73282 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 237 / Monday, December 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

certificate holding district office. The AMOC 

approval letter must specifically reference 

this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(l) Related Information 

Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety 

Agency Airworthiness Directive 2011–0219, 

dated November 11, 2011, and the service 

information specified in paragraphs (l)(1) 

through (l)(3) of this AD, for related 

information. 

(1) Saab Service Bulletin 340–27–097, 

Revision 03, dated April 19, 2012. 

(2) Saab Service Bulletin 340–27–098, 

Revision 01, dated April 13, 2012. 

(3) Saab Service Bulletin 340–27–099, 

Revision 01, dated April 13, 2012. 

(m) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Saab Service Bulletin 340–27–097, 

Revision 03, dated April 19, 2012. 

(ii) Saab Service Bulletin 340–27–098, 

Revision 01, dated April 13, 2012. 

(iii) Saab Service Bulletin 340–27–099, 

Revision 01, dated April 13, 2012. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Saab AB, Saab Aeronautics, 

SE–581 88, Linko ̈ping, Sweden; telephone 

+46 13 18 5591; fax +46 13 18 4874; email 

saab340techsupport@saabgroup.com; 

Internet http://www.saabgroup.com. 

(4) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA. For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

November 21, 2012. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–29169 Filed 12–7–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0186; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–268–AD; Amendment 

39–17278; AD 2012–24–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 737–600, 

–700, –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER 

series airplanes. This AD was prompted 

by reports of flight crew failure to 

activate air data probe heat. This AD 

requires modifying the anti-icing system 

for the angle of attack sensor, the total 

air temperature, and the pitot probes. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent ice 

from forming on air data system sensors 

and consequent loss of or misleading 

airspeed indication on all airspeed 

indicating systems, which could lead to 

loss of control of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective January 14, 

2013. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of January 14, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; 

telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; 

fax 206–766–5680; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. You may 

review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Frank Carreras, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 

130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425– 

917–6442; fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

frank.carreras@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on February 28, 2012 (77 FR 

11789). That NPRM proposed to require 

modifying the anti-icing system for the 

angle of attack sensor, the total air 

temperature, and the pitot probes. 

Actions Since Issuance of NPRM (77 FR 

11789, February 28, 2012) 

Since we issued the NPRM (77 FR 

11789, February 28, 2012), we reviewed 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012. (The NPRM referred to Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–30A1063, 

dated November 16, 2011.) Among other 

things, Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012, updates certain information, 

including part numbers, various 

accomplishment steps, certain modules, 

maintenance manuals, and kit 

information. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (77 FR 11789, 

February 28, 2012) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. Aviation 

Partners Boeing stated that installation 

of winglets per STC ST00830SE does 

not affect the NPRM and stated it would 

provide supporting data to the FAA 

upon request. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time 

Seven commenters requested that we 

revise the 24-month compliance time, as 

proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, 

February 28, 2012). 

Korean Air Lines (KAL), Air Pacific 

Limited (APC), Delta Air Lines, Inc. 

(DAL), American Airlines (AAL), United 

Airlines (UAL), and Southwest Airlines 

(SWA) requested we extend the 

compliance time. UAL and AAL 

requested we take into account the time 

needed to obtain modification kits and 


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to modify the panels. SWA and AAL 

stated that the compliance time will 

result in unscheduled maintenance 

outside of a heavy maintenance cycle. 

SWA stated unscheduled maintenance 

visits could last up to four days outside 

of a heavy maintenance cycle. APC 

noted it would not be able to 

accomplish the actions during this 

year’s C-checks, which are at 2-year 

intervals. 

Turkish Airlines (THY) stated that the 

proposed 24-month compliance time 

may not be enough for fleet-wide retrofit 

since the P5–9 panel modification 

restricts the rate of aircraft modification. 

KAL requested that the compliance time 

be extend to 30 or more months. DAL 

requested that the compliance time be 

extended to 36 months due to several 

factors. DAL cited the rate at which 

operators can complete the 

modification, expected late kit release 

based on revisions in service 

information linked to the service 

bulletin validation process, and 

‘‘flawed’’ service information. DAL also 

compared the modification specified in 

this NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 

2012) with a similar modification that 

installs warning lights to the P1–3 and 

P3–1 panels, and stated that this similar 

modification has a 36-month 

compliance time. 

