Elbridge A. Colby

Michael S. Gerson

Editors

Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling 

Strategic 

Stability:

Contending 

Interpretations

Strategic 

Stability:

Contending 

Interpretations

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Strategic Studies Institute 

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

STRATEGIC STABILITY:

CONTENDING INTERPRETATIONS

Elbridge A. Colby

Michael S. Gerson

Editors

February 2013

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THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY:

THE UNITED STATES AND THE

THREAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK

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CHAPTER 7

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL,

AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN EUROPE

Jeffrey D. McCausland

INTRODUCTION

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

and 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editors

Mr. Elbridge A. Colby

Mr. Michael S. Gerson

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE