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76–234PDF 2012

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NASA’S 

COMMERCIAL CREW ACQUISITION STRATEGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

Serial No. 112–104 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

VACANCY 

VACANCY 

VACANCY 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Friday, September 14, 2012 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ...........................................................................................................

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Member, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Witnesses: 

Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration 

and Operations Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration 

and Operations Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration .......................................................................................................... 52 

Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ............................................................................................................. 57 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Submitted Statement for the Record by Representative Jerry Costello, Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 64 

(1) 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 

NASA’S COMMERCIAL CREW 

ACQUISITION STRATEGY 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in Room 2318 

of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph Hall [Chairman 

of the Committee] presiding. 
2 

RALPH M. HALL, TEXAS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

fDDl!.' BERNICE. JOHNSON, TEXAS 

RANKING MEMBER 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

(202) 225-6371 

WWW.sciCflcenousc.gov 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Recent Developments in NASA's Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy 

Friday, September 14,2012 

9:30 a.m.-ll :30 a.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Witnesses 

Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, 

Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National 

Aeronautics and SPilce Administration 

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.) 

Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
3 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Recent Developments in NASA's Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy 

Friday, September 14,2012 

9:30 a.m. 11 :30 a.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

NASA recently awarded more than $1.1 Billion to three companies to develop competing 

concepts for human space transportation launch systems. This hearing will review NASA's 

rationale for selecting the three companies; consider the cost and safety implications of these 

recent decisions; and given the unique nature of Space Act Agreements, examine the level of 

NASA's insight and thus, its ability to evaluate technical and safety requirements. 

Witnesses 

Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations 

Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

V ADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

Introduction 

NASA's commercial crew program is funding the development of multiple competing concepts 

for human spaceflight vehicles. With this program the government is stimulating aerospace 

companies to develop human spaceflight vehicles and systems that NASA hopes will eventually 

result in multiple, safe crew transportation options from which NASA can then purchase crew 

transportation services to ferry astronauts to and from the International Space Station by 2017. 

The program has been underway since 2010, allocating a total of$366 Million among six 

companies in the first two phases. 

On August 3, 2012, NASA selected three companies to receive a total of$1.113 Billion in the 

third phase of the program, bringing the level offederal spending to nearly $1.5 Billion. This 

third phase is known as Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) and runs thru May 

2014. Optional milestones beyond May 2014, if exercised by NASA, will require additional 

funding. As with the two previous phases (CCDevl & CCDev2), NASA is granting the money 

using Space Act Agreements (SAAs), instead of Federal Acquisition Regulations. According to 

NASA, SAA grants cannot be used to purchase anything for the "direct benefit or use of the Us. 

Government."] 

1 Chiles Act: 31 USC 6303 

Page 1 of' 
4 

Ultimately though, before NASA can purchase any transportation services from successful 

developers, it will have to certify that the systems are capable of performing NASA's missions 

and are safe enough to carry American and our international partner astronauts to the ISS. 

Since the U.S. government will not own the vehicles, the designs, or the intellectual property, 

NASA plans to fund two follow-on contracts - contracts that conform to Federal Acquisition 

Regulations to certify these systems before flight to ensure they meet NASA's technical and 

safety requirements. During the current phase of design, under an SAA, no NASA crew 

transportation system requirements can be levied on the commercial partners.2 As a result, 

NASA cannot exercise the same level of insight it normally has in other technology development 

efforts. NASA has not been able to credibly estimate the expected total cost to certify the 

companies' designs, or the cost to buy launch services. To a large degree the per-seat cost will 

depend on the number, and financial strength of non-government purchasers that enter the 

market. 

Background 

On February I, 2010, NASA initiated the first phase of its Commercial Crew Development 

program (CCDevl), using stimulus funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 

2009. With CCDevl NASA awarded a total of $50 Million using Space Act Agreements (SAA) 

to fund five competing companies. On April 18, 2011, NASA initiated the second phase 

(CCDev2), awarding a total of $269.3 Million to four competing companies. On September 19, 

2011, NASA granted an additional $46.2 Million to two of the companies, bringing the total 

CCDev2 awards to $315.5 Million. 

The current (third) phase of the program in known as the Commercial Crew Integrated 

Capability (CCiCap). According to the solicitation the CCiCap strategic goals are as follows: 

1. Advancing multiple integrated crew transportation systems to an orbital crewed 

demonstration flight no later than the middle of the decade or as early as possible. 

2. Achieving significant industry financial investment. 

3. Achieving affordable development costs. 

4. Providing the initial crew transportation system capability that will lead to long-term 

cost effective access to Low Earth Orbit. 

S. Developing a capability to Low Earth Orbit that supports commercial markets for both 

commercial and Government customers. 

The overall safety goal was stated in general terms: 

"Successful commercial human space flight demands the highest commitment to safety; therefore 

NASA has the goal of fostering a safety culture in the commercial space flight industry that 

ultimately will minimize the risks associated with human space flight to LEG. NASA's goal is for 

Participants to demonstrate safety processes that include strong inline checks and balances, 

healthy tension between responsible organizations, value-added independent assessments and 

appropriate data archival, which will increase Government confidence in the Participant's 

approach to safety. " 

2 August 17, 2011 NASA letter to industry http:Ucommercialcrew.nasa.gov!document file get.cfm?docid=249 

Page 20f7 
5 

NASA's goal for the Commercial Crew Development program is to stimulate the aerospace 

industry to develop multiple, competitive, privately operated, human spaceflight vehicles and 

systems. Although the government is paying for about 90 percent3 of this development, NASA 

will not own the vehicles or retain the designs, intellectual property, or data rights. Private 

entities will own and operate the vehicles and systems. Instead of the government specifYing 

what is needed, the private entities will propose their designs, on their development schedule, 

with the hope of meeting NASA's objectives. NASA is not requiring any certified cost or 

pricing information. Further, NASA will delegate to the companies the responsibility to ensure 

that lower-tier suppliers provide components meeting specified performance requirements. In 

this way NASA will no longer control how the government's requirements are met, and instead 

give that responsibility to the private companies. 

On August 3, 2012 NASA awarded Space Act Agreements to three different companies with a 

combined value of $1.113 Billion. Boeing will receive $460 Million, SpaceX will receive $440 

Million, and Sierra Nevada will receive $212.5 Million. The CCiCap Space Act Agreements 

cover a base period of 21 months (ending in May 2014). 

The following table, derived from the CCiCap Selection Statement4

, illustrates NASA's final 

evaluation ratings. 

NASA Evaluation Ratings Sierra Nevada ATK Boeing SpaceX 

Tech. Bus. Tech. Bus. Tech. Bus. Tech. Bus. 

Effectiveness Very High X X X X 

High X 

Moderate X X 

Low 

Very Low 

Confidence High X X 

Medium X X X X 

Low X 

, 90 percent is indicative of the approximate relative contribution of the Federal Government. The actual nongovernment cash or in-kind contributions of the commercial partners is proprietary information and varies by 

company, and may be greater or less than 10 percent of the total. 

4 http://commercialcrew.nasa.gov/document file gel.cfm?docID=645 

Page 30f7 

X 

X 
6 

The following table illustrates NASA's Commercial Crew program spending by company 

through the CCiCap base period to May 2014. 

Program 

3.7 

18,0 

no 

I 

fLO 

105,6 

25,7 

590,9 

0,0 

1.4 

338,1 

515,0 

In addition to the fUllds shovm above, the three companies selected for CCiCap submitted 

optiollal milestones, that include such big ticket items as launch and landing simulations, 

spacecraft qualiilcation testing, crew escape system pad abort tests, purchasing launch vehicles 

necessary for demonstration flights, and crcwcd orbital test flights, The optional milestones have 

aggregate total cost estimates in the of $4,5 Billion, more than four times greater than the 

costs assumed for the CCiCap base (2012-2014), 

Page 4 of7 
7 

Updated Acquisition Strategy 

Concurrent with the CCiCap awards NASA released the following updated acquisition strategy. 

COlllmercial Crew Transportation System Development 

Certification for ISS Crew TraflSportatioll 

Phase::! 

Ukely 2-4 awards vafldatjon, test $nd 

Ltkefy 1-2 awards 

iSS Crew Transportation Services 

Figure 1: Overall CCP Roadmap 

Ceilification fo 

fnclvde at least 

one Crowed ISS 

Mission 

/SSSenlice 

missions ,w.;!ty 6 

monthS 

The three Act Agreements in the CCiCap phase are represented by the top bar in the figure 

above. NASA believes that during this time the companies will their integrated 

designs including the launch vehicle, crew-carrying spacecraft, and abort systems for 

crew As mentioned em'lier, no NASA requirements can be levied during the 

phase, but is increasingly apparent to NASA that ensuring that the systems developed 

this process comply with NASA's requirements necessitates procurement contracts based on 

Federal Acquisition Regulations. If NASA waits too long to begin certification of a company's 

design, any necessary changes will likely be more complex and costly. 

As a result, NASA has decided to begin initial certification activities in the near futme - which 

are depicted in the figure above under the heading Certification for ISS Crew TranspOltationand will use FAR-based procurement contracts. NASA plans to award two to fom FAR-based 

fixed-price contracts in the 11r8t phase of certification known as the Certification Products 

Contract (CPC). The CPC period ofperfOlmance will be approximately 15 months; with an 

expected award date in Februm'y 2013. According to NASA the CPC awards will not exceed 

$10 Million per award, and the total value of all CPC awards is expected to be $30-40 Million. 

It is also important to note from the above that NASA is planning to buy ISS Crew 

TranspOltation Services at least one year BEFORE companies have completed NASA's 

certification. Therefore, it's unclear how NASA will know ifthese systems are safe. 

Page 5 of7 
8 

Below is the schedule for NASA certification activities 

Industry Design [========;=======Z:j~t:;;====~~ Maturity Phase 2 Cert 

Figure 1: NASA's CTS Certification Activities 

NASA hopes that by the end of the Phase 1 Certification that more than one company vrill have 

an integrated design sufficient to enter a Phase 2 competition leading eventually to a crewed ISS 

test mission. 

Overarching Questions 

.. Does NASA's planned acqnisition process provide the best value to the government? 

.. \Vhat arc NASA's strategic goals for CCiCap, and were the CCiCap awards correctly 

evaluated against NASA's stated strategic goals? 

.. Do the goals reflect thc needs of the government and our international partners for access 

to ISS? 

" Will this process result in the safest, most efficient, human spaceflight vehicle to meet the 

government's needs to service the International Space Station? 

.. Why is NASA planning to award crew transportation contracts before the systems are 

certified for NASA's mission? How much increased cost and risk does the government 

assume as a result of this decision? 

Page 6of7 
9 

Appendix 1 

Commercial Crew Program 

Appropriated Compared to 

Fiscal Year (FY) Obligations 

Explanation oflhe FY 2011 Unobligated Roll Through; 

Commercial Crew funding was increased by $14M and the FY 2012 funding 

FY 2011 funds. Due to 

* "Total Conunercial Crew" line rellects the latest Operating Plans through FY 2012 and the FY 2013 President's 

FY 2013 through FY 2017; in FY 2010, $O.lM was u'ansferred from Commercial Cargo to Commercial 

servant labor to 

continuing resolution. Current House markup provides S500M and current Senate markup provides 

Commercial Crew has obligated $383. 1M in FY 2012 through August 2012. 

$28.3M in September 2012 for a total of$41IAM. Future obligations have 

Page 7 of 7 
10 

Chairman HALL. The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will come to order. I say good morning and welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘Recent Developments in NASA’s Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies and the Truth in Testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. And we certainly thank all 

of you for your preparation time, your traveling time and for the 

time you are giving us here today. We will have opening statements, and I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Before we begin today, I want to take a moment to pay tribute 

to a true hero, and I know it is a tribute all of us would pay, and 

a very dear friend, Neil Armstrong, who was memorialized yesterday in a very moving ceremony at the National Cathedral. He has 

been before this Committee a lot of times and he was an inspiration to everyone, a hero throughout the world, and yet one of the 

most honorable and gracious men you have ever known or ever 

met. I had the pleasure of having him in my home in late August, 

and the thing I treasure more than anything, his letter back several days later that I didn’t really receive, didn’t find its way 

through Washington through Texas to my office in Rockwell, my 

home in Rockwell for some time. 

On several occasions he appeared before this Committee. His 

first step, I don’t say anything here that you don’t know, and you 

were listening, you heard it yesterday, a lot of it, established our 

preeminence in space, and I think it got old to him to hear people 

introduce him as the Columbuses and the Magellans of space, but 

that is exactly what they were. Neil was just really an advocate for 

preserving our leadership, and I know my colleagues join me in 

working to carry out his legacy. We will also be inspired by his 

very remarkable life and forever honor him for his place in American history. People will be reading about him and value very much 

the pictures they have with him though they didn’t get an autograph with most of them in his latter years. I think he got a little 

sick of people getting his autograph and going and selling it for a 

thousand bucks or so. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today. I 

know you treasured his recognition yesterday and the memory that 

we have of him. 

I will get underway with my statement. NASA recently awarded 

more than $1.1 billion to three companies to develop competing 

concepts for human space transportation launch systems. Today’s 

hearing is going to review NASA’s rationale for selecting the three 

companies, to consider the cost and safety implications of these recent decisions, and given the unique nature of Space Act Agreements, examine the level of NASA’s insight and thus its ability to 

evaluate technical and safety requirements. 

Our Nation has made great strides in space exploration but these 

strides have not come without cost and without sacrifice. We have 

lost astronauts. After the Columbia accident, President Bush and 

Congress put our Nation and absolutely put us on a path to develop new human space transportation systems that were designed 

from inception to be safer than the space shuttle. Safety was very 

big, of course. NASA responded with the Constellation system. But 
11 

this Administration has chosen a different path. NASA now seeks 

to use government funds to stimulate aerospace companies to develop multiple, competing human spaceflight systems, systems for 

which NASA may be the only customer. Are these systems designed from inception to be safer than the space shuttle, or is 

NASA responding to different goals? How and when will we know 

the safety of these new systems? 

