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“[I]t is Saudi Arabia and its 

Arab allies that are inflaming 

sectarian enmity. By projecting their anxieties regionally, 

Saudi Arabia has raised the 

stakes and provoked a 

potential regional showdown 

with Iran. Fears of deepening 

sectarian tensions in the Gulf 

are now being realized.”

April 15, 2011

Counterrevolution in the Gulf

Summary

•	 Saudi Arabia is pursuing a combination of domestic and regional policies that risk destabilizing the Persian Gulf and that risk undermining the United States interests there. 

•	 Amid calls for political change, Saudi Arabia is failing to address pressing concerns about its 

political system and the need for political reform. Instead of responding favorably to calls for 

more political openness, the Kingdom is pursuing a risky domestic agenda, which ignores the 

social, economic, and political grievances that might fuel popular mobilization.

•	 Saudi Arabia’s military intervention into Bahrain has escalated sectarian tensions in the Gulf. 

The crackdown in Bahrain is not only provoking Iran and creating the conditions for a regional 

crisis, but it is also creating new opportunities for Iran to expand its sphere of influence.

•	 The United States has reasons to maintain a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia. It also has 

the leverage to encourage the Kingdom to refrain from escalating tensions in the Gulf and 

further inflaming sectarian anxieties.

Unnerved by changes taking place across the Middle East and North Africa, Saudi Arabia has 

sought to undertake drastic measures to ensure its security at home and in the region. However, its 

measures are in fact achieving the opposite. Rather than dealing with the political aspirations of its 

own citizens or those in neighboring Bahrain, where Riyadh has intervened militarily to help crush 

pro-democracy protests, Saudi Arabia is turning back the clock at home and provoking a potential 

crisis with Iran. 

Recent tactics used by this key American ally may be exacerbating security risks and creating an 

environment that will make it more difficult for the United States to secure its interests. Whether 

Washington is prepared to accept Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Gulf is a critical question. On one 

hand, the United States needs the kingdom, not least for their oil. On the other, the price of that 

alliance has increased significantly in recent weeks.

Saudi Arabia’s current strategy and the potential risks it entails is partly the result of its fears over 

Iran’s growing hegemony in the region. But it is also partly the result of a shifting domestic balance 

of power, a renewed sectarian approach to politics and a continued reluctance to pursue political 

reform.

Evading Reform 

In recent years, Saudi citizens have pressed to reform a system that they believe is subject to royal 

family abuse, rife with corruption, and one that encourages discrimination against religious minorities and women. When King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 2005 many believed he was 

Toby C. Jones

E-mail: tobycjones@yahoo.com

Phone: 570.994.2870

peaceBrieF89
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Counterrevolution in the Gulf

page 2 • PB 89 • April 15, 2011

a committed reformer, but he has demonstrated to be mostly committed to protecting the power 

of the royal family. But even though he has not proven interested in creating space for greater 

participation, Abdullah has ushered in significant changes. Most importantly, he has devoted 

considerable energy to marginalizing religious hardliners and checking the power of some of the 

Kingdom’s most odious religious figures. 

While it is widely believed that the Al Saud has always ruled with the close cooperation of the 

religious establishment, the relationship between the ruling family and the Kingdom’s senior 

religious scholars has often been strained. Because prominent religious figures regularly clashed 

with the Kingdom’s rulers on matters of domestic and foreign policy, Saudi elites struggled to 

minimize the role of the clergy over the course of the 20th century. As oil revenues skyrocketed in 

the 1970s, Riyadh found itself less dependent on the scholars for their support. 

But at the end of the decade, domestic conflicts, including the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 

Mecca by religious rebels in 1979, changed the balance of power in the Kingdom. In exchange 

for a religious ruling allowing authorities to send security into the Grand Mosque to root out the 

rebels, Riyadh was compelled to promise renewed influence for the religious establishment. In 

the 1980s, the Kingdom pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into Islamic foundations, schools 

and causes, including the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s war 

against Shiite Iran. Over the last three decades, religious scholars have exercised considerable 

cultural and political power, often to the frustration and embarrassment of the Kingdom’s rulers. 

King Abdullah has taken significant steps to restore the pre-1979 balance of power by sacking 

controversial religious figures, seeking to centralize control over the judiciary, and challenging the 

clergy on matters of women’s rights. The effect had been to rein in some of the Kingdom’s most 

important religious institutions, including the notorious religious police.

Many Saudi citizens have respect for the king, but they remain frustrated with the glacial pace 

of reform. Recent events in the Middle East -- most importantly the popular uprisings that toppled 

governments in Tunisia and Egypt -- inspired some Saudi citizens to renew calls for change. So far, 

efforts to seize upon regional momentum have resulted not in reform, but in the strengthening of 

hardliners within the royal family.

