Slip Op. 07- 76

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x : The Resource Club, Ltd., : : Plaintiff, :

: v. : Before: Pogue, Judge : Court No. 03-00781 United States, : : Defendant. :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x OPINION [Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied; Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment granted.] Dated: May 16, 2007

Follick & Bessich(John A. Bessich, Suzanne Liberti) for the Plaintiff. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civ i l Division, U.S. Department of Justice Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office;(Amy M
. R ubin, Trial Attorney), Su-Jin Yoo, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Of counsel, for the Defendant. Pogue, Judge: Plaintiff, Resource Club, Inc., (“Resource Club”) challenges the United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) decision to assess, collect and retain duties and fees paid on imported merchandise. Relying on the statutory provision
for abandonment of goods, Section 563(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930,Court No. 03-00781 Page 2

All references to the United States Code (“U.S.C.”) are to the 1 2000 edition. 1 9 U.S.C. § 1563(b), Resource Club contends that Customs 1 improperly denied a refund of duties after Resource Club abandoned the subject merchandise to Customs. Resource Club’s claim, stated in its December 4, 2000 protest, followed the September 8, 2000 liquidation of its entries. Plaintiff’ s Complaint (“Compl.") 3. Customs’ May 2, 2003, denial of Resource Club’s protest is the agency action under review in this case. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary j u d gment on Resource Club’s claim. For t h e reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review This court’s jurisdicti o n to hear the Plaintiff’s challenge lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(“[t]he Court of International Trade
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest . . . .”). I n a n a c t i o n under § 1581(a), the Court r e v i e w s the matter de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1). See Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States, 20 CIT 1450, 1456, 951 F.Supp. 241, 246 (1996), aff'd 160 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir
. 1 9 9 8 )
. Applying a de novo standard of review, the court examines the court record to reach the correct conclusion. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,Court No. 03-00781 Page 3

depositions, answers to interrogatories, a n d admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Summary of Facts The following facts are uncontested. Plantiff Resource Club is the importer of record of 1,683 dozen ladies’ jeans, Entry No. 066-1132964-7, Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute 2 (“Pl.’s R. 56 Statement”), and has paid all the related duties and fees associated with this ent r y . Id. Upon importation, on or about September 1999, a Customs national field import spe c i a list detained the shipment pending the verification of authenticity of the shipment’s Cambodian visa. Id. Resource Club protested this detention of the entry. Following the denial of Resource Club’s protest, Customs notified Plaintiff, on May 19, 2000, that the Cambodian visa was not genuine and that the shipment had been seized as being imported contrary to law. Resource Club then petitioned for relief from Customs’ seizure. Id. at 3.
Al t h o u g h it denied Resource Club’s petition for relief, Customs also issued a decisio n letter, dated September 7, 2000, authorizing remission o f the merchandise for “Export Only”, upon payment of all storage charges and $14,137.00, represen t i n g 10Court No. 03-00781 Page 4

The Government d enies the accuracy of Resource Club’s 2 representation of the relief granted, adding that the relief was conditioned upon payment of the above stated fine , “payment of all accrued storage charges, the exportation under Customs’ supervision of a l l of the seized merchandise and the execution of a hold harmless agre e ment.” Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Statement Material Facts as to which there are no G e n u i ne Issues to be Tried 3 (“Def.’s R. 56 Resp.”). The court finds this f a ctual dispute immaterial to its resolution of the controversy. The Government admits that Plaintiff provided an Election of 3 Proceedings form but d enies the accuracy of Resource Club’s represen t a tion of its letter to Customs. The government avers that Resource Club conditioned its withdrawal of the p e t i t ions upon the refund o f a l l customs duties and fees. Def.’s R. 56 Resp. 2. The court finds this factual dispute immaterial to its resolution of the controversy. percent of the foreign dutiable value. Pl.’s R. 56 Statement 3. Customs’ offer of relief was to expire if Resource Club failed to respond within 30 days. Plaintiff’s Exhibit (“Pl.’s Ex.”) G. On 2 September 8, 2000, the entry was liquidated. Pl.’s R. 56 Statement 3. Resource Club filed a supplemental petition for further relief
on Nov e mb e r 3 , 2 000. Pl.’s R. 56 Statement 3. On December 4, 2000, Resource Club notified Customs that it was “ f ormally withdrawing its petition and supplemental petition, and abandoning the subject goods to Customs” and provided Customs with an executed
“Elect i o n o f Proceedings form”. Id. On the same day, Resource 3 Club filed the protest at issue in this action, number 1001-00- 105159, contesting the assessment, collection, an d retention of duties. Id. at 1. Customs proceeded with forfeiture proceedings of the merchandise in February o f 2 0 01, and in April, the governmentCourt No. 03-00781 Page 5

