Engineer

Far from Ordina

The U.S. Army Corps of Engine

in St. Lo

Damon Manders and Brian Rentfro

Ordnance and Technical Services Branch

St. Louis District

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

September 1, 2011

iii

Foreword

In 2007, the state of Missouri adopted as its motto, “Close to Hom

from Ordinary.” The title of this volume – “Engineers Far from Or

– builds on this motto. To some this may seem presumptuous, mayb

arrogant, but it closely refl ects the fact that St. Louis has been home t

of the nation’s greatest civilian and military engineers and that it has 

central hub for exploration and civil engineering almost since U.S. a

tion of the Louisiana Territory. Some of the nation’s leading topographi

civil engineers have called St. Louis or Missouri their home at some p

their career, including William Clark, Joseph N. Nicolette, Henry M. 

James B. Eads, Henry and Edward Flad, Robert E. McMath, John A. 

son, Edward A. Glenn, Claude Strauser, Jack Niemi, and many others. E

ers include Lewis and Clark, Zebulon Pike, John C. Fremont, Kit Carso

Manuel Lisa departed from St. Louis. Many leading U.S. Army Corps o

neers offi cers received tutelage from the Mississippi River near St. Loui

of Engineers Col. Charles Gratiot was a St. Louis citizen. Col. Stephen H

became the Chief of the Corps of Topographical Engineers after expl

of the Missouri River and improvements to the river at St. Louis an

locations. One of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s fi rst assignment

engineer offi cer was to improve the St. Louis Harbor. Brig. Gen. Will

Bixby was at one point simultaneously the St. Louis District Engineer

ern Division Engineer, and Chief of Engineers. No less than seven St

District Engineers served as members of the Mississippi River Comm

fi ve of them as its president, including some of the most brilliant offi ce

organization has known.

Likewise, the history of St. Louis is fi lled with some of the most imp

engineering accomplishments in the nation. At the beginning of the Am

occupation of St. Louis, the city served as a starting point for explorati

mapping of the Northwest. Topographical engineers working for the C
iv

region. Civil engineers and engineer offi cers helped make the earliest impro

ments to the Mississippi River and established transportation routes to 

west that allowed its expansion. These accomplishments include the earl

experiments to reengineer the diffi cult Middle Mississippi River with s

removal, wing dams, notched and permeable dikes, dredges, and other te

nologies. In many ways, the district served as the laboratory for the res

the river. Some of the city’s leading businessmen, biologists, and engine

worked hand in hand with the Corps, leading to some of the most produc

civilian-military knowledge exchanges the nation has known. By the twenti

century, the Corps was building one of the greatest lock and dam system

the world, constructing levees and fl oodwalls to protect the region from fl o

ing, and establishing reservoirs at several tributary lakes and streams. La

environmental river engineering innovations such as chevron dikes, bendw

weirs, tree screens, and environmental pool management were developed 

implemented at St. Louis District as a result of their detailed studies and m

eling. Such efforts demonstrate the great knowledge and innovative attitud

district engineers and planners, not only with regards to navigation and fl 

control, but also to environmental mitigation and restoration.

The activities of the Corps of Engineers in St. Louis always preceded 

growth and change. As the Corps has improved the rivers and made it safe fr

fl ooding, the city has grown from a frontier town and French colony, to a ri

town and trading center, to a railroad hub and industrial giant. The popu

tion of the city grew from a few thousand in the 1820s to the fourth largest 

in the U.S. by 1900. Although the population of the city itself declined a

World War II, the surrounding metropolitan area has grown and the harbo

St. Louis, now stretching 70 miles along the river, continues to contribute 

the well being of the metropolitan area. Refl ecting the concerns of the nat

about the impact of industrialization and river improvements on the envir

ment, the Corps worked closely with other agencies and local governmen

maintain a balance between nature and the activities of man by restoring 

river system to its former state. These connections and their impact on the 

itself form an important thread in the stories that follow.

The history more or less follows a topical approach, which, although w

ten as independent essays or units, still follows something of a chronolog

outline. The fi rst section discusses the role of the Corps in westward expans
v

ment in building the transportation routes that made the city during t

50 to 70 years in the U.S. The second section provides an overview of 

sippi River navigation improvements, from the earliest attempts to cl

river of snags in 1825 through various attempts to maintain a channel t

permanent and temporary improvements in the 1880s, to the construc

slack water dams north of St. Louis from 1934 to 1965 maintaining 

foot depth, through other studies and innovations up to modern day. 

three discusses fl ood control efforts from the growth of federal respon

from 1917 to 1936, the construction of urban fl ood control projects afte

the development of reservoirs from the 1950s to the 1980s, major fl oo

since World War II, and response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Secti

briefl y discusses the involvement of the St. Louis District in military co

tion, focusing mostly on World War II but including major deploym

twentieth and twenty-fi rst century confl icts. Section fi ve focuses on the m

era and the changes the district underwent to respond to new environ

requirements. It includes a description of the two major construction p

one completed and the other eventually deauthorized, and their environ

impact. It also chronicles the development of major environmental tec

gies and programs to restore the river’s natural regimen. Thus, while d

ing the major responsibilities of the district topically, the history pro

from the early republic period for exploration, to the prewar era for navi

to the twentieth century for fl ood control and military construction, to 

twentieth century and early twenty-fi rst century for environmental proj

The authors wish to extend their thanks to the St. Louis District 

support, without which this volume would not have been possible. Th

nance and Technical Services Branch, for which the authors themselve

provided much of the preliminary research, visited archives, collected an

tized sources, and conducted employee interviews. In particular, the a

wish to mention Jon Daly and Donna Zoeller, who put in considerabl

in paving the way for the writers to take up their task. The authors also 

Thomas A. Freeman, Rochelle Hance, Randy Curtis, Laurel Lane, a

entire branch for their support and help. The authors appreciate the pa

tion of the more than 27 employees and military personnel who particip

interviews, as well as past interviews conducted by Michael Ruddy and 

Special thanks go to Charles Camillo, the Mississippi Valley Division his
vi

ect. Finally, the authors wish to thank their families and friends for their s

port during this project, and I thank God for this opportunity to write about 

city that has become my second home.

Damon Mand

September 2
vii

Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Part I. Gatekeepers of the West: The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and Westward Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1. St. Louis: Base for Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Opening the Gateway to the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Part II. Engineering the Middle Mississippi: The U.S. Ar

Corps of Engineers and River Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Snag Removal on the Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. The St. Louis Harbor and Channel Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. Dredging and Channel Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6. Canalization of the Upper Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Navigation Improvements in the Modern Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Part III. Where the Rivers Run: The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and Flood Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. Federalization of Flood Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9. Urban Flood Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10. Flood Control Reservoirs in the St. Louis District . . . . . . . . . . 

11. Flood Fighting and Flood Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

12. Task Force Guardian and Hurricane Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Part IV. Serving the Nation: The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and Military Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

13. Military Construction and the Industrial Complex . . . . . . . . . 

14. War Mobilization on the Mississippi River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

15. Deployments and Combat Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
viii

of Engineers and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

16. Growing Environmental Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

17. The Meramec Dam Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

18. Replacement of Lock and Dam No. 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19. Environmental River Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

20. Environmental Pool Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Appendices

Appendix A. St. Louis District Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Appendix B. St. Louis District Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Appendix C. Notable Engineers in the St. Louis District . . . . . . . . . . 3

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

View of St. Louis, 1835, by Leon Pomarede, Courtesy St. Louis Art 

J
1

Part I.

Gatekeepers of the West:

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

and Westward Expansion

In 1967, St. Louis opened the Gateway Arch to the public. Desig

Eero Saarinen and Hannskarl Bandel, the 630-foot arch quickly beca

iconic symbol of the city. As part of the Jefferson National Expansion 

rial museum, the arch is a monument to the role of St. Louis as the “Gate

the West.” For many decades, St. Louis was the last civilized stop before 

ing the western wilderness. Dozens of explorers and thousands of settle

through the city on their way to their own destinies in the West as the 

States expanded across the continent. The arch celebrates this fact. Wha

well known is the role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played in open

maintaining this gateway. By fi rst occupying the city, by leading early e

tion of the northwest, and by opening and maintaining transportation 

west, the Army enabled westward expansion. Without the Army, and th

in particular, the route to the West may have taken decades longer to b

established, or it may have taken a different route entirely. Through the 

verance and vision of the U.S. government, the Army, and the Corps, t

to the West through St. Louis opened for generations of Americans se

better life.
2

 1 

St. Louis: Base for Exploration

Even before the U.S. assumed possession of the Louisiana Purchase 

1804, St. Louis served as a base for exploration of the Northwest. The pr

ous governors of St. Louis had organized several small trade journeys, bu

was the expedition led by Capts. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark in 18

that launched a period of exploration of the Missouri River, Upper Mississi

River, Arkansas River, Red River, and what would become Arkansas, Misso

Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas. This exploration con

ued until well after Missouri became a state in 1821. As the last major city 

the frontier where expeditions could purchase supplies and obtain inform

tion and where the U.S. Army maintained a presence for many years, it w

the logical starting and ending point for exploration. Starting with Lewis 

Clark, including Capt. Zebulon Pike and Maj. Stephen Long, and culminat

in the journeys of the renowned French mathematician Joseph N. Nicollet 

the Corps of Topographical Engineers, the Army and the Corps of Engine

pushed into the western frontier from St. Louis. In the process, they m

important discoveries while improving maps and knowledge of the regi

which enabled settlement and further exploration. At the same time, by 

explorers using St. Louis as a base of operations, the city itself grew into 

“Gateway of the West.”

When the fi rst U.S. Army offi cers arrived in St. Louis in 1803, it had alre

been a prominent French colony in the American West for 40 years. After 

tial exploration of the Mississippi River by Louis Jolliet and Jacques Marqu

in 1673, permanent occupation of the colony began with the founding of Bi

in 1698 by Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville, and in 1707 Robert Cavelier, Sieur 

La Salle named the territory Louisiana. As early as 1682, there had been a 

with the name St. Louis on the Illinois River, later rebuilt near Peoria, Illin

It was primarily a mission and Native American trading center, never nu

bering more than 100 or so persons. Among the tribes it evangelized were 

Tamaroas, whose principal village, Cahokia, lay across the Mississippi fr

modern St. Louis. Once the largest Native American city in North Amer
3

Tamaroas. Including Canadian traders, the mission at Cahokia grew to 

60 by 1705. Soon overshadowing it was a Jesuit mission to the Kask

which missionaries built originally in 1700 near the River Des Peres 

south side of modern St. Louis and later moved to the mouth of the Ka

River when the tribe relocated to escape Iroquois jurisdiction. The Ka

mission became “something of a capitol of the Illinois country for a long 

Located near rich soil adaptable to agriculture, the mission quickly g

more than 100 persons by 1715 with several mills as it became peop

Canadian and Louisiana merchants attracted by close proximity to salt 

and tin and lead mines. Encouraged by Scottish fi nancier John Law, the 

established Fort de Chartres 15 miles from Kaskaskia in 1720, Fort O

near the Missouri River in what is now Carroll County in 1723, and lead 

near the Meramec River in 1723, which led to settlement of Ste. Gen

Even at this time, “these French outposts in the Illinois country quickly b

 western-oriented,” historian James Primm observed. Trade with F

wealthy southwestern holdings kept the colony alive for a generation.1

Following the French and Indian War, Louisiana Gov. Jean Jacq

Abbadie granted a trade monopoly w

Missouri tribes to Gilbert Antoine Max

August 1763, his partner Pierre de Lacl

to scout a site for the endeavor. The co

started permanent occupation in 1764 

colony Laclede named St. Louis. He de

it after New Orleans in a gridiron patte

public square, common fi elds, and a to

for boats. Since the Treaty of Paris end

war ceded French holdings east of the 

sippi to the British, the colony received 

immigrants from Illinois, including a

40 families from Fort de Chartres and C

as well as Capt. Louis St. Ange de B

1

 Marcel Giraud, History of French Louisiana, Vol. 1 (Baton Rouge: LSU P, 1953): xi-10, 27-

337-348, quote on 340; James N. Primm, Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri (Boulder, Co

1981): 1-7, quote on 5; James B. Musick, St. Louis as a Fortifi ed Town (St. Louis: R.F. Miller, 

Calvin R. Fremling, Immortal River: the Upper Mississippi in Ancient and Modern Times (Mad

Wisconsin P, 2005): 101-122; Frederick J. Dobney, River Engineers on the Middle Mississippi: A H

the St. Louis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (St. Louis: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, M

Valley Division, St. Louis [MVS], 1978): 1-7.

Pierre de Laclede
4

and his garrison. The Spanish, w

had obtained Louisiana prior to 

1763 Treaty of Paris, fi nally exer

authority over the colony in 1767 w

construction of Fort Don Carlos so

of the Missouri River in 1768. In 17

St. Louis Gov. San Pedro Piernas est

lished garrisons and militia at St. Lo

and Ste. Genevieve. With the growth of the fur trade, by 1772, the populat

of St. Louis was 577 and Ste. Genevieve was 691. The city grew to includ

range of occupations, incomes, education, and life styles; other than the oc

sional ship from New Orleans, it was mostly self-suffi cient. Since the Span

opposed the British, the residents of Spanish Illinois supported the Ameri

Revolution, aiding Virginia Gen. George Rogers Clark, defeating a British 

Native American attack on St. Louis in 1780, and raiding a fort at St. Jos

1683 Map of French Colonial America

Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, 1735
5

especially after passage of the 

Northwest Ordinance in 1787, 

American settlement of Illinois spurred continued trade 

and growth across the river. As 

one of the largest towns in Illinois, Cahokia became the seat of 

St. Clair County and the territorial government in 1790. James Piggot established the fi rst ferry from 

became East St. Louis across the river. Despite Spanish closure of th

Mississippi to American trade, St. Louis residents remained friendly 

Americans, and the city grew to a population of 1,168 in 1792 and b

formed several satellite villages with populations ranging from 181 to 

the same time, St. Louisans started pushing farther west in search of ne

Marquette and the Indians 1869 by William Lamprecht, St. Louis Art Museum

August Chouteau’s 1780 map of St. Louis, M
6

Missouri in hopes of fi nding a way to the Pacifi c, but because of opposit

from Native American tribes reached no farther than North Dakota.2

Early American Exploration

France reacquired Louisiana in 1801, but facing war with Great B

ain, Napoleon Bonaparte offered to sell the territory to the United States 

$15 million in 1803. President Thomas Jefferson accepted despite reservati

that doing so violated the Constitution, and after the Senate ratifi ed a tre

approving the sale, Gen. James Wilkinson took possession of Louisiana at N

Orleans on December 20, 1803. On March 10, 1804, Lt. Gov. Carlos de Ha

de Lassus offi cially signed over St. Louis and Fort Don Carlos to Capt. Am

Stoddard, the Revolutionary soldier and later hero of the War of 1812. Fr

this point forward, there was a frequent if not near continuous presence 

Army offi cers responsible for the city’s protection and well-being. Stodd

served as acting governor until the arrival of William Henry Harrison in the 

of 1804. There was some apprehension and economic hardship as the territ

transitioned to U.S. government with the appointment of judges and adopt

of U.S. law. By showing great fl exibility and deference to local governme

Stoddard and Harrison maintained civil authority until Jefferson appoin

Wilkinson as the territorial governor in 1805. Although initially recei

favorably by Creole citizens, Wilkinson was surrounded by rumors of scan

and the rejection by Wilkinson offi cials of several land grants made prio

1803 sparked calls for his removal. Jefferson ordered him to New Orlean

head up defenses there, and assigned Capt. Meriwether Lewis as governo

1807. Lewis served as governor until his departure for Washington in 18

to straighten out his personal accounts, and he committed suicide soon af

wards. Brig. Gen. Benjamin Howard of Kentucky then served as governor u

1812. With reorganization of the Territory of Missouri in 1812, President Jam

Madison named Lewis’ former partner William Clark the new governor.3

After becoming U.S. property, St. Louis quickly became a base for explo

tion and expansion. Although Jefferson had been planning a western expedit

2

 Primm, pp. 9-67; Musick, pp. 5-104; Dobney, pp. 5-10; James W. Bond, The East St. Louis, Illi

Waterfront: Historical Background (St. Louis: National Park Service Division of History, 1969): 1-10

population of St. Louis declined somewhat by 1800 to 1,039 as populations shifted to these new village

3

 Primm, pp. 71-86, 104-105; Fremling, pp. 122-124. William Clark was the brother of George Ro

Clark.
7

cially commission the scientifi c and military expedition up the Missour

led by Capts. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, until after negotiatio

France for Louisiana were completed in June 1803. The Lewis and Clar

dition has received frequent treatment in recent years in celebration of i

year anniversary. Suffi ce to state here that St. Louis played an importa

in the journey, providing necessary supplies, personnel, and informatio

to the expedition’s departure up the Missouri. The offi cial beginning 

expedition was August 31, 1803, when Lewis left Pittsburg, Pennsylvan

initial crew sailed down the Ohio River through Cincinnati, Ohio, Clark 

it from Louisville, Kentucky. They then rowed up the Mississippi to St

There, Lewis found outgoing Lt. Gov. Carlos Delassus had not heard 

expedition and, despite Lewis having valid passports, would not let them 

Spanish Louisiana. Lewis returned to Cahokia, and the expedition wint

a camp by the Wood River. By the following January, Delassus had hear

the governor in New Orleans to let the expedition proceed, and Lewi

months in St. Louis hiring river men, copying maps, and gaining infor

from traders. After a long delay due to his involvement in disputes w

Osage and other tribes, Lewis assigned the military governor, Stoddard

agent and then joined the expedition, which departed up the Missouri R

June 3, 1804. On November 7, 1805, the expedition reached the Pacifi c 

and returned by two different routes and reunited on the Missouri R

August 1806, collecting valuable data on geography, mineralogy, ant

ogy, botany, zoology, and other fi elds. The expedition returned to St. L

September 23, 1806, and the subsequent publication of their accounts 

catapulted Lewis and Clark to fame.4

Another less recognized but important explorer of the West – who

author has called the “Lost Pathfi nder” – was Capt. Zebulon M. Pik

became famous for discovering Pike’s Peak and the headwaters of the 

sas River. In 1805, Wilkinson ordered then Lieutenant Pike up the Miss

River, ostensibly to locate the source of the Mississippi, but also to ne

4

 David Lavender, The Way to the Western Sea: Lewis and Clark Across the Continent (N

and Rowe, 1988): 1-94, 190-191, 356-389; Dobney, p. 6; Letter No. 86, Lewis to Jefferson, Whee

8, 1803; No 89, Lewis to Clark, Cincinnati, Sept. 28, 1803; No. 97 Delassas to Juan Manuel d

St. Louis, Dec. 9, 1803; No. 100, Lewis to Jefferson, Cahokia, Dec. 28, 1803; No. 106, Gov. to Dela

28, 1804; No. 121, Lewis to Stoddard, May 16, 1804; No. 123, Clark to William Croghan, St. Charle

1804; No. 124, Stoddard to Henry Dearborn, St. Louis, Jun. 3, 1804; No. 207, Lewis to Jefferson, 

Sept. 23, 1806 in Donald Jackson, Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition with Related Docume

1854 (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1962).
8

St. Anthony Falls. Pike left St. Louis on August 9, 1805, with 20 enlisted 

diers and an interpreter. He went as far north as what was later named L

Cass, Minnesota, which he incorrectly identifi ed as the headwaters of the M

sissippi. He had neglected in the throes of winter to follow the course anot

25 miles to its true source, Lake Itasca, discovered more than 25 years later 

Henry Schoolcraft. He returned April 30, 1806. A few months later, Wilkin

tasked Pike to transport Osage prisoners from the Missouri military cant

ment to their tribe, help to negotiate peace between the Osage and Canzes, 

then with the aid of the Osage travel to meet the chief of the Comanche trib

the headwaters of the Arkansas and Red rivers. Along the way, he was to col

information on the rivers, Native American tribes, fl ora, and fauna. Accord

to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, another object was to gather inform

tion on the Spanish, and Wilkinson warned Pike to move circumspectly. 

departed on July 15, 1806. Accompanying him were Lt. James B. Wilkin

(son of the general), 21 enlisted soldiers, and a doctor and interpreter. W

Lieutenant Wilkinson found the headwaters of the Arkansas, Pike discove

the mountain named for him but was unable to locate the head of the Red Riv

Captured by the Spanish, he was held prisoner in New Mexico over the win

but returned to Natchitoches, Louisiana, in July 1807 and thence to Washi

ton, D.C. Wilkinson communicated to Washington the information Pike s

on the rivers and particularly their navigation, the general country, the na

tribes, and what Pike believed was the source of the Mississippi River, wh

Dearborn wrote him, “met with approbation of the President” and were “h

in high estimation.”5

As these Army explorers opened up the West, additional explorers s

followed. Soon after the return of the Lewis and Clark expedition, Manuel L

of St. Louis established the Missouri Fur Company and established a fort 

the Missouri River. He sent a series of expeditions into the Northwest: Jo

Colter to the Yellowstone River in 1808, Andrew Henry to the Three Fo

5

 W. Eugene Hollon, The Lost Pathfi nder: Zebulon Montgomery Pike (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 19

30-73, 81-89; Donald Jackson, ed., Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike with Letters and Related D

ments (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1966): Vol. 1, pp. 6, 131, 162; Vol. 2, Letter No. 39, Dearborn to Wi

son, Feb. 28, 1906; No. 117, Pike to Jacob Kingsbury, Natchitoches, Jul 20, 1807; No 121, Pike to 

Natch., Aug. 12, 1807; quote from U.S. Cong., “Compensation to Persons Engaged in the Several Explo

Expeditions under Captain Pike,” H.D. 259 (10th Cong., 2nd Sess.); John O. Afi nson, The River We H

Wrought: A History of the Upper Mississippi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2003): 1-22. Many 

commented on the suspicion of Pike’s involvement in the Wilkinson-Aaron Burr plot to establish a nati

the Southwest, but there is no direct evidence of his knowledge and, as Hollon observes, “An examinati

Pike’s career makes it hard to believe that he could have plotted treason” (170).
9

expeditions all departed from St. Louis or St. Charles. In 1808, Briti

uralist and botanist John Bradbury received permission from the Je

administration to conduct a research expedition in the Northwest. He 

in St. Louis in December 1809, and after exploring the Ozarks, departe

St. Charles up the Missouri on March 12, 1810, returning later that y

1811, John Jacob Astor’s Pacifi c Fur Company commissioned an expedi

Wilson Price Hunt and Donald McKenzie to blaze a trail from St. Loui

Pacifi c, only the fourth crossing of the continent. Lisa and Henry accom

them on part of the journey. By 1812, an expedition led by Robert Stu

explored the Snake River, Green River, and skirted the Continental Div

this time, traders knew the region from the Missouri to the Snake River 

fairly well. Although these expeditions were not connected with the Arm

had been made possible in part by the Lewis and Clark and Pike exped

whose members aided other explorers.6

The War of 1812 suspended for a time exploration of the Northw

1812, General Howard resigned his post as governor to serve as a comm

He later led an attack on the Illinois tribes aligned with the British and 

lished Fort Clark near Peoria, named for Governor Clark. The threat 

primarily with Native American allies of the British, resulted in buildi

tifi cations in St. Louis. Two companies from Louisiana led by Capts. 

Spencer and James Musick built and garrisoned Fort Lookout near P

des Sioux in St. Charles County, supplemented by volunteers from St

led by Capt. Charles Lucas. For the most part, there was little action

rumors arose of British intrigue among upper Missouri tribes, Clark as

Manuel Lisa as an agent to counter this activity, and Lisa quickly bou

loyalty of several leading tribes, including the Sioux and Omaha. In 1814

led an expedition of 140 volunteers to Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, to c

Native American activities disrupting trade routes and established Fort 

at an advantageous vantage. However, soon after Clark’s departure, the 

captured the fort as well as the relief force sent a few months later. Th

ish paroled the volunteers but held the town until the end of the war. D

peace being declared at the end of 1814, fi ghting continued with loca

until 1816, when Clark negotiated a treaty with 10 tribes near Portage du 

6

 Reuben G. Thwaits, Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (NY: AMS, 1966); Vol. V., “Bradbury

in the Interior of America, 1809-1811”; Vol. VI., “Breckenridge’s Journey up the Missouri, 1811”; W

Goetzmann, Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863 (New Haven, Yale UP, 1959): 1-
10

Clark went on to serve as superintendent of Indian affairs and surveyor gene

of Illinois.7

Mapping the Northwest

With the conclusion of the war, the Corps set about to chart the Northw

frontier. Lewis, Clark, and Pike had received only minimal training as surv

ors, as all Army offi cers were expected to perform some topographical dut

and they produced several maps, but of limited scope. In 1816, the Corps s

topographical engineer Maj. Stephen H. Long to aid in building defense

Fort Clark on the Illinois River and to survey the Mississippi River. Educa

at Dartmouth College, Long was already a gifted mathematician, surveyor, 

inventor when he joined the Army in 1815, and 

he served initially as an instructor at the U.S. 

Military Academy at West Point, New York. 

Traveling to and from St. Louis, he spent 1816 

improving Fort Clark and 1817 mapping the 

Illinois Valley to Chicago and northern Indiana 

to Fort Wayne. He gathered information on the 

width, depth, and navigability of the streams 

he crossed and recommended connecting the 

Illinois River to the Great Lakes via a canal and 

constructing a public road from Ohio to the 

Mississippi River. After a brief trip to Washington, D.C., in 1817 he made an inspection 

trip up the Mississippi to St. Anthony Falls, 

near modern St. Paul, Minnesota, during which he gathered data on for

cations and possible sites for new posts. He returned to Fort Belle Fonta

north of St. Louis on August 15. Although his mission was military in nat

and required greater speed of travel, he nevertheless collected new informat

about the region. Soon after, he received orders to accompany Maj. Willi

Bradford and a rifl e company up the Arkansas River to establish Fort Sm

7

 Musick, pp. 108-111; Primm, pp. 105-107.

Stephen Harriman Long from 

portrait by Titian Ramsey Pea

Independence National Histor

Park Collection
11

December 1817.8

During the hiatus after this expedition, Long returned to Washingt

learned of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun’s planned Yellowstone E

tion. This was a mission to establish a chain of installations on the M

to the Yellowstone River, eventually reduced to just forts at the Mand

lages in the Dakota Territory and Council Bluffs, Nebraska. Long had 

proposed a scientifi c expedition up the Missouri, and he again proposed 

ration by a steamboat of his own design to precede the military expe

Calhoun accepted in June 1818. Long spent most of the next year ob

supplies, selecting scientists and offi cers, and designing the ever-larger 

boat, Western Engineer, which ended up 75 by 13 feet with a 19-inch 

The fi nal party numbered 24, including Capt. Thomas Biddle, Lt. Ja

Graham, Indian Agent Maj. Benjamin O’Fallon, botanist William B

geologist Augustus Jessup, zoologist Thomas Say, and artist Titian P

Baldwin, O’Fallon, and Biddle would later leave the expedition. They le

burg in April 1819 and arrived in St. Louis on June 9 to coordinate w

military expedition and collect supplies. They departed St. Louis on J

made stops at St. Charles and Franklin, arrived at the Missouri Compan

Lisa in September, and established a cantonment just upriver to spe

winter. Despite the poor performance of the Western Engineer, whic

frequent delays due to engine troubles caused by sludge from the Misso

steamboat was the fi rst to make it so far upriver. Long returned to Wash

and received new orders to travel overland to the Rocky Mountains and 

the source of the Platte, Arkansas, and Red rivers. He returned to St

in April 1820 and departed in June, but struggled with obtaining pro

after budgetary cutbacks. Facing hunger, the expedition split up and re

to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, in October 1820. Despite later criticism 

expeditions, they generated an enormous amount of scientifi c data: two 

274 drawings, and discovery of more than 700 species of plants and 

hundred species of insects and mammals that generated dozens of artic

books. The largest criticism of the expedition – Long calling the Great 

8 Roger L. Nichols and Patrick L. Halley, Stephen Long and American Frontier Exploration (N

of Delaware P, 1980): 1-60; Dobney, p. 7.
12

temporaries familiar with the region.9

Even as Long departed on his journeys, other expeditions were also go

forward. From 1818 to 1819, geologist Henry Schoolcraft explored the inte

of Missouri. He departed from Potosi, about 60 miles southwest of St. Lo

on November 6, 1818, and returned on February 4 the following year, dur

which he indentifi ed coal and other mineral deposits. Schoolcraft would la

become famous for accompanying Lewis Cass and Capt. David Douglass 

exploring the Michigan territory in 1820, exploring the Middle Mississi

Valley in 1825, and identifying the true source of the Mississippi River at L

Itasca, Minnesota, in 1832. In 1820, Maj. Stephen W. Kearny and four ot

offi cers traveled west to explore a route from Council Bluffs to Fort Snellin

the confl uence of the Mississippi and St. Peter’s rivers. Only three years la

Long would return to the Northwest to explore from Fort Snelling to the nor

ern border of the U.S. at the 49th parallel, and eastward to the Great Lak

For the most part, these explorations were commercial to identify poten

mine locations or to scout routes for canals or roads. In the 1830s, the Ar

Topographical Department funded several new expeditions to the Northw

The most important of these were led by George W. Featherstonhaugh (p

nounced Fanshaw). During two journeys through Arkansas and up the Mis

sippi River to Fort Snelling in 1834 and 1835, he took notes on geography 

located mineral deposits before returning to St. Louis in November 1835.10

Exploration of the Northwest reached 

zenith with the expeditions of Joseph N. Ni

let. Born and educated as a mathematician 

Savoy, France, Nicollet served as astronom

at the Paris Observatory under the resto

Bourbon monarchy only to lose support in 

Revolution of 1830. On immigration to 

U.S., he met Chief of Engineers Col. Cha

Gratiot and Auguste Chouteau in Washingt

D.C., who encouraged him to go to St. Lo

and explore the Mississippi River. A

9

 Nichols and Halley, pp. 61-180; Edwin James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburg to the R

Mountains (Ann Arbor: University Microfi lms, Inc., 1966): Vol. 1, 1-75, 146, 404; Vol. 2, 282. 10 Schoolcraft, Journal of a Tour into the Interior of Missouri and Arkansaw (London: Richard Phi

1831): 3-7, 93; Nichols and Halley, pp. 181-216.

Brigadier General Charles Gratiot
13

for St. Louis in 1834, traveled up the Tennessee River, and then took a detour to visit New 

Orleans and Florida. He arrived in St. Louis in 

1835 and established a measurement station to 

collect meteorological and astronomical observations with which he calculated the elevation 

above sea level. He eventually made six other 

trips to the city over the next four years, usually between expeditions or trips to Washington. In 1835, he explored up the Missouri 

River to Council Bluffs, again making careful 

geographic observations. In 1836, funded by 

Chouteau, he made an expedition to the source 

of the Mississippi to gather more precise data. 

In 1838, Col. John J. Abert, chief of the newly formed Corps of Topogr

Engineers, agreed to purchase the extensive geographic data and map

piled by Nicollet for $5,000. However, Nicollet argued that there we

gaps in knowledge about the Dakota Territory, and Abert authorized 

expedition to the triangle between the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. A

panied by Lt. John C. Fremont and botanist Charles A. Geyer, Nicolle

expeditions in 1838 and again in 1839 on board the Antelope, a steamer 

by the American Fur Company of St. Louis. In 1839, Nicollet departed S

for good to complete his maps in Wash

Over the next three years, he worked 

map and a report of his fi ndings with 

of Fremont, and in 1843, within month

death, Congress published what was th

accurate hydrographical map of the 

west published to that time, to include I

Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota

Missouri, and Nebraska. Praised by A

“an extremely accurate map,” by Lt. G

neur K. Warren as “one of the greatest 

butions ever made to American geog

and by former Smithsonian Institute As

Auguste Chouteau, MHS

Fremont 1852 William Jewette
14

ous atlases. His incomplete journal, also published in 1843, included deta

descriptions of the geography, fl ora and fauna, anthropology, and history of 

exploration from 1836 to 1839, as well as the fi rst detailed history of St. Lo

he compiled while visiting the city, with which he had built such a str

connection.11

Throughout this time of exploration, St. Louis quickly grew to someth

more than a frontier town. Americanization of the city, with all its virt

and vices, started early. From 1803 to 1816, 80 percent of families moving 

St. Louis were American. In 1807, the fi rst Baptist congregation moved acr

the river, in 1811 the fi rst Presbyterian church, and in 1821 the fi rst Meth

ist, although the Catholic Church remained strong with the establishmen

St. Louis as the fi rst head of the Louisiana diocese. The city gained its fi rst 

in 1806, fi rst newspaper in 1808, fi rst grammar school in 1809, fi rst fi re co

pany in 1810, fi rst overseer of roads in 1811, fi rst market house in 1812, and fi 

bank in 1816. Industry grew rapidly, and “by 1832 St. Louis was the unch

lenged capitol of the American fur trade,” biologist and river historian Cal

Fremling observed. Used by Army offi cers as a base of operations for explor

the wilderness, St. Louis was offi cially incorporated in 1809 and grew quic

With the infl ux of residents after the War of 1812, St. Louis grew to 4,598 

1820, with the county growing to 9,850, an increase of 77 percent. Only a y

later, when Missouri became a state, the population of St. Louis and outly

towns had reached 9,732. From 1810 to 1820, Illinois had also grown fr

12,282 to more than 55,000 citizens, many of whom maintained connecti

across the river. It became a state in 1818, with the capitol at Kaskaskia. Ar

offi cers and engineers had led exploration of the West from St. Louis. A

result, the city had gained a prominence that would only grow in the deca

that followed.12

11 Martha Coleman Bray, Joseph Nicollet and His Map (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Soc

1980):12-63, 127-293; J.N. Nicollet, Report Intended to Illustrate a Map of the Hydrographical Bas

the Upper Mississippi River, S.D. 380 (26th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-94; Abert, Warren, and Baird quotes 

Frank N. Schubert, Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1819-

(Wash., D.C.: Historical Division, OCE, 1980): 12-13. The Corps of Topographical Engineers existed 

parallel engineer organization with the Corps of Engineers under the War Department from 1838 to 

after which the two merged.

12 Primm, pp. 86-112; Fremling, p. 125; Dobney, pp. 11-13.
15

St. Louis and the 

Oregon Trail

By 1840, “Manifest Destiny” was in full swing among Americans, and wit

ing descriptions of the Pacifi c Coast by settlers and travelers from Califor

Oregon, some in Congress sought to fi nd an overland route to the new Promise

Among these were Sens. Thomas Hart Benton and Lewis F. Linn of Missou

saw St. Louis as key to any overland route. As historian 

Frank Schubert noted, “Benton’s St. Louis, transformed 

from a sleepy French outpost to a frontier metropolis at 

the hub of the Missouri River and Santa Fe trade routes, 

faced westward to Oregon and New Mexico.”

Benton sought out Joseph N. Nicollet, but since his 

health was failing, he turned to his faithful assistant, 

Lt. John C. Fremont of the Topographical Corps, soon 

to earn the nickname “Pathfi nder.” Benton secured 

funding and support from Chief Topographical Engineer Col. John J. Abert while Fremont organized an 

expedition that included German map-maker Charles 

Preuss. After marrying Benton’s daughter, Fremont set 

out in May 1842 for St. Louis, where his family settled.

Traveling by steamer up the Missouri River, on which Fremont recruited 

trapper Kit Carson, the expedition set out from Chouteau’s Landing near Kans

They travelled to the American Fur Company outpost of Fort Laramie on th

River. There the party split and explored the North and South Platte Rive

Rocky Mountains, but regrouped at the South Pass, where the North Platte 

Horn basins met the Green River. On August 15, he climbed the Wind Rive

and planted a U.S. fl ag. He had found the gateway to Oregon. He returned and 

published his report in “a brilliant tour de force.”

In a second expedition in 1843, he again departed St. Louis and Chouteau

ing, following his route through the South Pass along the Green River and Be

to the Great Salt Lake by September 6, 1843. From there, he followed the Snak

to the Columbia River, which he reached on October 25. He then fl oated down

Fort Vancouver, which he reached by mid-November. After exploring northe

fornia, Fremont returned in 1844. His second report and the maps of Preuss 

the single most important source for information about what became the Orego

which established St. Louis and later Independence, Missouri, as the gatewa

West.13

13 Schubert, pp. 19-34.

Thomas Hart Benton
16

 2 

Opening the Gateway to the West

When Joseph Nicollet fi rst arrived in St. Louis in 1835, he observed t

it was actually two cities: the historic French city of his heart and the th

ing “Queen city of the river.” This was another way of saying that the city w

quickly growing from its historical origins as a French colony and frontier to

to a city of industry and river commerce, through which fl owed thousand

souls migrating westward. It also recognizes that, more than any other fac

what enabled the transformation of St. Louis from frontier town to “Gatew

to the West” was the development of safe and reliable transportation rou

In this, the Corps of Engineers played important, though at times confl ict

roles. From the establishment of St. Louis in 1764 until 1817, transportat

relied mostly on slow and precarious river barge and fl atboat traffi c. With 

advent of the steamboat and its advance north of the Ohio River, the Mis

sippi River became a major highway to St. Louis and the West, although n

gation remained dangerous for many years until its improvement by the Cor

As traffi c grew, so did the city. During the Civil War, the closure of the lo

river crippled river traffi c for many decades. It was at this point that the ov

land route to St. Louis and the growing development of railroads became m

important for westward migration. It was the combination of these transpo

tion methods – the Mississippi River and the railroad – that opened St. Lo

as a gateway westward.14

Growth of River Transportation

Even before European settlement of the Mississippi Valley, Native Am

cans had used the river as a highway with simple canoes and longer pirogu

With a colony spanning the length of the valley, the 

French used the river to send supplies to St. Louis and 

furs to New Orleans. Traffi c was slow, however. Most 

used fl atboats up to 60 feet long, smaller Kentucky 

boats, or ribbed keelboats up to 70 feet long. Using 

poles and sometimes aided by small sails, these vessels 

14 Nicollet quoted in Bray, p. 133.

Type of small fl atboat 

used on Mississippi
17

barges similar to longboats with sails and oars could make four or fi ve m

hour. The development of steamboats greatly increased the speed of tra

reduced the amount of labor, thereby reducing costs by a third, accor

one estimate. In 1807, Robert Fulton fi rst navigated a river with the ste

Clermont sporting a Boulton and Watt engine and reached Albany, New 

up the Hudson River in a record 32 hours. Working with Robert R. Livi

in 1810 Fulton obtained from C.C. Clairborne, the governor of Orleans 

tory, sole rights to operate steamboats on the Mississippi River. Their 

boat, the New Orleans, sailed from Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, to New O

from October 11, 1811, to January 10, 1812, piloted by Nicholas Roosev

including stops, it took only a little less than 11 days of continuous r

time to make the entire journey. The vessel carried 300 tons and 60 pass

and made fi ve to six miles per hour. Nevertheless, despite its speed, i

draft led to it being snagged and sinking in 1814 near Baton Rouge, Lou

while their second vessel, the Vesuvius, embarrassingly became lodge

sandbar and was unable to complete a widely advertised 1,500-mile tri

of Natchez, Mississippi. Although 10 steamboats operated on the river b

1811 and 1816, the river was still dangerous to navigate.15

Two factors enabled the growth of steam traffi c that eventually 

St. Louis the port it became. One was development of a steamboat tha

safely navigate the river. The disaster of the New Orleans and the pre

trips of the Vesuvius and other vessels intimidated many pilots, and fo

years the majority of traffi c on the river above Natchez, Mississippi, con

to be pole-pushed barges. What changed this was the development of 

low draft steamboat by boat captain and War of 1812 blockade runner 

M. Shreve. His fi rst steam vessel, the Enterprise, made it up the Red Riv

from Pittsburg to New Orleans and back, but Shreve did not trust it 

tinue to make the journey. His second vessel, the Washington, placed 

smaller engine on the deck with passengers on a second deck above 

eliminating a large hold and allowing for a shallower draft. This design, 

imitated, allowed steamboats to travel over sandbars and other obstacle

easily than past steamboats. As Fremling observed, “The hackneyed ol

about the western steamboat that could run over a fi eld after a heavy d

15 William J. Petersen, Steamboating on the Upper Mississippi (Iowa City: State Historical Societ

1968): 1-67; Edith McCall, Conquering the Rivers: Henry Miller Shreve and the Navigation of 

Inland Waterways (Baton Rouge: LSU P, 1984): 19-80.
18

isville, Kentucky, to New Orleans in 13 days in 1816 with a return trip in 1

in a record 24 days. By the 1850s, steamboats made the trip from St. Loui

New Orleans on average in six days, the record, made by the Robert E. Le

1870, being under four days. With improvements in steamboats and the en

the Fulton-Livingstone monopoly after legal challenge by Shreve, by 1819 th

were more than 60 steamboats operating on the river, including ocean-go

vessels. In 1821, 247 steam vessels registered in New Orleans.16

The other factor that enabled growth of St. Louis as a port of call w

improvement of the river to the point where all river traffi c became reas

ably safe and reliable, a process that took many years. As early as 1784, Pie

L’Enfant, a French engineer serving in the Revolutionary Army, had reco

mended maintaining a permanent Corps of Engineers that could deve

transportation routes, among other duties. Secretary of the Treasury Alb

Gallatin was the fi rst to propose a federally funded program of roads and can

in 1808, arguing that, faced with a lack of development and far-fl ung popu

tions, “The General Government can alone remove these obstacles.” Althou

his focus was roads and canals, he envisioned the Mississippi and other riv

as part of a general system of transportation connected by canals. Both Thom

Jefferson and James Madison also expressed support for canals and a Natio

Road, but because of their desire to limit spending, the scope of governme

and “internal improvements,” it was not until the Monroe administration t

any effort proceeded to improve the Mississippi. After the War of 1812, S

retary of War John C. Calhoun, in compliance with a request from Congr

submitted a new report on roads and canals in which he wrote, “The exp

ence of the late war amply proves in the present state of our internal impro

ments the delay, the uncertainty, the anxiety, and the exhausting effects

calling up the militia. “It is of the utmost importance to prevent a recurre

of a similar state of things, by the application of a portion of our means, to 

construction of such roads and canals, as are required.” Such roads and can

would benefi t communication, commerce, and defense. He also recommen

improvements to rivers, although he noted that many improvements could 

made by local government. Particularly in the West, the swiftness of the M

sissippi, “which is no less the cause of its security, than that of its comme

and wealth,” made transportation easy enough that “little remains to be d

16 Petersen, pp. 68-74; McCall, 96-179; Dobney, 17-19; Fremling, 168-169, quote on 168; Anfi nson, 1-
19

the valley was under way.17

As a result of Calhoun’s recommendations, in 1820 Congress auth

a survey of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers with an eye toward improv

of navigation. That report, completed by Col. Joseph Totten and Bri

Simon Bernard in 1821, was the fi rst survey of its kind of the Mississipp

Among the obstacles to navigation it mentioned were sandbars at its 

that prevented passage except during high water; rafts of fallen trees o

wood, planters or trees and root wads embedded in the river, and saw

snags hidden in the water that obstructed and often damaged vessels; 

and falls, which, though dangerous, were well known; and high wat

rents, which often pulled vessels out of the river during fl oods. To solv

problems, they recommended continual removal of snags, the increas

of steamboats, and use of dikes to manage current. They also recomm

experiments with dikes to remove sandbars on the Ohio before procee

their adoption to clear 21 bars they identifi ed. On receiving this report i

Congress debated whether to make improvements, and some argued 

had no authority. This was settled by the Supreme Court in Gibbons vs. 

in which the court affi rmed that the federal government had power to r

and improve navigation on interstate waters under the commerce cl

the Constitution. On April 30, 1824, Congress passed the General Surv

which appropriated $30,000 for the Corps of Engineers to conduct add

surveys for roads and canals. Less than a month later, it passed an act 

priating $75,000 for removal of snags on the Mississippi and Ohio as 

to conduct experiments to remove sandbars on the Ohio. In 1826, it 

the fi rst offi cial Rivers and Harbors Act to provide for additional improv

projects. Over the next several decades, Congress passed additional Riv

Harbors acts appropriating hundreds of thousands of dollars to make im

ments, a gradual process dependent on the views of Congress whether i

or should invest in what some saw merely as internal or local improvem

17 Letter, L’Enfant to Continental Congress, Dec. 15, 1784, in Paul K. Walker, ed. Engineers of 

dence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (

ton: Corps of Engineers History Offi ce [CEHO], 1981): 358-9; Gallatin, Roads and Canals, S.D. 

Cong., 1st Sess.): quote p. 725; Calhoun, “Report of the Sec. of War Relative to Roads and Canals” (

ton: De Krafft, 1819): quotes on 4, 8; Forest G. Hill, Roads, Rails, and Waterways: The Army Engi

Early Transportation (Norman, U of Oklahoma P, 1957): 9-10, 17-41. 18 U.S. Cong., “Report of the Board of Engineers on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers,” H.D. 35 (

2nd Sess.): 4-14; U.S. Cong., An Act to improve the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers

(18th Cong., 1st Sess.); Thomas Gibbons vs. Aaron Ogden, 22 U.S. 9 Wheat. 1 (1824); U.S. Con

making appropriations for certain Internal Improvements for the year 1832 (22nd Cong., 2nd S

pp. 25-49; Dobney, pp. 18-20; Anfi nson, pp. 22-28.
20

these acts, in 1824 the Corps of Engineers established the Board of Engine

for Internal Improvements, composed initially of Totten, Bernard, and c

engineer John L. Sullivan. The board continued in existence until the form

tion of the Bureau of Topographical Engineers in 1831. One of the fi rst a

of this board was to execute a snag removal program. As Bernard and Tot

noted, snags were very common and were the primary cause of damage 

ships on the rivers. The history of the river was replete with stories of sh

damaged by snags. The board advertised payment of $1,000 for the best p

and design for a snag-removing vessel, and after review of several submissi

awarded a $60,000 contract to John Bruce of Kentucky, an experienced n

gator, as the Superintendent of Western River Improvements. In 1825, M

Samuel Babcock, the assigned Corps offi cer, reported signifi cant progress, 

complaints from William M. Poyntz and other boat captains that Bruce 

made fraudulent claims led to an investigation by Capt. William H. Chase t

fall. Evidently, Bruce believed that his contract’s instructions requiring “c

ting them off at the bottom of the river, or at least ten feet below extreme 

water” meant that he only had to remove snags from the low-water chan

leaving the most dangerous snags in sandbars and high-water channels. T

result was suspension of Babcock and the contract, although Bruce con

ued to fi ght to receive payment until the Civil War. One of Bruce’s assista

served as a temporary replacement until a permanent superintendent co

be found. Although he made some progress by 1826, it would take many m

years before snags were under control, and continual maintenance to kee

that way.19

The second set of planned improvements was the removal of sandbars 

the Ohio. Although there had been some experiments in Europe using dike

narrow and increase the velocity of rivers and scour sandbars, there was li

experience with such methods in the U.S., which was why Bernard and Tot

suggested experiments before proceeding with permanent changes. For t

work, the Corps sent Maj. Stephen Long. Unable to start the experiment

19 U.S. Cong., Condition of the Military Establishment, 1824, H.D. 262 (18th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 699-

713-714; Annual Report of the Sec. of War, 1825, H.D. 284 (19th Cong., 1st Sess.): 109-110, 136, 139; An

Report of the Sec. of War, 1826, H.D. 334 (19th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 361; Annual Report of the Sec. of W

1828, H.D. 390 (20th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 14; Report of Chief Engineer Relative to the Application of Ap

priation for Removing Obstructions to the Navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, S.D. 14 

Cong. 1st Sess.): 3-28, quote on 7; Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Ri

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Austin: U of Texas, 1994): 143-144; Hill, pp. 49-78, 153-165; Dobney

20-21; Anfi nson, pp. 22-28.
21

near Henderson, Ohio, until 1825. This proved successful, but no effo

made on the second experiment to allow time to judge the effect of th

By 1828, a contractor had cleared bars near the mouth of the Ashtabula 

Black River, and Huron River. These experiments suggested that en

could make similar improvements on the Mississippi. By 1832, Congr

extended appropriations to include similar improvements on the M

Arkansas, Red, and Upper Mississippi rivers, even as it continued t

improvements on the Ohio.20

In August 1817, the Zebulon M. Pike, a converted keelboat, was t

steamboat to arrive at St. Louis, followed shortly by the Constitutio

launched an era of St. Louis being a leading port of call on the Miss

By 1819, when Stephen Long entered the harbor in the Western Engin

his way up the Missouri, steamboats were a common sight. By 1823, wh

Virginia made the fi rst trip by steamboat from St. Louis to Fort Snellin

were more so. By this point, two years after Missouri became a state, the 

lation in the vicinity of St. Louis exceeded 10,000. River transportatio

continued to grow over the next decade. From 1831 to 1837, the num

steamboats registering in St. Louis grew from 60 to 195 per year, most o

20 Annual Report of the Sec. of War, 1824-1828; Hill, pp. 49-78, 153-165; Dobney, pp. 20-21; Anfi 

22-28.

St. Louis Harbor 1840s
22

making 10 or more landi

per year. The offi cial numbe

passengers arriving by stea

boat annually grew from 43

1,607, and the amount of t

nage unloaded grew from 7,

to 22,794 tons. Major produ

being shipped initially inclu

lead and other ore, fur, 

lumber, but agricultural pr

ucts became increasingly p

ular after 1850. Total pac

boats operating on the ri

grew from 230 in 1834 to m

than 1,000 in 1849, mov

250,000 tons. There remai

many dangers for steamb

travel. The fi re started onbo

the White Cloud that destro

23 steamers in St. Louis har

St. Louis 1850

Steamboats in St. Louis Harbor 1850s

Flatboat
23

1857 to 1885 demonstrate the diffi culties. There was, nevertheless, gro

travel because of the improvements to the river and the riverboat.21

Railroads and the Eads Bridge

While the greatly improved river channel became the primary me

transportation upriver to St. Louis, overland traffi c also grew. During St

fi rst years in the Union, roadways from the East Coast were practically 

istent. The usual route was to travel overland to Pittsburg and then ride 

down the Ohio River. In 1808, Congress authorized work on the Nationa

from Cumberland, Maryland, to Vandalia, Illinois, a project which the 

surveyed and oversaw. Although not completed until 1841, the surveye

was in use prior to paving. By 1817, an overland route was fi rmly esta

from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, across Ohio to Lexington and Lou

Kentucky, and thence to Kaskaskia, Illinois, and East St. Louis. From 

travelers could take Wiggins Ferry (formerly Piggot’s Ferry) across th

or call for a boat to be sent over from St. Louis – at that time, the Miss

was still narrow enough to hear across it. By 1820, a stagecoach line m

trip from Vicennes, Indiana, to East St. Louis in three days, and by 183

was a direct connection from the National Road at Vandalia to East St

for which St. Louis lobbied in 1836. Although river travel remained c

on average than traveling by stage, one estimate is that some 80,000 p

made this trip over the winter of 1839 when the river was frozen and cl

traffi c.22

In 1826, Corps work on railroad surveys started. Although Army en

had experimented some with railroads and Gallatin had mentioned t

his report, before 1825, most railways were short mining trams or stea

riages. By 1826, Congress became more interested in railroads and auth

a survey for routes of canals and railways to connect the Roanoke, 

and Kanawha rivers. The following year, work started on surveying th

ern end of the Baltimore-Ohio Railroad. This became one of the large

veying efforts of the Corps prior to the Mexican War. Among the en

to work on the project were Long, William Howard, Maj. William G. M

21 Fremling, p. 166, 181-183; Petersen, pp. 75-106; Primm, pp. 138-139; Anfi nson, pp. 1-22; “One 

Years on the Mississippi River,” pamphlet (Memphis: MVD, 1967): 1-2.

22 Hill, p. 37; Bond, pp. 21-25; U.S. Cong., “Missouri-National Road,” H.D. 140 (24th Cong., 1st 
24

travelled to England to study railroads and became three of the leading railr

experts in the U.S. By 1831, the Corps had conducted surveys for a dozen ot

railroad lines on the East Coast and then turned to railroad lines in the So

and in Ohio after 1832. As Chief of Engineers, Colonel Totten considered r

roads critical for transporting troops and munitions to proposed fortifi catio

By 1836, there was a railroad line running from East St. Louis to Illinoistow

about six miles – to carry coal. The owners would later extend this to Caseyv

and Brooklyn, Illinois, in 1857 to carry passengers and freight. By this time, 

Mississippi and Ohio Railroad was complete connecting East St. Louis to 

Baltimore-Ohio Railroad, making East St. Louis the western terminus of a 

that extended to the East Coast. By the following year, there were 10 lines c

necting to East St. Louis. In 1851, construction began on a Pacifi c Railroad 

from St. Louis to the Western border of Missouri, with additional lines ad

over the next decade. The fi rst western train left St. Louis in 1852.23

Because of ferry costs, it was critical to build a bridge across the Mississip

The Rock Island Railroad completed the fi rst railroad bridge across the ri

at Davenport, Iowa, in 1855. As a result, most western traffi c went throu

Chicago. As early as 1836, St. Louis citizens had suggested a bridge, incl

ing John A. Roebling and Pittsburg engineer Sylvanus Lothrop, who built 

Allegheny Bridge. However, the cost was prohibitive for the number of inv

tors interested. In 1855, Josiah Dent started a bridge company, but with cr

cism from some engineers, “the project died of fright,” as one historian not

Finally, in 1866, the St. Louis-Illinois Bridge Company obtained permiss

from Missouri to build the bridge, but permission from Illinois was tenu

because of opposition from the Wiggins Ferry and Chicago interests. Nev

theless, Missouri was able to get approval from Congress for the bridge in 

1866 Rivers and Harbors Act. Soon after, James Eads obtained an interes

the company and became its chief engineer. Eads was a civil engineer who 

made his reputation as a salvager and inventor; he had invented a diving 

for salvage work and had designed the fi rst U.S. iron gunships during the C

War. He developed a unique steel bridge design incorporating arched trus

with 500-foot spans. The following year, bridge designer L.B. Boomer of C

cago and his Illinois-St. Louis Bridge Company obtained permission to bu

a bridge from the Illinois legislature. The Illinois Company worked to opp

23 Hill, pp. 96-132; Bond, pp. 20-21, 27-31, 34-35; Primm, pp. 211-231; on Totten’s views, see U.S. C

National Defense and National Foundries, H.R. 206 (26th Cong., 1st Sess.): 123-127.
25

Construction of Eads Bridge
26

started construction of the bridge on August 20, 1867, and Boomer tried to h

workers arrested. Finally, Eads met with David Garrison, the Illinois Comp

president, and proposed merging the companies and letting an independ

panel decide on the design. The companies merged in early 1868, and a pa

selected Eads’ design. Eads laid the cornerstone on February 25, 1868. T

most diffi cult part of the work was excavating the riverbed to place the foun

tions for the piers on bedrock. Using pneumatic caissons fed by compres

air – an idea he adopted after a trip to England – he started work on the E

Pier on October 25, 1869, and the West Pier on January 15, 1870. Even aft

tornado destroyed an abutment in 1871, he completed the masonry in 1872 

started on the steel work in 1873.24

In 1873, John McCune, E.W. Gould, J.R. Pegram, and James Collins 

the Keokuk Steamboat Line complained to Secretary of War William Belk

that the new bridge obstructed navigation. That summer, Belknap authori

a board of review to suggest modifi cations to the bridge in Special Order 1

The Corps convened a board to include Col. James H. Simpson, Maj. Gouv

neur K. Warren, Maj. Godfrey Weitzel, Maj. William Merrill, and Maj. Cha

Suter in St. Louis on September 2, 1873, while Eads was in Europe. Bri

company vice president William Taussig and assistant engineer Henry F

appeared before the board with their attorney. However, the board wo

not allow sworn testimony since it was not a trial and would not allow a c

tinuance for the company to produce additional witnesses. Charges that 

board did not provide adequate notice later proved false. The board repor

on September 12 that the bridge was less than 50 feet above high water – 

enough space for ocean-going steamboats to pass – with spans too far ap

for lights or hooks to be used for navigation. It recommended construction 

bypass channel around the bridge for a cost of $1.7 million. On his return fr

Europe, Eads wrote a scathing review in which he questioned the exper

of the board, objected to the board’s belief the bridge was too short based 

the testimony of 13 riverboat captains, and rejected the board’s remedy. 

and Taussig traveled to Washington to appeal to President Ulysses S. Gra

who told Belknap to drop the case. The board reconvened January 14, 18

on order of the Chief of Engineers Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys to rec

sider its opinion in light of the remarks of Eads and others. A second report 

24 Bond, pp. 32-33, 51-68; Primm, pp. 291-303; Dobney, p. 41; Dorsey, Road to the Sea: The Sto

James B. Eads and the Mississippi River (NY: Rinehart, 1949): 96-146, quote on 99.
27

years, that the 13 riverboat men mentioned by Eads either had no rec

erboat experience or experience limited to the St. Louis area, and that 

list of recent ships visiting St. Louis and authorities on shipbuilding pro

bridge was too low. They continued to insist on a bypass channel, but sin

was “distasteful” proposed several other changes to the bridge design

ever, having already gained presidential approval, Eads ignored the fi nd

the board. His bridge opened to pedestrian traffi c on May 24 and vehi

June 3, with the fi rst train crossing it on June 9, 1874. By this time, the

no talk of or need for making any changes, as Eads envisioned. “The brid

exist just as long as it continues to be useful to the people who come af

Eads said at the dedication, and so far, it has.25

Thus, by 1840 river traffi c was secure, and by 1874 St. Louis was 

only to Chicago as a railroad junction in the Northwest. Development o

transportation routes had enduring effect on migration through St. L

the West. Before the Civil War, the majority of immigrants to the Upp

sissippi Valley came by steamboat “for all or part of their journey.” B

steamboats were navigating as far west as Montana, requiring overland 

only on the last stage of a journey. By 1857, St. Louis was receiving 

steamers per year, and by 1850 it exceeded New Orleans as the largest 

embarkation on the Mississippi. It had already surpassed it in the num

steamboats originating from there. “By 1847, St. Louis had become the 

navigation for the Upper Mississippi River and its tributaries,” Fremling 

As a result, St. Louis had reached a population exceeding 16,000 by 18

35,000 by the following decade. Missouri grew to more than 350,000

25 Dorsey, pp. 146-165; Primm, pp. 303-308; Dobney, pp. 41-42; U.S. Cong., St. Louis an

Bridge across the Mississippi River, H.D. 194 (43rd Cong., 1st Sess.), quote on 17; Eads, “Rev

U.S. Engineers’ Report on the St. Louis Bridge,” in McHenry, pp. 77-88; John Barry, Rising 

Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America (NY: Simon and Schuster, 199

Recent historians, including Barry, have portrayed this episode as a feud between Humphreys and 

pitted progressive civilian engineers against a conservative Corps over control of the river. But t

suggests Humphreys was only marginally involved, and that the matter was handled routinely, des

plaints. That there may have been personal jealousy involved is certainly possible, but the board 

praised the design, and several members worked with Eads on other matters. A better grounded 

of the Corps was its support of well-connected navigation interests. The original complaint came 

captains friendly to Belknap, and the board seems to have accepted their testimony over that of t

company. In general, the Corps was favorable to river navigation over railroad – it had not bee

involved in railroad surveys since 1853 – and it opposed several other bridges for similar reasons

Rock Island and Quincy Railroad bridge collisions in 1856 and 1870 and with the passage of new 

bridge requirements in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1866, the Corps started bridge inspections an

developed bridge design standards to protect navigation. Seen in this context, the actions of the C

part of a long-term review of bridges, not a vindictive act against a single engineer. See Annual 

Chief of Engineers, 1870, pp. 229-249; Henry Abbot, “The Physics of the Mississippi River,” Van N

Engineering Magazine 20:130 (Jan. 1879): 1-6. While navigation interests generally opposed br

railroads, “they did not dominate St. Louis,” where city boosters were dominant (Primm, p. 235).
28

were the direct results of the improvements in steamboats and river navi

tion. Once the Civil War began, however, with access to the Lower River 

off, St. Louis declined as a port, but recovered only decades later. During 

lull, more and more immigrants turned to railroads, which were not only m

direct and thus often faster, but also far cheaper once bridges across the M

sissippi replaced expensive ferries. The Eads Bridge and Union Station w

monuments to this era. Chicago remained the fi rst link in the transcontin

tal railroad, but “St. Louis became a rail center.” By 1880, its population 

increased to 350,000, behind only New York, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and C

cago. With improvements to river navigation made by the Corps after 18

including four-foot and six-foot channels, St. Louis became once more on

the leading ports in the nation. By this time, migration westward had more 

less stabilized, while St. Louis had emerged as a commercial power house 

Middle America.26

26 Fremling, pp. 187-210, quotes 187, 198; Primm, p. 128-139, 147, 167-173, 270, 287-288; Dobney

39-43; Anfi nson, pp. 1-22.

Steamers Robert E. Lee and the Natchez race from New Orleans to St. Louis
29

Part II.

Engineering the Middle Mississip

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

and River Navigation

The Mississippi River has always been king of St. Louis, and, as one 

observed, St. Louis was its queen. The river provided the life blood of the 

provided the primary means of transportation, a vehicle of trade, and a 

of income. But it was also a source of danger for those who did not kn

river. When Missouri became a state in 1821, the Mississippi and othe

being used for transportation contained serious impediments to navi

snags, sandbars, rapids, ice fl oes, and shallow waters. For decades, the

vented navigation during long stretches of the year. In 1825, the Corps 

efforts to improve the river through removal of dangerous snags and ob

and to clear out good harbors in major cities. In 1872, it began work 

manent improvements intended to increase the depth of the river. Ho

those who worked these projects observed that the Middle Mississipp

– generally defi ned as the stretch from the Illinois to the Ohio rivers – w

ticularly diffi cult to engineer. It had a lower velocity and sediment conte

the lower river, but greater sediment than the relatively clear upper rive

as the Corps of Engineers experimented with dams, dikes, revetment, 

ing, and other improvements was the river made permanently navigab

the improvements were slow in coming, and the cost was great. Long te

impact on the river of these improvements has created controversy t

continued to present day.
30

 3 

Snag Removal on the Mississippi

In 1824, the Corps of Engineers established the position of Superintend

of Western River Improvement to oversee improvement of the Ohio and M

sissippi rivers. Based on the recommendation of Brig. Gen. Simon Bern

and Col. Joseph Totten in 1821, Congress had fi nally authorized and fun

improvements in An act to improve the navigation of the Ohio and Mississi

rivers, signed by James Monroe on May 24, 1824. The Board of Engineers 

Internal Improvements had selected John Bruce as the fi rst superintende

However, despite representations he made of his success between Pittsbu

Pennsylvania, and Louisville, Kentucky, an investigation initiated after co

plaints on the quality of his work revealed in 1825 that he had made frau

lent claims. A second superintendent, one of Bruce’s assistants, assigned 

complete the work died soon after the 1826 season. Although he made so

progress on the Ohio River, the program appeared doomed to failure in 

1826. To turn it around, the Corps needed to select a man of great invent

and drive. The Report of the Secretary of War for 1827 noted: “A gentleman 

Kentucky, who was highly recommended for his knowledge of the diffi cul

Artist’s representation of St. Louis harbor around 1850s
31

in the navigation on those rivers, as well as for his zeal and activity, ha

chosen to superintend the removal of the obstructions.” That man, Henry 

Shreve, developed a snag-removing vessel and oversaw improvements 

Mississippi River and its tributaries for more than a decade, greatly imp

navigation on the rivers surrounding St. Louis.27

Henry Shreve had led an ideal capitalist’s life to that time. Born 

Jersey in 1785 as the son of the Revolutionary offi cer Col. Israel Shreve

grew up in Brownsville, Pennsylvania, near the 

Ohio River and spent his youth working in a 

mill and then as a laborer on fl atboats. In 1807, 

he entered the roaring business of merchantboat captain by building his fi rst keelboat. For 

four years, he worked the trade between Pittsburg and St. Louis and grew close to August 

Chouteau, Silas Bent, and other prominent 

St. Louis businessmen. In 1811, the same year 

he married, he built a second keelboat to travel 

to New Orleans. In 1814, he entered the steamboat craze by building the Enterprise, which 

27 Report of Sec. of War, 1826, p. 361; quote from U.S. Cong., Showing the Condition of the 

Establishment and Fortifi cations during the Year 1827, H.D. 360 (20th Cong., 1st Sess.): 631. Maj

Long in 1843 identifi ed Maj. Samuel Babcock as having followed Bruce, but he did not die until af

Snagboat Macomb

Henry Shreve
32

was the fi rst steamboat to travel from Pittsburg to New Orleans and back. La

that year, Brig. Gen. Andrew Jackson commandeered the Enterprise and 

captain to carry supplies and personnel during the War of 1812 – at the tim

was the only steamboat available because both the New Orleans and Vesuv

of the Fulton-Livingston company had capsized earlier that year. Shreve ser

Jackson enthusiastically, delivering supplies to Fort St. Phillip and other lo

tions, running the British blockade, helping evacuate New Orleans, and beco

ing the fi rst steamship to make it up the Red River to the famous raft of tr

After the war, in 1816 Shreve designed the fi rst shallow draft steamship – 

Washington – to allow navigation in the shallow inland river waters. By p

ing the engine above deck and including an additional deck for passengers 

cargo, it did not need a deep hold below the waterline. When the Fulton-L

ingston company sued him to prevent his operating on the Mississippi Riv

Shreve won a court battle that ended the company’s monopoly both for him

and other steamboat operators.28

An avid tinkerer, Shreve had in 1821 developed an idea for a vesse

remove snags and even corresponded with Secretary of War John C. Calho

about it in 1824 after the passage of the Act for the Improvement of the O

and Mississippi Rivers. Later that year, however, when the Board of Engine

28 McCall, pp. 1-51, 96-163; Petersen, pp. 36-74.

St. Louis Riverfront 1867
33

advertisement, Shreve did not submit his plans because he felt the mon

not just compensation. With the failure of Bruce to clear the Ohio an

tinued clamor to remove snags from the Mississippi, Secretary of War 

Steamboats on the Mississippi

Early snagboat on Mississippi
34

Shreve’s ideas and recommended him for the position. On December 10, 18

President John Quincy Adams offered a commission to Shreve as the n

superintendent. Having worked for nearly 20 years as a ship captain, Shr

understood the pressing need for river improvement. Snags, sawyers, 

planters growing or embedded in the banks and bed of the river caused sev

damage to vessels. According to calculations he made in 1827, since 1822 

least 14 steamboats worth $560,000 had sunk after damage from snags 

10 others had received some level of damage amounting to $115,000. Cons

ering there were only 134 steamboats operating on the Mississippi at the ti

snags impacted just under one in fi ve vessels. Further, more than 150 fl atbo

and keelboats worth $360,000 had sunk, for a total of more than $1 million 

losses. Other obstacles, such as sandbars, rapids, and large rafts of trees, p

vented navigation for much or all of the year. Given the growth of comme

on the Mississippi – 537,000 tons in 1827 – it was an intolerable situation. 

this reason, Shreve accepted the position in January 1827 for a mere six dol

a day, although he would fi ght for years to receive additional compensati

Because of high water, he could not commence operations until the fall, a

which he removed snags, roots, and shipwrecks from sandbars and chutes 

the Mississippi from the Ohio River to the St. Francis River, and snags in 

main low-water channel as far north as New Madrid. It was, nevertheless, 

very experimental. As with Bruce, he initially used a twin-hulled barge ou

ted with manual winches and cutters to conduct the work, but found it diffi c

Still, as he and his crew gained experience, he was able to increase their pr

ress to about six miles per day focusing mostly on snags on sandbars.29

Based on this early experience, he made two recommendations. One wa

remove trees within three or four hundred feet of the riverbank to prevent th

from falling in the river or collecting as driftwood. The other recommendat

was to build a steam-powered snag-removal vessel such as he had proposed 

1821. He estimated the cost at $20,000 plus $2,000 per month operating co

which nevertheless would be half the expense of manual methods. “In fact I 

believe that it will be found impossible to remove many of the most formida

snags and planters by any other means that can be applied.” He submitted 

own design to the Chief of Engineers that fall, and, after receiving appro

29 U.S. Cong., “Letter from Henry M. Shreve to the Hon. C.A. Wickliffe on the Subject of Navigation o

Mississippi River,” H.D. 11 (20th Cong., 1st Sess.): 5-6; Condition of Military Establishment, 1827, p. 

McCall, pp. 180-185. 
35

from the Secretary of War in July 1828, completed construction of the 

New Albany, Indiana, in time for the 1829 operating season. This fi rst 

the Heliopolis, was a twin-hulled steamer, 125 feet long and 25 feet wid

a windlass, cables, and chains for pulling up the snags. This was som

similar to designs submitted by Bruce and David Prentice. What separa

design was that the windlass was steam-powered, unlike that of Bru

that a wedge-shaped beam at the front of the vessel provided greater le

in pulling up the snags, unlike all previous designs. Altogether, it took 

of 40 to operate. The vessel proved so successful, Shreve built a seco

Archimedes, in 1831, and two more, the Eradicator and the H.M. Shr

1836. Several other Corps of Engineers vessels operating on the Cumb

and other rivers also adopted Shreve’s design.30

Shreve started work on clearing snags using the Heliopolis in lat

Typically, he would operate from late summer to early spring each year, 

ing fl ood months at St. Louis or Louisville. By 1836, he lived in St. Lo

managed Mississippi River operations from the city, although he contin

maintain an offi ce in Louisville, from which he submitted most reports. 

30 “Letter from Shreve to Wickliffe,” p. 4; U.S. Cong., “Henry M. Shreve – Snag Boat,” H.R. 

Cong., 3rd Sess.); “Henry M. Shreve, Jun. 7, 1844,” H.R. 538 (28th Cong., 1st Sess.); Annual 

the Sec. of War, 1829, H.D. 410 (21st Cong., 1st Sess.): 169; Annual Report of the Sec. of War, 1

485 (22nd Cong., 1st Sess.): 735; Annual Report of Sec. War, 1836, H.D.745 (25th Cong., 2nd Se

Dobney, pp. 21-23.

Shreve’s snagboat design
36

snags along 850 miles on the Ohio, 859 snags on the Mississippi as far north 

the Missouri River, and then later another 227 snags on the Ohio. The larg

snag removed was a 160-foot tree; the most snags removed were 47 on a sin

day. At the same time, three fl atboats continued removing snags from sa

bars and chutes and experimented with removing trees from the river ban

In 1831, the Heliopolis turned south, while the newly completed Archime

turned north and removed 204 snags above the Ohio. By 1832, the vessels 

removed most snags on the Ohio – those remaining were only accessible dur

low water, which limited the work season. Together, they removed more th

1,000 snags on the Mississippi for the fi rst time and also felled just under 5,0

trees along the banks. In the 1833 season, the vessels removed 1,960 snags 

felled 10,000 trees, while the fl atboats cleared sandbars from St. Louis to 

St. Francis River. In 1834, Lt. T.S. Brown and the Heliopolis turned to rem

ing snags on the Arkansas River while the Archimedes removed 1,385 sn

and logs along the waterline at 14 locations, including the mouth of the Oh

Missouri, and St. Francis rivers and 1,622 trees from the Missouri to Natch

Mississippi. Work continued at a high pace, as the crews removed 1,462 sn

and 2,599 trees between the Missouri and Ohio in 1835 and 1,491 snags 

3,434 trees in 1836. By this point, Shreve had started clearing the Mississi

north to the Des Moines Rapids. With two additional vessels added in 1836, 

crews made signifi cant progress in 1837 – 1,894 snags and 18,141 trees remo

– this despite the sinking, recovery, and repair of the Archimedes. In 1839, 

crews turned up the Missouri and removed 1,198 snags and 1,544 trees al

335 miles and removed 1,047 snags and 64 trees on the Osage River.31

By 1841, incoming steamboat captain John W. Russell replaced Shreve 

the new superintendent. Although Russell, a character of giant stature and 

endary reputation, continued to oversee snag removal periodically until 18

in 1843 the Corps assigned Col. Stephen H. Long as superintendent, a posit

he held on and off until the Civil War. By then, the Offi ce of Western Ri

Improvements, relocated to Cincinnati, Ohio, actively employed seven ci

ian engineers and superintendents who oversaw work by hundreds of labor

31 U.S. Cong., “Letter from the Sec. of War transmitting copies of the Reports of H.M. Shreve an

Delafi eld on the improvement of navigation on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers,” H.D. 9 (21st Cong., 

Sess.); “Henry M. Shreve—Navigation on the Ohio River,” H.D. 74 (21st Cong., 2nd Sess.); Annual Rep

of the Sec. of War, 1830-1841; Operations of the Topographical Bureau during the year 1839, S.D. 58 (

Cong., 1st Sess.); Supplement to the Annual Report of the Chief Engineer, S.D. 125 (26th Cong., 1st Se

Dobney, pp. 23-24.
37

where from one to fi ve snag-boats of Shreve’s design, each accompan

a manually operated machine boat to pull up snags in shallow waters 

quarter boat to house personnel clearing banks and sandbars. It als

ated dredge boats and smaller mud-scows to aid in removal of bars an

obstructions. These were steam-powered ladder dredges, which used m

cal and manual methods for removing sediment. In addition, by 1855 th

was working with the Eads and Nelson Company to remove wrecked 

boats and submerged obstructions to navigation using a diving bell in

by James Eads. Work continued on and off on removal of the Red Rive

as well as improvements to harbors, construction of dams and jetties, an

lar projects. However, the primary focus of the offi ce remained snag re

mainly on the Mississippi River, but also on the Arkansas, Missouri, I

Osage, Red, and other river systems. After 1856, the offi ce focused on c

the passes of the Mississippi, not turning to snagging and dredging aga

after the Civil War, when it tested and adopted a scraper dredge inven

Long that removed sandbars by pulling up sediment for redistribution 

stream. Meanwhile, snag removal would continue sporadically into the 

eth century to maintain navigation on the rivers.32

The impact of snag removal on Mississippi River navigation can

underestimated. As early as 1830, Shreve noted that because of his im

ments there had been only a single recorded wreck, and that was a fl 

Snags sank fi ve or more steamboats from 1831 to 1833, though all of qu

able condition. In 1834, there were only three wrecks. 1835 was the fi rst 

which the risk of wrecks due to collision was higher than that due to sna

1836 was the fi rst year there were no known snag-related wrecks of stea

on the river. At the same time, due to the other improvements he mad

most dangerous passes” of the Mississippi “present now only smooth 

of water, which may be traversed with perfect safety,” Kentucky re

noted, and the full length of the Ohio and Red rivers were passable for t

time. The result of these improvements was a decline in the chances of 

to roughly 50:1, which in turn led to a decline in the cost of insuranc

32 Annual Reports of the Sec. of War, 1843, 1857, 1868. Russell, who stood over six-foot-six, b

Jean Lafi tte in a brawl and pulled a building into the river in Natchez with his steamboat over th

passenger; see Leland R. Johnson, The Falls City Engineers: A History of the Louisville District, U

Corps of Engineers (Wash.: CEHO, 1974): 89-101. For a description of later snag-removal opera

Annual Report of the Chief Topographical Engineer, 1855, pp. 287-385. Long sometimes repo

St. Louis and Alton, Illinois.
38

of shipping goods and traveling by boat to and from St. Louis, New Orlea

and other cities. The river was not completely safe – the Ozark sank in 

St. Louis harbor in 1841 and a snag tore open the Shepherdess within mile

Market Street in 1844 – but it was safer. As Shreve lay dying at his estate, G

atin Place, outside St. Louis on March 6, 1851, he supposedly listened to 

steamboat whistles of ships approaching the Port of St. Louis and remark

“When it reaches you from somewhere in the distance, a steamboat whistl

the sweetest music in the world.” He no doubt refl ected on the vast impro

ments in the Mississippi River, increases in steamboat traffi c, the growth of 

Port of St. Louis, and his own role, at great expense to himself, in bringing i

fruition.33

33 Quote from U.S. Cong., “Ohio and Mississippi River,” H.R. 337 (21st Cong., 1st Sess.); “Shreve to W

liffe”; “Henry M. Shreve, 1836”; Henry M. Shreve, 1844”; Annual Reports of the Sec. of War, 1830-

Primm, p. 155; Shreve quoted in McCall, p. 249.
39

 4 

The St. Louis Harbor and Channel Regulation

When Pierre de Laclede established the city of St. Louis in 1764, on

reasons for selecting the site was the potential harbor at a convex curv

Mississippi River. A bluff overlooking the river protected the site from fl 

while a narrow channel from the bluff allowed easy access to the river

was reasonably clear at that location and far enough from the Missour

to be impacted by its currents. It was here that he located the tow pa

became the fi rst port. This harbor served the city for 70 years withou

and in 1836 St. Louis became a port of entry for ocean-going ships. 

harbor changed over time as sandbars formed both up and downriver, e

ally becoming islands. By the early 1830s, it appeared the river was sta

shift to the east. Already, there had been signifi cant investment in por

ties, ferries, and other utilities, which the city would have to move at co

able cost if the river shifted. If it moved far enough, it would lead to de

the harbor altogether. In December 1833, the city of St. Louis requested 

support to clear the harbor, and the Corps of Engineers took action over 

years. However, river training works were still experimental. It had be

than a decade since the experiments of Maj. Stephen H. Long using win

on the Ohio River to remove sandbars. It was unclear in 1834 when t

examinations occurred of the St. Louis Harbor whether the same tec

would work on the larger Mississippi River or whether some other appr

clearing the obstructions and maintaining the harbor was possible. The 

ods fi nally used, however, not only had great impact on the St. Louis H

but on the Mississippi as a whole. It was at St. Louis that engineers m

fi rst attempts on the Mississippi River at channel regulation through 

nent works.

Clearing the St. Louis Harbor

In the eighteenth century, the St. Louis Harbor could accommodat

river traffi c of the time, and there were no islands in the immediate 

of the port. Across the river from the port was a strip of bottomland bo

by Cahokia Creek, which eventually joined a slough to form a narrow 
40

After 1800, however, two sandbars had started to form in the river. One de

oped across from and slightly north of the harbor, and within a few years g

to more than a mile long and became populated with cottonwood and wil

trees. It eventually earned the name Bloody Island because of the numbe

duels fought there, including nationally reported duels between Sen. Thomas 

Benton and Charles Lucas in 1817 over Benton’s voting eligibility, and betw

Maj. Thomas Biddle and U.S. Rep. Spencer Pettis in 1831 over the Natio

Bank. Over time, more and more of the river diverted between Bloody Isl

and the Illinois shore. The other bar, Duncan’s Island, grew to about 200 ac

and denied access to several blocks south of Market Street. The narrow ch

nel west of the island became narrower and narrower, threatening to conn

to the mainland. Together, the islands forced the channel toward Illinois 

eventually eroded Cahokia Island while widening the channel between Blo

Island and Illinois until only half of the river fl owed along its original course

the same time, severe shoaling east and north of Duncan’s Island created a l

sandbar that presented a severe obstacle during low water by the mid-183

It appeared that the river was shifting toward the eastern shore and would

time, make St. Louis an inland city. Such shifts happened frequently, as w

the river later cut off Kaskaskia – the one-time capitol of Illinois – from the r

of the state, placing it on the same side of the river as Missouri.34

34 Primm, pp. 117, 141-157; Bond, pp. 34-50; Toni Flannery, “How Young Robert E. Lee Helped Sav

St. Louis Waterfront,” News Clipping (MVS Archives).

Artist’s representation of St. Louis harbor in 1875
41

a detriment to commerce, in 1832 the city of St. Louis paid John Goo

$3,000 to remove it using a primitive dredge. During low water, he used 

of oxen to plow up the bar in order to allow the current to remove the sed

Unfortunately, the bars quickly reformed and were not measurably sma

the end of 1833, the city council voted to send a memorial to Congress 

for aid in clearing the harbor, which the Missouri legislature forwarde

congressional delegation in January 1834. The same year, St. Louis req

that the Superintendent of Western River Improvements, Henry M. 

make a preliminary survey. After a brief examination, he recommend

use of wing dams to clear the channel. He had used similar means t

numerous bars on the Ohio River and believed the same principles wou

here. Based on this testimony, Chief of Engineers Brig. Gen. Charles G

a St. Louis citizen, personally investigated the site in 1834. He prop

dam extending from the Illinois shore to Bloody Island to direct the c

toward Missouri and wash out Duncan’s Island or possibly a wing dam 

Missouri shore between Chouteau and Cascarot islands to force the c

toward Illinois, which would then tend to push westward after clearin

carot Island. Failing these, he recommended a wing dam at the southe

of Bloody Island to push the channel toward Missouri. He estimated th

cost at $40,000. His plan also met the approval of Capt. John Symingto

St. Louis Arsenal. As a result of Gratiot’s recommendations, Congress 

priated $15,000 in 1836 for harbor improvements, although this was 

than what he recommended and what was ultimately necessary.35

The proposed project faced immediate diffi culties, including a lega

lenge. As soon as Robert Duncan, for whom the island was named, hear

the proposal of the city council and recognized the value of the island if 

adjacent to the port, he built a hut on the island to claim title to it, and th

a preemption claim at the Surveyor’s Offi ce in New Madrid, Missouri. C

cating matters, Duncan sold land on the island to surveyor general E

Langham, A.W. McDonald, and A.H. Evans, who then fi led a petition t

the bill, arguing that the city had no right to destroy the property and 

of its citizens without due process simply for the benefi t of the city. T

council fi led a counter petition accusing the owners of claiming the prop

35 U.S. Cong., “Memorial of the Legislature of Missouri,” H.D. 21 (23rd Cong., 1st Sess.); “

St. Louis,” H.R., 14 (23rd Cong., 2nd Sess.); Robert R. Brooks, “Robert E. Lee – Civil Engineer,” C

neering 10:3 (Mar. 1940): 167-169.
42

drive up its value. Duncan’s claim was based on 

Spanish law, which held sway over the region 

until 1804, but the city noted that even according to Spanish law islands belonged to riparian 

landowners. In any case, an investigation by 

Congress into Duncan’s claims found that he 

had not previously fi led for a title, but only for 

the preemption at the end of 1835, and therefore had no legal claim to prevent removal of 

the island. A later suit by Illinois interests also 

tried to prevent work on Bloody Island, but 

ultimately to no effect.36

Gratiot assigned Shreve to make the 

improvements in October 1836, but he was 

unable to commence the work because of prior commitments on the R

River. He stressed to Gratiot and to St. Louis mayor John F. Darby the need 

more money than Congress appropriated, which would barely cover prepa

tions. In his estimation, at least $50,000 was necessary. The city submitte

memorial requesting more money for the work, and Congress increased 

36 U.S. Cong, “Memorial of E.T. Langham and A.W. McDonald,” H.D. 278 (24th Cong., 1st Sess.); 

Emption to the Sand Bar, in Front of St. Louis,” H.D. 197 (24th Cong., 1st Sess.); “Relative to the Title t

Island Opposite St. Louis,” H.D. 1539 (24th Cong., 1st Sess.). 

