area handbook series

Angola

a country study


t
Angola

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Thomas Collelo

Research Completed

February 1989
On the cover: Portion of a fresco depicting revolutionary

scenes at the Karl Marx Institute of Education in Luanda

Third Edition, First Printing, 1991.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Angola : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Thomas Collelo. — 3d ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series) (DA pam ; 550-59)

"Supersedes the 1979 edition of Angola : a country study,

edited by Irving Kaplan" —T.p. verso. "Research completed December 1988."

Includes bibiliographical references (pp. 277-295) and index.

Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:550-59/990

1. Angola. I. Collelo, Thomas, 1948- . II. Kaplan, Irving.

III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550-559.

DT1269.A54

967.3—dc20

1990 90-3244

CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-59

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being

prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program. The

last page of this book lists the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Acting Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

111

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- lowing individuals, who wrote the 1979 edition of Angola: A Country Study, edited by Irving Kaplan: H. Mark Roth, "Historical

Setting"; Irving Kaplan, "The Society and Its Physical Setting";

Margarita Dobert, "Government and Politics"; Eugene K. Keefe,

"National Security"; and Donald P. Whitaker, "The Economy."

Their work provided the organization and structure of the present

volume, as well as substantial portions of the text. The authors are grateful to individuals in various government

agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research

materials, and expertise to the production of this book. The authors

also wish to thank members of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed directly to the production of the manuscript. These

people include Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and

served as liaison with the sponsoring agency, and Marilyn L. Majeska and Andrea T. Merrill, who managed book production. Vincent Ercolano and Sharon Schultz edited the chapters, and Beverly

Wolpert performed the final prepublication review. Also involved

in preparing the text were editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton

and Izella Watson. Shirley Kessel compiled the index. Linda Peter- son of the Library of Congress Composing Unit set the type,

under the direction of Peggy Pixley.

Invaluable graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto,

who reviewed all the graphics and designed the artwork on the cover and title page of each chapter; Kimberly A. Lord, who prepared

all the maps except the topography and drainage map, which was

prepared by Harriett R. Blood; and Sandra K. Ferrell, who pre- pared the charts. In addition, Carolina E. Forrester reviewed the

map drafts, and Arvies J. Staton supplied information on ranks

and insignia.

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals

and public and private agencies who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. The authors are indebted especially to those

persons who contributed original work not previously published.

v

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile XV

Introduction xxi

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Rachel Warner

PRECOLONIAL ANGOLA AND THE ARRIVAL

OF THE PORTUGUESE 5 Kongo Kingdom 6

Ndongo Kingdom 10 The Defeat of Kongo and Ndongo 11 Matamba and Kasanje Kingdoms 12 Lunda and Chokwe Kingdoms 13 Ovimbundu and Kwanhama Kingdoms 13 The Dutch Interregnum, 1641-48 14 ANGOLA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 14 Slave Trading in the 1700s 14 Portuguese Settlers in Angola 16 THE 1800s: TURMOIL IN PORTUGAL, REFORM

AND EXPANSION IN ANGOLA 16 The Early Nineteenth Century 16 Abolition of the Slave Trade 17 Expansion and the Berlin Conference 17 SETTLEMENT, CONQUEST, AND DEVELOPMENT 19 The Demographic Situation 19 Military Campaigns 20

Administration and Development 20

ANGOLA UNDER THE SALAZAR REGIME . 21 Angola under the New State 21

Salazar's Racial Politics 22

RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM 23

Roots of Discontent 24

African Associations 26

Organizational Weaknesses 27

vii
Beginning of Revolution 28

ANGOLAN INSURGENCY 29

Ascendancy of the MPLA 31 Emergence of UNITA 32

Liberation Movements in Cabinda 33

Portuguese Economic Interests and Resistance

to Angolan Independence 34

The Portuguese Coup d'Etat and the End of the Colonial Era 35

COALITION, THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT,

AND CIVIL WAR 36

Foreign Intervention 38

Collapse of the Transitional Government 38

South African Intervention 39

INDEPENDENCE AND THE RISE OF

THE MPLA GOVERNMENT 40

Transformation into a Marxist-Leninist Party and

Internal Dissent . 41 Shaba Invasion and the Nitista Plot 41 Strenthening Ties with the Soviet Union and Its Allies 42

Economic Problems and Implementation

of Socialist Policies 44

The UNITA Insurgency and the South African

Threat 45

The Final Days of the Neto Regime 46

THE DOS SANTOS REGIME 47

Steps Toward a Stronger Party and Political Discord 48

The Namibia Issue and Security Threats in the

1980s 48

Second Party Congress 50

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 53

Rachel Warner

PHYSICAL SETTING 57

Terrain 57

Drainage 60

Climate 61 POPULATION STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 61

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 64

The Definition of Ethnicity 65

Ethnolinguistic Categories 67

viii
Mestizos 79

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 80

Social Structure in Rural Communities 81

Social Structure in Urban Areas 86

Effects of Socialist Policies 87

Role of Women and Children 90

Effects of the Insurgency 91

RELIGIOUS LIFE 92

Christianity 94

Indigenous Religious Systems 97

EDUCATION 100

Conditions Before Independence 100

Conditions after Independence 100

Education in UNITA-Claimed Territory 103

HEALTH AND WELFARE 104

Chapter 3. The Economy ill

Nancy Clark

BACKGROUND TO ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 113

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 116

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 117

FOREIGN TRADE AND ASSISTANCE 119

Foreign Trade 120

Foreign Assistance 121 LABOR FORCE 122

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 125

Oil 125

Diamonds 131 Iron Ore 133

Other Minerals 135

AGRICULTURE 135

Coffee 137

Food Crops and Livestock 138

Timber 140

Fishing 140

INDUSTRY 141

Electric Power 142

Food Processing 142

Light Industry 144

Heavy Industry 146

Construction Materials 147

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 147

ix
Roads 147

Railroads 147

Ports 150

Air Transport 151 Telecommunications 151

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, FINANCES, AND

FOREIGN DEBT 152

Balance of Trade and Payments 152

Finances 154

Foreign Debt 154

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 157

Rita M. Byrnes

BACKGROUND 160

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 164

The Constitution 164

Executive Branch 165

Legislative Branch 168

Judicial System 169

Local Administration 169

POPULAR MOVMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF

ANGOLA-WORKERS' PARTY 170

Background 170

Structure 171 Operations 174

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 176

MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS 180

Mass Organizations 180

Interest Groups 183

POLITICAL OPPOSITION 187

MASS MEDIA 189

FOREIGN RELATIONS

.

191

Policy Making 191 Regional Politics 192

Communist Nations 197

United States and Western Europe 199

Chapter 5. National Security 203

Joseph P. Smaldone

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 206

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES 208

Background 208

Independence Struggle, Civil War,

and Intervention 209

x
The Development of FAPLA 210

ARMED FORCES 211

Constitutional and Political Context 211

Armed Forces Organization and Mission 214

Troop Strength, Recruitment, and Conscription 222

Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military

Justice 223

Foreign Influences 224

Training 229

FAPLA's Combat Performance 231

WAR AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

IN SOCIETY 232

The Costs of Endemic Conflict 232

War and the Military in National Perspective 233

Civic Action and Veterans' Groups 235

INTERNAL SECURITY 235

Antigovernment Opposition 236

Erstwhile Opposition: FLEC and the FNLA 237

The Enduring Rival: UNITA 238

Angola as a Refuge 244

Internal Security Forces and Organization 246

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 250

Criminal Justice System 250

Prison System 252

Incidence and Trends in Crime 252

Human Rights 254

Appendix A. Tables 257

Appendix B. 1988 Regional Accords 271

Bibliography 277

Glossary 297

Index 301

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Angola, 1988 xx

2 Major Angolan Kingdoms, 1200-1900 8

3 Topography and Drainage 58

4 Population Distribution by Age and Sex, Mid- 1986 62

5 Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1988 68

6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1985 116

7 Crude Oil Production, 1980-87 126

8 Oil Exploration and Production Areas, 1986 128

9 Economic Activity, 1988 134

xi
10 Transportation System, 1988 148

11 Structure of the Government, 1988 166

12 Structure of the MPLA-PT, 1988 172

13 Military Regions and Principal Bases, 1987 216

14 Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1988 218

15 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1988 228

16 Territory Claimed by UNITA, 1988 240

xii
Preface

Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, and military aspects of Angolan society. Sources of information

included scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of

governments and international organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Up-to-date data from

Angolan sources for the most part were unavailable. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some

of the more valuable sources suggested as possible further reading

appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the

metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix A). A glossary is also included.

Place-names follow a modified version of the system adopted by

the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use,

known as the BGN/PCGN system. The modification is a signifi- cant one, however, in that some diacritical markings and hyphens

have been omitted.

Terminology and spelling sometimes presented problems. For

example, after independence Angola's ruling party was known as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento

Popular de Libertacao de Angola—MPLA). In 1977, however, in

asserting its commitment to the principles of Marxism-Leninism,

the MPLA added to its nomenclature "Partido de Trabalho. " The

term is translated in this book as "Workers' Party" but is else- where often seen as "Labor Party." Furthermore, because the spelling of the names of ethnic groups occasionally varies, in some cases alternate spellings are given in parentheses. Finally, many Angolan officials who fought in the liberation struggle against the Portuguese acquired noms de guerre; these officials are often referred

to in press accounts by their nicknames. When such officials are

cited in the text, their noms de guerre are given in parentheses

after their surnames.

xiii

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: People's Republic of Angola.

Short Form: Angola.

Term for Citizens: Angolans.

Date of Independence: 1975, from Portugal.

xv
Geography

Size: Approximately 1,246,700 square kilometers, including enclave

of Cabinda.

Topography: Coastal lowland along Atlantic; Namib Desert south

of Benguela; hills and mountains paralleling coast rise to high

plateau in east, divided by many rivers and streams. Much of

Cabinda Province coastal plain and hills. Climate: Hotter and drier along coast than in mountains and

plateau. Rainy season in northern part of country from September

to April; in southern part from November to about February. Coolest

months July and August. Warm and wet in Cabinda Province.

Society

Population: In 1988 estimated at 8.2 million, most of which concentrated in western half of country. About 46 percent of population under age fifteen in 1986.

Ethnic Groups: Ovimbundu, Mbundu, and Bakongo constituted nearly three-fourths of population in 1988. Other groups LundaChokwe, Nganguela, Nyaneka-Humbe, Ovambo, mestigo (see

Glossary), and European.

Languages: Portuguese official language, but Bantu languages

spoken by more than 95 percent of population.

Religion: Christians (Roman Catholics and various Protestant

denominations) estimated at between 65 and 88 percent of population in 1988; remainder practiced traditional African religions.

Education and Literacy: Eight-year course compulsory until age

fifteen, but enrollment severely disrupted by insurgency. Separate

school system in rebel-controlled areas. Overall literacy rate about

20 percent in 1987.

Health and Welfare: Very poor health care because of years of

insurgency. High prevalence of infectious diseases; 20,000 to 50,000

amputees. Large number of foreign, especially Cuban, medical per- sonnel in country. Life expectancy in 1987 forty-one for males and

forty-four for females.

Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Approximately US$4.7 billion

in 1987; US$600 per capita.

xvi
Extractive Industries: Oil most important sector of economy. Contributed 30 percent of GDP in 1985. Concentrated in areas off- shore of Cabinda Province. Diamond mining in northeast disrupted

by fighting.

Agriculture: In steep decline as result of insurgency. Contributed

only 9 percent of GDP in 1985. Coffee principal export crop. Manufacturing: Stagnant in late 1980s because of insurgency and

lack of spare parts. Contributed 16 percent of GDP in 1985. Main

industries food processing, construction, and textiles. Exports: Oil revenue nearly 90 percent of total export earnings

in 1988.

Imports: Foodstuffs, military equipment, and inputs to petroleum industry most important imports.

Currency: In December 1988, official rate of kwanza was Kz29.3

to US$1, but United States dollar traded on parallel market at up

to Kz2,100.

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Transportation and Telecommunications

Railroads: Three lines with total of 3,075 kilometers of track ran from coast to hinterland. Benguela Railway, longest line, severely

damaged by insurgency.

Roads: Total of about 70,000 kilometers of roads, of which 8,000

kilometers paved.

Ports: Three major ports (Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe) and several smaller terminals.

Inland Waterways: Nearly 1,300 kilometers of navigable rivers. Airports: International airport at Luanda; thirteen other major

airports.

Telecommunications: Fairly reliable system included microwave,

troposcatter, and satellite links. Government and Politics

Government: Marxist-Leninist government based on 1975 Constitution (later revised) but dominated by Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de

xvii
Libertagao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho—MPLA-PT). Government composed of executive branch led by president, who appointed

Council of Ministers and Defense and Security Council. Legislative branch consisted of People's Assembly. As of late 1988, be- cause of inability to hold elections, People's Assembly had been

appointed. Justice system composed of Supreme Court, Court of

Appeals, people's revolutionary courts, and series of people's

courts. Politics: Real power resided with MPLA-PT, whose chairman was president of republic. Political Bureau most important body

in party. Central Committee, although subordinate to MPLAPT party congress, wielded greater influence over party policies.

No legal opposition parties, but beginning in 1976 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para

a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) waged devastating

insurgency from bases in southeast and elsewhere.

Foreign Relations: Government relied on Soviet Union and its allies, especially Cuba, for military support. United States and other

Western nations played important economic roles. South Africa,

which has supported UNITA, most important regional threat.

December 1988 regional accords with South Africa and Cuba

which provided for cessation of South African support for UNITA, withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and independence

for Namibia—may change complexion of regional politics and for- eign relations.

International Organizations: Member of African Development

Bank, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (observer status),

Customs Cooperation Council, Group of 77, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, Nonaligned Movement,

Organization of African Unity, Southern African Development

Coordination Conference, United Nations and its agencies, and

World Federation of Trade Unions.

National Security

Armed Forces: Active-duty strength consisted of army of 91,500,

air and air defense force of 7,000, and navy of 1,500; reserve personnel of 50,000. At end of 1988, armed forces supported by nearly

50,000 Cuban troops and a few thousand Soviet and East German

advisers. Army supported by 50,000-member Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, a kind of reserve militia. Two

years of universal and compulsory conscription.

xvin
Combat Units and Major Equipment: Army organized into more

than seventy brigades in ten military regions. Operated about 1 , 100

Soviet-manufactured tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Air force

organized into three regiments (fighter-bomber, transport, and

helicopter). Combat aircraft included MiG-23 and MiG-21 fighters. Navy used three ports and had guided missile fast patrol boats

and torpedo boats.

Military Budget: Amounted to US$1.3 billion in 1986 (in constant 1980 dollars)—more than 40 percent of government expenditures and about 30 percent of GNP.

Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces: Largest group was

People's Vigilance Brigades, a lightly armed citizens' militia with

strength of from 800,000 to 1.5 million. In 1988 about 7,000 border

guards and 8,000 police officers (supported by force of 10,000).

xix
-6

^abinda Mbanz^Congo

ZAIRE , J , V

| r UIGE

_J} . Uige . / ~K

^~

J ' ""V J L"a"£aJ^ (norte/

BENGO \

'

^^^ ; ^^

' \ 5^ ::l

' MALANZE S CUANZA \

Atlantic \ Sumbe UL

l

' >

. BIE

— • • — International boundary — • — Province boundary

® National capital ZAIRE Province

• Province capital 100

100200J<ilometers 200 Mil 1

LUNDA

NORTE

Lucapa

)

\

*Saurimo LUNDA

SUL

-12 Benguela

h

f i

^UaT

b

°l Kuito

hi UAMBO,

BENGUELA^_ ~-

• u

HUILA

/

*Luena MOXICO

A

\

' Lubango

Namibe r

\NAMIBE' . / ^

rv CUNENE ^

Ondjiva

\

• Menongue \ . % CUANDO

CUBANGO

\

1

-J

12

12-

24

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Angola, 1988

xx
Introduction

AN IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC EPISODE in the course of Angolan history took place onJune 22, 1989, in the remote Zairian town

of Gbadolite. On that date, Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos

Santos shook the hand of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the antigovernment movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de

Angola—UNITA). This friendly gesture occurred at the end of a meeting attended by representatives from seventeen African

nations and held under the auspices of Zairian president Mobutu

Sese Seko. Accompanying the handshake was a communique call- ing for a cease-fire between government forces and UNITA rebels,

national reconciliation, and direct negotiations; specific provisions were to be arranged later. But like many other incidents in Angolan history, this promising event soon became a disappointment

as the parties failed to make progress along the path to peace. And

so, scarcely two months after the so-called Gbadolite Declaration,

UNITA announced the end to the cease-fire. As the internal tur- moil resumed, Angolans once again became victims in a civil war

that by 1989 had lasted for fourteen years. Clearly, turmoil, victimization, and disappointment are themes

that have pervaded Angola's history, especially since the arrival

of Europeans in the fifteenth century. Although the Portuguese crown initially sent to Angola teachers to educate and priests to proselytize, Portugal eventually came to view the area mainly as a source for slaves, especially for Brazil, its colony across the Atiantic

Ocean. In the several centuries during which the slave trade

flourished, scholars estimate that 4 million Africans from the Angola

region were taken into slavery. Of this number, perhaps half died

before reaching the New World.

During its five centuries of colonization, Portugal treated Angola

mostly with indifference or hostility. Although Angolans were often

responsible for enslaving other Africans, Portuguese traders provided the impetus and the market for slaving. By raising small armies,

Portuguese fought their way into Angola's interior, disrupting as they went kingdoms having sophisticated civilizations. Less allur- ing to Portuguese setders than Brazil, Angola generally attracted

poorer immigrants, a great many of whom were degredados (see Glossary), or exiled convicts. Portugal's exploitation of Angola did not

cease even after slavery had been legally abolished in Angola in

1858. Lisbon spent the last part of the nineteenth century engaged

xxi
in wars against the African kingdoms that it had not yet conquered

and in consolidating its hold on territories awarded to it at the Berlin

Conference of 1884 during the so-called scramble for Africa.

In the twentieth century, and particularly after 1926 and Antonio

Salazar's rise to power in Portugal, Lisbon exploited Angola's

agricultural and mineral wealth. Salazar facilitated this exploitation by inducing greater numbers of Portuguese to settle in Angola

to manage plantations and mines and by enacting labor laws that

forced Angolans to work for Portuguese. He also ensured that Afri- cans could not easily participate in or benefit from the colonial

administration.

In the 1950s and 1960s, as most other African colonies were winning their independence, many Angolans, especially educated mestigos (see Glossary) and assimilados (see Glossary), came to resent the continued oppressiveness of the Salazar regime, which stead

fastiy refused to consider granting independence to its African holdings. As a consequence, in the early months of 1961 a rebellion

erupted in the northern part of the colony. This event sounded the

opening shots of Angola's war of liberation, a conflict that dragged on until 1974. In that year, a military coup d'etat in Lisbon toppled the government of Marcello Caetano (who had replaced Salazar

in 1968). The generals who assumed power had fought the anticolonialists in Africa and were weary of that battle. And so, soon

after the coup they announced plans for the independence of all of Portugal's African possessions.

Unlike other Portuguese African colonies, the transition to independence in Angola did not proceed smoothly. During the

1960s and 1970s, the three most important liberation movements

were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola—MPLA), the National

Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Liberta- cao de Angola—FNLA), and UNITA. When these groups could

not resolve peacefully their differences about the leadership and

structure of a unified government, they turned their guns on each

other; the FNLA and UNITA eventually formed a loose coalition

to oppose the MPLA, the movement that finally prevailed. The

subsequent chaos, however, induced most Portuguese to repatriate, leaving Angola critically deficient in skilled professionals such

as managers, teachers, and technicians.

The resultant civil war had domestic, regional, and international

dimensions. Domestically, the movements tended to be divided

along ethnic lines: the MPLA came to be identified with the

Mbundu, the FNLA with the Bakongo, and UNITA with the

Ovimbundu. In the late 1980s, ethnicity was still a sensitive issue. xxn
Regionally, Zaire came to the aid of the FNLA by supplying bases

and some combat troops. South Africa, concerned about communist

expansion in southern Africa, invaded Angola from neighboring

Namibia. Internationally, the Soviet Union backed the MPLA with

materiel and advisers, while Cuba supplied thousands of combat

troops. The United States sided with the FNLA by providing financial assistance and by helping to hire mercenaries.

By mid- 1976 most of the fighting had died down. The South

Africans had withdrawn, and, for the most part, the FNLA and

UNITA had been routed, thanks primarily to the effectiveness of

Cuban forces. Consequently, the MPLA was able to legitimize its claim of control over the government. Nonetheless, despite its legitimization and the recognition of its claim by most African states and many other countries and international organizations, the

MPLA still was confronted with an insurgency. Leading this insurgency from the southeast part of the country was Savimbi's

UNITA, which had regrouped with the assistance of South Africa,

and, after 1985, with aid from the United States. By 1989 this conflict, which many believed was merely an extension of the civil war, had claimed an estimated 60,000 to 90,000 lives, had exacted

hundreds of thousands of casualties, and had forced about 700,000

people from their homes.

During the 1980s, the strains of the conflict were everywhere

apparent. A significant portion of Angola's young populace (median

age 17.5 years in 1988), estimated at 8.2 million in 1988, was moving westward away from the principal battiegrounds. Between 1975

and 1987, cities such as Luanda, Huambo, and Benguela witnessed an almost unchecked population explosion. But as the cities filled,

the countryside emptied. The consequences of this rural-to-urban

migration were devastating to the nation's welfare. The cities were

unable to absorb such masses so quickly; the government could

not provide adequate services, such as medical care and education; and jobs and housing were in short supply. Most important,

with agricultural workers leaving their farms, the cities could not

obtain enough food for their residents. By the late 1980s, Angola, once a food exporter, was importing more than half of its grain

requirements. Moreover, thousands of those who could not reach

cities settled in displaced persons camps, many of which were funded

and operated by international relief organizations. Unrecorded as of 1989 were the psychological effects on the populace of leaving

the relatively stable, traditional environment of the country for the

uncertain, modern society of the city.

Exacerbating these demographic strains was the economy's poor

performance in the 1980s in relation to its vast potential. The

xxiii
production of coffee, sisal, sugar, iron ore, and diamonds either

declined or stagnated. Furthermore, the closure by UNITA insurgents of the Benguela Railway, which linked the rich mining regions

of Zaire and Zambia with Atlantic ports, denied transit fees to the

government. As a result, the economy became almost exclusively

dependent on petroleum. Production of oil had begun in 1956, and

by the late 1980s, with the financial and technical assistance of

Western companies, oil sales accounted for nearly 90 percent of

export earnings. Most Angolans, however, failed to benefit from

these earnings. To finance the war against UNITA, the government in 1986 allocated more than 40 percent of its budget to defense

expenditures, leaving relatively little for pressing social needs.

Several other factors contributed to economic weaknesses. First,

because of the lack of foreign exchange, imported consumer goods were scarce, especially in state-run stores. This scarcity generated

a widespread parallel market in which goods were frequently bartered rather than sold because Angola's unit of currency, the kwanza

(for value of the kwanza—see Glossary), was virtually worthless.

And because of commodity shortages, graft and pilfering (particularly at points of entry) became government concerns. National

production also suffered because industrial workers and agricultural laborers were reluctant to work for kwanzas; as a result of

the shortage of goods, the government often could not even barter

for the services of workers or the output of farmers.

The UNITA insurgency and its associated disruptions notwithstanding, the government itself was responsible for some economic

ills. Critics of the government claimed that mismanagement in centralized planning, state-run companies, and state-owned farms contributed significantly to the nation's economic decline. The

government, in fact, seemed to agree in 1987, at which time President dos Santos announced plans to restructure the economy,

calling for greater commercial liberalization and privatization of

enterprise.

But while the government was willing to concede the economic

shortcomings of Marxism-Leninism, it was resolutely opposed to accepting the notion of sweeping changes in political ideology. Since

the First Party Congress in December 1977, when the MPLA

became a "workers' party" and added "PT" (for Partido de

Trabalho) to its acronym, Angola's leadership had followed a course

that some observers have described as "Moscow oriented." Despite

this characterization and the fact that Angola's enmeshed partygovernment structure resembled that of the Soviet Union, the dos

Santos regime was notably more moderate than the regime of his

predecessor, Agostinho Neto. In the late 1980s, however, political

xxiv
power remained in the hands of dos Santos and his small inner

circle. For the most part, Angola's goal of installing a functioning socialist state had not been attained. Although millions of Angolans

had been mobilized into mass organizations or defense forces, political debate was narrowly constrained. The party, with a membership of only about 45,000, dominated the government. As of

1989, the People's Assembly—nominally the highest state organ

was largely an appointed body, unrepresentative of the constituents

it was designed to serve. Likewise, the MPLA-PT was controlled

primarily by the eleven-member Political Bureau (led by its chairman, dos Santos) and secondarily by the Central Committee; the

party congress, the MPLA-PT's theoretical supreme body, in practice was subordinate to the other organs. In addition, reflecting

the nation's precarious security situation, many serving in party

and government positions were military officers. Angola's foreign relations wavered in the 1980s. Within black

Africa, Luanda's relations with other states generally were good.

Those with Zaire, however, fluctuated from normal to poor be- cause of Kinshasa's sponsorship during the 1970s of the FNLA and

because of Angola's support during the same period of an antiMobutu armed movement. In addition, although Zaire denied aiding UNITA, most observers agreed that during the 1980s Kinshasa

allowed Zairian territory to be used to support Savimbi's movement, creating another bone of contention between the two neighbors. Angola's principal antagonist in the region, however, was

not Zaire but South Africa. Since its invasion of Angola in 1975

and 1976 during the war of independence, Pretoria has frequently

violated Luanda's sovereignty, either in pursuit of members of the

South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO—a group fighting for Namibian independence) or in support of UNITA forces. In the late 1980s, Angola's ties to the superpowers were in a state of flux. Although Luanda was closely aligned with the Soviet Union

and its allies, this relationship generally was considered an out- growth of Angola's security predicament. In economic concerns,

the MPLA-PT often turned to the West, particularly in matters

relating to the oil sector but also for trade and commerce and in

other areas. Reportedly, the Soviet Union prodded the Angolan

government into participating in the December 1988 regional

accords, but in late 1989 it was uncertain how the reforms being

carried out in the Soviet Union under Mikhail S. Gorbachev would

affect the policies and practices of the MPLA-PT government. The

other superpower, the United States, also played an important

role in the accords. After their signing, however, United States xxv
president George P. Bush affirmed American support for the

UNITA rebels and vowed to continue backing Savimbi's move- ment until the MPLA-PT and UNITA reached an accommodation.

The MPLA's independence struggle and subsequent conflict with

UNITA and South Africa compelled the government to develop

the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas

Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA). Comprising a ground force, air and air defense force, and navy, FAPLA

was one of the largest and most heavily armed militaries in Africa. In 1988 experts estimated its strength at 100,000 active-duty

personnel, 50,000 reservists, and many hundreds of thousands more

in a variety of militias and internal security units. Bolstering this force in the late 1980s were about 50,000 Cuban troops, who

provided logistical and combat support.

FAPLA was armed and trained by the Soviet Union and its allies. Its major equipment included MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft,

T-62 and T-72 main battle tanks, and an assortment of air defense,

field artillery, and naval assets. Although this arsenal and the

assistance of Cuban troops and Soviet and East European advisers had prevented a UNITA victory, by 1988 Luanda had

incurred an external debt estimated at almost US$4 billion, most

of which was owed to Moscow for military materiel and assis- tance. In late 1989, Angola's economic and political prospects appeared

less bleak than they had only a year or two earlier. The economic

restructuring program, together with other austerity measures, con- vinced the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) to admit Angola as a member in June 1989 (over the objection of the

United States). This event opened the door for greater financial

assistance. Furthermore, the December 1988 regional accords,

which provided for the staged withdrawal of Cuban troops, the ces- sation of South African support for UNITA, and the independence

of Namibia, augured well for Angola's future. Observers reasoned

that as the Cuban troops departed (and by mid- 1989 more than

10,000 had left), Luanda's payments to Havana for military aid

would drop; with South Africa's cutoff of support to UNITA, that

organization's ability to disrupt the economy would decline and

perhaps push it closer to accepting a peace plan; and with independence for Namibia, the threat of South African aggression would

diminish substantially. Carrying this logic one step further, reporters

argued that if the peace process begun at Gbadolite in June 1989

could be revitalized and an agreement between the MPLA-PT and

xxvi
UNITA achieved, Angolans stood a chance of reversing the pattern of turmoil, victimization, and disappointment that had plagued

the country for the previous 500 years. October 18, 1989

* * * A few significant events occurred in Angola after the completion of the research and writing of this manuscript. By mid- 1990

it became clear that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, the signatories of the December 1988 regional accords, were intent on faith- fully executing the provisions of the agreement. Since the signing, more than 37,000 Cuban troops had departed Angola, and the

remaining 13,000 Cubans, most of whom were stationed near Luanda, were to be brought home by mid- 1991. As promised,

South African forces withdrew from Angolan territory, and Pretoria

ceased aid to UNITA. Finally, Namibia held elections and, as planned, celebrated its independence on March 21, 1990.

These positive developments notwithstanding, most Angolans

enjoyed little improvement in their quality of life, and, for many,

conditions deteriorated. The primary reason for this decline was

that the MPLA-PT and UNITA had failed to make much progress on the path to peace. Each side of the dispute held a different

interpretation of the Gbadolite Declaration. Analysts suggested that

Mobutu, the mediator of the Gbadolite talks, may have presented

varying versions of the agreement to each side. In any case, warfare

persisted from mid- 1989 to mid- 1990 as FAPLA and UNITA troops

batded each other for control of the southeastern town of Mavinga.

Government forces captured the town in early February 1990, but

intense fighting continued in the region for several months. Following a heavy engagement, FAPLA retreated from Mavinga in

early May, and UNITA reoccupied it. In addition to the combat that raged in Angola's southeast,

UNITA reportedly made inroads in the country's northwest. This

success allegedly was accomplished through Zairian operational sup- port and United States assistance. According to some sources, the

Zairian government was resupplying UNITA forces there via cargo

flights from Kinshasa. The United States, using this Zairian air bridge, reportedly provided UNITA with materiel and other

assistance worth an estimated US$45 million to US$60 million

annually. By mid- 1990 UNITA forces sabotaged water facilities and electric power lines to Luanda and generally disrupted the eco- nomic life of the nation. xxvn
Despite the on-going military situation, there appeared to be some

softening of political positions. In April 1990, government and

UNITA representatives met in Portugal for negotiations. As a

result, UNITA recognized the Angolan state with President dos

Santos as its head. UNITA, however, also called for the replacement of the single-party state with a multiparty government chosen

in free elections. Observers saw a coincidence of interests here

because the MPLA-PT had pledged to hold elections in which nonparty candidates—including members of UNITA—could run for

seats in the People's Assembly. The single-party versus multiparty

issue was to be debated at the Third Party Congress, scheduled

for December 1990.

Regardless of the outcome of this congress, however, observers

believed that UNITA's battlefield successes might encourage

Savimbi to hold out for a total military solution. With the con- tinued United States commitment to UNITA, at the same time

that Cuban troops were withdrawing and the Soviet Union's interest in supporting the MPLA-PT government was weakening, some

analysts reasoned that a UNITA victory in Angola, whether on

the battlefield or at the polls, was merely a question of time.

September 9, 1990 Thomas Collelo

XXVlll
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
A village near Pungo Andongo, formerly Pungu-a-Ndondong,

the capital of the Ndongo Kingdom in the sixteenth century
IN NOVEMBER 1975, after nearly five centuries as a Portuguese

colony, Angola became an independent state. By late 1988, however, despite fertile land, large deposits of oil and gas, and great

mineral wealth, Angola had achieved neither prosperity nor

peace—the national economy was stagnating and warfare was

ravaging the countryside. True independence also remained unrealized as foreign powers continued to determine Angola's future. But unattained potential and instability were hardships well

known to the Angolan people. They had suffered the outrage of

slavery and the indignity of forced labor and had experienced years

of turmoil going back to the early days of the indigenous kingdoms.

The ancestors of most present-day Angolans found their way to the region long before the first Portuguese arrived in the late fifteenth century. The development of indigenous states, such as the Kongo Kingdom, was well under way before then. The primary

objective of the first Portuguese settlers in Angola, and the motive

behind most of their explorations, was the establishment of a slave

trade. Although several early Portuguese explorers recognized the

economic and strategic advantages of establishing friendly relations

with the leaders of the kingdoms in the Angolan interior, by the

middle of the sixteenth century the slave trade had engendered an

enmity between the Portuguese and the Africans that persisted until

independence.

Most of the Portuguese who settled in Angola through the nineteenth century were exiled criminals, called degredados (see Glossary), who were actively involved in the slave trade and spread

disorder and corruption throughout the colony. Because of the

unscrupulous behavior of the degredados, most Angolan Africans soon came to despise and distrust their Portuguese colonizers. Those

Portuguese who settled in Angola in the early twentieth century were peasants who had fled the poverty of their homeland and who

tended to establish themselves in Angolan towns in search of a means of livelihood other than agriculture. In the process, they

squeezed out the mestigos (people of mixed African and white descent; see Glossary) and urban Africans who had hitherto played

a part in the urban economy. In general, these later settlers lacked

capital, education, and commitment to their new homelands.

When in the early 1930s Antonio Salazar implemented the New

State (Estado Novo) in Portugal, Angola was expected to survive on its own. Accordingly, Portugal neither maintained an adequate

3
Angola: A Country Study

social and economic infrastructure nor invested directly in longterm development.

Ideologically, Portugal maintained that increasing the density

of white rural settlement in Angola was a means of "civilizing"

the African. Generally, the Portuguese regarded Africans as in- ferior and gave them few opportunities to develop either in terms

of their own cultures or in response to the market. The Portuguese

also discriminated politically, socially, and economically against

assimilados (see Glossary)—those Africans who, by acquiring a cer- tain level of education and a mode of life similar to that of Europeans, were entitled to become citizens of Portugal. Those few

Portuguese officials and others who called attention to the mistreatment of Africans were largely ignored or silenced by the colonial

governments.

By the 1950s, African-led or mestigo-\ed associations with explicit

political goals began to spring up in Angola. The authoritarian Sala- zar regime forced these movements and their leaders to operate

in exile. By the early 1960s, however, political groups were suffi- ciently organized (if also divided by ethnic loyalties and personal

animosities) to begin their drives for independence. Moreover, at

least some segments of the African population had been so strongly

affected by the loss of land, forced labor, and stresses produced

by a declining economy that they were ready to rebel on their own. The result was a series of violent events in urban and rural areas

that marked the beginning of a long and often ineffective armed

struggle for independence.

To continue its political and economic control over the colony,

Portugal was prepared to use whatever military means were necessary. In 1974 the Portuguese army, tired of warfare not only in

Angola but in Portugal's other African colonies, overthrew the Lisbon regime. The new regime left Angola to its own devices—in

effect, abandoning it to the three major anticolonial movements.

Ideological differences and rivalry among their leaderships divided these movements. Immediately following independence in 1975,

civil war erupted between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola

MPLA) on the one hand and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola—FNLA)

and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA)

on the other hand. The MPLA received support from the Soviet

Union and Cuba, while the FNLA turned to the United States. UNITA, unable to gain more than nominal support from China,

turned to South Africa. Viewing the prospect of a Soviet- sponsored

4
Historical Setting

MPLA government with alarm, South Africa invaded Angola. The

Soviet and Cuban reaction was swift: the former provided the

logistical support, and the latter provided troops. By the end of

1976, the MPLA, under the leadership of Agostinho Neto, was

in firm control of the government. Members of UNITA retreated

to the bush to wage a guerrilla war against the MPLA government,

while the FNLA became increasingly ineffective in the north in

the late 1970s.

The MPLA, which in 1977 had declared itself a Marxist-Leninist

vanguard party, faced the task of restoring the agricultural and

production sectors that nearly had been destroyed with the departure of the Portuguese. Recognizing that traditional MarxistLeninist policies of large-scale expropriation and state ownership

would undermine redevelopment efforts, Neto permitted private

involvement in commercial and small-scale industry and developed

substantial economic relations with Western states, especially in

connection with Angola's oil industry.

After Neto's death in 1979, Jose Eduardo dos Santos inherited

considerable economic difficulties, including the enormous military costs required to fight UNITA and South African forces. By

the end of 1985, the security of the Luanda regime depended almost

entirely on Soviet-supplied weaponry and Cuban troop support.

Consequently, in the late 1980s Luanda's two main priorities were

to end the UNITA insurgency and to make progress toward eco- nomic development. By late 1988, a United States-sponsored peace

agreement held out some hope that, given time, both priorities could

be achieved.

Precolonial Angola and the Arrival of the Portuguese

Although the precolonial history of many parts of Africa has been

carefully researched and preserved, there is relatively little information on the region that forms contemporary Angola as it was

before the arrival of the Europeans in the late 1400s. The colonizers of Angola, the Portuguese, did not study the area as thoroughly as British, French, and German scholars researched their colonial

empires. The Portuguese, in fact, were more concerned with recording the past of their own people in Angola than with the history

of the indigenous populations.

The limited information that is available indicates that the original

inhabitants of present-day Angola were hunters and gatherers. Their

descendants, called Bushmen by the Europeans, still inhabit portions of southern Africa, and small numbers of them may still be

found in southern Angola. These Khoisan speakers lost their

predominance in southern Africa as a result of the southward ex- pansion of Bantu-speaking peoples during the first millennium A.D.

5
Angola: A Country Study

The Bantu speakers were a Negroid people, adept at farming,

hunting, and gathering, who probably began their migrations from

the rain forest near what is now the Nigeria-Cameroon border.

Bantu expansion was carried out by small groups that made a

series of short relocations over time in response to economic or political conditions. Some historians believe that the Khoisan speakers were peacefully assimilated rather than conquered by the Bantu.

Others contend that the Khoisan, because of their passive nature,

simply vacated the area and moved south, away from the newcomers.

In either case, the Bantu settled in Angola between 1300 and

1600, and some may have arrived even earlier. The Bantu formed

a number of historically important kingdoms. The earliest and

perhaps most important of these was the Kongo Kingdom, which

arose between the mid- 1300s and the mid- 1400s in an area over- lapping the present-day border between Angola and Zaire (see fig.

2). Other important kingdoms were Ndongo, located to the south

of Kongo; Matamba, Kasanje, and Lunda, located east of Ndongo; Bie, Bailundu, and Ciyaka, located on the plateau east of Benguela; and Kwanhama (also spelled Kwanyama), located near what

is now the border between Angola and Namibia. Although they

did not develop a strong central government, the Chokwe (also

spelled Cokwe) established a significant cultural center in the northeast of present-day Angola.

The precolonial kingdoms differed in area and the number of

subjects who owed allegiance, however nominal, to a central

authority. The kings might not directly control more land or people than a local ruler, but they were generally acknowledged as paramount. Kings were offered tribute and were believed to possess substantial religious power and authority. A king's actual secular power, however, was determined as much by his own personal

abilities as by institutional arrangements.

The African kingdoms tended to extend their lines of communication inland, away from the Atlantic Ocean. Until the arrival

of the Europeans, Africans regarded the sea as a barrier to trade.

Although the sea might supply salt or shells that could be used as currency, the interior held the promise of better hunting, farming, mining, and trade.

Kongo Kingdom

In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Kongo Kingdom was

the most powerful of a series of states along Africa's west coast known as the Middle Atlantic kingdoms. Kongo evolved in the late fourteenth century when a group of Bakongo (Kongo people)

6
Historical Setting

moved south of the Congo River into northern Angola, conquering the people they found there and establishing Mbanza Kongo

(now spelled Mbanza Congo), the capital of the kingdom. One of

the reasons for the success of the Bakongo was their willingness

to assimilate the inhabitants they conquered rather than to try to become their overlords. The people of the area thus gradually be- came one and were ruled by leaders with both religious and politi- cal authority.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the manikongo (Kongo king)

ruled the lands of northern Angola and the north bank of the Congo

River (present-day Congo and Zaire). Kongo was the first kingdom on the west coast of central Africa to come into contact with

Europeans. The earliest such contact occurred in 1483 when the

Portuguese explorer Diogo Cao reached the mouth of the Congo

River. After the initial landing, Portugal and Kongo exchanged

emissaries, so that each kingdom was able to acquire knowledge

of the other. Impressed by reports from his returning subjects, Nzinga Nkuwu, the manikongo, asked the Portuguese crown for missionaries and technical assistance in exchange for ivory and other goods.

The ruler who came to power in 1506 took a Christian name,

Afonso. He too admired European culture and science, and he

called on Portugal for support in education, military matters, and

the conversion of his subjects to Christianity. Many historians, in

fact, maintain that Afonso behaved more like a ''Christian" than

most of his teachers. Afonso, therefore, soon came into conflict with

Portuguese bent on exploiting Kongo society. The most insidious

and lasting aspect of this exploitation was the slave trade.

Not long after Afonso became king, Portugal began to turn its attention to the exploration of Asia and the Americas. As Portugal's interest in another of its colonies, Brazil, increased, its in- terest in Africa declined. Over time, the Portuguese crown came

to view Kongo primarily as a source of slaves. Slaves were used

first on the sugar plantations on nearby Portuguese-claimed islands

but later were sent mainly to Brazil. Once Kongo was opened to the slave trade, halting or limiting it became impossible. Afonso 's complaints to the Portuguese crown about the effects of the trade

in his lands were largely ignored. By the 1520s, most of the missionaries had returned to Portugal, and most of the remaining whites were slave traders who disregarded the authority of the manikongo.

In addition to the slave trade, Kongo faced other challenges in

the sixteenth century. After the death of Afonso in the 1540s, the

kingdom endured a period of instability that culminated in an upheaval in 1568. This rebellion was long attributed by Portuguese

sources and others to the invasion by a group of unknown origin

7
Angola: A Country Study

Figure 2. Major Angolan Kingdoms, 1200-1900

8
Historical Setting

called the Jaga. Others, however, believed that the attack was probably launched by a Bakongo faction opposed to the king that may

have been joined or aided by non-Bakongo seeking to gain control over the Kongo slave trade and other trading routes. In any case, the assault on the capital (which had been renamed Sao Salvador)

and its environs drove the king, Alvaro I, into exile. The Portuguese

governor of Sao Tome, responding to pleas from Alvaro I, fought

the invaders from 1571 through 1573, finally ousting them and oc- cupying the area until the mid- 15 70s. A few years earlier, Sebastiao, the Portuguese king, had granted the area south of the Bakongo as a proprietary colony to Paulo

Dias de Novais, an associate of Portuguese Jesuits and an ex- perienced explorer of the West African coast. In 1576, in effective

control of the countryside and facing no organized Kongo opposition, the Portuguese founded the town of Luanda, in effect establishing the colony of Angola. Other African leaders, however,

continued to resist the Portuguese, and the Europeans only managed

to establish insecure footholds along the coast. Concerned that Afri- can attacks might impede the stream of slaves to Brazil and Portugal, in 1590 the crown assumed direct control of the colony.

Alvaro I and his successor, Alvaro II, brought stability to the

Kongo Kingdom by expanding the domain of their royal authority while keeping at bay encroachment by the Portuguese, whose

colony during the late years of the sixteenth century remained confined to the area south of Kongo. But after the death of Alvaro

II in 1614, conflicts over access to cultivable land between Kongo

and the Portuguese colony of Angola soured formerly amicable

relations, and in 1622 the Portuguese governor of Angola launched an attack on Kongo. Although not entirely successful from the Portuguese point of view, the war had a number of lasting effects. First,

the colony captured a large number of slaves, which demonstrated how rewarding slave raiding could be. Second, the Portuguese came out of the war convinced of the existence of silver and gold

mines in Kongo, a belief that encouraged a series of conflicts between the colonists and the Kongo Kingdom for the next half century. The war also created a xenophobia among the Bakongo of

the interior, who drove away many Portuguese. Because the trading system depended largely on the Bakongo, commerce was greatiy

disrupted, with effects on the Angolan colony as great as those on

the Kongo Kingdom.

Adding to Kongo's troubles in the early 1600s was a general dis- satisfaction among the Bakongo with their rulers, some of whom

were greedy and corrupt. Consequently, conflicts arose over suc- cession to the throne, and more and more sections of the kingdom

9
Angola: A Country Study

gained substantial degrees of autonomy and established local control over the trade that had so enriched the monarchy in earlier years. Ndongo Kingdom

Shortly after Cao made his initial contact with the Kongo Kingdom of northern Angola in 1483, he established links farther south

with Ndongo—an African state less advanced than Kongo that was made up of Kimbundu-speaking people. Their ruler, who was tributary to the manikongo, was called the ngola a kiluanje. It was the first part of the tide, its pronunciation changed to "Angola," by which

the Portuguese referred to the entire area. Throughout most of the sixteenth century, Portugal's relations

with Ndongo were overshadowed by its dealings with Kongo. Some

historians, citing the disruptions the Portuguese caused in Kongo

society, believe that Ndongo benefited from the lack of Portuguese

interest. It was not until after the founding of Luanda in 1576 that

Portugal's exploration into the area of present-day Angola rivaled

its trade and commerce in Kongo. Furthermore, it was only in the

early seventeenth century that the importance of the colony Portugal established came to exceed that of Kongo.

Although officially ignored by Lisbon, the Angolan colony was

the center of disputes, usually concerning the slave trade, between

local Portuguese traders and the Mbundu people, who inhabited

Ndongo. But by mid-century, the favorable attention the ngola

received from Portuguese trade or missionary groups angered the

manikongo, who in 1556 sent an army against the Ndongo Kingdom. The forces of the ngola defeated the Kongo army, encouraging him to declare his independence from Kongo and appeal to Portugal for military support. In 1560 Lisbon responded by sending an expedition to Angola, but in the interim the ngola who had

requested Portuguese support had died, and his successor took captive four members of the expedition. After the hostage taking, Lisbon routinely employed military force in dealing with the Ndongo

Kingdom. This resulted in a major eastward migration of Mbundu people and the subsequent establishment of other kingdoms.

Following the founding of Luanda, Paulo Dias carried out a series of bloody military campaigns that contributed to Ndongo resent- ment of Europeans. Dias founded several forts east of Luanda,

but—indicative of Portugal's declining status as a world power

he was unable to gain firm control of the land around them. Dias

died in 1579 without having conquered the Ndongo Kingdom.

Dias's successors made slow progress up the Cuanza River, meeting constant African resistance. By 1604 they reached Cambambe,

10
where they learned that the presumed silver mines did not exist. The failure of the Portuguese to find mineral wealth changed their

outlook on the Angolan colony. Slave taking, which had been

incidental to the quest for the mines, then became the major eco- nomic motivation for expansion and extension of Portuguese

authority. In search of slaves, the Portuguese pushed farther into

Ndongo country, establishing a fort a short distance from Massangano, itself about 175 kilometers east of Angola's Atlantic coast. The consequent fighting with the Ndongo generated a stream of

slaves who were shipped to the coast. Following a period of Ndongo diplomatic initiatives toward Lisbon in the 1620s, relations degenerated into a state of war. The Defeat of Kongo and Ndongo

The Portuguese imposed a peace treaty on the Bakongo. Its conditions, however, were so harsh that peace was never really

achieved, and hostilities grew during the 1660s. The Portuguese

victory over the Bakongo at the Battle of Mbwila (also spelled

Ambuila) on October 29, 1665, marked the end of the Kongo Kingdom as a unified power. By the eighteenth century, Kongo had

been transformed from a unitary state into a number of smaller

entities that recognized the king but for all practical purposes were

independent. Fragmented though they were, these Kongo states
Angola: A Country Study

still resisted Portuguese encroachments. Although they were never

again as significant as during Angola's early days, the Bakongo

played an important role in the nationalist and independence struggles of the twentieth century.

The Ndongo Kingdom suffered a fate similar to that of Kongo.

Before the Dutch captured Luanda in 1641 , the Portuguese attempted to control Ndongo by supporting a pliant king, and during the

Dutch occupation, Ndongo remained loyal to Portugal (see The

Dutch Interregnum, 1641-48, this ch.). But after the retaking of

Luanda in 1648, the ngola judged that the Portuguese had not suffi- cientiy rewarded the kingdom for its allegiance. Consequentiy, he

reasserted Ndongo independence, an act that angered the colonists. In 1671 Ndongo intransigence prompted a Portuguese attack and

siege on the capital of Pungu-a-Ndondong (present-day Pungo

Andongo). The attackers killed the ngola, enslaved many of his fol- lowers, and built a fort on the site of the capital. Thus, the Ndongo Kingdom, which had enjoyed only semi-independent status, now

surrendered entirely to Portugal.

Matamba and Kasanje Kingdoms

As Portugal became preoccupied with the Ndongo Kingdom as a source of slaves, two inland Mbundu states—Matamba and

Kasanje—prospered. Littie is known of Matamba before the seventeenth century, but in 1621 Nzinga (called Jinga by the Portuguese),

the sister of the ngola a kiluanje, convinced the Portuguese to recognize Ndongo as an independent monarchy and to help the kingdom expel the Imbangala people from its territory. Three years

later, according to some sources, Nzinga poisoned her brother and

succeeded him as monarch. Unable to negotiate successfully with

a series of Portuguese governors, however, she was eventually

removed. Nzinga and many of her followers traveled east and forged

alliances with several groups. She finally ascended to the throne

of the Matamba Kingdom. From this eastern state, she pursued

good relations with the Dutch during their occupation of the area from 1641 to 1648 and attempted to reconquer Ndongo. After the

Dutch expulsion, Nzinga again allied with the Portuguese. A

dynamic and wily ruler, Nzinga dominated Mbundu politics until

she died in 1663. Although she dealt with the Europeans, in modern

times Nzinga has been remembered by nationalists as an Angolan

leader who never accepted Portuguese sovereignty.

After Nzinga' s death, a succession struggle ensued, and the new

ruler tried to reduce Portuguese influence. Following their practice with the Ndongo, the Portuguese forced him out and placed

their own candidate, Kanini, on the throne. Kanini coveted the

12
Historical Setting

nearby kingdom of Kasanje—peopled by Mbundu but ruled by

Imbangala—for its role in the slave trade. Once he had consolidated power, in 1680 Kanini successfully moved against Kasanje,

which was undergoing a succession crisis of its own. Kanini's defeat

of the Kasanje state made his Portuguese benefactors realize that

as his empire expanded, Kanini was increasingly threatening their

own slaving interests. Subsequently, Kanini defeated a Portuguese

military expedition sent against him, although he died soon after. In 1683 Portugal negotiated with the new Matamba queen to halt

further attempts to conquer Kasanje territory and, because of

mounting competition from other European powers, convinced her

to trade exclusively with Portugal.

Lunda and Chokwe Kingdoms

The Lunda Kingdom lay east, beyond Matamba and Kasanje.

It developed in the seventeenth century, and its center was in

present-day Zaire's western Shaba Region (formerly Katanga

Province). The Lunda Kingdom expanded by absorbing the chiefs

of neighboring groups in the empire, rather than by deposing them.

The Lunda consolidated their state by adopting an orderly system

of succession and by gaining control of the trade caravans that

passed through their kingdom.

The Portuguese hoped to deal directly with the Lunda for slaves

and thus bypass the representatives of the Matamba and Kasanje,

who acted as intermediaries. Apparentiy entertaining similar ideas,

the Lunda attacked Matamba and Kasanje in the 1760s. The Lunda, however, proved no more successful than the Portuguese at totally subduing these Mbundu kingdoms.

The Chokwe, who, according to oral accounts, migrated from

either central Africa or the upper reaches of the Kasai River in

present-day Zaire, established themselves as trading intermediaries

in eastern Angola in the middle of the nineteenth century. With

guns that they obtained from the Ovimbundu, they attacked and

destroyed the Lunda Kingdom in 1900. The Chokwe rapidly ex- panded their influence in the northeast and east, replacing the Lunda culture with their own language and customs.

Ovimbundu and Kwanhama Kingdoms

Between 1500 and 1700, the Ovimbundu peoples migrated from

the north and east of Angola to the Benguela Plateau. They did

not, however, consolidate their kingdoms, nor did their kings

assert their sovereignty over the plateau until the eighteenth century, when some twenty-two kingdoms emerged. Thirteen of the

kingdoms, including Bie, Bailundu, and Ciyaka, emerged as

13
Angola: A Country Study

powerful entities, and the Ovimbundu acquired a reputation as the most successful traders of the Angolan interior. After the Portuguese conquered most of the Ovimbundu states in the late nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonial authorities directly or

indirectly appointed Ovimbundu kings.

The Kwanhama, belonging to the Bantu-speaking group, established a kingdom early in the nineteenth century in the vicinity

of the border with present-day Namibia. Kwanhama kings welcomed trade with Europeans, especially with Portuguese and German gun dealers. Feared even by the Portuguese, the well-armed

Kwanhama developed a reputation as fierce warriors. Their kingdom survived until 1915, when a large Portuguese army invaded

and defeated them.

The Dutch Interregnum, 1641-48

During the first half of the 1600s, when Portugal became involved

in a succession of European religious and dynastic wars at the

insistence of Spain, the Portuguese colonies were subjected to attacks

by Spain's enemies. Holland, one of Spain's most potent enemies,

raided and harassed the Portuguese territories in Angola. The Dutch

also began pursuing alliances with Africans, including the king of

Kongo and Nzinga of Matamba, who, angered by their treatment

at the hands of the Portuguese, welcomed the opportunity to deal

with another European power.

When it rebelled against Spain in 1640, Portugal hoped to establish good relations with the Dutch. Instead, the Dutch saw

an opportunity to expand their own colonial holdings and in 1641

captured Luanda and Benguela, forcing the Portuguese governor

to flee with his fellow refugees inland to Massangano. The Portuguese were unable to dislodge the Dutch from their coastal beachhead. As the Dutch occupation cut off the supply of slaves to Brazil,

that colony's economy suffered. In response, Brazilian colonists

raised money and organized forces to launch an expedition aimed

at unseating the Dutch from Angola. In May 1648, the Dutch gar- rison in Luanda surrendered to the Brazilian detachment, and the

Dutch eventually relinquished their other Angolan conquests.

According to some historians, after the retaking of Luanda, Angola

became a de facto colony of Brazil, so driven was the South American colony's sugar-growing economy by its need for slaves. Angola in the Eighteenth Century

Slave Trading in the 1 700s

Slave trading dominated the Portuguese economy in eighteenth14
Historical Setting

century Angola. Slaves were obtained by agents, called pombeiros,

who roamed the interior, generally following established routes along rivers. They bought slaves, called pegas (pieces), from local chiefs in exchange for commodities such as cloth and wine. The

pombeiros returned to Luanda or Benguela with chain gangs of

several hundred captives, most of whom were malnourished and

in poor condition from the arduous trip on foot. On the coast, they were better fed and readied for their sea crossing. Before embarking, they were baptized en masse by Roman Catholic priests. The

Adantic crossing in the overcrowded, unsanitary vessels lasted from

five weeks to two months. Many captives died en route. During the sixteenth century and most of the seventeenth century, Luanda had been the main slave port of the Portuguese, but

toward the end of the 1600s they turned their attention to Benguela.

Although the first efforts at inland expansion from Benguela failed,

the Portuguese eventually penetrated the Ovimbundu kingdoms

and subjected their people to the same treatment that had earlier

befallen the Mbundu. By the end of the eighteenth century, Benguela rivaled Luanda as a slave port.

According to historian C.R. Boxer, African slaves were more

valued in the Americas than were American Indian slaves because

Africans tended to adjust more easily to slavery and because they were less vulnerable to the diseases of Europeans. Boxer also suggests that Jesuits in the New World opposed the notion of using

Indians as slaves, whereas they were less resistant to the use of Afri- cans as slaves. Many of these African slaves were sent to Spanish

colonies, where they brought a higher price than they would have

if sold in Brazil.

From the late sixteenth century until 1836, when Portugal

abolished slave trafficking, Angola may have been the source of

as many as 2 million slaves for the New World. More than half

of these went to Brazil, nearly a third to the Caribbean, and from

10 to 15 percent to the Rio de la Plata area on the southeastern

coast of South America. Considering the number of slaves that

actually arrived, and taking into account those who died crossing

the Atlantic or during transport from the interior to the coast for

shipping, the Angola area may have lost as many as 4 million people as a result of the slave trade.

By the end of the eighteenth century, it became clear that Lisbon's dream of establishing a trading monopoly in its colonies had

not been achieved. Competition from foreign powers contributed

significantly to Portugal's inability to control the slave trade, either

in Angola's interior or on the coast. In 1784, for example, the

French expelled a garrison that the Portuguese had established a

15
Angola: A Country Study

year earlier in Cabinda. Portugal was also concerned about the

northward expansion of Dutch settlers from the Cape of Good Hope

area. Moreover, at this time the British, Dutch, and Brazilians,

not the Portuguese, were contributing most of the capital and vessels used in the slave trade. Furthermore, many of the European

goods arriving at Angolan ports were coming from nations other

than Portugal.

Portuguese Settlers in Angola

The Portuguese authorities and settlers in Angola formed a motley group. The inhabitants resented the governors, whom they

regarded as outsiders. Indeed, these officials were less concerned

with the welfare of the colony than with the profit they could realize from the slave trade. But governing the small colony was difficult because any central administrative authority had to deal with a group of settlers prone to rebellion. Because Brazil was the jewel

of Portugal's overseas territories, Portuguese who immigrated to Angola were frequentiy deserters, degredados, peasants, and others

who had been unable to succeed in Portugal or elsewhere in the

Portuguese-speaking world.

Owing principally to the African colony's unsavory reputation

in Portugal and the high regard in which Brazil was held, there was little emigration to Angola in the 1600s and 1700s. Thus, the

white population of Angola in 1777 was less than 1,600. Of this number, very few whites were females; one account states that in

1846 the ratio of Portuguese men to Portuguese women in the

colony was eleven to one. A product of this gender imbalance was

miscegenation; for example, the mestizo population in 1777 was es- timated at a little more than 4,000.

Besides exporting them, Europeans in Angola kept slaves as porters, soldiers, agricultural laborers, and as workers at jobs that the

Portuguese increasingly considered too menial to do themselves.

At no time, however, was domestic slavery more important to the

local economy than the exporting of slaves. The 1800s: Turmoil in Portugal, Reform and Expansion

in Angola

The Early Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth century ushered in a period of crisis for Portugal. The invasion by Napoleon's armies in 1807 forced the Portuguese court into exile in Brazil. In 1820 the regency was

overthrown, and a conflict began between constitutionalists and

monarchists that did not end until 1834. Many of these changes

16
Historical Setting

were echoed in Angola, where there were uprisings and an army

mutiny that toppled the colony's governor.

The instability in Europe in the first three decades of the

nineteenth century removed Portugal, Britain, France, and Holland from the Angolan slave market. But this turn of events allowed

Angolan traders access to other markets. Unfettered trade with

Brazilians, Cubans, and American southerners enabled the Portuguese slave dealers to enjoy a period of great prosperity, while

the Angolan kingdoms suffered increased depopulation. After the

constitutionalist triumph in Portugal in 1834, a provisional junta

took charge in Luanda.

Abolition of the Slave Trade

In the early 1830s, the Portuguese government appointed a

progressive prime minister, the Marques de Sa da Bandeira, whose

most important reform was the abolition of the slave trade in 1836.

The decree, however, could not be enforced adequately, and it took

Britain's Royal Navy to put an end to the activity in the middle

of the nineteenth century.

In 1858 slavery was legally abolished in Angola. Government

slaves had already been freed in 1854, but the 1858 proclamation

declared that all slavery should cease by 1878. Legislation was

passed to compensate owners and to care for the freed people. But

many of the colonists found ways to circumvent the decree, so that

the actual conditions of labor did not change significantly.

Expansion and the Berlin Conference

The abolition of the slave trade coincided with increased Portuguese expansion in Angola. Expansion began in 1838 with the

conquest and establishment of a fort at Duque de Braganca

(renamed Calandula), in an area east of Luanda. By mid-century

the Portuguese had extended their formal control still farther east

to the Kasanje market near the Cuango River (see Matamba and

Kasanje Kingdoms, this ch.). In 1840 the Portuguese founded the

town of Mocamedes (present-day Namibe) on the coast south of

Benguela. The Portuguese also attempted to gain control of the

coast from Luanda north to Cabinda through military occupation

of the major ports. Because of British opposition, however, they were unable to complete this attempt and never gained control of

the mouth of the Congo River.

The cost of military operations to secure economically strategic

points led in 1856 to the imposition on Africans of a substantially

increased hut tax, which for the first time had to be paid with cur- rency or trade goods rather than with slaves. As a result, many

17
Angola: A Country Study

Africans either refused to pay or fled from areas controlled by the

Portuguese. By 1861, therefore, the Portuguese lacked the resources

for continued military expansion or economic development, and

most of the interior remained in the control of African traders and

warriors.

From the late 1870s through the early 1890s, Portugal renewed

expansion into the interior. Part of the impetus came from the Lisbon Geographical Society, founded in 1875 by a group of industrialists, scholars, and colonial and military officials. This society

stimulated a popular concern for the colonies in Portugal. In reac- tion to the activities of the society and the growing interest among

Europeans in colonial adventure, the Portuguese government

allotted large sums for public works in Africa and encouraged a minor revival of missionary work.

An advisory commission to Portugal's Ministry of the Navy and

Colonies formed an expedition in the 1870s to link Angola on the

Atlantic coast with Mozambique on the Indian Ocean coast. The

Portuguese government supported this expedition because it aspired

to control a solid strip of territory across the central part of the

continent. Nonetheless, Portugal was unable to gain control of the

hinterland.

Aware of French and Belgian activities on the lower Congo River,

in 1883 the Portuguese occupied Cabinda and Massabi north of

the Congo River, towns that Portugal had long claimed. In the same year, Portugal annexed the region of the old Kongo Kingdom. Seeking to uphold these claims against French and Belgian

advances in the Congo River Basin, Portugal negotiated a treaty

with Britain in 1884; the other European powers, however, rejected it. Portugal's subsequent demands for an international confer- ence on the Congo fell on deaf ears until German chancellor Otto von Bismarck seized on the idea as an opportunity to diminish

French and British power.

At the Berlin Conference of 1884, the participants established

in principle the limits of Portugal's claims to Angola, and in later years, treaties with the colonial powers that controlled the neighboring territories delineated Angola's boundaries. But because

other, more powerful European states of the nineteenth century

had explored central Africa, they, not Portugal, determined

Angola's boundaries. The west coast territory Portugal acquired

included the left bank of the Congo River and the Cabinda enclave, an acquisition whose value to the state was demonstrated in later years by the discovery there of oil. Britain, however, forced Portugal to withdraw from Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) and

Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia).

18
Historical Setting

Portugal and Belgium concluded several agreements between

1891 and 1927, establishing a complex border generally following

natural frontiers. Cabinda's boundaries with the French Congo

and the Belgian Congo were delimited in 1886 and 1894, respectively, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Portugal had staked

out most of its claims in Angola.

As far as Europe was concerned, Angola was in the Portuguese

sphere of influence, and its status was not subject to further deliberations. Considering its diminished stature in relation to other

European powers, Portugal had done well to hold onto as much

territory as it had. But the fact that Angola was recognized as a Portuguese possession did not mean that it was under Portuguese

control. The work of conquest took the better part of twenty-five

years, and in some remote areas even longer.

Settlement, Conquest, and Development

The Demographic Situation

As the spheres of interest in the African interior became clari- fied, European nations turned to fulfilling the obligation imposed

by the Berlin Conference of effectively occupying all territories

claimed. For Portugal, meeting this obligation involved not only

the conquest of the independent African kingdoms of the interior

but also an attempt to settle Portuguese farmers.

Immigration in the late nineteenth century was discouraged by

the same conditions that had deterred it earlier: a difficult climate

and a lack of economic development. Although there were fewer

than 10,000 whites in Angola in 1900 (most of whom were degredados), there was a substantial increase in white female immigration;

the male-to-female ratio that year was a bit more than two to one. Concomitantly, there was a drop in the ratio of mestigos to whites;

whereas mestigos had outnumbered whites in 1845 by more than

three to one, in 1900 this ratio was reversed. Africans still constituted more than 99 percent of the population in 1900. Their numbers reportedly declined from an estimated 5.4 million in 1845 to about 4.8 million in 1900, although scholars dispute these figures.

Whites were concentrated in the coastal cities of Luanda and Benguela. In addition to farming and fishing, Europeans engaged in

merchant activities in the towns and trade in the bush. In the south,

colonies of farmers who had settled earlier in the century had dwindled into small outposts, as many settlers returned to Luanda.

In the late nineteenth century, Africans controlled trade in the

plateaus of the interior, despite Portuguese expansion. The Ovimbundu proved highly successful intermediaries on the southern

19
Angola: A Country Study

trade route that ran from the Bie Plateau to Benguela. The Ovimbundu were more competitive than the sertanejos (people of the frontier, as Europeans and their representatives in the rural areas were

called), who often had to pay tribute and fines to African chiefs

through whose territory they traveled. By the mid- 1880s, the Ovimbundu by and large had replaced the sertanejos. The Chokwe and

Imbangala also took advantage of their positions in the interior to extend their control over the region's trade. Nonetheless, by the

late 1800s Portuguese encroachments and the imposition of European rule limited the political freedom of these Africans and

diminished their prosperity.

Military Campaigns

After the Berlin Conference, the Portuguese military was preoccupied with the subjugation of the African inhabitants of the hinterland, and by 1915 it secured the colony for Portugal. Before

African resistance was broken, intensive military action was neces- sary in several areas. One campaign took place in the southern

region in response to a request from the Boer settlement near Humbe that was threatened by the Kwanhama. Sporadic campaigning included several serious reverses for the Portuguese. The Portuguese were able to bring the Kwanhama under control only with

the assistance of field artillery and the establishment of a series of

fortified garrisons. One of the most difficult Portuguese military

campaigns was waged against the Dembos, a Kimbundu-speaking

people who lived less than 150 kilometers northeast of Luanda. The

Portuguese attacked the Dembos repeatedly over a period of three

years before the Dembos were finally subdued in 1910. Because

of difficult conditions, including the tropical climate, the Portuguese

did not complete their occupation of Dembos land until 1917.

