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28 The caption is amended according to the Order filed on 1

March 2, 2005.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARSHALL LOSKOT, an individual, )

and DISABILITY RIGHTS )

ENFORCEMENT, EDUCATION, SERVICES: )

HELPING YOU HELP OTHERS, a )

California public benefit )

corporation, ) 2:04-cv-1992-GEB-PAN(JFM)

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

)

v. ) ORDER

)

RAKESH SEHGAL, an individual, and )

SEHGAL, INC., a California )

corporation, )

)

Defendants. )

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)

Pending are the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations (“F&Rs”), filed December 12, 2005, on Plaintiffs’

Motion for Default Judgment on their Americans With Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) and state claims. The F&Rs are not adopted because the

following finding is rejected: “The admitted allegations of the

complaint are insufficient to establish that [Defendants] are

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responsible for the existing accommodations at United Petroleum

Truck Stop . . . .” (F&Rs at 7.) This finding is rejected because

it is contrary to the Ninth Circuit decision in Botosan v. Paul

McNally Realty, wherein it states “any allocation made in a lease

or other contract is only effective as between the parties, and

both landlord and tenant remain fully liable for compliance with

all provisions of the ADA relating to that place of public

accommodation.” 216 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2000).

Each Plaintiff seeks identical injunctive relief under

both the ADA and California law, and damages under California law. 

(Proposed Default J. ¶¶ 1-2.) Loskot alleges in the Complaint

specific dates on which he tried to access the United Petroleum

Truck Stop, and asserts he would return if the premises are

modified to accommodate his disability. (Pls.’ Comp. ¶¶ 2, 45.) 

Disability Rights Enforcement, Education, Services: Helping You

Help Others (“DREES”) relies on the injunctive relief claims Loskot

asserts, yet neither the Complaint nor the Motion for Default

Judgment demonstrate why DREES is prosecuting these same claims. 

Therefore, DREES’s standing is raised sua sponte. See B.C. v.

Plumas Unified School Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“[F]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine

jurisdictional issues such as standing.”).

The doctrine of standing is made up of

constitutional and prudential considerations. . . . 

The prudential component of standing embraces,

[j]udicially self-imposed limits on the exercise 

of federal jurisdiction, such as the general 

prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s

legal rights . . . .

Clark v. Burger King Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341 (D. N.J. 2003)

(internal citation and quotation omitted.). Under the “prudential

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[component of standing] . . . access to the federal courts” is

limited “to those litigants best suited to assert a particular

claim.” Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,

99-100 (1979). DREES as “[a]n association has standing to sue in a

representational capacity if at least one [of its] member[s] would

have standing to sue in his own right, if the asserted interests

are germane to the association's purposes, and if neither the claim

nor the relief requested would require individual participation by

members.” Access 123, Inc. v. Markey’s Lobster Pool, Inc., 2001 WL

920051, at *2 (D. N.H. Aug. 14, 2003). Here, the only factual

allegations in the Complaint assert just Loskot’s claims; DREES’s

ADA claims are based solely on Loskot’s factual allegations. 

(Pls.’ Comp. at 6-9.) Consequently, Loskot is “the better party to

assert his own claims[,]” and DREES lacks standing to assert these

same claims. Access 123, Inc., 2001 WL 920051, at *4.

Nor has DREES shown it has standing to assert ADA claims

on behalf of its other members since no factual allegation has

demonstrated this standing. See Access 123, Inc., 2001 WL 920051,

at *4 (stating where an association did “not demonstrate[] that any

member, other than [the individual plaintiff], would have standing

to bring the same ADA claims against [the defendant,] . . . [the

association] lack[ed] standing to assert claims on behalf of its

other members”). Therefore, under the prudential component of

standing, DREES lacks standing to assert Loskot’s ADA claims.

Loskot’s request for injunctive relief under the ADA is

denied because the injunctive relief sought is not specific enough

“to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of [Defendants].” 

Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1087 (9th

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Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). For example, the Proposed

Default Judgment Order instructs Defendants that “[w]arning signage

regarding unauthorized use of disabled parking spaces must be

posted conspicuously at each entrance to off-street parking

facilities, or immediately adjacent to and visible from each stall

or space.” This instruction is confusing because it is unclear

whether “each” refers to each stall or space in the off-street

parking facility, or whether it refers to only the disabled parking

space or spaces. (Proposed Default J. at 1.) The Proposed Default

Judgment Order further instructs Defendants that “[b]lank spaces on

sign(s) must be filled with appropriate information.” (Id. at 2.) 

However, no explanation is provided of the language that would

satisfy the phrase “appropriate information.” Additional

confusion exists in the instruction telling Defendants that “[o]ne

designated disabled parking space which meet [sic] the requirements

for van accessibility must be installed in the parking area.” 

(Id.) The referenced “requirements for van accessibility” are not

identified. Finally, the Proposed Default Judgment Order, despite

making four references to “accessible parking spaces” or “disabled

parking spaces,” is devoid of the total number of spaces Defendants

must install. Accordingly, Loskot’s proposed injunction under the

ADA lacks the required specificity and is fraught with uncertainty

and confusion. Loskot’s request for an injunction under the ADA is

therefore denied.

It must be decided whether the ADA claims should be

dismissed or whether Loskot should be provided another opportunity

to seek a default injunction under the ADA. Dismissal is

appropriate here because Loskot is not without a remedy since he

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can pursue the same injunctive relief under state law. 

Accordingly, the ADA claims are dismissed.

Since all the federal claims have been dismissed, the

issue is reached whether supplemental jurisdiction should continue

being exercised in this action. Under § 1367(c), the district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

state claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” The exercise of this

“discretion . . . is informed by the [United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715,(1966)] values of economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity.” Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]n the

usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated . . .,

the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988); Wade v. Regional Credit Assoc., 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th

Cir. 1996) (“Where a district court dismisses a federal claim,

leaving only state claims for resolution, it should decline

jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without

prejudice.”).

Here, the value of fairness weighs against exercising

supplemental jurisdiction because both Loskot and DREES desire

injunctive relief, yet prudential considerations prevent DREES from

having standing to litigate an injunction in federal court, in

light of the allegations in the Complaint that allege claims only

on behalf of Loskot. It is unclear whether this standing bar would

prevent DREES from litigating the state injunction claims in state

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court, since “standing requirements [under California law] will

vary from statute to statute based upon the intent of the

Legislature and the purpose for which the particular statute was

enacted.” Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood

Investors, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 1386 (2005). 

Further, a decision on the remaining state injunctive

relief and damage claims should be made in state court since

“[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a

matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by

procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

In conclusion, consideration of the Gibbs values reveal

that I should decline to continue exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state claims. Therefore,

this action is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c) as of the date on which this Order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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