Shutting Down the Day of Rage 

Pro-reform activists launched calls to hold a Day of Rage on March 11, in which they hoped citizens 

would turn out for demonstrations in cities across the country. Alarmed by Hosni Mubarak’s fall 

from power in Egypt, Saudi authorities responded anxiously and harshly to stave off a similar 

outcome at home. They sought various ways to outmaneuver their critics and crush any potential 

popular uprising before it got started. To do so Riyadh dusted off a familiar playbook. In late 

February, King Abdullah promised a multibillion dollar financial aid program in an effort to 

co-opt dissenters. The regime also threatened would-be protesters. In early March, Saud al-Faisal, 

the Saudi foreign minister, warned that authorities would “cut off any finger” raised against the 

government in protest. Authorities also threatened fines and imprisonment for demonstrators. 

Riyadh also enlisted the religious establishment for support. On March 7, the Senior Council of 

Ulama, Saudi Arabia’s highest ranking religious authority, issued a statement declaring protests to 

be un-Islamic. Considering Abdullah’s past efforts to curtail the power of the clergy, their renewed 

support for the monarchy was a significant development.

On March 11, a heavy police presence made it virtually impossible for Saudi citizens to organize 

publicly. Less than a week later the Saudi government announced a second sweeping package of 

financial inducements, including housing subsidies, a jobs creation program, and unemployment 
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Counterrevolution in the Gulf

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assistance. Flush with cash from high oil prices, Riyadh can afford to throw money at its deeply 

rooted problems. It is a familiar strategy. While buying favor will likely quell dissent in the short 

term, its longer-term effectiveness is uncertain.

A New Balance of Power 

One of the most important outcomes of the result struggle to fend off public pressure appears to 

be the reconfiguration of the Kingdom’s balance of power and the emergence of hardliners within 

the royal family, most notably the controversial Minister of the Interior Prince Nayef, third in line to 

the throne. As minister of the Interior and commander of Saudi Arabia’s domestic security forces, 

Nayef was responsible for dispatching thousands of police to prevent demonstrations. 

The decision to enlist the support of religious scholars indicates a reversal of Abdullah’s efforts to 

marginalize the clerical establishment’s influence. Recent moves to support the clergy—and sideline moderates—reinforce this conclusion. On March 18, alongside the announcement of material 

support for Saudi citizens, the government also announced significant new levels of spending 

on religious schools and institutions and expanded powers for the country’s religious police. On 

April 2, the government sacked Ahmad al-Ghamdi, the head of the Mecca’s branch of the religious 

police who last year claimed that Islam does not mandate gender segregation.

The potential renewal of clerical power in Saudi Arabia, particularly its most conservative 

elements, is cause for concern. It is worth recalling that the ascendance in the 1980s of a generation of politically motivated clergy helped radicalize some Saudi citizens and contributed to the 

globalization of violent extremism in subsequent decades.

Stoking Sectarian Tensions 

There has also been a sectarian element to Saudi Arabia’s handling of its domestic crisis. In the 

week leading up to the March 11 Day of Rage, small protests took place in Shiite neighborhoods 

across the Eastern Province. Shiite demonstrators called for minor concessions, such as the end 

of discrimination and the release of political prisoners. Saudi rulers seized on these small demonstrations to cast the entire opposition as beholden to Iran and pursuing a sectarian agenda. 

Prince al-Faisal remarked that the regime would “not tolerate any interference in our internal 

affairs by any foreign party . . . and if we find any foreign interference, we will deal with this decisively.” It is hard to tell if the regime’s attempt to portray their critics as agents of Iran succeeded 

in dissuading protesters from taking to the streets. Anti-Shiism is deeply rooted in Saudi Arabian 

society and may have convinced some not to throw their lot in with the Kingdom’s most despised 

religious minority. 

More importantly, the pretense of foreign meddling and the sectarian gambit allowed the 

Kingdom’s rulers to justify their heavy-handed approach more generally as an effort to protect 

national security rather than as an attempt to ignore the substance of the reformers’ agenda. 

Regional Implications 

The domestic anxieties on display in Riyadh have shaped the regime’s decision making in 

neighboring Bahrain, another close American ally in the Gulf, as well. On March 14, in response to 

mounting pressure on the Bahraini regime by tens of thousands of opposition protesters, Saudi 

Arabia sent a contingent of around 1,000 military personnel (along with a small force from the 

United Arab Emirates) into Manama to support efforts to crush the popular uprising there. The 

resulting crackdown has been violent and brutal. 
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Counterrevolution in the Gulf

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The Saudis have many reasons for not wanting to see the ruling al-Khalifa toppled from power 

in Bahrain. The most important has to do with the possibility of a Shiite government taking over 

in Manama. While Bahrain’s opposition is largely committed to democratic reform, it is true that 

the vast majority of those protesting against the government come from the country’s majority 

Shiite community. For the most part, however, Bahrain’s opposition has carefully avoided framing 

their demands in sectarian terms. Whatever the actual substance of their opposition’s platform, the 

governments in Riyadh and Manama have used religious affiliation and regional sectarian anxieties as an excuse to crackdown violently. 

