action before the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies for the proposed PFSF, as well as each agency’s responsibilities under NEPA.

G.3.6.1.2 Agency Oversight

Comment Summary:

One commenter noted that Representative Hansen of Utah has called for a Congressional

investigation into the Federal agencies' oversight of the process related to the financial arrangements

between the Skull Valley Band and the applicant. (SL3-06)
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NUREG-1714 G-112

Response:

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge the comment summarized above. The issue in

the comment is not directly related to the NEPA environmental review of the proposed PFSF, and

therefore no response is warranted. Should any investigation be initiated, the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies will fully cooperate.

G.3.6.1.3 Support for Agency Oversight

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed support for the Federal government's ability to oversee the proposed

action. (SL1-33) Another commenter supported the credibility of the NRC. (SL3-03)

Response:

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge this comment. No further response is

required.

G.3.6.1.4 Review Process in Light of Lawsuits

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that various lawsuits and appeals have been filed against the BIA, the

applicant, and the BLM regarding the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that the processing of

this application should be suspended pending resolution of these actions. (SL1-17) 

Response: 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has dismissed the State of Utah’s lawsuit

against the DOI. State of Utah v. United States Department of the Interior, 210 F.3d 1193 (10th Circ.

2000). The United States District Court for the District of Utah has dismissed another lawsuit against

the DOI. State of Utah v. United States Department of the Interior, Consolidated Case No. 2: 

98CV380K (D. Utah, February 14, 2000). The plaintiffs did not appeal that dismissal. These lawsuits,

challenging the BIA’s conditional approval of the proposed lease, are separate processes and concern

separate issues from the NEPA process currently underway. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

conducted the review of the proposed action in accordance with all applicable regulations. These

regulations do not require the agencies to stop their review due to the existence of a lawsuit or appeal.

G.3.6.1.5 Agency Decision-Making

Comment Summary:

Several comments were provided regarding decision-making authority:

C One commenter inquired about who will make the decision concerning this project so that

comments could be sent directly to the decision-maker(s). (SL3-57) 

C Commenters expressed dissatisfaction with previous Federal agency decision-making which led

to nuclear testing and nerve gas. (SL2-05, SL2-18, SL3-04) 

C One commenter stated that construction of the PFSF must not be allowed to begin until all agency

decision-making has been completed. The commenter added that no agency should be forced to

make an objective determination while the applicant commits large amounts of resources to this

project. (0198)
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G-113 NUREG-1714

C One commenter asserted that there is some contempt for the NRC’s decision-making process,

based on what the commenter indicated is a well-established history of bias and self-interested

decisions masquerading as objective science. The commenter stated that a full civic dialogue is

needed in which the NRC acts with integrity and credibility. (SL3-49)

Response:

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have conducted the review of the proposed PFSF in

accordance with all applicable Federal regulations. The comment on previous Federal agency

decision-making which led to nuclear testing and the development of nerve gas addresses actions not

related to this proposal, and thus, does not require a response. As stated in the DEIS, the decision on

whether to grant a license to the applicant is being made by the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR

Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level

Radioactive Waste.” These regulations define several steps in the decision-making process, including

a safety review, and an environmental review. Specific safety and environmental regulations in 10

CFR Part 72 and 10 CFR Part 51 govern these reviews. The NRC staff has conducted a safety

review and an environmental review. These reviews are documented in a SER and this FEIS, both of

which are available to the public.

The concerns of interested persons are also addressed before the NRC’s ASLB. The State of Utah

and other intervenors were granted status as parties to the ASLB adjudicatory proceeding on the

license application. The intervenors raised a number of safety and environmental contentions that

have been, or are in the process of being, adjudicated. This adjudicatory process began in 1997,

shortly after the NRC staff received the license application from PFS. Hearings on some of the safety

contentions were held in Salt Lake City in June 2000. Hearings on remaining safety contentions and

environmental contentions are scheduled to be held in Salt Lake City during 2002. The final ROD for

the application for the proposed PFSF will be the ASLB’s initial decision or the final decision of the five

Presidentially-appointed NRC Commissioners acting together as the Commission. The Commission’s

decision need not be unanimous. The five Commissioners, acting as a body, may delegate the

Commission’s authority to issue a license to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards. While the STB has granted a license for construction and operation of the proposed rail

line from Skunk Ridge to the proposed PFSF, construction of the facility would not begin until the BIA

approves the lease, the BLM approves the ROW for the transportation facilities, and the applicant

obtains any applicable construction-related permits.

The BIA is fulfilling its trust responsibility by conducting its own independent evaluation of the EIS to

ensure that it adequately analyzes the potential impacts of the BIA’s proposed action and alternatives

on the quality of the human environment. Upon the completion of the FEIS and if the NRC issues the

proposed license, the BIA will issue its own ROD, and make a decision on the proposed lease.

G.3.6.1.6 Executive Order 11514 – National Environmental Policy Act, Protection and

 Enhancement of Environmental Quality

Comment Summary:

Referring to page 1-19, line 23 of the DEIS, one commenter stated that NEPA has been violated

because there is no environmental enhancement, only environmental degradation and threat to the

BLM’s ACEC. (0077)

Response:

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies disagree that NEPA has been violated. NEPA requires

Federal agencies to assess the environmental impacts of their actions and to give those impacts

appropriate consideration in their decision-making. NEPA does not require that the proposed action

enhance the environment.
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G.3.6.2 The NRC Action

G.3.6.2.1 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the NWPA does not permit the construction and operation of an MRS until

a permanent disposal facility has been identified. (SL1-14)

One commenter noted that the DEIS stated that the SNF stored at Skull Valley (the proposed site) will

be transported to the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository, when that facility has not yet been

licensed. (SL2-17) One commenter stated that the NRC should develop a national policy before

waste materials are stored in any community. (SL1-12)

Referring to page 1-6, lines 39-41, in the DEIS, one commenter said that it is DOE’s problem, not the

residents of Utah, that the deadline imposed by the NWPA is already nearly two years delinquent. 

The commenter stated that mismanagement and an apparent unwillingness to abide by the law

discredits those who are presently making judgments with respect to relative degrees of

environmental and socio-economic impacts. The commenter stated that there is a conflict of interest,

and that justice cannot be served in any reasonable fashion by the same people who are responsible

for creating the problem of delay. (0112)

Response:

The NRC acknowledges these comments. The issues raised in the comments are related to the

requirements of the NWPA that apply primarily to DOE activities and responsibilities. These issues

are not directly related to the PFSF environmental review and therefore need not be considered in this

EIS. However, the commenters should note that the proposed PFSF is not an MRS, but an awayfrom-reactor ISFSI. Away-from-reactor ISFSIs are licensed under 10 CFR Part 72. Also, the NRC

and the DOE are separate Federal agencies. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 established the

NRC and the DOE. The mission of the NRC is to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials for the

protection of public health and safety. One of DOE’s responsibilities is to establish a permanent

repository for SNF and high level waste (for which the NRC will make a licensing determination).

The NRC acknowledges the comments on the proposed Yucca Mountain facility and notes that they

are beyond the scope of the EIS. However, it should be noted that in its Waste Confidence Decision,

10 CFR 51.23 (55 Fed. Reg. 38474; Sept. 18, 1990), the NRC stated that at least one mined

geological repository will be available at the end of 2025. The NRC finds no basis for the comment on

conflict of interest.

G.3.6.2.2 The NRC’s Authority Under NWPA

Comment Summary:

One commenter said that the NRC should not have the authority to make such a decision and that it

should be left up to the people of the United States. (0117)

Another commenter requested that the NRC staff acknowledge that western states acting through the

Western Governors Association have established a clear policy that "a private interim storage facility

shall not be located within the geographic boundaries of a western state without the written consent of

the governor." (0142)

One commenter stated that the DEIS is fatally flawed because the NRC is acting beyond its statutory

authority in issuing a license to the applicant. The commenter said that Congress has not authorized

the NRC to issue a license to a private entity for a centralized 4,000-cask, away-from reactor, SNF
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-115 NUREG-1714

storage facility. The commenter asserted that the NRC may only license the storage of SNF at

facilities that are authorized by statute. 

The same commenter stated that the NWPA, Part B, Interim Storage Program, 42 USC 10151-10157,

defines the scope of facilities authorized for interim storage of SNF. In light of the NWPA, the

commenter asserted that the NRC cannot rely on its general statutory authority or authority to license

SNF as the source of its authority to license a centralized 4,000-cask away-from-reactor facility

operated by a corporation claiming limited liability. The commenter asserted that the NRC’s general

licensing authority does not give the NRC carte blanche authority to make any rules it wishes

regarding away-from-reactor storage of SNF.

The commenter stated that the Congress authorized storage of SNF away from reactors only at

Federally-owned facilities, citing 42 USC 10155(h). According to the commenter, neither the NWPA

nor the statutory basis in 1980 for the NRC to promulgate Part 72 can be construed as authorizing the

NRC to issue a license for a privately-owned, centralized 4,000-cask, away-from-reactor, nuclear

waste storage facility that is being sought by the applicant. The commenter stated that the Congress

granted the NRC rulemaking authority for licensing technologies for the storage of civilian SNF at the

site of any civilian nuclear power reactor, citing 42 USC 10153. The commenter also stated that the

NWPA authorized the “establishment of a Federally owned and operated system for the interim

storage of SNF at one or more facilities owned by the Federal Government with not more than 1,900

metric tons of capacity,” citing 42 USC 10151(b)(2).

The commenter also stated that there is no assurance that the SNF in Utah will ever be moved. In

addition, the commenter stated that the licensing of an off-site ISFSI is totally a regulatory creation by

the NRC and there are no Congressional reporting requirements. (0198)

The same commenter stated that the analysis should consider whether the NRC has statutory

authority to license the proposed PFSF, and assess the way in which the applicant will use public

services without any compensation to the Federal government. The commenter asserted that

Congress recognized that there would be social and economic impacts associated with a large

centralized storage facility, citing 42 USC 10156(c), and stated that accordingly, Congress authorized

payment of up to $15 per kilogram of spent fuel or 10 percent of costs associated with planning, public

services and other social and economic impact costs. The commenter stated that 10 CFR Part 72

imposes no requirements on the applicant to give financial assistance to governmental entities. For

example, the commenter added that if the NRC licenses the PFSF, annual shipments of up to 200

casks of nuclear waste may travel through the rail-congested and populated Wasatch front area,

including downtown Salt Lake City. According to the commenter, the State at least receives training

and financial assistance from the Federal government for the military nuclear waste shipments (such

as the Waste Isolation Pilot Project wastes) passing through the State as it would if this facility were

authorized by the NWPA, but no such assistance will be forthcoming from this applicant. The

commenter said the State is unaware of what arrangements the applicant intends to use to safeguard

shipments and respond to emergencies en route, at Rowley Junction, or along Skull Valley Road. The

commenter concluded that rather than receiving financial assistance, the State of Utah will be forced

to expend funds to ensure that its citizens will not be harmed. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the numerous comments on its authority to review and approve an

away-from-reactor ISFSI of this size, including policy statements of the Western Governors

Association, and notes that they are beyond the scope of the EIS. The NRC has the authority under

the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to independently review and approve such a proposed ISFSI facility at or

away from a reactor site. There are opportunities for public participation in the licensing and hearing

process. The NRC has conducted its safety and environmental reviews in accordance with the AEA,

and in accordance with regulations included in 10 CFR Parts 51 and 72. The NRC staff

acknowledges the commenter’s concern that the DEIS is flawed. However, the comments on 10 CFR
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NUREG-1714 G-116

Part 72 are relevant to the rulemakings that created and amended those regulations and are not

applicable to the EIS for the proposed PFSF. Comments on Congressional reporting requirements

are also beyond the scope of the EIS. Requirements of the NWPA including State participation and

financial compensation are not related to the environmental review but are related to the activities of

the DOE and also are beyond the scope of the EIS. The comment on the ultimate movement of the

fuel away from the PFSF is beyond the scope of the EIS as well. It should be noted that regulations of

the NRC and Cooperating Agencies require that all fuel be removed after all regulatory approvals

have expired.

The environmental impacts of transporting SNF are evaluated in Section 5.7.2 of this FEIS. The NRC

staff has determined that the environmental impacts are small. Specific transportation issues raised in

this comment are addressed in Section G.3.16.

G.3.6.2.3 The NRC Review Process

Several comments were received addressing the NRC’s licensing process that reflected opposition to

the proposed facility, addressed the basis and schedule for the NRC staff’s review of the application,

public participation in the licensing and hearing process, missing information from the licensing

process, and miscellaneous issues related to licensing.

Comment Summary:

Several comments were provided opposing the project. 

C Some commenters expressed opposition to the project, and urged the NRC to disapprove the

license and to stop the proposed project. (0039, 0053, 0076, 0077, SL1-10, SL1-17, SL1-18, SL1-

39, SL3-04, SL3-43) One commenter said that the applicant should not be licensed in Utah since

the applicant has not been forthright in the disclosure that the proposed PFSF may become

permanent. (0053) One commenter said that the NRC should not grant the license for this

controversial project and should put the needs of citizens first. (SL3-43) 

C Two commenters stated that the opposition to this proposal by the Governor of Utah, Utah state 

regulators, and the citizens of Utah must be honored. (0039, 0053, 0077) 

Response:

The staff acknowledges the comments opposing the proposal but they reflect opinion and are not

applicable to the environmental review conducted for the proposed PFSF. Additional comments about

permanence of the proposed PFSF are addressed in Section G.3.2.1 

Comment Summary:

Several comments were provided concerning the timing and the schedule of the review process.

C Some commenters stated that the NRC has already reached its decision on the application. 

(0053, 0096, GR-06, SL3-48, SL3-57) One commenter stated that the EIS process is a sham and

that the NRC has already decided to approve the project because it serves the interests of

powerful nuclear industry stakeholders. (0015, GR-13)

C Referring to page 2-33, lines 31-32 of the DEIS, one commenter said it is not clear why the

licensing process is being done prior to the NEPA process, unless NRC is just trying to say that it

has met the necessary regulatory requirements of incorporating public participation. (0096)

C One commenter questioned the need to rush the review process. (GR-13)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-117 NUREG-1714

C Commenters urged the NRC to slow down the review process, stating that the project is being

rushed by politics, and asserted that the NRC should not risk the health of people in Utah and

those along the transportation routes simply out of greed and environmental injustice. (GR-16,

GR-22, SL1-37, SL3-16) 

C One commenter stated that the NRC’s hasty review process raised questions about the integrity of

the report and the agency itself. The commenter said that the NRC was disregarding the health

and socioeconomic impacts on the communities surrounding the proposed PFSF and along the

transport corridors. The commenter said an independent commission equally represented by

different sides of the issue should conduct a comprehensive review of the DEIS. (0185) 

C One commenter questioned whether the Federal government is now being hasty as a result of

missing the January 31, 1998, deadline for a permanent repository. The commenter claimed that

DOE had broken promises and failed to fulfill its obligations throughout the process and that more

time is needed for the residents of the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band, Salt Lake City, and all

communities along the transportation route. (SL2-05)

Response:

PFS applied for a license to operate an ISFSI, which is an interim storage facility and not a permanent

SNF disposal facility. The NRC’s regulatory process for licensing an ISFSI, away-from reactor or atreactor, is well defined in 10 CFR Part 72. The license application is being reviewed in accordance

with those regulations. All required review periods and processes are being followed, including

funding for the licensing review. However, consideration of the adequacy of the NRC licensing

process is not a subject covered by this EIS. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have not

decreased the time for reviewing and producing the necessary NEPA documents. The NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies have reviewed the applicant’s proposal in accordance with all applicable

regulations. Further, the NRC is not pursuing a review schedule based on “greed and environmental

injustice.” 

The NRC has not made a decision to license the proposed PFSF. For a contested license application,

the NRC licensing process includes the completion of a safety and environmental review, as well as

the completion of an ASLB proceeding. The NRC staff safety evaluation and findings must be

documented in the SER that is available to the public. This FEIS documents the environmental review

by the NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies. There are no regulatory requirements to have the

FEIS reviewed by additional independent parties. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have

fostered public participation by holding a number public meetings about the proposal and have

solicited comments on the DEIS, as referenced in this document. The ASLB proceeding permitted

individuals or groups that established standing (i.e, demonstrated the potential to be adversely

impacted by the proposed actions) an opportunity to submit contentions on specific safety and

environmental issues related to the license application. The ASLB process is ongoing and is expected

to be completed in 2002.

Following the completion of the ASLB proceeding, the five Presidentially-appointed NRC

Commissioners will review the NRC staff’s SER and FEIS, and the entire record from the ASLB

proceeding, and then make and publish a decision whether to grant or deny the license application. 

The NRC licensing process will not be complete until this decision is made by the Commission.

Comment Summary:

Two comments were received about public participation in the NRC licensing process.

C One commenter stated that the NRC regulations must be changed so that the public has a

meaningful voice in at-reactor dry cask storage decisions, and so that dry casks at reactors are

manufactured, used, and maintained to lower the inherent dangers as much as possible. (0257)
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NUREG-1714 G-118

C Another commenter stated that because the general public is excluded from participation in

hearings before the ASLB, the public will be unable to fairly and completely respond to these

critical decisions, contrary to the requirements of NEPA and Federal administrative procedures. 

(0198)

Response:

The suggestion to change existing NRC regulations is beyond the scope of the EIS and would be

better suited to the process by which petitions for rule changes are made. The NRC staff considers

the comment that the public is excluded from the hearing process to be incorrect. The hearing

process allows individuals or groups that establish standing to participate in the hearings. In addition,

during limited appearance sessions, members of the public are permitted to make statements to the

ASLB. This process is consistent with NEPA requirements.

Comment Summary: 

One comment addressed scoping comments on the proposed action. This commenter noted that

there are three agencies involved in this environmental decision-making process that were not

involved at the time of the NRC’s 1998 scoping process, and one agency that was not involved at the

time of the NRC’s 1999 scoping process. Therefore, the commenter stated, EIS Scoping Comments

submitted by the State of Utah on June 19, 1998, and May 27, 1999, should be included in the

considerations of the agencies regarding the DEIS. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding the State of Utah’s scoping comments. 

However, the NRC staff notes that a representative of the BIA was present at the 1998 scoping

meeting in Salt Lake City. The comments provided by the State of Utah were summarized in two NRC

scoping reports, published in September 1998 and November 1999. The Cooperating Agencies

reviewed these reports and are aware of the issues raised by the State of Utah. Nevertheless, the

State of Utah’s scoping comments were included and responded to as comments on the DEIS.

Comment Summary:

One commenter discussed information that was missing from the licensing process. This commenter

stated that the licensing process failed to disclose pertinent information regarding emergency

preparedness, risk factors on the transportation corridors, and financial information needed to assure

stability for this long-term nuclear waste facility. This commenter argued that this information is

needed to further Utah’s position regarding the citizen’s health, welfare and safety. (0148)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the commenter’s concern. However, the NRC has addressed

emergency preparedness and financial information in its SER. This information need not be included

in the FEIS. Risk factors on the transportation corridors are considered in the FEIS in Section 5.7.2.

Comment Summary:

Three additional comments addressed miscellaneous aspects of the licensing process.

C One commenter asked how the licensing process is financed and if it creates a conflict of interest. 

(SL3-04)
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G-119 NUREG-1714

C The same commenter said that a project of this magnitude will affect the entire country and that

the decision should not be left to the NRC alone, but to public debate within our democratic

process. (SL3-04) 

C One commenter stated that the NRC’s licensing process is inadequate for licensing a permanent

or semi-permanent facility since it has been used only for reactor licenses. The commenter stated

that the NRC’s hearing process is biased in favor of the utility companies and tainted by the fact

that the Federal government is being sued by the reactor licensees because no Federal

permanent storage facility has been provided. The commenter said that it is unethical for the NRC

to serve only the license applicants and to allow the applicant to enlist the Native Americans to

store the waste, since it is environmentally unjust. (SL1-10) 

Response: 

The NRC is an independent Federal agency that has been directed by the U.S. Congress to charge

license fees to fund greater than 90% of its budget. Hence the cost of the staff licensing review is

being financed by fees being paid by the applicant. This is no different from any other licensing action

and is not a conflict of interest for the regulator.

Federal actions similar to this licensing effort are generally not subject to a public approval process via

voting. The Federal agencies’ authority is delegated through the democratic processes inherent in our

republican form of government. See Section 3.6.2.2 above.

The licensing process defined under 10 CFR Part 72 is applicable to an at-reactor facility as well as

one that is located away from a reactor. The review and approval process are the same for both

facilities and require a safety and environmental review for site-specific applications. The comment on

the NRC hearing process is the opinion of the commenter and is not based on fact. As stated above,

the NRC is an independent agency that is reviewing an unsolicited application for an ISFSI design. 

The NRC’s action is not related to DOE’s actions to develop a permanent geological repository. The

NRC has no jurisdiction over the applicant’s agreements made with the Skull Valley Band.

G.3.6.2.4 Public Health and Safety

Comment Summary: 

Several comments were provided regarding the NRC’s protection of public health and safety. 

C Commenters encouraged the NRC to take seriously the mission of protecting public health and

safety, the environment, and the common defense and security. (SL3-31, SL3-34)

C One commenter stated that it is vital that the NRC and other Federal agencies proceed with great

care and sensitivity to make sincere efforts to protect public health, safety, and welfare in all of the

states affected by the project, in light of the overall distrust of the Federal government and its

nuclear waste program. (0236) 

C One commenter said that the NRC needs to give greater weight to the comments from people

having expertise in ionizing radiation than to those persons who have no knowledge of what is

involved. The commenter stated that there is a great need for public education about the issues

involved in the proposed action. (0122)

Response: 

The mission of the NRC is to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the common

defense and security, and the environment in the civilian use of nuclear materials in the United States. 

A formal license review is one way that the NRC ensures the protection of public health and safety. In
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-120

carrying out its safety review of the proposed PFSF, the NRC staff determines whether an applicant

has demonstrated compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, the NRC regulations for the

temporary storage of SNF. The NRC staff documents its safety review of the proposed PFSF in the

SER, as updated. The NRC’s regulations for environmental reviews are found in 10 CFR Part 51. 

Those regulations have been followed by the NRC staff in carrying out this environmental review. The

comments received on the DEIS have been given careful consideration and every effort has been

expended to ensure that all the comments have been addressed fairly and accurately. Most

importantly, the protection of public health and safety has been at the forefront in all decisions. 

G.3.6.2.5 Fiduciary Duties

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the NRC has a fiduciary duty to consider perception damages in the same

way that the BIA is required to do. (SL1-17)

Response: 

The United States Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460

U.S. 766, 775 (1983) (PANE), decided that the perception of risk is beyond the scope of NEPA. In

view of the Supreme Court’s decision in PANE, there is no requirement for the NRC or the BIA to

consider “perception damages.” Further, neither the NRC’s NEPA regulations in 10 CFR Part 51, nor

the BIA’s NEPA Handbook (30 BIAM Supplement 1) require consideration of perceived risk. In view

of the above, the comment does not warrant changing the analysis or conclusions in the FEIS. 

G.3.6.2.6 Review of Safety Evaluation Report

Comment Summary: 

Some commenters stated that there were no plans to allow the public to comment on the SER. (0096,

SL3-09) Commenters requested the comment period for the DEIS be extended until the SER is made

available as an amendment to the DEIS. (0194, 0215)

One commenter stated that the general public is excluded from participation in hearings before the

ASLB regarding the SER and, consequently, the public will be unable to fairly and completely respond

to these sections, contrary to the requirements of NEPA. (0198)

Several other commenters made the following comments concerning the SER:

C One commenter stated that the public will not be able to submit comments on the SER, which will

address transportation safety. (SL3-09)

C One commenter stated that since the SER is not subject to public notice and comment, it would

not meet the requirements of NEPA, and the information it contains may not be relied upon in

finalizing the EIS. The same commenter indicated that new information, upon which the action will

be based, would not be available before the close of the comment period, and this information is

necessary to complete the EIS. (0198) 

C Another commenter stated that the SER should be available to the public for review and comment

because it provides background for the EIS. The commenter stated that the SER’s discussion of

the following topics are not complete: military aircraft hazards, meteorological characteristics,

seismic design and exemption request, soil classification, and stability of cask storage pads and

the canister transfer building. (0051)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-121 NUREG-1714

C Another commenter said that the SER would not be available until after the comment period, so its

safety conclusions cannot be reviewed. (0096)

C One commenter stated that earthquake and seismic evaluations have been excluded from the

DEIS, eliminating the opportunity for public review and comment. (0012, SL1-01)

C Another commenter stated that the issues brought up concerning Hill AFB, aircraft crashes, and

seismic activity are addressed in the DEIS and the SAR. (SL1-23)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges these comments and notes that they are not directly related to the

environmental review. Specifically, the SER, as updated, documents the NRC’s safety evaluation of

the license application and whether it meets applicable NRC safety regulations in 10 CFR Part 72. 

NRC safety regulations are established through a rulemaking process during which members of the

public can comment on proposed regulations. Similar to the EIS process, the NRC must review and

respond to public comments on rulemakings. This was done for 10 CFR Parts 51 and 72. The NRC

staff has also conducted an environmental review in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 and has

documented it in the DEIS and FEIS. The technical objects discussed in this comment are reflected in

the SER, as updated. Information in the SER need not be repeated in the DEIS or FEIS and the SER

need not be complete for the environmental review to begin or end. Consistent with NEPA practices,

any new relevant and material information must be included in the FEIS. The NRC staff and the

Cooperating Agencies did not identify any new information that would change environmental impacts

and the conclusions reached in the DEIS, and therefore the DEIS was not supplemented and reissued

for comment.

G.3.6.2.7 The NRC’s Credibility and Objectivity in the Decision-Making Process

Comment Summary: 

Several comments addressed NRC’s credibility and ethics, oversight and management record, its

relationship with the industry it regulates, its objectivity, responsiveness and fairness, and its

responsibility.

C One commenter stated that the NRC has no credibility based on past actions relating to the

licensing of nuclear facilities. (0015) Another commenter noted that the NRC said that it has a

solution but the commenter does not think the industry has really addressed the issue. (SL1-21) 

One commenter stated that earlier nuclear regulatory agencies told residents to watch nuclear

blasts from their rooftops. (SL1-32) 

C One commenter said that the NRC is at the core of the mismanagement and oversights of the

nuclear utility industry. The commenter said that NRC is unethical. (SL1-10)

C The same commenter stated that the NRC should stop letting nuclear industries affect minority

populations. (SL1-10) Another commenter said that, as a government agency, the NRC should

not be involved in the exploitation of Native Americans, as has occurred in the past. (0029) 

C Other commenters expressed concern about the relationship between the NRC and the nuclear

industry and private reactor licensees (SL3-04, SL3-33, SL3-40, SL3-49), stating that the NRC,

who is the “employer of the power plant,” has the most waste to dispose of and is acting as a

representative of the applicant. (SL3-25) One commenter said that the professional alliance

between the NRC and the nuclear power industry should be challenged and that the NRC

authorities who write, regulate, and judge its own laws should be questioned within a

Congressional debate. (SL3-04) One commenter said that the NRC has a long history of serving

the interests of powerful nuclear industry stakeholders. (0015) One commenter stated that the
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NUREG-1714 G-122

NRC is not objective about the proposed project and that it is “championing” the project. The

commenter urged the NRC and especially the Cooperating Agencies to carefully consider the

objectivity of this process, stating that an objective review would lead to the conclusion that the

DEIS, which the commenter believes is flawed, cannot support any decision-making. (0198) One

commenter said that the limited liability corporation, not the NRC, is really making the decisions. 

(SL3-40)

C One commenter stated that the NRC is not credible, noting discrepancies in the distance of the

proposed PFSF to Salt Lake City. The commenter said that during the scoping hearings, the

PFSF was stated to be 54 miles from Salt Lake City, but in other documents the distance is

75 miles away. (SL1-15) 

C One commenter said that the NRC’s approval of the proposed action will show that the NRC has

accepted false information and is corrupt and fraudulent, operating outside its own laws and the

laws of other entities. (0039, 0077) Another commenter said that the history of the nuclear

industry has been one of deception. (SL3-40) 

C One commenter said that political realities, which have an impact on the implementation of a

decision in favor of the license application, were not addressed in the DEIS. The commenter

asserted that the agencies and proponents have not been responsive or fair. In the commenter’s

view, political realities may make implementation of a decision in favor of the applicant a practical

impossibility and that if this project proceeds, whatever millions are spent in constructing a highlevel nuclear waste dump here will ultimately be lost, perhaps with no alternative in sight. (0008) 

C One commenter stated the NRC, the BLM, the applicant, the eastern reactor licensees, and the

communities in the east who do not want the waste “in their backyards,” are being irresponsible. 

(0076, SL3-16) 

C One commenter said that the NRC seems determined to designate the balance of Utah as a

waste site. (0027) 

C The same commenter asked what the NRC is doing to regulate the production of the SNF that is

proposed to be shipped to Utah. The commenter stated that the welfare of people has a higher

priority than the profits of big business. (0027) Another commenter said that the private nature of

the SNF storage facility raises the issue of who will effectively regulate the industry. (0054)

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges the comments summarized above. These comments are related to the

commenters’ view of the NRC’s credibility and objectivity. These comments are not related to the

environmental review, and therefore do not require a detailed response. However, the commenters

should note that the NRC is an independent Federal regulatory agency with no ownership of any

nuclear facility. The NRC has no association with any nuclear weapons program because it regulates

only civilian uses of nuclear material. The NRC regulates licensees by conducting a thorough and

independent review of each application for a license, consistent with its congressional mandate and

the NRC’s regulations for safety and environmental review. These regulations establish an

independent review process to consider factual issues and contentions brought before the NRC. The

NRC staff completed the environmental review described in the EIS and that review was consistent

with NEPA as well as the CEQ implementing regulations (40 CFR Part 1500-1508), the STB’s

implementing regulations (49 CFR Part 1105), and the NRC’s implementing regulations (10 CFR Part

51). Those regulations specify the procedures for reviewing potential environmental impacts, and

soliciting public review of the draft results and recommendations. 

Throughout this review process, the NRC’s only relationship with the applicant is the formal and open

exchange of factual information about the application, safety evaluation, and environmental report. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-123 NUREG-1714

This exchange is completed through a process in which the applicant submits the license application,

the NRC reviews the application and issues requests for additional information (RAIs), and the

applicant responds to the RAIs. As part of this process, however, the NRC staff is authorized to

confer privately with the applicant on an informal basis, and has done so with PFS. All RAIs and

responses are documented and are publicly available.

For the proposed PFSF, the NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies were required to prepare an

EIS. The DEIS was based on the best scientific information available about the potential

environmental impacts. This DEIS was completed by the NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies

and their consultants, independently of the applicant. When the applicant provided information, the

NRC reviewed and verified the information, and conducted its own analysis of potential impacts. If

comments on the DEIS provided specific corrections or additional information, including the

information about the distance of the site from Salt Lake City, the staff evaluated, considered, and

addressed this information in this FEIS, as appropriate. 

G.3.6.2.8 Preceding Actions

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that existing radioactive and Superfund sites should be cleaned up, workers

affected by these sites compensated, and that the transportation of low level radioactive waste be

regulated to protect railroad workers, before a new facility is licensed. (SL3-04) 

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges this comment. However the comment does not require any action to be

taken regarding the environmental review of the PFS application. Contamination of old nuclear

facilities is not within the scope of this EIS since cleanup of old Superfund radioactive sites is not

related to the proposed action and is the responsibility of other Federal agencies and other parties. 

The NRC and the DOT have specific regulations for the transportation of low-level radioactive waste. 

The NRC and the DOT have concluded these regulations provide adequate protection to workers and

the public.

G.3.6.2.9 Seismic Standards

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters were concerned that the NRC will license a facility that is not designed to the very

highest seismic standards or does not meet the NRC’s regulations on seismic standards. (0053,

0198, SL1-38) One commenter asked if the NRC is going to waive its own earthquake regulations

and make an exception for the proposed PFSF. The commenter also asked if the NRC would require

a resident inspector at the proposed PFSF. (0053, SL3-48) Another commenter stated that despite

objections from the State of Utah and significant evidence of geologic and seismic problems, the NRC

is considering exempting the proposed facility from certain existing NRC seismic regulations. The

commenter said that if this does occur it would allow the applicant to build and operate a facility to a

lower design standard, which may have significant environmental consequences. (0198) Another

commenter opposed giving a license to a corporation that does not use a design with the very highest

possible seismic standards. (SL1-38)

Response: 

As discussed in Section 4.7.2 of this FEIS, the applicant provided an in-depth analysis in its license

application that considered the ground faults in the vicinity of the site and other information relevant to

seismic characteristics of the proposed PFSF design. The applicant has also requested an exemption

to the seismic requirements specified in 10 CFR 72.102(f)(1). These NRC requirements are based on
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deterministic methods. The applicant requested, instead, to demonstrate the safety of the proposed

PFSF design by considering uncertainties in seismic inputs by using a probabilistic seismic hazard

analysis to evaluate the effects of potential seismic activity at the proposed PFSF. (Probabilistic

seismic hazard analysis is allowed by the NRC for license applications for nuclear power plants.)

The applicant chose a 2000-year return period to find the expected maximum ground motion for its

probabilistic seismic hazards analysis. The staff evaluated the proposed exemption and the

supporting analysis and found that the applicant’s method adequately considered the seismic hazards

factors at the proposed site and demonstrated that a seismic event would not pose an undue risk to

public health and safety. The applicant determined, and the NRC staff confirmed, from the applicant’s

analysis that the proposed PFSF and storage cask are adequately designed to withstand the expected

maximum ground motion for the site based on the 2,000-year return period. The storage canisters

containing the SNF would remain intact during the design basis earthquake and therefore would not

release radioactive material. The NRC staff concluded that there would be no additional radiological

or environmental impact from the proposed PFSF in the event of a design basis earthquake. See

Chapters 2 and 15 in the NRC’s SER, as updated, for a discussion of the staff’s evaluation of the

applicant’s seismic analysis. The NRC staff recommended to the Commission that it grant the

exemption if it decides to license the proposed PFSF. 

At this time the NRC has no plans for assigning a resident inspector to the proposed site if the NRC

grants a license. 

G.3.6.2.10 Public Acceptance of Risks from Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the NRC should provide more compelling information regarding why the

people of Utah should accept the risks associated with the proposed PFSF and whether the risks are

fair. (GR-13)

Response: 

The NRC is an independent Federal agency. Congress and the President have assigned the NRC the

responsibility for regulation, certification, and licensing of civilian uses of radioactive material, pursuant

to the AEA to ensure the protection of human health and the environment. The NRC protects public

health and safety by setting standards for construction and operation, and requiring licensees to meet

those standards. If the proposed PFSF described in the proposed action is built and operated as

required by the regulations, then the risk to workers, and the general public is deemed to be

acceptable.

G.3.6.2.11 Commission Membership

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that a Native American representative needs to be included on the

Commission in order for the NRC to understand why most Tribe members would never consider such

an action. (GR-22) 

Response: 

The commenter should note that the recognized government of the Skull Valley Band approached the

BIA with a proposed lease agreement with the applicant. Approval of the lease is an action being

considered by the BIA. The NRC staff reviewed the environmental impacts of the proposed action

and concluded that the impacts were either small or could be mitigated. The analysis included
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evaluating the impacts to Native Americans. In addition, the NRC staff consulted with the Skull Valley

Band and other American Indian Tribes and organizations as a part of its cultural resource review. 

The NRC is comprised of five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the

Senate. Each commissioner serves a term of five years. The responsibility of the Commission is to

require applicants and licensees to demonstrate reasonable assurance that their licensed activities will

be conducted so as to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Consistent with

the applicable laws and the NRC’s regulations, the commissioners review and weigh the information

provided to them from the application, the safety evaluation, the environmental review, any legal

proceedings, and public comments in determining whether to approve an application and what

conditions or requirements to place on applicants.

G.3.6.2.12 Financial Responsibility

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the NRC has a poor record of evaluating licensees’ financial reliability. 

The commenter noted that the NRC failed to ensure that a private company had adequate funds to

clean up the Atlas mill tailings site, noting that the company declared bankruptcy and was not

ultimately responsible for the necessary cleanup. (0198)

Response: 

A financial analysis of applicants is conducted as part of the NRC’s safety review to ensure

regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 are satisfied. The NRC required the applicant to demonstrate that it will

be able to obtain sufficient funds to build, operate, decommission, and close the proposed PFSF. The

analysis can be found in Chapter 17 of the SER. The comment on a previous NRC evaluation is

beyond the scope of this EIS.

G.3.6.2.13 State Involvement

Comment Summary: 

One commenter noted that the State of Utah has not been allowed fair representation in participating

in the process. Referring to 42 USC 10155(d), the commenter noted a contradiction between the

applicant’s proposal and the centralized away-from-reactor storage under NWPA. The commenter

stated that under NWPA, the Secretary of Energy first must apprise the state Governor and

Legislature of potentially acceptable interim storage sites and the Secretary’s intention to investigate

those sites, according to 42 USC 10155(d)(1). Second, the commenter noted that the Secretary is

required to give timely updates and results of investigations to the Governor and Legislature and enter

into negotiations to establish a cooperative agreement between the Secretary and the State. The

commenter stated that under such an agreement the state “shall have the right to participate in a

process of consultation and cooperation ... in all stages of the planning, development, modification,

expansion, operation and closure of storage capacity at a site or facility within such State for the

interim storage of spent fuel from civilian nuclear power reactors,” as stated in 42 USC 10155(d)(2). 

The commenter also noted that the cooperative agreement must include sharing of all technical and

licensing information; use of available expertise; joint project review, surveillance and monitoring

arrangements; and schedule of milestones and decisions points and opportunities for state review and

objection, according to 42 USC 10155(d)(3). In addition, the commenter said that the Secretary must

periodically report to Congress, according to 10155(f). Finally, the commenter stated that a state may

voice its disapproval to Congress of a proposal to construct storage capacity of 300 metric tons or

larger at any one site, according to 42 USC 10155(d)(6). (0198, 0198a)

The commenter stated that in contrast to a cooperative Federal-state role and meaningful involvement

ascribed to the state under the NWPA, 10 CFR Part 72 requires no Federal cooperation or
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involvement with the state. The commenter noted that the state is treated merely as any other party to

the NRC proceeding. Regarding the proposed action, first, the commenter stated that the applicant

has made no effort to apprise the state of its proposed PFSF and that the State of Utah first learned

about the proposed PFSF through press releases and by sending state officials to Washington, D.C.

to attend meetings between the applicant and the NRC, where the public was permitted to listen to the

discussion. Second, the commenter said that there has been no cooperation or consultation between

the applicant and the state, and that failure to allow the state to review and comment on the

emergency plan, as required by 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14), is just one example of the lack of

communication with the state. Finally, the commenter stated that there is no opportunity for state

review or oversight of the project, except through litigation, and that the state has had to spend

hundreds of thousands of dollars to participate through intervention in the NRC’s formal license

adjudication to have any voice in the siting and licensing of the proposed PFSF, despite what is

required under 42 USC 10155(d). After comparing what the applicant is requesting and what

Congress requires under the NWPA, the commenter stated that it is obvious that the NRC is avoiding

the national policy and directives Congress set in the NWPA and is without statutory authority to

license the proposed PFSF. (0198)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments about state involvement with the proposal and how it

differs with state involvement with actions under the NWPA. The NRC is conducting the licensing

review of the application consistent with the NRC regulations. The NRC authority to establish

regulations for licensing an ISFSI (10 CFR Part 72), is authorized by the AEA, not the NWPA. The

NWPA does not specifically apply to licensing of a privately-owned ISFSI. After the license application

was reviewed and docketed by the NRC, the State of Utah requested and was granted status as a

party to the adjudicatory proceeding before the ASLB. This has afforded the state access and

participation in the adjudicatory process. The commenter references the participatory process for the

host jurisdiction for a geologic repository. This process is specific to the repository program and does

not apply to the 10 CFR Part 72 licensing process. In any case, the host jurisdiction for the proposed

PFSF is not the State of Utah, but rather the Skull Valley Band. 

The comments regarding a lack of cooperation and interaction among various parties were made very

early in the licensing process. NRC believes interactions with all parties have been appropriate.

The comment about the emergency plan is incorrect in that the NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 do

not require that the state review and approve the plan as part of the licensing process. The applicant

is only required to coordinate its plan with local authorities, and the NRC is responsible for review and

approval of the plan. Lastly, the suggestion that the state review or oversee the proposed facility is

not consistent with Federal legislation and regulations. 

G.3.6.2.14 Rowley Junction Licensing

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern that a Part 72 license to protect public health and safety is not

required for the proposed ITF. The commenter stated that due to the continuous presence of SNF

arriving at or departing from the proposed ITF and the potential long-term storage of some of the SNF,

it is important to provide the public with the regulatory protections that are afforded by compliance with

10 CFR Part 72. As examples, the commenter stated that the applicant should have a security plan

that protects the site from intruders according to NRC standards. There should also be an emergency

plan to protect workers and the public in the event of an accident at the proposed ITF. In addition, the

boundaries of the proposed ITF site should be identified, and dose analyses performed to ensure that

nearby members of the public are not exposed to unacceptable doses from SNF that is sitting on the

site. The applicant should also provide assurance that the proposed ITF is designed in a way that

protects public health and safety, using appropriate structures, equipment, and protective measures. 
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In the absence of such measures, the commenter stated, the proposed ITF poses an unacceptable

safety and health risk to workers and the public. (0198a)

The same commenter stated that the license application should be rejected because it does not seek

approval for receipt, transfer, and possession of SNF at the Rowley Junction ITF, in violation of

10 CFR 72.6(c)(1), in that the Rowley Junction operation is not merely part of the transportation

operation but a de facto interim SNF storage facility at which the applicant will receive, handle, and

possess SNF. The commenter added because the proposed ITF is an interim SNF storage facility, it

is important to provide the public with the regulatory protections that are afforded by compliance with

10 CFR Part 72, including a security plan, an emergency plan, and radiation dose analyses. (0198a,

0198c)

The commenter stated that the point at which the NRC regulations apply instead of the DOT

regulations may be when the ISFSI licensee is in receipt and possession of the casks. The applicant

stated that it will accept delivery and perform receipt inspection at the proposed site, not at Rowley

Junction. The commenter questioned who has actual or constructive possession and receipt of the

casks at Rowley Junction. As stated by the applicant, either the applicant or the licensed reactor

licensees will perform transportation under the DOT regulations, but the responsibility for operation at

Rowley Junction has not been clearly addressed. The number of casks and the length of time casks

will likely be at Rowley Junction before they are transferred to heavy-haul trucks expands the concept

of in-transit to the point where the casks should be considered as being stored and in the possession

of the applicant as part of its ISFSI operation. (0198b)

Response: 

NRC received the comment concerning 10 CFR Part 72 licensing before publishing the DEIS. The

DEIS analyzed and documented the potential health impacts resulting from the proposed ITF and

concluded that the impacts would be small. The NRC staff has determined that the activities

performed by the applicant at the proposed ITF are normal activities occurring during transport of

Class 7 materials (radioactive hazardous materials or storage incident thereto). Thus, the activities

are covered under the DOT regulations for shipping hazardous materials. (See Title 49 of the CFR.) 

Accordingly, the NRC has concluded that a Part 72 (10 CFR Part 72) license for the proposed ITF is

not required. The NRC SNF storage regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 do not apply to the proposed ITF

because the SNF would not be stored there. 

Since the applicant plans to use its own locomotives on dedicated trains carrying the SNF, therefore,

under the likely scenario, no proposed ITF will be operational. However, the potential environmental

impacts of the proposed ITF are evaluated in the EIS as an alternative to the proposed action. See

the discussion in Section 9.4.1.3 of this FEIS.

G.3.6.3 The BIA Action

G.3.6.3.1 The BIA Process and General Comments

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters stated that the BIA had failed to follow its own regulations, legal responsibilities,

and fiduciary duties in processing the application for the proposed PFSF and lease. (0112, 0210, GR01, SL1-17, SL1-21, SL1-39, SL3-07, SL3-18)

C One commenter noted that the BIA’s approval of the lease agreement was without NEPA review. 

The commenter asserted that the BIA stated in court that they did not keep administrative records

of the leasing process and, thus, the lease does not technically exist. In addition, the commenter

claimed that Federal law prohibits NEPA reviews on Tribal lands, and that the DEIS cannot

substitute for the BIA’s NEPA review. (SL1-17)
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C Several commenters expressed concern over the approval of the lease because not all members

of the Skull Valley Band have signed the lease and because there are questions about the

leadership of the Skull Valley Band and its relationship with the BIA. (SL1-26, SL3-04, SL3-07) 

C Another commenter stated the BIA improperly prejudiced itself by approving in 1997 a

“conditional” lease for the proposed facility, before the DEIS. By encouraging or allowing the

transfer of funds and other actions based on the lease, the BIA impaired its ability to impartially

carry out its trust responsibility to the Skull Valley Band. (0158)

C One commenter stated that the lease between the Skull Valley Band and the applicant must be

approved by the BIA. (The commenter referenced 25 USC 415 and 25 CFR Part 162). The BIA

waived certain regulatory requirements and granted “conditional” approval of the lease, subject to

completion of the EIS. The commenter was concerned that only an edited version of the lease is

available from the BIA. Lease terms regarding lease termination provisions, frustration of purpose

provisions, surety bonding arrangements, lease rent, and taxes and regulations are not available. 

The commenter expressed concern that the BIA is deferring to the NRC process for an evaluation

of the environmental effects caused by the Skull Valley Band entering into the lease, and the NRC

may defer to the BIA for the evaluation of the lease provisions. The commenter added that it is

incumbent on the NRC to require the applicant to fully disclose all provisions of the lease in order

that the NRC and the petitioners may evaluate under what conditions the applicant is entitled to

use and control the site, the financial costs associated with the lease, the termination and

frustration of purpose provisions, and the Skull Valley Band’s regulatory requirements. (0198a)

C The same commenter stated the BIA will fail to meet its trust responsibility if it approves this lease,

because the applicant is a limited liability company, and the lack of financial resources available in

the event of an accident is not in the best interest of the Skull Valley Band. (0198)

C Another commenter noted that the BIA’s own regulations require it to evaluate perceived

damages. (SL1-17)

C One commenter questioned if any other Tribal government would be affected by the proposal. 

(0096)

C Two commenters expressed concern about allegations of financial irregularities between the

applicant and the Skull Valley Band. The commenters asked that the NRC or Congress

investigate the financial relationship between the applicant and the Skull Valley Band and the

BIA’s three-day approval of this facility. (SL1-17, SL3-04)

C One commenter noted that Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act directs the

Secretaries of Defense, Interior, Air Force, and Army to conduct a study to evaluate the impact

upon military training, testing, and operational readiness of any proposed changes in land

management of the State of Utah national defense lands. The commenter stated that the BIA

cannot take any action until this study is complete. (GR-01)

Response: 

The BIA has not yet given final approval to the proposed lease between the Skull Valley Band and the

applicant. The court has confirmed that final approval has not been given by BIA in State of Utah v.

United States Department of the Interior, 210 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2000). Under the CEQ regulations

implementing NEPA, the BIA has participated as a Cooperating Agency in the preparation of this EIS

because of its jurisdiction by law (the required approval of the lease) and because of its special

expertise in Indian matters. Leases and permits are issued in accordance with 25 CFR Part 162 and

other applicable Federal regulations, and no lease is approved without consent of the Skull Valley

Band members. In this case, the proposed lease is located on Skull Valley Band trust property, and a

resolution by the governing body of the Skull Valley Band authorizing approval is sufficient. A majority
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of the Skull Valley Band members approved a resolution granting authority to the Executive

Committee to negotiate and enter into this lease. Skull Valley Band members also gave the Executive

Committee the authority to approve future amendments to the lease. The BIA cannot provide final

approval of the lease until the NEPA process has been completed.

The process for developing the FEIS is designed to avoid the potential problem noted by the

commenter, that the NRC and the BIA will defer to one another with respect to certain issues, and

therefore that the EIS will have gaps. The FEIS completes the documentation of the Cooperating

Agency staffs’ evaluation of the environmental effects of the PFSF, from construction up to and

including license termination. The FEIS also evaluates the environmental effects of whatever

structures might be left on the proposed site pursuant to the lease between the applicant and the BIA

after the applicant completes decommissioning and the NRC terminates the license. With regard to

the commenter’s specific concerns, the FEIS addresses: (1) the conditions under which the applicant

is entitled to use and control the site (Section 1.5.2); (2) the financial costs associated with the lease

(e.g., the benefits to the Skull Valley Band) (Section 5.5); (3) impacts from termination of the lease

(Section 4.9); and (4) the Skull Valley Band’s regulatory requirements (Section 1.6).

With respect to the commenter’s observation that the NRC must require the applicant to disclose all

provisions of the lease, the NRC can provide that information only in accordance with the

requirements of 10 CFR 2.790 and must not disclose proprietary information. This portion of the

comment is not relevant to the adequacy of the analysis documented in the FEIS, and therefore, no

further response is necessary.

The BIA has fulfilled its trust responsibility as a Cooperating Agency by conducting its own

independent evaluation of the EIS to ensure that it adequately analyzes the potential impacts of the

BIA’s proposed action and alternatives on the quality of the human environment. After issuing the

FEIS and if the NRC issues the proposed license, the BIA will issue its own ROD. Contrary to the

commenter’s assertion, the BIA’s NEPA procedures and its leasing regulations do not require analysis

of perceived risks. See 30 BIA Supplement 1 (1993) (the BIA NEPA Handbook) and 25 CFR Part

162. Furthermore, analysis of perceived risks is not required in NEPA reviews under Metropolitan

Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).

The BIA acknowledges the comment requesting an investigation into alleged violations of Federal law

by the DOI, including the BIA, and an investigation into the financial arrangement between the Skull

Valley Band and the applicant. Should any such investigation be initiated, the DOI and the BIA will

cooperate fully. The propriety of any financial arrangement between the applicant and the Skull Valley

Band is outside the scope of this EIS. However, the provisions of the proposed lease and proposed

license contain financial protections for the Skull Valley Band in case of default by the applicant.

Comments about the internal workings of the Skull Valley Band’s government are outside the scope of

the EIS and should be resolved within the Skull Valley Band through established procedures. To the

extent that any of the commenters allege that the BIA officials witnessed or participated in any of the

alleged improprieties, the BIA denies such allegations. The proposed lease was presented to the BIA

for approval by the duly elected government of the Skull Valley Band as an official act of the Skull

Valley Band. The BIA is therefore required, as part of its government-to-government relationship with

the Skull Valley Band, to consider the proposed lease as an official act of the Skull Valley Band. The

NRC and the Cooperating Agencies will continue the NEPA process and other processes for their

proposed actions until completion or unless the applicant or the duly elected government of the Skull

Valley Band withdraw the license application or the proposed lease.

With respect to the commenter’s suggestion that Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization

Act applies to the BIA’s decision to approve or disapprove the proposed lease, that section specifically

prohibits amendments to RMPs by the BLM until the referenced study is completed. Although the

legislation refers broadly to the Secretary of the Interior, the commenter is incorrect because Section
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2815 does not prevent the BIA from making a decision on a proposed lease, independent of the study

and the BLM actions. 

G.3.6.3.2 The BIA Responsibility/Objectivity

Comment Summary: 

One commenter asked Cooperating Agencies, such as the BIA, not to be complacent and assume

that the NRC has adequately analyzed the issues. According to the commenter, the NRC has

opposed contentions by the State of Utah only to request the same information from the applicant in a

non-litigation forum. The commenter stated that the lead agency preparing the DEIS is an advocate

for the applicant, as opposed to an unbiased participant, and urged the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies to carefully consider the objectivity of this process. The commenter expressed concern

about the NRC’s acceptance of the applicant’s proposal to “start clean, stay clean,” where it has been

determined that no contingency plans and minimal contingency funds are necessary. (0198)

Response: 

In its role as a Cooperating Agency, the BIA is responsible for the quality of the analysis in the EIS. 

The BIA has conducted its own independent and objective evaluation of the EIS pursuant to the Indian

Long-term Leasing Act, to ensure that it adequately analyzes the potential impacts of the BIA’s

Proposed Action and alternatives on the quality of the human environment. This review is based on

Executive Orders (including that concerning environmental justice), CEQ’s NEPA regulations and

guidance, the BIA’s NEPA procedures, NEPA case law, and sound science. After issuing the EIS and

if the NRC issues the proposed license, the BIA will issue its own ROD. The ROD issued by the BIA

will be the result of its objective appraisal of the issues discussed in the EIS and its independent

analyses of impacts that may result from the construction of the proposed PFSF on the Reservation.

With respect to the commenter’s concern that the proposed PFSF is not subject to contingency

planning and has minimal contingency funds, the applicant will have nuclear property insurance and

nuclear liability insurance. Also, the applicant has designed the facility in such a way so that release

of radioactive material is not credible as a result of design basis accidents.

Concerns about the objectivity of the NRC’s review process are addressed in Section G.3.6.2.7.

G.3.6.3.3 Statement by Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that on September 8, 2000, Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs,

DOI, said that injustice promulgated by the Federal government has been a significant impact on

Native Americans. The agency’s “legacy of racism and inhumanity” includes forced relocations and

attempts to erase cultural heritage, described as “ethnic cleansing,” according to Mr. Gover, the BIA

Director. On behalf of the Federal government, Mr. Gover promised Native Americans that, “By

accepting this legacy, we accept also the moral responsibility of putting things right. Never again will

we attack your religions, your languages, your rituals, or any of your tribal ways.” The commenter said

that the DEIS contains serious inconsistencies and flagrant ethical lapses in “moral responsibility” as

stated by Mr. Gover. In its obligation to objectively review the applicant’s proposal and honestly

recognize the long-term impact the proposed PFSF will have on Native Americans, the BIA cannot

approve the project and comply with the promise and commitment as stated by Kevin Gover. (0112)

Response: 

The BIA notes that it was the Executive Committee of the Skull Valley Band, not the BIA, that

approached the applicant about placing storage facilities for SNF on its reservation. At the time the
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Skull Valley Band approached the applicant with the proposal, the BIA had no knowledge of the Skull

Valley Band’s intentions and had not been informed by the Skull Valley Band. When the Skull Valley

Band and the applicant approached the BIA to consider approving the proposed lease, the BIA was

required by law to respond to the Skull Valley Band’s request. Approving the lease is a “major Federal

action” that requires the BIA to follow procedures outlined by NEPA, resulting in this EIS. 

In his remarks, Kevin Gover apologized on behalf of the BIA for the past treatment of American Indian

Tribes by the United States, which has been marked by periods of severe opposition to Tribal

sovereignty and economic development. Mr. Gover also noted, however, that the BIA is “at long last

serving as an advocate for Indian people in an atmosphere of mutual respect.” Since the end of the

termination policy in the early 1970's, the United States government continues to support the Tribes in

their efforts to fulfill their status as sovereign nations. Also, beginning with the enactment of the Indian

Self-Determination Act in 1975, the United States is making a greater effort to support actions by

Tribal governments to give their people a better life, consistent with their traditions and culture, and

also improving their ability to compete and thrive in the modern world. The proposed actions by the

NRC and the Cooperating Agencies are part of that support, to assist the sovereign government of the

Skull Valley Band to better the lives of its people.

The BIA acknowledges the comment that the DEIS contains serious inconsistencies and flagrant

ethical lapses in “moral responsibility.” The EIS has been reviewed and revised to reconcile

inconsistencies within the document throughout the development process. The purpose of the NEPA

review is to prepare a document that includes objective, thorough analyses of impacts, including

direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed action and alternatives.

G.3.6.3.4 The BIA Statement of Purpose

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the statement of purpose for the BIA’s action is inappropriate. The NRC

suggests in the DEIS that the purpose of the BIA’s decision is to promote the economic development

objectives of the Skull Valley Band. The commenter stated the Cooperating Agencies have precluded

a meaningful assessment of the proposed PFSF by beginning the analysis with an artificially

restrictive statement regarding the purpose and need for the proposed PFSF. By characterizing the

purpose of the proposed PFSF in that way, the BIA has foreclosed objective consideration of any

other alternative that would not accomplish exactly what the applicant and the Skull Valley Band have

proposed. The commenter added that it is also not clear that the economic or other well being of the

Skull Valley Band members is analogous to the economic development objectives of the Skull Valley

Band. (0158)

Response: 

As stated in the EIS, the purpose and need for the BIA action is founded on its trust responsibility to

American Indian Tribes and the government-to-government relationship between the United States

and American Indian Tribes. These two concepts are the cornerstones of the legal relationship

between the United States government and American Indian Tribes. The trust responsibility requires

that the United States appropriately manage the natural resources located within the boundaries of

American Indian Reservations and that the United States assist American Indian Tribes in achieving

economic self-sufficiency. The United States must therefore support the economic development

efforts of American Indian Tribes, but must also examine the environmental impacts of those efforts to

protect and manage the natural resources of the Tribes. The government-to-government relationship

is rooted in the recognition that American Indian Tribal self-government predates the establishment of

the United States. Thus, the United States recognizes the internal sovereignty of American Indian

Tribal governments and deals directly with the Tribal government as the duly designated

representative of the Tribe. The action of the BIA, and the range of reasonable alternatives to that

action, are therefore limited to those that fulfill the trust responsibility of the United States to the Skull
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Valley Band. In consideration of those alternatives, however, the BIA also must give due deference to

the preference of the Skull Valley Band, as expressed through its duly elected sovereign government.

The BIA also noted that the economic development objectives of the Skull Valley Band are intended to

promote the economic well being of the Skull Valley Band members. 

G.3.6.3.5 Trust Responsibility

Comment Summary: 

Many comments were made regarding the BIA’s trust responsibility, including the following:

C One commenter stated that the BIA has defined the scope of its review of the DEIS so narrowly

that it has failed to meet its trust responsibilities. In the DEIS, page 1-15, the BIA states that “[a]s

part of its government-to-government relationship with the Skull Valley Band, the BIA’s NEPA

review is limited to the scope of the proposed lease negotiated between the parties, not evaluation

of actions outside the lease (e.g., ultimate disposition of the SNF).” However, in light of the BIA’s

trust responsibilities, the commenter stated that ultimate disposition of SNF is central to the

question of whether the Indian land base will be preserved for the long term. (0198)

C Another commenter stated the DEIS failed to consider aspects and impacts of the proposed

project that are necessarily the subject of the BIA review, and that the BIA should not be

constrained by the NRC’s regulations and precedents in its analysis of the project, given the BIA’s

trust responsibilities to the Skull Valley Band. The commenter added that the NRC improperly

characterized the scope of the BIA’s role in the proposed action as limited to an analysis of the

impacts of the proposed lease (see DEIS page 1-15). While the lease is what requires the BIA to

be involved, the commenter expressed that the agency must analyze the entire project pursuant to

its trust relationship with the Skull Valley Band. (0158) 

C One commenter stated that the BIA cannot be a Cooperating Agency with respect to approval of

the lease between the Skull Valley Band and the applicant. The commenter argued that such an

action requires an independent EIS by the BIA because different standards are used in evaluating

the impacts of these two major Federal actions under NEPA. The BIA has a trust responsibility to

all Tribal members to evaluate the effects of approving the lease, whereas the NRC’s EIS will not

evaluate the fiduciary responsibility of the Federal government to Tribal members. (0198h)

C Another commenter stated that the DEIS mischaracterizes the focus of the BIA’s trust

responsibility. Rather than owing a responsibility to the Skull Valley Band as an entity, the BIA

has a trust obligation to the members of the Skull Valley Band. The BIA fundamentally misstates

its responsibilities in the DEIS at this threshold level, and as the entire DEIS is based on this

misconception. Therefore, the commenter stated that the document is flawed. The commenter

also said that in the DEIS the BIA ignores well-documented instances of improper treatment of

members of the Skull Valley Band government related to the proposed lease and related to the

transfer of lease funds. This improper treatment includes the government’s threats to withhold

Tribal membership and other tribal benefits, the actual withholding of funds, attempts to interfere

with the attorney-client relationship, and attempts to interfere with Tribal members’ ability to

participate in the Tribal government. The commenter added that the Skull Valley Band members

who oppose the proposed PFSF are suffering from the actions of the Skull Valley Band

government as a direct result of their opposition to the proposed PFSF. By focusing on the Skull

Valley Band government rather than Skull Valley Band members, the DEIS attempts to avoid

analysis of these impacts and is inadequate. The commenter stated that this focus on the Skull

Valley Band government rather than Skull Valley Band members also misleads the DEIS analysis,

in that the document does not account for differences among Tribal members, particularly

differences among, and differing impacts on, those living on the Reservation and those living off
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-133 NUREG-1714

the Reservation. These differences also include differing world views and differing attitudes

toward and support for the proposed PFSF. (0158)

C One commenter stated that it would be impossible for the BIA to endorse the applicant’s proposal

because it is designed to take advantage of the very group the BIA is responsible for protecting. 

The commenter asked that the BIA explain that the applicant’s consortium and its companies are

looking out for themselves and their stockholders, not the welfare of the Skull Valley Band. (SL3-

18) 

Response: 

The proposed action that the BIA has analyzed in this EIS is the approval or disapproval of a lease to

store SNF on the Reservation. The term of that lease is a maximum of 50 years. The proposed lease

requires that the SNF be removed from the Reservation before the end of that term. The proposed

lease does not specify that the SNF be disposed of in a geologic repository or that the applicant must

move the SNF to another storage facility. Therefore, the existence of a particular facility for the

ultimate disposition of the SNF is not part of the BIA’s proposed action, nor is it a connected action

under the CEQ’s NEPA regulations. Similarly, the trust responsibility as implemented through 25 USC

415 mandates that the BIA ensure that the SNF is removed from the Reservation and that the facility

is decommissioned. However, the trust responsibility does not dictate the ultimate disposition of the

SNF after it is removed from the Reservation. The disposition of SNF is addressed by NRC

regulations. As discussed in G.3.4.3.1, the fuel would be relocated to a permanent repository (if

available) or to a location identified by the owners of the fuel in accordance with applicable NRC rules.

Under the CEQ’s regulations implementing NEPA, the BIA has participated as a Cooperating Agency

in the preparation of this EIS because of its jurisdiction by law (the required approval of the lease) and

because of its special expertise in Indian matters. The BIA has conducted its own independent

evaluation of the EIS pursuant to the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, to ensure that it adequately

analyzes the potential impacts of the BIA’s proposed action and alternatives on the quality of the

human environment. This review is based on Executive Orders (including that concerning

environmental justice), CEQ’s NEPA regulations and guidance, the BIA’s NEPA procedures, NEPA

case law, and sound science. After issuing the EIS and if the NRC issues the proposed license, the

BIA will issue its own ROD. Therefore, the BIA has adopted the NRC’s EIS since the BIA has

determined that it complies with NEPA and supports the BIA’s proposed action. Participation in this

EIS as a Cooperating Agency has also been consistent with the purpose of NEPA to reduce

paperwork and duplication.

The BIA acknowledges the comment that the BIA’s trust responsibility is to the members of the Skull

Valley Band rather than to the Skull Valley Band as an entity. The proposed lease was presented to

the BIA for approval by the recognized government of the Skull Valley Band as an official act of the

Skull Valley Band. The BIA is, therefore, required, as part of its government-to-government

relationship with the Skull Valley Band, to consider the proposed lease as an official act of the Skull

Valley Band. The NRC and Cooperating Agencies will continue the NEPA process and other

processes for their proposed actions until completion or unless the applicant withdraws the license

application or the duly elected government of the Skull Valley Band withdraws the proposed lease.

The BIA staff disagrees that it has misstated its focus of its trust responsibility in the DEIS. Further the

comments on improper treatment of Skull Valley Band members is beyond the scope of the DEIS. 

Lastly, the comment that the proposal by the applicant is intended to take advantage of the group that

BIA is responsible for protecting is unfounded and also beyond the scope of the DEIS. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-134

G.3.6.3.6 BIA Statutory Authority

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the proposed action and process violates the BIA’s statutory authority. 

The commenter stated that the Secretary of Interior, through the BIA, is required to approve the

applicant’s lease with the Skull Valley Band. Before 1970, it was acknowledged that the BIA’s primary

purpose in exercising that authority was to preserve the Native American land base for the furtherance

of Indian culture and values. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § B, at 508-509

(1982 ed.). 

The commenter added that, in 1970 the Indian leasing statute was amended by Pub. L. 91-275, which

considerably broadened the list of factors that the Secretary must satisfy as having considered before

approving a lease. The language of the amendment is as follows: 

Prior to approval of any lease or extension of an existing lease pursuant to this Section, the Secretary

of the Interior shall first satisfy himself that adequate consideration has been given to the relationship

between the use of the leased lands and the use of neighboring lands; the height, quality, and safety

of any structures or other facilities to be constructed on such lands; the availability of police and fire

protection and other services; the availability of judicial forums for all criminal and civil causes arising

on the leased lands; and the effect on the environment of the uses to which the leased lands will be

subject. Pub. L. No. 91-275, §§ 1, 2, 84 Stat. 303 (codified as amended at 25 USC 415(a)(1993)).

The commenter also added that the Senate Report, issued in connection with the approval of this

amendment, is instructive with respect to its purpose: 

While it is not the intention of the committee to unduly burden development plans for Indian lands, the

committee and the Department of the Interior have an obligation to protect the public interest and

safety. S. Rep. No. 91-832 (1970), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3245. 

The commenter further stated that the requirement in the 1970 amendment that environmental factors

be considered by the Secretary in approving leases of Tribal lands, led to a Court decision that the

requirements of NEPA are triggered by the Secretary’s action in approving American Indian leases. 

According to the commenter, in Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 598 (10th Cir. 1972), the Court held

that Secretarial approval of a long-term lease would be likely to have a significant impact on the

human environment and thus constituted “major Federal action” which required the preparation of an

EIS. The commenter added that the Court held specifically that the purpose of the 1970 amendment

to 25 USC 415(a) was to reaffirm “congressional intent that environmental considerations are to play a

factor in any Bureau of Indian Affairs decisions.”

The commenter stated that the DEIS cannot satisfy the requirements of 25 USC 415(a), because

there is no expectation that nuclear waste will be removed from the proposed PFSF at the end of the

lease period, which is clearly a negative impact on the environment. (0198)

Response: 

The commenter is correct that the Secretary of the Interior must approve the proposed lease under

25 USC 415. The Secretary has delegated this authority to the BIA. The cited text from Cohen’s

Handbook of Indian Law refers not to approval of a lease, however, but to the continuing purpose

behind the requirement of Secretarial approval for any alienation (i.e., sale or other transfer of title) of

Indian trust land. (The 1970 date cited by the commenter apparently refers to amendments to 25 USC

415 that added certain criteria for the Secretarial approval of leases.)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-135 NUREG-1714

The specific criteria listed in 25 USC 415 (quoted by the commenter) are being addressed by the BIA

in its consideration of the lease under that statute. Under Davis v. Morton (also cited by the

commenter), the NEPA process is only one part of the larger lease approval process.

Regarding the comment that the nuclear waste will be removed from the proposed PFSF at the end of

the lease period, the BIA staff notes that the proposed action that the BIA has analyzed in this EIS is

the approval or disapproval of a lease to store SNF on the Reservation. The term of that lease is a

maximum of 50 years. The proposed lease requires that the SNF be removed from the Reservation

before the end of that term. The proposed lease does not specify that the SNF be disposed of in a

geologic repository or that the applicant must move the SNF to another storage facility. Therefore, the

existence of a particular facility for the ultimate disposition of the SNF is not part of the BIA’s proposed

action, nor is it a connected action under the CEQ’s NEPA regulations. Similarly, the trust

responsibility (as implemented through 25 USC 415) mandates that the BIA ensure that the SNF is

removed from the Reservation and that the proposed PFSF is decommissioned and the NRC license

has been terminated. However, the trust responsibility does not dictate the ultimate disposition of the

SNF after it is removed from the Reservation. The disposition of SNF is addressed by NRC

regulations. As discussed in G.3.4.3.1, the fuel would be relocated to a permanent repository (if

available), or to a location identified by the owners of the fuel in accordance with applicable NRC

rules.

G.3.6.3.7 Native American Interests

Comment Summary: 

Referring to page 9-1 Section 9.2.2 the BIA Action, lines 41-44 in the DEIS, one commenter

questioned whether the BIA is complying with the decision in Cady v. Morton (527 F.2d 786), which

stated that the BIA must prepare an EIS for any significant action regarding Tribal interests. The

commenter stated this would include the conditional lease between the applicant and the Skull Valley

Band. The commenter stated that the DEIS does not include analysis of the significance of the lease

agreement regarding the Skull Valley Band’s interests, and therefore the BIA ignored its mandate by

not addressing the significant interest of Native Americans to assure their unique diversity and/or

intergovernmental relationships. The commenter added that the BIA has failed to address significant

interests of the Native Americans, and how these interests would or would not be affected by the

proposed action. (0096)

Response: 

In Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit held that the BIA was required to prepare an EIS before approval of certain coal leases

because that approval was a “major Federal action” under NEPA. The BIA has not yet given final

approval to the proposed lease between the Skull Valley Band and the applicant. The court has

confirmed that BIA has not given final approval for the lease in State of Utah v. United States

Department of the Interior, 210 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2000). Under the CEQ’s Regulations

implementing NEPA, the BIA has participated as a Cooperating Agency in the preparation of this EIS

because of its jurisdiction by law (the required approval of the proposed lease) and because of its

special expertise in Indian matters. The BIA has conducted its own independent objective evaluation

of the EIS to ensure that it adequately analyzes the potential impacts of the BIA’s proposed action and

alternatives on the quality of the human environment. Part of that evaluation is to make sure that the

EIS adequately addresses impacts to Indian trust resources and that the analysis properly considers

the sovereignty of the Skull Valley Band and the government-to-government relationship of the Skull

Valley Band and the United States. After issuing the EIS and if the NRC issues the proposed license,

the BIA will issue its own ROD with respect to the proposed lease. Therefore, the BIA has adopted

the NRC’s EIS since the BIA has determined that it complies with NEPA and adequately evaluates the

BIA’s proposed action. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-136

G.3.6.3.8 Long-term Financial Security

Comment Summary: 

One commenter referred to page 3-36, lines 9-12 of the DEIS, and noted that the statement there

implies the Tribal government has no long-term financial security. The commenter stated it is the

responsibility of the BIA to secure Tribal culture and diversity, and in doing so, assure the security of

the Native American Nations.

Referring to page 9-14, lines 18-21 of the DEIS, the same commenter stated that the BIA’s primary

responsibility is to ensure the protection of Native American culture, historical interest, etc., but the

possibility of storing SNF rods on Native American lands suggests that economic profits of the nuclear

reactor licensees can affect the impacts of the established environmental justice requirements. (0096)

Response: 

The commenter is correct concerning the long-term financial status of the Skull Valley Band, but

misstates the responsibility of the Federal government. As part of the United States’ trust

responsibility, the BIA and other Federal agencies provide many services to American Indian Tribes,

including the Skull Valley Band. One aspect of the trust responsibility is to encourage and assist

American Indian Tribal governments, including that of the Skull Valley Band, in exercising their

sovereign right to self-governance and self-determination. The right to give their people a better life,

consistent with their traditions and culture, includes considering actions such as economic

development opportunities like the applicant’s proposal. The United States’ trust responsibility, in

addition to the Environmental Justice Executive Order language, required the Federal government to

consider the impact of any proposal such as the proposed PFSF on the culture of the Tribe as well as

other impacts. The BIA is conducting that analysis reflected in this EIS and in accordance with the

lease approval process under 25 USC 415.

G.3.6.4 The BLM Action

G.3.6.4.1 Consistency with Mission Statement and Management Plan

A number of comments were received about BLM actions, the Pony Express RMP, and about BLM’s

independence.

BLM Mission and Actions

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters questioned the actions of the BLM:

C Two commenters stated the BLM is not following its Mission Statement to sustain the health,

diversity, and productivity of the public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future

generations. (0198, SL3-18) Several commenters stated that the DEIS has ignored the Pony

Express RMP requirement that public lands not be made available for inappropriate uses such as

storage or use of hazardous materials (munitions, fuel, chemicals, etc). The DEIS statement

about the “absence of significant conflicts with existing resource management plans” cannot be

supported. (0012, 0166, 0198, 0198i, SL1-01)

C Another commenter asserted that the NRC, the BLM, and the applicant have shown a lack of

responsibility because they are located in the east and would not be affected by radiation if

something goes wrong at the proposed PFSF. (0076, SL3-16)
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G-137 NUREG-1714

C One commenter stated that in addition to the limited BLM evaluation criteria listed on page 1-15 of

the DEIS, the BLM must also consider the possibility that the BLM lands would become

contaminated, that parties responsible for this contamination may be absent, that there is a

potential for increase in wildfires, and that firefighting forces may be inadequate. (0198)

C One commenter stated that the BLM must not approve the ROW request for the rail line. (SL1-39)

Response:

The BLM staff reviewed its Mission Statement and concluded that granting the ROW for the proposed

rail line would not be in conflict with it. BLM’s Mission Statement provides for the use of public lands

by qualified ROW applicants. The ROW, if approved, would be subject to stipulations necessary to

reduce or avoid environmental harm to the public lands. Regarding the comment about the location of

applicant’s and regulators’ offices, the staff notes that the safe operation of any facility should be

independent of the location of the applicant’s corporate headquarters or the headquarters offices of

regulators. See the response to item G.3.6.2.7 on NRC Credibility and Objectiveness. The comment

on the agency and applicant responsibility is an opinion of the commenter and is acknowledged. No

response is considered necessary.

The BLM staff reviewed the issue of the RMP regarding hazardous materials. The sentence to which

the commenter referred was taken out of context from a decision regarding national guard permits on

public lands. The RMP Decision on Hazardous Waste Management states “the BLM will not authorize

placement or processing of hazardous wastes on public lands.” The proposed storage site is not

located on public lands and this decision does not preclude the transportation of hazardous wastes

across public lands. The proposed ROW therefore is not in conflict with the RMP.

The potential for contamination is discussed in Sections 4.7.2.3 and 5.7.2.4 of this FEIS. BLM has

identified two Mitigation Measures in FEIS Sections 2.1.5 and 9.4.2 which would be added to the

ROW grant that specifies actions if an accident should occur. BLM has considered the increased fire

risk in FEIS Section 5.8.4. The comments did not identify any specific element that was not already

addressed. Therefore, no changes other than the additional Mitigation Measures in FEIS Section

9.4.2.

Pony Express RMP

Comment Summary:

Additional comments dealt with the Pony Express RMP.

C One commenter asked if the Pony Express RMP has been amended to consider all aspects of the

proposed PFSF and, if so, to what extent the public was involved in this process. The commenter

also asked when it was amended and by whom, and whether the RMP would be reconsidered if

revisions to the DEIS are required. (0112)

C One commenter stated that the proposed amendments to the Pony Express RMP should not be

limited to the rail spur; they must take into account other changes in the area: a coordinated

resource management plan is underway, studies of vegetation are being conducted, the I-80

corridor is a target for development, and land values may rise. (0198i)

C The same commenter stated that when amending the RMP, the NEPA process must be followed,

including consideration of alternatives such as the no action alternative. Such consideration must

include the economic effect of implementing each alternative. (0198i)
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NUREG-1714 G-138

Response:

Regarding the question about the RMP amendment, the land use plan has not yet been amended,

and would not be amended until all the NEPA work is completed, a decision is made by the NRC

regarding siting of the proposed PFSF, and the BIA approves the lease between the Skull Valley Band

and the applicant. The BLM will also comply with Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2000 or any future directives.

Plan amendments are used to change one or more of the terms, conditions, or decisions of an

approved land use plan. Plan amendments are most often prompted by the need to consider a

proposal or action that does not conform to the plan. In this instance, the plan amendment would

allow a very specific project, a rail line, and is evaluated in this associated EIS. Section 6.3 of this

FEIS presents the cumulative impacts. Cumulative impacts include past, present, and reasonably

foreseeable actions. No additional information has been presented for inclusion and evaluation in this

FEIS. 

In accordance with NEPA regulations, the no action alternative was addressed in the FEIS. Included

in this EIS was a discussion on the economic effect of the proposed action and alternatives.

BLM Independence

Comment Summary:

Two commenters addressed BLM’s independent review of the proposal. The commenters noted that

the BLM and other Cooperating Agencies should not assume that the NRC has adequately analyzed

every issue, particularly because the commenters believe that the NRC is acting as an advocate for

the applicant. The BLM should take an independent, unbiased look at the DEIS and should ensure

that all issues have been studied in the level of detail normally required for an EIS prepared by the

BLM. (0158, 0198) One commenter noted that the desire of Federal agencies to cooperate is

laudable, but the BLM must not delegate their decision-making authority to any other agency; rather,

the BLM should consider all of the facts about the transfer and storage of this waste. (0198) 

Response:

The BLM has conducted its own independent evaluation of the EIS to ensure that it adequately

analyzes the potential impacts of the BLM’s proposed action and alternatives. This review is based on

the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, CEQ’s NEPA regulations and guidance, the BLM’s

NEPA procedures, NEPA case law, Executive Orders, and sound science. After issuing the EIS and if

the NRC issues the proposed license, and the BIA has issued its ROD, the BLM will issue its own

ROD. The content of the ROD issued by the BLM will be the result of its objective appraisal of the

issues discussed in the EIS and its own analysis of impacts that may result from the construction of

the railroad or ITF.

G.3.6.4.2 Legacy Highway, Native Plants, and Wild Horses

Comment Summary: 

Some commenters made statements regarding the BLM actions and impacts on the Legacy Highway,

native plants, and wild horses.

C One commenter expressed concern that the BLM appears willing to approve nuclear shipments

along the same corridor as the Legacy Highway, which the BLM has objected to due to

environmental impacts. (SL3-43) 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-139 NUREG-1714

C One commenter expressed concern that the use of non-native plants raises questions of how the

BLM plans to protect native plants and the animal habitats that depend on them. (0096)

C Another commenter expressed concern that the DEIS states that wild horse patterns will have to

change, even though a BLM official advised that impacts to the wild horse population should be

evaluated and mitigated. (0039)

Response: 

The BLM staff reviewed the comment regarding the Legacy Highway and concluded that this issue is

not directly related to the environmental review. The BLM did not take a position on the Legacy

Highway proposal as there are no public lands involved along its route. The proposed rail line in Skull

Valley is approximately 50 miles southwest of the Legacy Highway route. The two proposals are

therefore not related.

To prevent additional loss of native vegetation, clearance of the ROW would be limited to the

minimum width necessary for construction by the applicant. Rehabilitation of the ROW would include

native species, as well as fire-resistant species, which would help reduce the spread of wildfires. This

would protect native plants and the associated animal habitats. See Section 5.4.1.1 of the FEIS for

further detail.

The Cedar Mountain wild horse herd would not be adversely impacted by the proposed rail line

because the herd’s predominant use area is at a higher elevation on the mountain range than the

proposed rail line. The location of the rail line may keep the horses within the designated herd

management area.

G.3.6.4.3 Need for Study of Military Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters noted that Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act directs the

Secretaries of Defense, Interior, Air Force, and Army to conduct a study to evaluate the impact upon

military training, testing, and operational readiness of any proposed changes in land management of

the State of Utah national defense lands. The commenters stated that the BLM cannot take any

action for any proposal under or near the UTTR, including participating in this EIS process or

amending the RMP, until this study is complete. The commenters asserted that the proposed ROW is

located directly under the Service B Military Operating Area of the Test and Training Range. In

addition, the commenters stated that a 1999 letter from the Solicitor for the DOI indicated that the

National Defense Authorization Act essentially freezes any decision to change the RMP and any other

related planning. (0198, GR-01)

Response: 

The BLM reviewed the issue of Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2000 and concluded that the BLM is not precluded from environmental studies on proposed projects. 

Paragraph (c) states: “The Secretary of Defense shall conduct the study in cooperation with the

Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army.” The DOI was not directed to be a partner in

the study. The prohibition in paragraph (d) states that “the Secretary of the Interior may not proceed

with the amendment of any individual resource management plan for Utah national defense lands, or

any statewide environmental impact ...” the BLM does not intend to make a decision on the Pony

Express RMP amendment until the study has been completed.

Public Comment Letter #68, submitted September 19, 2000, is a letter from Department of the Air

Force, Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas W.L. McCall, Jr. acknowledging that the Air Force would

not need to institute overflight restrictions or change operations of the UTTR. “Importantly, both the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-140

NRC staff and representatives of PFS have assured the Air Force in private meetings that no

overflights or other changes in the way the Air Force conducts its operations would be needed to

accommodate the proposed facility.”

G.3.6.4.4 Inappropriate Influence of Native Americans

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern that the NRC and the BLM inappropriately influenced Native

Americans in Utah to consider this project because of their sovereign nation status. (SL3-16)

Response: 

Neither the NRC nor the BLM were involved in any discussions between the applicant and the Skull

Valley Band and both agencies had no role in the selection of a site by the applicant. The BLM’s role

in this NEPA process is to respond to and to evaluate a ROW proposal from a qualified applicant.

G.3.6.4.5 Clarification of Decision-Making Process

Comment Summary: 

Commenters requested clarification regarding the BLM’s decision-making process, given that page

xlviii of the DEIS indicated that “a BLM decision to grant a ROW to PFS would be dependent upon the

decisions made by the NRC and the BIA.” (0047, 0089)

Response: 

The two sentences in the DEIS following the sentence quoted by the commenter provide clarification. 

Those sentences state “If the NRC issues a license to PFS for the proposed PFSF and the BIA

approves the lease, then the BLM’s preferred alternative would be to amend the Pony Express RMP

and issue a ROW for the Skunk Ridge rail siding and rail line. Absent such findings by the NRC and

the BIA, the BLM would not grant either of PFS’s rights-of-way requests.” In other words, the BLM

would grant a ROW to the applicant only if the applicant had authorization to build the proposed PFSF

on the Reservation. 

G.3.6.4.6 Inconsistency with State Law

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed that the DEIS did not take into consideration state laws (UCA 19-3-301

and 318) that govern the siting of high-level nuclear waste facilities, and the allocation of liability

among owners of such facilities. The commenter asked if the BLM considered whether accidents or

nuclear incidents on the rail spur may require Federal taxpayer clean-up, or whether equity interest

owners are aware that they may be personally liable for such incidents.

C The commenter also asserted that the BLM did not consider the Utah state law (UCA 54-4-15)

requiring that the State’s permission (and concurrence by the Governor and legislature) be

granted for the construction of a rail grade crossing of a public highway.

C The commenter stated that consistency or inconsistency with state law is normally discussed in

detail in other EISs, such as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument DEIS. In these

other engagements, the BLM staff were much more available to meet with state and local interests

to address concerns. The DEIS for this project does not mention this issue. The BLM should

participate with the Governor in the review of this issue and should take the time to make

information and personnel available to state, local, and private interests.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-141 NUREG-1714

C The commenter noted that the BLM is required to coordinate all proposed actions with the State of

Utah to determine whether the proposed actions are consistent with state purposes, plans,

policies, and programs. This action is fundamentally inconsistent. (0198, 0198i)

Response: 

Section 1.5.3.2 of the FEIS has been added to discuss consistency of the proposed action with state

resource plans. The potential for accidents and contamination to occur from an accident along the

proposed rail line is discussed in Section 5.7.2.4 of this FEIS. The BLM’s ROW grant, if issued, would

require the following: (1) the applicant’s survey of the proposed rail corridor prior to decommissioning

with the results of the survey reviewed by the NRC and the State of Utah; and (2) the applicant will be

responsible for cleaning up any spills, resulting from transport of SNF, that may occur along the

proposed rail corridor. The measures have been added to the FEIS.

While it is true that there is a Utah state law governing rail grade crossing of a public highway,

according to the BLM’s official land status records, there are no public highways that would be

crossed by the proposed rail line. The existing roads in Skull Valley have not been granted a ROW

under the Federal Land Management and Policy Act, nor has the county filed as an assertion under

RS2477 to have those rights acknowledged by the BLM. Therefore, according to the current BLM

policy, the roads have no legal status. 

A discussion of planning consistency was added to the FEIS at Section 1.5.3.2. The State of Utah

and other interested persons and groups were afforded an opportunity to participate in the plan

amendment process by Notice of Intent published in the Federal Register April 15, 1999 (64 FR

18633). In addition, when it becomes possible to finish the plan amendment process, the State will

again have an opportunity to work with the Salt Lake Field Office, BLM, in development of the final

decision through the consistency review procedure. The BLM is following its procedures for

completion of a land use plan amendment. The BLM’s regulations at 43 CFR 1610.3-2 require that

land use plans be as consistent as practicable with resource plans, policies, and programs of other

Federal agencies, state agencies, local governments, and American Indian Tribes. Inconsistencies

are required to be identified.

G.3.6.4.7 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS contains conclusions about Wild and Scenic River eligibility

which are inconsistent with the cooperative 1977 MOU entered into by the BLM, the Forest Service,

the National Park Service, and the State of Utah. (0198)

Response: 

Table 1.2 in the EIS describes Critical Elements identified by the BLM and considered in the DEIS. 

The table states that there is no effect on Wild and Scenic Rivers. This statement was made because

there are no perennial streams or rivers in the Cedar Mountains. In the absence of perennial, running

water, there was no basis for consultation with other agencies.

G.3.6.4.8 Fair Market Value for Land

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed a concern that the BLM will not be able to comply with the Federal Land

Policy Management Act requirement that it receive fair market value for the railroad spur ROW. 

Judging by the payments to the Skull Valley Band, the value is much higher than what is received for

grazing land. (0198) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-142

Response: 

The BLM is required to obtain fair market value for all granted ROWs. This rental amount is

determined through application of the BLM’s rental schedule or through a formal appraisal process,

which is consistent with the Federal Land Policy Management Act. 

G.3.6.5 The STB Action

G.3.6.5.1 Rail Licensing Action

Comment Summary: 

One commenter asked the STB to deny the license to construct the rail line. (SL1-39) 

Response: 

In a decision dated December 13, 2000, the STB granted preliminary, conditional approval of the

license application for the proposed rail line. The STB approval was contingent on completion of the

environmental review process and imposition of appropriate environmental mitigation. The STB’s final

review will include the DEIS and FEIS and all public comments and other information provided as part

of its review proceeding. Further, the commenter provided no justification for the request.

G.3.6.5.2 Application of the STB Criteria

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed a concern that the STB did not complete a comprehensive evaluation of

the proposed action.

C The commenter stated that the DEIS reflects only a partial consideration of the STB’s regulatory

criteria for assessing environmental impacts of spent fuel transportation.

C The commenter stated that according to the DEIS, because each agency must take an action and

because those actions are interrelated, the NRC, the BIA, the BLM, and the STB have agreed to

cooperate in the preparation of a single DEIS. Elsewhere in the DEIS, however, the NRC staff

made it clear that the STB has not yet undertaken its environmental analysis by stating, “STB will

review both the merits of the proposal and the potential environmental impacts. STB will prepare

a ROD [record of decision] providing the basis for its decision to either grant or deny the license

application with appropriate conditions, including environmental conditions.” Consistent with this

second statement, the commenter added that the DEIS does not reflect a comprehensive

evaluation by the STB of the applicant’s proposal against the STB’s regulatory criteria for

information that must be provided in applicants’ environmental reports. See 49 CFR Part 1105. 

The commenter also stated that the state believes the STB has had little involvement in the DEIS.

C The same commenter stated that the DEIS addressed the STB’s criteria or the substantive issues

raised by the criteria, but did an incomplete or inaccurate job. For instance, the NRC’s discussion

of whether transportation of spent fuel to the proposed PFSF meets the STB’s threshold criteria

for preparing an EIS thoroughly understated the significance of the impacts of the activity. The

DEIS on page 5-2 stated that the proposed action does not meet the minimum threshold limits for

an EIS set out in 49 CFR 1105.7(e)(4) and (5), i.e., an increase of rail line traffic so as to cause a

minimum threshold increase in energy usage or air pollution, but that nevertheless, based on the

hazardous nature of irradiated fuel, the STB “is considering potential environmental impacts”

along the railroad lines that the applicant proposes to use. The commenter does not agree with

this conclusion. The commenter asserted that, under any reasonable definition of an action
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-143 NUREG-1714

“significantly” affecting the environment, the proposed action of moving half the nation’s

commercial irradiated fuel must be considered a “significant” Federal action.

C The commenter also noted out that the DEIS reflected only partial consideration of the STB’s

regulatory criteria for assessing environmental impacts related to spent fuel transportation, which

does not meet their commitment to conduct a full environmental review. (0198g)

Response: 

The STB has participated fully as a Cooperating Agency in the environmental review of the proposed

PFSF, including the environmental review of the proposed rail line. The text referred to by the

commenter states that the STB will review both the public interest merits and the potential

environmental impacts of the proposed rail line consistent with the STB’s rules for considering

construction and operation of new rail lines. As a Cooperating Agency, the STB’s environmental staff

has participated in preparing the DEIS and FEIS, consistent with the STB’s environmental review

requirements. In considering the potential environmental impacts of the proposed rail line, the STB

will consider the environmental analysis, recommended mitigation, and public comments described in

this FEIS. No additional environmental review will be necessary for the STB to make its decision on

final approval of the license application.

The DEIS statement on page 5-2 includes a reference to the STB’s thresholds for conducting an

environmental review. Based on the STB’s environmental thresholds, the rail operations of the

proposed action would not result in any significant impacts to the environment. The STB completed a

full and thorough evaluation of potential environmental impacts of the proposed rail construction and

operation. For the portion of the rail line that would be constructed, the analysis, results, and

proposed mitigation are adequately described in this FEIS.

G.3.6.6 Tribal Action

G.3.6.6.1 Ethical Concerns about Siting Facility on the Goshute Reservation

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters expressed concern that it is unethical to site the applicant’s facility on the

Reservation and the Skull Valley Band’s sacred lands, and the Federal government should instead

help the Skull Valley Band to improve their land. (0011, 0224, SL1-11, SL2-13, SL3-07, SL3-18)

Commenters expressed concern about the following ethical considerations: 

C The Skull Valley Band is being targeted for the siting of the proposed PFSF because of their

sovereign nation status and in an attempt to avoid state and local regulations and tax

requirements. (0015, 0021, GR-06, GR-13, SL3-04, SL3-25, SL3-54)

C The Reservation was chosen because of all the other hazardous facilities already located in the

vicinity. (0011, GR-06, SL1-05, SL3-54) 

C The U.S. Federal government historically has not provided just compensation for confiscation of

Tribal lands. (SL3-25) 

C The people of Utah are being asked to bear the costs and risks so the nuclear industry and the

people on the east coast can benefit from artificially low power costs. (SL3-23, SL3-33) This is

occurring even though there is room to store waste at reactor sites. (SL3-33)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-144

Response: 

In 1992, the Skull Valley Band received a Federal grant to study the benefits and impacts of siting an

MRS facility. From 1992 until 1995, the leaders of the Skull Valley Band carefully accumulated data

and traveled to various parts of the United States and the world to examine first hand all aspects of

the storage of SNF under the MRS Program. After the Skull Valley Band completed its research, it

determined that it was interested in hosting the ISFSI and approached the applicant regarding that

possibility. The siting process for the proposed PFSF is described in Chapter 7 of the FEIS.

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies are executing their legal obligations to process the

unsolicited application for the PFSF license and associated regulatory approvals by complying with

environmental regulations and requirements. The proposed PFSF has gone through a public review

as part of the NEPA analysis. The NEPA review includes acknowledgment of nearby facilities that

store or process toxic pollutants. The NEPA review also analyzes the possible impacts that may

result from constructing the PFSF, including cumulative impacts of the proposed PFSF when added to

those facilities and other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. 

One commenter stated that it is ethically wrong to impose hazardous materials on “sacred lands.” The

Reservation is Goshute Indian land, and its sacredness is determined by the Goshutes. The BIA

holds the Reservation in trust. The General Council and Executive Committee of the Skull Valley

Band have the legal authority to determine the types of economic development proposals they would

like to pursue. Input from Skull Valley Band members on these proposals is obtained by various

means. However, evaluation of ethics by non-Skull Valley Band members is not relevant to this

process. Concerns about the ethical issues associated with past land use decisions in Skull Valley

and with other Tribal lands are not within the scope of the environmental review.

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies’ decision process has considered all of the available

information about the proposed PFSF, including compliance with regulations, the safety evaluation,

the environmental review, and public comments. For a discussion on reactor storage capacity issues

see Section G.3.1.

G.3.6.6.2 Tribal Decision-Making

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters expressed concern that the Tribal decision-making regarding the proposed PFSF

was not democratic. (0021, 0024, 0029, 0034, 0112, GR-06, SL1-15, SL1-17, SL1-26, SL3-25,

SL3-46)

A number of commenters argued that the decision regarding construction of the proposed PFSF was

being made by only a few of the members of the Skull Valley Band and that most other members of

the Skull Valley Band, the people of Utah and the State of Utah government oppose the proposed

PFSF. The commenters stated that such a decision is not appropriate for just a few Goshute Indians

to make since it will affect so many people living outside the Reservation. (0029, 0034, 0095, 0106,

0126, 0149)

One commenter asked how many of the members of the Skull Valley Band are aware of private deals

made by the three leaders. The commenter also questioned whether all the Tribal members have

been given the opportunity to fully understand all the pertinent issues and vote or voice an opinion. 

The commenter stated that the process is prejudicial and inadequate if all members of the Skull Valley

Band have not been adequately consulted. (0112)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-145 NUREG-1714

Other commenters expressed the following beliefs regarding these issues:

C A few commenters said the Skull Valley Band Chairman signed the lease agreement without

consulting with the rest of the Skull Valley Band. (0183, 0191, SL1-17, SL1-39)

C Several commenters stated that not every Tribal member will benefit economically from the lease

agreement. (GR-06, SL1-17, SL1-26, SL3-25, SL3-46) 

C Several commenters said that only a minority of the Tribe actually supports the project. (0034,

0057, 0106, 0134, 0189, GR-06, SL1-15, SL1-17, SL1-34)

C One commenter stated a number of Goshute Indians (25 or 30) are accepting an enormous bribe

and do not really represent the rest of the Tribe. (SL3-07)

C One commenter said those Tribal members who do not receive economic benefits from the project

would not be able to afford to leave the Reservation if they wanted to. (SL1-17)

C Commenters stated that Tribal members opposing the project are being harassed and threatened. 

(0042, 0201, SL3-25)

C Several commenters stated the only reason the Tribe supports this facility is because of the

severe financial need that exists. (0054, 0106, 0149, SL1-02, SL1-10, SL1-36, SL2-06)

C One commenter suggested that DEIS Exhibit F-3 information under Public Acceptance is incorrect

in that a vote of the host population on record in support of the proposed PFSF has not been

taken by the Skull Valley Band. The commenter also stated that a lawsuit was filed alleging that

the Tribal Chairman signed the lease with the applicant without consulting the Skull Valley Band’s

governing body. In addition the commenter added that the money being received by the Skull

Valley Band for the proposal is only being distributed to the members who support the proposal. 

(0191)

C One commenter stated the references in the DEIS to Tribal opposition (page 6-27, Section

6.2.1.2, line 24) should be stated as “some members of the Skull Valley Band” and not as Tribal

representatives, as the Tribe is represented by the Tribal Government. (0163)

C One commenter expressed concern that some Native Americans admitted to being “wined and

dined” by the applicant and taken on foreign junkets to nuclear storage facilities and on-site

storage facilities. (SL3-25)

C One commenter expressed concern that the Tribal decision-making process prevents outsiders

from having a say in a decision that will affect them. (0095) 

C One commenter said a nuclear waste dump should not be allowed to be placed 50 miles away

from 1.5 million people in Salt Lake City. (0126)

Response: 

The comments addressing the internal workings of the Skull Valley Band’s government are beyond

the scope of the EIS. The proposed lease was presented to the BIA for approval by the government

of the Skull Valley Band as an official act of the Skull Valley Band. Therefore, the BIA is required, as

part of its government-to-government relationship with the Skull Valley Band, to consider the proposed

lease as an official act of the Skull Valley Band. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies are

continuing the NEPA process and other applicable processes for their respective proposed actions

until their completion, unless the applicant withdraws the license application or the recognized

government of the Skull Valley Band withdraws the proposed lease. To the extent that any of the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-146

comments allege that the BIA officials witnessed or participated in any improprieties, the BIA denies

such allegations. 

The Skull Valley Band has the legal authority to negotiate leases, ROWs and permits for development

purposes on its reservation. The Federal approvals and Skull Valley Band decisions associated with

these types of actions must comply with Federal laws and regulations. The BIA has the regulatory

authority to approve leases, ROWs, and permits on Skull Valley Band trust lands. The Skull Valley

Band’s decision to consider the construction and operation of the PFSF on the Reservation and the

BIA’s approval of the lease are based on factors that include the economic development goals of the

Skull Valley Band and the environmental analysis and evaluation documented in the FEIS.

Members of the Skull Valley Band elect their government officials democratically to serve as the

recognized Skull Valley Band leaders for specified terms in office. The General Council and Executive

Committee of the Skull Valley Band have the authority to make decisions that reflect the best interest

of the Skull Valley Band members, provide economic development opportunities, and allow

preservation of their heritage. Although some members of the Skull Valley Band have filed lawsuits

against the BIA, the proposed project approvals have been consistent with the Skull Valley Band’s

governing practices. The decision by some Skull Valley Band members to live off the Reservation is

made by individual or family Skull Valley Band members, not the Skull Valley Band leadership. This

does not preclude those Skull Valley Band members from recognizing and acknowledging that

Reservation lands are an integral part of their heritage and lives. 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding the effect of the facility on people, including

some Skull Valley Band members opposed to the project as well as people in the State of Utah. The

Skull Valley Band sought construction of the ISFSI on the Reservation. The proposed lease was

entered into by the recognized government of the Skull Valley Band. Any concerns by Skull Valley

Band members with the action of that government should be addressed through the internal

procedures of the Skull Valley Band and are outside the scope of this EIS. The NEPA process

analyzed the impacts of constructing and operating the facility and soliciting public comments and

opinions concerning the impacts. The State of Utah and non-Tribal members do not, however, have

the authority to decide the types of development activities that the Skull Valley Band should or should

not pursue. The General Council and Executive Committee of the Skull Valley Band has the authority

to make decisions concerning any economic development opportunities on their Reservation.

The location of the proposed site and its proximity to Salt Lake City has been evaluated by the NRC in

its SER and in the EIS. Both are acceptable and consistent with applicable regulations.

G.3.6.7 Agency Consultations and Coordination

G.3.6.7.1 Agency Consultation

Comment Summary: 

Commenters stated that the DEIS did not include consultation with the following agencies: the DOE,

the DOT, the USAF, Army, or Pentagon; the State of Nevada; the Union Pacific Railroad and railroad

trade organizations; the State of Utah (including its Division of Transportation); transportation corridor

states; the local community and Native American jurisdictions; and the Forest Service. (0039, 0042,

0077, 0112, 0134, 0166, 0171, 0198, 0198g, 0198h, 0201, GR-01, SL2-11, SL3-09, SL3-55)

Two commenters expressed concern that NRC staff had not met with representatives from the U.S.

Army’s Dugway Proving Ground or the citizens of Dugway in preparing the DEIS. (0039, 0077,

GR-05) 

Referring to the DEIS, pages 1-17, lines 15 and 32, and pages 1-18, lines 1-12, one commenter

specifically questioned whether (and to what extent) the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-147 NUREG-1714

Reservation, tribes other than the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Indians (including the Northern

Ute, Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah, Northwestern Band of Shoshoni Nation, and other Goshute Bands),

the Oregon-California Trail Association, and the National Park Service participated in the consultation

process. (0112, SL1-11)

One commenter stated that the NRC and the DOE should communicate about the implications of the

proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that the NRC staff met with the DOE staff regularly to resolve

technical issues related to site characterization of the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository, and both

the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository and the proposed PFSF relate to managing SNF and affect

both agencies. The commenter stated that the agencies should determine how the location of 40,000

metric tons of SNF in rail canisters affects the DOE’s plans. The commenter stated that only rail

canisters will be used at the proposed PFSF and this affects the DOE; therefore, the commenter

suggested that the private facility should be planned in coordination with the DOE. (0171)

One commenter said that the NRC should openly discuss the full extent of the State of Utah’s legal

and regulatory authority [relative to the PFSF] with appropriate State officials. (0198h)

One commenter stated that inter-governmental coordination and public involvement have occurred. 

The commenter added that because one part of the Federal government, through its failure, created

the necessity for the project, it is fitting that agencies would work together to meet NEPA obligations. 

(0236) 

Response: 

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies consulted with all appropriate agencies and groups, as

discussed below.

The NRC staff met with Colonel John A. Como, Commander of the Dugway Proving Ground, on

January 26, 1998. Army personnel gave the NRC staff and representatives of the parties to the

adjudicatory proceedings a tour of the facility and briefed them on the activities conducted there. The

NRC staff provided the Dugway officials with an overview of the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff and

the other Cooperating Agencies also invited Dugway Proving Ground representatives to participate in

the consultation process required by Section 106 of NHPA. A description of these interactions with

Dugway Proving Ground was inadvertently omitted from Chapter 10, “Agencies Consulted,” of the

DEIS. NRC revised Chapter 10 of the FEIS to include the consultation activities with Dugway Proving

Ground. 

On November 4, 1999, the NRC staff met with representatives of the USAF at the Pentagon in

Arlington, Virginia. The NRC staff discussed the ongoing safety and environmental review for the

proposed PFSF. The meeting focused on the potential impacts of the proposed PFSF on activities at

the UTTR. The USAF discussed, in a general way, the types of flight operations that take place

closest to the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff met with the USAF again on November 17, 1999, at Hill

AFB, in Ogden, Utah. Representatives of the Army (from Dugway) and the USAF agreed that officers

from Hill AFB would represent the U.S. military interests at the meeting. The USAF provided a

detailed discussion of the military use of the air space over the proposed PFSF. The USAF also

provided an overview of military operations, the type of equipment used, and some specific accidents

that occurred at the UTTR, and the impact of any possible air space restrictions. Descriptions of these

meetings were omitted from Chapter 10, “Agencies Consulted” of the DEIS. In September 2001, the

NRC staff met with USAF representatives. The NRC revised the FEIS to reflect the consultation

activities with the USAF and US Army. 

Utah State representatives have participated in a number of public meetings held by the NRC staff to

discuss the EIS and the proposed action.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-148

Regarding the suggestion to consult with Tribes other than the Skull Valley Band, the NRC has

consulted with the Skull Valley Band, the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation, and Tribal

Council of the Te-Moak Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada. In addition, the NRC has forwarded

project cultural resources information to the Northern Ute Indian Tribe, Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah,

and the Northwestern Band of Shoshoni Nation. However, these tribes have declined to be consulting

parties in the Section 106 consultation process of the NHPA.

The NRC consults with DOE on technical issues associated with the proposed geologic repository

program and site characterization activities at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in accordance with specific

requirements of the NWPA, as amended. This pre-licensing consultation is unique to the repository

program.

The NRC did not identify any need to gather additional data from the State of Nevada or consult with

the State of Nevada, because the host jurisdiction of the proposed site is surrounded by the State of

Utah. The NRC did not determine any need to consult with the Union Pacific railroad, because the

proposed actions would not result in any unique use of the Union Pacific rail line that is not already

addressed by current DOT regulations. Similarly, there was no need to consult with the railroad trade

organizations. NRC did not determine any need to consult with the DOT, because the NRC and the

DOT have an interagency agreement regarding the transportation of radioactive material and NRC’s

regulations address the transportation of radioactive material. No specific transportation corridor

states have been identified at this time. Until a license is granted and the applicant, its member

reactor licensees and other clients decide upon a shipping schedule, discussions associated with

routing are speculative.

The State of Utah provided a significant number of comments during the scoping process and has

raised contentions as a party to the ASLB proceeding. These safety and environmental contentions

were also submitted as comments on the DEIS. Based on these comments, the NRC is aware of the

State’s concerns. The NRC staff consulted with Utah SHPO. Discussion of this consultation is in

Section 1.5.5, “Required Agency Consultation,” of the EIS. The NRC staff also gathered necessary

state-generated data through the applicant’s and State of Utah’s web sites. The NRC did not

determine a need to consult with the Forest Service, because there are no Forest Service lands

involved. Similarly, there was no need to consult with the National Park Service, because no National

park land would be affected.

The NRC acknowledges the comment that intergovernmental coordination has occurred.

The NRC staff recognizes the DOE as a stakeholder and notes that DOE representatives have

regularly attended the public meetings on the proposed PFSF. The DOE requested and received

copies of major publicly available NRC documents on the proposed PFSF.

G.3.6.7.2 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)

Comment Summary: 

FWS stated that it concurs with the DEIS determination that the proposed action would have no effect

on listed endangered or threatened species. If the proposed action changes or if additional

information becomes available, FWS may reconsider this determination. (0089) 

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges FWS’s concurrence. The proposed action has not changed since publication

of the DEIS, and no additional information has become available that would change the determination

of no effect. Additional information about the consultation process with FWS can be found in Section

1.5.5, “Required Agency Consultation,” and in Appendix B, “Consultation Letters” of this FEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-149 NUREG-1714

G.3.7 Public Participation Process

G.3.7.1 Scope and Scale of the Public Participation Process

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the proposal is beyond the scale of anything the NRC has ever

approved, and has the potential to affect millions of people. The commenters stated that the

Cooperating Agencies and the public should be made aware of the magnitude of this proposal and

that the scope of the public participation process should consider the magnitude of the proposal. 

(0012, GR-04, SL1-01, SL1-27) Other commenters stated that the scope of the comment process

was limited. Additional comments are summarized below:

• One commenter stated that this program would start the unprecedented transport of hundreds of

thousands of high-level radioactive waste shipments on our nation’s roads and rails through

communities inhabited by millions of people. The commenter stated that there would be more

shipments in one year under this proposal than in all past shipments combined. (0185)

• Some commenters stated that the NRC should establish an outreach program to better educate

the public about the project. (0236, GR-14) Many commenters requested that the various

agencies hold question-and-answer sessions, as the format of the public meetings did not allow

citizens to have their questions answered, especially if they were general questions not related to

the DEIS. (0026, 0034, 0043, 0053, 0170, GR-14, SL2-20, SL3-48) One commenter stated that

the failure to answer questions suggested the project proponents had something to hide. (GR-14) 

Another commenter said that project supporters downplayed very real concerns. (SL3-16) One

commenter asked when people would have the opportunity to discuss the whole project, not just

the DEIS. (SL1-14)

• One commenter stated that a project that affects everyone should be decided by everyone. (SL3-

32) Another commenter stated that citizens of Utah should be allowed to vote on this initiative. 

(0188)

Response: 

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies appreciate the concerns about the scale and magnitude

of the proposed project. The Cooperating Agencies sought public participation during the scoping

process and public comment on the DEIS with full consideration of the project’s scale and associated

public concerns. The public participation process for the proposed PFSF was consistent with the

NRC’s regulations applicable to an away-from-reactor ISFSI (10 CFR Part 51 for the environmental

review and 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, for the formal hearing process). Public participation activities

also met the requirements of the other Cooperating Agencies.

The NRC staff has reviewed numerous license applications for nuclear power plants which are

technically more complex than the proposed PFSF. The applicant proposes an SNF storage facility

that would have a significantly larger capacity than any current at-reactor facility. However, the

technology being proposed for this storage facility is the same for any such facility, regardless of size. 

NRC regulations provide appropriate processes for EIS scoping and for soliciting comments on DEISs

for such facilities.

The Cooperating Agencies evaluated the number of SNF shipments that would result if the proposed

PFSF were approved. This evaluation is described in Chapter 5 of this FEIS. NRC regulations in 10

CFR 71.5 and DOT regulations in various parts of 49 CFR govern the transportation of SNF. 

Compliance with these regulations provides adequate protection of public health and safety during

SNF transportation.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-150

Regarding suggestions for public education and question-and-answer sessions about the project, the

agencies prepared the DEIS to provide information about the potential environmental impacts of the

proposed PFSF for public review and comment. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies conducted

the public meetings to receive comments on the DEIS. The meetings were not intended as questionand-answer sessions on the proposed project. The public could ask questions during the meetings

and comment period and the NRC has responded to those questions in this FEIS. In addition, the

NRC staff was available both before and after the public meetings to answer questions. 

In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Congress authorized the NRC to license persons to

use and possess the materials that the applicant proposes to store at the proposed PFSF. Congress

also authorized the NRC to institute specific standards and procedures for reviewing license

applications. Congress did not make licensing of individual facilities subject to a vote or consensus of

the public. Rather, Congress directed the NRC to establish procedures through which persons,

whose interests might be affected by a proposed action, could request a hearing on that action (see

G.2). The ASLB is currently presiding over a proceeding initiated because several parties requested

such a hearing. The State of Utah and organizations representing members of the public are

participating in this proceeding. The proceeding involves the NRC’s review of the requested action,

including safety and environmental matters. The FEIS documents the NRC and Cooperating

Agencies’ analysis of environmental issues. However, discussion of “the whole project,” including

safety issues and the actions requested of the BLM, the BIA, and the STB, are beyond the scope of

the FEIS.

G.3.7.2 Accessibility of the Public Participation Process

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters were concerned about public accessibility and participation including:

• One commenter stated that the process and opportunities for public input have been inadequate

from the inception of the proposal. (SL1-05) 

• Another commenter stated that the SAR and the applicant’s ER, which are repeatedly referred to

in the DEIS, are inaccessible to members of the public. The commenter further stated that the

NRC document room offers copies at $121.50 and $52, respectively, and that most concerned

individuals and organizations cannot afford copies. (0194)

• One commenter stated that information about the project supporters’ credentials and their

credibility was unavailable. The commenter further stated that some discrepancies have been

revealed concerning the reported qualifications of the supporters’ experts, which suggests that

they are hiding something. (SL3-12)

• One commenter stated that members of the Skull Valley Band opposed to the proposed project

were barred from the licensing process and questioned why they had been barred. The

commenter said that public comments would have little influence. (GR-06) 

• Another commenter stated that the cost/benefit/risk information had not been shared with the Skull

Valley Band, the citizens of Utah, or residents along the transportation routes. (0053) 

• One commenter stated that the NRC did not provide for a local Utah mail drop-off or e-mail

delivery of comments on the day comments were due, which shortened the comment period. 

(0198) Another commenter did not see a place to comment or cast a vote about the proposed

PFSF on the NRC web site. (0095)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-151 NUREG-1714

Response: 

The NRC staff made the following comprehensive efforts to inform the public about the proposed

action and involve the public in the EIS process: The NRC staff held two sets of public scoping

meetings early in the environmental review process to receive comments on the scope of the

environmental review (June 1998 and April 1999). The NRC staff distributed the DEIS to interested

and affected public agencies and to the Marriott Library in Salt Lake City. The DEIS was also

available on the NRC’s web site at www.nrc.gov. The NRC has conducted an open public process,

consistent with the requirements of the NEPA, NRC regulations, and Cooperating Agencies’

regulations. 

The agencies provided a 90-day public comment period for the public and Federal and state agencies

to review the DEIS and provide comments. During the public comment period, the agencies

scheduled two public meetings on the DEIS (July 27 and 28, 2000). The NRC staff conducted public

meetings to receive comments on the DEIS, and at these meetings, provided copies of the DEIS and

the web address for the DEIS. In response to concerns expressed at these public meetings, the

agencies scheduled two additional public meetings on August 21, 2000, to receive additional public

comments. To allow everyone attending the meetings an opportunity to comment, the agencies

encouraged commenters to summarize their comments on the DEIS and submit detailed comments in

writing. Comment cards were also distributed at these public meetings. The NRC staff was available

to answer questions about the review process before and after the public meetings.

The DEIS, ER, and SAR continue to be available for public review free of charge on the NRC web

site, at the University of Utah Marriott Library in Salt Lake City, and at the NRC’s public document

room. These documents include the information about the costs, benefits, and risks associated with

the proposed PFSF.

The NRC staff notes that some members of the Skull Valley Band opposed to the proposed PFSF

were given status as a party to the licensing proceeding. Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, an organization of

these members of the Skull Valley Band, has participated since the beginning of this process.

The NRC web site allowed the public to submit comments by e-mail and several individuals used the

web site to provide comments. The NRC staff accepted for consideration any e-mail, faxed

comments, or written comments received as late as one to two weeks after the close of the public

comment period.

Generally, Federal actions and regulatory decision-making such as this are not subject to a public

voting process.

The credentials or credibility of other commenters is outside the scope of this FEIS.

G.3.7.3 Community Awareness and Understanding

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters were concerned that others are not aware of the proposed project. (0013, 0052,

0105, GR-05, SL1-27, SL2-08, SL3-39, SL3-41) 

Commenters stated that the majority of people to whom they spoke were not aware of the application

or the hazards associated with the proposed PFSF (0217), that a comment period was occurring, or

that they lived on a transportation route for the proposed PFSF. (0105, GR-16, GR-20, SL1-36, SL2-

07, SL2-12, SL3-39) Other commenters stated that the pending decision could affect the lives of

hundreds of generations, and that a decision should not be made at this time with the public so

uninformed. (GR-06, SL1-27)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-152

One commenter stated that for-profit corporations, assisted by public agencies, could not force a

burden as heavy as nuclear waste storage on a public that is unsuspecting or unwilling. (SL1-38)

Another commenter stated that if the proposed PFSF accepts waste from non-member nuclear reactor

licensees, then many other states could be subject to commercial, irradiated nuclear fuel shipments,

and the associated risks to health, property, and the environment, without having been consulted or

notified by the NRC. (0052) 

One commenter stated that the FEIS should address notification of affected states and tribes along

the rail lines. (0240) Another commenter said that the DEIS did not indicate that communities will be

notified of these dangerous shipments and must have response plans. The commenter said that

mayors of towns and cities along the rail lines in Utah were not aware of these requirements. (GR-05)

Response: 

The EIS scoping process and a 90-day public comment period served to involve the public in the EIS

process. At the public DEIS scoping meetings in Salt Lake City (1998 and 1999) and Tooele (1999),

Utah, the NRC staff discussed its proposed schedule and provided contact information for parties

interested in further information or discussions. The NRC staff issued notices of scoping meetings in

the Federal Register (63 Fed. Reg. 24197, May 1, 1998; 64 Fed. Reg. 18451, April 14, 1999) and

advertised the meetings in the Salt Lake Tribune, The Deseret News, and the Tooele Transcript

Bulletin. In addition, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies held a series of public meetings in Salt

Lake City and Grantsville, Utah, during July and August 2000, to receive oral public comments on the

DEIS. The NRC staff also issued notices of these meetings in the Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg.

39206, June 23, 2000; 65 Fed. Reg. 49029, August 10, 2000) and advertised these meetings in the

local newspaper. The meetings also received substantial publicity from the Salt Lake City area media. 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies provided ample opportunity for public participation in the

development of the EIS.

When the NRC received and accepted the PFS license application for docketing, the NRC staff

published a notice in the Federal Register (62 Fed. Reg. 41099, July 31, 1997). This notice began the

process that resulted in the designation of the State of Utah and others as parties to the licensing

proceeding (see G.2). Therefore, since the fall of 1997, the State of Utah has participated in the

applicant’s licensing proceeding before the ASLB, which conducts the formal licensing hearings. 

Other parties opposing the application before the ASLB include: Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia (an

organization of the members of the Skull Valley Band who are opposed to the proposed action); the

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance; and the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation (a

separate Federally recognized Indian Tribe with familial connections to members of the Skull Valley

Band). Originally, a group of ranching interests with land bordering the Reservation were granted

status as parties, but they later reached a settlement with the applicant and are no longer involved in

the adjudicatory process. The Skull Valley Band is also a party to the licensing proceeding. Both the

applicant and the NRC staff also participate in this adjudicatory process. In addition, at hearings, the

ASLB often provides, at its discretion, an opportunity for citizens to state their positions in limited

appearance statements regarding the licensing action being considered. These limited appearance

statements are transcribed at the time they are made, and are placed in the docket of the proceeding.

Limited appearance statements do not form part of the evidentiary record of the proceeding upon

which the ASLB must rely in making any decision on the merits of the issues raised by the intervening

parties. Nonetheless, the public’s limited appearance statements may help the ASLB or the parties in

their deliberations in connection with the issues to be considered in the proceeding.

Regarding notification along transportation routes, the NRC staff provided the public along

transportation routes the same opportunities to comment on the scope of the EIS and on the DEIS. 

However, specific routes have not yet been identified for SNF shipments to the proposed PFSF. The

NRC’s regulations do not require any further notification for the EIS process. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-153 NUREG-1714

G.3.7.4 Availability of DEIS

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters expressed concern about the availability of paper copies of the DEIS and the

difficulty of downloading a copy of the DEIS from the Internet. (0003, 0012, 0052, 0096, 0194, 0232,

SL1-01, SL1-11, SL1-36, SL1-39, SL3-09, SL3-48)

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies sought to make public documents such as the DEIS

available to all interested parties. In accordance with NRC regulations, the NRC staff issued a notice

of availability for the DEIS in the Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000). In the notice,

the NRC staff provided information on how to obtain a free copy of the DEIS, and also informed the

public that the DEIS was available on the NRC web page. In recognition of the document size, the

document was posted to the web site on a chapter-by-chapter basis, so that it would be easier to

download. Technical difficulties in downloading the DEIS from the NRC web site may have been

caused by the size of the document. However, the NRC staff listed a phone number on the same web

page as the DEIS from which the public could request a free paper copy of the DEIS. The NRC

distributed approximately 700 copies of the DEIS to Federal, Tribal, state, and local government

officials, as well as members of the general public. The NRC staff made copies of the DEIS available

to every person who requested a copy.

The NRC, in keeping with its goal of becoming a paperless office, has closed local public document

rooms around the country. At the time the DEIS was published, the local public document room in

Utah had been closed. However, the NRC staff provided multiple copies of the DEIS to the former

local public document room at the University of Utah Marriott Library in Salt Lake City.

G.3.7.5 Length of Comment Period

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters asked the NRC to extend the comment period to ensure adequate opportunity for

public input. (0010, 0012, 0016, 0043, 0048, 0052, 0059, 0101, 0127, 0141, 0148, 0167, 0183, 0187,

0198, 0201, 0203, 0210, 0233, 0250, GR-04, GR-16, GR-21, SL1-15, SL1-39, SL3-17, SL3-19, SL3-

21, SL3-29, SL3-34, SL3-37, SL3-39, SL3-42, SL3-45)

Commenters suggested an extension of the comment period by:

• At least 60 days. (0052, 0084, 0099, 0118, 0127, 0130, 0135, 0139, 0151, 0157, 0180, 0185,

0189, 0194, 0195, 230)

• 90 days. (0003, 0027, 0159, 0198, 0249, 0257) 

• Six months or more. (0026, 0034, 0036, 0041, 0042, 0043, 0046, 0053, 0060, 0086, 0121, 0134,

0201, 0210, 0210b, 0217, 0229, SL2-07, SL2-12, SL2-14, SL3-04, SL3-06, SL3-09, SL3-12, SL3-

27, SL3-31, SL3-33, SL3-35, SL3-40, SL3-43, SL3-45, SL3-47, SL3-48, SL3-54, SL3-55) 

Two commenters said the proposal was moving too quickly and more time was needed to comment. 

(SL1-05, SL1-36)

One commenter argued strongly that 90 days was not a sufficient time to analyze the details of a

proposal of this magnitude. The commenter stated that the Federal government routinely allows

comment periods well in excess of 90 days for large EIS’s, for issues that are also important, but not

as clearly fundamental to the health and safety of the people of Utah. The commenter stated that the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-154

DOE’s DEIS on the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository, which was also national in scope and

similar in its impact, had an initial comment period of 180 days, with an additional extension beyond

that time. The commenter also stated that the comment period should be extended because, in the

commenter’s view, agency staffs have made it unnecessarily difficult to submit comments, as many

citizens were confused about how and where to submit them, and the DEIS itself lacked any

guidance. (0198)

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies reviewed the comments requesting additional time to

comment and concluded that the participatory process had provided sufficient time and opportunities

for the public to bring forward issues and concerns for the agencies’ consideration. The NRC staff

provided a 90-day comment period on the DEIS, a period which exceeds the 45-day period generally

provided under NRC regulations (10 CFR 51.73) and those of the STB (49 CFR Part 1105). The

comment period also exceeds the recommended 60-day comment period in the BIA’s NEPA guidance

(30 BIA Manual, Supplement 1, 1993), and met the 90-day period required for EISs involving the BLM

resource plan amendments (43 CFR 1610.2(c)). The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies held a

series of public meetings in Grantsville and Salt Lake City, Utah, to receive oral public comments on

the DEIS. The Federal Register notice announcing the availability of the DEIS provided directions and

addresses for submitting public comments. The NRC staff also provided directions on how to submit

public comments, and contacts for each agency during the public meetings. In addition, the NRC and

the Cooperating Agencies considered several comments that were received after the comment period. 

The NRC staff reviewed several requests to hold additional meetings along “the proposed

transportation routes” and concluded that the additional meetings were not warranted because

specific transportation routes have not yet been identified. 

In view of the already expanded opportunities for public comment on the DEIS, earlier NRC staff

efforts to solicit public involvement in the EIS scoping process, and public meetings held during the

comment period, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies concluded that an extension of the comment

period was not warranted. Additional information on the opportunity for commenting during the EIS

scoping process and the 90-day public comment period is provided in Section G.3.7.2. The NRC

received thousands of comments from several hundred commenters by the September 21, 2000,

comment period closing date, and therefore concluded that the length of the comment period did not

preclude meaningful and substantial public comment on the DEIS.

G.3.7.6 Requests for Additional Public Meetings

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters requested additional public meetings. (0003, 0019, 0021, 0027, 0029, 0062, 0096,

0201, 0230, GR-04, GR-14, GR-21, GR-23, SL1-15, SL1-37, SL1-39, SL2-06, SL2-08, SL2-14, SL2-

20, SL3-06, SL3-19, SL3-21, SL3-35, SL3-55) Commenters suggested meeting locations in

Grantsville, Tooele, Ogden, Spanish Fork, and in southern Utah. (GR-14, SL3-55)

• Two commenters said there has not been enough public opportunity to understand, discuss, and

mitigate issues fairly with Utah residents. (0010, 0015) 

• Some commenters said that communities through which the waste would pass have been denied

the opportunity to voice their concerns and that it would be more efficient to resolve their concerns

prior to the approval of the action. (0198, SL2-05, SL3-56) Other commenters said meetings

should be held in communities along the transportation route. (0026, 0034, 0042, 0043, 0052,

0084, 0096, 0101, 0118, 0121, 0124, 0127, 0130, 0135, 0136, 0139, 0141, 0151, 0157, 0180,

0182, 0183, 0185, 0187, 0189, 0195, 0201, 0203, 0210, 0217, 0249, 0257, GR-21, SL1-05, SL1-

09, SL1-35, SL1-36, SL1-39, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL2-14, SL3-06, SL3-09, SL3-23, SL3-35, SL3-36,

SL3-40, SL3-41, SL3-45, SL3-47)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-155 NUREG-1714

• One commenter indicated that few persons outside Utah were aware of the proposed PFSF and

that the DOE held half of the 20 hearings on the impacts of the proposed Yucca Mountain

repository outside of Nevada. (0198)

• Many commenters suggested that meetings be held in the cities where the SNF originates and in

cities along the perceived transportation routes, including cities in California, Illinois, Indiana,

Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming and states affected by

high level waste shipment from non-member reactor licensees to the proposed PFSF. (0003,

0021, 0118, 0135, 0171, 0180, 0249, 0257, GR-14, GR-16, GR-23, SL1-35, SL1-36, SL2-05, SL2-

14, SL3-31, SL3-35, SL3-54)

• Several commenters suggested specific cities for public meetings, including St. Louis, Missouri;

Kansas City, Missouri; Jefferson City, Missouri; Gary, Indiana; Chicago, Illinois; Des Moines, Iowa;

Omaha, Nebraska; and Laramie, Wyoming. (0159, 0194, 0249)

• Other commenters said the two meetings initially scheduled were too few and too early in the

DEIS comment period. (0012, 0015, SL1-01, SL1-14, SL1-37, SL3-21) 

• Two commenters said the public has a right and a need to be able to address the impacts of the

proposed PFSF. The commenters expressed concern that the DEIS comment period was the last

opportunity the public would have to address this proposal before the final documents are

generated. The commenters stated that there will be licensing board hearings, but only for parties

that have been admitted, and that the limited appearance statements submitted at those hearings

are not considered in the same way as comments on the DEIS are considered. (0198, GR-04)

Response: 

The NRC differentiates between public meetings and hearings. The NRC holds public meetings as

forums to allow members of the public to express their views on specific issues related to NRC

licensing or other actions. By contrast, hearings are generally associated with the formal adjudication

of issues before the ASLB. Members of the public can seek to become parties to such a hearing with

full participatory rights, including cross-examination of other participants. At this time, the State of

Utah, the Skull Valley Band, the applicant, Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, the Confederated Tribes of the

Goshute Reservation, and the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance are all parties to the hearings. Any

members of the public, and others who are not official parties to a hearing, can participate by

submitting a written statement or making oral presentations (known as limited appearance

statements). 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies conducted a public scoping process before preparing the

DEIS. The agencies held scoping meetings for the EIS in Salt Lake City, Utah (June 1998 and April

1999), and Tooele, Utah (April 1999). At these meetings, the agencies discussed the proposed

schedule and solicited input from the general public on environmental concerns related to the

proposed PFSF. The NRC published notice of the scoping meetings in the Federal Register (63 Fed.

Reg 24197, May 1, 1998; 64 Fed. Reg. 18451, April 14, 1999) and advertised the meetings in the Salt

Lake City Tribune, the Deseret News, and the Tooele Transcript Bulletin. 

The NRC staff published notice on June 23, 2000, that it had made the DEIS publically available (65

Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000), and the NRC staff and Cooperating Agencies provided a 90-day

comment period on the DEIS. This period exceeded the 45-day comment period required under NRC

and STB regulations. The comment period also exceeded the 60-day comment period recommended

in the BIA NEPA guidance, and met the 90-day comment period required for EISs involving the BLM

resource plan amendments. In view of the already expanded opportunities for public comment on the

DEIS, earlier NRC staff efforts to solicit public involvement in the environmental impact statement

scoping process, and public meetings held during the comment period, the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies concluded that an extension to the comment period was not warranted. The NRC received
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-156

thousands of comments from several hundred commenters by the September 21, 2000, comment

period closing date, and therefore concluded that the length of the comment period did not preclude

meaningful and substantial public comment on the DEIS.

