[Cite as State v. Skaggs, 2016-Ohio-1160.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2015-L-024

 - vs - : 

JASON J. SKAGGS, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 13 CR 

000937. 

Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Alana A. Rezaee, Assistant Prosecutor, 

and Jacqueline M. O’Donnell, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration 

Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For PlaintiffAppellee). 

Matthew C. Bangerter, P.O. Box 148, Mentor, OH 44061 (For Defendant-Appellant). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Jason Skaggs, appeals from the February 10, 2015 judgment of 

the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him for receiving stolen property 

following a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand the matter for further proceedings. 

{¶2} On February 7, 2014, appellant was indicted by the Lake County Grand 

Jury on one count of receiving stolen property, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of 
 2

R.C 2913.51(A). Appellant pleaded not guilty and a jury trial commenced on January 

20, 2015. The following facts were adduced at trial. 

{¶3} Jake Falter, a student at The Ohio State University in Columbus, testified 

that he purchased a MacBook Pro laptop computer in 2012 for $1,100.00 on Apple’s 

website and that he used the computer primarily for school and had various notes and 

papers saved onto the computer’s hard drive. After a year of use, the “T” button 

became unattached and was no longer fixed onto the computer’s keyboard. 

{¶4} On October 11, 2013, Falter left his laptop in the living room of the 

townhouse where he lived with three other roommates before leaving to go out with 

friends. He did not notice that his computer was missing until the following Sunday, 

October 13, when he needed it to work on homework for class. While Falter did not 

have a password on his computer, he did install a program, “Prey”, that sends a report 

via electronic mail that gives the location, I.P. address, and other information of a 

registered device once it is reported stolen on the program’s website. When Falter 

received the report, it indicated that the laptop was located at an address assigned to 

MicroLink Computer Outlet, a store located in Mentor, Ohio. He contacted the Mentor 

Police Department that evening, who advised him that he would first have to file a report 

with the Columbus Police Department, which he did the following day, Monday, October 

14, 2015. Falter also provided the police with the computer’s serial number, which was 

labeled on the box the computer came in. 

{¶5} Falter further testified that his father purchased the laptop back from 

MicroLink a few days later for $275.00. When he was able to look it over after it came 

back into his possession, there was a different user name on the computer, “Dave 
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Dietz”, but it did not have a password. Some of the documents he had saved onto the 

computer were also missing. 

{¶6} Officer Curt Davis of the Mentor Police Department testified that he spoke 

with Falter on the evening of October 14, 2014. After writing down the information 

provided by Falter, Officer Davis travelled to MicroLink and spoke with the owner, Ziad 

Ibrahim. Ibrahim stated that he had purchased the laptop from an individual the 

previous day at approximately 1:00 in the afternoon that he was able to identify as 

appellant. Officer Turek, an evidence tech who arrived at the location shortly thereafter, 

took photos of the computer with the matching serial number. In addition, Officer Davis 

was provided with all of the business records kept by Ibrahim from his purchasing the 

laptop from appellant as well as the surveillance footage that had recorded the 

transaction as it took place. 

{¶7} Ziad Ibrahim testified appellant entered his store and stated that he was 

interested in selling the MacBook Pro he was holding because he had purchased a new 

one. After he turned the laptop on to inspect it, appellant entered the password to log 

on. Ultimately, Ibrahim concluded that the computer was in nice condition and offered 

to purchase it from Skaggs for $275.00, which he accepted. As per his usual business 

practice, Ibrahim entered appellant’s driver’s license information into his computer as 

well as a description of the MacBook computer. Ibrahim further remarked that, while he 

did find it unusual that appellant’s license indicated that he had a Columbus address, 

appellant informed him that he had just moved to Cleveland with his girlfriend on Abbey 

Rd., which Ibrahim notated in his records. 

{¶8} Sebastian Cassius testified next for the state and identified himself as a 

Geek Squad manager at Best Buy who oversees various departments within the store. 
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He indicated that Falter did own an Apple MacBook Pro based on information previously 

provided to him and that, based on the computer’s model number, it still had a selling 

price of $1,099.99 as of January 16, 2015. 

{¶9} Detective Mike Malainy of the Mentor Police Department testified he was 

approached by Officer Davis in the detective bureau on the evening of October 14, 2013 

and was asked if he could assist him in recording a phone call. From the information 

collected by Officer Davis, Detective Malainy called the number and left a message with 

appellant’s girlfriend for him to call back, which appellant did a few minutes later. 

Detective Malainy informed appellant that their conversation was being recorded and 

asked him about how he came across the MacBook Pro computer. 