NASA is using Space Act Agreements, not regular contracts, giving the companies great flexibility to do as they see fit, in fact, so 

much flexibility that during this phase no NASA crew transportation system requirements can be levied. It is hard for me to understand why NASA is proceeding this way. Will this result in systems that are safe for our American and international partner astronauts? How will NASA know if they don’t have the insight? And 

perhaps more importantly to those of us in Congress who are asked 

to fund this, how and when will NASA know if it is getting what 

it needs and if these systems will be safe enough? Redesigns will 

be costly and time consuming if important technical or safety requirements were not addressed up front, which I think they should 

be. 

If our Nation is going to ask crews to explore space, it is our responsibility to do everything possible to ensure that those astronauts return to Earth safely. I am not convinced this approach is 

the right one but I am willing to listen. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RALPH HALL

Good morning, and welcome to today’s hearing. Before we begin today, I want to 

take a moment to pay tribute to a true hero and a dear friend, Neil Armstrong, who 

was memorialized yesterday in a moving ceremony at the National Cathedral. 

Neil Armstrong was an inspiration to all Americans, a recognized hero throughout 

the world—and yet one of the most humble and gracious men you ever met. On several occasions Neil appeared before this Committee to offer his wisdom and insight, 

deflecting praise and questions with grace and humility. 

Neil’s first step on the Moon established America’s preeminence in space and 

paved the way for scores of spectacular missions involving hundreds of outstanding 

Astronauts. Neil was one of the most impassioned advocates for preserving America’s leadership in space and constantly challenged us to strengthen human space 

exploration goals and missions. I urge my colleagues to join me in working to carry 

out his legacy. We will forever be inspired by his remarkable life and forever honor 

him for his place in American history. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today. I know at lot of time and 

effort goes into your preparation but your knowledge and experience is very important to us, so thank you for taking the time to appear today. 

NASA recently awarded more than $1.1 billion to three companies to develop competing concepts for human space transportation launch systems. Today’s hearing 

will review NASA’s rationale for selecting the three companies; consider the cost 

and safety implications of these recent decisions; and given the unique nature of 

Space Act Agreements, examine the level of NASA’s insight and thus, its ability to 

evaluate technical and safety requirements. 

Our nation has made great strides in space exploration. But those strides have 

not come without cost and sacrifice. We have lost astronauts. After the Columbia 

accident President Bush and Congress put our nation on a path to develop new 

human space transportation systems that were designed from inception to be safer 

than the Space Shuttle. NASA responded with the Constellation system. But this 

Administration has chosen a different path. NASA now seeks to use government 

funds to stimulate aerospace companies to develop multiple, competing human 

spaceflight systems—systems for which NASA may be the only customer. Are these 

systems designed from inception to be safer than the space shuttle, or is NASA responding to different goals? How and when will we know the safety of these new 

systems? 
12 

NASA is using Space Act Agreements—not regular contracts—giving the companies great flexibility to do as they see fit. In fact so much flexibility that during this 

phase no NASA crew transportation system requirements can be levied. It’s hard 

for me to understand why NASA is proceeding this way. Will this result in systems 

that are safe for our American and international partner astronauts? How will 

NASA know if they don’t have the insight? And perhaps more importantly to those 

of us in Congress who are asked to fund this, how and when will NASA know if 

it is getting what it needs and if these systems will be safe enough. Redesigns will 

be costly and time consuming if important technical or safety requirements were not 

addressed up front. 

If our nation is going to ask crews to explore space, it is our responsibility to do 

everything possible to ensure that those astronauts return to Earth safely. I’m not 

convinced this approach is the right one but I’m willing to listen. 

Chairman HALL. At this time I recognize Ms. Edwards for her 

opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 

words about Neil Armstrong. It really was quite a moving tribute 

in celebration of his life yesterday, and I think for those of us, 

whether we were mature back then or were just little girls in 

school, it made us come to appreciate the desire and willingness to 

explore uncharted territory, and I think has made me anyway as 

infectious about NASA and the space program as I have ever been. 

I want to thank our witnesses this morning and look forward to 

your testimony. And as my colleagues know, I am a strong supporter of NASA, both the science programs and the human 

spaceflight activities. I also am keenly interested in and excited by 

the entrepreneurial energy that is being devoted to human 

spaceflight these days. The passion of those working on commercial 

approaches to human spaceflight is indeed infectious, and as I have 

said before—no great secret—I want to be there myself. I want to 

fly. 

But that said, in my capacity as a member of this Committee, I 

have a responsibility, as we all do, to scrutinize each of NASA’s 

major projects to make sure that they are well planned and executable. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program has to be subjected to 

that same level of oversight and scrutiny if we are to do our jobs 

on this Committee. 

In that regard, I am concerned that NASA may not be holding 

that program, the Commercial Crew Program, to the same standard as other major acquisitions. Make no mistake: this is a major 

acquisition for NASA. When the taxpayer is footing the bill, paying 

on average 9 out of every 10 dollars that is being spent to develop 

these commercial crew vehicles, we are not talking about a 

straightforward purchase of commercial services from the GSA list. 

These services don’t even exist yet. 

I am puzzled and a bit frustrated that NASA appears to be unable or unwilling to acknowledge the warning signs that this major 

program is not on a firm path to success at present, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about that. In that regard, the 

written testimony of the Chair of the Aerospace Safety Advisory 

Panel, ASAP, Admiral Dyer, is illuminating. While his prose is cautious and understated, it is hard not to read the concern couched 

in such statements as, and I quote, ‘‘Lacking an independent cost 

estimate, we are uncertain as to affordability,’’ and continuing the 

quote, ‘‘However, we arrive at this point in time with designs that 

are maturing before requirements, and where government and in-
13 

dustry have not yet agreed on how winning designs will be accepted and certified. We worry that the cart is ahead of the horse,’’ and 

he continued, ‘‘NASA is just now undertaking to determine how 

systems will be certified to transport NASA astronauts. This timing 

increases programmatic risk and has serious potential to impact 

safety.’’ 

And so to that, I would add some of my own concerns, namely 

that not only do we not have an independent cost assessment to 

guide our Congressional deliberations, we don’t have independent 

assessment of when these commercial systems will actually be able 

to start operational service to the International Space Station. 

NASA is saying ‘‘in the 2017 timeframe’’ in Mr. Gerstenmaier’s testimony, and even 2018 in one of its notional planning charts, and 

I would note that both of those dates are within just a few years 

of the currently scheduled end of Space Station operations and 

years later than originally promised. Moreover, both of those dates 

appear to be based on assumed funding levels for the Commercial 

Crew Program that don’t seem to bear much resemblance to what 

Congress has authorized or appropriated so far, or is likely to approve in the foreseeable future. If that is true, then I think we need 

NASA to give us a cost and schedule estimate that is based on 

more realistic budgetary assumptions, so we can see what is most 

likely to actually happen, something we require for all other NASA 

major programs. 

In addition, NASA still has not given Congress a clear understanding of how much it will cost to fly our astronauts on these 

commercial systems. It is reported that NASA has had an independent assessment that estimates that NASA’s commercial crew 

seats are likely to be several times as high as Soyuz costs. If that 

is true, and I want to know whether it is true, we need to know. 

And finally, as alluded to in Admiral Dyer’s testimony, NASA’s 

latest approach to acquiring those commercial crew systems is, to 

put it charitably, ‘‘complex and unique.’’ Trying to run Space Act 

Agreements in parallel to FAR-based contracts may be a 

workaround, as the ASAP testimony phrases it, but that begs the 

question of why NASA didn’t just stick to its original plan for FARbased contracting. 

So we have much to talk about today. And as I close, I want you 

to know how much I appreciate the service that is rendered to this 

Committee and to the Nation on a continuing basis by the gentlemen appearing before us today. Both of you really have difficult 

jobs, and we appreciate your efforts, and thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENATIVE DONNA F. EDWARDS

Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses. I look forward to your testimony. 

As my colleagues know, I am a strong supporter of NASA, both its science programs and its human spaceflight activities. I also am keenly interested in and excited by the entrepreneurial energy being devoted to human spaceflight these days. 

The passion of those working on commercial approaches to human spaceflight is infectious—and as I’ve said before, I’d love to fly into space myself someday! 

That said, in my capacity as a Member of this oversight Committee, I have a responsibility to scrutinize each of NASA’s major projects to make sure that they are 

well planned and executable. NASA’s commercial crew program has to be subjected 

to that same level of oversight if we are doing our jobs on this Committee. 
14 

In that regard, I have to say that I am concerned that NASA is not holding that 

program to the same standard as its other major acquisitions. And make no mistake—this is a major acquisition for NASA. When the taxpayer is paying on average 

nine out of every ten dollars being spent to develop these commercial crew vehicles, 

we are not talking about a straightforward purchase of commercial services from the 

GSA list—these services don’t even exist yet. 

That said, I am puzzled and a bit frustrated that NASA appears to be unable or 

unwilling to acknowledge the warning signs that this major program is not on a 

firm path to success at present. In that regard, the written testimony of the Chair 

of the Aerospace Advisory Panel (ASAP), Admiral Dyer, is illuminating. While his 

prose is cautious and understated, it is hard not to read the concern couched in such 

statements as: 

‘‘Lacking an independent cost estimate, we are uncertain as to affordability.’’ 

‘‘However, we arrive at this point in time with designs that are maturing before 

requirements, and where government and industry have not yet agreed on how 

winning designs will be accepted and certified. We worry that the cart is ahead 

of the horse,’’ and 

‘‘NASA is just now undertaking to determine how systems will be certified to 

transport NASA astronauts. This timing increases programmatic risk and has 

serious potential to impact safety.’’ 

To that I would add some of my own concerns, namely that not only do we not 

have an independent cost assessment to guide our congressional deliberations, we 

don’t have any independent assessment of when these commercial systems will actually be able to start operational service to the International Space Station. NASA 

is saying ‘‘in the 2017 timeframe’’ in Mr. Gerstenmaier’s testimony and even 2018 

in one of its notional planning charts—and I would note that both of those dates 

are within just a few years of the currently scheduled end of Space Station operations—and years later than originally promised. Moreover, both of those dates appear to be based on assumed funding levels for the commercial crew program that 

don’t seem to bear much resemblance to what Congress has authorized or appropriated so far, or is likely to approve in the foreseeable future. If that’s true, then 

I think we need NASA to give us a cost and schedule estimate that is based on more 

realistic budgetary assumptions, so we can see what is most likely to actually happen—something we require for all of NASA’s other major programs. 

In addition, NASA still has not given Congress a clear understanding of how 

much it will cost to fly our astronauts on these commercial systems. It is reported 

that NASA has had independent assessments that estimate that NASA’s commercial crew seat costs are likely to be several times as high as Soyuz costs. Is that 

true? We need to know. 

And finally, as alluded to in Admiral Dyer’s testimony, NASA’s latest approach 

to acquiring these commercial crew systems is, to put it charitably, ‘‘complex and 

unique.’’ Trying to run Space Act Agreements in parallel to FAR-based contracts 

may be a ‘‘workaround,’’ as the ASAP testimony phrases it, but that begs the question of why NASA didn’t just stick to its original plan for FAR-based contracting. 

Well, we have much to talk about today. As I close though, I would like to say 

that I deeply appreciate the service rendered to this Committee and to the nation 

on a continuing basis by the two gentlemen appearing before us today. You both 

have very hard jobs, and we appreciate your efforts. 

Thank you, and with that I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady yields back. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning. I would like to join Chairman Hall in welcoming our witnesses to 

today’s hearing. You both have served the nation well in a number of capacities over 

the years, and we appreciate your dedication. 

I will try to be brief in my opening comments. It was a little less than a year 

ago that this Committee held its most recent hearing on NASA’s commercial crew 

program. At that time, I raised a number of concerns and questions that I believe 

Congress needed to have addressed if we were to adequately pass judgment on 
15 

NASA’s plans and protect the interests of the taxpayer. A year later most of those 

questions and concerns remain. 

I had hoped that in the intervening time, NASA would either converge on a realistic and executable plan within likely funding levels that could provide safe, affordable, and timely commercial crew transportation services to the International Space 

Station—or alternatively, determine that it couldn’t do so with a high likelihood of 

success within the available funding and then look for other ways of meeting its 

crew transportation needs. 

Unfortunately, NASA has done neither. 

Instead of converging on an executable plan, NASA has shifted its acquisition approach multiple times and now is proposing to carry out two distinct acquisition approaches in parallel. It has persisted in basing its program on budgetary assumptions that appear to be unrealistic based on both the authorizations and appropriations provided to date and the fiscal outlook facing the agency. And it still does not 

appear to have achieved a consensus within the agency on whether the primary purpose of the program is to provide crew transport to the ISS as soon as possible or 

to attempt to create a new commercial crew industry that doesn’t currently exist. 

While I hope that I am wrong, those don’t appear to be the characteristics of a 

program that is headed in a successful direction. And I see other symptoms of a program in trouble. First, despite repeated requests by this Committee and concerns 

voiced by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, NASA still has not had an independent cost and schedule assessment conducted for the commercial crew program, 

so we still do not know what the ultimate cost to the American taxpayer is likely 

to be, or when these systems are likely to become operational. 

Second, while a number of Members have supported the program because they do 

not like the idea of paying the Russians to transport our astronauts to the ISS, 

NASA has been unable to provide any evidence to indicate that the cost per seat 

to NASA will be any lower than the costs it incurs with the Russians. Instead, a 

number of the analyses done for NASA to date indicate that NASA’s cost per seat 

from commercial providers could be several times higher than the prices charged by 

the Russians. 

Third, while one of NASA’s stated goals for its commercial crew program is 

‘‘Achieving significant industry financial investment,’’ based on Committee staff calculations the recently awarded Space Act Agreements demonstrate that the companies selected are only willing to contribute an average of just 11% of the cost of developing the commercial crew systems-systems that the government will then also 

have to pay to use. I’m not sure I can explain to my constituents why they should 

consider that a fair arrangement. 

Finally, although I think most Members believe the primary justification for the 

commercial crew program is to provide crew transportation to the ISS as soon as 

possible, NASA’s own planning charts now show operational commercial crew transportation services to the ISS not starting until 2018-not the 2015 or 2016 dates 

agency officials were originally predicting-and only two years from the currently 

scheduled end of the Space Station program. Even that 2018 date appears to be 

based on funding levels from here on out that are not likely to be achieved. 

Well, I’m sorry that I can’t give a more positive assessment today. I really am 

excited by the work that the companies have done to date, and I certainly wish 

them well. However, as I said at last year’s hearing, I can’t let my enthusiasm for 

entrepreneurship override my responsibility to take a clearheaded look at NASA’s 

plans. I owe that to my constituents and to all of the American taxpayers. 

I will just close by again thanking our witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony. With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 
16 

Chairman HALL. At this time I am honored to get to introduce 

the panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. William H. 

Gerstenmaier, a very capable Associate Administrator of Human 

Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate at the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration. Mr. Gerstenmaier began 

his career at NASA in 1977 after graduating from Purdue University with a bachelor of science degree in aeronautical engineering. 

He has been before this Committee on many occasions. We have 

sought his advice. He has always been generous with it. During his 

tenure at NASA, he has led a number of activities associated with 

the shuttle, International Space Station and the shuttle Mir. Mr. 

Gerstenmaier has received a number of awards at NASA including 

the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Executives, and I welcome you once again, Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

Our second witness is retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Joseph W. 

Dyer, Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Admiral 

Dyer served a long and distinguished career in the United States 

Navy. He received his wings in 1971. He progressed through the 

ranks, eventually obtaining the position of Chief Test Pilot and 

Program Manager for the F–18 program, and from 2000 to 2003 

served as Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command. Today 

he is a Senior Executive with the iRobot Corporation. Welcome, Admiral Dyer. We are very delighted to have you with us here today. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes after which the members of the Committee will have 

five minutes each to ask questions. We will be generous with that 

with the value of your presentation here and your gift of your time, 

getting ready to come here and testify. 

I now recognize the witness’s to present their testimony. Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, you are recognized for five minutes, sir, to present 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS MISSION DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Thank you. 

I had the privilege of working with the teams that are developing 

and operating the systems that support human spaceflight. The 

teams take this responsibility very seriously. This is a tremendous 

responsibility and honor. These teams are doing their best to deliver and operate systems in efficient, effective, safe and cost-effective manners. The teams also recognize the sacrifices made by this 

Nation to provide NASA the funds necessary to pursue these endeavors. The teams believe the sacrifices made by the Nation will 

enable a better future. 

Sometimes folks like to talk about our development activities, 

commercial and traditional, as separate, unrelated activities. There 

have been two hearings this week, one on examining NASA’s development of the Space Launch System and Orion crew capsule, and 

today’s hearing, ‘‘Recent Developments in NASA’s Commercial 

Crew Acquisition Strategy.’’ I look at these as related activities and 

both in support of human spaceflight. The Commercial Crew Program is important to the International Space Station program. We 

need redundant crew transportation and rescue capability as soon 
17 

as possible. We need to back up crew transportation for this remarkable facility, the International Space Station. We have similar 

redundancy in cargo. We have different providers for cargo, and we 

need the same for crew. We need a very different system to enable 

exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, that is, for SLS and Orion. It 

has different technical capabilities. 

The current budget environment is making developing two systems, crew for ISS and the SLS–Orion for beyond low-Earth orbit 

a challenge. Both of these programs are needed for a human 

spaceflight program. We need to look at these programs supporting 

each other and ultimately the human spaceflight program for the 

Nation. The human spaceflight program in combination with 

NASA’s scientific robotic exploration program is providing a motivation for innovation, creativity and provides the Nation a chance 

to inspire students to pursue technical careers. 

My written testimony covers many of the recent events in Commercial Crew Program. We recently have made the Commercial 

Crew Integrated Capability Space Act Awards. The teams have 

completed requirement development for crew transportation. We 

have developed an overall strategy that uses Space Act and contracts. This strategy is outlined in a white paper that is publicly 

available. Two days ago, we put out a request for proposal for the 

first phase of the contract that will develop crew transportation for 

ISS. This is the first award of the first phase of a two-phase contract that we intend to award in February of 2013. We are still finalizing the details of our overall strategy in the outyears. 

And then we also put a white paper that describes our approach 

to certifying the designs for crew transportation, and this white 

paper is not to be confused with the white paper on acquisition 

strategy. This white paper talks about how we are going to actually 

certify the designs and how we maintain waivers, et cetera, and ensure the safety of the requirements that are in place, and we are 

looking for comments to this white paper that was recently released. 

We have listened to many outside expert advisors and built a 

sound strategy to deliver capability for this Nation in a cost-effective and safe manner. The approach to this program is different 

than past programs but shares many similarities. We have learned 

from previous activities and are putting that learning to work. We 

are also taking lessons from the commercial crew and applying 

those back to SLS and Orion. I am sure we will learn more as we 

progress. We are innovating as best that we can. It will not be easy 

developing a system to safety carry crew to he ISS. The teams have 

made tremendous progress in the last year. We still have many 

challenges ahead understanding the fiscal year 2013 budget, completing phase one awards for the certification acquisition, monitoring progress of our commercial providers as they head towards 

a critical design review level of maturity, and refining the outyear 

acquisition strategy. We will listen to the outside advisors and take 

their advice into consideration. 

I continue to watch the NASA team deliver programs and products that others thought impossible. With proper support from all 

of us, the NASA team will deliver a safe U.S. crew transportation 

system for the ISS. 
18 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:] 
19 

Statement of 

William H. Gerstenmaier 

HOLD FOR RELEASE 

UNTIL PRESENTED 

BY WITNESS 

September 14,2012 

Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

before the 

House Science, Space, and Technology Committee 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss the newest phase of NASA's Commercial Crew Program (CCP). We arc 

committed to launching our crew from U.S. soil on spacecraft built by American companies as 

soon as possible. This program is good for NASA, the American taxpayer, and the U.S. 

economy. American commercial crew transportation and emergency return services will enable 

the United States to fly its own astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS), end 

our sole reliance on foreign governments, increasc the ISS crew complement to 7 from 6, enable 

increased ISS research utilization, and allow NASA to focus on deep space exploration. The ISS 

is a tremendous national resource and having dissimilar redundancy in crew transportation is 

critical to effective utilization ofISS. Cargo transportation has dissimilar redundancy with four 

independent systems capable of ISS cargo resupply (Progress, ATV, HTV, and Dragon). For 

ISS crew transportation, we have only a single system the Soyuz. Lastly, the providers of these 

crew transportation services will also be able to market their low-Earth orbit transportation 

serviees to other non-NASA customers, thus improving the U.S. position in commercial space 

launch services. 

NASA is very pleased with tile progress our commercial space industry partners have made and 

continue to make in the development of crew and cargo transportation systems to date. SpaceX's 

demonstration flight to the Station in May 2012 achieved all of its test objectives enabling 

regular cargo resupply missions to be performed to the ISS. Moreover, the mission was 

completed at significantly less cost to the American taxpayers than if we had pursued a 

traditional, cost-plus development contract approach, and provides further confidence in our 

commercial space transportation strategy. Orbital Sciences is following elose behind, with test 

flights of its Antares rocket and Cygnus cargo spacecraft and their own demonstration mission to 

the Station planned in the months ahead. In fue Commercial Crew Program, our four funded 

CCDev 2 partners Blue Origin, Sierra Nevada Corporation, SpaceX and Boeing, and our three 

unfunded partners United Launch Alliance, A TK and Excalibur Almaz, have successfully 
20 

completed almost all of the planed milestones, with only four remaining to be accomplished by 

the end of the year. These milestones included major risk-reduction testing such as engine 

firings, parachute drop tests, astronaut evaluations, and wind tunnel tests, in addition to 

numerous technical design and safety reviews. 

On August 3,d, NASA announced three new agreements with American commercial companies 

to design and develop the next generation of U.S. human spaceflight capabilities. Known as 

Commercial Crew Integrated Capability, or "CCiCap," these newly signed agreements will 

enable advances that are intended to ultimately lead to the availability of commercial human 

spaceflight services for government and commercial customers. 

Undcr CCiCap, industry partners will advance the integrated critical design of their planned crew 

transportation systems, including the crew spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground systems, and 

mission control capabilities. The agreements commence with a 21 month base period that will 

run from August 2012 through May 2014, which includes completing major design efforts and 

risk reduction demonstrations, propulsion testing, abort tests, and landing tests. This 21 month 

period will lead to approximately a critical design review level of maturity for two of these 

companies. The agreements also include proposed optional milestones beyond the base period, 

which NASA may fund incrementally, as needed. The information provided in support of these 

optional milestones will be important to improving our cost models for development under this 

new system of acquisition. 

The companies selected for CCiCap agreements are: 

-- Tbe Sierra Nevada Corporation, of Louisville, Colorado 

-- Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX), of Hawthorne, California, and 

-- The Boeing Company, of Houston, Texas 

Sierra Ncvada will continue maturing their Dream Chaser spacecraft to be launched on an Altas 

V rocket, while focusing on safety analysis and subsystem technology maturation/risk-reduction. 

The Dream Chaser is a reusable, piloted lifting body, derived from NASA's HL-20 concept. It 

will glide to landings on a runway, similar to the Space Shuttle. Their agreement includes nine 

base period milestones, and is worth $212.5 million if all milestones are accomplished. Notable 

milestones include further atmospheric flight testing of the Dream Chaser engineering tcst 

article, two integrated system safety analyses, wind tunnel testing, and propulsion systems 

testing. 

SpaceX is maturing its Falcon 9IDragon transportation system, focusing on developing an 

integrated, side-mounted launch abort system and other crew systems. The un-crewed version of 

the Dragon capsule has already been demonstrated as part of the Commercial Orbital 

Transportation System (COTS) program, and will be used operationally as part of the ISS cargo 

2 
21 

resupply services effort beginning later this year. However, changes will be required for the 

cargo version to meet the requirements necessary to carry crew. The crewed version of the 

Dragon will land on land. SpaceX's fourteen base period milestones are valued at $440 million, 

and include pad and in-flight abort flight tests, primary structure qualification, and an integrated 

system critical design review. 

Boeing will continue developing its "CST-IOO" crew spacecraft, to be launched on an Atlas V 

initially, but capable of launching on other rockets. The CST -100 is a capsule-based spacecraft 

that leverages proven flight components. It will be reusable for up to ten missions and utilize 

airbags to enable land-based landings. Boeing's agreement includes $460 million for nineteen 

base period milestones including wind tunnel testing, a production design review, propulsion 

systems testing, a pilot-in-the-loop demonstration, and an integrated system critical design 

review. 

NASA is confident that these agreements for CCiCap will provide a cost-effective approach by 

which the partners can be innovative, creative, safe, and flexible in their design solutions to 

develop a commercial LEO crew transportation capability, while still maintaining competition 

for future stages of the program. 

Overall Commercial Crew Program Strategy 

NASA has a two-fold strategy to end the United States' sole reliance on foreign crew 

transportation to the International Space Station and utilize a safe, cost-effective U.S. Crew 

Transportation System (CTS) as soon as we are able to certi1'y those systems to carry NASA 

astronauts. 

NASA is using Space Act Agreements under the CCiCap phase to support the design and 

development of commercial crew transportation capabilities, as outlined above. 

NASA will use FAR-based contracts for the certification of commercially developed 

capabilities and for the procurement of crew transportation services to and from the ISS 

to meet NASA requirements. 

NASA is committed to ensuring that the requirements, standards, and processes for CTS 

certification for all commercial missions are held to the same or equivalent safety standards as 

Government human spaceflight missions. NASA certification will cover all aspects of a crew 

transportation system, including: development, test, evaluation, and verification; program 

management and control; flight readiness certification; launch, landing, recovery, and mission 

operations; sustaining engineering, and maintenance/upgrades. To ensure NASA crew safety, 

NASA certification will validate technical and performance requirements, verify compliance 

with requirements at the subsystem, process, and safety levels, validate that the CTS operates in 

the appropriate environments, and quanti1'y residual risks. 

3 
22 

NASA has detennincd that F AR-bascd contracts arc needed for ISS servicc missions and has 

decided to begin the initial certification efforts immediately to enable the earliest possible crew 

transportation. If NASA were to delay certification activities, the deVelopment of industry's 

capabilities could eventually reach the point where any changes necessary to meet NASA 

requirements would not be technically feasible or affordable, potentially extending our reliance 

on foreign systems. 

To mitigate these risks, NASA is moving forward immediately with plans to compete and award 

2-4 FAR-based fixed-price contracts in CTS Certification Phase I that will begin early NASAmanaged certification activities. These contracts are referred to as Certification Products 

Contract(s) (CPCs). The dcliverables will inelude early life-cycle certification products 

(alternate standards, hazards analysis, and verification, validation, and certification plans). The 

period of perfonnance will be approximately IS months, with an expected award date in 

February 2013. CPC awards will not exceed $10 million per award. 

At the conclusion of the CPC, NASA anticipates that more than one commercial provider will 

have achieved the technical maturity of an integrated critical dcsign state to enable a Phase 2 

competition for the CTS Ccrtification Contract. A separate, fonnal solicitation (RFP) will be 

released for the Phase 2 Certification Contract. Under NASA's planned strategy, the Phase 2 

CTS Certification Contract will include development, test, evaluation, and certification activities 

enabling NASA to assess the CTS capability for perfonning ISS missions in compliance with 

NASA requirements to ensure NASA CCP mission and safety objectivcs are achicved. To 

provide an incentive to any commercial provider who is successful in achieving CTS 

Certification, the Phase 2 contract will include, as options, a nominal number of crewed missions 

to the ISS following successful CTS Certification. NASA believes that having more than one 

contractor through Phase 2 would provide significant advantages for insuring safe and affordable 

CTS through competition. The ultimate number of awards will be driven by technical maturity, 

funding availability, and mission needs. An acquisition stratcgy white paper has been developed 

that lays out the strategy for these procurement activities. The whitepaper can be accessed from 

the Commercial Crew Program website (hltp:llcommercialcrew.nasa.gov/) under the "Program 

Forum" link. 

Phase 2 Certification activities will then lead to a competitive acquisition for the provision of 

commercial ISS transportation services using FAR-based, fixed-price contracts, similar to the 

manner in which NASA has contracted for commercial cargo services. Based on the information 

the Agency has received to date and assuming reasonable budget levels and technical progress, 

we believe that this acquisition strategy can enable services beginning in the 2017 timeframe. 

This estimate takes into consideration not only the schedule plans of our current industry 

partuers, but also the NASA certification work described above. Beginning CCiCap now, and 

awarding the CPCs by early 2013, will ensure we stay on track for achieving the 2017 goal. We 

recognize that some of the industry providers are aiming at a service date earlier than 2017 and 

we will be able to take advantage of an earlier date if it occurs. 

4 
23 

Conclusion 

Following the example of many successful industries in the past, the United States is now 

entering a new era in spaceflight that harnesses the innovation and ingenuity of the private 

sector. This capability will provide cargo and crew access to LEO, while NASA once again 

pushes the boundaries of human exploration. The ISS has now entered its intensive research 

phase, and this phase will continue through at least 2020. In order to realize the promise of this 

facility, NASA will be relying on U.S. industry to provide cargo resupply, return and disposal 

services, as well as crew transportation and emergency return services. While there are still 

challenges ahead, the recent success of the SpaceX COTS demonstration mission is a harbinger 

of the potential of procuring transportation services from private entities. 

Human spaceflight is a very difficult endeavor and achieving routine commercial crew 

transportation is a challenge, but NASA is structuring an approach that provides the highest 

probability of success. NASA's current path is a solid approach for developing and acquiring 

crew transportation services in a manner that is cost-effective and provides for crew safety. 

Procuring commercial crew transportation services from U.S. industry will allow NASA to focus 

its resources on the development of vehicles that will take our astronauts beyond LEO for the 

first time since 1972, furthering the legacy of the late Neil Armstrong and building on the 

incredible recent successful landing of the Mars Science Laboratory Curiosity rover on the 

surface of Mars. Support to this activity is also critical to ISS, which is key to the future of 

human spaceflight. ISS not only can provide research valuable to the people of the earth, but is 

also needed for NASA to reduce the risks associated with astronauts travelling for extended 

times beyond low Earth orbit. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond to any question you or the other Members of the 

Committee may have. 

5 
24 

Chairman HALL. Thank you. 

I recognize Admiral Dyer to present his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. DYER, 

U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), 

CHAIRMAN OF THE AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL 

Admiral DYER. Thank you, Chairman Hall, distinguished members of the panel. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

As requested, I will present the ASAP’s perspective regarding 

NASA’s current acquisition approach for the Commercial Transportation System. As noted in our 2011 annual report, the Commercial 

Crew Program remains an important topic for the ASAP. We have 

closely followed the program and its progress and its acquisition 

strategy. 

Sir, my outline for remarks today are how high should the bar 

be set with regard to safety, the certification contracts, a big step 

forward but how will they be administered, this relationship between the SAA and FAR contracts that Congressman Edwards addressed, and lastly, clear communications. 

Congressman Hall, when I went through this with my wife last 

night, it took me seven minutes. She said that wasn’t too bad for 

a Southerner. I told her you would understand. 

In our 2011 report, we addressed the question, and I quote, ‘‘How 

safe is safe enough?’’ The pursuit of great reward often comes hand 

in hand with great risk so it has always been with explorers. The 

answer to the question must come from a balance between risk and 

reward and should reflect a consensus among the American people, 

the White House and the Congress. It is not our purpose or intent 

to answer the question, how safe is safe enough. It is instead to 

point out areas where we believe the stated requirement may not 

produce the requisite safety. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier’s team produced a retrospective review of the 

space shuttle safety program and risk with the benefit of 20/20 

hindsight. During those genesis days, there was a belief that the 

risk of loss to crew was one in a thousand. Retrospectively, we believe now that it is one in 12. The design goal or design baseline 

for commercial space is one in 270 for a specific mission. So we 

raised the question, are we raising the bar high enough. That remains to be seen but I know it is very much on the mind of NASA. 

In our submission, sir, we provide a checklist of what we believe 

are the six most important items, and as our practice, we have 

color-coded them red, yellow, green to reflect what we believe to be 

their status. 

A solid green and a giant step forward is that NASA has clearly 

communicated to the partners-cum-contractors that certification is 

a fundamental requirement of transitioning NASA and transporting astronauts to and from space. 

Three elements that we code as yellow, they are progressing. 

They are advanced significantly by the certification contracts but 

not yet in hand or establishing solid requirements, promulgating 

how the agency will verify those requirements and a validation and 

verification plan. 
25 

Two elements that are red in our mind deal primarily with the 

process that contractors shall follow on the path to certification. 

Congresswoman Edwards, as you indicated, it is not yet clear to us 

how waivers and deviations will be approved, who is accountable 

and how the process shall be administered. 

Lastly, both from the Congress’s perspective and NASA’s perspective, budget and budget stability are a significant challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, informally, Committee staff has asked, is the 

Space Act Agreement appropriate to support the development of 

commercial crew transportation capabilities. To date, many maintain that the freedom and flexibility of an SAA have enabled creativity and innovation, and it may be delivering greater value for 

money. That may be true. However, we arrive at this point in time 

with the designs that are maturing before requirements, where 

government and industry have not yet agreed on how winning designs will be accepted and certified. 

The current acquisition approach and funded under the SAA construct is concurrent with a contracted or FAR-based certification 

program. It is unique and it is complex. In our opinion, this approach is a workaround for the requirements and the communication and challenges implicit in the SAA. It is not clear yet to the 

panel how the safety requirements necessary for certification will 

flow from the FAR contract to the SAA partners. 

Let me speak specifically to communication, and I would submit 

this is my most important message of the morning. In our travels 

to Boeing, SpaceX, Orbital Sciences, Sierra Nevada and Blue Origin, we have heard pros and cons with regard to the SAA. Flexibility is universally the prime advantage. However, as the design 

matures and begins taking shape, partners seek reassurance that 

they are on the right track that will lead to successful certification. 

They posed specific questions about what NASA will eventually require of the designs but NASA interprets that they cannot provide 

the answers to these SAA questions, to these questions under the 

SAA construct. We asker the partners so in that case what do you 

do. One contractor answered by saying ‘‘We look for nonverbal communication, you know, body language and winks and nods.’’ Mr. 

Chairman, if you are the congressionally charted panel tasked to 

watch over safety, this is not a comfortable communication approach for requirements. 

The FAR-based certification contract has the potential to overcome this challenge but it is a workaround for the downsides of 

Space Act Agreements. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Dyer follows:] 
26 

Statement of 

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Retired) 

Chairman 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration's 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

before the 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and distinguished Members, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. As requested, I would like to present the NASA 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's (ASAP's) perspective regarding NASA's current acquisition 

approach for the Commercial Transportation System (CTS). 

As noted in our 2011 Annual Report, the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) remains an 

important topic for the ASAP. We have been closely following the Program's progress and the 

acquisition strategy for the CTS. 

The Panel is especially focused on requirements, design, and certification, given the historical 

reassessment of risk that was performed on the Space Shuttle. In that regard, I would like to 

quote from the ASAP's 2011 Annual Report: 

"How safe is safe enough?" The pursuit of great reward often comes hand in hand with great 

risk-so it has always been with explorers. The answer to the question must come from a balance 

between risk and reward and should reflect a consensus among the American peopJe, the White 

House, the Congress, and NASA. 

It is not our intent or purpose to answer the question; however, we point to areas where we 

believe the stated Tequirement may not produce the requisite safety. We especially invite your 

attention to the section "Reassessment of Space Shuttle Risks" and the historical gap between 

anticipated and deployed systems risk. 

[The results of the NASA analysis are depicted in the following graphic 1 
27 

One key finding was that the risk on a new system that has not been flown before and thns has not 

been through the rigors of real-life flight is probably much higher thau what the initial risk 

assessments show. The reason for this difference is that at the beginning of operations, all the 

failure mechanisms are not fully known. In the language of risk analysis, such unknown failure 

mechanisms are often called "unknown-unknowns." In the Shuttle's case, the first flight risk as 

now retrospectively calculated was in actuality I in 12 for LOC [loss of crew J, yet at least one 

analysis that existed at the time of the initial launch estimated the risk to be I in 1 ,000 or better. 

In other words, the system was almost JOO times more dangerous than the early analysis 

indicated. This type of disparity must be remembered when future targets for reliability and LOC 

numbers are chosen for new programs. One thing that has always been said in the design business 

is that engineering design standards take care of the "knowns"; factors of safety take care of the 

"known-unknowns"; and margin is what takes care of the "unknown-unknowns." A significant 

margin for error should be allowed for the unknown-unknowns as well as to create a robust 

design. 

2 
28 

NASA has detennined that CTS certification contracts are needed for the International Space 

Station (ISS) mission. Quoting from a NASA white paper on NASA Commercial Crew 

Program (CCP) Updated Acquisition Strategy, August 2012: 

"NASA has decided to begin initial certification efforts immediately to enable the earliest 

possible crew transportation. If NASA were to delay certification activities, the 

development of industry's capabilities could eventually reach the point where any 

changes necessary to meet NASA requirements would likely not be technically feasible 

or affordable, potentially extendiug our reliance on foreign systems. 

To mitigate these risks, NASA is moving forward immediately with CTS Certification 

activities, as depicted in Fignre 1. By instituting critical, yet limited, early certification 

activities as soon as possible, NASA has the opportunity to minimize technical risks, and 

cost or schedule impacts that would result by waiting to begin CTS Certification 

activities after industry's designs have been completed." 

Industry PDR ____ CDR======== Design c: ____ _ Maturity 

.: Phase: 1 Cert 

Figure 1: NASA's CTS Certification Activities 

Continuing to quote from the NASA white paper: 

"As depicted in Figure 2, NASA plans to award 2-4 FAR [Federal Acquisition 

Regulation )-based fixed-price contracts in CTS Certification Phase I to begin early 

certification activities. These contracts are referred to as Certificatiou Products 

3 
29 

Contract(s) (CPCs). The scope of the CPCs will be limited to submittal and tecbnical 

disposition of the following specific, early lifecycJe certification products: Alternate 

Standards, Hazard Analyses, a Certification Plan, and a Verification & Validation Plan. 

The CPC activities will not include any design, development, test or evaluation activities. 

The CPC period of peri'0D11anCe will be approximately] 5 months, with an expeeted 

award date in February 2013. CPC awards will not exceed $10 million per award, and the 

total value of all CPC awards is expected to he $30-40 million." 

Commercial Crew Transportation System Development 

Certification for ISS Crew Transportation 

[-G;tif;;;;ti;p;~;a;m~j 

Likely 2:4 <tIwiiJrds 

RfP' 

ISS Crew Transportation Services 

Figure 2: Overall CCP Roadmap 

At the conclusion of the CPCs, NASA anticipates that more than one commercial provider wil! 

have an integrated design with sufficient technical maturity to enable a Phase 2 competition for 

the CTS Certification Contract. The ASAP agrees. 

NASA believes that having up to two contractors through Phase 2 would provide significant 

advantages for ensuring safe and affordable CTS through competition. The ultimate number of 

awards wilt be driven by technical maturity, funding availability, and mission needs. We agree 

that having two contractors through Phase 2 is advantageons. Lacking an independent cost 

estimate, we are uncertain as to affordability. 

The ASAP offers a check list and provides our color-coded stalus assessment below. [A note on 

colors: _ highlights what the ASAP considers to be a IOllg-stauding concern or an issue that 

has not yet been adeqnately addressed by NASA. highlights an important ASAP 

concern oj' issne, but one that is currently being adclressed by NASA. iB indicates a 

4 
30 

positive aspect or a concern that is being adequately addressed by NASA but continues to be 

followed by the Panel.] 

a .• Clearly communicate to the contractors that NASA certificatIOn is a fundamental 

re uirement prior to trans orUna NASA and NASA sponsored astronauts into s ace. 

b.. Establish solid requirements (Improving with the advent of the Certification 

Product Contract and Certification Contract) 

c .• Promulgate how the Agency will verify that requirements are being met-

(Improving as in b., above) 

d .• Possess a validation plan that confirms the required capability - (The plan is late, 

butwill be produced in the upcoming CPC contract) 

. 0 Clearly layout a process that the contractors shall follow on the path to certification 

(It is not yet clear how waivers and deviations will be approved, who is accountable 

and how the rocess shall be administered) 

.0 Stabilize NASA's budget at a level sufficient to execute the plan- (Made mor 

ifficult by the lack of a good cost estimate and a stable acquisition Ian) 

Mr. Chairman, in your invitation letter of September 7, 2012, you asked that I relay the ASAP's 

assessment on NASA's current acquisition approach. We believe that the Phase 1 and Phase 2 

approach to cIear the certification "fog" is a significant step forward. We believe, and NASA 

concurs, that both Phase 1 and Phase 2 must be FAR-based contracts. The Panel believes a fixed 

price contracting approach is satisfactory for Phase 1 , where establishing technical standards is 

the objective. NASA has not yet decided upon contract type for Phase 2, which encompasses 

interim certification, verification, and validation. 

The ASAP strongly believes that only a cost type contract is appropriate for Phase 2. We believe 

that fixed price type contracts are appropriate for low risk undertakings where the requirements 

are clearly understood by both the government and the contractor(s). Phase 2 is neither, and we 

believe both schedule and safety would be enhanced in a cost-plus environment. Why? While 

Space Act Agreements (SAAs) may have stimulated new companies to enter the business, much 

remains unsettled. Design has preceded requirements, and with the recent phased approach, 

NASA is just now undertaking to determine how systems will be certified to transport NASA 

astronauts to and from the ISS. This timing increases programmatic risk and has serious 

potential to impact safety. 

Additionally, any number of Department of Defense (DOD) programs provides evidence that the 

presumed cost advantages of fixed price deVelopment may be illusory. The following picture 

perhaps best illustrates the result of trying to manage fixed price development. 

5 
31 

Mr. Chairman, informally, the committee staff has asked, "Is a Space Act Agreement appropriate 

to support the development of commercial crew transportation capabilities'?" To date, many 

maintain that the freedom and flexibility of an SAA havc enabled creativity and innovative 

design solutions and may have delivered greater value for money. That may he true. However, 

we arrive at this point in time with designs that are maturing before reqnirements, and where 

government and industry have not yet agreed on how winning designs will be accepted and 

certified. We wOITY that the cart is ahead of the horse. 

The cnrrent acquisition approach·-·CTS Development that is funded under an SAA conculTenl 

with Certification that is funded under a FAR-based contract-is complex and unique. In onr 

opinion, this approach is a workaround for the requirements and communications challenges 

implicit to the SAA. It is not yet clear to the Panel how the safety requirements necessary for 

certification will now from the FAR contract to the SAA "partners." 

Let me speak specifically to the communications challenges under SAAs. In our travels to 

Boeing, SpaceX, Orbital Sciences, Sierra Nevada, and Blue Origin, we heard pros and cons 

about SAAs. Flexibility is universally the prime advantage; however, as design matures and 

begins taking shape, the partners seek reassnrance that they are on a track that will lead to 

snccessful certification. They pose specific questions abont what NASA will eventually require 

of the designs, but NASA cannot provide those answers nnder the SAA construct. We asked, "In 

6 
32 

that case, what do you do?" One contractor answered by saying, "We look for nonverbal 

communication ... you know, body language and 'winks and nods'." If you are the 

Congressionally-cbartered Panel tasked to watch over safety, this is not a comfortable 

communication approach for requirements. The FAR-based certification contract has the 

potential to overcome this challenge, but it is a workaround for the SAA's downside. 

In summary, in the Panel's view, NASA is being very creative and doing all it can to develop a 

commercial crew transportation capability on a very limited and potentially unstable budget. 

However, they unquestionably face a number of challenges in reaching the point where these 

systems can be confidently certified as being "safe enough" for the astronauts that rely on this 

process to ensure their safety. 

7 
33 

Chairman HALL. Admiral, thank you. It was a very good presentation. You kind of shook your finger in our face there once. Did 

you do that to your wife? 

Admiral DYER. She usually does it to me. 

Chairman HALL. Good testimony, and we thank you for it. 

Don’t judge the interest of this Committee by empty chairs here 

because November 7th or 6th is coming pretty soon, and we have 

just a few working days. Each of them has somewhere to go. I am 

not unlike each of them because I have to leave the chair to go to 

the Floor for a while and I am going to ask the Chairman of Space 

and Aeronautics, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, to 

take the chair until I get back, and not to get used to it or don’t 

enjoy it too much. 

Mr. PALAZZO. [Presiding] I want to echo Chairman Hall’s comments, and thank you again for your solid testimony. I would also 

like to remind Members of the Committee, rules limit questioning 

to five minutes. The Chair will at this point open the round of 

questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Admiral Dyer, this is going to be directed to you. Many of us on 

this Committee lived through the aftermath of the Columbia accident investigation and remember some of those lessons. NASA 

needs clear requirements and good communication with its companies. Your testimony points out how NASA’s planned approach, 

where development is funded by SAA concurrent STET with certification funded by FAR-based contract is complex, unique, and a 

workaround for the communications and requirements that are 

necessary to ensure safety and NASA’s final certification. If your 

panel is not comfortable with this approach, then Congress should 

not be comfortable either. What is the worst-case scenario from this 

process and what keeps the ASAP up at night? 

Admiral DYER. Well, sir, there are a number of things that keep 

us at night, and let me address two uber ones and then I will home 

in a little closer. The first worry is frankly that another administration takes another approach to space program, as we have seen 

over the last several Administrations in our country. If that happens, it is going to be a long way to Mars. Closer to home, this 

issue of clarity and focus is important, we believe, from the ASAP 

perspective. There are different leadership perspectives within 

NASA, and frankly, there is some lack of clarity that makes the 

program harder to manage, that along with the cost estimate that 

Congressman Edwards mentions. 

The agency knows how to build space systems. The agency knows 

how to support economic development. But the concurrency and 

some uncertainty as to which is prime is making the program harder to manage. Likewise, the budget lack of a cost estimate on behalf of NASA and the uncertainty and instability as funding finds 

its way to NASA are probably the largest worries. To get to the 

bottom perhaps of the question you are asking, were NASA to run 

short of funds and in an attempt to deliver with lesser funds if they 

were to continue with the Space Act Agreement and put aside the 

FAR-based contracts, we think that would not lead to a good place. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Admiral Dyer, proponents of NASA’s commercial 

crew acquisition approach often tout the monetary contributions of 

the companies as an example of efficiency in government con-
34 

tracting, the implication being that the company should have some 

skin in the game. Yet as a business leader, I am sure you understand that companies only lay out money if they believe they can 

get it back plus an adequate return on their investment. Would you 

comment on how the life cycle costs of NASA’s current approach 

could lead to higher seat prices to the government than if standard 

contracting had been used in the beginning? 

Admiral DYER. Well, I am an engineer like my friend, Bill 

Gerstenmaier, so let me use the technique of let us look at it in 

the limits and then decide where we are somewhere in between. On 

one end of the continuum, if a company pays the total bill in and 

of themselves, then they should have total freedom and the marketplace should determine the utility but the buyer in this relationship has only an indirect influence on what the company designs 

and delivers if they are doing it all themselves. Over on the other 

end of the continuum in a more classic government, fully government-funded undertaking, the government has great influence as 

the buyer. They can specify what they want and what the system 

should deliver. We are on neither one of those continuums. We are 

somewhere in the middle with a significant amount of money being 

paid by the government, a smaller amount of money being ‘‘skin in 

the game,’’ as you call it, but the influence in some people’s mind 

is the inversion of that. Even though there is a small amount of 

contractor money in the game, there is tremendous influence via an 

SAA. 

So let us just for argument’s sake say that we are totally in the 

middle and everybody is paying 50/50. Does that represent a good 

lifecycle cost equation? Well, it does if it succeeds but it doesn’t if 

it fails. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Mr. Gerstenmaier, would you like to respond? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, I would say that I think the advantage 

here to the contractors is, they see a market out there for these vehicles and this capability beyond NASA’s needs so they look at 

what they are doing with their rocket development and it can be 

used for other applications and it can fly in other areas separate 

than NASA, so they have a market beyond us so they are willing 

to put some development funding into this activity so they can support that other activity when it comes about with their capability 

they are developing, and that will essentially lower the cost for us 

in development. 

So what we are doing is, we are essentially allowing them to take 

the work that they are doing, the development they are working on 

for the launcher, for example. In the case of SpaceX, that launcher 

can be used to launch satellites in another market separate from 

NASA. That helps them expend or receive revenue in those other 

areas, so that is the reason that they are contributing. Boeing looks 

at it. They see another market out there for commercial crew 

flights to space and so does Sierra Nevada as well. So they see another market out there so they are building this capability not only 

for NASA but for their own use, so therefore it is appropriate for 

them to contribute some portion of the developmental costs to this 

activity. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. 

I now recognize Ms. Edwards for five minutes. 
35 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. I don’t know if others heard it, but I have to tell you, Admiral 

Dyer, I hear real warning signs coming out of your testimony and 

particularly when you talk about proceeding with designs before 

you have requirements. I just don’t get that. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, does the schedule that you outlined in your 

acquisition strategy assume that you will receive the President’s 

budget request level of $830 million per year for the remainder of 

the development program? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Based on our BPD submit in 2013, it does 

from 2014 on. We expect to receive that level of funding. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Do you think that level of funding really appears 

likely in the current fiscal environment, and what would be the impact on your schedule if you get an annual funding level of $500 

million per year? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, where we are for 2013 is, we are uncertain about the funding level in 2013 because we are sitting here 

with a Continuing Resolution so we are held back basically at the 

funding level of 2012. We have accommodated for that funding scenario in 2013 here where we have been hoping in 2013 we would 

get somewhere around the Senate level that has been discussed in 

some of the bills. We will see what we get. Then from 2014 on out, 

we are looking at getting in the 800 level of funding, and as part 

of the PB14, we will provide you the details of the cost estimate, 

the details of the budgeting that go behind that in an effort to try 

to get support for this program that we think is critically important 

and we need on the order of the $800 per year in 2014. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I strongly suggest that, especially in this environment here, to pen an estimate of completion and activity based on 

a hope is a real challenge, I think, for the agency. 

Admiral Dyer, does NASA’s commercial crew budget seem sufficient to you and what are your considerations as you answer that 

question? 

Admiral DYER. NASA of course supports the President’s budget 

but I will tell you from close and long-term association with the 

folks at NASA, they feel they are underfunded. They feel they are 

challenged to deliver what they are asked to accomplish with the 

funding available. They are being innovative, and that is good, but 

I recommended, Mr. Chairman, in my first appearance before this 

Committee some years ago that if I could give NASA and the Congress a single gift, it would be a good cost estimate. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Can I just ask you then, given that statement, 

how is it that in the absence of an independent cost and schedule 

estimate can we in Congress know with any level of confidence 

what it will get for whatever budget NASA proposes? 

Admiral DYER. Well, that is a challenge. It is an understanding 

of what it is going to cost to deliver, number one. Number two, it 

is a confident place to stand with the best of conscience because 

somewhere along the line of fewer dollars, longer time, less money, 

there must be a place where good conscience says we can’t deliver 

for this. Now, I will tell you right up front, I have 30 years of association with Charlie Bolden and the very highest respect for Bill 

Gerstenmaier. These folks will not violate good conscience but we 

are making it hard for them. 
36 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

And just as I close, Mr. Gerstenmaier, can you just tell me why 

you failed to seek an independent cost assessment and a schedule 

for the Commercial Crew Program and isn’t it the norm for all the 

other NASA major programs to do such? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have the basis for our cost estimate 

which we have provided to you. It is not a traditional cost estimate. 

If you look at what we are doing here, we are procuring under a 

hybrid discussion, as we talked about the Space Act portion and 

the contract piece. We ask the contractors as part of the commercial crew integration capabilities Space Act to give us the cost to 

go all the way to a demonstration flight. We now have that cost 

data available from those proposals. We are going to take that cost 

data now and run it through an independent group to take a look 

at that and develop an independent cost estimate based on that 

data we received from them and will provide that to you as part 

of the President’s budget request for 2014. So we will give you the 

data associated with what we have got from the contractors or from 

the Space Act activities and we will provide that to you as an independent assessment as we go forward in 2014. And to be frank, 

that was as fast as we could get it to you with this hybrid approach 

that we were taking. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, and I yield. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Smith from Texas for five minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, you have a wonderful reputation for your 

technical knowledge and for being a good manager, so I would like 

to direct some questions to you. The first one is that I appreciate 

the funding constraints that have been mentioned, but has the 

White House sent any signals to you to go slow either on Orion or 

SLS? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. No, we have received no signals to go slow 

on either Orion or SLS. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Next question is, when it comes to NASA and 

the target deadline of 2014 for the first test launch of Orion, what 

are the odds that NASA will make that 2014 deadline? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have very solid plans to have the Orion 

capsule ready to support that 2014 test flight. Our plans now show 

delivery of that vehicle. It is actually in Florida undergoing outfitting in Florida. It should be complete and ready to be turned over 

to the launch vehicle at the end of next year, in December of 2013. 

What we are waiting on is the launch vehicle. The current launch 

vehicle availability is September of 2014, and so pending the 

launch vehicle, I believe we will be ready to fly in 2014. But the 

capsule work is going very well. We we are working heat-shield 

problems. We are working some avionics problems. We are working 

some parts problems. That is all normal stuff we do normally. We 

have got schedule margin. We will have the vehicle ready to go fly 

at the end of 2013. All we need is a launch vehicle. 

Mr. SMITH. A hundred percent sure? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I am never a hundred percent sure but we 

will be ready before the launch vehicle is ready. That I can tell you. 
37 

Mr. SMITH. Great. Another odds question. What are the odds that 

Boeing and SpaceX and Sierra Nevada will meet their scheduled 

deadlines? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. If you take a look at some of their proposals 

or you discuss with them, they show earlier crew transportation 

dates than 2017. They think they can be earlier than those dates. 

From a NASA perspective, we backed off. We said it wasn’t appropriate to accept their dates. We wanted some margin in that. So 

we have done our planning based on a 2017 delivery date, which 

gives us some margin. 

Mr. SMITH. So you have every expectation they will meet their 

deadlines? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think they will be a little bit late from 

what they are advertising in their proposals but they will be there 

about the time we estimate in 2017. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you for that. 

My last question is this. There has been some discussion about 

the definition of ‘‘commercial’’ as it is applied to commercial crew 

and cargo programs. What percentage of the funding for those programs comes from the private sector and what percentage of the 

funding comes form NASA? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. It varies by each one of the participants in 

the Space Act the amount, and it is proprietary to the companies 

the exact percentage, but there is a contribution by them. It is 

smaller in some cases and larger in other cases. 

Mr. SMITH. Overall, it has been my understanding that 80 or 90 

percent of the funding comes from NASA. Is that a ballpark legitimate figure? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I would say the majority of the funding is 

coming from NASA for this activity. 

Mr. SMITH. Does that raise any questions about applying the 

term ‘‘commercial’’ to some of these enterprises or are you comfortable with that application? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We could have a long discussion about what 

the term ‘‘commercial’’ really means. The way I look at it is, I 

would not use that term specifically but what we are doing is, we 

are getting a contribution from the contractors to help in this activity because they believe there is another market out there. If you 

want to pin the term ‘‘commercial’’ on that, you can pin the term 

but the facts are what I described. 

Mr. SMITH. And regardless, we appreciate what they are doing 

and their capability as well. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Ms. Bonamici from Oregon for five 

minutes. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for your 

testimony and for all you do. 

Admiral Dyer, I want to follow up on the issue of how the role 

of Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is shaped based on the underlying purpose of the commercial crew initiative, and I know in the 

past ASAP has written about the need for clarity and consistency 

of purpose, and you talked about that in your testimony. So in 

ASAP’s opinion, is the purpose of the Commercial Crew Program 
38 

to develop the commercial space industry or is to acquire transportation to the International Space Station? 

Admiral DYER. Well, that is a great question and one that we 

have asked and one that is not entirely clear in its answer, at least 

to us. Is it economic development, looking back to the 1930s and 

the role that government played in what became our aviation industry via the airmail programs or is it transportation of astronauts to the International Space Station and to low-Earth orbit. De 

facto, I think the answer is both, that NASA is attempting to do 

both. But part of what we mean by a lack of clarity is an answer 

to which is the priority and which is first function and first focus. 