The NRC staff reviewed several requests to hold additional meetings along the potential transportation

routes and concluded that the additional meetings were not warranted. Through the notification

described above, the NRC staff provided the public along potential transportation routes the same

opportunities to submit written comments on the scope of the EIS and the DEIS. The NRC regulations

do not require any further notification during the EIS process. The applicant has not identified routes

for SNF shipments to the proposed PFSF. Therefore, it would be premature for the NRC staff to begin

to schedule or hold public meetings in areas that may or may not be on the route to the proposed

PFSF. If the proposed PFSF is licensed and routes are established, members of the public can notify

the NRC staff and request additional information.

G.3.7.7 Public Notification and Meetings Process

Comment Summary: 

Some commenters expressed concern about the notice of public meetings and the process, location,

and adequacy of the meetings. 

C Several commenters stated that notices of the public meetings (37 days for the July meetings and

two weeks for the August meetings) were not adequate (0026, 0183, 0198, 0210, SL2-14, SL3-19,

SL3-21, SL3-47), and press coverage has been inadequate. (0034, 0036, 0198, SL2-18, SL3-41) 

One commenter suggested 23 specific organizations that should be notified about future

meetings. (SL3-47) Two commenters said that neither they nor their neighbors were notified

about the project. (0233, GR-05)

C Other commenters stated that the NRC did not consult or notify public and elected officials in

communities along the transportation route about the DEIS (0194, SL3-55), or advertise the public

meetings in those communities, as the DOE has done with previous projects. (0060, 0198, 0210,

SL3-09) 

C One commenter stated that more responses will be submitted now that more people are learning

about the proposed project. (SL3-55) 

C One commenter stated the hearing process for the proposed PFSF was inadequate. The

commenter said that the NRC should hold public meetings in public buildings in the future. 

(GR-21, SL1-35) 

C Some commenters wondered why the meeting room was so small, and why the NRC held the

meeting during a week when most people go on vacation. (GR-21, SL1-10, SL1-14) Another

commenter said the agencies were not prepared for the number of people at the public meetings. 

(SL3-55)

C One commenter asked why his bags were searched during a public meeting. (0021) 

C One commenter was reportedly told that if one “could speak English,” then one could comment on

the public record. The commenter expressed concern about this statement, because people who

do not speak English might be disenfranchised or alienated by this process. (GR-21) 

C Some commenters said the meetings should allow more time for commenters to speak, stating

that two minutes is inadequate. (0015, 0198, GR-13, GR-21, SL1-09, SL1-14, SL1-15, SL2-08,

SL3-19, SL3-56) 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-157 NUREG-1714

C Some commenters stated they were not treated with respect at the public meetings. (GR-06,

GR-21, SL1-14, SL1-21, SL1-35, SL3-19, SL3-49)

C One commenter asked where additional comments could be sent, other than to the NRC and to

Congress. (SL3-57) 

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge the concerns expressed by the commenters. 

Based on the public involvement activities, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies consider the

distribution of the DEIS and the public meeting notification processes to be adequate.

In accordance with NRC regulations, the NRC staff published a notice of availability for the DEIS in

the Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000). In the notice, the NRC staff provided

information on how to obtain a free copy of the DEIS, and also informed the public that the DEIS was

available on the NRC web page. From June 16, 2000, to September 2000, the NRC distributed

approximately 700 copies of the DEIS to Federal, Tribal, state, and local government officials, as well

as members of the general public. The NRC staff also provided multiple copies of the DEIS to the

University of Utah Marriott Library. Based on these actions, the NRC staff concluded that the

availability and distribution of the DEIS were adequate.

During the public comment period, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies scheduled two public

meetings on the DEIS (July 27, 2000, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and July 28, 2000, in Grantsville, Utah)

to receive oral public comments on the DEIS. In response to concerns expressed at these public

meetings, the agencies scheduled two additional public meetings on August 21, 2000, in Salt Lake

City to allow for additional public comment. The NRC published notice of these meetings in the

Federal Register (65 Fed. Reg. 39206, June 23, 2000, and 65 Fed. Reg. 49029, August 10, 2000). 

The NRC staff also advertised these meetings in Utah newspapers and issued nationwide press

releases. The Salt Lake City area media provided substantial meeting coverage.

The meetings were held to provide interested parties with an opportunity to present comments on the

DEIS rather than to provide question-and-answer sessions on the proposed project. Based on the

number of commenters, it was necessary to limit the time allowed to each commenter during the

meeting to provide as many people as possible with an opportunity to speak. When announcing the

time limitations, the agencies emphasized that detailed comments could be submitted in writing. 

Furthermore, during the first meeting, the agencies committed to schedule a least one more meeting

to provide an additional opportunity for interested members of the public to provide oral comments. As

a result, the NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies held two additional meetings. The NRC

published notices for these meetings in the Federal Register, for two weeks in advance (65 Fed. Reg.

39206, June 23, 2000 and 65 Fed. Reg. 49029, August 10, 2000) and sent written meeting

notifications to all individuals who had requested them.

The NRC staff did not prevent any non-English speakers from participating in the public meetings. 

The Cooperating Agencies did not receive any requests for translation services, although they would

have been provided if requested.

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies selected the meeting venues primarily to ensure safe and

sufficient public meetings. The NRC has specific procedures for maintaining a safe atmosphere in

which the public can provide comments and the agencies can respectfully listen and receive those

comments. The procedures are designed to minimize disruption during the meetings and to allow

both supporters and opponents of an application an opportunity to be heard. One procedure includes

searching the bags of every person who attends the meetings.

Attendance at the first meeting was larger than anticipated; consequently, the room was too small for

all participants. The NRC provided an overflow room, adjacent to the meeting, with a monitor to view
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-158

the meeting. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies subsequently extended the time of the meeting

and scheduled additional meetings in both the afternoon and evening to allow all interested people to

provide comments.

Based on these public involvement activities, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies consider the

public meetings for the DEIS appropriate and sufficient to fulfill each agency’s objectives.

G.3.7.8 Adequacy of Project Information

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern that the information provided on the proposed action was

inadequate and inaccurate. The commenter requested that a summary of the DEIS be made available

for the average reader to comprehend. The commenter cited a brochure that the applicant produced

and asked that the NRC require the applicant to provide objective, factual information to the public. 

(0053, SL3-48)

One commenter stated that the licensing process has failed to disclose pertinent information regarding

emergency preparedness, risk factors on the transportation corridors, and financial information

needed to assure stability for this long-term nuclear waste facility. (0148)

One commenter stated that the nuclear industry has had a minimal amount of experience with the

shipment of irradiated fuel rods from commercial power plants, and that rods have been corroding and

leaking in spent fuel pools for decades. The commenter questioned whether the Skull Valley Band

and other Tooele County residents have been told this. (0203)

Response:

The NRC staff considers that the DEIS contains a complete description of the proposed action and a

thorough evaluation of the potential environmental impacts. The DEIS also included an Executive

Summary, which provides a simplified summary of the information in the DEIS for public review. The

FEIS also includes an Executive Summary. The NRC staff does not regulate, restrict, or specify the

information that an applicant (e.g., PFS) must provide to the public about its proposals before the

NRC. The applicant submitted all of the information the NRC required for a license review. The NRC

specifies the information the applicant must supply to the NRC as part of its application, as listed in

applicable regulations. This information is publicly available on the NRC docket for the application. 

The NRC (and other parties to the licensing proceeding) reviewed all of the information provided by

the applicant.

Information about the NRC staff evaluation of emergency preparedness and financial information

about the proposed project is available in the SER. Information about the risks along transportation

corridors is provided in Section 5.7 of the FEIS. The NRC staff concluded that neither the proposed

PFSF nor the transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF would result in significant impacts to the

environment.

The NRC staff concluded that SNF can be safely transported and stored with minimal environmental

impacts, as described in the SER, as updated and Sections 4.7.2 and 5.7.2 of the DEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-159 NUREG-1714

G.3.7.9 Fairness of the Decision-making Process

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters questioned the fairness of the decision-making process. 

C One commenter expressed concern that the agencies have already made a decision to approve

the proposed action, regardless of public opposition. (SL3-11)

C One commenter stated that stakeholders must have truthful information before they are able to

give their “informed consent” to allow the transportation or storage of nuclear waste in their

communities. The commenter believes that the applicant’s information and materials about the

project are misleading and deceptive. The same commenter stated that the people of Utah do not

want to be patronized, misled, misinformed, or deceived by the applicant, some members of the

Skull Valley Band, or the Tooele County Commission. (0053)

C Two commenters questioned whether the project proponents intend to engage in a meaningful

civic dialogue about the impacts of this project, and whether they are trying to avoid certain legal

and political constraints by making a deal with a Tribal government. (0015, GR-13, SL3-31)

C Another commenter stated that even though the facility is located on land owned by a Tribal

government, the land is located within Tooele County, and the public should have a role in the

decision-making process. (SL1-15) Another commenter stated that locating the facility on Tribal

land effectively eliminates participation by elected officials, regulators, and the public. (SL3-31) 

C One commenter stated that the planning of this radioactive waste transportation and storage

program has taken place between the waste generators and the proposed hosts of the facility

secretly and out of the public’s eye. (0185) Another commenter stated that the wishes of the

residents of Utah and the entire Skull Valley Band were not being heard. (SL1-39)

C A few commenters expressed distrust about the proposed action and questioned the fairness of

the Skull Valley Band’s decision-making process. (GR-06, GR-13, GR-14) One commenter

stated that opposition speeches were not permitted at Tribal meetings and questioned how this

can be understood or portrayed as a fair and mutual decision by the Tribal community. (GR-06)

Response: 

Each of the actions that PFS has requested of the NRC and each of the Cooperating Agencies

requires development of an EIS. Specifically the applicant has: (1) applied for a license from NRC for

the proposed PFSF, (2) applied for a license to construct a new rail line from STB, (3) requested

rights-of-way (which to be granted would require a land use plan amendment) from BLM, and (4)

requested BIA review and approval of the lease between the applicant and the Skull Valley Band. 

These actions are prerequisites to implementation of the proposed action. (Refer to Section 1.5 of the

DEIS.) Each agency is using the decision-making process required by its regulations. The NRC and

each Cooperating Agency has a well-defined process for determining whether to grant or deny this

type of application. The applicant has not received a license or unconditional approval from any

agency. The Cooperating Agencies find no basis for the comment about a predecision on the

approval of the proposed PFSF.

Part of each agency’s process is the completion of an environmental review. Each agency has

carefully considered all comments received on the DEIS, and, where appropriate, have made

revisions to the document. In addition, the agencies have included in the FEIS summaries of all the

comments received on the DEIS. This information will allow each agency’s decision-makers to

carefully consider the opinions of interested members of the general public. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-160

The FEIS was revised to answer questions and clarify issues of concern expressed in the public

meetings. The responses to public comments and additional information provided in the document

provide greater detail to increase public knowledge and understanding of the proposed action. The

agency decision-making process will be based on the best available information and analysis of the

information.

The NRC regulatory process for licensing an away-from-reactor ISFSI, such as the proposed PFSF,

consists of both safety and environmental reviews. The NRC SER, as updated, concludes that the

proposed PFSF can be designed, constructed, and operated safely. However, the NRC can only

issue the requested license upon a decision of the Commission itself (majority vote of five

commissioners). This cannot occur until the FEIS is complete and the ASLB adjudicatory process is

complete. Subsequently, the license will be issued. The Commission will not make a final decision on

the licensing of the proposed PFSF until both reviews are complete. 

The BIA has not yet given final approval to the proposed lease between the Skull Valley Band and the

applicant (see State of Utah v. United States Department of the Interior, 210 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.

2000)). Under CEQ regulations implementing NEPA, the BIA is participating as a Cooperating

Agency in the preparation of this EIS because of its jurisdiction by law (the required approval of the

lease) and because of its special expertise in American Indian matters. The BIA is conducting its own

independent evaluation of the EIS to ensure that it adequately analyzes the potential impacts of BIA’s

proposed action and its alternatives on the quality of the human environment. Upon completion of the

FEIS and if the NRC issues the proposed license, the BIA will issue its own ROD.

The NRC staff and the BIA acknowledge the comment regarding the fact that the Reservation is

bordered on all sides by Tooele County, Utah. However, the reservations of Federally recognized

Indian tribes are separate and distinct geopolitical entities. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

recognize and respect this distinction. 

Several comments address the internal workings of the government of the Skull Valley Band. These

comments are outside the scope of the EIS and should be resolved within the Skull Valley Band. The

proposed lease was presented to the BIA for approval by the elected government of the Skull Valley

Band as an official act of the Skull Valley Band. The BIA is therefore required, as part of its

government-to-government relationship with the Skull Valley Band, to consider the proposed lease as

an official act of the Skull Valley Band. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies will continue to

review the applications before them until they determine to grant or deny them, unless the applicant

withdraws the license application or the elected government of the Skull Valley Band withdraws the

proposed lease. 

At each public meeting associated with the NEPA process, the agencies provided opportunities to

comment to all persons who desired to speak. At the request of many members of the public, the

agencies scheduled additional public meetings. The agencies selected meeting locations to maximize

public participation. Grantsville, Utah, was chosen because it is near the proposed site. Salt Lake

City, Utah, was chosen because it is the largest population center in Utah and is located near Skull

Valley. The meeting buildings were chosen to accommodate the expected number of participants.

G.3.7.10 Agency Responsiveness

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters who expressed concern about the responsiveness of the agencies stated the

following:

C One commenter stated that some of the public’s recent interactions with the NRC did not make

them feel comfortable that comments and objections by the State of Utah would be taken
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G-161 NUREG-1714

seriously. (SL1-16) One commenter said that some of the NRC’s statements at a public meeting

fell short of complete disclosure. (SL2-20)

C Some commenters said that they did not feel satisfied with NRC’s decision-making process and

expressed concern that the NRC was not being objective. (0008, 0015, GR-23) Two commenters

stated that for the NRC to assume they have accumulated adequate public input with so little effort

is insulting and a flagrant disregard for the democratic process. (0183, SL1-21) 

C Two commenters stated that nuclear waste storage could only be addressed with the broadest

public consensus. The commenters stated that the process pursued by the NRC so far will not

lead to that consensus. (SL1-38, SL3-49)

C Another commenter stated that the NRC’s hasty completion and review of the DEIS raises serious

questions about the integrity of the report and the agency, and the commenter requested either

more public meetings in all of the affected communities or a more comprehensive DEIS review by

an independent commission equally represented by different sides of the issue. (0185)

Response: 

The administrative, technical, environmental and adjudicatory processes of the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies exist to ensure that the interests and concerns of all citizens are appropriately

considered and addressed. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies must follow the existing legal

and regulatory frameworks, as they have done. The regulations governing the agencies’ review and

the proposed PFS are not the subject of the EIS; therefore, comments regarding the responsiveness

of the cooperating Federal agencies and the NRC decision-making process are beyond the scope of

the EIS. The agencies believe the proposed PFSF review process, which has been underway since

1997, is not a “hasty” review. As described above, the agencies have not made their final decisions.

G.3.7.11 Support for Public Participation Process

Comment Summary: 

Some commenters supported the public participation process. (0100, 0206, 0236, GR-10, SL1-23,

SL2-02, SL2-03, SL2-10, SL2-12, SL3-01)

C One commenter stated that the public should realize the opportunity they have for input and use it

fairly. (SL2-03)

C Two commenters said that there was no need or time for additional public input. (0132, 0255)

C Additional commenters said that the NRC provided adequate opportunities for input on the DEIS. 

(0100, 0206, SL3-57)

C Another commenter said the panel was really listening to what the public was saying. (SL3-39)

C Several commenters thanked the NRC for holding additional hearings (i.e., public meetings held

on August 21, 2000). (0050, SL2-06, SL2-08, SL2-10, SL3-58)

Response: 

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge the statements of support for the public

participation process for the proposed PFSF. The NRC has conducted an open public process,

consistent with the requirements of NEPA and with the regulations set forth by the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies. The NRC held two sets of public scoping meetings early in the environmental

review process (June 1998 and April 1999) and four public meetings on the DEIS during the public
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NUREG-1714 G-162

comment period (July 27 and 28, and August 21, 2000). The agencies provided a 90-day public

comment period for agencies and the public to review the DEIS and provide comments. This FEIS

considers and addresses the nearly 4,000 individual comments NRC received in more than 250

letters, e-mail messages, and 140 oral comments transcribed at public meetings.
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G.3.8 Adequacy of the EIS

G.3.8.1 NEPA Procedural Requirements

G.3.8.1.1 Adequacy of Information and Analysis

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the DEIS is deficient in the information and analysis required by

NEPA and other Federal regulations. (0012, 0039, 0077, 0096, 0112, 0113, 0134, 0142, 0148, 0186,

0198, 0198g, 0198i, 0215, GR-11, SL1-07, SL1-10, SL1-32, SL1-37, SL2-02, SL2-13, SL3-02)

Several commenters indicated general and specific deficiencies. Specifically:

C Some commenters stated that the DEIS is seriously deficient in the information and analysis

required by NEPA, the NRC’s own regulations, and other Federal regulations. Several requested

that the DEIS be reissued for public comment. (0012, 0156, SL1-28)

C One commenter stated that the “draft” document should not include false data or unsupportable

information, but rather a “draft” should only require adjustments in font style, punctuation, and

other format, not adjustments to content. (0039) 

C Another commenter stated that the DEIS is so deficient that it could not serve as the basis for the

careful analysis and consideration that a project of this magnitude requires. (0012) 

C One commenter stated that the DEIS is far from a complete document, since it is difficult for

members of the public to get an accurate picture of the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated

that some of the missing information can be obtained, but much of it has been claimed by the

applicant to be proprietary and is not available. The commenter indicated that such proprietary

information is only available to parties to the licensing proceeding who have entered into a

confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement with the applicant. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that NEPA requires the NRC to consider fairly “unquantified

environmental amenities,” such as impacts on flora and fauna. (0198i)

C The same commenter stated that an EIS must accurately describe the existing environment of the

area(s) that would be affected by a proposed action, and must assess the potential impacts of the

proposed action and all reasonable alternatives on that environment, as stated in 40 CFR 1502.15

and 1502.16 and 10 CFR 51, Subpart A, Appendix A, Sections 6 and 7. (0198i)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS is not in compliance with NEPA, specifically 42 USC 4332,

because it ignores Executive Order 13045, “Protection of Children from Environmental Health

Risks and Safety Risks,” (April 21, 1997) and 42 USCA Section 11001 to 11050, “Emergency

Planning and Community Right-To-Know.” The commenter indicated that such references are

missing in the following places: the dialogue box in the Executive Summary on page xxxiv, Table

ES.1 on page xxxix, and pages 1-18 through 1-21, Section 1.6.1.1, “Federal Laws and

Regulations.” (0096) 

Commenters indicated that the DEIS did not address the consequences and cumulative impacts of the

proposed action as required by the CEQ regulations in 40 CFR 1500. Specifically, commenters stated

the following:

C Three commenters argued that the consequences and cumulative impacts to ecological and

health issues were not adequately analyzed, and in some cases were not identified in the DEIS. 

(0012, 0096, 0198) 
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NUREG-1714 G-164

C One commenter stated that the CEQ regulations in 40 CFR 1508.25(c) require that an EIS

consider costs and cumulative impacts (40 CFR 1508.7), as those impacts on the environment

that result from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and

reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or

person undertakes such other action. The commenter said that several existing facilities that

should be considered in this context are described in the commenter’s June 19, 1998, scoping

comments. (0198i) 

C One commenter referenced page 3-54, lines 45-46 of the DEIS and the dialogue box on page

xxxiv of the Executive Summary, stating that there is a lack of cumulative impacts analysis and

data upon which to base such analysis. (0096)

Response: 

The NRC staff reviewed the comments on the adequacy of the DEIS and has determined that the

DEIS was complete based on publicly available information when it was prepared and that it complied

with NEPA, environmental regulations and procedures of the Cooperating Agencies, and all applicable

Federal regulations and Executive Orders. Consistent with the requirements of NEPA, the NRC staff

evaluated and compared the environmental impacts of the proposed action and its alternatives. The

DEIS described the proposed action (Chapters 1 and 2), the purpose and need for the action (Chapter

1), alternatives to the proposed action (Chapter 2), potentially affected environment in Skull Valley,

Utah (Chapter 3), the direct and indirect environmental impacts of the proposed action and proposed

mitigation (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), the cumulative impacts of the proposed action (Chapter 6) and a

comparison of the alternatives (Chapter 9). The changes identified in this FEIS are minor clarifications

and do not change any conclusions of the EIS. Therefore, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

will not reissue the DEIS. For a detailed explanation of how the NRC staff addressed Executive Order

13045 and 42 USC 4332 and 42 USC Sections 11001-11050, which were cited by the commenter,

see Sections G.3.15.5.2 and G.3.3.1.7, respectively of this FEIS.

The analysis contained in the EIS fully considers the environmental impacts of the proposed action

and is consistent with the type of analyses performed in other NEPA documents prepared by the NRC

and the Cooperating Agencies. The NRC staff acknowledges the commenters’ concern about

cumulative impacts. However, the NRC staff notes that the cumulative impacts analysis considers the

incremental impact of the action when considering other past, present, and future foreseeable actions. 

As discussed in Section 6.3 of the EIS, “Cumulative Impacts,” the proposed action has relatively small

and localized impacts and, therefore, has negligible effects on the environmental conditions in the

area, even when considered with other foreseeable actions.

The NRC staff reviewed the DEIS and concluded that the environmental analysis adequately meets

the CEQ NEPA regulations (40 CFR Part 1500), the NEPA requirements in the NRC regulations (10

CFR Part 51), and the requirements of the Cooperating Agencies.

G.3.8.1.2 Compliance with NEPA Implementing Regulations

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters stated that the DEIS does not comply with NEPA or the regulations for

implementing the requirements of NEPA. (0039, 0077, 0096, 0112, 0113, 0142, 0156, 0158, 0198,

0198g, 0198h, 0198i, GR-11, SL1-07, SL2-02) Commenters provided the following specific

statements:

• One commenter indicated that the four Cooperating Agencies have failed in their responsibility to

address public laws and policies in accordance with the statutory requirements of NEPA: 42 USC

4332, states: “The Congress authorizes and directs, that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
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G-165 NUREG-1714

policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in

accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter.” (0096)

• One commenter stated that the DEIS is inadequate because it does not comply with Federal

regulations for implementing NEPA and the NRC’s own implementing regulations. The

commenter requested that the DEIS be redrafted to address the omissions, that a draft be

reissued, and that the public be given an opportunity to review and comment on the revised draft

prior to any decision on the proposal. (0113)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS provides abundant evidence that the applicant and the NRC

have been evasive, dishonest, misleading, unwilling to bring forward pertinent scientific facts, and

on many counts have been attempting to evade the Federally mandated process. (0112) The

commenter stated that, regarding the applicant and the DEIS, the NEPA process is unethical and

the NRC kept the public uninformed by not distributing the DEIS prior to the June hearing. (0112) 

C Two commenters stated that the NEPA process was not objective. (0158, 0198) One

commenter, stating that the NEPA process did not precede the licensing process, asserted that

the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have essentially committed themselves to approving the

proposed PFSF, and NEPA has become an exercise of post-hoc rationalization rather than a truly

objective, information-gathering process. Specifically, the commenter said that the DEIS fails to

address the need for the proposed PFSF and the real alternatives. (0158)

C The same commenter stated that the NRC relies too heavily on Oak Ridge National Laboratory,

an entity with institutional prejudice in favor of nuclear power. The commenter said this is

particularly true given that the Cooperating Agencies do not share the NRC’s pro-nuclear

mandate. (0158) 

• One commenter indicated that the DEIS discusses BMPs to be employed in facility construction

and in transportation, but omits BMPs for facility operation, presumably because such BMPs have

not been developed. (0156)

C One commenter stated that the magnitude, scope, and unprecedented movement of SNF across

the country solely as the result of the applicant’s proposal demands that all of the agencies

involved conduct an independent and unbiased analysis. (0198) 

C The same commenter stated that the DEIS does not reflect joint consideration or preparation with

the STB. (0198g) 

C The same commenter stated that, since the SER is not subject to public notice and comment, it

does not meet the requirements of NEPA, and may not be relied upon in finalizing the EIS. (0198)

Several commenters commented specifically on the provisions in NUREG-1555, “Environmental

Standard Review Plan — Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power

Plants,” to indicate a lack of compliance with implementing NEPA requirements. Specifically: 

• Some commenters stated that, consistent with NUREG-1555, the DEIS should not refer to other

documents, such as the SER and SAR, for supporting and explanatory information, as it does on

several occasions. (0039, 0077, 0096, 0156, 0198, 0215, GR-11, SL1-07, SL2-02) For example,

one commenter noted that the DEIS reference to the SER on pages 1-12 and 4-2, is a technical

and procedural flaw. (0198) Referring to page 1-12, lines 43-44 of the DEIS, one commenter also

stated that the NRC safety evaluation needs to be a part of the DEIS, since it is difficult for the

public to get the necessary information to make an informed determination of impacts. (0096)

• One commenter stated that the DEIS fails to emphasize significant issues, as required by

NUREG-1555. (SL2-02) The commenter cited the DEIS’ emphasis on economic benefits
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NUREG-1714 G-166

resulting from a brief construction period as an example of focusing on insignificant issues. (0039,

0077)

Response: 

The NRC staff concluded that the DEIS is complete and complies with NEPA and that the EIS was

conducted under an appropriate NEPA process. The process the NRC staff used to consider the

application for the proposed PFSF is the same process the NRC uses to license other facilities. The

licensing review process involves separate environmental and safety reviews, both of which begin

after receipt of the license application, which together account for the overall NRC review. As part of

its application, the applicant submitted an ER to provide information for the NRC staff’s environmental

review, and a SAR to provide information for the NRC staff’s safety review. The NRC is a regulatory

agency and, as such, it does not propose projects; it regulates the civilian use of nuclear materials. 

Therefore, the NRC staff’s review begins upon receipt of the license application. The DEIS

documents the environmental review and the SER documents the safety review.

NUREG-1555 provides guidance to the NRC staff regarding the environmental review for nuclear

power plants, not SNF storage facilities. Notwithstanding the fact that NUREG-1555 is not directly

applicable to the environmental review for an ISFSI, page 3 of the introduction to NUREG-1555 states

that each EIS will stand on its own as an analytical document that fully informs decision-makers and

the public of the environmental effects of the proposed action and those reasonable alternatives. The

EIS is not intended to supplant the safety evaluation. NUREG-1555 does not preclude reference to

SERs, SARs, or other publicly available technical reports. 

NUREG-1555 also states that the EIS should emphasize the issues that are significant and reduce

emphasis on other issues and background material. One commenter indicated that the DEIS

emphasized insignificant issues rather than only concentrating on significant ones. The NRC staff

found that the issues indicated in the comment are discussed at an appropriate level of detail

commensurate with their significance as they relate to the environmental impacts of the proposed

action.

As described in the introduction to Section 1.5 of the DEIS, this EIS has been prepared as a

collaborative effort between the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies. The Cooperating Agencies have

used the technical expertise available at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, as well as technical expertise

from other consulting firms, to prepare portions of the analyses and assessments contained in this

FEIS. Oak Ridge National Laboratory possesses no commercial SNF that could be sent to the

proposed PFSF, nor does it have any other interest in or anticipated benefit from the proposed PFSF. 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have attempted to respond to all specific and general

comments received on the DEIS.

The NRC staff concluded that the EIS is consistent with NEPA and the NRC regulatory requirements

and guidance and that the FEIS emphasizes issues that are significant to the environmental review. 

G.3.8.1.3 Consideration of Connected Actions

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS should include evaluations of several connected actions as

required by 40 CFR 1508.25. The commenter stated that only one permanent site, Yucca Mountain,

is under consideration for permanent disposal of SNF, and that the proposed PFSF is only justifiable if

the waste can ultimately be shipped by rail to the [proposed] Yucca Mountain repository site through

Lincoln County, Nevada. The commenter stated that the applicant’s proposal and the [proposed]

Yucca Mountain project, therefore, must be considered connected actions. (0193)
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G-167 NUREG-1714

One commenter stated that because the proposed PFSF is a national-scale facility that will store a

significant percentage of all SNF destined for the [proposed] permanent repository, the EIS must

address the implications of this licensing decision on other SNF options under NWPA. The

commenter stated that these are connected actions that are not “sufficiently distinct” to be considered

separately and that the siting of such a “national-scale facility” should have input through the NEPA

process from affected parties, such as states affected by transportation, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of such facilities. (0198b)

Response: 

The NRC staff believes the EIS appropriately considered connected actions to the proposed PFSF. 

The NRC staff does not consider the issue raised by the commenters to be a connected action. 

Specifically, 40 CFR 1508.25(a)(1)(i) states that actions are connected if they “automatically trigger

other actions which may require” EISs. Construction of the proposed PFSF would not trigger the

construction of the proposed Yucca Mountain Geologic Repository. In addition, 40 CFR

1508.25(a)(1)(ii) states that actions are connected if they cannot “or will not proceed unless other

actions are taken previously or simultaneously.” The construction and operation of the proposed

PFSF would occur before the proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain would be

built, if it were approved. Finally, 40 CFR 1508.25(a)(1)(iii) states that actions are connected if they

are “independent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.” The

proposed action has utility independent of the availability of a permanent geological repository and

independent of any specific route used to transport the SNF to such a permanent geological

repository.

The EIS does not need to address the implications of the proposed PFSF on other SNF options under

the NWPA. If the NRC approves the application, it would not be precluded from taking nor compelled

to take further actions for SNF storage or disposal. As stated in Section 1.3 of the DEIS, “Need for the

Proposed Action,” the proposed action provides reactor licensees with an alternative to at-reactor

storage. The applicant has identified three primary reasons why an away-from-reactor ISFSI is

needed: First, some reactor sites have constraints that could prevent expanding on-site storage. 

Second, an away-from-reactor ISFSI would afford reactor licensees with reactors that are already shut

down with the ability to fully decommission their sites sooner. Third, a centralized away-from-reactor

ISFSI would reduce the cost of SNF storage for some reactor licensees. Likewise, the proposed

permanent geologic repository has utility independent of the proposed PFSF. The DOE is currently

considering several transportation modes and routes. Specifically, the DOE is evaluating several

possible locations for an ITF. It would be speculative to assume that the DOE would select the

location of an ITF based solely on the construction of the proposed PFSF.

Regarding the comment on the NWPA and connected actions, the proposed PFSF is being licensed

as an interim facility under 10 CFR Part 72. The proposed action is not subject to the requirements of

the NWPA. Likewise, the NWPA requirements for the construction of a permanent geologic repository

are not reduced or eliminated because of the possibility of the proposed PFSF.

G.3.8.1.4 State and Local Consistency and Compliance

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the NRC cannot rely on the ER prepared by the applicant, because it is

inadequate to satisfy the requirements for writing a defensible EIS. The commenter stated that the

NRC regulations require EISs to describe approvals, permits, and legal entitlements that the facility

would need to undertake the proposed action and the compliance status of those requirements. The

commenter referred to 10 CFR 51.71(c). The commenter stated that the CEQ regulations in 40 CFR

1506.2(d) require full cooperation and lack of duplication with state and local procedures. (0198h)
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Response:

Comments regarding state and local requirements were based on the applicant’s ER. The NRC did

not use the ER alone to satisfy the requirements of an EIS. Both the CEQ’s implementing regulations

for NEPA and the NRC’s NEPA regulations allow the use of environmental information from an

applicant (40 CFR 1506.5(a) and 10 CFR 51.43, respectively). As required by the CEQ NEPA

regulations, the NRC staff independently evaluated the information submitted by the applicant, to the

extent that it was used in the EIS.

Section 1.6.2 in the FEIS lists all permits that must be obtained by the applicant prior to operating the

proposed PFSF. The NRC staff finds that the environmental analysis in the EIS adequately meets the

NEPA requirements (40 CFR Part 1500) and the NEPA requirements in NRC’s regulations (10 CFR

Part 51).

Regarding the comment on cooperation and lack of duplication with state and local procedures, 40

CFR 1506.2(d) states: “To better integrate environmental impact statements into State or local

planning processes, statements shall discuss any inconsistency of a proposed action with any

approved State or local plan and laws (whether or not Federally sanctioned). Where an inconsistency

exists, the statement should describe the extent to which the agency would reconcile its proposed

action with the plan or law.” As set forth in Section 1.6.2 of the FEIS, the State of Utah has enacted

legislation in Utah S.B.81 (2001) establishing extensive (and possibly prohibitive) requirements

relating to the transportation, transfer, or storage of high-level nuclear waste within the exterior

borders of the State. PFS has filed a legal action concerning the validity of this legislation and the

matter remains pending at this time. Regarding the other parts of 40 CFR Section 1506.2, the NRC

staff is not duplicating any state or local agency review process, including any NEPA-equivalent

process. Section 1.5 of the FEIS includes a discussion of the consistency review conducted by the

BLM.

G.3.8.1.5 Rail Line Impacts on Regional Environment

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the Low Corridor License Amendment does not comply with 10 CFR

72.100(b), 10 CFR 51.45(c), or 40 CFR 1508.25, because it failed to evaluate, quantify, and analyze

the costs and cumulative impacts on the regional environment associated with constructing and

operating the rail line. The commenter’s basis is the following: NRC regulations require the applicant

to define the potential effects of the ISFSI on the region. In particular, 10 CFR 72.100(b) requires an

evaluation of “the effects on the regional environment resulting from construction, operation, and

decommissioning of the ISFSI....” Moreover, 10 CFR 51.45(c) requires an analysis in the

environmental report of “other benefits and costs of the proposed action.” Furthermore, the CEQ

regulations in 40 CFR 1508.25(c) require that an EIS consider cumulative impacts. “Cumulative

impact” is defined in 40 CFR 1508.7 as:

The impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when

added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what

agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative

impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over

a period of time.

The commenter added that the CEQ regulations further require that “cumulative actions which, when

viewed with other proposed actions, have cumulatively significant impacts should therefore, be

discussed in the same impact statement.” 40 CFR 1508.25(a)(2). The commenter stated that the rail

line from Skunk Ridge (near Low, Utah) is being constructed solely to move SNF casks from the

Union Pacific mainline at the junction of Interstate 80 and Low across public lands to the Skull Valley

Reservation. According to the commenter, the proposed rail corridor has no independent utility other
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G-169 NUREG-1714

than to serve the applicant’s proposed PFSF. Thus, the commenter concluded that the rail line is

inextricably part of the applicant’s ISFSI project and, as such, must be evaluated under the criteria in

10 CFR 72.100(b), and 10 CFR 51.45(c) and the CEQ regulations. (0198i) Moreover, the commenter

argued that the Low Corridor License Amendment is wholly without discussion of the direct and

indirect costs or cumulative impacts associated with the construction and operation of the proposed

rail line. Rather, the amendment described only the indirect benefits of the rail line (e.g., the rail line

will provide opportunities for further Skull Valley Band economic development projects). (0198c)

Response: 

This comment was directed at the applicant's license application and ER. The DEIS considered the

applicant's ER and addressed the concerns identified in the comment. Chapter 5 of this FEIS

describes the potential environmental impacts from constructing and operating the proposed new rail

line in Skull Valley. Section 6.3 of this FEIS addresses cumulative impacts, including those from the

proposed rail line. Section 5.7.2.8 of the FEIS addresses the regional impacts of SNF transportation. 

The NRC staff determined that the EIS adequately complies with the regulations cited by the

commenter.

G.3.8.1.6 Other Impacts in NEPA Review

Comment Summary: 

One commenter asserted that compliance with NEPA requires consideration of cumulative impacts;

risks of accidents along the Skull Valley Road; flooding; and pollution, seismic, and visual effects. The

commenter stated that these impacts are not addressed in the DEIS and that consideration of these

impacts is a distinctly separate legal requirement from compliance with the NRC safety regulations. 

(0198b)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. Cumulative impacts are addressed in Section 6.3 of

this FEIS. Risks of accidents are addressed in Sections 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts”

(Transportation), and 4.7.2, “Radiological Impacts at the Proposed Site (Site A).” Potential impacts

from flooding are discussed in Section 5.2.2, “Impacts During Operation” (Transportation), and 4.2.2,

“Impacts During Operations at the Preferred Site.” Impacts to water quality and air quality are

discussed in Sections 4.2, 4.3, 5.2, and 5.3 and visual impacts are discussed in Sections 4.8.2 and

5.8.2, “Scenic Qualities” (Transportation). The environmental impacts from a seismic event are

discussed in Section 4.7.2.3, “Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Operations and Accidents.”

G.3.8.1.7 Additional Natural Resources Information

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant acknowledges in the ER that additional studies must be

done to identify species and develop mitigation plans prior to construction. The commenter stated that

to meet the 10 CFR 72.100 and 10 CFR 72.108 requirements and NEPA, the information must be

obtained and included in the ER. The commenter also referred to the Horseshoe Springs Wildlife

Management Area, the Timpie Springs Waterfall Management Area, Great Salt Lake, Salt Mountain

Springs, and the proposed PFSF, and stated that the 10 CFR regulations and NEPA require the

applicant to identify what is in the area. (0198b)
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NUREG-1714 G-170

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS considered and addressed the issues

identified by the commenter and provided additional analyses prepared by the NRC, the Cooperating

Agencies, and their contractors.

Several surveys have been conducted since the applicant prepared the initial version of the ER (e.g.,

as referenced in Chapter 12 of the FEIS: Kass 1998a, 1998b; Stone and Webster 1998). Sections

4.4 and 5.4, “Ecological Resources,” of the FEIS discuss the predicted ecological impacts of the

proposal and include mitigation measures to minimize impacts. To provide current data on which to

design and implement monitoring programs, the applicant will conduct additional surveys and

coordinate with the responsible Federal agencies prior to initiating construction.

G.3.8.1.8 Military Training Impacts

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to comply with NEPA regulations and the NRC’s

regulations for implementing NEPA (10 CFR 51.71(d)) because it does not adequately assess the

cumulative and socioeconomic impacts from loss of military operations airspace use, including a

reduction in military readiness and national security, and potential socioeconomic impacts to Utah

communities that rely on employment and patrons of military agencies that use the Sevier B military

operating area. In an EIS scoping comment, the commenter raised the issue that the proposed

storage and transportation of SNF may impact the vitality and mission of the UTTR operated by Hill

AFB. The commenter said that such an impact should be considered because Hill AFB is a major part

of Utah’s economy. (The commenter referenced DEIS, Appendix A, Environmental Impact Statement

Scoping Process, Supplemental Scoping Report, Private Fuel Storage Facility, Skull Valley Indian

Reservation, Tooele County, Utah, November 1999, at 8.) The scope of the EIS, according to the

commenter, should include “potential cumulative impacts, if any, of the proposed facility in the context

of other existing and proposed facilities and activities in the area” and “the direct and indirect

economic effects (both beneficial and adverse) on employment, taxes, residential and commercial

development, agriculture, and public services in the area” (Id. at 12). Moreover, the commenter stated

that Section 3.2 of the Supplemental Scoping Report addresses “Issues Outside the Scope of the

EIS,” such as issues relating to conflicts in State-Tribal jurisdiction and DOE responsibilities and

activities, as well as issues relating to health and safety that will be evaluated in the SER (Id. at 15). 

The commenter stated that the impacts to the vitality and mission of the UTTR and the effect on

Utah’s authority cannot be seen to be outside the scope of the DEIS. (0198e)

According to the commenter, fighter wings stationed at Hill AFB use the Sevier B military operating

area to conduct low and medium altitude entries into restricted airspace over the UTTR-Dugway

Proving Ground land mass. (The commenter referenced the letter from Colonel Ronald G. Oholendt

to Governor Michael O. Leavitt, May 3, 1991.) The commenter stated that there is a conflict between

the military’s use of the area and the proposed PFSF and the proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge

(near Low, Utah), which will be located under the Sevier B military operating area. The commenter

said that this conflict must be addressed in any NEPA analysis of the proposed PFSF.

According to the commenter, activities conducted in the Sevier B military operating area include flight

ingress and egress to restricted airspace over the UTTR-DPG land mass, weapons testing, and air-toair combat training. Furthermore, the “UTTR has the largest overland special use airspace . . . within

the continental United States.” The commenter said that without the full use of the UTTR, Hill AFB

has the potential to become just another Air Force base and be subject to closure under the Base

Closure and Realignment Act. The commenter said that the UTTR is important to the vitality of Hill

AFB, primarily because the UTTR has the largest overland active combat-ready training zone in the

continental United States. (0198e)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-171 NUREG-1714

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. In the DEIS, the NRC staff followed NEPA

requirements and considered impacts on socioeconomic and community resources as a result of

potential impacts from the proposed PFSF on local military operations. The NRC staff did not identify

any impact on the operations at Dugway Proving Ground, Hill AFB, Tooele Army Depot, Deseret

Chemical Depot, or the UTTR from the presence of the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff also did not

identify any socioeconomic or national security impacts on nearby military operations from the

proposed PFSF. See Section G.3.13 for more detail.

On November 4, 1999, the NRC staff met with USAF representatives at the Pentagon, in Arlington,

Virginia. The NRC staff discussed the ongoing safety and environmental review for the proposed

PFSF. The meeting focused on the potential impacts of the proposed PFSF on activities at the UTTR. 

The USAF discussed, in a general way, the types of flight operations that take place closest to the

proposed PFSF. The NRC staff again met with the USAF on November 17, 1999, at Hill AFB, in

Ogden, Utah. Representatives of the Army (from Dugway) and the USAF agreed that officers from

Hill AFB would represent the U.S. military interests at the meeting. The USAF provided a detailed

discussion of the military use of the air space over the proposed PFSF. The USAF also provided an

overview of military operations, the type of equipment used, some specific accidents that occurred at

the UTTR, and the impact of any possible air space restrictions. The NRC staff updated Chapter 10,

“Agencies Consulted,” of the FEIS. See discussion in Section G.3.13.4. Deputy Assistant Secretary

Thomas W.L. McCall, Jr., acknowledged in a letter submitted on September 19, 2000, that the USAF

would not need to institute overflight restrictions or change operations of the UTTR in response to the

proposed PFSF. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the proposed PFSF would not have any

impact on the operations of the UTTR, such that it would affect the usefulness of the UTTR. 

G.3.8.2 Clarity of the Document

G.3.8.2.1 Use of Plain English

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern that the DEIS is not written in plain or common language,

making it difficult for the average person to understand. (0039, 0077, 0179, 0236, GR-20, GR-22,

SL1-07, SL1-39, SL3-57) Commenters provided the following specific comments:

C One commenter stated that the DEIS gave lengthy and difficult to understand descriptions without

providing concise conclusions. (GR-20)

• Two commenters stated that NUREG-1555 requires that the DEIS be written in plain language. 

(GR-11, SL1-07)

C One commenter expressed concern that Section 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts,” is written for

technical experts and may be difficult for the public to understand. (0236) 

C The same commenter noted that the analytical approach taken in Section 5.7.2, “Radiological

Impacts,” is too difficult to read for the public, and that the entire section seems written for peer

experts. The commenter added that it may very well be accurate, but the public is not used to

such terms as "3.60 X 10-2 LCF." The commenter asked that the NRC consider the unresolved

differences of opinion between radiation safety specialists at the NRC and the EPA on appropriate

radiation standards for [the proposed] Yucca Mountain [repository] and whether to set standards

in terms of dose or risk. The commenter asserted that much more needs to done to explain these

differences to the public. (0236) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-172

C One commenter found the use of measurements such as metric tons misleading, since the reader

initially did not know if a metric ton was heavier than a regular ton. (SL3-57) 

C One commenter suggested that references to the NRC publication, Transporting Spent Fuel,

Protection Provided Against Severe Highway and Railroad Accidents, (NUREG/BR-0111, March

1987) would provide the public with a better understanding of the transportation risk and

suggested using the following language:

“Current NRC regulations require that shipping casks meet certain performance standards. 

The performance standards include normal operating conditions and hypothetical accident

conditions a cask must be capable of withstanding without exceeding specified acceptance

criteria that (1) limit the releases of radioactive material and radiation levels outside the cask

and (2) assure that the spent fuel will remain subcritical (that is will not undergo a selfsustaining nuclear reaction).”

(0179)

Several commenters discussed the length of time and effort that it took to read and analyze the DEIS

(GR-11, GR-20, SL1-07, SL2-12, SL3-46, SL3-48), and provided the following specific comments: 

C One commenter suggested that the DEIS should be made available in summary form, since the

entire volume is often too difficult to comprehend. (SL3-48)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS is not well designed because it does not clearly state which

agency is responsible for writing which section, and this is confusing to the public. (SL2-12)

Response: 

The NRC staff notes the comments about document readability and shares the commenters’ belief

that the DEIS should be written in plain language. The NRC staff believes the DEIS is written in plain

language. However, the NRC recognizes that the highly technical aspects of both the proposed

project and the assessment of potential impacts may be difficult for some people to comprehend. As

a result, the DEIS includes several summary tables of the conclusions reached. Table 6.1, “Summary

of Significance Levels of the Combined Potential Impacts for Skull Valley Alternatives Addressed in

this FEIS,” provides a summary of the level of impact to each resource area from the proposed action. 

Table 9.1, “Summary and Comparison of Potential Environmental Impacts,” provides a brief

description of each alternative’s impact to each resource area. In addition, during the preparation of

the EIS, the NRC staff attempted to move the most technical aspects of the work into the various

appendices to the report, making the information available to the interested reader without interrupting

the readability of the main report.

In response to the comments and in keeping with the goal of writing to a general audience, a technical

editor reviewed a draft of the FEIS to ensure that the language in the document responds to the needs

of most readers. The results of this technical editorial review were incorporated into this FEIS.

In preparing the DEIS, the NRC staff attempted to write to as broad and diverse an audience as

practicable. For example, the Executive Summary, Section 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts,” and

Appendix D, “Transportation Risks Analysis,” present the radiological impacts of transportation in

three levels of detail and complexity. In several places in the FEIS, including Sections 3.7,

“Background Radiological Characteristics,” and 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts,” the NRC staff attempted

to provide background information on radiation dose assessment terminology and probabilistic risk

assessment. For example, latent cancer fatalities are defined in Section 3.7, “Background

Radiological Characteristics,” of the FEIS. Nevertheless, the NRC staff acknowledges that FEIS

Section 5, “Transportation Impacts of the Proposed Action,” involves complicated technical issues that

do not easily lend themselves to meaningful plain language explanations. The NRC staff attempted to

present these matters in plain language and in the clearest manner possible. The commenter did not
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-173 NUREG-1714

provide specific examples of why Section 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts,” was too difficult to read,

therefore, the NRC staff cannot respond further to this comment. The text box in Section 5.7.2,

“Radiological Impact,” provides an explanation of the meaning of LCF in the impact analysis.

The difference between the NRC and the EPA regarding standards for the proposed permanent

geologic repository at Yucca Mountain primarily concerns the need for a separate groundwater

standard that would be applied to a permanent geologic repository disposal site. This issue does not

have relevance to storage sites such as the proposed PFSF, and it is not mentioned in the FEIS

because it is beyond the scope of the environmental review.

Great care has been taken throughout this FEIS to include both the metric units and the English units

of measure for all numerical data. The term “metric tons uranium” or MTU is a standard measurement

within the nuclear industry, and, therefore, English units were omitted. To prevent confusion in this

FEIS, the NRC staff revised the “List of Acronyms and Abbreviations” to include a definition of the

English equivalent of an MTU. The NRC staff has also defined “MTU” in English units upon its first

use in the document (see the FEIS Executive Summary and Section 1.2, “The Proposed Action”).

The NRC staff revised Appendix D, “Transportation Risks Analysis,” of the FEIS to incorporate

additional clarifying language and information from the NRC publication “Transporting Spent Fuel,

Protection Provided Against Severe Highway and Railroad Accidents” (NUREG/BR-0111, March

1987). 

Regarding the question about which Federal agency prepared which portions of the DEIS, the

document was prepared as a collaborative effort. Each Cooperating Agency (i.e., the NRC, the BIA,

the BLM, and the STB) contributed to the development of the DEIS and reviewed the contributions of

the other agencies. While the NRC staff prepared the radiological impact analyses presented in

Sections 4.7, “Human Health Impacts,” and 5.7, “Human Health Impacts of SNF Transportation,” of

this FEIS, other agencies’ staff prepared sections on subjects within their areas of expertise.

The length of the DEIS is directly related to the complexity of the proposed action and the significant

amount of public interaction. The proposed project requires that the FEIS cover all aspects of the

proposed action and its potential impacts. However, the FEIS includes an Executive Summary to

summarize the findings of the document and to reduce the amount of detailed or technical discussion

contained elsewhere in the FEIS.

G.3.8.2.2 Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Index

Comment Summary:

One commenter praised the inclusion of a list of acronyms and abbreviations and an index and table

of contents. (SL2-12)

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies included a list of acronyms, abbreviations, and an index of

the table of contents to ease the use of the FEIS, and the agencies appreciate the comment.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-174

G.3.8.3 Errors

G.3.8.3.1 Typographical Errors (General)

Comment Summary: 

One commenter noted the following typographical errors in the document. (0163)

C The commenter stated that, “Desert Peak (page 3-58, Section 3.8.2, “Scenic Qualities,” line 21),”

should read, “Deseret Peak.” (0163)

C The commenter stated that there appears to be a typographical error in the calculated dose rate at

the OCA boundary. Assuming a proposed PFSF array of 4,000 HI-STORM storage casks, the

dose rate is 2.80 E-3 mrem/hr (SAR page 7.3-13), not the 0.00283 mrem/hr shown (page 4-43,

Section 4.7.2.1, “Estimated Dose to the General Public,” line 21). (0163)

C The commenter noted that on page xxxiii of the Executive Summary, line 10, ITP (as an acronym

for Intermodal Transfer Point) should be replaced with ITF (Intermodal Transfer Facility). (0163)

C The commenter noted that the reference to a construction period of 9 months (page 4-32, Section

4.5.1.8, “Economic Structure,” line 26) appears to be a typographical error, because the same

chapter (page 4-35, Section 4.5.1.6, “Transportation and Traffic,” line 29) references a 19-month

construction period. However, the commenter noted that the correct estimated time period for

Phase 1 of construction is actually 18 months, referencing ER Section 4.1.7.1, “Construction

Phase 1.” (0163)

Response:

The typographical errors noted in the comments above have been corrected in this FEIS.

G.3.8.3.2 Editorial Changes

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters suggested the following minor editorial changes to the document. (0145, 0163)

C One commenter suggested that the term, “nerve gas incinerator,” (Appendix F, Exhibit F.39.

Executive Summary, page F-41) be referred to as a “chemical warfare agent incinerator”

throughout the document. (0145) 

C One commenter stated that Skull Valley Road is a State road. However, Figure 4.2 (page 4-52)

suggests that the project would not be visible from any “State highway.” (0163)

Response: 

The phrase “nerve gas incinerator” is not used anywhere in this FEIS, except in Appendix F. The

information presented in Appendix F was developed and used by the applicant to support its siteselection process. The data sheets on display in Appendix F document the information generated by

the applicant, and, therefore, do not require the change as suggested in the comment.

The erroneous entry in Figure 4.2 has been corrected in the FEIS to indicate that the proposed PFSF

would be visible from a State highway.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-175 NUREG-1714

G.3.8.3.3 General Errors

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters state that the DEIS presents false or inaccurate information. (GR-11, SL1-15)

C One commenter stated that information provided at a June 1998 hearing differs from that included

in the DEIS. The commenter said that a map provided by the NRC shows the site is located

approximately 54 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah. However, new documentation states that the

proposed site is 75 miles from Salt Lake City. (SL1-15) 

Response: 

The NRC staff apologizes for any information that may have been miscommunicated at the earlier

public meetings on this project. As to the claimed inaccuracies in distances, the discrepancies appear

to be related to the Salt Lake City location from which the distances were measured. That is, different

distances can be obtained if the measurement is taken from the center of the city or from the city

limits. The distance obtained from U.S. Geological Survey maps shows a direct distance of 58 miles

from the center of the proposed site to the State Capitol building in Salt Lake City. By highway, this

distance is 75 miles.

G.3.8.3.4 Inconsistencies in the DEIS

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters suggested that there are additional inconsistencies in the DEIS. (0096, 0163) 

Specifically:

C One commenter stated that the statement made on page 1-6, lines 11-12 (regarding

environmental acceptability of at-reactor storage), seems to be inconsistent with the statement

made on page xli, lines 14-44. (0096) 

C The same commenter noted that the statement on page 2-32, lines 4-5 (regarding shipment

between existing reactor sites), seems to be saying something different from what is said on page

xli, lines 38-41(regarding the lack of significant environmental impacts from at-reactor storage). 

(0096)

C The same commenter stated that variation of frequency and population density is available to the

public, contrary to what is written in the DEIS (page D-7, lines 2-3). (0096)

C One commenter noted that the statement that the proposed new rail line “would cross 32 arroyos

... at which drainage culverts designed to the 100-year flood would be installed,” (page 2-14,

Section 2.1.1.3, “New Rail Line,” line 35) is inconsistent with the statement that appears later in

the DEIS on page 5-6, line 8, that 110 culverts would need to be installed for the proposed rail

line. The commenter also stated that the applicant would provide sufficient culverts for the

proposed rail line to maintain the existing drainage and to allow passage of the 100-year flood. 

(0163)

C The same commenter noted that the DEIS stated that under current DOE plans, removal of SNF

from nuclear power plants would not begin until 2010 (page 6-43, Section 6.7, “Potential Impacts

of the No Action Alternative,” line 29). The commenter stated that DOE’s statements consistently

refer to a start for SNF removal in 2010 “at the earliest.” The commenter stated that the DEIS

correctly described DOE’s announced policy on page 8-2, line 46. However, the commenter

noted, on page 8-7, line 9, the DEIS again omitted the qualifier “at the earliest.” (0163)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-176

Response: 

There is no inconsistency with the text on page xli (regarding the environmental acceptability of atreactor storage) and page 1-6 (regarding the purpose and need for the proposed PFSF) as claimed in

the comment. The text on page 1-6, Section 1.3, “Need for the Proposed Action,” states that the

proposed PFSF would provide an “alternative” for the storage of SNF. The commenter has apparently

misinterpreted this purpose and need as suggesting the proposed PFSF would provide a

“replacement” for other storage methods and locations. The conclusions of this EIS show that the

proposed PFSF, as well as at-reactor storage options, are both viable alternatives.

The text on page xli (regarding the lack of significant environmental impacts from at-reactor storage) is

not inconsistent with the text on page 2-32 (regarding the shipment of SNF between existing reactor

sites) as claimed in the comment. The two statements are not related. The basis for the claimed

inconsistency is unclear from the comment.

Regarding the comment about the variation of frequency and population density as discussed in

Appendix D, the original comment noted that such information is available from the local sheriff’s office

and/or the local emergency planning committees. The commenter misunderstood the type of

unavailable data being described in Appendix D. The NRC staff acknowledges that specific local

population data described in the comment are available (from such sources as the Bureau of Census,

local sheriff’s offices, etc.), but it is not just the raw population data that are of interest in Appendix D. 

The referenced statement in Appendix D discusses modeling assumptions and states that information

is not available to link specific accident frequencies (i.e., the subset of each accident within an

accident severity category; see Table D.3, “Spent Fuel Severity and Release Fractions Used in this

Study to Calculate Accident Consequences and Risks,” in this FEIS) with the densities of the

populations in zones in which they might occur. 

Regarding the comment on the rail line crossing the 32 arroyos, the information in the DEIS was taken

from the most recent “Plan of Development” submitted by the applicant to the BLM for the rail line. 

This plan is still under development and is subject to change. The inconsistency noted in the

comment is related to the fact that multiple culverts are proposed at some arroyo crossings. 

Therefore, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the number of proposed culverts and the

number of arroyos. As noted, the applicant has committed to provide sufficient culverts for the

proposed rail line to maintain the existing drainage and to allow passage of the 100-year flood. 

Regarding the comment on the availability of a permanent geologic repository, the text in this FEIS

has been changed to include the phrase “at the earliest,” as suggested in the comment, for DOE’s

schedule to open a permanent repository by 2010.

G.3.8.3.5 Inconsistencies in References

Comment Summary: 

One commenter suggested that the reference to Table 7.4-2 of the SAR (page 4-44, Section 4.7.2.2,

“Estimated Dose to Occupational Personnel,” line 16) of the DEIS should be deleted since it applies to

doses from operations involving TranStor casks. The commenter noted that the table, which related

to TranStor operations, has been deleted from the SAR. (0163)

The commenter stated that on page 2-8, Section 2.1.1.2, “Facility Description,” line 12, the statement

that the Canister Transfer Building is “75 ft” high is incorrect. The commenter suggested that it is 90 ft

high, referencing the applicant’s SAR Figure 4.7-1, “Canister Transfer Building,” Sheet 2 of 3. (0163)

The commenter stated that on page 2-10, Section 2.1.1.2, “Facility Description,” line 12, the statement

that the “Canister Transfer Building would be heated electrically, while propane tanks located near

each of the other three buildings to provide space heating for those structures” is incorrect. The
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G-177 NUREG-1714

commenter stated that according to the applicant’s SAR, Sections 4.3.12, “Gas Reactor Licensees,”

and 8.2.4, “Explosion,” all of the proposed PFSF buildings, including the Canister Transfer Building,

will be heated with propane. The commenter added that additional electric baseboard heaters will be

used in the offices located in the Canister Transfer Building. (0163)

The commenter noted that the statement that the light poles at the proposed PFSF would be 120 ft

high (page 4-22, Section 4.4.2.2, “Wildlife,” line 42) is incorrect. The commenter stated that the light

poles would be 130 ft high, as stated in ER Section 4.2.8.2, “Scenic Resources.” (0163)

Response: 

The NRC staff revised the text in this FEIS to include the corrections to the factual and typographical

errors noted by the commenter and described in the comments.

G.3.8.3.6 Executive Summary and Chapter 1 Errors

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that Florida Power & Light Company has replaced Illinois Power Company

as a member of the applicant reactor licensees and this change should be made throughout the

document. (0163, 0198, 0259)

One commenter said that the statement, “SNF reprocessing never materialized” (page 1-6, Section

1.3, “Need for the Proposed Action,” of the DEIS), is incorrect. The commenter stated that the

reprocessing of SNF from U.S. commercial reactors took place for a period of time at the West Valley

facility. (0163)

One commenter noted that the sidebar box on page xxxiv does not include, “unknown impacts,”

although they are mentioned several pages later (page xxxv, “Potential Impacts,” lines 16-19). (0096)

The same commenter stated that Table 1.2, “Critical Elements Identified by BLM and Considered in

this DEIS,” (page 1-17, line 18) is incorrect. The commenter stated that eagles have nested in the

area and that riparian species would therefore be affected by the proposed rail corridor. (0096) 

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have revised the FEIS to reflect new applicant member

reactor licensees. Florida Power & Light Company has been added, and Illinois Power Company

removed. Figure 1.3, “Reactors Which Are Owned by the PFS Companies,” has been revised to show

the location of applicant member reactors and Table 1.1, “Site-Specific Reactor Information for PFS

Member Utilities,” now shows the characteristics of these reactors.

The NRC staff acknowledges that reprocessing of commercial nuclear fuel did occur at a facility in

West Valley, New York, from 1966 to 1972. However, large scale reprocessing by U.S. commercial

reactors never materialized as expected. Instead, the once-through fuel cycle became the practice of

U.S. commercial nuclear plant operators. The FEIS text in Section 1.3, “Need for the Proposed

Action,” has been amended to acknowledge this activity. 

The NRC “standards” (included in NUREG-1437, which this FEIS uses) do not include the category

“unknown.” Therefore, the sidebar box on page xxxiv is correct. 

The statement in Table 1.2, “Critical Elements Identified by BLM and Considered in this DEIS,” is not

in error. The proposed rail corridor does not cross any riparian area, or wetlands, as explained in

Section 3.4.2.2 of the FEIS. The sections of the FEIS addressing wetlands, Sections 4.4.1.3, 4.4.2.3,

5.4.1.3, and 5.4.2.3, present the results of the analysis of the impacts of the proposed action on
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-178

wetlands. As summarized in Table 9.1, “Summary and Comparison of Potential Environmental

Impacts,” the cooperating Federal agencies predict that those impacts would be small. The use of the

project area by birds (including eagles) is described in Section 3.4, “Ecological Resources,” of the

FEIS. The specific use of Skull Valley by bald eagles is reported in Section 3.4.3.2, “Wildlife.” While

bald eagles hunt in the valley during the winter, the closest nest location is over 120 km (70 miles) to

the east.

G.3.8.3.7 Chapter 2 Errors

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the title for the second column of Table 2.1, “Anticipated Peak Workforce

Requirements at the Proposed PFSF and New Rail Corridor,” on page 2-5, should be changed to

“Construction Workers During Operations” to make clear that these numbers do not include the

operating staff of the proposed PFSF. (0163) 

One commenter noted the Reservation’s eastern boundary, as shown in Figure 2.13, “Proposed

Location of an Intermodal Transfer Facility in Skull Valley,” is not consistent with those shown in other

chapters of the DEIS. (0077)

One commenter indicated that the statements, “movement of the transfer cask (with the SNF canister

inside) from a position above the shipping cask to above the storage cask would occur on the second

floor of the Canister Transfer Building,” and “canister would never be lifted more than 25 cm (10

inches) above the second floor” (page 2-19, Section 2.1.2.1, “Transportation of Spent Fuel to the

Proposed PFSF,” lines 32-35) are incorrect. The commenter stated that there is no second floor of the

Canister Transfer Building, and the transfer cask and canister are hoisted approximately 19 ft above

the building floor during the canister transfer operation, using a single failure-proof crane. (0163)

The commenter noted that Figure 2.16, “Alternative Route for a New Road in the Western Portion of

Skull Valley,” on page 2-45, Section 2.2.5, “No-Action Alternatives,” appears to be a duplicate of

Figure 2.16, “Alternative Route for a New Road in the Western Portion of Skull Valley,” on page 2-44. 

(0163)

Response: 

Regarding the comment on Table 2.1, “Anticipated Peak Workforce Requirements at the Proposed

PFSF and New Rail Corridor,” the NRC staff incorporated corrections contained in the comment into

this FEIS.

Regarding the comment about the eastern boundary of the Reservation, the NRC staff reviewed and

revised all of the figures in the FEIS to show the accurate shape and location of the Reservation

boundary.

Regarding the comment on the movement of the transfer cask, the NRC staff incorporated the

corrections contained in the comment into the FEIS.

The duplication of Figure 2.16, “Alternative Route for a New Road in the Western Portion of Skull

Valley,” at the end of Chapter 2, “Alternatives Including the Proposed Action,” in the DEIS was a

misprint that is corrected in this FEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-179 NUREG-1714

G.3.8.3.8 Chapter 3 Errors

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the lands within the 8 km (5 miles) radius of the proposed PFSF are open

for recreational purposes, contrary to what is stated in the DEIS (page 3-39, lines 10-11). (0096)

Two commenters stated that the maps in Chapter 3, “Potentially Affected Environment in Skull Valley,

Utah,” do not show enough of the features referenced in the text. (0096, 0166) Specifically, one

commenter asked why Indian Hickman Creek is not shown in Figure 3.8, “Location of Major Springs in

Skull Valley,” yet it is mentioned on page 3-9 (lines 37-40). (0096)

Response: 

The NRC staff revised and clarified FEIS to indicate that there are no “designated” recreational lands

within the radius of the proposed PFSF that are open for recreational purposes.

Based on the current scale of Figure 3.8, Indian Hickman Creek would not be visible in the figure and

cannot be added.

The NRC staff updated the figures in the FEIS to include key features, to the extent possible. 

Specifically, Figure 2.1, “Location of the Proposed Site for the PFSF on the Reservation,” has been

revised to show Indian Hickman Creek.

G.3.8.3.9 Chapter 4 Errors

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that Figure 4.1, “Estimated Water Use During Construction of the Proposed

PFSF,” (on page 4-8, Section 4.2.1.3, “Groundwater”) indicates that construction Phase 1, period 2,

lasts 35 weeks, whereas Section 4.5.5, of the applicant’s ER identifies this interval as being 7 months,

or 30 weeks. The commenter also noted that Figure 4.1, “Estimated Water Use During Construction

of the Proposed PFSF,” indicates that construction Phase 1, period 3, lasts 30 weeks, whereas

Section 4.5.5, of the applicant’s ER identifies this interval as being 9 months, or approximately 39

weeks. The commenter suggested that the different durations may affect the cumulative water usage

calculated by the NRC on this graph. (0163)

The commenter stated that Table 4.6, “Estimated Probabilities of Fatal and Nonfatal Occupational

Injuries for the Construction and Operation of the Proposed PFSF,” (page 4-40, Section 4.7.1, “NonRadiological Impacts at the Proposed Site (Site A)”) identifies the duration of construction Phase 1 as

lasting 2 years, and the duration of Phases 2 and 3 as lasting 10 years each. The commenter

suggested that this should be corrected to show that Phase 1 is 1.5 years, and Phases 2 and 3 are

only 5 years each in duration (Sections 4.1.7.1, 4.1.7.2, and 4.1.7.3 of the applicant’s ER). The

commenter suggested that since the DEIS multiplied the probability of fatal and non-fatal injuries per

year by the number of years of each phase, correction of the duration of each phase will significantly

reduce the probability of fatal and non-fatal injuries, also shown in Table 4.6. The commenter also

pointed out that the use of the incorrect durations occurs in several other places. (0163) 

Response: 

The NRC staff corrected Figure 4.1, “Estimated Water Use During Construction of the Proposed

PFSF,” as suggested in the comment. While the total volume of water used for the duration of the

project changes, it is not a significant change and does not affect the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies’ conclusions.
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NUREG-1714 G-180

The NRC staff incorporated the corrections suggested in the comment on the construction schedule

from 10 years to 5 years and the impact to workers, described in Section 4.7.1, “Non-Radiological

Impacts at the Proposed Site (Site A),” during the construction period. The resulting implications of

the change in schedule on worker injuries and fatalities have been documented in Section 4.7.1.1,

Table 4.6, Section 6.1.7, and Tables 6.2 and 6.3. These changes do not affect any of the EIS

conclusions.

G.3.8.3.10 Appendix C Errors

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the header for Section C.3.5 (page C-7, line 28) of Appendix C, “Rail

Routes to the Proposed PFSF Site,” should be, “Route to Skull Valley from Pocatello, Idaho,” rather

than, “from Black Rock, Utah.” (0169)

Response: 

The NRC staff made the change suggested in the comment regarding Section C.3.5 in this FEIS. 

G.3.8.3.11 Appendix D Errors

Comment Summary:

The commenter stated that on page D-4, line 36, “0.13 Sv/h” should be “0.13 mSv/h.” The commenter

explained that 13 mrem is equal to 0.13 mSv, and 13 mrem/h is the appropriate dose rate at 1 meter

from the shipping cask. (0169)

Response: 

The NRC staff incorporated the change suggested in the comment regarding the dose rate on page

D-4 of Appendix D, “Transportation Risk Analysis,” into this FEIS.

G.3.8.3.12 Appendix F Errors

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that testing done by an independent contractor hired by the Skull Valley Band

showed that there was no chemical contamination in the area of the sheep kill incident (Appendix F,

Exhibit F.39, pages F-42-F-43). (0145) 

The commenter argued that the information regarding operations at the Dugway Proving Ground has

been misrepresented in Appendix F, “Site Selection Evaluation Forms.” The commenter noted that

the DEIS does not reference any Department of Army sources of information about the activities in the

area of the proposed site. (0145) Specifically, the commenter provided the following information:

C The commenter stated that the last sentence, page F-42 is incorrect. It states, “...operations at

Dugway Proving Ground have been reduced somewhat with the encouragement of the State of

Utah...” The commenter stated that the testing (of chemical and biological defense systems)

mission conducted by Dugway Proving Ground (through its West Desert Test Center) has

increased substantially over the last 12-18 months, and is projected to continue to increase over

the next several years. The commenter also noted that the State of Utah’s DEQ works closely

with Dugway Proving Ground’s Directorate of Environmental Programs to ensure that

environmental compliance and permitting efforts meet all Federal and State requirements for all

environmental media on the installation. The commenter stated that the State of Utah has been

supportive of Dugway Proving Ground’s mission to serve the nation. However, the commenter
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G-181 NUREG-1714

also noted that over the last several years, Federal funding to support Dugway Proving Ground’s

base operations (e.g., housing, maintenance, facility upgrades, community services, etc.) has

declined, not keeping pace with the increase in workload at its West Desert Test Center. (0145)

C The commenter also noted that Dugway Proving Ground has not conducted outdoor testing of

chemical or biological warfare agents since 1969, and the attendant risk referred to in this

paragraph is, therefore, insignificant. (0145)

C The commenter also noted that the statement in the lead paragraph (Appendix F. Exhibit F.39,

page F-44) is incorrect. The commenter stated that only chemical and biological defense system

testing is conducted; Dugway Proving Ground does not operate a biological or chemical weapons

laboratory. (0145)

C The commenter also noted that Dugway Proving Ground is not located immediately next to the

Reservation as stated in this paragraph (Appendix F, “Site Selection/Evaluating Forms,” Exhibit

F.39, page F-44), but rather “nine miles south of the Reservation,” as stated on the DEIS map,

Figure 1.1-1, “Regional Location of Skull Valley in Utah,” page 1-2 and on page F-46. (0145)

C The commenter stated that Dugway Proving Ground is not a town nor is it open to free public

access; it is a U.S. military installation. The commenter explained that housing at the base is not

available to the general public but only to military, government, and contract employees of the

U.S. Army specifically working on Dugway Proving Ground 4, contrary to what is stated in the

DEIS, referencing Appendix F, “Site Selection/Evaluation Forms,” Exhibit F. 39, page F-15. 

(0145)

C The commenter noted that Appendix F, “Site Selection/Evaluation Forms,” Exhibit F.39, page F46, makes several incorrect statements. First, the commenter stated that residents of Dugway

Proving Ground are employees of the U.S. Army or one of its contractors. The commenter also

stated that it is likely that only a very limited number of residents would be available for

employment at the proposed PFSF. Second, the commenter stated that the use of the facilities is

limited to people who reside or work on the installation. Third, the commenter explained that

employees conduct chemical and biological defensive testing, not testing of chemical and

biological weapons. The commenter clarified that it is an assumption that this work is far more

dangerous than (working with) SNF. (0145)

Response: 

The information presented in Appendix F, “Site Selection/Evaluation Forms,” was developed and used

by the applicant to support its site-selection process. The data sheets on display in Appendix F

document the information generated by the applicant in 1996 and, therefore, do not require any

changes. Prior to the publication of the DEIS, the NRC staff consulted with representatives of Hill AFB

and Dugway Proving Ground to ensure and confirm that the information contained in the body of the

DEIS was complete. The NRC staff revised Chapter 10, “Agencies Consulted,” to include these

military official consultations. 
[This page intentionally left blank]
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G-183 NUREG-1714

G.3.9 Geology, Minerals, and Soils

G.3.9.1 Lack of Subsurface Investigations and Geologic Features Information 

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant has not demonstrated the suitability of the proposed site

because the license application and SAR do not adequately address the site and subsurface

investigations necessary to determine geologic conditions, potential seismicity, ground motion, soil

stability, and foundation loading. (0198a)

One commenter said that the SAR Section 2.6, which defines geologic features, is not acceptable

because the discussions, geologic maps, profiles of the site stratigraphy, structural geology, geologic

history, and engineering geology are not complete, and are not supported by investigations sufficiently

detailed to obtain a clear representation of the site geology. The commenter stated that the maps do

not provide the requisite detail to evaluate the assumed geologic conditions stated in the text. For

example, the commenter said that only 25 borings were taken across the site, and from this a single

generalized geologic profile in an obtuse angle across the canister fuel storage facility was presented. 

(The commenter cited SAR Figure 2.6-5.) The commenter stated that the geologic profile cannot be

correlated with surface topography, geologic deposition soil characteristics, or seismic profiling

completed for the site. The commenter said that details missing include the interrelationship of the

subsurface conditions with the geologic history of the site. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding inadequate information in the SAR. However,

the NRC staff evaluated geologic and other site characteristic information provided in the license

application and SAR and found it acceptable.

The staff notes that the applicant amended its license application to include additional geologic and

seismic information. The additional information included site and subsurface data necessary to

adequately characterize seismic, geologic, and soil conditions. The NRC staff concluded that the

breadth and depth of geological and geophysical investigation represented a “comprehensive

technical foundation of geological knowledge” and “the applicant has sufficiently documented these

investigations in the SAR and subsequent documents.” The NRC staff documented its evaluation in

Chapter 2, “Site Characteristics,” of the SER, as updated.

G.3.9.2 Accuracy and Completeness of Soil Data

Comment Summary:

One commenter said that the organic content of test pit soils was misrepresented at 20 percent to

30 percent, and that it is actually between 0.05 percent and 0.55 percent. The commenter also said

that moisture content in the soil was more important than the organic content, and that the NRC

should provide the moisture content in the FEIS. The commenter questioned the relevance of the

organic content of soils to the proposal before the NRC. The commenter further stated that the DEIS

data are incomplete because the DEIS should include a figure that shows the locations of test pits and

borings, topography, faults and their type, and springs. The commenter also said that supporting

documents such as the SAR are not publicly available, making review of the DEIS “nearly impossible.” 

(0039, 0077, GR-11)

Response:

The NRC acknowledges the comment regarding organic content of test pit soils, but noted that

Section 3.1.3 of the EIS, “Soils,” states that the organic content of the soils is “low (not more than 20
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NUREG-1714 G-184

to 30 percent) to non-existent,” and summarizes the results of laboratory testing of soils at the

proposed site. The moisture content of the soils is also presented in Section 3.1.3 of the DEIS. The

presence of soils and the organic content are included to support the ecological analysis.

The NRC acknowledges the comment about the completeness of data in the DEIS and the level of

detail regarding the location of topography, faults, and other items. However, it is the position of the

NRC that the level of information regarding topography, faults, and other items in the EIS is

appropriate. The information is consistent with the defined purpose of the EIS and reflects the NRC

safety findings on the site characteristics provided with the application. The level of information

regarding site characteristics in Chapter 3, “Potentially Affected Environment in Skull Valley, Utah,” is

intended to support the analysis and findings of Chapters 4 throgh 9 of the FEIS. 

Although the SAR is not a part of the EIS, it is available to the public. For more detailed discussion of

the public availability of relevant documents, see Section G.3.7.8.

G.3.9.3 Seismic Setting

G.3.9.3.1 Seismic Analysis of the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the DEIS does not provide enough detailed analysis about the risks

associated with seismic events, such as earthquakes, and the ability of the proposed PFSF to

withstand the effects of an earthquake. Many of these commenters stated that the seismic risks were

a reason to find an alternate location. (0012, 0024, 0027, 0039, 0042, 0063, 0096, 0103, 0112, 0134,

0140, 0174, 0198, 0198h, 0200, 0201, 0224, 0229, GR-05, GR-21, SL1-01, SL1-02, SL1-34, SL1-39,

SL2-02, SL2-19, SL3-02, SL3-18, SL3-52, SL3-55)

Several commenters stated there were errors, discrepancies, or a lack of information in the

characterization of seismic features. (0039, 0077, 0083, 0089, 0103, 0112, SL1-07, SL2-02, SL3-52)

One commenter expressed concern about the accuracy of the seismic information used in the site

screening analysis in Appendix F, “Site Selection/Evaluation Forms,” of the DEIS. The commenter

said that 86 percent of the 38 exhibits in Appendix F had “unknown” as the evaluation results. The

commenter also stated that another site, the Mescalero Reservation in New Mexico, was rejected

because a capable fault is present on site. The commenter thought that the same situation should

apply to the proposed site. (0039, SL3-52)

Another commenter stated that at Tooele, Utah, northeast of the proposed site, the probabilistic

ground motion values for PGA are 0.16 ge with a 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years

and 0.36 ge with a 2 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years. The commenter said that the EIS

should include the seismic criteria used to design the site and the rail line. (0089)

One commenter noted that the proposed PFSF may not be designed to withstand the type of seismic

event that could occur in the area (0198) and that the applicant’s evaluation of seismic hazards was

not sufficient to establish design parameters. (0198h) 

One commenter noted that the DEIS does not discuss the possibility of soil liquefaction during a

seismic event. This commenter also stated that the small amount of text and the small-scale map

were inadequate to conclude that the seismic activity would not present a significant hazard. (0112) 

Several commenters commented on the adequacy of the seismic evaluation for determining the

seismic risks of the site. One commenter said that only 3 of the 25 test pits were characterized. (GR11) Another commenter suggested that a similar level of trenching and seismic evaluation should be

conducted as is performed for zoning and building approval under Utah law. (0112) One commenter
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G-185 NUREG-1714

said that the evaluation of seismic hazards was not sufficient to establish design parameters, and the

applicant’s characterization of subsurface foundation soils is not supported by the applicant’s data. 

The commenter added that the Utah Geological Survey is evaluating the applicant’s data, and it

appears there are more faults near the proposed site than previously identified. (0198, 0198h)

One commenter stated that the DEIS said the proposed site is at least 2 miles (and 5 miles) from

capable faults, when supporting documents (e.g., Appendix F, Exhibit F.3, page F-5, Initial Screening

Form) show distances of 0.5 miles and 1.2 miles to the East and West faults. The commenter stated

that the EIS should clearly state that the East and West faults are capable faults (as described in the

SAR). The commenter stated that the proposed site is located in an area between these two faults on

an up-thrown area called a horst, which indicates a high seismic risk. The commenter further said that

the proposed site is 5 miles from a modern epicenter, and there are five other modern epicenters in

Skull Valley. (0039, 0077, GR-11, SL3-52)

Another commenter noted that geologic and geo-seismic studies or maps are commonly available at

the Utah Department of Natural Resources bookstore and university libraries in the Salt Lake City

area. The commenter said that one of these, entitled “Quaternary Geologic Map of Skull Valley,

Tooele County, Utah,” identifies known geo-seismic faulting and related activity that the DEIS does not

include, specifically an approximately 520-acre area that contains at least 20 “faults or fractures

having small or undetermined displacement” (Map 150, Utah Geological Survey, by Dorothy Sack,

1993). The commenter said that of the total amount of faulting in the immediate area, over 275 acres

are within the designated 820-acre OCA as delineated by Figure 2.1, “Location of the Proposed Site

(i.e., Site A) for the PFSF on the Reservation,” and Figure 2.11, “Alternative Site (i.e., Site B) for the

Proposed PFSF on the Reservation,” of the DEIS. The commenter stated that more than 20 acres of

this faulting are within the 99-acre restricted-access area. The commenter further stated that a

second study, “Quaternary Faults and Folds, Utah,” (Suzanne Hecker, Plate 1, Bulletin 127, 1993) is

also available at the bookstore and confirms the presence of Late Pleistocene faulting in Skull Valley

as defined above. The commenter said that this map clearly indicates the Stansbury Fault and other

inferred faulting within the OCA. Notwithstanding these faults being clearly defined in these studies as

genuine seismic fractures, the commenter said that at the August 21, 2000, public meeting, a member

of the NRC panel characterized them as “sand bars.” (0112)

One commenter said that more than 113 recorded earthquakes and four faults have been recorded in

the project area. (SL1-10) Another commenter said that there are three other faults in close proximity

to the proposed site. (0103) Another commenter stated that an earthquake in the area is probable in

the next 50 to 60 years. (SL1-15)

Several commenters mentioned the potential changes that could result from seismic events. One

commenter said that an earthquake on the Stansbury Fault could trigger significant earthquakes in the

smaller faults in Skull Valley. The commenter said that scientific studies have found that nearly twothirds of all the historical earthquakes that ruptured the surface in the Basin and Range province

(between Salt Lake City and Reno) occurred on faults that had no evidence of surface rupturing in the

last 10,000 years. The commenter also said that fault zones similar to the one underlying the

proposed site and parts of the railway exist in many areas of the world, including parts of the Wasatch

Fault. The commenter stated that in similar zones of multiple faults, history demonstrates that a

surface fault rupture can occur on any of the fault strands or, in rare cases, may cause a new fault

branch to be propagated and rupture the surface in a new location. (0198, 0198h) 

Another commenter noted the 50-mile proximity of the Wasatch Fault and its potential to generate

strong ground motion, liquefaction, and amplified ground shaking in soft sediments, which could occur

during SNF handling at the proposed PFSF. The commenter also stated that there are quaternary

scarp faults in Skull Valley on the west side of the Stansbury range. (SL1-16) 
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NUREG-1714 G-186

One commenter said that the proposed site includes complex seismicity, capable faults and potentially

unstable soils. The commenter said that the DEIS does not fully assess the impact of placing 4,000

casks over such a site. (0198a)

One commenter said that it is dangerous for the casks to be stored upright, above ground, and on

unanchored concrete pads between two nearby capable faults. In the event of an earthquake, the

casks could tip over. The DEIS does not specify how the casks would be righted in the short time

required in the DEIS. (0039, 0077)

Two commenters stated that Figure 3.1, page 3-4, of the DEIS, “Mapped and Interpreted Surface and

Subsurface Structural Features in the Immediate Area of the Proposed Site,” does not include a data

source reference. (0089, 0112)

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges the comments that the DEIS should have included a full evaluation and

comprehensive descriptions of the seismic design of the proposed PFSF and the seismic risk

associated with the surrounding area. However, it is the position of the NRC that the level of

information regarding the seismic setting and environmental impacts of a seismic event in the EIS is

appropriate. The information is consistent with the defined purpose of the EIS and reflects the NRC

safety findings about the detailed seismic analyses provided with the application. The purpose of the

EIS is to evaluate the impacts of the proposed action on the environment. The environmental impacts

resulting from natural phenomena events at the proposed PFSF, such as earthquakes, are addressed

in Section 4.7.2.3 of the DEIS, “Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Operations and Accidents.” The

DEIS states that no credible accident, including the design basis earthquake, would cause a release

of material to the environment. The license application for the proposed action and the NRC staff

SER, as updated, provide the detailed information and analyses to support this finding. The license

application includes the applicant’s SAR and other supplemental information. Both the SAR and the

NRC staff’s SER as updated are publicly available.

The NRC thoroughly evaluated the site-specific characteristics of the proposed site, the seismic

design of the proposed PFSF, and the ability of the proposed PFSF design to withstand a designbasis earthquake. This included information provided in the application and independent staff analysis

of the seismic design. The information provided in this FEIS is only a summary of the seismic

information submitted by the applicant. The NRC safety evaluation considered a significant amount of

additional information. The NRC staff evaluated the application to verify that it satisfied applicable

NRC safety regulations. The NRC seismic evaluation is documented in Chapter 2, “Site

Characteristics,” and Chapter 15, “Accident Analysis,” of the SER, as updated. The specific

comments on the staff’s evaluation of seismic matters involve safety issues that do not directly affect

the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, and are beyond the scope of the EIS.

The data source reference for Figure 3.1 of the DEIS, “Mapped and Interpreted Surface and

Subsurface Structural Features in the Immediate Area of the Proposed Site,” is a report entitled “Fault

Evaluation Study and Seismic Hazard Assessment, Private Fuel Storage Facility, Skull Valley, Utah

(Project No. 4790),” Final Report No. GMX-4790 (Revision 0). Geomatrix Consultants, Inc. of San

Francisco, California, prepared the report in February 1999 for Stone and Webster Engineering

Corporation, Denver, Colorado.

G.3.9.3.2 Seismic Analysis of the Proposed Rail Route

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS did not evaluate the seismic setting or hazards along the

proposed rail routes and the potential for derailment, especially in the event of strong ground shaking

or surface rupture. The commenter noted that the rail line would cross the East and West faults, both
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G-187 NUREG-1714

of which are capable faults. The commenter stated that a seismic event along the proposed rail line

could cause a derailment. The commenter said that just south of Interstate Highway 80, the proposed

railway parallels segments of the Cedar Mountain Fault. The commenter stated that the size, extent,

location, and nature of this fault are poorly known and that the degree of hazard the Cedar Mountain

Fault presents to the railway is unknown. (0198, 0198i)

Two commenters specifically mentioned the potential for the Pass Canyon Cross Fault to affect the

rail line, and requested additional descriptions of these faults in the FEIS. The commenters said that

this fault shows the possibility of past movement up to 3 km. (0089, 0198)

One commenter stated that geological hazards should be thoroughly analyzed along the proposed rail

line to determine the safe siting of rail lines carrying SNF. (0198)

Response:

The NRC determined that it is unlikely that a design basis earthquake at the rail line would subject the

transportation cask to external forces greater than those predicted from the certification drop tests. 

The transportation cask is certified to withstand severe drop tests and not release radioactive material

to the environment in accordance with transportation requirements in 10 CFR Part 71. Therefore, it is

unlikely a design basis earthquake would result in a release in radioactive material from the

transportation cask. Furthermore, based on the relatively small number of shipments (one to two

trains per week) to the proposed PFSF, it is highly unlikely a transportation cask would be located on

the rail line during a design basis earthquake. The NRC concluded that the risk posed by a seismic

event at the rail line is small.

G.3.9.3.3 Public Accessibility of Seismic Evaluation

Comment Summary:

A few commenters stated that the lack of evaluation of seismic risks in the DEIS prevented agencies

and the public from reviewing and commenting on the risks. These commenters said that the detailed

evaluation, supporting information, and seismic design criteria included in the SAR or the SER should

be included in the FEIS. (0012, 0089, 0112, 0198, SL1-01) One commenter stated that the NRC’s

draft SER contains errors and should not be relied on for geologic analyses. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the commenter’s concern that agencies and the public were prevented

from reviewing and commenting on seismic risk. However, seismic hazards were discussed in the

SAR, which was publicly available at the time the DEIS was issued. Subsequently, the NRC issued

the publicly-available SER, as updated, which contains a seismic evaluation of the proposed PFSF

design.

The purpose of the EIS is to evaluate impacts of the proposed action on the environment. The

environmental impacts resulting from natural phenomena, such as an earthquake, are addressed in

Section 4.7.2.3, “Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Operations and Accidents” of the EIS. 

Additionally, a summary of the NRC staff’s safety evaluation of the applicant’s seismic analysis was

added to Section 4.7.2.3. Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that the information in the SER is

correct and the comment regarding unspecified errors in “the draft SER” cannot be addressed in the

FEIS.
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NUREG-1714 G-188

G.3.9.3.4 Fault History and Ground Motion

Comment Summary:

One commenter presented the following questions and discussion about surface faulting and ground

motions: 

Surface Faulting. The commenter cited 10 CFR 72.102(b), in which the NRC regulations recognize

that areas west of the Rocky Mountains may potentially be seismically active. These areas, including

the proposed site, must be evaluated by the techniques set forth in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A,

IV(b)(2), which requires the “evaluation of tectonic structures underlying the site, whether buried or

expressed at the surface, with regard to their potential for causing surface displacement at or near the

site.” The commenter also cited 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, III(g)(1), which says that the purpose

of the evaluation is to define capable faults which exhibit movement “at or near the ground surface at

least once within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring nature within the past 500,000

years.” 

The commenter stated that although the applicant concluded in the SAR that there is no evidence of

“fault offset of the surficial soils” (SAR, pages 2.6-35), the SAR does not provide sufficient supporting

evidence to identify presence or absence of buried capable faults that have moved at least once within

the past 35,000 years or repeatedly within the past 500,000 years. The commenter stated that

surficial material at the site was deposited by Lake Bonneville sometime between 10,000 and 25,000

years ago, and according to the Quaternary Geologic Map of Skull Valley, Utah, additional deposits

may range from 25,000 to 500,000 years old (D. Sack, Utah Geological Survey Map No. 150, 1993). 

The applicant conducted seismic-reflection surveys to detect subsurface geologic structure in deeper

bedrock, and unconsolidated material directly overlying the bedrock, and seismic-refraction surveys to

detect subsurface geologic structure in shallower unconsolidated material. The commenter referred to

the applicant’s analysis, which is summarized in Appendix 2B of the SAR, and identifies buried faults

in Paleozoic bedrock beneath the site in a seismic reflection survey, and the applicant’s conclusion

that the faults “do not appear to extend into the overlying unconsolidated sediments” (SAR, pages 2.6-

36). The commenter questioned this conclusion and stated that based on a review of the reflector

profiles, several of these faults apparently displace a significant reflector above what the applicant

interpreted as the top of the bedrock, and then extend upwards into the overlying unconsolidated

sediments. The commenter suggested that irregular surfaces in layers in seismic-refraction profiles of

overlying shallow sediments may support an interpretation of displacement in younger material during

more recent times than the applicant determined.

The commenter referred to Figure 4.6 in SAR Appendix 2B and stated that the faults in the western

half of seismic line 2 pose particular concern because they directly underlie the proposed site. The

commenter continued, saying that other faults that might offset unconsolidated sediments appear in

seismic line 3 and cross the proposed easement area. If capable, the faults in both areas might

produce greater vibratory ground motion than the proposed PFSF design could withstand. Moreover,

the faults beneath the proposed site might also pose a threat of surface fault rupture that the facility

site and design must accommodate. Citing a recent publication, the commenter stated that regardless

of the evidence showing displacement within the last 35,000 years, the Nevada Bureau of Mines

recently determined that 64 percent of the surface-rupturing historical earthquakes in the Basin and

Range physiographic province, which includes Skull Valley, occurred on faults with no prior evidence

of Holocene movement (within the last 10,000 years). (DePolo, C.M., and Slemmons, D.B., “130,000

years vs. 10,000 year (Holocene) classification of active faults in the Basin and Range Province”

(abstract), in Basin and Range Province Seismic-Hazards Summit Program and Abstracts: Reno,

Nevada, Western States Seismic Policy Council, 1997, page 28.) According to the commenter, many

of the earthquakes occurred on faults that had not experienced prior large earthquakes for up to

130,000 years. The Hickman Knolls Horst block, where the Reservation is located, might include

similar buried faults. The commenter concluded that the applicant should extend its evaluation to

determine the potential for seismic activity from earthquakes on faults in the site vicinity. (0198a)
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G-189 NUREG-1714

Ground Motion. The commenter stated that the site may also be subject to ground motion that

exceeds the applicant’s predictions because spatial variations in ground motion amplitude and

duration could result from the near surface traces of potentially capable faults (the Stansbury and

Cedar Mountain faults). (The commenter references Sommerville, P.G., Smith, N.F., Graves, R.W.,

and Abrahamson, N.A., “Modification of empirical strong ground motion attenuation relations to

include the amplitude and duration effects of rupture directivity” in 68 Seismological Research Letters

(No. 1) 199 (1997).) The commenter concluded that the applicant’s failure to adequately assess

ground motion places undue risk on the public and the environment and fails to comply with 10 CFR

72.102(c). (0198a)

Response: 

The purpose of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of the proposed action. Issues

raised concerning the characterization of faults and ground movement are not directly related to

assessing the environmental impacts of the proposed action. As a part of its safety review, the NRC

staff evaluated the proposed PFSF to determine if it could withstand a design basis earthquake. The

NRC staff evaluated all material in the SAR and addressed concerns regarding seismic activity and

ground motion for the proposed site and vicinity. The NRC’s evaluation of seismic risks is

documented in Chapters 2, “Site Characteristics,” and 15, “Accident Analysis,” of the SER, as

updated. From this analysis, the NRC staff determined that a design basis earthquake would not

result in a cask tip over or in a release of radioactive material. Therefore, the NRC staff has not

identified any environmental impacts from a design basis earthquake.

The environmental impacts resulting from accidents and natural occurrences, such as an earthquake,

are addressed in Section 4.7.2.3, “Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Operations and Accidents” of

this EIS.

G.3.9.3.5 Floods and Waves Generated by Earthquake and Landslide

Comment Summary: 

One commenter said that the applicant failed to investigate information regarding floods and water

waves along the lake shore that may have been generated by earthquake or landslide events, as

required by 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, IV(c)(2), 10 CFR 72.92, and 10 CFR 72.102(b). (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided by the applicant and determined that the

applicant has demonstrated compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements in 10 CFR

Part 72, which governs ISFSI siting. The NRC staff’s evaluation of this information is documented in

Chapter 2, “Site Characteristics,” of the SER, as updated.

G.3.9.3.6 Subsurface Soils Investigation

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS should provide clearer and more complete information about

subsurface soil investigations. The commenter stated that the EIS should include specific information

about the location, depth, and analysis of the test pits, the conepenetronomy test, and soil borings. 

The commenter stated that page 3-12, line 6 of the DEIS implies that the test borings encountered

groundwater at 125 ft. The commenter stated that this makes Section 3.1.3, “Soils,” of the DEIS even

more deficient, because it fails to provide sufficient and meaningful detail on subsurface conditions. 

The commenter said that soils in Section 3.1.3, page 3-3, should be described below 9 ft, and stated

that the EIS should not rely on information in the SAR. (0039, 0077, SL2-02)
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NUREG-1714 G-190

One commenter stated that the subsurface investigation needs further analysis concerning water

levels, and referred to page 3-5, line 1 of the DEIS, which states that a series of borings of unstated

depth were put in place. The commenter said that the DEIS describes soils to a depth of 9 ft, and

says that the water content ranged from 9 percent to 50 percent. The commenter stated that because

moisture generally increases with depth toward a water table and shallow groundwater occurs

between 3 and 15 ft in almost all of Utah’s intermontane valleys, the report implies that water content

in soil could be 50 percent moisture at a depth of 9 ft. The commenter stated that if so, the capillary

fringe or fully saturated conditions (i.e., shallow groundwater) exist at a depth of 9 ft. The commenter

said that the SAR shows geotechnical lab data and soil boring logs indicating moisture contents over

40 percent at shallow depths and perched water at about 9 ft. Based on the DEIS information, the

commenter concludes that there is a shallow aquifer at a depth of approximately 9 ft that must be

described and discussed. Further information published by the State of Utah confirms that a shallow

aquifer exists in the area of the proposed site. (0039, 0077)

One commenter stated that perhaps the most significant shortcoming in the license application and

SAR is the lack of any rigorous and detailed investigation of subsurface conditions that would be

appropriate for any nuclear facility. The level of investigations presented is more typical of very

preliminary studies for site screening efforts and not a detailed determination of site suitability for

establishing design parameters. (0198a)

One commenter stated that the DEIS should discuss unique plant organisms known as cryptogamic

crusts, their ability to bind soils, and the potential impact of large truck traffic. (0112)

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges the comments about the completeness of data in the DEIS and the level of

detail regarding the subsurface soil investigations. However, it is the position of the NRC that the level

of information regarding subsurface soils in the EIS is appropriate. The information is consistent with

the defined purpose of the EIS and reflects the NRC safety findings on the detailed subsurface soil

investigations provided with the application. The level of information regarding subsurface soil in

Chapter 3, “Potentially Affected Environment in Skull Valley, Utah,” is intended to support the analysis

and findings of Chapters 4 through 9 of the FEIS. The NRC staff evaluated all the subsurface soil

information in the application including the SAR and determined it was acceptable. The NRC

thoroughly evaluated the subsurface soil characteristics of the proposed site and documented its

evaluation in the SER as part of the licensing safety review.

The NRC acknowledges the comment on the test pits, however, the purpose of this data is to provide

detailed profiles of near-subsurface faulting and stratigraphy for the seismic evaluation performed by

the NRC staff. This information is not relevant to the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF. 

The information and data used by the staff in its evaluation are discussed in Chapter 2, “Site

Characteristics,” of the SER as updated.

The NRC considered the comment about the need for further subsurface investigation of water levels

near the site, but determined that no further investigation is required at this time. The NRC obtained

the information in this FEIS to describe the occurrence, abundance, and use of groundwater at and

near the site from on-site investigative activities, as well as published sources. Analytical results from

a single test well on the proposed site indicate that the water table occurs at a depth of 125 ft, which is

consistent with other published estimates of the groundwater level in that part of Skull Valley. The

NRC agrees that the effects of groundwater withdrawal for the proposed PFSF operation are uncertain

until further testing is performed (see Section 4.2.1.3 in this FEIS, “Groundwater”). The applicant has

committed to perform further aquifer evaluation during construction, implement a groundwater

withdrawal monitoring plan, and obtain water from off-site sources if necessary to supply the

construction and operational needs for the proposed PFSF. However, the project's feasibility is not

dependent upon the availability of on-site groundwater.
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G-191 NUREG-1714

The NRC acknowledges the comment concerning the issues of site suitability and the level of

investigation necessary to determine site suitability in the license application. However, such issues

involve safety issues that do not directly affect the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, and

are beyond the scope of the EIS, and are addressed in the NRC SER. The NRC staff also reviewed

the proposed PFSF design and determined that it could be safely constructed and operated at the

proposed site.

In response to the comment about cryptogamic crusts, material was added to Sections 3.4.1.1,

“Vegetation,” and 4.4.1, “Construction Impacts at the Preferred Site (Site A),” of this FEIS about these

biological soil crusts.

G.3.9.3.7 Effect of Collapsible Soils on Proposed Rail Corridor

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the alluvial-fan deposits under the piedmont slope of the eastern edge of

the Cedar Mountains might contain collapsible soils, which could lead to rail bed instability due to

volumetric change. (0198, 0198i) 

Response: 

The applicant is currently conducting soil surveys for the proposed rail line. Based on these surveys,

the applicant would appropriately engineer the rail line to ensure rail stability. Engineering properties

of the soils on the eastern flank of the Cedar Mountains would be obtained by the applicant as part of

final project design. The applicant would consider soil stability as a design issue at that time.

G.3.9.4 Mineral Resources

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the potential for mineral deposits exists in the southern Skull Valley,

particularly on the western portion near the proposed rail line. Potential minerals include

skarn/porphyry copper deposits, vein/replacement lead-zinc-silver deposits, and disseminated goldsilver deposits. The commenter said these types of minerals were discovered beneath valley fill in

Nevada and Arizona. Since mining of some of these materials is typically performed using open pit

mines, the construction of a rail line or other surface facilities could negatively affect the development

of mineral resources. The commenter said that the FEIS should address the potential economic loss

to the State and to the Skull Valley Band. (0198i)

Response:

Section 3.1.4 of this FEIS, “Mineral Resources,” acknowledges the potential for mineral deposits to

occur in Skull Valley. However, the lapsed claims in the valley suggest an overall lack of interest in

mineral exploration and the extraction. Impacts from the unavailability of mineral resources due to

construction and operation of the proposed PFSF are discussed in Sections 4.1.1, “Construction

Impacts at the Preferred Site (Site A),” and 4.1.2, “Impacts During Operations at the Preferred Site,” of

this FEIS.

The NRC considers further analysis with regard to the potential economic impact on mineral resources

to be speculative, due to the lack of information on the exact location and quantity of specific mineral

resources in Skull Valley.
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G.3.9.5 Effects of Weather on Soil and Rock at the Proposed Site

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the application did not discuss the geochemical effects of the environment

(weather and rain water) on the physical and strength characteristics of the soil and rock at the

proposed site, particularly if there is potential for geochemical weathering and leaching of soils and

rocks at the proposed site. The commenter said correlations should be made with previous

groundwater conditions which led to the calcareous deposition and probable cementation of the

subsoils. (0198a)

Response:

This comment was received prior to the publication of the DEIS and was directed at the applicant’s ER

and license application. The FEIS updates the material supplied by the applicant and provides the

discussion that is identified in the comment. Section 2.1.1.2 of the FEIS states that a soil cement

would be used around the proposed storage pads. This soil cement will be specially engineered to

reduce the influx of water into the foundation. Furthermore, the weathering and leaching described in

the comment would occur on a relatively lengthy time scale and would not be expected to create

unusual deterioration of site soil or rocks over the proposed lifetime of the facility.
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G-193 NUREG-1714

G.3.10 Water Resources

G.3.10.1 General Comments

G.3.10.1.1 Existing Conditions

Comment Summary:

Two commenters expressed concern about the identification and characterization of water resources

at the proposed site. (0039, 0198h, SL2-02) One commenter stated that water resources and the

hydrologic setting need to be thoroughly and accurately characterized. (0039, SL2-02) The

commenter also stated that the DEIS de-emphasized the significance of Horseshoe Springs to the

region’s water. (SL2-02) Another commenter said that monitoring wells are necessary in identifying

and protecting water resources. (0198) 

Two commenters said that maps and figures are needed to illustrate the features and water resources

of the proposed site. (0039, 0051, 0077) One commenter said that page 3-9, line 42, of the DEIS

stated that the stream channel feature nearest to the proposed site is 1,500 ft to the northeast. The

commenter asked if this statement is referring to Indian Hickman Creek, and also asked for a

clarification of line 45, which stated that the “nearest perennial surface water flow” is 10 miles to the

north. The commenter said that maps should show these important “salient” features and that a

clearer discussion of the features and water resources should be included in the DEIS. (0039, 0077) 

The commenter also said that Figure 3.3 on page 3-10 of the DEIS fails to show the BLM’s ACEC,

Indian Hickman Springs, and the Skull Valley Band Reservation outline. (0039, 0077) Another

commenter stated that Figure 3.4 on page 3-13 of the DEIS should be updated to illustrate Castle

Rock Land and Livestock, Inc.’s water rights to a well in Section 33, Township 4S, Range 8W and the

BLM’s rights to a surface impoundment in Section 35, Township 4S, Range 9W. (0051)

Response:

The NRC staff considered the comments and noted that Section 3.2 of this FEIS provides information

on surface water and groundwater resources and Section 3.4.2.2 provides information on wetlands

associated with springs. The impacts to these resources are presented and discussed in Section 4.2

for the proposed activities on the Reservation, and in Sections 5.2 and 5.4 for the proposed

transportation systems in Skull Valley.

Section 3.4.2.2 of this FEIS discusses the designation of Horseshoe Springs by the BLM as an ACEC. 

Its location is shown on Figure 3.8. Sections 4.4.1.3 and 4.4.2.3 discuss the potential impacts to this

area during the construction and operation of the proposed PFSF. Sections 5.4.1.3, 5.4.2.3, and

5.4.3.3 discuss the potential impacts to wetlands resources from construction and operation of the

transportation facilities. Because Horseshoe Springs is 23 km (14 miles) from the center of the

proposed PFSF, 11 km (7 miles) from the proposed Skunk Ridge rail corridor, and 16 km (10 miles)

from the alternative ITF at Timpie, the NRC staff concluded that adverse impacts would be small. 

Regarding the need for monitoring wells, Sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the FEIS fully characterize the water

resources in the project area. Because the SNF will be shipped to Skull Valley in sealed metal

cylinders (see Section 2.1.2 in this FEIS), no radioactive contaminants are expected to escape from

these sealed containers and there is no need for monitoring wells as suggested in the comment. 

Section 2.1.5 describes the monitoring program for radioactivity at the proposed PFSF.

The figures referenced in the comment have been updated in this FEIS. Key features, such as those

identified in the comment, have been highlighted to the extent possible. For example, Figure 2.1 has

been revised to show the location of Indian Hickman Creek; the boundaries of the BLM’s area of

concern have been added to Figure 1.2; and additional information about nearby wells and water

rights has been added to Figure 3.4. In addition, text has been added to Section 3.2.3 in the FEIS to
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NUREG-1714 G-194

describe the characteristics and proximity of Indian Hickman Creek. The stream channel nearest to

the proposed PFSF is not a perennial stream and is not Indian Hickman Creek.

G.3.10.2 Surface Water

G.3.10.2.1 Affected Surface Water

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to adequately identify surface waters that may be

affected if the NRC issues a Part 72 license. The commenter stated that the applicant generically

indicated, in its ER in Sections 2.5-2 and 4.1-10, that there are “few perennial streams in Skull Valley

and none in the vicinity of the [proposed PFSF,]” some dry washes that drain northward or

northwestward in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF, and no springs occur within 5 miles of the

proposed PFSF although some spring channels are located near Timpie and Delle. The commenter

also referenced the ER in Section 4.3-6, in which the applicant states that “springs also occur at

several locations along Skull Valley Road, surfacing at various distances from the highway ... [and] no

perennial lakes or ponds are within 5 miles of the [proposed PFSF] other than a few stock ponds or

small reservoirs built for irrigation purposes.” The commenter said that this discussion is inadequate

to permit an assessment of surface waters that may be affected by construction, operation, and

decommissioning of the site and transportation of SNF. The commenter stated that there are at least

50 springs located within 15 miles of the proposed PFSF, and there are perennial waters protected for

agricultural uses located within 10 miles of the site. (0198a)

Response:

The DEIS and FEIS provide a complete description of the potentially affected water resources in

Section 3.2. As described in Section 4.2, the NRC staff did not identify any significant environmental

impact to surface water.

G.3.10.2.2 Surface Water Quality

Comment Summary:

A few commenters expressed concern that the proposed action will affect the surrounding surface

waters. (0039, 0051, 0063, 0077, 0089, 0158, 0198a, 0198i, 0240) One commenter expressed

concern that construction, operation, and maintenance of the proposed PFSF will cause degradation

of water resources. (0198a) The commenters provided the following specific comments:

C One commenter said that further information is needed on downstream compliance with water

quality standards. (0240) Another commenter said that page 2-26 of Section 2.1.4 of the DEIS

failed to address how BMPs will be implemented to avoid and mitigate disturbance (due to

construction and other traffic) to the springs located along Skull Valley Road. (0039, 0077) 

Another commenter expressed concern that construction of the proposed PFSF and access road,

widening Skull Valley Road, or building a rail spur will generate a number of radiological,

chemical, or heavy metal contaminant sources from the heavy machinery, vehicles, construction

materials, and chemicals, including fuel, solvents, and asphalt, that will be used during

construction. These activities would present the potential for these contaminants to be released to

groundwater and surface water via drainage ditches, culverts, and seepage. The commenter

expressed concern that culverts will be located through the access road embankment and the

applicant’s access road off Skull Valley Road, “to carry the occasional runoff.” (The commenter

referenced the ER, pages 4.1-10.) (0198a)

C One commenter noted that Section 6.1.2, “Water Resources,” page 6-4, line 41 of the DEIS,

stated that localized channel alterations, caused by flood control berms, would constitute potential
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G-195 NUREG-1714

impacts to surface water hydrology. The commenter stated that changes in channel morphology

and sediment distribution might occur downstream of the proposed PFSF and the retention basin,

on public lands. The commenter said that the effects of localized channel interactions and

sediment distribution should be described with any associated inspection and mitigation

measures. (0051) Another commenter expressed concern that the culvert systems would

increase wet season flows, increase erosion, increase siltation in drainages, provide a conduit for

the transportation of contaminants, and introduce noxious or invasive undesirable plant species. 

Therefore, the commenter stated that additional study is needed to minimize these effects. (0089)

C One commenter stated that the EIS must address the nature and character of the water courses

present at the proposed PFSF and along the proposed rail line. The commenter noted that a

stream alteration permit must be obtained for any alteration of natural streams. (0198i)

C One commenter asked where the DEIS discussed the impacts to the Horseshoe Springs ACEC

caused by the construction and operation of the proposed rail line. (0077) Another commenter

said that the DEIS should consider the potential impacts of the construction, operation, and

decommissioning of the proposed action on the Great Salt Lake. (0158)

C Another commenter said the proposed action could cause potential damage to the watershed,

which is a vital source of Utah’s water reservoir, and stated that radiation leakage has already

occurred in the Colorado River. (0063)

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies concluded that mitigation measures required by the NRC,

Cooperating Agencies, and other Federal agencies and State permitting authorities, including the

applicant’s BMPs, would reduce any short- or long-term adverse environmental impacts associated

with the proposed action to acceptable levels. Other than stormwater runoff and septic discharge,

there are no expected releases to the groundwater or surface water from the proposed PFSF.

Potential impacts to surface water bodies were discussed in a number of places throughout the

Environmental Consequences section of the DEIS (Section 4.2, “Water Resources”). The DEIS also

contained information on mitigation measures that would be implemented by the applicant (Sections

2.1.4, “Best Management Practices,” 4.3.4, “Mitigation Measures,” 9.1, “Introduction,” and 9.4.2,

“Mitigation Measures”), Federal and State permits that must be obtained (Section 1.6, “Federal, Tribal

and State Authorities, Regulations, and Permits”), and BMPs that would be implemented to minimize

the potential impacts to surface water bodies (Table 2-7, “Best management practices as proposed by

PFS,” and Section 9.4.2, “Mitigation Measures”). Impacts to the wetlands along Skull Valley Road that

may be caused by increased road traffic and heavy-haul trucks are considered to be small. 

Discussion of those impacts has been added to Section 5.4.2.3, “Wetlands,” of this FEIS.

The types of localized channel alterations, as identified in the comment, are acknowledged to have the

potential to cause impacts to surface water morphology; however, their impacts have been determined

to be “small to moderate” along the proposed rail corridor, and “small” elsewhere. The primary source

of such impacts would be from flood conditions. The potential for erosion and sedimentation is

evaluated in Sections 4.2.1.1, 4.2.2.2, 5.2.1.2, and 5.2.2.2 of the FEIS. The culverts for the proposed

rail line would be designed to minimize any changes to stream channels. In addition, these culverts

would be designed to carry flows from the 100-year flood. The mitigation measures that will be

required of the applicant as a condition of the license and lease (see Section 9.4.2, “Conditions 5A

and 5D,” in this FEIS) will minimize the impacts. Noxious or invasive undesirable plant species along

the rail corridor would be controlled by the use of herbicides as discussed in Section 5.4.2.1 of the

FEIS.

With regard to the comment about water courses, there are no such features on the proposed site of

the ITF near Timpie. The proposed drainage culverts for the new rail line would be designed so as to
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minimize any changes to existing drainage channels at the foot of the Cedar Mountains. The culverts

would be designed for a 100-year flood event. The stream alteration permit for the rail line is

discussed in Section 1.6.2.1 of this FEIS.

As discussed in Section 2.1.1.3 in this FEIS, the proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge (near Low, Utah)

would be located on the western side of Skull Valley. Section 5.4 of the FEIS discusses the potential

impacts to Horseshoe Springs. Horseshoe Springs is located on the eastern side of Skull Valley (see

Figure 1.2 in this FEIS). The closest approach of the proposed rail line to Horseshoe Springs is over 7

miles; hence, there would be no potential for impacts to Horseshoe Springs from either the

construction or the operation of the rail line.

Information about the Great Salt Lake and the potential for impacts to it and the species (particularly

migratory birds) that use it from construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF, 

has been added to Sections 3.4.1.2 and 5.4.2.2 of this FEIS. Potential impacts are predicted to be

small.

As discussed in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, the potential impacts from radiation (emanating from the SNF

inside sealed metal canisters) would be limited to workers and persons located along the

transportation routes. The type of damage suggested in the comments would only arise in the event

of an accident that resulted in the release of radioactive materials. As discussed in the NRC’s SER,

the staff investigated such events and found that the large-scale dispersion of radioactive materials

(from an accident) is a not a credible event. Therefore, there is no basis for the concern expressed in

the comment about impacts to the watershed and/or Utah’s water reservoir.

G.3.10.2.3 Water Supply and Water Rights

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern that water rights and the Reservation’s water supply must be

consistently and fully discussed. The commenter said that water resources, such as Indian Hickman

Springs and Indian Hickman Creek Canyon, are inconsistently characterized in the “Socioeconomic

and Community Resources” Section and “Aquatic Resources” Section on page 3-26. The commenter

also stated that these water resources are not discussed in all appropriate sections of the DEIS, and

stated that the inconsistencies, contradictions, and deceptions must be resolved before the EIS is

approved. (0039, 0077)

The commenter said that inconsistent facts throughout the DEIS negate the contention that local water

resources legally and feasibly meet the consumptive needs of the proposed action. Specifically, the

commenter said that the statement on page 3-12, line 40 of the DEIS that “no surface water in Skull

Valley provides private or public drinking water” is deceptive because it failed to recognize that the

Reservation is supplied water by Indian Hickman Creek. The commenter noted that the Creek exists

due to springs located on non-Reservation land. The commenter stated that on page 3-35, line 9, the

DEIS stated that surface water is piped from Indian Hickman Canyon (USGS, 1985 topo series) to

serve the Reservation. The commenter asked if this statement on page 3-35 meant that Indian

Hickman Creek is a water source for the Skull Valley Band or others. The commenter also asked how

the water supply from the pipeline compares to the Skull Valley Band’s dependence on well water. 

(0039, 0077)

In addition, the commenter stated that the Reservation boundary would show that Indian Hickman

Creek (page 3-9, line 37 and page 3-26, line 5 of the DEIS) does not originate on the Reservation and

is therefore subject to adjudication, rather than indiscriminate unquantifiable use as proposed in the

DEIS. The commenter stated that indiscriminate transfer of water rights is prohibited by the Utah

Department of Natural Resources. The commenter stated that during the scoping process one Skull

Valley Band member stated that the water piped from the mountain, perhaps from Indian Hickman

Spring, is dirty and indicated that the water may be used for consumptive purposes. The commenter
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also said that page 3-25, line 9 of the DEIS stated that this “stream water is delivered to the irrigable

lands through an existing pipeline.” (0039, 0077)

The commenter questioned the statements on page 3-9, lines 37-46 of the DEIS, about the

occurrence and proximity of perennial streams and stream channels. The commenter said that the

DEIS noted that Indian Hickman Creek is the stream nearest to the proposed site and has flow rates

up to 3.1 cubic ft per second from April to June. The commenter asked if Indian Hickman Creek is a

perennial stream with flow between June and April, and noted that if Indian Hickman Creek “feeds the

Reservation’s water supply reservoir,” then it is an important water resource that must be thoroughly

discussed. The commenter also asked about the location of the pipeline and reservoir. (0039, 0077)

The commenter stated that the DEIS should fully discuss every condition, occurrence, and other

aspect of water resources (specifically Indian Hickman Canyon), and how the project would affect

these resources. (0039, 0077) 

Response:

Section 3.2.3 of the FEIS has been revised to include a more complete discussion of the water rights

of the Skull Valley Band. Water rights of the Skull Valley Band were created in 1917 and 1918 when

the Reservation was established. The rights provide for water to irrigate practicably irrigable acreage,

maintain fisheries, and supply domestic, municipal, and industrial needs. The Skull Valley Band has

sovereignty over the use of its water. The applicant’s request to use water rights owned by the Skull

Valley Band is subject to review and approval by the BIA as part of its review of the proposed lease. 

As described in Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS, PFS plans to use groundwater and commercial offsite

water sources for construction and operation of the facility. The applicant has not proposed to use any

water from Indian Hickman Creek.

The Skull Valley Band uses a well to provide water for domestic uses. Some water from Indian

Hickman Creek is diverted to a small irrigation storage reservoir [less than 5 acre-ft or 1.63 million

gallons (6,170 m3

)] and about 3 acres of land are irrigated with this water. Section 3.2.3 of the FEIS

has been revised to include additional discussion on Indian Hickman Creek. The FEIS concluded that

construction and operation of the proposed PFSF would not affect Indian Hickman Creek.

G.3.10.2.4 Storm Water Permits and Monitoring

Comment Summary:

A few commenters expressed concern that the detention basin is a potential source of surface or

groundwater contamination. (0051, 0089, 0198) Commenters provided the following specific

comments:

C One commenter disagreed with the statement on page 4-10 of the DEIS that the proposed PFSF

will be a zero release facility. The commenter said that page 4-10 specifically identified that water

from the detention basin will infiltrate into the ground. (0198) Another commenter asked what the

contingency plan is if the philosophy of “start clean/stay clean” cannot be maintained for the life of

the proposed PFSF. (0096)

C One commenter stated that any discharge to waters of the State requires permits. (0198) The

commenter stated that the EIS must show compliance with Utah’s Groundwater Discharge Permit

requirement since the detention basin proposed by the applicant at the north end of the storage

pad is designed to leach into groundwater (according to ER 4.2-4), and since the State of Utah

has jurisdiction over all groundwater within the State. The commenter stated that leaching from

the basin into the groundwater would be unacceptable. (0198h) The commenter said that if there

were any spills of either radiological or non-radiological contaminants, the detention basin would

collect them. The commenter expressed concern that the design of the detention basin would not
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effectively protect groundwater from contamination. The commenter added that a groundwater

permit would include groundwater protection criteria, which would determine the basin design. 

(0198)

C Referring to the ER at 4.2-2, the same commenter said the applicant cannot support the argument

that “[s]urface runoff is uncontaminated and will not adversely affect vegetation or wildlife.” The

commenter said the applicant failed to address the adverse impacts as a potential result of

contaminated ground or surface waters, including contaminated puddles and ponds, on various

species; and did not indicate an intent to sample the detention basin or prevent the detention

basin from draining in the event contaminants are present. The commenter said the applicant did

not address any waterborne radioactive, chemical, or heavy metal contaminants that may be

absorbed by wildlife, aquatic organisms, or vegetation. (0198a, 0198b) The same commenter

stated that the applicant should use liners and water quality monitoring for the cask pads and the

stormwater detention basin. The commenter said that on page 4-12, the DEIS indicated that the

applicant would sample and analyze water from the basin to determine if contaminants are

present. The commenter stated this is not an accurate description of what the applicant proposed,

based on page 4.2-8 of PFS/ER2000, which discusses that sampling and analysis would be done

when free standing water is present. The commenter also said that there is no indication in the

DEIS (page 2-10) of where any water pumped from the detention basin would be collected or

discharged. (0198)

C Another commenter asked if the stormwater collection and detention basin and water will be

monitored for radioactivity. (0089)

C One commenter noted that Section 4.2.2.4, “Groundwater,” page 4-12, line 23, stated that the

applicant would sample and analyze water from the basin when water is present to determine if

contaminants are present. However, the commenter noted that this effort is not mentioned in

Section 6.3 of the ER “(Proposed Operational Monitoring Programs).” The commenter suggested

that Section 4.2.2.4 be updated to include a list of contaminants of concern and analytical

methods to be used. (0051)

C Another commenter stated that constructing the detention basin (page 4-13, Section 4.2.4, lines

18-24 of the DEIS) prior to constructing the storage pads and other structures and facilities on-site

would mitigate the potential impacts to surface water during construction as recommended by the

DEIS. (0163)

Response:

In response to the comments, the NRC staff revised Section 4.2.2.1 regarding a "zero release" facility. 

The term "zero release" refers only to the proposed PFSF's ability to retain all radioactive materials

(i.e., SNF) without their release. The term does not apply to effluent (such as stormwater) that would

be discharged from the proposed PFSF. This FEIS has been revised to avoid any inferences about

the lack of gaseous and/or liquid discharges (which would accompany the proposed project). As

discussed in Section 2.1.2.1 of the DEIS, the start clean/stay clean philosophy means that the

proposed PFSF would be a radiological contamination-free site. Because of operational safeguards,

as well as stringent design standards for the proposed PFSF and the casks that will be stored there,

contamination at the proposed PFSF should be low. The storage pad area would not be

contaminated as a result of any normal, off-normal, or accident events because the canisters are

surveyed for contamination before they are loaded into storage casks and the canisters are welded

shut. Portable monitors will be used to perform airborne monitoring during canister handling

operations.

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies appreciate the comments about the requirements of State of

Utah water discharge permits, however State regulations and design specifications regarding

stormwater retention basins do not apply on the Reservation. The EPA is the responsible agency for
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-199 NUREG-1714

surface water or groundwater discharges. The applicable permit requirements are described in

Section 1.6.2 of the FEIS. 

Because the average rainfall at the site is only about 26 cm (10 in) per year, relatively small volumes

of water would be expected across the site. Water drainage from the site may soak into the ground

before it reaches the proposed detention basin. To clarify perceived discrepancies between the DEIS

and ER, Section 4.2.2.4 in this FEIS has been revised to state that the applicant would sample and

analyze water from the proposed detention basin when freestanding water is present to determine if

radiological contaminants are present. The applicant’s sampling plan was described in Section 4.2.4

of the applicant’s ER.

Water resource degradation due to construction, operation, and maintenance of the PFSF was

analyzed and found to cause little adverse impacts. Section 4.2 of the FEIS describes the analysis of

the impacts of constructing and operating the proposed PFSF and includes information related to

contaminants and the uses of the detention basin.

As stated in Section 4.2.2.4 of the FEIS, there would be no significant amounts of water collected in

the proposed detention basin, except after severe storms. Also, no contaminants are expected to be

found in the stormwater in the basin. Any stormwater collected in the detention basin would be

expected to evaporate and/or infiltrate and migrate northward from the storage pad area and would

probably dissipate in the soils above the water table. The depth to groundwater in this portion of Skull

Valley is about 125 ft; therefore, there is only a very small potential for any interaction between the

limited amount of water in the basin and the local groundwater. Based upon the absence of any likely

impact to groundwater, there does not appear to be a need for a detention basin liner, as

recommended in the comment. The final determination of stormwater control measures is subject to

EPA review under stormwater permit requirements.

In the event freestanding water collects in the detention basin, the applicant proposes to pump it out

after confirming that the water is not contaminated. The water would be pumped to the north of the

proposed storage pads. This would allow the water to flow in a generally northward direction, away

from the proposed PFSF and along the same pathways that would exist if the proposed PFSF or

detention basin were never constructed.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment supporting the timing of the detention basin construction. 

No response is required.

G.3.10.2.5 Impacts to the Great Salt Lake

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the Great Salt Lake is adjacent to the proposed ITF and transportation

routes. In addition, the commenter stated that the water drainage from the area of the proposed PFSF

goes to the Great Salt Lake. The commenter stated that the impact of any spill or other discharge to

the Great Salt Lake or into the drainages which discharge into the Great Salt Lake must be evaluated

to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.100, defining potential effects of the proposed PFSF on the

region, and NEPA. Also, the commenter stated that the potential impact on the environment of the

transportation of SNF and use of a transfer station in the vicinity of the Great Salt Lake must be

evaluated to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.108. (0198b) 

Response:

The impacts to the Great Salt Lake from a proposed ITF are found in Section 5.2 of the FEIS. Since

there was virtually no potential to cause environmental impacts to the immediate area near the

proposed ITF, the NRC staff concluded that no impact on the Great Salt Lake was likely. The

requirements of 10 CFR 72.108 address the evaluation of the potential impact of the transportation of
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NUREG-1714 G-200

SNF. The evaluation of the environmental impacts of the ITF transportation option are evaluated in

Chapter 5 of the EIS.

G.3.10.3 Water Use

G.3.10.3.1 Facility Water Use

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern about the amount of available water required to operate the

proposed PFSF. (0039, 0042, 0077, 0112, 0134, 0163, 0198a, 0198h, 0198i, 0201, 0215, GR1-11,

SL1-11, SL1-21, SL1-39, SL2-02, SL3-46, SL3-55) Commenters provided the following specific

comments:

C Several commenters said that the DEIS does not adequately characterize the water sources, the

importance of water, the issue of water rights, and fires. (0042, 0077, 0112, 0198i, 0201, SL1-11,

SL1-39, SL2-02, SL3-46, SL3-55)

C One commenter said the DEIS portrays water resources as adequate, yet the DEIS admits the

uncertainties, and shows no data on which a water-plentiful scenario is based. (0039, 0077)

C One commenter said the applicant does not specify if the 1,500 gallons-per-day (gpd) estimate is

a daily average or a peak usage estimate during construction, construction/operation, or

decommissioning. (0198a)

C One commenter stated that clarification on water usage is needed: Are 10 gpm (as stated on line

42, Section 4.2.2.3) needed for operation, 1,500 gpd (as stated on page 4-12, line 29), or 1,900

gpd (as stated in the SAR)? The last two statements implied that 1,500 to 1,800 gpd is all that is

required for operations. (0039, 0077)

C One commenter stated that several water usage estimates are missing from the DEIS: estimates

from the cement batch plant and plant wash-down, from decommissioning, and the worst-case

water usage requirements for revegetation plans. (0215)

C One commenter stated that water use during Phases 2 and 3 was not addressed in the DEIS. 

(GR-11) 

C Another commenter asked how the fire flow requirements were determined and if the proposed

PFSF will comply with Tooele County fire flow requirements and the Uniform Fire Code. The

same commenter said that well test logs should be provided. (0112)

C One commenter pointed out several inconsistencies between the DEIS and the applicant’s ER. 

Section 2.2.4.2 of the DEIS stated that “[p]otable water would be provided for the [ITF] in tanks

transported from the site.” However, Section 4.5.2 of the applicant’s ER stated that an on-site

storage tank at the proposed ITF would be refilled periodically by a local commercial supplier of

drinking water. Section 2.2.4.2 of the DEIS stated that “Construction of the ITF would require a

peak daily water use of 132 m3

/day (35,000 gpd).” However, Section 4.5.2 of the applicant’s ER

calculated the peak water usage for construction of the ITF to be 21,200 gpd. Regarding the

proposed PFSF, Section 4.2.2.4 stated that “the quantity of water that would be used by workers

is estimated to be about 6 m3

/day (1,500 gpd).” However, Section 4.5.4 of the applicant’s ER

indicated that during Phase 1 construction, the volume of water required for worker use is

3,300 gpd. During operations, including concurrent Phase 2 and Phase 3 construction, the

amount of water use would decrease to 1,800 gpd. (0163)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-201 NUREG-1714

C Regarding Federal water rights, one commenter indicated that there are many technical and legal

analyses required to identify agricultural water needs. If the water rights of the Reservation are

established, then the water use must be changed from irrigation to industrial uses. (0198h) The

same commenter said that the applicant merely assumes that it would be able to drill wells for its

water needs, which are estimated at 1,500 gpd, referring to the ER at 4.2-4. The commenter said

that the applicant must show that it has the legal authority to drill such wells and that its water

appropriations do not interfere with or impair existing water rights. Furthermore, the commenter

said, the applicant did not specify whether the 1,500 gpd is a daily average or a peak usage

estimate or whether that quantity of water would be required throughout the life of the proposed

PFSF. (0198a)

Response: 

The concerns about water availability and use are noted. Figure 4.1, which shows anticipated water

use for the facility during both construction and operation, has been updated for the FEIS. On-site

well water use is indicated, as is the amount of water that will be imported from off-site. The applicant

has reached a proprietary agreement with a local water vendor in the area to provide and transport the

necessary water to the proposed site. In the event that the proposed new on-site water wells do not

provide adequate water quantity or quality, additional water would be purchased from this same local

vendor. 

The applicant has stated that there is sufficient water available locally. Within a 15-mile radius of Low

(i.e., Skunk Ridge), there are three wells, each with appropriate water rights and pumping capacity to

withdraw up to 400,000 gpd. Less than half of this amount is normally withdrawn from these wells on

a daily basis.

The numerical values for water use during operation of the proposed PFSF were stated in Section 4.2

in the DEIS. The 1,500 gpd value referenced in the comment is for worker use (e.g., potable water,

toilet facilities). The applicant would use the remainder of the water during operations for construction

of the concrete storage casks, which would be manufactured on-site and on an as-needed basis. 

Note also that the 10 gpm value referenced in the comment is the maximum pumping rate proposed

for the new groundwater wells and that groundwater might never actually be extracted at this rate. 