We disagree with these requests to 

extend the compliance time. In 

developing an appropriate compliance 

time for these actions, we considered 

the urgency associated with the subject 

unsafe condition, the practical aspect of 

accomplishing the required 

modification and the normal scheduled 

maintenance times for most affected 

operators. In consideration of these 

items, as well as parts availability, we 

have determined that the 24-month 

compliance time for the modification is 

the longest duration allowable that will 

ensure an acceptable level of safety. 

According to the provisions of 

paragraph (i) of this AD, however, we 

may approve requests to adjust the 

compliance time if the requests include 

data substantiating that the new 

compliance time would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Include an Alerting System 

Air Line Pilots Association 

International (ALPA) requested that we 

revise the NPRM (77 FR 11789, 

February 28, 2012) by including an 

alerting system as part of the proposed 

requirements. ALPA stated that any 

automatic system design must include a 

crew alerting system to provide the 

flight crew with an aural and visual 

indication if the heating system does not 

automatically activate or is not 

functioning properly. ALPA further 

states that human factors principles 

should be integrated into a warning 

system design to ensure that factors 

such as pilot field of view and nuisance 

warnings due to normal ground 

operations (e.g., single engine taxi) are 

fully evaluated. ALPA stated that 

Boeing Model 747–400 airplanes have 

an automatic system and this system 

provides crews with an engine 

indicating and crew alerting system 

(EICAS) message if any item in the air 

data probe suite is not being heated, 

either due to heating element failure or 

if the system fails to activate upon 

engine start. ALPA reasoned that a 

similar alerting system should be 

included in the proposed system for 

Model 737 airplanes. 

We agree that if the heating system 

does not automatically activate or is not 

functioning properly, the flight crew 

should receive an alert. We also agree 

that human factors principles should be 

considered in an alert system design. 

These principles are consistent with 

FAA regulations, policy, and guidance. 

However, we disagree with revising 

this AD to include changes to the flight 

crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions 

on Model 737 airplanes because that 

model incorporates ‘‘CAPT PITOT’’ and 

‘‘F/O PITOT’’ caution lights on the P5– 

9 overhead panel for the captain’s and 

first officer’s probe heat. Both caution 

lights are tied to a Master Caution light 

in each pilot’s primary field of view and 

an ‘‘Anti-ice’’ caution light that alerts 

the pilots to check the overhead panel 

for the specific condition causing the 

Master Caution and ‘‘Anti-ice’’ lights to 

illuminate. The captain’s and/or first 

officer’s PITOT light will illuminate 

whenever a loss of electrical current 

flow is sensed through the respective 

pitot probe heater. The practical effect 

of the change to automatic probe heat 

activation is that when the probe heat 

switch is in AUTO, the respective 

PITOT light should be out when either 

engine is running. Therefore, if the 

switch is in AUTO and the 

corresponding PITOT light remains on 

with either engine running, a 

malfunction of the automatic activation 

system is indicated. 

Flight crew procedures for both 

normal and non-normal operation of the 

pitot heat system are unaffected by this 

change. We have determined that the 

existing flight crew alerting for pitot 

heat malfunctions provides adequate 

flight crew alerting for pitot heat 

malfunctions on Model 737 airplanes, 

whether the system is manually or 

automatically activated. Furthermore, 

since probe heat is activated with the 

probe heat switch in AUTO when either 

engine is running, single engine taxi 

should not generate nuisance warnings; 

a PITOT light during single engine taxi 

would indicate a malfunction of the 

automatic activation system. No change 

to the final rule is necessary in this 

regard. 

Request To Revise Precipitating Event 

Language 

Boeing requested we revise the 

sentence in the Summary section of the 

NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) 

that describes the precipitating event, 

i.e., ‘‘reports of flight crew failure to 

activate air data probe heat.’’ Boeing 

suggested that the phrase ‘‘as required 

by the FAA approved operating 

procedures’’ be added to the end of the 

sentence in question. Boeing reasoned 

that the suggested text would make it 

clear that existing Boeing Model 737NG 

operating procedures are FAA-approved 

and that the flight crew failed to 

perform a required action. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to revise the language that 

describes the precipitating event. 

Regardless of whether the flight crew 

adhered to prescribed operating 

procedures, we consider that failure to 

activate the air data probe heat on the 

part of the flight crew represents an 

unacceptable risk to the affected 

airplanes, as evidenced by the current 

lack of an automatic probe heat 

activation system in combination with 

the demonstrated accident and incident 

history on the type associated with 

failure to activate probe heat. In 

addition, the purpose of this AD is to 

identify and correct an unsafe condition 

in the type design of the affected 

airplanes. We find that the precipitating 

event statement is accurate as originally 

worded in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, 

February 28, 2012). We have not made 

any change to the final rule in this 

regard. 

