alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT  31.1 CERTIFICATION

I, William J. Reilly, President, certify that:

     1. I have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report  on Form  10-QSB  of  Suncoast
Naturals, Inc.;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

     3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this quarterly report fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:
         a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
         b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and
         c) Presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

     5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing
theequivalent functions):
         a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
         b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls; and

     6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Dated: 8/04/2005         /s/ WILLIAM J. REILLY
                        ----------------------
                        William J. Reilly
                        President, Director
Case No. 9,778a.

#### MOORE v. PAXTON.

[Hempst. 51.] 1

Superior Court, Territory of Arkansas.

Oct., 1827.

Limitation op Actions — Foreign Judgment.

1. The statute of limitations is not pleadable to a judgment rendered in another state.

2. Where process is served on the defendant, or his appearance entered to the action, the judgment of another state is conclusive; and no pleas can be interposed thereto, nor can it be impeached in any other way than it could be in the state where rendered.

[This was an action by Alexander S. Moore against Joseph Paxton.]

1

 [Reported by Samuel H. Hempstead, Esq.]

OPINION OF

THE COURT.

This is an action of debt brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, upon a judgment obtained in the state of South Carolina. The defendant has plead the statute of limitations, to which plea the plaintiff has demurred. The statute is as follows: “All actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract, without specialty, shall be brought within five years after the cause of action shall accrue.” Geyer, Dig. 274. This has been considered a question of great importance, and has been ably argued at the bar. We are satisfied that the statute of limitations cannot be plead to an action of debt founded on a judgment from another state, or territory, where the process was served upon the defendant in person, or his appearance entered to the action. The judgments of sister states do not stand upon the same footing as foreign judgments; but where the defendant has personal notice by the service of process, or enters his appearance,' the judgment is conclusive, and cannot be inquired into in any other way than it could be' in the state where the judgment was obtained, and no other pleas can be interposed thereto. This doctrine has been settled by the supreme court of the United States, in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch [11 U. S.] 481, and Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. [16 U. S.] 234. The demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations must be sustained. Judgment for plaintiff.
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No s . 06

- 18

- 00025

- CR & 06

- 18

- 00026

- CR

BRADLEY CURTIS KOUGHER, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court Hopkins County, Texas Trial Court No s . 1726304 & 1726305

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.2 O R D E R Court reporter Jana Atchison Rushing recorded the trial court proceedings in appellate cause numbers 06

- 18

- 00025

- CR and 06

- 18

- 00026

- CR, styled Bradley Curtis Kougher v. The State of Texas , trial court cause numbers 1726304 and 1726305, respectively, in the 8th Judicial District Court of Hopkins County, Texas. A copy of this record has been requested by a family member of Bradley Curtis Kougher. After receiving that request, we asked Rushing if she would voluntarily redact the sensitive data from the record before we were faced with the prospect of disclosing an unredacted copy of the reporter’s record. Rushing has respectfully declined to redact the sensitive data, on a voluntary basis. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 9.10. Sensitive data includes, (1) A driver’s license number, passport number, social security number, tax identification number or similar government

- issued personal identification number; (2) bank account number, credit card number, and other financial account number; (3) a birth date, a home address, and the name of any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed.
T EX
. R. A PP . 9.10(a). Rule 9.10(b) provides that, “[u]nless a court orders otherwise, an electronic or paper filing with the court, including the contents of any appendices, must not contain sensitive data.” Further, “[t]he filing of a document constitutes a certification by the filer that the document complies with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule.” T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 9.10(e).3 Having determined that volum es 1 and 3 through 9 of the reporter’s record contain sensitive data, as that term is defined by Rule 9.10, we hereby ORDER Rushing to redact from these volumes any and all sensitive data they contain. 1 Those volumes of the so redacted reporter’s record a re to be received by this Court no later than Thursday, August 8 , 2019

