[Cite as State v. Ramey, 2020-Ohio-1572.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsERIC R. RAMEY 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2019CA0013 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Coshocton County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 18CR0207

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 17, 2020 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JASON GIVEN KORI GATTERDAM 

Coshocton County Prosecuting Attorney ERIK P. HENRY 

318 Chestnut Street 280 Plaza, Ste. 1300 

Coshocton, OH 43812 280 N. High St. 

 Columbus, OH 43215 
[Cite as State v. Ramey, 2020-Ohio-1572.]

Gwin, J., 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric R. Ramey [“Ramey”] appeals his conviction and 

sentence after a jury trial in the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On September 28, 2018, Detective Dave Stone of the Coshocton County 

Sheriff’s Office was conducting a drug trafficking investigation at the Downtown Motel in 

Coshocton, Ohio. The investigation targeted Tiffany Wiggins ("Wiggins") and an unknown 

male. As part of the investigation, the Sheriff's Office employed a paid confidential 

informant, Floyd Lewis ("Lewis"). Lewis' contract with the Sheriff's Office began July 20, 

2016, and the Sheriff's Office paid him $200—$100 at the time of each buy and $100 

upon completion of the case, i.e., after trial. 

{¶3} On September 29, 2018, Detective Stone gave Lewis a concealed video 

recorder and $150 in buy money. Under the surveillance of Detective Stone and 

Detective Tim Bethel, Lewis drove his vehicle to the Downtown Motel and entered 

Room No. 2. After completion of the controlled buy, Lewis exited the motel room, 

and Detective Stone recovered from Lewis two clear bags containing 

methamphetamine. State's Exhibit 3. 

{¶4} Detectives continued to monitor the motel room, and saw an unknown 

male, later identified as Ramey, exit the room. Detectives followed Ramey and 

apprehended him in an alley. Detectives found in Ramey's possession a clear bag 

containing methamphetamine, as well as $80 of the buy money Lewis used during the 

controlled buy. State's Exhibit 4; State's Exhibit 5. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 3 

{¶5} After the controlled buy, Detective Stone applied for, and a judge granted, 

a search warrant for the motel room. Detective Stone acknowledged that the sale from 

Wiggins to Lewis constituted the predicate for the warrant. After the arrests of both 

Wiggins and Ramey, the detectives executed the warrant and searched Room No. 2. 

{¶6} Detectives seized six bags of methamphetamine from inside a gray LG 

cell phone box found in a dresser drawer. One of the bags contained a "ball" or a larger 

amount of methamphetamine that would typically be broken down into smaller amounts 

for sale. State’s Exhibit 14. The remaining five bags each contained a smaller amount 

of methamphetamine typical of drug buys. Exhibit 9 was a bag containing 

methamphetamine that had “3.5” handwritten on the front of the bag. Exhibit 10 was a 

bag containing methamphetamine that had “3.6” written on it. Exhibit 11 was another 

bag of methamphetamine that had “3.5” written on it. Exhibit 12 was a bag of 

methamphetamine that had “3.2” written on it. Id. Exhibit 14 was a large bag of 

methamphetamine. Exhibit 13 was then introduced as a bag of methamphetamine 

located in Room No. 2 with State's exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14. 

{¶7} Detective Stone testified that these exhibits were indicative of drug 

trafficking. He testified that the smaller bags are what is typically sold and packaged 

from the larger bag. State's Exhibit 16 was introduced as small baggies typically used 

for drug trafficking recovered from the gray box. Exhibit 17 and 18 were more small 

baggies recovered from the gray box. State's Exhibit 19 and 20 were introduced as other 

small baggies consistent with drug trafficking recovered from the gray box. Exhibit 15 

was introduced as the gray box located in the dresser. State's Exhibit 22 was introduced 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 4 

as a digital scale typically used to weigh drugs. State's Exhibit 21 was introduced as a 

photograph of the items located in the gray box. 

{¶8} Detectives further uncovered during the search of the motel room $40 in 

buy money on the north side of the bed (State's Exhibit 23), also on the north side of 

the bed two glass smoking pipes consistent with smoking methamphetamine (State's 

Exhibits 24-25), an empty (State's Exhibit 26) as well as a full syringe (State's Exhibit 

27), and mail purportedly belonging to Ramey (State's Exhibit 28). Detective Stone also 

noted seeing male clothing and hygiene products, as well as two toothbrushes in the 

bathroom. Detectives also found a bag of methamphetamine inside Wiggins' purse. 

State's Exhibit 29. 