Request To Revise Unsafe Condition 

Statement 

Boeing requested we revise the unsafe 

condition statement in the Summary 

section, Discussion section, and 

paragraph (e) of the NPRM (77 FR 

11789, February 28, 2012). Boeing stated 

that the text ‘‘* * * which could lead 

to loss of control of the airplane’’ should 

read, ‘‘* * * which would not provide 

the necessary air data instrumentation 

to safely fly the airplane.’’ Boeing stated 

that loss of, or erroneous, airspeed 

indications do not necessarily lead to 

loss of control because other indications 

can be used to safely fly the airplane. 

Boeing noted that multiple in-service 


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73284 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 237 / Monday, December 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

events have occurred without loss of 

control when the flight crew followed 

the procedures that mitigate loss of air 

data. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to revise the unsafe condition 

statement. Although some in-service 

events might have occurred without loss 

of control, loss of, or misleading 

airspeed indication on all airspeed 

indicating systems can, in fact, lead to 

an unsafe condition of loss of airplane 

control. FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 

25–11A, ‘‘Electronic Flight Deck 

Displays,’’ dated June 21, 2007 (http:// 

rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

7d6139991c94e7d9862573080063f84d/ 

$FILE/AC%2025-11A.pdf), typically 

classifies loss of all airspeed displays 

(including the standby display) as a 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure condition. 

‘‘Catastrophic’’ is defined in FAA AC 

25.1309–1A, ‘‘System Design and 

Analysis,’’ dated June 21, 1988 (http:// 

rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

50bfe03b65af9ea3862569d100733174/ 

$FILE/AC25.1309-1A.pdf) as a failure 

condition which would prevent 

continued safe flight and landing. FAA 

AC 25–11A also classifies display of 

misleading airspeed information on one 

primary display combined with a 

standby failure (i.e., loss of airspeed or 

incorrect airspeed) as a ‘‘catastrophic’’ 

failure condition. As specified in 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) Safety Recommendation A–07– 

56, dated September 13, 2007 (http:// 

www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2007/ 

a07_55_56.pdf), in at least one inservice event on a Boeing Model 737 

airplane, it was determined that this 

condition ultimately resulted in a loss of 

airplane control with fatal injuries. 

In addition, we agree with Boeing’s 

identification of the effects of unreliable 

air data, as given in the Background 

section of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–30A1063, dated November 16, 

2011; and Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012. For these reasons, we find that the 

unsafe condition statement is accurate 

as originally worded in the NPRM (77 

FR 11789, February 28, 2012). We have 

not made any change to the final rule in 

this regard. 

Request To Revise Discussion Section of 

the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 

2012) 

Boeing requested we revise certain 

text in the Discussion section of the 

NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 

2012): 

• To indicate existing compliance of 

pitot heat alerting with section 25.1326 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.1326); 

• To indicate failure of the flight crew 

to respond properly to the amber 

caution-level indication of a lack of 

probe heat; and 

• To state that the indication is in 

clear view of a flight crew member. 

Boeing stated the changes are needed for 

the following reasons: 

• To correctly state that the system 

provides indication of a lack of probe 

heat activation, as required by section 

25.1326 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.1326), rather 

than a positive indication of heat 

activation, as stated by the FAA (and 

which would not be compliant); 

• To make it clear that the existing 

indication is compliant; 

• To correct the ‘‘blameless’’ tone of 

the passive voice used in the first 

sentence of the Discussion section by 

making it clear that it is only the flight 

crew that can fail to activate the probe 

heat, which is one of the advantages of 

a manual system; and 

• To make it explicit that the unsafe 

condition is not only a result of flight 

crew failure to activate the probe heat, 

but also a result of the flight crew 

ignoring the caution-level indication 

that is in plain view. 

Since the Discussion section of the 

NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) 

is not restated in the final rule, we 

cannot change that section. However, 

we find that clarification is necessary. 

According to section 39.5 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

39.5), we issue ADs when we find that 

an unsafe condition exists in the 

product, and that the unsafe condition 

is likely to exist or develop in other 

products of the same type design. We 

made such a finding with respect to the 

pitot heat system of the affected 

airplanes in this AD action. Therefore, 

it is our responsibility to correct the 

unsafe condition independent of 

whether the design was considered 

compliant to applicable airworthiness 

standards; an AD is the appropriate 

vehicle for doing so. 