. If any of such redacted volumes are not received by August 8, we

warn Rushing that we may begin contempt proceedings and order her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of this Cour t for failing to obey its order

. IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT
Date: July 16, 2019

1 These volumes contain the names of five persons who were minors when the offense was committed. See T EX
. R. A PP . 9.10(a)(3). In accordance with Rule 9.10(d), “Sensitive data must be redacted by using the letter ‘ X ’ in place of each omitted digit or chara cter or by removing the sensitive data in a manner indicating that the data has been redacted.” T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.10(d).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-7982

GEORGE EDWARD WILLIAMS, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

J. R. INGRAM, Special Agent; RON ROGERS,

Special Agent; UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND AGENTS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,

District Judge. (CA-94-270-2)

Submitted: March 21, 1996 Decided: April 12, 1996

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George Edward Williams, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Lindsay Reeves

Davis, Jr., Charles Edward Nichols, NICHOLS, CAFFREY, HILL, EVANS

& MURRELLE, Greensboro, North Carolina; Gill Paul Beck, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983) and

Bivens.* We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Williams v. Ingram, No. CA-94-270-2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 11,

1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Before the First Division,

November 27, 1946

No. 51433.

#### Protests 636-K, etc., of Ignaz Strauss & Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

The chemist who analyzed samples of two of the items in issue testified that they were composed solely of synthetic phenolic resin and that synthetic resin is not the chief binding agent. The manager of the plaintiff company testified that he examined all of the invoices covered by the protests and made a list (exhibit 1) of all the items similar to the two items as *225to which the chemist testified. From the record presented, the court was of the opinion that the plaintiff made out a *prima facie*case, overcoming the presumption of correctness attaching to the collector’s classification. Although there is not a chemist’s analysis in the record of each of the items in question, the court was satisfied that all of the merchandise is in all material respects the same as the items on which an analysis had been made. Following Abstract 49907, the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
Case KTo. 9,780.

#### MOORE v. WATERS.

[5 Cranch, C. C. 283.] *1*

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

March Term, 1837.

Justice op Peace — Jurisdiction — Incidental Questions.

A justice of the peace may have jurisdiction of a matter, incidentally, of which he would not, if it were the principal cause of action; therefore he may have jurisdiction in an action of debt upon a bond, in the penalty of fifty dollars, conditioned that if a certain bay mare should be proved not to be the property of J. B., the bond should be in full force, otherwise, void; and thus collaterally try the title to the mare.

Replevin of the plaintiff’s property, taken by the defendant [John Waters] who was a constable, under and by virtue of a fieri facias issued by a justice of the peace upon a judgment, by him rendered, in an action of debt upon a bond, in the penalty of fifty dollars, the condition of which was that if a certain bay mare (described therein) should be thereafter legally proven not to be the property of James Brown, then the bond to be in full force; otherwise void.

Mr. Brent, for plaintiff [James Moore],

contended that the justice had no jurisdiction to try the title to.the mare, wlych was the only matter tried by the justice.

Mr. Bradley, contra.

The cause of action is a debt of fifty dollars; this is within the jurisdiction of. the justice, and he cannot be ousted of that jurisdiction by reason of any collateral matter which may come in question, incidentally upon the trial.

1

 [Reported by Hon. William Cranch, Chief Judge.]

THE COURT (MORSELL, Circuit Judge,

doubting) was of opinion that the justice had jurisdiction of the cause. The bond was a contract to pay $50, upon a certain event. Whether that event had or had hot occurred, ■was a question incidental to the question whether the debt was due or not. If the justice admitted improper evidence, it was error, but could not oust him of jurisdiction. Verdict for defendant,
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v LEVELL LYON, Private, U. S. Army, Appellant

20 USCMA 58, 42 CMR 250

No. 22,975

August 21, 1970

*Colonel Daniel T. Ghent, Captain Howard L. Kaplus,*and *Captain Stewart Pettet Davis*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Colonel David T. Bryant, Major Edwin P. Wasinger, Captain William R. Steinmetz,*and *Captain Milburn M. O’Dowd, Jr.,*were on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

DARDEN, Judge:

In United States v Williams, 20 USCMA 47, 42 CMR 239 (1970), this Court determined that a court-martial sentence is not rendered illegal because of a military judge’s failure to inquire of the appellant personally if he had anything to say in his own behalf before sentencing. That same question is again raised. Because the reasoning in *Williams*is equally applicable here we affirm the decision of the Court of Military Review.