Leaders in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have warned against Iranian meddling and have 

cynically suggested that the uprising in Bahrain was orchestrated by Tehran. After Saudi Arabia’s 

intervention and the resort to violence to clear Manama’s streets, Bahrain’s King Hamad declared 

that their coordinated efforts had succeeded in foiling a foreign plot against him and his Sunni 

supporters. Tensions with Iran have spread across the Gulf. On April 2, Kuwaiti authorities announced they would expel several Iranian diplomats for allegedly being involved in a spy-ring. 

Following a meeting of their foreign ministers in Riyadh on April 3, the Gulf Cooperation Council issued a statement that they were “deeply worried about continuing Iranian meddling” and accused 

Iran of plotting against the Arab monarchies. They condemned “Iran’s interference in Bahrain’s 

internal affairs, in violation of international conventions.”

Iran has responded predictably to the crackdown in Bahrain and to the increasingly shrill antiIranian rhetoric. In mid-March, Iran withdrew its ambassador from Bahrain and blasted Manama for 

not accommodating the demands of its citizens. Iranian officials have also engaged in the escalating war of words. 

Claims of Iranian meddling have been mostly unfounded until now. While some members 

of Bahrain’s opposition have invoked the possibility of Iranian intervention, they have represented a marginal fringe. Instead, it is Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies that are inflaming sectarian 

enmity. By projecting their anxieties regionally, Saudi Arabia has raised the stakes and provoked 

a potential regional showdown with Iran. Fears of deepening sectarian tensions in the Gulf are 

now being realized.

One of the potential tragedies of the current situation in the Persian Gulf is that Saudi Arabia’s 

and Bahrain’s manipulation of sectarian anxieties may ultimately prove self-fulfilling. With nowhere 

else to turn and little support for their cause, it is likely just a matter of time before Bahrain’s 

opposition does look to Tehran for guidance. And although Iran’s leaders insist they will refrain 

from intervening in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the current crisis has created 

an opening for Tehran to become more assertive and influential.

Implications for the United States 

The evolving crisis in the Gulf represents a clear risk to regional security, one of the United States’ 

most important global strategic priorities. The United States is understandably concerned about 

the prospect of greater Iranian influence and the threat it poses in the region, and yet it is two of 

the United States’ closest regional allies that are leading the Gulf down the path of an enduring 

crisis in which Iran’s power will almost certainly grow. 

Washington should increase pressure on the governments in Riyadh and Manama to change 

their current posture and find a more constructive way forward. This means dealing seriously with 

the challenges of reform at home, putting an end to the violence against their own citizens, and 

refraining from further manipulating and exacerbating sectarian anxieties. 
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About This Brief

Toby C. Jones has lived and 

worked in Saudi Arabia and 

Bahrain. Formerly the Gulf Analyst 

with the International Crisis Group, 

he is assistant professor of Middle 

East history at Rutgers University. 

He is the author of “Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged 

Modern Saudi Arabia” (Harvard 

University Press, 2010). The views 

expressed here are his own. 

So far, American attempts to resolve the crisis in the Gulf have failed. Calls for restraint have been 

ignored. The situation is increasingly urgent, especially given the intensification of acrimony between Iran and its Arab neighbors. And it demands a greater American role, lest the United States 

get dragged into another military conflict. The United States possesses considerable leverage in 

the Gulf, particularly with Saudi Arabia. 

The most significant source of U.S. leverage comes from its security relationship with the 

Kingdom and the other Arab states in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has long been a vital strategic and 

economic partner. It has also long been dependent on the United States for security assurances. 

Those assurances should not include allowing the Kingdom to risk destabilizing the region. The 

United States should make clear to Riyadh that the American military presence in the region, and 

its policy of selling weapons to regional allies, is not a cover for the Kingdom’s current reckless 

strategy. Hardliners in Riyadh and Bahrain not only take the American military commitment to the 

Gulf for granted, but have also turned that commitment into a source of leverage for themselves.

Should Riyadh continue on its current path, the U.S. should make clear that a reconsideration 

of U.S. military commitments may be necessary. The United States has in the past and can in the 

future monitor its interests in the Gulf from “over the horizon.” While it seems counterintuitive, 

compelling regional actors to deal with one another on even ground will ultimately produce a 

more durable political outcome. The United States’ impulse is to continue to play the balance of 

power game and to seek advantages for itself and its allies. This approach is not working. In fact it 

is creating new opportunities for Iran. While it may be desirable to maintain a strong relationship 

with Saudi Arabia going forward, the risks of doing so may quickly outweigh the benefits. 

Counterrevolution in the Gulf

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