{¶9} On cross-examination, Detective Stone noted they could not locate $30 of 

the buy money. Detective Stone also acknowledged that if a confidential informant 

violated the terms of the contract by using illegal drugs or committing criminal acts, the 

Sheriff’s Office would terminate the contract. Detective Stone had no knowledge of 

Lewis violating the contract from July 20, 2016, through September 29, 2018. Detective 

Stone testified on cross examination that the gray box was for an LG cell phone; 

however, he did not know to whom the box belonged. Detective Stone acknowledged 

that no one observed Ramey directly selling drugs to anyone. Finally, Detective Stone 

admitted making no attempt to identify the handwriting found on the bags of 

methamphetamine marked as State's Exhibits 9-12, or to test any of the evidence for 

DNA. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 5 

{¶10} The confidential informant, Floyd Lewis testified he was presently 

incarcerated for a matter occurring in Muskingum County, Ohio. Lewis also admitted a 

prior robbery conviction. 

{¶11} Lewis admitted that for the past few years he has made his living by 

working as a confidential informant for the Coshocton County Sheriff's Office. Lewis 

detailed the controlled buy on September 29, 2018. State's Exhibit 30 was introduced 

as the video/audio recording of the buy from the device that Lewis wore during the 

controlled buy. Lewis testified that at first he had tried to buy methamphetamines and 

heroin; however, they had just sold out of heroin. Lewis said that he gave Wiggins the 

money and Wiggins gave him the drugs. Lewis testified that when he requested a large 

amount of drugs to purchase, Wiggins got permission from Ramey to sell that amount. 

Ramey told Wiggins that Lewis could purchase two bags of methamphetamine for $150. 

Twice Ramey told Wiggins the deal was okay. 

{¶12} Lewis acknowledges being at the Downtown Motel the night before and saw 

Wiggins; he did not see Ramey. On cross-examination, Lewis admitted he did not honor 

his contract, including by using drugs on his own. Lewis stated the night before, he bought 

$15 worth of methamphetamine, fentanyl, or heroin for his girlfriend. The following 

morning, Lewis contacted Detective Bethel of the Sheriff’s Office and advised that he 

could buy from Wiggins and "we proceeded from there.” Lewis corrected himself that he 

might not have bought directly from Ms. Wiggins the night before but he did find out she 

was the one who had "the weight.” 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 6 

{¶13} Wiggins testified that she was currently incarcerated in prison based on her 

involvement in this case. Wiggins had four other drug trafficking convictions, as well as a 

felony theft conviction. 

{¶14} Wiggins testified that she and Ramey began staying at the Downtown Motel 

on September 28, 2018. Wiggins said that when Lewis knocked, Ramey gave Wiggins 

permission to let Lewis into the room. When Lewis came into the room, there was 

approximately seven grams of methamphetamine in two baggies in the open on a 

nightstand between the beds. Wiggins testified that it was Ramey's drugs and she was 

assisting in selling them. Ramey gave her permission to sell both bags and watched her 

prepare and sell the drugs. This was by way of an affirmation nod. Ramey approved the 

purchase price of $150. Wiggins testified that she gave the $150 to Ramey. Wiggins 

acknowledged that the gram of methamphetamine in her purse was given to her by 

Ramey for personal use. 

{¶15} Wiggins testified that the night before, she went to Walmart and bought a 

pre-paid cell phone with her money, not Ramey's. Wiggins identified State's Exhibit 15 

as the gray box in which the phone had been packaged. Wiggins claimed she took the 

phone out of the gray box that morning, after Lewis came but before her arrest and the 

search of the room. Wiggins denied placing any items into the box. Wiggins testified no 

one else came to the room after Lewis left and before Ramey left. Wiggins claimed Ramey 

left the room to sell someone methamphetamine at the library. When Wiggins left the 

room to take the trash out, detectives arrested her. 

{¶16} Wiggins did acknowledge how both she and Ramey were addicts, and both 

of them used drugs while in the motel room, including the previous night. In fact, when 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 7 

detectives interviewed Wiggins after her arrest, Wiggins was still high. Wiggins further 

stated Ramey rented the room because she did not possess any identification. 

{¶17} On the video, Wiggins acknowledging hearing Lewis saying 130 and also 

"I will owe you 20." Wiggins testified Lewis did not have the whole $150. When asked 

why detectives only located $120, Wiggins stated that was all Lewis gave her. 