Chief Judge Quinn concurs.

FERGUSON, Judge

(concurring) :

I concur.

I agree with my brothers’ disposition of this case for the reason set forth in my separate opinion in United States v Williams, 20 USCMA 47, 42 CMR 239 (1970).
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v EDWARD E. EASTER, Specialist Five, U. S. Army, Appellant

19 USCMA 68, 41 CMR 68

No. 22,278

November 14, 1969

*Colonel Daniel T. Ghent*and *Captain Karl J. Uebel*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Colonel David, T. Bryant, Major R. Kevin McHugh,*and *Captain Richard K. Bank*were on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Ferguson, Judge:

The accused was convicted by general court-martial convened in the Federal Republic of Germany. We granted review to determine whether the constitutional limitations on court-martial jurisdiction laid down by the Supreme Court in O’Callahan v Parker, 396 US 258, 23 L Ed 2d 291, 89 S Ct 1683 (1969), apply to this conviction.

Subsequent to our grant of review in this case, we decided in United States v Keaton, 19 USCMA 64, 41 CMR 64, that the holding in *O’Callahan*did not apply to a court-martial held in the Philippines, under the authority of a treaty between the United States and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, for an offense committed in that country. While the particular offense in *Keaton*could be described as “service connected” within the meaning of *O’Callahan*(cf. United States v Nichols, 19 USCMA 43, 41 CMR 43), we held, for the reasons set forth therein, that all offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, committed in a foreign country, were cognizable in a court-martial held in that country.

*69Authority to try this accused by court-martial, in the Federal Republic of Germany, was granted under Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and Article XIX of the Supplementary Agreement. Because the offense of which he now stands convicted (attempted housebreaking) occurred in the civilian community, a waiver of jurisdiction by the German authorities, provided for in the Agreement, was obtained and attached to the record of trial as Appellate Exhibit XXIII.

Since what we said in United States v Keaton, supra, with reference to the constitutional limitations on court-martial jurisdiction laid down in *O’Callahan,*applies equally here, we hold that the court-martial had jurisdiction to try this accused.

The decision of the board of review is affirmed.

Chief Judge Quinn concurs.

Judge Darden concurs in the result.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

TRAVON JOHNSON,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 528 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 4th day of April, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
----

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ON SOCIAL SECURITY FOR MIGRANT WORKERS

Rates for conversion of currencies pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72

(2006/C 268/15)

Article 107(1), (2), (3) and (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72

Reference period: October 2006

Application period: January, February and March 2007

----
**Independent Auditors' Consent**
The Board of DirectorsKansas City Life Insurance Company:
We consent to theincorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 2-97351) on FormS-8 of Kansas City Life Insurance Company of our report dated January 31, 2003,with respect to the consolidated balance sheet of Kansas City Life InsuranceCompany and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2002 and 2001, and the relatedconsolidated statements of income, stockholders’ equity, and cash flows foreach of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2002 and all related financial statement schedules, which reportis incorporated by reference in the December 31, 2002 annual report on Form 10-Kof Kansas City Life Insurance Company. 

The audits referred to inour report dated January 31, 2003, included the related financial statementschedules listed in Item 15(a)(2) as of December 31, 2002, and for each of theyears in the three-year period ended December 31, 2002, included in this annualreport on Form 10-K. These financial statement schedules are the responsibilityof the Company’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion onthese financial statement schedules based on our audits. In our opinion, suchfinancial statement schedules, when considered in relation to the basicconsolidated financial statements taken as a whole, present fairly in allmaterial respects the information set forth therein. 