Pursuant to this statutory authority, th e Secretary of the 4 Treasury promulgated regulations governin g the importer’s exercise of this allowance. The relevant section, 19 C.F.R. § 158.43(a)-(b) reads: Allowance in duties for merchandis e entered under bond destroyed under section 557(c), T a r i f f Act of 1930, as (continued...) contractor, EG&G services, who was the custodia n o f the goods during the seizure, sold the merchandise for exportation. Def.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts as to which there are no Genuine Issues to be Tried 4 (“Def.’s Add’l. R. 56 Statement.”). On May 2, 2003, Customs denied Plaintiff’s December 4, 2000 protest. Pl.’s R. 56 Statement 3. Resource Club contends that Customs improperly denied its protest in light of its abandonment of the subject merchandise pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b).

Discussion A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Resource Club argues for a full refund of duties and fees paid, citing 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b), which, in relevant part states:

[u]nder such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe and subjec t t o any conditions imposed thereby the consignee may at a n y time within three years from the date of o r i g i nal importation, abandon to the Government any merchan d ise in bonded warehouse, whereupon any duties on such merchandise may be re m i t t e d o r r e f u n d e d a s t h e c a s e m a y b e , b u t any merchan d i s e so abandoned shall not be less than an entire package and shall be abandoned in the original package without having been repacked while in a bonded warehouse (other than a bonded manipulating warehouse). 19 U.S.C. § 1563 ( b )
. Reading 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b) literally, 4Court No. 03-00781 Page 6

(...continued) amended (19 U.S.C. 1557(c)), or for merchandise in bonded warehouse abandoned to the Governm e n t under section 563( b ) , Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1563(b)), shall be subject to the following conditions: (a) Application by importer. The importer shall file an application for a bandonment or destruction of merchandise in bond with the port director on Customs Fr o m[sic] 3499, with the title modified to read "Application and Permit to Abandon (or Destroy) Goods in Bond." When a n application is for permission to destroy, the propos e d method of destruction shall be stated in the application and be sub j e c t t o the approval of the port director. (b) Concurrence of warehouse proprietor. An application to abandon or destroy warehoused merchandise shall not be ap p r o v e d unless concurred in by the warehouse proprietor. 19 C.F.R. § 158.43(a)-(b). All references to t h e Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2002 edition. The statute authorizing the Secretary of Treasury to establish 5 such warehouses is 19 U.S.C. § 1555(a), which reads: [d]esignation; preconditions; bonding requirements, supervision. Subject to subsection (b) of this s e c t i o n , b u i l d i n g s o rp a r t s o fb u i l d i n g s a n do ther enclosures may be designated by t h e S ecretary of the Treasur y a s bonded warehouses for the storage of imported merchandise entered for warehousing, or taken possession of by the appropriate customs o fficer, or under seizure, or for the manufacture of mer c handise in bond, or for the repacking, sorting, or cleaning of imported merchandise . . .
. Before any imported merchandise not finally released from customs custody shall be s t o r e din any such premises, the owner or lessee thereof shall give a bond in such sum and with (continued...) Customs responds that Resource Club’s goods were not stored in a
“bonded warehouse” and therefore were not eligible for abandonment in the first place. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n
Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 5 (“Def.’s Mem.”). Customs al s o d raws 5Court No. 03-00781 Page 7

