area handbook series

South Korea

a country study



South Korea

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Andrea Matles Savada

and William Shaw

Research Completed

luneJ 990
On the cover: North Watchtower, Suwon Castle

Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1992.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

South Korea : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library

of Congress ; edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William

Shaw. —4th ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA

pam ; 550-41)

'

' Research completed July 1 990 . '

'

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 347-375) and index.

ISBN 0-8444-0736-4

1. Korea (South). I. Savada, Andrea Matles, 1950-

II. Shaw, William, 1944- . III. Library of Congress. Federal

Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550-41.

DS902.S68 1992 91-39109

951.95—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-41

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 204-02
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by

the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under

the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program sponsored by the

Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other

published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

iii

Acknowledgments

This edition supercedes South Korea: A Country Study published

in 1982. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portions

of that edition in the preparation of the current book.

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division

of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book.

Sandra W. Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of

all parts of the book. Robert L. Worden also reviewed parts of the

book and made numerous suggestions and points of clarification. Timothy L. Merrill assisted in the preparation of some of the maps,

checked the content of all of the maps, and reviewed the sections on geography and telecommunications. Thanks also go to David P. Cabitto, who designed the cover and chapter art and provided

graphics support; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and

production and edited portions of the manuscript; Andrea T.

Merrill, who provided invaluable assistance with regard to tables

and figures; and Barbara Edgerton, Alberta Jones King, and Izella Watson, who performed word processing.

The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United

States government agencies who gave their time and special

knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country StudiesArea Handbook Program for the Department of the Army; Cho

Sung Yoon, Far Eastern Law Division, Library of Congress, who re- viewed the sections of the manuscript on the judiciary and the legal

system; and John Merrill of the Department of State, who reviewed

the text and also offered suggestions and points of clarification. The editors are also grateful to several academic experts on

Korea: Gari K. Ledyard, Robert Ramsey, and Donald N. Clark.

Although they provided advice on specific issues, they are in no way responsible for the views found in the book. In addition, the

editors wish to thank various members of the staff of the Embassy

of the Republic of Korea in Washington for their assistance.

Others who contributed were Harriett R. Blood and Greenhorne

and O'Mara, who assisted in the preparation of maps and charts;

Katherine Young, who edited portions of the manuscript; Catherine

Schwartzstein, who performed final prepublication editorial review,

and Joan C. Cook, who prepared the index. Linda Peterson and

Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Composing Unit pre- pared camera-ready copy, under the direction of Peggy Pixley. The

inclusion of photographs was made possible by the generosity of

various individuals and public and private agencies.

v

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile xv Introduction xxiii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Chong-Sik Lee

ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN NATION 3 THE THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD 4 THE EVOLUTION OF KOREAN SOCIETY 7

Silla 7 Koryo 7 THE CHOSON DYNASTY 9 CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETY UNDER

THE DYNASTIES 15 Cultural Expression 15 Korean Identity 18

Political and Social Institutions 19 KOREA UNDER JAPANESE RULE 20

WORLD WAR II AND KOREA 24

SOUTH KOREA UNDER UNITED STATES

OCCUPATION, 1945-48 25

Economy and Society 29

Establishment of the Republic of Korea 30

THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-53 31 THE SYNGMAN RHEE ERA, 1948-60 33

The Political Environment 33

Society under Rhee 35

The Postwar Economy 36

THE DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE 36

SOUTH KOREA UNDER PARK CHUNG HEE,

1961-79 38

The Military in Politics 39

Economic Development 43

Society under Park 45

Foreign Relations 50

vii
THE TRANSITION 52

The Democratic Republican Party 53

The New Democratic Party 53

STUDENTS IN 1980 54

GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN TAKES OVER 54

The Kwangju Uprising 55

The Chun Regime 56

The 1980 Constitution 57

Purges 57

Chun's "Cultural Revolution" 58

Economic Performance 59

Foreign Policy 59

The Demise of the Chun Regime 61 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 67

Donald M. Seekins

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 70

Land Area and Borders 70

Topography and Drainage 71 Climate 72 POPULATION 75 Population Trends 77 Population Settlement Patterns 79

Urbanization 81 Koreans Living Overseas 86

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUES 88

Traditional Social Structure 91 The Emergence of a Modern Society 94

Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea 96

Traditional Family Life 99

Family and Social Life in the Cities 102

Changing Role of Women 104

CULTURAL IDENTITY 108

Korea and Japan 109

The Korean Language Ill EDUCATION 114

Primary and Secondary Schools 116

Higher Education 118

College Student Activism 121 RELIGION 122

Religious Traditions 122

Religion in Contemporary South Korea 127

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 128

Health Conditions 129

vin
Health Care and Social Welfare 130

Chapter 3. The Economy 135

Daniel Metraux

THE JAPANESE ROLE IN KOREA'S ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 139

THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 140

Industrial Policies 143

Economic Plans 144

Revenues and Expenditures 145

THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS 146

The Origins and Development of Chaebol 147

The Role of Public Enterprise 149

Pohang Iron and Steel Company 150

Korea Electric Power Corporation 152

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT 153

INDUSTRY 155

Steel 156

Electronics 157

Shipbuilding 157

Automobiles and Automotive Parts 158

Armaments 160

Construction 160

Textiles and Footwear 161 Chemicals 161 ENERGY 162

AGRICULTURE 163

Major Crops 165

Forestry and Fishing 167

The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s 168

Prospects 170

SERVICE INDUSTRIES 170

Money and Banking 171 Small and Medium-Sized Businesses 174

THE LABOR FORCE 175

Wages and Living Conditions 176

Industrial Safety 178

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 178

Roads 178

Subways and Railroads 181

Civil Aviation 182

IX
Telecommunications 182

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 183

Aid, Loans, and Investment 183

Foreign Trade Policy 188

Exports and Imports 188

KOREA IN THE YEAR 2000 190

The Setting 190

The Role of Science and Technology 191 The Economic Future 193

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 197

William Shaw

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 200

THE GOVERNMENT 205

The Legislature 205

The Executive 206

The State Council 208

The Presidential Secretariat 210

The Judiciary 210

The Civil Service 211

Local Administration 214

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 215

Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987 215

Events in 1988 219

Returning to the Politics of National

Security, 1989 225

Parties and Leaders 228

Interest Groups 233

POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND POLITICAL

VIOLENCE 239

HUMAN RIGHTS 243

THE MEDIA 246

Roy U.T. Kim

FOREIGN POLICY 250

Organization and Operation 250

Basic Goals and Accomplishments 251

Relations with the United States 255

Relations with the Soviet Union , 256

Relations with Japan 259

Relations with China 260

Relations with North Korea 261

Relations with International Organizations and

the Third World 263

Future Prospects 264

x
Chapter 5. National Security 267

Rodney P. Katz

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 271

Koguryo, Silla, and Koryo Kingdoms 271

The Choson Dynasty and the Japanese

Colonial Period 272

The South Korean Army after World War II 274

War on the Korean Peninsula 275

South Korea's Response to the North Korean

Military Buildup 276

THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 279

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE

ARMED FORCES 281

Army 281

Air Force 285

Navy and Marine Corps 286 Reserve and Civil Defense Forces 287

Recruitment, Training, and Conditions of Service . . . 288

Officers and Noncommissioned Officers 290

Enlisted Personnel 291

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 291

DEFENSE SPENDING AND MILITARY

PRODUCTION 293

Defense Spending 293

Military Production 295

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR WAR 297

United States Forces in Korea 298

South Korean and United States Cooperation 302

Guy R. Arrigoni

INTERNAL SECURITY 303

The Threat from the North 303

Seoul's Response 305

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 311

The Agency for National Security Planning 311

The Defense Security Command 314

KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE 317

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 322

Crime 325

Criminal Procedure 325

Appendix. Tables 333

Bibliography 347

Glossary 377

xi
Index 381

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of South Korea, 1990 xxii

2 Korea During the Three Kingdoms Period, Fifth to Sixth Centuries A.D 6

3 South Korea in Its Asian Setting, 1990 26

4 Topography and Drainage 74

5 Average Annual Rainfall 76

6 Population Growth Rate, Selected Years, 1949-85 80

7 Rural and Urban Population Distribution, Selected

Years, 1955-85 82

8 Increase in Licensed Health Care Personnel, Selected Years, 1955-85 132

9 Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 1988 164

10 Employment by Sector, 1980 and 1988 166

11 Transportation System, 1988 180

12 Structure of the Government, 1989 208

13 Comparative Growth of the Armed Forces of South

Korea and North Korea, 1950-90 278

14 Deployment of South Korean and United States Forces

in South Korea, 1990 282

15 Officer and Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1990 292

16 Comparison of Defense Expenditures, South Korea

and North Korea, 1978-88 294

17 Organization of South Korean and United States Forces

in South Korea, 1988 300

18 Organization of the Korean National Police, 1989 320

xii
Preface

Like its predecessor, this study attempts to review the history

and treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social,

political, economic, and military aspects of South Korea. Under

Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president of the Sixth Republic

in 1987 (as well as under the previous president, Chun Doo Hwan,

1980-87), South Korea has been struggling to maintain its eco- nomic successes. Movement in more democratic directions has been

much slower than economic development. Political unrest, labor

strikes, and student agitation continued to challenge the government in the early 1990s.

Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, for- eign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and

international organizations, and numerous periodicals on Korean

and East Asian affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end

of the book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable

sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each

chapter. A Glossary also is included.

Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases those

approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names.

However, the generic parts appended to some geographic names

have been dropped and their English equivalents substituted: for example, Cheju Island, not Cheju-do, and South Ch'ungch'ong

Province, not Ch'ungch'ong-namdo. The name South Korea has

been used where appropriate in place of the official name, Republic of Korea. The McCune-Reischauer system of transliteration

has been employed, except in cases of the names of some prominent national figures, internationally recognized corporations, and

the city of Seoul, where the more familiar journalistic equivalent

is used. The names of Korean authors writing in English are spelled as given.

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion table

is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric

measurements (see table 1, Appendix).

The body of the text reflects information available as of June

1990. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been updated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- curred since the completion of research, and the Bibliography

includes recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful

to the reader.

Xlll

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Republic of Korea.

Short Form: South Korea.

Term for Citizens: Korean(s).

Capital: Seoul.

Date of Independence: August 15, 1948.

Geography

Location and Size: Strategic location in waters of the Sea ofJapan,

Korea Strait, and Yellow Sea. Total land area of Korean Peninsula,

including islands, 220,847 square kilometers; approximately 98,477

square kilometers (44.6 percent) constitutes territory of South Korea.xv
Land Boundary: 238 kilometers with North Korea.

Disputes: Demarcation Line with North Korea; Liancourt Rocks

claimed by Japan.

Topography and Drainage: Approximately 70 percent of land area mountains and uplands. Principal ranges—T'aebaek and Sobaek

range and Chiri Massif. Tallest mountain—Mount Halla at 1,950

meters, a volcanic cone located on Cheju Island. Longest rivers

Naktong River, 521 kilometers; Han River, which flows through

Seoul, 514 kilometers; and Kum River, 401 kilometers.

Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid summers with

late monsoon rains, flooding. Seoul's January mean temperature - 5°C to - 2.5°C; July, 22.5°C to 25°C. Cheju Island warmer,

milder weather than other parts of South Korea. Annual rainfall varies from year to year but usually averages more than 100 centimeters; two-thirds of precipitation falls between June and September. Droughts, particularly in southwest; approximately one

every eight years. Society

Population: 1980 census reports total population of 37,448,836.

January 1989 estimate 42.2 million. Population in 1985 of two largest cities, Seoul and Pusan, 9.6 million and 3.5 million, respectively. Population growth rate in late 1980s less than 1 percent.

Language: Korean the national language. No significant linguistic minorities. Regional dialects of Korean mutually intelligible with

exception of that spoken on Cheju Island. Written language uses Chinese characters and Korean han'gul script, or han'gul alone.

Education and Literacy: Adult literacy rate in late 1980s approximately 93 percent. Primary school education compulsory (grades one through six). Approximately 95 percent of population age-group

in secondary schools (middle and high schools); 83 percent in aca- demic high schools; 17 percent in vocational high schools in 1987.

About 35 percent of student age-group attended colleges and universities in 1989—one of world's highest rates. Religion: Great diversity of religious traditions include Buddhism,

Confucianism, Ch'ondogyo, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and

as many as 300 new religions incorporating elements of these mainstream religions. Shamanism, oldest religious tradition.

Health: Increase in life expectancy from 51.1 years for men and

54.2 years for women in late 1950s to 66 years for men and 73

xvi
years for women in 1990 reflects dramatic improvements in health

conditions. Death rate declined significantly from 13.8 deaths per

1 ,000 in late 1950s to 6 per 1 ,000 in 1990. Infant mortality 23 deaths

per 1,000 live births as of mid- 1990. Health personnel and facili- ties largely concentrated in large cities, particularly Seoul and

Pusan. Serious public health problems caused by environmental

pollution and poor sanitation. No unified national health insur- ance system but medical insurance benefits available to almost all South Koreans.

Economy

General Character: Export oriented although domestic market in- creasing source of growth in late 1980s; real growth 12.5 percent

1986-88; 6.5 percent, 1989. Dominated by chaebol, or business conglomerates. Most industries, except mining, in urban areas of northwest and southeast. Heavy industry generally in south. World's

tenth largest steel producer in 1989. Major electronics producer.

Automobiles and automotive parts major domestic growth and ex- port industry of 1980s. Armaments also manufactured for domestic use and export. Construction critical source of foreign currency

and invisible export earnings. Textiles, clothing, and leather

products important. Growing labor movement affects production

and costs. Gross National Product (GNP): In 1989 US$204 billion,

US$4,830 per capita, 6.5 percent annual growth rate. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$211.9 billion at market

prices, 1989; real annual growth 6.1 percent. Average growth 6.1

percent 1986-90; high, 12.4 percent in 1986; low, 6.1 percent in

1989.

Industry: Main growth sector, produced 46 percent of GDP and

employed 35 percent of work force in 1988.

Resources: Minimal resources. Mineral deposits mostly small, ex- cept for tungsten. Anthracite coal most important mineral product

by volume and value, but also imported. Most energy needs met

by nuclear power, coal, and crude petroleum imports.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Employed approximately 21

percent of work force in 1989; generated 10.2 percent of GDP. Relative importance declining since mid-1960s; production grew 5.9

percent in first half of 1989. Major crops rice and barley, also millet, corn, sorghum, buckwheat, soybeans, and potatoes. Fishery xvn
products popular food and important export commodity. Inadequate forestry resources. Foreign Trade: Annual trade in 1988 more than US$100 billion;

first time world's tenth largest trading nation. Major trading part- ners United States andJapan. Main exports textiles, clothing, elec- tronic and electrical equipment, footwear, machinery, steel, ships,

automobiles and automotive parts, rubber tires and tubes, plywood,

and fishery products. Main imports machinery, electronics and elec- tronic equipment, petroleum and petroleum products, steel, grains,

transport equipment, raw materials, chemicals, machinery, timber and pulp, raw cotton, and cereals. Balance of payments af- fected by oil imports and raw materials needs; surplus of US$4.6

billion in 1989, but deficit of US$1.9 billion, 1990.

Currency and Exchange Rate: January 1990, US$1 = 683.4 won (W).

Fiscal Year: January 1 through December 31.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads: 51,000 kilometers of roadways; 46.3 percent paved in 1988;

1,539 kilometers express highways, more under construction;

845,000 passenger cars and 748,000 commercial vehicles in 1987.

Intercity bus system; subway system in Seoul.

Railroads: State-run Korean National Railroad with

6,340-kilometer network; 761.8 kilometers double track; 1,023

kilometers electric railroads. Suburban lines connect to Seoul subway system.

Major Ports: Pusan, Inch'on, Kunsan, Mokp'o, and Ulsan.

Civil Aviation: International airports at Seoul, Pusan, and Cheju.

Two airlines serve major domestic cities: Asiana Airlines and

Korean Air. Korean Air international service includes routes to Japan, North America, Middle East, Soviet Union, and Western

Europe.

Telecommunications: Adequate domestic and international services; approximately 9.2 million telephones in 1987; 42 million radio

receivers; by 1989 there were 79 AM and 46 FM radio stations;

256 television stations (57 of 1 kilowatt or greater) and 8.6 million

television sets; four satellite earth stations.

Government and Politics

System of Government: Constitution of Sixth Republic approved

October 1987; effective February 1988. Strong presidency; president

xvm
elected for one five-year-term by direct popular vote. 224 members

of 299-member National Assembly elected by popular vote for four- year-term in April 1988; rest appointed by political parties according

to proportional formula.

Justice: Administration ofjustice as function of courts established

under Constitution and amended Court Organization Law of 1949.

Supreme Court highest organ of court system; appellate courts and

district courts. Constitution Court decides constitutionality of a law,

dissolution of a political party, impeachment, petitions relating to Constitution, disputes between state agencies, or between state agencies and local governments. Family Court adjudicates domestic

affairs and juvenile delinquency. Courts-martial have jurisdiction over offenses committed by armed forces personnel and civilian

military employees.

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces and six provincial-level

cities. Provinces divided into counties and ordinary cities; counties into townships and towns; townships into villages. Mostly part

of central government; increasing self-government.

Politics: Multiparty system, but political parties with contrary aims

or activities may be dissolved by Constitution Court.

Foreign Affairs: Member of most international organizations but no formal membership in United Nations in mid- 1990. Mutual

defense treaty with United States, which along with Japan, one

of two most important foreign policy partners. Relations with

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) treated as "internal" rather than "foreign"; public and private contacts in- creasing.

National Security

Armed Forces: Active-duty personnel 650,000 (June 1989). Component services: army, 575,000 (including 25,000 marines); air

force, 40,000; navy, 35,000. Reserve forces about 1.2 million in

1990. Compulsory service in army, navy, and air force, thirty to

thirty- six months.

Combat Units and Major Equipment: Ground Forces: three army

headquarters; equipment inventory includes 1,560 tanks and 1,550

armored personnel carriers, 12 surface-to-surface missiles. Air

Force: includes twenty-two ground attack/intercept squadrons and

one reconnaissance squadron; inventory includes 500 combat aircraft. Navy: three fleet commands, one aviation command, one amphibious command with minisubmarines, destroyers, frigates,

xix
missile-attack craft, minesweepers, patrol boats, and amphibious

craft. Military Budget: 5 percent GNP, US$10 billion, 1989 estimate.

Military Production: Domestic defense industry begun in early

1970s provides approximately 70 percent of weapons, ammunition,

communication and other equipment, vehicles, clothing, and other

supplies to armed forces. Internal Security Forces: Agency for National Security Planning

(ANSP), Defense Security Command, Korean National Police collect domestic intelligence. Korean National Police strength 130,000

in 1989.

Foreign Military Treaties: Signatory to Republic of Korea-United

States of America Mutual Defense Treaty (1954).

xx

'Korea (Bay

Jetton)

.33 Sea

126 128 NORTH KOREA

-34

o:

Inch

Demarcation fine

1 68roiHtariZ9d_gor>s \

*S® Ch'unch'dn

4 KANGWON

t Seoul ? KYONGGI ) ®Suwon

Province boundary ® National capital ® Province capital ® Directly governed city and province capital Directly governed city 25 50 Kilometers 25 50 Miles

CH'

r- rNORThT V

^DH'UNGCh^G

UTH ( ® Ch'drfgju ICH'ONG 7 MADTU

Taejon®^ i

NORTH

f ^ KYONGSANG

® Taegu /VA SOUTH

?NORTH

~a ®Chonju /"^ >v CHOLLA .»

Japan

36-

X KYONGSANG

®Kwangju V SOUTH

jholla -^-^ ^

c^

726 CHEjy.

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

34-

JAPAN

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of South Korea, 1990

xxn
Introduction

FOR NEARLY A HALF-CENTURY, the Republic of Korea

(South Korea) and the United States have maintained a close rela- tionship. Since the mid-1980s, South Korea has been the seventh

or eighth largest trading partner of the United States, and the

United States has ranked as South Korea's first or second trading

partner. In 1990, nearly four decades after the end of the Korean

War (1950-53), Washington retained more than 45,000 troops on

the Korean Peninsula committed to the defense of South Korea.

During the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf, Seoul joined other

coalition partners of the United States and provided a military medical team and several hundred million dollars in support of the campaign to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

Ties between the two countries extend to language, education,

and culture. In 1991 English was the primary foreign language

studied in South Korea, and for some time it has been popularly

said that more Ph.Ds from American universities work for the South

Korean government than for the United States government.

Hundred of thousands of United States servicemen, businessmen,

Peace Corps volunteers, and missionaries have lived and worked

in South Korea, and as many as 1 .5 million South Koreans—one

fourth of all overseas Koreans—have emigrated to the United States. The Korean Peninsula has been inhabited since paleolithic times,

and Korean historians trace the ethnic roots of the Korean people

at least as far back as the pottery-using cultures of the fourth and

third centuries B.C. Early tribal groups formed numerous federations, and over the centuries these combined into larger state-like

entities. Sometime before the fourth century B.C., at least one of

these entities had begun to refer to its leaders by the Chinese title for king, wang. Three of these states, boasting an aristocratic social structure and centralized institutions of government, had come

to dominate Korea by the early centuries of the present era, con- ducting trade and intermittent warfare with each other and with

China. Stretching down from Manchuria in the north was the kingdom of Koguryo; in the southwest and southeast, respectively, the

kingdoms of Paekche and Silla held sway. Korean political, cultural, and linguistic unity dates back to the unification of these three

kingdoms under Silla in the seventh century A.D., making Korea,

despite its present temporary division into two states, one of the

oldest unified nations in the world.

xxin
Geographically poised between China and Japan, Korea developed its own social and cultural patterns. More deeply influenced

than Japan by Chinese culture, Korea adopted the Chinese model

of monarchy and successive dynasties, rather than developing a

single imperial line from its early tribal federations. Yet Korea re- tained its native preference for a strongly aristocratic social order

based on hereditary lineages. Korea also served as one of several

cultural bridges between its two regional neighbors, taking pride

in passing along advanced Chinese political, philosophical, reli- gious, and literary ideas and models to what Koreans consistently

perceived as a less well-developed Japan.

Korea's geographic position often made it a focal point for re- gional conflict. Recovering from two Japanese invasions in the late sixteenth century and Manchu incursions several decades later,

Korea's last traditional dynasty—the kingdom of Choson (1392-

1910)—withdrew into self-protective isolation, stricdy regulating

travel and commerce with Japan while maintaining its tributary

status with China. This policy was increasingly challenged, however, during the nineteenth century, when Western diplomats,

traders, and adventurers sought to open all of East Asia, including what they termed the Korean "Hermit Kingdom," to European-style trade and diplomatic relations. In the end, Japan

forced open the Korean door, imposing a Western-style "unequal

treaty" on Korea in 1876.

At the turn of the century, Korea was the object of two wars

as China and Japan in turn fought to maintain footholds on the

peninsula and to exclude a Russia keenly interested in Korea's warm-water ports. In the first half of the twentieth century, Korea

was victimized by several decades of colonization by Japan

(1910-45), becoming by the 1930s a stepping stone and industrial

base for Japanese military expansion into Manchuria and north- ern China. Although many Koreans fought for independence from

Japanese rule, Korea's liberation in 1945 was brought about not

by Korean efforts but by the Allied victory over Japan and by the

division of Korea into two zones of occupation by the United States and the Soviet Union. In the southern zone, the United States Army

Military Government in Korea lasted for three years before the

establishment of the Republic of Korea. South Korea's immediate postwar fate was dominated not only by the Cold War antagonism of the two great powers but also by seemingly irreconcilable

political differences among Koreans themselves. Separate and antagonistic states controlled the two halves of the peninsula by 1948,

setting the stage for the considerable civil conflict that led to the

Korean War (1950-53).

XXIV
Given the tragic and bitter legacy of the loss of national independence under Japanese colonial rule, the experience of national partition in 1945, and the ensuing civil war, educational authorities

in South Korea have emphasized areas of national identity in schoolbook treatments of Korean history and language. Despite many

differences among South Koreans, this carefully nourished national

consciousness centered perceptions on national independence and

the place of Korea on the stage of world history. Such thinking

underlies much of the vigorously pursued economic development

of the past three decades and also carried on a long tradition of

modern Korean thought. For example, after Japan seized control

of Korean foreign relations and military affairs in 1905, Korean

historian Ch'oe Nam-son compared the nation's parlous condition

with the glories of ancient Korean dynasties and asked, "How long

will it take us to accomplish the goal of flying our sacred national

flag above the world? '' As energetic national preparations for the

1988 Seoul Olympics—under the slogan "Korea to the world, the

world to Korea" —demonstrated, toward the end of the century

South Koreans still were striving for national success and an in- ternational reputation in response to that same impulse.

South Korean urbanization—which increased by a rate of more

than 4 percent annually during the 1960s and 1970s—continued

at a slightly slower rate of 3 percent per year in the 1980s. According to the 1990 census, Seoul was one of the world's largest cities. Its more than 10.6 million people accounted for almost one quarter

of the country's 43.5 million people. The concentration of the population in Seoul prompted efforts by city planners to decentralize

government and other functions by moving some ministries and

agencies to Taejon. The growth of Seoul and other cities, although

partly caused by interurban migration, also was accompanied by

a reduction of the rural farming population, especially in the poorer

areas of the southwest. This migration was reflected in Seoul by

the numerous restaurants that offered regional specialties and by

the electoral districts that produced bloc votes for presidential candidates from one or another province in the December 1987

presidential election.

Another social change with political implications was the in- creased emphasis on higher education during the 1980s. When army

General Chun Doo Hwan took power in 1980, he approved a plan

to double college and university enrollments within four years. Perhaps, as some observers said, the change was intended to submerge traditional student protest in a sea of aspiring professionals

and white-collar workers. Yet planners also knew that broader education was vital to continued economic growth, inasmuch as the xxv
country's exports faced increasing competition from labor-rich

Third World countries and Seoul sought to shift to knowledgeintensive and high-technology industries. By 1990, according to a Ministry of Education study, one South Korean in four was a

student. The number of South Koreans in college by the late 1980s

comprised some 35 percent of the relevant age-group, a higher per- centage than Japan or any country in the world except the United

States and the Philippines.

The changes in higher education corroded old political patterns

and in several ways may have set the stage for the political and

constitutional reforms of the late 1980s. With the spread of scientific and technical education and the continued growth of a new

managerial elite, the military's claim—heard especially in the highgrowth years of the 1960s and early 1970s—to managerial and technical leadership became increasingly irrelevant. The more educated

populace also seemed less tolerant of press censorship and other

authoritarian practices. Meanwhile, increasing student enrollments

and the consequent rise in the number of college graduates in the

job pool created even greater discontent among many unemployed

and underemployed graduates and provided a setting in which a

small but increasingly radical student dissident movement—often

financed with sizable student association fees—could find its voice.

The steady modernization and urbanization of society were ac- companied by a continued growth in nostalgia for Korea's past.

Even in the countryside, the 1980s saw a continuation of the late 1970s revival of folk arts, often supported by generous government

subsidies for regional festivals and * 'living cultural treasures"

experts in traditional technologies, crafts, and arts, such as architecture, temple painting, or traditional p 'ansori folk opera. Shamanism, ignored by modernizing elites in the 1950s and 1960s, was much more openly practiced in the 1970s and 1980s, when it was

not unusual to see a new office building or major tourist hotel for- mally opened with shamanistic rites. Many urban professionals en- joyed taking their children to visit the Folk Village near Seoul where

they could examine a well- scrubbed reconstruction of nineteenthcentury country life and try to imagine a quieter, less hurried time.

The revival of traditional culture in the 1970s and 1980s cut across

class and political lines. It had a political dimension as well, seen both in dissident student adaptations of traditional anti- aristocratic

mask dramas that lampooned the social and political establishment

and in government promotion of school trips to the shrine of

sixteenth-century naval hero Yi Sun-sin. Religious commitment was strong for many South Koreans,

nearly half of whom were affiliated with an organized religious

xxvi
community in the 1980s. About 20 percent of the population was

Buddhist, whereas a somewhat larger and more rapidly growing

Christian community gave South Korea the second largest proportion of Christians in Asia, following the Philippines. Although conservative on the whole, the country's Christian population also included some of the most active elements of the political dissident

movement.

Confucianism was dominant during the last dynasty (1392-1910)

but declined in force as a political philosophy following the loss of independence to Japan in 1910. Nevertheless, it retained a lin- gering impact on social relations even in the early 1990s. Attempts

to revive Confucian ethical values, whether through the Park Chung

Hee government's campaign for filial piety and loyalty in the 1970s

or in occasional public seminars or newspaper editorials through

the early 1990s, reflected both a decline in the practice of Confucianism as a living creed and the feeling of many South Koreans

that rapid modernization and the growth of materialism had created an ethical vacuum.

Population policies begun in the 1960s continued their momentum through the 1980s. Tax and medical insurance benefits for smaller families, for example, provided additional incentives for

family planning in the early 1980s. The government also distributed

posters, such as one featuring an attractive young couple and the

slogan, "Have one child and raise it well." The effect of such ef- forts continued to be felt in a decline in the number of primary

and middle school students; the number of middle school students

alone dropped by half a million during the 1980s. The success of

the family planning program was suggested by the desire of other

Asian countries to send officials to Seoul for training.

As the number of births per couple reached 1 .9 in 1990, the population growth rate dropped to just over 0.9 percent from almost

1.6 a decade earlier, causing the Economic Planning Board to predict serious labor shortages and to authorize importing increased

numbers of foreign workers. Many factories already had been compensating for such shortfalls by hiring illegal immigrants (1,000

such workers were deported in 1990), or by breaking prevailing

patterns to hire married women in substantial numbers. By 1991

South Koreans also were beginning to reflect on the social and policy

implications of two emerging problems: a possible male-female imbalance by the end of the 1990s, resulting from a continuing prefer- ence for sons and use of family planning techniques; and projections

of a steadily increasing proportion of elderly in the population over

the coming two decades.

xxvii
South Korea's economic growth continued to be driven by the

import of raw materials and semi-finished components (the latter proportionally declining in the late 1980s) and the export of finished

industrial products. Manufacturing accounted for more than 30

percent of the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), aided

by the rapid modernization of technology and the continuous reinvestment of trade proceeds. By the end of the 1980s, the Republic

of Korea was the world's tenth largest steel producer and had made

major strides in mastering the production technologies required

for the home electronics and semiconductor industries. South

Korean-made televisions, personal computers, videocassette recorders, and microwave ovens increasingly became known under their

own brand names, although dependence on Japan for key components and some assembly production for Japanese companies also

continued.

The automotive industry gained a firmer footing under close

government direction following overexpansion in the late 1970s.

Most of the growth in the early 1980s was fueled by overseas sales,

which began to boom in 1985, but also was stabilized by a rapidly

growing domestic market by the end of the decade. Textiles and

construction, both staples among the export industries in the 1970s,

continued to play an important role through the 1980s. As South

Korea's comparative advantage in labor became increasingly subject

to challenge from developing economies in Asia and elsewhere,

however, planners looked to even greater social investment in hightechnology fields, such as materials science, biotechnology, elec- tronics, and aerospace, and to an economy that would become

technology-intensive sometime during the 1990s.

Growth in the service sector, comprising real estate, supply ser- vices, entertainment, the hotel industry, and other services, continued in the late 1980s, outpacing increases in manufacturing. The

number of workers in service industries increased by 8 percent between 1988 and 1989, amounting to more than twice the rate of

increase in manufacturing-sector employees during the same period.

In the first half of 1990, the total number of workers in manufacturing declined for the first time since the early 1960s. In 1990 the

Economic Planning Board, concerned over this trend and a projected shortfall of 69,000 new manufacturing workers for the year, announced its Industrial Manpower Supply Program. The program was designed to stem the exodus of skilled manpower from

manufacturing industries by offering long-term workers preferred

admission to college and university night-school programs. The

government also prepared to use tax penalties and higher utility rates to slow the growth in what it viewed as unproductive " con- sumption industries."

xxvin
As South Korea continued to industrialize and urbanize during

the 1980s, the agricultural sector drifted into stepchild status. Official support for rice prices dropped behind the rate of inflation in

the mid-1980s as Seoul attempted to reduce government costs. Urban growth contributed to a series of problems. Young people were sent to the cities for education or left the farms to seek employment and left behind a smaller and increasingly older farm

population. Young bachelor farmers had greater difficulty in finding

wives willing to undergo the rigors of rural life. Productivity gains

failed to keep up with changes in population, leading to greater

imports of wheat and soybeans. Rising land prices caused by the

housing squeeze and commercial and industrial construction gave an impression of increased farmers' assets, even as modern

machinery costs and increased use of consumer credit contributed

to higher farm indebtedness. Tenancy increased from 21 percent

to more than 30 percent during the decade, as urban investors and

the larger scale farming encouraged by the government absorbed

increasingly scarce and costly farm lands. Average farm incomes

had fallen well below urban incomes by the end of the decade. By

1 990 many farmers could agree with the statement of the founder

of a matchmaking center for bachelor farmers that it was "time

to turn the government's attention to farmers' life and welfare."

Part of increasing farm indebtedness during the second half of

the 1980s was used to finance consumer durables that brought farm

families closer to national standards, even as the gap between rural

and urban incomes was increasing. A 1990 report of the Ministry

of Agriculture and Fisheries indicated that more than 90 percent

of rural households had refrigerators, electric rice cookers, and propane gas ranges. Even more significant were major increases in

rural ownership of consumer goods, such as telephones and color

television sets, which served to link rural families with national and

international developments and issues. Such linkage, in turn, may

have contributed both to an increasing awareness of the growing

rural-urban gap and to the politicization of farmers' movements

in response to foreign pressures to liberalize agricultural markets.

In political life, South Korea began the 1980s with an old pattern. For the third time in two decades, a military leader or former

military leader declared a state of political crisis, rewrote the constitution, and drove prominent civilian politicians from government through farfetched legal charges or under the guise of

"political purification." Re-elected president in electoral college

voting in February 1981, former General Chun Doo Hwan consolidated his control through dominance over the court system, use

xxix
of the state security apparatus, and tight restriction of the media.

By the second half of the decade, however, Chun's government

had lost considerable political capital. In the National Assembly

elections of 1985, Chun's Democratic Justice Party was able to re- tain control of the legislature only through a system of proportionality that converted its scant 35 percent of the popular vote into

54 percent of the seats. Polls taken in 1986 showed that only 41

percent of people queried expressed confidence in political leaders

and that less than 50 percent of respondents were satisfied with

the kind of society in which they lived. Dissatisfaction with government control of the media was especially strong and was evident

in newspaper editorials and a popular campaign to withhold payment of compulsory viewers' fees to the state-run television network.

The gradual reemergence of banned political figures, such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, began in 1985 and culminated in the full restoration of political rights to all former politicians in a political compromise between the ruling and opposition

political parties that followed severe civil disturbances in June 1987.

Subsequent events marked a watershed in South Korean politics.

First, the government removed virtually all restrictions on the

media. Next, in late 1987, the Constitution was revised—the first constitutional revision since 1960 that was drafted through a process of multiparty discussions. The 1987 revision promised substantial

changes in the unequal power relationships among the three

branches of government that had prevailed at least since the in- ception of theyusin constitution in 1972. Under the new fundamental law, the president lost the power to rule through emergency

decrees and to dissolve the legislature. The National Assembly

gained new rights to investigate state affairs, to hold longer an- nual sessions, and to approve Supreme Court appointments. These

and other constitutional provisions pointed to more potential au- tonomy for the legislature, the court system, and for the constitutional review of legislation.

The presidential election of December 1987 placed a former army

general, Roh Tae Woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, in

the Blue House, or presidential mansion. A minority president,

he won only 36 percent of the votes cast. Kim Young Sam and

Kim Dae Jung, who together accounted for 54 percent of the votes,

accused Roh's party of election fraud, while apologizing to the public for their failure to agree between themselves on a unified opposition candidacy. The charge of fraud on a scale great enough to have swung the election was undermined at the time by the fragmentary and anecdotal evidence presented and by the insistence

of each of the two Kims that he was the one who would have

xxx
prevailed in the absence of government misconduct. In 1990,

however, the government admitted to one serious legal breach

the diversion of more than US$14 million dollars from the 1987

national budget to support Roh's election campaign. For some observers, it remained an open question whether other large-scale

irregularities may have occurred, or what further steps the government might have taken to ensure victory had the two major opposition candidates been unified.

In the National Assembly elections held in April 1988, the rul- ing party lost a working majority for the first time in South Korea's

history. The new balance of forces in the legislature made a reality of the separation of powers provided for in the new Constitution when opposition assembly members joined forces to reject

President Roh's first appointment for chiefjustice of the Supreme

Court in the summer of 1988. Through the rest of 1988 and 1989,

additional signs of the new order were seen in the distribution of

committee chairmanships among the ruling and opposition parties and in the process of compromise, as floor leaders of the four

principal parties periodically met to negotiate working agendas for the legislature and its committees. As 1989 ended, Roh's party was

engaged in secret negotiations with two of the three opposition parties to bring this process of compromise under firmer control.

As a result of these talks, Roh's party merged with Kim Young

Sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Chong-p'il's New

Democratic Republican Party to create a new Democratic Liberal

Party (DLP) in January 1990. Some observers likened the result- ing coalition to Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Each of the

former opposition party leaders clearly hoped to become an important power broker within the ruling party and perhaps also to become the party's candidate for the 1992 presidential election.

In the short term, the formation of the DLP provided the president with a substantial majority in the National Assembly, while

politically isolating his most uncompromising political opponent,

Kim Dae Jung. Seen in longer-term perspective, the merger curtailed the broader processes of compromise and cooperation in the

National Assembly that had included even Kim's Party for Peace

and Democracy (PPD) in 1988 and 1989. It further put the new

ruling party in the awkward position of having to pass important

legislation in the absence of opposition politicians, who boycotted

the legislature on several occasions during 1990. The merger also complicated factional politics within the ruling party.

Although politicians were permitted to change parties under the

1987 Constitution and related laws, Kim Dae Jung immediately

labelled the move a "coup d'etat against representative politics"

xxxi
and called, unsuccessfully, for new elections. A small number of

legislators from Kim Young Sam's party also objected to the new

super-party and eventually formed the small Democratic Party.

Kim Dae Jung's isolated Party for Peace and Democracy spent

much of 1990 and early 1991 fulminating against the DLP and

attempting to embarrass the government politically by boycotting

National Assembly sessions or attempting to resign. The disengagement of the PPD often seemed to leave it marginalized and unable

to contribute to major legislation or even to influence issues in which

it had an immediate political interest, such as the scheduling of

small district local elections in March 1991 . Awareness of the costs of intransigence may have prompted a more moderate approach

in the second half of 1991. In private talks with President Roh in

September, Kim Dae Jung successfully lobbied for several regional

development projects in the Cholla region.

By mid- 1991 the DLP coalition was beginning to show signs of

strain, brought about by differences over questions such as the timing of the upcoming 1992 presidential and National Assembly elec- tions and disagreement over how the party's presidential candidate

would be chosen. On most such issues, Kim Chong-p'il and President Roh formed a mini-coalition within the party, opposed by

Kim Young Sam and his followers. Competition for the party's

presidential nomination reintensified after National Assembly elec- tions in March 1992, in which the DLP won slightly less than 50

percent of the seats. The DLP was able to recover a bare majority

by absorbing several members who had run as independents.

Kim Dae Jung's party encountered major defeats in local elections in March and June 1991 . It subsequently absorbed small

numbers of opposition lawmakers, becoming in turn the New

Democratic Party and finally, under Kim's joint leadership with

Yi Ki-t'aek, the Democratic Party (DP) in September. The DP,

which included some members from outside the Cholla region, con- tinued to fight the ruling DLP across a variety of issues, including

tax and budget policy, hyperinflation in urban land prices, and

corruption. Like the Kim Young Sam faction within the DLP, the

DP opposed possible revision of the Constitution to create a parliamentary system of government. In National Assembly elec- tions in March 1992, the DP won a respectable 31.1 percent of

the seats. Outside the world of the parties, other features of political life changed during the 1980s. Professional associations and interest

groups, long under the domination of the state, began to strive for more autonomy. Farmers' associations—traditionally little more

than mechanisms for communicating government policies—began xxxn
to proliferate and to protest trade liberalization measures. Professional associations of university teachers, journalists, and lawyers

also became increasingly outspoken on political issues. The major

business conglomerates

chaebol—sought a greater role in economic

policy formation. The voices of industrial associations were heard more clearly as the respective economic ministries began to gain

influence within a less centralized state planning structure. At the

fringes of politics, an extremist wing of the leftist student move- ment conducted sporadic violence through the 1980s. The violence

peaked in dozens of arson or Molotov cocktail assaults against

government offices, commercial establishments, police boxes, and

United States diplomatic and cultural facilities in late 1988 and

1989.

South Korea's diplomacy during the 1980s, while remaining

oriented toward the West, also aggressively pursued closer ties with

China, the Soviet Union, and East European countries. Trade with

these countries, obscured by Seoul's nonpublication of the rele- vant import-export statistics, continued to grow throughout the decade, and was matched by a variety of other contacts, culminating

in the participation of the Soviet Union, China, and all the major

East European countries in the 1988 Seoul Olympics. These ef- forts, which South Korea termed pukpang chongch'aek, meaning

"Nordpolitik" or northern policy, were intended to diversify the

country's global trade relations and to give Seoul greater leverage

in its difficult relationship with the Democratic People's Republic

of Korea (North Korea).

Seoul's northern policy alone would probably have accomplished

little without the dramatic liberalizing reforms in East European

countries, which made it possible for South Korea to establish diplomatic relations with all nations of Eastern Europe by the end of

the 1980s. The opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet

Union in September 1990 followed a series of high-level bilateral

meetings in 1989 and early 1990.