Lee’s map of St. Louis Harbor

Robert E. Lee
43

Shreve’s place, Gratiot sent young engineer offi cer Lt. (soon Capt.) Ro

Lee to manage the work. After arriving in St. Louis and fi nding hous

his family in August 1837, Lee obtained the services of Lt. Montgom

Meigs and civil engineer Henry S. Kayser. By December, he had com

a survey and established a plan to build a dam from Illinois to Bloody 

bank protection on the western side of the island, and a dike extendin

its southern tip for $160,000, although he admitted the work was expe

tal. This was essentially the same plan proposed by Gratiot but at fou

the price. Later, he would change the planned works to a set of dikes fro

south of Venice, Illinois, to Bloody Island and, after receiving approva

work building them. By 1840, however, the Corps had reassigned Lee 

York to work on harbor fortifi cations. Kayser continued construction 

St. Louis dikes as city engineer for the next 10 years. At the time Lee l

dikes were still not complete despite expending all federal funds by the 

1840. They had completed about 940 feet on the upper end of Bloody 

but had not completely closed off the channel east of the island. It was 

St. Louis to complete it and build the 2,000-foot dike at the foot of the 

Despite their uncompleted state, the works did achieve a measure of s

Duncan’s Island started to erode, the distance between Bloody Island a

nois lessened, and within two years there was a 13-foot channel into St

Harbor, which continued to grow. The only problem resulting from the 

was shoaling at the end of the dike on the south end of Bloody Island. 3

By 1843, the situation had started to deteriorate again as sandbars t

ships or forced them to take a two-mile detour, prompting a new su

Lt. Col. Stephen H. Long. His preliminary report noted that Lee’s dike ex

along the Illinois shore for some distance, but left a large gap east of 

Island for boat traffi c, through which fl owed a stream the size of the M

River. The completed dike was creating a sandbar north of St. Louis harb

extended toward Missouri, while the Illinois shore north of the dike wa

ing. The dike at the foot of Bloody Island was causing the island to narr

37 U.S. Cong., “Sand Bar—Harbor of St. Louis,” H.D. 124 (24th Cong., 2nd Sess.); “Harbor of S

H.D. 298 (25th Cong., 2nd Sess.); “A report of the Chief of Engineers upon the proposed improvem

Mississippi River from Alton to the Meramec River,” S.D. 50 (41st Cong., 3rd Sess.): 11-15; Primm

158; Flannery, “How Lee Helped Save Waterfront”; Horace J. Sheely, Jr., “Lee Serves in the West,” 

Report (Jefferson Expansion Memorial); Brook, “Robert E. Lee—Civil Engineer.” St. Louis has lon

Lee – Mayor Darby once said that “Lee brought the Father of Waters under control” (Sheely, p. 3) 

although a competent engineer, merely started a plan proposed by others and never actually com

work.
44

agreeing that correction of the situation was necessary, believed the Co

could complete the work for less than Lee’s original estimate. The same y

St. Louis obtained two additional surveys by Shreve and city assistant engin

Clement C. Coote. Shreve added that the base of the dike had eroded cons

erably and urged completion of a dam to Bloody Island and construction 

wing dams on its western shore at a cost at $150,000. He also observed sev

erosion of the Illinois shore opposite the Missouri River. Coote recommen

a similar plan for $155,000, with additional protection of the Bloody Isla

Kerr’s Island, and the Illinois shore near Venice, as well as elimination of B

sell’s Point, which pushed the current toward Illinois. As a result of these s

veys, St. Louis submitted a new memorial in January 1844 for funds to impr

the harbor, renew snag removal, check erosion across from the Missouri Riv

lower tolls on the Ohio Canal, and improve the Des Moines Rapids.38

In February 1844, Long assigned Capt. Thomas J. Cram to develop a p

of action. Cram provided an additional level of specifi city in the status of 

project, noting that only 42 of Lee’s upright posts remained, that only 124 

of dike existed with another 350 feet underwater, and that the St. Louis d

had washed away or was partially underwater, having separated from Blo

Island. He recommended abandoning the works to remove Duncan Isla

because the harbor had since expanded northwards, there was no commer

reason to try to improve the harbor south of Market Street. The greater dan

in his mind was the Missouri River eroding the Illinois shore, which mi

allow the Mississippi to divert down Long Lake and Cahokia Creek, shiftin

far to the east and away from St. Louis. He proposed several possible wor

revetment along the Missouri and Illinois shores, a crib dam to increase fl 

east of Cascarot Island, building a dam from Illinois to Bloody Island, bu

ing three wing dams north of Bloody Island, and cutting a canal bound b

snag dam to channel the Missouri River toward a rocky portion of the Illin

shore. He recommended the revetment and snag dam for somewhere betw

$300,000 and $500,000 depending on the materials and methods used.39

However, both Long and Abert rejected Cram’s plan as too experimen

and expensive. Long doubted the proposed revetment would work since th

had been no experiments with them, while Abert wrote, “While I am willin

38 Report of Chief Topographical Engineer, 1843, H.D. 2 (28th Cong., 1st Sess.): 134-136; “Memoria

Number of Citizens of St. Louis, Missouri,” S.D. 185 (28th Cong., 1st Sess.): 36-45; Primm, p. 156.

39 U.S. Cong., Harbor of St. Louis, H.R. 203 (28th Cong., 1st Sess.).
45

yet must acknowledge that I could not agree with him in the plans pro

primarily because the plan did not directly attack the problem of the har

concerned issues north of it. To review the plan, he assigned a board of 

composed of Long and Lt. Col. James Kearney. They recommended bu

dam from the Illinois shore to Bloody Island with a causeway on top and 

tion of the shores of Bloody and Kerr islands to prevent erosion for $19

Cram made some preparations for the work in 1845 using remaining 

but with U.S. entry into the Mexican War, no action ensued for severa

By 1849, Long had nearly completed a dam to Bloody Island, and althou

Flood of 1850 demolished what is now East St. Louis, eroded Cahokia 

until Cahokia Creek was the Illinois shore, and destroyed a huge sec

the dam, the works had been effective in enlarging the channel into St

harbor and starting to scour Duncan’s Island once more. The Corps re

the dam in 1852 and completed the causeway from Illinois to the island

that point until after the Civil War, Congress provided no additional app

tions to complete the work, so no further progress was made on the p

despite a small amount of funds remaining unused.40

It was not until after the Civil War that the Corps renewed its attentio

harbor. By this time, the predictions of Shreve and Cram on the Missou

scouring the banks of the Mississippi and impacting the harbor were 

to pass. In particular, the harbor at Alton, Illinois, just north of the 

ence of the Missouri and Mississippi, was starting to silt, with a large s

blocking access to the port. The Missouri had shifted about a mile sou

the Illinois shore across from the river had eroded some 3,500 feet sinc

Because of the drought of 1863, navigation on much of the river betw

Missouri and the Ohio was more treacherous, with many shoals, sandba

shallow places that blocked passage during part or all of the year and im

traffi c to and from St. Louis. The central harbor had stabilized as Bloody 

became attached to the Illinois shore, and a somewhat smaller Duncan’s 

became attached to Missouri, eventually becoming the new shoreline 

wharf. Other than city dikes protecting Kerr Island and Cahokia Bend

were no new works completed. In 1866, Congress authorized 49 proje

40 Harbor of St. Louis, pp. 2-3; Report of Chief Topographical Engineer, 1844 (28th Cong, 1st S

Report of Chief Topographical Engineer, 1845 (28th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 368-373; Report of Ch

graphical Engineer, 1851 (32nd Cong., 1st Sess.): 429; “Report on Mississippi River improveme

pp. 12-13.
46

26 surveys, but none specifi cally in St. Louis. By then, the federal governm

had appropriated $75,000 of more than $900,000 spent on the impro

ments. After complaints about the Alton harbor, Congress authorized a sur

in 1868. Lacking funds, Maj. Gouverneur K. Warren arranged for the city 

Alton to pay for civil engineer Henry C. Long to make some basic measu

ments. He determined that in some places the river was no more than th

feet in low water, and that a large bar was forming south of the harbor, quic

becoming an island. He proposed a dam for $112,000 to close off the ch

nel west of Ellis Island to funnel water against the Illinois shore at Alton, p

more detailed surveys. At the same time, St. Louis paid Col. William E. Mer

to complete a new survey of its harbor, which he did by 1869. He revealed th

while the middle harbor near Market Street was of suffi cient depth, the har

north of Biddle Street and the southern harbor at Carondolet, recently ad

to St. Louis, were too shallow in low water to allow development of the wha

41 Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1867-1870; “Report on Mississippi River Improvement,” pp. 1-2, 1

Anfi nson, pp. 33-37.

Levee, St. Louis, Missouri (LOC)
47

Establishment of the St. Louis Engineer Offi c

In 1870, work on the harbors received a boost when the Offi ce o

ern River Improvements relocated from Cincinnati, Ohio, to St. Louis w

reassignment of Lt. Col. William F. Raynolds as offi cer in charge. An 184

Point graduate, Raynolds was an experienced topographical engineer, w

made improvements on the Ohio River, explored the Missouri and Yello

Rivers, oversaw lighthouse construction, and served in the Mexican an

wars, including the defense of Harper’s Ferry in 1863. Since the time 

superintendency of Henry M. Shreve in the 1830s, the work of the O

Western River Improvements had been divided between the Ohio River 

hand and Mississippi, Arkansas, Red, and Missouri rivers on the other. 

often worked from a project offi ce in St. Louis to oversee projects on the 

sippi while still maintaining an offi ce in Louisville, Kentucky. Stephen H

had moved the main offi ce to Cincinnati after 1843, but in practice, en

offi cers in the Corps of Topographical Engineers maintained temporary 

Stereo by T.W. Ingersoll, Mo. - St. Louis - View of Levee looking toward Eads Bridg

(LOC)
48

Horse-drawn shoe wagons fl ooded levee, St. Louis (LOC)

Busy St. Louis Levee (LOC)
49

the Civil War and the reunifi cation of the Topographical Engineers and 

of Engineers, there were separate offi ces overseeing work on the Ohi

and Western Rivers, each reporting separately to the Chief of Engineer

of this work remained snag removal, for which the Corps had built num

snag-removal vessels. It was only logical to relocate the offi ce closer to th

ects being managed by moving the Offi ce of Ohio River Improvements 

cinnati and Western River Improvements to St. Louis. This was, in essen

fi rst step taken from a project-based Corps offi ce in St. Louis to what b

a district offi ce overseeing regional projects. By 1872, Raynolds was re

from the Engineer Offi ce in St. Louis with responsibility from the Illinoi

Ohio River rather than from the Offi ce of Western River Improvements

had ceased to exist.42

In 1870, Congress approved a new detailed survey of the St. Lou

Alton harbors. This survey, completed in 1871 by Raynolds and Capt. C

Allen, provided the additional detail the 1868 surveys lacked. They agre

previous surveys that a dam from Missouri to Ellis Island would force th

against the Alton Harbor and thus increase the harbor depth, recomm

clearing snags west of Maple Island and opening Mobile Chute to dive

of the Missouri away from the Illinois shore, and suggested clearing sa

and snags east of Cabaret (previously Cascarot) Island to reduce scour 

yer’s Bend and the northern St. Louis Harbor. They also called for m

borings and surveys on which to base future decisions and noted in gen

problems encountered in the past in trying various works without know

effect. In essence, Raynolds argued that “the only safe method of proc

is to follow nature as closely as practicable” by encouraging the river to 

known or established paths and not diverting it where it would not na

go. The following year, Chief of Engineers Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Hum

formed a board of review composed of Raynolds, Allen, Warren, Merr

Lt. Col. John Newton. The board recommended adoption of the plans t

the channel west of Ellis Island and to open Mobile Chute, but believed 

ment of the banks and building or extending parallel dikes along both 

in Sawyer’s Bend would be more effective than opening Cabaret Sloug

42 Compare Annual Reports of the Sec. of War, 1832-1836 with the Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1

George E. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Offi cers and Graduates of the United States Military 

at West Point, New York, since its establishment in 1802, Vol. II, pp. 155-156 (http://penelope.

edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Army/USMA/Cullums_Register/, 

2011); Anfinson, pp. 33-49. The fi rst districts established were St. Paul in 1866 and Rock Island in 
50

area on which navigation to St. Louis depended. Total suggested funding w

$409,000.43

In June 1872, Congress appropriated $125,000 to start work on 

improvements and another $200,000 in March 1873. During this time, Ra

olds was able to make preparations for the harbor improvements in addit

to making improvements on the Missouri, Cuivre, Fourche La Faive, Ba

Bartholomew, Black, White, and Onachita, Arkansas, Osage, and St. Fran

rivers, to include snag removal, dredging, damming chutes, and wing dam

improve rapids or scour sandbars. On January 1, 1873, Col. James H. Simp

took over as the offi cer in charge. An 1832 West Point graduate, Simpson 

gained experience with harbor improvements, although he had also surve

numerous roads and railroads, including a new route from Salt Lake C

Utah, to the Pacifi c Coast in 1859. After service in the Civil War, he returned 

oversee improvements to the Susquehanna, Tombigbee, and Coosa rivers 

Cape Fear, Mobile, Pensacola, and Tampa harbors, among other projects

the St. Louis Engineer, he started the planned works on the Mississippi w

gusto, raising the dike at Ellis Island, removing obstructions in Mobile Chu

protecting Sawyer’s Bend using dikes and retaining walls, and overseeing w

by contractors extending and raising the Venice and Long dikes within 

St. Louis Harbor. Most of this work was complete by 1875 other than perio

repairs. After receiving additional funds, Simpson added a dam blocking 

western channel of Piasa Island across from Alton in 1875, and in 1879, C

gress authorized the closure of the channel west of Maple Island, again with 

idea of forcing more fl ow against the Illinois shore and thus scouring sandb

In 1878, St. Louis requested an additional dike from Bloody Island to Ven

to improve access to the northern wharf, but Simpson refused to endorse 

plan barring relocation of the wharf some 600 feet where the channel w

suffi ciently deep. Simpson also continued execution of improvements on 

Osage River such as the removal of Shipley’s, Dixon’s, Round Bottom, Bar

Locket’s, and General Bolton’s shoals and snag removal on the Little Misso

White, and St. Francis rivers, although the latter projects were later transfer

to other offi cers. By 1874, Humphreys would note of the contraction wo

that “the system of construction is no longer experimental, but can be app

43 “Report on Mississippi River Improvement,” pp. 2-4, quote p. 2; Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1872, 

1, Pt. 2 (42nd Cong., 3rd Sess.): 54-55, 358-36; Dobney, pp. 44-47.
51

generally with assurance of success if skill, care, and forethought be ex

in the location of works and management of construction.”44

While Simpson built the approved projects, he also completed a 

from the Missouri to the Ohio to locate obstacles to navigation and i

improvements. The Corps briefl y surveyed Kimswick to Cairo, Illinois, i

followed by an in-depth triangulation survey of the river through 187

was the most detailed and scientifi c study of the river to that date and in

a general description of characteristics, detailed maps and cross-secti

veys, discharge and velocity measurements, depth soundings, sedimen

port evaluations, and sediment analysis. In his analysis, Simpson pro

brilliance in understanding basic hydraulic theories and application. 

manent improvement must of necessity be designed and executed in 

harmony with the natural laws of the river. A mighty river is impatien

restraint – can be led, not driven.” Good navigation required depth and 

44 Cullum’s Register, Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1872-1880, quote from 

61.

View of completed St. Louis Bridge with steamboats in Mississippi River and views of s

of bridge construction, based on photographs taken in 1874 by R. Benecke, sections of p

machinery, and portrait of Capt. James B. Eads. 11437 U.S. Copyright Offi ce, Copyright 

Compton & Co. (1874) LOC
52

General Survey map of St. Louis 1892
53

through permanent works such as dikes or hurdles and chute closure

neers could increase the depth. Undue straightening and cutoffs could 

dangerous increases in velocity, and it was diffi cult and expensive to 

the channel’s direction or maintain unstable bends. In his view, most im

ments were more a matter of politics and fi nances than engineering – 

riparian landowners opposed closing chutes and other contraction w

would take many years of improvements to see results, and suffi cient f

was necessary to pursue the desired end over time until met. He see

ask for patience among lawmakers to allow the improvements time to 

Once improved, temporary improvements such as dredging and low

dams could help maintain the river, but at greater expense and less effe

although he noted that the current object of improvement was navigat

also recognized the need to protect landowners from bank erosion and 

ing, a statement prescient of future problems faced by the Corps. 45

The result of this survey, which identifi ed a total of 21 locations re

improvement from the Illinois to the Ohio, was a series of projects auth

by Congress over the next decade that greatly increased the work of the 

The fi rst of these projects was construction in 1874 of dikes and jetties al

shore from Carondelet to the foot of Carroll’s Island to remove Horsetai

particularly diffi cult sandbar and shoal that reduced the depth of the riv

south of St. Louis to less than four feet. By the following year, the wor

increased the depth to about eight feet, although an additional dike b

necessary in 1876 when the fl ood of 1875 eroded part of Arsenal Island

45 Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1874-1875, quote from 1875, p. 485; Dobney, pp. 48-52.

Wing dams on Mississippi, 1891
54

had also authorized closure of Cahokia Chute, which was the apparent ca

of the erosion of the island. Because of the rate of erosion, he invested m

appropriations in protecting both shores of the island in 1877 and comple

the closure by 1879. In 1875, Simpson completed work on dams to block chu

near Fort Chartres, Towhead, and Turkey islands and started construction 

dam at Liberty Island and Devil’s Island and a dike and revetment in Misso

Chute to widen that channel. In 1876, Congress authorized protection of 

banks of Dickey’s Island and the mouth of the Ohio River as well Kaskas

Bend, which was quickly eroding. By 1877, he had identifi ed more than 20 lo

tions on the river where banks were caving that required protection. Work 

several of these locations, including Kaskaskia, Liberty Island, and Dick

Island, faced continual problems with erosion. Efforts to revet these locati

failed because of lack of funding. By 1879, he concluded that lack of progr

was due to inadequate funding, and that, at the rate of $200,000 a year

would take a century to complete all of the works contemplated. “Enlar

operations will leave more unfi nished works at the end of each year and subj

the government to greater loss from their destruction by the failure of app

priations the following year.”46

In March 1880, Capt. (later Maj.) Oswald H. Ernst relieved Simpson 

the St. Louis Engineer. Ernst had graduated from West Point in 1864, ser

briefl y in the Civil War, returned to West Point as an instructor through m

of the 1870s, and replaced Allen as Simpson’s junior offi cer in 1878. He wo

later serve as superintendent of West Point and be promoted to major g

eral in the Spanish-American War. As historian Frederick Dobney observ

“While Simpson came to St. Louis at the end of his career, Ernst arrived w

his had just begun.” This difference in age demonstrated itself in a noted 

ference in style. Although he adhered to Simpson’s preference for perman

improvements, Ernst was more open to new methods, for example, the ap

cation of hurdles – permeable dikes that held up better against the ravage

current while forming new bank by trapping sediment. After experiments w

hurdles in 1879 in Horsetail Bar, he applied them widely in the St. Louis ar

Unlike previous engineers, he believed that erosion of the banks was the ca

of the deteriorating conditions. He observed that surveys confi rmed the ri

had materially widened to the detriment of navigation, but less so in woo

46 Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1874-1880, quote 1879, p. 1032.
55

willow trees to prevent widespread bank caving. He also fi rst implem

telephones, hydraulic excavators, and steam pile drivers. In addition, 

less concerned with local businesses than he was with ensuring that mon

available for general improvements. Simpson tended to be more respon

local pressure, for example, making expensive surveys or improvement

request of congressmen or local interests, particularly at ship landings

ever, Ernst argued:

The money, having been appropriated for improvement of the 

Mississippi between the Illinois and Ohio rivers, must, I think, 

be applied so as to benefi t the greatest number of persons interested in navigation of the entire stretch of river lying between 

those limits. There is no doubt that one important feature of an 

improved river is convenient access to landings; but the most

important result to be obtained by the improvement, and the 

one to be fi rst aimed at, is cheap through transportation for 

freight.

He tended to use general improvement funds for the river channel 

Congress specifi cally authorized and appropriated funds for harbor im

ments. Agreeing with Simpson that riparian landowner rights were da

engineering efforts, he proposed legislation to make the federal gove

owner of the riverbed to high water, since federal ownership of land was 

for his reclamation projects.47

Ernst completed the dam closing Cahokia Chute, neared completion 

dikes at Horsetail Bar, reinforced protection of Kaskaskia Bend, and ex

the remaining funds on Dickey’s Island. However, he refused further w

Kaskaskia or the mouth of the Ohio and requested separate funding fo

projects if they were to continue. Instead, he sought to spend general fu

improvements near Piasa Island to rectify rapids caused by previous wo

completed a survey in 1881 and received approval to proceed, but pulle

to improve Alton Harbor, which had started to silt once again, as requ

the Rivers and Harbors Act of that year. He completed a dike near the 

by 1883 and cleared the harbor by 1884. The hurdles at Horsetail Ba

signifi cant progress in reclaiming the bank despite some minor setbac

Ernst started to apply the technique to Cahokia Chute other locations. 

47 Dobney, p. 52; Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1876, 1879-1880, quote from 1880, pp. 1359-
56

repair spending. Ice also caused serious damage to ships, which is why C

gress approved in 1880 construction of an ice harbor in St. Louis, a protec

harbor where ships could moor when the river froze, but after the plan m

with indifference among St. Louis steamboat captains, Ernst recommen

suspension of construction. In 1881, Congress established a standard of ma

taining an eight-foot channel and standardized 2,500-foot width in the Mid

Mississippi and approved projects to improve the Cape Girardeau Harbor 

the river between Carroll’s Island and the Meramec River. Ernst comple

surveys in 1882 and recommended projects to include hurdles on the east b

and revetment on the west bank of Twin Hollows, hurdles near Pulltigh

prevent enlargement of a chute near Beard’s Island, closure of the west ch

nel of Chesley Island, and hurdles and revetment to build up the banks of J

Smith’s and Foster’s islands. By 1884, he had completed work on Twin H

lows, Jim Smith’s, and Cape Girardeau and spent additional funds on rep

and maintenance even as he pushed to complete the remaining projects.48

The District under the Mississippi River 

Commission

At this point, the St. Louis Engineer Offi ce came briefl y under the auth

ity of the Mississippi River Commission. Congress had created the Mis

sippi River Commission in 1879 to “correct, permanently locate, and dee

the channel and protect the banks of the Mississippi River; improve and g

safety and ease to the navigation thereof,” and “prevent destructive fl ood

With the growing impact of severe fl ooding in the Lower Mississippi Val

fl ood control proponents had proposed a commission early in the year, bu

met with stiff opposition from those who viewed fl ood control as essenti

a local issue that did not fall under the commerce clause of the Constituti

Only after Rep. Randall L. Gibson of Louisiana proposed a compromise 

that reduced emphasis on fl ood control and eliminated spending for levees 

the bill pass. After passage of the act, the coalition broke apart, and for m

years navigation proponents opposed funding for levees while fi scal conser

tives opposed excessive spending, forcing the commission to focus prima

on minimal contraction works south of Cairo to improve navigation. The ne

48 Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1880-1884.
57

president Benjamin Harrison, former Louisiana Chief Engineer Benja

Harrod, Henry Mitchell of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Bvt. Ma

Quincy A. Gillmore, Bvt. Brig. Gen. Cyrus B. Comstock, and Bvt. Bri

Charles R. Suter of the Corps of Engineers. Since it was ostensibly resp

for the entire river, one of its fi rst resolutions in 1879 was to make St. L

the halfway point on the river – the location for the commission headqu

where it would remain until 1929. Several St. Louis engineers, civil an

tary, played a role in the commission over the years.49

In the face of congressional funding constraints, the commission v

concentrate its limited funding on the more hazardous lower Mississipp

although it completed an assessment of the middle river in 1881. “The 

of Captain Ernst’s works thus far justifi es in our opinion the methods 

employed, and we are of the opinion that it should be pushed toward c

tion under liberal appropriations,” it concluded. It not only endorsed th

of the St. Louis Engineer Offi ce; it adopted the same methods for th

river, which it made its sole focus of improvement. Eads, however, dis

both with endorsing Ernst’s works, which he had not seen, and with t

over management of the river from the Missouri to the Ohio. “I do not 

the public expectation will be met by exempting so extensive and imp

section of river as this two hundred miles from the supervision of the co

sion,” which he noted had by law responsibility over the whole river. He 

later disagree with and leave the commission over his belief that leve

closure of all outlets from the river would increase the river’s scourin

bility and deepen the channel. Using what resources it had, the comm

started construction in 1881 of dikes and revetment at the Plum Point an

Providence reaches of the river, but, lacking a force of laborers, mad

progress. It was for this reason that in 1882 Congress gave the comm

supervision and initiative authority over the Corps offi ces south of Cairo

the commission divided into four districts to carry out its work – anoth

toward geographic districts. North of that point, the commission coord

49 Charles A. Camillo and Matthew T. Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, A history of the Mississi

Commission from its inception through the advent of the modern Mississippi River and Tributari

(Vicksburg, MS: MRC, 2004): 25-84, quote on C1; “[MRC] History,” N.D. (NARA-KC, RG 77, Ent

22).
58

out through existing offi ces.50

In the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1884, Congress placed work north of Ca

under commission oversight by providing funds under commission contro

continue the same projects. At the direction of Chief of Engineers Brig. G

John Newton, Ernst suspended work, furloughed workers, and spent s

eral months transferring property to the commission, although he did sp

just under $6,000 on maintenance. After receiving commission funding 

in the year, he was able to conduct little or no work. He added new hurd

near Carroll’s Island and repaired work at Twin Hollows, Pulltight, Ches

Island, and Jim Smith’s, but did little else because of winter and high wa

though what he did accomplish was particularly effective. By August 18

however, Congress had decided to move the St. Louis offi ce back under 

Chief of Engineers and provided $375,000 in funding to continue impro

ments. Soon after, Ernst left the offi ce, having been transferred to Texas 

November 22, 1886. Replacing him in St. Louis was Maj. Alexander M. Mil

Although some level of coordination continued, and the commission and Co

shared resources and employees such as Robert E. McMath and several dist

engineers, the St. Louis offi ce would remain responsible for Mississippi Ri

navigation improvements between the Illinois and Ohio rivers.51

By the end of Ernst’s administration, the St. Louis Engineer Offi ce 

more or less entered the modern era. Prior to the Civil War, the Offi ce of W

ern River Improvement and Corps of Topographical Engineers oversaw m

navigational projects in the region. After the Civil War, regional offi ces evol

that managed numerous projects in a specifi c geographic region, in this ca

from the Illinois to the Ohio River. Improvement of the St. Louis Harbor 

surrounding area, which continued sporadically from 1833 into the twe

eth century, spanned these organizations and provided a measure of fede

activity. At the beginning of the project, Corps methods were experimen

Using wing-dams to increase river velocity and scour sandbars, fi rst app

in 1825, was still new, as was use of revetment to protect riverbanks. Th

works were expensive, and given the laissez faire philosophy that domina

the federal government, funding was often not forthcoming to complete 

50 Report of the Mississippi River Commission, Nov 25, 1881, H.D. 10, (47th Cong. 1st Sess.): 1-20, q

on 20; “Communication, of the 12th instant, from Mr. James B. Eads, a member of the Mississippi R

Commission,” H.D. 10, Pt. 2 (47th Cong. 1st Sess.): 11; Camillo and Pearcy, pp. 42-83.

51 U.S. Cong., Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1885-1887; Report from the Mississippi River Com

sion, H.D. 38 (49th Cong., 1st Sess.): 15-17; Dobney, pp. 52-57. 
59

nevertheless effective in clearing the middle harbor, although other p

suffered from frugal fi nancing. By 1886, however, the role of the feder

ernment had changed. To improve navigation in the upper St. Louis H

in Alton Harbor, and the Mississippi River between the Illinois and Oh

government had to invest considerably more in river improvements to 

tain a navigable channel. Although the debate continued for decades a

utility and authority to make many improvements and the methods use

often prone to impermanence, it was nevertheless the beginning of m

water resources development.
60

River Regulation to the 

Twentieth Century

In an article in 1921, Maj. Dewitt Jones of the St. Louis District noted, “the meth

employed in the regulation of the Mississippi River are based on experience extend

over many years.” In fact, the strategies for river regulation had changed little since 

1880s, and would not change for many decades, although the materials and meth

used continuously improved.

Snag Removal – The Corps continued snag removal annually to maintain 

river, for which Congress authorized in 1888 expenditures of no more than $100,

per year. Into the 1920s, St. Louis District was responsible for snag removal on 

Middle and Lower Mississippi and Atchafalaya. It used the H.G. Wright and J

Macomb, built in 1880 and 1874, which required 40 to 45 personnel from Jul

March. Both vessels were of the Shreve design with dual hulls, a winch, and a lever

beam.

Stone Dikes – This was the fi rst form of channel constriction, typically cons

ing of a foundation of brush held in place by piles, on which stone was placed unt

reached 10 or 15 feet below low water. However, the district had largely abandoned 

method by the 1880s because of the expense and diffi culty in maintaining them.

Hurdles – Hurdles or permeable dikes were the preferred method of strength

ing convex banks and chutes and side channels. The district greatly improved them 

using double versus single pile rows to hold the mattresses, driven up to 15 feet dee

using pile-driving machinery. In addition, the district spaced the hurdles up to 1,0

feet apart versus no more than 300. Piles, preferably cypress or white oak, were 

inches in diameter and up to 65 feet long. Brush mattresses, later lumber, were 12 to 

feet long and six inches thick, held together by steel wire. Mattresses typically ended 

feet below low water. Hurdle plants included four to eight pile drivers, derricks, on

two steamships to carry shops and construction units, and quarter boats to house 

100 to 200-man workforce.

Revetment – Use of revetment to protect convex banks probably improved 

most of all strategies. Initially, re

ment consisted of a dike extending 

feet above low water, grading of ba

and paving with stone above water, 

rock was subject to considerable 

sion. From 1875 to 1881, for subaq

ous protection, the district introdu

woven willow or cottonwood m

tresses roughly 40 by 700 feet, l

Matress construction along Mississippi for river bank protection

Timber piling clump dike, Chester to 

Ste. Genevieve, Mo, 1947
61

expanded to 125 feet wide to increase 

effectiveness. As willow trees became 

scarce, the district substituted lumber. 

The district constructed mattresses 

and then sank them using ballast so 

that they ended at the low water line 

and overlapped downstream, with 

stone paving on the exposed bank. 

It took a crew of 86 to build and lay 

the mattresses, including grading and 

clearing crews. With improvements to 

concrete technology, by 1914, the Mississippi River Commission was experimenting with 10 or 12-foot concrete sla

in 1915 with mattresses of 3- to 4-foot articulated concrete blocks connected b

nized steel cable, although these were not universally accepted until after 1930

Portable Jetties – After experiments to determine the best angle and d

to achieve results, the district drove a line of sheet piles to support 10 to 20-f

rugated sheet-metal panels riveted to a three-inch thick frame, using mattr

reduce erosion on the bed. Although temporarily effective, the district abandon

use as too labor-intensive in 1898 after development of the dredge.

Dredging – The Mississippi River Commission started experiments with 

lic dredges beginning in 1893, while the district built the fi rst jet-type dredge 

and completed the fi rst three suction dredges the following year. While the jet 

was no longer in service by 1906, Dredges No. 3 and 4 (christened Selma and T

and two others completed in 1907 (Ft. Gage and Ft. Charles) were still in serv

World War I. These required crews of 37 to 39.52

52 Jones and James Skelly, “Regulation of Middle Mississippi River,” TME 13 (1921): 197-204

Raymond Haas, “Development of Concrete Revetments on the Lower Mississippi,” Concrete (

1947): 1-10.

Matress revetment between St. Louis an
62

 5 

Dredging and Channel Maintenance

Through 1886, the primary mission of the St. Louis Engineer Offi ce wa

improve navigation on the Mississippi by maintaining an eight-foot chan

on the Middle Mississippi through permanent improvements – dams to cl

chutes, dikes and jetties to contract the channel, hurdles to build up the ban

and revetment to protect the banks. Such maintenance work that occur

consisted of removal of snags, wrecks, or other obstacles. While Col. Step

H. Long and others had experimented with dredges or scrapers to physic

deepen the channel, since the time of C

James H. Simpson, most considered th

temporary measures as merely supplement

to more permanent works. They might impr

navigation for a time by removing silt, but t

did not correct the causes of the siltation 

permanent improvements sought to do. 

addition, because of limitations in technolo

dredging could only help maintain the chan

once lowered but not improve it without c

siderable cost. Although there were some s

cessful experiments with jet- and suction-t

dredges as early as 1881, these were not p

fected until the Mississippi River Commiss

performed a series of experiments and dev

oped several working prototypes after 1892

1896, the commission was promoting the use of dredging as the primary me

of improvement because of the higher cost of permanent improvements

the recommendation of the newly formed Board of Engineers for Rivers 

Harbors, in 1905 Congress adopted dredging as the primary method for ma

taining a navigable channel of suffi cient depth for the entire river. These r

ommendations gripped the St. Louis District in a debate that lasted a dec

about the effectiveness of temporary versus permanent improvements.

Maj. Alexander M. Miller had taken over the St. Louis offi ce in Novem

1886 and more or less continued the program of Maj. Oswald Ernst of build

St. Louis Riverfront 1905

Col. James H. Simpson DE 

January 1, 1873 - March 30, 1880
63

hurdles and revetment to maintain an eight-foot deep, 2,500-foot wide r

ized channel as required by 1881 guidance from the Chief of Engineers

continued the projects at Piasa Island, Horsetail Bar, Twin Hollows, Pu

Jim Smith’s Island, and Chesley Island. He also started new improve

including an extension of the Jim Smith hurdles to Sulphur Springs; ba

tection at Cairo, Illinois; hurdles to contract Lucas’ Crossing, a chute 

Calico Island; hurdles at Bruce Island near St. Charles, Missouri; pro

of the bank on the Illinois side of the Ste. Genevieve Bend; hurdles a

Tower on the east side of James Landing; and hurdles near Venice, Illi

narrow the river north of the Eads Bridge. Each of these projects require

odic repair and additions to see long-term improvement, and they oft

Simpson Charts - These are maps of the Mississippi River between the mouth of the 

River showing successive shore lines and topography. 1870-1878
64

the works or caused new problems. To th

responsibilities, the Corps had added s

removal on the Missouri and Mississippi riv

and responsibility for the Missouri, Gascona

and Kaskaskia rivers. Formerly, another of

headed by Col. Charles R. Suter in St. Lo

was responsible for snag removal on the M

sissippi and improvement of these other riv

but this offi ce merged with the St. Louis of

after its separation from the Mississippi Ri

Commission in 1886. There were only two snag removal vessels available, 

H.G. Wright and J.N. Macomb, which usually divided work between the M

souri and Mississippi or used borrowed equipment. The work on the Kaskas

was the fi rst improvement to this river and consisted of removing Nine-M

Shoal. In 1889, the Corps made another step toward modern organization 

establishing fi ve divisions in charge of multiple Corps offi ces. The St. Lo

offi ce operated initially under the Southwest Division headed by Col. Cyru

Comstock, who also served as president of the Mississippi River Commissio

Miller continued as engineer until March 4, 1893, when replaced by M

Charles J. Allen. While Miller was known best as a scholar – he had gradua

third at West Point in 1865 and translated a French work on Egyptian irri

tion during his time in St. Louis – Allen had a reputation for hands-on exp

ence with the river, having served as assistant to both Col. William F. Rayno

and Col. James H. Simpson. The period of 1894 to 1896 was one of widespr

drought – at one point in 1895 the river between St. Louis and Cairo, Illin

was closed to navigation for 56 days. With limited success with hurdles cle

ing a channel to the required eight feet, Allen began using new methods to 

in removing silt. One was the application of portable jetties. These were i

panels ten or so feet high that engineers could place temporarily in the chan

to focus the current toward a shoal or bar and aid in clearing it. Once the chan

was clear, they could remove the jetties for placement elsewhere. In 1894, A

successfully used them to aid in clearing the channel near Fort Chartes 

removing a bar at Devil’s Island, and in 1895, it took 22 men four days to dr

pile and set up a 1,200-foot jetty near Danby Landing. He also experimen

53 Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1887-1893; Dobney, pp. 56-57.

Maj. Alexander M. Miller
65

pumps on the deck of the towboat Gen. H.L. Abbot capable of pumping 

gallons per minute through a metal pipe to scour away sandbars. On J

13, 1896, Maj. Thomas H. Handbury replaced Allen. Handbury had pre

worked as assistant division engineer under Suter before overseeing 

and harbors work on the Columbia, Willamette, Ohio, and White river

student of Suter, who later headed the Mississippi River Commission’

mittee on Dredges and Dredging, Handbury was the fi rst major propo

using temporary improvements to clear the river near St. Louis. From 

1902, he promoted his views as a member of the Mississippi River Co

sion, which argued strongly after 1896 for increased funding for dred

preference to other methods of improvement.54

As early as 1896, Handbury was arguing that “movable dikes, d

and other temporary expedients will be necessary” to help maintain 

gable channel. The problem, he observed, was that there were times wh

Missouri River pumped too much sediment into the Mississippi, resu

“engorgement of the improved channel” as the sediment settled. In 18

example, analysis of sediment content of the water and along the bot

St. Charles showed that the sediment at that location would fi ll a squa

to a depth of 400 feet in one year. He asserted for the fi rst time, “Th

river] will be able to maintain itself at that depth at all times without 

ing and other temporary expedients cannot be 

asserted with positive certainty.” He quickly 

took up Allen’s experiments and advanced 

them beyond his isolated attempts. By 1897, 

Handbury had improved the Abbot by placing the jets in the aft, completed construction 

of another steam-powered jet dredge, and 

had three hydraulic suction dredges under 

construction, which went into service the following year. While continuing construction 

of hurdles and other permanent works, he 

increasingly used temporary improvements as 

the primary means of improvement. At Lucas, 

Ste. Genevieve, and Seventy-Six Landing, he 

54 Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1893-1896; Dobney, pp. 57-58; Cullum’s Register

pp. 35-36, Vol. IV, p. 150; “Discouraging River Report for ’95,” Waterways Journal (Sept. 19, 189

Maj. Thomas H. Handbury
66

tion depth of eight feet; at Harrisonville and Philadelphia Point, he used dre

ing alone to maintain the channel.55

Development of Dredging

Dredging had been a means of improving navigational depths in water 

thousands of years. The word dredge derives from the French term for “dra

and most early dredging technologies were nothing more than wooden or m

scoops, buckets, or plows dragged manually across the bottom or banks, ty

cally at low water. The most complicated manual methods involved bucket

shelves attached to hand-cranked ropes, conveyor belts, or chains formin

ladder to rapidly move earth. After 25 years of experimentation, the fi rst s

cessful steam-powered ladder dredge, designed by George Dutton, came i

use in 1829 at Ocracock Inlet, North Carolina, for a Corps harbor project. By 

1850s, ladder dredges on steam-powered vessels were in common use throu

out the U.S. for Corps river and harbor work. They were slow, however, 

minimal effectiveness, and required large crews of laborers to operate and 

in clearing a channel. After the Civil War, development of dredges proceede

four different lines. First was the scraper or agitator, whose purpose was to 

up sediment for the current to move downstream. This was particularly imp

tant given the hard crust that often formed on sandbars. Col. Stephen H. L

had designed a scraper in 1860 that included a metal frame with a harn

that attached with chains to a ship’s bowsprit. Tested from 1867 to 1869 un

Maj. Gouverneur Warren on the Upper Mississippi River near St. Paul, M

nesota, the scraper came into wide use the following decades. Another scra

tested in 1867 under Maj. M.D. McAlester was a screw-type, which used 

enlarged propeller to cut up the bottom. Inventors in the years that follow

designed various submarine excavators, plows, drums, and booms, mos

which had limited use. The most successful of the agitator type was the circu

dredge – a rotating wheel with teeth to break up the earth – designed in 18

This was later used in conjunction with suction-types in cutterhead dredg

55 Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1896-1899, quotes from 1896, p. 1723; Dobney, pp. 57-5
67

By themselves, scrapers were only moderately successful, capable of rem

a foot or two of sediment at most after considerable labor.56

Another line of development involved redirection of current to dre

a channel, which, although not technically dredging per se, was ofte

with other methods with great success. In its most basic form, this in

placement of trees or rocks at strategic locations, and most permanen

were designed using this principle. As early as 1879, engineers develope

56 Frank Snyder and Brian Guss, The District: A History of the Philadelphia District, U.S. Army 

Engineers, 1866-1971 (Phil.: USACE, 1974): 64-5; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1867

376; 1868, 317-340; John A. Ockerson, “Dredges and Dredging on the Mississippi River,” ASCE 

tions 40 (1898): 215-348.

Dredge Alpha

Dredge Beta
68

effect maximum scour, then removed at the end of a season. This was ess

tially a precursor to the large metal plates adopted by Allen in 1894. Anot

device was the marsh jetty, a sinkable barge with fl at sides that could be drop

into place. These temporary expedients could be used anywhere jetties w

effective but were reusable and lower cost. Another type was the Adams fl u

developed in 1879, which was essentially a pipe that redirected the curren

third line of development was the jet dredge, which used jets of concentra

water to scour sediment. These typically included pipes or hoses and noz

attached to a boom, frame, or the vessel itself through which a pump pus

water, either pumped directly from the river or fi ltered to remove sedime

The earliest test of a jet dredge mounted on a pile driver was by Maj. Osw

Ernst at Horsetail Bar in 1881, and the earliest test of a vessel-mounted jet w

in 1896 by Handbury. There were also experiments with using explosion

remove sediment, but these were mostly unsuccessful. In general, redirect

was highly successful in removing deep bars, but only for a short distanc

redirected channel would lose velocity, and lengthy bars or obstacles tended 

render jets ineffective.57

Finally, there were hydraulic suction dredges, which used pumps to s

water and sediment either down a pipe to the riverbank or, in the case 

hopper dredges, into the vessel itself to be deposited at a designated locati

The fi rst suction dredges were of the dipper type. Developed in 1870, th

dredges included a long arm with a suction head that operators dipped into 

river onto sediment. Used widely on the Illinois River and Upper Mississi

after 1883, they were highly successful under favorable conditions with li

sediment. In 1871, Maj. Quincy Gillmore developed the fi rst hopper dredg

the U.S. based on a model developed by French engineer Henri-Emile Bazin 

1867. By storing sediment inside, it could operate in open waters where dep

was not possible or desirable, such as existed in shallow Florida waterway

the mouths of rivers. James Eads designed a similar hopper type in 1877, 

Dredge Bayley, to aid in clearing the Mississippi River passes near its mou

In 1888, the Corps built the Menge and Pah-Ute, combined suction-lad

dredges that pumped silt brought up by a ladder into scows or sluice boxes 

the shore. More successful were dredges that used output pipes, such as 

57 Ockerson, pp. 231-242.
69

rivers.58

Perhaps what most promoted and enabled use of dredges was their 

opment and endorsement by the Mississippi River Commission after 1

1891, a delegation of ship captains operating below St. Louis raised co

that conditions on the river had deteriorated to the point where they im

navigation. As a result, the commission created the Committee on D

and Dredging in 1892 to research, prototype, and deploy dredges in the 

Mississippi River. Suter and St. Louis civilian engineer Henry Flad w

initial committee members, which eventually included Benjamin Harr

Handbury. By the following year, the committee had developed the 

Alpha, which featured a pump and drag system and discharge pipe e

ing aft. A mooring spud kept the dredge in place, allowing it to mov

and forth over a bar. First used near Cape Girardeau in 1894 to clear a 

foot bar, the dredge was a huge advance in technology, but lacked su

power. A second model introduced in 1896, the Dredge Beta, used two 

engines and improved the discharge pipe. After the 1896 Rivers and H

Act provided funding to build additional prototypes, the committee com

the Dredge Gamma later that year, which included more sophisticated 

and two intake lines and heads. A jet provided agitation to increase th

tiveness of the suction, and a 1,000-foot outtake line maximized dist

deposit areas. In 1897, the committee introduced the Dredge Delta, whi

a mechanical cutter on the suction head to break up soil. This was follo

the dredges Epsilon and Zeta, which used jet and scraping agitation to 

up soil prior to suction. While experimenting with design, the committ

tried various combinations of crew numbers and operation. With com

of these prototypes, dredging entered maturity of design and operation

The result of these tests was unqualifi ed endorsement of dredging 

Mississippi River Commission. In 1896, the commission passed a res

stating:

The general and permanent improvement of the Mississippi 

River by means of bank protection and contraction work will 

involve an outlay and diffi culties of obtaining materials so 

58 Ockerson, pp. 242-246, 295-298; Charles Prelini, Dredges and Dredging (NY: Van Nostrand 

94- 115.

59 Ockerson, 246-295; Herbert S. Gladfelter, Fifty-Five Years of Dredges and Dredging on the M

River in the Memphis District, Vol. 1, Pt. A (Memphis: USACE, 1952): a-j.
70

mission should inform Congress thereof, and submit to it the 

question of its continuance, particularly as it is of opinion that 

the practical results contemplated by the Act organizing the 

Commission of deepening the channel of the river for navigation ... can be attained with greater economy and probability 

of success in less time by dredging of obstruction bars in low 

water and maintenance.60

The costs of buying willows, lumber, and rock; the wages for large crew

install them; and the continual repair and replacement of hurdles and rev

ment was far more expensive than building a boat, after which the only c

was annual payment for fuel, small crews, and upkeep of the vessel.

The Great Dredging Debate

On March 21, 1899, Capt. Edward Burr relieved Handbury, bringing w

him a renewed faith in permanent works and thus departing somewhat fr

the commission. In his mind, the only thing preventing completion of the p

manent project was application of suffi cient funds. Since 1896, when Congr

appropriated $2.6 million over three years, the only signifi cant appropriat

was for $100,000 in 1900, requiring Burr to conserve funds to ensure em

gency funding was available. “Unless pressed with such appropriations as [

project’s] magnitude warrants,” he wrote in 1900, “satisfactory results eit

as to progress or economy cannot be expected.” Incomplete works could 

provide effect, and completed works faced problems such as ice damage or e

sion of earth behind hurdles that would require periodic repair. He believed 

million per year for fi ve years was necessary to complete the project. In ad

tion to repair or extension of hurdles and revetment at Ste. Genevieve, R

Towhead, Penitentiary Point, Devil’s Island, and others and continued dre

ing at Sulphur Springs, Staton Towhead, and several new locations, he ad

hurdles on the Illinois shore across from the St. Louis harbor north of the E

bridge and revetment of the Illinois shore near Beechridge just north of Ca

to prevent the river from cutting across to the Cache River. He also started 

add buoys to mark navigation channels.61

60 Gladfelter, pp. g-h.

61 Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1899-1902, quote from 1900, p. 2639; Dobney, pp. 67-6
71

the recommendations of the commission after he took offi ce on Novem

1901. Initially, he continued a balance of permanent works and dred

funding allowed. Congress did not appropriate more funds until 1902, w

provided $2 million over three years. High water the following year made 

ing unnecessary other than at Okaw Crossing, but he was able to mak

repairs to hurdles. By 1904, however, he changed course when he recei

recommendation of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors. The 

and Harbors Act of 1902 established the board to review Corps proje

cost-effi ciency and technical correctness prior to implementation. One 

fi rst projects it reviewed was improvement of the Mississippi River betw

Missouri and Ohio rivers, which it did at the request of Congress rath

a project report submitted by district or division engineers as was usu

case. In 1902, board members made a survey of the river between the M

and Ohio and reviewed data such as previous reports of district engine

his testimony before the board, submitted by correspondence, Casey not

permanent works were helpful in many locations, but were often destro

fl ood or the river changing course. “It has frequently occurred to me t

tion the propriety of continuing much further along the present lines.” 

nent works would cost more than $22 million, while dredging alone wou

Construction of early mattress revetment
72

$500,000 per year – only $200,000 more than annual dredging costs requi

whether or not one implemented permanent improvements.62

On November 12, 1903, the Board of Engineers made its report. It reco

mended continuation of the eight-foot channel from the Ohio to St. Louis 

a six-foot channel above St. Louis, which it believed would require $20 m

lion in contraction works and bank protect

plus annual maintenance. But “this cost can 

materially reduced by a use of dredging m

extensive than is made at the present tim

This would require spending $1.2 million 

dredging plant and $300,000 per year for op

ation. The only dissent came from then Ma

Burr, who was an instructor at the Engin

School and member of the board. While adm

ting improvements in dredging technology 

effi ciency, he nevertheless argued that “perm

nent improvement is feasible from a techn

standpoint, and that such improvement 

62 Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1901-1905, quote from 1905, p. 1590; History of the Boa

Engineers for Rivers and Harbors (Fort Belvoir, Va.: CEHO, 1980): 1-34, 47-48; Dobney, p. 69

Diagram of early mattress revetment

Maj. Thomas L. Casey
73

and certainty to any temporary dredged channel that it is much to be pr

to the latter even at a conceded greater cost.” In his experience, the 

discharge and alluvium below the Ohio that made dredging more effecti

permanent improvements did not exist above the Ohio, and dredgin

would not maintain the channel. Some combination in methods was nec

Based on these fi ndings and with permanent works taking too much ti

money, Congress adopted dredging as the primary means of improvem

the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1905. Casey greeted the change enthusias

observing that hurdles and revetment “may be considered auxiliary an

sidiary to dredging, which ... is authorized as the chief means of main

the channel.” Since Congress approved spending remaining funds on p

he continued some work on hurdles and revetment, particularly revetm

Sawyer Bend and contraction of the river at Cahokia Ferry, but he con

these as supporting efforts to dredge the channel rather than the co

Using $650,000 appropriated by Congress, he dredged throughout the 

to maintain and increase the channel to eight feet and completed design 

two dredges authorized by Congress, which cost a total of $330,000.63

Meanwhile, dredging had increased dramatically over the entire Miss

River. Below Cairo, the Mississippi River Commission took charge of dr

operations. The Committee on Dredges and Dredging, led by Handbu

later John A. Ockerson, continued its experiments and in 1902 made a 

of recommendations on dredge construction. Once the committee had 

oped dredges, the commission established the position of Superinten

Dredging in 1894, which operated out of the offi ce of the Secretary of th

mission in St. Louis. The fi rst superintendent 

was Col. Carl W. Sturtevant. He was followed 

by F.B. Maltby in 1898, William Gerig in 1904, 

and Foster H. Hilliard in 1905. These superintendents managed all dredging operations on 

the lower river and coordinated closely with 

St. Louis personnel, who continued to build 

and experiment with dredges. In 1918, the 

commission established a separate Dredging 

District, relocated to Memphis, Tennessee, 

63 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1904, quotes from 1904, pp. 2145-2150 and 1905

Dobney, pp. 68-69.

Col. Clinton B. Sears
74

responsibilities would be distributed throughout all of the districts on the M

sissippi River.64

By the time that Col. Clinton B. Sears relieved Casey on August 9, 19

Congress had authorized expenditure of the balance of funds on perman

improvements, although the vast majority of funds were still used for dre

ing and construction of the two authorized new dredges. At fi rst dredg

seemed to be working. The channel had increased from consistently above 

feet to above eight. In the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1907, Congress reitera

use of dredging alone other than excess funds to maintain permanent wo

already built, but it also cut the overall budget by 40 percent by providin

mere $1.5 million for fi ve years. Only a balance of $250,000 was availabl

maintain permanent improvements. Part of the reason for this cut in spend

was the request by Congress for a survey in 1907 to determine the feasibilit

a 14-foot channel. On January 28, 1908, Capt. Gustave R. Lukesh took ove

St. Louis district engineer. The same year, the Corps reorganized, placing 

Mississippi River and great Lakes districts under a single Western Divisi

Although engineers had used the term district for at least a decade, from t

point the Corps offi cially applied the term to the geographic regions under en

neer offi ces. Lukesh observed that “the interpretation” of the 1905 act “virtu

stopped all construction work for the perm

nent improvement of the river in the distr

and that funding constraints limited rep

of existing works. Despite the small leve

funding, in his brief tenure Lukesh was a

to dredge four miles of channel at 12 locati

throughout the district in 1908 and repai

extend permanent works at James Land

Crain Island, Willard Landing, Devil’s Isla

and Eliza Towhead. He used the dredges o

about three months out of the year, which 

explained as the result of effi ciency impro

ments rather than the funding cuts that lik

inhibited their use.65

64 Gladfelter, Vol. 1, Pt. A, pp. a-j, 1-38; Vol. 2, pp. 1-14.

65 Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1906-1908, quote from 1908, p. 1615.

Col. William H. Bixby
75

the Corps increasingly sought to revise the dredging-only policy. A

West Point graduate, Bixby studied in France before serving in district 

at Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Newport, 

Island; Detroit, Michigan; and Chicago, Illinois. At the time he took 

in St. Louis, he was also the Northwestern (later Western) Division En

and president of the Mississippi River Commission. After being named C

Engineers and promoted to brigadier general on June 12, 1910, he serve

than a week in all three capacities, although several times he left operat

the hands of Lt. Clarence H. Knight. In 1909, he spent only $50,000 on 

nent improvements because of the budgetary constraints, but put dredge

and No. 6, fi nally delivered in 1908 and 1909, to work maintaining an eig

channel. He also addressed the low-water plane for St. Louis, which wa

cal for establishing the legal requirements for navigation. The low-wate

is the lowest point reached by the river used to calculate channel depth 

congressionally mandated eight-foot channel. The record low-water o

had previously defi ned “zero” on the Market Street gage, which, esta

in 1861, was one of the oldest gages on the river. This was the startin

for calculating channel depth. With the many improvements to navigati

several low-water years, by 1909 the low-water plane was 3.6 feet belo

depending on the method of calculation. Bixby proposed spending $1.3 

on weirs and other works to raise the plane, and although the plan w

adopted, it was the beginning of a discussion on how to determine the c

depth for district operations. The 1915 Rivers and Harbors Act establ

mean low-water depth for dredging based on a 15-day low-water mean 

given season, a much lower number – equivalent to -5.2 feet on the St

gage – and much harder to maintain. In 1927, the district formally esta

the low-water reference plane, eventually adjusted to -3.5 feet. Howev

debate between proponents of dredging and permanent improvements 

ued for several decades over which number was proper for the district to 

maintaining the channel.66

In 1909, the Board of Examination and Survey of the Mississipp

established by Congress to consider a 14-foot channel fi nally submi

report. Board members included Bixby, Lt. Col. Curtis M. Townsend, 

66 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1908-1910; Memo of Opinion, “Integrated River Man

Mississippi River Navigation Project Dimensions,” May 26, 1993; Mr. Martin, “Low Water Refere

– St. Louis to Thebes,” Dec. 20, 1972 (MVS Archives); Dobney, pp. 69-71.
76

Homer P. Ritter. Included in the report was a recommendation to return to 

1881 project of permanent improvements on the Middle River, with fundin

$21 million (the original $20 million plus $1 million for repairs). They belie

dredging might be able to maintain the current channel most of the time, 

the only way to get a permanently deeper channel was through perman

works. In his annual report for that year, Chief of Engineers Brig. Gen. Willi

L. Marshall argued that “the 1881 proje

needs no further revision other than to 

urgent recommendations for annual appro

ations large enough to allow of the complet

of the $20,000,000 project.” It was, as Bi

noted after he became chief, a situation wh

Congress adopted a single recommendat

of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and H

bors “to the exclusion of the others,” injur

efforts to improve the river. As a result of 

report of the Board of Examination and 

infl uence of the arguments of Bixby, the Riv

and Harbors Act of 1910 restored the 1

project, along with dredging, to make perm

nent the navigable depth dredging had hel

the Corps achieve. It also provided $750,0

the largest appropriation since 1905 and th

times the amount provided the previous y

which would allow signifi cant progress.67

Finally, after months of temporary 

multitasked personnel fi lling the district en

neer slot, Lt. Col. Charles L. Potter assum

the position on August 22, 1910. An 1886 W

Point graduate, he was assigned originally 

the U.S. Cavalry in the West before trans

ring to the Corps of Engineers, where he ser

in the Spanish-American War and various c

works positions in Memphis, Vicksburg, Li

67 U.S. Cong., Report by a Special Board of Engineers on Survey of Mississippi River, H.D. 50 (61st C

1st Sess.): 1-21; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1909, p. 551; 1910, p. 620; Dobney, pp. 70-71.

Lt. Col. Charles L. Potter

Col. Curtis M. Townsend
77

Rock, and St. Louis. He would later become a member of the Mississipp

Commission and was its president during the disastrous Flood of 1927

took the approach of using permanent works where dredging did no

For example, from 1910 to 1911 he closed a chute near Grand Tower 

to increase the depth of the channel over a gravel bar that dredging co

remove. On June 30, 1913, Col. Curtis M. Townsend became the new St

District Engineer. He had a career similar to that of Potter, having gra

from West Point in 1879, served in the Spanish American War, and he

trict posts at Rock Island and the Great Lakes. Considered one of the 

experts on hydraulics in the early twentieth century, he was during th

time district engineer and president of the Mississippi River Commissi

later an author of a leading textbook on rivers and harbors work. He b

that when correcting the river by regulation, “the dredge becomes a ne

adjunct to the improvement” while the river adjusts its slope, and th

because dredging was successful in the lower river did not mean it wo

successful in other locations. Although the debate continued into the m

era as to whether dredging or permanent improvements were of greater 

tance or effi ciency, from this point forward, both were considered only 

the solution for maintaining a navigable channel.68

68 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1910-1913; Townsend, The Hydraulic Principles G

River and Harbor Construction (NY: MacMillan, 1922): 91.

Dredge Potter
78

The result of these and other improvements was what St. Louis histor

James Primm called “spectacular growth” in St. Louis in the 1890s and 190

The St. Louis World’s Fair and Exposition of 1904, celebrating the 100-y

anniversary of the Louisiana Purchase, and the hit song “Meet Me in St. Lou

demonstrated the degree to which residents’ pride in their city had gro

The city’s population had increased to 575,000 by 1900 and 687,000 by 19

making it the fourth largest city in the U.S. The number of businesses in 

city had doubled from 1880 to 1890 to 6,148, and the value of manufactu

goods rose to $229 million per year. It rose another 79 percent to $430 m

lion per year by 1910 despite the hard-hitting Depression of 1893. St. Lo

was a leader in the production of tobacco, beer, whiskey, whole sale goo

and groceries. For the latter, the development of refrigerated railroad cars w

critical, and in general the growth of railroads played an increasing role in 

prosperity of the city, for despite the improvements in the navigation chan

shipping had actually started to decrease.69

By 1913, just before the start of World War I, shipping on the Mississi

River had declined greatly over the previous decade. From 1901, when m

69 Primm, pp. 345-353, quote on 418.

Dredging operation at Cape Girardeau, Dredge Ste. Genevieve, 1935

Dredge operations north of St. Louis, 1935
79

266,000 tons in 1912. Receipt of goods from the upper river had also d

precipitously, e.g., a 50 percent reduction in corn and wheat and great

90 percent reduction in fl our and rye. Part of the reason for this declin

series of low-water years, including 1910, which was the most severe d

since 1864. There was no June rise, and the river north of St. Louis was 

for much of the year, shutting down freight lines. At Dubuque, Iowa, 

could wade across the river. “In fact, the diffi culty seems to be to fi nd 

where the river cannot be waded,” The Waterways Journal observed. T

dredging and other works, Potter and Townsend had increased the 

mark on the river from four to eight feet by 1913, but several freight lin

irreparably harmed, in part because of a decade lost with congressional 

ing reductions and overemphasis of dredging. Yet the greater reason 

decline was the lower cost of shipping goods by rail and by automobile

were far cheaper than river navigation at that time. From all appea

Mississippi River shipping was on the decline. What changed this was 

War I, which led to the need for an even greater channel.70

70 “Fleeting shadow of the Mississippi,” Waterways Journal (Jul. 30, 1910): 3; Annual Report o

Engineers, 1901-1913; Dobney, p. 73; Anfi nson, pp. 101-114.
80

The Sinking of the 

Dredge Ste. Genevieve

Newspapers called her “beautiful.” Those who worked with her said, “She go

you; she was different.” “Understandably, she was the object of many love affa

historian Cecily Jones said. The Dredge Ste. Genevieve, fondly called Genny by ne

everyone in the district, was a fi xture in St. Louis for more than 50 years and the las

the steam-powered stern-wheel dredges.

The district contracted Dravo Corporation of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, to build 

Ste. Genevieve in 1932 for $413,236, along with a twin vessel, the Grafton. Nam

after the historic city 65 miles south of St. Louis, the Ste. Genevieve was 267 feet lo

48 feet wide, and weighed 947 tons. Two Norberg steam engines powered the 

paddle wheel. It took a crew of more than 50 personnel working three shifts to ope

the dredge.

For 52 years, Genny helped to clear more than 200 miles of the Mississippi Ri

the lower Illinois, and on contract part of the Missouri and Ohio rivers. The dre

was a cutterhead, in which a series of blades like an egg beater broke apart the so

allow the suction dredge or a dustpan dredge to remove sediment. At times, the 

terhead ran into debris, including cars, sunken vessels, and, on one occasion, an 

dock wagon. Yet even at 52, the Ste. Genevieve was tough but sleek, with pristine w

and orange lines.
81

After retirement of the vessel in 1984, most wanted to see her turned 

museum. The city of Davenport purchased her but later turned her over to t

eral Services Administration. The Marine Learning Institute of Portage des Sio

souri, acquired her in 1990, but the vessel sunk near the Ohio River after a c

while being towed. After a month in dry dock for repairs, the Ste. Genevieve sun

in deep water outside Cape Girardeau, Missouri, only to be sold for salvage in 

Captain Geroid Lix of the Dredge Potter, the last master of the Ste. Gen

grieved her loss, noting that “she made a good living for a lot of families.” 

started on the vessel as a deckhand and worked on her for more than 30 years. 

Miller, the last pilot of the dredge, said it was like watching your house destroy

tornado. “The one who claimed her was the one she worked on for so many ye

Mighty Mississippi,” Jones concluded.71

71 Jones, “Dredge Ste. Gen Lost to Mississippi,” Esprit (Jul. 1996): 11-12.

Dredge Ste. Genevieve
82

 6 

Stair-Steps on the Upper Mississippi River

After a series of droughts and extreme low-water years from 1890 to 19

the Upper and Middle Mississippi River no longer provided a reliable ro

for navigation. Corps dredging was able to carve out a four-, six-, or eight-f

channel as authorized, but only after a long season of work following ann

high waters that placed new sediment and changed the channel. For l

stretches of the year, numerous locations in the channel were lower than t

and some sandbars required constant attention to keep the channel open. E

then, barges often had to travel half-full to navigate all portions of the riv

Railroads, which faced no such constraints, were much more reliable and s

incredible growth during the same period. The time to market was much fas

for agricultural products using railroads instead of barges from the Midwes

either the East or West coasts. Completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 cut e

deeper into Mississippi barge traffi c since it was suddenly faster and chea

to ship goods directly from one coast to the other via the canal than it 

been to use a combination of river and trains. During World War I, howev

Aerial view of Melvin Price Locks and Dam
83

fi c began to increase once more, but it faced constant problems with th

depth. Navigation boosters argued that if only the channel was deep eno

allow newer barges to move fully loaded, traffi c (and profi ts) would be r

to their former levels. The only way this was possible was to make th

itself into a canal with locks and dams to ensure there was enough wate

channel to pass all traffi c.

The Federal Barge Line and a Nine-Foot Chan

The navigation industry in St. Louis fi nally saw signs of improv

during World War I after decades of decline, although it did not return 

vious levels of commerce. With the increased demand for food, both to 

troops and a war-torn Europe, the amount of agricultural products ship

the Mississippi was once again on the rise. The lumber industry on the 

Mississippi continued to decline with the deforestation of the Northwe

new industries grew up, including Muscatine buttons made from musse

introduced in the late nineteenth century. By 1914, there were 114 butt

tories along the upper river. Commerce through St. Louis increase

Steamer Mississippi, 1935
84

which grew to dominate inland navigation, was showing signs of strain. T

“bridge arbitrary,” a tax on railroads using the Eads Bridge, increased shipp

costs by a third, leading to widespread criticism of the St. Louis nouveaux r

known as the Big Cinch, whom author Kate Chopin once described as “sh

round, blond, and bald.” A free bridge movement resulted in construction 

a city bridge by 1917, but a city toll kept the cost high for more than a deca

Several times in the early twentieth century, including 1907-1908, 1916-19

and 1921, railroad car shortages prevented prompt delivery of goods. Ra

increased as a result, but not until 1925 did the Federal Trade Commiss

standardize on these higher prices. Low-cost bulk agricultural products in p

ticular suffered from high shipping rates. With high volumes keeping pr

low, high shipping rates kept farmer profi t margins thin, whether they u

higher cost railroads or shipped less per load on barges. The adoption a

1900 of diesel engines and screw propellers on barges reduced costs, as did 

practice of driving lines of six or eight barges per tug, but these could not op

ate in very shallow water or tight bends.72

With the unreliability and cost of transportation injuring the war eff

in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson created the Railroad Administration 

improve the effi ciency of interstate transportation, primarily railroads but a

waterways and marine commerce. In 1918, Congress created a federal ba

line under the administration to help relieve overburdened railroads and p

vided $8 million to purchase or lease vessels. The line ran from St. Loui

New Orleans and along the Warrior River. By the end of the year, the line 

purchased or leased three tugs and 19 barges. It proved so successful, C

gress continued the line after the war, placing its 25 tows and 69 barges 

the Department of Commerce in 1920 and in the Department of War un

the Inland Waterway Commission in 1924. The line had great impact on co

merce. Between 1919 and 1921, river commerce in St. Louis more than doub

to $47.4 million. In 1924, Congress authorized the barge line to operate on 

upper river, but it was not until the Twin Cities Real Estate Board and ot

navigation boosters convinced the commission in 1926 to lease equipm

from the new Upper Mississippi Barge Line Company that the line started r

ular service north of St. Louis. Yet, while the extension of the line promised 

increase navigation and profi ts, the limited channel depth, which still had 

72 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1914-1918; Primm, pp. 422-425, Chopin quote on p. 

Anfi nson, pp. 175-195; Dobney, p. 73.
85

prevent the full use of barges in the upper river. The response, as it ha

the previous half-century, was to increase the authorized channel dep

time to nine feet.73

The Civil War had demonstrated the need for consistent depths t

barges to navigate the river above the Illinois, and river boosters had 

Congress to establish a minimum depth of four feet in 1866. This spur

Corps to create its fi rst district offi ces at St. Paul, Minnesota, and Rock 

Illinois, to manage the resulting increase in work. As traffi c increased o

following decade, promoters lobbied for a deeper channel. The Granger 

ment – a series of agricultural improvement organizations establishe

the Civil War – and Chambers of Commerce from major cities led th

to increase the channel depth. In the 1878 Rivers and Harbors Act, Co

established a 4.5-foot channel. Because of the greater ease in mainta

channel in the middle river, in 1881 the Corps established a six-foot c

north of St. Louis to the Missouri River and an eight-foot channel south 

Ohio. South of Cairo, Illinois, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1896 esta

a nine-foot channel to the Gulf of Mexico, but this had not been possibl

of St. Louis. Nevertheless, by 1900, the Upper Mississippi River Improv

Association and shipping companies were pushing for a six-foot channe

of the Missouri and found widespread support from the Corps, part

Col. Curtis M. Townsend, then serving as the Rock Island District En

Congress authorized the six-foot channel in the 1907 Rivers and Harbo

but even at that time, a six-foot depth was too shallow for most bar

1907, Congress requested that the Corps investigate the possibility of a 

channel from Chicago to the Gulf of Mexico. A board headed by Col. W

H. Bixby found in 1909 that, while south of St. Louis this was possibl

dredging and contraction, it did not recommend it because the existing 

was suffi cient for navigation. It did, however, recommend a nine-foot c

north of St. Louis.74

Calls for a nine-foot channel continued to increase in the years th

lowed, particularly after 1925. The problem was that there were places 

73 U.S. Cong., “United States Railroad Administration,” S.D. 275 (65th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-1

Water Transportation: Hearings on the subject of Inland Water Transportation,” Dec. 13, 1918 (6

1st Sess.): 1-5; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1919-1921; Anfi nson, pp. 197-219; Dobney

74 Anfi nson, pp. 53-144; William P. O’Brien et al, Gateways to Commerce: The U.S. Army Corp

neers’ 9-Foot Channel Project on the Upper Mississippi River (Denver: NPS, 1992): 17-20; U

Report by a Special Board of Engineers on Survey of Mississippi River from St. Louis, Mo., to i

H.D. 50 (61st Cong., 1st Sess.): 1-26; Dobney, pp. 93-94.
86

tional dredging and contraction. In the St. Louis District, decreases in fund

because of the war had impacted the ability of engineers to maintain the ch

nel, and the river had widened considerably since 1914 as a result. Maj. DeW

C. Jones, who took over as district engineer on June 1, 1920, after several ye

of service at West Point and the Engineer School, would write after his fi rst y

“Because of the small and insuffi cient appropriations for this district in rec

years the regulation works have deteriorated rapidly, many sections hav

been entirely destroyed, and their repair and restoration is deemed urgent.” 

funding increased over the next several years under Jones and Maj. Lunsf

E. Oliver, who served from 1922 to 1924, they were able to make many repa

but there were still problem areas north of St. Louis. Particularly in the 30 m

south of St. Paul, Minnesota, the Corps was unable to achieve a six-foot de

despite dozens of wing dams and continuous dredging. This led the Corp

install a lock and dam complex at Hastings, Minnesota, from 1928 to 1930

the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927, Congress authorized a nine-foot chan

from St. Louis to the Ohio River. War hero and former Alaska Engineer Co

mission member Maj. John C. Gotwals, who became district engineer on M

5, 1924, would note that this was the minimum operational depths for m

barges, making the nine foot channel critical for navigation. Yet, some in 

Corps doubted if the amount of commerce in the upper river justifi ed a dee

project. In contrast with St. Louis, the upper river saw little to no recovery fr

the decline of navigation, and Corps leaders such as Chief of Engineers M

Gen. Harry Taylor did not believe that commerce would increase with a dee

channel.75

The Corps was not alone in its opposition to the project. By 1925, th

was sizable opposition from conservationists, who reached their zenith 

infl uence the previous decade. Conservationism evolved initially as a respo

to the Desert Land Act of 1888 that sought to “conserve” water for mult

uses. “Conservation,” historian Samuel P. Hays wrote, “ was a scientifi c mo

ment,” in which scientists and government administrators sought to maxim

use of natural resources, by effi ciency improvements, dual-use facilities, 

protection of resources from overuse. As such, it was primarily a top-do

movement – only later did it include a popular element. Restoration of w

derness was important to the movement, but mainly in support of sportsm

75 Jones quote in Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1921, p. 1201.
87

cerned about the effect of Mississippi River improvements for som

Although the impact of human activities was slight at fi rst, snagging

clearing, dredging, contraction, and fi nally damming the river had chan

natural regimens. Denuding forestlands near the river had increased s

sion and bank caving, polluting the river. Dredging had reduced musse

or fi sh spawning grounds in some locations. Removal of sandbars or sh

and reclamation of wetlands had reduced the size of traditional hunti

fi shing grounds. Most had no objection to navigation, but wanted to 

balanced with other activities, and they were just as critical of industr

polluted the river or fi shed species to near extinction. By the late nine

century, lumber mills dumped 1.6 million feet of sawdust into the riv

year, and many cities dumped garbage and sewage directly into open 

garnering the grave concern of conservationists.76

Over several years, conservationists had worked to create gove

oversight and pass laws to manage the environment. In 1871, Congre

ated a Commission of Fish and Fisheries, which reorganized as the Bu

Fisheries in 1903, to promote the fi sheries industry. It would eventually 

with the Bureau of Biological Survey to create the Fish and Wildlife Se

76 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Effi ciency: The Progressive Conservation M

1890-1920 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1959): 2.

Dipper dredge St. Paul removing trailer dike near Lock and Dam No. 26
88

Mississippi River designed to relocate fi sh from endangered areas to side po

and tributaries where spawning could take place. A series of biological stati

established along the upper river from 1908 to 1922 rescued more than 

million fi sh. In the 1890 and 1899 Rivers and Harbors Acts, Congress fi rst l

ited and then established a permitting program for dumping or altering n

gable waters to reign in pollution. There were several efforts to create a natio

park or refuge to place parts of the river outside of navigational improveme

Iowa, for example, called for a national park in 1908 that resulted in a posi

report in 1917. Finally, in 1924, after several years of lobbying by the cons

vationist organization the Izaac Walton League, Congress agreed to creat

wildlife refuge at the Winesheik Bottoms with the approbation of the Cor

the fi rst such refuge on the Mississippi, which eventually expanded to m

than 233,000 acres.77

Slack-Water Dams

All of these concerns came to a head when Congress requested a study 

using slack water dams to create a nine-foot channel, fi rst from St. Paul, M

nesota, to Lake Pepin in 1925, then to the Missouri River in 1927. The conc

of slack water dams had been around for a century, and the Corps had s

cessfully applied the method on the Ohio River. Essentially, dams built ev

few miles created pools or slack water that deepened the channel, while lo

allowed access to the higher-elevation pools like climbing steps. After des

and construction of the fi rst dams by Col. William E. Merrill from 1874 to 18

the system on the Ohio River grew to include 51 dams. These were mova

dams – dams that included gates or wickets that could open during high wa

to allow passage of vessels or increased fl ow – and included the fi rst concr

dam in the U.S. However, there had been no attempt to build a similar syst

on a river the size of the Mississippi. In 1894, the Corps started construction 

a small dam between St. Paul and Minneapolis, which it replaced by 1917 w

a higher dam and hydroelectric plant after passage of the six-foot channe

1907, but these did not impede navigation because they were so close to 

headwaters. From 1903 to 1914, after receiving the approval of the Corps 

Congress, the Keokuk and Hamilton Water Power Company built a dam n

77 Anfi nson, pp. 145-173; Fremling, pp. 155-156, 218-219, 230; Hays, pp. 1-143.
89

fi rst non-navigable dam below the Twin Cities, but since fewer and few

sels tried to pass through the rapids each year and instead used a pre

constructed bypass canal and lock, the reviewing engineer did not be

was an issue. Although the Corps built locks at Moline and a bypass can

Claire, these allowed open water navigation if needed and thus came un

criticism by conservationists than the Keokuk Dam. The Corps did not co

another lock and dam until construction of the Hastings Dam in 1928

was, nevertheless, precedent for non-navigable dams on the Mississipp

The Corps initially assigned Maj. Charles L. Hall of the Rock Islan

trict to perform the survey Congress requested, but surprisingly, in 19

came out against the dams, ostensibly because they were not econo

justifi ed, but also because he believed them environmentally harmful. A

Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin supported Hall against w

saw as special interests, but with pressure mounting from navigation b

and the threat looming of congressional hearings, he requested a restud

holding private and public meetings into early 1928, Hall declared h

ings unchanged on February 27, 1929. Boosters and towns in favor of t

conducted press campaigns against Hall and the Corps, and the Miss

Valley Association convinced the Board of Engineers for Rivers and H

in April that Hall had overestimated the costs because he had not com

a detailed survey as directed. In the end, the Corps assigned a specia

to review the project, including Mississippi River Commission presiden

Gen. Thomas H. Jackson, Louisville District Engineer Lt. Col. George R. 

ing, St. Paul District Engineer Lt. Col. Wildurr Willing, Hall, and Gotwa

Corps relieved Hall from duty on the board on October 14 because he wa

paigning against the project. With insuffi cient time to complete the surv

board submitted an interim report on December 16, 1929, which the Se

of the War forwarded to Congress on February 15, 1930. The specia

recommended a two-phased approach building six dams and improv

three existing dams north of the Wyoming River, followed by construc

11 other dams north of the Illinois River. The Board of Engineers for 

and Harbors, however, was “unable to determine upon a satisfactor

78 O’Brien et al., pp. 35-44; Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, pp. 197-222; Leland R. Jonson, 

River Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: The History of a Central Command (Cincinn

1992): 26-30; Anfi nson, “The Secret History of the Mississippi’s Earliest Locks and Dams,” Minn

tory (Summer 1995): 254-267.
90

recommendations.79

Conservationists, meanwhile, continued to lobby against the new rivers 

harbors bill based on the plan, as did the railroads. Both the Bureau of Fishe

and Bureau of Biological Survey reviewed the bill and feared the dams wo

either create pools of insuffi cient depth below the dams or instable pools ab

that were not conducive to wildlife. Although they thought the dams mi

prove benefi cial after several years of adjustment, they wanted input on 

design. After meeting with the organizations on May 9, 1930, the Corps agr

to conduct a joint study of Cooper Lake below Keokuk Dam to determine 

impact of dams on wildlife in return for approval of the plan. With the supp

of these organizations, despite continued opposition from the Izaak Wal

League and other local conservationists, Congress authorized the dam proje

in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930. The study of Cooper Lake later that y

found that the dam was benefi cial as long as water levels were consistent 

did not isolate wildlife in backchannels and that pollution would impact o

the community dumping it, not the entire chain of pools. As a result, the Co

agreed to maintain consistent water levels after the dams were in place. T

railroads also lobbied against the project, and in 1931 sued to stop constr

tion of Lock and Dam No. 4 based on changes in the plan made after the 19

report. Although the injunction approved by the district judge was eventu

overturned, Congress passed a resolution authorizing future changes in 

interim plan in 1932. With these issues resolved, the Corps proceeded w

construction of the project.80

To handle work on the new dams, the Corps reorganized its divis

structure in 1929, establishing an Upper Mississippi Valley Division to wh

St. Louis District transferred. It would remain in this division until abolishe

1954. Also in 1929, the Corps extended the district boundary from the Misso

to the Illinois River and in 1933 to Clarksville, Illinois, making district resp

sible for more than 250 miles of river, including areas covered by the dam p

ect. The division completed site surveys, started designs, held public meeti

in 1930, and on December 9, 1931, released the fi nal report on the dams. T

system would include 26 locks and dams, incorporating existing structures 

79 Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, pp. 222-237; O’Brien et al., 27-32; U.S. Cong., Mississippi R

between Mouth of Missouri River and Minneapolis, Minnesota (Interim Report), H.D. 290 (71st Cong.

Sess.): 1-7.

80 Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, pp. 239-269; Dobney, pp. 94-95.
91

river into a navigation canal. Three of these dams would be inside the en

St. Louis District: Nos. 24, 25, and 26. The 1931 report divided these 

into four categories: A. those dams critical for commerce; B. those neces

achieve at least a six-foot channel; C. those dams critical for a nine-foo

nel; and D. those needed to achieve the nine-foot channel in areas tha

potentially be maintained through heavy dredging. All of the dams in St

District were the lowest priority. By 1931, design of the fi rst dams wa

plete and construction started, with a third of the dams completed by 1

St. Louis, design of the fi rst dam started in 1933. Maj. William A. Snow 

lished a Lock and Dam Section, which included one offi cer, four enginee

draftsmen, and a clerk. An experienced combat engineer with degree

West Point and MIT, Snow understood the need for a robust organiza

manage large construction projects. Capt. William A. Wanamaker head

section, and Lawrence B. Feagin served as senior engineer. After initial 

by division engineers William A. McAlpine and Frederick Griffi n, Feag

responsible for engineering on all three dams in the district. Feagin, wh

received a commission as a colonel and served as district engineer 

World War II, conducted tests on the behavior of piles under changi

static loads that led to a change in design with the adoption of concrete 

Like the Ohio River locks and dams, the dams were all movable. Mo

designs used roller gates – large metal tubes that could be lowered or r

to control water fl ow, but by 1933 designs were incorporating lower-cost 

gates, large wedge-shaped gates, to some degree. Lock and Dam No. 

26 used a combination of roller and 

tainter gates; Lock and Dam No. 24 

used exclusively tainter gates. Once 

design was complete under Snow, 

Maj. Barley M. Harloe (1933-1935) 

oversaw early construction, which 

Maj. Paul S. Reinecke (1935-1940) 

completed.81

81 U.S. Cong., Survey of Mississippi River between Missouri River and Minneapolis, H.D. 137, P

Cong., 1st Sess.): 1-10; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1929-1933; Anfi nson, River 

Wrought, pp. 255-256; O’Brien et al., pp. 47-51, 63-97, 190; “William Arthur Snow,” ASCE Annu

(Jun. 10, 1941): 333-341; Dobney, pp. 93-95.

Dam 25 construction, 1938
92

than $13.8 million available to start the project, this barely covered surve

design, and purchase of easements on the fi rst three dams. Fortunately, 

projects came at the advent of the New Deal programs initiated by Presid

Franklin D. Roosevelt in response to the Great Depression. This included 

Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, the National Industrial Rec

ery Act of 1933, which established the Public Works Administration (PW

and included $3.3 billion in public works, and the Emergency Relief App

priations Act of 1935, which established the Works Progress Administrat

(WPA). The projects received $7.2 million in 1932, $71 million in PWA fund

1933, and $25 million in 1935, $27 million in 1936, and $28.6 million in 1

from WPA funds for a total funding of $170 million. As the earliest dam buil

the district, Lock and Dam No. 26 received mostly PWA funds, while Nos

and 24 received mostly Emergency Relief Appropriations Act or WPA fun

These programs ensured the project was fl ush with money; work started wit

a month of Snow receiving PWA funds in September 1933. Yet because th

programs were designed to provide maximum employment rather than e

ciency, the projects faced problems with untrained workers and hiring dela

unions expressed concerns about worker safety, and there were inevitably c

fl icts with local program administrators. Dealing with these and similar iss

within the tight schedules demanded by the projects required decentralizat

of real estate and contracting functions to local offi ces. In one case, when Al

WPA chairman John D. McAdams wrote in the Alton Evening Telegraph t

the Corps should reconsider objections to a recreation area for the Alton D

Reinecke publically agreed, but observed privately to McAdams,

A W.P.A man is said to be a man who knows a great deal about 

very little and who goes along knowing more and more about 

less and less until fi nally he knows practically everything about 

nothing.... An engineer starts out knowing practically everything about everything, but ends up knowing nothing about 

anything, due to his association with editors and W.P.A men.82

It was a humorous reminder of the bureaucratic chaos that resulted fr

confl icts among these “alphabet soup” agencies at multiple levels.

82 Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, pp.269-274; O’Brien et al., pp. 55-62; Dobney, pp. 89-93, Rein

quote on p. 97; on the PWA and WPA, see, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt an

New Deal, 1932-1940 (NY: Harper and Row, 1963): 55-58, 124-130.
93

The fi rst lock and dam built in St. Louis District was Lock and Dam 

at Alton, Illinois, 23 miles above St. Louis. Originally intended for G

15 miles upriver, the Corps changed the location, at least in part, becaus

limited space for equipment storage in Grafton versus Alton. McAlpin

pleted design of the dam in 1934, which included two locks, one 110 by 60

the other 110 by 350 feet. The 1,724-foot dam included three roller ga

30 tainter gates. The Corps awarded the construction contract for the l

Griffi ths and Son for $3.2 million, and the company started construction 

coffer dams in February 1934. As with all of the locks and dams, the con

Upper Mississippi and Illinois River locks and dams
94

tion proceeded on the lock fi rst to leave the river open for navigation unti

completion. Griffi ths started draining the area by May and started work 

driving piling and setting foundations in June. The contract ran consisten

behind schedule, primarily because of the contractor’s use of a conveyor bel

deliver concrete, which, although labor-saving, was much slower than man

transportation of the concrete. Because of this, erection of steel work did 

start until February 1935. Work was 65 percent complete in June 1935, and 

company completed the main lock in September 1935. Griffi ths started c

struction on the auxiliary lock in October, but had to stop construction in m

December because of ice. As a result of continued frozen weather, the co

dam broke on February 29, 1936. When the contractor refused to complete 

lock because of its losses, the Corps terminated the contract in April 1936. T

Corps had to hire a separate contractor to remove the remains of the coffer d

and complete the lock. At the same time, it awarded a $4.9 million contrac

Engineering Construction Company for the dam. The contractor installed 

three coffer dam sections, started draining the enclosed area by August 19

and was laying concrete by Oc

ber using cranes, pumps, 

barges. The company comple

the fi rst section in February 19

and the gate fabricator – Am

can Bridge Company – star

installing the gates by June. W

was 50 percent complete by J

1936. Work on the third sect

was complete in April 1937. 

that remained on the two str

tures was connection of utilit

completed in 1938, and the ad

tion of a recreation area abutt

the reservoir, completed in 19

The total cost of the dam w

$13.1 million.83

83 U.S. Cong., Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1934-1940; O’Brien et al., pp. 105-125, 197; “Con

Report: First Coffer Dam, Dam No. 26” (St. Louis: St. Louis District [MVS], 1936): 1-7; Dobney, pp. 95-
95

Construction on the other two locks and dams in St. Louis District, de

by Griffi n, started after 1935. The Corps next built Lock and Dam No

Winfi eld, Missouri, near Bradley Island, 241 miles above the Ohio. It in

a 1,296-foot dam to the island and a 2,566-foot earthen dike from the is

Locks and Dams, 9-foot Channel project

Towboat Crimson Duke towing 42 barges, 1986
96

a 110- by 600-foot lock along the eastern shore of the island. Instead of a sp

way, the dam included fully submersible gates to allow water and ice to fl 

over them. The Corps started surveys and purchase of land in July 1935, wh

it completed in early 1936, but the contractor – United Construction Comp

of Minnesota – had proceeded to construction of the lock at the end of 19

The lock was 35 percent complete by June 1936 and fi nished by June 19

Construction of the dam started on May 21, 1937, was 66 percent complete 

the end of 1938, and was fi nished in 1939.