{¶18} Sarah Dobbs, a forensic scientist employed by the Bureau of Criminal 

Investigation [“BCI”] in the Richfield office, testified last for the state. The parties 

stipulated to Ms. Dobbs' qualifications as an expert witness. Ms. Dobbs examined the 

methamphetamine submitted in this case, the results of which were reflected in her report 

marked as State's Exhibit 31. According to Ms. Dobbs, State's Exhibit 4 weighed 6.79 

grams; State's Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 weighed a combined 28.17 grams; State's 

Exhibit 13 weighed 3.45 grams; and State's Exhibit 29 weighed 1.77 grams. Ms. Dobbs 

testified the bulk amount of methamphetamine is 3 grams, and the combined weight of 

all the drugs in this case fell within the range of 15 grams to 150 grams, i.e., between 5 

times and 50 times bulk. 

{¶19} The parties stipulated to the chain of custody of the state's case; stipulated 

to State's Exhibit 32, a report from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, confirming that 

State's Exhibit 3 is methamphetamine and weighed 6.06 grams; stipulated that Room 2 

of the Downtown Motel is located within the vicinity of a school; and stipulated to Ms. 

Dobbs' expertise. 

{¶20} After the close of evidence, Ramey requested an instruction for the lesser 

included offense of Aggravated Possession of Drugs in an amount greater than bulk 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 8 

amount but less than five times the bulk amount, i.e. the amount of drugs found on 

Ramey's person when he was arrested. 

{¶21} The jury found Ramey guilty of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a violation 

of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(d), a felony of the first degree. The trial court proceeded to 

sentencing. Ramey was sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment for eleven years. 

The trial court noted that in imposing a maximum sentence that the offense was the worst 

form of the offense. Specifically, the trial court noted the amount of methamphetamine, 

the digital scales, and the prepared bags with weights written on them. The trial court 

noted that Ramey was prepared to introduce a large amount of methamphetamine into 

the community at a rapid pace. The court further noted Ramey had a prior felony 

conviction for trafficking in drugs out of Wayne County, Ohio and a prior theft conviction. 

The trial court further noted that Ramey had a prior federal conviction for counterfeit 

United States currency and was wanted by federal authorities for probation or parole 

violations related to that offense. 

Assignments of Error 

{¶22} Ramey raises three Assignments of Error, 

{¶23} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 

OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND 

SECTION 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶24} “II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO 

DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 9 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER

THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. 

{¶25} “III. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED APPELLANT TO 

SERVE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR HIS CONVICTION, IN VIOLATION OF HIS 

RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED 

STATES CONSTITUTION.” 

I. 

{¶26} In his First Assignment of Error, Ramey argues that he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Ramey contends, 1). Trial counsel was 

ineffective because counsel failed to voir dire prospective jurors regarding their 

feelings regarding drug use; 2). Failed to object to the state introducing other acts 

evidence of Wiggins; and 3). Trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's improper 

statement in closing argument. 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 

{¶27} To obtain a reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 

693(1984). A defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a 

court's need to consider the other. Strickland at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 

699; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 2000-Ohio-448, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 10 

{¶28} In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the 

range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the 

performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 

considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689,104 

S.Ct. at 2064. At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2064. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 

A. Whether there is a reasonable probability that trial counsel’s objections would 

have been sustained and whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury would 

have found Ramey not guilty if the objections had been sustained. 

1). Failure to voir dire on issue of drugs. 

{¶29} Ramey contends, “defense counsel needed to uncover prospective jurors' 

prejudices and biases as to drugs so he would know whether the juror could be fair to his 

client. Jurors personally affected by drug use or with family members affected by drug 

use obviously would view the facts of this case in a skewed manner. Defense counsel 

intentionally left on the panel jurors who have in some way been so negatively impacted 

by drugs that they could not be fair and impartial.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

{¶30} In the case at bar, the state inquired of the jurors during voir dire as follows, 

 Let's talk about the alleged offense. It's a single count. We are 

talking about this because sometimes the offense itself will bring up biases, 

make it so you can't be objective while sitting as a juror. The offense in this 

case revolves around the trafficking or specifically the intended distribution 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 11 

of methamphetamine. Does that subject matter cause anyone concern 

about how they could objectively weigh the evidence in this case? 

T. at 26. None of the jurors answered in response to the state’s inquiry. 

{¶31} Defense counsel inquired as follows, 

 I want to be just a little bit more specific since this case involves 

drugs. Very many of you on questionnaires listed at some point in your life 

you were the victim of a crime. And drugs has been a problem that's 

increased in recent years to the point that many crimes, whether they are a 

drug crime or not, are somehow tied to drugs. It's one of those things that's 

in the back of people's minds that I find when they hear the case is about 

drugs, they frown, and its unpleasant topic to them and within their own 

family this may be something that has been a scourge that they have 

personally experienced. 