{¶10} On the recording, appellant informed Detective Malainy that he purchased 

the laptop from an individual on Saturday morning outside a hotel near Ohio State 

Route 161 in Columbus for $150.00. Appellant indicated the individual knew the 

password for the computer and that he was selling the computer in order to buy a new 

one. Appellant also asked if the laptop was stolen prior to purchasing it, which the 

individual denied. Appellant explained to Detective Malainy that, while he had all 

intentions of keeping the computer, the brakes on his vehicle were starting to fail while 

travelling to visit a friend in Euclid. As he did not have the money to get the brakes 

repaired, he sold the computer to MicroLink and used the money from the sale to 

purchase the parts. Appellant also told the detective he was with two friends who may 

have witnessed the transaction between him and the other individual at the hotel, but 

appellant did not provide him with their contact information. And appellant did not 

provide Detective Malainy with any sales receipts for car parts. 
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{¶11} When the state rested, the defense made a Crim.R. 29 motion for 

acquittal, which was denied. A second motion was requested prior to closing 

arguments, which was also denied. A short time after being released for deliberations, 

the jury returned a guilty verdict on the sole count in the indictment; it further found that, 

per the instructions, the property at issue was worth at least $1,000, but no more than 

$7,500. 

{¶12} At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the state presented several factors that 

showed that recidivism would be likely for appellant: he committed the offense at issue 

a month after being released on bond for a separate criminal case in Franklin County; 

had a history of juvenile adjudications in addition to having been found guilty for nearly a 

dozen other offenses as an adult, including possession of stolen property; and had been 

convicted of drug possession, possession of drug abuse instruments, and paraphernalia 

since committing this offense. The state also noted appellant was currently serving his 

sixth prison sentence and recommended that appellant be sentenced to twelve months 

to be served consecutively to the prison sentence he was currently serving. 

{¶13} Appellant was ultimately sentenced to eleven months, to be served 

consecutively to his current prison sentence, and restitution in the amount of $275.00, 

the amount Falter had to pay to get his computer back. Appellant timely appealed and 

asserts three assignments of error. As they are related, we shall address appellant’s 

first and second assignments of error together, they read: 

{¶14} “[1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant when 

it returned a verdict of guilty against the manifest weight of the evidence 

{¶15} “[2.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant in 

denying his motion for Acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A).” 
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{¶16} A “sufficiency” argument raises a question of law as to whether the 

prosecution offered some evidence concerning each element of the charged offense. 

State v. Windle, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-033, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶25. “[T]he proper 

inquiry is, after viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, whether the jury 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” State v. Troisi 179 Ohio App.3d 326, 2008-Ohio-6062 ¶9 (11th Dist.). 

{¶17} In contrast, a court reviewing the manifest weight observes the entire 

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 

the witnesses and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Schlee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 93-L082, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5862, *14-*15 (Dec. 23, 1994). 

{¶18} Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C. 

2913.51(A), which required the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, he 

“receive[d], retaine[d], or dispose[d] of property [belonging to Jake Falter] knowing or 

having reasonable cause to believe that the property ha[d] been obtained through [the] 

commission of a theft offense.” 

{¶19} There was no dispute that Falter’s computer had been stolen. It was also 

undisputed that appellant received, retained, and/or disposed of the computer. 

Appellant’s arguments therefore concentrate on whether he had “reasonable cause to 

believe” the computer was stolen. Appellant offers various benign explanations relating 

to the circumstances of his purchase to rebut the state’s circumstantial case. In 
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particular, he maintains his purchase of the computer in a “shady” location,1 for less 

than it was worth, with a lack of accessories does not necessarily imply he should be on 

reasonable notice that it was stolen. 

{¶20} Circumstantial evidence involves evidence not grounded on actual 

personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from 

which inferences are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be established. State 

v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). An inference is “a conclusion which, by 

means of data founded upon common experience, natural reason draws from facts 

which are proven.” State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263 (1947). It therefore follows that 

when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, that evidence must 

establish collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence of primary facts 

may be rationally inferred according to common experience. Windle, supra, at ¶34. 

Circumstantial evidence is accorded the same probative value as direct evidence. State 

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶21} The jury heard appellant’s rebuttal arguments to the state’s evidence at 

trial. The jury, as the sole judge of the weight of the evidence, was free to accept or 

reject appellant’s version of events. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 

93-A-1796, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2655, *5 (June 17, 1994). With this in mind, the 

“shady” location of the purchase, the lack of accessories, and the relatively-low 

purchase price provided the jury with a rational and persuasive foundation to support 

the conclusion appellant had reasonable cause to believe the computer was stolen. 