South Korea's two-way trade with communist countries increased

by one-third in 1990 to reach an estimated US$5.6 billion. Increased

trade relations with the Soviet Union followed closely on the heels

of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, driven by Moscow's perception that

South Korea could play an important role in the development of

the Soviet Far East. As with other East European countries, South

Korea's exports to the Soviet Union were heavily concentrated in

electrical and electronic appliances. During 1990 and early 1991, news of bilateral exchanges, civil aviation agreements, and pending commercial deals between the chaebol and the Soviet Union filled the South Korean press. By the end of 1991 , South Korea had paid

xxxiii
or approved slightly more than half of a promised US$3 billion

package of loans, commodity credits, and project assistance to the

Soviet Union, and it was expected that Seoul's aid program would

continue with the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Trade with China, which began with quiet transactions in the

late 1970s, was estimated to have reached US$1 billion in 1985

and more than US$5 billion in 1991 . The importance of the SeoulBeijing economic relationship was demonstrated in the establishment of trade offices with limited consular functions in the two capitals in October 1991 and a trade agreement two months later, in

which South Korea and China exchanged most-favored-nation sta- tus. The political component in such trade remained prominent,

as evidenced in Seoul's tolerance for sustained balance of payments

deficits. In the case of trade with China, such deficits grew from

US$1.2 billion in 1989 to a projected US$2 billion for 1991.

Probably because China remained more sensitive than the Soviet

Union to North Korea's reactions, progress in moving toward diplomatic relations between Seoul and Beijing was slower than the moves establishing formal trade ties. In the mid-1980s, the two

countries had increased quasi-diplomatic contacts to include a number of negotiations to resolve a series of sea and air incidents, and

China permitted South Korea's attendance at international conferences and meetings of United Nations organizations in China.

The two countries also participated jointly in a variety of athletic

competitions and sports exchanges. In September 1990, China ex- tended courtesy diplomatic status to South Korean athletic offi- cials attending the Asian Games in Beijing; and by mutual

agreement senior diplomats in the trade representative offices held

formal diplomatic immunities and privileges under the Vienna Convention, reportedly performing consular as well as commercial

duties. Beijing sent a vice foreign minister to the Seoul meeting

of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia

and the Pacific in April 1991; South Korean-Chinese discussions

during the meeting provided the highest level official contact to that date between the two countries. In May 1991, when it be- came clear that China would no longer support its North Korean

ally by vetoing South Korea's membership in the United Nations, some observers believed that the two countries had moved even

closer to establishing formal diplomatic ties. Over the past two decades, South Korea's relations with North

Korea have been characterized by alternating periods of tension

and dialogue. Ajoint communique issued by the two countries on

July 4, 1972, agreed to continue discussions concerning political

and military questions and confidence-building measures to be

xxxiv
implemented through a North-South Coordinating Committee and

Red Cross channels. Through the 1970s, however, further discussions stalled as each side reaffirmed its position in an effort to claim

and retain the initiative and to deny legitimacy to the other side. In early 1980, the two countries for the first time referred to each

other by their official names and agreed to work toward prime

ministers' talks. By the following year, negotiations stalled again

after P'yongyang made a number of political demands on the Chun

Doo Hwan government—including withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea—as a precondition for further talks and

also sponsored an abortive attempt to have Chun assassinated by

two Canadian gangsters. A second attempt—a bombing in October

1983—failed to kill the South Korean president but killed four cabi- net ministers and thirteen other officials during a state visit to Rangoon, Burma. In 1984 Seoul rejected Pyongyang's proposals for three-way talks that would have included Washington but excluded

South Korea from key discussions on military topics. Bilateral dis- cussions during the same year concerning a joint Olympics team

failed to achieve results in time for the Los Angeles Olympics in

July.

After South Korean acceptance of North Korean rice, cement,

and medicine for southern flood victims in September 1984, the

two sides conducted talks and some exchanges on a range of issues

for a sixteen-month period through early 1986. These discussions

in the mid-1980s were sometimes acrimonious and frequently in- terrupted, each side presenting proposals, as one observer noted,

that almost seemed intended to provoke rejection by the other or

to play to the galleries of world opinion. In retrospect, however,

it can be seen that the mid-1980s discussions were successful in

establishing institutions for dialogue on both sides and in laying

down multiple channels of contact and communication that con- tinued to function through the early 1990s.

A series of talks to reunite families separated by national division and the war took dozens of Red Cross representatives and even more journalists from each side across the Demarcation Line during three visits in 1984. In September 1985, several dozen North

Koreans and South Koreans met with separated family members,

and a similar number of folk art performers from each side gave

concerts in the two capitals.

In the area of economic cooperation, vice-ministerial level conferences met at P'anmunjom on a number of occasions during 1984

and 1985, exploring for the first time specific trade, transportation, and other joint projects. South Korean and North Korean

legislators met twice in July 1985 to explore political issues. Bilateral

XXXV
discussions began in 1984 concerning a North Korean proposal

to cohost the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. After an interlude fol- lowing the North Korean bombing of a South Korean airliner over

the Andaman Sea in November 1987, Olympic talks continued

through mid- 1988, when they broke down in disagreement over

the number of games to be hosted in P'yongyang.

The two Koreas continued to talk past each other concerning

broader political issues during much of 1988 and 1989. President

Ron's July 1988 proposal for freer contacts and expanded exchanges

between the two Koreas and the eventual establishment of a Korean

commonwealth was met with North Korean reiteration of Kim II Sung's 1972 proposal for a transitional Democratic Confederal

Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, Seoul began to disclose the exis- tence of a quiet trade relationship between the two countries and

in early 1989 allowed a major industrialist to travel to P'yongyang

to discuss additional forms of economic cooperation. North Korea

generally welcomed these steps but also continued to demand abrogation of South Korea's National Security Act, under which Seoul

prosecuted several unauthorized South Korean travellers to North

Korea.

An important breakthrough in relations between the two Koreas

began in 1990, which saw the beginning of a series of prime

ministerial talks. Held alternately in Seoul and P'yongyang, these

garnered substantial publicity but little progress until mid- 1991,

when it became clear that Seoul had won China's support for its plan to have both Koreas simultaneously admitted to the United

Nations. That event took place in September. During the fourth

round of prime ministers' talks in P'yongyang in October, the two

Koreas agreed to work on a nonaggression accord. This document,

the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and

Cooperation, was signed in Seoul on December 13, 1991. It took

effect in mid-February 1992, at the time of the sixth round of prime

ministerial talks in P'yongyang. In late December 1991, the two

Koreas signed a separate agreement barring either side from having or using nuclear weapons.

Although the new agreement was in itself a landmark, observers

noted that it was essentially a promissory note, in which the two

Koreas pledged to cease negative actions toward each other and to continue to work toward resolution of several important issues. These

issues included a declaration of nonaggression, a separate peace

treaty, and measures to promote free travel and correspondence.

The question of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, which South

Korea held to be of overriding importance, still was being discussed

by working-level negotiators in late March 1992.

xxxvi
South Korea's relationship with the United States increasingly was focused on bilateral economic issues, spurred by a current ac- count surplus that began in the mid-1980s and increasing United

States pressures to open South Korean markets for agricultural and

industrial products as well as telecommunications and finance ser- vices. These issues posed a problem not only for South Korean

diplomacy, but also contributed to often tumultuous domestic criti- cism of Seoul whenever it appeared to show signs of weakness in

negotiations with Washington.

An important issue in South Korean-United States relations during the 1980s was the joint security relationship. This relationship

not only encompassed technical issues such as the size, composition, financial support, and legal status of United States forces sta- tioned in South Korea, but also included a psychological dimension

because of the popularly perceived role of the joint United States- Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command in the brutal kill- ings of civilians in Kwangju in May 1980 during the coup d'etat

of Chun Doo Hwan. Facts surrounding the Kwangju incident

deliberately distorted under Chun Doo Hwan's martial law

authorities—remained unclarified until the United States government issued a detailed statement on the subject in 1989. The state- ment, prepared in response to a South Korean National Assembly

query, showed that the United States had not approved the coup

and that the troops used in Kwangju in 1980 were not under operational control of the Combined Forces Command but had taken

their orders from South Korean army authorities under General

Chun.

The Korean War permanently enhanced the role of the military in South Korean society and politics as well as in the defense

of the nation. Although South Korean military officers did not seek

to intervene actively in politics under the rule of President Syngman Rhee (1948-60), the coups d'etat of generals Park Chung Hee

in 1961 and Chun Doo Hwan in 1980 demonstrated that some ele- ments in the army believed that the nation's security demanded

periodic corrections in the course of politics as well as preparedness against North Korea. The army's influence on society and

politics during the 1980s continued to be seen in the laws that

prevented the news media from freely covering political-military

issues, mandatory student participation in the college-level Student Defense Corps, the custom of preferential placement of re- tired senior officers in the civil service and in state-run corporations,

and in the frequent practice of punitively drafting students expelled

for demonstrating against the government. At an even broader level,

harsh discipline within the military probably provided the most xxxvn
significant political socialization for the more than 75 percent of

South Korean males who served in the regular army, the reserves, or the Homeland Reserve Force. Many of these practices were the subject of reforms outlined in

the Ministry of National Defense White Paper in 1988, when the

Roh administration abolished the Student Defense Corps and made

efforts to standardize conscription practices and to provide some

protection to the rights of recruits. As opinion surveys conducted

in 1990 indicated, however, the public continued to support re- forms that would improve conditions of service, eliminate preferential placement of retired military officers in the civil service, and

move military installations away from populated areas. In the same

year, the government promulgated additional regulations intended

to reduce the more severe aspects of military life and protect the

basic rights of recruits.

As the 1990s began, however, some observers believed that

change in many military practices would come slowly. One of the

most outspoken criticisms, voiced in a South Korean army publication in 1990, was by an army major general who charged that

"a trend characterized by assaults, abusive language and torture

prevails in the barracks." He called upon the army to reform it- self to regain the trust of the public. The charges were given additional credence two months later when a former marine corps officer was convicted on charges of torturing a subordinate. In October

1990, the minister of national defense was relieved of his position

after a former undercover agent of the Defense Security Command

disclosed that the military counterintelligence organization had con- tinued to maintain dossiers and conduct surveillance on some 1 ,300

prominent civilians, including politicians, clergymen, and journalists. The government pledged its efforts to return the Defense

Security Command to its original function. The following year, however, the government admitted as true new media charges that

the DSC was investigating several student activists. Under President Chun Doo Hwan's force modernization program, military spending increased dramatically during the 1980s,

exceeding estimated North Korean military spending during most

of the decade and nearly doubling to US$10 billion a year by 1990.

As a result of improvements in the defense industrial base that began

in the mid-1970s, 70 percent of the equipment and weaponry used

by the armed forces was being produced by domestic defense in- dustries by the late 1980s.

At the end of the 1980s, the armed forces numbered about

650,000. The army continued to divide responsibilities among three

commands. The First Army and the Third Army defended the

xxxviii
country from the threat of North Korean attack in their positions

along the Demilitarized Zone. The Second Army, positioned well

south of Seoul, was charged with logistical and training responsibilities and managing the military reserve system. Some of the country's forward defense was also provided by the marine corps, which was charged with defense of the Han River estuary and five is- lands located close to North Korea. Specialized army units, such

as the Capital Defense Command, defended the seat of government, while the Defense Security Command in Seoul was responsible for military counterintelligence and monitoring politics within

and outside of the military.

The air force expanded its fighter squadrons during the 1980s,

operating almost 700 combat, transport, and training aircraft under

its three commands. In wartime, it assumed control of civilian air- ports and sections of major highways adapted for use as runways.

During the 1980s, the air force added the F-16 and the Republic

of Korea-United States coproduced F-5 to its fighter inventory.

The smaller navy also modernized during the decade, focusing on

antisubmarine warfare and the deployment of new, domestically

produced submarines, frigates, fast-attack craft, and patrol boats.

In 1 990 Roh moved the headquarters of the army and air force

(with navy to follow) to Taejon in an effort to promote more effec- tive interservice cooperation and more efficient command and control of the armed forces during wartime. In that same year, the

armed forces began a three- to five-year plan to reorganize the com- mand structure. Under the Armed Forces Organization Act passed

in July and promulgated in October, the joint chiefs of staff sys- tem in use since the Korean War would be replaced with a more

centralized Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in which operational

control of the military forces would be centralized in the hands of

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new Joint Chiefs

of Staff structure was designed to give Seoul a wartime command

structure separate from the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command.

Fundamental to the restructuring was the separation of the operational and administrative functions immediately below the minister

of national defense. Under the reorganization, which took effect on Armed Forces Day, October 1, 1990, the minister of national

defense defined military policy, consolidated planning, and allo- cated resources. The newly invigorated Joint Chiefs of Staff had

the authority to employ military units of all the military services,

including task forces organization for joint operations. Unified operations, strategic planning, intelligence, and logistic directorates consolidated functions previously controlled by the separate services,

xxxix
and the service headquarters were reduced to maintenance, support, logistics, personnel, and administrative functions. The ser- vices were to have reduced intelligence organizations, but most of

their intelligence assets were to be transferred to the newly created

Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence Command.

The 45,000 United States troops in Korea in 1990 included a

small contingent at P'anmunjom with the United Nations Command, some 32,000 United States Army members under the Eighth

Army, and 12,000 United States Air Force personnel under the

Seventh Air Force. Military issues relating to the Combined Forces

Command and other topics were discussed in annual bilateral Security Consultative Meetings and in other joint talks. In April 1990,

the United States Department of Defense announced a program

to shift gradually the United States military presence in South Korea

to a smaller and more supportive role as international political conditions and strengthened South Korean defense capabilities permitted. As part of this program, the United States and South Korea

also agreed to disband the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Field Army and to separate the Ground Component Command from the Combined Forces Command during the 1991-93

period. The two countries further agreed to appoint a South Korean

senior officer as commander of the Ground Component Command

and to replace the senior member of the United Nations Command

to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC)—who had been a United States officer since the signing of the armistice in 1953—with a South Korean general. The appointment of a South Korean army

major general to the senior MAC position was made in March 1991

.

At the twenty-second Security Consultative Meeting in November 1990, Seoul agreed to increase its financial support for United

States forces stationed in South Korea from US$2.7 billion in 1990

to US$2.8 billion the following year. This figure includes valuations for contributions in real estate, logistics support, discounted

costs, and tax. Other issues discussed included Seoul's requests for eased United States restrictions on its exports of coproduced military hardware and improved terms for United States Foreign Military Sales to South Korea. Discussions also occurred concerning

possible reductions in the Team Spirit exercise scheduled for 1991,

in part because of United States military commitments in the Persian Gulf and in part because of budgetary reasons. The exercise was reduced in scale in 1990 and 1991 and cancelled in 1992

In January 1991, South Korea and the United States signed an amended Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the legal

position of United States forces in South Korea. This agreement, the

first major revision of the 1966 SOFA, expanded Seoul's criminal

xl
jurisdiction over United States personnel. Other provisions of the

agreement concerned customs procedures and the disposition of

property no longer used by United States forces in South Korea.

In 1991 President Bush announced that the United States would

withdraw its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, and later in the year, in a statement accepted by United States authorities,

President Roh Tae Woo declared that the country was free of such

weapons. In 1989 the United States had stated that North Korea

had a plutonium reprocessing facility theoretically capable of supporting nuclear weapons development. By mid- 1991, United States,

Japanese, and South Korean estimates held that North Korea was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than previously real- ized. By the end of the year, North Korea, which had signed the

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, still had not set a date for on-site inspections of nuclear facilities by

the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the joint statement

issued after the close of the twenty-third United States-Republic

of Korea Security Consultative Meeting in November 1991, both

countries declared that they had "agreed to postpone the second

stage reduction of United States forces in Korea until such time

as the North Korean threat and uncertainties of developing nuclear

weapons have disappeared and the security in this region is fully

guaranteed." This fact meant that withdrawals would stop once United States forces were drawn down to the 36,000 target for stage one. It was also confirmed at the meeting that the United States- Republic of Korea Combined Field Army would be dissolved and

that a Korean general would be made Combined Forces Command

ground component commander in 1992, further decreasing the

United States profile.

March 31, 1992 William Shaw

xli

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Panghwasuru Pavilion, port of Suwon Castle
A SMALL COUNTRY, approximately the size of Britain, Korea

is located on a peninsula that protrudes southward from the northeastern corner of the Asian continent. It is an old country, whose

people evolved as one nation from the seventh century until 1945,

when the country was divided by the United States and the Soviet

Union at the end of World War II. The ensuing cold war created

two Korean governments, one in the north known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and another in the south

known as the Republic of Korea (ROK). The two Koreas engaged

in a bitter war between 1950 and 1953 and remained divided as of 1990, even though the two governments began to talk to each

other in 1971.

South Korea and North Korea took distinctly different paths of

development after they were divided. By 1990 North Korea had

emerged as a staunch communist society, while South Korea was

evolving into a liberal democracy after many years of military dictatorship. The two societies, however, shared a common tradition

and culture.

Origins of the Korean Nation

As is true of all countries, Korea's geography was a major fac- tor in shaping its history; geography also influenced the manner

in which the inhabitants of the peninsula emerged as a people sharing the common feeling of being Koreans (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). The Korean Peninsula protrudes southward from

the northeastern corner of the Asian continent and is surrounded on three sides by large expanses of water. Although Japan is not

far from the southern tip of this landmass, in ancient times events on the peninsula were affected far more by the civilizations and

political developments on the contiguous Asian continent than by

those in Japan (see fig. 1). Because the Yalu and Tumen rivers have long been recognized

as the border between Korea and China, it is easy to assume that

these rivers have always constituted Korea's northern limits. But

such was not the case in the ancient period. Neither of the rivers was considered to be sacrosanct by the ancient tribes that dotted

the plains of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. Because the

rivers freeze in the winter, large armies were able to traverse them

with ease. Even when the rivers were not frozen, armies equipped

with iron tools could easily build ships to cross them.

3
South Korea: A Country Study

The Korean people trace their origins to the founding of the state of Choson. Choson rose on the banks of the Taedong River in the

northwestern corner of the peninsula and prospered as a civiliza- tion possessing a code of law and a bronze culture. The Choson

people gradually extended their influence not only over other tribes

in the vicinity, but also to the north, conquering most of the Liaodong Basin. However, the rising power of the feudal state of Yen

in northern China (1122-225 B.C.) not only checked Choson's

growth, but eventually pushed it back to the territory south of the

Ch'ongch'on River, located midway between the Yalu and Taedong

rivers. The Chinese had discovered iron by this time and used it extensively in farming and warfare; the Choson people were not

able to match them. Yen became established in the territory vacated

by Choson.

Meanwhile, much of what subsequentiy came to constitute China

proper had been unified for the first time under Qin Shi Huangdi.

Subsequently, Yen fell to the Qin state; the Qin Dynasty (221-207

B.C.) was in turn replaced by a new dynasty, the Han (206 B.C.

A.D. 220). In 195 B.C. a former officer of Yen took over the throne

of Choson by trickery, after which he and his descendants ruled

the kingdom for eighty years; but in 109-108 B.C. China attacked

Choson and destroyed it as a political entity. The Han Chinese

then ruled the territory north of the Han River as the Four Eastern

Districts; the original territory of Choson became Lolang (or Nangnang in Korean). (North Korean historians have argued that the

Lolang District was located more to the northwest of the Korean

Peninsula, perhaps near Beijing. This theory, however, has not

been universally accepted.) Until the Han period, the Korean

Peninsula had been a veritable Chinese colony. During some 400

years, Lolang, the core of the colony, had become a great center

of Chinese art, philosophy, industry, and commerce. Many Chinese

immigrated into the area; the influence of China extended

beyond the territory it administered. The tribal states south of the

Han River paid tribute to the Chinese and patterned much of their

civilization and government after Chinese models.

The Three Kingdoms Period

The territory south of the Han River is relatively distant from

the Asian continent; hence, the people living there were initially

able to develop independently, without much involvement with

events on the continent. The early settlers of this region gradually

organized themselves into some seventy clan states that were in

turn grouped into three tribal confederations known as Chinhan,

Mahan, and Pyonhan. Chinhan was situated in the middle part of

4
Historical Setting

the peninsula, Mahan in the southwest, and Pyonhan in the

southeast. Their economies were predominantly agricultural, and

their level of development was such that they built reservoirs and

irrigation facilities. These tribal states began to be affected by what was happening in the region north of the Han River around the

first century B.C.

About the middle of the third century A.D., the Chinese threat

began to serve as a unifying political force among the loose confederations of tribes in the southern part of the peninsula. Adopting the Chinese political system as a model, the tribes eventually

merged into two kingdoms, thereby increasing their chances of sur- vival against Chinese expansionism. The two kingdoms eventually came to play an important role in Korean history.

Geographic features of the southern parts of the land, in particular the configuration of mountain ranges, caused two kingdoms

to emerge rather than one. In the central part of Korea, the main

mountain range, the T'aebaek Range, runs north to south along

the edge of the Sea of Japan, which lies off the east coast of the

peninsula. Approximately three-fourths of the way down the peninsula, however, at roughly the thirty- seventh parallel, the mountain range veers southwest, dividing the peninsula almost in the

middle. This extension, the Sobaek Range, proved politically significant; the tribes west of it were not shielded by any natural barriers against the Chinese-occupied portion of the peninsula, whereas

those to the southeast were protected. Moreover, the presence of

the mountains prevented the tribes in the two regions from establishing close contacts. The tribal states in the southwest were the first to unite, calling

their centralized kingdom Paekche. This process occurred in the

mid-third century A.D., after the Chinese army of the Wei Dynasty (A.D. 220-65), which controlled Lolang, threatened the tribes in A.D. 245. The Silla Kingdom evolved in the southeast. Silla historians traced the kingdom's origin to 57 B.C., but contemporary

historians regard King Naemul (A.D. 356-402) as having been the

earliest ruler. Some of the tribal states in the area of the lower Naktong River, along the south central coast of the peninsula, did not

join either of these kingdoms. Under the name Kaya, they formed

a league of walled city-states that conducted extensive coastal trade

and also maintained close ties with the tribal states in western Japan.

Sandwiched between the more powerful Silla and Paekche, Kaya

eventually was absorbed by its neighbors during the sixth century

(see fig. 2). The northern kingdom of Koguryo emerged from among the

indigenous people along the banks of the Yalu River. The Han

5
South Korea: A Country Study

ca. A.D. 475 ca. A.D. 575 — — — Kingdom boundary 50 100 150 Kilometers • Populated place 25 50 100 150 Miles

Figure 2. Korea During the Three Kingdoms Period, Fifth to Sixth Centuries A.D.

Chinese seized the area in 108 B.C., but from the beginning

Chinese rulers confronted many uprisings against their rule. Start- ing from a point along the Hun River (a tributary of the Yalu),

the rebels expanded their activities to the north, south, and

southeast, increasingly menacing Chinese authority. By A.D. 53

Koguryo had coalesced into an independent centralized kingdom;

the subsequent fall of the Han Dynasty and ensuing political divisions in China enabled Koguryo to consolidate and extend its power.

Despite repeated attacks by Chinese and other opposition forces,

by 391 the kingdom's rulers had achieved undisputed control of

all of Manchuria east of the Liao River as well as of the northern

and central regions of the Korean Peninsula. Koguryo's best-known

ruler, King Kwanggaet'o—whose name literally means "broad ex- pander of territory" —lived to be only thirty-nine years of age, but

reigned twenty-one years, from 391 to 412. During that period,

Kwanggaet'o conquered 65 walled cities and 1,400 villages, in addition to aiding Silla when it was attacked by the Japanese. His

accomplishments are recorded on a monument erected in 414 in

southern Manchuria. Koguryo moved its capital to P'yongyang in

427 and ruled the territory north of the Han River. But Koguryo's

6
Historical Setting

expansion caused it to come into conflict with the Sui Dynasty of

China (581-617) in the west and Silla, which was beginning to ex- pand northward, in the south.

Although Koguryo had been strong enough to repulse the forces

of the Sui Dynasty, combined attacks by Silla and the Tang Dynasty of China (618-907) proved too formidable. Koguryo' s ally

in the southwest, Paekche, fell before Tang and Silla in 660; the

victorious allies continued their assault on Koguryo for the next

eight years and eventually vanquished the weary kingdom, which

had been suffering from a series of famines and internal strife. Silla thus unified Korea in 668, but the kingdom's reliance on

China's Tang Dynasty had its price. Eventually Silla had to forcibly

resist the imposition of Chinese rule over the entire peninsula, which

Silla' s rulers did, but their strength did not extend beyond the Taedong River. Much of the former Koguryo territory was given up

to the Chinese and to other tribal states. It remained for later dynasties to push the border northward to the Yalu and Tumen rivers. The Evolution of Korean Society

After the Three Kingdoms period, Korea witnessed the rise and

fall of three dynasties—unified Silla (668-935), Koryo (918-1392),

and Choson (1392-1910). Each of these dynasties was marked by

initial periods of consolidation, the flourishing of civilization, and

eventual decline.

Silla The first 215 years of the Silla Dynasty were marked by the establishment of new political, legal, and education institutions of considerable vigor. Domestic and foreign trade (with Tang China and

Japan) prospered. Scholarship in Confucian learning, mathematics,

astronomy, and medicine also flourished. Buddhism, introduced to the peninsula in A.D. 372, reached its zenith (see Religion, ch. 2). Silla began to decline, however, in the latter part of the eighth

century when rebellions began to shake its foundations. By the latter half of the ninth century, two rivals had emerged. The chaotic sit- uation eventually led to the emergence of a new Koryo Dynasty

in 918 under a former officer, Wang Kon.

KoryO

The founder of Koryo and his heirs consolidated control over

the peninsula and strengthened its political and economic foundations by more closely following the bureaucratic and land- grant

systems of Tang China. The rise of the Kitan Liao tribe in the

north, however, threatened the new dynasty. The Liao invaded

7
South Korea: A Country Study

in 1010; Koryo was engulfed in devastating wars for a decade. After

peace was restored, Koryo' s inhabitants witnessed nearly a century

of thriving commercial, intellectual, and artistic activities parallel

to those taking place under the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in China.

The Koryo leaders actively sought to imitate the Song's advanced

culture and technology. In turn, the Song looked upon Koryo as a potential ally against the tribal invaders to whom it had been

forced to abandon northern China in 1127. Stimulated by the rise of printing in Song China, Koryo also made great headway in printing and publication, leading to the invention of movable metal type

in 1234, two centuries before the introduction of movable type in

Europe.

By the twelfth century, Koryo was plagued by internal and ex- ternal problems. Power struggles and avariciousness among the

ruling classes led to revolts by their subjects. The situation was ag- gravated by the rise in the north of the Mongols, who launched

a massive invasion in 1231. The Koryo armies put up fierce

resistance but were no match for the highly organized mounted

troops from the north, whose forces swept most of the Eurasian

continent during this period.

The Mongol Empire under Khubilai Khan enlisted Koryo in

its expeditions against Japan, mustering thousands of Korean men

and ships for ill-fated invasions in 1274 and 1281 . In each instance,

seasonal typhoons shattered the Mongol-Koryo fleets, giving rise to the myth of kamikaze, or the " divine wind." Korea, in the meantime, was completely under Mongol domination. Koryo kings married Mongol princesses. Only in the early fourteenth century, when

the Mongol Empire began to disintegrate and the Ming Dynasty

(1368-1644)—founded by a former Chinese peasant—pushed the

Mongols back to the north, did Koryo regain its independence.

In 1359 and 1361, however, Koryo suffered invasions by a large

number of Chinese rebel armies, known as the Red Banner Bandits, who sacked and burned the capital at Kaesong, just north of

the mouth of the Han River. The country was left in ruins.

As the Mongols retreated to the north and the Ming established a garrison in the northeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, the

Koryo court was torn between pro-Ming and pro-Mongol factions. General Yi Song-gye, who had been sent to attack the Ming forces

in the Liaodong region of Manchuria, revolted at the Yalu and

turned his army against his own capital, seizing it with ease. Yi took

the throne in 1392, founding Korea's most enduring dynasty. The

new state was named Choson, the same name used by the first Korean kingdom fifteen centuries earlier, although the later entity

8
Fifth- or sixth-century gold crown excavated from a

Silla Dynasty tomb

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington

usually has been called simply the Choson Dynasty or the Yi Dynasty. The capital of Choson was at Seoul.

The ChosOn Dynasty

The Koryo Dynasty had suffered from a number of internal

problems; Yi and his followers implemented drastic reforms to place

the new dynasty on firmer ground. One of these problems revolved

around the deterioration of land administration, a basic issue in a predominantly agrarian society. Contrary to the law specifying

public (governmental) ownership of land, powerful clans and Buddhist temples had acquired a sizable proportion of farmland. By

exacting a disproportionate share of crops in the form of rents, the

"landlords" were causing economic destitution and social discontent among the peasants. By illicitly removing the farms from tax

rolls, these clans and temples reduced the government's income,

thus straining the treasury. Yi had sided with reformists even before he took power, hence it was natural for him to rectify past

inequities after ascending to the throne.

The reform of the land system, however, had direct repercussions on the practice of Buddhism because Buddhist temples and

monks had been among those exacerbating the land problem. The

economic influence of the temples was eliminated when they lost vast lands. The rectification went beyond economic reform,

however, because the dominant forces in the new dynasty were

9
South Korea: A Country Study

devout Confucianists who regarded Buddhism as a false creed. The

fact that Buddhist monks had wielded a strong influence in politics, the economy, and society during the latter part of the Koryo

Dynasty—and that many of them had been corrupted by power

and money—strengthened the opposition to Buddhism. Accordingly, the new dynasty launched a sweeping attack on Buddhism

and its institutions, an attack that had profound and enduring ef- fects on the character of civilization on the peninsula.

Many of the outstanding temples were permitted to remain intact; indeed, a few Choson monarchs were devout Buddhists.

Nevertheless, Buddhism exerted little influence over the religious

life of Korea under the Choson Dynasty; nor did any organized

religion replace it. Although many people adhered to shamanism,

geomancy, fortunetelling, and superstitions, Korea effectively be- came a secular society.

The Choson Dynasty had an auspicious beginning. During the

reign of the fourth monarch, King Sejong (1418-50), a Buddhist, enormous strides were made in the arts, science, and technology.

The Korean script, known as han'gul (see Glossary), which eventually came into common usage in the twentieth century, was developed by scholars at that time.

After Sejong, however, the dynasty fell into the hands of lesser men, and in the late fifteenth century the country began a long

decline. Succession to the throne often caused long and bitter struggles, particularly when a ruler did not leave behind an heir who

had reached the age of majority. Members of the Confucianeducated, scholar-official elite yangban (see Glossary) class quarreled over minor points of Confucian ritual and etiquette, especially the

proper period of mourning upon the death of a royal personage.

Factional groups began vying for power, frequently going to the

extreme of exterminating the members of defeated factions. The

civil service examination became a sham, and corruption ran rampant. Royal relatives and members of powerful factions increased

their landholdings, which became exempt from taxes and thereby

reduced the dynasty's sources of revenue. The farmers suffered more and more from tax burdens and other extractions imposed

by greedy officials and landlords. In short, the country was not

being effectively governed. To make matters worse, Japanese at- tacks in 1592 and 1597 and Manchu assaults in 1627 and 1636

ravaged the country's economy and turned much of the farmland

to waste for a long period thereafter. The resulting social and economic depression of the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries fostered the rise of a new intellectual move- ment advocating the practical use of human knowledge. Pioneered

10
Historical Setting

by a Confucian scholar named Yi Su-kwang, the new thought

soon to be called Sirhak (practical learning)—was partly inspired

by the firsthand knowledge of occidental sciences that Yi Su-kwang

had acquired while on official visits to Beijing. As historian Kibaik Lee has noted, Sirhak thought encompassed a variety of in- tellectual activities and several diverse viewpoints. These included

proposals for refinement of the traditional administrative and land

systems, advocacy of commercial and manufacturing activity, and

a renewed interest in Korean history and language. Brought to maturity in the late eighteenth century by Chong Yag-yong, the Sir- hak Movement was supported by a group of discontented scholars, petty officials, former bureaucrats, and commoners. The Sirhak Movement found itself in direct confrontation with

the dominant trend in neo-Confucian thought, which stressed the

metaphysical and abstract teachings of the renowned Chinese

philosopher Zhu Xi (see Traditional Social Structure, ch. 2). Neither the efforts of such wise and able kings as Yongjo (1725-75) and

Chongjo (1776-1800), nor those of the Sirhak scholars, were able to reverse the trend against empirical studies and good government.

Western ideas, including Christianity, reached Korea through

China in the seventeenth century. By 1785, however, the government had become incensed over the rejection of ancestor worship

by Roman Catholic missionaries, and it banned all forms of Western

learning. Western ships began to approach Korean shores after 1801, seeking trade and other contacts, but the government rejected

all overtures from abroad. When news of the Opium War in China

(1839-42) reached Korea, the dynasty had all the more reason to shut the doors tighdy against Western "barbarians." In the meantime, the Choson Dynasty suffered from a series of natural calamities including floods, famines, and epidemics, as well as large-scale

revolts of the masses in the northwest (1811-12) and southwest (1862

and 1894-95).

The expansion of Western powers in East Asia in the nineteenth

century significantly altered the established order, in which Korea

had been dominated by China. China under the Qing Dynasty

(1644-191 1) was in decline; its power waned rapidly under the concerted attacks of such Western nations as France, Britain, and Russia. Stimulated by these events, Japan proceeded to modernize after having been forced to open its ports by Commodore Matthew C.

Perry of the United States Navy in 1853-54. Korea, however, re- mained dormant, having closed itself to all outside contacts in the

early eighteenth century.

The Japanese were the first foreign power in recent history to succeed in penetrating Korea's isolation. After a warlike Japanese

11
South Korea: A Country Study

provocation against Korea in 1875 (when China failed to come to Korea's aid), the Japanese forced an unequal treaty on Korea in

February 1876. The treaty gave Japanese nationals extraterritorial

rights and opened up three Korean ports to Japanese trade. In retali- ation, China sought to counter Japan by extending Korea's exter- nal relations and playing off one Western power against another.

Accordingly, Korea signed treaties with the United States, Britain,

Italy, Russia, and other countries within the decade after the one

with Japan.

Internally, the Korean court split into rival pro-Chinese, proJapanese, and pro-Russian factions, the latter two having more

reformist and modernizing orientations. In 1895 the Japanese

minister to Korea masterminded the assassination of the Korean

queen, who with her clan had opposed reform-oriented, Japanesesupported leaders. The Korean king, however, rejected not only

Japan but also the various reform measures and turned for support to one of Japan's adversaries—Russia. The king fled to the

Russian legation in Seoul to avoid possible Japanese plots against

him and conducted the nation's business from there. The Japanese

blunder had served the Russians well. In the meantime, under the leadership of So Chae-p'il, who had

exiled himself to the United States after participating in an unsuccessful palace coup in 1884, a massive campaign was launched to advocate Korean independence from foreign influence and controls. As well as supporting Korean independence, So also advocated reform in Korea's politics and customs in line with Western

practices. Upon his return to Korea in 1896, So published Tongnip simmun (The Independent), the first newspaper to use the hangul writing system and the vernacular language, which attracted an ever-growing audience (see The Korean Language, ch. 2). He

also organized the Independence Club to introduce Korea's elite to Western ideas and practices. Under his impetus and the influence

of education provided by Protestant mission schools, hundreds of

young men held mass meetings on the streets and plazas demanding democratic reforms and an end to Russian and Japanese domination. But the conservative forces proved to be too deeply

entrenched for the progressive reformers, who trashed the paper's

offices. The reformers, including Syngman Rhee, then a student

leader, were jailed. So was compelled to return to the United States in 1898, and under one pretext or another the government suppressed both the reform movement and its newspaper.

The revolt of 1894-95, known as the Tonghak Rebellion, had

international repercussions. Like the Taiping rebels in China thirty

years earlier, the Tonghak (see Glossary) participants were fired

12
Statue of King Sejong (1418-50), Toksu Palace, Seoul

Courtesy Oren Hadar

13
South Korea: A Country Study

by religious fervor as well as by indignation about the corrupt and

oppressive government. The rebellion spread from the southwest

to the central region of the peninsula, menacing Seoul. The Korean

court apparendy felt unable to cope with the rebels and invited Chi- na to send troops to quell the rebellion. This move gave Japan a

pretext to dispatch troops to Korea. The two countries soon en- gaged in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), which accelerated the demise of the Qing Dynasty in China.

The victorious Japanese established their hegemony over Korea

via the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and dictated to the Korean

government a wide-ranging series of measures to prevent further

domestic disturbances. In response, the government promulgated

various reforms, including the abolition of class distinctions, the

liberation of slaves, the abolition of the ritualistic civil service ex- amination system, and the adoption of a new tax system.

Russian influence had been on the rise in East Asia, in direct

conflict with the Japanese desire for expansion. In alliance with

France and Germany, Russia had just forced Japan to return the

Liaodong Peninsula to China (which Japan had seized during the

First Sino-Japanese War) and then promptly leased the territory

from China. The secret Sino-Russian treaty signed in 1896 also

gave the Russians the right to build and operate the Chinese Eastern Railway across northern Manchuria, which served as a link in the

Russian Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. Russia proceeded to acquire numerous concessions over Korea's forests and mines.

The strategic rivalry between Russia and Japan exploded in the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, won by Japan. Under the peace

treaty signed in September 1905, Russia acknowledged Japan's

' 'paramount political, military, and economic interest" in Korea.

A separate agreement signed in secret between the United States and Japan at this time subsequentiy aroused anti-American senti- ment among Koreans. The Taft-Katsura Agreement was cynical

by modern standards, exchanging what amounted to a lack of in- terest and military capability in Korea on the part of the United

States (Japan was given a free hand in Korea) for a lack of interest or capability in the Philippines on the part ofJapan (Japanese imperialism was diverted from the Philippines). Given the diplomatic

conventions of the times, however, the agreement was a much weaker endorsement of the Japanese presence in Korea than either the

Russo-Japanese peace treaty or a separate Anglo-Japanese accord.

Two months later, Korea was obliged to become a Japanese protectorate. Thereafter, a large number of Koreans organized themselves in education and reform movements, but by then Japanese

14
Historical Setting

dominance in Korea was a reality. Japan annexed Korea as a colony on August 22, 1910.

Characteristics of Society under the Dynasties

Cultural Expression

Koreans, like the other East Asian peoples, have a highly developed aesthetic sense and over the centuries have created a great

number of paintings, sculptures, and handicrafts of extraordinary

beauty. Among the very earliest are the paintings found on the

walls of tombs of the Koguryo Kingdom (located in what is now

North Korea) and around the China-North Korea border area. These paintings are colorful representations of birds, animals, and

human figures that possess remarkable vitality and animation. Similar, though less spectacular, tombs are found around the old capitals of the kingdoms of Paekche and Silla in present-day South

Korea. A number of gold objects, including a gold crown of great

delicacy and sophistication dating from the Three Kingdoms period,

have been found in South Korea.

Buddhism was the dominant artistic influence during the later Three Kingdoms period and the Silla and Koryo dynasties. Themes

and motifs that had originated in India passed to Korea through

Central Asia and China. A number of bronze images of Buddha

and the Bodhisattvas were made during the sixth, seventh, and

eighth centuries. The images are not mere copies of Indian or north

Chinese models, but possess a distinctly ' 'Korean" spirit that one

critic has described as

4 'as indifference to sophistication and artificiality and a predisposition toward nature." The striking stone Buddha found in the Sokkuram Grotto, a cave temple located near Kyongju in North Kyongsang Province, was carved during the Silla Dynasty and is considered to be the finest of Korean stone carvings.

During the centuries of Buddhism's ascendancy, a large number

of stone pagodas and temples were built, one of the most famous

being the Pulguksa Temple near Koyngju.

The Koryo Dynasty is best remembered for its celadons, or

bluish- green porcelains, considered by many specialists to be the

best in the world, surpassing even the Chinese porcelains upon

which they were originally modeled. Many have intricate designs

of birds, flowers, and other figures rendered in light and darkcolored clay on the blue-green background; some are delicately

formed into the shapes of flowers, animals, and objects. Choson

Dynasty pottery tended to be simpler and more rustic and had a

great influence on the development ofJapanese artistic appreciation

from the late sixteenth century on. After the attempted Japanese

15
South Korea: A Country Study

invasions of Korea in the 1590s, Korean potters were taken back

to Japan.

During the Choson Dynasty, Buddhism was no longer a source

of artistic inspiration. The art, music, and literature of theyangban were deeply influenced by Chinese models, yet exhibited a distinctively Korean style. Korean scholar-officials cultivated their skills in the arts of Confucian culture—Chinese poetry, calligraphy, and

landscape painting. Poetry was considered to be the most important of these arts; men who lacked poetic ability could not pass the

civil service examinations. Scholars were expected to refine their

skill in using the brush both in calligraphy, the ornamental writing of Chinese characters that was considered an art in itself, and

in landscape painting, which borrowed Chinese themes and styles.

However, scholarly calligraphers and landscape painters were considered amateurs. Professional artists were members of the chungin (see Glossary) class and were of low status, not only because their

painting tended to diverge from the style favored by the upper class but because it was too realistic. Particularly among the yangban,

Chinese dominance of cultural expression was assured by the fact that Korean intellectual discourse was largely dependent on Chinese

loanwords. Scholars preferred to write in Chinese rather than in

native Korean script.

One uniquely Korean style of painting that developed during

this period was found in the usually anonymous folk-paintings (minhwa), which depicted the daily life of the common people and used

genuine Korean rather than idealized or Chinese settings. Other

folk paintings had shamanistic themes and frequentiy depicted hermits and mountain deities. A distinctive position in traditional Korean literature is occupied

by a type of poem known as the sijo —a poetic form that began to develop in the twelfth century. It is composed of three couplets and

characterized by great simplicity and expressiveness:

My body is mortal, commonly mortal.

My bones end in dust, soul or no soul. My lord owns my heart, though, and that cannot

change.

This poem is by Chong Mong-ju (1337-92), a Koryo Dynasty

loyalist who was assassinated at the foundation of the Yi Dynasty.