 I don't want to ask you about the particularities of any of the crimes 

that you have been victim of or that there has been drug problems in your 

family particular to that. I think that's private and you can keep it to yourself. 

But now that I have put a little bit of focus on it, is there anybody here that 

feels that maybe they are not the best person to sit in judgment on a case 

like there? And I will turn the question a little more specific, and I would ask 

those of you back here to remember this one for yourselves when you come 

up -- if you come up here to the box in a little bit. Is there any -- if you found 

yourself in Mr. Ramey's shoes today, is there any reason why you wouldn't 

want yourself sitting in judgment on this case? Thank you. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 12 

T. at 31-31. 

{¶32} It is a well-established principle of law that “[t]he conduct of voir dire by 

defense counsel does not have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions have 

to be asked.” State v. Cornwell, 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 568, 1999–Ohio–125, 715 N.E.2d 

1144, citing State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042(1992). Ohio courts 

“have recognized that counsel is in the best position to determine whether any potential 

juror should be questioned and to what extent.” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 539, 

2001–Ohio–112, 747 N.E.2d 765, citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143–144, 

538 N.E.2d 373(1989). 

{¶33} “The fact that defense counsel did not decide to ask additional questions or 

to press every single potential juror on this issue—or to inquire about specific mitigating 

factors—is reasonable as a matter of strategy. See Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 539, 747 

N.E.2d 765.” State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 1051, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, 

¶156. 

{¶34} In the case at bar, both the state and the defense gave the jurors the 

opportunity to discuss how their views on drugs could affect their ability to be fair and 

impartial jurors. The trial court oversaw the voir dire and the record of voir dire indicates 

that the jurors could render a fair and impartial verdict. 

{¶35} Even if counsel’s performance at voir dire had been deficient, Ramey 

cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. He has failed to establish a reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance at voir dire, the result of 

the trial would have been different. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 13 

Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, at ¶ 67. State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 1051, 2014-Ohio1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶157. 

2). Failure to object to “other acts” evidence of Tiffany Wiggins. 

{¶36} Ramey next contends, “During the testimony of confidential informant Floyd 

Lewis, Lewis mentioned trying to buy heroin from Wiggins. Wiggins purportedly told 

Lewis she had already sold the last bit of heroin. Defense counsel failed to object to this 

other acts testimony regarding uncharged criminal conduct.” Appellant’s Brief at 

11(references to the transcript omitted). 

{¶37} In the case at bar, the defense argued that both Wiggins and Ramey are 

drug addicts. T at 190. The clear defense strategy was that Wiggins, not Ramey was the 

drug dealer. T. at 190-191. Defense counsel noted that Wiggins was a “four time 

convicted drug trafficker.” T. at 193. 

{¶38} A defendant has no constitutional right to determine trial tactics and strategy 

of counsel. State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 72, 717 N.E.2d 298(1999); State v. 

Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 150; State v. Donkers, 

170 Ohio App.3d 509, 867 N.E.2d 903, 2007-Ohio-1557, ¶ 183(11th Dist.). Rather, 

decisions about viable defenses are the exclusive domain of defense counsel after 

consulting with the defendant. Id. When there is no demonstration that counsel failed to 

research the facts or the law or that counsel was ignorant of a crucial defense, a reviewing 

court defers to counsel's judgment in the matter. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 

402 N.E.2d 1189(1980), citing People v. Miller, 7 Cal.3d 562, 573-574, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 

498 P.2d 1089(1972); State v. Wiley, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-340, 2004- Ohio-1008 at ¶ 21. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 14 

{¶39} Debatable strategic and tactical decisions may not form the basis of a claim 

for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 1995–Ohio–

171. Even if the wisdom of an approach is questionable, “debatable trial tactics” do not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. “Poor tactics of experienced counsel, 

however, even with disastrous result, may hardly be considered lack of due process * * 

*.” State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 48, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980)(quoting United States 

v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir.1963), certiorari denied 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1112, 10 

L.Ed.2d 143. 

{¶40} Evidence that Wiggins may have sold drugs to Lewis at a previous time fits 

with the defense strategy that Wiggins was the drug dealer. Thus, a reasonable trial 

strategy supported defense counsel’s decision not to object. 

