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THE FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S 

OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, 

AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 29, 2012 

Serial No. 112–81 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida, Chairman 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

VACANT, Minority Professional Staff Member 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESS

Dr. Alexander G. Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, Chief Medical 

Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

APPENDIX

Questions Submitted by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Alexander G. Garza .. 21 

(1) 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS 

Thursday, March 29, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bilirakis and Richardson. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Good morning. Thanks for being so patient, by the 

way. But the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, 

and Communications will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony from Dr. 

Garza on the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Office of Health Affairs. 

I now recognize myself to make an opening statement. 

I am pleased to welcome back Dr. Garza before the subcommittee 

to discuss the President’s budget request for the Office of Health 

Affairs. Welcome, sir. 

The Office of Health Affairs’ mission is to provide health and 

medical expertise in support of the Department’s mission, to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all hazards impacting the 

Nation’s security. OHA is charged with helping to protect the 

health of Americans in the case of, God forbid, a National incident 

with health consequences. 

This subcommittee maintains great interest in ensuring that 

OHA’s request and ultimate use of appropriated funds are indeed 

providing enhanced health security for the Nation. The President’s 

fiscal year 2013 budget request included $166 million for OHA, a 

slight decrease over the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. 

As for previous years, the BioWatch program accounts for the 

vast majority of this spending. BioWatch is far and away the most 

expensive activity of OHA’s, comprising $125 million, or 75 percent 

of its request this year. Forty million dollars of the BioWatch request is proposed for continued testing of the next generation technology known as Gen III. 

If successful, this new system would enable a drastic decrease in 

detection time, from the current 12 to 36 hours, down to 4 to 6 
2 

hours. It would also provide detectors that function reliably indoors. 

As I relayed at our fiscal year 2012 budget hearing, such milestones could represent important advances, but only if we actually 

achieve those milestones. I and other Members have become increasingly concerned about the viability of this developing technology, and also about OHA’s ability to deploy on time and within 

budget. 

Any new BioWatch program, particularly one that will cost $5.7 

billion, must prove that it provides a substantial improvement over 

current technologies, and that communities in which it will be deployed are fully on board with using it. 

In addition to BioWatch, I also look forward to discussing with 

Dr. Garza, the National Biosurveillance and Integration Center, 

NBIC. NBIC seeks to fuse myriad biosurveillance data to provide 

early detection of an event of National significance, whether a devastating food-borne outbreak, or an airborne release of anthrax. 

The $8 million request for NBIC is difficult to understand in 

light of the absence of demonstrable success of the NBIC, and also 

in light of the continued absence of a promised new strategic plan. 

Dr. Garza’s comments on this, as well as on how the new biosurveillance pilot programs outlined in the request will help 

achieve integrated biosurveillance of course will be appreciated. Although BioWatch and NBIC comprise about 80 percent of your request, I also look forward to hearing how the fiscal year 2013 budget plan supports other activities, such as medical countermeasure 

distribution, to DHS employees and first responders, information 

sharing with State and local partners, and facilitation of agricultural security. 

Then also, by the way, I would like to point out Dr. Garza’s good 

work in procuring medical countermeasures for DHS employees 

ahead of other Federal agencies. Congratulations, sir. 

Thank you very much for your good work. Very much appreciated. 

In light of continued risks to human and animal health from terrorists and from Mother Nature, the level of attention in funding 

these activities receive continues to be a priority of this subcommittee. 

With that, I once again welcome you, Dr. Garza. I look forward 

to your testimony. 

[The statement of Chairman Bilirakis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN GUS M. BILIRAKIS

MARCH 29, 2012 

I’m pleased to welcome back Dr. Garza before the subcommittee to discuss the 

President’s budget request for the Office of Health Affairs. 

The Office of Health Affairs’ mission is to provide health and medical expertise 

in support of the Department’s mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

all hazards impacting the Nation’s security. OHA is charged with helping to protect 

the health of Americans in the case of a National incident with health consequences. 

This subcommittee maintains great interest in ensuring that OHA’s request and 

ultimate use of appropriated funds are indeed providing enhanced health security 

for the Nation. 

The President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request includes $166 million for OHA, 

a slight decrease over the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. 
3 

As per previous years, the BioWatch Program accounts for the vast majority of 

this spending. BioWatch is, far and away, the most expensive activity of the Office 

of Health Affairs, comprising $125 million, or 75 percent, of its request this year. 

Forty million dollars of the BioWatch request is proposed for continued testing of 

the next-generation technology known as Gen–3. 

If successful, this new system would enable a drastic decrease in detection time 

from the current 12 to 36 hours, down to 4 to 6 hours. It would also provide detectors that function reliably indoors. As I relayed at our fiscal year 2012 budget hearing, such milestones could represent important advances, but only if we actually 

achieve those milestones. I and other Members have become increasingly concerned 

about the viability of this developing technology, and also about OHA’s ability to deploy it on time and within budget. 

Any new BioWatch Program—particularly one that will cost $5.7 billion—must 

prove that it provides a substantial improvement over current technologies, and that 

communities in which it will be deployed are fully on board with using it. 

In addition to BioWatch, I also look forward to discussing with Dr. Garza the National Biosurveillance and Integration Center. NBIC seeks to fuse myriad biosurveillance data to provide early detection of an event of National significance, whether 

a devastating food-borne outbreak or an airborne release of anthrax. 

The $8 million request for NBIC is difficult to understand in light of the absence 

of demonstrable success of the NBIC, and also in light of the continued absence of 

the promised new strategic plan. Dr. Garza’s comments on this, as well as on how 

the new biosurveillance pilot programs outlined in the request will help achieve integrated biosurveillance, will be appreciated. 

Although BioWatch and NBIC comprise about 80 percent of your request, I also 

look forward to hearing how the fiscal year 2013 budget plan supports other activities, such as medical countermeasure distribution to DHS employees and first responders, information sharing with State and local partners, and facilitation of agricultural security. In light of continued risks to human and animal health from terrorists and from Mother Nature, the level of attention and funding these activities 

receive continues to be a priority for this subcommittee. 

With that, I once again want to welcome Dr. Garza. We look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Now I would like to recognize our Ranking Member for any comments she might make. You are recognized, Ms. 

Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes, good morning. Before I begin, I would like 

to take a moment to thank Chairman Bilirakis and the Majority 

staff for working with me yesterday and my staff during the full 

committee mark up of H.R. 3563, and your kindness to include our 

amendment that would help improve participation of the educational institutions in the Integrated Public Alert Warning System, which we both firmly support. 

So I wanted to personally thank all of you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. My pleasure. Thank you for all your good work as 

well. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. No problem. 

So, regarding today’s hearing, we want to acknowledge our lone 

witness here and thank you for your testimony in advance. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the activities carried out by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs and the 

fiscal year 2013 budget request for the office. When you testified 

before this panel last year, I expressed my concern that the Office 

of Health Affairs was having a difficult time defining its mission 

being attributed to the growing pains, some would say, by the administration’s reorganization that had occurred. 