Administration and Development

Portuguese colonial policies toward civil administration were first formulated in Mozambique, where in the 1890s Antonio Enes,

former minister of colonies, advocated close control and full use

of African labor, administrative reorganization, and colonization

schemes. In 1899 Paiva Couceiro, who had been with Enes in

Mozambique, published a volume in which he advocated white

colonization, decentralization of administration from Lisbon, and

the necessity of inculcating in the Africans the "habit of work."

As governor general of Angola between 1907 and 1910, Couceiro

prepared the basis of civil administration in the colony. Military

officers were to oversee administrative divisions, and through them

European civilization was to be brought to the Africans. Many

20
Historical Setting

of Couceiro's reforms were incorporated in legislation in 1914 that

brought, at least in theory, financial and administrative autonomy to the colony.

There was considerable progress toward the development of an economic infrastructure during the first quarter of the twentieth

century. New towns sprang up in the interior, and road construction advanced. The key to development, however, was the Benguela Railway, which would become Angola's largest employer and

which linked the mines of the Belgian Congo's Katanga Province

(in present-day Shaba Region in Zaire) to the Angolan port at Lobito.

In the 1920s, the Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia

de Diamantes de Angola—Diamang), an exclusive concessionaire

in Angola until the 1960s, initiated diamond mining. As the

employer of more Africans than any other industry, Diamang

deeply affected the lives of its 18,000 African workers through

extensive investment and the provision of social services.

The Portuguese, however, were generally unable to provide

Angola with adequate development capital or with settlers. Trade

had fallen off sharply when the rubber boom ended just before

World War I, and the war itself produced only a brief revival of

foreign trade. At the end of what is commonly referred to as Portugal's republican era (1910-26), the finances of the colony were

in serious difficulty.

Angola under the Salazar Regime

Angola under the New State

The right-wing Portuguese military coup of May 1926, which

ended the republican era, led to the installation of a one-party re- gime in Portugal and the establishment of what came to be known

as the New State. A young professor of economics, Antonio Salazar, became minister of finance in 1928, and by 1930 he was one

of the most prominent members of the government. He held the

post of prime minister from 1932 until 1968, when he was incapacitated by a stroke. During his tenure in office, he left a lasting impression on events in Angola.

The most important changes introduced into Angola by the new

regime were embodied in the Colonial Act of 1930. This act brought

Angola's economy into line with economic policies that the new

regime was implementing at home. But Portugal's application of

strict financial controls over the colony also halted the drift toward

political autonomy in Angola.

Portugal's policies toward Angola in the 1930s and 1940s were

21
Angola: A Country Study

based on the principle of national integration. Economically,

socially, and politically, Angola was to become an integral part of

the Portuguese nation. In line with these policies, Portugal renamed

African towns, usually after Portuguese heroes. Still later, in the

early 1950s, Portugal withdrew the currency, known as the angolar, and replaced it with the Portuguese escudo.

Portugal integrated its economy with that of Angola by erecting

protective trade tariffs and discouraging foreign investment capital, except in the construction of the Benguela Railway and in the

exploitation of diamonds. In this way, Portugal sought to make

Angola self-supporting and, at the same time, to turn it into a market for Portuguese goods. But despite a certain degree of success, Angola enjoyed no real prosperity until after World War II, when

higher coffee prices brought enormous profits to Angolan producers.

The consequent economic success of the coffee plantations, owned

primarily by newly arrived Portuguese setders attracted by the colo- ny's increasing wealth, continued until independence in 1975, when

the Portuguese exodus and civil war severely disrupted the Angolan economy.

Salazar's Racial Politics

Until 1940 Portuguese constituted less than 1 percent of Angola's population, and it was not until 1950 that their proportion

approached 2 percent. This increase in the number of Europeans

and the continuation of forced labor (not abolished until 1962) and

other labor abuses led to an intensification of racial conflict. Before

1900 mestizos had been engaged in a variety of commercial and

governmental roles, but as the white population came to outnumber them, the status of mestizos declined. In the first two decades

of the twentieth century, laws and regulations requiring a certain

level of education to hold some government positions effectively

excluded mestizos from access to them. In 1921 the colonial administration divided the civil service into European and African branches

and assigned mestizos and the very few African assimilados to the

latter, thereby limiting their chances of rising in the bureaucratic

hierarchy. In 1929 statutes limited the bureaucratic level to which

mestigos and assimilados could rise to that of first clerk, established

different pay scales for Europeans and non-Europeans in both public

and private sectors, and restricted competition between them for jobs in the bureaucracy. Given this legal framework, the immigration of increasing numbers of Portuguese led to considerable dis- affection among mestigos, who had hitherto tended to identify with

whites rather than with Africans.

22
Historical Setting

Beginning in the 1940s, the system of forced labor came under

renewed criticism. One particularly outspoken critic, Captain Henrique Galvao, who had served for more than two decades in an

official capacity in Angola, chronicled abuses committed against

the African population. The Salazar government responded by

arresting Galvao for treason and banning his report. Despite the

introduction of some labor reforms from the late 1940s through

the late 1950s, forced labor continued.

Legislation that was passed in Portugal between 1926 and 1933 was based on a new conception of Africans. Whereas Portugal previously had assumed that Africans would somehow naturally be

assimilated into European society, the New State established definite

standards Africans had to meet to qualify for rights. The new legislation defined Africans as a separate element in the population,

referred to as indigenas (see Glossary). Those who learned to speak

Portuguese, who took jobs in commerce or industry, and who

behaved as Portuguese citizens were classified as assimilados. In

accepting the rights of citizenship, assimilados took on the same tax

obligations as the European citizens. Male indigenas were required

to pay a head tax. If they could not raise the money, they were

obligated to work for the government for half of each year without

wages.

The colonial administration stringently applied the requirements

for assimilation. In 1950, of an estimated African population of

4 million in Angola (according to an official census that probably

provided more accurate figures than previous estimates), there were

fewer than 31,000 assimilados. But instead of elevating the status of Africans, the policy of assimilation maintained them in a degraded status. The colonial administration required indigenas to carry

identification cards, of major importance psychologically to the Afri- cans and politically to the Portuguese, who were thus more easily

able to control the African population.

The authoritarian Salazar regime frequently used African in- formants to ferret out signs of political dissidence. Censorship, border control, police action, and control of education all retarded the

development of African leadership. Africans studying in Portugal

and therefore exposed to "progressive" ideas—were sometimes

prevented from returning home. Political offenses brought severe

penalties, and the colonial administration viewed African organizations with extreme disfavor.

Rise of African Nationalism

In the 1940s and 1950s, African acquiescence to Portuguese col- onization began to weaken, particularly in the provinces bordering

23
Angola: A Country Study

the Belgian Congo and in Luanda, where far-reaching changes in

world politics influenced a small number of Africans. The associations they formed and the aspirations they shared paved the way

for the liberation movements of the 1960s.

The colonial system had created a dichotomy among the Afri- can population that corresponded to that of the Portuguese social structure—the elite versus the masses. Within the context of the

burgeoning nationalist struggle, competition developed between

the small, multiracial class of educated and semi-educated town

inhabitants and the rural, uneducated black peasantry that formed

the majority of Angola's population. At the same time, black

Angolans identified strongly with their precolonial ethnic and

regional origins. By the 1950s, the influence of class and ethnicity

had resulted in three major sources of Angolan nationalism. The

first, the Mbundu, who inhabited Luanda and the surrounding

regions, had a predominantly urban, elite leadership, while the

Bakongo and Ovimbundu peoples had rural, peasant orientations.

The major nationalist movements that emerged from these three

groups—the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA—each claimed to represent the entire Angolan population. Before long, these movements became bitter rivals as the personal ambitions of their leaders, in addition to differences in political ideology and competition

for foreign aid, added to their ethnic differences (see Ethnic Groups

and Languages, ch. 2). Roots of Discontent

Portugal's assimilationist policy had produced a small group of

educated Africans who considered themselves Portuguese. But as

this group recognized that it was not fully respected by the Portuguese and as it became increasingly aware of its alienation from

its traditional origins, some members began to articulate resent- ment, both of their own ambiguous social and cultural situations

and of the plight of the nonassimilated majority of Africans. From

among their ranks emerged most of the first generation of liberation movement leaders.

The influx of rural Africans to towns also bred anticolonial resent- ment. In the 1950s, the population of Luanda almost doubled, and

most of the growth was among Africans. Lured by the expectation

of work, Africans in towns became aware of the inequality of

opportunities between Europeans and Africans. The compulsory

labor system that many had experienced in rural areas was regarded

as the most onerous aspect of Portuguese rule. More than any other

factor, this system, which was not abolished until 1962, united many

Africans in resentment of Portuguese rule.

24
Under the Salazar regime,

Angolans who neither spoke

Portuguese nor behaved as Europeans, like this mother

and child, were classified as indfgenas.

Courtesy Richard J. Hough

The Salazar government's settlement policies contributed to the

spread of anticolonial resentment, especially after 1945. These poli- cies resulted in increased competition for employment and growing racial friction. Between 1955 and 1960, for example, the

government brought from Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands more than 55,000 whites. Induced to emigrate by government

promises of money and free houses, these peasants settied on colonatos (large agricultural communities). Many immigrants to the colonatos were unskilled at farming, often lacked an elementary education, or were too old for vigorous manual labor. Consequently,

many of them were unsuccessful on the colonatos and, after a time,

moved to towns where they competed with Africans, often successfully, for skilled and unskilled jobs. The Portuguese who held jobs

of lower social status often felt it all the more necessary to claim

social superiority over the Africans.

External events also played a role in the development of the

independence movements. While most European powers were

preparing to grant independence to their African colonies, the Sala- zar regime was seeking to reassert its grasp on its colonies, as witnessed by the effort it expended in the ill-fated colonato system.

There were two basic patterns in the rise of nationalism in

Angola. In one case, African assimilados and other urban Africans

with some education joined urban mestiqos and whites in associations based on the assumption that their interests were different

25
Angola: A Country Study

from, and perhaps in competition with, those of the majority of

the African population still attached to their rural communities.

Angolans also formed organizations based on ethnic or religious

groupings that encompassed or at least sought to include rural Afri- cans, although the leaders of these organizations often had some

education and urban experience.

African Associations

The beginnings of African associations, to which the liberation

movement traced its roots, remained obscure in 1988. Luanda was known to have had recreational societies, burial clubs, and other

mutual aid associations in the early 1900s. After the Portuguese

republican constitution of 1911 increased freedoms of the press, opinion, and association in the African colonies, a number of Afri- can associations were formed, including the Lisbon-based African

League in 1919. Sponsored and financed by the Portuguese government, pardy in response to pressure from the League of Nations

with which African League leaders had established contacts, the

African League was a federation of all African associations from

Portuguese Africa. Its avowed purpose was to point out to the Portuguese government injustices or harsh laws that ought to be

repealed. In 1923 the African League organized the second ses- sion of the Third Pan-African Congress in Lisbon.

Assimilados (mestigo and African) dominated most associations,

and their membership seldom included uneducated Africans.

Because the associations were under close Portuguese control, their

members were unable to express the full extent of their discontent

with the colonial system. As a result, extralegal, politically oriented

African associations began to appear in the 1950s. Far-reaching

economic and social changes, the growth of the white settler population, increased urbanization of Africans, and the beginnings of

nationalist movements in other parts of Africa contributed to the

growth of anticolonial feeling. In 1952 some 500 Angolan Africans

appealed to the United Nations (UN) in a petition protesting what

they called the injustices of Portuguese policy and requesting that

steps be taken to end Portuguese rule. The Popular Movementfor the Liberation of Angola

The earliest anticolonialist political group in Angola, founded

about 1953, was the Party of the United Struggle of Africans of

Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola—PLUA).

In December 1956, the PLUA combined with other organizations

in Luanda to form the MPLA, whose aim was to achieve independence for Angola by means of a united front of all African interests.

26
Historical Setting

After many of its leaders were arrested in March 1959, the party

moved its headquarters to Conakry, Guinea. The MPLA's first leader, Mario de Andrade, an educated mestiqo and a poet, gave

the party a reputation for representing primarily the interests of

urban intellectuals rather than the indigenous masses. The MPLA traces its Marxist-Leninist origins to its ties with

the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues—PCP). The initial MPLA manifesto called for an end to colonialism and the building of a modern society free of

prejudice, a goal that could be realized only after a lengthy period

of political preparation followed by a revolutionary struggle. The

MPLA leadership sought a definite direction and a set of objectives for the independence struggle, in contrast with the broad

nationalist approach of its greatest rival for supremacy in the struggle, the FNLA. Thus, the MPLA's program, outlined in a policy

document in the 1960s, avoided a stated commitment to socialism or Marxism-Leninism, but it clearly alluded to the movement's

adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles and the Nonaligned Movement. The organization's leftist orientation attracted the support

of the Soviet Union and China, both of which envisioned prospects

for a foothold in Africa provided by a ruling Marxist-Leninist van- guard party.

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola

The FNLA was founded in 1954 as the Union of Peoples of

Northern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola

UPNA). Founded to advance the interests of the Bakongo rather

than to promote independence, the UPNA petitioned the UN in

1957 for restoration of the Kongo Kingdom, an objective shared

by the Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des Bakongo—Abako) in the

Belgian Congo (present-day Zaire; see Kongo Kingdom, this ch.).

Because of important ties to the Bakongo in the Belgian colony and

because of the difficulties of operating in Angola, the UPNA was

based in Leopoldville (present-day Kinshasa, capital of Zaire). In

1958, acknowledging the futility of its quest, the UPNA adopted

the title Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de

Angola—UPA) and the aim of independence for all of Angola.

Organizational Weaknesses

The Angolan African organizations active before 1961 were dis- organized and lacked resources, membership, and strong leadership. There were a number of reasons for these weaknesses. First,

their members were not prepared for either a political or a military struggle during the 1950s, however attractive they may have

27
Angola: A Country Study

found nationalist ideals. Second, they were divided socially as well

as ethnically. There were gulfs between the mestigos and the assimilados, on the one hand, and the indigenas, on the other hand, that

frequentiy resulted in the pursuit of different goals. Third, although

a substantial proportion of the white community also wanted Angola

to break away from Portuguese domination, it hoped to perpetuate the colonial regime in every aspect except its control by Lisbon.

Finally, there was a critical lack of capable black leaders in the

1950s. The newly developing elite was not large enough to run a

nationalist movement, and traditional leaders, focused on ethnic

issues, were not prepared to lead such a movement. Church leaders, who might have been capable as national movement leaders,

did not enter the struggle unless disaffected or until they became

targets of police repression.

Beginning of Revolution

After 1959, as several African states won their independence,

anticolonial sentiment intensified in Portugal's overseas territories. The Portuguese met this sentiment with stiffening opposition

characterized by increasing surveillance and frequent arrests. In

December 1959, the Portuguese secret political police, the Inter- national Police for the Defense of the State (Policia Internacional

de Defesa de Estado—PIDE), arrested fifty-seven persons in Luanda who were suspected of being involved in antigovernment political activities. Among those arrested were a few Europeans,

assimilados, and other Africans. After this incident, the Portuguese

military in Angola reinforced its position, particularly in the northwestern provinces, and became increasingly repressive.

In the first months of 1961, tensions came to a head. A group

of alleged MPLA members attacked police stations and prisons in an attempt to free African political prisoners. Then, a group of

disgruntled cotton workers in Malanje Province attacked government officials and buildings and a Catholic mission. In the wake

of further sporadic violence, many wealthy Portuguese repatriated. They left behind them the poor whites who were unable to leave on short notice but who were ready to take the law into their own

hands.

The violence spread to the northwest, where over the course of

two days Bakongo (thought by some to have been UPA members)

in Uige Province attacked isolated farmsteads and towns in a series of forty coordinated raids, killing hundreds of Europeans. Also

involved in the rural uprisings were non-Bakongo in parts of Cuanza

Norte Province. During the next few months, violence spread northward toward the border with the former Belgian Congo as the

28
Historical Setting

Portuguese put pressure on the rebels. Although it had not begun

that way, as time passed the composition of the rebel groups became

almost exclusively Bakongo.

The Portuguese reacted to the uprising with violence. Settlers organized into vigilante committees, and reprisals for the rebel- lion went uncontrolled by civilian and military authorities. The

whites' treatment of Africans was as brutal and as arbitrary as had

been that of the Africans toward them. Fear pervaded the country, driving an even deeper wedge between the races. The loss of Africans as a result of the 1961 uprisings has been

estimated as high as 40,000, many of whom died from disease or because of famine; about 400 Europeans were killed, as well as many

assimilados and Africans deemed sympathetic to colonial authorities. By summer the Portuguese had reduced the area controlled

by the rebels to one-half its original extent, but major pockets of

resistance remained. Portuguese forces, relying heavily on air power, attacked many villages. The result was the mass exodus

of Africans toward what is now Zaire.

In an effort to head off future violence, in the early 1960s the

Salazar regime initiated a program to develop Angola's economic

infrastructure. The Portuguese government increased the paved

road network by 500 percent, stimulated the development of domestic air routes, provided emergency aid to the coffee producers, and

abolished compulsory cotton cultivation. To reestablish confidence

among Africans and among those who had been subject to reprisals

by white settlers, the military initiated a campaign under which

it resettled African refugees into village compounds and provided

them with medical, recreational, and some educational facilities. The uprisings attracted worldwide attention. In mid- 1961 the

UN General Assembly appointed a subcommittee to investigate

the situation in Angola, and it produced a report unfavorable to Portuguese rule. The events also helped mobilize the various liber- ation groups to renewed action.

Angolan Insurgency

The rebels who had coordinated the 1961 uprisings later began

to undertake effective military organization. The several nationalist organizations set up training camps and attracted external mili- tary aid. In the summer of 1961, for example, the UPA, which

had strong support among the Bakongo, formed the National Liberation Army of Angola (Exercito de Libertacao Nacional de

Angola—ELNA), a force of about 5,000 untrained and poorly

armed troops. Subsequently, groups of Angolans went to Morocco and Tunisia to train with Algerian forces, then fighting for

29
Angola: A Country Study

their own nation's independence. After winning its independence

in 1962, Algeria supplied the ELNA with arms and ammunition.

In March 1962, the UPA joined with another small Kongo

nationalist group, the Democratic Party of Angola (Partido

Democratico de Angola—PDA) to form the FNLA. The FNLA

immediately proclaimed the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilo—GRAE).

The president of the FNLA/GRAE, Holden Roberto, declared his

organization to be the sole authority in charge of anti-Portuguese

military operations inside Angola. Consequently, he repeatedly

refused to merge his organization with any other budding nationalist movement, preferring to build the FNLA/GRAE into an all- Angolan mass movement over which he would preside.

By 1963, with training and arms from Algeria, bases in Zaire,

and funds from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the

FNLA/GRAE military and political organization was becoming

formidable. Still, it made no significant territorial gains.

Meanwhile, the MPLA, which had been behind the initial uprisings in Luanda in February 1961, had suffered a great deal

from Portuguese reprisals, with many of its militant leaders dead

or in prison. The rebuilding of the MPLA was substantially aided

in 1962 by the arrival of Agostinho Neto, an assimilated Mbundu

physician who had spent several years in jail for expressing his

political views and had recently escaped from detention in Portugal. Neto attempted to bring together the MPLA and Roberto's

FNLA/GRAE, but his efforts were thwarted by Roberto's insis- tence that his organization represented all Angolans.

Initially based in Kinshasa, as was the FNLA/GRAE, in 1963

the MPLA shifted its headquarters to Brazzaville (in present-day

Congo) because of Roberto's close ties to Zairian president Mobutu

Sese Seko. From Brazzaville, the MPLA launched small guerrilla

operations in Cabinda, but the movement was militarily far weaker

than the FNLA. Moreover, it lacked an operations base from which

it could reach the densely populated north and center of Angola.

As it dragged on into 1964 and 1965, the conflict became

stalemated. Hampered by insufficient financial assistance, the in- surgents were unable to maintain offensive operations against a

fully equipped Portuguese military force that had increased to a

strength of more than 40,000. The FNLA settled into a mountain

stronghold straddling the border of Uige and Zaire provinces and

continued to carry on guerrilla activities. The insurgents found it increasingly difficult to sustain the cohesion they had achieved after 1961 and 1962. Between 1963 and 1965, differences in leadership,

programs, and following between the FNLA and the MPLA led

30
Historical Setting

to open hostilities that seriously weakened each group's strength

and effectiveness.

Ascendancy of the MPLA

In 1964 the MPLA reorganized and increased its efforts to reinforce its units fighting in the Dembos areas. The improved effi- ciency of the movement's political and military operations attracted

support from other African countries, the OAU, and several nonAfrican countries, all of which had previously scorned the MPLA

because of its internal problems.

The growing military success of the MPLA in the mid-1960s was largely the product of support from the governments of Tanzania and Zambia, which permitted the organization to open offices in their capitals. More important, Tanzania and Zambia allowed

the transport of Chinese and Soviet weapons across their territories to the Angolan border. Because of the influx of weapons, in

1965 the MPLA was able to open a military front in eastern Angola,

from which it launched a major offensive the following year. By

this time, the MPLA had become a greater threat to Portugal's

colonial rule than the FNLA.

In June 1966, the MPLA supported an unsuccessful coup against

President Marien Ngouabi of Congo, whereupon activities of all guerrilla groups in Brazzaville were curtailed. After the MPLA

moved its headquarters to Lusaka, Zambia, in 1968, it conducted

intensive guerrilla warfare in the Angolan provinces of Moxico and

Cuando Cubango.

Beginning in 1969, attacks in Lunda and Bie provinces forced

the Portuguese to resettle many inhabitants of these areas in forti- fied villages. Wherever MPLA guerrillas were in control, they

created new political structures, mainly village action committees.

Politically indoctrinated MPLA guerrillas, some of whom had

received military training in Eastern Europe, ranged all over eastern Angola. By 1968 the MPLA was able to hold regional party conferences inside the country.

The MPLA had a political advantage over the FNLA because

of the links of MPLA leaders to the international ideological left. Its multiracial, Marxist-Leninist, and nationalist (versus ethnic or

regional) views appealed to liberals in Europe and North America. Because of his radical orientation, however, Neto failed to get

help from the United States. During the mid-1960s, the MPLA's

ties to the communist world intensified as MPLA military cadres

traveled to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Beginning in 1965, the MPLA began to receive training from Cuban

forces.

31
Angola: A Country Study

Emergence of UNITA

The MPLA and FNLA faced a third competitor beginning in

1966 with the emergence of UNITA. UNITA first came to international attention when, in December 1966, a group of its guerrillas attacked the town of Vila Teixeira de Sousa (renamed Luau),

succeeding in interrupting the Benguela Railway and stopping Zambian and Zairian copper shipments for a week. The new organization was formed by Jonas Savimbi, the former foreign minister and

main representative of the Ovimbundu within the FNLA/GRAE,

whose disagreements with Roberto over policy issues led to Savimbi's resignation in July 1964. Savimbi had traveled to China in

1965, where he and several of his followers received four months

of military training and became disciples of Maoism. Perhaps the

strongest impact of Maoism on UNITA has been Savimbi' s insis- tence on self-sufficiency and maintenance of the organization's

leadership within Angolan borders. Upon his return to Angola in

1966, Savimbi turned down an invitation from the MPLA to join

its organization as a rank-and-file member and moved UNITA into

the bush, where the organization began its guerrilla war with a

small amount of Chinese military aid transported via Tanzania and

Zambia.

Although UNITA lacked educated cadres and arms, it attract- ed the largest following of the three movements from the Ovimbundu, who comprised about one-third of the population. And,

unlike the MPLA and FNLA, UNITA enjoyed the benefits of a

unified and unchallenged leadership directed by Savimbi.

Moreover, in contrast to the m^V°"dominated, urban-based

MPLA, Savimbi presented UNITA as the representative of black

peasants. UNITA's constitution proclaimed that the movement

would strive for a government proportionally representative of all ethnic groups, clans, and classes. His Maoist-oriented philosophy

led Savimbi to concentrate on raising the political consciousness

of the peasants, most of whom were illiterate and widely dispersed.

Savimbi preached self-reliance and founded cooperatives for food

production and village self-defense units. He set up a pyramidal

structure of elected councils grouping up to sixteen villages that—at least in theory—articulated demands through a political commissar to a central committee, whose thirty-five members were to be

chosen every four years at a congress.

In the early 1970s, UNITA began infiltrating the major population centers, slowly expanding its area of influence westward beyond Bie. There, however, it collided with the eastward thrust of

the MPLA, which was sending Soviet-trained political cadres

32
Agostinho Neto, Angola's first president, delivers a speech on independence day.

Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont)

to work among the Ovimbundu and specifically with the Chokwe,

Lwena, Luchazi, and Lunda, exploiting potential ethnic antagonisms (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). On the eve of independence, UNITA controlled many of the

rich, food-producing central and southern provinces and was therefore able to regulate the flow of food to the rest of the country.

At the time, it claimed the allegiance of about 40 percent of the

population.

Liberation Movements in Cabinda

Several movements advocating a separate status for Cabinda were founded in the early 1960s, all of them basing their claims on their

own interpretation of Cabindan history. The most important of

these was the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of

Cabinda (Mouvement pour la Liberation de 1' Enclave de

Cabinda—MLEC), led by Luis Ranque Franque, which had

evolved out of various emigre associations in Brazzaville. In December 1961 , a faction of the MLEC headed by Henriques Tiago

Nzita seceded to form the Action Committee for the National Union

of Cabindans (Comite d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabindais—CAUNC). A third group, Alliance of Mayombe (Alliance

de Mayombe—Alliama), led by Antonio Eduardo Sozinho,

33
Angola: A Country Study

represented the Mayombe (also spelled Maiombe), the ethnic

minority of the enclave's interior. The three groups resolved their

differences and united in 1963 as the Front for the Liberation of

the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de

Cabinda—FLEG). When the MPLA began its military incursions

into Cabinda in 1964, it encountered hostility not only from coastal

members of FLEC who were living in and near the town of Cabinda

but also from Mayombe peasants, whose region near the Congo

frontier MPLA guerrillas had to cross. Emulating the FNLA, FLEC created a government in exile on

January 10, 1967, in the border town of Tshela in Zaire. Reflecting earlier divisions, however, the faction headed by Nzita es- tablished the Revolutionary Cabindan Committee (Comite

Revolutionnaire Cabindais) in the Congolese town of Pointe Noire.

Portuguese Economic Interests and Resistance to Angolan

Independence

Portugal's motivation to fight Angolan nationalism was based on economic factors. Salazar had instituted an economic system

in 1935 that was designed to exploit the colonies for the benefit

of Portugal by excluding or strictly limiting foreign investments.

But by April 1965, Portugal faced increasing defense expenditures

in order to resist the growing military strength of the nationalist

movements, the MPLA in particular. This turn of events forced

Salazar to permit the influx of foreign capital, which resulted in

rapid economic growth in Angola.

One of the most lucrative foreign investments was made by the

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc), a subsidiary of the United

States-based company Gulf Oil (now Chevron), which found oil in the waters off Cabinda. Other economic concerns included iron,

diamonds, and the manufacturing sector, all of which experienced an enormous increase in production from the mid-1960s to 1974

(see Background to Economic Development, ch. 3). By this time,

Angola had become far more valuable economically to Portugal

than Mozambique or any of its other colonies. Consequently,

Angola's economic growth reinforced Portugal's determination to refuse Angolan independence.

One of the most far-reaching and damaging features of the Portuguese counterinsurgency was the implementation of a resettle- ment program in 1967. By grouping dispersed Africans into large

villages organized by the military in eastern and northwestern

Angola, the Portuguese hoped to achieve organized local defense

against guerrilla attacks and to prevent insurgent infiltration and

mobilization among peasants. Outside the fighting zones, the

34
Historical Setting

Portuguese used resettlement villages to promote economic and social development as a means of winning African support. The Portuguese further controlled the African population by establishing a network of spies and informers in each resettlement village.

By 1974 more than 1 million peasants had been moved into reset- dement villages. The widespread disruption in rural Angola caused

by the resettlement program, which failed to stop the insurgency,

had profound and long-term effects on the rural population. The

breakdown in the agricultural sector in particular was so pervasive that rural reconstruction and development in independent

Angola had, as of 1988, never really succeeded.

The Portuguese armed forces gained an advantage over the

insurgents by the end of 1973 through the use of napalm and defoli- ants. The MPLA suffered the most from counterinsurgency operations, which were concentrated in the east, where the MPLA had

its greatest strength. The MPLA's military failures also caused fur- ther conflicts between its political and military wings, as guerrilla

commanders blamed the MPLA political leadership for the organization's declining military fortunes. In addition, the Soviet Union's

support for Neto was never wholehearted.

The FNLA, which fought from Zairian bases, made litde progress

inside Angola. Furthermore, the Kinshasa government, reacting

to a 1969 Portuguese raid on a Zairian border village that the FNLA

used as a staging base, shut down three border camps, making it even more difficult for the FNLA to launch actions into Angola.

Moreover, internal dissent among FNLA troops exploded into a mutiny in 1972; Mobutu sent Zairian troops to suppress the mutiny and save his friend Roberto from being overthrown. Although

the Zairian army reorganized, retrained, and equipped FNLA guerrillas in the aftermath of the mutiny, the FNLA never posed a seri- ous threat to the Portuguese.

UNITA was also suffering from a variety of problems by the

end of 1973. Militarily it was the weakest nationalist movement.

The organization's military arm lacked sufficient weaponry. Many

of its Chokwe members, who did not have the ethnic loyalty to the organization felt by the Ovimbundu, went over to the betterarmed FNLA and MPLA.

The Portuguese Coup d'Etat and the End of the Colonial Era

During the early 1970s, its African wars—including fierce

nationalist struggles in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau—were

draining Portugal's resources. By 1974 the Portuguese had lost 11,000 military personnel in Africa. On April 25, 1974, a group

of disillusioned military officers, led by the former governor and

35
Angola: A Country Study

commander in Guinea-Bissau, General Antonio de Spinola, over- threw the Lisbon government.

On July 14, Spmola acceded to the wishes of officers who favored

independence for the Portuguese territories in Africa and promised

to take steps toward their freedom. At the end of July, Spinola

appointed Admiral Rosa Coutinho as head of a military council

formed to oversee Angola's independence. Also during this time,

UNITA and the MPLA signed cease-fire agreements with Portugal; the FNLA initially moved military units into northern Angola,

but later it too signed a cease-fire. The liberation movements set up offices in the major population centers of the country, eager

to mobilize support and gain political control.

The approximately 335,000 whites in Angola, who had no political experience and organization under years of Portuguese

authoritarian rule, were unable to assert a unilateral independence.

In addition, their security was severely threatened as the new

Spinola government began releasing political prisoners and authorized Angolans to organize, assemble, and speak freely. In July

1974, white frustration exploded into violence as Luandan whites

rioted, pillaged, and massacred African slum dwellers. The Portuguese army quickly suppressed the riot, but when the Portuguese

government announced that it intended to form a provisional Angolan government that would include representatives of both the

nationalist movements and the white population, further rioting

by whites erupted in Luanda.

Coalition, the Transitional Government, and Civil War

In the wake of the coup in Portugal, there remained a wide split

in the Angolan nationalist movement. Lisbon was anxious to relin- quish power to a unified government and took an active role in

bringing about a reconciliation of the three liberation movements.

In addition, at the urgings of the OAU, Neto, Roberto, and

Savimbi made several attempts to form a common front. At a meeting in Kenya in early January 1975, they recognized their parties

as independent entities with equal rights and responsibilities, agreed

that a period of transition was necessary before independence could

be achieved (during which they would work with the Portuguese

to lay the foundation for an independent Angola), and pledged to maintain Angolan territorial integrity. They also agreed that only

their three organizations would be included in a unity government.

FLEC, with its goal of a Cabindan secession, did not support territorial integrity and was excluded. In addition, an MPLA splinter

group led by Daniel Chipenda was not considered a legitimate

nationalist movement, and it too was excluded.

36
Angolans celebrating independence in the streets of Luanda,

November 1975

Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont)

37
Angola: A Country Study

Meeting in Alvor, Portugal, on January 10, the Lisbon government and the nationalist movements produced an agreement

setting independence for November 11, 1975. Under the Alvor

Agreement, a transitional government headed by a Portuguese high

commissioner was formed; it included the MPLA, UNITA, and

the FNLA.

One factor that influenced these agreements was the role of Admiral Coutinho. His pro-MPLA proclivities threatened the deli- cate balance that the liberation movements had achieved. Angered

by his activities, Spinola removed him at the end ofJanuary 1975.

On January 31, 1975, the transitional government was sworn

in, but the coalition, based on a fragile truce, had serious difficulties, as the leaders of its three member organizations bickered over

a number of issues, including personal power. Within days, local- ized conflicts between MPLA and FNLA forces were renewed.

Moreover, on February 13 the MPLA attacked the Luanda office of Chipenda's faction, after which Chipenda joined the FNLA and

became its assistant secretary general.

Foreign Intervention

During the transition period, foreign powers were becoming in- creasingly involved as the situation in Angola rapidly expanded

into an East-West power struggle. In late January, a high-level United States government policy-making body authorized a grant of

US$300,000 to the pro-Western FNLA, which at the time seemed

to be the strongest of the three movements. In March the Soviet

Union countered by increasing arms deliveries to the MPLA, and

by mid-July that group had become appreciably stronger militarily. Alarmed, the United States increased funding to the FNLA and,

for the first time, funded UNITA. Cuba, which had been aiding

the MPLA since the mid-1960s, sent military instructors in the late spring of 1975. By early October, more Cuban military personnel

had arrived, this time primarily combat troops; their total then probably reached between 1,100 and 1,500.

In April the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana

decided to support Savimbi as leader of an Angolan government

of national unity, believing that UNITA attracted the widest popular support in Angola. Savimbi also had the support of some francophone states and of Nigeria and Ghana. Some of these countries

later withdrew that support when the OAU pleaded for reconciliation and adherence to the Alvor Agreement.

Collapse of the Transitional Government

Inevitably, the delicate coalition came apart as the leaders of the

38
Historical Setting

three movements failed to resolve fundamental policy disagreements

or control their competition for personal power. Although the OAU

brought Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi together in June 1975 for negotiations that produced a draft constitution, heavy fighting broke

out in early July and spread swiftly throughout the country.

Within a week, the MPLA had forced the FNLA out of Luanda,

while the FNLA had eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in

the northern towns of Uige and Zaire provinces. UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA on August 1, 1975. A year earlier,

the MPLA had created its military wing, the People's Armed Forces

for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA), which became the core of the postindependence army (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). The FNLA and

UNITA, recognizing that their separate military forces were not

strong enough to fight the MPLA, formed an alliance and withdrew their ministers from the provisional government in Luanda,

heralding full-scale civil war. The United States Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA), meanwhile, initiated a covert program to have

American and European mercenaries fight with the FNLA.

On August 14, 1975, the transitional government collapsed. Portugal ordered the dissolution of the coalition government and an- nounced the assumption of all executive powers by the acting

Portuguese high commissioner in Angola. In reality, MPLA offi- cials filled those ministries abandoned by the FNLA and UNITA,

thereby allowing the MPLA to extend its political control throughout the Luanda government.

South African Intervention

South Africa's interest in Angolan affairs began during the Portuguese colonial period, especially after 1966 when the insurgency

spread to the east. South Africa's military and intelligence services cooperated closely with those of Portugal. South Africa and

Portugal opened a joint command center in Cuito Cuanavale in

southeast Angola in 1968, and from there South African troops

participated in actions against Angolan nationalist guerrillas as well

as against southern Angola-based guerrillas of the South West Africa

People's Organization (SWAPO), the Namibian group fighting for independence from South African rule. The collapse of Portugal's empire and the prospect of black rule

in Angola (and Mozambique) caused enormous concern in Pretoria.

Especially troubling to the South African government was the leftist orientation of several of these nationalist movements. Thus, in August 1975 South African military forces came to the aid of the

FNLA-UNITA alliance and occupied the Ruacana hydroelectric

39
Angola: A Country Study

complex and other installations on the Cunene River. On October

23, a force of 300 South African troops, assisted by about 3,000

South African-trained Angolans, invaded Angola. They advanced

rapidly north for nearly 1,000 kilometers and came within 100

kilometers of Luanda. This force was later increased to as many

as 10,000, but most of these troops were Angolans under South

Africa's military command.

The South African invasion had several international conse- quences. It prompted a massive increase in the flow of Soviet military supplies to the MPLA and caused Cuba to send thousands

of men to Angola in defense of the government. Moreover, because

the United States was supporting the same factions as the South

African regime, the United States involvement drew harsh criti- cism from the international community. Furthermore, many Afri- can countries that until then had opposed the MPLA, including

Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and Sudan, reversed themselves and

recognized the MPLA government.

Independence and the Rise of the MPLA Government

Unlike Portugal's other African possessions, which had made

relatively peaceful transitions to independence months earlier, by

November 11, 1975, Angola was in chaos. In the absence of a central government to which Portuguese officials could relinquish control, Portugal refused to recognize any faction; instead, it ceded

independence to the people of Angola. The MPLA subsequently

announced the establishment of its government in Luanda and

called the territory it controlled the People's Republic of Angola.

The FNLA and UNITA announced a separate regime with headquarters in the southern city of Huambo and called their territory

the Democratic People's Republic of Angola. But because of continuing hostility between them, the FNLA and UNITA did not

set up a government until December 1975, nor did they attempt

to fuse their armies. Moreover, the FNLA-UNITA alliance

received no formal recognition from other states, mostly because

of its South African support. In general, the international community, particularly other African states, viewed South African in- volvement in favor of the FNLA and UNITA as a legitimization

of Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA.

By January 1976, with the support of some 10,000 to 12,000

Cuban troops and Soviet arms worth US$200 million, it was clear

that the MPLA had emerged as the dominant military power. By

February 1976, the FNLA and its mercenaries had been defeated

in northern Angola; under international pressure, South African

troops had withdrawn into Namibia; and the MPLA was in control

40
Historical Setting

in Cabinda. Furthermore, United States assistance to the FNLA

and UNITA ceased following the passage by the United States Senate of the Clark Amendment, which prohibited all direct and

indirect military or paramilitary assistance to any Angolan group

.

The OAU finally recognized the MPLA regime as Angola's offi- cial government, as did the UN and Portugal and more than eighty

other nations.

Transformation into a Marxist-Leninist Party and Internal Dissent

Although Marxist influences were evident before independence,

Marxism-Leninism had not been the MPLA's stated ideology. But

during a plenum of the MPLA Central Committee in October 1976,

the party formally adopted Marxism-Leninism. The plenum also resulted in several major organizational decisions, including the

creation of a secretariat, a commission to direct and control the

Department of Political Orientation, and the Department of

Information and Propaganda. The National Party School, founded

in February 1977, trained party cadres to fill national and provincial party positions, and at the First Party Congress in December

1977, the MPLA transformed itself into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party to be called the Popular Movement for the Liberation

of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

Angola-Partido de Trabalho—MPLA-PT)

.

The estimated 110,000 members of the MPLA-PT had widely

diverse backgrounds and political ideas, which made factionalism

inevitable. The Neto regime soon faced problems generated by

independent left-wing organizations and militant workers. Neto

made the first public reference to internal dissent on February 6,

1976, when he denounced a demonstration that had protested the

termination of a popular radio program that had been critical of

the new government and that had demanded rule by workers and

peasants. The government arrested some of the demonstrators and

launched a major crackdown on opposition elements. One of these was the so-called Active Revolt, a faction founded in 1973 that comprised intellectuals of varying political orientation and included the

MPLA's first president, Mario de Andrade, and other prominent

MPLA leaders. Another opposition element was the Organization

of Angolan Communists (Organizacao dos Comunistas de

Angola—OCA), a Maoist movement founded in 1975 that attacked

the MPLA as a bourgeois party, condemned Soviet imperialism,

and called for the withdrawal of all Cuban forces. Shaba Invasion and the Nitista Plot

Several incidents in the mid- to late 1970s contributed to the

MPLA regime's reliance on Soviet military aid and the presence

41
Angola: A Country Study

of Cuban troops. The first incident occurred on March 8, 1977,

when the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front

National pour la Liberation du Congo—FNLC), a political opposition group hostile to Zaire's President Mobutu, launched an at- tack from Angola on Zaire's economically vital Shaba Region.

Although the Zaire government halted the invasion with the aid

of Moroccan troops, Mobutu accused the MPLA of having

instigated the attack. In return, Neto charged Mobutu with harboring and militarily supporting both the FNLA and FLEC . The

MPLA government, faced with continuing border violations and

engaged in recriminations with the Mobutu regime, requested and

received an increase in the number of Cuban troops.

Another incident brought factionalism in the MPLA leadership

into sharp focus. Two ultraleftists, minister of interior and Central Committee member Nito Alves and Central Committee member Jose Van Dunem, had become critical of the government's

economic policies, which both men considered too moderate. They

also criticized the government leadership for its heavy representation of whites and mestizos. In October 1976, the MPLA condemned

Alves for factionalism and abolished his ministry. The government

set up a commission of inquiry that investigated reports that Van

Dunem and Alves had purposely caused food shortages to stir up

discontent. The commission found the men guilty and expelled them

from the Central Committee in May 1977. Later that month, Al- ves and Van Dunem led an uprising in the capital and called for mass demonstrations outside the presidential palace. The uprising failed, but Alves, Van Dunem, and their followers seized a number of senior government leaders, whom they later killed. The Neto regime, already alarmed by party factionalism and

the number of members who did not actively support the party's

Marxist-Leninist objectives, conducted a massive purge. It re- ganized the party and the mass organizations, many of which

had supported Alves and Van Dunem. The commissars and directing committees in eight provinces, appointed by Alves when he

had been minister of interior, were removed. Thousands of Alves

supporters, referred to as Nitistas, were dismissed from their positions and detained. All mass organizations were made subordinate

to the MPLA. Finally, to achieve these changes, national and

provincial restructuring committees were set up. By December

1980, the party had shrunk from 1 10,000 members to about 32,000

members.

Strengthening Ties with the Soviet Union and Its Allies

The Nitista plot shook the Neto regime severely and was a stark

42
After independence, an MPLA

soldier stands on an armored

vehicle in front of a Portuguese

statue that has been deliberately covered with a cloth. Courtesy United Nations

(J. P. Lajfont)

\

reminder of the young government's vulnerability in the face of

internal factionalism and South African destabilization efforts. In

the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, the government came to the realization that its survival depended on continued support from

the Soviet Union and its allies. Consequently, the government's

reliance on Soviet and Cuban military support increased, as did

its commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

A new phase of Angola's formal relationship with the Soviet Union had already begun in October 1976, when Neto signed the

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union pledging both signatories to mutual military cooperation. The treaty was

significant in global terms in that it gave the Soviet Union the right

to use Angolan airports and Luanda harbor for military purposes,

enabling the Soviet Union to project its forces throughout the South

Atlantic region.

For the Soviet Union, its intervention in Angola was a major

foreign policy coup. Soviet leaders correctly judged that the United States, because of its recent Vietnam experience, would be reluc- tant to intervene heavily in a distant, low-priority area. Conditions

would thus be created in which the Soviet Union could exert its influence and gain a firm foothold in southern Africa. In addition,

South African involvement in Angola convinced most members

of the OAU that Soviet support for the Angolan government was

a necessary counterweight to South African destablization efforts.

43
Angola: A Country Study

Furthermore, United States support for UNITA during the civil war had tainted the United States in the eyes of the OAU and many

Western governments, which perceived a South African-American

link.Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions into

southern Angola, coupled with UNITA's northward expansion in

the east, forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military per- sonnel from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic

(East Germany), and Cuba.

The Angolan government's relationships with the Soviet Union and Cuba were linked in some ways but distinct in other

respects. Clearly, the Soviets and Cubans were both attracted to the Angolan government's Marxist-Leninist orientation, and Cuba

generally followed the Soviet Union's lead in the latter' s quest

for international influence. Nonetheless, Cuba had its own agenda in Angola, where Cuban leader Fidel Castro believed that by

supporting an ideologically compatible revolutionary movement

he could acquire international status independent of the Soviet

Union.

Although Soviet and Cuban interests in Angola usually con- verged, there were also disagreements, mostiy because of the fac- tionalism within the MPLA-PT. On the one hand, the Soviet Union

seemed to have favored Minister of Interior Alves's more radical

viewpoints over those of Neto and probably supported the Nitista

coup attempt in 1977. The Cubans, on the other hand, played an

active military role in foiling the coup attempt and increased their

troop presence in Angola shortly thereafter in support of the Neto

regime.

Economic Problems and Implementation of Socialist Policies

One of the priorities of the Neto regime after independence was

to repair the country's infrastructure, which had been shattered

by the liberation struggle and the civil war (see Background to Economic Development, ch. 3). There had been extensive damage to bridges, roads, and transport vehicles, and most undamaged vehicles had been taken out of the country by the Portuguese. With

no means of transporting food and other essential supplies to many

areas of the country, the distribution system collapsed. Furthermore, a good part of the economy disintegrated when most of the

Portuguese settlers, including skilled workers and government and

economic development administrators, left the country at independence.

44
Historical Setting

Perhaps more in response to the economic emergency than as a result of the party's long-term commitment to a planned socialist economy, the government created a large state sector as stipulated

in a resolution passed during the October 1976 party plenum (see

Role of the Government, ch. 3). Earlier that year, the government

allowed state intervention in the management of private companies that had suffered most from the Portuguese withdrawal and

passed the Law on State Intervention in March 1976, which provided for the formal nationalization of private companies. As a result, a large part of the economy, including abandoned commercial

farms, the mining industry, and the banking sector, became publicly owned. The government, however, acknowledging the massive reconstruction task it faced, continued to encourage and support

the private sector and to welcome foreign investment.

The MPLA leadership gave urgent priority to the revival of the

agricultural sector, which employed about 75 percent of the eco- nomically active population. But the government's rejection of market incentives, the massive dislocations caused by warfare, the

disorganization of the new bureaucracy, and hostility among the

peasants to imposed collectivization of their land doomed most

government efforts. Once a food exporter, Angola was forced to import an ever-increasing amount of food.

Although the agricultural sector barely continued to produce,

the Angolan economy survived because of the oil produced by and

sold to Western private enterprise (see Oil, ch. 3). The honest and

straightforward approach of the Angolan government toward its Western investors earned it the admiration of its partners and result- ed in the inflow of capital not only in the oil industry but also in

mining and fishing.

The UNITA Insurgency and the South African Threat

In addition to severe economic disruptions, in the late 1970s the

Angolan government was also challenged by the UNITA insurgency. UNITA was able to survive after the war for independence,

first, because of the continued loyalty of some of its traditional

Ovimbundu supporters, but, more important, because of military

and logistical support from South Africa. Pretoria established its relationship with UNITA for several reasons. Vehemently anticommunist, South Africa felt threatened by the MPLA's turn toward

the Soviet Union and its allies. The South Africans also wished

to retaliate for Luanda's support of SWAPO. Furthermore, by

helping UNITA shut down the Benguela Railway, which linked

the mining areas of Zaire and Zambia to Atiantic ports, Pretoria

45
Angola: A Country Study

made these two countries more dependent on South Africa's trans- portation system and thus more responsive to South African wishes.

In support of UNITA leader Savimbi, the South African Defense

Force (SADF) set up bases in Cuando Cubango Province in

southeastern Angola. Savimbi established his headquarters in Jamba

and enjoyed air cover provided by the South African air force from

bases in Namibia (see fig. 16). The SADF also trained UNITA

guerrillas in Namibia and provided UNITA with arms, fuel, and

food. On occasion, South African ground forces provided direct

support during UNITA battles with FAPLA.

Damaging though the UNITA assaults were, the greatest threat

to Angola's security in the late 1970s was posed by the SADF. Following its withdrawal from Angola in mid- 1976 after its involvement in the war for independence, the SADF routinely launched

small-scale incursions from Namibia into southern Angola in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas. The first large-scale South African

incursion into Angola took place in May 1978, when the SADF

raided a Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga and killed hundreds

of people. By the end of 1979, following the SADF bombing of

Lubango, the capital of Huila Province, an undeclared border war

between South Africa and Angola was in full force. The Final Days of the Neto Regime

By the late 1970s, Angolan head of state Agostinho Neto had

reached a better understanding of the motivations behind the 1977

Nitista coup attempt. Accordingly, he sought a more pragmatic

approach to balancing the diverse personalities and schools of

thought within the government and party. In December 1978, Neto

began a series of government and party reorganizations designed

to increase the powers of the president, purge both ruling struc- tures of incompetent and corrupt officials, and balance ethnic,

racial, and ideological elements. By abolishing the offices of prime

minister and deputy prime minister, Neto was able to deal direcdy

with his ministers rather than through intermediaries. The reor- ganization also resulted in the dismissal or reassignment of a large

number of senior party officials. Neto effected the most dramatic

change in the MPLA-PT Political Bureau, which had been dominated by mestigos and Mbundu. He reorganized the Political Bureau

by appointing officials, including three Bakongo and two Cabindan members, who gave it a broader ethnic representation (see

Structure of Government, ch. 4). These reorganizations were accompanied by a partial amnesty that included the release from

prison and return from exile of members of the Active Revolt, many

of whom Neto reintegrated into the party. Furthermore, Neto

46
Historical Setting

welcomed back to Angola a number of FNLA members and,

according to some sources, even made friendly overtures to Chipenda. By 1979 Neto had largely succeeded in molding the

MPLA-PT into a cohesive organization of carefully selected cadres.

Neto also pursued a foreign policy designed to weaken external

support for UNITA (and what was left of the FNLA and FLEC)

and to secure friendly relations with as many states as possible for both security and economic reasons. Included in this last goal was

a July 1979 foreign investment law that provided more attractive

benefits for foreign investors and that Neto designed primarily to encourage further Western investment in oil exploration.

The Dos Santos Regime

When Neto died in September 1979 in a Moscow hospital, he was still in the process of consolidating his power and reconciling

with former opponents. To his credit, the internal party cohesion

that he fostered allowed a smooth transfer of power to Jose Eduardo dos Santos, a Soviet-educated Mbundu who had served as

first deputy prime minister and then as minister of planning fol- lowing the December 1978 reorganization.

Despite his student years in the Soviet Union, dos Santos was

a moderate with a pragmatic outlook, not unlike that of Neto. He

soon expressed his preference for a mixed economy with an

important role for the private sector. The direction in which he

guided the MPLA-PT was especially telling. He pushed for the

promotion to the Central Committee of four moderates—Manuel

Alexandre Rodrigues (nom de guerre Kito; Mbundu), Kundi Paihama (southern Ovambo), Paulo Jorge (mestigo), and Roberto de

Almeida (mestigo). The ethnic backgrounds of these four men also demonstrated the new regime's continuing commitment to broadened representation in the top party leadership. Nonetheless, no Ovimbundu—the largest ethnic group and the one to which Savimbi

belonged—was a member of the Political Bureau. Dos Santos

defended this omission by explaining that there were no politically

educated Ovimbundu who could fill top party positions. The promotion of Minister of Foreign Relations Jorge to full membership

in the Central Committee was especially significant because, during the Neto regime, Jorge had initiated contact with the West and

maintained the flexible foreign policy that characterized that regime,

despite Soviet objections. Minister of Domestic and Foreign Trade

Almeida, also promoted to full Central Committee membership, was an active participant in the fostering of Angola's economic ties with the West as well.

47
Angola: A Country Study

Steps Toward a Stronger Party and Political Discord

The party unanimously confirmed dos Santos as its president

during the MPLA-PT's First Extraordinary Party Congress held

in December 1980. The congress also increased the number of Central Committee members from fifty-eight to seventy, and it took

a decisive step toward creating a greater role for the party in run- ning the nation and a diminished role for the government. A major

constitutional change that had been enacted earlier paved the way

for the formation of the national People's Assembly. Provincial as- semblies, elected by the public, then elected assembly members,

who in turn elected a twenty-five-member permanent commission

that included the president and the entire Political Bureau. Thus,

the People's Assembly, which replaced the government's Council

of the Revolution, became an organ primarily of the party rather

than the government.

During a meeting in March 1981, the Central Committee fur- ther reinforced the MPLA-PT's primacy over the government by

assigning to itself increased responsibility for the job of orienting

and supervising the work of the Council of Ministers. A government reorganization followed the meeting, and several ministers

left the government to take on senior party positions, where they

had greater opportunities to gain power. Because most of the

ministers who remained in the Council of Ministers were technocrats, the bureaucratic skills of government officials improved,

and the reorganization further differentiated government and party

functions.

Dos Santos's efforts to secure the supremacy of the party over

the government, however, created sharp divisions within the government and party elites along political and racial lines. On one

side were the Africanists, or nationalists, who were mostly black

and held most of the senior positions in the government and ministries. The Africanists, for the most part, were known as pragmatists

and favored improved relations with the West and a rapprochement with UNITA. On the other side were the ideologues, mostly

mestigos and whites, who dominated the party and adhered adamantly to the Soviet Marxist-Leninist line. Although these divisions

caused bitter schisms and numerous policy-making problems, they were not unusual for a government that dealt with both the Soviet

Union and its allies (in the military sphere) and the West (in the

economic sphere).

The Namibia Issue and Security Threats in the 1980s

In the early 1980s, the status of Namibia evolved into a

48
Historical Setting

complex international issue involving principally the governments

of the United States, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. The United

States, troubled by the growing Soviet and Cuban presence in

Angola, sought to reduce this influence by becoming directly

involved in negotiations for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from

Angola and for Namibian independence. For its part, Angola

claimed that if the SADF threat were removed from its southern

border, it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and

Soviet advisers. The most obvious way this could be done was if South Africa granted independence to Namibia. South Africa,

already preoccupied with the leftist regime in Angola, was reluc- tant to relinquish control of Namibia and allow free elections

because of the possibility that these elections would bring its traditional nemesis, SWAPO, to power.

In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the United States formed an informal negotiating team, called the Contact Group, to work with South

Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The

South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed

to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favor of the instal- lation of a SWAPO government in Namibia. Pretoria continued

to attend negotiating sessions throughout the early 1980s, always

prepared to bargain but never ready to settle. By the beginning of 1981, South Africa's undeclared war with

Angola and its support for an increasingly effective UNITA had

become the focus of the dos Santos regime. After the failure in January 1981 of the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia, South

African military aggression escalated and became directed as much

against Angolan targets as against SWAPO guerrillas. In August

1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea, in which several

thousand troops and accompanying equipment penetrated 120

kilometers into southwestern Angola. This invasion marked the

beginning of a different kind of war, one in which South Africa no

longer pretended to restrict its incursions to the pursuit of SWAPO

units but openly intensified its assaults on Angolan economic tar- gets and began to occupy Angolan territory, particularly in Cunene Province. Furthermore, SADF support for UNITA in 1982

and 1983 increased to the extent that the South African Air Force

(SAAF) participated in UNITA operations against FAPLA.

The rapid escalation of South African military aggression

in Angola was matched by the massive infiltration of the countryside by UNITA forces. This activity far exceeded UNITA's previ- ous hit-and-run operations aimed primarily at the Benguela

Railway. But perhaps the most detrimental effect of the UNITA

49
Angola: A Country Study

insurgency was the disruption of the economy, particularly the

agricultural sector. By the end of 1985, fighting between UNITA

and FAPLA had forced hundreds of thousands of peasants to flee from the fertile central highlands. The result was a precipitous drop

in food production. UNITA guerrillas also frequently mined roads

and railroads, blew up electric power transmission lines, and

attacked dams, mining facilities, and coffee plantations. Moreover,

they began taking foreign technicians hostage in the hope of gaining publicity for the UNITA cause. Second Party Congress

The Second Party Congress of the MPLA-PT, held in December 1985, focused on two main themes: greater economic efficien- cy and improved defense capabilities. The party had little to celebrate in view of the deplorable conditions that then prevailed.

Politically, the party lacked sufficiently educated cadres, and eco- nomically, the government was forced to import 80 percent of its food and had become dependent on Western oil companies to keep

the economy afloat. The large number of party members attending the congress who were also military officers (about a quarter

of all party delegates) exemplified the MPLA-PT's emphasis on

the defense sector. The Central Committee report to the congress

projected that more than one-third of the government budget would

go to defense and security over the next five years. During the congress, party officials expressed their dissatisfaction with economic policies patterned on Soviet models that had

failed to revive Angola's agricultural sector. In fact, the most significant results of the congress were a purge of Soviet hardliners

and an influx of well-trained nationalists with more pragmatic viewpoints. Within the party's senior ranks, many leading ideologues were demoted, as were a number of mestigos; they were replaced

with younger black technocrats and the president's closest supporters.

An unexpected change involved one of the most prominent members of the pro- Soviet group, Lucio Lara, who had been considered

the second most powerful figure in the MPLA-PT. Lara lost his

position in the Political Bureau and ended up with the largely

honorary position of first secretary of the People's Assembly. Overall, the most notable outcomes of the congress were the enhanced

prestige and authority of dos Santos and a more professional and

loyalist party leadership, in which the armed forces were heavily

represented.

By the late 1980s, Angola had far to go in its quest to become

a viable, sovereign state. More than 50,000 Cuban troops remained

50
Historical Setting

in the country to provide security; UNITA and the SADF launched

attacks with impunity; the oil sector—and hence the treasury

suffered grievously from the worldwide slump in petroleum prices;

and hundreds of thousands of Angolans, in the countryside as well

as in the increasingly crowded cities, were malnourished. Yet, in

late 1988 there were a few reasons for optimism. United States- sponsored negotiations were finally successful, opening the door

for a settlement of the Namibia dispute, the withdrawal of Cuban

forces from Angola, and an accord between the MPLA-PT and

UNITA—in short, the conditions necessary for Angola to resume

the process of nationbuilding and to prepare a better future for its people (see Regional Politics, ch. 4).

* * * Sources emphasizing the early history of the Africans in Angola

are Jan Vansina's Kingdoms of the Savanna, Douglas L. Wheeler and

Rene Pelissier's^4w^o/a, and Joseph C. Miller's Kings and Kinsmen.

The best accounts of Portuguese expansion in Angola are Gerald

J. Bender's Angola under the Portuguese and Lawrence W. Henderson's Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, both of which deal extensively with the brutality of Portuguese colonial policies and institutions. Other useful works are Malyn Newitt's Portugal in Africa, C.R. Boxer's Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825, and

John Sykes's Portugal and Africa. By far the most complete and valuable account of the Angolan

nationalist struggle is John A. Marcum's The Angolan Revolution.

This work is divided into two volumes: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-1962 and Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976.

Keith Somerville's Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society is an ex- haustive and well-written account of the MPLA's institutions and

policies.

A wealth of material exists on Angola's security problems and

the escalation of Soviet and Cuban military support. Some of the

best sources are Tony Hodgesy s Angola to the 1990s, a special report

published by the Economist Intelligence Unit; John A. Marcum's

paper prepared for the United States Information Agency titled

' 'Radical Vision Frustrated: Angola and Cuba"; GeraldJ. Bender's

article in Current History titled

4 'The Continuing Crisis in Angola"; two chapters byJohn A. Marcum tided "UNITA: The Politics of Survival" and "A Quarter Century of War" in Angola, Mozambique, and the West, edited by Helen Kitchen; two articles by Gillian Gunn titled "The Angolan Economy" and "Cuba and

51
Angola: A Country Study

Angola," also in Helen Kitchen's edited volume; and Arthur Jay

Klinghoffer's The Angolan War.

Documentation of Angola's recent history can be found in the

annual Africa Contemporary Record and various issues of Africa Confidential, as well as many periodicals dealing with Africa. (For fur- ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

52
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
A young Angolan celebrates during a carnival.
IN LATE 1988, ANGOLAN SOCIETY still bore the scars

inflicted by five centuries of colonial rule and by a thirteen-yearlong insurgency that had drained the national treasury and frus- trated the government's efforts to implement Marxist-Leninist

policies. Complicating the study of contemporary Angolan society was the limited information available to researchers. During the

period of turmoil that began in 1975, few Western observers had

been allowed access to government-controlled areas. Furthermore,

the Angolan press was closely controlled by the government and

prone to propagandistic reporting; antigovernment sources were

equally slanted.

Despite these limitations, certain features of Angolan society could

be outlined, if not clearly discerned. In 1988 Angola had an esti- mated population of 8.2 million, the great majority of whom lived

in the western half of the country. Nearly 7 million Angolans lived

in government-controlled areas. The remainder, an estimated 1.25

million, resided in rebel-held regions. Most Angolans inhabited

rural areas, although there had been a significant trend since the

1970s toward urban growth. By 1988 about a third of the population was living in towns and cities. Most of the urban areas were

in the more populous western half of the country.

Scholars often divided the population into a number of ethnolinguistic categories, but in many cases these categories had been

devised by others, both Portuguese and Africans. Physical boundaries based on these categories had been established by the Portuguese for use in census taking and related activities. Although

they acquired a certain meaning for the people included in them in

the course of the colonial period and during the nationalist struggle,

these categories were neither fixed nor internally homogeneous,

and they were subject to change under shifting historical conditions.

The three largest categories—the Ovimbundu, the Mbundu, and

the Bakongo—together constituted nearly three-quarters of Angola's

population. Mestigos (persons of mixed European and African

ancestry; see Glossary), at less than 2 percent of the population,

had played an important role in the ruling party since independence, mostly because they were fairly well educated in a society

in which educated persons were relatively few. They had, however,

been the target of much resentment, a consequence of their former

identification with the Portuguese and, often, of their expressions

55
Angola: A Country Study

of superiority to Africans. The regime of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who became president in 1979, sought to dissipate this resent- ment by replacing high-ranking mestigo party and government

officials with individuals of other ethnic backgrounds.

Little is known of the actual workings of indigenous social sys- tems as modified during the colonial period. The most persistent

of groupings and institutions, such as clans or tribes, were based on descent from a common ancestor, in most cases a common

female ancestor, and were traced through females. (With rare exceptions, however, authority lay in male hands.) As enduring

as these had been, such groupings and institutions were showing

signs of losing their significance toward the end of the colonial era. In many instances, they were further disrupted by the devastating

effects of the insurgency waged by the National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia

Total de Angola—UNITA), which caused massive displacement

of much of the rural population, particularly from the eastern provinces.

The Portuguese-imposed national structure was almost totally

destroyed by the Marxist-Leninist institutions established after independence in 1975. There have been significant changes,

however, in the ideology of the country's leaders in the mid- to

late 1980s. Although the ruling party, the Popular Movement for

the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular

de Libertagao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho—MPLA-PT), in- veighed against what it called petit bourgeois tendencies, its leaders accepted private enterprise and a more tolerant attitude toward

personal gain as means of coping with the country's massive eco- nomic and administrative problems.

Despite its opposition to religion, the Marxist-Leninist government did not prohibit the existence of religious institutions. Many

Angolans were Roman Catholics or Protestants, and missionaries

had been instrumental in providing education to Angolans during

the colonial era when schooling had been largely denied to Afri- cans by the colonial authorities. Nonetheless, the government was

suspicious of large organized groups that could threaten its stability,

particularly the Roman Catholic Church, because it had not overtly

opposed Portuguese colonialism. There was less hostility toward

the Protestant churches, which had not maintained particularly close

ties to the Portuguese colonial authorities. Indigenous religions con- tinued to influence the lives of a large segment of the population, even though some of these people also belonged to Christian

denominations.

56
The Society and Its Environment

In the late 1980s, there was a tremendous need for educated

Angolans in both the economic and the governmental sectors,

especially in technical fields. Although the government had made

steady progress in providing education at the primary and secondary school levels, there were still severe teacher shortages, mostly

in rural areas, and vast problems in reaching those children living

in areas where UNITA military actions were most frequent.

There were also shortages of trained Angolan personnel in the

health field, which had forced the government to bring in hundreds

of foreign health care personnel to meet the needs of the population as well as to train Angolans in health care practices. Nonetheless, the high infant mortality rate and proliferation of diseases,

exacerbated by poor sanitation and malnutrition, attested to the

government's insufficient progress in this area. Physical Setting

A total area of 1,246,700 square kilometers (including Cabinda

Province) makes Angola the seventh largest state in Africa, but

it is also one of the most lightly populated (see fig. 1). The country

is bordered to the north and east by Zaire, to the east by Zambia,

and to the south by Namibia. The 7,270-square-kilometer enclave

of Cabinda, which is separated from the rest of Angola by a strip

of Zairian territory, is bordered on the north by Congo.

Terrain

Angola has three principal natural regions: the coastal lowland,

characterized by low plains and terraces; hills and mountains, ris- ing inland from the coast into a great escarpment; and an area of

high plains, called the high plateau (planalto), which extends east- ward from the escarpment (see fig. 3). The coastal lowland rises from the sea in a series of low terraces. This region varies in width from about 25 kilometers near Benguela to more than 150 kilometers in the Cuanza River Valley just

south of Angola's capital, Luanda, and is markedly different from

Angola's highland mass. The Atlantic Ocean's cold, northwardflowing Benguela Current substantially reduces precipitation along

the coast, making the region relatively arid or nearly so south of

Benguela (where it forms the northern extension of the Namib

Desert), and quite dry even in its northern reaches. Even where,

as around Luanda, the average annual rainfall may be as much

as fifty centimeters, it is not uncommon for the rains to fail. Given

this pattern of precipitation, the far south is marked by sand dunes,

which give way to dry scrub along the middle coast. Portions of

the northern coastal plain are covered by thick brush.