The text in Section 4.2.2.4 in this FEIS was revised to state that, during the operational period of the

proposed PFSF, the quantity of water used by workers would be about 5.5 cubic meters per day

(14,400 gpd). All uses of water at the proposed PFSF are described in Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS,

which also provides data on water use. (Estimates for specific operations, such as batch plant and

wash-down, were included in these figures.) The NRC staff concluded that this small change in water

use does not alter the conclusion that the impacts to groundwater would be small. Section 4.2.1.2 of

the FEIS has been updated to address water use during construction Phases 2 and 3. The water use

during decommissioning, which includes revegetation, was addressed in Section 4.9.2 of the FEIS.

Regarding the proposed ITF, the NRC staff revised the text in Section 2.2.4.2 in this FEIS to reflect

the changes noted in the comments. The NRC staff acknowledges the use of an on-site water

storage tank and water distribution system at the proposed ITF location. The tank would be refilled

periodically by a local commercial drinking water supplier. The text in Section 2.2.4.2 in this FEIS was

also revised to state that the peak water usage during the construction of the proposed ITF would be

about 80 cubic meters per day (21,200 gpd).

The NRC safety review as reflected in the SER addressed the safety aspects of the proposed PFSF

and specifically included the consideration of fire protection measures. The proposed PFSF would

comply with all applicable laws and regulations regarding fire flow requirements. The on-site storage

tanks would be designed to contain adequate volumes of water for fire protection. The water use

description in Section 2.1.1.2 includes the amount of water needed to fill these tanks.
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NUREG-1714 G-202

Text has been added to Section 3.2 of this FEIS to discuss water rights; however, an assessment of

the issues associated with the assignment, use, or trading of water rights is beyond the scope of this

EIS. The proposed wells would be drilled on the Reservation and would be under the control of the

BIA and the Skull Valley Band, but not the State.

G.3.10.4 Groundwater

G.3.10.4.1 Groundwater Characterization

General Comments

Comment Summary:

A few commenters addressed groundwater characteristics and said that the DEIS should provide

correct information and supporting documentation. (0039, 0051, 0077, 0198, GR-11)

Two commenters said that conclusions regarding groundwater are faulty and could be adversely

affected due to incorrect well depths, questionable pump test data, a very large radius of influence,

and testing an unused portion of the aquifer. (0039, 0051, 0077, GR-11)

One commenter said the DEIS should justify assumptions and include concise and accurate basic

information to assure reviewers that the information is correct. (0039)

Other commenters said the DEIS incorrectly presents information and failed to provide adequate

supporting data. (0039, 0077, 0215, GR-11, SL2-16) One commenter stated that in addition to the

requirements of 10 CFR 72.24(d), 72.011 (b) and 72.108, for a site located over an aquifer which is a

source of well water, NUREG-1567, pages 2-10, requires the applicant to survey groundwater users

and well locations, static water levels, well pumping rates, and aquifer drawdown. Also, the SAR

requires a discussion of the future projected amount of water withdrawals. (0198a)

Response:

In response to the comments about groundwater, the NRC staff revised the information in Section 3.2

of this FEIS to clarify and update the types of data suggested in the comments. This update includes

information on Indian Hickman Creek, nearby springs, and nearby wells (see the revised Figure 3.4). 

Additional updated information about the groundwater setting at the proposed location of the ITF near

Timpie has been added to Sections 5.2.1.4 and 5.2.2.2 of this FEIS, which discuss the impacts to

groundwater as a result of the transportation facilities. Section 4.2 of this FEIS discusses the potential

impacts to groundwater at the proposed PFSF. These sections address the parameters identified by

the commenters to the extent that appropriate information is currently available.

Depth to Groundwater

Comment Summary:

A commenter said that well depths listed in the DEIS on page 3-14, lines 1 and 2, are incorrect

according to both the DEIS’s own data and publicly available data. The commenter said the depths

differ by over 200 vertical ft. The commenter said the groundwater is found as shallow as 0-12 ft

below the surface. (Section 5.2.1.4, page 5-8, line 28). The commenter said that groundwater at the

proposed ITF is very shallow (only about 12 ft deep) because documented groundwater levels nearby

are shallow (20 ft below land surface at the Delle Auto Truck Stop in Delle and 3 to 8 ft below grade at

the Teddy Bear Truck Stop in Rowley). (0039, 0077, GR-11)

Another commenter said that the applicant maintained that “[d]iscussion of potential contamination of

groundwater is not applicable since the depth to groundwater at the site is substantially removed from
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-203 NUREG-1714

any activity at the site’s finished grade.” (SAR 2.5-5.) The commenter said that to support its

statement, the applicant generically described the strata at the site, the depth to groundwater at

approximately 100 to 127 ft, and the low general permeability and groundwater velocity. However, the

commenter stated that the applicant did not support its statements with any calculations based on

specific factors, or the identification of the potential contaminants or direct pathways to groundwater. 

(0198a) 

One commenter disagreed with the stated fluctuations and stated that wells surrounding the proposed

site can be 600 ft deep. (GR-11) Another commenter said the statement, “Anecdotal information from

the Skull Valley Band indicates annual groundwater fluctuations in their community well over 33

meters per year” provided another argument for better groundwater characterization. (0051) Two

commenters stated that the anecdotal information is unreliable without proper citation of data origin. 

(0039, 0077, 0215)

One commenter requested further discussion regarding the inexplicable 100-foot annual vertical

gradient experienced in one of the Skull Valley Band’s wells. The commenter asked if this unusual

condition affects water availability for the proposed PFSF and the Skull Valley Band, how this

condition will affect the proposal, and whether the applicant intends to use this supply for the project. 

The commenter wanted the EIS to identify the well, its depth to groundwater, its capacity, the

seasonal nature of its fluctuations, and the effect on water availability. The commenter also requested

discussion regarding the shallow aquifer, which is located at about 9 ft below the surface. (0039,

0077)

Response:

The NRC staff obtained information describing the occurrence, abundance, and use of groundwater at

or near the site on the Reservation from on-site investigative activities, as well as published sources. 

The results of the investigation performed on-site are consistent with published information on the

occurrence of groundwater at the site. A single well pumping test was used to estimate well yield and

aquifer properties at the site. The water table elevation level in that well was at a depth of 125 ft. That

depth was consistent with other published estimates of groundwater level in that part of Skull Valley. 

The NRC staff revised the text of Section 5.2.1.4 in this FEIS to state that the depth to groundwater at

the proposed ITF site near Timpie is approximately 7m (21 ft). The reference to anecdotal information

mentioned in the DEIS concerning water level fluctuations did not include critical or clarifying

information, and was not included in the actual analysis.

Location of Wells

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that maps and figures are missing from Sections 2.4, “Surface Hydrology,” and

2.5, “Subsurface Hydrology,” of the SAR, and the proposed location of new on-site wells which would

supply water for construction is also missing. (0051) Another commenter said the figures in the DEIS

of the site and surrounding wells are unclear. (GR-11) The same commenter pointed out an

inconsistency in the DEIS regarding the nearest well from the proposed site. Page 4-7 stated that the

nearest well is 2.5 miles away, yet an earlier section, on page 3-12, stated the nearest well is 2.0

miles away. The commenter stated that this must be corrected and resolved because a difference of

0.5 miles, or 2,640 ft, is significant relative to the reported radius of influence of 7,000 ft for a pumping

well. (0039, 0077)

Response:

The well nearest to the proposed PFSF is found at the nearest residence; hence the correct distance

to the nearest well is 2.0 miles. The NRC staff revised the text in this FEIS to correct the error noted

in the comment. The map and data presented in Figure 3.4 of this FEIS have been revised to provide
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NUREG-1714 G-204

the information requested in the comment. The NRC staff addressed any information that may have

been missing from the applicant’s SAR in its preparation of the SER, which is not part of the EIS.

Radius of Influence

Comment Summary:

A commenter considered hydraulic conductivity of the permeable material and examined the

geometrics, and stated that the calculation of this 7,000-foot radius of influence could not be derived

from the data presented in the DEIS, SER, and SAR. The 7,000-foot radius of influence is too great. 

(GR-11) The commenter also said the 7,000-foot radius of influence is inconsistent with data reported

in the DEIS, which states that the hydraulic conductivity is 0.144 ft per day, the screened interval is

100 ft, and there is a low-to-moderate assumed pumping rate of 10 gpm. The commenter stated that

such a large estimate for the radius of influence is indicative of a lack of understanding of the local

water resources. (0039, 0077)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges that there is some uncertainty in the potential radius of influence that

would be created from the anticipated groundwater withdrawals for the operation of the proposed

PFSF. The applicant acknowledged the necessity to perform additional testing to determine the

adequacy of the on-site groundwater supply and to obtain an alternative supply if site testing shows

the supply to be inadequate. A mandatory mitigation measure would be required by the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies that would grant licenses or approvals for this project. Condition 5B in Section

9.4.2 of this FEIS states that “PFS shall develop a monitoring program to determine if the wells

nearest the proposed PFSF are adversely impacted from groundwater withdrawal associated with the

construction and operation of the proposed PFSF.”

Specificity of Data

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern that information (e.g., hydraulic conductivity, radius of influence,

etc.) in the DEIS is based on regional and not site-specific data. The commenter said these

parameters should be measured and determined by the State. (GR-11) Another commenter said it is

unclear why no local data were obtained to estimate hydraulic gradient, conductivity, storativity (sic),

and average linear groundwater velocity at the site. The commenter said all cited data (SER, page 2-

25) appears to have been gleaned from regional studies, which are also not directly referenced in the

text. (0051) One commenter questioned the validity of using a storage coefficient whose values

range by an order of magnitude (page 4-9, line 1). (0039, 0077)

Response:

As noted in the comment, the analyses in this EIS use regional data, which are the best currently

available information for characterizing the site. The data presented in the EIS (as extracted from

data used in the NRC’s SER) are appropriate for use in the analyses in Sections 4.2 and 5.2 in this

FEIS. The NRC staff does not consider the types of site-specific data recommended in the comment

to be essential input to these analyses.

The analysis of the potential radius of influence for the proposed on-site well used a published range

of storage coefficients because site-specific aquifer properties have not yet been determined. The

resulting analysis showed that for the conditions modeled, the range of storage coefficient had an

effect of varying the radius of influence between 1,300 and 7,000 feet. Use of the larger radius of

influence is conservative, and is included in the discussion in Section 4.2.1.3 of the DEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-205 NUREG-1714

Accuracy and Level of Data Detail

Comment Summary:

One commenter requested that the agencies develop and/or make available certain groundwater

information in the FEIS, including the on-site test well location; any construction logs and pumping test

data; the groundwater flow regimes at and around the site with a sufficient number of wells and

observations to account for seasonal variations of hydraulic heads; and a calibrated numerical

groundwater flow model. (0051) 

One commenter said that Figure 3.4 of the DEIS did not identify the data or source of the well

information. Specifically, the commenter said that well number 2 has data; depth to water in well

number 3 is not 90 ft; depth to water in well number 4 is also reported in State documents; well

number 9, the nearest well, has no data, yet the document repeatedly states that impacts to the

nearest well are expected to be small. Also, the figure describing water rights showed information that

is not publicly available and is not reliable without proper citation of the data’s origin. The commenter

said that the source and date of information collected should be shown on Figure 3.4. (0039, 0077)

Response:

The NRC staff revised Figure 3.4, “Locations of water wells within 8 km (5 miles) of the proposed

PFSF” (showing well locations and well data) in this FEIS, in response to the comments, primarily to

reflect water rights. The type of information and level of detail identified in the comment is contained

in the applicant’s SAR and is evaluated in the staff’s safety findings in the SER. Further, the staff did

not rely on the identified information to conduct its environmental analysis set forth in the FEIS. The

staff did rely on more general, regional water resource data. See the response to the following

comment.

Currency of Data

Comment Summary:

Two commenters suggested that the groundwater assessment is flawed since it is based on an

outdated 1968 hydrology study (Hood Wadell study of 1968). (0215, SL2-16)

One commenter said the poor characterization of groundwater and the outdated 1968 data will lead to

bad decisions, resulting in groundwater contamination, and affecting/damaging supply habitats of the

Great Salt Lake and critical habitats of the international migratory wetlands. (SL2-16) 

Response:

Regarding the use of groundwater data from a 1968 study, the Hood and Waddell study referenced in

the DEIS still contains the most comprehensive discussion of groundwater conditions in Skull Valley. 

According to the applicant, a regional study published in 1981 showed virtually no change from the

previous analyses of Hood and Waddell. The applicant also reported that recent conversations with

K.M. Waddell at the U.S. Geological Survey’s Salt Lake Office confirmed that no further,

comprehensive groundwater studies exist for Skull Valley.

Characterization of Springs

Comment Summary:

Some commenters expressed concern that springs are not adequately characterized and the impact

on them is not assessed. (0039, 0047, 0077, 0089, 0198h, SL1-26) One commenter stated that the
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NUREG-1714 G-206

local springs are mischaracterized in the DEIS on page 3-11, line 40. The commenter stated that the

springs in Skull Valley occur along faults, not at the toes of the alluvial aprons. (0039, 0077)

Response:

In response to the comment, the text in Section 3.2.2 of this FEIS has been revised to more fully

describe the occurrence of springs in and around Skull Valley along faults, as well as toes of the

alluvial aprons. Section 3.4.2.2 of the FEIS provides information about wetlands that are associated

with springs, and the potential impacts of the proposed action on those wetlands are discussed in

Sections 4.4.1.3 and 5.4.1.3. Section 1.6.2.1 describes the status of wetlands, perennial or seasonal

springs delineation at the proposed PFSF.

Groundwater Quality

Comment Summary:

One commenter said the groundwater affected by the proposed PFSF will most likely be classified as

Class IA – Pristine Groundwater, although it is not yet classified. (0198)

Response:

Regardless of the classification of the groundwater, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

concluded that the impact to groundwater would be small.

G.3.10.4.2 Groundwater Contamination

General Comments

Comment Summary:

Many commenters expressed concern that the proposed action would result in groundwater

contamination. (0039, 0047, 0051, 0077, 0089, 0198, 0198h, 0215, 0229, GR-11, SL1-26, SL2-13,

SL2-16, SL3-21, SL3-54) Commenters stated that groundwater could be affected by radiation, runoff

from the cask storage area, hazardous waste, the digging of multiple wells, and the lack of liners and

monitoring for the detention basin. (0198, SL2-13, SL3-21, SL3-54)

Response:

The NRC staff analyzed water resource degradation due to construction, operation, and maintenance

of the proposed PFSF and found that adverse impacts would be small. FEIS Section 4.2 describes

the analysis of the impacts to groundwater of constructing and operating the proposed PFSF. Section

4.2.2.4 includes information related to monitoring. Even though no contamination is expected to

occur, PFS would monitor for radiological contaminants if free standing water is present in the

detention basin. Further, there is no regulatory requirement to install a liner in the detention basin.

Contamination at PFSF Site

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to assess adequately the health, safety, and

environmental effects from the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF

and the potential impacts of transportation of SNF on groundwater, as required by 10 CFR 72.24(d),

72.100(b) and 72.108. Specifically, the commenter expressed concerns about potential groundwater

impacts from the sanitary wastewater system and the stormwater detention basin. (0198a, 0198b)
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G-207 NUREG-1714

The commenter stated that the applicant’s ER and SAR did not describe the proposed PFSF’s

wastewater system. (ER 3.3-4, 5 and SAR 4.3-3.) In addition to the sanitation system providing a

direct pathway to groundwater for chemical, heavy metal, and radiological contaminants that are

collected or accidentally drained into the sewage system, it also will be a pathway for contaminants

from employee hand washing, laundry, restrooms, showers, cafeteria, and laboratory waste streams. 

Furthermore, drain sumps used to catch and collect water that drips from shipping casks in the

canister transfer building will be discharged into the sanitary system. (SAR 7.5-4.) (0198a) The

commenter stated that it is impossible based on the information provided in the DEIS to determine

whether the soil leach field, which would receive all of the proposed PFSF’s wastewater, is adequate,

and added that the adequacy of septic tank(s) and drains from the process system also needs to be

determined. The commenter said the EIS must show the locations of drains and analyze the effect on

groundwater and down-gradient resources, and how water quality requirements will be met. (0198,

0198h) The commenter asked what contaminants and quantities would be going down the drain:

truck, cask or equipment washdown wastewater; storm runoff; or non-radiological pollution? (0198) 

The commenter also stated that under routine operations and from effluent run-off, including rain water

and snow melt, the storage pads will likely transport various radiological, heavy metal, and chemical

contaminants to the unlined detention basin, which will act as a direct pathway to groundwater. 

Furthermore, the commenter stated that during heavy rains or flood events the detention basin may

overflow and contaminate perennial and intermittent surface streams. (0198a) The same commenter

said that contaminated runoff from each of the pads could infiltrate directly into the groundwater. 

(0198)

Response:

Section 2.1.1.2 of the DEIS described how a sanitary drainage system, using underground pipes,

would be installed to serve the proposed buildings and to transmit liquid wastes to the underground

septic system. The NRC staff added text to Sections 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.3 in this FEIS to describe the

design for the process area drains. That is, drain sumps would be provided in the cask load/unload

bay of the Canister Transfer Building. These sumps would catch and collect any water that drips from

the shipping casks (e.g., from rainfall or melting snow) onto the floor. Water collected in these drain

sumps would be sampled and analyzed to verify it is not radioactively contaminated prior to its

release. In the event contaminated water is detected, it would be collected in a suitable container,

solidified by the addition of an agent (such as cement) so that it qualifies as solid waste, staged in a

low-level waste holding cell while awaiting shipment off-site, and transported to a licensed low-level

waste disposal facility.

All drains, except those in the Canister Transfer Building, would be connected to the proposed

sanitary drainage system. This drainage system would feed into the two separate septic systems that

are being proposed. The two septic systems would be expected to process less than 5,000 gpd and

would require registration with the EPA as described in Section 1.6.2.1 of the FEIS. Information on

impacts to sanitary waste is included in Section 4.5 of this FEIS. 

While it is true that any water collected in the detention basin would seep into the ground, the

anticipated small volume of this water would not significantly affect groundwater resources. That is,

the proposed site receives only about 26 cm (10 in) of rainfall annually. Water drainage from the site

may soak into the ground before it ever reaches the proposed detention basin. In the event

freestanding water collects in the detention basin, the applicant proposes to pump it out after

confirming that the water is not contaminated. The water would be pumped to the north of the

proposed storage pads. This would allow the water to flow in a generally northward direction, away

from the proposed PFSF and along the same pathways that would exist if the facility or detention

basin were never constructed. Information regarding impacts to the environment of the detention

basin is presented in Section 4.2 of this FEIS. 
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NUREG-1714 G-208

Off-site Contamination

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to discuss the impact of groundwater contamination on

down-gradient hydrological resources. As the applicant generally indicated, referencing ER 2.5-8 to

10, recharge to the groundwater in Skull Valley watershed is from precipitation mainly collected from

the Stansbury, Onaqui, and Cedar Mountains. (Hood, J.W. and Waddell, K.M., Hydrologic

Reconnaissance of Skull Valley Tooele County, Utah: Utah Department of Natural Resources

Technical Publication No. 18, 1968.) The commenter said that this document reports that

groundwater generally flows from the recharge areas along both sides of the valley (base of the

mountains) toward the middle axis of Skull Valley. The commenter stated that the proposed site and

Skull Valley Road are located within the Skull Valley watershed. Groundwater at the site moves

northwest, toward the axis of Skull Valley. North of the Reservation, the groundwater then flows north,

then northeast, where it discharges through evapotranspiration or surface flow and under flow to the

Great Salt Lake. (Id. at 57.) The commenter stated that, in generically discussing groundwater

characteristics, the applicant failed to discuss the environmental effects and impact from groundwater

contamination on the more than 30 wells used for irrigation and stock watering located down gradient

of the proposed PFSF. The commenter also stated that the applicant failed to discuss the impact on

the approximately 50 springs that are located within 15 miles of the proposed site. (0198a)

The commenter added that the applicant failed to discuss the impact of groundwater contamination on

the down-gradient Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area (Timpie Spring) and the Great Salt

Lake. These areas provide wetlands and habitat for aquatic wildlife and shorebirds. The commenter

stated that Timpie Springs and the Great Salt Lake, like all ground and surfacewater resources in the

area, are critical to Utah’s ecosystem. The commenter stated that potential accidents involving casks

being transported along the rail route that parallels the Great Salt Lake and Timpie Springs into

Rowley Junction would have serious effects on these areas, as would contamination of ground and

surfacewater along the corridor route from the proposed site. (0198a)

Response:

The comments about off-site contamination were directed at the applicant’s ER and not at the EIS. 

The EIS updates that document and other licensing information provided by the applicant. The NRC

staff agrees that the Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area and the Great Salt Lake provide

wetlands and habitat for aquatic wildlife and shorebirds. The lake supports between 2 and 5 million

shorebirds and hundreds of thousands of waterfowl during spring and fall migration. Because of its

importance to migratory birds, the lake was designated a part of the Western Hemisphere Shorebird

Reserve Network in 1992. The lake and its marshes provide a resting and staging area for birds, as

well as an abundance of brine shrimp and brine flies that serve as food for them. The potential for

transportation accidents severe enough to damage a cask and release radioactive material is

discussed in Section 5.7.2 of the FEIS. The NRC staff used consistently conservative assumptions to

analyze those potential impacts and concluded that annual and cumulative radiological impacts of

transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF would be small. Also, the NRC staff concluded in its SER

that the proposed PFSF would meet all Federal safety standards during normal, unusual, and accident

conditions. The casks used would be impervious to a range of disturbance, from floods, to explosions,

to missile attacks, making contamination via groundwater of the Great Salt Lake unlikely. Additional

information about the Great Salt Lake and the potential for impacts to it has been added to Sections

3.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.4 of this FEIS.

Sections 4.2 and 5.2 of this FEIS discuss the potential impacts to groundwater from contaminants. 

The NRC staff concluded that the impacts would be small at the proposed site, rail line, and proposed

ITF.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-209 NUREG-1714

Contamination at Transportation Facilities

Comment Summary:

One commenter also said that the applicant did not assess the potential for groundwater

contamination at the proposed ITF at Rowley Junction or along the transportation route. The

commenter stated that the applicant estimated the groundwater depth at about 120 to 127 ft. (ER at

2.5-11.) The commenter said that the applicant then assumed groundwater along the proposed rail

spur is also at a depth of over 100 ft and that “it is unlikely that the railroad spur will have any impact

on hydrological resources.” (ER at 4.4-4.) The commenter stated that groundwater depths range from

less than 10 ft to over 30 ft at various points along Skull Valley Road, at the proposed location for the

rail spur or at the expansion of Skull Valley Road (Exhibit 13, Map: Shallow Groundwater and Related

Hazards). In addition, the commenter stated that the proposed ITF at Rowley Junction is adjacent to a

protected wetland area where groundwater is encountered at less than 10 ft (Exhibit 13). 

Furthermore, the commenter said that while the applicant described the subterranean strata, the low

permeability, and the low groundwater velocity at the site, (ER at 2.5.5), the applicant did not discuss

these factors along the transportation route or at the proposed ITF. (0198a) Another commenter said

that Section 5.2.1.4, pages 5-8, line 28, reads that the groundwater table is at 125 ft below the ground

surface. However, this is the groundwater elevation at the proposed site, not at the rail line locations. 

The section should be corrected and the required size of the fuel spill that would impact groundwater

should be re-evaluated. (0051)

Response:

In response to the comment, the text in Section 5.1.2.4 of the FEIS has been revised to avoid the

inference that the depth to groundwater at the ITF location is 120-125 feet. The expected depth to

groundwater at the ITF location would be approximately 21 feet, as reflected in the FEIS. The EIS

analyzed the groundwater impacts due to construction and operation of a rail spur. Sections 5.2.1 and

5.2.2 of the FEIS present the results of the analysis of the construction and operation impacts for the

proposed ITF. The text in these sections has been revised in this FEIS to indicate that the Best

Management Practices Plan specified as a mitigation measure (see Section 9.4.2) would be required

for the proposed rail route at the proposed ITF, and that such a plan would minimize the potential for

adverse impacts to groundwater.

G.3.10.4.3 Groundwater Analysis

General Comments

Comment Summary:

Several commenters addressed the analysis and impacts from groundwater extraction for construction

and operation of the proposed PFSF. (0039, 0051, 0077, 0112, 0215, GR-11, SL1-07, SL3-46) 

Commenters expressed concern about finding the amount of water necessary to operate the proposed

PFSF, since drilling has not yet occurred and the source and availability of groundwater are uncertain. 

The commenters said additional study is warranted to validate current conditions, support the

estimates of groundwater availability, and ascertain the impacts of groundwater withdrawal from the

proposed site on the Reservation. (0051, 0215, GR-11, SL1-07, SL3-46) 

Response:

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies agree with the commenters that it is important to

prevent impacts to groundwater. The potential impacts to groundwater are described in the Sections

4.2 and 5.2 of the FEIS. As described in those sections, the proposed action has only a small

potential to affect groundwater. Because of the uncertainties in the analysis of impacts to adjacent

water wells, the NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies proposed that the applicant be required to
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-210

implement a monitoring program to identify any potential adverse effect to nearby wells. This program

would allow PFS to take appropriate corrective actions. Condition 5B in Section 9.4.2 in the FEIS

describes this proposed requirement. See the following comment that addresses groundwater

availability.

Groundwater Capacity

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern about the characterization of the groundwater production

capacity at the proposed PFSF. One commenter concluded that adequate water may not be found

within a reasonable proximity anywhere in the region. (0112) One commenter said the DEIS is

contradictory: page 4-11, line 42 implied that the applicant’s studies or analysis verified that

groundwater is sufficient for facility operations, whereas page 4-7, line 32 states “there is some

uncertainty as to the availability of sufficient groundwater quality.” (0039, 0077)

One commenter questioned the method (Section 4.2.1.3, page 4-7) that used to determine on-site well

production capacity. Specifically, the commenter stated that the DEIS relied on only a single

observation well and did not identify parameter values used to calculate drawdown (i.e., flow rates

used in calculations, duration of the pump test, and flow rates the aquifer is capable of producing). 

(0039, 0077)

The same commenter said that Section 4.2.1.3 of the DEIS only provides assumptions based on a

single observation well, and does not identify the parameter values used to calculate drawdown, such

as flow rates used in the calculations, duration of the pump test, or flow rates the aquifer is capable of

producing. (0077)

One commenter questioned the legitimacy of extrapolating from a 25-foot screen test well to a fullscale production well. The commenter said that production test wells should be drilled and the

pumping test analyzed to assess impacts of groundwater withdrawal from the proposed site or the

Reservation. The commenter specifically stated that a full-scale production well should be drilled to

the correct depth before issuing the FEIS. Only then, the commenter added, can it be stated with

some level of confidence if owners of existing wells, as listed in Figure 3.4, would be affected from the

withdrawal of groundwater, because direct aquifer recharge is likely non-existent at the proposed site. 

The commenter also said commercial contractors, as mentioned in Executive Summary, page xxxv,

should be identified and the source of water disclosed. (0051)

Response:

Section 2.1.1.2 of the FEIS describes how the majority of the water would be supplied from off-site

private sources in the event that local well supplies are inadequate in quantity or quality. This water

would be transported to the facility by tanker trucks. Table 2.3 of the FEIS shows that, during

construction, the amounts of water to be supplied by new on-site wells (to be drilled only on the

Reservation) would be small. Section 4.2.1.3 of the FEIS acknowledges that there is some

uncertainty (such as single observation wells, draw down parameters, and flow rates, as identified in

the comment) as to the availability of sufficient groundwater on site to meet the expected construction

and operational needs of the proposed PFSF. As for the comment on the inconsistency in the DEIS,

the statements as cited are in Section 4.2.1.3 (with respect to operation) and Section 4.2.2.3 (with

respect to construction) and thus, they are not contradictory. In the event these new on-site wells

prove to be inadequate, water from additional off-site sources would be used. Therefore, the applicant

would not rely on any on-site water sources, which is consistent with minimizing site and local

impacts.

Regarding the availability of water in the vicinity of the proposed project, the applicant contacted local

commercial water vendors. Within a 15-mile radius of Low (i.e., Skunk Ridge), there are three wells,
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-211 NUREG-1714

each with the appropriate water rights and pumping capacity to withdraw up to 400,000 gpd. The daily

withdrawals from each of these wells is less than half of this amount. The planned maximum daily use

of water at the proposed PFSF is 1,800 gpd as stated in Section 4.2.2.4 of this FEIS. Thus, adequate

water supplies are located near the proposed PFSF.

Groundwater Withdrawal and Characterization of the Aquifer

Comment Summary:

Several commenters addressed the impacts of groundwater withdrawal and the characterization of the

aquifer at the proposed PFSF. (0039, 0047, 0051, 0077, 0089, 0112, 0166, 0215) Some commenters

stated that a drawdown might adversely affect existing water resources and doubted that the aquifer is

capable of yielding 7 gpm capacity. (0039, 0047, 0051, 0077, 0089, 0112, 0166, SL3-54) A few

commenters stated that the DEIS did not address the impacts to groundwater. (GR-11, SL2-13, SL3-

21) One commenter stated that the impact of water withdrawal on the natural environment has not

been determined. (0047) Several commenters addressed specific issues involving aquifer

characterization:

C One commenter stated that, in addition to the requirements of 10 CFR 72.24(d), 72.011 (b) and

72.108, for a site located over an aquifer which is a source of well water, NUREG-1567, Standard

Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities, page 2-10, requires the applicant to survey

groundwater users and well locations, static water levels, well pumping rates, and aquifer

drawdown. Also required in the SAR is a discussion of the future projected amount of water

withdrawals. (Id. page 2-13.) The commenter stated that well water is used as a source of

potable water by users near the vicinity of the proposed site, including Castle Rock, et al., owners

of nine homes along Skull Valley Road, and Ohngo Gaudadeh Deva. The applicant stated that

“[l]ocalized drawdown of the valley aquifer will occur in the vicinity of the wells, the extent of which

cannot be estimated until the wells are drilled.” (The commenter cited SAR at 2.5-5.) The

commenter stated that this statement is inadequate to comply with the regulations as implemented

by NUREG-1567. The commenter stated that the applicant has failed to adequately discuss or

evaluate the effect of its water usage on other well users and on the aquifer. (ER at 4.2-4.) The

applicant implies that it plans to draw water from on-site wells. The commenter said the applicant

should provide an estimate based on an estimated pump rate and local hydrological data. The

commenter also said the applicant failed to discuss water needs, the impact of water usage, and

water rights at the proposed ITF. (0198a)

C Two commenters said that the statement that hydraulic conductivity of the water-bearing zone was

determined from a well test (page 3-12, line 20) conflicts with the statement in the Executive

Summary, page xxxv, line 18, which says “until test wells are drilled and their production capacity

is checked” the impact on local water resources caused by drawdown is “unknown.” The DEIS

described water production only in terms of what is needed, not what the aquifer will support. 

(0039, 0077, 0166)

C One commenter expressed concern that the characterization of the groundwater occurrence,

availability, and potential impacts on page 4-7, line 20 were erroneous and contradictory. The

commenter said that line 32 stated that there is uncertainty associated with the availability of water

while other parts of the DEIS say that the availability of water and the impact on groundwater are

unknown. (0039, 0077) One commenter stated that no reference is given in Section 4.2.1.3,

page 4-7, line 20 for the analysis provided by the applicant that drawdown is not expected to

extend beyond 2.1 km from the pump well. The commenter also stated that the statement, “The

planned groundwater withdrawals for the proposed PFSF would not adversely impact other

groundwater users in Skull Valley during construction and operation or after decommissioning of

the site” (Section 6.3.2, page 6-33), conflicts with Section 9.4.1, page 9-4, where it is stated that

“until test wells are drilled and their production capacity checked, certainty of the impact to

groundwater is unknown.” (0051)
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NUREG-1714 G-212

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding groundwater withdrawal and the

characterization of the aquifer in Skull Valley. The analysis of the impacts to adjacent water supplies

was based on the information available at the time the DEIS was prepared. Locations of groundwater

wells (as registered with the State of Utah) were determined and displayed on a map indicating the

water rights associated with each well (see Figure 3.4 in this FEIS). On-reservation groundwater and

surface water use was shown and discussed in Section 3.2.3 of the DEIS. A local water table map

was not prepared because subsurface investigations encountered the water table at only one location

on the site.

The expected rate of groundwater withdrawal and total project water use was discussed in Sections

2.1.1.2, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2.3, and 4.2.2.4 in the DEIS and updated in the FEIS as appropriate. 

Because of the uncertainties in the analysis of impacts to adjacent water wells, the NRC staff and the

Cooperating Agencies propose that the applicant be required to implement a monitoring program to

identify any potential adverse effect to nearby wells and to take appropriate corrective actions. 

Condition 5B in Section 9.4.2 in the FEIS describes the proposed requirement. If the tests show that

groundwater capacity is insufficient or the quality of water is unacceptable, the applicant would obtain

water from sources off-site but still on the Reservation. It should be noted that determination of the

adequacy of on-site or nearby aquifer characteristics is not a prerequisite to NRC approval of the

PFSF, since the applicant can rely on off-site water sources.

In response to the comment that the DEIS treated the subject of well testing inconsistently, the staff

has revised the Water Resources section of the executive summary of the FEIS to state that although

some limited well testing has been conducted, the Cooperating Agencies propose that PFS be

required to implement a monitoring program to determine the impacts of withdrawing groundwater as

set forth above. Further, the text was revised to reflect the fact that the impact on local water

resources caused by drawdown is “uncertain” instead of “unknown,” and that the staff used a large

and reasonable radius of influence (assuming adequate supply) to evaluate impacts on local water

resources.

In response to the comment about the reference for a drawdown analysis discussed in Section 4.2.1.3

of the DEIS. The analysis applicable to the comment was documented in a calculation performed by

PFS [Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) 1999 Calc. No. 0599602-G(B) 15, Rev. 0,

Determination of Aquifer Permeability from Constant Head Test and Estimation of Radius of Influence

for the Proposed Water Well], and a reference to this calculation has been added to the EIS.

Drawdown of Aquifer

Comment Summary:

C One commenter said that the DEIS did not evaluate the effect that the drawdown of localized

aquifers has on ephemeral springs and other water resources. This should be addressed in the

FEIS. (0047) 

C One commenter said that the mitigation requirement for using an alternate water source if

neighboring groundwater users are affected by drawdown (Section 4.2.4, “Mitigation Measures,”

page 4-13, line 26) is inadequate, because it does not provide for a quantitative analysis of aquifer

characteristics. (0051) Another commenter stated that the DEIS should provide clarification as to

whether monitoring of groundwater is voluntary, as suggested by page 4-13, lines 33-36 of the

DEIS, or mandatory under Federal and State statutes and regulations. (0096) 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-213 NUREG-1714

Response:

As described in Section 3.2.2 of the DEIS, the water table at the site occurs at an elevation of

approximately 1326 m above sea level. The nearest spring at an equivalent or lower ground surface

elevation noted on the Skull Valley topographic map is approximately 10 miles to the north, and the

Horseshoe Springs are 14.5 miles north of the site. The source of water for these springs has not

been documented, however the presence of the springs along the outcrop of the Springline Fault

suggests up welling of groundwater recharged from the Stansbury Mountains or from the alluvial fans. 

These springs are well beyond the influence of pumping from any new on-site well. As discussed in

Section 9.4.2 of the FEIS, based on the environmental review, the NRC and the Cooperating

Agencies have proposed that a number of mitigation measures be required of the applicant to reduce

the impacts associated with the proposed action. One of the measures (see Condition 5B) states that

prior to initiating construction, the applicant shall develop a monitoring program to allow a

determination as to whether the wells nearest the proposed PFSF are adversely impacted from

groundwater withdrawal associated with the construction and operation of the proposed PFSF.

Alternate Groundwater Sources

Comment Summary:

C One commenter said the DEIS does not specify where water will be obtained if new wells are not

sufficiently productive. (0039, 0077) Two commenters expressed concern about where water

trucks would be travelling from to reach the proposed PFSF. (0077, SL3-46)

Response:

If the tests show that the quantity or quality of the groundwater obtained from the new wells is

unacceptable, the water would be supplied from off-site private sources. The agreement between the

applicant and specific private vendors is beyond the scope of this EIS.

Impact of Precipitation Interception on Groundwater Recharge

Comment Summary:

C One commenter expressed concern over the effect of large impermeable surfaces on groundwater

recharge. (0215)

Response:

The NRC staff disagrees with the comment that impermeable surfaces would preclude groundwater

recharge. Precipitation that accumulates on impermeable sources would become runoff and collect in

the detention basin. Water in the detention basin would either infiltrate into the ground or accumulate

in the detention basin. Freestanding water in the detention basin would be pumped to the north of the

proposed storage pads. This would allow the water to flow in the same pathways that would exist if

the proposed PFSF detention basin were never constructed.

G.3.10.5 Flooding

G.3.10.5.1 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)

Comment Summary:

Three commenters specifically indicated that the analysis and documentation of the PMF was

inadequate. (0051, 0089, 0198h) The comments included:
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-214

C The applicant’s license application fails to estimate the PMF as required by 10 CFR 72.98. 

Design structures important to safety are inadequate to address the PMF. (0198a)

C The PMF analysis was not available in the SER so it cannot be verified. (0051)

C One commenter stated that the drainage area is closer to 240 square miles, not the 26 square

miles that was used to compute the PMF for the portion of the area that cuts across the access

road east of the proposed PFSF. Wetter-than-average conditions which would occur during a

PMF event would fill the large depressions south of the access road and water running off from

the southern end of Skull Valley would only drain through the depression near the northeast

corner of the area, causing flooding. (0198a, 0198h)

C From the information available in the SAR and ER, the following questions arise: Why was the

PMF generated for drainage basin “A” based on a general, low-intensity cyclonical storm? Were

“worst case” trajectories for storm movements in both basins modeled in order to maximize the

combined “time of concentration” at the facility location? What are the watershed eccentricities for

both basins, respectively? Since snowmelt from the Stansbury Mountains may constitute an

important contribution to the PMF, have optimum snow cover and maximum melting rates been 

considered? Was the PMF, as calculated at the proposed facility, based on combined routing of

drainage basins “A” and “B” PMFs by the ACE Hydraulic Engineering Center’s River Analysis

System (HEC-RAS) software, or on the larger PMF for drainage basin “B” (102,000 cubic ft per

second) only?” (0051)

C One commenter stated that the data, the method of analysis, the assumptions, and the

quantitative results of the analysis as it relates to the effects of the PMF on the proposed PFSF

should be documented in Section 4.2.2.2. (0089)

Response: 

Section 2.1.1.2 in the FEIS references the SER analysis regarding the PMF. The NRC staff evaluated

the PMF, and, as set forth in the SER, the staff concluded that the design for the proposed PFSF

satisfied all requirements for a PMF, including 10 CFR 72.98. Specific details regarding the design

and construction of the earthen diversion berms to be built around the uphill sides of the storage area

are given in the applicant’s SAR and the NRC’s SER. There is no need to provide PMF analysis

details in the EIS because these details involve safety issues that do not directly affect the

environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, and are beyond the scope of the EIS. A general

description of the flooding impact analysis is summarized in Section 4.2.2.2 of the FEIS.

The comment about the drainage areas, in square miles, appears to be directed at an early version of

the applicant’s license submittal. In subsequent submittals, the basins were divided into drainage

basin “A” of 270 square miles and drainage basin “B” of 64 square miles. The PMF analysis was later

performed using the wetter-than-average conditions, as well as many other conservative assumptions

that significantly affected the resulting peak flood discharge computations.

In response to the comment regarding modeling assumptions, the NRC staff analyzed drainage basin

“A” for both the general, low-intensity storm and the high-intensity thunderstorm. The large basin size,

in conjunction with the length of concentration, yielded a larger PMF (most conservative flood peak

discharge) with the general storm. The general storm yielded the worst case flood hydrograph. The

NRC staff generated the PMF hydrograph using the specific hydrologic parameters of the proposed

site and waste management system and HEC-1. The NRC staff evaluated the watershed using

several “times of concentration.” The PMF peak discharges reported in the SER are based on the

most conservative time of concentration. The effect of the direction or “trajectory” of the storm was not

considered, because the NRC staff considered storm trajectory impacts for an extended low-intensity

general storm minimal, if not negligible. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-215 NUREG-1714

Snowmelt was not integrated into the PMF analysis. Based upon the regional and seasonal

precipitation patterns, the probability of a “major” snow pack and a PMF occurring simultaneously is

low. The analysis assumptions were found to be consistent with NRC guidance.

The PMFs for each basin were computed independently. The worst case storm for drainage basin “A”

is a general storm while the worst case storm for drainage basin “B” is a thunderstorm. The

characteristics of the two basins are considerably different as exemplified by the tributary areas, basin

slopes, basin shapes, relief, and times of concentration. Combining the two “worst case” peak

discharges provides the highest water surface elevation (most conservative) for structure design. A

comprehensive watershed analysis (drainage basins “A” and “B” combined) was not performed

because the flow of the two basins does not join until downstream of the proposed site and the times

of concentration vary significantly.

The DEIS acknowledges, in Section 4.2.2.2 that a PMF could result in the development of a drainage

swale through natural flow and erosion processes upslope of the berm outside of the proposed PFSF. 

The applicant’s proposed design includes flow routing and energy dissipating features in the design of

the flood diversion berm that would mitigate this potential impact.

G.3.10.5.2 100-Year Flood Analysis

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated the 100-year flood event was inadequately characterized in the DEIS, and that

the applicant’s initial screening form (page F-5 of the DEIS, Exhibit F.3) cites the DOE as a resource

for flooding analysis. The appropriate implementing agency, not the DOE, must evaluate flooding. 

(0039, 0077)

Another commenter expressed concerns about drainage features being designed for the 100-year

storm event and not for the PMF because the earthen berms will not protect the proposed PFSF from

flooding during a PMF and the proposed PFSF will be isolated. The commenter indicated that

supporting documentation is needed to support the statement on DEIS page xxxv, line 24 that

downstream flooding potential will not increase because of the presence of the proposed PFSF. 

(0051)

After reviewing the drainage characteristics for drainage basin “B” (Section 2.1.1.2, “Facility

Description,” page 2-9, lines 24 and 46 and Section 4.2.1.1, “Surface Water,” page 4-5, line 26), one

commenter stated that the western flood protection berm should be extended to the north, and that a

“funnel and gate” system should be provided at the northern end of the berm for any diverted water to

enter the northern drainage basin. The commenter asked if any unsaturated zone modeling had been

conducted (based on site-specific data) to assess soil infiltration rates and the soil’s water-retention

characteristics. The commenter said that Section 4.2.2.4, “Groundwater,” page 4-12, line 34 of the

DEIS, which said that soil characteristics have a relatively low infiltration capacity, is not supported by

a quantitative analysis. The commenter said that an infiltration model needs to show that pooling of

surface water would not adversely affect operation of the proposed PFSF. (0051)

The same commenter questioned the rationale for designing the detention basin and associated

drainage features for the 100-year storm event. The commenter expressed concern that the 100-year

storm event is likely to be met or exceeded 2.33 times, or once in about 43 years. The commenter

questioned why a single design is considered adequate for economic analysis regarding flood

mitigation and storm drainage at the proposed PFSF, especially in light of the statement on page 2-23,

line 8 that the applicant intends to store SNF at the proposed PFSF for up to 40 years. (0051)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-216

Response:

Appendix F displays copies of the information sheets available to the applicant in 1996 when the

applicant was trying to select a location for the proposed PFSF. The information in Appendix F was

neither developed for nor used as input to the analyses contained in this FEIS. The analyses

conducted for the SER fully characterized the potential for flooding at the proposed site and has

determined the proposed flood protection designs to be adequate and appropriate.

As shown in Figure 2.2 and described in Sections 2.1.1.2 and 4.2.2.2, the proposed PFSF will be

designed to divert surface water runoff and flood waters during a maximum credible flooding event, or

PMF. This is a flood of greater severity than the 100-year flood.

Regarding flood protection, the commenters incorrectly juxtaposed two design features of the

proposed PFSF (see Section 2.1.1.2). The proposed PFSF itself would be protected on the south and

west sides by earthen flood protection berms designed to withstand the PMF. The other on-site

drainage features (e.g., the detention basin) would be designed to accommodate waters from the 100-

year storm event, and not the PMF as suggested in the comment. The earthern berms would

adequately protect the proposed PFSF from the PMF and would ensure that floodwaters would not

rise above the level of the storage pads and therefore not affect operation of the proposed PFSF. 

However, even if the proposed PFSF were to become isolated as noted in the comment, the safety of

the SNF in storage casks would not be jeopardized by such a temporary event.

A discussion of potential downstream flooding effects is presented in Section 4.2.2.1 of the DEIS. The

analysis indicates that because the area of the proposed PFSF is only 0.02 percent of the total

watershed area, even without collection of the runoff in the detention basin (which would be designed

with capacity for a 100-year storm) there would be at most a 0.02 percent increase in downstream

water volume, which the NRC staff concluded is an insignificant incremental difference.

In reference to the comment that infiltration rates and the water-retention characteristics of the soil

may contribute to the pooling of floodwaters, the flood analysis in the SER, using the most

conservative approach, assumed no infiltration. The analysis determined that the highest elevation of

standing water from the maximum flood conditions would not reach the storage pads and would not

adversely affect operation of the proposed PFSF.

G.3.10.5.3 Flood Potential and Control

Comment Summary:

Several commenters addressed the potential for flooding and its control. (0039, 0047, 0051, 0077,

0198i, 0215) Two commenters stated the EIS must better address the flood potential and method for

managing any floods from the greater watershed along the proposed rail route, storage sites, and the

proposed ITF. (0198i, 0215) Commenters provided the following specific comments:

C Any flood control impoundments may require plan approval by the State Engineer. (0198i)

C Flooding, including debris flows, debris floods, and stream floods, is not an extremely rare event in

the Skull Valley area. It could pose hazards to operation of the rail spur. In the early 1980s,

debris flows moved down from the piedmont of the Stansbury Mountains and crossed Skull Valley

Road near Iosepa. (0051, 0198i)

C Under “unusually high” precipitation, Skull Valley Road is not safe or suited in its current condition

to support the reportedly proposed 172 percent increase in the road’s use and certainly not the

transportation proposed under Alternative 1 or the proposed ITF/Alternative 3. The commenter

cites page 3-11, line 13 of the DEIS which stated that trucks have overturned on water-softened

asphalt roads in Skull Valley. (0039, 0077)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-217 NUREG-1714

C The proposed site was once inundated by ancient Lake Bonneville (Section 3.2, page 3-6, line

40). One commenter stated that Lake Bonneville could flood Skull Valley, thereby potentially

flooding sections of the main Union Pacific railroad. This possibility should be discussed in detail,

and mitigating measures ought to be considered. (0051)

C The half life of SNF is 10,000 years and flooding could potentially occur within this time in the area

where SNF will be stored. (0047)

C One commenter stated a number of consequences may occur because of flooding or an

inadequate berm construction and location. The access road may be flooded or washed out,

preventing necessary operations personnel or emergency service providers access to the site. 

The applicant would not be able to cope with emergencies as required by 10 CFR 72.24(k). If the

flooding is not prevented, translation motion of the storage pad and building foundations could

occur, resulting in structural damage, or failure. Therefore, the applicant would not meet the

requirement of 10 CFR 72.24(d)(2) that structures, systems and components provide for the

prevention and mitigation of accidents caused by natural phenomena. Flooding of the proposed

PFSF would also transport on-site chemical and radiological contaminants to off-site soils and

ground and surface waters, thus violating 10 CFR 72.24(l). (0198a)

Response:

State authorities, regulators, and permits are discussed in Section 1.6 of this FEIS. As described in

Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS, the flood protection berms would provide flood control for the proposed

PFSF, but they do not include any flood control impoundments. Potential flooding of the proposed ITF

is addressed in G.3.10.5.4.

The rail line would be approximately 4.5 ft above the surrounding terrain and would be subject to

permit approval from ACE for drainage culverts. Embankment dressing would also ensure the proper

drainage of the railbed. The applicant would construct a detention basin on the north side of the

proposed PFSF as described in Section 2.1.1.2.

Regarding washouts on the proposed rail line, the NRC staff who prepared this FEIS agree that the

types of hazards described in the comment could occur (see Section 5.2.2.2 in this FEIS). Washouts

or other damage to the proposed rail line could interrupt the shipment of SNF to the proposed PFSF

and would require repair. Because shipments could be safely delayed until repairs are completed, the

NRC staff concluded that flood or debris damage would not pose a hazard to the SNF inside the

shipping casks.

The comment referring to Skull Valley Road’s condition is noted. The applicant has stated that the

heavy-haul trucks would be designed such that improvements to Skull Valley Road would not be

necessary. A heavy-haul permit from the State of Utah would be required, however, and any unsafe

operating conditions would be identified and corrected prior to road use.

As discussed previously, the applicant has modeled the PMF for the proposed site, and has proposed

design features to account for flood events. Details of the applicant’s analysis can be found in the

SER. 

The EIS, in Section 3.2.1.1 acknowledges that during the Late Pleistocene Epoch the Skull Valley was

inundated by Lake Bonneville. Modern-day flooding events are noted in Section 3.2.1.2. While floods

could certainly occur during a 10,000-year time period, the proposed PFSF is not a permanent

repository. The proposed PFSF is located at an elevation of about 1,360 m above sea level (about

4,470 ft), while the recent (in 1986) maximum level of Great Salt Lake was 1,284 m (about 4,220 ft). A

major climate change in North America would be required to cause Great Salt Lake to rise 76 m (250

ft) and the process would take centuries to occur. Because the proposed PFSF is a temporary
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-218

storage facility, the NRC staff concluded that the type of flooding described in the comment is not a

credible event during the limited lifetime of the proposed PFSF.

Comments concerning the potential for flood events to prevent emergency access, cause structural

damage, and transport contaminants are considered to be unreasonable scenarios. The NRC staff

has reviewed the flood analysis and relevant proposed engineering designs and found them

acceptable. Details of this analysis can be found in the SER.

G.3.10.5.4 Flooding Impacts on the ITF

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the impact of flooding, inundating, or swamping on the proposed ITF

needs to be considered. The rise in the elevation of the Great Salt Lake has resulted in extensive

flooding events in the recent past. The elevation of the rail tracks at Rowley Junction is just 3-8 ft.

higher than the Great Salt Lake’s historic high in 1986, 4211.85 ft. During that time, rail tracks near

the Lake were lost. This failure to identify the significance of potential flooding events to the rail route

paralleling the Great Salt Lake and to the ITF violates 10 CFR 72.92. (0198a, 0198b)

One commenter stated that Section 3.2, page 3-6, line 40 fails to mention that the northern end of

Skull Valley was inundated around A.D. 1700 (prehistoric high, elevation 4117 ft above mean sea

level). This scenario needs to be discussed in more detail and mitigating measures need to be

considered. (0051)

Response: 

The potential environmental impacts from flooding at the location of the proposed ITF near Timpie was

addressed in Section 5.2.1.2 of the DEIS. The proposed site is above the floodplain as defined by the

Utah Department of Natural Resources. The NRC staff concluded that the site has little or no flooding

potential. Stormwater would be controlled under a general permit from the State of Utah. The

proposed ITF would not be subject to regulation under 10 CFR Part 72.

G.3.10.5.5 Impact of Flood Control Measures

Comment Summary:

One commenter indicated that the applicant stated that earthen berms, which serve to divert flooding,

will “have little effect on the natural surface hydrology.” (The commenter references the applicant’s

ER at 4.2-5.) However, the applicant fails to justify its conclusion that a concentration of flood water

around the facility would not affect surface water or groundwater. The same commenter indicated that

the earthen berms are under-designed and do not comply with 10 CFR 72.24(d)(2). The proposed

PSPF is not appropriately protected from flooding. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff has determined that the proposed berm design is adequate to protect the proposed

PFSF, even though the access road may be flooded by a PMF event (see Section 4.2.2.2 of this

FEIS). The proposed berms would protect the SNF storage pads from a PMF such that the

floodwaters would not rise above the level of the pads; hence, the types of foundation instability and/or

transport of contaminants, as described in the comment, would not occur. The NRC staff addressed

adequacy of the proposed berm design and the analysis of potential flooding at the proposed PFSF in

the SER.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-219 NUREG-1714

G.3.10.6 Mitigation Measures

G.3.10.6.1 Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan

Comment Summary:

Two commenters addressed the need for an SPCC plan. One commenter stated that an SPCC plan

for the transportation facilities and the proposed PFSF is missing and should be incorporated into

Table 2.7. (0051) The other commenter noted that there is no requirement that the applicant develop

an SPCC plan for the rail line (page 9-12, lines 32-34), because it does not involve a stationary facility. 

The applicant will develop an SPCC plan for the proposed ITF if the threshold requirement specified in

40 CFR Part 112 is exceeded. (0163) 

Response:

In the DEIS, the NRC staff indicated that an SPCC plan would be needed. Since issuance of the

DEIS, PFS determined the EPA regulations do not require an SPCC because there is no reasonable

expectation, even in the absence of any oil containment or control equipment, that a discharge of oil

from the proposed PFSF would reach waters of the United States. In its ER, PFS committed to

developing a Best Management Practices Plan that would include a spill response procedure for

appropriately responding to a spill of oil or fuel at the proposed PFSF or related transportation

facilities. This procedure would address spills on site, at the rail siding, or along the rail line. To

ensure that construction and operational activities will not lead to contamination of groundwater, the

Cooperating Agencies have proposed that PFS be required to implement this BMP, and be required to

be responsible for clean up of spills or accidents at the rail siding and along the rail line in

conformance with applicable standards. See Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS.

G.3.10.6.2 Groundwater Monitoring Program

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the proposed PFSF should not be approved until an adequate water

supply has been established. Before the FEIS is issued the commenter added that, a full-scale well

should be drilled to verify that water requirements from on-site wells can be met without adversely

lowering the groundwater table or altering groundwater quality. The commenter also stated that

construction should not be initiated until the well water is verified, especially since the test well drilled

at the proposed site (boring CTB-5) apparently did not yield more than 1.2 gpm. (SAR, page 2.6-29)

(0051)

Another commenter stated that the statement regarding monitoring programs on page 2-28, lines 5-7

of the DEIS is inaccurate because water could become radioactively contaminated. (0096)

Response: 

In the event that the water quantity or quality from the proposed on-site wells proves to be inadequate,

Section 2.1.1.2 in this FEIS describes how water could be purchased from a local commercial vendor. 

Therefore, the applicant would not need to rely on any on-site water sources, which is consistent with

minimizing site and local impacts. It should be noted that determination of the adequacy of on-site or

nearby aquifer characteristics is not a prerequisite to NRC approval of the PFSF, since the applicant

can rely on off-site water sources. Moreover, adverse impacts to groundwater near the proposed site

in Skull Valley are not likely to occur because of the mitigation actions proposed to be required. The

mitigation measures described in Section 9.4.2 in this FEIS (see Condition 5B) will require

measurement of the same type of well parameters that could be obtained by a full-scale test well prior

to construction as suggested in the comments.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-220

Section 4.2.2 of the FEIS discusses the potential impacts during operations at the proposed site. The

NRC staff concluded that the SNF containment system that would be used at the proposed PFSF is a

zero radiation release system, and there would be no release of radioactive material or radioactive

discharge to the detention basin or groundwater.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-221 NUREG-1714

G.3.11 Air Quality

G.3.11.1 Air Quality Impacts

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that construction, operation, and maintenance of the proposed PFSF will

cause degradation of air quality, and such impacts are inadequately discussed in the applicant’s ER. 

(0198a)

Another commenter stated that the environmental impacts and the amount of air pollution generated

by the proposed PFSF would be minimal because there is nothing released to the air. (SL2-10) 

Response: 

As described in the DEIS, the NRC staff concluded that the proposed project’s impact to air quality

would be small to moderate. The primary impact to air quality would be dust emissions from the

construction activities at the proposed PFSF and the related transportation facilities. Construction

activities could produce some localized impacts on air quality due to fugitive dust emissions. 

However, dust emissions during construction would be minimized by mechanical dust control

measures, such as surface wetting. These controls would be used during the construction of both the

proposed PFSF and the transportation facilities and would be applied specifically to earth moving

activities, the concrete batching facility, material transfer points and stockpiles, and temporary or

permanent flood protection berms. During operation, air quality would only be affected by pollutants

from the burning of fossil fuels used to power the locomotives and the diesel engine for an emergency

generator, and to provide heat for the buildings. Additional information on air quality impacts is

provided in Sections 3.3.2, 4.3, and 5.3 of this FEIS.

G.3.11.2 Permits and Requirements

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that because construction will include an on-site asphalt batch plant to

construct storage pads, cask shielding, and concrete building(s) (as stated in the ER at 3.2-2), the

proposed PFSF is subject to regulation under Section 111 of the CAA and may require a PSD permit. 

Specifically, the commenter stated that the batch plant is subject to Section 111 of the CAA, and to 40

CFR Part 60, Subpart I (New Source Performance Standards for Hot Mix Asphalt Facilities). The

commenter added that the proposed PFSF would be considered a major stationary source of air

pollution required to obtain a PSD permit, under 40 CFR 52.21(b)(1)(i)(b), 52.21(c)(iii)(aa), and 40

CFR 60.90.

The commenter also stated that if the proposed PFSF is required to obtain a PSD permit, it will also

be required to obtain a Title V permit. The commenter stated that the applicant must be required to

complete a more rigorous analysis of the air quality impacts associated with the proposed PFSF. 

(0198a)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment but clarifies that the proposed PFSF, as described in

Section 2.1.1.2, would include a concrete batch plant, not an asphalt batch plant. The portion of this

comment related to permitting is addressed in Section G.3.3.1.9.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-222

G.3.11.3 Fugitive Dust

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the proposed construction activities for the ITF and the proposed PFSF

and the rail line from Skunk Ridge (near Low, Utah) will require controlling fugitive dust. The

commenter also stated that the applicant should comply as appropriate with the control of fugitive dust

requirements in the Utah Administrative Code R307-205-3 and 4. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that the proposed construction activities will require the control of fugitive dust,

as is discussed in Sections 4.3, (for the proposed PFSF) and 5.3, (for the rail line and ITF site) of this

FEIS. Sections 4.3.4 and 5.3.4 prescribe mitigation measures that could reduce the amounts of

fugitive dust generated. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies with licensing and/or approval

authority for this project will require the applicant to develop a dust control program (see Condition 4 of

Section 9.4.2, “Mitigation Measures,” in this FEIS). The NRC staff notes the regulatory information

offered by the commenter. The NRC and Cooperating Agencies conclude that the required mitigation

is sufficient to reduce fugitive dust impacts to small or temporarily moderate levels as indicated in the

EIS. 

G.3.11.4 Other Emissions

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the EIS should provide a better assessment of air quality impacts from the

construction and operation activities at the proposed ITF, along the transportation route, and at the

proposed PFSF than provided by the applicant’s ER. The commenter stated that Sections 4.3.3 and

4.8-2 of the ER provided an inadequate analysis of air quality modeling techniques. The commenter

further stated that the applicant failed to adequately analyze whether it will be in compliance with the

NAAQS, whether it will be subject to regulation under Section III of the CAA, and whether it is a major

stationary source of air pollution requiring a PSD permit. The commenter added that the applicant

may need an Operating Permit in accordance with Title V of the CAA and also a State air quality

approval order. The commenter asserted that the EIS must address and show how the applicant will

achieve compliance with these permitting requirements. (0198h)

The same commenter stated that the applicant’s air quality analysis did not satisfy the requirements of

10 CFR 51.45. The commenter said that the applicant’s statement, in Section 9.1-4 of the ER, that

there are “no air emission sources, including the emergency diesel generator, large enough to require

a CAA, Title V permit,” falls short of an adequate air quality analysis to satisfy the CAA or NEPA. The

commenter also stated that the analysis of air quality impacts in Section 4.3.3 of the ER is totally

inadequate. (0198a)

The commenter assumed that the applicant used EPA’s SCREEN3 model to perform its air quality

dispersion modeling analysis, which the commenter stated is “inappropriate because it dilutes the

impact of the project by spreading the emission releases over areas where the releases will not occur

and during hours of the day when construction operations will not take place.” The commenter stated

that the effects of terrain limit the directional flow of air, thus, the persistency factor used in converting

one-hour SCREEN3 modeled concentrations into 24-hour concentrations underestimates the source’s

impact. The commenter recommended that the applicant complete a more refined dispersion analysis

and describe the source of input information and assumptions – such as monitored hourly

meteorological data sets (wind speed, direction, stability class, temperature, and mixing height),

source data, background concentrations, and other contributing industrial sources – to show that there

will be no potential violation of NAAQS or significant air quality impacts off the Reservation. (0198a)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-223 NUREG-1714

One commenter stated that construction-related dust is the only form of air pollution addressed in the

DEIS. The commenter stated that the FEIS should also address emissions for rubber, sulfur dioxide

(SO2), and other pollutants generated by project-related traffic. (SL3-46)

Another commenter expressed concern that contamination from the incinerator’s toxic emissions will

eventually end up in the water and accumulate in the food supply. (SL2-14)

Response: 

With respect to the comment that the applicant has failed to adequately analyze whether it will be in

compliance with NAAQS, analysis of compliance with NAAQS is included in Sections 4.3 and 5.3 of

this FEIS. Vehicular emissions of SO2 come mostly from diesel vehicles, which use fuel containing

more than a trace amount of sulfur. Such emissions have not produced measured ambient-air

concentrations of SO2 in excess of 25 percent of a NAAQS during the last three years in the area

around and including Salt Lake City, as is evident from monitoring data available to the public on the

EPA web site (www.epa.gov/airsdata). Therefore, it would be expected that additional diesel vehicles

in Skull Valley would not increase SO2 regional concentrations by appreciable amounts. With respect

to the comment that an air quality analysis adequate to satisfy the CAA and NEPA is not provided by

the applicant’s submittal, the FEIS presents an analysis of the air quality environmental impacts, and

the NRC staff has determined that they would be small to moderate. Regulatory issues, such as

requirements for permits, are addressed in Section 1.6 of the FEIS and Section G.3.3.

With respect to the use of the SCREEN3 atmospheric dispersion model, it was not used for the

analysis in this FEIS. The EPA-recommended Industrial Source Complex Short-Term (ISCST3) air

dispersion model was used.

With respect to the comment that “the effects of terrain limit the directional flow of air,” the terrain in

the area around the proposed PFSF appears to be flat. Larger scale topographic features, such as

the surrounding mountains and the general slope of the valley floor, influence, but do not limit, the flow

of air on a much larger spatial scale. It is not clear how this is relevant to the spatial scales applicable

to the dispersion modeling.

With respect to the comment that a more rigorous analysis is required, the NRC performed such an

analysis (e.g., incorporating hourly meteorological data) for this FEIS. The analysis included hourly

meteorological data for eight years at the Salt Lake City International Airport, and for two additional

years of available (hourly) data from a location a few miles southeast of the proposed site and in a

similar topographic setting. Background concentrations are found in Table 3.3, “Summary of Air

Quality for the Skull Valley Area for 1995-1999" of this FEIS. Moreover, other contributing sources in

the region were included in the analysis. For additional information on impacts to air quality, see

Sections 4.3 and 5.3, of this FEIS.

With respect to the comment that construction-related dust is the only form of air pollution addressed

in the DEIS, other pollutants are discussed. However, fugitive dust from site construction would be

the greatest source of airborne particulate matter. Very fine particulate matter from tire rubber, brake

linings, etc. is a byproduct of traffic. However, in a remote location like Skull Valley, which includes no

large traffic-congestion areas, such traffic-related emissions would be small.

With respect to the comment about potential toxic emissions from an incinerator, the proposed PFSF

will not include an incinerator and no incineration of toxic waste is proposed by the applicant.

Comments regarding air quality and permitting of air emissions are also addressed in Section

G.3.3.1.9 of this FEIS.
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December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-225 NUREG-1714

G.3.12 Ecological Resources

G.3.12.1 General Comments

G.3.12.1.1 Species and Ecosystems

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant has not estimated potential impacts to ecosystems and

“important species.” The commenter stated that in the ER the applicant discussed, to a limited extent,

the anticipated short-term impacts on mammals, raptors, snakes, fish, and a few plant species that

may be found within the vicinity of the proposed site, Skull Valley Road, or the proposed ITF. The

commenter stated that the applicant did not discuss and acknowledge the importance of the variety of

species found in the Skull Valley ecological system, including aquatic organisms, or the collective

impact of the proposed action on the ecological system as a whole. The commenter stated that the

applicant did not discuss the impact of additional traffic, fugitive dust, radiation, and other pollutants on

various species. The commenter stated that the applicant failed to assess the individual and collective

impacts on each species, especially since the impacts on wetland species, aquatic organisms, plants,

fish, and birds are vastly different. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment is based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS provided updated information and other

licensing information from that same time period. Sections 3.4, 4.4, 5.4, and 9.4.2 of the DEIS

addressed the issues mentioned in this comment.

Section 3.4 of this FEIS describes the ecological resources of Skull Valley near the proposed and

alternative sites for the proposed PFSF, the potential transportation corridors, and the proposed ITF

near Timpie. This section includes descriptions of species that may be individually or cumulatively

affected by the proposed action or alternatives. Section 3.4 emphasizes plant and animal species,

biodiversity, and species and ecosystems of special concern to the FWS, the BLM, and the UDWR.

The potential impacts of site preparation, construction, and operation of the proposed PFSF on

ecological resources are evaluated and discussed in Section 4.4 of this FEIS. Since the existing

drainages near the proposed site are ephemeral and support no permanent aquatic communities,

construction activities would have negligible direct and indirect impacts on aquatic biota, and thus,

they are not considered in Section 4.4. The potential impacts on ecological resources of site

preparation, construction, and operation of facilities for transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF are

evaluated and discussed in Section 5.4 of this FEIS. Mitigation measures to limit impacts during

construction, operation, and transportation are identified in Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS. The impacts of

decommissioning the proposed PFSF are discussed in Section 4.9.4 of this FEIS. 

Several surveys have been conducted since the initial version of the ER was prepared (e.g., as

referenced in Chapter 12 of this FEIS: Kass 1998a, 1998b; Stone and Webster 1998). Sections 4.4

and 5.4 of this FEIS discuss the predicted ecological impacts of the proposal and include mitigation

measures to reduce or avoid impacts. To provide current data on which to design monitoring

programs, additional surveys would be conducted prior to initiating construction. 

The NRC staff concluded that the FEIS adequately assesses and presents the potential impacts of the

proposed PFSF on important species and ecosystems.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-226

G.3.12.1.2 Habitats

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant must identify the potential impacts to the following

geographical areas and associated species:

C Horseshoe Springs Wildlife Management Area (“Horseshoe Springs”). The commenter stated that

Horseshoe Springs is located approximately 9.5 miles south of Timpie Junction (Rowley Junction)

and approximately 1,100 feet west of Skull Valley Road, according to the ER 4.3-3. The BLM has

designated Horseshoe Springs a wetland/riparian area and restricts disturbing activities, including

new road construction or new right-of-ways, within 1,200 feet. (0198a)

C Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area. The commenter stated that the proposed ITF is

located within the Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area. (0198a)

C Great Salt Lake. The commenter stated that the applicant failed to assess the impact on the

Great Salt Lake and its dependent species. The Great Salt Lake is just north of Timpie Springs

Waterfowl Management Area, near the proposed ITF. In addition, the Great Salt Lake is only 21.7

miles northeast of the proposed site and the likely eastern transportation routes will closely follow

the southern and eastern shorelines of the Great Salt Lake. According to Utah Administrative

Code (R317-2-6-6 [Standards of Quality for Waters of the State]), the Great Salt Lake is a unique

body of water that has no outlet and is, therefore, a sensitive ecosystem. The greater Great Salt

Lake Wetland Ecosystem supports 75 percent of Utah’s vital wetlands. In addition, the Great Salt

Lake is a western hemisphere shorebird reserve. (0198a)

C Salt Mountain Springs. The commenter stated that Salt Mountain Springs is approximately 300 ft.

west of Skull Valley Road. The commenter stated that the applicant indicated that the speckled

dace, a State-protected indigenous fish, is known to inhabit one of the springs in the area. The

commenter stated the applicant plans to implement sediment and erosion control measures to

prevent any impacts, but does not discuss impacts from other sources (e.g., radiation or other

pollution). The commenter stated that the applicant did not discuss the various species that

depend on the fragile wetland. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS provided updated information on this topic

and addressed the issues mentioned in this comment. This FEIS addresses the issues in Sections

3.4, 4.4, 5.4, and 5.7.

C Horseshoe Springs is described in this FEIS in Section 3.4.2.2. Potential impacts to it and its

species, as presented in DEIS Sections 4.4.1.3, 4.4.2.3, 5.4.1.3, and 5.4.2.3, would be small.

C The proposed ITF would be located near the Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area in a

highly disturbed area with no unique ecological communities, as discussed in Section 3.4.1.1 of

this FEIS. Construction impacts of the proposed ITF near Timpie Springs would be small, as

described in Section 5.4.1 of this FEIS.

C The NRC staff agrees that the Great Salt Lake is important habitat for migratory birds. The lake

supports between two and five million shorebirds and hundreds of thousands of waterfowl during

spring and fall migration (USGS 2000). Because of its importance to migratory birds, the lake was

designated a part of the Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network in 1992. The lake and

its marshes provide a resting and staging area for the birds, and an abundance of brine shrimp

and brine flies that serve as food for them.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-227 NUREG-1714

C The NRC staff added additional information about the Great Salt Lake to Sections 3.4.1.2 and

5.4.2.2 of the FEIS. The NRC staff concluded that the impacts to the Great Salt Lake are small.

C The potential for transportation accidents severe enough to damage a cask and release

radioactive material is discussed in Section 5.7.2, “Radiological Impacts,” of this FEIS. Because

of the consistently conservative assumptions used to analyze those potential impacts, the NRC

staff concluded that annual and cumulative radiological impacts of transporting SNF to the

proposed PFSF are small. Also, the NRC staff concluded in its SER, as updated, that the

proposed PFSF would meet all applicable NRC safety standards during normal, unusual, and

accident conditions (NRC/SER 2000). Therefore, no credible accident would contaminate the

Great Salt Lake or affect its ecosystem either directly or via groundwater contamination. This

information has been added to Section 5.4.2.2 of this FEIS.

C Salt Mountain Springs is part of the Kanaka Lake and Springs complex indicated on Figure 3.8 of

this FEIS. Wetlands in Skull Valley are discussed in Section 3.4.2.2 of the FEIS. The use of the

area by the speckled dace is discussed in Section 3.4.3.2 of the FEIS. Even if the heavy-haul

truck alternative was selected for transporting casks to the proposed PFSF, the NRC staff

concluded there would be no impacts to that species from radiation or other pollution.

G.3.12.1.3 Biological Surveys

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that Section 2.3, pages 1-21, of the applicant’s ER addressed ecological

impacts to the environment by generically describing the "known" species within the vicinity of the

proposed site, while to a very limited extent, identifying some of the species near Skull Valley Road

and the proposed ITF at Rowley Junction. The commenter stated that unless surveys are conducted

and plans are prepared now, it is impossible to determine (1) if the proposed action adversely affects

the ecological system as required by 10 CFR 72.100(b) and 72.108, (2) if prevention or mitigation

plans may be effectively implemented, or (3) if the proposed transportation routes and proposed site

are even feasible, given various ecological impacts. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment is based on the applicant’s ER. Several surveys have been conducted since the initial

version of the ER was prepared (e.g., as referenced in Chapter 12 in this FEIS: Kass 1998a, 1998b;

Stone and Webster 1998). Sections 4.4 and 5.4 of the EIS discuss the predicted ecological impacts of

the proposal, which the NRC staff has determined be small. The FEIS also includes mitigation

measures to further reduce or avoid impacts. To provide current data for designing and implementing

monitoring programs, the NRC staff and Cooperating Agencies propose PFS be required to perform

additional surveys prior to initiating construction (see Condition 2A, FEIS Section 9.4.2).

G.3.12.1.4 Herbicide Use

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters stated that page 4-20, Section 4.4.2.1, of the DEIS indicated that herbicides may be

used to assist in maintaining the restricted-access area free of vegetation. The commenters indicated

that the FEIS should address pesticide use not only in the context of non-target vegetation, but also

with respect to other natural resources, including wildlife and water resources. (0047, 0089) 

Two commenters asserted that the DEIS stated that prior to construction, a plan to control noxious

weeds during construction and operation of the proposed PFSF and related rail facilities would be

developed. The commenters stated that this plan should be included in the EIS and made available to

the public and agencies for evaluation. (0047, 0089)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-228

Response: 

There are no plans to use pesticides for the proposed project. However, herbicides are expected to

be used for the proposed project. As stated in Section 4.4.2.1, the applicant has indicated that any

herbicides used will be applied according to EPA’s regulations and requirements. Thus, the impacts

to wildlife and water resources would be small. To clarify this matter, information has been added to

the FEIS in Sections 4.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.2.

Section 9.4 in the FEIS states that the plan for monitoring and controlling exotic and noxious weeds

during construction and operation of the proposed PFSF would be coordinated with the BIA and the

BLM. The revegetation plan for the rail line would comply with the latest BLM guidelines on

revegetation in effect at that time for details such as soil preparation, type of seed mix, fertilizing, time

of year to plant, and watering frequency. The revegetation plan for the proposed site would comply

with current BIA and Skull Valley Band guidelines for revegetation in effect at the time of

implementation. BLM guidelines such as the Interagency Forage and Conservation Planning Guide

for Utah, EC 438, are publicly available, and if the proposed action is approved, the project-specific

revegetation plans will also be publicly available.

G.3.12.2 Vegetation

G.3.12.2.1 Native Plants and Vegetation

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters expressed concern about the potential effects to the native plants, some rare

plants and other vegetation in the area of construction and operation of the proposed PFSF. (0047,

0050, 0096, SL1-26)

C One commenter, in reviewing page 4-18 of the DEIS, expressed concern specifically about the

impact of non-native species. The commenter stated that there is no analysis of the impacts of

crested wheatgrass, a non-native species, and questioned how protective of the environment it

would be if the crested wheatgrass spreads outside the area where it is planted and competes

with the native vegetation. (0096)

C Two commenters also expressed concern about the culvert system installed for the rail line

increasing wet season flows, increasing erosion, silting in the drainages, and providing a conduit

for the transport of contaminants and noxious or invasive undesirable plant species in those

sensitive areas. (0047, 0089)

Response: 

Various sections of the DEIS contain information on native plants and vegetation. In Section 3.4.1.1,

the DEIS noted that much of Skull Valley has been invaded by a non-native exotic grass species

known as cheatgrass. Specifically, the document stated that "due to numerous large fires (primarily

caused by lightning), cheatgrass has invaded and replaced the natural vegetation in much of Skull

Valley." Section 4.4 of the DEIS discussed impacts of the construction and operation of the proposed

PFSF on vegetation. Also, Section 5.4.1.1, which discussed the impacts of the proposed

transportation alternatives, stated that "no unique habitats would be cleared for either the ITF near

Timpie or the Skunk Ridge rail corridor." For a number of reasons (see Section 4.4.1.2 of this FEIS),

BIA has determined that PFS should revegetate the proposed site with crested wheatgrass, a nonnative species. While revegetation with native species would have a small positive impact on

vegetation, planting a fire barrier with crested wheatgrass would result in replacing one dominant nonnative species (cheatgrass) with another (crested wheatgrass). Planting crested wheatgrass would

have a small impact because it is no more invasive than the cheatgrass currently located in the area,

and crested wheatgrass provides some protection from fire.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-229 NUREG-1714

The proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge (near Low, Utah) may require the installation of 110 culverts

crossing approximately 32 arroyos (see Section 1.6.2.1). The use of BMP’s during construction would

control erosion and siltation during construction. Impacts to surface waters, and the potential for the

culvert to act as a conduit for the transport of sediment and noxious or undesirable plant species,

would be small. The reference by the commenter to “contaminants” is unclear, although particulates

or total suspended/dissolved solids may be considered as contaminants. During operations, the

potential for culverts to act as conduits for contaminants and undesirable species is also considered to

be small because the applicant’s culvert design includes criteria that specify flow velocity thresholds

that require rip-rap to be placed at culvert outlets. It is recognized that streams along the proposed rail

line need to be protected. The new rail line would be designed such that natural drainages would be

preserved. A CWA Section 404 permit from the ACE may be required prior to construction (see

Section 1.6.2.1 of this FEIS). Additionally, maintenance of culverts would be required to ensure they

function at design levels.

G.3.12.2.2 Revegetation

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that clearing and grubbing activities prior to railroad construction will destroy

as much as 776 acres of vegetation. (The commenter references ER Rev. I at 4.4-3.) This vegetation

provides habitat for a variety of wildlife species. The commenter indicated that the applicant claimed it

will be able to revegetate a significant amount (621 acres) of vegetation destroyed during construction,

with a permanent loss of 155 acres of vegetation. However, the commenter stated that the area of

habitat destruction is located in a sensitive, slow growing, xeric environment. Such areas, notoriously

sensitive to environmental impacts, are difficult to restore. The ER is inadequate because it fails to

demonstrate how the applicant plans to carry out revegetation of 621 acres in such a sensitive and

slow growing environment. Any discussion of revegetation efforts must also show where and how the

applicant will obtain access to needed water. (0198c)

Response: 

This comment refers to information in the applicant’s ER. The DEIS addressed the issues mentioned

in this comment. This FEIS addresses these issues in Sections 4.4.5 and 5.4.4.

The NRC staff agrees with the statement that habitat restoration in a xeric environment can be

difficult. After construction is completed, disturbed areas near the proposed PFSF and along the rail

corridor would be revegetated. As discussed in Section 4.4.5.1 of the EIS, native species are

preferred for revegetation and should be used where feasible. However, as noted in that section, the

major concern is to maintain ecologically functioning perennial plant communities. Thus, species used

in revegetation should be selected for ease of establishment, seedling vigor, and persistence in the

community. Also, as discussed in Section 5.4.4 of the EIS, planting a mixture of primarily native

species along the corridor would have a beneficial impact on the local ecosystems and biodiversity.

The applicant and the BIA have consulted and determined that crested wheatgrass would be an

appropriate species to use for revegetation (see Section 4.4.5.1 of the EIS).

The applicant would develop a revegetation plan for the proposed site that considers all these issues

in consultation with the Skull Valley Band and the BIA. The applicant would also develop a plan for

revegetating the rail corridor during construction, in consultation with the BLM. The plans would

include monitoring during the life of the proposed PFSF to ensure successful vegetation

establishment. To date, the BIA and the BLM have not required irrigation for revegetation plans in

similar environments. Sections 4.4.5 and 5.4.4 of the EIS discuss mitigation measures to ensure

successful revegetation.
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NUREG-1714 G-230

G.3.12.3 Wildlife

G.3.12.3.1 Impacts on Habitats

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern that habitats important for wildlife would be affected. (0047,

0089, 0158, 0198, 0198h, 0198i, SL1-15, SL2-14, SL2-16). Commenters provided the following

specific concerns:

C One commenter stated that the applicant failed to adequately assess the potential impacts and

effects from the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF and SNF

transportation on species and specific habitats in the region as required by 10 CFR 72.100(b), 10

CFR 72.108, and NEPA. The commenter said that the applicant has not conducted surveys and

studies to acquire the necessary information to make an adequate assessment. (0198a) The

same commenter stated that certain areas are important wildlife habitats and must be managed in

a way that protects, improves, and maintains critical habitats. (0198i) The commenter also stated

that the nearby Horseshoe Springs (managed as a wildlife use area by the BLM) and Timpie

Springs (managed as a wildlife management area by the UDWR) areas represent important

wetlands for migratory birds and should be protected. The commenter stated that these areas act

as extensions of the much larger Greater Great Salt Lake Wetland Ecosystem. (0198h, 0198i)

C One commenter disagreed with the statement in the DEIS on page xxxiv that the proposed site

would not occupy land with unique habitats or wetlands. (SL1-15) 

C Several commenters expressed concern for wetlands and the Great Salt Lake, which serve as

important refuges and habitats for migratory birds. (0047, 0198, 0198a, 0198i, SL1-15, SL2-14,

SL2-16) Several commenters were concerned that the DEIS did not consider the potential

impacts of the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF on the Great

Salt Lake, especially on the shore and migratory bird populations and wetlands habitat, including

the Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area (Timpie Springs). The commenters were

concerned about potential contamination, particularly from accidents, of important wetlands

habitat or the surface and groundwater that flow to these wetlands. (0158, 0198a, 0198h, SL2-16)

One commenter asserted that the DEIS would have to encompass the entire Western Hemisphere

to capture the proposed PFSF’s effects because the Great Salt Lake is an internationally known

migratory route for thousands of bird species. The commenter said that a disaster would affect

the food chain worldwide. (SL1-15)

C One commenter stated that the BLM must ensure that the rail spur and transportation of high level

nuclear waste are consistent with each of the specific RMPs. Activities that could increase the

use of Skull Valley Road and affect Horseshoe Springs should not be allowed. Otherwise, the

Pony Express RMP, Wildlife and Fisheries Program Decision must be amended. (0198i)

C Two commenters expressed concern that project construction would result in the temporary loss

of 776 acres of habitat and the permanent loss of 155 acres of habitat and that construction of the

rail line would fragment Wildlife Habitat Areas. (0047, 0089) One commenter stated that the

facility poses a threat to habitat of the loggerhead shrike, the burrowing owl, and the Skull Valley

pocket gopher. (0050)

C One commenter expressed concern that proposed on-site drainage to a 3-hectare storm water

collection and detention basin would be mistaken for a wetland habitat or source of water. 

(Section 2.1.1.2, page 2-9) The commenter asked what measures have been taken to ensure this

would not occur. (0089)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-231 NUREG-1714

C One commenter suggested that State and Federal resource agencies be consulted for training of

on-site personnel who are responsible for ensuring construction activities do not disturb sensitive

ecological and cultural resources. The commenter stated that input from State and Federal

resource agencies is critical since migratory birds are expected in the area. (0047)

Response:

Some of the comments regarding important species are based on the applicant’s ER. This FEIS

addresses these issues in Sections 3.4 and 5.

The ecological resources of Skull Valley, in general, and those in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF,

proposed ITF near Timpie, and rail corridor, in particular, are described in Section 3.4 of the FEIS. 

That section describes plant and animal species, biodiversity, and ecosystems of special concern to

the FWS, the BLM, and the UDWR that may be individually or cumulatively affected by the proposed

action or alternatives. The proposed and alternate sites for the proposed PFSF, ITF, and rail corridor

are undeveloped rangeland that is dominated by vegetation common throughout the valley.

Comments on the adequacy of the applicant’s surveys and analysis were based on the applicant’s

ER. Several surveys have been conducted since the initial version of the ER was prepared (e.g.,

Kass 1998a, 1998b; Stone and Webster 1998). The NRC staff reviewed the analysis in the DEIS and

concluded the DEIS adequately addressed the types of deficiencies identified in the comment. 

Specifically, Section 4.4 of this FEIS addresses the potential ecological impacts at the proposed site

on the Reservation, and Section 5.4 addresses the potential impacts of the proposed transportation

facilities. The proposed ITF would be located near the Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area

in a highly disturbed area with no unique ecological communities, as discussed in Section 3.4.1.1 of

the FEIS. There are no credible accidents or operational activities that would affect Timpie Springs. 

Thus, as described in Sections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2 of the FEIS, impacts of the potential ITF on Timpie

Springs would be small. As noted in the mitigation measures that are proposed to be required in

Section 9.4.2 (see Condition 2), additional surveys must be conducted to provide current data on

which to design monitoring programs and to fulfill the conditions of the Federal licenses and approvals

required for this project.

Regarding unique habitats or wetlands on the proposed site, the NRC staff concluded that the

statement in the EIS is correct that the proposed site would not occupy any unique habitats or

wetlands. 

The NRC staff agrees that Great Salt Lake is important habitat for migratory birds. The lake supports

between two and five million shorebirds and hundreds of thousands of waterfowl during the spring and

fall migrations [USGS (http://wwwdutslc.wr.usgs.gov/greatsaltlake/index.html, accessed October 11,

2000)]. Because of its importance to migratory birds, the lake was designated a part of the Western

Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network in 1992. The lake and its marshes provide a resting and

staging area for the birds, as well as an abundance of brine shrimp and brine flies that serve as food.

The NRC staff concluded in its SER, as updated, that the proposed PFSF would meet all Federal

safety standards during normal, unusual, and accident conditions. No credible accident would

contaminate Great Salt Lake or affect its ecosystem either directly or via groundwater contamination. 

Information has been added to Sections 3.4.1.2 and 5.4.2.2 of the FEIS about the Great Salt Lake and

the NRC staff’s conclusions about construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed

PFSF.

Impacts of construction and operation of the proposed rail corridor on natural resources are

summarized in Section 5.4 of this FEIS. These impacts would be small. In addition, Section 5.4.4.2

presents mitigation measures that include curtailing or restricting construction activities during certain

periods of the year. These measures will help to avoid affecting mating, nesting success, or raising

young of sensitive species. The impacts of habitat loss, including habitat loss for those species listed
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-232

in the comments, are discussed in Sections 4.4.1.2 and 5.4.1.2 of the FEIS. Because the amount of

habitat lost would be only a very small part of the total habitat available in Skull Valley, the impact

would be small. 

Since there would be no construction on Skull Valley Road itself, there would be no impact from

construction on Horseshoe Springs and, therefore, no need to revise the Horseshoe Springs HMP. 

The projected increase in traffic on Skull Valley Road is discussed in Sections 4.5.1.6, 4.5.2.6, and

5.5.2.2 of the FEIS, while the potential impacts of that increase on wildlife are considered in Sections

4.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.2. The largest increase in traffic would occur during Phase 1 of construction. 

Roaming animals may need to adjust their movements and migration patterns during that time due to

the increase in traffic in the area. During the operation of the proposed PFSF, because construction

activities for the most part would be completed, minor impacts to wildlife from on-site transportation

would be expected. Because the proposed ITF would be located at the northern end of Skull Valley,

most of the impacts of traffic associated with it would be on Interstate 80 and not Skull Valley Road. 

Sections 5.5.1.2 and 5.5.2.2 of the FEIS discuss the impacts of the ITF on transportation and traffic

with respect to construction and operation, respectively. Overall the impacts of increased road traffic

on wildlife are predicted to be small, and no specific measures to avoid or mitigate them are

necessary. 

Section 1.5.3 of the FEIS discusses the need for the BLM to amend the Transportation and Utility

Corridor Decision 1 of the Pony Express RMP prior to granting a right-of-way for a rail corridor on the

west side of Skull Valley. The amendment would add an exception to the RMP decision to allow the

construction and use of the proposed rail line outside the corridors established in the RMP. As stated

in Section 5.4.1.1 of the FEIS, wildlife in Skull Valley do not exclusively use any portion of the valley,

and there are no clearly defined migration or seasonal use patterns for wildlife in Skull Valley. The

presence of the proposed rail line would not significantly contribute to habitat fragmentation,

segregation, or interruption of habitat connectivity. If the physical presence of the railroad helps to

keep the wild horse herd within the Cedar Mountains Wild Horse Herd Management Area, this would

result in a slight beneficial impact to the wild horses.

No wetlands occur on either the proposed or alternate site for the proposed PFSF. As described in

Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS, standing water is expected to quickly evaporate from the stormwater

detention basin. Therefore, there is no potential for this basin to develop the characteristics of a

wetland. The NRC staff concurs that State (as appropriate) and Federal resource agencies should be

consulted and included in the proposed training. Additional text has been added to Condition 7 of the

proposed mitigation measures (see Section 9.4.2 in this FEIS). 

G.3.12.3.2 Impacts on Wildlife

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the proposed PFSF poses potential impacts to wildlife. (0047, 0050, 

0089, 0198h, 0215) Commenters expressed the following specific concerns: 

C Two commenters expressed concern regarding the increase in daily use of Skull Valley Road,

which is likely to result in an increase in wildlife mortality and disrupt wildlife movement in the

valley. (0047, 0089) 

C One commenter stated that the potential wildlife impacts are underestimated and may also go

undetected under the current proposal without an adequate monitoring plan. The commenter

stated that the effectiveness of the methods needs to be studied for stress, winter impacts,

migration impacts, nesting impacts, radiological impacts, and population surveys. (0215)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-233 NUREG-1714

Several commenters expressed concern about the direct and indirect effects related to the

construction of the rail line. (0047, 0089, 0198a, 0198c, 0198i) Commenters provided the following

specific comments:

C Two commenters stated that the proposed rail line corridor has not yet been surveyed for wildlife

resources, and that a survey should be completed prior to initiating construction and results

included in the FEIS for review. (0047, 0089)

C Several commenters stated that the proposed construction of a new rail line in Skull Valley would

cross undeveloped public lands that comprise the Great Basin Ecosystem and affect wildlife. The

commenters asserted the rail line should not be allowed to disturb these areas that have already

been designated as important wildlife habitat. Several commenters expressed concern that the

rail line will fragment and dramatically decrease wildlife habitat and affect resident and migratory

birds. The commenters stated that the rail line will act as an artificial barrier to the traditional

range of some wildlife, cutting off winter feeding range for wild horses, and disrupting other

established wildlife migration patterns for mule deer and pronghorn antelope. (0047, 0089, 0198i) 

C One commenter expressed concern that some wildlife species would be permanently driven out of

the area, either because of destruction of habitat or from noise and other activities associated with

construction, operation, and maintenance of the railroad, and that noise levels from construction

and operation of the railroad may also disrupt mating and breeding activities. (0198c, 0198i) The

same commenter stated that while the applicant indicated in its ER that construction activities will

"temporarily disturb resident wildlife species" (ER at 4.1-4), there was no discussion of the longterm impacts to the overall ecological system in Skull Valley since there would be ongoing

construction for more than 20 years. (ER 4.1-4 to 5.) (0198a)

Response:

The potential impacts to wildlife of the proposed PFSF are described in Sections 4.4 and 5.5 of the

FEIS. The NRC staff concluded that the impacts to wildlife would be small. The mitigation measures

proposed to be required described in Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS include surveying for sensitive species

immediately before construction and notifying the appropriate Federal agency (BIA or BLM) with

management responsibility if any are identified. This would allow PFS, in coordination with BIA or

BLM, to then implement measures to reduce impacts to wildlife and its habitat. These mitigation

measures would be required as part of the license and approval process by the NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies. 

As discussed in the FEIS, the impacts on ecological resources from the slight increase in traffic on

Skull Valley Road would be small. The projected increase in traffic on Skull Valley Road is discussed

in Sections 4.5.1.6, 4.5.2.6, and 5.5.2.2 of the FEIS, while the potential impacts of that increase on

wildlife are considered in Sections 4.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.2. The largest increase in traffic would occur

during Phase 1 (approximately 18 months) of construction. An increase in traffic in the area during

construction may result in accidental killing of animals crossing roadways but is not expected to affect

movement and migration patterns of animals living in the area. During the operation of the proposed

PFSF, because construction activities for the most part would be completed, minor impacts from onsite transportation would be expected. Overall the impacts of increased road traffic on wildlife are

predicted to be small, and no specific measures to avoid or mitigate them are necessary. 

The NRC staff reviewed the issue of the potential impacts of operation of the proposed PFSF to

wildlife and concluded that the potential wildlife impacts are not underestimated. Those impacts are

reported in Section 4.4 of this FEIS. Mitigation measures, including a monitoring program, are

presented in Section 4.4.5.2 of this FEIS. One of those measures would require the applicant, in

cooperation with the BIA and the Skull Valley Band, to develop an adequate monitoring program that

would be implemented during operation of the proposed PFSF. This program would detect impacts
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-234

on wildlife. Methods to be used to discourage wildlife from remaining near the storage casks would be

determined as part of the monitoring program.

The potential impacts of construction and operation of the proposed rail line on wildlife are described

in Section 5.4 of this FEIS. The NRC staff concluded that the impacts to wildlife would be small. 

Noise impacts from operation of the trains carrying SNF on the proposed rail line are addressed in

Section 5.8.1 and, as discussed there, are expected to be minimal and to diminish substantially with

distance from the rail line. The results of ecological surveys are described in Section 3.4.3 in this

FEIS. Additional surveys would be conducted along the proposed rail line before initiating

construction. (See Section 9.4.2 of the FEIS.) Section 5.4.4.2 contains mitigation measures that

include curtailing or restricting construction activities during certain periods of the year to avoid

affecting mating, nesting success, or raising of young.

As stated in Section 5.4.1.1 of the FEIS, wildlife in Skull Valley do not exclusively use any portion of

the valley. Therefore, the presence of the proposed rail line would not significantly contribute to

habitat fragmentation, segregation, or interruption of habitat connectivity. Also, because there are no

clearly defined migration or seasonal use patterns for the wildlife in Skull Valley, the new rail line

would not significantly affect the movement of wildlife. Some wildlife may avoid the area, but the

impact is expected to be small.

The NRC staff evaluated the impacts of the proposed PFSF on the wild horse population and added

the results to Sections 5.4.1.2 and 5.4.2.2 of the FEIS. There are currently about 350 wild horses in

the Cedar Mountains Wild Horse Herd Management Area, managed by the BLM. The BLM’s

management goals are to keep the horses within the management area and maintain an appropriate

number of horses based on the amount of available vegetation. Based on the proposed location of

the right-of-way and the projected speed of the trains, there would be no direct impacts to horses from

the proposed PFSF. In fact, the physical presence of the railroad may help to keep the horses up on

the mountain within the herd management area, so there may be a slight beneficial impact to horses

from the proposed PFSF.

Regarding the comment on ongoing construction activities, while there will be movement of casks to

the proposed PFSF and intermittent activity associated with building new storage pads and

assembling storage casks, there will not be constant construction activities for the life of the proposed

PFSF. Initial construction would continue for about 18 months, as described in Section 2.1.1.2 of this

FEIS. Phase 1 of the project would include construction of the major buildings, the storage pads in

the southeastern quadrant of the restricted-access area, the access road, a new rail siding, and a new

rail line. This phase would involve most of the clearing that would be needed for the proposed PFSF. 

Section 4.4.1 of this FEIS describes the impacts of construction of the main facility on the overall

ecological system in Skull Valley, including wildlife. This assessment includes the impacts of all the

clearing that would be needed for the proposed PFSF. While there will be some impacts during

construction of the proposed PFSF and a rail line, the NRC staff concluded that these impacts would

be small and proposed that certain mitigation measures be required to minimize those impacts. See

Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS. Following the initial construction, some construction would also occur after

operation begins (Phases 2 and 3 construction). During Phases 2 and 3 of construction, impacts on

wildlife would be lower because construction activities (construction of additional storage pads) would

be limited to the previously disturbed restricted area. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that the longterm impacts to the overall ecological system in Skull Valley from construction are adequately

considered in the FEIS.

G.3.12.3.3 Radiation Effects on Wildlife

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern about potential radiological exposure to wildlife near the

proposed PFSF. (0047, 0089, 0163, 0198h)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-235 NUREG-1714

C One commenter stated that the longer the SNF is stored in this location, the higher the potential

for unanticipated release of radioactivity. The commenter asserted that the project has the

potential to permanently contaminate an environment of worldwide significance to migratory birds. 

The commenter stated that if the project is approved, there should be a specified time frame and

firm commitment to move the SNF away from an area of such importance to migratory birds. 

(0047)

C One commenter expressed concern over the potential impacts resulting from bioaccumulation of

radionuclides in the raptor population from accidental contamination of the raptors' prey sources. 

(0198h)

C One commenter asserted that there is a discrepancy between the DEIS and the applicant’s ER, as

follows. In the DEIS on page 4-22, the calculations show the radiological dose potentially

received by animals perched on the top surface of the HI-STORM storage cask 100 percent of the

time for one year would be well below 1 Sv/yr (100 rem/yr). As set forth in ER Section 4.2.9.2.2, a

bird perching on top of a Hl-STORM storage cask 100 percent of the time for one year would

receive 2 x 44.7 rem or a total of 89.4 rem. (0163)

C One commenter expressed concern about the precautions that will be taken to protect wildlife,

particularly avian species, from radiation exposure. The commenter referenced Section 3.7 of the

DEIS, “Background Radiological Characteristics,” which indicated that the natural sources of

radiation at the proposed site are equivalent to 84 mrem/yr, which is approximately 1.5 times the

national average annual effective dose equivalent of ionizing radiation to a member of the U.S.

population, and Appendix D (page D-10, Section D.3.2, “Radiological Impacts,” third full

paragraph), which stated that, during transport, each SNF cask is assumed to have a dose rate of

13 mrem/hr at a distance of 3 ft. (0089)

Response:

Potential radiological exposure to wildlife from the proposed PFSF are discussed in Section 4.4.2.2 of

the FEIS. As discussed below, the impacts from that exposure are expected to be small.

As discussed in Section 1.2 of the FEIS, the proposed action includes shipping the SNF to a

permanent repository prior to the completion of facility decommissioning after the end of the licensed

life of the proposed PFSF. For a discussion on the term of the license requested by PFS, and the

requirements for removing SNF from the proposed PFSF should the NRC grant the application, see

Section G.3.4 of this Appendix.

As discussed in Section 5.7.2 of this FEIS, no credible accident would release radioactive material

and contaminate the Great Salt Lake or affect its ecosystem either directly or via groundwater

contamination. Thus, radioactive contamination of the Great Salt Lake or its tributary waters and

associated wetlands would be unlikely. 

Because there would be no releases of radioactive liquid or gaseous effluents from the proposed

PFSF (PFS/RAI1 1999), accumulation of radiation in wildlife from feeding on insects and other

invertebrates living around the storage casks is not possible. Information has been added to Section

4.4.2.2 of this FEIS to clarify this issue. 

As stated in Section 4.4.2.2 of the FEIS, the NRC has no standard for radiation doses to wildlife, but

the applicant has established a radiation dose criterion of 100 rem/yr (1 Sv/yr) (based on a review of

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) studies), which is the lowest dose rate at which harmful

effects of chronic irradiation have been reliably observed in sensitive species (PFS/RAI1 1999). In

addition, the PFS criterion is set at a dose lower than that specified in the IAEA studies. In view of the

above, NRC staff believes the PFS criterion may reasonably be applied in considering doses to

wildlife from the proposed PFSF.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-236

The natural radiation in the area, .0084 Sv/yr (0.084 rem/yr), is much less than 1 percent of the 100

rem/yr criterion. As discussed in Section 4.4.2.2 of this FEIS, under a maximum exposure scenario of

24 hours a day for 365 days a year, doses to wildlife at the fence around the northern boundary of the

restricted-access area would be no more than 0.05 Sv/yr (5 rem/yr) for the HI-STORM cask system

(PFS/ER 2000). Adding the background value of .0084 Sv/yr (0.084 rem/yr) to the 0.05 Sv/yr (5

rem/yr) from that system would result in a value below 6 rem/yr, well below the applicant’s radiation

dose criterion of 1 Sv/yr (100 rem/yr).

The dose of 0.438 Sv/yr (43.8 rem) presented in Section 4.4.2.2 of the DEIS was based on a bird

perched on a single cask and included consideration of the radiation field for a single cask as

described in Table 2.6 in this FEIS. The calculation offered in the comment more correctly accounts

for the radiation field of the multiple casks in the proposed storage array. As noted in the comment,

this revised dose would still be below levels of concern. In addition, mitigation measures would

require the applicant, in cooperation with the BIA and the Skull Valley Band, to develop an adequate

wildlife monitoring program that would be implemented during operation of the proposed PFSF. 

Methods to be used to induce wildlife to stay away from the storage casks would be determined as

part of the monitoring program. The dose in Section 4.4.2.2 of this FEIS has been revised to reflect

the theoretical dose to a perching bird from multiple casks.

G.3.12.4 Wetlands

G.3.12.4.1 Wetlands Identification

Comment Summary: 

One commenter noted that the BLM has designated 48,000 acres (or 75 square miles) in Horseshoe

Springs as Areas of Critical Environmental Concern. The commenter stated this is a significant issue

because it involves an important percentage of wetlands and water resources. (0077, SL2-02) One

commenter stated that the qualitative statement on page 3-26, line 26, of the DEIS that "wetlands are

uncommon in Skull Valley" is incorrect. The commenter stated that wetlands comprise nearly ten

percent of Skull Valley, and ten percent is a vitally significant percentage in the deserts of the western

United States. The commenter stressed that West Coast standards differ significantly from those of

the East Coast and the difference is based on the scarcity and often unavailability of water resources

in the West. (0039, 0077)

One commenter asserted that the nearest wetland to the proposed ITF is in Timpie Springs, not

Horseshoe Springs, as stated in the DEIS. The commenter added that the DEIS contains erroneous

assumptions, such as that groundwater occurs at a depth of 125 ft. near Timpie Springs, and therefore

other assumptions made in Section 5.4.1.3, page 5-16, are debatable. (0039, 0077)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees with the comment that wetlands in Skull Valley are important because of the

scarcity of water resources in the West. The statement in Section 3.4.2.2 of the DEIS referred to all

the lands in the United States that the BLM administers. This statement has been clarified to specify

that the less than 9 percent figure refers to wetlands in all land administered by the BLM, not

specifically to wetlands in Skull Valley. Furthermore, as discussed in Sections 4.4 and 5.4, neither the

proposed site nor rail line would impact any wetlands.

Section 5.4.1.3 of this FEIS does not state that the nearest wetland to the location of the proposed ITF

is Horseshoe Springs. The section states that Horseshoe Springs is the largest wetland area in Skull

Valley. The proposed location of the ITF near Timpie is highly disturbed, with no unique ecological

communities. Construction of the proposed ITF would not affect Timpie Springs. Section 2.2.4,

describes the location of the proposed ITF and Section 5.4 describes the impacts of the proposed ITF.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-237 NUREG-1714

Regarding the comment concerning the depth to groundwater at the ITF, the staff has revised the

FEIS to correctly indicate that the depth to groundwater at the ITF is approximately 21 ft. See Section

5.2.1.4 of this FEIS.

G.3.12.4.2 Wetlands Impacts

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters expressed concern about the potential impacts to wetlands. (0039, 0077, 0158,

0166). Commenters stated the following:

C Two commenters stated that Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the DEIS failed to discuss adequately

the potential impacts to the wetlands and spring resources, although these areas were described

as important natural resources that are part of the "Potentially Affected Environment in Skull

Valley, Utah," in Chapter 3. (0039, 0077, 0158) 

C Some commenters stated that the DEIS did not address impacts to the wetlands along Skull

Valley Road that may be affected by increased road traffic and heavy-haulers. (0039, 0077, 0158,

0166) 

C One commenter stated that the applicant failed to discuss the impact of groundwater

contamination on the downgradient Timpie Springs and the Great Salt Lake. The commenter

stated that these areas provide wetlands and habitat for aquatic wildlife and shorebirds. The

commenter noted that the Great Salt Lake is a western hemisphere shorebird reserve and the

world's largest staging area for Wilson's Phalaropes. The commenter also said that the Great Salt

Lake has 75 percent of the western population of Tundra swans and also provides habitat for bald

eagles (threatened species) and peregrine falcons (endangered species). (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that wetlands and water resources are significant issues, particularly in arid

regions such as Skull Valley. The BLM has designed 308 hectares (760 acres) of land surrounding

Horseshoe Springs as an ACEC. This tract is located near Skull Valley Road within the much larger

Horseshoe Springs WHA that covers 25,611 hectares (63,286 acres) in the northern part of Skull

Valley. This FEIS presents a description of the springs and an assessment of the potential for the

proposed action to affect them in Sections 3.4.2.2, 4.4.1.3, 4.4.2.3, 4.8.3, 5.4.1.3, 5.4.2.3, 6.1.4.1, and

6.3.4. As discussed in those sections, the proposed action would have only a small impact on the

wetlands and water resources in the Horseshoe Springs ACEC.

Potential impacts to the wetlands along Skull Valley Road caused by increased road traffic and heavyhaul trucks are considered to be small. Discussion of those impacts has been added to Section

5.4.2.3, of this FEIS. The impacts to the Horseshoe Springs ACEC caused by constructing and

operating the proposed rail spur are discussed in Sections 5.4.1.3 and 5.4.2.3, respectively.

The comment regarding Timpie Springs Waterfowl Management Area is based on the applicant’s ER. 

The DEIS updated that document and other licensing information from that same time period. As

described in Sections 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2.4, 5.2.1.4, and 5.2.2.4 of this FEIS, the proposed PFSF and

transportation facilities would not result in any significant impacts to groundwater resources in Skull

Valley and this would not result in any impacts to the downgradient Timpie Springs and the Great Salt

Lake.
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NUREG-1714 G-238

G.3.12.4.3 Permits and State Certification

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern that state certification was not discussed in the DEIS. The

commenter noted that a Section 404 permit is required from the ACE for discharge of dredged or fill

materials into waters of the United States such as inland waters, lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, and

tributaries to navigable waters, in accordance with 33 USC 1344. The commenter stated that state

certification of 404 permits is required under Section 401 of the CWA (33 USC 1341) and that the

state must certify that the permit will not exceed state water quality standards or otherwise violate a

state requirement. The commenter stated that there has been no official delineation of wetlands by

the ACE near the rail corridor, proposed PFSF, or ITF, and to adequately assess wetland impact

delineation must formally occur. (0198)

The commenter stated that the applicant's analysis of other required water permits lacked specificity

and did not satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 52.45. The commenter stated that in Sections 9.1-3

and 9.2 of the ER, the applicant merely states that it "might" need a CWA Section 404 dredge and fill

permit for wetlands along the Skull Valley transportation corridor, and that it will be required to consult

with the state on the effects of the ITF on the neighboring Timpie Springs Wildlife Management Area. 

The commenter disagreed with the ER at 9.1-4, which stated that an American Indian tribe may be

treated as a state under the CWA. The commenter stated that this is irrelevant to the permits because

the Skull Valley Band has not applied for delegation of any CWA programs. The commenter

recommended that the applicant specifically describe the wetlands affected by its operation, the point

discharge sources, and the activities that may require control under a storm water permit. (0198a)

Response: 

For the construction of the proposed rail line, the applicant completed a survey in October 2000 to

determine if the rail line would cross jurisdictional streams or wetlands, which would require a

Section 404 permit from the ACE. The initial conclusions of the survey confirmed that the proposed

rail line would not cross perennial or seasonal streams, playa wetlands, or other isolated wetlands. 

However, two channels along the proposed rail corridor that could be considered ephemeral are still

under evaluation. If either the ACE or the State of Utah determines that these channels are

ephemeral, they may be jurisdictional, which would, therefore, require a permit from the agency

claiming jurisdiction. Sections 1.6.2.1 and 1.6.2.3 of this FEIS have been revised to reflect this

information.

G.3.12.5 Threatened, Endangered, and Other Species of Special Concern

G.3.12.5.1 Special Status Species

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern about the potential that endangered, threatened, and candidate

endangered species (e.g., Ute ladies’-tresses, least chub, spotted frog, peregrine falcon, bald eagle

and mountain plover), may be found in the rail line from Skunk Ridge (near Low, Utah), as stated in

ER Rev. 1, Table 2.3-2. The commenter stated that these species, other sensitive species, and their

food base may be affected by or driven out of the area by construction activities, noise levels, and

operation of the railroad. The commenter also stated that project activities may also disrupt mating

and breeding activities. (The commenter references ER Rev. 1 at 4.4-4.) (0198c)

The same commenter stated that the EIS must not only address impacts to endangered and

threatened species but also candidate, sensitive, and high-value species. The commenter identified

the threatened species as bald eagles, which are known to frequent Skull Valley, and peregrine

falcons, which nest at Timpie Springs, near the proposed ITF. The commenter also indicated that the
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G-239 NUREG-1714

State has listed sensitive bird species and other "high-interest" bird species in the area, including the

bobolink, burrowing owl, Caspian tern, common yellow throat, ferruginous hawk, long-billed curlew,

short-eared owl, and Swainson’s hawk. The commenter noted that the RMP indicates it will protect

candidate species such as the ferruginous hawk and Swainson’s hawk during critical nesting periods. 

(0198i)

The same commenter stated that to demonstrate the adequacy of its ER regarding the peregrine

falcon, the applicant lists the provisions in the ER 5.2.3.2.4, which concluded that the peregrine falcon

nests are "not located in the vicinity" of the proposed ITF. The Timpie Springs Waterfowl

Management Area is adjacent to the proposed ITF and therefore, the impact on this Federally

endangered species must be addressed. The commenter recommended that the applicant address all

possible impacts on Federally endangered or threatened species, including all potential behavior in

accordance with Reg. Guide 4.2, at 2-4, n. 2. (0198b)

The commenter also stated that the applicant indicated, in ER at 4.1-7, that the Skull Valley pocket

gopher is identified as a "high-interest" species in the State of Utah. The commenter stated that the

applicant must conduct the survey now to comply with 10 CFR 72.100 and to determine the presence

of Skull Valley pocket gophers and the overall impact, rather than conducting a survey of gopher

mounds prior to construction to avoid surface disturbance within 100 feet of any burrow, as indicated

by the applicant. (0198a, 0198b)

Two commenters concurred with the DEIS in its determination that there is presently no effect to listed

endangered and threatened species. The commenters recommended that if project plans change, or

if additional information on the distribution of listed or proposed species becomes available, this

determination should be reconsidered. (0047, 0089)

Response: 

Some of the comments above are based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS included updated

information on the subjects of these comments. Sections 4.4.3, 5.4.1.5, and 5.4.2.5 in this FEIS

address impacts to endangered, threatened, and other species of special concern at both the

proposed site and along the transportation corridors. Mitigation measures are included in Sections

4.4.5, 5.4.4, and 9.4.2 of this FEIS to protect species that are identified during construction or

operation of the proposed PFSF and its related transportation facilities. These species include

Federally-listed threatened or endangered species and Utah or BLM endangered, threatened, or

sensitive species if any are taken by construction or operation of the proposed PFSF or its related

transportation facilities. Section 5.4.4.2 presents mitigation measures that include curtailing or

restricting construction activities during certain periods of the year to avoid affecting nesting success

or raising young of sensitive species found during wildlife surveys.

The peregrine falcon is no longer on the Federal list of threatened and endangered species, having

been delisted on August 25, 1999. (See 64 Fed. Reg. 46541-46558.) This species is, however, still

listed by the State as endangered. As discussed in Section 5.4.1.5 of this FEIS, the impacts of the

proposed project on the peregrine falcon and other species that are found in Timpie Springs would be

small.

Information on pocket gophers and the potential impacts of the proposed project on them is included

in Sections 3.4.3.2, 4.4.1.2, 4.4.3.2, 5.4.1.2, and 5.4.1.5 of this FEIS. As stated in Section 3.4.3, there

was no evidence of Skull Valley pocket gophers during surveys of the proposed site, rail line corridor,

and the proposed ITF. Although previous surveys have been conducted, the NRC staff and the

Cooperating Agencies have determined that an additional survey for pocket gopher mounds is

necessary prior to initiating construction to ensure no significant impact would occur. Therefore,

mitigation measures proposed to be required for pocket gophers, as specified in Sections 5.4.4.2 and

9.4.2 of this FEIS, include a requirement that the applicant complete surveys for the Skull Valley

pocket gopher before initiating construction.
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NUREG-1714 G-240

As noted in the comment summary, the Utah Field Office of the FWS has concurred with the “no

effect” determination in the DEIS for threatened and endangered species and critical habitat. (See the

FWS letter in Appendix B of this FEIS.)

Mitigation measures to further reduce impacts to threatened and endangered species are included in

Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS. If project plans change in a way that may modify the “no effect”

determination on such species or if additional information on their distribution becomes available, the

“no effect” determination may be reconsidered and consultation with FWS will begin again.

Impacts of construction and operation of the proposed rail corridor on natural resources are

summarized in Section 5.4 of this FEIS. These impacts would be small.

G.3.12.5.2 Plant Species

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant has not identified aquatic plants that may be adversely

affected by the proposed action and upset the fragile wetland ecosystem. The commenter stated that

the applicant, in Section 4.1-3 of the ER, indicated that "[n]o Federal or State-listed threatened or

endangered plant species are known to occur within the site or access road" but acknowledged, in the

ER at 4.1-4, that two "high-interest" plants, Pohl's milkvetch and small spring parsley, may occur in the

area. The commenter expressed concern that the applicant did not adequately assess plant species

and impacts on those identified. (0198a) 

Response: 

This comment is based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS addressed the issues identified in this

comment. This FEIS discusses the issues in Sections 3.4 and 4.4. Wetlands in Skull Valley are

described in Section 3.4.2.2, which includes information on wetland aquatic plants.

Vegetation in the area of the proposed project is identified in Sections 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.3.1. As

discussed in Section 3.4.3.1, small spring parsley would not be expected to occur in the area of the

proposed PFSF and, therefore, would not be affected by the proposed PFSF. Information on the

location of Pohl’s milkvetch in relation to the proposed PFSF is found in Section 3.4.3.1. Impacts of

the proposed PFSF on Pohl’s milkvetch would be small, as described in Section 4.4.3.1.

As noted above, the Utah Field Office of the FWS has concurred with the “no effect” determination for

threatened and endangered species and critical habitat. (See the FWS letter in Appendix B of this

FEIS.)

G.3.12.6 Cumulative Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters expressed concern that the analysis in the DEIS of human and wildlife health

impacts for the purposes of cumulative impacts is inadequate. (0158, 0215) One commenter stated

that the DEIS needs to address the full range of potential impacts along the transportation routes from

the reactors to the storage facility. The commenter stated that cumulative effects to public health and

wildlife from the other radiation sources along the transportation routes and in proximity to the storage

site need to be evaluated and presented in the EIS (i.e., operations associated with Envirocare could

contribute to cumulative impacts). (0215) 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-241 NUREG-1714

Response: 

Section 5.7 of this FEIS presents a detailed analysis of radiation impacts along the potential rail

transportation routes. The NRC staff determined from the analysis that the dose to a maximally

exposed individual located close to the rail route for the entire project period to ship 4,000 casks to the

proposed PFSF would be small. Impacts to wildlife would be similarly small. The cumulative impacts

of radiation are discussed in Section 6.3.7 of this FEIS.

G.3.12.7 Mitigation Measures

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that efforts must be made to avoid or minimize impacts to ecological

resources. (0047, 0089, 0198, 0198h, 0215) Commenters expressed the following concerns:

C Two commenters stated that measures to avoid or minimize impacts should be described. (0047,

0089) One commenter indicated that mitigation measures, particularly radionuclide contamination

to wildlife or their habitat use areas, be coordinated with the State to develop mitigation strategies. 

(0198h) 

C Two commenters strongly recommended that State and Federal resource agencies be consulted

for training of on-site personnel, particularly since migratory birds (i.e., raptors) are anticipated to

occur in the area. (0047, 0089)

C One commenter stated that compensatory mitigation for unavoidable construction and

maintenance impacts must be planned, and urged the applicant to coordinate with the UDWR to

develop acceptable mitigation strategies. (0198h)

C One commenter said that the proposed PFSF would not use spikes or cones to prevent birds from

perching on top of the HI-STORM storage casks. The commenter explained that this was decided

based on page 2-28, Section 2.1.5, lines 22-23 of the DEIS which states that "[i]f birds are found

to be perching and/or nesting around or on the casks, devices (such as cones or spikes) would be

installed to deter such bird behavior." The commenter stated that the applicant would take such

action, however, only to the extent that the potential doses would be in excess of the 100 rem/year

criterion established to prevent harmful effects to wildlife from radiation. The commenter noted

that Section 4.2.9.2.2 of the ER, indicated that doses to birds spending one-half of their time

perched on top of the HI-STORM storage casks were calculated to be 44.7 rem/year. The

commenter quoted the DEIS on page 4-24, line 21, "even if a bird spent 100 percent of its life for a

year on the top surface of a [HI-STORM storage] cask, the dose received would be well below the

1 Sv/yr (100 rem/yr) criterion." (0163)

C Citing the DEIS page xxxvi, one commenter stated that the applicant has proposed no biological

monitoring during operation, but indicated that it will instead implement surveillance programs to

prevent wildlife habitation within the storage area. The commenter stated that the impossibility of

this goal was evidently recognized by agency staffs because on page xlv of the DEIS, "Mitigation

Measures," the NRC staff indicated that the applicant would be required to develop an adequate

wildlife monitoring program before initiating operations. The commenter agreed with the

requirement, but disagreed with the timing, and stated that any monitoring plan should be subject

to review in the EIS process. The commenter suggested that the requirement for biological and

wildlife monitoring should include a monitoring program for vegetation and soils, to establish a

baseline for these media as specified on page 2-28 of the DEIS. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that the applicant failed to propose and develop various protective or

mitigation plans in conjunction with the appropriate authorities. The commenter stated that

protective or mitigation measures must be identified now so they can be evaluated and the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-242

feasibility of the proposed site determined. The commenter stated that the applicant's plans, as

stated in 4.3-3 to 4 of the ER, include a mitigation plan for Horseshoe Springs and protective plan

for Salt Mountain Springs developed with the BLM, and mitigation plans for Timpie Springs and

protection of raptor nests developed with the UDWR. (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC staff agrees with the commenters that efforts must be made to avoid or minimize impacts to

wildlife and vegetation. Mitigation measures have been included in Sections 4.4.5, 5.4.4, and 9.4.2 of

this FEIS to avoid or minimize impacts to vegetation, wildlife, and species of special concern.

The NRC staff reexamined the wildlife monitoring issue and concludes that it is appropriate that the

monitoring program be developed close to the time when it would be implemented (i.e., before

initiating operation). The applicant, as described in Section 2.1.5 of this FEIS, has committed to

developing a wildlife monitoring program before initiating operations and implementing it during

operation. This commitment has been included as one of the mitigation measures proposed to be

required and included in each agency’s ROD (Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS). The sentence in Section

2.1.5 of the DEIS about using spikes or cones to prevent birds from perching and/or nesting around or

on casks has been deleted.

As discussed in Section 4.7.2.1 of the FEIS, there appears to be no viable mechanism by which

radioactive materials would migrate off-site or even away from the casks. Thus, regular, on-going

monitoring for radiation in vegetation and soils would not be necessary. 

The NRC staff agrees that State and Federal resource agencies should be consulted and included in

the proposed training. Additional text has been added to Condition 7 of the proposed mitigation

measures (Section 9.4.2 in this FEIS) to address the concern expressed in the comment.

The comment regarding mitigation plans in the ER was addressed in the DEIS, and again in this FEIS

in Section 9.4.2.
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G-243 NUREG-1714

G.3.13 Socioeconomic and Community Resources

G.3.13.1 Reservation Socioeconomics

G.3.13.1.1 General Socioeconomic Issues on the Reservation

Comment Summary: 

Commenters expressed concern about the financial implications of the proposed PFSF for the Skull

Valley Band. Specifically, commenters raised the following issues: 

C One commenter questioned whether money from the lease agreement would actually result in

improvements in employment, housing, and other areas. (SL1-26) Commenters asserted that the

adverse environmental impacts are greater than the economic benefits to the Skull Valley Band. 

(0050, 0054)

C One commenter expressed concern that the applicant would go bankrupt, leaving the Skull Valley

Band and Utah with financial liabilities. (0053)

C Several commenters stated that historically the Skull Valley Band has not had much economic

power to improve conditions on the Reservation and they have survived on desolate land. (GR08, SL2-06, SL2-13) One commenter asserted that members of the Skull Valley Band should take

the money and move as far away from Skull Valley as possible. (SL2-01) Another commenter

said that the Skull Valley Band is selling their birthright to the land, and their neighbors’ birthright

to their land. (GR-09)

C Other commenters asserted a lack of information on payments to the Skull Valley Band, including

such issues as why the DEIS lists the estimated economic benefit to the County and State, but

does not list the estimated economic benefit to the Skull Valley Band, including the lease

payments, and why the DEIS does not include an economic benefit comparison among the

alternatives. (0134, 0215, SL1-15, SL1-39, SL3-39)

C Several commenters stated that there were irregularities in the financial arrangements between

the applicant and the Skull Valley Band. Some stated that the financial dealings of the applicant

and the failure of the Cooperating Agencies to provide oversight on this process should be

investigated and that Congress has been requested to do so. (0044, 0105, 0183, 0210a, 0210,

GR-01, SL1-17, SL3-06) More specifically, one commenter stated that the investigation would

examine the failure of the BIA to ensure that all aspects of this proposal complied with Federal

law, and DOI and BIA regulations. (0210a) Several commenters stated that the NRC has not

taken into account the concerns raised in Representative James Hansen’s letter to the ASLB,

dated June 23, 2000, concerning alleged irregular financial arrangements between the applicant

and members of the Skull Valley Band. (0210)

C One commenter stated that trust funds, which exist to promote agricultural development on the

Reservation, would be compromised by the proposal and that the DEIS does not adequately

consider this issue. The commenter stated that the FEIS should analyze what impact the

construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF would have on the ability of

the Skull Valley Band members to utilize and/or access these funds. Additionally, the commenter

suggested that the existence of these funds, as well as other potential sources of revenue that

were seriously discounted by the DEIS, should also be considered in the evaluation of the project. 

(0158) 

C Another commenter asked if law enforcement would be improved on the Reservation and by

whom if the proposal is approved. (0053)
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NUREG-1714 G-244

Additionally, one commenter stated that the application does not address required legal entitlements

for the applicant to undertake critical activities associated with the proposed PFSF. For example, the

commenter stated that the NRC must satisfy itself that the applicant is entitled to use and control the

proposed site on the Reservation, which requires full disclosure of the lease between the applicant

and the Skull Valley Band. The commenter stated that currently, only a portion of the lease has been

released to the public and the NRC and it is unknown whether the withheld portions of the lease

contain termination clauses and other substantive lease provisions. (0198h)

Response: 

Several commenters expressed concern that the money paid to the Skull Valley Band for leasing part

of the Reservation to construct the proposed PFSF would not provide economic benefit to the Skull

Valley Band and would not result in better standards of living. Another commenter suggested the

Band use any funds to move away. If the Skull Valley Band receives economical benefits as a result

of constructing the proposed PFSF, it is the choice of the members and their leadership to decide how

the funds are used and distributed. 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge the comments that the Skull Valley Band is

surviving without economic power on desolate land, and that the Band is selling their birthright, as well

as their neighbors’ birthright. These comments are considered to be beyond the scope of this EIS. 

The Skull Valley Band has identified this proposed project as a means to provide financial resources

to support activities desired by the Band, such as enhancing existing infrastructure on the

Reservation, improving services to Skull Valley Band members (examples include improved housing

and employment assistance), and engaging in new commercial endeavors. Further, the applicant has

also indicated that it will provide training and development opportunities for Skull Valley Band

members (see Section 4.5.18).

There are currently no plans to change law enforcement procedures or practices on the Reservation. 

The proposed PFSF would include an independent security force for facility protection. The NRC staff

reviewed the applicant’s physical protection plan in the SER and found the plan to be adequate.

Another commenter expressed concern that the applicant could go bankrupt leaving the Skull Valley

Band and Utah with liability. To prevent this, the provisions of the proposed lease contain financial

protection for the Band in case of default by the applicant. The NRC conducts a financial assurance

review of all applicants. If the proposed PFSF were transferred to a different consortium, the NRC

would require the same financial assurances as for the original applicant.

Commenters wanted to know the amount of the lease payment to the Skull Valley Band. The

proposed lease is confidential and proprietary information of the Skull Valley Band and the applicant,

and is, therefore, not included in the FEIS. See State of Utah v. U.S. DOI, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D.

Utah 1999), aff’d 210 F. 3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2000). Also, under the proposed action, there would be a

positive economic benefit to the Skull Valley Band that would not occur under the no action

alternative.

Several commenters questioned the financial arrangement between the applicant and the Skull Valley

Band and indicated that Congress should investigate whether there are any improprieties associated

with this arrangement. Should any such investigation be initiated, the DOI and the BIA would

cooperate fully. However, whether there has been any impropriety in any financial arrangement

between the applicant and the Skull Valley Band is outside the scope of this FEIS.

One commenter stated that the FEIS should consider the impact of the proposed PFSF would have on

the Skull Valley Band’s ability to access trust funds for agricultural development. This FEIS concludes

that impacts to the lands adjacent to the proposed rail line and the proposed PFSF would be small

and, therefore, would have no impact on agricultural development. Section G.3.13.2.8 of this FEIS

discusses property values as they relate to the proposed action. It is not anticipated that the Skull
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-245 NUREG-1714

Valley Band will be denied access to any trust funds that exist to promote agricultural development on

the Reservation.

The environmental impacts of the proposed action would not be significant and economic benefit to

the Skull Valley Band would be large (see Section 6 of this FEIS).

G.3.13.1.2 Tribal Culture and Traditions 

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters expressed concern about impacts of the proposed PFSF on the Skull Valley

Band. Several commenters stated that the DEIS does not adequately address potential long-term

impacts to American Indian Tribal culture, tradition, world-view, and relationship to the land. (0096,

0112, 0158, SL1-26) One commenter said that the Skull Valley Band’s expertise in ethno-botany

would be threatened by the proposal, and that the traditional reverence for the land and biota would be

compromised. (0112)

C One commenter said that the DEIS’s treatment of socioeconomic impacts exhibits little insight into

the social, cultural, and religious affairs of the Skull Valley Band members. According to this

commenter, the DEIS repeatedly makes foundationless statements concerning small and not so

small impacts on, for example, cultural resources, without providing an expert or culturally

sensitive basis for these conclusions. Further, the commenter asserted that the DEIS is

inadequate with respect to addressing impacts on traditional social interactions and cultural

activities of Skull Valley Band members. The commenter argued that the DEIS does not

adequately analyze the potential inability of Skull Valley Band members who fear or abhor the

project to leave the Reservation or the psychological impact this inability may have on them and

their culture. Additionally, the commenter argued that the document fails to consider long-term

impacts to the survival of the traditional culture, religion, and language of the Skull Valley Band

members. (0158)

C The same commenter said that in analyzing impacts to the Skull Valley Band members, the NRC

does not adequately consider factors peculiar to this community. The commenter asserted, as an

example, the failure of the NRC to identify the existence and magnitude of impacts that could be

oppressive given the unique situation of the Skull Valley Band members. The commenter stated

that Skull Valley Band members have a unique interest in preserving their traditional worldview,

lifestyle, and relationship to the land, in part, because without their participation, these cultural

views face extinction. Furthermore, the commenter stated that, given their minority status, Skull

Valley Band members are much more prone to losing their cultural identity given the prevalence

and force of the majority culture. (0158) 

C One commenter stated that Section 6.1.5, “Socioeconomic and Community Resources,” of the

DEIS (pages 6-10 through 6-14) accepts the fallacy that the Native Americans are

indistinguishable from the remainder of the Tooele County residents in terms of socioeconomic,

cultural, and community aspects. The commenter said that the DEIS fails to address the unique

differences and the hardship most Native Americans have had to face. (0096) 

C One commenter stated that on page xliii of the DEIS, lines 1-17 no environmental costs are

discussed with respect to the Skull Valley Band, only benefits (page xlii). According to the

commenter, specific costs associated with the abandonment and abrogation of a cultural heritage

based on reverence for the land per se were not discussed in the DEIS. The commenter cited this

as the essential basis for opposition from Navajo, Hopi, Shoshone (to whom the Goshutes are

related), and other Tribes. The commenter stated that this opposition identifies the most

significant socioeconomic concern of Native Americans throughout the region. The commenter

also stated that reverence for the land was not identified, except by Native Americans opposed to
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-246

the proposed PFSF. According to the commenter, this is a serious oversight that also constitutes

a significant socioeconomic cost. (0112)

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies reviewed the potential effects of the project on the culture

and traditions of the Skull Valley Band, and did not find evidence of an adverse effect. In Section

3.6.2.2, the DEIS stated that there are no documented traditional cultural properties or usage of

culturally important natural resources within the proposed PFSF project area. Based on consultation

with regional Federally recognized American Indian tribes, the Skull Valley Band, and other

organizations, the NRC staff did not identify traditional cultural properties at the proposed PFSF. 