The Office of Health Affairs was administratively created to assist the statutorily-created chief medical officer. Under this statute, 

the chief medical officer is charged with the responsibilities of advising the Secretary on public health issues and to coordinate bio 
4 

defense and medical preparedness activities within the Department, among other Federal agencies, and with the State and local 

governments. 

Under our discussion today is BioWatch, as the Chairman alluded to, and the National Biosurveillance Integration System, that 

is consuming 80 percent of the full year 2013 budget request for 

this office. 

Consequently, the National Academy of Sciences has raised questions about the efficiency of these programs. Likewise, Federal 

watchdogs have determined that the BioWatch program has suffered from some growing pains, others might call management 

issues, and upgrades of the development and the delays of the Generation III technologies. 

Setting aside these questions, I am concerned about the 

BioWatch’s coordination with State and local public health officials. 

It is my understanding that the Office of Health Affairs lacks the 

authority to compel information sharing by other Federal agencies. 

The development of this information-sharing framework is the 

essence of this program. One GAO report found that the NBIC resorted to gathering information publicly, available on the internet. 

This certainly isn’t the best use of our taxpaying dollars and the 

expertise that we hope to enjoy. 

I have been assured that the strategy to improve NBIC is forthcoming. However, it is my understanding that strategy has not 

been shared yet with this committee. As your authorizers, we need 

to understand the strategy to properly evaluate your budget request. 

I encourage you today to provide necessary information and understanding, that we might continue to support the programs. 

With that, I thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony. I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Richardson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER LAURA RICHARDSON

MARCH 29, 2012 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the activities carried out by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs and the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Office. 

When you testified before this panel last year, I expressed my concern that the 

Office of Health Affairs was suffering from an identity crisis. 

The Office’s difficulty in defining its mission have been attributed to growing 

pains and the fact that it came about as the result of an administrative reorganization. 

Without a statutory authorization to guide it, the Office’s mission seemed to lack 

clarity and consistency. 

Recently, the Office appears to be morphing from a policy office to a program office. 

The Office of Health Affairs was administratively created to assist the statutorilycreated chief medical officer. 

Under the statute, the chief medical officer is charged with the responsibilities of 

advising the Secretary on public health issues and to coordinating biodefense and 

medical preparedness activities within the Department, among other Federal agencies, and with State and local governments. 

Since its inception, the number of Full-Time Equivalents in the Office of Health 

Affairs has nearly doubled. 

BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance Integration System consume 80% of 

the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the office. Most troubling is that GAO and 
5 

the National Academy of Sciences have raised questions about the efficacy and efficiency of these programs. 

Federal watchdogs have determined that the BioWatch program has suffered from 

poor management of upgrades and developmental delays of Generation 3 technologies. 

Setting aside these management questions, I am also concerned about BioWatch’s 

coordination with State and local public health officials. 

Unfortunately, concerns about the BioWatch program are not the only concerns. 

The National Biosurviellance Integration Center also suffers from efficacy concerns. It is my understanding that the Office of Health Affairs lacks the authority 

to compel information sharing by other Federal agencies. The development of this 

information-sharing framework is the essence of this program. 

One GAO report found that NBIC resorted to gathering information publicly 

available on the internet. This does not seem to be an effective use of taxpayer dollars. 

I have been assured that a strategy to improve NBIC is forthcoming. However, 

the strategy has not been shared with this committee. As your authorizers, we need 

to understand this strategy to properly evaluate your budget request. I encourage 

you to make it available to us. Dr. Garza, I look forward to hearing your plans to 

address these concerns. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I thank the Ranking Member for her statement. 

I want to remind other Members of the subcommittee, you are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 29, 2012 

Congress cut funding for the Department of Homeland Security by $2 billion in 

fiscal year 2012. 

Less money for the Department meant that programs like the Metropolitan Medical Response System had to be consolidated into larger grant programs. Funding 

for University Programs and Research and Development programs were dramatically reduced. 

I raised my concerns about the wisdom of these budget cuts when Congress 

passed the fiscal year 2012 appropriations bill at the end of last year. 

I am not here to belabor those issues. But it is important to understand the context in which we must review all budget requests. 

The prospect of sequestration looms, and my friends on the other side of the aisle 

have indicated their intention to protect certain sacred cows. 

These pressures will force this committee to assure that Homeland Security dollars are spent on programs that are effective, efficient, and contribute to the safety 

and security of this Nation. 

To that end, we must take a serious look at Generation 3 of BioWatch. According 

to DHS, over the last 10 years, we have spent $800 million for BioWatch. 

During that time, the feasibility of the technology has been called into question 

by the National Academy of Sciences and there is only one potential vendor. 

In light of the current fiscal climate, we need to begin to ask hard questions about 

the feasibility of continued support. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Now I am pleased to welcome Dr. Garza back to 

the subcommittee. Dr. Garza is the assistant secretary for health 

affairs and chief medical officer of the Department of Homeland Security. 

He manages the Department’s medical and health security matters, oversees the health aspects of contingency planning for all 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards, and leads a 

coordinated effort to ensure the Department’s preparing to respond 

to biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. 

Prior to joining the Department in August 2009, Dr. Garza spent 

13 years as a practicing physician and medical educator. 

He most recently served as the director of military programs at 

the ER One Institute at the Washington Hospital Center, and has 
6 

served as the associate medical director of the emergency medical 

services for the State of New Mexico, and the director of EMS for 

Kansas City, Missouri Health Department. 

Dr. Garza holds a medical degree from the University of Missouri 

Columbia School of Medicine, a masters of public health from St. 

Louis University’s School of Public Health, and a bachelors of 

science in biology from the University of Missouri in Kansas City. 

Prior to earning his medical degree, he served as a paramedic 

and an emergency medical technician. He is a fellow at the American College of Emergency Physicians and a member of the American Public Health Association. 

Again, welcome, Dr. Garza. Your entire written statement will 

appear in the record. I ask that you summarize your testimony. 

You are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER G. GARZA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS, CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. GARZA. Thank you, sir. Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member 

Richardson, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

I would like to share with you some of OHA’s accomplishments 

over the past year and my priorities for the coming year. 

As you are aware and as you have expressed, the Office of 

Health Affairs provides health and medical expertise in support of 

the DHS mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all 

threats. I view OHA’s mission as protecting the United States from 

the impact of health threats, regardless of whether they are naturally occurring, manmade, intentional, or accidental. 

I often say that we look at health through the prism of National 

security. Our health expertise is unique within DHS. Our security 

outlook is unique within the health field. 

Over the past year, OHA has accomplished much towards our 

mission. As part of OHA’s goal to build National resilience against 

health incidents, we have worked to improve programs in biodefense and chemical defense, strengthened our outreach in State 

and local public health officials, and developed key programs to 

promote health within the Department. 

Starting with our BioWatch program, this continues to be the 

only Federally-managed, locally-operated, Nation-wide biosurveillance system, designed to detect the intentional release of select 

aerosolized biological agents. 