57
Angola: A Country Study

Figure 3. Topography and Drainage

58
The Society and Its Environment

59
Angola: A Country Study

The belt of hills and mountains parallels the coast at distances

ranging from 20 kilometers to 100 kilometers inland. The Cuanza

River divides the zone into two parts. The northern part rises gradually from the coastal zone to an average elevation of 500 meters,

with crests as high as 1,000 meters to 1,800 meters. South of the

Cuanza River, the hills rise sharply from the coastal lowlands and

form a high escarpment, extending from a point east of Luanda

and running south through Namibia. The escarpment reaches 2,400

meters at its highest point, southeast of the town of Sumbe, and

is steepest in the far south in the Serra da Chela mountain range.

The high plateau lies to the east of the hills and mountains and

dominates Angola's terrain. The surface of the plateau is typically

flat or rolling, but parts of the Benguela Plateau and the Humpata

Highland area of the Hufla Plateau in the south reach heights of

2,500 meters and more. The Malanje Plateau to the north rarely

exceeds 1,000 meters in height. The Benguela Plateau and the

coastal area in the immediate environs of Benguela and Lobito,

the Bie Plateau, the Malanje Plateau, and a small section of the

Hufla Plateau near the town of Lubango have long been among

the most densely settled areas in Angola.

Drainage

Most of the country's many rivers originate in central Angola,

but their patterns of flow are diverse and their ultimate outlets

varied. A number of rivers flow in a more or less westerly course

to the Atlantic Ocean, providing water for irrigation in the dry

coastal strip and the potential for hydroelectric power, only some

of which had been realized by 1988. Two of Angola's most important rivers, the Cuanza and the Cunene, take a more indirect route

to the Atlantic, the Cuanza flowing north and the Cunene flowing

south before turning west. The Cuanza is the only river wholly

within Angola that is navigable—for nearly 200 kilometers from

its mouth—by boats of commercially or militarily significant size. The Congo River, whose mouth and western end form a small portion of Angola's northern border with Zaire, is also navigable.

North of the Lunda Divide a number of important tributaries

of the Congo River flow north to join it, draining Angola's northeast quadrant. South of the divide some rivers flow into the Zambezi

River and thence to the Indian Ocean, others to the Okavango

River (as the Cubango River is called along the border with

Namibia and in Botswana) and thence to the Okavango Swamp

in Botswana. The tributaries of the Cubango River and several

of the southern rivers flowing to the Atlantic are seasonal, completely dry much of the year.

60
The Society and Its Environment

Climate

Like the rest of tropical Africa, Angola experiences distinct,

alternating rainy and dry seasons. In the north, the rainy season may last for as long as seven months—usually from September to April, with perhaps a brief slackening in January or February. In

the south, the rainy season begins later, in November, and lasts until about February. The dry season (cacimbo) is often characterized by a heavy morning mist. In general, precipitation is higher

in the north, but at any latitude it is greater in the interior than

along the coast and increases with altitude.

Temperatures fall with distance from the equator and with alti- tude and tend to rise closer to the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, at Soyo,

at the mouth of the Congo River, the average annual temperature

is about 26°C, but it is under 16°C at Huambo on the temperate

central plateau. The coolest months are July and August (in the

middle of the dry season), when frost may sometimes form at higher

altitudes.

Population Structure and Dynamics

As of late 1988, the last official census in Angola had been taken

in 1970. As a result, most population figures were widely varying

estimates based on scanty birth and death rate data. According to the United States Department of Commerce's Bureau of the Census, Angola's 1988 population was about 8.2 million. The United

States Department of State gave a 1986 figure of 8.5 million, while

the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa esti- mated the mid- 1986 population at 8.9 million. The Angolan government estimated the 1988 population at almost 9.5 million (see table

2, Appendix A). The government figure, however, may have

included Angolan refugees in neighboring countries. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, a private agency, in mid- 1987 more than 400,000 Angolan refugees resided in Zaire and Zambia. There were about 50,000 Cuban soldiers and civilians and

about 2,000 military and civilian advisers and technicians from the

Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) stationed in Angola. There were also about 10,000 South

African refugees, most associated with the antigovernment Afri- can National Congress (ANC); 70,000 Namibian refugees, most

associated with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); and 13,200 Zairian refugees. There was no officially reported

immigration or emigration.

In spite of warfare, poor health care, and the large number of

Angolans in exile, the population was growing steadily in the

late 1980s. Like population estimates, however, growth rate

61
Angola: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

65 and over 60-64

55-59

50-54 45-49

40-44 35-39

30-34

25-29 20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9 0-4

I m

cz m

MALES I mi FEMALES

I

I mHHHHHHI

I

I ft c m I mm

I d

9i DO 6C)0 3(30 C) 3(DO 6(DO 9C)0 POPULATION IN THOUSANDS

Source: Based on information from African Statistical Yearbook, 1986, Pt. 3, Addis Ababa,

1986.

Figure 4. Population Distribution by Age and Sex, Mid-1986

calculations varied considerably. According to a 1987 estimate by

the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the growth

rate was 3.6 percent. The UN 1986 estimate of 2.7 percent was

a good deal lower, while the government, whose demographic

estimates typically exceeded those of Western governments and

international organizations, announced a 1986 growth rate of almost

4.9 percent. The CIA figured the infant mortality rate in 1987 at 167 per 1,000, and the United States Bureau of the Census calculated the death rate at 21 per 1,000.

According to UN figures, Angola had a very young population.

In 1986 the UN estimated that about 46 percent of the population was under age fifteen (see fig. 4). At the other end of the age scale,

only 4.8 percent of the population was sixty years of age or older.

The government estimated the median age at 17.5 years. Life

expectancy in 1987, according to United States government sources, was forty-one for males and forty-four for females.

The 1970 census showed the most densely setded areas of Angola

to be the plateau, those coastal zones including and adjacent to the

cities of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, and Mocamedes (present-day

Namibe), and the enclave of Cabinda. The most densely settled province in 1970 was Huambo. The other large area of relatively

62
The Society and Its Environment

dense settlement included much of Cuanza Norte Province and the

southern part of Uige Province. This area was the major center

for coffee cultivation and attracted a number of Europeans and

migrant workers. Except for Zaire Province in the far northwest,

the most thinly populated areas of Angola lay in its eastern half. Since the start of the independence struggle in the early 1960s, an almost continuous process of urbanization has taken place. This

process was accelerated in the 1980s by the UNITA insurgency,

which induced hundreds of thousands of Angolans to leave the countryside for large towns. Angola's urban population grew from 10.3

percent in 1960 to 33.8 percent in 1988 (according to government

statistics). Much of the growth occurred in Luanda, whose population more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, and which by

1988 had reached about 1.2 million. Other towns had also acquired

larger populations: Huambo grew from fewer than 100,000 resi- dents in 1975 to almost 1 million in 1987, and Benguela's population increased from 55,000 to about 350,000 over the same period.

After independence in 1975, there were a number of changes

in the structure of the population. The first was the exodus of an

estimated 350,000 white Portuguese to their homeland. Yet, by

1988 there were an estimated 82,000 whites (representing 1 per- cent of the population), mostly of Portuguese origin, living in

Angola.

The second change was brought about by large-scale population movements, mostly among the Ovimbundu who had migrated

in the 1950s and 1960s to work on coffee plantations in northwest- ern Uige Province. Panic-stricken by the onset of civil war in 1975,

most Ovimbundu workers fled to their ethnic homelands in the

central provinces. Another large-scale population movement oc- curred as many of the Bakongo who had fled to Zaire during the

nationalist struggle returned to Angola (see Coalition, the Transitional Government, and Civil War, ch. 1). The third and most striking population shift, most notable in

the late 1970s and 1980s, had been the flight of increasing numbers of internal migrants out of the central provinces, where the

effects of the UNITA insurgency had been most destructive. Most

of this massive migration had been toward urban areas. From 1975

to 1988, millions of rural civilians were displaced, including more

than 700,000 forced from their villages since 1985 by armed conflict. Many of these migrants relocated to ramshackle displacement

camps, many of which were run by West European private voluntary organizations. Although these camps were less vulnerable to attacks by UNITA guerrillas, conditions in them were poor. Food

and water were in short supply, and health care was limited.

63
Angola: A Country Study

Many of the displaced persons living in Benguela Province were Ovimbundu from the plateau regions of eastern Benguela and Huambo provinces. The officially registered displaced population of

21 ,478 in Benguela Province (1988 figure) lived in nine camps and

one transit center, but there were probably thousands more living

with family members in the province's urban areas, including Lobito and Benguela. The estimated 116,598 displaced persons living

in several camps in Cuanza Sul Province had been forced to flee from the province's eastern rural areas or from the plateau regions

of Benguela, Huambo, and Bie provinces because of intense guerrilla activity. Because access to many rural areas was limited and

sometimes impossible, most of these displaced persons were forced

to rely on other local populations and some limited and sporadic

outside assistance. Most displaced persons fled from the more fertile and wetter highlands to the less hospitable coastal zone and

would be expected to return to their homes when the security situ- ation improved.

In 1988, however, the majority of displaced persons had become

integrated into the larger urban population, especially around Luanda. Many displaced persons who sought refuge in urban areas did so through family or other relations to circumvent government

registration procedures and so avoid taxation, conscription, or

forced resettlement. Consequently, the exact numbers of these people could not be computed. In Luanda much of the destitute population, estimated at 447,000 and mostly consisting of displaced

persons, lived in vertical shantytowns (large apartment blocks in

the center of the city with inadequate or nonexistent water sources or sanitary facilities) or in huge, maze-like neighborhoods known

as musseques, the largest of which housed an estimated 400,000

people.

Ethnic Groups and Languages

Although Portuguese was Angola's official language, the great

majority of Angolans (more than 95 percent of the total population) used languages of the Bantu family—some closely related,

others remotely so—that were spoken by most Africans living south

of the equator and by substantial numbers north of it. Angola's remaining indigenous peoples fell into two disparate

categories. A small number, all in southern Angola, spoke so-called

Click languages (after a variety of sounds characteristic of them)

and differed physically from local African populations. These Click

speakers shared characteristics, such as small stature and lighter

skin color, linking them to the hunting and gathering bands of

southern Africa sometimes referred to by Europeans as Bushmen.

64
Displaced persons walk to a camp in Cuanza Sul Province. Courtesy Richard J. Hough

The second category consisted of mestigos, largely urban and living

in western Angola. Most spoke Portuguese, although some were

also acquainted with African languages, and a few may have used

such a language exclusively.

The Definition of Ethnicity

Bantu languages have been categorized by scholars into a number of sets of related tongues. Some of the languages in any set may be more or less mutually intelligible, especially in the areas where speakers of a dialect of one language have had sustained contact with speakers of a dialect of another language. Given the mobility and interpenetration of communities of Bantu speakers over

the centuries, transitional languages—for example, those that share

characteristics of two tongues—developed in areas between these

communities. Frequendy, the languages of a set, particularly those

with many widely distributed speakers, would be divided into

several dialects. In principle, dialects of the same language are considered mutually intelligible, although they are not always so in fact. Language alone does not define an ethnic group. On the one

hand, a set of communities lacking mutually intelligible dialects may for one reason or another come to share a sense of identity in any given historical period. On the other hand, groups

sharing a common language or mutually intelligible ones do not

65
Angola: A Country Study

necessarily constitute a single group. Thus, the Suku—most of them

in Zaire but some in Angola—had a language mutually intelligible with at least some dialects of the Bakongo. However, their historical experience, including a period of domination by Lunda

speakers, made the Suku a separate group.

Although common language and culture do not automatically

make a common identity, they provide a framework within which

such an identity can be forged, given other historical experience.

Insofar as common culture implies a set of common perceptions

of the way the world works, it permits individuals and groups sharing it to communicate more easily with one another than with those

who lack that culture. However, most Angolan groups had, as part

of that common culture, the experience and expectation of political

fragmentation and intergroup rivalry. That is, because one community shared language and culture with another, political unity or even neutrality did not follow, nor did either community assume

that it should. With the exception of the Bakongo and the Lunda, no group had experienced a political cohesion that transcended

smaller political units (chiefdoms or, at best, small kingdoms). In

the Bakongo case, the early Kongo Kingdom, encompassing most

Kikongo-speaking communities, had given way by the eighteenth

century to politically fragmented entities. In the Lunda case, the

empire had been so far-flung and internal conflict had become so great by the nineteenth century that political cohesion was limited

(see Kongo Kingdom; Lunda and Chokwe Kingdoms, ch. 1). Very often, the name by which a people has come to be known

was given them by outsiders. For example, the name "Mbundu"

was first used by the Bakongo. Until such naming, and sometimes

long after, the various communities or sections of a set sharing a language and culture were likely to call themselves by other terms,

and even when they came to use the all-encompassing name, they

tended to reserve it for a limited number of situations. In virtually

all colonial territories, Angola included, the naming process and

the tendency to treat the named people as a discrete entity distinct

from all others became pervasive. The process was carried out by

the colonial authorities—sometimes with the help of scholars and

missionaries—as part of the effort to understand, deal with, and

control local populations. Among other things, the Portuguese tended to treat smaller, essentially autonomous groups as parts of larger

entities. As time went on, these populations, particularly the more

educated among them, seized upon these names and the communities presumably covered by them as a basis for organizing to improve their status and later for nationalist agitation. Among the

first to do so were mestizos in the Luanda area. Although most spoke

66
The Society and Its Environment

Portuguese and had a Portuguese male ancestor in their genealogies, the mestigos often spoke Kimbundu as a home language. It

is they who, in time, initiated the development of a common Mbundu identity.

In general, then, the development of ethnic consciousness in a group encompassing a large number of communities reflected shifts from the identification of individuals with small-scale units to at least partial identification with larger entities and from relatively

porous boundaries between such entities to less permeable ones. But the fact that these larger groups were the precipitates of

relatively recent historical conditions suggests that they were not

permanendy fixed. Changes in these conditions could lead to the

dissolution of the boundaries and to group formation on bases other

than ethnicity.

In any case, ethnic identities are rarely exclusive; identification

with other entities, new or old, also occurs in certain situations

because not all sections of a large ethnic group have identical

interests. It remained likely that earlier identities would be appealed

to in some situations or that new cleavages would surface in others.

For example, descent groups or local communities were often

involved in competitive relations in the precolonial or colonial eras, and the conditions similar to those giving rise to such competition

might still prevail in some areas. In other contexts, younger members of an ethnic group may consider their interests to be different

from those of their elders, or a split between urban and rural sec- tions of an ethnic entity may become salient. In Angola, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people,

especially in the late 1980s, had significant repercussions on ethnic identification. For example, many of those forced to abandon

rural areas and traditional ethnic communities for urban dwellings no longer engaged in agricultural activities and the small town

life that defined their communities. Instead, they were forced to become urban laborers in ethnically mixed surroundings. Many

were compelled by their new circumstances to learn new languages

and give up traditional life- styles in order to survive in their new

environment.

Ethnolinguistic Categories

Caveats notwithstanding, a listing of the more commonly used

ethnic rubrics and an indication of the dimension of the categories

they refer to is useful as a preliminary description of Angola's peoples. The 1970 census did not enumerate the population in ethnic terms. The most recent available count, therefore, is based on

projections of the 1960 census. Most projections assume that the

67
Angola: A Country Study

Figure 5. Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1988

68
The Society and Its Environment

rank order of the major ethnolinguistic categories did not change,

although the proportions may have done so. In particular, a fairly

large segment of the Bakongo of the northwestern provinces of Zaire

and Ufge were already refugees in 1970 and were not included in

the 1970 census. Although it is not clear how many Bakongo subsequendy returned to Angola, it may be assumed that many of them

returned and that their relative status as the third largest group was unchanged. The same is true of other ethnic groups whose

members fled to Zaire and Zambia in the late 1980s when the

insurgency intensified in Angola's border regions. This category

would include many Ovimbundu, who fled central Angola to Zambia, and many Lunda and Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), who fled to Zaire from eastern and northern Angola.

Ovimbundu

The largest ethnolinguistic category, the Ovimbundu, were

located in west-central Angola, south of Mbundu-inhabited regions

(see fig. 5). In 1988 the United States Department of State esti- mated that they constituted 37 percent of the population. The language of the Ovimbundu was Umbundu.

The core area of the Ovimbundu kingdoms was that part of the

Benguela Plateau north of the town of Huambo. Expansion continuing into the twentieth century enlarged their territory considerably, although most Ovimbundu remained in that part of the

plateau above 1,200 meters in elevation.

Like most African groups of any size, the Ovimbundu were formed by the mixture of groups of diverse origin (and varying

size). Little is known of developments before the seventeenth century, but there is some evidence of additions to the people who

occupied the Benguela Plateau at that time. Over time, a number

of political entities, usually referred to as kingdoms, were formed

(see Ovimbundu and Kwanhama Kingdoms, ch. 1). By the eighteenth century, there were twenty-two kingdoms. Thirteen were

fully independent; the other nine were largely autonomous but owed

tribute to one of the more powerful entities, usually the kingdom

of Bailundu, but in some cases Wambu or Ciyaka. By the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, effective occu- pation by the Portuguese had caused a fairly rapid decline in the

power of the heads of these kingdoms, but Ovimbundu continued

to think of themselves as members of one or another of the groups

based on these political units after World War II. In addition to the groups that clearly spoke dialects of Umbundu, there were two on the periphery of Ovimbundu distribution:

the Mbui, who seemed to straddle the linguistic boundary between

69
Angola: A Country Study

the Ovimbundu and the Mbundu; and the Dombe living to the

west near the coast, whose language was closely related to Urnbundu, although not a dialect of it. The Dombe and several other

groups, including the Nganda and the Hanya (who, according to one account, spoke Umbundu dialects) relied on cattle raising, as did their southern neighbors, the Herero and the Ovambo. Still others, typically the old tributary kingdoms, came to speak Umbundu relatively recently.

Until the Portuguese established firm control over their territo- ry, the Ovimbundu—particularly those of the major kingdoms of

Bailundu (to the northwest), Bihe (to the northeast), and Wambu

(in the center)—played important roles as intermediaries in the

slave, ivory, and beeswax trades, acting as carriers, entrepreneurs,

and raiders. With the decline of the slave trade in the last decades

of the nineteenth century, the entrepreneurs among the Ovimbundu

turned to the rubber trade, abandoning the warfare and raiding

that had hitherto been integrally related to their economic activities. The rubber slump at the beginning of the twentieth century,

the end of the de facto autonomy of their kingdoms not long after,

and the displacement of Ovimbundu traders by the Portuguese

forced these people to turn to cash-crop agriculture. (The men had

hitherto had little involvement with cultivation; in fact, the women continued to be responsible for the cultivation of subsistence

crops.)

The introduction of cash crops, particularly coffee, led to a series of changes in settlement patterns and social arrangements (see

Structure of Society, this ch.). But after a time, soil exhaustion,

lack of support of African agriculture by the colonial authorities,

incursions of Portuguese settlers who took over valuable property

in the highlands, and a number of other factors contributed to a

decline in the success of Ovimbundu cash-crop agriculture. By the

early 1960s, up to 100,000 Ovimbundu, estimated at one-quarter

of the group's able-bodied adult males, were migrating on one- year and two-year labor contracts to the coffee plantations of Uige

and Cuanza Norte provinces; another 15,000 to 20,000 sought work

in Luanda and Lobito; and roughly the same number worked in

the industrial plants of Huambo or for European farmers in the

Benguela Plateau. In most cases, remuneration was low, but these

migrant workers had little alternative. This pattern continued

through the remainder of the colonial period, except for those males

who were involved in nationalist activity (usually with UNITA).

In the 1940s, the Ovimbundu organized what was probably

the most closely knit Angolan community of the colonial era. With

the financial and ideological aid of North American Christian

70
The Society and Its Environment

missionaries, they established a network of Christian villages, each

with its own leadership, schools, churches, and clinics. They were

thus able to maintain the Ovimbundu culture while providing

educational and social amenities for their children. The generation that emerged out of this structure became the disciples ofJo- nas Savimbi and the basis for UNITA, which in the 1980s used

the same concepts to maintain Ovimbundu cohesiveness within

UNITA-controlled areas. Given the degree of change in Ovimbundu society and the

involvement of the Ovimbundu with UNITA, it was difficult to determine their long-range role in Angolan politics. Just how long

Ovimbundu solidarity would persist under changing circumstances

could not be predicted.

Mbundu

Just north of Ovimbundu territory lived the Mbundu, the second

largest ethnolinguistic category, whose language was Kimbundu.

In 1988 they made up an estimated 25 percent of the Angolan population. In the sixteenth century,.most of the groups that came to be known as Mbundu (a name apparendy first applied by the neighboring Bakongo) lived well to the east of the coast in the plateau

region (at a somewhat lower altitude than the Ovimbundu); a few

groups in the far northeast lived at altitudes below 700 meters. In

general, the outlines of the area occupied by the Mbundu had re- mained the same. The major exception was their expansion of this area to parts of the coast formerly occupied by Bakongo and others.

Although most of the boundaries of Mbundu territory remained

fairly firm, the social and linguistic boundaries of the category had

shifted, some of the peripheral groups having been variably

influenced by neighboring groups and the groups close to the coast having been more strongly influenced by the Portuguese than were

the more remote ones. Moreover, the subdivisions discernible for

the sixteenth century (and perhaps earlier) also changed in response

to a variety of social and linguistic influences in the colonial period. The Mbundu in general and the western Mbundu in particular, located as they were not far from Luanda, were susceptible

to those influences for a longer time and in a more intense way

than were other Angolan groups.

There were a number of Kimbundu dialects and groups. Two,

each incorporating Portuguese terms, gradually became dominant,

serving as lingua franca for many Mbundu. The western dialect was centered in Luanda, to which many Mbundu had migrated

over the years. The people speaking it, largely urban, had come

71
Angola: A Country Study

to call themselves Ambundu or Akwaluanda, thus distinguishing

themselves from rural Mbundu. The eastern dialect, known as Ambakista, had its origins in the eighteenth century in a mixed

Portuguese-Mbundu trading center at Ambaca near the western

edge of the plateau region, but it spread in the nineteenth century

through much of eastern Mbundu territory. Another Kimbunduspeaking group, the Dembos, were generally included in the Mbundu category. Living north of Luanda, they had also been strongly

influenced by Kikongo speakers.

By the late 1960s, the Mbundu living in the cities, such as Luanda

and Malanje, had adopted attributes of Portuguese life-style. Many

had intermarried with Portuguese, which led to the creation of an

entirely new class of mestigos. Those who received formal education and fully adopted Portuguese customs became assimilados (see

Glossary).

The Mbundu were the MPLA's strongest supporters when the

movement first formed in 1956. The MPLA's president, Agostinho Neto, was the son of a Mbundu Methodist pastor and a graduate of a Portuguese medical school. In the 1980s, the Mbundu

were predominant in Luanda, Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Malanje, and

northern Cuanza Sul provinces.

Bakongo

The Kikongo-speaking Bakongo made up an estimated 15 per- cent of the Angolan population. In 1988 the Bakongo were the third

largest ethnolinguistic group in Angola. Concentrated in Uige,

Zaire, and Cabinda provinces, where they constituted a majority

of the population, the Bakongo spilled over into the nation of Zaire

(where they were the largest single ethnic group) and Congo.

Although the Angolan city of Sao Salvador (renamed Mbanza Congo) was the capital of their ancient kingdom, most of the Bakongo

were situated in Zaire.

Their former political unity long broken, the various segments

of the ethnolinguistic category in Angola experienced quite dif- ferent influences in the colonial period. The Bashikongo, living near the coast, had the most sustained interaction with the Portuguese but were less affected by participation in the coffee econo- my than the Sosso and Pombo, who were situated farther east and

south. All three groups, however, were involved in the uprising

of 1961 . The Pombo, still farther east but close to the Zairian border, were much influenced by developments in the Belgian Congo

(present-day Zaire), and a large contingent of Pombo living in

Leopoldville (present-day Kinshasa) formed a political party in the

72
1

Children playing ware,

a traditional game

Courtesy UNICEF

(Maggie Murray-Lee)

early 1950s. The Solongo, dwelling on the relatively dry coastal

plain, had little contact with the Portuguese. They and the Ashiluanda of the island of Luanda, to the south, were Angola's only

African sea fishermen.

The Mayombe (also spelled Maiombe) of the mountain forests of Cabinda spoke a dialect of Kikongo but were not part of the

ancient kingdom. That part of the Mayombe living in Zaire did

join with the Zairian Bakongo in the Alliance of Bakongo (Alli- ance des Bakongo—Abako) during the period of party formation

in the Belgian Congo, but the Cabindan Mayombe (and other

Kikongo-speaking groups in the enclave), relatively remote

geographically and culturally from the Bakongo of Angola proper,

showed no solidarity with the latter. Instead, in 1961 the Mayombe

formed a Cabindan separatist movement, the Alliance of Mayombe

(Alliance de Mayombe—Alliama), which merged with two other

Cabindan separatist movements in 1963 to form the Front for the

Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao

do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC).

One of the first major revolts of the nationalist struggle was insti- gated by Bakongo in March 1961 in the northwest. The Portuguese

crushed the peasant attack, organized by the Bakongo group, the

Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola

UPA), on their settlements, farms, and administrative outposts.

Subsequently, 400,000 Bakongo fled into Zaire. In 1962 the UPA

73
Angola: A Country Study

formed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente

Nacional de Libertacao de Angola—FNLA), which became one

of the three major nationalist groups (the other two being the MPLA

and UNITA) involved in the long and bloody war of independence.

Most of the FNLA's traditional Bakongo constituency fled into exile in Zaire during the war. Following independence, however, many

Bakongo exiles returned to their traditional homesteads in Angola.

They had since retained their ethnolinguistic integrity.

Lunda-Chokwe

The hyphenated category Lunda-Chokwe constituted an esti- mated 8 percent of the Angolan population in 1988. As the hyphenation implies, the category comprises at least two subsets, the

origins of which are known to be different, and the events leading

to their inclusion in a single set are recent. The Lunda alone were

a congeries of peoples brought together in the far-flung Lunda

Empire (seventeenth century to nineteenth century) under the

hegemony of a people calling themselves Ruund, its capital in the eastern section of Zaire's Katanga Province (present-day Shaba

Region). Lunda is the form of the name used for the Ruund and

for themselves by adjacent peoples to the south who came under

Ruund domination. In some sources, the Ruund are called Northern Lunda, and their neighbors are called Southern Lunda. The

most significant element of the latter, called Ndembu (or Ndembo), lived in Zaire and Zambia. In Angola the people with whom

the northward-expanding Chokwe came into contact were chiefly

Ruund speakers. The economic and political decline of the empire by the second half of the nineteenth century and the demarcation of colonial boundaries ended Ruund political domination

over those elements beyond the Zairian borders.

The Chokwe, until the latter half of the nineteenth century a small group of hunters and traders living near the headwaters of

the Cuango and Cassai rivers, were at the southern periphery of

the Lunda Empire and paid tribute to its head. In the latter half

of the nineteenth century, the Chokwe became increasingly involved

in trading and raiding, and they expanded in all directions, but

chiefly to the north, in part absorbing the Ruund and other peoples. In the late nineteenth century, the Chokwe went so far as

to invade the capital of the much-weakened empire in Katanga.

As a consequence of this Chokwe activity, a mixed population

emerged in parts of Zaire as well as in Angola, although there were

virtually homogeneous communities in both countries consisting

of Chokwe, Ruund, or Southern Lunda.

74
The Society and Its Environment

The intermingling of Lunda (Ruund and Southern Lunda) and

Chokwe, in which other smaller groups were presumably also

caught up, continued until about 1920. It was only after that time

that the mixture acquired the hyphenated label and its members

began to think of themselves (in some contexts) as one people.

The languages spoken by the various elements of the so-called

Lunda-Chokwe were more closely related to each other than to other

Bantu languages in the Zairian-Angolan savanna but were by no means mutually intelligible. The three major tongues (Ruund, Lunda, and Chokwe) had long been distinct from each other, although some borrowing of words, particularly of Ruund political titles by

the others, had occurred.

Portuguese anthropologists and some others accepting their work

have placed some of the peoples (Minungu and Shinji) in this area with the Mbundu, and the Minungu language is sometimes considered a transitional one between Kimbundu and Chokwe. There

may in fact have been important Mbundu influence on these two

peoples, but the work of a number of linguists places their languages

firmly with the set that includes Ruund, Lunda, and Chokwe.

Economic and political developments in the 1970s affected var- ious sections of the Lunda-Chokwe differently. Substantial numbers of them live in or near Lunda Norte Province, which contains

the principal diamond mines of Angola. Diamond mining had been

significant since 1920, and preindependence data show that the in- dustry employed about 18,000 persons. Moreover, the mining com- pany provided medical and educational facilities for its employees

and their dependents, thereby affecting even greater numbers. How

many of those employed were Lunda-Chokwe is not clear, although

neighboring villages would have been affected by the presence of

the mining complex in any case (see Extractive Industries, ch. 3).

In the intra-Angolan political conflict preceding and immediately

following independence, there apparently was some division between the northern Lunda-Chokwe, especially those with some

urban experience, who tended to support the MPLA, and the rural

Chokwe, particularly those farther south, who tended to support

UNITA. In the 1980s, as the UNITA insurgency intensified in

the border areas of eastern and northern Angola, Lunda-Chokwe

families were forced to flee into Zaire's Shaba Region, where many

remained in 1988, living in three sites along the Benguela Railway. The impact of this move on the ethnolinguistic integrity of

these people was not known.

A somewhat different kind of political impact began in the late 1960s, when refugees from Katanga in Zaire, speakers of Lunda

75
Angola: A Country Study

or a related language, crossed the border into what are now Lunda

Sul and northern Moxico provinces. In 1977 and 1978, these

refugees and others whom they had recruited formed the National

Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front National pour la Liberation du Congo—FNLC) and used the area as a base from

which they launched their invasions of Shaba Region (see National Security Environment, ch. 5). In the 1980s, these rebels and

perhaps still other refugees remained in Angola, many in Lunda

Sul Province, although the Angolan government as part of its rapprochement with Zaire was encouraging them to return to their

traditional homes. The Zairian government offered amnesty to

political exiles on several occasions in the late 1980s and conferred

with the Angolan government on the issue of refugees. In 1988,

however, a significant number of Zairian refugees continued to inhabit Lunda-Chokwe territory. The significance for local LundaChokwe of the presence and activities of these Zairians was not

known.

Nganguela

Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela) is a term, pejorative in connotation, applied by the Ovimbundu to the peoples living east and

southeast of them. The essentially independent groups constituting what was no more than a Portuguese census category was split

by southward penetration of the Chokwe in the late nineteenth cen- tury and early twentieth century. Only two groups in the western

section of the territory accepted the name Nganguela; the others

carried names such as Lwena (or Lovale), Mbunda, and Luchazi

all in the eastern division. The Lwena and Luchazi, roughly equal

in number, constituted about a third of the census category of Nganguela, which in 1988 accounted for an estimated 6 percent of the

Angolan population.

Unlike the farming peoples who numerically dominated the larger

ethnolinguistic categories, the groups in the western division of the

Nganguela were cattle raisers as well as cultivators. Those in the eastern division near the headwaters of the Zambezi River and its tributaries also relied on fishing. All the groups included in the Nganguela ethnolinguistic category

spoke languages apparentiy related to those spoken by the Ruund,

Southern Lunda, and Chokwe. Lwena and Chokwe, although not

mutually intelligible, were probably more closely related than

Chokwe was to Ruund or Lunda. Except for sections of the

Lwena, during the time of kingdoms most of these peoples were

outside the periphery of Lunda influence, and some (in the western

76
The Society and Its Environment

division) were affected by Ovimbundu activity, including slave

raiding.

Of the ethnolinguistic categories treated thus far, the Nganguela

have had the least social or political significance in the past or in

modern times. For the most part thinly scattered in an inhospitable territory, split by the southern expansion of the Chokwe, and

lacking the conditions for even partial political centralization, let alone unification, the groups constituting the category went different

ways when nationalist activity gave rise to political movements based

in part on regional and ethnic considerations. The western divi- sion, adjacent to the Ovimbundu, was most heavily represented

in the Ovimbundu-dominated UNITA. Some of the groups in the

eastern divisions were represented in the MPLA-PT, which Mbundu and mestizos dominated, although the Lwena, neighbors of and

related to the Chokwe, tended to support UNITA.

In the 1980s, the spread of the UNITA insurgency into the

Nganuela-inhabited area adjacent to the Zambian border led to the flight of many Nganguela families into Zambia. The extent of this flight and its effects on the ethnolinguistic integrity of the

Nganguela were unknown.

Ovambo, Nyaneka-Humbe, Hereto, and Others

In far southwestern Angola, three categories of Bantu-speaking

peoples have been distinguished. Two of them, the Ovambo and

the Herero, were more heavily represented elsewhere: the Ovambo

in Namibia and the Herero in Namibia and Botswana. The Herero

dispersion, especially that section of it in Botswana, was the con- sequence of the migration of the Herero from German South West

Africa (present-day Namibia) after their rebellion against German

rule in 1906. The third group was the Nyaneka-Humbe. Unlike

the other groups, the Nyaneka-Humbe did not disperse outside

Angola. In 1988 the Nyaneka-Humbe (the first group is also spelled

Haneca; the latter group is also spelled Nkumbi) constituted 3 per- cent of the population. The Ovambo, of which the largest subgroup were the Kwanhama (also spelled Kwanyama), made up an esti- mated 2 percent of the Angolan population. In the second half of

the nineteenth century, the Kwanhama Kingdom of southern

Angola was a powerful state involved in a lucrative trade relationship with the Portuguese, who, together with the Germans, occupied

Kwanhama territory in the early twentieth century. In the 1980s,

the Ovambo were seminomadic cattle herders and farmers. The

Herero constituted no more than . 5 percent of the population in

1988. Traditionally, the Herero were nomadic or seminomadic

77
Angola: A Country Study

herders living in the arid coastal lowlands and in the mountainous

escarpment to the east in Namibe, Benguela, and Huila provinces.

Many Herero migrated south to Namibia when the Portuguese

launched a military expedition against them in 1940 following their

refusal to pay taxes. In the southeastern corner of the country, the Portuguese dis- tinguished a set of Bantu-speaking people, described on a map pre- pared by Jose Redinha in 1973 as the Xindonga. The sole linguistic

group listed in this category was the Cussu. The Language Map of

Africa, prepared under the direction of David Dalby for the Inter- national African Institute, noted two sets of related languages in

southeastern Angola. The first set included Liyuwa, Mashi, and

North Mbukushu. These languages and other members of the set were also found in Zambia and Namibia. The members of the

second set, Kwangali-Gcikuru and South Mbukushu, were also

found in Namibia and Botswana. The hyphen between Kwangali

and Gcikuru implies mutual intelligibility. Little is known of these

groups; in any case, their members were very few.

All of these southern Angolan groups relied in part or in whole on cattle raising for subsistence. Formerly, the Herero were

exclusively herders, but they gradually came to engage in some

cultivation. Although the Ovambo had depended in part on culti- vation for a much longer time, dairy products had been an important source of subsistence, and cattle were the chief measure of

wealth and prestige.

The southwestern groups, despite their remoteness from the

major centers of white influence during most of the colonial period, were to varying degrees affected by the colonial presence and, after World War II, by the arrival of numbers of Portuguese in such

places as Mocamedes (present-day Namibe) and Sa da Bandeira

(present-day Lubango). The greatest resistance to the Portuguese was offered by the Ovambo, who were not made fully subject to colonial rule until 1915 and who earned a considerable reputation

among the Portuguese and other Africans for their efforts to maintain their independence. In the nationalist struggle of the 1960s

and early 1970s and in the postindependence civil war, the Ovambo

tended to align themselves with the Ovimbundu-dominated UNITA. Many also sympathized with the cause of SWAPO, a mostly

Ovambo organization fighting to liberate Namibia from South Afri- can rule. Hunters, Gatherers, Herders, and Others

Scattered throughout the lower third of Angola, chiefly in the dri- er areas, were small bands of people. Until the twentieth century,

78
The Society and Its Environment

most of them were nomadic hunters and gatherers, although some

engaged in herding, either in addition to their other subsistence

activities or as their chief means of livelihood. Those who survived

turned, at least in part, to cultivation.

The bands living a nomadic or seminomadic life in Cuando

Cubango Province (and occasionally reaching as far east as the upper Cunene River) differed physically and linguistically from their

sedentary Bantu-speaking neighbors. Short, saffron-colored, and

in other respects physically unlike the Nganguela, Ovambo, and

Nyaneka-Humbe, they spoke a language of the !Xu-Angola or Maligo set of tongues referred to as Khoisan or Click languages

(the exclamation point denotes a specific kind of click), whose precise relations to each other are not yet fully understood by observers.

Several other hunting and gathering or herding groups, the members of which were taller and otherwise physically more like the

local Bantu speakers, lived farther west, adjacent to the Ovambo

and Herero. These people spoke Bantu languages and were less nomadic than the Khoisan speakers, but they were clearly differ- ent from the Ovambo and Herero and probably preceded them

in the area. Mestizos

In 1960 a little more than 1 percent of the total population of

Angola consisted of mestigos. It has been estimated that by 1970

these people constituted perhaps 2 percent of the population. Some

mestigos left at independence, but the departure of much greater

numbers of Portuguese probably resulted in an increase in the

proportion of mestigos in the Angolan total. In 1988 mestigos probably continued to number about 2 percent of the Angolan population.

The process of mixing started very early and continued until in- dependence. But it was not until about 1900, when the number

of Portuguese in Angola was very small and consisted almost entirely of males, that the percentage of mestigos in the population ex- ceeded the percentage of whites (see The Demographic Situation,

ch. 1). After a number of generations, the antecedents of many mestigos

became mixed to the extent that the Portuguese felt a need to establish a set of distinctions among them. Many mestigos accepted

this system as a means of social ranking. One source suggests that

the term mestigo used alone in a social context applied specifically to the offspring of a mulatto and a white; the term mestigo cabrito referred to the descendant of a union between two mulattos; and

the term mestigo cafuso was applied to the child of a union between

a mulatto and a black African. It is possible that an even more

complex set of distinctions was sometimes used.

79
Angola: A Country Study

Most mestiqos were urban dwellers and had learned to speak Portuguese either as a household language or in school. Although some

of the relatively few rural mestiqos lived like the Africans among

whom they dwelt, most apparently achieved the status of assimilados, the term applied before 1961 to those nonwhites who fulfilled certain specific requirements and were therefore registered as Portuguese citizens.

With some exceptions, mestiqos tended to identify with Portuguese

culture, and their strongly voiced opposition over the years to the

conditions imposed by the colonial regime stressed their rights to a status equivalent to that of whites. Before World War II, only

occasionally did mestiqo intellectuals raise their voices on behalf of

the African population. Thus, despite the involvement of mestiqos

in the nationalist struggle beginning in 1961 and their very important role in the upper echelons of the government and party,

significant segments of the African population tended to resent them. This legacy continued in the late 1980s because mestiqos dominated the MPLA-PT hierarchy.

Starting in the late 1970s, an average of 50,000 Cuban troops

and civilian technical personnel (the overwhelming majority of

whom were male) were stationed in Angola. As a result, a portion

of the nation's younger population was undoubtedly of mixed Afri- can and Cuban descent. This new category of racial mixture,

however, had not been described by researchers as of late 1988,

and no figures existed on how many Angolans might fall into this category.

Structure of Society

The most pervasive influences on the structure of Angolan soci- ety in the late 1980s were the Marxist-Leninist policies of the

government and increased militarization to counter the UNITA

insurgency. Based on the principle that the party, the working class,

and the worker-peasant alliance played a leading role in society,

Marxist-Leninist policies were applied in the late 1970s to every

sector of society and the economy, affecting the lives of urban and

rural inhabitants alike. Direct military actions had the greatest effect on those living in the central and southern provinces, causing large

displacements of whole groups of people and the creation of a substantial refugee population in Zambia and Zaire. Moreover, thousands of young men and women were conscripted into the Angolan

armed forces, while many thousands of older citizens served in

militias and civil defense units (see War and the Role of the Armed

Forces in Society, ch. 5). In regard to the direct effects of war, press reports in 1988 estimated that since 1975 the insurgency had

80
The Society and Its Environment

claimed from 60,000 to 90,000 lives and had orphaned an estimated

10,000 children. The U.S. Committee for Refugees reported that

by 1988 about 20,000 Angolans, mostly women and children, had

been crippled by mines buried in rural fields and roads.

Social Structure in Rural Communities

The crucial social units in rural systems were villages (or other

forms of local community) and groups based on common descent,

actual or putative. These were basic entities, even if subject to change in form and function in the period preceding the Portuguese

incursion and during the centuries when Portugal exercised only

indirect influence in the interior. Throughout these hundreds of

years, changes in the structure of rural political and economic sys- tems had their impact on rural communities and kin groups, but

rural community organization and the organization of kin groups,

often linked, remained the most significant elements in the lives of ordinary Africans.

In general, the connection between a rural community and a descent group (or some other kin-based set of persons) lay in the

fact that the core of each community consisted of a descent group

of some kind. Others in the community were tied to the members

of the group by marriage or, in an earlier period, by a slave or

client relationship, the effects of which may well have survived the

formal abolition of slavery, as they have elsewhere. Typically, neighboring villages were tied together either because their core groups were made up of members of related descent groups (or different

segments of a larger descent group) or, in some cases, by fairly

frequent intermarriage among members of a limited set of villages.

Traditionally, descent groups in Angola are matrilineal; that is, they include all persons descended from a common female ancestor through females, although the individuals holding authority are, with rare exceptions, males. In some cases, junior males inherit

from (or succeed to a position held by) older brothers; in others,

males inherit from their mother's brother. Patrilineal descent

groups, whose members are descended from a male ancestor through males, apparently have occurred in only a few groups in

Angola and have been reported only in conjunction with matrilineal

groups, a comparatively rare phenomenon referred to as a double

descent system.

It must be emphasized that even where double descent systems

did not exist, kin traced through the father were important as individuals in systems in which group formation was based on matrilineal descent. In some cases, the Bakongo for example, an individual

would be tied through his father to the latter 's matrilineage,

81
Angola: A Country Study

appropriate members of which have an important say in aspects

of that individual's life. Broadly speaking, matrilineal descent groups alone have been

reported for the Bakongo (but are well described only for some of

the Zairian Bakongo), the Mbundu, the Chokwe, and the Ovambo, but their occurrence is probable elsewhere. A double descent

system has been reported for Angola's largest ethnolinguistic group,

the Ovimbundu, and might also be found among some of the

southern groups.

The structure and workings of the double descent system of the

Ovimbundu had not been adequately described as of 1988. In any

case, ethnographic studies made in the middle of the twentieth cen- tury suggest that patrilineal groups as such (as opposed to links

with the father and some of his kin) had virtually disappeared and

that matrilineal groups had, by and large, lost most of their significance as a result of major changes in patterns of economic

activity.

Descent groups vary in size, degree of localization, function, and

degree of internal segmentation. In the kinds of groups commonly

called clans, the links between a putative common ancestor and

the living cannot be traced, and no effort is made to do so. Such

groups are larger in scope than the units into which they are divided,

although they need not have many members in absolute terms. They are rarely localized, and their members may be widely dis- persed. Clans have not been widely reported in Angola. The only

large ethnic category in which they have been said to exist is the

Bakongo. Even among the Bakongo, the clans do not seem to have

had political or economic functions.

More typical of traditional Angolan communities have been the

kinds of descent groups usually called lineages, in most cases matrilineages. Among such descent groups, the common ancestor

is not so remote, and genealogical links can be traced to her. Structurally, lineages of greater depth (for example, those five to seven

generations in depth from ancestor to most recent generation) may

be further segmented into shallower lineages (perhaps three to four

generations in depth), lineages at each level having different functions. This structure seems to have been the case among the Bakongo. There, the deeper unit controlled the allocation of land and

performed tasks connected with that crucial function, whereas shal- lower lineages controlled matters such as marriage.

Another important aspect of rural community life was the role

of traditional leaders. After the outbreak of African opposition to colonial rule in the early 1960s, most local leaders were, if not loyal to the Portuguese, reluctant to support the nationalist movements.

82
The Society and Its Environment

The MPLA, in particular, was urban based and therefore had lit- tle contact with local leaders in rural areas. Following independence,

however, and most markedly in the 1980s, the government recognized the necessity of gaining the support of rural peasants to counter the spreading influence of UNITA. Thus, party officials began

appointing local leaders to district or local committees, thereby re- assigning to them a significant role in the local political hierarchy.

Ovimbundu Social Structure

Before the twentieth century, neither matrilineage nor patrilineage dominated Ovimbundu society. Economic matters, such as property rights, seem to have been linked to the matrilineage, while

political authority was passed through the patrilineage. The lin- eage system declined in the twentieth century, as more and more

Europeans settled on the highly arable plateau. The results were

land shortage and commercialization that loosened the control either

lineage system might have over what had become the primary

resource in the Ovimbundu economy. By the mid-1950s, terms

formerly used for the patrilineal and matrilineal descent groups were still heard, but they no longer referred to a cohesive group.

They were applied instead to individual patrilineal and matrilineal

relatives. Significantly, the Portuguese termfamilia had also come

into use by this time.

The development of cash-crop agriculture and changes in land

tenure, in combination with inadequate soils and Ovimbundu

agricultural techniques, led to soil depletion and the need by nuclear

families for increasingly extensive holdings. Nucleated villages, consequently, became less and less feasible. Increasingly, particularly in the coffee- growing area, the homestead was no longer part of the nucleated village, although dispersed

homesteads in a given area were defined as constituting a village.

The degree of dispersal varied, but the individual family, detached

from the traditional community, tended to become the crucial unit.

Where either Protestants or Roman Catholics were sufficiently

numerous, the church and school rather than the descent group

became the focus of social and sometimes of political life. In at least one study of a section of the Ovimbundu, it was found that each

entity defined as a village consisted almost exclusively of either Protestants or Roman Catholics (see Christianity, this ch.).

But given the problems of soil depletion and, in some areas, of land shortage, not all Ovimbundu could succeed as cash-crop

farmers. A substantial number of them thus found it necessary to go to other regions (and even other countries) as wage workers.

Consequendy, some households came to consist of women and chil- dren for long periods.

83
Angola: A Country Study

In 1967 the colonial authorities, concerned by the political situ- ation east of the Ovimbundu and fearing the spread of rebellion

to the plateau regions, gathered the people into large villages to control them better and, in theory at least, to provide better social

and economic services (see Angolan Insurgency, ch. 1). The Ovimbundu, accustomed to dispersed settlement, strongly resented the

practice. Among other things, they feared that the land they were

forced to abandon would be taken over by Europeans (which in some cases did happen).

By 1970 compulsory resettlement had been abolished in part of

Ovimbundu territory and reduced elsewhere. Then the Portuguese

instituted a rural advisory service and encouraged the formation

of what they called agricultural clubs. The old term for matrilineal

descent group was sometimes applied to these organizations, which were intended to manage credits for Ovimbundu peasants. These

units, however, were based on common interest, although traces of kin connections sometimes affected their operation, as did the

relations between ordinary Ovimbundu and local rulers. Moreover,

conflict within the group often took the form of accusations of sor- cery. The effects on these units of independence, the stripping away

of the advisory service, and the early years of the UNITA insurgency were unknown. It is unlikely, however, that the Ovimbundu took to enforced cooperation or collectivization easily.

The effects of the UNITA insurgency on Ovimbundu life were

extensive and frequendy devastating. Much of the fighting between

government troops and UNITA forces, especially in the 1980s, took

place on Ovimbundu-occupied territory. Largely dependent on

agriculture, Ovimbundu village life was seriously disrupted, and

large numbers of Ovimbundu were forced to flee, abandoning their

traditions along with their homes.

As UNITA gained control over a growing area in southeast Angola, however, the organization tried to preserve the integrity of

Ovimbundu life-style and customs (see fig. 16). UNITA established a series of military bases throughout the southeast that served as administrative centers for the surrounding regions. Under Ovimbundu leadership, the bases provided educational, social, economic,

and health services to the population, operating much like the vil- lage system on the central plateau. To what extent this system

preserved at least some aspects of Ovimbundu traditional life in

the late 1980s was unknown.

Mbundu Social Structure

Among the Mbundu, the matrilineage survived centuries of

change in other institutions. Membership in and loyalty to it was

84
Villagers pumping water from an uncontaminated well Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee)

of great importance. The lineage supported the individual in material and nonmaterial ways because most land was lineage domain,

access to it required lineage membership, and communication

between the living and their ancestors, crucial to traditional religion, was mediated through the lineage.

The Mbundu lineage differed from Bakongo and Ovimbundu

groups in its underlying theory; it consisted not of individuals but

of statuses or tides filled by living persons. In this system, a Mbundu

could move from one status to another, thus acquiring a different

set of relationships. How, in fact, this theoretical system affected

interpersonal relationships between biological kin has not been described, however.

The Mbundu matrilineage was in some respects a dispersed unit,

but a core group maintained a lineage village to which its members returned, either at a particular stage in their lives or for brief

visits. Women went to the villages of their husbands, and their chil- dren were raised there. The girls, as their mothers had done, then

joined their own husbands. The young men, however, went to the

lineage village to join their mothers' brothers. The mothers' brothers

and their sisters' sons formed the more or less permanent core of

the lineage community, visited from time to time by the women

of the lineage who, as they grew old, might come to live the rest of their lives there. After a time, when the senior mother's brother

85
Angola: A Country Study

who headed the matrilineage died, some of the younger men would

go off to found their own villages. A man then became the senior

male in a new lineage, the members of which would be his sisters and his sisters' sons. One of these younger men might, however,

remain in the old village and succeed the senior mother's brother

in the latter' s status and take on his role completely, thus perpetuating the older lineage. According to one account, the functioning

lineage probably has a genealogical depth of three to four generations: a man, his sister's adult sons, and the latter' s younger but

married sister's sons. How this unit encompasses the range of sta- tuses characteristic of the matrilineage in Mbundu theory is not

altogether clear. Social Structure in Urban Areas

Whatever the kind and degree of change in the workings of lin- eage and community in rural Angola, research in the musseques of

Luanda showed that the lineage system had litde significance there. Musseques are settlements in and around Luanda (and some of the

other big towns) in which many of the urban poor live. Residents

of the settlements in Luanda were predominantly of Mbundu ori- gin. In the 1980s, the settlements became the refuge of hundreds

of thousands of displaced persons.

Some of the inhabitants of the musseques worked regularly in

manual jobs, but others were employed only intermittently, and

still others would go jobless for long periods. The variation in the

material circumstances of males in particular affected the composition of the households. Ideally, and often in fact, the household

consisted of a man and a woman, living in a union legally or otherwise sanctioned, and their children. Occasionally, another kinsman or kinswoman was part of the unit. In the 1980s, with the

influx of the rural displaced, additional kin or acquaintances were

probably also becoming part of many of the family units.

The man was expected to assume the primary responsibility for

supporting the household and to provide, if possible, for the education of the children, although others sometimes contributed.

Given the economic circumstances of most of these men, the burden sometimes became overwhelming, and some men reacted by

leaving the household. This reaction accounted, with some exceptions, for the presence of female heads of households.

In the 1980s, an important effect of extended kinship ties was

the expectation of migrants from rural areas that they could turn

first to their kin already in place for at least temporary housing

and other aid. The tendency was to look to heads of households

who were of the same matrilineage, but that practice was not

86
The Society and Its Environment

universal. Moreover, it did not signify that the matrilineage had

been transplanted to the musseques. The relationship between the

head of the household and the newly arrived migrant was that

between two individuals. The urban situation did not provide the

conditions for the functioning of the matrilineage as a social,

political, and economic unit.

Given the combination of the nuclear family household, the

absence of matrilineages, and the relative ethnic homogeneity of

the musseques of Luanda, the organization of permanent or temporary groups engaged in social or political activity and the for- mation of interpersonal relationships were likely to be based directly on economic concerns or on other common interests arising out

of the urban situation. Elsewhere, such concerns and interests were

often mediated by or couched in terms of considerations of ethnicity or kinship.

Effects of Socialist Policies

Beginning in late 1977 with the First Party Congress of the

MPLA, at which the conversion of the MPLA to a vanguard party was announced, party leaders attempted to define the kind of so- ciety and economy they wished to develop. The process of definition was by no means systematic and often simply drew on

Marxist-Leninist cliches borrowed from the Soviet model. Nevertheless, from time to time statements of either purpose or criticism

focused on specific features and problems of Angolan society as these leaders saw them. Sometimes, the solutions offered appeared

to have conflicting implications.

Running through the statements of leaders and editorials in Angola's largest newspaper, Jornal de Angola, and other party and state publications were frequent and strong references to the need to eliminate all signs of ethnicity, regionalism, and racism. On several

occasions, the statements and editorials asserted that ethnicity and

regionalism were not the same, but their differences were not spelled out. Because there is a link between ethnolinguistic category and

location, the differential effects on behavior of ethnicity and regionalism are often difficult to determine.

At the same time that the party cautioned against racism (the

reference is to mestiqos and to those Portuguese who remained in

Angola after independence), it also discouraged attitudes of superiority. Presumably, this was an allusion not only to the preindependence attitudes of Portuguese and mestiqos but also to those of urban,

educated Africans, who would in former times have been called

assimilados. In fact, it is unlikely that the Portuguese in the party

would act in the style of the Portuguese colonial official or settler,

87
Angola: A Country Study

but some mestigos, uncommitted ideologically, might act in such

a way; educated Africans, secure in their racial situation, were even more likely to exhibit a sense of superiority to ordinary Africans.

The sensitivity of the party to popular perceptions about racism

and attitudes of superiority was partly responsible for attempts in

the 1980s by the dos Santos regime to remove from the top party

echelons a number of mestigos, who dominated the party structure,

and replace them with a more ethnically diverse group (see Politi- cal Environment, ch. 4). In the 1980s, there was a significant shift of attitude on the part

of government and party officials toward private enterprise and

what the party had previously labeled "petite bourgeoisie." In the

1970s, the term was widely and pejoratively used to discourage

individuals from activities in which they could accumulate personal

wealth. Although self-aggrandizement was still discouraged, the

party recognized that economic and agricultural centralization had

failed as development strategies and that movement toward pri- vate enterprise would be necessary to boost domestic production,

increase the supply of goods available to the Angolan population,

and generally improve the economic picture.

The implications of these policy changes for the structure of

society, including economic support for individual peasant farmers and an increase in the role of private traders, were extensive.

Where the party once discouraged the existence of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie both in urban and in rural Angola, some observers believed that efforts to develop the country and come to grips

with its economic and technical problems might generate not only a bureaucratic middle class and elite but also a business middle

class less amenable to control than a salaried state bourgeoisie.

Policies Affecting Rural Society

Prior to independence, most peasants engaged in subsistence

farming and cattle herding, whereas commercial farms and plantations, which produced most of the cash crops, were owned and

operated primarily by Portuguese settlers. Although most farmers

and herders consumed most of what they produced, those who did

market some of their output depended on Portuguese bush traders. A barter system developed through which agricultural produce was

exchanged for agricultural supplies and consumer goods from the

cities. This entire system collapsed with the sudden departure of

the Portuguese farmers and bush traders at independence.

The government acted immediately by transforming the abandoned commercial farms into state farms, all of which were large

88
Homeless children on a street in Luanda

Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee)

and understaffed. The lack of personnel with managerial and technical skills, the breakdown of machinery, and the unwillingness

of peasants to work for wages soon eroded the experiment in

nationalization, and by the early 1980s much of the land was

appropriated for individual family farming.

The government proceeded cautiously in its dealings with the

peasants, recognizing that productivity had to take priority over

ideology. Thus, instead of immediately collectivizing land, the

government formed farming cooperatives, but this too failed because

of the government's inability to replace the function of the Portuguese bush traders, despite the establishment of a barter system

managed by two state companies (see Agriculture, ch. 3). By the

early 1980s, most peasants, having never received from the state any promised goods, returned to subsistence farming and their tradi- tional way of life. A shift in agricultural policy began in 1984 that may have

provided the basis for a fundamental change in rural life in the

future. The goal was to restore a flow of farm surplus products

to urban areas and reduce dependence on imports. Along with the

dissolution of the state farms, the government began setting up

agricultural development stations to provide assistance to farmers

in the form of technical advice, equipment, and seeds and fertili- zer. In 1988 these measures were gradually reversing the decline

89
Angola: A Country Study

in agricultural production for the market in the few provinces

unaffected by the UNITA insurgency.

Policies Affecting Urban Society

Many of the difficult economic conditions existing in Angola's

cities and towns were the result of the UNITA insurgency, including

the almost total disruption of the transportation system necessary

to carry produce from rural to urban areas. However, by the late 1980s the government had recognized that much could be blamed

on the cumbersome and ineffective mechanisms of the centralized

economy (see Role of the Government, ch. 3). In 1988 the government, faced with the continuing decline of the manufacturing sector, began to move away from state-controlled companies and

promised to enact new laws that would make private ownership

possible.

The impact of the changes in economic policy were not immediately apparent in Luanda in 1988. The only two sources of goods

for the capital's population were rationed and poorly stocked state stores and the parallel market, where the local currency was accepted

at only a fraction of its face value. Many foreign businesses were

giving their Angolan employees credit at a government supermarket where they could buy food. Some foreign businesses set up their

own stores in which their employees could shop. The largest parallel

market operation in Luanda, Roque Santeiro, was only one of many

that depended on European shipments for products such as clothing, watches, medicine, and tape players, as well as food. There

was some indication that goods were also bought by insiders at state stores and resold at many times the price in the parallel market.

Despite official rhetoric, the government recognized its inability

to provide basic goods to the population and seldom interfered with

parallel market activities. Physical living conditions in Luanda were deplorable in 1988.

The elegant marble apartment buildings that lined the city's downtown streets during the colonial era had become slums with neither

running water nor electricity. Even most of those able to afford

luxuries were living without basic conveniences or amenities; eve- ning activities, such as cultural events or dining out, were rare. And because of a lack of spare parts, there were few taxis or other means of transportation.

Role of Women and Children

Almost no research existed on the role of women and children

in Angolan society in the late 1980s, but a few generalities could

be drawn. In rural Angola, as in many African economies, most

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The Society and Its Environment

of the population engaged in agricultural activities. Women per- formed much of the agricultural labor, as did children of both sexes. Marriage generally involved family, political, and economic interests as well as personal considerations. The household was the most

important unit of production and was usually composed of several

generations. The women grew and prepared most of the food for the household and performed all other domestic work. Because of

their major role in food production, women shared relatively equal

status with men, who spent much of their time hunting or tending

cattle. Many women and children belonged to two mass organizations:

the Organization of Angolan Women (Organizacao da Mulher

Angolana—OMA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation

of Angola-Youth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular

de Libertagao de Angola—JMPLA). Before independence, the

OMA and JMPLA were instrumental in mobilizing political support for the MPLA among thousands of Angolan refugees. After

independence, and especially after the creation of the MPLA-PT

in 1977, the mass organizations came under the strict control of

the party and were given the role of intermediaries between the

MPLA-PT and the population.

In 1987 the OMA had a membership of 1 .3 million women, most

of whom lived in rural areas. Among the many contributions of

OMA's members were the establishment of literacy programs and

service in health and social service organizations (see Mass Organizations and Interest Groups, ch. 4). Most OMA members,

however, were poor and unemployed. In 1988 only 10 percent of

MPLA-PT members were women, although more women were

finding jobs in teaching and professions from which they had been

excluded in the past.

The JMPLA, which claimed a membership of 72,000 teenagers

and students in 1988, became the only route to party membership

after 1977. JMPLA members were required to participate in the

Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, formerly

the People's Defense Organization (Organizacao de Defesa

Popular—ODP), and political study groups. The relatively small

size of the organization, however, was indicative of the difficulty

the government faced in recruiting young people from rural areas. Effects of the Insurgency

The UNITA insurgency had a far greater impact on Angola's

social fabric than the government's socialist policies. Hundreds of

thousands of displaced persons were forced not only to seek refuge

in towns and military protected resettlement areas but also to

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Angola: A Country Study

disrupt traditional life-styles. Intensive military recruitment drained

urban and rural areas of much of the young adult male population as well. UNITA frequendy reported avoidance of government

military conscription and battlefield desertions, and its spokespersons also claimed in late 1988 that large numbers of teachers in

rural areas had been recruited by the government, depleting the

schools of trained instructors. It was not clear to what extent, if any, this disruption changed the social order in families, or if vil- lage social structures remained intact. Another significant influence on the population caused by the

UNITA insurgency was the emphasis on defense. Two militia forces were created: the ODP in 1975 (renamed the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops in 1985), and the People's

Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas Populares de Vigilancia—BPV) in

1984 (see War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society; In- ternal Security Forces and Organization, ch. 5). The Directorate

of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, operating as a backup force to the Angolan armed forces, had both armed and un- armed units dispersed throughout the country in villages to protect

the population from UNITA attacks. Although the Directorate of

People's Defense and Territorial Troops had an estimated 50,000

official members in 1988, as many as 500,000 men and women

may have been participating in reserve functions. The BPV,

organized more as a mass organization than as a branch of the

armed forces, had an estimated 1.5 million members in 1987.

Designed to function in urban areas, the BPV had broader responsibilities than the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial

Troops, including political and military training of the population

and detection of criminal activities. The consequences of war-related economic failure also disrupted

Angolan society profoundly. The government had been compelled

to expend enormous economic and human resources to fight

UNITA, denying the population basic goods and services as well

as diverting those with the skills badly needed for national development into military positions. The toll was heaviest among children,

who suffered the most from substandard health conditions and the

underfunded and understaffed school system. The insurgency also contributed heavily to underproduction in the agricultural sector,

resulting in dangerous food shortages, especially in rural areas, and

in the country's dependence on external food sources. Religious Life

The attitude of the Angolan government toward religion was

inconsistent. The MPLA-PT's strong commitment to Marxism92
Young victims of the insurgency

Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Yannick Muller)

Leninism meant that its attitude toward religion, at least officially,

corresponded to that of the traditional Soviet Marxist-Leninist

dogma, which generally characterized religion as antiquated and

irrelevant to the construction of a new society. The government

also viewed religion as an instrument of colonialism because of the

Roman Catholic Church's close association with the Portuguese.

Furthermore, because membership in the party was the road to influence, party leaders and many of the cadres were likely to have no formal religious commitment, or at any rate to deny having one (even though most of Angola's leaders in the 1980s were educated at Catholic, Baptist, or Congregational mission schools).

Nonetheless, the government acknowledged the prevalence of

religion in Angolan societies and officially recognized the equality

of all religions, tolerating religious practices as long as the churches

restricted themselves to spiritual matters, The state, however, did

institute certain specific controls over religious organizations, and

it was prepared to act quickly when it felt that it was challenged

by the acts of a specific group. Thus, in early 1978 the MPLA-PT

Political Bureau ordered the registration of "legitimate" churches

and religious organizations. Although priests and missionaries were

permitted to stay in the country as foreign residents and although

religious groups or churches could receive goods from abroad, fur- ther construction of new churches without a permit was forbidden.

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Angola: A Country Study

A conflict developed in the late 1970s between the government

and the Roman Catholic Church. In December 1977, the bishops

of Angola's three archdioceses, meeting in Lubango, drafted a

pastoral letter subsequently read to all churches that claimed fre- quent violations of religious freedom. Their most specific complaint was that the establishment of a single system of education ignored

the rights of parents. They also objected to the government's sys- tematic atheistic propaganda and its silencing of the church's radio

station in 1976. In response to charges of government meddling

in religious affairs, President Neto issued a decree in January 1978

stating that there was complete separation between church and

religious institutions. In addition, Jornal de Angola printed an attack on the bishops, accusing them of questioning the integrity of the

Angolan revolutionary process. The outcome of the conflict had repercussions for Protestant churches as well as for the Roman Catholic Church. In essence, the government made it clear that religious institutions were to adhere to government and party rulings regarding nonreligious issues. In the late 1980s, there was a slight change in the government's

policy toward religion. The president and others in the government and party elites, recognizing that political opposition had not

coalesced around religious leaders, became less fearful of religious

opposition and therefore more tolerant of religious groups in general. One exception was the Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the

World, an independent Christian sect founded in 1949 by Simon

Mtoko (also spelled Simao Toco). Mtoko, a Protestant from Uige

Province, fashioned the sect after the Kimbanguist movement (not

to be confused with traditional kimbanda practices, which had arisen

in the Belgian Congo in the 1920s; see Indigenous Religious Systems, this ch.). The government had been especially suspicious of

the Mtokoists because of their strong support in Benguela Province,

most of whose residents were Ovimbundu, the principal supporters of UNITA. Mtokoists also were involved in riots in the Catate

region of Bengo Province and in Luanda at the end of 1986, and

they attacked a prison in Luanda in 1987 in an attempt to free fel- low believers who had been arrested in the 1986 riots. As a result,

the government banned the sect, claiming that its members had

used religion to attack the state and had therefore lost their legitimacy. Subsequently, however, as part of the general relaxation of

its policy on religion, the government softened its position on the

sect and in March 1988 declared it a legal religion.

Christianity

Religious affiliation in Angola was difficult to define because many

who claimed membership in a specific Christian denomination also

94
The Society and Its Environment

shared perceptions of the natural and supernatural order characteristic of indigenous religious systems. Sometimes the Christian

sphere of the life of a community was institutionally separate from

the indigenous sphere. In other cases, the local meaning and practice of Christianity were modified by indigenous patterns of belief

and practice.

