[Cite as State v. Ramey , 2020-Ohio-1572.]

COURT OF APPEALS COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsERIC R. RAMEY Defendant-Appellant JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : : : Case No. 2019CA0013 : : : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Coshocton Cou nty Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 18CR0207

JUDGMENT: Affirmed DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 17, 2020 APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant JASON GIVEN KORI GATTERDAM Coshocton County Prosecuting Attorney ERIK P. HENRY 318 Chestnut Street 280 Plaza, Ste. 1300 Coshocton, OH 43812 280 N. High St. Columbus, OH 43215[Cite as State v. Ramey , 2020-Ohio-1572.]
Gwin, J., {¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric R. Ramey [“Ramey”] appeals his convict ion and sentence after a jury trial in the Coshocton County Court of Co mmon Pleas. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On September 28, 2018, Detective Dave Stone of the Coshocton Co unty Sheriff’s Office was conducting a drug trafficking investigatio n at the Downtown Motel in Coshocton, Ohio. The investigation targeted Tiffany Wiggins ("W iggins") and an unknown male. As part of the investigation, the Sheriff's Office employ ed a paid confidential informant, Floyd Lewis ("Lewis"). Lewis' contract with the She riff's Office began July 20, 2016, and the Sheriff's Office paid him $200—$100 at the time o f each buy and $100 upon completion of the case, i.e., after trial. {¶3} On September 29, 2018, Detective Stone gave Lewis a concealed v ideo recorder and $150 in buy money. Under the surveillance of Dete ctive Stone and Detective Tim Bethel, Lewis drove his vehicle to the Downtown M otel and entered Room No. 2. After completion of the controlled buy, Lewis exit ed the motel room, and Detective Stone recovered from Lewis two clear bags contain ing methamphetamine. State's Exhibit 3. {¶4} Detectives continued to monitor the motel room, and saw an unkn own male, later identified as Ramey, exit the room. Detectives foll owed Ramey and apprehended him in an alley. Detectives found in Ramey's posses sion a clear bag containing methamphetamine, as well as $80 of the buy money Lew is used during the controlled buy. State's Exhibit 4; State's Exhibit 5.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 3 {¶5} After the controlled buy, Detective Stone applied for, and a ju dge granted, a search warrant for the motel room. Detective Stone acknowledg ed that the sale from Wiggins to Lewis constituted the predicate for the warrant. Aft er the arrests of both Wiggins and Ramey, the detectives executed the warrant and sear ched Room No. 2. {¶6} Detectives seized six bags of methamphetamine from inside a gra y LG cell phone box found in a dresser drawer. One of the bags conta ined a "ball" or a larger amount of methamphetamine that would typically be broken down i nto smaller amounts for sale. State’s Exhibit 14. The remaining five bags each con tained a smaller amount of methamphetamine typical of drug buys. Exhibit 9 was a bag co ntaining methamphetamine that had “3.5” handwritten on the front of the bag. Exhibit 10 was a bag containing methamphetamine that had “3.6” written on it. Ex hibit 11 was another bag of methamphetamine that had “3.5” written on it. Exhibit 1 2 was a bag of methamphetamine that had “3.2” written on it. Id. Exhibit 14 wa s a large bag of methamphetamine. Exhibit 13 was then introduced as a bag of met hamphetamine located in Room No. 2 with State's exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14. {¶7} Detective Stone testified that these exhibits were indicative o f drug trafficking. He testified that the smaller bags are what is ty pically sold and packaged from the larger bag. State's Exhibit 16 was introduced as small baggies typically used for drug trafficking recovered from the gray box. Exhibit 17 an d 18 were more small baggies recovered from the gray box. State's Exhibit 19 and 20 were introduced as other small baggies consistent with drug trafficking recovered from t he gray box. Exhibit 15 was introduced as the gray box located in the dresser. State's Exhibit 22 was introducedCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 4 as a digital scale typically used to weigh drugs. State's Exhib it 21 was introduced as a photograph of the items located in the gray box. {¶8} Detectives further uncovered during the search of the motel roo m $40 in buy money on the north side of the bed (State's Exhibit 23), al so on the north side of the bed two glass smoking pipes consistent with smoking methamp hetamine (State's Exhibits 24-25), an empty (State's Exhibit 26) as well as a ful l syringe (State's Exhibit 27), and mail purportedly belonging to Ramey (State's Exhibit 2 8). Detective Stone also noted seeing male clothing and hygiene products, as well as two toothbrushes in the bathroom. Detectives also found a bag of methamphetamine insid e Wiggins' purse. State's Exhibit 29. {¶9} On cross-examination, Detective Stone noted they could not loca te $30 of the buy money. Detective Stone also acknowledged that if a conf idential informant violated the terms of the contract by using illegal drugs or co mmitting criminal acts, the Sheriff’s Office would terminate the contract. Detective Stone had no knowledge of Lewis violating the contract from July 20, 2016, through Septem ber 29, 2018. Detective Stone testified on cross examination that the gray box was for an LG cell phone; however, he did not know to whom the box belonged. Detective St one acknowledged that no one observed Ramey directly selling drugs to anyone. Fi nally, Detective Stone admitted making no attempt to identify the handwriting found on the bags of methamphetamine marked as State's Exhibits 9-12, or to test any of the evidence for DNA.