Additionally, we do not make 

findings for the incidents identified in 

safety recommendations issued by the 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB). We do not have any 

information that supports the argument 

that the flight crews involved in the 

incidents identified in the NTSB safety 

recommendation deliberately 

disregarded a properly functioning pitot 

heat alert that they had observed. Many 

possible scenarios associated with pitot 

heat alerting could contribute to the 

failure of the flight crew to activate the 

probe heat; including a malfunction of 

probe heat alerting resulting in failure to 

provide an indication of lack of 

activation, the flight crew not observing 

or properly identifying the alert due to 

various factors (even though certain 

elements of the alerting system are 

within the pilots’ primary field of view), 

or the flight crew not understanding the 

meaning of the alert or the proper 

procedures for responding to it. 

We have not made any changes to the 

final rule in this regard. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate 

AAL, DAL, and SWA requested that 

we revise the cost estimate of the NPRM 

(77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). AAL 

stated the NPRM and service 

information underestimate the labor 

cost by greater than 50 percent. AAL 

stated that additional out-of-service 

days and lost opportunity cost should 

be included in the Cost of Compliance 

section of the NPRM. DAL stated there 

is a significant investment in excess of 

$250,000 in ‘‘seed’’ modules that are 

necessary to minimize the risk of not 

accomplishing the proposed changes. 

DAL concluded that this cost is not 

represented in the Costs of Compliance 

of the NPRM. SWA stated the expected 

labor cost is underestimated by 32 workhours due to removal and reinstallation 

of lavatory A and galley #1. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ request to revise the cost 

estimate. We do not agree to change the 

AD to accommodate the investment in 

‘‘seed’’ modules, since this appears to be 

an operator-specific cost associated with 

individual maintenance scheduling. 

Also, we disagree that the cost estimate 

is underestimated by greater than 50 

percent. However, we revised the Costs 

of Compliance section of this AD as 

follows. We revised the parts cost to 

match the information presented in 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012. In addition, we included 30 

additional work-hours for removing and 

reinstalling lavatory and galley 

monuments that might be necessary to 

do the modification. This information 

was coordinated with Boeing. 

Request To Reference Revised Service 

Information 

Several commenters noted that Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 737–30A1063, 

dated November 16, 2011, is inadequate. 

That service information is cited in the 

NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) 

as the appropriate source of service 

information for accomplishing the 

required actions. The commenters 

requested that the service information 


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be revised to incorporate certain 

clarifications. One airline, DAL, 

specifically requested that the final rule 

not be released until the service 

information has been validated. 

We agree. As explained previously, 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012, has been issued. This service 

information has been validated by 

means of use of an aircraft in 

maintenance, and is referenced in this 

final rule as the appropriate source of 

service information. In addition, we 

added a new paragraph (h) to this AD 

(and re-designated subsequent 

paragraphs) to provide credit for certain 

actions performed before the effective 

date of this AD using Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–30A1063, dated 

November 16, 2011. 

DAL also requested we specify 

‘‘revisions to BAE Systems Service 

Bulletin 233A3201–30–02’’ as approved 

service information, and provide contact 

information for BAE. (The commenter 

did not specify a revision level or date 

for the BAE service information.) DAL 

stated that its review of the BAE 

Systems service information (which 

provides instructions on how to modify 

the P5–9 window/pitot heat module to 

the required ON and AUTO pitot heat 

switch configuration) identified 

discrepancies in the Accomplishment 

Instructions. 

DAL provided examples of the 

identified discrepancies, including 

connector identifications and the 

number of printed wire assemblies on 

the P5–9 modules. DAL stated it has 

contacted Boeing and BAE Systems to 

seek resolution of these discrepancies. 

DAL added that BAE concurred that 

its service information will require 

revision. DAL indicated that additional 

revision of the Boeing service 

information might be required in light of 

any BAE Systems service information 

revision. DAL noted that the service 

information, as currently published, 

would necessitate that operators request 

approval of alternative methods of 

compliance (AMOC) for resolutions to 

the identified discrepancies in order to 

comply with the final rule. 

We find that clarification is necessary. 