{¶41} Even if trial counsel’s failure to object to the other acts evidence would have 

been deficient, the prejudice inquiry requires Ramey to “show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Ramey has not met this burden and 

this Court is not convinced that Ramey would have been found not guilty even if the 

evidence had been excluded.1

3). Failure to object to Prosecutors’ appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury 

during closing argument. 

{¶42} Ramey next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because defense 

counsel failed to object to the prosecutor improperly asking the jury to address a 

community drug problem. (Appellant’s Brief at 12). Ramey does not argue that the 

 1 Ramey’s sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence arguments will be addressed in Ramey’s 

Second Assignment of Error, infra. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 15 

comments made by the state during closing argument amounted to prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

{¶43} A prosecutor is entitled to a certain degree of latitude in closing arguments. 

State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St. 2d 583, 589, 433 N.E.2d 561(1982). Thus, it falls within 

the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the propriety of these arguments. State 

v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 269, 473 N.E.2d 768(1984). A conviction will be reversed 

only where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor's comments, 

the jury would not have found the defendant guilty. State v. Benge, 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 

141, 1996-Ohio-227. Furthermore, "[i]solated comments by a prosecutor are not to be 

taken out of context and given their most damaging meaning.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 

416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431(1974). 

{¶44} Comments made to incite fear; prejudice and/or passion in the jury require 

reversal. Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 247(1943); State v. Williams, 23 Ohio 

St. 3d 16, 20(1986). 

{¶45} Ramey cites the following statement made by the state in the rebuttal 

portion of its closing argument as the only ground for his argument that his trial counsel 

was ineffective, 

 Now, Mr. Mullen got up here and talked about rules. Rules constitute 

all the way back to the founding of our country. And he is right. There are 

rules that the State of Ohio has to follow, that the government has to follow 

in serious matters such as this. And Mr. Ramey is availing himself of those 

rules; however, we as citizens have rules, too. And that rule is, one of them, 

is you don't traffic this poison in communities. That's a rule. And when you 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 16 

do and when it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you are guilty of 

it, that's a rule. So the rules cut both ways. 

T. at 199-200. 

{¶46} We find the statements cited by Ramey in support of his argument do not 

rise to the level of inciting fear, prejudice, and/or passion. “The prosecutors' argument 

did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of the 

accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent....” Darden v. Wainwright

(1986), 477 U.S. 168, 181-182, 106 S.Ct. 2624, 2472. 

{¶47} “‘The failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 347, 715 N.E.2d 

136(1999), quoting State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 

831(1988). A defendant must also show that he was materially prejudiced by the failure 

to object. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d at 244, 527 N.E.2d 831. Accord, State v. Hale, 119 

Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶233. 

{¶48} We find no error in the prosecutor's comments. Therefore, Ramey’s trial 

counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. 

4). Cumulative effect. 

{¶49} Finally, Ramey alleges that the errors outlined in his previous arguments 

amount to cumulative error requiring reversal. 

{¶50} In State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003–Ohio–5059, 796 N.E.2d 506, 

the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of cumulative error. However, as 

explained in State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006–Ohio–4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶ 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 17 

197, it is simply not enough to intone the phrase “cumulative error.” State v. Sapp, 105 

Ohio St.3d 104, 2004–Ohio–7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 103. 

{¶51} Here, Ramey cites the doctrine of cumulative error, lists or incorporates the 

previous arguments, and gives no analysis or explanation as to why or how the errors 

have had a prejudicial cumulative effect. Thus, this argument has no substance under 

Bethel and Sapp. 

{¶52} Further, where we have found that the trial court did not err, cumulative error 

is simply inapplicable. State v. Carter, 5th Dist. No.2002CA00125, 2003–Ohio1313 at ¶ 

37. As this case does not involve multiple instances of error, Ramey’s argument is without 

merit. 

CONCLUSION. 

{¶53} Trial counsel’s conduct of voir dire on the issue of drugs was a matter of 

trial strategy and Ramey cannot point to prejudice resulting from counsel’s decision. 

{¶54} Ramey’s trial strategy was to demonstrate that Wiggins, not Ramey, was 

the dealer of the drugs in question. Therefore, failure to object to testimony that Wiggins 

had sold drug or attempted to sell drugs on the night before this incident was a matter of 

trial strategy. Ramey can point to no prejudice from counsel’s decision. 

{¶55} The prosecutor’s statements in closing argument were not improper; 

therefore, Ramey’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. 

{¶56} As this case does not involve multiple instances of error, Ramey’s argument 

that the cumulative effect of the errors mandates reversal is without merit. 

{¶57} Ramey’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 18 

II. 