Lock and Dam 24, although lower cost than the other three, was m

more complicated in design. Located 93.5 miles above St. Louis near Clar

ville, Missouri, the dam was diffi cult to design because of the fl ood plai

the river is ordinarily 1,650-feet wide but expands to 3,800 feet during fl 

events. To account for this, Griffi n designed a 1,340-foot dam with a 2,720-f

submersible dike. Coming at the apex of tainter gate design, No. 24 inclu

15 tainter gates, making the design much lower cost. It also is the only of 

three locks built on gravel instead of piling. This was due to the shale fo

dation, which prevented driving piling. The contractor, Central Engineer

Company of Iowa, started construction in 1936. The lock was 65 percent co

plete by June 1937 and fi nished by 1938. Construction on the dam started F

ruary 26, 1938, was seven percent complete by June 1938, 62 percent by J

1939, and fi nished by 1940. Thus, original construction on all of the dams w

complete by American entry into World War II.84

There were some minor modifi cations to all of the dams, such as enhan

ment of the dam pools for use as recreation areas. At the insistence of local r

dents, when construction of Lock and Dam No. 26 was completed, the Co

added a recreation area with a landscaped scenic drive. It had also adde

picnic area near Lock and Dam No. 25. By the 1960s, in line with Corps effo

to include recreation areas in its reservoirs, the district initiated constr

tion of recreation and public access areas at all three dam pools. In 1961, 

Corps approved district designs for a boat ramp, parking lot, and comfort 

tion complete with running water and sewage at Alton (No. 26). In 1963, 

Corps approved designs for boat ramps, parking lots, comfort stations, 

additional picnic areas at Winfi eld and Norton Woods, Missouri (No. 25), 

84 U.S. Cong., Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1934-1940; Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, p. 

O’Brien et al., pp. 192-195; Dobney, pp. 99-101.
97

in 1968 approved designs for a boat launch, parking area, comfort stati

reforestation near Clarksville, Illinois (No. 24).85

There were also some major modifi cations to the dam system n

Chain of Rocks. Located 190 miles above the Ohio River, the Chain of R

a seven-mile stretch of rapids caused by a series of rock ledges that ex

times almost the width of the river. After completion of the other 26 da

Chain of Rocks was the only remaining area on the river in which nav

was often below nine feet and sometimes as shallow as 5.5 feet. Becaus

rapids, which moved up to 12 feet per second, it was extremely hazard

navigate. There had been discussion of building a bypass canal as early a

but Congress did not request a plan until 1938, which the Corps subm

December the same year. In it, the Division Engineer Lt. Col. Malcolm 

proposed several plans, including a bypass canal and a lock and dam 

river. Unfortunately, although Congress approved the plan, President 

evelt vetoed the rivers and harbors bill because of the war. He fi nally ap

it when resubmitted in 1945 at the war’s end. The design was for an 8.

550-foot wide, 32-foot deep canal following Cabaret Chute bypassing th

of the rocks, the north end just south of the Missouri River and the sou

85 USACE, Alton Navigation Pool, Mississippi and Illinois Rivers, DM 2Cc1 (St. Louis: MVS, 19

Winfi eld Navigation Pool, Lock and Dam No. 25, Mississippi River, DM 2Cc1 (St. Louis: MVS, 19

Clarksville Navigation Pool, Lock and Dam No. 24, Mississippi River, DM 2 (St. Louis: MVS, 196

Model of Lock and Dam 25
98

near Granite City, Illinois. It included two locks – 110 by 1,200 feet and 

by 600 feet – about a mile above the lower terminus, with six control tow

the most of any lock in the system. The main lock was the fi rst 1,200-foot l

in the system. The use of double vertical-lift gates on the north end inst

of miter gates allowed fl ow of ice down the canal during cold weather. T

contract, issued to River Construction Corporation, started in 1947 under 

oversight of Col. Rudolph E. Smyser, Jr. Most of the early work consisted 

moving roads and utilities, which continued through 1950. Particularly d

cult was movement of Highway 66, which required construction of a 17-sp

bridge over the canal. The contractor started work on the locks on July 1, 19

In November 1948, work started on the canal using dredges and placemen

Old Lock and Dam 26

Lock and Dam 26 construction, 1935 Lock and Dam 26 construction, 1938
99

protective levees along the canal. Included in the 

design was a 6,750-foot harbor facility near the 

southern end. The canal opened to traffi c in February 1953.86

Although the original Chain of Rocks design 

considered a small wicket dam, Congress did not 

authorize it, and the district did not construct 

it. By 1955, however, the Corps recognized that 

increases in slope due to scouring below the Alton 

Dam were inhibiting navigation. In one 98-day 

period from 1955 to 1956, the depth was too shallow for the dam to operate. In response to request 

for a study, the district conducted public hearings 

and submitted a preliminary report to Congress 

in 1957. St. Louis District Engineer Col. George 

C. White recommended either altering the Alton 

Dam or building a low-water dam at the Chain of 

Rocks. Authorized in the Rivers and Harbors Act 

of 1958, the dam was a 10.5-foot high, 3,240-foot 

long rock dam 950 feet south of the Chain of Rocks 

Bridge with a 700-foot spillway to allow ice to fl ow 

downstream. This was the fi rst dam completely cutting off the river w

lock on the river itself. Similar to a design used above Niagara Falls, th

86 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River between Ohio River and Mouth of Missouri River, H.D. 231 (7

1st Sess.): 1-47; Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1947-1953; Mississippi River – Chain 

Project (St. Louis: MVS, 1947): 1-7; O’Brien et al., pp. 127-129, 201; Dobney, pp. 113-117; Col. Clar

“Navigation Improvement at Chain of Rocks,” TME (Dec. 1948): 556-557; Col. F.E. Ressegieu, “Th

Rocks Canal,” TME (Mar.-Apr. 1953): 128-130.

Col. Rudolph E. Smyser Col. Beverly C. Snow Col. Fred E. Ressegie

Col. George E. White, 

Col. Charles B. Schwe
100

as originally contemplated. The contractor started construction of the dam 

February 1959 under the leadership of Col. Charles B. Schweizer without co

dams using a cableway to place stones directly onto the rock foundation i

specifi c order to prevent water from disturbing them. This made the cost of 

dam less than half of other designs contemplated. Revetment on the east b

prevented erosion where the dam did not sit on rock. Construction was pra

cally complete in 1963, with some additional work and improvements to 

lock stretching into 1964.87

A fi nal change occurred in the dam system in 1990 – the replacement of L

and Dam No. 26 with the Melvin Price Locks and Dam (See Section V.). At 

time the fi rst of the locks in St. Louis District came online, it passed 1.4 mill

tons of traffi c. By 1967, it was passing more than 40 million. The 600-foot l

as well as its alignment with the channel greatly constrained traffi c, and th

were often long delays in locking through to the upper river. Given the amo

of traffi c, year-round versus seasonal use, and its key position as gateway to 

Upper Mississippi and the Illinois River, the Corps considered this a natio

87 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River between St. Louis, Mo., and Lock and Dam No. 26, S.D. 7 (85th C

1st Sess.): 1-17; Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1947-1964; Mississippi Low Water Dam betw

St. Louis, Mo., and Lock and Dam No. 26, GDM 2 (St. Louis: MVS, 1958) 1-30; O’Brien et al., pp. 127

201; Dobney, pp. 113-117.

View south from Chain of Rocks canal
101

piling had allowed greater movement in the foundation – up to ten in

that caused cracks in the auxiliary lock, causing a spike in maintenanc

The numerous attempts to repair the facility in the 1950s were imperm

buying only another estimated 10 years of life. As the situation contin

Tow leaving Chain of Rocks canal
102

conducted a study of replac

the lock and recommende

plan of building another d

with two larger locks sligh

downstream from the origi

It would, however, take anot

two decades for the projec

be authorized and construct

in part due to opposition fr

environmental groups and 

long planning time requi

by the National Environm

tal Policy Act, which requi

coordination with dozens 

agencies and groups. It w

nevertheless, constructed 

the old dam decommissioned and removed in 1990. Despite opposition, 

nation would continue to approve using the slack water dam system to ma

tain navigable depths, although somewhat modifi ed to meet the new envir

mental imperative.88

Before World War I, navigation on the Mississippi River had declined 

just over 250,000 tons being shipped to St. Louis. At that time and as late 

1925, with the growth in railroads and trucking, Corps leaders believed t

the Upper Mississippi River in particular would no longer be used for co

mercial navigation. A combination of improvements in barges, high railr

fares, and the development of a federal barge line helped improve navigati

The line would continue to operate until after World War II, with contin

increases in tonnage. However, it was the nine-foot channel, achieved throu

a series of locks and dams north of St. Louis, that truly restored navigat

to earlier levels and eventually surpassed them. In 1938, more than a mill

tons shipped through the completed Lock and Dam No. 26. By 1956, tonn

shipped through the lock exceeded 15 million tons and was anticipated to 

26 million by 1963. The system as a whole was passing more than 2.6 mill

88 USACE, Report on Replacement, Lock and Dam No. 26, Mississippi River, Alton, Illinois (St. L

MVS, 1968); “Locks and Dam No. 26, Mississippi River – Alton, Illinois,” report on failure (St. Louis: M

[1977]); O’Brien et al., pp. 130-132, 199.

Chain of Rocks
103

by 1970. There can be no doubt that the nine-foot channel had vastly inc

waterborne commerce, as navigation boosters had predicted, but it a

many environmental impacts, most of which were unanticipated. Unl

claims of the Izaak Walton League and other conservationists, wildlife i

teemed in the new pools created by the dams. Yet, pollution from fertiliz

become a problem, some migrating species of fi sh were cut off from sp

waters, and the lack of sediment in the river created complex problem

as a decline in delta creation in Louisiana. Most of these issues were c

and had multiple causes. They would, nevertheless, become a rallying 

the environmental politics that embraced the nation after 1970.89

89 “Merchant Marine of the Middle West,” Literary Digest 124 (Jul. 3, 1937): 36-38; Mississi

between St. Louis, Mo., and Lock and Dam No. 26, pp. 6-7; Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, pp
104

Architecture of the 

Mississippi River 

Locks and Dams

The locks and dams constructed on the Upper Mississippi River contained m

new technologies, which refl ected the latest engineering. The use of tainter g

instead of traditional roller gates after 1936, the transition from submersible to n

submersible and open-frame to solid gates, the improvements to miter gates on lo

and the extensive testing of concrete, piling, and other structures all demonstrate 

evolution of technology. However, as with all engineering projects, the locks and d

built as part of the nine-foot project also refl ected the evolving architectural taste

the designers and of the times. 

William McAlpine and Lenvik Ylvisaker designed all of the locks and dams prio

1934, most of which the Corps built before 1936. These designs were mostly utilita

with neoclassical infl uences. They typically included large industrial windows, arc

or alcoved window sills, buttress detailing, and hipped roofs. Lockmaster houses w

traditional colonial two-story homes. As O’Brien et al. note, “In all cases, simplicity 

the hallmark of design.”
105

After 1934, Edwin Abbot took over design of the dams, constructed afte

By this time, the infl uence of the Modern Art style became prominent. The re

unbroken planes and surfaces, fl at roofs, slits instead of windows, inset or g

gate structures, curved lines, and sweeping arches. Particularly infl uential w

international designs and technology presented at the 1933 Century of Progres

sition in Chicago. There were many parallels in U.S. designs to German roller g

the Rhine River. “The Depression-era ‘message of the modern’ had not been 

America’s engineers.”

In St. Louis District, while McAlpine started the design of Lock and Dam N

was Frederick Griffi n who completed that design and the designs for Locks an

Nos. 24, 25, and 27 after initial design by the Upper Mississippi Valley Divisio

one can see more utilitarian block designs in Lock and Dam No. 26, such as the 

control station, yet also more gentle curves on the tainter gate assemblies an

gate piers. The other dams have even more prominent modern designs, althou

is still simplicity of design for the locks.

Such nuances in design remind observers that engineering is both an art an

ence. While most historians focus primarily on the science, on new technolog

as gates and adaptations to the engineering realities of geography, the structur

are an oft overlooked but critical aspect of design.90

90 O’Brien et al., pp. 63-102.
106

 7 

Navigation Improvements in the Modern Era

River traffi c continued to increase after World War II. During the ten-y

period from 1953 to 1963, commerce on the Middle Mississippi River g

124 percent, nearly fi ve times the river as a whole. Tonnage handled by the p

of St. Louis also increased as a result. It had tripled from the end of World W

II to 1956. This did not always result in greater employment, and the late 19

and early 1960s were periods of economic stagnation for St. Louis in gene

– unemployment was high, and there were areas of urban fl ight as more th

100,000 left the city. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that navigat

increasingly contributed to the prosperity of the city as more and more go

were transported on the river versus over means. This was due in large par

the continual efforts to maintain and improve navigation on the Mississi

River. By World War II, the permanent project of hurdles, wing dams, clos

chutes, and revetment was 75 percent complete. As long as there was at le

75,000 cubic feet per second of water fl owing in the channel, the perman

project could maintain a nine-foot depth along 90 percent of the channel be

Early photo of shipwreck on the Middle Mississippi
107

years more dredging became necessary. Yet as the district continued w

these and other navigational projects, issues new and old continued to 

the way the district conducted business. Concerns about the environme

cost greatly impacted the shape of new projects, even as engineers wo

update aging infrastructure and reduce project costs. As a result, they 

oped innovative techniques to improve effi ciency and lower cost while 

taining optimal environmental conditions.91

Progress on the permanent project or channel improvement progra

tinued in the decades following World War II. With damages to navig

works from the Floods of 1944 and 1947 and additional works added, t

trict reported an estimated completion of 68 percent in 1950. By 1960, t

gram was only 78 percent complete, primarily because of damage to rev

resulting from heavy ice in 1951 and 1958, but the channel itself was 

improved. After reaching 81 percent completion, in 1974 the district com

a study to determine changes needed to maintain a nine-foot channel

resulted in authorization of an additional 170,000 linear feet of dik

revetment, greatly increasing the program size. The district completed 

91 Dobney, pp. 113-114; U.S. Cong., Mississippi River between Coon Rapids Dam and Mout

River, H.D. 669 (76th Cong., 3rd Sess.): 26-27.

Early river training structure
108

and 79 percent by 1990. A rock removal contract issued in 1988 removed so

100,000 cubic yards of rock from the channel by 1990. Despite expenditu

of more than $2 million per year on average, the program never reached m

than 85 percent completion because of continued refi nement, repair, and ad

tion of dikes and revetment to improve the channel. Nevertheless, the progr

was able to maintain a channel depth of 10 feet during high water in most lo

tions, making dredging required only during low water.92

Fighting Droughts

The exception was during drought years, when excessive dredging beca

necessary to counter the hazards of low water. Over time, the district gre

improved its response to droughts. The primary response to past droug

such as that of 1910 or 1939, was to increase dredging to keep a channel cl

By the fi rst major drought after World War II in 1964, Corps response expan

to include working with other agencies to maintain the channel. From 1952 

1964 during the long dry spell, precipitation in St. Louis was 42 inches be

normal and seven inches below normal in 1964. Dry conditions extended i

Minnesota, Montana, and the Dakotas. Other than briefl y on March 10, 19

water levels were between zero and -5.5 feet on the St. Louis gage for mon

on end, including 130 consecutive days since November 2, 1963 – the long

since the 1939-1940 drought (166 straight days). In addition to reducing ch

nel depths below nine feet, low water contributed to silting in many locatio

closing numerous side channels and reducing the depth of the St. Louis Har

from 28 feet to around seven. The harbor was closed for 36 consecutive d

while barges moored all along the 11-mile waterfront waiting to offl oad ca

so as to achieve a fi ve-foot draft and proceed upriver. In addition to its us

dredging, the Corps worked with the Coast Guard daily to survey and m

open channels with buoys and coordinated release of water from reservo

on the Upper Mississippi by the end of March 1964. Other suggestions t

the Corps never implemented included one by St. Louis District Engineer C

James Meanor, Jr., to build a dam near Jefferson Barracks in an attemp

back water up to the Chain of Rocks Dam and increase channel depths.93

92 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1950-2008. 93 “Old Man River in Trouble Here: Low Water at St. Louis,” Post-Dispatch (Sun., Mar. 22, 1964): 1-5
109

from 1988 to 1989. It impacted all major tributaries of the Mississippi

of which saw record low stages and fl ows more than 50 percent below n

unlike the drought of 1964, during which the Ohio and other tributarie

near normal stages. In St. Louis, fl ow was at or below 50 percent of norm

May to October 1988. Stages at St. Louis started to decline in April 19

continued to go down until July, normally a period of high water. Thro

the low water season, the gage stayed near or below zero, reaching only -

on December 23 and 26. The drought also set numerous daily record lo

had the lowest 210-day fl ow. By June, numerous channels were shoalin

there were 26 channel closures between St. Louis and Baton Rouge, som

ing as long as three days. One of these near Ste. Genevieve kept nea

barges waiting from June 23 to 26. The Corps and Coast Guard restricte

to 20 barges and an 8.5-foot draft, later increasing the number to 25 bar

with previous low water periods, the district started emergency dredgi

snagging and working with the Coast Guard to survey and mark the ch

The Corps shortened the navigation season for the Missouri, dredged th

for the fi rst time since 1979, and surveyed and marked the channel. Such 

ties continued until October. Aiding the channel depth was the release o

from Corps reservoirs, particularly the Gavins Point Dam on the M

After determining that it would have little impact on low water, the Co

not time release at the reservoirs with low water elsewhere, but the res

seasonal release nevertheless added 36,000 cfs or 50 percent of the 

sippi fl ow at St. Louis, which amounted to approximately four feet. Nav

remained fairly normal above St. Louis because of the locks. When the 

discovered that Lock and Dam No. 26 was passing excessive fl ow, pot

draining the navigation pool, it implemented emergency repairs to rolle

at Locks and Dams Nos. 24, 25, and 26. All of these measures had some s

as demonstrated by consistently high tonnage moved despite the obsta

The drought also presented new challenges. For the fi rst time, the 

of Illinois and Missouri requested relief under PL 84-99 and the Staff

to address water supply issues. Several wells and water intakes on riv

reservoirs went dry or were threatened by low water or later ice. The 

94 IWR, Surviving the Drought: Corps of Engineers Response to Drought Conditions in 19

USACE, 1989): iii-8; James R. Tuttle, “Overview of Hydrometeorology Subbasin Flow Contribu

Water Levels, Mississippi RiverDrought ‘88’,” American Public Works Association (Vicksbur

1988): 1-12; “Low Water Wreaks Havoc on the River,” Esprit (July 1988): 8-9.
110

Matress revetment

Early photo of stone revetment
111

Numerous small communities and farmers or ranchers along the M

River requested assistance with their water supply, leading to sever

investigations. Papineau, Illinois, requested emergency water after 

70 wells went dry, and the Corps provided a temporary piping system 

regular deliveries started. After Blandinsville, Illinois, requested sup

transport water to the town, the district provided an emergency permit 

a new well. At other locations outside the district, the Corps installed pu

worked with the National Guard to deliver water. Overall, critical comm

tion during the event was much improved. The Lower Mississippi Valle

sion collected and distributed water level information throughout the 

As with fl oods, the Corps established a River Industry Executive Task 

Committee that included the Corps, Coast Guard, and river industry

helped distribute information and guided the federal government on de

impacting navigation.95

95 Surviving the Drought, pp. 8-28; Tuttle, pp. 13-17.

Tow navigating Mississippi River under icy conditions
112

Cost Constraints

By 1970, a combination of new national imperatives and new technolog

were radically changing the navigation mission of the Corps. The environmen

movement (see Section V.) became a force impacting nearly all Corps proje

by the late-1960s and resulted in numerous statutory and regulatory requ

ments that changed the way the Corps did business. Cols. Edwin R. Deck

Carroll N. LeTellier, and Guy E. Jester led the district during this period 

change as it adjusted its operations to meet these new demands. As a re

of the new requirements, most Corps projects started to include element

mitigate their environmental impact, while other projects originated prim

ily for the purpose of environmental restoration. Coordination among sta

holders, to include federal environmental agencies such as the U.S. Fish 

Wildlife Service or Environmental Protection Agency and state agencies s

as the Missouri Department of Conservation, increased greatly as river en

neers cooperated on ways to improve habitat on the Mississippi River w

improving the channel. By planning dredging locations, altering existing di

and revetment, and applying new environmental river engineering techniqu

the district was able to recreate diversity of habitat even as it maintaine

stable navigational channel. A primary concern was maintaining wetland ar

rather than converting the river to dry land, as had been the goal of past re

mation projects, and the district worked to maintain or recreate shallow po

and side channels by reducing sedimentation, notching dikes to allow wa

behind diked areas, and building pools that incorporated fast and slow wa

using rock interfaces. In these ways, the day-to-day operations of the dist

addressed new environmental goals.96

Ecological concerns also impacted projects with no specifi c environmen

content, such as the Kaskaskia River Dam, whose construction spanned p

sage of environmental law. The Kaskaskia River runs approximately 325 m

from central Illinois to the Mississippi River about 118 miles north of the O

River. Prior to 1896 the Corps had made minor improvements to increase 

river depth and remove snags in the lower 22 miles, especially at Evansv

but river depths remained as low as two feet in low water, with widths 60 

75 feet. Because of these limitations, Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. Lytle Bro

96 Jon Daly and Donna Zoeller, Interview with Claude Strauser, Jul. 28, 2010 (MVS Archives).
113

improvement for modern barge traffi c.” He did not recommend a plan s

ted to Congress that year to build a slack-water system of six locks and 

but in 1954 the Senate requested a reevaluation. The district examined c

improvements in the lower 50 miles only. In general, residents were fav

to the project, other than opposition by the railroads. A major factor in p

ing the plan was the fact that 1.8 billion tons of coal lay in the ground 

15 miles of the river as far north as Fayetteville, Illinois. The plan sub

by the district in 1961 included a lock and dam at mile four to ensure 

water in the lower river, a nine-foot deep and 200-foot wide channel 

through straightening and deepening of the river, increases in water 

from upstream reservoirs, and various bridge and road alterations. Sup

by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, Acting Chief of En

Maj. Gen. Keith R. Barney recommended the project for $58 million. W

ings of $5 million in transportation costs, the benefi t-cost ratio was 1.

gress approved it in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1962.97

Preconstruction work started in 1964; the district awarded the fi rst c

on the canal from mile 19 to mile 23 in April 1966; and construction 

in June. Another contract awarded in 1967 covered channel correctio

the district awarded a contract for the lock and dam on September 22

with an original completion date of 1972. Actually completed in 1974, t

was 600-feet long and 84-feet wide, and the reinforced concrete dam in

two 60-foot wide bays controlled by six tainter gates. With its completi

project was 70 percent complete overall. It was fully operational in 19

complete in 1978. By the time construction ended, costs for the proj

increased to $119.6 million, with $7.6 million local. By this time, there h

been born a new environmental consciousness. In 1978, the Illinois D

ment of Transportation (IDOT) published the Kaskaskia River Project 

Plan, which a contractor had developed to plan land use in the project a

the weeks after publication of the plan and at a public meeting that Sep

in New Athens, in which the state presented the plan to 250 attendee

eral new issues arose. The largest complaint among local boater assoc

and residents was that the plan limited recreational boating in the can

Sierra Club and Audubon Society sought more wildlife areas and wa

limit multi-use areas they believed would fall victim to economic develo

97 U.S. Cong., Kaskaskia River, Illinois, S.D. 44 (87th Cong., 1st Sess.): i-47; USACE, “Kaskaskia 

Sheet,” (St. Louis: MVS, 1964). 
114

nois Department of Conservation criticized 

the entire project for its impact on wilderness 

areas. IDOT considered alterations to the plan 

and published the fi nal version in January 

1979, which, although it accommodated additional recreational aspects, did not meet all 

demands for wilderness areas and limitations 

on economic activity.98

Spurred by this belated criticism of the 

canal, local papers and organizations launched 

investigations that questioned the benefi ts of 

the projects. Changes in railroad shipping, 

the sale of an option for a Kaiser Aluminum 

plant, and increases in construction costs due 

to shoreline erosion had reduced the benefi tcost ratio to 1.1, which would likely not have 

earned congressional approval. Further, the 

coal mining anticipated did not develop in the 

fi rst several years of the project, with the primary developer remaining Peabody Coal Company, one of the original boosters of the project 

(many called it “Peabody’s Ditch”). For Peabody’s customers, the canal did provide a savings of a $1 per ton of coal shipped, but the customer base was rather limite

1978. Nevertheless, District Engineer Col. Leon E. McKinney argued it was 

early to judge benefi ts, which would come over the next 20 years. As it tur

out, he was correct. By 1997, industries had shipped 50 million tons of cargo 

the canal worth $1.75 billion, and new cargo docks had opened. Among go

shipped were grain at a signifi cant savings, which injected more cash into 

local economy. One report estimated the canal had created more than 4,0

jobs, including 600 in the coal mining industry. Equally important was 

growth in recreational boating – more than 8,000 vessels used the lock in 1

98 USACE, “Navigation Project: Kaskaskia River, Illinois” (St. Louis: MVS, 1968); “Kaskaskia River Na

tion” (St. Louis: MVS, 1974); Shirley Flood, “Tempers `Flare’ at the Kaskaskia River meeting,” New Ath

Ill., Journal-Press (Sept. 7, 1978): 1, 3; Bill Anderson, “Kaskaskia River land use plan faces diffi cu

St. Louis Globe-Democrat (Aug. 29, 1978): 1-2; Timothy Middleton, “Kaskaskia River Canal: A facelift 

death mask?” Southern Illinoisan (Thurs., Aug. 17, 1978): 24.

Col. James B. Meanor, Jr.

Col. Edwin R. Decker
115

impact of the project continued, bu

were satisfi ed as to its fi nal shape. Al

environmental challenges to the projec

mostly after its completion, such issue

onstrate the diffi culties of meeting bot

ronmental and navigational objectives 

modern era.99

Addressing environmental goals i

gational projects came at a cost, ho

Many projects saw delays as the Corps 

additional coordination with other a

and the public, prepared documentation, and developed mitigation pl

times, delays were lengthy. Unlike Lock and Dam No. 26, which was de

and built in the 1930s in seven years, it took more than 20 years after 

get approval and build the Melvin Price Dam as its replacement. Other p

did not advance at all, such as the 12-foot navigation channel. The 1944 

Control Act had authorized a 12-foot channel below Cairo, Illinois. Reso

had authorized study from Cairo to Minneapolis in 1945, but the Kore

delayed action on the 1949 survey. Congress approved a restudy of th

in 1968. Barge lines argued that a consistent channel depth would lowe

modity costs – most barges had to either carry less cargo or reload after 

ing the lower river – by increasing the tonnage shipped per load up to 

tons. Since some pools in the river were already 12 feet, the North 

Division estimated only 25 percent of the channel would require adju

through dredging or increased dam heights. The St. Louis District 

pated in these studies. It had already been experimenting with mainta

nine-foot channel with a 1,200-foot width in prototype sections, and 

the data to the 12-foot study. Railroads opposed the channel, as they h

nine-foot channel, and they found ready allies in the environmental mov

then blossoming. Environmental interests found neither dredging nor 

lake levels acceptable – one could destroy river bottom fi sh habitats, th

could fl ood wetlands and destroy waterfowl and plant habitat. Release 

99 Timothy Middleton, “Cost analysis shows Kaskaskia Canal loser,” Southern Illinoisan (Aug. 

24; “Kaskaskia River Project called ‘Peabody’s Ditch,’” Centralia, Ill., Sentinel (Fri., Aug. 25, 1978)

thy Middleton, “Big boost for area hasn’t been realized,” Edwardsville, Ill., Intelligencer (Aug. 15

Bob Lockhart, “Kaskaskia celebrates 25th anniversary,” Esprit (Nov. 1998): 1, 7.

Col. Carroll N. LeTellier
116

in 1972, which contained language favorable to the channel, greatly alarm

environmental interests, and this spilled over to opposition to the St. Lo

District study of replacing Lock and Dam No. 26 as a fi rst step to building 

12-foot channel. In the end, the fi nal draft published in 1973 recommen

against the channel above Grafton, Illinois, as not cost-effective, and the Co

deferred further study on the middle river.100

Aside from the costs of lost revenue of economic benefi ts and the ad

costs of environmental project features, high infl ation combined with del

to increase the cost of many projects by more than 10 percent over seve

decades. This impacted both the district and its customers. Large budget c

and increased spending scrutiny from 1980 to 2008 sometimes forced the 

trict to choose among options or to delay projects until funding was availa

Since 1983, the district had lost about 280 employee slots through attrition 

conversion to temporary positions, and this impacted district operations

April 1990, District Engineer Col. James Corbin established strict cost c

trols over the Operations and Maintenance budget because of cost overr

at maintenance-intensive projects such as the reservoirs. He assigned a te

to review all spending decisions. One challenge they faced was high dredg

costs, and Mike Dace, Dave Busse, and others worked to improve forecastin

water levels to determine dredging 

requirements. Typically, dredges 

operated using a 28-day weather 

forecast and dredged for the worst 

case scenario, but this was often 

ineffi cient because the forecasts 

were inaccurate and did not provide enough lead time to bring on 

additional crews. Busse developed 

a low-stage probability model or 

“low-cast” that determined the 

chance a certain river stage would 

be reached 30 to 120 days out based 

on local and tributary forecasts. 

100 Raymond H. Merritt, The Corps, the Environment, and the Upper Mississippi River Basin (Wash.: 

torical Division, OCE, 1984): 65-72; Michael Ruddy, Interview with David Comfort, Mar. 17, 1980; M

Remarks of Jack Niemi to LMVD, Apr. 14, 1975 (MVS Archives).

Dave Busse receives Chief of Engineers Desi

Environmental Award
117

of dredges required. The team also introduced the use of global positi

tem-based channel sweeps to more accurately determine where dredgi

required.101

By 1991, under incoming Commander Col. James Craig, the tea

evolved into what he termed Integrated River Engineering or later Int

River Management (IRM), an interdisciplinary steering committee und

liam Sutton to improve operations and reduce costs for managing th

Craig would note soon after its formation:

In the past, the attitude has been you have “x” dollars to dredge 

the river and you use that money dredging the river until the 

money is gone. Well, that is not necessarily the smart way to 

do it. There’s a lot of energy out in the river just with the water 

moving along, and we ought to tap into that to help us dredge 

the river, keep that navigation channel open.102

The team would review issues such as dredging or fl ood forecasts 

as work with outside agencies such as the Soil Conservation Service to a

siltation or Fish and Wildlife Service to look at environmental issues. A

operating as a team caused some tensions. In 1993, for example, th

reviewed the low-water reference plane to reduce dredging requiremen

district had established a low-water reference plane (LWRP) of -5.0 

the St. Louis gage (equivalent to 40,000 cubic feet per second or cfs) i

The district periodically updated the LWRP, for example to 54,000 cfs 

to account for upstream reservoirs. The most recent review had been i

which continued to maintain the -3.5 LWRP. For dredging, however, t

trict followed the mean low-water depth established by the Rivers and H

Act of 1915 of 15 consecutive low-water days in a year, which was equ

to -5.0 feet St. Louis gage or a nine-foot channel at a design fl ow of 40,0

The dispute between dredging and engineering depth proponents wen

as a legal review of the issue by the district Offi ce of Counsel, with the d

authorities under which the district operated indicating that the distr

discretion under the authority of the Chief of Engineers to adjust dep

admit of such increase ... as may be necessary to allow of the free movem

101 Daly and Zoeller, Interview with Michael Dace, May 25, 2010; Interview with Dave Busse, M

July 26, 2010; Ruddy, Interview with Col. James Corbin, Jan. 4 and Nov. 3, 1989, Dec. 14, 19

Archives).

102 Ruddy, Interview with Col. James Craig, Nov. 20, 1991 (MVS Archives).
118

opened the district to reduce dredging in locations where it was not justifi 

although in practical application total dredging remained near or above 

million cubic feet per year.103

The increased cost of federal projects also presented problems to local co

munities as sponsors struggled to raise necessary cost-share funds. The m

prominent project facing such challenges was the construction of new wo

to protect the St. Louis harbor. Despite improvements made throughout 

nineteenth century, the St. Louis harbor continued to face navigation proble

during low water. Congress had authorized additional study of the prob

in 1964 and 1971. Based on a feasibility study completed in 1982, Congr

approved the project in the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. H

ever, a model study conducted at the Waterways Experiment Station on 

L-dike in March 1986 recommended its replacement with a Prototype Ri

Access Improvement Structure (PRAIS), essentially an outer wall for the do

that would divert the current and scour sediment. The Municipal Dock w

favorable to the PRAIS project, but the Tri-City Regional Port near the Ch

of Rocks wanted a smaller (1,800-foot) harbor to be built fi rst with comp

tion of the project 10 years later to reduce maintenance costs. 1991 costs 

the project were $12 million federal and $23 million nonfederal. When a va

engineering study in 1987 suggested using coffer dams would save $200,0

the district completed a letter report revising the benefi t-cost analysis. A

103 Ibid.; Memo, District Counsel to CELMS-PM-M (Sutton), Legal Opinion on the Mississippi River N

gation Project Dimensions, May 28, 1993 (MVS Archives).

Col. James D. Craig Col. Thomas C. Suermann Col. James E. Corbin
119

result, the Chief of Engineers requested a General Evaluation Report. T

trict started work on this in 1996. In 1998, the Tri-City Regional Port req

modifi cation of the project to change the harbor location and size to 

dependence on the dam. By this time, the cost of the project had incre

more than $30 million nonfederal, and in 2001 the St. Louis Municip

stated it could no longer support the PRAIS. Because of the smaller b

cost ratio and safety concerns for the Tri-City Port plan, the district 

recommend it, more or less ending work on both projects.104

Environmental issues also touched another major area of concern 

district – renewal of aging infrastructure. One challenge faced by the 

after 1970 was that most structures built prior to World War II were 

ing the end of their 40 or 50-year design lifecycle, such as Lock and Da

24-27 in the St. Louis District. In addition to structural issues, the inc

size of tows and smaller capacity of older locks increased the wait time re

for locking through these facilities. In the Flood Control Act of 1970, Co

approved an operational study of existing navigational facilities. Fro

to 1988, the Corps or its contractors developed various studies on oper

improvements, small craft locks, year-round navigation, mooring, hydro

and lock capacity. These generally confi rmed that an average 15-bar

typically 1,200 feet in length, had to lock through 600-foot locks in two 

causing a delay of up to two hours on all Upper Mississippi locks oth

No. 26 and No. 19, which had 1,200-foot locks. The Corps had been re

ing mitigation plans for the locks since it fi rst developed environmental 

statements, and environmental proponents sought to tie mitigation 

104 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1991-2005; USACE, General Reevaluation Report

Harbor Missouri and Illinois Project (St. Louis: MVS, 2004).

Col. Thomas J. Hodgini Col. Michael R. Morrow Col. Kevin C. William
120

the need for upgrading the facilities and proceeded to a reconnaissance stu

Rather than treating the locks separately as it had in the past, the North C

tral Division combined the studies of all locks so as to better understand 

impact of the entire system, a novel but complex approach. After complet

the reconnaissance study in 1991, the Corps combined the Upper Mississi

River Navigation System with a similar study of the Illinois River in 1991 

the feasibility study. The St. Louis District was deeply involved in this effor

The feasibility study proceeded in 1993, but by 1998 encountered seve

delays. It was taking longer than expected to develop the engineering, e

nomic, and environmental data for requirements identifi ed during public me

ings. In particular, the complex economic models used to project lock us

over 50 years proved very diffi cult. With the study running behind sched

Col. James V. Mudd of the Rock Island District, which led the project, pr

sured the team to complete the study. In early 2000, St. Louis District eco

mist Donald C. Sweeney submitted an affi davit through the Offi ce of Spe

Counsel charging that the Corps had falsely developed economic data to 

approval of the project. This resulted in an Inspector General investigati

105 USACE, Integrated Final Feasibility Report and Programmatic Environmental Impact Statemen

the UMR-IWW System Navigation Feasibility Study (N.P.: MVD, 2004): 1-19.

Chevrons near side channel
121

congressional hearings, and an independent review of the study 

National Research Council. Although the Offi ce of Special Counsel fou

charges had merit, leading to reprimand of several persons, and Sween

widely lauded as a whistleblower, especially in the environmental comm

ultimately there were no charges of fraud, and incoming Chief of En

Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers maintained that the impression of impropriet

as a result of trying to complete the study on time. “We had workers, Dr

ney among them, who were trying to do the right thing,” Flowers wou

state. In the end, the 2001 National Research Council report, while ac

edging the diffi culties of predicting economic activity, found that the ec

model developed by Sweeney was untenable. “It was this emerging rea

that caused much of the tension between the parties involved in the 

tions,” Flowers testifi ed before Congress, and he later noted that “if th

the time they did their investigation on the whistleblower allegation, 

have had the National Academy of Sciences report, it might have been a 

ent outcome.” The National Research Council recommended improvem

the economic model, greater consideration of nonstructural approach

better integration of environmental factors.106

106 Sweeney quotes from Matt Sorrell, “Flowers Talks on Waterways Issues,” Esprit (Apr. 2002

“US Army Corps Responds to Navigation Study Critics,” Wed. Feb. 28, 2001 (http://www.m

army.mil/PublicAffairs Offi ce/InternetNews/TopStory/CorpsResponds.htm, June 29, 201

Inland Navigation System Planning: The Upper Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway (Wa

National Academy Press, 2001): 61-87; “Affidavit of Donald C. Sweeney” (http://www.mvr.us

mil/PublicAffairsOffi ce/NavStudy/SweeneyAffi davit.htm, June 29, 2011); Kellie Lunney, “Ar

employee receives whistleblower award,” Government Executive, Mar. 7, 2001 (http://www.gov

dailyfed/0301/030701m1.htm, June 29, 2011).

Shallow pool on Kaskaskia River
122

ranging from no action to a combination of new locks, lock extensions, moor

and switchboat facilities, and increased fees with fi ve different ecological al

natives to include structural changes, pool management, channel restorati

fi sh passages, and island building. In the end, it recommended a dual-purp

integrated plan encompassing minor structural improvements, nonstructu

improvements, and lock extensions on locks 20 to 25 for $2.4 billion an

long-term intermediate ecological plan to include habitat creation, water le

management, fi sh passages, and fl oodplain restoration for $5.3 billion. The f

eral government would pay for all of the design and engineering and 65 perc

of construction. Congress approved the overall plan in the Water Resour

Development Act of 2007 and scheduled General Investigation funds start

in 2005 for Preconstruction Engineering and Design. As of 2010, the Corps 

spent more than $61 million on designing 30 site-specifi c ecological and sm

scale navigation projects. It had prepared more than $57 million in shov

ready construction projects, but as of 2011 none of the projects had procee

while waiting on fi nal decision on local funding.107

At the same time, the St. Louis District did proceed with major rehabil

tion of locks 24, 25, and 27. The district submitted rehabilitation reports on 

and 25 by 1992, and planning started on the projects after receiving fundin

1994. Starting in 2001, the district closed Lock No. 24 over the winter for th

years to repair piers and concrete walls and replace gates, valves, and electr

equipment for $35 million. During the fi rst year, the district replaced the au

iary gates, the second year it dewatered the lock for the fi rst time in a decad

replace the machinery and culvert valves, and in the third year it dewatered 

lock again to break up and carefully remove deteriorated concrete and repl

with precasted concrete panels. Spotters would shut down operations if 

endangered bald eagles came within 500 feet of the lock. It also allowed 

opportunity to remove the zebra mussel from the walls, an invasive spe

harmful to lock operation. The district completed repairs to lock 25 by 2002 

$24 million, including a new control computer, miter gates, pedestrian brid

and gate operating equipment and motor. In 2007, the district shut down L

No. 27 for two 55-day periods over 16 weeks to refurbish lift-gate machin

and counter weights, install new computer controls, and repair concrete 

107 UMR-IWW System Navigation Feasibility Study, pp. i-xv; Project Fact Sheet, Upper Mississippi R

System Navigation and Ecosystem Sustainability Program, Jan. 1, 2011 (http://www2.mvr.usace.a

mil/projects/ dsp_ factsheet.cfm?ProjID=F5C2680A-9D38-8690-BF35D7AB9AA74F7C, June 29, 201
123

Chute on Kaskaskia

Kaskaskia Lock and Dam
124

operational at a time.108

Evolving Navigation Technology

Even as the St. Louis District struggled to balance environmental requ

ments with spiraling project and maintenance costs, it worked to incorpor

new technologies that helped reduce the environmental footprint and main

nance costs of many projects. Although the district had been leasing an I

650 mostly for administrative purposes since 1949, its fi rst application o

computer to an engineering project came in the late 1950s on the St. Lo

fl oodwall project. Afterwards, it used computers for a variety of projects. In

vations such as the use of channel sweeps, global positioning systems, and 

Internet to automatically upload data saved considerable funds on dredg

Over several years, the district adopted or developed numerous other te

nologies that aided navigation on the Mississippi or other rivers. For exam

the addition of mooring buoys south of Lock and Dam No. 27 in 1991 allow

108 “St. Louis District’s Lock 24 Gets a Renewed Lease on Life,” Esprit (Feb. 2003): 1-6; “Lock and Dam 

deteriorated concrete walls get a facelift,” Esprit (Jan. 2004): 1-4; “Lock 27 Machinery Rehabilitation N

Completion,” Esprit (Feb. 2006): 1-5; USACE, “Lock and Dam No. 25 Major Rehabilitation, Missis

River, Illinois and Missouri: Closeout Report” (St. Louis: MVS, 2004).

L-Dike north of St. Louis
125

damage to the shore or mooring to and damaging trees, as was often th

While the district developed technologies such as notched and step-up 

notched closure structures, and off-bankline revetment primarily to 

environmental goals, it developed several others that had dual purposes

point structures were short rock dikes that extended into the side chann

the riverbank. When the fl ow encountered a hard point, it directed t

downward into the riverbed, creating scour holes beneath the structur

deepened the channel. The construction after 2005 of chevron dikes – 

shoe-shaped rock dikes in the middle of the river bordering the main c

with the ends downstream – redirected fl ow and aided in scouring the ch

This reduced the more than $925,000 per year dredging requiremen

St. Louis. The district implemented three chevron dikes near St. Louis 

to scour the channel, which promised to greatly reduce or possibly eli

dredging. It promised to pay for itself within six years. “This is river en

ing at its best,” Leonard Hopkins, the chevron dike project manager, sa

Two major innovations developed in St. Louis were riparian corrid

bendway weirs. St. Louis District engineer Jerry Rapp developed the c

109 Dobney, pp. 129, 134; “River industry’s prototype mooring buoy,” Esprit (April 1998): 1, 

Dooley, “Arches in the river aid navigation, save money and support the environment,” Esprit (O

7, 12; “River Engineering,” Web page (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/arec/basics.html, June 30, 201

Closure structure
126

to a potential cutoff at Dry Bay

Thompson’s Bend. This narrow l

just south of Cape Girardeau 

been experiencing severe eros

that risked cutting a new chan

and impacting navigation for seve

years. The district assigned Rapp 

solve the problem in 1986. After try

stone revetment and various ot

solutions and facing setbacks a

the 1993 and 1995 fl oods, Rapp 

others developed the concept of a t

screen or riparian corridor – a bu

strip of fast-growing, water-resist

hardwoods planted between the 

erbank and the fl ood plain to prev

erosion. They worked through 

Real Estate Offi ce with landown

associations to strategically plant 

harvest cottonwood and other tr

making the concept at once navi

tionally benefi cial, environment

friendly, and fi nancially lucrative, 

concept earned numerous conser

tion awards.110

One of the most important 

highly acclaimed innovations t

the district introduced was bendw

weirs. These were submerged r

structures that extended upstre

at a 30 degree angle from the outs

bank of a river bend that widened 

channel by taking the spiraling 

secondary fl ows from the outside 

110 Terrie Hatfi eld, “DE Visits Thompson Bend Riparian Corridor Project,” Esprit (Apr. 2000): 1, 8-10

Construction of chevron dikes

Thompson Bend riparian corridor

Tow navigating river bend

Bendway wier
127

redistributed fl ow greatly reduced sediment accumulation and widen

river to create a safer and more navigable channel, revolutionizing the w

engineers address the problem of river bends. River bends had long b

most troublesome and treacherous stretches of the river. One problem 

because the Mississippi’s meandering tendencies, which eroded the b

bends, threatening the existing channel. The usual method of counteri

problem was to revet the outer riverbank, but this tended to redirect t

er’s energy away from the bank and into the riverbed, scouring an exce

deep channel. Another problem was that sediment accumulated on the 

of the bend, causing channel narrowing and point bars to develop. The

and narrow channels produced spiraling currents that forced tows to n

the channel using a fl anking movement by moving sideways while e

the bend. The maneuver was extremely complex and diffi cult, and not a

could perform it successfully. On average, these treacherous bends 

20 groundings each year between St. Louis and Cairo, Illinois. These g

ings, combined with the slow movement around bends, caused bottlene

traffi c delays that cost the navigation industry between $13 and $26 

annually. The Corps spent more than $5 million annually dredging b

the region to keep them from narrowing. For more than a century thes

lems plagued river engineers until the development of bendway weirs.1

The district river engineers began developing the weirs in the late 

To better understand the river mechanics at river bends, the district w

with the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station (WES) in 

burg, Mississippi, to develop physical models of two particularly troub

bendways, Dogtooth Bend and Prices Bend. After testing and evalu

number of different structures, engineers concluded that a never befo

structure called a bendway weir was the best solution. However, thes

only model tests, and engineers still needed to test the new structures 

river itself. The district began constructing the fi rst bendway weir on th

in June 1989, and by December 1990, it had completed a fi eld of 13 be

weirs at Dogtooth Bend. The fi eld cost only around $1 million and yet 

111 USACE, “Bendway Weirs,” brochure (St. Louis: MVS, 1993); “District receives Presidenti

Award,” Esprit (June 1994): 3; Daly and Zoeller interview with Busse; USACE, Bendway Weirs o

sissippi River (St. Louis: MVS, 1992): 15-50. The district submitted the latter to ASCE as a nomi

the Outstanding Civil Engineering Achievement Program. For a detailed discussion of engineering 

in bendway weirs, see Robert Davinroy, “Bendway Weirs: A New Structural Solution to Navigation 

Experienced on the Mississippi River,” PIANC Bulletin, No. 69 (1990). While WES claims credit fo

bendway weir design, the district developed the initial concept; see Interview with Busse.
128

immediately the weirs began widening the channel. Within two months of 

project’s completion, Dogtooth Bend, which had been a challenge to engine

and the navigation industry for more than a century, was widened by more th

200 feet. The widened channel’s current slowed suffi ciently enough that to

could now navigate the formerly treacherous bend with relative ease. The w

improved navigation so much that within just fi ve months of the construct

of the fi rst weir fi eld, tows could navigate Dogtooth Bend without using fl a

ing maneuvers. There was a dramatic decrease in accidents and delay time

river bends, saving shippers millions annually. Moreover, the weirs elimina

the need for costly dredging in these areas. By 1998, the district installed 

weirs on 16 bends, including Price, Cape Rock, and Red Rock. There were 

individual weirs on this stretch of the river alone. In recognition for this in

vation, the district and its personnel received numerous awards, including 

Presidential Award for Design Excellence, the American Society of Civil En

neers Award of Merit, the Permanent International Association of Navigat

Congresses Gustave Willems Award, and the Chief of Engineers Design 

Environmental Awards Program’s Award of Excellence.112

112 “Arches in the river aid navigation”; “River Engineering,” Web page; “Bendway Weirs,” broch

USACE, Bendway Weirs Design Manual (St. Louis: MVS, 1990); Bendway Weirs on the Mississippi R

pp. 38-49; “More recognition for bendway weir project,” Esprit (Dec. 1991): 4

Aerial of riverbend
129

The development and use of 

several of these innovations came 

as a result of micro-modeling — or 

Hydraulic Sediment Response modeling — conducted at the St. Louis 

District in the Applied River Engineering Center. Physical hydraulic 

models are scale replicas of water 

channels based on Isaac Newton’s 

principle of similitude – that liquids 

will behave in a similar manner at 

different scales. First developed by 

hydraulic engineers at universities 

and laboratories in the late nineteenth century, physical models 

became a popular method of testing hydraulic structures prior to 

construction. A movable bed model 

includes sedimentation processes 

using materials imitating real sediment. In 1993, Rob Davinroy of the district Potamology Section te

hypothesis that a small-scale model of a section of the Mississippi was a

rate as larger models. District engineers were intrigued, so Davinroy en

master’s degree program at the University of Missouri-Rolla to test his h

esis. He chose to test a 20-mile section of the Mississippi that include

tooth Bend. Engineers at WES constructed a large-scale model of this 

of the river to serve as the prototype for the smaller model. This “micro-

had a scale of approximately 1:15,000 horizontal and 1:1,200 vertical

the size of a tabletop. After constructing, calibrating, and analyzing the 

model, Davinroy concluded that “the micro model overall displayed 

bed confi gurations as compared to both the larger WES model and the 

sippi River hydrographic surveys.” Not only did results reveal that micr

eling was a viable solution for analyzing and predicting sediment fl ow, 

do it for a fraction of the cost and time required for large-scale mod

Applied River Engineering Center

HSR (Micro) Model
130

as opposed to the years it sometimes took to obtain results from fi eld exp

ments. The overall impact of micro-models revolutionized river engineerin

To implement the concept, the district established the Applied River En

neering Center. The center opened in 1994, and river engineers immedia

went to work refi ning micro-modeling and applying it to the river’s most co

plex problems, such as sediment transport. One reason why scientists and en

neers had been skeptical of using small-scale models in the past was that 

technology needed to calibrate and measure them simply did not exist. H

ever, advances in technology allowed engineers to improve micro-modeling 

employing advances such as laser technology and electronic automation. 

create accurate models, engineers at the center teamed with the district’s G

spatial Engineering Branch to collect data on the existing physical condition 

the river. Engineers used bathymetric surveys, side scan sonar, vessel moun

LIDAR, and water velocity vector surveys to collect critical data that allow

them to accurately evaluate the existing physical conditions of the river. T

then used the accumulated data to create a bathymetric survey, similar t

topographic map of the riverbed. Next, they combined this survey with d

113 “Davinroy gets patent,” Esprit (Feb. 1998): 1, 4; Davinroy, Physical Sediment Modeling of the M

sippi River on a Micro Scale (Master’s thesis, University of Missouri-Rolla, 1994): 49-90, 136-137; US

“Micro Modeling,” Applied River Engineering Center brochure (St. Louis: MVS, 2000).

Macro Model at the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC)
131

ing the model, engineers used the data from the actual river and com

it to the model to ensure that it was an accurate replication. They did 

scanning the model using laser technology, which collected fl ow data a

ated a bathymetric survey of the model’s riverbed. Lastly, engineers com

the data to determine if there was any need for further calibration. On

brated, they used computers to control the simulation of fl ow and se

loads. With an accurate simulation in place, they used their knowled

intuition gained from years of studying and observing the river to imp

and test structural modifi cations to the river. They then collected data fr

experiments and used this to make a qualitative assessment about the 

of a proposed design alternative.114

The numerous successful projects and various awards associate

micro-modeling exemplify how revolutionary the technology was. B

1980 and 1995 more than 40 barge accidents occurred on a specifi c str

the Mississippi near Locks and Dam No. 24 because of dangerous crossc

that caused barges to become misaligned and break apart. Engineers kn

cause of the current, but there was no practical method for them to det

a permanent solution. Micro-modeling allowed engineers to study mo

114 “Micro Modeling,” brochure; “Davinroy gets patent”; “Applied River Engineering Center,” W

(www.mvs.usace.army.mil/eng-con/expertise/arec and www.mvs.usace.army.mil/arec/river

ing_data.html, May 26, 2010). For a more detailed discussion of the process of collecting data fo

brating micro models, see Davinroy, “River Replication.” 

Bathymetric image of a section of a river
132

engineers found the best solution – four underwater weirs 

– they implemented it, and this 

section of the river was soon 

safe to navigate without harm 

to the environment. This technology also allowed the district 

to test structures to ensure that 

the natural energy of the river 

did the work of moving sediment out of the main channel. 

In an important commercial 

section of the river located 

45 miles upstream of St. Louis, sedimentation was a chronic problem. T

region, known as Bolter’s Bar, often required dredging twice a year. Howev

the center was able to fi nd a solution that eliminated the need for dredg

and saved the Corps millions of dollars. The center solved numerous ot

potamological questions such as soil and sediment deposition and develop

plans for bendway weirs, chevron dikes, or other structures at locations such 

Marquette Island, Santa Fe and Picayune chutes, and the Southeast Misso

Port. In recognition of micro-modeling, the district and its employees recei

numerous awards and honors, including the Chief of Engineers Design 

Environmental Program Award. In 1997, the U.S. Patent Offi ce granted 

district a patent on micro modeling.115

In the meantime, the navigation mission of the St. Louis District con

ued to affect the shipping industry in St. Louis. The port of St. Louis, wh

Primm called “gateway to the world,” was in 1980 the largest port in the nat

by area, with facilities ranging 70 miles from St. Charles, Missouri, to K

kaskia, Illinois. Although other ports led by volume, and the Port of Southw

Louisiana surpassed it in size, the port nevertheless remained critical for 

region, directly employing more than 21,000 workers and affecting the job

115 Environmental River Engineering; Davinroy, “Managing sedimentation using micro modeling,” E

(Sept. 1996): 7-8; Davinroy, “River Replication”; David Gordon, “A Remedy for the Chronic Dredging P

lem,” Engineer: Professional Bulletin for the Army Corps of Engineers (Oct.-Dec. 2004); “Micro Mod

Wins Honor Award,” Esprit (Mar. 2001). “Applied River Engineering Center,” brochure (St. Louis: M

1997); Claude Strauser, “Davinroy gets patent”; Strauser, “Environmental River Engineering,” Esprit (

1996):6; “Strauser named Civilian of the Year,” Esprit (Sept. 1997): 4.

Davinroy receives 1994 Presidential Design Awa

from President Clinton
133

low-sulphur coal from Wyoming. Its 86 docks transported more than 

lion tons per year. This despite the general decline in population and in

for while outlying towns and the county grew somewhat, St. Louis, with i

borders, declined in population to less than 550,000 by 1980, twenty-fo

the nation. This decline has continued to present day, with the 2010 

showing St. Louis with only a population of 319,000 with St. Louis 

declining somewhat to 998,000. Manufacturing also declined, althoug

was growth in specifi c industries such as transportation equipment, fab

metals, aerospace, and chemical products. Even with such decline, 30 c

nies with annual sales more than $100 million were headquartered in S

in 1980 and 24 of the top 25 companies in the U.S. had operations in t

and many of them relied on or used port facilities. Thus, as the city dw

navigation became even more important, not just for the city but for the 

region. Yet, at the same time, fl ood control grew increasingly import

protecting these industrial assets.116

116 Primm, pp. 472-518; Press Release, “U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Missouri’s 2010 Census P

Totals, Including First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for Legislative Redistricting,” Feb

(http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn49.html, May 31, 2011).

Santa Fe Chute
134

Part III.

Where the Rivers Run:

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

and Flood Control

St. Louis is situated near the confl uence of the Missouri and Mississi

rivers. Separately, these two form the thirteenth and fourteenth longest riv

in the world, the fi rst and second longest in the United States. Together, t

form the longest system in the world. By volume, the Mississippi and Misso

are among the fi ve largest rivers in the United States. The state of Missour

itself a great junction of the rivers of the U.S. heartland. The Mississippi Ri

forms its eastern border. The Arkansas, White, Black, and St. Francis bas

drain most of its south. The Osage drains the central and western end of 

state. The Missouri forms part of the western border and, with the Grand 

Chariton, drain much of the north and west. Further, the Kansas, Platte, 

Moines, and Ohio rivers border Missouri. It is no wonder that Missouri o

adopted as its motto, “Where the Rivers Run.” As these rivers sometimes r

Missouri has often suffered from severe fl ooding from numerous locations. 

most of the nineteenth century, the federal government considered fl ood c

trol as mostly a local issue, and the state worked to minimize fl ooding, prim

ily through the use of levees. With several fl oods after 1850, the governm

established the Mississippi River Commission in 1879 to help plan fl ood c

trol, and in 1917 started funding fl ood control works. After the Great Flood

1927 and 1936, the federal government assumed responsibility for large fl 

control programs, particularly on the Lower Mississippi River. Today, 

Corps of Engineers is responsible for various fl ood control programs includ

works to minimize fl ooding on the Mississippi and other river basins, ur

fl ood planning, and fl ood and hurricane response.

Aerial view of the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers during the 1993 Flood
135

 8 

Federalization of Flood Control

Since before the founding of St. Louis, the Middle Mississippi Rive

periodic fl oods and drainage problems. The Corps of Engineers ha

deeply involved in navigational improvements to rivers and harbor

1824, but until the twentieth century it supported fl ood control onl

rectly. Because the Supreme Court ruled in Gibbons vs. Ogden that Co

could regulate navigation under the commerce clause of the Constitut

most of the nineteenth century a majority in Congress believed that 

tional improvements were constitutional but that fl ood control was ess

a local matter. After 1850, Congress provided some funding for fl ood 

indirectly to local organizations, periodically paid for surveys that mad

control recommendations, and empowered the Mississippi River Comm

to provide guidance and support building dual-purpose levees, but it w

until 1917 that it specifi cally authorized direct funding of works for fl oo

trol. As a result, fl ood control was mostly a state and local responsibi

most of the early history of St. Louis. With the growth of large, multi-sta

control programs, it became increasingly clear that local authorities lac

resources and authority to complete works necessary for the protection 

communities, requiring greater and greater response from the federal g

ment. As the preeminent authority over engineering on rivers that fl oo

fell to the Corps to propose solutions for fl ood control problems.

The Middle Mississippi, as with the rest of the river, experienced 

high waters and was prone to bank overfl ow every two to three years. S

these fl oods were very severe. The fi rst recorded fl ood of any size near S

was in 1724. Prior to U.S. control of Missouri, the largest fl ood was “L’a

grandes eaux” (Year of Great Water) in 1785, which reached what wo

40.7 feet on the St. Louis gage according to later estimates. The larges

on record in the nineteenth century was in 1844, which reached 41.4 

St. Louis and extended from St. Charles, Missouri, to Thebes, Illinois. A

ing to one account, waters were so deep in St. Louis that the steamboat 

ner moored in front of a store on Front Street, and most of Kaskaskia, I

was under 20 feet of water. Other disastrous fl oods included 1851, 185

1892, which all reached more than 36 feet in St. Louis, although the 
136

St. Louis sat mostly on a limestone bluff, the impact area was usually limite

those regions adjacent to the river or extended low ground south of the Ch

of Rocks, north of Arsenal Street, and north of River des Peres. On the e

bank, the American Bottoms was particularly fl ood-prone. Running south 

the Illinois Bluffs, the region was a stretch of alluvial valley running nea

10 miles wide, with numerous lakes and rivers and some of the most fertile l

in the region. It encompassed most of Madison, Monroe, and St. Clair coun

from Alton to Chester, Illinois, including notably the towns of East St. Lo

Cahokia, Brooklyn, Venice, Madison, and Granite City. As both of these ar

grew in population – by 1900 St. Louis had a population over 550,000 and 

American Bottoms more than 50,000 – fl oods had become more and m

costly as they impacted more industry and homes.117

The Earliest Levees

The earliest and most common way of protecting against fl oods was c

struction of levees. As early as 1823, St. Louis started improvement of its wh

through the construction of levees to protect the bank from annual rises, 

the city extended and partially paved these in 1845 and 1854. They were, h

ever, of limited scope and size, being no more than a few miles in length. Ot

than railroad embankments built after 1850 and a few private levees of une

quality and height, there were few levees on the Middle Mississippi, and n

built by the government, until after the Civil War. In 1850, Congress passed 

Swamp Land Act, which authorized the sale of federally owned swamp land 

12 states to pay for levees or reclamation efforts, in essence providing indir

federal payment for local fl ood control. Illinois received more than 1.5 mill

acres, and Missouri received more than 3.3 million through the act, mos

which was prairie wetlands. It took a decade or more to identify the land, t

it over to the counties for sale, and then arrange for its transfer, with railro

being the leading purchasers. Little of this land bordered the Mississippi Riv

so most funds were used in the interior of both states. The earliest state 

authorizing assistance to local levee districts on the Mississippi River did 

come until 1879 in Illinois, and within three years there were low levees un

117 U.S. Cong., Harbor and Approaches to St. Louis, H.D. 772 (59th Cong., 1st Sess.): 9-11; Clarence J. R

“Draining the American Bottoms,” Monthly Weather Review (May 1911): 698; Primm, p. 418; Dobney

30-32.
137

adjacent communities had raised about a 50-mile stretch of levees to a 

36 feet, high enough to resist the Flood of 1892.118

These were exclusively state and local levees. The primary federa

tance provided during this period was advice on plans and constructio

dards. In 1850, Congress authorized the fi rst major hydrographical 

of the Mississippi River, which the War Department split into two s

The fi rst, completed by French-educated civilian engineer Charles El

in 1852, was concise, contained limited data, and recommended a co

tion of levees, outlets, and reservoirs to protect the Mississippi Valle

destructive fl oods. He was, Dobney noted, “ahead of his time—too far a

turned out, to be taken seriously,” though he spurred considerable disc

and Congress later adopted a plan containing many of his suggestions. 

an extended illness suffered by lead researcher Capt. Andrew A. Hum

the second study was not complete until 1861. Authored by Humphre

Lt. Henry L. Abbot, the Mississippi Delta Survey provided the detail tha

study lacked and was one of the most infl uential documents ever produ

the Corps. After extensive analysis of the river and comparison of m

Humphreys and Abbot recommended the use of levees and maintenanc

existing bed and outlets below Cape Girardeau, Missouri, as the best m

to prevent destructive fl oods. A second study by Humphreys after the Ci

and another by a board headed by Col. Gouverneur K. Warren in 1874 m

less echoed the fi ndings of the Delta Survey that the best way to prot

valley was through a developed levee system. All of these studies stres

need for the federal government to help fund and oversee implementa

their plans. Finally, in 1879, Congress created the Mississippi River Co

sion to both improve navigation and reduce fl ood damages on the riv

commission established its headquarters in St. Louis.119

Although Congress gave the Mississippi River Commission authori

the entire river, because of funding limitations and congressional str

on using funds for fl ood control, the commission fi rst focused prima

118 Primm, pp. 122-123, 160-175, 281-282; U.S. Cong., Mississippi River from Cape Girardea

Rock Island, Ill., H.D. 628 (63rd Cong., 2nd Sess.): 10-11, 19-21; Gary R. Dyhouse, “Chronology 

Construction on the Middle Mississippi River,” Dec. 2009 (MVS Archives); Margaret B. Bogue, “Th

Land Act and Wet Land Utilization in Illinois, 1850-1890,” Agricultural History 25:4 (Oct. 1951): 

119 Camillo and Pearcy, pp. xiv-35; Reports in Reference to Inundations of the Mississippi Rive

(32nd Cong., 1st Sess.); Humphreys and Abbot, Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the M

River (Delta Survey) (Wash., D.C.: GPO, 1876): 445-450; Report of Sec. of War, 1875, H.D. 1, P

Cong., 1st Sess.): 536-565; Dobney, pp. 77-78, quote on 78.
138

1884 to 1886, the St. Louis District was not part of the commission, althoug

was under its oversight and several district engineers also served as memb

including Maj. Thomas Handbury, Col. William F. Bixby, and Col. Curtis 

Townsend. At fi rst, there was much disagreement about the proper method

improvement. All agreed that jetties and bank protection would improve l

water navigation as they had in St. Louis, but civilian engineer James B. E

also argued that levees would help contract the river during high water 

scour the bottom, especially if the commission closed all outlets. Col. Cyru

Comstock disagreed that levees had any impact on low-water navigation 

believed in closing outlets only when it aided navigation by reducing d

gerous currents or increasing scour of the riverbed. In 1882, the comm

sion adopted a compromise position that acknowledged that levees could 

jetties in contraction but that did not recommend closure of all outlets, 

soon afterwards Eads left the commission. Because of fi nancial constrai

the commission accomplished little with fl ood control other than establish

levee standards, experimenting with methods, and providing support to lo

levee and drainage districts, which conducted most of the work on levees. O

time, recommendations of the commission supporting levee construction c

vinced Congress to support levee construction for navigation improvement

that levees became the only politically acceptable solution for both navigat

and fl ood control proponents.120

By the turn of the century, the commission had overseen construction 

an extensive levee system throughout much of the valley reaching up to 60 

70 feet high. North of Cairo, the levees, being locally or privately built, were 

of uneven heights and quality. This started to change only after the Flood 

1903, the second worst fl ood on record to date and the fi rst since rapid grow

in population. This fl ood exceeded 38 feet on the St. Louis gage (eight 

above fl ood stage), overtopped the Illinois levees, and devastated the lowla

near St. Louis and the American Bottoms as it extended more than 10 m

from bluff to bluff. It lasted from June 5 until June 19 at St. Louis, rising 

feet per day until it peaked on June 11. Venice, Granite City, and Madison s

cumbed almost immediately to three breaches in the Madison County lev

Seventeen drowned and 70 percent of low-lying areas on the east bank w

inundated – more than 320,000 acres – ruining wheat, potato, and corn cro

120 Camillo and Pearcy, pp. 37-95; Dobney, pp. 78-79.
139

levees at Chouteau Island to relieve the Cross levee protecting East St

The city initially held on by inches, but the levee breached a few day

fl ooding half the town and killing another two. About 25,000 were hom

several hundred took refuge in St. Louis, which, other than the riverside 

was mostly above water. By June 7, high water blocked traffi c across th

Bridge, and railroads were unable to run, causing many to turn to stea

to transport people and goods across the river. Preliminary damage es

exceeded $15.8 million. Before the fl oodwaters subsided, the St. Loui

Dispatch asked, “How can another fl ood be prevented?” Robert E. M

a former civilian engineer for the district and president of St. Louis 

of Improvements, argued that improvements “should be undertaken 

and with no thought of what the cost may be.” Mississippi River Comm

member and St. Louisan John A. Ockerson was more circumspect, noti

the cost would be high but less than the cost of a fl ood every decade. “I

erly presented to Congress, I have no doubt that government appropr

to pay a considerable part of the best of construction would be forthcom

Because of reports of levees, bridges, and railroad embankments co

ing the river near St. Louis during the fl ood, in 1905 Congress autho

survey of the approaches to St. Louis to prevent fl oods caused by obstr

in the river. The district engineer, Maj. Thomas Casey, took this as i

tion to develop a general fl ood control plan. Authored by assistant en

William S. Mitchell, what became known as the Mitchell report acknow

that the severity of fl ooding was the result of contraction of the riv

St. Louis, which likely raised gage readings by three feet. But rather th

posing removal of obstacles, the report recommended raising levees to 

on the St. Louis gage at federal expense to counter future rises and ext

the levee system along both shores and in the bottoms backcountry. 

the fi rst major recommendation for the federal government to adopt th

fl ood control measures north of Cairo as it had in the lower river in lin

commission standards. While Northwest Division Engineer Col. Wil

Bixby, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, and Chief of En

Brig. Gen. Alexander Mackenzie all endorsed the recommended meas

121 Root, p. 698; “Flood’s Widespread Havoc at St. Louis,” NYT (June 9, 1903); The Flood of 1

cago and Alton Railway, N.D.); “The Great Madison Levee,” Post-Dispatch (Fri., Jun. 5, 1903): A

Dynamited to Relieve Pressure,” Post-Dispatch (Sun., Jun. 7, 1903); “Threatening Break in Northe

Post-Dispatch (Thurs., Jun. 11, 1903); “Flood Damage $16 Million” and “How Can Another Floo

vented” Post-Dispatch (Sun. Jun. 14, 1903): McMath and Ockerson quoted on A1 (MVS Historica
140

Mitchell’s overall plan, stating that as the levees were not for navigation t

should not be a federal responsibility, that the levees could have detrimen

effect on navigation and require extension of levees northward, that the cos

more than $3 million did not include relocation of railways and buildings, 

Cairo fl oodwall at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers during the 1927 fl ood

1927 fl ood at Cape Girardeau
141

of obstacles on the river.122

Although Congress did not adopt the Mitchell plan, it did in 1906 

the jurisdiction of the Mississippi River Commission to Cape Girardeau 

request of the commission to authorize construction of levees to prot

upper end of the St. Francis Basin from Mississippi River fl oods. This 

improvement of levees from Cape Girardeau to Cairo partially at 

expense. Despite the lack of federal fl ood control works for most of the 

north of Cape Girardeau, state and local authorities made signifi cant im

ments in the levee system over the next decade. By 1913, local governme

created more than 52 levee and drainage districts north of Cairo, of wh

were in Illinois and 16 were in Missouri. Eighteen of these were but r

formed and had either not started or were in very early stages of constr

and so had not yet provided protection. The rest had levees under constr

although most of these were of insuffi cient height, being no more than 

high with a crown no more than 14 feet wide. By comparison, most co

sion levees were more than 45 feet on average. A few state levees were 

quality, including the Wood River levee, which reached a height of 32 

122 Harbor and Approaches to St. Louis, pp. 1-20.

St. Louis fl oodwall, 1935 (LOC)
142

Illinois and 34 in Missouri, although these were not contiguous.123

Finally, in 1913 Congress requested a survey by the Mississippi River Co

mission from Cape Girardeau to Rock Island, Illinois, to determine the fl 

control needs of this stretch of river. The report, completed by the foll

ing year, recommended extension of the levee system to protect the mid

valley, relying on local levee districts to conduct most work. In 1916, Congr

extended the jurisdiction of the commission on the Mississippi River to R

Island as well as to some tributaries. The following year, the Flood Control 

of 1917 recognized for the fi rst time that the levees being constructed by 

commission were also for fl ood control and authorized considerable spend

increases on levee construction provided that local interests paid for at le

half of construction costs, provided all rights of way, and paid for maintena

of the levees. As a response to these increases in mission, in 1918 the comm

sion created a Northern District, headquartered in St. Louis, to build lev

north of Cape Girardeau, as well as a Dredging District in Memphis, T

nessee, to dredge throughout its jurisdiction. From that point until 1928, 

Northern Commission District was offi cially responsible for levee construct

north of Cairo, while the St. Louis District continued to be responsible for n

gational improvements such as hurdles and dredging. There continued so

interchange in personnel as there had previously been with the commissi

Although spending levels increased initially to more than $200,000 a year 

1920 for levee construction from the Ohio River to the Missouri River, t

afterwards dropped to a level of roughly $100,000 per year, where they sta

consistently until 1928. The commission planned for and invested in levee

Clear Creek, East Cape, East Side, the Alton-to-Gale reach, and the St. Lou

to-Cape Girardeau reach, among others, but most of the funding and labor 

came from the local levee districts.124

The Flood Control Acts of 1928 and 1936

In 1927, the Mississippi Valley experienced the worst fl ood in its histo

sparking extensive changes to both the Mississippi River Commission and 

123 Mississippi River from Cape Girardeau Rock Island, pp. 4-12; Annual Report of the Chief of Engin

1904-1906; Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology”; Camillo and Pearcy, p. 100. 124 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River from Cape Girardeau to Rock Island, pp. 1-12; Flood Control Act of 

PL65-367 (65th Cong, 1st Sess.); Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1918-1927; Dyhouse, “Levee C

nology”; Camillo and Pearcy, pp. 103-122. 
143

only policy, which many blamed for the disaster. After presentation of n

ous plans, Congress endorsed that of Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. 

Jadwin in the Flood Control Act of 1928. This plan included a controlle

way, three uncontrolled fl oodways, and higher levees, including incre

levee height of up to three feet between Cairo and Cape Girardeau. The 

initiated a series organizational changes in the commission and gave re

bility for directing the plan to the Corps. Since the majority of the new 

was south of Cape Girardeau and work north of that point was nearing c

tion, Jadwin considered the Northern District no longer necessary an

dinated with commission president Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Jackson to t

its employees and equipment to the St. Louis and Rock Island districts, 

which managed fl ood control work north of Cape Girardeau under comm

guidance. The districts south of Cape Girardeau also merged with Cor

tricts, but remained under the authority of Jackson, who served as comm

of the new Lower Mississippi Valley Division. On Jadwin’s order, he also 

ferred the Dredging District to Memphis District. Jackson then subm

new functions statement for the commission making it an advisory bo

the Corps now responsible for all investigations and execution of work

the work of the Mississippi River Commission was then the responsib

the Lower Mississippi Valley Division, whose jurisdiction no longer in

St. Louis, Jadwin started reviewing relocation of the commission to M

or Vicksburg, Mississippi. On October 7, 1929, the new Chief of Enginee

Gen. Lytle Brown, ordered the commission to move its headquarters to 

burg by November 30.125

In the seven years following the passage of the 1928 Flood Contr

most of the fl ood control efforts were focused on raising or repairing 

ing levees, with the commission establishing a standard levee height o

44 feet (St. Louis gage). Devastating fl ooding in the Northeast in 1935 an

once again brought attention to the need improved fl ood control legi

125 Camillo and Pearcy, pp. 141-172; E.J. Thomas, “Flood of 1927” (MRC Tech Files 2-2-23): 1-2; U

Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley, H.D. 90 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.): 23-33; U.S. Cong., Floo

Act of 1928, PL 70-391 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.): Sec. 8; Memo, Jackson to Jadwin, Abolishing t

ern District, Mississippi River Commission, Jul. 7, 1928; Jackson to Jadwin, Field Reorganizatio

1928; Jackson to Jadwin, Functions and Agencies of the Mississippi River Commission, July 27, 19

Archives); Camillo and Pearcy, pp. 170-172. “History against us in fl ood fi ght bill – Col. Potter,” 

Tenn., Commercial Appeal (May 17, 1928) (NARA-KC, RG 77, ENT 521, Box 22); Memo, Lt. Co

Robins to Jackson, Reorganization of Engineer Department at Large, Oct. 7, 1929; Elliott to Maj. 

ruth, Nov. 25, 1929; Maj. AKB Lyman to Secretary of War, Transfers at Government expense, Oct

(MRC Archives).
144

Although the fl oods did not impact the Mississippi Valley, the region benefi 

from the legislation that followed. The Flood Control Act of 1936 was one of 

most sweeping pieces of legislation in the New Deal era. For the fi rst time, C

gress admitted that “fl ood control on navigable waters or their tributaries 

proper activity of the Federal Government” and that “improvement of riv

and other waterways for fl ood control and allied purposes shall be under 

jurisdiction of and shall be prosecuted by the War Department under the dir

tion of the Secretary of War and supervision of the Chief of Engineers.” O

and for all, Congress established fl ood control as a nationwide responsibilit

Near the St. Louis landing during 

Mississippi fl ood

1944 fl ood at Cape Girardeau

View of 1903 fl ood at Eads Bridge
145

not under the direct control of the commission were now under the Corps, making the 

St. Louis District responsible for fl ood control 

within its boundaries. The act also outlined 

more than 270 fl ood control projects, of which 

21 were in the domain of the St. Louis District. 

Among these were projects at Venice, East 

St. Louis, Prairie du Pont, Columbia, Harrisonville, Fort Chartres, Ste. Genevieve, Perry County, Degognia, Preston

Creek, East Cape Girardeau, Wood River, Grand Tower, and North Alex

By 1940, construction was ongoing in more than 10 levee districts. T

these projects were complete by the end of World War II with several 

progressing considerably. With projects added in fl ood control acts pa

the years that followed – particularly the Flood Control Act of 1938 – an

continued repairs, construction on some projects has continued to prese

although most work was complete by the mid-1960s.126

126 Joseph L. Arnold, The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act (Fort Belvoir: CEHO, 1988): 5

Cong., Flood Control Act of 1936, PL 74-738 (74th Cong., 2nd Sess.); Annual Report of the Chie

neers, 1936-1945; Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology”; Dobney, pp. 103-108. Ironically, the record-break

of 1937 hit less than six months later, although the worst of it affected the Ohio River and Lower M

Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1928-1935.

General Jadwin
146

The Flood of 1844

The Flood of 1844 was the largest fl ood by volume experienced by St. Louis u

late into the twentieth century. Although the 1993 Flood holds the record for fl 

height at 49.6 feet and number of consecutive days above fl ood stage at 148, unlike 

of 1844, this was the height confi ned by the levee system.

Although the winter of 1844 was not particularly severe, the spring brought m

rainstorms starting in May. The river was over bank full stages by May 1, but starte

recede on May 3. Over the next two months St. Louis saw 18.11 inches of rain, 10 inc

higher than normal. Other regions up the Missouri River, such as Fort Leavenwo

Kansas, saw more than 20 inches. The river began to rise again on May 10, and a w

later, the Missouri Republican called it “a tremendous fl ood.”

The waters are coming down upon us from every quarter. The Mississippi is now as high as it has been known for many years and is 

still rising. Just above Oak street it was last evening within 6 or 8 feet 

of touching the curbstone. The cellars above the wharf are fi lling with 

water....The whole of the American Bottom, from Alton to Kaskaskia, 

will be, we fear, submerged. The people are deserting their homes in 

Illinois towns.

The fl ood continued to rise until it was at the doors of stores on Front Street no

of Pine, and vendors had to evacuate their goods to the second story. On the Illin

side, the fl ood extended to the Pap house, or two and a half miles. The fl ood starte

recede again on May 23 until it was within its banks again on June 7. But as one Co

report noted, “the fl ood from the Missouri was yet to come.” It began to rise again 

June 8. By June 17, water was six inches higher than it had reached in May, an

reached a peak at St. Louis on June 28 at 41.7 feet on the Market street gage.
147

The water covered all of East St. Louis, with several houses overturned or 

from their foundations. Residents of Cahokia fl ed to the bluffs. It covered th

country from Weston to Glasgow, ruining thousands of acres of farmland, and C

Bottom was six to eight feet underwater. In places, the river ran upwards of 

wide. In St. Louis, the water rose to door hatches on Front and Morgan Street, a

the steamer Lightner to rest her bow on Henry N. Davis’ store. At Pine and Fr

water was midway up on the doors, and lower areas, such as Mill Creek, were c

submerged. Some 500 persons in the city evacuated their homes.

Based on measurements taken by Capt. Thomas J. Cram at the St. Louis A

the fl ood reached 30 feet (fl ood height) on May 17 and remained above fl ood sta

July 18, a total of 63 days. For the week of 24 to 30 June, the water was cons

above 40 feet. Later estimates were that the fl ood fl ow reached 1.3 million cu

per second, with 900,000 cubic feet per second coming from the Missouri. A

later fl oods overturned some of these statistics, and the U.S. Geological Surve

later downgrade the estimated fl ow of the fl ood to one million cfs, for nearly a 

the Corps deemed the Flood of 1844 a 200-year fl ood event used for plannin

protection works.127

127 “Floods of Rivers within or near the St. Louis Missouri Engineer District,” [1942] (MVS Archi

View of St. Louis during 1844 fl ood
148

 9 

Urban Flood Control

By 1950, the St. Louis District had made signifi cant progress in bring

levees up to standard. Projects at Miller Pond, Kaskaskia Island, Seahor

Meredosia Lake, and East Cape Girardeau were mostly complete; work at Cl

Creek, Perry County, Columbia, East St. Louis, and Prairie du Pont were at v

ious stages of construction; and projects at Preston, Fort Chartres, Harris

ville, Grand Tower, and Wood River, delayed by World War II and the fl o

of 1943 and 1944, started soon after 1945. South of Cape Girardeau, Misso

fl ood control was under the authority of the Mississippi River Commissi

which had been busy raising those levees to standard. Although before the w

the district had started to raise levee heights to the 1935 standard, the fl o

of 1943 and 1944 and later the fl oods of 1947 and 1951 demonstrated the n

for additional protection to account for confi nement of fl oodwaters betw

the growing levee walls. The Corps continued to adjust levee standards, wh

repeatedly extended construction on existing levees into the future, yet a n

problem arose – protection of urban areas where the levee system could no

had not yet reached. Beginning after World War II, the Corps started to st

Alton, IL. At the intersection of W. Broadway and State during the 1943 fl ood
149

for St. Louis, Cape Girardeau, and 

Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, and Alton 

and East St. Louis, Illinois, that protected those cities from fl ooding, as it 

had with thousands of acres of farmland since 1917. This was sometimes 

challenging because of the limitations of space, time, and the money 

needed from local government to 

help pay for the works, but the district made great strides to bring pro

to these regions over the next half-century.128

Evolution of Urban Flood Control Standards

In 1935, the St. Louis District had established standard levee heigh

to 44 feet, St. Louis gage, from the Illinois River to the Ohio River. Based 

1903 Flood, this is what the Corps believed provided protection for a 5

fl ood – 38 feet plus up to six feet of freeboard depending on local cond

North of the Illinois River, the Rock Island District had established leve

dards of 12 to 18 feet in 1914, although the Corps recognized the need to 

these standards after completion of the Upper Mississippi lock and 

which had altered high water lines in some locations. By 1940, the St

District had already started to adjust levee standards in urban areas t

changing requirements for protection due to confi nement of fl oods betw

levees. Particularly near East St. Louis and Cairo, Illinois, the Corps b

the large populations of these cities and their industrial importance re

even higher protection. As a result, the district had since 1935 increase

heights two feet higher than the 44-foot standard on the eastern side 

river from East St. Louis to Prairie du Point. Because St. Louis was mo

a protective bluff, it was not initially a concern. In 1940, Upper Miss

Valley Division Engineer Lt. Col. Malcolm Elliott recommended, and 

of Engineers Maj. Gen. John L. Schuley approved, these levee heights 

standard for the East Side. These levees included a one-to-three slope 

water side and one-to-fi ve slope on the land side, depending on the 

128 Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1941-1946.

High water in Cape Girardeau durin

fl ood
150

ing these heights placed areas protected by lower levees at higher risk, Ell

recognized that a confi ned fl ood reaching the 50-year level would breach fi 

in less developed regions, providing greater protection to the cities. His ove

conclusion was that “levees appear to offer the most practicable and econo

cal means of fl ood relief for lands along the main stem,” a sentiment repea

by district engineers over the next three decades.129

The fl oods of 1943 and 1944 were the worst fl oods the district had faced 

a century, exceeding all previous stage records except 1844. Although the 

charge was only 660,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) or roughly 66 percen

the 1844 fl ood, the 1943 Flood reached 38.9 feet at St. Louis because of grea

confi nement of the levees, and it reached even higher in Kaskaskia. Sixt

of 19 levee districts fl ooded despite the improvements in the fl ood con

system. The 1944 Flood was even greater, its 844,000 cfs reaching 39.19 

at St. Louis and fl ooding 15 of 19 districts. As a result, in 1944, the district 

mally increased levee standards to 47 feet (St. Louis) for the East Side to co

a 200-year event equivalent to the Flood of 1844. It conducted a survey of le

heights in light of the revised standards and adjusted completion rates in 

process. As the district completed these levees, confi ned fl oods continued 

threaten the system. The Flood of 1947 came in three crests – April 12 to 

April 26 to May 2, and June 9 to July 13 for a total of 50 days above fl ood sta

Again, despite having a fl ow of only 782,000 cfs, it reached a peak of 40.2 

on July 2 – a foot higher than in 1944 – and fl ooded 10 of 19 districts. Althou

its fl ow was even lower at 772,000 cfs, the Flood of 1951 reached nearly 

same height, cresting at 40.28 feet on July 22. This followed two crests fr

May 6 to 8 and June 29 to July 30, totaling 35 days. Because of improveme

in the system, only three of 19 districts fl ooded, with the largest breache

Degognia, Missouri. As the levees advanced and provided greater protecti

confi ned heights grew despite lower fl ood fl ows. While fl ooding impacted fe

areas as the system neared completion, those areas not protected – prima

urban areas – saw severe damages.130

129 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River between Coon Rapids Dam and Mouth of Ohio River, H.D. 669 (

Cong., 3rd Sess.): 43-58, quote p. 78; Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology.”