 

1. Appellant takes issue with the state’s characterization of the area of Columbus in which he purchased 

the computer as “shady.” Appellant, however, used this word to characterize the location during an 

interview with Detective Malainy. 
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{¶22} Appellant, however, underscores he performed the same inquiries as 

Ibrahim to ascertain whether the computer was stolen; to wit, he notes he asked the 

seller if it was stolen, who purportedly responded in the negative. And, when the seller 

produced the password, he felt satisfied the computer was not stolen. In the abstract, 

these factors provide some basis for the conclusion that one could reasonably purchase 

the computer without serious suspicion or doubt that it was obtained through theft. 

When considered in light of other surrounding circumstances, however, they do not 

negate the inference that appellant had reasonable cause to believe the computer was 

obtained through theft. 

{¶23} First of all, the circumstances surrounding appellant’s purchase of the 

computer and Ibrahim’s purchase were different. Appellant purportedly paid only $150 

for the computer and the transaction took place, by appellant’s admission, in a “shady” 

part of a large city. Ibrahim, a business owner who purchases and sells computers, 

paid $275 after researching what similar models are being sold for on Ebay. He further 

obtained appellant’s identification and recorded his personal information pursuant to his 

business protocol. Although appellant, like Ibrahim, may have asked his seller whether 

the computer was stolen, other salient features of the purchases were entirely different. 

{¶24} And, in any event, the similarities between the inquiries posed by 

appellant and Ibrahim do not serve to exculpate appellant or undermine the inference 

that appellant had reasonable cause to believe the computer was stolen. Simply 

because Ibrahim was not charged in the case does not support the inference that 

appellant had no reasonable basis to believe the machine was obtained by theft. 

{¶25} Furthermore, there was evidence presented that the computer, while in 

Falter’s possession, was not “password protected.” There was also evidence adduced 
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at trial that installing a password is not difficult and can be accomplished without any 

specialized computer training. These points, taken in conjunction with the 

circumstantial evidence discussed above, demonstrate the evidence militated in favor of 

and not against a conviction. 

{¶26} Given the circumstances of this case, we conclude there was sufficient, 

persuasive evidence to support appellant’s conviction for receiving stolen property. 

{¶27} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error lack merit. 

{¶28} Appellant’s third and final assignment of error provides: 

{¶29} “The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant-appellant to a term of 

imprisonment contrary to statute and where its findings were not supported by the 

record.” 

{¶30} Appellant contends the trial court’s sentence of 11-months imprisonment, 

to be served consecutively to a sentence he was already serving, was contrary to law. 

We agree. 

{¶31} This court reviews felony-sentencing appeals using the standard set forth 

under R.C. 2953.08(G). State v. Hettmansperger, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014-A0006, 2014-Ohio-4306, ¶14. R.C. 2953.08(G) provides, in pertinent part: 

{¶32} (2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of 

this section shall review the record, including the findings 

underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing 

court. 

{¶33} The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a 

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for 

resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is not 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate 

court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and 

convincingly finds either of the following: 
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{¶34} (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s 

findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division 

(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 

2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; 

{¶35} (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶36} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) governs the imposition of consecutive felony 

sentences. It provides: 

{¶37} (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for 

convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender 

to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the 

consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future 

crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are 

not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct 

and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court 

also finds any of the following: 

{¶38} (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses 

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a 

sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 

of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior 

offense. 

{¶39} (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of 

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or 

more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual 

that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part 

of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 

{¶40} (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender.” 

{¶41} In State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶37, the Ohio 

Supreme Court held: 

{¶42} In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court 

is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at 

the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its 

sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to 

support its findings. Nor is it required to give a talismanic 

incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary 
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findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the 

sentencing entry. 

{¶43} “Failure to make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing hearing 

and incorporate them in the judgment entry of sentence renders the sentence contrary 

to law.” State v. Purtilo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-003, 2015-Ohio-2985, ¶17. 

{¶44} Here, the trial court ordered appellant to serve an 11-month prison term 

consecutively to a term he was already serving in Cuyahoga County. The trial court, 

however, failed to make the necessary R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing 

hearing; moreover, the statutory findings were also absent from the court’s sentencing 

order. Appellant’s sentence is therefore contrary to law. See Purtillo, supra (reversing 

a sentence where trial court failed to make findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when it 

ordered term of imprisonment to be served consecutively to a sentence from a separate 

case). 

{¶45} Appellant’s third assignment of error has merit. 

{¶46} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 

resentencing. 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.