The poet refers to his political choice not to side with the new

government.

Many of these poems reveal a sensitivity to the beauties of nature, delight in life's pleasures, and a tendency toward philosophical

16
Historical Setting

contemplation that together produce a sense of serenity and, sometimes, loneliness. Frequently the poems reveal a preoccupation with

purity, symbolized by whiteness:

Do not enter, snowy heron, in the valley where the crows are quarreling.

Such angry crows are envious of your whiteness,

And I fear that they will soil the body you have

washed in the pure stream. The development of a Korean alphabet (today known as han 'gul) in the fifteenth century gave rise to a vernacular, or popular, liter- ature. Although the native alphabet was looked down upon by the

yangban elite, historical works, poetry, travelogues, biographies, and

fiction written in a mixed script of Chinese characters and han 'gul were widely circulated. Some vernacular literature had what could

be interpreted as social protest themes. Probably the earliest of these was The Tale ofHong Kil-tong hy Ho Kyun. The protagonist, Hong

Kil-tong, was the son of a nobleman and his concubine; his ambition to become a great official was frustrated because of his mother's

lowly background. He became a Robin Hood figure, stole from

the rich to give to the poor, and eventually left Korea in order to establish a small kingdom in the south. Other vernacular writers

included Kim Man-jung, who wrote The Nine Cloud Dream, which

dealt with Buddhist themes of karma and destiny, and The Story

ofLady Sa. Pak Chi-won's Tale ofa Yangban gave a realistic account

of social life in eighteenth-century Korea. In 1980 Korean schol- ars discovered a nineteenth-century vernacular novel that told of

the complicated relationships among members of fouryangban and

commoner clans over five generations in a very detailed and realistic manner. At 235 volumes, this work is one of the longest novels ever written.

P'ansori combine music and literary expression in ballad-form

stories, which are both recited and sung by a performer accompanied by a drummer who sets the rhythms—a kind of "one-man

opera" in the words of one observer. P'ansori usually are inspired

by myths or folk tales and have Confucian, Buddhist, or folkloric

themes. In the 1970s and 1980s, dissident students often drew on

the techniques of traditional folk drama to satirize contemporary

politics.

Korean folk tales are closely tied to religious traditions and usually

have shamanistic, Buddhist, or Confucian themes. While Confucian

tales tend to be moralistic and didactic, Buddhist and shamanistic

tales are highly imaginative and colorful, depicting the relationships

17
South Korea: A Country Study

among spirits, ghosts, gods, and men in many different and often

humorous ways.

Korean Identity

That the Korean kingdoms were strongly affected by Chinese

civilization and its institutions was not surprising. Not only were

the Chinese far more numerous and often more powerful militarily

than the Koreans, but they also had a more advanced technology

and culture. Chinese supremacy in these realms was acknowledged

not only by the Koreans, who were militarily inferior, but also by

those who were powerful enough to conquer China, such as the

Kitan Liao, who ruled parts of northern China, Manchuria, and

Mongolia between 907 and 1127; the Mongols who ruled China

from 1279 to 1368; the Jurchen tribes, who later seized northern

Manchuria; and the Manchus, who ruled China between 1644 and

1911. The adoption of Chinese culture was more than simply an

expression of submission to China, it also was the indispensable

condition of being civilized in the East Asian context. This situation continued until the inroads of Western civilization substantially altered the political and cultural map of Asia in the latter part

of the nineteenth century.

The adoption of Chinese culture and institutions by the Korean

kingdoms, however, did not obliterate the identity of the Korean

people. Koguryo had risen against the Chinese conquerors, and

Silla had stubbornly resisted Chinese attempts to turn it into a

colony. While Silla and subsequent dynasties were obliged to pay

tribute to the various Chinese, Mongol, and Jurchen dynasties,

and although Korea was subjected to direct overlordship by the

Mongols for a century, the Korean kingdoms were able to survive

as independent entities, enabling their citizens to maintain an identity as a separate people.

Further contributing to the maintenance of this identity was the

Korean language, which linguists generally agree belongs to the

Altaic language family of Inner Asia. There is no doubt that the

indigenous language was deeply affected by the country's long contact with China. Not only did its written form rely on Chinese

characters until the fifteenth century, but about half of its vocabulary was of Chinese origin. Nevertheless, the language is very differ- ent from Chinese in its lexicon, phonology, and grammar. Although

at one time the ruling classes were set apart from the rest of the

population by their knowledge of Chinese characters and their ability to use Chinese in its written form, since the unification of the

peninsula by the Silla Dynasty all Koreans have shared the same

spoken language.

18
Historical Setting

Political and Social Institutions

Despite the fact that Korea would undergo numerous reforms,

palace coups, and two dynastic changes after the Silla period, many

of the political and social systems and practices instituted during

the Silla Dynasty persisted until the nineteenth century. Their

Chinese inspiration, of course, had much to do with the durability

of these systems. One lasting principle was that of centralized rule. From the time of the Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla states of the Three

Kingdoms period, royal houses always governed their domains

directly, without granting autonomous powers to local administrators. The effectiveness of the central government varied from

dynasty to dynasty and from period to period, but the principle

of centralization—involving a system of provinces, districts, towns,

and villages—was never modified.

Another feature that endured for centuries was the existence of a stratified social system characterized by a clear distinction between the rulers and the ruled. Under the Silla Dynasty, society was rigidly organized into a hereditary caste system. The Koryo

Dynasty, which succeeded Silla, instituted a system of social class- es according to which the rest of the population was subordinate

to an elite composed of scholar-officials. By passing the higher civil service examination and becoming a government official a com- moner could become a member of the elite, but since examinations presupposed both the time and wealth for education, upward

mobility was not the rule. This system continued during the Choson Dynasty. The strength of the aristocratic tradition may have

been one factor contributing to the relative weakness of the Korean

monarchy, in which the king usually presided over a council of

senior officials as primus inter pares, rather than governing as absolute ruler. During the Choson Dynasty, family and lineage groups came

to occupy tremendous importance. Because one's social and political status in society was largely determined by birth and lineage,

it was only natural that a great deal of emphasis was placed on

family. Each family maintained a genealogical table with meticulous

care. Only male offspring could prolong the family, and clan lines

and theirs were the only names registered in the genealogical ta- bles; therefore, the birth of a son was regarded as an occasion of

great joy. The Confucian stress on the family reinforced the importance Koreans attached to the family.

The Confucian principle of Five Relationships (see Glossary)

governing social behavior became the norm of Korean society.

Righteousness toward the sovereign, filial piety, deference to older

19
South Korea: A Country Study

and superior persons, and benevolence to the younger and inferior

became inviolable rules of conduct. Transgressors of these rules were regarded as uncultured beings unfit to be members of society.

Whether in the family or society at large, people in positions of

authority or occupying superior status commanded respect.

Still another enduring feature of traditional society under the

Choson Dynasty was the dominance of theyangban class. Theyangban

not only held power but also controlled the national wealth in the

form of land. The court permitted the yangban to collect revenues on the land as remuneration for their services. Because much commercial activity was related to tributary missions to China or to government procurements, the wealth of the merchants often was

dependent upon the discretion of the yangban.

Finally, because under the Choson Dynasty one could enter into

the scholar-official elite by passing examinations based on Confucian writings and penmanship, the entire society stressed classical education. The arts of war were accorded a lesser status, even though the founders of both the Koryo and Choson dynasties were

generals and despite the fact that the country had suffered from numerous foreign invasions.

Korea under Japanese Rule

Korea underwent drastic changes under Japanese rule. Even before the country was formally annexed by Japan in 1910, the

Japanese caused the last ruling monarch, King Kojong, to abdicate the throne in 1907 in favor of his feeble son, who was soon married off to a Japanese woman and given a Japanese peerage.

Japan then governed Korea under a residency general and subsequently under a governor general directly subordinate to Japanese

prime ministers. All of the governor generals were high-ranking

Japanese military officers. In theory the Koreans, as subjects of the Japanese emperor, en- joyed the same status as the Japanese; but in fact the Japanese

government treated the Koreans as a conquered people. Until 1921

they were not allowed to publish their own newspapers or to or- ganize political or intellectual groups.

Nationalist sentiments gave rise to a Korean student demonstration in Japan, and on March 1, 1919, to a Proclamation of In- dependence by a small group of leaders in Seoul. With the

consolidation of what became known as the March First Movement, street demonstrations led by Christian and Ch'ondogyo (a

movement that evolved from Tonghak) groups erupted throughout the country to protest Japanese rule.

20
Kyongbok Palace, Seoul

Courtesy Oren Hadar

In the wake of the protest, Japan granted considerable latitude

to Korea. As historians have noted, the ensuing intellectual and

social ferment of the 1920s marked a seminal period in modern

Korean history. Many developments of the period, including the

organization of labor unions and other social and economic movements, had continuing influence into the postliberation period. In

the 1930s, however, the ascendancy of the military in Japanese politics reversed the change. Particularly after 1937, when Japan

launched the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) against China,

the colonial government decided on a policy of mobilizing the entire

country for the cause of the war. Not only was the economy reor- ganized onto a war footing, but the Koreans were to be totally assimilated as Japanese. The government also began to enlist Korean

youths in the Japanese army as volunteers in 1938 and as conscripts

in 1943. Worship at Shinto shrines became mandatory, and every

attempt at preserving Korean identity was discouraged.

The Korean economy also underwent significant change. Japan's

initial colonial policy was to increase agricultural production in

Korea to meet Japan's growing need for rice. Japan had also begun to build large-scale industries in Korea in the 1930s as part

of the empire-wide program of economic self-sufficiency and war

preparation. Between 1939 and 1941, the manufacturing sector

21
South Korea: A Country Study

represented 29 percent of Korea's total economic production. The

primary industries—agriculture, fishing, and forestry—occupied

only 49.6 percent of total economic production during that period,

in contrast to having provided 84.6 percent of total production between 1910 and 1912.

The economic development taking place under Japanese rule,

however, brought little benefit to the Koreans. Virtually all industries were owned either by Japan-based corporations or byJapanese

corporations in Korea (see The Japanese Role in Korea's Economic

Development, ch. 3). As of 1942, Korean capital constituted only

1 .5 percent of the total capital invested in Korean industries. Korean

entrepreneurs were charged interest rates 25 percent higher than

their Japanese counterparts, so it was difficult for Korean enterprises to emerge. More and more farmland was taken over by the

Japanese, and an increasing proportion of Korean farmers either

became sharecroppers or migrated to Japan or Manchuria. As

greater quantities of Korean rice were exported to Japan, per capita

consumption of rice among the Koreans declined; between 1932

and 1936, per capita consumption of rice declined to half the level consumed between 1912 and 1916. Although the government imported coarse grains from Manchuria to augment the Korean food

supply, per capita consumption of food grains in 1944 was 35 per- cent below that of 1912 to 1916.

UnderJapanese rule, intellectual influences different from tradi- tional Buddhist, Confucianist, and shamanistic beliefs flooded the

country. Western-style painting was introduced, and literary trends, even among writers who emphasized themes of social protest and

national independence, tended to follow Japanese and European

models, particularly those developed during the late nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries. The works of Russian, German, French,

British, American, and Japanese authors were read by the more

educated Koreans, and Korean writers increasingly adopted

Western ideas and literary forms. Social and political themes were

prominent. Tears ofBlood, the first of the "new novels," published

by Yi In-jik in serial form in a magazine in 1906, stressed the need

for social reform and cultural enlightenment, following Western

and Japanese models. Yi Kwang-su's The Heartless, published in

1917, stressed the need for mass education, Western science, and

the repudiation of the old family and social system. Ch'ae Mansik's Ready Made Life, published in 1934, protested the injustices

of colonial society.

In the 1920s and 1930s, socialist ideas began to influence the

development of literature. In 1925 left-wing artists, rejecting the

romanticism of many contemporary writers, established the Korean

22
Japan's Residency General

Courtesy Carpenter Collection, Library of Congress

Proletarian Artists' Federation, which continued until it was suppressed by Japanese authorities in 1935. One of the best representatives of this group was Yi Ki-yong, whose 1936 novel Home tells of the misery of villagers under Japanese rule and the efforts of

the protagonist, a student, to organize them. Poets during the colonial period included Yi Sang-hwa, Kim So-wol, and Han Yong-un.

But the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War marked a period of unprecedented repression in the cultural sphere by

Japanese authorities, which continued until Korea's liberation in

1945.

From the late 1930s until 1945, the colonial government pursued a policy of assimilation whose primary goal was to force the

Koreans to speak Japanese and to consider themselves Japanese

subjects. In 1937 the Japanese governor general ordered that all instruction in Korean schools be in Japanese and that students not

be allowed to speak Korean either inside or outside of school. In

1939 another decree "encouraged" Koreans to adopt Japanese

names, and by the following year it was reported that 84 percent

of all Korean families had done so. During the war years, Koreanlanguage newspapers and magazines were shut down. Belief in

the divinity of the Japanese emperor was encouraged, and Shinto

shrines were built throughout the country. Had Japanese rule not

23
South Korea: A Country Study

ended in 1945, the fate of indigenous Korean language, culture,

and religious practices would have been extremely uncertain (see

Korea and Japan, ch. 2). Japanese rule was harsh, particularly after the Japanese militarists began their expansionist drive in the 1930s. Internal Korean

resistance, however, virtually ceased in the 1930s as the police and

the military gendarmes imposed strict surveillance over all people

suspected of subversive inclinations and meted out severe punishment against recalcitrants. Most Koreans opted to pay lip service

to the colonial government. Others actively collaborated with the

Japanese. The treatment of collaborators became a sensitive and

sometimes violent issue during the years immediately following

liberation.

World War II and Korea

On August 8, 1945, during the final days of World War II, the

Soviet Union declared war against Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria and Korea. By then, Japan had been depleted

by the drawn-out war against the United States and its Allies, and

Japanese forces were in no position to stave off the Soviets. The

dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August

6 and August 9, respectively, had led the Japanese government

to search for ways to end the war. On August 15, 1945, Japan sur- rendered unconditionally.

The Japanese surrender and the Soviet landing on the Korean

Peninsula totally altered the history of contemporary Korea. At

the Cairo Conference of December 1943, the Allies had decided

to strip Japan of all the territories it had acquired since 1894, the

beginning ofJapan's expansionist drive abroad. The United States,

China, and Britain had agreed at Cairo that Korea would be allowed

to become free and independent in due course after the Allied vic- tory. The Soviet Union agreed to the same principle in its declaration of war against Japan.

Although the United States president, Franklin D. Roosevelt,

and Marshal Josef V. Stalin of the Soviet Union had agreed to establish an international trusteeship for Korea at the Yalta Conference of February 1945, no decision had been made on the exact formula for governing the nation in the aftermath of Allied victory.

The landing of Soviet forces, however, compelled the United States government to improvise a formula for Korea. Unless an agreement were reached, the Soviets could very well occupy the entire

peninsula and place Korea under their control. Thus, on August

15, 1945, President Harry S Truman proposed to Stalin the divi- sion of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel. The next day Stalin

24
Historical Setting

agreed. Evidently Stalin did not wish to confront the United States by occupying the entire peninsula. He may also have hoped that

the United States, in return, would permit the Soviet Union to occupy the northern half of the northernmost major Japanese is- land, Hokkaido (see fig. 3).

The Allied foreign ministers subsequently met in Moscow on December 7, 1945, and decided to establish a trusteeship for a five- year period, during which a Korean provisional government would

prepare for full independence; they also agreed to form a joint

United States-Soviet commission to assist in organizing a single

4 'provisional Korean democratic government." The trusteeship

proposal was immediately opposed by nearly all Koreans, especially the Korean right under Syngman Rhee, who used the issue

to consolidate his domestic political base. The Korean communists

objected at first, but quickly changed their position under Soviet

direction.

The joint commission met intermittently in Seoul from March

1946 until it adjourned indefinitely in October 1947. The Soviet

insistence that only those "democratic" parties and social organizations upholding the trusteeship plan be allowed to participate in

the formation of an all- Korean government was unacceptable to the United States. The United States argued that the Soviet for- mula, if accepted, would put the communists in controlling positions throughout Korea.

South Korea under United States Occupation,

1945-48

The three-year occupation by the United States of the area approximating present-day South Korea, following the liberation of

Korea from Japan, was characterized by uncertainty and confusion. This difficult situation stemmed largely from the absence of a clearly formulated United States policy for Korea, the intensifi- cation of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet

Union, and the polarization of Korean politics between left and

right. Although the United States had maintained diplomatic ties with the Choson Dynasty between 1882 and 1905, Korea in 1945

still was a remote country known only to a small number of missionaries and adventurous businessmen, holding little importance

in the official scheme of things. And although the United States had proposed the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line between

the two occupation armies, United States policymakers still were

unsure of the strategic value of South Korea. United States policy

25
Figure 3. South Korea in Its Asian Setting, 1990

toward Korea became more uncertain after the deadlock of the

United States-Soviet joint commission. While United States officials were pessimistic about resolving their differences with the Soviet

Union, they remained committed to the December 1945 decision

26
Historical Setting

of the Allied foreign ministers (made during their Moscow meeting) that a trusteeship under four powers, including China, should

be established with a view toward Korea's eventual independence.

Thus, United States officials were slow to draw up long-range

alternative plans for South Korea.

Moreover, as the Soviet Union consolidated its power in North

Korea and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or Kuomintang

KMT) government of Chiang Kai-shek began to falter in China,

United States strategists began to question the long-run defensibility

of South Korea. By 1947 it appeared that South Korea would become

the only area of mainland Northeast Asia not under communist control. According to one highly placed official, this was an "exposed,

unsound military position, one that [was] doing no good."

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the United

States occupation forces in Korea, was obliged to work under a

severe handicap—a mission of maintaining peace and order until

the international conflict over Korea was resolved. Possessing very

limited resources, Hodge was expected to pursue the "ultimate

objective" of fostering "conditions which would bring about the

establishment of a free and independent nation."

General Hodge had to contend with hostile Korean political

groups. Before United States forces had landed in Korea in September 1945, the Koreans had established self-governing bodies, or people's committees. The leaders of these committees had organized the Central People's Committee, which proclaimed the establishment of the "Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945.

Exiles abroad, mainly in China, had organized the "Korean Provisional Government" in Shanghai as early as 1919 and had sus- tained a skeletal organization in other parts of China until 1945.

The United States recognized neither the republic nor the provisional government. The provisional government was headed by

Syngman Rhee, its first president, and Kim Ku and Kim Kyusik, premier and vice premier, respectively. The United States would not recognize any group as a government until an agreement was reached among the Western Allies. The exiles were mollified by the favorable treatment they received when they returned

to South Korea, but were incensed by the order to disband issued

by the United States Army Military Government in Korea. The

military government that administered the American-occupied zone proceeded to disband the local people's committees and impose

direct rule, assigning military personnel who lacked language skills and knowledge of Korea as governors at various levels. The Korean Communist Party, resuscitated in October 1945,

had been a major force behind the Central People's Committee

27
South Korea: A Country Study

and the "Korean People's Republic" and quickly built a substantial following among the workers, farmers, and students. The party

eventually changed its stance on trusteeship and came out in support of it on January 3, 1946. Because the party was under the

control of the Soviet command in P'yongyang, it came into direct

confrontation with the United States Army military government.

The situation was exacerbated in December 1945 when the decision to establish a trusteeship was announced. To the Koreans,

who had anticipated immediate independence, the decision to implement a five-year trusteeship was humiliating, and the initially

warm welcome to United States troops as liberators cooled. By early

1946, the United States Army military government had come to rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements, including landlords and other propertied persons.

The United States initially supported the returned exiles and the

conservative elements, but between May 1946 and April 1947, the

military government tried to mobilize support behind a coalition

between the moderate left represented by Yo Un-hyong (or Lyuh

Woon Hyung), who had been the figurehead of the Central People's

Committee, and the moderate right, represented by Kim Kyu-sik,

vice premier of the exiled government. This attempt only intensified splits within the left-wing and right-wing camps without producing any positive results. The moderates' argument that the Koreans

should oppose the trusteeship was unacceptable to the other parties. Communist leaders, on the other hand, were driven underground in May 1946 after the discovery of a currency-counterfeiting

operation run by the party. The left-wing and right-wing groups,

in the meantime, frequently engaged in violent clashes not only on ideological grounds, but also because of their opposing views

about the trusteeship decision. In December 1946, the military government established the South

Korean Interim Legislative Assembly to formulate draft laws to be used as "the basis for political, economic, and social reforms."

South Korea's problems, however, required solutions at a much

higher level. The left-wing political groups, consolidated under the

rubric of the South Korean Workers' Party, ignored the assembly. The conservative Korean Democratic Party, supported by landlords and small-business owners, opposed the assembly because their

principal leaders were excluded from it. Although many of the as- sembly's forty-five elected members were conservatives, most of

the forty-five appointed members were moderates nominated by

Kim Kyu-sik, who had emerged as Hodge's choice for political

leadership. Unfortunately, Kim lacked dynamism and broad support among the masses.

28
Historical Setting

Economy and Society

These circumstances had thrown South Korea's economy into

complete chaos. Even if the occupation forces had arrived with a

carefully laid economic plan, the situation would have been difficult because the Japanese had developed Korea's economy as an in- tegral part of their empire, linking Korea to Japan and Manchuria.

The division of Korea into two zones at an arbitrary line fur- ther aggravated the situation. There were many inherent problems

in building a self-sufficient economy in the southern half of the

peninsula. Most of the heavy industrial facilities were located in

northern Korea—the Soviet zone—including the chemical plants

that produced necessary agricultural fertilizers. Light industries in

southern Korea had been dependent on electricity from the hydraulic generators located on the Yalu River on the Korean-Manchurian

border; electric generating facilities in the south supplied only 9

percent of the total need. Railroads and industries in the south also had been dependent upon bituminous coal imported from Manchuria, Japan, and the north (although the south had been exporting some excess anthracite to the north).

The problems were compounded by the fact that most of Korea's

mines and industries had been owned and operated by Japan. As

the United States Army military government let the 700,000

Japanese depart from South Korea in the months following the start of the American occupation, almost all of the mines and factories

now enemy properties vested in the military government—were

without managers, technicians, and capital resources. This situation led to severe problems of unemployment and material

shortages.

The months after the arrival of occupation forces also witnessed

a vast inflow of population. South Korea's population, estimated

at just over 16 million in 1945, grew by 21 percent during the next

year. By 1950 more than 1 million workers had returned from

Japan, 120,000 from China and Manchuria, and 1 .8 million from

the north. The annual rate of increase of births over deaths con- tinued at about 3.1 percent. Since rural areas were inhospitable

to newcomers, most of the refugees settled in urban areas; Seoul

received upwards of one-third of the total. The situation was fur- ther aggravated by scarcities of food and other commodities and

by runaway inflation, caused in part by the fact that the departing

Japanese had flooded Korea with newly printed yen.

The social unrest created by these developments can be easily

surmised. By 1947 only about half the labor force of 10 million was gainfully employed. Labor strikes and work stoppages were

29
South Korea: A Country Study

recurrent phenomena, and demonstrations against the United States Army military government's policies drew large crowds. Temporary

stoppages of electricity—supplied from the northern areas—in the

early part of 1946 and late 1947 plunged the southern region into

darkness on each occasion, deepening the despair of the populace.

The disillusioned and disconcerted people paid keen attention to political leaders of various persuasions who offered new ways

of solving the Korean problem.

Establishment of the Republic of Korea

In this atmosphere, the United States scuttled an earlier plan

to provide US$500 million over five years for South Korean development. It then submitted the Korean problem to the United

Nations (UN) in September 1947. In November the UN General

Assembly recognized Korea's claim to independence and made

preparations for the establishment of a government and the withdrawal of occupation forces. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea arrived to supervise the election of a national

assembly, which was held in May 1948. The Soviet Union,

however, objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the

commission to the Soviet-controlled zone in the north. It was becoming increasingly clear that two separate regimes would be established on the peninsula.

The prospect of perpetuating the division of Korea catapulted some of the southern political leaders to action, significantly alter- ing the political configuration there. The choice they faced was between immediate independence at the price of indefinite division, or postponement of independence until the deadlock between the

United States and the Soviet Union was resolved. Rhee had campaigned actively within Korea and the United States for the first alternative since June 1946. Other major figures in the right-wing

camp, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, decided to oppose the

"separate elections" in the south, hoping to resolve the international impasse by holding talks with their northern counterparts.

The group led by the two Kims made their way to P'yongyang,

the future capital of North Korea, in April 1948, boycotted the

May 1948 elections, and were discredited when P'yongyang cut

off electricity, leaving Rhee a clear field although he lacked grass roots support apart from the Korean Democratic Party. By this time, the communists in the south had lost much of their political

following, particularly after a serious riot in October 1946; most

of their leaders congregated in the north. The moderate left-wing

camp was in disarray after their leader, Yo Un-hyong, was assas- sinated in July 1947. Kim Kyu-sik had been the clear choice of the

30
Historical Setting

United States Army military government, but he could not be dis- suaded from his fruitless trip to P'yongyang.

The National Assembly elected in May 1948 adopted a constitution setting forth a presidential form of government and specifying a four-year term for the presidency. Syngman Rhee, whose supporters had won the elections, became head of the new assembly.

On this basis, when on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea

(South Korea) was proclaimed, Rhee assumed the presidency. Four

days after the proclamation, communist authorities completed the

severing of north-south ties by shutting off power transmission to the south. Within less than a month, a communist regime, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), was proclaimed

under Premier Kim II Sung, who claimed authority over the entire

country by virtue of elections conducted in the north and the underground elections allegedly held in the south. Rhee scarcely had time

to put his political house in order before North Korea launched

its attack on South Korea in June 1950.

The South Korean army had come into being in September 1948

(see The South Korean Army after World War II, ch. 5). A communist-led revolt of army regiments in the southern part of the peninsula in October of the same year, known as the Yosu-Sunch'on

rebellion, had consumed much of the army's attention and

resources, however, and a massive purge in the aftermath of that

revolt weakened the entire military establishment. Given South

Korea's precarious future and the communist victory in China,

the United States was not eager to provide support. By June 29,

1949, United States occupation forces had been withdrawn, save

for a handful of military advisers, and Korea had been placed outside of the United States defense perimeter.

The Korean War, 1950-53

In the meantime, the communists had built a formidable politi- cal and military structure in North Korea under the aegis of the

Soviet command. They had created a regional Five-Province Administrative Bureau in October 1945, which was reorganized into

the North Korean Provisional People's Committee in February 1946

and shed the "Provisional" component of its name twelve months

later. The communists also expanded and consolidated their party's

strength by merging all of the left-wing groups into the North

Korean Workers' Party in August 1946. Beginning in 1946, the

armed forces also were organized and reinforced. Between 1946

and 1949, large numbers of North Korean youths—at least 10,000—were taken to the Soviet Union for military training. A

draft was instituted, and in 1949 two divisions—40,000 troops

31
South Korea: A Country Study

of the former Korean Volunteer Army in China, who had trained

under the Chinese communists and had participated in the Chinese

civil war (1945-49), returned to North Korea.

By June 1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000

and 200,000 troops, organized into ten infantry divisions, one tank

division, and one air force division. Soviet equipment, including

automatic weapons of various types, T-34 tanks, and Yak fighter

planes, had also been pouring into North Korea in early 1950.

These forces were to fight the ill-equipped South Korean army of

less than 100,000 men—an army lacking in tanks, heavy artillery,

and combat airplanes—plus a coast guard of 4,000 men and a police

force of 45,000 men. The events following the June 1950 invasion proved the superiority of North Korean military forces and the soundness of their overall invasion strategy. South Korea's army was simply overwhelmed;

Seoul fell within three days. By early August, South Korean forces were confined in the southeastern corner of the peninsula to a terri- tory 140 kilometers long and 90 kilometers wide. The rest of the ter- ritory was completely in the hands of the North Korean army.

The only unforeseen event complicating North Korea's strategy was the swift decision by the United States to commit forces in sup- port of South Korea. On June 26, 1950, Truman ordered the use

of United States planes and naval vessels against North Korean

forces, and onJune 30 United States ground troops were dispatched.

The United States, fearing that inaction in Korea would be interpreted as appeasement of communist aggression elsewhere in the

world, was determined that South Korea should not be over- whelmed and asked the UN Security Council to intervene. When

Douglas MacArthur, the commanding general of the United

Nations forces in Korea, launched his amphibious attack and landed

at Inch'on on September 15, the course of the war changed

abruptly. Much of North Korea was taken by United States and

South Korean forces before Chinese "volunteers" intervened in

October, enabling North Korea to eventually restore its authority over its domain. The war lasted until July 27, 1953, when a ceasefire agreement was signed at P'anmunjom. By then, the war had

involved China and the Soviet Union, which had dispatched air force divisions to Manchuria in support of North Korea and had

furnished the Chinese and North Koreans with arms, tanks, military supplies, fuel, foodstuffs, and medicine. Fifteen membernations of the United Nations had contributed armed forces and

medical units to South Korea.

The war left indelible marks on the Korean Peninsula and the

world surrounding it. The entire peninsula was reduced to rubble;

32
Historical Setting

casualties on both sides were enormous. The chances for peaceful

unification had been remote even before 1950, but the war dashed

all such hopes. Sizable numbers of South Koreans who either had

been sympathetic or indifferent to communism before the war be- came avowed anticommunists afterwards. The war also intensified hostilities between the communist and noncommunist camps

in the accelerating East-West arms race. Moreover, a large number of Chinese volunteer troops remained in North Korea until

October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly important

role in Korean affairs. Because tension on the Korean Peninsula

remained high, the United States continued to station troops in

South Korea over the strenuous objections of North Korean leaders. The war also spurred Japan's industrial recovery and the United

States' decision to rearm Japan.

The Syngman Rhee Era, 1948-60

The Political Environment

Even though Syngman Rhee had been handily elected president

by the National Assembly in 1948—with 180 of the 196 votes cast in his favor—he quickly ran into difficulties. South Korean politics during Rhee's regime (1948-60) essentially revolved around

Rhee's struggle to remain in power and the opposition's efforts to unseat him. Constitutional provisions concerning the presidency

became the focal point.

Because Rhee's four-year term of office was to end in August

1952 under the 1948 constitution, and because he had no prospect

of being reelected by the National Assembly, he supported a constitutional amendment, introduced in November 1951, to elect the

president by popular vote. The proposal was resoundingly defeated

by a vote of 143 to 19, prompting Rhee to marshal his supporters

into the Liberal Party. Four months later, in April 1952, the opposition introduced another motion calling for a parliamentary form

of government. Rhee declared martial law in May, rounded up

the assembly members by force, and called for another vote. His

constitutional amendment to elect the president by popular vote was railroaded through, passing with 163 votes of the 166 assembly members present. In the subsequent popular election in August,

Rhee was reelected by 72 percent of the voters. The constitution, however, limited the president to only two

terms. Hence, when the end of Rhee's second term of office approached, the constitution again was amended (in November 1954)

by the use of fraudulent tactics that allowed Rhee to succeed himself indefinitely.

33
South Korea: A Country Study

In the meantime, South Korea's citizens, particularly the urban

masses, had become more politically conscious. The press frequently

exposed government ineptitude and corruption and attacked Rhee's

authoritarian rule. The Democratic Party capitalized on these particulars; in the May 1956 presidential election, Rhee won only 55

percent of the votes, even though his principal opponent, Sin Ik-hiii,

had died of a heart attack ten days before the election. Rhee's run- ning mate, Yi Ki-bung, fared much worse, losing to the Democratic

Party candidate, Chang Myon (John M. Chang). Since Rhee was

already eighty-one years old in 1956, Chang's victory caused a major tremor among Rhee's supporters.

Thereafter, the issue of Rhee's age and the goal of electing Yi

Ki-bung became an obsession. The administration became increasingly repressive as Liberal Party leaders came to dominate the

political arena, including government operations, around 1958. Yi,

formerly Rhee's personal secretary, and his wife (Mrs. Rhee's confidant and a power-behind-the-scenes) had convinced the childless Rhee to adopt their son as his legal heir. For fear that Rhee's

health might be impaired, he was carefully shielded from all information that might upset him. Thus, the aged and secluded pres- ident became a captive of the system he had built, rather than its master.

In March 1960, the Liberal Party managed to reelect Rhee and

to elect Yi Ki-bung vice president by the blatant use of force. Rhee

was reelected by default because his principal opponent had died

while receiving medical treatment in the United States just before

the election. As for Yi, he was largely confined to his sickbed—

cause of public anger—but "won" 8.3 million votes as against 1.8

million votes for Chang Myon. The fraudulent election touched

off civil disorders, known and celebrated as the April 19 Student

Revolution, during which 142 students were killed by the police.

As a result, Rhee resigned on April 26, 1960. The next day all four members of the Yi family died in a suicide pact. This account

has been challenged by some who believed Yi's family was killed

by his bodyguards in hopes of enabling Rhee to stay on. Rhee, a self-righteous man convinced of his indispensability to Korea, loathed his critics and opponents and equated criticism with

treason. Although his record as a national hero and his skill in handling United States-Korean relations won him admiration during

the immediate years after the Korean War, Rhee became a captive of the people surrounding him. In the late 1950s, his policies were largely without results as rapid changes in the economy and

society deeply affected South Korea's system.

34
Historical Setting

Society under Rhee

The transformation of South Korean society during the Rhee

era was of revolutionary proportions because of the convergence

of a number of forces. A major impetus for social change was the

greatly enhanced opportunity for education. Although Japan had

introduced a modern education system to Korea, opportunities for Koreans were purposely limited, particularly at the secondary and

university levels. Educational opportunities were greatly expanded immediately after the Japanese defeat, and the trend continued

through the Korean War and afterwards. Higher education provided more opportunities for upward mobility to a large number of young

people. This opening also meant greater political awakening among

the young, particularly in view of the strong emphasis placed on

democratic values and ideas by teachers and intellectuals. For the

first time, Korean youths were provided open access to democratic

ideas both at school and through the mass media. These Western

ideas became the norm against which to judge the government in

power when the exigencies of the war period were removed.

A land reform law enacted in June 1949 also had a leveling effect on Korean society. Under this law, nearly 1 million sharecroppers, or approximately 40 percent of total farm households, became small

landowners. The reform also brought about the decline of the landlord class that had formed the backbone of traditional Korean society

for centuries. Because big business and industrial groups did not

emerge until the late 1950s and early 1960s, almost everyone in soci- ety was placed on an equal footing.

The Korean War had the most significant effect on the social

system. The movement of large armies up and down the length of

the peninsula was accompanied by civilian refugees. People of diverse

backgrounds intermingled for prolonged periods, deeply affecting

everyone's way of life. The indiscriminate destruction of property

during the war also had the effect of homogenizing Korean society.

The war caused hundreds of thousands of young men from rural areas to enlist in the army, exposing them to modern organization, technologies, and a new world outlook. The war also gave

rise to a large officer corps that later developed into an increasingly

significant social group.

Better education and the government's postwar economic policies contributed to accelerated urbanization. Reconstruction projects

created jobs in the cities, while the government's effort to control

the prices of farm products made it unprofitable to till small farm

plots. The urban population increased rapidly from 11.6 percent

35
South Korea: A Country Study

in 1940 to 24.4 percent in 1955 and 28.3 percent in 1960. These

changes had a direct impact on politics because the better-educated

and urbanized elements became increasingly vocal and more in- dependent in their political judgments.

The Postwar Economy

The war had destroyed most of South Korea's production facilities. The South Korean government began rehabilitation as soon

as the battle zone near the thirty-eighth parallel stabilized in 1952.

The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and members

of the UN, principally the United States, also provided badly needed

financial assistance. Seoul depended heavily on foreign aid, not

only for defense, but also for other expenditures. Foreign aid constituted a third of total budget in 1954, rose to 58.4 percent in 1956,

and was approximately 38 percent of the budget in 1960. The first annual United States economic aid bill after the armistice was US$200 million; aid peaked at US$365 million in 1956 and was

then maintained at the US$200 million level annually until the

mid-1960s.

The scarcity of raw materials and the need to maintain a large

army caused a high rate of inflation, but by 1958 prices had stabilized. The government also intensified its effort to increase industrial production, emphasizing power generation and textile and

cement production. In order to reduce dependence on imports, such

principal items as fertilizer and steel began to be produced domestically.

The average rise in the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) was 5.5 percent from 1954 through 1958. Industrial production led the advance, growing by nearly 14 percent per year. The

tightening of fiscal and monetary policies in 1958, coupled with

the phasing out of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction

Agency program and the reduction in direct aid from the United

States in 1957, caused a shortage of raw materials for importdependent industries and led to an overall economic decline. By

1958 Liberal Party leaders paid more attention to political survival

than to economic development. The government adopted a comprehensive Seven-Year Economic Development Plan in January

1960, but before the plan could be implemented, the student revolution brought down the government.

The Democratic Interlude

Rhee's resignation left a political void subsequently filled by Ho

Chong, whom Rhee had appointed foreign minister the day before he resigned. Although Ho was a lifelong friend of Rhee, he had

36
Historical Setting

maintained amicable relations with Democratic Party leaders and

thus was acceptable to all concerned. Between April andJuly 1960,

Ho's transitional government maintained order, exiled Rhee and

his wife to Hawaii, and prepared for a new general election of the

National Assembly in July. That body revised the constitution on June 15, instituting a parliamentary form of government with a bicameral legislature. In the July election, the Democratic Party

won 175 of the 233 seats in the lower house of the National Assembly. The second largest group, the independents, won forty-nine

seats. The Liberal Party won only two seats. In the upper house,

the Democratic Party won thirty-one of the fifty-eight seats. The Democratic Party had been a coalition of two divergent ele- ments that had merged in 1955 to oppose Rhee. When the com- mon enemy—Rhee and his Liberal Party—had been removed from

the scene and opportunities for power were presented, each group

sought to obtain the spoils for itself. The Democratic Party candidate for the presidency in the March

1960 election, Cho Pyong-ok, died of illness shortly before the elec- tion, just as his predecessor, Sin Ik-hui, had in 1956. The two

groups openly struggled against each other during the July elec- tions for the National Assembly. Although they agreed on Yun

Po-son as presidential candidate and Chang Myon as their choice

for premier, neither had strong leadership qualities nor commanded

the respect of the majority of the party elite. Yun and Chang could

not agree on the composition of the cabinet. Chang attempted to hold the coalition together by reshuffling cabinet positions three

times within a five-month period. In November 1960, the group

led by Yun left the Democratic Party and formed the New

Democratic Party (Simmindang) . In the meantime, the tasks confronting the new government were

daunting. The economy suffered from mismanagement and cor- ruption. The army and police needed to be purged of the political

appointees who had buttressed the dictatorship. The students, to whom the Democratic Party owed its power, filled the streets almost

daily, making numerous wide-ranging demands for political and

economic reforms, but the Democratic Party had no ready-made

programs. Law and order could not be maintained because the

police, long an instrument of the Rhee government, were demoralized and totally discredited by the public. Continued factional wrangling caused the public to turn away from the party.

This situation provided a fertile ground for a military coup.

Whereas Rhee had been able to control the military because of

his personal prestige, his skill in manipulating the generals, and

the control mechanisms he had instituted, Chang lacked all these

37
South Korea: A Country Study

advantages. When the demands of the young army officers under

Major General Park Chung Hee were rebuffed, and as political

power appeared to be increasingly hanging in the balance with no

one clearly in charge, the army carried out a coup d'etat on May

16, 1961. Chang's own army chief of staff, Chang To-yong, joined

the junta, and Chang's fragile government was toppled. (The junta

subsequently tried and convicted General Chang for attempting

to take over the junta.) The young officers' initial complaint had

been that Chang Myon had not kept a campaign pledge to weed

out corrupt generals from the South Korean army, and some Korean sources attributed this failure to the intervention of highranking United States military officers, who feared the weakening

of South Korea's national security.

Yun Po-son sided with the junta and persuaded the United States Eighth Army and the commanders of various South Korean army

units not to interfere with the new rulers. Yun stayed on as president for ten months after the military junta took over power, thereby

legitimizing the coup. A small number of young officers commanding 3,600 men had succeeded in toppling a government with

authority over an army of 600,000.

South Korea under Park Chung Hee, 1961-79

The junta under Park Chung Hee quickly consolidated its power,

removed those it considered corrupt and unqualified from government and army positions, and laid plans for the future. The thirtytwo-member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR)

became all-powerful.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created

in June 1961 to prevent a countercoup and to suppress all potential enemies. It was to have not only investigative power, but also the power to arrest and detain anyone suspected of wrongdoing

or harboring antijunta sentiments. The KCIA extended its power

to economic and foreign affairs under its first director, Colonel (retired) Kim Chong-p'il, a relative of Park, and one of the original

planners of the coup against Chang.

In May 1961 , the junta pledged to make an all-out effort to build a self-reliant economy and to carry out a " great human revolution" by wiping out all corruption and evil practices in the government and by introducing a "fresh and clean morality." The

National Assembly was dissolved, and high-level civilian officials were replaced by military officers. By 1963 the junta's economic

policies had not produced any favorable results. The KCIA under Kim Chong-p'il was involved in a number

of scandals that considerably tarnished the junta's image. The

38
Historical Setting

military leaders had worked actively to establish a political party,

later known as the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which

existed from 1963 to 1980, in preparation for the return of politics to the civilians. Former politicians, however, were prohibited from

engaging in organizational activities. Although Park had announced

in February 1963 that he would not participate in civilian politics,

the following month he announced a popular referendum to decide

whether the junta should extend its rule for another four years. Facing stiff opposition from both the South Korean public and the

United States, the plan for a referendum was canceled.