130 Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology”; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1941-1951.
151

View north from McArthur Bridge, July 20, 1951

View south on Second from Chouteau, July 19, 1951
152

Congressional concern about still unprotected areas grew rapidly after 

fl oods. One of the fi rst projects the district studied was improvement of C

Girardeau. The district had already started levees across the river in East C

Girardeau and in nearby Perry County and Grand Tower. In 1943, Congr

requested a review of additional fl ood protection for St. John’s Bayou Le

District to the south and also at Cape Girardeau, but the war delayed w

on the survey. The fl oods of 1944 and 1947 impacted the town particula

hard. On May 3, the Flood of 1944 reached 40.70 feet at Cape Girardeau; 

Flood of 1947 reached 41.88 feet on July 6. In both fl oods, about 800 ac

of industrial property along the water front fl ooded. Average annual dama

were $328,000, but these did not include potential damage to three major 

tories subject to 200-year fl ooding, which would have raised this amoun

nearly $3 million. In light of the probable impact area and damage, in 19

the district recommended about 1.5 miles of 49-foot levees (Cape Girard

gage) and fl oodwalls extending from high ground on the north end of town 

Cape La Croix Creek south of the city, relocation of several highways and r

roads and construction of fi ve gates for roads that could not be moved, two n

pump stations, and improvements such as widening and paving sewers 

Cape Girardeau fl oodwall
153

bors, noting that the city is on a bend, believed “a higher degree of pro

is desirable,” and raised levee heights to 51 feet for $5.2 million, $4.7 mi

which the federal government would pay.131

Although Congress authorized the Cape Girardeau project in the 

Control Act of 1950, it took several years to work out cost-sharing agre

for the $5 million project. In 1955, the local levee district provided assu

for Reach 2 in the downtown area, and construction started in Februar

Construction was 80 percent complete by 1960 and complete by the fo

year other than a single section held up by diffi culties in obtaining rights 

The levee district requested that the federal government proceed with co

nation of the property on March 21, 1961. With this accomplished in 196

struction proceeded on the section and was complete in 1964. Howev

levee district never provided cost assurances on the other three reaches

Congress de-obligated in 1978. Meanwhile, work on the East Cape Gir

levee was mostly complete by 1959, but the district suspended furthe

on the project because of lack of local concern on correcting seepage 

discovered near the levees. It would take another fi ve years to work ou

ing issues and complete the project. On the recommendation of the C

Engineers in 1984, Congress approved another project protecting th

Girardeau-Jackson Metropolitan Airport in the Water Resources Develo

Act of 1986. This included channel improvements to Cape La Croix Cre

Walker Branch, a small fl oodwater detention reservoir, bridge improve

and recreation features for a total cost of $41 million, with $11.8 million 

contributions. After receiving a local cooperation agreement for the pro

1991, construction started on the channel improvements in 1993, whic

complete by 1999. Construction on the reservoir started in June 2000 a

complete in 2004. After many years of settlement and wear and tear, i

Congress approved reconstruction of the Cape Girardeau fl oodwalls. Im

ments included a rock berm to stabilize the existing retaining wall; rep

fl oodwalls, including joint repairs, toe drain replacement, soil stabil

and seal replacement on closure gates; and various mechanical, electric

structural repairs to pump stations. Once the city signed the local coop

131 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River at Cape Girardeau, Mo., H.D. 204 (81st Cong., 1st Sess.):1-18, q
154

agreement, from 2008 to 2010 the district contracted more than $2 million 

work on the fl ood protection system.132

The Flood of 1947 devastated low-lying regions of St. Louis, and in 19

Congress requested a new study of fl ood protection for the city. A hearing c

ducted the following year found most residents were favorable to protecti

The St. Louis District completed the study in June 1953. The plan examine

combination of 47-foot fl oodwalls and levees (St. Louis gage), closure ga

and improved drainage structures in fi ve reaches extending along the en

waterfront as well as part of the River des Peres. It recommended construct

of Reach 3 from Maline Creek to the Eads Bridge and Reach 5b from River 

Peres to Broadway Street and deferment of Reach 4 from the Eads Bridge 

Chippewa Street and the rest of Reach 5 from Fillmore Street to Jefferson B

racks because of a low benefi t-cost ratio. In its 1954 analysis of the plan, 

Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors made three important modifi 

tions. First, noting that “fl ows considerably greater than those on record,” 

1.3 million cfs, “are possible of occurrence,” the board argued that the lev

should be 52 feet – a fi ve foot increase over those proposed by the distr

132 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1956-1964, 1990-2004; Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology”; “

Girardeau (Floodwall), Missouri,” Web page (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/pm/cape-fl oodwall/index.h

Mar. 31, 2011).

East St. Louis fl oodwall, 1951
155

recalculation of damages revealed that 

Reach 4 had a positive cost-benefi t 

ratio, and it recommended adoption 

of this reach. The board agreed that 

the other areas had experienced little 

fl ood damage and did not need the 

protection. Last, because local interests expressed concern that Reach 5b 

would interfere with new businesses 

in the area, the board recommended 

deferment of that project. Further discussion with several railroads through 

1955 resulted in adjustments to the 

alignment that also increased the 

cost slightly. Altogether, the project 

included 11 miles of levees and fl oodwalls, 44 improved sewers or drainage 

ditches, and 28 new pump stations for 

$131 million, $8 million of which was 

local. Congress approved the project 

in the Flood Control Act of 1955.133

The biggest challenge was obtaining the funds to pay for the local share 

of the project. “Where were we going 

to get that, we knew it would be absolutely impossible, except through 

a bond issue,” local businessman 

Morton Meyer observed. Yet even 

at that time, it was diffi cult to get 

approval for a bond issue. He and 100 other businessmen, including a

William Crowdus, Harry Gaines of Gaines Hardware and Lumber Com

Harry C. Colwell of Terminal Railroads, and others, formed the St. Loui

Control Association, which was instrumental in getting approval for the 

133 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River at St. Louis, Mo., S.D. 57 (84th Cong., 1st Sess.): vii-11, quote on 3

Flood Protection for City of St. Louis and Vicinity: Supplementary Detailed Cost Estimate (St. Lo

1954):1-11.

St. Louis Project south of Market S

St. Louis Project fl oodwall, 1964

St. Louis Project, aerial view NE fr

Humboldt St. showing levee and Ba

pumping station
156

through a small tax increase, sought consolidation of county and city gove

ment to improve its fi nancial situation, and was favorable to the project. Si

he was proposing a $110 million bond for various other improvements throu

out the city such as for transit and sewerage, the association worked to lo

to include the fl ood control project under the bond through parades, press 

speaking campaigns, and testimony before Congress and the Corps. Citiz

eventually voted six to one in favor of the bond issue and project. The asso

tion continued to push for completion of the project over the next 20 years 

worked with the district engineers to resolve technical and business issues.

After completing local cooperation agreements, the contractor broke grou

on the project on February 24, 1959. By 1965, the walls and levees on Re

3 were 80 percent complete and capable of providing preliminary protecti

while Reach 4 was 10 percent complete. By 1968, the project was 86 perc

complete for both reaches. By 1973, the project was practically complete 

provided critical protection during the Flood of 1973. This fl ood paralleled 

Great Flood of 1927 in many ways. By March 7, 1973, the river was at 37 

in St. Louis – seven feet above fl ood stage. Six different fl ood crests follow

On April 28 and 29, the river reached 43.3 feet on the St. Louis gage at 

estimated 852,000 cfs, causing 150 to evacuate along the River des Peres 

breaking 35 of 36 private levees along the Mississippi. There were more th

12,000 acres of damage to urban areas not protected by Corps projects co

pared to 8,000 acres of damage in protected areas. One area that was protec

was St. Louis. Only a single gap in the protection was incomplete, requir

placement of sandbags, but “nobody got wet, not a soul,” Meyer would la

134 Primm, pp. 496-506; Michael Ruddy, Interview with Morton Meyer, Aug. 22, 1980 (MVS Archives

St. Louis fl oodwall construction, 1964
157

note. The offi cial dedication of the St. Louis fl oodwalls was on May 2

The project prevented more than $929 million of damages during th

major fl oods in the last quarter of the twentieth century, including 19

early as 1968, the city created a Riverfront Development Plan that incorp

fl ood protection into its architectural and engineering plans. In 1974, Co

assigned the district to develop a plan for the St. Louis metro area. Al

this never resulted in new projects, it is notable as the district’s primar

into urban planning.135

East Side Levees and Alton to Gale

Construction of levees on the east side of the river, which was of su

cern prior to World War II, also advanced to increase protection of c

Illinois, starting with Alton. South of and adjacent to Alton, Congre

135 “St. Louis Eleven-mile fl ood protection: Project Moves Ahead,” presentation (St. Louis, M

(MVS Archives); Ron Jones, “The wall that save St. Louis (again)” Esprit (Apr. 1994): 4-5; Mississ

and Tributaries: Post-Flood Report, 1973 (Vicksburg: LMVD, [1974]): 1-60; Quote from Ruddy 

with Meyer; Floods and Flood Control on the Mississippi, 1973 (N.P.: USACE, [1974]): 1-33; 

“Levee Chronology.”

West Alton, MO, during the 1973 fl ood
158

as 1942, the district was seeking to extend these levees to provide additio

protection to industrial areas north and south of the river. A separate st

completed in 1953 also recommended extension of the Wood River lev

northward to provide protection to the city of Alton, which had a populat

just over 30,000 at that time. Although partially protected by the Wood Ri

levees, gaps in the protection allowed fl ooding of about 100 acres in the bu

ness district, which had caused $1 million in damages since 1943. The proj

fl ood – 650,000 cfs – would have caused closer to $3 million. The propo

project included a little over a mile of levees and fl oodwalls, with levees an

closure structure adjacent to the Lock and Dam No. 26 guide wall and acc

road, a pump station, and improvements to the city sewer system. Total c

was $4.2 million, of which the local share was $886,000. Congress appro

the project in the Flood Control Act of 1954. In 1958, the district renewed r

ommendation of extending the Wood River levees from Alton to Hartford 

protect more than 7,000 acres of industrial area. The proposed levees inclu

extension and reconstruction of 22 miles of levees north, south, and along 

fork of the river, raised to a height of 45 feet on the St. Louis gage, with riv

side levees raised to 52 feet. This required more than 20 closure structure

various design. The district also recommended numerous pump stations 

sewer improvements to aid interior drainage for a total of $15 million. The 

trict added another pump station and enlargement of drainage structures 

report of 1963.136

In 1957, Congress requested an inquiry into what modifi cation to fl ood p

tection was necessary for the Mississippi between the Missouri and Ohio riv

specifi cally mentioning St. Clair and Madison counties, Illinois. By the time 

district completed the study in 1963, the 22 miles of levees in the East S

Levee District approved in 1936 were more than 83 percent complete, with 

expected completion date of June 30, 1964. There were, nevertheless, still iss

with interior drainage in low areas near Blue Waters Ditch and Harding Di

and also near the Cahokia Creek diversion, which funneled the creek outs

of the levee. The overfl ow in these areas impacted 18,000 acres with ann

damages estimated to increase to $980,000 as industrialization of the reg

increased. Among the improvements the district recommended were impro

136 U.S. Cong., Mississippi River, Urban Areas at Alton, Ill., H.D. 397 (83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-27; W

River Levee and Drainage District, H.D. 150 (88th Cong., 1st Sess.): 1-48; USACE, Wood River Levee 

Drainage District, GDM No. 4 (St. Louis: MVS, 1958): 1-57.
159

$9.3 million, of which $3.1 million was local. Congress approved the 

the Flood Control Act of 1965. An additional interior drainage study com

in 1984 found other improvements as not economically justifi ed bec

the low property value of remaining areas prone to fl ooding, althoug

gress did authorize reconstruction and repair of the pump station, d

works, and several bridges in the Energy and Water Development App

tions Act of 1988 for $37 million. Additional interior fl ooding in the vic

East St. Louis from 1993 to 1996 prompted Congress to request a reeva

in 1997. After several years of study, in 2000 the Corps proposed con

the project to an ecosystem restoration project, and started developing f

estimates. The report, which Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Carl A. Strock 

on December 22, 2004, included projects such as diversions, creek c

relocation, sediment retention structures, and wetlands development 

eight bottomland areas that had incidental fl ood control benefi ts for a 

$208 million. Congress approved the project in the Water Resources D

ment Act of 2007. Once approved, the district started monitoring eco

conditions and modeling the solution but had not started constructio

2010.137

As early as 1935, the district considered levees from Alton to Gale, I

as a unit, despite being managed by 17 levee and drainage districts. Par

reason was that multiple levee districts protected some urban areas, 

ing coordination with various agencies to complete fl ood protection. D

continuation of multiple projects in these areas, by 1950 the district dis

the system as the Alton-to-Gale levees. Signifi cant reaches of these leve

complete by 1968, including at Prairie du Pont and the East Side levee

the remainder complete by 1977. Even before this time, many of the 

experienced slides resulting from clay soils cracking during hot weath

partially collapsing during high water in areas where the slope was too 

By 1961, these slides were so extensive and frequent that the district sta

maintain an inventory of them. Most levee districts saw 20 or more slid

the next 48 years, with some districts – such as Grand Tower and De

– experiencing as many as 200 slides during this period. The slides im

nearly 25 miles of levee along the system. Although the St. Louis Distr

137 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1997-2008; Water Resources Development Act of 

110-114 (110th Cong., 1st Sess.): Tit. 1, Sec. 1001: 18; “East St. Louis and Vicinity, Illinois” (www.m

army.mil/pm/esl-vicinity/index.html, Apr. 6, 2011).
160

gency repair, it recognized as early as 1979 that preventative measures w

necessary to address the problems long-term. That year and in 1986, the 

trict proposed repairing the levee sections by degrading the levees and rebu

ing them using replacement materials. In 1997, the district submitted a d

report recommending a repair method using an injection of a lime-fl y ash m

ture to fi ll cracks and stabilize the soils for $113 million. The Memphis Dist

had been using similar methods to repair levees since 1995. As of 2010, 

project was undergoing independent peer review before fi nal submission.13

Ste. Genevieve

Despite early interest in making improvements to Ste. Genevieve, it w

the last prominent town in the district to see fl ood protection. In 1936, C

gress had approved improvements to levees southeast of the town to pro

138 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1997-2008; Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology”; Gary P. Lowe, 

sentation, Alton to Gale Organized Levee Districts, Illinois and Missouri (Continuing, Defi ciency Co

tions) Letter Report, Jul. 15, 2010 (MVS Archives).

Ste. Genevieve, MO during 1973 fl ood
161

on the levees in 1941 but delayed the project because of the war oth

reviewing and recommending modifi cation of the project to cover the Co

Big Field near Valle Spring Branch. In 1945, Congress requested an i

gation of fl ood control requirements between Ste. Genevieve and St. 

focusing on the Cottonwoods area west of Kaskaskia, so the St. Louis D

suspended further action on improvements to the Levee District No. 

outside of town until it could advance a fi nal plan. In 1948, the Corp

pleted this study. After reviewing three options, it recommended an ex

of the Perry County levees along the waterfront, to incorporate the origi

Genevieve Levee District levees as well as include protection of the Cotto

and Common Big Field areas, for $5.7 million in federal spending. Al

would be two feet higher than the 50-year fl ood (1903). However, none o

levees actually entered into town, and Congress never approved the p

probably because of the low cost-benefi t justifi cation – the population 

Genevieve was never greater than fi ve thousand.139

Although the town itself did not request protection of industrial as

did fi nally request protection of historical assets. In 1950, as part of its 

sis of fl ood protection along the Middle Mississippi requested by Cong

1844, the St. Louis District conducted a preliminary study recommen

detailed survey to see if fl ood protection was warranted, but the town 

requested further study. By the mid-1960s, however, the Ste. Geneviev

ist Bureau had developed a master plan for restoration of the town 

on its historic past. Established in 1735 – nearly 30 years before St. L

Ste. Genevieve had several buildings older than 150 years centered on 

mile stretch of river. The master plan proposed relocation of outlying hi

buildings, restoring those that were in need of repair, reproducing hi

conditions, and adding fencing, landscaping, parking, and vending to p

a tourist attraction for the city. It was only after these improvement

under the assault of the Flood of 1973 that the town requested and Co

funded the study in 1974. The fl ood had caused more than $1.5 million i

ages and potentially threatened long-term destruction of the more t

irreplaceable historic buildings. Estimated fl ood damage for the urban 

fl ood reaching 49 feet on the local gage was more than $7 million. In a

to the Mississippi, the town also faced periodic fl ash fl ooding from G

139 Dyhouse, “Levee Chronology”; USACE, Ste. Genevieve – St. Marys, Missouri (St. Louis: MV

Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1941-1948.
162

combination of 3.5 miles of levees and three closure gates, two pump statio

drainage improvements, water detention areas, widening and deepening 

Gabouri Creek, and environmental and recreational areas just under $40 m

lion. The district reviewed fi ve different alternatives, but none of them 

cost-benefi t ratios higher than 0.3. Noting that Corps regulations prohibi

construction of projects that did not have at least a 1:1 ratio, yet with “su

cient merit” based on environmental and historic benefi ts, District Engin

Col. Leon E. McKinny argued, “it would, therefore, be up to Congress to ov

ride this policy in the interest of historic preservation,” and recommended t

Congress do so.140

The Flood of 1982 struck Ste. Genevieve worse than the Flood of 1973, 

most of the historical buildings received some level of damage. With the 

continuing to push for protection, the district continued to prepare data for 

project, for example through completion of an archaeological assessment of 

plan in early 1983, even as the town promoted its historical resources throu

national publications to help justify the project. Finally, in 1985 the Board 

Engineers for Rivers and Harbors submitted its report on the district’s 1

140 Allies Engineers and Architects, The Master Plan for Restoration of Ste. Genevieve, Missouri (St. L

Hellmuth, Obata, and Kasselbaum; Booker and Associates, 1966): 1- 44; USACE, Ste. Genevieve Su

Report (St. Louis: MVS, 1979): 1-95, quotes 93, 95.

St. Louis fl oodwall that prevented fl ooding of large industrial areas during the 1973 fl o
163

the lack of economic justifi cation. By this time, the cost was $31 millio

the local share being $2.5 million. Based on this testimony, Chief of En

Lt. Gen. E.R. Heiberg approved the project, which Congress fi nally ad

Metro East levees
164

the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. It took another decade 

another major fl ood – the Flood of 1993 – to convince local agencies to sign 

LCA and provide funding for the project. At the time it started, the project c

had increased to $48 million. The groundbreaking ceremony was on Augus

1997, and most project features were complete by 2002. It took several ad

tional years to complete the recreation features.141

141 Michael J. McNerny and R. David Hoxie, Final Report: Archaeological Resources Survey and Im

Assessment of the Ste. Genevieve Levee Project (St. Louis: MVS, 1983); Maj. Gen. N.G. Delbridge to Ch

Engineers, Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, Apr. 16, 1985; Heiberg to Secretary of the Army, Aug. 20, 1986 (

Archives); Terrie Hatfi eld, “A new beginning for Ste. Genevieve,” Esprit (Sept./Oct. 1997): 1, 8, 13; 

Genevieve, MO – High and Dry,” Esprit (2002): 13; for examples of city promotion, see “Ste. Genevie

French Legacy in Middle America,” Better Homes and Gardens Country Home (August 1985): 58-70.

St. Louis fl oodwall, September 18, 2008
165

nal federal levee projects authorized starting in 1936 were complete. T

exception was the Kaskaskia Island levees project, which ended a decad

The urban projects at Cape Girardeau, St. Louis, East St. Louis, and Alto

also complete, despite the diffi culties of construction in a congested urb

and obtaining cost assurances from smaller towns and suburban areas. I

the worst fl ood in more than 100 years hit the valley. By July, the Miss

Basin surpassed its average annual rainfall, and July rain was 600 p

above normal. The river was above fl ood stage (30 feet on the Market 

gage) for 80 consecutive days and 148 days altogether, beating the p

record of 77. It was above 40 feet for 36 days. The more than one million 

charge was the highest measured fl ow to pass St. Louis. Although the St

District saw fl ood damages exceeding $1.4 billion, the fl ood control 

built by the Corps over the previous 55 years prevented an estimated $

lion in damages – a savings of more than 80 percent. The urban fl ood 

projects were an integral part 

of this system by preventing or 

limiting damage to urban and 

industrial zones not covered 

by the original project. Had 

it not been for these projects, 

the Flood of 1993 and other 

fl oods would have assuredly 

caused even more damage to 

the St. Louis area.142

142 Gary Dyhouse, “Myths and misconceptions of the 1993 fl ood,” Esprit (May 1994): 6-8.

St. Louis landing, September 18, 2008
166

 10 

Flood Control Reservoirs in the St. Louis Distri

For more than 70 years, the Corps of Engineers opposed reservoirs as 

ineffective and costly to be part of any fl ood protection plan for the Mississi

Valley. Although the Corps had worked with local levee districts in build

fl ood control reservoirs, primarily at the headwaters of the Mississippi, 

had even approved one reservoir for power generation on the Mississippi – 

Keokuk, Iowa – it had remained opposed generally to reservoirs despite ad

cacy by leading engineers. In general, the Corps argued that reservoirs co

only reduce fl ood heights a limited amount, requiring additional and exp

sive fl ood control or protection methods such as levees, and that the cos

purchasing land for building enough reservoirs to achieve needed effect w

high. This attitude did not really change until the Corps faced the diffi cultie

resolving real estate issues to implement the Mississippi River and Tributa

Project. By this point, any method of reducing fl ood heights became acce

able, and in 1935 the Corps identifi ed numerous reservoir sites and adop

a strategy of adopting these gradually mostly at local cost. Several of the r

ervoirs identifi ed were in St. Louis District, including on the Kaskaskia 

Big Muddy rivers, Illinois, and on the St. Francis, Meramec, and Salt riv

Missouri. Built over several decades as local communities were able to pay 

them, the reservoirs helped to reduce localized fl ooding while providing e

nomic benefi ts such as recreation areas and power generation.

Slow Acceptance of Reservoirs

European engineers had used reservoirs since at least 1711 as a method 

fl ood control, navigational improvement, and irrigation or water supply. T

method typically involved building dams upstream on a river with a spillw

to allow controlled overfl ow. The stream would back up and form a lake, wh

engineers could use for multiple purposes or release during low water. In 

past, however, engineers mostly used them on small streams rather than a la

basin that involved dozens of tributary rivers miles from the main stem. T

fi rst engineer to suggest using reservoirs to control fl oods on the Mississi

was Charles Ellet, Jr., in 1849 and then in 1852 in a widely distributed rep
167

eliminating natural reservoirs on the river and up tributaries, where th

expanded during high water and stored a portion of fl oodwaters. By b

reservoirs on the tributaries, it would not only relieve “the whole valley 

Mississippi” but “render every stream that is ever navigable permanen

In his 1861 Mississippi Delta Survey, Capt. Andrew A. Humphreys, resp

to Ellet, argued that such a reservoir system was impractical. While no

ing that reservoirs could improve navigation and aid fl ood control on 

rivers, he believed that “the idea that the Mississippi delta may be ec

cally secured against inundation by such dams has been proven ... to b

highest degree chimerical.” Setting aside the question of cost, his ana

the Flood of 1858 found that it would have been necessary to hold bac

than one million cubic feet of water per second for 36 days, which wou

required 90,000 square miles of storage, more than the total area avai

the Ohio Valley where the majority of fl oodwaters originated. This mad

reservoirs exclusively to prevent fl oods not only ineffective but nearly 

sible, although he did not address the use of reservoirs to supplemen

fl ood control methods.143

Later reports, including by the Mississippi River Commission, largel

to the same conclusion as Humphreys. Although the commission lack

funds in 1880 to conduct a suffi cient survey to recommend specifi c pl

reservoirs, it nevertheless reported favorably on the use of reservoirs 

Mississippi headwaters and on tributaries above the Wisconsin River 

to improve navigation, which it estimated could hold back more than 

cubic feet per second for 100 days. Such a system, the commission a

would have no appreciable effect below Rock Island, Illinois. Comm

president Col. Curtis Townsend, formerly the St. Louis District En

argued after the Flood of 1912 that “a reservoir must be close to the loc

be benefi ted” and that reservoirs on the Mississippi’s tributaries “are to

distance for the regulation of any stream.” He also argued they would 

cost-effective because of the amount of storage required to have even 

mal effect on fl ood levels compared to the lower cost of levees. After th

of 1927, the Corps conducted one of the most detailed examinations o

voirs in its history. Civil engineer James P. Kemper would later obser

143 Inundations of the Mississippi River, in U.S. Cong., Reports on the Ohio and Mississippi Rive

Flood Control Comm. Doc. 17 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.): 112-120, quote p. 116; Delta Survey, pp. 406-

on 411.
168

Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin appointed a board headed by C

William Kelley, who was retiring from the Federal Power Commission. T

board examined existing reservoirs in the Upper Mississippi, at Keokuk, 

on the Miami River in Ohio. It also reviewed 203 additional sites. In the e

the board concluded that since it would cost $1.2 billion to build enough r

ervoirs to store 98-million acre feet of water, and that this would lower fl 

heights less than 10 feet on average, such a system was not economically j

tifi ed. It further argued that it would be impossible to develop reservoirs 

multiple uses since operating them for local fl ood control, power, or irrigat

would likely confl ict with the need to time the release of water specifi cally 

Mississippi River fl ood control.144

Despite such opposition, reservoirs remained the preference of lead

conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot because they believed they could 

used for multiple purposes, i.e., for agriculture, water supply, navigation, 

fl ood control. This was by no means a universal attitude, and many recogni

as Kelley did the diffi culties in operating reservoirs for multiple purposes w

still being able to reduce fl oods. Power generation required a constant fl ow 

turn turbines, irrigation or water supplies required a fairly full reservoir ye

round, while fl ood control required low levels prior to spring rains to cont

fl oodwaters. Other engineers argued strenuously for reservoirs to supplem

levees in lieu of outlets, which were highly unpopular. Kemper, for exam

drafted a plan for the Louisiana Board of Engineers based on a subset o

reservoirs identifi ed by Kelley along the Arkansas and White rivers, wh

he believed would lower fl ood levels enough to eliminate the proposed Bo

Floodway in Arkansas. Another reservoir proponent, Miami Conservancy pr

ident Arthur Morgan, doubted that the commission had seriously conside

reservoirs and later proposed a series of reservoirs on the Tennessee and O

rivers as president of the Tennessee Valley Association.145

144 U.S. Cong., Report of the Mississippi River Commission, 1880, H.D. 95 (46th Cong., 3rd Sess.): 

Townsen quoted in Benjamin G. Humphreys, Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River (Wash.: Miss. R

Ass., 1914): 141-142; Report on the Control of Floods of the Mississippi River by Means of Reservoirs, H

Flood Control Comm. Doc. 2 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.): 1-33; Kemper quote from Rebellious River (Bo

Bruce Humphreys, 1949): 114. 

145 Morgan, “Flood Control by Reservoirs,” ENR (Aug. 12, 1937): 263-268; “Reservoir Control for M

sippi Suggested by 1927 Flood Data,” ENR (Mar. 20, 1930): 488. On differences on reservoirs, com

Pinchot in U.S. Cong., House Committee on Flood Control, House Flood Control Hearings, Vol. 5, (

Cong., 1st Sess.): 3467-3486; Elmer Peterson, Big Dam Foolishness: The Problem of Modern Flood Co

and Water Storage (NY: Devin-Adair, 1954): 93; and Luna B. Leopold and Thomas Maddock, Jr., The F

Control Controversy: Big Dams, Little Dams, and Land Management (NY: Ronald Press, 1954): 36-51, 
169

requested consideration by the Corps of fl ood plans using them, part

after Maj. Gen. Lytle Brown became Chief of Engineers in 1929. Ho

he refused to commit to any plan until completion of the 308 Reports 

lished by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927. House Document 308 

69th Congress recommended that the Corps conduct surveys to det

whether improvements for all major waterways were justifi ed for pow

eration, irrigation, or fl ood control. Conducted by local district engine

surveys took many years to complete. The fi rst report based on this da

1931 commission report on modifi cation of the Mississippi River and 

taries Project, examined 269 reservoir sites in various combinations fo

million, but none of them eliminated the use of fl oodways, making th

added cost. However, the report did establish the concept that the gove

would need to build a system of reservoirs gradually as funding allowed 

than all at once as with most Corps projects. With the completion of 15

308 Reports by the end of 1933, the Corps fi nally submitted its compreh

review of reservoir sites in 1935. In the report, the commission reviewe

plans, one that proposed operation of reservoirs for Mississippi fl ood 

tion, one for localized fl ood reduction, and one to achieve the greatest 

tion in fl ood heights for the lowest price since the fi rst two plans cost mo

$1 billion. Given the cost, it recommended building and operating res

for local fl ood reduction as local resources allowed. Although this lessen

effect on the Mississippi, it made the reservoirs inherently more desira

local levee boards, which would then pay the majority of the cost of the 

voirs. Later, provisions in the Flood Control Act of 1944 (PL 78-534) auth

construction of recreation areas at reservoirs, increasing their local va

making them multiple-purpose. Among the reservoirs identifi ed were fo

would eventually fall in the St. Louis District on the Meramec and Salt 

Missouri, and the Kaskaskia and Big Muddy Rivers, Illinois. The distric

spend the next 40 years completing these, and one it never completed.1

146 U.S. Cong., Control of Floods in the Alluvial Valley of the Lower Mississippi River, Vol. 1, H.D

Cong., 3rd Sess.): 1-15; Comprehensive Report on Reservoirs in Mississippi River Basin, H.D. 

Cong., 1st Sess.): 1-42; Flood Control Act of 1944 (78th Cong., 2nd Sess.): Sec. 4.
170

The fi rst reservoir built in the district was the Wappapello Dam and R

ervoir on the St. Francis River in the Ozarks of southern Missouri, althou

it was in the Memphis District at the time of its construction. There had b

long-running problems with fl ooding in the St. Francis Basin. Mississi

River Commission levees provided some relief after 1917, but there was 

extensive fl ooding at its headwaters far from the levees. After passage of 

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927, the Memphis District completed the 3

reports on the St. Francis River in 1929 and 1930, focusing on the upper ri

and backwater area. Although the reports considered a power generation r

ervoir at Wappapello, Missouri, it found the reservoir more expensive tha

system of levees and recommended it as not economically justifi ed. It was n

therefore, included in the 1935 Corps reservoir report. In 1935, the St. Fr

cis Levee District proposed a fl ood control reservoir at Wappapello instead 

more extensive levees to protect against headwater fl ooding. Although the p

cost roughly the same, “it is believed to be better engineering,” Memphis D

trict Engineer Maj. William E. Hoge wrote. Approved by the commission, 

reservoir was among changes to the Mississippi River and Tributaries (MR

Project Congress authorized in the Overton Act of 1936. The Corps started c

struction in 1938 and completed it in 1941. The reservoir included a 2,700-f

earthen dam with a concrete spillway and three 20-foot wide tainter gates. T

resulting pool held 613,000 acre-feet, of which 23,000 was for fl ood red

tion. Although constructed and operated by the Memphis District as part of 

MR&T, since the reservoir fell within area already in the St. Louis District, 

Corps transferred it to St. Louis District control in 1982, including operat

of both the reservoir and recreation site. The current site, 150 miles south 

St. Louis and just west of Cape Girardeau, includes 180 miles of shoreline 

beaches and 44,000 acres of wilderness trails and areas. Through a mem

randum of understanding with the district, The Nature Conservancy help

monitor and maintain the unique ecology of the site, such as Deep Muck Fen

Most other reservoir projects in the district were initially included in 

1935 Corps Reservoir Report. Perhaps the largest of these were on the K

kaskia River in Illinois. Although the Kaskaskia Basin was not a major indust

147 U.S. Cong., St. Francis River, Mo. And Ark., H.D. 159 (71st Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-3; Hoge to Div. E

Report on letter from Mr. H.N. Pharr, Mar. 15, 1935 (MRC Archives); “Wappapello Lake: Pride of South

Missouri,” Esprit (Nov. 1996): 1, 6; Wappapello Fact Sheet (http://www.mvs.usace.army.mil/wappap

wap-facts.htm, Apr. 26, 2011).
171

Wappapello Dam, 1945

Wappapello Dam, 2008
172

it contained a fairly large population, with 350,000 spread over the 5,800-m

area and at least four urban areas greater than 10,000 in population. T

325-mile river fl ooded annually, with the fl ood of record being in 1943, wh

reached stages near 40 feet at New Athens and over 20 feet at Shelbyv

These caused average annual damages exceeding $2.5 million including ur

areas. Over time, 129 levee and drainage districts tried to improve the situat

through drainage ditches, and eight of them built low levees totaling 36 mi

yet fl ooding remained an issue. As noted previously, a survey for a syst

of navigation locks and dams conducted in 1933 found the project “inad

able” because “the river is clearly not suitable for improvement for mod

barge navigation.” However, the Corps had proposed a reservoir near Car

in its 1935 reservoir report, but, without a corresponding detailed 308 rep

did not provide specifi cs. The Flood of 1937 generated interest in the proj

and after a preliminary survey Congress authorized a dam and reservoir 

the Flood Control Act of 1938. The initial plan developed by 1940 was fo

2,600-foot dam and spillway at Carlyle, a reservoir to hold 860,000 acre-f

and levees between Carlyle and New Athens to protect the basin from overfl 

Like other projects approved prior to 1941, World War II delayed complet

of the plans. Once the war was over, local interests formed organizations 

Aerial of Carlyle Lake
173

ration and Kaskaskia Valley Association. Among the citizens leading th

were Emil Bugard, the president of the development corporation, asso

president and attorney Eldon Hazlett, development corporation secreta

realtor Albert Wilson, and publisher Henry Norcross. These organized n

ous public meetings to discuss the projects, which intensifi ed after th

Flood.148

After several years of local organizations lobbying for the project, th

completed a revised report in 1957. The report included the Carlyle Da

Reservoir more or less as previously designed. This was a 2,600-foot da

a concrete spillway and seven 40-foot tainter gates, holding back 9

acre-feet in storage in a lake with 83 miles of shoreline. However, the pl

added a dam and reservoir at Shelbyville. This included a 3,000-foot e

dam with fi ve 40-foot tainter gates. The reservoir would hold 474,000 ac

with 172 miles of shoreline. Both projects would include recreation fe

including campgrounds, wilderness areas, and boating and swimming 

ties. Total cost was $73 million at a benefi t-cost ratio of 1.3. The She

project alone was expected to increase the number of boats navigating th

to 3,000 per year, attract up to four million visitors and generate mo

$13 million per year in revenue by 1971, and provide for a general in

in land values. The Flood Control Act of 1958 authorized both proje

removed the Carlyle reservoir from the Mississippi River Basin Plan to 

rize it as a separate project. With its design already complete, construc

the Carlyle Dam started in 1958, was 25 percent complete by 1962, a

ished in 1967 for a total cost of $42 million. Design of the Shelbyvil

started in 1958, and work on the reservoir started in 1963 with fi lling in 

local mines, the location of many of which had never been recorded. Th

opened the reservoir in 1970 with a dedication ceremony on Septem

After congressional approval, the Corps completed the local cooperation 

ment for the New Athens levees in 1964 and started construction in 1965

recommendation of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, the 

government assumed the total cost of the levees, including the $3.5 mi

local contributions, provided the local levee organizations paid for eas

148 “Emile Bugard Faithful Backer of Project,” East St. Louis Sunday Journal (July 29, 1962): 4; U

Kaskaskia River, Illinois, H.D. 232 (85th Cong., 1st Sess.): 1-18; Dobney, pp. 138-140.
174

upgrade to recreational facilities on both lakes approved in 2010.149

Both the Shelbyville and Carlyle reservoirs are operated under an appro

Water Control Plan and have active upstream and downstream coalitions. S

eral groups organized to address issues relevant to their specifi c section of 

Kaskaskia River. These groups worked in partnership with the St. Louis D

trict and divided the river into four reaches. These groups came together in 

mid-1990s to form a coalition that came to be called the Kaskaskia Waters

Association (KWA). District representatives meet regularly with the asso

tion’s board to discuss the management of the basin. The goals of this co

erative include effective use of the basin’s resources, economic developme

increased recreational opportunities, sound agricultural practices, and ecos

tem restoration. The collaborative between the KWA and the district increa

support for corps projects in the watershed while maximizing the benefi t

the projects.150

A second location identifi ed in the 1935 Reservoir Report was the 155-m

Big Muddy River in Illinois. Since 1915, the 2,300-mile river basin experien

six major fl oods, with the fl ood of record in 1961 achieving 25.9 feet at Ben

and 29.6 feet in Plumfi eld. Average annual damages exceeded $157,000. T

population of the two counties near the river – Jefferson and Franklin – w

71,600 in 1962, half of it urban, with coal, timber, and agriculture being le

ing industries. The region had suffered chronic unemployment since the Gr

Depression, making job creation an important rationale for a project. Althou

studies in 1925 and 1933 did not fi nd fl ood control or navigation projects j

tifi ed, the Corps considered the river a potential location for a reservoir, 

there was no serious investigation of the site until after World War II. In 19

Congress requested a review of fl ood control plans, and in response Illin

formed the Rend Lake Conservancy District in 1955 to urge creation of 

reservoir. The 1957 feasibility study found navigational improvement was p

sible but did not address fl ood control. However, an Illinois study the sa

year favored a reservoir for recreation and water supply. A 1961 hearing 

149 Kaskaskia River, Illinois, pp. 18-48; “Carlyle Lake,” Esprit (Jan. 1996): 1, 6-9; Annette, McMic

“Lake Shelbyville: Central Illinois showpiece,” Esprit (Apr. 1996): 1, 6; MVS, “Carlyle Lake, Illinois,” 

brochure (MVS Archives); “Thousands Witness ‘Beginning of Era,’” Moultrie County, Ill., News, news

ping, May 9, 1963 (MVS Archives); USACE, “Shelbyville Dam Dedication After Action Review (St. L

MVS, 1970); U.S. Cong., Kaskaskia River Levees, Illinois, H.D. 351 (88th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-10; Dob

pp. 138-140

150 Information Paper, Kaskaskia River Watershed based Pilot Budget for FY 2014 (MVS Archives, N

Information paper, Kaskaskia Watershed Association, Inc. (MVS Archives, N.D.).
175

the issue in Benton drew more than 500, including the governor, co

men, and local mayors, most of whom favored project. The largest conce

the number of coal mines the lake would cover, and although some com

sought compensation, Corps policy was to allow continued mining in th

ect area. The Corps submitted its fi nal report in 1962 proposing an e

dam near Benton with a 500-foot concrete spillway and vertical lift gat

reservoir would hold 302,000 acre-feet of water, 111,000 for fl ood contr

would lower fl ooding by up to six feet. Total cost was $30 million at a 

fi t-cost ratio of 1.6. Approved in the Flood Control Act of 1962, const

started on the impoundment dams in 1965 and the main dam in 1968

complete in 1970 and operational in 1972 for a fi nal cost of $60 million

its completion, the recreation features have been critical in providing j

the local community. Use of the wilderness area has grown annually – 

cent in 1994 alone – generating $200,000 annually. In 2010, the Corps 

a $26 million upgrade to facilities on the lake.151

The next reservoir completed was the Cannon Dam and Reservoir 

Salt River in Missouri. The Salt River is 192 miles long. More than 

live in the 2,920 square-mile basin, more than half in urban areas. 

151 U.S. Cong., Rend Lake Reservoir, Illinois, H.D. 541 (87th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-39; Interview w

F. Huizenga, N.D. (MVS Archives); Mark Meador and Maureen Curran, “Rend Lake: Gateway to 

Illinois,” Esprit (Mar. 1996): 1, 6; Dobney, pp. 140-142.

Aerial of Rend Lake, 2008
176

9,500 soybean, corn, 

and wheat farms dot 

the rural areas, which 

were subject to frequent 

fl ash fl oods. The largest fl ood on record, that 

of 1958, had a fl ow of up 

to 70,000 cubic feet per 

second, which resulted in 

fl ood heights of 29.9 feet 

at New London and 

34.8 feet at Monroe City. 

Average annual damages 

were $339,000. Local 

residents fi rst proposed 

a dam to increase river 

depth in 1931, but it was 

never built. The Corps 

initially included it as a 

potential reservoir site 

in its 1935 Reservoir 

Report, and the 1936 Flood Control Act authorized a study of a reservoir 

levees on the Salt River. After an initial public meeting at which the 125 atte

ees gave approval to the project, numerous locally organized meetings 

lowed. The district completed its initial study in 1937 but did not recomm

a plan. Nevertheless, the 1938 Flood Control Act authorized a dam and res

voir near Joanna, Missouri. In a report published in 1940, the Federal Po

Commission recommended revising the project to include power generati

but no action was taken because of U.S. entry into the war. Once the war w

over, Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler requested a rest

of the project in 1946, but with no change in results. It was not until C

gress requested a study in 1961 that the Corps fi nally developed a new p

for a reservoir for power generation and fl ood control. The study review

three potential sites but continued to support the site near Joanna. The des

included a 1,900-foot earthen dam and a concrete spillway with seven 40-f

Map of Mark Twain Lake and Clarence Cannon Dam
177

Construction of Clarence Cannon Dam 12 April 1977
178

control and 437,000 for power generation. The Northeast Missouri Elec

Power Cooperative would be responsible for the 50,000 to 62,000 kilow

generated by the plant. In addition, the project included 36 miles of chan

improvement for a total cost of $63 million at a benefi t-cost ratio of 1.3. Si

the construction of the reservoir, it has held back infl ows greater than 70,0

dsf on seven occasions, and even held back over 100,000 dsf in 2008. T

reservoir has been integral to fl ood control plans, under-promising but ov

performing, it has prevented more than $1 billion in fl ood damages over 

life of the project.152

The Flood Control Act of 1962 authorized the reservoir as a project s

arate from the Mississippi River Basin Plan. After four years of design fr

1963 to 1966 and several more years of site preparation, construction on 

dam started in 1971 and came to a conclusion in 1983. With the pool fi l

the Corps dedicated it in 1984 as the Clarence Cannon Dam, named after 

long-serving Missouri U.S. Representative, and christened the pool the M

Twain Lake. The Corps operates the dam remotely from the Kansas City D

trict, which is actually closer to the dam’s location, with an automatic test in

152 U.S. Cong., Salt River, Missouri, H.D. 507 (87th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 1-58; “Cannon Dam and Mark T

Lake,” Esprit (Feb. 1996): 6; Dobney, pp. 142-144.

Assembly of stay ring at Clarence Cannon Dam. Ring used for controlling fl ow of water 

turbine runner, 1980
179

east Power Cooperative runs the power yard, selling electricity prim

the Association of Missouri Electric Cooperatives Inc., with excess pow

to Southwest Power Association. The association includes 40 member

cooperatives across Missouri.153

The fi nal reservoir recommended by the Corps was the Meramec D

Reservoir on the Meramec River in Missouri. There had been numerous 

of a dam on this river. The earliest study of the river in 1880 found it co

be improved and later studies for hydropower found it unsuitable for a 

generation reservoir. There were, however, long-term fl ooding problem

extensive basin. The 308 study of the basin, completed in 1929, recomm

a fl ood control reservoir, the 1935 Reservoir Report included it, and Co

approved it in the 1938 Flood Control Act. Delayed by World War II, the 

did not receive close attention until after the war, with a 1949 report pu

by a Meramec River Cooperative that recommended a plan of multipl

and reservoirs for navigation similar to what the Corps had installed 

Ohio River and elsewhere. However, with rediscovery of parts of the b

pristine wilderness areas, there was widespread environmental concern 

153 “Cannon Power Plant First in Nation,” Esprit (Mar. 1988): 6; “Cannon Dam”; “Clarence Can

and Mark Twain Lake,” brochure, MVS, 2007 (MVS Archives); “Electric Co-ops in Missouri” (ww.a

coops.html, May 10, 2011).

Aerial of Mark Twain Lake and Clarence Cannon Dam, 2008
180

studying the reservoir, holding frequent public meetings from 1947 to 19

but as opposition grew, the governor of Illinois postponed further plann

for the basin and requested suspension of the project. The Chief of Engine

offi cially suspended the project in 1951. Over the next decade, severe fl ood

in the Meramec Basin sparked renewed interest in the project, but envir

mental organizations remained opposed to it. Although planning continued 

the project for the next two decades, environmental opposition prevented 

action on the project other than preliminary real estate purchases. It wo

remain a thorny issue throughout the 1970s (see Section V).154

Since their construction, district reservoirs have played a critical role 

reducing fl ood stages on both the Mississippi River and its tributaries. Ta

alone, reservoirs may not seem to reduce fl ood stages signifi cantly, but th

reservoirs must be understood as merely one element of a system that a

includes fl oodwalls, agricultural levees, and urban levees. The district m

also balance recreation needs with fl ood management, as holding back 

much or too little water in reservoirs can create less than desirable conditi

for recreation seekers. During periods of high precipitation, reservoirs st

enough water to reduce fl ooding downstream, with the water being released 

as to minimize fl ood damages downstream.

The effi cacy of the Kaskaskia reservoirs has been put to the test numer

times since their construction, preventing an estimated $622 million in e

nomic losses between 1993 and 2011 alone. One of the fi rst tests occurred 

August of 1978, when torrential rains in would have caused signifi cant fl ood

in the Kaskaskia River Basin had it not been for Lake Shelbyville. The infl 

into the reservoir rose to 17,000 CFS, yet downstream of the reservoir the K

kaskia remained within its banks. During the potential fl ood, the reserv

stored over 18 billion gallons of fl ood waters, preventing an estimated $1.1 m

lion in damages.155

One of the greatest tests for the two reservoirs came in the spring of 20

Rainfall 150 percent above normal saturated the region by late April 2002, 

the reservoirs still had over 100 percent of their storage capacity by the 

of April. When rainfall reached 200 percent above average for the month 

154 T. Michael Ruddy, Damning the Dam: The St. Louis District Corps of Engineers and the controv

over the Meramec Basin Project from its inception to its deauthorization (St. Louis: MVS, 1992): 

Dobney, pp. 144-147; Michael Ruddy, Interview with Michael Dace, Feb. 15, 1985 (MVS Archives).

155 “Shelbyville dam credited with preventing fl oods,” Clinton County News (Aug. 30, 1978); Inform

Paper, Kaskaskia River Watershed based Pilot Budget for FY 2014 (MVS Archives, N.D.).
181

trict followed its approved Water Control Plan, recreation would have s

greatly and farmers would not have been able to plant their crops. The 

plan determines minimum and maximum releases through a combina

the time of year, pool levels, downstream conditions, and future precip

forecasts. The plan also included a mechanism for temporary deviation 

allowed Water Control Managers to deviate from the approved plan 

deemed appropriate. This was just such a circumstance, as deviation w

essary to limit losses from fl ooding. On April 21, district Water Contro

agers made an aggressive move with the pool elevation at 443.79 feet 

(below target elevation), deciding to make bankfull releases that woul

for as much fl ood control storage as possible. Rain continued to fall in

April and early-May, with pool elevations at Carlyle reaching above 45

NGVD by May 14. On May 16, a new record pool elevation was set and e

ally levels reached nearly 460 feet NGVD, just 2.5 feet from the top of th

control pool. If downstream releases were too high, they would impact f

well into planting season; however, if discharge was too low, recreation 

ties would have to remain closed until near the end of the season. Th

lenge was fi nding a way to save both the recreation and crop season. O

16, district personnel spent all night going over various scenarios and tr

work out a solution with members of the Kaskaskia coalition. The co

and the district developed a deviation from the plan that was agreeable f

farmers and recreationists, allowing downstream farmers to plant and 

crop prior to the 4th of July so that recreation could resume by the holid

solution was raising discharge above maximum levels (10,000 cfs) in 1,

increments. The discharge eventually reached 13,000 cfs and fl ooded a

mately 26,000 acres of agricultural land, but farmers were still able t

and recreation use at Lake Carlyle reached 94 percent of what it was i

and 2003.156

The performance of reservoirs is perhaps best exemplifi ed by th

fl ood. During the event, federal fl ood control reservoirs stored over 17 

acre feet of water, none of which reached St. Louis until after the Augus

These reservoirs are estimated to have reduced fl ood levels at St. Louis b

feet. Mark Twain was fi lled and emptied three and a half times during th

fl ood, and average daily infl ows were as high as 92,000 cfs. Yet release

156 Joan Stemler and Jackie Taylor, “The Kaskaskia Flood of 2002: A Case Study on Cooperation 

fl icting Project Purposes” (St. Louis: MVS, 2002)
182

around 50 cfs. Water Control Managers at Mark Twain were able to ens

that the maximum release rate was observed whenever possible so that p

elevations could remain low. Yet discharge had to remain low during crit

periods to reduce fl ood levels downstream. Thus, Water Control Managers 

to constantly monitor conditions at their own reservoirs while at the same t

monitoring conditions downstream as well as forecasts for future precip

tion. While the 1993 fl ood was devastating, it could have been far worse ha

not been for the reservoirs. The experience gained in the 1993 fl ood helped 

district to prevent what could have been a devastating fl ood the very next y

Had it not been for Mark Twain and Truman lakes, fl ood stages could h

reached 47.4 feet in St. Louis. Yet the stage at St. Louis reached on 36.6 

because Truman Lake and Mark Twain Lake absorbed infl ows of 400,000 

and 75,000 cfs respectively, while only releasing 500 cfs and 50 cfs resp

tively. The fl ood stage could have been second only to that of the 1993 fl o

and yet because of the performance of the reservoirs, the 1994 fl ood beca

the disaster that never happened.157

Growth in District Responsibilities

The St. Louis District made several organizational changes to support n

work on reservoirs. One change was enlargement of the Real Estate Offi ce. C

ation of a reservoir required purchasing thousands of acres of land – not o

for building dams and spillways but also the land fl ooded to create the lakes

handle these transactions, the district created an enlarged Real Estate Offi 

The offi ce reached peak employment of 73 in 1967 in the Meramec proj

declining to between 20 and 30 personnel for most of the 1980s and 199

after which it reached a low of 15 personnel in 2007. This corresponded to 

number of fi eld offi ces the St. Louis District Real Estate Offi ce operated at res

voir sites – fi ve in 1967, declining to three in 1973, all of which were elimina

after 1978 with completion of the projects. These employed the majority of 

personnel in the offi ce. Led by Elmer Huizenga for more than 38 years (19

1973), the district’s Real Estate Offi ce had one of the best records of amica

resolution of condemnation suits in the Corps, obtaining 85 percent of l

tracts through voluntary purchase. In addition, as the number of recreat

157 James T. Lovelace and Claude N. Strauser, “Protecting Society from Flood Damage: A Case Study 

the 1993 Flood” (www.mvs-wc.mvs.usace.army.mil/papers/93fl ood/93fl ood.html, Jan. 13, 2012).
183

ations. The Corps employed dozens of park rangers and other emplo

manage camp grounds, wilderness areas, boat ramps, and swimming a

also maintained operators and technicians at each dam to manage the o

and water levels in the lake. Prior to 1966, the district had an integrate

struction-Operations Division, but the district created a separate Ope

Division by 1967 and a separate Recreation Resources Management 

in 1970 (later renamed the Natural Resources Management Branch). A 

voir offi ce opened at Carlyle in 1966, Shelbyville in 1970, Rend Lake i

Cannon in 1975, Wappapello in 1983, and Cannon Power Plant in 198

reservoir employed 30 to 40 personnel, increasing the operations total t

than 170 by 1983, where it has consistently remained until combination 

construction and operations divisions again in 1993.158

Despite the initial misgivings of the Corps about the cost-effective

reservoirs, ultimately, the Corps embraced them because, even when op

for local fl ood control as most were designed, they still aided fl ood cont

degree on the Mississippi River. There is little doubt that the reservoirs 

local communities. From 1985, the fi rst year after the last dam became 

tional, until 2010, the Shelbyville and Carlyle dams had prevented an est

$691 million in damages, Rend Dam $550 million, Wappapello Dam $1

lion, and Cannon Dam more than $2 billion. At the same time, the recre

areas built near the reservoirs generated anywhere from several hundre

sand dollars to more than $10 million in revenue annually, which prov

enormous boost to local communities. The Cannon Dam provided pow

throughout the state of Missouri by many rural areas that would not li

able to generate their own power. Such benefi ts often outweighed the hi

of federal investment in developing and operating these projects.159

158 Dobney, p. 144; Interview with Huizenga; District Organization Charts (MVS Archives). 159 Annual Report to Congress for Flood Damage Reduction; E-mail, Don Cool to Damon Mand

voir data, Apr. 26, 2011; One cubic foot of water per second amounts to 724 acre-feet per year.
184

Center for Dam 

Monitoring

The St. Louis District completed construction on the Clarence Cannon Dam 

1983. Because of its distance from district offi ces and to reduce overhead, by 198

had installed automated monitoring and management systems to allow the Kansas 

District (the closest to the dam) to remotely operate the dam. Based on this experie

Headquarters tasked the district to develop guidance and conduct PROSPECT clas

In 1995, Headquarters assigned the district as the Technical Center of Expertise (T

for Automated Performance Monitoring of Dams. The fi rst chief of the center was 

Brown.

As the TCX, the district provides support for agencies requiring aid in design

procuring, installing, integrating, training on, and maintaining systems for collect

transmitting, and reading data for monitoring and managing dams and related st

tures. Because of the lack of commercially available software, the district developed 

Instrumentation Database Package, which it ported to Microsoft Windows in 1996

of 2011, version 5.0 of the software was available.

As aging monitoring systems have reached obsolescence, one of the issues 

center faced was to upgrade systems. For example, in 2010, it helped upgrade hardw

and software for monitoring the Chief Joseph and Howard Hansen dams in the Sea

District. It helped replace 79 legacy data loggers – including hardware and softwa

that had been monitoring 980 instruments at the dams since the 1970s. Another m

issue faced by systems is grounding and lightning protection.

With continued downsizing of the Corps after 1990 and increased concern w

the safety of civil works after Hurricane Katrina and other fl oods, future work for 

TCX would likely increase. Based on its superior performance, the TCX was recerti

in 2012.160

160 “Clarence Cannon Dam and Mark Twain Lake,” Esprit (Feb. 1996): 6; “TCX for APMD,” Esprit (

1996): 3; “Automated Performance Monitoring of Dams,” Web page (http://www.mvs.usace.army

eng-con/expertise/ apmd.html, Aug. 19, 2011).
185

 11 

Flood Fighting and Flood Management

In addition to designing and building fl ood control works such as 

fl oodwalls, and reservoirs, the Corps of Engineers has also long been in

in responding to fl oods and other emergencies through fl ood fi ghting

gency response, and levee rehabilitation. Prior to World War II, these 

ties were mostly ad hoc. Because of widespread belief in limited gover

the federal government in general was only loosely involved in eme

response, and it was only as it gained responsibility for levee constructi

it aided in fl ood fi ghting activities such as sandbagging, patrolling an

ing up levees, and rescue or evacuation. This started to change only a

Great Flood 1927, one of the worst natural disasters in the twentieth c

Without an organized federal response to what was a national disaster, 

ing would have been much prolonged and the death count likely much 

With the recognition in 1936 that fl ood control was a federal responsib

was only a matter of time until Congress began to also take steps to p

for a federal response to natural disasters that overwhelmed local res

Starting with the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, increasing with establishm

the Federal Emergency Management Agency and passage of the Stafford 

the 1970s and 1980s, and culminating in the establishment of the Hom

Security Department and National Response Plan in 2004 and 2005, t

of Corps of Engineers and St. Louis District in fl ood fi ghting and eme

response continued to grow over the past century.

Prior to the twentieth century, the federal government had a minim

in fl ood response. With the creation of the Mississippi River Commis

1879 and a growing role in overseeing construction of levees and othe

control works, though often under the guise of navigational improveme

Corps of Engineers also gained responsibility for protecting and stren

ing these works. Using existing funding, the Corps could improve know

areas through construction of emergency berms or dikes, sandbaggin

standard height levees, and patrolling levees for signs of underseepage o

weaknesses, although local agencies often provided most of the labor a

of these fi xes as they had for many years. Other emergency response fun

such as evacuation or caring for refugees, were mostly private affairs
186

nationwide; most agencies operated under a patchwork of laws that were 

specifi c to national emergencies. When events outpaced the response of in

vidual agencies, the tendency was to create special teams to oversee these fu

tions, as actually happened during the Flood of 1927. President Calvin Cooli

created a Special Mississippi Flood Committee headed by Secretary of Co

merce Herbert Hoover that included the secretaries of war, navy, agricultu

and treasury. Because there was no funding set aside for the response 

Corps funding was dependent on local contributions, Secretary of War Dwi

Davis actually spent more than $7 million on nothing more than the prom

of House Appropriations Chairman Martin B. Madden that he would supp

ment the funds when Congress was in session. Even then, the main resour

provided by the Corps were for reconstruction, although they did provide bo

and airplanes to search for and rescue survivors. Care for refugees fell to 

Red Cross, for which Hoover helped to raise nearly $17 million. Although la

Flood Control Acts provided some funds for emergency purposes, this rar

exceeded one or two million dollars, mostly for levee repair.161

161 Pete Daniel, Deep’n As It Come: The 1927 Mississippi River Flood (Fayetteville, Ar.: University of Ar

sas Press, 1996): 14-175; Arthur D. Frank, The Development of the Federal Program of Flood Contr

the Mississippi River (NY: AMS, 1968): 193-198; U.S. Cong., Congressional Record, House, 70th Cong

Sess., Pt. 1 (Dec. 1927): 217-218. As Joan Wilson noted in, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Bo

Little, Brown, 1975): 78-121, the use of the Red Cross closely fi t Hoover’s view of volunteerism.

Grand Tower, Illinois, after levee break during 1927 fl ood
187

In 1950, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act (PL 81-875), whi

vided a fund for some emergency relief activities. It also authorized the 

to aid local authorities with planning, technical assistance, and eme

relief. Congress expanded these resources in the Emergency Flood C

Work Act of 1955 (PL 84-99), which authorized the Corps to suppor

fi ghting and other relief activities, as well as to repair damaged civil w

requested by local government. It required a presidential emergency d

tion to put the law in motion. At the same time, the White House made 

to improve coordination of emergency response through the Offi ce 

and Defense Mobilization and Offi ce of Emergency Planning, which m

executive emergency response from 1958 to 1973. It was not really un

when President Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency Mana

Agency (FEMA) in Executive Order 12127 that there was a federal ag

suffi cient resources to manage national or regional emergencies. FEM

tially had a mixed record of responding to major disasters such as Hu

Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, but President William J. 

greatly improved the agency by making it cabinet-level, expanding it

Flood fi ghting efforts at Swan Drainage and Levee District, Illinois River, 1943
188

Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288), as amended by the Rober

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 100-707) in 19

required the Corps to support FEMA and other agencies in planning for 

Flood fi ghting at Illinois River levee, 1943

Meramec fl ooding at Valley Park, 1945
189

such as debris removal, temporary roof repairs (i.e., blue roofs), or p

public buildings as well as supporting rescue and recovery, emergency 

ing, oil removal, and other tasks.162

Throughout the period immediately after World War II, even aft

sage of PL 81-875 and 84-99, the primary task of the Corps during eme

response operations remained fl ood fi ghting and levee rehabilitation. T

the late 1960s, the Mississippi Valley as a whole experienced numero

water years in what has been termed the “long dry spell.” After the F

1951, it was a decade before the next large fl ood in 1961, and then n

decade after that until the next fl ood. The response to the Flood of 19

perhaps typical. In fact, there were four fl oods that year in January

July, and October, affecting mostly the Mississippi, Illinois, Salt, and M

basins, with river stages in St. Louis reaching just over 40 feet in Ap

January and October fl oods were primarily fl ash fl oods, and the distric

mally staffed its response during these events. St. Louis District expe

162 U.S. Cong., Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, PL 93-288 (93rd Cong., 1st Sess.); Robe

ford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707 (100th Cong., 2nd Sess.); ER 

Christopher Cooper and Robert Block, Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland 

(NY: Times Books, 2006): 47-73.

Looking south from Eads Bridge during fl ood stage 39.3 feet, July 20, 1951
190

more than $30 million in damages in both Missouri and Illinois. The distri

response included conducting reconnaissance, providing advice to local ag

cies, operation of a fl ood fi ght center with the Red Cross in April and July t

coordinated with other agencies and military units operating in the regi

providing fl oating plant for rescue operations and levee patrols, and help

to shore up defenses where local agencies were incapable. Overall, the fede

fl ood control system held up well, with the majority of levee breaches in priv

levees, although there were sand boils where water boiled up on the land s

of the levee, slumping of levees, and bank caving requiring repair. Total rep

cost was only $179,000.163

The next major fl ood, and the last before the advent of FEMA, was 

Flood of 1973. Heavy rains from October 1972 to January 1973 in the Misso

and Upper Mississippi basins saturated the ground, and by February 1

the Upper Mississippi reached fl ood stages. By April 1, 1973, the fl ood st

at Cairo, Illinois had reached 55.67 feet. The maximum discharge reached 

the middle river was 850,000 cfs at St. Louis, where gages reached over 

feet for eight straight days, and nearby Alton, Illinois, saw record dischar

163 USACE, 1969 Floods (St. Louis: MVS, 1969): 1-22 and inc. 2.

Kaskaskia River fl ood at New Athens, Illinois, May 11, 1961
191

of more than 500,000 cfs. Operation of reservoirs in the Missouri and 

Mississippi reduced fl ow at St. Louis about two feet. Most breaches in th

system occurred above Grafton, Illinois Altogether, there were 11 br

of federal levees that resulted in $2.1 million in damages. For once, th

Flood fi ghting at Kaskaskia Island, 

March 31, 1973

Sandbagging at Arnold, Mo. during 

fl ood

Flood stage at St. Louis Floodwall, 1973 Crystal City, Mo. April 29, 1973

St. Louis fl oodwall just downstream of Eads 

Bridge during 1973 fl ood

Corps intelligence offi cer at fl ood fi gh

center, 1973
192

River and St. Francis River saw less impact and no major breaches, althou

the Lower Mississippi saw extensive fl ooding, with a total of $1.1 billion 

damages valley-wide. While the Mississippi River Commission activated 

Morganza Spillway and Bonnet Carré Spillway, it ended up fl ood fi ghting at 

Bird’s Point-New Madrid Floodway. The St. Louis District started emerge

operations on March 1 in Illinois and March 6 in Missouri, and continued 

operate for more than a month. As before, the district’s primary task wa

patrol the levees, coordinate with and advise local offi cials, help man the R

Cross fl ood fi ght center at Grafton, and provide fl ood fi ghting supplies s

as the 1.1 million sandbags, 30 pumps, 400 life preservers, and 350 roll

roofi ng plastic. In many areas, the district also provided services for whic

became well known in modern fl ood fi ghts – debris removal, utility resto

tion, road and public building repairs, as well as levee repairs.164

The Great Flood of 1993

While there were fl oods with localized impact in 1982 and 1983, the fi 

major fl ood after the institution of FEMA was the Flood of 1993. Prior to 19

164 USACE, Post-Flood Report, 1973 (Vicksburg, MS: LMVD, 1973): iii, 11-42, 53-71.

Relative fl ood stage of 1951 fl ood at Alton, Mo.
193

the largest fl ood on the middle Mississippi occurred in 1844. Althou

charge from this fl ood was estimated to have been approximately 1.3 

cfs, modern estimates have adjusted this to approximately 1 million c

1993 fl ood exceeded this total by approximately 80,000 cfs. This num

even more staggering considering that reservoirs decreased peak disch

an estimated 200,000 cfs, making the 1993 fl ood the greatest ever recor

the middle Mississippi and the supreme test of the Corps fl ood control sy

Rank, Magnitude (inches), and Date (month/year) of the F

Largest Precipitation Events Recorded on the Upper Missis

River Basin for Selected Durations.166

165 USACE, After Action Flood Report: Midwest Flood of 1993 (St. Louis: MVS, 1993); Gary Dyho

the Great Flood of 1993 all that great?” Esprit (Jan. 1999). 166 The Great Flood of 1993: Causes, Impacts, and Responses, ed. Stanley A. Changnon (Boulder: 

Press, 1996), 58.
194

than average precipitation covered much of the Upper Mississippi River Ba

Then, after a normal winter, the spring rains came, producing the wet

period experienced in the upper basin in 99 years, with precipitation be

150 percent or greater in some areas. This heavy precipitation, especially w

combined with the saturated state of the soil, produced the great fl ood that 

lowed. On June 26, the Mississippi River reached fl ood stage and would rem

there (except for a few hours on September 14) continuously until Octobe

On August 1, the river reached its peak fl ood stage at the St. Louis gage, rea

ing 49.58 ft with a discharge of 1,080,000 cfs. Damages resulting from th

fl ows would have been far greater were it not for the fl ood control system 

place on the upper Mississippi. This system consisted of three componen

agricultural levees, urban levees/fl oodwalls, and fl ood control reservoirs

total, there are around 1,600 levees above St. Louis, approximately 95 perc

of which are agricultural levees. These are small, mostly privately owned lev

constructed to protect productive farmland from seasonal fl ooding. Dur

larger fl oods, these levees are designed to overtop so that they can relieve pr

sure on the levees/fl oodwalls protecting urban areas. The other 5 percent 

urban levees/fl oodwalls that protect more densely populated areas and cr

cal infrastructure (bridge approaches, interstates, commerce, chemical pla

and manufacturing, water plants, etc) from larger fl oods. Reservoirs hold b

water in the tributaries to reduce pressure on the levees along the main ch

nel. Each component of this system must be considered as part of a whol

order to assess its overall effi cacy.167

The Corps had 251 levees in the fi ve upper Mississippi basin districts, 

of which were affected by the 1993 fl ood. Of those affected, 157 preven

fl ooding that would have inundated over 1 million acres and caused an e

mated $7.4 billion in damages. The Corps’ urban levees and fl oodwalls w

especially effective, protecting vital areas with high population densities fr

inundation. The fact that fl ows did not overtop a single urban levee is a te

ment to the system’s effi cacy. Of the 36 remaining agricultural levees, 32 m

their design capacity, only overtopping when this capacity had been exceed

In fact, many levees actually withstood fl oodwaters above their design cap

ity. At the request of locals, the Corps breached the other four levees bef

they reached design capacity so that they would not overtop. By intention

167 USACE, AAR: Midwest Flood of 1993 (St. Louis: MVS, 1993); GAO, Midwest Flood: Information o

Performance, Effects, and Control of Levees (Wash., D.C.: GPO, 1997).
195

nating damages from scouring that would have occurred if the leve

been allowed to overtop. Breaching these levees may have fl ooded far

but it also relieved pressure on other levees and fl oodwalls in the system

giving added protection to vital urban areas such as St. Louis. In all, fl 

at these levees caused an estimated $450 million in damages, and al

a large sum, this pales in comparison to damages that the levee syste

vented. The Corps had designed its levee system to protect vital urba

and the system had done just that. In addition to the Corps levees, non-

St. Louis fl oodwall
196

dotted the basin. However, these levees were not Corps-operated nor were t

designed to withstand major fl ooding events like the 1993 fl ood. Rather, t

were designed to protect farmlands from fl oods ranging from a frequency o

to 50 years.168

Reservoirs, the other component of the fl ood control system, provided f

ther relief during the 1993 fl ood, holding back more than 20 million acre-f

water at just the right time to relieve pressure on the levee system by reduc

fl ood stages in urban areas. For example, reservoirs at Mark Twain and Car

set new record pool elevations of 636.9 and 455.53 respectively. The dist

carefully monitored discharge from these reservoirs so that minimum rele

could be used when fl ood crests were occurring at downstream locations. Th

the downstream movement of water held in reservoirs could be delayed so t

the water would arrive after the crest. The Corps was able to use these 

other reservoirs in its system to reduce the fl ood stage at St. Louis by 3 to 5 f

Since the Corps designed the St. Louis fl oodwall for 52 ft plus two feet of fr

board, the use of reservoirs reduced the fl ood stage at St. Louis just enou

to protect against a potential catastrophic failure. While levees did raise fl 

stages higher by confi ning the fl ow to a narrower portion of the fl oodpl

reservoirs held back the additional fl ow, thereby having the cumulative ef

of reducing fl ooding.169

Although levees and reservoirs had the net effect of reducing fl ooding on 

system, numerous fl ood fi ghting challenges remained. One challenge was fo

casting fl ood stages, as the Corps forecasts consistently predicted fl ood sta

higher than those predicted by the National Weather Service (NWS) dur

the 1993 fl ood event. Flood fi ghting efforts depending on accurate foreca

of fl ood stages, so missing the mark by even a miniscule margin could mak

huge difference. In the district’s engineering judgment, the river would cres

the St. Louis gage at around two feet higher than what the NWS was forec

ing. The NWS and other forecasting agencies all had the river going down a

July 24. However, the district, which understood the complexities of this ri

system, forecast that the river had not yet crested and would reach over 49 

on the St. Louis gage by the end of July or beginning of August. Thankfu

168 Ibid; James T. Lovelace and Claude N. Strauser, “Protecting Society from Flood Damage: A Case S

from the 1993 Flood” (www.mvs-wc.mvs.usace.army.mil/papers/93fl ood/93fl ood.html, Jan. 13, 2012

169 Lovelace and Strauser, “Protecting Society from Flood Damage: A Case Study from the 1993 Flo

GAO, Midwest Flood (Wash., D.C.: GPO, 1997).
197

District Engineer Col. James Craig trusted the judgment of district en

and sent out word to prepare for 49 feet. Although offi cial federal respo

ity for forecasting rested with the NWS and it was not the responsibility 

Corps to contradict the NWS’s public forecast, the district could comp

by advising fl ood fi ghters that it would be prudent to prepare for NWS f

plus an additional two feet of freeboard. The district’s advice allowed 

fl ood fi ghting in the various levee districts to be better prepared for wh

Levee overtopping during 1993 fl ood

Mississippi at normal stage and during the 1993 fl ood
198

actual crest did occur. Ultimately, the judgment of the district proved corr

as the river crested at 49.53 feet on the St. Louis gage.170

Another challenge was ensuring that the fl oodwalls and levees held b

the massive wall of water beyond them. In densely populated urban areas 

St. Louis, a failure would be catastrophic, potentially causing billions of d

lars in damages. Flood fi ghters had to combat cracking, underseepage, 

sand boils at levees and fl oodwalls. The St. Louis fl oodwall nearly gave w

after experiencing severe cracking and underseepage, but the district sho

up one section with rock and built ring levees around boils, preventing the w

from failing. At Ste. Genevieve, the levees leaked considerably but held a

the district increased their height to 50 feet using sandbags. At Fort Chart

because a drainage culvert would not open, local offi cials requested that 

Corps breach a levee to allow water out of a back fl ooded area, which it 

on August 4. Engineers leading the fl ood fi ghting efforts often had to m

decisions rapidly and on the spot, relying largely on their knowledge and ex

rience as guidance. The efforts of these fl ood fi ghters, combined with the str

tural fl ood control system of levees, fl oodwalls, and reservoirs, was estima

to have reduced potential fl ood damages by over 50 percent. Moreover, al

the levees/fl oodwalls built to urban design standards withstood the wrath 

the river.171

After the fl ood stage peaked on August 1, the district had to begin releas

the water that it had held back in reservoirs. The challenge for the Corps w

how to go about releasing the water in such a way that it restored the capa

of the reservoirs while at the same time not prolonging fl ood levels on the M

sissippi. The navigation industry had already lost an estimated $100 mill

170 Interview with Dave Busse, Nov. 10, 1995 (MVS Archives); Interview with Jack Niemi, Nov. 1995 (

Archives).

171 Lovelace and Strauser, “Protecting Society from Flood Damage: A Case Study from the 1993 Flood

August 8, 1993 After fl ood
199

needed to ensure that water was released from the reservoirs in such a w

commercial navigation could return to the river. The district carefully 

tored weather forecasts, rainfall, and rainfall runoff computations, usi

information to determine the optimum amount of water it should relea

its reservoirs so that navigation could return to the river while at the sam

minimizing any potential hazards to levees. The district’s efforts allowe

gation to resume on the river at the earliest possible time, saving milli

the navigation industry and the consumer.172

Flood Fighting after 1993

Only two years later, in 1995, the district faced another fl ood fi gh

twice the normal spring rainfall in the Dakotas, Kansas, and the Ohio 

and 325 percent higher than normal rainfall in St. Louis that May, th

reached fl ood stages by mid- month, reaching a peak of 41.8 feet at St

on May 22. It was above fl ood stage for 52 straight days. Peak dischar

800,000 cfs at St. Louis and 857,000 cfs at Chester. There were num

challenges, with local levees failing on the East Side and nearly all loca

at St. Charles, but once again no federal levees failed, although at le

levees would have overtopped had it not been for Corps reservoirs. T

trict operated its EOC from May 17 to June 6, managing 183 district p

nel. The president declared Illinois a disaster area on May 30 and Miss

June 3. The district provided 3 million sandbags, 36 pumps, and 2,00

of plastic. The fl ood fi ght was extremely active in numerous location

as the Illinois River, Kaskaskia, St. Louis, and St. Charles. In 1993, sin

threatened to undermine the St. Louis fl oodwall at Riverview Blvd. In 1

district constructed a rock berm to prevent uncontrolled underseepage 

levee at Kaskaskia Island. As in 1993, navigation was a major challenge t

district had to closely manage. Four of fi ve locks in the district closed, 

as the lower 80 miles of the Illinois River. When the Corps and Coast 

established the Joint Traffi c Control Center, it also included representa

the tow industry, earning high praise from industry representatives. The 

developed processes for conducting test tows with industry to get lock

172 Ibid.
200

closing.173

Emergency response in the Corps changed dramatically after the terro

attacks of September 11, 2001. The creation of the Department of Homel

Security, the placement of FEMA under it, and the creation of an agency 

manage grant programs required some adjustments in operation. In additi

the development of a National Response Plan in 2004 to manage all natio

emergencies introduced new agencies and processes. Signed by all fede

agencies involved, the plan did not introduce new law but provided a str

ture to better meet legal requirements. The plan used the National Incid

Management System – a system developed by state emergency workers 

California and elsewhere – that introduced standard organizations and ter

nology. Upon presidential declaration of emergency and DHS declaration 

incident of national signifi cance, FEMA would establish a Joint Field Offi ce 

each region affected. Among its offi cials was a Federal Coordinating Offi 

who helped coordinate the federal response. The plan included 15 Emerge

Support Functions, each assigned a federal lead. The Corps of Engineers w

responsible for No. 3, Public Works and Engineering, but had responsibili

supporting several others. Along with other agencies, the Corps would t

establish Recovery Field Offi ces, typically near the Joint Field Offi ce so a

coordinate with FEMA and other agencies. The Corps nevertheless also had 

traditional responsibilities for fl ood control and repair under PL 84-99 and 

Stafford Act.174

While there was minor fl ooding in 2002, it did not exceed 40 feet 

St. Louis, and the fl ood control system mitigated its impact, although th

was severe fl ooding at the Wappapello reservoir and other locations. “It w

about a normal fl ood,” Jake Scanlon said. The largest fl ood after the Natio

Response Plan went into effect was in 2008. It was actually two major fl 

events. After heavy winter snowfall in Ohio and from Iowa to Wisconsin, M

souri experienced the wettest March on record and the third wettest May. C

Girardeau and Jackson, Missouri, reached new 48-hour rainfall records. T

spring fl ood crested at 30.7 feet at St. Louis and 41 feet at Cape Girardeau 

April. Additional rainfall in Wisconsin in early June sent the Des Moines 

Skunk rivers to record stages, while more rain fell in late June over the M

souri River Valley. The summer fl ood crested at 29.5 feet at St. Charles on 

173 USACE, After Action Flood Report: Midwest Flood of 1995 (St. Louis: MVS, 1995): 1-14. 174 Cooper and Block, pp. 131-3; DHS, National Response Plan (N.P.: DHS, Dec. 2004): 8-19, 22-39
201

St. Louis and Chester on July 1, and at 42 feet at Cape Girardeau on July 

fl ood stretched all along the Middle Mississippi.175

The district EOC operated from March 18 to May 21 and then agai

June 10 to July 18, 2008. During its operation, 85 employees worked 

EOC and four of the seven fl ood fi ght areas. The district distributed 6

sandbags and 322 rolls of plastic sheet during the spring fl ood and 2

lion sandbags, 12 pumps, and 1,000 rolls of plastic during the summe

It was a hard-fought fl ood. Two levees overtopped at Miller Pond nea

Girardeau and Vandalia near Kaskaskia, Illinois, on March 18 and 2

numerous other slides and sand boils reported. During the summer 

13 levees overtopped, including at Winfi eld, 

Kuhs, Elm Point, and Columbia Bottoms, 

with severe scour reported at Ste. Genevieve. 

This inundated more than 60,000 acres. The 

district was able to recover from a slide at the 

Wood River levees and prevented scour from 

weakening a levee at Ste. Genevieve using rock 

berms, prevented breaches along the Illinois 

River and the East Side Levees through placing ring levees around sand boils and by constant monitoring, and investigated a leak at 

a gravity drain at Degognia. The spring fl ood 

briefl y closed the Kaskaskia Lock, but the 

summer fl ood closed Lock 25 and 25 and the 

Kaskaskia Lock for more than 20 days. Lock 

26 and 27 remained open. Once again, a team 

that included the Corp, the Coast Guard, and 

the transportation industry monitored events 

and evaluated requests for emergency movement. The president declared several counties 

in southern Missouri a disaster area on March 

19 and on June 25 declared 22 counties in 

Missouri a disaster area while declaring it an 

175 Scanlon quoted in “Flood Fight of 2002,” Esprit (May 2002): 1-5; USACE, Mississippi Riv

Flood 2008 After Action Report (St. Louis: MVS, 2008): 1-8, 15-18; USACE, Mid-West Flood 2

Action Report (St. Louis: MVS, 2008): 1-9.

Col. Thomas E. O’Hara

Col. Christopher G. Hall
202

incident of national signifi cance. Aside from the major fl ood fi ghts, the dist

spent nearly $38,000 supporting Emergency Support Function No. 3. It sp

$4 million on both fl oods.176

Flood Forecasting

Part of the Corps response to the annual high waters and bi- or trienn

fl oods included efforts to forecast the fl oods so as to reduce fl ood impact. T

Corps normally forecasted all river conditions, both high and low water

an attempt to support and manage navigation. Corps offi ces used such fo

casts to manage a range of operational issues including annual dredging 

operation of reservoirs. Prior to 1980, attempts to forecast fl oods with 

precision faced the same challenges weather forecasters faced – manual d

collection and small numbers of data points provided incomplete picture

trends that did not allow more than 24 to 48-hour forecasts with any ac

racy. This situation improved greatly in the digital age. Instead of manu

collecting data from gages once or twice a day, the Corps established dig

gages that broadcast data by radio wave on an hourly basis, allowing for ea

and faster collection and more thorough trend analysis. The availability of 

ellite and radar imagery for every section of the country, especially after 

176 Mississippi Flood 2008 AAR, pp. 9-24; Mid-West Flood 2008 AAR, pp. 9-38.
203

forecasters to determine weather patterns. By the late 1980s the data b

accurate enough to allow long-term forecasting needed to support fl oo

ing. By determining how high fl ood water would reach in various loc

the Corps could place sandbags, teams, or other resources far in advan

Corps developed software to integrate real-time radar, rainfall data, an

observations to create mathematical models and terrain visualizations 

forecasting. Although data collection was automatic, users set some 

eters based on engineering experience. The Flood of 1993 was the fi rst in 

Corps forecasts played a major role, with the district accurately predic

in advance that fl ood heights at St. Louis would reach nearly 50 feet. Al

questioned by the National Weather Service and others, the fi nal resu

onstrated the accuracy of the experienced Corps analysts. The models 

make this forecast served primarily an internal audience, but after 199

local agencies and the navigation industry increasingly started to reques

forecast products, including models, maps, and visualizations, which he

communicate the timing of fl ood crests.177

As the district worked to improve the products it provided to its c

ers, several other changes helped to vastly improve forecasts. From 

1997, it further refi ned its modeling software. The Levee Safety Program

tuted after questions arose about levee safety following Hurricane Kat

2005 and established as a long-term program in 2007, resulted in th

thorough inventory of levees in the St. Louis District. This allowed fore

to have an even better understanding of which levees would overtop a

time, and how this would affect fl ooding. When the public complain

river forecasts provided by the federal government during the Flood o

were inconsistent, unreliable, and not widely distributed, Mississippi 

Division Commander Maj. Gen. Michael J. Walsh held a conference to i

gate the issue. He discovered that most users found St. Louis District fo

exceptional, but other agency forecasts were less so. Although the N

Weather Service, U.S. Geological Service, and other Corps districts ofte

the same data, their assumptions and use of the data varied widely. As 

of the conference, the Corps established a fusion team of forecasters fr

177 Damon Manders, Interview with Dave Busse, July 11, 2011; “Engineering Innovation in the 

District,” Esprit (Feb. 1997): 1-2.
204

was even greater accuracy, proved most recently in the Flood of 2011.178

The fl oods of 1993, 1995, 2008, and 2011 were some of the largest fl o

the Middle Mississippi River and Missouri River had ever known, and thou

they caused several million dollars in fl ood damages, fl ood control works b

by the Corps of Engineers prevented billions of dollars in additional damag

While much of this protection was due to the quality of the structures, 

integrity of the structures was due in part to the efforts of the Corps in fo

casting, managing, and responding to the fl oods through vigilance and pro

tive measures. Additional efforts in support of FEMA and other agencies to 

in rescue, emergency engineering, and rehabilitation of public works gre

alleviated fl ooding and suffering that occurred as a result of overtopping 

breaching of the levees. Such responsibilities had evolved since World War 

and continued to expand as federal responsibilities to respond to disasters a

grew. The St. Louis District had become increasingly involved in emerge

activities as a result of these requirements, both in fl ood fi ghting and aid

fl ood victims. Yet perhaps the greatest emergency response achievement of 

St. Louis District came, not within district boundaries, but far to the south

was this that proved its mettle in modern disaster response.

178 Ibid.
205

The Great Flood Fight 

of 1993

As the spring of 1993 approached, winter snow began to melt, and snowfall 

spring showers, all of which combined to pour more and more water into the 

Mississippi. But spring rains and rising water levels in the region were nothi

especially for district engineers who understood the complex nature of the r

May, it looked as though the river had fi nally crested and would begin to recede

rain just kept coming. Throughout May and June, water levels remained high 

July 1, the district’s primary focus became fi ghting this great fl ood. This effor

required personnel to pull together in a singular cause, consumed the district t

out the rest of the summer.

Months before the July 1 opening of the Emergency Operations Center

Control had been preparing for the fl ood fi ght to come. Emergency Operations

cert with the Water Control Section, advised locals, provided them with fl ood 

supplies, and administered construction contracts. Individuals from water con

EOC worked between 14 and 16 hours a day seven days a week throughout th

fl ood fi ght, and by July 8, these were open 24 hours a day seven days a week.