Traditional plants of value to the Skull Valley Band, such as sage and cedar, are sparse at the

proposed site due to a lack of surface water, and are considered inferior to the same plants growing in

the Stansbury Mountains east of the Reservation, and in the adjacent Tooele Valley.

Neither the DEIS nor the FEIS claim that Native Americans are indistinguishable from the remainder

of Tooele County. The FEIS notes, in Section 6.1.5, “Socioeconomic and Community Resources,”

that impacts to those resources are indistinguishable except for population, land use, and economic

structure and made no conclusion regarding the comparability of impacts to cultural resources

between Native American and non-Native American communities.

Regarding comments about consideration of potential impacts to the Skull Valley Band’s reverence for

the land and broader world view, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies note that the Skull Valley

Band has carefully researched and considered its participation in the proposed project and the

potential benefits and adverse impacts to the Skull Valley Band. The Skull Valley Band has

subsequently chosen to enter into an agreement with the applicant. As a part of the business

arrangement between the Skull Valley Band and the applicant, the Skull Valley Band has stated that

among its purposes for participating in the proposed PFSF are to establish a cultural center on the

Reservation that would maintain and teach their traditional language and culture and to improve the

Reservation housing and infrastructure, which would encourage Tribal members to live and work on

the Reservation. Accordingly, the proposed action does not appear to threaten any expertise in ethnobotany that members of the Tribe have, nor would it appear to directly compromise any traditional

reverence for the land and biota.

Therefore, this FEIS concludes that the proposed PFSF would not adversely affect Tribal cultural

values or traditional cultural properties. 

G.3.13.1.3 Support for Tribal Benefits

Comment Summary: 

Supporters of the proposed PFSF stated that a majority of the General Council of the Skull Valley

Band voted in favor of the proposed action, a substantial majority of the adult members of the Skull

Valley Band signed resolutions in favor of pursuing the proposed PFSF, and the Skull Valley Band has

discussed the possibility of building an ISFSI for many years. (0100, SL1-03, SL1-30) Commenters

stated that when the Skull Valley Band was first approached about an MRS proposal prior to the PFSF

proposal, the majority of the Tribal General Council voted for the MRS proposal. Additionally, the

commenters stated that the Skull Valley Band has turned down a landfill proposal and other proposals

they believe would spoil the land. According to the commenters, the Skull Valley Band has used its

own resources to research this project, and has agreed to allow the proposed PFSF on the

Reservation because they believe it is safe. (GR-02, GR-03, SL1-03)

C One commenter stated that if the other facilities provided more of a benefit for the Skull Valley

Band, they would not have to consider a facility like the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated
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G-247 NUREG-1714

that, as a sovereign nation, the Skull Valley Band has a right to do what they want with tribal land. 

(GR-10) 

C One commenter noted that the financial income from the proposed action could address housing

and medical needs on the Reservation. (SL1-30) 

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies acknowledge the comments supporting the proposed action

as it relates to the Skull Valley Band and the use of land on the Reservation for the proposed PFSF. 

These comments do not require modification of the DEIS.

G.3.13.2 Regional, State, and National Socioeconomics

G.3.13.2.1 General Comments

Comment Summary: 

A commenter raised concerns that the proposed action will have impacts on the growth, development

potential, and infrastructure of Tooele County. (0198h) Another commenter was concerned that if the

County continues to accept hazardous waste facilities, the County will be viewed as a place that does

not place great importance on protecting its environment, and there will be a decreased interest in

cleaning up current waste sites. (SL2-06)

Several commenters expressed concern that the DEIS did not address the socioeconomic impacts of

the proposed action on Salt Lake City and the Wasatch Front. (0198, SL1-01, SL1-05, SL1-10, SL1-

16, SL2-05, SL2-15, SL3-02, SL3-33) Specifically, commenters have the following concerns:

C Many commenters said that the transportation of SNF through Salt Lake City and other cities

would have a negative impact on property values, tourism, revitalization efforts, and the rest of the

economy. (0041, 0042, 0046, 0050, 0063, 0067, 0072, 0073, 0079, 0080, 0082, 0086, 0104,

0134, 0160, 0177, 0194, 0201, 0210, SL1-05, SL1-10, SL1-37, SL2-05, SL2-07, SL2-13, SL3-04,

SL3-05, SL3-08) 

C One commenter said that developers would be less likely to develop land in Utah because of the

transportation of SNF through the State. (SL2-07) 

C One commenter said that the Governor’s web site, www.qget.state.ut.us contains more

information on the following issues: 1) the Tooele County and City population projections and

State of Utah’s Tooele County persons per square mile (Section 3.5.22 of the DEIS); 2) the State

of Utah and Tooele County employment and income statistics and Tooele County residential

building permits (Section 3.5.2.3); and 3) the Tooele County average school-aged children per

household (Section 4.5.1). The commenter says that for Section 3.5.2.2, there is more

information on the web site about Tooele County and City population projections and about State

of Utah and Tooele County persons per square mile. For Section 3.5.2.3, the commenter says

there is more information in the web site for State of Utah and Tooele County employment and

income statistics and Tooele County residential building permits; and for Section 4.5.1, there is

more information on the web site for Tooele County average school-aged children per household. 

(0198)

C One commenter stated that the economic impact from real and perceived risks must be evaluated

not only for the storage of the SNF in Utah, but also for other communities and states that would

bear the risk of transportation. (0166)
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NUREG-1714 G-248

C Some commenters asserted that Federal agencies have historically approved projects in Utah that

have had negative effects on the State’s citizens, including uranium workers, millers, truckers, and

“Utah testing downwind victims.” (SL3-04, SL3-19, SL3-25)

C One commenter said that the safety and long-term effects on the State of Utah must be

considered. (0105)

Response: 

The DEIS acknowledged the expected future growth in Tooele County (see Section 3.5.2.2

“Population” and Table 3.8 “Population projections for incorporated areas in Tooele County”). This

expected growth, however, will be limited by the availability of resources and infrastructure, particularly

in Skull Valley (see Section 3.5.2.1 “Land Use”). The impacts of storage and transportation of SNF on

community and socioeconomic resources throughout the life of the proposed PFSF are assessed in

Sections 4.5 and 5.5, respectively.

Federal regulations governing waste cleanup are not affected by the number or the location of waste

disposal and storage sites being licensed. Regardless of location, each site must comply fully with the

specific regulations governing its construction, operation, closure, and cleanup. The approval of the

proposed PFSF would not affect the regulations governing any waste disposal or storage site in

Tooele County or the State of Utah.

The NRC staff reviewed comments regarding socioeconomic impacts of the proposed action on Salt

Lake City and the Wasatch Front. As explained in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 on impacts during

construction and operation, other than a portion of the relatively small construction and operations

work force that may reside in Salt Lake City and other areas outside of Tooele County and commute

to their work in Skull Valley, it is expected that all socioeconomic impacts, to the extent that they occur

at all, would occur in Tooele County.

The NRC staff notes the commenters’ statements that the mere presence of SNF (whether at the

proposed PFSF or along the rail transportation routes) could create perceptions that adverse impacts

will occur. As established by current NEPA case law, an EIS is only required to consider the effects of

a proposed action upon the physical environment. The element of public perception of risk, including

stigma, falls outside of the definition of “real and tangible” impacts; hence, the types of analyses

suggested in the comment (regarding potential impacts to property values, tourism, revitalization

efforts, and the overall economic stability of the region) are too far removed from the proposed action

to warrant consideration in the FEIS (see G.3.13.28 for more discussion on property values). 

Regarding the perception of adverse effects from the transportation of nuclear materials through Utah,

shipments of nuclear materials through Utah already occur regularly without any significant adverse

effects on Utahns. These shipments will, by necessity, continue even if this project is not approved.

The purpose of the FEIS is to evaluate environmental impacts of the proposed action, not the effects

of past decisions by Federal, State, or local agencies. However, the FEIS evaluates cumulative

effects of the proposed action and takes into consideration past, present, and future activities in the

vicinity of the proposed site. The discussion of cumulative impacts is located in Section 6.3

“Cumulative Impacts.” The discussion identifies any small, moderate, or large cumulative impacts that

would result from the proposed action. The FEIS states that all of the potential cumulative impacts

would be small, with the exception of scenic quality impacts, which were determined to be moderate

because the proposed action would contribute to a cumulative change from an undeveloped rural area

to one that incorporates residential, commercial, and industrial development. No large adverse

cumulative impacts were identified. 

The NRC notes the reference offered in the comment regarding city, county, and state data sources. 

The nature of most, if not all, socioeconomic data is that it is frequently updated. At the time the DEIS

was prepared, the NRC staff used the most recent data available from the source referenced by the
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G-249 NUREG-1714

commenter. The NRC staff reviewed and considered the most recent data available from this source,

and determined that the new data would not result in any changes to the conclusions presented in the

DEIS and here in the FEIS. Accordingly, the information and data used in Chapter 3 of this FEIS is

sufficient for developing an adequate assessment of potential environmental impacts.

Regarding the safety and long-term effects on the State of Utah, the FEIS analyzes the human health

impacts of the proposed PFSF, as well as the effects of decommissioning the proposed PFSF (see

G.3.5 and G.3.15 for additional comment responses on decommissioning and human health

respectively).

G.3.13.2.2 Population 

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters expressed concern that Utah’s population is growing and an increased population

should be considered when planning for a facility that will last 20 years or more. (0198h, SL3-39) 

One commenter stated that the license application failed to address the impacts of the proposed

PFSF on future growth in this area of Utah. The commenter said that the population of Utah is

projected to more than double in the next 25 years, with the most significant increases occurring along

the Wasatch Front and adjacent counties to the east and west. The commenter also said that Tooele

County is already experiencing increased growth in residential development and that various

organizations and partnerships are currently assessing, through public scoping processes, options or

scenarios for such growth. The commenter stated that there is significant public information available

and that NRC should consider this information as part of its EIS scoping, and must evaluate the

impacts of transportation and storage of high level nuclear waste on the public and on infrastructure,

for the entire life of the proposed PFSF and its operations. (0198h)

The same commenter stated that the DEIS does not rely on current information pertaining to growth

projections. The commenter stated that in numerous sections of the report, the percentage change

from the 1996 population is used to determine impacts to the Tooele County population, when more

current information is available. According to this commenter, the DEIS does not acknowledge that

Tooele County’s growth rate has continued to climb; instead, it relies on a growth rate of 2.9 percent. 

The commenter stated that no discussion of expected land use can be complete without a better

understanding of population growth than this DEIS exhibits. The commenter also noted the availability

of data at the Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget, Demographic and Economic Analysis. 

(0198)

Response: 

Section 3.5.2.2 of this FEIS discusses the current and projected populations for the impact area (see

also Table 3.8). Projected populations for areas outside the impact area (i.e., outside of Tooele

County) were purposely not considered in the FEIS because they are not expected to experience

impacts as a result of the proposed action. The analysis in this FEIS does, however, account for

proposed population increases along the possible rail transportation routes to the proposed PFSF

(see Section 5.7.2.3).

The DEIS used the most recent growth projections available at the time, namely the projections

published in December 1996 by the Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget, Demographic and

Economic Analysis Section. The more recent population data to which the commenter refers, also by

the Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget, Demographic and Economic Analysis Section, now

projects population for Tooele County to the year 2030 (rather than the year 2020). Although this

more recent population projection identifies higher populations than the earlier projection (e.g., 65,852

in the year 2020 for Tooele County compared to the 1996 projection of 59,678 in the year 2020) and

provides a projection to the year 2030 (80,938), it would not alter conclusions regarding the expected

impacts of the proposed action because the contribution of project-related population and associated
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-250

infrastructure (e.g., housing, education, utilities, and traffic) would constitute an even smaller

increment (or impact) on Tooele County and its municipalities than was assessed in the DEIS. For a

detailed explanation on the estimated dose to the public see Section 4.7.1.2 of the FEIS.

G.3.13.2.3 Housing

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters stated that there is a shortage of housing in Tooele County and at Dugway Proving

Ground. The commenters expressed concern that there will not be sufficient housing for construction

and operation personnel. (0112, SL1-07) One commenter stated that the comparison to “vacant

housing units” in 1990 (DEIS page lviii) in other parts of Tooele County, the largest county in Utah, is

insulting and illogical, given the extensive geographic distance and the fact that 1999 statistics

indicate an ongoing crisis for affordable housing in Tooele County. The commenter said it is

deceptive and disingenuous not to cite available current data. (0112)

Response: 

Section 3.5.2.4 of the FEIS provides the latest complete set of data available related to housing in the

impact area. As noted there and in Sections 4.5.1.2 “Construction Impacts” and 4.5.2.2 “Operations

Impacts,” there should be sufficient housing available in the impact area, even without considering

housing in Dugway Proving Ground or Wendover, to accommodate construction and operations

personnel and their families. The NRC staff is not aware of any recent data that establish a housing

shortage in Tooele County, nor does the commenter provide any such data.

G.3.13.2.4 Education

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that busing students will have a negative effect on the Native American

educational process with respect to their ability to have contact with plants used for traditional

indigenous medicinal practices. (0112)

Response: 

Students living on the Reservation currently attend schools in Dugway. The proposed action would

not include any changes to student busing. Therefore, there would be no effect on Native Americans’

education or contact with plants used for traditional indigenous medicinal practices.

G.3.13.2.5 Sanitary Waste Systems

Comment Summary: 

One commenter suggested that the list of communities with centralized wastewater systems listed in

the DEIS should also include Wendover, Utah. (0171)

Response: 

The staff appreciates this information and has incorporated it into revised Section 3.5.2.4 in this FEIS. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-251 NUREG-1714

G.3.13.2.6 Transportation and Traffic

Construction Traffic

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters expressed concern about increased traffic on Skull Valley Road. The DEIS

stated there would be a 172 percent increase in road traffic (page lxi). Commenters stated that “given

a standard multiplier of 4.2 or even 2.5 people per family, that represents a 2,133 percent increase.” 

(0047, 0077, 0089, 0112, SL1-11) One commenter stated that the baseline ADT (average daily traffic

count) presented in the DEIS does not include approximately 30 residents who do not commute on a

regular basis. Compared to an additional 255 construction workers and/or employees plus a family

multiplier of at least 3.5 (rest of the state is 4.2) or 892 people, this commenter argued that there

would actually be an increase of 2,974 percent in the population that commutes every day. Therefore,

the commenter stated that the DEIS numbers are erroneous. (0112) 

One commenter stated that the summary table on page lxi, as well as similar discussions throughout

the document (e.g., 4-3), indicate that the impact to Skull Valley Road will be moderate to large, yet

there is no provision in the document for road maintenance or repair. The commenter stated that

given the uncertainty of water on site, the project will probably need to haul significant amounts of

water along Skull Valley Road, which is not currently suited for this level of use. The commenter also

stated that during Utah’s “unusually high” precipitation, trucks driving on Skull Valley Road sank in the

water-softened asphalt and overturned, and that no substantial improvements to this road have been

made since those events. According to the commenter, these statements are testimony that Skull

Valley Road is not safe or suited in its current condition to support the reportedly proposed 172

percent increase in the road’s use and certainly not the transportation proposed under Alternative 1 or

the ITF/Alternative 3. (0039) 

Another commenter expressed concern about potential impacts to recreation access roads on the

BLM lands (RS2477 roads). (SL1-01)

Response:

Increases in traffic are based on the number of vehicles using a particular road, not on the number of

people in a family (whether drivers or passengers in a vehicle). Impacts due to traffic increases are

addressed in Section 4.5.1.6. The NRC staff concluded that the impacts to traffic on Skull Valley

Road would be small to moderate. The FEIS recommends consideration of traffic scheduling by the

applicant to avoid or reduce these impacts (see Section 4.5.4). Table 3.15 shows the most recent

available data on average daily traffic on roadways in the proposed project area, including transport of

water. Maintenance along Skull Valley Road is addressed below under “Heavy-Haul Traffic.”

In commenting on impacts to rural roads that access public lands, one commenter referred to

“RS2477 roads.” The term “RS2477 roads” apparently refers to roads constructed under 43 USC 932

(now repealed), which authorized rights-of-way for construction of highways over public lands not

reserved for public uses. Effective October 21, 1976, Congress repeated this statute in Section

706.(a) of the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) (P.L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2793),

which also includes standards for granting or issuing new rights-of-way. However, the FLPMA

provides that its provisions shall not be construed as terminating any valid right-of-way existing on

October 21, 1976. See 43 U.S.C. 1701. See generally, Sierra Club v. Hodel, 846 F.2d 1068, 1078

(10th Cir. 1988) (summarizing the relevant provisions and history of RS2477 and the FLPMA). Such

roads appear to be the subject of the comment.

With respect to such RS2477 roads, the commenter appears concerned about the potential for the

proposed PFSF or its transportation facilities to limit access to public lands. Although it is not clear

from the information presented in the comment which specific rural roads are of concern, impacts to
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NUREG-1714 G-252

the use of rural roads, including those used to access the Cedar Mountains Wilderness Study Area,

Horseshoe Springs, and the Deseret Peak Wilderness, are considered and assessed in Sections

4.8.3, 5.5.1.1, and 5.8.3 of this EIS. As indicated in those sections, the NRC staff concluded that

during construction of the proposed rail spur (approximately 14 months), users of these public lands

might experience some delays during the week but would not be expected to experience delays for

weekend use. During operation, the train traffic would be infrequent (two times per week), so access

to public lands would not be affected.

Military Traffic

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that impacts on transportation due to military maneuvers have not been

addressed. (0039, 0077) The commenter stated that there are numerous opportunities in the DEIS

for discussion of transportation issues. The only transportation issues discussed relate to the

infrequent traffic caused by the few workers and residents of Dugway and Skull Valley. The

commenter stated that the DEIS does not discuss impacts to transportation due to military maneuvers. 

According to this commenter, the NRC needs to realize and understand that Skull Valley Road, in its

present condition (even after serious subsidence and damage caused by the 1982-1983 wet years,

which were not repaired, a point mentioned in the DEIS) is barely suited for the impacts it currently

sustains. The commenter stated that this road is a narrow, 2-lane road with no shoulder and steep

banks on each side and that there are distances of up to 2 miles between places to pull off of Skull

Valley Road. The commenter stated that the pull-offs that do exist are very steep and narrow, and

most require small 4-wheel-drive vehicles to negotiate. (0077)

Response:

Any existing traffic related to military maneuvers is included in the calculation of ADT discussed in

Section 3.5.2.4. The DEIS considered the impact of the incremental increase in traffic on Skull Valley

Road resulting from the proposed action and local transportation alternatives (i.e., the new rail line

from Skunk Ridge or the use of an ITF and heavy haul trucks). The analysis considered existing use

of the road, including military maneuvers. See Section 4.5.1.6 for impacts during construction of the

proposed PFSF, Section 4.5.2.6 for impacts during operation of the proposed PFSF, Section 5.5.1.1

for impacts during construction of the proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge, Section 5.5.1.2 for impacts

during construction of the ITF near Timpie, and Section 5.5.2.2 for impacts during operation if the ITF

alternative is selected. In each instance where it is anticipated that activities associated with the

alternatives may result in adverse impacts to traffic on Skull Valley Road, the DEIS recommended

avoiding or reducing these impacts by appropriate scheduling of the proposed PFSF related traffic. 

See Section 4.5.4 regarding mitigation of adverse traffic impacts during construction and operation of

the proposed PFSF and Section 5.5.4 regarding mitigation of adverse traffic impacts during

construction and operation of the ITF transportation option. The comments on the condition of Skull

Valley Road are addressed in the following summary and response on heavy-haul traffic.

The impact to Skull Valley Road of any change in military operations is speculative and is not the

subject of this environmental review.

Heavy-Haul Traffic

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that if Skull Valley Road is selected as a haul road in place of the rail

alternative, it would create substantial impacts on the highway and highway users. This commenter

argued that the hauling would cause numerous safety concerns and would likely cause substantial

pavement damage. The commenter suggested that the EIS evaluate these operational

considerations. (0198i) The commenter stated that the applicant has inaccurately represented that
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Skull Valley Road is capable of handling the heavy-haul vehicles without road improvements or

upgrades (page xxxviii of DEIS). According to the commenter, the DEIS has inadequate information

to support such a conclusion. (0198) Specific concerns and comments include the following: 

C The same commenter questioned how transportation by truck or rail would be scheduled to avoid

delays and conflicts with normal commerce and emergency transportation. The commenter also

questioned how conflicting transportation on Skull Valley Road will be mitigated, recognizing that

based on information in the license application, there will be up to 200 shipments per year, and

turn-around time for unloading each cask once it arrives will take anywhere from 11 to 22 hours

per cask. (0198h)

C One commenter said that the planned haul vehicles would be oversized and overweight. The

commenter stated that the Utah Code and Utah Administrative Code govern hauling and

permitting. According to the commenter, oversize/overweight permits would be required for each

trip and a separate permit for hauling the SNF would also be required. Additionally, the

commenter stated that escort vehicles would be required for each haul. The commenter argued

that the pavement subgrade materials over much of the highway length are weak and that the

pavement shows extensive cracking over much of the area. According to the commenter,

frequent heavy loads from the proposed hauling would cause severe pavement and subgrade

damage. The commenter stated that oversize/overweight permits would likely not be granted until

the pavement and subgrade can be strengthened, and the highway drainage structures might also

need to be strengthened. According to the commenter, the Statewide Transportation

Improvement Plan currently contains no plans to improve this highway. The applicant would likely

be required to make the necessary improvements as a condition of the permits. The commenter

stated that the summary table on page lxi and the statement on page 4-31, line 44, regarding

potential wear and tear on Skull Valley Road contradict the statement on page xxxviii, line 14, that

the ITF/Alternative 3 will not impact the physical integrity of Skull Valley Road. (0039)

C Commenters stated that the DEIS does not contain an adequate analysis of the potential impacts

of heavy-haul trucks along Skull Valley Road, including safety. These commenters stated that

although the average accident rate for this route is below the expected rate, the severity rate is

high, because the highway was not designed and built to accommodate heavy trucks. According

to the commenters, the pavement is narrow, with narrow, unpaved shoulders. Because of the

long tractor/trailer combinations required, the commenters asserted that there is high potential for

head-on accidents. According to the commenters, there are numerous horizontal and vertical

curves that have insufficient passing sight distance to accommodate vehicles of the size required. 

The commenters asserted that the roadway would require significant improvements to handle the

planned hauling, such as widened pavements, increased shoulder widths, flattened highway

curves, and pullout areas to facilitate safe passing and to accommodate vehicle safety

inspections. Again, the commenters asserted that the Statewide Transportation Improvement

Plan does not address this highway. According to the commenters, the applicant would likely be

required to make these improvements before a permit could be issued. (0012, 0096, 0198)

C Regarding anticipated weight loads and clearance limits, one commenter suggested that the EIS

provide the specification of the existing “22- to 24-foot wide asphalt highway” (ER, Section 2.1.2)

beginning at Timpie and continuing south to the proposed PFSF access road. This commenter

also posed a number of questions about heavy-haul trucks: What are the weight tolerances for

the anticipated 225-ton loaded heavy-haul truck? To what specifications has the road been built? 

Would the road need to be rebuilt to carry the anticipated loads? According to the commenter,

Figures 2.1-2 (2 figures) in the ER are “silent” on the elevation, grade, and performance

specifications of the proposed PFSF access road. The commenter stated that the related

discussions in Section 3.2.1.4 of the ER, although providing more information on the Skull Valley

Road improvements, are silent on the improved road and performance specifications. The

commenter asserted that it appears from the discussion that it is not yet certain whether
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improvements would be within existing road rights-of-way, and that acquisition of rights-of-way

may pose significant challenges. (0198i)

C Prior to making the above improvements to the Skull Valley Road (SR-196), and any other related

roadway, the same commenter stated that an environmental analysis would have to be

completed. The commenter stated that NEPA or State and local requirements would apply. The

commenter asserted that the needed improvements would require addressing impacts to

stream/drainage crossings, rare and endangered species, and cultural and historic resources. 

According to the commenter, State permits, including a UPDES storm water discharge permit for

construction would be required. (0198)

Response:

The applicant has indicated that if the ITF is constructed and operated, specially designed heavy-haul

vehicles with multiple sets of tires to appropriately distribute the weight of the vehicle and its load

would be used on the Skull Valley Road. The applicant indicated that these special vehicles would

adequately distribute the weight of the load and the vehicle itself, and, therefore, modifications to the

Skull Valley Road would not be required. Accordingly, the types of road modifications described in the

comment are not being proposed as part of the project. However, because Skull Valley Road is

designated a State road, a special use permit would be required from the State of Utah for the use of

these heavy-haul vehicles on Skull Valley Road.

Section 5.5.2.2 of the FEIS discusses the potential impacts to Skull Valley Road for the ITF

alternative. The FEIS indicates that 200 cask shipments per year would result in an average of four

round trips per week on Skull Valley Road. Given the small number of trips, the NRC staff concluded

that the traffic impacts would be small. Section 5.5.4 discusses potential mitigation measures that

could further reduce the impact. While the Cooperating Agencies are recommending that the

applicant implement a mitigation measure of scheduling truck shipments so as to avoid local traffic

delays, the recommended measure does not direct PFS as to how scheduling should be done and is

not proposed to be required. Several methods of mitigation regarding the scheduling of PFS traffic

could be developed, such as avoiding periods of heaviest traffic during morning and afternoon

commuting.

Regarding the apparent inconsistency between the Executive Summary and page 4-31 of the DEIS,

the NRC staff has revised the FEIS to acknowledge the potential for increased wear and maintenance

on Skull Valley Road due to heavy-haul truck traffic with the ITF alternative. See the Executive

Summary and Sections 5.5.2.2, 6.1.5.3 and 9.4.1.3 of the EIS.

The State of Utah is responsible for the maintenance of Skull Valley Road. Hence, the required

heavy-haul permit would allow the State to ensure the applicant would operate within the parameters

set by the State for the roadway. No modifications are anticipated for Skull Valley Road. Wear and

tear to the road would be addressed in accordance with State requirements for this type of roadway. 

As stated above, no additional improvements to Skull Valley Road would be expected as a result of

HHT transport; however, if the State determines otherwise, it is expected that the appropriate State

and local environmental reviews would be conducted.

Road Construction

Comment Summary:

One commenter said that before the applicant and the NRC expend enormous amounts of time and

resources on this license application, it is incumbent on the applicant to show that it is entitled to

widen Skull Valley Road, that the proposed road work is within the scope of existing public rights-ofway, and that the casks containing SNF can be safely moved from the railhead 24 miles along a 15-

foot wide roadway to the facility in all weather and traffic conditions. The commenter asserted that the
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application contains little more than the applicants’s hope to widen the road without any right to do so

and without any discussion on how a 15-foot roadway would satisfy health, safety, and environmental

concerns. (0198a)

The same commenter said that under UCA. 27-12-133, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the

right-of-way of any State highway or county road is “dug up or excavated or structures or objects of

any kind or character [are] placed, constructed, or maintained within any such right-of-way unless

permitted by the appropriate authority.” The commenter asserted that there is no indication that the

applicant may widen a public road or move drainage culverts, etc. solely with the cooperation of

Tooele County. Also, the commenter stated that there is no indication that Tooele County is in accord

with the applicant’s plan. Furthermore, the commenter stated that the applicant has not provided plat

maps of the area to show the existing rights-of-way and whether such road widening is feasible. 

Finally, there is no justification that a 15-foot road is sufficient to accommodate the size and quantity of

heavy-haul trucks that will use Skull Valley Road over the life of the proposed PFSF. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. The alternate proposal to construct and operate an

ITF, including the use of heavy-haul vehicles on Skull Valley Road, is described in Section 2.2.4.2 in

this FEIS. The NRC staff recognizes that any additional construction activities associated with Skull

Valley Road could have additional environmental and socioeconomic impacts. However, there are no

proposals to widen or otherwise modify Skull Valley Road or any other road, or to move or replace

drainage culverts. The applicant has claimed that Skull Valley Road is wide enough to accommodate

heavy-haul trucks if the ITF is approved. The NRC requires that licensees comply with all applicable

Federal, state, and local requirements. The EIS assumes that the applicant would comply with all

requirements regarding transportation construction. The comment indicates that the applicant would

need permits from appropriate Utah authorities to widen or otherwise perform work on Skull Valley

Road. The commenter did not identify any specific legal requirements for permits, other than a

criminal provision applicable to persons engaging in such activities without a permit. Nonetheless, the

applicant would have to satisfy any permitting requirements applicable to such activities in order to

engage in them. The applicant has indicated, however, that no work on Skull Valley Road, including

widening the right-of-way, would be necessary for the road to accommodate the transportation of SNF

via heavy-haul vehicles. Accordingly, the comment does not warrant changing the analysis or

conclusions in the EIS. Regarding the safety of transporting SNF from the ITF to the proposed PFSF,

the NRC staff addressed transportation accidents associated with transporting SNF from the ITF in

Section 5.7 of the FEIS, and concluded that the risk of an accident is small.

G.3.13.2.7 Land Use

Existing Land Uses

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern that the DEIS did not address impacts to State lands, private

lands, and State-owned rights-of-way. (0198) 

Another commenter stated that there are no significant conflicts with existing resource management

plans or land use plans within Skull Valley. (0179)

Response: 

The FEIS addresses impacts to land use, regardless of ownership, in Sections 4.5.1.7, 4.5.2.7, 5.5,

and 6.1.5. Impacts to land use are expected to be small for construction and operation of the

proposed PFSF itself, moderate for construction and operation of the proposed rail line, and small for

construction of the ITF and heavy-haul truck transportation of the SNF on Skull Valley Road. 
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NUREG-1714 G-256

Rail Line

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant has not shown the ability to build a rail line from the rail head

at Rowley Junction to the proposed PFSF. The main rail line is on the north side of Interstate 80. A

narrow freeway underpass allows access to Skull Valley Road on the south side of Interstate 80 and

from there it is 25 miles along the two-way, 22-foot-wide Skull Valley Road to the proposed PFSF. 

The commenter stated that if the applicant cannot use the public right-of-way, it must acquire Skull

Valley Road (from the BLM and intervenors, Castle Rock, et al.). The commenter asserted that it is

highly unlikely that these landowners would grant a right-of-way to the applicant that would permit rail

transportation of SNF across their land. Thus, the commenter believed it should be presumed that the

applicant would have to build an ITF at Rowley Junction and transport the SNF to the proposed PFSF

by road. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. The applicant withdrew the proposal to construct a

new rail line along the Skull Valley Road. The FEIS evaluates the applicant’s replacement proposal

for a new rail line on the western side of Skull Valley (approximately seven miles from Skull Valley

Road) on land managed by the BLM.

Utah Trust Lands

Comment Summary:

In scoping comments, one commenter stated that the DEIS must address impacts to the Trust Lands

Administration lands adjacent to transport routes and around the proposed ITF. (0198h, 0198i) The

commenter stated that if the lands of the Trust Lands Administration are adversely affected, then they

should either be compensated or the license for the proposal should be denied. (0198h)

The same commenter also stated that the EIS must analyze the direct and indirect impacts of the

transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF, including the economic impact to trust lands adjacent to

transportation routes. The commenter stated that the EIS must assess the economic impact to the

lands administered by the Trust Lands Administration around Rowley Junction, the proposed ITF site. 

(0198h)

The commenter stated that it is critical that the NRC, the BLM, and the BIA take into account the

purpose of trust lands in the DEIS. The commenter said that the problem of addressing the handling

of high level radioactive waste is fraught with uncertainties as a result of the complexity of technical

issues, its novelty, its extraordinary time horizon, and the extreme difficulty in predicting with any

confidence the numerous unknowns associated with high level radioactive waste.

The commenter stated that the economic analysis must account for all diminution in value to trust

lands, including any impact to trust lands “caused by” the public’s attitude towards the proposal and its

involvement with the handling, transportation and storage of high level radioactive waste.

The commenter said that the effect of the public’s apprehension on the market value and revenue

generating potential of trust lands surrounding the proposed transportation routes, including the

railroad line, are of concern to the Trust Lands Administration. The commenter stated that it has been

documented that property values of lands near proposals involving high level radioactive waste have

been diminished as a result of this apprehension, referring to City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 14 NM 659,

845 P.2d 753 (1992). The commenter stated that the market value and revenue generating potential

of these trust lands would probably be adversely affected if NRC approves the proposal. Furthermore,

the commenter stated that an NRC regulation, 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, App. A, provides that the
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G-257 NUREG-1714

EIS must identify possible conflicts among the proposal and its alternatives and the objectives of

Federal and State policies.

The commenter said that if the EIS determines that the economic value and revenue generating

potential of trust lands will be adversely affected or that the Trust Lands Administration will be

hindered in its ability to effectively manage trust land, the United States, acting through the NRC, must

honor its duty as grantor of the trust and either compensate the Trust Lands Administration or deny

licensing of the proposal. (0198h)

Response:

The NRC received these comments during scoping meetings and prior to the publishing of the DEIS. 

Impacts along the proposed rail line from Skunk Ridge and at the alternative ITF near Timpie are

addressed and discussed in Chapter 5 of this EIS. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies did not

identify any significant adverse impacts to lands adjacent to the proposed project area, including any

Utah Trust Lands; therefore, the NRC staff did not identify any conflicts between the proposal and

State policies related to Trust Lands. Further discussion of potential impacts to property values is

included in Section G.3.13.2.8.

G.3.13.2.8 Economic Structure

General Comments

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters indicated that the project would have long-term negative impacts on Utah’s

economy and that the DEIS did not address socioeconomic impacts of the project outside of Tooele

County and outside the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band. (0012, 0041, 0204, GR-01, SL1-01,

SL1-04, SL1-05, SL1-10, SL1-16, SL2-01, SL3-04, SL3-28) 

Specifically, the commenters focused on the following potential economic impacts:

C One commenter said that the stated $53 million in economic benefits to Utah is small in

comparison with the project’s annual budget or the 20-year budget. (SL1-07) 

C Several commenters stated that the people of Utah will receive no benefits from the proposed

PFSF, but that the profits of the nuclear industry and the safety of people in the east will increase. 

(GR-13, SL1-10, SL3-49) 

C One commenter stated that the analysis for the proposed Yucca Mountain project by the Nuclear

Waste Project Office in Nevada showed that as many as 30,000 jobs could be lost in Las Vegas

alone due to the permanent geologic repository being sited there. The commenter thought such

an impact should be considered for the proposed action. (SL2-12)

Several commenters questioned the statement that the County will benefit economically from the

proposed PFSF, since the facility will be on Reservation land, where county taxes are not collected,

and property values would decrease resulting in lower revenues for the County. (0112, SL3-46, SL3-

54) 

C One commenter asserted that the applicant would pay the Skull Valley Band members favoring

the proposal and Tooele County approximately $48 million over the 40-year period. Based on this

and other assumptions, the commenter calculated that this payment was equivalent to a payment

of $100 per acre for the land affected by the proposed action. The commenter stated that the

proposed action would preclude other more economically beneficial uses of the land. (0112)
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NUREG-1714 G-258

• One commenter suggested that the project would create a major economic disincentive for other

businesses that might otherwise locate in Tooele County. (0198)

C One commenter stated that it is not appropriate for any property owner or any business to operate

in a manner that damages other businesses and other people’s property rights. (SL3-05)

Other commenters expressed concern that the discussion of potential economic impacts is not broad

enough. Specifically, these commenters recommend that the discussion cover the following issues:

C One commenter suggested that the discussion in Section 4.5 should include current employment,

economic, and tax revenue statistics as a comparison to the overall existing scale of the local

economy. (0179) 

C Another commenter recommended discussion of the impact of closure of the proposed PFSF on

Tooele County and the Skull Valley Band. More specifically, the commenter, pointing to page

4-64, Section 4.9.5, lines 7-8, stated that the impacts of closure of the proposed PFSF should

include the loss of revenue to the County pursuant to the County-PFS agreement, in addition to

the loss of tax payments and the loss of revenue to the Skull Valley Band. (0163) Additionally, the

commenter stated that on page 7-33, line 14, the payments to Tooele County would be made

pursuant to the agreement between the applicant and the County and would not be “tax

payments.” As stated in the comment, on page 4-36, lines 16-17, the correct estimate for these

payments is $91.2 million, as stated in ER Section 7.2.2. (0163)

C The same commenter stated that the discussion on page xlii, line 40, regarding the benefit to

Tooele County, should include economic benefits called for under the agreement between the

County and the applicant. (0163)

One commenter stated that there is an economic and societal cost in providing for firefighting and law

enforcement services. The commenter said that the applicant chose to locate on an Indian

reservation, thus attempting to avoid many State and local environmental regulations and taxing

requirements. There is no assessment in the DEIS of the costs that would occur from the applicant

using governmental resources. (0198)

Response:

In general, there should be positive economic effects (see Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) within the State of

Utah, including areas outside Tooele County, resulting from increased employment and income

generated by the project’s spending during construction and operation. Regarding the comment about

potential job losses resulting from the proposed PFSF, the commenter did not identify a specific

reference for the staff to review. The NRC staff has evaluated employment impacts (see 4.5 and 5.5)

from construction and operation of the proposed PFSF and rail line and concluded that those impacts

are small. The NRC staff found no basis for a conclusion that the PFS project would result in job

losses in Utah.

In general, costs of the project would be paid by the individual reactor licensees. These same reactor

licensees would receive net benefits to the extent that the costs they would be charged to use the

proposed PFSF would be less than the costs of continuing to store SNF at the reactor site. The

benefits and costs are assessed in Chapter 8 of this FEIS.

The NRC staff researched the issue of County and State tax payments related to the proposed PFSF. 

This issue is discussed more fully in Section 4.5.2.8 of the FEIS, which states that the applicant has

negotiated a separate agreement with Tooele County under which the applicant would pay an

estimated $91.2 million to the County over the life of the project. Similarly, the applicant estimated

State tax payments in the amount of $53.5 million over the life of the project, from sales tax related to

purchasing equipment, materials, and supplies for the facility including the manufacturing of steel
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-259 NUREG-1714

liners for the storage casks. These sales taxes would not be the only economic benefit to Utah from

the proposed action.

As discussed below, the NRC staff is not aware of any evidence that property values in the County or

any other place, will decrease in the future as asserted in the comment. The NRC staff reviewed the

commenter’s calculations for the “opportunity cost” of the land and found no basis for the assumptions

included in the calculation. The staff cannot concur with the commenter’s analysis and believes the

socioeconomic analysis in the FEIS is adequate and accurate. Furthermore, the elected government

of the Skull Valley Band has determined that this is an appropriate use of their land.

The NRC staff reviewed the concern that the proposed PFSF and other hazardous waste facilities in

the area have created a disincentive for other companies to locate to Tooele County. Although the

hazardous waste facilities cited by the commenter are currently present in Tooele County, the County

has continued to experience a higher growth rate (2.9 percent) than the State as a whole (2.1 percent)

for the time period through the 1990s. The growth rate demonstrates that people continue to locate in

Tooele County and that businesses to serve those people also continue to locate in the County. The

NRC staff has not identified any basis for concluding that the proposed PFSF would affect a business’

decision to locate in Tooele County.

Based on the most recently available data, the DEIS described current employment, economic, and

tax information relevant to the assessment (see Section 3.5.2.3). The DEIS also assessed the

socioeconomic impacts of closure of the proposed PFSF in the discussion of decommissioning

impacts in Section 4.9.5; the NRC staff assessed these impacts to be relatively small, although

perhaps the most potentially significant impact would be the loss of revenue to the Skull Valley Band

(from the lease payments) and the loss of revenue to State and local governments (from tax payments

and payments in lieu of taxes). These jurisdictions would have sufficient notice of the date of the

proposed PFSF’s closure to plan for the loss of these revenues.

Regarding the comment on regulatory requirements and the costs of using government resources, the

applicant will be subject to Federal regulation and any environmental mitigation requirements

established by the NRC and Cooperating Agencies. Section 4.5.2.8 of this FEIS lists estimated tax

payments that would be made to the State of Utah. As noted in Section G.3.13.1.1, the applicant will

provide its own on-site security force and its own firefighting equipment and brigade for the proposed

PFSF. The likelihood of a significant event that would require the use of offsite governmental

resources is considered to be low; therefore, there is little likelihood of costs to State and local

governments resulting from such an event.

Tax Revenues and Expenditures

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters expressed concern with how the proposed action will affect Utah’s taxpayers and

the State’s tax revenues.

C One commenter expressed concerned that the DEIS did not address economic impacts to Utah’s

taxpayers. The commenter said that the cost of training and providing emergency personnel

would be the State of Utah’s responsibility and that Utah’s taxpayers would have to pay for

accidents that might occur at the proposed PFSF or during the transportation of the waste. (SL2-

07) 

C One commenter said that the State will not receive any tax money since the proposed PFSF

would be on Reservation lands. (SL3-46)

C One commenter asserted that the State and local communities may experience a loss in tax

revenue (e.g., State income, sales, and property). This commenter also stated that
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-260

socioeconomic impacts related to the applicant’s proposal may occur beyond the boundaries of

Tooele County. According to this commenter, direct and socioeconomic impacts from the loss of

Hill AFB would affect the entire state, including Davis, Weber, Morgan, Box Elder, Cache, and Salt

Lake counties. The commenter stated that NEPA requires such impacts to be assessed. (0198e)

Response: 

The NRC staff considers severe rail accidents resulting in a release of radioactive material and

subsequent cleanup costs to be very unlikely, and, therefore, considers the likelihood that Utah

taxpayers would have to pay for transportation accidents to be low. Accordingly, the staff need not

consider such costs in its evaluation. For more discussion of the economic cost of transportation

accidents see Section G.3.16.6. Furthermore, accidents resulting from transportation of SNF to and

from a reactor are covered under the Price-Anderson Act. The NRC has specific indemnity and

insurance requirements for the transport of SNF to and from a reactor site. Although not required, the

applicant committed to pursue and maintain nuclear liability insurance for the proposed PFSF in the

maximum commercially available amount of $200 million. The SER, as updated, for the proposed

PFSF concluded that there would be no release of radioactive materials in effluents during normal and

credible accident conditions. Therefore, it is not anticipated that an accident at the proposed PFSF

would exceed the $200 million coverage.

In its emergency plan, the applicant identified equipment and personnel capable of responding to

emergency situations at the proposed PFSF. The applicant’s emergency plan for the proposed PFSF

also includes provisions for training entities providing emergency response assistance. The training

would include facility orientation, exposure guidelines, personnel monitoring devices, and basic

contamination control principles (PFS/EP 2000. “Emergency Plan, Private Fuel Storage Facility, Skull

Valley Indian Reservation, Tooele County, Utah, (Rev 10),” NRC Docket No. 72-22, Private Fuel

Storage, LLC). All states provide emergency response for transportation accidents involving

hazardous materials. There are a number of shipments of radiological materials within the State of

Utah, for which the state already provides capable emergency response. The North American

Emergency Response Guidebook for First Responders involving hazardous materials, developed in

part by the DOT, does not distinguish between the actions needed for a SNF shipment and other

shipments containing radioactive materials (U.S. Department of Transportation. “2000 Emergency

Response Guidebook, A Guide for First Responders During the Initial Phase of a Dangerous

Goods/Hazardous Materials Incident”). Therefore, an assumption that additional cost would be

incurred, for unique or different training to respond to potential transportation accidents involving SNF,

does not appear to be justified. 

Additional impacts on the economic structure of the impact area during the operational life of the

proposed PFSF include county tax payments, local payroll, and other local expenditures. Payments to

Tooele County have been estimated to be $91.2 million over the life of the proposed PFSF (based on

a proposed agreement negotiated between the applicant and the County) (PFS/RAI2 1999). Local

payroll during operation of the proposed PFSF has been estimated to be $81 million (based on the

applicant’s estimate of actual staff positions and anticipated pay for each position, including benefits)

(PFS/RAI2 1999). Other local expenditures, including operations support and reactor licensees, have

been estimated to be $79 million (based on the applicant’s estimate of the number of personnel

involved, the number of buildings, and the estimated utility load for these buildings) (PFS/RAI2 1999). 

In addition, steel liners for the storage casks would be fabricated in the Salt Lake City or Tooele

County area over a 21-year period and shipped over-the-road by truck to the proposed site on the

Reservation, where they would be filled with concrete from the batch plant; the number of weekly

shipments to the site would be four (or 200 per year). The construction cost of casks and canisters

has been estimated to be $747 million (PFS/RAI2 1999). The direct and indirect benefits of cask and

liner construction would accrue to whatever jurisdiction hosts their manufacture. The expenditures

identified above would result in sales tax payments to the State of Utah, estimated to be $53.5 million

(based on the applicant’s review of the Utah tax structure). (PFS/RAI2 1999)
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G-261 NUREG-1714

Section 6.3 describes the cumulative impacts to the region from the proposed project. The NRC and

the Cooperating Agencies did not identify any significant adverse socioeconomic impacts in Tooele

County or beyond.

The comment on socioeconomic impacts related to Hill AFB is addressed in Section G.3.13.3.1,

“Military Operations.”

Property Values 

Comment Summary:

Many commenters were concerned that the project’s potential impact on the property values of homes

in the area or along transportation routes has not been adequately addressed. (0071, GR-18, GR-22,

SL1-05, SL2-12, SL3-05, SL3-14, SL3-39, SL3-54)

Several commenters stated that whether there is a real or only a perceived potential for accidents and

health hazards, there would be a negative effect on property values, and there should be

compensation for the loss of value. (SL1-05, SL3-04, SL3-05, SL3-39) 

Several commenters discussed the Komis case, in which a property owner was awarded damages for

the reduction of property value due to the public’s perceived risk. See City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114

N.M. 659, 845 P.2d 753 (1992) (Komis). (GR-22, SL1-05, SL2-07, SL3-05, SL3-55) According to one

commenter, in Komis, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld an award of property damages of

$337,850 to John and Lemonia Komis for perceived loss due to the public perception of fear. (GR-22) 

One commenter stated that the studies in the case determined that the public perception devaluation

was in the 11 percent to 30 percent range. (SL3-05) According to one commenter, the proposed

shipments to Skull Valley would pass through low income and minority neighborhoods in Salt Lake

City. The commenter stated that the courts upheld that property values decrease along nuclear waste

transportation corridors and that property owners along such corridors are entitled to compensation for

the loss of value.

One commenter offered a calculation of property value loss for 100 miles along the Wasatch Front at

$5 billion to $20 billion, using a 15 percent decrease in value on properties within one-half to two miles

of the tracks. (0086) Two commenters stated that agricultural land or products from the land would

also lose value. (SL2-07, SL3-05)

Another commenter said residents of Skull Valley and other communities might feel compelled to

move if the site were approved. (SL3-54) 

Response: 

Several commenters requested that the FEIS include a discussion of potential negative effects on

property values of the proposed PFSF and associated transportation of SNF, regardless of whether

such effects arise from a real or perceived risk of accidents. Because the commenters believe there

would be negative effects, they request that the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies require a

mitigation measure for any loss of value. As discussed below, however, the potential for any

reduction in property values that might result from the proposed action is too far removed from the

proposed action to warrant consideration in the EIS.

As indicated by the Supreme Court, to warrant consideration in an EIS, environmental effects must

have a reasonably close causal relationship to a change in the physical environment. See

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (PANE). The

Supreme Court also held that “risk of an accident is not an effect on the physical environment.” 

PANE, 460 U.S. at 775 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, in order for the proposed action to have

an adverse impact on property values, it must have an actual effect on the physical environment, and
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NUREG-1714 G-262

the risk of an accident is not such an effect. The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies have not

identified any effects on the physical environment that would have an adverse effect on the property

values, nor have the commenter identified any such physical effects.

The comments refer to a decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico as showing that the value of

properties along transportation routes for SNF decline because people are afraid of the dangers

associated with nuclear waste transportation. See Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 845 P.2d 753. That

decision, however, affirmed a trial court determination of actual damages based on the fair market

value of land remaining after a partial taking to construct a highway on which radioactive materials

were to be transported. (Id.) The Supreme Court of New Mexico did not consider in Komis whether

asserted effects on property values need to be evaluated in an EIS, and the Komis decision does not

undercut the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in PANE. The Komis decision does not require that the

NRC and the Cooperating Agencies evaluate whether property values might be reduced along rail

corridors because of the risks of transportation of SNF by rail to the proposed PFSF.

G.3.13.3 Indirect Impacts

G.3.13.3.1 Military Operations 

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters were concerned that the DEIS did not analyze the socioeconomic impacts to

military operations such as Dugway Proving Ground, Hill AFB, Tooele Army Depot, the Deseret

Chemical Facility, UTTR, or surrounding communities. Commenters stated that these facilities are

strategically important to the military and to national security, and that the DEIS should discuss the

possibility and impacts of curtailed operations at these facilities due to the location of the proposed

PFSF. (0012, 0034, 0042, 0077, 0083, 0087, 0090, 0096, 0112, 0134, 0137, 0154, 0198, 0198e,

0198i, 0201, 0210, 0210a, 0256, GR-01, SL1-01, SL1-12, SL1-20, SL1-21, SL1-34, SL2-11, SL3-02,

SL3-06, SL3-20, SL3-28, SL3-30)

One commenter stated that Congress recognized, in its 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, the

potential for conflict between possible uses of federal land and the important goal of preserving the

UTTR. The commenter stated that the DEIS did not recognize this potential or describe its economic

and other impacts. (0198) Another commenter stated that the study required by Section 2815 of the

National Defense Authorization Act to evaluate the impact upon military training, testing, and

operational readiness of any proposed changes in land management of the Utah national defense

lands has not been completed. (0210a, GR-01)

Many commenters stated that the Air Force would have to impose special flight restrictions over the

proposed PFSF and this would have a negative impact on military base operations, military readiness,

military training, and national defense. Commenters stated that use of this airspace and Military

Operating Area is essential to the UTTR because it offers an ingress route that is irreplaceable, it is

the largest overland special use airspace within the continental United States, it is a testing and pilot

training area, and it is critical to the military readiness of the United States. (0012, 0087, 0198, 0198e,

0198i, 0210, 0215, GR-01, SL1-01, SL2-11, SL3-20, SL3-28) Several of the commenters provided the

following specific concerns: 

C One commenter stated that the proposed action constitutes a threat to the viability and mission of

the UTTR, operated out of Hill AFB. The commenter stated that the base is a large piece of the

economy for Utah and that a zero probability cannot be placed on the chance of accidental

release of live ordinance, thus threatening the operations of the UTTR. (0198i) 

C One commenter expressed concern that the DEIS did not include the DOD in its analysis of the

effects of storing SNF adjacent to the Hill AFB Bombing Range and the Wendover Bombing

Range, as well as the effects to national security if their use is limited. The commenter added that
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there is no analysis of the possibility of military use of the bombing ranges if SNF casks were hit. 

(0096)

C Several commenters stated that the DEIS does not consider the economic risk and cost to Utah’s

economy if the military is forced to restrict its testing adjacent to the proposed PFSF. 

Commenters added that such restrictions could cost thousands of jobs at Hill AFB. (0090, 0198,

0256, GR-01, SL3-20)

C Several commenters were concerned that the proposed PFSF is likely to harm Hill AFB’s ability to

escape the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process and subsequently impact the regional

economy. (0087, 0112, 0137, 0154, 0198, 0215, 0256, GR-01, SL2-11, SL3-04, SL3-28, SL3-30)

One commenter said that the proposed PFSF could result in cumulative impacts on military

operations, leading to adverse socioeconomic impacts on Utah's economy. The commenter asserted

that restrictions in military training or weapons testing may have subsequent socioeconomic impacts

on Utah communities that rely on employment at the UTTR and Hill AFB. "Weakening of the UTTR

will cripple the military value of Hill AFB and subject it to possible closure." (Citing statement by Utah

First District Congressman, Representative James V. Hansen, Limited Appearance Session, Salt Lake

City, June 23, 2000) (0198e)

Specifically, the commenter cited the following information:

C The commenter (citing the SAR, rev. 13, at 2.2- 8) stated that the proposed PFSF and the

proposed Low rail line would be located under the Sevier B Military Operating Area. (0198e)

C According to the commenter the UTTR-Dugway Proving Ground airspace, including the Military

Operating Areas, is an irreplaceable testing and pilot training area, and its continued availability is

critical to the military readiness of the United States. (Citing statement by Utah First District

Congressman, Representative James V. Hansen, Limited Appearance Session, Salt Lake City,

June 23, 2000) (0198e)

C The commenter (citing letter from Colonel Ronald G. Oholendt to Governor Michael O. Leavitt,

May 3, 1991, Exhibit 5) also stated that to simulate combat conditions, Hill AFB aircraft carrying

live ammunition must use the Sevier B Military Operating Area in Skull Valley to make an

undetected approach to war targets located on UTTR-Dugway Proving Ground. The commenter

stated that aircraft use the Sevier B Military Operating Area for low and medium altitude entries

into restricted airspace over the UTTR-Dugway Proving Ground landmass, weapons testing, and

air-to-air combat training. The commenter asserted that there is no other suitable nearby airspace

in which Hill AFB aircraft may perform undetected combat exercises. The commenter further

asserted that even a five-nautical-mile overflight prohibition above the proposed PFSF would

eliminate the use of the Sevier B Military Operating Area. (0198e)

C The commenter (citing Economic Report to the Governor, State of Utah Governor's Office of

Budget and Planning, January 2000 at 153, Exhibit 4) stated that various military missions require

use of the range to train combat-ready forces. The commenter cited, as an example, Hill AFB,

Utah, which is headquarters for one of ten new "expeditionary" forces for deployment to troubled

areas around the world. (0198e)

C The commenter (citing the Economic Report at 153) stated that Hill AFB is a major part of the

State economy because it is Utah's largest basic employer. The commenter stated that Hill AFB

currently employs 11,628 civilians, 4,619 military personnel, 1,112 reservists, and 3,718

contractors for a total of 21,077 positions. The commenter estimated that 12,351 additional jobs

are attributable to the operation of Hill AFB. Additionally, the commenter stated that new contracts

and other realignments are expected to create 2,700 to 3,000 additional new jobs in the next three

years. (0198e)
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C The commenter (citing Realignment Scenarios, Exhibit 6, at 11) stated that in fiscal year 1993,

$578 million in wages were paid to civilian, military personnel, and reservists at Hill AFB. 

According to the commenter, $196.8 million in goods and services were purchased by Hill AFB in

fiscal year 1993. The commenter asserted that the existence and operation of Hill AFB has also

led to increases in indirect and induced employment. (0198e)

C The commenter stated that the DEIS fails to comply with NEPA and 10 CFR 51.71(d) because it

does not adequately assess the cumulative and socioeconomic impacts from loss of Military

Operating Area airspace use. The commenter referenced the EIS Scope in the DEIS (Appendix

A, Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process, Supplemental Scoping Report, Private Fuel

Storage Facility, Skull Valley Indian Reservation, Tooele County, Utah, November 1999). The

commenter stated that the Scoping Report said the scope of the EIS would include "potential

cumulative impacts, if any, of the proposed facility in the context of other existing and proposed

facilities and activities in the area" and "the direct and indirect economic effects (both beneficial

and adverse) on employment, taxes, residential and commercial development, agriculture, and

public services in the area." The commenter asserted that the Scoping Report implied that the

EIS would address the impacts to the vitality and mission of the UTTR, which is a cumulative and

socioeconomic impact that the commenter raised in its supplemental scoping comments. 

Moreover, the commenter stated that Section 3.2 "Issues Outside the Scope of the EIS," of the

Supplemental Scoping Report addresses issues such as those relating to conflicts in State-Tribal

jurisdiction and the DOE responsibilities and activities, as well as issues relating to health and

safety that will be evaluated in the SER. The commenter stated that Section 3.2 of the

Supplemental Scoping Report does not indicate that the impacts to the vitality and mission of the

UTTR and the effect on Utah's economy are outside the scope of the DEIS. (0198e)

One commenter stated that the proposed PFSF poses no threat to the continued operation of Hill AFB

and thus no threat to the economy of the State of Utah. The commenter based this statement on the

analysis of risk to the proposed PFSF from military aircraft flights and ordnance used on and around

the UTTR. Based on this analysis the commenter determined that the probability of an accident

involving military aircraft ordnance is extremely low. The commenter added that the probability that

such an unlikely accident would cause a release of radioactive material is further reduced by the

robust design and construction of the storage casks. (0163)

Another commenter stated that the assurances by the NRC and the applicant that no overflight

restrictions would be necessary are based on mathematical calculations of the unlikeliness of an

accident involving the Air Force and the proposed facility. The commenter indicated that the Air Force

agrees that an accident is unlikely and has asked that the FEIS state that there is no foreseeable

reason why the facility owners or the NRC should ever require or seek any changes in the operation of

UTTR. (0068)

Response: 

Text has been added to Section 3.5.2.1 in this FEIS to describe more fully the military resources in the

area, including the military flight access corridor in the Sevier B Military Operating Area. In regard to

the UTTR, the NRC staff met with the U.S. Air Force about the potential for impacts to the UTTR or

the mission of Hill AFB. No overflight restrictions are being contemplated to accommodate the

proposed PFSF. The SER addressed the potential for air crashes into the proposed site. The NRC

staff has determined that such an accident is not credible.

The NRC staff has not identified any impact on the operations of Dugway Proving Ground, Hill AFB,

Tooele Army Depot, Desert Chemical Facility, or the UTTR from the presence of the proposed PFSF. 

The NRC staff evaluated potential hazards to the proposed site from military operations and other

facilities in the Skull Valley area. These operations included military aircraft operations and cruise

missile testing in the UTTR and other past and present military operations. The NRC staff determined

from its review and the applicant’s analyses that an accident at the proposed PFSF, such as an F-16
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air crash, resulting from these activities is extremely unlikely (less than one chance in a million per

year). Accordingly, such accidents are not reasonably foreseeable, and do not require consideration

in this FEIS. 

The U.S. Air Force will be aware of the presence of the proposed PFSF when planning future

activities. The U.S. Air Force has indicated they will not require any significant restrictions on military

operations within the UTTR due to the presence of the proposed PFSF. Therefore, the NRC staff

concluded the proposed PFSF will not pose any significant limitation or other impacts on nearby

military installations and other military operations. As a result, the staff did not identify any

socioeconomic or national security impacts on nearby military operations from the proposed PFSF.

G.3.13.3.2 Other Indirect Impacts

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that increased light pollution could have significant impacts on astrological

(sic) observations at Dugway Proving Ground. (0198)

The same commenter stated that discussion of socioeconomic impacts in Section 2.7 of the ER is

inadequate. The commenter said that the applicant’s ER overinflates the indirect benefit of the

project, while under reporting the project’s potential indirect costs. (0198h)

Response:

Lighting would be designed for the security, monitoring, and surveillance of the storage casks. 

Lighting for the 40-ha (99-acre) restricted-access area would be provided by lights atop 40-m (130-ft)

poles located at the perimeter of the area. The light fixtures would be downcast and shielded to

minimize light pollution. It is expected that impacts from light pollution will be minimal.

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. Both the direct and indirect impacts to

socioeconomic and community resources during the operational period of the proposed PFSF are

primarily associated with workers who might move into the area. These impacts were summarized in

Table 4.5, “Potential Impacts to Socioeconomic and Community Resources During the Operation of

the Proposed PFSF,” of the FEIS. As set forth in the FEIS, impacts to the socioeconomic and

community resources of the Skull Valley Band and their Reservation are indistinguishable from those

to the remainder of Tooele County with the exception of population, land use, and economic structure.

Because the operations workforce (direct and indirect) would be relatively small and the operations

period would be relatively long, the effect of the proposed project on the economic structure of the

local area would be small, but favorable and long-lasting. The commenter’s specific issues regarding

socioeconomic impacts are addressed throughout this section (Section G.3.13).

G.3.13.4 Cumulative Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the proposed PFSF should be more fully evaluated in context with the

cumulative impacts of other facilities in the region. The commenters stated that Tooele County is

already overburdened by many environmental and hazardous waste facilities (e.g., Superfund sites),

that the large number of hazardous waste facilities in the area is a disincentive for other companies to

move to Tooele County, and suggested that the communities that generate the waste should take

responsibility for it. (0011, 0171, GR-18, SL1-20, SL2-06, SL3-07)
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NUREG-1714 G-266

More specifically, commenters expressed the following concerns: 

C One commenter stated that the analysis of the indirect and cumulative impacts of the proposed

action on the local Tooele County economy and on individual property values is inadequate. 

(0113)

C One commenter stated that the existing toxic uses of land in the Skull Valley region are not

addressed. The commenter added that ethical decision-making has been lacking in the past, the

present, and apparently will be in the future. (0011)

C One commenter expressed concern that the cumulative impacts from facilities in the region will

affect property values. (GR-18)

C One commenter expressed concern that the incentive to clean up other facilities in Tooele County

will be lost due to the placement of SNF in Skull Valley. (SL2-06)

One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to address the potential cumulative and socioeconomic

impacts of building and operating the proposed PFSF and the rail line from Skunk Ridge (near Low,

UT) under the Sevier B Military Operating Area, limiting currently authorized use of Sevier B Military

Operating Area airspace and any subsequent socioeconomic impacts on the communities that support

activities conducted in the Sevier B Military Operating Area. (The commenter referenced DEIS pages

5-21 to 5-29). The commenter stated that the DEIS makes a brief reference to the fact that the military

is a major land owner in Tooele County (the commenter referenced DEIS at page 3-36), and that the

government, including the military, provides more jobs by far than any other employer in Tooele

County (DEIS at page 3-39). The commenter asserted that there is not even a reference in the DEIS

that the proposed PFSF or the Low rail line is under the Sevier B Military Operating Area, let alone an

analysis of the impacts on the military or Utah’s economy. The commenter stated that the DEIS does

not comply with NEPA because it omits an analysis or assessment of the cumulative and

socioeconomic impacts that the proposed PFSF and Low rail line may have on Hill AFB and Utah’s

economy. (0198e)

Response: 

The cumulative impacts of the proposed PFSF in conjunction with other hazardous waste facilities in

the Tooele County vicinity is discussed in Section 6.3. The cumulative impact analysis covers the full

range of environmental effects. The analysis concluded that all potential cumulative impacts of the

project would be small, with the exception of scenic quality. The proposed PFSF, in conjunction with

other development in the area, would create a moderate impact to the scenic quality of the area from

that of an undeveloped rural area to one that includes residential, commercial, and industrial

development. Cumulative health impacts were found to be small. Section 5.7, “Human Health

Impacts of SNF Transportation,” contains a more thorough discussion of this issue. 

The NRC staff reviewed the concern that the proposed PFSF and other hazardous waste facilities in

the area have created a disincentive for other companies to locate to Tooele County. Tooele County

has continued to experience a higher growth rate (2.9 percent) than the State as a whole (2.1 percent)

for the 1990s. The growth rate demonstrates that people continue to locate in Tooele County and that

businesses to serve those people will continue to locate there as well.

Cumulative impacts on the growth and development potential of Tooele County are considered in the

FEIS in Section 6.3.5, “Socioeconomic and Community Resources,” in which the NRC staff concludes

that both of the local transportation options would involve rail transfer points located in areas that may

be used in the future for similar expansion or development (e.g., for other waste management

activities in the Tooele County's Interstate 80 Planning District). Tooele County has adopted waste

management as one of its development activities for this part of the County. The FEIS also states that

the potential for cumulative impacts to socioeconomic and community resources exists, since almost
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all residential and infrastructure options for all activities in Tooele County are in the Rush or Tooele

Valley portions of the County.

Regarding potential cumulative or socioeconomic impacts to military operations in the area, the NRC

staff met with the U.S. Air Force about the potential for impacts to the UTTR or the mission of Hill

AFB. No overflight restrictions are being contemplated to accommodate the proposed PFSF. The

NRC staff concluded that the proposed PFSF would not result in any significant cumulative

socioeconomic impact to Hill AFB. However, the text in this FEIS in Section 3.5.2.1 has been revised

to include additional information about military aircraft using Skull Valley and the Sevier B Military

Operating Area.
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G.3.14 Cultural Resources

G.3.14.1 Cultural Properties

Comment Summary:

One commenter asserted that there is a potential for historic properties to be on-site and in the

surrounding area. The commenter indicated that the Donner Party Historic Trail alignment, Pony

Express California, and Hawaiian Historic Settlement are within eight miles of the proposal. (0198h) 

Other commenters stated that the applicant should consult with state and Federal agencies about

possible disturbance of cultural resources. Commenters stated that the DEIS should clarify what type

of on-site training the applicant will provide to ensure cultural resources are not disturbed. (0047,

0089) Another commenter stated that the DEIS failed to list the cultural resources that may be

affected and the extent of these impacts. (0112)

Two commenters called for an inventory of archaeological resources affected along the proposed rail

alignment. (0096, 0198h, 0198i) One of these commenters indicated that archaeological resources

have been encountered along the proposed railway alignment. The commenter stated that the BLM

has records of artifacts near the proposed railway. (0198i)

One commenter wanted the Lincoln and Victory Highways, the Central Pacific Railroad, and the first

transcontinental telegraph line to be cited and evaluated as cultural landmarks. (0112)

Two commenters stated that the Hastings Cut-Off Trail and Donner-Reed Trail may be impacted and

asked why these trails were not properly evaluated. (0112, 0198, 0198c, 0198i) One commenter said

that these two significant historical resources may be lost where the rail line crosses them. The

commenter also stated that the ER does not quantify or otherwise evaluate this loss as a cost of

obtaining a license to store SNF on the Skull Valley Reservation. (0198c) The other commenter

asserted that the DEIS is negligent in not providing additional documentation on the Hastings Trail

and, thus, cannot conclude that the cumulative impact to cultural resources is low. (0112) 

One commenter was concerned about the impacts of traffic and road construction to the native

Hawaiian townsite of Iosepa and Horseshoe Springs on Skull Valley Road. (0039, 0077)

Response: 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have contacted numerous agencies, Tribes, and

organizations and offered an opportunity to participate in the consultation process required by Section

106 of the NHPA. These agencies, Tribes, and organizations include State agencies (including Utah

SHPO), Federally recognized Indian Tribes (including the Northwestern Band of Shoshoni Nation,

Northern Ute, Tribal Council of the Te-Moak Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada, Paiute Indian

Tribe of Utah, Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation, and the Skull Valley Band), and other

organizations (including National Park Service, member organizations of the Utah Historic Trails

Consortium, National Railway Historical Society, Iosepa Historical Society, U.S. Army Dugway Proving

Ground and Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia) that may be concerned with the possible effects of the proposed

action on historic properties. 

The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies conducted ongoing consultations, required by the NHPA and

its implementing regulations, with all Tribal, State, and Federal offices, including the Advisory Council

on Historic Preservation, along with the other interested parties, to ensure compliance with historic

preservation laws and regulations concerning mitigation of potential adverse effects during

construction activities. The consultation process included the consulting parties’ evaluation of the

results of a literature review, through ethnographic and historic eligibility recommendations,

determination of effects on the properties’ eligibility for inclusion in the National Register of Historic
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NUREG-1714 G-270

Places (National Register), and development of mitigation measures. These mitigation measures will

be documented in an agreement developed by all consulting parties. This agreement will outline

measures that the applicant shall take to avoid, minimize, or mitigate any adverse effects. 

Additionally, the agreement will contain a commitment to develop a Treatment Plan that includes

specific mitigation measures for cultural resources within the affected area. A Discovery Plan for

previously unencountered sites will be appended to the Treatment Plan. See the draft agreement in

Appendix B of this FEIS.

During the preparation of the DEIS and the subsequent review and comment phase, the applicant

conducted intensive cultural resources field inventories at project areas, including: (1) the proposed

ITF location, comprising about 40 acres about 1.8 miles west of Timpie Junction; (2) the Skunk Ridge

transportation corridor from Interstate 80 southward to the Reservation; (3) the proposed site (Sites A

and B) and the site access road (about 1,000 acres) on the Reservation; and (4) an exploratory

trench, located along the northern base of Hickman Knolls on the Reservation. The results of these

surveys confirmed that historic resources are present in the project area and resulted in the discovery

and documentation of 12 sites, 16 isolated historic features, and 70 isolated artifacts or small, isolated

artifact clusters.

Of the 12 sites, eight are considered eligible for inclusion in the National Register including the

Hasting Cutoff (site 42T0709), which is part of the California National Historic Trail; U.S. Route 40 (site

42T01409); the “new” Victory Highway (site 42T01410); an old alignment of the Victory Highway (site

42T01411); a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century telegraph line (site 42T01412); the Western

Pacific Railroad (site 42T01413); a segment of the Deep Creek Road, which may contain portions of

the Beckwith Trail (site 42T01416); and the Sulphur Spring or Eight-Mile Spring Road (site 42T01417),

which is part of the California National Historic Trail. The applicant’s proposed PFSF design features

do not affect the earlier route of the Lincoln Road, which originally paralleled Skull Valley Road along

the east side of the valley before being rerouted through the Tooele Valley. Consequently, the Lincoln

Highway has not been recorded nor evaluated as part of this project.

The proposed rail line would intersect the Donner-Reed Trail and Hasting Cutoff Trail. Construction

and operation of the rail line and proposed PFSF would constitute a visual impact on the historic

character of the original trail alignments at the points of intersection with the rail line and the valley

floor viewshed. The consulting parties have agreed that collection of additional mapping and other

visual data would be utilized to mitigate the impacts to the greatest extent possible.

The former Hawaiian settlement of Iosepa is located away from the rail corridor on the east side of

Skull Valley. The proposed rail line would be visible from the former town site. However, the NRC

and the Cooperating Agencies concluded that the impact would be small. The applicant’s plans do

not include widening or any other physical changes to the roadbed. If Skull Valley Road is selected as

the access route to the proposed PFSF, the road would be used in its current condition. Therefore,

there would be no adverse effects to the town site under this scenario. If the rail access option is

selected, Skull Valley Road would be used for general vehicular access to the proposed PFSF, but

again the applicant does not plan improvements to the road. Consequently, whether Skull Valley

Road is used for heavy-haul or regular vehicular traffic, there would be no impacts to the former town

site.

Section 3.6 describes the cultural resources that are potentially affected by the proposed project. The

impacts on these resources from the proposed PFSF and transportation are discussed in Sections 4.6

and 5.6 of this FEIS, respectively. The commenters did not identify any cultural resources not already

evaluated as set forth in these sections of the FEIS, and revision to the FEIS is not required. In

Section 9.4.2 of the FEIS, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies proposed that the applicant be

required to train workers to ensure that construction activities do not disturb cultural resources. This

section of the FEIS has been revised to state that training would be conducted in coordination with

cognizant cultural and ecological resource agencies.
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G.3.14.2 Native American Properties

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters stated that the proposed PFSF would be built on lands sacred to Native

Americans, would affect traditional territories and roaming areas, and would generally affect the

landscape, which should be revered. (0112, GR-06, GR-10, SL1-11, SL2-06, SL3-54) One

commenter asserted that project responsibilities defined by Executive Order 13007, “Indian Sacred

Sites,” May 24, 1996, and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 USC 1996, have been

ignored. The commenter also stated that the DEIS is inaccurate in its characterization of proposed

PFSF impacts to Native American resources. This commenter indicated that these resources are

unique to the Skull Valley area. (0012)

Several commenters stated that Tribal cultural traditions are being ignored and affected. (0096, 0112,

0113, 0158) Other commenters asserted that cultural resources should have received more attention. 

(0198h, SL1-11) One commenter asserted that the DEIS does not adequately analyze the impact on

the connection between Skull Valley Band members and their Reservation, their lands, and access to

these lands. (0158)

Several commenters indicated that the DEIS did not address traditional properties important to the

Skull Valley Band. (0096, 0112, SL1-11)

One commenter stated that archaeological sites on the Reservation are not addressed. (SL1-26)

One commenter indicated that Table 3.17 on page 3-49 of the DEIS lacked information about the

Fremont Indians, other Native American tribes, and the Spanish and Mexican cultures which the

commenter believed were in the area before the Skull Valley Band. (0096)

Response: 

The NRC and Cooperating Agencies’ ongoing consultations with regional Federally recognized Indian

Tribes have concluded that no traditional cultural properties, including archaeological sites, would be

adversely affected by the proposed action, including the proposed railroad access corridor and the

proposed PFSF on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band.

The Utah SHPO suggested consulting with tribes other than the Skull Valley Band, including the

Northern Ute Indian Tribe, Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah, Northwestern Band of Shoshoni Nation and

other Goshute Bands. The NRC and Cooperating Agencies completed consultation with the Skull

Valley Band, the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation, and Tribal Council of the Te-Moak

Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada. In addition, the agencies forwarded project cultural resources

information to the Northern Ute Indian Tribe, Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah,and the Northwestern Band

of Shoshoni Nation. However, these tribes declined to be consulting parties in the Section 106

consultation process of the NHPA.

By its own terms, Executive Order 13007 (codified at 42 USC 1996) does not create any right, benefit,

or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party. After

extensive consultation, no Indian Tribe or authoritative representative of an Indian religion has

informed the Cooperating Agencies of the existence of a “sacred site,” as defined in Executive Order

13007, within the Federal lands that would be affected by the proposed action. Accordingly, no action

is necessary under Executive Order 13007.

The applicant conducted cultural resource inventories on the Reservation for the area that would

include the proposed PFSF. As discussed in the FEIS (Section 3.6.2.1), no archaeological sites were

recorded on Reservation lands that have been designated for use by the proposed PFSF.
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NUREG-1714 G-272

The cultural historical sequence for the Skull Valley area, dating back about 12,000 years, is

summarized in Table 3.17 of the DEIS. A discussion of the Fremont occupation of the area is

included in the table, along with information for each of the other groups that have utilized the area

throughout the prehistoric and historic cultural periods. Section 3.6.2.1 of this FEIS discusses the

prehistoric occupants of the area. 

G.3.14.3 Effects on Plants and Animals on the Reservation

Comment Summary:

Two commenters expressed concern about plants used by the Skull Valley Band (0096, 0112,

SL1-11) while another thought there were animals on the Reservation considered to be endangered. 

(SL2-06) Two commenters stated that Ralph Chamberlain’s 1911 study of vegetation in the area

should be cited in the EIS and that, as a result, the DEIS statement on page 3-51 is in error. (0096,

0112) One commenter said that only 11 plant species are identified in DEIS Section 6.3.4.1.1,

whereas Chamberlain identified 334 species. (0112) The commenter stated that impacts are ignored

to plants with ecological habitats unique to Skull Valley, plants used for religious rites, and those

providing medicinal therapy unavailable elsewhere. (0112, SL1-11) 

One commenter stated that the applicant has not identified any plant species that may be culturally or

medicinally (scientifically) significant to various individuals. For example, the commenter said that

Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation gather plants in the vicinity of the Skull Valley

Reservation. The commenter stated that the applicant must determine whether significant plant

species may be affected by the proposed action. (0198a)

Response: 

Section 3.6.2.2 of the DEIS referenced earlier studies of Goshute plant names and uses in Skull

Valley including the study by Ralph Chamberlain. Section 3.6.2.2 also addressed potential uses of

culturally important plants by the Skull Valley Band. Contacts with Tribal representatives indicate that

usage of certain plants occurs in the vicinity, but that the plants on the proposed site are considered

inferior to the same plants growing in the Stansbury Mountains east of the Reservation and in

adjacent Tooele Valley because of arid growing conditions at that locale. To date, no information has

been made available that specifically documents collection and/or use of culturally important plants by

tribes within Skull Valley. Consultations with Tribal representatives did not identify any culturally

important animals that reside on or use the acreage designated for development of the proposed

PFSF.
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G.3.15 Human Health Impacts

G.3.15.1 Adequacy of Evaluation of Human Health Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the evaluation of human health impacts is inadequate. Some

commenters stated that the DEIS did not consider actual risks. One commenter was concerned that

the DEIS considered only a “best scenario.” (SL2-13) Commenters stated that the human health

risks and impacts warrant a more thorough evaluation. (0236, SL1-05, SL1-37, SL2-13, SL3-02)

Response: 

While it is unclear what the commenter meant by the statement that the DEIS only considered a “best

scenario,” the Cooperating Agencies believe that all reasonably foreseeable impacts to human health

have been adequately addressed. The NRC staff considered the specific issues raised by the

commenters and concluded that the EIS adequately addressed these issues and the overall human

health impacts from the proposed PFSF. The commenters did not provide any new information, facts,

or studies that invalidated the evaluation of human health impacts set forth in the DEIS, or that

warranted additional analyses. As discussed in Sections 4.7 and 5.7 of the EIS, the NRC staff

determined that the radiological and non-radiological health impacts from the proposed PFSF,

including shipment of the SNF, would be small. The NRC staff considered pollutants and occupational

health during construction of the proposed PFSF. As discussed in Section 4.3 of the EIS, the NRC

staff found impacts to air quality from pollutants such as particulate matter to be small. The NRC staff

also evaluated expected fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries and found these impacts to be small. 

As discussed in Section 4.9 of the EIS, the NRC staff concluded that impacts from decommissioning

activities would be similar to construction impacts and would be small. 

As discussed in Section 4.7.2 of the EIS, the NRC staff considered potential human health impacts of

ionizing radiation (e.g. radiation dose and latent cancer fatalities) from the proposed PFSF received by

the public from possible ingestion or inhalation of radioactive materials and from possible exposure to

radiation (e.g. gamma rays and neutrons) that would be directly emitted from the SNF. The NRC staff

also considered the radiological impacts from incident free (routine) SNF shipments and from potential

transportation accidents involving SNF, as discussed in Section 5.7.2 of the EIS. In its analysis of

radiological impacts, the NRC staff considered the inherent ability of the cask designs to confine SNF

contents and minimize direct radiation during normal operations, off-normal operations, and credible

accidents (i.e. the most severe reasonably foreseeable scenarios). As discussed in Section 2.1.2 of

the EIS, the SNF will be completely sealed (welded-shut) in steel canisters during its entire life-time at

the proposed PFSF. The exterior of each canister will be decontaminated prior to shipment to the

proposed PFSF in order to remove any significant amounts of radioactive material. Each steel

canister will be surrounded by a robust transportation cask (overpack of thick layers of steel) at all

times during shipment to the proposed PFSF and will then be surrounded by a robust storage cask

(overpack of thick layers of concrete and steel) during storage at the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff

further considered the effect of several potential hazards such as military accidents in the vicinity of

the proposed site, and credible accidents, such as tornados, wildfires, and earthquakes, on the

storage cask and proposed PFSF. The NRC staff also evaluated the ability of the proposed PFSF

physical protection plan and safeguard systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to

prevent the theft of special nuclear material (10 CFR Part 73).

As discussed in the EIS, the design of the welded canister would prevent the release of its radioactive

contents during normal operations and credible accident scenarios at the proposed PFSF. Therefore,

there would not be any accumulation or movement of the SNF radioactive contents in the environment

that would impact the public. The NRC staff also determined that the health impact from direct

radiation to the public would be minimal and a small fraction (less than 2 percent) of the radiation

impacts that would be expected from natural background radiation. The NRC staff also determined
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NUREG-1714 G-274

that the health impact to workers at the proposed PFSF would be small and below radiation safety

limits for workers as required by the NRC (10 CFR Part 20). Finally, the NRC staff determined that

the radiological impacts from incident free transportation or potential transportation accidents during

transport to the proposed PFSF would be small. 

In addition, the applicant showed in its safety review that the estimated radiological doses to workers

and general public were within NRC regulatory dose limits. NRC regulations require licensed facilities

not to exceed these regulatory limits to assure that there is no undue risk to workers or the general

public from ionizing radiation. The NRC staff performed an independent evaluation of the applicant’s

analyses and found it acceptable as documented in the SER, as updated. In view of the foregoing,

the NRC staff concludes that the EIS throughly analyzes human health impacts from the risks of

construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF.

G.3.15.2 Background Radiological Characteristics

G.3.15.2.1 Comparison of Radiological Impacts to Background Radiation

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters stated that the evaluation of background radiological characteristics in the DEIS is

inadequate. (0039, 0077, 0096) One commenter stated that the DEIS inaccurately assumes that

background radiation has the same effects as radioactive isotopes found in SNF. (0096) Another

commenter stated that the DEIS needs to reflect the baseline radioactivity tests reported in the SAR. 

(0039, 0077) Several commenters said that the DEIS oversimplifies radiological exposure by

comparing it with medical x-rays and other sources of radiation. (0076, SL2-08, SL3-16, SL3-19) 

Response: 

The NRC staff considered specific issues raised by commenters regarding background radiation

characteristics and has determined that the EIS adequately addressed this information in Section 3.7. 

The NRC staff agrees that the types and energies of radiation emitted from SNF, natural sources, and

man-made devices may be different. However, the methodology for determining radiation dose values

(e.g. mSv or mrem) for individuals accounted for these differences and were independent of the actual

source of radiation. In other words, a 1 mrem whole-body radiation dose received from SNF has the

same radiological impacts (latent cancer risks) as a 1 mrem whole-body radiation dose received from

radon or a medical x-ray. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that it is valid and appropriate to

compare the radiation doses from the proposed PFSF to the radiation doses from natural sources

such as environmental radon or man-made devices such as medical x-ray equipment. Accordingly,

Table 3.18 in this FEIS provides useful information for comparing the radiation doses from the

proposed PFSF to the relative impacts of radiation dose from various natural and man-made sources.

The NRC staff believes that the background gamma radiation measurements and the radionuclide soil

measurements obtained by the applicant, and presented in Section 3.7 of the EIS, provided an

adequate description of the background radiological characteristics of the proposed site for the

purposes of the EIS. The applicant did not provide pre-operational baseline radioactivity tests in the

SAR as suggested by the commenter. The applicant stated it would perform additional radiological

measurements at the proposed site to establish a pre-operational radiological environmental baseline.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-275 NUREG-1714

G.3.15.3 Radiological Impacts

G.3.15.3.1 Adequacy of Radiological Impacts Analysis

Comment Summary: 

A number of commenters expressed concern that the radiological risks and impacts have been

inadequately and incompletely analyzed. (0076, 0183, 0198h, 0198i, GR-14, SL1-09, SL1-20,

SL1-26, SL1-37, SL2-08, SL2-12, SL2-17, SL3-06, SL3-16, SL3-18, SL3-19, SL3-19, SL3-21, SL3-38) 

A number of commenters stated that the human health impacts to the general public have been

ignored or inadequately analyzed. The commenters expressed concern about the health and safety

risks the proposed action would pose to their families, to Utah citizens, and to individuals who live on

the transportation corridors. (0001, 0002, 0012, 0041, 0046, 0048, 0067, 0090, 0097, 0189, 0198,

0198h, 0200, 0264, GR-06, GR-23, SL1-01, SL1-17, SL1-21, SL1-39, SL2-13, SL2-15) One

commenter stated that scrutinizing safety issues and radiation exposures associated with the

proposed action is important to the process. (SL2-04) Commenters identified the following concerns

regarding safety:

C Several commenters questioned comments made by proponents and/or said the safety claims

made by proponents were not credible. (0076, SL1-09, SL1-20, SL1-26, SL1-37, SL2-17, SL3-06,

SL3-16, SL3-19, SL3-21, SL3-38) 

C One commenter stated that the ER failed to consider the health and safety risks raised during the

decommissioning process. (0198a)

C One commenter said the current radiation risk assessments are inadequate. (SL2-08) 

C One commenter said doses to the public under normal operating conditions should be considered. 

(0189) 

C One commenter said an evaluation of the maximum foreseeable release incident or a worst case

scenario should be considered. (SL1-21) 

C One commenter said the EIS should include quantitative and qualitative (health/ecological) risk

assessments (site and operation specific) as part of the license application process. (0198h,

0198i)

Response: 

The NRC staff determined that the radiological impacts from normal operations would be minimal as

discussed in Section 4.7.2 of the EIS and summarized below. Because the welded SNF canisters

would remain intact and would not release radioactive contents during normal and off-normal

operations, the applicant determined that direct radiation is the only possible radiological dose

contributor to the general public. Direct radiation levels will decrease substantially with increasing

distance from the PFSF. A conservative estimate showed a maximum radiological dose of

approximately 0.06 mSv/yr (6 mrem/yr) to an individual at the site boundary during normal and offnormal operations, which is approximately 1⁄4 of the NRC dose limit of 0.25 mSv/yr (25 mrem/yr). As

shown in Table 3.18 of the EIS, this calculated dose would be a small fraction (less than 2 percent) of

the typical dose received by the average member of the public from other natural and man-made

radiation sources.

In addition, the NRC staff determined that the radiological impacts at the proposed PFSF site from the

most severe credible accidents are small, as discussed in Section 4.7.2 of the EIS. The NRC staff

had determined from evaluation of the applicant’s analyses that the welded SNF canisters would also

remain intact and would not release radioactive materials after a credible accident. The applicant’s
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NUREG-1714 G-276

analyses included an in-depth analysis of potential hazards such as local military activities, and

credible accidents such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and wildfires. In addition, the applicant calculated

a hypothetical dose assuming a hypothetical canister leak after a credible accident to further

demonstrate compliance with the regulatory dose requirements in 10 CFR 72.106(b). The applicant

determined the hypothetical dose to an individual member of the public would be less than 1 mSv (100

mrem) at 500 m. This is significantly less than the NRC regulatory dose limit of 50 mSv (5,000 mrem)

for credible accidents (approximately 1/50 of the dose limit). The NRC staff performed an independent

evaluation of the applicant’s analyses and found them acceptable, and the staff’s evaluation is

documented in the SER, as updated.

As described above, the NRC staff has evaluated normal operation and foreseeable accidents and

described the proposed PFSF’s anticipated effects on human health in the FEIS. The FEIS describes

doses to the public from normal operation. As discussed in the FEIS, the NRC staff has determined

that no credible, foreseeable accident at the proposed PFSF would result in the release of

radionuclides, with consequent effects on health. The credibility of project proponent’s safety claims is

irrelevant to the NRC staff’s evaluation and conclusions. In addition, the commenters did not identify

any particular flaws in the NRC staff’s evaluation. The comments on these matters did not warrant

any changes to the EIS.

As discussed in Sections 4.7.2 and 4.9 of the EIS, the NRC staff believes that health impacts from

decommissioning and off-site shipment of SNF would be similar to the impacts from initial construction

and shipment of SNF to the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff does not expect any significant health

effects from radiological exposure because the proposed PFSF would be a “start clean, stay clean”

facility. This meant that there would be little, if any, contamination to clean-up during

decommissioning, and radiation doses would be similar to those during normal operation. The

comment on decommissioning does not warrant any change to the EIS. The NRC staff safety

evaluation is documented in the SER, as updated.

The comments on the adequacy of radiation risk estimates and the comments about having

quantitative and qualitative risk assessments are acknowledged. However, the NRC staff has

determined that the EIS contains a conservative assessment of potential radiological doses and risks

based on sound scientific principles, and presents these risks in the manner that can be easily

compared to other natural and man-made radiological risks in the environment. The NRC has

published several useful technical documents that provide a detailed explanation of radiation, and its

effects on the human body, and help to show how these risks correlate to radiation dose estimates

from the proposed PFSF. These documents include: Regulatory Guide 8.29, "Instruction Concerning

Risks from Occupational Radiation Exposure," and Regulatory Guide 8.13, "Instruction Concerning

Prenatal Radiation Exposure." These documents can be found on the NRC Web Page at

http://www.nrc.gov. In view of the above, the NRC staff concludes that radiological impacts have been

adequately addressed in Section 4.7 of the EIS.

G.3.15.3.2 Accumulation of Radioactive Material

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS should have considered bioaccumulation or biomagnification in

the food chain or human body, especially that of children, developing fetuses and breast feeding

infants. (SL1-21)

Response:

As discussed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.7.2 of the EIS, the proposed PFSF would not release any

significant radioactive material into the environment that would result in “bioaccumulation” or

“biomagnification” in the food chain or in the human body. In addition, accumulation of radioactive

material in the human body through inhalation and ingestion was considered in the development of the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-277 NUREG-1714

requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 72, and the establishment of dose limits for radiation

workers and for general members of the public including children and fetuses. Furthermore, the

estimated dose from a hypothetical release in Section 4.7.2.3 of the EIS considered ingestion through

the food chain.

G.3.15.3.3 Proposed Yucca Mountain Radiation Standards

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the NRC must consider the unresolved differences between radiation

safety specialists at the NRC and the EPA on appropriate radiation standards for the proposed Yucca

Mountain repository, and whether to set standards in terms of dose or risk. (0236) 

Response:

The comment concerning appropriate radiation standards for the proposed repository is beyond the

scope of the EIS. As stated in the comment letter from the EPA (0240) in Appendix H, the EPA

radiation standards apply only to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, as directed by Congress. 

The radiation standards for an ISFSI are specified in 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 72. The NRC staff has

concluded that these standards adequately protect public health and safety.

G.3.15.3.4 Magnitude of Radiological Impacts

Comment Summary: 

A number of commenters stated that the radiological impacts of SNF are excessive, dangerous or

even lethal. (0004, 0009, 0076, GR-06, GR-09, SL1-09, SL3-06, SL3-16, SL3-18, SL3-36, SL3-40,

SL3-43) Commenters stated that:

C Nuclear waste is lethal for thousands of years. (0004, 0009, 0076, SL3-06, SL3-16, SL3-36) 

C Cancer rates will increase as a result of exposure to radiation from the SNF. (0004, 0009, SL3-

40) 

C The facility presents a radiation poisoning danger. (GR-09, SL3-43) 

C Other countries have recognized nuclear waste as hazardous. (SL1-09) 

C The NRC has no experience with this type of facility because of its unique, large size. (GR-09)

Response: 

The NRC staff has concluded that the SNF storage system to be used at the proposed PFSF can

meet all applicable regulations regarding off-site dose limits. The proposed PFSF transfer and

storage systems have been designed to maintain exposures ALARA. In addition, its shielding and

confinement features have been designed to provide reasonable assurance that radiation doses to

workers and the public will be within all applicable regulatory limits. The NRC considered the size of

the proposed PFSF in its evaluation. The methods of analysis and regulatory standards used to

evaluate the facility were generally independent of the proposed size of the facility. In addition, the

radiation dose limits in 10 CFR 72.104 and 72.106 would apply to the proposed PFSF independent of

its capacity. The commenters did not provide any new information, facts, or studies that invalidated

the evaluation of radiological health impacts considered in the DEIS, or that warranted additional

analyses. Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that the EIS has adequately addressed these issues

and radiological health impacts from the proposed PFSF. The NRC safety evaluation is documented

in the SER, as updated.
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NUREG-1714 G-278

The NRC staff notes that SNF could be dangerous, in an unshielded bare state, without proper

shielding and confinement inherent within a SNF storage or transportation cask that has been

approved by the NRC. The NRC staff has determined that SNF could be safely shielded and

contained by the HI-STORM 100 storage cask system and other facilities that are proposed for use at

the proposed PFSF. 

G.3.15.3.5 Radiological, Chemical, and Heavy Metal Contaminants

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that a leak would pollute the watershed and cause radiation poisoning and

death. (SL3-21)

Another commenter expressed concern that the applicant failed to identify all effluent sources and

potential contaminants and contaminant pathways that may have subsequent impacts to surface water

and groundwater. The commenter stated the proposed PFSF as designed, the proposed ITF, and

transportation of SNF present the potential for a number of contaminant sources. The commenter was

concerned that construction and operation of the ISFSI will generate an effluent with radioactive,

chemical, and heavy metal contaminants that may be transferred to the groundwater. The commenter

indicated the applicant must identify the actual contaminant sources, the potential for surface and

groundwater contamination, and the impact of any contamination on downgradient resources, in order

to satisfy 10 CFR 72.100(b). (0198a)

The commenter stated that the SAR is required to describe the ability of the surface water and

groundwater environment “to disperse dilute or concentrate, normal and inadvertent releases of

radioactive effluents for the full range of anticipated operating conditions” and to identify contaminant

pathways according to NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities. 

Furthermore, the commenter stated that the applicant is required to review “the transport characteristic

of aquifers which are subject to radionuclide contamination, and an adequate description of the

contaminant pathways” and ensure that “potential future groundwater uses are conservatively

estimated.” (0198a)

Regarding operations, the commenter stated that routine maintenance of diesel generators, facility

vehicles, and equipment such as the tractor and overhead cranes, will generate various solvents and

other organic contaminants. Also, the commenter stated that washing or rinsing heavy haul trucks

and other vehicles will generate an effluent that may be contaminated with radioactive, heavy metal, or

organic contaminants both on site and at Rowley Junction. Further, the commenter stated that

precipitation may wash off contaminants from vehicles or cask surfaces and that laboratory operations

may generate a variety of radiological, heavy metal, or chemical contaminants. (0198a)

The commenter also expressed concern that construction of the proposed PFSF and the access road,

as well as the widening of Skull Valley Road or building a rail spur would generate a number of

radiological, chemical, or heavy metal contaminant sources from the heavy machinery, vehicles,

construction materials and chemicals, including fuel, solvents, asphalt, etc., that will be used during

construction. These activities, according to the commenter, would create the potential for these

contaminants to be released to groundwater and surface water via drainage ditches, culverts and

through seepage. As an example, the commenter stated that culverts would be located through the

applicant’s access road off Skull Valley Road and the access road embankment “to carry the

occasional runoff.” (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC staff determined that the radiological impacts from normal operations and credible accidents

are small as discussed in Section 4.7.2 of the DEIS. In making this determination, the NRC staff

considered potential ionizing radiation impacts (radiological dose) from ingestion or inhalation of
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G-279 NUREG-1714

potential radioactive materials released from the proposed PFSF and transported through the

environment. The DEIS showed that the design of the welded canister used by the proposed PFSF

prevents the release of radioactive contents to the environment and therefore prevents contamination

of air or water in the environment during normal operations and credible accident scenarios. 

Therefore, there would not be any accumulation or movement of radioactive material in the

environment from operation of the proposed PFSF. Hence, the DEIS did not explicitly address

potential contaminant pathways in groundwater or surface water.

Activities at the proposed site or proposed ITF were not expected to result in contamination of

groundwater from heavy metals or organic contaminants. In addition, the proposed PFSF will have a

surface water detention basin to contain run-off during operation. Control of water run-off is discussed

in Section 4.2 of the DEIS. The environmental impacts to groundwater from potential radiological and

chemical contaminants generated during construction and operation of the proposed PFSF are

discussed in Sections 4.2, 5.2, and 6.3.2 of the EIS.

G.3.15.3.6 Owner Controlled Area Boundary Dose Rates

Comment Summary: 

One commenter expressed concern that the applicant had not adequately described why the owner

controlled area (OCA) boundary was chosen and whether boundary dose rates will be the ultimate

minimum values compared to other potential boundaries. (0198a)

Response: 

NRC regulations for ISFSIs do not specify boundary selections to minimize radiation exposure, except

for specifying in 10 CFR 72.106 that the boundary must be at least 100 meters form the SNF handling

and storage facilities. The applicant selected and proposed a boundary that exceeded this distance. 

The NRC staff evaluated the potential radiation exposure at the proposed boundary and determined it

would meet all regulatory requirements. A comparison of the applicant-chosen OCA boundary to

some other hypothetical boundary is not required.

G.3.15.3.7 Testing of Rain and Snow Melt

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to indicate whether rain water or melted snow from the

proposed PFSF storage pads would be collected and analyzed prior to disposal and whether it would

be handled as radioactive contaminated waste. (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC would not require the applicant to monitor for directly discharged radioactive effluents to the

environment since the proposed PFSF is designed not to release its SNF contents. However, any

water from rain storms or snow melt which runs off from the storage pads of the proposed PFSF will

be collected in a detention basin. As stated in Section 4.2.2.4 of the EIS, the applicant would further

sample and analyze free-standing water in the basin to determine if radiological contaminants are

present.

G.3.15.3.8 Compliance with NRC Radiation Exposure Limits

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to include an analysis of accident conditions, including

accidents due to natural phenomena, in accordance with 10 CFR 72.104 and 72.126(d). (0198b) The
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NUREG-1714 G-280

same commenter stated that 10 CFR 72.126(d) requires that “[a]nalyses must be made to show that

releases to the general environment during normal operations and anticipated occurrences will be

within the exposure limit given in 10 CFR 72.104. Analyses of design basis accidents must be made

to show that releases to the general environment will be within the exposure limits given in 10 CFR

72.106.” The commenter asserted that the applicant has completely failed to include an analysis of

accident conditions including accidents due to natural phenomena. (0198a)

The commenter stated that the applicant has failed to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the

dose limits specified in 10 CFR 72.106(b) can and will be complied with, and quoted the requirements

of that regulation and applicable guidance in NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry

Storage, (October 1996), at 12-3, which defines a design-basis accident as “the subset of all credible

accidents that bound the entire spectrum of accidents that could occur in terms of the nature and

consequences of accidents.” (0198a)

The commenter also asserted that the applicant did not provide enough information to meet NRC

requirements controlling and limiting the occupational radiation exposures to as ALARA and analyzing

the potential dose equivalent to an individual outside of the controlled area from accidents or natural

phenomena events. The commenter also asserted that the applicant failed to address several specific

safety issues involving the applicant’s radiation protection program. The commenter stated that the

applicant has not complied with 10 CFR 72.24(e) and (m); NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for

Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities (Draft), U.S. NRC (October 1996) Section 9; NRC Reg. Guide 3.62,

Standard Format and Content for the Safety Analysis Report for Onsite Storage of Spent Fuel Storage

Casks, Section 9; NRC Reg. Guide 8.8, Information Relevant to Ensuring the Occupational Radiation

Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be As Low As Reasonably Achievable, U.S. NRC, Revision

3 (June 1978); and NRC Reg. Guide 8.10, Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational

Radiation Exposures As Low as is Reasonably Achievable, U.S. NRC, Revision 1-R (May 1977). 

(0198a, 0198b)

Response: 

The issues identified in the comments are not directly related to the environmental review and the EIS,

but are instead related to the NRC staff’s safety evaluation. Therefore, the NRC staff considers these

issues to be beyond the scope of the EIS. The NRC staff notes that the applicant addressed the

effects of normal operation on dose to the public and also the effects of credible accidents in the SAR,

in accordance with NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities. The

accident conditions analyzed in the SAR included the types identified by the commenter (e.g.,

earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, explosions, fires, and cask tipover). The NRC staff determined that

the applicant's evaluation of the radiological impacts of normal operations reflected that the operations

would not exceed the dose limits in 10 CFR 72.104 as discussed in Chapter 11 of the SER, as

updated. The NRC staff also determined the applicant’s description of the quality assurance program,

radiation protection program, and ALARA program is acceptable as discussed in Chapters 11 and 12

of the SER. The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis and determined that credible accidents

would not result in the release of radioactive contents as discussed in Chapter 15 of the SER, as

updated. Therefore, the accident exposure limits in 10 CFR 72.106 would not be exceeded.

G.3.15.3.9 Airborne Radioactive Effluents

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to adequately discuss control of airborne effluents

which may cause unacceptable exposures to workers and the public. (0198a, 0198b) One

commenter expressed concern about living downwind of the facility and being exposed to radioactive

releases. (0001)
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G-281 NUREG-1714

Response: 

Section 4.7.2.1 of the DEIS indicated that there will be no off-site, airborne radiological effluents from

the proposed PFSF under normal operating conditions. Therefore, there should not be any exposure

to the public from airborne radiological effluents under normal operating conditions. Direct radiation

from the casks would be the only source of radiation to members of the public. As indicated in Section

4.7.2.3 of the EIS, no credible accident scenarios would result in the release of radioactive contents,

including off-site, airborne radioactive effluents. Workers could hypothetically be exposed to localized

airborne radioactive contamination at the proposed PFSF as a result of normal handling of the SNF

canisters. However, they would be monitored under a radiological protection program and their

exposure would be maintained ALARA.

G.3.15.3.10 Safety and Viability of SNF Storage

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that there needs to be more research into making SNF safe before nuclear

energy is a viable choice. The commenter cited a National Academy of Science (NAS) report

commissioned by the DOE that said, according to the commenter, that engineered barriers such as

concrete and steel would eventually fail and that much of the information known about the behavior of

contaminants in air, soil, and water might eventually be proven wrong. The commenter said that

nuclear energy is in its infancy and we don’t know what it is going to do. (SL3-18)

Another commenter stated that the proposed action is an engineering experiment based only on

theory and no actual data. The commenter compared it to the atomic testing of the 1950's and

believed it was unwise to rely upon theory that may prove to be unreliable, if not deadly. (0144)

Response:

The NRC staff disagrees with the comment that the proposed PFSF is an engineering experiment. 

Dry storage technology has been used for several years and has an excellent safety record. 

Currently, there are more than 200 dry storage casks that have been loaded by nuclear power reactor

licensees in the U.S.

The NRC staff notes that the NAS report cited by one commenter was written for the DOE’s geologic

repository program where SNF and high-level waste would be permanently emplaced underground for

disposal. The discussion in the NAS report of the failure of concrete and steel barriers refers to deep

geologic disposal time periods of up to 10,000 years, far greater than the 20-year license term of the

proposed PFSF, which is an above-ground temporary facility. Therefore, the NAS report does not

apply to the proposed PFSF.

G.3.15.4 Impacts to Workers

G.3.15.4.1 Magnitude of Impacts to Workers

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the proposed action poses moderate health impacts to workers. The

commenter added that workers at the proposed PFSF must risk their health in order to be employed. 

(0050)

One commenter stated that the applicant’s failure to provide adequate means for inspecting and

repairing the contents of SNF canisters, or detecting and removing contamination on the canisters

would result in increased risks to workers. Workers would be required to handle and inspect casks
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NUREG-1714 G-282

with contamination or defective contents during receipt of casks, storage of casks, or in preparing the

casks for shipment to a permanent repository. (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the concerns in comments regarding the handling of damaged or

contaminated canisters. The FEIS states that if contaminated canisters (i.e., unacceptable removable

surface contamination) are found during the receipt inspection at the proposed PFSF, then the

canister would be repackaged into its shipping cask and returned to the originating reactor. The

shipping cask was designed to contain any such surface contamination. The return shipment would

not place workers at risk from any significant occupational exposure to the contaminated canister. 

Section 2.1.2.1 of the FEIS has been revised to better explain the terminology concerning repackaging

and return of casks and the resulting consequences. However, handling and repairing of the SNF

contents are not necessary to return a contaminated canister. The proposed PFSF is not designed to

perform these operations and the applicant would not be licensed or authorized by the NRC to perform

such operations during storage operations at the proposed PFSF. The SNF will be sealed (weldedclosed) at the originating nuclear power plant prior to shipment to the proposed PFSF. The applicant

would be limited to handling the canisters which contain the SNF contents. Accordingly, the impacts

suggested by the commenter are beyond the scope of the EIS.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding risks to workers. However, an occupation that

involves radiation exposure contains a health risk based on the expected exposure level. The

Commission has determined that there will not be any undue risk to the safety of the workers at a

licensed facility if individual dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20 are not exceeded. These radiation

exposure limits for workers were based, in part, on providing no greater occupational risk to health

than other typical occupations. Doses to workers, although generally higher than those received by

the general public, would be administratively controlled by the applicant to levels at or below NRC’s

regulatory limits. The applicant will be required to ensure that worker doses do not exceed NRC

radiological dose limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 (e.g. 5 rem/year for an individual worker). As part

of typical radiation worker training and in conjunction with the proposed PFSF radiation protection

program, each radiation worker would be informed of potential radiation risks from possible radiation

exposures as part of his or her job.

The NRC staff also notes that radiological doses to the workers at the proposed PFSF would be

monitored on a continual basis during operation of the proposed PFSF in order to verify that NRC

regulatory dose limits are not exceeded. The applicant would also have to implement a radiological

protection program during operations that assures, in part, individual doses are ALARA. The applicant

may meet these regulatory objectives by several methods such as providing additional shielding for

specific tasks, managing the number of personnel and exposure times for various tasks, and training

workers to maintain their doses ALARA. Radiation dose rates in some work areas would be actively

monitored with electronic measuring equipment and individual doses to workers would also be

monitored both actively and passively while performing radiological tasks at the proposed PFSF. 

These actual measurements of worker doses will provide positive assurance that individual regulatory

dose limits are not exceeded. The NRC staff will also implement appropriate inspection procedures

for the proposed PFSF, if licensed, and verify that operations are performed in accordance with NRC

regulations and license conditions. 

G.3.15.4.2 Conclusions Regarding the Proposed ITF and High Doses to Workers

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters provided the following comments regarding doses to workers and the use of

ALARA for the proposed PFSF and ITF:
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-283 NUREG-1714

C One commenter indicated that the discussion of radiological impacts to workers contradicted the

discussion dismissing the proposed ITF alternative from detailed evaluation. The commenter

stated that phrases such as “within acceptable levels” and “minimal radiological impacts” in

discussing the proposed action implied that any dose is inconsequential. The commenter stated

that the DEIS, however, stated that alternative three was not considered because of “additional

doses that would be incurred by workers making the transfer.” (SL3-46)

C One commenter stated that the assumption on page xxxviii of the DEIS that doses received by

workers under the proposed ITF option would exceed the 5 rem occupational exposure limit in 10

CFR Part 20 is inappropriate. The commenter stated that the proposed PFSF must comply with

NRC regulations and that it was inappropriate to make an assumption that any of the alternatives

would result in workers exceeding exposure limits. The commenter added that the FEIS should

assume that proposed operations will be conducted in full compliance with NRC regulations, and a

more appropriate consideration of worker doses would change NRC’s determination of the

significance of the potential impact from “small to moderate” to “small.” (0179)

C One commenter stated that Tables ES.2 and 9.1 of the DEIS indicated doses to workers are small

although the estimated doses are at 90 percent of the NRC regulatory limit of 5 rem/yr. The

commenter indicated the doses appeared to be excessive when compared to occupational doses

for workers a the proposed Yucca Mountain repository which would handle, maintain, and monitor

SNF received in transportation casks in a manner nearly identical to the work at the proposed

PFSF. The commenter stated that the DEIS for the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository reports

that worker doses would average less than 1 rem/yr. The commenter also stated that it was not

readily apparent from the tables and the discussion in Section 4.7.2.2 of the DEIS the extent to

which ALARA principles had been considered in minimizing the estimated occupational doses. 

The commenter stated the FEIS should evaluate the application of ALARA principles towards

maintaining worker doses as far below the applicable limits as possible. (0240)

C One commenter stated that a worker dose of 4.45 rem/yr seemed high and a dose of 5.3 rem/yr

[ITF option] in Table ES.2 of the DEIS is above the NRC legal limit. The commenter asked

whether doses would be limited to levels significantly less than 5 rem/yr by the application of

ALARA principles or facility administrative limits. (0169)

Response:

The DEIS did not imply that doses for the proposed PFSF were “inconsequential,” but rather showed

that the radiological health impacts were small or minimal. The NRC staff determined that, as set forth

in the EIS, estimated worker doses and associated latent cancer fatalities are a small health impact if

they are below the NRC dose limit of 5 rem/yr, or 2x10-3 LCF/yr. The Commission has previously

determined that doses and associated health risks at or below 5 rem/yr would not result in undue risk

to nuclear workers. The DEIS concluded that additional radiological health impacts from transfer

operations would be eliminated if the proposed ITF alternative were not implemented. As discussed in

Section 6.1.7.3 of the EIS, the calculated ITF dose estimates that exceeded 5 rem/yr were based on

information provided by the applicant and the premise that the workers at the proposed PFSF facility

would also be performing transfer operations at the proposed ITF. Therefore, the combined doses for

these workers under this alternative were calculated to exceed 5 rem/yr for the purposes of the EIS

analyses. Therefore, these potential impacts would be small to moderate. As further discussed

below, the applicant would need to take some action either through their ALARA program or by

employing additional workers to assure regulatory limits and ALARA objectives are satisfied, if it

intends to use the proposed ITF.

The NRC staff agrees with the commenters that NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 do not allow the

dose to any worker to exceed 5 rem/yr. As discussed below, the NRC staff agrees that individual

worker doses could be maintained within this limit at the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff notes (see

Section 6.1.7.3 in this FEIS) that the collective dose for the ITF transfer and PFSF storage of
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-284

200 canisters per year would be 0.802 person-Sv/yr (80.2 person-rem/yr). Because the applicant has

indicated that the workers conducting the cask transfer operations at the ITF would also perform

Category 1 and/or Category 2 duties (as described in Section 4.7.2.2 in this FEIS) at the proposed

PFSF, approximately 12 to 15 workers might share this dose. Therefore, the average dose for each

worker was calculated to exceed the regulatory limit of 0.05 Sv/yr (5 rem/yr).

As suggested by several commenters, NRC regulations also require worker dose to be maintained

ALARA. As discussed in Section 4.7.4 of this FEIS, the occupational doses to workers could be

mitigated and maintained ALARA by means of active programs that involve administrative controls,

engineering controls, measurements, and training. The NRC staff notes that its safety review found

that the proposed PFSF design satisfies ALARA objectives and that there is reasonable assurance

that the radiation protection program proposed by the applicant can maintain radiation exposures

ALARA. The NRC staff review of the proposed PFSF radiation shielding design and radiation

protection programs were documented in Chapters 7 and 11 of the SER.

If licensed, the applicant could meet ALARA objectives by several methods such as providing

additional shielding during specific tasks, managing the number of personnel and exposure times for

various tasks, and providing worker training to maintain doses ALARA. Radiation fields in some areas

would be actively monitored with electronic measuring equipment and individual doses to workers

would be monitored with active electronic devices and passive TLDs. The continual monitoring of

workers would assure that NRC dose limits are satisfied and allow for implementation of individual

corrective actions to mitigate worker exposures during operations, as necessary.

Furthermore, the NRC staff notes that ALARA objectives would be a “continuous” requirement during

actual operations at the proposed PFSF. Workers could likely receive doses well below the upper

values presented in the EIS based on the proposed ALARA program and successful implementation

by the applicant. The applicant would have radiation protection personnel who would draw upon

several years of experience with meeting similar ALARA requirements at the nuclear power plants

owned by the PFS- member companies and other companies. The NRC staff will also implement

appropriate inspection procedures for the PFSF, if licensed, and verify that the applicant is in

compliance with NRC dose limits and ALARA requirements. 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment that compared calculated doses for the proposed PFSF

workers to doses calculated in DOE’s DEIS for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. The NRC

staff did not compare dose estimates between the two facilities to determine if the proposed PFSF

would meet regulatory dose requirements and ALARA objectives, and such an evaluation is not

necessary for this safety issue. Nonetheless, differences in dose estimates could potentially be

attributed to several possible factors such as differences in the assumed SNF characteristics,

differences in the assumed design and purpose of both facilities, and/or differences in the assumed

number of workers at both facilities. Therefore, any differences in estimated doses would not change

the conclusion that radiological impacts to the workers for the proposed PFSF would be small.

G.3.15.5 Impacts to Members of the General Public

G.3.15.5.1 Magnitude of Impacts to the General Public

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the radiological impacts to the environment and human health are

considerable and too great to proceed with the proposed action. (0001, 0002, 0012, 0027, 0044,

0063, 0144, GR-06, GR-23, SL1-01, SL1-17) Several commenters stated that the human health

impacts would be excessive and unacceptable. (0001, 0010, SL1-20, SL3-04, SL3-55, SL3-31)

One commenter stated that high safety standards will not be maintained at the facility. (SL2-15)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-285 NUREG-1714

Several commenters stated that cancer deaths and other serious illnesses have occurred due to

atomic testing in Nevada and the proposed action would have similar consequences. (0027, 0044,

0063, 0144)

Three commenters stated that people were told there was no danger from nuclear testing in the past,

but are now suffering from health impacts associated with that testing. (SL2-17, SL3-06, SL3-16) 

Another commenter recalled similar safety assurances regarding uranium mining. (SL3-38)

One commenter stated that there is conflicting information about the safety of SNF so why take a

chance when the impacts could be catastrophic. (SL3-31)

One commenter expressed concern about risks to citizens based on the conclusions in the Utah

Department of Environmental Quality review of the DEIS. (0041, 0046)

One commenter noted that the stated impact is vastly underestimated and that the description of

“influence zones” in the license application is misleading. The commenter stated that the original

application did not mention that the influence zone actually contains one of the most urbanized areas

in the country (top third or fifth) – the Wasatch Front. The commenter added that there was no

discussion of factors or conditions such as “wind travel/wind speed” to show how quickly materials

could be broadcast by frequent winds from the north-west, west and south-west. (0198h) 

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding the safety and environmental impacts of the

proposed PFSF. The NRC staff determined that there is reasonable assurance that operation of the

proposed PFSF, constructed in accordance with the design set forth in the application, will provide

adequate protection of the public health and safety. Specifically, the proposed PFSF will have met

applicable NRC licensing requirements, and operation of the proposed PFSF would be subject to NRC

inspections and reviews of operating procedures, and required reports. Thus, the NRC would

continue to review compliance with applicable NRC requirements, should the NRC grant a license and

the PFSF be constructed and operated. As explained below, the NRC staff considered specific issues

raised by commenters and concluded that Section 4.7 of the DEIS has adequately addressed these

issues and the general public radiological health impacts from the proposed PFSF.

The NRC staff determined that the radiological impacts from normal operations and credible accidents

would be small as discussed in Section 4.7.2 of the EIS. In the EIS, the NRC staff considered

potential ionizing radiation impacts (radiological dose) from ingestion or inhalation of radioactive

materials that might be released from the proposed PFSF and/or exposure to direct radiation that

would be emitted from the proposed PFSF. The EIS showed that the welded canister design used by

the proposed PFSF prevents the release of radioactive contents to the environment and therefore

prevents contamination of air or water in the environment during normal operations and credible

accident scenarios. Therefore, there would not be an accumulation or movement of radioactive

material in the environment from operation of the proposed PFSF. The applicant also showed that

estimated radiological doses to workers and the general public were within NRC regulatory dose

limits. NRC regulations require that licensed facilities do not exceed these regulatory dose limits to

assure that there are no undue risks to workers or the general public from ionizing radiation. These

dose limits are based on sound scientific principles and are conservative to account for age and

gender. NRC staff performed an independent evaluation of the applicant’s analyses and documented

its findings in Chapter 7 of the SER, as updated. If licensed, the applicant would be required to meet

these safety standards during the lifetime of the proposed PFSF. The NRC would also inspect the

proposed PFSF to verify safety standards are met.

The NRC staff acknowledges concerns and opinions regarding past nuclear testing in Nevada and

uranium mining. However, specific concerns regarding environmental impacts of past nuclear testing

and uranium mining are unrelated to the requested action and are beyond the scope of this EIS. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-286

Radiological releases associated with past nuclear testing and uranium mining are vastly different

than the storage of SNF at the proposed PFSF. The welded canister design used by the proposed

PFSF would prevent the release of radioactive contents to the environment, and therefore prevent

contamination of air or water in the environment during normal operations and credible accident

scenarios. Because the proposed PFSF would not release any radioactive contents to the

environment during normal operations or accidents and the facility’s design would reduce direct

radiation to minimal levels, there are no cumulative radiation impacts associated with the proposed

action and uranium mining.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding the risks to citizens based on Utah Department

of Environmental Quality comments on the DEIS. The NRC staff considered risk to all citizens from

potential impacts of the requested action and found that the proposed PFSF poses a low risk. The

NRC staff considered the comments and specific issues submitted to the NRC by Utah, including the

Utah Department of Environmental Quality. The comments made by the Utah Department of

Environmental Quality are addressed throughout Appendix G.

The comments regarding “influence zones” referred to information in the applicant’s ER. The DEIS

addressed the issues mentioned in the comment. The commenter hypothesized the accidental

release of radioactive materials with a wide-scale dispersion of those materials, and claimed that an

inadequate “influence zone” has been used to characterize the impacts from such an accident. The

NRC reviewed such potential events in the SER, as updated, and found that the large-scale

dispersion of radioactive materials (from an accident) is not a credible event. Therefore, no change to

the FEIS is required with respect to influence zones.

G.3.15.5.2 Radiological Impacts to Children and Other Special Populations

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated concerns about and provided information regarding radiological standards

for children and radiological impacts to children. Specifically, commenters stated the following

concerns:

C One commenter stated that children are more vulnerable to radiation than adults because of their

higher surface-area-to-volume of organs ratio. The commenter stated other contributing factors

including the fact that children have higher soil ingestion rates. The commenter added that in the

opinion of the State of Utah’s expert, Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, because of these distinctions, the dose

to children from the proposed PFSF is likely to be significantly higher than the dose to an adult. 

The commenter stated that in order to satisfy the dose regulation, it is necessary to determine

whether the dose limits are satisfied for children. In addition, the commenter stated that the risk to

children is greater. According to the commenter, children also have a greater chance of

developing cancer than adults, because they live longer than adults (and therefore have a greater

chance to develop cancer). (0198)

C One commenter stated that pages 4-42 through 4-45, Section 4.7.2.1, “Estimated Dose to the

General Public,” of the DEIS have several fallacies and ignore a large portion of the general

public. Specifically, the commenter expressed concern that the maximally exposed individual is

typically a “white male approximately six feet and approximately 155 to 170 pounds, for 70 years.” 

The commenter asserted that the analysis ignores breast feeding infants, a developing fetus,

females, ethnic people and children. (0096)

C One commenter stated that the analysis of latent cancer fatality is inadequate because it only

assesses latency for an adult male. The commenter asserted that information from the BEIR V

report by the NAS shows latent cancer fatalities are higher among children and females. The

commenter also stated that children have actively growing cells, and children live more years than

adults and, therefore, there is more time for the cancer to develop. The commenter added that
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-287 NUREG-1714

information should be provided to indicate that radiation exposure at an earlier age is more likely

to lead to cancer fatality. (0096)

C A few commenters stated that an analysis of health and safety risks to children and developing

fetuses is required by Executive Order 13045 and is not included in the DEIS. (0096, 0200, GR22, SL1-21, SL2-12) One commenter requested this analysis as the majority of the members of

the Skull Valley Band are under the age of 18. (0096) The commenter also stated it is not clear if

the standards (10 CFR Part 20) cited in the Transportation Options section (page xxxviii,

Executive Summary, lines 26-31) give children’s health and safety the highest priority, as required

by Executive Order 13045. (0096, SL1-21) 

C One commenter also stated that ICRP-60, “1990 Recommendations of the International

Commission of Radiological Protection,” (1991) is more accurate for human radiation doses,

particularly inhalation doses from a refined lung model, than ICRP-30, “Limits for Intakes of

Radionuclides by Workers,” (July 1978) and correctly calculates the dose to children, which ICRP30 does not do at all. (0198b)

Response:

The NRC staff considered radiation exposure at the boundary of the proposed PFSF to be the only

linkage between the proposed action and potential health impacts to children. The Executive

Summary of the DEIS discussed why occupational exposure standards are not relevant to radiation

exposure at the facility boundary. A conservative estimate showed a maximum radiation dose of

approximately 0.06 mSv/yr (6 mrem/yr) to an individual at the site boundary, which is approximately

two percent of the natural background radiation dose in the United States of 3 mSv/yr (300 mrem per

year) (see Section 4.7.2.1). At the location of the Reservation resident nearest to the proposed PFSF,

this dose would diminish to about 0.01 percent of the natural background radiation dose in the United

States. The impacts from these doses would be small in comparison to the everyday dose impacts

from natural background radiation present in the environment; hence, there should be no discernible

health impact to children or adults on the Reservation as the result of any radiation exposure from the

proposed action.

The purpose of controlling dose to the public is to limit the lifetime risk from radiation to any member of

the general public. Variation of the sensitivity to radiation with age and gender is considered in NRC

standards, which are based on a lifetime exposure that includes all stages of life, from birth to old age. 

The unrestricted annual dose limit of 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) specified in 10 CFR 72.104(a) is considered

to pose a small health risk to all individuals and is consistent with EPA standards and is protective of

all individuals as discussed above.

The NRC has endorsed ICRP-26 and ICRP-30 recommendations and incorporated its guidance into

radiation dose standards in 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 72, and continues to believe these standards are

inherently protective of all individuals. The NRC has not incorporated newer ICRP-60 recommendations into its radiation standards. Any future changes to the dose standards would be the subject of a

future rulemaking proceeding. However, as discussed in Sections 3.7 and 4.7 of the EIS, the

estimated human health impacts from radiation were based on the ICRP-60 latent cancer fatality risk

value of 5 x 10-4 LCF/rem, which considers radiation effects on younger age groups.

The purpose of Executive Order 13045 is to require Federal agencies "to identify and assess

environmental health risks and safety risks that may disproportionately affect children" in rulemaking

activities. The proposed action is not a rulemaking activity and therefore the Executive Order does not

apply directly to the proposed action. Nevertheless, the NRC staff concluded that the proposed action

would not result in any environmental health risks or safety risks that would disproportionately affect

children, as discussed above, and a change to the EIS is not warranted.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-288

G.3.15.5.3 Psychological and Human Health Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters provided specific concerns regarding psychological and associated health

impacts. Specifically, commenters stated the following concerns:

C One commenter stated that an accident would affect the health of hundreds of Utah citizens from

associated psychological fears. (0013)

C One commenter stated that the physical stress from an accident or fear of an accident could lead

to non-cancer health problems including chronic bronchitis, digestive system problems,

hypertension, and compromised immune systems. (SL1-27)

C One commenter stated that fears related to the proposed action are not unrealistic as claimed by

proponents. (GR-06)

C One commenter stated that the proposed action may result in psychological harm to the Skull

Valley Band. (SL2-06-2)

C One commenter stated that the negative risks and perceptions would affect Salt Lake City. (SL1-

05)

C One commenter stated that the proposed action would result in a loss of peace of mind of Utahns. 

(0197)

C One commenter stated that the health risks associated with the proposed PFSF will negatively

affect the emotional safety and quality of life for Utah citizens. (0013)

C One commenter stated that Utah children will fear nuclear waste related accidents. (SL3-43)

C One commenter asserted that the fear of an accident at the proposed PFSF will cause stress and

physical harm to children and adults in the area that far outweigh any direct physical harm from

the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that according to Ukranian investigators, stress and

emotional trauma on children from the Chernobyl disaster is of more concern than cancer or

chromosome damage. The commenter further stated that stress combined with radiation phobia

has led to real diseases, including chronic bronchitis, digestive system problems, and

hypertension, and may have compromised immune systems. The commenter also said that any

Chernobyl cleanup liquidators received little radiation but presumed they were affected, with the

resulting stress leading to increased suicides and alcohol abuse. The commenter added that

these effects and the decrease in quality of life are significant costs not captured in the DEIS. 

(0013, SL1-27)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges that many concerned members of the public may have various degrees

of fear about the perceived danger of accidents at the proposed PFSF. However, the Supreme Court

has held that “risk of an accident is not an effect on the physical environment.” Metropolitan Edison

Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775 (1983) (PANE) (emphasis in original). The

risk and perception of that risk are necessary links in the causal chain from the facility to psychological

health damage, including anxiety, tension, and fear, a sense of helplessness, and accompanying

physical disorders (see id. at 774-75). According to the Supreme Court’s decision in PANE, the

element of risk lengthens the causal chain beyond the reach of NEPA. Therefore, the psychological

and physical health impacts from perceived risks are beyond the scope of the EIS. Based on this

determination, the NRC staff did not evaluate the potential impacts from fears, stress, or perceptions. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-289 NUREG-1714

Based on its evaluation of the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, the NRC staff has

concluded that the risk from radiation exposure during normal operations or accidents is small.

G.3.15.5.4 Radiological Impacts Other than Latent Cancer Fatalities

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated or implied concerns regarding radiological impacts other than latent

cancer fatalities. (0096, 0183, 0257, GR-06, GR-14, SL2-12) One commenter stated that nuclear

waste might cause thyroid cancer, weaken immune systems, and affect Skull Valley Band members

with diabetes. (GR-06) One commenter stated that the DEIS should include the full health impacts

from an accident, including latent cancer fatalities, nonfatal cancers, birth defects, genetic damage,

lowered immunity, and other diseases. (0257-6) Other commenters stated that the DEIS failed to

consider nonfatal cancer and radiological health impacts besides cancer, including birth defects,

immune function damage, genetic damage and developmental disorders, and any other disease or

malady currently known to be caused by radiation exposure. (0096, 0183, GR-14, SL2-12)

Response:

As discussed in response to G.3.15.1, the NRC staff considered potential human health impacts of

ionizing radiation (e.g. radiation dose and latent cancer fatalities) from the proposed PFSF received by

the public from possible ingestion or inhalation of radioactive materials and from possible exposure to

radiation (e.g. gamma rays and neutrons) that would be directly emitted from the SNF. The NRC staff

also considered the radiological impacts from incident free (routine) SNF shipment and from potential

transportation accidents involving SNF, as discussed in Section 5.7.2 of this FEIS. The NRC staff has

determined that the health impact from direct radiation to the public would be minimal and a small

fraction (less than 2 percent) of the radiation impacts that would be expected from natural background

radiation. In addition, the applicant showed in its safety analysis that the estimated radiological doses

to workers and general public would be within NRC regulatory dose limits. According to NRC

regulations, licensed facilities must not exceed regulatory limits to ensure that there is no undue risk to

workers or the general public from ionizing radiation. The NRC staff performed an independent

evaluation of the applicant’s analyses and found it acceptable as documented in the SER, as updated.

The use of radiation dose values and correlated latent cancer fatalities to evaluate human health

impacts is discussed in Sections 3.7 and 4.7.2 of this FEIS. The risk of latent cancer fatalities to any

given individual, based on conservative assumptions, is very low and would likely not be

distinguishable among normal cancer rates in the population. Latent cancer fatalities were the

predominant health risk considered in the EIS, and were the predominant risk considered by the NRC

to establish the regulatory dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20.