Although Roman Catholic missions were largely staffed by nonPortuguese during the colonial era, the relevant statutes and ac- cords provided that foreign missionaries could be admitted only

with the approval of the Portuguese government and the Vatican

and on condition that they be integrated with the Portuguese missionary organization. Foreign Roman Catholic missionaries were

required to renounce the laws of their own country, submit to Portuguese law, and furnish proof of their ability to speak and write

the Portuguese language correctly. Missionary activity was placed

under the authority of Portuguese priests. All of this was consis- tent with the Colonial Act of 1930, which advanced the view that

Portuguese Catholic missions overseas were "instruments of civili- zation and national influence." In 1940 the education of Africans was declared the exclusive responsibility of missionary personnel.

All church activities, education included, were to be subsidized by

the state. In reality, Protestant missions were permitted to engage

in educational activity, but without subsidy and on condition that

Portuguese be the language of instruction (see Education, this ch.).

The important Protestant missions in place in the 1960s (or their

predecessors) had arrived in Angola in the late nineteenth century

and therefore had been at work before the Portuguese managed

to establish control over the entire territory. Their early years, therefore, were little affected by Portuguese policy and practice. Before

the establishment of the New State (Estado Novo) in Portugal in

1926, the authorities kept an eye on the Protestant missions but were not particularly hostile to them (see Angola under the New

State, ch. 1). Settlers and local administrators often were hostile,

however, because Protestant missionaries tended to be protective

of what they considered their charges. In those early years and later, Protestant missionaries were not only evangelists but also teachers,

healers, and counselors—all perhaps in a paternal fashion but in

ways that involved contact with Africans in a more sustained fashion

than was characteristic of Roman Catholic missionaries and local administrators. Protestant missionaries worked at learning the local languages,

in part to communicate better with those in their mission field, but

above all in order to translate the Old Testament and the New

Testament into African tongues. Protestant missionaries were much

95
Angola: A Country Study more likely than administrators and settlers to know a local language. Roman Catholic missionaries did not similarly emphasize

the translation of the Bible and, with some exceptions, did not make

a point of learning a Bantu language.

Because specific Protestant denominations were associated with

particular ethnic communities, the structure of religious organization was linked to the structure of these communities. This con- nection was brought about in part by the tendency of entire

communities to turn to the variety of Protestantism offered locally. The conversion of isolated individuals was rare. Those individuals who did not become Christians remained to a greater or lesser extent adherents of the indigenous system; unless they migrated

to one of the larger towns, persons of a specific locality did not

have the option of another kind of Christianity. Those members

of a community who had not yet become Christians were tied by

kinship and propinquity to those individuals who had. On the one

hand, indigenous patterns of social relations affected church

organization; on the other hand, the presence of Christians in the

community affected the local culture to varying degrees. Christians who could quote Scripture in the local tongue contributed

phrases to it that others picked up, and the attributes of the Christian God as interpreted by the specific denomination sometimes

became attached to the high god of the indigenous religious sys- tem and typically made that deity more prominent than previously.

The involvement of the Protestant churches in the languages of

their mission areas, their medical and other welfare activity, and

their ability to adapt to local structures or (in the case of the

Methodists among the Mbundu) to be fortuitously consistent with

them gave Protestants much more influence than their numbers

would suggest. For example, the leaders of the three major nationalist movements in the 1970s —the MPLA, UNITA, and the

FNLA—had been raised as Protestants, and many others in these

movements were also Protestants, even if their commitment may

have diminished over time.

Estimates of the number of Roman Catholics in Angola varied.

One source claimed that about 55 percent of the population in 1985 was Roman Catholic; another put the proportion in 1987 at 68

percent. Most Roman Catholics lived in western Angola, not only

because that part of the country was the most densely populated

but also because Portuguese penetration into the far interior was

comparatively recent and Roman Catholic missionaries tended to follow the flag. The most heavily Roman Catholic area before

independence was Cabinda Province, where most of the people were Bakongo. Bakongo in Angola proper were not quite so heavily

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The Society and Its Environment

Roman Catholic, and Protestantism was very influential there. There was a substantial proportion of Roman Catholics among the

Mbundu in Luanda and Cuanza Norte provinces. Less heavily

Catholic were the Ovimbundu-populated provinces of Benguela

and Huambo, although the city of Huambo had been estimated

to be two-thirds Catholic. In the southern and eastern districts,

the proportion of Roman Catholics dropped considerably.

The proportion of Protestants in the Angolan population was

estimated at 10 percent to 20 percent in the late 1980s. The majority

of them presumably were Africans, although some mesticos may have

been affiliated with one or another Protestant church.

The government recognized eleven Protestant denominations:

the Assembly of God, the Baptist Convention of Angola, the Baptist Evangelical Church of Angola, the Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of Angola, the

Evangelical Church of South-West Angola, the Our Lord Jesus

Christ Church in the World (Kimbanguist), the Reformed Evangelical Church of Angola, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the

Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, and the United Methodist Church.

In the late 1980s, statistics on Christian preferences among ethnic groups were unavailable, but proportions calculated from the

1960 census probably had not changed significantly. According to the 1960 census, about 21 percent of the Ovimbundu were Protestants, but later estimates suggest a smaller percentage. The sole Protestant group active among the Mbundu was the Methodist Mission, largely sponsored by the Methodist Episcopal Church of the

United States. Portuguese data for 1960 indicated that only 8 per- cent of the Mbundu considered themselves Protestants, but Protestant missions had considerable success among the Dembos. As

many as 35 percent of the Bakongo were considered Protestants by the official religious census of 1960, with Baptists being the most numerous.

In addition to the Protestant churches directly generated by the

missions and continuing in a more or less orthodox pattern, there were other groups, which stemmed at least in part from the Protestant experience but expressed a peculiarly local tendency and which were dominated entirely by Africans. The number of Angolans

identifying with such African churches is not known, but it is rea- sonable to assume that many Angolans were attached to them.

Indigenous Religious Systems

There were as many indigenous religious systems in Angola as there were ethnic groups or even sections of ethnic groups. Two

97
Angola: A Country Study

or more ethnic groups might share specific elements of belief, ritual,

and organizational principle, but the configuration of these elements

would be different for each group or section. Nevertheless, certain

patterns were widespread.

Most traditional African religions claim the existence of a high

god, but this deity's attributes vary. For example, some groups

emphasize the high god's role as a creator, while others do not. Specific events in the human world are not usually explained by

reference to this god, nor is a cult addressed to it. The active entities in indigenous religious systems are ancestral

and nature spirits. Ancestral spirits are considered relevant to the

welfare of a descent group or its members, and nature spirits are considered relevant to the welfare of a community in a given location. However, specific individuals may be directly affected by one

of the nature spirits resident in rocks or trees or in natural forces

such as wind or lightning.

Ancestral spirits, especially those of recently deceased kin, must

be honored with appropriate rituals if they are expected to look

favorably on the enterprises of their descendants. Only some of

these rituals are performed by the descent group as a whole. More

frequently, they are performed by and on behalf of a segment of

the group or an individual.

In theory, nature spirits are not generally considered to have

led a human existence, but there are exceptions. Occasionally, the

spirits of local rulers or others are detached from specific descent

groups or are considered to have the characteristics of other nature

spirits in that they are resident in features of the landscape.

The spirits of the ancestors of a kin group are looked to for assistance in economic and social matters, and some misfortunes

famine, poor crops, personal losses—are ascribed to failure to have

performed the appropriate rituals or to having misbehaved in some

other way. Not all misfortunes are attributed to ancestral or nature

spirits, however. Many people believe that magical powers inhere

in things and that these powers, though usually neutral, may be

used malevolently to afflict others or to prevent others from dealing with affliction, particularly illness and death. It is further thought

that individuals, sometimes unconsciously and without the use of

material or technical means, can bring illness or other affliction to human beings. Such persons, usually called witches, are thought

to be marked by the presence of a substance in the stomach or other

organ. The terms witch and sorcerer have been applied to those who

use their power malevolently, and the distinction between the two

is based in part on whether the power is inherited (witch) or acquired

in exchange for something of value (sorcerer), whether the power

98
The Society and Its Environment

is mystical or technical, and whether the power is used on one's

(the witch's) own behalf or on behalf of others, at a price. In fact, this distinction is made only in some societies and may be linked

to certain features of community social structures and associated

with patterns of accusation—whether kin by blood or marriage or non-kin are held to be responsible.

Individual difficulties are attributed to witchcraft, sorcery, or

the acts of ancestral or nature spirits. The determination is usually

made by a diviner, a specialist whose personal power and use of

material objects are held to be generally benevolent (although there are cases in which a diviner may be accused of sorcery) and whose

sensitivity to patterns of stress and strain in the community help

him or her arrive at a diagnosis. A diviner—widely called a kimbanda—may also have extensive knowledge of herbal medicine, and

at least part of the work of the kimbanda is devoted to the application

of that knowledge.

The kimbanda is said to have inherited or acquired the ability to communicate with spirits. In many cases, the acquisition of such

power follows illness and possession by a specific spirit. The proficiency and degree of specialization of diviners varies widely. Some

will deal only with particular symptoms; others enjoy broad repute

and may include more than one village, or even more than one

province, in their rounds. The greater the reputation of the kimbanda, the more he or she charges for services. This widespread

term for diviner/healer has entered into local Portuguese, and so central is the role of the kimbanda to the complex of beliefs and practices characterizing most indigenous religions that some sources, such as the Jornal de Angola, have applied the term kimbandism to indigenous systems when cataloging Angolan religions.

In general, the belief in spirits (ancestral or natural), witches,

and sorcerers is associated with a worldview that leaves no room

for the accidental. Whether events are favorable or adverse, responsibility for them can in principle be attributed to a causal agent.

If things go well, the correct ritual has been performed to placate

the spirits or invoke their help. If things go badly, the correct ritual has not been performed, or a spirit has been otherwise provoked,

or malevolent individuals have succeeded in breaching whatever

protective (magical) measures have been taken against them. This

outlook often persisted in Angola among individuals who had been

influenced by Christianity or secular education. With some changes

in particulars, it seemed to pervade urban areas, where a kimbanda

rarely lacked clients.

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Angola: A Country Study

Education

Conditions Before Independence

African access to educational opportunities was highly limited

for most of the colonial period. Until the 1950s, facilities run by

the government were few and largely restricted to urban areas. Responsibility for educating Africans rested with Roman Catholic and Protestant missions (see Religious Life, this ch.). As a con- sequence, each of the missions established its own school system,

although all were subject to ultimate control by the Portuguese with

respect to certain policy matters. Education beyond the primary level was available to very few

Africans before 1960, and the proportion of the age-group that went on to secondary school in the early 1970s was still quite low.

Nevertheless, primary school attendance was growing substantially.

Whether those entering primary schools were acquiring at least functional literacy in Portuguese was another matter. Primary

school consisted of a total of four years made up of a pair of twoyear cycles. Portuguese statistics do not indicate how many stu- dents completed each of the cycles, but it is estimated that far fewer

completed the full four years than entered the first cycle. Similarly, there seems to be general agreement among observers that a

great number of those who entered secondary school did not complete it. In general, the quality of teaching at the primary level was

low, with instruction carried on largely by Africans with very few

qualifications. Most secondary school teachers were Portuguese,

but the first years of secondary school were devoted to materials

at the primary level. Conditions after Independence

The conflict between the Portuguese and the various nationalist

movements and the civil war that ensued after independence left the education system in chaos. Most Portuguese instructors had

left (including virtually all secondary school staff), many buildings

had been damaged, and the availability of instructional materials was limited.

A report of the First Party Congress published in December 1977

gave education high priority. The report emphasized MarxismLeninism as a base for the education system and its importance

in shaping the "new generation," but the objectives of developing national consciousness and respect for traditional values were

also mentioned. The training at all levels of persons who would

be able to contribute to economic development was heavily stressed. The government estimated the level of illiteracy following

100
Students at a secondary school in Luanda

independence at between 85 percent and 90 percent and set the

elimination of illiteracy as an immediate task. Initiated in November

1976, the literacy drive gave priority to rural peasants who had

been completely ignored by the Portuguese education system. The

priorities for education were, in order of importance, literacy,

primary education, secondary education, and intermediate and

university education. The government established the National

Literacy Commission (under the leadership of the minister of education) to administer the literacy campaign.

The government reported that in the first year of the literacy

campaign (November 1976 to November 1977) 102,000 adults

learned to read and write; by 1980 the figure had risen to 1 million. By 1985 the average rate of adult literacy was officially esti- mated at 59 percent; United States government sources, however,

estimated literacy at only 20 percent. In late 1987, Angola's offi- cial press agency, Angop, reported that the provinces with the most

newly literate people included Hufia, Huambo, and Benguela and

that 8,152 literacy teachers had participated in the campaign since

its inception.

At independence there were 25,000 primary school teachers, but

fewer than 2,000 were even minimally qualified to teach primary

school children. The shortage of qualified instructors was even more

pronounced at the secondary school level, where there were only

600 teachers. Furthermore, secondary schools existed only in towns.

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Angola: A Country Study

The First Party Congress responded to this problem by resolving to institute an eight-year compulsory system of free, basic education

for children between ages seven and fifteen. Four years of primary

education, provided free of charge, began at age seven. Secondary

education, beginning at age eleven, lasted a further six years. School enrollment, which rose very slowly considering Angola's youthful population, reflected the dire effects of the insurgency.

In 1977 the government reported that more than 1 million primary

school students were enrolled, as were about 105,000 secondary

school students, roughly double the numbers enrolled in 1973. What

proportions of the relevant age-groups these students constituted was not known, but in the case of the primary school students it may have been almost two-thirds, and in that of secondary school

students, perhaps a tenth to an eighth. Official government statistics released in 1984 showed that primary school enrollment had

declined to 870,410, while secondary school enrollment (including

vocational school and teacher training students) had increased to 151,759. This made for combined primary and secondary school

enrollment consisting of 49 percent of the school-age population.

By 1986 the primary school enrollment had increased to 1 ,304, 145.

Luanda's Agostinho Neto University, the country's only university, had an enrollment of 4,493 students in 1984, which had

declined to 3,195 by 1986. A total of 72,330 people were enrolled

in primary adult education programs in 1986.

The government began implementation of its education plan in

close cooperation with its allies, particularly Cuba. Between 1978

and 1981, Cuba sent 443 teachers to Angola. According to an Angolan source, in 1987 an estimated 4,000 Angolan students,

representing one-fourth of all foreign students from Africa, Asia,

Latin America, and the Caribbean studying in Cuba, were attending Cuban elementary, middle, and college preparatory schools,

as well as polytechnical institutes and the Superior Pedagogical Polytechnic Institute. Also in Cuba, assisting in the education of their

compatriots, was a group of twenty-seven Angolan teachers. In

addition, the Soviet Union participated in Angolan education programs. More than 1,000 Angolan students had graduated from

intermediate and specialized higher education programs in the

Soviet Union by the end of 1987, at which time 100 Soviet lec- turers were teaching at Agostinho Neto University, the Luanda

Naval School, and the Institute of Geology and Cartography in

the Angolan capital. By mid- 1988 United States sources reported

that 1,800 Angolan students were studying in the Soviet Union.

A number of Angolan organizations become active during the

1980s in the quest for better educational facilities. In 1987 the

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The Society and Its Environment

JMPLA launched a special campaign to recruit 1 ,000 young people to teach in primary schools in Luanda Province. The groups

targeted by the campaign included secondary school and higher

education graduates, as well as some workers. The OMA not only

sponsored programs to teach women to read and write but was also involved in programs to reduce infant mortality and promote family

planning. Even the military formed a special group in 1980, the

eighth contingent of the Comrade Dangereux Brigade, whose basic

function was to teach primary school; 6,630 brigade members were

reported to have taught 309,419 students by 1987.

Despite the government's efforts, the UNITA insurgency

prevented the construction of a new education system on the

remains of that inherited from the Portuguese. The demands of

the war had drained funds that could otherwise have been applied

to building schools, printing books, and purchasing equipment.

In 1988, according to the United States Center for Defense Information, the Angolan government spent more per capita on the mili- tary (US$892) than on education (US$310). The war in the

southern and central regions of the country also prevented the

spread of the school system; the consequences of the fighting,

including UNITA attacks on schools and teachers and the massive displacement of rural populations in those areas, disrupted the

education of hundreds of thousands of school-age children. Further damaging to Angola's future was the fact that many of those

studying abroad had either failed to complete their courses of study

or had not returned to Angola.

Education in UNITA-Claimed Territory

By the mid-1980s, UNITA had gained control over a large part

of Angola's southeast and claimed to have gained the allegiance

of more than 1 million Angolans. As an integral part of his strategy

to win over the hearts and minds of the populations in the occupied

area, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi established a state within a

state, complete with a system of schools and hospitals to meet the

needs of the local populations. The town of Jamba, UNITA'

s

stronghold in southern Cuando Cubango Province, had a population of between 10,000 and 15,000, all of whom claimed loyalty

to UNITA and Savimbi.

Although much of the information released by UNITA was

propagandistic, it provided a rough outline of the educational sit- uation in UNITA areas. UNITA claimed that its complex system

consisted of nearly 1,000 schools, in which almost 5,000 teachers

taught more than 200,000 children. A Portuguese reporter who

visited UNITA-claimed territory in late 1987 reported that the

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Angola: A Country Study

UNITA education system consisted of two years of kindergarten,

four years of primary school, and seven years of high school. Upon

completion of high school, the brightest students were given scholar- ships to study at universities in Britain, Cote d'lvoire, France, Portugal, and the United States. Others attended middle-level technical courses in agriculture, nursing, primary school teaching, and typing in Jamba's Polytechnical Institute. UNITA's academic organization closely resembled that of Portugal, with Latin an important

part of the curriculum.

Another Portuguese source reported in mid- 1988 that there were

ninety-eight Angolan scholarship students studying in Portugal

under UNITA sponsorship. Because Portuguese institutions did

not recognize the courses taught in Jamba, UNITA-educated stu- dents were required to take the examinations from the fourth class level up to university entrance examinations, losing two or three

years of their UNITA education in the process. In other European

countries, however, UNITA-sponsored students took only the

examinations required for admission to the education level for which

they wanted to enroll. Nevertheless, UNITA preferred to send its students to Portugal because of the common language. UNITAsponsored students generally studied agronomy, engineering, and

medicine.

Health and Welfare

In general, the civil war had degraded the quality and availability of health care since independence. Logistical problems with sup- ply and distribution of equipment as well as the lack of physical

security impeded the provision of health care throughout the country, and public health services existed only in areas under government control. The rest of the country depended on international

and private relief organizations, although UNITA provided a fairly

extensive health care system of its own in rebel-controlled areas. Poor even by African standards, health conditions in Angola were made even worse by the failure of government health programs

to reach much of the population and by the movement of a significant part of the population out of war-ravaged regions. The country remained heavily dependent on foreign medical assistance

because instruction in Angolan medical schools had progressed

slowly.

Prior to independence, only urban inhabitants, many of whom

were Portuguese, had access to health facilities. One of the MPLA's

priorities when it came into power was to provide health care to the entire population through a network of health facilities over- seen by the National Health Service, an organization subordinate

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The Society and Its Environment

to the Ministry of Health. In theory, basic health workers determined the level of care required by each patient. In rural areas,

village dispensaries and health stations were staffed by a nurse, and district health centers provided outpatient services, a pharmacy,

and up to twenty beds. District health centers referred patients to provincial hospitals when necessary. In reality, health care was

limited and often unavailable in rural areas because of the lack of

resources and the absence of government control throughout much

of the country. The government claimed, however, to run 700

health posts and 140 health centers in rural areas in the late 1980s.

UNITA, as part of its general goal of disrupting government ser- vices, impeded and often prevented the movement of health care personnel and medical equipment in many areas of the country,

including regions outside its immediate control. Reports from various sources, mostly appearing in the Portuguese press, alleged that

UNITA forces had attacked and destroyed rural medical facilities. The OMA, the National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos—UNTA), and the Angolan

Red Cross were also involved in promoting health care through

the provision of health education, vaccination campaigns, and surveillance of health conditions. Particularly prominent was a primary

health care program provided by the Angolan Red Cross in urban

shantytowns. Most health-related programs, however, were

administered by foreign and international organizations with the

cooperation of the Angolan government. Most of these programs,

primarily the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

and various UN agencies, provided emergency relief aid to those

affected by the UNITA insurgency. The ICRC operated mostly

in the provinces of Huambo, Bie, and Benguela, administering

projects for improving nutrition, sanitation, and public health, with

a total staff of some 70 people, assisted by about 40 physicians, nurses, technicians, and administrators from foreign Red Cross

societies and an estimated 800 Angolan relief workers.

Infectious and parasitic diseases were prevalent among most of

the population. These diseases flourished in conditions of inadequate to nonexistent environmental sanitation, poor personal

hygiene habits, substandard living conditions, and inadequate to nonexistent disease control programs. These conditions caused a

cholera epidemic in 1987 and 1988 that killed almost 2,000 people

in twelve provinces.

Conditions worsened in the 1980s, primarily because the UNITA insurgency had resulted in the creation of a massive internal

refugee population living in tent camps or urban shantytowns. The

most frequent causes of death included gastrointestinal diseases,

105
Angola: A Country Study

malaria, respiratory infections, and sexually transmitted diseases,

all of which were aggravated by endemic malnutrition. The most

prevalent diseases included acute diarrhea, cholera, hepatitis,

hymenolepiasis, influenza, leprosy, meningitis, onchocerciasis,

schistosomiasis, tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, yaws, and yellow

fever. In addition, in 1989 approximately 1.5 million Angolans were

at risk of starvation because of the insurgency and economic mismanagement. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

estimated that Angola had the world's fourth highest mortality rate for children under the age of five, despite a program launched in

1987 by UNICEF to vaccinate children against diphtheria, measles,

polio, tetanus, tuberculosis, and whooping cough. UNICEF claimed

to have vaccinated 75 percent of all Angolan children under the

age of one.

If statistics provided by the chief of the Department of Hygiene

and Epidemiology in Angola's Ministry of Health were accurate,

the incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in

Angola was fairly low by African standards—0.4 percent of blood

donors in Luanda and 2 percent to 4 percent of adults in Cabinda

tested positive for the AIDS virus. The highest percentage of cases was in the northeast region bordering Zaire. There were indications, however, that the actual number of AIDS cases was significantly higher; the United States-based AIDS Policy Research

Center claimed a high incidence of the disease among Cuban troops

based in Angola and Angola-based African National Congress

members. The biggest problems in determining the extent of the

epidemic were inadequate communications systems and the lack

of modern blood testing or computers to tabulate the death toll in

rural areas. In cities controlled by the government, the World

Health Organization helped initiate an information and testing campaign in 1988 that included the distribution of condoms.

Another prevalent health concern centered on the tens of thousands of people, many of them women and children, crippled by

land mines planted by UNITA insurgents and, according to for- eign relief organizations, by government forces. Estimates on the

number of amputees ranged from 20,000 to 50,000. Foreign relief organizations operated orthopedic centers in both governmentcontrolled and UNITA-occupied areas, providing artificial limbs

and physical therapy. The largest facility was the Bomba Alta

Orthopedic Center in Huambo, Angola's second largest city, which was operated by the ICRC. Designed essentially to manufacture

orthopedic prostheses and braces for paralytics and to provide physical rehabilitation, in 1986 the center treated 822 patients, of

whom 725 were adults and 97 were children. In 1987 the center was

106
Women washing clothes in an irrigation canal, a breeding ground for insects that spread parasitic diseases Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee)

107
Angola: A Country Study

staffed with twenty-one Angolan and three foreign medical per- sonnel, ten of whom specialized in orthopedic prostheses for the

lower limbs. The center provided 1,260 patients with prostheses

in 1988.

Most of Angola's estimated forty-five hospitals, all government

operated, were located in urban areas (see table 3, Appendix A).

Conditions in the hospitals, however, were often deplorable. Poor

sanitation, a lack of basic equipment, and disruptions in water and

electrical services were common. Trained medical personnel were

in chronic short supply; in the late 1980s, Angola had only 230

native-born doctors, and only 30 percent of the population had

access to health services. Most physicians, nurses, technicians, and

national health advisers were foreigners—principally Cubans, East

and West Europeans, and South Americans. In 1986 there were

about 800 physicians in Angola (1 per 10,250 people—a very low

ratio even by African standards) and somewhat more than 10,500

nurses. A Western source reported in February 1989 that 323 physicians, or 41 percent of the total number of doctors in governmentcontrolled areas, were Cubans.

The government had placed a high priority on health and medical training programs, requiring that all foreign medical personnel teach classes in medicine, in addition to performing their clinical duties. There were two physician training programs in the country (in Luanda and Huambo) and more than twenty nursing

schools, staffed primarily by Angolan, Cuban, and Soviet teachers.

Most of the instructors in all medical training programs were for- eign (primarily Cuban, Yugoslav, Soviet, and East German), and

Angolan students attended medical training programs in Cuba,

East Germany, and Poland.

According to a Portuguese source, health care in UNITAcontrolled Angola was well organized and effective. The rebels oper- ated a hospital in Jamba, which was staffed by Portuguese-trained

medical personnel assisted by several French personnel from the

volunteer organization Doctors Without Borders. Jamba's hospital was highly specialized, with the capability to meet most of the

needs of the surrounding population; the only unavailable treat- ments were neurosurgery and cardiothoracic surgery. The hospital was apparently well equipped (probably by South Africa) with

both instruments and medicines. Although tropical diseases were

prevalent, war casualties were often the reason for hospitalization,

with most of the wounded having first been treated at field hospitals established along the military fronts.

* * *

108
The Society and Its Environment

Sections of this chapter dealing with preindependence subjects

and general discussions of the structure of society are based on parts

of larger studies. Such studies include Hermann Possinger's "Interrelations Between Economic and Social Change in Rural Africa, '

Lawrence W. Henderson's ''Ethnolinguistic Worlds," Douglas L. Wheeler and Rene Pelissier's Angola, and Joseph C. Miller's Kings

and Kinsmen, which includes a discussion of the complex character

of Mbundu matrilineages.

Much of the more recent information has been culled from books,

studies, and translations of foreign publications provided by the

United States Joint Publications Research Service. Keith Somerville's Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society provides an excellent

overview of the government's policies on education and religion;

Linda M. Heywood's "The Dynamics of Ethnic Nationalism in

Angola" contains a detailed analysis of UNITA's aspirations among

the Ovimbundu as well as Ovimbundu life in present-day Angola;

and Angola's official press agency, Angop, has provided detailed

items pertaining to issues of health and education. Also of great

value are articles in the Washington Post and New York Times by for- eign correspondents such as Blaine Harden and James Brooke deal- ing with the effects of the UNITA insurgency on the rural and urban

populations.

Two valuable sources on the grave conditions in which most

Angolans live are the U.S. Committee for Refugees' Uprooted

Angolans and the final report of the United States Private Voluntary Agency and the United States Government Assessment

Team to Angola. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

109

Chapter 3. The Economy
Women cultivate a field belonging to a farmers' association.
IN 1988 OBSERVERS OFTEN mentioned Angola's need to rehabilitate and revive its economy. Since independence in 1975,

most economic production had deteriorated, and the country had

become almost totally dependent on the export of oil for revenues. In the wake of the war for independence, the flight of trained per- sonnel and foreign capital had left the country without the means

to continue production. Furthermore, the prolonged insurgency,

which still affected much of the country in late 1988, had undermined those enterprises that were still functioning. Although the

political and military situation undoubtedly contributed to these

economic problems, the Angolan economy had never been very

strong, and most economic successes were of recent and precari- ous origins.

By the late 1980s, the economic potential of Angola had not been

reached. Existing transportation networks, including railroads,

roads, and ports, serviced only a fraction of the traffic they were

built to accommodate. Likewise, manufacturing industries, such

as textiles, cement, vehicle assembly, and food processing, all operated well below their productive capacities. Moreover, vast areas

that had been cultivated for both cash and subsistence crops lay

idle, and Angola was forced to import food. Indeed, even the local labor force, which had worked on the large agricultural estates, was unemployed and subsisted in displacement camps or in the

cities on foreign aid. The only exceptions to the general regression

in productivity were in the oil, electric power, telecommunications,

and air transportation industries. While these sectors were expanding, most of Angola's economic production was shrinking.

Background to Economic Development

The Angolan economy has been dominated by the production

of raw materials and the use of cheap labor since European rule

began in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese used Angola principally as a source for the thriving slave trade across the Atlantic;

Luanda became the greatest slaving port in Africa (see Slave Trading in the 1700s, ch. 1). After the Portuguese Empire abolished

the slave trade in Angola in 1858, it began using concessional agree- ments, granting exclusive rights to a private company to exploit

land, people, and all other resources within a given territory. In

Mozambique, this policy spawned a number of companies notori- ous for their exploitation of local labor. But in Angola, only the

113
Angola: A Country Study

Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de

Angola—Diamang) showed even moderate success. At the same

time, Portuguese began emigrating to Angola to establish farms

and plantations (fazendas) to grow cash crops for export (see Agriculture, this ch.). Although these farms were only partially successful

before World War II, they formed the basis for the economic growth

that shaped Angola's economy in the late 1980s.

Before World War II, the Portuguese government was concerned

primarily with keeping its colonies self-sufficient and therefore

invested little capital in Angola's local economy. It built no roads

until the mid- 1920s, and the first railroad, the Benguela Railway, was not completed until 1929. Between 1900 and 1940, only 35,000

Portuguese emigrants settled in Angola, and most worked in com- merce in the cities, facilitating trade with Portugal. In the rural

areas, Portuguese settlers often found it difficult to make a living

because of fluctuating world prices for sugarcane and sisal and the

difficulties in obtaining cheap labor to farm their crops. As a result,

they often suspended their operations until the market prices rose and instead marketed the produce of Angolan farmers.

But in the wake of World War II, the rapid growth of industrialization worldwide and the parallel requirements for raw materials led Portugal to develop closer ties with its colonies and to begin

actively developing the Angolan economy. In the 1930s, Portugal

started to develop closer trade ties with its colonies, and by 1940

it absorbed 63 percent of Angolan exports and accounted for 47

percent of Angolan imports, up from 39 percent and 37 percent,

respectively, a decade earlier. When the price of Angola's principal crops—coffee and sisal—jumped after the war, the Portuguese

government began to reinvest some profits inside the country,

initiating a series of projects to develop infrastructure. During the

1950s, Portugal built dams, hydroelectric power stations, and trans- portation systems. In addition, Portuguese citizens were encouraged

to emigrate to Angola, where planned settlements (colonatos) were

established for them in the rural areas. Finally, the Portuguese in- itiated mining operations for iron ore, manganese, and copper to complement industrial activities at home, and in 1955 the first successful oil wells were drilled in Angola (see Extractive Industries,

this ch.). By 1960 the Angolan economy had been completely trans- formed, boasting a successful commercial agricultural sector, a promising mineral and petroleum production enterprise, and an

incipient manufacturing industry.

Yet by 1976, these encouraging developments had been reversed.

The economy was in complete disarray in the aftermath of the war of independence and the subsequent internal fighting of the

114
The Economy

liberation movements. According to the ruling Popular Movement

for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho—MPLA-PT),

in August 1976 more than 80 percent of the agricultural plantations had been abandoned by their Portuguese owners; only 284

out of 692 factories continued to operate; more than 30,000

medium-level and high-level managers, technicians, and skilled workers had left the country; and 2,500 enterprises had been closed

(75 percent of which had been abandoned by their owners). Furthermore, only 8,000 vehicles remained out of 153,000 registered,

dozens of bridges had been destroyed, the trading network was dis- rupted, administrative services did not exist, and files and studies were missing.

Angola's economic ills can also be traced to the legacy of Portuguese colonial development. Although the Angolan economy had

started to show strong signs of growth by 1960, most developments

had originated recently and precariously. Many of the white settlers had come to Angola after 1950 and were understandably quick

to repatriate during the war of independence. During their stay,

however, these settlers had appropriated Angolan lands, disrupting local peasant production of cash and subsistence crops. Moreover, Angola's industries depended on trade with Portugal—the

colony's overwhelmingly dominant trade partner—for both markets and machinery. Only the petroleum and diamond industries

boasted a wider clientele for investment and markets. Most important, the Portuguese had not trained Angolans to operate the

larger industrial or agricultural enterprises, nor had they actively

educated the population. Upon independence Angola thus found

itself without markets or expertise to maintain even minimal eco- nomic growth.

As a result, the government intervened, nationalizing most businesses and farms abandoned by the Portuguese. It established state farms to continue producing coffee, sugar, and sisal, and it took over the operations of all factories to maintain production. These

attempts usually failed, primarily because of the lack of experienced

managers and the continuing disruptions in rural areas caused by

the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao

Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) insurgency. Only the petroleum sector continued to operate successfully, and by 1980 this sector had helped the gross domestic product

(GDP—see Glossary) reach US$3.6 billion, its highest level up to 1988 (see fig. 6). In the face of serious economic problems and the

continuing war throughout the countryside, in 1987 the government announced plans to liberalize economic policies and promote

115
Angola: A Country Study

1985 - GDP in percent

fH Manufacturing

Other

Trade and Services

[H Agriculture g Petroleum

Transportation

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 43.

Figure 6. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1985

private investment and involvement in the economy. But most

observers believed that the key to Angolan economic success rest- ed only partially with the privatization of production. Even if peace were achieved, the economy would still have great difficulties in

reaching its full potential.

Structure of the Economy

Since independence, the economy has been dominated by the

oil export industry and drained by the need to carry on the war

against the UNITA insurgents. Because of the collapse of the cashcrop economy, particularly the cultivation of coffee by large-scale

plantations, in 1988 the economy depended totally on the oil sec- tor to generate funds. As a result of increased oil production, GDP

had risen steadily from Kzl09.4 billion (for value of the kwanza

see Glossary) in 1982 to Kzl44.9 billion in 1985.

Unfortunately, however, as the war against UNITA continued,

most revenue from oil sales was quickly spent on the nation's defense

forces. The relationship between oil profits and defense requirements became most acute in 1986 when the price of oil dropped,

reducing government revenues and resulting in a jump in the per- centage of government spending on defense.

At the same time, the war has also wreaked havoc in the already

116
The Economy

suffering agricultural sector, forcing the government to use pre- cious foreign exchange to import food. Once a food exporter, Angola by the late 1980s was importing half of its grain requirements

to compensate for reduced production in the war-torn rural areas. Although the war has caused much rural-to-urban migration,

industries based in the cities have been unable to harness this potential work force. Most of the Angolans coming into the cities have

little education or training, pardy because education in the rural areas has been disrupted by the war. Furthermore, the industries

in the cities have been hurt by the lack of raw materials, including

grain, timber, sugarcane, and cotton, normally produced in the

rural areas. Consequendy, industries have come to depend on highpriced imported materials. The frequent unavailability of industrial inputs, particularly during 1986 when the government severely

restricted imports to protect foreign exchange reserves, has led to underproduction and underuse in the manufacturing sector (see

Industry, this ch.).

As a result of the general dislocation in the economy, particularly in the transportation and distribution systems, many goods were unavailable in the 1980s. Thus, the black market (also called

the parallel market, or kadonga) had come to dominate trade and

undermine government efforts to impose order on domestic production. Consequently, the value of the kwanza also dropped, making it increasingly difficult for the government to attract wage

earners to either agricultural or manufacturing enterprises. Furthermore, pilfering and graft in most economic enterprises had

become common, as workers recognized that goods used in barter were more valuable than wages paid in kwanzas. As a result,

inflation was high, goods were scarce, worker absenteeism was

widespread, and productivity was low.

Role of the Government

The government, under the control of the MPLA-PT Central

Committee, directly controlled most of the economy (see Struc- ture of Government, ch. 4). Government-owned enterprises took

the place of private enterprises and businesses. Because most Portuguese owners of manufacturing concerns and agricultural plantations fled the country at the time of independence, the new

government was forced to nationalize factories and farms to keep

them operating. The government also intervened directly to protect the country's wealth from foreign exploitation by creating companies to control Angola's mineral and petroleum wealth.

State-owned companies in the oil industry have negotiated attractive terms of operation with the foreign companies that pump the

117
Angola: A Country Study

oil, keeping a large percentage of the profits inside the country.

The government's economic policies thus have combined ideology with necessity to fill the gap left by the Portuguese, without

emulating the economic system created under colonialism.

But in the mid-1980s, Angola's centralized economy had fal- len on hard times. Despite a 21.5 percent rise in the volume of

oil production in 1986, government oil receipts fell to only 45 per- cent of the budgeted level because of the serious drop in worldwide oil prices that year. As a result, government revenues were

barely half of the level budgeted for 1986 (see table 4, Appendix

A). The government responded by cutting overall expenditures

by 5.5 percent, mostly for items related to economic development,

although expenditures for social services rose by 14 percent. The

war against UNITA compounded the effect of lost oil revenue

defense expenditures rose to a record 40.4 percent of the 1986

budget (see War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society,

ch. 5). Weak economic performance since independence has led government planners to reorient economic ideology, endorsing programs

to liberalize many state policies and return some state functions

to the private sector. In December 1986, the government decreed

the liberalization of agricultural marketing, allowing for some free trade of agricultural goods to motivate farmers to produce more

for the local market. Since the departure in 1975 of the Portuguese

traders, who traditionally had monopolized rural trading, the

inefficiency of the National Company for the Marketing and Distribution of Agricultural Products (Empresa Nacional de Comercializagao e Distribuicao de Produtos Agricolas—Encodipa) and

the scarcity of basic consumer goods and manufactured agricultural inputs have discouraged peasants from producing surpluses

(see table 5, Appendix A). Most peasants have retreated to a purely

subsistence form of farming. Similar inadequacies by the state livestock marketing company have resulted in serious overstocking in the cattle-raising southwestern region of Angola. Since

1984 the government has also been dissolving the state farms

established on land formerly owned by Portuguese commercial

farmers and has been turning the land over to the workers. Agricultural development stations have been set up to provide these farmers

with services such as mechanized plowing. Furthermore, local peasant associations and cooperatives have been established throughout the country to organize production and consolidate resources. On August 17, 1987, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos an- nounced plans to restructure the economy. These reforms, called

the Economic and Financial Rectification (Saneamento Economico e

118
The Economy

Financeiro—SEF), put the economy in line with the policy guidelines approved by the Second Party Congress in December 1985. In his speech, the president listed several factors affecting the econ- omy, including the steep fall in oil prices in 1986, the "excessive

centralization of socialist planning methods," the poor management of state enterprises, and corruption. The SEF program mandated a strong move toward the private sector domestically and

abroad, including membership in the International Monetary Fund

(IMF—see Glossary) and World Bank (see Glossary). The foreign

investment law was therefore being reviewed, and an office was

to be established to promote investment and reduce negotiating

costs. The SEF program also called for the privatization of nonstrategic state enterprises, ending budget subsidies to the remaining state enterprises, shifting from state farms to the peasant sector, raising prices, enacting monetary reforms, and devaluing the kwanza. The president noted that because the state had tried to enter

so many different areas of economic activity, it had been unable

to prevent the deterioration of the services for which it was traditionally responsible, such as education, health services, police, and

civil administration. One area that the government was unlikely

to relinquish to the private sector, however, was control over imports

(see Foreign Trade and Assistance, this ch.).

In addition to the general liberalization of economic policies that

the government proposed, the MPLA-PT Central Committee also launched a campaign against graft and the parallel market. The

parallel market offered at exorbitant prices a full range of goods

normally unavailable inside Angola. By June 1987, forty-two work

teams had been established to oversee government efforts to end

this illegal trade, and the provincial authorities had ordered the

closing of all parallel markets. In addition, the government directed the military to supervise more closely the movement of goods

at the intraprovincial and interprovincial level. The government

also started an educational campaign of "consciousness raising" on farms and in factories to discourage the theft and pilfering that

fed goods to the parallel market.

These efforts notwithstanding, in 1988 sources estimated that

approximately 40 percent of the goods imported through Luanda

never reached their intended destinations because of theft. Moreover, because the purchase of basic foodstuffs required ration cards,

in 1988 the parallel market was thriving.

Foreign Trade and Assistance

Because of the overall decline in productivity after independence,

Angola has become increasingly dependent on foreign trade and

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Angola: A Country Study

assistance to meet its domestic needs. It has also become dependent on oil export earnings to fund imports. Traditionally, the most

important imports have been machinery items, especially equipment for the oil industry. By the mid-1980s, however, military

equipment and food were becoming Angola's most important

imports. The country continued to export most of its oil to the West,

in particular the United States. The Soviet Union, as the country's arms supplier, and France and the United States, as suppliers of oil equipment, were the country's major import partners.

Assistance from individual foreign countries and international

organizations was also becoming increasingly important to Angola

because of its mounting food crisis. Only by severely limiting imports has the government been able

to prevent a serious crisis in the balance of payments account. In

the 1980s, the Ministry of Planning, in consultation with the

National Bank of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola—BNA), the

Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade, and other ministries drew

up an annual foreign trade budget as part of the annual national

plan. This plan set ceilings for categories of imports in each sector of the economy, and import quotas were then allocated to individual

companies. For each foreign order, the importing company was

required to submit invoices and apply to the Ministry of Domestic

and Foreign Trade for an import license. Most imports were

brought in by state foreign trade companies and new regional

import-export companies. However, the oil companies enjoyed for- eign exchange autonomy and imported their equipment directly.

Foreign Trade

Until the dramatic fall in world oil prices in 1985 and 1986, the

most dominant feature of the external economy since independence

had been the large increase in oil export earnings (see table 6, Appendix A). By 1985 crude oil exports were more than eight times

their 1973 level. At the same time, however, there was a precipi- tous drop in other exports, most notably coffee and diamonds, leav- ing Angola almost completely dependent on oil for export earnings.

In 1988, for example, oil revenue represented nearly 90 percent

of total export earnings. Nevertheless, the strong performance of

the oil sector, combined with stringent import controls, resulted

in continuing trade surpluses, which by 1985 had risen to US$740

million.

The country's principal trading partners, except for the Soviet

Union, continued to be Western nations. The United States has

been the main market for oil and thus the leading importer by far of Angolan goods since at least 1980. Angola's other main Western

120
The Economy

markets were Spain, Britain, Brazil, and the Netherlands. Spain,

in particular, substantially increased its trade with Angola by importing a record US$300 million worth of goods in 1985, ten times

the 1980 level. Angola's principal Western sources of goods were

the United States, France, and Portugal (suppliers of oil industry

equipment), but an increasing amount of goods came from Brazil.

The Soviet Union, because of the large amount of arms it supplied, emerged as the major source of imports. Angola has also developed close trade ties with Zimbabwe, importing maize for local consumption and blankets to use as items of barter in rural marketing campaigns.

Since 1979 Angola has imported an increasing amount of foodstuffs from Western nations. In particular, it has imported wheat

from the European Economic Community (EEC) and Canada, in- creasing from 83,000 tons in 1980 to 205,000 tons the following

year and dropping to an average of 160,000 tons per year from

1982 to 1986. Likewise, Angola imported meat (100,000 tons in

1985) and milk (400,000 tons in 1985) from the West.

Because of the sharp drop in oil prices in 1986, imports were

severely limited by the government. The government suspended

the issue of import licenses except when importers obtained credit

abroad or had their own foreign exchange. Capital goods imports were slashed, as were consumer goods, spare parts, and some in- dustrial inputs. Military purchases were not cut, however, nor were

imports of food, pharmaceuticals, goods for rural marketing campaigns, and oil industry equipment.

Foreign Assistance

Since 1980 foreign assistance grants have increased because of

Angola's agricultural crisis and the drop in oil export earnings.

In 1984 gross official development assistance from multilateral

institutions rose to US$33 million, nearly double the figure for 1979

(see table 7, Appendix A). Foreign aid was likely to increase in

the late 1980s as a result of Angola's accession to the Lome Convention (see Glossary) in April 1985, making the country eligible

for funding under the Lome III Agreement, which was to remain

in effect until 1990.

Because of the mid-1980s crisis in local agricultural production,

food imports were essential to feed the population, and Angola had

to appeal for more than US$100 million in food aid. Nevertheless,

such aid did not meet food requirements, and in 1986 the country

experienced a cereal shortfall of more than 100,000 tons. In addition, Angola appealed for US$21 million in nonfood aid in 1987,

most of which was earmarked for relief and survival items.

121
Angola: A Country Study

Most direct aid was provided by Western organizations, and

Angola was trying to improve its relations with several individual

Western countries to negotiate for further assistance. In addition

to assistance provided by the United Nations (UN) World Food

Programme (WFP), in the late 1980s the EEC was providing

assistance through the Lome III Agreement as well as through the

European Investment Bank. Furthermore, Angola regularly

received aid from Sweden for various small-scale development

projects, and France provided some assistance tied to the purchase

of French equipment. Angola has improved relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and succeeded in reaching an agreement in 1987 with that country for 3,600 tons of food

aid. Likewise, Portugal agreed in 1987 to provide US$140 million

in credits toward the recovery of Angolan companies hurt by the

exodus of Portuguese settlers after independence and to cooperate

in some joint economic ventures with the Angolan government.

Angola also received significant assistance from the Soviet Union and East European nations. In 1977 Angola and the Soviet

Union established an intergovernmental commission for technical, scientific, and trade cooperation. Projects addressed by this commission have included the design of a hydroelectric station, rural

electrification, assistance in the petroleum and fishing industries,

the supply of industrial equipment and physicians, and the training of Angolan technicians. The commission agreement was to run

to the year 2000 and included plans for Soviet technical assistance

in the petroleum industry, in light industry, and in livestock production. Angola has similar technical assistance agreements with Hungary (for the pharmaceutical and automobile industries), with

Yugoslavia (for the petroleum industry and for agriculture), and

with Bulgaria (for urban planning). Yugoslavia also built a large

department store in Luanda to market Yugoslav-made goods, and

trade between the countries has increased. And in October 1986,

the government signed a cooperation agreement with the Council

for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA), the com- mon market for the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and

a few other countries. Under Comecon a joint commission on

cooperation was to be established to determine future forms of

cooperation and assistance between the nations.

Labor Force

Before independence the economy employed a labor force of unskilled Angolans and trained Portuguese. Since independence there

has been littie change in the overall composition of the work force,

although in the 1980s there was a shortage of both skilled and

122
Semiskilled laborers work in a plastics factory.

unskilled workers. Most foreign workers fled the country at independence, but some have returned as contract workers, called cooper- ants by the government. Many unskilled workers in the rural areas—primarily plantation laborers—migrated to the cities in the

wake of the 1975-76 fighting and the exodus of the plantation owners and managers. In the 1980s, most of the work force, even in

the cities, remained illiterate and untrained for work in the manufacturing sector. By 1980 the labor force still conformed to its preindependence distribution: roughly 75 percent of all workers were engaged in agricultural production, 10 percent in industry, and

15 percent in services.

Calling itself a socialist workers' state, Angola was committed

to protecting the rights of its workers and providing them with a reasonable wage. In the 1980s, all workers therefore belonged to the National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos—UNTA) and received a minimum wage.

In addition, there were incentive programs at some factories, and

UNTA promoted a "socialist emulation" program in which workers won bonuses for exceptional productivity. Nevertheless, the

government has become dissatisfied with worker productivity,

especially at the state-run enterprises, and has proposed to tie all wages to performance.

Foreign workers have also posed a problem for the government

because of their high salaries and because they contradict the party's

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Angola: A Country Study

ideological commitment to the use of Angolan labor. The government, however, was forced to use foreign workers in many crucial

positions after the departure of the Portuguese. These positions in- cluded those held by physicians, teachers, engineers, and technicians. Most came from Portugal, Cuba, Eastern Europe, Italy,

France, Spain, Scandinavia, and Brazil. By 1984 the salaries of

these foreign workers accounted for more than US$180 million,

despite government attempts to force a reduction in this work force. In pursuit of Angolanization (that is, the goal of having an upperlevel work force that is at least 50 percent Angolan), in 1985 the

government began initiating some training programs. In November of that year, it reached agreement with the German Democratic

Republic (East Germany) on a training program for Angolan financial analysts. The greatest success occurred in the petroleum sector, however, in which by the end of 1985 more than 50 percent

of the workers were Angolans with some technical training. This

success was the result of actions taken by the government and the

National Fuel Company of Angola (Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola—Sonangol), which employed about half of the

workers in the petroleum industry, to substitute Angolans for for- eign workers. The 1982 Angolanization law (Decree 20/82) established a special fund for training activities. Consequently, intensive

training courses and seminars in the petroleum field increased from

66 in 1982 to 151 in 1985. Sonangol participated in financing various training efforts, including scholarship grants. Furthermore,

Sonangol closely cooperated with Angolan universities to introduce

fields of study related to the petroleum industry. In the early 1980s,

two training programs, one for geologists and geophysicists and

the other for petroleum engineers, were instituted in the schools

of science and engineering at the University of Angola. At the same

time, the university's school of engineering began an equipment

engineer training program. The training of middle-level technicians was undertaken by the National Petroleum Institute, at Sumbe

in Cuanza Sul Province; the institute's teachers and administrators were cooperants from Italy (see fig. 1). The institute trained

between fifty and sixty production specialists per year, some of

whom were from countries belonging to the Southern Africa

Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC).

By the beginning of 1986, the government claimed some success in its Angolanization program. According to the minister of

industry, 44 percent of senior-level and middle-level management

in industry were Angolans. Nevertheless, after the drop in oil prices

in 1986, the government sought to reduce the number of foreign

workers even further and enacted the Statute on the Cooperant

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The Economy

Worker. This law established the principle that cooperants must train

Angolan workers in their jobs and pay taxes based on Angolan labor

regulations. To increase the ranks of Angolan workers, the government even encouraged the return of Angolan exiles who had for- merly opposed the MPLA. These included former members of the

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de

Libertacao de Angola—FNLA), the Organization of Angolan Communists (Organizacao dos Comunistas de Angola—OCA), and

UNITA (see Political Opposition, ch. 4). The response to this en- couragement has been somewhat meager, however, because of Angola's ongoing instability.

Extractive Industries

The petroleum industry dominated the extractive industries and,

indeed, the entire economy. Since the dramatic increase in oil prices

in 1973 and 1974, petroleum had assumed growing importance.

The petroleum industry was so important, in fact, that the MPLA

for the most part allowed foreign oil companies to import as much

machinery as they needed and made only modest demands for the

Angolanization of the work force. Thus, petroleum has remained

the most successful sector in the economy, despite the 1986 price

drop, and has provided the government with most of its revenues. In contrast, mining of diamonds and iron ore, commodities that once ranked as major exports, has almost ceased because of dis- ruptions from the war. Either through direct attacks on diamond

mines or through the disruption of iron ore transport, in the 1980s

it had become nearly impossible to continue operating these mineral

industries. Diamond production started to revive in 1987, but only

in areas patrolled by government troops.

Oil

As of December 1984, the country's total proven recoverable

reserves of crude oil were estimated by Sonangol at 1 .6 billion barrels. This amount was considered sufficient to maintain production at 1986 levels until the end of the century. Most Angolan oil

is light and has a low sulfur content. As the only oil producer in

southern Africa, Angola has promoted cooperation in energy matters on behalf of SADCC.

The first oil exploration concession was granted by the Portuguese

authorities in 1910, but commercial production did not begin until 1956 when the Petroleum Company of Angola (Companhia de

Petroleos de Angola—Petrangol) started operations in the Cuanza River Basin (see fig. 3). The company later discovered oil onshore in the Congo River Basin and became the operator for most of

125
Angola: A Country Study

CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION

400

YEAR

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, International Energy Statistical Review, November 27, 1984, 1; and September 27, 1988, 1.

Figure 7. Crude Oil Production, 1980-87

the onshore fields in association with Texaco, an American company, and Angol (a subsidiary of Portugal's SACOR). At about

the same time, a subsidiary of the American-based Gulf Oil, the

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc), began explorations in the

Cabinda area in 1954 and started production in 1968. Production

rose from 2.5 million tons in 1969 to 8.2 million tons in 1973, while

exports nearly quadrupled in volume. Because of the added benefit

of the 1973 oil price increase, the value of oil exports was almost

twelve times higher in 1973 than in 1969, and oil finally surpassed

coffee as the principal export. Crude oil production in the early

1980s dipped somewhat as a result of decreased investments. By

1983, however, production had rebounded and thereafter continued

to set new output records (see fig. 7). Postindependence Exploration and Production

Following independence, the new government enacted sweeping changes in the oil industry and claimed sole rights over all of the petroleum deposits in the country. Under the Petroleum

Law No. 13/78, enacted on August 26, 1978, the government

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The Economy

established Sonangol as the exclusive concessionaire of the state's hydrocarbon resources. The company was divided into several

directorates, including one for the development of hydrocarbons

and another for the distribution of byproducts on the domestic market. The hydrocarbons directorate was responsible for reaching

agreements with private companies for the development of local resources. In 1978 it divided Angola's offshore area (except for Cabinda) into thirteen blocks of approximately 4,000 square kilo- meters each for development by private companies (see fig. 8). By

1981 exploratory drilling had been conducted on Blocks 1 through

4, and production began in Blocks 2 and 3 in 1985.

Sonangol was empowered to enter into two types of agreements

with foreign companies: joint ventures, in which Sonangol and its private partners shared in investments and received petroleum

produced in the same proportion (51 percent Sonangol, 49 percent foreign); and production-sharing agreements, in which the for- eign company served as a contractor to Sonangol, made the

necessary investments, and was compensated by receiving a share

of the oil produced. Sonangol also could stipulate a price cap in

the production-sharing agreements that would allow windfall profits to accrue to Sonangol and not to the foreign companies. In practice, all of the new areas opened up for exploration and production since independence have been subject to production-sharing

agreements, while the areas previously under production—primarily

in Cabinda—were joint-venture operations between Sonangol and

foreign companies. In addition, Sonangol also participated in jointventure companies that provided services and supplies to the oil exploration and production companies.

Except for Cabinda, production in the offshore fields started after independence. In offshore Block 1, the first seismic work began

in May 1982, and the first drilling commenced in December of

that year. Activity in Block 2 began in 1980, and by 1985 two fields were producing (Cuntala and Essungo) a total of 11,700 barrels per day (bpd—see Glossary). In addition, oil was discovered

by the end of 1985 in the West Sulele formation in Block 2. Sonangol had started construction in Block 2 of the Rwanda operational base to provide support for operators in Blocks 1,2, and

3. Block 3 also started exploration activity in 1980, and by 1986

at least six wells there were considered commercial. A major

development project was being initiated in Block 3 for the Palanca

and Pacaca fields and for a sea-loading terminal. The other blocks

in exploration were 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9; Blocks 8, 10, 11, and 12 had

not been opened by the government as of the end of 1985 (see ta- ble 8, Appendix A).

127
Angola: A Country Study

A

Atlantic

Ocean

CONGQ . ^Boundary representation

/ not necessarily authoritative

Nami be

-NAMIBIA

International boundary

National capital ja Petroleum refinery 8 Offshore block Onshore production area

Offshore production area

Offshore exploration area

Offshore open area

1 00 200 Kilometers 50 100 150 Miles

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 54.

Figure 8. Oil Exploration and Production Areas, 1986

Oil was also produced in onshore fields in the Cuanza and Congo river basins. There were forty- six wells in the Cuanza River

Basin, near Luanda, where production began in 1959. In 1986

Sonangol estimated that the field had a life of another five to six years at then-current levels of production. Being an old field, it had very low production costs. The oil fields in the Congo River

128
The Economy

Basin, however, were far more productive, yielding nearly eight

times the amount raised in the Cuanza River Basin. From 1981

to 1985, between 30,700 bpd and 34,900 bpd were produced in

the Congo River Basin, but an average of only about 4,200 bpd

was produced in the Cuanza River Basin.

In addition to its production agreements, Sonangol has actively

invested in the development of production capabilities and in

exploration and distribution projects. In 1979 the company compiled the available data on the sedimentary basins and carried out

a seismic survey program on the continental platform, upon which

the subsequent division of the continental shelf platform was based.

Furthermore, the company has made major investments in expanding its ability to distribute petroleum at home and abroad since

it assumed direct responsibility in 1977 for marketing Angolan oil (Cabgoc marketed Cabinda oil, which accounted for almost half

of Angola's oil production). Some of Sonangol's other major

investments included gas injection facilities in Cabinda; development of the Takula, Lumueno, Quinfuquena, Quinguila, Essungo, and Cuntala fields and the offshore Cabinda fields; construction

of the Kwanda oil field service base; and construction of the Quinfuquena oil terminal.

New arrangements have also been made for the future development of several production areas. Financing totaling US$350 million has been secured for the development of the Takula fields in

Cabinda, owned jointly by Sonangol and Cabgoc, from an international consortium of banks. Cabgoc has also signed three new

joint-venture contracts on oil research and exploration in Cabinda. Under the terms of these contracts, Cabgoc was to be responsible for the total cost of the research operations and was to be

reimbursed by Sonangol only if commercially viable oil was dis- covered.

As a result of the many joint-venture and production- sharing

agreements reached by the government in the late 1970s, by 1985

US$798 million had been invested in exploration and US$1 .2 bil- lion in development. The largest investors were Cabgoc and Sonangol in Cabinda and the French firm Elf Aquitaine and its partners

in Block 3. This increased investment has led to higher production. For example, production in Cabinda more than doubled between 1980 and 1985.

Marketing

Exports of crude oil have outpaced exports of refined oil be- cause refining facilities have not been expanded at the same rate as crude oil output. In the late 1980s, all of the oil produced offshore

129
Angola: A Country Study

(in Cabinda and Block 3) was exported, while the crude oil found

onshore was refined domestically.

Petrangol's output was about 32,000 bpd in 1985, sufficient to meet domestic demand for most products except butane and jet

fuel, while a large surplus of fuel oil was produced for export

(585,900 tons in 1985). The facilities for bottling propane and butane were also expanded at a cost of US$7 million. The capacity

of the Petrangol oil refinery on the outskirts of Luanda was increased

to 1.7 million tons a year in 1986. In 1987 Sonangol was exploring the possibility of having some of its crude petroleum refined

in Portugal.

The supply of petroleum products for the domestic market was

controlled by Sonangol and increased 8 percent between 1980 and

1985. Initially, Sonangol shared the market with Shell and Mobil,

but Sonangol bought out the Angolan subsidiaries of these companies in 1981 and 1983. Subsequently, Sonangol also purchased

two Portuguese companies that bottled gas, gaining a monopoly

over the distribution of refined products. Among these products,

butane gas accounted for 65 percent of the total gas consumed locally

and was used primarily in homes in urban areas. In addition,

Sonangol distributed gasoline, gas oil, and lubricating oils. Its greatest distribution problems were the lack of storage facilities throughout the country and problems associated with the domestic transportation network.

In response to the fall in oil prices in 1986, the Angolan government began considering regional cooperation to protect the interests of oil suppliers. In that year, Angola was invited to join the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although

it declared its willingness to act in concert with OPEC members

to avert the growing crisis in oil prices, Angola joined the African

Petroleum Producers' Association, which included four OPEC

members (Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria) and three non- OPEC oil producers (Cameroon, Congo, and Benin). Together,

these eight countries produced 188 million tons of oil in 1986,

equivalent to about one-fifth of OPEC's production and 6.4 per- cent of world production.

In the late 1980s, the major foreign oil companies operating in

Angola were American. Chevron, which had taken over Gulf,

owned 49 percent of the shares in the offshore Cabinda blocks, Angola's largest production area, where output was fairly stable in

1986 and 1987 at about 200,000 bpd. In 1986 President Ronald

Reagan's administration pressured American oil companies and

equipment suppliers to withdraw their interest in the Angolan

oil industry to protest the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

130
Oil exploration off the coast of Cabinda

Courtesy United Nations

(J. P. Laffont)

Chevron therefore withdrew 20 percent of its interests from Cabgoc and sold its shares to the Italian firm Agip. Conoco, however,

rebuffed this pressure and became the third American oil company to begin operations in Angola in offshore Block 5. Texaco,

another major operator in Angola, operated in offshore Block 2, near Soyo, where it held a 40 percent interest in a productionsharing consortium. It also had a 16 percent interest in some of

the onshore fields in the Congo River Basin.

The United States Congress also banned new Export-Import

Bank lending and credit insurance for sales to the Angolan oil in- dustry, putting American suppliers at a major disadvantage in this market. British suppliers waiting to come into the market have been

delayed because of the reluctance of British banks to offer longterm or medium-term credits for such sales. However, France has

entered the market, granting exceptional credit facilities for oil- related sales. Diamonds

Diamond mining began in 1912, when the first gems were dis- covered in a stream in the Lunda region in the northeast. In 1917

Diamang was granted the concession for diamond mining and

prospecting, which it held until independence. Control over the

company was obtained by the government in 1977. In April 1979, a general law on mining activities (Law 5/79) was enacted and gave

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Angola: A Country Study

the state the exclusive right to prospect for and exploit minerals.

Accordingly, a state diamond-mining enterprise, the National

Diamond Company (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes—Endiama), was founded in 1981 and acquired the government's 77 percent

share in Diamang. UNITA, which selected the diamond mining

industry as a principal target, soon crippled mining efforts, and

by the beginning of 1986 the two foreign companies involved in

servicing and operating the industry pulled out of Angola. By

mid- 1986 Diamang was formally dissolved, leaving large outstanding debts.

Attacks by UNITA on mining centers, disruption of transport

routes, and widespread theft and smuggling caused diamond sales to fall to US$33 million by 1985 and to an estimated US$15 million in 1986. In late 1986, Roan Selection Trust (RST) International, a subsidiary of the Luxembourg-registered holding company

ITM International, began mining in the Cafunfo area, along the

Cuango River, the site of Angola's most valuable alluvial diamond

deposits (see fig. 9). Mining had been halted there for more than

two years after UNITA attacked the mining camp in February

1984, kidnapping seventy-seven expatriate workers and severely

damaging the mining equipment. After the subsequent kidnapping of a British expatriate in November 1986, defense forces in

the area were strengthened, allowing the resumption of mining operations. In 1987 production there averaged 60,000 carats, and about

120,000 carats were produced in the other two mining areas, Andrada and Lucapa. By 1987 diamond production had risen to 750,000 carats, compared with less than 400,000 carats produced

in 1986. The 1987 figure, however, was still not much more than

1985 production and only a little over half of 1980 output (see

table 9, Appendix A).

This increase in production has benefited from the rise in the

price per carat received for Angolan diamonds. The resumption

of mining in the area along the Cuango River and a decline in

theft of stones of higher value in the Andrada and Lucapa areas have increased the value of output. Furthermore, Endiama, which was responsible for overseeing the industry and for holding monthly

sales, has benefited from a general improvement in the world diamond market as well as dealers' willingness to pay higher prices

in the hope of securing favored treatment in the future. As a result,

average carat value established by the monthly sales in 1987

exceeded US$110, more than twice as much as in 1985 (US$45)

and at its highest level since 1981 (US$119).

In 1987 Endiama signed a two-year mining contract with the

Portuguese Enterprises Corporation (Sociedade Portuguesa de

132
The Economy

Empreendimentos—SPE), a Portuguese company that has retained a large number of Portuguese technicians previously employed by

Diamang. Former Diamang shareholders founded SPE in 1979 after Diamang was nationalized. The precise terms of the contract were

not made public, but it was thought that the company would

undertake new prospecting, which had been at a virtual standstill since independence. Through a subsidiary, the SPE also was to help Endiama with diamond valuation, which a British company

had been carrying out. In December 1987, Angola also signed an

agreement with the Soviet Union to cooperate in mining diamonds

and quartz. Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviet Union

was to participate in mining enterprises and was to draw up a

detailed geological map of Angola.

In 1987 the government also began to revise the 1979 mining

law to encourage new companies to invest in the diamond-mining

industry, in particular to resume prospecting. Among the companies believed to be considering investing in 1988 was Britain's Lonrho conglomerate, which had taken an increasingly active interest

in Angola in the late 1980s. The South African diamond-mining

giant DeBeers was also interested after it lost its exclusive marketing rights for Angolan diamonds at the end of 1985 because of

government suspicions that DeBeers had devalued Angolan diamonds. DeBeers has expressed interest in studying the kimberlite

pipes (deep, subsurface deposits), which, because of the depletion

of the alluvial deposits, were thought to represent the future of the

Angolan diamond industry.

Iron Ore

Once one of the country's major exports, iron ore was no longer

mined in the late 1980s because of security and transportation

problems. From the mid-1950s until 1975, iron ore was mined in

Malanje, Bie, Huambo, and Huila provinces, and production

reached an average of 5.7 million tons per year between 1970 and

1974. Most of the iron ore was shipped to Japan, West Germany,

and Britain and earned almost US$50 million a year in export revenue. After independence, the government established a state company, the National Iron Ore Company of Angola (Empresa

Nacional de Ferro de Angola—Ferrangol), for the exploration, mining, processing, and marketing of iron ore. Ferrangol contracted

with Austromineral, an Austrian company, to repair facilities and

organize production in Cassinga. Production began to slow in 1974

as a result of technical problems at the Cassinga mine in Hufla

Province and stopped completely in August 1975. The area fell under foreign control after South African forces invaded in 1975.

133
Angola: A Country Study

— — International boundary

® National capital D Diamonds

Fe Iron V/A Coffee P Petroleum

Fishing ^ Textiles

Electric power

Cement y Livestock g Wood processing C Cotton

Iron/steel processing

100 200 Kilom eters 100 200 Miles

Figure 9. Economic Activity, 1988

134
The Economy

Although South Africa withdrew its troops in early 1976, as of 1988

mining had not resumed in the area. By 1988 the Cassinga mines had a production capacity of approximately 1 . 1 million tons per year. However, the railroad to the port of Namibe (formerly Mocamedes) needed extensive repair,

and since it was located only 310 kilometers north of the Namibian border, security against South African attacks could not be

ensured. Furthermore, UNITA was active in the area and posed

a threat to the rail line if it were repaired. Even if these problems

could be resolved, production of iron ore at Cassinga would be cosdy

in view of the depressed state of the world steel market in the late 1980s.