On July 23, three small sandboils in close proximity were discovered on t

kaskia Island Levee at the toe of the 100-foot wide seepage berm. As the d

gressed, the three sandboils were becoming larger and larger, carrying more an

District personnel at the Emergency Operations Center during the 1993 fl ood
206

foundation sands and silts. The levee district’s volunteers were vigorously build

larger sandbag rings to try to control the three sandboils. Shortly before midni

the three sandboils merged into a single, large sandboil that fl owed uncontrolla

carrying dark gray sand and silt with intermittent belches of foamy and frothy air 

water. The levee district volunteers built a larger sandbag ring around the sandboil 

uncontrolled seepage fl ows decreased as the water level in the ring rose. Mark A

and Steve O’Connor were called around midnight to assist the Kaskaskia Island Le

District. By the time Alvey and O’Connor arrived on the site, the sandboil had calm

down but was still making dirty water by carrying fi ne sand and silt. At approxima

9:00 am on July 22, the sandboil suddenly erupted violently, fl owing with a two-

diameter fountain. Alvey, Christopher Coe, and Herb Klein (Levee Commission

were trying to raise the sandbag ring to hold more water over the sandboil. Alvey 

throwing sandbags into the throat of the sandboil only to have the sandbags th

back at him. The grass-covered ground surrounding the sandboil started vibrating 

slowly rising in front of him. Alvey shouted for the others to stop throwing sandb

and run for high ground. Charlie Dees from Rend Lake observed that a transv

crack had formed across the levee crown as the sandboil appeared to explode from 

water pressure that was nearly black in color from the eroded silt. The levee collap

into the void scoured by the enormous, uncontrolled fl ows through the sandboil. 

levee completely breached by 9:30 am, just less than 24 hours after being discove

as 3 small sandboils. The resulting scour hole was measured to be an average dept

50 feet with a total volume of 1 million cubic yards of displaced silt and sand depos

on the surrounding farm fi elds.

On July 24, just two days after fl oods breached the Kaskaskia Island Levee, A

was working with Ken Klaus and Richard Hagan fl ood fi ghting at Bois Brule. A

Klaus and Hagan returned to their hotel after a 14-hour shift, they received a ca

telling them that a sand boil had erupted and required their attention. The two m

rushed to the site and began working on the boil, but they soon had to redirect t

attention to saving a Corps employee who was plunged into the river after a sectio

the levee broke. This man was Harold Smith, a long-time district maintenance wor

Harold Smith’s Corps vehicle found one mile away from levee breech
207

tion of the levee broke. Smith, who heard the sound of running water, rushe

truck to back it away from the sandboils. Just as he stepped into his truck, t

breached a nearby section of the levee. Water quickly rushed in, overturning 

truck and thrusting him out of his truck and into the current. Smith was badly 

and fi ghting for his life, but miraculously, he was still alive. Meanwhile, Kl

Hagan were rushing to the location to see if they fi nd the lost Corps employee. 

fully, Hagan was from Bois Brule and used this knowledge to navigate back r

fi nd Smith. Hagan eventually found Smith clinging to life on the levee and rush

to the hospital, where he remained for the next four days. Smith’s truck wa

lucky, as the district vehicle was not recovered until Easter Sunday 1994, a frig

reminder of just how narrowly Smith had escaped death.

As water levels continued to rise in early July, the district had to close i

and dams and by July 11, all traffi c on the Mississippi above the Ohio River 

a halt. Lock and Dam 25 essentially became an island and fl ood fi ghters and s

had to be taken to the area by boat. At Melvin Price, the concerned crew ne

watched the river rise closer and closer to overtopping the lock walls. Crews co

fi ghting the fl ood, coming to and from their 12-hour shifts via johnboat. To ma

ters worse, crewmembers had to endure 100-degree heat, often working wa

in water to try to protect the billion-dollar facility. When water levels fi nally b

recede, the crew had to rush to put the vital structure back in operation onc

which it did on August 17.

Flood fi ghting was also intense at the district’s levees, as fl ood fi ghters had 

vigorously to save the levees while at the same time ensuring the safety of the 

in the surrounding area. Sometimes the efforts to save levees were successfu

times not. At Prairie du Rocher, fl ood fi ghters won a well-deserved victory. Des

tenacious and exhausting efforts of fl ood fi ghters, the Kaskaskia, Columbia, a

risonville levees had all been breached, and fl ood fi ghters at Prairie du Roche

Crew at control house of Melvin Price L&D during the 1993 fl ood
208

their levee was next. District engineers Claude Strauser and George Postal propos

controlled breach at Stringtown-Ft. Chartres to relieve pressure on the levee and ho

fully save it from a more devastating failure. On August 3, the district breached 

levee while fl ood fi ghters continued to sandbag. In the end, the risky strategy work

and the fl ood fi ghters earned a well-deserved victory.

Another major victory occurred at the Keach Levee, where fl ood fi ghters fou

to save valuable farmland near the Illinois River. Because the fl ood occurred in J

and August, crops were on the ground and a breach would destroy the harvest, wh

would have a devastating economic impact for people in the region. However, fl 

fi ghters were able to prevent an overfl ow by using sandbags and a wooden fl ood fe

to raise the height of the levee. As the river continued to rise, the levee was eventu

breached. District personnel, National Guardsman and local farmers continued to fi 

to save the levee, risking their lives in the process. Yet their efforts were ultima

successful, as they were able to brace the levee and repair the breach. These are ju

few examples of the courage exhibited by fl ood fi ghters during the 1993 fl ood. W

each of them may have different roles as district employees, nevertheless, each joi

together, sacrifi cing their time and in many cases, risking their very lives, all in a co

erative effort to fi ght the fl ood and help their fellow citizens.

Mark Alvey, far right, and others ringing a sandboil on Kaskaskia Island
209

 12 

Task Force Guardian and Hurricane Respons

It is ironic that of the modern fl ood fi ghting duties embraced by th

locked St. Louis District, the one that earned it signifi cant recogniti

in response to a tropical hurricane. Assigned the mission of support

Mississippi Valley Division in responding to a hurricane event, the St

District fi rst fulfi lled this requirement in the aftermath of Hurricane K

Striking on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina was the most devastati

ricane in history, causing $81 billion in damages, together with Hurrican

which struck less than a month later on September 24 in western Lou

Katrina was the third deadliest hurricane, causing more than 1,500 

The storms were both within the top 10 most intense storms on reco

Katrina was one of the largest on record in New Orleans, despite the fa

both were only Category Three on the Saffi r/Simpson scale at landfall. K

produced the largest storm surge on record throughout much of the 

area (27 feet) and the largest waves ever measured in North America (5

The response to Katrina and Rita was the largest in the Corps, involvin

than 6,000 employees and three divisions across a fi ve-state area ove

than two years. Another 3,000 employees from other agencies also sup

the Corps. Leading the effort in Mississippi and Louisiana was the Miss

Valley Division, whose response eventually involved all of its districts, 

ing the St. Louis District, which had responsibility for levee rehabilita

became the job of the district to oversee construction or rehabilitation o

than 220 miles of levees and fl oodwalls in a mere nine months, one of th

est construction projects ever attempted by the Corps.179

The involvement of the St. Louis District in hurricane response ori

in 1998 with the Readiness 2000 program. The Headquarters of the 

of Engineers (HQUSACE) developed the program to guide divisio

response to major disasters using multidiscipline and multidistrict pl

and response teams, prescripted mission assignments, advanced cont

179 Eric S. Blake, Edward N. Rappaport, and Christopher W. Landsea, The deadliest, Costliest, 

Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2006 (and Other Frequently Requested H

Facts) (Miami: NHC, 2007): 5; Manders, David Tajkowski, and Mike Dace, Rebuilding Hope: A H

the Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Vicksburg: MVD, 2011): v-13; on discrepancies be

Saffi r/Simpson Scale and other hurricane factors, see Debi Iacovelli, “The Saffi r/Simpson Hurric

An Interview with Dr. Robert Simpson,” Mariners Weather Log 43:1 (April 1999): 10-12.
210

After Hurricane Georges passed north of New Orleans later that year, the M

sissippi Valley Division started developing a contingency plan based on Rea

ness 2000 concepts. According to the plan, if the New Orleans District w

incapable of functioning, the other districts in the division would assume 

mission: Memphis and Vicksburg Districts would handle Federal Emerge

Management Agency (FEMA) engineering missions such as debris remo

St. Paul and Rock Island Districts would support ice, water, and housing m

sions; and St. Louis District would handle civil works missions. Developed 

tested over several years, Division Commander Brig. Gen. Robert Crear sig

the plan in May 2005, allowing only a single opportunity to train on it in 20

during Hurricane Dennis prior to Hurricane Katrina in August.180

On Thursday, August 25, 2005, Bill Frederick, the National Weather S

vice employee assigned to the division, started to track the storm, and Gene

Crear prepared to put the plan into action. The division received its fi rst ta

ers from FEMA on the Saturday before the storm, and Crear pushed these 

180 William Irwin, “Readiness 2000 tested by storms,” Engineer Update (Oct. 1998): online; “Missis

Valley Division Hurricane Contingency Plan (CONPLAN),” May 18, 2005.

Aerial view of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
211

The New Orleans District started 

its evacuation and preparations for 

the storm. The storm struck the following Monday, and although New 

Orleans received minimal damage 

from the storm, the fact that large 

areas of the city had fl ooded to 

10 feet or more confi rmed that 

there must have been breaches in 

the levee system surrounding the 

city. Within days, Corps personnel 

that remained behind in the city 

had identifi ed major holes in two 

of the drainage canals running into 

Lake Pontchartrain, as well as in 

the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal 

(IHNC) and along the Mississippi 

River-Gulf Outlet. There were also 

several Mississippi River and hurricane protection levees that received severe damage, with literally do

breaches over several miles in Plaquemines Parish near the Gulf of M

Many of the navigation canals and locks in Louisiana were clogged with 

and the Coast Guard shut down the Mississippi River for several days a

ited traffi c for part or all of the lower river for two weeks. With 80 per

the city inundated and most of the 22 pump stations in the city not fu

ing, by Friday, September 2, Crear called on Rock Island District to 

the unwatering mission as Task Force Unwatering. Its job was to mak

porary repairs to the breaches and remove the water through gravity, p

pumps, and restoration of the New Orleans drainage system. He also n

Col. Lewis Setliff of the St. Louis District of his intent to stand up a task 

rebuild the broken levees with a deadline of June 1, 2006, the beginnin

next year’s hurricane season.181

181 Damon Manders, Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert Crear, May 29, 2007; James Stark to Cre

Transition/Mission Close Out Plan – Hurricane Katrina (FEMA Louisiana Transitional Recovery O

MVD); Manders et al., 27-58, 127-128.

Corps Emergency Operations person

17th Street in New Orleans

Aerial shot of 17th Street after Hurric

Katrina
212

Setliff immediately started organizing 

teams and planning the response, and on 

September 14, 2005, received initial funding 

of $450,000 to start work on damage assessments and surveys. Initial teams moved to division headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi, 

to coordinate collection of aerial photography and other data to determine levee heights 

before the storms. By September 19, he had 

established project teams for four geographic 

areas (Orleans East Bank, New Orleans East, 

St. Bernard Parish, and Plaquemines Parish), 

as well as teams for fi nding borrow pits to acquire levee material and for ba

removal to work with the Coast Guard to move barges off levees requir

repair. Delayed by Hurricane Rita, which struck September 24, the adva

party from St. Louis arrived in New Orleans on September 26. The remain

of the 73-person task force moved to New Orleans on September 28, and 

September 29, the Corps introduced Task Force Guardian to the public. It la

brought on additional personnel and contractors to raise the total numbe

more than 200 task force employees by January 2006. By the end of Octob

it required additional facilities and rented a fl oor in the recently repaired F

eral Reserve Bank Building in downtown New Orleans on October 26, wher

would remain until completion of the mission in June 2006.182

According to the process established in PL 84-99, Corps district comma

ers must inform local authorities that they have 30 days to request repai

fl ood control works. Once it receives a request for rehabilitation, the Co

develops a Project Information Report (PIR) detailing the damages. As w

the original project, the benefi t-cost ratio for repairs has to exceed 1.0, lo

authorities have to pay for a percentage of construction, and the Corps 

only restore levees to authorized project heights The task force built its P

on surveys completed by September 14 using Light Detection and Rang

(LIDAR), which uses lasers bounced off the ground from a plane to quic

182 David Tajkowski, Interview with Col. Lewis Setliff, May 11, 2007; Commander’s Assess., Sept. 14

Oct. 19-29, 2005; Commander’s Briefi ng, Oct. 19-27, 2005 (TF Hope Historical Documentation, Vol. 

SITREP-TF Guardian, Oct. 1-2, 18-22, 2005 (ENGLINK or OH, MVD electronic fi les); Manders et al

184-188. 

Col. Lewis F. Setliff
213

of Expertise for Photogrammetric Services, the St. Louis District had r

experts in LIDAR and served most Corps districts as well as agencie

as the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servi

other military services. Once it collected data, the task force compare

with data and photographs from before the storm to determine the a

of fi ll required and develop a cost estimate. It was proceeding with sur

mid-September. Local levee districts submitted all requests for rehabi

by early October, and the task force completed PIRs for Orleans East B

October 18, New Orleans East on October 19, and St. Bernard and Plaqu

parishes by the end of the month, but it revised them by December an

uary based on new information. Even as it collected additional inform

the task force was proceeding with preparing contracts for the fi rst proj

St. Bernard Parish and other locations.183

There were many initial obstacles to proceeding. The biggest issues i

PIRs were how to repair the fl oodwalls on the 17th Street, London Aven

Orleans canals that drained into Lake Pontchartrain; the large number 

in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and Gulf Intracoastal Waterway; 

183 Interview with Setliff; “Corps of Engineers to Restore Pre-Katrina Protection in New Orleans

news release, Sept. 29, 2005; “CEMVS – Center of Expertise for Photogrammetric Mapping,” 

(http://mvs-wc.mvs.usace.army.mil/tcx.html, July 18, 2011); Manders et al., pp. 185-200.

Construction of sheet piling on 17th Street
214

near total devastation of many miles of the New Orleans to Venice and M

sissippi River levees in Plaquemines Parish. “The outfall canals were proba

the biggest challenge we were faced with that we did not know about go

in,” Setliff later stated. It would be diffi cult to make all of the repairs gi

the two or three-year estimates for completing some of them. The high cos

the repairs – initially $287.7 million, revised to $638.5 million – also pose

problem, as most local government agencies simply lacked the resources to 

20 percent of repairs as required by law. “Using normal processes during 

contingency just would not work, for instance, using a cost share for making 

repairs because you had a community with no tax base at all. There was nob

there,” Setliff said. On October 12, 2005, Assistant Secretary of the Army 

Civil Works John Paul Woodley approved a one-time waiver from cost shar

requirements and made the arrangements with the Offi ce of Management 

Budget and Congress. Finally, there were funding issues. Funding for rehab

tation came from two primary sources: Flood Control and Coastal Emerge

funds from HQUSACE and operations and maintenance (O&M) funds u

primarily to restore Mississippi River levees. By October 9, the task force 

awarded 10 contracts worth $86 million; on October 19 it had another $78 m

lion available in FCCE funds, but it was advertising or awarding contracts wo

Sheet piling construction at canal in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
215

$122 million. HQUSACE reprogrammed another $150 million, but by O

28 it was out of money as the Army worked to transfer more funds. By t

of November, it had awarded 36 of 45 expected contracts worth $245 m

but it continued to struggle with just-in-time funding.184

Task Force Guardian faced other issues as construction proceede

was making sure not to duplicate the errors of the past. By the time t

force arrived in New Orleans, Louisiana State University, the Unive

California at Berkeley, and the American Society of Civil Engineers 

had all started investigations into why the fl oodwalls along the Lake 

chartrain canals and the IHNC had 

failed – these works had not only 

overtopped but shifted several feet 

causing the largest breaches in the 

city’s defenses. On October 10, 2005, 

the Corps established the Interagency Performance Evaluation 

Task Force (IPET), which involved 

150 nationally recognized scientists 

184 Setliff quotes from Interview with Setliff; Manders et al., pp. 190-200; Commander’s Assessm

19-25, Nov. 1-15, 19, 27, 30, 2005; Commander’s Briefi ng, Oct. 21, Dec. 11, 2005 (TF Hope, Vol. 4-6

the PIRs dated Oct. 17, 18, and 19, Nov. 30, and Dec. 13, 2005; and Jan. 5 and 20, 2006.

Repair of levee breach in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina

Flexiboat bridges used as waterbase

platforms for closing of canal breach
216

independent peer review by ASCE and the National Research Council. A

discovered issues impacting rehabilitation, IPET would share information w

Task Force Guardian, and task force members sat in on weekly IPET upda

Several of its fi ndings proved crucial. In its January 10, 2006, prelimin

report, IPET found that there were likely design fl aws and foundation iss

that contributed to the fl oodwall failures, casting doubt on the ability of Gua

ian to complete the repairs near Lake Pontchartrain by June 1. Instead, it ch

to build fl oodgates at the mouth of the drainage canals that would close dur

tropical storm events and prevent surge coming in from the lake to pro

the canals. This required additional authorization from Congress in Februa

IPET’s interim report published March 10 found that the failure mechan

was I-walls tilting under fl ood pressure, allowing the crack to fi ll with wa

and weaken the structure. I-walls consisted of a single wall sitting on top 

sheet piles partially buried in a levee and were thus more unstable but requi

less real estate. A contributing factor to the failures was weak clay soil foun

tions under the soil, which had not been detected in soil borings during origi

construction. Guardian adjusted by driving deeper sheet piles below the c

layer and by installing T-walls shaped like an inverted T, which were m

stable than I-walls but took up more space. It stabilized these with H-p

driven at angles to hold the T in place. “Now that we know what to look 

we’re out there looking for it,” Corps structural research scientist and Inform

tion Technology Laboratory Director Reed Mosher said.185

Another factor was removing barges in the waterways and often on top 

levees. Because they blocked access to some construction sites, the Corps 

to remove them prior to proceeding with construction. The Task Force Gua

ian barge removal team worked with barge owners, the Navy, and the Co

Guard to remove the barges. Initially, it would contact barge owners to rem

their property from levees, but where the owner was unknown or unreacha

Corps or Coast Guard contractors would remove it. The team initially identi

51 barges in priority work areas and was in the process of moving 30 of th

by October 28, 2005. By the fi rst week of November, the Coast Guard ide

fi ed another 120 vessels (later expanded to 158). Estimated removal cost w

185 Tajkowski, Interview with Setliff, June 12, 2007; Mark Schliefstein and Bob Marshall, “Canal 

planned before storm season,” New Orleans Times-Picayune (Wed., Jan. 11, 2006); IPET, Perform

Evaluation Status and Interim Results (N.P.: IPET, Mar. 10, 2006): I3-I4; Mosher quoted in Mars

“Omissions revealed in levee design,” Times-Picayune (Fri., Mar. 17, 2006); Manders et al., pp. 212-22
217

and had exceeded 110 vessels removed by the end of the month and 

the end of March. However, the process slowed by this point, with 

removal of the barges at a rate of about one every day or two until the c

tor removed the last vessel on April 16, 2006. This was a major milesto

allowed the task force to step up construction at these sites.186

A third obstacle that slowed progress was locating enough fi ll to 

the levees. Initial estimates were two million cubic yards of fi ll, but th

to 4.6 million cubic yards by the end of the year with adjustments to th

Locating and purchasing a suffi cient number of borrow pits to obtain so

challenge, but the larger challenge was getting soil of appropriate qualit

of the area around New Orleans was swampland or organic soils, whic

unsuitable for building levees. The borrow team conducted tests of num

sites and worked with Corps real estate personnel to purchase pits as fa

as Grammercy and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The fi rst borrow pit ope

October 24 in Plaquemines Parish, near the Mississippi River levees, bu

questioned soil quality there or in St. Bernard Parish. By January 2006, 

ian was importing clay soils from Mississippi to mix with local soil. By 

the Corps had sent more than 36 of an anticipated 51 barges from the 

pits, which delivered 400,000 cubic yards of soil to St. Bernard Pari

800,000 cubic yards to Plaquemines Parish. To ensure soil quality, the 

initially conducted laboratory samples from each load of soil, but the p

was lengthy and time-consuming. As the need quickly outstripped lab

testing of all soils, the Corps adopted a process of on-site inspection

random tests of soil sent to the laboratory.187

Meeting the Deadline

Despite the delays caused by funding, barge removal, and locating 

task force made signifi cant progress. By February, the task force had 

between 20 percent and 33 percent of required fi ll, completed 17 of 5

ects by March 21, and was 54 percent complete overall by the end of 

186 Interview with Setliff, June 12; Commander’s Assessment, Oct. 29-Nov. 12, Dec. 13, 2005; F

Mar. 28, Apr. 18, 2006; SITREP TF Guardian, Oct. 25, 2005; Commander’s Briefi ng, Feb. 2, 16, 2

Vol. 4-10); Manders et al., pp. 207-208, 231-232.

187 Interview with Setliff, June 12; Commander’s Assessment, Oct. 24, 29-Nov. 12, Dec. 13, 200

23, Mar. 28, Apr. 18, 2006; Commander’s Briefi ng, Oct. 3, Dec. 29, 2005, Feb. 2, 16, 2006; SI

Guardian, Oct. 1, 5, Dec. 29, 2005 (TFH Vol. 4-10); John Schwartz, “Too Little Clay, Too Much San

Worry,” NYT (Sun. Feb. 19, 2006); Manders et al., pp. 209-211, 232-233. 
218

As of February 20, the Corps awarded 48 of 52 contracts to local contract

This required close management of contracts to ensure that funding was av

able, advertising and awarding contracts according to government standa

(including small business awards), and completing 126 contract modifi 

tions by early April. It also required coordination with real estate person

to purchase property, gain rights of way to remove trees or other obstac

and ensure fair prices to encourage cooperation with the government. O

the Corps awarded the contracts, Setliff closely managed all aspects of 

projects through site visits, phone calls, and status updates, including m

agement of personnel assignments, quality control, and material stockpi

Given the tight schedules and high demand for employees with special sk

it was essential to make sure people were in the right place at the right tim

prevent delays. Likewise, while conventional wisdom considered stockpil

on construction projects wasteful, it prevented delays in large projects w

tight deadlines. Multifunctional management teams for each construction a

helped to maintain the management pressure. “Our philosophy early on w

that we wanted to ensure victory back in February, instead of prevent defea

May. Probably when people look back at this it will be seen as the wave of 

future.” Certainly, many contractors agreed.188

188 Setliff Interview, June 12; Setliff quoted in “Katrina Analysis Has Designers Building Faster 

Smarter,” ENR (Mon., May 1, 2006); Commander’s Assessment, Feb. 14, Mar. 7, 21, 28, Apr. 4, 12, M

23, 2006 (TFH Vol. 7-11); Manders et al., pp. 227-239.

Corps Emergency Operations personnel at New Orleans
219

the outfall canals on Lake Pontchartrain. Space was tight near the lak

after purchasing all available adjacent property. Because of local se

agency concerns about the lack of drainage when the gates were shut, t

force included a plan to purchase and install large pumps, although the 

ity was less than when open and thus unsatisfactory to local governme

fi rst 10 pumps arrived at the end of April, and the last 34 arrived on 

2006. “We’re up against the laws of physics and how many pumps can b

in a certain amount of time,” Setliff said. At approximately the same tim

tractors installed the 75-ton jackets that would hold the gates at the 17th 

Canal. However, on May 12, Task Force Guardian announced that it wo

be able to complete installation of all gates and pumps before June 1. O

Orleans Avenue Canal gate would be complete. Therefore, to meet the 

line, the task force installed sheet pile across the mouth of the other two 

leaving enough of a gap in the temporary wall to allow drainage until a t

storm appeared on the horizon, when contractors could cut off the cana

like we did during Hurricane Rita,” Setliff added. Most people accepted 

suffi cient to meet the deadline, although many still complained about t

of pumps, which could cause the city to fl ood if the gates were shut. The 

continued to work for many months to increase pump capacity and en

pumps functioned correctly.189

The remaining projects came down to the wire. At the end of Ap

task force had completed 22 of 59 contracts and was 73 percent complet

all. On May 22, 2006, with only a week to go, it had completed 38 of 5

tracts and was 92 percent complete overall. This was due in part to th

gates in Orleans Parish, which would not be complete until after Jun

contracts concerned completing the levees, and Setliff focused on thes

denly, on May 29, a 400-section of levee at a high school in Buras, Louis

Plaquemines Parish slumped six feet under its own weight. Contractors 

the process of addressing weak soil to raise the levee another two feet w

collapse occurred. It would take another three weeks to repair the secti

at least there was a levee there. On one last section, the task force push

contractor all night long, and the project manager called Setliff at 11:5

189 Commander’s Assessment, Mar. 7, 21, 28, Apr. 12, 18, 25, May 2, 9, 23, 2006 (TFH Vol. 9-

quoted in John Schwartz, “Big, Maybe Ugly, but Their Role Heroic,” NYT (Thurs., Mar. 23, 2006) a

Grissett and Mark Schleifstein, “Gates Won’t Be Ready By June 1,” Times-Picayune (Fri., May 

Manders et al., pp. 234-238.
220

only at 96 percent overall, mainly due to the closure gates, all of the levees w

at authorized height other than the section at Buras. “You can hold the Co

accountable for our work. And I am also very confi dent that this will perfo

as it is designed,” Setliff said.190

After the deadline passed, Task Force Guardian continued in operation u

July 1, 2006, when it completed handoff of its responsibilities to other Co

entities. For although the task force met the deadline, it still had contract

complete, none more important that the closure gates on the Lake Pontch

train canals. “A lot of work is going to go on beyond that date as we conti

to make the system better,” Setliff said. With more than $4 billion in new c

struction authorized in legislation passed since Hurricane Katrina, in Janu

2006, the Mississippi Valley Division started planning the Hurricane Prot

tion Offi ce (HPO), which stood up from April to June 1. The HPO was a Co

offi ce under division authority to manage the large number of hurricane p

tection projects, primarily in Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parish

By May, the task force was transferring responsibilities to the New Orle

District, including for removing trees from levees, projects in St. Charles 

Jefferson parishes, and its normal civil works responsibilities. Of the 36 ac

projects on June 1, it transferred 11 to the HPO, 17 to New Orleans District, 

the rest it closed out by the end of the month. While it did not complete the 

sure gates and pumps, it completed levees at Buras, Port Sulphur, and Ho

Place and closed out numerous small projects, such as repairs to pump 

tions, back levees, fi nal grading of levees, and addition of safety features at 

IHNC. By mid-June, the task force started to transition personnel to the H

and New Orleans District. All but 15 personnel had vacated the Federal Rese

Bank Building by the end of the month, and another fi ve continued to maint

fi eld offi ces. These would remain for several weeks closing out contracts.191

Task Force Guardian’s restoration of the protection of New Orleans 

June 1 was, as one news article observed, a “breathless fi nale that has b

called one of this generation’s greatest adventures in civil engineering.” T

task force had overseen removal of 155 barges and other vessels from lev

190 Setliff Interview, June 12; Commander’s Assessment, Apr. 25, May 23, 30, 2006 (TFH Vol. 10-11); M

Schleifstein, “Levee slumps, repairs to take weeks,” Times-Picayune (Tues., May 30, 2006); Joe G

“Corps: Storm work is 92% complete,” Baton Rouge Advocate (Wed. May 24, 2006); Setliff quoted in B

Williams, “Army: ‘You can hold the Corps accountable,’” MSNBC transcript (Thurs., June 1, 2006); Man

et al., pp. 238-239.

191 Setliff quoted in “Katrina Analysis”; Manders et al., pp. 239-244; Commander’s Assessment, Jun. 6

1, 2006 (TFH Vol. 12).
221

built three interim gate structures on the outfalls, among numerou

smaller projects. It had managed 59 construction projects worth $5

lion, involving 26 contractors (most of them local) and requiring purc

894 acres of land worth $63 million. It had moved well over three millio

yards of earth under a contract worth $47 million. It was an incredible 

plishment for nine months of work. The tight deadline, just-in-time fu

limited materials, and cramped working conditions all worked against s

but Task Force Guardian was able to complete the mission by careful m

ment and by relying on a wealth of civil works experience from St. Lou

trict, as well as from the New Orleans area and elsewhere. The perform

the task force refl ected great credit on the district, which had contrib

much time and effort to help its neighbors from the south.192

192 Quote from John Schwartz, “Levees Rebuilt Just In Time, But Doubt Remains,” NYT (Thurs

2006); Task Force Hope Status Report, Sept. 28, 2006 (TFH Vol. 13); Manders et al., pp. 239-244
222

Part IV.

Serving the Nation:

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

and Military Construction

One of the earliest responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engine

was military construction, and it was for this initially that Congress establis

the fi rst corps of permanent engineers. Following the War of Independen

Congress had great concerns about enforcement of terms of the Treaty 

Paris of 1783, especially given the lack of fortifi cations along the U.S. front

George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of War Henry Knox, 

French engineer Pierre L’Enfant had all argued eloquently for establishm

of a permanent corps of engineers because of the diffi culties of drafting ex

rienced engineers to build such protection, and Congress fi nally acted in 18

For more than two decades, the primary responsibility of the Corps was c

struction of fortifi cations, primarily along the coast. Although after the C

War the Corps shifted its focus from fortifi cations to civil works, the milit

construction mission of the Corps never entirely evaporated, most often be

absorbed by combat engineers, many of whom had previously served as ci

ians in the Corps. There have been periods, nevertheless, of domestic milit

construction, none as large as during World War II, when military spend

in the St. Louis District topped $500 million. The result of that mission w

an incredible spurt of activity building military-industrial facilities, some 

whom are still in use today.
223

 13 

Military Construction and the Industrial 

Complex

One of the earliest roles of the Army in St. Louis, and the Corps of En

nationwide, was building fortifi cations. When Congress established a 

nent Corps of Engineers in 1802, it was fi rst and foremost to improv

fi cations throughout the nation to help in enforcement of treaty prov

The Board of Engineers for Fortifi cations, led by Brig. Gen. Simon B

from 1816 to 1826, helped plan and oversee construction of dozens of 

and frontier forts. Its work continued under Col. Joseph Totten throu

Civil War, bringing considerable innovation to fort-building. At St. Lo

Corps helped survey the limited number of fortifi cations left from its c

era, but other than brief ownership of the Jefferson Barracks after th

War and establishment and operation of an engineer depot on that bas

decades that followed, it left most construction to the Quartermaster 

This changed in World War II. With the enormous construction requir

of mobilizing for a global confl ict, the Army assigned the Corps of En

to complete this work. Over four years, the Corps built numerous facilit

helped procure equipment and supplies for contractors supporting t

effort. This had an immediate effect on the economy of the St. Louis ar

built up an industrial complex that continued to dominate the econo

decades after the war.

When the U.S. took control of St. Louis, there were already severa

Spanish-built fortifi cations in existence, including the Fort on the 

Walnut Street originally constructed in 1780 but greatly expanded in 

stone bastion built off what is now Cherry Street in 1792, a wooden bloc

overlooking Mill Creek in 1797, and a series of six stone towers erected 

on the edge of town facing south and weSt. Just prior to American occu

the Spanish noted that the blockhouse and bastion were in good con

but that the Fort on the Hill and towers were all in various states of dis

Another, Fort Don Carlos on the Missouri River, had been abandoned i

The early American government of St. Louis found the fortifi cations un

some because of structural problems and some because of their faulty loc

Over several years, it converted the Fort on the Hill to a jail and cour
224

away from Don Carlos on the Missouri, which eventually became Fort B

Fontaine. During the War of 1812, there was a garrison of 200 housed there

this the Army added a stone battery – Fort Lookout – at Portages des Sioux 

the Mississippi River just south of the Missouri. Evidently, however, no fede

funds were used in the construction of these installations, for the Departm

of War kept no record of them nor listed them among fortifi cations in repo

to Congress.193

By 1817, soon after Maj. Stephen H. Long arrived to survey and impr

fortifi cations along the Mississippi River, Fort Belle Fontaine was an est

lished military post, housing a rifl e regiment led by Capt. Benjamin O’Fall

After establishing residence at the fort, Long conducted numerous survey

forts in the area. In 1820, he also conducted a survey of the fortifi cation

St. Louis. Congress had legislated in 1812 that the government turn over 

land not in use to the city. On his recommendation, military commissio

Brig. Gen. Henry Atkinson retained the old ruined stone bastion and a nei

boring strip of land, although he authorized removal of the remaining st

in 1824. The city used stone from the other towers as needed to repair stre

and buildings until 1860, when the southernmost tower was demolished

1820, Atkinson approved expenditures of more than $3,000 on improveme

to Fort Belle Fontaine, which until 1824 housed 21 offi cers and 305 sold

from the 1st Infantry. By 1826, however, plans were already in the works 

move to a new military cantonment a few miles south of St. Louis – the Jef

son Barracks – to provide a greater concentration of regional troops and al

easier response both to the east and weSt. The installation housed the 1st, 3

and 6th Infantry regiments or more than 500 personnel under Atkinson, so

of whom later deployed in various duties, such as escorting convoys, putt

down Native Americans revolts, or in general serving as the western rese

The base also served as the fi rst infantry school to train personnel serving 

the West. At fi rst, soldiers slept in tents, but by 1830 contractors for the Qu

termaster Corps were improving the facility and in 1837 completed stone b

racks. In 1827, the Army also purchased a 37-acre tract between the barra

and the city to serve as the new St. Louis Arsenal, upon whose opening F

193 Primm, pp. 20-23, 28, 40-41, 43, 99-100; Musick, pp. 105-111.
225

factures, and several repair shops.194

In 1866, Congress authorized transfer of Jefferson Barracks to the 

of Engineers to serve as the new Engineer Army Depot that supplied 

projects near St. Louis. It was also the home of Company E of the En

Battalion, the primary active duty engineer battalion remaining after th

War. Capt. William Ludlow was the fi rst commander of the depot, follo

Capt. P.C. Hains. The Corps purchased the base from the Quartermas

$20,000 and within two years had completed barracks for offi cers and e

personnel, put up a fence, built several workshops and warehouses, and 

storage and repair of engineer equipment. By 1871, however, Congress c

course once again and transferred Company E to join the rest of the ba

at Willet’s Point, New York. Instead of maintaining possession of the ba

the Corps transferred the entire complex to the Ordnance Departme

Corps of Engineers maintained a small contingency to operate the d

194 U.S. Cong., “A Report of the Present Strength of the U.S. Army,” H.D. 18 (15th Cong., 1st Sess

fi cations,” H.D. 183 (16th Cong., 1st Sess.); Condition of the Military Establishment, 1823, H.D. 

Cong., 1st Sess.): 558; Report of the Secretary of War, 1826-1866; NPS, “Jefferson Barracks: 

Years,” Museum Gazette (May 1994); Musick, pp. 112-115; Primm, pp. 106-108, 137-8, 150. 

St. Louis Arsenal, 1905 MHS
226

land between the river and the Iron Mountain Railroad to the St. Louis Dist

to maintain the depot near the St. Louis Arsenal. The depot served not only 

a storage facility and repair shop, but also as a shipyard and service base 

the district. There were numerous attempts to purchase the property from 

1864 illustration of Jefferson Barracks

Aerial view of Scott Air Force Base
227

and to the government in the past 25 years, that no thought should be 

tained of parting with it.”195

Rebuilt from 1892 to 1900, the Jefferson Barracks remained an 

Army training, induction, and demobilization center until after World W

continued in use by civilian and veteran groups until 1939, when the M

National Guard took command of the barracks. Capable of housing 3,

once again became an Army training, induction, and separation center 

World War II. The Air Corps, in particular, had expressed interest in th

erty as early as 1940 and selected the installation as the site of an Air 

Replacement and Training Center. Prior to World War II, the Quarterm

were responsible for most domestic military construction. With the a

of construction required for mobilization – $10 billion by 1942 – overw

ing the Quartermasters, in 1941 the Army assigned the task to the C

Engineers, fi rst for airfi elds, then all military construction in the U

fi rst project assigned to St. Louis District was construction of the Air 

Replacement Center, which required upgrade of many facilities at Je

Barracks. Following this was the expansion of Scott Field, Illinois, into a

Air Force Station, which involved demolition of decades-old wooden bu

and reconstruction of everything from runways and hangars to hospit

barracks. A third Air Corps project involved construction of an airfi eld 

124th Observation Squadron at Vichy, Missouri.196

By the end of 1941, the district became involved in the fi rst non-Ai

project – construction of the St. Louis Ordnance Plant, which was resp

primarily for small arms production. The district would oversee desi

construction of nine other ordnance and chemical weapons plants in M

and Illinois, most of which were designed and built by contracted arc

engineering-construction fi rms. It also oversaw construction of engine

medical depots, a military police headquarters, and a factory training 

One of the most unusual projects involved construction of the Alien 

Internment Camp at Weingarten, Missouri, near Ste. Genevieve. This 

160-acre prisoner-of-war (POW) camp with fi ve compounds (four p

195 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1866-1871; Memo, St. Louis Engineer Offi ce to Chie

neers, Aug. 12, 1909 (MVS Archives).

196 Jefferson Barracks Heritage Foundation, “Chronological History of Jefferson Barracks” (http

jbhf.org/ chronology.html, Mar. 21, 2011); “Mobilization of the Field (St. Louis District) Organ

World War II” (MVS Archives); Dobney, p. 108; Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corp

neers: Construction in the United States (Wash.: USACE, 1972): 244-272, 440-476.
228

and one guard) and numerous concrete-foundation wooden buildings, incl

ing 36-man barracks, two-man offi cer apartments, canteens, dance ha

guard towers, and fences, notably with hot and cold running water and fl 

toilets, a luxury for a POW camp. The guard compound housed the 40

408th and 410th Military Police. The camp opened on June 22, 1943, w

the transfer of 662 Italians from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; it received 

fi rst German prisoners a week later. By September 1943, it housed 992 offi c

and 3,515 enlisted soldiers. At its height in June 1945, it housed more th

5,200 prisoners, who were released gradually after the end of the war. Ot

construction projects followed, eventually totaling more than 20 projects wo

an estimated $500 million, which made the St. Louis District’s responsib

ties one of the largest in the nation. To handle this workload, the district g

from an employment of 777 in April 1941 to a peak of 3,415 in August 19

This included 32 project managers hired by the district to oversee constr

tion projects – one per project. By 1944, as construction started to decl

many district employees were transferred elsewhere to support more urg

St. Louis Ordnance Plant in 2003 (demolished in 2006)
229

sonnel overseas to serve as combat engineers.197

In addition to this construction mission, the district also support

duction and procurement missions. The primary production mission in

preparation of landing craft tanks through the installation of ammuniti

machinery rigging. Contractors shipped shells from plants on the Illin

Upper Mississippi rivers, which Corps barge crews assembled at the 

shipyard and service base. Altogether, district employees assembled 5

ing craft tanks for shipment downriver to the gulf. Most contractors 

time lacked the amount of equipment needed to complete contracts. T

the Engineer Warehouse and Yards, the district stored and distribute

neer equipment to contractors working throughout its area of operatio

included not only loaning its own equipment for the duration of a c

but also equipment procured from other suppliers. The district pr

inspected, and distributed construction and engineer equipment to c

tors in a 10-state area. It administered equipment contracts for supplie

more than a two-state area. The Upper Mississippi Valley Division offi c

in St. Louis, also supported this mission through widespread real estate 

sitions for military construction projects. Although they never left the d

two project managers supported the Manhattan Project developing t

nuclear weapon primarily through the location and procurement of m

to support the top secret effort. As construction slowed, much of the 

ment found use in other districts for major projects such as construction 

Alaskan Highway. The district performed other procurement duties fo

tary installations within the district, for example providing fi re trucks, 

tanks, and steel landing mats, as well as procuring, inspecting, packagi

shipping engineer equipment to overseas location in support of the war 

The district performed a similar mission during the Korean War from 

1954 by procuring prefabricated buildings, water purifi ers, and electric

erators for use in theater.198

In 1940, before American entry into the war, St. Louis had 15 p

unemployment, higher than the national average and higher than the m

of cities roughly the same size. It had suffered greatly during the Great D

sion. The growth of the industrial complex in and around St. Louis re

197 “Mobilization of the Field Organization”; Dobney, pp. 108-109; David Fiedler, The Enemy A

POWs in Missouri During World War II (Columbia, Missouri: U of Missouri P, 2003): 64-66, 180

198 “Mobilization of the Field Organization”; Dobney, pp. 108-109, 118-119.
230

ment. Total employment increased from 150,000 in 1941 and reached a pea

1943 of 600,000. Most of these jobs were in transportation, government, 

industry, and there were signifi cant increases in the employment of wom

and non-whites during this period. By the following year, cutbacks on airc

production lowered employment to 535,000 and the Bureau of Labor Statis

predicted it would continue to decline. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt t

wartime employment helped pull St. Louis out of the high unemployment t

it had faced during the Great Depression. Some of this employment decli

after the war – ordnance and aircraft product, for example – while indust

such as meat packing, leather goods, steel and iron, and machinery stabili

and found other outlets and new markets. Thus, the impact of wartime c

struction continued for a decade after the war.199

Within months of the conclusion of the war, most of the properties op

ated directly by the Department of War – including Jefferson Barracks – w

declared war surplus and sold at auction. Scott Army Air Station became Sc

Air Force Base, which managed its own construction. With mobilization of 

National Guard during the Korean Confl ict, in 1950 Jefferson Barracks beca

headquarters to all Missouri Army and Air National Guard units in St. Lo

Although the Corps remained involved in military construction, the district 

not have any major responsibilities at nearby bases and was only peripher

involved in these missions. Some level of construction occurred in the Kor

and later confl icts, but because there was no large-scale war mobilization 

construction, the participation of the Corps in later confl icts was prima

through combat engineers. Throughout World War II, the Corps underst

that many of the projects which it had laid aside would aid in providing 

employment at the end of the war. In 1942, Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Eug

Reybold would write that the projects already authorized “provides a ba

log of meritorious projects which may be undertaken to cushion the shock 

unemployment during the transition period following the present emergen

By 1945, there were more than 650 projects worth $1.7 billion, 150 of th

worth $750,000 authorized in 1944. In fact, the Corps had never fully 

aside these projects because “all fl ood control projects ... are either directly 

199 Impact of the War on the St. Louis Area: City of St. Louis and St. Louis County, Missouri, Madison 

St. Clair Counties, Illinois (Wash.: DOL, BLS, 1944): 1-19.
231

effort during the war.200

200 “Chronological History of Jefferson Barracks”; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1941

8; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1945, pp. 6-7.
232

History of the St. Louis 

District Offi ce

Prior to 1870, there was no St. Louis District, only project engineers assigne

address issues such as the depth of the St. Louis Harbor or snag removal on the M

sissippi or Missouri River. The Corps of Engineers had established an engineer de

at the Jefferson Barracks in 1866, but relocated the last engineer battalion to New Y

in 1870, transferring the property to the Ordnance Department. With the relocatio

the Offi ce of Western River Improvements to St. Louis in 1870 and its abolition 

simultaneous establishment of the U.S. Army Engineer Offi ce, St. Louis, in 1872, 

district has since maintained a facility in the city.

The fi rst 12 years of its existence, the district offi ce moved no less than three tim

from 404 Market Street to 1122 Pine Street, and then to 417 Pine Street. The offi ce 

then very small, amounting to only a handful of employees, and most of these sma

buildings no longer exiSt. In 18

the district moved to the U

Custom House, later known 

the Old Post Offi ce, on the cor

of 8th and Olive streets, wher

remained for more than 50 ye

Just prior to this time, in 1881 

Army Quartermaster Departm

granted the district use of a s

of land from the St. Louis Arse

between the Iron Mountain R

road and the Mississippi R

south of Arsenal Street. T

became the Service Base, wh

the district built numerous sh

and warehouses to support p

ects and maintain fl oating pl

The depot there replaced the 

the district had been operatin

the Jefferson Barracks.

In 1935, the district mo

to the Federal Building at 

Street (now Tucker Bouleva

and Market Street, where 

U.S. Court House and Custo

then lay. This was the loca

of the district during World W

II, although it was from the 

vice Base that it helped to sup

district contractors and arm

Old Post Offi ce Building

Federal Building at 12 Street (now Tucker Blvd.) 

and Market
233

During this time, the district greatly 

expanded in size. It had extended from 

the Missouri to the Illinois River and up 

the Missouri to St. Charles in 1928; from 

the Illinois to Clarksville, Illinois, and up 

the Missouri to Hermann in 1930; from 

Clarksville to Clements Station, Missouri, 

in 1940; and to the lower 80 miles of the 

Illinois River in 1942.

The offi ce remained at the Old Federal Building until around 1960, when 

it moved briefl y to the Boatman’s Bank 

Building across from the Mercantile Bank 

Building on Broadway and then to the 

Frisco Building on 9th and Olive (906 

Olive). By this time, with the addition of 

responsibility for reservoirs being constructed on the Kaskaskia, Big Muddy, 

Meramec, and Salt rivers, the district was 

an enormous endeavor. It occupied all 

of the upper fl oors of the Frisco Building, the fi rst fl oor being reserved for local 

businesses. In the fall of 1970, the offi ce 

moved to the building (unnamed) at 210 

North Tucker, between Olive and Pine. 

It remained there for 20 years. Finally, 

on Labor Day 1990, the district moved to 

the Mart Building, renamed the Robert A. 

Young Federal Building in 1988, on the 

corner of Tucker at Spruce (1222 Spruce 

Street), where it resides today.201

201 “The Way I Remember It,” Esprit (Feb. 2003):12-13; “History of St. Louis Missouri Enginee

January 1944,” manuscript (MVS Archives): 1-6; Memo to Chief of Engineers on Service Base, Aug

(MVS Archives).

Olive St. (Frisco Building)

210 N. Tucker

Robert A. Young Federal Building
234

 14 

War Mobilization on the Mississippi River

While military construction formed a large responsibility during the w

the St. Louis District nonetheless continued its civil engineering function. E

as Europe became engulfed in war in 1939 and 1940, the district was wind

up several key projects. The last of the three major locks and dams built in 

district – Nos. 26, 25, and 24 – were fi nally complete in 1940, providing a ni

foot channel in the Mississippi north of the Missouri River. It had develo

a plan for bypassing the one spot below the Alton Dam that was consisten

below nine feet – the Chain of Rocks. South of the Missouri, the district w

78 percent complete in building permanent regulating works, such as di

and revetment. Through continuous dredging, it was able to maintain a n

foot channel throughout the year. Ten of the 21 fl ood control projects C

gress had authorized in the 1936 Flood Control Act were complete, and seve

others were in various stages of completion to bring levees to a standard hei

of 44 feet. With American entry into the war in December 1941, work on s

eral of these projects took a back seat to the war effort. The proposed Ch

of Rocks Canal and Lock, for example, did not get presidential approval u

after the war. Nevertheless, the Army realized that, as the primary inter

transportation route to the Mid-West, the Mississippi River was critical for 

war effort by allowing bulk transportation of war supplies in a protected ch

nel. Continued improvement of the river and protection of adjacent land w

necessary, but less and less funding was available for such work the last 

years of the war.202

Concern for developing and maintaining the Mississippi River and ot

waterways for national security purposes fi rst arose in the aftermath of the W

of 1812. During this confl ict, in which the British invaded U.S. soil and bur

the capitol, movement of troops and supplies came with great diffi culty, ha

ing the war effort. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun submitted his “Rep

on Roads and Canals” in 1819 as a direct result of these issues. As noted pr

ously, he especially saw the Mississippi River as playing a critical role, as it 

during the Battle of New Orleans and in supplying U.S. coastal fortifi catio

The report in turn led to the fi rst survey of the Mississippi River in 1820 

202 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1940, p. 1121.
235

however, by the Civil War. With the South in control of the mouth of th

for much of the war, the federal government and its contractors turned 

roads to transport war supplies, leading to phenomenal growth of the ra

in the decade after the war. Navigation boosters responded by lobbyin

deeper channel to allow improved transportation and also for federal sup

the shipping industry. Although Congress authorized a deeper channel, 

to complete the projects had not been forthcoming. On the eve of Wor

I, the project was only 33 percent complete, largely as a result of incon

funding. Periodic railroad car shortages and high fares during the war re

from poor national planning fi nally convinced industrialists to increasin

the river and Congress to authorize the development of a federal barge 

1918 to reduce the strain on the overused railroads. As a result, traffi c 

river reached more than 25 million tons. The barge line proved so suc

Congress extended its charter in the Transportation Act of 1920, and it 

ued to expand and operate through World War II.203

Despite the lessons learned from World War I, the transportation 

structure faced similar problems at the outset of World War II. There ha

considerable improvement since 1920. The Corps of Engineers had dee

straightened, and shortened the channel south of St. Louis while buildin

and dams north of it to maintain a nine-foot channel depth. A similar sy

locks and dams on the Ohio River, Illinois River, and Gulf Intracoastal 

way, along with many other rivers and tributaries, created a network of 

ways extending 15,000 miles. This was in addition to more than 2,00

of federal levees protecting facilities from fl ooding. Commercial carrie

invested more than $50 million in terminal facilities, which were pra

nonexistent prior to World War I. The federal barge line expanded ser

the upper river and by 1936 had grown to 21 towboats and 204 barges m

77.7 million tons of cargo per year, with annual revenues exceeding 

lion. There were 160 regulated commercial carriers operating more than 

barges on the river, making the total number of operators more than 6

barges more than 5,000. Nevertheless, despite wide availability of barg

lower shipping rates, the long delivery time using barges during the p

period, limited waterway access to some installations, and high dem

203 Calhoun, “Report on Roads and Canals,” pp. 1-8; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 19

T. Michael Ruddy, “Mobilizing for War: St. Louis and the Middle Mississippi during World War 

(MVS Archives): 1-4.
236

tation. It typically took 15 days for a tow to make its way downriver, ver

four days by train. Many bases and production centers were not located n

rivers, and many more lacked terminal facilities needed to load and offl 

from barges. Some biographers have characterized President Franklin D. R

sevelt’s response to the war as reactionary and chaotic despite his reputat

for state planning, and his administration did not take any steps to improve 

situation until the strain was already evident. By September 1941, increas

pressure on train lines to deliver goods needed by military installations led 

Quartermaster Corps to take steps to locate all new installations near wa

ways and to ensure that they had adequate terminal facilities.204

In December 1941, the Secretary of War created the Offi ce of Defe

Transportation to coordinate governmental policy on transportation issu

The Inland Waterways Division handled river traffi c. One of its fi rst acts 

1942 was to authorize barge lines to tow any available barges to maximize 

usage. By the spring of 1942, oil shortages on the East coast were becom

evident, and pipelines and railroads could supply just over half of the 1.3 m

lion barrels of oil required to meet war demands. Barge traffi c, though slow

was cheaper, held more per unit, and could be easily rerouted to meet eme

ing requirements. In addition, use of inland waterways protected vessels fr

enemy submarines that were harassing offshore shipping and blockading po

To enhance barge traffi c, the division established a program to convert s

barges designed for dry goods to carry oil while building new wooden bar

for dry goods. The Traffi c Control Division of the Quartermaster Departm

put to work idle barges, looked for opportunities to maximize barge use, 

sought to reduce rates. By 1943, barges had transported more than 1.7 bill

barrels of oil, equivalent to more than seven million tank rail car loads. Bar

moved more than 92 million tons of iron, mostly through the Great Lakes. La

in the war, grain for civilian aid programs became more important. Traffi c w

65 percent upstream on the Mississippi River during the war versus 90 perc

204 Ruddy, pp. 3-4; “Merchant Marine of the Middle West,” pp. 1-3; “Wartime and the River,” Fortun

(Jul. 1942): 69-75, 102-107; Thomas E. Lyons, “Old Man River Mobilizes for War,” Domestic Comm

31:8 (Feb. 25, 1943): 3-6; Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization

Operations (Wash.: Offi ce of Chief of Military History, 1951): 367-369. In Lautenburg’s classic and m

favorable study of the New Deal, Franklin served as a moderator of competing interests, whose prog

codifi ed in New Deal legislation often confl icted with his stated desires (84-85). Others, such as David Br

have argued that “the New Deal was essentially reactive,” and that the programs declined with wartime p

perity; management of war assets was in some ways separate from these activities; Brody, “The New 

and World War II,” in John Braeman et al., ed., The New Deal: The National Level, Vol. I (Columbus, 

Ohio State UP, 1975): 271.
237

18,000 tons per month in 1941 to 157,000 tons in 1944. For both the Ar

Navy, nearly 4,000 ships and submarines built at inland shipyards and fl 

dry docks moved down the Illinois or Ohio rivers from shipyards in Pen

nia, Indiana, and Illinois and along the Mississippi, including 2,115 that 

St. Louis. Within the St. Louis District, tonnage passing through the 

Mississippi increased from 3.4 million in 1941 to 4.4 million in 1944, al

the port of St. Louis itself saw only a slight increase until after the war 

an increase in diversity of products carried.205

Maintaining a channel in the Middle Mississippi to support this 

traffi c fell to the St. Louis District through continuation of construction 

manent works and dredging under the leadership of Col. Roy B. Grower 

and Col. Lawrence B. Feagin to 1946. Overall, 

the navigation improvement project advanced 

from 80 to 86 percent complete through 

1944. There was a slight decline in permeable 

dikes (hurdles) installed from 1941 to 1942, 

but the district was able to main a high level 

of work during the fi rst two years and even 

increased the amount of revetment installed. 

It built 23,000 linear feet of new dikes in 

1941, 18,700 in 1942, and 19,800 in 1943, and 

added 1,800 feet, 2,900 feet, and 5,300 feet 

of revetment the same years. After 1944, the 

amount of new construction dropped precipitously to a low of 1,975 feet of dikes and 2,100 feet of revetment. Dur

same period, the number of dikes and revetment repaired consistent

demonstrating the district’s growing focus on maintaining the status qu

when new construction was not possible. Dredging, meanwhile, staye

tively fl at at an average of 21.5 miles of channel dredged per year. Flood 

also made signifi cant progress during the fi rst two years of the war. The 

completed levees at North Alexander in 1942, and East Cape Girardea

kaskia, and Meredosia Lake and Willow Creek in 1943. Levee projects a

Creek, Columbia, Perry County, Wilson and Winkel and Prairie du Po

205 Big Load Afl oat: U.S. Inland Water Transportation Resources (Wash.: American Waterwa

tors, Inc., 1966): 48-50; Ruddy, pp. 4-12; Lyons, pp. 3-6; Wardlow, p. 369; “Wartime and the R

102-107; Dobney, pp. 107-108.

Col. Lawrence B. Feagin
238

ground despite completion of preliminary contracting and real estate work, 

example, at Wood River, Ste. Genevieve, Fort Charles, Harrisonville and 

Landing, Preston, Grand Tower, and Degognia and Fountain Bluff.206

The bigger story and what became the district’s primary focus in later ye

were the severe fl oods of 1943 and 1944, which threatened to shut down 

river and terminal facilities for weeks at a time. The middle river had alre

faced high water in 1941 and 1942, which left the ground saturated and p

vided high stages at St. Louis as early as January – it was within inches of fl 

stage on January 1, 1943 – although stages later declined. When major stor

struck the Missouri and Upper Mississippi valleys in early May, stages reac

38.9 feet in St. Louis on May 24, the highest stages since 1844. Another cr

followed in June after heavy rains in the Illinois Valley, reaching 34.9 feet 

June 26. There were 14 days above fl ood stage in May and 21 days in June. T

following year, after moderate spring rain left the ground saturated once mo

three heavy storms struck in April in the Missouri Valley. The gage at St. Lo

rose from 31.3 feet in mid-April to 39 feet on April 30, beating the 1943 rec

by several inches. Another set of storms struck the Upper Mississippi in M

keeping St. Louis above fl ood stages until May 13 for a total of 23 days. Of 

fl oods, 1943 had a much greater impact. It had been several years since 

previous fl ood, and many refused to evacuate. There were major breache

the incomplete Perry County Levee and on the Illinois River, but none of 

levees completed since 1936 failed. The 1944 Flood was much more sever

this regard, since there were crevasses at several of the complete as wel

incomplete levees: Fort Chartres, Harrisonville, Preston, Prairie du Pont, Pe

County, Grand Tower, Clear Creek, and Kaskaskia. These fl ooded over ha

million acres, killed 10 people, and caused more than $17 million in damag

which was still less than 1943 because more people and animals evacuated 

1944. They also caused great damages to Corps works. The fl oods set navi

tion projects several years, and fl oodwaters seriously degraded levees at Pe

County, Columbia, East St. Louis, Clear Creek, and Kaskaskia.207

Congress provided considerable funding for the Corps to respond to 

fl oods. In addition to several hundred thousand dollars left from the Fl

Control Act of 1941 for rescue and repair, the St. Louis District received m

206 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1941-1945. 207 Ibid.; “Report on April-May 1944 Flood in the St. Louis Missouri Engineer District,” (MVS Archi

1-14.
239

Riverfront at Alton, Illinois during 1944 fl ood

Chester, Illinois during 1944 fl ood
240

$2.2 million of $34 million provided by PL 79-75 in 1944. These approp

tions funded a range of fl ood fi ghting work, including establishing fi eld offi 

managing volunteers and personnel from Scott Army Air Force Station s

to support the mission, supplying personnel, patrolling levees for weaknes

and bracing weak levees with sandbags, lumber, and fencing. Approxima

80 percent of costs went to protective works to prevent fl ooding. The dist

also coordinated with the Red Cross, U.S. Coast Guard, and local agencie

help evacuate personnel, livestock, and farm machinery to higher ground us

a fl eet of boats, cars, and trucks. After the 1944 Flood, the Corps led efforts 

only to repair the levees, but to strengthen them. Total spending on rep

levees within the district, including private levees, was $1.9 million, with 

additional $2.5 million spent on levee improvement.208

By 1944, the war effort was becoming more intense and drawing more 

more resources from the district. With completion of several major proje

the district workforce had dwindled from its peak reached in 1942. Severa

the fl ood control projects were “suspended until after the war,” even thou

new surveys taken after the fl oods showed that the levees were much furt

from completion than previous estimates. The fl oods of 1943 and 1944, as w

as high water in 1945, also suspended construction activities for many wee

Nevertheless, 1944 and 1945 saw authorization of several new projects

include additional fl ood protection and the Chain of Rocks Canal. The dist

conducted preliminary work such as preparation of contracts and purchas

real estate on several of the new projects, including the canal. Between 

new projects and destruction of works by the fl oods, the navigation project w

70 percent complete at the end of 1945.209

Throughout the war, the St. Louis District maintained a nine-foot chan

It did so even in the midst of two of the most severe fl oods St. Louis had e

seen, as well as during severe winter ice fl oes that prevented work for seve

weeks during the winter. With the channel maintained by the Corps, the mo

ment of fuel, ammunition, food, materials, machinery, and weapon syste

was relatively free throughout the war, which enabled the U.S. to successf

support combat operations abroad. The result was the unfettered growth 

shipping on the Mississippi River throughout the war. On the Middle Mis

sippi alone, there was a 25 percent growth in through-traffi c shipping. Fr

208 “Report on 1944 Flood,” pp. 1-14; Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1943-1945. 209 Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1944-1945.
241

1939 to 1945, tonnage passing through St. Louis grew 16 percent to 3.4 m

How much of this was due to the war is debatable since most of this in

occurred before 1941, and shipping from 1941 to 1945 stayed more or l

After the war, however, the picture is clear. By 1950, shipping on the 

sippi had grown 36 percent from a wartime peak of 101 million to 138 

tons, while tonnage handled by the port of St. Louis had more than dou

4.8 million. With shipping lanes established and industries refocused o

mercial endeavors, St. Louis became once again the “Queen of the Miss

River.”210

210 Ruddy, pp. 16, 19.

Chain of Rocks project cofferdam construction, 1947
242

 15 

Deployments and Combat Engineering

Despite the fact that the Corps of Engineers had responsibilities for c

works, it remained part of the U.S. Army. As such, one of the most import

missions of the Corps was supporting the engineering mission of the total ar

Sometimes, this mission required Corps personnel to serve overseas, mostly 

combat engineers, providing support by building roads, forts, bridges, po

and basic infrastructure. Corps engineering expertise allowed for the ra

mobility and deployability required for a modern army to function effi cien

Before the twentieth century, the military mission and the civil engine

ing mission were more connected and often occurred in the same locatio

After World War I, the Quartermaster Department was in charge of build

Army facilities until November 1940, when the War Department transfer

this responsibility to the Corps. Since that day, the Corps has played a v

role supporting domestic military construction. Nevertheless, it also con

ued to play a role in the military mission, providing essential engineering s

port to the Army during overseas campaigns in Europe, Asia, and the Mid

EaSt. Particularly in the last 20 years, much of this support came from Co

civilians who volunteered for deployment to support the Corps military m

sion. Until recently, the St. Louis District has not maintained detailed reco

on who from its civilian ranks served in combat, although many of its milit

personnel did so, particularly district engineers such as World War II vete

Col. Rudolph E. Smyser, Jr., Korean War veteran Col. Guy E. Jester, and V

nam War veteran Col. James B. Meanor, Jr.211

By December 1941, the Corps was deeply involved in construction activi

at home and soon became involved in construction overseas, as the Corps b

air bases in the British Atlantic territories and bridges in Italy, France, 

Germany. The Corps also assisted the military in beach assaults at Norma

and other landing points, as under heavy fi re they destroyed land mines 

cleared paths for troops to land. After the war, the Corps played an imp

tant role in the rebuilding of Japan. Altogether, the Army sent more th

300,000 engineers overseas in combat roles, many of them drafted from 

211 “Support the Total Army,” Information Bulletin (Feb. 1983); USACE, The U.S. Army Corps of E

neers: A History (Wash., D.C.: Offi ce of History, Headquarters, USACE, 2007); Interview with Mea

James Towey, Interview with Guy Jester, Aug. 10, 1987 (MVS archives); Dobney, pp. 104-157.
243

how many it sent. In some cases, as with Max Lamm, employees rece

engineer commission, served for several years in the district supportin

tary construction and procurement projects, and then deployed to the

a combat engineer. Others, such as M.F. Carlock, served their entire tim

military offi cer stateside. A reservist, Carlock was called up, served in St

Chicago, and New York, and then returned to his civilian job. Most prob

faced a situation similar to James Lawler, who was drafted into the Na

then eventually received a commission in the Seabees and served in t

Eventually, most of the offi cers working in the district transferred to oth

tricts or to theater to serve in combat engineer roles through the remai

the war.212

During the Korean War, the Corps districts and divisions through

country shifted their focus to supporting the military effort. The St. Lou

trict even dispatched the Dredge Davison to Korea to assist in the war 

Army engineers supported troops by building fortifi cations to stabil

perimeter and roads that allowed for rapid movement of troops and 

ment. They also constructed airfi elds, ports, and bridges, including th

and Teal bridges, which allowed troops movement across rivers. In a

to construction that directly supported the Korean military efforts, en

constructed water and sanitation systems that the Republic South Kor

tinued to use after the war ended. During the Cold War, the Corps con

building projects overseas, constructing airbases and early warning 

ties at numerous locations. Alaska and Greenland remained importa

because they protected the border with the Soviet Union. Some distr

sonnel supported these efforts through temporary assignments. For ex

Carl Barron worked in Alaska in 1955 and 1956 building a 500-man ba

runways, fuel tanks, and storage areas. Army engineers provided simil

port to troops during the Vietnam War, constructing fortifi cations, por

airbases, and one of the most impressive feats of engineering was the co

tion of 900 miles of paved highway that connected major population 

and aloud for rapid movements.213

212 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History; Dobney, pp. 108-109; Rex Van Almsick, Inter

Max Lamm, Mar. 2, 1979; Interview M.F. Carlock, Mar. 19, 1979; Interview with James Lawler, Ma

(MVS Archives).

213 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History; William R. Farquhar, Jr. and Henry A. Jeffers, J

ing the Imjin: Construction of Libby and Teal Bridges During the Korean War (October 1952- J

(Fort Belvoir: Offi ce of History, USACE, 1989); Rex Van Almsick, Interview with Carl Barron, M

(MVS Archives).
244

play a key role supporting the Army. When operation Desert Storm commen

in 1990, Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Henry Hatch made a call for Corps pers

nel to volunteer for service in Kuwait so that they could support the war eff

During the campaign, the Corps’ Middle East/Africa Projects Offi ce overs

design, construction, contracting, and real estate services for the Army, 

after the war played a critical role rebuilding Kuwait’s infrastructure. To ca

this mission, approximately 2,000 men and women from the Corps deplo

to Kuwait, mostly in the capacity of civilian volunteers, but many also se

ing as soldiers. Combat engineers from the Corps played an important rol

providing engineering and construction support in the combat zone, incl

ing building roads, bridges, airfi elds, bases, and destroying enemy obstac

Although Corps civilian volunteers played a signifi cant role providing milit

support, one of their most important functions was providing expertise 

contracting, real estate, damage assessment, well drilling, dredging, electr

supply power, and other fi elds. Early in the war, the delayed fl ow of engine

and their equipment directly affected the maneuverability of units and th

ability to sustain themselves and operate effi ciently. Without these brave en

neers providing essential support, the safety of tens of thousands of troops 

the success of the mission would have been severely compromised.214

Ten years after the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. was once again conduct

a military campaign in Iraq, and once again, Corps personnel played a vital r

supporting this mission. 

addition, the Corps person

have been essential to the W

on Terror. To support the Ov

seas Contingency Mission, 

Corps established the Tran

lantic Division, which inclu

the Gulf Region District 

North and South Afgha

stan districts, and a depl

ment center that assists Co

214 Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait (W

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1999): 35-40; McDonnell, Supporting the Troops: The U.S. Army Cor

Engineers in the Persian Gulf War (Alexandria: CEHO, 1996): foreword, pp. 1-55; USACE, The U.S. A

Corps of Engineers: A Brief History (Fort Belvoir, VA: CEHO, 2007). 

District deployee Joe Kellett in Afghanistan
245

Afghanistan. As of 2011, more 

than 10,000 Corps personnel 

have deployed to southwest 

Asia to aid the war effort and 

rebuilding process. Many of 

these were Corps civilians who 

volunteered their services, and 

others were reservists serving 

as soldiers. Between 2003 and 

2005, Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s despotic r

but an equally challenging task was rebuilding the infrastructure of 

provide the stability needed to sustain democracy. In Afghanistan, the 

undertakes similar projects supporting infrastructure development. 

efforts would not be possible without the support of corps personnel 

engineering expertise help make reconstruction efforts possible, as th

vide support for thousands of projects, including building hospitals, mu

buildings, water and wastewater treatment facilities, police stations, 

forts, roads, airports, seaports and numerous other essentials.215

In the St. Louis District, numerous individuals have served in Ir

Afghanistan since 2002, some as reservists, but most as civilian volu

Some of these volunteers have even deployed multiple times. The n

of district members deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan at a given time 

ated with each new deployment and return, with the number usually 

between 12 and 14 deployed for anywhere between a few months to 

Some district volunteers, such as Michael Quinn, who served as an el

engineer in Afghanistan, were also veterans of Operation Desert Stor

Operation Iraqi Freedom. When asked why he volunteered for deploy

he responded, “there was a need for help, and I wanted to come and con

to the efforts here.” Others, such as Francis Walton, a construction rep

tative in Afghanistan who has been with the district for over 30 year

deploying for the fi rst time. In fact, Walton enjoyed his efforts so mu

quickly requested and received approval for a second six-month deploym

215 USACE, “FAQ on Gulf Region District and Afghanistan Engineer District,” brochure (N.D.). 216 “USACE Heroes: supporting overseas contingencies,” Esprit (Aug. 2010); “Deployments in s

OIF/OEF shift from Iraq to Afghanistan,” Esprit (Fall 2009).

Corps-constructed and designed treatment 

in Fallujah
246

While some volunteers u

their expertise gained throu

working for the Corps and app

it to efforts in Afghanistan and Ir

others, such as Marty Seger, e

used skills acquired outside of 

Corps. Seger, a crane and towb

operator for the district, worked 

water and wastewater plant supe

sor before coming to the district in 1995. An important part of establishin

stable infrastructure in Iraq was providing water and sewage treatment pla

which the Iraqi government had neglected to do. Part of the Corps mission w

to provide clean water to the people of Iraq, and Seger played a vital role in 

effort, as he was able to use the skills he acquired prior to joining the distric

oversee water and wastewater plants in Iraq that provided clean water. Prio

this, Baghdad dumped its sewage into the Tigris river, but the Corps was abl

use the wastewater plant it constructed in May 2004 to treat this sewage for 

fi rst time in over 15 years, providing nearly 120 million gallons of clean wa

every day. Corps efforts continued, as volunteers and Iraqis worked toget

Corps of Engineers completes river bypass in Afghanistan

Corps personnel supervise Afghans 

constructing drainage trench
247

increasing the city’s clean water capacity.217

Joe Kellett, the district’s Deputy District Engineer for Plannin

grams, and Project Management, shared his primary reason for volunt

“to make a difference – to change the outcome in Afghanistan.” Yet, 

went on, making a difference in a war-torn nation was not just about w

military victories, it was about helping develop Afghanistan’s infrastr

This effort required deployees to devote signifi cant time, typically 1

shifts seven days a week, overseeing construction and engineering p

However, Corps efforts were not limited to engineering projects, as con

success required educating native peoples so that they can ultimately 

self-suffi ciency.218

These missions were never a direct responsibility of the district. 

when the Army and Corps requested help, individual employees volun

for the duty. Since the end of the Vietnam confl ict, all soldiers were volu

rather than draftees, and many district employees volunteered to serve 

reserves. Others went as civilians under temporary assignment. Some w

the extra money or the adventure, but most went out of a sincere desire 

port the troops or to improve conditions in the countries where the U

deployed. Many served in engineering support roles, aiding combat en

with their duties. Others provided contracting or real estate suppor

worked long hours often in very primitive conditions. It was this level 

sacrifi ce that defi ned employment at the district.

District Deployments During the Oklahoma C

Bombing and 9-11

After the San Francisco Bay area earthquake of 1989, the federal g

ment recognized the need to improve its response to emergencies. In 19

U.S. Army Forces Command responded to this need by formally task

Corps with the responsibility of providing structural engineers to partic

the new Urban Search and Rescue Program. In 1992, the pilot training 

was held and the formation of the Structures Specialists Cadre was in

The training focused on providing the necessary skills to support the 

mission and the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force. This support in

217 “Marty Seger Writes from Duty in Iraq,” Esprit (Apr. 2008). 218 “Joe Kellett visits from Afghanistan,” Esprit (Fall 2008).
248

fully or partially collapsed 

structures during the search 

and rescue efforts so that the 

risk to personnel and victims 

could be minimized. These 

specialists were also trained 

to design shoring systems to 

stabilize structures so that rescuers could gain safe access 

to victims. The emergency 

response system was set up 

so that search and rescue 

personnel were available to 

FEMA to deploy on a mission 

in a moment’s notice (within 

six hours of a disaster), with 

the mission that typically lasting between six to 10 days. 

The fi rst signifi cant test of this 

system was after the April 19, 

1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. Tom Niedernhofer - then as design engineer for the St. Louis Distri

has previously done work as a structure specialist after the Loma Prieta 

Northridge earthquakes in California, Hurricane Andrew in Florida, and 

1993 fl ood. However, none of this could fully prepare him for the Oklaho

City Bombing. Niedernhofer was one of two structural specialists deplo

within just six hours of the disaster. Niedernhofer worked the night shift w

the other specialist, and engineer from California, took the day shift. Wo

ing 15- to 16-hour shifts, these engineers ensured that the structure was sta

enough for rescue crews to begin their efforts. These two specialists remai

for eight days, with replacements arriving on the seventh day and a seam

replacement occurring on the eighth. The efforts of these specialists provi

protection that helped prevent rescuers from becoming victims themselves

219 “Belleville man took part in rescue efforts,” Belleville News-Democrat (April 30, 1995); USACE, 

Urban Search and Rescue Program,” Fact Sheet (www.usace.army.mil/Emergency/Documents/USR2

pdf, Sep. 13, 2011); Brian Rentfro, Interview with Tom Niedernhofer, Sep. 19, 2011 (MVS Archives). 

St. Louis District Structure Specialist Tom 

Niedernhofer conducting inspection at Oklahom

City bombing site
249

Six years later, that same Tom Niedernhofer was part of a group 

St. Louis District engineers who departed for New York in response 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These fi ve were part of a gr

15 Corps structures specialists from across the nation who did urban 

and rescue work as part of the emergency response to the disaster. Short

the attacks, the Corps began mobilizing its emergency response res

which included deploying its structural specialists. These fi ve engineer

Stamper, Gary Lee, Vick James, Dave Mueller, and Niedernhofer – r

word that that they would be departing from St. Louis on September 

fi ve men quickly informed their loved ones that they would be departing 

dangerous mission, boarded the Mississippi Valley Division plane, and 

for Jacksonville, Florida and Wilmington, North Carolina to pick up fi v

tional specialists, with the other fi ve 

traveling by car. While in route, the 

engineers tried to get more specifi c 

information about their mission, 

but with no success. They arrived 

at the Trenton, New Jersey airport 

and the next morning departed for 

Camp Kilmer for further instructions. However, even after the engineers received their briefi ng and 

equipment, their mission was still 

not exactly clear, as they would only become keen to it once they arr

Manhattan. Numerous diffi culties impeded their journey, as they encou

road blocks that set them back. Even after they arrived at Caven Poin

Jersey, where they were to cross the Hudson River via ferry, they were d

Corps structure specialists at World Trade Center

Corps personnel with Chief of Engine

Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers at World Tra

Center
250

Because of the delays, the team was not able to cross the Hudson until 

morning of the 15th. Niedernhofer was able to get the team FEMA identifi 

tion cards that would allow them to access Ground Zero, but numerous r

blocks made access diffi cult. The team tried to give assistance inspecting 

slurry wall that held back the waters of the Hudson Bay, but city engine

wanted to control those efforts and the structural specialists continued look

for ways to assiSt. That opportunity came on September 17 when some of 

team members found the 1010 Command Post, which had search and res

responsibility for the south central area of the World Trade Center comp

and were able to devote their efforts to search and rescue work at building 4

the days to come, these engineers were able to help identify falling debris h

ards, consult on debris removal, and consult on road pavement settlement t

presented hazards to a crane being used in debris removal. Because of the m

sive resources of New York City, the efforts of the structural specialists w

not as essential as was normally the case during such a disaster. Neverthel

these engineers, alongside New York City fi re fi ghters, policemen, and ot

brave men and women, contributed their time and risked their own safety 

an effort to save lives and protect the safety of others.220

220 Rentfro, Interview with Tom Niedernhofer; USACE, “USACE was only Army command with 9-11 

sions,” Engineer Update (Sep. 2011); “Urban Search and Rescue at the World Trade Center: Up Close 

Personal,” Esprit (Oct. 2001).
251

Service in World War I

Max Lamm started working for the St. Louis District in 

1938 in the Levee Section, where 

he worked diligently conducting 

levee inspections on the Illinois 

River and worked on drainage 

issues until the district became 

involved in military construction 

during World War II. He had just 

started working on the Granite 

City Engineer Depot, when in 

1941, District Engineer Col. Roy 

Grower approached him about 

accepting a commission to serve 

as an offi cer in the Army Reserves 

in the Corps of Engineers. Shortly thereafter, Lamm accepted the commiss

second lieutenant and went straight to work for the district.

At that time, the district had some 32 offi cers serving as area or project m

– most managers after 1941 were military offi cers. The area managers were in 

of all projects in a specifi c area and had several project managers under them

were reservists, and some were active duty ordnance offi cers with an engineerin

ground. Grower worked to have them reassigned to the district, which had on

heaviest domestic military construction missions in the Corps.

Lamm worked initially as assistant executive offi cer of the Engineering Wa

and Yards. He helped to recondition and ship equipment for various project

nifi cant amount of this equipment ended up supporting the Alaskan Highway 

one of the largest construction projects in the country. He also stored and shipp

plus material from ordnance factories, and even helped provide supplies to th

hattan Project. Next, he served as chief of the Inspections Branch, with respo

over 35 inspectors. These ensured contractors completed jobs correctly and in

everything from plumbing at facilities to steel landing planks on airfi elds.

After three months of training at Fort Belvoir in 1944, Lamm fi nally shipp

seas. Because of his experience at the district at Scott Air Field, he requested w

airfi elds. Assigned as a platoon leader on the Philippines, he worked building 

and roads until 1945. Around Thanksgiving, after Japanese surrender, Lamm 

to Yokahoma, Japan, where he reconditioned a Japanese military academy t

U.S. troops. He shipped for Fort Lewis, Washington, in March 1946.221

221 Rex Van Almsick, Interview with Max Lamm, Mar. 3, 1979 (MVS Archives).

Construction of Alaska Highway, 1942
252

Part V.

Conservation and Controversy:

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

and the Environment

By the 1960s, the Corps of Engineers had long been the preeminent en

neering organization in the nation. Corps structures provided fl ood cont

hydroelectric power, recreation, water supply, improved navigation, and m

other essentials. For engineers on the Mississippi, the most important of th

responsibilities was maintaining a safe and dependable navigation chan

However, by the 1960s and 1970s, the more traditional mission of mainta

ing navigation and providing fl ood control expanded to include many n

traditional responsibilities. The history of the Corps from the 1960s until 

present is essentially the story of how the organization evolved in respons

its new responsibilities. The primary catalyst for this change was the Natio

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Previously, the St. Louis District’s prim

concerns were maintaining navigation and providing fl ood control in a co

effi cient manner. However, NEPA required that the Corps perform all of th

traditional functions in an environmentally sensitive manner. In the deca

that followed NEPA, the Corps evolved from an organization defi ned by m

sive civil works projects into an organization that provided a multitude 

nontraditional engineering services, such as curation and archaeological m

agement, recreation, and ordnance removal. Most importantly, during 

period the Corps responded positively to its new mission, learning to bala

its traditional functions with its new environmental mandate, thereby facili

ing economic development while protecting the environment for enjoymen

future generations.
253

 16 

Growing Environmental Responsibilities

The post-World War II era saw a growing national concern for the e

ment that altered the approach, workload, and organization of the St

District. The growing appreciation for maintaining pristine wildernes

and fi ghting the government and big business to prevent pollution of 

resources led to the passage of numerous environmental laws and regu

after 1950, with the result that by 1980 the work of the district had c

signifi cantly. This applied to a range of activities, from planning large 

tion and fl ood control construction projects to include multipurpose fa

to new permitting requirements, to entire new programs to clean up D

ment of Defense infrastructure. It became, in many respects, a new 

with a new focus. While traditional construction activities often initiall

major modifi cations and delays that frustrated some employees and sp

the growth of new activities and programs meant growth in funding an

that would last decades into the future. The navigation and fl ood contr

sion continued, but there can be no doubt that, just as fl ood control defi 

decades after 1936, the period after 1970 was the environmental era.

Environmental Planning

In December 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental 

Act (NEPA) – landmark legislation that had a profound impact on t

the Corps and St. Louis District conducted business. The story of the n

environmental movement began nearly a century earlier. The nation’s 

for environmental protection was largely a response to the rapid gro

industry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As industrialization 

erated, consumption of natural resources increased rapidly. By the 

the nineteenth century, many Americans had become distrustful of bi

ness and wanted to preserve resources and limit impacts on health. 

the most important supporters of this view was President Theodore Roo

An avid outdoorsman and conservationist, he wanted to ensure future g

tions would be able to enjoy the pristine beauty of the American wild

Because unregulated industrial practices and expansion were devastat
254

tect resources from overconsumption and exploitation. Roosevelt’s poli

resulted in the nation designating more than 230 million acres as natio

parks and forests and establishing the Forest Service in 1905. Roosevelt ba

his conservationism on the idea of effi cient use of natural resources. Howev

with the rise of environmentalism, effi cient use would evolve into an ideol

that the nation must protect nature for its own sake.222

In the decades leading up to the 1960s, the nation emerged as a world sup

power, and as its prosperity grew, consumption grew along with it. Becaus

this prosperity, many Americans had leisure time to enjoy nature. This cau

many people to develop a greater appreciation of nature and keener awaren

of environmental issues. Rising consumption and continued industrializat

concerned many people, especially those who had come to appreciate Am

ca’s wilderness during the prosperity of the post War years. In the climat

1960s activism, new environmental groups cropped up and older ones beca

more outspoken. What made the movement unique was its grassroots natu

as many ordinary Americans, such as biology teachers, college students, 

members of small communities, became involved, unlike the elitist conser

tion movements of previous decades. Many modern environmentalists poin

Rachel Carson’s 1962 book, Silent Spring, as the beginning of the moveme

Silent Spring informed the public about the dangers of pesticides, leading 

increased public interest in environmental issues. Over the next few ye

environmentalists became much more aggressive in attempts to bring pu

awareness to environmental issues. For the fi rst time, various environmen

groups united their efforts to affect political change. The growing infl uenc

the environmental movement combined with the public’s growing concern 

environmental issues resulted in Congress passing a series of laws inten

to deal with these problems: the Clean Water Acts (1960, 1965, and 19

the Clean Air Acts (1963 and 1967), the Endangered Species Acts (1964, 19

1973, and 1976), and the Water Quality Act (1965), culminating in passag

222 Benjamin Kline, First Along the River: A Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement (San F

cisco: Acada Books, 1997); Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Effi ciency: The Progre

Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1959).
255

or activity that might have an impact on the environment.223

NEPA required all federal agencies to comply with legal mandates 

they make fi nal decisions about Federal actions that could have environ

effects.” To oversee this process, the government established the Cou

Environmental Quality (CEQ), which ensured agencies followed requir

cesses, advised the president on environmental matters, and supervised 

mentation of NEPA. NEPA also required agencies to submit an environ

impact statement (EIS) before undertaking projects potentially affect

environment. In December 1970, President Nixon created the Environ

Protection Agency (EPA) to establish and enforce environmental pro

standards, conduct environmental research, and advise the president o

ronmental policies. Both the CEQ and EPA reviewed each EIS before a

ing any action. In response to NEPA, the Corps expanded to comply w

new federal requirements. Initially, it revised regulations to include a tw

evaluation process for projects. The fi rst step was a brief environmenta

conducted by the district engineer that resulted in an environmental 

ment. In the next step, the district engineer determined whether to p

based on the assessment. If there were any evidence a project might h

environmental impact, the district prepared an EIS. This meant that bef

large-scale Corps project could begin, there would have to be a lengthy p

of planning, authorization, and review, as well as consideration of any f

alternatives that might have a less signifi cant environmental impact.224

The Clean Water Act of 1977 further increased Corps responsibili

Section 404 of the act required the Corps “to protect the aquatic enviro

by requiring a permit for virtually all physical impacts to our nation’s w

and water resources.” As a result, Corps permitting responsibilities ex

between 1969 and 1975, during which time the Corps received 74,000 

applications and granted 63,370. The passage of the Endangered Specie

1973 also increased Corps environmental planning responsibilities, as i

the protection of endangered plant and animal life a federal responsibil

223 Kline, First Along the River; Kirkpatrick Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Envir

Movement, 1962-1992 (NY: Hill and Wang, 1993): 1-45; Hays, A History of Environmental Pol

1945 (Pittsburg: Pittsburg UP, 2000); Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Envir

Movement (NY: Hill and Wang, 1993); Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, M

Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven: Yale UP, 1999). 224 CEQ, A Citizen’s Guide to the NEPA: Having Your Voice Heard (Wash., D.C.: CEQ, 2007); Ja

“The Birth of the EPA,” EPA Journal (Nov. 1985); Andrews, Managing the Environment; Carr

and William Willingham, “Protecting the Nation’s Waters: A History of the U.S. Army Corps of E

Regulatory Responsibilities, 1899-1999,” manuscript (Feb. 1999): 36-69.
256

Section 7 particularly affected the Corps, as it prohibited any federal act

that might have a detrimental impact on endangered species or their habi

The weight of these new responsibilities fell onto the back of the Corps and

Richard Andrews writes, showed that “the Corps was subjected to more inte

external pressures to implement environmental policy than nearly any ot

federal agency.” These pressures became the catalyst for the organizatio

changes that occurred in the decades following NEPA.225

One response to NEPA was establishment of the Environmental Ad

sory Board. Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke invited six 

tinguished members of the environmental community to advise him, so 

could make changes to allow the Corps to better comply with NEPA. To ens

that districts included environmental considerations in the planning proc

the Corps released Environmental Guidelines for the Corps of Engineers 

December 1970. However, the board was critical of the Guidelines becaus

felt the Corps should require advisory boards at the district level. It also cr

cized the planning process, insuffi cient public involvement in projects, and 

inadequacies. These criticisms came largely because board members desi

rapid change, which was diffi cult due to the decentralized nature of the Cor

Another diffi culty, described by former District Engineer Col. Guy Jester (1971-1973), 

was “trying to teach our people how to do an 

environmental impact statement [and] how 

to address the environmental problems.” 