The NRC staff also considered the specific risk of thyroid cancer in the safety review because there

are separate regulatory limits in 10 CFR 72.104 for radiation doses to the thyroid. The NRC staff

determined that the proposed PFSF poses no undue risk to human health from any specific exposures

to the thyroid. In addition, radiological affects on the thyroid are typically associated with the ingestion

or inhalation of radioactive iodine. As discussed in the EIS, the proposed PFSF would not release any

significant amount of radioactive materials to the environment. Therefore, the surrounding population

would not likely ingest or inhale any radioactive iodine from the proposed PFSF.

There likely would not be any discernible non-cancer health impacts as suggested by the commenters,

because the estimated exposure to the public is very low, and below regulatory dose limits. These

dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20 are protective of all individuals and also consider the possibility of

severe hereditary defects along with latent cancer fatalities. Radiation-induced health impacts such

as birth defects, genetic damage (other than induced cancer), immune function damage, and other

possible diseases have typically been detected and associated with extremely high levels of acute

radiation exposure (such as from an atomic bomb blast) that were several orders of magnitude greater
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-290

than estimated public exposures from the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff also determined that it

would be difficult to find a discernible risk of diabetes or some other compounding effect on diabetes

to Skull Valley Band members, if any, from the very low exposures estimated for the proposed PFSF. 

Diabetes is a disease of complex etiology that could be caused and compounded by several

environmental or lifestyle factors.

G.3.15.6 Impacts from Off-Normal Operations or Accidents

G.3.15.6.1 Adequacy of Accident Scenarios Analysis

Accidents and Off-Normal Operations - General

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters asserted that the DEIS does not address the costs or health impacts of accidents

adequately, in part because the DEIS considers far too few off-normal operations and accident

scenarios. (0012, 0015, 0023, 0042, 0058, 0084, 0127, 0135, 0136, 0171, 0183, 0185, 0189, 0194,

0195, 0198, 0198g, 0198h, 0198i, 0204, 0204b, 0217, 0240, 0246, 0257, 0260, GR-13, GR-16, SL1-

01, SL1-07, SL1-05, SL1-32, SL1-39, SL2-05, SL2-20, SL3-04, SL3-18)

Several commenters expressed concern with the probabilities, impacts, and consequences of various

accident scenarios. Some commenters stated that accidents could result in release of radioactive

material with catastrophic environmental impacts. Others expressed concern that the human health

and environmental consequences of an accident scenario could be immense and long lasting. 

(0198h, SL1-05, SL1-20, SL2-01, SL2-13, SL3-21) Specifically, commenters stated the following

concerns:

C The impacts of an accident at the proposed PFSF could be similar to Chernobyl. (GR-15)

C The DEIS did not provide an adequate analysis of various accident scenarios and release

incidents. (0024, 0090, 0158, 0198h, 0203, GR-16, SL1-09, SL1-21, SL1-32, SL1-39, SL2-13)

C The possibility that accidents may occur due to human error has not been made up and there is

no guarantee they would not happen. (GR-06)

C Unexpected nuclear-related accidents can happen such as the accident in Tokaimura, Japan and

the dry storage cask explosion in Wisconsin. (GR-16) 

C Many highly radioactive materials such as xenon, iodine, cesium, ruthenium, rubidium, antimony,

uranium and thorium could be released in the event of an accident and are missing from Table

D.5 of the DEIS. (0203)

C It is unacceptable that the adequacy of the facility design to withstand accidents is addressed only

in the SER and not in the DEIS, especially since the SER will not be available until the EIS is

finalized. (0198, 0230)

C Accident scenarios are addressed in the SAR, as well as the SER, and such issues will be the

subject of a public hearing in the Spring. (SL1-23)

C The applicant failed to adequately identify and assess potential accidents; therefore, the

commenter was concerned that the applicant is unable to determine the adequacy of the ISFSI

design to prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences of accidents as required by 10 CFR

72.24(d)(2). (0198a)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-291 NUREG-1714

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding consequences of various accidents. NRC

safety regulations and guidance specify that ISFSIs be designed to withstand various credible

accidents, including natural events, without having a significant radiological release. The SER, as

updated, included an evaluation and determination of (1) the adequacy of the design to withstand

credible accidents, (2) the potential for a radiological release to occur as a result of any such accident,

and (3) the significance of any such radiological release. The EIS analyses then considered the

evaluation documented in the SER, as updated, and any other relevant information to determine the

radiological impact on the environment. There is no requirement to duplicate the SER analysis in the

EIS. 

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analyses of potential hazards to the proposed PFSF and

consequences of credible accidents. These hazards included potential seismic (earthquake) events,

natural phenomena, military and commercial aircraft crashes, events at nearby facilities, and other

events at the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff evaluation was based on information provided by the

applicant and the NRC staff’s independent analyses. The NRC staff evaluation of potential hazards

and resulting credible accidents are described in detail in Section 15 of the SER, as updated. The

NRC staff determined that the applicant had demonstrated that all credible accidents would not result

in a release of radioactive contents. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that there is no radiological

impact from the proposed PFSF as a result of potential seismic events, natural phenomena, military

and commercial aircraft, potential events at nearby facilities, and other credible accidents at the

proposed PFSF. In addition, the NRC staff determined that accidents outside the proposed PFSF

design basis are not credible. Accordingly, such accidents are not reasonably foreseeable and need

not be considered in the EIS.

The purpose of Table D.5 in the EIS is to reflect radionuclide inventory used to determine health

impacts from SNF shipments, and is not intended to reflect all byproduct material that would be

present in SNF during accident conditions. Table D.5 included the radionuclides, or radioactive

elements, whose activities exceeded about one percent of the total radioactive inventory of the SNF. 

Appropriate radionuclides were considered in dose estimates presented in Section 4.7.2 of the EIS. 

The dose analysis considered the presence of radioactive byproduct material with the most effect on

human organs that would be present during normal or accident conditions. The production facility in

Tokaimura, Japan, and the Chernobyl nuclear reactor were different types of facilities that involved

significantly different activities than those at an SNF dry storage facility and those that would be

conducted at the proposed PFSF. Therefore, the past accidents at the Tokaimura facility and the

Chernobyl reactor are not relevant to the analysis of the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF

and are beyond the scope of the EIS.

Furthermore, the accident scenarios that are analyzed as part of the accident analysis included in the

SAR considered several types of accidents that could be precipitated by human error. The review

criteria used by the NRC staff also took into account the recent experience from the hydrogen-burn

incident that occurred at the Wisconsin facility.

Earthquakes, Floods, Lightning, Tornados, and Other Natural Phenomena

Comment Summary:

Many commenters expressed concern that accidents initiated by earthquakes and other natural

phenomena were not adequately analyzed or addressed in the DEIS. (0012, 0077, 0090, 0198,

0198h, 0215, 0230, 0246, GR-05, GR-06, GR-21, GR-23, SL1-01, SL1-10, SL1-15, SL1-16, SL1-29,

SL1-34, SL1-39, SL2-19, SL3-07, SL3-19, SL3-25, SL3-40) 

One commenter stated that it is not clear in the DEIS under what conditions the storage casks and

proposed PFSF could withstand earthquakes, wildfires, direct lightning strikes, tornadoes, corrosive
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-292

atmospheric deposits, mechanical forces from precipitation and wind, and internal or external

overheating. (0215-6) Another commenter stated that emergency situations resulting from excessive

heat or cold, as well as snow buildup, around the storage casks should be evaluated. (0198h)

Response:

The NRC staff has evaluated the effects on the proposed PFSF from the most severe, credible,

natural phenomena, including earthquakes, wildfires, lightning strikes, tornadoes, atmospheric

deposits, precipitation, and wind. The FEIS includes an analysis of the effects the proposed PFSF

might have on the physical environment under such natural phenomena. The NRC staff did not,

however, evaluate effects on the proposed PFSF from natural phenomena that are not credible. 

Natural phenomena more severe than those evaluated as set forth in the SER, as updated, are not

reasonably foreseeable, and need not be considered in this FEIS. The FEIS does not discuss the

effects of natural phenomena that are not credible. Notwithstanding that there is no requirement for

the FEIS to include analysis as suggested by the commenters, the NRC staff, as set forth below, has

briefly summarized its evaluation of the safety issues the commenters raise.

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analyses of potential natural phenomena, including floods,

lightning, snowfall, and credible tornadoes. The NRC staff determined from its own confirmatory

analyses and the applicant’s analyses that (1) berms would retain water from a probable maximum

flood and flooding would not submerge the cask storage area; (2) the proposed PFSF and design

features can survive lightning; (3) the proposed PFSF and casks can withstand a design-basis tornado

and associated wind-driven missiles; and (4) the casks can withstand snowfall. With respect to

overheating, the applicant’s analysis provided reasonable assurance that the casks would provide

adequate protection of the public health and safety, even if the vents were completely blocked for

72 hours. If licensed, the applicant would be required to survey the vents every 24 hours to ensure

they are not blocked. Furthermore, potential effects of credible floods, lightning, snowfall, and

tornadoes would not result in a release of the SNF contents. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that

there would be no radiological impact from the proposed PFSF as a result of these natural

phenomena (seismic phenomena are addressed in the next comment response). The NRC staff

evaluation is documented in Chapter 15 of the SER, as updated.

Furthermore, the impacts of the proposed PFSF upon the environment in the event of flooding were

addressed in Sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2.2 of the EIS. The impacts of the proposed rail line from

Skunk Ridge in the event of a flood were addressed in Sections 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.2.2 of the EIS. There

would be no other impacts from the proposed PFSF or proposed rail line in the event of the other

types of natural phenomena mentioned in the comment.

Design Basis Accidents Involving Earthquakes and Other Seismic Concerns

Comment Summary:

Some commenters expressed concern with the ability of the proposed PFSF to withstand earthquakes

during storage and handling of the casks. The commenters stated the following concerns:

C Earthquakes, ground motion, soil stability concerns, foundation concerns, surface rupturing,

seismic history and other major geologic and seismic considerations are not addressed in the

DEIS. (0198, 0230)

C There is no discussion in the DEIS of the risk of cask sliding and tipping over that may occur as a

result of an earthquake. (0198)

C The claims by the applicant that an earthquake is unlikely and that storage casks can not fall over

are not supported by any reliable data. (0077) 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-293 NUREG-1714

One commenter stated that whether the casks are Holtec casks or TranStor casks, the applicant’s

cask sliding analysis fails to consider the potential range of conditions that may occur during a seismic

event, such as whether the pad will remain rigid under cask loading; whether the simple frictional

elements applied in the soil-structure interaction model are appropriate; and whether the analyzed

coefficients of friction of 0.2 and 0.8 bound the actual behavior of the cask-pad interface under

dynamic loading. The commenter wanted the NRC staff to continue to require the applicant to perform

complete analysis. (0198f)

Response:

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis of potential seismic (earthquake) events at the

proposed site and performed confirmatory analyses. These analyses considered ground faults in the

vicinity of the proposed site and other information relevant to seismic characteristics at the proposed

site, as well as the proposed design of the proposed PFSF. The applicant calculated the maximum

ground accelerations in both the horizontal and vertical directions from the largest design earthquake

event in a 2,000-year return period, using a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). See

Section G.3.6.2.9 for additional detail on the seismic standards used for the proposed PFSF. An

accident analysis assuming these maximum ground accelerations was performed for the structures,

systems, components important to safety at the proposed PFSF (i.e., canister, concrete storage cask,

transfer cask, lifting devices, canister transfer building, canister transfer overhead bridge crane,

canister transfer semi-gantry crane, seismic struts, and cask storage pads). The accident analysis

considered both cask handling operations in the canister transfer building and storage operations on

the pad. The analysis recognized that a seismic event could take place at any time during any stage

of a transfer or storage operation involving a cask or a canister. The NRC staff determined from these

analyses that it had reasonable assurance that the proposed PFSF and storage casks, if constructed

as designed, would provide adequate protection to the public health and safety in the event of the

design earthquake event with a return period of 2,000-years. Further, the analysis determined that

such an earthquake event would not result in a release of SNF contents. Therefore, the NRC staff

concluded that there is no radiological impact from the proposed PFSF as a result of the design

earthquake event. The NRC staff evaluation of the applicant’s analysis of seismic setting and hazards

are documented in Chapters 2 and 15 of the SER, as updated.

Fires 

Comment Summary:

A number of commenters expressed concern that the DEIS does not adequately consider the risks of

a fire at the proposed PFSF. (0039, 0042, 0077, 0249, SL1-07, SL1-09, SL1-18, SL1-34, SL1-39,

SL3-25, SL3-40, SL3-43) One commenter stated that wildfire danger, including fires sparked by train

operations in Skull Valley, has received inadequate evaluation. (0246) Another commenter stated

that range or wildfires should be evaluated in the EIS. (0198h) A commenter stated that the DEIS

failed to analyze, for example, a collision resulting in a long-duration extremely hot fire. (0203)

Response:

The NRC staff determined from the applicant’s analyses that potential fire and explosions at the

proposed site would not result in a release of SNF contents. In response to public comments, a new

Section 4.8.4 has been added to the FEIS to discuss the impact of the proposed PFSF on wildfires. 

The proposed storage area would be surrounded by vegetation (i.e., crested wheatgrass) that would

serve to resist fire. The proposed storage area itself would be covered with a layer of gravel and

would be kept clear of combustible material. In addition, the proposed rail line would be revegetated

with fire resistant native grasses. The proposed PFSF would have its own fire-fighting capability and

might rely upon the assistance of Tooele County.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-294

The fire suppression system for the proposed PFSF has been found acceptable by the NRC staff and

the staff’s evaluation is documented in the SER. The commenter did not provide details on the

potential collision accident followed by a fire of long duration. However, as discussed in Chapter 15 of

the SER, several credible accident scenarios involving potential diesel fuel fires at the proposed PFSF

were analyzed. This included a 50-gallon diesel fuel fire from the cask transporter which surrounds

the cask and a 6,400-gallon diesel fuel fire from nearby locomotives on-site. In all cases, the casks

were shown to adequately survive the fire events and not release SNF contents. In addition, the

proposed transportation casks would be able to withstand a fuel fire at 1,475°F for 30 minutes as

required in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4). As stated in Section 4.8.4 of this FEIS, the staff found no basis to

conclude that the proposed facility would cause wildfires.

Sabotage and Terrorism at the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

Many commenters expressed concern that the DEIS did not adequately consider the risks of sabotage

and terrorism at the proposed PFSF. (0036, 0077, 0096, 0112, 0198, 0215, GR-05, GR-06, GR-23,

SL1-10, SL1-11, SL1-22, SL1-32, SL2-05, SL2-08, SL3-12) Commenters stated the following

concerns:

C Security measures for the proposed PFSF may not be adequate. (0039, 0077, 0142, SL1-11,

SL1-32, SL2-08)

C One person has been able to penetrate security in the nuclear power industry more than 20 times. 

(SL2-08)

C The applicant and Tooele County will be unable to provide protection from terrorism and

sabotage. (0039, 0077, SL1-11, SL2-05)

C The DEIS should address a worst case scenario of a nuclear detonation by terrorists. (SL1-32,

SL2-08)

C It was estimated that 100,000 deaths and $15 billion worth of damage could result from a terrorist

attack at a nuclear waste facility. (SL1-32)

C A less manageable and totally uncontrolled environment exists should an accident occur - the

proposed site is not secure, the public is not educated nor trained in protecting themselves, and

trained personnel and specialized equipment are not present. (0198h)

C Sovereignty issues might affect the ability to ensure security at the site. (SL1-32)

Response:

The physical protection plan for the proposed PFSF must meet the safeguard requirements in 10 CFR

72.180 and 73.51, and have appropriate capabilities for the protection of stored SNF and high-level

radioactive wastes. These regulations require the design of safeguard systems to protect against acts

of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material. These regulations also

specifically require that the licensee provide several specific means to deter, detect, and respond to

acts of sabotage. First, the licensee must store SNF and high-level radioactive waste only within a

protected area. The licensee must have systems to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of, or

activities within, the protected area. The protected area must have two physical barriers, one at the

perimeter of the protected area and the other providing substantial penetration resistance such as by

the approved storage cask. The facility needs to be sufficiently illuminated, and the perimeter of the

protected area much be continually surveilled and protected by an active intrusion alarm system. The

associated primary alarm station must be located within the protected area, with bullet proof walls,
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-295 NUREG-1714

doors, ceiling, and floor and must not be visible from outside the protected area. Also, a second

redundant alarm station is required. A personnel identification system and controlled lock system is

required. Redundant communication capability must be provided between the onsite security force

and the designated response force. All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the

protected area must be checked for proper authorization and visually searched for explosives. All

detection systems must be tamper indicating with line supervision. Details of the above must be

described in a physical protection program which must be approved by the NRC and periodically

reviewed by independent licensee staff.

The NRC staff evaluated the Physical Protection Plan for the proposed PFSF as documented in

Chapter 18 of the SER. The NRC staff determined that the Physical Protection Plan satisfied the

requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 73.51. The NRC staff concluded that the applicant has provided

reasonable assurance that the Physical Protection Plan for the proposed PFSF will provide for the

common defense and security and adequate protection of the health and safety of the public when

fully implemented.

In addition, in light of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the NRC staff has

been directed to review the NRC’s security regulations and procedures. If the NRC determines that

revisions to NRC’s requirements are warranted, such changes would occur through a public

rulemaking. The NRC staff, however, has not yet identified any specific additional requirement for

storage of SNF with respect to sabotage.

Military Accidents 

Comment Summary:

Several commenters indicated that any probability of a military accident is unacceptable given the

magnitude of its consequences. Several commenters expressed concern that the DEIS did not

consider risks associated with military accidents given the proximity to active gunning and bombing

ranges, recent cruise missile and F-16 crashes, and the proximity of the site to the UTTR. Several of

these commenters expressed concern that a military plane or cruise missile crash, or other military

accident at the proposed PFSF, could result in a release of radioactive material. Other commenters

expressed concern over recent military aircraft and cruise missile crashes in the vicinity of the

proposed PFSF. (0012, 0013, 0036, 0090, 0096, 0174, 0198, 0198i, 0210a, GR-01, GR-06, SL1-01,

SL1-06, SL1-10, SL1-11, SL1-12, SL1-27, SL1-34, SL2-01, SL2-11, SL3-06, SL3-12, SL3-19, SL3-20,

SL3-28, SL3-40) Commenters stated the following concerns:

C The following statement in the DEIS should be justified: "canister leakage under hypothetical

accident conditions is not considered to be a credible event" (Page 4-47, line 37). The comment

suggested that an accident scenario that could result in an environmental release should be

analyzed, for example, an aircraft crash into a stored cask. (0169)

C The chance of the accidental release of live ordnance or crash of an aircraft can never realistically

be placed at zero. (0198i)

C Tests of unmanned, long-range cruise missiles and other emerging, large footprint weapons are

permitted and have been conducted within 1 mile of the site. The commenter stated that last year

a cruise missile crashed in the same Military Operating Area beneath which the PFSF is proposed

and that there have been over a dozen aircraft accidents in the past 10 years. (0198, 0210a,

GR-01)

C The ability of the proposed PFSF to withstand explosions and missile or jet crashes. (0215, 0096)

C Locating a high-level nuclear waste storage facility under an active military testing and training

range is harmful to national security and dangerous to the local population. (GR-01)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-296

C The proposed PFSF is incompatible with surrounding military activities. The commenter stated

that the proposed PFSF will be located east of the UTTR property and underneath the UTTR

airspace designated as a Military Operating Area. According to the commenter, the activities

approved in the airspace over the proposed PFSF include air-to-air training, low-altitude training,

cruise-missile testing, and major military exercises. Also, the commenter stated that the main use

of the Skull Valley airspace is to allow low- and medium-altitude entries of F-16s into the UTTR

from Hill AFB. The commenter added that the risk of aircraft crashes, including military aircraft,

into the proposed PFSF has not been evaluated at all in this DEIS and is a significant risk. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis of potential aircraft hazards from both commercial

aviation and military traffic in the vicinity of the proposed site. This evaluation was based on the

applicant’s analysis of military and commercial aircraft operation in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF. 

The staff determined from the applicant’s analyses and its own confirmatory analyses that the total

probability of a crash at the proposed PFSF was less than one in a million (1.0 x 10-6) crashes per

year. Therefore, such an event is not reasonably foreseeable, and need not be considered in the EIS. 

The staff also considered the use of military cruise missiles in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF,

including past cruise missiles testing, and determined that such use would not pose an unacceptable

hazard to the proposed PFSF. In addition, the NRC staff also determined that current military

operations at nearby facilities and sites such as Hill AFB, Dugway Proving Ground and the UTTR

would not have to be altered or reduced in order for the proposed PFSF to meet NRC safety and

regulatory requirements. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in Chapter 15 of the SER, as

updated.

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis of potential hazards from events at nearby military

sites such as Dugway Proving Ground, Michael Army Airfield, and the UTTR. The evaluation included

potential hazards from off-site explosions, rocket testing, chemical munitions, biological defense

activities, unexploded ordnance, hung ordnance, conventional munition testing, and cruise missile

testing. The NRC staff determined from its own confirmatory analyses and the applicant’s analyses

that potential events at nearby sites would not pose an unacceptable hazard to the proposed PFSF

because of the low likelihood of such events or the distance from the proposed PFSF to these sites. 

Therefore, radiological impacts from the proposed PFSF, as a result of potential events from military

aircraft and nearby military sites, are not reasonably foreseeable and need not be considered in the

EIS.

Tipped Casks

Comment Summary:

Commenters expressed concern regarding tipped casks, including the following specific concerns:

C The environmental impacts of toppled casks. (0112)

C The procedures and testing for righting casks in the short time frame specified in the DEIS and the

impacts of not righting a cask within a specified time frame of 12 hours. (0077, 0096, 0112)

C The need to evaluate the necessary response time and capability for righting an overturned cask. 

(0198h)

C The claims by the applicant that storage containers cannot be tipped are not supported by any

reliable data. (0077)

One commenter referenced page xxxvi, lines 32-33 of the DEIS, concerning impacts to community

resources, and stated that the region cannot provide for the righting of tipped casks within the time
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-297 NUREG-1714

frame specified in the DEIS. The commenter questioned how a radiological team would reach into the

large subdivision of casks to correct the problem. The commenter further stated that response time is

a critical issue, because it has been estimated that it would take between 12-15 hours for the nearest

radiological team to reach the site from the West Coast. The same commenter questioned what time

frame is required to right all casks should they become altered due to a geo-seismic event. The

commenter also questioned whether the “storage cask transporter” (Figure 29) is capable of righting

toppled casks and whether the procedure has been adequately tested with loaded casks other than in

computer simulations. (0112)

Response:

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s analyses of potential cask tipover at the proposed PFSF. The

NRC staff determined from its own confirmatory analyses and the applicant’s analyses that cask

tipover should not occur at the proposed site based on the design of the casks and other measures

designed to restrain the casks during handling operations. Therefore, methods and response times

for “up-righting” is beyond the scope of the cask design. In addition, the applicant’s analyses indicated

that a hypothetical cask tipover or drop (such as from a seismic event) would not significantly damage

the cask and confinement and shielding of the SNF would be maintained. As discussed in Chapter 15

of the SER, as updated, cask tipover is not considered to be credible during design-basis seismic

events.

G.3.15.6.2 Analysis of Emergency Response Capabilities is Inadequate

Emergency Response

Comment Summary: 

A number of commenters expressed concern that the analysis of emergency response capabilities is

inadequate. Commenters stated that emergency response capabilities for fires, leaks or other

incidents at the proposed PFSF are inadequate. Many of these commenters expressed concern

about the availability of emergency responders capable of managing accidents at the proposed PFSF. 

(0039, 0042, 0077, 0096, 0112, 0171, 0198, 0198e, 0246, SL1-07, SL1-09, SL1-10, SL1-38, SL1-39,

SL2-12, SL3-04, SL3-43, SL3-55) 

C One commenter asked what emergency response provisions were included in the DEIS? (0039,

0077)

C One commenter stated that there is no indication there will be adequate police and fire protection

and other services as required by statute. (0198)

C One commenter stated that there would not be time to respond to an emergency at the proposed

PFSF. (0033) 

C One commenter stated that the discussion of emergency response impacts was minimal and

inadequate for the nature of the proposed PFSF and the kinds of problems that have the potential

to occur. The commenter added that Section 3.5.2.4 discussed public health and safety on page

3-43 of the DEIS, but no corresponding discussion of public health and safety is found in Section

4.5 under environmental consequences. The commenter stated that there should be a full

discussion of emergency response issues in the FEIS, including the liability issues related to the

involvement of volunteers responding to a radiological emergency. (0171) 

C Citing page 3-43, line 1-4 of the DEIS, a commenter stated that the problem with volunteer fire

departments is that under the Uniform Fire Code they cannot conduct remediation activities as

hazardous materials teams. The commenter concluded that, consequently, they may not be

available to respond to radiological incidents. (0096) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-298

C One commenter stated that the applicant should be required to have an assessment for

emergency-response needs, local emergency response training, and have sufficient safety and

cleanup equipment for radioactive problems in case an incident occurs. (0230)

C One commenter stated that with minor exceptions, none of the common sense regulatory

mechanisms have been employed by the NRC to ensure problems are avoided or addressed at

the proposed PFSF. Also, the commenter stated that emergency planning should include a

quantitative risk assessment as well as a detailed evaluation of the regulations, procedures,

equipment, and personnel necessary to mitigate the impacts of the individual and cumulative

impacts. The commenter also stated that the FEIS should indicate the permits, license,

regulations, and procedures required to ensure that any impacts can be mitigated. (0198, 0198h)

C The commenter stated that the applicant failed to describe and consider area specific

impediments to emergency response such as flooding, high winds, range fires, ice and snow, and

the presence of grazing domestic and wild animals on access roads which will impede the

response of off-site emergency assistance and the transporting of on-site victims to off-site

medical facilities. (0198a)

C One commenter stated that a critical aspect of the EIS scoping process is the definition of

emergencies, both those that could result from the operation of the proposed storage of high level

nuclear waste fuel rods and emergencies which could impact the ISFSI operations. (0198h)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding emergency response. However, emergency

response and emergency planning issues are addressed in the NRC safety review. The applicant will

be required to meet specific regulations (10 CFR 72.32) for emergency response planning at the

proposed PFSF. The NRC staff evaluated the Emergency Plan for the proposed PFSF and found it

acceptable as documented in Chapter 16 of the SER. Therefore, an evaluation of the Emergency

Plan was not included in the EIS. The Emergency Plan addressed the actions that would be taken in

the event of an accident or off-normal event (e.g., a fire) at the proposed PFSF. This included the

consideration of the roles and needs of off-site emergency response personnel. For a detailed

discussion of the Emergency Plan, see Chapter 16 of the SER.

Emergency Plan and Evacuation

Comment Summary:

C One commenter stated that the applicant did not adequately describe the proposed PFSF in

accordance with Regulatory Guide 3.67, Section C.1, the activities to be conducted at the

proposed PFSF, and the area near the proposed PFSF in sufficient detail to evaluate the

adequacy and appropriateness of the Emergency Plan. According to the commenter, the

applicant merely touched on some of these requirements without adequately addressing any of

them, and in fact, regularly refers to its “Emergency Plan implementing procedures” which will be

developed sometime in the future to take care of numerous details which should have been

described in its Emergency Plan. (0198a)

C One commenter stated that the Emergency Plan did not contain sufficient detail to meet the

provisions of Regulatory Guide 3.67, Section 5.4.1, because the applicant has failed to provide

adequate information on specific protective, communication, medical, contamination control,

decontamination, fire fighting, radiation detection and hazardous material detection equipment

with inventory lists and specific locations of the equipment. The commenter was concerned that

without specific adequate information, emergency preparedness personnel may not be capable of

providing a timely response to an emergency. (0198a)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-299 NUREG-1714

C One commenter stated that the failure to allow the State of Utah to review and comment on the

Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14) is an example of the applicant refusing to

work with the State. (0198a)

C A few commenters stated that the DEIS does not evaluate the possibility of evacuation or identify

emergency evacuation routes in the event of accidents. (0012, 0198, SL1-01, SL1-10, SL1-29) 

C One commenter expressed concern that no emergency evacuation route through Skull Valley had

been identified in case of a chemical agent leak. (0012, 0198, SL1-01) 

C Another commenter expressed concern that the impacts of evacuating abandoning the proposed

PFSF due to an incident, like release of a chemical warfare agent, were not considered. (0158)

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding emergency planning and evacuation, but these

comments were not directly related to the environmental review. The comments were instead related

to the NRC safety evaluation. Therefore, the issues identified in the comments are beyond the scope

of the EIS.

As discussed above, the NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s Emergency Plan and found it acceptable. 

The review of the Emergency Plan was documented in Chapter 16 of the SER. The effects of a

hypothetical accident in which radioactive contents were released would be small and would meet

regulatory limits as discussed in Section 4.7.2.3 of the EIS. There were not any credible accidents for

the proposed PFSF that released SNF contents or that resulted in a significant radiological exposure

to the public. Therefore, emergency evacuation route planning was not warranted for the proposed

PFSF, as suggested by some commenters, and the EIS did not include any such evaluation. The

NRC staff notes that Interim Spent Fuel Project Office Staff Guidance #16, Emergency Planning,

provides the principle guidance for preparing Emergency Plans for ISFSIs. Regulations in 10 CFR

72.32(a), Emergency Plan, provided the regulatory requirements for ISFSI emergency plans.

Spill Control

Comment Summary:

C One commenter expressed concern about the 1000-gallon diesel fuel tank located next to the

canister transfer building because the DEIS only stated that fuel spills will be managed under

RCRA requirements. The commenter stated that RCRA does not routinely manage petroleum

spills. The commenter questioned the safety and management of the diesel tank. (0039, 0077)

C One commenter stated that there is a discrepancy between the DEIS and the ER. The

commenter added that page 5-10, Section 5.2.2.4 of the DEIS stated, “PFS’s current list of BMPs

... does not include a specific commitment concerning spill response” at the proposed ITF. 

However, the commenter stated that Sections 9.1-6 and 9.1-8 of the ER state that a spill plan will

be developed if the threshold requirements specified in 40 CFR Part 112, Oil Pollution Prevention,

for such are exceeded. (0163)

C One commenter stated that contingency planning for the proposed PFSF is inadequate. The

commenter stated that the applicant has not met the STB requirement that contingency plans be

in place. The commenter said that management practices and controls, contingency plans, and

financial assurance should be required to prevent and respond to spills. The commenter cited

DEIS, pages 2-19, 2-25, and 4-42 and stated that the NRC appears to have uncritically accepted

the applicant’s assurance that it will “start clean, stay clean.” (0198, 0198h)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-300

Response:

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding spill control of hazardous materials. The NRC

staff notes that 10 CFR 72.32(a)(13) refers to the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know

Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 99-499 (EPCRA). EPCRA stipulates that if a facility has an extremely

hazardous substance in an amount greater than the appropriate threshold planning quantity, then the

facility must designate a facility Emergency Coordinator to participate in the local planning process. 

The proposed SNF storage facility would not have any extremely hazardous substances, as defined in

40 CFR Part 355, present in amounts equal to or greater than the threshold planning quantities

specified in 40 CFR Part 355, Appendix A. Since only limited quantities of hazardous materials such

as diesel fuel would be stored and used at the proposed PFSF, spills or other accidents involving

hazardous materials have no potential for posing a threat to on-site or off-site personnel. The

implementing procedures for the applicant’s Emergency Plan will contain a list of all hazardous

materials to be used at the proposed PFSF, including quantities, locations, use and storage

requirements. 

Section 4.2 of this FEIS discusses the potential impacts of a fuel oil spill on water resources at the

proposed PFSF and concludes that the impact would be small. As discussed in Section 9.4.2 of this

FEIS, to ensure that construction and operational activities will not lead to contamination of

groundwater, the Cooperating Agencies have proposed that PFS be required to implement a Best

Management Practices Plan that would include a spill response procedure for appropriately

responding to a spill of oil or fuel at the proposed PFSF or related transportation facilities. This

procedure would address spills on site, at the rail siding, or along the rail line. To the same end, the

Cooperating Agencies have also proposed that PFSF be required to be responsible for clean-up of

any spills or accidents on the PFSF, at the rail siding, and along the right-of-way for the rail line, in

accordance with applicable standards. As discussed in Section 4.7.2.3 of the EIS, credible accidents

at the proposed PFSF would not result in the release of SNF contents to the environment. 

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 14 of the SER, the staff evaluated the waste confinement and

management systems for the proposed PFSF and determined that the applicant has adequately

described systems for confining possible radiological wastes (liquid or solid) from decontamination

activities. Therefore, PFSF personnel should be able to mitigate any minor radiological contamination

issues at the site during operations.

Fire Suppression and Fire Fighting Capability

Comment Summary:

Several commenters questioned the adequacy of locally-based fire fighting resources for the proposed

PFSF. (0042, 0112, 0198, 0246, SL1-09, SL1-10, SL1-39, SL2-12, SL3-04, SL3-43, SL3-55)

C A few commenters stated that fire suppression is not adequately addressed. (0039, 0077, 0112,

0246, SL3-43) 

C Two other commenters said that the FEIS should address measures to avoid starting a fire as well

as measures to protect the site and facilities in the event of a fire. (0047, 0089) 

C One commenter asked how much of the “adequate plan for fire protection, suppression, and

rehabilitation during construction and operation” cited on page xlv, lines 17-19 of the DEIS has

been developed and tested? (0112) 

C One commenter questioned which facility in the West Desert gets first priority to fire fighting

resources. The commenter does not believe emergency responders could protect all of the West

Desert facilities during a wildfire. (SL1-09)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-301 NUREG-1714

C One commenter was specifically concerned because of the proximity of the 1000-gallon diesel fuel

tank to the canister transfer building and storage pads. The commenter also stated that the only

mention of fire suppression provisions were in the SAR on page 2.5-5. (0077-9)

C One commenter expressed concern about water availability to fight a fire at the proposed PFSF. 

According to the commenter, the applicant expects to obtain water for fire fighting, potable water

and water for the concrete batching plant, from surface storage tanks since “it is unlikely that

water wells drilled into the main valley aquifer would yield adequate quantities of water for these

purposes on demand.” However, the commenter was concerned whether the storage tanks could

hold sufficient water for a serious fire, especially since the applicant identified the use of a fire

truck at the proposed site, another fire truck available from the Reservation, as well as trucks

supplied by Tooele County Fire Department, all of which may need access to the water tanks in a

wide spread difficult fire situation. (0198a)

C Two commenters stated that reliance on the Tooele County Fire Department was unacceptable

because the Tooele County Fire Department consisted of volunteers, and the Utah State Highway

Patrol provides very few responders. The commenters also said that the Chief of the Tooele

County Fire Department has already stated that his department would not provide support in the

event of a fire at the proposed PFSF. (0039, 0077, 0198) 

C One commenter stated that volunteer firefighters will not access radioactive sites and the

proposed PFSF may have to be evacuated for several days. The commenter stated that Utah

Senator Ron Allen testified to the ASLB that, in his experience as a fire chief in Skull Valley, the

area is dry and often experiences high winds causing range fires to burn thousands of acres. The

commenter stated that Senator Allen also stated that the most common procedure in fighting such

fires in Skull Valley has been to evacuate all persons at risk as quickly as possible, miles ahead of

the fire. The commenter also said that the Senator questioned whether the applicant was willing

to completely evacuate and abandon the proposed site for what could be a period of several days. 

The commenter asserted that the Senator said that county and city fire chiefs in the area have not

been contacted or asked about potential aid agreements to the proposed site. (0198) 

C One commenter stated that the applicant’s ability to deal with on-site fires and the environmental

consequences of these fires should be addressed. Specifically, the commenter stated that there

is no substantive discussion of the consequences that will result from the applicant’s inadequately

trained and staffed fire fighting unit. The commenter stated that the consequences of leaving the

proposed PFSF unattended for several days must be addressed in the FEIS. The commenter

also expressed concerned that the proposed PFSF would have no fire fighters on-site after normal

working hours. (0198) 

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding fire suppression and availability of off-site fire

fighting personnel. With one exception, as discussed below, the comments are not directly related to

the environmental reviews. The comments were instead related to the NRC safety evaluation. 

Therefore, the issues identified in the comments are beyond the scope of the EIS.

With respect to the safety issues as discussed above, the NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s

Emergency Plan, including fire-fighting resources, and found it acceptable. The NRC staff considered

that a credible fire accident affecting the proposed PFSF during canister handling at the Canister

Transfer Building or cask transfer was possible. A credible fire at the proposed PFSF could be

initiated by the ignition of diesel fuel from the storage tank, vehicle diesel fuel tank, locomotive fuel

tank, or electrical insulation/equipment. Fires from other site-specific sources, such as materials onsite, grass-fueled wildfires, and accidents on nearby highways or industrial complexes were also

considered. The NRC staff evaluated possible consequences of the fires, and the design and

description of fire detection systems and fire-suppression systems, and found them acceptable. The
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-302

NRC staff evaluation was documented in Chapters 6 and 15 of the SER. The NRC staff concluded

that no radioactive contents would be released as a result of fire accidents. As discussed above, the

NRC staff also concluded that the applicant’s emergency plan, which considered off-site emergency

response, was adequate. As stated in Section 4.8.4 of the FEIS, the proposed PFSF would have its

own fire-fighting capability and would not rely solely upon the assistance of Tooele County. Also, see

response to fire-related comments in G.3.15.6.1.

One commenter suggested that the FEIS should address measures to avoid starting a fire at the

facility. As discussed in Chapter 6 of the SER, the applicant has adequately described the design of

the proposed PFSF for fire detection, alarm, and suppression systems and these systems will be

designed based on acceptable codes and standards. In addition, fire barriers with adequate width will

be placed around the restricted area of the proposed PFSF to prevent fire hazards. As noted above, a

fire at the proposed PFSF could be initiated by the ignition of diesel fuel from the storage tank, vehicle

diesel fuel tank, locomotive fuel tank, or electrical insulation/equipment. Section 5.8.4 of the FEIS

already addresses the issue of wildfire, including those that could be started by sparking from the

wheels of a locomotive on the rails in the proposed transportation corridor. The DEIS lacked any

discussion of wildfire originating at the proposed PFSF, and the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies

have added such a discussion in Section 4.8.4 of the FEIS.

G.3.15.6.3 Leaking and Contaminated Canister Issues

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters expressed concern about the applicant’s planned management of leaking casks

during storage. (0198h, SL1-06) One commenter stated that the impacts of being unable to

repackage a cask which is damaged or leaking, during transportation and storage, should be further

evaluated. (0198h) One commenter objected to the applicant’s plan to return leaking containers to

the place of origin. The commenter stated that there is no guarantee of safety and believes the

applicant will jeopardize millions of lives by returning leaking casks. (SL1-06)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the concerns in comments regarding return of “leaking” or

“contaminated” canisters to the place of origin. The staff emphasizes, however, that the applicant

described the return of contaminated canisters, not contaminated casks or leaking canisters. The

FEIS states that if contaminated canisters (i.e., those with unacceptable removable surface

contamination) are found during the receipt inspection at the proposed PFSF, then the canister would

be repackaged into its shipping cask and returned to the originating reactor. The shipping cask is

designed to contain any such surface contamination. The return shipment would not cause any

significant exposure to the general public from the contaminated canister. Section 2.1.2.1 of the FEIS

has been revised to better explain the terminology concerning repackaging and return of casks and

the resulting consequences.

The SNF will be contained inside steel canisters sealed (i.e., welded shut) at the originating reactor.

The steel canisters are leak tested at the originating reactor before they are sent to the applicant to

verify that the canisters are completely intact. At the proposed PFSF, these canisters will be stored

inside concrete and metal overpacks that would rest on the storage pads. These steel canisters are

designed to remain intact and not leak during the transport process to the proposed PFSF. They are

also designed to remain intact and not leak during storage at the proposed PFSF during normal

operations and credible accidents. The steel canisters also would not likely require any significant

repairs at the proposed PFSF. 

The term “contaminated” in the EIS generally refers to unacceptable levels of radioactive material

contamination on the exterior of the steel canisters (i.e., removable contamination that exceeds the

maximum limits specified in the proposed Technical Specifications for the PFSF). Section 8.1.5 of the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-303 NUREG-1714

SAR and Section 4.7.2.3 of the FEIS provided a hypothetical and conservative calculation that

indicates that maximum contamination limits in the proposed Technical Specifications would not result

in a significant or generally detectable dose (0.004 mrem) to the general public during storage. The

NRC staff concluded that intact canisters, which also satisfy allowable contamination levels, would not

release any significant radioactive material to the environment. 

The term “leaking” in the EIS generally refers to a hypothetical condition that is not credible, in which

there would be a release of radioactive material (solids or gases) from the welded steel canisters into

the environment. In Chapter 3 of the SER, the NRC staff proposed a license condition that would

require the inside of the transportation cask to be sampled for radioactive gases upon receipt and prior

to opening, in order to reverify that the canister confinement boundary is intact. In the hypothetical

scenario that a canister is not intact and is leaking, the shipping cask should be able to safely contain

the SNF contents and any hypothetical leakage from the inner steel canister, without a significant

radiological exposure to the general public. 

G.3.15.6.4 Facility Design and Operations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter provided several comments regarding the proposed PFSF operations, including staff

training and certification and cask design and handling. The commenter stated concern that the

applicant did not adequately analyze cask accidents. The commenter stated the following concerns:

C The applicant did not consider the foreseeable risk posed by a cask drop accident in which a

canister is dented or warped, and cannot be returned to its shipping cask. The commenter stated

that if this occurs, the applicant has no provision for repacking the SNF. (0198a) 

C The applicant failed to discuss canister end accidents involving improperly constructed casks. 

According to the commenter, it was unclear whether the TranStor cask is subject to the same

quality of fabrication as the VSC-24. The commenter stated that the NRC issued a Demand for

Information to the Sierra Nuclear Corporation on October 7, 1997, as a result of numerous NRC

inspection findings indicating that, since 1992, Sierra Nuclear’s quality assurance and corrective

action programs have failed to identify and correct design control and fabrication deficiencies. 

The commenter expressed concern that a canister with fabrication deficiencies could fail, and if it

contained failed fuel, could release fission products. (0198a) 

C The cask maximum lift heights of 10 and 18 in. imply that vertical drops greater than these

amounts would result in damage to the canister or interior contents. The commenter stated that

the applicant must not only address lifting accidents while on-site at the proposed PFSF, but at the

proposed ITF or during transport on either rail or highway, where significant damage could occur

during an accident with the potential release of nuclear material. The commenter added that

cladding of SNF elements is likely to be very brittle through extensive radiation embrittlement, so

cladding failure is likely during such accidents. (0198a)

One commenter stated that training and certification of applicant personnel fails to satisfy Subpart I of

10 CFR Part 72 and will not ensure that the proposed PFSF is operated in a safe manner. The

applicant’s organizational structure, pre-operational testing program, and testing program are

identified in Section 9.1 through Section 9.3 of the SAR. These sections do not satisfy the minimal

NRC requirements and do not provide assurance that the proposed PFSF will be operated in a safe

manner. (0198a)

One commenter noted that the SAR has no discussion regarding the physical condition of operators,

as required by 10 CFR 72.194. The commenter said that a potential operator should be required to

pass a medical examination that certifies the operator has the physical ability to perform duties of

his/her specific job and has no physical impairments or mental conditions that would adversely affect
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-304

his/her performance or cause operational errors that would endanger public health and safety. 

(0198a)

The commenter stated that the applicant relies on some of the assumptions in the Sandia report for

calculating CEDE from the HI-STORM cask and for the fuel failure accident evaluated in the SAR. 

The commenter stated that the applicant also relies on the Sandia report for its assumption that only 5

percent of the release fraction of Co-60 and Sr-90 will be respirable. However, the applicant did not

explain why it was appropriate to use this particular assumption from the Sandia Report, but not the

assumption regarding the initial release to the plenum, which would have yielded a higher dose than

calculated by the applicant. Moreover, Sandia’s assumption of a 5 percent respirable release fraction

is based on a transportation accident. The applicant provides no evidence that it is an appropriate

assumption for the fuel failure accident evaluated in the SAR. The commenter contended that a

greater percentage of fuel would be respirable than calculated in the applicant’s SAR. (0198a)

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to provide information about fuel failure that may be

relevant to potential accidents at the proposed PFSF. Specifically, the commenter expressed concern

with the applicant’s statement that “the most vulnerable fuel” can withstand 0.63 g in the most adverse

orientation. The commenter stated that the applicant did not provide the basis for its statement and

did not specify whether this included fuel with leaks and cladding failures that has been stored

underwater for many years and dry for many more years. Also, the commenter added that the

applicant has not provided the loading that would cause such fuel to fail. (0198a)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments regarding design aspects of the cask and its ability to

withstand accidents. However, the issues identified in the comments are not directly related to the

environmental review and EIS, but are instead related to the NRC safety evaluation. Therefore, these

issues are beyond the scope of the EIS. The NRC staff considered these technical issues in its safety

evaluation, and determined that the design and proposed operation of the proposed PFSF satisfied

applicable regulations.

The NRC staff considered hypothetical accidents that could occur at the proposed PFSF and

concluded that the proposed PFSF and cask design would provide sufficient shielding and would

maintain confinement such that the doses to workers and to the public would be below regulatory

limits. In the EIS, the staff evaluated the environmental impacts of the credible accidents and

determined that the human health impacts would be small, as discussed in Section 4.7.2.3. 

G.3.15.7 Cumulative Impacts

G.3.15.7.1 Inadequate Analysis of Cumulative Impacts

Comment Summary: 

A number of commenters expressed concern that the DEIS provided an inadequate analysis of

cumulative impacts. Specifically, commenters expressed concern with the cumulative human health

and environmental risks and impacts, such as increased cancers and deaths, that might result from

adding the proposed PFSF to existing facilities in the area, many of which have hazards associated

with them. Commenters said that existing facilities are already causing health problems and a cancer

rate in the area that is several times the national average. (0009, 0056, 0096, 0116, 0118, 0121,

0135, 0139, 0157, 0166, 0171, 0180, 0182, 0189, 0190, 0194, 0195, 0198a, 0210a, 0215, 0217,

0257, GR-01, GR-09, GR-14, GR-23, SL1-01, SL1-14, SL2-05, SL2-14, SL2-17, SL3-06, SL3-37)

Many commenters stated that Utah and particularly the area in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF is

already burdened and has suffered too much from the existing toxic facilities and military testing

activities. Some commenters stated that there would be cumulative impacts from U.S. Army nerve
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-305 NUREG-1714

gas and chemical weapons incinerators, hazardous waste incinerators, the Envirocare “low level”

radioactive waste dump, a hazardous waste landfill, a U.S. military biological weapons proving ground

and bombing range, a U.S. Army depot with a large underground plume of carcinogenic water, the

Tekoi Rocket Engine Test Facility, and a magnesium factory whose hydrochloric acid emissions make

it one of the single worst air polluters in the country. (0001, 0019, 0033, 0044, 0056, 0064, 0067,

0071, 0074, 0075, 0076, 0091, 0095, 0111, 0116, 0128, 0129, 0137, 0139, 0141, 0147, 0149, 0164,

0174, 0185, 0190, 0194, 0195, 0203, 0210a, 0225, 0229, 0232, 0246, 0257, 0260, GR-08, GR-09,

GR-14, GR-20, GR-23, SL1-09, SL2-13, SL2-14, SL2-17, SL3-07, SL3-08, SL3-16, SL3-21, SL3-37) 

One commenter also indicated that the area surrounding the proposed site (the Wendover Range and

aerial munitions testing area) has a “historic pattern of errors, chemical leakages, dead sheep,

frequency of carcinogenic anomalies, and nuclear fall-out.” (0163h)

Commenters were specifically concerned with the cumulative impacts of the proposed action and the

following activities nearby: 

C Radiation sources, including Envirocare, along the transportation route and in proximity to the

proposed PFSF. (0215) 

C Chlorine releases from MagCorp, air emissions from Kennecott Copper, above-ground disposal of

low-level radioactive and mixed wastes at Envirocare, uranium mill tailings from the Atlas Corp.

facility, and related impacts from Dugway Proving Ground, Tooele Army Depot, chemical weapons

incinerators, hazardous waste incinerators, and medical waste incinerators in the area. (0009,

0116, 0190, 0215, GR-01, GR-14, SL1-01, SL2-14, SL3-37) 

C Confirmed releases of deadly GB nerve agent and releases of polychlorinated biphenlys, dioxins,

and mercury from the incinerator. (SL2-14) 

C Bio-magnification and bio-accumulation of mercury from trash incineration. (SL2-14) 

C The Envirocare proposal to increase its waste stream to include Class A, B & C radioactive

wastes. (0096) 

C Synergistic effects of the radiation from the proposed PFSF with impacts from surrounding toxic

facilities. (0189, 0217) One commenter questioned whether possible synergistic effects of the

radiation with other toxic compounds have been studied. (0189)

One commenter said that storing SNF on the Reservation will reduce incentives to clean up Superfund

sites in Tooele County. (SL2-06)

One commenter said the cumulative impacts analysis is lacking the insight that was addressed in the

scoping hearings and that the DEIS does not adequately evaluate the proposed action in the context

of the collective, interrelated and cumulative impacts of the facilities in the region. (0171) One

commenter stated that the determination that the proposed PFSF may not lead to significant additional

exposure to harmful emissions does not excuse the NRC from examining cumulative exposure levels

by combining past, present and reasonably foreseeable releases of all types of hazardous and toxic

pollutants and emissions. The commenter noted that the purpose of a cumulative impact analysis is

to examine the cumulative effects of even individually insignificant actions and impacts. The same

commenter added that a cumulative impact analysis should include impacts of reasonably foreseeable

single or multiple accidental releases of toxic and hazardous emissions in combination with emissions

and impacts from the proposed PFSF. (0158) One commenter stated that the determination of the

significance of potential environmental impacts on page xxxiv of the DEIS only addressed the single

compound effect and does not take into account cumulative effects to ecological and health burden. 

The commenter cited page 3-56, Table 3.20 of the DEIS and indicated that the data did not take into

account cumulative effects. (0096) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-306

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the commenters’ concern that Utah has borne its share of the burden of

waste facilities. The EIS, as required under NEPA, provides an analysis of cumulative impacts of

other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, including, where appropriate, the

presence of other industrial facilities in the region to determine whether cumulative impacts would

exist from hazardous and toxic pollutants and emissions. This included consideration of existing air

emissions sources and background pollutant concentrations and cumulative effects on members of

the public due to the presence of radioactive materials including the proposed PFSF and other known

sources of radiation and pollution in the region. The proposed PFSF would not produce air emissions

of radioactive material that could create additional or cumulative health effects. There would be only

insignificant atmospheric emissions except for dust during construction activities or liquid discharges

from the proposed PFSF that could create adverse cumulative impacts in conjunction with the other

nearby industries. These emissions were evaluated as increments to the existing airborne pollutant

levels in Skull Valley and were found to be insignificant from a combined or cumulative perspective. 

Therefore, the analyses in the EIS indicates that cumulative health effects of the transportation and

storage of SNF at the proposed PFSF combined with other radiation exposures are small.

The NRC staff also acknowledges the comments regarding the current human health impacts of

facilities currently near the proposed site, and specific concerns and opinions about the growing

“burden” of pollution sources in the region west of Salt Lake City, particularly in regard to a potential

new source of pollution from the proposed PFSF. However, the presence of the types of industrial

facilities in Tooele County is a consequence of previous choices made by elected officials in the State

of Utah and state and local permitting authorities. In addition, the NRC staff did not evaluate the

current human health impacts of pre-existing facilities that could pose risks not associated with the

proposed PFSF. Such an evaluation is outside the scope of the EIS. In addition, the staff, in this

FEIS, did not assess the other facility impacts independently of the proposed PFSF, in Table 3.20.

The NRC staff notes the comments about nerve agent GB, PCBs, dioxins, mercury and other

chemicals; however, none of these substances will be emitted by the proposed PFSF. Therefore,

there would not be any cumulative chemical effects of these agents from other facilities with the

proposed PFSF. The nearby facilities mentioned in the comments could result in human health

effects at some locations primarily by airborne pollutant emissions. As discussed above, the proposed

PFSF will not produce air emissions with radioactive material that could create additional or

cumulative health effects. In addition, there is no evidence that radiation emitted from the proposed

PFSF would have a synergistic effect with any emissions from the other facilities identified in the

comments. Furthermore, the NRC staff has no evidence that storage of SNF at the proposed PFSF

would reduce incentives to clean up Superfund sites in Tooele County.

For the proposed action, the only possible cumulative human health impacts including possible

community disease rates, would be associated with exposure to direct radiation from the proposed

PFSF and other known sources of radiation in the region. There are no foreseeable projects that

would add substantially to the radiation environment in Skull Valley. The radiation doses discussed in

Sections 4.7 and 5.7 of this EIS are extremely low and radioactive material would not accumulate in

the environment or significantly interact with other possible adverse agents in the environment. In

addition, as discussed in Section 6.3.7 of the EIS, the cumulative health effects of SNF and other

radioactive waste transport on the population of Utah is small. Therefore, as discussed above, the

cumulative radiological impacts from the proposed PFSF and associated transportation activities is

small.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-307 NUREG-1714

G.3.15.8 Positive Comments on Human Health Analysis

G.3.15.8.1 General Comments

Comment Summary: 

A number of commenters said the proposed PFSF is safe or that dangers associated with the

proposed action have been greatly exaggerated. Several commenters said greater education about

radiation will enable people to set aside their fears. Some commenters said that health impacts are

being misrepresented, especially by making inaccurate comparisons to Hiroshima, Nagasaki and

Chernobyl. (GR-03, GR-07, GR-08, GR-10, GR-17, SL1-03, SL2-10, SL3-53) Two commenters

noted that many claims of radioactive waste dangers are unsubstantiated. (GR-08, SL1-03)

Several commenters stated that the radiological impacts of nuclear waste are minimal and that SNF

can be safely transported and stored as proposed by the applicant. (0016, 0017, 0020, 0179, GR-02,

GR-03, GR-08, GR-10, SL1-03, SL1-08, SL1-19, SL1-25, SL2-04, SL2-10, SL3-50) Commenters

provided the following comments as a basis for their statements:

C Nuclear power is safe, or safer than other energy sources. (SL1-08, SL2-04, SL3-50) 

C Radiation exposure can be simply and safely controlled with engineered barriers like the cask

system. (0016, GR-02, SL1-03) 

C SNF rods are not lethal for ten thousand years. (0170, GR-24) 

C There is no evidence that the proposed PFSF will not be operated safely. (GR-02, SL1-03) 

C SNF has been safely handled in other countries. (GR-08) 

C The radiological impacts associated with transporting, handling, and storing the proposed

quantities of SNF are minimal (potential radiation exposures to the public have been estimated to

be less than 2 percent of naturally occurring background radiation). (0179)

C The residential radiological exposure of background radiation in Utah from radon, radioactive

isotopes in the rocks and soil, and cosmic rays is equivalent to 360 mrem per year or 36 chest xrays per year. (0170, SL2-04)

C Nuclear energy does not generate additional carbon dioxide to contribute to global warming. 

(0170) 

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments. The NRC staff agrees that there is reasonable

assurance that operation of the proposed PFSF, constructed in accordance with the design set forth in

the application, will provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Specifically, the

proposed PFSF will have met applicable NRC licensing requirements, and operation of the proposed

PFSF would be subject to NRC inspections and reviews of operating procedures, and required

reports. Thus, the NRC would continue to review compliance with applicable NRC requirements,

should the NRC grant a license and the PFSF be constructed and operated. The NRC staff did not

determine the validity of the specific positive comments insofar as they go beyond the safety criteria

used by the NRC staff in its safety review of the proposed PFSF, and the environmental impacts

addressed in the EIS.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-308

G.3.15.8.2 Minimal Radiological Exposure to Workers

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters stated that the radiological exposure to workers will be minimal and less than the

maximum safely allowed. (0017, 0170) One commenter stated that workers would spend only the

minimum time necessary near a storage cask, in accordance with ALARA principles, and that

operators will be adequately shielded. The commenter stated that a worker within arm’s length of one

storage cask for 8 hours would be exposed to 20 mrem, the maximum safe amount for one day. The

commenter also stated that for a worker near a whole array of storage casks, the exposure is almost

7.5 mrems per hour, so the worker should limit his time to under 2.5 hours per day. According to the

commenter, workers would be monitored with radiation badges to assure their individual safety. 

(0170)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that the radiological impacts from SNF would be small. Doses to workers,

although generally higher than those received by the general public, would be administratively

controlled to levels at or below NRC’s regulatory limits. The NRC staff did not independently verify or

evaluate specific data provided by the commenter regarding dose rates and work times at the

proposed PFSF. However, the NRC staff concluded that the shielding features of the casks and

proposed PFSF are adequate to ensure that radiation exposures to workers can be within applicable

regulatory limits for both normal and accident conditions, based on expected dose rates and work

times provided by the applicant. The NRC staff evaluation is documented in Chapter 7 of the SER, as

updated.

G.3.15.8.3 Safety of ISFSIs

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the proposed action would be safe as evidenced by the operation of

other on-site SNF facilities in the United States and other countries. (0014, 0170, GR-08, GR-12, GR17, SL1-03, SL1-40, SL2-04) One commenter asserted that there has never been a release of

radiation to the public from operation of these facilities. The commenter said that the NRC had

calculated that an individual standing at the boundary of the proposed PFSF would receive “no more

than a fraction of the normal background dose in the United States.” (0014, GR-12, SL1-40) Another

commenter calculated the exposure equivalent of living near the full-capacity site for 20 years to be

one chest x-ray. (0170, SL2-04)

Some commenters stated that there would be no significant impacts from an accident. A few of these

commenters asserted that accidents involving compromised casks or fuel rods would be easily

contained and remediated since the SNF, according to those commenters, is in the form of heavy

solid pellets, confined in the fuel rods which are sealed in canisters in an inert gas atmosphere. 

(0016, 0020, 0170, GR-08, SL1-25) One commenter asserted that even if a canister and its fuel rods

were broken apart, the pellets would only lay around on the ground where they could easily be found

with a geiger counter. (0020-11) One commenter stated that it is impossible for heat buildup in the

storage facility to lead to an accident like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. The commenter stated that

any release of material could be expected to be small and to happen very slowly. (0016) One

commenter stated that if an accident occurred there would not be a nuclear explosion and there would

not be a meltdown. (SL1-25) Another commenter stated that nuclear fission reactions are not set off

by heat, light, chemicals, electric sparks, or lightning and the neutron-absorbing characteristics of the

cask materials and SNF prevents fission chain reactions. (0170) The same commenter stated that

the consequence of a tipped cask would be heat buildup. The commenter indicated that this heat

buildup could be mitigated by righting the cask or installing a cooling fan. Also, the commenter stated

that there would be at least seven days to stand it up or install a fan before any structural damage
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-309 NUREG-1714

could begin. (0170) One commenter stated that resources would be available to respond to fires. 

(SL3-57)

Response: 

The NRC staff agrees that there is reasonable assurance that operation of the proposed PFSF,

constructed in accordance with the design set forth in the application, will provide adequate protection

of the public health and safety. Specifically, the proposed PFSF will have met applicable NRC

licensing requirements, and operation of the proposed PFSF would be subject to NRC inspections and

reviews of operating procedures, and required reports. Thus, the NRC would continue to review

compliance with applicable NRC requirements, should the NRC grant a license, and the PFSF be

constructed and operated. The NRC staff safety evaluation of the proposed PFSF is documented in

the SER, as updated. The NRC staff did not evaluate the validity of each specific comment regarding

the characteristics of the SNF and proposed PFSF insofar as they go beyond the safety criteria used

by the NRC staff in its safety review of the proposed PFSF design, and the environmental impacts

addressed in the EIS.

However, the NRC staff notes that the EIS provided radiation dose analyses of off-normal operation

and accident scenarios for the proposed PFSF, which included accident assumptions and scenarios

that involved partial blockage and 100 percent blockage of cask air inlet ducts. The NRC staff

reviewed the proposed PFSF design and concluded that no credible accident (including earthquakes,

tornados, floods, cask drop events, and vent blockage) would result in a release of SNF contents. 

The NRC staff did not consider release of SNF pellets or tipped casks to be a credible event after a

credible accident, as suggested by some commenters.

G.3.15.8.4 Extremely Low Probability of Aircraft, Bomb or Missile Accident

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the probability of an accident involving an Air Force aircraft, bomb, or

missile and the proposed PFSF would be extremely low, well below the regulatory standards set by

the NRC. The commenter added that even if such an accident were to occur, it is unlikely that any

radioactive material would be released into the environment from the heavy concrete and steel casks

in which it will be stored. The commenter provided a detailed analysis similar to that provided in the

license application to support these conclusions including the following data:

C The annual probability that a storage cask or the Canister Transfer Building would be damaged by

an explosion of live ordnance jettisoned from a crashing aircraft or carried aboard an aircraft that

crashed near the proposed PFSF is equal to 2.43x10-10, which is insignificant.

C The maximum annual air crash impact probability for aircraft conducting air-to-air training on the

UTTR South Area was calculated from the sum of impact probabilities of the altitude bands to be

7.35x10-8.

C The average annual crash impact probability for aircraft flying the Moser recovery is

conservatively estimated to be 1.32x10-8.

C The probability of an aircraft from Michael Army Airfield and airway IR-420 crashing at the

proposed PFSF is 3.0x10-9 per year.

C The cumulative probability that a military aircraft would crash and impact the proposed PFSF or

that ordnance jettisoned from military aircraft would impact the site is 3.93x10-7 per year, and

would not require the Air Force to change its operations on or around the UTTR.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-310

The commenter stated that hung ordnance (ordnance that does not release from the plane when the

pilot initiates release) striking the proposed PFSF is not a credible event and does not require the Air

Force to change its operations on or around the UTTR. Also, the commenter stated that a cruise

missile striking the proposed PFSF is not a credible event and if the proposed PFSF is built and

operated, the Air Force would not need to change its testing of cruise missiles on the UTTR. (0163)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that an accident at the proposed PFSF involving Air Force aircraft, bombs, and

cruise missiles was not considered a credible event because of the low probability of this type of

occurrence (approximately one in a million crashes per year) at the proposed PFSF. As discussed in

the response in G.3.15.6.1, the NRC staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant

regarding air crash probabilities and found it acceptable as documented in Chapter 15 of the SER, as

updated.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-311 NUREG-1714

G.3.16 Transportation

G.3.16.1 Incident-Free Transportation Analysis Methodology and Assumptions

G.3.16.1.1 Need for a Site-Specific Transportation Risk Assessment 

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that risk assessments, both quantitative and qualitative, are critical for the

initial and ongoing evaluation of a facility for licensing, environmental impact analysis, and operations. 

The commenter expressed the view that the license application for the proposed PFSF failed to

provide a risk assessment. The commenter asserted that until one is done and a sufficient opportunity

for public review is provided, it is impossible to evaluate the cumulative impacts of facility and

transportation options on the public and the environment. Without such evaluation, the commenter

stated that the EIS is incomplete and unacceptable. The commenter also indicated that the EIS must

fully examine the safety of all the equipment to be utilized in the transportation of the SNF, including

canisters, trucks, railroad cars, and loading and unloading equipment. (0198h)

The same commenter stated that the EIS should consider all environmental impacts associated with

normal transportation of SNF, including occupational radiation exposures and exposures to the public

along highways and rail lines. The commenter stated that the RADTRAN computer code is

significantly more accurate and generally shows much higher radiological doses to the general public

than methods used in the past by the NRC, and the NRC staff should use that code in performing its

analyses. The commenter stated RADTRAN is consistently used by the DOE in its environmental

analyses of radioactive waste transportation, and there is no reason it cannot be used by the NRC. 

(0198h)

The commenter contended that use of 10 CFR 51.52, Table S-4, to estimate the radiological impacts

of transporting SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF is inappropriate because the supporting

analysis for Table S-4, WASH-1238, "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials

to and from Nuclear Power Plants,” is not applicable for the SNF transportation being proposed by the

applicant. Specifically, the commenter indicated that the EIS must consider the great distances over

which SNF would be shipped to the proposed PFSF. The commenter explained that WASH-1238 is

based on a transportation distance of approximately 1,000 miles, but the distance to the proposed

PFSF may be more than twice that amount. (0198h) The same commenter stated that in WASH1238 the NRC staff assumed that SNF would be stored under water in pools for a short period, and

then individual fuel assemblies would be shipped; but under the proposed action all SNF would be

stored at reactor sites for at least five years. The commenter stated that some of this SNF is likely to

have been stored in dry casks prior to shipment. The commenter asserted that SNF that remains in a

fuel pool until shipment to a reprocessing plant does not experience the potentially damaging

environment of dry storage. (0198a)

The commenter also asserted that the HI-STAR cask, which the applicant proposed to use can hold

more than a critical mass of SNF (17 PWR assemblies). The commenter stated that this stands in

contrast to the assumption underlying WASH-1238 and Table S-4, which is 7 PWR assemblies for a

train cask, an amount less than a critical mass. The commenter stated that if the NRC staff gives

“burn up credit,” then the decision as to when SNF is sufficiently used up or “burned” to justify

shipment becomes essentially a management decision. The commenter stated that leaving this

decision in the hands of the reactor licensees could introduce an additional source of human error, in

which mistakes could lead to criticality accidents. The commenter asserted that a criticality event, in

which fuel is rearranged and water enters the cask, would be far outside the envelope of

consequences assumed in Table S-4 and Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of

Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0170, published December 1977. (0198a)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-312

The commenter also stated that there are many deficiencies in WASH-1238, and, therefore, doses

must be recalculated for the entire shipping distance from plants to the proposed PFSF, and from the

proposed PFSF to the repository, for all 19 plants served by the proposed PFSF. (0198h)

The same commenter stated that the NRC staff should evaluate the demographics of transportation

corridors proposed for use by the applicant. The commenter expressed concern that large quantities

of SNF would pass through Salt Lake City, a major population center. (0198h)

Response:

These comments were based on the applicant’s ER. As documented in the SER, the NRC staff

examined the safety and risks of the proposed PFSF using the methods and approaches described in

the comment. Section 5.7 of this FEIS presents the potential human health risks of transporting the

SNF. In the transportation analysis in the DEIS the NRC staff considered the impacts of transporting

SNF from the reactor sites to the proposed PFSF. The DEIS as written (including Chapters 5 and 6,

and Appendices C and D) accommodated these comments.

The response in Section G.2 describes the NRC staff’s consideration of Table S-4. This FEIS

includes a comparison of the applicant’s dose estimates to the results in 10 CFR Part 51, Table S-4

(and WASH-1238), and NUREG-0170, and concluded that the dose estimates of the proposed action

are less than the estimates in Table S-4 and NUREG-0170.

Regarding some of the technical points raised by the commenter, environmental conditions (e.g.,

temperature) are established as part of the safety review for cask certification (i.e., licensing) of the

SNF storage systems. The objective of establishing the environmental conditions is to prevent SNF

degradation. SNF that is damaged to the point where cladding may not provide confinement must be

canistered prior to shipment, and the authorized contents of transportation casks are specified in the

certificate of compliance issued by the NRC. The canister designs are quite robust and more than

compensate for the condition of the SNF. Thus, damaged SNF does not produce any increase in

consequence or risk of an accident. Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 71, casks must be designed to maintain

subcriticality during normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions. The FEIS is

intended to address the environmental impacts of the proposed action, not to conduct or repeat a

safety review of a certified cask. The NRC staff, in evaluating the probabilities and consequences of

accidents set forth in the FEIS, appropriately took into consideration failures of transportation

equipment and the SNF. 

The effects of population densities along transportation corridors including those through Salt Lake

City, were captured in the DEIS by the construction of rural, suburban, and urban route segments for

the transportation routes examined. If by demographics, the commenter means the characteristics of

the population along the route (income level, minorities, etc.), the NRC staff examined this in the DEIS

in Chapter 6, Sections 6.2, 6.3.9, 6.4.9, and 6.7.9, which discuss environmental justice considerations

relative to the impacts of the proposed PFSF.

G.3.16.1.2 The EIS Should Rely on Table S-4, Not Site-Specific Assessments

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that NEPA does not require that environmental impacts already evaluated in

prior EISs be reevaluated, particularly when subsequent NRC analyses have shown Table S-4 to be

conservative. Specifically, the commenter stated that Section 5.7.2 should compare radiological

exposures during cross-country transportation with those set forth in Table S-4 since the purpose of

the analysis set forth in the EIS should be to ascertain whether the conclusions of Table S-4 of 10

CFR Part 51 remain conservative. The commenter asserted that the cross-country analysis is

unnecessary in light of the provisions in Part 72 requiring only a regional transportation analysis and
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-313 NUREG-1714

the fact that the environmental impact statements prepared for all of the applicant's potential reactor

customers have included a transportation analysis. (0163)

Thus, the commenter concluded that the FEIS should explicitly recognize that Table S-4 is the

applicable NRC regulatory standard, that SNF transportation falls within the bounds of Table S-4, and

that the RADTRAN analysis described in the EIS confirms the Commission's regulatory standard in

Table S-4. (0163)

Response:

The response in section G.2 explains the rationale for the analysis performed by the NRC staff, and

the applicability of Table S-4. The transportation analysis in the FEIS has been expanded to elaborate

on the rationale for the RADTRAN analysis included in the DEIS, and to include a comparison of the

FEIS results to Table S-4. The NRC staff concludes that the analysis adequately estimates the

environmental impacts from transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF.

G.3.16.1.3 Inadequate Methodology in the Applicant’s ER

Comment Summary: 

One commenter contended that the ER failed to give adequate consideration to the

transportation-related environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that in

order to comply with NEPA, the applicant and the NRC staff must evaluate all of the environmental

impacts associated with transportation of SNF to and from the proposed PFSF, including preparation

of SNF for transportation to the proposed PFSF, transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF, SNF

transfer during transportation to the proposed PFSF, transfer and return of defective casks to the

originating nuclear power plant, and transfers and transportation required for the ultimate disposal of

the SNF. The commenter asserted that the ER used the numerical values in Table S-4 for its

evaluation of the transportation-related environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF, claiming that

these values are conservative with respect to the scope of activities of the proposed PFSF. (0198a)

The commenter stated that while the supporting analysis for Table S-4, WASH-1238, includes the

dose to the truck crew, garage men, and freight handlers for a standard SNF shipment, the applicant's

proposal involves additional handling of the SNF canisters and casks. The commenter stated that at

an originating reactor site, the SNF must be placed in a storage cask for placement in a transportation

overpack and transported to the ITF; then this transportation package must be lifted onto a heavy-haul

truck, transported to the proposed PFSF, and then the SNF cask must be transferred to a storage

overpack. (0198a)

The commenter also stated that, in an apparent effort to supplement Table S-4, the SAR contains an

analysis of the impacts of SNF transfer at the proposed ITF. The commenter stated that even if Table

S-4 applies, this analysis is inadequate as follows: The applicant assumes that there would only be

one cask on the Rowley Junction site every day. The commenter asserted that there would be a high

volume of rail shipments involved and it is likely that bottlenecks would form at Rowley Junction;

therefore, it is likely that more than one cask would be stored at the proposed ITF at any given time.

The commenter stated that the applicant failed to evaluate the potential for bottlenecks and their

impacts with respect to incident-free handling and accidents. The commenter stated that the applicant

also failed to take into account the additional doses that would be incurred by state and Federal

radiation inspectors. (0198a) 

Response:

The discussion in Chapter 5 of the DEIS provided an analysis of the environmental impacts of

transporting SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF. The analysis addressed the options

proposed by the applicant. Additional evaluations proposed by the commenter are beyond the scope
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-314

of this FEIS. Regarding the applicability of Table S-4, see the transportation response in Section G.2. 

See also Section G.3.16.1.8 (worker doses at reactors).

G.3.16.1.4 Different Methodology in DEIS as Compared to the Applicant’s ER

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the transportation impact analysis prepared by the NRC contractors,

SAIC, Oak Ridge, is different than the analysis the applicant included in the ER. The commenter

stated that while the DEIS transportation analysis is more specific than the applicant’s ER, it is

seriously deficient. (0198g) The same commenter stated that the DEIS represents a much more

specific analysis of the applicant’s project, using more up-to-date analytical tools. The commenter

contends that Table S-4 is not applicable for the proposed PFSF. (0198b)

The commenter also stated that the NRC staff resisted these changes in the context of the applicant’s

licensing hearing, and yet has gone ahead and made many of them behind the scenes. The

commenter stated that this illustrates the NRC staff’s general resistance to public participation in the

applicant’s licensing proceeding, and generally undermines the NRC staff’s credibility in this

environmental review process. (0198g)

The commenter stated that rather than employing WASH 1238, the DEIS utilizes the RADTRAN 4

computer program to model specific routes, and the population zones and radiation risks for each

route. (0198g)

The commenter stated that there are great differences between the DEIS and the applicant's ER with

respect to the transportation of SNF. Table S-4 makes many assumptions that are different from the

assumptions used in the DEIS. (0198g)

Response:

Oak Ridge National Laboratory assisted the NRC staff in performing the transportation analysis in the

DEIS. The NRC staff acknowledges that the analysis in the DEIS is different from the analysis in the

applicant’s ER. The response in Section G.2 explains the rationale for the analysis performed by the

NRC staff.

The discussion in Chapter 5 of this FEIS provides an adequate analysis of the environmental impacts

of transporting SNF from the reactor site to the proposed PFSF. The transportation analysis in the

FEIS was expanded to include a comparison of the transportation impacts estimated for the proposed

PFSF with Table S-4. In reference to the PFS proceeding before the Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board (ASLB), the NRC staff indicated at the hearing that the NRC staff would appropriately rely on

earlier NRC transportation studies. The NRC staff has determined that the analysis in the DEIS is

consistent with that position. The NRC environmental review process is open and provides an

opportunity for public comment.

G.3.16.1.5 Additional Routes Should Be Specified Instead of One Representative Route 

Comment Summary:

One commenter was impressed to see an analysis of transportation impacts of the proposal. The

commenter appreciated that the analysis in Section 5.7.2.3 of the radiological impacts of national

transportation of SNF was conducted on a "worst-case" basis by assuming that all 40,000 MTU of

SNF would be shipped from Maine to Skull Valley, resulting in a conservative estimate of exposure in

a more concentrated population over the longest possible route for a longer period than would occur in

reality. The commenter urged that the calculation be made available for more likely routes and actual

amounts so that states along specific corridors would be able to relate to their own scenario. The
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-315 NUREG-1714

commenter found the methodology used by the DOE in the Yucca Mountain DEIS of providing

"generic risk" for incident-free and accident doses for both rail and truck modes to be of some value to

state and local governments, even though the DOE deferred on selection of mode or routing for the

permanent geologic repository. (0236)

Response:

Contrary to the comment, the NRC staff does not claim that the FEIS analysis either represents a

worst-case scenario or is the longest possible route for an individual SNF shipment. NEPA does not

require an EIS to include a worst-case analysis. The NRC staff used a representative route approach

to evaluate the transportation impacts of the proposed action. In this approach, the NRC staff

performed its analysis as if the SNF to be stored at the proposed PFSF would travel from the Maine

Yankee nuclear power plant (even though the Maine Yankee plant itself would never possess that

much SNF to ship). This route is one of the longest possible routes that any individual shipment could

experience, and also passes through some of the most populated regions of the country. Maximizing

these factors tends to conservatively overestimate the transportation risks. Thus, the overall risks

estimated using this route are expected to characterize the risks of shipments to the proposed PFSF,

regardless of their individual origin, transportation details (such as use of intermodal transfer near the

reactor site), and reasonably foreseeable route characteristics. Use of the representative route

approach in the FEIS is further supported by the fact that the volume of SNF, modes (namely,

exclusively rail or intermodal including rail), routes, and reactor licensees that could ship SNF to the

proposed PFSF are subject to decisions that are yet to be made.

The staff acknowledges the comment about DOE’s risk methodology. However, it is not related to this

action.

The analysis provides a conservative estimate of the radiological impacts from transporting

40,000 MTU of SNF to the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff concluded from the analysis that the

transportation impacts from the proposed action would be small.

G.3.16.1.6 Reliance Should Not Be Placed on the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS

Comment Summary:

Two commenters expressed concerns that the DEIS relied on the transportation analysis conducted

for the Yucca Mountain project as the basis for the proposed PFSF, because the commenters

considered the previous analysis to be inadequate. (SL2-12, SL3-09) One of these commenters

stated that much has changed since 1982 or 1986, which is when the data for the Yucca Mountain

analysis were collected. One commenter stated that it seems as if the applicant’s ER and SAR rely

exclusively on the 1986 Yucca Mountain environmental assessment for the transportation related risks

of this proposal. (SL3-09) Another commenter stated that the DEIS did not adequately address

national transportation impacts, saying that a national transportation impact analysis was done in the

1999 DEIS for the Yucca Mountain project. The commenter stated that the analysis also was

inaccurate. The commenter also stated that most people agree that the transportation analysis in the

DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS was insufficient. The commenter stated that NRC Chairman Meserve has

stated that he also considered the DOE analysis of national transportation to be less than admirable. 

(SL2-12) 

Response:

The NRC staff’s transportation analysis for the proposed PFSF does not rely upon the transportation

analysis that appears in either the DOE’s 1999 Yucca Mountain DEIS or the DOE’s 1986

Environmental Assessment. The NRC staff commented on the DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS,

including the transportation aspects, and the NRC staff understands that those comments are being

resolved by the DOE through its comment resolution process. The adequacy and accuracy of the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-316

DOE’s DEIS, and the NRC staff’s comments on it, are beyond the scope of this EIS, which only

considers risks related to the proposed PFSF. However, the NRC staff notes that both this FEIS and

the DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS have common references, such as the 1987 Modal Study

(NUREG/CR-4829, Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident

Conditions, February 1987), and in general use a similar (but not identical) risk assessment approach. 

The adequacy of the NRC approach and references is addressed in the response to transportation

issues in Section G.2. The NRC’s official comments on the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS can be found

on the NRC web page (www.nrc.gov/NMSS/DWM/eiscomments).

G.3.16.1.7 Comparison of Proposed PFSF DEIS and Yucca Mountain DEIS Results

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that even if results in the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS are scaled appropriately

for differences in the quantity of SNF and distance, the incident-free population doses, especially the

worker doses, remain higher than those in the proposed PFSF EIS. (0169)

Response:

The proposed PFSF DEIS shows that the estimated incident-free doses for population and workers

are small. The DOE reached a similar conclusion in its Yucca Mountain DEIS.

The “Mostly Rail Option” of the DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS includes 10,815 rail shipments and 2,601

truck shipments for a total of 13,416 shipments to the proposed permanent repository. The total

number of shipments considered in the proposed PFSF DEIS is only about 30 percent of this total. 

The estimated incident-free dose to the general population over the lifetime of a permanent repository,

derived from the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS, is between 990 and 1500 person-rem; the analogous

value for the proposed PFSF is 184 person-rem, which is between a factor of five and a factor of eight

smaller. 

Some of the differences between the two EISs can be attributed to the use of general rail-freight input

values for stop times in the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS, as opposed to the dedicated rail input for stop

times used in the proposed PFSF DEIS. Additional sources of conservatism in the DOE Yucca

Mountain DEIS include the use of different package dimensions and slightly different cask dose rate

values, both of which strongly affect the result. These inputs to the analysis also caused the Yucca

Mountain DEIS risk estimates to be higher than those in the proposed PFSF DEIS.

Differences between the worker dose values can be attributed mainly to the inclusion of at-reactor

worker doses in the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS. These workers were not included in the proposed

PFSF DEIS, nor have they been included in any major transportation analyses performed by the NRC

in the past. The reason for this is that they are already considered in the environmental

documentation associated with the reactor itself. For a more detailed response regarding the

inclusion of at-reactor worker doses see the comment response in Section G.3.16.1.8.

The FEIS for the proposed PFSF adequately characterizes the risks and safety issues associated with

the transportation aspects of the proposed action. The FEIS characterizes these risks and safety

issues using assumptions that reflect the maximum number of shipments that would be required and

the fact that transport to a permanent facility would eventually be necessary.

G.3.16.1.8 The EIS Transportation Analysis Should Be Comprehensive

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant has not identified the originating locations of the SNF, the

means and routes by which it would be shipped, or the specific manner in which it would be
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-317 NUREG-1714

transferred to shipping vehicles. The commenter stated that the EIS must address the impacts of all

actions that are foreseeable as a result of the licensing of the activities proposed by the applicant. 

The commenter further stated that impacts of both normal operations and off-normal operations, such

as accidents and sabotage, must be considered, including preparation of SNF for transportation to the

proposed PFSF; actual transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF by rail and/or truck; transfer from

rail to truck at the currently proposed ITF; transportation from the proposed ITF to the proposed PFSF

by heavy-haul truck; and transfer from transportation casks to storage casks. The commenter stated

that the EIS must also consider transfer-related and transportation-related impacts that would be

incurred if the SNF had to be returned to the originating nuclear power plant site or another site if it is

found to be improperly packaged or defective, and the impacts of transferring and transporting SNF to

a final repository at the conclusion of the storage period at the proposed PFSF. (0198h)

Response:

These comments were based on the applicant’s ER. The NRC staff concluded that the DEIS (in

Chapter 5 and Appendices C and D) is responsive to these scoping comments. The impacts of SNF

handling at reactors, including preparations for handling and transport of SNF, are considered as

matters of reactor operations and licensing and, therefore, were considered in the EISs for the reactor

sites. The radiological impacts to workers at reactor sites, including doses from SNF handling

activities, are administratively controlled and limited by regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 to no more than

5 rem/yr to any individual worker. In reality, worker doses are significantly below this limit due to

application of administrative limits and requirements to reduce doses to levels that are ALARA. 

Therefore, the transportation analysis begins once the SNF is loaded on a transportation vehicle on or

near the reactor site. In the FEIS, Chapter 5 and Appendix D were revised to explicitly discuss

intermodal operations near reactor sites (e.g., heavy-haul truck or barge to a rail-head). The overall

transportation risk is discussed in Section 5.7.2 of the FEIS. The NRC staff determined that the

impacts are small.

The impact of returning SNF that is improperly packaged or defective to the originating reactor is small

and insignificant. It is expected that only a small number, if any, of the SNF canisters would arrive at

the proposed PFSF improperly packaged or defective to the extent that it would be necessary to return

the SNF to the originating reactor site. This is because the SNF would be handled and loaded in

accordance with each utility’s specific operating procedures and requirements, which must satisfy all

applicable NRC requirements. In the unlikely event a canister would need to be returned to the

originating reactor, it would be returned in a transportation cask that would meet all the DOT and the

NRC transportation regulations. Because it is expected that only a small fraction of canisters, if any,

would need to be returned, the incremental increase in radiological impacts resulting from the

additional shipments is considered to be small.

G.3.16.1.9 NRC Regulations for Cask Designs and Their Bases Are Inadequate

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the NRC's reliance on NUREG-0170 and the 1987 Modal Study for risk

estimates in the DEIS was unsound because the irradiated SNF transport container testing standards

upon which they are based are unsound. The commenter indicated that the testing standards are

extremely outdated, and do not represent real-life accident potentials. The commenter focused

comments on two of the NRC tests. Specifically, the commenter stated that trains will be traveling at

higher speeds, and will generate greater forces than those represented by the NRC drop test, and

could run into unyielding surfaces. The commenter requested that the NRC staff identify the

unyielding surfaces along the route from the eastern reactors to Utah. The commenter also stated

that the NRC fire test is outdated and insufficient. The commenter stated that combustibles on or near

railways in the year 2000 include chemicals with burning temperatures much higher than 1,475

degrees, and real-life train fires have burned for much longer than 30 minutes, with some burning for

many days. (0194) 
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NUREG-1714 G-318

One commenter claimed that the Part 71 drop test of 30 feet represents a 30-miles-per-hour impact

onto an unyielding surface. The commenter stated that there are unyielding surfaces on the rails to

the proposed PFSF, such as bridge abutments and possible drops from ridges onto rocks, and the

train speeds are a bit higher than 30 miles per hour. (GR-16)

One commenter stated that the same criteria used for the building that will house the SNF should be

used for the vehicles to transport the SNF. For example, the commenter asserted that if the vehicles

could be constructed to be bombproof and to survive derailment, then public safety would be well

served. (0036) 

Response:

The FEIS states that only NRC-certified cask designs (in this case, the HI-STAR cask) can be used for

transportation of commercial SNF to the proposed PFSF.

The Commission previously determined that transportation regulations in 10 CFR Part 71 provide a

reasonable degree of safety. This is based, in part, on NUREG-0170, which includes an estimate of

impacts from large-scale SNF shipment campaigns, and shows that environmental impacts from the

transportation of all radioactive material are small (46 FR 21619, April 13, 1981). Subsequent studies

have reaffirmed this conclusion. For example, the 1987 Modal Study concluded that the impact and

thermal forces that are represented by the NRC certification tests in 10 CFR Part 71 encompass 994

of every 1,000 accidents.

The hypothetical accident conditions in 10 CFR Part 71 are a set of repeatable engineering tests that

were developed to produce the damage seen in severe transportation accidents. They are not

intended to mirror any specific accident scenario, but to envelop the damage seen in all but the most

severe accidents. All of the NRC transportation studies, including this FEIS, recognize that some

accident scenarios could occur in which the thermal and impact forces exceed those represented by

the design standards. However, those types of accidents are rare, and in estimating the risk, their

probability is considered in addition to their consequences. Also, possible impact speeds in actual

SNF transportation may exceed the impact speed in the test, but the combination of speed, impact

surface hardness, orientation to produce maximum damage, and very low allowable leakage in the

impact tests is not likely to be exceeded in an actual accident. Because the regulatory standards have

previously been determined to be adequate, more rigorous cask designs are not considered in the

FEIS.

The accident severity categories (from the Modal Study) used by the EIS account for the occurrence

of wayside features (such as hard surfaces) that might approximate unyielding surfaces along the

transportation route. The NRC staff used the values from the Modal Study in lieu of values specific to

the Maine Yankee to the proposed PFSF route (which could have been obtained, for example,

through GIS data), because the staff intended this route to represent shipments from any location in a

reasonable and conservative fashion.

G.3.16.1.10 The EIS Should Have Relied Upon Other Studies

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that use of the transportation accident probabilities and release fractions

"based on the Modal Study," [page 5-44] in the DEIS is inappropriate. The commenter had previously

criticized the use of the Modal Study for transportation accident analyses, especially regarding the

performance of large rail casks in severe accidents. The commenter provided a critique of the Modal

Study as an attachment to the comment letter. The commenter stated that the NRC staff is in the

process of conducting a study to update the Modal Study with specific reference to the increased

number of shipments, changes in shipping cask designs, and the changing transportation environment

in which shipments to a temporary storage facility and/or a permanent repository would take place. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-319 NUREG-1714

The commenter stated that the discussion of the Modal Study in the EIS must be revised to address

both the technical and procedural implications of the Modal Study reassessment currently being

conducted by the NRC. The commenter asserted that the NRC would almost certainly not complete

its Modal Study update until if the NRC issues the proposed license. (0204)

A commenter stated that the EIS should re-evaluate previous assumptions and calculations regarding

radiological releases during an accident. The commenter asserted that recent analyses suggest that

during a severe accident, a greater fraction of Cesium-137 may be released than estimated in WASH1238. The commenter also stated that the Cesium-137 inventory of the TransStor cask is a factor of

3.4 greater than assumed in WASH-1238 and that this new information must be evaluated in the EIS.

(0198h)

One commenter stated that more analysis should be done on the risks of a canister breaking in an

accident because, in the event of an accident, the structural integrity of the canisters is questionable. 

(0113) Another commenter stated that the EIS should re-evaluate previous assumptions and

calculations regarding radiological releases during an accident. (0198h) Another commenter stated

that accident scenarios considered in the DEIS are too few. (0058) 

One commenter stated that the radiation risk analysis should be based on the most recently available

estimates, namely the Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates, March 2000,

NUREG/CR- 6672. The commenter stated that the data in that study substantiate that the risk

estimates in NUREG-0170 are, indeed, conservative when related to the actual shipment experience

from the later study. (0236)

Response:

The EIS employs radiological release information contained in NUREG/CR-4829. NUREG/CR-4829

was published by the NRC in February 1987, after being peer reviewed by the Denver Research

Institute. The information in this report is adequate for the purpose of assessing SNF transportation

impacts, and provides a conservative estimate of (i.e., overstates) these impacts. The response in

section G.2 provides additional insight on this conservatism.

The NRC staff is aware of the criticisms sponsored by the commenter, but the staff concluded that at

the time the DEIS was being prepared, the Modal Study remained the most comprehensive and best

available information on the severe accident performance of casks. The commenters do not identify

any better source of information. Therefore, the Modal Study is a valid source of information on SNF

cask behavior under severe accident conditions, and the NRC staff used that information, as

documented, in the DEIS. As noted by the commenters, the NRC continues to conduct new studies

on SNF transportation safety. However, the new studies do not invalidate the NRC’s previous efforts,

such as the Modal Study, and are not a necessary prerequisite to performing an adequate

assessment of SNF transportation impacts as part of an environmental review associated with

licensing, such as is documented in the FEIS. 

When the NRC staff prepared the transportation analysis for the DEIS, NUREG-6672 was not

complete. NUREG-6672 was published in March 2000, when the NRC staff was essentially finished

with the transportation analysis.

G.3.16.2 Intermodal Facility Operations and Transport Segments

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that, historically, most heavy-haul movements of commercial SNF have been

either on the site of a commercial nuclear power plant, or off-site a relatively short distance to a nearby

rail or barge facility. The commenter stated that on-site heavy-haul movements of SNF at licensed

nuclear power plant facilities have generally not had to address the heavy-haul constraints such as
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-320

impacts to traffic, need for road improvements, and transporter (heavy-haul) design. The commenter

stated that wheel spacing and load distribution requirements for a single-purpose, on-site and/or nearsite road can be quite different from those for public highways and roads. The commenter also stated

that for off-site movements of SNF, as a general rule, the longer the heavy-hauling distance, the more

difficult it is to implement such movements on a routine basis. The commenter asserted that most

heavy-haul movements of SNF have been over relatively short distances and that movements of up to

10 miles have been conducted without major issues arising; but beyond that, the impediments have

mounted exponentially. The commenter added that these are associated logistical problems, and that

some heavy-haulers have stated categorically that hundreds, or even dozens, of repetitive movements

of large SNF casks (the current proposal anticipates hundreds per year) over public roads would

simply not be tolerated by most public highway officials. (0198i)

Response:

The DEIS addressed the heavy-haul transportation option. Movement of large loads is a mature

technology and the distances being proposed are not excessive or unprecedented for large loads. 

The DEIS discussed the impacts to traffic on Skull Valley Road from heavy-haul transport of SNF. 

The NRC staff concluded that the impacts would be small. The NRC staff has determined that there is

no basis to conclude that the amount of heavy-haul transport of SNF being proposed would not be

tolerated by most public highway officials, and that such a conclusion is speculative. 

G.3.16.2.1 The DEIS Overlooks the Need to Use Heavy-Haul Trucks Near Reactors

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS underestimates the risks posed by transportation of SNF to the

proposed PFSF because it ignores the impacts of intermodal transfer at the reactor end of the

transportation activities, from heavy-haul trucks to railheads near reactor sites. The commenter also

stated that the STB regulations require the applicant's ER to "describe any effects of the proposed

action on public health and safety," and thus these effects should have been addressed in the DEIS

(49 CFR 1105.7(e)(7)(i)). The commenter stated that the DEIS is completely inadequate, in that the

analysis failed to consider the radiological impacts of intermodal transfer near reactor sites, and failed

to provide a consequence analysis that shows the potential health effects of serious accidents. 

(0198g) 

The commenter also asserted that the route from Maine Yankee to the proposed PFSF, chosen for

specific analysis by the NRC staff, is not representative of intermodal transfer near reactor sites

because the Maine Yankee reactor has a rail line directly into the plant. The commenter stated that,

based on Table J-12 of the DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS, 17 of the 22 reactors owned by the

applicant’s members cannot accommodate the rail cask proposed for use in the transportation

campaign, due to lack of a direct rail connection, insufficient bay size, or insufficient crane capacity. 

Therefore, the commenter added that these sites would require intermodal transfer to move SNF from

heavy-haul truck or barge to rail. The commenter further stated that there would be the additional

doses to workers during the transfer of casks to rail cars at intermodal transfer points, and that heavyhaul truck transportation involves greater incident-free radiation exposures to workers and the general

public than does rail transportation. The commenter stated that the analysis in the DEIS of these

potential exposure risks is insufficient, and incident-free risks have been underestimated. (0198g)

The commenter stated that the additional exposure to workers from these operations on the reactor

end of the SNF transport would mirror exposure on the Timpie end and, therefore, an equivalent

amount of exposure, adjusted for the smaller number of affected reactors, should be added to the

calculations. Specifically, the commenter stated that 17 of the 22 reactors owned by the applicant’s

members will require intermodal transfer from a heavy-haul truck to a rail line, and an additional dose

to crew members of 9.64 person-rems per year (17/22ths of 12.48) should be expected. (0198g) 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-321 NUREG-1714

The commenter stated that near the reactors shipping to the proposed PFSF, the population density is

expected to be closer to suburban densities and much greater than that of Skull Valley (1.3

persons/km2

). The commenter assumed a suburban default population density of 719 persons/km2

along the heavy-haul routes, and calculated an increased annual population dose of 719/1.3 x 0.23

person-rems, or 127.2 person-rems/year. The commenter, assuming only 17 of 22 reactors would

require heavy-haul transport, calculated that the additional population dose due to heavy-haul

transport at the reactor sites would be 98.3 person-rems/yr. The commenter included its calculated

additional exposures arising from heavy-haul transport from reactors to railheads to arrive at a

predicted increase in latent cancer fatalities from the 20-year operation more than six times greater

than that given in the DEIS. (0198g) 

Response:

The NRC staff reviewed the commenter’s concerns on the potential for additional worker dose and

public dose resulting from intermodal transfer near reactor sites and has determined that the FEIS

adequately addresses them.

The first part of the comment concerns intermodal transfer near reactor sites. The NRC staff used a

representative route approach in the DEIS. In this approach, the NRC staff performed its analysis as

if all the SNF to be stored at the proposed PFSF traveled from the Maine Yankee nuclear power plant

to the proposed PFSF (even though Maine Yankee itself would never possess that much SNF to

ship). This route is one of the longest possible routes that any individual shipment could experience,

and also passes through some of the most populated regions of the country. Maximizing these factors

tends to conservatively overestimate the transportation risks. Thus, the overall risks estimated using

this route are expected to be representative of the risks of shipments to the proposed PFSF,

regardless of their individual origin, transportation details (such as use of intermodal transfer), and

reasonably foreseeable route characteristics.

The NRC staff’s use of the representative route approach in the DEIS is further supported by the fact

that the volume of SNF, modes (namely, exclusively rail or intermodal including rail), routes, and

reactor licensees that could ship SNF to the proposed PFSF are subject to decisions that are yet to be

made. Therefore, the impacts of shipments to the proposed PFSF, for reactors that utilize an

intermodal transport near the reactor, are accounted for in the nationwide impacts of the

representative Maine Yankee to the proposed PFSF route. Nevertheless, in response to the

comments in this area, the NRC staff supplemented the DEIS approach in the FEIS by explicitly

considering illustrative environmental impacts of intermodal operations near reactor sites considering

realistic population densities (e.g., heavy-haul truck to railhead transport and cask transfer). The

results confirmed that the representative route adequately accounts for the radiological impacts

associated with intermodal transfer of SNF near reactor sites.

The commenter’s assertion that the DEIS does not adequately address the consequences of a serious

accident is responded to in Section G.3.16.8.7.

The NRC staff finds no basis for the commenter’s assertion that 17 of the 22 member reactors require

an additional intermodal segment near the reactor. For example, the commenter’s reference, the

DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS Table J-12, identifies 13 (of 21, not 22) applicant-member-owned

reactors as “commercial sites with direct rail access.” The remaining reactors could install direct rail

access, use a heavy-haul truck segment with an intermodal transfer to rail, or use a barge segment

with an intermodal transfer to rail. In addition, the reactors owned by current applicant members

should not be presumed to be the only reactors that would ship to the proposed PFSF. This is

reflected by the NRC staff’s selection of the Maine Yankee reactor (not currently a member of the

applicant), and its representative route, for the DEIS assessments. Based on the information in Table

J-12 of the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS, the majority of reactor sites have direct rail access capability.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-322

While the NRC staff agrees that it is likely that the population along the route from a reactor site to an

intermodal transfer point would be higher than that for Skull Valley, Utah, the staff does not believe it

is appropriate to generically assume the entire route would be represented by a suburban population

density. It is likely that the route would consist of some combination of rural, urban, and suburban

population densities.

G.3.16.2.2 Truck Transport of SNF to the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the DEIS should consider the impacts of truck transport of SNF to the

proposed PFSF. One commenter stated that although the applicant states that all SNF would be

shipped to the proposed PFSF by rail, some of the plants it serves have no rail access. The

commenter stated that those with sufficient crane capability may transfer the casks to heavy-haul

trucks, and from the trucks to rail cars. According to the commenter, however, there are some plants,

such as Indian Point, that do not have sufficient crane capability to handle heavy shipping casks. The

commenter stated that the impacts of these transfers have not been assessed by the applicant, nor

have they been assessed in previous EISs. (0198h) 

Another commenter stated that the EIS lacks consideration of potential truck shipments to the

proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that the DEIS assumed that all shipments to the proposed

PFSF would be made by rail, but that at least some member utility reactors (Indian Point, Monticello,

La Crosse, and possibly others) are not rail capable, and it would be extraordinarily difficult for

geographic and other reasons to move the SNF by truck from these reactor sites to an intermodal

transfer point for loading onto trains. The commenter asserted that even if all of the SNF arrived at the

proposed PFSF by rail, truck transport, either legal weight or heavy-haul, would be needed at various

points in the transportation system. The commenter stated that this may involve heavy-haul

shipments from reactors to railheads or legal weight truck shipments from reactors that do not have

the capability to handle large rail casks. The commenter concluded that the DEIS should have clearly

identified and then evaluated the routes to be used for truck shipments from reactors to railheads, and

that such an analysis should have included an assessment of impacts on the communities that would

be affected by such shipments. (0204)

One commenter stated that the assumption of 100 percent rail shipment is questionable, and is

probably not bounding. The commenter stated that Section 2.1.3.2.3 of the DOE Yucca Mountain

DEIS describes a "mostly rail shipping scenario" in which about 80 percent of commercial SNF is

shipped by rail and 20 percent by truck, because some commercial nuclear sites lack the capability of

loading large-capacity rail shipping casks. Both infrastructure and human health impacts from truck

shipment would be different from rail since highways are often closer to populated areas than are rail

lines. (0169)

One commenter requested that the DEIS include an analysis of the impact of alternative shipping

casks on shipment numbers and safety. (0142)

Response:

As stated in the DEIS, the transportation analysis considers rail as the mode of transportation for

cross-country shipments of SNF. A short heavy-haul truck segment near the reactor or near the

proposed PFSF is also possible, and the impacts of these heavy-haul truck segments are analyzed in

the FEIS. This approach is appropriate for the following reason. 

Truck and rail are the two practical modes of cross-country transportation of SNF. The license

application only proposed the Holtec International HI-STORM/HI-STAR dry cask storage system for

use at the proposed PFSF. The HI-STAR is the transport cask used in conjunction with the HISTORM dry storage cask. The large size of the HI-STAR cask would make it impractical to transport
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-323 NUREG-1714

it by truck cross-country, because a heavy-haul vehicle would have to be used to transport these

casks and heavy-haul vehicles travel at very low speeds (i.e., 10-20 miles per hour). The applicant

stated that SNF would only be shipped by rail from the reactor sites to the proposed PFSF. The

applicant stated that for reactor sites that cannot accommodate large rail transportation casks, such as

the HI-STAR, SNF would be transferred from the SNF pool to a smaller cask. The SNF would be

transferred from the smaller cask using a dry cask transfer system to a larger rail transportation cask. 

Also, the applicant would need to request a license amendment if it chose to use a different cask

design. That license amendment would include an environmental review (and opportunity for public

comment) that would consider transportation impacts.

G.3.16.2.3 Proposed Intermodal Operations Are in Conflict with Timeliness Rules

Comment Summary:

One commenter said that the DOT regulations require freight cars containing hazardous materials to

be forwarded within 48 hours (49 CFR 174.14 (a)). The commenter also stated that the NRC

regulations require that shipments of SNF be planned in order to avoid storage times in excess of

24 hours (10 CFR 73.26(b)). The commenter stated that these regulations cannot be satisfied for the

heavy-haul option. The commenter reasoned that if a 4-cask train pulls into the proposed ITF, only

one cask per day could be transferred to the proposed PFSF, that is, 3 cars would remain at the

proposed ITF for several days, which is much longer than 24 hours. The commenter stated that the

DEIS should address this practical impossibility of satisfying Federal transportation regulations, and

evaluate the adverse environmental consequences, such as increased radiation doses to workers and

increased vulnerability of transportation casks to sabotage. (0198h)

The commenter stated that the large volume and frequency of proposed rail shipments by the

applicant creates the significant potential for backup of trains and casks at Rowley Junction. The

commenter reasoned that Union Pacific Railroad has a stated policy of shipping SNF in dedicated

trains at 35 miles per hour. The commenter concluded, therefore, that it can be reasonably

anticipated that five or more casks would arrive at Rowley Junction at the same time. The commenter

asserted, furthermore, the amount of time required to move a cask out of Rowley Junction would be

contingent on many factors:

C There is only one crane to unload casks at Rowley Junction;

C The cask must be transported 24 miles by a slow moving heavy-haul truck from Rowley Junction

to the proposed PFSF; and

C Once at the proposed PFSF, the cask must be inspected and removed from the truck and

shipping container to a transfer container then to a storage container, an operation that could take

anywhere from 11 to 22 hours. (See SAR Table 5.1-2.)

The commenter stated that potentially only one cask per day could be moved out of Rowley Junction. 

The commenter added that, consequently, if casks had to be stored at Rowley Junction, both the

radiation doses to workers and the public and the risk of accidents would increase. The commenter

concluded that these impacts were not anticipated in previous NRC environmental analyses, and must

be considered in the EIS for the proposed PFSF. (0198h) 

Response:

The NRC staff notes that the DOT requirement in 49 CFR 174.14(a), cited in the comment, applies to

the forwarding of shipments within the rail mode. Once a rail carrier delivers an SNF shipment to the

proposed ITF, the rail mode portion of the shipment is concluded. This requirement does not apply to

the storage, incident to transport, that occurs if the shipment must await transfer to the highway mode. 

The NRC staff also notes that the NRC’s physical protection requirement in 10 CFR 73.26(b), cited in
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NUREG-1714 G-324

the comment, applies to strategic special nuclear material in transit. This requirement does not apply

to irradiated reactor SNF in transit, including SNF shipments to or from the proposed PFSF.

As stated in Section 5.7.2.9 of the FEIS, the proposed ITF was designed to accommodate a maximum

of three casks at one time. To achieve the desired receipt rate of four casks per week, two trains

carrying two casks would be required. It is anticipated that for a three-cask train it would take 28 work

hours to complete transfer of the last cask to the heavy-haul trailer for delivery to the proposed PFSF. 

For a two-cask train it would take 16 work hours. The environmental consequences of the cask

remaining at the proposed ITF while awaiting transport to the proposed PFSF would be negligible. 

The NRC regulations for physical protection of SNF in transit (10 CFR 73.37) apply while SNF is in

storage incident to transportation. The NRC staff considers these regulations adequate.

G.3.16.2.4 EIS Should Compare Dedicated Trains, General Rail Freight, and Truck Service

Comment Summary:

One commenter asked about the impacts of using general purpose freight trains to transport SNF, not

only through Utah, but across the United States. (0198h)

Another commenter stated that the DEIS failed to appropriately analyze and select a preferred

transportation mode for NWPA shipments. The commenter quoted a statement in the DEIS: “Because

of the size and weight of the SNF shipping casks included in the PFS license application, shipment by

rail is the only viable cross-country transportation option. Therefore, the focus of the cross-country

transportation analysis in this chapter is on rail transportation.” (DEIS, page 5-1) The commenter

stated that while the commenter agrees that there may be several advantages to shipping SNF by rail

(including reducing the overall number of shipments), this level of modal analysis in the DEIS is

inadequate to ensure that other viable transportation alternatives were properly considered. (0142)

The same commenter stated that the EIS does not adequately address the details of how rail

transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF would be conducted. In particular, the commenter stated

that the DEIS did not adequately address how environmental and human health impacts would be

altered by the use of dedicated, versus general service, trains to ship SNF to the proposed PFSF. 

(0142)

The commenter also requested that the DEIS be revised to reflect and address the selection of rail as

the mode of transportation. The commenter indicated that rail transportation accidents could result in

the casks being subjected to larger physical forces than other modes of transportation; therefore, rail

transportation would present different risks than truck transportation. (0142)

Response:

As stated in the DEIS and the comment, the transportation analysis considers rail as the feasible

mode of transportation for cross-country shipments of SNF. This is appropriate for a number of

reasons. Truck and rail are the two primary modes of cross-country transportation of SNF. Because

the license application identifies only one cask design (HI-STORM) for use at the proposed PFSF, an

NRC license, if granted, would only permit use of the HI-STORM storage cask. The canisters used in

the HI-STORM dry storage cask system are too large to consider cross-country transport by truck

practical. The applicant would need to request a license amendment if it chose to use a different cask

design. The license amendment would include an environmental review, which would include

consideration of the transportation impacts. 

The applicant has committed [PFS/RAI1 February 18, 1999] to complying with the Association of

American Railroads’ Performance Standard for Spent Nuclear Fuel Trains. That standard applies to a

dedicated cask/car/train system. As noted in the DEIS (page 2-19), the applicant would use two

single-purpose, dedicated trains, which would proceed from an originating reactor site directly to Skull
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G-325 NUREG-1714

Valley, Utah, stopping only for crew changes, refueling, and periodic inspections. Therefore, only

dedicated trains are assessed in the FEIS transportation impacts. 

To provide additional perspective, note that with respect to the RADTRAN analyses, the incident-free

general population dose for shipment of 200 casks by general purpose freight trains (i.e., nondedicated trains) is the same as that for shipment by dedicated trains. Because dedicated trains do

not make classification yard stops, use of general purpose trains would increase worker doses due to

the doses received at classification yard stops. Because general population exposures at

classification yards are minimal, these stops would not increase incident-free general population

doses significantly. 

The accident risks the NRC staff calculated in the DEIS are based on the shipment of four casks per

train and failure of all four casks, should the train be involved in a severe accident. Since a typical

train accident involves about 10 rail cars, and cars being shipped to the same destination would be

placed together in a general purpose freight train, the use of general purpose freight trains to ship SNF

to the proposed PFSF would be expected to yield accident consequences very similar to those

calculated for dedicated trains whenever the 10 cars involved in the “typical” accident include all four

cars carrying SNF casks. If some of the cars carrying the SNF casks were not involved in the

accident, lower consequences would result.

Regular train accident risks might be lower or higher than dedicated train risks, but would most likely

be somewhat higher because superior rolling stock (railcars) would likely be selected for a dedicated

train and because the cars in the dedicated train would likely have their weights matched to minimize

derailments. These two factors together should mean that dedicated trains would be less likely to

have accidents than general purpose trains.

G.3.16.2.5 Proposed Action Adversely Affects the DOE’s Repository Options

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS has not addressed the fact that the proposed PFSF may all but

eliminate several transportation alternatives within Nevada to the proposed permanent geologic

repository at Yucca Mountain. The commenter stated that licensing of the proposed PFSF practically

forecloses the use of legal weight trucks, and as a consequence, development and operation of the

proposed PFSF, in conjunction with development and operation of the proposed permanent geologic

repository at Yucca Mountain, may effectively shift transportation risks from other routes to one

crossing through Lincoln County and the City of Caliente. One commenter stated that the relationship

of the proposed action to Lincoln County and the City of Caliente is evident and should have been

considered within the scope of the DEIS. The commenter stated that the NRC, in the DEIS, indicated

that national and regional transportation impacts had been addressed in detail in the DOE Yucca

Mountain DEIS, but this is inconsistent with the NRC's comments on the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS. 

The commenter concluded that both NUREG-1714 and the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS fail to

adequately consider regional transportation impacts. (0193)

Another commenter asserted that over half of the SNF scheduled to come to the proposed permanent

geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is rail-ready and in the west already. The commenter stated

that the DEIS did not acknowledge this information, even though this information should have

significant impacts on transportation decisions. (0171) Another commenter stated that the DEIS was

vague about the transport routes. (SL3-55) One commenter asked how the NRC’s decision about the

proposed PFSF could affect the DOE’s decisions about modes and routes, if over half the SNF

scheduled to be shipped to Yucca Mountain is likely to be shipped by rail. The commenter concluded

that the NRC and the DOE should be communicating more with each other regarding transporting the

SNF. The same commenter expressed concern about how the proposed action would affect

transportation decisions and routing to the proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca

Mountain and to Tooele County, Utah, through Eureka County, Nevada. The commenter expressed
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NUREG-1714 G-326

specific concern about the potential transportation impacts on the commenter’s county from building a

rail line from the Union Pacific tracks in northern Eureka County, southwest through Crescent Valley

and into Lander County to the proposed PFSF. (0171) 

One commenter stated that the DEIS assumes that all SNF will be shipped by rail from the proposed

PFSF to a permanent geologic repository (pages 1-5 to 1-6; 2-22; 5-39; 5-50). The commenter stated

that the proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain currently lacks rail access and

the DEIS ignores this and underestimates the difficulty of constructing a new rail line to Yucca

Mountain. The commenter stated that three of the potential rail access routes identified by the DOE in

the Yucca Mountain DEIS (Carlin, Caliente, or Caliente-Chalk Mountain) would constitute a significant

new rail construction project, the longest in the United States in quite some time. The DEIS, therefore,

cannot assume that loaded dual-purpose canisters could be shipped from the proposed PFSF to

Yucca Mountain directly by rail. The EIS must consider an alternative mode of transportation such as

legal weight truck. (0204) 

Response:

The NRC cannot conclude that the licensing of the proposed PFSF would eliminate some alternatives

for transporting SNF and other high-level waste to a permanent geologic repository, as the commenter

asserted. The NRC staff notes that the Holtec International HI-STORM/HI-STAR dual purpose cask

system is currently certified for use at reactor sites. Licensing the proposed PFSF, which would use

the same cask technology, would not additionally restrict the DOE’s repository options.

In its DEIS for the proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, the DOE considered a

mostly rail alternative and a mostly truck alternative for transportation of SNM to its site. As a part of

the mostly rail alternative, the DOE is considering several locations for an ITF. Determining the

potential routes or the location of an ITF within the State of Nevada would be based on a number of

factors, and the commenter did not provide any reason why the DOE might select the location of an

ITF or eliminate the mostly legal weight truck alternative based on the presence of the proposed

PFSF. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that the construction and operation of the proposed

PFSF would not increase or shift any transportation risk associated with the DOE’s permanent

geologic repository.

The discussion in the FEIS notes that specific consideration of transportation alternatives within the

State of Nevada is being considered as a part of the DOE’s proposed action to construct and operate

a permanent geologic repository. The FEIS does not summarize the NRC comments on this aspect of

the DOE Yucca Mountain DEIS. Detailed consideration of possible transportation alternatives for the

proposed permanent geologic repository within the State of Nevada is beyond the scope of this FEIS. 

Also, contrary to one of the comments, Section 5.7.2 of the DEIS recognized that rail access to the

proposed repository at Yucca Mountain does not currently exist. Given the number of factors that are

now indeterminate with respect to transportation of SNF from the proposed PFSF to the DOE’s

proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, further analysis of this matter is not now

practical.

In light of the above, the NRC staff concludes that SNF could be shipped (at least the majority of the

way) to the proposed permanent geologic repository by rail. The NRC staff did not evaluate

transporting SNF from the proposed PFSF to a permanent geologic repository by legal weight truck

because the casks are too large. To transport by truck, a heavy-haul vehicle would be needed. Due

to the slow speed heavy-haul vehicles travel, transporting SNF from the proposed PFSF to a

permanent geologic repository by heavy-haul vehicle is impractical. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-327 NUREG-1714

G.3.16.2.6 Accidents on Skull Valley Road or the ITF

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that heavy-haul trucks could make up to 400 trips per year along Skull Valley

Road, a secondary two-way paved road, and that the potential for accidents from these vehicles has

not been evaluated. (0198a) The commenter stated that the manner and equipment by which the

casks would be transferred from the rail line to a heavy-haul trailer were not described. The

commenter also stated that the height to which casks would be raised and their orientation are

important considerations when assessing impacts. (0198g)

Response:

The NRC staff considered the potential accident risk of shipping SNF along Skull Valley Road and

concluded that the risk is small. Section 5.7.2.4, on page 5-49, of the DEIS provided radiological

accident dose risk estimates for the shipments on Skull Valley Road. Specifically, the estimate of risk

is 1.08x10-3 person-rem/year which equates to 2.2x10-2 person-rem over the 20 year campaign (an

LCF risk of 1.1x10-5). The non-radiological accident risk is the chance for traffic accidents, which was

presented in the DEIS in Section 5.7.1.1, page 5-34. Specifically, the estimate of fatal injury during

the 40-year period is 0.0023 and the estimate of non-fatal injury for the 40-year period is 0.18. All of

these impacts are small.

As stated in the DEIS, SNF would be transferred from the rail car to a heavy-haul vehicle at the

proposed ITF. The likelihood of the cask being subjected to conditions that would exceed certification

testing limits from this transport activity is very low. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the

likelihood of an accident occurring during transfer of SNF from the rail car to the heavy-haul vehicle is

low.

G.3.16.3 Estimates of Incident-Free Radiological Impacts and Risks of Transportation

G.3.16.3.1 The EIS Results Are Inadequate Because They Are Not Project Specific

Comment Summary: 

A number of commenters stated that the DEIS does not adequately analyze the risks and impacts of

transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF. (0012, 0112, 0139, 0142, 0169, GR-21, SL1-01, SL1-20,

SL1-37, SL2-04)

Several commenters stated that the NRC is relying on outdated studies with little project-specific

analyses. (0012, 0194, 0198, 0236, SL1-01) One commenter stated that the DEIS tries to downplay

the significance of the risk of moving SNF across the country and then storing it about 50-55 miles

from downtown Salt Lake City. (SL1-09)

Several commenters expressed concern about the safety of people living along the transportation

route who would be exposed to radiation. (0010, 0048, 0149, 0159, GR-16, SL3-02)

Some commenters stated that the DEIS did not address the negative impacts to health, environment,

property values, and the economies of cities, counties, and states along the SNF transportation

routes. (0012, SL1-01, SL1-05, SL1-10, SL1-37, SL2-12, SL2-14) A number of commenters

expressed concern about the health and safety impacts of transporting SNF on communities along the

transportation corridor and stated that the DEIS did not adequately analyze these impacts. (0012,

0090, 0135, 0136, 0151, 0156, 0185, 0189, 0194, 0198, 0198h, 0200, 0217, 0257, SL1-01, SL1-05,

SL1-10, SL2-04, SL2-05, SL2-12, SL3-06, SL3-18, SL3-26, SL3-27, SL3-49) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-328

Response:

The analysis set forth in the DEIS characterized the risks and safety issues associated with

transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF using assumptions that reflect the number of shipments

that would be required, and the fact that transport to a permanent geologic repository would eventually

be necessary (see DEIS Section 5 and Appendix D).

Contrary to the comments, the NRC staff did provide a project specific analysis. The DEIS and FEIS

contain a RADTRAN analysis, which provides an estimate of the nationwide and regional

transportation impacts associated with the proposed action. The analysis provides a conservative

estimate of the radiological impacts from transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF and, based on

the analysis, the NRC staff concluded that the transportation impacts from the proposed action would

be small.

Because the exact routes and volume of SNF that would be shipped from each reactor site are

unknown, the NRC staff made several conservative assumptions to attempt to reasonably bound the

transportation impacts. Section 5.7.2 of this FEIS discusses many of these assumptions and

Appendix D provides additional information regarding the assumptions used in the analysis. Previous

studies were used for some of the accident analysis assumptions, such as train accident rates,

accident consequences, and severe accident probabilities. However, the NRC staff concluded that

using these studies for some key assumptions resulted in a conservative estimate of the risk of an

accident, and adequately characterized the risks and safety issues associated with transportation

aspects of the proposed action.

The potential radiological impacts to persons located within 800 m (0.5 mi) of the representative route

were calculated and are described in the DEIS and the FEIS (Chapter 5 and Appendix D). In no case

would the maximum individual dose for an off-link member of the public exceed 1.11x10-4 rem (0.111

mrem). This dose is extremely low, far below the thresholds for acute effects (fatalities or injuries) and

applicable regulatory dose limits. The average annual background radiation dose to an individual in

the United States is about 300 mrem. Thus, the annual dose to the maximally exposed individual from

SNF transportation to the proposed PFSF would be negligible in comparison to the average individual

background dose.

Regarding property values and certain economic impacts upon cities (e.g., tourism), under NEPA, the

NRC is obligated to consider the effects on the physical environment that could result from the

proposed action. The risk of an accident, however, is not an effect on the physical environment. See

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). To warrant

consideration in an EIS, environmental effects must have a reasonably close causal relationship to a

change in the physical environment. Therefore, in order for a proposed action to have an adverse

impact on tourism or property values, it must have an actual effect on the physical environment. 

Because the risk of an accident from SNF transportation is not such an effect, it is not required that

agencies consider the impacts on tourism and property values, if any, resulting from the public's

perception of such risk.

G.3.16.3.2 Regional Impacts Are Understated and Overlook Important Issues

Comment Summary:

Two commenters stated that the number of trips per day transporting SNF would pose an

unacceptable risk to the communities along the Wasatch Front. (0113, 0198) One commenter stated

that the DEIS failed to discuss the substantial transportation impacts to the Wasatch Front. (0198) 

One commenter stated that people live within 20- to 40-feet of the railway tracks up Spanish Fork

Canyon, Utah County. (SL3-14)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-329 NUREG-1714

One commenter was interested in the health risks to people who reside in Salt Lake City where the rail

lines pass close to residences. The commenter indicated that the increase in radiation would result in

a higher incidence of cancer for those living along the corridor. (SL1-05) 

One commenter questioned whether there would be additional impacts from transporting SNF from

Southern California Edison's nuclear power plants, stating that the SNF from these facilities would not

otherwise travel through Utah on its way to deep geologic storage at the proposed site at Yucca

Mountain, Nevada. (0198h)

The same commenter questioned what the impacts would be of shipment along a corridor which is

not, and would not likely be, proposed for shipment of SNF to the proposed permanent geologic

repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (0198h)

One commenter also stated that the population affected is directly dependent on the mode of

transportation selected. The commenter expressed concern that some of the region’s largest

populations would be exposed to thousands of “nuclear waste” shipments if rail is selected because

Western urban areas grew around rail centers. The commenter stated that consideration of these

different risks should be included in the EIS. (0142)

Response:

As set forth in the FEIS in Section 5.7, any increase in cancer resulting from the proposed action for

individuals living along the transportation routes would be small and, hence, would be even smaller for

any fraction of the route, such as the segments mentioned in various comments. These small

increases in latent cancer fatalities were based on the estimates of radiation exposure to individuals

within 0.8 km (0.5 mi) on either side of the rail line (1.6 km [1 mi] bandwidth). The dose to individuals

further away than that would be negligible. The proximity of residences to the rail line in sections of

Salt Lake City, and in other locations on other potential routes, was accounted for by the calculation

methodology described in Appendix D. That methodology identified high-density route segments in

urban areas and treated them accordingly. Therefore, the NRC staff’s analysis considered these

locations appropriately. 

Section 5.7.2.10 of the FEIS includes an analysis of the impacts of transporting SNF in the region of

the proposed PFSF, which includes Salt Lake City (the region is considered to be in and near the

State of Utah). The analysis considered the five different access routes within the region that could

potentially be used to transport SNF to the proposed PFSF. The analysis assessed the environmental

impacts along each of these routes as if all 40,000 MTU of SNF was transported on each route, even

though it is unlikely that any one of the five routes would be used to transport all 40,000 MTU of SNF. 

The highest annual incident-free dose for any one of the five routes was estimated to be 0.00619

person-Sv (0.619 person-rem). For accidents, the highest dose risk was 0.0022 person-Sv (0.222

person-rem) per year. From these results the NRC staff concluded that the environmental impacts

from transporting SNF within the region of the proposed PFSF would be small.

The NRC staff used a representative route approach in the DEIS to assess the cross-country

transportation impacts. In this approach, the NRC staff performed its analysis as if all the SNF to be

stored at the proposed PFSF traveled from the Maine Yankee nuclear power plant (even though the

Maine Yankee plant itself would never possess that much SNF to ship). This route is one of the

longest possible routes that any individual shipment could experience, and also passes through some

of the most populated regions of the country. Maximizing these factors tends to conservatively

overestimate the transportation risks. Thus, the overall risks estimated using this route are expected

to be representative of the risks of shipments to the proposed PFSF, regardless of their individual

origin, transportation details, and reasonably foreseeable route characteristics. The routes for neither

the proposed PFSF nor the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain are known at this time. However,

as noted by one commenter, it is possible that shipments to the proposed PFSF would use different

routes than shipments to a permanent geologic repository, resulting in impacts to groups of people
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-330

who might not otherwise be affected. The NRC staff maintains that such impacts would be small as

demonstrated by the FEIS representative route impacts assessment. 

Both shipments to and from the proposed PFSF are assessed in the FEIS. The evaluation in the FEIS

accounts for the possibility that a given cask might travel a given route twice (for example, once from

California through Nevada to the proposed PFSF, and then from the proposed PFSF through portions

of Nevada), and the NRC staff concluded that the overall impacts would be small. Therefore, the

impacts of shipments to the proposed PFSF from California are included in the nationwide impacts of

the representative Maine Yankee to the proposed PFSF route. 

G.3.16.3.3 Issues Related to Shipments from the Proposed PFSF Are Overlooked

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that a major problem with the transportation risk estimates in the DEIS is that

they seem to focus almost exclusively on getting the SNF to Utah. The commenter indicated that there

seems to be very little risk or dose analysis included for removing the SNF from Utah. The commenter

reasoned that it would take as many shipments to empty 4000 canisters from the site as it would to fill

it. The commenter questioned whether the "exiting" transport risks and "incident-free" doses at least

double all risks and "incident-free" doses reported in the DEIS. (0194) Three commenters stated that

the DEIS should have examined the costs and implications of returning the SNF from the proposed

PFSF back to the reactors or to alternative storage sites in the event that Yucca Mountain is not

available, since this situation would double the number of shipments of SNF. (0142, 0204, SL2-17) 

One commenter requested that the EIS include an analysis of the impacts of alternative shipping

casks on shipment numbers and safety and analysis of the impacts of moving the SNF after its

storage period (believed to be 20 years or possibly 40 years, under the license) either back to its origin

or to a permanent geologic repository. The commenter indicated that such an analysis should include: 

a) the effects of SNF decay and degradation; b) an examination of where the SNF would be shipped,

if, after 20-40 years, the reactor site where the SNF originated has been decommissioned; and c) an

analysis comparing the impacts of extended at-reactor SNF storage to transport to a centralized

interim SNF storage facility. (0142)

One commenter stated that the EIS should evaluate the environmental impacts that would result if the

SNF could not be transported to the originating plant because the plant had closed, and no other

nuclear licensee would accept the SNF for repackaging. (0198h)

Response:

In its evaluation in the FEIS (page 5-39), the NRC staff assesses the impacts of eventual rail

transportation of SNF to and from the proposed PFSF. That assessment utilizes a conservative

population and route. The assessment of removal of SNF stops at the Utah border. As noted in the

FEIS, the plans beyond the Utah border for the transport of SNF are subject to decisions that have not

yet been made. However, the NRC staff believes it is reasonable to assume that the impacts of future

transportation to a repository would be encompassed by the impacts of the representative Maine

Yankee to the proposed PFSF route. Therefore, contrary to some comments, if SNF were transported

to a permanent geologic repository at the proposed Yucca Mountain site, or to another site for

permanent storage, or back to the originating reactor site, the transportation risks and incident-free

dose would be small. These issues are discussed more fully in the FEIS.

The primary cost associated with transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF would be the capital cost of

the canisters and casks and the cost of loading the un-canistered SNF into canisters. These large

costs would have already been incurred when the SNF was initially shipped to the proposed PFSF

and would not recur for subsequent transportation.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-331 NUREG-1714

The FEIS does not explicitly address future transportation of SNF with cladding that has degraded

during the storage period, because environmental conditions (e.g., temperature) are established as

part of the licensing (safety review) of the SNF storage systems with the objective of preventing such

degradation. The transportation of SNF that is degraded to the point where sufficient confinement

must be analyzed prior to shipment must be specified on the certificate of compliance along with a

description of the authorized contents of transportation casks. The canisters are quite robust and

should more than make up for the condition of the SNF. Thus, damaged SNF does not produce any

increase in consequence or risk in an accident. 

One commenter hypothesizes that after a period of storage at the proposed PFSF, some SNF might

need to be returned to the original plant, but that plant might have closed; the commenter also

postulates that a permanent repository would not be available. The NRC staff notes that the

disposition of the SNF that is owned by a licensee (e.g., the SNF owned by a particular reactor

licensee, including that in dry storage) is a matter that is considered during the necessary

decommissioning approvals. However, even in a hypothetical situation such as presented in the

comment, an alternative destination could be ordered consistent with the need to protect public health

and safety, common defense, or the environment. This issue is further discussed in Section G.3.4 of

this FEIS.