Other Minerals

In addition to diamonds and iron ore, Angola is also rich in

several other mineral resources that had not been fully exploited

by the late 1980s. These include manganese, copper, gold, phosphates, granite, marble, uranium, quartz, lead, zinc, wolfram, tin,

fluorite, sulfur, feldspar, kaolin, mica, asphalt, gypsum, and talc. The government hoped to resume mining in the southwest for crystalline quartz and ornamental marble. It has been estimated that

5,000 cubic meters of marble could be extracted annually over a period of twenty years. A state-owned company mined granite and

marble in Huila and Namibe provinces and in 1983 produced 4,450

cubic meters of granite and 500 cubic meters of marble. Since then,

the company has ceased production to re-equip with modern

machinery. Quartz production, however, was suspended indefinitely because of the military situation in the areas close to the extraction sites in Cuanza Sul Province.

The government established a company in 1980 to exploit phosphate deposits located in the northwest. There were 50 million tons of deposits in Zaire Province and about 100 million tons in Cabinda. Although studies of the deposits in both locations have been

made by Bulgarian and Yugoslav companies, as of 1988 production had not started at either site. Agriculture

By the end of the colonial period, a variety of crops and livestock was produced in Angola. In the north, cassava, coffee, and cot- ton were grown; in the central highlands, maize was cultivated;

and in the south, where rainfall is lowest, cattle herding was prevalent. In addition, there were large plantations run by Portuguese

that produced palm oil, sugarcane, bananas, and sisal. These crops were grown by commercial farmers, primarily Portuguese, and by

135
Angola: A Country Study

peasant farmers, who sold some of their surplus to local Portuguese

traders in exchange for supplies. The commercial farmers were dominant in marketing these crops, however, and enjoyed substantial support from the colonial government in the form of technical

assistance, irrigation facilities, and financial credit. They produced

the great majority of the crops that were marketed in the cities or exported.

After independence, the departure of Portuguese farmers and

traders in the rural areas undermined agricultural productivity.

In response, the government set up state farms on land formerly

owned by the Portuguese and established the National Company

for the Marketing and Distribution of Agricultural Products

(Empresa Nacional de Comercializagao e Distribuicao de Produtos Agricolas—Encodipa) to maintain the rural trading system.

Neither body, however, was successful, and by 1984 the government started phasing out the state farms and turned production

over to individual farmers. In December 1985, the government

also put most rural trade back into private hands. To help peasant

farmers, the government established agricultural development sta- tions and provided bank credits for small-scale agricultural projects.

Several hundred state farms were to be turned over to associations

of tenant farmers as an embryonic form of cooperative. The

association was to buy or rent tools for shared use, share marketing initiatives to strengthen prices, and share transport. By the end

of 1985, the Directorate of Farm Marketing controlled 4,638 farm

cooperatives and 6,534 farmers' associations; but of these, only 93

cooperatives and 71 associations were operational.

In the late 1980s, the country faced serious problems in resuscitating agricultural production. By 1988 the departure of the Portuguese, rural depopulation, and the physical isolation of the

farming areas had almost totally halted commercial production of

such cash crops as coffee and sisal, as well as the subsistence production of cereals. Production was stagnating because of marketing

and transport difficulties; shortages of seed, fertilizer, and consumer

goods for trade with peasant farmers; and the impact of the war

on planting, harvesting, and yields. Land mines and fear of attacks

had forced peasants to reduce the areas under cultivation, especially fields distant from villages, and to abandon hopes of harvesting some planted areas. Moreover, the internal migration of

peasants to safer areas had resulted in the overcultivation of lands

and decreased yields.

Despite these obstacles, there were some successes. The relatively secure Hufla Province maintained a fair level of production, and

the reorientation of government policy away from inefficient state

136
The Economy

farms and toward peasant producers promised to provide services

to and boost production by peasant farmers. By the end of 1987,

there were twenty-five development stations providing services to peasant producers in ten provinces, and four more were being set up.

Coffee

Nowhere has the decline in agricultural production been more

dramatic than in the coffee sector. Formerly Angola's leading

export, by 1985 coffee exports had dropped to 8 percent of their

1973 level (see table 10, Appendix A). Under colonial rule, about

2,500 large commercial farms and 250,000 peasants were involved

in growing coffee. During the 1975-76 fighting, the owners,

managers, and skilled technicians, as well as most of the migrant

work force, abandoned the coffee estates, which were then nationalized. Suffering from a lack of skilled management and shortages

of available labor in the rural areas, these coffee farms have continually posted losses. By 1985 the thirty-four state coffee companies produced only 8,890 tons of coffee and depended on

government subsidies to stay in business. The government marketed only 4,700 tons from peasant producers in that year. In 1983 the government adopted an emergency program to revive

the coffee industry. Local coffee companies, rather than the National

Coffee Company (Empresa Nacional de Cafe—Encafe), were given

the responsibility to run the state coffee farms, and, to encourage

greater efficiency, the area under cultivation was reduced to less than one-fifth of the area abandoned by the large commercial coffee growers at independence. Aid for these efforts has been obtained

from the French Central Board for Economic Cooperation (Caisse

Centrale de Cooperation Economique—CCCE) and two UN

organizations, the WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The WFP was furnished with US$14.3 million on a

five-year (1983-87) plan to pay coffee workers in food rather than

in local currency to discourage worker absenteeism, one of the in- dustry's most serious problems. In addition, the government, as part of its program of economic liberalization, was in the process

of turning over the marketing of coffee to local, rather than national, organizations.

Despite these efforts, however, by 1985 the state coffee farms

had only about 50 percent of the required work force because of

the general drain of people from the rural areas and the unattractive wages that were paid in nearly worthless kwanzas. Moreover,

the industry was still plagued by the UNITA insurgency, whose

attacks had inflicted over US$4 million worth of damage on coffee

137
Angola: A Country Study

plantations by 1985. Other problems encountered on the coffee

plantations mirrored the general deterioration of the economic

infrastructure. High charges for transportation of coffee and

machinery and lack of facilities for hulling the coffee slowed and

made more expensive the entire production process. Furthermore, some plantation managers complained that their workers were not

productive, not only because of absenteeism but also because of

their advanced age. The decline in coffee exports in the mid-1980s resulted largely

from the depletion of stocks that had earlier cushioned exports as production declined. Exports to members of the International Coffee

Organization (ICO) have remained fairly stable since 1983, but

exports to non-ICO members, of which East Germany has been

by far the most important market in the late 1980s, have declined.

The fall in sales to the non-ICO market has eroded coffee earnings because these sales have traditionally been at substantially

higher prices than those to ICO members. Exacerbating the decline

in production and exports has been the depressed world market

for coffee. From February 1986 to August 1987, ICO indicator

prices dropped by more than 20 percent.

Food Crops and Livestock

The decline in marketed food crop production and the rapid

growth of the urban population have caused a food crisis in the

cities. By the mid-1980s, urban dwellers depended almost entirely on cereal imports, and the approximately 600,000 rural displaced

persons were completely dependent on food aid from foreign donors.

Local production of cereals met only half the national requirement

in 1986 and totaled only about 300,000 tons—about 60 percent

of the yearly average in the mid-1970s. Decreased production was

the result of general problems associated with the war, including

deteriorating transportation and a lack of market incentives for

peasant producers. By the late 1980s, malnutrition was widespread.

Similarly, livestock production has declined. Both cattle and pigs are raised, but production fell from 36,500 tons slaughtered in 1973

to only 5,000 tons in the early 1980s. This tremendous decrease was the result of a combination of factors, including the departure

of the commercial farmers, increasing disruption from the war (in

this case from South African forces in the southern part of the country), and the deterioration of facilities and services, especially vaccinations, crucial for livestock production. During their occupation

of Cunene Province in 1975, the South African troops allegedly

destroyed some 1,500 water holes for cattle, severely damaging

livestock production in that region.

138
A laborer holds a basket offreshly picked coffee beans. Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont)

139
Angola: A Country Study

Timber

Timber production also declined dramatically after independence. Production of logs dropped from 555,000 cubic meters in

1973 to below 40,000 cubic meters in 1981 and 1982. Nonetheless, the government was interested in promoting production to supply local manufacturing. Some valued woods, such as mahogany, grow in the rain forests in Cabinda, where there are also eucalyptus, pine, and cypress plantations. A new state forestry

company was established in 1983 with aid from Cuba to revive

the industry in Cabinda, and by 1985 log production had risen

to 113,000 cubic meters. In 1986 the Panga-Panga enterprise of

Cabinda, which manufactured pressed wood, exported 123 million square meters of sheets to Italy.

Fishing

Fishing was a major industry before independence. In the early

1970s, there were about 700 fishing boats, and the annual catch was more than 300,000 tons. Including the catch of foreign fish- ing fleets in Angolan waters, the combined annual catch was esti- mated at 1 million tons. Following independence and into the late 1980s, however, the local fishing industry had fallen into disarray,

the result of the flight of local skilled labor and the return of the

fishing boats to Portugal. By 1986 only 70 of the 143 fishing boats

in Namibe, the port that normally handled two-thirds of the

Angolan catch, were operable. Furthermore, most of the fish- processing factories were in need of repair. Once an exporter of

fish meal, by 1986 Angola had insufficient supplies for its own

market.

Some of the foreign fishing fleets operating in Angolan waters were required by the government to land a portion of their catch

at Angolan ports to increase the local supply of fish. Fishing agreements of this kind had been reached with the Soviet Union, which

operated the largest number of boats in Angolan waters, and with

Spain, Japan, and Italy. Spain also agreed to help rehabilitate the

Angolan fishing industry in exchange for fishing rights. In other

cases, the government allowed foreign fleets to export their entire

catch in exchange for license fees. In the mid-1980s, the government began rehabilitating the fishing

industry, especially in Namibe and Benguela provinces. The first priority was to replace and repair aging equipment. To accomplish this goal, the government was receiving a significant amount

of foreign assistance. In 1987 the EEC announced plans to provide funds to help rebuild the Dack Doy shipyards and two canning

140
The Economy

plants in Tombua. Spain sold Angola thirty-seven steel-hull boats

for US$70 million, and fourteen modern fishing boats were on order

from Italy.

Industry

Under the Portuguese, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly

because of the substantial increase in the size of the white settler population, the creation of a large domestic market for goods, and

the strict exchange controls imposed in 1962 that encouraged

investment in local industry. The manufacturing sector was dominated by light industries that produced consumer goods, especially the food-processing industry, which accounted for 46 percent

of the value of manufactured output in 1973. In contrast, heavy

industries accounted for only 22 percent of output. When the set- tlers fled, most small manufacturing firms were left without their

clerical work force, their managers, and even their owners; in 1976

only 284 out of 692 manufacturing businesses were operating under their old management. In reaction to the decline in the manufacturing sector, in March 1976 the MPLA government enacted the

Law on State Intervention and nationalized all of the abandoned

businesses. However, by 1985 industrial production was only 54

percent of its real value in 1973.

In the years immediately following independence, the government spent large sums to put plants back into operation, but its plans were overly ambitious, and it overestimated the state's capacity to keep factories supplied with necessary materials and

inputs. In the early 1980s, investment was cut drastically, as the

government sought to control expenditures and the foreign exchange

deficit. Because of limited funding, projects were more carefully

selected, and there was clearer recognition of the need for simultaneous restructuring in other sectors, particularly those supplying raw materials for manufacture. By 1986 approximately 180

companies were operating in the manufacturing sector, and their

output was equal to about 13 percent of GDP. Of that amount,

state-run companies accounted for 56 percent.

Among the most acute problems for industrial rehabilitation were

shortages of raw materials, unreliable supplies of water and electricity, and labor instability. The decline in domestic production

of many raw materials has been especially critical in the decline

in local manufacturing. For example, by 1986 only a small frac- tion of the 8,000 tons of cotton needed annually by the textile industry was supplied locally, while during the early 1970s Angola

exported raw cotton. The deterioration of the water supply sys- tem has also damaged many industries, especially breweries, as

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Angola: A Country Study

have cutoffs in electricity supply. Furthermore, labor problems,

a consequence of a shortage of skilled workers and disincentives

to work for wages in an inflated economy, have depleted the local work force. Foreign exchange constraints have also prevented many

industries from importing the necessary raw materials.

Electric Power

Angola is especially well endowed with potential sources for the

production of electricity, both hydroelectric (estimated in 1986 at 7,710 megawatts potential capacity) and thermal (using locally

produced oil). By 1986, however, a total of only 367 megawatts

of generating capacity existed at the country's main power stations. Power stations on four rivers traditionally supplied most of the electricity consumed in the main urban areas: the Cambambe station on the Cuanza River and the Mabubas station on the Dande River

provided electricity to the capital and the north, the Biopio and

Lomaum stations on the Catumbela River supplied cities in the

central provinces, and the Matala station on the Cunene River was

the main source of power in the south. The Ruacana station, also on the Cunene River near the border with Namibia, was under

South African control during much of the 1980s. In addition, thermal stations in Luanda, Namibe, Cabinda, Huambo, Biopio, Uige,

and Lubango supplied power. However, these regional power sys- tems were not connected. Furthermore, there were separate local grids in Cabinda and in the diamond-mining area of Lunda Norte

Province.

Repairs were needed on the electrical system because of deteriorating equipment and the sabotage of stations and distribution

lines. The central system has been hit repeatedly by UNITA, which

in the 1980s put the Lomaum station and a substation at Alto

Catumbela out of commission. Many of the power lines in the central area and in the northwest have also been cut by UNITA. Therefore, many businesses have installed their own generators and

produce approximately 20 percent of the total electricity generated in Angola. In the late 1980s, the government was going ahead

with plans to build a 520-megawatt hydroelectric station on the

Cuanza River at Capanda to augment the northern system. The

government had also reached an agreement with Brazil and the

Soviet Union for financial and technical assistance in building the

station for an estimated US$900 million.

Food Processing

The food-processing industry suffered not only from the general economic constraints in Angola but also from government142
143
Angola: A Country Study

imposed import restrictions. By 1988 the industry depended almost

entirely on imports for its raw materials. By 1985 food processing

had reached only 37 percent of its 1973 level. The most successful

branches of the industry were maize processing (84 percent of the

1973 level), wheat milling (57 percent), and brewing (55 percent).

Since independence, there have been some major investments in

brewing and soft drinks, sugar processing, baking and flour milling, and vegetable oil production. The government controlled the

bread-making industry and operated eight bakeries. Considerable

improvements have been made in factory equipment to boost

production; nevertheless, production came to a standstill twice in

1985 because of a lack of wheat flour. War and the sudden departure of Portuguese technicians in 1975

adversely affected sugar production. The main problems were a

decline in cane production and a deterioration in the quality of cane. Formerly grown on large Portuguese-owned plantations, cane was

produced in the 1980s by state-run organizations assisted by Cuban

technical advisers. After the Portuguese abandoned the plantations,

most of the sugarcane plants were not maintained. The sucrose content in Angolan sugarcane dropped from a pre- 1975 average

of 9.5 percent to an average of only 3.5 percent in 1987, making

it necessary to grow nearly three times as much cane to produce

the equivalent amount of sugar. Among many other problems that

aggravated sugar production were the shortage of water for irrigation, lack of equipment and fertilizers, theft, and poor drainage

in the cane fields. Furthermore, there has been a large decline in

the area cultivated, inappropriate cane varieties have been

introduced, and machinery in the sugar mills has become dilapidated. Although some sugar was exported at the end of the colonial period (18,303 tons in 1973), an average of about 55,000 tons a year was imported from Cuba between 1979 and 1986.

Light Industry

By 1986 light industry, which included textiles, clothing, tobacco, soaps, matches, and plastic and wood products, had almost been

restored to its preindependence level of production. The largest

investments in light industry have been in two large textile projects:

the Africa Textil plant in the city of Benguela (US$15 million),

completed in 1979, and the Textang-II plant in the city of Luanda

(US$45 million), completed in 1983. They each had a production

capacity of more than 10 million square meters of cloth per year

but have produced far less because of shortages of cotton. Other

notable investments have been in wood processing (US$12 million), with projects in Cabinda and Luanda.

144
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Angola: A Country Study

The state-owned National Textile Company (Empresa Nacional

de Texteis—Entex) has also suffered from a shortage of cotton. Founded in 1980, Entex had factories throughout the country and

the capacity to produce 27 million square meters of cloth per year. By 1987, however, the company was turning out only 12 million

square meters. Likewise, the production capacity of blankets was

nearly 1.7 million per year, but only 900,000 were produced in

1986. Adding to Entex' s problems, one of its major factories,

Textang-I, was shut down in 1986 because of a lack of treated water

and damage from mud. By 1987 no stocks of raw materials or spare

parts had been replaced.

Similarly, plastics production under a state-run company was

only about half of installed capacity. Operating factories abandoned

by the Portuguese after 1976, the state agency suffered from a lack

of materials and from aging equipment. It employed foreign technical assistants but had also been training Angolan workers at home

and overseas. Heavy Industry

By 1985 heavy industry was producing only 35 percent of its 1973 output. The main branches of this sector were the assembly

of vehicles; production of steel bars and tubes, zinc sheets, and other

metal products; assembly of radio and television sets; and manufacture of tires, batteries, paper, and chemical products. There have

been large investments to rehabilitate steel production. Nevertheless, although imports of steel dropped from more than 58,000 tons

in 1980 to 35,000 tons in 1986, Angola still imported most of its finished steel goods, including tubes, sheets, and plates.

In 1983 the government established a company to process scrap

metal. The Northern Regional Enterprise for the Exploitation of

Scrap Metal, located in Luanda, had the capacity to process 31 ,000 tons of scrap metal and produced 7,125 tons of processed scrap

metal in 1985, its first year of operation. The government claimed

that the efforts of this enterprise had saved US$1.4 million that

would have been spent on importing scrap metal. The government

planned to establish another company in Lobito, with the financial support of the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

The government also controlled the automobile assembly industry

through a company founded in 1978 after a Portuguese firm had

been nationalized. The company consisted of a factory that assembled light vehicles; a plant, possibly at Viana, that assembled buses

and heavy trucks; and a factory at Cunene that built the chassis

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The Economy

for all these vehicles. The light vehicle factory was particularly af- fected by the cutback in imports in 1982, and its output fell in

1983-84 to only 20 percent of capacity. Likewise, the bus and truck

plant has experienced shutdowns because of a lack of parts. In- puts for the automobiles came from state-owned companies that

produced paint, plastic seats, metal tubing, and rubber tires. Construction Materials

Despite official support for the construction materials industry,

by 1985 production of building materials still fell far short of

government hopes. In 1988 the government was rehabilitating the

Angolan Cement Company (Empresa de Cimento de Angola

Cimangola), which accounted for 90 percent of Angolan production. Cimangola was founded in 1954 and was declared a mixed

enterprise after independence, with part-Danish ownership. In 1973

Cimangola produced 582,300 tons of cement, but in 1985 it produced only 183,600 tons. In 1988 the government was planning to double the production capacity of the Cimangola plant on

the outskirts of Luanda through the installation of another kiln,

bringing production capacity up to 750,000 tons. Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads

The Portuguese left Angola with a relatively well-developed road

network that totaled about 70,000 kilometers, 8,000 of which were

paved. Since 1975, however, many bridges have been blown up,

many vehicles have been destroyed, and many roads have been

subject to attack by UNITA guerrillas, necessitating military con- voys for road transportation. In the late 1980s, roads and railroads were still exposed to sabotage and ambush. Rural-urban trade and

supply bottlenecks limited most inland industries, and transport

and communications services suffered from labor shortages. The

highest priority has been given to repairing the bridges linking the

provincial capitals.

Railroads

In the 1980s, three different 1 .067-meter gauge rail systems ran from the hinterland to major ports on the Adantic Ocean (see fig.

10). The longest line (1,394 kilometers) was the Benguela Railway. It linked the port of Lobito with the central African rail sys- tem that served the mining regions of Shaba (Zaire) and the

Zambian Copperbelt. The Benguela Railway had a rail spur to Cuima, near Huambo. In late 1988, it was operating only between

Lobito and Benguela. In the south, the 899-kilometer Namibe

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Angola: A Country Study
The Economy

149
Angola: A Country Study

Railway linked the port of Namibe to Menongue, with branches

to Chiange and to the Cassinga iron ore deposits. In the north, the

Luanda Railway ran from Luanda to Malanje, with rail spurs to Caxito and Dondo. In addition, a 123-kilometer, narrow-gauge line that had run from Porto Amboim to Gabela was closed as of 1987.

All three major systems have been subject to guerrilla attacks,

and service on the Benguela Railway in particular has been severely

affected. By May 1986, an estimated US$69 million worth of

damage had been inflicted on the line, and the company that operated it had accumulated more than US$200 million in losses by

1986. Observers estimated that at least US$180 million would be

needed to rehabilitate service on the line and that repairs would

take five years. Similarly, traffic on the Namibe Railway has

declined because of attacks by UNITA and because of the closure

of the Cassinga iron mines, which had provided the line with most

of its freight. Finally, by 1986 the Luanda Railway was carrying

only one-fifth of the level carried in 1973, a consequence of guerrilla attacks and the deterioration of the line. The rehabilitation of the "Lobito corridor" has been adopted

as an official SADCC project. The project included the purchase

of more locomotives and wagons and the upgrading of the entire

Benguela Railway from Lobito to the Zaire border. The project

also included the development of the Lobito port at a cost of about

US$90 million.

Ports

The decline in rail traffic has led to a decrease in activity at the

country's major ports—Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe. In 1988

Luanda's port was in disrepair. It had berths for eleven ships, with

adjacent rail sidings, and forty-one cranes; however, only two of

the sidings and few of the cranes were operational. Dockside clear- ance was slowed not only by the nonfunctioning equipment but

also by the estimated labor force daily absenteeism rate of 40 per- cent to 50 percent. The volume of freight handled by Luanda in

1986 had fallen to only 30 percent of its 1973 level. Lobito was the main terminal on the Atlantic Ocean for the Benguela Railway, and in 1988 it was Angola's most efficient port.

The port's management was better organized and more competent than that of Luanda. In addition, there was much less pilferage at Lobito than at Luanda. Nonetheless, by 1986 it operated

at one-fifth of its 1973 level, primarily because of the loss of Zambian and Zairian traffic on the Benguela Railway.

Namibe, too, was hampered by inoperable equipment and loss of traffic. The volume of cargo handled there dropped sharply

150
The Economy

after the halt of iron ore exports, leaving the ore terminal idle. In addition to minor general cargo ports at Ambriz, Benguela,

Porto Amboim, Sumbe, and Tombua, there were major petroleumloading facilities at the Malongo terminal in Cabinda Province and

at the Soyo-Quinfuquena terminal at Soyo. In the late 1980s, some

of the minor ports were taking on greater importance as road trans- portation became increasingly disrupted by UNITA ambushes.

To help rectify some of these transportation problems, the government had contracted with West German and Danish companies

to improve port operations and to establish repair and storage

facilities. The government was also involved in training pilots,

sailors, and mechanics and also sent students to Portugal, Cuba,

and the Soviet Union to study merchant marine subjects.

Air Transport

In contrast to other transport methods, air transport has grown,

partly in response to the difficulties of land transport. The state- run national airline, Angola Airlines (Linhas Aereas de Angola

TAAG; formerly known as Transportes Aereos de Angola), has

been highly profitable and in 1984 posted pretax profits of US$12.7

million. The airline benefited from high passenger and cargo load on its flights, the low price ofjet fuel in Angola, and the low wages

paid to employees. In 1988 TAAG was planning to refurbish its fleet of Boeing 737s and 707s. Because of United States opposition to the sale of American aircraft to Angola, TAAG was expected

to purchase its new aircraft from Airbus Industrie of France.

Domestic service linked Luanda with Benguela, Cabinda, Huambo, Lubango, Malanje, Negage, and Soyo. Because of unrealisti- cally low fees, demand for domestic flights was heavy. Boarding

a flight, even with a confirmed reservation, was often problematic,

and flight schedules were undependable. Although it operated only

domestic flights before independence, TAAG has since established an extensive international route network based at the country's

major airport at Luanda. TAAG offered service from Luanda to the African countries of Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique, Cape Verde,

Sao Tome and Principe, and Congo. The company's international routes served Havana, Lisbon, Moscow, Paris, and Rome.

Telecommunications

Telecommunications in Angola have also improved since

independence. The number of telephone subscribers has grown

from 24,500 in 1974 to 52,000 in 1986. Luanda was estimated to have two-thirds of all telephones. Two state bodies were responsible for telecommunications: the National Telecommunications

151
Angola: A Country Study

Company (Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicagoes—Enatel) for

domestic service, and the Public Telecommunications Company

(Empresa Publica de Telecomunicacoes—Eptel) for international

service. Enatel included twenty automatic and thirty-six manual

telephone exchanges and three telex centers. Eight of the eighteen

provincial capitals had automatic local and interurban services;

interurban links were provided by microwave and troposcatter sys- tems. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

(Intelsat) links were provided via an earth station at Cacuaco. In

December 1986, Angola resumed contacts with Intersputnik, the

Soviet-sponsored international space telecommunications organization, and planned to incorporate the station at Cacuaco into the

Intersputnik system. To ensure continuous international communications, in 1986 the government announced plans to install a second earth station at Benguela.

Balance of Payments, Finances, and Foreign Debt

Balance of Trade and Payments

Despite generally large trade surpluses, the national current

account has been in deficit since statistics were first published in

1978. Trade surpluses have been outweighed by large deficits on

"invisibles" —primarily interest and profits, transport costs, and

technical assistance payments. The largest part of the outflow for

interest and profits was accounted for by the payments of state- run petroleum companies abroad for amortization of their loans

(see table 11, Appendix A).

By 1988 the medium-term and long-term capital account had

been positive for many years because of large inflows from loans,

most of which were granted by the Soviet Union on concessional

terms. The centralized planning system strictly controlled exter- nal borrowing, and each year the Ministry of Planning set a ceil- ing on borrowing, following consultations with the National Bank

of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola—BNA).

Most of Angola's debt has been contracted on concessional terms. The effective rate of interest on medium-term and long-term debt was only 4.9 percent in 1985, and the average loan maturity was

about seven years. Out of a total of US$3.25 billion in disbursed

and undisbursed debt, US$2.06 billion was owed to the Soviet

Union for military purchases. This amount carried very attractive terms: an annual interest rate of 3 percent and repayment over

ten years, including a three-year grace period. In contrast, only

11.5 percent of loans from creditors outside Comecon were granted on a concessional basis.

152
153
Angola: A Country Study

The government has taken steps to reverse the growth in imports

of services, proposing new programs to train Angolans to provide

key technical assistance. At the Second Party Congress in December 1985, the government proposed several steps to give priority

to national companies when awarding building contracts; to cut

less essential services, such as transport expenditures and international telephone and telex usage; and provisionally to suspend pri- vate transfers abroad. In particular, in March and June 1986 the

government placed severe restrictions on salary transfers abroad

by foreign resident workers and foreign aid workers.

Finances

Banking was a monopoly of the state-run BNA, which controlled

currency, loans, and foreign debts for the private and state sectors. Reflecting the general liberalization of state economic policies adopted in 1986, the BNA has provided credit for foreign

investors and has tried to encourage foreign banks to establish operations inside Angola. The BNA handled all government financial

transactions and played an important role in setting fiscal policy,

especially regarding permissible foreign loans and the establishment of annual ceilings on imports. The bank has been notably

unsuccessful, however, in halting the decline of the kwanza, which

in late 1988 traded on the parallel market for up to 2, 100 per United

States dollar—barely one-seventieth of its theoretical value. In fact,

because the local economy was based more on barter than on monetary exchange, the BNA's primary impact has been in the area

of foreign loans, which have become increasingly important to the

economy.

Foreign Debt

Angola's total disbursed external debt, much of which was owed

to the Soviet Union and its allies for arms purchases, totaled about

US$4 billion in mid- 1988. There was only a 0.3 percent rise in

medium-term and long-term debt in 1986, but the buildup of arrears

after the crash in oil prices resulted in a 145 percent increase in

short-term debt. Arrears accounted for US$378 million, including US$224 million owed to Western countries. In 1986 the Soviet

Union (Angola's largest creditor), Brazil (the second largest), and

Portugal agreed to reschedule debt payments.

By the end of 1986, some debt payments were running seven

to eight months late, and some Western export credit agencies

denied Angola most medium-term and long-term credits. The

depreciation of the United States dollar, to which the Angolan

kwanza was tied, has added to the balance of payments pressure.

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The Economy

This situation existed because Angola's oil sales were denominated in United States dollars, while many of its imports were priced

in relatively stronger European currencies. By 1987 Angola's ac- cumulated arrears (US$378 million) and its debt-service obligations (US$442 million of principal and US$196 million of interest)

equaled nearly half of its exports of goods and services.

The government in 1987 attempted to put together a financial

arrangement to repay its external debts over a fifteen-year period.

The minister of finance proposed raising US$1 billion on the

international capital market through the issue of fifteen-year,

floating-rate notes to pay off its arrears to Western creditors, to prepay principal due on nonpetroleum-related debts, and to provide approximately US$125 million in revenue. The Paris Club

(see Glossary), however, turned down the proposal because of its complexity, uncertainty over its success, and the cost implications

for the creditor countries. To provide an alternative, the Europeans advised Angola that they would consider debt rescheduling if the government would seek membership in the IMF. Subsequently, President dos Santos announced in August 1987 that his government intended to apply for membership in the IMF and the World

Bank.

Information on Angola continues to be difficult to obtain. For

many years, government policies and the ongoing insurgency dis- couraged visits by international organizations, journalists, and scholars. By the late 1980s, however, more information was becoming

available. The most comprehensive source on the economy is Tony

Hodges's Angola to the 1990s. Specific material on economic background can be gleaned from Malyn Newitt's Portugal in Africa and

Gerald J. Bender's Angola under the Portuguese. Publications of multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are

helpful for data on various aspects of the economy. Useful periodicals include the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly Country

Report, Jeune Afrique, West Africa, Jornal de Angola, Africa Economic

Digest, Africa Research Bulletin, Marches tropicaux et mediterraneans, AfriqueAsie, and Africa Hoje. (For further information and complete cita- tions, see Bibliography.)

155

Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Angolans march at a political rally.
AFTER THIRTEEN YEARS of guerrilla warfare, Angola final- ly escaped from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, but with few of

the resources needed to govern an independent nation. When an

effort to form a coalition government comprising three liberation

movements failed, a civil war ensued. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

Angola—MPLA) emerged from the civil war to proclaim a MarxistLeninist one-party state. The strongest of the disenfranchised movements, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA),

continued to battle for another thirteen years, shifting the focus

of its opposition from the colonial power to the MPLA government. In late 1988, the social and economic disorder resulting from

a quarter-century of violence had a pervasive effect on both in- dividual lives and national politics.

Angola's 1975 Constitution, revised in 1976 and 1980, ratifies the socialist revolution but also guarantees some rights of private

ownership. The ruling party, renamed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de

Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho—MPLA-PT) in 1977,

claimed the power of the state. Although formally subordinate to the party, the government consolidated substantial power in its executive branch. The president was head of the MPLA-PT, the

government, the military, and most important bodies within the

party and the government. In his first nine years in office (1979-88),

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos further strengthened the

presidency, broadening the influence of a small circle of advisers

and resisting pressure to concentrate more power within the

MPLA-PT. His primary goal was economic development rather

than ideological rigor, but at the same time dos Santos considered

the MPLA-PT the best vehicle for building a unified, prosperous

nation.

Among the first actions taken by the MPLA-PT was its conversion into a vanguard party to lead in the transformation to

socialism. Throughout the 1980s, the MPLA-PT faced the daunting

task of mobilizing the nation's peasants, most of whom were con- cerned with basic survival, subsistence farming, and avoiding the

destruction of the ongoing civil war. Only a small minority of

Angolans were party members, but even this group was torn by

internal disputes. Factional divisions were drawn primarily along

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Angola: A Country Study

racial and ideological lines, but under dos Santos influence within

the MPLA-PT gradually shifted from mestizo (see Glossary) to black

African leadership and from party ideologues to relative political

moderates.

Mass organizations were affiliated with the party in accordance

with Marxist-Leninist dogma. In the face of continued insurgent

warfare and deteriorating living standards, however, many social

leaders chafed at party discipline and bureaucratic controls. Dos

Santos worked to build party loyalty and to respond to these tensions, primarily by attempting to improve the material rewards of

Marxist-Leninist state building. His greatest obstacle, however, was the destabilizing effect of UNITA and its South African sponsors; Angola's role as a victim of South Africa's destructive regional

policies was central to its international image during the 1980s.

In December 1988, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba reached

a long-sought accord that promised to improve Luanda's relations

with Pretoria. The primary goals of the United States-brokered

talks were to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and remove Cuba's massive military presence from Angola. Vital eco- nomic assistance from the United States was a corollary benefit

of the peace process, conditioned on Cuba's withdrawal and the

MPLA-PT's rapprochement with UNITA. Despite doubts about

the intentions of all three parties to the accord, international hopes

for peace in southwestern Africa were high.

Background

Political units in southwestern Africa evolved into complex struc- tures long before the arrival of the first Portuguese traveler,

Diogo Cao, in 1483. The Bantu- speaking and Khoisan- speaking

hunters the Portuguese encountered were descendants of those who

had peopled most of the region for centuries. Pastoral and agricultural villages and kingdoms had also arisen in the northern and

central plateaus. One of the largest of these, the Kongo Kingdom,

provided the earliest resistance to Portuguese domination (see Kongo Kingdom, ch. 1). The Bakongo (people of Kongo) and their

southern neighbors, the Mbundu, used the advantage of their large

population and centralized organization to exploit their weaker

neighbors for the European slave trade.

To facilitate nineteenth-century policies emphasizing the extrac- tion of mineral and agricultural resources, colonial officials reor- ganized villages and designed transportation routes to expedite

marketing these resources. Colonial policy also encouraged interracial marriage but discouraged education among Africans, and

the resulting racially and culturally stratified population included

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Government and Politics

people of mixed ancestry {mestigos), educated Angolans {assimilados—see Glossary) who identified with Portuguese cultural values,

and the majority of the African population that remained uneducated and unassimilated (indigenas—see Glossary). Opportunities

for economic advancement were apportioned according to racial

stereotypes, and even in the 1960s schools were admitting barely more than 2 percent of the school-age African population each

year. Portugal resisted demands for political independence long after other European colonial powers had relinquished direct control of

their African possessions. After unsuccessfully seeking support from

the United Nations (UN) in 1959, educated Luandans organized

a number of resistance groups based on ethnic and regional loyalties. By the mid-1970s, four independence movements vied with one another for leadership of the emerging nation (see African

Associations, ch. 1). The MPLA, established by mestigos and educated workers in

Luanda, drew its support from urban areas and the Mbundu population that surrounded the capital city. The Union of Peoples of

Northern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola

UPNA) was founded to defend Bakongo interests. The UPNA soon dropped its northern emphasis and became the Union of Angolan

Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola—UPA) in an attempt

to broaden its ethnic constituency, although it rebuffed consolidation attempts by other associations. The UPA, in turn, formed the

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de

Libertacao de Angola—FNLA) in 1962, when it merged with other

northern dissident groups.

A variety of interpretations of Marxist philosophy emerged during the 1950s and 1960s, a period when Western nations refused

to pressure Portugal (a member of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization—NATO) to upgrade political life in its colonies. The

Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues

PCP) helped organize African students in Lisbon and encouraged

them to press for independence. A campaign of arrests and forced

exile crushed most Angolan nationalist leadership, but in Portugal underground antifascist groups were gaining strength, and

Angolan liberation movements flourished. The MPLA established

its headquarters in Leopoldville, Belgian Congo (present-day Kinshasa, Zaire), and in 1962, after a period of exile and imprisonment, Agostinho Neto became head of the MPLA.

Neto, a physician, poet, and philosopher, strengthened the

MPLA's left-wing reputation with his rhetorical blend of socialist ideology and humanist values. He also led the group in protests

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Angola: A Country Study

against enforced cotton cultivation, discriminatory labor policies,

and colonial rule in general. MPLA and UPA leaders agreed to cooperate, but long-standing animosities led members of these two

groups to sabotage each other's efforts. Within the MPLA, leadership factions opposed each other on ideological grounds and policy

issues, but with guidance from the Soviet Union they resolved most

of their disputes by concentrating power in their high command.

Soviet military assistance also increased in response to the growing commitment to building a socialist state. In April 1974, the Portuguese army overthrew the regime in Lisbon, and its successor began dismanding Portugal's colonial empire.

In November 1974, Lisbon agreed to grant independence.

However, after centuries of colonial neglect, Angola's African population was poorly prepared for self-government: there were few educated or trained leaders and almost none with national experience.

Angola's liberation armies contested control of the new nation, and

the coalition established by the Alvor Agreement in January 1975

quickly disintegrated (see Coalition, the Transitional Government,

and Civil War, ch. 1). Events in Angola in 1975 were catastrophic. Major factors that

contributed to the violence that dogged Angola's political development for over a decade were the incursions into northern Angola

by the United States-backed and Zairian-backed FNLA; an influx

of Cuban advisers and, later, troops providing the MPLA with

training and combat support; South African incursions in the south;

UNITA attacks in the east and south, some with direct troop support from Pretoria; and dramatic increases in Soviet materiel and

other assistance to the MPLA. Accounts of the sequence of these

critical events differed over the next decade and a half, but most

observers agreed that by the end of 1975 Angola was effectively

embroiled in a civil war and that growing Soviet, Cuban, South

African, and United States involvement in that war made peace

difficult to achieve.

International recognition came slowly to the MPLA, which controlled only the northern third of the nation by December 1975.

A small number of former Portuguese states and Soviet allies recog- nized the regime, and Nigeria led the Organization of African Unity

(OAU) in granting recognition. The FNLA and UNITA attempted

unsuccessfully to establish a rival government in the Angolan town

of Huambo, but no one outside Angola recognized their regime.

By the end of 1976, Angola was a member of the UN and was recog- nized by most other African states, but its domestic legitimacy

remained in question.

162 i
A view of Lobito, one of Angola's largest cities Courtesy Richard J. Hough

MPLA leader Neto had avoided ideological labels during the struggle for independence, although the MPLA never concealed the Marxist bias of some of its members. Neto viewed Marxist-Leninist

orthodoxy as a means of unifying and organizing Angola's diverse

society and of establishing agricultural growth as the basis for eco- nomic development. He also hoped to avoid disenfranchising urban

workers or encouraging the growth of a rural bourgeoisie, while maintaining crucial military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

One of the MPLA's many slogans, "people's power" (poder popular), had won broad support for the group before independence,

especially in Luanda, where neighborhood self-help groups were formed to defend residents of poor and working-class neighborhoods against armed banditry. This movement was quickly curtailed by the police, but people's power remained a popular symbol

of the demand for political participation. After independence,

despite constitutional guarantees of people's power, the slogan

became a symbol of unrealized expectations. President Neto, despite

his democratic ideals, quickly developed an autocratic governing

style. He introduced austerity measures and productivity campaigns

and countered the resulting popular discontent with an array of

security and intelligence operations.

Industrial workers, who were among the first to organize for people's power, found their newly formed unions absorbed into the

163
Angola: A Country Study

MPLA-controlled National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao

Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos—UNTA), and the party

began to absorb other popular organizations into the party structure. Students, laborers, and peasant farmers agitated against what

they perceived as a ra^'f°"clominated political elite, and this resent- ment, even within the ranks of the MPLA itself, culminated in an

abortive coup attempt led by the former minister of interior, Nito

Alves, in May 1977.

In the aftermath of the 1977 Nitista coup attempt, the MPLA

redefined the rules for party membership. After the First Party Congress in December 1977 affirmed the Central Committee's decision to proclaim its allegiance to Marxist-Leninist ideals, the MPLA

officially became a "workers' party" and added "-PT" (for "Partido de Trabalho") to its acronym. In 1978 its leaders began a purge

of party cadres, announcing a "rectification campaign" to correct

policies that had allowed the Nitista factions and other "demagogic"

tendencies to develop. The MPLA-PT reduced its numbers from

more than 100,000 to about 31,000, dropping members the party

perceived as lacking dedication to the socialist revolution. Most

of those purged were farmers or educated mestigos, especially those

whose attitudes were considered "petit bourgeois." Urban workers, in contrast to rural peasants, were admitted to the MPLAPT in fairly large numbers.

By the end of the 1970s, the ruling party was smaller, more unified, and more powerful, but it had lost standing in rural areas, and its strongest support still came from those it was attempting

to purge—educated mestigos and assimilados. Progress was hampered

by losses in membership, trade, and resources resulting from

emigration and nearly two decades of warfare. The MPLA-PT

attempted to impose austerity measures to cope with these losses,

but in the bitter atmosphere engendered by the purges of the late 1970s, these policies further damaged MPLA-PT legitimacy. Pursuing the socialist revolution was not particularly important in non- Mbundu rural areas, in part because of the persistent impression

that mestigos dominated the governing elite. National politicians

claimed economic privilege and allowed corruption to flourish in

state institutions, adding to the challenges faced by dos Santos, who

became MPLA-PT leader in 1979.

Structure of Government

The Constitution

Adopted in November 1975, independent Angola's first and only

Constitution dedicates the new republic to eliminating the vestiges

164
Government and Politics

of Portuguese colonialism. The Constitution provides numerous

guarantees of individual freedom and prohibits discrimination based on color, race, ethnic identity, sex, place of birth, religion, level of education, and economic or social status. The Constitution also promises freedom of expression and assembly.

Constitutional revisions in 1976 and 1980 more clearly establish the national goal of a revolutionary socialist, one-party state. As revised, the Constitution vests sovereignty in the Angolan people, guaranteed through the representation of the party, and

promises to implement "people's power." It also emphasizes the

preeminence of the party as policy-making body and makes the

government subordinate to it. Government officials are responsible for implementing party policy. Economic development is founded on socialist models of cooperative ownership.

Other constitutional guarantees include health care, access to education, and state assistance in childhood, motherhood, disability,

and old age. In return for these sweeping guarantees, each individual is responsible for participating in the nation's defense, voting

in official elections, serving in public office if appointed or elect- ed, working (which is considered both a right and a duty), and

generally aiding in the socialist transformation.

Despite its strong socialist tone, the Constitution guarantees the

protection of private property and private business activity within

limits set by the state. National economic goals are to develop

agriculture and industry, establish just social relations in all sectors of production, foster the growth of the public sector and cooperatives, and implement a system of graduated direct taxation. Social

goals include combating illiteracy, promoting the development of

education and a national culture, and enforcing strict separation

of church and state, with official respect for all religions.

The Constitution also outlines Angola's defense policy. It explicitly prohibits foreign military bases on Angolan soil or affili- ation with any foreign military organization. It institutionalizes the

People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas

Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA) as the

nation's army and assigns it responsibility for defense and national

reconstruction. Military conscription applies to both men and

women over the age of eighteen (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). Executive Branch

The President

Executive authority is vested in the president, his appointed ministers, and the Defense and Security Council (see fig. 11).

165
Angola: A Country Study

166
Government and Politics The president is selected as head of the MPLA-PT by the Politi- cal Bureau. His authority derives first from his status as head of

the MPLA-PT and then from his preeminence in government.

President dos Santos, like his predecessor, had wide-ranging powers as the leading figure in politics and the military. He was com- mander in chief of the armed forces and chairman of the Council

of Ministers. He was also empowered to appoint and dismiss a wide

variety of national and provincial officials, including military officers and provincial commissioners. The president could also designate an acting president from among the members of the MPLA-PT

Political Bureau, but if he died or were disabled, his successor would

be chosen by the Central Committee.

Council of Ministers

In late 1988, the Council of Ministers comprised twenty-one

ministers and ministers of state. The seventeen ministerial portfolios included agriculture, construction, defense, domestic and for- eign trade, education, finance, fisheries, foreign relations, health,

industry, interior, justice, labor and social security, petroleum and

energy, planning, state security, and transport and communications. Ministers were empowered to prepare the national budget

and to make laws by decree, under authority designated by the

national legislature, the People's Assembly, but most of the ministers' time was spent administering policy set by the MPLAPT.

In February 1986, dos Santos appointed four ministers of state (who came to be known as "superministers") and assigned them

responsibility for coordinating the activities of the Council of

Ministers. Their portfolios were for the productive sphere; eco- nomic and social spheres; inspection and control; and town planning, housing, and water. Twelve ministries were placed under

superministry oversight; the ministers of defense, foreign relations,

interior, justice, and state security continued to report directly to the president. This change was part of an effort to coordinate policy,

reduce overlapping responsibilities, eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, and bolster the government's reputation for ef- ficiency in general. Most ministers and three of the four ministers

of state were also high officials in the MPLA-PT, and their policymaking influence was exercised through the party rather than

through the government.

Defense and Security Council

In May 1986, the president appointed eight respected advisers

to the Defense and Security Council, including the ministers of

167
Angola: A Country Study

defense, interior, and state security; the ministers of state for the

economic and social spheres, inspection and control, and the

productive sphere; the FAPLA chief of the general staff; and the

MPLA-PT Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture. The president chaired the council and gave it a broad mandate, including oversight and administration in military, economic, and diplomatic affairs. He strengthened this authority during the council's first five years by treating the council as an inner circle of close advisers. By 1988 the Defense and

Security Council and the Political Bureau, both chaired by the president, were the most powerful decision-making bodies within the

government and party, respectively.

Legislative Branch

The principle of people's power was enshrined in the 223-member

People's Assembly, which replaced the Council of the Revolution

as the nation's legislature in 1980. The primary purpose of the People's Assembly was to implement some degree of participatory

democracy within the revolutionary state and to do so outside party

confines. People's Assembly delegates did not have to be party

members, and many were not. The planned electoral process was

the election of 203 delegates to three-year terms by an electoral

college. The electoral college, in turn, would be elected by universal suffrage. The remaining twenty delegates were to be elected

by the Central Committee of the MPLA-PT. During the 1980s,

implementation of this plan was obstructed by security problems

and bureaucratic snarls. In 1980 the Central Committee elected

all People's Assembly members. In 1983 the government's lack

of control over many rural areas, combined with a dearth of accurate census data, prompted dos Santos to postpone the elections. The

1986 elections, actually held in 1987, consisted of mass meetings

at which the names of nominees were presented on a list prepared

by the existing People's Assembly. A few names were challenged

and removed, but these lengthy public discussions did not consti- tute the democratic process required by the Constitution.

The People's Assembly met every six months to approve the

national budget and development plan, enact legislation, and

delegate responsibilities to its subcommittees. It also elected the

twenty-five-member Permanent Commission to perform assembly

functions between sessions. The president headed the Permanent

Commission, which was dominated by members of the MPLAPT Political Bureau. The subordination of the People's Assembly

to the MPLA-PT was ensured by including high-level party offi- cials among the former's appointed members and by frequent

168
Government and Politics

reminders of the preeminence of the party. The government's

intention was to create people's assemblies at all levels of local administration in order to establish a government presence in

remote areas and promote party- government contacts. The planned

assemblies were an important symbol of people's power, although

they were also intended to be controlled by the party elite. Judicial System

The Ministry ofJustice oversaw the nation's court system, which

comprised the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, people's

revolutionary courts, and a system of people's courts. High-level

judges were appointed by the minister of justice. The Supreme

Court and the Court of Appeals heard cases involving national offi- cials and appeals from lower courts. People's revolutionary courts heard accusations related to national security, mercenary activity, or war crimes. They presided over both military and civilian cases, with senior military officers serving in a judicial capacity in military cases (see Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military Justice,

ch. 5). Appeals were heard by appellate courts in each provincial

capital.

People's courts were established in the late 1970s by the National

Court Administration of the Ministry of Justice as part of a na- tionwide reorganization along Marxist-Leninist lines. The people's court system comprised criminal, police, and labor tribunals in each

provincial capital and in a few other towns. The MPLA-PT Political Bureau appointed three judges—one professional and two

lay magistrates—to preside over each people's courtroom and as- signed them equal power and legal standing. Although the professional judges had substantial legal training, lay judges were

appointed on a rotating basis from among a group of citizens who

had some formal education and several weeks' introductory legal

training. Some were respected leaders of local ethnic groups. No

juries were empaneled in either civil or criminal cases, but judges

sometimes sought the opinion of local residents in weighing decisions.

Local Administration

As of late 1988, Angola was divided into eighteen provinces

(provincias) and 161 districts (municipios) (see fig. 1). Districts were

further subdivided into quarters or communes (comunas), villages

(povoagoes), and neighborhoods (bairros). Administration at each le- vel was the responsibility of a commissioner, who was appointed

by the president at the provincial, district, and commune levels and elected at the village and neighborhood levels. The eighteen

169
Angola: A Country Study

provincial commissioners were ex-officio members of the executive branch of the national government. The supreme organ of state power was the national People's Assembly. Provincial people's

assemblies comprised between fifty-five and eighty-five delegates,

charged with implementing MPLA-PT directives. People's assemblies were also envisioned, but not yet operational in late 1988,

at each subnational level of administration.

In 1983 the president created a system of regional military councils to oversee a range of local concerns with security implications.

High-ranking military officers, reporting directly to the president,

headed these councils. Their authority superseded that of other

provincial administrators and allowed them to impose a state of

martial law within areas threatened by insurgency. The boundaries of military regions and the provinces did not coincide exactly.

Until 1988 ten regional military councils were in operation. In early

1988, however, the Ministry of Defense, citing this structure as inadequate, announced the formation of four fronts (see Constitutional and Political Context, ch. 5). Popular Movement for the Liberation of AngolaWorkers' Party

Background

During the 1960s, the MPLA established its headquarters at Kinshasa, Zaire, and then at Lusaka, Zambia, and Brazzaville, Congo. The MPLA's scattered bases and diverse constituent groups

contributed to disunity and disorganization, problems that were

exacerbated by personal and ideological differences among party

leaders. The first serious split occurred in 1973, when Daniel

Chipenda led a rebellion, sometimes termed the Eastern Revolt,

in protest against the party's ra^V°~dominated leadership and

Soviet interference in Angolan affairs. Chipenda and his followers were expelled from the MPLA, and many joined the northernbased FNLA in 1975. Then in 1974, about seventy left-wing MPLA

supporters based in Brazzaville broke with Agostinho Neto. This

opposition movement became known as the Active Revolt. Shortly

after independence, a third split occurred within the party, cul- minating in the 1977 coup attempt by Nito Alves. Later in 1977,

the MPLA transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard

party and launched a lengthy rectification campaign to unify

its membership, impose party discipline, and streamline decisionmaking processes. In 1980 Angola was governed by a new head of state under

a newly revised Constitution. The nation's first legislature, the

170
Government and Politics

People's Assembly, served as a symbol of people's power, but state organs were clearly subordinate to those of the party. Within the

MPLA-PT, channels for political participation were being nar- rowed. Both government and party leaders established a hierarchy of organizations through which they hoped to mobilize rural

populations and broaden political support. At the same time,

MPLA-PT leaders launched programs to impose party discipline on the party's cadres and indoctrinate all segments of society in

their proper role in political development.

Overall goals were relatively easy to agree upon, but poverty

and insecurity exacerbated disagreements over specific strategies

for attaining these objectives. By the mid-1980s, the party had three

major goals—incorporating the population into the political process, imposing party discipline on its cadres, and reconciling the diverse

factions that arose to dispute these efforts. Some MPLA-PT offi- cials sought to control political participation by regulating party

membership and strengthening discipline, while others believed the

MPLA-PT had wasted valuable resources in the self-perpetuating

cycle of government repression and popular dissent. President dos

Santos sought to resolve disputes that did not seem to threaten his

office. However, much of the MPLA-PT' s political agenda, al- ready impeded by civil war and regional instability, was further

obstructed by these intraparty disputes.

Structure

The Political Bureau reported in 1988 that the MPLA-PT had more than 45,000 members. Its social composition, an important

aspect of its image as a popular vanguard party, consisted of

approximately 18 percent industrial workers, 18 percent peasants,

4 percent agricultural wage earners, and 60 percent described

by the Political Bureau as "other classes and social strata interested in building socialism." However, the fact remained that many

party members were still government employees, members of the

petite bourgeoisie the MPLA had denounced so loudly in the

1970s.

The central decision-making bodies of the MPLA-PT included

the Political Bureau, Central Committee, and the party congress,

each headed by the president as party chairman (see fig. 12).

A hierarchy of committees existed at the provincial, district, and

village levels; the smallest of these, the party cell, operated in many

neighborhoods and workplaces. The MPLA-PT's organizing principle was democratic centralism, which allowed participants at each

level of the organization to elect representatives to the next higher

171
Angola: A Country Study

CHAIRMAN OF THE MPLA-PT* PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

POLITICAL BUREAU

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

CONGRESS

SECRETARIAT

EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL

FOREIGN RELATIONS

DEFENSE AND SECURITY

ORGANIZATION

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCES

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES IDEOLOGY

STATE AND LEGAL AGENCIES

PRODUCTIVE SECTOR

AUXILIARY DEPARTMENTS

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES

DISTRICT COMMITTEE

Z X

z

LOCAL

COMMITTEE

X

DISTRICT COMMITTEE

LOCAL

COMMITTEE

/, \ / \

CELL 1 CELL CELL j CELL

z

LOCAL

COMMITTEE

X

LOCAL

COMMITTEE

/ \ / \

CELL j CELL ] CELL CELL

'MPLA-PT-Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho-MPLA-PT)

Source: Based on information from Keith Somerville, Angola, Boulder, 1986, 88-89; and

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party, Angola: Trabalho

e luta, Paris, 1985, 68. Figure 12. Structure of the MPLA-PT, 1988

level. MPLA-PT policy guaranteed open discussion at each level,

but majority decisions were binding on the minority, and lowerlevel bodies were bound by higher-level decisions. Party hierarchies were incomplete in most areas, however, because of low

literacy rates, poverty, and security problems. Many lower-level

party functionaries therefore had roles in both party and government.

172
Government and Politics

Political Bureau

The Political Bureau's eleven full members and two alternates were elected from among Central Committee members to assume

the responsibilities of the committee between its sessions and to control the policy direction of the party. This small group wielded

substantial power within the MPLA-PT, and its authority and

membership overlapped that of the Central Committee Secretariat.

In late 1988, the Political Bureau and the Defense and Security

Council were the most influential bodies in the party and government, respectively.

Central Committee

Although the Central Committee was formally subordinate to the MPLA-PT party congress, in late 1988 the ninety Central

Committee members wielded greater influence over party policy.

The Central Committee assumed control between sessions of the

party congress, and members of the Central Committee were in- fluential in setting the congressional agenda.

Central Committee actions were implemented under the direction of its Secretariat, which in late 1988 consisted of nine department heads elected from the Central Committee. The Secretariat was responsible for directing day-to-day party work, collecting and

analyzing information, preparing guidelines, and recommending

courses of action in accordance with party congress policy.

Subordinate to the Central Committee Secretariat were seventeen specialized auxiliary agencies, which in late 1988 included the

departments of administration and finance, agriculture, culture and

sports, defense and security, economic and social policies, education, energy and communications, executive personnel, foreign re- lations, industry, information and propaganda, legal system, mass and social organizations, organization, policy and ideology, public welfare, and state agencies. These departments worked in cooperation with provincial and lower-level party organizations to implement Central Committee directives.

Party Congress

Theoretically the supreme body within the MPLA-PT, the party

congress was actually controlled by top party officials. Following

its first regular session in 1977 and an extraordinary session in 1980,

the party congress was expected to convene once every five years. Most of the 630 delegates to the 1985 Second Party Congress were

elected from among provincial committees, with most members

of the Central Committee and all members of the Political Bureau

173
Angola: A Country Study

as delegates. The party congress was responsible for setting the

party's overall policy direction, confirming the Political Bureau's

choice of party chairman and president, and electing the Central

Committee members, who retained the decision-making authority of the party congress between sessions.

Regional Organization

The basic unit of the party was the cell, which consisted of between three and thirty members within a workplace or small neighborhood. Each cell elected a sector committee, which in turn elected a rural village committee or urban neighborhood committee, as appropriate. These committees, in turn, elected district and provincial committees. Higher-level committees were supposed to meet

every two years and elect executive functionaries to set their agendas and retain minimal authority between meetings. An important task in each committee was the election of a party control

commission to combat factionalism and promote cooperation among

party functionaries within the region. At each level, control commission members were confirmed by the next higher level body

before assuming office. Operations

In addition to a chronic shortage of cadres, the MPLA-PT faced numerous obstacles in its first decade as a ruling body. By late 1988,

the MPLA-PT party structure had not yet matured enough to respond temperately to criticism, either from within or from without. Party leaders dealt harshly with their critics, and political

participation was still carefully controlled. Impeded by civil war,

insurgency, economic problems, and the perception of elitism within

its party ranks, the MPLA-PT campaign to mobilize grass-roots

support remained in its early stages. Party membership was a

prerequisite for effective political action, but channels of entry into

the MPLA-PT were constricted by the party's entrenched leadership and centralized authority structure. Critics of the MPLAPT, in turn, felt that after a quarter-century of warfare, they were

being underserved by a large government apparatus that was pre- occupied with internal and external security.

Factionalism also slowed the implementation of MPLA-PT programs. Rather than a strong, unified, vanguard leadership, the

MPLA-PT presented an elite cadre torn by racial and ideological

differences. Racial stratification, the legacy of colonial rule, permeated the party and society, providing a continuous reminder of

economic inequities. The MPLA-PT had not established a reputation as a leader in the struggle to end racial discrimination,

174
Villagers in Benguela Province showing support for the government

at an impromptu rally

Courtesy Richard J. Hough

175
Angola: A Country Study

in part because of its roots among student elites selected by colonial

officials. Many early party leaders were mestigos who had studied

in Europe; some had married whites and were removed from the

cultural background of their African relatives. Moreover, some

Angolans still identified Marxist philosophy with European intellec- tuals rather than African peasants.

Ideological splits also grew within party ranks during the first nine years of dos Santos's regime, overlaying racial divisions. Divergent views on the role of Marxism in Angola produced clashes over domestic and foreign policy. Some African MPLA-PT leaders

placed nationalist goals ahead of ideological goals, such as the radical

transformation of society, and one of their nationalist goals was

the elimination of mestigo domination.

The lines between racial and ideological factions tended to coincide. On the one hand, strong pro- Soviet views were often found

among the party's mestigo leaders, who were inclined to view

Angola's political situation in terms of revolutionary class struggle. In their eyes, ethnic, regional, and other subnational loyalties were obstacles to political mobilization. Black African party militants, on the other hand, often viewed racial problems as more

important than class struggle, and they hoped to shape the MPLAPT into a uniquely Angolan political structure. For them, Soviet

intervention brought new threats of racism and foreign domination. Traditional ethnic group leaders were, in this view, vital to grassroots mobilization campaigns. Race and ideology did not

always coincide, however. A few staunch ideologues were black

Africans, while a small number of mestigos espoused moderate views

and favored nonaligned policies.

Political Environment

In many Third World states, the president was the paramount

leader, and in this regard Angola was no exception. Its president,

Jose Eduardo dos Santos, combined strong party loyalty with

political pragmatism. This loyalty had political and personal bases.

Dos Santos owed much of his success to the MPLA, which he had

joined in 1962 at the age of nineteen. The party sponsored his study

at Baku University in the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1970. In 1974

MPLA leader Neto appointed dos Santos to the Central Committee, which elected him to its elite Political Bureau; this group elected

him to succeed Neto, who died in 1979. Dos Santos traveled to the Soviet Union a few weeks later to confirm his revolutionary

agenda as president.

Dos Santos's loyalty to Marxism-Leninism was founded in his

student years in the Soviet Union, where he also married a Soviet

176
Government and Politics

citizen (who later returned to her homeland). There, he developed

his belief in the vanguard party as the best strategy for mobilizing

Angola's largely rural population. At the same time, however, he

professed belief in a mixed economy, some degree of decentralization, an expanded private sector, and Western investment. Like

many African leaders, he did not equate political eclecticism with

internal contradiction, nor did he view Angola's political posture

as an invitation to Soviet domination.

Dos Santos did not embrace Marxism for its Utopian appeal;

his view of Angolan society after the envisioned socialist transformation did not lack internal conflict. Rather, he viewed MarxistLeninist organizational tenets as the most practical basis for mobilizing a society in which the majority lacked economic and

educational opportunities. A small vanguard leadership, with proper

motivation and training, could guide the population through the

early stages of national development, in his view, and this approach

could improve the lives of more people than capitalist investment

and profit making by a small minority. During the 1980s, because

trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe failed to develop

and because Western technical expertise appeared vital to Angola's development, dos Santos favored improved political relations

with the West as a step toward peace and greater prosperity. Although he had scorned his predecessor's shift in the same direction in the late 1970s, dos Santos denied that his move signaled a weakening commitment to Marxism.

Despite his strong party loyalty, in the late 1980s dos Santos was known as a political pragmatist. He sometimes spoke out against

the MPLA-PT's most extreme ideologues and took steps to limit

their influence. He openly criticized the results of the rectification

campaign of the late 1970s, which, in his view, had removed too many loyal members from the party's rolls. He also recognized

that the campaign had alienated much of the nation's peasant

majority, that they remained indifferent toward party programs in

the late 1980s, and that they had not benefited from many MPLAPT policies.

Political pragmatism was not to be confused with a liberal style

of governing. In response to security crises and public criticism,

dos Santos ordered arrests, detentions without trial, and occasional

executions. He concentrated power in his office and narrowed his

circle of close advisers. He enlarged the executive branch of government by appointing new ministers of state to coordinate executive

branch activity and convinced the MPLA-PT Central Committee to entrust him with emergency powers. Dos Santos also per- suaded party leaders to empower him to appoint regional military

177
Angola: A Country Study

councils that had sweeping authority over civilian and military

affairs in unstable regions of the country and that were answerable only to the president.

Dos Santos further consolidated his hold on executive authority

in April 1984 by establishing the Defense and Security Council (see

Executive Branch, this ch.). In 1985 he enlarged the party Central Committee from sixty to ninety members and alternates, thus

diluting the strength of its staunch ideological faction.

Undermining potential opponents was not dos Santos's only

motivation for consolidating power within the executive branch of

government. He was also impatient with bureaucratic "red tape," even when justified in the name of party discipline. Accordingly,

the primary qualification for his trusted advisers was a balance of

competence, efficiency, and loyalty. Rhetorical skills, which he

generally lacked, were not given particular priority; ideological

purity was even less important. His advice for economic recovery was summed up as "produce, repair, and rehabilitate." The direct,

relatively nonideological governing style exemplified by this approach earned dos Santos substantial respect and a few strong

critics. Economic and security crises worsened during the first nine years

of dos Santos's presidency, draining resources that might have been

used to improve living standards and education. The president

rejected advice from party ideologues, whose primary aim was to develop a sophisticated Marxist-Leninist party apparatus. Rather

than emphasize centralized control and party discipline, dos Santos embraced a plan to decentralize economic decision making in

1988. He then appointed Minister of Planning Lopo do Nascimento

to serve as commissioner of Huila Province in order to implement

this plan in a crucial region of the country.

The 1985 Second Party Congress assented to the president's

growing power by approving several of his choices for top government office as party officials. Among these was Roberto de Almeida, a member of the Defense and Security Council in his capacity

as the MPLA-PT secretary for ideology, information, and culture

and one of dos Santos's close advisers. Party leaders elected Almeida, a mestigo, to both the MPLA-PT Central Committee and the Political Bureau.

Demoted from the top ranks of the party were the leading ideologue, Liicio Lara, and veteran mestigo leaders Paulo Jorge and Henrique Carreira (nom de guerre Iko). The split between ideologues

and political moderates did not render the party immobile, in part

because of dos Santos's skill at using Angola's internal and exter- nal threats to unite MPLA-PT factions. The ever-present UNITA

178
179
Angola: A Country Study

insurgency provided a constant reminder of the frailty of the nation's

security.

Mass Organizations and Interest Groups

Mass Organizations

Three mass organizations were affiliated with the MPLA-PT

in 1988—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of AngolaYouth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular de Liberta- cao de Angola—JMPLA), the Organization of Angolan Women

(Organizacao da Mulher Angolana—OMA), and the UNTA. Each was founded as an anticolonial social movement during the 1960s

and transformed into a party affiliate when the MPLA-PT became

a vanguard party in 1977. Although these groups were formally

subordinate to the party in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they continued to operate with relative autonomy. Strict party

ideologues objected to this independence and sometimes treated

organization leaders with contempt. The resulting tensions added

to public resentment of party discipline and became a political issue

when Neto accused leaders of the JMPLA, the OMA, and the

UNTA of supporting the Nitista coup attempt of 1977. Alves, the

coup leader, had criticized MPLA-PT leaders for bourgeois atti- tudes and racism, and many people in these organizations supported

Alves 's allegations.

In the late 1970s, mass organizations became an important

target of the rectification campaign. Their role in society was

redefined to emphasize the dissemination of information about

party policy and the encouragement of participation in programs. Throughout most of the next decade, MPLA-PT officials continued to criticize the lack of coordination of organizational agenda with party needs. The mass organizations became centers of

public resentment of MPLA-PT controls, but these groups were

not yet effective at organizing or mobilizing against MPLA-PT

rule. Popular Movementfor the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement

The JMPLA was founded in 1962 and converted into a training ground for MPLA-PT activists in 1977. It claimed a membership of 72,000, mostly teenagers and students, in 1988. The

JMPLA conducted military exercises and political study groups,

measuring success within the group primarily by an individual's

commitment to the socialist revolution. The Second Congress of

the JMPLA was held on April 14, 1987, a date that was also celebrated as National Youth Day.

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Government and Politics

Despite the symbolic and practical importance of the political role of the nation's youth, MPLA-PT officials generally had a deri- sive attitude toward JMPLA leaders during the 1980s. At the

MPLA-PT congresses of 1980 and 1985, party officials criticized

youth leaders for their failure to encourage political activism. They

also remonstrated against youth group officials for the bourgeois

attitudes, materialism, and political apathy they detected among

children and teenagers. One measure of these problems was the

continued urban influx among young people, which impeded

MPLA-PT efforts at rural mobilization.