Because NEPA provided little guidance on 

implementation, organizations had to use 

trial and error to determine the best methods. 

For example, environmentalists criticized the 

district’s fi rst EIS because it was only eight 

pages long, compared to the multivolume 

products of today. However, NEPA offered 

no precise guidelines for EIS preparation processes, which the Corps developed in response to criticisms and recommen

tions. NEPA created further challenges because it dramatically increased 

225 A Citizen’s Guide to the NEPA; Andrews, Environmental Policy and Administrative Change: Im

mentation of the National Environmental Policy Act (Wash., D.C.: Lexington, 1976): 47-91; Andrews, M

aging the Environment, pp. 39-41; Pursell and Willingham, p. 55.

Col. Guy Jester
257

often required years of studies and compiling data. All these factors e

the need to improve EIS preparation and planning, but changes wou

time, as districts hired new employees and trained old ones to comp

new guidelines. It should be noted that, as an engineering organizati

district’s primary concern for more than a century was completing proj

an economically feasible way. It had to reshape this way of thinking a

in response to NEPA. As former Distric

neer Col. Thorwald Peterson pointed o

Corps of Engineers’ performance durin

early years of NEPA, [shows] that it w

tainly at the forefront of adaptation.”22

The real test of NEPA was its imp

tation at the operating levels of gover

For the law to be effective, organi

needed to change their philosophy and 

ment organizational changes. The ev

of planning and project management r

how the Corps responded to these r

ments. The Environmental Advisory 

suggested to Clarke that the Corps 

a much more intricate planning proc

response, the Corps issued guidelines outlining Corps objectives for 

planning, which included an emphasis on public participation in the 

planning process. These objectives were exemplifi ed by reorganization 

district level. Districts renamed their units and redefi ned their roles. T

dite organizational changes, districts expanded their personnel and inc

the responsibilities of existing personnel. Historians Daniel Mazmani

Jeanne Nienaber observed that planning “was seen as the route to [m

better decisions by coming to terms with rapid change, increasing co

ity, and new environmental demands.” In addition to technical, engin

and economic factors, planning now included confl ict resolution, enviro

tal studies, public relations, and EIS preparation. One way districts add

226 Towey, Interview with Jester; Martin Reuss, Shaping Environmental Awareness: The Uni

Army Corps of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board, 1970-1980 (Fort Belvoir: CEHO, 1982); 

Environmental Policy, pp. 47-91; Ruddy, Interview with Peterson, May 19, 1983 (MVS archives)

Environmental Statement, Meramec Park Lake (St. Louis: MVS, Nov. 6, 1970).

Col. Thorwald Peterson
258

sections, in the Planning Division. Their primary function was EIS preparati

but they also reviewed projects and ensured compliance with NEPA guideli

during the planning process. The fact that the number of environmental p

sonnel in the Corps increased from 75 to 575 between 1969 and 1977 shows 

profound impact that NEPA had on the Corps planning process. The plann

divisions also had to run public involvement programs and send represen

tives to public meetings. The goal of environmental planning was to create 

“integrated planning process” so districts could address environmental c

siderations at the beginning of a project. However, because of the backlog 

previous projects environmental units needed to address, most were not f

to participate at the beginning of the planning process until the late 1970s

the 1980s, the Corps had dramatically improved its planning process, but 

needed to make signifi cant organizational changes to create a planning proc

that was fast and effi cient, as well as sensitive to environmental needs.227

The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 was a major catalyst for 

Corps to adopt more effi cient project planning. The act authorized the Co

to undertake 270 new projects and deauthorized 290 older projects. It a

required the Corps to expedite the planning process for all civil works p

ects. Another catalyst was Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch’s n

vision for the strategic planning process. Hatch wanted to improve Corps pl

ning by incorporating strategic planning methods used by corporations. T

Corps project management model was ineffi cient, as it required a projec

go through a different manager each time it entered a new phase. Typica

a project had different managers for the planning, engineering, constructi

and operations phases. This system was inadequate to meet the demand

planning, so the Corps began using life cycle project management – wid

used in the corporate world – to optimize planning. With life cycle proj

management, a project manager oversaw every aspect of a project through 

life cycle. In July 1988, the Corps issued a circular that directed districts 

begin implementing project management as part of Initiative-88. For ev

project, the Corps would appoint a civilian as deputy district engineer, assig

227 Reuss, Shaping Environmental Awareness, pp. 47-91; Mazmanian and Nienaber, Can Organiza

Change?: Environmental Protection, Citizen, Participation, and the Corps of Engineers (Wash. 

Brookings Inst., 1979): 52; Donita M. Moorhus and Gregory Graves, The Limits of Vision: A History o

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1988-1992 (Wash. D.C.: USACE, 2000): 1-51; USACE, Planning Guid

Notebook, ER 1105-2-100 (Wash., D.C.: USACE, 2000), Ch. 2, Sec. 3.
259

establish a Program Management Offi ce to advise the deputy.228

In 1988, former District Engineer Col. Daniel Wilson stated tha

made life cycle project management so signifi cant was that it allowed 

managers to “cut across organizational lines,” 

i.e., the stovepipe organization in which there 

was a different manager for each phase of a 

project. Wilson argued that these changes in 

philosophy showed that this was not the same 

“old Corps of Engineers,” but a modern organization. The fi rst time the district used these 

new management techniques was in 1989, 

when it appointed a life-cycle project manager 

to oversee the Melvin Price Locks and Dams 

Project. In 1991, the district changed the Project Management Branch to the Programs and 

Project Management Division. Planning and 

project management had always been closely 

related, and with the new emphasis on life-cycle project management, m

the Planning Division with the Programs and Project Management D

was a logical decision. In 1999 the Planning Division merged with th

grams and Project Management Division to create one “super divisio

Planning, Programs, and Project Management Division. Although the 

certainly would have evolved without NEPA, these environmental respo

ties accelerated the changes that occurred, forever changing the way the 

did business.229

Recreation

In the years after World War II, American prosperity soared, the pop

expanded, and people had more leisure time to enjoy America’s vast 

resources. This caused a surge in the demand for recreation sites, part

228 Reuss, Reshaping National Water Politics: The Emergence of the Water Resources Developm

1986 (Fort Belvoir: IWR, 1991), Ch. 4; Moorhus and Graves, pp. 1-6; Alan Atkisson, Interview with 

Hatch, In Context 32 (Sum. 1992). 229 Ruddy interview with Col. Daniel Wilson, July 28, 1988 (MVS archives); Daly and Zoeller Inter

Dace, May 25 and June 10; St. Louis District Organizational Charts (MVS archives); Departmen

Memorandum for Commander, Mississippi Valley Division, concerning the Implementation Pl

5-1-11, Programs and Project Management (MVS archives).

Col. Daniel Wilson
260

closer to large urban areas. However, industrial expansion and prospe

impacted the quantity and quality of recreation resources available beca

expansion required millions of acres for new subdivisions, highways, indust

sites, airports, and schools. In response to the loss of these resources, Congr

established the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission in 1958 

undertake a nationwide study of outdoor recreation. Public Law 85-470 aut

rized the commission to “determine the outdoor recreation wants and ne

of the American people now and what they would be in 1976 and 2000.” T

law also authorized the commission to “determine what policies and progra

should be recommended to ensure that the needs of the present and future 

adequately and effi ciently met.” In 1962, the Commission presented its O

door Recreation for America report to Congress. The report stated that 

increasing demands for recreation meant public agencies needed more mo

for acquiring and maintaining recreation sites. The report concluded that wa

was the focal point for recreation and, although plenty of land was availa

the government did not “effi ciently” meet recreation needs. The commiss

Aerial of St. Louis in 1950s
261

opment of guidelines for the management of outdoor recreation resour

The Corps had not initially intended to get into the recreation busin

because the report emphasized water-based activities, the Corps – espec

its numerous reservoirs –came to play an essential role in meeting the n

recreation needs. The growing importance of recreation for the Corps w

denced by the 17-fold increase in attendance at its recreation areas b

1953 and 1973. One reason for this increase was the 1944 Flood Cont

which authorized the Corps to construct, operate and maintain public pa

recreational facilities in reservoir areas. In 1962, Congress amended th

act, broadening the Corps’ authority to include all water resource p

Another important piece of legislation contributing to the growth of rec

was the 1965 Federal Water Projects Recreation Act, which required th

to give full consideration to recreation opportunities at multi-purpose 

voirs and also defi ned parameters for cost-sharing with other federal an

federal agencies at these sites. Since 1944, the Corps has signed leas

state and local agencies that allow agencies to participate in adminis

and development of recreation sites. However, those sites under Corps 

before the implementation of this cost-sharing principle continued to b

ated directly by the Corps.231

With the increasing demand for recreation, Corps-built lakes and 

ation sites grew exponentially. The fi rst district lake project was Carlyle 

nois. In response to fl ooding on the Kaskaskia River, a group of con

citizens began meeting in 1933 to discuss the possibility of a project 

lyle. Congress rewarded their efforts 

in the 1938 Flood Control Act, which 

approved a major fl ood control reservoir in the region. However, the outbreak of World War II delayed the 

project until interest renewed in the 

1950s. By 1957, the Corps completed a 

comprehensive plan for the Kaskaskia 

230 “Outdoor Recreation for America (1962),” in Lary M. Dilsaver, ed., America’s National Par

The Critical Documents (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefi eld Publishers, 1994); Maj. Gen. J.W. Mo

reation Surge” Water Spectrum 5:2 (1973). 231 Increased attendance discussed in Morris, “Recreation Surge”; Flood Control Act of 1944, P

(78th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 22, 1944); Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965 (PL 89-72), as 

Engineering Regulation 1165-2-400 (August 9, 1980).

Recreation area at Rend Lake
262

River Project and the following year Congress authorized the construction 

reservoirs at Shelbyville and Carlyle in the Flood Control Act of 1958. C

struction on Carlyle Lake was completed in 1967, producing a 26,000 acre r

ervoir (at normal pool) that was the largest man-made lake in Illinois. W

the primary purpose of the lake was fl ood control, it was a multipurpose res

voir that improved navigation of the Kaskaskia, supplied water to the regi

and provided numerous environmental stewardship and recreation opportu

ties, including camping, picnicking, swimming, boating, fi shing, and sail

The demand for recreation was shown by the increase in visitation, which r

from 929,008 recreation days in 1967 to over 4 million by the 1990s. In 20

the Kaskaskia Navigation Project was combined with the Carlyle Lake P

ect. When the Kaskaskia project was authorized in 1962, the original purp

was aiding commercial navigation through construction of a lock and dam t

would allow for the creation of a 9-foot navigation channel. However, p

ect benefi ts were not limited to navigation, as the area offers numerous r

reational opportunities. Approximately 5,000 recreational crafts lock throu

Kaskaskia each year and the project also includes four major public boat ram

and a popular marina at New Athens. In addition, the project has provided 

Boating at Rend Lake
263

communities, such as the city of Evansville.232

The district used what it learned at Carlyle during construction of Re

Shelbyville lakes. Construction of Shelbyville Lake was completed in 19

Rend Lake was completed just two years later. Like other district rese

Shelbyville and Rend were multi-purpose facilities, with recreation bei

one of their purposes. Recreation demands increased signifi cantly at Shel

growing from approximately 1.2 million in 1970 to just over 3 million b

The district used what it learned during the development of the Illinois 

voirs and applied it to those in Missouri: Mark Twain and Wappapel

construction of Mark Twain Lake and Clarence Cannon Dam had bee

sidered long before Congress approved it with the Flood Control Act o

Since the 1930s, a reservoir had been discussed as a means of fl ood c

but it was not until 1983 that the project was completed. In addition to s

ing fl ood control, hydroelectric power, and 4.5 million gallons of clean 

the project has offered numerous 

recreation opportunities, such as 

camping, fi shing, hunting, boating 

and hiking. Moreover, because the 

district was able to apply what it had 

learned during construction at the 

Illinois lakes, it was able to develop 

an area that included the diversity 

of recreational opportunities and 

facilities required at a modern site. 

Wappapello, which was constructed 

between 1938 and 1941, was originally part of the Memphis District b

transferred to St. Louis in the early 1980s. The primary function of the 

voir was to minimize fl ooding in the St. Francis Basin, but the lake also 

opportunities for recreational development and environmental stewa

After the transfer, the St. Louis District consolidated facilities for effi cien

brought the recreation areas up to current standards. The Corps develop

232 USACE, Master Plan, DM No. 10, Carlyle Lake, Illinois (St. Louis: MVS, 1997); “Carlyle Lake/

Navigation Project,” Esprit (June 2001). It should be noted that visitation fi gures between 1967 

are based on the same method of measurement; however, in 1992 the Corps adopted the Visitor E

Reporting System (VERS), meaning that those fi gures after 1991 cannot be accurately compared 

fi gures. In some cases, because of the new standardized system of measurement, visitor number

while actual visitation decreased.

Mark Twain Lake visitor center
264

altered recreation facilities in response to the evolving and diverse use patte

of visitors. This development included modernization of facilities, expan

forms of recreation opportunities, and easy access for disabled persons. Ad

tional opportunities are offered by concessionaries that provide dining, cab

and boat rental and by local organizations partner with Wappapello to o

visitors numerous family-oriented special events. Visitation at the lake fl uc

ated between 1.1 and 2.1 million visitors from 1963 to 1982 and has remai

around 2 million since 1983. The Corps has outgranted lands to the Misso

Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) for operation of Lake Wappap

State Park and to the Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) for fi sh 

wildlife management. In addition, the district promotes habitat improvem

and maintains a refuge on project lands.233

The Corps had constructed the majority of its reservoirs in the 1960s 

1970s. Since this time, visitor needs and expectations have changed dram

cally, requiring the Corps to respond by modernizing areas to meet curr

recreation demands. Modernization included upgraded sanitary facili

and toilets (fl ush toilets replace pit toilets), as well additions such as laun

233 “Carlyle Lake,” Esprit (Jan. 1996); USACE, Master Plan, DM No. 10, Carlyle Lake, Illinois (St. L

MVS, 1997); USACE, Master Plan, DM No. 9, Clarence Cannon Dam and Mark Twain Lake (St. L

MVS, 2004); Visitation data after 1992 based on VERS. Morris, “Recreation Surge”; “Celebrate the La

Esprit, special lakes issues (June 2001).

Carlyle Lake at sunrise
265

buildings and shower areas. The district also began building new and i

ing old access roads to areas, paving walking areas and parking lots, 

picnic areas, constructing swimming areas, and modernizing camps

adding electricity and longer pads for recreational vehicles use. In ad

the district improved areas to make them accessible for the disabled and 

provide a greater diversity of non-water-based recreational opportuniti

as hiking trails, improved campgrounds, playgrounds, visitor centers

areas, hunting areas, historic and educational sites. By 1999, the Corps 

nized the need for modernization of its facilities nationwide, so it establ

Recreation Facilities Standards Task Force to develop a commonly app

of recreation facility design standards and levels of service for the mod

tion of Corps recreation areas. This lead to the Recreation Area Modern

Program (RAMP), which included guidelines and standards for modern

at areas. In 2005, Shelbyville Lake was one of six lakes that the Corps c

receive funds for modernization.234

The district’s recreational improvements were not limited to reserv

also modifi ed navigation pools to provide public access. Thousands of 

used each year used the slack-water pools created by the nine-foot c

project to fi sh, swim, boat, and sightsee. Recognizing the need for rec

234 USACE, Master Plan, DM 7B, Lake Shelbyville, Illinois (St. Louis: MVS, 2004).

Corps hunter safety course
266

region and found that many of the top activities were not water-based, such 

walking, pleasure driving, picnicking, observing wildlife, bicycling, and r

ning. In response to demands for these activities, the district developed 

Rivers Project Master Plan in 2001. The goal of the project was to provide rec

ational, environmental stewardship, and environmental education opportu

ties while balancing these goals w

economic development. Numer

recreation opportunities exis

along the Mississippi, Illinois, 

Kaskaskia rivers. Because comm

cial and private interests used 

waterways, and because of the fr

ile balance between human activi

and protecting the environment

was essential to develop projects 

way that balanced commercial, en

ronmental, and recreational nee

To meet this challenge, the dist

began evaluating Corps-mana

public lands and the opportuni

for development. The district a

evaluated user demands to de

mine which activities it should fo

on developing. Overall, the m

popular activities were boat-fi 

ing, sightseeing, recreational bo

ing, and bank-fi shing, represent

75-percent of total activities. H

ever, studies revealed a signifi c

demand for activities such as cam

ing, picnicking, swimming, hik

and bicycling, which were especi

prevalent in the St. Louis metrop

tan area, as people desired increa

opportunities near riverfronts. 

Map of Riverlands
267

the same way it did at reservoirs – modernizing facilities, developing 

address the need for additional activities, and creating safer and more 

sible sites. As of 2011, there were 28 Rivers Project areas in the district

gation pools, offering numerous recreational opportunities while provid

convenience of modern amenities.235

With the increasing number of Corps reservoirs, the need for im

water safety at these areas became apparent. In 1971, there were 

500 water-related fatalities at Corps lakes and the average number o

ties remained around 300 throughout the decade. In the mid-1970s, th

of Engineers, recognizing that the Corps needed to intensify its water 

efforts, issued a directive to this effect. These efforts helped to reduce 

ties to around 200 annually by the mid-1980s. In 1986, the Corps be

National Water Safety Program, which centralized water safety efforts 

districts nationwide in order to ensure that the quality of program was 

tent Corps-wide. The program’s aim was to identify life-threatening co

associated with water-based recreation and increase public awareness 

practices through various forms of educational media. During its fi rst 2

the program has seen the number of reported water-related fatalities at 

managed areas decline to nearly half the average of the 1970s and early 19

1994, headquarters formed the National Water Safety Products Advisor

mittee to provide fi eld-level input on water safety products and develo

The committee also provided information on the effi cacy of the program 

level of individual recreation areas at the district level. This grassroo

information helped to facilitate site-specifi c improvements to water safe

St. Louis District oversees recreational safety at its more than 300,000 

which include fi ve reservoirs, fi ve navigational projects, 80 miles on t

nois River, 36 miles on the Kaskaskia, and 300 miles on the Mississippi

areas attract approximately 17 million visits per year, over 60 percent o

participate in water-based activities. The Corps began keeping statis

water-related fatalities in 1998 and has used the data collected as a m

measure the effi cacy of its water safety efforts. The data revealed that 

ing was responsible for 86 percent of deaths, with boating and swimmin

responsible for 89 percent of these deaths. The St. Louis District respon

these fi gures by launching educational campaigns at target groups, on

235 USACE, Rivers Project Master Plan (St. Louis: MVS, 2001). 
268

collected were used to determine the focal points of the education progr

which were swimming and boater safety. The district has used public serv

announcements, newsletters, commercials, outreach programs, poster c

tests, billboards, internet, safety courses, printed materials, and various ot

sources of media to carry out its campaign. At individual areas, personnel w

trained in safety procedures, signs were posted, and rescue equipment m

available to optimize effi cacy. The objective of these efforts was to decre

fatalities by 50 percent by the end of 2009, with 2007 being the base year. 

meet this objective, the district must have only 6 in FY08 and 4 in FY09

2008, the district had just one fatality and two in 2009.236

In addition to the improving recreation opportunities in navigation po

and at reservoirs, the district used these areas for environmental impro

ments. At Mark Twain, Shelbyville, Wappapello, and Carlyle lakes, the distr

in cooperation with other responsible agencies, seeks to maintain steady p

elevations which enhance the quality of spawning. The district also used wa

level fl uctuations at its navigation pools on the Mississippi to improve vege

tive growth and optimize habitat conditions. It also enhanced fi sh and wild

protection by providing environmental demonstration areas that various s

cies used as habitat. These areas were especially important for waterfowl, wh

use wetlands for sustenance while making their migrations. Enhanced ar

included the Riverlands Environmental Demonstration Area near Melvin P

Locks and Dam and fi sh and wildlife management areas at district reservo

Resource managers oversaw these areas to ensure the maximization of wild

conservation while providing recreational opportunities that were compat

with protecting the environment. These sites also provided numerous edu

tional opportunities, as visitors could observe species in a natural habitat 

learn the importance of balancing human activities and the environment.23

236 USACE, “Water Safety Program Summary” (www.corpslakes.usace.army.mil/employees/w

safety/ pback.cfm, Dec. 29, 2011); USACE, St. Louis District Boating and Water Safety Strategic Camp

Plan (St. Louis: MVS, 2008); USACE, Corps of Engineers Public Water Related Fatalities FY97-FY10 (w

corpslakes.usace.army.mil/employees/watersafety/pdfs/COE_Water-related_Fatalities_FY98-10

Division%20Summary.pdf, Dec. 29, 2011). 237 “State parks and wildlife management areas,” Esprit (Ap. 1996); “Wildlife management area,” E

(Jan. 1996); “Waterfowl management,” Esprit (Mar. 1996); “Sustaining the Mississippi River,” Esprit 

1995).
269

John F. Marzec

John F. Marzec dedicated his career in service to the Corps, the St. Louis 

and to the public. During his service as Chief of the Natural Resource Mana

Branch (1976 to 1997), he provided direction not only for the district, but for n

programs, helping to shape an entire generation of biologists, foresters, rang

land use planners. His innovative leadership helped to establish a framework 

project operations are done today, as he demanded a balanced program that 

sized all program elements including fl ood control, recreation, natural resource

supply and navigation. 

Marzec’s leadership style was ahead of its time, as practices now comm

were championed by him decades before they became mainstream. He require

training between the district and fi eld, established work details at HQUSACE, pr

staff visits to other projects and encouraged fi eld staff to regularly share succes

failures. John served as a mentor and role model for many who have become le

the District, including Dennis Fenske, Beth Pitrolo, Andrea Murdock (Lewis), 

Foss, Gary Stilts, Dave Berti, Jim Lynch, Bob Wilkins, Stan Ebersohl, Jim Hill, 

Jefferson and others. His efforts were instrumental in creating the professiona

management organizations that exist in the district today. 

Marzec was also a leader in using public involvement in the planning pro

recognized the need for public input in solving diffi cult problems, so in 1985 h

off the Traditional Access Plan, which facilitated use of full public involvement. 

used public consensus building in the Shoreline Management Plan at Lake She

John was also instrumental in utilizing contracting as a method of increa

purchasing power and freeing hired labor for more critical tasks. He estab

staffi ng structure that was responsive and effi cient in the use of new technolog

business methods. He worked tirelessly to empower Operations Managers t

an effective organizational structure. John understood that without funding, 

could be done; so he worked throughout his career to develop an adequate O&

funding level. 

Near the end of his career, he became the fi rst Operations Project Manage

Rivers Project Offi ce. In addition, he restructured and consolidated the Mis

River Lock and Dams and River resource management functions into one Ope

Project.
270

In 1906, Congress passed the Antiquities Act, the fi rst in a series of l

and regulations emphasizing the importance of preserving the nation’s cultu

and archaeological resources. These laws required the curation of mater

removed from federal lands, including the more than 25 million acres ow

or leased by the Department of Defense. This DoD land contains more th

32,000 known archaeological sites, nearly 8,000 of which can be or are lis

on the National Register of Historic Places.

After World War II ended, the over 6 million returning soldiers nee

to return to work. However, many of their positions had been fi lled in th

absence, so one challenge the nation faced was creating new jobs for the retu

ing soldiers. One way to create jobs was to undertake a number of infrastruct

and civil works projects, many of which involved the Corps. At some proj

locations, the Corps uncovered cultural resources that required archaeolog

excavation. After recovering the cultural resources (i.e. material remains), 

Corps sent the collections (the artifacts and the records associated with 

investigations) to repositories located throughout the country. The prob

that the Corps and other federal agencies faced was curation of the collecti

Dr. Michael “Sonny” Trimble awarded Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service
271

and the collections were spread out at various repositories across the 

try as late as the 1980s. Even if such a plan existed, many federal a

lacked the funds and expertise needed to effi ciently manage these colle

In response to this need, the Corps issued a regulation providing a 

policy and guidance concerning the curation of cultural resources. “How

as Dr. Michael “Sonny” Trimble, chief of the St. Louis District’s Curati

Archives Analysis Branch, indicated, “the curation guidelines and sta

applicable in 1984 [were] very general and often vague.”238

 During the previous 30 years, the district had undertaken mor

92 collection-generating projects. It stored these collections at 10 repo

scattered throughout Missouri and Illinois. The problem for those ma

the collections was that “the numerous laws establishing federal own

of archaeological materials did not provide agencies or repositories wit

guidelines for provision of fi nancial support necessary for long-term cur

In August 1987, the Department of the Interior published a propose

tion rule that would establish curation guidelines for federal agencies to 

When codifi ed in 1991, the new regulation established

defi nitions, standards, procedures, and guidelines to be followed by Federal agencies to preserve collections of prehistoric and historic material remains, and associated records, 

that are recovered in conjunction with Federal projects and 

programs under certain Federal statutes. (36 CFR Part 79:1)

238 USACE, Saving the Past from the Future: Archaeological Curation in the St. Louis District 

MVS, 1991): 1-15, 30, 89, quote on 9; USACE, “Chapter 6: Environmental Engineering,” Unpublis

uscript (MVS archives); Department of the Interior, “Department of Defense: Archaeological C

Management” (www.doi.gov/pam/dodarc.html, Feb. 17, 2011).

Before facility After collections facility
272

Terry Norris, the district archaeologist at the time, hired Dr. Michael “Son

Trimble for a four-year term to provide additional technical assistance on so

standard Corps archaeological work. Trimble began reading over draft fede

curation regulation and congressional records and soon discovered the p

posed legislation for the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriat

Act (NAGPRA) and the new federal curation guidelines (36 CFR Part 79). 

quickly realized the dramatic impact that these new regulations would have 

archaeology because federal agencies simply did not have the requisite peo

for conducting the kind of work required by this legislation. In addition, si

Trimble had a background in museum management, a fi eld that few archaeo

gists specialized in, he could apply this expertise to the new federal curat

requirements. Moreover, he knew that the Corps had enormous archaeolo

cal collections, second only to the Smithsonian amongst Federal governm

collections. Trimble soon realized that the requirements of this new legi

tion, given the size of the Corps’ archaeological collections, presented a uni

opportunity for him to essentially start a business within the Corps inven

rying and overseeing the proper curation of these collections. Understand

that all federal agencies would have to adhere to these new guidelines a

would not have the capacity or expertise to handle the workload, Trimble w

to district archaeologist Terry Norris to discuss the possibility of the dist

doing this work and providing its expertise to other districts and agenc

Trimble saw this work as a challenge that gave him the freedom to deve

innovate ways to approach archaeological collections management. In or

to fi nd out the extent of the efforts required to assess and inventory col

tions across the country, he began with the district’s collections. The time 

effort required far exceeded anything that Trimble had expected. One rea

it was so challenging was that much of the archaeological materials had b

sent away to various specialists across the country for analysis. Trimble had 

track down these materials and request that it be returned to the district. O

the next year, Trimble wrote up his fi ndings and published them in a volu

that became the template for how people composed their reports in the futu

Once Trimble had fi gured out how to do inventory at a district level, he co

apply that same knowledge at the national level.

After conducting numerous investigations to assess its collections, 

district determined that they were deteriorating and the facilities housing 
273

responded to these fi ndings with a number of corrective actions. It co

all of its collections into two repositories and developed cooperative 

ments with these facilities for the proper care of collections. The distr

developed a set of archaeological collections standards to ensure uniform 

tion of all collections. To raise public awareness about the importance 

tecting the nation’s cultural resources, the district initiated a series of 

lectures and exhibits. The district had quickly become a leader in the 

collections management and soon began advising other federal agen

the proper methods of archaeological collections management. To ca

this mission, the district assembled a team of archaeologists, anthropo

museum studies specialists, collections managers, biologists, and arc

These professionals, under the director of Trimble, provided the distric

team of skilled experts who could meet the challenges of large-scale ar

logical collections management.239

In December 1994, Director of Civil Works Maj. Gen. Stan Genega 

lished the Mandatory Center of Expertise for Archaeological Curation a

lections Management in the St. Louis District. He chose the district b

its Curation and Archives Analysis Branch had played a key role in ass

advising, and improving curations management in other districts. The 

established the center to “ensure USACE compliance with the curation 

data requirements mandated by Public Law 101-601, Native American 

Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)” (ER 1110-3-109) and to o

curation management in other Corps districts and federal agencies as 

to “assist Headquarters, Divisions, and Districts in carrying out the c

requirements of the Corps civil works program.” Between 1998 and 

the center conducted assessments at 165 repositories across the nati

were curating Corps collections. The center used assessments to help 

ties comply with the federal curation regulation and educate Corps c

resources staff nationwide on the proper methods of curation and coll

management. It provided technical assistance to agencies including th

Marines, and Air Force, as well as the Bureau of Land Management, Bu

Indian Affairs, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.240

239 “Environmental Engineering,” pp. 7-11; Saving the Past from the Future:, quote on p. 8; “DoD

logical Collections Management.”

240 DoD: Archaeological Collections Management”; “Environmental Engineering,” pp. 7-11; “MC

History” (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/engr/curation/MCXHistoryTxt.html, Feb.17, 2011). 
274

requirements of NAGPRA. Passed in 1990, the law requires federal agen

to inventory human remains and associated funerary objects of Native Am

cans and provide federally recognized Native American tribes, Native Haw

ians, and Alaskan Natives with an inventory of the collection. Upon requ

agencies must repatriate collections to those federally recognized tribes, Na

Hawaiians, and Alaskan Natives that have been determined to be cultur

affi liated with the human remains and objects. To ensure compliance with 

new law, the center used its own staff and contractors throughout the U.S

collect data on skeletal remains and artifacts. Personnel from the center p

vided assistance in the drafting of compliance documents and identifi cat

of the cultural affi liation of the human remains. In recognition of the c

ter’s achievements in archaeological curation, it received the Vice Preside

Hammer Award in 1999 recognizing signifi cant contributions in suppor

reinventing government principles.241

In addition to the center’s role in providing technical assistance to ot

federal agencies, it participated in a number of other important projects 

programs, including locating and mapping historic shipwrecks, aiding the U

Army Central Identifi cation Laboratory in Hawaii (now the Joint POW/M

Account Command) in the recovery of missing military personnel, and prov

ing technical assistance to the General Services Administration (GSA) afte

discovered a mass grave of former slaves in New York City. The historical sh

wrecks project grew out of the need for documentation of shipwreck locati

on the Middle Mississippi. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centu

steamboats dominated the river. However, because of the hazards involved 

navigating the Mississippi and its tributaries, a large number of these bo

sank. Historians had long been familiar with the history of inland navigat

during this period, but they lacked information about the precise nature 

location of shipwrecks buried in siltation by a meandering river. The hist

cal shipwrecks project produced a report listing and mapping the locat

of nearly 700 vessels that had sank in this small section of the rivers dur

the nineteenth and early twentieth century. This data has helped histori

241 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, PL 101-601 (101st Cong., 2nd Sess.); US

“Champion of Your Heartland’s Water Resources” District Brochure (St. Louis: MVS, 2001); “Mand

Center of Expertise for the Curation and Management of Archaeological Collections,” Esprit (Dec. 19

“Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” Esprit (Dec. 1995); “District Gets Ham

Award,” Esprit (Feb. 1999).
275

Steamboat.”242

In the mid-to-late 1990s, the Central Identifi cation Laboratory in 

asked for the center’s assistance in searching for, excavating, and reco

missing military personnel lost in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam 

Archaeologists from the center participated in nearly 130 recovery exca

and identifi ed at least 31 military personnel. Another example of the c

growing reputation was the GSA’s request that it provide technical ass

in the analysis and reburial of the remains of a mass grave of 400 form

can and African American slaves discovered in New York City in 1991. T

sought a suitable curation facility for the artifacts and advice on how to m

its collections, so it contacted Trimble and asked for his assistance on th

ect. The center agreed to provide technical assistance, especially dur

challenging re-interment phase of the project. With the center’s help, t

was able to successfully analyze, inventory, and re-intern the remains.2

Undoubtedly, the highest-profi le project the center undertook was it

vation and analysis of mass gravesites in Iraq. In 2004, after the cap

242 USACE, “Historical Shipwrecks on the Middle Mississippi and Lower Illinois Rivers” (St. Lo

2004).

243 “Mandatory Center of Expertise,” Esprit; “St. Louis and New York U.S. Army Corps of Engin

tricts partner on one of the greatest archaeological discoveries of our time,” Esprit (Nov. 2003).

Mass grave site in Iraq
276

asked Trimble to assemble a team of experts, including forensic experts 

archaeologists, to recover evidence of genocide in prosecuting Hussein’s regi

The Iraqi Mass Graves Team estimated that more than 400 mass graves dot

the countryside. Through professional excavations of X mass grave sites; an

ysis of all human remains, clothing, and other material remains; careful rev

of more than 90,000 images; and meticulous attention to the maintenanc

the chain of custody for all these materials, the team was able to docum

what happened to these Iraqi men, women, and children. During Trimb

4.5 hours of testimony at Saddam Hussein’s trial, he was able to provide p

pable evidence of the guilt of Hussein and other former Baath Party offi ci

ultimately leading to their conviction. However, what began as a mission 

prove genocide turned into something much more for the Iraqi Mass Gra

Team: the repatriation of the remains. Trimble indicated that his personal g

was to return the bodies “to their families so that they may have closure

that they may rebury them with honor, reverence, and love.” The team acco

plished this goal when it returned the remains wrapped in cloth to the Kurd

people. The Kurds buried these remains in a national cemetery that honors 

memory of those whose lives were lost.244

Trimble and the center’s staff continue to provide support to the Corp

their main mission areas—NAGPRA and archaeological curation—and to ot

federal and state agencies as requested.

244 “Setting the Record Straight” Esprit (Jan. 2007); “Proof Positive” Esprit (Fall 2005); Donna M

“Forensics Team Gives Voice to Saddam’s Fallen, Shows U.S. Values,” Armed Forces Press Service 

2008); Kristi Mayo, “Digital-Image Management at Mass Gravesites,” Evidence Technology Maga

(May-June 2008); “Dr. Michael ‘Sonny’ Trimble: Giving voices to Iraq’s murdered peoples” Esprit (

2006).
277

Veterans Curation 

Project

After spending time in Iraq uncovering mass Iraqi gravesites and giving te

against Saddam Hussein’s regime, Michael “Sonny” Trimble returned home co

for the fate of many of the wounded veterans coming home from Iraq and Afgh

Trimble had an additional concern: overseeing the proper documentation - as r

by the National Historic Preservation Act - of the more than 47,000 boxes of a

logical materials collected from excavations at Corps project sites since the 19

an effort to address these dual concerns, he conceived the idea to employ w

veterans and give them on-the-job training processing archaeological collect

the summer of 2009, this conception became a reality, as the Corps funded $

lion to the project, which the St. Louis district’s Center of Expertise used to des

manage the project’s implementation. By October 20, 2009, the project had op

fi rst center in Augusta, Georgia. In 2010, the Corps opened two additional fac

Washington, D.C. and St. Louis, Missouri. Every six months, each facility hires 

erans, whom it trains in curation skills that these veterans can use to acquire 

the end of six months, a new group of veterans is employed and trained. For 

these veterans, making the transition back to civilian life can be diffi cult, as 

by Walter Sinnott, a Purple Heart recipient who suffers from Post Traumati

Syndrome. Sinnott explains that his work on the project provided him with mo

just a paycheck or job skills; it provided him with the opportunity to sit “dow

people and interact...with them on a normal level,” which helped immensely in 

with the diffi culties of making the transition back to civilian life. He is just one 

veterans making this diffi cult transition who have benefi tted from the project.

Veterans receiving curation training
278

As early as 1880, District Engineer Maj. Oswald H. Ernst complained t

erosion of banks due to cultivation, logging, and clearing to reduce snags 

impacted navigation. Congress initially addressed this problem in 1881 w

it established a standard navigational channel, but river industries threate

the health of the river in other ways. Because loggers used water to transp

timber, logs clogged the river, mills cut canals to transport logs, and saw m

discharged sawdust directly into the river. Other industries altered the riv

cut trees for fuel, or discharged pollutants. While the Corps was respons

for regulating certain activities as early as 1890, it was not until passage of 

1899 Rivers and Harbors Act that Congress defi ned Corps regulatory respon

bilities. Section 10 made it illegal to obstruct or alter navigable waters with

fi rst acquiring a permit from the Corps. The Refuse Act (Section 13) prohibi

dumping refuse “other than that fl owing from streets and sewers and pass

therefrom in a liquid state.” Over time, Congress expanded these limitation

timber, oil, and other pollutants, although the primary emphasis was imp

to navigation. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 authorized 

secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce to advise federal agencies to pro

wildlife, and its 1958 amendments enabled agencies to request permit den

although their advice was not compulsory.245

Other laws expanded permitting in the decades that followed. The Supre

Court case Zabel v. Tabb, in which a Florida developer sued the Corps beca

it denied a permit to dredge Boca Ciega Bay, strengthened Corps regu

tory responsibilities to include non-navigation factors. After a 1969 fi re 

the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, revealed the level of pollution on 

nation’s waterways, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control 

Amendments of 1972. Its goal was “to restore and maintain the chemical, ph

ical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waterways.” Disputes over whet

the expanded permits applied to non-navigable waterways such as wetla

led to the 1975 Supreme Court case Natural Resources Defense Council v. C

loway, which interpreted Section 404 to include wetlands. Congress pas

amendments to the 1972 Act, leading to what is now known as the Clean Wa

245 Dobney, pp. 1-63; Hays, Conservation, pp. 27-48; Pursell and Willingham, pp. 1-35; O’Brien et al

17-20; Annual Report, 1880, p. 1369; Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899; Regulatory Program of the 

Army Corps of Engineers, 33 CFR Part 320, General Regulatory Policies, p. 1; USACE, Regulatory 

gram: Applicant Information, EP 1145-2-2, May 1985, p. 2; USACE, “Water Resources Policies and Aut

ties,” Digest of Water Resources Policies and Authorities, EP 1165-2-1 (Wash., D.C.: 1999) Ch. 21.
279

amendments gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 

authority to implement Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and also g

Corps authority “to issue permits, after notice and opportunity for publi

ings for the discharge of dredged or fi ll material into the navigable wa

specifi c disposal sites.246 Problems over the precise interpretation of 

404 persisted into the 1980s, particularly the defi nition of “navigable.” 

404’s qualifi cation “waters of the United States” did little to alleviate am

ties, as the Corps interpreted this broadly. However, opponents of this in

tation maintained that Corps regulatory responsibilities should apply 

to traditional navigable waters. In 1985, the Supreme Court decided 

vs. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. that the Clean Water Act covered w

adjacent to navigable waters. This ruling signifi cantly broadened the s

Corps jurisdiction and made it possible to develop comprehensive gui

for wetlands protection. In 1986, the Corps introduced the “Migrato

Rule,” which clarifi ed extending its jurisdiction to waters that provide 

for migratory birds. Also in 1986, the Corps published the Final Rule fo

latory Programs of the Corps of Engineers at 33 CFR Parts 320 throug

This rule has been amended over time to now include Parts 331 and 

1987, with its regulatory jurisdiction more clearly defi ned, the Corps iss

Wetland Delineation Manual, the purpose of which was “to provide gui

and methods to determine whether an area is a wetland.” The manual 

wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or 

water at a frequency and duration suffi cient to support, and that under 

circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted 

in saturated soil conditions.” Several attempts were made in 1989 and 

modify the 1987 manual, but on August 27, 1991, the use of the 1987 m

became mandatory for making offi cial wetland delineations. The Corps 

rently developing Regional Supplements to the 1987 manual to acco

regional variations in plants, soils, and hydrology. In August 1993, the 

and the EPA published their fi nal wetlands regulations, which tighte

246 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F. 2D 199 (5th Cir. 1970); Regulatory Program: Tribal Consultation an

nation, p. 1; Pursell and Willingham, pp. 32-35; Applicant Information, p. 2; “Water Resource

and Authorities,” Ch. 2; Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, Petitioner v. U.S. Army 

Engineers 99-1178, 531U.S. 159 (S.C. 2001); Clean Water Act, P.L. 92-500 (92nd Cong., 2nd S

101(a), 404; USACE, “Wetlands and Waterways Regulation and Permitting,” (MVS Archives); “R

The Regulatory Program,” Esprit (Nov. 2005); The Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Handbook (W

Environ. Law Inst., 2007): 1-9; Garrett Power, “The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Res

ties of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” Virginia Law Review 63 (May 1977): 504-558.
280

material from wetlands must obtain a permit.247

From the late 1970s through 1990s the Corps faced the challenges of ada

ing its traditional regulatory responsibilities to include wetlands protecti

These challenges bogged down the permitting process, which took more th

120 days for some individual permit applications. One reason the process t

so long was the increased number of permit applications that resulted fr

the Clean Water Act of 1977. To compound this problem, manpower shorta

made it diffi cult to process the increasing number of applications in a tim

manner. By 1988, the total number of annual permit applications had increa

to around 70,000, and by 1997, that number had increased to around 100,0

Of these applications, the Corps denied less than one percent. Another rea

was the growing complexity of the permitting process and the lack of a pre

defi nition for wetlands, as no such defi nition existed before the release of 

Wetlands Delineation Manual in 1987. To improve the permitting process, 

regulatory program simplifi ed regulatory guidelines, producing a more effi ci

247 USACE, Corps of Engineers Wetlands Delineation Manual, (Wash., D.C.: HQUSACE, 1987): 9; US

Recognizing Wetlands (Wash., D.C.: HQUSACE, 1998); The Clean Water Jurisdictional Handbook

11-13; Danny McClendon, “Sand and Gravel mining in Missouri Streams,” Esprit (Nov. 1995).

Spunky Bottoms wetland restoration
281

and Regulation, in 1980 approximately one-third of all issued permi

longer than 120 days to process, but by 1983 the average processing tim

about 70 days. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act required that federa

cies make every effort to process permits within 90 days, so the Cor

already improved its average processing time for all permits within th

mum. However, the Corps continued to try to improve processing tim

permits by setting a goal of 60 days for all permits. The Corps set 120 

its goal for processing the more diffi cult individual permits. Because the

mits represented actions that would have a far greater environmental i

the process was far more complex and was often delayed by factors 

Corps control. In the 1990s, the Corps continued to improve the effi ci

its permitting process, with 90 percent of all decisions coming in le

60 days. In 1994, the average decision time for individual permits was 1

and by 1997, the Corps made a decision in less than 120 days for 79 per

individual permits.248

After 2000, the Corps regulatory program faced new challenges reg

the defi nition of “navigable waters.” In the 2001 case Solid Waste Ag

Northern Cook County vs. the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Su

Court ruled that Congress had not intended for the Clean Water Act to 

isolated waters not adjacent to navigable waters. This interpretation na

the scope of the Corps regulatory responsibilities to where it was bef

“Migratory Bird Rule.” In 2006, the meaning of “waters of the United 

was the subject of debate in Rapanos vs. United States. The mai

was whether the “waters of the United States” included isolated wate

extended into non-navigable tributaries connecting navigable waters

on the decision, the Corps and EPA developed the “signifi cant nexus” 

determine if a wetland is within the scope of the Clean Water Act. Esse

a nexus is a link that must exist between navigable and non-navigabl

for it to fall under the scope of the Clean Water Act. Once again, the de

of “navigable waters” and “waters of the United States” had changed, an

again the Corps had to reevaluate its wetlands responsibilities.249

248 Wetlands Delineation Manual; U.S. Cong., Wetlands: Their Use and Regulation (Wash., D

1984): 1-28, quote on 11; Pursell and Willingham, pp. 83, 130, 155.

249 The Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Handbook, pp. 11-22; Solid Waste Agency v. USAC

CWA Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Rapanos v. United States, Jun

(MVS archives); U.S. Cong., ‘The Supreme Court Addresses Corps of Engineers Jurisdiction over 

Waters”: The SWANCC Decision’ (Wash., D.C.: CRS, 2001).
282

404 requirements was the mitigat

of adverse effects on the environm

by restoring, creating, enhancing, 

preserving wetlands. The concept 

mitigation banks, in which resto

tion of wetlands at specifi c sites offs

harmful activities, evolved in the ea

1980s. By 1988, the H.W. Bush adm

istration set “no net loss of wetlan

as its goal. In February 1990, the Co

and EPA issued a memorandum s

porting mitigation banking. The g

of permitting was not the prevent

of wetlands development, but its re

lation, which the Corps accomplis

by protecting the environment w

District wetland restoration area

Example of a stream mitigation bank
283

function. To better understand mitigation banking, the Corps tasked th

tute for Water Resources to conduct a study of existing banks. The 1992 

outlined the pros and cons of mitigation banking, noting that the conce

still somewhat controversial. In 1995, the Corps and several other federa

cies, including the EPA and Fish and Wildlife Service, issued policy gu

on mitigation banks, after which the Corps used mitigation banks as a 

not only to “compensate for aquatic resource losses,” but to provide 

opers [with] an effi cient method to practically and economically mitig

small wetland impacts.” Even so, mitigation banks were not an instant s

nor were they intended to be, as it would take time to develop their e

use. The main criticism of mitigation banking was that there was no a

data on their effi cacy. However, the fact that wetland loss decreased 

cantly after the 1970s showed the success of mitigation and regulatio

number of acres lost annually during the 1970s and 1980s was 290,0

by 1995, that number dropped to 117,000 acres lost annually. Yet, bec

the controversial nature of permitting and mitigation, the Corps still r

criticism, highlighting the inherent challenges of simultaneously per

development with wetlands protection. While environmentalists comp

that not enough was being done to protect wetlands, others complain

Corps efforts intruded too much on the rights of private property owne

The St. Louis District launched a new initiative to meet these cha

when it started the fi rst stream mitigation bank in the nation. The mit

bank program not only compensated for the loss of wetlands, but also fo

in other aquatic resources, such as streams. Mitigation for streams, ho

proved far more diffi cult because new streams could not be created to co

sate for the loss of impacted streams. In 2000, the district addressed thi

lem by creating the Fox Creek Stream Mitigation Bank, which took a str

a deteriorated state and improved it to compensate for stream impacts

Corps districts soon adopted this innovative approach and began using 

mitigation banks and in-lieu fee programs as a means to offset wetland

and allow the Corps to reach the its goal of no net loss of wetlands.251

250 Pursell and Willingham, pp. 95-96, 113-115, 157, 160; GAO, Wetlands Overview: Problems W

age Data Persist (Wash., D.C.: GPO 1998): 9. 251 Craig Litteken, “St. Louis District Stream Mitigation Banks,” Aquatic Resources News (Summ

Phil Brown, “District starts fi rst stream mitigation bank in the nation,” Esprit (May 2000).
284

use of mitigation. The report contained two major criticisms: 1) the com

ance monitoring program was inconsistent and 2) many Corps mitigation p

ects had been unsuccessful. In response to these criticisms, the Corps iss

Regulatory Guidance Letter 01-01, which provided Corps regulatory progra

with guidance on how to improve mitigation. Although the guidance letter c

tained some innovative ideas, some environmental groups took issue with 

To address these issues, the Corps met with these groups and in 2002 relea

Regulatory Guidance Letter 02-02, which addressed many of their concer

One issue was that there was no consistent policy among districts, and m

district policies were not consistent with national policies. The Corps addres

this issue by developing a standard template for developing district guidelin

and by 2004 all districts had mitigation guidelines that provided greater st

dardization and consistency. Another innovation was the development of 

Mitigation Rule. Issued on April 10, 2008, the fi nal Mitigation Rule requi

“equivalent standards for all forms of mitigation, and objective of sustaina

and accountable mitigation, and strongly encourages a watershed approac

The Mitigation Rule also established a preference to use mitigation banks, 

lowed by in-lieu fee mitigation, and then permittee-responsible mitigation

based on a watershed approach. This rule also addressed the criticisms m

in the 2005 GAO Report on Wetlands Protection, which determined that 

Corps did “not have an effective oversight approach to ensure that comp

satory mitigation is occurring. While the Corps made signifi cant strides 

improving permitting, balancing the economic development of wetlands w

protecting wetlands remains one of the more diffi cult challenges facing 

Corps.252

Ordnance Removal and FUSRAP

In the early 1970s, the town of Times Beach, Missouri, decided to sp

unpaved roads with oil. This seemed a simple and practical solution for its d

problem. However, after many people in the town became ill in the late 197

the EPA took soil samples to determine the source of the problem. The res

were shocking: the soil contained large amounts of dioxin, a powerful carci

gen. After the Meramec Basin fl ooded in 1982, fearful that fl ooding could spr

252 USACE, Regulatory Program 2002-2008 Report (Wash., D.C.: GPO 2008) pp. 5, 19-23; GAO, 

lands Protection (Wash., D.C.: GPO, 2005), quote in “Highlights.”
285

the toxins, the EPA asked the St. Louis District to do a fl ood control s

Times Beach. The district was already quite familiar with the Merame

region, making it a perfect fi t to assist the EPA at Time Beach. Because 

nature of the work, the district gained valuable experience working wi

ardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (HTRW). The EPA also asked the 

if it could provide aerial photographs of the region. The district did so 

and at a cost $20,000 less than other bids. The EPA rewarded the d

efforts by providing additional surveying and mapping work. This exp

in HTRW cleanup and removal provided an opportunity for future work 

ing the Huntsville Division, the technical center of expertise on HTRW

investigation of potential sites. In 1984, the district contacted Huntsvill

preparing preliminary assessments for potentially contaminated sites ba

the work for EPA. Impressed by the district’s experience, Huntsville hir

do HTRW work, which it did from 1984 to 1991.253

By 1990, the district’s HTRW work was beginning to decline, b

experience the district gained made it a perfect fi t to assist Huntsvill

sion with the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP). Th

253 “Environmental Engineering” (MVS archives); “Around the nation: Times Beach, Mo., Board 

Seal Off Town,” NYT (Apr. 27, 1983); “Joint Federal/State Action Taken to Relocate Times Beach R

EPA Press Release (Feb. 22, 1983); Daly and Zoeller interview with Dace; Ruddy interview with Da

interview with Beech, Jul. 11, 1985 (MVS archives); Interview with Col. James Craig, Sep. 2, 19

archives).

Times Beach in December 1982
286

DERP. The program originated with the 1980 Comprehensive Environmen

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which required clean

of environmentally harmful wastes. In 1983, Congress approved establishm

of an Environmental Restoration Defense Account, a fund for cleanup at ac

and former Department of Defense (DoD) sites. Between World War I and 

1960s, the military tested or used munitions, ordnance, and other hazard

materials at many installations. Over time, the DoD closed, transferred, or s

many of these sites, disposing of hazardous materials using best practice

the time. As development occurred around these former military sites, the p

sible dangers and need for cleanup became apparent. The Army assigned 

Corps responsibility for cleanup in 1984. In 1986, Congress amended CERC

establishing DERP to clean up contamination at formerly used defense s

(FUDS). After the Corps named Huntsville the center of expertise for DE

the division had a heavy task assessing and inventorying more than 10,0

former defense sites potentially containing contamination. In November 19

Mike Dace, future chief of the Ordnance and Technical Services Branch, c

tacted Huntsville about assisting with the program. The St. Louis District 

assisted the division on HTRW work, and at division request, district pers

nel met with division leaders. By the spring of 1992 Huntsville asked the 

trict to prepare a project management plan describing how it could use Arch

Search Reports (ASRs) to aid in cleanup at former defense sites. Impressed 

the district’s plan, the division awarded it a $4 million contract to begin inv

torying, evaluating, and preparing ASRs.254

The fi rst task was putting together a team 

to develop an inventory of chemical warfare 

sites. Initially, what would become the Ordnance and Technical Services Branch consisted of only four engineers and a secretary. 

The district had to quickly hire historians, 

archivists, and munitions and safety specialists to research, assess, and inventory sites 

and compile ASRs. It borrowed project managers and assistants from other branches and 

divisions to assist on the project. By summer 

254 “Environmental Engineering”; Daly and Zoeller interview with Dace; “The District’s newest mis

Ordnance and Explosive Waste,” Esprit (Dec. 1992).

Mike Dace
287

It completed and sent its master inventory 

to Huntsville for comparison with the existing list. After completing this task, the district 

began preparing ASRs, prioritizing them by 

risk. Historians, archivists, safety and munitions specialists, project managers, and engineers worked together compiling the reports. 

Archivists and historians visited archives, 

libraries, local historical societies, and military history centers and interviewed locals, 

people associated with the site, and anyone 

else who could provide valuable information. 

They evaluated historic maps and photographs and compared them to modern ones to 

determine the location of hazards. After gathering and evaluating this information, a project manager oversaw compilation of ASRs 

containing a site’s history, its present state, 

and its use of ordnance, explosives, and other 

hazardous materials. The Corps then used the 

data to perform cleanup at the site. Since the 

program began, the Corps inventoried more 

than 10,000 properties, with cleanup planned 

or ongoing at more than 3,000 properties. 

Because some properties required more than 

one cleanup project, the total number of projects is around 5,000 and growing. As of 2007, 

program expenditures were nearly $4 billion 

with an estimated $18.7 billion required for 

completion. As of 2011, the district had completed more than 3,000 ASRs, each taking anywhere from a few mo

more than a year to complete. The district took responsibility for pre

these reports at a time when job growth within the district was slow. Ho

the program provided the district with a needed boost by creating mil

dollars worth of new work preparing search reports. Moreover, its exp

500 lb toxic chemical bom

at Attu Island

Project Manager Rady Cu

conducting research at NA

District ordnance and exp

safety specialist Randy Fr

performing site inspection
288

the district responsibility of cleaning up fi ve contaminated sites under the F

merly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP).255

During the early 1940s, the government began work on the Manhat

Project to create the fi rst atomic bomb. The Army created the Manhattan En

neering District to carry out this mission, which included working with hig

radioactive substances. In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy A

which established the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out the mission 

the new law. This mission included researching peaceful ways to use ato

energy. Some of this research took place at sites within the St. Louis Distr

The Mallinckrodt Chemical Plant in downtown St. Louis extracted urani

and radium from ore. From 1946 to 1957, the Manhattan Energy District u

a site near Lambert Airport to store the radioactive byproducts of this proc

In 1966, a private company purchased the airport site and transferred radio

tive materials to Hazelwood Interim Storage Site on Latty Avenue, later sell

them to another company, which shipped them to Colorado. As a result of 

this movement and also of natural processes, these and adjacent sites w

contaminated with radioactive material. Although the actual levels of radio

tivity are low enough that they do not pose an immediate threat, the radio

tivity will remain in the soil for thousands of years without proper cleanup.

In 1974, the Department of Energy started FUSRAP to clean up sites s

as the ones in and around St. Louis. The Department of Energy continued 

oversee the program until October 1997, when the Energy and Water Dev

opment Appropriations Act transferred responsibility for the program to 

Corps. This transfer had an especially profound impact on the St. Louis Distr

as its fi ve FUSRAP sites contained approximately half the total volume of 

$500 million program. These sites were the Madison Site in Illinois, St. Lo

Downtown Site, St. Louis Airport Site, Vicinity Properties, and the Hazelw

Interim Storage Site. The cleanup process began with the collection and rev

of information on the site. The district then conducted a remedial investi

tion/feasibility study to determine the type of contamination, its locati

and cleanup alternatives. In addition, the district informed the public ab

the project’s progress and encouraged public participation throughout. T

255 Ibid.; USACE, “Champion of Your Heartland’s Water Resources” Brochure (MVS: 2001); “District l

for chemical warfare weapons,” Esprit (Jan. 2004); USACE, “DERP-FUDS fact sheet,” (Wash., D.C.: US

2000). 

256 “Environmental Engineering”; “What is FUSRAP?” Web site (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/eng-

expertise/fusrap.html, Mar. 22, 2011).
289

it sent out for public comment and review. After reviewing comments, t

trict developed a Remedial Design describing the cleanup plan in detail. 

the district began Remedial Action or cleanup. After cleanup was com

subsequent fi ve-year reviews collect information on the effi cacy of clea

ensure that FUSRAP objectives have been met. Since undertaking respo

ity for its fi ve sites, the district successfully proposed and implemente

edies at these locations, with the success of each cleanup being subje

fi ve-year review.257

By 1986, the environmental era that started with the passage of N

1969, was fi rmly entrenched in the Corps. Not only had responsibilities 

environment grown in project planning, the St. Louis District had assu

developed new programs for recreation, archaeological research, perm

and ordnance removal. These new responsibilities required more em

and funding, so that more than more of the district’s budget was rel

environmental programs. This was due, in part, to a decline in spend

traditional construction activities as the district had to reevaluate fl ood 

and navigation projects in light of environmental regulation. Two proj

particular came to a near standstill because of environmental protests. 

growth in other areas more than made up for this lag in construction p

while the district started to adapt even non-environmental programs t

them more ecologically friendly.

257 Ibid.; “Building a virtual team: FUSRAP’s experience” (May 1999).
290

 17 

The Meramec Dam Controversy

As the St. Louis District entered the environmental era, it faced num

ous setbacks to ongoing construction projects. Some, such as the Kaskas

River Lock and Dam, were more or less complete, and only received critic

and modifi cation after the fact. Some studies did not go forward at all. On

these was the Meramec Dam and Reservoir. Planning for the dam had b

ongoing since the Great Depression, but from the outset, a large number of c

zens questioned the value of the project. Despite opposition, the project fi n

reached a construction phase when Congress passed the National Environm

tal Policy Act (NEPA), requiring the district to obtain input from other agen

and the public. The result was a cessation of work while the district sough

reconcile the positions of agencies to determine the best plan to address fl o

ing in the region. Yet unlike other projects that eventually proceeded once 

process was complete, public outcry against the dam and ineffective defe

of the project eventually led to its cancellation. The controversy lasted m

than a decade, creating long-lasting suspicion of the Corps even as the dist

sought to fi nd a workable solution that met all requirements.

Meramec River near Sullivan, Missouri
291

across eight Missouri counties and draining 4,000 square miles. L

within this basin are the Meramec River and several tributaries, in

the Bourbeuse and Big rivers. Beginning as a small stream near Salem

souri, the river fl ows 220 miles across the basin until it empties into th

sissippi River in Arnold, Missouri. As the basin stretches southwest, the 

becomes rugged and the population sparse. In 1960, around half the 

population of 212,000 lived in this rugged region, and the other half liv

St. Louis. Those settled near St. Louis benefi tted from a growing ec

while the sparsely populated southwestern region fell into economic d

in part due to migration near St. Louis. As the St. Louis suburbs grew an

people settled in the Meramec fl oodplain, the risk of fl ood damage dram

increased. The 1915 fl ood, which left more than 2,000 people homele

twelve dead in Valley Park, Missouri, shows how devastating a rising M

could be. The population growth that occurred in the region in the decad

followed exponentially increased the destructive potential of fl oods.258

The primary catalyst for studying fl ood control in the Meramec Ba

the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925 and House Document No. 308, 

directed the Corps to conduct surveys and submit reports on the poten

multipurpose use of 200 waterways, including the Meramec. The St. Lou

trict Engineer submitted the 308 report on the Meramec in April 192

study, which was the fi rst comprehensive, multipurpose study of the Me

concluded that “the best practicable coordinated plan of improvement 

Meramec Basin is for a single earth dam at mile 63.4 in the Meramec 

designed primarily for bankfull local fl ood control...and so far as prac

for Mississippi fl ood control.” However, the report recommended th

detailed survey or project study be made...at this time...” because the b

of the project would not be “commensurate with the cost.”259

258 Edward L. Ullman, Ronald R. Boyce, and Donald J. Volk, The Meramec Basin Water and 

Development, Report of the Meramec Basin Research Project, Vol. I: Summary and a Program 

Resource Development Proposals (Wash. UP, 1962), pp.13-20; Arnold, pp. 11-38. 259 Dobney, pp. 78-84; Camillo and Pearcy, pp. 57-65; Anfi nson, River We Have Wrought, pp

(Aug. 23, 1915); “Remembering the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927,” Esprit (Mar. 2002); Red C

Mississippi Valley Flood Disaster of 1927: Offi cial Report of Flood Operations (Wash.: Red Cro

Report on the Meramec River, HD 686 (71st Cong., 3rd Sess.): 1.
292

The recommendations of the 308 report seemed to doom any hope 

developing the basin in the near future. However, the Great Depression beca

the catalyst for development. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal p

cies expanded the role of the federal government and increased spending, t

renewing interest in public works. To garner support for a lake on the Me

mec, approximately 50 citizens from St. Louis formed the Lake Meramec As

ciation in 1933. Its recommendation was that the Public Works Administrat

undertake the project “at the expense and under the direction of the Fede

Government.” The organization urged the project “for the purpose of provid

water recreational facilities for the people of the nearby city of St. Louis.” W

the primary goal of developing the basin remained fl ood control, this incre

ing interest in recreation was a portent of things to come.260

In June 1938, the Senate authorized the Corps to study three potential fl 

control dams, one of which was on the Meramec. The primary purpose of th

dams was fl ood control in the lower Meramec Basin, with fl ood control on 

Mississippi River playing a secondary role. Over the next few years, the dist

continued to study the basin to form a comprehensive fl ood plan. Simulta

ously, the district attempted to coordinate these efforts with various state 

federal agencies. In 1942, the National Resources Planning Board created 

Meramec Cooperative Investigation Field Committee to coordinate efforts 

produce a cooperative report on the basin. W.W. Horner was named consult

engineer and coordinator for the fi eld committee, which began meeting in J

1943. Each agency in the investigation completed an independent report 

sent it to the other members for review, included as appendices to the co

erative’s fi nal report. While the other 

agencies were conducting their investigations, the Corps was conducting 

its own study. By 1945, the agencies’ 

investigations were nearly complete 

and the fi eld committee began work on 

a full report. After completion of several additional studies and revisions, 

260 Memo, B.M. Harloe to Division Offi ce, UMVD, Feb. 7, 1934 (MVS archives).

Valley Park fl ood, 1945
293

not without controversy.261

The Meramec Dam project had opposition as early 1938 when Co

fi rst authorized it. Some opposition came from people who feared losin

others because of possible wildlife impacts, and others because of fear

large lake would alienate small watercraft owners. But early opposition w

strong and fell more into the category of concern. That began to change b

1945 and 1950 as new concerns emerged. The opposition leader was a 

lic priest named George Hildner, chairman of the Meramec Basin Res

Committee, which actively opposed a dam on the river. In Septembe

Hildner summarized the concerns of the opposition succinctly: “If these 

[dams] are a benefi t to us, we want them, and if not, we don’t want them

problem for opponents was that they simply did not believe benefi ts of 

outweighed its possible negative impacts. For example, some Franklin 

farmers complained that these “dams will destroy more good bottomland 

the dam than would be protected from fl ooding below the dam.” Some 

were concerned that the project focused too much on national interests a

enough on the interests of those living in the basin. Others feared the 

tial environmental impact. Still others wanted development, but argu

the Corps should explore alternatives to a large reservoir. However, b

Congress already authorized the Corps to build the reservoirs, the coop

investigation felt that it had no choice but to recommend the dams.262

In response to opposition, the Chief of Engineers recommended “ex

tures on this project be held to the absolute minimum until it is clear tha

is no organized opposition to the improvements proposed.” Although Co

approved the project, it still had to run the gauntlet of public opinion b

could advance any further. The district scheduled four public hearings to 

support for the project. In his opening address at the fi rst of these in De

1949, District Engineer Col. Rudolph Smyser articulated that the basic p

was to inform the public and allow them to express their opinions on t

posed project. The meetings revealed that opposition to the project was 

261 U.S. Cong., Flood Control Act of 1936; Flood Control Act of 1938, PL 75-761 (June 28, 193

A Meramec Chronology of the Corps of Engineers and Missouri’s Meramec Basin, 1880 to 19

archives): 3; “Three Flood Control Dams Near City in Bill,” Post-Dispatch (June 13, 1938); M

Reinecke, dams in the Meramec River Basin, Aug. 4, 1938 (MVS Archives); Summary Report of 

amec Cooperative Investigation Filed Committee (MVS archives); Memo to Col. Kittrell, Meram

Basin—Outline of Investigation, Apr. 19, 1949 (MVS archives). 

262 “Minutes of Meeting, Union Chamber of Comm., Union, Mo., Sept. 10, 1945 (MVS archives

tions—32nd Annual Meeting of Franklin Cty. Framer’s Association, Union, Mo., Nov. 12, 1949; 

Report, Sec. II, p. 6.
294

organized yet effective. Of those who spoke, 33 supported the project, and 

opposed it. Only 1,496 people signed the petition supporting the project, w

2,978 signed the petition opposing it. To summarize its position, the Meram

Basin Resources Committee published a pamphlet, A Shameless Sham, wh

preached “preservation not ruination” and offered an alternative fl ood c

trol plan. Besides the opposition’s call to protect the rural culture of the ba

and conserve the environment, its most damning criticism was that the proj

was not economically feasible. Horner and the cooperative investigation ca

to the same conclusion, estimating that “the annual charges for carrying 

these fl ood abatement measures would be about three times the fl ood dama

Original plan for development of Meramec Basin that included multiple reservoirs
295

ate more than $11 million in revenue annually. However, dam oppone

already planted the seed of doubt in the public’s mind, so when Missou

Forrest Smith came out in opposition to the project in late December 1

essentially sealed its fate.263

One reason why the project failed was that people simply did not 

it would be economically benefi cial. The primary objective of the proj

fl ood control, yet the economic benefi ts from fl ood control amounted 

19 percent. This meant the Corps had to consider benefi ts other tha

control to justify a large reservoir. The most important non-fl ood contr

efi t was recreation; however, because the primary concern was fl ood 

and navigation, recreation was a tertiary concern that the Corps could 

as the sole basis to justify a project. This began to change in the 195

1960s. As the economy soared, an affl uent society desired recreation res

for enjoying its newfound wealth and leisure time. In response to the n

needs, Corps responsibilities evolved to include multipurpose water re

planning, an important part of which was recreation. Because of its p

ity to St. Louis, the Meramec Basin offered great potential to meet rec

needs. Moreover, because of economic stagnation in many rural areas 

basin, recreational development offered economic benefi ts that could re

these rural communities. Recreation needs combined with fl ood contro

stir up interest in a Meramec reservoir once again.264

The growing interest in recreation coincided with other important d

ments in the basin, namely, a severe drought between 1952 and 1957 and 

in June and July 1957 that caused an estimated $3.9 million in damag

Corps estimated that the three dams would have prevented $3 million o

damages. The drought and subsequent fl ood, when combined with t

nomic needs of the region, led some communities to form local commi

discuss the basin’s needs. The most infl uential of these was the Merame

Corporation. Formed in June 1958, the corporation’s objective was to d

an overall plan, secure an objective research study, and undertake an in

tion campaign to bring public awareness to the advantages of develop

263 OCE to Division Engineer, UMVD, Public Hearings on the Meramec Basin Reservoirs, Dec

Meramec Public Hearings, Opening Address by Col. Smyser, Dec. 13, 1949; Meramec Basin Resou

mittee, “A Shameless Sham”: The Army Engineer “Plan” for the Meramec Basin, 1950; “Coopera

ies,” Draft, Oct. 3, 1947, p. 11 (MVS archives). 

264 Forrest Smith, “Statement on Meramec Basin Reservoirs”, Dec. 21, 1949 (MVS archives); Ul

Meramec Basin Water and Economic Development, Report of the Meramec Basin Research Proj

Summary and a Program of Water Resource Development Proposals, (Wash. UP, 1962): 34-40.
296

stated in a December 17, 1958 letter that he hoped the Corps would “proc

with the restudy as soon as funds were available.” As the Corps waited for C

gress to appropriate funds and approve a restudy, the corporation sponso

independent research by Edward Ullman of Washington University. This 19

study focused primarily on economic development of the basin. It suppor

building reservoirs in the region, but this support was linked to economic 

recreational benefi ts. The study reported that in the years following World W

II, attendance at Corps reservoirs was growing at a rate of about 28 perc

annually. Thus, the need for recreation was considerable and would conti

to grow. To meet these needs, the study suggested that a large reservoir be b

as close to St. Louis as possible. Because this study coincided with the distri

study, the district used some Ullman report fi ndings in its own study. H

ever, the approach of the Ullman study was much narrower than the distri

study. The district’s mandate was to study multipurpose planning as a fun

mental goal for the development of the basin, which meant it had to consi

fl ood control, recreation, and economic benefi ts to evaluate the feasibility 

reservoir.265

In April 1960, Congress authorized the district to undertake a new, co

prehensive study of the basin, funded starting the following fi scal year. To g

a sense of public opinion, the district held new public hearings, the fi rs

which was in St. Clair, Missouri, in April 1961. Reactions at the meetings var

but District Engineer Col. Alfred J. D’Arezzo 

stated that a “vast majority” of people were 

open to a restudy and a new project. In addition to public hearings, the Corps released an 

information bulletin in September 1962 outlining the history of the previous project in the 

basin, the planning procedures for any future 

project, and the primary aims of this project. 

Public support for the project was strong initially; however, organized opposition would 

soon emerge in the form of the Meramec 

Rivers Association. At a public hearing held 

265 Status Report on the Meramec Basin Flood Control Project; The Meramec River Basin: An Informa

Bulletin, (St. Louis: MVS, 1962); Excerpt, “The Meramec Basin Blues” St. Louis Magazine (N.D.); Mera

Basin Reservoirs Missouri: Digest of Preliminary Information (MVS, 1959): 9 (MVS archives); Ullman, p

Col. Alfred J. D’Arezzo
297

in St. Clair on December 18, 1963, the district revealed its plan for dev

the basin. Most of those who spoke supported the district’s plan, with 

of the 53 speakers expressing opposition. The next day, the Globe-De

headline read: “Cannon Goes All-Out for Meramec Basin Plan.” The s

of Rep. Clarence Cannon of Missouri was crucial for advancing the pro

he was the head of the powerful House Appropriations Committee. W

support of both Cannon and the public, the Meramec plan looked as th

would fi nally become a reality.266

On January 30, 1964, the district submitted The Meramec River, M

Comprehensive Basin Study to the Lower Mississippi Valley Divisio

study recommended a series of reservoirs primarily for the purposes o

control and navigation. The largest of these reservoirs was located at the 

mec Park Lake site, which offered the highest cost-to-benefi t ratio (1

the fi ve sites studied. The district projected the Meramec Park site to p

more than $3.8 million in annual benefi ts, making it twice as benefi cia

266 “Meramec Park Lake Chronology of Events Leading to Present Status” (May 3, 1972), p. 2; 

Chronology, p. 19; Meramec River Basin Information Bulletin; D ‘Arezzo comments in excerpt, Gl

ocrat, April 9, 1961; “Group will Oppose Meramec River Plan,” Globe-Democrat (April 10, 1963)

by Col. James B. Meanor, Public Hearing, St. Clair, Mo., Dec. 18, 1963; Record of Public Hea

18,1963 (MVS archives); “Cannon Goes All-Out for Meramec Basin Plan,” Globe-Democrat (Dec. 

Valley Park during 1961 Meramec fl ood
298

next closest sites at Pine Ford and Union, which were each projected to p

duce around $1.8 million in annual benefi ts. The Meramec Park site simply 

best with the Corps mandate to follow a multipurpose approach in consider

various factors other than fl ood control and navigation when making a de

mination about the best site for a reservoir. The division engineer submit

the study to the Chief of Engineers on June 15, 1965. The Chief of Engine

agreed with the study’s recommendations and sent his report to Congr

where it was printed as House Document 525, 89th Congress, 2nd Sessi

On November 7, 1966, Congress authorized the Meramec River Basin proj

by including it in the Flood Control Act of 1966. The act authorized the c

struction of three reservoirs and 19 angler use sites; the Meramec Park 

Union reservoirs, which were already authorized under the Flood Control 

of 1938, were included in the plan. The plan divided the project into hierarc

cal phases, with the most important projects being part of the fi rst phase. T

Map of proposed Meramec reservoir
299

completion fi rst.267

In June 1967, the district completed preconstruction planning for th

amec Park site and started acquiring real estate. The district spent mo

$2.2 million acquiring 8,841 of the 40,800 acres needed for the proje

district planned to use 22,100 acres specifi cally for meeting recreation 

Most of the controversy in these early years of the project centered o

acquisition. In 1968, the district released a pamphlet on policies and 

dures for land acquisition. This pamphlet was intended to educate the 

and assuage any fears concerning the purchase of land. Naturally, some c

complained that they would have to sell their lands, and others comp

about land speculation, but overall these complaints were minimal. I

the Civil Works Appropriations Act provided $3 million for constructio

as construction was set to begin, opponents of the project emerged.268

Growth of Opposition

The most profound effect of the construction delay was that it a

opposition groups an opportunity to mobilize. These efforts received a 

boost in 1969 with passage of NEPA, which required the Corps to prepa

submit an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for certain projects, 

ing the Meramec Park Lake project. The law changed the scope of Corp

ning, as the Corps would now have to justify projects environmentally 

as economically. In other words, the district could not justify the projec

on the basis of its cost-to-benefi t. The district completed the EIS in Nov

1970 and fi led it with the Council on Environmental Quality in Februar

The EIS stated the district chose the site because “the Meramec Park La

receives relatively heavy use as compared to other portions of the Ba

went on to point out, “In the absence of this project this portion of the 

mec Basin will continue to develop in a disorganized manner. Ultimate

uncontrolled development will destroy the highly desirable natural qua

the area, and eliminate a severely needed source of recreation for the St

area.” According to the EIS, some of the region would be lost to inun

but these areas would be “replaced by other desirable qualities of consid

267 USACE, Notice of Comprehensive Basin Study of Meramec River, Missouri (LMVD, 1964); 

Park Lake Chronology,” pp. 3-5; U.S. Cong., Brief Report on Meramec River, Missouri Basin Plan 

(89th Cong., 2nd Sess.).

268 “The Meramec Project: A Progress Report” (MVS archives); “Meramec Park Lake Chronology
300

impact on the environment. Any alternatives would be either ineffective wit

the context of multipurpose development or cost prohibitive. Excluding app

dices, which included the recommendations of various state, federal, and lo

agencies, the statement was eight pages long, which was minuscule compa

to the multivolume statements that the Corps would later produce. Howev

the district believed that many of these concerns had already been addres

in the Comprehensive Basin Plan and the Ullman study.269

Those opposed to the project were quick to criticize the EIS. The fi rst gro

to challenge it was the Coalition for the Environment. In late April 1971 

coalition, which represented 50 affi liated groups, issued a statement claim

that the EIS contained “undocumented assertions, confl icting statements 

signifi cant omissions.” Mark Paddock, chairman of the coalition’s Open Sp

and Land Use Committee, sent a letter to the Council on Environmental Qua

suggesting that the Corps consider alternatives to a large reservoir. The le

proposed creating an “En

ronmental Conservancy D

trict” that he claimed “wo

provide for the continued n

ural character of this beaut

valley and would provide e

greater recreational oppor

nities” However, the distri

primary charge was to bu

a multipurpose structure 

fl ood control. The other ju

fi cations for the project, s

as recreation, water sup

and economic benefi ts, w

important, but they were s

ondary considerations t

made the project poss

from a cost-to-benefi t sta

point. The district essenti

expressed this same view w

269 USACE, EIS, Meramec Park Lake (St. Louis: MVS, 1970); Ruddy, pp. 67-71. 

Anti-dam pamphlet by Don Rimbauch
301

sympathetic because requirements of NEPA were new, but he argued th

did “not relieve the Corps of the responsibility to prepare an Environ

Impact Statement which meets all the requirements of the National E

mental Policy Act.” He went on to question the district’s claims concern

fl ood control and water quality benefi ts of the project, and he rejected th

that the benefi ts would offset environmental impacts. The district’s re

was that the benefi ts would more than offset the loss of land and eff

the environment. While 5,900 acres of pastureland would be inundated 

project, this loss would be “more than balanced by the benefi ts attrib

to reduction of fl ood damages on the 21,280 acres of crop and pastu

below the reservoir.” The district also noted that it had discussed alter

in the Comprehensive Basin Study and concluded that these alternativ

not effective. These conclusions were backed by the fi ndings of the in

dent Washington University Study, which also suggested a large reserv

the best means to address the needs of the basin. The district simply in

factors such as fl ood control when making its determination, leading it 

clude the Meramec Park site was best from a multipurpose perspective

On November 30, 1971, the new district engineer, Col. Guy Jester, req

a meeting with the coalition and Meramec Basin Association (the Sier

declined this invitation) to discuss plans for development of the bas

to hear their opinions concerning preparation of a supplemental EIS. 

December 9, 1971 meeting, Jester informed those present that he appro

in-depth review of the Comprehensive Basin Study to identify areas re

additional environmental impact information. The district also fi led a 

mental EIS with the Council for Environmental Quality. Jester also sug

the establishment of an advisory committee, and those present at the m

concurred. The day after the meeting, the district sent an invitation to t

ticipating organizations requesting that each appoint two persons to s

the committee. On February 3, 1972, the district once again urged the 

Club to participate in the committee’s work, but for a second time it d

to do so.271

270 “Environmentalists: ‘No’ To Meramec Lake Project,” Globe-Democrat (April 27, 1971); “Mera

Lake project assailed by environmental group” Globe-Democrat (June 26, 1971); Letter, Mark P

Col. Carroll LeTellier, June 24, 1971; Reply in letter from Coalition for Environment, June 24, 19

archives).

271 Litigation Report, Sierra Club et. al. v. Robert F. Froehlke, et. al., Dec. 26, 1973, Sec. 8 (MVS 
302

inventory of the Meramec Basin, with the supplemental study set for comp

tion in October 1972. However, on September 25, 1972, shortly before 

district was due to submit its supplemental EIS, the Sierra Club, Ozark Ch

ter, fi led a lawsuit against the Corps. In the months to come, the Sierra C

and the Ozark Chapter’s outspoken director, Jerry Sugerman, would beco

the leaders of those opposed to the project. The Sierra Club alleged, am

other things, that the district had not complied with the requirements of NE

because of the insuffi ciency of the Meramec EIS. In July 1973, the U.S. Dist

judge refused to grant an injunction to stop construction on the project 

gave the district until October 1, 1973 to revise the EIS. The district fi led 

revised supplemental Final Environmental Impact Statement with the Co

cil on Environmental Quality on September 27, 1973. The fi nal EIS came 

the same conclusions as the fi rst, but included extensive data and backgrou

research – four volumes and several hundred pages. On December 26, 19

the Sierra Club responded by refi ling an amended suit alleging the revised 

did not consider the entire Meramec Basin but instead focused only on the 

of the reservoir. It also alleged that the district’s claims concerning the bene

Aerial shot showing location of proposed reservoir
303

a nonstructural solution would be a 

more desirable alternative. The case 

was set for trial in November 1974.272

In the months leading up to the 

trial, two new issues emerged to complicate the Meramec project: the Indiana Bat and the Onondaga Cave. The 

Indiana Bat became an issue because 

the 1973 Endangered Species Act required federal agencies to consider t

sible effects of a project on endangered species. When the Sierra Club 

out that the reservoir might affect a large number of these bats, on Sep

20, 1974 it amended its suit to include these claims. The other issue em

when Lester Dill, owner of the Onondaga Cave, alleged the reservoir 

inundate several caves in the region, including the one he owned. On J

1974, Dill fi led a suit to block construction of the reservoir. Although the

were intended to halt construction, Congress appropriated $4.6 million 

272 Meramec Chronology, pp. 49-50; “The Meramec Dam Plan” Mar. 1974 (MVS archives,); Rud

Litigation Report, Sierra Club et. al. v. Robert F. Froehlke.

One of the many caves found in the 

Meramec Basin

Aerial showing the site of Meramec Dam during early construction phase
304

tion on the Meramec access road 

and visitor center began shortly 

thereafter.273

The opening testimony of the 

Sierra Club trial began on November 

26, 1974. The issue of the Indiana Bat 

played only a minor role in the trial, 

as the district judge concluded that 

construction of the reservoir had not 

“shown any indication of harassing or endangering the Indiana Bat.” On 

other two issues – the cost-to-benefi t ratio and nonstructural alternatives – 

court ruled that the district had adequately disclosed the necessary envir

mental information on alternatives, and the project’s cost-to-benefi t ratio 

to 1.9 was in fact accurate. On March 19, 1975, Judge Kenneth Wangelin ru

in favor of the Corps. In response to the ruling, the St. Louis Globe-Democ

contained an editorial conveying optimism that the project may fi nally be a

to move forward, as “one of the last serious challenges to completion of 

project has been eliminated.” However, the project still had to overcome 

obstacles of the Lester Dill suit and an appeal by the Sierra Club to the U

Court of Appeals.274

On April 7, 1975, just 19 days after the district court ruled for the Cor

the Sierra Club fi led its appeal of the decision. Its allegations were mostly 

same as in the previous case; however, the suit gave more attention to the In

ana Bat and alleged violation of the Endangered Species Act. The bat is

was essentially a non-factor in the previous trial because the plaintiffs adde

just weeks before the trial, and the Sierra Club’s claims were unsubstantiat

However, the plaintiffs claimed that even though the reservoir would not in

date the caves the bats live in, construction could disrupt hibernation cycle 

cause them to die. In addition, they claimed that the entire region served a

fragile ecosystem for the bat. Because of these possible impacts, the Sierra C

wanted the district to halt construction pending more accurate studies. T

court accepted the appeal on September 10, 1975, and required the Corp

provide a report on possible effects of the reservoir on the bat. The district 

273 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, Cause No. 72C584(3), (U.S. Dist. Ct., East. Dist. of Mo.); Meramec Chrono

pp. 51-52; News clipping, Globe-Democrat (June 5, 1974) (MVS Archives). 274 Sierra Club v .Froehlke; Editorial in Globe-Democrat (Mar. 21, 1975).