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 5 {¶10} The confidential informant, Floyd Lewis testified he was presen tly incarcerated for a matter occurring in Muskingum County, Ohio. Lewis also admitted a prior robbery conviction. {¶11} Lewis admitted that for the past few years he has made his liv ing by working as a confidential informant for the Coshocton County Sh eriff's Office. Lewis detailed the controlled buy on September 29, 2018. State's Exh ibit 30 was introduced as the video/audio recording of the buy from the device that Le wis wore during the controlled buy. Lewis testified that at first he had tried to buy methamphetamines and heroin; however, they had just sold out of heroin. Lewis said that he gave Wiggins the money and Wiggins gave him the drugs. Lewis testified that whe n he requested a large amount of drugs to purchase, Wiggins got permission from Ramey to sell that amount. Ramey told Wiggins that Lewis could purchase two bags of metham phetamine for $150. Twice Ramey told Wiggins the deal was okay. {¶12} Lewis acknowledges being at the Downtown Motel the night before and saw Wiggins; he did not see Ramey. On cross-examination, Lewis admi tted he did not honor his contract, including by using drugs on his own. Lewis state d the night before, he bought $15 worth of methamphetamine, fentanyl, or heroin for his girlf riend. The following morning, Lewis contacted Detective Bethel of the Sheriff’s Offi ce and advised that he could buy from Wiggins and "we proceeded from there.” Lewis co rrected himself that he might not have bought directly from Ms. Wiggins the night befor e but he did find out she was the one who had "the weight.”Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 6 {¶13} Wiggins testified that she was currently incarcerated in prison based on her involvement in this case. Wiggins had four other drug trafficki ng convictions, as well as a felony theft conviction. {¶14} Wiggins testified that she and Ramey began staying at the Down town Motel on September 28, 2018. Wiggins said that when Lewis knocked, Ra mey gave Wiggins permission to let Lewis into the room. When Lewis came into th e room, there was approximately seven grams of methamphetamine in two baggies in the open on a nightstand between the beds. Wiggins testified that it was Ram ey's drugs and she was assisting in selling them. Ramey gave her permission to sell bo th bags and watched her prepare and sell the drugs. This was by way of an affirmation nod. Ramey approved the purchase price of $150. Wiggins testified that she gave the $1 50 to Ramey. Wiggins acknowledged that the gram of methamphetamine in her purse was given to her by Ramey for personal use. {¶15} Wiggins testified that the night before, she went to Walmart an d bought a pre-paid cell phone with her money, not Ramey's. Wiggins ident ified State's Exhibit 15 as the gray box in which the phone had been packaged. Wiggins claimed she took the phone out of the gray box that morning, after Lewis came but be fore her arrest and the search of the room. Wiggins denied placing any items into the b ox. Wiggins testified no one else came to the room after Lewis left and before Ramey lef t. Wiggins claimed Ramey left the room to sell someone methamphetamine at the library. W hen Wiggins left the room to take the trash out, detectives arrested her. {¶16} Wiggins did acknowledge how both she and Ramey were addicts, an d both of them used drugs while in the motel room, including the previ ous night. In fact, whenCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 7 detectives interviewed Wiggins after her arrest, Wiggins was st ill high. Wiggins further stated Ramey rented the room because she did not possess any id entification. {¶17} On the video, Wiggins acknowledging hearing Lewis saying 130 an d also "I will owe you 20." Wiggins testified Lewis did not have the w hole $150. When asked why detectives only located $120, Wiggins stated that was all L ewis gave her. {¶18} Sarah Dobbs, a forensic scientist employed by the Bureau of Cri minal Investigation [“BCI”] in the Richfield office, testified last f or the state. The parties stipulated to Ms. Dobbs' qualifications as an expert witness. M s. Dobbs examined the methamphetamine submitted in this case, the results of which we re reflected in her report marked as State's Exhibit 31. According to Ms. Dobbs, State's Exhibit 4 weighed 6.79 grams; State's Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 weighed a combine d 28.17 grams; State's Exhibit 13 weighed 3.45 grams; and State's Exhibit 29 weighed 1 .77 grams. Ms. Dobbs testified the bulk amount of methamphetamine is 3 grams, and th e combined weight of all the drugs in this case fell within the range of 15 grams to 150 grams, i.e., between 5 times and 50 times bulk. {¶19} The parties stipulated to the chain of custody of the state's c ase; stipulated to State's Exhibit 32, a report from the Bureau of Criminal Inv estigation, confirming that State's Exhibit 3 is methamphetamine and weighed 6.06 grams; st ipulated that Room 2 of the Downtown Motel is located within the vicinity of a schoo l; and stipulated to Ms. Dobbs' expertise. {¶20} After the close of evidence, Ramey requested an instruction for the lesser included offense of Aggravated Possession of Drugs in an amount greater than bulkCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 8
amount but less than five times the bulk amount, i.e. the amoun t of drugs found on Ramey's person when he was arrested. {¶21} The jury found Ramey guilty of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(d), a felony of the first degree. The trial court proceeded to sentencing. Ramey was sentenced to a mandatory term of imprison ment for eleven years. The trial court noted that in imposing a maximum sentence that the offense was the worst form of the offense. Specifically, the trial court noted the am ount of methamphetamine, the digital scales, and the prepared bags with weights written on them. The trial court noted that Ramey was prepared to introduce a large amount of me thamphetamine into the community at a rapid pace. The court further noted Ramey ha d a prior felony conviction for trafficking in drugs out of Wayne County, Ohio a nd a prior theft conviction. The trial court further noted that Ramey had a prior federal co nviction for counterfeit United States currency and was wanted by federal authorities fo r probation or parole violations related to that offense. Assignments of Error {¶22} Ramey raises three Assignments of Error, {¶23} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE S IXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. {¶24} “II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AGAINST THE MANIF ESTCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 9