This is an invaluable resource for the Nation. However, its 

strength is really in the symbiotic relationship with our partners 

at the State and local levels, making this truly a biodefense system, and not merely a biodetection system. 

In addition to our day-to-day operations, BioWatch also supports 

multiple National special security events, which will keep them 

quite busy this year. BioWatch has made tremendous strides over 

the past year. 

We continue to mature our laboratory capabilities. We have introduced a Critical Reagent Program from the Department of Defense into our BioWatch labs, and have implemented a comprehensive quality assurance program. 
7 

In the coming year, in addition to continuing to improve our current operations, we will move forward with the development and 

testing of our the Next Generation Biodetection technology. 

The National Biosurveillance Integration Center, or the Center, 

has been made especially significant progress this year, including 

the upcoming launch of an effective strategy. This strategy will be 

defined by the extraordinary collaboration from inter-agency partners, as well as the private sector and State and local officials. 

In addition to the new strategy, the Center continues to provide 

day-to-day situational awareness of biological events of concern. As 

an example of this, in May 2011 in the E. coli outbreak in Germany, at the request of the National Security Staff, the Center executed an NBIC notification protocol, bringing together multiple 

Federal agencies. 

As a result of this collaborative effort, American citizens at home 

and abroad were given up-to-date information about the outbreak, 

how to stay safe. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection were 

able to use this information to target imports that may have posed 

a risk to the United States. 

We view this type of collaboration as just one component of the 

future of the Center. 

As you know, the threat posed by attacks using chemical agents 

is both very real and very troubling. Our Chemical Defense Program has made tremendous strides this year, assisting State and 

local jurisdictions to evaluate chemical defense capabilities, 

through a demonstration project in partnership with the city of 

Baltimore and the Maryland Transit Authority. 

The Chemical Defense Program has also rightly focused on postincident planning, including the decontamination of people following a chemical attack, by developing best practice protocols in 

line with the best possible science. 

In the coming year, we will continue to improve our chemical defense capabilities to meet this threat. We have also continued our 

efforts with our State and local partners, as well as to ensure that 

they had information about the threats. 

OHA continues to help States identify where they need to develop additional capabilities, provide information on best practices, 

grants, and training. 

As you have mentioned, OHA is charged with protecting the 

DHS workforce. The potential health threats facing DHS employees 

are diverse. As the chief medical officer, I along with my office 

work to address issues ranging from resilience and wellness, developing quality measures for medical, and the protection of employees against biological attacks. 

OHA’s Medical Countermeasures Initiative provides DHS personnel with immediate access to protective measures in the event 

of a biological attack. We procured medical countermeasures for the 

entire DHS workforce. This will ensure that the United States will 

continue to have a robust National security posture in the event 

that our workforce needs to respond. 

In addition, OHA has initiated the Medical Quality Management 

Program to work to standardize health and medical policy across 

the Department, and have initiated a new program with medical 

liaison officers. 
8 

These are just a few of the many achievements that that we have 

accomplished over the past year. 

We recognize the challenges that will need to be addressed in the 

upcoming year. We will redouble our efforts to meet them. 

I want to thank this committee for your continued interest and 

support, and for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look 

forward to answering any questions that you might have. Thank 

you. 

[The statement of Dr. Garza follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER G. GARZA

MARCH 29, 2012 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and distinguished Members of 

the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you regarding the fiscal 

year 2013 budget for the Office of Health Affairs. I appreciate the opportunity to 

update you on our progress from last year in addressing homeland security issues 

with health impacts. 

As you are well aware, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) provides health and 

medical expertise in support of the DHS mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all threats. OHA’s responsibilities include: Serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary and FEMA Administrator on medical and public health issues; 

leading and coordinating biological and chemical defense activities; providing medical and scientific expertise to support DHS preparedness and response efforts; and 

leading the Department’s workforce health and medical oversight activities. OHA 

also serves as the primary DHS point of contact for State and local governments 

on medical and public health issues. 

OHA has four strategic goals that coincide with the strategic goals of the Department: 

1. Provide expert health and medical advice to DHS leadership; 

2. Build National resilience against health incidents; 

3. Enhance National and DHS medical first responder capabilities; and 

4. Protect the DHS workforce against health threats. 

Today I will discuss how we are working to achieve our mission and goals and 

how our fiscal year 2013 budget will support these efforts. 

GOAL 1: PROVIDE EXPERT HEALTH AND MEDICAL ADVICE TO DHS LEADERSHIP

Coordinated medical oversight ensures that the care rendered by both our occupational health system and our operational medicine system is uniform and consistent 

with National standards. To fulfill our statutory responsibility to provide expert 

health and medical advice to leadership throughout DHS, OHA is working with 

DHS components to build a Medical Liaison Program. 

Medical Liaison Officers (MLOs) are OHA physicians that work with DHS components to ensure consistent health and medical advice is provided across DHS. MLOs 

will provide dedicated support on guidance related to operational decisions as well 

as occupational health and workforce readiness issues. MLOs will also develop predeployment guidance to personnel deployed both domestically and abroad and 

strengthen the capability and capacities to provide medical countermeasures to our 

deployed workforce. Ultimately, this program will enhance consistency across DHS 

on health and medical issues, while providing each component with information tailored to their specific operational needs. 

Recently, OHA’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) MLO served as 

the lead medical/public health representative for FEMA’s Whole Community Executive Steering Committee, which developed the country’s first-ever National Preparedness Goal under Presidential Policy Directive 8. OHA is working to expand the 

presence of MLOs to additional components to improve the quality of health and 

medical advice to support DHS operations and the DHS workforce. This year, we 

hope to have a total of four MLOs on board. 

OHA is also creating a centralized DHS medical credentialing management system that ensures verification of medical provider credentials. This system is used 

to verify DHS employee qualifications, licensure information, and relevant health 

care provider data and has increased the ability to track and provide care to those 

within DHS. Currently 63% of DHS medical providers have been credentialed and 

that number continues to climb as we identify practitioners throughout DHS. 
9 

Future plans include integration of the Medical Credentialing Management and 

Learning Management Systems to provide real-time credentialing status and data 

to operational components, allowing for distributed training and education that reduces cost, improves efficiencies, and supports operational medical programs. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget request supports the development of the MLO program and our work in workforce credentialing management, which will institute a 

‘‘One DHS’’ policy for medical and health issues. 

GOAL 2: BUILD NATIONAL RESILIENCE AGAINST HEALTH INCIDENTS

OHA operates, manages, and supports the Department’s biological defense and 

surveillance programs. Two programs that provide biological threat awareness capacity are BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (the Center). 

Detection 

One of OHA’s primary responsibilities is to mitigate the consequences of biological 

incidents through early detection. The BioWatch Program identifies the release of 

an aerosolized biological agent and provides an alert to public health officials, allowing for a faster response and the rapid provision of medical countermeasures. 

The BioWatch Program is an example of a key partnership between Federal, 

State, and local government. BioWatch is the only Federally-managed, locally-operated Nation-wide bio-surveillance system designed to detect the intentional release 

of select aerosolized biological agents. Deployed in more than 30 metropolitan areas 

throughout the country, the system is a collaborative effort of health personnel at 

all levels of government. 

