United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“Reform programs may 

be inappropriate for local 

contexts, or are corrupted 

or terminated before their 

completion. In the worst 

cases, local security forces 

that are trained and equipped 

by international experts are 

politicized and used as tools 

for repression rather than the 

promotion of democracy.”

February 16, 2010 

Local Ownership of Security Sector 

Reform

Summary

• Security sector reform (SSR) is a highly complex and political process involving a range of 

international and local actors. There is a growing policy consensus that sustainability is a 

critical component of success for SSR programs, and that early local ownership is a critical 

component of sustainability. 

• Practitioners face several obstacles to achieving local ownership, particularly in con ict 

a ected countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. To overcome these obstacles and e ectively 

promote local ownership, international actors must answer three important questions:

• First, what are we trying to achieve? Despite the apparent consensus on the importance of 

local ownership, the de nition of local ownership is still debated. 

• Second, which locals should take ownership of SSR? It is often di cult for international 

donors to select partners, since local actors often have competing visions and priorities. 

• Finally, how do we measure success? In evaluating SSR programs, should international or local 

values and priorities be used to judge the success of SSR programs? 

Local Ownership is Abundant in Policy but Absent in Practice

Security sector reform (SSR) is the complex task of transforming the institutions and organizations 

that deal directly with security threats to the state and its citizens.1 SSR can be a powerful tool 

for con ict prevention, but it is used most often in post-con ict environments. External actors 

assisting with post-con ict reconstruction establish programs to reform the military and police 

forces that protect citizens and the state. Eventually, the host nation takes on responsibility for 

these forces and reform programs. However, this transition from donor to local ownership often 

fails short of success. Reform programs may be inappropriate for local contexts, or are corrupted 

or terminated before their completion. In the worst cases, local security forces that are trained and 

equipped by international experts are politicized and used as tools for repression rather than the 

promotion of democracy. In order to avoid such unintended consequences, SSR programs must 

begin by incorporating local priorities and local ownership from the planning stage and insuring 

local participation in the implementation of programs throughout. 

International donors have adopted guidelines that encourage local ownership of reform 

programs. The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) guidelines 

on Security Sector Reform and Governance devote a chapter to encouraging donors to facilitate 

LIZ PANARELLI

E-mail: lpanarelli@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3875

PEACEBRIEF11
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

national leadership of SSR programs. According to the OECD, “External actors need to orient their 

assistance to supporting local stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than leading them down it.”2

 The United Nations has outlined 10 guiding principles for SSR, four of which 

relate to local ownership.3 The United States guidelines on SSR list “support host nation ownership” 

as the  rst of six guiding principles. 4

Despite this consensus within the donor community, SSR programs are still most often driven 

in practice by donor priorities and timelines. In Afghanistan, the priority donors assign to counterinsurgency and counter narcotics operations trump those of the afghan population for personal 

safety and control of common crime. As a result, U.S police training programs stress military skills 

and counterinsurgency tactics, while other countries have programs that re ect various national 

priorities and levels of resources. 5 This gap between doctrine and practice is exacerbated by dif-

 culties with donor coordination complex operations and the challenges of working in an insecure 

environment. The gap also reveals tensions around goals and benchmarks for success. 

What Are We Trying to Achieve? Local Buy-In Is Not Enough

The  rst question facing international actors is what exactly they are trying to achieve by promoting local ownership. The answer is seemingly simple: sustainability. When local actors are not 

involved in designing, implementing, and  nancing reform programs, the resulting programs are 

inappropriate for local contexts. They are often  nancially unrealistic without donor support and 

may be rejected by the local population. Appropriate local ownership of SSR programs often fails 

because donors neglect the development of national ministries that manage and support local 

security forces and concentrate only on training and equipping personnel. 

There is a fundamental tension between supporting robust international SSR programs and 

supporting robust local ownership. There is a growing consensus among donors on the norms and 

values upon which the security sector should operate. This vision of a “reformed” security sector is 

citizen-oriented, accountable to the rule of law, and controlled by democratically elected governments. “Successful” SSR programs create institutions that are similar to those in Western countries 

regardless of whether they are completely appropriate in the local context. In many countries, 

collective governance and religion-based legal systems are the norm for large sections of society, 

particularly in rural areas. Such traditional systems may con ict with universal standards of human 

rights, particularly with regard to women and minorities. Promoting local ownership risks promoting norms that con ict with international standards.

Faced with tight deadlines and insecure environments, donors set priorities and move ahead 

with SSR programs. Viewing a robust approach to local ownership as idealistic, they try instead 

for the next best thing, which is “local buy in” for donor-driven programs. This limited objective is 

justi ed based on such practical considerations as urgency, local corruption, and a lack of local 

capacity to develop and implement programs. However, the failure to achieve genuine local 

ownership ultimately leads to the failure of the programs at great cost to donors, host nations, and 

the very priorities donors identi ed as justi cation for donor-driven programs.

Who Among Locals Should Own Security Sector Reform? 

One obstacle to promoting local ownership of SSR programs is that local actors may have competing visions and priorities and inadequate resources for security sector reform. Local actors may 

simply lack the technical skills to play a leading role in designing SSR programs. Control of the 

armed forces is a highly political issue and local actors may not be able to reach consensus or may 

have alternative agendas. Corruption is often rampant and external actors must be cautious about 

Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform

page 2 • PB 11 • February 16, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

which local leaders they seek to empower. As a result, international donors often undertake the 

assessment, planning and design stages of reform programs unilaterally. 