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. {¶25} “III. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED APPELLANT TO SERVE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR HIS CONVICTION, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF TH E OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNI TED STATES CONSTITUTION.” 

### I. {¶26} 

### In his First Assignment of Error, Ramey argues that he was deni ed effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Ramey contends, 1). Trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to voir dire prospective jur ors regarding their feelings regarding drug use; 2). Failed to object to the state introducing other acts evidence of Wiggins; and 3). Trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's improper statement in closing argument. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. {¶27} To obtain a reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assis tance of counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's performanc e fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient pe rformance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair ou tcome of the proceeding. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693(1984). A defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the S trickland test negates a court's need to consider the other. Strickland at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699; State v. Madrigal , 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 2000-Ohio-448, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000).Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 10 {¶28} In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense coun sel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s ass istance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2064. At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’ s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2064. ISSUE FOR APPEAL. A. Whether there is a reasonable probability that trial counsel’s objections would have been sustained and whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found Ramey not guilty if the objections had been sustained. 1). Failure to voir dire on issue of drugs. {¶29} Ramey contends, “defense counsel needed to uncover prospective jurors' prejudices and biases as to drugs so he would know whether the juror could be fair to his client. Jurors personally affected by drug use or with family members affected by drug use obviously would view the facts of this case in a skewed man ner. Defense counsel intentionally left on the panel jurors who have in some way bee n so negatively impacted by drugs that they could not be fair and impartial.” Appellant ’s Brief at 11. {¶30} In the case at bar, the state inquired of the jurors during voi r dire as follows, Let's talk about the alleged offense. It's a single count. W e are talking about this because sometimes the offense itself will br ing up biases, make it so you can't be objective while sitting as a juror. Th e offense in this case revolves around the trafficking or specifically the intend ed distributionCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 11 of methamphetamine. Does that subject matter cause anyone conc ern about how they could objectively weigh the evidence in this cas e? T. at 26. None of the jurors answered in response to the state ’s inquiry. {¶31} Defense counsel inquired as follows, I want to be just a little bit more specific since this case i nvolves drugs. Very many of you on questionnaires listed at some point in your life you were the victim of a crime. And drugs has been a problem t hat's increased in recent years to the point that many crimes, whethe r they are a drug crime or not, are somehow tied to drugs. It's one of thos e things that's in the back of people's minds that I find when they hear the ca se is about drugs, they frown, and its unpleasant topic to them and within their own family this may be something that has been a scourge that they have personally experienced. I don't want to ask you about the particularities of any of th e crimes that you have been victim of or that there has been drug proble ms in your family particular to that. I think that's private and you can keep it to yourself. But now that I have put a little bit of focus on it, is there a nybody here that feels that maybe they are not the best person to sit in judgmen t on a case like there? And I will turn the question a little more specifi c, and I would ask those of you back here to remember this one for yourselves when you come up -- if you come up here to the box in a little bit. Is there any -- if you found yourself in Mr. Ramey's shoes today, is there any reason why yo u wouldn't want yourself sitting in judgme nt on this case? Thank you.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 12

T. at 31-31. {¶32} It is a well-established principle of law that “[t]he conduct o f voir dire by defense counsel does not have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.” State v. Cornwell , 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 568, 1999–Ohio–125, 715 N.E.2d 1144, citing State v. Evans , 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042(1992). Ohio courts “have recognized that counsel is in the best position to determ ine whether any potential juror should be questioned and to what extent.” State v. Murphy , 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 539, 2001–Ohio–112, 747 N.E.2d 765, citing State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143–144, 538 N.E.2d 373(1989). {¶33} “The fact that defense counsel did not decide to ask additional questions or to press every single potential juror on this issue—or to inqui re about specific mitigating factors—is reasonable as a matter of strategy. See Murphy , 91 Ohio St.3d at 539, 747 N.E.2d 765.” State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 