MPLA-PT leaders assigned the JMPLA the task of guiding

the national children's organization, the Agostinho Neto Organization of Pioneers (Organizacao dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto

OPA). The goal of the OPA was to educate all children in patriotic

values, socialism, and the importance of study, work, and scientific knowledge. Founded as the Pioneers in 1975, the group took

the name of the nation's first president at its second conference

in November 1979, following Neto's death. JMPLA leaders generally viewed the OPA as a recruiting ground for potential political

activists. National Union of Angolan Workers

The UNTA was organized in 1960 in the Belgian Congo (presentday Zaire) to assist refugees and exiled MPLA members in their

efforts to maintain social contacts and find jobs. Managing the

UNTA became more difficult after independence. The UNTA

headquarters was transferred to Luanda, where the shortage of

skilled workers and personnel for management and training programs became immediately evident. UNTA leaders worked to transform the group from an adjunct to a national liberation army

to a state labor union, but encouraged by the "people's power"

movement, many workers thought the MPLA victory entitled them

to assume control of their workplace. UNTA leaders found that

workers' rights were sometimes given a lower priority than workers' obligations, and at times industrial workers found themselves

at odds with both the government and their own union leadership.

These tensions were exacerbated by the demands of militant workers who favored more sweeping nationalization programs than those

undertaken by the government; some workers opposed any compensation of foreign owners. During the early 1980s, Cuban advisers were assigned to bring

industrial workers into the MPLA-PT. With their Angolan counterparts in the UNTA, Cuban shop stewards and union officials undertook educational programs in technical and management

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Angola: A Country Study

training, labor discipline and productivity, and socialist economics. Their overall goal was to impart a sense of worker participation in the management of the state economy—a difficult task in an environment characterized by warfare and economic crisis. By

late 1988, the Cubans had achieved mixed success. Some of the

UNTA's 600,000 members looked forward to the prosperity they

hoped to achieve through MPLA-PT policies; many others felt their

links to the government did little to improve their standard of liv- ing, and they were relatively uncommitted to the construction of a socialist state. UNTA officers did not aggressively represent worker interests when they conflicted with those of the party, and the

fear of labor unrest became part of Angola's political context. Organization of Angolan Women

The OMA was established in 1963 to mobilize support for the

fledgling MPLA. After independence, it became the primary route by which women were incorporated in the political process. Its membership rose to 1 .8 million in 1985 but dropped to fewer than

1 .3 million in 1987. The group attributed this decline to the regional

destabilization and warfare that displaced and destroyed families

in rural areas, where more than two-thirds of OMA members lived. In 1983 Ruth Neto, the former president's sister, was elected secre- tary general of the OMA and head of its fifty-three-member national

committee. Neto was reelected secretary general by the 596 delegates who attended the OMA's second nationwide conference on March 2, 1988.

During the 1980s, the OMA established literacy programs and

worked to expand educational opportunities for women, and the

government passed new legislation outlawing gender discrimination in wages and working conditions (see Conditions after Independence, ch. 2). MPLA-PT rhetoric emphasized equality between

the sexes as a prerequisite to a prosperous socialist state. At both

the First Party Congress and the Second Party Congress, the

MPLA-PT Central Committee extolled contributions made by

women, but in 1988 only 10 percent of MPLA-PT members were women, and the goal of equality remained distant. Through the

OMA, some women were employed in health and social service

organizations, serving refugees and rural families. More women

were finding jobs in teaching and professions from which they had

been excluded in the past, and a very small number occupied

important places in government and the MPLA-PT. However,

most Angolan women were poor and unemployed.

In addition to leading the OMA, Ruth Neto also served on

the MPLA-PT Central Committee and as secretary general of the

182
77z£ government has had difficulty mobilizing support

from peasant farmers.

Pan-African Women's Organization (PAWO), which had its headquarters in Luanda. The PAWO helped sponsor Angola's annual

celebration of Women's Day (August 9), which was also attended

by representatives from neighboring states and liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia.

Interest Groups

Peasant Farmers

In the early 1970s, rural volunteers were the backbone of the

MPLA fighting forces, but after independence few peasant fight- ers were given leadership positions in the party. In fact, most farmers were purged from the party during the rectification campaign

of the late 1970s for their lack of political commitment or revolutionary zeal. Criteria for party membership were stricter for farmers

than for urban workers, and a decade later MPLA-PT leaders

generally conceded that the worker-peasant alliance, on which the

socialist transformation depended, had been weakened by the rectification campaign. When debating the reasons for this failure, some MPLA-PT members argued that their urban-based leadership had ignored rural demands and implemented policies favoring urban residents (see Effects of Socialist Policies, ch. 2). Others

claimed that the party had allowed farmers to place their own

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Angola: A Country Study

interests above those of society and that they were beginning to emerge as the rural bourgeoisie denounced by Marxist-Leninist

leaders in many countries.

Policies aimed at rural development in the early 1980s had called

for the establishment of state farms to improve productivity of basic

foodstuffs in the face of shortages in equipment and technical experts. Cuban and Bulgarian farm managers were put in charge

of most of these farms. These advisers' objectives were to introduce

the use of mechanization and chemical fertilizers and to inculcate

political awareness. By the mid-1980s, however, the salaries of for- eign technical experts and the cost of new equipment far outweighed

revenues generated by these state enterprises, and the program was

abandoned.

Many farmers reverted to subsistence agriculture in the face of

the spreading UNITA insurgency and what they often perceived as government neglect. Convincing them to produce surplus crops for markets presented formidable problems for party leaders. UNITA

forces sometimes claimed crops even before they were harvested,

and urban traders seldom ventured into insecure rural areas. Even

if a farmer were able to sell surplus crops, the official price was of- ten unrealistically low, and few consumer goods were available in

rural markets even for those with cash (see Agriculture, ch. 3). In response to the apparent intransigence of some rural Angolans, the MPLA-PT attempted another strategy for mobilizing

political support by creating farmers' cooperatives and organizing

them into unions to provide channels of communication between

farmers and party leaders. In late 1988, these unions represented

only a small percentage of the rural population, but some party

leaders still expected them to succeed. Rural resentment of the

urban-based MPLA-PT leadership was still fairly widespread,

however, and this resentment contributed to the success of UNITA

in Angola's southern and eastern provinces.

Traditional Elites In the late 1980s, President dos Santos was working to strengthen

his support among the nation's traditional leaders. Every few weeks,

he would invite delegations of provincial and local-level representatives to meet with him, and Angop would headline these meetings with 4 'the chiefs." Their discussions focused on regional

economic and social concerns and served the important political

purpose of demonstrating the government's desire to avoid confrontation and to secure support in rural areas. The MPLA had a neutral relationship with traditional elites before independence, in part because the urban-based party had

184
Government and Politics

little contact with ethnic group leaders, whose following was strongest in rural areas. After independence, in its determination to improve the national economy and infrastructure, the MPLA called on people to rise above ethnic and regional loyalties, labeling them

impediments to progress in the class struggle. Early MPLA rhetoric

also condemned many religious practices, including local African

religions. Such policies provoked the contempt of some traditional

leaders.

Crises were dampened somewhat by the party's often confrontational relationship with the civil service during the early 1970s.

Civil servants, as representatives of the colonial regime, had often

clashed with traditional leaders or had otherwise subverted their

authority. The MPLA, in contrast, condemned the elitist attitudes

of bureaucrats who were employed by the colonial regime, thus

gaining support from traditional rulers. At the same time, however,

the party drew much of its support from the petite bourgeoisie it condemned so loudly, and much of the civil service remained intact after independence.

By 1980 MPLA-PT efforts to consolidate support in outlying

regions were evident. Party officials appointed ethnic group leaders to participate in or lead local party committees in many areas. Merging traditional and modern leadership roles helped strength- en support among rural peasants who would have otherwise

remained on the periphery of national politics. Although success was limited to a few areas, this program allowed dos Santos to maintain a balance between national and regional interests. Even some

party ideologues, initially inclined toward strict interpretations of

Marxist-Leninist dogma, voiced the belief that populist elements

might be appropriate for a Marxist regime in an African context. Religious Communities

The MPLA-PT maintained a cautious attitude toward religion

in the late 1980s, in contrast to its determination in the late 1970s

to purge churchgoers from the party. A 1980 Ministry of Justice

decree required all religious institutions to register with the government. As of 1987, eleven Protestant institutions were legally recognized: the Assembly of God, the Baptist Convention of Angola,

the Baptist Evangelical Church of Angola, the Congregational

Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of South-West Angola, the Our Lord

Jesus Christ Church in the World (Kimbanguist), the Reformed

Evangelical Church of Angola, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church,

the Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, and the United

Methodist Church (see Christianity, ch. 2). Roberto de Almeida,

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Angola: A Country Study

the MPLA-PT Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture, admonished church leaders not to perpetuate oppressive or elitist attitudes, and he specifically warned that

the churches would not be allowed to take a neutral stance in the

battle against opponents of the MPLA-PT regime.

The official attitude toward religion reflected the ideological split

in the party leadership. Staunch party ideologues, who had purged

almost all churchgoers during the rectification campaign of the late 1970s, opposed leniency toward anyone claiming or recognizing

moral authority outside the regime. But as they had done in regard

to traditional leaders, the president and his close associates weighed

the balance between ideological purity and political necessity and

soon moderated their antireligious stance. Political opposition had

not coalesced around religious leaders, and, in general, the fear

of religious opposition was weakening in the late 1980s.

Employing Marxist-Leninist diatribes against the oppression of

the working class, only the most strident ideologues in the MPLAPT maintained their opposition to religion. The Roman Catholic

Church was still strongly identified with the colonial oppressor, and

Protestant missionaries were sometimes condemned for having sup- ported colonial practices. More serious in the government's view

in the late 1980s was the use by its foremost opponent, Jonas Savimbi, of the issue of religion to recruit members and support for his

UNITA insurgency. Savimbi's Church of Christ in the Bush had

become an effective religious affiliate of UNITA, maintaining

schools, clinics, and training programs.

Small religious sects were annoying to MPLA-PT officials. The

ruling party suspected such groups of having foreign sponsors or

of being used by opponents of the regime. To the government, the

sects' relative independence from world religions was a gauge of

their potential for political independence as well. Watch Tower and

Seventh-Day Adventist sects were suspect, but they were not per- ceived as serious political threats. However, the Jehovah's Witnesses were banned entirely in 1978 because of their proscription on military service.

During the late 1980s, security officials considered the small Our

Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World to be a threat to the regime,

despite the fact that the Mtokoists, as they were known, were not

particularly interested in national politics (see Internal Security,

ch. 5). Their founder, Simon Mtoko (also known as Simao Toco),

had been expelled from Angola by the Portuguese in 1950 for

preaching adherence to African cultural values. He returned to Angola in 1974 but soon clashed with MPLA leaders over the

regime's authority over individual beliefs. He opposed the party's

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Government and Politics

Marxist rhetoric on cultural grounds until his death in 1984. After

his death, officials feared the group would splinter into dissident

factions. The church was legally recognized in 1988 even though

Mtokoists clashed with police in 1987 and 1988, resulting in arrests and some casualties.

Political Opposition

After thirteen years of national independence, Angola's armed

forces, FAPLA, remained pitted against UNITA in a civil war that

had erupted out of the preindependence rivalry among liberation

armies. The FNLA and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de

Cabinda—FLEC) lost popular support during the first decade of

independence, and, as a result, in 1988 UNITA remained the only

serious internal threat to the dos Santos regime. Few Angolans

expected either UNITA or government forces to achieve a military victory, but the political impact of the UNITA insurgency was

substantial nonetheless (see The Enduring Rival: UNITA, ch. 5). Jonas Savimbi established UNITA in 1966. Leading a group

of dissident members from the northern coalition that included the

FNLA, he established a rival liberation movement that sought to avoid domination by Holden Roberto and his Bakongo followers

(see Angolan Insurgency, ch. 1). UNITA recruits from Savimbi 's Ovimbundu homeland and from among the Chokwe (also spelled

Cokwe), Lunda, Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela), and other

southern Angolan societies sought to preserve elements of their own

cultures (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). Some southerners also maintained centuries-old legacies of distrust toward northern

ethnic groups, including the Bakongo and the Mbundu.

Savimbi' s legitimacy as a dissident leader was acquired in part

through the reputation of his grandfather, who had led the Ovimbundu state of Ndulu in protest against Portuguese rule in the early

twentieth century. From his father, Savimbi acquired membership

and belief in the United Church of Christ, which organized Ovimbundu villages into networks to assist in mission operations under

colonial rule. One of these networks formed the Council of Evangelical Churches, a pan-Ovimbundu umbrella organization that

united more than 100,000 people in south-central Angola. They

were served by mission schools, training centers, and clinics, with

near-autonomy from colonial controls. Local leaders, who staffed some of these establishments, voiced their demands for greater

political freedom, and colonial authorities moved to suppress the

Council of Evangelical Churches as pressures for independence

mounted in the 1960s.

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Angola: A Country Study

The territory in southeastern Angola controlled by UNITA in

the late 1980s included part of the area that had been administered

by the Council of Evangelical Churches before independence (see

fig. 16). Here, many people supported Savimbi's struggle against

the MPLA-PT as an extension of the long struggle for Ovimbundu, not Angolan, nationhood. UNITA-run schools and clinics oper- ated with the same autonomy from Luandan bureaucratic control

as their mission-sponsored counterparts had before independence.

Ethnic loyalties remained strong in the southeast and other

UNITA-controlled areas of rural Angola. Class solidarity, in comparison, was an almost meaningless abstraction. Savimbi was able

to portray the class-conscious MPLA-PT in Luanda in terms that

contrasted sharply with models of leadership among the Ovimbundu

and other central and southern Angolan peoples. He described party

leaders as a racially stratified elite, dominated by Soviet and Cuban

advisers who also provided arms to suppress the population. The

MPLA-PT's early assaults on organized religion reinforced this image. Many rural Angolans were also keenly aware that the party

elite in Luanda lived at a much higher standard than did Savimbi's commanders in the bush. And they carefully noted that people in rural areas under MPLA-PT control still lived in poverty

and that the government bureaucracy was notoriously inefficient

and corrupt.

UNITA' s regimented leadership, in turn, presented itself as the

protector of rural African interests against outsiders. Through

Savimbi's skilled public relations efforts, his organization became

known as a local peasant uprising, fighting for political and reli- gious freedom. Savimbi had no headquarters in other countries

and took pride in the humble life-style of his command in Jamba,

well within UNITA-held territory. On this basis, he won some sup- port in the south and east, gained volunteers for UNITA forces,

and slowed government efforts to extend MPLA-PT control into

the countryside. In the late 1980s, however, international human

rights organizations accused UNITA of human rights abuses, charging that UNITA was intimidating civilians to force them to support UNITA or to withhold support for the MPLA-PT.

For the government, the ever-present threat of the UNITA

insurgency served a number of useful purposes. It helped rally support for party unity in the capital and surrounding areas. The

government was able to capitalize on the reputation for brutality

that grew up around some UNITA commanders and the destruction of rural resources by UNITA forces. Young amputees in

Luanda and other towns provided a constant reminder of the several

thousand land mines left in rural farmland by Savimbi's troops.

188
In the late 1980s, amputees such as these could be found

in towns and villages throughout the country.

Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Yannick Muller)

UNITA activity also provided an immediate example of the party

ideologues' stereotype of destabilization sponsored by international

capitalist forces. These forces were, in turn, embodied in the regional enemy, South Africa. The UNITA insurgency also enabled the

MPLA-PT government to justify the continued presence of Cuban

troops in Angola, and it helped maintain international interest in

Angola's political difficulties. The regional accord reached in December 1988 by Angolan,

South African, and Cuban negotiators did not address Angola's

internal violence, but in informal discussions among the participants, alternatives were suggested for ending the conflict (see

Regional Politics, this ch.). Western negotiators pressured the

MPLA-PT to bring UNITA officials into the government, and

even within the party, many people hoped that UNITA

representatives—excluding Savimbi—would be reconciled with the

dos Santos government. Savimbi, in turn, offered to recognize dos

Santos's leadership on the condition that free elections, as promised

by the 1975 Alvor Agreement, would take place after the withdrawal

of Cuban troops.

Mass Media

The government nationalized all print and broadcast media in

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Angola: A Country Study

1976, and as of late 1988 the government and party still controlled

almost all the news media. Angola's official news agency, Angop,

distributed about 8,000 issues of the government newsletter,

Didrio da Republica, and 40,000 copies ofJornal de Angola daily in

Luanda and other urban areas under FAPLA control. Both publications were in Portuguese. International press operations in

Luanda included Agence France-Presse, Cuba's Prensa Latina,

Xinhua (New China) News Agency, and several Soviet and East

European agency offices. Under the scrutiny of the MPLA-PT, the media were limited

to disseminating official policy without critical comment or opposing

viewpoints. The Angolan Journalists' Union, which proclaimed

the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitution, nonetheless worked closely with the MPLA-PT and pressured

writers to adhere to government guidelines. Views differing slightly

from official perceptions were published in the UNTA monthly

newsletter, Voz do Trabalhador, despite active censorship.

Radio Nacional de Angola broadcast on medium-wave and short- wave frequencies in Luanda and eighteen other towns. Radio broadcasts were in Portuguese and vernacular languages, and there were an estimated 435,000 receivers in 1988. In the late 1980s, people

in central and southern Angola also received opposition radio broadcasts from the Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, operated

by UNITA in Portuguese, English, and local vernaculars. Limited television service in Portuguese became available in Luanda and

surrounding areas in 1976, but by 1988 there were only about

40,500 television sets in the country.

Angop maintained a cooperative relationship with the Soviet news

agency, TASS, and Angola was active in international efforts to improve coordination among nonaligned nations in the field of communications. Information ministers and news agency representatives from several Third World nations were scheduled to hold their

fifth conference in Luanda in June 1989—their first meeting since

1985, when they met in Havana. The Angop delegation was to serve as host of the 1989 conference, and Angolan information offi- cials in the government and party were to chair the organization

from 1989 to 1992.

Angola was also a leader among Portuguese-speaking nations of

Africa. Students from these nations attended the Interstate Journalism School in Luanda, which opened May 23, 1987, with support from the Yugoslav news agency, Tanyug. In September 1987,

journalists from these five Lusophone nations held their third conference in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. A major goal of this group was

to coordinate cultural development based on their common language,

but an important secondary goal was to demonstrate support for

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Government and Politics

Angola in its confrontation with South Africa. By 1990 they hoped

to celebrate the Pan-African News Agency's opening of a Portuguese desk in Luanda.

Foreign Relations

Policy Making

Angola's foreign relations reflected the ambivalence of its for- mal commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its dependence on

Western investment and trade. Overall policy goals were to resolve

this dual dependence—to achieve regional and domestic peace,

reduce the need for foreign military assistance, enhance economic

self-sufficiency through diversified trade relations, and establish

Angola as a strong socialist state. MPLA-PT politicians described

Angola's goal as geopolitical nonalignment, but throughout most

of the 1980s Angola's foreign policy had a pronounced pro-Soviet

bias.

Two groups within the MPLA-PT and one council within the

executive branch vied for influence over foreign policy, all under

the direct authority of the president. Formal responsibility for for- eign policy programs lay with the MPLA-PT Central Committee. Within this committee, the nine members of the Secretariat

and the five others who were members of the Political Bureau wielded decisive influence. The Political Bureau, in its role as guardian

of the revolution, usually succeeded in setting the Central Committee agenda.

During the 1980s, as head of both the party and the government,

dos Santos strengthened the security role of the executive branch

of government, thereby weakening the control of the Central Committee and Political Bureau. To accomplish this redistribution of

power, in 1984 he created the Defense and Security Council as an

executive advisory body, and he appointed to this council the six most influential ministers, the FAPLA chief of the general staff, and the Central Committee secretary for ideology, information,

and culture. The mandate of this council was to review and coor- dinate the implementation of security-related policy efforts among

ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was more concerned

with diplomatic and economic affairs than with security matters. Southern Africa's regional conflict determined much of Angola's foreign policy direction during the 1980s. Negotiations to end

South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia succeeded in linking

Namibian independence to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Cuban presence and that of South West Africa People's

Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC)

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Angola: A Country Study

bases in Angola bolstered Pretoria's claims of a Soviet- sponsored

onslaught against the apartheid state. On the grounds that an

independent Namibia would enlarge the territory available to Pretoria's enemies and make South Africa's borders even more

vulnerable, South Africa maintained possession of Namibia, which

it had held since World War I. Pretoria launched incursions into

Angola throughout most of the 1980s and supported Savimbi's

UNITA forces as they extended their control throughout eastern Angola.

The MPLA-PT pursued its grass-roots campaign to mobilize

peasant support, and UNITA sought to capitalize on the fear of

communism to enhance its popularity outside rural Ovimbundu

areas. Many Angolans accepted MPLA-PT condemnations of the

West but balanced them against the fact that Western oil companies in Cabinda provided vital revenues and foreign exchange and

the fact that the United States purchased much of Angola's oil. Moreover, in one of Africa's many ironies that arose from balancing the dual quest for political sovereignty and economic development, Cuban and Angolan troops guarded American and other

Western companies against attack by South African commandos

or UNITA forces (which were receiving United States assistance).

Regional Politics

Most African governments maintained generally cautious support of the Luanda regime during most of its first thirteen years

in power. African leaders recognized Luanda's right to reject

Western alignments and opt for a Marxist state, following Angola's long struggle to end colonial domination. This recognition of

sovereignty, however, was accompanied by uncertainty about the

MPLA-PT regime itself, shifting from a concern in the 1970s that

spreading Soviet influence would destabilize African regimes across the continent to a fear in the 1980s that the MPLA-PT might be

incapable of governing in the face of strong UNITA resistance.

The large Cuban military presence came to symbolize both Angola's political autonomy from the West and the MPLA-PT's reli- ance on a Soviet client state to remain in power. By 1988 the party's

role in the struggle against South Africa had become its best guarantee of broad support across sub-Saharan Africa.

Pretoria's goals in Angola were to eliminate SWAPO and ANC

bases from Angolan territory, weaken MPLA-PT support for Pretoria's foes through a combination of direct assault and aid to UNITA, and reinforce regional dependence on South Africa's own

extensive transportation system by closing down the Benguela Railway (see fig. 10). At the same time, however, South Africa's

192
Having fled the UNITA insurgency, these youngsters faced

malnourishment in a displacement camp.

Courtesy Richard J. Hough

193
Angola: A Country Study

right-wing extremists relied on Marxist rhetoric from Angola and

Mozambique as evidence of the predicted communist onslaught

against Pretoria. The political ties of Angola and Mozambique to the Soviet Union also bolstered South Africa's determination to strengthen its security apparatus at home and provided a rationale for continued occupation of Namibia. Knowing this important prop for Pretoria's regional policies would diminish with the

Cuban withdrawal from Angola, South Africa actually prolonged

Angola's dependence on Soviet and Cuban military might by derailing negotiations for Namibian independence.

In 1984 South Africa and Angola agreed to end support for each

other's rebels and work toward regional peace. This agreement,

the Lusaka Accord, was not implemented, however, as Pretoria

continued incursions into Angola, partly in response to new arrivals

of Cuban forces. Regional Accord

On December 22, 1988, after eight years of negotiations, Angola,

Cuba, and South Africa concluded a regional accord that provided

for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In a series of talks mediated by the United States, the three parties agreed to link

Namibian independence from South African rule to a staged withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Both processes were to begin

in 1989. Cuban troops were to move north of the fifteenth parallel,

away from the Namibian border, by August 1, 1989. All Cuban

troops were to be withdrawn from Angolan territory by July 1

,

1991 (see Appendix B).

The December 1988 regional accords did not attempt to resolve

the ongoing conflict between Angolan forces and UNITA. Rather,

it addressed the 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 435, which

called for South African withdrawal and free elections in Namibia

and prohibited further South African incursions into Angola. The

United States promised continued support for UNITA until a negotiated truce and power-sharing arrangement were accomplished.

The December 1988 regional accords created a joint commission of representatives from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the United

States, and the Soviet Union to resolve conflicts that threatened

to disrupt its implementation. However, immediate responsibility

for the accord lay primarily with the UN, which still required an

enabling resolution by the Security Council, a funding resolution

by the General Assembly, and a concrete logistical plan for member states to establish and maintain a Namibian peacekeeping force as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) called

for by Resolution 435.

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Government and Politics

Angola's participation in the regional accords was pragmatic.

The accords promised overall gains, but not without costs. They entailed the eventual loss of Cuban military support for the MPLA-PT

but countered this with the possible benefits of improved relations

with South Africa—primarily an end to South African-supported

insurgency. The accords also suggested possible benefits from improved regional trade, membership in the World Bank (see Glossary) and International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), and

loans for development purposes. President dos Santos intended to reduce Angola's share of the cost of the Cuban presence, to reduce

social tensions in areas where Cuban military units were stationed,

and to weaken UNITA's argument that the MPLA-PT had

allowed an occupation force to install itself in Angola. The MPLAPT also hoped to gain a friendly SWAPO government in neighboring Namibia and an end to sanctuary for UNITA forces in

Namibian territory. (This goal was complicated by the fact that

Ovambo populations in southern Angola and Namibia provided

the core of SWAPO, and, at the same time, many Ovambo people supported UNITA.)

As the first Cuban troops planned to withdraw from Angola,

most parties to the accords still feared that it might fail. Angolan

leaders worried that the UNITA insurgency would intensify in the

face of the Cuban withdrawal; that UNITA leaders might find new

sources of external assistance, possibly channeled through Zaire;

and that South African incursions into Angola might recur on the

grounds that ANC or SWAPO bases remained active in southern

Angola. South African negotiators expressed the fear that the Cuban

troop withdrawal, which could not be accurately verified, might

not be complete; that Cuban troops might move into Zambia or other neighboring states, only to return to Angola in response to UNITA activity; or that SWAPO activity in Namibia might prompt

new South African assaults on Namibian and Angolan territory.

SWAPO negotiators, in turn, feared that South Africa or some

of Namibia's 70,000 whites might block the elections guaranteed

by UN Resolution 435, possibly bringing South African forces back

into Namibia and scuttling the entire accords. These and other

apprehensions were evident in late 1988, but substantial hope

remained that all regional leaders supported the peace process and

would work toward its implementation.

Relations with Other African States Angola was wary of attempts at African solidarity during its first years of independence, an attitude that gave way to a more activist role in southern Africa during the 1980s. President Neto rejected

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Angola: A Country Study

an offer of an OAU peacekeeping force in 1975, suspecting that

OAU leaders would urge a negotiated settlement with UNITA.

Neto also declined other efforts to find African solutions to Angola's instability and reduce the Soviet and Cuban role in the region.

A decade later, Angola had become a leader among front-line states (the others were Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and

Zimbabwe) seeking Western pressure to end regional destablization by Pretoria. Luanda also coordinated efforts by the Southern

African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to reduce

the front-line states' economic dependence on South Africa.

Angola's relations were generally good with other African states that accepted its Marxist policies and strained with states that harbored or supported rebel forces opposed to the MPLA-PT. The

most consistent rhetorical support for the MPLA-PT came from

other former Portuguese states in Africa (Cape Verde, Sao Tome

and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique).

Nigeria, which led the OAU in recognizing the MPLA-PT

regime in 1975, went on to seek a leadership role in the campaign

against South Africa's domination of the region, but Nigeria never

forged very close ties with Angola. Nigeria's own economic difficul- ties of the 1970s and 1980s, its close relations with the West, and

other cultural and political differences prevented Luanda and Lagos

from forming a strong alliance.

Zaire's relations with Angola were unstable during the 1970s

and 1980s. Zairian regular army units supported the FNLA in the

years before and just after Angolan independence, and Angola harbored anti-Zairian rebels, who twice invaded Zaire's Shaba Region

(formerly Katanga Province). But Zaire's President Mobutu Sese

Seko and President Neto reached a rapprochement before Neto's

death in 1979, and Zaire curtailed direct opposition to the MPLAPT. Nonetheless, throughout most of the 1980s UNITA operated

freely across Zaire's southwestern border, and Western support

for UNITA was channeled through Zaire (see National Security

Environment, ch. 5). Complicating relations between these two

nations were the numerous ethnic groups whose homelands had

been divided by the boundary between Zaire and Angola a cen- tury earlier. The Bakongo, Lunda, Chokwe, and many smaller

groups maintained long-standing cultural, economic, and religious

ties with relatives in neighboring states. These ties often extended

to support for antigovernment rebels. Zambia, which had officially ousted UNITA bands from its western region in 1976, voiced strong support for the MPLA-PT

at the same time that it turned a blind eye to financial and logisti- cal support for UNITA by Zambian citizens. Without official

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Government and Politics

approval, but also without interference, UNITA forces continued

to train in Zambia's western region. Lusaka's ambivalence toward

Angola during the 1980s took into account the possibility of an eventual UNITA role in the government in Luanda. Both Zambia and

Zaire had an interest in seeing an end to Angola's civil war be- cause the flow of refugees from Angola had reached several hundred

thousand by the mid-1980s. Peace would also enable Zambia and

Zaire to upgrade the Benguela Railway as an alternative to South

African transport systems.

Elsewhere in the region, relations with Angola varied. Strained

relations arose at times with Congo, where both FNLA and Cabindan rebels had close cultural ties and some semi-official encouragement. Senegal, Togo, Malawi, and Somalia were among the

relatively conservative African states that provided material support to UNITA during the 1980s. Throughout most of the decade,

UNITA also received financial assistance from several North Afri- can states, including Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, and these

governments (along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) pressured their

African trading partners and client states to limit their support of

the MPLA-PT.

Communist Nations

The Soviet Union supported the MPLA-PT as a liberation move- ment before independence and formalized its relationship with the

MPLA-PT government through the Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation and a series of military agreements beginning in 1975.

Once it became clear that the MPLA-PT could, with Cuban support, remain in power, the Soviet Union provided economic and

technical assistance and granted Angola most-favored-nation sta- tus (see Foreign Trade and Assistance, ch. 3). The support of the Soviet Union and its allies included diplomatic representations at the UN and in other international forums,

military hardware and advisers, and more direct military support

in the face of South African incursions into Angola. Civilian technical assistance extended to hydroelectric projects, bridge building and road building, agriculture, fisheries, public health, and

a variety of educational projects. Technical assistance was often

channeled through joint projects with a third country—for example, the Capanda hydroelectric project entailed cooperation between

the Soviet Union and Brazil.

Soviet-Angolan relations were strained at times during the 1980s,

however, in part because Angola sought to upgrade diplomatic ties with the United States. Soviet leadership factions were divided over

their nation's future role in Africa, and some Soviet negotiators

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Angola: A Country Study

objected to dos Santos's concessions to the United States on the

issue of "linkage." The region's intractable political problems, and

the cost of maintaining Cuban troop support and equipping the

MPLA-PT, weakened the Soviet commitment to the building of a Marxist-Leninist state in Angola.

Angolan leaders, in turn, complained about Soviet neglect

low levels of assistance, poor-quality personnel and materiel, and

inadequate responses to complaints. Angola shared the cost of the

Cuban military presence and sought to reduce these expenses, in

part because many Angolan citizens felt the immediate drain on

economic resources and rising tensions in areas occupied by Cuban

troops. Moreover, dos Santos complained that the Soviet Union

dealt with Angola opportunistically—purchasing Angolan coffee

at low prices and reexporting it at a substantial profit, overfishing

in Angolan waters, and driving up local food prices.

For the first decade after independence, trade with communist

states was not significant, but in the late 1980s dos Santos sought

expanded economic ties with the Soviet Union, China, and

Czechoslovakia and other nations of Eastern Europe as the MPLAPT attempted to diversify its economic relations and reduce its dependence on the West. In October 1986, Angola signed a cooperative agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(Comecon or CMEA), a consortium dedicated to economic cooperation among the Soviet Union and its allies. As part of the Comecon agreement, Soviet support for Angolan

educational and training programs was increased. In 1987 approximately 1,800 Angolan students attended institutions of higher education in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also provided about

100 lecturers to Agostinho Neto University in Luanda, and a variety of Soviet-sponsored training programs operated in Angola, most

with Cuban instructors. Approximately 4,000 Angolans studied

at the international school on Cuba's renowned Isle of Youth. More

Angolan students were scheduled to attend the Union of Young

Communists' School in Havana in 1989. Czechoslovakia granted

scholarships to forty-four Angolan students in 1987, and during

that year Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic

(East Germany) also provided training for about 150 Angolan

industrial workers.

Cuba's presence in Angola was more complex than it appeared

to outsiders who viewed the Soviet Union's Third World clients as little more than surrogates for their powerful patron. The initiative in placing Cuban troops in Angola in the mid-1970s was

taken by President Fidel Castro as part of his avowed mission of

"Cuban internationalism." Facing widespread unemployment at

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Government and Politics

home, young Cuban men were urged to serve in the military overseas as their patriotic duty, and veterans enjoyed great prestige on

their return. Castro also raised the possibility of a Cuban resettle- ment scheme in southern Angola, and several hundred Cubans

received Angolan citizenship during the 1980s. Cuban immigration increased sharply in 1988. In addition to military support, Cuba

provided Angola with several thousand teachers, physicians, and

civilian laborers for construction, agriculture, and industry.

Angolan dependence on Cuban medical personnel was so complete

that during the 1980s Spanish became known as the language of

medicine.

China's relations with Angola were complicated by Beijing's

opposition to both Soviet and United States policies toward Africa. China supported the FNLA and UNITA after the MPLA seized

power in Angola, and China provided military support to Zaire

when Zairian troops clashed with Angolan forces along their com- mon border in the late 1970s. China nonetheless took the initia- tive in improving relations with the MPLA-PT during the 1980s.

The two states established diplomatic ties in 1983.

United States and Western Europe

Angola's relations with the United States were ambivalent. The

United States aided the FNLA and UNITA before independence.

During most of 1976, the United States blocked Angola's admission to the UN, and in late 1988 the two nations still lacked diplomatic ties. United States representatives pressured Luanda to reduce

its military reliance on Cuba and the Soviet Union, made neces- sary in part by United States and South African opposition to the

MPLA-PT and support for UNITA. In 1988 Angola's government news agency quoted Minister of Foreign Relations Afonso

Van Dunem (nom de guerre Mbinda) as saying the United States had a "Cuban psychosis" that prevented it from engaging in talks about Namibia and Angola. Nevertheless, after the December 1988

regional accords to end the Cuban military presence in Angola,

United States officials offered to normalize relations with Angola

on the condition that an internal settlement of the civil war with

UNITA be reached.

Political and diplomatic differences between the United States and Angola were generally mitigated by close economic ties. American oil companies operating in Cabinda provided a substantial portion of Angola's export earnings and foreign exchange, and this relationship continued despite political pressures on these companies to reduce their holdings in Cabinda in the mid-1980s.

The divergence of private economic interests from United States

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Angola: A Country Study

diplomatic policy was complicated by differences of opinion among

American policymakers. By means of the Clark Amendment, from

1975 to 1985 the United States Congress prohibited aid to UNITA

and slowed covert attempts to circumvent this legislation. After the

repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, however, trade between

Angola and the United States continued to increase, and Cuban

and Angolan troops attempted to prevent sabotage against United

States interests by UNITA and South African commandos.

Western Europe, like the United States, feared the implications

of a strong Soviet client state in southern Africa, but in general

European relations with the MPLA-PT were based on economic

interests rather than ideology. France and Portugal maintained good

relations with the MPLA-PT at the same time that they provided

financial assistance for UNITA and allowed UNITA representatives to operate freely in their capitals. Portugal was Angola's leading trading partner throughout most of the 1980s, and Brazil,

another Lusophone state, strengthened economic ties with Angola

during this period.

* * * John A. Marcum's two-volume series, The Angolan Revolution,

analyzes historical trends in Angolan politics and society from the

early colonial struggle through the early years of independence.

Marcum also views the postwar environment and its political

implications in "Angola: Twenty-five Years of War," and he analyzes obstacles to the socialist transformation in "The People's

Republic of Angola." Keith Somerville's Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society provides an extensive discussion of Angola's variant

of Marxism-Leninism and raises the question of its implications

for the rural majority of Angolan people. Kenneth W. Grundy's

"The Angolan Puzzle" assesses Angolan prospects for peace in

1987 in the context of the regional struggle.

Gerald J. Bender analyzes Angola's contemporary predicament

from a historical perspective in "American Policy Toward Angola" and "The Continuing Crisis in Angola." Catherine V. Scott,

in "Socialism and the 'Soft State' in Africa," compares 1980s

political developments in these two Marxist states in southern

Africa. Tony Hodges' s Angola to the 1990s, essentially an economic

analysis, also contains insight into political trends. Fred Bridgland's

"The Future of Angola" and Jonas Savimbi provide critical views

of MPLA-PT rule, while Fola Soremekun's chapter on Angola

in The Political Economy ojAfrican Foreign Policy, edited by Timothy

M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, and Angola's Political Economy by

200
Government and Politics M.R. Bhagavan view Angola's 1980s leadership from a more

favorable perspective. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

201

Chapter 5. National Security
An elderly member of the People's Vigilance Brigades
IN THE LATE 1980s, ANGOLA was a nation at war, still struggling to escape the legacy that one standard history has characterized as "five centuries of conflict." Since the 1960s, Angola had

experienced, sometimes simultaneously, four types of war: a war of

national liberation, a civil war, a regional war, and the global struggle between the superpowers. Angola had won its independence

from Portugal in 1975 after a thirteen-year liberation struggle,

during which the externally supported African nationalist movements splintered and subdivided. However, independence provided no respite, as the new nation was immediately engulfed in a civil war whose scope and effects were compounded by foreign military

intervention. Although the Popular Movement for the Liberation

of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola—MPLA)

eventually won recognition as the legitimate government, it did

so only with massive Soviet and Cuban military support, on which

it remained heavily dependent in late 1988.

Despite the party's international acceptance and domestic

hegemony, Angola in the late 1980s remained at war with itself and its most powerful neighbor, South Africa. The insurgency led

by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao

Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA), bolstered by growing foreign support, spread from the remote and

sparsely populated southeast corner of the country throughout the

entire nation. South African interventions on behalf of UNITA

and against black South African and Namibian nationalist forces

in southern Angola also escalated. Luanda's reliance on the Soviet

Union, Cuba, and other communist states for internal security and

defense increased as these threats intensified. Intermittent diplomatic efforts since the late 1970s had failed to end the protracted war; indeed, each new initiative had been followed by an escalation of violence.

Nonetheless, a turning point in this history of conflict may have

been reached in 1988. After the warring parties clashed in the early

part of that year at Cuito Cuanavale, in Africa's largest land batde since World War II, the exhausted parties succeeded in negotiating a regional peace agreement brokered by Chester A. Crocker,

the United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs. On July 13, representatives of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa

initialed an agreement on a "set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa."

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Angola: A Country Study

They signed a cease-fire agreement on August 22, to be overseen by their Joint Military Monitoring Commission. Finally, their

trilateral accord of December 22 provided for South African military withdrawal and cessation of assistance to UNITA; the phased

removal of Cuban forces from Angola over a twenty-seven-month

period ending on July 1, 1991; termination of Angolan assistance

to African National Congress (ANC) exiles in the country; and

South African withdrawal from Namibia coupled with independence for that territory under United Nations-supervised elections

(see Appendix B). Although UNITA was not a party to this historic

regional peace agreement, it was hoped that internal peace based on national reconciliation would also ensue. Whether the trilateral accord would be honored and whether Angolans would make peace

among themselves were crucial issues in late 1988. History suggested that this would be but a brief respite from endemic conflict,

but the promise of a future free of conflict may have provided the

impetus to break with the burden of the past.

National Security Environment

Although Angola's boundaries with neighboring states were not

disputed, the country's geopolitical position heavily affected national

security. Luanda enjoyed fraternal relations with Congo and Zambia, but sporadic antagonism characterized the regime's relations

with Zaire. Since Pretoria's intervention in the civil war of 1975-76, an undeclared state of war had existed with South Africa, which

occupied Namibia, the territory to the south of Angola (see fig. 1). Relations with Zaire, with which Angola shares its longest border,

had been punctuated by hostility since the 1960s, when Zaire's

President Mobutu Sese Seko sponsored and provided sanctuary

to an MPLA rival, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola—FNLA), and to the

separatist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente

para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC). Although there

had been no conflicts over the positioning of the border itself, the

direct intervention of regular Zairian forces in Angola on behalf

of the FNLA in September 1975 exacerbated the three-way civil war and attendant intrusions by South African, Soviet, and Cuban

forces. Despite a February 1976 accord in which the Angolan and Zairi- an governments renounced further hostilities, Zaire not only con- tinued to provide sanctuary and assistance to the FNLA, which

made periodic raids into Angola, but also facilitated FLEC attacks on Angola's oil-rich Cabinda Province. Aircraft based in Zaire also violated Angolan airspace, occasionally bombing villages on the

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National Security

northern border. In retaliation, in 1977 and 1979 Luanda allowed

Katangan dissidents based in Angola to invade Zaire's Shaba

Region (formerly Katanga Province), from which they were repelled

only after the intervention of Egyptian, Moroccan, French, and

Belgian forces (see Angola as a Refuge, this ch.).

Having apparently evened their scores, Angola and Zaire nor- malized relations in 1978, and the two erstwhile antagonists entered

into a nonaggression pact with Zambia in 1979. In February 1985,

Luanda and Kinshasa signed a security and defense pact including mutual pledges not to allow the use of their territory for attacks on each other; the two governments also set up a joint defense and

security commission to develop border security arrangements. In

July 1986, Angola and Zaire set up joint working groups and re- gional commissions to implement their pledges, and in August 1988

they signed a border security pact.

Despite normalization and border security agreements, AngolanZairian relations remained strained and fraught with inconsistencies

in the late 1980s. The two countries could not effectively control their 2,285-kilometer border, which UNITA forces continued

to cross freely. Furthermore, Kinshasa continued indirect support

of UNITA, particularly after 1986, by permitting United States use of the Kamina airbase in Shaba Region to deliver military aid

to the insurgents and to train them in the use of new weapons.

Despite numerous diplomatic and media reports of Zaire's involvement in logistical support of UNITA, Kinshasa persisted in denying the charges.

Zaire's erratic behavior did not constitute a direct threat to Angola. The activities of South Africa, however, were another matter. Whereas Zaire had limited itself to using its strategic location

to support insurgencies against the Angolan government, Pretoria

had the means to sponsor guerrilla resistance and to wage protracted war. In order to defend the 1,376-kilometer Angolan border with

occupied Namibia against infiltration by South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas based in Angola, South

African forces cleared a one-kilometer-wide strip along nearly half

the border's length. The Ovambo people, SWAPO's main base

of ethnic support, straddled the border, facilitating SWAPO's movements and recruitment efforts (see Ethnic Groups and Languages,

ch. 2). Starting in the late 1970s, South Africa had engaged in an

escalating series of air and ground raids and prolonged operations

in southern Angola against SWAPO and in defense of UNITA.

The South African Defense Force (SADF) occupied parts of south- ern Angola between August 1981 and April 1985. During and

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Angola: A Country Study

after that period, it undertook frequent air and ground attacks,

hot pursuit operations, preemptive raids against SWAPO bases,

and major interventions against Angolan armed forces on behalf

of UNITA. In fact, large-scale South African air and ground attacks on Angolan government forces in 1985, 1987, and 1988 reversed

the momentum of Luanda's offensives and saved UNITA from

almost certain defeat. South Africa finally withdrew its troops from

Angola in September 1988 under the terms of the United States- brokered peace plan. South Africa had also provided UNITA with

massive arms and logistical support, which was to be terminated

under the tripartite regional peace accord (see Regional Politics,

ch. 4).

To bolster its regional position, Luanda sought to regularize and

strengthen its security ties with neighboring states. In addition to

its nonaggression and border pacts with Zaire, Angola employed

regular consultation, coordination, and cooperation with Botswana,

Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in an effort to enhance regional security. These ties were reinforced through

bilateral defense accords with Tanzania and Mozambique signed

in May 1988 and July 1988, respectively. A defense pact with Zambia was also reported to have been signed in March 1988, but this report was denied by the Zambian government.

Evolution of the Armed Forces

Background

Throughout history, relationships based on conflict, conquest,

and exploitation existed among the Angolan peoples as well as between Angolans and their Portuguese colonizers. Following the

initial contacts in the 1480s between Portugal and the Kongo and

Ndongo kingdoms, relations were peaceful. However, by the early sixteenth century Angolans were enslaving Angolans for the purpose of trading them for Portuguese goods. This commerce in

human beings stimulated a series of wars (see Precolonial Angola

and the Arrival of the Portuguese, ch. 1). The Portuguese eventually intervened militarily in the kingdoms' affairs and subsequently

conquered and colonized Kongo and Ndongo. Whereas warfare

among Africans traditionally had been limited in purpose, scale,

intensity, duration, and destructiveness, the wars of slavery and

Portuguese conquest were conducted with few restraints. Intra-African and Portuguese-African warfare continued from

the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, as the slave and fire- arms trade penetrated the hinterland and Portugal attempted to extend its territorial control and mercantile interests. War and

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National Security commerce were the principal occupations of the Portuguese settlers, who represented the worst elements of their own society. Portugal was the first European nation to use deported convicts

{degredados—see Glossary) to explore, conquer, and exploit an overseas empire. But unlike other European penal exiles, who were

mostly impoverished petty criminals, these Portuguese exiles were

the most serious offenders. By the mid-seventeenth century, vir- tually all non-African army, police, and commercial activities were dominated by the degredados. Indeed, until the early twentieth cen- tury the great majority of Portuguese in Angola were exiled convicts (see Setdement, Conquest, and Development, ch. 1). During the nineteenth century, the degredados expanded and consolidated their hold on the political, military, and economic life of the territory. In 1822 degredado renegades joined garrison troops

in Luanda in revolting against the Portuguese governor and set- ting up a junta. The degredados comprised the bulk of the Portuguese

resident military and police forces, both of which engaged in plunder

and extortion. In the 1870s, there were about 3,600 Portuguese

officers and men stationed in Angola, and this number increased

to 4,900 by the turn of the century. These were supplemented by

African soldiers, auxiliaries, and Boer immigrants.

In contrast to the earlier pattern of episodic military campaigns

with transient effect, the early twentieth century brought systematic

conquest and the imposition of direct colonial rule. Taxation, forced

labor, and intensified military recruitment were introduced.

Although Portuguese policy officially permitted the assimilation of

Africans, virtually all officers and noncommissioned officers

remained white or mestigo (see Glossary). During the dictatorship

of Antonio Salazar (1932-68), the Portuguese army in Angola was

60 percent to 80 percent African, but not a single black Angolan achieved officer rank (see Angola under the Salazar Regime,

ch. 1). Independence Struggle, Civil War, and Intervention

When the African nationalist revolt erupted in early 1961, the

Portuguese army in Angola numbered about 8,000 men, 5,000 of

whom were African. The colonial forces responded brutally, and

by the end of the summer they had regained control over most of

the territory. The human cost, however, was enormous: more than

2,000 Europeans and up to 50,000 Africans died, and about 10 per- cent of Angola's African population fled to Zaire. By early 1962,

the Portuguese army in Angola had grown to 50,000 and thereafter averaged 60,000 into the mid-1970s. About half of this expansion was achieved by conscription in Angola, and most conscripts

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Angola: A Country Study

were Africans. The Portuguese established a counterinsurgency pro- gram of population resettlement throughout the country. By the

mid-1970s, more than 1 million peasants had been relocated into

strategic settlements, and 30,000 males had been impressed into

service in lightly armed militia units to defend them.

The thirteen-year Angolan war for independence, in which three

rival nationalist groups fought the Portuguese to a stalemate, ended after the April 1974 military coup in Portugal. At that time,

the MPLA and the FNLA had an estimated 10,000 guerrillas each,

and UNITA had about 2,000. Within a year, these groups had

become locked in a complex armed struggle for supremacy. By

November 1975, when independence under a three-way coalition

government was scheduled, the MPLA and the FNLA had built

up their armies to 27,000 and 22,000, respectively, while UNITA

had mustered some 8,000 to 10,000. Further complicating the sit- uation was a substantial foreign military presence. Although the

Portuguese forces numbered only 3,000 to 4,000 by late 1975, some

2,000 to 3,000 Cubans had arrived in support of the MPLA, from

1,000 to 2,000 Zairian regulars had crossed the border to aid the

FNLA, and 4,000 to 5,000 SADF troops had intervened on behalf

of UNITA. The civil war was soon decided in favor of the MPLA

by virtue of the massive influx of Soviet weapons and advisers and

Cuban troops.

The Development of FAPLA

In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola—EPLA). Many of its first cadres had received

training in Morocco and Algeria. In January 1963, in one of its early operations, the EPLA attacked a Portuguese military post

in Cabinda, killing a number of troops. During the mid-1960s and

early 1970s, the EPLA operated very successfully from bases in

Zambia against the Portuguese in eastern Angola. After 1972,

however, the EPLA's effectiveness declined following several Portuguese victories, disputes with FNLA forces, and the movement

of about 800 guerrillas from Zambia to Congo.

On August 1, 1974, a few months after a military coup d'etat

had overthrown the Lisbon regime and proclaimed its intention

of granting independence to Angola, the MPLA announced the

formation of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

(Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola—FAPLA),

which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed

from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of

sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until

210
Government recruits learning the mechanics of an AK-47 assault rifle Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont)

the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency,

when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and

accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of

institutional change.

Unlike African states that acceded to independence by an or- derly and peaceful process of institutional transfer, Angola inherited a disintegrating colonial state whose army was in retreat. Although

Mozambique's situation was similar in some respects, the confluence of civil war, foreign intervention, and large-scale insurgency

made Angola's experience unique. After independence, FAPLA

had to reorganize for conventional war and counterinsurgency

simultaneously and immediately to continue the new war with South

Africa and UNITA. Ironically, a guerrilla army that conducted

a successful insurgency for more than a decade came to endure

the same kind of exhausting struggle for a similar period.

Armed Forces

Constitutional and Political Context

The Angolan Constitution provides a framework for both international and national security policies. Article 16 establishes the

country's official policy of military nonalignment and prohibits

the construction of foreign military bases on Angolan territory.

Reflecting its concern for territorial unity and the status of Cabinda

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Angola: A Country Study

Province as an integral part of the national homeland, Article 4

also provides that "any attempt to separate or dismember" any

territory will be "forcefully combated." The president, under

Article 6, is designated commander in chief of the armed forces

and in Article 53 is also given extraordinary powers to declare a

state of emergency or a state of siege, to declare war, and to make

peace.

The government's organization for security and defense reflected both ideological and national security considerations in its interlocking network of party, government, and military officials. The

Council of the Revolution, which performed both executive and

legislative functions before 1980, included the minister of defense,

the chief of the general staff, and regional military commanders.

In the first national People's Assembly (national legislature), which

in 1980 replaced the Council of the Revolution as the supreme organ

of state, defense and security personnel constituted 10 percent of

the membership (see Structure of Government, ch. 4).

Since the early days of the liberation struggle, the MPLA had

recognized the need for firm political direction of FAPLA. Politi- cal control was established and maintained by two complementary

means: political indoctrination and institutional penetration and

subordination. Political education was an integral part of FAPLA's military training, and political commissars were attached to guerrilla units to ensure compliance with party directives.

MPLA politicization and controls were formalized and expanded after the transformation of FAPLA into a conventional army

during 1975 and 1976. Many of the independence leaders continued to hold concurrent positions in the party, government, and

military establishment. At the regional level, the overlaying of

military and political leadership was also common, as many of

the provincial commissars were both MPLA Central Committee members and FAPLA lieutenant colonels. Within the armed

forces, political commissars in each unit reported not to the military chain of command but to the political leadership of the region

or province.

Extensive politicization of the military by institutional means did

not preclude the possibility of military intervention in politics. In

1977 Nito Alves led an abortive coup in which several MPLA and

FAPLA leaders were killed. In the aftermath, Alves 's supporters were executed or purged, and the top military and political posts

in the armed forces were assigned to loyalists: David Antonio Moises was appointed FAPLA chief of the general staff, and Juliao Mateus

Paulo (nom de guerre Dino Matross) became FAPLA national

political commissar.

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National Security

The interpenetration of the MPLA and FAPLA was maintained

throughout both organizations' hierarchies. In 1983, six years after the MPLA had designated itself a ''workers' party" (Partido de

Trabalho; henceforth the party was known as the MPLA-PT), a

series of party committee seminars for the political organs of the

defense and security forces was inaugurated by Paulo, then Central Committee secretary for defense and security. The purpose

of these seminars was to review the implementation of party directives and structures within the armed forces. In 1985 seminar members recommended that the party's provincial departments of

defense and security implement the 1984 directive to award membership to armed forces veterans and disabled soldiers and that the

local party and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of AngolaYouth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular de Liberta- cao de Angola—JMPLA) participate more actively in defense and

security. For its part, FAPLA had a political directorate that maintained party liaison and supervision.

In the 1980s, the need for total mobilization and coordination

of the nation's resources to combat the escalating UNITA insurgency and South African intervention led to reorganizations of

both the central and the provincial governments. President Jose

Eduardo dos Santos created the Defense and Security Council under

his chairmanship in April 1984 to plan and coordinate national security policy. Originally, the council included the ministers of defense,

state security, and interior; the FAPLA chief of the general staff; and the party Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture as an ex officio member. In May 1986, the Defense

and Security Council expanded to include the ministers of state for inspection and control, for the productive sphere, and for economic and social spheres, posts that had been created in a February 1986

government reorganization. In effect, the Defense and Security

Council became the standing body of the Council of Ministers when

the latter was not in session. The Defense and Security Council met

in two sessions: a weekly meeting on defense and security matters,

and a biweekly meeting on economic issues. In July 1983, the MPLA-PT Political Bureau decided to form

regional military councils as an "exceptional and temporary measure" to coordinate political, military, economic, and social leadership in areas "affected by armed acts of aggression, vandalism and

banditry." The councils reported directly to the president as FAPLA commander in chief, who was empowered to determine

which areas warranted such councils and to appoint council members. The councils were authorized to requisition and restrict the

movement of people and goods, and their newly created military

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Angola: A Country Study

tribunals tried crimes "against state security, economic sabotage,

speculation and disobedience of directives from the regional military councils, as well as those who may damage or endanger the

interests of collective defense and security" (see Criminal Justice

System, this ch.). Eleven of Angola's eighteen provinces were

immediately made subject to regional military councils, whose chairmen were FAPLA colonels.

Before 1988 FAPLA' s areas of operations were divided into ten

military regions (see fig. 13). In early 1988, however, calling this structure inadequate, the Ministry of Defense announced the for- mation of northern, eastern, southern, and central fronts. The

northern front encompassed Zaire, Uige, Malanje, Cuanza Norte,

and Bengo provinces. The eastern front covered Lunda Norte,

Lunda Sul, and Moxico provinces. No official information on the

other fronts was available in late 1988, but presumably the southern

front included Cuando Cubango, Cunene, Hufla, and Namibe

provinces, and the central front may have comprised Bie, Huambo, Benguela, and Cuanza Sul provinces. There was no information on the status of Cabinda and Luanda provinces, but perhaps

they remained separate regions because of their strategic importance and small size. Because of the uncertain boundaries of these

fronts, most news accounts referred to the military regions when

describing FAPLA' s areas of operation.

Armed Forces Organization and Mission

The minister of defense served under both the political and the

military authority of the president in his dual role as head of government and FAPLA commander in chief. Because defense and security matters were of extreme urgency, the minister of defense was

considered second in importance only to the president. The minister was responsible for the entire defense establishment, including the

army, air force, navy, and local militias. The commanders of the

three major military services each held the title of vice minister

of defense. Colonel Henrique Carreira (nom de guerre Iko), the

first minister of defense, held the post from 1975 to 1980; as of

late 1988 Pedro Maria Tonha (nom de guerre Pedale) had been

minister of defense since July 1980 (see fig. 14).

The Angolan armed forces were collectively known as FAPLA.

The army was officially termed the People's Army of Angola

(Exercito Popular de Angola—EPA). The government and most

press reports, however, referred to the army as FAPLA. The tri- ple mission of the military was to protect and defend the authority

of the party and government from internal subversion, to defend

the country from external attack, and to assist regional allies in

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meeting their internal and external security needs. Accordingly,

FAPLA was organized and equipped to fight both counterinsurgency and conventional wars and to deploy abroad when ordered;

it had engaged in all these tasks continuously since independence.

Its main counterinsurgency effort was directed against UNITA in

the southeast, and its conventional capabilities were demonstrated principally in the undeclared war with South Africa. FAPLA

first performed its external assistance mission with the dispatch of

1 ,000 to 1 ,500 troops to Sao Tome and Principe in 1977 to bolster

the socialist regime of President Manuel Pinto da Costa. During

the next several years, Angolan forces conducted joint exercises

with their counterparts and exchanged technical operational visits. The Angolan expeditionary force was reduced to about 500 in early

1985. It is probable that FAPLA would have undertaken other

"internationalist" missions, in Mozambique for example, had it not been absorbed in war at home.

In 1988 the strength of the Angolan armed forces was estimated

at 100,000 active-duty and 50,000 reserve personnel, organized

into a regular army and a supporting militia, air and air defense

force, and navy. The active-duty forces had expanded greatiy since

independence as UNITA's insurgency spread throughout the country and South African interventions increased in frequency and

magnitude. As of late 1988, Lieutenant General Antonio dos Santos Franca (nom de guerre Ndalu) was FAPLA chief of the general staff and army commander. He had held these positions since

1982.

Ground Forces The regular army's 91 ,500 troops were organized into more than

seventy brigades ranging from 750 to 1,200 men each and deployed

throughout the ten military regions. Most regions were commanded

by lieutenant colonels, with majors as deputy commanders, but some regions were commanded by majors. Each region consisted

of one to four provinces, with one or more infantry brigades assigned

to it. The brigades were generally dispersed in battalion or smaller

unit formations to protect strategic terrain, urban centers, settle- ments, and critical infrastructure such as bridges and factories.

Counterintelligence agents were assigned to all field units to thwart

UNITA infiltration. The army's diverse combat capabilities were

indicated by its many regular and motorized infantry brigades

with organic or attached armor, artillery, and air defense units;

two militia infantry brigades; four antiaircraft artillery brigades; ten tank battalions; and six artillery battalions. These forces were

concentrated most heavily in places of strategic importance and

215
Angola: A Country Study

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216
National Security

recurring conflict: the oil-producing Cabinda Province, the area around the capital, and the southern provinces where UNITA and

South African forces operated.

Special commands, military formations, and security arrangements were also created in extraordinary circumstances. Thus, for example, in June 1985 the provincial military authorities in the

Tenth Military Region established a unified command to include

both FAPLA and the People's Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas

Populares de Vigilancia—BPV) to confront UNITA's expanding

operations in the region (see Internal Security Forces and Organization, this ch.). Similarly, special railroad defense committees were formed in the Ninth Military Region to protect the Luanda Railway between Malanje and Luanda (see fig. 10). These municipal

committees were composed of party, government, FAPLA,

JMPLA, and BPV units. In 1987 FAPLA was reported to be re- cruiting regional defense forces to assist the regular army against

the UNITA insurgency, but in late 1988 no additional details were

available.

FAPLA was equipped almost exclusively by the Soviet Union.

In early 1988, it was reported to have at least 550 tanks and 520

armored vehicles, more than 500 artillery pieces and multiple rocket

launchers, 500 mortars, at least 900 antitank weapons, and more

than 300 air defense guns and surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries (see table 12, Appendix A). However, in view of continuous

losses and the influx of new and replacement materiel, these figures were only approximate. For example, the South African minister

of defense reported in late 1988 that Angola's inventory of T-54

and T-55 tanks had increased from 531 to 1 ,590 between September 1987 and September 1988. Moreover, FAPLA and UNITA

exaggerated successes and underestimated losses in military actions.

In the major battle of Mavinga in 1986, UNITA claimed to have

killed 5,000 FAPLA troops and to have destroyed 41 combat air- craft, 202 tanks and armored vehicles, 351 military transport

vehicles, 200 trucks, and 40 SAMs, figures that represented 15 per- cent to 25 percent of FAPLA's inventory.

In addition to combat troops and equipment, logistical support

units, and extensive headquarters organizations, the armed forces

established a growing infrastructure to service, repair, and manufacture defense equipment. In 1983 the government created a new

company under the Ministry of Defense to rehabilitate and repair

armored military vehicles, infantry weapons, and artillery. A maintenance and repair center for Soviet-made light and heavy vehicles, located at Viana near Luanda, was turned over to Angolan

authorities by the Soviet Union in 1984 to strengthen Angolan

217
Angola: A Country Study

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National Security

self-sufficiency. This center, reportedly capable of servicing 600

military and commercial vehicles a day, was one of the largest of

its kind in Africa. Viana was also the site of an assembly plant for commercial vehicles as well as military trucks and jeeps. In June

1986, the government signed a contract with the Brazilian company Engesa for the purchase of military trucks and construction of

a facility with the capacity to repair about 30 percent of the country's heavy trucks, military vehicles foremost.

The regular army was also supported by a 50,000-member

citizens' militia, the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial

Troops, an organization under the minister of defense that had

both counterinsurgency and police functions. The directorate was

established in September 1985 as a successor to the People's Defense

Organization (Organizacao de Defesa Popular—ODP). The ODP

had been formed in September 1975 as an adjunct to FAPLA to defend against Portuguese settler resistance and attacks by antiMPLA insurgents. After the civil war, it retained its territorial defense and counterguerrilla supporting roles but served more as a reserve than as an active paramilitary force. Indeed, some 20,000

ODP militia were inducted into the regular army in the early 1980s,

apparently to satisfy an urgent requirement to expand FAPLA.

In 1988 the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops was organized into eleven '

' Guerrilla Force" brigades, two of which

(about 10,000 members) were to be on active duty with FAPLA

at any given time. They were deployed in battalion and smaller

formations, and they often operated in proximity to or jointly with

FAPLA units, defending factories, farms, and villages and maintaining vigilance against insurgents. Although some estimates put

the troop strength of the Guerrilla Force as high as 500,000, such

figures were probably based on data from the late 1970s or reflect- ed the inclusion of reserve components. Lieutenant Colonel Domingos Paiva da Silva was commander of the Guerrilla Force from

1978 until his death from natural causes in July 1987 (see Internal

Security Forces and Organization, this ch.).

Air and Air Defense Force

The People's Air and Air Defense Force of Angola (Forca Aerea

Popular de Angola/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea—FAPA/DAA), offi- cially established on January 21, 1976, was the largest air force

in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonel Alberto Correia Neto became vice

minister of defense and FAPA/DAA commander in September

1986. He succeeded Colonel Carreira, who had held that post since

1983. The 7,000-member FAPA/DAA included about 180 fixedwing combat attack and interceptor aircraft; an equal number of

219
Angola: A Country Study

helicopters; several maritime patrol, reconnaissance, trainer, and

transport aircraft; five air defense battalions; and ten SAM battal- ions (see table 13, Appendix A). Seeking voluntary enlistment was

initially the sole form of recruitment, but in the 1980s conscription was increasingly employed until volunteerism was restored in

1988.

Angola's army had about fifteen years to develop an organization and gain combat experience prior to independence. In contrast, FAPA/DAA had to acquire personnel, experience, and

equipment immediately, and in the context of a civil war. These

unusual circumstances affected both recruitment and force development. FAPA/DAA's pilots, mostly in their mid-twenties, got

combat experience immediately. Moreover, given FAPA/DAA's virtually instantaneous creation, its long-term dependence on

external assistance was inevitable. Soviet, Cuban, and other communist forces provided pilots and technicians to fly and maintain

FAPA/DAA's growing, diversified, and increasingly complex air

fleet. The principal tasks of this new branch of the Angolan military were to protect the capital, guard major cities and military

installations in the south against South African air raids, and extend

the air defense network and combat operations southward to confront UNITA forces and South African invaders.

According to a 1987 press report, FAPA/DAA was reorganized

into three regiments: a fighter-bomber regiment headquartered in

Lubango, a transport regiment in Luanda, and a helicopter regiment in Huambo. In addition, FAPA/DAA aircraft and air defense

units were deployed in strategic locations throughout the country.

Of Angola's 229 usable airfields, 25 had permanent-surface run- ways, 13 of which exceeded 2,440 meters. The capabilities and effectiveness of FAPA/DAA have increased

markedly following its creation. FAPA/DAA' s expanded capacity

to provide air cover and supplies to forward ground forces, strike

at UNITA bases and interdict South African aircraft, evacuate

wounded personnel, and perform reconnaissance and liaison missions became particularly apparent during combined offensives after 1985. Like the army, FAPA/DAA developed modern facilities to repair and service both military and civilian aircraft for Angola

and other African states. Navy

The People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de Guerra Popular de

Angola—MGPA) remained a relatively unimportant branch of the

armed forces because of the exigencies of the ground and air wars

in the interior. The navy's fortified headquarters and home port,

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as well as major ship repair facilities, were at Luanda. Although

there were several good harbors along Angola's coastline, the only

other ports used regularly were Lobito and Namibe, and these were

used only to support temporary southern deployments. The latter two ports were located near railheads and airfields. Lobito had

minor repair facilities as well. The navy's mission was to defend the 1 , 600-kilometer coastline

and territorial waters against South African sabotage, attacks, and

resupply operations to UNITA; to protect against unlicensed fish- ing in Angolan waters; and to interdict smugglers. In early 1985,

President dos Santos transferred responsibility for protecting the

rich offshore fisheries from the coast guard to the MGPA to provide more effective enforcement of fishing regulations. After Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Augusto Alfredo, vice minister of defense

and MGPA commander, was killed in a road accident in June 1985,

he was succeeded by Rear Admiral Antonio Jose Condessa de Carvalho (nom de guerre Toka), who had spent the previous four years

in the Soviet Union studying military science.