Indiana Bat
305

with the Missouri Department of Conservation and the U.S. Fish and 

life Service. On April 23, 1976, the Court of Appeals upheld Judge Wan

decision and ruled in favor of the Corps, thus eliminating one of the tw

actions against the project.275

The other legal challenge remaining was the Lester Dill suit. Dill ha

negotiating with the Corps over the sale of his lands, but he soon gre

trated with negotiations and fi led suit to prevent the construction of the 

voir. Don Rimbach, an amateur geologist and cave enthusiast, sided w

and began to speak out publically against the reservoir. Because a num

caves dotted the region, Rimbach argued, construction on the project 

be halted because these caves were important natural resources needi

tection. He also argued that in addition to being important natural res

these caves presented a possible safety hazard to the reservoir and shou

be studied thoroughly before the district begins construction. However, 

1976, largely in response to the Corps’ legal victory over the Sierra Clu

dropped his suit. While the Corps won two major victories over dam 

nents, it nonetheless began to lose in the court of public opinion.276

The Fight for Public Opinion

Rimbach’s arguments concerning the safety of the dam and the Sierra 

allegations that the project would have a signifi cant environmental impa

not have convinced the courts, but they had brought public attention 

issues. Often, opponents encouraged opposition by presenting infor

out of context. For example, the opposition claimed - based on infor

that was taken out of context from the EIS– that the reservoir woul

12,600 acres and protect only 11,800. The facts were that the reservoir 

protect 11,800 acres from fl ooding and provide partial protection for 

acres in the portion of the Meramec Valley between the proposed da

the confl uence of the Meramec and Bourbeuse Rivers, but the oppositi

already planted the seed of doubt in the public’s mind. To compound th

lem, the Teton Dam collapsed in June 1976, providing an opportunity t

that the Meramec project should be halted. Although the Teton Dam wa

275 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, Brief of Appellants, No. 75-1252 (8th Cir., 1975). 276 Ruddy, pp. 75-76; James Gamble and Don Rimbach, “Should the Meramec River be dammed 

it be left alone: For the dam and Against the dam,” The Midwest Motorist (Feb. 1976); Litigatio

Lester Dill v. James R. Schlesinger, Civil 74-246 C (2) (EaSt. Mo. DiSt. 1974).
306

public support to their side. The problem for the Corps was that it could 

publically debate these issues with the opposition, as former District En

neer Col. Guy Jester observed, “the Corps itself doesn’t push a project; it is 

people who want the project who have to push it.” The district could prom

the project by releasing information to the public, but it could not actively p

mote it. From the Corps’ point-of-view, its information campaign, which w

based on technical information and facts, was not as effective as the emotio

rhetoric of project opponents. Moreover, those groups that did support 

project, namely the Meramec Basin Corporation, were simply not as effec

at illuminating the fallacies of the opposition’s arguments or evoking a posi

response from the public to ensure that the project would reach completion

After its defeat in the courts, the Sierra Club turned to a new strategy 

stop the project. This included proposing an alternative plan for develop

the basin, which it published as the “Meramec Heritage Riverway” plan in J

1976. The plan was the brainchild of Sugerman, who argued that it would c

only $69 million, whereas the Corps project would cost $115 million. The p

offered a nonstructural solution to address the basin’s fl ood control and r

reation needs. The plan proposed using land already purchased for the proj

to develop fl ood control and recreation while preserving the Meramec in 

natural, free fl owing state. It listed additional water skiing, reservoir fi sh

and minor fl ood control reductions as the only advantages of the Corps proj

but it ignored additional advantages of the dam such as water supply and e

nomic benefi ts. Moreover, the 52-page report contained little, if any, subst

tive analysis, especially when compared to the Corps multivolume study t

had already addressed those criticisms that the alternative plan did make. T

Sierra Club even asked Congress “to authorize and fund a full federal review 

the alternative plan by the appropriate Federal agency” and “declare a mora

rium on further project development.”278

277 For information on the acreage that would have be protected from fl ooding, see USACE, Final 

Meramec Park Lake (St. Louis: MVS, 1973), Section One-29; Martin Towey, Interview with Col. Leon M

inney (Aug. 11, 1987); Towey, Interview with Jester; Interview with Dace; Ruddy interview with Jester (

7, 1983) (MVS Archives). These interviews shed light on Corps perspective of the propaganda campaign 

the role of public opinion in the determining the fate of the project. An overview of the public debate betw

the Meramec Basin Corporation and Rimbach can be found in The Midwest Motorist (Feb. 1976); how

much of the public’s information and misinformation is in newspaper articles (e.g. Post-Dispatch and G

Democrat), which served as a public platform for the project’s opponents and proponents. 278 “Alternative plan to Meramec Dam outlined by Sierra Club,” The Cuba Free Press (June 10, 1976); J

M. Sugerman, “Report on the Meramec Heritage Riverway, and Other Alternatives To the Meramec 

Reservoir Project,” (Sierra Club, 1977) (MVS Archives).
307

plan, but provided little factual evidence. The Corps considered the a

tion of land as a nonstructural alternative, but as of 1975, it would ha

$158 million and not $69 million as the Sierra Club claimed. Thus, the a

tive plan was not more cost effi cient than the Corps project. In additi

alternative plan would not provide the same economic, recreation, an

control benefi ts. It claimed that there were ample recreation resources 

basin already, such as canoeing, hiking, and river fi shing, even though 

had shown that such recreation activities were not as popular as activ

large lakes. Furthermore, a large reservoir would not eliminate opport

for canoeing, hiking, and river fi shing, as many such opportunities wou

exist on much of the upper Meramec and its tributaries. The Sierra Club

posals in the alternative plan and its criticisms of the Corps were essenti

same as those previously addressed in the courtroom. The district resp

that it had already “thoroughly and professionally analyzed” similar a

tives “during the analysis of the Meramec Basin Plan, both prior to aut

tion and subsequent to authorization to the project.” Thus, there was n

to consider the Sierra Club’s plan. Taking all of this into considerati

alternative plan seemed to be nothing more than yet another means 

construction once the other Sierra Club strategies had failed.279

While the Sierra Club’s plan may not have been a viable alternative

increase skepticism of the project and brought public awareness to th

sibility of a nonstructural solution. The alternative plan was also a r

point for opposition to the Corps plan, especially among politicians. 

been defeated in the courts, the Sierra Club turned to the political arena 

the project. Candidates voiced their opinions on the project. One of th

outspoken dam opponents was John Danforth, who was running for t

Senate and was a supporter of the alternative plan. Danforth opposed th

ect because it was “not worth the price tag or the irreparable ecological da

He claimed “the accuracy and validity of the Corps’ fl ood control cost-

analysis is subject to serious question.” He outlined his views on the M

Dam in a position paper released in April 1976, which echoed many of th

themes the Sierra Club expressed. This should come as no surprise cons

279 Sierra Club v Froehlke, Cause No. 72C584(3); “Meramec Basin Projects Fact Sheet, price le

October 1976” (MVS archives); Response to RCGA request on “Alternative Plan to Meramec Dam 

by Sierra Club” (Jul. 14, 1976); “Canoeing on the Meramec and the Impacts on Canoeing Caused by 

ect” (Apr. 2, 1977) (MVS Archives); Ruddy, 79-80.
308

candidate Richard Gephardt and gubernatorial candidate Joseph Teasd

both publically opposed the project. Even presidential candidate Jimmy Ca

opposed the dam, comparing it to one he vetoed while governor of Geor

Supporters of the project included Missouri Gov. Kit Bond, congressional c

didate Robert Young, and Reps. Richard Ichord and William Burlison. Ot

politicians, such as Sen. Thomas Eagleton 

remained neutral and asked for a referendum 

to gauge the public’s opinion on the project.280

The most signifi cant impact of the 1976 

election was that it brought increased public 

interest to the issues. Much of this attention was inaccurate and misleading, such 

as the claims of the alternative plan or that 

the Meramec would be another Teton. Both 

opponents and proponents voiced opinions 

on the matter in the Post-Dispatch and the 

Globe-Democrat, but these often refl ected 

more about the attitudes of the editors than 

they did about the public’s opinion. Numerous polls showed public support both for and 

against the project. For example, the St. Louis 

Engineers Club favored the project by a vote 

of 375 to 257, but the Automobile Club of Missouri poll showed that 1,301 of 1,500 opposed 

the project. While these polls were far from 

scientifi c and revealed little of the true nature 

of overall public opinion, they did show the 

trend toward using a referendum to determine the fate of the project. Some politicians 

even favored a referendum. Bond asked for a vote on the project in eastern M

souri; Eagleton refused to give his opinion until a referendum was taken. T

day after Bond expressed his desire for a referendum in the Globe-Democ

280 Danforth comments in excerpt, Post-Dispatch (Apr. 22, 1976); Danforth, “The Meramec Dam: Pos

paper 1” (Apr. 22, 1976) (MVS Archives); Interview with Dace; “Jimmy Carter campaigning in St. Lo

Post-Dispatch (Mar. 24, 1976); most candidates’ views are in Post-Dispatch and Globe-Democrat from 

to Sept. 1976. The Globe-Democrat offers more proponent view; the Post-Dispatch includes mostly 

opposing views.

Thomas Eagleton

John Danforth
309

Even though it would be another two years, the fate of the project was t

toward a referendum.281

When the election results came in, Teasdale, Danforth, and Carter 

their respective races. The election of dam opponents in key races signa

beginning of the end for the project. Of those elected, Danforth was th

outspoken critic of the project. He went so far as to bring in Sugerma

a member of his staff and help him oppose the project. Some politician

as Eagleton and Teasdale, recommended that project funds be halted p

the outcome of a referendum. Eagleton, who was originally a proponen

dam, was highly criticized for his equivocating views, as he seemed c

to follow the whim of public opinion rather than take a defi nite stan

Post-Dispatch reported that eight of 12 members of the Missouri congre

delegation favored delaying the project. Others, such as Ichord, warned 

taking such as stand, as it would create diffi culty for Missouri to obtain 

funds for future projects. However, even Ichord agreed to conduct a pol

residents of the three counties of the project area, but he resisted a sta

or 13 county referendum.282

Let the Voters Decide

The December 26, 1975, Post-Dispatch headline read: “Spending for 

mec Dam may be halted until vote.” This proved prophetic in light o

dent Carter’s February 21, 1977, message to Congress, in which he inclu

Meramec project as one of 19 water projects on his “hit list.” This list in

projects Carter wanted eliminated because they were what he considere

barrel” projects that infl ated the federal budget. Carter believed that, i

ble, the Meramec River should be kept in its free fl owing state. President 

Ford’s budget for fi scal year 1978 included $10 million for Meramec co

tion, but Carter wanted the project reevaluated to determine if it would 

in the federal budget. Because the project was on the hit list, the district 

281 “Meramec Opponents Cite Teton Dam Break,” Post-Dispatch (June 8, 1976); Polls in Post-Disp

11 and 27, 1976); Globe-Democrat article excerpt on referendum (Sept. 13, 1976); “Sierra Club Wa

Wide Dam Vote,” Post-Dispatch (Sept. 14, 1976). 282 Excerpts, Post-Dispatch (Dec. 19, 1976); Post-Dispatch (Feb. 6, 1977); Globe-Democrat, (Jan

18, 1977); Post-Dispatch (Jan. 9, 1977); Globe-Democrat (Jan. 13, 1977) (MVS Archives).
310

it to the president no later than April 15, 1977.283

As part of the project review process, the district held another public me

ing. This meeting, the so-called “Meramec Shoot-out,” was scheduled 

March 26 in Sullivan, Missouri. In the weeks leading up to it, even many w

supported the project recommended halting funding until its fate was cl

Lower Mississippi Valley Division Engineer Maj. Gen. Frank Koisch reco

mended to Congress that appropriations for the project should stop for 

time being, as there was “no sense in spending money on a project that is ab

to be shut down.” Even Ichord, a staunch supporter of the project, agreed t

“there is no reason to spend vast sums...until its future is decided.” When 

meeting fi nally took place, it showed a mixture of support and opposition 

the project. Estimated attendance was more than 2,000. Of the approxima

100 people who spoke at the meeting, 60 opposed the dam, and 40 suppor

it. The next day’s Post-Dispatch and Globe-Democrat headlines read: “Che

Boos at Meramec Dam Hearing” and “Marathon Dam Hearing Claims no Cl

Victor,” revealing the inconclusive nature 

of the meeting. The opinions voiced by both 

sides expressed mostly the same issues that 

were prevalent throughout the project and, 

just as before, there was no clear consensus. 

Some dam opponents called for McKinney 

to be fi red, accusing him of conducting the 

meeting improperly by giving false information and being biased against dam opponents. 

Transcriptions of the meeting revealed that 

these allegations were false, and supporters of 

the dam sent numerous letters to Washington 

praising McKinney’s conduct and implored offi cials in Washington to not al

these accusations to mislead them. The contrasting tone in the letters reve

how heated and personal the debate had become. Although there was no cl

consensus against the dam, in spite of the fact that the Corps’ review revea

that the project’s cost-to-benefi t ratio was 1 to 1.5, Carter decided to de

283 Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1

Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, House, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 9 (Wash.: GPO, 1

86-87, 203-206; Excerpts, Post-Dispatch (Dec. 23, 1976); Globe-Democrat (Jan. 17, 1977); Letter to LM

Review of Corps Projects, Mar. 1, 1977 (MVS Archives).

Col. Leon McKinney
311

as no surprise, as he had stated while campaigning for the presidency th

ought to get the Army Corps of Engineers out of the dam-building bus

For Carter and many opponents of the dam, environmental concerns to

cedence over the economic benefi ts.284

After Carter eliminated appropriations for the Meramec project, he 

pushing for deauthorization. His administration also began pressuring 

Headquarters and the Lower Mississippi Valley Division to ensure t

St. Louis District would not discuss the project publically. When the 

House began issuing news releases supporting the Sierra Club’s mis

information, it told McKinney that the district should not publically con

this information. From McKinney’s point-of-view, he was a public serva

was being asked to at the very least withhold important information fr

public, and in some cases even lie publically about the project’s benefi ts

McKinney refused to comply, he was threatened with reassignment. In 

such pressure, a referendum was beginning to look more and more like 

the last hopes for the project.285

With the possibility of a referendum seeming more likely, a debate 

over the extent of such a vote. Dam supporters argued that it was essen

regional issue and should be limited to those counties directly affected 

project. In contrast, opponents argued for a wider vote that would includ

ties outside the boundaries of the proposed reservoir. Some even argue

statewide vote. In January 1978, the Missouri Senate committee dist

a bill for a non-binding advisory vote on the project. The state senate 

the bill and Governor Teasdale signed it in April. The August 8 vote 

include 12 counties and St. Louis. For proponents, a strong showing of s

at the polls could pressure Washington to include appropriations for th

ect for the upcoming fi scal year. In fact, the House Appropriations Com

had already approved $12 million for construction contingent on the o

of the “non-binding” referendum. Even Danforth, a staunch opponen

284 USACE, “Public Information Brochure” (St. Louis: MVS, Mar. 1977); USACE, Project Review, 

Park Lake (St. Louis: MVS, Mar. 8, 1977); News Release, “Army Engineers Announce Schedule 

Meeting on 19 Water Resource Projects,” Mar. 24,1977 (MVS archives ); Excerpts, Post-Dispa

27, 1977); Globe-Democrat (Mar. 28, 1977); Excepts, Post-Dispatch (Apr. 17, 1977); “Exultant C

Harsh Words for Meramec Dam in Visit Here,” Post-Dispatch (Mar. 24, 1976); Carter quote from 

Campaign Vow Crashes Into a Pork Barrel,” Washington Post (Apr. 1, 1977); “Digest of Public M

Meramec Park Lake at Sullivan” (St. Louis: MVS, Mar. 26, 1977) (MVS Archives). Of more than 

only a few make accusations against McKinney. Letters from Duane Woltjen, Sierra Club Ozar

spokesman, to Carter and Lt. Gen. John Morris were the most vehement and accused McKinney 

supporters of incompetence and misrepresentation of the facts. 

285 Towey interview with McKinney provides a discussion of the pressures on the district from Wa
312

statewide approval. Others, such as Eagleton, promised to support the proj

if a regional referendum showed support. However, both sides came to ag

that a referendum was necessary to determine the fate of the dam. Over 

next four months, both opponents and proponents campaigned vigorously 

fate of the project.286

The Meramec Basin Association led the campaign for those who suppor

the dam, while the Sierra Club led the campaign of the opposition. Much of t

campaigning took place in local newspapers, but it also included fl yers, in

mation bulletins, and public speakers. In one case, Wehrenberg Theaters ai

a short anti-dam fi lm, narrated by Marlin Perkins of the TV show, “Wild Ki

dom,” before its feature presentations. Various groups released polls claim

to reveal the public’s opinion on the project. These polls ranged from statew

to basin-wide, to only the three counties affected by the reservoir. In Ap

Ichord released the results of a three-county poll he had taken, which show

strong support in the counties directly affected – 62 percent in Washingt

Franklin, and Crawford. Other polls showed much weaker support both sta

wide and in urban regions.287

A severe blow for dam supporters occurred when the Director of C

Works Maj. Gen. Charles McGinnis recommended to the Senate Subcommit

on Public Works that Congress delete funding for fi ve projects, including 

Meramec. He stated that, as part of the executive branch, he must present 

president’s views. In other words, if the White House was against the projec

was not McGinnis’ role to contradict its policy. Much like McGinnis, the dist

was in a similarly diffi cult position, as it could not speak publically about 

project unless responding to questions, and even then, district personnel 

to be careful about how they responded. Thus, the fate of the project was u

mately in the hands of its proponents, and their public support campaign w

not as effective as their opponents’ campaign. While project supporters arg

that the effects on the environment would be minimal when compared to 

economic benefi ts, opponents were nevertheless able to exploit anxieties ab

the environment. Ironically, the whole dam discussion had started becaus

286 Excerpts, Post-Dispatch (Jan. 18, 1978); Post-Dispatch (Jan. 28, 1978); “House Clears Meramec 

Referendum,” Post-Dispatch (Apr. 4, 1978) (MVS Archives). 287 While not debated exclusively in local papers, positions on the referendum can be found in the P

Dispatch and Globe-Democrat. “Head of Theaters Showing Anti-Dam Film Target of Suit,” Globe-Demo

(Jul. 26, 1978). 
313

for many, both opponents and proponents.288

The election results revealed just how effectively dam opponents 

public support against the dam – 64 percent voted against it. Most oppos

dam came from counties not directly affected by it. In St. Louis and St. C

counties, the results were overwhelmingly against the dam, with 214,67

325,488 opposed. However, two of three counties impacted by the dam, 

ington and Crawford, voted in favor of it, while Franklin County voters s

vote almost evenly, with 51 percent opposed. Dam proponents argued t

scope of the referendum was unfair, as voters in regions unaffected by t

determined the fate of a project impacting only three counties. In other 

urban opposition to the dam offset the support for the dam that existed 

regions that would benefi t most from a reservoir. The Senate quickly wi

the $12 million earmarked for the project, and the debate quickly sh

deauthorization and how to dispose of the land acquired for the project

Continued Controversy

The referendum essentially sealed the fate of the dam. However, it 

end the controversy surrounding the project. This controversy manifeste

in the form of heated political debates about the provisions of the dea

zation bill. More specifi cally, the debates concerned guidelines for disp

the 28,000 acres acquired for the project as well as how to address t

prevalent issues of fl ood control and water supply. In July 1981, Rep. W

Bailey of Missouri introduced a deauthorization bill that included pro

for a year-long study to determine how to dispose of the land. In addit

bill included possibility of a smaller dam in the future. Danforth and 

ton objected to such a plan, in large part because it left open the opt

a future dam. In contrast, their bill included provisions for selling b

land at what the former landowners originally paid for it or the current 

price, whichever was less. The proposed bill also included provisions 

tributing 5,122 acres to Missouri for use as state parks and recreation 

288 McGinnis’ statements in excerpt, Globe-Democrat (June 30, 1978) (MVS Archives). Interv

Dace and McKinney (Aug. 11, 1987) reveal the district’s perspective on the referendum and the Cart

istration’s positions on the dam. They also discuss how the district was hamstrung in its efforts t

the dam. McKinney described proponent efforts a “no-sided” campaign in comparison with the ca

opponents.

289 Referendum results in excerpts, Aug. 9, 1978 editions of Globe-Democrat and Post-Dispatch; 

excerpts, Globe-Democrat (Aug. 11, 1978) (MVS Archives).
314

as neither side was willing to compromise.290

Around the time that debates over deauthorization were occurring, wa

supply emerged as an important determinant for future plans in the basin

assess these needs, the Institute of River Studies at the University of Misso

Rolla conducted a study of the water supply needs of the basin. The fi ndi

revealed that while streamfl ow was more than enough to meet anticipa

needs in most years, shortages could still occur in severe drought years. H

ever, these years were infrequent. The study revealed that water supply co

be an issue in the future, and thus the district believed that “the public in

est would be best served by planning for contingency supplies, to allow 

uncertainties in predicting future events.” From the district’s perspective

was trying to anticipate future problems with water supply and address th

in any future plans for the basin. However, dam opponents saw this as j

another ploy to keep the Meramec project alive. Even after the deauthor

tion of the project, the issue of water supply would continue to be prevalen

debates about plans for the basin.291

In addition to debates over water supply and deauthorization, there was 

the glaring problem of fl ood control. Because of the controversy surround

the project, people often lost sight of the fact that the most important funct

of the reservoir was fl ood control. If a large reservoir was not a viable solut

for fl ood control, then alternative means needed to be explored. In an attem

to address this problem, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Up

Mississippi River Basin Commission, and U.S. Water Resources Council agr

on the need for a special study of fl ood plain management. In June 1981, 

group released its fi ndings in Out of Harm’s Way. The report recommen

that the state or federal government purchase lands in the river’s fl ood pl

as well as zoning lands to prevent development in regions susceptible to fl o

ing. The study also recommended other non-structural solutions for fl ood

such as controls on quarrying and dredging operations, better fl ood prepa

tion, bank stabilization, and building levees in areas especially prone to fl 

damages, such as Valley Park. In light of the public’s growing aversion to la

290 “Bailey Introduces Bill To Deauthorize Dam,” Rolla Daily News (Jul. 17, 1981). 291 “Water Supply is issue in Meramec projects,” Globe-Democrat (Oct. 16, 1981); Institute of River Stu

Meramec River Basin Water Supply Study, (St. Louis: University of Missouri-Rolla, 1979); USACE, M

mec River Basin Water Supply Study (St. Louis: MVS, 1979).
315

would become more and more prevalent in future planning for the regi

In July 1981, nearly two years after the referendum, legislator

still debating deauthorization. Standing in the middle of these debat

Rep. Robert Young. Before making a decision to commit to either plan, 

met with District Engineer Col. Robert Dacey, Meramec Project Coor

Michael Dace, and former District En

Guy Jester in June 1981. From the d

perspective, it was just responding to Y

request and supplying neutral fac

biased conclusions. From Young’s p

tive, he simply wanted the district to bri

up to date on the situation so he woul

the facts before making a decision. Ho

from the perspective of dam opponent

as Eagleton, it seemed as though the 

was lobbying and trying to revitalize i

in the project. Eagleton called the me

“fl agrant intervention in the political p

and accused the district of “pumpi

Young to oppose a dead project. Eagleton met with Chief of Engineers L

Joseph K. Bratton to voice his complaints. However, Bratton told Eaglet

the district engineer has a responsibility to respond to such requests, an

he was not at fault. After the meeting, Eagleton stated that he was satisfi 

would make no further comment.293

After the controversy from this meeting settled, the two sides were 

compromise on a deauthorization bill. A major issue for Eagleton an

forth was that Bailey’s plan included provisions for a future study of a 

scale project. In return for Bailey dropping this provision, Danforth and 

ton agreed to a provision to sell land at its current market value. Young 

the bill, which became Public Law 97-128. President Ronald Regan si

into law in December 1981. The deauthorization bill included a provisi

292 Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission, Out 

Way: Lower Meramec Valley Flood Damage Reduction Study, Summary Report (St. Louis: M

1981). 

293 Interview with Dace; “Young denies being infl uenced on dam project,” Globe-Democrat (Aug

“Army Corps Accused Of Politicking,” Post-Dispatch (Aug. 2, 1981); “Corps Head Appeases Eagle

Briefi ng Young On Dam,” Post-Dispatch (Aug. 6, 1981).

Col. Robert Dacey
316

included a provision for a $20 million fund for non-reservoir fl ood con

efforts on the lower Meramec, as well as provisions for a water supply stu

Former landowners would have one year to buy back their lands at mar

price. After this year, the district would dispose of whatever lands remai

by public auction. Because the General Services Administration was norm

charged with land disposal, this responsibility would be a unique challenge 

the district in the years to come.294

Before the district could dispose of land, it had to wait for the Misso

legislature to decide on the 5,122 acres offered to the state as part of the de

thorization bill. Controversy arose over these acres, as some argued the Co

should return this land to its previous owners. In addition, there was deb

over how to fi nance and maintain the land. In April 1982, the Missouri le

lature accepted 5,122 acres, offering some land at auction and the remain

land as state parks. The bill provided for a 600-foot strip along each side of 

river to be protected from development. On October 18, 1983, District En

neer Col. Gary Beech offi cially deeded this 

land to the state of Missouri. The remaining 

task for the Corps was disposing of more than 

20,000 acres. The fi rst step was to offer these 

lands to former owners. The district sent letters containing offers to more than 500 former 

landowners, who had one year to respond. 

Because the market value of the lands fl uctuated, some former landowners expressed 

anger over the resale values. Others wanted 

the courts to decide the issue. In the end, 

former owners purchased only 2,400 acres, 

leaving approximately 18,000 acres for the 

district to sell at three public auctions. These 

294 “Compromise reached on Meramec Park Lake,” Macon Chronicle (Nov. 25, 1981); “Meramec com

mise,” Boonville Daily News (Dec. 3, 1981); “Congressman Wendell Bailey Reports On Meramec Deau

rization,” Willow Springs News (Dec. 10, 1981); U.S. Cong., Act to deauthorize several projects withi

jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers, PL 97-128 (97th Cong., 1st Sess.) “Congress Passes Bill to 

Meramec Dam,” Post-Dispatch (Dec. 17, 1981); “Reagan’s Pen Kills Meramec Dam Project,” Post-Disp

(Dec. 30, 1981).

Col. Gary Beech
317

$7.4 million.295

In retrospect, there was no single factor that prevented completion 

Meramec Dam. Instead, the project ran a gauntlet of challenges that e

ally culminated in its deauthorization in 1981. When support for the 

was at its apex, funds were limited due to the nation’s involvement in Vi

When funds for construction became available, Congress had passed 

forever changing the way the Corps and other agencies evaluated its p

When the project began in the 1960s, its economic benefi ts were suffi c

justify its construction. Even though the project remained benefi cial f

economic perspective, by the 1970s economic benefi ts alone were not 

to justify the project. Even if the project’s economic gains offset the e

mental impact of the project, the fact remains that the proponents of t

simply did do an effective enough job informing the public about the po

of the project. Instead, the public chose to follow the rousing rhetoric 

opponents, who were far more effective at getting their opinions hea

more importantly, believed. In December 1982, a fl ood devastated the 

causing approximately $150 million in damages. Dam proponents argu

the reservoir would have signifi cantly reduced fl ood damages, while opp

still claimed otherwise. Nonetheless, the fl ood highlighted the fact tha

solution to the problem was still necessary. Proponents tried to use 

an opportunity to stir up renewed interest in a reservoir, but opponen

ended any such hopes. In a sense, the Corps’ role was essentially unchan

it still had to fi nd solutions for the Meramec Basin. In another, the Corps 

never be the same, as its methods for addressing problems such as tho

existed in the Meramec Basin would have to evolve in response to NE

the public’s growing desire to protect the nation’s natural resources.296

295 “Governor Bond signs Meramec lands bill,” Sullivan Tri-county News, (Apr. 29, 1982); “Ar

preparing to unload dam project land,” Globe-Democrat (Oct. 4, 1983); “Meramec land bill said 

Crawford Mirror (May 6, 1982); Memo, Meramec Park Lake Disposal Project, Oct. 17, 1983 (MVS 

“Meramec Lands Offered At Prices 50% Below and Above Purchase Prices,” Independent-Jour

15, 1983); “Landowners Of Meramec Dam Project Land Met To Discuss Problems of Repurchase

Independent News (Dec. 21, 1983); “Corps Needs to Be More Flexible On Dam Land Prices,” R

News (Jan. 27, 1984); “Corps of Engineers To Auction Property from Meramec Dam,” Post-Dispa

25, 1987); “Landowners decide on suit to bring down land prices,” Tri-County News (Feb. 1, 1984

After-Action Report (St. Louis: MVS, 1988). 296 “Thousands Flee Rampaging Rivers,” Globe-Democrat (Dec. 6, 1982); Editorial in Globe-

(Dec. 12, 1983); Interview with Dace.
318

Carter “Hit List”

When the 1976 presidential election race began, few people outside of Geo

had ever heard of the little known governor of that state. Yet Jimmy Carter’s mess

which promised to cut back government spending and eliminate what he called “p

barrel” projects, spoke to many voters who had become disillusioned with Washing

For Carter, pork barrel projects were unnecessary, highly expensive, and represen

some of the worst examples of government waste. While governor of Georgia, Ca

halted one such project by vetoing a proposed dam on the Flint River. Carter felt 

his action had not only removed an expensive and unnecessary project, but had 

protected the environment by keeping the river free-fl owing. While on presidential 

campaign trail, Carter vowed that he “would get the Army Corps of Engineers ou

the dam-building business.” In my opinion, he added, “we have built enough dam

this country and [he] will be extremely reluctant as president to build anymore.” S

came as no surprise that when the Carter campaign visited St. Louis in March 1976

voiced opposition to the Meramec Dam. Proponents and opponents alike knew that 

election would likely doom the dam.

When the election results came in, Carter had won by a narrow margin. This 

tory was a crushing blow for the future of large civil works projects like the Mera

Dam. The administration quickly began compiling a preliminary list of projects alre

under construction that should be halted. Eventually, the administration reduced 

list - which became known as the Carter “hit list” - to 19 projects, one of which 

the Meramec Dam. When the administration released the list, many legislators w

furious, as they had devoted a great deal of time and effort to see these projects co

to fruition. After further review, the administration agreed to reduce the numbe

projects on the “hit list” to nine; however, the Meramec remained. From the beginn

of his campaign, Carter was indifferent to the economic, fl ood control, and recreatio

benefi ts of the dam. He had already determined that this was a pork barrel pro

and that protecting the environment and keeping the river in a free-fl owing s

took precedence over any of the aforementioned benefi ts that might accrue. In o

words, Carter was determined to 

halt the project. The administration soon began pressuring Corps 

headquarters, which in turn led to 

pressure on the St. Louis district. 

Faced by opposition from without 

and within, the fate of the project 

was determined long before the 

outcome of the “non-binding” 

referendum that would prove the 

coup d’état for the Meramec Dam. Flint River in Georgia just downstream of propo

Corps dam site
319

 18 

Replacement of the Alton Dam

Among the major Corps projects delayed by the National Enviro

tal Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental regulation, perhaps th

important was the replacement of Lock and Dam No. 26 at Alton, Illin

noted previously, with the passage of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 193

gress increased the channel depth to nine feet, which the Corps main

through a series of locks and dams on the Upper Mississippi that 

slack-water navigation pools. By the 1940s, this nine-foot channel proj

successfully turned the Upper Mississippi System into an intra-cont

highway, leading to explosive growth in the number of vessels navigat

river and in the size of the tows carrying valuable coal, petroleum, gra

other essential goods to and from markets. These tows, which had 

maximum payloads of approximately 5,000 tons prior to the nine-foo

ect, could now carry a maximum of 50,000 tons, facilitating the rapid 

of the nation’s economy. Although commercial navigation grew thro

the entire Upper Mississippi due to the new nine-foot channel, certain 

experienced especially rapid growth. One was the Alton Dam. Yet by o

1950s, it was obvious that the facility had structural issues requiring sign

repair, and that the size of the lock was prohibitive for processing the 

ing level of traffi c. By the following decade, the St. Louis District bega

ning for replacement of the lock, but new environmental requirements d

and altered the plans, demonstrating again how the environmental mov

greatly impacted navigation in the district.297

 Although the Alton dam employed the best-known engineering pri

of the time, there were a number of unforeseen engineering issues w

structure that became manifest in the years following its completion. F

the structure’s foundation was not stable, as the vertical piles that anch

were driven into sand that rested atop overlying bedrock. Because of sc

and fi lling during construction, foundation materials under much of th

were much weaker than when initially tested. The weak foundation cau

structure to shift, with lock walls moving as much as 10 inches and dam 

297 O’Brien, pp. 11-20; “The Mississippi River Navigation System and Locks and Dam 26,” Feb. 1

Archives); DuWayne A. Koch, “Tomorrow’s Waterways,” Water Spectrum N.D. (MVS Archives).
320

cracking, joint separation, underseepage, and voids that developed around 

piles. In addition, scouring just below the dam caused a 300-foot-long 

10-foot deep hole to develop. One scuba diver investigating the structu

said that the piles were so exposed that it was like walking through a for

To ensure that the structure remained stable, the Corps performed numer

costly repairs. For example, in 1964 the Corps expended $186,000 on repa

and just six months into 1968, the Corps had expended another $276,0

These repairs would have to continue in the years to come just to maintain 

structure, and far more costly expenditures were required for long-term so

tions to these structural problems.298

In addition to structural defi ciencies, the growth of navigation on the up

Mississippi system and especially at Alton made it apparent that the dam’s lo

ing capacity was inadequate to meet future demands. There are two prim

reasons for this inadequacy. First, the structure was located between the con

ence of the Illinois River, 15 miles upstream, and the Missouri River, eight m

downstream. The traffi c from these two rivers combined with Mississippi t

fi c, causing the Alton site to be particularly congested. For example, in 19

the dam’s fi rst year of operation, 1.4 million tons locked through the dam, 

by the 1950s, 20 million tons moved through the locks annually. This ann

298 Arthur Johnson, “St. Louis District Begins Design of Alton Locks,” ASCE Annual Meeting, Oct. 18

1971(MVS Archives); Dobney, p. 151; David Chenoweth, “Trials at Alton,” Water Spectrum (Wint. 1977

“Mississippi River Navigation System”; A detailed assessment of the state of old Lock and Dam No. 26 ca

found in Report on Replacement, Lock and Dam No. 26, Mississippi River, Alton, Illinois (St. Louis: M

1968).

View of Lock and Dam 26 in 1938
321

tonnage had increased to 40 million by 1967. This dramatic increase 

exposed the second major inadequacy 

of the Alton Dam—its 600-foot and 

350-foot locks simply were not capable of meeting the demands created by 

the growth of navigation because they 

required longer tows to split for multiple lockages. The Corps estimated 

that the practical capacity of the locks was 41.5 million tons, which wo

reached in 1968. The problem was already beginning to manifest itsel

form of delays, as waiting tows congested the site and created a tran

tion “bottleneck.” Barge companies complained that they were losing $

lion annually because of congestion delays at the dam. Moreover, rep

the structure caused further delays when the Corps closed the main l

29 days in February 1968 to recondition the lower gates. During these r

around 900 tows experienced delays ranging from several hours to seve

Lock and Dam 26 site map, 1934

First vessel through L&D 26
322

Because traffi c continued to increase, delays would become even worse in 

future.299

Repair or Replacement?

As early as the 1950s, the Corps recognized the need to address ina

quacies of the dam. By September 1956, the Offi ce of the Chief of Engine

approved the initiation of an authorization report for rehabilitation. T

Corps charged engineering fi rm Tibbetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton with 

study. The Corps released the report on this study in June 1957, and sho

thereafter the district held a pu

hearing to discuss a rehabilitat

and expansion project. However, 

rehabilitation plan would take s

eral years to materialize, and by 

time it did, the focus was beginn

to shift away from rehabilitation 

toward replacement. In August 19

the district released a major study 

299 Report on Replacement, pp. 1-21. 

Tainter valves of main gate, Lock and Dam 26, 1933

Crack in auxiliary lock wall
323

report incorporated many of the fi ndings of the 1957 study, both of which 

recommended construction of a 110-

foot by 1200-foot lock to accommodate increasing traffi c. By June 1965, 

the Board of Engineers for Rivers and 

Harbors approved the plan, prompting a new public hearing to discuss the 

project. Held in St. Louis on February 15, 1966, the meeting showed tha

all support for a larger lock was strong, especially among navigation in

However, the Offi ce of the Chief of Engineers questioned the advisab

replacing the existing lock and instead recommended construction of 

dam. To make a determination about which plan of action was best – r

ment or rehabilitation – representatives from the district, Board of En

for Rivers and Harbors, Offi ce of the Chief of Engineers, and Lower Miss

Valley Division held a conference in August 1966 and concluded that 

detailed study was needed to make a determination.300

300 Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement), “Chronological Events Prior to Project Docum

“Investigations.”

Closeup of crack in lock wall

Aerial of old Lock and Dam 26
324

Over the next two years, the district held additional conferences and c

ducted further studies on the best plan of action. These studies and discussi

centered on navigation, lockage time and delays, the structural integrity of 

existing facility, and the costs and benefi ts of both repair and replacement

May 1968, the study was nearing completion, and the district held a pu

meeting in Alton to reveal its plans. Various state and local agencies atten

the meeting, as well as concerned citizens and representatives from comm

cial interest groups. Once again, overall support for the project was stro

especially with waterway interests. These interests unanimously approved 

project because they saw it as a solution to costly delays that drove up shipp

costs, which increased prices for consumers. In addition, there appeared to 

little environmental opposition, as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ackno

edged that the project “will have relatively minor adverse effects.”301

Shortly after the public hearing, the district submitted its report to the d

sion offi ce, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, and Offi ce of the Ch

of Engineers for approval. The Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor, appro

301 Report on Replacement, Ex. A, letter, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Col. Edwin Decker, Jun. 14, 1

Arthur Johnson, “St. Louis District Begins Design of Alton Locks”; MVS, “Statement of Findings Locks 

Dam No. 26 (Replacement), Upper Mississippi River Basin, Mississippi River, Alton Illinois,” 1974 (

Archives).

Map of existing structure and proposed replacement location
325

it in July 1969 and used his authority under the 1909 River and Harb

to authorize it – Section 6 of the act gave the secretary authority to a

a project if “its entire reconstruction is absolutely essential to its effi cie

economical maintenance and operation.” Such modifi cations to a st

“shall be considered and approved by the Board of Engineers for Rive

Harbors and be recommended by the Chief of Engineers before the w

reconstruction is commenced.” The Secretary had already used this au

to expand facilities on the Ohio River without specifi c congressional ap

and now he was using this same authority once again. He sent his req

the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which approve

for fi scal year 1970.302

The report the Secretary approved discussed three specifi c factors 

to the conclusion that the Corps should build a new dam. First, as dis

above, the structure had deteriorated and needed extensive repairs to en

safety and functionality. Although the Corps did not know when it would 

was necessary to be proactive to protect navigation. If a major failure oc

the effects would be economically devastating. At the least, the Corps 

to perform extensive repairs on the existing dam, and the district dete

302 Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement); U.S. Cong., River and Harbor Act of 1909, P.L. 60-

Cong., 1st Sess.); “Mississippi River Navigation System.”
326

be nearly the same as the cost of replacing the existing structure, an estima

$214 million for rehabilitation versus $203 million for replacement. The ex

ing structure would approach its 50-year lifespan when the district comple

repairs. Pile driving adjacent to the structure could weaken the foundation 

cause the structure to “walk” downstream. Finally, even if repaired, engine

ing principles used during the construction of the old dam were not up to 

standards of modern engineering.303

The second factor the report discussed was the impediment to wa

borne commerce that the existing structure presented. Its locks simply w

not capable of meeting future commercial demands. Thus, whether the 

trict built a new structure or rehabilitated the old one, the locks would h

to be expanded. However, expanding the locks and performing repairs wo

require a shutdown of river traffi c while the district performed the impro

ments. An interruption of river commerce could have a devastating impact 

the economy, as shippers would have to move goods by more expensive mod

such as railroads, leading to increased costs for consumers. This relates to 

fi nal justifi cation for the project: its cost-benefi ts savings. Based on 1968 t

nage, a new structure would produce approximately $10 million in annual b

efi ts from savings on transportation costs. Moreover, annual benefi ts wo

grow with the increase in annual tonnage. The report estimated that ann

tonnage at the site would increase from 46 million to 174 million tons betw

1970 and 2030. Based on this projected growth, the report estimated maxim

annual benefi ts could reach as high as $31 million. Much of the projected s

ings would benefi t shipping industries, but groups such as farmers and elec

companies would benefi t as well. These two industries provided consum

with essential good. For example, approximately 25 percent of the total gr

produced in the Midwest passed through the locks annually. Electric com

nies relied on coal to supply power, much of which was shipped by barge. O

utility estimated that without waterborne commerce, electrical rates for c

sumers would increase by 19 percent. Because of the breadth of the Mississi

navigation system and the nation’s reliance on the system for essential go

and services, the Alton dam was more than just a local issue; it was a natio

303 Report on Replacement, sec. IV, V and VI. 
327

energy needs of not only the Midwest, but the entire nation.304

Considering the disadvantages of rehabilitation, the Corps deci

replacement. The district considered four possible sites before determini

a site two miles downstream was the best choice. The site had several 

tages over the existing site and other sites considered. The location all

straight, two-mile approach to the locks. One problem with the existing 

ture was that the nearby shoreline jutted out into the river, causing app

ing tows to take an indirect approach to the lock. The straight approach 

allow safer and more effi cient locking. In addition, building at this l

would allow the existing dam to remain operational during constructio

venting a costly hiatus for shipping. Moreover, the location would e

Alton’s waterfront, improve operation of barge-loading facilities, and p

various recreational opportunities. Construction diffi culties would be 

mal, and the structure leveraged current design criteria, making it adequ

304 Ibid.; Dobney, p. 151; “Fact, Fiction on Alton dam replacement,” Response by American W

Operators to Reader’s Digest (MVS Archives).

Aerial view of old L&D 26 just before beginning construction of Melvin Price Locks 

Dam
328

by 1,200-foot locks. Rather than being side-by-side, these would be separa

by two tainter gates, allowing for more effi cient locking. The sill depth at 

new locks would be 18-feet deep, providing more clearance space for nine-f

draft tows and allowing more effi cient navigation of locks during periods w

ice accumulates on the bottom of tows. The dam would also consist of n

110-foot by 42-foot tainter gates. In addition, the foundation of the new lo

and dam would be on battered steel H-piles driven into bedrock at an angl

form a web-like foundation, which was far more stable than wooden frict

piles driven into sand.305

The preconstruction planning phase began when Congress allocated fu

for the project in May 1970. The district’s initial estimates were that the proj

would take 11 years to complete, with construction set to begin in 1974. Prec

struction planning included various studies on both the existing and repla

ment structure. Because it would be at least 11 years before the new dam w

complete, the district had to maintain and increase the capacity of the Al

dam. To increase its capacity, the district explored means such as switchbo

and mooring facilities. However, most investigations and studies during 

phase concerned the replacement structure. The district conducted a study 

the appropriate lock sizes, concluding that two 1,200-foot locks were necessa

The district oversaw numerous other investigations as well – alternate st

ies, model studies, fi eld surveys, hydraulic analyses, and pile driving and l

tests to determine foundation characteristics and feasibility of using H-pi

During the planning and design stages, the Corps and other reviewing offi 

held several conferences to discuss and review ideas developed during th

various studies. In addition, the Waterways Experiment Station conduc

various model tests, passing its fi ndings and recommendations along to 

district for consideration during the dam’s design. Besides studies on the str

ture itself, the district also performed studies on the best means of cofferd

construction and possible recreation opportunities provided by the proj

The district incorporated these fi ndings into its design memoranda, the fi rs

which, on hydrology, the Corps approved on July 29, 1971. Soon thereafter, 

Corps approved the general design memorandum, moving the project swi

305 Report on Replacement, Sec. V; further discussion of the state of the facility can be found in Richa

Armstrong, “Replacement—Locks and Dam No. 26: Plans Considered,” Proceedings of the ASCE, in Jou

of the Waterways and Harbors Division (Feb. 1970): 49-63; “Statement of Findings”; Johnson, “St. L

District Begins Design”; O’Brien, p. 132.
329

few changes to the original plan. Most notably, the size and number of 

gates changed and the overall cost increased from $203 million to $3

lion, mostly because of infl ation. The district, division, Waterways Expe

Station, and Offi ce of the Chief of Engineers agreed to the revisions a

project’s cost estimates at a series of conferences held in August and S

ber 1972.306

The district planned to carry out a three-stage construction seque

the replacement structure. During the fi rst stage, after completion of 

dam, the contractor would build 6.5 gate bays. During the second sta

contractor would construct the half gate bay of the dam and the rive

During the fi nal stage, the contractor would complete the land lock a

gate bays in the separation between the two locks. On August 6, 1974, 

before construction on the fi rst stage cofferdam was set to begin, a cont

ensued, as 21 railroads, the Izaak Walton League, and the Sierra Club i

temporary restraining order against opening bids for construction on t

stage cofferdam.307

Environmental Objections

On January 1, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed NEPA into la

ever changing that the Corps and other federal agencies would do bu

The immediate effect of the law was the requirement to fi le an environ

impact statement (EIS) for any project that would have an impact on th

ronment. Concurrent with the other studies and reports for the repla

of the Alton dam, the district quickly set to work on an EIS for the p

The Corps fi led the draft EIS with the Council on Environmental Qua

March 15, 1974. The district received approximately 40 letters from 

groups and federal, state, and local agencies revealing a mixture of s

and opposition. Those who supported the project saw it as an oppo

to increase navigational capacity of the river and promote economic 

306 Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement), Sections 2, 9, 10, 13, 17, 19, and 21; Johnson, “St. Lou

Begins Design”; Minutes of Meeting, Review Conference on Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement)

Consultants and Government Representatives, WES, Jul. 31-Aug. 2, 1972 (St. Louis: MVS); a chr

listing and summary of meetings between 1970 and 1971 are in USACE, Locks and Dam No. 26 

ment) Conference, 18-19 November 1971 (St. Louis: MVS, 1971). For a more detailed discussion of 

ferences, including those from 1972-1973, see “Civil Works Project Files, L & D No. 26—Conferenc

Archives); The increase in the estimated cost of the project was due to infl ation and the cost of rep

existing facility concurrently.

307 Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement), Sec. I; Izaak Walton League of America, Et Al. v. John 

655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
330

and conservation groups who feared that the project would have a detrim

tal impact on the environment. Much of this concern related to fears that 

project was part of a plan to expand the capacity of the entire upper Mis

sippi. These letters did not outright oppose the project, but urged the Co

to halt the project until after further studies. Moreover, they argued that 

was a part of a 12-foot channel project, it required a system-wide EIS to m

NEPA requirements. Other letters questioning the project came from gro

and agencies who felt that the cost-benefi t fi gures were inadequate and that 

district should consider other means of transporting goods. Finally, some 

ters expressed the opinion that the district should pursue rehabilitation rat

than replacement because it was more cost-effi cient.308

The district reviewed these comments and included them in the fi nal E

which it fi led with the Council on Environmental Quality on July 2, 1974. T

statement concluded that environmental impacts would be minimal. The o

adverse impacts that the statement cited were inundation of 600 acres, pot

tial impacts to habitats along the river due to industrial growth, and poss

bank erosion and sedimentation because of increased traffi c. However, th

impacts were considered minor, especially considering the economic bene

that would occur because of increased waterborne commerce. The statem

considered alternatives to the project, but concluded that all of them w

inadequate to meet the demands of growing waterborne commerce. One p

sible alternative was rehabilitation, but the cost was the around the same 

replacement and required either the construction of a temporary lock or a h

to through navigation for one to three years, which would have a detrimen

economic impact. Once economic losses were included, rehabilitation har

seemed a viable alternative.309

Some concerned groups were not convinced about Corps intentions, and 

August 6, 1974, just a month after the district fi led its fi nal EIS and a day bef

bidding on the fi rst stage cofferdam was to begin, 21 railroads, the Izaak Wal

League, and the Sierra Club fi led suits in district court seeking an injunction 

stop construction. The court granted a temporary injunction and on Septe

ber 6 issued a preliminary injunction on further activity on the project. T

308 USACE, Final Environmental Statement, Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement), Upper Missis

River Basin, Mississippi River, Alton Illinois (St. Louis: MVS, 1974), see App. H for letters received 

Sec.9, pp. 183-273, for Corps responses.

309 Ibid., see also Sec.5 and 6 on adverse environmental impacts and alternatives.
331

court then combined these suits. The trial was set to begin on March 3

However, the Secretary of the Army was able to convince the court to de

trial while the Corps awaited clarifi cation on the exact extent of the sec

authority.310

There were many reasons why the plaintiffs fi led suit. The railroads o

the project primarily because they claimed federally fi nanced mainten

the river system represented an unfair subsidy to the barge industry, al

it was not the only mode of transportation that received federal subsidies

the Corps’ perspective, it was simply responding to its congressional m

to maintain effi cient navigation for waterborne commerce. Unfortunate

mandate placed the Corps between two rival industries. The controver

Lock and Dam No. 26 was essentially “a very classic meeting ground b

two old adversaries, the railroads and the barge industry,” District En

Col. Thorwald Peterson pointed out. “In effect, the St. Louis Distr

caught in the middle. Lock and Dam No. 26 was where the battle was 

but the real issue was user fees.” The user fee issue was the other reas

railroads opposed the project, as they wanted the barge industry to co

cost of maintenance. However, it was not the responsibility of the C

310 Izaak Walton League v. Marsh; Leon E. McKinney, William R. Sutton, and Jean-Yves Perez, “

Dam No. 26, Rehabilitation Versus Replacement,” TME (Mar.-Apr., 1980).

Confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers
332

seemed favoritism for the barge industry. One railroad representative char

the Corps with “promoting its own construction self-interest and the inter

of a narrow band of shippers.” Barge representatives retorted that “the proj

was essential to the economic well-being of the St. Louis area.” Another rea

for railroad opposition was that they claimed increasing the capacity of 

locks would lead to an increase in the capacity of the river, which would ca

profi ts to plummet. While it may seem on the surface that declining railr

profi ts should not be a federal concern, these companies received federal ai

prevent them from declaring bankruptcy. If the Corps project had an adve

affect on the industry, this would inhibit railroads from repaying federal loa

Railroads also claimed that thousands of jobs would be lost if increased ri

commerce caused their profi ts to decline.311

Environmentalists had their own though often related reasons for opp

ing the project. For example, environmentalists also feared that increased l

capacity would lead to an increased capacity on the entire upper river. T

argued that the plan was nothing more than a clever ruse to create a 12-f

channel based on the idea that increasing the lock’s capacity would lead t

shifting transportation bottleneck that would move up the river, thus creat

the need for increased capacity at each locale. They feared that this increa

capacity would have a devastating impact on riverine ecology. They cited 

further proof the proposed 18-foot sill depth. Because the larger sill depth 

accommodate tows with a 12-foot draft, the logical implication, at least 

the environmentalists, was that it would necessarily lead to a 12-foot ch

nel. The plaintiffs also argued that the Corps did not have specifi c congr

sional approval for the project. The authority that the Corps cited was Sect

6 of the 1909 River and Harbors Act, which gave the Secretary of the Ar

authority to approve projects deemed necessary to maintain effi cient navi

tion of the Upper Mississippi. Because the proposed structure was part of 

nine-foot channel, the secretary and Corps believed they were simply car

ing out their congressional mandate. The Corps had already used this sa

authority to expand and improve facilities on the Ohio River. However, 

plaintiffs argued that because the increased lock capacity would “necessar

311 Ruddy, Interview with Peterson; Izaak Walton League v. Marsh; “Corps Promotes Dam, Rail Spo

man Says,” Post-Dispatch (Sept. 12, 1975); CBO, Alton Locks and Dam: A Review of the Evidence, 

Working Paper (Wash., D.C.: CBO, 1976); “The Mississippi River, Locks and Dam 26: Issues and Answ

Post-Dispatch (Feb. 22, 1976), provides an excellent overview of the arguments of all sides of the issue.
333

authority. Moreover, because impacts would be system-wide, approval 

to be part of a system-wide policy. These criticisms led environmenta

claim the project’s EIS was inadequate because it was too localized and 

consider alternatives, arguing that a system-wide EIS was necessary to 

with NEPA.312

After reviewing the evidence, U.S. District Court Judge Charles 

issued a temporary injunction ordering the project to be delayed “un

defendants obtain the consent of Congress and cured the defects of th

ronmental impact statement.” Richey, who interestingly enough had w

for the Corps during World War II, went on to state that “the decision to 

the capacity of this part of the Upper Mississippi River Navigation Syste

46 to 190 million or more tons is, in essence, the decision to expand the 

ity of the entire system.” Thus, either the Corps must submit an EIS tha

into account the system-wide impacts of a 12-foot channel, or it must 

the project.313

The St. Louis District responded swiftly by beginning preparation of 

supplement EIS that would take into account the system-wide rathe

regional effects of increased navigation. Meanwhile, the district bega

paring a Formulation Evaluation Report on the project to present an u

analysis of traffi c projections, alternatives considered, and system cons

The major issues surrounding the project fall into three specifi c but ofte

related categories: engineering debates, impacts on the railroads, and e

mental impacts. The district’s responses to all of these criticisms refe

the 1968 report on the existing structure. To support the report’s recomm

tions, the district cited numerous engineering conferences and studies 

ing the project subsequent to the report. These studies concluded that 

lock and dam had deteriorated to the point that a major rehabilitation w

only solution. However, as the district had already pointed out, rehabi

would cost almost the same as the proposed replacement. Thus, the 

had chosen to replace rather than rehabilitate.314

312 Izaak Walton League v. Marsh; Interview with Peterson; CBO, pp. 4-9; “Confl ict Snarls Midwe

ways Expansion,” Washington Post (Jul. 7, 1975). 313 “Corps Promotes Dam, Rail Spokesman Says,” Post-Dispatch; “Confl ict Snarls Expansion.” 314 USACE, Draft Supplement Environmental Statement, Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacemen

Upper Mississippi River Basin, Mississippi River, Alton, Illinois (St. Louis: MVS, 1975); USAC

Memorandum No. 11, Formulation Evaluation Report, Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacemen

(St. Louis: MVS, 1975). 
334

unanimous, there was no consensus about the best solution. Because of 

district’s cost estimates, based on the need for signifi cant cofferdams an

temporary lock to allow continued navigation, it concluded that replacem

was the best option. The cost of the temporary lock and the cofferdams wo

be approximately $200 million, thus driving up the cost of rehabilitation. T

district also explored extensive grouting as a means to repair the structu

which was very expensive. In addition, pile driving during rehabilitation wo

result in vibrations that could further weaken the structure. Lastly, rehab

tation would be the equivalent of what Jester described as a “chrome-coa

Model T.” In other words, the Corps should not make massive expenditu

on an outdated structure if it could construct a superior one for the same c

However, others believed that the district had overestimated the cost of re

bilitation, that costly cofferdams and a temporary lock were not necessa

and that the Corps could repair the locks individually, using non-vibration

techniques, without closing the river to commerce.315

The district responded to opponents by arguing that it had already explo

all possible alternatives, concluding that replacement downstream was 

best solution. While cheaper alternatives ‘seemed viable on fi rst glance, an

sis revealed that there were serious engineering defi ciencies in them and t

correcting these defi ciencies would dramatically increase the cost of rehabil

tion. The debate concerning the best engineering solution for Lock and D

No. 26 continued to be controversial, with each side believing its plan to 

the best solution. From the Corps’ perspective, no other group had inves

more time, effort, and engineering expertise into evaluating the solutions 

the problems at No. 26. However, in an effort to assuage those who were cr

cal of the Corps’ rehabilitation tests, in May 1977 the Corps entered into 

agreement with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), which 

been critical of the plan, to conduct an 18-month testing program to reso

the uncertainties associated with rehabilitation plans. The study was set 

completion in December 1978.316

The other issue surrounding the project was the impact of increas

the river’s capacity. For the railroads, this impact was on the economy; 

315 “Locks and Dam 26: Issues and Answers”; “Playing the Waiting Game with Locks and Dam 26,” broc

(National Committee on Locks and Dam 26, N.D.) (MVS Archives); McKinney, Sutton, and Perez, “Reha

tation Versus Replacement”; CBO, Alton Locks and Dam; USACE, Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacem

Supplement No. 2 to Design Memorandum No. 2, General Design Memorandum (St. Louis: MVS, 197

316 Ibid.
335

claims on the 18-foot sill depth, a shifting bottleneck, and previous stud

12-foot channel. The Corps responded by pointing out that recent engin

studies supported using an 18-foot sill depth for ships with a nine-foo

which were 17 percent more effi cient than a 14-foot sill. Since optim

depth in a 12-foot channel was between 21 and 25-feet, the Corps argu

sill depth did not reveal plans for a 12-foot channel. Concerning claim

greater locking capacity would lead to a shifting bottleneck, the Corps p

out that No. 26 was located at a heavy traffi c location that required 

capacity. Rather than a shifting bottleneck, ships delayed at No. 26 woul

more quickly upriver to locks and dams that have more than enough c

to meet these demands. The Corps also responded to accusations that 

vious feasibility studies for a 12-foot channel revealed its intentions, 

that this study was merely one of numerous such studies that the Corp

undertakes to decide the feasibility of possible projects. This study con

that the project was economically unfeasible and that the Corps woul

specifi c congressional approval to proceed.317

In the months following the injunction, the district continued prep

supplement EIS as well as a Formulation Evaluation Report to reeval

economic impacts of the project. The draft took into account the impac

project on the entire upper river system as well as alternative modes o

portation as a viable alternative to replacing the dam. It reached the sam

clusions as the fi rst EIS – two 1,200-foot locks were necessary, and inc

capacity would have minimal environmental impact. The district fi led th

supplement, the fi nal EIS, and the Formulation Evaluation Report w

Council on Environmental Quality in June 1975. To offer the public an 

tunity to review the project, the district scheduled two St. Louis public 

ings for July and September 1975. In addition, it scheduled two public m

in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, and St. Paul, Minnesota, in December 1975. A

mately 200 people, 32 of whom gave statements, attended the fi rst m

on July 21. Overall, the meeting revealed strong support for the project

ever, many people requested additional time to review the EIS and Fo

tion Evaluation Report and a subsequent meeting to discuss the cont

these documents further. Another meeting took place on September 11 

1975. Approximately 300 people attended the meeting, 49 of whom ma

317 “Eighteen-foot Sill Depth Decision Made Based on Nine-foot Channel,” and “Waterways Vs. R

Post-Dispatch (Feb. 22, 1976); Final EIS.
336

the 49 speakers favoring it. Like previous discussions of the project, those w

favored it felt that the increased capacity was necessary for economic grow

but those who opposed felt that it threatened the railroads and would hav

negative environmental impact. The same was true of the letters sent by th

reviewing the documents, as they revealed overall support for the project, w

the exception of environmental and conservation groups, and the railroads

In August 1975, the Corps asked the Board of Engineers for Rivers 

Harbors to review the project. By February 1976, the board had completed 

review, recommending the replacement of two 1,200-foot locks project wit

single 1,200-foot lock project that included provisions for a second lock in 

future. The district agreed with the Board’s recommendation, and plann

was soon underway on a single 1,200-foot lock with an annual capacity of 

million tons. In March, the Corps sent a draft recommendation to concer

governors and agencies for comment. In addition, the district began prep

ing a revised draft supplement EIS and a new draft EIS, both of which it fi 

with the Council on Environmental Quality on March 19. The single 1,200-f

lock proposal had a number of advantages, but the most important was tha

would eliminate the primary reason for railroad and environmental opp

tion – the dramatic increase of the river’s capacity. If the project would 

dramatically increase the river’s capacity, there was no need for system-w

analysis of environmental and economic impacts. The Secretary of the Ar

also withdrew his approval for the two-lock proposal under authority of S

tion 6 of the 1909 River and Harbor Act, eliminating the other reason w

the court had granted the injunction on construction – lack of specifi c c

gressional approval. In July 1976, the Chief of Engineers forwarded his rep

to the Secretary of the Army recommending a single 1,200-foot lock with 

estimated cost of $391 million. On August 24, the Secretary sent the rep

along with comments, recommendations, and all other relevant studies

Congress for review and approval. In addition, the Corps provided Congr

with a Supplemental Economic Data Report that included updated and revi

data on the project’s cost-benefi t analyses. The same day, the Corps also fi 

its new Final EIS with the Council on Environmental Quality. Congress be

318 Design Memorandum No. 11,; Draft Supplement EIS; Supplement No. 2 to DM No. 2; Upper Missis

River Basin Commission, Replacement of Locks and Dam 26, Proceedings of Public Information Mee

(Minn.: UMRBC, 1975).
337

it would take another two years for Congress to make a decision.319

New Studies and Authorization

In the two years leading up to congressional authorization of the p

opponents and proponents articulated their arguments to Congress, an

ous groups undertook new studies analyzing the project. One outspoken 

was the DOT. It had already undertaken a review of the two-lock propo

fi ndings of which it included in its September 1975 Advisory Report. Thi

questioned Corps economic analysis of the two-lock proposal, but con

that a single 1,200-foot lock was necessary before the end of the century 

future traffi c demands. In addition, because it would take between eight 

years to complete the project, the DOT recommended that construction 

begin within fi ve years. The question was not whether the district shou

struct a 1,200-foot lock, but whether it should be a replacement or a reh

tion project. Such engineering analysis was the subject of great controv

various proposals claimed to be able to rehabilitate the old structure 

than the Corps estimated. Concerning the effects of increased lock capa

the railroads, the DOT concluded that a single 1,200-foot lock would not 

signifi cant impact, but a two to three year comprehensive study was ne

to more precisely determine these effects.320

In a May 2, 1977 statement before the Senate Subcommittee on 

Resources, Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams suggested that 

studies were necessary to determine the best course of action. This sug

resulted in an 18-month joint study with the Corps that aimed at end

controversy over replacement versus rehabilitation. The study was ap

and scheduled for completion in December 1978. However, replaceme

ponents complained that numerous studies had already been conduct

new studies would cost the taxpayers, drive up the project’s cost throug

tion, and further delay it. Because cofferdams were a major contributo

high cost of rehabilitation, the study explored the feasibility of doing 

without them. In addition, it analyzed the structure’s foundation to det

319 Supplement No. 2 to DM No. 2, Sec. I; Michael Isikoff, “Logjam breaking up at Alton locks and 

nois Issues (Jan. 1979); McKinney, Sutton, and Perez, “Rehabilitation Versus Replacement”; Izaa

League v. Marsh.

320 “Statement of Robert H. Binder, Ass. Sec. for Policy, Plans and International Affairs, DOT, 

Subcom. on Water Resources of the Sen. Pub. Works Com., concerning the replacement of Alton 

Dam,” Probability of Failure folder (MVS Archives).
338

soil characteristics. The most effective way to strengthen the soil was throu

chemical grouting, but such methods were very expensive, driving up the c

of rehabilitation to the point that it would cost nearly the same as replaceme

Once again, Corps studies revealed that replacement was the best option.32

Another controversial study was the Cushing study, so-called because 

principal consultant was Jerome J. Cushing, a civil engineer who had pr

ously worked for the Harza Engineering Company, which provided an indep

dent cost estimate for Lock and Dam No. 26. The Illinois DOT hired Cushin

serve as a consultant on its plan for constructing a new lock and rehabilitat

the existing structure. The IDOT report, completed in March 1976, sugges

the dam could be rehabilitated for approximately $46 million, a fraction 

what the Corps estimated. The report also claimed its plan would take less t

to complete and included plans for a second lock constructed without de

ing waterborne commerce. In response to this study and other similar on

the National Committee on Lock and Dam 26 hired Sverdrup and Parce

respected engineering fi rm, to review the studies. The fi rm’s review was crit

of the Cushing study’s cost estimates and proposed engineering methods. T

fi rm argued that once these engineering defi ciencies and cost estimates w

corrected, rehabilitation would cost nearly the same as replacement. With s

confl icting opinions on the matter, determining the best option for Lock 

Dam No. 26 was becoming an increasingly diffi cult task.322

During the spring and summer of 1977, the appropriate House and Sen

committees held hearings on the merits of the project. While Congress deba

the economic, environmental, and engineering issues associated with the p

posal, another controversial issue emerged – user fees. In May 1977, Ju

Richey lifted the temporary injunction because the Secretary of War had w

drawn Section 6 approval because the proposed facility would now contain o

one 1200-foot lock, thus nullifying arguments about the effects of increa

321 “Statement of Brock Adams, Sec. of Trans., before the Subcom. on Water Resources of the Sen. C

on the Env. and Pub. Works, concerning Alton Locks and Dam authorization legislation and navigation 

charges,” Probability of Failure folder (MVS Archives); “Playing the Waiting Game with Locks and Dam 

brochure (National Committee on Locks and Dam 26, N.D.) (MVS Archives); Isikoff, “Logjam breaking 

The fi ndings of the DOT and Corps study are discussed in McKinney, Sutton, and Perez, “Rehabilit

Versus Replacement,” and in Supplement No. 2 to Design Memorandum No. 2, Sec. 2 and 6-03. 322 Cushing, Maintenance of Locks and Dam 26 (Alton, Illinois), Executive Summary, 1976; “Playin

Waiting Game with Locks and Dam 26,” brochure (National Committee on Locks and Dam 26, 1979); Q

tions for Deposition of Jerome Cushing, in deposition documents (MVS Archives). It should be noted 

the Western Railroads Association, which was vehemently opposed to the project, previously empl

Cushing as a consultant. Also, a group composed largely of supporters of the barge industry hired the 

neering fi rm to analyze the various studies , the point being that these competing special interest gr

often muddled the best engineering solution, and the Corps was often caught in the middle of these deb
339

sional authorization of the project. Once Congress resolved this issue, i

approve the project and construction could begin. Railroads in the regi

long argued that the barge industry had an unfair advantage because t

eral government fi nanced maintenance and improvements on the Upp

sissippi River System. Supporters of the barge industry argued that in t

the railroads had received huge federal land grants allowing them to 

at the expense of river transportation. Ultimately, politicians would 

the user fees issue on the fl oor of Congress. On June 22, 1977, Senat

Domenici of New Mexico agreed to sponsor a bill that would author

replacement project in exchange for a fuel-tax user fee. The debate now 

to just how much the fee should be. Rail supporters wanted the tax to b

forcing the barge industry to pay for all improvements to the river. E

mental groups also called for a high tax, with some wanting a fee of 63 ce

gallon on diesel. After intense lobbying and negotiations, Congress set 

at 10 cents per gallon. The compromise resulted in Congress passing the 

Waterways Revenue Act on October 21, 1978. In addition to authorizin

struction of a single-lock replacement for Lock and Dam No. 26, the l

three other important provisions. First, it established a savings accou

would cover approximately half the cost of the replacement project as 

providing funding for future projects. Second, the law charged the Upp

sissippi River Basin Commission to “prepare a comprehensive master p

the management of the Upper Mississippi River System.” Last, it provi

construction of a second lock, of a size to be determined, pending the fi 

of the study. With the law passed and the project approved, Congress ap

ated funds for construction starting in October 1979.323

Although the project now had congressional approval, this was n

antee that it would come to fruition. There was still the legal battle, 

plaintiffs fi led an amended suit in response to recent events. The fi ve-d

commenced on September 10, 1979. The plaintiffs’ allegations were ess

the same as they had been in 1974. However, they did add the charge t

323 Izaak Walton League of America, Et Al. and Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Com

al. v. Clifford R. Alexander, et al. Civil Action No. 74-1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979); For an overview for 

ground and debate surrounding user fees, see Isikoff, “Logjam breaking up”; Todd Shallat, “Colos

St. Louis: Remaking the Mississippi at Melvin Price Locks and Dam,” Illinois Heritage (Jul.-Au

Tom Littlewood, “Clash of transportation interests basis of confl ict at Alton locks and dam,” Illin

(Apr. 1977); “It’s the Missouri Pacifi c vs. the Bargemen, and the prize is the coal and grain of 

American Heartland,” St. Louis Magazine (Sept. 1979). For the Corps’ perspective on user fees, see 

with Peterson and Michael Ruddy, Interview with Daniel Flippen, Sept. 3, 1984 (MVS Archives).
340

dures and provided inadequate economic and environmental data. The Co

responded that Congress had made the decision with its specifi c approval. T

court concurred, but ruled that the Corps should have held a post-author

tion public meeting on the single-lock project. Concerning compliance w

NEPA, the plaintiffs contended that the Corps did not consider three curr

proposals in the fi nal EIS of 1976 and did not consider several other alter

tives, including rehabilitation, investment in alternative transportation mod

and more effi cient methods of congestion control. In addition, the plaint

held to their previous arguments, accusing the Corps of not adequately cons

ering the environmental impacts of the increased traffi c through the facil

Finally, they alleged that the Corps relied on “secret” data that prevented 

adequate review of its records.324

After fi ve days of testimony and rebuttal, Judge Richey ruled the Corps w

guilty of violating its own regulations by not holding a post-authorization pu

meeting. However, he ruled in favor of the defendants on all other charges. 

found that the administrative record was complete and that no “secret” d

inhibited analysis of the EIS. He also ruled that the EIS adequately conside

alternatives and that no system-wide EIS was necessary because the structu

capacity would not necessarily lead to a 12-foot channel project. Because NE

required the Corps to study only impacts related to physical impacts, the co

decided that if the EIS showed the project had no signifi cant physical impa

it had no signifi cant environmental impacts. This meant that a more comp

hensive, system-wide study would be superfl uous, because NEPA only requ

analysis of likely impacts and not all possible impacts. In light of the outco

of the trial, the environmental arguments against the project seemed to h

little weight. And some, such as Colonel Peterson, argued that the envir

mental issue was never signifi cant because “the environment simply was 

that affected. But the environment was used as a basis to marshal political s

port and to make the case in the courts against the replacement project.” T

plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the case came before the appellate co

in January 1981. After reviewing the evidence, Judge Shelly Wright uph

the district court’s ruling. The crux of the appellant’s argument remained 

324 A discussion of the legal disputes leading up to the October 1979 trial and the deposition and trial 

mary can be found in Izaak Walton League and Railways v. Alexander, in the MVS Archives. A summ

of the preceding case as well as its appeal can be found in Izaak Walton League v. Marsh; Interview 

Peterson.
341

odology it used to determine the cost-benefi t ratio of the project, but th

quickly dismissed these claims as being without merit because not only 

Corps disclosed this methodology, it had actually helped appellants to 

the Corps’ computer programs for use on appellants’ computer system

added that the “appellants have failed successfully to attack the Corps’ 

sion that the physical impact of the project would be minor.” She wen

say that although the appellants were able to produce two biological 

that supported these claims, “they were unable to identify any other 

who supported their claims.” With the district court’s ruling upheld, the 

could now focus its attention on completing construction on the fi rst p

the project.325

Construction Proceeds

Construction on the fi rst stage of the project began late in 1979. Com

in November 1980, the fi rst contract for this stage was for revetment 

Illinois side to protect against the fl ow restrictions caused by the coff

The next task was construction of the fi rst stage cofferdam. The d

325 Ibid.

Construction stages at Lock and Dam 26R
342

design memorandum called for a 25-acre cofferdam extending 1,000 feet, 

largest ever constructed on the Mississippi. Once cofferdam construction w

complete in December 1981, the dewatering process began, as contract

pumped approximately 100 million gallons of water a day from the site so t

excavation could begin. Flooding did occur during excavation in the sprin

1982, but posed little threat, as the cofferdam was still relatively undevelo

at that time. By December 1982, excavation was complete, and pile driv

and concrete work commenced, as crews began work driving the nearly 4,8

battered and vertical H-piles into the foundation material. These piles w

Stage one construction

Second stage construction Second stage cofferdam during October 1

fl ood
343

would construct the six-and-a-half 

tainter gate bays, representing the 

bulk of the superstructure.326

 Although the Corps overcame the 

legal challenges to the project, other 

challenges arose that threatened to 

halt construction, namely inclement 

weather, which resulted in the loss 

of more than 97 workdays after construction began. In addition, scouring caused by rapid fl ows threatened 

the cofferdam with underseepage. 

Thankfully, the district possessed the 

foresight to address underseepage 

in its design memorandum, which 

included using a large rock beam 

upstream of the cofferdam to defl ect 

fl ows. Grouting around the structure also helped to address underseepa

most severe threat to construction was that the river would overtop the 

dam, causing a catastrophic failure. December 1982 posed the greatest 

as the worst December fl ood on record caused the river to rise to with

feet of overtopping the cofferdam. As torrential rains continued to pou

and water levels continued to rise, the St. Louis District took the initia

prevent a failure, and on December 3 issued orders to partially fl ood t

ferdam. This action delayed pile driving for nearly a month, but stabili

structure. However, a reason for optimism soon emerged, as water level

to drop, fostering hope that the project might narrowly escape a catas

Maurice Risken, project manager for the fi rst phase contract, expresse

mism when he stated that the crews had “suffered the worst the river c

us and we came through just fi ne.” Flooding in the spring of 1983 also p

threat, but thankfully the worst threats passed. The remaining construc

326 USACE, “Riverlands Area, Melvin Price Locks and Dam,” (St. Louis: MVS, N.D.) (MVS Archive

gation lock design becomes research project,” ENR (Aug. 6, 1987); “Dewatering the Mississippi,” E

9, 1982); “Navigation lock design becomes research project,” ENR (Aug. 6, 1987); USACE, “Op

Waterways” Decommissioning Ceremony Invitation Packet (St. Louis: MVS 1990); USACE, “Sal

River, Opening the Waterways, the Dedication of Melvin Price Locks and Dam,” (St. Louis: MV

“Army mud shoes beat Ol’ Miss,” ENR (Dec. 16, 1982). 

Flooding of second stage cofferdam, 

9 October 1986

Second stage construction of main lo

November 1987
344

two proceeded rather smoothly when compared to the challenges of the fi 

stage. Crews completed the construction, dewatering, and excavation of 

second stage cofferdam in January 1986. With the cofferdam completed, w

began on the two-and-a-half gate bays and the main lock.327

During the construction stages of the project, Congress passed Public L

97-118 in December 1981, offi cially designating the facility “Melvin Price Lo

and Dam.” This name would take effect immediately upon the termination 

Price’s term of service to the Congress. Price, a 21-term representative 

staunch supporter of the project, passed away on April 22, 1988, upon wh

Congress named Lock and Dam No. 26 in his honor. In February 1990, 

fi rst lock on the structure became operational. That same year, the district t

down old Lock and Dam No.26, a structure that had played such a vital role 

the river for a half century, offi cially replacing it with Melvin Price Lock 

Dam.328

Corps projections for navigation growth proved accurate, as 80 million t

moved through the 86 million-ton lock in its fi rst year of operation. In ad

tion, construction of a second lock was underway, a project wrought with 

own challenges and controversies. As described above, a second lock was p

327 Ibid. 328 “Salute to the River.”

Third stage construction of auxiliary lock
345

the increase in navigation required the Corps to delay plans pending the 

of further studies. The law that authorized the fi rst lock – the Inland 

ways Revenue Act – included provisions for a second lock; however, ap

of this lock was contingent on the outcome of a study on its environmen

economic impacts. Section 101 authorized the Upper Mississippi Rive

Commission to direct this study and use its fi ndings to prepare a comp

sive master plan for the management of the Upper Mississippi River S

In addition to the commission, eleven other state and federal agencies 

pated in the study. The study would evaluate the various impacts of inc

navigation resulting from a second lock and assess the system-wide rath

regional impacts of an increase in navigation. The study should det

whether a second lock was needed, and if so, what the optimum size of t

should be. Shortly after Congress passed the law authorizing the master 

October of 1978, the three-year study began.329

329 Information on the annual tonnage at Mel Price Locks and Dam can be found at “Melvin P

and Dam, Alton, Illinois,” Web Page (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/navigation1/melvin% 20lock.h

23, 2011); Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission, Comprehensive Master Plan for the Ma

of the Upper Mississippi River System (Minneapolis: UMRBC, 1982), Ch. 1; USACE, Draft Envir

Impact Statement, Second Lock at Locks and Dam No. 26 (Replacement), Mississippi River, Alto

and Missouri (St. Louis: MVS, 1986), Sec. 3. The first chapter provides an overview of the master 

its history, objectives, and approach with a more detailed discussion of the study’s analysis in the su

chapters. Documents pertaining to public review and the agency comments are in the second volu

master plan.

Last blast of old Lock and Dam 26
346

submitted it to the public and the appropriate federal, state, and local ag

cies for comment and review. The plan identifi ed the economic, environm

tal, and recreational needs of the river system, set objectives for meeting th

needs, and recommended guidelines for meeting these objectives. Related 

these studies was the impact of increased navigation, more specifi cally, 

impact of a second lock. The study collected and analyzed data pertaining 

the impacts of a second lock on other forms of transportation such as railroa

the economic benefi ts a second lock would have for the nation, and the en

ronmental impacts of increased navigation. The study also investigated me

to avoid or minimize these impacts. The district then discussed contents of 

study in a series of public meetings held in the spring of 1981. In addition

series of formal public meetings took place during November 1981, provid

each affected state an opportunity to present formal responses to the study a

afforded the commission an opportunity to alter to the study based on th

comments and recommendations. On December 14, 1981, the commiss

approved the fi nal report and sent the master plan to Congress for appro

However, approval of the second lock would take another three years.330

The master plan’s conclusions and recommendations favored construct

of a 600-foot lock. In addition, it recommended the project not be subjec

NEPA. Concerning the system-wide environmental effects of the increase 

the river’s capacity, the study concluded these would be minimal. Howeve

recommended establishment of 10-year habitat rehabilitation, enhanceme

and resource monitoring programs, discussed below. After nearly three ye

of debate, Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act in Aug

1985. The law authorized construction of a 600-foot lock at Melvin Price 

approved appropriations for the master plan’s environmental managem

recommendations. In November 1986, Congress passed additional autho

ing legislation in the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. Section 1

authorized construction of the second lock and implementation of an envir

mental management program for the Upper Mississippi. One recommendat

that Congress did not include was exemption from NEPA – the district wo

have to prepare an EIS for the second lock. Preparation of a draft EIS be

soon after Congress passed authorizing legislation. The district completed 

draft EIS and fi led it with the Council on Environmental Quality in Septem

330 Comprehensive Master Plan, Ch. 1; Draft EIS, Second Lock, Sec.3.
347

lock, the district used it as its primary reference document. Preparation 

draft EIS posed several challenges. One was that there were resource da

in the master plan that placed limitations on the study’s understanding 

environmental consequences of increased navigation. The district add

this problem by disclosing these data gaps. The Fish and Wildlife Serv

also critical of limiting the scope of the draft EIS to impacts on the main 

the Mississippi and Illinois Rivers and not tributaries. The master plan 

include such studies, so no data existed for the impact on tributaries. 

an issue arose during the public hearings because engineering and 

plans were proceeding before environmental management work had 

To address this issue, the district coordinated its construction and 

efforts with environmental management efforts so that both would tak

concurrently.331

Once the district submitted the draft EIS, a controversy arose over 

tion. “The initial draft Environmental Impact Statement that we put o

pretty well rejected by all the ... agencies as being inadequate and inco

because we did not identify levels of mitigation,” stated then District En

Col. Daniel Wilson. In response to these criticisms, the district include

them in a supplemental draft EIS fi led in November 1987. After the supp

tal draft EIS was returned with comments and suggestions, the distric

porated into the fi nal draft EIS. However, the district still needed to de

level of mitigation that needed to occur, which was diffi cult to assess. Mo

because data gaps existed, no accurate determination could be made w

further studies. The district recommended undertaking a plan of study

began in 1988, to address these issues and determine the proper level o

gation. However, the Fish and Wildlife Service responded by creating 

to prepare reports on the proper levels of mitigation, eventually arguing 

annual mitigation of around $29 to $78 million just for the second lock

viewed such costly proposals as excessive, especially considering the 

lock did not increase the total capacity of Melvin Price Lock and Da

provided redundancy in case the main lock closed for a time. Environm

ists did not view the second lock in this way, but as a means for the C

increase river capacity. These unresolved issues and the possibility of a d

331 Draft EIS, Second Lock, Sec. 1-Summary; Ruddy, Interview with Wilson. 
348

fi led its fi nal EIS in 1988.332

Construction on the third and fi nal stage of the project was set to beg

and delays that prevented inclusion of the second lock in stage three c

struction would be costly. Once stage three was complete without the seco

lock, it would be far more expensive to go back and add the second lock la

However, the Corps and environmental groups worked together to solve 

disagreement over the proper level of mitigation, fi nally decided at an Aug

26, 1988, interagency meeting with representatives from the Corps, incl

ing St. Louis District Engineer Col. James Corbin, and environmental grou

including the Izaak Walton League and the Fish and Wildlife Service. Th

present made several agreements pertaining to the plan of study, eliminat

the major impediment to construction of the second lock – mitigation. In F

ruary 1989, the district released the plan of study. Just over three years la

the $970 million structure with a capacity of approximately 142 million to

was fi nally complete.333

The Environmental Management Program

In addition to studying the effects of a second lock, the Upper Mississi

River Basin Commission also undertook an environmental study of syst

the results of which became part of the master plan’s recommendations for 

establishment of an environmental management program. This aspect of 

master plan would become the major catalyst for establishment of the Co

Environmental Management Program. However, interest in a program of en

ronmental management on the river goes back even further than the mas

plan. In 1976, Congress passed a Water Resources Development Act, Sect

117 of which included provisions for the Corps to “investigate and study

cooperation with interested States and Federal Agencies, through the Up

Mississippi River Basin Commission the development of a river system m

agement plan.” The responsibility for carrying out these investigations, kno

as the Great River Resource Management (GRRM) study, fell on three Co

districts – St. Paul, Rock Island, and St. Louis – each of which represente

Great River Environmental Action Team. Each district’s team was respons

332 Quote and discussion of mitigation can be found in Interview with Wilson; Interview with Flippen; F

EIS, Second Lock, Sec. 1.3; USACE, Plan of Study, Navigation Effects of the Second Locks, Melvin P

Locks and Dam (St Louis: MVS, 1991). 333 Plan of Study; “Salute to the River.”
349

sippi. St. Paul and Rock Island completed their studies in Septemb

December 1980, respectively, and two years later, the St. Louis Distric

pleted its study. Each district submitted recommendations outlining w

improve environmental management to the Board of Engineers for Riv

Harbors. After reviewing these studies, the board made its recommen

to Congress. Although the GRRM study was a signifi cant fi rst step tow

tiating an environmental management program, it was not a termina

In other words, it highlighted the fact that the only way to fully addr

upper river’s long-term environmental needs was to conduct additiona

ies. The long-term impact of the GRRM study was that many of its fi 

were included in the master plan (discussed below). However, the imm

impact of the GRRM studies was that their fi ndings were incorporat

the Corps’ maintenance program on the Upper Mississippi River, resu

the environmental enhancement of operation and maintenance, dredgi

disposal activities for little additional cost.334

While the GRRM studies were ongoing, the Upper Mississippi Rive

Commission was initiating its own study, the fi ndings and recommen

of which became part of the master plan. The authorization of the mast

came from the Waterways Revenue Act that authorized the construction 

replacement for Lock and Dam No. 26. Although the focus of this stu

the impact of a second lock on the river system, its scope was not lim

this purpose, as it was also charged with studying the environmental n

the river system and developing a program for environmental mana

and habitat rehabilitation and enhancement. Both the GRRM and mast

studies focused on the need for environmental management, but the 

study focused only on the Upper Mississippi, while the master plan f

on the entire upper river system. The completed master plan included 

mendations for an initial 10-year environmental management progra

would include a habitat rehabilitation and enhancement program, and 

term resources monitoring program with a computerized inventory and 

sis system. In response to these recommendations, Congress passed the 

Resources Development Act of 1986, also known as the “Upper Miss

334 A discussion of the GRRM Study and its relationship to the master plan can be found in the 

sources: Comprehensive Master Plan, Chapter 1; USACE, Final EIS, Second Lock at Locks and 

26 (Replacement), Mississippi River, Alton, Illinois and Missouri, Foreword; U.S. Cong. Water 

Development Act of 1976, PL 94-587 (94th Cong., 2nd Sess.): Sec. 117.
350

nationally signifi cant ecosystem and offi cially authorized the establishmen

the Environmental Management Program (EMP).335

While the statutory basis for the EMP comes from Section 1103 of the 19

Water Resources Development Act, the program received initial authorizat

in the 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act. During this “early action” ph

of the EMP, Congress appropriated $2.5 million for the newly established p

gram and articulated the basic framework for the EMP. The subsequent aut

rization in the 1986 act outlined in detail the EMP’s programmatic eleme

The Corps responded by issuing a general plan to guide implementation. T

guidelines included programs for habitat rehabilitation and enhanceme

long-term resource monitoring, and computerized inventory and analysi

these resources, all of which were included in the master plan’s recommen

tions. In addition, much like the GRRM study that preceded it, three Co

districts – St. Paul, Rock Island, and St. Louis – would manage the progr

Congress also recognized the need for continual monitoring and reevaluat

to adapt it in response to the changing needs of the ecosystem. Thus, w

the authorization expired, the Corps and other cooperating agencies co

offer recommendations that allowed the program to evolve each time Congr

renewed authorization. Although the Corps holds overall program managem

responsibility, it is an overall multi-participant program in which a numbe

agencies, including the Corps, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Environmen

Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and fi ve states – Misso

Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin – cooperate to improve, enhan

and manage the ecology of the entire Upper Mississippi River System.336

Between the 1985 and 2003, Congress allocated just over $247 million 

the EMP. Congress assigned the largest proportion of these funds to Hab

Rehabilitation and Enhancement Projects (HREP). Between 1985 and 20

Congress allocated $145 million for habitat projects; and in 2009 alone, C

gress allocated $23 million for such projects. As of 2010, Congress had a

cated just over $241 million for habitat projects out of the nearly $391 mill

in total EMP funds. However, these funds meant little if the programs t

supported did not affect the necessary environmental impacts. The prim

335 Comprehensive Master Plan, Chapter 1; Final EIS, Second Lock, Foreword; USACE, Rock Isl

Report to Congress, An Evaluation of the Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Managem

Program (Rock Island: MVR, 1997), Ch. 1. 336 Rock Island, Report to Congress, Exec. Sum. and Ch. 1.
351

on the Corps, particularly habitat projects, for which the Corps was t

agency. This HREP effort included the planning, design, constructio

monitoring of projects that enhance or rehabilitate fi sh and wildlife h

The positive impacts of HREP can be seen in the various habitat proje

each participating district successfully completed. As of 2010, the EM

completed 53 HREPs, improving fi sh and wildlife habitat on approx

95,100 acres. An additional 34 pending projects are in various stages of 

and, once completed, these will produce around 80,000 additional a

habitat.337

The St. Louis District implemented numerous HERPs on its str

the Mississippi, which begins just below Lock and Dam 22 at Saverto

souri and continues until the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio Riv

addition, the district implemented habitat projects on the fi rst 80 mile

Illinois River and the lower 35 miles of the Kaskaskia River. Each of thes

ects took into account the unique circumstances of a particular area an

employed a variety of techniques used in various combinations to reha

and enhance the environment. These techniques included dredging s

backwaters and side channels to restore aquatic habitat, constructin

and beams to prevent heavy silt loads from entering habitat areas, and 

ing islands to decrease wind-generated disturbances, thus reducing tu

and creating habitat for small aquatic plants and animals. By 2000, the 

was receiving $3 million annually for habitat projects, with a great po

for continued program growth. As of 2000, the district had used thes

to complete seven projects, including HREP areas at Pharrs Island an

Lake, totaling more than $27 million worth of environmental improve

Completed in 1992, Pharrs Island was the second HREP project that th

undertook. The area consisted of a 605-acre complex of four islands 

tomland hardwood timber and backwater and interior wetland habita

deposits had reduced the productivity of this once rich wetland by fi 

portions of the backwaters, which provided habitat for various species, 

ing migrating waterfowl and wintering bald eagles. To address this 

the district constructed a dike to protect the remaining wetland habita

337 Ibid; USACE, Upper Mississippi River Restoration Environmental Management Progr

Report to Congress (Rock Island: MVR, 2010), Exec. Sum.
352

mature.338

As of 2011, the district had completed eight HERPs and had another 

awaiting approval, in planning, or under construction. Of completed proje

one of the most ambitious was Swan Lake, approved in 1993 and comp

in 2001. The lake extended eight miles along the Illinois River, providing 

important backwater habitat for spawning, rearing, and wintering fi sh, as w

as migratory birds. However, sedimentation, erosion, and fl uctuating wa

levels had reduced the size of this important habitat. Without addressing 

problem, sedimentation would reduce the surface area of the lake by 30 p

cent within 50 years. The district addressed this problem using dredging, dik

levees, water control and fi sh passage structures, and hillside sediment con

basins, completed at a cost of $15 million. Through their efforts, the dist

reduced sedimentation and ensured continued existence of a lake that provi

2,900 acres of the vital wetland habitat. However, reducing sedimentation 

its buildup in the lake is an ongoing challenge, one that would remain unm

were it not for EMP and district efforts.339

In addition to HREP, the EMP conducts a Long Term Resource Monitor

Program that allows the Corps to use environmental monitoring, research, 

modeling with data management to better manage the river and implem

habitat rehabilitation and enhancement projects more effi ciently. One adv

tage of monitoring resources is that the EMP can analyze the data collec

and use it to document system-wide ecological trends and investigate spec

resource problems, such as the impacts of navigation on the environment

well as numerous other problems affecting riverine ecology, such as sedim

tation, water level fl uctuation, and lack of aquatic vegetation.340

These are only a few examples of EMP projects that led to the enhancem

and restoration of over 95,000 acres of vital habitat as of 2010. Numer

projects are either under construction or planned for future construction

response to the overwhelming success of the program, as detailed in the 1

report to Congress evaluating the EMP, Congress reauthorized the projec

338 “Corps environmental work gets a boost through UMRS-EMP,” Esprit (Jan. 2000); USACE, “S

Lake,” brochure (Rock Island: MVR, N.D.); USACE, “Pharrs Island,” brochure (Rock Island: MVR, N

“The District and the Environment and the Planning Connection, Environmental Management,” E

(Sept. 1995).