1051, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶156. {¶34} In the case at bar, both the state and the defense gave the jur ors the opportunity to discuss how their views on drugs could affect th eir ability to be fair and impartial jurors. The trial court oversaw the voir dire and the record of voir dire indicates that the jurors could render a fair and impartial verdict. {¶35} Even if counsel’s performance at voir dire had been deficient, Ramey cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. He has failed to establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performa nce at voir dire, the result of the trial would have been different. See, e.g., State v. Adams , 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 13 Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, at ¶ 67. State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 1051, 2014-Ohio1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶157. 2). Failure to object to “other acts” evidence of Tiffany Wiggins. {¶36} Ramey next contends, “During the testimony of confidential info rmant Floyd Lewis, Lewis mentioned trying to buy heroin from Wiggins. Wigg ins purportedly told Lewis she had already sold the last bit of heroin. Defense cou nsel failed to object to this other acts testimony regarding uncharged criminal conduct.” Ap pellant’s Brief at 11(references to the transcript omitted). {¶37} In the case at bar, the defense argued that both Wiggins and Ra mey are drug addicts. T at 190. The clear defense strategy was that W iggins, not Ramey was the drug dealer. T. at 190-191. Defense counsel noted that Wiggin s was a “four time convicted drug trafficker.” T. at 193. {¶38} A defendant has no constitutional right to determine trial tact ics and strategy of counsel. State v. Cowans , 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 72, 717 N.E.2d 298(1999); State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 150; State v. Donkers, 170 Ohio App.3d 509, 867 N.E.2d 903, 2007-Ohio-1557, ¶ 183(11th Dist.). Rather, decisions about viable defenses are the exclusive domain of def ense counsel after consulting with the defendant. Id. When there is no demonstra tion that counsel failed to research the facts or the law or that counsel was ignorant of a crucial defense, a reviewing court defers to counsel's judgment in the matter. State v. Clayton , 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189(1980), citing People v. Miller , 7 Cal.3d 562, 573-574, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089(1972); State v. Wiley , 10th Dist. No. 03AP-340, 2004- Ohio-1008 at ¶ 21.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 14 {¶39} Debatable strategic and tactical decisions may not form the bas is of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Phillips , 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 1995–Ohio– 171. Even if the wisdom of an approach is questionable, “debat able trial tactics” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. “Poor tactic s of experienced counsel, however, even with disastrous result, may hardly be considered lack of due process * * *.” State v. Clayton , 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 48, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980)( quoting United States v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir.1963), certiorari denied 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1112, 10 L.Ed.2d 143. {¶40} Evidence that Wiggins may have sold drugs to Lewis at a previou s time fits with the defense strategy that Wiggins was the drug dealer. Th us, a reasonable trial strategy supported defense counsel’s decision not to object. {¶41} Even if trial counsel’s failure to object to the other acts evi dence would have been deficient, the prejudice inquiry requires Ramey to “show t hat there is a reasonable probability that, but for counse l’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Ramey has not met this burden and this Court is not convinced that Ramey would have been found no t guilty even if the evidence had been excluded. 1 3). Failure to object to Prosecutors’ appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury during closing argument. {¶42} Ramey next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective becaus e defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor improperly asking th e jury to address a community drug problem. (Appellant’s Brief at 12). Ramey does not argue that the

1 Ramey’s sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence argume nts will be addressed in Ramey’s Second Assignment of Error, infra.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 15 comments made by the state during closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. {¶43} A prosecutor is entitled to a certain degree of latitude in clo sing arguments. State v. Liberatore , 69 Ohio St. 2d 583, 589, 433 N.E.2d 561(1982). Thus, it fall s within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the propri ety of these arguments. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 269, 473 N.E.2d 768(1984). A conviction w ill be reversed only where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent t he prosecutor's comments, the jury would not have found the defendant guilty. State v. Benge , 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 141, 1996-Ohio-227. Furthermore, "[i]solated comments by a pro secutor are not to be taken out of context and given their most damaging meaning.