The intent of this AD is to require 

installation of a P5–9 module with 

AUTO and ON pitot heat switch 

functionality that supports automatic 

pitot heat activation. As discussed 

previously, we reviewed Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–30A1063, dated 

November 16, 2011; and Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–30A1063, Revision 

1, dated July 10, 2012; and determined 

that this service information provides 

sufficient instructions to adequately 

correct the unsafe condition. Operators 

may use either the original issue or 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012, to comply with the AD 

requirements. However, this AD does 

not require accomplishment of the BAE 

service information. No change to the 

final rule is necessary in this regard. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We have determined that these minor 

changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 

11789, February 28, 2012) for correcting 

the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, 

February 28, 2012). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 1,025 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Modification, including removing 

and reinstalling galleys and lavatories.

90 to 109 work-hours × $85 per 

hour = $7,650 to $9,265.

$6,674 to $8,051 ........ Up to $17,316 ............. Up to $17,748,900. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 


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73286 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 237 / Monday, December 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2012–24–08 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–17278; Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0186; Directorate Identifier 

2011–NM–268–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective January 14, 2013. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, 

and –900ER series airplanes; certificated in 

any category; as identified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–30A1063, Revision 1, 

dated July 10, 2012. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/ 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America 

Code 3030, Pitot/Static Anti-Ice System. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of flight 

crew failure to activate air data probe heat. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent ice from 

forming on air data system sensors and 

consequent loss of or misleading airspeed 

indication on all airspeed indicating systems, 

which could lead to loss of control of the 

airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Modification 

Within 24 months after the effective date 

of this AD: Modify the anti-icing system for 

the angle of attack sensor, the total air 

temperature, and the pitot probes, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 

2012. 

(h) Credit for Previous Actions 

This paragraph provides credit for actions 

required by paragraph (g) of this AD, if those 

actions were performed before the effective 

date of this AD using Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–30A1063, dated November 16, 

2011, which is not incorporated by reference 

in this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Frank Carreras, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, 

FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6442; fax: 425– 

917–6590; email: frank.carreras@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 206– 

544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

November 23, 2012. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–29469 Filed 12–7–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. CPSC–2012–0037] 

16 CFR Part 1500 

Codification of Animal Testing Policy 

AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Consumer Product Safety 

Commission (CPSC or Commission) 

codifies its statement of policy on 

animal testing that provides guidance 

for manufacturers of products subject to 

the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 

(FHSA) regarding replacement, 

reduction, and refinement of animal 

testing methods. 

DATES: Effective January 9, 2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Leslie E. Patton, Ph.D., Project Manager, 

Office of Hazard Identification and 

Reduction, U.S. Consumer Product 

Safety Commission, 4330 East West 

Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814; 

telephone (301) 504–7848; 

lpatton@cpsc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

A. Background 

On June 29, 2012, the Commission 

issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 

to amend regulations on the CPSC’s 

animal testing methods under 16 CPR 

part 1500 to clarify alternative test 

methods that replace, reduce, or refine 

animal testing. 77 FR 38754. The final 

rule on the Commission’s regulations on 

animal testing under 16 CFR part 1500 

is published elsewhere in this Federal 

Register. The final rule on revisions to 

the animal testing regulations is 

effective 30 days after publication of the 

rule in the Federal Register. 

In addition, on June 29, 2012, the 

Commission also proposed to codify its 

statement of policy on animal testing to 

reflect new methods accepted by the 

scientific community as replacements, 

reductions, or refinements to animal 

tests including recommendations of and 

test methods of the Interagency 

Coordinating Committee on the 

Validation of Alternative Methods 

(ICCVAM; http://iccvam.niehs.nih.gov/ 

home.htm). 77 FR 38751. Codification at 

16 CFR 1500.232 would make the 

ICCVAM recommendations and 

Commission’s animal testing policy 

more accessible and transparent to 

interested parties. Although the 

Commission proposed to make the 

animal testing policy effective on the 

date of publication in the Federal 

Register, because the animal testing 

policy references sections of the animal 

testing regulations in 16 CFR part 1500, 

we will make the statement of policy 

effective on the same date, 30 days after 

publication of the policy in the Federal 

Register. The Commission has also 

established a Web page on the CPSC’s 

Web site at http://www.cpsc.gov/library/ 

animaltesting.html regarding the 

ICCVAM recommendations and new 

developments in test methods that 

replace, reduce, or refine animal testing. 

After consideration of the comments, 

the Commission codifies its final 

statement of policy on animal testing. 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with