The Military in Politics

The junta had drawn up a new constitution and had put it before a popular referendum in December 1962, receiving 78.8 percent

of the vote. Under the new constitution, the president was to be

elected by direct popular vote and have strong powers—including

the authority to appoint the premier and cabinet members without

legislative consent and to order emergency financial and economic

measures. Under United States pressure, Park, who had held the

position of acting president following Yun's resignation in March

1962, retired from the army as a four-star general and ran as the

DRP candidate in the October 1963 presidential election. He was

elected by a narrow margin, winning 46.6 percent of the vote, as compared with 45. 1 percent for Yun Po-son, the New Democratic

Party candidate. In the subsequent election for the unicameral legislature, held in November 1963, the government won 110 of the

175 seats. Until 1971 South Korea operated under the political framework

it had adopted in 1963. Even though Park imposed some restric- tions on members of the press, intellectuals, and opposition politicians, these groups were permitted considerable latitude to criticize the government and to engage in organizational activities. Although

there were numerous student demonstrations, particularly in 1965

when the government normalized its relations with Japan and sent 45,000 combat troops to support the Republic of Vietnam in

response to a request from the United States, the students were

controlled and there were no casualties in confrontations with the

police. The presidential and National Assembly elections in 1967

and 1971 were closely contested but won by Park. In order to suc- ceed himself for the third time in 1971, Park amended the constitution in 1969.

In December 1971, Park again tightened his control over the

country. He proclaimed a national emergency and forced through

the National Assembly a bill granting him complete power to

39
South Korea: A Country Study

control, regulate, and mobilize the people, the economy, the press, and everything else in the public domain. In October 1972, he

proclaimed martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, closed

all universities and colleges, imposed strict press censorship, and

suspended political activities. Within a few days he "submitted"

a new draft constitution—designated the yusin (revitalization)

constitution—to a national referendum. The 1972 constitution al- lowed Park to succeed himself indefinitely, to appoint one-third

of the National Assembly's members, and to exercise emergency

powers at will. The president was to be chosen by the more than

2,000 locally elected deputies of the supposedly nonpartisan National

Conference for Unification, who were to cast their votes as an elec- toral college without debate.

Students and intellectuals conducted a national campaign to revise the 1972 constitution in the fall of 1973. As the student campaign began to gather momentum, the president issued his first emergency decree in January 1974 outlawing all such campaigns.

Successive emergency measures imposed further restrictions on

other segments of society, but the harshest and most comprehensive restrictions were imposed by Emergency Measure Number

Nine, issued in May 1975, which made it a crime either to criti- cize the constitution or to provide press coverage of such an activity,

subject to a penalty of more than a year's imprisonment. Student

participation in politics or coverage of student political activities in the press were subject to the same punishment. The president

justified the harsh measures by citing the need for national unity

in the face of an alleged threat of attack from North Korea.

Having concentrated all power around himself, Park suppressed

his opponents harshly. KCIA agents abducted Kim Dae Jung,

Park's opponent in the 1971 presidential elections, from a hotel

in Tokyo in August 1973, precipitating a major crisis in South

Korean-Japanese relations. Kim had been abroad after the elec- tion and remained there after Park declared martial law, traveling

between Japan and the United States and conducting anti-Park

activities. Students demonstrating against theyusin constitution were summarily incarcerated. In March 1976, prominent political leaders, including former President Yun and presidential candidate

Kim, issued the Democratic Declaration calling for the restoration

of democracy. Park had them arrested and sentenced to five to eight

years in prison.

In the meantime, Park narrowly avoided an assassination at- tempt by a South Korean youth (resident in Japan), whose stray

bullets killed the president's wife instead in August 1974. After this incident, Park became more reclusive and came to rely more and

40
Historical Setting

more on his chief bodyguard, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, of the Presidential

Security Force. Force alone could not sustain the authoritarian system. Park's

strongest defense against his critics had been the high rate of eco- nomic growth under his leadership (see The Government Role in

Economic Development, ch. 3). By 1978, however, the growth rate had begun to decline, and inflation had become a serious problem.

Seoul successfully weathered the first "oil shock" when Middle

Eastern suppliers drastically raised prices in 1973, but was hard

hit by the second shock in 1978-79. In December 1978, Park belatedly adopted a stabilization plan to cool down the economy, but

the plan caused a serious recession, leading to a succession of

bankruptcies and increased unemployment.

The first overt manifestation of workers' discontent appeared

in August 1979 with demonstrations by 200 women employees of

the Y.H. Industrial Company, which had just gone bankrupt.

Women workers occupied the headquarters of the opposition New

Democratic Party and demanded the right to manage the company themselves. When the workers refused to obey the government's

order to disperse, some 1,000 riot policemen raided the building.

Pandemonium occurred, and one of the workers died—it was unknown whether she had jumped, was pushed, or was jostled to her death. Despite the government's efforts, the "Y.H. Incident"

became a rallying cry of the opposition.

Aside from the visible social unrest caused by political suppression and economic recession, the opposition camp had reason to become emboldened in its criticism of the government in 1979. Disaffection was particularly severe in urban areas. Although the New

Democratic Party was suffering from internal dissension, it won

a plurality in the December 1978 general elections for the National Assembly, the first general elections to be held since 1973. In

the 1978 elections, the Democratic Republican Party won only 30.9

percent of the popular vote, a decline of 7.8 percent from 1973.

In contrast, the opposition obtained 34.7 percent, an increase of

2.2 percent from 1973. Independent candidates won 27.2 percent

of the vote (twenty-two seats in the National Assembly); fifteen of

the twenty-two subsequently joined the New Democratic Party,

although three were "persuaded" to switch to the government

party. Because one-third of the National Assembly's members were government-appointed, the opposition could not command a

majority.

The new leader of the New Democratic Party, Kim Young

Sam, began his challenge to the government in June 1979. He an- nounced to the foreign press his readiness to meet with Kim II Sung,

41
South Korea: A Country Study

the North Korean president, to discuss matters relating to unification and delivered a scathing attack on the government in the

National Assembly. He argued that the government had been in

power too long and had been clearly discredited by the elections;

that Emergency Measure Number Nine suffocated peoples' free- dom and was clearly unconstitutional; that Seoul had colluded with

hoodlums to assault the New Democratic Party headquarters and

to harass him; that the suppression of human rights had become

an international disgrace; that the people should be permitted to

elect their own president through direct elections and be allowed

to live without fear; and that a fair distribution of wealth should

be permitted without government interference. The government

immediately retaliated and ousted Kim from the National Assembly. In a show of solidarity, all opposition members of the National Assembly resigned on October 13, 1979.

The Y.H. Incident and the harsh confrontation between the

government and the opposition parties agitated the college students.

Students in Taegu and Seoul staged campus rallies and demonstrations in September 1979. In mid-October, students in Pusan

poured into the streets and clashed with police, leading the government to declare martial law in that city. In late October, students

in Masan launched a demonstration. The government placed the

city under 4 'garrison decree, '

' and the army took over the responsibility for public order.

Close Park associates such as Kim Chong-p'il were reported to have counseled the president to meet some of the student demands

and reduce repression, but were opposed by presidential security

chief Gh'a Chi-ch'ol. Ch'a also sharply disagreed with Kim Chaegyu, the director of the KCIA, who had counseled moderation in

the government's handling of the student protesters. On October

26, 1979, the nation's most powerful figures—Park, Ch'a, and Kim

Chae-gyu—met in a KCIA safe house restaurant for dinner to dis- cuss, among other things, the Pusan situation. In the sharply divided

discussion that followed, Kim gunned down Park, Ch'a, and their

bodyguards.

It could be argued that Park had created his own dilemma by

instituting the yusin constitution and by assuming unlimited powers. If he had loosened control, however, the demand for reforms

might have spread, proving impossible to contain. The system had

provided for neither a pressure-release valve nor an escape hatch.

In his eighteen years in power (1961-79), Park had been obsessed

with ushering the country into the ranks of developed nations, had

pursued his goal relentlessly, and had achieved considerable results. Having been trained under the Japanese, he closely patterned his

42
Historical Setting

development strategies after Japan's, where a feudal society had

been turned into a modern nation between the 1860s and 1930s.

The Japanese leaders of the Meiji era (1868-1912), however,

possessed two advantages over Park. First, they had operated in a period when the masses were less politically conscious and

authoritarian control was more easily accepted. This was not the

situation in South Korea, where students had already toppled a government in 1960. Second, the Japanese also had a built-in sys- tem of checks and balances because the top-echelon leaders operated in a council where different leaders interacted among

themselves as equals. Park, by contrast, operated on a one-manrule basis, unchecked by constraints on his own decision-making

powers.

Economic Development

South Korea's economy grew rapidly under Park. The military

leaders, with little previous political or administrative experience,

and lacking a developmental program, later turned to the

economists and planners for assistance. The Economic Planning

Board was established in 1961. A program of rapid industrialization based on exports was launched. The shift in orientation was

reflected in the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan

(1962-66), and the subsequent second (1967-71), third (1972-76),

and fourth (1977-81) five-year economic development plans.

Park's policies encouraged private entrepreneurs. Businesses were

given powerful incentives to export, including preferential treat- ment in obtaining low-interest bank loans, import privileges, per- mission to borrow from foreign sources, and tax benefits. Some

of these businesses later became the chaebol (see Glossary; The Origins and Development of Chaebol, ch. 3). Toward these ends, the currency was drastically devalued in 1961

and 1964, and import quotas for raw materials eased. Private saving was encouraged by raising interest rates, and funds were borrowed

from abroad. Exports also were encouraged by direct subsidies;

all taxes and restrictions on the import of intermediate goods that were to be used to produce export products were removed. As the

existing industries—textiles, clothing, and electrical machinery,

among others—had been stagnant because of a lack of imported raw materials, these policies produced immediate results. These developmental programs required enormous amounts of

capital. As the level of United States assistance stabilized, the Park

regime turned to "financial diplomacy" with other countries. The

normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 brought Japanese

funds in the form of loans and compensation for the damages

43
South Korea: A Country Study

suffered during the colonial era. Park made a state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 that resulted in the extension

of government aid and commercial credits. The availability of funds

and the increasing level of exports elevated Seoul's credit rating,

making it possible to increase borrowing in the open international

market. Further, the conflict in Indochina stimulated economic

growth. Seoul's export drive also owed much to the availability

of an educated labor force and a favorable international market.

South Korean businesses discovered that they could successfully

compete abroad. As idle capacity was used up and the demand for new manufacturing investment rose, increasing numbers of for- eign investors were attracted to South Korea.

Foreign exchange earnings improved as export and foreign

receipts rose. The government also took steps to increase tax revenues and stabilize consumer prices. Much of the price stabiliza- tion program was carried out at the expense of farmers, who were

forced to accept the government's policy of low grain prices. Agricultural development lagged behind until 1971, when the government

shifted to a policy of high grain prices and inaugurated the Saemaul undong (New Community Movement) aimed at improving

the farm village environment and increasing agricultural production and income (see The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s,

ch. 3). Official statistics indicated rapid economic growth. Substantial

successes were achieved under the first two five-year economic development plans. The manufacturing sector provided the main stimulus, growing by 15 percent and 21 percent, respectively, during

the two plans. Domestic savings rates grew and exports expanded

significantly (see Economic Plans, ch. 3). A new economic strategy

emphasizing diversification in production and trade proved generally successful in the 1970s. Under the third plan, the government

made a bold move to expand South Korea's heavy and chemical

industries, investing in steel, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, chemicals, and nonferrous metals. South Korea's capability

for steel production and oil refining rose most notably. Refineries

for zinc and copper and modern shipbuilding facilities were constructed; automobiles began to be exported to a few markets. The

plan sought to better prepare South Korea for competition in the

world market and to facilitate domestic production of weaponry.

The quadrupling of oil prices beginning in 1973 severely threat- ened the South Korean economy, which depended heavily on

imported oil for energy production. Construction contracts in the

Middle East, however, provided the necessary foreign exchange

44
Historical Setting

to forestall a balance-of-payments crisis and to continue the high

rate of growth.

The growth-oriented economic strategy emphasizing exports in- evitably produced side effects. Although the government previously

had been able to manage these side effects and effectively surmount

various economic crises, the situation began to deteriorate in 1978.

The emphasis on exports had produced a shortage of domestic con- sumer goods that was exacerbated by the increasing demands

brought about by rising wages and the advance in living standards.

Price controls imposed on producers of consumer goods discouraged

the manufacture of these goods. Meanwhile, the inflow of dollars

rapidly expanded the money supply and inflation became a seri- ous problem. According to a Bank of Korea report, consumer prices rose only 14.4 percent in 1978, but most observers agreed that the

actual rate was near 30 percent.

The high rate of inflation continued into 1979. According to a

report issued by the Economic Planning Board in August 1979,

the average household's cost of living had gone up 26.3 percent

from the previous year. Although wages had been rising rapidly

during the previous several years—spurred by shortages of skilled and semiskilled workers—the rise in wages began to slow down.

The average wage increased 1 2 percent during the year preceding

August 1979.

To address these ills, Park had replaced the economic team in

the cabinet in December 1978 and adopted stabilization measures

entailing the lowering of the growth rate: a stringent tight-money

policy; a switch of investment capital planned for heavy industries

to light industries producing consumer products; a reduction of

price controls to encourage more production of consumer goods;

and assistance for the poor. But these measures caused a recession, produced a succession of bankruptcies among small and medium loan-dependent enterprises, and increased unemployment.

Society under Park

The rapid pace of industrialization not only changed much of

the South Korean landscape, as farmlands were converted into highways and factory sites, but also profoundly modified social structure, social values, and behavior. As late as 1965, some 58.7 percent

of the labor force was engaged in agriculture and fishery, but the

percentage declined to 50.4 percent in 1970 and 38.4 percent in

1978. The percentage of workers engaged in secondary industries,

including mining and manufacturing, rose from 10.3 percent in

1965 to 35.2 percent in 1970 and 38.4 percent in 1978. Industrialization led to a rapid increase in South Korea's urban population,

45
South Korea: A Country Study

which rose from 28.3 percent of the total in 1960 to 54.9 percent

in 1979. Rapid urbanization compounded the problems of housing, transportation, sanitation, and pollution, and exacerbated other

social problems.

Improved living standards and ever-increasing job opportunities accelerated the desire among South Koreans for education, particularly at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning.

In 1960 about one-third of children between twelve and fourteen

years of age attended middle schools; that proportion increased to 53.3 percent in 1970 and 74.0 percent in 1975. In 1960 some 19.9

percent of the population between fifteen and seventeen years of

age attended high schools; that proportion increased to 29.3 per- cent in 1970 and 40.5 percent in 1975. By 1970 about 9.3 percent

of college-age youths attended colleges and universities, and the

number of university graduates exceeded 30,000 a year. Eight years

later, 41,680 students graduated from four-year institutions of

higher learning (see Education, ch. 2). Most workers with higher education qualifications were absorbed

by the rapidly growing industrial and commercial sectors, joining

the ranks of the growing middle class. Demands and rewards for people in the more prestigious fields—doctors, lawyers, economists,

scientists, and managers—were increasing. The number of whitecollar workers in commerce, industry, banking, civil service, and

the teaching profession also rose, as did the number of small en- trepreneurs and retailers. A high proportion of those people who regarded themselves as middle class resided in Seoul, the locale for much of the nation's

wealth, talent, and many of its cultural resources. As beneficiaries

of the rapidly expanding economy, much of the middle class either was content with its situation or indifferent to politics. Many highly

educated persons in this group who found themselves in less well- paid positions than they would have liked remained dissatisfied,

and together with students and intellectuals they formed the core of opposition to the Park regime.

Rural villages also underwent changes of revolutionary proportions, particularly after 1971. As the government had emphasized

industrial growth and slighted the agrarian sector, agricultural

production lagged; its annual rate of growth during the 1967-72

period was only about 2.5 percent. With overall GNP growing at over 10 percent a year during the same period, the rural economy

steadily lost ground, until by 1969 farm income was only a little more than half that earned by urban workers. This situation contributed to the high rate of migration to the cities and eroded political support for the president (see Agriculture, ch. 3).

46
Historical Setting

This situation led the government to take active measures to in- crease farm productivity and income in 1971. Government subsidies to farmers were increased by setting relatively high prices for grains. Higher-yield rice varieties were introduced. Advanced

agricultural technology was made more widely available through

extension services, and more fertilizers and credits were provided.

As a result of these measures, farm productivity and farm income

increased very rapidly during the ensuing years, and the rate of

emigration to the cities tapered off. The Saemaul Movement was instituted with great fanfare by

Park in the fall of 1971 . The movement was envisioned as a higlily

organized, intensively administered campaign to improve the ' 'en- vironment" quality of rural life through projects undertaken by the

villagers themselves with government assistance. The bureaucracy,

particularly at the regional and local levels, was mobilized on a massive scale to ensure that the program would be carried through

to completion in all 36,000 villages. The initial emphasis was on

improving village roads and bridges and replacing thatch with tile or composition roofs. The momentum was maintained and increased in subsequent

years as the Saemaul Movement evolved into a major ideological

campaign aimed at the psychological mobilization of the entire country in support of "nation building." During the first two or three

years, emphasis continued to be on improving the village environment, but later focus was shifted toward projects designed to raise

agricultural productivity and farm income.

As local government officials were jolted out of their traditional

lethargy by the continuing insistence of higher authorities that

essential services be delivered to farmers, the farmers began to have

ready access to agricultural extension services, rural credit, and

market information. The result of improved services and increased

resource allocation was that farmers became more confident of their

ability to improve the village environment through their own

cooperative efforts and became more convinced of the usefulness

of outside official help. As a result of the Saemaul Movement, about

85 percent of villages had electricity, and about 60 percent of farm

households had television sets by the late 1970s. Some 85 percent

of rural children continued from free, obligatory primary schooling to middle school, and over 50 percent of these middle school

pupils were entering high schools. Many farmers also acquired

modern amenities that had been available only to city dwellers just a decade earlier, such as sewing machines, radios, irons, and wall

clocks.

47

49
South Korea: A Country Study

Foreign Relations

Relations with North Korea

Even though the Korean War ended in a truce agreement in

July 1953, a high level of tension remained between the two countries. Although North Korea presented numerous proposals for

peaceful unification after signing the truce, none was premised on

the notion of the continuation of the existing South Korean government, which made the proposals unacceptable to Seoul.

Throughout the Park era, relations with North Korea were marked by mutual distrust and discord, with only a brief respite

between July 1972 and June 1973 when the two sides engaged in

high-level negotiations. Hopes were raised that tensions might be

reduced and a way toward unification of the divided nation found.

Entrenched suspicions made the contentious issues separating the

two sides even more difficult to solve, and the talks were broken

off (see Relations with North Korea, ch. 4). Meanwhile, the armed

confrontation continued (see The Threat from the North, ch. 5). The continuing failure of the negotiations reflected the depth of

the gap separating the two Koreas—particularly noteworthy in view

of the mellowing international environment evidenced, for example, by China's much-improved relations with both the United

States and Japan. There were indications that both China and the

United States exerted considerable influence on the Korean negotiations, but without marked effect. Leaders in the north and the

south found their ideologies and aims totally incompatible. South

Korea's leaders were determined to keep their society free from

communism, while North Korea's leaders were committed to the cause of bringing "people's democratic revolution" to the south.

Relations with Japan

The most important development in South Korea's diplomacy

under Park was the normalization of relations with Japan. Although

South Korea had traded with Japan since 1948 and the two countries had engaged in negotiations since 1951, disagreement on a number of issues had prevented diplomatic ties. The junta under

Park actively sought to normalize relations. Negotiations resumed

in October 1961 , culminating in an agreement in June 1965 to es- tablish diplomatic relations (see Relations with Japan, ch. 4). Park

settled for a fraction of the "reparations" earlier demanded by

Rhee, andJapanese fishermen were given access to South Korean

waters outside of the three-mile territorial limit (Rhee had prohibited Japanese fishermen from coming any closer than the medial

line between Japan and Korea). Under the treaty, the Japanese

50
Historical Setting

government was to provide the capital necessary for an industrialization program and to open up ever-increasing loans, investments (both public and private), and trade (see Foreign Economic

Relations, ch. 3). The treaty normalizing relations was denounced

as a sellout by the opposition and the intellectuals and touched off prolonged, widespread student demonstrations.

South Korean-Japanese relations since normalization have been

amicable, but were considerably strained by the abduction from

Tokyo of Kim Dae Jung in August 1973, which resulted in long

and embarrassing negotiations. In 1979 South Korean-Japanese

relations entered a new era as the two countries began informal

ties on defense matters, such as the establishment of the KoreanJapanese Parliamentary Conference on Security Affairs.

Relations with the United States South Korea continued to depend on United States military as- sistance. In spite of initial United States hesitation about supporting Park in 1961, the two countries maintained close economic,

military, and diplomatic ties. South Korea dispatched combat troops

to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1965 to augment

United States forces there, and President Lyndon B. Johnson paid a personal visit to Seoul in October 1966 to show his appreciation.

Friction began to develop in the Washington-Seoul relationship

after the United States withdrew one of its two divisions from South

Korea in 1971 and intensified after Park instituted rigorous authoritarian measures under his 1972 constitution. This tension led to an accelerated effort by the Park government to gain support in

the United States Congress. The methods used by Seoul's lobbyists

ultimately resulted in the embarrassing "Koreagate" affair of 1977,

involving former Ambassador Kim Dong-jo and rice dealer Park

Tong Sun. Investigations by the Ethics Committee and by the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on

International Relations of the United States House of Representatives received much press coverage and weakened United States support for South Korea.

During his presidential election campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter

pledged, if elected, to withdraw all combat troops from South Korea.

His victory aggravated United States-South Korean relations considerably (see Relations with The United States, ch. 4). In March

1977, the United States decided to withdraw its ground combat

forces over a four-to-five year period. Some 3,600 troops subsequently were withdrawn, but further reductions were suspended

in 1979. In the meantime, President Carter and the Congress con- tinued to press for the improvement of the human rights climate

51
South Korea: A Country Study

in South Korea. Relations between the two countries were at a low

point in 1979, just before Park's assassination. In early 1981, President Ronald Reagan's administration announced that further withdrawals were not being considered.

The Transition

Soon after Park's October 26, 1979 assassination, South Korea

went through kaleidoscopic changes—intense and open competition for power, student upheavals, a military takeover, a gruesome

massacre, and the emergence of a new authoritarian order. Since

Park had concentrated virtually all political power around himself, his assassination created a political vacuum. One of his main

pillars of power, the director of the Presidential Security Force, was assassinated with him; the director of the other major political

instrument, the KCIA, was quickly arrested by the Martial Law

Command for conducting the assassinations. In addition, the

National Assembly, one-third of its members presidential appointees, had been rendered impotent by the yusin constitution.

Ch'oe Kyu-ha, premier under Park, was elected president in

December 1979 by the National Conference for Unification, a rubber stamp electoral college. Ch'oe had no independent political base.

He reaffirmed the need for a new constitution in his December

21 inaugural speech, stating that a new constitution supported by

a majority of the people would be adopted within a year and that a fair general election would be held soon afterward.

Even before his inauguration, Ch'oe, as acting president, had

abolished Emergency Measure Number Nine. Several hundred in- dividuals serving prison terms or being investigated on charges of

violating that decree were released on December 8. One of those

benefiting from the release was Kim Dae Jung, who had been under house arrest and whose civil rights were to be restored on February 29, 1980. Also affected were student activists who had been

arrested for staging campus demonstrations.

Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, the head of the Defense

Security Command, was responsible for conducting the investigation of Park's assassination. Chun used the factionalism rife within the military to assert his control over the army on December

12, 1979. He promptly set about uprooting the Park-era power

elite and building a new political base. This power play, combined

with increasing social and labor unrest, economic instability, and

the factionalism within and between the ruling and opposition parties, set the scene for the military's consolidation of power and cul- minated in Chun's assumption of the presidency in August 1980.

Politics in South Korea in 1980 mainly revolved around framing

52
Historical Setting

a new constitution. The principal opposition party, the New

Democratic Party under Kim Young Sam, advocated concluding

the process by August 15, but President Ch'oe, evidently under

military pressure, was not ready to expedite the constitutional process. The scheduling issue led to a major student upheaval in

May 1980, followed by a military takeover.

The Democratic Republican Party

In the meantime, the country underwent a brisk process of political realignment. Although Park had organized and headed the

Democratic Republican Party in 1963 to mobilize mass support

behind his regime, by 1972 he had discarded it when he imposed

the yusin constitution. As a result, the DRP had only a nominal

existence at the time of Park's death. It was incumbent upon the

new president of the DRP, Kim Chong-p'il, to revive the party.

The DRP had suffered a disastrous loss in the December 1978 National Assembly elections. This situation led to a call for "rectifi- cation" (chongp'ung) within the party, which meant removing certain

top leaders who had attracted notoriety for illicit wealth and undemocratic political behavior.

The New Democratic Party

The New Democratic Party (NDP), the principal opposition

party, also had its share of problems. Kim Young Sam was elected

as NDP leader for three years in 1979, so his position would have

been secure had not the Ch'oe government restored Kim Dae

Jung's civil rights. Even though Kim Dae Jung, the NDP presidential candidate in 1971 , had been out of the political arena for more

than seven years, he commanded a large political following. Because the NDP was expected to win the forthcoming election by

a wide margin, the presidency of the republic was at stake in the

negotiations for Kim Dae Jung's reinstatement in the party. In

the end, negotiations broke off, and on April 7, 1980, Kim Dae

Jung declared that he would no longer seek to rejoin the NDP.

Although Kim Young Sam and his supporters had waged a fierce political struggle against President Park toward the end of his rule,

many of those in leadership positions in the NDP had tended to be accommodating to the Park regime. Kim Dae Jung and his fol- lowers, on the other hand, represented the active dissident students,

intellectuals, and progressive Christians who had engaged in direct

struggle against the Park regime. The chaeya serydk (literally, forces

in the field, but the term also means an opposing political force) were more radical in orientation. Kim Dae Jung and his group

53
South Korea: A Country Study

wished to expedite the process of restoring democracy, even if it meant forcing the hands of Ch'oe and his supporters.

Students in 1980

While professional politicians engaged in the struggle for realignment, college students were restless for action. The students ini- tially were concerned with campus affairs. As soon as the new

semester began in March 1980, students on various campuses began

to demand the removal of professors with close ties to the Park

regime and of university owner-presidents who had amassed for- tunes by operating their institutions. They also demanded autonomy

from government control. The students held rallies and on-campus

demonstrations and in some cases occupied college offices. As a

result of the unrest, many university presidents resigned.

In early May 1980, however, the students' slogans began to change. Students demanded that martial law be lifted immediately

and that the "remnants of the yusin system," including Chun, be

removed. They also demanded the guarantee of labor rights, the

removal of "compradore capital," and the protection of farmers'

rights. Although student demonstrations had been confined to their

campuses when the issues raised concerned institutional matters,

they now began to spill out into the streets. The massive demonstrations by the students continued until May

16, when Premier Sin Hyon-hwak promised that the government

would attempt to speed up the process of adopting a new constitution. Ch'oe even shortened his Middle Eastern trip by a day and

returned home on the evening of May 1 7 . Student demonstrations

paralyzed the nation and sent politicians and government leaders

to their council meetings. According to an unconfirmed report, Sin even offered his resignation to the president upon his return and

advised the president to remove Chun.

General Chun Doo Hwan Takes Over

Whatever counsel the civilian leaders may have offered Ch'oe,

the military's position prevailed. Chun Doo Hwan, as head of the

Defense Security Command, had already replaced the army chief

of staff in December 1979 and had taken the command of the KCIA

in April 1980.

Chun's methodical and speedy actions after May 17 clearly re- vealed that he had a well-laid plan. He issued a decree closing down

the colleges and universities and prohibiting all political gatherings. All publications and broadcasts were to receive prior censorship, criticism of the incumbent and past presidents was outlawed,

and the manufacture and spreading of rumors were forbidden.

54
Historical Setting

Chun's plan aimed not only at quelling demonstrations but also

at destroying the power base of all existing political figures and

groups.

The arrest of Kim Dae Jung and other arch enemies of Park was to be expected as soon as the military stepped in on May 1 7

.

But the arrest of Kim Chong-p'il and other people who had been

influential under Park came as a total surprise.

The Kwangju Uprising

Chun's hard-line policy led to a confrontation in Kwangju, a

city of 600,000 people located 170 miles south of Seoul, in South

Cholla Province, the scene of an uprising and bloodbath between

May 18 and 27. As noted in a report issued by the Martial Law

Command, the students and ''hot-blooded young soldiers" confronted each other; angry citizens joined in, driven by alleged rumors that the 1 soldiers of Kyongsang Province origin came to exterminate the seeds of the Cholla people."

The Kwangju massacre was to became an important landmark

in the struggle for South Korean democracy. It heightened provincial hostility and marked the beginning of the rise of anti-American

sentiment in South Korea.

According to the report, the sequence of events was triggered

by student demonstrations on the morning of May 18 in defiance

of the new edict. Some 200 Chonnam University students began

demonstrating in the morning, and by 2:00 P.M. they had been

joined by more than 800 additional demonstrators. City police were

unable to control the crowd. At about 4:00 P.M., the Martial Law

Command dispatched a Special Forces detachment consisting of

paratroopers trained for assault missions. The report did not mention it, but the paratroopers killed a large number of people.

On May 20, some 10,000 people demonstrated in Kwangju. On

May 21, the Special Forces were withdrawn, and the city was left to the rioters. A memorial service was held on May 24, with approximately 15,000 citizens in attendance.

On May 25, approximately 50,000 people gathered for a rally

and adopted a resolution calling for the abolition of martial law

and the release of Kim Dae Jung. A committee of leading citizens was organized on May 23 to try to settle the impasse, but "impure elements" and "maneuverers behind the scene" allegedly obstructed an effective solution. On May 27, at 3:30 A.M., an army

division that had been circling the city for three days launched an

attack. After light skirmishes, the army quashed the revolt in less than two hours. The army arrested 1 ,740 rioters, of whom 730 were

detained for investigation.

55
South Korea: A Country Study

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the Martial Law

Command's account. The uprising started with student demonstrations. The Martial Law Command dispatched assault troops

whose random killings angered citizens who had not participated

in the initial student demonstrations. According to later reports

by the command, nearly 200 persons were killed, including 22 sol- diers and 4 policemen; of the civilians killed, only 17 died on the

final day of assault. And, regardless of who spread the "wanton

rumors," they evidently were credible enough to prompt the gathering of 50,000 Kwangju citizens. Chun, touring the city after the revolt had ended, told the people of Kwangju not to make an issue of what had happened, but

to learn from it. The specter of Kwangju, however, was to haunt

him for years to come. There were several aftereffects resulting from the Kwangju in- cident. It deepened the chasm that had existed between the Kyongsang provinces (from which Park and Chun originated) and the

Cholla provinces, of which Kwangju is a capital and from which

the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung came (see Population Settle- ment Patterns, ch. 2). The United States' role also was controversial. General John A. Wickham, Jr. had released South Korean

troops from the South Korea-United States Combined Forces Command to end the rebellion, and President Reagan had strongly en- dorsed Chun's actions (see Relations with the United States, ch. 4). The Chun Regime

Having suppressed the Kwangju uprising with brute force,

General Chun Doo Hwan further tightened his grip on the government. He and three of his close associates served as the core of

the junta committee, known as the Special Committee for National

Security Measures. The three were Lieutenant General Ch'a Kyuhon (deputy chief of staff of the army), Major General Roh Tae

Woo (commander of the Capital Garrison Command), and Major

General Chong Ho-yong (commander of the Special Forces). The

junta vested in itself the authority to pass laws and to make all decisions affecting the state until a new National Assembly came into

being.

On August 5, 1980, Chun promoted himself from lieutenant

general to full general in preparation for retiring from the army

on August 22. On August 27 he was elected president by the

National Conference for Unification, receiving 2,524 of the 2,525

votes cast. The single dissenting vote was invalidated for an unknown reason.

56
Historical Setting

Chun presented his objective at his September 1 , 1980, inauguration: to create a new society where all past corrupt practices would

be replaced by mutual trust and justice. In order to accomplish

this goal, he planned to remove the old politicians from the scene; only those certified as "clean" would be permitted to participate

in building the new order.

In the economic field, Chun intended to do away with excessive

protection of industries and to encourage creativity. An increase

in employment opportunities would be facilitated, and cooperation and coprosperity between labor and management would be

brought about. Farmers' income would be increased by continuing the Saemaul Movement.

The 1980 Constitution

One of Chun's inaugural promises was the promulgation of a new constitution and the holding of a national referendum to approve it. On September 29, 1980, the government announced the

draft of a constitution that in many ways was the most democratic

South Korea had ever had—except for the supplementary provisions and the procedure for presidential election. The guarantee

of peoples' democratic rights was absolute, including the right to privacy in communications, the prohibition of torture, and the in- admissability in court trials of confessions obtained by force. The

president, who was to be elected by an electoral college and to serve a single seven-year term, was given strong powers, including the

right to dissolve the National Assembly, which in turn could bring

down cabinets but not the president. In the event that the constitution was amended to extend the president's term of office, such

changes were not to be applied to the incumbent. The document

received the overwhelming approval of the voters—91 .6 percent—at the national referendum held on October 22, 1980.

The constitution, however, was a "promissory note." Until the

new National Assembly was elected and inaugurated, the Legislative Council for National Security, to be appointed by Chun, would

enact all laws. A supplementary provision in the constitution also called for the dissolution of all existing political parties. In effect,

by offering to bring in a democratic government by June 1981,

Chun had obtained a mandate to change the political landscape

in whatever form he chose. The new constitution placed South

Korea under a constitutional dictatorship from October 1980 to June 1981.

Purges

Chun zealously pushed his campaign to weed out corruption.

57
South Korea: A Country Study

The clean-up campaign began in May 1980 when Kim Chongp'il and others were forced to give up their wealth and retire from

politics. In June some 300 senior KCIA agents were dismissed.

In July 1980, more than 230 senior officials, including former cabi- net officers, were dismissed on corruption charges. The ax also fell on 4,760 low-level officials in the government, state-owned firms,

and banks, with the proviso that the former officials not be rehired

by such firms within two years. The Martial Law Command ar- rested 1 7 prominent politicians of both the government and opposition parties for investigation and removed some 400 bank officials,

including 4 bank presidents and 21 vice presidents. The government also announced the dismissal of 1 ,819 officials of public enterprises and affiliated agencies, including 39 (some 25 percent) of

the presidents and vice presidents of such enterprises and banks

and 128 board directors (more than 22 percent).

The "clean-up campaign" also extended to the mass media. On

July 31 , 1980, the 172 periodicals that allegedly caused "social decay

and juvenile delinquency" were summarily abolished, among them some of the finest intellectual magazines of liberal inclination and

prestigious journals for general audiences. This action resulted in

the dismissal of hundreds of journalists and staff. The daily

newspapers not affected by the purge also were directed to weed

out "corrupting," that is, liberal writers (see The Media, ch. 4). Chun's "Cultural Revolution"

In the wake of Chun's purge, the government also launched a massive reeducation program for the nation's elites. High government officials, judges, prosecutors, business executives, college

professors, and their spouses—32,000 persons in all—were brought

together for an intensive three-day training program at Saemaul's

New Community Training Centers in Suwon and elsewhere. The

training regimen included morning exercises, environmental

cleanup, lectures on the New Community Movement, and discussion sessions on "the proper way of life." This training program, initiated under Park's regime, eventually was to be extended to the general public. In August 1980, the

government launched another massive propaganda campaign, or- ganizing "Bright Society Rallies" in major cities where tens of thousands of citizens were mobilized to hear speeches. In addition,

"Cleansing Committees" were established at all levels of government down to the local ward (ri and dong) levels (see Local Administration, ch. 4).

58
Historical Setting

Economic Performance

The new regime inherited an economy suffering from all the side

effects of Park's export-oriented development program and policy

of expanding heavy and chemical industries (see Economic Development, this ch.; Industrial Policies, ch. 3). The international eco- nomic environment of the early 1980s was extremely unfavorable,

a situation that further restricted South Korea's exports. It was

necessary, therefore, for the Chun regime to concentrate on stabili- zation, and it devoted its first two years to controlling inflation while

attempting to bring about economic recovery. Investment was

redirected from the capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries

towards labor-intensive light industries that produced consumer

goods. Import restrictions were lifted. The economy began to improve in 1983 because of stringent anti- inflationary measures and the upturn in the world economy. While

South Korea had suffered a negative growth rate in 1980, it at- tained an 8.1 percent growth rate in 1983. Exports began increasing in mid- 1983 and the economy began to gain strength. A good

harvest in 1983 also helped. South Korea attained its 1983 export

target of US$23.5 billion, a 7.6 percent increase from 1982.

In December 1983, Seoul unveiled its revised Fifth Five-Year

Economic and Social Development Plan. The plan called for steady

growth for the next three years, low inflation, and sharply reduced

foreign borrowing. Exports were to rise by 15 percent a year, infla- tion was projected to be held at 1.8 percent, and per capita GNP

was to rise to US$2,325 by 1986. The annual growth rate was planned to average 7.5 percent though the actual performance was

higher. The real GNP growth rate was 7 percent in 1985, but for the next three years 12.9 percent, 12.8 percent, and 12.2 percent,

respectively.

Foreign Policy

United States One of the most salient elements of the Chun regime was its close

ties with the Reagan administration. The ties were in sharp contrast to the strained Washington-Seoul relationship under presidents Carter and Park, when the United States government had

criticized Park's dictatorial policies and attempted to implement

Carter's campaign pledge to withdraw United States ground combat

troops from South Korea. The relationship also had been strained

because of the 1977 Koreagate scandal.

Reagan provided unmitigated support to Chun and to South

59
South Korea: A Country Study

Korea's security. Chun was Reagan's first official guest in the White

House. Reagan reaffirmed his support of Chun by visiting Seoul

in November 1983.

While Reagan's support considerably buttressed Chun's stature

in domestic politics and the international arena, it also fueled the

subculture of anti-Americanism. The opposition forces in South

Korea, suffering from the government's stringent suppression,

denounced United States' support for the Chun regime as a cal- lous disregard for human rights and questioned the United States' motives in Korea. The past image of the United States as a staunch

supporter of democracy in South Korea was replaced with that of

defender of its own interests, a policy impervious to injustices committed in South Korea. This view was accentuated by the fact that

Chun's White House visit occurred only several months after the

Martial Law Command had brutally suppressed the student uprising in Kwangju. (It was later revealed by Richard V. Allen, National Security Advisor to President Reagan, that Chun's visit was

part of Washington's diplomatic effort to spare the life of Kim Dae

Jung, who had been sentenced to death.) This atmosphere led some

of South Korea's radical elements to take extreme measures, such

as arson committed at the United States Information Service building in Pusan in March 1982 and the occupation of the United States Information Service Library in Seoul in May 1985. Students who

demonstrated against the Chun government invariably carried anti- American slogans.

Japan

The Chun government also brought about a significant change

in South Korea's relations with Japan. In 1981 Chun utilized the

United States' support and its strategy of allocating greater responsibility to Japan in the East Asian region to persuade Tokyo to grant Seoul a large public loan. The negotiations lasted until early

1983 and aroused many conflicting emotions in both countries.

However, Chun was able to obtain a US$4 billion low-interest loan

that significantiy contributed to boosting South Korea's credit rating

and to accelerating its economic recovery; Seoul's foreign debt had

reached US$41 billion at the end of 1983 and was badly in need

of an improved credit rating. Japanese prime minister Nakasone

Yasuhiro capped the negotiation process by paying a state visit to Seoul in January 1983. Whereas other Japanese prime ministers

had visited Seoul for inaugurations or funerals, this was the first state visit to South Korea by a Japanese leader since the country was liberated from Japan in 1945.

60
Historical Setting

China and the Soviet Union

Chun continued Park's policy of improving relations with Chi- na and the Soviet Union and attached considerable importance to these two countries, long the allies of North Korea. Beijing and

Moscow were thought to have much influence in charting the fu- ture of the Korean Peninsula and were thus a part of Nordpolitik

(see Relations with the Soviet Union; Relations with China, ch. 4). Seoul's official contact with Beijing was facilitated by the landing of a hijacked Chinese civilian airliner in May 1983. China sent a delegation of thirty-three officials to Seoul to negotiate the return

of the airliner, marking the beginning of frequent exchanges of per- sonnel. For example, in March 1984, a South Korean tennis team

visited Kunming for a Davis Cup match with a Chinese team. In

April 1984, a thirty-four-member Chinese basketball team arrived

in Seoul to participate in the Eighth Asian Junior Basketball Championships. Some Chinese officials reportedly paid quiet visits to South Korea to inspect its industries, and South Korean officials visited China to attend various international conferences. Since Chi- na and South Korea began indirect trade in 1975, the volume has

steadily increased (see Foreign Trade Policy, ch. 3). The Soviet Union's unofficial relationship with South Korea began in 1973, when it permitted South Koreans to attend an international conference held in the Soviet Union. In October 1982, a Soviet official attended an international conference in South Korea on the preservation of cultural relics. The uproar following the

Korean Air (KAL) 007 incident in September 1983, when the Soviet

air force shot down the KAL passenger airplane, brought about

a hiatus in contacts, but the unofficial relationship resumed in 1988.

The Demise of the Chun Regime

Even though Chun Doo Hwan's government had attained considerable results in economy and diplomacy, his government failed to win public trust or support. In spite of Chun's lofty pronouncements, the public basically regarded Chun as a usurper of power

who had deprived South Korea of its opportunity to restore democracy. Chun lacked political credentials; his access to power

derived from his position as the head of the Defense Security

Command—the army's nerve center of political intelligence—and

his ability to bring together his generals in the front lines. Chun and his military followers failed to overcome the stigma

of the Kwangju incident, and the new "just society" that he

promised did not materialize. In fact, between 1982 and 1983, at least two of the major financial scandals in South Korea involved

61
South Korea: A Country Study

Chun's in-laws. The Chun government's slogans became hollow.

While Park had gained respect and popularity through the recordbreaking pace of economic development, Chun could not repeat

such a feat. In the 1985 National Assembly elections, opposition

parties together won more votes than the government party, clearly

indicating that the public wanted a change. Moreover, increasing

numbers of people had become more sympathetic to the students,

who presented increasingly radical demands.