Sometimes I think the administration and leadership of the program is harder because those priorities seem at least to ebb and 

flow. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

And I wanted to ask Mr. Gerstenmaier, the work that NASA 

does is very important to everyone in the country, but in the district I represent in Oregon, it is home to a lot of high-tech companies in an area known as the Silicon Forest, and though they may 

be not directly NASA related, the technology companies in the district certainly all benefit from the development of new, innovative 

solutions that NASA has been responsible for over the years. So I 

want to ask about the development of a domestic alternative to the 

Russian Soyuz spacecraft that is currently being used to transport 

crew members to the ISS, and apparently you have indicated earlier this year, I believe in Senate testimony, that the domestic alternative is expected to reduce costs, and I understand it may be 

too early to determine the exact value of that cost reduction and 

those savings but will you please discuss what factors you will be 

considering in making the eventual determination and discuss particularly how or whether NASA will consider the intangible benefits that a domestic alternative may have, especially in the area of 

innovation and economic development. It is a balance, and I wonder if you could suggest how we can use this acquisition policy to 

simultaneously encourage private-sector creativity and innovation 

but without diminishing the safety of our astronauts. Thank you. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. You articulated very clearly all the things 

we are trading back and forth. We clearly have to keep safety as 

number one in this activity and make sure we have a transportation system that can keep our crew safe, and Admiral Dyer described pretty clearly what one of the big questions is how safe is 

safe enough, and we are going to have to work collectively to determine that. None of us can do that individually but we will definitely adhere to safety. 

Innovation is very important. Doing things domestically is also 

important, to challenge our folks to do things a new way, to look 

at using commercial products to look at other ways of getting crew 

to space has tremendous advantages to us domestically here in the 

United States. We also would like to get good value. We budgeted 

at roughly the Soyuz seat price in the outyears with inflation going 

forward. We would like to get lower than that and we will see 

where the costs come in as we go through this activity and we get 

better understanding of where things move but I think the things 

you describe are things that we need to trade across each other. 
39 

The one that I think that becomes a line around is safety. At some 

point we don’t trade beyond that. We need to make sure we get a 

capability that will support what we need. Then the next piece 

comes in, the cost side. If the costs go extremely high, which we 

don’t think they will, we think we have a good chance to get the 

costs less than Soyuz but if they go high then we need to trade, 

are we getting significant benefit on the innovation side and the 

domestic production side to make that warranted, so we will articulate to you to the best of our ability where we see that information 

fall out and with you we can help make those trades that are right 

for the Nation. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much. I yield back. Thank you, 

Mr. Chair. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Rohrabacher from California 

for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am trying to get a feel for what is really going on here, and 

first let me ask, this hybrid system that you are talking about obviously this is not a pure commercial system that we are working on. 

Obviously we are heading in that direction. Perhaps that is why 

that term is being used. That system was put in place and it has 

been utilized this one time for the supply of the space station. How 

much did that save us or did that cost us to utilize that new system rather than the traditional ways that NASA has been using to 

resupply the space station? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. In the case of cargo, I can’t give you a specific number of what we saved, but if you look at the launch costs 

and the cargo delivery, it is substantially less by using the Space 

Act approach than actually acquiring the services under a FAR 

part 12 contract for the actual delivery of the services. So that has 

been a significant savings to us. 

The thing that we need to consider with crew is, there is another 

dimension and that is the safety aspect, and we need to watch that 

as it goes forward, but there was a significant savings by using this 

approach with cargo. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, and a significant savings, and did you 

identify that there was a significant greater risk of using this hybrid system? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think that the risk in the case of cargo was 

schedule. We got the systems delivered to us later than we would 

have desired but we were able to extend the shuttle with an extra 

flight that made that risk tolerable to have that schedule delay acceptable to us overall. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is a lot of concern being expressed 

today about extending a system that has already worked for cargo 

and trying to utilize that for crew, and it has already proven very 

significantly successful in terms of financially without really identifiable risk except of the schedule, and now people are very concerned that we might apply that same hybrid principle to crew. 

Now, obviously we are concerned about the lives of the crew. Let 

me also—so that is just one fundamental that I see going on here 

in this hearing. 

And Admiral, you said something in passing that sort of started 

me thinking. It is a long way to Mars basically unless we have this 
40 

steady—if we can’t count on steady funding. Let me suggest that 

I think that nobody wants to face the fact that we can’t afford to 

go to Mars now. The bottom line is, in order to have steady funding, we are going to have to defund every other space project that 

we have. Nobody wants to face that. Maybe if we are going to provide safety, maybe if we are going to provide reliability and do this 

professionally, maybe we should set our goals to something that we 

can actually accomplish within the budgets that are possible without destroying every other aspect of the space program. I think 

that is what is happening here today. That is what we are really 

discussing. And I think there is a lot of things that we can do in 

space. I think that this hybrid system that we are talking about 

now will give way to really a commercial industry in which we can 

have people perhaps putting—we have an example of that from the 

gentleman in Nevada right now who is building space systems that 

they can put up there and inflate, and they have already actually 

put one up into space where you have a space habitat not done by 

the government, and it just seems to me that if we are going to be 

the number one space power, we have got to have responsible goals 

in mind. 

I went to Neil Armstrong’s funeral ceremony yesterday, and of 

course, I am of the generation that he was the ultimate hero of our 

generation, and I think he will be the ultimate hero of a thousand 

years of human history quite frankly, but that Apollo program, it 

appears to me that some people want our entire space program to 

be based on the structure of Apollo. They want—and we did that 

for the moon. I don’t think we can do that for the entire—and expect to accomplish the great other things that we have to accomplish. We can’t do that for Mars at the expense of what it would 

take and expect to have any other kind of space program. We have 

some very serious issues that we need to discuss in terms of safety 

as we move forward in terms of the way we approach things. 

I appreciate both of you today giving us a lot of insights as to 

where we are at and how to proceed, so thank you very much. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Clarke from Michigan for five 

minutes. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

This question is for both of you gentlemen, and it deals with the 

differences between acquisitions through the FAR and the Space 

Act Agreements. Specifically, in your opinion, how would the outcome of the award and the evaluation of this contract for transportation services be different under the FAR as compared to granting 

the money through Space Act Agreements? How would the outcome 

of the award and evaluation process be different? 

Admiral DYER. I will go first and quick and tell you that the 

panel doesn’t have access or knowledge with regard to source selection so I am afraid I am no help with that one, sir. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I would say that the differences at the top 

level are with the Space Act, NASA loses the ability to direct the 

contractor exactly how the requirements are done. As Congressman 

Edwards talked about, we can see what is happening in the design 

but we cannot directly influence the design so we get a lot of insight into what is happening. We can see how they are designing 

the vehicle. We can see how they are putting it together—Admiral 
41 

Dyer talked about that—but we cannot give them positive feedback, is that design good or is that design not good. We can just 

listen to the design and be there. In a contract, we have the direct 

ability to interact with the contractor and tell them exactly what 

we want, the way we want it and ensure that it meets our requirements. What we are doing with this hybrid approach is we are letting them have this freedom to go ahead and design but then we 

are holding it almost in parallel as fast as I can. In February of 

2013 we will have a contract in place where we can then have them 

tell us whether they want to use alternate standards, they don’t 

want to build it the way we want to. We can provide direct feedback to them under this contract. We are going to ask them how 

they do hazard reports, how they control the risks associated with 

spaceflight. We can provide direct feedback to them. So what we 

are trying to do is, we are trying to take the advantages of a Space 

Act that allows them to run fast and quick but then we are in parallel going to put on top of that a mechanism that we can get some 

ability to interact with them in a more formal manner to actually 

control the design, that we get something that comes out the other 

side that we can actually use. So those are kind of the advantages 

and disadvantages. If you did a pure contract, we would be much 

more involved and it would be probably a little bit longer process 

and a much more costly process if we did just a pure contract. 

Admiral DYER. Congressman Clarke, just to shirttail on Mr. 

Gerstenmaier’s comments, NASA is the keeper of our body of 

knowledge on how to get systems into space. So to have better and 

clearer communications, to overcome that problem that Bill just 

voiced is the thing that we think would be most important as we 

go forward in any construct in any type contract. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back my time. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Bartlett from Maryland for 

five minutes. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your testimony 

and your service. 

I understand that it is now generally conceded that transportation via this new vehicle could cost several times as much as 

going on the Soyuz. Is that correct? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We don’t believe that that is the case. We 

have done some kind of worst-case analysis, I would say, to go 

ahead and bound the upper limit of the budget, and that is what 

you may be referring to where we have some cost estimates where 

the seat price is higher than the Soyuz, but then when we look at 

what we have got in CCiCap proposals, we look at what we have 

done under this new method and we can see various approaches 

that get us below essentially what we believe the Soyuz seat price 

is. So I think we have seen both. We will continue to go work those 

and see where we are, so we see a range of prices. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Obviously from a national-pride perspective, we 

would rather be riding our own horse. Was there any discussion up 

front as to how much we might be willing to pay in excess cost to 

make this happen? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have not had that discussion in terms of 

excess cost. I believe that is still in front of us as we bring this design a little bit more to maturity. 
42 

I think the other piece is, it is not just having our own horse but 

I talked about it in my oral a little bit, to have another way to get 

to space station with our crews other than just the Russians is tremendously important. You know, even when we had the Columbia 

tragedy, we could not have kept crews onboard space station. We 

could have not continued to assemble space station without the 

Russians being able to back us up with transportation. So no matter how good a transportation system is, for an asset that is critical 

as the space station is to get research done and continue to moving 

forward, we believe we need an alternate way to get to space station, and that is what we are doing with our crews and that is 

what we are doing here with this activity, this commercial crew 

transportation activity. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand our goal for this new asset in terms 

of safety is one in 273. Can you tell me what that is for the Soyuz? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We don’t have an exact number associated 

with Soyuz. We have looked at it from a historical standpoint. We 

don’t have a detailed understanding of the systems design and the 

hardware designs but we looked at it and we would say the Soyuz 

is equivalent to that but I can’t provide to you a detailed analysis 

that shows exactly that equivalency, but if you look at the flight 

history of the vehicle, the amount of time they have flown, I would 

say that in a more qualitative discussion, you can say they are 

roughly equivalent. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I really hate to ask this next question because I 

am a scientist and a huge supporter of NASA and human 

spaceflight. If the sequester occurs, it would cut defense about $50 

billion next year. Defense is about one-fifth of our spending. So let 

us be fair and cut everything a commensurate amount. That would 

mean $250 billion next year. That means we are cutting Medicaid, 

Medicare, Social Security. These cuts are considered draconian and 

impossible but if they occur, the full $250 billion, that would be 

somewhere between only one-fourth and one-fifth of our deficit. 

Now, if we cannot possibly cut one-fourth to one-fifth of our deficit, 

how do we ever get there? I have 10 kids and 18 grandkids and 

two great-grandkids. Obviously it is not going to be business as 

usual. Obviously we can’t continue doing the same things that we 

are doing now, and there is going to have to be a line that we draw: 

above that we fund; below that we can’t fund. How do we determine where we put this program, above or below that line? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. No, I am not sure I can even answer that 

question. We can talk about our programs. We can talk about the 

value of the programs but then it is ultimately up to this body and 

a larger body to decide what the right answer is to that question. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral? 

Admiral DYER. I really don’t have anything to add to Bill’s last 

comment, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. The Chair recognizes Mr. McNerney, the gentleman from California. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to see you 

back here this morning again. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, let us talk about the Commercial Crew Program for a little while. Now, is the plan—I understand what you 
43 

said earlier that we are not going to completely eliminate looking 

at the Soyuz as a backup program but does this eliminate the use 

of the Soyuz as our main reliable carrier for all of our crews or are 

we going to still rely on the Soyuz every so often for our transportation? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Our intent would be to use this U.S. space 

carrier for all the transportation to and from ISS. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. That is good. 

Admiral, do you think that the Commercial Crew Program is receiving more or less scrutiny than the oversight NASA would receive if there were no private-sector involvement? Do you think 

there is more or less scrutiny now? 

Admiral DYER. The essence of the Space Act construct limits the 

flow of information and prohibits direction from NASA into the 

partners. They are not contractors. ‘‘Partners’’ is the operative 

word. So I think an honest answer to your question is that there 

must be less because this large body of knowledge that NASA holds 

is more difficult in its transfer to those that are building the future 

space systems. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. That isn’t the answer I expected. Does that put 

us at more risk then in terms of safety for our astronauts? 

Admiral DYER. You know, sir, you can build confidence in systems that fly in a couple of ways. The first way I will mention is 

difficult, expensive and long in coming, and that is that you just 

fly it enough or launch it enough to where statistically you have 

built the confidence that it is good to go. That is not a launch or 

two or three or even ten, but if you launch enough, you can build 

confidence that it is solid and it is ready to go. And frankly, I think 

that is part of our confidence in the Soyuz system. 

On the other end of the continuum, you can have detailed knowledge of the design, detailed insight into the build, and intimate 

knowledge in the truthfulness of the people. That comes with the 

intimacy that in our opinion is difficult to establish in the Space 

Act Agreement. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. I appreciated your earlier comment, 

Admiral, that your biggest gift would be an accurate budget assessment. What do you think the most difficult part of the budget is? 

Is there a specific item or is it just too many uncertainties all up 

and down the chain? 

Admiral DYER. Mr. Gerstenmaier, I think, spoke to it when he 

said this is a different animal. We know how to do a classic contract, classic FAR-based government procurement. This isn’t one of 

those for many and perhaps many good reasons. So it is more difficult but I don’t think it is impossible. I will speak with a little 

more freedom than I did in my DOD days when I was sitting in 

testimony on the Hill and tell you that one of the things that I like 

about a solid cost estimate is it gave me a confident place to stand 

if it was cogent. They are never right, by the way. They always 

evolve. But if it gives you a cogent place to stand, then I could be 

supportive and defensive of the budget that I thought it would take 

to execute. And then if that budget was cut, other folks wore some 

of the responsibility for reducing the funding to that program, be 

it extended schedule, be it increased risk, be it what have you. But 

others had to wear some of the responsibility. If you don’t have a 
44 

cogent cost estimate, you don’t have a place to stand for that conversation. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you for your frank answer, Admiral. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. All right. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 

now recognizes Mr. Brooks, the gentleman from Alabama, five minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Gerstenmaier 

and Admiral Dyer, thank you for your service. 

