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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN BOWMAN, an individual; and )

DISABILITY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, )

EDUCATION SERVICES: HELPING YOU )

HELP OTHERS, a California public )

benefit corporation, )

) 2:04-cv-0755-GEB-PAN

Plaintiffs, )

) ORDER

v. )

)

BEST WESTERN STATION HOUSE INN; )

THE WILLIFORD FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, )

L.P., a California limited )

partnership; BEST WESTERN INTER- )

NATIONAL, INC., an Arizona )

corporation and LEWIS T. WILLIFORD,)

an individual dba BEST WESTERN )

STATION HOUSE INN, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On December 12, 2005, the parties filed a Joint Pretrial

Statement (“JPS”), which pursuant to the Rule 16 Scheduling Order was

supposed to delineate the issues for trial. The Court reviewed the

JPS in preparation for the Final Pretrial Conference scheduled on

December 19, 2005. In light of the JPS, the Final Pretrial Conference

is vacated, summary judgment will be entered on the only federal

question because Plaintiff Susan Bowman lacks standing, and the

remaining state claims will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

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The only federal question is whether Bowman is entitled to

injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

which would require the removal of architectural barriers at the Best

Western Station House Inn (“the Inn”) located in the City of South

Lake Tahoe. Since the parties’ JPS reveals it is undisputed that

Bowman has no intention of returning to the Inn, Bowman lacks Article

III standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA. (JPS at 12.) 

To establish Article III standing, Bowman must demonstrate

she faces “a real and immediate . . . threat of future injury” that

can be addressed through injunctive relief. Church v. City of

Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994).

Because injunctions regulate future conduct, a

party has standing to seek injunctive relief only

if the party alleges . . . a real and immediate--

as opposed to a merely conjectural or

hypothetical-- threat of future injury. 

Logically, "a prospective remedy will provide no

relief for an injury that is, and likely will

remain, entirely in the past." Although "past

wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a

real and immediate threat of repeated injury,"

"[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in

itself show a present case or controversy

regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied

by any continuing, present adverse effects." 

Id. (citations omitted). Consequently, “[i]n ADA cases, courts have

held that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief unless

[she] alleges facts giving rise to an inference that [she] will suffer

future discrimination by the defendant.” Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d

1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001).

Therefore, the fact that Bowman may have suffered an injury

in the past, “does not in itself show a present case or controversy

regarding injunctive relief . . . if [the showing is] unaccompanied by

any continuing, present adverse effects.” Lujan v. Defenders of

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1 The entry of summary judgment is consistent with the warning

in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed October 7, 2005:

[S]ince [the] process [of having the parties delineate trial

issues in a JPS] is designed to promote efficiency and conserve

judicial resources, “there is no reason to require that the

elimination of non-trialworthy claims await a formal motion for

summary judgment.” Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d

24, 29 (1st Cir. 1996). “If the pretrial [statement] discloses

that no material facts are in dispute and that the undisputed

facts entitle one of the parties to judgment as a matter of law,”

the Court may summarily dispose of the case or issue. Portsmouth

Square v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 868-69

(9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).

(continued...)

3

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (citations omitted). Even when a

plaintiff declares in a vague manner an intent “to return to the

places [she] had visited before . . . ‘[s]uch some day’ intentions --

without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any

specification of when the some day will be -- do not support a finding

of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Id.

“Absent such an allegation, the likelihood of future discrimination

remains conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent, and not real and

immediate.” Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1082. 

The “Undisputed Facts” section of the JPS states Bowman “has

not returned to Lake Tahoe, and does not plan to return to Lake Tahoe,

because the altitude affects her health.” (JPS at 12.) Since Bowman

concedes “it is highly unlikely that she will ever again be in a

position where any discrimination by [the Inn] against disabled

individuals will affect her personally,” she “has failed to suggest

[she is likely to experience] a ‘real or immediate threat’ of future

discrimination by [the Inn].” Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081-82. Therefore,

summary judgment is entered in favor of Defendants on Bowman’s ADA

claim.1

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1(...continued)

(Oct. 7, 2004, Order at 10.)

4

Defendants argue “[b]ecause the only federal claim is one

for ADA violations, and Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed on

. . . standing grounds, this court should dismiss Plaintiff’s state

law claims.” (JPS at 24.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state

claim when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction . . . .” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. Of

Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). “In the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors

to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -- will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.” 

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); City of

Chicago, 522 U.S. at 173 (1997) (“when deciding whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh

in each case, . . . the values of judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity’”). 

The state law claims in this action assert violations of (1)

the Disabled Persons Act, California Civil Code §§ 54 et seq., (2)

California Health and Safety Code § 19955 et seq., and (3) the Unruh

Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq. (JPS at 20-22.) 

The relief sought includes injunctive relief, general and special

damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. (Id. at 20-22.) The

parties have requested a jury trial on the state issues, including

whether each Defendant “breached a duty of care to Plaintiff,” and

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whether “the breach of duty proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries.” 

(Id. at 4.) In addition, the parties have requested that the court

determine whether each Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff,

which under California law involves consideration of several policy

factors. See e.g. Sakiyama v. AMF Bowling Centers Inc., 110 Cal. App.

4th 398, 405 (2003). 

Determination of these state issues should be decided in a

state forum because “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be

avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the

parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable

law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

As a matter of comity and to provide the parties with “a surer-footed

reading of applicable [California] law” in a state forum, the Court

declines to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claims. See id. Therefore, the state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice as of the date on which this Order is

filed. 

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendants on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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