Current detection capabilities, termed BioWatch Generation 1 and 2 (Gen 1/2), 

consist of outdoor aerosol collectors whose filters are manually retrieved for subsequent analysis in a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) facility. In addition to the 

more than 30 cities that Gen 1/2 operates in on a daily basis, BioWatch has supported several National Special Security Events with additional collectors, personnel, and laboratory support, providing an additional layer of protection and security. 

The BioWatch Program continues to collaborate with partners to improve laboratory capabilities and leverage existing knowledge and resources. This year, 

BioWatch, in close collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), and 

State and local public health laboratories, successfully implemented the use of the 

DoD Critical Reagent Program assays to conduct initial screening for the aerosol release of bioterrorism agents. Coupling these assays with CDC LRN assays for confirmation provides significantly increased confidence in the analytical results of 

BioWatch samples. 

The BioWatch Program has also developed and implemented a comprehensive 

Quality Assurance (QA) program. Recently made operational, the Laboratory QA 

Program Plan (QAPP) was developed in close collaboration with State and local public health laboratories and provides the quality assurance framework for BioWatch 

laboratory operations. An example of the Laboratory QAPP is the use of QA samples 

that provide an expected result into the daily analysis at every lab. The data from 

these samples provides accurate insights into false positive and false negative laboratory results and provides better confidence in laboratory results. 

While the Gen 1/2 system is extremely beneficial, it is labor-intensive and results 

may not be available until 12–36 hours after the release of a biological agent has 

occurred. To shorten the time to detect, OHA has been testing the next generation 

of BioWatch, Generation 3 (Gen–3) for eventual procurement, which will reduce the 

time of detection of a biological agent by using automated detection. 

DHS believes that early detection is an essential part of an effective biodefense 

posture as reducing the time to detect is imperative to saving thousands of lives. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget funds continues the current operations of the Gen 

1/2 BioWatch detection network and continues development and testing of the next 

generation technology to expedite response times. 

Biosurveillance 

Another key element to an overarching biodefense framework is biosurveillance. 

OHA is focused on developing and maintaining an integrated, real-time surveillance 

picture. 

The National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) enhances the identification, location, and tracking of biological events potentially impacting homeland security by uniquely integrating information and data and leveraging interagency com-
10 

munications and relationships. NBIS supports prevention and mitigation of such 

events by providing timely notifications and on-going situational awareness to enhance response of Government agencies. NBIS is a community of Federal, State, 

local, territorial, and Tribal agencies, as well as international and private-sector organizations that shares a common goal of protecting the United States from biological threats. NBIS values trusted relationships and collaboration across various organizational boundaries. 

The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (the Center) housed within OHA, 

coordinates comprehensive National biosurveillance and situational awareness contributed by members of the NBIS. The Center’s mission is to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of National concern; integrate and 

analyze information relating to human health, animal, plant, food, water, and environmental domains; disseminate alerts and pertinent information; and oversee development and operation of the NBIS. 

The May 2011 E. coli outbreak in Germany is a recent example of how NBIS can 

be used to enhance response to a health security incident. During this incident, 

NBIS made subject matter experts available to answer existing concerns about the 

potential origin and virulence of the associated E. coli strain, and facilitated communication between Federal agencies. Sixty-one individuals representing 13 Federal 

staffs, agencies, or departments participated in this process. As a result of this collaborative effort, American citizens at home and abroad were given up-to-date information about the outbreak and how to stay safe. Additionally, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) was able to use this information to target imports that may 

have posed a risk to the United States. 

NBIS and the Center continue to work towards tackling the inherent difficulties 

of integrated biosurveillance. OHA has spent the last year working with the Federal 

interagency, State and local partners, and private sector stakeholders to develop a 

new strategy to improve integrated biosurveillance. With the new strategy, OHA is 

striving to meet National priorities, mitigate impacts of biological events, and make 

significant improvements in collaboration, information integration and sharing, 

analysis, and reporting. 

In the mean time, OHA is continuously examining potential areas for improved 

collaboration and situational awareness. The Center is supporting a demonstration 

project in North Carolina called the National Collaborative for Bio-Preparedness 

(NCB–P). The aim is to validate integrated information sharing of public health, 

animal surveillance, environmental monitoring, and other biosurveillance information on the State level. The Center is also developing projects that pilot improved 

information sharing with the private sector and Federal partners, as well as 

leveraging existing information technology (IT) and biosurveillance resources at 

agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and CDC. The fiscal year 2013 

budget request increases resources for OHA to move forward with the new strategy 

for the Center and support more pilot projects. 

Chemical Defense 

OHA’s Chemical Defense Program (CDP) aims to provide Federal, State, and local 

governments with knowledge and tools to build and sustain a viable framework for 

preparedness and response to high-consequence chemical events. 

To build a response knowledge base, OHA partnered with the Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS) to host a symposium on the decontamination of 

humans after a chemical attack. This symposium brought together leading Federal, 

State, and local officials to examine decontamination guidance and research gaps. 

By ensuring response activities are based on the best possible science, OHA is helping first responders save lives after a chemical incident. 

OHA launched a partnership with the Maryland Transit Administration and the 

City of Baltimore to develop chemical defense techniques for subway mass transit. 

This demonstration project is the next step in the work that began last year which 

evaluated chemical detection technology, providing local jurisdictions with expert 

evaluation of potential capabilities. OHA is looking to expand this program to additional jurisdictions and is developing criteria to allow jurisdictions to submit proposals for demonstration projects. The fiscal year 2013 budget request, in addition 

to anticipated carry-over funding from fiscal year 2012, will allow CDP to move forward with these initiatives. 

Improving Public Health Information Sharing and State and Local Capabilities 

OHA works to improve State and local capabilities through information-sharing 

efforts. OHA has developed a new program to sponsor as many as 100 security 

clearances for key State and local health officials to facilitate the sharing of classified health threat information. OHA works with the Office of Intelligence and Anal-
11 

ysis (I&A) to enhance information sharing with State and local health officials by 

providing classified health threat briefings on emerging threats. This year, OHA 

provided State and local officials with this information through briefings held jointly 

with events such as the BioWatch Workshop and conferences hosted by the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), the National Association of 

County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), and the Association of Public Health 

Laboratories (APHL). OHA also works with the National Operations Center (NOC) 

within the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning to provide key health information for the NOC’s situational awareness reports, such as contamination following the 2011 Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster. These reports are produced and 

distributed by the NOC to homeland security enterprise partners. By ensuring State 

and local health officials have information on current threats, they can better direct 

their preparedness efforts to meet those threats. 

Public health officials can bring valuable insights into the fusion center environment, shaping preparedness efforts, response, and recovery. OHA is also working to 

bring help bring those public health and medical partners in to fusion centers by 

providing guidance documents and technical assistance to facilitate the establishment of information exchange between public health and other homeland security 

partners to share appropriate health-related threat intelligence. 

OHA has also worked to help States identify where they need to develop additional capabilities, and has provided information on best practices, and training. 