I would like to get into the finances a little bit more. It is something you all have touched on. And if you could, share with me 

what is each Commercial Crew Integrated Capabilities participant’s total private investment, or, in a different way of approaching it, the percentage of the government commercial crew award 

versus the private investment in these programs. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I can’t provide the specifics because 

it is proprietary to the companies but it is on the order of probably 

80 percent, 90 percent as we have discussed government investment. It could be a little soft around those numbers but it is on 

that order overall, and it varies from partner to partner in the 

Space Act activity. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is it fair to say then that the private-sector contribution to the total cost is in the neighborhood of 10 to 20 percent, the inverse of 80 to 90 percent? What is your degree of confidence that the private sector is contributing somewhere between 

10 and 20 percent, not more, not less? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think we have pretty good insight into 

what is going on, and we believe that they are contributing on that 

order. There is no reason to doubt that they are actually contributing those portions that we have discussed. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you have any data that establishes the amount, 

perhaps that you can’t share with us today because it is proprietary? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I don’t have any direct data. You know, you 

would typically ask me, do I have a 533, do I have an accounting 

sheet, a record formally transmitted from, and I do not have that, 

but we see it from evidence of work they are doing, activities they 

are doing and other things, so we indirectly can attest to the numbers that I just talked about. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. And continuing, Mr. Gerstenmaier, at 

a rate of no more than two NASA missions per year, most analysts 

conclude that only one provider will ultimately be needed. If only 

one provider is selected to provide this service, how much government funding will have been provided to the other firms that will 

not be providing subsequent services to the United States government? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. If you want a precise number, I can take it 

for the record and we can go calculate what that number is, but 

there will be funds that will have gone to these other providers 

that are not providing a service. The question is, is the market 

going to be just ISS or is the market going to be bigger than ISS. 

What we hear from these commercial companies is they believe 

that there is a market for their spacecraft that is beyond the government’s need. They believe there is a commercial-sector market 
45 

for that. So even though one of these companies may only provide 

services to NASA for our ISS activities, the others may have another market to go do that can be there. Then I have the advantage 

from the government side is now I have another contractor that I 

could go back and pick up to go provide services later in some future activity if we decide to extend, for example, space station beyond 2020 and we need some additional services. It may be someone else in the market for us to go by. So we are investing in that 

other contractor as you described but we potentially get some benefit if they can generate a market on their own. 

Mr. BROOKS. That underlying premise in the question was that 

there would only ultimately be one provider needed to do the twoplus or minus NASA missions a year. Is that an accurate premise? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I believe that is where we are looking for the 

actual services flight we are looking at potentially we say likely one 

provider in that region. I think the other reason we want to carry 

multiple providers earlier is, it provides a competition across those 

providers which keeps them meeting NASA requirements, it keeps 

them wanting to invest their own funding in this activity so that 

avenue of competition up front also gives us some pretty strong 

benefits to help us get a good price coming out the end, even 

though we may ultimately down-select to just one contractor or 

one—yeah, one contractor. 

Mr. BROOKS. In the Committee notes for this hearing, it states, 

‘‘On August 3, 2012, NASA ordered Space Act Agreements to three 

different companies with a combined value of $1.113 billion. Boeing 

will receive $460 million, SpaceX will receive $440 million and Sierra Nevada will receive $212 million.’’ Is that consistent with your 

recollection? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. And if I do the math correctly, if only one of these 

three companies is ultimately going to be providing services to the 

United States government, if, for example, that happens to be Boeing just because they are the ones that are receiving the most 

money, that means roughly $650 million would have been spent on 

companies for which NASA is not getting any direct service but we 

are spending the money on the hope that some day that competition will lower the cost. Is that a fair assessment? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I would add that the benefit of having competition, it is very difficult at this stage in the development to pick 

a winner. If I knew with certainty which one of those companies 

could actually come through this process and deliver a product out 

the other side, I could pick now. But at this point in where we are, 

I want them to continue their development. I want them to get into 

tests. I want to see how their hardware flies. I want to understand 

whether they have a safe system or not. And that, I guess the extra 

cost you describe, I believe that gives us significant benefit that it 

gives me an opportunity to select another provider if I see one system is safer than another. It gives me an option to move forward. 

So even though there is an extra cost, I believe there is a significant benefit to us, not monetarily but from a capability standpoint 

and from a safety standpoint of carrying multiple providers at this 

phase. 
46 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier, for sharing your insight on why we are doing what we are doing. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional minute. 

Chairman HALL. Thank you, sir. 

I will recognize Mr. Hultgren of Illinois for five minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, NASA’s acquisition plan includes a costly phase, and I think it is about $4.5 billion of optional milestones. 

I wondered, would these optional milestones if selected; using 

Space Act Agreements or Federal Acquisition Regulations, so SAA 

or FAR? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. They are only available for us to exercise 

under the Space Act and they are only—and we have the ability 

to exercise them one at a time. So we don’t need to pick up the entire phase. We could do those one at a time but they would be 

under a Space Act. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Do you know, do the companies expect the optional milestones are part of the certification path? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think you would have to ask the companies. I don’t anticipate using those in the certification activity. We 

believe we are going to move to this certification products contract 

phase one followed by a phase two as shown in the white paper. 

We may choose to implement one or two of those milestones but we 

will be careful about which ones of those we choose and we will 

make sure they are justified and understood and they provide significant value back to the U.S. government. 

Mr. HULTGREN. So your expectation from NASA’s point of view 

is that they wouldn’t be used, or if they are used, there would be 

very minimal usage. Is that right? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I would say selective. We will use those if we 

selectively see some significant advantage to us to pick up one of 

those milestones or two of those milestones in that period. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Admiral Dyer, from your perspective on the safety advisor panel, what are the pitfalls do you think of this process? 

Admiral DYER. I don’t know that there are any that I haven’t 

mentioned in terms of communications, et cetera, et cetera. It does 

touch on that what keeps you at night worry, though, and that is, 

there is tremendous pressure in any government agency and any 

government program to force fit the job to be done into the money 

available. So if money does run short, we worry that there may be 

an attempt to certify not via a FAR contract but via the Space Act 

agreements perhaps with a very limited demonstration of safety 

without the insight. That wouldn’t be a good thing. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Mr. Gerstenmaier, you mentioned kind of what 

your thoughts or expectations would be as far as the optional milestones go. I wonder would they really only become affordable if the 

Commercial Crew Program is funded at a higher level than it receives today? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. As we project forward in our budget submit for 2013, you know, we are looking for $829 million or so in fiscal 

year 2014, we think we need those funding levels. It is not clear 

that a funding level would directly tie to these milestones, in other 

words, if we had more funding, would we implement these milestones? I would look at it more from a technical benefit standpoint, 
47 

does this provide an ability to advance or to get more safety insight, does this give us an additional test that is critical to us. So 

it is kind of a—I don’t know. We would look at them and evaluate 

whether it makes sense, so it is not tied to the overall funding level 

whether we would implement those optional milestones or not. 

Mr. HULTGREN. If I can change direction just a little bit, while 

not directly related to today’s hearing, I wondered, Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, if you could comment briefly on the current state of 

the J–2X engine? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. The J–2X is doing extremely well down in 

Stennis. We fired that engine for, I believe, up to 19 minutes, 

which is one of the longest firings we have had in any liquid-engine 

test program. It is meeting all its milestones, all its performance 

activities. It is proceeding extremely well down in Stennis. 

Mr. HULTGREN. I wonder if there any threat of money being redirected away from J–2X development toward some of these other 

programs? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, we need to look at the overall needs 

of the program of what the right approach is as we move forward 

for the heavy-lift launch vehicle. The upper stage clearly needs this 

J–2X engine if we are going to get into 130-metric-ton region. We 

can also get in that same lift capability by changing the boosters 

on the side of the SLS. We have an advanced booster contract to 

go take a look at that to see other liquid systems that may go on 

the side. So we are actively trading those back and forth. We may 

slow down the testing a little bit on J–2X if we think that gets us 

to a faster capability for SLS or we may keep it right at the same 

path we are on right now, but the intent is, I want to take J–2X 

until we have that system fully wrung out and ready to be an operable system for the future. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Well, I see my time has just about run out. 

Thank you both. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman HALL. I thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Ms. Adams, the gentlelady from Florida, for 

five minutes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, can you describe the working relationship 

that NASA has with the CCiCap companies and how that relationship helps NASA guide the development of these new vehicles, especially since our biggest concern is that NASA does not have the 

authority to impose safety requirements at this stage in the development? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have teams located at each one of the 

CCiCap providers. Those teams get insight into the daily activities 

and the design that is occurring and the work that is occurring on 

those designs as they are moving forward. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Are you having open dialog with CCiCap? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have full insight into what they are 

doing and what activity is going on. We don’t have the control side 

but we have full insight into what they are doing. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So you don’t have a conversation back and forth? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think that is probably a fair way of saying 

it. 
48 

Mrs. ADAMS. I want to talk about the cost of Atlas V rockets. The 

price of an Atlas has skyrocketed under the evolved expendable 

launch vehicle administered under the Air Force. My understanding is that the Commercial Crew Program will greatly lower 

the cost of crew launch for our Nation. However, NASA has selected two proposals that are using Atlas V vehicles. Is NASA 

somehow getting a cheaper price than the Air Force is getting? 

NASA paid over $220 million per launch for the Atlas V rocket for 

the GOES–R and GOES–S missions. Is the cost similar to what we 

paid under the Commercial Crew Program, or what will be paid 

under Commercial Crew? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. What we are doing under the Commercial 

Crew Program is, we are getting integrated service, which is transportation of crew to the ISS. It is then up to the commercial crew 

providers to negotiate with United Launch Alliance for the cost of 

the rockets that you described over the cost of the Atlas V. That 

is internal to their contract. What I am looking for is a total cost 

on the other side, and it would be best for you to talk to the individual CCiCap providers to get their insight into what their relationship is with United Launch Alliance. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Okay. Do you believe it will be more cost-effective 

than what the U.S. Air Force is doing? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I don’t have insight into that. I know what 

the seat price is on the other side or the anticipated seat price, and 

there needs to be some efficiency there. It does help in the sense 

that it is helping throughput through the system and that helps 

lower some of the marginal costs which could potentially benefit 

both sides. It could potentially also lower costs for other satellite 

providers as well as for us. 

Mrs. ADAMS. If NASA receives level funding on the order of $500, 

$525 million over the next several years for Commercial Crew? 

Does the acquisition plan hold together; will you get the services 

agreement sometime in 2017? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. As part of our budget submit, we will go look 

at some alternate funding scenarios and show you what is available at those various funding levels. I don’t have that information, 

or I am not prepared to talk about it today. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So you can’t talk about whether you think you will 

get to a service agreement by some time in 2017? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Well, I think it would be better for us to 

take that for the record and then go ahead and actually put the 

numbers together and show you where it is as part of our PB14 activity. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Okay. In the plan presented today, what would 

NASA reduce, eliminate or extend if the program is flat-funded? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Say the question again. In terms of—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. In the plan presented today, in the plan presented 

today, what would NASA reduce, eliminate or extend if the program is flat-funded? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, what we would do is, we would go 

look and see what our options are. If we say flat-funded, we would 

look into extension, we would look at other alternate activities. 

What we need to be cognizant of is what Admiral Dyer talked 
49 

about, if I get a certain funding, we need to go take a hard look 

at this and say is this something we can actually deliver. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Are you not having contingency plans? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have contingency plans but not of the 

level that you just described because I am still struggling with exactly what my fiscal year 2013 budget is. Is it 406, which it was 

back in 2012, or is it the Senate or the House version that sits out 

in front of us. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Go back to the awards. If they were made under the 

FAR-based selection process, how would the decision process be different? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We followed a pretty rigorous process to do 

these funded Space Act awards. It didn’t fall under the exact definition of the FAR activity. It has certain constraints. But the spirit 

and the intent of what we did in our reviews, the way we did our 

deliberations, the way I set up the teams, the way we did the evaluations, the way we did the criteria is all consistent with what the 

FAR was but we didn’t follow the exact letter of the law of the 

FAR. 

Mrs. ADAMS. But it is very close? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. It is very close. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will yield back. 

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady yields back. 

I think we are about out of soap here. We are going to have to 

quit washing pretty soon. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, I didn’t get to have a question, but as I came 

back in, you were talking about how the Russians had supported 

the space station after the Columbia accident, and I guess my question is, how much can we rely on the Russians to supply Soyuz 

after 2016 even if NASA is no longer a customer there? It is my 

understanding we are paying them something in excess of $50 million now and by then it will be around $62 million. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, as we—— 

Chairman HALL. We are no longer buying seats unless we are. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We intend once we get our capability we 

would no longer purchase seats from the Russians. We have a problem in July 1 of 2016. We have the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act which prohibits us from providing funding or even 

bartering for capability from the ISS. We are going to need some 

relaxation in that Act to continue to operate the space station with 

the Russians. So we could not—we are prohibited now from buying 

seats beyond that July 2016 date with the Russians currently. We 

anticipate that some legislation will get approved in the next year 

that may help us with that current problem. 

Chairman HALL. Okay. I think that answers the question I had. 

Ms. Edwards had a brief question to close on. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

Chairman HALL. Your time is up. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I just adore him. 

Chairman HALL. Go ahead. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to follow up on that, in terms of—so you will be seeking a 

waiver then for INKSNA, and if that is true, do you actually have 
50 

a legislative proposal? Because presumably that would need to happen at the end of 2012 or early next year, right? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We need it in the spring of next year, and 

we have been working with several folks and working internal to 

the Administration to get a proposal to come forward. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. Mr. Gerstenmaier, it would just be 

really helpful to have that, especially if you look at our calendar 

this year and early next year. It would be helpful if we had something to bounce off of. Thank you. 

Chairman HALL. Thank you for your brevity. 