(...continued) such sureties as may be approved b ythe Secretary of the Treasury to secure the Government against any loss or expense connected with or arising from the deposit, storage, or manipulation of merchandise in such warehouse

. . . . 19 U.S.C. § 1555(a). This section provides: 6 [i]f the importation or entry of the merch a ndise is subject to quantitative restrictions requiring a visa, permit, lice n se, or other similar document, or stamp f rom the United States Government or from a foreign government or issuing authority pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, the merchandise shall be sub j e c t to detention in accordance with section 1499 of this title unless the appropriate visa, license, permit, or similar document or stamp is presented to the Customs Servic e ; b u t if the visa, permit, license, or similar document or stamp which is presented in connection with the importation or entry of the merchandise is counterfeit, the merchandise may be seized and forfeited.
A summary forfeiture administered by Customs has the following 7 effect under 19 U.S.C. § 1609(b): Effect. A declaration of fo r f eiture under this section shall have the same force and effect as a final decree and orde r of forfeiture in a judicial forf e i t u r e proceeding in a district court of the Uni t e d S tates. Title shall be deemed to vest in the United States free and c lear of any liens or (continued...) support for its position from the Tariff Act’s “Enforcement Provisions”. Customs notes that Resource Club’s goods were seized

as a result of Customs’ finding that the entry vi s a f o r the importation was counterfeit, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(3); 6 such a finding authorizes Customs to seize a n d f o rfeit the merchandise. In addition, Congress charged Customs with storing 7Court No. 03-00781 Page 8

(...continued) encumbrances (except for first preferred ship mortgages pursuant to section 961 of Title 46, Appendix, or an y corresponding revision, consolidation, and enactment of such subse c t ion in Title 46) fro m t h e date of the act for which the forfeiture wa s incurred. Officials of the various States, i n sular possessions, territories, and commonwealths of the United States shall, u p on application of the appropriate customs officer accompanied by a certified copy of the declaration of forfeiture, remove any recorded liens or encumbrances which apply to such property and issue or reissue the necessary certificat e s of title, registration certificates, or s imilar documents to the United States or to any transferee of the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1609(b)

. That regulation provides: 8 (a) To whom addressed. Petitions for the remission or mitigation of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture incurred (continued...) seized goods, pending th e i r disposition, in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1605, which, in relevant part reads: [p]ending such disposition, th e property shall be stored i n s u ch place as, in the customs officer's opinion, is most convenient and appropriate with due regard to the expense in volved, whether or not the place of storage is within the judicial district or the customs collection district in w h i ch the property was seized . . . . 19 U.S.C. § 1605. Citing the above statutory provisions, Customs claims that it seized Resource Club’s goods and stored them as required by law. Def.’s Mem. 9-10. Additionally, however, in response to Customs’ May 19, 2000 notice which alerted Resource Club that its visa was counterfeit, Resource Cl u b filed a petition for relief from the sei z u r e , p u r s u a n t t o 1 9 C
. F
. R
. § 1 7 1
. 1
. C u s t o m s r e p l i e don 8Court No. 03-00781 Page 9