{¶58} In his Second Assignment of Error, Ramey argues that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him, and further Ramey contends that the jury’s findings 

are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence. 

{¶59} The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in 

conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of 

a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 

U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616, 

621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence involves a 

question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 

2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the elements 

of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.” State v. Richardson, 150 

Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13. 

{¶60} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not 

ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus: Walker, at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio 

St.3d 474, 2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 19 

we do not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if 

believed, [the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001), 

quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus (emphasis added); Walker at ¶31. We 

will not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could 

not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 

70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 

430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL 

A. Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of Ramey’s guilt 

on each element of the crime of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

{¶61} In this case, the indictment charged Ramey with violating R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2), which provides: "(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: (2) 

Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a 

controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has 

reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled substance 

analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.” The indictment 

further alleged Ramey violated R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d) because the controlled substance 

involved methamphetamine, a schedule II drug, in the amount exceeding five times the 

bulk amount but less than fifty times the bulk amount, and in the vicinity of a school. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 20 

{¶62} In the case at bar, the parties entered into four stipulations: (1) chain of 

custody was not a contested issue; (2) Sacred Heart Elementary School is within 1,000 

feet of Room Number 2 of the Downtown Motel (that the room was within the vicinity of a 

school); (3) Sarah Dobbs from BCI is an expert in forensic analysis of controlled 

substances and scheduled drugs; (4) the authenticity of State's exhibit 32 which was a 

report from BCI. T. at 8-9. The stipulations were reduced to writing and filed with the trial 

court on August 9, 2019. [Docket Entry No. 58]. 

{¶63} Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless of his 

purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will 

probably be of a certain nature.” Further, “[a] person has knowledge of circumstances 

when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” Id. “Whether a person acts 

knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the 

surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Huff, 

145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563, 763 N.E.2d 695(1st Dist. 2001). (Footnote omitted.) Thus, 

“[t]he test for whether a defendant acted knowingly is a subjective one, but it is decided 

on objective criteria.” State v. McDaniel, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 16221, 1998 WL 

214606 (May 1, 1998), citing State v. Elliott, 104 Ohio App.3d 812, 663 N.E.2d 412(10th 

Dist. 1995). See also, State v. Jones, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38, 318 N.E.2d 637 (“The 

determination of whether appellant had the required culpable mental state must be made 

with a view to the totality of circumstances surrounding the beating of Otto Baum. As this 

court stated in paragraph four of the syllabus in State v. Huffman (1936), 131 Ohio St. 

27, 1 N.E.2d 313: “The intent of an accused person dwells in his mind. Not being 

ascertainable by the exercise of any or all of the senses, it can never be proved by the 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 21 

direct testimony of a third person, and it need not be. It must be gathered from the 

surrounding facts and circumstances under proper instructions from the court.”). 

{¶64} In the case at bar, Lewis testified that when he requested a large amount 

of drugs to purchase, Wiggins got permission from Ramey to sell that amount. Ramey 

told Wiggins that Lewis could purchase two bags of methamphetamine for $150. Twice 

Ramey told Wiggins the deal was okay. 

{¶65} Wiggins testified that they were Ramey's drugs and she was assisting him 

in selling them. Ramey gave her permission to sell both bags and watched her prepare 

and sell the drugs. This was by way of an affirmation nod. Ramey approved the purchase 

price of $150. Wiggins testified that she gave the $150 to Ramey. Wiggins testified that 

the gram of methamphetamine in her purse was given to her by Ramey for personal use. 

{¶66} Ramey does not challenge the evidence related to preparation of the drugs 

for distribution. Ramey further does not challenge that the drug was methamphetamine, 

a schedule II drug, in the amount exceeding five times the bulk amount but less than fifty 

times the bulk amount, and that it was found in the vicinity of a school. Ramey’s argument 

centers upon his contention that Wiggins, not Ramey was the actual seller of the drugs. 

{¶67} Viewing the evidence in the case at bar in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Ramey had committed the crime of Aggravated Trafficking of 

Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d). We hold, therefore, that the state met 

its burden of production regarding each element of the crime of Aggravated Trafficking of 

Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d) and, accordingly, there was sufficient 

evidence to submit the charge to the jury and to support Ramey’s conviction. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 22 

Manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶68} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a 

manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the 

evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 

678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as 

stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v. 

Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001). 

 “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against 

the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every 

reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the 

finding of facts. 

* * * 

 “If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the 

reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with 

the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and 

judgment.” 

Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 

3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978). 