One of the most serious problems the government faced was that

the argument for restricting democracy became less and less credible. The people had long been tolerant of various restrictions imposed by succeeding governments because of the perceived threat

from the north, but the consensus eroded as the international en- vironment moderated. More and more people became cynical about

repeated government pronouncements, viewing them as self-serving

propaganda by those in power. This tendency was particularly

pronounced among the post-Korean War generation that constituted a majority of the South Korean population.

The unpopular Chun regime and its constitutional framework was brought down in 1987 largely by the student agitation that

beset the regime. Student activists set the tone and agenda of the

society as a whole because the government and the governmentcontrolled press had lost their credibility. The opposition parties

worked with the students, although they disagreed on the ultimate

aim—the politicians wanted reform, while the students demanded

revolution. The opposition politicians wanted constitutional reform

to replace the existing system of electing the president through the

handpicked electoral college with direct popular election. The stu- dents attacked not only the military leaders in power but also the

entire socio-political and economic establishment.

A small number of confirmed radicals led the student movement.

They argued that the basic cause for the political and social malaise

in South Korea was "American imperialism," which they believed

had dominated South Korea ever since it was liberated from Japan

in 1945. In their view, "American imperialism" buttressed the

military dictatorship and the exploitative capitalist system; the struggle against the military dictatorship and American imperialism was

inseparable. This position was the same argument that North Korea

had been advancing since 1946, but a more important source of

intellectual persuasion came from the revisionist school of histori- ography that swept United States academia during the 1970s.

The revisionist argument was very similar to that of Lenin on

imperialism. The Cold War was seen as the inevitable outcome of

the United States capitalist system's need for continuous economic

62
Historical Setting

expansion abroad. United States participation in the Korean War

and the subsequent stationing of United States forces in South Korea

satisfied such a need, according to this perspective. For the revisionists, it was irrelevant that the United States had decided to abandon Korea in September-October 1947, or that the United States had withdrawn its occupation forces from South Korea in 1949.

The communist countries, whether the Soviet Union or North

Korea, were seen as passive entities reacting against the aggressive actions of ' 'American imperialists' ' rather than pursuing their

own goals. The fact that the United States had interjected itself into the Korean War in 1950, and that it continued to station its troops in South Korea after the war, was evidence enough.

The revisionist arguments found a fertile soil among the university students. The inquisitive students had long viewed the onesided anticommunist propaganda emanating from official and

established sources as stifling and as leaving too many questions

unanswered. The new arguments sounded logical and convincing,

particularly when some of the revisionists took liberty with historical evidence. Increasing numbers of students took to the streets to denounce the military dictatorship and American imperialism.

Initially, the public was apathetic to the confrontation between

the student demonstrators and government, but the daily fracas on the streets and the never-ending smell of tear gas aroused their

ire. The news about the torture and death of a student, Pak Chongch'ol, by the police touched the sore nerves of the people. President Chun attempted to squash the opposition by issuing a declaration on April 13, 1987, to suspend the ''wasteful debate" about

constitutional reform until a new government was installed at the

end of his seven-year term. The declaration was, instead, his re- gime's swan song. Chun wanted to have his successor "elected"

by his handpicked supporters; the public greeted the declaration

with universal outrage. Even the Reagan administration, which

had been taciturn about South Korea's internal politics, urged the

Chun government not to ignore the outrage. Finally, on June 29,

1987, Roh Tae Woo, the government party's choice as Chun's successor, made a dramatic announcement in favor of a new democratic

constitution that embodied all the opposition's demands.

* * *

Extensive literature is available in English on all the subjects co- vered in this chapter. Ki-baik Lee's A New History of Korea is the

best account of Korean history available in English. The following sources are also helpful: Han Woo-kuen's The History of Korea;

63
South Korea: A Country Study

William Henthorn's A History ofKorea; The History ofKorea by Sohn

Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup; and East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, coauthored by John K. Fairbank, Edwin

O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig.

Aspects of the Choson Dynasty are dealt with in JaHyun Kim

Haboush's^l Heritage ofKings, William Shaw's Legal Norms in a Confucian State, and Young-ho Ch'oe's The Civil Examinations and the Social Structure in Early Yi Dynasty Korea. Late nineteenth-century

developments are covered in Vipan Chandra's Imperialism,

Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea, James B.

Palais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, and C.I. Eugene Kim

and Han-Kyo Kim's Korea and the Politics ofImperialism, 1876-1910.

Various aspects ofJapanese rule are detailed in AndrewJ. Grajdanzev's Modern Korea and Chong-Sik Lee's Japan and Korea: The

Political Dimension. Korea's reaction to Japanese colonialism is re- counted in Chong-Sik Lee's The Politics of Korean Nationalism.

George McAfee McCune's Korea Today is particularly valuable for the period between 1945 and 1948. The period ofJapanese colonial

rule is also treated in Dennis L. McNamara's The Colonial Origins

ofKorean Enterprise and Michael Edson Robinson's Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925.

Among the numerous works that have taken advantage of declassified documents concerning the period leading up the Korean War

are James Irving Matray's The Reluctant Crusade, the second volume

of Bruce Cuming's work on that period, Hie Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-50, and Peter Lowe's The Origins of the Korea War.

Information about Korea under Syngman Rhee can be found

in Gregory Henderson's book, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex; in

Joungwon Alexander Kim's Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972; and in Chi-young Pak's Political Opposition in Korea,

1945-1960. Robert T. Oliver, a close associate of Rhee, explains

Rhee's actions in Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea,

1942-1960. Lee Hahn-Been's Korea: Time, Change, and Administration analyzes governmental performance under Rhee and subsequent regimes. Han Sung-Joo's The Failure of Democracy in South Korea provides an incisive analysis of both the Rhee regime and

the Chang Myon government.

A number of books treat Korea in the modern era, although most

of them emphasize the political aspect of the society. Gregory

Henderson's book is particularly valuable for its treatment of

modern and contemporary periods through the late 1960s. The 1961

coup d'etat and the government under Park Chung Hee are dis- cussed in Kim Se-Jin's The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea,

64
Historical Setting

John Kie-Chiang Oh's Korea: Democracy on Trial, David C. Cole

and Princeton N. Lyman's Korean Development: The Interplay of

Politics and Economics, Young Whan Kihl's Politics and Policies in Divided Korea, Sung Chul Yang's Korea and Two Regimes, and The Eco- nomic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea by Edward S. Mason and others. For the government under Chun Doo Hwan,

see Harold C. Hinton's Korea under New Leadership; for South

Korea's foreign policy, see Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han's

Foreign Policy of the Republic ofKorea and Byung Chul Koh's The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea. South Korea's relations

with North Korea are treated in detail by Robert A. Scalapino and

Chong-Sik Lee's Communism in Korea and Ralph N. Clough's Embattled Korea.

Studies on Korea: A Scholar's Guide, edited by Kim Han-Kyo, lists numerous books and articles; many items are annotated. Far Eastern Economic Review, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Asian Wall Street Journal, and Asian Survey regularly provide analyses of South Korea's

politics and economy. A comprehensive source of publications deal- ing with Korean history is the Association for Asian Studies' an- nual Bibliography of Asian Studies. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

65

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
North Watergate, Suwon Castle, has a stone bridge with

seven arches spanning the Namch'on River.
FEW SOCIETIES HAVE CHANGED as rapidly or as dramatically since the end of World War II as that of the Republic of Korea

(South Korea). When the war ended in 1945, the great majority

of the people living in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula were poor peasants. The Japanese colonial regime from 1910 to 1945 had promoted modernization of the economy and society. The

regime's efforts, however, had a limited, and mainly negative, impact on most Koreans inasmuch as the main intent of the modernization program was to serve Japan. The poverty and distress of

the South Koreans were deepened by the Korean War of 1950-53

when numerous people died and cities and towns were devastated.

During the next four decades, however, South Korea evolved into a dynamic, industrial society. By 1990 educational and public health

standards were high, most people lived in urban areas, and a complex structure of social classes had emerged that resembled the social structures of developed Western countries or Japan. The country

also was making substantial progress in its evolution from a military dictatorship similar to that of many Third World regimes to a democratic, pluralistic political system. In the mid-1950s, few

observers could have imagined that Seoul, the country's capital,

would emerge from the devastation of war to become one of the

world's most vibrant metropolitan centers—rivaling Tokyo, Hong

Kong, and Los Angeles.

Colonial occupation, war, and the tragedy of national division

fostered abrupt social changes. Rapid economic growth engendered

profound changes in values and human relationships. Yet there

also was continuity with the past. Confucian and neo-Confucian

ideas and institutions, which flourished during the Choson Dynasty

(1392-1910), continued to have an important impact in 1990. The

Confucian influence was most evident in the tremendous value

placed on education, a major factor in South Korea's economic

progress. Equally evident was the persistence of hierarchical, often

authoritarian, modes of human interaction that reflected neo- Confucianism's emphasis on inequality.

The complex kinship structures of the past, sanctified by Confucianism, had eroded because of urbanization but did not disappear. In 1990 Koreans were more likely to live in nuclear families

than their parents or grandparents, but old Confucian ideas of filial piety still were strong. At the same time, contemporary social values were influenced by traditional but non-Confucian Korean values,

69
South Korea: A Country Study

such as shamanism and Buddhism, and by ideas brought into the

country from the West and Japan.

The population of the Korean Peninsula, sharing a common lan- guage, ethnic identity, and culture, was one of the world's most

homogeneous. Although there were significant regional differences even within the relatively small land area of South Korea, neither

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) nor South Korea had significant non-Korean ethnic minorities. This

homogeneity, and the sense of a shared historical experience that

it promoted, gave the people of South Korea a strong sense of

national purpose. However, the years of Japanese colonial rule,

the division of the peninsula after World War II, the establishment

of two antagonistic states in the north and south, and the profound

changes in the economy and society caused by industrialization and

urbanization since the 1950s led many South Koreans to search anew for their national identity and place in the world. Often, the concern for identity expressed itself as xenophobia, the creation

of a "national mythology" that was given official or semiofficial

sanction, or the search for the special and unique "essence" of

Korean culture.

Physical Environment

Land Area and Borders

The Korean Peninsula extends for about 1,000 kilometers southward from the northeast part of the Asian continental landmass.

The Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu are located some 200

kilometers to the southeast across the Korea Strait; the Shandong

Peninsula of China lies 190 kilometers to the west. The west coast of the peninsula is bordered by the Korea Bay to the north and

the Yellow Sea to the south; the east coast is bordered by the Sea

of Japan (known in Korea as the East Sea). The 8,640-kilometer

coastline is highly indented. Some 3,579 islands lie adjacent to the

peninsula. Most of them are found along the south and west coasts. The northern land border of the Korean Peninsula is formed

by the Yalu and Tumen rivers, which separate Korea from the

provinces of Jilin and Liaoning in China. The original border

between the two Korean states was the thirty-eighth parallel of lati- tude. After the Korean War, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ—see Glossary) formed the boundary between the two. The DMZ is a

heavily guarded, 4, 000-meter-wide strip of land that runs along

the line of cease-fire, the Demarcation Line (see Glossary), from

the east to the west coasts for a distance of 241 kilometers (238 kilo- meters of that line form the land boundary with North Korea).

70
The Society and Its Environment

The total land area of the peninsula, including the islands, is 220,847 square kilometers. Some 44.6 percent (98,477 square

kilometers) of this total, excluding the area within the DMZ, constitutes the territory of the Republic of Korea. The combined ter- ritories of North Korea and South Korea are about the same size as the state of Minnesota. South Korea alone is about the size of

Portugal or Hungary and is slightly larger than the state of Indiana.

The largest island, Cheju, lies off the southwest corner of the

peninsula and has a land area of 1,825 square kilometers. Other

important islands include Ullung in the Sea ofJapan and Kanghwa Island at the mouth of the Han River. Although the eastern

coastline of South Korea is generally unindented, the southern and

western coasts are jagged and irregular. The difference is caused

by the fact that the eastern coast is gradually rising, while the

southern and western coasts are subsiding.

Lacking formidable land or sea barriers along its borders and

occupying a central position among East Asian nations, the Korean

Peninsula has served as a cultural bridge between the mainland

and the Japanese archipelago. Korea contributed greatly to the development of Japan by transmitting both Indian Buddhist and

Chinese Confucian culture, art, and religion. At the same time,

Korea's exposed geographical position left it vulnerable to invasion by its stronger neighbors. When, in the late nineteenth century, British statesman Lord George Curzon described Korea as a "sort of political Tom Tiddler's ground between China, Russia, and Japan," he was describing a situation that had prevailed

for several millennia, as would be tragically apparent during the

twentieth century.

Topography and Drainage

Early European visitors to Korea remarked that the land resembled "a sea in a heavy gale" because of the large number of successive mountain ranges that crisscross the peninsula. The tallest mountains are in North Korea. The tallest mountain in South

Korea is Mount Halla (1,950 meters), which is the cone of a vol- canic formation constituting Cheju Island. There are three major

mountain ranges within South Korea: the T'aebaek and Sobaek

ranges and the Chiri Massif (see fig. 4).

Unlike Japan or the northern provinces of China, the Korean

Peninsula is geologically stable. There are no active volcanoes, and

there have been no strong earthquakes. Historical records, however,

describe volcanic activity on Mount Halla during the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392 A.D.).

71
South Korea: A Country Study

Over the centuries, Korea's inhabitants have cut down most of

the ancient Korean forests, with the exception of a few remote,

mountainous areas. The disappearance of the forests has been a major cause of soil erosion and flooding. Because of successful

reforestation programs and the declining use of firewood as a source of energy since the 1960s, however, most of South Korea's hills in the 1980s were amply covered with foliage. South Korea has no extensive plains; its lowlands are the product of mountain erosion. Approximately 30 percent of the area of South Korea consists of lowlands, with the rest consisting of uplands and mountains.

The great majority of the lowland area lies along the coasts, particularly the west coast, and along the major rivers. The most important

lowlands are the Han River plain around Seoul, the P'yongt'aek

coastal plain southwest of Seoul, the Kum River basin, the Naktong River basin, and the Yongsan and the Honam plains in the

southwest. A narrow littoral plain extends along the east coast. The Naktong is South Korea's longest river (521 kilometers).

The Han River, which flows through Seoul, is 514 kilometers long,

and the Kum River is 401 kilometers long. Other major rivers in- clude the Imjin, which flows through both North Korea and South

Korea and forms an estuary with the Han River; the Pukhan, a

tributary of the Han that also flows out of North Korea; and the

Somjin. The major rivers flow north to south or east to west and

empty into the Yellow Sea or the Korea Strait. They tend to be

broad and shallow and to have wide seasonal variations in water

flow.

News that North Korea was constructing a huge multipurpose

dam at the base of Mount Kumgang (1,638 meters) north of the

DMZ caused considerable consternation in South Korea during

the mid-1980s. South Korean authorities feared that once it was

completed, a sudden release of the dam's waters into the Pukhan

River during north-south hostilities could flood Seoul and paralyze the capital region. During 1987 the Kumgang-san Dam was

a major issue that Seoul sought to raise in talks with P'yongyang.

Although Seoul completed a "Peace Dam" on the Pukhan River

to counteract the potential threat of Pyongyang's dam project

before the 1988 Olympics, the North Korean project apparently

still was in its initial stages of construction in 1990.

Climate

Part of the East Asian monsoonal region, South Korea has a temperate climate with four distinct seasons. The movement of air masses from the Asian continent exerts greater influence on South

Korea's weather than does air movement from the Pacific Ocean.

72

m National capital

i T'aebaek Range

ii Charyong Range

in Sobaek Range

Spot elevations

in meters

25 50 75 Kilometers

1 (

(

, 25 50 75 Miles

A

Sea of Japan
The Society and Its Environment

Winters are usually long, cold, and dry, whereas summers are short,

hot, and humid. Spring and autumn are pleasant but short in duration. Seoul's mean temperature in January is - 5°C to - 2.5°C;

in July the mean temperature is about 22.5°C to 25°C. Because

of its southern and seagirt location, Cheju Island has warmer and

milder weather than other parts of South Korea. Mean temperatures on Cheju range from 2.5°C in January to 25°C in July.

The country generally has sufficient rainfall to sustain its agriculture. Rarely does less than 75 centimeters of rain fall in any given

year; for the most part, rainfall is over 100 centimeters. Amounts

of precipitation, however, can vary from year to year. Serious

droughts occur about once every eight years, especially in the rice- producing southwestern part of the country. About two-thirds of

the annual precipitation occurs between June and September.

South Korea is less vulnerable to typhoons than Japan, Taiwan,

the east coast of China, or the Philippines. From one to three

typhoons can be expected per year. Typhoons usually pass over South Korea in late summer, especially in August, and bring tor- rential rains (see fig. 5). Flooding occasionally causes considerable damage. In September 1984, record floods caused the deaths

of 190 people and left 200,000 homeless. This disaster prompted

the North Korean government to make an unprecedented offer of

humanitarian aid in the form of rice, medicine, clothes, and building

materials. South Korea accepted these items and distributed them

to flood victims.

Population

Although a variety of different Asian peoples had migrated to the Korean Peninsula in past centuries, very few have remained

permanentiy. Hence, by 1990 both South Korea and North Korea

were among the world's most ethnically homogeneous nations. The

number of indigenous minorities was negligible. In South Korea,

people of foreign origin, including Westerners, Chinese, and

Japanese, were a small percentage of the population, whose resi- dence was generally temporary. Like their Japanese neighbors,

Koreans tend to equate nationality or citizenship with membership in a single, homogeneous ethnic group or "race" (minjok, in

Korean). A common language and culture also are viewed as important elements in Korean identity. The idea of multiracial or multiethnic nations, like India or the United States, strikes many

Koreans as odd or even contradictory. Consciousness of homogeneity is a major reason why Koreans on both sides of the DMZ viewed

their country's division as an unnatural and unnecessary tragedy.

75


South Korea: A Country Study

NORTH KOREA

Demarcation am and

® National capital

• Populated place 25 50 Kilometers 25 50 Miles

I rich 'c Seoul O

Taejon* Sea

of Japan

.Taequ

Under 1 ,200

millimeters 1,200-1,400

millimeters FZZ]Over 1,400 Y//A millimeters 4

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Figure 5. Average Annual Rainfall

Against the background of ethnic homogeneity, however, significant regional differences exist. Within South Korea, the most

important regional difference is between the Kyongsang region,

embracing North Kyongsang and South Kyongsang provinces in

the southeast, and the Cholla region, embracing North Cholla and

South Cholla provinces in the southwest. The two regions, sepa- rated by the Chiri Massif, nurture a rivalry said to reach back to the Three Kingdoms Period, which lasted from the fourth century

76
The Society and Its Environment

to the seventh century A.D., when the kingdoms of Paekche and

Silla struggled for control of the peninsula (see The Origins of the

Korean Nation, ch. 1; fig. 2). Observers noted that interregional

marriages are rare, and that as of 1990 a new four-lane highway

completed in 1984 between Kwangju and Taegu, the capitals of

South Cholla and North Kyongsang provinces, respectively, had

not been successful in promoting travel between the two areas. South Korea's political elite, including presidents Park Chung

Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo, have come largely from

the Kyongsang region. As a result, Kyongsang has been a special

beneficiary of government development assistance. By contrast,

the Cholla region has remained comparatively rural, undeveloped,

and poor. Chronically disaffected, its people righdy or wrongly have

a reputation for rebelliousness. Regional bitterness was intensified

by the May 1980 Kwangju incident, in which about 200 and

perhaps many more inhabitants of the capital of South Cholla

Province were killed by government troops sent to quell an insurrection. Many of the troops reportedly were from the Kyongsang

region (see Students in 1980, ch. 1; United States Forces in South

Korea, ch. 5). Regional stereotypes, like regional dialects, have been breaking

down under the influence of centralized education, nationwide media, and the several decades of population movement since the

Korean War. Stereotypes remain important, however, in the eyes

of many South Koreans. For example, the people of Kyonggi

Province, surrounding Seoul, are often described as being cultured,

and Ch'ungch'ong people, inhabiting the region embracing North

Ch'ungch'ong and South Ch'ungch'ong provinces, are thought

to be mild-mannered, manifesting trueyangban virtues (see Traditional Social Structure, this ch.). The people of Kangwon Province

in the northeast are viewed as poor and stolid, whereas Koreans

from the northern provinces of P'yongan, Hwanghae, and Hamgyong, now in North Korea, are perceived as being diligent and

aggressive. Cheju Island is famous for its strong-minded and in- dependent women.

Population Trends

The population of South Korea has grown rapidly since the

republic's establishment in 1948. In the first official census, taken

in 1949, the total population of South Korea was calculated at 20,188,641 people. The 1985 census total was 40,466,577. Population growth was slow, averaging about 1 . 1 percent annually during

the period from 1949 to 1955, when the population registered at 21.5 million. Growth accelerated between 1955 and 1966 to 29.2

77
South Korea: A Country Study

million or an annual average of 2.8 percent, but declined significantly during the period 1966 to 1985 to an annual average of 1.7 percent (see fig. 6). Thereafter, the annual average growth rate was estimated to be less than 1 percent, similar to the low growth

rates of most industrialized countries and to the target figure set by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for the 1990s. As of

January 1, 1989, the population of South Korea was estimated to be approximately 42.2 million.

The proportion of the total population under fifteen years of age

has risen and fallen with the growth rate. In 1955 approximately

41.2 percent of the population was under fifteen years of age, a percentage that rose to 43.5 percent in 1966 before falling to 38.3

percent in 1975, 34.2 percent in 1980, and 29.9 percent in 1985.

In the past, the large proportion of children relative to the total population put great strains on the country's economy, particularly because substantial resources were invested in education facilities (see Primary and Secondary Schools, this ch.). With the

slowdown in the population growth rate and a rise in the median

age (from 18.7 years to 21.8 years between 1960 and 1980), the

age structure of the population has begun to resemble the columnar pattern typical of developed countries, rather than the pyramidal pattern found in most parts of the Third World.

The decline in the population growth rate and in the proportion

of people under fifteen years of age after 1966 reflected the success of official and unofficial birth control programs. The government

of President Syngman Rhee (1948-60) was conservative in such

matters. Although Christian churches initiated a family planning

campaign in 1957, it was not until 1962 that the government of

Park Chung Hee, alarmed at the way in which the rapidly increasing population was undermining economic growth, began a nationwide family planning program. Other factors that contributed to a slowdown in population growth included urbanization, later marriage ages for both men and women, higher education levels, a

greater number of women in the labor force, and better health stan- dards (see Public Health and Welfare, this ch.).

Public and private agencies involved in family planning included

the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Home

Affairs, the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, and the

Korea Institute of Family Planning. In the late 1980s, their activities included distribution of free birth control devices and information, classes for women on family planning methods, and the

granting of special subsidies and privileges (such as low-interest

housing loans) to parents who agreed to undergo sterilization. There

78
The Society and Its Environment

were 502,000 South Koreans sterilized in 1984, as compared with

426,000 in the previous year. The 1973 Maternal and Child Health Law legalized abortion.

In 1983 the government began suspending medical insurance

benefits for maternal care for pregnant women with three or more

children. It also denied tax deductions for education expenses to parents with two or more children.

As in China, cultural attitudes pose problems for family planning programs. A strong preference for sons—who in Korea's Confucian value system are expected to care for their parents in old

age and carry on the family name—means that parents with only

daughters usually continue to have children until a son is born.

The government has encouraged married couples to have only one

child. Such encouragement has been a prominent theme in public

service advertising, which stresses "have a single child and raise

it well."

Total fertility rates (the average number of births a woman will have during her lifetime) fell from 6.1 births per female in 1960

to 4.2 in 1970, 2.8 in 1980, and 2.4 in 1984. The number of live births, recorded as 711,810 in 1978, grew to a high of 917,860 in

1982. This development stirred apprehensions among family planning experts of a new "baby boom." By 1986, however, the number

of live births had declined to 806,041.

Given the size and age structure of the population in 1990,

however, substantial increases are expected over the next few decades. According to the government's Economic Planning Board,

the country's population will increase to between 46 and 48 million by the end of the twentieth century, with growth rates ranging between 0.9 and 1.2 percent. The population is expected to

stabilize (that is, cease to grow) in the year 2023 at around 52.6

million people. In the words ofAsiaweek magazine, the "stabilized

tally will approximate the number of Filipinos in 1983, but squeezed

into less than a third of their [the Philippines'] space."

Population Settlement Patterns

South Korea was one of the world's most densely populated countries, with an estimated 425 people per square kilometer in

1989—over sixteen times the average population density of the United States in the late 1980s. By comparison, China had an estimated 1 14 people, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

246 people, and Japan 323 people per square kilometer in the late 1980s. Because about 70 percent of South Korea's land area is mountainous and the population is concentrated in the lowland

areas, actual population densities were in general greater than the

79
South Korea: A Country Study

80
The Society and Its Environment

average. As early as 1975, it was estimated that the density of South

Korea's thirty-five cities, each of which had a population of 50,000

or more inhabitants, was 3,700 people per square kilometer. Because of continued migration to urban areas, the figure was doubtless higher in the late 1980s.

In 1988 Seoul had a population density of 17,030 people per

square kilometer as compared with 13,816 people per square kilo- meter in 1980. The second largest city, Pusan, had a density of

8,504 people per square kilometer in 1988 as compared with 7,272

people in 1980. Kyonggi Province, which surrounds the capital and

contains Inch'on, the country's fourth largest city, was the most

densely populated province; Kangwon Province in the northeast was the least densely populated province.

The extreme crowding in South Korea in 1990 was a major fac- tor not only in economic development and in the standard of liv- ing but also in the development of social attitudes and human

relationships. More than most other peoples, South Koreans have

had to learn to live peacefully with each other in small, crowded

spaces, in which the competition for limited resources, including

space itself, is intense. Continued population growth means that

the shortage of space for living and working will grow more se- vere. According to the government's Economic Planning Board,

the population density will be 530 people per square kilometer by

2023, the year the population is expected to stabilize. Urbanization

Like other newly industrializing economies, South Korea ex- perienced rapid growth of urban areas caused by the migration of

large numbers of people from the countryside. In the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries, Seoul, by far the largest urban settle- ment, had a population of about 190,000 people. There was a strik- ing contrast with Japan, where Edo (Tokyo) had as many as 1 million inhabitants and the urban population comprised as much

as 10 to 15 percent of the total during the Tokugawa Period

(1600-1868). During the closing years of the Choson Dynasty and

the first years of Japanese colonial rule, the urban population of

Korea was no more than 3 percent of the total. After 1930, when

the Japanese began industrial development on the Korean Peninsula, particularly in the northern provinces adjacent to Manchuria,

the urban portion of the population began to grow, reaching 11.6

percent for all of Korea in 1940.

Between 1945 and 1985, the urban population of South Korea

grew from 14.5 percent to 65.4 percent of the total population (see

fig. 7). In 1988 the Economic Planning Board estimated that the

81
South Korea: A Country Study

1955

21,526,374

All other cities 12.2%

1975

34,706,620

Pusan

7.1%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. 51.5%

Source: Based on information from Korea Institute for Population and Health, Journal of

Population and Health Studies [Seoul], 8, No. 2, December 1988, 19, 22.

Figure 7. Rural and Urban Population Distribution, Selected Years, 1955-85

82
The Society and Its Environment

1980

37,448,836

1985

40,466,577

83
South Korea: A Country Study

urban portion of the population will reach 78 . 3 percent by the end

of the twentieth century. Most of this urban increase was attributable to migration rather than to natural growth of the urban population. Urban birth rates have generally been lower than the national

average. The extent of urbanization in South Korea, however, is not fully revealed in these statistics. Urban population was defined

in the national census as being restricted to those municipalities

with 50,000 or more inhabitants. Although many settlements with

fewer than 50,000 inhabitants were satellite towns of Seoul or other

large cities or mining communities in northeastern Kangwon

Province, which would be considered urban in terms of the living

conditions and occupations of the inhabitants, they still were offi- cially classified as rural. The dislocation caused by the Korean War accounted for the

rapid increase in urban population during the early 1950s.

Hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of them from North

Korea, streamed into the cities. During the post-Korean War period,

rural people left their ancestral villages in search of greater economic

and educational opportunities in the cities. By the late 1960s, migration had become a serious problem, not only because cities were

terribly overcrowded, but also because the rural areas were losing

the most youthful and productive members of their labor force. In the early 1970s, the Park Chung Hee government launched

the Saemaul undong (New Community Movement) as a rural

reconstruction and self-help movement to improve economic conditions in the villages, close the wide gap in income between rural

and urban areas, and stem urban migration—as well as to build a political base. Despite a huge amount of government-sponsored

publicity, especially during the Park era, it was not clear by the

late 1980s that the Saemaul undong had achieved its objectives.

By that time many, if not most, farming and fishing villages consisted of older persons; relatively few able-bodied men and women

remained to work in the fields or to fish. This trend was apparent

in government statistics for the 1986-87 period: the proportion of

people fifty years old or older living in farming communities grew

from 28.7 percent in 1986 to 30.6 percent in 1987, whereas the

number of people in their twenties living in farming communities

declined from 11.3 percent to 10.8 percent. The nationwide per- centages for people fifty years old or older and in their twenties were, in 1986, 14.9 percent and 20.2 percent, respectively (see

Agriculture, ch. 3). In 1985 the largest cities were Seoul (9,645,932 inhabitants), Pusan

(3,516,807), Taegu (2,030,672), Inch'on (1,387,491), Kwangju

(906,129), and Taejon (866,695). According to government statistics,

84
The Society and Its Environment

the population of Seoul, one of the world's largest cities, surpassed

10 million people in late 1988. Seoul's average annual population

growth rate during the late 1980s was more than 3 percent. Twothirds of this growth was attributable to migration rather than to natural increase. Surveys revealed that "new employment or seeking a new job," "job transfer," and "business" were major rea- sons given by new immigrants for coming to the capital. Other

factors cited by immigrants included "education" and "a more

convenient area to live." To alleviate overcrowding in Seoul's

downtown area, the city government drew up a master plan in the

mid-1980s that envisioned the development of four "core zones"

by 2000: the original downtown area, Yongdungp'o-Yoido, Yongdong, and Ch'amsil. Satellite towns also would be established or expanded. In the late 1980s, statistics revealed that the daytime

or commuter population of downtown Seoul was as much as six times the officially registered population. If the master plan is successful, many commuters will travel to work in a core area nearer

their homes, and the downtown area's daytime population will decrease. Many government ministries have been moved out of

Seoul, and the army, navy, and air force headquarters have been

relocated to Taejon.

In 1985 the population of Seoul constituted 23.8 percent of the

national total. Provincial cities, however, experienced equal and,

in many cases, greater expansion than the capital. Growth was particularly spectacular in the southeastern coastal region, which en- compasses the port cities of Pusan, Masan, Yosu, Chinhae, Ulsan,

and P'ohang. Census figures show that Ulsan 's population increased

eighteenfold, growing from 30,000 to 551,300 inhabitants between

1960 and 1985. With the exception of Yosu, all of these cities are

in South Kyongsang Province, a region that has been an especially favored recipient of government development projects. By comparison, the population of Kwangju, capital of South Cholla

Province, increased less than threefold between 1960 and 1985,

growing from 315,000 to 906,129 inhabitants.

Rapid urban growth has brought familiar problems to developed

and developing countries alike. The construction of large numbers

of high-rise apartment complexes in Seoul and other large cities alleviated housing shortages to some extent. But it also imposed

hardship on the tens of thousands of people who were obliged to relocate from their old neighborhoods because they could not af- ford the rents in the new buildings. In the late 1980s, squatter areas

consisting of one-story shacks still existed in some parts of Seoul.

Housing for all but the wealthiest was generally cramped. The concentration of factories in urban areas, the rapid growth of motorized

85
South Korea: A Country Study

traffic, and the widespread use of coal for heating during the severe winter months have caused dangerous levels of air and water pollution. Although environmental awareness is increasing, a polluted

environment will adversely affect the quality of life in the cities for some time to come. Koreans Living Overseas

Large-scale emigration from Korea began around 1904 and con- tinued until the end of World War II. During the Japanese colonial

occupation, many Koreans emigrated to Manchuria (present-day

China's northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang), other parts of China, the Soviet Union, Hawaii, and the

continental United States. Most emigrated for economic reasons; employment opportunities were scarce, and many Korean farmers lost their land after the Japanese introduced a system of land

registration and private land tenure, imposed higher land taxes,

and promoted the growth of an absentee landlord class charging

exorbitant rents. Koreans from the northern provinces of Korea

went mainly to Manchuria, China, and Siberia. Many people from

the southern provinces went to Japan. Koreans were conscripted

into Japanese labor battalions or the Japanese army, especially during World War II. In the 1940-44 period, nearly 2 million Koreans

lived in Japan, 1.4 million in Manchuria, 600,000 in Siberia, and

130,000 in China. An estimated 40,000 Koreans were scattered

among other countries. At the end of World War II, approximately

2 million Koreans were repatriated from Japan and Manchuria.

More than 4 million ethnic Koreans lived outside the peninsula

during the early 1980s. The largest group, about 1.7 million people, lived in China. Most had assumed Chinese citizenship. The

Soviet Union had about 430,000 ethnic Koreans. One observer

noted that Koreans had been so successful in running collective

farms in Soviet Central Asia that being Korean was often associated

by other Soviets with being rich. By contrast, many of Japan's approximately 700,000 Koreans

had below-average standards of living. This situation occurred partly because of discrimination by the Japanese majority and partly

because of the fact that a large number of resident Koreans, loyal

to the North Korean regime of Kim II Sung, preferred to remain

separate from and hostile to the Japanese mainstream. The proNorth Korea Chosen soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) initially was more successful than the pro-South

Korea Mindan (Association for Korean Residents in Japan) in at- tracting adherents among residents in Japan. Since diplomatic re- lations were established between Seoul and Tokyo in 1965, however,

86
Typical housing outside the city wall, Seoul, 1904

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

Typical housing, Seoul, 1989

Courtesy Oren Hadar

87
South Korea: A Country Study

the South Korean government has taken an active role in promoting the interests of their residents in Japan in negotiations with

the Japanese government (see Relations with Japan, ch. 4). It also has provided subsidies to Korean schools in Japan and other com- munity activities. By the end of 1988, there were over 2 million South Korean overseas residents. North America was the preferred destination—the

choice of over 1.2 million of these residents. Korean immigrants

in the United States and Canada gained a reputation for hard work

and economic success. South Koreans also were overseas residents

ofJapan (at least 680,000), Central America and South America

(85,000), the Middle East (62,000), Western Europe (40,000), other

Asian countries (27,000), and Africa (25,000). A limited number

of South Korean government-sponsored migrants setded in Chile,

Argentina, and other Latin American countries. Because of South

Korea's rapid economic expansion, an increasing number of its citizens resided abroad on a temporary basis as business executives, technical personnel, foreign students, and construction workers. A small number of overseas South Koreans had migrated back

to South Korea, primarily because of the much improved economic

conditions and the difficulties in adjusting to living abroad.

Social Structure and Values

The social values of contemporary South Korea reflect the synthesis and development of diverse influences, both indigenous and

foreign. Probably the most important of these is the neo-Confucian

doctrine of the Chinese philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200), first in- troduced into Korea during the closing years of the Koryo Dynasty

(918-1392). The rulers of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) adopted

it as their state ideology. The most important Korean neo- Confucian philosopher, Yi Hwang, also known as Yi T'oe-gye

(1501-70), had a great influence on later generations of Confucianists not only in Korea but also in Japan.

Neo-Confucianism combines the social ethics of the classical Chinese philosophers Confucius (Kong Zi, 551-479 B.C.) and

Mencius (Meng Zi, 372-289 B.C.) with Taoist, or Daoist, and

Buddhist metaphysics. One of the doctrine's basic ideas is that the

institutions and practices of the ideal human community are an

expression of the immutable principles or laws that govern the move- ments of the cosmos. Through correct social practice, as defined

by the Confucian sages and their commentators, individuals can

achieve a kind of spiritual unity with heaven. Neo-Confucianism

defines formal social relations on all levels of society. Social relations are not conceived of in terms of the happiness or satisfaction of

88
The Society and Its Environment

the individuals involved, but in terms of the harmonious integration of individuals into a collective whole that mirrors the harmony of the natural order.

Neo-Confucianism in Korea was becoming rigid and increasingly

conservative by the mid-1 500s. The practice of neo-Confucianism

emphasized hierarchy in human relations and self-control on the

individual level. Society was defined in terms of the Five Relationships (o ryun in Korean; wu lun in Chinese) that had been formulated

by classical Chinese thinkers, such as Mencius, and subsequently

sanctified by the neo-Confucian metaphysicians: "between father

and son there should be affection; between ruler and minister there

should be righteousness; between husband and wife there should

be attention to their separate functions; between old and young

there should be a proper order; and between friends there should

be faithfulness." Only the last was a relationship between equals.

The others were based on authority and subordination, including

the first relationship, which involved not so much mutual love as the unquestioning subordination of the son to the will of his father. Throughout traditional Korean society, from the royal palace

and central government offices in Seoul to the humblest household

in the provinces, the themes of hierarchy and inequality were pervasive. Persons were expected to nurture "sincere" attitudes, which

meant not so much expressing what one "really" felt as "reflect- ing on" or "clarifying" one's thoughts and feelings until they con- formed to traditional norms. There was no concept of the rights

of the individual. The ideal man or woman was one who controlled

his or her passions or emotions in order to fulfill to the letter a host

of exacting social obligations.

In the context of wider society, a well-defined elite of scholarofficials versed in neo-Confucian orthodoxy was legitimized in terms

of the traditional ethical distinction between the educated "superior

man" or "gentieman" and the "small man" who seeks only profit.

The distinction was a central theme in the writings of Confucius

and Mencius. Confucianism as a political theory proposed a benevolent paternalism: the masses had no role in government, but the

scholar-officials were supposed to look after them as fathers look

after their children.

Just as the father commanded unquestioning obedience in the

household and the scholar-official elite did so in the nation as a

whole, there was also a hierarchy in international relations. China,

the homeland of neo-Confucianism and the most powerful nation

in the region, was the center of Choson Korea's cultural universe

for most of the dynasty's duration.

Foreign observers have been impressed with the diversity of the

89
South Korea: A Country Study

Korean character as expressed in day-to-day human relations.

There is, on one hand, the image of Koreans as self- controlled,

deferential, and meticulous in the fulfillment of their social obli- gations; on the other hand, there is the Korean reputation for volatility and emotionalism, for being the "Irish of the East." The

ecstasy and euphoria of shamanistic religious practices, one of

Korea's most characteristic cultural expressions, contrasts sharply

with the austere self-control of Confucian ancestor rituals (see

Religion, this ch.).

Although relatively minor themes in the history of Korean ethics

and social thought, the concepts of equality and respect for individuals are not entirely lacking. The doctrines of Ch'ondogyo (see Glossary), an indigenous religion that originated in the nineteenth

century and combines elements of Buddhism, Taoism, shamanism, Confucianism, and Catholicism, teach that every human

"bears divinity" and that one must "treat man as god."

Western social and political values such as democracy, individualism, the equality of the sexes (also seen in Ch'ondogyo), and national self-determination were introduced by late nineteenth-century

Korean reformers and by West European and North American missionaries, who had a profound effect upon the development of Korean

education and political values. These concepts have played an in- creasingly prominent role in South Korean life in recent decades.

Although by no means democratic, the Confucian tradition it- self contains anti-authoritarian themes. Mencius taught that the

sovereign and his officials must concern themselves with the welfare of the people and that a king who misuses his power loses the

right to rule—the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. In Korean

as well as Chinese history, there were many Confucian statesmen

who, often at the cost of their own lives, opposed the misuse of

power by those in authority. The tradition of political protest in

South Korea, particularly by university students, owes as much

to this aspect of the Confucian tradition as it does to democratic

and Marxist concepts imported from the West. Just as out-of-power

"rustic literati," or sarim, pursued purely moral and academic

studies and disdained government service at various times during

the Choson period, so modern-day university students, claiming

to be the "conscience of the nation, '' have opposed the bureaucratic

and professional elite in government and private business.

Thus, to depict traditional Korean social values in terms of an

authoritarian Confucian tradition is overly simplistic. A more comprehensive account of social values might describe them in terms

of interacting dualities, a kind of yin-yang opposition and synthesis. There is the tension, for example, between self-control and

90
The Society and Its Environment

solemnity, on the one hand, and almost explosive volatility at the

level of individual behavior, on the other; between the duty-bound

austerity of Confucian family life and ritualism, and the ecstasy

and abandon of shamanistic rites; between the conservatism of

agricultural villages and the looser social organization of fishing

communities; between the orthodox concept of male supremacy

and the reality of much "hidden" female power; between the

"higher" rationalized, humanistic, or scientific culture imported

from China, Japan, or the West, and much older indigenous or

native cultural themes; between hierarchy and equality; and between slavish deference to authority and principled resistance.

Traditional Social Structure

In Choson Dynasty Korea, four rather distinct social strata developed: the scholar-officials, collectively referred to as the yangban; the chungin (literally "middle people"), technicians and administrators subordinate to theyangban; the sangmin, or commoners,

a large group composed of farmers, craftsmen, and merchants; and

the ch'ommin (despised people)," at the bottom of society. To ensure stability, the government devised a system of personal tallies in order to identify people according to their status. In the strictest sense of the term, yangban referred to government

officials or officeholders who had passed the civil service examinations that tested knowledge of the Confucian classics and their neo- Confucian interpreters. They were the Korean counterparts of the

scholar-officials, or mandarins, of imperial China. The termyangban, first used during the Koryo Dynasty, means literally "two

groups," that is, civil and military officials. Over the centuries,

however, its usage became rather vague, so that the term can be

said to have several overlapping meanings. Strictly speaking, ayangban lineage was one that consistently combined examination success with appointments to government office over a period of some

generations. During the Choson period, examination candidates

had to show several generations of such ancestry on both sides to be admitted to the civil service examinations. A broader use of the

term included within the yangban two other groups that could be

considered associated with, but outside of, the ruling elite. The

first group included those scholars who had passed the preliminary

civil service examination and sometimes the higher examinations

but had failed to secure government appointment. In the late Choson Dynasty, there were many more successful examination candidates than there were positions. The second group included the more remote relatives and descendants of government officials. Even if these people were poor and did not themselves serve in the

91
South Korea: A Country Study

government, they were considered members of a "yangban family"

and thus shared the aura of the elite as long as they retained Confucian culture and rituals. An interesting development in the social history of the Choson

Dynasty occurred after the government began to sell honorary

patents of office to people who were not yangban to raise revenue

following the dislocations of the Hideyoshi invasions. Wealthy com- moners sometimes went beyond such status symbols to commission forged genealogies or to take on other trappings of yangban

status. This form of social climbing was highly irritating to traditionalyangban families of the types mentioned above. Probably even more common were formeryangban families that had drifted down

into genteel poverty and commoner status. Both developments show

that the Choson Dynasty class system was beginning to lose some

of its rigidity on the eve of the momentous changes of the late nineteenth century.