For example, OHA partnered with the National Center for Food Protection and 

Defense (NCFPD) to develop the Food Sector Food and Agriculture Readiness Measurement Toolkit (FARM Toolkit). The FARM Toolkit allows the States to self-assess 

the strengths of their food emergency response plans and identify areas for potential 

improvement through a survey tool. The survey assesses the level of preparedness 

in the food sector, level of integration of the food sector into the emergency management community, current emergency management capabilities of the food sector, 

and the emergency management needs of the food sector. Upon receiving the survey 

results, an integrated database returns relevant information on best practices, planning, training, and funding resources—all designed to help State and local communities improve their preparedness for adverse food incidents. 

OHA also developed a partner page on the Lessons Learned Information Sharing 

(LLIS.gov) portal where emergency response providers and homeland security officials can access an on-line network of content related to lessons learned, best practices, and innovative ideas on food, agriculture, and veterinary defense. Best practices help States leverage lessons learned to improve their capabilities and planning. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget request will continue to support public health information sharing and capability development initiatives. 

GOAL 3: ENHANCE NATIONAL AND DHS MEDICAL FIRST RESPONDER CAPABILITIES

To enhance National and DHS medical first responder capabilities, OHA works 

with emergency medical services (EMS) program coordinators throughout DHS to 

protect our workforce and facilitate treatment of life-threatening and common medical or traumatic events. 

Within the past year, OHA developed protocols that outline the care that medical 

technicians and paramedics should administer to patients. First, OHA developed 

protocols for Basic Life Support (BLS) and Advanced Life Support (ALS). The BLS/ 

ALS protocols describe common signs and symptoms and provide treatment options 

associated with common pre-hospital injuries or illnesses encountered by DHS EMS 

personnel and align with National EMS standards of care. Second, in collaboration 

with several other Federal agencies such as the DoD and the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), OHA created the Austere Emergency Medical Support (AEMS) Field Guide 

and Training Program. This program provides support to select and highly qualified 

DHS EMS personnel who are deployed to austere, remote, high-threat, and disaster 

environments. To ensure medical proficiency with the content in the field guide, 

DHS-OHA conducted the first training in January 2012 with a class of 25 DHS 

EMS Paramedics. 

OHA recently published the first DHS EMS Strategic Plan. This plan will ensure 

EMS education, training, scopes of practice, and quality assurance practices are consistent across DHS and compliant with National standards. Through cross-component collaboration and standardization, patient outcomes may improve and EMS 

programmatic costs may decrease. 

OHA has also reached out to medical first responders to raise awareness of 

human trafficking. As part of DHS’s Blue Campaign, the Department’s initiative to 

fight human trafficking, OHA, FEMA, and the U.S. Fire Administration produced 

a video for first responders regarding indicators of human trafficking they might en-
12 

counter and what they can do to help victims. We also developed tailored indicator 

cards to include health-related indicators that first responders, such as firefighters 

and EMTs, may notice. We’ve been working with our partners in the EMS community to get these resources out to the field through a variety of stakeholder events. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget request will support the continued development of resources and capabilities for medical first responders both within DHS and in our 

local communities. 

GOAL 4: PROTECT THE DHS WORKFORCE AGAINST HEALTH THREATS

The potential health threats facing the DHS workforce are diverse and as Chief 

Medical Officer, I am working to address issues ranging from resilience and 

wellness to the protection of employees following a biological attack. 

We know the stress that comes from carrying out the DHS mission can take its 

toll on the workforce. Secretary Napolitano asked that we improve resilience and 

wellness in the DHS workforce to ensure employees have the tools necessary to 

manage this stress while supporting the mission. Our program, DHSTogether, has 

conducted DHS-wide training and held two symposiums on employee resilience. The 

fiscal year 2013 budget request will allow OHA to continue to work with components on improving employee resilience through additional training support for employees and managers. 

OHA’s Medical Countermeasures (MCM) Initiative provides DHS personnel with 

immediate access to life-saving medications in the event of a biological attack to ensure front-line operations can continue. At this time, we have purchased MCM for 

100 percent of the DHS workforce, which includes working animals and critical contractors. This year, OHA delivered nearly 200,000 courses of medical countermeasures (MCM) to 127 field locations. The fiscal year 2013 budget request will 

allow OHA’s MCM program to maintain the DHS antibiotic and antiviral stockpile 

and expand pre-positioned MCM to an additional 350 DHS field locations. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify regarding OHA’s work and our fiscal year 2013 budget request. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you for your testimony. I will recognize 

myself for 5 minutes for questioning. 

Dr. Garza, on BioWatch, the President’s request included $125 

million for BioWatch, for the program, an increase of $11 million 

over the enacted 2012 figure. Of this amount, $39.9 million is intended for continued testing for the Next Generation Gen III System. This is an increase in $16 million—that is my understanding—66 percent over 2012. 

The GAO is currently working on an investigation of BioWatch 

Gen III—I know you are aware of that—due to serious concerns 

over this procurement by Members of both the House and the Senate and, of course, our committee. 

There has been no comprehensive cost/benefit analysis done to 

ensure that all these millions, $5.7 billion actually, in fact, over the 

project’s lifetime, will buy down risks sufficient to justify the expenditure. Can you please explain to the Members of this subcommittee how you can justify further expenditures on this program in the absence of a cost/benefit analysis that gets an analysis 

of a broad set of alternatives, as well as other important data collection, to ensure that what will ultimately be a multi-billion dollar 

program procurement—of course, it has to be sound. 

So I will give you the opportunity to respond to that. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, thank you, sir. 

It is a very good question. It is appropriate for you to ask about 

spending taxpayer dollars. You are correct that there is an increase 

in the budget request for 2013 as part of the normal acquisition 

program that has been going through. So the budget numbers are 
13 

going to vary from year to year depending on what the acquisition 

strategy is doing during that particular amount of time. 

The acquisition strategy that we have developed for the 

BioWatch program is very robust. It has to meet certain milestones 

before it can progress to the next phase, which I think makes it 

give me a lot of comfort and it gives the Department more comfort 

knowing that we are not going to be spending money unless our 

program is able to meet the certain goals that we have established 

for it. 

So in terms of buying down risk, that is what the acquisition program is all about. It is making sure that we are addressing the 

risks both to the Department and to the Nation. To the Department to make sure that we are not spending money foolishly on 

equipment that is not going to do what it is supposed to do, but 

also balancing that risk to the Nation as well, and looking at what 

would be the impact of a biological attack within the country. 

Now as we realized in 2001, with the bio attacks which we just 

celebrated the 10th anniversary of, the recovery amounts from a biological attack during that year were in the billions of dollars. So 

combined with our risk-averse strategy in the acquisition process, 

we feel like we are doing a very good job of balancing the risk/benefit ratio. 

Although I certainly would not be opposed to anybody doing a 

risk/benefit analysis, I feel like we have already incorporated 

enough of that into the acquisition strategy to make it much more 

comfortable for us moving forward. 