G.3.16.3.4 The Risk is Lower if the SNF is Not Transported from its Current Locations

 Until a Permanent Repository Is Available

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the risks to transport the SNF across the United States are greater than

maintaining the SNF on the sites where it was produced. (SL2-05) Another commenter asserted that

the benefit of decentralized ISFSIs is that SNF stored at reactor sites would be allowed to cool until a

permanent repository were available. The commenter stated the following: "if temporary storage took

place over a 25-year period, five half-lives for Co-60, then 1/32 of the original Co-60 activity would

remain. The activity of Cesium-137 would decrease by approximately one half-life. Other

radionuclides would decline as well, although not as dramatically. This would significantly decrease

the dose rates outside of shipping casks, thus greatly reducing radiation exposures to workers and the

public during an accident or during incident-free transport." (0198g) A few commenters said that the

proposed PFSF and the transport of SNF could have a strong overall negative environmental and

public health impact, and specifically in Indiana. (0117, 0131, 0135, GR-19)

Another commenter stated that 53,000,000 people would be at risk due to transportation across the

country. (SL2-12) 

Several commenters stated that the proposed action increases health and safety risks because the

SNF is moved twice, first into Skull Valley and then later to the proposed permanent geologic

repository at Yucca Mountain. (0077, 0249, SL1-16, SL3-02) Several commenters stated that since

the proposed PFSF is a temporary storage facility, the SNF would have to be moved to a permanent

repository in the future, resulting in additional risk. (0153, 0142, 0217, GR-01, SL1-10, SL3-02) 

Another commenter stated that there is significant cost and inherent risk in transporting SNF these

great distances, then transporting it again to a permanent repository when one is available. The

commenter asserted that transportation of this magnitude, frequency, and high-risk has never been

tested by the appropriate agencies; therefore, the risk evaluation in Appendix D yields nonrepresentative results. The commenter concluded that there would be a strong inherent risk in

shipping the proposed amounts of SNF cross-country for 20 years without suffering a serious

accident. (0166)

One commenter requested that the EIS include an analysis comparing the impacts of extended SNF

storage at the reactor to the transport of SNF to a centralized ISFSI. (0142)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-332

One commenter stated that shipping SNF to Utah is an unnecessary risk. (0249) 

One commenter questioned the logic behind putting the SNF into storage in Utah and then

transporting it to Yucca Mountain in a few years. The commenter stated that there would be only

health and safety risks without economic or health and safety benefits. (SL1-16) One commenter

stated that the proposed PFSF project puts every Utah resident at risk. (0038)

Response:

The NRC has established regulatory programs for both the transport and storage of SNF. Both of

these programs provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The risks associated with

either SNF storage or transportation are small. To date, more than 1,300 SNF shipments have been

made in the United States and no accident resulting in a radiological release has occurred. Also, the

NRC and the DOT have completed several analyses of the potential impacts of SNF transport. Many

of these analyses, such as NUREG-0170, serve as the basis for the current regulatory programs.

Even if the risk from transport of the SNF is greater than the risk of continuing to store it at its present

location, the risk from transport is still small. There is no requirement in NEPA to choose the

alternative that minimizes risk. The NRC must assure that it does not authorize an action that would

pose an undue risk to public health and safety. Provided all applicable NRC requirements are

satisfied, there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety are adequately protected

whether the SNF is transported or stored. However, the NRC staff anticipates that SNF would

ultimately be transported from reactor sites, for example, to a permanent geologic repository. 

The NRC and the DOT have specific requirements that govern the movement of SNF. With such

standards in place, SNF can be transported without creating an undue risk to public health and safety. 

In Section 5.7.2 of the FEIS the NRC staff has evaluated the environmental (radiological) impact to

human health of transporting SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF and then transporting the

SNF from the proposed PFSF to a permanent geologic repository. The NRC staff has concluded that

the environmental impact to human health would be small.

G.3.16.3.5 Risk of Large SNF Shipping Campaign

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern about the risk associated with shipping such a large volume

of SNF. One commenter stated that 1,000 rail cars or 2,000 18-wheel over-the-road units would be

needed to transport the SNF, and noted that with so many units, there would be a high risk of

accident. (GR-09) Another commenter stated that, mathematically, it seems that at least one of the

shipments would have some form of accident resulting in a spill. (0118) One commenter stated that

the risk of accident increases the more frequently SNF is transported. (SL3-32) One commenter

asserted that the risk of rail accidents is too dangerous and unnecessary. (0249)

Response:

As noted in the FEIS (page 2-16), “the applicant would use two single-purpose, dedicated trains which

would proceed from the originating reactor site directly to Skull Valley, Utah, stopping only for crew

changes, refueling, and periodic inspections.” Thus, there would be a limited number of transportation

casks and rail equipment in service at any given time and the equipment would be reused for multiple

dedicated train shipments. About 50 shipments per year would be received at the proposed PFSF

(averaging 4 casks per shipment), which would be about one shipment per week. The FEIS analysis

accounts for the probability of a transportation accident, based upon the number of railcar-miles or

truck-miles traveled, not on the number of individual conveyances. As set forth in the FEIS, the NRC

staff concludes that the impacts of accidents would be small and within previous NRC risk estimates

that have been found acceptable. 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-333 NUREG-1714

G.3.16.3.6 Comments on the Radionuclide Inventory of Spent Fuel to Be Shipped

Comment Summary:

One commenter said that the EIS should take into account the characteristics of the SNF shipments,

such as the burn-up level of the SNF and the weight of SNF shipments. (0198h) Another commenter

stated that the contents of every transportation cask should be characterized. (SL2-12)

One commenter wanted more data pertaining to isotopic decay. (0096)

Response:

Burn-up level and SNF age both affect the amounts of radionuclides present in SNF at the time it is

shipped. The FEIS does consider the burn-up and weight characteristics of the SNF. The inventory

examined in the DEIS was calculated for 5-years-cooled SNF with a burn-up of 40,000 MWD/MTU. 

These assumptions are conservative with respect to estimating impacts because as stated in

Section 4.7.2 of the DEIS, the applicant estimates that the average SNF that would be stored at the

proposed PFSF is expected to be 20-years-cooled and have a burn-up of 35,000 MWD/MTU. 

The weight of the SNF shipment would be determined by the SNF cask in which the SNF is shipped

(the Holtec International HI-STORM/HI-STAR dual purpose cask system). Differences in cask weight

would not affect transportation or storage radiological risks. The SNF characteristics for a cask are

included in Appendix D of the DEIS. Also, the inventory of Co-60 was adjusted to account for its

presence in CRUD (CRUD is not part of the SNF, but is deposited on the outside of the rods).

The NRC staff reviewed the request for additional isotopic data and determined that it is not directly

related to the environmental review. However, there are several publications related to this subject;

for example, Schleien, B. Ed., 1998, Handbook of Health Physics and Radiological Health, 3rd Ed.,

Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, Tables 8-7 through 8-10 and Table 8-13.

G.3.16.3.7 The EIS Contains Premature Assumptions for the Proposed Repository

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that, due to the explicit determination made by the NRC in its Waste

Confidence Decision, it is arbitrary and capricious for the NRC staff to assume that the proposed

permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is not only "a" possibility to consider, but the "only"

possibility. The commenter stated that this assumption is integral to the DEIS's analysis of both the

proposed PFSF and the Wyoming alternatives, and its conclusion that the Wyoming Alternative is not

"obviously superior." (The commenter references the Executive Summary of the DEIS, page xli.) 

(0198)

The commenter stated that since most of the nation's commercial reactors are located to the east of

Utah (the commenter references DEIS, page 5-1), and closer to the alternative site in Wyoming (the

commenter references Map, DEIS, page 5-41), it is quite possible that a permanent repository site

other than at Yucca Mountain would enhance the transportation benefits of the Wyoming site in

relation to the proposed site. (0198)

One commenter asserted that the Cooperating Agencies should revise the analysis without the

assumption that Yucca Mountain is the site of the permanent geologic repository. The commenter

stated that, at the very least, the Cooperating Agencies should consider another site, either a specific

site or a composite location, and provide a full sensitivity analysis. The commenter stated that the

NRC staff used such an approach in its choice of the Maine Yankee location as the composite location

of the nation's reactors for the purpose of its incoming SNF transportation analysis. The commenter
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-334

asserted that it would be easy to take some centralized major rail center as the composite location

and re-run the NRC staff analysis with the new location. (0198)

One commenter expressed concern that the scope of the proposed action includes transfer to the

proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain by rail. The commenter stated that there

is currently no rail transportation route to Yucca Mountain and questioned the effect on the proposed

action if such routes are not approved. (SL2-12)

One commenter stated that, based on recent NRC documents, "the NRC has not committed to a

specific repository, and thus the DEIS errs by assuming that Yucca Mountain will be the chosen

repository.” For example, a recent NRC document assessing the risk of SNF transportation (NUREG6672) considers three potential sites for an ultimate repository, one each in the southeast, southcentral, and southwest. The commenter stated that both the NRC and the applicant have relied on the

flawed assumption that a permanent repository will be built at Yucca Mountain, something the NRC

does not concede anywhere else. The commenter stated that the EIS should evaluate the applicant’s

proposal in light of a variety of potential locations for the permanent repository, including Nevada. 

(0198g) 

One commenter asserted that the DEIS analysis of transport-related costs and risks incorrectly

assumes that the permanent geologic repository will be at Yucca Mountain. (The commenter stated

that this assumption can be found in the DEIS page 5-39, lines 41-46.) The commenter stated that

this is contrary to the NRC's position in the 1990 Waste Confidence Decision. (The commenter stated

that the decision was affirmed without change in its December 6, 1999, review, and references 64

Fed. Reg. 68005 et seq.) The commenter quotes the following from the Waste Confidence Review,

55 Fed. Reg. 38505, September 28, 1990: "In order to obtain a conservative upper bound on the

timing of the repository availability, the Commission has made the assumption that the Yucca

Mountain site will be found to be unsuitable. If DOE were authorized to initiate site screening for a

repository at a different site in the year 2000, the Commission believes it reasonable to expect that a

repository would be available by the year 2025." (0198)

Response:

In general, these comments assert that the DEIS prematurely presumed that a permanent geologic

repository will be sited at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and, therefore, other options for ultimate

disposition should be assessed.

The sections of the DEIS that refer to the proposed permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain

have been rephrased in the FEIS to clearly indicate that Yucca Mountain is a candidate or proposed

repository that is being studied pursuant to the NWPA, as amended.

For shipments to the proposed PFSF that would pass through the State of Nevada, impacts in the

State of Nevada would be bounded by the nationwide transportation impacts presented in Chapter 5

and Appendix D of the FEIS. 

In the DEIS (page 5-39), the NRC staff also assessed the impacts of eventual rail transportation of

SNF from the proposed PFSF to a permanent geological repository. The NRC has not received an

application requesting a license for permanent geologic repository, and the NRC has not made any

determination regarding any proposal to construct such a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, or

any other location. DOE is not currently considering any other location. However, the NRC staff

recognized that Yucca Mountain may not be selected or approved as the final repository, and the

assumption made is for analytical purposes in this FEIS. Further, this EIS does not dictate any

particular result for future actions taken with respect to other nuclear waste management facilities

(including a repository or other storage facility).
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-335 NUREG-1714

The NRC staff considered the issue raised by the commenter of including an analysis of the potential

impacts of transporting SNF from the proposed PFSF to a permanent repository site other than the

proposed Yucca Mountain site.

The NRC staff believes it is reasonable to assume that the impacts of future transportation to a

repository, regardless of its location, would be encompassed by the impacts of the representative

Maine Yankee to PFS route. As discussed above in Section 5.7.2.3, the route chosen for analysis is

one of the longest potential ones between a power reactor and the proposed PFSF, passing through a

significant number of large population centers. Therefore, the estimated potential dose to the public

would be conservative. Further, the potential effects of anticipated accidents would also be

maximized since the number of accidents is proportional to the length of the route. Consideration of

SNF shipment to a particular alternate permanent repository location would not add meaningful

information to the FEIS evaluation.

The NRC staff acknowledges that NUREG/CR-6672 considered multiple locations for a permanent

geologic repository. NUREG/CR-6672 was intended to serve as a generic study with the purpose of

determining if the results of NUREG-0170 were still conservative. In contrast, the purpose of this

FEIS is to assess the impacts of the proposed action. The NRC staff has determined that the

transportation analysis adequately evaluated the transportation impacts of the proposed action, and

analyzing the impacts of transporting SNF to other possible locations for a permanent repository would

not result in significantly different impacts.

The NRC staff has also concluded that the impacts of transporting SNF from reactor sites to an ISFSI

at the alternate Wyoming site would also be small. The additional transportation impacts associated

with transporting SNF from the alternate Wyoming site to the Utah/Nevada border do not result in a

significant impact, and were not the basis for concluding that the Wyoming site was not obviously

superior to the Skull Valley site.

Finally, the NRC staff notes that this FEIS does not dictate any future actions to be taken with respect

to other waste management facilities (such as a repository EIS or EIS for another ISFSI).

G.3.16.3.8 Nevada-Specific Impacts Are Not Considered

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that Yucca Mountain is repeatedly named in the DEIS as the final repository

site, but asserted that the DEIS does not provide estimates of risks to Nevadans from unloading the

SNF from the proposed PFSF into Nevada. (0194) Two commenters wanted to know if the State of

Nevada and its residents were considered by the NRC to be impacted by the proposal. (0171, 0193) 

One commenter stated that there could be significant and long-lasting negative economic impacts to

the State of Nevada in the event of a serious accident or terrorist incident. (0204)

One commenter expressed confusion about whether the State of Nevada and its residents are

considered by the NRC to be impacted by the proposed action. The commenter explained that pages

5-37 and 5-39 of the DEIS refer to radiological impacts, and analyze only as far as the Nevada-Utah

border, at the most likely entry point for rail. The commenter further stated that the document does not

address the impacts on the other side of the border that could be caused by the facility locating in

Utah. The commenter also referred to page C-2, which states that SNF stored at the proposed PFSF

would be transported to Yucca Mountain. The commenter stated that whether or not the NRC has

prematurely determined that the SNF would be moved to Yucca Mountain, the failure of the EIS to

include impacts in and on Nevada is a major flaw in the document. (0171)

The commenter stated that the NRC justified the absence of analysis by stating that the DOE is doing

their own route analysis within Nevada. Yet the DOE is not even listed as an agency consulted in the

preparation of the proposed PFSF document. In addition, the commenter stated that in its own review
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-336

of the DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS, the NRC raised serious concerns about the adequacy of the

DOE’s transportation analysis. The commenter asserted that by its own admission, the NRC knows

the DOE’s Yucca Mountain DEIS is flawed, and yet is relying on the DOE to do the Nevada analysis. 

(0171)

One commenter stated that the final version of NUREG-1714 should include an analysis of the

impacts to Nevada corridor communities of transporting SNF from the proposed PFSF to the proposed

permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. The commenter stated that limiting the analysis to

the Utah State line represents a severely incomplete assessment of transportation impacts, unless the

applicant and the NRC intend to permanently dispose of SNF at the Utah state line. (0193)

Response:

For shipments to the proposed PFSF, the representative route is used to estimate nationwide impacts,

regardless of the origin and route used for any given shipment. Impacts within the State of Nevada

would be less than the nationwide transportation impacts presented in Chapter 5 and Appendix D of

the DEIS, because there would be fewer shipments through Nevada than assumed in the

transportation analysis, and the route through Nevada would be shorter than the route from Maine

Yankee to the proposed PFSF. For rail transportation of SNF from the proposed PFSF, the DEIS 

(page 5-39), assessed the impacts using a conservative population and route that stops at the UtahNevada border. The reasons the NRC staff chose this route are set forth in Section G.3.16.3.7 of this

Appendix.

As noted in the FEIS, the plans beyond the Utah border are subject to decisions that have not yet

been made. However, the NRC staff has determined that it is reasonable to assume that the impacts

beyond the Utah border would be no greater than the impacts of the representative Maine Yankee to

the proposed PFSF route. This is clarified in the FEIS. The details of potential repository design and

operations (e.g., use of a direct rail route or an ITF with heavy-haul segment) that are not yet certain

are beyond the scope of this FEIS. The DEIS noted that the Yucca Mountain DEIS considered

several possible rail routes and ITFs.

The NRC has not received an application requesting a license for permanent geologic repository, and

the NRC has not made any determination regarding any proposal to construct such a repository at

Yucca Mountain, Nevada, or any other location. DOE is not currently considering any other location. 

However, the NRC staff recognized that Yucca Mountain may not be selected or approved as the final

repository, and the assumption made is for analytical purposes in this FEIS. Further, this EIS does

not dictate any particular result for future actions taken with respect to other nuclear waste

management facilities (including a repository or other storage facility).

G.3.16.3.9 Dose Rates from Casks Inadequately Identified

Comment Summary:

A number of commenters asserted that the DEIS does not adequately identify the "routine" doses or

levels of radioactivity to the public from casks in transit. (0084, 0118, 0121, 0135, 0139, 0157, 0180,

0185, 0194, 0195, 0217, 0257)

One commenter questioned whether the Holtec transport casks would function properly. The

commenter stated that flawed shielding materials in transport and storage containers may cause an 

increase in “incident-free” doses to workers and members of the public. (0194)

Two commenters asserted that dense shielding material such as lead would be required to completely

contain all the radiation emanating from the SNF, and that this shielding material would be too heavy

to transport. (0194, 0257, GR-16) The commenters indicated that the shipment casks would be like

mobile x-ray machines, exposing everyone along the routes to gamma and neutron radiation. As an
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G-337 NUREG-1714

example, the commenters described a scenario involving a car driving on a nearly 50-mile stretch of

Interstate 15 in Utah that closely parallels the proposed rail route to Skull Valley, potentially exposing

the driver for a full hour. (0194, 0257)

One commenter expressed concern that a shipment could get stopped in transit for an indefinite

period of time thus posing a greater risk to people along the transportation route. (GR-05)

One commenter asserted that standing near a cask loaded with SNF is four times as hazardous as

flying in an airplane. (0017)

Response:

Section 5.7.2 of this FEIS includes an estimate of the radiological doses associated with routine

“incident free” transportation of SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF. The radiation field that

surrounds the cask decreases markedly as the distance from the cask increases. At distances from

30 m to 800 m (98 ft to 0.5 mile), the cask would appear almost like a point source and, therefore, the

dose rate would decrease as the square of the distance from the cask. In the NRC staff’s analysis,

each cask was assumed to have a dose rate of 0.13 mSv/hr at a distance of 1 m (13 mrem/hr at 3 ft)

from the cask surface, which is approximately equivalent to (slightly higher than) the regulatory limit of

0.1 mSv/hr at 2 m (10 mrem/hr at 6.5 ft); therefore, any SNF cask with a higher dose could not be

shipped. The NRC staff conservatively assumed that the source term consisted entirely of gamma

radiation for calculation of the incident-free dose. Actual cask radiation levels would be measured

prior to each shipment and, in practice, are expected to be lower than the regulatory limit. 

Appendix D of the FEIS notes that the collective dose to the public consists of the dose to persons

living or working near the route, persons traveling on the route, and persons at stops. The sum of

these three doses is given in Table 5.9 in Chapter 5 and Tables D.6 through D.9 in Appendix D of the

FEIS. The total annual incident-free (“routine”) population dose is 9.18 person-rem (Table 5.9). This

dose would be distributed over the entire potentially exposed population (members of the public within

800 m on either side of the track; crew and general public on the same train as the SNF shipment or

on trains that pass by the SNF shipment; persons in all vehicles sharing the transportation route, and

individuals at stops). Section 5.7.2 of this FEIS also provides the radiological dose for the “maximally

exposed individual. The NRC staff concludes that the radiological impacts to the maximally exposed

individual or any member of the public from routine transport of SNF would be small. Therefore,

exposure of individuals traveling on Interstate 15 would be small. For more information on the details

of these exposure situations, see the RADTRAN 4 Technical Manual. 

The design of the cask including the shielding has been approved by NRC in accordance with 10 CFR

Part 71. It is very unlikely that an SNF shipment could get stopped in transit for an indefinite period of

time. As noted in the DEIS (page 2-16), “The applicant would use two single-purpose, dedicated

trains which would proceed from the originating reactor site directly to Skull Valley, Utah, stopping only

for crew changes, refueling, and periodic inspections.” The RADTRAN analysis included in the DEIS

accounts for stops in transit, because this is part of normal rail movement. Stops or delays are

included in the model to account for both expected and unexpected delays. The transportation risks

presented in Section 5 of this FEIS indicate that such risks would be small.

In response to one comment, the dose rate near a loaded SNF cask is greater than the dose rate in

airplanes at cruising altitude, but the NRC staff has not evaluated the overall risk of flying, as

compared to the risk from such exposure. (Although comparisons such as in the comment can offer

perspective, they are not material to the analyses and conclusions in the FEIS.)
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NUREG-1714 G-338

G.3.16.3.10 Magnitude of the Shipping Campaign Is Unprecedented

Comment Summary:

A few commenters stated that the proposed PFSF would require transportation of more SNF for

longer distances than has ever been transported in the past or stored in one location, and this

represents unknown risks. (0012, 0198, SL1-01, SL2-12, SL3-31) One commenter stated that the

experience to date with transportation of commercial wastes involves short distances compared to the

cross country route required for the proposed PFSF. (0012)

Another commenter stated that the movement of these amounts of high level SNF is unprecedented. 

The commenter stated that, furthermore, each cask contains 40 times the radioactivity of the

Hiroshima bomb. The commenter stated that utility companies plan to move two to six casks per

week through Salt Lake City and the Wasatch front, that these casks have been in use for 14 years,

and the license is for 25 years, then another 25 years. (SL1-10)

Two commenters stated that the use of the proposed PFSF would require transportation of more SNF

across the nation than has been transported before, creating risks that may, in the end, turn out to

have been taken unnecessarily. (0012, 0198) One commenter stated that the proposed temporary

site provides a significantly greater risk, since 27 times more SNF than has been transported in the

past would be moved to the proposed PFSF. (SL3-02) Another commenter stated that casks should

be moved as little as possible to avoid possible dangers and damage. (SL1-20)

One commenter stated that, contrary to what nuclear industry supporters say, the casks are definitely

not infallible, and the applicant has no track record of being able to transport, handle, or manage such

a vast quantity of SNF. The commenter asked if it would be double or triple jeopardy for the applicant

to assure that, if any of the casks arrived in Utah damaged, they would send them back to the site of

origin. The commenter stated that not only has the applicant admitted there would be a danger, but

they would have that danger traverse populated areas and watersheds three times. Furthermore, the

commenter stated that it is reprehensible that the applicant is planning to ship this waste through

Utah's most populated communities and portions of the watersheds. (SL1-20)

Response:

The risks from SNF shipments to the proposed PFSF can be estimated using standard techniques, as

documented in the DEIS. These techniques take into account the radionuclide inventory of the cask. 

The DEIS estimates indicated that the total risk (product of the risk per shipment times the expected

number of shipments) would be small (see Table 5.9 and Section 5.7.2.4 of the DEIS). The NRC staff

notes (in contrast to one comment) that the license, if approved, would be for 20 years, not 25 years,

and could be renewed. 

All SNF shipments to the proposed PFSF would meet the NRC and the DOT regulations that assure

minimal risk to the public for any single shipment and for the entire shipping campaign. The shipment

of SNF is not new or unproven. In more than 20 years of shipments in the U.S. and around the world,

the safety record of SNF shipments has been excellent (no fatalities or injuries due to cargo, and no

releases of radioactivity). Regarding the response of a damage cask, see Section G.3.16.1.8.

G.3.16.3.11 DEIS Transport Worker Doses Not Adequately Defined

Comment Summary:

One commenter mentioned that the DEIS did not define anticipated hours of exposure per train crew. 

One commenter expressed concern that the DEIS did not address the extensive duration of time that

rail workers would be subjected to radiation. (0112)
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G-339 NUREG-1714

Response:

Regarding exposure to transportation crews, the relevant parameter is the accumulated dose and not

the number of hours of exposure. Section 5.7 of this FEIS presents the potential (accumulated) doses

to transportation crew members and workers at the proposed PFSF.

G.3.16.3.12 Effects on Populations More Sensitive to Radiation

Comment Summary:

Two commenters stated that the EIS does not adequately consider the health risks of radioactivity

exposure to sensitive populations like pregnant women and their unborn children from transportation

of casks. (GR-16, SL1-05) Another commenter stated that the DEIS did not adequately analyze the

risks to children and the elderly. The commenter stated that the DEIS assumed on page D-5, lines

11-16 that the person exposed would be the age of the average worker, between 20-45. (0096)

Response:

The NRC staff estimated in the DEIS the risks to the general population (including pregnant women,

children, and the elderly) from transportation accidents that are so severe that there would be a

release of radioactive material, and the radiological exposure to the general public from routine

(incident-free) transport of SNF. The estimated population dose risks are small. The estimated dose

to the general population encompasses doses to pregnant women and their unborn children. Since

the estimated risk to the entire population and the maximally exposed individual has been found to be

small, the risk to any population subgroup, such as pregnant women, would also be small.

The NRC staff explained in the DEIS (page D-21, lines 9-11) that the transportation analysis accounts

for health effects to young and elderly persons by its choice of a dose to health effect conversion

factor (risk factor). The risk factor of 5.0x10-4 LCF per person-rem for public exposure is 25 percent

higher than the worker risk factor (4.0x10-4 LCF per person-rem), because the general population

includes persons above (the elderly) and below (children) the worker age range of 18 to 65, who could

be more sensitive to the biological effects of radiation. For a more detailed discussion on this subject

see comment response G.3.15.5.2.

G.3.16.3.13 Comments That Generally Agree with EIS Assessments/Conclusions

Comment Summary:

One commenter asserted that experience will allow the project to be successful. The commenter

stated that the DEIS review of the transportation impact is thorough and complete, and clearly

supports moving the SNF from nuclear power plants to the Reservation as proposed by the applicant. 

The commenter stated that the DEIS review is supported by the practical knowledge that over the past

35 years more than 3,800 shipments of SNF and more than 10,000 radioactive materials shipments

have been made in this country without a single radiation injury. The commenter concluded by stating

that panels of national experts have repeatedly found that it is safe to transport SNF, and to store it at

a centralized interim storage facility without impairing the local citizens and the environment. (0070)

A few commenters stated that SNF can be transported safely. (0014, 0017, 0170, 0236, GR-12, SL1-

08, SL1-25, SL1-40, SL2-03, SL2-04, SL3-58) One commenter stated that DOT and NRC regulations

for transporting radioactive material ensure public health and safety. (0014, SL1-40) Two

commenters noted that shipping casks are built to meet high safety standards established by the

NRC. (0014, 0017)

Other commenters stated that SNF can be transported more safely than other materials. (0017, SL1-

08, SL2-03) Several commenters noted that the radiological impacts from the transportation of SNF
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NUREG-1714 G-340

are small, and accidents involving SNF would not lead to significant environmental impacts. (0014,

0017, 0170, 0179, GR-12, GR-24, SL1-08, SL1-25, SL1-40, SL2-04, SL3-53) 

One commenter stated that shipping SNF is safer than shipping a rocket motor. (SL2-03)

Another commenter stated that radiation from SNF casks is not comparable to bomb test fallout. The

commenter stated that once the cask has passed by, no radioactive material is left behind and the

area is as clean as before. The commenter similarly explained that the gamma ray dosage received

as the cask goes by is gone with no residue. The commenter explained that SNF transport is not

comparable to an above-ground bomb test that produces large quantities of dust mixed with

radioactive isotopes (fallout), which settles out over the countryside. (0170) 

Another commenter stated that a canister could not "leak." The commenter described the SNF inside

the rods as solid pellets of ceramic (uranium dioxide), each about as large as two aspirin tablets or a

small rock. The commenter stated that these are inside stainless zirconium tubes called SNF rods,

welded shut. The commenter continued by stating that the rods are arranged into bundles and sealed

inside a stainless steel canister. The commenter stated that the word "leak" is usually reserved for

liquids, gases, or powders, which might escape through a small crack. The commenter asserted that

no pellets could escape in any of the credible "severe" accidents, and if any ever did escape, they

could be located by Geiger counter and retrieved. (0170)

One commenter indicated that plutonium in microscopic particle-size escaping from the spent reactor

rods is not realistic. The commenter asserted that it is only unsafe in terms of direct radiation for two

or three meters from the container. The commenter stated that, if there were an accident, it would not

be a nuclear explosion like in Nevada, that thrust radioactive particles into the atmosphere and

scattered them downwind, nor would it be a wide area contamination or a meltdown. Rather, the

commenter stated that there might be a breakage of the container and a spillage of metal pieces from

that container, and that the problem would be very local. The commenter stated that clean-up crews

would come in with a Geiger counter, find those pieces, pick them up, and take them away. (SL1-25)

Some commenters stated that people living near the transportation route would be exposed to less

radiation than they would from flying in an airplane or from a chest x-ray. (0014, 0017, GR-12, GR-24,

SL1-08, SL1-40, SL2-04, SL3-53) One commenter asserted that, although standing one meter away

from a cask is four times more hazardous than flying, the risk is the same at five meters and at 10

meters there is no risk. (0017) One commenter stated that it would take the passage of 19,000

shipping casks at 30 miles per hour to give one person leaning against the fence an exposure

equivalent to one chest x-ray. Such exposure, the commenter stated, could not happen. (0017, 0170,

GR-24, SL1-08, SL2-04, SL3-53) The same commenter asserted that one would receive more

exposure in a brick house because of isotopes in the brick. (GR-24) One commenter noted that the

potential radiation exposures to the public from transporting, handling, and storage of casks have

been estimated to be less than 2 percent of naturally occurring background radiation. (0179) One

commenter challenged claims that residents within a half-mile to two miles of the transportation route

could be affected by radiation and devalued property. (SL3-53) One commenter stated that a person

who spends 15 minutes standing 6 feet away from a vehicle carrying radioactive materials would only

receive 2.5 mrem, approximately the equivalent received by the commenter on the flight from

Washington to the public meeting in Utah. (GR-12, SL1-40)

One commenter noted that the casks are built and tested to withstand 30 mph train wrecks against

unyielding concrete structures in addition to a thirty minute gasoline fire and eight hours under water. 

The commenter believes it would be a simple task to keep the public at a safe distance if a wreck at

30 mph were to occur. (0017)

Several commenters stated that nuclear SNF can be transported safely. (0014, 0017, GR-12, SL1-08,

SL1-25, SL1-40, SL2-03, SL2-04, SL2-10, SL3-58) Other commenters added that there are strict

DOT and NRC standards for transporting SNF that ensure safety during transportation, and that much
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G-341 NUREG-1714

experience has been gained in shipping SNF; and, as a result, there have been no major accidents. 

(0014, SL1-41, SL2-10, SL3-58) One of these commenters noted that no harmful levels of

radioactivity have been released in the eight transportation accidents that have occurred in 35 years

involving radioactive materials. (0014)

In addition, two commenters stated that extensive studies have been conducted to ensure safety in

the event of an accident while the waste is being sent to the storage facility. (0179, SL3-50) 

Two commenters noted that past NRC transportation studies used conservative assumptions that

overestimated the frequency and consequences of potential accidents. (0179, SL1-40) Another

commenter made the point that radioactive material was already being transported on Utah's

highways, specifically I-80. (GR-08) One commenter stated that moving and storing SNF can be

done more safely than moving the same energy-equivalent amount of coal. (0017, SL1-08)

Another commenter stated that the risk of transportation and storage of SNF should be evaluated

realistically and not exaggerated. This commenter stated further that a factor of 10,000 is an

exaggerated risk factor. (SL3-53) One commenter indicated that studying international experience in

the transport of SNF could be an asset in the EIS. The same commenter noted that there has never

been an accident involving a commercial SNF transportation package. (0179) One commenter noted

that he was aware of the local, state, and Federal requirements for the shipments and the training

requirements for shippers, as well as the safety record for previous shipments of SNF. This

commenter expressed concern that misinformation about the very safe transportation of the SNF

would lead us to solutions that are actually less safe. The commenter encouraged the careful study of

all disposal options so that SNF can be transported and stored in a consolidated location. (SL1-41)

One commenter cited specific NRC and DOT regulations that govern the shipment of used SNF and

other radioactive material. The commenter stated that these regulations are sufficient to ensure that

the chance of radioactive release in transport would be minimal. (0014-11)

One commenter added that in the event of an accident, people would only need to be kept back 30

feet, and workers limited to two hours per day within arm's length of the shipping casks to ensure

safety. (SL2-04)

Response:

The NRC staff notes the comments. The NRC staff has determined that the DEIS did not require

modification to reflect the information in these comments. No further response is required.

G.3.16.4 Route Selection

G.3.16.4.1 Identification of Specific Routes Is Necessary for this EIS

Comment Summary:

A number of commenters expressed concern that interstate transportation routes were not specifically

identified or evaluated in the DEIS, and concluded, therefore, that impacts to communities along the

transportation routes were not adequately considered. A few commenters stated that the lack of

national route information disadvantages some states that would be affected by the proposed project,

whose residents may not be informed or familiar with the issues. (0012, 0042, 0112, 0142, 0166,

0194, 0198, 0201, 0204, SL1-01, SL2-12, SL3-55) One commenter asserted this was a political ploy

to keep concerned citizens in the dark until it is too late for them to voice effective opposition. (0194) 

Another expressed the view that people and communities in states that would be affected by the major

and unprecedented spent nuclear SNF shipping campaign are deprived of the opportunity to review

and comment on the proposed action, and this is required under NEPA. (0204) Two commenters

believe that lack of specific routes prevents consideration of important safety information related to
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NUREG-1714 G-342

transportation infrastructure. (0142, 0166) One commenter stated that the representative route

approach is ineffective to bound the potential impacts because it does not take into account accident

and recovery issues related to elevated roadways, bridges, tunnels, and steep grades, or the

existence of rivers or other bodies of water. (0142)

Response:

The NRC staff disagrees with the comments and believes the representative route approach used in

the DEIS was appropriate for estimating nationwide impacts of transportation associated with the

proposed action. As summarized below, the FEIS provides sufficient information from which to

estimate that the nationwide transportation impacts are small. 

The NRC staff used a representative route approach to evaluate transportation impacts of the

proposed action. In this approach, the NRC staff analyzed transportation of SNF to the proposed

PFSF as if all the SNF to be stored there would travel from the Maine Yankee nuclear power plant

(even though Maine Yankee plant itself would never have that much SNF to ship). This route is one of

the longest possible routes that any individual shipment could experience, and also passes through

some of the most populated regions of the country. Maximizing these factors tends to conservatively

overestimate the transportation risks.

Even including these conservative factors in the evaluation, the NRC staff concluded that risks along

the route from Maine-Yankee to the proposed PFSF would be small. In reality, any route, from any

reactor, would carry less than the total 4000 cask transits, and therefore, the risks along any other

route, from any other reactor would be a fraction of the risk along the Maine-Yankee to Skull Valley

route. Thus, the overall risks estimated using this route are expected to characterize overall risks of

shipments to the proposed PFSF, regardless of their individual origins, transportation details (such as

use of intermodal transfer), and reasonably foreseeable route characteristics. Use of the

representative route approach in the FEIS is further supported by the fact that the volumes of SNF,

modes (exclusively rail or intermodal including rail), routes, and reactor licensees that could ship SNF

to the proposed PFSF are subject to decisions that are yet to be made.

The NRC believes that there has been an adequate opportunity for public involvement. The DEIS was

available for a 90 day public comment period, which is double that required by NRC regulations. The

NRC staff believes the DEIS was clear in that the nationwide impacts of transportation included

impacts in many states, and that the representative route was not the only route that might be utilized

for potential shipments to the proposed PFSF. For a more detailed response on public participation

see Section G.3.7.

G.3.16.4.2 DEIS Should Consider Route Possibilities from All Reactors

Comment Summary:

One commenter indicated that the analysis in the DEIS failed to use "reactor-specific shipment

numbers and route-specific inputs resulting in a technically indefensible and legally deficient

transportation risk analysis." Since the proposed action could result in shipping SNF from any reactor

site, the commenter stated that the DEIS should have identified and analyzed the probable rail routes

from all 72 reactor sites, using an accepted routing model such as INTERLINE. The commenter went

on to state that the DEIS should then have used a bounding scenario approach to transportation risk

analysis, using reactor-specific and route-specific data for minimum (12 site owned by PFS members)

and maximum (72 site) national transportation scenarios. The commenter stated that such an

analysis could have and should have been done and included in the DEIS. The commenter indicated

that failure to include an adequate analysis of potential national transportation routes is, of itself,

sufficient to require that this DEIS be withdrawn, redone, and reissued for an additional public

comment period. (0204)
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G-343 NUREG-1714

Response:

The representative route approach used in the FEIS characterizes overall risks of shipments to PFS,

regardless of their individual origins, transportation details (such as use of intermodal transfer), and

reasonably foreseeable route characteristics. Although likely routes from each reactor site to the

proposed PFSF can be predicted using the existing railroad system and industry practices (this is

precisely the method used to predict a route from Maine Yankee site), it is not possible to assign

specific, required routes at this time. Rather, specific routes are identified in the transportation plan

prepared prior to each shipment. Accordingly, railway routing practices are beyond the scope of this

FEIS. The NRC staff concludes that use of predicted routes from each reactor would not provide

additional insight on the impacts, beyond the FEIS’ single representative route.

G.3.16.4.3 DEIS Lacks Criteria for the Selection of Routes and Modes

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the transportation analysis contained in the DEIS lacked depth. The

commenter stated that of greatest concern to western states is that the DEIS fails to establish any

credible criteria for the selection of shipping routes and transportation modes. (0142)

The commenter stated that the analysis of routes should include not only the traditional assessment of

distance, population exposure and time in transit, but should also examine factors which could (a)

threaten the integrity of the cask, (b) pose problems in the recovery from an accident that did not result

in a release of radioactive materials, and (c) cause delays in transit or impede interstate commerce. 

The commenter stated that analysis of modes and routes should take into account recent work by the

U.S. Department of Transportation under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act. 

(0142)

One commenter stated that the DEIS did not include any analysis that provides a sound methodology

for evaluating optional mixes of routes (and transportation modes). The commenter stated that the

size and scope of the proposed PFS shipping campaign is similar to that of a potential NWPA

campaign, and the commenter asked that the DEIS be amended to: 1) include the development of a

sound methodology for evaluating optional mixes of routes (and transportation modes); 2) provide

route-specific analyses and a specific evaluation of the impacts on states along transportation

corridors; and 3) identify preferred routes from each potential reactor shipping site to the proposed

PFSF. The commenter recommends that the NRC work together with western states and tribes to

develop an acceptable methodology for evaluating routes. (0142)

Response:

As set forth in the DEIS, the NRC staff evaluated the environmental impacts of transporting SNF to the

proposed PFSF using a representative route analysis. The NRC staff concluded that the

environmental impacts are small. The DEIS clearly indicated that the applicant intends to ship SNF by

rail. The DEIS also explained why the transportation analysis only considered rail as an alternative for

cross-country shipment of SNF. The purpose of the DEIS is not to establish criteria for the selection

of shipping routes and transportation modes. However, Section D.3, “Regional Transportation Risks

Near Skull Valley, Utah,” investigates possible rail routes to the proposed PFSF from points on an

approximately 250 mile radius circle around the proposed PFSF.

Selection of rail transportation routes is beyond the scope of this FEIS. As long as the applicable

regulations, including DOT regulations under the Hazardous Material Uniform Safety Act, are satisfied,

shipments could utilize any route. In addition, the reactors that may utilize the proposed PFSF are not

specified at this time, and the routes used may change over time. The NRC staff has concluded that

the representative route that was assessed results in a reasonable bound to the potential
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transportation impacts of the proposed action. Additional analysis has been provided in FEIS

Appendix D.1.5.2.

G.3.16.4.4 Shipping Distances Must Be Considered

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS must consider the distances over which SNF will be shipped to

the PFS facility. (0198h)

Response:

As noted in the DEIS, the Maine Yankee to Skull Valley route was selected as the representative route

for study because it is one of the longest shipment routes to the proposed PFSF site and also passes

through a large number of urban areas. The specifics of this route are presented in Section 5.7.2 and

Appendix C of this FEIS. 

G.3.16.4.5 DEIS Does Not Satisfy Federal Highway Administration Requirements

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the logical termini of the project may not be adequate. FHWA regulations

state the following: 

In order to ensure meaningful evaluation of alternatives and to avoid commitments to

transportation improvements before they are evaluated, the action evaluated in each EIS or

finding of no significant impact shall connect logical termini and be of sufficient length to

address environmental matters on a broad scope (23 CFR 771.111(f)). 

Based on the above, the commenter stated that the study of the environmental consequences may not

be limited to just the immediate location of the proposed action. Since this project proposes the

transport of nuclear waste by rail, a more appropriate study area would be from where the waste is

loaded by train to where it is removed from the train. (0198)

Response:

The regulations cited by the commenter are the Federal Highway Administration regulations for

implementing NEPA. This regulation is not applicable to any of the cooperating Federal agencies. 

The comment does not warrant any change in the DEIS. However, the cooperating Federal agencies

interpret the comment to mean that the NEPA analysis of the proposed action should not be

segmented. The analysis in the FEIS includes the entire scope of the proposed action. The FEIS

considered the environmental impacts of constructing and operating the proposed PFSF and rail line

and the impacts of transporting SNF to and from the proposed PFSF. The transportation analysis

considers transporting SNF from reactor sites to the proposed PFSF. This analysis was done by

using a representative route. Please see comment response G.3.16.4.1. Accordingly, the proposed

action is not segmented in the analysis.

G.3.16.4.6 The EIS Overlooks Demographics along the Routes

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the NRC should evaluate the demographics of transportation corridors

proposed for use by the applicant. The commenter was concerned, for example, that large quantities

of SNF will pass through Salt Lake City, a major population center. (0198h)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-345 NUREG-1714

Response:

The effects of population densities along transportation corridors were captured in the FEIS by

determining mileage and weighted population densities for the rural, suburban, and urban route

segments of the transportation routes examined. If, by demographics, the commenter means the

characteristics of the along-route populations (income level, minorities), the NRC staff examined these

demographics in the FEIS for the potential routes within the State of Utah in Section 6, which

discussed environmental justice considerations relative to the impacts of the proposed PFSF.

G.3.16.4.7 The DEIS Should Include a Detailed Transportation Plan

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that a comprehensive, detailed and cooperatively developed transportation

plan for the proposed PFSF should be provided to all potential corridor states and tribes and that all

provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act should be met by the applicant. The same commenter

further requested that an additional, comprehensive transportation and handling plan should address

all aspects of the additional rail spur required or intermodal transfer of the high level waste at Rowley

Junction, including but not limited to infrastructure improvements, handling equipment and protocols,

security and sabotage safeguards, inspection of shipping casks, vehicles and carriers, and state

oversight and regulation. (0198h)

Response:

The staff believes that a detailed transportation plan is not necessary for an adequate EIS. In

estimating impacts, the NRC staff presumed that the applicant would meet all current regulatory

requirements for PFSF-related transportation. As required, transportation plans will be developed and

applied to each shipment, but they are not relevant to the FEIS analyses. Accordingly, the issues

raised in this comment are beyond the scope of the FEIS.

Provisions of the NWPA, as amended (P.L. 97-425) [including the provisions of Section 180 that apply

to transportation of SNF and high-level waste by, of, and for the DOE], are not the subject of the

environmental review and do not apply to the proposed action. The comments do not warrant any

change to the FEIS.

G.3.16.4.8 Additional States Could Be Affected If Additional Reactor Licensees Ship to PFSF

Comment Summary:

One commenter was concerned that, as the DEIS case study of SNF shipment from the Maine

Yankee reactor shows, if the proposal is approved then new reactor licensees would attempt to send

their SNF to the proposed PFSF. The commenter states that this could result in dozens of more

states finding themselves subject to unprecedented numbers of commercial SNF shipments. The

commenter concludes that the NRC should consult with and notify public and elected officials in these

States, stating that these communities along the transportation routes deserve hearings just as much

as Utah does. (0257)

Response:

Neither the application nor the DEIS indicated that the proposed PFSF would receive SNF only from

PFS-member reactor licensees. As stated in the DEIS, if the PFSF is licensed, reactor licensees that

are not members of the PFS consortium are expected to ship SNF to the proposed PFSF. However,

the amount of SNF that can be accepted by the proposed PFSF would be fixed by the licensed

capacity of the facility. A representative route approach was used in the DEIS. In this approach, the

NRC staff analyzed transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF as if all the SNF to be stored there
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-346

would travel from the Maine Yankee nuclear power plant (even though Maine Yankee plant itself

would never have that much SNF to ship). This route is one of the longest possible routes that any

individual shipment could experience, and also passes through some of the most populated regions of

the country. Maximizing these factors tends to conservatively overestimate the transportation risks. 

Thus, the risks estimated for this route are expected to encompass risks of shipments to the proposed

PFSF, regardless of their individual origins and reasonably foreseeable routes. Therefore, the impacts

of shipments to the proposed PFSF, through varied regions across the country, are included in the

nationwide impacts of the representative Maine Yankee to proposed PFSF route. Regarding the

comment on public hearings along transportation routes see comment response G.3.7.6.

G.3.16.5 Transportation Safety Standards

G.3.16.5.1 Consistent Safety Standards Should Apply to All Spent Fuel Shipments

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the transportation of SNF might not be subject to the same safety

standards as a Federally-owned project such as Yucca Mountain because the proposed action is an

agreement between a private company and Native Americans. (SL1-10)

Response:

The commenter’s concern is based on an inaccurate premise with respect to SNF transportation. All

commercial radioactive material transportation (including SNF) is subject to the same applicable NRC

and DOT regulations as well as relevant state requirements. As stated in the FEIS (page 5-1), the

SNF must be shipped in packages (i.e., casks) which have been certified by the NRC under 10 CFR

Part 71. Section 180(a) of the NWPA, as amended (42 USC 10175) mandates that the DOE transport

SNF to a permanent repository (if one is licensed) using packages that meet the NRC's standards

(i.e., Part 71). Thus, the proposed PFSF and the geologic repository transportation programs are

subject to the same transportation standards.

G.3.16.5.2 DEIS Does Not Recognize Inadequacies in DOT Regulatory Program

Comment Summary:

One commenter questioned the effectiveness of DOT safety regulations, particularly in the area of

enforcement. The commenter suggested that the DOT evaluate the need for a citizen oversight board

for the radioactive waste transportation safety program or perhaps the remedy of citizen watches to

enforce the regulations, if the DOT refuses to enforce them. The same commenter stated that the

changes in the transportation industry between 1986 and 2000 might result in a possible "regulatory

lapse." The commenter suggested that the FEIS should describe the changes in the transportation

industry during this time period. Also, the commenter stated that last year Congress eliminated

funding for the DOT's Radioactive Waste Transportation Safety Program. The commenter concluded

that this would have an impact on the safety of transporting nuclear waste to the proposed PFSF and

that this should be addressed in the FEIS. (SL3-09)

Response:

The adequacy of DOT radioactive material regulatory programs and suggestions for a citizen’s

oversight board for implementing DOT rules are not the subject of the FEIS. DOT has a transportation

safety program covering radioactive materials, and the NRC staff is not aware of any Congressional

action that has eliminated funding for that program. In fact, DOT has a regulatory program in place

that includes inspection and enforcement for transportation of radioactive materials. Further, pursuant

to an NRC-DOT interagency agreement, NRC also inspects for, and enforces, compliance with DOT

requirements by its licensees. The millions of shipments of radioactive materials that occur each year,
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-347 NUREG-1714

with an exceptional record of safety, verify the effectiveness of the NRC/DOT regulatory approach. 

Based on the above, the NRC staff has concluded that transport of SNF in accordance with existing

regulatory programs would provide adequate protection of the public health and safety.

In contrast to the comments, the NRC staff concludes that the FEIS reflects the relevant, current

transportation industry practices and regulatory requirements that are within the scope of the FEIS

analyses. Further, the applicant has committed [PFS/RAI1 February 18, 1999] to complying with the

Association of American Railroads’ (AAR’s) “Performance Standard for Spent Nuclear Fuel Trains,”

developed in 2000. Absent additional and more specific information, no change to the conclusions of

the FEIS is required.

G.3.16.5.3 Buffer Cars Between Cask-Carrying Railcars Are Not Required

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that on page 5-45, Section 5.7.21.4, line 37 of the DEIS states that the casks

being transported by rail will be "widely separated from each other on the train (usually by a buffer car

between each cask-carrying railcar)." The commenter further stated that applicable regulations do not

require that a buffer or spacer car be positioned between cask-carrying railcars, and the applicant

does not plan to provide buffer cars between cask cars. (0163)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that buffer cars are not required between SNF cask-carrying railcars. The

presence of buffer cars between SNF cars (or lack thereof) does not impact the RADTRAN analysis. 

The NRC conclusion that the impacts are small remains valid. The casks are widely separated

without buffer cars because of the size of the casks in relation to the size of the railcar. As indicated in

the DEIS on page 5-45, the DEIS conclusions are based on assessments that assume that all four

casks on the train are damaged and release material for any accident of a given severity. The NRC

staff, however, notes (DEIS pgs 5-45 to 5-46) that it is reasonable to expect that all four casks would

not be damaged to such an extent in an accident. Therefore, the NRC staff analyzed a supplemental

case, in which one cask is damaged, and the NRC staff believes that the most reasonable estimate of

risk lies somewhere between the two cases. The NRC staff revised the FEIS to remove the

parenthetical discussion on buffer cars.

G.3.16.6 Economic Consequences

G.3.16.6.1 Economic Impacts of Severe Transportation Accidents in Urban Areas

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the DEIS is deficient because it does not discuss the economic

impacts of a severe rail transportation accident [Category 6] in an urban area. (0183, 0198g, 0204a,

0257) Commenters stated that the public must be informed that one severe rail cask accident could

cause 115 latent cancer fatalities and cost tens or hundreds of billions of dollars to clean up, and thus

the DEIS must include this information. Two commenters also provided their own estimates of the

economic impacts from calculations they performed using various computer codes such as

RADTRAN4, RADTRAN5, and RISKIND. (0198, 0204) These estimates range from $31 billion to

$313 billion. One commenter added that the RADTRAN 5 model estimates the cost of emergency

response, surveying, evacuation, and cleanup, based on the calculated concentration of radioactive

material following an accident. The commenter pointed out that the stand-alone economic model

found in RADTRAN 5 is currently available to NRC and the public on the Sandia National Laboratory’s

Transnet system (http://ttd.sandia.gov/risk/tnet.htm); and, therefore, this readily available information

should be included in the EIS for the consideration of Federal decision-makers, as it has been in other

EISs. (0198g, 0198h)
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

1

 Total route length(4476 km) * urban fraction of the route (0.043) * number of rail cars per year (200) *

category 6 accident rate per rail car-km (1.4E-11).

NUREG-1714 G-348

One commenter stated that for the most economically severe rail accident in an urban area under

weighted average meteorological conditions, the RADTRAN 5 analysis has estimated the associated

costs to be on the order of $270 billion for 10-year cooled SNF and $145 billion for 25.9-year cooled

SNF, present-day value. The commenter also stated that for the most economically severe truck

accident, a RADTRAN 5 analysis estimated the associated costs to be on the order of $36.6 billion for

10-year cooled SNF and $20.1 billion for 25.9- year cooled SNF. Another commenter stated that the

economic impacts of a severe GA-4 truck cask accident containing 4 PWR SNF assemblies range

from $7.3 billion for SNF aged 25.9 years to $12.9 billion for SNF aged 10 years, all under weighted

average meteorological conditions. (0204a) 

The same commenter stated that the DEIS also fails to provide any estimate of the economic impacts

of the maximum severity rail accident reported in Section 5.7.2 and in Appendix D. The commenter

stated that Radioactive Waste Management Associates (RWMA) prepared an estimate of the

economic impacts of a similar accident involving a similar large rail cask, using the 6 RADTRAN 4 & 5

models and a range of alternative assumptions about cleanup levels, SNF age and radiological

characteristics, atmospheric dispersion, and population densities. The commenter stated that RWMA

concluded that the economic impacts of cleanup and other post-accident costs in an urban area would

range between $9.4 billion and $145 billion for a rail cask loaded with 26-year-old pressurized-water

reactor (PWR) SNF. The commenter also indicated that for a rail cask loaded with 10-year-old PWR

SNF, economic impacts could be as high as $270 billion. (0204)

C Two commenters stated that it is unclear whether the Price-Anderson Act will cover accidents that

occur during transportation of high level nuclear waste to or from the proposed PFSF, but that,

even if it does, nuclear reactor licensees would only be liable for a maximum of $9.43 billion of

accident costs. The commenters asserted that the Federal government - U.S. taxpayers - would

be responsible for the rest, and the rest could be significant. The commenters also asserted that

the estimated economic costs for a transportation accident in a metropolitan area ranges from $14

to $313 billion. (0012, 0198, SL1-01)

Many commenters stated that the DEIS did not address the economic consequences of an accident.

(0012, 0096, 0136, 0204b, GR-16, SL1-01, SL2-05, SL3-04, SL3-18)

A few commenters asserted the DEIS does not adequately address the economic costs associated

with transportation accidents or accidents at the proposed PFSF.

C The commenters stated that the cost of an accident requiring emergency evacuation and cleanup

is estimated to be as high as $300 billion in a dense urban area. (0130, 0136, SL1-05, SL2-05)

Response:

The comments indicate that costs in urban areas for an accident (a Modal Study Category 6 accident)

that involves a high speed train derailment, a long duration fire or both, might range from $30 to $300

billion dollars.

The NRC staff considers such accidents to be very unlikely. For example, the NRC’s staff estimates

that the probability of having a Category 6 accident in an urban area is 5.4E-7/yr or 1 in 1.8 million per

year,1

 if one assumes the FEIS accident rates, route fractions and distances for the Maine Yankee to

Skull Valley route. Notwithstanding the fact that the NRC staff believes the Modal Study

conservatively estimates the probability of a Category 6 accident, it is likely that most routes to the

proposed PFSF would be shorter, and/or have a smaller urban fraction. Therefore, the contribution to

the overall accident risk (including costs) of these accidents is small due to their low probability of
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-349 NUREG-1714

occurrence. Based on the above, the severe accidents for which the commenters believe the NRC

should consider costs are remote and speculative, and there is no requirement to consider the cost of

such accidents.

As stated in the transportation response in Section G.2, the methods currently available to calculate

the economic cost are dependent upon several uncertain variables and the calculated cost can vary

significantly depending on the location of the accident. To quantify the risk, the NRC staff would have

to speculate on the location of the accident. Therefore, economic costs for an accident are not

explicitly quantified in the FEIS. As an example, using the Chanin and Murphin model (the model

used in conjunction with RADTRAN 5) to calculate costs for this very improbable accident

(category 6), the costs would be at the bottom of the commenter’s range if the level to which property

was decontaminated (cleaned-up) was based on long term exposure to groundshine and the

inhalation of resuspended radioactive materials. Costs at the top of the commenters range would

occur only if exceedingly stringent decontamination standards were used. Such decontamination

standards would only be needed to prevent persons who grow or raise most of their own food from

receiving total exposures of concern not only from groundshine and inhalation of resuspended

radioactive materials but also from the consumption of home grown contaminated foods, which

represents a potentially dominant (but highly uncertain) exposure pathway.

In addition, the cost of disposal for low-level radioactive waste generated during cleanup is subject to

large uncertainties such as the actual volume of material to be disposed of, how far it would be

transported, and the nature of disposal fees. The NRC staff determined that accidents that are more

likely in an urban area would have costs that are far less than those estimated by the commenter. Few

people in urban centers will raise and grow a significant portion of their own food, however, other

location dependent and unforeseeable variables, such as (1) the choice of a cleanup standard

(primarily determined by how much food is obtained from backyard farming) and (2) the cost of waste

disposal (which depends on waste volume and the disposal method and location) would also influence

the economic cost of clean-up.

Finally, the costs of less severe accidents that have a small but more realistic chance of occurring in

an urban area (a Modal Study Category 5 accident; accident probability about 10-8 per transit of Salt

Lake City) are likely to be at least an order of magnitude less than those estimated above. The costs

of such accidents depend on the same factors identified above. Because these variables are so

uncertain, the resulting cost estimates would also be uncertain. For a response to the comment

regarding accidents at the proposed PFSF and liability for accidents at the proposed PFSF see

Sections G.3.15.6 and G.3.21.

G.3.16.6.2 Economic Impacts of Severe Accidents in Salt Lake City

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that health and cost impacts of a severe transportation accident in Salt Lake

City are significant. A contractor for one commenter prepared an assessment of the health impacts

and economic costs of a severe accident involving transportation of spent nuclear SNF to the

proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that the evaluation shows that the consequences of a

potential accident or sabotage event are significant, and should be fully evaluated in an EIS. The

results of this analysis of a severe transportation accident in Salt Lake City, ranged from $31.9 billion

(RADTRAN 4 code) to $300 billion (RADTRAN 5 code), assuming 5 year cooled SNF, average

weather conditions, and 1344 persons/km2. (0198g)

Several commenters expressed concern about the effects an accident might have in an environment

having a population density similar to Salt Lake City Utah. (0084, 0127, 0135, 0185, 0194, 0195,

0198g, 0257, GR-16) One commenter stated that under average atmospheric conditions, a severe

accident [Category 6] resulting in a release of a small fraction of the radioactive contents of a rail cask

carrying 5-year cooled SNF would result in 115-117 additional latent cancer fatalities to the population
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

2

 1.4x10-11 accidents/railcar-km * 50 km traveled per transit in Salt Lake City.

3

 The value 1.1x10-5/yr is calculated as follows: 1.4x10-11 category 6 accidents per kilometer, times 4476 km

per shipment, times 200 shipments per year, times the rural and suburban route fraction (1-.044). [0.044 is the

urban fraction]

NUREG-1714 G-350

of exposed individuals, and the economic impacts associated with evacuation, interdiction, and

restoration are calculated by RADTRAN 4 would be on the order of $14.3 billion dollars, ranging up to

$23.9 billion. The commenter’s analysis is based on a population density of 567 persons/km2

,

corresponding to a low-density urban area such as Salt Lake City. The commenter stated that

population doses will scale with population density. (0198g) One commenter noted that a state’s

consultant estimated that the cost for disruption and clean-up, if there is a train accident along the

Wasatch front, would be between $100-300 billion. (0015, GR-13)

Response:

A severe (e.g., Category 6) rail accident in Salt Lake City is very improbable. Using the Modal Study

data, the probability of a severe rail accident in Salt Lake City involving SNF shipments to the

proposed PFSF is 7x10-10 per transit of Salt Lake City.2 Assuming 200 annual transits (number of

railcars carrying casks) the probability is 1.4x10-7/yr or about 1 in 7 million chance over the proposed

20 years of SNF shipment. Therefore, given the low likelihood of occurrence, to estimate the

economic cost of such an event is not very meaningful in the context of EIS conclusions or selection

among EIS alternatives. Furthermore, the methods currently available to calculate the economic cost

are dependent upon several variables and the calculated cost can vary significantly depending upon

the location of the accident (see Section G.3.16.6.1).

G.3.16.6.3 Cost of a Severe Accident in Rural Area

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the NRC must calculate and publish the full economic and health impacts

from a severe accident, either storage or transportation, in both urban and rural settings for all the

projected transport routes. (0012, SL1-01) Commenters defined full health impacts as including

latent cancer fatalities, non-fatal cancers, birth defects, genetic damage, lowered immunity, and other

diseases. (0127, 0136, 0139, 0157, 0180, 0183, 0194, 0195, 0257) One commenter stated that one

severe rail cask accident could cause over one hundred cancer deaths and cost tens or hundreds of

billions of dollars to clean up. The commenter stated that NRC's DEIS does not describe the potential

environmental and economic impacts of rail accidents bound for the proposed PFSF. (0183)

Response:

It is likely that most rail routes used to ship SNF to the proposed PFSF will consist of a large rural

fraction, and therefore, the likelihood of a severe accident in a rural area is higher than an urban area. 

However, the NRC considers a severe rail accident unlikely anywhere. Using the FEIS accident rates

and the Maine Yankee to the proposed PFSF route, the probability of a Category 6 rail accident in a

rural or suburban area is 1.1X10-5/yr (which is about one in 90,000).3

 Notwithstanding the fact that the

NRC staff believes the Modal Study conservatively estimates accident severity fractions and the

probability of a Category 6 accident, it is likely that most routes to the proposed PFSF will be shorter

than the FEIS representative route. As stated in the transportation response in Section G.2, the costs

associated with clean-up from a severe transportation accident are dependent upon several uncertain

variables and the calculated cost can vary significantly, depending upon the location of the accident. 

Therefore, they are not explicitly quantified in the FEIS.

As set forth in the FEIS, the NRC staff estimated latent cancer fatalities as a measure of the overall

accident dose risk. As described in the transportation response in Section G.2, the accident dose risk
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-351 NUREG-1714

describes the consequences of an accident while appropriately considering the likelihood of the

accident. The health impacts from radiation exposure during transportation is estimated using factors

that convert population dose to latent cancer fatalities. The NRC does not develop these factors, but

rather uses those provided by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (e.g., ICRP

Publication 30). These factors are generally accepted as providing a conservative estimate of the

significant health impacts associated with radiation exposure.

For a response to the comment regarding accidents at the proposed PFSF and liability for accidents at

the proposed PFSF. See G.3.15.6 and G.3.21, respectively.

G.3.16.6.4 Responsibility for Accident Costs and Clean-up

Comment Summary:

One commenter asked the question who would be responsible for a cleanup if an accident occurred

on route since the applicant is a limited liability corporation. (0042) 

Two commenters stated that a single severe rail cask accident could cause 115 latent cancer fatalities

and cost tens or hundreds of billions of dollars to clean up and this needs to be made clear to the

public, as well as the fact that any costs over $7 billion become the liability of the American taxpayer

under the Price-Anderson Act. (0084, 0127) Several commenters stated that the DEIS must report

that the public will have to pay any cleanup costs over $7 billion. (0136, 0139, 0183, 0194, 0195,

0257) Some commenters stated that clean up costs could be as high as $270 billion to $330 billion

and taxpayers might have to pay up to $321 billion of that for the cleanup of an accident. (0198, 0204,

SL2-20)

One commenter suggested that some things are outside of human control, and thus there are no

guarantees that an accident will not happen, and if one does, it will be the taxpayers who will foot the

bill. (SL3-18) Another commenter stated that homeowner and health insurance exclude the costs of

nuclear accidents. (0260) One commenter stated that the responsibility for transportation related

accidents should be solely and completely borne by the applicant. The commenter noted that the

DEIS should evaluate the economic and health impacts if cleanup costs cannot be paid promptly by

responsible parties. (0198h) 

Response:

The response in Section G.2 provides some clarification on these points, particularly the cost

estimates provided by the commenters. As stated in the response in section G.2, the Price-Anderson

Act provides for financial protection to cover public liability claims arising from activities of the nuclear

power industry to a maximum per incident dollar level of $9.1 billion. Transportation of SNF to and

from a reactor is covered by the Price-Anderson Act. The entire $9.1 billion would come from private

sources. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation in 1988 that developed a method to promptly

consider compensation claims of the public for liabilities resulting from nuclear accidents that exceed

the $9.1 billion limit. As it relates to accidents at the proposed PFSF, though not required by NRC

regulations, the applicant has indicated that it will carry both off-site and on-site liability insurance for

the proposed PFSF. For more detail on liability insurance for the proposed PFSF, see Section G.3.19.

G.3.16.6.5 Economics of Transporting Fuel to PFS

Comment Summary:

One commenter asked NRC to consider that there has been a lot of controversy over the amount of

money required to transport SNF to the proposed PFSF. The commenter asks if on-site reprocessing

or recycling might be a better use of the money that will have to be spent to transport SNF to PFS and

store it. (SL3-57) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-352

One commenter asserted that there is a high economic and health cost in transporting the SNF long

distances. (0077)

Response:

Transportation of SNF to the proposed PFSF is a private activity. The NRC does not have any

authority to redirect the use of private funds in such a manner. As explained in Section G.3.5,

reprocessing of SNF is not considered a reasonable alternative for the proposed action. 

Regarding the latter comment, the PFS FEIS and other SNF transportation risk assessments conclude

that SNF shipments do not have associated high economic or health cost-risk . The health impacts of

the proposed transportation were calculated and are described in the FEIS (Chapter 5 and Appendix

D); the economic costs of incident-free transport (capital cost of transportation cask, loading SNF,

etc.) are calculated and were considered in the cost-benefit analysis in Chapter 8 of the FEIS. The

majority of the direct economic cost of the proposed transportation does not depend on the distance

traveled. That is, the cost of cask acquisition, inspection, etc. would be the same regardless of

distance traveled. The differential cost of longer trips consists primarily of proportional increases for

expenses such as fuel, labor charges, and vehicle amortization. These expenses have little effect on

capital costs and only an incremental effect on operating costs. Thus, trip distance is not an

overriding factor in the overall cost of SNF transportation. The health impacts are estimated to be

small, as are the associated costs. The economic costs of transportation accidents are discussed in

Section 5.7.2 of the FEIS and in comment responses G.3.16.6.1-G.3.16.6.4.

G.3.16.6.6 Computer Codes That Estimate Accident Costs

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the economic consequence estimates are significantly higher for the

RADTRAN 5 economic model than the RADTRAN 4 economic model. The commenter also stated

that the RADTRAN 5 economic model admittedly does not attempt to account for a large number of

costs associated with a severe SNF accident, such as estimates of the costs associated with

determining the level of contamination. The commenter stated that the model assumes that there are

no costs associated with areas contaminated with levels below the cleanup criteria, when in reality

there would be costs associated with surveying and measuring contamination levels. The commenter

also stated that indirect costs, such as costs of litigation, loss of production capacity, and stigma

effects are not included in the RADTRAN 5 model. The commenter also stated that the costs of

cleanup included in the model for an urban environment were estimated for an average urban

population density of 1344 persons/km , less than 30 percent the density assumed in the commenter’s

previous RADTRAN 4 calculations. The commenter stated that if one were to alter the economic

model to consider the effects of an accident using a more realistic urban population density, the

economic costs computed by the RADTRAN 5 model would be much greater than those presented in

this report. (0204a)

One commenter stated that the economic cost estimates previously recorded for stability class F

conditions fall at the low end of the range of values calculated using RADTRAN 4. The commenter

calculated economic costs of $9.4 billion under stable meteorological conditions for SNF aged

25.9 years, and under weighted average meteorological conditions, calculated costs of over

$63 billion. For SNF aged 10 years, the commenter calculated economic cost at $108 billion under

weighted average meteorological conditions. (0204a)

Response:

As stated in the transportation response in section G.2, the methods currently available to calculate

the economic cost are dependent upon several uncertain variables, primarily related to dispersion and

deposition of the contamination, and thus the calculated cost can vary significantly depending on the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-353 NUREG-1714

location of the accident. In general the calculated cleanup cost would be expected to be lower than

that reported by the commenter because of the conservative method RADTRAN uses to determine

the dispersion of radioactive material resulting from a transportation accident..

The staff used the RADTRAN 4 code in the FEIS calculations, but did not use the economic

consequence modeling features. The NRC staff did not rely upon RADTRAN 5 or RISKIND for this

FEIS. Therefore, any differences in the economic model between RADTRAN 4 and RADTRAN 5

would not be relevant. Each of these codes employ estimation methods that are believed to be

extremely conservative, and, because of the uncertainties described above, the NRC staff believes

these can only be considered rough estimates for the accident scenarios considered.

G.3.16.6.7 Accidents Could Disrupt Commerce in Certain Areas

Comment Summary:

One commenter was particularly concerned that the railroad runs through the center of the town of

Clearfield and that the Freeport Center, Utah's largest manufacturing center, is located close to the

railroad and therefore is at risk in the case of a leak or accident. The same commenter expressed

concern about the possibility of an accident near the Freemont Manufacturing Center and the impacts

from such an accident on the greater Salt Lake City area. (SL2-01) 

One commenter stated that the DEIS must include both the short and long term costs for a severe

accident in Salt Lake City, including the loss of income to local businesses and the State of Utah due

to an evacuation of the city and the costs of decontaminating a major urban area including

decontamination of streets and buildings. The commenter stated that the further cost to the railroad of

tying up the rail lines while restoration of the accident scene and decontamination takes place must

also be considered. The commenter stated further that the lost revenues alone are estimated by the

Association of American Railroads at $1 million an hour. (0198i)

The same commenter stated that the proposed spur will cross numerous streams along the route. 

The commenter stated that the DEIS does not adequately address the cost of cleanup and re-routing

traffic. (0198)

Response:

The health impacts aspects of these comments are dealt with in other responses. Those responses

describe that the risk assessment in the FEIS (Chapter 5 and Appendix D) shows that the total risks

are small and, hence, even smaller for a small fraction of the route such as the portion of the rail route

passing through Clearfield, near the Freemont Manufacturing Center, or through Salt Lake City. This

reasoning also applies to the economic risk. As set forth in Section G.3.16.6.2 of these comment

responses, the probability of such an accident is 4x10-7/year or about 1 in 7 million chance over the

proposed 20 years of SNF shipment. Accordingly, such an accident is not reasonably foreseeable.

Disruption of commerce and loss of business associated with SNF transportation accidents involving

SNF costs are considered to be very unlikely. For the improbable accidents that could lead to a

radioactive release, an attempt to calculate the economic costs of these unlikely accidents with any

precision is speculative and difficult, for the reasons discussed in the transportation response in

Section G.2. A quantitative estimate of cost would require the NRC to speculate on many of the key

variables, including the location of the accident. Therefore, the NRC staff has not attempted to

quantify the economic cost of any particular accident in the FEIS. Furthermore, if such an event

occurred, transportation accidents are covered by liability indemnification and Price-Anderson Act. As

discussed in the transportation response in Section G.2, the NRC believes it is unlikely that the

economic impact of a transportation accident would exceed the amount of coverage provided under

the Price Anderson Act because only a small fraction of accidents would result in any release of

radioactive material and a significant release is considered very unlikely. Consequently, for minor
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-354

accidents where there is no radioactive release, it is unlikely that recovery and restoration of the

accident scene, for an accident involving one or more SNF transport casks, would be significantly

different than restoration of other derailment accidents.

G.3.16.6.8 Economic Impacts to Transportation Infrastructure

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that neither the license application nor the ROW application provides sufficient

detail concerning the costs associated with constructing, operating, and closing the proposed rail line

or ITF. The commenter gives the example that there is no performance or design specification

information, such as whether the quality of the rail meets the minimum Class 2 track rating established

by AAR Circular OT-55 for hazardous materials shipments, switching needs at interline connection

and facilities, signaling capabilities, and travel grades. According to the commenter, those are only a

few of the many missing details necessary for an adequate analysis of costs and benefits. (0198i)

One commenter requested that the DEIS take into account the impact of transportation accidents on

the reliability of the transportation corridor. (0198h)

One comment asked that for every alternative, including the proposed plan amendment for the

proposed rail line ROW, the BLM estimate its economic impact upon the economic potential of nearby

trust lands. (0198i) The same commenter stated that the proposed rail line would begin in the vicinity

of Interstate 80, which is the principal east-west highway corridor for the State of Utah and Wasatch

Front, and that closure of I-80 due to a SNF accident could create serious public safety and interstate

commerce problems. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff has determined that sufficient information was provided by the applicant to determine

the cost of these facilities in the cost-benefit analysis. The applicant provided estimates of the cost of

the proposed rail line, and these costs have been included in the cost benefit analysis. Further, the

cost of the proposed rail line were considered and reviewed as a part of the NRC staff’s evaluation of

the applicant’s financial qualifications. There would be no impact to State of Utah trust lands in the

vicinity of the proposed PFSF or new related transportation facilities from normal operations, so the

NRC staff has concluded that there would be no economic impact to these lands. The NRC staff

concluded that the risk of a severe rail accident involving SNF in transit to the proposed PFSF would

be small. Therefore, the risk of public safety and interstate commerce problems resulting from the

proposed action is small.

G.3.16.6.9 Costs of Training and Providing for Emergency Response Functions on the Routes

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the economic impacts of transportation accidents and the trained

personnel to respond to those accidents are not adequately considered. (0012, 0171, 0198, 0230,

SL1-07, SL1-39, SL2-05, SL3-04) Two commenters claim that few, if any, of the hundreds of

communities through which shipments of nuclear waste would pass have the equipment or trained

personnel necessary to respond to a major accident or terrorist incident. (0198, SL2-05) A

commenter asked what the impacts might be of not providing funding for emergency response along

the transportation corridor throughout the United States. (SL3-04) One commenter stated that the

EIS should include discussion of the liability issues related to the involvement of volunteers

responding to an accident. (0171)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

4

 G.S. Mills, et al., “Study of Evacuation Times Based on General Accident History,” Proceedings of the 11th

International PATRAM Conference, Las Vegas, NV, 1995.

5

 G.S. Mills, et al., “Study of the Components of Evacuation Times,” Proceedings of the 12th International

PATRAM Conference, Paris, France, 1998.

6

 “1992 Traffic Safety Facts Annual Report,” U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation

Statistics, BTS-CD-04-01.

G-355 NUREG-1714

Response:

Data developed by Sandia National Labs indicate that current capabilities for emergency response

throughout the United States provide for rapid response times and adequate evacuation training.4,5,6

Personnel trained to provide adequate emergency response were not explicitly considered in the FEIS

because they are already available and therefore result in no additional economic impact. Currently,

there are shipments of radiological materials within the State of Utah, for which the state already

provides capable emergency response.

The 2000 Emergency Response Guide book (ERG2000) for first responders to incidents involving

hazardous materials, developed in part by the U.S. Department of Transportation, does not distinguish

between the actions needed for a SNF shipment and other shipments containing radioactive materials

(i.e., Guide No. 165 applies to fissile radioactive materials of low to high level radiation, including

SNF). As noted in ERG2000, according to the requirements of the U.S. Department of Labor,

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (29 CFR 1910.120) and the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (40 CFR Part 311), first responders must be trained in how to respond to expected

emergencies. Therefore, the proposition that additional cost will be incurred, for unique or different

training to respond to potential transportation accidents involving SNF, does not appear to be justified. 

In most cases, consistent with ERG2000, a first responder to an accident involving a SNF cask will

cordon off an area around the accident site, maintain access control, and measure radiation levels to

confirm there has been no increase in cask radiation levels, and no release of radioactive material.

More than 3 million radioactive material packages are shipped nationwide each year. Also, SNF

continues to be shipped across the U.S. each year for activities unrelated to the proposed PFSF. 

Because of this existing commerce in radioactive materials, the training necessary to perform survey

measurements is readily available. Most local hazardous material response authorities maintain the

capability to survey radioactive material shipments. Should a very unlikely SNF shipment accident

occur in which a release of material is suspected or confirmed by a first responder, the state would be

called upon to render additional assistance. First (local) responders are not expected to be trained to

respond further for this unlikely situation. Again, states already maintain staff trained in dealing with

radiological transportation accidents. Should the state decide it needs to call on Federal agencies,

that assistance is available, and already maintained, by the Federal agencies. For more detail on

emergency response see Section G.3.16.11.

G.3.16.7 Comments Related to Fuel Behavior, or Cask and Carriage Performance,

 During a Transportation Accident

G.3.16.7.1 Transport Cask Designs

Comment Summary:

Two commenters stated that the DEIS fails to consider that the transportation casks are not designed

or tested to withstand transportation accidents or sabotage. (0012, 0198h, SL1-01) 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-356

Response:

Transportation casks are designed to withstand transportation accidents, and this is considered in the

FEIS. The NRC staff’s assessment of accident risks in the FEIS is based, in part, upon Modal Study

and upon the RADTRAN code. The Modal Study investigated the ability of casks that minimally meet

NRC's standards to withstand forces that could be anticipated in transportation accidents. Those

results are used in the DEIS' application of the RADTRAN computer code. Section 5.7.2.7 of the

DEIS (Section 5.7.2.10 of the FEIS) addresses the potential for sabotage of a cask. Although the

NRC's cask design standards (in 10 CFR Part 71) were established with transportation accident safety

in mind, the rigor of the standards is such that the designs inherently provide a measure of protection

from sabotage as well. As mentioned in Section 5.7.2.10 of the FEIS, the NRC has previously

evaluated the consequences of sabotage attacks upon casks and concluded that the likelihood of a

successful sabotage event is low. The NRC staff responds to the testing aspects of this comment

below. See G.3.16.10 below.

G.3.16.7.2 Testing of Transport Casks

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the transport accident risks in the DEIS are severely underestimated and

asks if NRC and DOT have tested to destruction the Holtech HI-STAR casks that would be used. The

commenter asked if there are combustibles on the rails that could achieve such destructive forces. 

(0194) Two commenters stated that transport containers are not required to undergo full-scale

physical tests, that tests have only involved computer simulations, and that this is far from a rigorous

cask safety testing program. (0142, 0194) One commenter stated that there are conflicting reports

about the testing of the shipping casks. This commenter asked whether the casks are designed with

site specific criteria in mind, including Utah's seismic activity and possible misfired missiles from the

Utah Testing and Training Range. This commenter also questioned who is responsible for ensuring

the design meets safety standards, and if the responsible party has a conflict of interest in performing

this duty. This commenter questioned how the NRC handles "cask design criteria concerning

hydrogen build-up and cracking of the SNF plating," and criticality accidents. This commenter also

questions where the public can view this information. (SL3-04)

Another commenter was concerned that the film 'Safety Every Step of the Way' [referenced by another

commenter] does not accurately portray crash tests performed on casks in the 1970's at Sandia

National Laboratory. (GR-16) The commenter stated that the testing standards are outdated and in

particular, the crash test for a cask crashing into an unyielding surface going 30 mph is not an

adequate test. A few commenters indicated that railway accidents could involve crashes into bridge

abutments or drops from ridges onto rocks at speeds higher than 30 mph. (0112, 0170, GR-16)

One commenter stated that the citizens of Clearfield are concerned that nuclear waste will be

transported through Clearfield, stating that there is no certainty that the containers are safe and that

the containers have never been tested in severe accidents. (SL2-01)

Another commenter stated that casks have been tested by computer simulation modeling to withstand

an impact resulting from a drop from 30 feet onto a concrete surface. However, the commenter says

that this, in no manner, is comparable to the discharge of a cask from a rail car traveling at

conventional speeds, should such car become derailed on relatively flat terrain. The commenter

stated that should the train collide with another train approaching at a commensurate rate of speed, or

should the cask fall from an elevated bridge or overpass, the magnitude of impact could exceed the

computer simulated estimation by a factor of at least 10 times. The commenter asserted that while a

reduction of rate of speed for the "single purpose" train may serve to partially mitigate this, the cask

would nevertheless be fractured to an unknown extent, allowing for an unknown displacement of

nuclear waste. The commenter also stated that reduction in speed of the train would also cause a

significant socioeconomic impact related to an overall reduction in the efficiency of rail delivery of all
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-357 NUREG-1714

other goods throughout the country. The commenter asserted that these impacts are not addressed in

the DEIS. (0112)

One commenter was concerned about the cumulative effects of shipments of casks containing nuclear

waste passing close to or through population centers. The commenter did not think computer

modeling of this risk is appropriate and that actual tests should be conducted. One commenter was

concerned that computer modeling of the long-term cumulative effects of shipping SNF is inadequate,

because modeling is not an "actual test." (SL3-06)

Finally, a few commenters stated that the risk of transporting nuclear waste has only been subjected

to simulated tests and that the applicant does not have a history of shipping as large a quantity of SNF

as proposed in the DEIS. ( 0039, 0077, GR-21, SL1-20) One of the commenters asserted that

because transportation of this magnitude has never been tested, the risk evaluation in Appendix D

yields non-representative results. The commenter stated that there is a strong inherent risk in

shipping the proposed amounts of SNF cross-country for 20 years and not suffering a serious

accident. (0039, 0077, 0166)

Response:

As is reflected by the FEIS, only NRC certified cask designs can be used for transportation of

commercial SNF. Cask performance for the hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71 can be

evaluated through testing, engineering analyses (e.g., computer modeling), comparison to similar

designs, or by combinations of these methods. The NRC could require scale or full-sized testing or

both as a part of certification review, if a design has unique features that introduce uncertainty or that

have not been previously analyzed. Typically, SNF cask designs have been certified using

engineering analyses supplemented by physical testing of certain cask components (e.g., the impact

limiters). The testing is used to support the validity and conservatism of the engineering analyses, and

to support more detailed analyses which form the basis for the NRC staff’s finding with respect to

certification. The HOLTEC HI-STAR system, which is the system to be used by PFS, was certified

using this approach. 

The hypothetical accident conditions in 10 CFR Part 71 are a set of repeatable engineering tests that

were developed to produce the damage seen in severe transportation accidents. They are not

intended to mirror any specific accident scenario, but to envelope the damage seen in all but the most

severe accidents. Thus, possible impact speeds during SNF transit may exceed the impact speed in

the test, but an accident is not likely to exceed the combination of speed, impact surface hardness,

orientation to produce maximum damage, and very low allowable leakage in the impact tests.

It is very unlikely that a rail cask would be hit by a misfired missile. The NRC staff safety review

considered a misfired missile or an aircraft hitting the proposed PFSF and concluded that such an

event was not credible. The likelihood of hitting transportation casks is at least as low, since they

would not always be present at the proposed PFSF (rail shipments one to two times a week), are

much smaller than the proposed PFSF, and are moving.

Regarding the adequacy of the 10 CFR Part 71 standards, the Commission has previously determined

that transportation regulations in 10 CFR Part 71 provide a reasonable degree of safety, based in part

on the Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other

Modes, NUREG-0170, published December 1977. NUREG-0170, which included an estimate of

impacts from large-scale SNF shipment campaigns, shows that environmental impacts from the

transportation of all radioactive material is small (46 FR 21619, April 13, 1981). Subsequent studies

have reaffirmed this conclusion. For example, the 1987 Modal Study concluded that the impact and

thermal forces that are represented by the NRC certification tests in 10 CFR Part 71 encompass 994

of every 1,000 accidents. In addition, cask response to impacts more severe then those specified in

the 10 CFR Part 71 certification tests has been investigated in several risk studies. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-358

The tests shown in the 1970’s films were not used in preparing the DEIS or FEIS and have not been

used by NRC in cask design certification activities. Therefore, the films are not material to the matters

discussed in the DEIS and no further response is not required. 

The comments regarding the cask response to sabotage are addressed in G.3.16.10. However, the

NRC staff notes that previous studies have concluded that casks designed to the hypothetical

accident tests also inherently provide a measure of protection from sabotage.

In summary, the need for cask testing is considered in NRC cask design reviews, which is a safety

review that is separate from the preparation of the FEIS. Cask testing is not required to analyze

transportation accidents in the FEIS. The NRC regulations governing cask certification are adequate. 

The regulations do not require full scale physical testing or testing of the cask to destruction.

G.3.16.7.3 Human Error in Cask Construction

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS should consider the risk of accidental radiation exposure caused

by human error in the design and construction of casks. The commenter stated the EIS should also

identify and evaluate a bounding accident, taking into account the maximum hazards and

demographic conditions of the environment. (0198h) The commenter indicated that WASH-1238

assumes a perfect container and perfect operation in an imperfect world, casks are not necessarily

built according to design. (0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff considers the potential for human errors in cask construction to be low for two primary

reasons. First the NRC staff reviews and approves the cask design and the cask manufacturer’s

quality assurance program. Second, the NRC staff determined that significant design faults that could

lead to external dose rates exceeding the regulatory limits would not pass the cask prototype testing

and cask certification processes. To the extent that faulty packaging is a cause of or contributor to the

occurrence of accidents in general, they are already included in the overall accident frequency data

used in the FEIS. Since there is no reason to expect the severity distribution for accidents caused

exclusively by human errors to be different from the overall severity distribution for all accidents, the

NRC staff believes that the contribution of human errors to accidents has been considered

adequately. 

G.3.16.7.4 Railcar Properties

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS does not describe the type of railroad cars to be used for

transporting casks to the proposed PFSF, or evaluate the accident risks posed by putting extremely

heavy loads on the rail. The commenter stated that the DEIS uses an average accident rate,

eliminating certain minor accidents, such as grade-crossing and rail yard accidents. The commenter

asserted that the standard railroad car is a two-axle trolley; therefore the accidents in this accident

database will primarily relate to this standard car. However, the commenter stated that the applicant is

considering the use of flat-bed rail cars with 3-axle fixed trolleys (also known as "Maxson-type" cars). 

The commenter asserted that regardless of the applicant’s recent claims that it will be using different

cars, no information has been provided to indicate that the applicant will in fact use a rail car other

than the 3-axle fixed trolley. The commenter indicated that Maxson-type 3-axle fixed trolleys can be

expected to have a higher accident rate than the standard rail cars evaluated. The commenter stated

that the DEIS is inadequate because it fails to address the contribution to accident risks caused by the

potential use of Maxson-type 3-axle fixed trolley cars. The commenter stated that the DEIS does not
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-359 NUREG-1714

describe the types of cars carrying the casks and that safety practices and safety records on

derailment of those cars are not described. (0198g) 

The same commenter stated that the EIS must fully examine the safety of all the equipment to be

utilized in the transportation of the SNF, including canisters, trucks, railroad cars, loading and

unloading equipment, etc. The commenter also stated that the EIS must determine the accident rates

associated with each type of equipment to be utilized in the transportation of HLW, the probability of

each type of accident event, and its impact upon each proposed transportation route. In assessing the

impact, the commenter states that the EIS must assess any economic impact that may occur as a

result of the closure of each proposed transportation route to facilitate the containment and cleanup of

any contamination. (0198h)

One commenter wanted to know what type of railroad cars are to be used for transporting casks to the

facility. The commenter stated that the DEIS should discuss the types of cars that the applicant will

use. (0198g)

The same commenter stated that 49 CFR 1105.7(e)(11)(iv) requires that the DEIS describe the

following rail operations: the estimates of freight to be transported (in carloads and tonnage), the

anticipated daily and annual number of train movements, number of cars per train and motive power

requirements. However, the commenter added that the DEIS does not describe the type of cars,

which is important for safety considerations, the labor force requirements and the proposed

maintenance of way practices, which are also required by §1105.7(e)(11). The commenter asserted

that the applicant may be using Maxson-type rail cars with 3-axle fixed trolleys which have higher

accident rates. The commenter added that although the applicant has stated more recently that it

does not intend to use Maxson-type cars with fixed 3-axle fixed trolleys, it has not made any firm

commitment in this regard. In addition the commenter stated that the applicant may be forced to use

Maxson-type rail cars because the load of a shipping cask may be too heavy for other types of rail

cars. The commenter stated that the SAR Section 4.5.4.2 describes the proposed use of a six-axle

rail car carrying a 142-ton loaded rail cask, but not all rail line segments can accommodate these

weight loads (greater than 400,000 lbs.), nor the six-axle flat car dimensional clearances. (0198g)

Response:

The applicant has committed to using the AAR performance standard for SNF trains. That standard

does not require Maxson-type cars. Since dedicated trains will likely use superior rolling stock, rely

upon the most up-to-date railway technologies, and have carefully matched weights, the NRC staff

believes it is reasonable to assume they will have accident rates lower than or similar to the rates for

general use freight trains. Further, derailment-type accidents represent only a small percentage of the

severe accidents that could challenge a cask. Therefore, the staff believes these aspects of the FEIS

analysis remain sufficient.

The AAR performance standard does not explicitly specify an acceptable railcar maximum weight. 

Based on the Holtec HI-STAR FSAR and railroad industry information on depressed flatbed rail cars,

the staff estimates a loaded rail car could weigh approximately 195,000 kg (430,000 lbs gross weight

on rail) This is more weight than the weight of a “typical” loaded railcar (which is about 129,730 kg

[286,000 lbs gross weight on rail]), but comparable to that of a modern rail locomotive. (See AAR

Manual of Standards and recommended practices, Section C -Car Construction - Fundamentals and

Details (200 and 2000 Series)) Information obtained from locomotive manufacture websites indicate

modern locomotives can weigh approximately 195,000 kg (425,000 lbs) gross weight on rail

(http://www.gmemd.com/locomotives/naf/sdgo90mac/basic.html). There would only be about four

railcars per train and only about 50 trains shipped per year. Therefore the staff concludes the trains

will not be significant with respect to increasing the rate of rail wear and degradation.

The risk of a severe rail accident involving a SNF cask in transit to the proposed PFSF is small. 

Therefore the likelihood that a transportation route would be closed to facilitate the containment and
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-360

cleanup of contamination-associated accidents resulting from SNF shipments to the proposed PFSF is

low.

G.3.16.7.5 Shipment of Damaged Fuel

Comment Summary:

A commenter indicated that the EIS should evaluate the impacts of transporting SNF whose cladding

is known to be damaged, and therefore less capable of performing its safety function. (0198h)

Response:

An individual SNF assembly or bundle that is damaged to the point where cladding may not provide

confinement, must be placed into an inner sealed (single assembly) metal canister before inserting

into the HI-STAR/HI-STORM dual purpose canister, which is placed into the HI-STAR shipping cask)

prior to shipment. These additional inner metal canisters are robust and compensate for the condition

of the SNF. Thus damaged SNF does not produce any increase in consequence or risk in an

accident.

G.3.16.7.6 Return of Damaged, Leaking, and Contaminated Casks

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the DEIS does not adequately address the risks associated with

returning leaking casks to the point of origin. (0077, 0084, 0096, 0118, 0121, 0127, 0135, 0157, 0166,

0180, 0182, 0183, 0185, 0194, 0198, 0211, 0215, 0257, GR-05, SL1-06, SL1-20 ) Commenters cited

the practices described on page 2-19, lines 20-22 of the DEIS. (0096, 0193) One commenter

questioned the legality of this practice and asked that the responsibility for a leaky cask be identified. 

(0171) One commenter questioned what would happen to the SNF if another state resists sending a

leaking cask through their jurisdiction or if the place of origin is decommissioned (SL3-04), and one

commenter expressed concern that SNF could be stranded indefinitely on the Wasatch Front,

increasing the risks there. (GR-05) Another commenter added that additional discussion needs to

address the safety risk of returning a canister to the shipper, if contamination on the canister is above

acceptable levels. (0230) Another commenter stated that the transportation casks shipped to the

proposed storage facility would not arrive contaminated because they will not have been in the SNF

pools at the various nuclear power plants. (SL1-23)

Other commenters stated that the applicant has no plan to build a SNF pool or a hot cell for dealing

with contaminated or defective casks at its interim storage site in Utah. The commenters asserted

that contaminated casks are a significant issue, and note that 49 incidents of "accidental surface

contamination" have occurred between 1965 and 1992, according to the DOE, and even more

incidents have occurred in Europe and Japan. (0194, 0257) One commenter stated that if the

contamination is allowed to remain on the canisters, it may be shaken loose during transportation and

transfer, and contaminate workers and the site of the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that the

applicant has no effective means of determining whether the canisters are contaminated, or removing

the contamination. (0198a)

One commenter stated that the DEIS does not address the multiplication of transport risks to

Nevadans. The commenter asserted that the applicant plans to return any contaminated or

problematic shipping containers or canisters to the reactor at which they originated, and the NRC has

apparently decided to prematurely declare Yucca Mountain the nation's permanent repository for highlevel nuclear waste. Therefore, the commenter stated that it is possible that Nevadans could see

single shipments of high-level nuclear waste pass their doorstep a total of four times each. The

commenter also asserted that licensing the proposed PFSF would have very significant political

consequences for Nevada, because once high-level nuclear wastes are transported 7/8ths of the way
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-361 NUREG-1714

from eastern reactors to Utah, the political pressures to go ahead with Yucca Mountain despite its

severe scientific unsuitability would be immense. (0194)

One commenter asked what would be the impacts of being unable to repackage a cask which is

damaged or leaking, during transportation and storage; explaining that the EIS should indicate what

permits, licenses, regulation, and procedures, at a minimum, would be required to ensure that these

impacts can be mitigated. One commenter said that because PFS is designated to be a “start clean,

stay clean” facility, there is no hot cell, an accident during transportation or cask leaks to deal with. In

addition, the commenter asserted that if the casks were leaking, regulatory requirements and

opposition from transportation corridor states would likely make it impossible to remove the material

from the proposed facility. (0198) Another commenter asked if procedures and regulatory limits are in

place for decontamination of transportation casks. (0215)

Response:

The comments speak in terms of leaking or contaminated canisters and casks. There are significant

differences between a contaminated canister and a leaking cask or canister. The term “leaking cask”

can be somewhat confusing since it may be misconstrued. Since there is no water or other liquid in

the cask, “leaking” in the sense of liquids escaping from the cask is not a problem. Leaking in this

context generally refers to integrity of the confinement boundary or whether the cask meets the

regulatory requirements associated with acceptable levels of radiation emanating from the cask.

The applicant intends to employ a Holtec International canister-based storage design. The steel

canister that contains the SNF is compatible with the HI-STORM storage overpack (i.e. storage cask)

proposed for use at the proposed PFSF and the HI-STAR transportation overpack (i.e. transportation

cask) proposed for use for shipments between the proposed PFSF and the originating utility. The

NRC staff evaluated the canister design and found that it is highly unlikely that it will leak radioactive

contents during storage within the HI-STORM. As discussed in Section 4.2.7.1 of this FEIS, the

canister is closed and sealed with redundant confinement welds and leak tested at the utility. Further,

the staff determined the probability of canister leakage to be very low ( 9.7 x 10-6 per cask).

The FEIS states that if contaminated canisters (i.e., those with unacceptable removable surface

contamination) are found during the receipt inspection at the proposed PFSF, then the canister would

be repackaged into its shipping cask and returned to the originating reactor. The shipping cask is

designed to contain any such surface contamination. The return shipment would not cause any

significant exposure to the general public from the contaminated canister. Section 2.1.2.1 of the FEIS

has been revised to better explain the terminology concerning repackaging and return of casks and

the resulting consequences. In any case, the applicant could return a canister to a reactor site only in

a cask that satisfies all NRC and DOT regulations (including radiation level limits, contamination limits

and leak rate). Provided these regulations are met, this practice is legal. In the RADTRAN 4 analysis

performed for this FEIS, the risks of the shipment of such a canister would be equivalent to the risks of

other SNF shipments (i.e., the incident-free dose is the same because it is based on the maximum

cask exterior radiation level permitted by the regulations, and the accident risk is the same because -

to be conservative - no credit was taken for the canister providing an additional barrier to release in

accidents). Accordingly, there is no reason for a canister being returned to its point of origin to be

stranded along the way or remain at the proposed PFSF.

In accordance with NRC and DOT regulations, the exterior of the HI-STAR transportation cask will be

surveyed prior to transport to and from the proposed PFSF to assure that all standards, including

contamination limits, are satisfied. The transportation cask can only be shipped if it satisfies all

appropriate NRC and DOT regulations. If necessary, the applicant would decontaminate the exterior

of the transportation cask below regulatory limits prior to shipment back to the utility. Neither a hot cell

nor pool is required for such operations. However, the NRC staff determined that the likelihood that

the exterior of the HI-STAR 100 transportation cask being contaminated at the proposed PFSF is low

because the cask must be decontaminated at the utility prior to its shipment to the proposed PFSF
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-362

and it should not be exposed to any external radioactive material during both shipment and

processing at the proposed PFSF. This is a significant difference between the HI-STAR cask and

previous cask contamination incidents that are discussed by one commenter.

The NRC staff has reviewed the comments that indicated the transport risks would significantly

increase (by as much as a factor of three or four), for ‘returned’ casks (as indicated above only

contaminated canisters might need to be returned). The NRC staff has concluded that based on cask

and canister design and reactor procedures for loading canisters that very few canisters are expected

to arrive at the proposed PFSF contaminated to the extent that it would be necessary to return the

canisters to the originating reactor site. The canisters and casks are surveyed and decontaminated at

the reactor sites using standard health physics techniques prior to shipment. In Section 5.7.2 of the

FEIS, the NRC has determined that the risk is acceptable. Because it is expected that only a fraction

of canisters would need to be returned, the incremental increase in radiological impacts resulting from

the additional shipments associated with returning contaminated canisters is considered to be

insignificant.

The FEIS does not evaluate the impacts of being unable to ‘repackage’ a canister that is damaged

during transport or storage, into another transport cask, because the staff believes the likelihood of

such occurrences are remote and speculative. However, even in a hypothetical situation such as

presented in the comment, an alternative approach could be ordered consistent with the need to

protect the public health and safety, or the common defense and security.

As discussed in G.3.16.3.7, the NRC has not made any decision with respect to the permanent

repository proposed for Yucca Mountain. Section 2.1.2.1 of the FEIS has been revised to further

clarify that the applicant intends to return contaminated canisters, not a contaminated or leaking

transportation cask.

G.3.16.8 Comments Related to Transportation Accident Risks

G.3.16.8.1 General Comments on the Accident Risks of Proposed Action

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that there is a high risk of accidents along the transportation route. Some

of these commenters said that the risk of an accident or the health and safety impacts of the accident

are not fully addressed. (0005, 0054, 0058, 0062, 0067, 0080, 0083, 0084, 0090, 0135, 0136, 0185,

0257, GR-09, SL1-01, SL1-09, SL3-11, SL3-18, SL3-32) Some commenters believed that the DEIS

does not adequately address the risk of an accident or the health and safety impacts in the event of a

storage or transportation accident. (0005, 0054, 0058, 0084, 0090, 0135, 0170, 0185, 0198g, 0204,

0249, GR-09, SL1-05, SL1-09, SL2-01, SL2-05, SL3-11, SL3-14, SL3-18, SL3-19, SL3-25, SL3-32) 

Some commented that the transportation of the waste across the nation poses significant risk to

citizens along the routes, especially if there are accidents severe enough to release radiation or result

in spills and leaks. (0042, 0054, 0201) Other commenters were concerned with the health impacts

from radiological poisoning if there is a leak. (SL2-04, SL3-21) One commenter stated that NRC has

chosen to rely on outdated studies with "little project specific analysis." (0198)

One commenter stated that the EIS should identify and evaluate impacts from accidents that could

occur during SNF transfer, transportation and storage. (0198h) The commenter stated that accidents

evaluated should include, but not be limited to, cask drop, collision during transportation, collapse of or

fall from railroad trestle (including impacts of burial in sediment and water intrusion into cask), and

major fires. (0198h)

The same commenter requested clarification on the types of transportation accidents possible,

mitigation strategies, responsibility for financial and other losses due to accidents, payment

assurance, and cumulative impacts for SNF transportation accidents and other accidents from existing
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-363 NUREG-1714

and currently known activities. The commenter asked that the transportation modes to be used by

PFS be identified, as well as alternatives evaluated. (0198h)

Response:

The analysis in the FEIS addresses the potential releases and resulting health impacts that could

result from transportation accidents. Accident risks during storage at the proposed PFSF and during

canister transfer at the ITF or site are also addressed. SNF transfer (e.g., loading SNF into canisters)

can only occur at the originating reactor facilities, and is not addressed by this FEIS because its risks

have already been addressed during the licensing. 

Although specific transport accident scenarios, such as described in the comments, are not

considered, the NRC staff evaluated cask performance (including possible releases and

consequences) for several severity categories of accidents. These categories are defined by the

ranges of impact and thermal forces a cask could experience. Appendix D explains this approach. 

The general approach in the FEIS is based in part on the generic Modal Study of severe accidents,

which is based on conservative assumptions as described in Section G.2. The Modal Study did

investigate a sample of historical, very severe accidents and concluded that SNF casks meeting the

requirements of Part 71 would have performed favorably had they been in those accidents. Although

information and results from the Modal Study were used, the information and results are

supplemented in this FEIS with project-specific information. The NRC staff concluded that the EIS

reference to the Modal Study information is appropriate and that the EIS approach adequately and

conservatively estimates the risk of severe accidents. 

The modes of transportation that could be used for the carriage of SNF from originating reactors to the

proposed PFSF are discussed in the DEIS. The types of accidents that are possible are discussed in

the DEIS, and the impacts are included in the severity categories described in the DEIS. In order to

be conservative, the impacts of accident mitigation measures or accident response measures are not

included in the accident consequence analysis. Therefore, any consequences that might result

following prompt and effective accident response measures would be less, perhaps greatly less, than

those calculated in the DEIS. Moreover, most of the costs associated with any accidents that might

occur during SNF transportation would be covered under the Price-Anderson Act. This issue is further

discussed in Section G.2. The probability of a transportation accident or an accident at the proposed

PFSF occurring at the same time an accident occurs from other activities is low. The possible modes

of SNF transportation proposed by the applicant and alternative modes are discussed in Chapter 2 of

the FEIS. Also, Section 6.1.7 of the FEIS discusses the cumulative impacts of SNF transportation to

the proposed PFSF.

G.3.16.8.2 SNF Can Be Transported Safely

Comment Summary:

Some commenters expressed the view that severe transportation accidents involving SNF casks

would not result in a significant radiological release. (0020, 0170, GR-24, SL1-25, SL2-04) One

commenter stated that for catastrophic accidents that break open a canister and expose SNF rods,

the prudent distance would be half a mile, until the radiation can be measured and the canister could

be approached. The commenter stated that robots would need to be employed to pick up the SNF

pellets or rods, and Geiger counters would need to be used until they were all picked up. (SL2-04) 

One commenter stated that if an accident does occur, there will not be a meltdown or white-area

contamination. The commenter also stated that the container would break and metal pieces from the

container would spill and clean up would be localized. (SL1-25) Another commenter expressed the

view that from the transportation of SNF, there would be less than one death per century. The

commenter stated that shipping SNF yields less risk than shipping coal since the volume of SNF to be

transported is so small compared to coal. (GR-24) One commenter stated that SNF is in the form of

heavy pellets contained in SNF rods sealed in canisters and that in the engineered storage
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-364

configuration, the SNF is never exposed to the outside atmosphere. (0020) Another commenter

stated that the accident that requires $14 to $320 billion for cleanup is not credible. The commenter

argued that such an accident would involve a cask colliding at over 75 mph with a direct hit to a hard

surface (not a glancing blow), followed by a sustained fire hot enough to oxidize or burn the zirconium

cladding on any exposed SNF rods. The commenter stated that the small amount of radioactive

waste on the inside surface of the cladding would thus go up in smoke and contaminate a large area

with the equivalent of fallout. However, the commenter asserted that with 30 mph dedicated trains,

this extremely severe accident would be impossible. The commenter also stated that no radioactive

dust cleanup would be needed in any credible accident. (0170)

Response:

The FEIS presents the transportation accident risks associated with the proposed action and

concludes those risks are small. Some of these comments deal with mitigation measures and

accidents that the NRC staff does not believe are credible. For example, all containment barriers

(cladding, canister, and the cask itself) would have to fail catastrophically for SNF pellets to spill onto

the ground. This is a remote and speculative accident scenario that need not be analyzed in the

FEIS.

G.3.16.8.3 Assumptions Input in the EIS’ RADTRAN Accident Analysis

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the following issues related to RADTRAN as it is used in the DEIS need to

be critically examined: accident severity fraction; locations of severe accidents; unrealistic accident

scenarios; rail accident rates; all radionuclides not included; sabotage not evaluated. (0198i)

One commenter stated that the DEIS employs the average rail accident rate, not the rail accident rate

for specific rail lines that will be used. (0201) The commenter stated that similar to accident rates the

NRC employs for different types of highways (interstate rural, interstate urban, rural, urban, and so

on), the staff must discuss the accident rates for different types (quality) of rail lines if the DEIS is to

comply with NEPA. (0198g) Another commenter stated that the assessment of accident risk is based

on statistics from the 1960's of traffic density, driving speeds, etc. (0201) Another commenter

requested that the NRC identify (and use in the accident study) the unyielding surfaces along the route

from eastern reactors to Utah. (0194) One commenter indicated that rail transportation accidents

could result in a cask being subject to large physical forces, and therefore, presents different risks

than truck transportation. The commenter also stated that the population affected is directly

dependent on the mode of transportation selected, because Western urban areas grew around rail

centers. (0142) One commenter stated that people live within 20 to 40 feet of the railway tracks up

Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah County. (SL3-14) One commenter stated that the EIS should take into

account the contribution to the risks and impacts of SNF transportation caused by current and

anticipated conditions on interstate highways and rail corridors, and stated that congestion increases

the potential for accidents and sabotage against unprotected railroad cars that are either moving very

slowly or sitting on railroad sidings for extended periods of time. (0198h)

One commenter stated that the DEIS underestimates the likelihood of the occurrence of a Category 6

accident because the database from which the accident rates was obtained does not include specific

minor accidents, such as grade-crossing or railyard accidents. The commenter stated that, if one

employs the Saricks and Kvitek study of accident rates, then one must also change the accident

severity distributions to reflect the fact that minor accidents have been removed. The commenter

concluded that if this is done, the likelihood of a severe accident is then too low. The commenter

opposed the use, concurrently, of accident rates developed from an Argonne National Laboratory

study and accident distributions from the Modal Study. (0198g)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-365 NUREG-1714

Response:

These issues have been reviewed by the staff and, as set forth below, the NRC staff has concluded

that they do not warrant changes to the assumptions or methodology of the DEIS. In some cases,

however, the NRC staff made clarifying changes in the FEIS. The justifications for this conclusion are

presented below by topical area, with the exceptions of radionuclide inventory and sabotage (which

are responded to in Sections G.3.16.3 and G.3.16.10, respectively).

In its analysis of the transportation impacts for the proposed action, the NRC staff used a rail accident

rate derived from the Modal Study rail accident rate of 0.11 accidents per million railcar-kilometers. 

The FEIS clarifies this matter. Rail accident rates have been studied (for example, by Saricks and

Kvitek) and the staff believes further study could develop more detailed accident rate data including

dependencies on track type, train consist (i.e., the set of rail cars as presented for transport), and

terrain. However, because all of these effects are included in the current data, breaking out separate

accident rates that reflect each of these characteristics would only provide more detailed information

about the range of rail accident risks without significantly altering predictions of mean rail accident risk. 

Thus, while the comments are correct in stating that the DEIS uses this ‘average’ rail accident rate,

applied over the representative (Maine Yankee to the proposed PFSF) route, this does not mean that

the likelihood of an accident is “too low.”

The NRC staff believes that the use of single railway accident rate for purposes of the DEIS analyses

is appropriate and conservative as follows. The overall risks estimated using the DEIS representative

route are expected to characterize risks of shipments to the proposed PFSF, regardless of their

individual origins, transportation details (such as use of intermodal transfer), and reasonably

foreseeable route characteristics. For example, the accident rate used in the DEIS includes accidents

for general freight service and accidents that occur in classification yards. Accident rates for general

freight service are higher than those for dedicated trains, and accident rates for trains in classification

yards are higher than those for trains on main line tracks. Because dedicated SNF trains will be used

for shipments to the proposed PFSF and will almost always travel over mainline rail routes, and

generally not through classification yards, the accident rates are conservative.

As noted in the DEIS (page 2-16), “PFS would use two single-purpose, dedicated trains which would

proceed from the originating reactor site directly to Skull Valley, Utah, stopping only for crew changes,

refueling, and periodic inspections.” Because of the commitment to meet the AAR Standard, the

applicant’s dedicated trains should have superior rolling stock. If it can be assumed that dedicated

trains consist of superior rolling stock, accident rates for such a dedicated train traveling on main line

tracks should be lower than those for regular freight trains traveling on main line tracks. The Modal

Study accident rate was developed from Federal Railway Administration statistics for the years 1975-

1982. A study performed by Argonne National Laboratories (Saricks and Kvitek, 1994), estimated

accident rates of about half the value used in the DEIS when all tracks are considered, and about one

quarter that value when only mainline tracks are considered. In fact, the accident rate of 0.11

accidents per million railcar-kilometers encompasses about 90 percent of the distribution of main line

regular freight train accident rates documented in the Argonne study.

Both the Saricks and Kvitek study and the Modal study used FRA rail accident data to develop their

results. The FRA defines an accident as an event that leads to cost damages above a cost damage

reporting threshold, which has been increased over the years to correct for inflation. Although the

older FRA accident data used by the Modal Study and the newer accident data used by Saricks and

Kvitek are keyed to different cost damage thresholds, the older and newer data are believed to be

based on accidents with quite similar severities. Both the more recent study by Saricks and Tomkins

(ANL/ESD/TM-150) and recent FRA Accident/Incident Bulletins show about the same number of

grade crossing incidents and the number of those incidents is much larger than the total number of all

other train accidents. This is to be expected because the FRA requires that all grade-crossing

incidents be reported (i.e., there is no damage threshold for grade crossing incidents).
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NUREG-1714 G-366

Inspection of the Modal Study rail accident event tree shows that only 3 percent of all of the accidents

on the event tree are grade crossing accidents. Thus, although not explicitly stated in the Modal

Study, grade crossing incidents must have been excluded if they did not appear to be severe enough

to possibly be of concern with regard to cask damage. Accordingly, the treatments of accidents in the

Saricks and Kvitek study and in the Modal Study are quite consistent, and use of the Modal Study rail

accident scenario conditional probabilities with accident rate data taken from the Saricks and Kvitek

study is acceptable for the analysis in the DEIS. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that

the use of this accident rate for purposes of the PFS DEIS is valid.

Regarding the accident severity fraction in the DEIS, the NRC staff examined a set of six categories of

representative severe accidents with severities and conditional probabilities of occurrence that range

from moderately severe and somewhat probable to extremely severe and highly unlikely (see DEIS

Tables D.3 and D.4). The Modal Study used a very wide range of accident scenarios to construct a 20

category accident matrix, which was collapsed into the six DEIS categories. That range contained a

variety of collision-only, fire-only, and collision plus fire scenarios. These scenarios had accident

severities and conditional probabilities of occurrence that ranged from the moderately severe and

somewhat probable to the extremely severe with very low probability. Thus, this set of scenarios more

than adequately represents the variety of real accidents that might lead to the release of radioactivity

from a SNF cask, including releases caused by very improbable accidents. The FEIS clarifies this

process in Appendix D. The NRC staff believes this set adequately captures the range and

probabilities of severe accident radioactive release. The occurrence of features (such as hard

surface) that might approximate unyielding surfaces along transportation routes are inherently

considered in the accident severity categories (from the Modal Study) used by the NRC staff. The

NRC staff used the values from the Modal Study in lieu of values specific to the Maine Yankee to the

proposed PFSF route (which could have been obtained, for example, through GIS data), because this

route was intended to represent shipments from any location in a reasonable and conservative

manner.

As for locations of severe accidents; to capture the effects of population density on accident

consequences, RADTRAN 4 divides a transportation route into aggregate urban, suburban, and rural

segments. The RADTRAN 4 analyses performed for the FEIS also did this for all of the routes

examined (e.g., representative nationwide route and regional routes). The impacts were evaluated to

everyone in a one mile wide pathway centered on the rail line. Thus, the NRC staff considered the

appropriate population along the rail routes. In addition, because rail traffic densities are not expected

to depend significantly upon population density beside rail routes, the use of a single average rail

accident rate that does not vary with location is unlikely to have a significant affect on the risk results

calculated in the FEIS.

Current conditions on interstate highways and rail lines were captured by the FEIS analyses by the

use of accident statistics to estimate accident rates and the fractions of all accidents that lead to

different types of accidents (different accident scenarios). Collisions at slower speeds (such as in

traffic congestions) would not generate forces significant enough to damage a cask. As highway and

railway accident rates have been declining for several decades, it is likely that risks and impacts will

be lower for shipments in the far future than for those that occur in the near future. 

G.3.16.8.4 DEIS Release Fraction for CRUD

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS underestimates the radiological consequences accidents, by

underestimating the release fraction for CRUD. The commenter believes the DEIS release fractions

do not properly take the behavior of CRUD into account, because Cobalt-60 that adheres to the

outside of SNF assemblies and Cobalt-60 within the SNF should have different release properties. 

The commenter stated that the DEIS uses a release fraction for Co-60 that is equivalent to that for

SNF particulates. (0198g)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

7

 The value of 0.0236 persons-rem is the single cask result reported in FEIS Section 5.7.2.5. Assuming

four casks per train, an additional factor of 3.58 could be applied to the 0.0236 value, and the 0.0806 value, to

obtain a result that assumes four casks have releases (as explained in FEIS Section 5.7.2.5). An additional

factor of 50 (the number of 4-cask trains per year) could be applied to each value to obtain annual impacts

(annual impacts are presented on many of the tables in this FEIS). In all cases the ration between the example

case of 100 percent CRUD release, and the FEIS methodology, will remain 3.4.

G-367 NUREG-1714

Response:

CRUD is a colloquial term for corrosion and wear products (rust particles, etc.) that become

radioactive (i.e., activated) when exposed to radiation in the reactor vessel. The term is popularly

considered to be an acronym for Chalk River Unidentified Deposits, the Canadian plant at which the

activated deposits were first discovered. CRUD can plate out on hot surfaces in the primary reactor

coolant system such as fuel rods. Activation of nickel in the corrosion products produces Co-60

which, after 5 years cooling time out of a reactor, is the only significant constituent in CRUD in terms

of the FEIS’ transportation risk assessment. This FEIS accounts for the presence of CRUD, and its

decay, in its inventory quantity for Co-60 for 5 year cooled fuel (5.23 x 102

 curies, see Table D.3).

CRUD will not effect the FEIS incident free analysis, but some CRUD could be released in a severe

accident. The FEIS applied the Modal Study release fraction for fuel rod particulates to Co-60. The

FEIS therefore treats the Co-60 inventory as if it were another fission product contained inside the fuel

rods, rather than a deposit on the external surface of the fuel rods. The Modal Study release fractions

are based on the experimental studies (Lorenz, 1990), which did not examine spallation of CRUD from

rod surfaces.

To determine if the assumption of using modal study release fractions for CRUD was appropriate, or if

it could lead to a significant underestimate of accident dose risk, the NRC staff further investigated this

issue, as described below.

Following issuance of the DEIS, the NRC staff reviewed other available studies for estimates of the

possible impacts of CRUD releases. The phenomena that would govern spallation of CRUD from

spent fuel rod surfaces when subjected to accident loads, its transport through the spent fuel cask,

and release to the environment, were examined in NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung, 2000). That

examination suggests that CRUD release fractions for spent fuel, when transported in a rail cask,

could range from 10-3 to 10-1 depending on accident conditions and severity. In contrast, the FEIS

release fractions for particulates range from 6x 10-8 to 2x 10-5.

To determine an absolute upper bound for the effects due to various CRUD release fractions, the

Maine Yankee-to-PFSF RADTRAN rail calculation performed for this FEIS was repeated by using a

100 percent CRUD release, which bounds the assumption in NUREG-6672. This repeat calculation

produced a single shipment accident population dose risk (adjusted by a factor of 1.3 to account for

future population) of 0.000806 person-Sievert (0.0806 person-rem). This value can be compared to

the single shipment accident population dose risk of 0.000236 person-Sievert (0.0236 person-rem)7

reported in FEIS Section 5.7.2.5. Thus, in this example, where all 523 Curies of Co-60 (i.e., all the

CRUD) is assumed to be released for any category 2 through 6 accident, the accident population dose

risk would increase by a factor of 3.4 (0.0806/0.0236). However, as shown in Table 5.7, the

transportation accident population dose risk associated with the proposed PFSF is a small fraction of

the values reported in NUREG-0170. If the dose risk for the transportation of SNF to the proposed

PFSF in Table 5.7 is increased by a factor of 3.4 above the value shown in the DEIS, the resulting

population dose risk would still be a small fraction of the NUREG-0170 value, and the FEIS conclusion

that the accident population dose risk is small would be unchanged.

In reporting the results for this FEIS, the NRC staff considered the above information but has chosen,

as the base-case, to retain its application of Modal Study release fractions for particulates to CRUD. 

There are several reasons for this decision. First, the NRC staff does not believe that 100 percent
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-368

release of CRUD in any accident is physically possible, because (1) much of the CRUD is chemically

bonded or tightly adheres to the fuel rod surface, (2) a leak pathway large enough to let 100 percent

escape is not credible, (3) the particle size distribution of spalled CRUD would be expected to include

larger particles that would settle out inside the cask or possibly plug leak paths, and (4) a driving

force - pressure differential - does not exist that could enable a 100 percent release). Second, in

performing the FEIS accident risk assessment, the NRC staff ignored (i.e., did not allow credit for the

presence of the welded canister of the HOLTEC HI-STAR system, which will in practice provide a

significant additional barrier to the release of radioactive materials in transportation accidents. Third,

Co-60 has a radioactive half-life of 5.27 years, and its radioactivity decreases quickly in relation to the

radioactivity in the spent fuel pellets. Therefore, CRUD importance to transport accident risk declines

as cooling time increases, whereas the FEIS maximized its importance by conservatively assuming

that the fuel is cooled for only five years even though PFS has indicated the average cooling time of

SNF expected to be shipped to PFSF is 20 years. Fourth, the CRUD surface concentration on fuel

assemblies of 140: Ci/cm2

, was conservatively selected based on the upper value observed by

measurements of CRUD on rod surfaces (Sandoval et al., 1991). Finally, the NRC staff believes that

the Modal Study release fractions provide adequate estimates for the purpose of this FEIS of the

releases of important nuclides for a range of severe accidents (because, for example, the study does

not allow credit for nuclide retention in the cask). In light of the above, the radionuclide inventories

and release fractions chosen in the FEIS provide better perspective regarding the importance of

CRUD in relation to other radionuclides in spent fuel, while at the same time not resulting in CRUD

inappropriately dominating any decisions that are based upon the risk assessment results.

G.3.16.8.5 Transportation Accident Scenario

Comment Summary:

Some comments stated that the accident analysis in the DEIS is deficient because the accident

analyzed in the "Accident Scenario" is a severe rail accident in which one of the four casks carried by

a typical rail shipment of spent nuclear SNF is damaged sufficiently to cause the release of a fraction

of its contents. (0198g)

Response:

These commenters have misunderstood the DEIS. As indicated on DEIS page 5-45, the DEIS

conclusions are based on assessments that assume that all four casks on the train are damaged and

release material for any accident of a given severity. The NRC staff, however, notes that it is

reasonable to expect that all four casks would not be damaged to such an extent in an accident. 

(DEIS, pages 5-45 to 5-46) Therefore, the NRC staff analyzed a supplemental case, in which one

cask is damaged, and the most reasonable estimate of risk lies somewhere between the two cases. 

The analysis in the FEIS remains unchanged in this respect.

G.3.16.8.6 Derailments Due to Specific Localized Conditions

Comment Summary: 

Many comments expressed concern about possible derailment and safety. (0096, 0210b, SL1-09,

SL1-11, SL2-05, SL3-04, SL3-18, SL3-19) One commenter stated that many of the proposed routes

will be shared with Utah's mining industry and that these tracks bear constant heavy coal loads. The

commenter asked whether there will be any studies conducted concerning the condition of the railroad

tracks and the risk of derailment. The commenter stated that recently Utah experienced a major

derailment because of the weakened condition of tracks. (SL3-04) A few commenters asked what

measures will be taken to avoid transportation accidents. (SL1-09, SL3-18, SL3-19) Specifically, one

of the commenters asked how accidents due to rail defects will be prevented, noting that there was a

train accident in the local area that was due to a rail defect rather than human error. (SL3-18) One

commenter stated that the issue of derailments, which are often caused by human error, has not been
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-369 NUREG-1714

addressed. (SL1-11) Another commenter stated that although rail transport is relatively safe, the

derailment of a train near Scofield illustrates that no one can guarantee the safe transport of

radioactive materials. (SL2-05) Another commenter questioned pages 5-35 and 5-36, lines 43-12 in

Section 5.7.1.3 of the DEIS, saying that the DEIS assumes that there will be no train derailments that

could cause shipping cask valves to open and allow the contents to be lost into the ambient

environment. (0096) 

Response:

Railroads have track maintenance and inspection programs that the NRC does not regulate. The

railroads’ interests, in continued economic viability, are a reason to believe that no degradation of

facilities that would lead to significantly higher accident rates will occur. As highway and railway

accident rates have been declining for several decades, it is likely that risks and impacts will be lower

for shipments in the far future than for those that occur in the near future.

Notwithstanding the above, the NRC staff’s conclusion that the transportation accident risks are small,

using historical accident rates, does not indicate that enhancement of existing track maintenance

programs would be warranted because of SNF transportation plans. The accident rates and severity

fractions used in the DEIS are from the Modal Study, which was developed using Federal Railway

Administration (FRA) data collected for 1975-1982. The Modal Study train accident rate and

derailment fractions are national averages; the staff believes that use of more detailed information on

segments of the route would not change the FEIS conclusions. The accidents in the database include

derailments caused by track conditions and derailments caused by human error. More recent studies

have indicated a general downward trend in rail accident rates since the Modal Study was performed. 

In addition, the staff believes that the FEIS is conservative with respect to accident rates because the

FEIS does not take credit for the fact that a dedicated train traveling almost exclusively on main line

tracks will be used (such a train should have a lower derailment rate than regular freight trains

traveling on the same tracks). As noted in the DEIS (page 2-16), the applicant would use two

single-purpose, dedicated trains which would proceed from the originating reactor site directly to Skull

Valley, Utah, stopping only for crew changes, refueling, and periodic inspections. These trains will

therefore avoid classification yards and lesser-graded tracks that are often initiators for derailments. 

Also, the applicant has committed [PFS/RAI1 February 18, 1999] to complying with the Association of

American Railroads’ (AAR’s) Performance Standard for Spent Nuclear Fuel Trains. Compliance with

this standard results in use of superior rolling stock and consideration of single cars as well as train

consists (groups of cars), which is reasonably expected to result in a lower derailment rate. In

addition, enhanced quality assurance and maintenance programs applied to the design and use of the

equipment.

With regard to the last comment, Section 5.7.1.3 of the DEIS discusses non-radiological latent health

effects such as those from vehicular exhaust emissions. The HI-STAR transportation cask does not

have valves. The chances for a release, resulting from cask breach (not valves opening), are included

in the accident severity and release fractions as discussed in Section 5.7.2.

G.3.16.8.7 Estimate of Transport Accident Risk

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS tries to downplay the significance of the risk of moving waste

across the country and then storing it about 50-55 miles from downtown Salt Lake City. (SL1-09) 

Another commenter stated that the DEIS underestimates the probability and consequences of most

severe transportation accidents (a "Severity Category 6" accident) on DEIS pg D-6, Table D.2. The

commenter stated that the DEIS estimates that the probability of an accident of this severity is 1x10-12

per mile for shipment by rail, DEIS at D-7, and that this is a significant underestimate. The commenter
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NUREG-1714 G-370

stated that calculations are not made for environmental impacts of a maximum reasonably foreseeable

credible accident. (0198g)

Another commenter stated that the proposed action involves shipping commercial SNF rods to the

Skull Valley Goshute Nation, crossing 42 states and numerous communities, large and small. The

commenter stated that rail shipment for the maximum reasonable foreseeable release is 260 times the

Cesium released by the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and that the maximum reasonable foreseeable

release could happen. The commenter stated that there was a release of GB/Sarin into the ambient

environment at the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility, Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele, Utah

on May 8-9, 2000. (0096) 

A number of commenters said that a severe rail cask accident, releasing a small fraction of the

radioactive contents of a cask carrying 5-year-old cooled nuclear SNF, could result in 115 latent

cancer fatalities. (0084, 0127, 0135, 0136, 0157, 0180, 0185, 0195, 0257)

Response:

Section 5.7.2 of the FEIS evaluates the risk of transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF. The NRC

staff’s estimates for the number of cancers that could result from potential severe accidents are stated

on an annual basis and for the entire duration of shipments. This approach accounts for the

probability of severe accidents, as well as the potential location of an accident (e.g., urban or not) and

the associated health consequences. The NRC staff believes the risk stated in the FEIS is

conservative and small. As it relates to the risks of the proposed PFSF (i.e., not related to

transportation), the NRC staff completed an accident analysis (Chapter 15 of the SER) and concluded

that no radioactive material would be released as a result of any credible accident event. Therefore,

the NRC staff believes that the proposed PFSF does not present an undue risk to the public health

and safety. 

The radioactive inventories for the casks are presented in the DEIS Table D-5. Regardless of the

inventory of any particular radionuclide, it is physically impossible for the SNF to start a nuclear

explosion or release comparable to that from a nuclear weapon. There is also no comparable

dispersion mechanism (i.e., the energy imparted by weapon detonation). Therefore, comparison of

the inventory to nuclear weapon yields is meaningless with regard to evaluating the FEIS alternatives

and such comparisons are inappropriate.

The staff did not consider releases from chemical facilities as affecting the SNF transport risk. The

staff believes that a chemical accident occurring concurrent to a SNF transport being in the area, and

causing a transport accident that is more severe than the accidents already considered, is a remote

and speculative event that would not offer insights regarding the FEIS alternatives. 

The correct value for the probability of a category 6 accident per rail car mile is 2.2 x 10-11 rather than

1 x 10-12 as listed the DEIS at D-7. Note that this value was in the DEIS text as illustrative information

and was not used in the risk calculations. The NRC staff disagrees that this is a significant

underestimate. Using data from the Modal Study, the NRC staff calculates that the probability of a

Category 6 accident is the conditional probability of having a Category 6 accident given that a rail

accident occurred. This is the product of the probability of a rail accident, which is 0.11 accidents per

million rail-car km (0.176 accidents per million rail-car miles) and the probability of a category 6

accident, which is 1.25 in 10,000 or (1.25x10-4). The correction does not alter the conclusion set forth

in the DEIS at D-7 that a Category 6 accident would not be expected during the shipment of SNF to

the proposed PFSF. The FEIS will be revised accordingly. The commenters did not provide any

specific information that might indicate that these probabilities were otherwise underestimated.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-371 NUREG-1714

G.3.16.8.8 Impacts of Natural Occurrences on Transport Accidents

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concerned that numerous potential natural occurrences such as

earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, wildfire, and wind gusts could result in a transportation accident

affecting the SNF. (0147, 0198, 0198i, SL3-18, SL3-19, SL3-25) A commenter was specifically

concerned that winds might tip over tankers carrying SNF to the proposed PFSF. The commenter

asserted that, in such a disaster, all Utah highways would be shut down, and there would be no way to

escape. (SL1-29) One commenter was concerned that debris flows and stream floods could pose a

hazard to the operation of a rail spur in its path. (0198) 

One commenter said that the EIS should consider the impacts of strong ground shaking and the

possibility of a surface rupturing earthquake that might occur along the railway. The commenter

stated that the DEIS must (1) address environmental consequences of subsurface hazards, including

seismic, faulting, and soil/foundation hazards to transportation, transfer, and storage of high level

nuclear waste and (2) substantiate NRC's geotechnical analysis. The commenter indicated that the

SER does not present an evaluation of site specific seismic, faulting, or soil/foundation hazards and

potential environmental consequences along the transportation corridors, including the requested

right-of-way for a rail spur on public lands or the requested right-of-way for an intermodal transfer site

on public lands. (0198)

One commenter said that seismic risks along the transportation routes need to be determined. (0215) 

Another commenter stated that either surface rupture or strong ground shaking could be sufficient to

cause derailment of a train carrying nuclear materials. (0198) 

Two commenters wanted the potential transportation impacts resulting from flooding to be made clear

and analyzed. (0051, 0198) Specifically, one commenter stated that text in Section 5.2.2.2, “Potential

Impacts of Flooding,” (DEIS page 5-9, line 39) states that flows in excess of the 100-year flood could

result in overtopping of the railroad embankment at one or more locations. The commenter stated that

a cask-specific accident analysis (design event IV) appears to be missing for a scenario involving a

train derailment with canister leakage as a result of sheet flooding along the rail spur between the

proposed PFSF and Skunk Ridge. The commenter questioned whether risks of radiological effects on

the surrounding environment be quantified for such an accident. The commenter concluded that the

summary given in Section 5.7.2.4, incident-free and accident dose risks from SNF shipments to the

proposed PFSF, does not appear to answer the question presented above, because it is not caskspecific and based on general assumptions that apply to the entire rail corridor from the Maine Yankee

plant to the proposed PFSF. (0051)

Response:

The impacts of events in which a transport cask might experience large forces of natural origin

(earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) are not explicitly considered in the FEIS because the NRC staff

considers these events to be remote and speculative and thus, not warranting detailed consideration. 