Yangban serving as officials could enrich themselves because they were given royal grants of land and had many opportunities for

graft; but unemployed scholars and local gentry often were poor.

They were a kind of "twilight elite" that was both feared and yet

often mocked in peasant entertainments. In his satirical Tale of a Yangban, the writer Pak Chi-won (1737-1805) describes the life of ayangban, however poor, as one of enforced idleness, exacerbated

by the need to maintain appearances. Ayangban had to study Confucian literature and pass at least the preliminary examinations.

He was prohibited from engaging in manual labor or commerce

and had to present an image of poise and self-control. Ayangban

could not, among other things, "poke and play with his chopsticks,"

"eat raw onions, '

' or "puff hard on his pipe, pulling in his cheeks.

'

Yet he exercised much arbitrary power in his own village. In principle, the yangban were a meritocratic elite. They gained their positions through educational achievement. Certain groups of persons

(artisans, merchants, shamans, slaves, Buddhist monks, and others) were prohibited from taking the higher civil service examinations,

but these formed only a small minority of the population. In the- ory, the examinations were open to the large majority of people

who were farmers. In the early years of the Choson Dynasty, some commoners may have been able to attain high positions by pass- ing the examinations and advancing on sheer talent. In later years,

talent was a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for entry into

the core elite because of the surplus of successful examinees. Influential family connections were virtually indispensable for obtaining high official positions. Moreover, special posts called

"protection appointments" were inherited by descendants of the

92
The Society and Its Environment

Choson royal family and certain high officials. Despite the emphasis on educational merit, the yangban became in a very real sense a

hereditary elite. Below theyangban yet superior to the commoners were the chungin, a small group of technical and administrative officials. They

included astronomers, physicians, interpreters, and professional

military officers, as well as artists. Local functionaries, who were members of a lower hereditary class, were an important and fre- quentiy oppressive link between theyangban and the common people.

They were often the de facto rulers of a local region.

The commoners, or sangmin, composed about 75 percent of the

total population. These farmers, craftsmen, and merchants alone

bore the burden of taxation and were subject to military conscription. Farmers had higher prestige than merchants, but lived a hard

life. Below the commoners, the ''base people," or ch'dmmin, did

what was considered vile or low-prestige work. They included ser- vants and slaves in government offices and resthouses, jailkeepers

and convicts, shamans, actors, female entertainers (kisaeng), professional mourners, shoemakers, executioners, and, for a time at least,

Buddhist monks and nuns. Also included in this category were the

paekchong, apparentiy descended from Inner Asian nomads, who

dealt with meat and the hides of animals, were considered "unclean," and lived in segregated communities. Slaves were treated

as chattels but could own property and even other slaves. Although numerous at the beginning of the Choson Dynasty, their numbers

had dwindled by the time slavery was officially abolished at the

end of the nineteenth century.

During their invasions in 1592 and 1597, the armies of the

Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi destroyed many genealogical

records, making it difficult to determine who was and who was not a member of &yangban family. Also, as Japanese armies were approaching Seoul, slaves in the capital rose up and burned documentary

evidence of their servitude. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries, the old social distinctions were breaking down. During

the early Choson Dynasty, commoners did not have family names

or class affiliations (see Traditional Family Life, this ch.). However,

they began to adopt names in order to avoid the stigma of low sta- tus. Counterfeit genealogies could frequendy be purchased, and commoners sometimes attached their names toyangban genealogies

to avoid military service taxes. Other late Choson Dynasty social

changes included the gradual shift of agricultural labor from slave

status to contractual arrangements and the emergence of "entrepreneurial farmers" —commoners who earned small surpluses

through innovative agricultural techniques.

93
South Korea: A Country Study

The Emergence of a Modern Society

In 1894 a program of social reforms, known as the Kabo Reforms, was initiated by pro-Japanese Korean officials. Yangban and commoners were made equal before the law, the old Confucian

civil service examinations were abolished, and slavery and ch'dmmin status was ended. Modern forms of government and administration, largely borrowed from Japan, were adopted. In the years

before annexation, a self- strengthening movement and government

reforms attempted to regain Korean control of the pace and direction of change. However, it was only following the Japanese annexation in 1910 that the rapid social transformation of Korea began.

Rural society was radically transformed. Traditionally, all land

belonged to the king and was granted by him to his subjects.

Although specific parcels of land tended to remain within the same

family from generation to generation (including communal land

owned by clans and lineages), land occupancy, use, and ownership patterns often were legally ambiguous and widely divergent

from one part of the country to another. There was no institution

of private property during the Choson Dynasty. The Japanese,

however, conducted a comprehensive land survey between 1910

and 1920 in order to place landownership on a modern legal foot- ing. Farmers whose families had tilled the same soil for generations but could not prove ownership in a way satisfactory to the

colonial authorities had their land confiscated. Such land came into

the hands of the colonial government, to be sold to Japanese land

companies, such as the Oriental Development Company, or to Japanese immigrants. As research by Edward Graegert has shown,

however, the survey also helped to confirm, or in some cases even

to improve, the position of some members of the existing Korean

landlord class. Many were formeryangban who cooperated with the

Japanese. Thoseyangban who remained aloof from their country's

new overlord often fell into poverty. The farmers themselves either

became tenants or were forced to leave the land. During the depression of the 1930s, thousands emigrated to the cities or overseas. Many others fled to the hills to become 'Tire-field" (slash-and-burn)

farmers, living under extremely harsh and primitive conditions.

By 1936 this last group numbered more than 1.5 million people.

The Japanese built railroads, highways, schools, and hospitals

and established a modern system of administration. These changes were intended to link the colonial economy more effectively to that

ofJapan. The new, modern sector required technically trained experts. Although the top positions were invariably occupied by

Japanese, Koreans worked on the lower levels as secondary technical

94
The Society and Its Environment

and administrative personnel. Thus, while the number of Korean

high officials in the colonial administration increased from only 354

to 442 people between 1915 and 1942, the number of junior offi- cials increased from 15,543 to 29,998 in the same period. Japan's

industrial development policies during the 1930s and 1940s,

although concentrated in the northern half of the peninsula adja- cent to Manchuria, created a new class of workers and lower-level

industrial managers who played an important role in the industrial

development of South Korea after 1945.

The great majority of Koreans suffered under Japanese rule. A

large number of farmers were forced off their land after 1910; in- dustrial workers and miners working for Japanese-owned firms were

often treated little better than slaves. Under colonial agricultural

policies, rice cultivation was maximized, although most rice was grown for consumption in Japan.

Nevertheless, development under Japanese colonial rule provided some foundation, however unintentionally, for South Korea's impressive post- 1945 economic growth (see Korea under Japanese

Rule, ch. 1). A small group of Korean entrepreneurs emerged who

fostered close ties with the colonial government, and Japanese busi- ness interests established family-held firms that were the precursors

of South Korea's present-day chaebol, or business conglomerates.

It is a tribute to their acumen that these entrepreneurs were able

to survive and prosper in a colonial economy dominated overwhelmingly by Japanese capital.

Three developments after 1945 were particularly important for

South Korea's social modernization. The first was the land reform

carried out by United States and South Korean authorities between

1945 and 1950. The institution of private property was retained,

but the American occupation authorities confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese colonial government, Japanese

companies, and individual Japanese colonists. The Korean government also carried out a reform whereby Koreans with large landholdings were obliged to divest most of their land. A new class of

independent, family proprietors was created.

The second development was the great influx from North Korea

and other countries of repatriates and refugees. In the 1945-49 period, between 1.5 million and 2 million Koreans returned to South

Korea from Japan, the northeast provinces of China, and other

foreign countries. With the establishment of a communist state in

North Korea, a large number of refugees fled to South Korea and

were joined by many more during the Korean War. A conservative

estimate of the total number of refugees from the north is 1 .2 million.

95
South Korea: A Country Study

Most of the northerners settled in the cities—new recruits for the

country's industrial labor force. The third development was a direct result of the Korean War.

Traditionally Koreans, like their Chinese and unlike their Japanese

neighbors, considered the military to be a low-status occupation.

Korea did not have its own armed forces during the colonial period, although some Koreans served in the Japanese military, especially after 1941, and a handful, such as former President Park

Chung Hee, received officer's training. The North Korean invasion ofJune 1950 and the three years of fighting that followed cast the South Korean military establishment into the role of savior of

the country. And since the coup d'etat of May 1961 that established Park Chung Hee, the military establishment has held considerable political power. Roh Tae Woo, elected president in 1987, was a retired general with close connections to the military elite. Universal military conscription of men has played an important

role in South Korea's development, both in political socialization

and in integrating a society divided by strong regional prejudices.

It also has exposed the nation's young men to technical training

and to a disciplined way of life. During the three decades after Park's 1961 coup d'etat, the goal

of the military elite was to create a harmonious, disciplined society

that was both technically advanced and economically efficient. Economic modernization, however, has brought social changes

especially in education and urbanization—that have had a corrosive effect on the military's authoritarian view of society and have

promoted the emergence of a more contentious, pluralistic society

than many in the military have found desirable.

Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea

Rapid economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization have

caused a profound transformation in the class structure of South

Korean society since the end of the Korean War. One of the most

important changes has been the emergence of a "new" middle class consisting of civil servants, salaried white-collar workers in large

private companies, and professionals with specialized training, such

as engineers, health care professionals, university professors, architects, and journalists. The number of factory workers also has grown

impressively. According to figures provided by Kim Kyong-Dong,

a sociologist at Seoul National University, the portion of the population that can be labeled "new middle class" (excluding self- employed professionals) grew from 6.6 percent to 17.7 percent

between 1960 and 1980. The proportion of industrial workers

expanded from 8.9 percent to 22.6 percent of the labor force during

96
The Society and Its Environment

the same period. Independent farmers and members of the rural

lower class, including agricultural laborers, experienced corresponding declines in percentage: together, they accounted for 64 per- cent of the population in 1960 but only 31.3 percent in 1980.

The urban lower class, consisting to a great extent of recent arri- vals from rural parts of the country living in squatter areas, composed an estimated 6.6 percent of the population in 1960 and 5.9

percent in 1980. An "old" middle class consisting of shopkeepers

and small business proprietors in urban and rural areas, self- employed professionals, and self-employed craftsmen grew modestiy

from 13 percent to 20.8 percent of the population between 1960

and 1980. Kim's figures also include what he euphemistically calls an "upper-middle" class—the country's economic and social elites, whose numbers grew from 0.9 percent to 1 .8 percent of the population between 1960 and 1980.

Another way of viewing contemporary South Korean society is to consider the sources of social inequality. In a 1988 article, Korea

specialist David I. Steinberg focused on several of these sources, which include the disparity in living standards between urban and

rural areas—the main motivation behind sustained urban migration. Although the Saemaul Movement was successful in narrowing

the gap between rural and urban incomes during the mid-1970s,

disparities subsequently reemerged. Steinberg also noted that

despite the land reform of the late 1940s, tenancy has grown, and

that by 1981 as many as 46 percent of all farmers were "full or

partial tenants."

Discrimination on both the community and individual levels against the people of North Cholla and South Cholla provinces re- mains a second important source of inequality. Disparities in per

capita income between Seoul and the provinces of North and South

Kyongsang had virtually disappeared by the early 1980s, but per

capita incomes in the capital were still 1 .8 times those in the Cholla region in 1983. As in most other Asian (and most Western) countries, gender differences remain another source of major inequalities

(see Changing Role of Women, this ch.).

Government control of the financial system has created substantial inequalities between the favored chaebol, which at least until

the late 1980s had access to credit at low rates, and capital- starved

smaller businesses that had to rely on nonbank sources of credit. Official support of the chaebol as the engines of South Korean eco- nomic growth and industrialization was clearly reflected in the dif- ferences between salaries and working conditions of employees in

large and small enterprises. Also, the Park and Chun regimes'

hostile policies toward labor unions kept workers' wages low—and

97
South Korea: A Country Study

internationally competitive. In Steinberg's words, "The Korean

worker has been asked to suffer for the good of society as a whole . . .

. " Activists who tried to organize independent unions were harassed, arrested, imprisoned, and frequently tortured by

the authorities. During the liberalization that began in 1987,

however, the government permitted the establishment of independent labor unions and assumed a new attitude, at times approaching

neutrality in labor-management disputes (see Interest Groups, ch. 4). Education remained the single most important factor affecting

social mobility in the 1990s. With the exception of the military,

whose top echelons were educated at the Korea Military Academy,

the postwar elites of South Korea shared one characteristic: they were graduates of the most prestigious universities. There was a

well-defined hierarchy of such schools, starting with Seoul National

University at the top and followed by Yonse University and Koryo

University (more commonly known as Korea University in English). Ehwa Woman's University was the top institution for women

(see Education, this ch.).

A survey conducted in the mid-1970s by the Korea Development Institute, a research organization funded by the government

but having considerable operational independence, revealed that

25 percent of a sample of entrepreneurs and 35 percent of a sample of higher civil servants had attended Seoul National University. The university's control of entry into the government and

business elites is comparable to that exercised by the University

of Tokyo in Japan. One major difference, however, is that for a Japanese student an extended period of study or residence abroad

is not considered advisable because it interrupts one's career "track" within a single bureaucracy or corporation; many prominent South Koreans, however, obtain advanced degrees at universities in the United States and in Western Europe.

The social importance of education is one of the major continuities between traditional and contemporary Korea. People at the

top require blue-ribbon educational backgrounds, not only because

education gives them the cultural sophistication and technical expertise needed to manage large, complex organizations, but also because subordinates will not work diligently for an uneducated

person—especially if subordinates are educated themselves. "Old

school ties" are also increasingly necessary for advancement in a

highly competitive society. At the bottom of the steep highereducation pyramid are low-prestige "diploma mills" whose graduates have little chance of breaking into elite circles. Yet graduation even from these institutions confers a sort of middle-class status.

98
The Society and Its Environment

Despite impressive increases in university enrollments, the central importance of education credentials for social advancement has

tended to widen the gap between the middle and lower classes. In- come distribution is more unequal than in Japan or Taiwan, with

pronounced disparities between college and secondary-school graduates. Many workers know that their comparatively low wages make

it virtually impossible for them to give their children a college education, a heavy financial burden even for middle-class families.

In the workplace, men and women with a middle-school or secondary-school education are often treated with open contempt

by university graduate managers. The latter address them with rude

or abrupt words whose impact is amplified by the status-sensitive

nature of the Korean language (see The Korean Language, this ch.). The result has been bitter resentment and increasing labor

militancy bordering on political opposition to the status quo.

During the 1980s, the concept of minjung (the masses) became

prominent in the thinking and rhetoric of radical students, mili- tant labor unionists, activists identified with the Christian churches,

and progressive but generally non-Marxist intellectuals. Although

its meaning is vague, minjung encompasses not only the urban

proletariat in the Marxist sense but also the groups, including farmers, small bourgeoisie, students, and skilled craftsmen, who allegedly

have been exploited by the country's numerically small ruling class (the military elite, top bureaucrats, and big business). National

elites were viewed as collaborating with foreign (particularly United

States and Japanese) capitalists in order to create a situation of per- manent dependence on foreign capital. The emphasis on neocolonialist themes by minjung spokespeople drew deeply on South

Korean populist, nationalist, and xenophobic sentiments to place

the origin of social evils outside the Korean race. Traditional Family Life

Filial piety {hyo in Korean; xiao in Chinese), the second of the

Five Relationships, defined by Mencius as affection between father

and son, traditionally has been the normative foundation of Korean

family life. Though its influence has diminished over time, this rela- tionship remains vitally important in contemporary South Korea.

Entailing a large number of reciprocal duties and responsibilities

between the generations of a single family, it generally has been

viewed as an unequal relationship in which the son owed the father

unquestioning obedience. Neo-Confucianists thought that the

subordination of son to father was the expression, on the human

level, of an immutable law of the cosmos. This law also imposed

a rigidity on family life.

99
South Korea: A Country Study

Family and lineage continuity traditionally was, and to a great extent remains, a supremely important principle. This principle

reflects Mencius's view that of all possible unfilial acts, to deprive

one's parents of posterity is the worst. Historically, the Korean

family has been patrilineal. The most important concern for the

family group was producing a male heir to carry on the family line

and to perform ancestor rituals in the household and at the family

gravesite. The first son customarily assumed leadership of the family after his father's death and inherited his father's house and a

greater portion of land than his younger brothers. This inheritance

enabled him to carry out the ritually prescribed obligations to his ancestors. Ancestor worship was, simultaneously, a social ethic and a

religion. In some ways, it was the most optimistic of faiths. It taught

that deceased family members do not pass into oblivion, to an afterlife, or, as the Buddhists believe, to rebirth as humans or animals

in some remote place, but remain, in spiritual form, securely within

the family circle. For traditionally minded Koreans, the presence

of the deceased could be an intensely real and personal one. Fear

of death was blunted by the consoling thought that even in the grave one would be cared for by one's own people. Succeeding generations had the obligation of remembering the deceased in a yearly

cycle of rituals and ceremonies.

Traditionally, the purpose of marriage was to produce a male

heir to carry on the family line rather than to provide mutual companionship and support for husband and wife. Marriages were

arranged. A go-between or matchmaker, usually a middle-aged

woman, carried on the negotiations between the two families in- volved who, because of a very strict law of exogamy, sometimes

did not know each other and often lived in different communities.

The bride and groom met for the first time at the marriage cere- mony, a practice that ended in the cities by the 1930s.

The traditional Korean kinship system, defined by different obli- gations in relation to ancestor worship, was complex. Anthropologists generally view it in terms of four separate levels, beginning

with the household on the lowest level and reaching to the clan,

which included a large number of persons often spread over an

extensive geographical area. The household, chip orjip (see Glossary) in Korean, consisted of husband and wife, their children, and

if the husband were the eldest son, his parents as well. The eldest son's household, the stem family, was known as the "big house"

(k'unjip), whereas that of each of the younger sons, a branch family

containing husband, wife and children only, was known as the "little house" (chagunjip). It was through the stem family of the eldest son

100
"Spring Time, " a traditional dance performance

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

that the main line of descent was traced from generation to generation. The eldest son was responsible for rituals in honor of the

ancestors, and his wife was responsible for producing the all- important male heir. The second level of kinship was the "mourning group" (tangnae),

which consisted of all those descendants of a common patrilineal

forbearer up to four generations back. Its role was to organize

ceremonies at the grave site. These rites included the reading of a formal message by the eldest male descendant of the tangnae progenitor and the offering of elaborate and attractive dishes to the

ancestral spirits.

Similar rituals were carried out at the third level of kinship or- ganization, the lineage (p'a—see Glossary). A lineage might comprise only a handful of households, but in some cases included

hundreds and even thousands of households. The lineage was

responsible for the rites honoring ancestors of the fifth generation

or above, performed at a common grave site. During the Choson

Dynasty, the lineage commonly possessed land, grave sites, and

buildings. Croplands were allocated to support the ancestral ceremonies. The lineage also performed other functions: the aid of poor

or distressed lineage members, the education of children at schools

maintained by the p 'a, and the supervision of the behavior of younger lineage members. Because most villagers were members of a common lineage during the Choson Dynasty, the p'a performed

101
South Korea: A Country Study

many of the social services on the local level that are now provided

by public schools, police, and social welfare agencies.

The fourth and most inclusive kinship organization was the clan,

or, more accurately, the tongjok (surname origin group). Among

ordinary South Koreans, this group was commonly known as the

pongwan, or "clan seat." Members of the same tongjok shared both

a surname and origins in the generally remote past. Unlike members of the smaller kinship groups, however, they often lacked strong

feelings of solidarity. Important tongjok include the Chonju Yi, whose

lineage seat was in Chonju in North Cholla Province and who

claimed as their progenitor the founder of the Choson Dynasty,

Yi Song-gye; and the Kimhae Kim, whose lineage seat was in Kimhae in South Kyongsang Province and who claimed as their com- mon ancestor either the founder of the ancient kingdom of Kaya

or one of the kings of the Silla Dynasty (A.D. 668-935).

Approximately 249 surnames were used by South Koreans in

the late 1980s. The most common were Kim (about 22 percent of

the population), Li or Yi (15 percent of the population), Pak or Park (8.5 percent), Ch'oe (4.8 percent), and Chong (4.2 percent).

There are, however, about 150 surname origin groups bearing the

name Kim, 95 with the name Yi, 35 with the name Pak, 40 with

the name Ch'oe, and 27 with the name Chong.

In many if not most cases, the real function of the tongjok was

to define groups of permissible marriage partners. Because of the

strict rule of exogamy, people from the same tongjok were not per- mitted to marry, even though their closest common ancestors in

many cases might have lived centuries ago. This prohibition, which

originated during the Choson Dynasty, had legal sanction in

present-day South Korea. An amendment to the marriage law pro- posed by women's and other groups in early 1990 would have

changed this situation by prohibiting marriages only between per- sons who had a common ancestor five generations or less back.

However, the amendment was strongly opposed by conservative

Confucian groups, which viewed the exogamy law as a crystallization of traditional Korean values. Among older South Koreans,

it is still commonly thought that only uncivilized people marry

within their clan group.

Family and Social Life in the Cities

Contemporary urban family and social life in South Korea at the start of the 1990s exhibits a number of departures from traditional family and kinship institutions. One example is the tendency for complex kinship and family structures to weaken or break

down and be replaced by structurally simpler two-generation,

102
The Society and Its Environment

nuclear families. Another closely related trend is the movement

toward equality in family relations and the resulting improvement

in the status of women. Thirdly, there is a movement away from

lineage- and neighborhood-based social relations toward functionally

based relations. People in the cities no longer work among their

relatives or neighbors in the fields or on fishing boats, but among

unrelated people in factories, shops, and offices. Finally, there is an increasing tendency for an individual's location and personal

associations to be transitory and temporary rather than permanent

and lifelong, although the importance of school ties is pivotal. There

is greater physical mobility as improved transportation facilities,

superhighways, and rapid express trains make it possible to travel

between cities in a few hours. Subsidiary transportation networks

have broken down barriers between once-isolated villages and the

urban areas (see Transportation and Telecommunications, ch. 3). Mobility in human relations also is becoming more apparent as people change their residences more frequently, often because of

employment, and an increasing proportion of the urban population lives in large, impersonal apartment complexes.

Matchmaking was a big business in Seoul and other cities in con- temporary society; coffee shops and lounges often were crowded on weekends. In a change from traditional society, prospective

brides and grooms held scores of interviews, sonpogi, before deciding on the companion they would like to date-for-marriage. Many of

these young men and women changed their minds after these dates,

and the process began again. Yonae, or "love match" marriages,

occurred with increasing frequency.

Contrary to the Confucian ideal, the nuclear family consisting

of a husband, wife, and children is becoming predominant in con- temporary South Korea. It differs from the traditional "branch

family," or "little house" (chagunjip), for two reasons: the conjugal relationship between husband and wife tends to take precedence over the relationship between the son and his parents, and the

nuclear family unit is becoming increasingly independent, both eco- nomically and psychologically, of larger kinship groups. These

developments have led to greater equality among the family units

established by the eldest and younger sons. Whereas the isolated

nuclear family was perceived in the past as a sign of poverty and

misfortune, the contemporary nuclear family is often viewed as the

result of a conscious choice made by those who do not wish their

privacy invaded by intrusive relatives. Economic relations between the generations of a single family

changed radically in the transition from traditional rural to modern

urban society. In the past, the male head of the patrilineal family

103
South Korea: A Country Study

controlled all the property, usually in the form of land, and was

generally the sole provider of economic support. With the development of modern industry and services, however, each adult generation and nuclear family unit has become more or less economically independent, although sons might depend upon their parents or even their wife's parents for occasional economic assistance

for example, in purchasing a house. Because urban families usually

live apart from their paternal in-laws, even when the householder

is the eldest son, the wife no longer has to endure the domination

of her mother-in-law and sister-in-law. In many cases, the family

is closer to the wife's parents than to the husband's. The modern

husband and wife often are closer emotionally than in the old family system. They spend more time together and even go out socially, a formerly unheard-of practice. Yet the expectation still remains that elderly parents will live with one of their children,

preferably a son, rather than on their own or in nursing homes.

This expectation could change in the last decade of the century,

however, with the expansion of health care and social welfare facilities. Outside the nuclear family, blood relationships still are important, particularly among close relatives, such as members of the same tangnae, or mourning group. Relations with more distant relatives, such as members of the same lineage, tend to be weak, especially if the lineage has its roots in a distant rural village, as most

do. Ancestor rites are practiced in urban homes, although for fewer generations than formerly: the majority of urban dwellers seem

to conduct rites only in honor of the father and mother of the family head. As a result, there are far fewer ancestors to venerate and

far fewer occasions on which to hold the household ceremonies.

In some ways, however, increased geographical mobility has helped

to preserve family solidarity. In the late 1980s, during New Year's,

Hansik (Cold Food Day in mid-April), and Ch'usok (the Autumn

Harvest Festival in mid-September), the airplanes, trains, and highways were jammed with people traveling to visit both living rela- tives and grave sites in their ancestral communities.

Changing Role of Women

During the Koryo and early Choson Dynasties, it was customary

for the married couple to live in the wife's parents' household. This

arrangement suggests that the status of women was then higher

than it was later during most of the Choson Dynasty. NeoConfucian orthodoxy dictated that the woman, separated from her

parents, had a primary duty of providing a male heir for her husband's family. According to Confucian custom, once married, a

104
The Society and Its Environment

woman had to leave her parents' household permanently and then

occupy the lowest position in her husband's family. She was often

abused and mistreated by both her mother-in-law and sisters-in- law—at least until the birth of a son gave her some status in her

husband's family. The relationship between wife and husband was

often, if not usually, distant, aptiy described by the Korean proverb:

"By day, like seeing a stranger; by night, like seeing a lover." Choson Dynasty law prohibited widows from remarrying, although a

similar prohibition was not extended to widowers. Further, the sons and grandsons of widows who defied the ban, like children of secondary wives, were not allowed to take the civil service examinations

and become scholar-officials. The duty of a woman to her husband, or rather to her husband's

family, was absolute and unquestionable. In the traditional society,

only men could obtain a divorce. A husband could divorce his spouse

if she were barren—barrenness being defined simply as the inabili- ty to bear sons. Even if a husband did not divorce his wife, he had

the right to take a second wife, although the preferred solution for a man without a son during the Choson Dynasty was to adopt a son of one of his brothers, if available. The incompatibility

of a wife and her in-laws was also grounds for divorce.

In contemporary society, both men and women have the right

to obtain a divorce. Social and economic discrimination, however,

makes the lot of divorced women more difficult. The husband may

still demand custody of the children, although a revision of the Family

Law in 1977 made it more difficult for him to coerce or to deceive

his wife into agreeing to an unfair settlement. The rate of divorce

in South Korea is increasing rapidly. In 1975 the number of divorces was 17,000. In the mid-1980s, the annual number of divorces was

between 23,000 and 26,000, and in 1987 there were 45,000 divorces.

The tradition of total female submission persisted in Korean vil- lages until relatively recent times. One Korean scholar who came

from the conservative Ch'ungch'ong region south of Seoul recalled

that when a high school friend died of sickness during the 1940s,

his young bride committed suicide. Her act was commemorated in her own and the surrounding communities as an outstanding ex- ample of devotion to duty.

Traditionally, men and women were strictiy segregated, both in- side and outside the house. Yangban women spent most of their lives in seclusion in the women's chamber. It is said that the traditional

pastime of nolttwigi, a game of jumping up and down on a seesawlike contraption, originated among bored women who wanted to peek over the high walls of their family compounds to see

105
South Korea: A Country Study

what the outside world was like. Economic necessity gave women

of the lower classes some freedom as they participated in farm work

and sometimes earned supplemental income through making and

selling things.

A small minority of women played an active role in society and

even wielded political influence. These people included female sha- mans (mudang), who were called upon to cure illnesses, tell fortunes, or in other ways enlist the help of spirits in realizing the wishes

of their clients. Despite its sponsorship of neo-Confucianism, the

Ghoson Dynasty had an office of shamanism, and female shamans

often were quite influential in the royal palace. The female physicians who treated female patients (because male physicians were

forbidden to examine them) constituted another important group

of women. Sometimes they acted as spies or policewomen because

they could get into the female quarters of a house. Still another

group of women were the kisaeng. Some kisaeng, or entertainers, were merely prostitutes; but others, like their Japanese counterparts the geisha, were talented musicians, dancers, painters, and

poets and interacted on nearly equal terms with their male patrons.

The kisaeng tradition perpetuated one of the more dubious legacies

of the Confucian past: an extreme double standard concerning the

sexual behavior of married men and women that still persists. In

the cities, however, many middle class women have begun to break

with these traditions.

An interesting regional variation on traditional female roles con- tinued in the late 1980s. In the coastal villages of Cheju Island,

women divers swam in search of seaweed, oysters, and other marine products and were economically self-sufficient. Often they

provided the main economic support for the family while the husband did subsidiary work—took care of the children and did household chores—in sharp contrast to the Confucian norm. The number

of women divers was dwindling, however, and men were increasingly performing jobs in service industries. Confucian ancestor worship was rarely practiced; female-centered shamanistic rites,

however, were widespread.

The factories of South Korea employ hundreds of thousands of

young women on shop floors and assembly lines making, among

other things, textiles and clothes, shoes, and electronic components.

South Korea's economic success was bought in large measure with

the sweat of these generally overworked and poorly paid female

laborers. In the offices of banks and other service enterprises, young

women working as clerks and secretaries are indispensable. Unlike their sisters on Cheju Island, however, the majority of these

women work only until marriage.

106
The Society and Its Environment

Although increasing numbers of women work outside the home,

the dominant conception, particularly for the college-educated middle class, is that the husband is the "outside person," the one whose

employment provides the main source of economic support; the

wife is the "inside person," whose chief responsibility is maintenance of the household, Women tend to leave the labor force when

they get married. Many women manage the family finances, and

a large number join kye, informal private short-term credit associations that give them access to funds that might not be obtainable

from a conventional bank. Probably the most important responsibility of married women is the management of their children's

education.

On the surface, Korean women often appear docile, submissive,

and deferential to the wishes of their husbands and in-laws. Yet

behind the scenes, there is often considerable "hidden" female power, particularly within the private sphere of the household. In areas such as household finances, South Korean husbands usually defer

to their wives' judgment. Public assertion of a woman's power,

however, is socially disapproved, and a traditional wife maintained

the image, if not the reality of submissiveness. And, as in other

male-dominated societies, Korean men often jokingly complain that

they are henpecked.

In traditional Korean society, women received little formal education. Christian missionaries began establishing schools for girls

during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ehwa

Woman's University, the most prestigious women's institution,

began as a primary school established by Methodist missionaries

in 1886 and achieved university status after 1945. Chongsin Girls'

School and Paehwa Girls' School were founded in 1890 and 1898,

respectively, in Seoul. Songui Girls' School was established in 1903

in P'yongyang. By 1987 there were ten institutions of higher education for women, including universities, colleges, and junior col- leges; women accounted for approximately 28 percent of total en- rollment in higher education. There were approximately 262,500

women students in colleges and universities in 1987. However, only

about 16 percent of college and university teachers were women

in 1987.

The growing number of women receiving a college education

has meant that their sex role differs from that of their mothers and

grandmothers. Many college-educated women plan independent

careers and challenge the right of parents to choose a marriage part- ner. The often fierce battles between university students and police

during the late 1980s included female participants. A correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review quoted a male student leader

107
South Korea: A Country Study

as saying that "short girls make great demonstrators, as they're

very tough and very hard to catch.

'

' Whether politically active South

Korean university women will follow their Japanese counterparts,

who demonstrated during the 1960s and 1970s, into a world of child- raising and placid consumerism remains to be seen. The number

of employed married women, however, increased by approximately

12.6 percent annually in the years since 1977.

In 1983, 51.8 percent of women living in rural areas were employed as compared with 37.8 percent of women living in urban

areas. Most of the women working in rural areas were over the

age of thirty, as young females (and males) tended to move to, and

seek employment in, cities and industrial areas.

Official South Korean statistics indicated that 43.6 percent of

women were in the work force by 1988. Prospects for lower class women, however, were frequendy grim. In some cases, they were

obliged to become part of the "entertainment industry" in order

to survive economically. According to one estimate, brothels, bars,

massage parlors, discos, and what are known as "Taiwan style"

barbershops (that is, those often employing a greater number of masseuses than barbers) employed as many as 1 million women,

though not all were prostitutes. This underworld of abuse, exploitation, and bitter shame had begun to be criticized and exposed

by women's activists. Cultural Identity

South Korea's homogeneous population shares a common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic heritage. National self-image is, on one

level, unambiguously defined by the convergence of territorial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identities (see Population, this ch.). Yet

intense feelings of nationalism, so evident in athletic events like the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul,

revealed anxiety as well as pride concerning South Korea's place

in the world. More than Western peoples and even more than the

Japanese, South Korean individuals are inclined to view themselves

as a tightly knit national community with a common destiny. In

a rapidly changing world, however, it is often difficult for them

to define exactly what being a South Korean is. To outsiders, the

intense concern with identity is perhaps difficult to understand;

it reflects a history of subordinate relations to powerful foreign states and the tragedy of national division after World War II. Many modernized, urban-dwelling South Koreans embark on a

search for the "essence" of their culture, which commonly expresses

itself as hostility to foreign influences. For example, the poet Kim

Chi-ha, whose opposition to the Park regime in the 1970s was a

108
The Society and Its Environment

model for a younger generation of dissidents, attacked the government as much for its neglect of traditional values as for its antidemocratic tendencies.

Seoul has not been slow to employ traditionalism for its own ends.

In 1987 the government adopted guidelines for the revision of his- tory textbooks, instructing publishers to describe the foundation

of the Korean nation by Tan'gun in 2333 B.C. as "a reflection

of historical facts" rather than simply a myth. The legendary Tangun was, according to the myth, the son of god and a bear-woman.

According to a Far Eastern Economic Review commentator, "... people ranging from reputable university scholars to chauvinist mystics regard Tan'gun as the personification of ethics and values that

emphasize a native Korean identity against the foreign religions

and philosophies of Buddhism, neo-Confucianism, Christianity and

Marxism that have otherwise dominated Korean history and

thought. ' ' Tan'gun's legendary kingdom is older than China's first legendary dynasty, the Xia (2205-1766 B.C.), and its antiquity

asserts Korea's cultural autonomy in relation to its largest neighbor. There have been proposals that the government subsidize the

rites of the numerically small community of believers in Taejonggyo and other cults that worship Tan'gun.

Problems of cultural identity are closely connected to the tragedy of Korea's division into two hostile states. Many members of

the younger generation of South Koreans born after the Korean

War fervently embrace the cause of t'ongil, or reunification, and

believe that it is the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet

Union, who are to blame for Korea's national division. The South

Korean government's dependence on the United States has been

cited as one of the principal reasons for the lack of improvement

in north-south ties. While a majority of South Koreans remain sus- picious of the North Koreans, many South Koreans also share the

sentiments expressed by Kim Chi-ha: "Our name is division, and

this soiled name, like an immovable destiny, oppresses all of us."

When parts of the wall dividing East Berlin and West Berlin were knocked down in November 1989, Koreans reflected sadly that

breaching the DMZ would not be such a simple task. Korea and Japan

National or ethnic groups often need an "other," a group of

outsiders against whom they can define themselves. While Western

countries with their individualistic and, from a Confucian perspective, self-centered ways of life provide important images of "otherness" for South Koreans, the principal source of such images for

many years has been Japan. Attitudes toward Japan as an "other"

109
South Korea: A Country Study

are complex. On the most basic level, there is hostility fed by

memories of invasion and colonial oppression, present-day economic

frictions, and the Japanese government's inability or unwilling- ness to do anything about discriminatory treatment of the large

Korean minority in Japan. The two countries have a long history

of hostility. Admiral Yi Sun-sin, whose armor-plated boats eventually defeated the Japanese navy's damaging attacks in the 1590s,

is South Korea's most revered national hero.

The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture's

adoption in the 1980s of revised textbook guidelines, softening the

language used to describe Japan's aggression during World War

II, inspired outrage in South Korea as well as in other Asian countries. The textbook controversy was a major impetus for a national campaign to build an Independence Hall, located about 100

kilometers south of Seoul, to keep alive memories of Japanese

colonial exploitation. Opened on August 15, 1987, the anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan, the building houses grim

exhibits depicting the atrocities of the Japanese military against

Korean nationalists during the colonial period.

During the colonial period, and particularly during World War

II, the Japanese initiated assimilation policies designed to turn

Koreans into obedient subjects of the Japanese emperor. Under

the slogan "Nissen ittai" (Japan and Korea as One), newspapers

and magazines published in the Korean language were closed, the

Korean Language Society was disbanded, and Korean writers were

forced to publish only in Japanese. Students who spoke Korean

in school were punished. There was pressure to speak Japanese

at home, adopt Japanese family and given names, and worship at Shinto shrines, the religious basis for which had been transplanted from the home islands. Korean Christians who refused to show

reverence to the emperor as a divinity were imprisoned or ostracized. In the words of historian Ki-baik Lee (called Yi Ki-baek in

Korean), ''Japan's aim was to eradicate consciousness of Korean

national identity, roots and all, and thus to obliterate the very existence of the Korean people from the face of the earth."

This shared historical experience has provoked not only hostili- ty but also a desire to purge Korean culture of lingering Japanese

influences. In the late 1980s, the government continued to prohibit the distribution of Japanese-made movies and popular music within the country in order to prevent unwanted contemporary

influences from crossing the Korea Strait. On a more polite level, depiction of Japan as the "other" in- volves contrasting the "essences" of the two countries' cultures.

This process has spawned a popular literature that compares, among

110
The Society and Its Environment

other things, the naturalness and "resonance" of Korean art and

music and the alleged imitativeness and constriction of their

Japanese counterparts; the "individualism" (of a non-Western sort)

of Koreans and the "collectivism" or group consciousness of the

Japanese; and the lyric contrast between the rose of Sharon, Korea's

national flower, which blooms robustly all summer long, and the

Japanese cherry blossom, which has the "beauty of frailty" in

springtime.

The search for a cultural "essence" involves serious contradictions. The literature of Korean cultural distinction is strikingly similar to Japanese attempts to prove the "uniqueness" of their own

cultural heritage, although "proof ofJapan's uniqueness is usually

drawn from examples of Western countries (the significant "other"

for modernized Japanese). Ironically, official and unofficial sponsorship of the Tan'gun myth, although a minor theme, bears an uncanny resemblance to pre-World War II Japanese policies

promoting historical interpretations of the nation's founding based on Shinto mythology.

Mixed in with feelings of hostility and competition, however,

is genuine admiration for Japanese economic, technological, and

social achievements. Japan has become an important market for South Korean manufactured products. Both countries have been

targets of criticism by Western governments accusing them of unfair trading practices. Friendly interest in South Korea is growing

among the Japanese public despite old prejudices, and large numbers of young Japanese and South Koreans visit each others' countries on school and college excursions. Like South Koreans,

Japanese liberals have been disturbed by official attempts to re- vise wartime history.

The Korean Language

Modern Korean language is descended from the language of the

Silla Kingdom, which unified the peninsula in the seventh century. As Korean linguist Yi Ki-mun notes, the more remote origins

of the Korean language are disputed, although many Korean lin- guists, together with a few western scholars, continue to favor the

now widely-contested nineteenth-century theory of an Altaic family of languages supposed to include Korean, Japanese, and Mongolian, among other languages. Although a historical relationship

between Korean and Japanese has not been established, modern

Korean and Japanese have many similar grammatical features, no

doubt in part because of close contacts between the two during the

past century. These similarities have given rise to considerable

speculation in the popular press. The linguist Kim Chin-wu, for

111
South Korea: A Country Study

example, has hypothesized that Korea and Japan stood at the end

of two routes of large-scale migration in ancient times: a northern

route from Inner Asia and a southern route from southern China

or Southeast Asia. In a variant on the "southern origins" theory

of some Japanese scholars, he views the two languages as reflect- ing disparate "northern' ' and "southern" influences, with Korean

showing more influence from the northern, Inner Asian strain. Both Korean and Japanese possess what is sometimes called "polite" or "honorific" language, the use of different levels of speech

in addressing persons of superior, inferior, or equal rank. These

distinctions depend both on the use of different vocabulary and

upon basic structural differences in the words employed. For ex- ample, in Korean the imperative "go" can be rendered kara when

speaking to an inferior or a child, kage when speaking to an adult

inferior, kaseyo when speaking to a superior, and kasipsio when speaking to a person of still higher rank. The proper use of polite language, or levels of polite speech, is an extremely complex and subde

matter. The Korean language, like Japanese, is extremely sensitive to the nuances of hierarchical human relationships. Two per- sons who meet for the first time are expected to use the more distant or formal terms, but they will shift to more informal or "equal"

terms if they become friends. Younger people invariably use for- mal language in addressing elders; the latter will use "inferior"

terms in "talking down" to those who are younger.