/s/KPMG LLPKansas City, MissouriMarch 26, 2003
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7409

JAMES CURTIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

JAMES VENABLE; DONALD POWELL; PAUL HICKMAN;

JOHN ALDRIDGE; MARK A. ADKINS; BOBBY WIDENER;

TERRELL C. WADE,

Plaintiffs,

versus

L. M. SAUNDERS; V. GRANT, MRS.; DAY, Warden;

L. M. HUFFMAN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District

Judge. (CA-98-538-7)

Submitted: February 10, 2000 Decided: February 15, 2000

Before WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

James Curtis, Appellant Pro Se. William W. Muse, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

James Curtis appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying relief on his 42

U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) complaint. We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. See Curtis v. Saunders, No. CA-98-538-7 (W.D. Va. Sept. 15,

1999). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
No. 56423.

protest 177873-K (New York).

#### W. A. Cleary Corp. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of lecithin (soybean residual sludge) similar in all material respects to that the subject of *United States*v. *C. J. Tower & Sons*(38 C. C. P. A. 131, C. A. D. 450), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. 54665.

#### Joseph Blank *v.*United States,

protests 134105-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of synthetic stones the same in all material respects as those -the subject of *S. Nathan & Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(37 C. C. P. A. 99, C. A. D. 426), the claim at 10 percent under paragraph 1528 was sustained.
Case 2:04-cv-01149-DFL-CMK   Document 111    Filed 06/15/06   Page 1 of 2

Case 2:04-cv-01149-DFL-CMK   Document 111    Filed 06/15/06   Page 2 of 2

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2012-07-27T19:49:17-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-21092 Conference Calendar

TCHEWAM LILY MUKWANGE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CITY OF HOUSTON, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-00-CV-2849

-------------------- August 21, 2002 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Tchewam Lily Mukwange appeals from the denial of her motion for relief pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(b) following the grant of summary judgment for the City of Houston (“the City”) on Mukwange’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We lack jurisdiction to review the grant of summary judgment itself, as Mukwange did not file a timely notice of appeal from that judgment. See United States v. Carr , 979 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir.No. 01-21092 -2- 1992). Regarding the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion, Mukwange contends that the district court erred by failing to recognize that it had erroneously interpreted the law of municipal liability and that the district court should have granted her Rule 60(b) motion and granted her the relief she sought in her complaint. The denial of Mukwange’s Rule 60(b) motion was not an abuse of discretion. See First Nationwide Bank v. Summer House Joint
Venture , 902 F.2d 1197, 1200 (5th Cir. 1990). The district court correctly understood the law of municipal liability and nothing in Mukwange’s pleadings or the materials she submitted established that her arrests and detentions arose from any constitutionally infirm policy, practice, or custom. See Johnson
v. Moore , 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992).
AFFIRMED.
Rev 0 (9/08)

Comments in Response to 

“Final rule; request for comments”

Docket: FAA-2012-1220 Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-208-AD

Comments have been received in response to: “Final rule; request for comments,”

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket and Directorate Identifier entered above. 

(Project engineer: Please review any comments to determine if additional action is warranted.

Once you have made your determination, please fill in the commenter(s) name(s) and check the 

appropriate response below. Include additional information following the appropriate response, 

if necessary. Then include your name and the date in the spaces provided, and return it to the 

AD directorate focal.

The FAA has reviewed comment(s) related to the above FAA Docket that we received from: The 

Boeing Company

(Please check one)

 These comments have not been found to contain any information to warrant reconsideration 

or change of this AD.

 These comments have been found to contain information that warrants consideration of 

additional regulatory action. (SEE Airworthiness Directives Manual 

FAA-IR-M-8040.1 FOR ADDITIONAL ACTION.)

______Sherry Vevea_____ February 1, 2013__

Name: Date:

(This form is part of the official docket file for this AD action.)