I am sorry, sir. Did I miss another part of your—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Follow up on the—sure, let me follow up on 

BioWatch. Last year, fiscal year 2012, back and forth between the 

Department of Homeland Security and the OMB, we learned that 

OMB was questioning DHS and OHA’s handling of the BioWatch 

program in terms of cost controls and financial reporting, and that 

the program’s cost growth and delays required a more conservative 

approach for fiscal year 2012. 

Describe to this committee how your budget request reflects a 

conservative approach and improved management practices. 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely, sir. 

So the budget request is always tied to the acquisition strategy. 

But it is also tied to the timeliness that we can get certain things 

accomplished in the Gen III program. It is a very technically difficult program. 

So we always have to remember that this equipment, this technology has never been accomplished before. So we don’t really have 

a template that we can say, we think we are going to meet data 

on this date exactly. 

So in order to balance the risk to the Department of, we don’t 

want to rush through testing and evaluation, we want to make 

sure that all of these issues work, versus the risk to the Nation of 

we have to have technology that meets the goal of protecting the 

Nation. That is a tricky balance to strike. 

So you bump that up against the budget cycle as well, and if you 

have a slide in any sort of testing and evaluation, that is going to 

impact your budget dollars, because, frankly, you can’t do testing 

unless you meet certain dates. 
14 

So it is a very complex acquisition. I think we have done a very 

good job of improving our financial reporting with OMB. We speak 

with them frequently. We make sure that our documents are in on 

time. 

I think we have accomplished quite a bit in making sure that we 

are being fiscally responsible, that we are meeting our acquisition 

guidelines, and that we are taking appropriate risk precautions, 

both for the Department and for the Nation. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

So now I will recognize Ms. Richardson for 5 minutes. 

Just to let you know, I plan to go at least one more round after 

this. Thank you. 

You are recognized for 5. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Dr. Garza, did I hear you say when we could 

expect the strategy to be done? I heard you reference it, but I didn’t 

hear a date. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, ma’am. I am assuming you are talking about the 

NBIC strategy. Is that correct, ma’am? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes. So the NBIC strategy has just finished its final 

round of comment and adjudication with the members of the NBIC. 

That was done last week with the working group, who will be taking it to the principals I believe in the next 2 weeks. 

After we have all of those comments vetted, adjudicated, I would 

project the strategy coming out probably within 2 months or so. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Assuming that we do have a strategy, 

how will you be able to implement the strategy and necessary improvements with $4 million less that is being recommended in your 

budget? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, ma’am. So part of the decline to the budget going 

into fiscal year 2013 is due to some of our pilot projects that we 

will be funding going forward because we anticipate them then becoming an on-going process within the NBIC. 

So the goal of the new strategy is making sure that the projects 

that we are going to be doing can become incorporated into the normal processes of the NBIC, where they won’t require as much upfront costs, but will rather become part of the continuing evolution 

of the NBIC. 

So we don’t anticipate needing those funds going forward. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So you are saying that you believe you will be 

able to adequately meet the affairs of your office with $8 million? 

Dr. GARZA. I believe so. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. One of the biggest issues we talked 

about before was the inadequate participation by the other Federal 

agencies that participate in NBIC. Can you give us an update of 

where we are on that? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, ma’am. So that ties into the strategic planning 

process as well. So you are absolutely right that we had a difficult 

time with inter-agency partners participating within the NBIC 

process. But as you pointed out, the statutory language for the 

NBIC is not ‘‘you shall’’, it is ‘‘you may’’. It is not ‘‘you shall.’’ 

I think that is appropriate actually, because I want people to be 

coming to the center or to the system because they see the value 
15 

in it. So one of the things with the strategy that we made sure we 

do is we made sure it wasn’t DHS-centric, that we made sure that 

it was system-centric. 

That means going and talking with each of the individual agencies to see what their needs were, to see what they saw of the system, how they could improve it, how they could contribute, and 

what they desire out of the system. 

So that is why it took a little bit longer than normal to develop 

a strategic process. But it also gave us buy-in from those institutions, because now it is them helping develop the strategy. So they 

have buy into it. 

I can just tell you anecdotally, from own experiences, is that we 

have had quite a bit of enthusiasm and interest in working with 

the Center. That gives value out to the individual agencies. 

So I can’t give you any, you know, concrete numbers that say, 

you know, this is how much we have improved in the interaction. 

But I can tell you that I think our relationships with the other 

agencies are dramatically improved. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Do you feel they are adequate? 

Dr. GARZA. I think they are evolving. I think they adequate right 

now for where we are. I think in the time to come that those relationships will continue to grow, that will continue to find novel 

ways of looking at data and to bring data in. 

I think we will continue to refine processes. I think people will 

contribute more. I think it is a good springboard now to get better 

and better. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. As you know, the administration has combined 

various programs and funding together. MMRS is a popular and effective program that has been now consolidated with UASI and 

some of the State homeland security programs. 

Why do you think we should continue to fund NBIC over programs like MMRS or other State and local programs? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, ma’am. Although I don’t—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Besides you wanting to keep your job. 

Dr. GARZA. Right, exactly. Although, you know, I am never one 

for trying to pit one program against another, but I do recognize 

economic difficulties where you have to make difficult choices. So 

the answer to that I would give is that the NBIC, what we envision 

it to be is a National asset that can help not only the Federal interagencies, but I think the whole of the Nation. 

So part of that is, as I expressed before, helping Federal agencies 

with information, with analyses that they might have not otherwise had, because they’re siloed in their data. But also reaching out 

to the State and locals, which was—effectiveness. 

We have done this in a couple of ways. One of those is giving 

them access to some of our common operating pictures, and then 

also developing our pilots to make sure that we are including the 

State and locals. 

So I think we can become a force multiplier with the States from 

a biosurveillance standpoint, which will give them a capacity that 

they haven’t had before. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I will yield at this time, since I am down to 

about 19 seconds. Or actually I am over. Thank you, sir. 
16 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. We are going to go one more round anyway. So 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Please provide an update on the status of the guidance for protecting the responders’ health during the first week following a 

wide-area aerosol anthrax attack. This guidance has been languishing in the clearance process for years. 

Tell us why the guidance has been delayed. But first give us the 

update. 

When will the guidance be released? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, sir, excellent question. This is something that I 

think has been very important to our office. As you have correctly 

noted, this has been a long time coming. 

Frankly, you know, we have been working on it very hard for the 

past couple years. It seems like this is a normal part of how you 

get things done, is you can do that 90 percent fairly quickly but 

that last 10 percent, that always seems to hold you back. 

We are at that last 10 percent right. So the document, I believe, 

is at almost the 99 percent right now. We have had the final vetting of comments, the adjudication of certain issues. We have been 

working with, you know, a whole smattering of the Federal interagency, HHS, NIOSH, OSHA, EPA. 

Everyone seems to be on board now. As you know, you are going 

to be having a hearing here in a couple weeks about medical countermeasures. So I fully anticipate that this report will be done, I 

am hoping, by that hearing. 