The Korean language may be written using a mixture of Chinese

ideograms (hancha) and a native Korean alphabet known as han 'gul, or in han 'gul alone, much as in a more limited way Indo-European

languages sometimes write numbers using Arabic symbols and at other times spell numbers out in their own alphabets or in some

combination of the two forms. Han'gul was invented by scholars

at the court of King Sejong (1418-50), not solely to promote liter- acy among the common people as is sometimes claimed, but also, as Professor Gari K. Ledyard has noted, to assist in studies of

Chinese historical phonology. According to a perhaps apocryphal

decree of the king, an intelligent man could learn han 'gul in a morning' s time, and even a fool could master it in ten days. As a result,

it was scorned by scholars and relegated to women and merchants.

The script, which in its modern form contains forty symbols, is considered by linguists to be one of the most scientific ever devised;

it reflects quite consistently the phonemes of the spoken Korean

language.

Because of its greater variety of sounds, Korean does not have the

problem of the Japanese written language, which some experts have

argued needs to retain a sizable inventory of Chinese characters

112
The Society and Its Environment

to distinguish a large number of potentially ambiguous homophones. Since 1948 the continued use of Chinese characters in South

Korea has been criticized by linguistic nationalists and some educators and defended by cultural conservatives, who fear that the

loss of character literacy could cut younger generations off from

a major part of their cultural heritage. Since the early 1970s, Seoul's

policy governing the teaching and use of Chinese characters has

shifted several times, although the trend clearly has been toward

writing in han'gul alone. By early 1990, all but academic writing

used far fewer Chinese characters than was the case in the 1960s.

In 1989 the Korean Language and Education Research Association, citing the need for Chinese character literacy "at a time when

the nation is entering into keen competition with Japan and China"

and noting that Japanese educators were increasing the number

of Chinese characters taught in elementary schools, recommended

to the Ministry of Education that instruction in Chinese characters be reintroduced at the primary-school level. Although the Korean and Chinese languages are not related in

terms of grammatical structure, more than 50 percent of all Korean

vocabulary is derived from Chinese loanwords, a reflection of the

cultural dominance of China over 2 millennia. In many cases there are two words—a Chinese loanword and an indigenous Korean

word—meaning the same thing. The Chinese-based word in

Korean sometimes has a bookish or formal flavor. Koreans select one or the other variant to achieve the proper register in speech, or in writing, and to make subtle distinctions of meaning in accor- dance with established usage.

Large numbers of Chinese character compounds coined in Japan

in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries to translate modern Western

scientific, technical, and political vocabulary came into use in Korea

during the colonial period. Post- 1945 United States influence has

been reflected in a number of English words that have been absorbed into Korean.

Unlike Chinese, Korean does not encompass dialects that are mutually unintelligible, with the possible exception of the variant

spoken on Cheju Island. There are, however, regional variations

both in vocabulary and pronunciation, the range being comparable to the differences that might be found between Maine and Alabama in the United States. Despite several decades of universal

education, similar variations also have been heard between highly

educated and professional speakers and Koreans of working class or rural backgrounds. Standard Korean is derived from the language

spoken in and around Seoul. More than forty years of division has

113
South Korea: A Country Study

meant that there are also some divergences in the development of

the Korean language north and south of the DMZ.

Education

Like other East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage, South

Korea has had a long history of providing formal education.

Although there was no state- supported system of primary education, the central government established a system of secondary

schools in Seoul and the provinces during the Choson Dynasty.

State schools suffered a decline in quality, however, and came to be supplanted in importance by the sowon, private academies that were the centers of a neo-Confucian revival in the sixteenth century. Students at both private and state-supported secondary schools were exempt from military service and had much the same social

prestige as university students enjoy today in South Korea. Like

modern students, they were frequently involved in politics. Higher

education was provided by the Confucian national university in

the capital, the Songgyungwan. Its enrollment was limited to 200

students who had passed the lower civil service examinations and

were preparing for the higher examinations.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modern

private schools were established both by Koreans and by foreign

Christian missionaries. The latter were particularly important be- cause they promoted the education of women and the diffusion of

Western social and political ideas. Japanese educational policy af- ter 1910 was designed to turn Koreans into obedient colonial subjects and to teach them limited technical skills. A state university

modeled on Tokyo Imperial University was established in Seoul

in 1923, but the number of Koreans allowed to study there never exceeded 40 percent of its enrollment; 60 percent of its students were Japanese expatriates.

When United States military forces occupied the southern half

of the Korean Peninsula in 1 945 , they established a school system

based on the American model: six years of primary school, six years

of secondary school (divided into junior and senior levels), and four

years of higher education. Other occupation period reforms included

coeducation at all levels, popularly elected school boards in local

areas, and compulsory education up to the ninth grade. The government of Syngman Rhee reversed many of these reforms after 1948:

in most cases only primary schools remained coeducational and

education was compulsory only up to the sixth grade because of a lack of resources. The school system in 1990, however, reflects the system established under the United States occupation.

114
The Society and Its Environment

During the years when Rhee and Park Chung Hee were in power, the control of education was gradually taken out of the hands

of local school boards and concentrated in a centralized Ministry

of Education. In the late 1980s, the ministry was responsible for administration of schools, allocation of resources, setting of enroll- ment quotas, certification of schools and teachers, curriculum development (including the issuance of textbook guidelines), and other

basic policy decisions. Provincial and special city boards of education still existed. Although each board was composed of seven members who were supposed to be selected by popularly elected

legislative bodies, this arrangement ceased to function after 1973.

Subsequently, school board members were approved by the minister

of education.

Most observers agree that South Korea's spectacular progress

in modernization and economic growth since the Korean War is largely attributable to the willingness of individuals to invest a large

amount of resources in education: the improvement of "human

capital." The traditional esteem for the educated man, originally

confined to the Confucian scholar as a cultured generalist, now

extends to scientists, technicians, and others working with specialized knowledge. Highly educated technocrats and economic plan- ners could claim much of the credit for their country's economic

successes since the 1960s. Scientific professions were generally

regarded as the most prestigious by South Koreans in the 1980s.

Statistics demonstrate the success of South Korea's national education programs. In 1945 the adult literacy rate was estimated at 22 percent; by 1970 adult literacy was 87.6 percent, and by the

late 1980s various sources estimated it at around 93 percent. South

Korean students have performed exceedingly well in international competitions in mathematics and science. Although only primary

school (grades one through six) was compulsory, percentages of

age-groups of children and young people enrolled in primary, secondary, and tertiary level schools were equivalent to those found in

industrialized countries, including Japan. Approximately 4.8 million students in the eligible age-group were attending primary school

in 1985. The percentage of students going on to optional middle

school the same year was more than 99 percent. Approximately

34 percent, one of the world's highest rates of secondary-school

graduates, attended institutions of higher education in 1987, a rate similar to Japan's (about 30 percent) and exceeding Britain's (20

percent).

Government expenditure on education has been generous. In

1975 it was W220 billion (for value of the won—see Glossary), the

equivalent of 2.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see

115
South Korea: A Country Study

Glossary), or 13.9 percent of total government expenditures. By

1986 education expenditure had reached won 3.76 trillion, or 4.5

percent of the GNP, and 27.3 percent of government budget

allocations.

Social emphasis on education was not, however, without its problems, as it tended to accentuate class differences. In the late 1980s, possession of a college degree was considered necessary for

entering the middle class; there were no alternative pathways of

social advancement, with the possible exception of a military career. People without a college education, including skilled workers with

vocational school backgrounds, often were treated as second-class

citizens by their white-collar, college-educated managers, despite

the importance of their skills for economic development. Intense competition for places at the most prestigious universities—the sole gateway into elite circles—promoted, like the old Confucian sys- tem, a sterile emphasis on rote memorization in order to pass sec- ondary school and college entrance examinations. Particularly after a dramatic expansion of college enrollments in the early 1980s,

South Korea faced the problem of what to do about a large number of young people kept in school for a long time, usually at great

sacrifice to themselves and their families, and then faced with limited

job opportunities because their skills were not marketable.

Primary and Secondary Schools

In the late 1980s, primary schools were coeducational, although

coeducation was quite rare at the middle-school and high-school

levels. Enrollment figures for 1987 on the primary-school level were

4,771,722 pupils in 6,531 schools, with 130,142 teachers. A decline

from the 1980 figure of 5,658,002 pupils was caused by population trends. Some 54 percent of primary school teachers were male.

In 1987 there were approximately 4,895,354 students enrolled

in middle schools and high schools, with approximately 150,873

teachers. About 69 percent of these teachers were male. The

secondary-school enrollment figure also reflected changing population trends; there were 3,959,975 students in secondary schools

in 1979. Given the importance of entry into higher education, the

majority of students attended general or academic high schools in

1987: 1 ,397,359 students, or 60 percent of the total, attended general or academic high schools, as compared with 840,265 students in

vocational secondary schools. Vocational schools specialized in a number of fields: primarily agriculture, fishery, commerce, trades,

merchant marine, engineering, and the arts. Enrollment in kindergartens or preschools expanded impressively

during the 1980s. In 1980 there were 66,433 children attending

116
The Society and Its Environment

901 kindergartens or preschools. By 1987 there were 397,020 chil- dren in 7,792 institutions. The number of kindergarten and

preschool teachers rose from 3,339 to 1 1 ,920 during the same period. The overwhelming majority of these teachers—approximately

92 percent—were women. This growth was attributable to several

factors: Ministry of Education encouragement of preschool education, the greater number of women entering the work force,

growth in the number of nuclear families without a grandparent

available to take care of children, and the feeling that kindergarten might give children an

4 'edge" in later educational competition. Kindergartens often paid homage to the expectations of parents

with impressive graduation ceremonies, complete with diplomas,

academic caps, and gowns.

Competitive entrance examinations at the middle-school level were abolished in 1968. Although as of the late 1980s, students

still had to pass noncompetitive qualifying examinations, they were

assigned to secondary institutions by lottery, or else by location

within the boundary of the school district. Secondary schools, for- merly ranked according to the quality of their students, have been

equalized, with a portion of good, mediocre, and poor students

being assigned to each one. The reform, however, did not equalize secondary schools completely. In Seoul, students who performed

well in qualifying examinations were allowed to attend better quality

schools in a "common" district, whereas other students attended

schools in one of five geographical districts. The reforms applied

equally to public and private schools, both of whose enrollments were strictly controlled by the Ministry of Education.

Although primary- and secondary-school teachers traditionally

enjoyed high status, they often were overworked and underpaid

during the late 1980s. Salaries were less than those for many other

white-collar professions and even some blue-collar jobs. High school

teachers, particularly those in the cities, did however, receive siz- able gifts from parents seeking attention for their children, but teaching hours were long and classes crowded (the average class contained

around fifty to sixty students).

In May 1989, teachers established an independent union, the

National Teachers Union (NTU—Chon'gyojo). Their aims included improving working conditions and reforming a school system

that they regarded as overly controlled by the Ministry of Education. Although the government promised large increases in allo- cations for teachers' salaries and facilities, it refused to give the

union legal status. Because teachers were civil servants, the government claimed they did not have the right to strike and, even if they

did have the right to strike, unionization would undermine the status

117
South Korea: A Country Study

of teachers as "role models" for young Koreans. The government

also accused the union of spreading subversive, leftist propaganda

that was sympathetic to the communist regime in North Korea.

According to a report in the Asian Wall Street Journal, the union

claimed support from 82 percent of all teachers. The controversy was viewed as representing a major crisis for South Korean education because a large number of teachers (1,500 by November

1989) had been dismissed; violence among union supporters, opponents, and police had occurred at several locations; and class disruptions had caused anxieties for families of students preparing

for the college entrance examinations. The union's challenge to the Ministry of Education's control of the system and the charges

of subversion had made compromise seem a very remote possibility at the start of 1990.

Higher Education

In the late 1980s, the university a South Korean high school

graduate attended was perhaps the single most important factor

in determining his or her life chances. Thus, entrance into a prestigious institution was the focus of intense energy, dedication, and

self-sacrifice. Prestigious institutions included the state-run Seoul

National University, originally established by the Japanese as Seoul

Imperial University in 1923, and a handful of private institutions

such as Yonse University, Koryo University, and Ehwa Woman's

University.

Because college entrance depends upon ranking high in objectively graded examinations, high school students face an "examination hell," a harsh regimen of endless cramming and rote memorization of facts that is probably even more severe than the one faced by their counterparts in Japan. Unlike the Confucian

civil service examinations of the Choson Dynasty, their modern

reincarnation is a matter of importance not for an elite, but for the substantial portion of the population with middle-class aspirations. In the late 1980s, over one-third of college-age men and women (35.2 percent in 1989) succeeded in entering and attending

institutions of higher education; those who failed faced dramatically reduced prospects for social and economic advancement.

The number of students in higher education had risen from

100,000 in 1960 to 1 .3 million in 1987, and the proportion of collegeage students in higher-education institutions was second only to the United States. The institutions of higher education included

regular four-year colleges and universities, two-year junior vocational colleges, four-year teachers' colleges, and graduate schools.

The main drawback was that college graduates wanted careers that

118
University chemistry laboratory

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington

would bring them positions of leadership in society, but there simply were not enough positions to accommodate all graduates each

year and many graduates were forced to accept lesser positions.

Ambitious women, especially, were frustrated by traditional barriers of sex discrimination as well as by the lack of positions.

A college-bound high school student, in the late 1980s, typically rose at dawn, did a bit of studying before school began at 7:30

or 8:00 A.M., attended school until 5:00 P.M., had a quick dinner

(often away from home), and then attended evening cramming

classes that could last until 10:00 or 11:00 P.M. Sundays and holi- days were devoted to more cramming. Because tests given in high

school (generally once every two or four weeks) were almost as important in determining college entrance as the final entrance ex- aminations, students had no opportunity to relax from the study

routine. According to one contemporary account, a student had

to memorize 60 to 100 pages of facts to do well on these periodic

tests. Family and social life generally were sacrificed to the supreme

end of getting into the best university possible.

The costs of the ' 'examination hell" have been evident not only

in a grim and joyless adolescence for many, if not most, young

South Koreans, but also in the number of suicides caused by the

constant pressure of tests. Often suicides have been top achievers

119
South Korea: A Country Study

who despaired after experiencing a slump in test performance. In

addition, the multiple choice format of periodic high school tests and university entrance examinations has left students little opportunity to develop their creative talents. A "facts only" orientation

has promoted a cramped and unspontaneous view of the world that

has tended to spill over into areas of life other than academic work.

The prospects for basic change in the system—a deemphasis on

tests—were unlikely in the late 1980s. The great virtue of facts- based testing is its objectivity. Although harsh, the system is believed

to be fair and impartial. The use of nonobjective criteria such as

essays, personal recommendations, and the recognition of success

in extracurricular activities or personal recommendations from

teachers and others could open up all sorts of opportunities for cor- ruption. In a society where social connections are extremely important, connections rather than merit might determine entry into a good university. Students who survive the numbing regimen of

examinations under the modern system are at least universally

acknowledged to have deserved their educational success. Top

graduates who have assumed positions of responsibility in government and business have lent, through their talents, legitimacy to the whole system.

Following the assumption of power by General Chun Doo Hwan

in 1980, the Ministry of Education implemented a number of re- forms designed to make the system fairer and to increase higher

education opportunities for the population at large. In a very popular move, the ministry dramatically increased enrollment at large.

The number of high school graduates accepted into colleges and

universities was increased from almost 403,000 students in 1980

to more than 1.4 million in 1989. This reform decreased, temporarily, the acceptance ratio from one college place for every four applicants in 1980 to one for every three applicants in 1981 . In 1980

the number of students attending all kinds of higher educational

institutions was almost 600,000; that number grew almost 100 per- cent to 1,061,403 students by 1983. By 1987 there were 1,340,381

students attending higher educational institutions. By 1987 junior

colleges had an enrollment of almost 260,000 students, and col- leges and universities had an enrollment of almost 990,000 students. Other higher education institutions enrolled the balance.

A second reform was the prohibition of private, after-school tutor- ing. Formerly, private tutors could charge exorbitant rates if they

had a good "track record" of getting students into the right schools

through intensive coaching, especially in English and in mathematics. This situation gave wealthy families an unfair advantage in

the competition. Under the new rules, students receiving tutoring

120
The Society and Its Environment

could be suspended from school and their tutors dismissed from

their jobs. There was ample evidence in the mid-1980s, however,

that the law had simply driven the private tutoring system underground and made the fees more expensive. Some underpaid teachers

and cash-starved students at prestigious institutions were willing

to run the risk of punishment in order to earn as much as W300,000

to W500,000 a month. Students and their parents took the risk

of being caught, believing that coaching in weak subject areas could

give students the edge needed to get into a better university. By

the late 1980s, however, the tutorial system seemed largely to have

disappeared.

A third reform was much less popular. The ministry established a graduation quota system, in which increased freshman enroll- ments were counterbalanced by the requirement that each fouryear college or university fail the lowest 30 percent of its students;

junior colleges were required to fail the lowest 15 percent. These

quotas were required no matter how well the lowest 30 or 15 per- cent of the students did in terms of objective standards. Ostensibly designed to ensure the quality of the increased number of college

graduates, the system also served, for a while to discourage stu- dents from devoting their time to political movements. Resentment

of the quotas was widespread, and family counterpressures were

intense. The government abolished the quotas in 1984.

College Student Activism

Student activism has a long and honorable history in Korea. Stu- dents in Choson Dynasty secondary schools often became involved

in the intense factional struggles of the scholar-official class. Students played a major role in Korea's independence movement, particularly the March 1 , 1919, country-wide demonstrations that were

harshly suppressed by the Japanese military police. Students protested against the Rhee and Park regimes during the 1950s, 1960s,

and 1970s. Observers noted, however, that while student activists in the past generally embraced liberal and democratic values, the

new generation of militants in the 1980s was far more radical. Most

participants have adopted some version of the minjung ideology that was heavily influenced by Marxism, Western "dependence theory," and Christian "liberation theology," but was also animated by strong feelings of popular nationalism and xenophobia.

The most militant university students, perhaps about 5 percent

of the total enrollment at Seoul National University and comparable numbers at other institutions in the capital during the late 1980s, were organized into small circles or cells rarely containing more

than fifty members. Police estimated that there were seventy-two

121
South Korea: A Country Study

such organizations of varying orientation (see Political Extremism

and Political Violence, ch. 4). Religion

Religious Traditions

Shamanism

Koreans, like other East Asians, have traditionally been eclectic rather than exclusive in their religious commitments. Their re- ligious outlook has not been conditioned by a single, exclusive faith but by a combination of indigenous beliefs and creeds imported

into Korea. Belief in a world inhabited by spirits is probably the

oldest form of Korean religious life, dating back to prehistoric times.

There is a rather unorganized pantheon of literally millions of gods,

spirits, and ghosts, ranging from the "god generals" who rule the

different quarters of heaven to mountain spirits (sansiri). This pantheon also includes gods who inhabit trees, sacred caves, and piles

of stones, as well as earth spirits, the tutelary gods of households

and villages, mischievous goblins, and the ghosts of persons who

in many cases met violent or tragic ends. These spirits are said

to have the power to influence or to change the fortunes of living

men and women.

Korean shamans are similar in many ways to those found in

Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. They also resemble the yuta

found on the Ryukyu Islands, in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. Cheju

Island is also a center of shamanism.

Shamans, most of whom are women, are enlisted by those who

want the help of the spirit world. Female shamans hold hut, or ser- vices, in order to gain good fortune for clients, cure illnesses by

exorcising evil spirits, or propitiate local or village gods. Such ser- vices are also held to guide the spirit of a deceased person to heaven.

Often a woman will become a shaman very reluctantly—after experiencing a severe physical or mental illness that indicates "possession" by a spirit. Such possession allegedly can be cured only

through performance of a hut. Once a shaman is established in her

profession, she usually can make a good living.

Many scholars regard Korean shamanism as less a religion than

a "medicine" in which the spirits are manipulated in order to achieve human ends. There is no notion of salvation or moral and

spiritual perfection, at least for the ordinary believers in spirits.

The shaman is a professional who is consulted by clients whenever

the need is felt. Traditionally, shamans had low social status and

were members of the ch'dmmin class. This discrimination has con- tinued into modern times.

122
The Society and Its Environment

Animistic beliefs are strongly associated with the culture of fish- ing villages and are primarily a phenomenon found in rural communities. Shamans also treat the ills of city people, however,

especially recent migrants from the countryside who find adjustment to an impersonal urban life stressful. The government has

discouraged belief in shamanism as superstition and for many years

minimized its persistence in Korean life. Yet in a climate of growing nationalism and cultural self-confidence, the dances, songs, and

incantations that compose the hut have come to be recognized as an important aspect of Korean culture. Beginning in the 1970s,

rituals that formerly had been kept out of foreign view began to resurface, and occasionally a Western hotel manager or other executive could even be seen attending a shamanistic exorcism ritual in

the course of opening a new branch in Seoul. Some of these aspects

of hut have been designated valuable cultural properties that should

be preserved and passed on to future generations.

The future of shamanism itself was uncertain in the late 1980s.

Observers believed that many of its functions in the future probably will be performed by the psychiatric profession as the government expands mental health treatment facilities. Given the

uncertainty of social, economic, and political conditions, however,

it appears certain that shamans will find large numbers of clients for some time to come. Taoism and Buddhism

Taoism, which focuses on the individual in nature rather than

the individual in society, and Buddhism entered Korea from Chi- na during the Three Kingdoms period (fourth to seventh centuries A.D.). Taoist motifs are seen in the paintings on the walls of

Koguryo tombs. Buddhism was the dominant religious and cul- tural influence during the Silla (A.D. 668-935) and Koryo

(918-1392) dynasties. Confucianism also was brought to Korea from

China in early centuries, but it occupied a subordinate position

until the establishment of the Choson Dynasty and the persecution of Buddhism carried out by the early Choson Dynasty kings

(see Social Structures and Values, this ch.).

Christianity

Roman Catholic missionaries did not arrive in Korea until 1794, a decade after the return of the first baptized Korean from a visit to Beijing. However, the writings of the Jesuit missionary, Matteo Ricci, who was resident at the imperial court in Beijing, had

been brought to Korea from China in the seventeenth century. It appears that scholars of the Sirhak, or practical learning, school

123
South Korea: A Country Study

were interested in these writings. Largely because converts refused

to perform Confucian ancestor rites, the government prohibited

the proselytization of Christianity. Some Catholics were executed

during the early nineteenth century, but the anti-Christian law was

not stricdy enforced. By the 1860s, there were some 17,500 Roman

Catholics in the country. There followed a more rigorous persecution, in which thousands of Christians died, that continued until

1884. Protestant missionaries entered Korea during the 1880s and,

along with Catholic priests, converted a remarkable number of

Koreans. Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries were especially

successful. They established schools, universities, hospitals, and

orphanages and played a significant role in the modernization of

the country. During the Japanese colonial occupation, Christians were in the front ranks of the struggle for independence. Factors contributing to the growth of Protestantism included the degenerate state of Korean Buddhism, the efforts made by educated Christians to reconcile Christian and Confucian values (the latter being

viewed as purely a social ethic rather than a religion), the encouragement of self-support and self-government among members of the

Korean church, and the identification of Christianity with Korean

nationalism.

A large number of Christians lived in the northern part of the

peninsula where Confucian influence was not as strong as in the

south. Before 1948 P'yongyang was an important Christian center: one-sixth of its population of about 300,000 people were converts. Following the establishment of a communist regime in the north,

however, most Christians had to flee to South Korea or face persecution.

New Religions

Ch'ondogyo, generally regarded as the first of Korea's "new

religions," is another important religious tradition. It is a synthesis of Confucian, Buddhist, shamanistic, Taoist, and Catholic in- fluences. Ch'ondogyo grew out of the Tonghak Movement (also

called Eastern Learning Movement) established by Ch'oe Che-u,

a man ofyangban background who claimed to have experienced a

mystic encounter with God, who told him to preach to all the world.

Ch'oe was executed by the government as a heretic in 1863, but

not before he had acquired a number of followers and had committed his ideas to writing. Tonghak spread among the poor people of Korea's villages, especially in the Cholla region, and was

the cause of a revolt against the royal government in 1894. While some members of the Tonghak Movement—renamed Ch'ondogyo

124
Eighth-century granite Buddha, Sokkuram Grotto, near Kyongju

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington

125
South Korea: A Country Study

(Teachings of the Heavenly Way)—supported the Japanese annexation in 1910, others opposed it. This group played a major role,

along with Christians and some Confucians, in the Korean nationalist movement. In the 1920s, Ch'ondogyo sponsored Kaebyok (Creation), one of Korea's major intellectual journals during the colonial

period (see The Media, ch. 4).

Ch'ondogyo' s basic beliefs include the essential equality of all human beings. Each person must be treated with respect because

all persons "contain divinity;" there is "God in man." Moreover,

men and women must sincerely cultivate themselves in order to bring forth and express this divinity in their lives. Self-perfection,

not ritual and ceremony, is the way to salvation. Although Ch'oe

and his followers did not attempt to overthrow the social order and

establish a radical egalitarianism, the revolutionary potential of

Ch'ondogyo is evident in these basic ideas, which appealed especially to poor people who were told that they, along with scholars

and high officials, could achieve salvation through effort. There

is reason to believe that Ch'ondogyo had an important role in the

development of democratic and anti-authoritarian thought in Korea.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Ch'ondogyo' s antecedent, the Tonghak

Movement, received renewed interest among many Korean in- tellectuals. Apart from Ch'ondogyo, major new religions included Taejonggyo, which has as its central creed the worship of Tan' gun, legendary founder of the Korean nation. Chungsanggyo, founded in the

early twentieth century, emphasizes magical practices and the cre- ation of a paradise on earth. It is divided into a great number of

competing branches. Wonbulgyo, or Won Buddhism, attempts to combine traditional Buddhist doctrine with a modern concern for

social reform and revitalization. There are also a number of small

sects which have sprung up around Mount Kyeryong in South

Ch'ungch'ong Province, the supposed future site of the founding

of a new dynasty originally prophesied in the eighteenth century.

Several new religions derive their inspiration from Christianity.

The Chondogwan, or Evangelical Church, was founded by Pak

T'ae-son. Pak originally was a Presbyterian, but was expelled from

the church for heresy in the 1950s after claiming for himself unique

spiritual power. By 1972 his followers numbered as many as 700,000

people, and he built several "Christian towns," established a large

church network, and managed several industrial enterprises.

Because of its overseas evangelism, the Hold Spirit Association

for the Unification of the World Christianity, or Unification Church

(T'ongilgyo), founded in 1954 by Reverend Sun Myong Moon

(Mun Son-myong), also a former Christian, is the most famous

126
The Society and Its Environment

Korean new religion. During its period of rigorous expansion during

the 1970s, the Unification Church had several hundred thousand

members in South Korea and Japan and a substantial (although

generally overestimated) number of members in North America

and Western Europe. Moon claimed that he was the "messiah"

designated by God to unify all the peoples of the world into one

"family," governed theocratically by himself.

Like Pak's Evangelical Church, the Unification Church has been

highly authoritarian, demanding absolute obedience from church

members. Moon, for example, has arranged marriages for his younger followers; United States television audiences were treated some

years ago to a mass ceremony at which several hundred young

"Moonies" were married. Also like Pak, Moon has coupled the

church's fortunes to economic expansion. Factories in South Korea

and abroad manufacture arms and process ginseng and seafood,

artistic bric-a-brac, and other items. Moon's labor force has worked

long hours and been paid minimal wages in order to channel profits

into church coffers. Virulently anticommunist, Moon has sought

to influence public opinion at home and abroad by establishing

generally unprofitable newspapers such as the Segye ilbo in Seoul,

the Sekai nippo in Tokyo, and the Washington Times in the United

States capital and by inviting academics to lavish international conferences, often held in South Korea. At home, the Unification

Church was viewed with suspicion by the authorities because of

its scandals and Moon's evident desire to create a "state within

a state." His influence, however, had declined by the late 1980s.

Religion in Contemporary South Korea

According to government statistics, 42.6 percent or more than

17 million of South Korea's 1985 population professed adherence

to an organized religious community. There were at least 8 million Buddhists (about 20 percent of the total population), about

6.5 million Protestants (16 percent of the population), some 1.9

million Roman Catholics (5 percent), nearly 500,000 people who

belonged to Confucian groups (1 percent), and more than 300,000

others (0.7 percent). Significantly, large metropolitan areas had

the highest proportions of people belonging to formal religious

groups: 49.9 percent in Seoul, 46.1 percent in Pusan, and 45.8

percent in Taegu. The figures for Christians revealed that South

Korea had the highest percentage of Christians of any country in

East Asia or Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Philippines.

Except for the Christian groups, which maintain a fairly clear- cut distinction between believers and nonbelievers, there is some

ambiguity in these statistics. As has been pointed out, there is no

127
South Korea: A Country Study

exact or exclusive criterion by which Buddhists or Confucianists can be identified. Many people outside of formal groups have been

deeply influenced by these traditions. Moreover, there is nothing

contradictory in one person's visiting and praying at Buddhist temples, participating in Confucian ancestor rites, and even consulting a shaman and sponsoring a kut. Furthermore, the statistics may

underrepresent the numbers of people belonging to new religions.

Some sources have given the number of adherents of Ch'ondogyo

as over 1 million.

Given the great diversity of religious expression, the role of

religion in South Korea's social development has been a complex

one. Some traditions, especially Buddhism, are identified primarily with the past. Buddhist sites such as the Pulguksa Temple and

the Sokkuram Grotto in Kyongju and the Haeinsa Temple near Taegu are regarded by most South Koreans as important cultural

properties rather than as places of worship. Confucianism remains

important as a social ethic; its influence is evident in the immense

importance Koreans ascribe to education. Christianity is identified with modernization and social reform. Many Christians in con- temporary South Korea, such as veteran political opposition leader

Kim Dae Jung, a Catholic, have been outspoken advocates of human rights and critics of the government. Christian-sponsored or- ganizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission promote labor

organizations and the union movement. New religions draw on

both traditional beliefs and on Christianity, achieving a baffling

variety and diversity of views. It has been estimated that there were

as many as 300 new religions in South Korea in the late 1980s,

although many were small and transient phenomena.

Public Health and Welfare

Health conditions have improved dramatically since the end of

the Korean War. Between 1955 and 1960, life expectancy was es- timated at 51.1 years for men and 54.2 years for women. In 1990

life expectancy was sixty- six years for men and seventy-three years

for women. The death rate declined significantly, from 13.8 deaths

per 1,000 in 1955-60 to 6 deaths per 1,000 in 1989—one of the

lowest rates among East Asian and Southeast Asian countries.

Nevertheless, serious health problems remained in 1990. South

Korea's infant mortality rate was significandy higher than the rates of other Asian countries and territories such as Japan, Taiwan,

Hong Kong, Singapore, and peninsular Malaysia. Although practically all the inhabitants of Seoul and other large cities had access to running water and sewage disposal in the late 1980s, environmental

128
The Society and Its Environment

pollution and poor sanitation still posed serious threats to public

health in both rural and urban areas. Health Conditions

The main causes of death traditionally have been respiratory

diseases—tuberculosis, bronchitis, and pneumonia—followed by

gastrointestinal illnesses. However, the incidence and fatality of

both types of illness declined during the 1970s and 1980s. Diseases

typical of developed, industrialized countries—cancer, heart, liver and kidney ailments, diabetes, and strokes—were rapidly becoming the primary causes of death. The incidence of parasitism, once

a major health problem in farming communities because of the

widespread use of night soil as fertilizer, was reported in the late 1980s to be only 4 percent of what it had been in 1970. Encephalitis, a viral disease that can be transmitted to humans by mosquitoes, caused ninety-four deaths in 1982. To reduce fatalities, the

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs planned to vaccinate 17.2

million persons against the disease by 1988.

The tensions and social dislocations caused by rapid urbanization apparently increased the incidence of mental illness. In 1985

the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs began a large-scale program to expand mental health treatment facilities by opening mental

institutions and requiring that new hospitals have wards set aside

for psychiatric treatment. The ministry estimated the number of

persons suffering from mental ailments at around 400,000.

South Korea has not been entirely immune from the health and

social problems generally associated with the West, such as acquired

immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and addictive drugs. A handful of AIDS cases was reported during the late 1980s. Seoul responded by increasing the budget for education programs and instituting

mandatory AIDS testing of prostitutes and employees of entertainment establishments. An AIDS Prevention Law was promulgated

in November 1987. In late 1989, the government drafted a law

requiring AIDS testing of foreign athletes and entertainers intending

to reside in South Korea without their spouses for more than three

months. Previously, the majority of those infected with AIDS had

been prostitutes working near United States military bases, ocean- going seamen, and South Koreans working abroad. In the late 1980s, however, homosexuals began to account for an increasing

number of those infected with the AIDS virus. The traditional

Korean attitude toward homosexuality, which was to deny its existence, made it extremely difficult to treat this part of the population. The 200-percent annual increase in the number

129
South Korea: A Country Study

of AIDS-infected persons (from one reported case in 1985 to twentytwo cases in 1988) worried health officials. While the use of heroin and other opiates was rare in South Korea

and the use of cocaine limited, the use of crystalline methamphetamine, or "ice," known in South Korea as hiroppon, had become

a serious problem by the late 1980s. Estimates of the number of

South Korean abusers of this illegal drug (known in the United

States as speed) ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 people in the late 1980s. Because use of the drug was believed to involve just lowstatus members of society, such as prostitutes and gangsters, the

problem of hiroppon abuse had long been ignored in South Korea.

The problem received greater attention from police and other

government agencies during the late 1980s as the drug increased

in popularity among professionals, students, office workers, housewives, entertainers, farmers, and laborers. Some observers sug- gested the drug's popularity was caused in part by a high-pressure

work environment, in which people used hiroppon to cope with long

working hours. It also has been suggested that the tighter border

controls imposed by Seoul have resulted in diverting the product

to the domestic market and contributing to greater domestic con- sumption.

An estimated 2,000 to 4,000 kilograms of methamphetamine were produced within South Korea annually, much of this total destined

for shipment to Taiwan, Japan, and the United States by South

Korean and Japanese yakuza, or gangsters. Since the majority of

users injected the drug intravenously (although smoking and snort- ing it were becoming popular), South Korean health officials were

concerned that the drug could contribute to the spread of AIDS.

In 1989 Seoul established a new antinarcotics division attached to the prosecutor general's office and increased almost fourfold the

number of drug agents.

Health Care and Social Welfare

The traditional practice of medicine in Korea was influenced

primarily, although not exclusively, by China. Over the centuries,

Koreans had used acupuncture and herbal remedies to treat a wide

variety of illnesses. Large compilations of herbal and other prescriptions were published during the Choson Dynasty: the 85-volume

Hyangyak chipsongbang (Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions)

published in 1433 and the 365-volume Uibangyuch'wi (Great Collection of Medicines and Prescriptions) published in 1445. Shops

selling traditional medicines, including ginseng, a root plant believed to have strong medicinal and aphrodisiac qualities, still were common in the 1980s. Because of the expense of modern medical

130
The Society and Its Environment

care, people still had to rely largely on such remedies to treat seri- ous illnesses until the 1980s, particularly in rural areas. The number of physicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, and

other health personnel and the number of hospitals and clinics have

increased dramatically since the Korean War (see fig. 8). In 1974

the population per physician was 2,207; by 1983 this number had

declined to 1 ,509. During the same period, the number of general

hospitals grew from 36 to 156 and the number of hospital beds tri- pled from 19,062 to 59,099. Most facilities, however, tended to be concentrated in urban areas, particularly in Seoul and Pusan.

Rural areas had limited medical facilities because in the past there

had been little incentive for physicians to work in areas outside

the cities, where the major of the people could not pay for treat- ment. Several private rural hospitals had been established with

government encouragement but had gone bankrupt in the late 1980s. The extension of medical insurance programs to the rural

populace, however, was expected to alleviate this problem to some

extent during the 1990s.

The South Korean government committed itself to making medical security (medical insurance and medical aid) available to vir- tually the entire population by 1991 . There was no unified national

health insurance system, but the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs coordinated its efforts with those of employers and private in- surance firms to achieve this goal. Two programs were established

in 1977: the Free and Subsidized Medical Aid Program for people

whose income was below a certain level and a medical insurance

program that provided coverage for individuals and their immediate

families working in enterprises of 500 people or more. Expenses were shared equally by employers and workers. In 1979 coverage was expanded to enterprises comprising 300 or more people, as well as to civil servants and teachers in private schools. In 1981

coverage was extended to enterprises employing 100 or more people and in 1984 to firms with as few as 16 employees. In that year, 16.7 million persons, or 41 .3 percent of the population, had medical insurance. By 1988 the government had expanded medical in- surance coverage in rural areas to almost 7.5 million people. As

of the end of 1988, approximately 33.1 million people, or almost

79 percent of the population, received medical insurance benefits.

At that time, the number of those not receiving medical insurance

benefits totaled almost 9 million people, mostly independent small

business owners in urban areas. In July 1989, however, Seoul ex- tended medical insurance to cover these self-employed urbanites,

so that the medical insurance system extended to almost all South

Koreans. Differences in insurance premiums among small business

131
South Korea: A Country Study

TOTAL HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL, 1965: 134,038

140,000 r

130,000 =

120,000

110,000

100,000

90,000

),000 :

70,000 :

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000 =

20,000 -

10,000

1 PHYSICIANS

2 DENTISTS

3 NURSES

4 PHARMACISTS

5 TRADITIONAL HERBALISTS

6 MIDWIVES

6

5

4

3

2

1

1955 1965 1975 1985

Source: Based on information from Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization ofthe Republic ofKorea, Cambridge, 1980, 402, 404; and The Statesman's Yearbook, 1988-89, New York, 1988, 775.

Figure 8. Increase in Licensed Health Care Personnel, Selected Years, 1955-85

132
The Society and Its Environment

owners, government officials and teachers, people in farming and

fishing areas, and those employed by business firms remained a

divisive and unresolved issue. Medical insurance programs for farming and fishing communities, where the majority of people were self-employed or worked

for very small enterprises, also were initiated by the government.

In 1981 three rural communities were selected as experimental sites for implementation of a comprehensive medical insurance program.

Three more areas, including Mokp'o in South Cholla Province, were added in 1982. Industrial injury compensation schemes were begun in the early 1960s and by 1982 covered 3.5 million workers

in most major industries.

During the 1980s, government pension or social security insur- ance programs covered designated groups, such as civil servants,

military personnel, and teachers. Private employers had their own

schemes to which they and workers both contributed. Government

planners envisioned a public and private system of pensions covering

the entire population by the early 1990s. In the wake of rapid eco- nomic growth, large sums have been allocated for social development programs in the national budget. In FY (fiscal year—see Glossary) 1990, total spending in this area increased 40 percent over the previous year. Observers noted, however, that serious defi- ciencies existed in programs for the handicapped, single-parent

families, and the unemployed.

* * * A New History of Korea by Ki-baik Lee provides ample coverage

of social developments during the Three Kingdoms, Silla, Koryo,

and Choson Dynasty periods and during the Japanese colonial oc- cupation. James B. Palais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea

gives a succinct overview of Choson Dynasty social structure. Michael C. Kalton's translation and commentary on Yi T'oe-gye's

The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning contains a valuable discussion

not only of the career of Korea's most noted Confucian scholar,

but also of the philosophical and ethical fundamentals of neo- Confucian orthodoxy. Donald N. Clark's Christianity in Modern Korea provides excellent coverage of Christianity in contemporary Korea.

Vincent S.R. Brandt's A Korean Village and Han Sang-Bok's

Korean Fishermen remain among the best descriptions of rural Korean

life during the mid-1960s. Although published in 1971, Lee Hyojae et al.'s "Life in Urban Korea" remains informative. Korean

family and kinship organizations are described exhaustively by Lee

Kwang-Kyu in his two-volume Kinship System in Korea.

133
South Korea: A Country Study

Virtues in Conflict, a collection of essays edited by Sandra Matielli, and Kim Yung-chung's Women of Korea discuss women's roles in Korean society. Female shamans are discussed in Kim Harvey

Youngsook's Six Korean Women and Laurel Kendall's The Life and

Hard Times of a Korean Shaman. Kim Chin-wu's The Making of the Korean Language provides an informative account of that subject.

Interesting discussions of South Korea's changing social classes are contained in David I. Steinberg's The Republic of Korea and in

Kim Kyong-Dong's "Social Change and Societal Developments

in Korea since 1945." Although its 1980 publication date precludes

discussion of the major changes that have occurred since that year, Education and Development in Korea by Noel F. McGinn et al. provides excellent background on this important subject. Recent developments are covered in some depth by publications such as the

Far Eastern Economic Review, whose weekly "Arts and Society" sec- tion deals extensively with education and other social matters. Other

periodicals containing discussions of South Korean society, education, and cultural expression include KoreaJournal, the Social Science Journal, and Korean Studies. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

134

Southwest Hidden Gate, Suwon Castle, largest of the five hidden gates, where a hidden road for transporting military provisions begins
IN THE FIRST THREE decades after the Park Chung Hee

government launched the First Five-Year Economic Development

Plan in 1962, the South Korean economy grew enormously and

the economic structure was radically transformed. South Korea's

real gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) expanded by an

average of more than 8 percent per year, from US$2.3 billion in

1962 to US$204 billion in 1989. Per capita annual income grew

from US$87 in 1962 to US$4,830 in 1989. The manufacturing sec- tor grew from 14.3 percent of the GNP in 1962 to 30.3 percent

in 1987. Commodity trade volume rose from US$480 million in

1962 to a projected US$127.9 billion in 1990. The ratio of domestic savings to GNP grew from 3.3 percent in 1962 to 35.8 percent

in 1989.

The rapid economic growth of the late 1980s, however, slowed

considerably in 1989. The growth rate was cut almost in half from

the previous year (to a still-robust approximate 6.5 percent), the

inflation rate increased as wages soared even higher, and there was

speculation concerning a small trade deficit in the early 1990s. These

developments all pointed to a gradual slowing of the expansion of

the rapidly maturing economy. Nevertheless, it also was clear that

rapidly rising domestic demand would keep the economy healthy

(even with a slight drop-off of exports), unless a major political crisis were to shock the country.