In fact, the process of developing a shared national vision among local actors for the security 

sector is a crucial  rst step toward ensuring that the reform processes is truly e ective. While 

the technical knowledge of local actors may be limited, the discussion can be framed in terms 

of the fundamental questions that are accessible to all: How did we get here? What are the threats 

to our security? What institutions do we need to address these threats? How will these institutions relate to one another? How will these institutions be  nanced? This dialogue can result in 

a national security outline, which identi es priorities for donors to support. Participation in this 

national strategic planning exercise gives local actors a stake in the implementation of resulting 

programs. 

External actors have important roles and responsibilities as facilitators of this dialogue. In 

particular, international facilitators must closely monitor which locals are driving the dialogue 

process. They can provide necessary funding, space and support to ensure that nonelite members 

of society are engaged. Involving civil society at an early stage practically informs the debate about 

realities on the ground, increases the likelihood that resulting programs will be locally appropriate 

and sustainable, and also encourages civil society to hold security forces and their leadership 

accountable. In some cases, the United Nations may be better placed to facilitate dialogue than 

bilateral actors with colonial or con ict-related relationships to the host country.

Facilitating SSR dialogue is a risky, complicated, highly political process. Participants may try to 

subvert or undermine the process or emphasize individual or group interests at the expense of the 

common good. Without this national conversation, however, subsequent programming will be 

unsustainable. The dialogue and the space for local actors to publicly voice opinions on policy and 

reach compromises is a fundamental  rst step in the reform process. 

How Do We Measure Successful Local Ownership?

A  nal question with which SSR implementers must grapple is how to measure success. Local 

ownership is di cult to de ne, but it is even more di cult to measure. Metrics for SSR programs 

are generally limited to the number of individuals that are trained and equipped with little reference to whether these personnel can actually perform their functions and make an impact. Donor 

control of programs and resources mean project implementers are responsible to foreign governments or nongovernmental organizations rather than to the host nation o cials and citizens. This 

distorted chain of accountability is exacerbated by the use of private security companies, which 

may subcontract functions to other  rms and utilize personnel from numerous countries. Commercial  rms may be more interested in generating pro ts for stockholders rather than in providing services further confusing the issue of accountability. In order to ensure e ective government 

oversight, local actors should establish their own metrics for success. Local systems for monitoring 

and evaluation should be part of the national dialogue and resulting policy. 

Questions of  nancing must also be part of the conversation between foreign donors and 

national governments from the start. In order to genuinely own SSR programs, host governments 

must invest their own resources. Including local  nancing helps size forces and institutions to what 

the host country will ultimately be able to sustain after donor support has been withdrawn. A shift 

towards host nations setting their own priorities and visions for their SSR programs inherently 

forces donors to relinquish control over programs, and increases the likelihood of the e cient 

transfer of programs to local control and maintenance over time. 

Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform

page 3 • PB 11 • February 16, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

202.457.1700

www.usip.org

ABOUT THIS BRIEF

This report summarizes views 

expressed at a public meeting 

of USIP’s Security Sector Reform 

Working Group on “Local 

Ownership of Security Sector 

Reform (SSR)” on December 

15, 2009. Panelists included 

Timothy Donais, editor of “Local 

Ownership and Security Sector 

Reform,” published by the Geneva 

Centre for the Democratic Control 

of Armed Forces, Adedeji Ebo, 

chief of the SSR Unit at the United 

Nations, Marc Cohen, co-author 

of “Protect and Serve or Train 

and Equip?,” published by Oxfam 

America, and Aleisha Arnusch, 

lead SSR researcher at the Pearson 

Peacekeeping Centre in Canada. 

Robert Perito, who directs USIP’s 

Security Sector Governance Initiative, moderated the panel. 

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end confl icts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the fi eld of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the offi ce 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

Recommendations

Neither foreign donors nor local actors alone have the combination of political will,  nancial 

resources, technical skills, local knowledge, and sustainable presence required to achieve success. 

Like all democratic processes, SSR is messy, multidirectional, unpredictable, and highly political. 

Donors must recognize that the consultative process and national dialogue are just as important 

as the outcome. This process, in which locals negotiate with donors and with each other, is di cult 

but absolutely critical. 

External actors should focus on facilitating dialogue and supporting the development of a 

national security policy. This policy can provide a framework for future donor support and coordination under the priorities set by the national government. 

Donors should ensure that civil society, minorities, women, rural populations, and representatives of non-state security systems are given voice in these discussions and have a stake in the 

resulting policy and process. 

The dialogue should include discussions of how success will be monitored and to whom reform 

practitioners will be held accountable. Host-nation  nancing must be a key element of this discussion and could provide a useful metric for local ownership.

Local and international actors should move beyond a “foreign” versus “local” ownership mindset 

and acknowledge that a hybrid approach is necessary. Realistic planning and implementation will 

be facilitated with the acknowledgment that the process is di cult, context-speci c and requires 

genuine cooperation between local and external actors. 

Donors must shift their funding outlook to a longer-term view of supporting SSR programs in 

other countries. Donor priorities must go beyond immediate stabilization to looking at the sustainability of programs and preventing a relapse into violence. 

Endnotes

1. Sean McFate. “Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Con ict Countries” 

U.S. Institute of Peace, September 2008, page 2.

2. Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation. “Security Sector Reform and 

Governance” 2005, page 33.

3. United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council. “Securing peace and 

development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” Report of the 

Secretary-General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, January 23, 2008.

4. U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of 

Defense. “Security Sector Reform,” February 2009, page 4. 

5. Robert Perito. “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform,” U.S. Institute of 

Peace, August 2009.

6. Robert Perito. “The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 

May 2009.

Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform

page 4 • PB 11 • February 16, 2010