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo , 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431(1974). {¶44} Comments made to incite fear; prejudice and/or passion in the j ury require reversal. Viereck v. United States , 318 U. S. 236, 247(1943); State v. Williams , 23 Ohio St. 3d 16, 20(1986). {¶45} Ramey cites the following statement made by the state in the re buttal portion of its closing argument as the only ground for his argu ment that his trial counsel was ineffective, Now, Mr. Mullen got up here and talked about rules. Rules con stitute all the way back to the founding of our country. And he is rig ht. There are rules that the State of Ohio has to follow, that the government has to follow in serious matters such as this. And Mr. Ramey is availing him self of those rules; however, we as citizens have rules, too. And that rule is, one of them, is you don't traffic this poison in communities. That's a rule . And when youCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 16 do and when it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you are guilty of it, that's a rule. So the rules cut both ways. T. at 199-200. {¶46} We find the statements cited by Ramey in support of his argumen t do not rise to the level of inciting fear, prejudice, and/or passion. “The prosecutors' argument did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implica te other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain sil ent....” Darden v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 168, 181-182, 106 S.Ct. 2624, 2472. {¶47} “‘The failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to susta in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Fears , 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 347, 715 N.E.2d 136(1999), quoting State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831(1988). A defendant must also show that he was materially p rejudiced by the failure to object. Holloway , 38 Ohio St.3d at 244, 527 N.E.2d 831. Accord, State v. Hale , 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶233. {¶48} We find no error in the prosecutor's comments. Therefore, Rame y’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. 4). Cumulative effect. {¶49} Finally, Ramey alleges that the errors outlined in his previous arguments amount to cumulative error requiring reversal. {¶50} In State v. Brown , 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003–Ohio–5059, 796 N.E.2d 506, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of cumulative er ror. However, as explained in State v. Bethel , 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006–Ohio–4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 17 197, it is simply not enough to intone the phrase “cumulative e rror.” State v. Sapp , 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004–Ohio–7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 103. {¶51} Here, Ramey cites the doctrine of cumulative error, lists or in corporates the previous arguments, and gives no analysis or explanation as to why or how the errors have had a prejudicial cumulative effect. Thus, this argument has no substance under Bethel and Sapp

. {¶52} Further, where we have found that the trial court did not err, cumulative error is simply inapplicable. State v. Carter , 5th Dist. No.2002CA00125, 2003–Ohio1313 at ¶ 37. As this case does not involve multiple instances of error, Ramey’s argument is without merit. CONCLUSION. {¶53} Trial counsel’s conduct of voir dire on the issue of drugs was a matter of trial strategy and Ramey cannot point to prejudice resulting fr om counsel’s decision. {¶54} Ramey’s trial strategy was to demonstrate that Wiggins, not Ram ey, was the dealer of the drugs in question. Therefore, failure to obj ect to testimony that Wiggins had sold drug or attempted to sell drugs on the night before th is incident was a matter of trial strategy. Ramey can point to no prejudice from counsel’s decision. {¶55} The prosecutor’s statements in closing argument were not improp er; therefore, Ramey’s tr ial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. {¶56} As this case does not involve multiple instances of error, Rame y’s argument that the cumulative effect of the errors mandates reversal is w ithout merit. {¶57} Ramey’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 18

II. {¶58} In his Second Assignment of Error, Ramey argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and further Ramey contend s that the jury’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. Sufficiency of the Evidence. {¶59} The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, th e accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar tial jury....” This right, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida , 136 S.Ct. 616, 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of t he evidence involves a question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.” State v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13. {¶60} When reviewing t he sufficiency of the ev idence, an appellate co urt does not ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus: Walker, at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favora ble to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio St.3d 474, 2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiencyCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 19 we do not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; r ather, we ask whether, ‘ if believed , [the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defenda nt's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy , 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001), quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus (emphasis added); Walker at ¶31. We will not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds un less ‘reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer , 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis , 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74. ISSUE FOR APPEAL A. Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of Ramey’s guilt on each element of the crime of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. {¶61} In this case, the indictment charged Ramey with violating R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), which provides: "(A) No person shall knowingly d o any of the following: (2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for dis tribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or anothe r person.” The indictment further alleged Ramey violated R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d) because th e controlled substance involved methamphetamine, a schedule II drug, in the amount exc eeding five times the bulk amount but less than fifty times the bulk amount, and in t he vicinity of a school.