{¶69} The reviewing court must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is 

an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 

904 (2001); State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008–Ohio–1744, ¶ 31. 

Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to 

decide whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses, the 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 23 

appellate court must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility. 

Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010–Ohio–2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20. In 

other words, “[w]hen there exist two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two 

conflicting versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not our province to 

choose which one we believe.” State v. Dyke, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99 CA 149, 2002–

Ohio–1152, at ¶ 13, citing State v. Gore, 131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125(7th 

Dist. 1999). Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the 

evidence to the fact finder, as long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision. 

State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 2012–Ohio–1282, ¶ 24. 

{¶70} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may 

not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “ ‘the jury clearly lost 

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist. 

1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional 

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 

B. Whether the jury court clearly lost their way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 

{¶71} The jury as the trier of fact was free to accept or reject any and all of the 

evidence offered by the parties and assess the witness’s credibility. “While the trier of 

fact may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly * * * 

such inconsistencies do not render defendant’s conviction against the manifest weight or 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 24 

sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Craig, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP–739, 1999 WL 

29752 (Mar 23, 2000) citing State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APA09–1236, 1996 

WL 284714 (May 28, 1996). Indeed, the trier of fact need not believe all of a witness’ 

testimony, but may accept only portions of it as true. State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 02AP–604, 2003–Ohio–958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 

N.E.2d 548 (1964); State v. Burke, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP–1238, 2003–Ohio–2889, 

citing State v. Caldwell, 79 Ohio App.3d 667, 607 N.E.2d 1096 (4th Dist. 1992). Although 

the evidence may have been circumstantial, we note that circumstantial evidence has the 

same probative value as direct evidence. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272, 574 

N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional 

amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4, 

684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). 

{¶72} In the case at bar, the jury heard the witnesses and viewed the evidence. 

The jury saw the events as they transpired in real-time because the events were recorded 

on the body camera worn by Lewis and admitted into evidence during the trial. Further, 

the jury was able to observe both Lewis and Wiggins subject to cross-examination. In 

addition, the jury heard Ramey’s arguments and explanations about his actions. Thus, a 

rational basis exists in the record for the jury’s decision. 

{¶73} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon 

the foregoing and the entire record in this matter we find Ramey’s conviction is not against 

the sufficiency or the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appears 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 25 

to have fairly and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the 

witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of Ramey’s guilt. The jury neither 

lost their way nor created a miscarriage of justice in convicting Ramey of Aggravated 

Trafficking of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d). 

{¶74} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that 

there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the 

crime for which Ramey was convicted. 

{¶75} Ramey’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶76} In accordance with R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), Ramey is entitled to appeal as of 

right the maximum sentence imposed on his conviction. 

Standard of Appellate Review. 

{¶77} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 

2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016–Ohio–1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22; 

State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶31. R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence 

and remand for resentencing where we clearly and convincingly find that either the record 

does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

See, also, State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014–Ohio–3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28. 

{¶78} Accordingly, pursuant to Marcum this Court may vacate or modify a felony 

sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 26 

record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes, or (2) the 

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶79} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118(1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. See also, In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985). “Where the 

degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing 

court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient 

evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio St. at 477 

120 N.E.2d 118. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 

Whether the trial court properly imposed the maximum sentence in Ramey’s case.

(1). R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and Maximum Sentences. 

{¶80} A trial court’s imposition of a maximum prison term for a felony conviction 

is not contrary to law as long as the sentence is within the statutory range for the offense, 

and the court considers both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in 

R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth R.C. 2929.12. State v. 

Keith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103413 and 103414, 2016–Ohio–5234, ¶ 10, 16; State v. 

Taylor, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA29, 2017-Ohio-8996, ¶16. 

{¶81} R.C. 2929.11(A) governs the purposes and principles of felony sentencing 

and provides that a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to 

achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are (1) to protect the 

public from future crime by the offender and others, and (2) to punish the offender using 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 27 

the minimum sanctions that the court determines will accomplish those purposes. 

Further, the sentence imposed shall be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact on the victim, and consistent with 

sentences imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). 