Specifically, natural phenomena would seldom, if ever, result in a cask experiencing larger impact or

thermal forces than those to which it is subjected to during regulatory certification testing. Therefore,

the consequences of such phenomena would be limited.

Furthermore, there is only a remote probability of a cask being in the exact location necessary to be

subjected to large forces as a result of the occurrence of such a natural phenomenon. In the FEIS,

risk is the product of the probability of an event and its resultant consequences. Natural events that

are severe enough to pose a challenge to cask integrity have such a low probability of occurrence that

even a large resultant consequence would represent a negligible contribution to the overall accident

risks associated with the SNF. Therefore, effects on casks from natural phenomena of such severity

as to cause health or environmental impacts, are not reasonably foreseeable, and need not be
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NUREG-1714 G-372

explicitly considered in the FEIS. Accidents caused by more frequent natural phenomena are

implicitly included in the data that was used to develop the accident rates used in the FEIS.

G.3.16.8.9 Impacts of Flooding and Impacts to the Great Salt Lake 

Comment Summary: 

A commenter stated that the EIS should evaluate the risks of flooding of transportation corridors by

the Great Salt Lake and the likelihood of SNF cladding degradation due to pre-shipment dry cask

storage, and its effects on the risk of accidental radiation releases. (0198h) Another commenter

asserted that it is impossible to measure the impacts of a possible accident to surrounding populations

and the Great Salt Lake. (SL1-15) A commenter expressed the view that previous NRC

environmental studies, which assume pre-shipment storage in SNF pools, are inadequate to address

the risk of flooding by the Great Salt Lake. (0198h) The commenter stated that the rail route from the

west travels parallel to the Great Salt Lake and state-administered sovereign lands, an area impacted

by extensive flooding due to rising elevation of the lake. The commenter said that riparian and

wetland habitat, brine shrimp farming, mineral and salt extraction, and extensive waterfowl habitat by

the Great Salt Lake may be affected by the proposed SNF transportation. The commenter expressed

the view that the potential for hazard to human health is too high to allow the transportation of these

materials through watershed and other key resource areas. (0198h)

One commenter stated that not only has the applicant admitted there is a danger, but they are going to

have that danger traverse populated areas and watersheds three times if damaged or leaking casks

are returned to the originating reactor. The same commenter expressed the view that it is

reprehensible that the applicant is planning to ship this waste through Utah's most populated

communities and portions of the watersheds. (SL1-20, SL3-18)

Two commenters were concerned about the impacts to the watershed in the event of a transportation

accident. (0198h, SL1-20, SL3-18) One commenter was concerned that waste would be transported

through upland forested areas and associated watershed areas. The commenter indicated that

incidents and accidents are not uncommon along the various rail routes throughout Utah. The

commenter said that it is estimated by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service that more than

15,000 shipments could be made over the next 30 years, with each train cask carrying the long-lived -

radiological equivalent of 200 Hiroshima bombs. The commenter stated that many of the routes cut

across key upland watershed areas providing downstream communities with high quality water. 

(0198h)

Response:

The NRC staff considers the accident scenarios presented by the commenter remote and speculative

for the reasons set forth in Section G.3.16.8.8. Notwithstanding that effects of such accidents are not

reasonably foreseeable, in the event of an accident sufficiently severe to compromise a cask seal and

disrupt both the canister and some SNF cladding, some particulates might be released that could be

deposited in an area drained by a river, creek, etc. The extent of any heavy deposition would be

limited, even in severe accidents; and remediation measures would be taken within contaminated

areas. Potential environmental consequences are expected to be, at most, minor to undetectable. 

The aspect of the comment relating to damaged duel shipment is addressed in the next response.

G.3.16.8.10 Shipping Damaged Fuel

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern about the applicant’s determination that transporting damaged

SNF poses no safety concern. Specifically, the commenter disagreed that the transportation of failed

SNF poses no safety concern because the canister acts as a replacement barrier in lieu of the failed
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-373 NUREG-1714

cladding; and asserted that risks of shipping failed SNF are higher than stated by the applicant

because of the loss of one barrier (the SNF cladding). (0198b)

Response:

The NRC staff reviewed the HI-STAR transportation cask that the applicant proposes to use, and

concluded that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. The type of SNF that can be transported

in the HI-STAR transportation cask is identified in the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) issued by the

NRC to Holtec International. The SNF transported to the proposed PFSF must be consistent with the

types of SNF identified in the CoC. The NRC staff determined that some types of damaged BWR

SNF can be safely transported in the HI-STAR provided it is packaged in accordance with the

requirements set forth in the CoC. The NRC staff has concluded that the transport of failed SNF in

this manner does not increase the dose risks described in the FEIS.

G.3.16.9 Maximum Credible Accident

G.3.16.9.1 Consequences of a Maximum Credible Accident

Comment Summary:

A commenter stated that the analysis in the DEIS acknowledges the possibility of a severe accident,

which would result in release of radioactive materials from a shipping cask, but fails to disclose the

consequences (human health effects and economic impacts) of the maximum credible accident. The

commenter performed what the commenter called bounding calculations using the RADTRAN and

RISKIND computer codes, selecting a range of what they considered credible alternative assumptions

about SNF age and radiological characteristics, atmospheric dispersion, and population densities. 

The commenter’s analysis concluded that a severe rail accident in an urban area could produce a

collective population dose of 144,000-1,080,000 person-rem and result in 72-540 latent cancer

fatalities. (0204)

One commenter stated that the accident probabilities used in the DEIS met the criteria used in DOE’s

Yucca Mountain DEIS to determine a credible accident. The commenter also stated that the NRC

often limits consideration of events to those having a probability of greater than one in a million. The

commenter stated that a Category 6 accident clearly fulfills this criterion based on the probabilities

used in the DEIS. The commenter requested that the NRC staff perform a consequence assessment

of severe yet credible accident scenarios, similar to that performed in the Yucca Mountain DEIS but

also including an economic consequence assessment. The commenter stated that it is not enough to

contend that the risks associated with improbable yet severe accidents have been accounted for

through the use of RADTRAN software. The commenter added the consequences of a severe yet

credible accident are important to estimate in order to determine emergency response readiness. The

commenter concluded that the NRC staff’s interpretation of the Yucca Mountain DEIS is incorrect and

leads to the wrong conclusion about the DOE's approach to estimating the consequences of severe

yet credible accidents. (0198g)

The same commenter stated that the DEIS also wrongly presents information about the risks of such

an accident without addressing its consequences. The commenter stated that this violates the NEPA

rule of reason that an EIS must be written in a fashion that enlightens and assists government

decision makers in weighing the costs and benefits of their actions. The commenter stated further that

rather than informing decision makers of the possible health and economic consequences of their

decisions, the DEIS requires them to be content with an abstraction of the overall risk. The

commenter concluded that this is hardly a sufficient basis for weighing alternatives or evaluating

mitigation measures. (0198g)
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NUREG-1714 G-374

The same commenter stated that in the DEIS, the NRC staff declined to calculate the environmental

and economic impacts of a maximum credible accident. According to the commenter, the NRC has

instead calculated the transportation risk. (0198g)

The commenter also stated that the DEIS does not describe or analyze the environmental impacts of

a maximum credible accident. The commenter stated that the reader is left with a numerical

abstraction that has no factual content, and reliance on a numerical abstraction to describe risks is

inconsistent with the approach taken by Federal agencies in other cases. (0198g) One commenter

stated that the DEIS does not adequately calculate the casualties from severe transportation

accidents. (0189) 

Response:

As discussed in the general transportation response in Section G.2, the NRC staff transportation

analysis includes evaluation of a broad range of accidents and the NRC staff believes it conservatively

estimates the risk of a transportation accident. The analysis is not limited to accidents the NRC

considers as credible. The NRC believes the approach used in the DEIS and FEIS is appropriate, and

provides the decision- maker with an understanding of the risk of the proposed action. An attempt to

present the accident consequences independent of their probability, or probability independent of

consequences would not provide the decision maker with the appropriate information to make an

informed decision. 

Section 5.7.2 of the FEIS presents the estimated dose risks of transportation associated with the

proposed action. The term ‘risk,’ as used in the FEIS, is the mathematical product of an event’s

probability and its consequence. In the FEIS, the NRC staff sums risk over six categories of

increasingly severe accidents to arrive at overall accident risk (this is the value that appears in FEIS

Table 5.7.2). An EIS is not required to consider the consequences of accidents in isolation from the

probability of such accidents. In fact, the consequences of accidents of each severity always are

calculated as a part of the risk calculation. These results are included in the supporting risk

assessment documentation.

While the NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding the DOE transportation analysis, the NRC

staff has chosen a different approach. The NRC staff believes the FEIS calculation and presentation

of accident risks is sufficient, and provides a decision maker with the appropriate information to make

an informed decision. Contamination that might be caused in an accident is calculated automatically

for all accident severities in which a release has been predicted. Costs are addressed in the

responses to other comments (see G.3.16.6).

G.3.16.9.2 Worst-Case Transportation Scenario

Comment Summary:

A few commenters stated that a worst-case scenario should be used in analyzing the impacts of an

accident. (0062, 0147, 0189, 0203, SL1-21)

Response:

Analysis of “worst-case” transportation accidents are neither appropriate nor required in the FEIS, as

such accidents would be of remote probability, and therefore speculative.

The agency preparing a NEPA document may determine what constitutes a full range of events that

have a potential for having impacts on the public. The NRC has determined that the range examined

in the FEIS is sufficient. Although early CEQ regulations had required a "worst-case analysis" in such

situations, this requirement was eliminated in a 1986 amendment to the regulations. The Supreme

Court later approved this amendment of the CEQ regulation, noting that it was not a prior codification
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G-375 NUREG-1714

of any judicial determination and there was good reason for the change, thus, the new regulation was

entitled substantial deference. (See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 109

S.Ct 1835 (1988)). The CEQ had explained that the amendment eliminated the distortion of the

decision-making process by overemphasizing highly speculative harms. Thus, no “worst-case”

analysis is required for the proposed action.

G.3.16.10 Sabotage

G.3.16.10.1 Impacts of Sabotage

Comment Summary:

A number of commenters stated that the DEIS discussion of the impacts from a potential sabotage

event is inadequate. (0012, 0053, 0112, 0142, 0166, 0198, 0198h, 0198i, 0204, 0204b, 0215-6, GR05, SL1-11, SL1-22, SL1-32, SL2-05, SL3-12, SL3-14) One commenter cites page 5-53 of the DEIS,

which states that "if a sabotage event that results in releases did occur, it is the judgment of the NRC

staff that the consequence's would not be unacceptably large." The commenter stated that the NRC is

down-playing the seriousness of the risk of sabotage, attempting to ignore the issue, and that this is

unacceptable. (0194) Another commenter stated that while the risk of an accident may be small, the

consequences are large, especially if there were a terrorist attack. (SL2-05) One commenter stated

that there is a lack of discussion on the issue of sabotage or terrorism and the measures the applicant

would take to prevent sabotage or terrorism at the site and during transportation. (0134) 

One commenter provided several reasons why the DEIS should include a discussion of the impacts of

sabotage. Specifically, the commenter stated that NRC regulations governing the EIS content require

that "[t]o the extent that there are important qualitative considerations or factors that cannot be

quantified, these considerations or factors will be discussed in qualitative terms." The commenter

stated that the increasing effectiveness and lethality of terrorist acts has been graphically

demonstrated by such incidents as the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut; the 1993

bombing of the World Trade Center; the February 1993 intrusion into the Three Mile Island site, in

which the intruder crashed his station wagon through the security gate and rammed it under a partly

opened door in the turbine building; the 1995 bombing of the Federal Courthouse in Oklahoma City;

the 1995 release of SARIN nerve gas in the Tokyo subway; and the 1998 bombing of the U.S.

embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The commenter asserted that the threat of sabotage is equally

applicable to nuclear waste transportation. (0198g) 

Another commenter stated that an unidentified document indicates that the threat of sabotage either

by an insider or by a terrorist was regarded as an important vulnerability of the facility and of

transportation activities. (SL1-22) One commenter stated that the probability of the destruction of

railway facilities in an effort to stop the waste from being shipped has not been addressed. (SL3-12)

One commenter stated that the shipment of SNF would be a natural target for terrorists, and doubted

that the shipping casks would survive a terrorist attack. (0098) One commenter asked whether the

NRC has explained to the Skull Valley Band why a huge parking lot lined with irradiated SNF rods

could perhaps be appealing to terrorists or saboteurs, or, referring to 10 CFR 73.37, why the NRC

regulations dictate that any rail shipment of irradiated reactor SNF within a heavily populated area

must be accompanied by two armed escorts. (0203)

One commenter stated that in addition to the risk of an accident due to natural occurrences, terrorist

attacks can also lead to an accident. (0053, 0147, SL1-11)

Two commenters stated that PFS is unable to provide protection from terrorism and sabotage. (SL1-

11, SL2-05) One commenter expressed the view that safe transport of the waste cannot be

guaranteed, nor can the resources to prevent a catastrophe in the event of a rail accident or terrorist

attack be guaranteed. (SL2-05) One commenter stated the EIS should take into account the
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NUREG-1714 G-376

contribution to the risks and impacts of SNF transportation caused by current and anticipated

conditions on interstate highways and rail corridors, and stated that congestion increases the potential

for accidents and sabotage against unprotected railroad cars that are either moving very slowly or

sitting on railroad sidings for extended periods of time. (0198h)

Another commenter stated that sabotage of a remote rail line is virtually impossible to predict or

control, and in fact, recent experience of transporting nuclear waste in Germany is a clear indication of

this likely means of environmental terrorism. (0112)

One commenter stated that the NRC regulations provide for only the most minimal protection against

sabotage during transportation of SNF, and the level of protection will not prevent a sabotage event. 

The commenter expressed the view that the NRC regulations (10 CFR 73.37) are inadequate because

they only require a small armed escort crew of two. The commenter stated that the DEIS fails to

acknowledge or consider that transportation casks are not designed or tested to withstand

transportation accidents and sabotage. (0012, SL1-01)

One commenter also states that STB regulations require contingency planning but the DEIS does not

include contingency planning or a discussion of any mitigation measures for sabotage events. This

minimal protection will not prevent a sabotage event. 10 CFR 51.71(d)). (0198g)

Response:

Since sabotage is an intentional act, there is no method to quantify the likelihood of sabotage, and

therefore no method to quantify the risk of sabotage. Consequently, the discussion of sabotage

impacts in Section 5.7.2.10 of the DEIS is necessarily qualitative. The NRC staff’s qualitative

assessment does not indicate that the NRC downplays the seriousness of SNF shipment sabotage. 

In addition, in light of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the NRC staff has

been directed to review the NRC’s security regulations and procedures. If the NRC determines that

revisions to NRC’s requirements are warranted, such changes would occur through a public

rulemaking. The NRC staff, however, has not yet identified any specific additional requirement for

storage of SNF with respect to sabotage. Also see Section 6.3.15.6.1.

The extensive security measures required by the NRC minimize the likelihood of sabotage events. 

First, the NRC currently has in place a set of regulatory requirements specifically for the physical

protection of irradiated reactor SNF in transit (10 CFR 73.37). These regulations specify performance

objectives, including minimizing the possibilities for radiological sabotage of SNF shipments, that

provide a deterrent to possible adversary attack. In addition, the NRC maintains a threat assessment

capability that includes close and ongoing contacts with the Federal law enforcement and intelligence

agencies. Based on the information available to the NRC, as well as the physical security regulations

in 10 CFR 73.37, the NRC staff believes that the current NRC regulations are adequate to protect

SNF shipments in transit.

Moreover, the staff has determined by analysis that if a SNF shipment was subject to a successful

sabotage attack, the likely consequences would be small. In general, SNF casks must be robust in

order to meet NRC’s hypothetical accident conditions and acceptance criteria, and are not easily

breached. The potential radioactive material releases from a successful sabotage attack on a SNF

cask have been quantified in previous studies, and were shown to be a small fraction of the cask

inventory. These releases are less than those associated with the very severe transportation

accidents considered in the FEIS. Similarly, transportation accidents (e.g., derailments) are

considered and evaluated in the FEIS. Sabotage attacks against the railroad infrastructure could

reasonably be expected to result in similar consequence events, and would be covered by the FEIS

analysis.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-377 NUREG-1714

G.3.16.10.2 NRC Sabotage Studies Out of Date

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that since WASH-1238 was prepared, the threat of sabotage has become

more real and the technology more sophisticated, as evident by the bombings at the World Trade

Center and the Federal Courthouse in Oklahoma City. (0198a) One commenter quoted Resolution

98-008 of the Western Governors' Association: "...the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks in the

United States such as the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, argue for a new, more

comprehensive assessment of the risk of terrorism and sabotage against repository shipments." The

commenter stated that the resolution also finds that changes in SNF shipping cask designs, and

improvements in the capabilities of weapons available to potential adversaries render less meaningful

the NRC's previous assessments of terrorism risks to spent nuclear SNF shipments. (0142)

One commenter stated that since the early 1980s, the NRC has relied on an outdated and poorly

interpreted set of experiments carried out by Sandia and Battelle Columbus Laboratories. (0198i)

One commenter stated that there were several problems with the DEIS, namely: (1) The DEIS cites

no references in support of its assertions about the probability and consequences of radiological

sabotage; (2) the DEIS ignores recent reports documenting changes in the nature of the terrorist

threat and the increased vulnerability of SNF shipping casks to attacks utilizing current antitank

weapons, commercial shaped charges, and other high-energy explosive devices; and (3) the DEIS

ignores the Commission's decision to publish for public comment the State of Nevada's petition for

rulemaking on SNF transportation safeguards [Docket PRM-73-10]. (0204) 

One commenter stated that the sabotage analyses performed by Sandia National Laboratories

assume that there will only be one detonation in the event of a sabotage attack, and that this

detonation will not completely penetrate a shipping cask. The commenter asserted that potential

saboteurs, especially those with access to remote-delivery devices such as anti-tank missiles, will be

able to attack a shipping cask using more than one missile. The commenter stated further that the

release of radioactive material due to a multiple-missile event has not been approached by Sandia or

any other government organization. The commenter asserted that there is no data available to

estimate the additional damage to a shipping container that would be caused by a multiple-missile

strike. The commenter concluded that it is certain that the damage would be significantly higher for

the case of a multiple-missile strike. (0198g) The commenter also expressed the view that

consequences may be significant because new armor-piercing weapons are currently available that

may easily penetrate the transportation casks. (0198) 

The commenter stated that currently available NRC studies do not address the particular

circumstances of the proposed PFSF and transportation scheme (to the extent-they are known) that

render them especially vulnerable to sabotage, such as the shipment of large quantities of SNF at low

speeds on rail lines that are easily accessible to saboteurs, the increased vulnerability of

transportation casks to sabotage during long layovers in rail yards, and the close proximity of Rowley

Junction to 1-80. (0198h)

One commenter indicated that prior NRC/DOE analyses of the impacts of explosive charges on SNF

shipping casks are deficient and flawed, leaving open the question of how serious an attack on a SNF

shipment could be. The commenter asserted that NUREG-0170 does not address this issue, nor

have any subsequent NRC or DOE analyses been instructive as to magnitude or probability. (0198i)

Another commenter submitted an assessment of the consequences of a successful sabotage attack

using the RADTRAN and RISKIND models and a range of alternative assumptions about SNF age

and radiological characteristics, atmospheric dispersion, and population densities. The commenter’s

analysis used the constrained attack scenario specified in the Sandia analysis prepared for DOE
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NUREG-1714 G-378

[Luna, Neuhauser, and Vigil, 1999 (“Luna Report”)]. The commenter asserted even more severe

attack scenarios with even greater health consequences are credible. (0204)

To demonstrate the consequences of a successful sabotage attack, two commenters performed

analyses to estimate the impacts of a successful sabotage event. (0198g, 0204) One commenter

performed a consequence assessment of the effects of a successful sabotage attack on a rail cask

shipment in Salt Lake City, Utah. The commenter used the RADTRAN 4 and RADTRAN 5 programs

to estimate the health and economic consequences of the sabotage event described in the Luna

Report, assuming a population density of 567 persons/km2 for the RADTRAN 4 economic analysis

and 1344 persons/km2 for the RADTRAN 5 economic analysis. To provide a range of potential

consequences, the commenter used a minimum, average, and maximum release fractions obtained

from the computer analyses documented in the Luna Report. (0198g)

Another commenter stated that the analysis evaluated the consequences of possible credible

sabotage events and found them to be comparable with the impacts of maximum reasonably

foreseeable accident events. The commenter indicated that a study conducted by SNL (Luna 99)

considered the effects of two different high-energy devices, and estimated the amounts and

characteristics of releases of radioactive materials from rail and truck casks resulting from each

device. (0204b)

One commenter believes the EIS should consider a sabotage scenario in which a terrorist incident

results in a one-percent release, which the commenter asserts would have radiological consequences

far greater than those assumed in the outdated DOE and NRC consequence assessments. The

commenter believes the new assessment must employ the following:

C Credible worst-case assumptions about the timing and location of a potential attack, and weather

conditions during and after the attack which are important for determining the fate of any releases;

C An attack in which the cask is captured, penetrated by one or more explosive devices, and

releases a significant amount (at least one percent) of its radioactive contents;

C An attack in which the cask is perforated by one or more armor-piercing rockets or missiles and

releases a significant amount (at least one percent) of its radioactive contents.

The commenter indicated that the reference cask for the above sabotage events should be a

NAC-TSC rail cask loaded with 26 Westinghouse PWR SNF assemblies that are 10-year-cooled with

a medium burn-up. The commenter stated that this would represent a total radioactivity inventory of

about 5.5 million curies. The commenter also stated that the reference weapon should be portable

anti-tank missiles for their ability to permeate the strong cask materials, their range and availability. 

The commenter recommended consideration of either the TOW-2 or MILAN anti-tank weapon. (0198i)

One commenter believes that: (1) the NRC should examine the issue of terrorism and sabotage

against SNF and HLW waste shipments, in order to determine the adequacy of the current physical

protection regulations under 10 CFR Part 73, and in order to assist in the preparation of a legally

sufficient EIS as part of the NRC licensing process for a geologic repository or an interim storage

facility; (2) the NRC should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of attacks that

have the potential for radiological sabotage, including attacks against transportation infrastructure

used by nuclear waste shipments, attacks involving capture of a SNF shipment and use of high

energy explosives against the cask, and direct attacks upon a SNF shipping cask using antitank

missiles; and (3) the NRC should conduct the comprehensive reassessment of terrorism/sabotage

consequences in a forum conducive to meaningful participation by all stakeholders, including the

creation of a stakeholder advisory group to assist the NRC in this task, and publish a full report on all

unclassified findings of its consequence reassessment. (0142)
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G-379 NUREG-1714

One commenter also provided estimates of the cost and radiological impact of a successful sabotage

attack which is based on information provided by the 1999 Sandia Study for the DOE and used in the

DEIS for the Yucca Mountain Project. (0204b)

Response:

The NRC staff believes that the extensive security measures required by the NRC minimize the

likelihood of any sabotage of a SNF shipment (see response to G.3.16.10.1). Previous SNF cask

sabotage studies investigated potential radioactive material release following the detonation of largemass high-explosive shaped charges, precisely placed on the surface of the cask so as to cause

maximum damage. The staff finds that previous studies provide an adequate estimate of the source

term that might be encountered should a likely sabotage scenario occur. NRC’s physical protection

regulations for SNF in transit (10 CFR 73.37) are based, in part, on these studies, and the regulations

are in use today. The staff does not believe further evaluation of cask response to sabotage is

necessary to complete the FEIS. Recently, the NRC conducted a study to determine if the original

assumptions underpinning the regulations remain valid. The study determined that those assumptions

do continue to remain valid. However, NRC continues to conduct further analysis of the

consequences of potential sabotage scenarios. In addition, in light of the attacks on the United States

on September 11, 2001, the NRC staff has been directed to review the NRC’s security regulations and

procedures. If the NRC determines that revisions to NRC’s requirements are warranted, such changes

would occur through a public rulemaking. The NRC staff, however, has not yet identified any specific

additional requirement for storage of SNF with respect to sabotage. The comment on the Nevada

Petition for Rulemaking on SNF transportation safeguards is being evaluated under a separate NRC

procedure and is beyond the scope of the proposed action and FEIS.

G.3.16.10.3 Economic Impacts of Sabotage

Comment Summary:

A few commenters were concerned about the costs that might be associated with successful sabotage

attack upon a cask (often these comments were expressed in conjunction with the consequences of

transportation accidents). In general, the commenters stated that the DEIS should include an

estimate of the economic impacts of a successful terrorist attack. (0198g, 0204, 0204b, SL1-32) One

commenter indicated that the EIS must estimate the health and economic impacts of a severe, but

credible accident and sabotage event that leads to a release of radioactive materials. (0198g)

One commenter stated that the DEIS fails to provide any estimate of the economic impacts of a

successful terrorist attack. The commenter’s contractor prepared an estimate of the economic

impacts of a successful terrorist attack on a large rail cask, using the RADTRAN and RISKIND models

and a range of alternative assumptions about cleanup levels, SNF age and radiological

characteristics, atmospheric dispersion, population densities, and estimated cleanup costs and other

post-incident economic impacts ranging from $500 million to $2.15 billion (2000$) using RADTRAN 4,

and $2 billion to $7 billion (2000$) using RADTRAN 5. (0204)

One commenter used the release fractions used in the DOE analysis of a rail transportation sabotage

event (SAND99-0963), and then used RADTRAN 4 or RADTRAN 5 to provide an economic analysis

of this event. The commenter stated that RADTRAN 4 estimates the population dose in terms of

50-year population dose, and therefore, the health consequences are not immediately comparable

with those obtained in the RISKIND analysis. In addition, the analysis assumed a cleanup level of

0.20 Fci/M2. (0204b)

Response:

The NRC staff believes that compliance with the current physical protection requirements in 10 CFR

73.37 for SNF in transit and the robust design of SNF storage cask approved under 10 CFR Part 71
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-380

provide adequate protection against the event of sabotage. Based on current studies, the

consequences of a successful sabotage event on a SNF transportation cask would not be any greater

than very severe transportation accidents.

As discussed in Section G.2, the methods for estimating this cost are highly dependent on the actual

spread of contamination (most model scenarios overestimate contaminated areas by factors of 3 to

10), land use, clean-up standards, speed of remediation and other factors. Thus, the estimated costs

can only be taken as the roughest estimate of the maximum likely cost if the optimally successful

sabotage event were to occur.

G.3.16.11 Emergency Response

G.3.16.11.1 DEIS Does Not Adequately Address Emergency Response

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern that the DEIS did not adequately address emergency

response plans in the event of an accident. Some commenters stated that communities along the

transportation route and in Tooele County do not have the equipment or ability to respond to an

accident involving nuclear waste. (0012, 0021, 0246, GR-05, SL1-10, SL1-39, SL2-05, SL2-12,

SL3-04, SL3-33) One commenter stated that in addition to human health impacts, shipment of

approximately 4,000 casks of SNF (up to 100 through Idaho) to the proposed facility will have an

impact on state, regional, and local government agencies that will likely be called on to assist in public

information activities and will be required to plan for and possibly respond to transportation

emergencies. The commenter added that this impact on government resources does not appear to be

addressed in the EIS, and that this impact can be considerable, especially in small rural counties such

as many of those in Idaho. (0169) Another commenter stated that Utah taxpayers will have to pay for

accidents that could occur during the transportation of the SNF. (SL2-07)

Several commenters discussed emergency response to a fire. (0057, 0096, 0215, SL1-39, SL3-55) 

One commenter said that a volunteer fire chief from Tooele County stated that none of his emergency

response personnel will respond to a fire at the PFSF. (SL1-39, SL3-55) One commenter said that

there is little information in the DEIS on emergency response procedures for the rail transport from

reactor licensees around the country. The commenter added that the applicant is proposing to

“unitize” the shipment rather than mixing the transport with other freight. The commenter asked if

unitized shipments will include crews specifically trained in emergency response in addition to their

security duties. The commenter further stated that the FEIS should address emergency response

plans. (0240) The same commenter stated that the DEIS failed to demonstrate the economic and

technical feasibility of recovering and re-shipping such large rail casks in the event of significant loss

of shielding and/or containment as a result of a severe accident or terrorist attack. The commenter

suggested that the DEIS must further consider the possibility of such incidents occurring in difficult

terrain comparable to that found along potential rail routes identified in the DEIS, such as the Union

Pacific railroad between Granger, NV and Ogden, UT, between Carlin, NV and Wendover, UT, and

between Elgin, NV, and Black Rock, UT. (0204)

Another commenter requested that an analysis be performed of the level of emergency preparedness

along the likely shipping routes, and an analysis of requisite coordination and communications with

DOE’s Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program and with affected states and tribes. (0142)

Response:

The issues identified in the comments that are related to emergency response at the PFSF are not

directly related to the environmental review and the FEIS, but are instead related to the NRC staff’s

safety evaluation. Therefore, these comments related to the PFSF Emergency Plan are beyond the

scope of the FEIS.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-381 NUREG-1714

The NRC staff notes that the applicant provided in its application its Emergency Plan for the Private

Fuel Storage Facility (Rev 10). The NRC staff has reviewed this document and has found that it

meets the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32(a). This regulation outlines the required contents of an

emergency plan including the following information: identification of the types of accidents and

mitigation measures, notification and coordination with off-site organizations. The NRC staff

evaluation of this safety issue is included in Chapter 16 of the SER and does not need to be repeated

in the FEIS. 

Regarding transportation emergency response, all states provide emergency response for

transportation accidents involving hazardous materials. Upon arrival at an accident scene involving

any hazardous material in transit, a first responder is expected to protect public safety, secure the

area, and call for the assistance of additional response personnel as needed. Vehicle placards,

package labels, and shipping papers communicate information about the hazardous material to

emergency responders. The DOT published the "2000 Emergency Response Guidebook,"

(ERG2000) for carriers and State and local first responders to use during the initial phase of an

accident involving hazardous materials. ERG2000 is carried by hazardous materials carriers and

emergency response personnel, and includes guides for the initial response to accidents involving

various types of radioactive materials. Shipments of radioactive materials are already occurring

nationwide, including shipments within the State of Utah, and these shipments will continue regardless

of whether the proposed PFSF is constructed. In fact, spent fuel was shipped in Utah as recently as

June 2001. Therefore, the assumption that additional cost would be incurred for adequate training to

respond to potential transportation accidents involving SNF destined for PFS does not appear to be

justified.

Given that SNF casks are designed to withstand accidents, the most likely first responder actions at

the scene of an accident involving a spent fuel shipment would include confirming that the cask is

intact and that there has been no release of radioactive material. At that point, recovery operations,

which are the responsibility of the carrier, not the first responder, could commence. Although difficult

terrain could complicate recovery operations, there is no reason to believe these complications would

be insurmountable, given railroad operational experience with recovery from severe full train

derailments. First responders are not expected to be the only responders in the event of an accident

so severe that radioactive material is released. Under such very unlikely circumstances, the first

responder will call upon additional resources to deal with the event.

Shippers are required to provide an emergency response telephone number with the shipping papers

that accompany each shipment. The shipper must also assign a person, who is knowledgeable with

the shipment, its potential hazards, and mitigation actions to be taken in the event of an accident to

receive calls at that telephone number. Also, driver training is required by DOT, including crew

training for emergency situations and contacting and assisting first responders. 

Further, states are recognized as responsible for protecting public health and safety during

radiological transportation accidents. Each state has established a Radiation Control Program

Director, who can advise and assist in transportation emergency response procedures if requested by

state and local organizations. Finally, Federal agencies are prepared to monitor transportation

accidents, and provide assistance if requested by states to do so. Eight Federal Regional

Coordinating Offices, funded by the DOE, are maintained throughout the U.S. In these offices,

personnel are on 24-hour call, and are capable of responding to such emergencies with equipment

and experts that could advise on recovery and removal of the cask and site remediation.

More than 3 million radioactive material packages are shipped each year in the U.S. When accidents

have occurred, the system described above has proven effective in providing emergency response. 

This system would be used for emergency response involving current SNF shipments, and will be

available for shipments of SNF to the PFSF.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-382

G.3.16.11.2 Methods to Avoid Rail Transport Fires

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that rail transport fires could be avoided if the applicant accepted long-haul

shipments only by railroad and used either a dedicated train or empty buffer cars on both sides of the

cask car. The commenter stated that buffer cars could even contain fire fighting equipment and a

trained operator to put out any fires if the train wrecks, further improving safety. (0017)

Response:

The analysis as stated in the FEIS shows that even with conservative assumptions, the cumulative

radiological and non-radiological risks of transporting the SNF are small. However, the NRC staff

acknowledges the suggestions to reduce the risk of fires and to mitigate accidents with emergency

response actions (e.g., firefighting equipment). The commenter cites examples of these opportunities. 

While the NRC staff believes such measures could be applied as a pragmatic matter, the staff has not

proposed that they be required to mitigate environmental impacts because the staff has concluded

that these impacts would be small, as described in Section 5.8.4 of the FEIS, even without such

mitigation.

G.3.16.11.3 Community Notification of SNF Shipments

Comment Summary:

Two commenters stated that the DEIS did not address whether communities will be notified that the

hazardous materials are being shipped. (GR-05, SL3-21)

One commenter stated that the representative shipment route from the Maine Yankee nuclear reactor

discussed in the DEIS shows that once the applicant opened its doors to non-member nuclear reactor

licensees' high level wastes, dozens more states could suddenly find themselves subject to

unprecedented numbers of commercial SNF shipments and the associated risks to health, property

and the environment, without ever having been consulted nor even notified by the NRC. (0052)

Response:

The FEIS does not consider notification of communities of transport, because communities are not

required to be notified of shipment of SNF, or other hazardous material. Reactor SNF shipments are

transported under applicable NRC and DOT regulations. The NRC staff believes that SNF can be

transported without presenting an undue risk to public health and safety. The NRC regulations do not

require consultation with states prior to shipment. However, NRC regulations require notification of

governors of states through or in which SNF will travel. Specifically, 10 CFR 73.37(f) requires that

each licensee provide advance notification to state governors before the transport of SNF is made

through or across state boundaries. There is no requirement for the notification of communities as

suggested by the commenter, and such notification is beyond the scope of the FEIS; the FEIS does

not address such notification. Also see Section G.3.16.4.8.

G.3.16.11.4 PFS Emergency Plan

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant’s Emergency Plan limits transportation planning to the

proposed PFSF site itself, and the surrounding Tooele County area. The commenter added that the

plan does not consider intrastate transportation and interstate transportation planning requirements. 

The commenter asserted that this is not satisfactory considering the heavily populated regional

transportation corridors along which these dangerous cargoes may move. For example, the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-383 NUREG-1714

commenter stated that Salt Lake County is likely to be affected, but does not receive any planning

consideration. The commenter also asked the following questions: (1) What are the identified

transportation routes from the nuclear reactors to the ISFSI site?; (2) What specific Utah communities

will be affected, can they deal with a nuclear waste-related emergency, and what remedial or

enhanced emergency management measures will be required?; (3) What unique security-related

circumstances along the identified routes must be considered, what factors could make the shipments

vulnerable to sabotage or accident?; and (4) What is the overall hazard vulnerability of the transfer site

at the routes' end? The commenter said that these concerns must receive appropriate emergency

planning consideration. (0198h)

Response:

The issues identified in the comments that are related to emergency response at the PFSF are not

directly related to the environmental review and the FEIS, but are instead related to the NRC staff’s

safety evaluation. Therefore, these comments related to the PFSF Emergency Plan are beyond the

scope of the FEIS.

The applicant’s emergency plan is intended to address emergency response activities for the

proposed PFSF. The NRC staff reviewed the emergency response plan a determined that it is

acceptable as related in Chapter 16 of the SER. While SNF is in transit, it is subject to the emergency

response guidelines for hazardous materials in transit. Please refer to comment response

G.3.16.11.1 for details on emergency response guidelines for SNF in transit, and G.3.16.4.1 for details

on route identification. The NRC staff notes that security related issues for transportation were

addressed in the applicant’s Security Plan, which is discussed in the SER.

G.3.16.11.5 Emergency Response for Accidents at the ITF or on Skull Valley Road

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that management and handling of such a large volume of material will create a

high potential for accidents having significant consequences to public health and safety. The

commenter stated that the application does not address response action for accidents and fatalities

occurring either in the ITF area or in the applicant's transportation route along Skull Valley Road. 

(0198a)

Response:

The NRC reviewed accidents associated with the transfer operations at the ITF (i.e., removing the

cask from the railcar and placing it onto a heavy-haul truck) and concluded that they have a negligible

contribution to accident risk, because it is very unlikely that the conditions during transfer will exceed

cask design requirements. For example, the maximum reasonable drop height at the ITF would be

less severe than the 10 CFR Part 71 cask certification drop test height of 30 feet onto an unyielding

surface. 

As discussed in the FEIS, the accident dose risk for the transport of SNF on Skull Valley Road by a

heavy-haul truck is small, estimated to be 1.08X10-5 person-rem annually. Therefore, the NRC staff

believes that a significant accident involving emergency response at the ITF or while transporting SNF

along Skull Valley Road is unlikely. Nevertheless, the SNF cask is still in transit while it is at the ITF or

being transported along Skull Valley Road and emergency response activities and capabilities would

be the same as those described in G.3.16.11.1.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-384

G.3.16.11.6 DEIS Does Not Discuss Contingency Plans for Spills

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS contains no description of contingency plans to deal with

radiation spills. (0198, 0198g)

The commenter stated that one of the STB criteria of great concern is 49 CFR 1105.7(e)(7), which

requires a description of “contingency plans to deal with accidental spills.” The commenter further

added that the DEIS contains no description of contingency plans to deal with radiation spills, and that

this is not just a regulatory violation but a failure to address a major mitigation measure. The

commenter suggested that the DEIS be substantially revised to address the potential for accidental

spills and contingency planning for those spills. The commenter asserted that in order to describe

contingency plans, the DEIS must first describe how material may be released and dispersed, i.e., the

extent of the spill, which would involve an analysis of the range of potential credible accidents, and the

consequences of these accidents. The commenter also stated that accidents should include credible

and foreseeable accidents due to derailments, fire or purposeful sabotage, and that the DEIS should

describe the environmental impact of these accidents, including the degree of environmental

contamination that can be expected, and the adverse health effects that can be expected. The

commenter also suggested that the DEIS describe the type of contingency measures that are needed,

including evacuation and cleanup, the cost of those measures, and how and by whom they will be

carried out. (0198g)

The commenter further stated that in declining to assess the impact of providing for and training

emergency responders and the emergency response plan, the NRC staff has not met the regulatory

requirements of one of its Cooperating Agencies, the STB. (0198g)

The commenter also stated that STB regulations at 49 CFR 1105.7(e)(7)(ii) require the DEIS to

identify the materials and quantity; the frequency of service; the safety practices (including any speed

restrictions); the applicant’s safety record on derailments, accidents and hazardous spills; the

contingency plans to deal with accidental spills; and the likelihood of an accidental release of

hazardous materials. However, the comment stated the DEIS is gravely deficient on these matters. 

The commenter agreed that the frequency of service is described, but contended that the safety

practices and the safety record on derailments using the 3-axle fixed trolley type of cars the applicant

intends to employ, are not described at all. (0198g)

Response:

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies reviewed the Application of Construction and Operation

Authority submitted to the STB, as well as the ER, SAR, and Emergency Plan, submitted to the NRC. 

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies determined that the application contained sufficient

information to conclude that contingency plans are adequately addressed under existing regulatory

requirements. These emergency response requirements are described in Section 5.7.2.5 of the FEIS. 

The STB’s requirement in 49 CFR 1105.7(e)(7) to describe contingency plans refers to information

that should be included in Environmental Reports. The requirement does not refer to EISs.

As described in Sections 4.7.2.3 and 5.7.2.2 of the DEIS, the potential for accidental spills requested

by the commenter is considered to be small. As discussed in the general transportation response, in

Section G.2, the NRC staff’s transportation analysis considered a broad range of accidents and

provided a conservative estimate of the risk of a transportation accident in the FEIS. The analysis is

not limited to accidents the NRC considers as credible. The NRC staff believes the approach used in

the FEIS is appropriate.

Section 5.2 of the DEIS discussed proposed mitigation activities for non-radiological spills along the

proposed rail line. Also, comment response G.3.16.12.8 of this appendix provides a more detailed
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-385 NUREG-1714

discussion of proposed mitigation measures for non-radiological spills along the rail line. The NRC 

staff believes it is unlikely that an accident resulting in a release of radioactive material will occur on

the proposed rail line. However, emergency response for any accident on the proposed rail line will be

the same for any hazardous material in transit.

The transportation of SNF is regulated under 49 CFR Part 173 (“Shippers - General Requirements for

Shipments and Packages”). Other regulations pertaining to the transport of materials to the proposed

PFSF are 49 CFR 172 (“Hazardous Materials Tables, Special Provisions, Hazardous Material

Communications, Emergency Response Information, and Training Requirements”), and 49 CFR 174

(“Carriage by Rail”). DOT driver training requirements in HM-164 (49 CFR Parts 171-173 and 177)

include crew training for emergency situations, including contacting and assisting first responders. 

Drivers also must maintain contact information for remediation contractors. The NRC’s physical

protection regulations require continuing contact between the shippers and the crew throughout the

course of the shipment. In urban areas, armed escorts who can render assistance and summon aid

must be available. All of these provisions will ensure prompt notification of proper authorities in the

event of accidents or other events of concern. Hazardous material carriers have remediation

contractors on call to respond to accidents, as necessary.

The NRC staff and the Cooperating Agencies considered the safety reporting requirements of the STB

regulations found at 49 CFR 1105.7. The DEIS described the effects of the proposed action on public

health and safety in Section 4.7, “Human Health Impacts,” and Chapter 5, “Transportation Impacts of

the Proposed Action.” The DEIS described the amount of SNF to be transported and the frequency of

service in Section 2.1.2.1, “Transportation of Spent Fuel to the Proposed PFSF.” Chapter 5 of the

DEIS also described that the transport of the SNF is regulated by both the DOT and the NRC. 

Adequate protection of the public health or safety with respect to SNF shipments is provided, to a

large degree, by the casks that contain the SNF. These casks must meet the performance

requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. The NRC must also certify the cask design. The NRC staff and the

Cooperating Agencies examined safety records, past accidents, and accident scenarios (see NUREGCR-4929, “Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditions”) as

part of the safety analysis.

G.3.16.12 Non-Radiological Transportation Impacts

G.3.16.12.1 Impact to Transportation Infrastructure

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the DEIS did not address the impacts to the transportation infrastructure

adequately. The commenter also stated that infrastructure costs were ignored. (0012, SL1-01)

Response:

The NRC staff addressed the impacts to transportation infrastructure in the local impact area in DEIS

Sections 4.5.1.6, 4.5.2.6, 5.5.1.1, 5.5.1.2, and 5.5.2. No significant impacts to transportation

infrastructure will be incurred outside the local impact area. Other than the cost of the proposed rail

line or ITF, no other transportation infrastructure cost are expected to be incurred. The approximately

50 SNF trains per year resulting from the proposed transports does not represent a significant

increase in rail traffic. Therefore, it is not expected that significant infrastructure cost would be

incurred. The cost of the proposed rail line was included in the cost benefit analysis in the DEIS. 

While the NRC staff recognizes that if the ITF is used, the State of Utah may require the applicant to

improve the road before granting a permit, the NRC staff has not attempted to speculate on the type or

cost of road improvements the State of Utah might impose. However, it is expected that the applicant

would be responsible for the cost of all road improvements for Skull Valley Road. The NRC staff

believes the analysis for this issue in the FEIS is adequate. 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-386

G.3.16.12.2 SNF Transportation Standards and Impacts to Rail Traffic

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS should address the physical clearance limits (height, weight) of

the package. The commenter stated that the License Application is silent on whether the proposed

SNF shipments will meet the "special train guidelines" established by Union Pacific for hazardous

materials (or heavy load) shipments (e.g., would the combined center of gravity [rail car and load]

exceed the AAR interchange rules, thus warranting special train consideration, such as speed limits

and train delays). (0198i) 

The commenter also expressed concern with operational considerations and stated that increasing

consolidation and abandonments of rail lines due to mergers has resulted in increasing traffic

densities on the remaining lines. Key east-west and north-south interchanges have been

experiencing severe-traffic delays and congestion. The commenter stated that these delays directly

affect the throughput of proposed SNF rail shipments and increases the statistical probability and

severity of potential accidents. (0198i)

The commenter asserted that the poor experience of Union Pacific in meeting (and mitigating)

congested bottlenecks suggests the need to significantly improve line haul capacity and supporting

infrastructure in the corridor and destination travel lines, and institution of expensive operational

improvements (such as in-transit rail welding and "maintenance on the fly"). The commenter stated

that these costs have generally been included directly through contributions to transport infrastructure

from shippers or have been included in higher rates. The commenter stated that the license

application is silent on the proposed project's contribution to reducing such potential bottlenecks in the

Salt Lake City metropolitan area, but this should be considered in the EIS. (0198i) The commenter

stated that the EIS should also examine the potential bottlenecking effect of focusing a large number

of SNF shipments, originating all over the United States, on a single geographic area. (0198h) 

Another commenter stated that an analysis of alternative operating protocols should be addressed. 

For example, the EIS should consider the impacts of using special train protocols (dedicated trains

traveling a maximum of 35 mph with one train stopping when another train passes [referred to as

“meets and passes”]). (0142)

One commenter stated that the EIS should address the rail line and highway weight limits and

highway heavy-haul requirements associated with the heavy rail casks. The commenter stated that

these include the bridges, trestles, switching, and secondary lines (rail), as well as the State bridges

and arterial roads in the vicinity of the proposed site, and the feeder lines (rail) throughout the Salt

Lake City, Ogden, and Provo interchanges. (0198i)

Response:

The applicant has committed [PFS/RAI1 February 18, 1999] to complying with the Association of

American Railroads’ (AAR’s) Performance Standard for Spent Nuclear Fuel Trains. One objective of

that specification is to provide a dedicated cask/car/train system that ensures safe transportation of

SNF casks and to allow timetable speeds with no restrictions on “meets or passes.” As noted in the

DEIS (page 2-16), the applicant would use two single-purpose, dedicated trains that would proceed

from the originating reactor site directly to Skull Valley, Utah, stopping only for crew changes,

refueling, and periodic inspections. Therefore, the applicant’s SNF train speeds and operations

should not result in bottlenecks, or other disruptions, to overall rail traffic. 

Also, the approximately 50 SNF trains per year resulting from the proposed transports does not

represent a significant increase in rail traffic. The DEIS (page 5-2) addressed the impacts on

proposed rail traffic; specifically, the increases in the number of trains or gross ton-miles do not

exceed STB thresholds for determining environmental impacts on operations. Finally, in preparing the

DEIS, the NRC staff presumed that as a matter of contracting with a common carrier (e.g., rail
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-387 NUREG-1714

company) in offering the SNF for transport, the shipper will necessarily satisfy each carrier’s applicable

clearance requirements (such as the Union Pacific railroad’s special train guidelines asserted by the

commenter), and that such clearance requirements do not significantly affect the DEIS’s assessed 

environmental impacts or the NRC staff’s conclusion that those impacts are small.

G.3.16.12.3 Impact of Further Railroad Consolidation on PFS Project

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern that the railroad industry has become a monopoly and stated that

a few years ago there was a backlog of abandoned freight cars. The commenter was concerned that

the impacts to the project if there is consolidation or de-consolidation of the railroad industry in the

future should be addressed in the EIS. (SL3-09)

Response:

The railroad industry continues to provide competitive rail service for shippers across the U.S. The

STB is the regulatory agency with responsibility for reviewing mergers of the major rail carriers

(Class I). As part of its reviews, the STB considers the impact of a proposed merger on the

competitive rail freight industry. The STB is not able to speculate on the potential impacts on this

proposed project of future railroad consolidation or de-consolidation, however it has been the STB’s

practice to implement a review and oversight period after approval of a merger to monitor railroad

operations, safety, and competitive service. For the proposed PFSF, the transport of the SNF across

the U.S. will be by dedicated train (a train carrying only the SNF) so it will not be affected by the

availability of freight cars. As stated above, the volume of train traffic associated with the proposed

action would not have a significant impact on the regional or national rail system.

G.3.16.12.4 BMPs and Emergency Response to Spills at ITF and Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that explosion and fire hazards from SNF at the ITF area and proposed PFSF

location should be addressed. The commenter stated that the DEIS discussion of spill mitigation has

inconsistencies as follows:

C Section 5.2.1.4 (page 5-8, lines 30 and 31) states that "spills could be mitigated through

implementation of BMPs" to clean up spills "before water quality impacts occur." However, the

BMPs list on page 1-26 has no such provision. The commenter asked how a BMP that does not

exist can be implemented. 

C Page 5-9 (line 23) states that "emergency response could intercept and clean up the spill,

contaminated surface water, and contaminated soils to mitigate the impact." However,

emergency response is not in the BMPs list. The commenter asked what emergency response

provisions this refers to, and who (Utah Division of Environmental Response and Remediation,

Tooele County, or the applicant) would respond.

C Page 5-10 (line 26) states that at the ITF, "a spill response action could be taken to prevent any

impact to groundwater." The commenter asserted that a spill will likely affect groundwater and

asked who is going to respond.

C Page 5-10 (line 30) states that the nature of the proposed activities is not likely to cause

accidental spills. The commenter asserted that if the ITF is intended to be used for fueling, it is

likely to experience spills.
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NUREG-1714 G-388

This commenter expressed concern that the Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasures Plan is

not referenced for the proposed alternative, only Alternative 3. (0039, 0077) 

Response:

As described in Section 2.2.4.2 in this FEIS, there would be no fueling operations at the ITF. The

heavy-haul vehicles would be fueled at the proposed PFSF on the Reservation. The NRC's SER has

addressed and evaluated fire hazards at the proposed PFSF.

The BMPs for this proposed project are not limited to the list in Table 2.7. Although the likelihood is

low, the environmental team who prepared this FEIS agree that a plan is needed to minimize the

impact of a spill along the proposed rail line or at the ITF. The Applicant will prepare a Best

Management Practices Plan to deal with spills on the site and along the rail line. To ensure that

construction and operational activities will not lead to contamination of groundwater, the Cooperating

Agencies have proposed that PFS be required to implement a Best Management Practices Plan that

would include a spill response procedure for appropriately responding to a spill of oil or fuel at the

proposed PFSF or related transportation facilities. This procedure would address spills on site, at the

rail siding, or along the rail line. To the same end, the Cooperating Agencies have also proposed that

PFS be required to be responsible for clean-up of any spills or accidents on the PFSF, at the rail

siding, and along the right-of-way for the rail line, in accordance with applicable standards. See

Section 9.4.2 in this FEIS.

The commenters did not supply any new analysis or studies to contradict that finding. Therefore,

claims of potential groundwater contamination from the release of radioactive material are without

basis.

G.3.16.12.5 Impact of Proposed Rail Line on Wildfire Risk and Impacts

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant’s ER and the right-of-way application failed to give adequate

consideration to the potential for fire hazards and the impediment to response to wild fires associated

with constructing and operating the applicant's proposed rail line. The commenter stated that the

applicant’s proposed movement of casks by locomotive in the Low rail line corridor presents a new

wildfire ignition source. The commenter stated that construction, operation, and activities associated

with the rail line will introduce a new fire source into an area that already has a high incidence for

wildfires. The commenter also stated that the proposed rail line would create an impediment to

fighting wild fires, noting that area responders typically drive four-wheel drive vehicles to fight wild land

fires and that hand crews may also be used, whereas heavy equipment is generally not used because

of the damage it may cause to the fragile ecosystem. The commenter stated that the four-wheel drive

vehicles carry a water tank containing 200-300 gallons of water and will have difficulty directly

crossing the rail line. The commenter stated that the presence of hazardous material such as SNF

may further endanger responders as well as impede their fire fighting activities around such hazardous

material because firefighters will be reluctant to pursue a wildfire in the vicinity of a train load of SNF

casks. (0198, 0198i) 

Response:

As stated in Section 5.8.4 of the DEIS, there is no evidence that the proposed new rail line would be

more prone to cause fires than any other railroad operations in BLM's Salt Lake District. Also as
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explained in that section, lightning accounts for the overwhelming majority of wildfires in the district. 

The NRC staff concluded that the proposed new rail line would not contribute significantly to the

existing risk of fire in Skull Valley.

As explained in Section 5.8.4, the revegetation plan for the proposed rail line could serve as a "green

strip" to help prevent the spread of wildfires. This section also discusses the potential for the new rail

line to interfere with fire-fighting efforts in Skull Valley. The proposed rail line would include several rail

crossings that would minimize the potential for the elevated railbed to adversely affect fire-fighting

efforts in Skull Valley. The mitigation measures that would be a required part of any license, lease, or

ROW approvals appear in Section 9.4.2 in this FEIS. Condition 2K of the mitigation measures, listed

in Section 9.4.2, specifies that the design, number and locations of all rail crossings would be

developed in consultation with the BLM.

G.3.16.12.6 Acceptable Risks vs. Unacceptable Risks

Comment Summary: 

One commenter objected to a statement on page xliii, lines 14-17 of the Executive Summary to the

DEIS. The commenter expressed concern that this statement implies that acceptable risks (i.e., risks

which we as human beings choose to take) are equivalent to unacceptable risks (i.e., risks that require

mitigation). (0096)

Response:

The information in lines 14-17, page xliii, of the Executive Summary of the DEIS means that the

expected dose to the public along transportation routes would be a small fraction of that which the

general public receives from natural sources. 

G.3.16.13 Indirect and Cumulative Impacts 

G.3.18.13.1 Potential Transportation Accidents Resulting from Aircraft Accidents

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant has completely failed to apply any aircraft accident scenarios

to the ITF or to the proposed cask transportation route, including along Skull Valley Road as required

by 10 CFR 72.90, 72.94, and 72.108, nor has the applicant made any mention of what airways,

military or commercial, pass over these areas. The commenter asserted that flight pattern J154 flies

directly over the ITF. The commenter stated that the applicant provides no basis for its assertion that

the casks and the facility need not be "designed to withstand the direct impact of an aircraft crash"

because such an accident is not a "credible event" (commenter references SAR at page 2.2-3 and EP

at page 2-15). The commenter added that given the high level of military aircraft activity in the area,

and the fact that this activity includes transport of live munitions. The commenter concluded that the

applicant should not be granted a license unless it evaluates the risks posed by aircraft accident

scenarios to the ITF and the casks themselves as they travel on trucks or railcars to the ISFSI. 

(0198a)

Response:

The DEIS considers potential accidents that could occur during the transport of SNF to the proposed

PFSF. While the NRC staff has not attempted to calculate the probability of a cask in transit being hit

by a military aircraft or live munitions, the staff consider such an accident scenario to be very remote

and speculative. The NRC staff evaluated the probability of a storage cask at the proposed PFSF

being hit by an aircraft or live munitions and determined that the probability was less than one in a

million chance (<10-6). The likelihood of hitting a transportation cask is at least as unlikely, since it is
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-390

not always present (rail shipments one to two times a week) at the facility, it is much smaller than the

facility, and it is moving.

G.3.16.13.2 The DEIS Should Consider the Cumulative Impacts of Shipping Hazardous

 Materials Through the State of Utah

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS should examine the cumulative impacts of shipping various kinds

of dangerous materials through the State, including cumulative risks of normal and accidental

exposure to toxic materials and risks of accidental collisions. The commenter added that the EIS

should also evaluate the interaction of SNF transportation to and from the proposed PFSF on other

activities in the area. The comment specifically stated that:

For instance, State Route 196, a two-lane blacktop road that runs north-south from I-80 at

Rowley Junction to Dugway Proving Ground, is the route defined by the applicant for

transportation of SNF rods by heavy-haul truck. The EIS must evaluate other uses and

priorities for this route, including the fact that it is the primary surface transportation route for

Dugway Proving Ground, and is one of three emergency evacuation routes for the nearby

chemical weapons incinerator at Deseret Chemical Depot. It is also the sole access for the

community of Iosepa, Utah, the adjacent ranching community, and residents of Skull Valley

Reservation.

The commenter concluded that there is also a need to evaluate the impacts of upgrading or widening

the road, if that is the transportation corridor for transportation of SNF or as a result of increased traffic

and use of the state route. (0198h)

The same commenter stated that the applicant has failed to identify, examine, and evaluate the

potential cumulative effects of the many land uses presently existing in the region. The commenter

added that, in addition to Dugway Proving Ground transporting conventional munitions along Skull

Valley Road, as the applicant discusses (SAR at page 2.2-2), Dugway also transports various

chemical agents used for testing. The commenter suggested that the applicant evaluate the potential

impacts of an accident involving chemical agent, including an accident caused by increased heavyhaul truck traffic on Skull Valley Road. (0198a)

Response:

These comments are based on the applicant’s ER. The transportation analyses presented in Section

5.7 of this FEIS addresses the concerns expressed in the comment.

In regard to transportation routes and the potential impacts of their use to local communities and

nearby facilities, the current proposal involves only rail routes for the shipment of SNF and, hence,

would not produce the type of highway impacts described in the comment. However, for the

alternative ITF, Section 5.5 of the FEIS discusses the impacts to traffic from the use of Skull Valley

Road for SNF transport to the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff concluded that the small number of

shipments each week, an average of four round trips, would not result in a significant impact. The

FEIS also includes in Section 5.1.4 possible mitigation measures to further reduce the impact. 

Therefore, if Skull Valley Road is used to transport SNF to the site, the infrequent number of

shipments (on average four roundtrips per week), would make the likelihood of an accident involving

an SNF cask and a vehicle carrying chemical agents low.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-391 NUREG-1714

G.3.16.13.3 Possible Transportation Impacts Resulting from Other Nearby Hazardous Facilities

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the applicant has inadequately considered credible accidents caused by

external events and facilities affecting the proposed PFSF, the ITF, and transportation corridor along

Skull Valley Road, including the cumulative effects of the nearby hazardous waste and military testing

facilities in the vicinity. (0198a)

The commenter stated that the applicant is required, to identify, examine, and evaluate the frequency

and severity of external natural and man-induced events that could affect the safe operation of the

proposed facility design, as well as the past and present man-made facilities and activities that may

endanger the proposed facility, as required by 10 CFR 72.90 and 72.94; see also, 72.98, 72.100,

72.108, and 72.122. (0198a)

The commenter indicated that the applicant should consider the impacts of the proposed PFSF on

activities at other industrial facilities such as the Army’s chemical weapons incinerator (TOCDF),

Dugway Proving Grounds, or the Utah Test and Training Range. The commenter stated that an

accident involving SNF casks may cause other facilities such as TOCDF to be evacuated, and

conversely, an accident at TOCDF may cause evacuation of the proposed PFSF or the ITF. (0198a)

The same commenter stated that the applicant failed to identify, examine or evaluate the potential

cumulative effects of the concurrent transport of SNF and other hazardous materials in the region. 

The commenter stated that other hazardous materials are transported on the same rail or highway

routes the applicant proposes to use, or are transported in the vicinity of the proposed PFSF or ITF. 

The commenter expressed concern that the applicant's proposed activities involving movement of high

level nuclear waste increase the potential for accidents associated with the transportation and

handling of these other types of waste. The commenter stated that the applicant should also address

the potential safety and security impacts from SNF or other hazardous materials remaining in rail

yards while awaiting shipment to a final destination, as well as the impact of such an occurrence. 

(0198a)

Response:

The NRC staff notes the comment. The issues identified in this comment focus on safety issues, and

are not directly related to the environmental review but are instead related to the NRC’s staff’s safety

evaluation and, therefore, are outside the scope of the FEIS. The NRC safety evaluation considered

other nearby industrial facilities to determine if any credible accident scenarios such as those

suggested by the commenter exist that may endanger the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff evaluated

the potential accidents resulting from the operation of the proposed PFSF, and concluded that there

are no credible accidents that would result in a release of radioactive materials.
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G-393 NUREG-1714

G.3.17 Other Environmental Impacts

G.3.17.1 Scenic Qualities

G.3.17.1.1 General Comments

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters stated that the DEIS does not adequately characterize or address impacts to

scenic quality. (SL1-11, SL3-40) Commenters made the following statements about particular scenic

topics:

C One commenter stated that the project would have a negative impact on the view of the Goshute

Valley from Stansbury Mountain. (SL3-40)

C One commenter stated that a discussion of Horseshoe Springs and the Reservation should be

included in the DEIS description of the existing visual environment (pages 4-52 & 4-53,

Figure 4.2). (0096)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS is contradictory in its discussion of scenic qualities. The

commenter stated that in one place the DEIS indicated that impacts to scenic qualities cannot be

completely mitigated and in other places it stated that impacts to scenic qualities can be

completely mitigated once the facility and rail line are decommissioned and removed. The

commenter stated that scars from wagons along the Mormon and Oregon Trails, which were

created 150 years ago in comparable arid environments, are still evident. The commenter also

stated that no comparable facility has ever been decommissioned, that there is no evidence in the

DEIS to support this assertion, and that scenic quality impacts cannot be completely mitigated. 

(0112, SL1-11)

C The same commenter stated that the proposed change of scenic quality in Skull Valley would not

represent a “small to medium” impact to residents, as described in the DEIS, but a very dramatic

impact. The commenter pointed out that the previous culture inhabiting the land had a religious

heritage of absolute respect for the land and prohibited any imposed use. The commenter stated

that a violation of scenic quality constitutes a violation of environmental justice. (0112)

C One commenter questioned the qualifications of the EIS preparers to evaluate aesthetic impacts

of this particular project in this region of the country and to evaluate what would constitute

appropriate landscape mitigation. (0198i)

Response: 

The NRC staff notes the comments and recognizes that individual perspectives will vary widely in the

qualitative significance they attribute to the scenic changes resulting from the proposed PFSF. The

NRC staff evaluated the effect the proposed PFSF would have on the scenic quality of Skull Valley. 

This analysis considered the visual impact from several vantage points, including the Stansbury

Mountains. As set forth in Sections 4.8.2 and 5.8.2, the visual impacts are moderate. In addition to

the NRC staff’s qualitative assessment included in Section 4.8.2 of this FEIS, artist renderings and

photographs have been incorporated.

With regard to the comment on the visual resources of the Horseshoe Springs and the Reservation,

the description in Sections 3.8.2 and 4.8.2 in the EIS have been reviewed and determined to be

adequate for the purpose of evaluating impacts. Neither the proposed PFSF nor the rail line could be

visible from Horseshoe Springs; hence, there would be no impact to the visual resources. Section

4.8.2 describes how the proposed PFSF would be visible from the Goshute Village, and Figure 4.6

illustrates the nature of the impacts to visual resources that would be affected.
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NUREG-1714 G-394

The Cooperating Agencies recognize the Native Americans’ respect for the land and the importance of

it to their culture. To ensure the impact of the proposed action was properly understood, the

Cooperating Agencies consulted with the Skull Valley Band and other Federally recognized Indian

Tribes and organizations, including the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation, regarding

the potential impact of the proposed PFSF on Native American culture and land use. The Skull Valley

Band and other Federally recognized Indian Tribes informed the Cooperating Agencies that the

proposed PFSF would not affect any cultural properties, including religious sites, or affect any cultural

use of the land. For additional discussions of environmental justice impacts on Native Americans, see

G.3.18.3.

Regarding the statement that there are contradictions in the DEIS, this FEIS Section 4.8.2 indicates

that the proposed PFSF scenic quality impacts could not be completely mitigated during operation of

the facility due to the industrial nature of the proposed PFSF. However, under the proposed lease the

applicant has indicated that the extent of removal of buildings and other structures would depend on

the needs of the Skull Valley Band and the BIA. Whether impacts are completely mitigated after the

proposed PFSF is decommissioned would depend on whether all facilities are removed and whether

the landscape is recontoured to its original condition (see Section 6.4.8.2). If there is a desire to

remove all buildings and revegetate to the way the area looked prior to construction, the applicant

would do that. The Skull Valley Band and the BIA would determine the extent of building improvement

or removal as part of the Non-radiological Decommissioning Plan to be approved by the BIA. The

Decommissioning Plan required by 10 CFR Part 72 would be subject to the NRC’s review, including

environmental review. The NRC staff reviewed the data regarding visual qualities and concluded the

impacts are small to moderate.

A technical expert qualified to evaluate aesthetic effects for the Skull Valley landscape reviewed the

visual impacts of the proposed action. Staff qualifications are presented in Section 11.1.

G.3.17.1.2 Landscaping

Comment Summary: 

One commenter questioned why visual simulations, about the aesthetic analysis of the proposed

PFSF, were not prepared for the DEIS. The commenter further stated that if the proposed grid layout

had been compared in visual simulations, the color blending would be shown to be insignificant

compared to the “brutal intrusion” of the upright casks and their color. According to the commenter,

landscape improvements would not serve to mitigate this impact. (0112) Another commenter stated

that the DEIS discussed color blending, but did not show any visual simulation models in color. 

(SL1-11) 

One commenter stated that “landscaping” would constitute a totally alien intrusion upon Skull Valley. 

The commenter questioned whether the proposed PFSF would really “blend” with “surrounding land

colors.” (0198i)

Response: 

The NRC staff agrees that color blending and landscaping could not completely mitigate the visual

contrast of the casks. Visual simulations beyond the artist renderings in Figures 4.3 through 4.7, were

not considered necessary to indicate the potential impacts.

G.3.17.1.3 Visual Impact of Transportation Activities

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that while the applicant may consider the area a “barren landscape,” the

aesthetic use and enjoyment of the area by the public should nonetheless be analyzed. The
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G-395 NUREG-1714

commenter stated that the applicant’s license application does not take into account how the visual

impact of its proposed PFSF and the transportation of casks along Skull Valley Road would detract

from visitors’ enjoyment of Deseret Peak, the Deseret Wilderness Area, and the Wasatch National

Forest in the Stansbury Mountains. The commenter further stated that the applicant has not

addressed how its activities would affect the public’s aesthetic enjoyment of public lands and

Horseshoe Springs, located directly off Skull Valley Road and 15 miles north of the proposed PFSF. 

The commenter stated that public access is allowed on the public lands adjacent to the proposed

PFSF, which are managed by the BLM, and that typical activities enjoyed by the public include offhighway vehicle use, camping, and hunting. The commenter also stated that Horseshoe Springs is a

protected recreational area with ponds and hiking trails where typical activities include fishing, hunting,

and bird watching. The commenter stated that the applicant must objectively consider the impact that

its proposed PFSF and the transportation of casks would have on these activities. (0198a)

The same commenter stated that no account has been taken of the visual impact the railroad will have

on the nearby BLM-managed Cedar Mountains WSA or other locations in Skull Valley. The Cedar

Mountains WSA is parallel to and west of the applicant’s rail line. The commenter stated that the

WSA boundary in some places is less than two miles from the railroad. (0198c, 0198i)

A commenter indicated that the DEIS stated that the distance between the rail line and Goshute

Village is approximately 12 miles, but that the distance between the rail line and the village will range

from approximately 3 miles at its shortest distance to 32 miles at its longest distance. However, the

commenter stated that even from the shortest point to the village, the rail line will not be easily visible

because of its low elevation. (0163)

Response: 

Section 4.8.2 of this FEIS indicates that the changes in the visual landscape would constitute small to

moderate impacts. Recreational users in Skull Valley, including the users of the Stanbury Mountains,

Cedar Mountains, along Skull Valley Road, and in areas adjacent to the Valley, would be able to view

the proposed PFSF. Section 5.8.2 addresses impacts from transportation on scenic qualities,

including recreational viewers. Recreational users in Skull Valley and in areas adjacent to the Valley,

including the Cedar Mountains and Stanbury Mountains, would be able to view the new rail line and

siding and the proposed ITF. Section 5.8.3 discusses impacts on the recreational use of the area.

This FEIS indicates that construction and operation of the proposed PFSF would change the visual

qualities of Skull Valley and would result in moderate visual impacts for recreational users (see

Sections 4.8.2 and 5.8.2). Recreational users of areas such as Horseshoe Springs may experience

delays to the extent that they use the Skull Valley Road to access these areas, but this would

constitute a small impact. During operation of the proposed PFSF, heavy-haul trucks may carry SNF

on the Skull Valley Road (see Section 5.8.3.2). Rail line construction would decrease the impacts of

delays as it would not be necessary to use heavy-haul trucks.

An account of the visual impact the railroad would have on the lands managed by the BLM was

documented in Section 5.8.2. Section 5.8.2 recognizes that there would be a moderate visual impact

to recreational viewers from construction and operation of the proposed rail line.

G.3.17.2 Recreation

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the EIS discussion of recreation resources and opportunities for recreation

should include the availability of sacred land and the absence of truck and rail traffic. Other

comparable recreational resources are not identified in the DEIS. (0112)
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NUREG-1714 G-396

One commenter stated that the applicant’s 26-mile north-south railroad along Skull Valley would

impede recreational users and ranchers from their established ability to cross Skull Valley (ER Rev. 1

at 4.4-8). While the ER stated that the proposed rail line would cross several roads, it is unclear

whether the proposed project would include construction of rail crossings for all roads, including dirt

jeep trails. The commenter stated that the ER failed to quantify adequately the costs or evaluate the

cumulative impacts associated with the railroad as they relate to recreational users and ranchers and,

thus, the ER does not meet the requirements of NEPA. (0198c)

Response: 

Section 3.8.3 of this FEIS addresses recreational resources and opportunities in the impact region. 

This discussion identifies opportunities for recreation that would not be impaired by the presence of

vehicular traffic of any kind in the BLM-managed Deseret Peak Wilderness and Cedar Mountains

WSA. The NRC staff concluded recreational impacts would be small (Section 5.8.3). As discussed in

Section 3.6.2.2, “Native American Properties,” the NRC staff is unaware of any sacred lands in the

impact region.

Sections 5.5 and 5.8.3 address the potential impacts of the proposed rail line to off-road vehicle users,

ranchers, and grazing activity. The NRC staff concluded that the construction of the proposed rail line

could reduce the use of public lands for recreation purposes, including the possible addition of

obstacles (in the form of elevated roadbed) to existing unimproved roads (“jeep roads”), trails, or

paths, and delays in access to public lands for recreational use during the work week, but not during

weekends (see Section 5.8.3). The NRC also concluded that grazing and ranching activities could be

curtailed temporarily during construction of the proposed rail line but that those impacts should be

lessened during operation (Section 5.5).

G.3.17.3 Wildfire

G.3.17.3.1 General Comments

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the DEIS did not adequately address the risk and impacts associated

with wildfire, including fires sparked by train operations in Skull Valley. (0012, 0201, 0246, SL1-01,

SL1-18, SL1-34, SL3-40, SL3-43, SL3-47) Commenters stated the following:

C One commenter stated that EIS must evaluate the effect of severe wildfires that occur in Skull

Valley as they relate to the proposed site, and whether sufficient resources are available to the

applicant to avoid or extinguish a wildfire. (0198h)

C Another commenter stated that the proposed fire suppression is inadequate. (SL3-43)

C One commenter stated that wood power poles could pose a fire danger, and steel should be

required. (0198)

C Another commenter stated that 250 acres recently burned in Stansbury Valley. (SL3-40)

C One commenter stated that wildfire is not an issue for the proposed PFSF. (SL3-57)

C Two commenters stated that Skull Valley suffers from annual range fires because cheatgrass

invades large areas. The areas of cheatgrass invasion become larger after each fire, which

renders the area susceptible to fires. The proposed PFSF would be within an area that already

frequently burns. This FEIS should address measures that would be taken to avoid a fire and

measures that would be taken to protect the proposed PFSF in the event of a fire. (0047, 0089)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-397 NUREG-1714

Response: 

The NRC staff considered the comments it received regarding wildfire risks and concluded that

Section 5.8.4 of this FEIS adequately addresses the risks of wildfires along the proposed rail line. 

Table 5.17 of the DEIS showed that a total of 888 fires occurred in the BLM’s Salt Lake District from

1989 through 1998, and 1.7 percent (15 fires) were caused by railroads. Given the expected level of

use (1-2 trains per week), the presence of the proposed rail line would not add significantly to the

existing risk of fire in Skull Valley, nor significantly impede responders to fires.

In response to the comments, a new Section 4.8.4 has been incorporated into this FEIS to discuss

impacts of the proposed PFSF on wildfires. The applicant would surround the proposed PFSF with

vegetation (i.e., crested wheatgrass) that would serve to resist fire. A layer of gravel would cover the

storage area itself and the area would remain clear of combustible material. The proposed PFSF

would include fire-fighting capability, and might need to rely upon the assistance of Tooele County. 

The wood power poles planned for the proposed PFSF would not significantly increase the risk of

wildfires compared to those posed by the power poles that already exist along Skull Valley Road. See

discussion in Section G.3.15.6.1 above.

G.3.17.3.2 Military Activity and Wildfires

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that Section 10-1 of the DEIS did not include the DOD in the list of nine

Federal agencies that have been consulted to provide data, regulatory information, or jurisdictional

information for the EIS. The commenter stated that other than lightning, the single most likely cause

of fire at the proposed PFSF would be errant flares and/or other accidental discharges from military

aircraft and missiles in the immediate area. The commenter indicated that Dugway Proving Ground is

less than 7 miles from the proposed “Restricted Area,” and questioned why neither the DOD nor Hill

AFB provided comment. The commenter stated that the DEIS does not reference a range fire, which

could not be controlled, that was ignited by a USAF flare. The flare destroyed all of the vegetation on

Fremont Island. The commenter stated that the distance of Skull Valley from fire fighting equipment

and manpower is comparable to the Fremont Island situation. (0112)

Response: 

Prior to the DEIS publication, the NRC staff consulted with representatives of both Hill AFB and

Dugway Proving Ground, who were inadvertently omitted from the list in Chapter 10. In response to

the comment, the list in Chapter 10 of this FEIS reflects the consultation with these military entities.

The NRC staff considered the hazards (including fire) associated with nearby military activities during

its evaluation of the safety and design of the proposed PFSF and documented its evaluation in the

SER, as updated. In addition, the NRC staff incorporated a new Section 4.8.4 into this FEIS to

discuss the fire-fighting capability associated with the proposed PFSF.

G.3.17.3.3 Rail Transportation and Wildfires

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the applicant failed to recognize that the rail line from Skunk Ridge (near

Low, Utah) poses a new risk of wildfire ignition due to its construction, operation, and other activities

associated with its location near easily ignitable dry grasses. The increased human activities near the

railroad would also increase the risk of wildfires. This FEIS should include an evaluation of these

costs and cumulative impacts. The same commenter provided additional statements regarding rail

transportation and wildfires, including:
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NUREG-1714 G-398

C The commenter stated that the rail line would diminish firefighting capabilities, because it creates

an impediment to fighting wildfires.

C The commenter also stated that four-wheel drive vehicles would have difficulty directly crossing

the rail line.

C The commenter asserted that the risk to responders to fires would increase because of the

potential for collision with trains in the dense smoke of a range fire.

C The commenter further stated that the presence of hazardous materials such as SNF may further

endanger responders and may further endanger the range because firefighters may be reluctant

to pursue a wildfire in the vicinity of a trainload of SNF. (0198c, 0198h)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS provided more information regarding the

topic and addressed the issues mentioned in the comment. Sections 4.8.4 and 5.8.4 in this FEIS

address the wildfire issue associated with the proposed PFSF and new rail line, respectively. 

Section 4.8.4 also describes the resources that the applicant would provide to fight fires at or near the

proposed PFSF.

As stated in Section 5.8.4, lightning is the overwhelming source of wildfires in the BLM’s Salt Lake

District. There is no evidence that the proposed rail line would be more prone to cause fires than any

other railroad operations in the BLM’s Salt Lake District, therefore, there are no additional associated

costs. The NRC staff concluded that the proposed new rail line would not contribute significantly to

the existing risk of fire in Skull Valley. For additional information on wildfire risks, see Section

G.3.17.3.1.

Section 5.8.4 states that the revegetation plan for the proposed rail line could serve as a “green strip”

to help prevent the spread of wildfires. The proposed rail line would also include several rail crossings

that could minimize the potential for the elevated railbed to adversely affect firefighting efforts in Skull

Valley. Section 9.4.2, “Mitigation Measures,” describes the actions that would be a required part of

any license, lease, or right-of-way approvals. Condition 2K specifies that the design, number and

locations of all rail crossings to allow fire suppression equipment to cross the rail line would be

developed in consultation with the BLM.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment regarding endangerment of responders and considers this

comment not to be supported by fact or data and therefore no change to the EIS has been made.

G.3.17.4 Livestock Management

G.3.17.4.1 General Comments

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the discussion of impacts to livestock grazing is insignificant when

compared to other more significant cultural resources that are not inventoried. (0112)

Another commenter stated that consistent with Section 5.5.4 (page 5-29, lines 10-12), the applicant

would take steps to minimize impacts to livestock grazing, including providing cattle guards and

livestock-secure fencing. Additionally, the applicant would take steps to ensure that it would not affect

the operation of existing water facilities east of the proposed rail line at Eight Mile Spring. The

commenter stated that the applicant does not plan to have a maintenance road along the rail line, so

gates at the unimproved railroad crossings will not be necessary. (0163)
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G-399 NUREG-1714

Response:

The NRC acknowledges the comment regarding the insignificance of impacts to livestock grazing, but

clarifies that the EIS Section 5.6, “Cultural Resources,” addresses the impacts from construction and

operation of the proposed rail line to cultural resources.

The NRC acknowledges the comment regarding the applicant’s commitment, which is consistent with

the mitigation measures discussed in Section 5.5.4 of this FEIS. The NRC also acknowledges the

commenter’s observation that gates would not be necessary at the unimproved road crossings (see

Section 2.1.1.3 of this FEIS for additional information on the infrequent use of these roads; the limited

speed of the train; and the planned use of cross-buck railroad crossing signs).

G.3.17.4.2 Impacts on Livestock and Plants

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that while the applicant broadly described and estimated in Section 2.2-2 of

the ER the number of domestic livestock grazing on the BLM property in the area, the applicant did

not identify the private domestic animals (livestock) or the domestic plant (farm produce) species in

the area. The commenter, citing Castle Land and Livestock, stated that private property adjacent to

the proposed site on Skull Valley Road is used for ranching and farming, and approximately 4,000

cows and calves winter on the private property north of the proposed PFSF and the BLM land. 

(Castle Rock Land and Livestock, L.C., Skull Valley Company, Ltd., and Ensign Ranches of Utah,

L.C., Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene, Docket No. 72-22, p. 2, filed March 11, 1997.) 

The commenter also stated that the private property produces a variety of crops, including alfalfa,

oats, barley, and wheat, and expressed concern that adverse impacts may include impacts on

livestock and plants from the radiological, chemical, heavy metal, noise, or visual pollution due to the

proposed action. (0198a)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. The DEIS presents the NRC staff’s analysis. The

DEIS identified agricultural activities, including domestic livestock grazing and agricultural production,

in Sections 3.5.2.1 and 3.5.2.3, respectively. In response to the comment, Table 3.11 has been

revised in this FEIS to provide information on cattle, sheep, and crop production. The NRC staff

assessed the impacts of the proposed PFSF on domestic livestock grazing in Section 4.5.1.7 and

Section 5.5 of this FEIS. Impacts to crop production are expected to be small.

G.3.17.5 Monitoring and Control of Exotic and Noxious Weeds

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters stated that the DEIS said that prior to construction, a plan would be developed to

control noxious weeds during construction and operation of the proposed PFSF and related rail

facilities. However, the commenters added that this plan should include both monitoring and control of

exotic and noxious weeds within the proposed PFSF and the proposed rail line. 

The same two commenters stated that although culverts would be installed in gullies near the

proposed PFSF, the culvert system is likely to increase wet season flows, increasing erosion and

silting in these drainages. The culvert system would also provide a conduit to transport contaminants

and noxious or invasive plant species to these sensitive areas. The commenters suggested that

impacts to surface water drainage might require additional study to minimize effects related to

siltation, erosion, and the introduction of contaminants or noxious plant species in these areas. (0047,

0089) 
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NUREG-1714 G-400

Response: 

The NRC staff concluded that the mitigation measures stated in the DEIS would be adequate to

monitor and control weeds within the proposed PFSF and the proposed rail line. The NRC has

modified the mitigation measure in Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS to make this requirement clearer. This

mitigation measure specifies that the noxious weed control plan would apply during facility operation

(not just during construction) of the proposed PFSF and along the rail line. The NRC revised the text

in Condition 2I of this FEIS to include exotic weeds as well as noxious weeds. 

As presented in Section 5.2.2.1 of this FEIS, the applicant would size and align the culverts to

minimize change to the natural drainage channels. The applicant designed culverts along the corridor

to carry the precipitation from a 100-year flood event. Under normal weather conditions in the area,

some sediment accumulation could occur upstream of the culverts after stormflow events. The

applicant would minimize downstream scour through the use of rip-rap at sites where rapid flow

velocities would occur at culvert outlets. Under normal conditions, these features would prevent

erosion downstream of the culverts. The applicant would control the growth of noxious or invasive

undesirable plant species through the use of herbicides, as described in Section 5.4.2.1 of this FEIS.

For additional discussion of wetlands and mitigation measures, see Sections G.3.12.4 and G.3.12.7.

G.3.17.6 Wilderness Areas

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters provided the following general comments regarding wilderness areas:

C One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to consider adequately the impacts of the proposed

PFSF and transportation alternatives on the wilderness character and the potential wilderness

designation of roadless public lands in the area. Similarly, the document failed to develop and

analyze a meaningful range of alternatives to the proposed PFSF and related transportation

alternatives that would preserve the wilderness character and the potential wilderness designation

of roadless public lands in the area. (0158)

C One commenter stated that the rail spur would pass near a proposed wilderness area in the Cedar

Mountains. Aside from a cursory comment about access during rail spur construction, the

potential impacts on this potential wilderness have not been described. The commenter stated

that the BLM should insist on a more comprehensive analysis of potential conflicts with the

wilderness it administers. (0198)

C The same commenter stated the applicant did not quantify the costs associated with noise levels

from construction activities and operation of the railroad on wilderness areas. The railroad will be

visible from the BLM Cedar Mountains WSA and other recreation areas in Skull Valley, and noise

from the operation of the rail line will be heard, destroying the solitary values associated with

wilderness areas. (0198c, 0198i) 

Response: 

Section 3.8.3 of this FEIS addresses the current wilderness character of nearby BLM-administered

lands and includes the Cedar Mountains WSA and adjacent lands. Section 2.2 of the FEIS identifies

the alternatives to the proposed rail line alignments. Compared to the proposed rail line, new rail line

corridor alternatives in Skull Valley, whether located in the center of Skull Valley, or on its eastern

side, offer similar or greater impacts. This FEIS also considered an ITF in lieu of the proposed rail

line. This FEIS identifies potential impacts to those resources in Sections 4.8.3 and 5.8.3. Such

impacts consist of transitory disruptions to recreational users’ access to the wilderness areas in the

western side of Skull Valley. Section 5.8.1, presents the potential impacts that could be caused by
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-401 NUREG-1714

trains carrying SNF on the proposed rail line. The NRC determined that noise impacts would be small

and would decrease substantially with distance from the rail line, thereby reducing the potential for

adverse impacts to recreational users of the Cedar Mountains WSA. Section 5.8.2 of the FEIS, and

G.3.17.1.3 address visual impacts of the proposed rail line on recreational users of the Cedar

Mountains.

G.3.17.7 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and Long-Term

 Productivity

G.3.17.7.1 Economic Benefits vs. Environmental Effects

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that a better balance should be made between the short-term economic

benefits and the long-term environmental effects of the proposed PSFS. Specifically, the commenter

indicated that short-term benefits to some members of the Skull Valley Band and to Tooele County do

not outweigh three long-term environmental effects: (1) health effects to women and children, whether

latent or not; (2) the risk of an aircraft crash; and (3) the effects of any limitation on the use of nearby

military facilities. (0096)

Response: 

It is desirable to have a favorable relationship between the short-term uses of the environment and its

long-term productivity. The Cooperating Agencies assessed this issue and found the balance

positive, as set forth in this FEIS in Section 6.5, “Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the

Environment and Long-Term Productivity.” The commenter raised three issues: health effects on

women and children, accident risks from aircraft crashes, and possible limitation on the use of nearby

military facilities. As set forth in this FEIS in Section 4.7, the effects of the proposed PFSF on human

health, including women and children, would be small. The potential safety hazards from aircraft

crashes and nearby military facilities were considered by the NRC staff during its safety evaluation. 

The NRC staff concluded that these potential hazards would not present a credible safety concern. 

Therefore, the NRC staff has not identified any reasons why the proposed PFSF would limit the use of

nearby military facilities. Indirect impacts to military operations are discussed in Sections G.3.8.1.8

and G.3.13.3.1. The three issues are not associated with any long-term environmental impacts. 

Therefore no modifications to this FEIS are warranted. Also, see Sections G.3.15.5.2 and G.3.15.6.1.
[This page intentionally left blank]
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-403 NUREG-1714

G.3.18 Environmental Justice

G.3.18.1 Scope of Environmental Justice Analysis

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the question that the NRC should have addressed is whether or not the

applicant’s proposal targets a vulnerable and susceptible low-income, minority population and

unethically attempts to exploit their poverty and past history of discrimination in order to shift unwanted

costs and risks onto that population from other, more prosperous sectors. (0204)

One commenter stated that an analysis of discrimination against low-income and minority populations

is missing from the DEIS and is warranted, given the BIA’s trust responsibility to the members of the

Skull Valley Band. (0158)

One commenter stated that pages 6-20 to 6-42 of the DEIS focus on the semantics of what constitutes

a “minority population” with respect to income and housing, but leave numerous more significant

environmental justice concerns unresolved. (0112)

One commenter said that, as part of the EIS scoping process, the NRC should determine if the socioeconomic nature of the alternative sites suggest that the site identification process is prejudiced, in

violation of the environmental justice policy of Executive Order 12898. (0198h)

Response: 

Executive Order 12898 requires Federal agencies to identify and address any disproportionately high

and adverse human health or environmental effects of their programs, policies, and activities on

minority and low-income populations. The NRC staff completed an environmental justice review that

considered human health and environmental effects. The first step in the NRC’s environmental justice

review is to identify the low-income and minority groups that the proposed action could affect. The

next step is to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed action on any low-income or minority

group. The NRC staff determined that all significant environmental justice impacts and concerns were

evaluated. The commenter did not provide any specific environmental concerns for the NRC staff to

consider.

The issues identified in the comment regarding the ethics of the applicant in the site selection process

are beyond the scope of the environmental justice review. The Commission considers that questions

of motivation on social equity in siting are outside NEPA’s purview. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.

(Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CL1-98-13, 48 NRC 28, 36 (1998). For further

discussion on the site selection process, see Section G.3.5.3.

G.3.18.2 Compliance with Environmental Justice Requirements

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters stated that the DEIS does not comply with Federal environmental justice statutes

and that the discussion is therefore inadequate. (0096, 0112, 0194, 0204, 0211, 0217, GR-06, SL1-

10, SL1-17, SL1-26, SL3-25, SL3-54) 

Specifically, commenters expressed the following concerns:

C Two commenters stated that the DEIS violates or fails to consider Executive Order 12898. (0211,

0217)
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NUREG-1714 G-404

C One commenter stated that under Executive Order 12898 the NRC is required to “... analyze the

environmental effects, including human health, economic and social effects, of Federal actions,

including effects on minority communities and low-income communities” when such analysis is

required by NEPA (42 USC 4321 et seq.), citing a February 11, 1994, Memorandum for the Heads

of All Departments and Agencies from President Clinton. The commenter argued that the earlier

policy of the DOE, in seeking an MRS site, focused on siting the facility(ies) on American Indian

Reservations and clearly was violating this directive. The commenter also argued that PFS

member reactor licensees are also responsible for site selection decisions, and the license

application for the ISFSI which, if licensed, would violate the Executive Order. The commenter

speculated that even if the Chairman of the Skull Valley Band had approached the applicant to

site the facility, rather than vice versa, that action would not outweigh the environmental justice

impacts on members of the Skull Valley Band who oppose the facility or individuals who live and

work next to the proposed site. The commenter argued that, but for the protection provided under

environmental justice provisions, these groups would not have equal protection under the law, or

equal protection regarding the siting decision, because the proposed PFSF is located on an

American Indian Reservation. Further, the commenter said that the lease between the Skull

Valley Band and the applicant does not absolve either the NRC or the Federal government of any

responsibility under NEPA, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, or Executive Order 12898. Therefore,

the commenter stated, as part of the EIS process, the NRC must fully and completely analyze and

evaluate the environmental justice data, criteria, and impacts of the proposed PFSF, and answer

the following questions:

- What are the impacts related to the possible decision to locate the proposed PFSF on an

American Indian Reservation? 

- What groups of individuals are affected? 

- What are the environmental, human health, social, economic, and other impacts? 

- Are these impacts mitigated under one or more of the alternative actions?

The commenter concluded that if environmental justice impacts cannot be mitigated, the NRC

should not allow the proposed site alternative in the EIS. (0198h)

C Another commenter stated that the underlying philosophy of Executive Order 12898, that minority

and low-income groups not be compelled to bear a disproportionate share of negative

environmental consequences from governmental actions, simply does not apply in this case.

(0163) 

Response: 

Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations

and Low-Income Populations,” February 11, 1994, requires all Federal agencies to “identify and

address, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of

its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations (including Indian Tribes) and low-income

populations in the United States and its territories.” One major mechanism for identifying and

addressing those effects is through NEPA (42 USC Parts 4321-4347). In compliance with Executive

Order 12898, Section 6.2 of this FEIS examines potential environmental justice impacts of the

proposed action and its alternatives. The environmental justice analysis concludes that the proposed

PFSF would not result in a disproportionately high and adverse impact to any low-income or minority

population. Other than Executive Order 12898, to the extent that there are “NEPA regulations about

Native Americans,” the CEQ’s NEPA regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) provide for consultation

with affected Indian Tribes. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies conducted such consultation

during preparation of this EIS and in the public comment process for this EIS (see Section 1.5.5 of this

EIS).
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G-405 NUREG-1714

The comment on applicability of the Executive Order to DOE’s siting process for an MRS is not

relevant to this environmental review. The DOE’s siting process was independent of the proposed

PFSF and the NRC’s license review.

G.3.18.3 Environmental Justice Impacts on Native Americans 

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters stated that the Skull Valley Band is being targeted for this facility. The commenters

noted that the Skull Valley Band is financially impoverished and that this proposal takes advantage of

their sovereign nation status in order to reduce costs for the reactor licensees. (0023, 0050, 0110,

0112, 0113, 0114, 0115, 0117, 0118, 0121, 0136, 0138, 0139, 0141, 0151, 0157, 0158, 0171, 0180,

0182, 0183, 0189, 0194, 0195, 0203, 0204, 0215, 0217, 0225, 0249, 0257, GR-15, GR-16, GR-23,

SL1-10, SL1-11, SL1-17, SL1-36, SL1-37, SL2-05, SL2-21, SL3-04, SL3-09, SL3-18, SL3-22, SL3-25,

SL3-31, SL3-54)

Commenters provided the following specific concerns:

C Several commenters stated that the proposed action constitutes environmental- or eco-racism.

(0117, 0141, 0180, 0194, 0195, 0257, GR-16, SL1-10, SL1-37)

C One commenter stated that the proposed action places a disproportionately high risk of adverse

health and environmental effects onto minority and low-income Native American communities.

(0157)

C One commenter stated that environmental justice violations constitute unavoidable impacts and

become the most significant fatal flaw of the proposed action. (0112)

C One commenter stated that Native Americans are being treated as expendable and less than

human. (0110)

One commenter stated that there is ample justification under NEPA for considering environmental

justice in this proceeding. By virtue of the large size and unique status of the proposed project, the

siting of the ISFSI must receive specific attention. (0198b)

The same commenter compared the applicant’s site selection process to the Claiborne case

(Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-97-9, 45 NRC 367 (1997)), in

which, the commenter alleged, progression of the site selection process and narrowing of the search

dramatically raised the level of minority representation in the population and in which the applicant’s

search had been focused disproportionately on areas of high minority populations. The commenter

noted that the PFS applicant started its site selection with 38 sites, over 20 of which were located on

Native American Reservations, and ended up with two closely located sites on the Reservation. The

commenter asserted that this implied discrimination in the site selection process. The commenter

stated that the NRC may not approve the selection of the Skull Valley site without conducting a

thorough and in-depth investigation of the applicant’s siting process to ensure the site selection was

not discriminatory. (The commenter references Claiborne, 45 NRC at 391). (0198a)

Response: 

Since the end of the termination policy in the early 1970's, the United States government has

supported Native American Tribes in their efforts to fulfill their status as sovereign nations. Also,

beginning with enactment of the Indian Self-Determination Act in 1975, the United States has made a

greater effort to support actions of Tribal governments to give their people a better life, consistent with

their traditions and culture, and the ability to compete and thrive in the modern world. The Skull Valley

Band and the applicant have reached a business agreement to construct and operate the proposed
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-406

PFSF. The Skull Valley Band believes this business arrangement will assist in the economic

development of the Skull Valley Band. As a result of the agreement, the applicant and the Skull Valley

Band requested regulatory approvals from the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies. The Skull Valley

Band is a sovereign nation that voluntarily participated in the site selection process. The site selection

process used by the applicant is described in Section 7.1 of this FEIS. Each agency will review the

request and make a regulatory decision. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies concluded that the

positive impact to the economic development of the Skull Valley Band will be considerable and

consistent with the Federal government’s responsibility to support Tribal governments in bettering the

lives of their people.

The NRC staff reviewed the concern that the Skull Valley Band, as an environmental justice

community, would experience a disproportionately high and adverse impact as a result of the

proposed project. Section 6.2 of the DEIS describes the analysis of potential environmental justice

impacts. Federal agencies are required to perform an environmental justice analysis for each Federal

project pursuant to Executive Order 12898. The purpose of environmental justice analysis is to

ensure that minority and/or low-income populations do not bear a disproportionate share of adverse

environmental consequences. The environmental justice analysis prepared for the proposed PFSF

did not indicate that any disproportionately high and adverse effects would occur in any environmental

justice community within the 50-mile radius as a result of the proposed project. A summary of the

potential impacts is provided in Table 6.5 of the DEIS. In addition, as set froth in Section G.3.18.1, the

Commission considers that questions of motivation on social equity are outside NEPA’s purview.

The NRC staff also analyzed the potential cumulative impacts for the DEIS, and the results indicated

that no disproportionately high and adverse impacts on low-income and minority populations would

result from construction or normal operation of the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff concluded that the

effect of the proposed PFSF on environmental justice is small. Commenters objected to this assertion

in the DEIS. However, the expected radiological impacts associated with either normal operation or

accidents at the proposed PFSF are small. Analyses conducted for the DEIS did not identify any

evidence that the proposed PFSF would compound any health problems of nearby residents or

visitors in the Skull Valley vicinity. Very little risk is added by the proposed PFSF and, therefore, the

proposed PFSF would not contribute to any disproportionately high and adverse impact to minority or

low-income populations.

The comparison of the applicant’s site selection process to the Clairborne case was directed at the

applicant’s ER, before the NRC staff began its environmental review. As documented in Section 6.2

of this FEIS, the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies considered the applicant’s proposed action in

light of all applicable environmental justice guidance, including the Commission’s decisions in the

matter of the applications and adjudicatory proceeding cited in the comment. 

G.3.18.4 Environmental Justice Analysis of Native American Culture

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS demonstrates inadequate analysis and prejudice in many areas. 

Specifically, the commenter cited page 1-12, lines 34-38, and stated that environmental justice issues

are not limited to impacts on “historical and archaeological resources of the area and on the cultural

traditions and lifestyles of Native Americans” as defined by the DEIS. Also, the commenter suggested

that the question of distribution and redistribution of items used in religious ceremonies does not

encompass the more critical issue, which is a matter of respecting the revered land. The commenter

added that this is a cultural prejudice and stated that the failure of the DEIS to acknowledge the

indigenous Native American heritage and values constitutes a serious environmental justice violation. 

The commenter also suggested that destruction of plants used for medicinal purposes constitutes an

environmental justice violation. (0112)
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G-407 NUREG-1714

The same commenter also said that the statement on page xlvii, lines 41-42, of the DEIS implied that

the respect of the diligent majority of Skull Valley Band for their land and their unwillingness to violate

cultural values is being used against them as an excuse to inflict impacts upon their land. (0112) 

Response: 

Regarding the comment about page 1-12, lines 34-38 of the DEIS, the NRC staff reviewed the section

of the DEIS cited in the comment and wishes to clarify the difference between the environmental

justice review and the cultural resources review. (The discussion cited by the commenter was

intended to discuss the scope of the cultural resources review. It was not intended to represent the

scope of the environmental justice review.) The scope of the environmental justice review in Section

6.2 of the DEIS and the FEIS, evaluates all the environmental impacts of the proposed action,

including cultural traditions and lifestyles, on low-income and minority groups. The NRC staff revised

Section 1.4 in the FEIS to clarify the scope of the environmental justice review.

The NRC staff conducted the environmental justice analysis in accordance with the NRC’s Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Policy and Procedure Letter 1-50, Revision 2, “Environmental

Justice in NEPA Documents,” (September 1999). Consistent with this guidance, the analysis

considered the environmental impacts of the proposed action on minority and low-income individuals,

including any impacts from special resource uses or dependencies such as cultural practices and

customs. The NRC staff considered the culture of the Skull Valley Band appropriately in the analysis. 

In addition to independent research performed by the NRC staff experts, the NRC staff considered all

information received from the Skull Valley Band’s Tribal government regarding their culture and use of

the land. The NRC staff also considered information received during scoping meetings, public

comments on the DEIS, and through consultation activities with Federally recognized Indian Tribes

and other organizations during the Section 106 consultation process. While the NRC staff does not

dispute Native Americans’ respect for the land, the information provided by the Skull Valley Band’s

Tribal government and other Native Americans does not indicate that the proposed action would affect

Native American culture or land use. Additional comments regarding cultural resources are

addressed in Section G.3.14 of this FEIS.

G.3.18.5 Environmental Justice Impacts on Individuals Along Rail Corridors

Comment Summary:

A few commenters expressed concern that the proposed shipments would pass through low-income

and minority neighborhoods located in Salt Lake City and that this has not been addressed. (SL1-05,

SL1-10, SL3-54)

One commenter objected to the decision to expand the radius of the area for environmental justice

analysis from 5 to 50 miles. The commenter stated that this decision was arbitrary and served to

circumvent Executive Order 12898. (SL3-54) 

Response: 

The discussion of demographics in Section 6.2.1.1 of the FEIS and the accompanying figures identify

concentrations of minority and low-income residents along the rail corridors within 50 miles of the

proposed site and in the Salt Lake City area in particular. The list of minority and low-income block

groups is shown in Table 6-4, “Minority and Low-income Block Groups Within 80 Km (50 Miles) of the

Preferred Site,” and Appendix E, “Census Bureau Data as Used in Environmental Justice Analyses,”

of the DEIS. Figure 6.1 and Section 6.2.1.1 identify minority and low-income block groups near the

rail corridor. Figure 6.2 and Section 6.2.1.1 identify low-income groups near the rail route. The

transportation analyses in the EIS indicated that there would be no disproportionate high and adverse

impacts to minority and low-income groups in transportation corridors as a result of the proposed

action.
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NUREG-1714 G-408

The analysis used a wider-than-standard radius to include the entire area that the project might

influence. Ordinarily, this area would be within a 4-mile radius of the project site. However, for the

proposed project, a 4-mile radius would barely extend beyond the Reservation boundaries. In this

case, the 4-mile radius was considered insufficient because of the high concern expressed in public

scoping comments concerning the potential effects across a much broader geographic area. This

broader area includes Grantsville, Tooele, Salt Lake City, and particularly the transportation corridors. 

By using the expanded radius, the NRC staff did not dilute the environmental justice impacts of the

proposed PFSF; the analysis evaluates the effects of the proposed project on each minority

community, rather than an average effect. As described in Section 6.2, the NRC staff compared the

demographic and income characteristics for each block group with data for the State of Utah, so the

use of a larger study area would not dilute the study results. Rather, the use of a larger study area

radius merely expands the geographic area where additional minority and low-income block groups

could be identified.

The NRC staff reviewed the concerns relating to impacts to low-income and/or minority communities

in Salt Lake City, and found that they are adequately addressed in this FEIS. Section 6.2.1.2

addresses potential impacts to environmental justice communities and specifically includes a

discussion of impacts related to radiological exposure along transportation routes through Salt Lake

City and Grantsville. This discussion refers the reader to the transportation analysis included in the

discussion of human health impacts of SNF transportation in Section 5.7 of this FEIS, which includes

an evaluation of potential health impacts to people living along the proposed transportation routes. 

The NRC staff concluded no disproportionately high and adverse impacts would occur to any

environmental justice community located along the proposed transportation routes. 

G.3.18.6 Consideration of Positive Economic Benefit

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters stated that the lease payments to the Skull Valley Band do not reduce the

environmental justice impacts of the proposed action. (0157, 0194, 0195, SL2-05)

One commenter stated that the positive socioeconomic impacts defined for environmental justice on

page 6-31, lines 21-27, of the DEIS are somewhat arrogant. The commenter added that, if there is no

economic development in an area, then any form of economic development would be positive; but the

commenter stated that the issue here is that this proposed PFSF would be placed in an area with an

environmental justice population. Given this situation, the commenter indicated that the positive

socioeconomic impacts are not there. (0096) 

The same commenter cited the statement on page xl, lines 37-40 of the DEIS: “If the proposed PFSF

were not constructed on the Reservation, then its positive economic benefits would not accrue to the

Skull Valley Band. The Skull Valley Band would be free to pursue other uses for their land, but would

lose opportunities for employment, as well as the financial gain from the proposed lease revenue.” 

The commenter said that this statement is a violation of environmental justice and that this type of

statement would not be made if the proposed site was in a wealthy community. (0096) 

The commenter indicated that the statement on page xlii, lines 5-8, of the DEIS is a typical

environmental injustice statement because it points out that low-income, minority people will have

“...positive economic benefits....” This same type of analysis is not used for on-site storage of SNF

rods. The commenter asked, “How is the statement not a violation of Environmental Justice?” (0096) 

The commenter indicated that the statement on page 9-14, lines 18-21 of the DEIS implied that

consideration of economic profits to the nuclear reactor licensees would distort the environmental

justice impacts. (0096) 
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G-409 NUREG-1714

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the commenters’ concerns that the identification of a positive economic

impact to the Skull Valley Band is a violation of environmental justice. However, the White House

guidance accompanying Executive Order 12898 requires Federal agencies to analyze environmental

impacts, including socioeconomic impacts, of an agency’s action to determine if the action results in a

disproportionately high and adverse impact to any low-income or minority community. Consistent with

the guidance provided, the NRC staff considered the environmental impacts of the proposed action. 

The analysis in the DEIS appropriately considered the socioeconomic impacts of the proposed action. 

One of the socioeconomic impacts of the proposed action is the positive economic impact to the Skull

Valley Band. Recognition of this positive economic impact is not a violation of Executive Order 12898. 

The NRC staff evaluated the impacts of the proposed action and concluded that the proposed action

would not result in a disproportionately high and adverse impact to any low-income or minority group. 

Regarding the comment that the environmental justice review should focus on the issue of siting the

proposed PFSF in an “environmental justice-defined area,” Executive Order 12898 does not state that

agencies should prevent actions from being taken in low-income or minority communities. Instead,

the Executive Order requires agencies to determine if their actions would result in a disproportionately

high and adverse impact to low-income and minority communities. The impacts that would result from

the proposed action are not significant and would not result in a high and adverse impact to lowincome and minority communities.

G.3.18.7 Environmental Justice Conclusion

Comment Summary: 

Two commenters objected to the assertion in Chapter 6 of the DEIS that there are no disproportionate

impacts from construction or normal operations and, therefore, the effect of the facility on

environmental justice concerns is small. (0050, 0171)

Several commenters stated that the NRC’s statement in the DEIS that the proposed PFSF has no

environmental justice impacts is incorrect. (0118, 0121, 0157, 0180, 0182, 0183, 0194, 0195, 0217,

0257) Several commenters objected to the claim in the DEIS that “there are no disproportionately

high and adverse impacts on low-income or minority populations.” (0136, 0195, 0257) One

commenter stated that it is shocking for the NRC to claim that dumping an enormous stockpile of highlevel wastes on this Reservation does not constitute an environmental justice impact. (0139)

Response: 

While the commenters objected to the environmental justice conclusions, they did not raise any

specific issues. Therefore, a detailed response cannot be provided. The conclusions in the DEIS

were based on a detailed analysis. The NRC staff completed the analysis in accordance with the

NRC’s Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Policy and Procedure Letter 1-50, Revision

2, “Environmental Justice in NEPA Documents” (September 1999). Consistent with this guidance, the

analysis considered the environmental impacts of the proposed action on minority and low-income

individuals, including any impacts from special resource uses or dependencies such as cultural

practices and customs. The analysis also considered past and present environmental impacts and

health and economic conditions for potentially affected low-income and minority groups. From the

analysis, the NRC staff determined that the proposed action would not result in disproportionately high

and adverse impacts to any low-income or minority population within the vicinity of the proposed PFSF

or transportation facilities.
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December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-411 NUREG-1714

G.3.19 Economic Benefits and Costs

G.3.19.1 General Comments

G.3.19.1.1 Objectivity of Benefits and Costs Analysis

Comment Summary: 

A few commenters stated that the DEIS analysis of benefits and costs is biased in favor of the

applicant and fails to consider many significant negative impacts. (0012, 0198, SL1-01, SL3-23) One

commenter added that there is a conflict of interest in the DEIS because it was prepared by the

applicant’s contractor, and that the FEIS should include an unbiased third-party analysis of benefits

and costs, including both direct and indirect economic impacts. (SL3-23)

One commenter stated that the DEIS makes numerous errors in its benefits and costs analysis, and

nearly every error skews the analysis to favor the applicant. (0198)

Response:

Although the input for the benefits and costs analysis was prepared by the applicant’s contractor, the

NRC staff has independently reviewed the data and analysis that has been presented. Section 8.1.2

of this FEIS identifies the major assumptions made by the applicant and its contractor, and provides

the NRC staff's analysis of the uncertainties and sensitivities in the applicant's calculations. The

comment about errors in the DEIS analyses did not provide any specific, additional economic costs

that should be considered in the analysis. 

G.3.19.1.2 Applicant’s Benefits and Costs Analysis

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 51.45(c), the applicant failed to

provide an adequate balancing of the benefits and costs of the proposed project, or to quantify factors

that are amenable to quantification. (0198a) The commenter made the following statements:

• The commenter asserted that the applicant's ER made no attempt to objectively discuss the costs

of the project. According to the commenter, other than the financial costs incurred by the

applicant in constructing and operating the proposed PFSF, the substance of the applicant's

discussion of costs is that the indirect costs, which are derived from the socioeconomic and

environmental impacts of the facility, are minimal due to the remote location and small size of the

actual storage area. (The commenter referenced ER at 7.3-1.) The commenter asserted that this

discussion is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 51.45(c). The commenter also

stated that the applicant failed to weigh numerous adverse environmental impacts against the

alleged benefits of the proposed PFSF. (0198a)

• The commenter further argued that the no action alternative would have significantly lowered

environmental costs and that the applicant failed to compare the environmental costs of the

proposed PFSF with the costs of the no action alternative. The commenter stated that the

applicant failed to weigh the benefits to be achieved by alternatives that could reduce or mitigate

accidents, environmental contamination, and decommissioning costs, such as inclusion of a hot

cell in the facility design. (0198a)

• In addition, the commenter asserted that the applicant made no attempt to quantify the costs

associated with the impacts of the proposed PFSF, even though such costs are amenable to

quantification. The commenter stated that, for example, costs related to accidents and

contamination may be quantified in terms of health effects and dollar costs; decommissioning
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-412

impacts can be quantified; visual impacts can be quantified in terms of lost tourist dollars; and

emergency response costs can be quantified based on the cost of those services. (0198a)

• The commenter stated that the benefits and costs analysis was inadequate, and therefore, the

applicant provides no meaningful basis for a comparison of alternatives. The commenter

concluded that the application must be rejected as insufficient to satisfy NEPA. (0198a)

Response:

These comments were directed at the applicant’s ER, which was submitted to the NRC as part of the

license application and therefore some of the comments are outdated. The DEIS used information

from several documents, including the ER. Chapter 8 of this FEIS presents the NRC staff’s analysis

of the benefits and costs of the proposed project. The costs of the no action alternative were included

in Chapter 8 and were also separately addressed in a new Section 6.7 in this FEIS. Also, see

discussion in Section 9.4.1.5 in this FEIS.

The NRC and Cooperating Agencies conducted an independent evaluation of the proposed facility

and analyzed the potential direct and indirect environmental effects. The analysis considered many

factors in addition to the size and location of the facility. See Table 9.1 for a summary of the potential

environmental impacts. A majority of the impacts were determined to be small, with only some being

small to moderate, or moderate. Additional detail is provided in discussions and analysis of

environmental effects in Sections 4.5 and 6 of the FEIS. NRC staff addressed the costs of these

environmental impacts in its evaluation in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of this FEIS.

Regarding the comment about quantifying visual impacts, the staff notes that the factors on which the

costs of visual impacts depend are uncertain. Nevertheless, the NRC staff performed a sensitivity

analysis on such costs, and found that their value would be significantly less than the typical rounding

errors included in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 in Section 8 of this FEIS.

The proposed PFSF is designed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, and no credible

accident at the proposed facility would result in the release of radioactive material. As set forth in

Chapter 15 of its SER, as updated, the proposed PFSF will be sited, designed, constructed, and

operated such that during all credible off-normal and accident events, the public health and safety will

be adequately protected. Further, the robust SNF storage casks make it highly unlikely that an

accident with any significant consequences could occur because the facility is designed against

reasonably foreseeable events. The costs of construction of the proposed PFSF in accordance with

Part 72 requirements have been included in the cost/benefit analysis so that the costs of reducing or

mitigating credible accidents at the proposed facility have been appropriately considered. Accidents

at the proposed PFSF that would result in the release of radioactive material are not credible, and,

therefore, consideration of costs to reduce or mitigate such accidents and benefits of such mitigation

is not required. Similarly, consideration of the costs of environmental contamination resulting from

such accidents is not required. For the same reasons, decommissioning costs need not include a

provision for accidents. (Decommissioning costs are considered in the cost-benefit analysis. See

FEIS Section 4.9.)

Quantification of the costs of environmental impacts of transportation accidents resulting from the

proposed action would be speculative since there are a number of methods that could be employed

for mitigation or remediation after an off-normal event or accident based on any number of

assumptions. The use of any of these methods would be hypothetical, arbitrary and difficult to justify

as being the most realistic. In addition, as discussed in Section G.3.16.6.1, transportation accidents

are considered to be highly unlikely events. The suggestion that the applicant should have considered

the benefits of adding a hot cell as an alternative (among others) to reduce or mitigate accidents,

environmental contamination, or decommissioning costs goes beyond existing regulatory

requirements. A hot cell is not a design feature called for under 10 CFR Part 72 require that the

proposed PFSF include any additional design features. Therefore, no additional design alternatives
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-413 NUREG-1714

need be considered in the benefits and costs analysis. See Section G.3.19.4.4 for a discussion of the

costs related to emergency response. See also Sections G.3.15.6 and G.3.19.4, and FEIS Section

9.4.3 for additional discussion.

Table 9.2 summarizes the potential environmental impacts of all the alternatives evaluated in this

FEIS. Mitigation measures that will be required as a condition of the license, lease, or right-of-way

approval for this project were identified in FEIS Section 9.4.2.

G.3.19.1.3 General Comments Related to the Benefits and Costs Analysis

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters stated that the DEIS was incomplete or inadequate in its evaluation of other

societal benefits and costs. (0015, 0090, 0198, GR-09, SL1-07, SL1-10, SL1-16, SL2-15, SL3-02,

SL3-04, SL3-11, SL3-57) Commenters indicated that the DEIS inadequately addressed societal

benefits and costs for the following reasons:

C One commenter stated that there is no logic behind putting the waste into storage in Utah and

then transporting it to [the proposed] Yucca Mountain [site] in a few years. The commenter

asserted that there are only health and safety risks and no economic or health and safety benefits

to this scheme. (SL1-16)

C One commenter stated that the reactor licensees should have realized that storage of the SNF

would be their fiscal responsibility. The commenter asserted that it is fiscally irresponsible to shift

the risks to Utah now, because the cost of storage at the proposed PFSF is favorable to these

utility companies. (0090)

C One commenter stated that more information should be provided regarding why the residents of

Utah should take the risk of allowing the proposed PFSF [to be built]. The commenter asserted

that the people of Utah are much more willing to accept the risks if there is a clear and compelling

reason regarding the common good and not just providing economic benefits to utility companies. 

(0015)

C One commenter stated that the Skull Valley Band has set a price for siting this facility and that

price has been kept secret throughout these proceedings. The commenter asserted that if this

project is approved, the Skull Valley Band will receive their price, but all of Utah and the rest of the

nation will pay the cost. (0198)

C Commenters stated that costs to the citizens of Utah are not adequately addressed in the DEIS,

and that the proposed PFSF may not provide any benefits to the people of Utah. (0197, SL1-10,

SL3-04) 

C One commenter stated the Skull Valley Band is not only selling out their own birthright, but also

that of their neighbors. The commenter added that the risks of transporting nuclear waste to Utah

should be avoided. (GR-09)

C One commenter said that when the DEIS Executive Summary (page xlii, lines 40-41) states that

Utah and Tooele County will benefit from the sale of manufacturing items for use at the proposed

PFSF, it incorrectly assumes there will be no economic consequences for Utah, Tooele County,

and communities on the transportation route. (0096)

C One commenter stated the stated economic benefits to Utah, about $53 million, amount to a small

percentage of the State’s budget (about $6.5 billion). (SL1-07)
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NUREG-1714 G-414

C One commenter asserted that the proposed PFSF is neither good economics nor good science. 

(SL3-11)

C One commenter indicated that Section 8.2 of the DEIS (page 8-10) states that “benefits and costs

are considered from a societal perspective.” The commenter stated that the agency actions being

considered in this proceeding are the actions of national regulatory bodies including the NRC. 

The commenter added that it is inappropriate to count lease revenues, jobs, and economic activity

in the Tooele County area as a benefit when considering the benefits of the applicant’s alternative,

but not count parallel benefits associated with the no action alternative (on-site ISFSIs). Finally,

the commenter indicated that the DEIS lists as one of its four major points in recommending the

proposed PFSF over the alternatives, the economic benefits for the Tooele County area. (DEIS,

page 9-13) The commenter concluded that it is unacceptable to reach such a conclusion when

the agencies have refused to consider the benefits of the alternative. (0198, 0198g)

C One commenter stated that the health and financial risks of the proposed PFSF are too high and

there are no assurances that high safety standards would be maintained. (SL2-15)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS purports to evaluate the potential environmental impact, but

that in the benefits and costs analysis the net economic benefit of constructing the proposed

PFSF is defined as the simple difference between (1) the incremental cost of continuing to store

the SNF at the existing reactor sites less (2) the cost of constructing and operating the proposed

PFSF. The commenter stated that this reasoning is flawed because it does not consider the

environmental impacts nor does it consider the incremental risks. In addition, the commenter

stated that the NRC, by reaching such a conclusion, is stating that the paramount, determinative

issue is the savings to utility companies located elsewhere, regardless of the risk to and

environmental impact on the environs of Skull Valley and the citizens of Utah. (0090, SL3-02)

C One commenter stated that the NRC should consider the controversy surrounding the amount of

money required to transport SNF to the proposed site. (SL3-57)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS failed to consider infrastructure costs to communities along

the transportation routes. (0042)

C Two commenters said the benefits and costs analysis in the DEIS is flawed and incomplete. 

(SL1-10, SL3-04)

C One commenter stated that if NRC's benefits and costs analyses were correct, there would not be

a community in this country that would not welcome the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated

the analyses are not correct, and accordingly, every community other than the Skull Valley Band

that has considered such a facility has rejected it. (0198)

• Another commenter stated that the costs of relocating SNF should be borne by the companies

that produced the contamination and not primarily by the taxpayers. (0097)

• Two commenters said that the costs and liability of SNF storage should be borne locally where the

power is generated. (0208, SL3-32) 

• Several commenters stated that the proposed action will only benefit the reactor licensees

generating the SNF. They also stated that the profits or cost savings of the nuclear power

industry should not be placed over the environmental and human health impacts on the Skull

Valley Band and the citizens of the West. (0015, 0043, 0048, 0096, SL1-07, SL1-16, SL2-05,

SL3-08, SL3-23, SL3-33, SL3-46, SL3-49)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-415 NUREG-1714

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges the comments about the role of the benefits and costs analysis. The NRC

staff summarized its conclusions on the benefits and costs of the proposed facility and the rationale for

those conclusions in Section 9.4.3 in this FEIS. Specific comments (as listed above) on the benefits

and costs of the proposed project are addressed below.

With respect to the comment about the logic of the proposed movement of SNF to Skull Valley, the

benefits lie in the alternative that it would present to operating nuclear power reactors. By electing to

use the proposed PFSF in Skull Valley, operating reactors would be able to reduce their overall SNF

storage costs, thereby making their operations more efficient and also possibly allowing them to move

all SNF away from the reactors more quickly once they have been decommissioned. This could also

reduce costs for ratepayers. The NRC staff determined that there is reasonable assurance that

operation of the proposed PFSF, constructed in accordance with the design set forth in the

application, will provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Specifically, the proposed

PFSF will have met applicable NRC licensing requirements, and operation of the proposed PFSF

would be subject to NRC inspections and reviews of operating procedures and required reports. 

Thus, the NRC would continue to review compliance with applicable NRC requirements, should the

NRC grant a license and the proposed PFSF be constructed and operated.

Section 1.3 of the EIS describes disposition of SNF from operating reactors. While the fiscal

responsibility for SNF has always been placed on the power generating reactor licensees, the options

for continued storage of SNF have become problematic at many of their nuclear reactors. The NRC

staff presented the risks to the people of Utah (as measured by exposure to radiation) as discussed in

Sections 4.7 and 5.7 in the DEIS and concluded the risks are very small; hence, the type of fiscal

irresponsibility claimed in the comment appears to be unfounded. Furthermore, the storage of SNF at

an interim facility, such as the proposed PFSF, does not remove any financial liability from the

companies owning the SNF, since they would continue to be responsible as owners of the SNF until

ownership and title for the SNF is accepted by the DOE.

With respect to the comment about risk to the people of Utah, contrary to what is stated in the

comment, the PFS Facility would not pose an undue risk to the people of Utah if licensed and

operated in accordance with NRC regulations. The NRC staff evaluated and discussed radiation

doses (and the corresponding risk of developing a fatal cancer from such exposure) in Sections 4.7

and 5.7 in the DEIS and determined the human health risks to be very small.

The NRC acknowledges the comment about the actions being contemplated by the Skull Valley Band

and the opinion offered about the costs to Utah outweighing the benefits. The comment about the

Skull Valley Band’s price for siting references a proprietary lease agreement between the applicant

and the Skull Valley Band that is addressed in Section 3.19.4.2 below. To the extent the commenter

included specific comments on whether costs to the people of Utah and the nation outweigh the

benefits of the proposed PFSF, such comments are addressed elsewhere in Section G.3.19 of this

appendix and more generally in FEIS Section 9.4.3. Therefore, no further response is required.

With respect to the economic benefits to the State, in addition to the estimated $53.5 million in tax

payments to the State of Utah, Tooele County would receive an estimated $91.2 million over the life of

the project from a proposed agreement between the County and the applicant. Local payroll

($81 million), expenditures for materials and services ($79 million), and cask/canister manufacturing

($747 million) could also increase these amounts. With respect to the comment regarding the size of

the estimated tax payments as compared to the size of the State of Utah’s budget, such a comparison

does not raise a deficiency in the NRC staff’s cost/benefit evaluation. That is, the estimated tax

payments, regardless of their amounts, are benefits expected to result from the proposed project. To

the extent the commenters identified specific costs to the State of Utah, Tooele County and

communities along the transportation routes, such costs are addressed elsewhere in this section. 

See, e.g., Sections G.3.19.1.2 (accident costs); G.3.19.4.4 (costs for emergency response);
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-416

G.3.16.6.1 (costs of transportation accidents). The NRC staff concludes that the economic benefits

and costs to the State of Utah and Tooele County have been accurately described in the EIS. 

Although the comment about the economic consequences to communities along the transportation

corridor does not warrant any change to the NRC staff’s cost/benefit evaluation, for reasons set forth

above, a new subsection has been added to Section 5.7.2.5 in this FEIS to address this issue.

The NRC staff notes the opinion offered in the comment about economics and science. 

The NRC staff acknowledges that some of the same types of economic benefits would accrue locally

near those reactors where at-reactor SNF storage would be expanded or newly constructed. Sections

6.7 and 9.4.3 in this FEIS have been revised to eliminate any inference that such benefits (excluding

lease payments to the Skull Valley Band) would apply only to the facility in Skull Valley and not to

each individual reactor licensee that chose to construct or expand at-reactor storage facilities.

With respect to the comment on health and financial risks, the NRC staff determined that there is

reasonable assurance that operation of the proposed PFSF, as set forth above, constructed in

accordance with the design set forth in the application, will provide adequate protection of the public

health and safety. Specifically, the proposed PFSF will have met applicable NRC licensing

requirements, and operation of the proposed PFSF would be subject to NRC inspections, and reviews

of operating procedures and required reports. Thus, the NRC would continue to review compliance

with applicable NRC requirements, should the NRC grant a license and the proposed PFSF be

constructed and operated (see Section 1.5.1 of this FEIS). To the extent the commenter included

specific comments on whether costs to the people of Utah and the nation outweigh the benefits of the

proposed PFSF, such comments are addressed elsewhere in Section G.3.19 of this appendix and

more generally in FEIS Section 9.4.3. In addition, the Commission has ordered that the applicant’s

commitment to obtain $200 million of offsite liability insurance be incorporated into the PFS license. 

Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 32

(2000). Such insurance would provide additional financial coverage for reasonably foreseeable

events for which the proposed PFSF is designed. As per the staff’s safety review, the NRC staff

determined that no reasonably foreseeable accident at the facility would result in any release of

radioactive material, so this issue does not require further evaluation.

With respect to the comment on the definition of net economic benefit, the commenter has

misunderstood the difference between “economic” benefits and costs and the other types of benefits

and costs addressed in this FEIS. The presentation in Section 8.1 of this FEIS deals exclusively with

“economic benefits and costs,” as correctly defined in the comment. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 in this FEIS

deal with the other types of benefits and costs that are identified in the comment. As stated in the

introduction to this comment response, above, the economic benefits and costs are not the sole

determinative issue in this FEIS.

It is not clear what controversial transportation costs are being identified in the comment. The cost of

transporting the SNF to Skull Valley has been included in the benefits and costs analysis in Section

8.1 of this FEIS. Further information on transportation costs is set forth below.

Regarding infrastructure costs to communities along the rail corridors, the NRC does not anticipate

substantial costs to the communities. As described in the transportation responses (Section G.3.16),

states are recognized as being responsible for protecting public health during radiological

transportation accidents, and these capabilities are already in place. The DOE also maintains

emergency response capability, which is available to the states by request.

The staff notes the comment about the benefits and costs analysis being flawed and incomplete. The

NRC staff also notes the comment asserting that the analysis of benefits and costs is incorrect and

that all other communities that have considered such a storage facility rejected it. To the extent the

commenters provided specific information on errors or flaws in the NRC staff’s analysis, that

information is addressed elsewhere in Section G.3.19.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-417 NUREG-1714

The companies shipping their SNF to the proposed PFSF would bear the economic cost of

transporting SNF to the proposed PFSF. This cost is considered in the benefits and costs analysis

contained in Chapter 8 of the FEIS. The environmental costs of transporting SNF to the proposed

PFSF are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of the FEIS.

SNF can be safely stored at facilities either on or near the site of its production. However, the

regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 (Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste) also allow for the storage of SNF in away-from-reactor

facilities. The applicant has requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, a license for an

away-from-reactor SNF facility, and the NRC is considering that application. As set forth in the FEIS,

the environmental and human health impacts of the proposed PFSF on the Skull Valley Band and the

citizens of the West are small. See discussion in FEIS Section 9.4. The NRC staff’s analysis of

benefits and costs does not place profits or cost savings above environmental and human health

impacts.

G.3.19.1.4 General Comments Supporting the Benefits and Costs Analysis

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters supported the proposed PFSF and the DEIS for the following reasons:

C One commenter stated that although the applicant is a limited liability corporation, and although

the applicant will possess the SNF, the nuclear utility companies would retain title to the SNF until

the Federal government takes possession of the SNF for final disposal. (SL3-58) 

C Another commenter stated that the DEIS addressed the positive economic impacts the proposed

PFSF would have for the Skull Valley Band, the County, and the State and that the proposed

PFSF would have such impacts without harming the environment. (SL1-03)

C One commenter stated that it is preferable to transport the SNF to a facility that the NRC’s DEIS

has found to be technologically safe and that would bring large economic benefits without harming

the environment of the Reservation and the State of Utah. (0070) 

C The same commenter supported the DEIS because the facility would alleviate some of the costs

to the nation’s ratepayers because the NRC license would provide for storage of SNF that is

currently being paid for by ratepayers. (0070)

Many commenters discussed the proposal’s potential economic impacts on the Skull Valley Band and

Tooele County. (0016, 0039, 0077, 0090, 0096, 0112, 0163, 0179, 0198, 0236, GR-07, SL1-03, SL1-

30, SL3-02, SL3-03, SL3-46, SL3-48) Commenters asserted that the DEIS accurately portrays the

benefits to the Skull Valley Band and Tooele County for the following reasons:

C Several commenters said the proposed PFSF will have positive economic impacts on the Skull

Valley Band, the County or future residents of the valley. (0016, 0179, 0236, 0236, GR-07, SL1-

03, SL1-30, SL3-03)

C Commenters stated that the proposed PFSF may attract people back to the Reservation; increase

employment and prosperity; and bring revenue to the Reservation that would improve health

insurance, health care, housing, and education. (0016, SL1-03, SL1-30)

C One commenter stated that after decommissioning, the proposed site will be made available for

other industrial uses because it will be served by a rail line that otherwise would not have existed. 

