[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-15319

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20059-KMM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

TYRONE JACKSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(May 31, 2017)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 15-15319 Date Filed: 05/31/2017 Page: 1 of 6 
2

After a jury trial, Tyrone Jackson was convicted of attempting to import and 

to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. For those 

offenses, the district court sentenced him to a total term of 115 months of 

imprisonment, at the high end of his advisory guideline range. Jackson appeals his 

sentence on the ground that it is greater than necessary to meet the purposes of 

sentencing. He asserts that the court overemphasized the length of his prior 

criminal record, which, in his view, was composed of mostly minor offenses. 

After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm Jackson’s sentence.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first ensure 

that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly 

calculating the guideline range or inadequately explaining the chosen sentence. Id.

at 51. We then examine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light 

of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 

Id. Because Jackson does not raise any issue of procedural error on appeal, we 

address substantive reasonableness only.

The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including 

the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, 

provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the 

Case: 15-15319 Date Filed: 05/31/2017 Page: 2 of 6 
3

public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 

In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the 

kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy 

statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). The court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, but it 

may, in its discretion, give greater weight to some factors over others. United 

States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Our review of the district court’s choice of sentence is deferential. Id. at 

1254–55. As a result, when a district court’s sentence falls within its discretion 

and we do not necessarily agree with it, we will affirm it “even though we would 

have gone the other way had it been our call.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 

1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, a

sentencing court can abuse its considerable discretion by (1) failing to afford 

consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight; (2) giving 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) committing a clear 

error of judgment in weighing the proper factors. Id. A district court’s unjustified 

reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be indicative of an unreasonable 

sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006). The party 

Case: 15-15319 Date Filed: 05/31/2017 Page: 3 of 6 
4

challenging the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is 

unreasonable “in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the 

substantial deference afforded to sentencing courts.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 

1256. 

Finally, although we do not presume that a sentence falling within the 

guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be 

reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence 

imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of a 

reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (stating that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well 

below the statutory maximum). 

Here, Jackson has not shown that his 115-month total sentence is 

substantively unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. The district court’s decision to give greater 

weight to Jackson’s criminal history was within its discretion. See id. at 1254, 

1261–63 (upholding a significant upward variance based in substantial part on the 

defendant’s “lengthy criminal history”). The record indicates that the court 

listened to Jackson’s arguments at sentencing but determined that a sentence of 60 

months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum, was too short in light of Jackson’s 

“life of one kind of crime or another,” for which he had received little to no 

Case: 15-15319 Date Filed: 05/31/2017 Page: 4 of 6 
5

punishment. The district court’s comments about Jackson’s criminal history were 

supported by the record, which reflected that over the course of decades Jackson 

had committed dozens of offenses, some of which were violent, and had received 

jail sentences totaling only 190 days and probation. 

Although the district court focused on Jackson’s criminal history, it did not 

rely on that single factor to the exclusion of all other § 3553(a) factors. In addition 

to his criminal history, the court cited the nature of Jackson’s offense, stating that a 

large quantity of drugs was involved; the need to promote respect for the law and

to provide deterrence, stating that state courts’ prior treatment of Jackson did not 

seem to impress on him the importance of conforming his behavior to the law; and 

the need to protect society, stating that he had been a disruptive and destructive 

force in his community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)–(C). Thus, the record 

shows that the court considered Jackson’s criminal history in conjunction with 

other pertinent § 3553(a) factors.1

 

The weight to be accorded the § 3553(a) factors was a matter for the district 

court, see Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254, and Jackson has not shown that the 

 1 We note that the district court may have committed plain Tapia error by considering 

rehabilitation and drug treatment when deciding on the length of the sentence of imprisonment. 

See United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011)). Nevertheless, given 

the court’s focus on Jackson’s criminal history and the other proper § 3553(a) factors, Jackson is 

not entitled to relief on plain-error review because the record contains no reason to believe that 

Jackson’s “sentence would have been different but for the court’s consideration of 

rehabilitation.” See id.

Case: 15-15319 Date Filed: 05/31/2017 Page: 5 of 6 
6

district court make a clear error in judgment by arriving at an unreasonable 

sentence based on the facts of this case, see Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. That the total 

115-month sentence is a reasonable one is further supported by the fact that it was

both within the advisory guideline range and well below the statutory maximum of 

40 years. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Accordingly, 

we affirm Jackson’s total sentence as substantively reasonable. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 15-15319 Date Filed: 05/31/2017 Page: 6 of 6