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 20 {¶62} In the case at bar, the parties entered into four stipulations: (1) chain of custody was not a contested issue; (2) Sacred Heart Elementary School is within 1,000 feet of Room Number 2 of the Downtown Motel (that the room was within the vicinity of a school); (3) Sarah Dobbs from BCI is an expert in forensic anal ysis of controlled substances and scheduled drugs; (4) the authenticity of State's exhibit 32 which was a report from BCI. T. at 8-9. The stipulations were reduced to writing and filed with the trial court on August 9, 2019. [Docket Entry No. 58]. {¶63} Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), “[a] person acts knowingly, regard less of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” Further, “[a] person has kno wledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” Id. “Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admissio n, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563, 763 N.E.2d 695(1st Dist. 2001). (Foo tnote omitted.) Thus, “[t]he test for whether a defendant acted knowingly is a subjec tive one, but it is decided on objective criteria.” State v. McDaniel , 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 16221, 1998 WL 214606 (May 1, 1998), citing State v. Elliott , 104 Ohio App.3d 812, 663 N.E.2d 412(10th Dist. 1995). See also, State v. Jones , 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38, 318 N.E.2d 637 (“The determination of whether appellant had the required culpable me ntal state must be made with a view to the totality of circumstances surrounding the be ating of Otto Baum. As this court stated in paragraph four of the syllabus in State v. Huffman (1936), 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313: “The intent of an accused person dwells in hi s mind. Not being ascertainable by the exercise of any or all of the senses, it c an never be proved by theCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 21 direct testimony of a third person, and it need not be. It mus t be gathered from the surrounding facts and circumstances under proper instructions f rom the court.”). {¶64} In the case at bar, Lewis testified that when he requested a la rge amount of drugs to purchase, Wiggins got permission from Ramey to sell that amount. Ramey told Wiggins that Lewis could purchase two bags of methamphetam ine for $150. Twice Ramey told Wiggins the deal was okay. {¶65} Wiggins testified that they were Ramey's drugs and she was assi sting him in selling them. Ramey gave her permission to sell both bags a nd watched her prepare and sell the drugs. This was by way of an affirmation nod. Ra mey approved the purchase price of $150. Wiggins testified that she gave the $150 to Ram ey. Wiggins testified that the gram of methamphetamine in her purse was given to her by Ra mey for personal use. {¶66} Ramey does not challenge the evidence related to preparation of the drugs for distribution. Ramey further does not challenge that the dr ug was methamphetamine, a schedule II drug, in the amount exceeding five times the bulk amount but less than fifty times the bulk amount, and that it was found in the vicinity of a school. Ramey’s argument centers upon his contention that Wiggins, not Ramey was the act ual seller of the drugs. {¶67} Viewing the evidence in the case at bar in a light most favorab le to the prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable person could have fo und beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramey had committed the crime of Aggrava ted Trafficking of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d). We hold, t herefore, that the state met its burden of production regarding each element of the crime of Aggravated Trafficking of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d) and, accordi ngly, there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge to the jury and to support Ramey’ s conviction.Coshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 22 Manifest weight of the evidence. {¶68} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting eviden ce, even though the evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v. Issa , 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001). “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly aga inst the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and eve ry reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment an d the finding of facts. * * * “If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction , the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which i s consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verd ict and judgment.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–1 92 (1978). {¶69} The reviewing court must bear in mind, however, that credibilit y generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa , 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. Murphy , 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008–Ohio–1744, ¶ 31. Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is p articularly competent to decide whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses, theCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 23 appellate court must afford substantial deference to its determ inations of credibility. Barberton v. Jenney , 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010–Ohio–2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20. In other words, “[w]hen there exist two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither of which is unbelievabl e, it is not our province to choose which one we believe.” State v. Dyke , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99 CA 149, 2002– Ohio–1152, at ¶ 13, citing State v. Gore , 131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125(7th Dist. 1999). Thus, an appellate cou rt will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the evidence to the fact finder, as long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision. State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 2012–Ohio–1282, ¶ 24. {¶70} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must f ind that “ ‘the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra , 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist. 1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is res erved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the convictio n.” Id. ISSUE FOR APPEAL. B. Whether the jury court clearly lost their way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. {¶71} The jury as the trier of fact was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence offered by the parties and assess the witness’s credib ility. “While the trier of fact may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discou nt them accordingly * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant’s conviction again st the manifest weight orCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 24 sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Craig, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP–739, 1999 WL 29752 (Mar 23, 2000) citing State v. Nivens , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APA09–1236, 1996 WL 284714 (May 28, 1996). Indeed, the trier of fact need not b elieve all of a witness’ testimony, but may accept only portions of it as true. State v. Raver , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP–604, 2003–Ohio–958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill , 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964); State v. Burke , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP–1238, 2003–Ohio–2889, citing State v. Caldwell , 79 Ohio App.3d 667, 607 N.E.2d 1096 (4th Dist. 1992). Althou gh the evidence may have been circumstantial, we note that circums tantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith , 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). {¶72} In the case at bar, the jury heard the witnesses and viewed the evidence. The jury saw the events as they transpired in real-time because the events were recorded on the body camera worn by Lewis and admitted into evidence dur ing the trial. Further, the jury was able to observe both Lewis and Wiggins subject to cross-examination. In addition, the jury heard Ramey’s arguments and explanations abo ut his actions. Thus, a rational basis exists in the record for the jury’s decision. {¶73} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evi dence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon the foregoing and the entire record in this matter we find Rame y’s conviction is not against the sufficiency or the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appearsCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 25 to have fairly and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of Ramey’s guilt. The jury neither lost their way nor created a miscarriage of justice in convicti ng Ramey of Aggravated Trafficking of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)( d). {¶74} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entire ty, we find that there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, prov es all the elements of the crime for which Ramey was convicted. {¶75} Ramey’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. III. {¶76} In accordance with R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), Ramey is entitled to app eal as of right the maximum sentence imposed on his conviction. Standard of Appellate Review. {¶77} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set for th in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016–Ohio–1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22; State v. Howell , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶31. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we clearly and convincingly f ind that either the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 292 9.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is o therwise contrary to law. See, also, State v. Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014–Ohio–3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28. {¶78} Accordingly, pursuant to Marcum this Court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincin g evidence that: (1) theCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 26 record does not support the trial court's findings under releva nt statutes, or (2) the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. {¶79} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will prov ide in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to th e facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118(1954), paragraph three of th e syllabus. See also, In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985). “Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross , 161 Ohio St. at 477 120 N.E.2d 118. ISSUE FOR APPEAL. Whether the trial court properly imposed the maximum sentence in Ramey’s case. (1). R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and Maximum Sentences. {¶80} A trial court’s imposition of a maximum prison term for a felo ny conviction is not contrary to law as long as the sentence is within the st atutory range for the offense, and the court considers both the purposes and principles of fel ony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set for th R.C. 2929.12. State v. Keith , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103413 and 103414, 2016–Ohio–5234, ¶ 10, 16; State v. Taylor, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA29, 2017-Ohio-8996, ¶16. {¶81} R.C. 2929.11(A) governs the purposes and principles of felony s entencing and provides that a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reas onably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, and (2) to punish the offender usingCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 27 the minimum sanctions that the court determines will accomplish those purposes. Further, the sentence imposed shall be “commensurate with and n ot demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact on the vic tim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar cr imes by similar offenders.” R. C. 2929.11(B). {¶82} R.C. 2929.12 sets forth the seriousness and recidivism factors for the sentencing court to consider in determining