I know that it is on schedule to go up to the Domestic Resiliency 

Group for adjudication. So I anticipate it being very shortly. I hate 

to give you an exact date, but I would say that we are rounding 

third and we are heading for home right now. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Can you keep us informed on that, because it is 

very, very important, as you know? 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. One last question: The Food, Agriculture, and 

Veterinary Division with OHA is responsible for the agriculture security activities of the Department. This small office has typically 

been funded at fairly modest levels, as you know, about at 

$720,000, and this year actually down to $640,000. 

This office works toward animal and agricultural health and providing planning tools at the local level to support this. But very little elaboration in the budget was provided as to what this money 

would be used for. What will this $640,000 be used for? Why isn’t 

it transparent in the budget? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, sir. I think you rightly stated that food—that is 

a very important mission within our office, and I think sometimes 

under-appreciated, how important it is, and how important food security is for this Nation. 

As you will remember during H1N1, when it first broke, it wasn’t 

called H1N1. It was called Swine Flu. That had a devastating attack on the pork industry, to the tune of billions of dollars. 

So we are very keen to not even issues that affect our stock can 

have a direct effect on the economy of this Nation, which is very 

important. So the things that FAV focuses on is, first, interacting 

with the Federal inter-agency, so with the USDA, FDA, but also 
17 

interacting within the DHS assets that implement the regulations. 

So that is particularly CDP, who does inspections. 

The thing that we have been most focusing on, though, is helping 

out the State and locals as well. We do that through a couple of 

different mechanisms. One is through building tools and guidance 

for them. 

So part of this is building them guidance so that they can look 

within their State and localities to see how prepared they would be 

for a food emergency. They can tally up where they are, where the 

challenges are. So they can direct resources and funding through 

that. 

So part of that has been going towards that effort. I will apologize to you. I don’t have an exact breakdown of where the money 

goes, but, you know, I would be happy to get the information back 

to your office, to tell you exactly all the efforts that—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Please do. I am sure the Ranking Member will be 

interested as well. 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. You can get back to us on that as well. 

All right, well, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

I will recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. My next question has to do with the deployment of Gen III technology that has repeatedly been delayed. Only 

one vendor has completed phase one of the testing. I understand 

that part of the reason for the delay in the deployment is due to 

a technical feasibility issue. 

How has OHA addressed the feasibility issue? Or is that the reason? 

Dr. GARZA. So I would have to make sure I understand what 

technical feasibility—what you meant by that. But let me explain 

to you some of the reasons why some of these issues have come up. 

So you are absolutely correct that one vendor has gotten through 

phase one testing. We are having a pause right now before we go 

to phase two, to go over the data from all of our phase one testing, 

to look at what things are going well, and what things need to be 

looked at further. 

So again, it is a first-of-kind technology. Nobody else in the world 

has developed this type of technology. So the pause after the phase 

one of acquisition is very important, so that we can take a look at, 

hey, what are the things that worked very, very well in phase one; 

what are the things that didn’t work as well as we needed them 

to, so that we can then go back and say, look, these things are either exactly where they need to be or they need to be improved 

upon. 

It is the same sort of development process that goes through with 

any complex technological development. You know, I always use 

the example of the iPhone. Look, the iPhone, when it first came 

out, had challenges. Have to go back and do engineering changes 

to improve it. That is exactly what this is supposed to do during 

this acquisition process. 

We take a look at what things did it do well on, what things 

didn’t it do well on, what things can we improve on. Then, frankly: 

Is this what we really need going forward? 
18 

So the acquisition process has those dates built in to make sure 

that we are doing what we are supposed to be doing, but, frankly, 

doing what the Nation needs as well. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would you say Gen III is on track? 

Dr. GARZA. I would say Gen III is appropriately where it should 

be right now, which is—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I am sorry. Would you say it is on track? 

Dr. GARZA. Well, it depends if you are looking at the acquisition 

time line, as you are looking at, hey, this is new technology. If you 

are looking at the acquisition time line, it slips. Absolutely, it slips. 

But as I mentioned before, this is to be expected in complex technology development. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Dr. Garza, I think you know I am supportive. 

It is obvious that I am supportive of the administration. But in all 

fairness, I need for you to really clearly answer the question. 

The reason why I am asking the question is we, as Members of 

Congress, we end up, you know, supporting funding of various programs, projects, services and so on. You know, some of us have had 

the opportunity to see projects go on way too long, only halfway to 

the end, that they really not be feasibly attainable. 

Meanwhile, we have spent, you know, millions and billions. So 

it is a responsibility question on our part. 

I am asking you, in your professional opinion, is Gen III on 

track? That is what I am asking you, yes or no? 

Dr. GARZA. Right. I truly appreciate your oversight of this. Believe me, we need oversight of important acquisitions. 

My professional opinion is it is right where it needs to be. Now 

there is going to be slips in the schedule. There is nothing that I 

can do or that anybody can do to prevent those. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I am not asking where it needs to be. I am asking you, do you believe that the project, given the testing that has 

been done so far, is something that is potentially feasible and attainable? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Within what approximate time frame would 

you expect Gen III to be deployed? 

Dr. GARZA. Well, we have to make sure we go through our acquisition strategy time line first. So I make no guarantees that it will 

make it through the next phase of testing. 

So why this acquisition strategy was built with these milestones 

here. So the next phase of testing will, again, test another part of 

the system. So we have to make sure that it is hitting all those 

marks before we even talk about procuring a machine. 

We don’t want to invest, you know, the $5.7 billion over the lifetime of the program unless we are relatively sure—absolutely sure 

that this is going to fit the bill. 

So we are still in that testing and evaluation period right now. 

I make no guarantees that it will go through procurement. 

But what we need to do is have robust testing and evaluation, 

to make sure that we are making the correct procurement decisions. That is the important part. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So are you anticipating 2 years, 5 years, 10 

years? 
19 

Dr. GARZA. The fiscal year 2013 schedule has a four-city operational testing and evaluation period on there, which, frankly, will 

take time. We need to run the machines in different environments, 

you know. 

So I would have to look at our acquisition time line again, but 

I am thinking the procurement decision would probably come 

around 18 months or so, after we complete including testing and 

all the data acquisitions and looking at data. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. My last question is referring to overlapping responsibilities. The Office of Safety and Environmental Programs within the under secretary of management is responsible for 

establishing DHS-wide safety and health programs. Therefore it 

appears to be some overlap between the occupational health efforts 

undertaken by OHA and the office residing in the management directorate. 

Please describe how the missions and the efforts of these two offices differ. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, ma’am. There is an important difference. 

So our office focuses mostly on the occupational health side. We 

have these developed guidelines with OSEP, up at the Office of 

Management, to make sure that everybody knows what each other 

is doing. Management has been more concerned with workplace 

safety issues, more so than occupational health issues. 

I think that is appropriate, since it was in a management office. 

But we have brought on a new occupational health position, retired 

from the DOD, very experienced. 