Now, the questions are completed, I presume. We have no one 

else. I want to thank the witnesses for their very valuable testimony, and if the Committee—any members of the Committee who 

are not here who have other business here have questions for you, 

we will submit them to you and would really appreciate your being 

able to answer them to us in writing. They will be submitted in 

writing, and we will keep the record open for two weeks for additional comments from other members. 

We thank you again over and over for your testimony and for 

your time, and you are excused. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(51) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
52 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier 
53 

Commercial Resupply Services contracts, what is NASA's negotiated composite 

cost per kilogram of payload? 

In a follow up question about the cost savings that have resulted from the 

commercial cargo program, you said, "I think the risk in the case of cargo was 

schedule. We got the systems delivered to us later that we would have desired but 

we were able to extend the shuttle with an extra flight that made that risk tolerable 

to have that schedule delay acceptable to us overall." What was the cost ofthe 

extra shuttle missions that were required as a result of the delays of the commercial 

cargo program? 

Your written testimony states that having dissimilar crew transportation services is 

'critical' to effective utilization of the International Space Station. Is NASA 

committing to contracting with two launch services providers, or does it expect to 

only have one U.S. provider? 

Based on NASA's CCiCap acquisition plan it appears 'the agency intends to solicit 

and award a services contract about half-way through the phase 2 certification 

contract. Please explain how NASA will evaluate the compliance and suitability of 

competing proposals when they are nine-months to one-year shy of completing 

their phase 2 work? 
54 

Questions from Rep. Donna Edwards 

To William Gerstenmaier 

1. As NASA has acknowledged, risks are higher using an SAA because the agency 

does not have approval authority over how companies are meeting those 

requirements. 

a. How is NASA addressing the risk of commercial partners potentially not 

meeting NASA safety or performance requirements at the end of the base 

CCiCap period? 

b. What will NASA do if designs produced do not meet NASA's safety and 

performance requirements and are deemed unacceptable? 

c. If NASA requires redesign or rework of completed systems, what impact 

will this have on costs and schedule? Who will pay these added costs? 

2. At the hearing, you indicated that NASA would consider using some of the CCiCap 

optional milestones. 

a. Wouldn't funding any of the CCiCap optional milestones undercut the 

whole purpose of the FAR-based certification phase contracts, which is 

preserving NASA's ability to mandate that its requirements be met and to 

provide NASA with the documentable need to verify that fact? 

b. Are there any conditions under which you would fund the optional 

milestone of a crewed flight to the ISS? If so, what are they? 

3. ASAP testified that NASA's latest acquisition strategy seems like an overly complex 

approach. 

a. If the rationale for switching to Space Act Agreements was funding 

uncertainty, what makes NASA believe that the FAR-based certification 

contracts won't be subject to that same funding uncertainty? 

b. If NASA believes that FAR-based contracts are needed, why not make the 

whole acquisition FAR-based instead of the current patchwork approach? 

4. Your Source Selection Statement identifies one of the five CCiCap strategic goals as 

"Achieving significant industry financial investment". Yet, it appears that on 

average, the companies are only willing to assume little more than a 10 percent 

share of the cost of developing their systems. 

a. Given that, why did you accept any of their proposals? 

b. Why didn't you either tell them that they had to contribute a higher cost 

share, or alternatively, scrap the SAA approach and go back to your FARbased acquisition strategy, since the government is paying almost all of 

the development costs? 

5. Your Acquisition Strategy White Paper states that to ensure NASA crew safety, 

"CTS Certification will validate technical and performance requirements, verify 

compliance with requirements at the subsystem level, process level and safety 

1 
55 

product level, validate that the CTS operates in the appropriate environments, and 

accept residual risk to NASA based on the governance model." 

a. How does NASA establish when residual risk is deemed "acceptable" and 

"unacceptable"? 

b. What relationship does that risk have to a governance model? 

6. Almost all of the studies available to date examining the cost of commercial crew 

transportation systems on a per seat cost basis include, as a cost component, 

associated development costs. This makes sense since the eventual litmus test 

of which alternative is better requires consideration of the government's total 

investment. How will costs spent as part of NASA's commercial crew 

development activities--CCDev, CCDev2, CCiCap, CPC, and Certification 

Contract-factor into the comparison between the seat costs using commercial 

providers and that using the Russian Soyuz? If such development costs are not 

factored into the comparison, how can this be a credible comparison? 

7. During the hearing, referring to the Soyuz, you indicated that you needed an 

alternate way to get to the ISS. You also said that your intent was to use the 

domestic commercial carrier for all transportation to and from the ISS and that 

Soyuz transportation would no longer be required. 

a. With the possibility of a single commercial provider for operational 

services, wouldn't NASA be in the same position it is in currently, namely 

having no alternate way to the ISS? 

b. Does this call for the establishment of a contingency approach in 

conjunction with the award for commercial crew services? 

c. How would this affect what NASA needs as part of any potential INKSNA 

legislation? 

2 
56 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER 

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Friday, September 14, 2012 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

THE HONORABLE RANDY NEUGEBAUER (R-TX) 

U.s, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Recent Developments in NASA's Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy 

To Mr. Gerstenmaier and V ADM Dyer: 

NASA will allow companies to propose alternative standards to agency requirements. Assuming 

current standards reflect decades of experience gained from launching a variety of previous 

vehicles, what is the most effective and ohjective method of assessing the soundness of a 

proposed alternative standard? What steps will NASA take to ensure that adopting an alternative 

standard in no way diminishes the level of safety? 

To Mr. Gerstenmaier: 

Why isn't there more synergy and cross-investment between NASA's SLS and Orion programs 

and NASA's Commercial Crew program? Why hasn't NASA leveraged the investments from 

Constellation to support commercial crew designs? 
57 

Responses by Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.) 

NASA AEROSPACE SAFIITY ADVISORY PANEL 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Washington, DC 20546 

VADM Joseph W. Dyer USN, (Ret.), Chair 

The Honorable Ralph M. Hall 

Chairman 

Committee on Science and Technology 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Mr. Hall: 

October 26, 2012 

Enclosed are the responses to the written questions submitted by the Members of the Committee 

on Science and Technology, resulting from the September 14,2012 hearing regarding the Recent 

Developments in NASA's Commercial Crew Acquisition Strategy. 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 9 9t"-

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.) 

Chair 
58 

September 14, 2012 Hearing on 

Recent Developments in NASA's Crew Acquisition Strategy 

Response to Questions from Chairman Ralph Hall 

1. To what degree does a launch vehicle's flight history mitigate the overall level of risk and the 

need for extensive certification work? 

• Can commercial crew proposals from competing companies with markedly 

disparate flight histories of their launch systems, such as between the SpaceX 

Falcon 9 and the Atlas 5 EEL V, be evaluated adequately and objectively? 

• What priorities should the government consider in this process? 

• Technically, flight history, or the lack thereof, doesn't change the inherent reliability or 

risk of a given design. It does, however, provide some insight into estimating that risk. 

Unfortunately, the number of flights required to give statistical confidence is often too 

high; this is especially true with expensive spacecraft. For flight history to be the primary 

basis of a safety certification, test cost would most probably eclipse any prior saving. 

Insight into the basic system design, component testing, configuration, manufacturing 

quality, and process techniques are required to provide the basis for certification. 

• Yes, systems with markedly different flight histories can be evaluated adequately through 

a certification process that takes these factors into account. The fidelity of the input data 

must be known to be high. Timely development of that certification process and the 

associated criteria should be the top NASA priority to facilitate timely safety 

certification. 
59 

Response to Questions from Acting Ranking Member Donna Edwards 

1. ASAP's May 2012 Quarterly Meeting minutes highlighted the importance of NASA laying out its 

requirements early to avoid "the illusion of no need for certification because of a few early 

successes. Certain flight successes can play an important role in developing confidence in the 

design, but should not negate the need for a formal certification by the government." 

a. Based on NASA's current acquisition approach, is ASAP still concerned about the 

agency possibly allowing "a few early successes" to substitute for meeting formal 

certification requirements? 

b. If so, what should Congress do in its oversight to address ASAP's concern and what 

NASA actions would satisfy ASAP? 

a. Because senior NASA leadership understands that a few flight successes cannot 

substitute for a rigorous certification process, the panel is not as concerned about the 

agency making that mistake as we are concerned by the potential of those outside the 

agency doing so. The Panel is concerned there is risk of the agency being pressured to 

proceed without adequate evaluations based on a well-designed certification process. 

b. Congress should provide adequate resources and time to conduct necessary insight and 

certification processes. The Phase 1 Certification Products Contract (CPC) should 

provide a good measure of what needs to be done and how long it will take. 

2. ASAP's 2011 Annual Report stated, with regard to the change in acquisition strategy, that "if 

NASA is deciding to take on more risk because the cost is otherwise prohibitive, then the Agency 

should be clear about that increased level of risk acceptance and develop approaches to manage 

that risk." 

a. Has NASA established an acceptable risk level for commercial crew systems? If not, 

should it? 

b. Has NASA examined the cost of reducing risks? If not, should it? 

c. Does NASA have a way to establish when risks are excessive? 

d. What are ASAP's plans for continued review of the Commercial Crew Program with 

regards to safety and risks? 

a. In July 2010, NASA established both "Threshold" and "Goal" probabilities for Loss Of 

Crew (LOC) for manned missions to the ISS. These values were -1/300 as the maximum 

acceptable risk, or threshold, and -1/1500 as an eventual or "mature system" goal. 

Because of the historical tendency to underestimate these risks at the start of complex 

programs, the Panel has stated that we would prefer more conservative and better defined 

values. 

b. NASA has not completed a holistic, formal cost estimate for the overall Commercial 

Crew Program. The Panel believes a creditable cost estimate would be a great aid in 

making cost trades. 

c. Technology exits for assessing the expected safety of rocket systems. NASA is currently 

in the process of developing policies and procedures for applying available techniques to 

the Commercial Crew agreements. The Panel has recommended that development of such 

certification policies and procedures be accelerated. The recently announced, FAR-based 

certification contracts have potential to accomplish this task. 
60 

d. The ASAP intends to keep Commercial Crew as a prime focus. However, please note --

as an outside advisory panel, the ASAP is not chartered to do in-depth engineering 

analysis of the various systems. Properly, this must be a NASA undertaking. 

3. During the hearing, in response to a Member question on NASA's plans regarding the CCiCap 

optional milestones under the SAAs, Mr. Gerstenmaier said that NASA might go forward with some 

of those milestones. In light of the concerns you expressed about the reduced oversight 

associated with SAAs, what is your view on even a selective use of these optional milestones? 

How would it affect the transition from the CCiCap under SAA to the FAR·based certification 

contracts NASA intends to award? 

NASA has not yet developed plans for how they might exercise those options. Some, such as 

crewed flight, would require significant planning for how to gain sufficient insight to ensure the 

safety of such potential crew members and would require the delineation of 

explicit requirements and processes. 
61 

Response to Questions from Congressman Randv Neugebauer 

1. NASA will allow companies to propose alternative standards to agency requirements. Assuming 

current standards reflect decades of experience gained from launching a variety of previous 

vehicles, what is the most effective and objective method of assessing the soundness of a 

proposed alternative standard? What steps will NASA take to ensure that adopting an alternative 

standard in no way diminishes the level of safety? 

The standards that NASA has are based on a rich history of what can go right and what can go 

wrong in spaceflight. NASA personnel are highly experienced in the background of these 

standards as well as alternative means of meeting their intent. New, creative approaches for 

providing adequate safety at less cost, less weight, or simpler designs is one potential benefit 

from encouraging commercial approaches to space flight. NASA must remain rigorous, 

however, in evaluating these new concepts. Doing so will be time consuming, but should be 

possible. Deviation from or a waiver to any significant standard should require a rigorous 

analysis and risk assessment that will be compared against the requirements, such as clearly 

defined LOC and Loss of Mission (LOM) values. Any additional residual risk needs to be 

accepted by the appropriate level of authority and documented as to the rationale behind that 

acceptance. 

(63) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
64 

SUBMITTED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BY REPRESENTATIVE JERRY COSTELLO

Chairman Hall, thank you for holding this important hearing. 

I was encouraged by SpaceX’s successful cargo demonstration last May and am 

looking forward to its upcoming launch of an operational cargo flight to the International Space Station (ISS) in October. I hope that Orbital Sciences will likewise 

be successful. 

While these milestones should be commended, it is important to note that crewed 

flights are a lot more difficult than cargo flights. As commercial crew development 

advances, I am concerned with NASA’s reversal in its commercial crew acquisition 

strategy—using Space Act Agreements (SAA), instead of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)-based contracts for design activities and its possible affect on astronaut safety, which is of paramount importance. 

Last year, NASA expressed to this committee that adherence to NASA’s safety requirements could not be assured without using FAR-based contracts. NASA said 

that the risk of commercial partners’ inability to meet its human-rating requirements could cause costly and time-consuming redesigns and pose safety concerns, 

thus requiring NASA to be more involved in the development of any commercial 

transportation system. As a result, NASA said Space Act Agreements could not be 

used. 

Because NASA has since reversed itself by going back to using SAAs, I am eager 

to hear from our panel of experts on what this committee can expect going forward, 

whether astronaut safety is being compromised, and whether we can be assured 

that taxpayer funds are being spent wisely. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to recognize the loss of two American 

icons. Neil Armstrong and Sally Ride reminded us of the sheer ingenuity of the 

American public and the limitless possibilities available when Americans come together toward a common goal. 

As his last hearing before this Committee, Mr. Armstrong cautioned that ‘‘NASA, 

with insufficient resources, struggles to fulfill the directives of the Administration 

and the mandates of the Congress. The result is a fractious process that satisfies 

neither.’’ Acknowledging that progress is rapid and unstoppable in a technologydriven world he also said ‘‘Our choices are to lead, try to keep up, or get out of the 

way. A lead, however earnestly and expensively won, once lost, is very difficult and 

expensive to regain.’’ 

Their achievements, counsel and wisdom on space exploration speak to the importance of maintaining American preeminence in space flight and ensuring that NASA 

is adequately funded to meet future challenges. 

Doing so would be a fitting way of honoring their courage, commitment, dedication, and exceptional accomplishments while maintaining American leadership in 

space exploration. 

Æ