the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 . R.C. 2929.12 is a guidance statute that sets forth the seriousness and recidivism criteria that a trial court “shall consider” in fashioning a felony sentence. Subsections (B) and (C) establish the factors indicating whether the offender's conduct is more serio us or less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. These factors inclu de the physical or mental injury suffered by the victim due to the age of the victim; the physical, psychological, or economic harm suffered by the victim; whether the offender’s re lationship with the victim facilitated the offense; the defendant’s prior criminal record; whether the defendant was under a court sanction at the time of the offense; whether the defendant shows any remorse; and any other relevant factors. R.C. 2929.12(B). The court must also consider any factors indicating the offender’s conduct is less serious t han conduct normally constituting the offense, including any mitigating factors. R. C. 2929.12(C). Subsections (D) and (E) contain the factors bearing on whether the offender is likely or not likely to commit future crimes. {¶83} In State v. Kalish , 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008–Ohio–4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, the court discussed the effect of State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006–Ohio–856, 845 N.E.2d 470 decision on felony sentencing. The court stated tha t in Foster the CourtCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 28 severed the judicial-fact-finding portions of R.C. 2929.14, hol ding that “trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutor y range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing ma ximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” Kalish at ¶ 1 and ¶ 11, citing Foster at ¶ 100, See also, State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007–Ohio–4642, 873 N.E.2d 306; State v. Firouzmandi , 5th Dist. Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823. {¶84} “Thus, a record after Foster may be silent as to the judicial findings that appellate courts were originally meant to review under 2953.08( G)(2).” Kalish at ¶ 12. However, although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, it left intact R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and the tria l court must still consider th ese statutes. Kalish at ¶ 13, see also State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006–Ohio–855, 846 N.E.2d 1; State v. Firouzmandi supra at ¶ 29. Thus, post- Foster, “there is no mandate for judicial fact-finding in the general guidance statutes. The court is merely to ‘cons ider’ the statutory factors.” Foster at ¶ 42. State v. Rutter , 5th Dist. No. 2006–CA–0025, 2006–Ohio–4061; State v. Delong, 4th Dist. No. 05CA815, 2006–Ohio–2753 at ¶ 7–8. {¶85} There is no requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that the trial court st ates on the record that it has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism or even discussed them. State v. Polick , 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431(4th Dist. 1995); State v. Gant , 7th Dist. No. 04 MA 252, 2006–Ohio–1469, at ¶ 60 (nothing in R.C. 2929.12 or the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court imposes any duty on the trial court to set forth its findings), citing State v. Cyrus , 63 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 586 N.E.2d 94(1992); State v. Hughes , 6th Dist. No. WD–05–024, 2005–Ohio–6405, ¶ 10 (trial court wa s not required to address each R.C. 2929.12 factor individually and make a fin ding as to whether it wasCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 29 applicable in this case), State v. Woods , 5th Dist. No. 05 CA 46, 2006–Ohio–1342, ¶ 19 (“... R.C. 2929.12 does not require specific language or speci fic findings on the record in order to show that the trial court considered the applicable se riousness and recidivism factors”) (citations omitted); State v. Taylor, 2017-Ohio-8996, ¶23. {¶86} In this case, the trial court sentenced Ramey to a mandatory te rm of imprisonment for eleven years. The trial court noted that in i mposing a maximum sentence that the offense was the worst form of the offense. S pecifically, the trial court noted the amount of methamphetamine, the digital scales, and th e prepared bags with weights written on them. The trial court noted that Ramey was prepared to introduce a large amount of methamphetamine into the community at a rapid p ace. T. at 235-237. The court further noted Ramey had a prior felony conviction for trafficking in drugs out of Wayne County, Ohio and a prior theft conviction. Id. at 236. The trial court further noted that Ramey had a prior federal conviction for counterfeit Unite d States currency and was wanted by federal authorities for probation or parole violation s related to that offense. T. at 234. {¶87} Accordingly, the trial court considered the purposes and princi ples of sentencing [R.C. 2929.11] as well as the factors that the court must consider when determining an appropriate sentence. [R.C. 2929.12]. The tria l court has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings. Nor is it required t o give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findin gs can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry. {¶88} Upon a thorough review, we find the record clearly and convinci ng supports the sentence imposed by the trial court. We find the trial cou rt properly considered theCoshocton County, Case No. 2019CA0013 30 purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 , as well as the applicable factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, along with all other relevan t factors and circumstances. While Ramey may disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge, Ramey’s sentence was within the applicable statutory range and therefore, we have no basis for concluding tha t it is contrary to law. {¶89} Ramey’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled. {¶90} The judgment of the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas is a ffirmed.

By Gwin, J., Hoffman, P.J., and Delaney, J., concur