He has been there only a couple months, but he has already done 

a lot of good work. But I think we do have a very good working 

relationship with OSEP and USM. I think we clearly understand 

where each others’ lanes are. We work with each other quite frequently. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Provide to the committee where your lanes are, 

what those differences are. 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

I have nothing further. I want to thank the Ranking Member for 

her questions and, Dr. Garza, for your valuable testimony. Then we 

may have some questions afterwards. 

Again, the Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for you. We ask you to respond in writing, sir. The 

hearing record will be open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

Thanks to the audience for all your patience as well. 

[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN GUS M. BILIRAKIS FOR ALEXANDER G. GARZA

BIOWATCH

Question 1. Knowing what you know about the biothreat, do you personally believe that BioWatch is contributing to our overall surveillance capability in a meaningful manner? In what specific way(s) are the results being integrated with other 

surveillance mechanisms? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2a. Several Federal agencies, including CDC, DHS, EPA, and FBI have 

responsibility for parts of the response to a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR) (laboratory analysis, detection, remediation, and law enforcement investigation respectively). FEMA’s role is unclear and they are rarely (if ever) engaged in multi-agency 

planning workgroups. 

Which agency has responsibility for coordinating the Federal response to a BAR? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2b. How does a BAR differ from what is known as a ‘‘CDC actionable 

event’’? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2c. How does the Biological Agent Threat Response protocol integrate 

with the Federal BioWatch response, and how is it coordinated with the BioWatch 

National Conference Call? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3a. I understand that further procurement actions for BioWatch Gen– 

3 have been postponed due to the Department’s decision to conduct a comprehensive 

biodefense strategy review to ensure Departmental capabilities are appropriate and 

well-grounded. 

Can you tell us the status of this review, and whether it was prompted by concerns about the capabilities of the Gen–3 prototype system? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3b. OHA staff indicated that this delay will impact both the fiscal year 

2012 and fiscal year 2013 planned expenditures for the Gen–3 program. Can you 

elaborate on how the planned rollout time line will be altered by this review? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3c. Are there outcomes being considered by Review Panel that could significantly impact the Gen–3 program? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3d. To your knowledge, has this review impacted other acquisition activities within the Department? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4a. OHA expended significant resources to test the current candidate 

technology in a field test 1 year ago in Chicago. 

What were the results of this testing? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4b. When will the data from the Phase 1 Chicago field test be made 

available for public and/or stakeholder review? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. Please describe, in detail, the ways in which OHA and the Science 

and Technology Directorate are cooperating on development and deployment of 

Gen–3 systems. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. By how much do you expect to reduce the casualty rates once the 

Gen–3 system is fully deployed? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 
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Question 7a. The BioWatch program involves testing for agents despite the fact 

that treatments for some of those agents are not necessarily available. 

Why should local governments test for BioWatch agents for which there exists no 

medical guidance, or capability to prevent or treat? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7b. What protocol does OHA propose they follow in the event of a positive result? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE AND INTEGRATION CENTER (NBIC)

Question 8a. The budget request for NBIC includes an increase of $1.0 million for 

the development of pilot projects with partners in the Government and private sectors to address core biosurveillance capabilities such as collaboration, information 

integration and sharing, and data analysis and reporting. These projects are proposed as part of the new ‘‘emergent strategy’’ for NBIC. 

How does OHA envision these pilot projects integrating into an overall picture of 

improved, integrated National biosurveillance? How will they build upon and integrate with the on-going National Collaborative for Bio-Preparedness project, which 

I understand will also continue to be funded? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 8b. What metrics have been established to assess individual programs’ 

short-term success as well as their contribution towards longer-term integrated biosurveillance goals? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 8c. How are the funds being distributed across the individual pilot 

projects and what are the time frames for pilot program roll-outs? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 8d. What is the current status of those programs that have already been 

initiated? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Medical Countermeasures 

Question 9. You have requested $1.9 million for a new Medical Countermeasures 

Program to implement the Executive Order that requires you to provide MCMs to 

your employees. The goal is to ensure maintenance of mission-essential Executive 

Branch functions. With this funding, OHA will develop a strategy and provide 

antivirals and antibiotics to cover the DHS workforce, critical contractors, and those 

in care and custody in the event of a pandemic or other health threat. 

Is specific threat or risk assessment information used to inform DHS’ MCM procurement strategy? Is there a formal process for prioritizing procurement decisions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Chemical Defense Program 

Question 10a. Previously the Chemical Defense Program sponsored a Transit 

Demonstration Project in Baltimore. 

What is the status of this project? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 10b. Does the reduction in funding for the Chemical Defense Program 

suggest a cancellation or elimination of these types of projects? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 10c. Has OHA decided not to fund additional pilot activities with transit 

agencies? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

General CBRN Defense 

Question 11a. Recent developments in the news regarding the H5N1 virus, or bird 

flu, have raised serious concerns over whether the proper infrastructure is in place 

to prevent dual-use research from being misused. 

In your role advising the Secretary and other Department leaders on health and 

medical matters, and in fulfilling OHA’s mission to provide health security, in what 

way have you and your staff been involved in the current debate as well as in the 

on-going debates about dual-use research generally? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 11b. Is DHS sufficiently involved in these discussions in your opinion? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 12. Homeland Security Presidential Directive—10 (Biodefense for the 

21st Century) issued in 2004 called for the Department of Homeland Security, in 

coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, to develop 
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comprehensive coordinated risk communication strategies to facilitate emergency 

preparedness for biological weapons attacks. This includes travel and citizen 

advisories, international coordination and communication, and response and recovery communications in the event of a large-scale biological attack. 

Has a coordinated risk communication strategy for biological attacks been issued 

to date? If not, when can we expect to see it? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

AGRICULTURAL SECURITY

Question 13. The S&T Directorate requested no funds for the National Bio and 

Agro-Defense Facility, which was envisioned to support the Nation’s agricultural security. Agricultural security is a common goal shared with your office. S&T is apparently reconsidering even the very need for such a lab. 

In light of decreased funding requested for your office for agriculture defense activities, combined with this lack of request from S&T, please relate to the committee 

whether this decreased emphasis is due to perceived decrease in threat on the part 

of the Department, or simply tough decisions in a tight budget environment. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION

Question 14a. There are no Federal guidelines on indoor, outdoor, or mass transit 

remediation following a biological release. If a large city such as New York were to 

apply the standards used to remediate the Senate Hart Building following the 2001 

attacks to a large area release in Manhattan, it could take anywhere from 50 to 

300 years to complete. 

When can local governments expect guidance from the Federal Government to recover from a large-scale release? Do you work with the EPA on providing such 

standards? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 14b. In the event of a false reactive identification of an organism, is the 

Federal Government willing to indemnify local governments for costs that would be 

associated with acting in response to a positive BioWatch result? Has OHA been a 

part of any such discussion? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

STATE AND LOCAL COORDINATION

Question 15. The economic difficulties of the last few years have had profound impacts on State and local workforces. Many employees in State and local health departments have lost their jobs, and I wonder to what extent planning, exercising, 

and response activities are suffering. 

Have you uncovered severe challenges at the State and local level due to the 

budget downturn, or for other reasons? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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