[Cite as Boggs v. Calaway , 2021-Ohio-2528.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

BRITTANI BOGGS Plaintiff-Appellee

v. FRANCISCO CALAWAY Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-38

Trial Court Case No. 2020-DR-195 (Domestic Relations Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 23rd day of July, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . LISON BOGGS, Atty. Reg. No. 0055841, P.O. Box 53, Marysville, O hio 43040 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee MARC S. TRIPLETT, Atty. Reg. No. 0021222 & TINA M. MCFALL, Atty . Reg. No. 0082586, 332 South Main Street, Bellefontaine, Ohio 43311 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .-2- DONOVAN, J. {¶ 1} Francisco Calaway appeals from the trial court's order grantin g a petition for a domestic violence civil protection order filed by Brittani Bo ggs, the mother of Calaway’s minor child. Calaway cannot challenge on appeal the trial cour t's grant of the order because he failed to file objections in the trial court, as req uired by Civ.R. 65.1. As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. {¶ 2} In Florenz v. Omalley , 2020-Ohio-4487, 158 N.E.3d 1009, ¶ 7-10 (2d Dist.),

we stated: “When a magistrate has denied or granted a protection order aft er a full hearing, the court may adopt the magistrate's denial or gr anting of the protection order upon review of the order and a determination t hat there is

no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the orde r.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii). “[T]he magistrate's grant or denial of a pro tection order after a full hearing is not effective until adopted by the cour t.” Heimann v.

Heekin , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130613, 2014-Ohio-4276, ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c). A trial court’s adoption, modification, or rejec tion of a magistrate's denial or granting of a protection order after a f ull hearing becomes effective when it is signed by the court and filed with the clerk. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(v). Pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G), a trial court's decision to adopt a magistrate's decision that grants or denies a [civil protection order] is a final, appealable order. However, as of July 1, 2016, the rule requir es a party to file timely objections to the trial court's order prior to fili ng an appeal. See-3- Civ.R. 65.1(G). Written objections must be filed within 14 days of the filing of the trial court's order. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). Since the July 1, 2016 changes to Civ.R. 65.1(G), several appe llate districts have held that an appeal must be dismissed if timely objections

were not filed. See, e.g., Casto v. Lehr , 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2020 AP 02 0002, 2020-Ohio-3777, ¶ 19; Hetrick v. Lockwood , 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-17-014, 2018-Ohio-118; J.S. v. D.E. , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0032, 2017-Ohio-7507; K.R. v. T.B. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-302, 2017-Ohio-8647; Post v. Leopardi , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2019-T-0061,

2020-Ohio-2890. In contrast, this court has not found the failure to file obje ctions to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., Fecke v. Sizemore , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28536, 2020-Ohio-2851 (affirming a protection order due to appe llant's failure to file objections); Whatley v. Canales , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28382, 2020-Ohio-213; Runkle v. Stewart , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2018-CA-27, 2019-Ohio 2356 (noting that the failure to file objections requ ired dismissal, but nonetheless affirming the trial court's protection order du e to failure to file objections); Anderson v. Gregory , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28277,

2019-Ohio-2346. See also Danison v. Blinco , 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-18- 19, 2019-Ohio-2767. Nevertheless, a party may not challenge the protection order on appeal if objections were not filed. Id.

Id. at ¶ 7-10. See also Steele v. Steele , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2020-CA-3, 2021-Ohio148, ¶ 2.-4- {¶ 3} This Court further noted: Civ.R. 65.1 is clear that magistrate decisions after a full he aring are not subject to the requirements in Civ.R. 53(D)(2) or (3). Florenz at ¶ 12, citing Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(b) and Runkle at ¶ 7. Further, a protection order “need not comply with Civ.R. 53( D)(3)(a)(iii), which requires a magistrate decision to ‘indicate conspicuously that a party shall not assi gn as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal con clusion, * * * unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factua l finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).’ ” Id.

Steele at ¶ 3. {¶ 4} In the absence of objections, Calaway may not challenge the tr ial court's decision to grant a protection order on appeal. Finally, as th is Court noted in Steele : * * * [W]e again express concern about the trial court’s langua ge in its protection order, which merely provides that the order is f inal and appealable, and accordingly suggests that objections are not re quired. We caution that a trial court's judgment granting or denying a civ il protection order should not imply that objections are unnecessary or optio nal. The final sentence of Civ.R. 65.1(G) provides: “a party must timely file objections to such an order under division (F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal, and the timely filing of such obj ections shall stay the running of the time for appeal until the filing of the court's ruling on the objections .” * * * Finally, we note that pursuant to R.C. 3113.31, either party ma y move to modify or terminate a civil protection order. R.C. 3113 .31(E)(8)(b)-5- provides: * * * The moving party has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that modification or termination of the protection order or consent agreement is appropriate becaus e either the protection order or consent agreement is no longer n eeded or because the terms of the original protection order or consen t agreement are no longer appropriate. “When ruling on a motion to terminate a [civil protection order ], a trial court must consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including the facto rs identified in R.C. 3113.31(E)(8)(c).” Brown v. Naff , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2011-CA-17, 2012-Ohio-1770, ¶ 10.

Steele at ¶ 7-8. {¶ 5} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.

Copies sent to: Alison Boggs Marc S. Triplett Tina M. McFall Hon. Lori L. Reisinger