(...continued) under any law administered by Customs must be addressed to the Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures Officer designated in the notice of claim. (b) Signature. For commercial violations, the petition for remission or mitigation must b e signed by the petitioner, his attorney-at-law or a Customs broker. If the petitioner is a co r p o r a tion, the petition may be s i g n e db ya no f f i c e ro rr e s p o n s i b l e s u p e r v i s ory official of the corporation, or a responsible employee representative of the corporatio n . Electronic signatures are acceptable. In non-comm ercial violations, a non-English speaking petitioner or petitioner who has a disability which may i mp e d e his ability to file a petition may enlist a family member or other representative to file a petition on his behalf. The deciding Custo m s officer may, in his or her discretion, require proof of representation before consideration of any petition. (c) Form. The petition for remis s i on or mitigation need not be in any particul a r form. Customs can require that the petition and any documents submitted in support of t h e petition be in English or be accompanied by an English translation. The petition must set forth the following: (1) A description of the property i n v o lved (if a seizure); (2) The date and place of the violation or seizure; (3) The facts an d c i r cumstances relied upon by the petitioner to justify remission or mitigation; and (4) If a seizure case, proof of a p e t i tionable interest in the seized property. (d) Fals e statement in petition. A false statement conta i n e di na p e t i t i o nm a ys u b j e c t t h e p e t i t i o n e rto prosecution under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1001. 19 C.F.R. § 171.1. September 7, 2000, offering relief, and prescribed a limited time of 30 days within which Resource Club was to respond. Pl.’s Ex. G.Court No. 03-00781 Page 10

19 C.F.R. § 171.22 provides: 9 [a]decision to mitigate a p e nalty or to remit a forfeiture upon condition that a stated amount is paid will be effective for not more than 60 days from the date o f notice to the petitioner of such decision unless the decision itself prescribes a different effective period. If payment of the stated am o u n t or arra n g e m e nts for such payment are not made, or a supplemental petition is not filed in accordance with re g ulation, the full penalty or claim for forfeiture will be de e med applicable and will be enforced by promptly referring the matter, after required collection action, if appropriate, to the appropriate Office of the Chief Counsel for preparation for referral to the D epartment of Justice unless other action has been directed by the Commiss ioner of Customs. 19 C.F.R. § 171.22. The 30-day deadline is authorized by 19 C.F.R. § 171.22. 9
It is a g ainst this legal framework that Resource Club maintains that Customs u n lawfully denied its petition protesting the imposition, collection, and retention of duties and fees.

B. Resource Club’s Errors It is significant that this case arises as a result of Customs’ finding that Resource C l u b presented a counterfeit visa for the entry of the subject merchandise. Resource Club does not contest this finding or challenge the lawfulness of the attendant seizure. However, Resource Club asserts that it exercised its right to abandonment within the three-year per i o dpermitted by 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b), and therefore Customs should refund the duties that Resource Club paid upon entry. C o n s i d e r e d in light of the legal framework outlined above, Resourc e Club’s argument isCourt No. 03-00781 Page 11

unpersuasive. As noted above, in its reply to Plaintiff’s May 9th petition, Customs offered relief and prescribed a time of 30 days within which Resourc e C l u b w a s to respond. Pl.’s Ex. G. When Resource Club failed to respond by O c tober 9, 2000, Customs initiated forfeiture proceedings. The next correspondence from Resource Club came in the form of a sup p l e m e n t a l petition for relief filed on November 3, 2000, almost 60 days after the September 7th Customs letter. By the plain language of 19 C.F.R. § 171.22, the decision to mitigate the penalty expired after 60 days unless the decision itself described a different effective period. In this case, by
the terms of Custom’s September 7, 2000 letter, there was a 30-day mitig a t i o np e r i o d
. O n c e t h a t e x p i r e d , C u s t o m s c o u l dl a w f u lly initiate the administrative forfeiture proceedings. These forfeiture proceedings did not involve placi n g R esource Club’s goods in a bonded warehouse; therefore, 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b), by its own terms, did not apply to Resource Club’s goods. Moreover, and apart from the lawfulness of Customs’ forfeiture and sale, Resource Club’s exercise of the abandonment provision suffers from fatal procedural errors. Plaintiff failed to meet two explicit conditions for abando n m e n t , both stated in Customs’ implementing regulations for 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b). Speci f i c ally, Resource Club failed to file Customs Form 3499 and failed toCourt No. 03-00781 Page 12

See supra, note 6. 10 produce evidence of the warehouse proprietor’s concurrence. 19 C.F.R. § 158.43. Because the statute’s plain language subjects the exercise of abandonment to the Secretary’s regulatory discretion, regulations promulgated pursuant to this authority have the force of law and are binding on this Court, unless they are “procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Resource Club does not challenge the validity of the regulations and no inferences drawn from the record in Resource Club’s favor suggest that Plaintiff should be excepted from the regulation’s requirements. Therefore, Customs’ denial of the Plaintiff’s protest is correct as a matter of law.