{¶82} R.C. 2929.12 sets forth the seriousness and recidivism factors for the 

sentencing court to consider in determining the most effective way to comply with the 

purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12 is a 

guidance statute that sets forth the seriousness and recidivism criteria that a trial court 

“shall consider” in fashioning a felony sentence. Subsections (B) and (C) establish the 

factors indicating whether the offender's conduct is more serious or less serious than 

conduct normally constituting the offense. These factors include the physical or mental 

injury suffered by the victim due to the age of the victim; the physical, psychological, or 

economic harm suffered by the victim; whether the offender’s relationship with the victim 

facilitated the offense; the defendant’s prior criminal record; whether the defendant was 

under a court sanction at the time of the offense; whether the defendant shows any 

remorse; and any other relevant factors. R.C. 2929.12(B). The court must also consider 

any factors indicating the offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally 

constituting the offense, including any mitigating factors. R.C. 2929.12(C). Subsections 

(D) and (E) contain the factors bearing on whether the offender is likely or not likely to 

commit future crimes. 

{¶83} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008–Ohio–4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, 

the court discussed the effect of State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006–Ohio–856, 845 

N.E.2d 470 decision on felony sentencing. The court stated that in Foster the Court 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 28 

severed the judicial-fact-finding portions of R.C. 2929.14, holding that “trial courts have 

full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer 

required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or 

more than the minimum sentences.” Kalish at ¶ 1 and ¶ 11, citing Foster at ¶ 100, See 

also, State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007–Ohio–4642, 873 N.E.2d 306; State v. 

Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823. 

{¶84} “Thus, a record after Foster may be silent as to the judicial findings that 

appellate courts were originally meant to review under 2953.08(G)(2).” Kalish at ¶ 12. 

However, although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, it left intact R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12, and the trial court must still consider these statutes. Kalish at ¶ 

13, see also State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006–Ohio–855, 846 N.E.2d 1; State v. 

Firouzmandi supra at ¶ 29. Thus, post-Foster, “there is no mandate for judicial fact-finding 

in the general guidance statutes. The court is merely to ‘consider’ the statutory factors.” 

Foster at ¶ 42. State v. Rutter, 5th Dist. No. 2006–CA–0025, 2006–Ohio–4061; State v. 

Delong, 4th Dist. No. 05CA815, 2006–Ohio–2753 at ¶ 7–8. 

{¶85} There is no requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that the trial court states on the 

record that it has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism 

or even discussed them. State v. Polick, 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431(4th Dist. 1995); State 

v. Gant, 7th Dist. No. 04 MA 252, 2006–Ohio–1469, at ¶ 60 (nothing in R.C. 2929.12 or 

the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court imposes any duty on the trial court to set forth 

its findings), citing State v. Cyrus, 63 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 586 N.E.2d 94(1992); State v. 

Hughes, 6th Dist. No. WD–05–024, 2005–Ohio–6405, ¶ 10 (trial court was not required 

to address each R.C. 2929.12 factor individually and make a finding as to whether it was 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 29 

applicable in this case), State v. Woods, 5th Dist. No. 05 CA 46, 2006–Ohio–1342, ¶ 19 

(“... R.C. 2929.12 does not require specific language or specific findings on the record in 

order to show that the trial court considered the applicable seriousness and recidivism 

factors”) (citations omitted); State v. Taylor, 2017-Ohio-8996, ¶23. 

{¶86} In this case, the trial court sentenced Ramey to a mandatory term of 

imprisonment for eleven years. The trial court noted that in imposing a maximum 

sentence that the offense was the worst form of the offense. Specifically, the trial court 

noted the amount of methamphetamine, the digital scales, and the prepared bags with 

weights written on them. The trial court noted that Ramey was prepared to introduce a 

large amount of methamphetamine into the community at a rapid pace. T. at 235-237. 

The court further noted Ramey had a prior felony conviction for trafficking in drugs out of 

Wayne County, Ohio and a prior theft conviction. Id. at 236. The trial court further noted 

that Ramey had a prior federal conviction for counterfeit United States currency and was 

wanted by federal authorities for probation or parole violations related to that offense. T. 

at 234. 

{¶87} Accordingly, the trial court considered the purposes and principles of 

sentencing [R.C. 2929.11] as well as the factors that the court must consider when 

determining an appropriate sentence. [R.C. 2929.12]. The trial court has no obligation 

to state reasons to support its findings. Nor is it required to give a talismanic incantation 

of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record 

and are incorporated into the sentencing entry. 

{¶88} Upon a thorough review, we find the record clearly and convincing supports 

the sentence imposed by the trial court. We find the trial court properly considered the 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 30 

purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the applicable 

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, along with all other relevant factors and circumstances. 

While Ramey may disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge, 

Ramey’s sentence was within the applicable statutory range and therefore, we have no 

basis for concluding that it is contrary to law. 

{¶89} Ramey’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶90} The judgment of the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, J., 

Hoffman, P.J., and 

Delaney, J., concur