339 USACE, “Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Management Program Post-construction 

formance Evaluation Report 2010 for Swan Lake Habitat Rehabilitation and Enhancement Project,” (M

St. Louis, 2010), 2-26.

340 Upper Mississippi River Restoration EMP, Exec. Sum.
353

the 1999 Water Resources Development Act. 

The law also required that the Corps submit 

a report to Congress every six years, outlining 

the achievements of the program, future plans, 

and changes needed to ensure the continuing success of the program. Part of what has 

made the program so successful has been its 

fl exibly, as its continues to evolve to meet both present and future e

mental needs. The irony of the program is that although it is the most s

ful program of environmental rehabilitation and enhancement in the n

history, the program itself was the result of the replacement of the Alto

a project so vehemently opposed by environmental groups because they 

the detrimental impacts the replacement structure would have on th

ronment. Such fears proved illusory, but only because of the signifi ca

ongoing efforts to develop environmental programs. Through cooperati

other agencies, the district was able to develop similar programs that we

mitigation of the lock and dam to address environmental planning for th

as a whole.341

341 Ibid.

Environmental demonstration area at Riverlands
354

National 

Great Rivers 

Museum

On October 15, 2003, seven years after initial funding for the project beg

approximately 300 people gathered to celebrate the opening of the National G

Rivers Museum at Melvin Price Locks and Dam. The $5.2 million, 12,000 squ

foot museum is considered the “crown jewel” of the Corps 11 regional visitor cen

across the nation. The museum was possible because a number of federal, state, 

private agencies came together in a cooperative effort to achieve a singular goal: 

ing the story of the Mississippi River. The two primary groups overseeing the pro

were the Corps and the non-profi t Meeting of the Rivers Foundation, both of wh

saw the museum as an opportunity to educate the public on the economic, indust

environmental, cultural and recreational signifi cance of the river. While much of 

public is aware that the Mississippi plays a signifi cant role in their lives, few peo

truly understand just how vital a role the river played in the history of the nation 

how far-stretching the impact of the river has been and continues to be on their li

In order to educate the public on the extent of the river’s impact, the museum u

numerous educational resources and exhibits that tell visitors the multi-faceted his

of the river from a variety of perspectives. In addition, the museum educates visi

on the role the Corps has played and continues to play on the history of the river, t

providing a history not only what the Corps has done for the river, but why the Co

has done it. Exhibits have included a larger scale model of a meandering river out

the museum and a micro-model complete with river engineering structures, bot

which have helped visitors to better understand how the river works and the role 

Corps river engineering structures have played in shaping the river. The museum 

offers over 20 interactive exhibits, including the Steer the Barge, which allows visi

to steer a tow stimulator, and a miniature water- management model in which visi

can attempt to control water levels by adjusting the fl ow through a series of minia

dams. If visitors want to see how the real thing works, they can take a tour of Me

Price Locks and Dam, which shows visitors how the structure works and explains w

a vital role it has played in creating and maintaining a pool essential for commer

navigation. In addition to educating visitors about the navigational and cultural 

tory of the river, the museum offers numerous 

exhibits and educational opportunities for both 

children and adults who want to better understand 

the environmental importance of the river and 

the fragile ecological balance that exists between 

humans and the numerous species of fi sh, plants, 

and wildlife that live in and around the river. View inside the National Great 

Rivers Museum
355

 19 

Environmental River Engineering

In June 1972, a diverse group that included biologists from state and 

conservation agencies, as well as river engineers from the St. Louis Dist

forth on the fi rst ever Mississippi coordination trip to discuss the prese

future environmental health of the Mississippi River. This annual coord

trip has since become a tradition in the St. Louis District, with literally 

of citizens representing a diversity of interests making the trip. The j

begins in St. Louis, Missouri, and continues for two days as an eclectic 

engineers, biologists, towboat captains, and government representative

ney down the river on a trip that Claude Strauser describes as nothing s

“magical.” No one could understand this magical event better than Stra

long-time district river engineer who fathered the trip, witnessing its ev

from a small gathering of engineers and biologists to an entirely new 

of engineering called “environmental river engineering.” However, re

between these diverse groups were not always so amicable. When th

fi rst began in the early 1970s, few could agree about what constituted a 

river. For engineers, it meant maintaining a safe and dependable nav

channel, as mandated by Congress; for environmentalists, a healthy riv

one that was rich in biological and habitat diversity, and any effort to im

Mississippi coordination trip
356

National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) forced these two seemin

incompatible groups – river engineers and biologists – to come together 

coordinate and discuss how the goals of maintaining navigation and protect

the environment could somehow co-exist. The story of this evolving relati

ship and the engineering evolution that occurred because of it is the story 

environmental river engineering.342

Environmental river engineers look to Col. James Simpson, district en

neer from 1873 to 1880, as one of the most important sources of their engine

ing philosophy. Although Simpson himself did not have environmental go

in mind when he wrote that any “permanent improvement must of neces

be designed and executed in entire harmony with the natural laws of the riv

modern river engineers applied this philosophy to the plethora of challen

they faced after the passage of NEPA. When Simpson arrived in St. Louis, 

Mississippi had nearly doubled in width, as the once narrow and deep na

ral state of the river had given way to wide and shallow state that impe

commercial navigation. In 1881, Congress authorized the Corps to maint

a dependable eight-foot navigation channel on the Middle Mississippi, t

beginning a century-long effort to reverse the effects of human activity al

the Mississippi by deepening the river. For the stretch of river above St. Lo

the Corps accomplished this through a series of locks and dams and by dre

ing. Below St. Louis there were the challenges of the open river. Erosion, se

mentation, meandering channels, and dangerous river bends all presen

unique challenges for the river engineer. To combat these problems, en

neers designed dikes, revetments, and various other river training structu

Although considered permanent, these structures were only temporary so

tions, and regular dredging was still necessary. If engineers were to deve

permanent solutions, they would need to act as Simpson had suggested, us

the natural laws of the river to improve the channel. By the late 1960s, 

Corps had successfully returned the river to something very close to its or

nal physical dimensions. But shortly thereafter Congress passed NEPA, 

the Corps would soon have to reevaluate the improvements that had hel

it to achieve this goal. From that day forward, it was no longer enough for 

Corps to merely maintain a safe and dependable navigation channel; it had 

maintain it in an environmentally sensitive manner. Engineers would hav

342 “Middle Mississippi Coordination Trip,” Esprit (Aug. 2000); Daly and Zoeller Interview with Strau
357

required them to use the natural laws of the river to improve both nav

and the environment.343

The First Coordination Meeting

In 1970, shortly after the passage of NEPA, the Missouri Departm

Conservation contacted the district regarding the environmental impac

numerous river engineering structures. Engineers knew quite well th

gational advantages of these structures, but they knew very little abou

environmental impacts. So biologists and engineers began evaluatin

impacts and discovered that the issues affecting the environment we

similar to those affecting navigation: erosion and sedimentation. From 

gational perspective, eroding banklines meant a wider river that was sh

and not as conducive for navigation. Erosion also led to increased se

tation, thus clogging the navigation channel and requiring costly dred

remove. In addition to sedimentation and erosion, the river channel ofte

to take shortcuts, especially around sharp river bends, by eroding the ba

trying to carve out a new channel. To correct this, the Corps constructed 

ments that stabilized the bankline. Although this effort saved the main c

and prevented a new one from developing, it created dangerous curren

were perilous to navigate. Moreover, it caused sediment to accumulate 

inner bank, thus narrowing the channel around river bends and forc

current downward where it scoured out an excessively deep and narro

gation channel.344

For biologists, erosion and sedimentation were just as harmful 

were for engineers, but for different reasons. One problem was that 

increased the amount of sediment in the river. Each year the Mississip

ried hundreds of millions of tons of sediment deposited in the Gulf of 

or in the river itself. River engineers tried to control where and how muc

ment accumulated by designing and building structures that altered the 

fl ow. Before the passage of NEPA, Congress mandated that the Corps m

a safe and dependable navigation channel, so engineers designed struct

accordance with this charge. Although such a design criterion enhan

343 USACE, Environmental River Engineering on the Mississippi (St. Louis: MVS, 1995). 344 Environmental River Engineering; USACE, “Bendway Weirs,” brochure (MVS, 1993); “River 

ing,” Web Page (www.mvs.usace.army mil/arec/basics.html, June 30, 2011).
358

structures directed quicker fl ows into the main channel, sediments accum

lated in slow moving, shallow areas, converting aquatic habitats into terrest

ones. Sedimentation, for biologists, was precisely this process of convert

habitats, a process that they viewed as detrimental because it led to a homo

neous rather than diverse riverine ecology. A homogeneous river ecology is 

healthy than a diverse ecology because it does not provide enough habitats 

species to thrive. For example, small fi sh need shallow areas with vegetat

for protection from predators. Without such protection, they have less cha

of maturing, and the river has less diversity. Environmentalists believed th

although river engineers had designed structures that returned the river to 

natural dimensions, they had done so in a way that did not increase the riv

ecological diversity. The challenge for river engineers was designing and mo

fying navigational structures to enhance the environment while carrying 

the congressional mandate of maintaining the navigability of the Mississipp

NEPA was essentially the opening page in a new chapter of the Corps’ h

tory, but the precise nature of this new chapter was undetermined, as a num

of inherent diffi culties accompanied the new law. One problem was that the 

was vague. “Nobody really knew how to implement it,” Strauser pointed ou

said “you will coordinate and consult,” but it gave no precise instructions a

how organizations were to carry out this mandate. In the St. Louis District, 

task of coordinating and consulting with various conservation agencies fell 

the shoulders of the young Strauser. With this task in hand, Strauser sought 

advice of Jack Niemi, then chief of Project Management. He asked Niemi w

the law meant by “coordinate and consult,” and Niemi, just as puzzled by 

requirements as other agencies under the umbrella of NEPA, replied that 

did not think that there was anyone who really knew exactly what this mea

“but your job is to try to fi gure out what these fellows want, understand w

they want, and try to develop some sort of dialogue.” By “these fellows,” Ni

meant state and federal agencies, such as the Missouri and Illinois Dep

ments of Conservation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, with whom 

district would soon schedule a coordination and consultation meeting.346

345 Environmental River Engineering; Jack Niemi and Claude Strauser, “Environmental River Engin

ing,” PIANC Bulletin No. 73 (1991). 346 Daly and Zoeller interview with Strauser; “St. Louis District Chronology” (MVS Archives); “Usin

river’s magic,” Southeast Missourian (June 21, 2007); Video interview with Claude Strauser on annual E

ronmental Coordination Trip on the Mississippi River (www.semissourian.com/gallery/1855/, Jun

2011); “Environmental River Engineering,” Esprit (Sept. 1996); “Middle Mississippi Coordination Trip
359

one another rather than actually communicating. As a result, each repr

tive would speak his mind and defend his own organization without 

for the opinions of others. This rather adversarial relationship did no

tate the cooperation necessary to affect permanent and positive environ

changes on the river. Another major impediment to constructive comm

tion was that both sides were involved in “either/or” discussions. En

must “either” protect the navigational and economic interests of the riv

the environmental interests, but both goals seemed mutually incompatib

fi rst step away from mere talking and toward discussion required bot

neers and environmentalists to recognize that they were both ultimately 

ing toward the same goal – improving the river. In an effort to overco

communication barrier between engineers and environmentalists, the 

organized a coordination trip on the Middle Mississippi. The district h

fi rst trip, comprising six state and federal offi cials, in June 1972. This co

tion trip served two functions. First, it broke down the communication g

existed between the various representatives, allowing them to come toge

a more informal setting better suited for amicable communication. Th

advantage of the trip was that it allowed a unique opportunity for offi cia

environmental agencies to play an active role in the process of improv

river. Rather than relying on second hand knowledge and observing from 

tance, offi cials coordinating with the district could now experience the i

of their suggestions fi rst hand. Once offi cials began playing a more act

in improving the river, they began to recognize that their goals were 

disparate after all. However, the positive relationship that would eve

develop as a result of the this cooperative effort would take several mor

to materialize.347

The initial impact of these early coordination trips was that biologis

the participating agencies were able to work with engineers to develop 

objectives for improving the navigational and environmental well-bein

river. Engineers understood their general objective of maintaining nav

in an environmentally sensitive manner, but it was not yet clear how the

accomplish this. So, the district adopted a team approach, allowing biolo

explain environmental problems and engineers to develop structural so

to these problems. The primary environmental problem that biologists 

347 Ibid.
360

explained that a healthy riverine ecology must have a balance of the four 

mary habitats: fast water, slow/quiet water, wetted edge, and terrestrial. O

engineers were aware of this environmental objective, they began working 

develop engineering solutions that promoted diversity without compromis

navigation. This objective initiated the design and construction of numer

experimental structures, the fi rst of which was a notched dike that engine

completed shortly before the fi rst annual Mississippi coordination trip in J

1972. This trip set the precedent for how engineers and biologists would co

dinate and consult in the decades to come. Typically, they looked at parti

larly troubled areas of the river and discussed a fi ve-year plan for improv

these areas, laying out in detail the planned improvements. In this way, 

program would evolve to meet the dynamic river’s ever changing needs in 

decades to come, with engineers eventually designing and implementing m

than 200 modifi cations that signifi cantly improved the ecological health of 

river without sacrifi cing navigational needs.348

Environmental River Engineering Experiments

Besides facilitating better communication and setting a precedent 

future meetings, this fi rst trip allowed biologists to actually observe with th

own eyes the impacts of a structure that they themselves had suggested. T

structure was a notched dike, which biologists suggested as a possible ben

cial modifi cation in 1971. Fishery biologists were particularly concerned w

the accumulation of sediment in dike fi elds. This sediment converted aqu

habitats to terrestrial, decreasing the biological diversity of the river. Bio

gists hoped that by placing notches in dikes, water could move through 

dike fi elds, thereby reducing sedimentation and the conversion of habitat. T

district experimented with this modifi cation at a dike fi eld just below Ste. G

evieve, Missouri. Although it did not work as hypothesized, it produced res

that were more benefi cial than expected. Rather than merely preventing ac

mulation of sediment and creating a fl ow path, it allowed development of 

four primary habitats. A further benefi t was that it allowed biologists 

conservation agencies to see that district engineers took them seriously. T

was an important step toward breaking down the communication barrier 

348 “Environmental River Engineering”; Daly and Zoeller interview with Strauser; “Using the river’s ma

Southeast Missourian; Video interview with Strauser; “Middle Mississippi Coordination Trip.” 
361

ecology.349

349 Environmental River Engineering; Niemi and Strauser, “Environmental River Engineering”

Zoeller Interview with Strauser; “St. Louis District Chronology”; “Environmental River Engineerin

Notched dikes on the Mississippi River

Notched dikes
362

tracted the University of Missouri-Rolla’s Institute of River Studies to col

engineering data on the structures. The Missouri Department of Conservat

collected the environmental data on the structures. The data from both st

ies showed that the biological diversity in the notched dike fi elds tested w

greater than at traditional dike fi elds. In addition, this increased diversity 

not diminish the navigability of the river. The UM-Rolla study concluded t

“the goal of providing habitat diversity around navigation structures...whil

the same time preserving an acceptable navigation channel has been achie

in this study area.” The results of these studies proved that the goals of en

neers and biologists were not incompatible.350

The initial notched dike structure was the fi rst of numerous modi

designs that engineers implemented on the river. These structures were 

product of years of experimentation, modifi cation, and analysis by the dist

in cooperation with the Missouri and Illinois Departments of Conservation 

the Fish and Wildlife Service. To reach the optimum design criteria, engine

and biologists worked together experimenting with and evaluating a var

of notch sizes, shapes, and locations. As a result, these designs constan

evolved along with the environmental river engineering program itself. T

only way for engineers at the time to determine the most effective modifi 

tion was to conduct fi eld tests on the river itself, so while later engineers wo

have the advantage of using micro-models, engineers during this early st

often had to use the river itself as their test model. Typically, engineers wo

design a modifi cation, implement it on the river, and then compare its impa

to the data collected from traditional structures. Biologists would then eva

ate the structural modifi cation to determine if it effectively created diver

of habitats. To make matters even more complex, the dynamics of the ri

required engineers to constantly modify structures in different ways to m

the unique challenges that each section of the river presented. Thus, one t

of notched dike modifi cation might work at one location, but another locat

might require a completely different modifi cation. Considering the multit

of challenges facing environmental river engineers at the time, they nee

a great deal of freedom to test experimental modifi cations on the river its

and thankfully, as Strauser points out, the district gave engineers “tremend

amount of latitude” to do just that.351

350 Niemi and Strauser, “Environmental River Engineering”; Daly and Zoeller Interview with Strauser

351 Environmental River Engineering; Niemi and Strauser, “Environmental River Engineering.” 
363

experimenting with other nontraditional structures, such as steppedup dikes, chevron dikes, and 

off-bankline revetment. Engineers 

designed stepped-up dike fi elds so 

that each dike rose like a staircase, 

increasing two feet over the previous one. This innovation used the 

river’s energy to reduce the amount 

of sediment deposited in the fi eld by 

pushing sediment out of the areas 

around the submerged dikes. As the 

river rose, a higher dike received 

the impact of the river’s energy and 

removed the accumulated sediment 

from around the lower dike. This 

process continued as the river rose 

until the energy of fl ow cleared out the excess sediment from the enti

fi eld. As a result of reduced sedimentation, these fi elds contained a 

diversity of habitats. When needed, river engineers further modifi ed 

structures by adding notches to the stepped-up dikes, creating even 

habitat diversity. Chevron dikes it adopted as a method of improving 

tion by scouring the channel from the center of the channel. In addi

reducing sedimentation, the chevron dikes created small islands betw

dikes, sometimes aided by dredge material deposition, which served a

able wildlife habitats. Moreover, the rocks in the dikes provided imp

habitat for various microorganisms that many fi sh depend on for foo

overall impact of these structures was to provide for all four primary h

thus facilitating greater ecological diversity.352

Environmental modifi cations to revetment were another importan

vation. Engineers used revetment to stabilize banks that were suscep

erosion. Typically, engineers did this by covering banks below the wa

with protective mattresses, removing vegetation grading the bank ab

352 Niemi and Strauser, “Environmental River Engineering”; Environmental River Engineerin

Engineering,” Web Page (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/arec/basics.html, June 30, 2011); “Arches in 

aid navigation.”

Chevron dikes

Construction of chevron dike
364

waterline to produce the desired slope, and then covering the bank with r

or concrete. Traditional revetment used rocks of a uniform size and distribu

them in a uniform way. However, biologists felt that this uniformity did 

provide the necessary diversity of habitats, so environmental river engine

began designing revetment to include greater variation that provided a grea

diversity of habitats. A further innovation that created even greater hab

diversity was off-bankline revetment. Conservationists opposed revetm

because it required removal of trees and vegetation. However, the alternativ

leaving the riverbank in a natu

state – led to erosion. Off-bank

revetment provided a solut

that allowed vegetation to rem

along the banklines while prot

ing banks from erosion. It did 

by placing rock just off the ba

creating a side channel betw

the bank and the revetment. Th

innovations protected banks fr

erosion in a way that impro

habitat diversity. An early 19

study led by the Missouri Dep

ment of Conservation compa

large-stone to smaller-stone rev

ment and natural riverban

The study concluded that at 

four sites evaluated, larger st

Off-bankline revetments

Dike using various sizes of rocks allowing for a 

greater diversity of habitats
365

stone accounted for 21 percent. The two natural banks accounted for 

percent and 12 percent of the total weight respectively. Thus, the d

modifi cations created habitats that provided even greater species d

than at natural banklines.353

The district introduced numerous other innovative modifi cati

the Middle Mississippi, such as notched closure structures and hard 

Because the Corps mandate was to maintain the navigation channe

engineers blocked fl ows into side channels to ensure the river’s energy 

into the main channel. This redirected fl ow reduced sedimentation in th

channel, but it caused side channels to clog with sediment, thus con

aquatic habitats to a terrestrial ones. To address this problem, the 

developed notched closure structures. These structures contained n

that dip below the water, allowing fl ow to continue through the side ch

Because fl ow continued through the side channel, a diversity of habitat

ished. In addition, these structures allowed enough of the river’s energ

directed into the main channel to maintain navigation. Hard point stru

which river engineers introduced to deepen side channels, created scou

353 Ibid; “River Engineering,” Web page.

Notched closure structure
366

species. The implementation of notched closures and hard points resulted 

side channels becoming one of the most important areas on the river, prov

ing all four primary habitats to many important aquatic species.354

One development that had enormous navigational and environmen

benefi ts was the bendway weir. Developed initially to widen river bends

discussed previously, these angled underwater rock weirs had greatly redu

sedimentation in bends, widened the river, and eliminated dangerous fl ank

movements by tows traveling through the bends. However, the environmen

benefi ts of the weirs were equally profound. The Corps conducted hydroaco

tic surveys of the fi sh populations at bendways between 1992 and 1995, wh

showed that the population density is approximately twice as high as the p

ulation at bends without weirs. A 1996 survey conducted by the UM-Rol

Institute of River Studies yielded even more impressive results, showing t

fi sh populations at the three bends it tested were an average of 13 times hig

than at the one bend studied that did not have weirs. The reason the weirs w

so environmentally successful was that they created all four primary habi

by widening the channel. In addition to the benefi ts for aquatic species, 

sand bar on the inner portion of the bend provided an important habitat for 

endangered Least Tern.355

One challenge for the environmental river engineering program was dev

oping methods to accurately test experimental modifi cations in a practi

timely, and cost effi cient manner. Engineers essentially had two options: 

experimental structures using the river itself as a model, or use large-sc

models, such as those at WES, but both options had inherent fl aws. The c

and time required to conduct fi eld experiments made this option impract

for assessing and meeting the numerous needs of the river. Engineers had 

design and construct modifi cations, wait for the river’s reaction to the modifi 

tions, and then evaluate the impacts and make modifi cations as needed. Desp

these challenges, environmental river engineers in the district had used 

method rather successfully throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The other opt

354 Environmental River Engineering; “River Engineering,” Web page. 355 “Hydroacoustic fi sh sampling of bendway weirs,” Esprit (Sept. 1996); Bendway Weirs on the Missis

River, pp. 38-49; Institute of River Studies, University of Missouri-Rolla, Fish Populations in Bend

Weir Fields, Results of the November 1996 Hydroacoustic Surveys Performed on the Middle Missis

River (St. Louis: MVS, 1997); T.M. Keevin, G.L. Hempen, R.D. Davinroy, R.J. Rapp, M.D. Petersen

D.P. Herzog, 2002 “The use of high explosives to conduct a fi sheries survey at a bendway weir fi eld on 

Middle Mississippi River,” Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference on Explosives and B

ing Technique, Las Vegas, Nevada, Feb. 10-13, 2002 (Cleveland: International Society of Explosives E

neers, 2002): 381-391.
367

tion (WES). Although these models made a profound impact on engin

designs, they were often impractical for smaller projects because some 

were as large as a football fi eld, expensive to operate, and time consumin

some experiments taking months to complete. Even though both optio

shortcomings, the complexities of moving water and sediment fl ow re

engineers to rely on them. Unfortunately, there were no simple rules o

equations that engineers could use to analyze sediment fl ows or see ho

impacted wildlife, so they had to conduct real-life experiments to asse

case individually. These tiresome techniques led many engineers to h

esize about possible solutions to the problem356

As discussed previously, in 1993, Rob Davinroy tested a concept for 

models that were smaller and less expensive and time-consuming to 

ate than large physical models at WES or experiments in the river it

response to this revolutionary technology, the St. Louis District imme

began developing plans to use it extensively to address many of the 

environmental problems. Through the work of the Applied River Engin

Center, micro-modeling had a profound impact on environmental rive

neering and the relationship between biologists and engineers. In the pa

of the reasons a communication gap existed between engineers and bio

was that they spoke different languages. When combined with the e

relationship between biologists and engineers facilitated by the annua

dination trips, micro-models allowed both sides to experience the chan

the river and watch it improve over time. Engineers no longer had to 

complex technical reports to communicate their analysis of the river. I

representatives from conservation agencies used the model to explai

changes needed to occur on the river, and then the engineers actually s

the impacts to the biologists. Because both sides were able to coopera

communicate, a team mentality developed that allowed positive relatio

and even friendships to develop. These congenial relationships were th

of a transition that began in the 1970s. When both sides fi rst began t

their conversations were always in the form of “either/or”. In these d

356 Robert Davinroy, Physical Sediment Modeling of the Mississippi River on a Micro Scale 

thesis, University of Missouri-Rolla, 1994): 4-13 on physical models on the Mississippi and 14-49 

cussion of the inherent problems with physical models and analyzing sediment transportation; als

St. Louis District, Environmental Documentation (St. Louis: MVS, 2006): Ch. 7, for further dis

the engineering diffi culties involved in analyzing sediment transportation on the Mississippi; “

sedimentation using micro modeling,” Esprit (Sept. 1996); Robert Davinroy, “River Replication,” C

neering (July 1999). 
368

and maintaining navigation seemed to be two incompatible goals. Howev

over the years these debates evolved into discussions in which “and” repla

“either/or”, thus allowing both sides to come to the realization that the sim

taneous environmental and navigational health of the river was possible.357

The Applied River Engineering Center quickly proved its success. Mic

models allowed engineers to try nontraditional and experimental alternati

that would otherwise be too impractical to attempt. Because of their speed 

cost effi ciency, engineers could experiment with alternatives that allowed th

to develop the optimum design. For example, biologists were worried abou

side channel of the Mississippi known as Santa Fe Chute. This was an imp

tant habitat for aquatic life, but because of sedimentation, it was in dange

becoming terrestrial. Engineers and biologists used micro-modeling to deve

357 Daly and Zoeller Interview with Strauser; Davinroy, “River Replication.” 

Strauser receiving the Presidential Award for Design Excellence from 

President Bill Clinton
369

dikes would restore habitat diversity to the channel. This area now p

a rich diversity of habitats that are essential for a healthy riverine ecos

This technology also allowed the district to develop a solution to sedime

problems at Bolter’s Bar, eliminating the need for dredging while at th

time allowing water to continue to fl ow into the biologically importa

channels.358

Early in his career, Strauser was having a discussion with fellow rive

neer Jimmy Graham, who was on the verge of retirement just as Str

career was beginning. However, before ending his career, he passed a

Strauser one fi nal piece of advice for the district’s future river engine

leave the river a better place than it was when they found it. For the ne

decades, the environmental river engineers of the St. Louis District p

this objective with gusto. And just like Graham and the district’s othe

neers, they pass this objective on to future engineers who will continue t

in response to the constantly evolving needs of a dynamic river, working 

to leave it better than they found it. While these engineers will come 

their story will continue because of the mark each of them leaves on the r

358 Environmental River Engineering; “Managing sedimentation using micro modeling,” Esp

1996); Davinroy, “River Replication”; David Gordon, “A Remedy for the Chronic Dredging Proble

neer: Professional Bulletin for the Army Corps of Engineers (Oct.-Dec. 2004). 359 Daly and Zoeller Interview with Strauser.
370

Woody Structures

In the summer of 2009, the Westvaco Corporation, which owned a paper mill in Wickliffe, Kentucky, donated a number of logs to the St. Louis 

District for use in creating habitat diversity on the 

Mississippi River. The company could not process 

the logs, which would ordinarily be used for paper, 

because they contained metal from nails. However, 

rather than see the logs destroyed, the district contacted the company and asked for permission to 

use the logs to create environmental structures in 

the Mississippi River. Westvaco donated 

the logs and under the authority of the 

Avoid and Minimize Program, the district placed 15 wood structures consisting 

of logs bundled together in two locations 

along the main channel border of the Mississippi River. The log bundles formed a 

single large wood pile that aquatic species could use as a habitat in the main 

channel border. After the success of the 

initial bundles, the district placed numerous additional woody structures were in 

the river, all of which provided 

areas of cover, reproduction and 

forage for fi sh species, as well as 

allowing for the accumulation of 

organic debris that is an essential 

food source for aquatic insects.

Logs being bundled for use as 

woody structures

Woody structure being lowered into riv

Woody structure behind dike
371

 20 

Environmental Pool Management

In 1994, the Corps began experimenting with the way it managed it

gation pools. These experiments would lead to an entirely new water 

management program, changing the way the Corps had managed the 

sippi since the late 1920s. The catalyst for this new program was an o

discussion between biologists from conservation agencies and enginee

the St. Louis District about the management of water levels in the nav

pools. Prior to efforts to maintain a navigable channel on the Mississip

river remained in a natural state in which water levels fl uctuated, a

aquatic macrophytes (vegetation) to grow during low-water periods, 

during summer months. During high-water periods, inundation of ve

regions provided important habitat for various aquatic species as 

migratory waterfowl, which used this vegetation as an important food 

These natural fl uctuations and the habitat diversity they promoted w

essential part of the ecological health of the Mississippi River. The ni

channel project had altered the river’s natural state, disrupting the norm

and fl ow of the river. Finding a solution to this problem would require 

erative effort between engineers, biologists, and conservation agencies, 

as a willingness to experiment. However, as with many of the environ

challenges the Corps faced, it would have to determine how it could mee

challenges without compromising navigation.360

As of 1994, the Corps had essentially used the same methods of wat

management for nearly 70 years. This system consisted of using a se

slack water pools to control the river’s natural ebb and fl ow, preventin

levels from dropping so low that safe navigation was impeded. This syst

an overwhelming success from a navigational perspective, but it also ha

ronmental shortcomings. For biologists, although the nine-foot chann

ect allowed the river to be navigable year-round and provided benefi ts 

large pools to serve as spawning grounds, it did so at the expense of the 

ebb and fl ow of the river. Without these fl uctuations, there were no low

periods for wetland vegetation to grow. To assess the importance of vege

360 USACE, Environmental Pool Management (St. Louis: MVS, 1998); “River Gamblin’,” L.A. Ti

27, 1997); USACE, 2004 Report to Congress, Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Ma

Program (Rock Island, Ill.: MVR, 2004): 15.
372

with Aquatic Microphytes, analyzing just how much fi sh actually depen

on these habitats. The study concluded that more than half the fi sh species 

the Upper Mississippi use this vegetation as a food source, a place to lay eg

and a place for larval fi sh to hide from predators and mature. As the essen

nature of these habitats became ever more apparent, the Corps and biolog

continued to work toward developing a solution to the problem.361

In addition to affecting aquatic species in the Upper and Middle M

sissippi, the absence of vegetation had a dramatic impact on the waterf

population. Migrating waterfowl followed the Upper Mississippi during th

annual migrations, spending a good deal of time feeding in vegetated are

These birds, and especially females carrying eggs, relied on the vegetation 

the insects found in the vegetation as a high-protein food source that provi

them with the energy necessary to complete their journey. Without the n

essary abundance of this food source, many birds were not able to comp

these migrations, thus leading to a decline in various waterfowl species. By 

1980s, the population of waterfowl throughout North America had decli

so dramatically that a number of private and governmental agencies from 

U.S., Canada, and Mexico formed a joint venture called the North Ameri

Waterfowl Management Plan to address the problem. The group recogni

the Upper Mississippi River as one of 34 waterfowl habitat areas that w

a major concern, due in large part to the shrinking number of macroph

communities.362

The natural ebb and fl ow of the river and the growth of aquatic vegetat

it promoted also had an impact on the water quality and aquatic life on 

river and the Gulf of Mexico. This is because vegetation fi lters out many 

the impurities contained in water by absorbing them and using them as nu

ents. For example, macrophytes absorb ammonium nitrate, nitrate, nitr

nitrogen, and phosphorus. As the soil dries, nitrogen is released safely into 

atmosphere rather than entering the river. The fi ltering of these impurities w

especially important on the Mississippi because studies had shown that 

361 Environmental Pool Management; Interview with Strauser; Daly and Zoeller interview with Buss

Busse, K. Dalrymple, and C. N. Strauser, “Environmental Pool Management,” in Upper Mississippi R

Conservation Committee, Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Meeting of the Upper Mississippi R

Conservation Committee (Rock Island: MVR, 1995); Upper Mississippi River Conservation Comm

Fishes interaction with aquatic macrophytes with special reference to the Upper Mississippi River Sy

(Rock Island, 1988).

362 Environmental Pool Management; North American Waterfowl Management Plan, Plan Comm

North American Waterfowl Management Plan, A Strategy for Cooperation (May 1986) and 1994 Up

to the North American Waterfowl Management Plan: Expanding the Commitment (1994). 
373

Much of this nitrogen entered the Gulf of Mexico, fertilizing algae and c

huge algal blooms to develop. The algae eventually died, absorbing oxy

they decomposed. The absorption of oxygen created a hypoxic – low ox

zone that could not sustain most aquatic species. One solution to this p

was dropping the water levels for an extended period of time to allow 

dry and vegetation to grow; however, before 1994, the Corps did not u

method because of its possible negative impacts on navigation.363

Experiments in Water Level Management

The St. Louis District uses a 

water level management method 

called hinge-point control. This 

method involves determining 

where in the navigation pool the 

hinge-point is — where the waterline from the fl at pool intersects 

the waterline during drawdown. 

As the river’s fl ow increases, water 

control managers open the dam 

gates and the waterline in the pool 

tilts on the hinge-point, raising 

the waterline upstream and lowering it downstream. The waterline 

teeters on this hinge-point, creating a pool with a waterline that 

declines at an angle as it moves 

downstream. When the dam’s 

gates closed, the pool’s waterline 

fl attened, rising downstream and 

lowering upstream. The key to this whole process was ensuring that the 

line never dropped below the hinge-point, which negatively impacte

gation. Because of the unknown variables presented by a dynamic riv

Corps typically worked in the middle of the hinge-point range to allow 

363 Environmental Pool Management; “River Gamblin’,” L.A. Times.
374

navigation, the level and length of drawdown did not allow suffi cient growt

vegetation. Typically, the drawdown was between 0.5 and 1.5 feet for no lon

than 20 days. While the Corps allowed greater duration and level of drawdo

when possible, its responsibility to protect navigation limited opportunit

Moreover, neither environmentalists nor engineers knew how long or h

much drawdown vegetation needed for optimum results. Some environm

talists wanted drawdown for months at a time, which would halt commer

navigation for the entire summer. Other biologists merely asked the Corp

study drawdown to determine if it could balance navigational and envir

mental goals simultaneously. In 1994, at the annual Mississippi Coordinat

Trip, biologists and engineers discussed a solution that initiated what beca

known as environmental pool management.364

The focus of the 1994 coordination trip was water level management. R

resentatives from the Missouri and Illinois Departments of Conservation 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service discussed pool management schedules w

Corps representatives, requesting that the Corps conduct a study on exten

drawdowns at Pool 25. In response to the request, Corps representatives as

biologists for a detailed write-up of their proposed water management stu

That same evening, Missouri biologist Ken Dalrymple drew up his propo

plan and presented it to Claude Strauser, then Chief of Potamology, and D

Busse, a senior member of water control management. Dalrymple reques

the Corps institute a study to evaluate the 

feasibility of his plan. Busse’s response was 

quick and to the point: “No.” He stated “It 

was unnecessary to study the proposal. Let’s 

just do it.” After engineers and Missouri 

Department of Conservation representatives determined the exact parameters of the 

experiment, Busse called Joan Stemler in 

Water Control and advised her to develop a 

general plan and simply stated “implement 

the plan.” After these instructions, Stemler 

364 Environmental Pool Management; Interview with Strauser; USACE, Water level Management Op

tunities for Ecosystem Restoration on the Upper Mississippi River and Illinois Waterway (Vicksb

MVD, 2004); Rivers Project Master Plan, Sec. 4; USACE, “NESP Information Paper, Dam Point Con

(St. Louis: MVS, N.D.).

Dave Busse
375

pool management. In a single day, the St. Louis District had impleme

new water management schedule, changing how the Corps conducted 

control management for 70 years. However, numerous challenges rem

for the infant program.365

The parameters of this fi rst experiment were to drawdown the po

minimum of 0.5 foot for at least 30 days between May 1 and July 31, th

mum period for growth and seed production. In addition, the district rai

pool no faster than 0.1 foot a day, facilitating even greater vegetation g

Lastly, the district ensured that these parameters did not interfere w

safety and dependability of the navigation channel. Because the Cor

never tried this type of water management plan, biologists and enginee

unsure just how successful the experiment would be. Fortunately, t

trict was able to coordinate its efforts with other agencies, such as th

souri Department of Conservation, to ensure its success. One of the g

challenges of the experiment fell on the shoulders of water control ma

who had to manipulate pools to within an inch to achieve optimum 

After drawdown, water managers slowly raised the river at a minuscule 

around an inch a day. To make this challenge even more diffi cult, water 

managers had to constantly monitor the hydraulic situation upstream, 

being aware of minute changes in the river that could have an impact 

they should manage water levels. Although challenging, the district was 

successfully implement the experimental plan at Pool 25 without any n

impacts on navigation or any additional cost to taxpayers.366

While district personnel carefully monitored the hydraulic situation

ural resources management committee formed so that it could monitor 

tive responses. The committee used natural resources managers to wor

fi eld, monitoring the experiment and collecting data. These resource m

ers also corresponded with water control managers to optimize the effi 

drawdown. They then collected and analyzed data from the experimen

senting their fi ndings to the district so that it could determine the suc

the experiment. When the fi rst experiment ended in the summer of 199

ogists and district personnel were amazed at just how successful it ha

The drawdown allowed approximately 2,000 acres of vegetation to gro

365 Interview with Strauser; Interview with Busse; Environmental Pool Management; “River Gam

Times. 366 Environmental Pool Management; “River Gamblin’,” LA Times.
376

seed production was excellent, providing a large number of waterfowl with s

tenance during their migration that fall. Most importantly, the district and 

committee determined that the project should continue so that they could c

duct more extensive research.367

Although the 1994 experiment was a great success, the district needed ad

tional quantitative data to make a more defi nitive judgment about the succ

of drawdown. So the district and Natural Resources Management Commit

agreed to conduct experiments in 1995 and 1996 as long as discharge remai

in a range that would not negatively impact navigation. The Missouri Dep

ment of Conservation and the Environmental Management Technical Cen

monitored vegetative response during the experiment, which was far m

extensive and the data far more detailed than in the previous experiment. Fr

mid-June through July, the district held water levels from one to three-

lower than maximum regulated levels at Pools 24, 25, and 26. The district 

resource managers also monitored Pool 22 during the experiment, using i

a base of comparison for the test pools. In addition, the district collected ae

infrared photographs of the sites, using these to analyze vegetative respon

especially near waterlines. The district and biologists conducted 20 survey

vegetative response at eight locations in 1995 and six in 1996. Their analy

revealed that plants typically grew seven to 10 inches during the 30-day dr

down period, but grew even faster as water levels began to slowly rise. Near 

waterline at sites where drawdown occurred, total acreage of vegetative grow

was between 255 and 880 acres. For comparison, surveyors found just 51 ac

of vegetation at Pool 22. In addition to the positive vegetative response, bio

gists concluded that the drawdown had no negative impact on fi sh, inve

brates, or any other aquatic species. The success of these experiments and 

367 Joseph H. Wlosinski et al., Response of vegetation and fi sh during an experimental drawdown in t

pools, Upper Mississippi River (USGS, Aug. 2000); Water Level Management Opportunities. 

Growth of vegetation after pool drawdown
377

tinue experimenting with environmental pool management.368

Creating a vegetative response that facilitated a healthy riverine 

was not as simple as drawing down pools at a fi xed level and time. The 

and biologists had to respond to the changing ecological needs of the r

ecology in determining the optimum parameters in a given year. The ke

program was carefully monitoring vegetative and wildlife responses. 

duration drawdowns produced a vegetative response detrimental to 

fi sh species. Between 1999 and 2002, 

Southern Illinois University conducted a detailed study at Pool 25 that 

quantifi ed the response of vegetation, 

fi sh, waterfowl, macroinvertebrates, 

and zooplankton to drawdown. It collected data on drawdowns of varying duration and levels. The greatest 

drawdown occurred in 1999, when 

levels remained at two feet below full 

for 54 days and induced the greatest 

368 Response during an experimental drawdown; Wlosinski et al., “Vegetation Response to a W

Experiment,” Web page (www.usgs.gov/reports _publications/psrs/psr_1997_07.html, July 26

Monitoring of vegetation growth at pool resulting from drawdown
378

vegetative response, and moderate drawdown occurred in 2001, produc

moderate response. The study concluded that the variations produced dif

ences in abundance and composition of vegetation, which impacted aqu

life. For example, longer drawdowns earlier in the year produced greater v

etative response, but moderate drawdowns later in the summer produced 

vegetation but more desirable habitats for fi sh. However, these variations 

not affect seed biomass available for waterfowl, so water control manag

could manipulate pools to optimize fi sh and macroinvertebrate diversity. F

response was dramatic, as biologists collected more than 34,000 fi sh rep

senting 23 species. During 2000 when drawdown was minimal and vege

tion sparse, fi sh were sparse because emergent vegetation provided habitat 

small fi sh and were an important food source. The most prevalent use of em

gent vegetation was as a nursery habitat for young fi sh. The study conclu

by recommending continued 

environmental pool management to produce benefi cial 

conditions for waterfowl and 

fi sh. It also showed that optimum pool management did 

not necessarily mean lengthy 

drawdowns, but rather drawdowns that responded to the 

specifi c ecological needs of a 

particular pool.369

Expansion of 

Environmental Pool Management

In response to the positive assessments of environmental pool mana

ment, other districts began experimenting with pool drawdowns as well

2001 and 2002, St. Paul District implemented environmental pool mana

ment at Pool 8. The district began drawing down water levels beginning on J

30, 2001, and continued with drawdown until mid-September. The dist

369 James E. Garvey et al., Responses of Fishes, Waterbirds, Invertebrates, Vegetation, and Water Qu

to Environmental Pool Management: Mississippi River Pool 25, (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Un

sity, 2003); USACE, Water Level Management Opportunities.

Vegetative growth at backwater area impacted 

environmental pool management
379

St. Louis District, as vegetative and fi sh response was strong. Moreov

number of waterfowl surveyed in Pool 8 was nearly double the number o

surveyed at Pool 7, which did not implement drawdown. In 2005 and 

the St. Paul district experimented with drawdown once again with simila

tive results. The district also determined that these drawdowns did not 

negative impact on navigation. Just as in the St. Louis District, St. Paul 

ued experimenting with drawdowns to determine optimum length, in

and time of the year to implement this water control method. Moreover

in St. Louis, St. Paul was using environmental pool management to cha

way it had managed water control for the previous 70 years.370

In recognition for environmental pool management, the district w

recipient of numerous awards, including the National Performance 

Board’s Hammer Award and the Chief of Engineers Design and Enviro

tal Awards Program’s Honor Award. Much like environmental river en

ing, environmental pool management was possible because conserva

and district personnel were able to bridge the communication gap th

existed between the two sides, initiating a dialogue that facilitated e

mental change. Because implementation of environmental pool mana

required no additional cost and presented no impediments to navigati

only real barrier to implementing the program was a willingness to expe

with nontraditional means of water control management. Ironically, on

most important environmental innovations the district implemented oc

because environmentalists and engineers met on a barge one summer 

have a friendly discussion about how to improve the river, none of which 

have been possible two decades earlier. The St. Louis District had worke

1970 to improve its environmental record. By 2000, it had made the tra

to considering environmental impacts equally with others. The environ

pool management program, as with environmental river engineering, w

best example of cooperation across multiple agencies to achieve nation

ronmental goals.371

370 Upper Mississippi River Pool 8 Drawdown Results (Water Level Management Task Force, 20

371 USACE, “Champion of Your Heartland’s Water Resources” (St. Louis: MVS, Sept. 2001).
380

Riverlands 

Environmental 

Demonstration Area

One of the district’s signifi cant e

ronmental enhancement projects was 

Riverlands Environmental Demonstra

Area. Riverlands, a restoration area n

the Missouri side of Melvin Price Lo

and Dam, opened in June 1998. This a

consisted of 1,200 acres of prairie-ma

wetland reserve that served as impor

habitat for various fi sh, waterfowl, 

native plant species. The area was es

cially important for migratory birds 

used the reserve annually. In addit

the area was open to the public for e

cational services for visitors who wan

to observe native and migrating wildf

and other wildlife species. It allows v

tors to observe species in a setting 

very closely resembles the natural stat

the region before the impacts of hum

settlement. In 2006, the district renam

it the Riverlands Migratory Bird San

ary in response to the Audubon Soc

designating it an important bird area. 

bird sanctuary encompasses 3,700 a

that include the 1,200 acres of resto

wetlands and prairie, as well as back

ter areas at Ellis, Teal, and Heron Pon

all of which provide excellent habitats 

fi sh, waterfowl, and other wildlife.372

372 USACE, Rivers Project Master Plan (St. Louis: MVS, 2001), Sec. 8; “Riverlands Migratory Bird San

ary,” Web page (www.mvs.usace.army.mil/Rivers/RMBS.html, July 26, 2011); “EDA dedicated,” E

(July 1998).

Map of Riverlands EDA

Vegetative growth at navigation pool

Bird watching at Riverlands EDA
381

 Conclusion 

As the city of St. Louis grew in the fi rst half of the nineteenth centur

transportation grew with it. However, before the improvements of the 

the river was treacherous to navigate or even impossible to navigate 

certain times of the year. Creating and maintain the navigability of the 

sippi River was essential for the growth and prosperity of not only St. Lo

the entire Mississippi River Basin. Moreover, these improvements fac

westward expansion and the growth of the nation as a whole. The distric

liest efforts towards achieving this goal included the removal of snags, 

ing, and the removal of sandbars to maintain the St. Louis Harbor. 

the second half of the eighteenth century, these efforts evolved to inclu

manent improvements to contract the river and maintain its navigabi

district engineer embodied this philosophy of permanent improvement

than Col. James H. Simpson. His vision was to harness the natural en

the river and use it to do the work of contracting and deepening the nav

channel. This philosophy would become even more prevalent in the tw

century, especially with the rise of the environmental movement and t

sage of NEPA. 

By the early twentieth century, Corps efforts to maintain a navigabl

nel came to include the construction of a series of locks and dams that 

make the river navigable year-round through the creation of a nine-foo

nel. During this time, fl ood control also became a major responsibility 

district, as it began construction of a series of fl oodwalls and multi-p

reservoirs that could be used for fl ood control, recreation, water supp

hydroelectric power. By the second half of the twentieth century, the 

had successfully contracted the river and deepened the channel so as retu

something resembling its state prior to development along the river. Ho

the improvements to the river came at a cost to the environment. The m

history of the district is one in which it evolved in response to the challe

simultaneously maintaining and regulating navigation, protecting again 

ing, and protecting the environment. The district has and continues t

to achieve balance between these responsibilities, creating a river that 

gable and simultaneously ecologically healthy. While the era of massi

works projects may have passed, the district continues to be at the fo
382

ing, Environmental Pool Management, Hydraulic Sediment Response Mod

ing and Integrated River Management. Just as it is the responsibility of ri

engineers to leave the river in a better state than what they found it, so too 

the responsibility of all district personnel to leave the district in a better st

than what they found it. This pursuit will no doubt continue into the twen

fi rst century, inspiring future engineers towards innovations far from ordin
383

 Appendix A 

St. Louis District Commanders

Offi ce of Western River Improvements

John Bruce, 1824-1825

Maj. Samuel Babcock, 1825-1826

Henry M. Shreve, 1826-1841

John W. Russell, 1842-1843

Maj. Stephen H. Long, 1843-1854

Col. J.E. Johnson, 1854-1855

Col. Stephen H. Long, 1855-1861

Col. John N. Macomb, 1866-1870

Lt. Col. William F. Raynolds, 1870-1872

Engineer Offi ce, St. Louis

Lt. Col. William F. Raynolds, 1872-1873

Col. James H. Simpson, 1873-1880

Maj. Oswald H. Ernst, 1880-1886

Maj. Alexander M. Miller, 1886-1893

Maj. Charles J. Allen, 1893-1896

Lt. Chester Harding, 1896

Maj. Thomas H. Handbury, 1896-1899

Maj. Edward Burr, 1899-1901

Maj. Thomas L. Casey, Jr., 1901-1906

Col. Clinton B. Sears, 1906-1908

Capt. Gustave R. Lukesh, 1908

Col. William H. Bixby, 1908-1910, 1917

Lt. Clarence H. Knight, 1909, 1910

Lt. Col. Charles L. Potter, 1910-1912

Col. Curtis M. Townsend, 1912-1915

Maj. Wildurr Willing, 1915-1917, 1919-1920

Lt. Col. Clarke S. Smith, 1917
384

Maj. Dewitt C. Jones, 1920-1922

Maj. Lunsford Oliver, 1922-1924

Maj. John C. Gotwals, 1924-1930

Capt. Sylvester E. Nortner, 1930

Maj. William A. Snow, 1930-1933

Maj. Bartley M. Harloe, 1933-1935

Lt. Col. Paul S. Rienecke, 1935-1940

Col. Roy W. Grower, 1940-1942

Col. Lawrence B. Feagin, 1942-1946

Col. Rudolph E. Smyser, Jr. 1946-1949

Col. Beverly C. Snow, 1949-1951

Col. Fred E. Ressegieu, 1951-1954

Col. George E. White, Jr., 1954-1957

Col. Charles B. Schweizer, 1957-1960

Col. Alfred J. D’Arezzo, 1960-1963

Col. James B. Meanor, Jr. 1963-1966

Col. Edwin R. Decker, 1966-1970

Col. Carroll N. LeTellier, 1970-1971

Col. Guy E. Jester, 1971-1973

Col. Thorwald R. Peterson, 1973-1976

Col. Leon McKinney, 1976-1979

Col. Robert J. Dacey, 1979-1982

Col. Gary D. Beech, 1982-1985

Col. Daniel M. Wilson, 1985-1988

Col. James E. Corbin, 1988-1991

Col. James D. Craig, 1991-1994

Col. Thomas C. Suermann, 1994-1996

Col. Thomas J. Hodgini, 1996-1999

Col. Michael R. Morrow, 1999-2002

Col. C. Kevin Williams, 2002-2005

Col. Lewis F. Setliff, 2005-2008

Col. Thomas E. O’Hara, 2008-2011

Col. Christopher G. Hall, 2011-
385

 Appendix B 

St. Louis District Chronology

1802 Congress authorized creation of the modern U.S. Army Corps 

Engineers.

1803 St. Louis and the Louisiana Territory became part of the U.S.

1804 Capts. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark left St. Charles to 

explore the Missouri River.

1819 Maj. Stephen H. Long started Missouri River Expedition on th

steamboat Western Engineer.

1824 Congress passed the fi rst act giving the Corps the responsibili

and appropriating $75,000 to improve navigation on the Ohio 

Mississippi Rivers. Corps of Engineers establishes the position 

Superintendent of Western River Improvement.

1826 Congress passed the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1826, the fi rst 

and harbors legislation to combine authorization for both surv

and projects. Henry M. Shreve hired as Superintendent of We

River Improvements, introduced snag removing vessel design

1835 Joseph N. Nicollet began exploration and mapping of Northw

1837 Lt. Robert E. Lee arrived in St. Louis to restore and protect th

harbor. Lee constructed a dike from Illinois to Bloody Island, 

ing the current to the Missouri side of the island and into a sa

in the harbor. 

1842 Col. Stephen H. Long becomes Superintendent of Western Riv

Improvement.

1844 During the Mississippi River Flood this year, the river crested 

June 27 at an estimated height of 41.32 feet on the present St. 

gage, long considered the fl ood of record at St. Louis. 

1861 Publication of A. A. Humphreys and Henry L. Abbot’s Report 

the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River, one of th

thorough analyses of the Mississippi River ever completed. Th

St. Louis gage was established on the Mississippi River.

1865 The American Civil War ended. River commerce on the Middl

sissippi declined as wartime conditions assured the rapid asce

dancy of the railroad over the steamboat.

1866 Corps of Engineers established depot and assumed control of 

son Barracks until 1871.
386

James B. Eads.

1870 The Offi ce of Western River Improvements transferred from Cinc

nati to St. Louis and charged with surveying the St. Louis and Alto

Harbors, and the banks opposite the Missouri River.

1872 St. Louis Engineer Offi ce established. The Rivers and Harbors Act 

1872 provided $100,000 for improvement of the Mississippi Rive

between the mouths of the Missouri and Meramec Rivers to guara

tee a regularized channel through the St. Louis Harbor suffi ciently 

deep enough to accommodate the large amount of river traffi c doc

ing in the harbor.

1873 Col. James H. Simpson became District Engineer from 1 January 

1873 through 30 March 1880. The district’s boundary extended fr

the mouth of the Missouri River on south to Cairo, Ill.

1875 In the 1875 Annual Report to the Chief of Engineers, Simpson ins

tuted a policy of permanent river improvement structures.

1879 Act of Congress 28 June 1879 created the Mississippi River Commission (MRC). The fi rst meeting is held in Washington, D.C., on 

August.

1881 Congress established an eight-foot project depth for the Mississip

River from St. Louis to Ohio River and six-foot depth from St. Lou

to the Missouri River. Maj. Oswald Ernst experimented with jet 

dredge.

1884 Congress placed the St. Louis District under the MRC, but returne

it to the oversight of the Offi ce of the Chief of Engineers in 1886.

1888 Rivers and Harbors Act set expenditures on snag removal at a ma

mum of $100,000 annually. St. Louis District establishes Service 

Base south of St. Louis.

1890 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, revised in 1892, gave the Co

jurisdiction and authority over the protection of navigable waters 

from pollution or obstructions.

1894 Maj. Charles J. Allen experimented with portable jetties and vesse

mounted jet dredges.

1896 Congress authorized the construction of dredges “with the view of 

ultimately obtaining and maintaining a navigation channel from 

Cairo, down, not less than 250 feet in width and nine feet in depth

1899 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 compiled all laws for protecti

of navigable waters. Section 10 gave the Corps the authority to reg

late activities that might lead to potential obstructions to navigati
387

approve or reject river development projects.

1903 The Flood of 1903, while reaching only 38 feet on the St. Loui

devastated the rich agricultural areas, towns, industries, and l

transportation systems. The few small private levees could no

stand the fl ood. More 20,000 refugees were forced from their 

during the fl ood.

1905 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1905 stipulated that dredging b

the primary means of maintaining a navigation channel on th

Middle Mississippi River. While the Act allowed hurdle work 

revetments as auxiliary aids to improve the channel, the prim

emphasis was on temporary improvements. The Mitchell Rep

fi rst recommended federal fl ood control works on the Middle 

Mississippi.

1907 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1907 authorized a 6-foot chann

the Upper Mississippi River using open river regulation.

1908 The Western Division was established with headquarters in 

St. Louis, and district offi ces at St. Paul, Kansas City, St. Louis

Memphis, and Vicksburg. The Western Division had jurisdicti

over specifi c work on the Mississippi River from its headwater

Baton Rouge.

1910 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1910 adopted a return to perm

improvement structures over dredging as the primary means 

establishing a navigation channel.

1917 Devastating fl oods on the Lower Mississippi River in 1912, 19

and 1916 led Congress to pass the fi rst Federal Flood Control A

(Ransdell-Humphreys Act), which authorized federal contribu

of 50 percent for fl ood control projects. 

1918 Northern MRC District established in St. Louis. The Federal C

Act created a federal barge line between St. Louis and New Or

From 1917 to 1920, the value of river commerce increased from 

$15 million to $31 million.

1923 The Flood Control Act of 1923 makes the construction of levee

fl ood control on the Mississippi River between the mouth of th

Ohio River and the Rock Island as the responsibility of the MR

1925 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925 directed the Corps and th

eral Power Commission to jointly survey and submit reports o

navigable streams indicating what multi-purpose water resou

development possibilities existed for navigation, hydropower, 

control, and irrigation. 
388

Document 308. The resulting 308 Reports embodied the fi rst sy

tematic efforts at comprehensive basin development planning.

The Flood of 1927 devastated the Mississippi valley from Grafton to New 

Orleans. The high water caused 17 breaks in the main levee line an

209 crevasses on the tributaries of the Mississippi River. The rive

crested on the St. Louis gage at 36.1 feet and remained above fl oo

stage from April 13 to May 1.

1928 Congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1928, which committed 

the federal government to a defi nite program of fl ood control, aut

rized the Mississippi River & Tributaries Project (MR&T). The MR

abolished the Northern District, transferred work to the Rock Isla

and St. Louis Districts, and extended the boundary of the St. Loui

District from the Missouri River to the Illinois River.

1929 The Corps of Engineers abolished the Western Division and estab

lished the Lower Mississippi Valley Division (LMVD) and the Upp

Mississippi Valley Division (UMVD), including the St. Louis Distr

The MRC relocated its headquarters from St. Louis to Vicksburg. 

1930 Congress passed The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930 authorizing 

the 9-Foot Channel Project on the Upper Mississippi River. The fi 

survey report, issued in 1931, called for the construction of 24 new 

locks and dams and the incorporation of three existing structures 

into the project. 

1931 The USGS took over measuring discharge velocity on the St. Loui

gage. 

1933 The northern boundary of the St. Louis District was extended to j

south of Saverton, making the District responsible for 300 miles o

the Mississippi River. 

1934 Construction began on Lock & Dam No. 26

1935 Congress passed the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, which 

provided funds to the Works Progress Administration. Constructi

began on Lock & Dam No. 25. 

1936 The Flood Control Act of 1936 authorized 300 fl ood control proje

nationwide. Of these, 48 were reservoirs, including Wappapello 

Lake in the Memphis District. In the St. Louis district, the Act aut

rized building or enlarging existing levees at East Cape Girardeau

North Alexander, Clear Creek, Preston, Degonia & Fountain Bluff

Perry County, Fort Chartres & Ivy Landing, Harrisonville, Columb

E. St. Louis, Prairie DuPont, Chouteau, Nameoki and Venice. Con

struction began on Lock & Dam No. 24. 
389

and the Joanna Reservoir (now Mark Twain Lake), and additi

projects at Miller Pond, Grand Tower, Kaskaskia Island, Woo

River, and Stringtown (deauthorized by PL 99-622 in 1986). C

struction of Lock & Dam No. 26 completed. Memphis District 

construction of Wappapello Lake. 

1939 For the fi rst time in 50 years, the St. Louis District reported th

it had performed no snagging operations. Lock & Dam No. 25 

completed.

1940 St. Louis gage reached its lowest level in recorded history at –

feet on January 16 and remained below zero for 181 continuou

days from 5 September 1939 to 3 March 1940. Lock & Dam N

completed.

1941 Memphis District completed Wappapello Lake. St. Louis Distr

began military construction in support of World War II.

1943 The Flood of 1943 hit the Middle Mississippi River. From St. L

to Cairo, the river reached the highest stages experienced sinc

1844. On May 24, the river crested at 38.88 feet on the St. Lou

gage. 

1944 The 1944 Flood Control Act formalized Corps participation in 

development of recreation facilities at reservoirs, authorizing 

purpose projects.

1945 Congress authorized the construction of the Chain of Rocks C

and Locks 27. 

1949 Construction of the Chain of Rocks Canal and Locks 27 began

1950 The Flood Control Act of 1950 authorized the Cape Girardeau 

Protection Project.

1953 Chain of Rocks Canal and Locks 27 completed. The federal go

ment sold the Federal Barge Line to private investors. 

1954 The Corps abolished the Upper Mississippi Valley Division an

transferred the St. Louis District to the Lower Mississippi Val

Division.

1955 Congress authorized the construction of the St. Louis Flood P

tion Project.

1956 Construction began on the Cape Girardeau Flood Protection P

1958 The Flood Control Act of 1958 reauthorized Carlyle Lake alon

a reservoir at Shelbyville. The Act also authorized Dam 27. Co

tion of Carlyle Lake began in November.
390

Protection Project began.

1962 The Flood Control Act of 1962 reauthorized the Joanna Reservoir 

along with Rend Lake. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1962 autho

rized the Kaskaskia Lock & Dam.

1963 Construction of Lake Shelbyville began.

1964 Drought conditions caused the St. Louis gage to remain below 0.0 

for 100 consecutive days from November 1963 to March 1964. Th

St. Louis area experienced an accumulated precipitation defi cit of 

42 inches from 1952 to 1964. On 26 January 1963 the river dropp

to –5.8 feet and on 1 January 1964 it reached –5.6 feet. Dam 27 

completed. Cape Girardeau Flood Protection Project completed.

1965 The St. Louis District completed Comprehensive Basin Summary 

Report for the Meramec Basin Project, which called for 13 reservoirs, fi ve local fl ood protection projects, and 21 angler-use sites. 

Construction of Rend Lake began. Joanna Reservoir renamed the 

Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir.

1967 Carlyle Lake completed. 

1969 Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 

which established preparation of the environmental impact statement (EIS) as an integral element of the Corps’ pre-authorization 

process on all projects and permit-granting activities. The Secreta

of the Army directs the St. Louis District to plan and design the 

replacement of Lock & Dam No. 26. The original plan called for a 

new dam and two new 1,200-foot locks to be constructed 2 miles 

downstream from the existing structure.

1970 The St. Louis District submitted the EIS for the Meramec Park La

Project. Lake Shelbyville and Rend Lake completed. The St. Louis 

District established the fi rst Environmental River Engineering Pr

gram in the nation to implement the Environmental River Engine

ing Project on the Middle Mississippi River. 

1971 Construction of Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir began.

1972 The River Engineering Unit completed the fi rst ever notched-dike 

structure. The district held the fi rst ever Mississippi River coordin

tion trip. The Corps of Engineers completed the Upper Mississipp

River Comprehensive Basin Study, which found a 12-foot navigation channel on the Upper Mississippi not economically feasible. 

Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA

which created guidelines affecting standards for EIS. Later amend

ments established Section 404 permits. Claiming the district was 
391

to stop construction of the Meramec Dam.

1973 The Mississippi River on the St. Louis gage experienced the th

highest levels in recorded history when it reached 43.3 feet. D

the fact that the river remained above fl ood stage for a then re

setting 77 consecutive days, Corps fl ood control measures pre

more damages than occurred for the fi rst time. Congress pass

Endangered Species Act, which required federal agencies to co

the possible effects of a project on endangered species.

1974 Environmental groups and the railroad industry fi led suits to 

the construction of the Lock & Dam No. 26 Replacement. The 

St. Louis Flood Protection Project and the Kaskaskia Lock & D

were completed.

1976 The Formulation Evaluation Report and a Draft Supplementa

EIS for the Lock & Dam 26 Replacement Project recommende

construction of a single 1,200 foot lock and a new dam, but re

mended that additional studies be completed prior to authoriz

of a second lock.

1977 Congress passes 1977 Clean Water Act, Section 404 of which g

increases the Corps permitting responsibilities.

1978 The Missouri State legislature approved referendum on the M

mec Park Lake Project, resulting in a lopsided victory by oppo

Congress passed the Inland Waterways Act (PL 95-502), whic

authorized construction of a new dam and lock as the Lock & 

26 Replacement Project and required completion of a master 

for the entire Upper Mississippi River Basin before considerat

a second lock. 

1979 Construction begins on Lock and Dam 26 Replacement.

1981 Public Law 97-128 deauthorized the Meramec Dam. As a part 

PL 97-128, Congress also designated the Clarence Cannon Da

Reservoir as Clarence Cannon Dam and Mark Twain Lake. Co

designates the Lock & Dam 26 Replacement as the Melvin Pri

Lock and Dam.

1982 Wappapello Lake is transferred from the Memphis District to 

St. Louis District.

1984 Clarence Cannon Dam and Mark Twain Lake completed. 

1986 Congress passed PL 99-662, the Water Resources Developme

of 1986 (WRDA 86). It authorized construction of a 600-foot 

iliary lock at the Melvin Price Locks and Dam and established 
392

(EMP).

1989 Drought conditions prompt St. Louis gate to reach –5.2 feet. Duri

1988-1989, 44 daily low stage records were established at St. Lou

and 128 daily low stage records at Cape Girardeau. District begins 

construction of fi rst ever Bendway Weir fi eld.

1990 Lock & Dam No. 26 was decommissioned and demolished. Full 

operation of Melvin Price commenced.

1992 The St. Louis District established the Avoid and Minimize Progra

to reduce environmental impacts of increased navigation traffi c 

due to second lock at the Melvin Price Locks and Dams. District 

Ordnance and Technical Services Branch is established to prepare 

Archive Search Reports for Huntsville Division.

1993 The Flood of 1993 surpassed all previous fl oods in the United Stat

On August 1 the Mississippi River set a high water mark on the 

St. Louis gage at 49.58 feet and reached an all-time high in terms 

of fl ow at 1,070,000 cfs. The river remained above fl ood stage for 

a new-record 80 consecutive days and for a new-record 148 days 

during the calendar year

1994 The St. Louis District implemented the fi rst ever Environmental 

Pool Management Plan. The district established the Applied Rive

Engineering Center (AREC), which used Micro Modeling to solve 

variety of sedimentation related issues. Melvin Price Auxiliary Lo

completed. Director of Civil Works Maj. Gen. Stan Genega established the Mandatory Center of Expertise for Archaeological Cura

tion and Collections Management in the St. Louis District.

1997 The Lower Mississippi Valley Division was abolished with the esta

lishment of the Mississippi Valley Division.

2001 District develops the Rivers Project Master Plan to provide recreational, environmental stewardship, and environmental education 

opportunities.
393

 Appendix C 

Notable Engineers in the St. Louis District

James B. Eads

James B. Eads was a self-educate

engineer whose early career was marked 

invention of the diving bell and his p

ship in a steamboat salvaging fi rm. H

neering reputation grew to the highest 

a result of the construction of the brid

bears his name. His reputation was en

further by his successful attempt to op

mouth of the Mississippi River to ocea

vessels through a system of jetties desi

narrow and deepen the South Pass. I

Eads testifi ed before Congress that th

principle he used at the South Pass could be extended upstream to deep

channel and improve navigation the length of the lower Mississippi Riv

this proposal ultimately was a factor in the creation of the MRC in 1

which Eads was a member. Eads advocated a “levees-only” plan to c

outlets and line the river with a system of levees located directly on the 

of the river to increase the volume of fl ow and deepen the channel, as h

system had done at the South Pass. After the MRC Committee on Outl

Levees did not recommend the closure the Atchafalaya River as an outle

resigned from the MRC.
394

Flad came to the United States from G

many during the German Republican Re

lution of 1848. He eventually settled n

St. Louis and found employment as a railr

engineer. During the American civil war, 

enlisted in the Union army as a private 

eventually rose to the rank of colonel. A

the war, Flad earned international respec

a civil engineer when, as an assistant en

neer to the world-renown James B. Eads

helped to construct the famous, steel-arc

Eads Bridge across the Mississippi River. F

was the designing force behind many of the boldest and awe-inspiring featu

of the bridge. Flad became a member of the MRC in 1890. As chairman of 

MRC Committee on Dredges and Dredging, Flad authored a favorable rep

on dredging as a temporary expedient for relieving low water shoaling. At 

recommendation, the MRC authorized the construction of an experimen

dredge, the Alpha. Flad personally supervised the construction of the Alp

which quickly proved the value of dredging and convinced the Commission 

construct more dredges. Flad, in turn, pioneered the design and construct

of the MRC dredging fl eet and its attending plant. Flad’s efforts ultimately l

to a fundamental shift in MRC policy, whereby dredging served as perman

compliment to contraction works for improving low water navigation.
395

After graduating from the University of 

Illinois, Ockerson became employed as an 

assistant engineer in the Great Lakes survey 

and served as a federal inspector of the Eads 

jetty surveys in 1876. Ockerson’s 45-year affi liation with the MRC dated back to its creation 

in 1879; fi rst as an assistant engineer and, 

from 1898-1924, as a member. As an assistant 

engineer, he guided the Commission’s surveys 

and physical examinations of the river from 

its headwaters to the Gulf of Mexico, and the 

surveys and maps he produced were so exceptionally complete and accurate that they were in great demand worldw

was a long-time member of several standing committees, including th

mittee on Dredges and Dredging, the Committee on Outlets and Leve

the Committee on the Separation of the Red and Mississippi Rivers, a

instrumental in shaping the direction of MRC policy. The MRC often an

the tall, dignifi ed, and eloquent Ockerson as the Commission’s point 

articulating MRC policy to Congress, his peers in the engineering comm

and the people of the Mississippi Valley.

Charles D. Lamb

He began his career in the district i

serving in the capacity of assistant en

until his death in 1923. He served as 

intendent of the engineer boatyard 

most of his career. During the early par

career, he was in charge of constructio

longitudinal dike opposite Alton, Illino

of the fi rst river-regulating works buil

district. In 1888 he made a preliminary 

ination and survey of the Kaskaskia Ri
396

He was a member of the St. Louis District 

from 1883 to 1930, serving in various capacities during that time, such as overseer and 

supervisor of construction and master of the 

dredge. He possessed and intimate knowledge 

of all branches of fi eld work in the district and 

ensured that this work was completed in an 

economical manner. The towboat Crane is 

named in honor of his service to the district.

William S. Mitchell

Mitchell was employed continuously with 

the Corps from 1878 to 1931, retiring at the 

age of 74. In 1904 he became the principal 

civilian engineer. During World War I he was 

appointed district engineer, the fi rst civilian to 

hold the position. He also directed the survey 

and report on a system of drainage with levees 

from the American Bottoms, which was the 

later basis for the East Side Levee District. 

He designed a fl eet of four towboats and 19 

large, steel barges. He also designed numerous hydraulic dredges which were essential 

for maintaining the navigability of the river.
397

Penniman was employed in the 

from 1891 until his death in 1934. Dur

time he served in many different cap

including timekeeper, transitman, Ma

Dredge, junior engineer, assistant en

engineer, senior engineer, and princip

neer. He was principal civilian assistan

St. Louis District from January 6, 192

his death. 

James E. Kennedy

Kennedy worked for the distric

1892 until 1938, during which time he 

in various capacities on river regulating 

and dredging operations, as well as ov

Master of Dredge, construction supe

dent, and senior superintendent. In 19

became an offi ce superintendent, pr

guidance and counsel on all river activ

the district. In his later years, he focu

efforts primarily on dredging. His kno

of the river and its history were unequ

the district during his long career.
398

Constance was a member of the district 

from 1904 to 1943, with the exception of a sixyear period in which he worked in the Kansas 

City District. He served in various capacities 

for the district, including river construction 

and supervisor of a large construction party. 

He designed numerous river construction 

jobs, new fl oating plants, and modifi cations 

to older plants. He also designed equipment 

for the district, including repair and upkeep of 

all district plants. He prepared specifi cations 

and contracts for fl oating plant as well as river construction. He was also 

charge of the engineer depot shops and general supply and repair organizat

of the district. 

John C. Debolt

Debolt was employed in the district from 1924 until his death in 19

He began his career with the Corps as a surveyman and in 1927 became 

inspector in charge of large construction jobs, 

including piling dikes and bank protection. 

He later worked in the district offi ce on plans 

and specifi cations and on examination and 

survey reports for navigation and fl ood control structures. He also served as Assistant 

Chief of Operations, Construction Division, 

and as head of the River Regulating Works 

Maintenance Section. He was the recipient of 

the Meritorious Civilian Award in 1944 for his 

service to the government.
399

Gray worked for the Corps from1923 until 

his retirement in 1965. He served as principal 

draftsman in the Louisville District from 1923 

to 1930. From 1930 to 1954, he worked in the 

Upper Mississippi Valley Division offi ce in 

St. Louis, serving as engineer in charge of all 

drafting work in connection with preparation 

of plans for locks and dams on the Mississippi 

River. He transferred to the St. Louis District 

in 1954. He worked as information offi cer 

for the district, devoting long hours and tireless effort to informing the 

about Corps plans and programs. In 1963, he received the Meritorious C

Service Award for his efforts to facilitate cordial relations between the 

and the media and public. 

Walter F. Lawlor

Lawlor began his civilian career with the 

Corps in November 1931 and continued his 

service to the district until his retirement in 

1969. His initial assignment was inspector on 

Illinois River levee construction. He eventually had complete responsibility for the design 

and supervision of construction on all levees 

in the district. In 1946 he was named Chief of 

the Engineering Division, a position he held 

until his retirement. Lawlor was a decisive 

leader with keen judgment and an ability for 

directing a broad fi eld of engineering, while 

also possessing exceptional knowledge of details pertaining to specifi 

ects. In 1968 he was awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service Award 

outstanding executive leadership in engineering.
400

Oheim began his career with the 

trict in 1927, a career which continued u

his retirement in 1970. He began as a Bo

man and advanced to the position of Surv

man, Inspector, Engineer Aide, Engineer 

the Lock and Dam Branch and, lastly, Ch

of Construction and Operations Division

position he held from 1958 until his ret

ment. He demonstrated superb ability in 

management of the Construction-Operati

Division and also in his advice and knowle

of river operations. During his tenure as Ch

of Construction-Operations the district shifted from construction of levee

construction of complex fl ood protection projects, pump stations, and fl 

control reservoirs. In 1966 he received the Meritorious Service Award for 

efforts and was also named St. Louis Federal Civil Service Employee of the y

in 1965.

John W. Gurley

Gurley began his career with the 

trict in 1934 as a sub-surveyman and reti

in 1972 as Chief of the Operations Divisi

His technical abilities contributed heavily 

the Mississippi River system being the co

dor of navigation it is today. He establis

the framework for Lake Management wh

became the model for the Corps.
401

Tiefenbrun began his career with the 

Corps in 1931 and continued service until his 

retirement in 1972. His initial assignment was 

hydraulic computations and studies. He was 

promoted to assistant chief of Hydraulics, a 

position he held until he was deployed for service in World War II. After reaching the rank 

of Colonel at the end of his service in 1946, he 

returned to the district in the Reports Branch 

of the Engineering Division. His efforts in the 

district resulted in the authorization of much of the work on the Illino

Kaskaskia, Big Muddy, and Meramec rivers. His also played a promine

in the initial authorization of the replacement for Locks and Dam No. 2

Otto K. Steffens

Steffens worked for the Corps 

years, half of which was spent in ser

the St. Louis District (1967-1984), 

which time he was Resident Engineer 

St. Louis Flood Protection Resident Of

1970, he became the Resident Engin

the construction of Clarence Cannon D

Reservoir and served in that capacity u

retirement.
402

Duff’s career with the district began in 

1938 and continued until his retirement in 

1986. He served with remarkable distinction 

as Comptroller, Supervisory Civil Engineer, 

Civil Engineer, and Hydraulics Engineer. All 

of his service was in the district except for 

his duty with the U.S. Navy Seabees between 

1943 and 1945. His efforts as the LMVD representative contributed greatly to the legislative action that resulted in the creation of the 

Corps Revolving Fund appropriation. 

Jack R. Niemi

Mr. Niemi began his long career with 

the district in 1962. He served as Chief of 

the Engineering Division from 1973 to 1989 

and as Deputy District Engineer for Project 

Management from 1989 until his retirement 

in 1993. Niemi was the recipient of numerous awards during his career, including the 

Presidential Award for Design Excellence, the 

Meritorious Civilian Service Award, a Professional Recognition Award from the American 

Society of Civil Engineers, and the Department of the Army Achievement Award. He 

also received the Engineer of the Year Award 

from the St. Louis Chapter of the National Association of Professional En

neers and was honored as Engineer of the Year of the Lower Mississippi Va

Division. 
403

Hahn’s 35-year career with the district 

began in 1964 and continued until his retirement in 1999. During this time he worked 

in the Planning and Engineering divisions 

and eventually became Chief of the district’s 

Readiness Branch. The 1993 fl ood focused 

national attention on Hahn and he became 

one of the most quoted people in America 

during the event. At the time of his retirement, he was recognized as an expert in fl ood 

damage reduction and emergency operations.

Thomas J. Mudd

Mudd began working for the district as a 

Structural Engineer in 1961. In 1968 he was 

promoted to the position of Supervisory Civil 

Engineer and assigned the role of leading the 

design effort for the Melvin Price Locks and 

Dam Project. Mudd left the district in 1987 to 

work at the Ohio River Division and later at 

the Waterways Experiment Station until his 

retirement in 1995. He will always be remembered in the district as “Mr. Mel Price” as the 

innovations he pioneered in the design and 

construction of the structure are a testament 

to his excellence as a structural engineer.
404

Strauser began his career in 1969 as a Junior Engineer Trainee for the 

trict. He quickly realized his desire to work as a river engineer on the M

sissippi, so he chose the River Stabilization Branch, of which he eventu

became chief, as his permanent assignme

The River Stabilization Branch became p

of the Hydrologic and Hydraulic Branch 

Strauser became chief of the branch in 19

and continued as such until his retiremen

2005. Strauser is considered the father o

new type of river engineering known as En

ronmental River Engineering. He was on

the Corps leaders in terms of balancing 

traditional function of maintaining navi

tion with the environmental mission of 

Corps that arose after the passage of NE

Strauser played an essential role in working to create a waterway that serve

a highway for water commerce while at the same time remaining environm

tally healthy.
405

Dace began his career with the Corps in 

1969 as Design Engineer in the Design Branch, 

where he remained until 1976. In 1976 he 

became a member of Project Management 

and became project manager for the proposed 

Meramec Park Lake project. In addition to the 

Meramec project, which was deauthorized in 

1981, Dace worked as a project manager on 

numerous other projects during his tenure, 

including an eight-month stint as Chief of the 

Project Management Division in 2006. Dace 

began working on a fl ood control study for 

the district at Times Beach, Mo. in 1982. During the study, the district 

experience with hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste and with aeri

tography. The district used this experience to obtain future work prepari

liminary assessments for the DERP-FUDS program. Dace played the es

role in obtaining this DERP-FUDS work for the district, the result of wh

the establishment of the Ordnance and Technical Services Branch, of 

Dace would serve as Chief until his retirement in 2006.
406

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417

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422

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(Replacement), Upper Mississippi River Basin, Mississippi River, Alton 

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(Replacement), Upper Mississippi River Basin, Mississippi River, Alton 

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Travelogues

“Bradbury’s Travels in the Interior of America, 1809-1811.” Thwaits, Reuben G. Ea

Western Travels, 1748-1846. Vol. V. NY: AMS, 1966.

“Breckenridge’s Journey up the Missouri, 1811.” Thwaits, Reuben G. Early West

Travels, 1748-1846. Vol. VI. NY: AMS, 1966.

Jackson, Donald. Ed. Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike with Letters and Rela

Documents. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966.

James, Edwin. Account of an Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky Mounta

Vol. 1 and 2. Ann Arbor: University Microfi lms, Inc., 1966.

Schoolcraft, Henry. Journal of a Tour into the Interior of Missouri and Arkan

London: Richard Phillips, 1831.

Video

Video interview with Claude Strauser on annual Environmental Coordination Trip 

the Mississippi River. www.semissourian.com/gallery/1855/, Jun. 30, 2011.