C. Customs has no obligation to store seized goods in a bonded warehouse. Plaintiff also argues that because its goods were in Customs’ custody when they were putatively abandoned, the “bonded warehouse” limitation i s inapplicable, thereby entitling Resource Club to a full refund of duties and fees. Pl.’s Affirmation Opp’n Def.’s
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 3 (“Pl.’s Opp’n Mem.”). The problem with this contention however, is that it ignores the legal status of the goods in question; the goods were s e i z e d by Customs due to their imp o r t ation contrary to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c). Specifically, 10Court No. 03-00781 Page 13

Customs was acting pursuant to its enforcement authority under the Tariff Act, and that authority is independent of t h e a b andonment statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1563(b), which appears in the “Transportation in Bond and Warehousing of Merchandise.” Becaus e C ongress carefully ou t l i n e d Customs’ enforcement powers in a separate statutory provision, and excluded such powers from other sections, by negative inference, the separate provision for aban d o n m ent, which i s n o t included in the statutory provision for seizure, cannot be read to impose additional conditions on the exercise of enforcement authority. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 (2006)(“A familiar principle of s tatutory construction . . . is that a negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other p r o v i sions of the same statute.”(citations omitted)). In addition, adopting Plaintiff’s positi o n w o uld contradict another fundamental principle of statutory interpret ation by rendering superfluous the broad delegation of discretion to a Customs officer in deciding what is a “convenient and appr o p riate” place to store seized goods under 19 U.S.C. § 1605, excerpted supra, p. 8. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”(quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))). Therefore, the bondedCourt No. 03-00781 Page 14

warehouse provision does not have any bearing on the treatment of goods, stored elsewhere, prior to enforcement proc e e d ings, or to the duties and fees paid upon importation of seized goods. In United States v. One Case Paintings, 99 F. 4 2 6 (2d. Cir. 1900), the Court rejected a similar argument from a Plaintiff who wished to o b t a in a refund of duties by abandoning goods that had been forfeited and sold as a penalty for undervaluation. The Court
held:
“[i]mportation” and “fraudulent unde r valuation” are

two distinct acts. The doing of the one act makes the importer a debtor to the government for the amount of duties, the doing of the other act makes him lose his goods; but there is nothing in the language of section 32 which c a n b e construed as a remission of the obligation to pay duties in any event.
Id. a t 4 2 8
. S i m i l a r l y , i mp o r t a t i o no fR e s o u r c e C l u b ’ s ladies’ jeans and payment of the concomitant duties are distinct from the presentation of a counterfeit visa and t h e penalties arising
th e r e f r o m . N o t h i n gi n1 9 U
. S
. C
. § 1 5 9 5 a ( c ) ( 3 ) , t h e p r o vision allowin g f or forfeiture of goods associated with a counterfeit visa, suggests either an obligation to store goods in a bonded warehouse or a remission of R e s o urce Club’s obligation to pay duties. The proposition that Customs is not o b l i ged to store seized goods in a b o n d e d w a r e h o u s e f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f a n i mp o r t e ris
bolstered b y t h e statutory provision for designating “bonded
warehouses” and t h e l egislative purpose such warehouses serve.Court No. 03-00781 Page 15

See Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. 3. (“[The requirement that] go o d s b e in 11 a bonded warehouse at the time of abandonment, only applies to situations where the goods are abandoned while in custody and control of the importer. This requirement exists due to the fact that an importer must store imported goods in a bonded warehouse until the goods clear Customs .”) Section 1555 of 19 U.S.C. provides in part: buildings or parts of buildings and other enclosures may be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as bonded warehouses for the storage o f imported merchandise entered for warehousing, or taken possession of by the appropriate customs officer, or under seizure, or for the manufacture of merchandise in bond, or for th e r e packing, sorting, or cleaning of i mp o r t ed merchandise. . . . Before any imported merchandise not fin a l ly released from customs custody shall be stored in any such premises, the owner or lessee thereof shall g i v e a bond in such sum and with such sureties as may be approv e d b ythe Secretary of the Treasury to secure the Government against any loss or expense connected with or arising from the deposit, st o r a g e , o rm a n i p u l a t i o no fm e r c h a n d i s e i ns uch warehouse. 19 U
. S
. C
. § 1 555(a) (emphasis added). It is apparent from this language that bonded warehous e s are not intended to protect the imp o r t e r , a s R e s o u r c e C l u bs u g g e s t s , b u t r a t h e rt o p r o vide 11 security to the Government. The intent to secure the government and not the importer is echoed by the very regulation that Plaintiff relies on. Subsection (c)(1) of the abandonment regulation states:

Costs. When in the o p inion of the port director the abandonment of merchandise under section 563(b), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1563(b)), will involve any expense or cos t t o the Government, or if the merchandise is worthless or unsalable, or cannot be sold for a sum sufficient to pay the expenses of sale, such ab a n d o n ment shall not be permitted unless the i mp o r t e rd e p o s i t s a s u mw h i c hi nt h e o p i n i o no fthe port director will be sufficient to save the Government harmless from any expense or cost resulting from such abandonment.Court No. 03-00781 Page 16

Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 3. 12 19 C.F.R. § 158.43(c)(1)(emphasis added). Considered in light of the permissive language o f 1 9 U.S.C. § 1555, it is well within the Secretary’s authority to determine and designate the bonded warehouses that will sufficiently secure the government against loss or expense. In addition, 19 U.S.C. § 1605 gives Customs broad discretion to store the goods in a site that is “convenient and appropriate” with “due regard” for the expenses involved. The fact that Customs
chose an unbonded warehouse to store the seized goods is in no way contrary to law. In other words, Customs is no t under any obligation to store the goods in a bonded warehouse during a

se i z u r e . T h e r e f o r e , R e s o u r c e C l u b ’ s a r g u m e n t t h a t , “ [ i ] t is patently unfair and unjust to allow Customs to deny the Plaintiff’s right of abandonment and duty refund, based on the fact that Customs decided to store the goods in a non-bonded warehouse,” 12
must fail. While it is not necessary to decide whether there is a statutory “right of abandonment” as the Plaintiff contends, it is certainly not the case that an importer whose goods have been seized for a suspected violation of U.S. Customs law may preserve such a “right” by asserting a governmental obligation to store its goods in a bonded warehouse pending their disposition. Finally, we note that by holding that an importer is entitledCourt No. 03-00781

to a refund of all duties and fees, simply by abandoning his goods to Customs after being notified of possible fraud, the Court would
create a significant moral hazard. Importers could systematically skirt Customs’ entry laws because counterfeit visas and other falsified information would carry no risk of loss or penalties. The law does not require such a result.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Donald C. Pogue Donald C. Pogue, Judge Dated: May 16, 2007

New York, New YorkSlip Op. 07-76

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x : The Resource Club, Ltd., : : Plaintiff, : : v. : Before: Pogue, Judge : Court No. 03-00781 United States, : : Defendant. :

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
**JUDGMENT** Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s complaint, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and all other pertinent papers, and after due deliberation, it is hereby
**ORDERED** that Plaintiff’s motion is denied; and further
**ORDERED** that Defendant’s motion be granted; and further
**ORDERED**that this action is dismissed.

/s/ Donald C. Pogue Donald C. Pogue, Judge

Dated: May 16 , 2007 New York, New York