The MGPA officially dates from July 10, 1976, when late- President Agostinho Neto visited the naval facilities at Luanda.

Its senior officers had actually begun training in 1970, during the war of liberation, when the MPLA sent the first cadre of twentyfour naval trainees abroad for a three-year training program.

However, there was no navy awaiting their return. The MPLA

inherited a small number of Portuguese ships at independence,

which were subsequently augmented by various Soviet warships

and support craft. In 1988 the MGPA was reported to have 1,500

personnel (thought to be volunteers) and a fleet of about fifty vessels that included guided-missile fast patrol boats, torpedo boats,

inland-water and coastal patrol vessels, mine warfare craft, and

amphibious landing craft. The independent merchant marine fleet had about 100 vessels that could be impressed into service (see table

14, Appendix A).

Most of the navy's maintenance, repair, and training were

provided by Soviet and Cuban technicians and advisers; Portugal

and Nigeria also provided training assistance. Despite extensive

foreign support, in late 1988 the serviceability of many of the vessels and equipment was in question. Moreover, naval recruitment

and the proficiency of MGPA personnel remained problematic;

indeed, the MPLA and Ministry of Defense leadership repeatedly

appealed to youth (the JMPLA in particular) to join the navy.

Foreign Auxiliary Forces FAPLA was augmented in the late 1980s by exiled Namibian

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Angola: A Country Study

and South African black nationalist forces, which enjoyed refuge

in Angola. SWAPO had some 9,000 guerrillas encamped primarily in the south. Their location near UNITA's area of operations

permitted them to collect intelligence and conduct operations, and

about 2,500 SWAPO troops regularly engaged in fighting UNITA.

Moreover, about 1,000 ANC guerrillas, exiles from South Africa,

also cooperated with FAPLA in action against UNITA and South

African forces. Upon implementation of the 1988 regional accords

signed by Angola, South Africa, and Cuba, it seemed likely that

SWAPO guerrillas would return to Namibia and that the ANC

members would be relocated to other African states outside the

region.

Troop Strength, Recruitment, and Conscription

FAPLA relied heavily on conscription to meet its staffing requirements. Voluntary enlistments were important, too, especially ,in FAPA/DAA and MGPA, where greater technical competence was

required. Recruitment and conscription were carried out by the

General Staffs Directorate for Organization and Mobilization

through provincial and local authorities.

Although two-year conscription had been initiated in 1978 pursuant to the Mobilization and Recruitment Law, the First Extraor- dinary Party Congress held in 1980 decided that increased troop

requirements warranted introduction of universal and compulsory military training. Angola thus became the first black-ruled state in sub-Saharan Africa to make its citizens subject to compulsory

military service. Of Angola's more than 8.2 million people, males

in the fifteen to forty-five age- group numbered almost 2 million,

half of whom were considered fit for military service. About 87,000

reached the military recruitment age of eighteen each year, but

a sizable proportion, perhaps a majority, were unavailable because

of rural dislocation and UNITA's control of at least one-third of

the country. The Ministry of Defense issued periodic conscription

orders for all men born during a given calendar year. Thus, for

example, in February 1988 the Ministry of Defense ordered all male

Angolan citizens born during calendar year 1970 to report to local registration centers to be recruited and inducted into active military service as of March 1 . Separate days were reserved for teachers

and students to report, and officials in charge of workplaces and

schools were instructed to deny admission to anyone not properly

registered for military service. After military service, all personnel were obliged to enroll in the Directorate of People's Defense

and Territorial Troops.

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National Security

Particularly in the late 1980s, FAPLA apparently resorted to other means besides conscription to satisfy military requirements;

political needs were sometimes also met in the process. For instance,

in the 1980s several hundred former FNLA rebels were integrated

into FAPLA after accepting amnesty. According to UNITA

sources, FAPLA also had begun to organize new recruits into battalions formed along ethnic lines, with Mbundu and Bakongo elite forces kept in the rear while Ovimbundu, Kwanhama (also spelled

Kwanyama), Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), and Nganguela (also

spelled Ganguela) were sent to the front lines (see Ethnic Groups

and Languages, ch. 2). Children of government and party leaders were reported to be exempt from conscription or spared service on the front lines. FAPLA was also reported by UNITA to have

forcibly conscripted hospital workers, convicts, youth, and old men

after suffering heavy losses in the offensive of late 1987.

Women played a definite but poorly documented role in national

defense. They too were subject to conscription, but their numbers

and terms of service were not reported. FAPLA included women's units and female officers, whose duties included staffing cer- tain schools, particularly in contested areas. Other details on the

size, type, and activities of these units were not available.

Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military Justice

It was difficult to gauge the conditions of service and morale

among FAPLA troops. Little public information was available in

the late 1980s, and much of what existed was propagandists

.

Nonetheless, service did seem difficult. Conscription was intensive in government-controlled areas, and the spread of the insurgency undermined security everywhere. The constant infusion of raw recruits, the rapid growth of FAPLA, the increasing scope and

intensity of military operations, and escalating casualties imposed

substantial personal and institutional hardships. The continued

dependence on foreign technicians and advisers, many of whom

were not deployed in combat zones, had adverse consequences for

operations and morale.

Pay and living conditions in garrison were probably adequate

but not particularly attractive; in the field, amenities were either

sparse or lacking altogether. The expansion of quarters and facili- ties for troops did not keep pace with the rapid growth of FAPLA,

especially in the late 1980s. There were periodic reports of ill- equipped and poorly trained soldiers, as well as breakdowns in administration and services. But given the lack of alternative employment in the war-torn economy, military service at least provided

many Angolans with short-term opportunities. UNITA frequently

223
Angola: A Country Study

reported incidents of flight to avoid government conscription;

demoralization among FAPLA troops from high casualties and

deteriorating conditions of service; and battlefield desertions,

mutinies, and revolts among FAPLA units. These reports became more frequent during annual FAPLA offensives against UNITA

strongholds after 1985.

In early December 1986, the People's Assembly approved new

military ranks for the three military services, differentiating those

of the army and air force from the navy. FAPLA and FAPA/DAA

were authorized to establish the ranks (in descending order) of

general, colonel general, major general, and lieutenant general.

The MGPA was to have the ranks of admiral, vice admiral, and

rear admiral; the ranks of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major

were replaced by captain, commander, and lieutenant commander,

respectively. Future navy second lieutenants would be given rank

equivalent to that of their counterparts in the army and air force. Later that month, President dos Santos received the rank of general

as commander in chief of the armed forces, the minister of defense was appointed colonel general, and ten other senior military officers were promoted to newly established higher ranks (see fig. 15).

Little information was available on the military justice system.

Military tribunals were created in each military region, and a higher

court, the Armed Forces Military Tribunal, served as a military

court of appeal. Some observers inferred from the criminal justice

system and the prevalent wartime conditions, however, that

Angolan military justice was harsh, if not arbitrary (see Crime and

Punishment, this ch.).

Foreign Influences

Communist Nations

The Angolan armed forces were equipped, trained, and supported almost exclusively by communist countries. The Soviet Union

provided the bulk of FAPLA's armaments and some advisers,

whereas Cuba furnished most of the technical assistance, combat

support, and training advisory services. Cubans also participated

to a limited extent in ground and air combat. Other communist

countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic

Republic (East Germany), Hungary, the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (North Korea), Poland, and Yugoslavia, also

furnished arms and related aid. In the 1980s, Angola also obtained

limited amounts of materiel, military assistance, and training from

countries such as Belgium, Brazil, Britain, the Federal Republic

of Germany (West Germany), France, Spain, and Switzerland.

224
A female member of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

Courtesy United Nations (Y. Nagata)

Broadly speaking, there was an international division of labor in

which the Soviet Union supplied large quantities of heavy weapons

and equipment, other communist states furnished small arms, and

the noncommunist suppliers provided mostly nonlethal items.

The MPLA owed its ascendancy in the civil war in large part

to the massive Soviet airlift of arms and Cuban troops during 1975

and 1976. Subsequently, Moscow and Havana remained the mainstays of the regime as far as its military needs were concerned. From

1982 to 1986, the Soviet Union delivered military equipment valued

at US$4.9 billion, which represented more than 90 percent of

Angola's arms imports and one-fourth of all Soviet arms deliveries to Africa. Poland and Czechoslovakia transferred arms valued

at US$10 million and US$5 million, respectively, over the same

five-year period. During 1987 and 1988, Moscow more than compensated for FAPLA losses with accelerated shipments of heavy

armaments. In addition to the tanks noted earlier, dozens of air- craft, heavy weapons, and air defense systems were delivered.

Beyond materiel deliveries, Moscow and its allies continued to provide extensive technical aid. Soviet military, security, and in- telligence personnel and advisers helped establish the defense and

security forces and served as advisers at all levels, from ministries

in Luanda to major field commands. The Soviet Union's civilian

225
Angola: A Country Study

and military intelligence services, in coordination with their counterpart organizations from other communist countries, particularly

East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba, assisted in the creation and development of the Angolan state security and intelligence

services.

The Soviet Union provided most of the air force pilot and technician training as well as technical assistance in the operation and

maintenance of the most advanced equipment: aircraft and warships, major weapons such as missiles, artillery, and rockets, and

sophisticated radar and communications equipment. The number

of Soviet service members and advisers varied. In 1988 it was esti- mated by most sources to range between 1 ,000 and 1 ,500 personnel, including some fighter pilots. UNITA claimed that the Soviet

military presence increased during 1988 to 2,500 or 3,000 and that seven officers were assigned to each FAPLA brigade.

Cuba was the main provider of combat troops, pilots, advisers,

engineers, and technicians. As the insurgency war expanded, so did Cuba's military presence. By 1982 there were 35,000 Cubans

in Angola, of which about 27,000 were combat troops and the

remainder advisers, instructors, and technicians. In 1985 their

strength increased to 40,000, in 1986 to 45,000, and in 1988 to nearly 50,000. All told, more than 300,000 Cuban soldiers had

served in Angola since 1975. Angola paid for the services of the

Cubans at an estimated rate of US$300 million to US$600 million

annually.

The Cuban forces, despite their numbers, generally did not

engage directly in combat after 1976. Most of the Cubans were

organized and deployed in motorized infantry, air defense, and

artillery units. Their main missions were to deter and defend against

attacks beyond the southern combat zone, protect strategic and eco- nomically critical sites and facilities, and provide combat support,

such as rear-area security, logistic coordination, air defense, and

security for major military installations and Luanda itself. At least 2,000 Cuban troops were stationed in oil-producing Cabinda

Province. Cubans also trained Angolan pilots, and flew some combat missions against UNITA and the SADF. In addition, Cuban

military personnel provided technical and operational support to SWAPO and the ANC within Angola (see Angola as a Refuge,

this ch.).

In mid- 1988 Cuba substantially reinforced its military presence

in Angola and deployed about one-fifth of its total forces toward

the front lines in the south for the first time. This cohort was reported to include commando and SAM units, which raised concerns about direct clashes with South African forces. The move was

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National Security

apparently made to keep UNITA and the SADF at bay and to strengthen the negotiating position of Luanda and Havana in the

United States-brokered peace talks. East Germany and North Korea followed the Soviet Union and

Cuba as Angola's most active and influential communist supporters. The East Germans played key roles in the intelligence and security agencies, as well as in the ideology and propaganda organs.

They provided communications security services, technicians,

mechanics, and instructors to maintain and operate equipment and

vehicles and to train artillery crews, radar operators, and combat

pilots. The East Germans also reportedly operated a training camp

south of Luanda for ANC and SWAPO guerrillas. Estimates of

the number of East Germans in Angola ranged from 500 to 5,000,

the higher estimates probably including family members and other

nonmilitary technicians and advisers.

During the 1980s, North Korea expanded and intensified its diplomatic and military assistance activities in Africa, particularly

in the southern part of the continent. After training Zimbabwe's

Fifth Brigade in 1981 and 1982 and furnishing arms to that country, North Korea made a major military commitment in Angola.

Although denied by Angolan officials, several sources reported that

Luanda concluded a military aid agreement with Pyongyang in

September 1983 that led to the dispatch of some 3,000 North Korean

combat troops and military advisers by May 1984.

The reported activities of the North Koreans included the training

of special units, such as hit-and-run forces and sniper squads. North

Korean troops also reportedly engaged in combat operations,

including FAPLA's early 1986 offensive. North Koreans were also reported to be providing military and ideological instruction to SWAPO and ANC militants in five training camps north and northeast of Luanda.

Other communist states provided more modest military support.

Arms deliveries by Poland and Czechoslovakia were noted earlier. A military cooperation agreement was signed in 1982 with Hungary, which was reported to have provided small arms. Yugoslavia furnished grenade launchers, trip-wire grenades, antipersonnel

mines, hollow-charge rockets, and air defense artillery; a Yugoslav firm also built a runway and other facilities at Lubango air- port. Romania was reported to have given unspecified military aid. Noncommunist Nations

In the 1980s, Angola diversified its foreign arms acquisitions for

political and practical reasons. Politically, Luanda was anxious to gain international legitimacy, counter UNITA' s international

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Angola: A Country Study

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National Security

diplomatic offensive, reduce its dependence on its communist allies, and gain leverage in dealing with its traditional arms suppliers.

The practical reason was dissatisfaction with the level of support

given by the Soviet Union and its allies, the poor quality of some

equipment, and the inability to obtain certain military materiel.

Perhaps in deference to the Soviet Union and other communist

benefactors, most procurements from other sources consisted of

relatively inexpensive support equipment. This policy left Moscow

with a virtual monopoly on the provision of major weapons systems.

Diversification was evident in FAPLA's purchase ofjeeps, Land

Rovers, and radios from Britain, trucks and communications equipment from West Germany, small-caliber ammunition and artillery shells from Belgium, uniforms from Japan, and jeeps, trucks, and

truck engines from Brazil. The MGPA also discussed the acquisition of corvettes with French, Spanish, and Portuguese shipbuilders.

Among the larger purchases made from Western Europe were Swiss

Pilatus training aircraft; Spanish CASA C-212 Aviocar transport

aircraft; French Dauphin, Gazelle, and Alouette helicopters; French

Thomson-CSF tactical military transceivers; and British Racal

radio communications equipment.

Ironically, Portugal continued to play a role in the Angolan conflict. Although the Portuguese government did not officially provide arms, military assistance, or troops, private Portuguese

"mercenaries" and advisers apparently served with both FAPLA

and UNITA. In 1983 retired Portuguese admiral Rosa Coutinho

set up a company to hire former military and reserve officers, many

of whom had served in Angola during the war of liberation, as contract military advisers and to train FAPLA counterinsurgency units. Twelve were reported to be training FAPLA instructors in early

1984, and a total of thirty-two were reportedly hired in 1986.

However, several of these advisers were killed in action against

UNITA, and most left by late 1987. UNITA also claimed that some

3,000 Portuguese "communists" were in the country assisting

Luanda in late 1986, but this claim may have been either an exaggeration or a reference to civilian technicians. MPLA-PT sources charged that there were more than 2,000 South African-trained

Portuguese commandos fighting with UNITA.

Training

Regular and informal training was provided throughout the country at troop recruitment centers, officer candidate schools, specialized technical training centers, and field units. The military regional

headquarters were responsible for providing individual training in

basic military subjects to troops and noncommissioned officers.

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Angola: A Country Study

In 1985 the government cited as major accomplishments the

establishment of formal training programs for military cadres, the

creation of military education centers throughout the country (particularly at the intermediate level for officers and specialists), and

the creation of various specialized branches of the armed forces. The Soviet Union and other communist countries provided most

of the formal military training. The United States Department of

State estimated that 3,260 Angolan military personnel had been

trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the end

of 1986 and that 1,700 Warsaw Pact military technicians were

present in Angola that year. Most of the technicians were engaged

in maintaining and otherwise servicing military equipment fur- nished by the Soviet Union and other communist states. Individual officer candidate training was conducted at the Comandante Zhika Political-Military Academy in Luanda, which

opened in 1984. Most of the instruction was originally given by

Soviet and Cuban officers and specialists, but since then qualified

Angolan instructors reportedly had joined the staff. As the academy's name suggested, the curriculum included training in such mili- tary subjects as strategy, tactics, and weapons, as well as political

and ideological indoctrination. Another training program at the

academy—a condensed version of the officer candidate politicalmilitary curriculum—was attended by senior party officials on

weekends over a ten-month period.

Senior military officers participated in an eight-month advanced

course at the Escola de Oficiais Superiores Gomes Spencer at Huambo, but details on the curriculum were not available. The

school's eighth class, which graduated in 1984, included about fifty

senior FAPLA officers. Advanced officer training and high-level

training for officers and enlisted personnel in armor, artillery, and

other specialties was also conducted in Huambo. The Gomes

Spencer academy was attacked and extensively damaged by a UNITA commando raid in July 1986.

Although information on unit-level training was not available,

battalion-level exercises had been reported in the northern and

western provinces, far removed from the war zone. It is likely that

such large unit-training exercises immediately preceded deployment

to the combat zone. Reserve units also trained, as indicated by the

report of a reserve battalion having completed a three-month course

that included physical conditioning, hand-to-hand combat, and

infantry tactics. In addition to basic individual and unit-level training, technical

training was provided in such specialized functional areas as communications, intelligence, artillery, armor, air defense, motor

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transport, and logistics. This training was provided at facilities such

as the Comandante Economica Communications School. FAPA/

DAA inaugurated a two-year course for cadets in 1979 at the National Air Force School in Negage. In early 1983, 176 cadets completed the nine-subject course, which was administered by Angolan

instructors and "internationalists" (presumably Soviet and Cuban

advisers). A course for radio technicians and radar specialists was

also offered at the Negage training center. Some military training was conducted abroad, particularly in

the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. In mid- 1985 the

commander of the Fifth Military Region's FAPA/DAA reported

the arrival in the region of many new pilots and technicians who

had recently completed their training program in the Soviet Union.

From 1977 to 1981, Soviet specialists trained more than 3,000 motor

mechanics and drivers and 100 aircraft technicians in both Angola

and the Soviet Union.

FAPLA's Combat Performance

FAPLA's military performance was difficult to gauge, particularly in view of the propagandistic reports issued by the various

forces contending in the region. On the one hand, UNITA had

extended its range of operations from the remote southeastern

extremities throughout the entire country within a few years of Portugal' s withdrawal. The SADF had occupied parts of southern

Angola for extended periods, virtually without contest, for the purposes of resupplying UNITA, intervening on its behalf, conducting reconnaissance flights and patrols, and attacking SWAPO

encampments. UNITA reported low morale among captured

FAPLA conscripts, lack of discipline among troops, heavy losses of personnel and equipment in battle, countless ambushes and

attacks on FAPLA forces, successful sabotage operations, and desertions by battalion-size FAPLA units. In the late 1980s, Angola's

minister of defense publicly called for greater discipline in FAPLA,

citing reports of theft, assaults, and drunken military drivers. As

late as 1988, in the wake of reports of increased FAPA/DAA effec- tiveness, the South African Air Force (SAAF) commander dis- missed the Angolans as "extremely unprofessional," noting that

"50 percent of the threat against us is Cuban."

On the other hand, it could be argued that FAPLA had substantially improved its capabilities and performance. In the first place, FAPLA had begun to develop and acquire the organization,

doctrine, and equipment of a conventional army only during the

civil war of 1975-76. It was then forced to fight a counterinsurgency war in the most remote and inaccessible parts of the country

231
Angola: A Country Study

over extended lines of communications, without the requisite air or ground transport or logistical infrastructure. UNITA also en- joyed the advantages of operating in thinly populated areas along

porous borders with Zambia and Zaire, with extensive SADF combat and logistic support, making it impossible for FAPLA to iso- late or outflank UNITA. Moreover, military experts believe that

counterinsurgency troops must outnumber guerrillas by ten to one

in order to win such wars, a ratio FAPLA could never approximate. The air force and navy were even further behind and had

required years to acquire the assets and the expertise needed for

effective operations. Although the navy was of marginal use in the

war, air power was critical. It was only after sufficient aircraft and

air defense systems had been deployed in the mid-1980s that Luanda

was able to launch and sustain large offensives in the south.

Although they suffered heavy losses and perhaps relied too heavily on Soviet military doctrine, FAPLA and FAPA/DAA in the late 1980s showed increased strength, put greater pressure on UNITA,

and raised the costs of South Africa's support for UNITA. Luanda's resolve and the improved capabilities and performance of its armed forces were among the essential conditions under which

South Africa agreed to negotiate its withdrawal from Angola.

War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society

The Costs of Endemic Conflict

Persistent internal and external conflict have wrought havoc on

Angola. The human cost has been awesome and tragic. It was

estimated that as a consequence of war, between 60,000 and 90,000

people had died, and 20,000 to 50,000 persons had become amputees as of 1988 (see Effects of the Insurgency, ch. 2). From 1975

to 1988, almost 700,000 people were forced to flee their rural homes

for relative safety in displacement camps or in burgeoning cities and towns, where they suffered gross deprivations in the absence

of basic services. About 400,000 Angolans became refugees in neighboring states. Moreover, in 1986 some 600,000 people needed nutritional assistance.

The Angolan economy was also ravaged by wartime destruction and the heavy defense burden. Iron production virtually

stopped, diamond mining and timber harvesting were severely curtailed, and smuggling siphoned off needed export earnings. Economic sabotage and attacks on infrastructure by UNITA and South

Africa damaged or destroyed hundreds of facilities and made

development impossible. The destruction attributed to South

African military actions alone was estimated at US$20 billion.

232
A government soldier is fitted for a prosthesis

at a hospital in Huambo.

Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Yannick Muller)

Devastation of the once-prosperous agricultural sector was forc- ing the government to import about 80 percent of its food requirements in the mid-1980s, at a cost of US$250 million to US$300

million annually. It was only because of oil production in rela- tively secure Cabinda Province that the country could pay the high

cost of defense and keep itself from total economic ruin (see Background to Economic Development; Structure of the Economy,

ch. 3). Military recruitment placed a growing burden on the Angolan

population. According to statistics published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the number of

soldiers per 1 ,000 people increased from five in 1975 to more than

seven in the 1980s, which ranked Angola fifty- seventh among 144

countries in 1985. Any reckoning of the military burden borne by

the Angolan people, however, must also take into account UNITA's

armed forces. And because both FAPLA and UNITA expanded

considerably in the late 1980s as the internal war intensified, the

number of combatants per 1 ,000 people was actually twenty (based on 1988 population and combined armed forces estimates), a figure

that moved Angola's global ranking into the top fifteen. War and the Military in National Perspective

Perpetual war magnified and multiplied the social and eco- nomic impact of defense spending. Military expenditures and arms

233
Angola: A Country Study

imports were the most obvious indicators of the intensified war

effort. Luanda's defense spending nearly quadrupled from US$343

million in 1978 to US$1.3 billion in 1986 (in constant 1980 dollars), the bulk of that increase coming after 1983. In 1986 defense

accounted for 40.4 percent of government expenditures. Military

expenditure as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP

see Glossary), estimated at 12 percent to 14 percent from 1980 to 1982, rose steadily to 28.5 percent by 1985.

Arms imports also increased dramatically. Measured in constant 1984 dollars, the value of arms imports nearly doubled after 1980. During the late 1970s, arms deliveries remained relatively constant at a bit more than US$500 million per year, but after 1980

they surged to an annual average of more than US$1 billion. Since

the 1970s, Angola's arms imports had ranged between 45 percent

and 88 percent of total imports. In mid- 1988 Angolan government

officials estimated the country's external debt at US$4 billion, most

of which was owed to the Soviet Union for military purchases, and

they were considering the possibility of imposing a compulsory public loan to cover revenue requirements.

Angola's heavy defense burden was evident by comparative stan- dards as well. According to 1985 statistics published by ACDA,

Angola ranked sixty-third of 144 countries in both military expenditure and size of its armed forces. These absolute measures of mili- tary effort were consistent with Angola's ranking of between

sixty-eight and seventy-three in GNP, central government expenditures, and population. However, the militarizing effects were seen more clearly and dramatically in relative measures of defense effort: Angola ranked seventeenth in level of arms imports and sixth in arms imports as a percentage of total imports, twenty-sixth in mili- tary expenditure as a percentage of GNP, thirty- second in military

expenditure as a percentage of the government's budget, fiftieth in

military expenditure per capita, and fifty-seventh in military expenditure relative to the size of the armed forces. The continued growth

of the armed forces, military expenditures, and arms imports into

the late 1980s further increased the burden of defense and en- sured that few resources would be left for social and economic

development.

Not only did the armed forces command and consume an enor- mous share of national wealth and revenue, their increased political

power was institutionalized at every level of government. The defense and security forces were heavily represented in the highest

organs of the party and government; indeed, the exigencies of war

virtually transformed the integrated party-government system into a military machine dedicated to prosecuting war at an increasingly

234
National Security

higher price. The reorganization of the territorial administration

into military regions and provincial defense councils carried the

process even further. It remained to be seen whether the December 1988 regional accords—which excluded UNITA—would result in a reversal of the process. Civic Action and Veterans' Groups

Like those of many other developing countries, Angola's armed

forces were intended to play an important role in nation building

through civic-action programs. The Constitution, in fact, specially assigns "production" and "reconstruction" duties to FAPLA.

In the late 1970s, FAPLA units were encouraged to grow their own

food and to undertake civic action, emergency relief, and public

construction projects. However, such tasks were given only nominal attention as the war intensified.

Veterans of the liberation struggle and families of those who died

in that protracted conflict enjoyed "special protection" under the

Angolan Constitution, but this status was not further defined. The

rapidly expanding pool of war veterans in the 1980s could make

a substantial contribution to national reconstruction and development if their political, ideological, organizational, social, and technical skills could be mobilized or channeled in such directions.

However, the continuation of the war and the absence of information about their postservice occupations and activities precluded

observation of veterans' actual roles in society. The MPLA-PT

did attend to veterans' interests through party and government

organs. As noted earlier, veterans were eligible for party membership, and a high government post, the secretary of state for war

veterans, was also dedicated to veterans' affairs. The Angolan War

Veterans Committee, with government endorsement, sought aid

from the Soviet Union and presumably other potentially sympathetic international donors.

Internal Security

Since independence, the MPLA-PT government had faced

several internal opponents and rivals for power. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between antigovernment and antiregime

opposition groups. These groups differed in their goals, methods,

and bases of support. On the one hand, antigovernment groups

protested or sought to change the incumbent leadership, used

conventional means of political opposition ranging from passive

resistance to attempted coups, and drew support from constituencies almost entirely within the country. The main source of such

235
Angola: A Country Study

political opposition was factionalism within the MPLA-PT. Clandestine opposition groups and religious sects also contributed to antigovernment tensions (see Political Opposition, ch. 4).

On the other hand, antiregime groups sought to transform the

political system or overthrow the ruling MPLA-PT, resorted to

efforts at secession and armed rebellion, and received substantial

external support. The most prominent of these political opponents were FLEC, the FNLA, and UNITA. Whereas the first two had

become spent forces by the 1980s, UNITA continued to pose a

serious national security challenge.

The MPLA-PT government survived this host of threats by

developing an extensive internal security apparatus to supplement

the armed forces. This system consisted of a paramilitary territorial militia; a state security ministry with penal functions, political

police, and border guards; a national police force; and a nationwide popular vigilance brigade organization.

Antigovernment Opposition

The history of the MPLA party and government is ridden with

factional strife based on ideological, political, ethnic, and personal

rivalries. In the early 1970s, Daniel Chipenda, a member of the

MPLA Central Committee, was thought to have instigated two

assassination attempts against President Neto and was expelled from

the party in December 1974. As leader of the so-called Eastern

Revolt faction, he joined the rival FNLA, based in Kinshasa, Zaire,

as assistant secretary general. Former MPLA president Mario de

Andrade also opposed Neto's leadership and attempted to rally support for his so-called Active Revolt faction in 1974. In May 1977,

Nito Alves, former commander of the first military division and

minister of interior, spearheaded an abortive coup with the support of an extremist faction. Many MPLA officials were killed,

including seven Central Committee members (see Independence

and the Rise of the MPLA Government, ch. 1). And in early 1988, seven military intelligence officers were reported to have been sen- tenced to imprisonment for fifteen to twenty years and expelled

from FAPLA for plotting a coup against President dos Santos.

Other sources of dissent included several small clandestine

groups, which, to avoid infiltration, remained anonymous and re- stricted recruitment mainly to Angolan expatriates and exiles. They

reportedly represented a variety of ideological inclinations, were

disaffected by the continuing civil war, economic chaos, and political

intolerance, and advocated development and a pluralistic political

system. In 1987 about two dozen members of one such group,

the Independent Democrats, were imprisoned and their leader

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National Security

sentenced to death. These events cast doubt on the group's con- tinued ability to survive.

Religious sects were another source of antigovernment agitation.

The Roman Catholic Church was often at odds with the MPLAPT government but did not openly challenge it. More problematic was the government's clashes with such independent sects as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Our Lord Jesus Christ Church

in the World (Kimbanguist), whose members were popularly called Mtokoists, after the sect's founder, Simon Mtoko (also spelled

Simao Toco). After Mtoko's death in 1984, elements of the Mtokoist sect engaged in alleged "antipatriotic activities" that were

supposedly responsible for riots that occurred in at least three cit- ies. Angolan security forces were believed to have sponsored re- bellious factions within the leadership. During 1986 and 1987, more

than 100 Mtokoists were killed in riots and demonstrations, and

the sect was banned for one year. Jehovah's Witnesses were banned

from practicing their religion for their refusal to perform military

service (see Interest Groups, ch. 4).

Erstwhile Opposition: FLEC and the FN LA

FLEC waged an intermittent independence struggle between its establishment in 1963 and its virtual demise by the mid-1980s.

Zaire's withdrawal of support and internal dissension in the late 1970s caused FLEC to fragment into five factions, three of which

remained marginally active militarily in the late 1980s. A combination of the factions' internal divisions and lack of external support, on the one hand, and the heavy concentration in Cabinda

of Cuban troops and FAPLA forces, on the other hand, reduced

FLEC to litde more than a nuisance. In 1983 Luanda granted an

unofficial amnesty to the guerrilla separatists, and more than 8,000

refugees returned home. In February 1985, a cease-fire agreement was signed and talks began, but no formal resolution was reached.

In late 1988, FLEC existed in little more than name only.

Holden Roberto's FNLA was also defunct by 1988. After los- ing to the MPLA in the civil war, the FNLA retreated to its traditional refuge in Zaire and continued to wage a low-level insurgency.

However, in 1978 Zaire withdrew its support of the FNLA as part

of the Angolan-Zairian accord signed in the wake of the second

invasion of Shaba Region. Ousted by his own commanders,

Roberto was exiled to Paris in 1979. He emerged again in 1983

in an unsuccessful effort to generate international support and

material aid for his 7,000 to 10,000 poorly armed troops, who operated (but did not control territory) in six northern Angolan provinces.

237
Angola: A Country Study

FNLA remnants formed the Military Council of Angolan

Resistance (Conselho Militar de Resistencia Angolana—Comira)

in August 1980 to replace the moribund movement. Comira claimed

to have 2,000 troops training in Zaire for an invasion of northern

Angola, but it never offered more than sporadic challenges. Its lack

of strength was the result of the loss of its major external patron,

the broadening of the leadership of the MPLA-PT to include more

Bakongo people (the primary source of FNLA support), and more

aggressive FAPLA operations. Several Comira leaders defected to the Angolan side, and in 1984 more than 1,500 armed rebels and

20,000 civilian supporters accepted the amnesty originally offered

in 1978 and surrendered to Angolan authorities. Hundreds were

integrated into FAPLA and the security forces. Luanda reported

in October 1988 that 11,000 former FNLA/Comira members had

been "reintegrated into national reconstruction tasks," and in

November the exiled Roberto was reported to have accepted

amnesty.

The Enduring Rival: UNITA

UNITA in the 1980s was a state within a state. Under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, it survived defeat during the civil war,

retreated to the remote southeastern corner of the country,

regrouped and made its headquarters at Jamba, and launched a determined campaign to overturn the MPLA-PT regime or at least force it to accept UNITA in a coalition government (see fig. 16).

With increasing international support and military aid, particularly from South Africa and, after 1985, the United States, UNITA

extended its campaign of destruction throughout the entire country. It enlarged its military forces and scope of operations and withstood several major FAPLA offensives.

Starting with a small army of a few thousand defeated and poorly

armed followers at the end of 1976, Savimbi built a credible political organization and fighting force. Unlike what became of the

MPLA under its faction-ridden leadership, UNITA remained the

creation and vehicle of its founder. Internal opposition occasionally surfaced, but the lack of independent reporting made it difficult to assess its significance. South Africa kept FAPLA and Cuban

forces at bay and intervened whenever FAPLA offensives threatened, leaving UNITA comparatively free to consolidate its control throughout the south and to extend its range of operations

northward. In February 1988, Savimbi announced the formation

of a UNITA government in "Free Angola," the area he controlled. Although his intent was to regularize administration, rather than

to secede or seek international recognition, this event marked a

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National Security

new stage in UNITA's organizational development and consolidation, and many Africans states maintained at least informal ties to the movement.

Savimbi's strategy and tactics were designed to raise the costs of foreign "occupation" through maximum disruption and dislo- cation, while minimizing his own casualties. UNITA's forces

infiltrated new areas and contested as much territory as possible,

wresting it away from FAPLA control whenever feasible. They rarely seized and held towns, except near their bases in the south.

Rather, they sabotaged strategic targets of economic or military

value and ambushed FAPLA units when the latter attempted to return to or retake their positions. FAPLA access was also obstructed by extensive mine laying along lines of communication,

approaches to setdements, and infrastructure sites. To undermine

support for the MPLA-PT, UNITA indiscriminately attacked or took hostage hundreds of expatriate technicians and advisers, and

Savimbi repeatedly threatened multinational companies with retali- ation for their support of the government. Apparently abandoning hope of military victory, Savimbi sought instead to strengthen

UNITA's bargaining position in demanding direct negotiations with

Luanda for the establishment of a government of national unity.

UNITA's military progress was remarkable. By 1982 it had

declared all but six of the eighteen Angolan provinces to be war

zones. In late 1983, with direct air support from South Africa,

UNITA took the town of Cangamba, the last FAPLA stronghold

in southeastern Angola. This operation marked a shift from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare, at least in the countryside. In

1984 UNITA announced the beginning of an urban guerrilla campaign and claimed responsibility for acts of sabotage in Luanda

itself and even in Cabinda. The movement gained control of the

regions bordering Zambia and Zaire, enabling it to develop secure supply lines plus infiltration and escape routes. From 1984 to 1987,

UNITA not only continued to advance north and northwest but

also repulsed major FAPLA offensives backed by heavy Cuban

and Soviet logistic and combat support, in the latter instances relying on SADF air and ground support. In spite of the 1988 regional accords, according to which FAPLA and UNITA were to lose much of their external support, no military solution to the war was

expected.

Military Organization and Capability

UNITA's military wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation

of Angola (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Angola—FALA), was

under the supreme authority of Savimbi as commander in chief.

239
Angola: A Country Study

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The chief of staff was second in command and controlled the headquarters elements of intelligence, personnel, logistics, and operations. In January 1985, the FALA chief of staff, Brigadier

240
National Security

Demosthenes Amos Chilingutila, who had held that post since 1979, was removed and made chief of operations, possibly because of

Savimbi's dissatisfaction with his performance, and replaced by

Brigadier Alberto Joaquim Vinama. However, following Vinama's

death in an automobile accident in October 1986, Chilingutila was

reappointed chief of staff. By the mid-1980s, FALA had evolved into a well-defined conventional military organization with command and specialized staff organs, a formal hierarchy of ranks, an impressive array of weapons

and equipment, and considerable international support. Geographically, UNITA's nationwide area of operations consisted of five fronts commanded by a colonel or brigadier, which were subdivided

into twenty-two military regions under a colonel or lieutenant

colonel. The regions in turn were divided into sectors (usually three)

commanded by a major and further subdivided into zones under

captains or lieutenants.

FALA had a four-tiered hierarchical structure. The lowest level,

the local defense forces, had six battalions of poorly armed men

recruited as guards and local militia in contested areas. The next

stratum consisted of dispersed guerrillas who trained in their local areas for about sixty days and then conducted operations there,

either in small groups of about twenty or in larger units of up to 150. They were armed with automatic weapons and trained to attack and harass FAPLA convoys, bases, and aircraft. The third

level included forty-four semi-regular battalions that received a three-month training course and were sent back to the field in units

of up to 600. These forces were capable of attacking and defending small towns and strategic terrain and infrastructure. Finally,

FALA regular battalions of about 1,000 troops each completed a six-month to nine-month training period, and about a quarter of

them also received specialized training in South Africa or Namibia

in artillery, communications, and other technical disciplines. Armed

with heavy weapons plus supporting arms such as artillery, rockets, mortars, and antitank and air defense weapons, these FALA

regulars had the tasks of taking territory and holding it. By 1987 UNITA claimed to have 65,000 troops (37,000 guerrilla fighters—those in the first three categories cited above—and

28,000 regulars), but other estimates put FALA's total strength

closer to 40,000. Among its specialized forces were sixteen platoons

of commandos and other support units, including engineering,

medicine, communications, and intelligence. In late 1987, women

were integrated into FALA for the first time when a unit of fifty

completed training as semi-regulars. Seven members of this group

received commissions as officers.

241
Angola: A Country Study

In addition to combat forces, UNITA had an extensive logisti- cal support infrastructure of at least 10,000 people, about 1,000

vehicles (mostly South African trucks), an expanding network of

roads and landing strips, schools, hospitals, supply depots, and

specialized factories, workshops and other facilities used to manufacture, repair, and refurbish equipment and weapons. The main

logistical support center and munitions factory was Licua. Many

smaller centers were scattered throughout UNITA-controlled ter- ritory. Like Jamba, UNITA's capital, these centers were mobile.

It was difficult to determine the conditions of service with UNITA

guerrillas. Military service was voluntary and uncompensated, but

soldiers and their families normally received their livelihood, even

if it sometimes meant appropriating local food supplies. Moreover,

political indoctrination was an essential part of military life and

training. Although visitors to UNITA-controlled territory reported

that the armed forces were highly motivated, FALA defectors and

captives allegedly reported coercive recruiting and low morale.

FALA had a substantial arsenal of weapons and equipment of

diverse origin, most of which was captured from FAPLA during

attacks on convoys, raids, or pitched battles, or donated by the

SADF as war booty. The remainder came from various countries

and the international black market. Included in FALA's inventory were captured T-34 and T-55 tanks, armored vehicles, vehiclemounted rocket launchers, 76mm and 122m field guns, mortars

(up to 120mm), RPG-7 and 106mm antitank weapons, heavy and

light machine guns, various antiaircraft guns, SA-7 and United

States-manufactured Redeye and Stinger SAMs, and G-3 and

AK-47 assault rifles. External Support

FALA, like FAPLA, would not have been able to expand its size,

capabilities, and range of operations without extensive external as- sistance. By supplying UNITA with US$80 million worth of as- sistance annually during the 1980s, Pretoria remained the group's

principal source of arms, training, logistical, and intelligence support. The SAAF made regular air drops of weapons, ammunition,

medicine, food, and equipment, sometimes at night to avoid in- terception, and was reported occasionally to have ferried FALA

troops. South African instructors provided training in both Namibia

and UNITA-controlled areas of southern Angola. The largest train- ing center in Namibia was at Rundu, where intensive three-month

training courses were conducted. In late 1988, amidst regional peace

negotiations, there were reports that UNITA was planning to relo- cate its main external logistical supply lines from South Africa to

242
Jonas Savimbi,

the leader of the National Union

for the Total Independence

of Angola

Courtesy Free Angola

Information Service

UNITA troops atop a

Soviet-built BTR-60

captured in Mavinga in 1987

Courtesy Free Angola

Information Service
Angola: A Country Study

Zaire and was moving its headquarters and forces into Namibia's

Caprivi Strip before the anticipated arrival of a UN peacekeeping

force. In addition to aid from South Africa, UNITA received support

in varying degrees from numerous black African and North Afri- can states. Zaire provided sanctuary and allowed its territory to be used by others to train and resupply UNITA forces, and Zambia and Malawi were suspected of granting clandestine overflight

and landing privileges. During the 1970s, UNITA troops were

trained in Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and other African countries. Subsequentiy, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Somalia, and Tunisia also furnished financial and military aid. Morocco, which had

supplied arms to the MPLA during the liberation struggle, switched

sides and became a major source of military training for FALA,

especially for officers, paratroops, and artillery personnel. Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab states furnished financial support

valued at US$60 million to US$70 million annually. Israel was also reported to have provided military aid and training to UNITA sol- diers at Kamina in Zaire. Although Savimbi denied that UNITA

had ever employed foreign mercenaries or advisers, there had been

reports of South African, French, Israeli, and Portuguese combatants among his forces. Beginning in 1986, the United States had supplied UNITA with

US$15 million to US$20 million annually in ' 'covert" military aid

funded out of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The first acknowledged shipments of United States aid consisted

of nonlethal items such as trucks, medical equipment, and uniforms,

but antitank and air defense weapons soon followed. The bulk of

this materiel was reportedly airlifted through Kamina airbase in

Zaire's Shaba Region, where a UNITA liaison detachment was

stationed and CIA operatives were believed by Luanda to have

trained 3,000 UNITA guerrillas. The remainder was thought to have been delivered through South Africa, Gabon, and Central

African Republic.

Angola as a Refuge

The MPLA-PT government, conscious of its own revolutionary and anticolonial origins and committed to the liberation of South

African-occupied Namibia and of South Africa itself, provided both

sanctuary and material support to SWAPO and the ANC. Although

FAPLA never made a preemptive attack south of the Namibian

border, Pretoria's forces repeatedly invaded or otherwise intervened militarily in Angola. South Africa's regional strategy was

to ensure UNITA's success, contain and disrupt SWAPO, prevent

244
National Security

the establishment of ANC bases in southern Angola, and halt Cuban

and Soviet expansion southward. In addition to SWAPO and the

ANC, a large contingent of Katangan gendarmes (remnants of the

force that had invaded Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978)

enjoyed the protection of the Angolan government.

SWAPO was headquartered in Luanda and directed camps

primarily in southern Angola from which its militants could infil- trate Namibia in small units. SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), had main command

centers in Luanda and Lubango and training camps in Hufla, Benguela, and Cuanza Sul provinces. To avoid identification, infiltra- tion, and attack by the SADF, most of its camps were mobile.

SWAPO recruits were trained at Angolan and Cuban military

facilities, whence they were dispatched to SWAPO camps and for- mally organized into battalions of 400 to 800 troops each. PLAN's

strength in 1988 was estimated at 9,000 troops, most of whom were engaged in operations in Angola against UNITA, rather than

against the SADF in Namibia. It was uncertain whether PLAN's

anti-UNITA operations represented a quid pro quo for Angolan

sanctuary and material support or reflected limited chances to operate in Namibia because of South African defenses. In the Angolan

government's 1986 offensive against UNITA, for example, it was

estimated that 6,000 to 8,000 SWAPO guerrillas operated with

FAPLA.

In May 1978, South African forces made their first major cross- border raid into Angola, attacking SWAPO's main camp at Cassinga. Other major South African incursions against SWAPO bases

and forces occurred in 1981 and 1983. These attacks and the many

that followed, coupled with UNITA's territorial expansion, dis- rupted SWAPO and forced it to disperse and move northward.

The Lusaka Accord of February 1984 provided for a ceasefire, South African withdrawal, and relocation of SWAPO under

FAPLA control to monitored camps north of a neutral zone along

the Namibian border. But Pretoria, alleging that SWAPO'

s

redeployment was incomplete, delayed its own pullout until April

1985. In September 1985, however, South Africa launched another

major air and ground attack on SWAPO and later claimed to have

killed about 600 guerrillas in 1985 and 1986.

The southern African peace negotiations in 1988 rekindled rumors of debate within the MPLA-PT about continued support

for SWAPO. The regional accords required Angola to restrict PLAN to an area north of 16° south latitude, about 150 kilometers from the Namibian border. South Africa accused SWAPO of

violating the agreement by remaining in the proscribed area and

245
Angola: A Country Study

intensifying its operations from a military command headquarters

at Xangongo. Accusations aside, SWAPO intended PLAN to form

the nucleus of a future Namibian national army, into which it would

integrate the existing territorial forces after a period of reorientation and rehabilitation.

The ANC, banned in South Africa, operated mainly in Angola

under the protection and control of Luanda. At least seven major

training camps for an estimated 1,000 to 1,400 members of the

ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Zulu for "Spear of

the Nation"), were in Angola. Most of the ANC's personnel, which were organized into three battalions, had their encampment at Viana, outside Luanda. This location in northern Angola provided security from South African attacks but restricted the ANC's

ability to infiltrate or mount attacks on South Africa. Other major

camps were also in the north at Caculama, Pango, and Quibaxe.

ANC militants, like those of PLAN, were engaged along with FAPLA forces in fighting UNITA. Some ANC forces may have been

integrated into FAPLA units. Such joint training and operations

facilitated the ANC's access to weapons and supplies, which came

mostly from the Soviet Union and its allies. Sanctuary in Angola

became all the more important after the March 1984 MozambiqueSouth Africa nonaggression and mutual security pact, the Nkomati

Accord, which obliged Maputo to control ANC activities. By 1988

a combination of internal and external pressures had considerably

weakened the ANC, including assassinations of its leadership, South

African infiltration and crackdowns at home, attacks on ANC cadres

in Botswana, and the United States-brokered peace accords under

which Luanda agreed to terminate its assistance to the ANC. As

1988 ended, the ANC decided to relocate its bases out of Angola;

reportedly, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Uganda had been

mentioned as possible destinations.

Finally, Angola was a refuge for some 1,400 Zairian dissidents.

Although quiescent since 1978, these former Katangan gendarmes,

who formed the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front

National pour la Liberation du Congo—FNLC), remained Luanda's potential trump card if relations with Zaire became intolerable.

Internal Security Forces and Organization

Internal security responsibilities in Angola were distributed

among the ministries of defense, state security, and interior, plus

the People's Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas Populares de Vigilancia—BPV). This elaborate internal security establishment was

another manifestation of endemic crises and the mass mobilization undertaken to cope with them. The Ministry of Defense's

246
National Security

Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, established

as the ODP in late 1975, had 600,000 members, with some of these

personnel in virtually every village by 1979. By that time, 50,000

ODP troops were also reported to be fighting alongside the regular army against UNITA and the SADF. Estimates of the size of

the ODP militia in the late 1980s varied widely, from an effective

strength of 50,000, one-fifth of whom served with FAPLA, to a nominal (possibly reserve) strength of 500,000. This militia had

both armed and unarmed units dispersed in villages throughout

the country to guard likely UNITA targets such as bridges, power

plants, wells, schools, and clinics. The ODP also cooperated with

FAPLA, sometimes in joint operations, to thwart infiltration and

attacks by small units in areas where UNITA or other insurgent

forces were operating.

State security functions were assigned to the Angolan Directorate

of Intelligence and Security (Direcao de Informacao e Seguranca

de Angola—DISA) in the Ministry of Interior. As the principal

internal security organ with intelligence collection and political

police functions, the DISA was powerful and feared. Its national

security police force had wide-ranging powers and discretion to con- duct investigations, make arrests, detain individuals, and determine how they would be treated. Indeed, during Colonel Ludy

Kissassunda's tenure as director (1975-79), the agency came into

disrepute for excesses that included torture and summary executions. In mid- 1979 President Neto announced the dissolution of

the DISA, the arrest of Kissassunda and several other top security

officials, and the reorganization of the state security apparatus.

Although officially abolished, the DISA remained the colloquial

term for the state security police. Its agents were trained at a school

in Luanda by East German and Soviet instructors. The DISA

reportedly also operated out of the Angolan chancery in Portugal

to maintain surveillance over expatriate activities and received

assistance from counterparts in various communist embassies in

Lisbon.

The Ministry of State Security was created in July 1980 as part

of a government reorganization by dividing the Ministry of Interior

into two separate ministries. The new ministry consolidated the

DISA's internal security functions with those relating to counterintelligence, control of foreigners, anti-UNITA operations, and frontier security. Colonel Kundi Paihama, the former minister of interior,

became the minister of state security upon creation of the ministry, but in late 1981 Colonel Paulo succeeded Paihama.

In early 1986, after having revitalized the party organs and

formed a new Political Bureau, President dos Santos undertook

247
Angola: A Country Study

to purge and reorganize the Ministry of State Security. He removed

Paulo and Deputy Minister Mendes Antonio de Castro, took over

the portfolio himself, and appointed Major Fernando Dias da

Piedade dos Santos, deputy minister of interior since mid- 1984,

as new deputy minister of state security. In March 1986, the president formed the Commission for Reorganization of the Ministry

of State Security, composed of all the directors at the ministries

of interior and state security, under Piedade dos Santos's leadership. After the arrest and jailing of several senior state security offi- cials for abuse of their positions, corruption, and other irregularities,

the commission was disbanded in March 1988. In May 1988, President dos Santos relinquished the state security portfolio to Paihama, who also retained the position of minister of state for inspection

and control.

The Angolan Border Guard (Tropa Guarda Fronteira Angolana

TGFA), under the Ministry of State Security, was responsible for

maintaining security along more than 5,000 kilometers of land borders with Congo, Zaire, Zambia, and Namibia; maritime border

surveillance may also have been included in the TGFA's mission.

The TGFA's strength was estimated at 7,000 in 1988. Local training

took place under Cuban instructors at several centers, including

Omupanda, Saurimo, Negage, and Caota, although some border

guards were sent to Cuba, presumably for advanced or specialized training.

After its reorganization in 1980, the Ministry of Interior supervised the national police, provincial administration, and investigation of economic activities. Although the Ministry of State Security was responsible for administering the national prison sys- tem, certain prison camps were run by the Ministry of Interior.

It was unclear how territorial administration was carried out in

relation to the regional military and provincial defense councils.

Colonel Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues (nom de guerre Kito), who

had been vice minister of interior in charge of internal order and

the national police, was promoted to minister in the 1980 reorganization and was still serving in that post in late 1988. At that time,

however, in response to reports that "special forces of a com- mando nature" had been established within the ministry without

authorization, President dos Santos ordered an investigation as a prelude to a restructuring and personnel purge.

The national Angolan People's Police evolved from the Portuguese colonial police and the People's Police Corps of Angola,

which was set up in 1976 under the Ministry of Defense. Headquartered in Luanda but organized under provincial and local com- mands, the police numbered about 8,000 men and women and

248
National Security

reportedly was supported by a paramilitary force of 10,000 that

resembled a national guard. Cuban advisers provided most recruit

training at the Kapolo Martyrs Practical Police School in Luanda, but some police training was also given in Cuba and Nigeria. In 1984 Minister of Interior Rodrigues dismissed Fernando da Conceicao as police director and named Piedrade dos Santos as his

provisional replacement. Rodrigues relieved Major Bartolomeu

Feliciano Ferreira Neto as chief of the general staff of the police

general command in November 1987, appointing Inspector Jose

Adao de Silva as interim chief of the general staff pending a per- manent posting. In December 1988, Armindo Fernandes do

Espfrito Santo Vieira was appointed commander general of the

Angolan People's Police (apparently the top police post, formerly

titled director). At the same time, police functions were being

reorganized and consolidated within the Ministry of Interior to eliminate unauthorized activities, give the police more autonomy,

and make them more responsive to party and government direction.

Finally, President dos Santos created the BPV in August 1983

as a mass public order, law enforcement, and public service force

in urban areas. Organizationally, the BPV had ministerial status,

and its commander reported directly to the president. In some ways,

the BPV was the urban counterpart of the Directorate of People's

Defense and Territorial Troops. Unlike this directorate, however,

whose members served alongside the army, the BPV was strictiy

defensive. Some BPV units were armed, but most performed public

security and welfare duties and local political and ideological

work—including intelligence gathering, surveillance and security

patrols, civil defense, crime prevention and detection, and the

organization of health, sanitation, recreation, beautification, and

other social services—with and through local government and the

field offices of central government agencies. The brigades were

organized at the provincial level and below, operated in small units

of up to 100 members, and expanded rapidly, particularly in areas

affected by UNITA insurgency. In late 1984, a large number of

FAPLA soldiers were integrated into the BPV to strengthen its numbers and technical military skills. The BPV was also reported to serve as a recruitment pool for FAPLA. By 1987 the BPV's strength was estimated by various sources to be from 800,000 to 1.5 million. A third of its members were said to be women, organized

into 30,000 brigades under Colonel Alexandre Lemos de Lucas

(nom de guerre Bota Militar).

The rapid growth and diverse social composition of the BPV were

illustrated by reports from Namibe and Huambo provinces. In early

1985, there were about 500 vigilantes organized into twenty-six

249
Angola: A Country Study

squads in Namibe, capital of Namibe Province. These vigilante

units had just been credited with neutralizing a network of

"saboteurs" who were stealing and selling large quantities of food

and housewares at high prices. Two years later, the Namibe provincial BPV was reported to have 1 1 ,885 men and women organized

into 6 municipal and 228 intermediary brigades. Among the ranks were 305 MPLA-PT members, 266 members of the Organization

of Angolan Women (Organizacao da Mulher Angolana—OMA),

401 members of the JMPLA, and 448 members of the National

Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores

Angolanos—UNTA). In Huambo Province, there were reportedly about 100,000 brigade members in early 1986, one-third of

them women, and the authorities planned continued expansion to 300,000 by the end of that year. As in the case of the armed forces, the Angolan internal security

organs were subject to ideological and institutional controls. They

were also heavily influenced by Soviet, East German, and Cuban

state security doctrines, organizational methods, techniques, and

practices. Advisers from these countries were posted throughout

the security ministries, where their presence, access, and influence

ironically became a security problem for the Angolan government.

They reportedly penetrated the internal security apparatus so thoroughly and recruited so many Angolan security officials that

President dos Santos removed foreigners from some sensitive areas and dismissed several Angolan security officers for "collaboration"

with foreign elements. A security school, staffed entirely by Angolan personnel, also opened in late 1987, thereby reducing the need

and attendant risks of sending officers abroad for training.

Crime and Punishment

Criminal Justice System

The Ministry of Justice administered the civil legal and penal

systems, although its jurisdictional boundaries with the Ministry

of State Security, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense,

and the regional military councils were unclear. The civilian court system, known as the People's Revolutionary Tribunal (Tribunal

Popular Revolucionario), was established in 1976 to deal with capital offenses against national security. These courts had jurisdiction over crimes against the security of the state, mercenary

activities, war crimes, and so-called crimes against humanity, and

they could unilaterally assume jurisdiction over any criminal case

that had a significant impact on national security (see Judicial System, ch. 4). Such tribunals, composed of three to five judges, were

250
National Security

established in each provincial capital but administered by a national

directorate in Luanda. In late 1988, Fernando Jose de Franca Dias

Van Dunem had been minster ofjustice since February 1986, when

he had succeeded Diogenes Boavida.

In 1983 military tribunals were set up in each military region

and empowered to try crimes against the security of the state, including alleged offenses committed on behalf of UNITA such

as terrorism, espionage, treason, sabotage, destabilization, and

armed rebellion; " economic crimes" such as speculation, hoarding, and currency violations; disobedience of directives from the

regional military council; and other acts that might "damage or endanger the interests of collective defense and security." The

independence of the judicial structure and process was severely cir- cumscribed by political control of the court system and the fact that

the judges of the military tribunals were military officers whose

appointment, reassignment, and removal were controlled by the

minister of defense. Military courts frequendy handed down death

sentences, which were usually carried out by firing squad. Although

persons sentenced to death by military courts were legally entitled

to automatic appeal to the Armed Forces Military Tribunal, the

highest military court, such appeals were not known to have been

lodged.

Article 23 of the Constitution provides that citizens shall not be

arrested and tried except in accordance with the terms of law and

states the right of accused persons to legal defense. However, the extent to which these provisions were observed was uncertain.

Amnesty International, a human rights organization, reported

the detention without charge or trial of dozens of political pri- soners and trials by military tribunals of hundreds who were not

given adequate opportunity to prepare their defense or appeal

sentences. Angolan law provided that persons suspected of having committed serious crimes against the security of the state could be detained

without charge by the Ministry of State Security for up to three

months and that this period could be extended an additional three

months. Unlike common criminals, such detainees did not have

to be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of arrest and

could not challenge the basis of detention. Political prisoners had

to be informed of the accusations against them after six months

in detention and then had to be referred to a public prosecutor or

released. If charges were pressed, there was no stated time period

within which a trial had to be held, and delays of several years were common.

251
Angola: A Country Study

Prison System

Little information was available on the Angolan prison system.

Prisons were primitive, and authorities apparently had wide dis- cretion in dealing with prisoners. As in most Third World countries, prisons were designed for custodial and punitive purposes,

not for rehabilitation. Detention facilities were overcrowded, diets were substandard, and sanitation and medical facilities were minimal. Intimidation, prolonged interrogations, torture, and maltreatment, especially of political prisoners, were common. Visits by

families, friends, and others appeared to be restricted arbitrarily.

Prisoners were sometimes held incommunicado or moved from one

prison to another without notification of family.

The ministries of state security and interior reportedly administered penal institutions, but their respective jurisdictions were unknown. The principal prisons were located in Luanda, where

a maximum security institution was opened in early 1981, and in

several provincial and local jurisdictions. The main detention

centers for political prisoners were the Estrada de Catete prison

in the capital and the Bentiaba detention camp in Namibe Province.

The government-run detention center at Tari in Cuanza Sul Province was identified as one of the main rural detention centers. Tari was a former sisal plantation turned into a labor farm, where

prisoners lived in barracks or in their own huts while doing forced

labor. In 1983 it was reported that Tari's prisoners included those

already sentenced, awaiting trial, or detained without trial as security risks. Political reeducation, once an integral element of rehabilitation, was not widely or consistently practiced. Foreign advisers,

principally East German and Cuban security specialists, assisted

in operating detention centers and in training Angolan state security service personnel. Elsewhere, East Germans were reported to be in charge of a political reeducation camp.

Incidence and Trends in Crime

It is difficult to generalize about the incidence of crime in Angola.

Indeed, the government's characterization of UNITA and other

insurgent groups as bandits, gangsters, criminals, puppet gangs,

rebels, and counterrevolutionaries suggested a complex mixture

of civil, criminal, and political criteria. However, it is likely that

Angolan society exhibited criminal patterns similar to those of

societies in other developing countries experiencing uncontrolled

rural-to-urban migration, rapid social change, unemployment and

252
Migration from rural areas to cities and the consequent

creation of slums, such as those pictured above, contributed to a rise in urban crime. Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont)

underemployment, the spread of urban slums, and the lack or breakdown of urban and social services. It is also likely that such

patterns were even more pronounced because of three decades of

endemic conflict and massive dislocation. Historical and comparative patterns suggest that crimes against property increased with

urban growth and that juveniles accounted for most of the increase.

Available evidence, although fragmentary, indicated that the

crime rate was rising. Smuggling, particularly of diamonds and

timber, was frequently reported as a major criminal offense, occasionally involving senior government and party officials. Dealing

in illegal currency was another common crime. Persons acting as police or state security agents sometimes abused their writs by ille- gally entering homes and stealing property. Intermittent police

crackdowns on black market activities had only short-term effects. Endemic production and distribution problems and shortages gave

rise to embezzlement, pilfering, and other forms of criminal misappropriation. The enormous extent of this problem was indicated by an official estimate in 1988 that 40 percent of imported goods

did not reach their intended consumers because of the highly

organized parallel market system. The government later approved

new measures to combat economic crime on a national scale.

253
Angola: A Country Study

Human Rights

Angola was a signatory to several international human rights

conventions, including the Convention on the Political Rights of

Women of 1953, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination against Women, the Geneva Conventions of 1949

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection

of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967. However, as of

1988 Angola was not a signatory to the Slavery Conventions of

1926 and 1956; the Genocide Convention of 1948; or the International Conventions on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966.

Although Angola had acceded to such conventions, and its Constitution guarantees most human rights, actual observance was subject to severe abridgments, qualifications, and contrary practices.

A human rights organization, Freedom House, consistently gave

Angola the lowest ratings on its scale of political rights and civil liberties, and The Economist World Human Rights Guide assigned

Angola an overall rating of "poor." Amnesty International and

the United States Department of State also issued reports highly

critical of human rights practices in Angola.

The lack or disregard of international human rights standards

in Angola was evident in several respects. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without due process were among the most common

abuses. Although Angolan law limited the amount of time one could

be detained without charge, there did not appear to be a specific

period within which a suspect had to be tried, and as many as several

hundred political prisoners may have been detained for years

without trial. The regional military councils had broad authority

to impose restrictions on the movement of people and material,

to requisition supplies and labor without compensation, and to try

crimes against state security. The BPV also had functions relating

to maintenance of public order, the exercise of which was not subject to normal judicial safeguards and due process. Constitutional protections of the inviolability of the home and

privacy of correspondence were routinely ignored by government

authorities, who made arbitrary home searches, censored correspondence, and monitored private communications. Arbitrary executions of political prisoners, especially those accused of supporting

UNITA or perpetrating "economic crimes," occurred despite

international protests and periodic reorganizations of the security

services. The government maintained strict censorship, did not

tolerate criticism or opposition, and denied freedom of assembly

254
National Security

to any group that was not sanctioned or sponsored by the

MPLA-PT. UNITA alleged that compulsory military service was meted out as punishment by the Ministry of State Security and

the BPV. Furthermore, the government did not permit the Inter- national Committee of the Red Cross access to persons arrested

for reasons related to internal security or military conflict. Amnesty International also reported numerous instances of tor- ture during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ministry of State Security officials were reported to have permitted or sanctioned torture of criminals and political prisoners by such methods as beating,

whipping, and electric shock. Political detainees arrested for offenses

such as criticizing government policies were deprived of food and

water for several days and subjected to frequent and severe beatings during interrogation and confinement. Although allegations

of torture and mistreatment remained common in the mid-1980s,

such practices did not appear to have been systematic.

* * * There is voluminous material available on Angola's military his- tory and contemporary national security affairs. The Angolan

independence struggle is thoroughly examined in John A. Marcum's two-volume The Angolan Revolution. The civil war of 1975-76

is covered by some of the excellent essays in Southern Africa since

the Portuguese Coup, edited by John Seiler. The external dimension

of the civil war is treated in Charles K. Ebinger's Foreign Intervention in Civil War, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer's The Angolan War, and

Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas's Angola: The Hidden History of

Washington's War.

The UNITA movement has been extensively studied as well. One sympathetic treatment is Fred Bridgland'sJonas Savimbi. Two

excellent politico-military analyses of the UNITA insurgency are Donald J. Alberts's " Armed Struggle in Angola" in Insurgency in

the Modern World and James W. Martin Ill's unpublished doctoral

dissertation, "UNITA Insurgency in Angola."

The human cost of the war—at least in terms of refugees—is well covered by the U.S. Committee for Refugees' Uprooted Angolans. The devastating economic impact of the protracted war is most

fully and systematically examined in Tony Hodges 's Angola to the 1990s.

A standard reference work on military forces and order of battle data is The Military Balance, issued annually by the International

Institute for Strategic Studies. Supplementary information is avail- able in the annual Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, specialized

255
Angola: A Country Study

annuals such asJane's Fighting Ships, Jane's Weapon Systems, andJane's All the World's Aircraft, and Combat Fleets of the World, edited by Jean

Labayle Couhat and Bernard Prezelin. Other useful reference works

are John M. Andrade's World Police and Paramilitary Forces and

Michael J. H. Taylor's Encyclopedia of the World's Air Forces. Statistics and other information on arms transfers, military spending,

and armed forces are contained in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's annual World Military Expenditures

and Arms Transfers and the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute's annual SIPRI Yearbook. Internal security and human rights conditions are evaluated

annually in the Amnesty International Report and the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Additional worldwide human rights reviews are Charles Humana'

s

The Economist World Human Rights Guide and Raymond D. Gastil's

Freedom in the World.

Finally, specialized current news sources and surveys are indispensable to research on contemporary national security affairs. The most relevant and accessible include the annual Africa Contemporary Record and periodicals such as Africa Research Bulletin, Africa

Confidential, Africa Diary, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, Jane's

Defence Weekly, and International Defense Review. The most useful sources are African DefenceJournal and its sister publication, Afrique

Defense. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

256
Appendix A

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Urban-Rural Breakdown of Population by Province, 1988

3 Major Civilian Hospitals by Province, 1988

4 Revenues, Expenditures, and Deficits, 1980-86

5 Agricultural Production Marketed by State Enterprises,

1982-85

6 Value of Exports, 1980-86

7 Multilateral Development Assistance, 1979-84

8 Crude Oil Production by Area, 1981-85

9 Production and Exports of Diamonds, 1977-87

10 Coffee Production, Exports, and Closing Stocks, 1971-86

11 Balance of Payments, 1982-85

12 Major Army Equipment, 1988

13 Major Air Force and Air Defense Force Equipment, 1988

14 Major Navy Equipment, 1988

257

Appendix A

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

259
Angola: A Country Study

Table 2. Urban-Rural Breakdown of Population by Province, 1988

Province Urban 1 Rural 2 Total Bengo 18,700 137,400 156,100 Benguela 297,700 308,800 606,500

Bie 201,600 842,400 1,044,000 Cabinda 73,600 73,600 147,200 Cuando Cubango 3,600 122,000 125,600 Cuanza Norte 18,000 347,100 365,100

CuanzaSul 52,700 576,600 629,300 Cunene 4,600 215,200 219,800

Huambo 214,400 1,201,900 1,416,300 Hufla 250,800 578,200 829,000

Luanda 1,363,900 15,900 1,379,800 Lunda Norte 36,300 243,000 279,300

Lunda Sul 80,000 71,400 151,400 Malanje 174,900 643,400 818,300

Moxico 39,600 255,700 295,300

Namibe 75,200 27,500 102,700

Ui'ge 211,000 550,100 761,100

Zaire 92,800 63,700 156,500 TOTAL 3,209,400 6,273,900 9,483,300

1 Includes cities and towns.

2 Includes villages and open countryside. Source: Based on information from United States Private Voluntary Agency, United States Government Assessment Team to Angola, "Final Report," October 25, 1988, Annex B, B-2.

260
Appendix A

Table 3. Major Civilian Hospitals by Province, 1988 1

Province Number of City Name Beds Services Bengo

Caxito

Benguela

Benguela

Lobito

BieCatabola Chissamba

Kuito

Cabinda

Cabinda

Civilian Hospital

Central Hospital

Civilian Hospital

Catabola Municipal

Hospital

Civilian Hospital

Regional Hospital

Lombe-Lombe

Hospital

120

250

190

80

140

Cuando Cubango

Menongue Regional Hospital

Huambo

Huambo Huambo Hospital

130

600

Longonjo

Huila Caluquembe

Lubango

Bongo Mission

Hospital

Missionary

Hospital

Central Hospital

100

129

240

General medical,

surgical, X-ray, and

laboratory. General medical, X-ray, and

laboratory;

staffed by Cuban

personnel. General medical,

surgical, X-ray, and

laboratory.

General medical. General medical,

surgical, X-ray, and

laboratory. General medical,

surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.

General medical,

surgical, and

teaching facility for rural workers. General medical,

surgical, X-ray,

laboratory. and

General medical,

orthopedic; depends on UNICEF and

International Committee of the Red Cross for equipment and

food. 2 General medical Seventh-Day

Adventists hospital. General medical,

surgical, and teach- ing facility for rural workers. General medical,

surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.

261
Angola: A Country Study

Table 3. —Continued.

Province

City Name

Number of Beds Services Luanda

Luanda

-do-

-do- Lunda Sul Saurimo

Namibe

Namibe

Ufge

Ufge

Americo Boavoia

Hospital

University Hospital

Central Hospital

Regional Hospital

N'Gola Kimbanda

Hospital

Ufge Regional

Hospital

600

500

120

100

General medical,

surgical, X-ray, and laboratory. General medical,

surgical, X-ray,

laboratory, and

teaching facility. General medical.

General medical,

surgical, X-ray,

laboratory.

General medical, X-ray, and

laboratory;

staffed by 13

specialized physicians.

General medical, X-ray, and

laboratory.

and

n.a. —not available.

1 Does not include hospitals in areas claimed by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA).

2 UNICEF—United Nations Children's Fund.

262
Appendix A

Table 4. Revenues, Expenditures, and Deficits, 1980-86

(in billions of kwanzas) 1

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Revenues

State enterprises 10.4 11.1 11.1 10.1 10.4 12.1 18.1 Taxes 41.9 53.3 32.3 38.7 54.4 56.4 35.1 Other JL9 JL2 _61 8 _9A HLO 17.3 Total revenues 2 60.1 73.7 50.7 55.6 74.6 78.5 70.5 Expenditures

Economic development f 28.4 43.4 26.3 17.9 22.0 23.4 14.8

Social services 13.7 13.8 15.1 14.8 17.3 18.7 21.4 Defense and security 15.0 15.0 15.0 23.3 29.4 34.4 34.6 Administration 17.0 11.8 13.7 9.2 9.5 9.9 9.8 Other 13A JU _2A _2A _jkl_ 4.8 Total expenditures 2 87.2 91.6 72.1 67.6 82.3 90.4 85.5

Deficits 27.1 17.9 21.4 12.0 7.7 11.9 15.0

1 For value of the kwanza—see Glossary.

2 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 42; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [London], No. 2, 1987, 12.

Table 5. Agricultural Production Marketed by

State Enterprises, 1982-85

(in tons)

Commodity 1982 1983 1984 1985

3,130 2,130 290 254 Bananas 11,000 15,290 10,775 21,094

12,790 8,370 3,336 5,309

Coffee 23,470 15,630 10,589 13,686 3,320 2,290 2,435 2,291 14,370 16,920 9,866 16,982 17,610 6,730 4,164 5,522 Maize 32,570 22,700 16,343 11,935 2,500 2,440 1,532 1,190 4,600 3,140 1,725 285

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [London], No. 1, 1987, 16.

263
Angola: A Country Study

Table 6. Value of Exports, 1980-86

(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Crude oil 1,391 1,345 1,234 1,526 1,748 1,905 1,240 Refined oil and liquefied petroleum gas . 98 101 60 120 122 128 80

Coffee 164 97 95 71 80 55 60 Diamonds 226 179 104 90 64 33 15 Other 9 6 4 3 3 4 5 TOTAL* 1,888 1,727 1,497 1,810 2,018 2,125 1,400

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 123; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [London], No. 1, 1987, 13; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome

and Principe [London], No. 4, 1987, 2.

Table 7. Multilateral Development Assistance, 1979-84

(in millions of United States dollars)

Donor 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 United Nations World Food Programme 5.0 3.1 4.8 6.1 8.5 9.5 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.7 5.0 6.0 United Nations Development

Programme 2.7 4.1 6.0 4.8 5.3 3.4 United Nations Children's Fund 4.7 3.2 2.5 1.7 3.0 3.3 European Community 0.6 1.0 3.2 1.6 2.5 9.7 Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.1 TOTAL 17.3 15.9 20.3 17.9 26.1 33.0

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 129.

264
Appendix A

Table 8. Crude Oil Production by Area, 1981-85

(in thousands of barrels per day)

Area 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Cabinda 85.6 80.5 130.3 58.4 165.2 Block 2 5.1 12.7 12.1 9.3 7.2 Block 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.8 Congo River Basin 34.9 32.4 30.7 31.9 31.7 Cuanza River Basin 3.7 4.0 4.9 4.5 4.0 TOTAL* 129.4 129.6 178.0 204.0 231.9

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 58.

Table 9. Production and Exports of Diamonds, 1977-87

Production Exports Year Volume 1 Value 2 Volume 1 Value 2 1977 333 885 337 847

1978 707 3,512 689 3,325 1979 839 4,365 791 4,225 1980 1,479 6,929 1,460 6,767

1981 1,397 4,959 1,409 5,350 1982 1,221 3,063 1,260 3,099 1983 1,030 2,784 1,002 2,704 1984 920 1,764 954 1,921 1985 714 945 741 977

1986 400 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1987 750 n.a. n.a. n.a.

n.a. —not available.

1 In thousands of carats.

2 In millions of kwanzas (for value of the kwanza—see Glossary). Source: Based on information, from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 75; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Angola, Sao Tome and Principe [London], No. 4, 1987, 17.

265
Angola: A Country Study

Table 10. Coffee Production, Exports,

and Closing Stocks, 1971-86

(in thousands of bags)

Year Production Exports Closing Stocks 1

1971 3,888 3,019 4,785 1972 4,031 3,097 5,619 1973 3,500 4,135 4,942 1974 3,206 2,961 5,147 1975 1,062 2,600 3,574 1976 958 1,123 3,379 1977 951 963 3,342 1978 572 1,245 2,644 1979 289 1,012 1,896 1980 721 661 1,931 1981 344 850 1,399 1982 290 620 1,024 1983 214 440 778

1984 254 370 616

1985 214 333 477

1986 2

.-. 270 313 414

1 Coffee held in storage at end of year.

2 Government forecast. Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 92.

Table 11. Balance of Payments, 1982-85

(in billions of kwanzas) 1

1982 1983 1984 1985

44.7 47.5 58.8 59.3

33.7 29.7 38.0 41.2

11.0 17.8 20.9 18.0

19.0 19.8 23.6 26.5 -7.2 -1.0 -1.7 -7.0

3.0 1.6 6.1 6.7 3.2 3.3 5.2 6.1

1 For value of the kwanza—see Glossary.

2 Free on board.

3 Figures may not result in balance because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 42-43.

266
Appendix A

Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1988

Type In Inventory Main battle tanks T-34 100 T-54/-55 300 T-62 100 + T-72 n.a. Light tanks PT-76 50 Armored vehicles BRDM-1/-2 200 + AML-60/-90 n.a. BTR-40/-50/-60/-152 255 BMP-2 65 Panhard M3 n.a.

Artillery Assortment of 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm,

and 152mm guns 500 SU-100 (self-propelled) n.a. BM-21/-24 multiple rocket launchers 75

1 20mm mortars 40 + 82mm mortars 460

Antitank weapons AT-3 n.a. 75mm, 82mm, and 107mm recoilless rifles 900

Air defense guns ZSU-23-4 (self-propelled) 20 ZSU-57-2 (self-propelled) 40 S-60 70 ZPU-1/-2/-4 n.a. ZU-23-2 n.a. M-1939 n.a. M-55 n.a.

Surface-to-air missiles SA-7/-4 n.a.

n.a. —not available.

267
Angola: A Country Study

Table 13. Major Air Force and Air Defense

Force Equipment, 1988

Type In Inventory

Attack aircraft MiG-23 Flogger 55 MiG-21MF Fishbed 60 Su-22 Fitter 7

Interceptors MiG-17F Fresco 20 MiG-19 Farmer 8 MiG-21bis Fishbed 30 Counterinsurgency and reconnaissance PC-7 Turbo-Trainer 8 Maritime patrol Fokker F-27MPA Friendship 1 EMB-111 Bandeirante 2 Fixed-wing transports Douglas C-47 Dakota 3 CASA C-212 Aviocar 11 L- 100-30 1 or 2 Do-27 5 Nord 262 4 BN-2A Islander 13 TU-134A Crusty 1 Yak-40 Codling 1 Commander 690A 1 PC-6B Turbo-Porter 4 An-2 Colt 10 An-12 Cub 2 An-26 Curl 33 An-32 Cline 3 Trainers MiG-15UTI Midget 3 Yak-il Moose 6 Cessna 172 3 PC-7 11 PC-9 4

Helicopters

Mi-8 Hip 50 Mi- 17 13 Mi-24 Hind C 27 Mi-25 21 SA-316B Alouette III 24 IAR-316B Alouette III 16 SA-342 Gazelle 5 SA-365N Dauphin 8 SA-315B Lama 1

268
Appendix A

Table 13. —Continued.

Type In Inventory

Surface-to-air missiles SA-2 Guideline 12 SA-3 Goa 40 SA-6 Gainful 72 SA-8 Gecko 48 SA-9 Gaskin n.a. SA-13 Gopher n.a.

n.a. —not available.

Table 14. Major Navy Equipment, 1988

Type In Inventory

Fast missile craft OSA-II with four SS-N-2

Styx missiles 6

Fast torpedo craft Shershen with four 533mm heavyweight torpedo tubes 4 or 5 Inland-water and coastal patrol boats Argos 4

Poluchat-I 2 Zhuk 1 or 2 Jupiter 1 or 2 Bellatrix 4 or 5 Mine warfare craft Yevgenya MH1 2 Amphibious vessels Polnocny-B 3 Alfrange 1 LCT 1 T-4 4 or 5 LDM-400 9 or 10

Coastal defense equipment

SS-C1 Sepal radar system at Luanda 1

269

Appendix B

1988 REGIONAL ACCORDS

Tripartite Agreement, December 22, 1988

AGREEMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

ANGOLA, THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, AND

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the

Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter

designated as "the Parties,"

Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement

in Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988,

and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement,

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978),

adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR

435/78,"

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between

the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's

Republic of Angola,

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in

implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement,

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence

of all states of southwestern Africa,

Affirming the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of

states, Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region

of Africa to self-detennination, independence, and equality of rights,

and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development,

and social progress,

Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement

271
Angola: A Country Study

of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of

Africa,

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the

Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security

in southwestern Africa,

Agree to the provisions set forth below:

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary General

of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council

to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart

Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and People's Republic of Angola shall cooperate with the Secretary General to ensure the independence of

Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any

action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The

Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used

by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of

war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or

inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could

prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

(4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba

shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward

the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from

the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for

the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the

United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of

force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used

by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity,

inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern

Africa.

(6) The Parties shall respect the principle of noninterference in

the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

(7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations

undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the

interpretation or implementation thereof.

(8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

272
Appendix B

Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish,

and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Afonso Van Dunem

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

Isidoro Octavio Malmierca

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Roelof F. Botha

Bilateral Agreement, December 22, 1988

Following is the unofficial United States translation of the original

Portuguese and Spanish texts of the agreement, with annex. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE

REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR THE

TERMINATION OF THE

INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE

CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the

Republic of Cuba hereinafter designated as the Parties,

Considering,

That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia shall commence on the 1st of April,

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the

safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial in- tegrity of the People's Republic of Angola are closely interrelated

with each other and with peace and security in the region of southwestern Africa.

That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agree- ment among the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and Republic of South Africa shall be

signed, containing the essential elements for the achievement of

peace in the region of southwestern Africa,

That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will bring to an end the reasons which compelled the Government of

the People's Republic of Angola to request, in the legitimate exercise of its rights under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,

the deployment of Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist

273
Angola: A Country Study

military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with the FAPLA

[the Angolan Government army], its territorial integrity and

sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its territory,

Noting,

The agreements signed by the Governments of the People's

Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1982

and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola approved in November 1984, and the

Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the Governments of the People's

Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of

South Africa on December 13, 1988,

Taking into account,

That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation

of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory

and the successful accomplishment of their internationalist mission,

The Parties agree as follows:

Article 1 To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 13th

parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who

constitute the Cuban troops contingent stationed in the People's

Republic of Angola, in accordance with the pace and time frame

established in the attached calendar, which is an integral part of

this agreement. The total withdrawal shall be completed by the

1st of July, 1991.

Article 2

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the

Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations deriving from Article 1 of this agreement in the event that

flagrant violations of the tripartite agreement are verified.

Article 3

The Parties, through the Secretary General of the United

Nations, hereby request that the Security Council verify the

redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops

from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and to this end shall agree on a matching protocol.

Article 4

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripartite agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa.

Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United

274
Appendix B

Nations, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages,

each being equally authentic.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Afonso Van Dunem

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

Isidoro Octavio Malmierca

Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule

CALENDAR

In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the

Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the

People's Republic of Angola for the termination of the mission of

the Cuban internationalist military contingent stationed in Angolan territory, the Parties establish the following calendar for the

withdrawal:

Time Frames

Prior to the first of April, 1989

(date of the beginning of implementation of Resolution 435)

Total duration of the calendar

Starting from the first of April, 1989

Redeployment to the north:

to the 15th parallel by

to the 13th parallel by

Total men to be withdrawn:

by 1 November 1989

by 1 April 1990

by 1 October 1990

by July 1991

3,000 men

27 months

1 August 1989

31 October 1989

25,000 men

33,000 men

38,000 men

50,000 men

Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men.

275

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West Africa [London].)

295

Glossary

assimilado(s)—Those Africans and mestigos (q.v.) considered by

the colonial authorities to have met certain formal standards

indicating that they had successfully absorbed (assimilated) the

Portuguese language and culture. Individuals legally assigned

to the status of assimilado assumed (in principle) the privileges

and obligations of Portuguese citizens and escaped the burdens,

e.g., that of forced labor, imposed on most Africans (indigenas—

q.v.). The status of assimilado and its legal implications were

formally abolished in 1961.

barrels per day (bpd)—Production of crude oil and petroleum

products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A barrel

is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to metric tons depends on the density of the

special product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one metric ton. Heavy products would be about seven barrels

per metric ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene,

would average eight barrels per metric ton.

degredado(s)—Exiled convicts; refers to convicted criminals sent from Portugal to Angola. Degredados constituted a very substantial part of the Portuguese who came to Angola from the six- teenth century to the early twentieth century.

fiscal year (FY)—January 1 to December 31. gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods

for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed

to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated

and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and

subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the

result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made.

See also gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (GDP

q. v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions

with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of

the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be cal- culated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer

payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost, removing in- direct taxes and subsidies.

297
Angola: A Country Study

indigences)—An African or mestigo (q. v.) without assimilado (q. v.) sta- tus. In Portuguese terms, it means unassimilated or uncivilized. Before the abolition of the status (and the distinction

between it and that of assimilado) in 1961, roughly 99 percent

of all Africans were indigenas.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- ing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members

(including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

kwanza—Angolan currency unit that replaced the Angolan escudo

after January 8, 1977. The kwanza, named for the Cuanza

(Kwanza) River, consists of 100 lwei (lw), named for one of

the river's tributaries. The kwanza was a nonconvertible cur- rency, but exchange rates for authorized transactions were

established regularly. In late 1988, US$1 officially equaled

Kz29.3; reportedly, the kwanza traded on the parallel market

for up to Kz2,100 per US$1.

Lome Convention—An agreement between the European Community (EC) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)

states whose provisions call for the EC to extend economic

assistance to ACP countries. Much of the aid is for project

development or rehabilitation, but a large portion is set aside

for the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX) system,

designed to help developing countries withstand fluctuations

in the prices of their agricultural exports.

mestigo(s)—An individual of mixed white and African ancestry.

Several varieties, depending on the nature and degree of mixture, were recognized by the Portuguese and mestigos in the

colonial era. Before 1961 most mestigos had the status of assimilado (qv).

Paris Club—A noninstitutional framework whereby developed

nations that make loans or guarantee official or private export

credits to lesser developed states meet to discuss borrowers' abil- ity to repay debts. The organization, which met for the first time in 1956, has no formal or institutional existence and no

fixed membership. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury,

and it has a close relationship with the World Bank (q. v.), the

International Monetary Fund (IMF

q.v.), and the United

298
Glossary

Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund

administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- tions are owned by the governments of the nations that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,

member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q. v.).

299

Index

Abako. Alliance of Bakongo (Abako)

accords, regional (1988) (see also agree- ments; Joint Military Monitoring

Commission): Angola's probable gains from, 5, 195; for Cuban troop removal, 194-95; effect of, xxv-xxvi, xxvii, 222 ACDA. See Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency (ACDA)

Action Committee for the National Union of Cabindans (Comite d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabindais: CAUNC), 33 Active Revolt (1974), 41, 46, 170, 236

administration, government: executive branch in, 165, 167-68; judicial system

of, 169; legislative branch of, 168-69;

at local level, 169-70 Afonso (Kongo king), 7 African League, 26

African National Congress (ANC), 61, 106; base and activity in Angola of, 191-92, 246; fighting against UNITA

by, 222; MPLA-PT support for, 244

African Petroleum Producers' Association, 130

Africans as traders, 19 Africans in Angolan society, 22-24

Africa Textil, 144 Agip Oil Company, 131 Agostinho Neto Organization of Pioneers (Organizacao dos Pioneiros Agostinho

Neto: OPA), 181 Agostinho Neto University, 102, 198

agreements, 38, 162; of Angola, Cuba,

and South Africa (1988), 205-6; with Comecon, 198; Lome III Agreement,

121-22; of military cooperation with Hungary, 227; nonaggression pact: Zaire, Zambia, Angola, 207-8; be- tween Portugal and Belgium, 19; relat- ed to fishing rights, 140; with Soviet Union, 197

agricultural sector (see also associations, farm; cooperatives, farm; farmers as in- terest group; imports): components of, 88-90; economic crisis of, 121, 138;

effect of resettlement on, 35; effect of UNITA insurgency on, 50, 56, 63, 92,

184; free trade policy for, 118; migration from, xxiii; plantations in, 88, 115; population in, 90-91; Portuguese farms

of, 114; production of, 135-37; ratio of labor force in, 123; socialism for, 45 AIDS Policy Research Center, United

States, 106

air force. See People's Air and Air Defense Force of Angola (Forca Aerea Popular

de Angola/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea: FAPA/DAA)

air transport industry, 113, 151 Alfredo, Manuel Augusto, 221

Algeria, 29-30, 130 Alliama. See Alliance of Mayombe

(Alliama)

Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des Bakongo: Abako), 27, 73

Alliance of Mayombe (Alliance de Mayombe: Alliama), 33, 73 Almeida, Roberto de, 47 Alvaro I (Kongo king), 9 Alvaro II (Kongo king), 9

Alves, Nito (seealso Nitistas), 42, 164, 170, 180, 212, 236

Alvor Agreement (1975), 38, 162 Ambundu (Akwaluanda) people, 71-72 Amnesty International, 251-55 ANC. See African National Congress

(ANC)

Andrade, Mario, 27, 41 Angola Airlines (Linhas Aereas de Angola: TAAG), 151 Angolan Border Guard (Tropa Guarda

Fronteira Angolana: TGFA), 248 Angolan Cement Company (Empresa de Cimento de Angola: Cimangola), 147 Angolan Directorate of Intelligence and

Security (Direcao de Informacao e Seguranca de Angola: DISA), 247 Angolanization law (Decree 20/82)

(1982), 124 Angolan Journalists' Union, 190 Angolan People's Police, 248-49 Angolan Red Cross, 105 Angolan War Veterans' Committee, 235

angolar, 22 Angol (SACOR subsidiary), 126 301
Angola: A Country Study

Angop (official news agency), 184, 190 armed forces (see also People's Armed

Forces for the Liberation of Angola

(FAPLA)): conscription in, 80; politi- cal power of, 234-35; responsibility of, 214-15; security supplement of, 236 Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Angola: FALA) (see also National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Inde- pendencia Total de Angola (UNITA)),

239-42 Armed Forces Military Tribunal, 224, 251 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), United States, 233, 234 army (see also People's Army of Angola

(Exercito Popular de Angola: EPA)):

organization and deployment of, 215, 217 army (colonial): discrimination in, 209; expansion of, 209-10

Ashiluanda people, 73 Assembly of God, 97, 185

assimilados, xxii, 4, 22, 23, 25-26, 28, 72, 80, 160-61

associations, African (see also assimilados), 26-28

associations, farm, 136

Austria, 133 Austromineral, 133 automobile assembly industry. See vehicle assembly industry

Bailundu Kingdom, 6, 13 Bakongo (Kongo) people (see also National Front for the Liberation of Angola

(Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola: FNLA)), 6-7, 9, 11-12, 24, 27,

28, 55, 66, 72-74, 81-82, 96-97; reli- gious affiliation of, 97; as slave traders, 160

balance of payments, 120, 152, 154-55 banking system, 154 Bantu speakers, 5-6, 14, 64-65

Baptist Convention of Angola, 97, 185

Baptist Evangelical Church of Angola, 97, 184

barter system, xxiv, 88, 89, 117

Battle of Mbwila (Ambuila), 11 Belgian Congo, 13, 21, 27

Belgium: in Congo River Basin, 18-19;

military assistance from, 224; role in Zaire conflict of, 207

Benguela: population growth in, 63; as slave port, 15 Benguela Current, 57 Benguela Plateau, 13, 60, 69 Benguela Railway, xxiv, 21, 22, 45, 75, 114, 147, 150, 192, 197 Benin, 130

Berlin Conference (1884), xxii, 18, 19, 20

Bie Kingdom, 6, 13 Bie Plateau, 60

black market. See parallel market BNA. See National Bank of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola: BNA)

Boavida, Diogenes, 251 Bomba Alta Orthopedic Center, 106, 108 Botswana, 60, 77, 78, 208

Boxer, C.R., 15 BPV. See People's Vigilance Brigades

(Brigadas Populares de Vigilancia:

BPV)

Brazil, 15, 16; agreements with, 142; Angola as de facto colony of, 14; loans from, 154; military purchases from,

219; technical and military assistance from, 197, 224; trade relations with, 120-21; workers from, 124

Brazzaville, 30 brewing industry, 144

Britain: influence in Angola of, 18; mili- tary assistance from, 224; role in Namibia issue of, 49; trade relations with, 120-21, 133

Bulgaria, 31 Bush, George P., xxv-xxvi Bushmen, 5

Cabgoc. See Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

(Cabgoc)

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc),

34, 126, 129, 130-31 Cabinda Province, 96, 206; Cuban troops

in, 226, 237; as enclave, 17, 18, 33-34,

57; oil fields of, 192, 199; separate sta- tus for, 33-34; separatist movement of, 73, 237 Caetano, Marcello, xxii Calandula, 17 Cambambe, 10-11 Cameroon, 130 302
Index

Canada, 49, 121 Cao, Diogo, 7, 10, 160 Cape Verde, 196

capital movements, 113

Caprivi Strip, Namibia, 244

Carreira, Henrique (Iko), 178, 214, 219

Carvalho, Antonio Jose Condessa de

(Toka), 221

Cassai River, 74

Cassinga, 46

Castro, Fidel, 44, 198 Catumbela River, 142 CAUNC. See Action Committee for the National Union of Cabindans

(CAUNC)

CCCE. See Central Board for Economic

Cooperation (CCCE)

cement industry, 147

Central Board for Economic Cooperation

(Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Eco- nomique: CCCE), 137 Central Committee (MPLA-PT), 168, 171-73 Chevron Oil Company, 34, 130-31

Chilingutila, Demosthenes Amos, 240-41 China: political support of, 27; relations with, 198; support for UNITA by, 32; weapons from, 31 Chipenda, Daniel, 36, 38, 47, 170, 236 Chokwe (Cokwe) people {see also LundaChokwe peoples), 6, 13, 20, 74, 76, 77, 82

Christianity, 56, 94-97; missionaries for, 70-71 Church of Christ in the Bush, 186 Cimangola. See Angolan Cement Company (Cimangola)

civil unrest (1961), 28-29

civil war, xxi, xxii-xxiii, 4, 162, 187, 205, 210, 225 Ciyaka Kingdom, 6, 13 Clark Amendment. See United States Click languages {see also Khoisan lan- guages), 64, 79

climate, 61 CMEA. See Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance

coffee industry, 22, 63, 116, 120, 137-38;

aid to, 29; nationalization of, 137; Ovimbundu people in, 70

collectivization, 45

colonatos system, 25, 114

Colonial Act (1930), Angola, 21, 95

Comandante Economica Communications School, 231 Comandante Zhika Political-Military

Academy, 230 Comira. See Military Council of Angolan

Resistance (Conselho Militar de Resis- tencia Angolana: Comira)

Conceicao, Fernando da, 249 Congo, 57, 130, 197, 206, 248 Congo River, 7, 17, 60 Congo River Basin, 18, 125, 128-29, 131 Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola, 97, 185 Conoco, 131

conscription {see also military recruitment), 80, 165, 209-10, 222

constitution (1911), 26

Constitution (1975), 159; country's security policies in, 211-12; guarantees and

rights under, 164-65; revision (1980), 170-71

construction materials industry, 147 Contact Group, 49 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

Women, 254 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 254

cooperants, 123, 124-25

cooperatives, farm, 89, 136, 184

cotton industry: abolition of compulsory

cultivation in, 29; in light industry,

144, 146; performance of, 141 Couceira, Paiva, 20-21

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA), 122, 198 Council of Evangelical Churches, 187-88 Council of Ministers, 167 Council of the Revolution (pre- 1980), 212

counterinsurgent activity, 34, 35, 210, 219, 231-32 coup d'etat: attempt in Angola, 31, 164;

Nitista attempt (1977), 42, 44, 180; Portugal (1974), xxii, 4, 210; Portugal,

May 1926, 21 Court of Appeals, 169

court system, 169; civilian, 250; military, 213-14, 224, 251; people's revolution- ary and people's, 169 Coutinho, Rosa, 35, 38, 229

credit system, 136, 154

crime, 252-53

Crocker, Chester A., 205 303
Angola: A Country Study

Cuando Cubango Province, 31, 46, 79, 103 Cuango River, 17, 74 Cuanza Norte Province, 28 Cuanza River, 10, 60, 142 Cuanza River Valley, or Basin, 57, 125, 128-29 Cuba: Isle of Youth in, 198; military as- sistance to MPLA from, 38, 226; mili- tary personnel in Angola, xxiii, xxvi,

xxvii, 5, 40, 42, 44, 49-51, 80, 106, 160, 162, 191-92, 194, 197-98, 199, 225; nationals of, 102, 108, 124, 144, 198-99; role in Namibian issue of, 49-50; support for MPLA of, 4-5, 162; support to SWAPO and ANC by, 226-27; technical assistance from,

220-21, 224, 226; trade relations with,

144; training instructors of, 31, 198, 226 Cubango River. See Okavango River/

Swamp

Cuito Cuanavale, 205 Cunene River, 39-40, 49, 60, 79, 142

currency (see also kwanza): depreciation of, xxiv, 117, 154; plan to devalue, 119 Cussu people, 78

Czechoslovakia, 31, 198, 224-25, 227

21, 113-14, 131-33 diamond industry, 21, 22, 75, 115, 120,

125, 13 1-33; nationalization of, 131-32

Dias, Paulo de Novais, 9, 10 Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Groups, 91, 92, 219, 222, 246-47 DISA. See Angola Directorate of Intelli- gence and Security (Direcao de Infor- macao e Seguranca de Angola: DISA)

disease, 29, 57, 105-6, 108 displacement camps, 63-64

displacement of population, 67

diviner (kimbanda), 99

Doctors Without Borders, 108 Dombe people, 70 do Nascimento, Lopo, 178

dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 47, 155, 164; administration of, xxiv-xxv, 5, 48, 49, 50, 56, 118-19, 159-60, 167, 177-78;

centralization of power in, 176-77, 191; decentralization plan of, 178; as MPLA-PT leader, 176-77, 178

dos Santos Franca, Antonio (Ndalu), 215 Duque de Braganca (fort), 17 Dutch settiers in Angola, 12, 14, 16

Dack Doy shipyards, 140 Dalby, David, 78 Dande River, 142 de Almeida, Roberto, 178, 185-86

de Andrade, Mario, 27, 236

DeBeers, 133 Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

224, 227

debt, external, 152, 154-55, 234

de Castro, Mendes Antonio, 248

Defense and Security Council, 165, 167-68, 178, 191; role of, 213

defense policy, 165

degredados (exiled criminals), xxi, 3, 16, 19, 209 Dembos people, 20, 72 Democratic Party of Angola (Partido

Democratico de Angola: PDA), 30 Denmark, 147

descent groups, 81-86 Diamang. See Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola: Diamang)

Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola: Diamang),

Eastern Revolt (1973), 170, 236

East Germany. See German Democratic

Republic

Economic and Financial Rectification (Saneamento Economico e Financeiro: SEF), 118-19 economic assistance: for fishing industry, 140-41; foreign, 120-22; in form of food aid, 138; from multilateral insti- tutions, 121; from Soviet Union, 38, 197; from United States, 38 economic performance, xxiii-xxiv, 113, 118, 119-20, 141-42, 144, 146, 232-

33; under Portuguese rule, 4 economic policy: effect of changes in, 90; move toward free enterprise of, 88; plan

to liberalize, xxiv, 115-16; reform for, 118-19

education system (see also literacy), 57; Angolans in Cuba, 102; foreign

teachers in, 102; levels of, 100; for mili- tary personnel, 230; of religious groups,

100; response to teacher shortage by, 102-3; teacher shortage in, 101; of UNITA, 103-4 304
Index

Egypt, 197, 207, 244

electric power industry (see also hydroelectric power), 113

Elf Aquitaine, 129

elites as interest group, 184 ELNA. See National Liberation Army of Angola (Exercito de Libertacao National de Angola: ELNA)

emigration, 113; of Africans (1961), 29;

after independence (1975), 44, 123

Enatel See National Telecommunications

Company (Empresa National de Tele- comunicacoes: Enatel) Encafe. See National Coffee Company

(Empresa National de Cafe: Encafe)

Encodipa. See National Company for the Marketing and Distribution of Agicultural Products (Empresa National de

Comercializacao e Distribuicao de Pro- dutos Agricolas: Encodipa)

Endiama. See National Diamond Company (Empresa nacional de Diamantes: Endiama)

Enes, Antonio, 20

enterprises, state-owned, 90, 117, 119,

132, 135, 140, 141, 146-47

Entex. See National Textile company

(Empresa Nacional de Texteis: Entex) EPA. See People's Army of Angola (Exercito Popular de Angola: EPA)

EPLA. See People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de

Libertacao de Angola: EPLA)

Escola de Oficiais Superiores Gomes Spencer, 230

Estado Novo. See New State ethnic groups, 55, 64-80 European Economic Community (EEC),

121-22 European Investment Bank, 122

Evangelical Church of Angola, 97, 185

Evangelical Church of South-West Angola, 97, 185

exports: of coffee, 120, 137-38; of dia- monds, 120, 132; of iron ore, 133, 135; of oil, 113, 116, 120, 129-30; to Portugal, 114

FALA. See Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas de

Libertacao de Angola: FALA)

famine, 29 FAO. See United Nations (UN)

FAPA/DAA. See People's Air and Air Defense Force of Angola (Forca Aerea

Popular de Angola/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea: FAPA/DAA)

FAPLA. See People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Ar- madas Populares de Libertacao de Angola: FAPLA)

farmers as interest group, 183-84

farms, commercial (see also farms, state- owned), 88

farms, state-owned, 88-89, 136

farms, subsistence (see also cooperatives, farm), 88-89, 184

fazendas, 114

Federal Republic of Germany: aid from,

122, 224; role in Namibia issue of, 49; trade relations with, 133

Ferrangol. See National Iron Ore Company of Angola (Empresa Nacional de Ferro de Angola: Ferrangol)

Ferreira Neto, Bartolomeu Feliciano, 249

fishing industry, 45, 140-41, 221 FLEC . See Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda:

FLEC)

FNLA. See National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de

Libertacao de Angola: FNLA)

FNLC . See National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front National pour la Liberation du Congo: FNLC)

food crisis, 120-22, 138

food-processing industry, 141, 142, 144

food rationing, 119

forced labor, 3, 4, 22-23, 24

foreign policy, xxv-xxvi, 191-92

forestry industry (see also timber production; wood processing), 140

France: aid from, 122, 137, 224; in Congo River Basin, 18-19; role in Namibia

issue of, 49; role in Zaire conflict, 207; trade relations with, 120-21, 131; workers from, 124 Franque, Luis Ranque, 33 Free Angola, 238

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave

of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda: FLEC), 34, 36, 73, 187, 206, 236, 237-38 305
Angola: A Country Study

Gabon, 130 Galvao, Henrique, 23 Gbadolite Declaration (1989), xxi, xxvi,

xxvii

geopolitical position, 206 German Democratic Republic, 124; mili- tary aid and personnel from, 44, 224,

227; trade relations with, 138; training

supplied by, 198 German South West Africa (see also Namibia), 77 Gorbachev, Mikhail S., xxv

government intervention: in Ovimbundu

affairs, 83-84; in private sector, 45 GRAE. See Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exfle: GRAE)

guerrilla activity, 5, 29-31, 159; cease-fire

in, 36; of MPLA and FNLA, 210; of SWAPO, 207; of UNITA, 46, 49, 63-64, 210

Guinea-Bissau, 35, 36, 196 Gulf Oil Company, 34, 126

Hanya people, 70

health care, 57, 61, 63, 104-8

herders of cattle, 88 Herero people, 70, 77-78

hills, 57, 60

Holland, 14

hospitals, 105, 108 Huambo, 63, 69, 106 Hufla Plateau, 60 Hufla Province, 46 human rights, 254-55 Humpata Highland, 60 Hungary, 122, 224, 227

hydroelectric power, 142; Capanda project for, 197; potential for, 60

ICO. See International Coffee Organization (ICO)

ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

illiteracy. See literacy Imbangala people, 12-13, 20 IMF. See International Monetary fund (IMF)

immigration: in nineteenth century, 19; of white people, 25 import licensing, 120, 121

imports: of food, 45, 116-17, 120-21,

144; government control of, 119-20,

142, 144; of military equipment, 120,

121, 217, 224-25; of oil industry equip- ment, 120-21; of services, 153; of steel, 146; of sugar, 144

independence: in 1975, 3, 4, 22, 40, 159; movements for, 4, 161 Independent Democrats, 236-37

indigenes, 23, 28, 161

industrial sector (see also manufacturing

sector): heavy industry in, 146-47; light industry in, 144, 146

inflation, 117

infrastructure (see also Benguela Railway;

electric power; ports; railroad system;

roads): destruction of, 115; develop- ment of, 21, 29, 114

Institute of Geology and Cartography, 102 insurgency (see also guerrilla activity): effect on economy of, 113; effect on education

of, 102, 103; of UNITA, xxiii, 29-31, 49-51, 55, 77, 80, 105-6, 115, 159

intelligence services, 225-26

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) interest groups, 183-87

International Coffee Organization (ICO), 138

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 105, 106

International Monetary Fund (IMF),

xxvi, 119, 155, 195

International Police for the Defense of the State (Policia Internacional de Defesa

de Estado: PIDE), 28

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 152

Intersputnik, 152

Interstate Journalism School, 190

investment: in manufacturing sector, 141; promotion of, 119

iron ore industry, 125, 133, 135, 150

irrigation, 60, 136

Isle of Youth (Cuba), 198

Israel, 244

Italy, 124, 140 ITM International, 132

Jaga people, 7, 9 Jamba, 103, 104, 108, 188, 242 Japan, 133, 140 306
Index

Jehovah's Witnesses, 186, 237 JMPLA. See Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement

(Juventude do Movimento Popular de

Libertacao de Angola: JMPLA)

Joint Military Monitoring Commission,

195, 206

Jorge, Paulo, 47, 178

judicial system, 169

Kanini, 12-13 Kapolo Martyrs Practical Police School, 249

Kasai River, Zaire, 13 Kasanje Kingdom, 6, 12-13 Katangan gendarmes (see also National Front for the Liberation of the Congo

(Front National pour la Liberation du

Congo: FNLC)), 245, 246 Katanga Province (Belgian Congo) (see also Shaba Region), 13, 21, 74 Kenya, 36 Khoisan speakers, 5-6, 79, 160 Kikongo speakers, 66, 72, 73

kimbanda. See diviner (kimbanda) Kimbundu speakers, 10, 20, 67, 71-72

Kinshasa, Zaire, 27, 30

kinship (see also descent groups), 81, 86

Kissassunda, Ludy, 247 Kongo Kingdom, 3, 6-7, 9-12, 18, 27,

66, 160, 208 Kuwait, 197, 244 Kwanhama (Kwanyama) Kingdom, 6 Kwanhama people, 14, 20, 77 kwanza, xxiv, 117

labor force (see also Angolanization law;

cooperants; forced labor; Statute on the Cooperant Worker): composition at in- dependence of, 122-23; exploitation of, 113-14; foreign workers in, 123-25; migrant workers and Europeans in, 63, 70; potential, 117; unions in, 163-64

land reform, 88-89

Language Map of Africa, 78

languages: Bantu, 64-65, 77-79; Chokwe, 75, 76; Click, 64, 79; Kikongo, 66,

72, 73; Kimbundu, 67, 71-72, 75; Kwangali-Ge;i :uru, 78; Liyuwa, 78; Lunda, 66, 75, 76; Mashi, 78; Minungu, 75; of Nganguela people, 76; North

Mbukushu, 78; Portuguese, 64-65, 67, 104; Ruund, 75, 76; South Mbukushu,

78; Suku, 66; Umbundu, 69-70

Lara, Lucio, 50, 178 law on State Intervention (1976), 45, 141 League of Nations, 26

Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, 27 Libya, 130

Lisbon, 26 Lisbon Geographical Society, 18

literacy, 100-101, 123

livestock, 135, 138

living standards, 90

Lobito (port), 21, 147, 150, 221 Lome Convention, 121, 122 Lonrho, 133

lowland, coastal, 57 Luanda: founding of (1576), 10; as modern port, 150, 220-21; musseques of, 86; as slave port, 15, 113 Luanda Naval School, 102 Luanda Railway, 150, 217 Lubango, 46, 78 Luchazi people, 76 Lunda-Chokwe peoples (see also Northern Lunda people; Southern Lunda people), 74-75 Lunda Divide, 60 Lunda Kingdom, or Empire, 6, 13, 74 Lunda Norte Province, 142 Lunda speakers, 66 Lunda Sul Province, 76 Lusaka, Zambia, 31 Lusaka Accord (1984), 194, 245 Lwena (Lovale) people, 76

maize-processing industry, 144 Malanje Plateau, 60 Malawi, 18, 197, 244 Maligo language. See Click languages;

languages

malnutrition, 138, 232

manikongo (Kongo king), 7, 10 manufacturing sector: for defense equip- ment, 217; labor force in, 123; nationalization of, 141; performance of, 117; under Portuguese rule, 141 Maoism, 32, 41 marriage, 91 Marxism-Leninism, 5, 27, 31, 41, 43, 44; as basis for education, 100; in court 307
Angola: A Country Study

system, 169; effect on religion of, 92-

94; influence on social structure of, 80, 87-88; institutions of, 56; of Jose dos

Santos, 176-77; of MPLA/MPLA-PT,

159-64; orientation of mass organizations in, 180 Massabi, 18 mass media, 189-91 mass organizations, xxv, 91, 92, 160, 180-83 Matamba Kingdom, 6, 12-13

matrilineage. See descent groups Mavinga, xxvii, 217 Mayombe (Maiombe) people, 34, 73 Mbanza Kongo (Mbanza Congo), 7 Mbui people, 69-70 Mbundu people, 10, 12-13, 15, 24, 55, 66-67, 71-72, 75-76, 82; as assimilados, 72; religious affiliation of, 97; as slave

traders, 160; social structure of, 84-86

medical assistance, foreign, 104 medical schools, 104

mercenaries, 39, 229

mestizos {see also assimilados), xxii, 3, 16, 19, 22, 25-26, 28, 55-56, 79-80, 160, 160-61; language of, 65, 66-67; in social structure, 87-88

Methodist Episcopal Church of the Unit- ed States, 97 MGPA. See People's Navy of Angola

(Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola: MGPA)

migration: effect of UNITA insurgency

on, xxiii, 63; patterns of, 63-64, 67; to urban areas, 24, 63, 117, 123

military assistance, 29-30, 224-27; from Cuba, 38, 40, 42, 43, 210; from South

Africa to FNLA-UNITA, 4-5, 39-40,

45, 208; from Soviet Union, 41-42, 43, 197; from Zaire, 210

military auxiliary forces, 221-22

military cooperation with Soviet Union, 43

Military Council of Angolan Resistance (Conselho Militar de Resistencia Angolana: Comira), 238

military councils, regional, 170, 213-14

military equipment: of air force, 219-20;

of army, 217, 219; imports and purchases of, 120-21, 227, 229, 234; ser- vice, repair, and manufacture of, 217, 219; of UNITA/FALA, 242

military expenditure. See spending,

defense

military ranks, 223-24

military recruitment, 233

military regions and fronts, 214, 215, 217, 229, 235

military tribunals, regional, 213-14, 224, 251

militia forces, 219, 247

mineral resources, 135 mining industry: for diamonds, 21; direct foreign investment for, 45; for iron ore, 133, 135; Law 5/79 of, 131-32, 133; Portuguese development of, 114

Ministry of Defense, 170, 217, 222, 246-48

Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade,

120 Ministry of Health, 105, 106 Ministry of Interior, 247, 248

Ministry of Justice, 169, 250

Ministry of Planning, 120 Ministry of State Security, 247-48, 251 Minungu people, 75

missionaries: Protestant, 95-96; Roman

Catholic, 95-96 MLEC . See Movement for the Liberation

of the Enclave of Cabinda (Mouvement

pour la Liberation de 1' Enclave de Cabinda: MLEC)

Mobilization and Recruitment Law

(1978), 222 Mobil Oil Company, 130 Mobutu Sese Seko, xxi, 30, 35, 42, 196, 206 Mocamedes (Namibe), 17, 78, 135 Moises, David Antonio, 212 monetary policy, 119 Morocco, 29, 197, 207, 244

mortality rates, 57, 62, 106 mountains, 57, 60 Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Mouvement pour la Liberation de 1' Enclave de Cabinda:

MLEC), 33 Moxico Province, 31, 75-76

Mozambique, 18, 20, 35, 113, 194, 196, 208 MPLA. See Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola: MPLA)

MPLA-PT. See Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers'

Party (Movimento Popular de Liber- tacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho: MPLA-PT)

308
Index

Mtoko, Simon (Simao Toco), 94, 186-87, 237

Mtokoists, 94, 186-87, 237

musseques, 64, 86-87

Namib Desert, 57 Namibe (port), 17, 78, 135, 140, 150-51, 221 Namibe Railway, 147, 150 Namibia, 14, 77, 78; border with, 57, 207, 248; occupation by South Africa

of, 49-50, 160, 191-92, 194; role of Canada in, 49; South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of, 39, 191, 221-22; status of, 48-50; training

ground for UNITA, 46, 242, 244

National Bank of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola: BNA), 120, 152, 154

National Coffee Company (Empresa Nacional de Cafe: Encafe), 137

National Company for the Marketing and

Distribution of Agricultural Products (Empresa Nacional de Comercializacao

e Distribuicao de Produtos Agncolas:

Encodipa), 118, 136

National Court Administration, 169 National Diamond Company (Empresa

Nacional de Diamantes: Endiama),

132-33

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola: FNLA), xxii, 4-5, 24, 27, 30-31, 36, 73-74, 161; in Angola, 35;

establishes government with UNITA

(1975), 40; grant from United States to, 38; loses support, 187; opposition to MPLA-PT by, 236; in provisional

government (1975), 38; relationship with Bakongo, xxii, 27, 73-74, 161 National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front National pour la Liberation du Congo: FNLC), 42, 76, 246

National Fuel Company of Angola (So- ciedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola: Sonangol), 124-31

National Health Service, 104-5

National Iron Ore Company of Angola

(Empresa Nacional de Ferro de Angola: Ferrangol), 133

nationalism, 23-24, 25, 34, 36-37, 161; Bakongo role in, 73-74; mestigo role in, 80, 161

nationalization, 45, 115, 117, 126-27,

137, 141 National Liberation Army of Angola (Exercito de Libertacao Nacional de Angola: ELNA), 29-30

National Literacy Commission, 101 National Party School, 41 National Petroleum Institute, 124

National Telecommunications Company

(Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicacoes: Enatel), 152

National Textile Company (Empresa Nacional de Texteis: Entex), 146 National Union for the Total Indepen- dence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para

a Independencia Total de Angola: UNITA), xxii, 4-5, 24, 35, 36; attacks on diamond industry of, 132; education system of, 103-4, 188; establishes government with FNLA (1975), 40;

ethnic representation in, 75, 77, 78, 94, 188-89; external military training for, 244; fighting with FAPLA of, xxvii, 231-32, 238-39; fighting with SWAPO

of, 222; formation and role of, 32, 187; health care system of, 104, 108, 188; infrastructure destruction by, xxvii, 142, 147, 150-51; insurgency of, 45, 49-51, 56, 57, 63, 75, 77, 80-81, 84, 90, 135, 137-38, 159-60, 186, 205, 238-39; military bases of, 84; military

organization of (FALA), 239-42; as opposition force, 236; in provisional

government (1975), 38; radio broadcasts of, 190; support from South Afri- ca for, 160, 162, 192; support from

United States for, 38, 194, 244

National Union of Angolan Workers

(Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores

Angolanos: UNTA), 105, 123, 163-64, 180-82

National Youth Day, 180

natural gas industry, 130

natural resources, 3 navy. See People's Navy of Angola (Marinha

de Guerra Popular de Angola: MGPA)

Ndembu (Ndembo) people, 74 Ndongo Kingdom, 6, 10-12, 208

Netherlands, 120-21

Neto, Agostinho, 5, 30, 31, 36, 39, 72, 161-62, 170; administration of, 41-42,

43, 44, 46-47, 94, 163; as MPLA leader, 176; opposition to, 236 309
Angola: A Country Study

Neto, Alberto Correia, 219

Neto, Ruth, 182-83 New State, Portugal, 3, 21, 23 Nganda people, 70 Nganguela (Ganguela) people, 76-77

ngola a kiluanje, 10, 12 Ngouabi, Merien, 31

Nigeria, 130, 162, 196, 221

Nitistas, 42-43, 164, 180 Nkomati Accord (1984), 246 Nonaligned Movement, 27 Northern Lunda people, 74 Northern Regional Enterprise for the Exploitation of Scrap Metal, 146 North Korea. See Democratic People's

Republic of Korea Nyaneka-Humbe people, 77 Nyasaland, 18 Nzinga, 12

Nzita, Henriques Tiago, 33-34

OAU. See Organization of African Unity (OAU)

OCA. See Organization of Angolan Communists (Organizacao das Comunistas

de Angola: OCA)

ODP. See People's Defense Organization

(Organizacao de Defesa Popular: ODP)

oil industry, 34, 45, 114, 115, 116, 117-

18; development and production of, 125-28; imports of equipment for, 120-21, 131; nationalization of, 126-

27; performance of, 113, 233; refining, 130; revenues from, 120, 125 Okavango River/Swamp, 60 OMA. See Organization of Angolan

Women (Organizacao da Mulher Angolana: OMA)

OPA. See Agostinho Neto Organization

of Pioneers (Organizacao dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto: OPA)

OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Organization of African Unity (OAU),

30-31, 36, 38-39, 162, 195-96

Organization of Angolan Communists

(Organizacao das Comunistas de Angola: OCA), 41 Organization of Angolan Women (Organizacao da Mulher Angolana:

OMA), 91, 103, 105, 180-82, 250

Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), 130

orthopedic centers, 106, 108 Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World (Mtokoists), 94, 97, 185, 186-87, 237 Ovambo people {see also South West Afri- ca People's Organization: SWAPO),

70, 77-78, 82, 207 Ovimbundu people, 13-14, 15, 19-20,

24, 55, 76, 77, 82; migration of, 63; social structure of, 83-84; in UNITA, 71

Paihama, Kundi, 47, 247-48

Paiva da Silva, Domingos, 219

Pan-African Congress, Third, 26 Pan-African News Agency, 191 Pan-African Women's Organization

(PAWO), 182-83

parallel market (black market) xxiv, 117, 119

Paris Club, 155 Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos

Africanos de Angola: PLUA), 26

patrilineage. See descent groups

Paulo, Juliao Mateus (Dino Matross),

212, 213, 247 PAWO. See Pan-African Women's Organization (PAWO)

PCP. See Portuguese Communist Party

(Partido Comunista Portugues: PCP)

PDA. See Democratic Party of Angola

(Partido Democratico de Angola: PDA)

People's Air and Air Defense Force of Angola (Forca Aerea Popular de Angola/Defesa Aerea y Antiaerea: FAPA/

DAA), 219-20

People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola: FAPLA),

xxvi, 39, 49; civil war against UNITA

of, 187; constitutional fiat for, 165, 235; equipment from Soviet Union for, 217;

foreign military forces in, 221-22; for- mation and development of, 210-11;

military performance of, 231-32; political control by MPLA of, 212-13;

role of ODP in, 219

People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola: EPLA), 210

People's Army of Angola (Exercito Popu310
Index

lar de Angola: EPA), 214

People's Assembly, xxv, 168, 170-71; as organ of MPLA-PT, 48; replaces Council of the Revolution (1980), 212

People's Defense Organization (Organizacao de Defesa Popular: ODP) {see also Directorate of People's Defense and

Territorial Troops), 91, 219, 247

People's Liberation Army of Namibia

(PLAN), 245-46

People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola: MGPA),

220-21

"people's power," 163, 165

People's Republic of Angola, 40

People's Revolutionary Tribunal, 250-51

People's Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas

Populares de Vigilancia: BPV), 92, 217, 246, 249-50 Permanent Commission, 168

Petrangol. See Petroleum Company of Angola (Companhia de Petroleos de Angola: Petrangol) Petroleum Company of Angola (Companhia de Petroleos de Angola: Petrangol), 125-26, 130 Petroleum Law (13/78) (1978), 126-27

phosphate deposits, 135

physicians, 108 PIDE. See International Police for the Defense of the State (Policia Internacional de Defesa de Estado: PIDE)

Piedade dos Santos, Fernando Dias da, 248-49

plains, high, 57 PLAN. See People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)

planalto. See plateau, high

plantations, 88, 115, 135-36, 144

plateau, high, 57, 60 PLUA. See Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola:

PLUA)

Poland, 224-25, 227

police: force, 248; functions, 219; school, 249

Political Bureau (MPLA-PT), 167, 168, 171-73

political system: anticolonial groups in, 26-27; elements of change in, xxviii; opposition to, 4; opposition to MPLAPT in, 236

Polytechnical Institute, 104

pombeiros, 15 Pombo people, 72-73

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- tacao de Angola: MPLA), xxii, 4-5,

24, 26-27, 30-31, 36, 75; bases in Afri- ca of, 170; competition with UNITA

by, 32-33, 159; in Congo (Zaire), 161; control of UNTA by, 163-64; defeats FNLA, 40-41; effect of counterinsur- gency on, 35; establishes government

(1975), 40, 159, 205; First Party Congress of, 41, 87, 164; incursions into Cabinda of, 34; Marxist orientation of, 160-63; as official government (1975),

41; political control of FAPLA by, 39, 212; in provisional government (1975), 38; support from Soviet Union to, 38, 205; ties to communist countries of, 31 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento

Popular de Libertacao de AngolaPartido de Trabalho: MPLA-PT), 41, 44, 46-47, 159, 213; Central Committee and Political Bureau of, xxv, 167,

168, 171-73, 191; ethnic group repre- sentation in, 77; First Party Congress

of, 41, 87, 164; foreign policy of, 191-200; government control by, 117; government of, xxv, 48; internal security mechanism of, 236; MarxistLeninist philosophy of, 56, 92-94,

159-60, 176; mestigos in, 80, 176; opposition to government of, 235-38;

party congress of, 173-74; president as head of, 167; regional military councils and tribunals of, 213-14; relations with

interest groups of, 183-87; role of OMA in, 182-83; Second Party Congress of, 50-51, 178; structure and

operation of, 171-74, 176, 191; subor- dination of People's Assembly to, 168-69; UNITA opposition to, 187-89 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement Quventude

do Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola: JMPLA), 91, 102-3,

180-81, 213

population: ages of, 62; distribution of, 57, 60, 62-63; estimates of, 55, 61; growth of, 61-63; ratio of Bakongo people in, 72; ratio of Lunda-Chokwe

311
Angola: A Country Study

peoples in, 74; ratio of Mbundu people in, 71; ratio of Ovimbundu in, 69;

ratio of Portuguese in, 22; structural changes in, 63-64

ports, 135, 150-51, 220-21

Portugal: advisers and training assistance from, 221, 229; Angola as colony of, xxi-xxii, 3-4, 10, 17-19, 113-15, 160, 208-9; anticolonial expression toward,

26-28, 209; cedes independence, 40;

colonial policy of, 20-22, 24, 209; cooperation of South Africa with, 39; counterinsurgency of, 34-35, 210; coup

d'etat in, 21, 162; domestic problems

of, 16-17; effect of wars in Africa on,

35; expansion in Angola of, 17-18; ex- ploration of, 7; loans from, 154; mili- tary presence of, 20, 28-29, 35-36, 229; New State regime in, 3, 21, 23; policy

for economic development of, 114; set- tlement policy of, 25, 83-84; trade re- lations with, 121 ; UNITA students in, 104; workers from, 124 Portuguese Communist Party (Partido

Comunista Portugues: PCP), 27, 161 Portuguese Enterprises Corporation (So- ciedade Portuguesa de Empreendimentos: SPE), 132-33

Portuguese in Angola, xxii, 3, 63, 78, 79, 87, 88, 114, 117, 124, 135, 141

precipitation, 57, 61

president, 165, 167; dual role of, 214

press representatives, international, 190

price system, 119

prison system, 252

privatization, 90, 119

Protestant religions, 56, 97, 185-86; in Angola proper, 97; relations with gov- ernment of, 94

Public Telecommunications Company

(Empresa Publica de Telecomunicacoes: Eptel), 152 purge by MPLA-PT, 42, 164

racial conflict (see also assimilados; indige- nas; mestigos), 22

racial discrimination, 4, 160-61 Radio Nacional de Angola, 190

railroad defense committees, 217

railroad system, Angola, 135, 147, 150

railroad system, Central Africa, 147 Reagan, Ronald, 130-31

rebellions, 28-29, 170, 236

rectification campaign, 180, 183, 186 Redinha, Jose, 78 Reformed Evangelical Church of Angola, 97, 185

refugees, 29, 61, 73-74, 80-81; camps

for, 105-6, 113, 232; from Katanga,

75-76; Ovimbundu people as, 84; refuge status of Angola as, 224-46

religion: effect of Marxism-Leninism on, 92-94; indigenous, 97-99

religious communities as interest group, 185-87, 237

religious institutions, 56

repair facilities, military, 217, 219, 220-21

resettlement program: for Ovimbundu

people, 83-84; of Portugal, 34-35, 91, 210

Revolutionary Cabindan Committee (Co- mite Revolutionnaire Cabindais), 34

Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exflo: GRAE), 30

Rhodesia, 18

river navigation, 60

river systems, 60, 142

roads, 29, 114, 147 Roan Selection Trust (RST) International, 132

Roberto, Holden, 30, 32, 36, 39, 187, 237

Rodrigues, Manuel Alexandre (Kito), 47, 248-49 Roman Catholic Church: relations with government of, 93-94, 237; ties to Portugal of, 186 Roman Catholicism, 56, 96-97 Romania, 227 Roque Santeiro (market), 90 Ruacana hydroelectric complex, 39-40

rubber industry: boom in, 21; Ovimbundu people in, 70 Rundu, Namibia, 242 Ruund people (see also Northern Lunda

people; Southern Lunda people), 74-75

Sa da Bandeira, Marques de, 17 Sa da Bandeira (town), 78 SACOR, 126 SADCC. See Southern Africa Develop- ment and Coordination Council

(SADCC)

312
Index

SADF. See South African Defense Force (SADF)

Salazar, Antonio, xxii, 21, 209; administration of, 3-4, 23, 25, 29; colonial eco- nomic policy of, 34 Sao Tome and Principe, 196, 215 Saudi Arabia, 197, 244

Savimbi, Jonas, 32, 36, 39, 71, 103; es- tablishes UNITA, 187; as leader of UNITA, 238-39; religious issue of, 186; role in Gbadolite Declaration, xxi; support from other African countries

for, 38

Scandinavia, 124

scrap metal industry, 146

Sebastiao (king of Portugal), 9

security, internal, 236; forces and organi- zation of, 246-50

SEF. See Economic and Financial Rectifi- cation (Saneamento Economico e Financeiro: SEF)

Senegal, 197, 244

Serra da Chela mountain range, 60

sertanejos (people of the frontier), 20

service sector, 123 Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 97, 185, 186 Shaba Region, Zaire, 13, 21, 42, 75-76,

147, 196

Shell Oil Company, 130

Shinji people, 75

shipyards, 140

Silva, Jose Adao, 249

slavery, 3, 16, 17

slave trade, xxi, 3, 7-8, 10, 11, 14-16,

113, 208; Ovimbundu people in, 70; Portuguese in, 14-16, 17

social structure (see also descent groups;

kinship): Africans in, 22-24, 27-28; ef- fect of UNITA insurgency on, 91-92;

influence of Marxism-Leninism on, 80; of Mbundu people, 84-86; of Ovimbundu people, 83-84; of Portuguese

colonialism, 24; in rural areas, 88-90;

units of, 81 Solongo people, 73 Somalia, 197, 244

Sonangol. See National Fuel Company of Angola (Sociedade Nacional de Combustfveis de Angola: Sonangol)

sorcerer, 98-99

Sosso people, 72 South Africa: incursions and border war

with, 46, 162, 194, 205, 206, 244-45; involvement in Angola of, 39, 43; mili- tary action against SWAPO of, 207-8,

245; refugees from, 61; role in Namibia

of, 49-50, 160, 191-92, 194, 205, 206-7; support and sponsorship of UNITA by, xxvii, 4-5, 45, 160, 162,

192, 205, 207-8, 210, 238, 242; troops

in Angola, xxiii, xxvii, 5, 40, 44, 49, 133, 135, 138, 207-8

South African Air Force (SAAF), 49, 242 South African Defense Force (SADF), 46, 207; Operation Protea of, 49; support

for UNITA by, 49, 210 Southern Africa Development and Coordination Council (SADCC), 124, 125, 150, 196 Southern Lunda people, 74-75

South West Africa People's Organization

(SWAPO), 39, 46, 49, 78; base and activity in Angola of, 191-92, 207, 244-46; MPLA-PT support for, 244; PLAN: military wing of, 245

Soviet Union: agreements with, 140, 142; Angolans studying in, 102; in education system, 102, 198, 230; loans from,

154; military advisers and supplies

from, 5, 38, 40, 152, 162, 226, 229;

military supplies to FAPLA from, xxvi, 217, 224-25; political support of, 27, 194; presence in Angola of, 49; rela- tions with, 197-98; support for MPLA

by, xxiii, 4-5, 31, 162; technical as- sistance from, 122, 197, 220-21,

225-27; trade relations with, 120-21,

198; treaty with, 43

Sozinho, Antonio Eduardo, 33

Spain: agreements with, 140; assistance from, 224; trade relations with, 120-21; workers from, 124 SPE. See Portuguese Enterprises Corporation (Sociedade Portuguesa de Empreendimentos: SPE)

spending, defense, xxiv, 116, 118, 233-35

spending, government, 116, 118, 141 Spmola, Antonio de, 35-36, 38

spirits, religious, 98-99

states or kingdoms, indigenous, 3, 6, 10, 69

Statute on the Cooperant Worker, 124-25

steel industry, 146

subsidies: for coffee industry, 137; plan

to eliminate, 119 313
Angola: A Country Study

sugar industry, 144 Suku speakers, 66 Supreme Court, 169 SWAPO. See South West Africa People's

Organization (SWAPO)

Sweden, 122

Switzerland, 224

TAAG. See Angola Airlines (Linhas Aereas de Angola: TAAG)

Tanzania, 31, 208, 244

technical assistance, 122; to agricultural

sector, 136; from Soviet Union, 122, 197, 220-21, 225-27

telecommunications, 151-52

telecommunications industry, 113 Texaco Oil Company, 126, 131 Textang-I, 146

Textang-II, 144

textile industry, 144, 146 TGFA. See Angolan Border Guard (Tropa

Guarda Fronteira Angolana: TGFA)

timber production, 140 Togo, 197 Tombua, 140-41 Tonha, Pedro Maria (Pedale), 214

training: medical, 108; military, 229-31;

police, 248-49; technical, 124, 230-31

transportation system, 90, 113, 147-51 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,

Angola-Soviet Union (1975), 43, 197

Tunisia, 29, 197, 244

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 81

Ui'ge Province, 28, 63 Umbundu speakers, 69-70 Umkhonto we Sizwe, 246 UNDP. See United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP)

UNICEF. See United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNIDO. See United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola: UPA), 27, 29-30, 73-74, 161-62 Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, 97, 185 Union of Peoples of Northern Angola

(Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola: UPNA), 27, 161

Union of Young Communists' School, Cuba, 198 UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola: UNITA)

United Church of Christ, 187 United Methodist Church, 97, 185 United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF), 106 United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), 146 United Nations Industrial Development

Organization (UNIDO), 146 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 194 United Nations (UN): Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 137; membership in, 162; protest by African Agnolans to, 26; role in 1961 uprising,

29; Security Council Resolution 435

(1978), 194; World Food Programme

(WFP), 122, 137 United States: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of, 39, 62; Clark Amendment,

200; Export-Import Bank of, 131; fund- ing and support for FNLA and UNITA, xxiii, xxv-xxvii, 4-5, 38, 44, 199, 238, 244; relations with, 197, 199; role in civil war of, 162, 199; role in Namibia issue of, 49-50, 51; trade re- lations with, 120-21, 131

universities, 102, 124, 198

University of Angola, 124 UNTA. See National Union of Angolan

Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabal- hadores Angolanos: UNTA)

UNTAG. See United Nations Transition

Assistance Group (UNTAG)

UPA. See Union of Angolan Peoples

(Uniao das Populacoes de Angola:

UPA)

UPNA. See Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (Uniao das Populacoes do

Norte de Angola: UPNA)

urban areas, 105, 108

Van Dunem, Afonso (Mbinda), 199 Van Dunem, Fernando Jose de Franca

Dias, 251 Van Dunem, Jose, 42

vehicle assembly industry, 146-47, 219 314
Index

Vieira, Armindo Fernandes do Espirito Santo, 249 Vinama, Alberto Joaquim, 241 Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 190 von Bismarck, Otto, 18

wages, 123 war for independence (1961-74), xxii, 29-36, 209-10

water supply system, 141 West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany

WFP. See United Nations (UN)

wheat-milling industry, 144

witches, 98-99 women: in military role, 92, 223; role in society of, 90-91; in UNITA/FALA,

241 wood-processing industry, 144 World Bank: membership in, 119, 155, 195 World Health Organization, 106 Xindonga people, 78

Xu-Angola language. See Click languages;

language

Yugoslavia, 122, 224, 22

Zaire, 13, 21, 27, 45, 147; Bakongo people in, 72, 196; border with, 42, 57, 60, 207, 248; haven for FNLA and FLEC,

206; Katangan gendarmes in Angola,

246; Katanga Province in, 75; Ndembu people in, 74; refugees in, 80, 197, 209; relations with Angola of, 196, 206-7; Shaba Region of, 75-76, 196, 207; support for UNITA by, xxvii, 196, 207, 244; support from China for, 199; withdraws support for FLEC, 237 Zambezi River, 60 Zambia, 18, 45, 78, 147; assistance from and relations with, 31, 206, 208; border

with, 57, 248; citizen support for UNITA, 196-97, 244; Ndembu people in, 74; refugees in, 77, 80, 197; sup- port for MPLA-PT of, 196 Zimbabwe, 18, 121, 208

315

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-87 Greece 550-98 Albania 550-78 Guatemala

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317
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550-27 Sudan

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318





PIN: 004225-000