(0236)
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NUREG-1714 G-418

C Another commenter stated the proposed PFSF will create jobs in construction, cask

manufacturing, facility operations, and future decommissioning services. (SL3-03)

C One commenter stated that one effect of the no action alternative would be the absence of

revenue to Tooele County under its agreement with the applicant. (0163)

Many commenters addressed the proposed PFSF’s potential environmental and cost impacts on the

State of Utah. (0012, 0013, 0096, 0179, 0197, GR-01, GR-05, GR-13, SL1-01, SL1-03, SL1-10, SL1-

27, SL2-14, SL2-20, SL3-02, SL3-03, SL3-04, SL3-36, SL3-46) Several commenters asserted that

the DEIS accurately portrays the benefits to the State of Utah for the following reasons:

C One commenter acknowledged that the DEIS includes the positive impact the proposed PFSF will

have on Utah. (SL1-03)

C One commenter expressed support for the construction of the PFSF and estimated that the

money coming into Utah from the proposed PFSF could be $3.37 billion if the facility is in

operation for 40 years. The commenter stated that the construction of the facility will cost an

estimated $100 million and will employ many people. The commenter added that 4,000 casks to

hold the SNF could be partially or wholly fabricated in Utah at a cost of about $2 billion, and the

operation and maintenance of the facility over 40 years is estimated at $1.2 billion. The

commenter further stated that the decommissioning cost is estimated to be $70 million. (SL3-03)

C The same commenter said the proposed PFSF would have a smaller environmental impact on

Utah than the Micron facility or construction of Interstate Highway 15, but the proposed PFSF is

undergoing the full EIS process (unlike the I-15 construction) and is receiving much more scrutiny. 

(SL3-03) 

C One commenter stated that the NRC correctly based its conclusion that the project’s benefits

would outweigh its costs on the economic benefits that would accrue to the Skull Valley Band,

local vendors, workers, and state and local government. (0179)

Response: 

The NRC acknowledges these comments that the DEIS addressed the positive economic impacts of

the proposed PFSF on the Skull Valley Band, the County, and the State. The purpose of a NEPA

document is to evaluate all impacts that may occur as a result of a proposed major Federal action. 

Thus, the NRC has evaluated both the positive and the negative impacts of the proposed action, and

has noted the observations, opinions, and expressions of support for the proposed PFSF in these

comments.

G.3.19.2 Economic Benefits and Costs

G.3.19.2.1 Assumed Market for SNF Storage at the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the assumed market for the proposed PFSF should be re-evaluated,

asserting that the number of PFS member reactor licensees has declined. The commenter stated that

reactor licensees have licensed ISFSIs, and the applicant has not disclosed if new customers have

signed agreements to use the proposed PFSF. The commenter added that some level of economic

benefits is directly proportional to the amount of SNF passing through the proposed PFSF and it is

reasonable to assume the primary source of customers will be PFS member reactor licensees (e.g.,

page 8-9 of the DEIS). The commenter then stated that it is unreasonable for the NRC and

Cooperating Agencies not to reflect the substantial changes and pending changes in PFS member

reactor licensees (e.g. Illinois Power, GPU and Florida Power). The commenter asserted that these
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G-419 NUREG-1714

changes affect the location of member reactors, SNF, the timing of shipments, and timing questions

that could affect the applicant’s net benefits relative to the no action alternative, especially at low

levels of throughput. The commenter stated that, therefore, the FEIS should consider the impact of

ownership changes on the location of member reactors, the quantity of SNF, and timing of the project

benefits for each alternative, especially at low levels of throughput. The commenter concluded that

the FEIS should also include a sensitivity analysis for reactors shutting down early, which has the

effect of reducing the demand for SNF storage. (0198)

The commenter indicated that in calculating the expected production of SNF, no credence is given to

the unreliability experienced with respect to some U.S. nuclear reactors based on the following

assertions:

There is no sensitivity analysis of anything other than each reactor completing a 40-year

operating life with an 80 percent capacity factor. Several plants owned by member reactor

licensees have not produced electricity over a significant period of time. Cook Unit I has been

off line for three years, since September 1997. Indian Point 2 has not produced power since

February 15, 2000. Cook Unit 2 and Clinton were down for a considerable period of time in

the late 1990s. In addition, Millstone 2 and LaSalle 2, plants owned by other electric

producers, also were down for years. Many reactors have been retired well before their 40-

year expected life, including three plants owned by member reactor licensees: LaCrosse,

Indian Point I and San Onofre 1. Furthermore, a number of researchers have estimated that

several operating reactors will retire early from service. These predictable changes will mean

less SNF will be generated, and the need for this proposed PFSF will be correspondingly less.

The commenter concluded that the DEIS should be revised to reflect this reality. (0198)

Response: 

The NRC revised this FEIS, including Table 1.1, “Site Specific Reactor Information for PFS Member

Reactor Licensees,” to present updated and current information regarding PFS member reactor

licensees.

Regarding the commenter’s assumption that the proposed PFSF would receive business primarily

from PFS member reactor licensees, the NRC made no such assumption in this FEIS. The NRC

updated the benefits and costs analysis in Chapter 8 of this FEIS to include the latest information on

the applicant’s members. The revisions to Chapter 8 include scenarios that involve the receipt of

quantities of SNF in excess of what is owned by the applicant’s members.

The FEIS is not required to evaluate the market potential of the proposed PFSF. Chapter 8 in this

FEIS evaluates the benefits and costs of the proposed action from a societal perspective, in

accordance with NEPA, and not from a market perspective or applicant perspective.

The NRC staff finds that the 80 percent capacity factor for the proposed PFSF is a reasonable

assumption based on recent experience with operating reactors. This is an average and is intended

to estimate the generation of SNF by many reactors over a long period of time. Because this is an

average, it is not useful to compare with specific individual reactors (especially not for short periods of

time) as suggested by the comment. While some reactors will operate at lower than 80 percent

capacity, others will operate above this level. Also, an individual reactor will be both above and below

its average capacity for discrete periods of time. For reactors that are no longer operating, the NRC

staff did not include any additional SNF generated from these facilities. Regarding the comment

addressing the need for the proposed PFSF, Section G.3.2 discusses the need for the proposed

action.
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NUREG-1714 G-420

G.3.19.2.2 Assumption Regarding Storage in Pools in the No Action Alternative

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that it is arbitrary and capricious to assume that the no action alternative would

require long-term storage in pools, and it is unreasonable to assume an $8 million annual pool

maintenance cost. Instead, the commenter recommended that the DEIS should have evaluated less

costly on-site ISFSIs, with five-year or older cooled fuel and without a supporting SNF storage pool. 

The commenter concluded that to remove the bias in favor of the applicant and against the no action

alternative, the analysis must be revised to delete the costs of maintaining backup pools. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff evaluated the $8 million annual pool maintenance cost set forth in the applicant’s ER

(see Section 8.1.2.4 in this FEIS) and used a range of costs from $6 to $10 million to test the

sensitivity of this assumption. The NRC staff agrees that in some cases transfer from at-reactor pool

storage to dry storage could reduce at-reactor storage costs for the no action alternative. Although

this potential reduction has not explicitly been included in the FEIS analysis, because only a limited

number of reactor sites would be economically attractive for this option, the lower value of $6 million

assumed for pool storage in the sensitivity analysis (see Table 8.3 in this FEIS) would likely

encompass the potential savings for utilizing ISFSIs in situations where they would be less costly.

G.3.19.2.3 Assumption Regarding A Permanent Repository

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS incorrectly assumed that deliveries to the permanent geologic

repository would be based on the oldest fuel first principle (OFF), when priority for ranking fuel

shipments is determined by the Standard Contract between reactor licensees and DOE as contained

in 10 CFR 961.11. According to the commenter, the Standard Contract has provisions that allow SNF

from shut down reactors to have priority, thus negating one of the applicant's stated major benefits. 

(0198) The commenter also stated that the DEIS analysis of transport related costs and risks should

not assume that the geologic repository will be at Yucca Mountain, especially since NRC stated in its

1990 Waste Confidence Decision (and affirmed in the 1999 review) that the Yucca Mountain site

should not be assumed to be the location of long-term storage for SNF. (0198)

More specifically, the commenter indicated that the NRC staff's conclusion that the proposed PFSF is

a superior alternative is based in large part on its assertion that some reactor licensees would have to

delay decommissioning of closed reactors for years due to their poor position in the DOE's priority

ranking queue for the geological repository. The commenter stated that the NRC staff's assertion is

based on the faulty assumption that all movements of SNF from commercial reactors to the geologic

repository are governed by an OFF priority system.

The commenter indicated that some problems with this assumption are that it is both factually

incorrect and unreasonable, and that the priority ranking for SNF shipments into the geologic

repository is determined by the Standard Contract between the reactor licensees and DOE contained

in 10 CFR 961.11. According to the commenter, this contract has three provisions of interest in the

current context: 

(1) a general statement that the priority for SNF deliveries to the geologic repository will be based on

the relative age of the reactor licensees' SNF; 

(2) a provision that allows reactor licensees to trade their priority rankings within the OFF queue. This

provision allows the creation of a market where a utility with old SNF but no shortage of space
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-421 NUREG-1714

could contract with another utility with young SNF and a space problem to allow the younger SNF

to be sent first; and, 

(3) a provision that notwithstanding the age of the SNF priority may be accorded any SNF removed

from a civilian nuclear power reactor that has reached the end of its useful life or has been shut

down permanently for whatever reason. (10 CFR 961.11)

The commenter indicated that given these provisions of the Standard Contract, it was clearly arbitrary

and capricious for the agency staffs to conclude (e.g., in DEIS, Section 8.3) that a major benefit of the

proposed PFSF is that it would solve the SNF storage problem for reactor licensees with plants

awaiting decommissioning and unfavorable OFF queue position problems. The commenter added

that the DEIS failed to document that such a problem existed as a practical matter and it did not

address the provisions of the Standard Contract (especially Article VI(B)(I)(b)), which appear to deal

with the issue and provide a resolution. Accordingly, the commenter recommended that the NRC

should revise its analysis underlying Chapter 8 of the DEIS in light of the provisions of the Standard

Contract cited above. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff also agrees that the Standard Contract between reactor licensees and the DOE has a

provision that allows shut-down reactors to have priority in shipping SNF to the permanent repository. 

Individual reactor licensees may or may not elect to trade priority allocations within the OFF queue

based on other considerations. Accordingly, the Standard Contact’s provision for this type of priority

for shutdown reactors but does not necessarily ensure that power reactor licensees would ever

exercise such options to reallocate OFF priority for their SNF.

The NRC staff agrees that reactors may not ship SNF to the permanent repository on the OFF

principle in all cases as modeled in the DEIS. The NRC staff believes that, if no other factors came

into play, a licensee owning multiple reactor sites would have some economic incentive to attempt to

reduce its at-reactor storage costs by reallocating priority rights to the repository among its reactors. 

To the extent that the DOE approves such reallocations, this would reduce the costs of the no action

alternative. However, the NRC staff also notes that other considerations (e.g., political and other

difficult-to-quantify social considerations) make it difficult to determine the true extent to which these

reallocations might actually be used. Therefore, any attempt to quantify the economic benefits or

costs of this activity would be speculative and therefore no change to the EIS has been made.

Regarding the comment about the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, the benefits and costs

analysis in this EIS does not assume that the permanent repository would be located at Yucca

Mountain, Nevada. With regard to the costs of shipping SNF to a permanent repository, these costs

would be borne by DOE. The NRC staff has not included these costs in the analyses for this EIS. 

The comments regarding transportation risk are addressed in Section G.3.16.

G.3.19.2.4 Assumption Regarding Discount for Overpacks and Canisters

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the assumption, which is reflected in both Table 8-2 and Table 8-3 on

page 8-5 of the DEIS, that the applicant has a 30 percent cost advantage for overpacks and canisters

is biased in favor of the applicant. The commenter stated that the FEIS should incorporate equal

costs in the sensitivity analysis. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff finds that the proposed PFSF would receive a significant cost savings from vendors for

purchasing canisters and overpacks. Because the applicant would be purchasing in much larger
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NUREG-1714 G-422

quantities than individual reactor licensees, it would receive significant price discounts justified by

lower production costs due to economies of scale. This is not a bias in the analysis. Although the

potential effects of cost differences less than 30 percent have not been modeled explicitly, the

sensitivity analysis in Table 8.3 of this FEIS presents data for cases when the costs for the proposed

PFSF are 10 percent higher and 10 percent lower than in the applicant’s base case.

G.3.19.2.5 Assumed License Period

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS fails to reflect that the application is for a 20-year license

because it incorrectly uses a 40-year accumulation of net benefits. The commenter added that the

DEIS sensitivity analysis does not provide a 20-year scenario, and should be rewritten. (0198) The

commenter also stated that decentralized at-reactor storage benefits and costs must be compared to

the applicant’s centralized storage and to the Federal centralized storage proposed at Yucca

Mountain. Further, the commenter asserted that for proposed decentralized storage, the economic

costs should include licensing a decentralized ISFSI, ISFSI construction, casks, and staff (unless the

Federal government assumes the burden) until SNF is transported and the possession-only license is

relinquished. The commenter asserted that under the applicant’s proposal, the economic costs should

include the casks, staff, transportation, Rowley Junction facility costs, licensing, and decommissioning

the facility. The commenter stated that under Federal interim storage, all transportation and storage

costs would be paid out of the Federal Waste Management Fund. The commenter added that the

proposed PFSF is considered for a 20-year license, and suggested a more reasonable projection

would be 60 years or more. (0198h)

Nonetheless, the commenter recommended that Chapter 8 be revised to reflect that the action being

considered here is for a 20-year license, stating that there is the possibility of a subsequent 20-year

license, but that license is not at issue here, nor is it automatic. The commenter asserted that any

subsequent license issuance would depend on data not available in this proceeding. (0198)

Response:

The NRC revised the benefits and costs analysis in Chapter 8 of this FEIS in response to the

comment. The analysis more conservatively now presents the costs associated with a single, 20-year

operating license period. The DEIS included a comparison of the "decentralized at-reactor storage

costs" (i.e., the costs of the no action alternative) with the "PFS centralized storage cost" as

recommended in the comment, and this FEIS updates that comparative analysis. Also, the NRC has

added a new Section 6.7.10 to this FEIS to discuss the costs of the no action alternative. The

consideration of the costs of "Federal centralized storage at [the proposed] Yucca Mountain" (as

recommended in the comment) is beyond the scope of this FEIS, since such costs are not germane to

the licensing decision under evaluation in this FEIS.

G.3.19.2.6 Construction Schedule

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that it is important to have a construction schedule to accurately assess

benefits and costs. (0198)

Response:

The construction of the proposed PFSF would occur in three phases, depending on its maximum

capacity (see Section 2.1.1.2 of this FEIS). Most of the construction, and, therefore, capital costs for

the project, would occur in the first phase and would be completed within 18 months after the

appropriate licenses and permits were granted by the NRC and the Cooperating Agencies. Section
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G-423 NUREG-1714

2.1.1.2 of this FEIS describes the timing of the construction phases. After the first phase, which would

provide the necessary facilities to make the proposed PFSF operational, additional storage pads

would be added throughout the facility’s operating life as needed. The NRC has included the timing of

costs, as appropriate, in the benefits and costs analysis in Chapter 8.

G.3.19.2.7 Sensitivity of the Benefits to a Delay in Opening the Proposed PFSF

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS did not analyze the potential for delay. If the proposed PFSF is

delayed by even two years, the commenter asserts that the net benefit of the proposed PFSF would

be greatly reduced.

More specifically, the commenter stated that many of the net benefits of the proposed PFSF described

in Table 8.3 of the DEIS will become negative if the proposed PFSF is delayed by only two years. The

commenter asserted that the applicant's assumptions are unusually biased in favor of the proposed

PFSF, e.g. the proposed PFSF is given a 30 percent cost advantage for overpacks and canisters, and

most nuclear power plants would continue to keep SNF in storage ponds after the reactors are closed. 

The commenter added that the DEIS describes a "detailed chain of logic" (DEIS, page 8-2) which

leads from the ERI April 2000 report to the figures in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 (ERI. "Utility At-Reactor

Spent Fuel Storage Costs for the Private Fuel Storage Facility Benefits and Costs Analysis

Revision 2," April 2000).

The commenter received a copy from the applicant of the proprietary data supporting the ERI report,

after entering into a Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure agreement with ERI. The commenter noted

that the net benefits of the proposed PFSF accepting SNF in the years 2002 and 2003 in the ERI April

2000 report are reflected in the overall net benefits of the proposed PFSF in the various scenarios in

Tables 8.2 and 8.3. If this is so, the commenter asserted that the net benefits shown in Tables 8.2

and 8.3 would be greatly overstated if the proposed PFSF is not available to accept waste in these

early years. According to the commenter, the proprietary ERI analysis shows that a delay in opening

the proposed PFSF could greatly reduce the net benefits and the DEIS does not adequately address

these concerns.

The commenter also stated that a defensible DEIS would have a well prepared sensitivity analysis. 

The commenter asserted that the sensitivity analysis in the DEIS needs to be redone to correct for all

of the problems identified in these comments, including: 

– The lack of a small SNF throughput scenario; 

– The re-specification of the analysis to reflect the benefits and costs of a 20-year PFSF; 

– The lack of an analysis of the impact of a second away-from-reactor ISFSI competitor to the

proposed PFSF; 

– The lack of an analysis of the impact of transshipment of SNF between reactors on the

benefits and costs of the proposed PFSF; 

– The unreasonable $8 million per year pool spent fuel maintenance cost; 

– The lack of timing scenarios of when the proposed PFSF would come online relative to when

a permanent geologic repository would come online; 

– The assumption in the transportation analysis that Yucca Mountain will be the site of the

permanent repository; and 
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-424

– The lack of a 2025 permanent repository scenario. 

This commenter added that the sensitivity analysis in the DEIS is arbitrary and capricious for these

reasons and must be redone. (0198)

Response:

The NRC staff agrees that a two-year delay in the proposed PFSF would potentially reduce its net

benefits. The NRC updated the analysis of net benefits calculated in Section 8 of this FEIS to reflect

that the proposed PFSF would begin operations in 2003, instead of in 2002 (as assumed in analyses

presented in Section 8 of the DEIS). The effect of this assumption is implicit in the benefits and costs

that are presented in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 in this FEIS.

The NRC has not accepted any other application for an equivalent off-site ISFSI for review. 

Therefore, it would be speculative to attempt to predict when, if ever, such a facility would come

online. Without knowing when such a facility would come online, it would be difficult to determine

what type of impact the facility would have on the flow of SNF to the proposed PFSF.

In general, a second away-from-reactor ISFSI would reduce the net benefits of the proposed PFSF,

because it would tend to reduce demand for alternate SNF storage. However, because of economiesof-scale, there would be a large competitive advantage for the initial away-from-reactor ISFSI that

becomes operational. Therefore, the effects of such alternatives on the proposed PFSF project are

not necessary to evaluate in the FEIS.

As stated above, the NRC staff reanalyzed the benefits and costs of the proposed action based on a

20-year license term, and this analysis is not based on the establishment of a permanent repository. 

Based on current DOE projections, a permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010, which could

be within the initial 20-year license term proposed for the PFSF. See Sections G.3.19.2.3 and

G.3.19.2.5. In addition, transfers of SNF from one reactor to another (G.3.19.2.10), the small

throughput scenario (G.3.19.2.8), and spent fuel pool costs (G.3.19.2.2) are addressed in other

sections of this Appendix.

Many of the issues identified by the commenter were addressed by the sensitivity analysis. The NRC

staff concludes that the sensitivity analysis is adequate.

G.3.19.2.8 Lack of Small Throughput Scenario Assumptions

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the small throughput scenario (i.e., a capacity of 6,600 or 8,000 MTU and

SNF throughput of 12,565 MTU from PFS members only, DEIS, page 8-1) is one of the applicant’s

most likely scenarios, and it is arbitrary and capricious to delete it from consideration. The commenter

also stated that NRC has failed to release the volume capacity under the proposed license, and has

failed to analyze volumes that are under the volume specified in the proposed license or the small

throughput scenario, and this is unfair to the public and a violation of NEPA. To analyze the small

throughput scenario the commenter added that the FEIS should also include sensitivity analysis on

timing issues regarding the availability of the proposed PFSF relative to the needs of its customers,

the availability of a permanent repository, and the 20-year life of the proposed PFSF.

The commenter asserted that (1) if the proposed PFSF were to come online in 2003 and accept only a

limited amount of SNF each year, and (2) the permanent repository were to come online in 2010 with

a policy of accepting SNF from decommissioned or decommissioning reactors on a priority basis, and

(3) the proposed PFSF had to get all its SNF off-site before the expiration of its 20-year license in

2021, then the applicant's market share might well be so small that it would not be a viable operation. 

If under these circumstances the proposed PFSF would not be viable, the commenter added that no
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G-425 NUREG-1714

benefits would accrue because it cannot be assumed that the proposed PFSF would, in fact, operate

even if the NRC granted it a license.

The same commenter stated that the DEIS analysis is unreasonable in that it ignores or assumes

away timing issues, and that Chapter 8 needs to be rewritten to reflect timing factors in the net

benefits of the proposed PFSF, the Wyoming alternative, and the no action alternative. The

commenter added that at the heart of the applicant's proposal is "interim" storage which is, in essence,

a timing issue. The commenter stated that net benefits depend on timing, yet other than the 2010

versus 2015 scenarios for [the proposed] "Yucca Mountain" (but not 2025), the NRC staff has

completely disregarded timing as a major variable. The commenter added that the timing of the

proposed PFSF, reactor need given the alternatives, and the timing of a competing facility, are all

assumed to be fixed, or are ignored altogether. The commenter concluded that this is especially

unreasonable because the NRC itself has assumed that a permanent facility would only be available

by 2025. (55 FR 38502, September 18, 1990.)

The commenter stated that Chapter 8 of the DEIS eliminates consideration of the small throughput

scenario for the proposed PFSF (pages 8-1 to 8-2). The commenter added that the only apparent

reason for the deletion is that as a result of NRC's confidential evaluation of the applicant’s financial

qualifications "a license condition has been proposed that would require the applicant to have service

agreements providing for long-term storage of SNF in excess of the 8,000 MTU capacity scenario." 

(DEIS page 8-2) The commenter added that the NRC staff has kept the volume capacity under the

proposed license condition confidential. The commenter recommended that the DEIS be rewritten to

include an analysis of a small throughput scenario based on the volume capacity under the proposed

license condition. (0198)

Response:

As presented in Section 8.1 of this FEIS, the NRC staff based the exclusion of the small throughput

scenario from the analysis on the existence of an NRC license condition that would ensure the

applicant had existing service contracts in excess of the small throughput capacity of 8200 or 9600

MTU. The NRC revised Chapter 8 of this FEIS to present the “breakeven” capacity of the proposed

PFSF, in lieu of presenting or revisiting the small throughput scenario. In addition, the NRC revised

the scenarios analyzed in Chapter 8 to include the consideration of a 20-year license for the facility as

suggested in the comment. These timing factors also apply to the costs of the no action alternative. 

In addition, the timing of decommissioning of the proposed PFSF is discussed in FSAR Section 4.9. 

The analysis of the Wyoming alternative was performed for siting purposes only to determine if the

Wyoming site was obviously superior to the site proposed for the PFSF on the Reservation, and

regulations do not require that a benefits and costs analysis be considered for this alternative. The

DEIS included an analysis of the timing and availability of a permanent repository. Based on current

DOE projections, a permanent repository is scheduled to open by 2010, which could be within the

initial 20-year license term proposed for the PFSF. The NRC updated this analysis for the FEIS.

G.3.19.2.9 Impact of a Second Off-Site ISFSI on PFS

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS fails to acknowledge that there may be a second off-site ISFSI

and does not consider the impact of a second off-site ISFSI on the proposed PFSF alternative, which

would have a direct negative impact on the net benefits of the facility. The commenter added that the

proposed PFSF’s viability depends on the quantity of SNF shipped to it, and the net economic benefits

are directly proportional to that quantity, which would be affected by a second off-site ISFSI. The

commenter stated that if NRC is no longer contemplating a second off-site license application, the

DEIS should clearly state that. In addition, the commenter asserted that the DEIS needs to be revised

to reflect whether there is a competing off-site ISFSI, and if so, to describe its impact.
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NUREG-1714 G-426

Response:

To date, the NRC has not accepted any application for an equivalent off-site ISFSI for review. 

Therefore, it would be speculative to predict when, if ever, such a facility would come online. Without

knowing this, it would be difficult to determine what type of impact the facility would have on the flow of

SNF to the proposed PFSF.

In general, a second away-from-reactor ISFSI would tend to reduce the net benefits of the proposed

PFSF, because it would reduce demand for alternate SNF storage if one assumes the market can

only support one away-from-reactor ISFSI. It should also be noted that away-from-reactor SNF

storage demands may be sufficient to support multiple ISFSIs. Therefore, the effects of such

alternatives on the proposed PFSF project are speculative and the NRC need not evaluate them in the

EIS.

G.3.19.2.10 Intra-Licensee Transfers of SNF

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the failure of the DEIS to consider intra-utility transshipments of SNF

sharply biases the DEIS toward the proposed PFSF and against the no action alternative, especially

given that reactor licensees are currently using intra-utility transshipments.

More specifically, the commenter asserted that the NRC staff has ignored the obvious probability (and

current reality) of shipments of SNF between facilities owned or controlled by the same utility. Thus, if

a utility has several reactors and one on-site ISFSI (or other available storage facility) all in the same

general area but not on the same site, the commenter stated that there is no apparent reason why the

NRC would not allow the utility to store SNF from some or all of its reactors at a common site. The

commenter also stated that the NRC has already held that ISFSIs are, in general, safe, and has

allowed transportation of SNF from commercial reactors to away-from-reactor SNF storage facilities in

the past. The commenter gave the example of Hatch (sic [Harris]), with SNF transfers from Brunswick

and Robinson.

The commenter recommended that the agency staff revise Chapters 8 and 9 of the EIS to reflect the

economics of intra-utility multi-site storage sharing. (0198)

Response:

The shipment of SNF between nuclear power plant sites has not been addressed in detail in this EIS

due to the limited interest expressed by multi-plant reactor licensees and the speculative nature of

such assumptions. As indicated in Section 2.2.1.2 of this FEIS, only two instances of intra-licensee

transfer of SNF have been approved by the NRC and a third is currently under Commission review. 

Transfers of SNF between sites would require NRC approval and a license amendment and an

associated NEPA review. As the presumption of such actions being undertaken are highly

speculative, they do not lend themselves readily to evaluation; hence, the NRC has not considered

any intra-licensee multi-site sharing of storage capacity.

G.3.19.2.11 SNF Shipping Costs

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the costs of shipping SNF across the country are not directly included in

the reactor licensees’ costs. (SL3-08)
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G-427 NUREG-1714

Response:

The NRC conducted a benefits and costs analysis for this FEIS, and included the costs of shipping the

SNF to Skull Valley as part of the cost of the proposed PFSF (see Section 8.1.1.5).

G.3.19.2.12 Cost of Railroad Line

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the license application and ROW application do not provide sufficient

detail on the costs of constructing, operating, and closing the rail line and the ITF. The commenter

added that the DEIS contains no performance or design specification information, such as track rating,

switching needs at inter-line connection and facilities, signaling capabilities, travel grades, and other

details necessary for an adequate analysis of benefits and costs. (0198i)

Response:

The NRC staff reviewed the costs provided by the applicant (in the proprietary Business Plan) for the

rail line and the ITF and determined these costs to be reasonable. The comments about design and

operation of the rail line and ITF are addressed in Section G.3.16.

G.3.19.2.13 Utah Regulatory Costs and Bonding Requirements Omitted

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS fails to reflect the regulatory costs and bonding requirements set

forth in the Utah Radiation Control Act. The commenter stated that it is unreasonable to ignore these

significant amounts when calculating the costs of the proposed PFSF, and that the agencies should

revise their analysis to reflect the requirements, or explain why they should not be included. (0198)

Response:

As described in the comment response G.3.3.2.3, the State of Utah does not have civil regulatory

jurisdiction over the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band. The proposed PFSF would be located on

the Reservation, and, while the Reservation is entirely surrounded by the State of Utah, it is not part of

the State. Accordingly, the State does not appear to have the authority to enforce the Utah Radiation

Control Act with respect to the proposed PFSF, and the comment does not warrant any change to the

analysis set forth in the FEIS.

G.3.19.2.14 Economic Costs of Alternatives

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the FEIS must consider the costs of alternatives to the proposed action. 

The commenter stated that the DOE has concluded that costs of a centralized DOE interim facility

would exceed costs of on-site management of SNF by $1.5 billion. The commenter added that the

FEIS must also recognize that money expended by private reactor licensees for storage of SNF will

have to be reimbursed by the Federal government given recent case law regarding the DOE's failure

to take title to the SNF. (0198i)

Response:

The NRC staff considered this comment concerning costs of alternatives, and determined that it refers

to a statement from testimony given by the former Energy Secretary Richardson before the House
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NUREG-1714 G-428

Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Energy and Power concerning H.R. 45, "The Nuclear

Waste Policy Act of 1999."

The staff reviewed this testimony and has determined that the DOE conclusion that the costs of a

centralized DOE interim facility would be greater than on-site management refers only to the federal

government’s portion of the total cost of national SNF storage. This cost to the federal government

would not be the same as the social cost perspective presented in the benefits and costs analyses in

Chapter 8 in this FEIS. Specifically, the $1.5 billion mentioned by former Energy Secretary

Richardson does not account for the reduction of utility at-reactor SNF storage costs.

In addition, whether the Federal government will have to reimburse private companies for storage of

SNF or not does not have any effect on the environmental impacts of the proposed action or the costs

or benefits or costs of the proposed action or any alternative evaluated in the FEIS. Accordingly, this

comment does not warrant any change to the FEIS.

G.3.19.3 Environmental Benefits and Costs

G.3.19.3.1 Regional/State Environmental Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters asserted that the DEIS overstates or misrepresents the benefits to the State of

Utah for the following reasons:

C One commenter stated that the EIS should provide more information explaining why residents of

Utah should be subjected to the risks associated with the proposed PFSF. (GR-13) One

commenter asked how the State of Utah can be compensated for the loss of human life and

wildlife, and the loss of environmental quality due to the proposed PFSF. The commenter also

asked how one compensates a State for its rising levels of radiation, which, like dioxin, could

cause rising levels of cancer, birth defects, and stillbirths. (SL2-14)

C Commenters stated that the DEIS does not include a benefits and costs analysis of the impact the

proposed PFSF may have on military operations, which take place on all sides of the proposed

PFSF, or on the residents of Dugway and the Dugway Proving Ground. The commenters stated

that the cost of restrictions on the operation of the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) could

have a significant impact on the Utah economy because loss of the UTTR might force the closure

of Hill AFB, which employs about 15,000 people. Commenters added that the loss of this Base

would be critical to the State and to the national defense, and the impacts on the Tooele Army

Depot, the Desert Chemical Facility, and other military installations also have not been analyzed. 

(GR-01, GR-05, SL2-20)

C Several commenters stated the nuclear reactor licensees will reap most of the benefits of the

proposed PFSF and their customers will enjoy rate decreases, while the risks and costs to Utah

communities are undervalued or ignored altogether in the DEIS. (0012, 0015, GR-13, SL1-01, 

SL3-02) One commenter claimed that the paramount, determining issue for the NRC is the

savings to utility companies located elsewhere. (0090)

C One commenter stated the DEIS Executive Summary (page xlii, lines 30-47) blurs the important

differences between environmental benefits and risks, and economic benefits and risks. The

commenter also argued that the nuclear power industry is the only industry not responsible for its

waste from “cradle to grave,” and it produces waste that is harder to treat, store, or dispose. The

commenter asserted that the Executive Summary is not fully correct when it states that failure to

license the proposed PFSF will result in an increase in air pollution per unit of electricity when the

closure of nuclear power plants increases reliance on fossil fuel powered plants. (0096)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-429 NUREG-1714

C One commenter stated that if the State lost the UTTR, which is under scrutiny now because of

endangered species and wilderness issues, it would also lose Hill Field, the “anchor store” of

Utah, and that Hill Field pays $5.7 billion every year to the State. (GR-01)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS should assess the cost of someone getting cancer from the

operation of the proposed PFSF. (SL3-36)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments and opinions about the accurate portrayal of potential

benefits to the State of Utah and the comments expressing the opinion that the benefits have been

overstated or misrepresented. For the reasons set forth below, the NRC staff concludes that with the

revisions provided in the benefits and costs analysis, Chapter 8 provides an accurate and complete

description of the analysis.

The NRC staff notes the concern that Utah citizens will be subject to the perceived risks of the

proposed PFSF. This FEIS does not describe any loss of human life, wildlife, or significant loss of

environmental quality accompanying the proposed action. The commenter appears to be concerned

about accidents that could release radioactive materials over a very large area. The NRC staff

reviewed such accident scenarios as part of its safety review and has not found any such events to be

credible.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comment requesting a benefits and costs analysis to determine

potential impacts to nearby military installations and/or operations. However, the NRC staff did not

identify potential impacts to nearby military operations as a result of the proposed PFSF. In regard to

the UTTR, the NRC staff met with the U.S. Air Force about the potential for impacts to the UTTR or

the mission of Hill AFB. No overflight restrictions are being contemplated to accommodate the

proposed PFSF. See FEIS Section 4.5.2.7.

The NRC staff considered the comment that the nuclear reactor licensees would reap the most

benefits, and it agrees that the economic advantages of the proposed PFSF would be attractive to

several existing nuclear power reactor licensees. However, the benefits and costs analysis in Chapter

8 of this FEIS presents the benefits and costs from a societal perspective and not from the applicant’s

or nuclear industry perspective. The NRC did not adjust or undervalue the costs or benefits of the

proposed PFSF project.

The NRC reviewed the comment that referred to a “blurring” of the differences between environmental

benefits/risks and economic benefits and risks in the Executive Summary of the DEIS. The Executive

Summary clearly presents headings to indicate that the discussion is focused on “Economic Benefits

and Costs” and then is followed by a discussion of “Environmental Benefits and Costs of the Proposed

Action.” The NRC staff also acknowledges the comment about the characteristics of the waste from

the nuclear power industry. In regard to the comment about increased air pollution, the statement that

concerned the commenter has been deleted from the FEIS. The NRC staff notes that nuclear energy

would need to be replaced with another form of energy that would generate its own environmental

impacts. Such impacts are beyond the scope of this EIS.

The NRC staff considered the comment regarding the cost associated with cancer. In the FEIS

Section 4.7.2, the NRC staff evaluated the likelihood of individual cancer cases resulting from

exposure to radiation from the proposed PFSF, and concluded that this likelihood is extremely low. 

Accordingly, evaluation of the costs of such an effect is not required.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-430

G.3.19.3.2 Economic Costs of Floods

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that the DEIS does not reference the problems or evaluate the risks of

flooding. The commenter added that the DEIS also does not evaluate the financial impacts to remedy

flood-related problems, which could result in significant costs to the State of Utah. (0198)

Response:

In the SER, the NRC evaluated the potential impacts of flooding on the proposed PFSF. Flood

protection berms (as described in Section 2.1.1.2) would be installed at the proposed PFSF and would

prevent any reasonably foreseeable damage from floodwaters to the proposed PFSF or to the SNF in

storage. The DEIS discussed the effects the existence of the proposed PFSF and rail line would have

on the natural drainage patterns in the event of a flood. As stated in the DEIS, these impacts would

be small. Therefore, any financial impacts to the State of Utah resulting from a flood would not be

affected by the presence of the proposed PFSF or rail line.

G.3.19.3.3 Earthquake and Seismic Evaluations

Comment Summary: 

One commenter stated that excluding earthquake and seismic evaluations from the DEIS prohibits

participating agencies and the public from evaluating risks, costs, benefits, and separate and

cumulative impacts. (0012, SL1-01)

Response:

The FEIS addresses the environmental impacts of an earthquake. Section 4.7.2.3 discusses the

radiological impacts resulting from accidents at the proposed PFSF. The NRC staff, in its safety

review, concluded that no credible accident, including an earthquake, would result in a release of

radioactive material; therefore, the radiological impacts from accidents, including earthquakes, are

small, and no cost analysis of earthquake-related accidents is warranted. Based on the above, the

NRC staff did not find that the participating agencies and the public were prohibited from adequately

assessing the environmental impacts of the proposed action, including the risks, benefits and costs.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed PFSF earthquake design against specific requirements in 10

CFR Part 72. The NRC staff presents the details of its review in the SER, as updated. The evaluation

concerns the safety of the proposed action, and whether that action satisfies the NRC’s safety

requirements, but does not consider the environmental impacts of the proposed action. The NRC is

not required to request public comment on an SER, nor is it required to repeat its safety evaluation in

an EIS. Accordingly, the FEIS does not include the NRC’s detailed technical (safety) evaluation. 

Rather, the FEIS discusses the environmental impacts of the proposed action. Nevertheless, to

address this comment, the NRC added a brief summary of the seismic review results to Section

4.7.2.3 of this FEIS.

G.3.19.4 Societal Benefits and Costs

G.3.19.4.1 Benefits: Site or Local Socioeconomic Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters asserted that the DEIS overstated or misrepresented the benefits to the Skull

Valley Band and Tooele County for the following reasons:
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-431 NUREG-1714

C Two commenters stated the benefits to the Skull Valley Band cited in the DEIS are incorrect,

overstated, or are unspecified. (0039, 0077, 0112)

C One commenter said pages xxxvi through xxxvii of the DEIS do not discuss lost economic

benefits. (0096)

C One commenter stated that the DEIS violates NUREG-1555 by failing to emphasize significant

issues and by overemphasizing the insignificant benefits to the Skull Valley area to promote the

proposed PFSF. (0039, 0077) 

C The same commenter stated that in Section 4.5.3 of the DEIS (page 4-36, line 1), the effects on

the local economic structure would be small during operation of the facility because only 43

workers will be employed and few are likely to be from Skull Valley. The commenter added that

the DEIS Executive Summary (page xxxvi) states that workers will come from a commute of up to

90 minutes away, which is outside the Tooele County area. (0039, 0077) The commenter stated

that most of the work will be performed by skilled contractors, rather than Native Americans who

may not be trained to perform such work. (0077) 

C The commenter stated that the benefits to all but a few parties are questionable because in many

places the DEIS attributes benefits to the Skull Valley Band without providing a dollar amount,

even though amounts are specified for other entities. The commenter argued that the potential

economic benefits to the Skull Valley area are small and insignificant; for example, most of the

employment opportunities created by the proposed PFSF would be temporary and would not be

filled by Native Americans. The commenter asserted that only 225 jobs are identified for the 19-

month construction phase and only 43 long-term jobs are expected for facility operations. The

commenter also asserted that the DEIS should not include the nebulous statement in Section

4.5.3 (page 4-36, line 4) that operations jobs “might” be filled by Tribal members. Also, the

commenter claimed that the DEIS contradicts itself by stating that the economic benefit realized

by the small number of jobs is itself “small.” (0039, 0077)

C One commenter said the County will not receive significant tax revenue from the proposed PFSF

because it will be on Reservation land, and the Reservation does not pay County taxes. (SL3-46)

C Several commenters stated the benefits would go to a few select groups, (0039, 0053, 0151,

0196), but would not benefit Utah generally. (0039, 0046, 0071, 0160, 0167, SL3-04)

C Commenters stated the applicant may go bankrupt or sell out to another utility consortium that

might go bankrupt leaving the Skull Valley Band and the people of Utah to pay for the operation

and decommissioning of the proposed PFSF. (0053, 0096, SL3-48)

C One commenter stated that although the rail line could make economic development of Skull

Valley more attractive, the ROW requested by the applicant from BLM is only for the applicant’s

use. (The commenter cited the DEIS in Section 8.3 page 8-11, lines 3-5) The commenter

concluded that there are no additional benefits of the ROW. (0163)

C A commenter stated that the definition of “net economic benefit” as the simple difference between

incremental cost of storing SNF at the reactor site and the cost of constructing and operating the

proposed PFSF does not account for the environmental impacts or increased risks. (0090, SL3-

02)

Response: 

The DEIS presented the benefits and costs of the proposed action on the local, regional, and State

economies. With regard to the comment about the nature of payments from the applicant to Tooele

County, the text has been revised in Section 4.5.2.8 of this FEIS to characterize the anticipated
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-432

revenues to the County from the applicant as payments in excess of $91 million over the life of the

project (based on a proposed agreement negotiated between the applicant and Tooele County). 

While, these monies are not tax payments, they would be significant revenues for the County. The

discussions of these economic impacts are found in Sections 4.5.1.8 and 4.5.2.8 of the FEIS.

One comment, that the Skull Valley benefits and costs analysis is incorrect, does not provide

supporting detailed information, and therefore a specific response is not necessary. Similarly, it is not

clear what the commenter means by “economic benefits lost,” hence, the NRC cannot develop a

specific response. If the commenter is referring to the economic costs, then Chapter 8 of this FEIS

addresses the subject.

In regard to NUREG-1555, that document contains the NRC’s standard environmental review plan for

nuclear power plants. The NUREG document specifically applies to new license applications for such

plants, and is not applicable to the proposed PFSF.

Regarding the comment on local economic structure, Sections 4.5, 5.5, and 6.1.5 of this FEIS assess

the impacts on the economic structure of Tooele County to be small but favorable. With respect to the

concern about the residential location of operations workers, the DEIS stated that jobs would likely be

filled by workers from Tooele County or from other counties within commuting distance, not

necessarily from outside Tooele County, as the commenter asserts. The NRC staff attempted to be

straightforward in estimating the number of jobs associated with each stage and element of the

proposed action without overstating or understating the magnitude of economic benefits. 

Regarding employment opportunities for Native Americans, the DEIS did not estimate the number of

jobs that would go to Native Americans but does conclude that job opportunities would be greater for

members of the Skull Valley Band. Although the applicant has not committed to a specific number or

type of jobs that might be filled by Tribal members, it has committed to training and development for

Tribal members in its ER (Section 7.2). The lease also requires the applicant to provide employment

preference first to members of the Skull Valley Band. The NRC and the Cooperating Agencies have

inserted language in Sections 4.5.1.8, 4.5.2.8, and 5.5.1.1 of this FEIS to clarify the potential for

employment of Tribal members.

The comment about benefits going to select groups and not to Utah generally is not supported by any

specific factual assertions, and does not require a response. Nevertheless, see FEIS Section 4.5.2.8

for a detailed discussion of the economic benefits for the proposed PFSF and the expected recipients.

Regarding the possibility of this applicant or a future license holder going bankrupt, the NRC license

would provide for the establishment of a “decommissioning fund” that would ensure sufficient funds

are available to adequately decommission the facility. This fund would exist and be available, even if

the applicant or a future licensee holder were to go out of business.

The NRC acknowledges the comment about the use of the rail line by the applicant. If a ROW were to

be granted, the applicant would have the only foreseeable use for such a rail line. Nevertheless, the

presence of this new rail line could provide transportation infrastructure to make the economic

development of Skull Valley more attractive to other potential users of the rail line. 

In regard to the definition of the “net economic benefit,” the definition and approach used in the

benefits and costs analysis in Chapter 8 of this FEIS is valid and appropriate. The economic analysis

does not attempt to include environmental effects and transportation or other risks of the proposed

action which are assessed elsewhere in the FEIS (see Chapters 5 and 6, and Section 8.2). 
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-433 NUREG-1714

G.3.19.4.2 Inadequate Data on Benefits and Costs of the Lease Agreement

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters requested that more information about the lease agreement be made available. 

(0163, 0198, 0240, SL1-15, SL3-48) Specific comments about the lease agreement include the

following: 

C One commenter said the DEIS Executive Summary provided estimates of the economic benefits

to the County and State, but does not estimate the lease payments to the Skull Valley Band. 

(SL1-15)

C One commenter stated that despite the NRC’s responsibility to require the applicant to provide

quality information to stakeholders, documentation of benefits and costs has not been shared with

the Skull Valley Band, the people of Utah, or the cities and states through which the SNF will

pass. (SL3-48) 

C One commenter stated that the lease agreement, conditionally approved by the BIA, including

payments to the Skull Valley Band and to Tooele County, must be made publicly available. (0198,

0198i) The commenter argued that these are major Federal actions, and therefore the lease

should be made publicly available to determine the appropriateness of these Federal decisions, as

well as to determine the benefits and costs to the Skull Valley Band. (0198) The commenter

asserted that there is insufficient information for an adequate analysis of the proposal’s benefits

and costs because the impacts of the financial commitments governing the lease cannot be

known unless the complete lease agreement is available. (0198h, 0198i)

C Two commenters stated that the FEIS should evaluate how the Skull Valley Band, the BIA, and

the DOI may incur financial responsibility if future actions by the applicant result in excess liability

or damage to Tribal lands. (0198, 0240)

C One commenter stated that the description of environmental benefits in Section 8.2 (page 8-10,

lines 12-23) should include the payments to Tooele County under the agreement with the

applicant, in addition to the payments received by the Skull Valley Band. (0163) 

Response:

The NRC staff reviewed the license application in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR Part 72. 

The benefits and costs analysis was part of the DEIS and included estimates of direct and indirect

economic benefits, including increased tax revenues to both Tooele County and the State of Utah. 

The DEIS recognizes the positive economic benefit to the Skull Valley Band. The details of the lease,

including the amount of the payment, are subject to review and approval by the BIA pursuant to the

requirements of 25 CFR Part 162. In addition, NRC regulations and NEPA, which outline the

requirements for an NRC EIS, do not require an evaluation of how financial responsibility may be

incurred by other parties (i.e., Federal agencies or Tribes) if future actions by the applicant result in

excess liability or damage to Tribal lands. Therefore, this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this

EIS. 25 CFR Part 162 also requires the lessee to post bonds or other assurances to guarantee its

performance of lease obligations.

Several commenters wanted the amount of the lease payment to the Skull Valley Band listed as an

economic benefit. The amount of the lease payments from the applicant to the Skull Valley Band

under the lease is not included in the FEIS because that information is confidential and proprietary to

the Skull Valley Band and the applicant. See State of Utah v. United States Department of the

Interior, Consolidated Case No. 2:98 CV 380 K (D. Utah November 3, 1999). Payments to Tooele

County are addressed in G.3.19.4.1.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-434

G.3.19.4.3 Other State or National Impacts

Comment Summary: 

Several commenters addressed the proposed PFSF’s impacts on states other than Utah, and on the

nation as a whole. (0015, 0020, 0070, 0198, 0198h, SL1-05, SL1-15, SL2-07, SL3-04) Commenters

asserted the DEIS overstated or misrepresented the benefits to other states and the nation for the

following reasons:

C One commenter stated that the economic benefits to private industry should not outweigh the

environmental impacts, potential loss of life, and increased risk of accidents and a price cannot be

placed on the risks associated with transporting SNF across the country. The commenter added

that there is no guarantee that negative, long-lasting impacts to people, land, and ecosystems will

not occur. (SL1-05)

C A commenter stated that the risks to the people of Utah would increase while risks would

decrease for people near nuclear power plants. The commenter asserted that no nuclear power

plants are in jeopardy of being shut down if the proposed PFSF is not built. (0015)

C Two commenters said Utah would be stigmatized by the proposed PFSF and this stigma will

adversely affect Utah’s economy and ability to grow. Specifically, the commenters stated that the

economy will suffer due to decreased property values and economic losses to the agricultural

industry, the tourist industry, and other industries. The commenters concluded that these costs

should be included in the DEIS. (SL2-07, SL3-04)

C A commenter stated that the DEIS should not weigh costs to reactor companies and other

communities more heavily than costs to Utah communities. The commenter added that the

people of Utah would not benefit from ensuring nuclear power output and reducing SNF storage

costs, things the DEIS cited as beneficial. The commenter stated that if the proposed PFSF is

approved, built, and operated, Utah will bear the risks of transporting an enormous volume of SNF

throughout the State; bear risks associated with having communities near storage bear negative

economic impacts; lose use of public lands and enjoyment of wildlife and recreation in Skull

Valley; bear the costs of training emergency responders and medical personnel; and continue to

bear the costs of Utah’s own power production externalities, including costs associated with air

pollution. (0198)

C The commenter stated that some items identified as costs for the no action alternative are actually

policy choices, including local prohibitions on storing additional SNF. Thus, the commenter

concluded that the DEIS should not consider the consequences of these choices as costs that

justify the proposed PFSF. (0198)

C The same commenter stated that the financial impacts to ratepayers should be considered. The

commenter asserted that ratepayers have already paid for SNF disposal by the Federal

government, and concluded that ratepayers will be paying twice if funds from public facilities are

committed to fund a second storage facility. (0198h)

C A commenter stated that the costs of not building an SNF storage facility should be included. The

commenter added that ratepayers pay the Federal government $3 million each day for SNF

storage, and a permanent facility is many years from completion. (0020)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments stating that the DEIS overstates or misrepresents the

benefits to other states and the nation. To the extent that the costs of storing SNF at the proposed
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-435 NUREG-1714

PFSF are less than the costs of other storage options, the proposed action would reduce net costs to

the ratepayers of those licensees which decided to use the proposed PFSF.

Regarding the comment about economic benefits not outweighing environmental impacts, potential

loss of life, and increased risk of accidents, the benefits and costs analysis presented in Chapter 8 of

this FEIS was prepared from a societal perspective, not from the reactor licensees’ or the applicant’s

perspective. This FEIS does not describe any potential loss of life or significantly increased risk of an

accident that would accompany the proposed PFSF. One commenter appears to be concerned about

accidents that could release radioactive materials over a very large area. The NRC staff’s safety

review considered such accident scenarios and did not find any such events to be credible. 

Accordingly, the NRC staff finds that this EIS does not weigh the benefits to reactor licensees more

heavily than environmental costs. The staff notes the opinion offered in the comment about Utahns

not benefitting from the nation’s continued use of nuclear power.

The comment referring to “negative, long-lasting impacts” is not specific. The proposed PFSF would

be temporary and would not be expected to produce any adverse long-term impacts. 

In regard to the comment about risks near operating nuclear plants and the possibility that operating

nuclear plants would be shut down, the risks associated with the transport, handling and storage of

the SNF are analyzed in this FEIS and are considered to be small (see Sections 4.7 and 5.7). This

FEIS indicates that the operating status of power plants could be diminished as storage space for SNF

continues to diminish.

The basis for the stigma described in the comment is not clear. EISs are only required to consider the

effects of a proposed action upon the physical environment. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People

Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). The elements of public perception, including stigma,

fall outside of this definition of “real and tangible” impacts; hence, the type of cost analysis suggested

in the comment is beyond the scope of this FEIS. A more complete discussion of property value

impacts is discussed in Section G.3.13.2.8 of this FEIS.

Regarding the comment about policy choices, the NRC staff has not included or analyzed the costs of

shutting down reactors due to site-specific SNF storage prohibitions in the benefits and costs analysis

in Chapter 8. The staff agrees that the costs identified in the comment are related to policy choices

and are speculative. However, it is useful to realize that the economic costs of this particular policy

choice could be potentially reduced if the proposed PFSF becomes an alternative for SNF storage.

In regard to the comment about financial impacts to ratepayers, it is true that reactor licensees have

passed nuclear power generating costs to the ratepayers to pay for a national permanent geological

repository for SNF. However, in the absence of such a national repository for SNF, reactor licensees

are passing on to ratepayers the costs of continuing to store SNF at power reactor sites. For some

reactor licensees, the proposed PFSF could offer an economical alternative to continued at-reactor

storage. To the extent that the costs of storing SNF at the proposed PFSF were less than the costs of

other storage options, the proposed action may reduce net costs to the ratepayers of those reactor

licensees who decided to use the proposed PFSF.

Regarding the comment about including the costs of not building the proposed PFSF, such an

analysis is included in Chapter 8 in this FEIS as part of the “no action alternative.” In addition, the

NRC staff added a new section, Section 6.7.10 in this FEIS to describe the economic costs of not

building the proposed PFSF in Skull Valley (i.e., the no action alternative).
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-436

G.3.19.4.4 Costs Related to Emergency Response

Comment Summary:

Several commenters stated that the potential cost of a transportation accident and the equipment

needed to respond were not adequately considered in the DEIS. (0012, 0023, 0217, 0240, 0246, SL1-

01, SL1-39, SL2-05) Another commenter stated that the DEIS should consider the costs to the local

emergency services network. The commenter added that the FEIS should discuss the liability issues

related to the involvement of volunteers responding to a radiological emergency. (0171) Other

commenters stated that cost considerations should include emergency response needs, local

emergency response training, equipment for radioactive incidents, and additional training for medical

personnel. (0198, SL3-04) One commenter questioned the impacts of not providing funding for

emergency response. (0198h) The commenter stated that the applicant’s ER does not identify

emergency response costs adequately, as follows: The applicant cited in the ER, Table 7.1-1 that

emergency response costs are quantified; Table 7.3-1 does not contain a category for emergency

response costs; and the applicant claims it is lumped into operating expenses. The commenter asked

what the costs are and how the NRC can evaluate information that is not provided. The commenter

therefore asserted that the entire Table 7.3-1 is so general, without any supporting information or

breakdown of information, that it is useless, and that 10 CFR 51.45(c) was intended to require more

information than is included. (0198b)

Response:

In its emergency plan, the applicant has identified equipment and personnel capable of responding in

emergency situations at the proposed PFSF. (The Emergency Plan was evaluated by the NRC in its

safety review and is discussed in the SER.) The applicant’s emergency plan for the proposed PFSF

also includes provisions for training entities providing emergency response assistance. The training

will include facility orientation, exposure guidelines, personnel monitoring devices, and basic

contamination control principles (PFS/EP 2000. “Emergency Plan, Private Fuel Storage Facility, Skull

Valley Indian Reservation, Tooele County, Utah, (Rev 10),” NRC Docket No. 72-22, Private Fuel

Storage, LLC). All states provide emergency response for transportation accidents involving

hazardous material. There are a number of shipments of radiological materials within the State of

Utah, for which the State already provides capable emergency response. The North American

Emergency Response Guidebook for First Responders involving hazardous materials, developed in

part by DOT, does not distinguish between the actions needed for an SNF shipment and other

shipments containing radioactive materials (U.S. Department of Transportation. “2000 Emergency

Response Guidebook, A Guide for First Responders During the Initial Phase of a Dangerous

Goods/Hazardous Materials Incident”). Therefore, an assumption that additional cost would be

incurred for unique or different training to respond to potential transportation accidents involving SNF

does not appear to be justified. Further, as the staff stated in Section G.3.16.6.1, the costs of a

severe transportation accident are determined by highly uncertain variables and the resulting costs

themselves are highly uncertain. Accordingly, the NRC need not consider such costs in the FEIS.

As for the comment directed to the applicant’s ER, Chapter 8 of this FEIS presents the NRC staff’s

analysis of the benefits and costs of the proposed project, and includes all operating costs, including

costs of emergency preparedness at the site level. Emergency preparedness resources at the local or

state level are addressed above.

G.3.19.4.5 Costs Related to Sabotage/Terrorist/Terrorist Attacks

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that the EIS should mention that a terrorist action could cost billions of dollars. 

(SL1-32) The commenter indicated that the EIS should include the economic impacts associated with
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-437 NUREG-1714

terrorists detonating a nuclear device at the proposed PFSF. (SL1-32) Another commenter noted that

costs of train accidents or terrorist attacks are enormous and must be considered in the EIS. (SL2-05)

Response:

Since sabotage is a deliberate malevolent act, a meaningful probability of likelihood cannot be

assigned. However, the NRC protects against potential events by assuring that adequate physical

protection plans are in place for nuclear facilities. The NRC staff has determined that the physical

protection plan for the proposed PFSF meets the current physical security and safeguards

requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 73.51, and that the plan demonstrates capabilities for the

protection of stored SNF. This is documented in the SER.

Any costs resulting from sabotage would involve hypothetical consequences from a speculative,

hypothetical successful attack. Accordingly, the cost associated with a successful sabotage event is

highly uncertain, and was not estimated in the FEIS. See Section G.3.15.6.1 for additional discussion. 

Economic cost of potential transportation accidents and compliance with Part 73 requirements are

discussed in Sections G.3.16.6 and G.3.16.10 respectively.
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G-439 NUREG-1714

G.3.20 General Environmental Comments (not Resource-Specific)

G.3.20.1 Adequacy of DEIS

Comment Summary:

Several commenters indicated in general comments that the DEIS is inadequate. (0012, 0015, 0023,

0112, GR-11, GR-13, SL1-01, SL1-07, SL1-19, SL1-37, SL1-39, SL3-02, SL3-04, SL3-28) Other

commenters stated that the DEIS does not stand on its own as an analytical document that fully

informs decision-makers and the public of the environmental effects of the proposed action. (0039,

0211, SL1-07, SL2-02)

The specific comments were:

C The DEIS fails to consider or evaluate any form of pollution other than radiological. (0198)

C The DEIS does not address “risk” in terms of what is ethical and fair, what is necessary, or who

benefits. (0015) The science of the DEIS should be balanced by consideration of human and civic

issues. (0015, GR-13)

C The DEIS does not address significant potential environmental impacts of the project, and, without

the SER, the safety conclusions are unsubstantiated. (0215) 

C The DEIS should consider potential impacts for the entire State of Utah and all states through

which SNF will pass. (0198, SL1-39) 

C More detailed maps of the proposed site and the area directly adjacent to the site need to be

included in Chapter 3 of the DEIS. The maps provided do not show salient features referenced in

the text (Hastings Pass, test pits, soil borings, stock ponds/reservoirs, springs other than

Horseshoe Springs). (0039, 0077)

C The DEIS should be further refined to provide additional information where needed to address

issues raised during the public meeting. (SL1-19)

C The DEIS fails to address indirect impacts of the proposed action. (SL1-28)

C The DEIS fails to give adequate consideration to reasonably foreseeable potential adverse

environmental impacts during storage of SNF at an ISFSI. (0198a)

C The DEIS fails to analyze the impacts on Nevada of locating 40,000 metric tons of SNF in western

Utah. The project would impact transportation, emergency management, land use, and property

values in Nevada and the DEIS should address those impacts. (0171, SL1-14)

Response: 

The DEIS considered impacts to the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band, surrounding areas, and the

State of Utah, as well as impacts from the cross-country transport of the SNF. The NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies examined environmental consequences for a wide variety of actions associated

with the proposed PFSF, including accident scenarios involving the SNF; the associated cost of the

accidents; and impacts related to construction and normal operation of the proposed PFSF. The

Cooperating Agencies examined potential impacts to air and water quality, biological and geological

resources, historic resources, scenic resources, and socioeconomics. No significant adverse impacts

from the proposed action were identified. The NRC staff has included a summary of the proposed

PFSF seismic analysis in this FEIS. More in-depth accident scenarios, including seismic potential

analyses, can be found in the SER, as updated, and need not be duplicated in the EIS.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-440

The NRC staff prepared the DEIS to conform to the CEQ’s regulations for implementing NEPA. The

process undertaken to implement NEPA includes public scrutiny, scientific analysis, and expert

agency comments. The NRC staff reviewed the DEIS and concluded that the findings presented in

the document are sound and scientifically defensible. The NRC staff conducted adequate analyses of

indirect and direct impacts for the EIS. Each subsection of Sections 4 and 5 of this FEIS addresses

both direct and indirect impacts of the proposed action. The analysis of risk in the EIS is based on

technical considerations and is not influenced by what groups may potentially be affected. The

analysis of risk does not include a discussion of ethics, which is beyond the scope of the document. 

The cost-benefit analysis presented in this FEIS shows the specific construction and operation costs

of the proposed action, as well as benefits to the local, regional and State economies. Sections

4.5.1.8 and 4.5.2.8 of this FEIS present the economic analysis of the construction and operations

impacts for the proposed action. The anticipated benefits and projected costs associated with the

proposed action are discussed in Section 8.

The design and operation of the proposed PFSF would conform to the NRC safety regulations

delineated in 10 CFR Parts 71 and 72. These regulations include specific requirements for the

transportation, physical protection, and safe storage of SNF. The applicant would be required to

satisfy all applicable regulations. 

With regard to the comments on the detail of the maps, the features mentioned were identified on

maps in Sections 3.8 and 3.12 of the DEIS. The test pits and soil borings (used in the staff’s safety

review of seismic design) are not identified because the NRC staff decided that level of detail was not

necessary for this FEIS. The NRC staff did not include that level of detail in order to focus on larger

environmental issues. See Section G.3.9 for a more detailed discussion of the maps in this FEIS. A

detailed discussion of the NRC staff’s seismic analysis is contained in the SER, as updated.

There is no clear link between the potential impacts to Nevada and the proposed PFSF in Skull Valley,

Utah. To the extent that SNF might be shipped through Nevada (either to, or away from, the proposed

PFSF), Section 5.7 of this FEIS presents the potential human health radiological impacts of such

shipments.

G.3.20.2 Accuracy of DEIS

Comment Summary:

Several commenters provided general comments that the DEIS is inaccurate. (0015, 0039, 0077, GR11, GR-13, SL1-07, SL3-02, SL3-04, SL3-28) One commenter provided comments on the

characterization of impacts, stating that impacts should be described as “beneficial” or “detrimental”

when appropriate (e.g., Table 4.5 of the DEIS, “Potential Impacts to Socioeconomic and Community

Resources During the Operation of the Proposed PFSF”). (0171) One commenter stated that the

DEIS fails to emphasize significant issues and falsely over-emphasizes non-significant issues. The

commenter cited examples regarding the distance of the nearest capable fault and the percentage of

wetlands in Skull Valley. (0039, SL2-02)

Response: 

The DEIS followed the mandate of 40 CFR 1500.1(b) to provide information that reflects “accurate

scientific analysis” and “expert agency comments.” NEPA implementing regulations state that impacts

may be beneficial or adverse, but that any impacts must be considered in both their “context” (human

context, geographical context, etc.) and “intensity” (the severity of the impact). (40 CFR 1508.27) A

standard of significance for characterizing impacts has been established by the NRC (NUREG-1437)

and is used in the DEIS (see page xxxxiv of the DEIS). 

The DEIS follows the implementing regulations of NEPA by focusing on significant issues. Both the

scoping process and agency coordination were used to identify significant issues pertaining to the
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-441 NUREG-1714

proposed action, per 40 CFR 1501.7. The specific issues included in the comment regarding the

nearest capable fault and wetlands are addressed in Sections G.3.9 and G.3.12, respectively.

G.3.20.3 Incomplete License Application

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that there are substantial and significant omissions and inadequacies in the

license application. The commenter added that the NRC staff is aware of these inadequacies, as

evidenced by RAIs issued to the applicant by the NRC staff for the SER. The commenter inquired

how new information would be included in the EIS scoping and evaluation and how new data and

information would be made available to the public. The commenter recommended that the NRC staff

delay the EIS until the license application is complete, if the NRC staff cannot define a process that

provides scoping, analysis, and evaluation of all issues. (0198h)

Response: 

This comment was based on the applicant’s ER. All material the applicant provided to the NRC, with

the exception of proprietary information, is available to the public. Information received in response to

RAIs was used to update the applicant’s SAR and ER. The updated SAR and ER are also available

for public review. The scope of the DEIS was based on a full and complete understanding of the

proposed action and all data the NRC staff deemed necessary from the applicant. The scope of the

DEIS was also based on public scoping comments. The DEIS addressed the deficiencies discussed

in the comment. During the public comment period on the DEIS, four public meetings were held in the

Salt Lake City and Grantsville, Utah, areas to allow for public input. Furthermore, the public comment

period on the DEIS was extended from a 45-day minimum to 90 days to allow sufficient time for

written public input.

G.3.20.4 ITF Impacts

Comment Summary:

One commenter expressed concern about the potential impacts of the proposed ITF resulting from its

close proximity to I-80, the Industrial Salt plant, and the Timpie Springs Wildlife Management Area. 

(0198i)

One commenter stated that the proposed ITF and the use of heavy-hauling trucks should be avoided

because of impacts to surface water, groundwater, and potential springs; the increased risks of

transferring SNF from rail to heavy-haul trucks; increased traffic; wildlife roadkill; and impacts to the

scenic beauty of the area. (0039, 0077)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments opposing the proposed ITF and the use of heavy-haul

trucks on Skull Valley Road. The FEIS concludes that the new rail line from Skunk Ridge is preferable

to the proposed ITF and the use of Skull Valley Road. Chapter 5 of this FEIS addresses

transportation impacts of the proposed ITF near Timpie on the resource areas specified in the

comment.

G.3.20.5 General Comments on Direct Impacts

Comment Summary:

Several commenters provided general comments on direct impacts and opposition to the project. 

These concerns included the following:
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-442

C Three commenters expressed concern about safety for Utah residents and the environment in the

event of an accident or exposure. (0147, 0205, 0207)

C Two commenters stated that the environmental risks are too great to pursue the proposed PFSF. 

(0001, SL3-04)

C Another commenter stated that there is a perception that Utah is the downwind dumping ground of

the West. (0131)

C Another commenter expressed concern that the proposed PFSF would not be clean. (GR-06)

Several other commenters stated that the potential impacts of the proposed PFSF would be negligible. 

Their comments included the following:

C Several commenters stated that the potential environmental impact of the proposed PFSF would

be small and the DEIS is adequate. (0016, 0020, 0179, 0235, 0236, 0259, GR-02, GR-10, SL1-

03, SL1-19, SL1-33, SL2-10)

C One commenter stated that impacts from the project would be less than the impacts from

construction of I-15 or the Micron facility. (SL3-03)

C Another commenter stated that nothing would be left behind when the SNF is eventually shipped

to a Federal waste repository. (SL2-10) 

C One commenter said that the potential environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF must be

considered seriously, because the facility could sustain the present and future generations of the

Skull Valley Band. The commenter explained that the Skull Valley Band has looked at all sides of

this issue - the Skull Valley Band’s General Council began researching the feasibility of a

temporary storage facility 10 years ago. The Skull Valley Band received grants to study SNF

storage nationally and internationally, and discussed the project with environmentalists and antinuclear activists. The commenter stated that the Skull Valley Band has gained considerable

experience in monitoring and protecting their environment. (GR-02)

Response: 

The NRC staff acknowledges the concern about environmental risks. The DEIS considered impacts

to the Reservation, surrounding areas, and the State of Utah, as well as cross-country transport of the

SNF. Environmental impacts were examined, including potential impacts to water quality, air quality,

and biological resources. The impacts were identified for normal operation of the proposed PFSF and

under accident scenarios. No significant adverse impacts were identified.

Accidents at the proposed PFSF are addressed in the SER. No credible accidents were identified that

would result in the large-scale dispersion of radioactive materials. Section 5.7 of this FEIS presents

the risks from radiological doses that would be associated with rail accidents. These risks would be

very small. See Section 5.7 of this FEIS for a complete description and evaluation of the impacts.

The NRC staff acknowledges the comments, indicating the potential impacts of the proposed PFSF

would be negligible. The EIS identifies the positive indirect impacts. These include socioeconomic

benefits to the Skull Valley Band and the project region.
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-443 NUREG-1714

G.3.20.6 Cumulative Impacts

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern that the DEIS does not adequately address the cumulative

impacts of the project. (0012, 0158, GR-09, SL1-01, SL1-28, SL3-25) Specifically, commenters

indicated the following:

C One commenter stated that the DEIS relies on a determination that impacts from the proposed

PFSF would be small enough to forego any determination of current and reasonably foreseeable

exposure levels, which is inappropriate under NEPA. (0158)

C One commenter said that without a seismic analysis, cumulative impacts cannot be analyzed. 

(0012)

C One commenter stated that impacts from a facility for Greater than Class C Waste could also be

approved in the area and combine with impacts from the proposed PFSF. (GR-10)

C A commenter stated that Utah is home to the largest toxic air polluter in the United States, two

chemical weapon incinerators, a hazardous waste incinerator, a hazardous waste landfill, a

radioactive waste landfill, a massive bombing range, and a proving ground for biological and

chemical warfare agents. (SL1-09) Another commenter stated that the cumulative impacts

analysis does not adequately evaluate the collective, interrelated, and cumulative impacts of the

facilities in the region. This analysis is lacking the insight addressed in the scoping hearings and

in Section 2.2.3 of the Scoping Issues Summary. (0171)

C One commenter stated this area of the country has already suffered enough, and was past its

capacity to handle the numerous toxic facilities located in the surrounding areas. (0249)

C One commenter indicated the NRC should evaluate the combined risk of the proposed PFSF and

of the Envirocare facility. (SL3-47)

C Three commenters indicated that Utah already has a number of hazardous waste facilities, and

the commenters suggested that the power plants that create the waste should store it at their own

facilities. (0249, SL1-20, SL3-32)

C One commenter expressed concern about public safety, stating that the United States is moving

forward with nuclear energy without long-term data to understand future impacts; (0083) and two

commenters asked how the long-term impacts of weather, earthquakes, and environmental

factors can be well understood when the industry has only been storing SNF for a dozen years. 

(0076, SL3-16)

One commenter stated the DEIS must consider the cumulative impacts of the proposed PFSF and the

numerous other facilities and activities in the West Deseret area. (0198h) The commenter stated

that:

C This area is already the storage site for 42 percent of the U.S.’s stockpile of chemical weapons.

The malfunction and crash of a cruise missile on the adjacent DPG, as well as crashes of F-16s

on maneuvers over the adjacent UTTR are well documented;

C Within a 30-mile radius of the proposed site, there are two hazardous waste incinerators, one

hazardous waste land disposal site, one NORM/Mixed waste/11(e)2 waste disposal facility, the

single largest Toxic Release Inventory air pollution source in the United States (Magnesium

Corporation of America, Rowley, Utah facility), and operations for stockpile and destruction of

conventional munitions;
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NUREG-1714 G-444

C DPG is also the designated landing site for NASA’s Stardust spacecraft and the MUSES-C

Asteroid Mission, a Japanese mission with NASA participation; and

C The NRC has a responsibility under NEPA to know, evaluate, and mitigate the cumulative impacts

of the proposed action, or to disapprove the proposed PFSF. The commenter stated that Utah

and the Reservation are not safe places to store SNF. (0198h)

Response: 

The cumulative impacts analysis methodology is described in Section 6.3 of the DEIS. The analysis

includes past, present, and reasonably foreseeable impacts in the region, including those associated

with the facilities mentioned in the comment. The location of other regional activities is identified in

Figure 1.1, “Regional Location of Skull Valley in Utah.” The NRC staff identified no adverse

cumulative impacts associated with the proposed action. Reasonably foreseeable effects are

generally considered in the context of indirect effects (40 CFR 1508.8(b)). The NRC staff did not

identify any reasonably foreseeable indirect effects indicating adverse impacts from exposure levels. 

The impact assessment for the proposed PFSF considers environmental factors across a wide range

of resources and media. The NRC staff reviewed the potential for impacts from earthquakes in

Section 15 of its SER, as updated.

G.3.20.7 Mitigation Measures

Comment Summary:

One commenter questioned why mitigation plans are not developed prior to the issuance of the FEIS. 

For example, the commenter added that mitigation plans will be developed later to deal with noxious

weeds, restoration, and revegetation; fire suppression; and wildlife monitoring. The commenter also

stated that rail line construction will be implemented according to a memorandum of agreement (MOA)

that is not available to the public or otherwise explained in the DEIS. The commenter stated that an

SPCC plan is said on page 5-10 to be forthcoming, but it is referenced only for Alternative 3. Lastly,

the commenter added that the NRC staff will be consulting with the DOD and will later address military

concerns in some agreement or document. (0156) 

A second commenter stated that in evaluating environmental impacts, it is unclear how a

determination is made about whether impacts will need to be mitigated, if the mitigating measures are

not known. The commenter added that both 10 CFR 72.100, and 40 CFR 1502.16 require a minimum

description of mitigation measures and an evaluation of the effects on the regional environment. 

(0198b)

One commenter stated that the DEIS includes recommended mitigation procedures throughout the

document, and that the applicant has reviewed them and expects to commit to all of them. (SL1-23)

Response: 

There is no regulatory or legislative requirement that formal mitigation plans are developed and

adopted prior to issuance of the FEIS (Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,

352-53 (1989)). NEPA requires only that the EIS discuss possible mitigation measures in sufficient

detail to fairly evaluate environmental consequences. Therefore, mitigation plans for noxious weeds,

revegetation, wildlife monitoring, etc., are not included in the DEIS but will be developed and put into

place prior to any facility construction. 

The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s ER and additional sources of information to determine what

level of environmental impacts would be associated with the proposed action. The NRC and the

Cooperating Agencies recommend specific mitigation measures be required. These mitigation

measures are described in Section 9.4.2 of the DEIS. If these mitigation measures are required by
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G-445 NUREG-1714

the NRC or the Cooperating Agencies final approval documents, the applicant’s compliance to

mitigation commitments will be determined through appropriate oversight by the NRC staff or the

appropriate Cooperating Agency.

Section 5.2.4, “Mitigation Measures,” references a Best Management Practices Plan to address spills

on site, at the rail siding, and along the existing rail line and is not limited to Alternative 3. To the

same end, the Cooperating Agencies have also proposed that PFS be required to be responsible for

clean-up of any spills or accidents on the PFSF, at the rail siding, and along the right-of-way for the rail

line, in accordance with applicable standards. See Section 9.4.2 of this FEIS. Additionally, the NRC

staff has consulted with the DOD, and no formalized agreement or documents are needed for the

proposed project because the effects of the proposed action on military operations in the area would

not be sufficient to warrant an agreement.
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G-447 NUREG-1714

G.3.21 Financial Qualifications

G.3.21.1 Compliance with NRC Requirements

Comment Summary: 

Many commenters asserted that the DEIS did not demonstrate that the applicant has the financial

capacity to construct, operate, and maintain the facility or has sufficient funding to respond to a major

accident. (0012, 0015, 0030, 0038, 0039, 0042, 0058, 0060, 0077, 0083, 0090, 0096, 0130, 0134,

0171, 0198, 0198h, 0198i, 0201, 0214, 0240, 0246, 0262, GR-21, GR-22, SL1-01, SL1-05, SL1-07,

SL1-10, SL1-15, SL1-20, SL1-32, SL1-38, SL2-05, SL2-07, SL2-20, SL3-02, SL3-04, SL3-18, SL3-25,

SL3-33, SL3-47, SL3-48) Several commenters provided the following additional specific concerns:

C Two commenters stated that the DEIS should evaluate the establishment of a bond or trust fund

adequate for the government to operate, or remediate an accident at, the proposed PFSF in case

the applicant is not financially able to do so. (0240, SL3-47)

C One commenter stated that the funding requirements are not only critical to safety concerns but

also to the level of maintenance, and the timeliness and effectiveness of decommissioning. The

commenter added that the environmental consequences that flow from under-capitalization and

operating on a shoestring budget must be addressed in the FEIS. The commenter added that the

FEIS should compare this project with ISFSIs authorized under the NWPA that are owned and

operated by DOE and have the full financial backing of the United States government. (0198h)

C The same commenter stated that the DEIS does not address the applicant’s financial

responsibility and liability to ensure impacts to the environment and human health will be

minimized. The commenter explained that the applicant claims to be a limited liability company

with no assets of its own, and as a limited liability company, each member utility company that

forms PFS would not be individually liable nor will its assets be individually at risk. The

commenter explained further that if the applicant does not have adequate financial resources to

safely operate the proposed PFSF, the DEIS evaluation is meaningless. The commenter asserted

that NRC has not required the applicant to submit detailed financial information. Prior to license

issuance, the commenter stated, NRC will not require the applicant to demonstrate that it will likely

be able to obtain sufficient funds to build, operate, and close the proposed facility. The

commenter stated that, instead, NRC will allow the applicant to build the proposed PFSF upon a

showing that the applicant has sufficient commitments, rather than actual funds in hand, to fund

phased construction. Also, the commenter stated that NRC will allow the applicant to operate if it

has contract commitments, not funds, to cover costs of storing the volume of waste covered by the

applicant contracts. (0198)

C Two commenters stated that the DEIS does not address who would pay if a catastrophic disaster

occurred, exceeding the assets and insurance of the applicant, and whether the assets of the

utility companies could be reached. (0090, 0096, SL3-02) 

Response:

Whether the applicant has demonstrated that it would be able to obtain funds sufficient to build,

operate, and close the proposed PFSF in accordance with the NRC’s regulations has no effect on the

environmental impacts of the proposed action or its costs or benefits. Rather, the evaluation of the

applicant’s financial qualifications is part of the NRC safety review, and consistent with NRC practice

is documented in the NRC’s SER. As documented in the SER, the NRC staff found that the applicant

had demonstrated compliance with the applicable financial-related regulatory requirements provided

certain conditions were met.
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-448

This issue was one matter in a proceeding before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. The

Commission has determined that PFS’ commitments are such that the facility will not be built or

operated if PFS cannot raise sufficient funds. The Commission required that the applicant’s

commitments be made conditions to the PFS license. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent

Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 32 (2000). In view of the above, the creation

of a bond or trust fund by the Federal government, as suggested by two commenters, is unnecessary. 

One commenter asserts that the NRC “will not require [the applicant] to demonstrate that it will likely

be able to obtain sufficient funds,” and that the NRC “will allow [the applicant] to build the [proposed

PFSF] upon a showing that [the applicant] has sufficient commitments, rather than actual funds in

hand, to fund phased construction.” The NRC’s regulations, however, explicitly permit an applicant to

demonstrate that it (a) possesses the necessary funds or (b) has reasonable assurance of obtaining

the necessary funds. 10 CFR 72.22(e). Section 72.22 does not require an applicant to have funds “in

hand.” Rather, the Commission has approved the use of license conditions to enforce the applicant’s

commitments as part of the applicant’s showing of financial assurance, and determined that the

applicant may rely on service agreements with customers to establish financial qualifications. Private

Fuel Storage, L.L.C., CLI-00-13, 52 NRC at 32. Further, the Commission has imposed a license

condition so that the facility will not be built or operated if the applicant cannot raise sufficient funds. 

Id. at 31.

Regarding the concerns about the applicant’s financial capacity in the event of an accident, the NRC

staff notes that as described in Sections 4.7 and 5.7 of the FEIS, it evaluated the risk of an accident at

the proposed PFSF and the health risk resulting from a potential transportation accident. Based on

these evaluations, the NRC staff concluded that there is no credible accident scenario at the proposed

PFSF that would result in the release of radiation. The NRC staff also concluded that the health risk

of a transportation accident during the life of the proposed PFSF is very small. In Section G.3.16.6.1,

the staff stated that the costs of a severe transportation accident are dependent on highly uncertain

variables, and the resulting costs themselves are highly uncertain.

In addition, the applicant will carry $200 million in off-site liability insurance and additional insurance

from private sources pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act (42 USC 2210) to cover accidents related to

SNF transportation.

G.3.21.2 Applicant’s Financial Qualifications in the Application

Comment Summary:

One commenter indicated that the applicant is a newly formed special purpose entity without an

operating record. Thus, according to the commenter, the regulatory standards in 10 CFR Part 50 for

financial qualifications of newly formed entities must be applied to the applicant's license application. 

The commenter provided a detailed discussion of the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 and the reasons

why the commenter concluded that the applicant does not satisfy these requirements. (0198a) The

commenter stated that contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 72.22(c) and 72.40(a)(6), the applicant

has failed to demonstrate that it is financially qualified to engage in the 10 CFR Part 72 activities for

which it seeks a license. According to this commenter, the 10 CFR Part 72 standard, which is very

general, may be interpreted by reference to the standards for financial qualifications set forth in 10

CFR Part 50 and Appendix C. (0198a)

The commenter stated that the financial qualification information in the application is extremely limited. 

The commenter asserted that the applicant's financial qualifications to carry out the activities it

proposes under this license application and the information the applicant submitted to demonstrate its

financial qualifications are deficient in the following respects:

C The commenter stated that information in the application about the legal and financial relationship

among the owners of the limited liability company (i.e., the license applicant) is deficient. This
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G-449 NUREG-1714

extremely limited information does not even begin to satisfy the NRC's financial qualifications

requirements to engage in the 10 CFR Part 72 activities it proposes under this license application. 

(0198a)

C The commenter stated that as part of the applicant's demonstration of financial qualifications, the

applicant must be required to submit a current statement of its assets, liabilities, and capital

structure. (0198a)

C The commenter stated further that the applicant has failed to show that it has the necessary funds

to cover the estimated operating costs over the planned life of the proposed PFSF because the

application is devoid of specific cost estimates. (0198a)

C The commenter also stated that in the ER (Table 7.3-1), the applicant aggregated all direct costs

into one lump sum of $100 million for initial costs to site the facility, the costs to engineer and

construct the facility, and annual costs associated with the Tribal lease, maintenance, operation,

transportation, security, license fees, and taxes. According to the commenter, the applicant's

representations are meaningless, because they cannot be evaluated unless each portion of the

construction costs is specified and the basis for each cost estimate is provided. (0198a)

C The commenter stated that the applicant appears to have significantly underestimated

construction costs. The commenter stated that the applicant's construction cost estimates are

less than one-fifth of DOE's estimates for a MRS to be located at the same Skull Valley

Reservation, although the applicant proposes to store twice as much SNF as DOE proposed for

the MRS. (0198a)

C The commenter stated that according to the license application the applicant plans to raise

additional capital through “service agreements” with customers and that terms of the service

agreements, such as costs, periodic terms, liability, performance, and breach clauses, are not

provided. (0198a)

C The commenter stated that the applicant should document an existing market and the

commitment of a sufficient number of service agreements to fully fund construction. In addition,

the commenter stated that there must be sufficient funds committed for operation,

decommissioning, and contingencies for the number of casks contracted to fund construction. 

(0198a)

C The commenter further stated that the applicant describes in the license application an option to

finance construction costs through debt financing secured by service agreements. The

commenter asserted that debt financing will not be viable until a minimum value in service

agreements is committed. According to the commenter, the applicant has therefore failed to show

that it has reasonable assurance of obtaining necessary funds through debt financing. (0198a)

C The commenter indicated that according to the license application, "ongoing operations and

maintenance costs ... will be paid by the customer on an annual basis." The commenter stated

that although the applicant states that it will require financial information from its "customers," it

has not addressed funding contingencies in the event a customer breaches the service agreement

or becomes insolvent while the customer's SNF is stored at the proposed PFSF. The commenter

asserted that the applicant does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate funds are

available to ensure the safe operation and maintenance of SNF storage in the event of

insolvencies, or while disputes are being resolved. (0198a)

Response:

One commenter questioned the basis for the applicant’s estimate of construction costs, and, with

reference to DOE’s costs estimates for a monitored retrievable SNF storage facility in Skull Valley,
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-450

asserted that the applicant had significantly underestimated such costs. The commenter did not

provide sufficient detail or support for its statement, therefore, the FEIS has not been changed. The

applicant’s estimate of its costs was subject to litigation during the June 2000 hearing held before the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) in Salt Lake City, Utah. The issue is currently pending

before the ASLB. The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s cost estimates and considered them to be

sufficiently detailed and adequate. The ASLB’s decision on this matter may modify this FEIS, if

necessary, and will, in effect, become part of this FEIS. See Lousiana Energy Services, LP (Claiborne

Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 89 (1998). The staff considered these above costs in

performing its analysis of benefits and costs in the FEIS. With respect to the other comments on this

issue, as described in Section G.3.21.1, the NRC staff’s evaluation of the applicant’s financial

qualifications are described in the SER. The applicant’s financial qualifications are considered as part

of the safety review and are not considered in the environmental review. The comments are beyond

the scope of the EIS and do not warrant any change or addition to the NRC staff’s evaluation of the

environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF as set forth in this FEIS.

However, it should be noted that an applicant for a license under 10 CFR Part 72 is not required to

satisfy the detailed financial qualifications requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. See Private Fuel Storage,

L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 30 (2000). Rather, 10

CFR Part 72 sets out a broad standard that provides a flexibility that 10 CFR Part 50 does not. The

NRC staff’s evaluation of the applicant’s financial qualifications is set forth in the SER. The NRC staff

concluded that the applicant satisfied all financial requirements in 10 CFR Part 72. As described in

Section G.3.21.1, the Commission subsequently directed the NRC staff to include several license

conditions to address the financial qualifications of the applicant.

G.3.21.3 Applicant’s Status as a Limited Liability Company

Comment Summary:

Several commenters expressed concern about the applicant’s status as a limited liability company

under normal conditions and those following an accident. These commenters questioned who would

be responsible for costs in the event of an accident. (0030, 0042, 0096, 0171, 0198h, 0201, 0262,

SL2-05, SL3-02, SL3-04) Other commenters were concerned that other entities, such as the State of

Utah, Utah residents, or taxpayers would have to bear the financial consequences of an accident. 

(0038, 0090, GR-21, SL1-05, SL1-15, SL1-20, SL1-38, SL2-07, SL3-18) Other commenters asserted

that the applicant alone should be held financially accountable in the event of an accident and not hide

behind an umbrella company with no assets. (0015, 0060, 0083, 0198h, 0214, GR-22, SL1-05, SL1-

10, SL1-20, SL2-05, SL2-07, SL3-18, SL3-25, SL3-33) Several commenters provided the following

additional specific comments: 

C Two commenters stated that the DEIS should describe and define the applicant’s status as a

limited liability company (one commenter referenced page 1-1 of the DEIS). (0096, SL3-02)

C One commenter stated that the applicant does not enjoy limited liability status under Utah law. 

Limited liability is a privilege granted by State law, and by virtue of its activities the applicant is not

considered a limited liability corporation. (0198, 0198i) 

C Two commenters asserted that all eight applicant member reactor licensees should be individually

liable to the full amount of their assets, in order to ensure that the State of Utah would not be

responsible for maintenance and cleanup. (0246, SL1-20) 

C One commenter stated that the DEIS fails to address what would happen if the cleanup costs of

an accident bankrupts the State of Utah’s annual budget. (0096)

C Another commenter stated that the applicant has not accounted for the difficulty of allocating

financial responsibility when casks are centrally stored and owned by different entities. (0198a)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix G

G-451 NUREG-1714

Response:

The NRC staff recognizes the concerns expressed in the comments regarding the applicant’s status

as a limited liability company, however, the corporate structure of the applicant is not related to the

environmental review. Therefore, a discussion of the applicant’s corporate structure is not included in

the FEIS. As part of its safety review, the NRC staff reviewed the financial qualification of the

applicant to assure adequate funding would be available to construct, operate, and decommission the

proposed PFSF in accordance with the NRC’s regulations.

As described above in Section G.3.21.1, the NRC staff evaluated the safety of the proposed PFSF in

the SER and the potential human health impacts in the EIS. As described in Section 4.7 of the FEIS,

the NRC staff concluded that there are no credible accident scenarios at the proposed PFSF that

would result in the release of radiation. As described in Section G.3.21.1, the applicant would obtain

$200 million of off-site liability insurance, which is the maximum amount available for the proposed

PFSF. The NRC staff has established specific license conditions that require the applicant to maintain

on-site and off-site liability assurance. The license conditions also require the applicant to establish

service agreements with individual reactor licensees storing SNF at the proposed PFSF. The service

agreements identify specific terms of service including liability. Further, each individual owner of the

SNF would be responsible and liable for the shipment of the SNF to the proposed PFSF. See Section

G.3.16.6.1 (costs of a severe transportation accident are uncertain).

G.3.21.4 Liability Limitations in the Proposed Lease

Comment Summary:

One commenter stated that there should be further evaluation in the FEIS of how the Skull Valley

Band, the BIA, and the DOI may incur financial responsibility if future actions by the applicant result in

excess liability or damage to Tribal lands. The commenter stated that lease requirements for liability

insurance do not ensure that the applicant will be held liable for potential environmental and human

health impacts. The commenter asserted that unless there is neglect or misconduct on the part of the

applicant, the lease agreement limits the applicant’s liability to one similar to any commercial facility,

and the liability is not directly tied to the actual amount of potential damage. (0240) 

Commenters stated that the Price-Anderson Act does not indemnify a private away-from-reactor

storage facility, and the NRC has no on-site nuclear property or insurance requirements. According to

the commenters, if there is an accident or other problem, the applicant’s liability under the lease

agreement with the Skull Valley Band is normally limited to the money available through commercially

reasonable nuclear liability insurance, even if actual costs are much higher. The commenters

conclude that there are no assurances that potential on- or off-Reservation impacts from an on-site

incident will be properly addressed. (0012, 0198, SL1-01)

Response:

The proposed lease provides for other forms of financial assurances for the Skull Valley Band (in

compliance with the BIA regulations) in addition to nuclear liability insurance. Such assurances are

intended to address potential impacts to trust resources from an onsite incident. The proposed lease

also provides that, should the lease be assigned, the assignee shall agree in writing to be bound by all

the terms and conditions of the lease.

Regarding the comment that the NRC has no on-site nuclear property or insurance requirement for a

private-away-from-reactor storage facility, the NRC staff evaluated the potential impacts of normal, offnormal, and accident conditions and concluded that there are no credible accidents at the proposed

site that would result in a release of a radioactive material. As set forth in the NRC’s SER, as

updated, the facility is designed to prevent significant releases of radioactive material upon the
FINAL EIS—Appendix G December 2001

NUREG-1714 G-452

occurrence of a reasonably foreseeable event. Therefore, accidents at the proposed PFSF that would

result in a significant release of radioactive material and lead to large cleanup and remediation cost

are remote and speculative and need not be addressed in the FEIS. In addition, the Commission has

ordered that the applicant’s commitment to obtain $200 million of off-site liability insurance be

incorporated into the PFS license. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 32 (2000). Such insurance would provide additional financial

coverage for reasonably foreseeable events for which the proposed PFSF is designed. The

Commission also directed the staff to include as a license condition a PFS commitment to obtain

insurance covering on-site liability in an amount to be determined at a hearing. See PFS, CL1-00-13,

52 NRC 23, 36 (2000).

G.3.21.5 Location and Timing of Financial Evaluation

Comment Summary:

Two commenters expressed concerns about the timing and availability of the financial analysis in

relation to the EIS and agency decisions.

C One commenter stated that because the NRC is deferring any financial evaluation, the

Cooperating Agencies, the BLM, the BIA, and the STB will be asked to make decisions before a

financial analysis is completed. The commenter stated that the environmental consequences that

may flow from PFS’s lack of a solid financial foundation cannot be assessed. The commenter

asserted that the BLM, the BIA, and the STB will need to make an independent analysis of the

environmental impacts associated with granting approval for their respective Federal actions to a

corporation that claims limited liability and no assets. (0198) 

C One commenter stated that the evaluation of the applicant’s financial capacity should be

described in the DEIS, rather than the SER. (0240) 

Response: 

While the NRC staff had not issued its evaluation of the applicant’s financial qualifications when this

comment was submitted, that evaluation is now complete and is available to the Cooperating

Agencies. As documented in the NRC’s SER, the applicant has demonstrated that sufficient funding

will be available to construct, operate, and decommission the proposed PFSF in accordance with the

NRC’s regulations. Given such a demonstration, there are no specific issues related to the applicant’s

financial qualifications that would impact the environmental review. Therefore, such a discussion was

not included in the FEIS. In addition, the Cooperating Agencies have completed their independent

review of the environmental impacts of the proposed PFSF as documented in the FEIS. 
December 2001

H-1 NUREG-1714

APPENDIX H

INDEX OF COMMENTERS*

H.1 Index by Commenter

Commenter Commenter

Number 

Ailion, David 0097

Allen, Sundra R. 0196

Anderson, Ross C. - Salt Lake City Mayor SL2-05

Anderson, Ross C. - Salt Lake City Mayor (Arce-Larreta, Juan) SL1-05

Arizona Safe Energy Coalition (Shroeder, Betty) 0217

Armbruster, Barb GR-20

Arnold, Jean 0042

Arnold, Joe 0069

Audubon Society of Great Salt Lake (Salt, Jeff) SL2-16

Barlow, Kee Y. SL1-24

Barrowes, Steve SL3-53

Barrowes, Steven 0170

Bear, Leon (Skull Valley Goshute Indians) SL3-01

Becker, Ralph - Utah State Senator SL1-04

Beckstead, Evan SL3-24

Belnap, Dave 0079

Benchley, Darin SL3-21

Bergsma, Chris 0253

Bodily, Kerry D. 0072

Bonar, Linda and John, Lauren & Johnny Stratton 0232

Bonar, Linda and John, Lauren & Johnny Stratton (Same as Commenter

Number 0232)

0245

Brehm, Michael SL3-44

Brimhall, Rodger M 0144

Brimley, Dawn 0064

Bulisova, Gabriela GR-23

Bulisova, Gabriela SL1-37

Buob, Marcel 0185

Burgess, Mary GR-17

Burnett, Matt 0060

Burr, Maegan 0129

Burr, Nancy 0128

Camara, Tom 0120

Campbell, Laura 0135

Cannon, Chris - U.S. Representative 0153

Cannon, Chris - U.S. Representative (Same as Commenter Number 0153) 0202

* Identical comments submitted more than once are marked “Same as Commenter Number ...”
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter Commenter

Number 

NUREG-1714 H-2

Carpenter II, C.C. 0117

Cathey, Randee SL3-22

Cathey, Tully SL3-27

Citizen Alert (Backlund, Kaitlan) SL2-12

Citizen Alert (Garrett, Jo Anne) SL2-17

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Cynthia of the Desert) GR-22

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Cynthia of the Desert) SL1-39

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Cynthia of the Desert) SL3-55

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (McConkie, James) SL1-12

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Swardhansen, Ann) SL3-04

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0041

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0046

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0152

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0162

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0192

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0199

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0210

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0251

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0252

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0254

Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions 0263

Citizens for Environmental Responsibility (Davis, Anita) SL2-14

Clayson, Dirk 0073

Clean Water Action Alliance of Minnesota (McKeown, Diana) 0180

Clean Water Action Alliance of Minnesota (McKeown, Diana) (Same as

Commenter Number 0180)

0258

Cline, Melon 0010

Cline, Russell A. 0007

Cluff, Thomas 0132

Collard, Sharon (family) 0264

Committee to Bridge the Gap (Magavern, Bill) 0136

Committee to Bridge the Gap (Magavern, Bill) (Same as Commenter

Number 0136)

0213

Concerned Mother 0022

Constable, Patricia 0207

Cook, Merrill - Congressman SL3-11

Cowley, Michael SL1-32

Crooks, Pat 0035

Dairyland Power Cooperative (Berg, William L.) 0143

Dalton, Christopher J. 0188

Davis Chamber of Commerce 0256

Davison, Maureen 0233

dcwechter@aol.com 0178

DeHaan, Susan 0067

Dickson, Mary 0043
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter Commenter

Number 

H-3 NUREG-1714

Dickson, Mary 0048

Dickson, Mary SL3-06

Dinger, Marilyn L. 0009

Doe, John 0062

Doebbeling, Denise SL2-15

Downwinders (Erickson, Steve) 0156

Downwinders (Erickson, Steve) SL1-07

Draper City Council (Colbert, Bill) SL1-06

Drey, Kay 0203

Drey, Kay (Same as Commenter Number 0203) 0219

Eberlein, Chris 0085

Ellis, Bruce R. 0049

Ellsworth, Sharon SL3-16

Ellsworth, Sharon R. 0076

Elnicky, Michele 0227

Environmental Organizations 0026

Escalante, Joe 0138

Eureka County, Yucca Mountain Information Office (Fiorenzi, Leonard) 0171

Eureka County, Yucca Mountain Information Office (Fiorenzi, Leonard)

(Same as Commenter Number 0171)

0209

Evett, Donald SL1-18

Families Against Incinerator Risk (Groenewold, Jason) SL1-09

Families Against Incinerator Risk (Groenwald, Jason) GR-14

Families Against Incinerator Risk (Reading, Karla) SL3-33

Families Against Incinerator Risk (Rosco, Cynthia) SL3-35

Families Against Incinerator Risk (Sheinberg, Jill) 0019

Families Against Incinerator Risk (Ward, Chip) GR-13

Farrer, Russell K. 0030

Ferguson, Tom 0118

Fife, Scott 0021

Fishler, Sandy 0215

Florida Power & Light Company 0259

Flowers, Bobbie D. 0119

Foote, Greg 0250

Funk, John L. 0172

Garbett, David 0045

Garcia, Francis SL2-19

Garrett, Stephen 0102

Gbur, Edith 0130

Gbur, Edith 0187

GE Stockholders' Alliance (Birnie, Patricia T.) 0189

Ghandi Peace Center (Matuso, Joe) SL2-21

Gier, Ruth 0029

Gilbert, Cathleen C. 0090

Gilbert, Gary S. 0106
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter Commenter

Number 

NUREG-1714 H-4

Gilbert, Heather 0108

Gilbert, Jason 0107

Gilbert, Kathleen SL3-02

Gillette, Karl R. 0260

Gilmore, Garrett D. 0002

Gleason, Cheri 0082

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (Rittenberg, Dayna) 0139

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (Slater, Alice) 0223

Goodman, Sidney J. 0155

Goodman, Sidney J. and Irma 0181

Green Party of Utah/Sustainable Salt Lake (Fife, Scott) SL3-40

Greene, Ellen 0191

Griffith, Chuck GR-09

Griffiths, Rex K. 0081

Groenewold, Jason SL3-47

Grubaugh-Littig, Pamela 0197

Guzzle, Richard L. 0247

Hagans, Bruce 0134

Haggerty, Bern SL3-09

Hansen, James V. - U.S. Congressman GR-01

Harman, David Jr. 0080

Hatch, Marguerite 0055

Hatch, Marie GR-15

Hawkins, Larry & Berlinda 0005

Hazard, Scot J. 0160

Heyn, Mike and Shana 0065

Hildebrandt, Rachel Genovese 0182

Hinchman, Andrew J. 0239

Hollinshead, Crispin B. 0121

Hoopiianian, Cory SL3-57

Horner, Joshua 0092

Howard, Blain SL1-33

Howard, Blaine N. 0122

Howell, Scott N. - Utah State Senator 0212

Howell, Scott N. - Utah State Senator SL1-02

Hurd, Linda 0176

Inaba, Nancy 0054

Iosepa Historical Association (Hoopiiaiana, Cory) SL2-09

Iwamoto, Jani SL2-13

J., Paula 0094

Jamison, Chris 0242

Jarvis, Boyer SL1-31

JEDI Woman (Garcia, Frances) 0024

JEDI Women (Macri, Bonnie) SL2-18

Jenkins, Robin 0039
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter Commenter

Number 

H-5 NUREG-1714

Jenkins, Robin 0077

Jenkins, Robin GR-11

Jenkins, Robin SL2-02

Jenkins, Robin SL3-52

Jensen, Jon SL1-35

Jensen, Jon SL3-23

Johnson, Eric 0140

Johnson, Jack 0033

Johnson, Jerry 0148

Johnson, Jerry 0231

Johnson, Jerry C. (Same as Commenter Number 0148) 0241

Johnson, Randy 0174

Jolley, David B. 0125

Jow, Tom E. 0214

Julander, Paula F. - Utah State Senator 0063

Julene 0093

Karch, Gary 0183

Karch, Gary (Same as Commenter Number 0183) 0221

Kaubin, Joy 0127

Kearn, Dau SL3-34

Kirkpatrick, Jeanee SL3-25

Kirkpatrick, Robynne GR-21

Kirkpatrick, Robynne SL1-34

Kirkpatrick, Robynne SL3-54

Knutson, Emil SL3-14

Kuhn, Nancy 0230

Lane, Sandy 0177

Lazar, Elise SL3-07

Lazar, Gerald SL3-08

Leavitt, Michael O. - Governor of Utah 0012

Leavitt, Michael O. -Governor of Utah SL1-01

LeDuc, Barbie 0028

Lee, Robert E. 0123

Lee, Tommy W. 0137

Lee, Tommy W. (Same as Commenter Number 0137) 0173

Lincoln County (NV), City of Caliente (NV), and Joint City/County Impact

Alleviation Committee (Baughman, Mike L.)

0193

Lippard, Chris 0056

Lord, Judy SL3-46

Lowry, Nikki L. 0224

Martin, Terry 0037

Mascherino, Les GR-18

McCarthy, Daniel 0038

McClarren, Chris 0249

McConkie, Paul SL3-31
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter Commenter

Number 

NUREG-1714 H-6

McConkie, Paul M. 0154

McItyre, Charles 0031

McKenna, Elinda 0164

Meyers, Dominique 0110

Miller, Bob 0095

Miller, Roger 0061

Mingo, Richard 0113

Mingo, Richard SL1-28

Minnema, Jeff 0003

Minnema, Jeff (Same as Commenter Number 0003) 0161

Missouri Department of Natural Resources (Mahfood, Stephen) 0159

Moriarty, Cathy 0032

Morrison, Rob 0116

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (Gray, Charles D.) 0236

Nelson, Mark SL3-42

Nelson, Steve SL1-16

Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects (Frishman, Steve) SL1-13

Niederman, Elizabeth SL3-41

Nielson, Dianne (Utah Department of Environmental Quality) GR-04

Nielson, Dianne (Utah Department of Environmental Quality) SL2-20

Nielson, Dianne (On behalf of Governor Leavitt) SL3-56

Niswander, M. Ruth 0084

North American Water Office (Crocker, George W.) 0186

North American Water Office (Crocker, George W.) 0211

North Davis Chamber of Commerce (Bouwhuis, Michael) 0087

North Davis Chamber of Commerce (Bouwhuis, Michael) (Same as

Commenter Number 0087)

0088

Northern States Power Company (Northard, Scott) SL2-10

Nuclear Energy Institute (Kraft, Steven P.) 0179

Nuclear Energy Institute (Unglesbee, Steven W.) 0014

Nuclear Energy Institute (Unglesbee, Steven W.) GR-12

Nuclear Energy Institute (Unglesbee, Steven W.) SL1-40

Nuclear Information & Resource Service, Greenpeace, Public Citizen,

Women's Action for New Directions, Women Legislators' Lobby

0157

Nuclear Information & Resource Service, Greenpeace, Public Citizen,

Women's Action for New Directions, Women Legislators' Lobby (Same as

Commenter Number 0187)

0184

Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin) 0052

Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin) 0194

Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin) GR-16

Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin) SL1-36

Nuclear Information Resource Service Petitions 0216

Nuclear Information Resource Service Petitions 0220

Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition (Bernstein, James) 0070

O'Connor, Amy M. 0237

O'Donnell, Alice 0151
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter Commenter

Number 

H-7 NUREG-1714

Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia (Bullcreek, Margene) GR-06

Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia (Bullcreek, Margene) SL1-26

Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and Margene

Bullcreek (Walker, Joro)

0158

Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and Margene

Bullcreek (Walker, Joro) (Same as Commenter Number 0158)

0243

Olsen, Larry 0098

O'Neal, James SL1-22

O'Neal, James SL2-08

PECO Energy (Hutton Jr., James A.) 0235

Peine, Hermann SL1-27

Peine, Hermann A. 0013

Peratis, Jeri 0101

Peratis, Jeri 0167

Peterson, Chris 0126

Peterson, Tim SL3-29

Peterson, William 0020

Peterson, William 0025

Peterson, William 0109

Peterson, William 0168

Peterson, William 0255

Peterson, William GR-19

Peterson, William SL2-03

Peterson, William SL3-50

Peterson, William SL3-51

Phillips, Archie 0036

Phillips, Penelope 0034

Phillips, William L. 0141

Pike, Douglas E. 0208

Prince, Molly G. 0103

Prior, Teresa 0105

Private Fuel Storage (Donnell, John L.) 0163

Private Fuel Storage (Northard, Scott) SL1-23

Private Fuel Storage (Northard, Scott) SL3-58

Rasmussen, Dana SL1-29

Ridling, Ron 0133

Robbins, Darlene 0091

Roberts, Todd SL3-19

Robinson, Bonnie GR-05

Rodman, Tiffany 0001

Rollins, Dan 0262

Roos, Jeri SL1-20

Roos, Jeri SL3-18

Rose, Jackson SL3-37

Sag, Mary E. 0200
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter Commenter

Number 

NUREG-1714 H-8

Sager, Lorraine 0044

Salter, David 0131

Sandquist, Gary SL3-03

Schelly, Jackie 0149

Schitzel, Dina SL2-07

Schmidt, Jerry SL1-15

Schwartz, Jill 0201

Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steve) GR-24

Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steve) SL1-08

Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steve) SL2-04

Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steven) 0017

Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Hoffman, R.J.) SL1-19

Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Hoffman, Robert) 0016

Sierra Club - Utah Chapter (King, Cindy) 0096

Sierra Club (Same as Commenter Number 0096) 0226

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Allen, Mary) GR-03

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Allen, Rex) GR-10

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear Leon D.) 0100

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear Leon D.) GR-02

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear Leon D.) SL1-03

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear, Arlene M.) GR-07

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear, Larry) GR-08

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear, Lawrence) SL1-30

Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Black Bear, Sammy) SL1-17

Smith, Christa Poulter 0115

Smith, Sean 0114

Snake River Alliance (Bradford, Beatrice) SL1-38

Snyder, Susi 0257

Sorenson, Heidi SL3-26

Standing for Truth about Radiation (Cullen, Scott M.) 0195

Starr, Carol D. 0229

Starr, Fay S. 0027

State of Idaho - INEEL Oversight (Trevor, Kathleen) 0169

State of Idaho - INEEL Oversight (Trevor, Kathleen) (Same as Commenter

Number 0169)

0234

State of Nevada - Office of the Governor 0204

State of Nevada, Agency Officials for Nuclear Project (Guinn, Kenny C.) 0018

State of Utah - Office of the Attorney General 0261

State of Utah - Office of the Governor 0198

Stats, Kathleen SL3-43

Stella, Matthew 0058

Stone, Sandy 0165

Sustainable Salt Lake/Green Party (Archibald-Stone, Penny) SL3-32

Tacoali, Shules 0040

Taylor, Roxanne 0004
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter Commenter

Number 

H-9 NUREG-1714

Teasdale, Paul 0078

The Sierra Club, Utah Chapter (King, Cindy) SL1-21

Timm, Patti 0083

Timm, Patti 0150

Tooele County Commission (Hunsaker, Teryl) 0206

Trichel, Judy (Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force) SL1-14

U.S. Air Force 0068

U.S. Air Force (Same as Commenter Number 0068) 0222

U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (Barnes, Bernard) 0145

U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (Barnes, Bernard) (Same as

Commenter Number 0145)

0146

U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (Barnes, Bernard) (Same as

Commenter Number 0145)

0244

U.S. Department of the Interior (Stewart, Robert F.) 0089

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Officials, Region 8 (Cody, Cynthia) 0240

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services (McCue, Robert) 0047

United States Public Research Group (Gordon, Joseph) SL3-36

University of Missouri (Miller, William) SL1-41

Unknown 0057

Urban, Dale T. 0166

Urban, Dale T. (Same as Commenter Number 0166) 0218

Utah Association of Realtors (Brubaker, Mac) 0086

Utah Association of Realtors (Brubaker, Mac) SL3-05

Utah Association of Realtors (Holmstead, Ken) SL3-10

Utah Association of Realtors (Jerman, Teri) SL3-39

Utah Defense Alliance (Bushnell, Mark) SL2-11

Utah Defense Alliance (McCall, Vickie) SL3-30

Utah Defense Alliance (Pavich, Michael) SL3-28

Utah Defense Alliance (Rush, Steve) SL3-20

Utah Department of Environmental Quality (Nakahara, Connie S.) 0238

Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (Gabert, Helge) 0051

Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (Gabert, Helge) (Same as

Commenter Number 0051)

0066

Utah Radiation Control Board (Sinclair, William J.) 0099

Vail, Dick 0071

Valenti, J.M. 0011

Van Dam, Lynn SL3-38

Van Wagoner, Mary 0228

vanFrank, Roger 0006

Vogt, Sharon SL3-17

Waggoner, Tom - Clearfield City Mayor/Utah Defense Alliance SL2-01

Wallace, Volley SL1-25

Ward, Brent 0008

Ward, Chip 0015

Ward, Chip SL3-49

Ward, Heidi and Chester 0111
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter Commenter

Number 

NUREG-1714 H-10

Warner, Sean SL2-06

Webb, Justin SL3-15

Webster, James SL1-11

Webster, James D 0112

Webster, Mariann SL1-10

Weed, Matthew T. and Annette G. 0246

Welles, Marylyn T. SL3-12

Wenger, Ray and Kathy 0075

West, William B. 0205

Western Interstate Energy Board (Turner, Allan) 0142

Western U.S. Citizen 0023

Westfield Real Estate (Dell'ergo, Thomas) 0104

Westfield Real Estate (Dell'ergo, Thomas) (Same as Commenter Number

0104)

0175

Wharram, Pamela 0074

Whipple, Chandler 0147

White, Rachel 0050

Whitney, Edward 0059

Williams, Paul L. 0225

Willie, Kyle SL3-13

Women Concened/Utahan United (Holtz, Mary) SL3-48

Women Concerned/Utahs Unite (Holt, Rosemary A.) 0053

Wrathall, Deborah SL3-45

Young, Faith 0124

Zeigler, Jennie 0190
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

H-11 NUREG-1714

H.2 Index by Commenter Number

Commenter

Number Commenter

0001 Rodman, Tiffany

0002 Gilmore, Garrett D.

0003 Minnema, Jeff

0004 Taylor, Roxanne

0005 Hawkins, Larry & Berlinda

0006 vanFrank, Roger

0007 Cline, Russell A.

0008 Ward, Brent

0009 Dinger, Marilyn L.

0010 Cline, Melon

0011 Valenti, J.M.

0012 Leavitt, Michael O. - Governor of Utah

0013 Peine, Hermann A.

0014 Nuclear Energy Institute (Unglesbee, Steven W.)

0015 Ward, Chip

0016 Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Hoffman, Robert)

0017 Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steven)

0018 State of Nevada, Agency Officials for Nuclear Project (Guinn, Kenny C.)

0019 Families Against Incinerator Risk (Sheinberg, Jill)

0020 Peterson, William

0021 Fife, Scott

0022 Concerned Mother

0023 Western U.S. Citizen

0024 JEDI Woman (Garcia, Frances)

0025 Peterson, William

0026 Environmental Organizations 

0027 Starr, Fay S.

0028 LeDuc, Barbie

0029 Gier, Ruth

0030 Farrer, Russell K.

0031 McItyre, Charles

0032 Moriarty, Cathy

0033 Johnson, Jack

0034 Phillips, Penelope

0035 Crooks, Pat

0036 Phillips, Archie

0037 Martin, Terry

0038 McCarthy, Daniel

0039 Jenkins, Robin

0040 Tacoali, Shules

0041 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0042 Arnold, Jean

0043 Dickson, Mary
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter

Number Commenter

NUREG-1714 H-12

0044 Sager, Lorraine

0045 Garbett, David

0046 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0047 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services (McCue, Robert)

0048 Dickson, Mary

0049 Ellis, Bruce R.

0050 White, Rachel

0051 Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (Gabert, Helge)

0052 Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin)

0053 Women Concerned/Utahs Unite (Holt, Rosemary A.)

0054 Inaba, Nancy

0055 Hatch, Marguerite

0056 Lippard, Chris

0057 Unknown

0058 Stella, Matthew

0059 Whitney, Edward

0060 Burnett, Matt

0061 Miller, Roger

0062 Doe, John

0063 Julander, Paula F. - Utah State Senator

0064 Brimley, Dawn

0065 Heyn, Mike and Shana

0066 Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (Gabert, Helge) (Same as

Commenter Number 0051)

0067 DeHaan, Susan

0068 U.S. Air Force

0069 Arnold, Joe

0070 Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition (Bernstein, James)

0071 Vail, Dick

0072 Bodily, Kerry D.

0073 Clayson, Dirk

0074 Wharram, Pamela

0075 Wenger, Ray and Kathy

0076 Ellsworth, Sharon R.

0077 Jenkins, Robin

0078 Teasdale, Paul

0079 Belnap, Dave

0080 Harman, David Jr.

0081 Griffiths, Rex K.

0082 Gleason, Cheri

0083 Timm, Patti

0084 Niswander, M. Ruth

0085 Eberlein, Chris

0086 Utah Association of Realtors (Brubaker, Mac)

0087 North Davis Chamber of Commerce (Bouwhuis, Michael)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter

Number Commenter

H-13 NUREG-1714

0088 North Davis Chamber of Commerce (Bouwhuis, Michael) (Same as Commenter

Number 0087)

0089 U.S. Department of the Interior (Stewart, Robert F.)

0090 Gilbert, Cathleen C.

0091 Robbins, Darlene

0092 Horner, Joshua

0093 Julene

0094 J., Paula

0095 Miller, Bob

0096 Sierra Club - Utah Chapter (King, Cindy)

0097 Ailion, David

0098 Olsen, Larry

0099 Utah Radiation Control Board (Sinclair, William J.)

0100 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear Leon D.)

0101 Peratis, Jeri

0102 Garrett, Stephen

0103 Prince, Molly G.

0104 Westfield Real Estate (Dell'ergo, Thomas)

0105 Prior, Teresa

0106 Gilbert, Gary S.

0107 Gilbert, Jason

0108 Gilbert, Heather

0109 Peterson, William

0110 Meyers, Dominique

0111 Ward, Heidi and Chester

0112 Webster, James D

0113 Mingo, Richard

0114 Smith, Sean

0115 Smith, Christa Poulter

0116 Morrison, Rob

0117 Carpenter II, C.C.

0118 Ferguson, Tom

0119 Flowers, Bobbie D.

0120 Camara, Tom

0121 Hollinshead, Crispin B.

0122 Howard, Blaine N.

0123 Lee, Robert E.

0124 Young, Faith

0125 Jolley, David B.

0126 Peterson, Chris

0127 Kaubin, Joy

0128 Burr, Nancy

0129 Burr, Maegan

0130 Gbur, Edith

0131 Salter, David
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter

Number Commenter

NUREG-1714 H-14

0132 Cluff, Thomas

0133 Ridling, Ron

0134 Hagans, Bruce

0135 Campbell, Laura

0136 Committee to Bridge the Gap (Magavern, Bill)

0137 Lee, Tommy W.

0138 Escalante, Joe

0139 Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (Rittenberg, Dayna)

0140 Johnson, Eric

0141 Phillips, William L.

0142 Western Interstate Energy Board (Turner, Allan)

0143 Dairyland Power Cooperative (Berg, William L.)

0144 Brimhall, Rodger M

0145 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (Barnes, Bernard)

0146 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (Barnes, Bernard) (Same as

Commenter Number 0145)

0147 Whipple, Chandler

0148 Johnson, Jerry

0149 Schelly, Jackie

0150 Timm, Patti

0151 O'Donnell, Alice

0152 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0153 Cannon, Chris - U.S. Representative

0154 McConkie, Paul M.

0155 Goodman, Sidney J.

0156 Downwinders (Erickson, Steve)

0157 Nuclear Information & Resource Service, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, Women's

Action for New Directions, Women Legislators' Lobby

0158 Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and Margene

Bullcreek (Walker, Joro)

0159 Missouri Department of Natural Resources (Mahfood, Stephen)

0160 Hazard, Scot J.

0161 Minnema, Jeff (Same as Commenter Number 0003)

0162 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0163 Private Fuel Storage (Donnell, John L.)

0164 McKenna, Elinda

0165 Stone, Sandy

0166 Urban, Dale T.

0167 Peratis, Jeri

0168 Peterson, William

0169 State of Idaho - INEEL Oversight (Trevor, Kathleen)

0170 Barrowes, Steven

0171 Eureka County, Yucca Mountain Information Office (Fiorenzi, Leonard)

0172 Funk, John L. 

0173 Lee, Tommy W. (Same as Commenter Number 0137)

0174 Johnson, Randy
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter

Number Commenter

H-15 NUREG-1714

0175 Westfield Real Estate (Dell'ergo, Thomas) (Same as Commenter Number 0104)

0176 Hurd, Linda

0177 Lane, Sandy

0178 dcwechter@aol.com

0179 Nuclear Energy Institute (Kraft, Steven P.)

0180 Clean Water Action Alliance of Minnesota (McKeown, Diana)

0181 Goodman, Sidney J. and Irma

0182 Hildebrandt, Rachel Genovese

0183 Karch, Gary

0184 Nuclear Information & Resource Service, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, Women's

Action for New Directions, Women Legislators' Lobby (Same as Commenter

Number 0187)

0185 Buob, Marcel

0186 North American Water Office (Crocker, George W.)

0187 Gbur, Edith

0188 Dalton, Christopher J.

0189 GE Stockholders' Alliance (Birnie, Patricia T.)

0190 Zeigler, Jennie

0191 Greene, Ellen

0192 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0193 Lincoln County (NV), City of Caliente (NV), and Joint City/County Impact

Alleviation Committee (Baughman, Mike L.)

0194 Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin)

0195 Standing for Truth about Radiation (Cullen, Scott M.)

0196 Allen, Sundra R.

0197 Grubaugh-Littig, Pamela

0198 State of Utah - Office of the Governor

0199 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0200 Sag, Mary E.

0201 Schwartz, Jill

0202 Cannon, Chris - U.S. Representative (Same as Commenter Number 0153)

0203 Drey, Kay

0204 State of Nevada - Office of the Governor

0205 West, William B.

0206 Tooele County Commission (Hunsaker, Teryl)

0207 Constable, Patricia

0208 Pike, Douglas E.

0209 Eureka County, Yucca Mountain Information Office (Fiorenzi, Leonard) (Same as

Commenter Number 0171)

0210 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0211 North American Water Office (Crocker, George W.)

0212 Howell, Scott N. - Utah State Senator

0213 Committee to Bridge the Gap (Magavern, Bill) (Same as Commenter Number

0136)

0214 Jow, Tom E.

0215 Fishler, Sandy
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter

Number Commenter

NUREG-1714 H-16

0216 Nuclear Information Resource Service Petitions

0217 Arizona Safe Energy Coalition (Shroeder, Betty)

0218 Urban, Dale T. (Same as Commenter Number 0166)

0219 Drey, Kay (Same as Commenter Number 0203)

0220 Nuclear Information Resource Service Petitions

0221 Karch, Gary (Same as Commenter Number 0183)

0222 U.S. Air Force (Same as Commenter Number 0068)

0223 Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (Slater, Alice)

0224 Lowry, Nikki L.

0225 Williams, Paul L.

0226 Sierra Club (Same as Commenter Number 0096)

0227 Elnicky, Michele

0228 Van Wagoner, Mary

0229 Starr, Carol D.

0230 Kuhn, Nancy

0231 Johnson, Jerry

0232 Bonar, Linda and John, Lauren & Johnny Stratton

0233 Davison, Maureen

0234 State of Idaho - INEEL Oversight (Trevor, Kathleen) (Same as Commenter

Number 0169)

0235 PECO Energy (Hutton Jr., James A.)

0236 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (Gray, Charles D.)

0237 O'Connor, Amy M.

0238 Utah Department of Environmental Quality (Nakahara, Connie S.)

0239 Hinchman, Andrew J.

0240 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Officials, Region 8 (Cody, Cynthia)

0241 Johnson, Jerry C. (Same as Commenter Number 0148)

0242 Jamison, Chris

0243 Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and Margene

Bullcreek (Walker, Joro) (Same as Commenter Number 0158)

0244 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (Barnes, Bernard) (Same as

Commenter Number 0145)

0245 Bonar, Linda and John, Lauren & Johnny Stratton (Same as Commenter Number

0232)

0246 Weed, Matthew T. and Annette G.

0247 Guzzle, Richard L.

0249 McClarren, Chris

0250 Foote, Greg

0251 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0252 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0253 Bergsma, Chris

0254 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0255 Peterson, William

0256 Davis Chamber of Commerce

0257 Snyder, Susi
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter

Number Commenter

H-17 NUREG-1714

0258 Clean Water Action Alliance of Minnesota (McKeown, Diana) (Same as

Commenter Number 0180)

0259 Florida Power & Light Company

0260 Gillette, Karl R.

0261 State of Utah - Office of the Attorney General

0262 Rollins, Dan

0263 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste Petitions

0264 Collard, Sharon (family)

GR-01 Hansen, James V. - U.S. Congressman

GR-02 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear Leon D.)

GR-03 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Allen, Mary)

GR-04 Nielson, Dianne (Utah Department of Environmental Quality)

GR-05 Robinson, Bonnie

GR-06 Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia (Bullcreek, Margene)

GR-07 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear, Arlene M.)

GR-08 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear, Larry)

GR-09 Griffith, Chuck

GR-10 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Allen, Rex)

GR-11 Jenkins, Robin

GR-12 Nuclear Energy Institute (Unglesbee, Steven W.)

GR-13 Families Against Incinerator Risk (Ward, Chip)

GR-14 Families Against Incinerator Risk (Groenwald, Jason)

GR-15 Hatch, Marie

GR-16 Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin)

GR-17 Burgess, Mary

GR-18 Mascherino, Les

GR-19 Peterson, William

GR-20 Armbruster, Barb

GR-21 Kirkpatrick, Robynne

GR-22 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Cynthia of the Desert)

GR-23 Bulisova, Gabriela

GR-24 Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steve)

SL1-01 Leavitt, Michael O. -Governor of Utah

SL1-02 Howell, Scott N. - Utah State Senator

SL1-03 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear Leon D.)

SL1-04 Becker, Ralph - Utah State Senator

SL1-05 Anderson, Ross C. - Salt Lake City Mayor (Arce-Larreta, Juan)

SL1-06 Draper City Council (Colbert, Bill)

SL1-07 Downwinders (Erickson, Steve)

SL1-08 Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steve)

SL1-09 Families Against Incinerator Risk (Groenewold, Jason)

SL1-10 Webster, Mariann

SL1-11 Webster, James

SL1-12 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (McConkie, James)

SL1-13 Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects (Frishman, Steve)
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter

Number Commenter

NUREG-1714 H-18

SL1-14 Trichel, Judy (Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force)

SL1-15 Schmidt, Jerry

SL1-16 Nelson, Steve

SL1-17 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Black Bear, Sammy)

SL1-18 Evett, Donald

SL1-19 Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Hoffman, R.J.)

SL1-20 Roos, Jeri

SL1-21 The Sierra Club, Utah Chapter (King, Cindy)

SL1-22 O'Neal, James

SL1-23 Private Fuel Storage (Northard, Scott)

SL1-24 Barlow, Kee Y.

SL1-25 Wallace, Volley

SL1-26 Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia (Bullcreek, Margene)

SL1-27 Peine, Hermann

SL1-28 Mingo, Richard

SL1-29 Rasmussen, Dana

SL1-30 Skull Valley Goshute Indians (Bear, Lawrence)

SL1-31 Jarvis, Boyer

SL1-32 Cowley, Michael

SL1-33 Howard, Blain

SL1-34 Kirkpatrick, Robynne

SL1-35 Jensen, Jon

SL1-36 Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Kamps, Kevin)

SL1-37 Bulisova, Gabriela

SL1-38 Snake River Alliance (Bradford, Beatrice)

SL1-39 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Cynthia of the Desert)

SL1-40 Nuclear Energy Institute (Unglesbee, Steven W.)

SL1-41 University of Missouri (Miller, William)

SL2-01 Waggoner, Tom - Clearfield City Mayor/Utah Defense Alliance

SL2-02 Jenkins, Robin

SL2-03 Peterson, William

SL2-04 Scientists for Secure Waste Storage (Barrowes, Steve)

SL2-05 Anderson, Ross C. - Salt Lake City Mayor

SL2-06 Warner, Sean

SL2-07 Schitzel, Dina

SL2-08 O'Neal, James

SL2-09 Iosepa Historical Association (Hoopiiaiana, Cory)

SL2-10 Northern States Power Company (Northard, Scott)

SL2-11 Utah Defense Alliance (Bushnell, Mark)

SL2-12 Citizen Alert (Backlund, Kaitlan)

SL2-13 Iwamoto, Jani

SL2-14 Citizens for Environmental Responsibility (Davis, Anita)

SL2-15 Doebbeling, Denise

SL2-16 Audubon Society of Great Salt Lake (Salt, Jeff)

SL2-17 Citizen Alert (Garrett, Jo Anne)
December 2001 FINAL EIS—Appendix H

Commenter

Number Commenter

H-19 NUREG-1714

SL2-18 JEDI Women (Macri, Bonnie)

SL2-19 Garcia, Francis

SL2-20 Nielson, Dianne (Utah Department of Environmental Quality)

SL2-21 Ghandi Peace Center (Matuso, Joe)

SL3-01 Bear, Leon (Skull Valley Goshute Indians)

SL3-02 Gilbert, Kathleen

SL3-03 Sandquist, Gary

SL3-04 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Swardhansen, Ann)

SL3-05 Utah Association of Realtors (Brubaker, Mac)

SL3-06 Dickson, Mary

SL3-07 Lazar, Elise

SL3-08 Lazar, Gerald

SL3-09 Haggerty, Bern

SL3-10 Utah Association of Realtors (Holmstead, Ken)

SL3-11 Cook, Merrill - Congressman

SL3-12 Welles, Marylyn T.

SL3-13 Willie, Kyle

SL3-14 Knutson, Emil

SL3-15 Webb, Justin

SL3-16 Ellsworth, Sharon

SL3-17 Vogt, Sharon

SL3-18 Roos, Jeri

SL3-19 Roberts, Todd

SL3-20 Utah Defense Alliance (Rush, Steve)

SL3-21 Benchley, Darin

SL3-22 Cathey, Randee

SL3-23 Jensen, Jon

SL3-24 Beckstead, Evan

SL3-25 Kirkpatrick, Jeanee

SL3-26 Sorenson, Heidi

SL3-27 Cathey, Tully

SL3-28 Utah Defense Alliance (Pavich, Michael)

SL3-29 Peterson, Tim

SL3-30 Utah Defense Alliance (McCall, Vickie)

SL3-31 McConkie, Paul

SL3-32 Sustainable Salt Lake/Green Party (Archibald-Stone, Penny)

SL3-33 Families Against Incinerator Risk (Reading, Karla)

SL3-34 Kearn, Dau

SL3-35 Families Against Incinerator Risk (Rosco, Cynthia)

SL3-36 United States Public Research Group (Gordon, Joseph)

SL3-37 Rose, Jackson

SL3-38 Van Dam, Lynn

SL3-39 Utah Association of Realtors (Jerman, Teri)

SL3-40 Green Party of Utah/Sustainable Salt Lake (Fife, Scott)

SL3-41 Niederman, Elizabeth
FINAL EIS—Appendix H December 2001

Commenter

Number Commenter

NUREG-1714 H-20

SL3-42 Nelson, Mark

SL3-43 Stats, Kathleen

SL3-44 Brehm, Michael

SL3-45 Wrathall, Deborah

SL3-46 Lord, Judy

SL3-47 Groenewold, Jason

SL3-48 Women Concened/Utahan United (Holtz, Mary)

SL3-49 Ward, Chip

SL3-50 Peterson, William

SL3-51 Peterson, William

SL3-52 Jenkins, Robin

SL3-53 Barrowes, Steve

SL3-54 Kirkpatrick, Robynne

SL3-55 Citizens Against Radioactive Waste in Utah (Cynthia of the Desert)

SL3-56 Nielson, Dianne (On behalf of Governor Leavitt)

SL3-57 Hoopiianian, Cory

SL3-58 Private Fuel Storage (Northard, Scott)