The most significant factor in rapid industrialization was the

adoption of an outward-looking strategy in the early 1960s. This

strategy was particularly well suited to that time because of South

Korea's poor natural resource endowment, low savings rate, and

tiny domestic market. The strategy promoted economic growth

through labor-intensive manufactured exports, in which South

Korea could develop a competitive advantage. Government initia- tives played an important role in this process. The inflow of for- eign capital was greatly encouraged to supplement the shortage of

domestic savings. These efforts enabled South Korea to achieve

rapid growth in exports and subsequent increases in income.

By emphasizing the industrial sector, Seoul's export-oriented development strategy left the rural sector relatively underdeveloped.

Increasing income disparity between the industrial and agricultural

sectors became a serious problem by the 1970s and remained a problem, despite government efforts to raise farm income and improve living standards in rural areas.

137
South Korea: A Country Study

By the early 1970s, however, the industrial sector had begun to face problems of its own. Up to that time, the industrial structure had been based on low value-added and labor-intensive products,

which faced increasing competition and protectionism from other

developing countries. The government responded to this problem

in the mid-1970s by emphasizing the development of heavy and

chemical industries and by promoting investment in high valueadded, capital-intensive industries.

The structural transition to high value-added, capital-intensive

industries was difficult. Moreover, it occurred at the end of the

1970s, a time when the industrial world was experiencing a prolonged recession following the second oil price shock of the decade

and protectionism was resulting in a reduction of South Korean

exports. By 1980 the South Korean economy had entered a period

of temporary decline: negative growth was recorded for the first time since 1962, inflation had soared, and the balance-of-payments

position had deteriorated significantly.

In the early 1980s, Seoul instituted wide-ranging structural re- forms. In order to control inflation, a conservative monetary policy

and tight fiscal measures were adopted. Growth of the money supply was reduced from the 30 percent level of the 1970s to 15 percent.

Seoul even froze its budget for a short while. Government intervention in the economy was greatly reduced and policies on imports

and foreign investment were liberalized to promote competition.

To reduce the imbalance between rural and urban sectors, Seoul

expanded investments in public projects, such as roads and communications facilities, while further promoting farm mechanization.

These measures, coupled with significant improvements in the

world economy, helped the South Korean economy regain its lost momentum in the late 1980s. South Korea achieved an average

of 9.2 percent real growth between 1982 and 1987 and 12.5 per- cent between 1986 and 1988. The double digit inflation of the 1970s was brought under control. Wholesale price inflation averaged 2.1 percent per year from 1980 through 1988; consumer prices increased

by an average of 4.7 percent annually. Seoul achieved its first significant surplus in its balance of payments in 1986 and recorded

a US$7.7 billion and a US$11.4 billion surplus in 1987 and 1988

respectively. This development permitted South Korea to begin

reducing its level of foreign debt. The trade surplus for 1989,

however, was only US$4.6 billion dollars, and a small negative

balance was projected for 1990 (see table 2, Appendix).

In the late 1980s, the domestic market became an increasing source of economic growth. Domestic demand for automobiles and

other indigenously manufactured goods soared because South

138
The Economy

Korean consumers, whose savings had been buoyed by doubledigit wage increases each year since 1987 and whose average wages

in 1990 were about 50 percent above what they had been at the

end of 1986, had the wherewithal to purchase luxury items for the

first time. The result was a gradual reorientation of the economy

from a heavy reliance on exports toward greater emphasis on meeting the needs of the country's nearly 43 million people. The shifts in demand and supply indicated that economic restructuring was

underway, that is, domestic consumption was rising as net foreign

demand was falling. On the supply side, the greater growth in ser- vices mirrored what the people wanted—more goods, especially

imports, and many more services.

By 1990 there was evidence that the high growth rates of the

late 1980s would slow during the early 1990s. In 1989 real growth was only 6.5 percent. One reason for this development was the

economic restructuring that began in the late 1980s—including

the slower growth of major export industries that were no longer

competitive on the world market (for example, footwear) and the

expansion of those industries that were competitive, such as elec- tronics.

The Japanese Role in Korea's Economic Development

The Japanese, who dominated Korea from the late 1890s to 1945

and who governed Korea as a colony from 1910 to 1945, were

responsible for the initial economic modernization of Korea. Before 1900 Korea had a relatively backward agricultural economy.

According to scholar Donald S. Macdonald, for centuries most

Koreans lived as subsistence farmers of rice and other grains and

satisfied most of their basic needs through their own labor or through

barter. The manufactures of traditional Korea—principally cloth,

cooking and eating utensils, furniture, jewelry, and paper—were

produced by artisans in a few population centers. Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan thrust a modern blend of industrial capitalism onto a feudal agrarian society.

By the end of the colonial period, Japan had built an extensive in- frastructure of roads, railroads, ports, electrical power, and government buildings that facilitated both the modernization of Korea's

economy andJapan's control over the modernization process. The

Japanese located various heavy industries—steel, chemicals, and

hydroelectric power—across Korea, but mainly in the north.

The Japanese government played an even more active role in

developing Korea than it had played in developing the Japanese

economy in the late nineteenth century. Many programs drafted

139
South Korea: A Country Study

in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s originated in policies drafted in

Japan during the Meiji period (1868-1912). The Japanese government helped to mobilize resources for development and provided

entrepreneurial leadership for these new enterprises. Colonial eco- nomic growth was initiated through powerful government efforts to expand the economic infrastructure, to increase investment in human capital through health and education, and to raise productivity.

In some respects, South Korean patterns of development after the early 1960s closely followed the methodology introduced by the

Japanese fifty years earlier—industrialization from above using a

strong bureaucracy that formulated and implemented economic

policies. Many of the developments that took place in Chosen, the

Japanese name for Korea during the period of colonization, had

also occurred in pre-World War II Japan; they were implementation of a strong education system and the spread of literacy; the

rise of a strong, authoritarian government that combined civilian

and military administration to govern the state with strict discipline;

the fostering and implementation of comprehensive economic programs by the state through its control of the huge national

bureaucracy; the close collaboration between government and busi- ness leaders; and the development of industries by the major

Japanese zaibatsu (commercial conglomerates).

Some political analysts, for example, Bruce Cumings and Gavan

McCormick, have been impressed with the common elements in

prewar and postwar economic growth in South Korea and especially with top-down government management of the economy.

Economists, such as Paul W. Kuznets, however, also draw atten- tion to the dysfunctional aspects of the colonial legacy and find some

of the discontinuities important.

Between the end of World War II and Park Chung Hee's ascension to power in 1961 , South Korea's political and economic links

to the Japanese colonial period were ruptured. There was considerable disruption after 1945 because of plant exhaustion; the loss of

linkages with Japanese capital and with upstream and downstream

industrial facilities; the loss of technical expertise, distribution sys- tems, and markets; and the subsequent obliteration of the industrial plant during the Korean War (1950-53).

The Government Role in Economic Development

In 1961 General Park Chung Hee overthrew the popularly elected regime of Prime Minister Chang Myon. A nationalist, Park wanted

to transform South Korea from a backward agricultural nation into

140
The Economy

a modern industrial nation that would provide a decent way of life for its citizens while at the same time defending itself from outside

aggression. Lacking the anti-Japanese nationalist credentials of Syngman Rhee, for example, Park sought both legitimacy for his regime

and greater independence for South Korea in a vigorous program

of economic development that would transform the country from

an agricultural backwater into a modern industrial nation.

Park's government was the beneficiary of the Syngman Rhee

administration's decision to use foreign aid from the United States during the 1950s to build an infrastructure that included a nationwide network of primary and secondary schools, modern roads,

and a modern communications network. The result was that by

1961, South Korea had a well-educated young work force and a modern infrastructure that provided Park with a solid foundation

for economic growth.

The Park administration decided that the central government

must play the key role in economic development because no other

South Korean institution had the capacity or resources to direct

such drastic change in a short time. The resulting economic sys- tem incorporated elements of both state capitalism and free enterprise. The economy was dominated by a group of chaebol (see

Glossary), large private conglomerates, and also was supported by

a significant number of public corporations in such areas as iron

and steel, utilities, communications, fertilizers, chemicals, and other

heavy industries. The government guided private industry through

a series of export and production targets utilizing the control of

credit, informal means of pressure and persuasion, and traditional monetary and fiscal policies (see The Origins and Development

of Chaebol, this ch.).

The government hoped to take advantage of existing technology to become competitive in areas where other advanced industrial nations had already achieved success. Seoul presumed that the

well-educated and highly motivated work force would produce lowcost, high-quality goods that would find ready markets in the United

States and the rest of the industrial world. Profits generated from

the sale of exports would be used to further expand capital, provide new jobs, and eventually pay off loans.

In 1961 Park extended government control over business by nationalizing the banks and merging the agricultural cooperative

movement with the agricultural bank. The government's direct control over all institutional credit further extended Park's command

over the business community. The Economic Planning Board was

created in 1961 and became the nerve center of Park's plan to

141
South Korea: A Country Study

promote economic development. It was headed by a deputy prime

minister and staffed by bureaucrats known for their high intellec- tual capability and educational background in business and eco- nomics. Beginning in the 1960s, the board allocated resources, directed the flow of credit, and formulated all of South Korea's

economic plans. In the late 1980s, the power to allocate resources and credit was restored to the functional ministries. In 1990 the

Economic Planning Board primarily was charged with economic

planning; it also coordinated and often directed the economic functions of other government ministries, including the Ministry of

Finance. The board was complemented by the Korea Development

Institute, an independent economic research organization funded

by the government. Other government bodies directing the econ- omy included the Office of the President, which included a senior

secretary for economic affairs; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry

of Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Labor; and the Bank of

Korea, which was controlled by the Ministry of Finance.

Park's first major goal, which was immediately successful, was

to establish a self-reliant industrial economy independent of the

massive waves of United States aid that had kept South Korea afloat during the Rhee years. Modernizing the economy and maintaining overall sustained growth were additional goals in the 1970s.

Significant economic policies included strengthening key industries,

increasing employment, and developing more effective management systems. Because South Korea was dependent on imports of raw materials, such as oil, a major government objective was to significantly increase the level of exports, which meant stressing greater

international competitiveness and higher productivity. The early

economic plans emphasized agriculture and infrastructure, the latter were closely tied to construction. Later, the emphasis shifted consecutively to light industry, electronics, and heavy and chemical industries. Using these strategies, an export-driven economy developed.

The government combined a policy of import substitution with

the export-led approach. Policy planners selected a group of stra- tegic industries to back, including electronics, shipbuilding, and

automobiles. New industries were nurtured by making the importation of such goods difficult. When the new industry was on its feet, the government worked to create good conditions for its export. Incentives for exports included a reduction of corporate and

private income taxes for exporters, tariff exemptions for raw materials imported for export production, business tax exemptions, and

accelerated depreciation allowances.

The export-led program took off in the 1960s; during the 1970s, some estimates indicate, Seoul had the world's most productive

142
Woman worker,

Hyundai Corporation

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington

economy. The annual industrial production growth rate was about

25 percent; there was a fivefold increase in the GNP from 1965 to 1978. In the mid-1970s, exports increased by an average of 45 per- cent a year. Industrial Policies

The major issue facing the Park regime in the early 1960s was

the grinding poverty of the nation and the need for economic policies to overcome this poverty. A critical problem was raising funds

to foster needed industrial development. Domestic savings were very

low, and there was little available domestic capital. This obstacle was overcome by introducing foreign loans and inaugurating attrac- tive domestic interest rates that enticed local capital into production. Of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, only

South Korea financed its economic development with a dramatic

build-up of foreign debt, debt that totaled US$46.8 billion in 1985,

making it the fourth largest Third World debtor. Foreign corporate

investments were primarily of Japanese origin.

As noted by consultant David I. Steinberg, Seoul administered

a series of economic development plans. The government mobilized

domestic capital by encouraging savings, determined what kinds of

plants could be constructed with these funds, and reviewed the potential of the products for export. In this sense, the will of the government to undertake economic development played a crucial role; the

143
South Korea: A Country Study

role of the government, however, was not limited to such measures as mobilizing capital and allocating investments.

Steinberg also pointed out that Park's government restructured

industries, such as defense and construction, sometimes to stimulate competition and other times to reduce or eliminate it. The Economic Planning Board established export targets that, if met, yielded

additional government-subsidized credit and further access to the

growing domestic market. Failure to meet such targets led to Seoul's

withdrawal of credit. Economic Plans

Economic programs were based on a series of five-year plans

that began in 1962. The First Five-Year Economic Development

Plan (1962-66) consisted of initial steps toward the building of a

self-sufficient industrial structure that was neither consumption

oriented nor overdependent on oil. Such areas as electrification,

fertilizers, oil refining, synthetic fibers, and cement were emphasized. The Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-71)

stressed modernizing the industrial structure and rapidly building

import-substitution industries, including steel, machinery, and chemical industries. The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan

(1972-76) achieved rapid progress in building an export-oriented

structure by promoting heavy and chemical industries. Industries

receiving particular attention included iron and steel, transport

machinery, household electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals.

The developers of heavy and chemical industries sought to supply

new industries with raw materials and capital goods and to reduce

or even eliminate dependence on foreign capital. New (and criti- cal) industries were to be constructed in the southern part of the

peninsula, far from the border with North Korea, thus encouraging economic development and industrialization outside the Seoul

area and providing new employment opportunities for residents of

the less developed areas. The Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-81)

fostered the development of industries designed to compete effec- tively in the world's industrial export markets. These major stra- tegic industries consisted of technology-intensive and skilled labor-intensive industries such as machinery, electronics, and shipbuilding. The plan stressed large heavy and chemical industries, such

as iron and steel, petrochemicals, and nonferrous metal. As a result,

heavy and chemical industries grew by an impressive 51.8 percent

in 1981; their exports increased to 45.3 percent of total output. These

developments can be ascribed to a favorable turn in the export per- formance of iron, steel, and shipbuilding, which occurred because

144
The Economy

high-quality, low-cost products could be produced in South Korea.

By contrast, the heavy and chemical industries of advanced countries slumped during the late 1970s. In the machinery industries,

investments were doubled in electric power generation, integrated machinery, diesel engines, and heavy construction equipment;

the increase clearly showed that the industries benefited from the

government's generous financial assistance program.

The late 1970s, however, witnessed worldwide recession, rising

fuel costs, and growing inflation. South Korea's industrial struc- ture became somewhat unbalanced, and the economy suffered from

acute inflation because of an overemphasis on investment in heavy

industry at a time when many potential customers were not in a

position to buy heavy industrial goods.

The Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan

(1982-86) sought to shift the emphasis away from heavy and chemical industries, to technology-intensive industries, such as precision machinery, electronics (televisions, videocassette recorders,

and semiconductor-related products), and information. More at- tention was to be devoted to building high-technology products in

greater demand on the world market.

The Sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan

(1987-91) to a large extent continued to emphasize the goals of

the previous plan. The government intended to accelerate import

liberalization and to remove various types of restrictions and nontariff barriers on imports. These moves were designed to mitigate

adverse effects, such as monetary expansion and delays in industrial structural adjustment, which can arise because of a large sur- plus of funds. Seoul pledged to continue phasing out direct assistance

to specific industries and instead to expand manpower training and

research and development in all industries, especially the small and

medium-sized firms that had not received much government atten- tion previously. Seoul hoped to accelerate the development of science

and technology by raising the ratio of research and development

investment from 2.4 percent of the GNP to over 3 percent by 1991

.

The goal of the Seventh Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-96), formulated in 1989, was to develop hightechnology fields, such as microelectronics, new materials, fine

chemicals, bioengineering, optics, and aerospace. Government and

industry would work together to build high-technology facilities in seven provincial cities to better balance the geographic distribution of industry throughout South Korea.

Revenues and Expenditures

The central government budget has generally expanded, both

145
South Korea: A Country Study

in real terms and as a proportion of real GNP, since the end of

the Korean War, stabilizing at between 20 and 21 percent of GNP

during most of the 1980s. Government spending in South Korea

has been less than that for most countries in the world (excepting

the other rapidly growing Asian economies ofJapan, Taiwan, and

Singapore). The share of government spending devoted to investment and other capital formation activities increased steadily through

the periods of the first and second five-year plans (1962-71), peaking

at more than 41 percent of the budget in 1969. Since 1971 investment expenditures have remained at less than 30 percent of the

budget, while the share of the budget occupied by direct government consumption and transfer payments has continued to increase,

averaging more than 70 percent during the 1980s.

During the 1980s, the largest areas of government expenditure were economic services (including infrastructural projects and

research and development), national defense, and education. Economic expenditures averaged several percentage points higher than

defense expenditures, which remained stable at about 22 to 23 per- cent of the budget (about 6 percent of GNP) during the decade.

In 1990 the government was studying plans to lower defense ex- penditures to 5 percent of GNP. Some observers noted a trend

toward a slight increase in the portion of the budget devoted to

social spending during the 1980s. In 1987 expenditures for social

services—including health, housing, and welfare—were 16.4 percent of the budget, up from 13.9 percent in 1980, and slighdy higher

than 1987 government oudays for education (see table 3, Appendix).

The government revenue structure was virtually totally dependent on taxes (see table 4, Appendix). By the early 1980s, nearly

two-thirds of tax money was collected in the form of indirect taxes. Revenues collected by the central government in 1987 rose to 19,270.3 billion won (for value of the won—see Glossary), up from

13.197.5 billion won in 1984.

The Government and Public and Private Corporations

Following the Korean War, foreign aid became the most important source of funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation

of the economy. What was left of the Japanese-built industrial plant,

most of which by the 1950s either was obsolete or had been destroyed by warfare), generally was turned over to private owners,

who were chosen more often for their political loyalty than for their

economic acumen. Moreover, Rhee favored certain businessmen

and companies with government contracts in exchange for financial support of his political endeavors. It was during this period

that a group of entrepreneurs began companies that later became

146
The Economy

the chaebol, or business conglomerates. The chaebol were groups of

specialized companies with interrelated management. These groupings of affiliated companies dominated South Korea's economy in

the late 1980s and often included businesses involved in heavy and consumer industries and electric and electronic goods, as well as trading companies and real estate and insurance concerns. The chaebol were responsible for the successful expansion of South

Korea's export capacity. According to Steinberg, in 1987 the revenues of the four largest chaebol were US$80.7 billion, a figure

equivalent to two-thirds of Seoul's total GNP. In that year, the

Samsung Group had revenues of US$24 billion; Hyundai, US$22.7

billion; Daewoo, US$16 billion; and Lucky-Goldstar, US$18 bil- lion. The revenues of the next largest chaebol, Sunkyong, totaled

US$7.3 billion in 1987. The top ten chaebol represented 40 percent

of all bank credit in South Korea, 30 percent of value added in

manufacturing, and approximately 66 percent of the value of all South Korean exports in 1987. The five largest chaebol employed

8.5 percent of the manufacturing work force and produced 22.3

percent of all manufacturing shipments. Despite a rash of strikes

against the chaebol beginning in 1987, the chaebol generally had higher

compensation and better working conditions than their lesser South

Korean competitors.

The Origins and Development of Chaebol

Although South Korea's major industrial programs did not begin until the early 1960s, the origins of the country's entrepreneurial elite were found in the political economy of the 1950s. Very

few Koreans had owned or managed larger corporations during

the Japanese colonial period. After the departure of the Japanese

in 1945, some Korean businessmen obtained the assets of some

of the Japanese firms, a number of which grew into the chaebol of

the 1990s. These companies, as well as certain other firms that were formed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had close links with Syngman Rhee's First Republic, which lasted from 1948 to 1960 (see

The Syngman Rhee Era, 1948-60, ch. 1). It was alleged that many

of these companies received special favors from the government

in return for kickbacks and other payments.

When the military took over the government in 1961, military

leaders announced that they would eradicate the corruption that

had plagued the Rhee administration and eliminate injustice from

society. Some leading industrialists were arrested and charged with

corruption, but the new government realized that it would need

the help of the entrepreneurs if the government's ambitious plans

to modernize the economy were to be fulfilled. A compromise was

147
South Korea: A Country Study

reached, under which many of the accused corporate leaders paid

fines to the government. Subsequentiy, there was increased cooperation between corporate and government leaders in modernizing

the economy.

Government-chaebol cooperation was essential to the subsequent

economic growth and astounding successes that began in the early

1960s. Driven by the urgent need to turn the economy away from consumer goods and light industries toward heavy, chemical, and

import-substitution industries, political leaders and government

planners relied on the ideas and cooperation of the chaebol leaders.

The government provided the blueprints for industrial expansion;

the chaebol realized the plans. However, the chaebol-led industrialization accelerated the monopolistic and oligopolistic concentration

of capital and economically profitable activities in the hands of a

limited number of conglomerates.

Park used the chaebol as a means towards economic growth. Exports were encouraged, reversing Rhee's policy of reliance on imports. Performance quotas were established.

The chaebol were able to grow because of two factors—foreign

loans and special favors. Access to foreign technology also was crit- ical to the growth of the chaebol through the 1980s. Under the guise

of 4 'guided capitalism," the government selected companies to undertake projects and channeled funds from foreign loans. The

government guaranteed repayment should a company be unable

to repay its foreign creditors. Additional loans were made available from domestic banks. In the late 1980s, the chaebol dominated

the industrial sector and were especially prevalent in manufacturing, trading, and heavy industries.

The chaebol were often compared with Japanese keiretsu (the suc- cessor of the zaibatsu), but as David I. Steinberg has noted, there were at least three major differences. First, the chaebol were family

dominated. In 1990, for example, in most cases the family that

founded the major business in the chaebol remained in control, while

in Japan the keiretsu were controlled by professional corporate

management. Second, individual chaebol were prevented from buying controlling shares of banks, and in 1990 government regulations made it difficult for a chaebol to develop an exclusive banking

relationship. The keiretsu usually worked with an affiliated bank and

had almost unlimited access to credit. Third, the chaebol often formed

subsidiaries to produce components for exports, while large

Japanese corporations often employed outside contractors. The tremendous growth that the chaebol experienced, beginning

in the early 1960s, was closely tied to the expansion of South Korean

exports. Growth resulted from the production of a diversity of goods

148
The Economy

rather than just one or two products. Innovation and the willing- ness to develop new product lines were critical. In the 1950s and

early 1960s, chaebol concentrated on wigs and textiles; by the

mid-1970s and 1980s, heavy, defense, and chemical industries had

become predominant. While these activities were important in the

early 1990s, real growth was occurring in the electronics and hightechnology industries. The chaebol also were responsible for turn- ing the trade deficit in 1985 to a trade surplus in 1986. The cur- rent account balance, however, fell from more than US$14 billion

in 1988 to US$5 billion in 1989.

The chaebol continued their explosive growth in export markets

in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the chaebol had become financially

independent and secure—thereby eliminating the need for further

government-sponsored credit and assistance. By 1990 the chaebol also had begun to produce for a growing domestic market.

The chaebol were powerful independent entities acting in the econ- omy and politics, but sometimes they cooperated with the government in the areas of planning and innovation. The government

worked hard to encourage competition among the chaebol in cer- tain areas and to avoid total monopolies.

Another reason for the success of the chaebol was their access to foreign technology. Rather than having to develop new areas through research and technology, South Korean firms could purchase foreign patents and technology and produce the same goods

made elsewhere at lower costs. Hyundai cars, for example, used an engine developed by the Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan.

The role of big business extended to the political arena. In 1988

a member of a chaebol family, Chong Mong-jun, president of Hyundai Heavy Industries, successfully ran for the National Assembly.

Other business leaders also were chosen to be members of the National Assembly through the proportional representation system.

The Role of Public Enterprise

A government-led economic development policy during the 1960s was necessary because the less experienced and capital-poor pri- vate entrepreneurs lacked the wherewithal to develop several crit- ical industries that were necessary to the nation's economic growth.

The government determined that establishing public corporations

to develop and manage these highly strategic industries was the

fastest and most efficient way to foster growth in a variety of key

areas. During the 1960s, public enterprises were concentrated in such

areas as electrification, banking, communications, and manufacturing. In 1990 these enterprises were, in many cases, efficient

149
South Korea: A Country Study

revenue-producing concerns that produced essential goods and ser- vices at low costs, but which also produced profits that were used

for new capital investments or to produce funds for public use else- where. In the 1980s, Seoul was slowly privatizing a number of these

firms by selling stocks, but the government remained the principal

stockholder in each company. In the 1980s, an important function of public enterprises was the introduction of new and expensive technology ventures. In 1985 the public enterprise sector consisted of about 90 enterprises employing 305,000 workers, or 2.7 percent of total employment in the nonagricultural sector. There were four categories of

public enterprises: government enterprises (staffed and run by

government officials), government-invested enterprises (with at least 50 percent government ownership), subsidiaries of governmentinvested enterprises (usually having indirect government funding),

and other government-backed enterprises. Government-invested

public enterprises, such as the Korea Electric Power Corporation

(KEPCO) and the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO),

represented the core of the new enterprises established during Park's

regime. In the late 1980s, roughly 30 percent of the revenues produced by public enterprises came from the manufacturing sec- tor and the other 70 percent from such service sectors as the electrical, communications, and financial industries.

Pohang Iron and Steel Company

In the 1960s, the Park government concluded that self-sufficiency

in steel and the construction of an integrated steelworks were es- sential to economic development. Because South Korea had not

had a modern steel plant before 1968, many foreign and domestic

businesses were skeptical of Seoul's decision to invest heavily in

constructing a steel plant. Despite the skepticism, however, POSCO

began production in 1972, just four years after the company's in- auguration in April 1968 with only thirty-nine employees.

Japan provided the money for the construction of the initial plant,

following an agreement made at the Third South Korea-Japan

Ministerial Meeting in 1969. Financing included US$73.7 million

in government grants and loans, US$50 million in credit from the

Japan Export-Import Bank, and technical assistance from Nippon

Steel and other corporations. This cooperation was one consequence

of the normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 and reflected

the view of the government of Japan as noted in the Nixon-Sato

communique of November 21, 1969, that "the security of the

Republic of Korea is essential to the security of Japan."

150
Fresh produce at the market, Seoul Courtesy Oren Hadar

It'aewon shopping district and entertainment center, Seoul

Courtesy Oren Hadar
South Korea: A Country Study

POSCO is located in the southeastern port city of P'ohang. Previously a fishing port whose major industry was processing fish and

marine products, P'ohang is now a major industrial center with

almost 250,000 people. In addition to the huge integrated steel mill,

P'ohang has an industrial complex housing companies that

manufacture finished steel products of raw materials provided by

POSCO.

POSCO first began to sell plate products in 1972 and focused

its sales policies on the domestic market to improve steel self- sufficiency at home. Special efforts were made to supply quality

iron and steel to related domestic companies at below export price

to strengthen their international competitiveness.

POSCO's growth has been immense. By the late 1980s, POSCO

was the fifth biggest steel company in the noncommunist world,

with an annual production approaching 12 million tons worth 3

trillion won. The further expansion of POSCO's productivity and

size, however, was sought at a time when the steel industries of

the United States and Japan were declining. POSCO's secondphase mill at Kwangyang was completed in August 1988. A thirdphase mill was expected, by the early 1990s, to further increase

crude steel production to a total output of approximately 17.2 million tons a year. In terms of productivity, POSCO was rated the

world's best steel manufacturer throughout the late 1980s and also was rated at the top in terms of facilities. In 1987 Seoul announced that it was going to transform POSCO

into a private company in line with the government's new policy

of privatizing state-run corporations. The government planned to retain a majority share of the stock; initial reports in the South

Korean press in 1988 indicated that the sale of public shares was

going slower than anticipated.

Korea Electric Power Corporation

KEPCO is a government agency whose goal is to provide abundant electric power and to develop reliable power resources. The

south of Korea traditionally had received its electric power from

power stations in present-day North Korea, but the Pyongyang

government cut off power to South Korea in 1948. The catastrophes

of the Korean War also posed electrical supply problems. The sit- uation had not improved greatly by 1961 when the new military

junta merged three smaller electric companies to form the Korea

Electric Company (KECO). Seoul invested heavily in KECO,

realizing that adequate sources of power were a basic prerequisite

to industrialization. In 1982 KECO was reorganized as a public

corporation and became known as KEPCO. All shares were owned

152
The Economy

by the government. In 1988 Seoul decided to sell 30 percent of all shares to the public.

KEPCO, one of the largest public corporations in South Korea,

with 30,289 employees, serviced about 99.8 percent of the populace

in 1988. It derived about 12 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric sources, 50 percent from thermal sources (coal, oil, and

gas-fired), and the rest from a growing number of nuclear power

plants. It was hoped that nuclear power would be developed fur- ther to lower reliance on oil, gas, and coal imports. KEPCO offi- cials pronounced their nuclear power plants safe from any potential

nonmilitary accidents and said that extraordinary measures had

been taken to protect the plants in case of a North Korean attack. Financing Development

Financing South Korea's economic development in the 1990s was expected to differ from previous decades in two main respects:

greater reliance on domestic sources and more emphasis on equity

relative to debt. Beginning in the 1960s, foreign credit was used

to finance development, but the amount of foreign debt had

decreased since the mid-1980s. According to the Sixth Five-Year

Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-91), an average an- nual growth rate of 8 percent was expected, together with account

surpluses of about US$5 billion a year through 1991.

To realize these growth targets, South Koreans needed the gross domestic savings rate to exceed the domestic investment rate; additionally, they needed the financing of future economic growth

to come entirely from domestic sources. Such a situation would

involve reducing foreign debt by US$2 billion a year; and South

Korea would become a net creditor nation in the mid-1990s.

Through the promotion and reform of the securities markets, es- pecially the stock market, and increased foreign investment, the

sixth plan encouraged the diversification of sources and types of

corporate finance, especially equity finance.

Domestic savings were very low before the mid-1960s, equivalent to less than 2 percent of GNP in the 1960 to 1962 period. The

savings rate jumped to 10 percent between 1970 and 1972 when

banks began offering depositors rates of 20 percent or more on sav- ings accounts. This situation allowed banks to compete effectively for deposits with unorganized money markets that had previously

offered higher rates than the banks. The savings rate increased to 16.8 percent of GNP in 1975 and 28 percent in 1979, but temporarily plunged to 20.8 percent in 1980 because of the oil price

rise. After 1980, as incomes rose, so did the savings rate. The

surge of the savings rate to 36.3 percent in 1987 and 35.8 percent in

153
South Korea: A Country Study

1989 reflected the sharp growth of GNP in the 1980s. The prospects

for continued high rates of saving were associated with continued

high GNP growth, which nevertheless declined to 6.5 percent in

1989.

According to Donald S. Macdonald, through the early 1980s

funds for investment came primarily from bilateral government

loans (mainly from the United States and Japan), international lending organizations, and commercial banks. In the late 1980s,

however, domestic savings accounted for two-thirds or more of total investment.

Throughout the 1980s, the financial sector underwent signifi- cant expansion, diversification of products and services, and struc- tural changes brought about by economic liberalization policies.

As noted by Park Yung-chul, financial liberalization eased interest

ceilings. Deregulation increased competition in financial markets,

which in turn accelerated product diversification. In the early 1980s,

securities companies were permitted to sell securities through a repurchase agreement. By 1985 banks also were allowed to engage

in the repurchase agreements of government and public bonds. In

1981 finance and investment corporations started dealing in largedenomination commercial paper. The new form of commercial

paper was issued in minimum denominations of 10 million won,

compared to the previous minimum value for commercial paper

of 1 million won.

In order to extend their ability to raise cash, investment and

finance companies introduced a new cash-management account with

a 4 million won minimum deposit in 1983. Investment and finance

corporations managed client funds by investing them in commercial paper corporate bonds and certificates of deposit. Moneydeposit banks in the mid-1980s began offering similar accounts,

known as household money-in-trust. Trust business formerly had

been the exclusive domain of the Bank of Seoul and Trust Company; however, after 1983 all money-deposit banks were authorized to offer trust services.

The financial system underwent two major structural changes

in the late 1970s and 1980s. First, money-deposit banks saw a sus- tained erosion of their once-dominant market position (from 80

percent in the 1970 to 1974 period to 55 percent by 1984). One

reason for this decline was that in the 1970s nonbank financial in- termediaries, such as investment trust corporations, finance companies, and merchant banking corporations, were given preferential treatment. Further, because the costs of intermediation at these

nonbank financial institutions were lower than at banks (with their

many branches nationwide and their multitudes of small savers and

154
The Economy

borrowers), their cost advantages and higher lending rates allowed

them a larger market share.

The second structural change was the rapid increase of commercial paper and corporate debenture markets. Another development was the steady growth of investment trust corporations in the 1980s.

Because of the introduction of tax and financing incentives by

the government that encouraged companies to list their shares on

the stock market, the Korean Stock Exchange grew rapidly in the

late 1980s. In 1987 more than 350 companies were listed on the

exchange. There was an average daily trading volume of 10 million shares, with a turnover ratio of 80 percent. In 1989 the stock

market was tarnished by accusations of insider trading among the

five major South Korean securities firms. The Securities and Exchange Commission launched an investigation in late 1989. The

popular index of the market soared to a high of 1,007.77 points on April 1, 1989, but plunged back to the 800s in late 1989 and

early 1990.

Business financing was obtained primarily through bank loans or borrowing on the informal and high-interest "curb market" of

private lenders. The curb market served individuals who needed

cash urgently, less reputable businesspeople who engaged in speculation, and the multitudes of smaller companies that needed operating funds but could not procure bank financing. The loans they

received, often in exchange for weak collateral, had very high in- terest rates. The curb market played a critical role in the 1960s

and 1970s in pumping money into the economy and in assisting

the growth of smaller corporations. The curb market continued

to exist, along with the formal banking system, through the 1980s.

Industry

The growth of the industrial sector was the principal stimulus

to economic development. In 1987 manufacturing industries ac- counted for approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product

(GDP—see Glossary) and 25 percent of the work force. Benefiting from strong domestic encouragement and foreign aid, Seoul's

industrialists introduced modern technologies into outmoded or newly built facilities at a rapid pace, increased the production of

commodities—especially those for sale in foreign markets—and

plowed the proceeds back into further industrial expansion. As a

result, industry altered the country's landscape, drawing millions

of laborers to urban manufacturing centers. A downturn in the South Korean economy in 1989 spurred by

a sharp decrease in exports and foreign orders caused deep concern

in the industrial sector. Ministry of Trade and Industry analysts

155
South Korea: A Country Study

stated that poor export performance resulted from structural

problems embedded in the nation's economy, including an overly

strong won, increased wages and high labor costs, frequent strikes,

and high interest rates. The result was an increase in inventories

and severe cutbacks in production at a number of electronics, auto- mobile, and textile manufacturers, as well as at the smaller firms

that supplied the parts. Factory automation systems were introduced

to reduce dependence on labor, to boost productivity with a much

smaller work force, and to improve competitiveness. It was esti- mated that over two-thirds of South Korea's manufacturers spent over half of the funds available for facility investments on auto- mation.

In 1990 South Korean manufacturers planned a significant shift in future production plans toward high-technology industries. In

June 1989, panels of government officials, scholars, and business

leaders held planning sessions on the production of such goods as new materials, mechatronics—including industrial robotics, bioengineering, microelectronics, fine chemistry, and aerospace. This

shift in emphasis, however, did not mean an immediate decline

in heavy industries such as automobile and ship production, which

had dominated the economy in the 1980s.

Except for mining, most industries were located in the urban

areas of the northwest and southeast. Heavy industries generally were located in the south of the country. Factories in Seoul contributed over 25 percent of all manufacturing value-added in 1978;

taken together with factories in surrounding Kyonggi Province,

factories in the Seoul area produced 46 percent of all manufacturing that year. Factories in Seoul and Kyonggi Province employed

48 percent of the nation's 2.1 million factory workers.

Steel

In 1989 South Korea was the world's tenth largest steel producer,

accounting for 2.3 percent of world steel production. South Korea

continued to expand crude steel production—19.3 million tons for 1988, up 14.9 percent over 1987. Domestic demand for steel products increased 8.5 percent from 15 million tons to 16.3 million tons over the same period because of the growing demands

of South Korean industry. Domestic demand accounted for 70 per- cent of the total, mostly because of the increased needs of such steel- consuming industries as automobiles, shipbuilding, and electronics. The steel industry grew in the 1970s after the government constructed the POSCO mill to service Seoul's rapidly growing automobile, shipbuilding, and construction industries. In 1988 South

Korea's steel industry included 200 steel companies. Iron and steel

156
The Economy

production was expected to increase in the early 1990s, given the

output increases in domestic user industries. Exports were likely to be flat or to decline because of decreased international demand.

Electronics

In 1989 South Korea was a major producer of electronics, producing color televisions, videocassette recorders, microwave ovens, ra- dios, watches, personal computers, and videotapes. In 1988 the

electronics industry produced US$23 billion worth of goods (up

35 percent from 1987), to become the world's sixth largest manufacturer. The total value of parts and components (including semiconductors) produced in 1988 totaled US$9.7 billion, overtaking consumer electronics production (US$9.2 billion) for the first time.

Manufacture of industrial electronics also grew significantly in 1988

and totaled US$4.6 billion (20 percent of total production). Electronics exports grew rapidly in the late 1980s to more than US$15

billion in 1988, up 40 percent from 1987—to become Seoul's leading

export industry. Although South Korean electronic goods enjoyed

substantial price competitiveness over Japanese products, the elec- tronics industry continued to be heavily dependent on Japanese

components, an important factor in South Korea's chronic trade

deficit with Japan. Some South Korean firms formed joint ventures with foreign concerns to acquire advanced technology. In the

late 1980s, South Korea's leading electronics firms (Samsung,

Lucky-Goldstar, and Hyundai) began establishing overseas plants

in such markets as the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Britain, Turkey, and Ireland.

By 1 990 significant shifts were occurring within the electronics

industry. In 1989 South Korea had lost some of its cost advantage

to newer consumer electronics producers in Southeast Asia. At the same time, production of electronic components and of industrial

electronics, particularly computers and telecommunications equipment, continued to expand to such an extent that overall demand

for South Korean electronics products was expected to increase

modesdy in the early 1990s. In 1990 Seoul projected that the microelectronics industry would grow at an annual rate of 17.2 percent

in the early 1990s.

Shipbuilding

During the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea became a leading

producer of ships, including oil supertankers, and oil-drilling platforms. The country's major shipbuilder was Hyundai, which built a 1 -million-ton capacity drydock at Ulsan in the mid-1970s. Daewoo

157
South Korea: A Country Study

joined the shipbuilding industry in 1980 and finished a 1 .2-millionton facility at Okp'o on Koje Island, south of Pusan, in mid-1981

The industry declined in the mid-1980s because of the oil glut and

because of a worldwide recession. There was a sharp decrease in

new orders in the late 1980s; new orders for 1988 totaled 3 million

gross tons valued at US$1.9 billion, decreases from the previous

year of 17.8 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. These declines were caused by labor unrest, Seoul's unwillingness to provide financial assistance, and Tokyo's new low-interest export financing in

support ofJapanese shipbuilders. However, the South Korean shipping industry was expected to expand in the early 1990s because

older ships in world fleets needed replacing.

Automobiles and Automotive Parts The automobile industry was one of South Korea's major growth

and export industries in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the capacity

of the South Korean motor industry had increased more than

fivefold since 1984; it exceeded 1 million units in 1988. Total in- vestment in car and car-component manufacturing was over US$3

billion in 1989. Total production (including buses and trucks) for 1988 totaled 1.1 million units, a 10.6 percent increase over 1987,

and grew to an estimated 1.3 million vehicles (predominantly pas- senger cars) in 1989. Almost 263,000 passenger cars were produced

in 1985—a figure that grew to approximately 846,000 units in 1989. In 1988 automobile exports totaled 576,134 units, of which 480,119

units (83.3 percent) were sent to the United States. Throughout

most of the late 1980s, much of the growth of South Korea's auto- mobile industry was the result of a surge in exports; 1989 exports,

however, declined 28.5 percent from 1988. This decline reflected

sluggish car sales to the United States, especially at the less expensive end of the market, and labor strife at home.

The industry continued to grow, however, because of a surge

in domestic demand, up 47 percent during the first half of 1989.

In 1989, for the first time since car exports had doubled in 1985,

domestic sales surpassed exports; two-thirds of the cars manufactured were sold domestically. Most of the domestic demand came

from first-time car buyers whose savings had been buoyed by

double-digit wage increases each year since 1987. Other factors lead- ing to the growing domestic demand for motor vehicles included

stable or slightly decreased new car prices because of cuts in special consumption taxes, reduced fuel taxes, and growing econo- mies of scale by manufacturers.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the automobile industry was

subject to a series of government controls and directives designed

158
Ulsan shipyard, one of the world's largest

Courtesy Hyundai Corporation

159
South Korea: A Country Study

to nurture the industry and prevent excess competition. For most

of the 1980s, Hyundai was the only company permitted to manufacture passenger cars, but in 1989 Kia Motors and Daewoo were

allowed to reenter the passenger car business. In 1989 Ssangyong

Motors became South Korea's fourth car manufacturer.

South Korea's auto parts industry grew rapidly in the late 1980s,

from US$3.8 billion in 1987 to US$4.6 billion in 1988 (US$4 bil- lion produced locally). Automotive parts imports, most of which came from Japan, totaled US$610 million in 1988 (down from

US$700 million in 1987). In 1989 South Korean automobile and

parts manufacturers planned to spend more than 2 trillion won

(US$2.8 billion) on facility expansion, research, and development.

Armaments

South Korea is an important manufacturer of armaments, both

for domestic use and for export (see Military Production, ch. 5). During the 1960s, South Korea was largely dependent on the United

States to supply its armed forces, but after the elaboration of President Richard M. Nixon's policy of Vietnamization in the early

1970s, South Korea began to manufacture many of its own

weapons. These included M-16 rifles, artillery, ammunition, tanks,

other military vehicles, and ships. Aircraft were assembled under

coproduction arrangements with United States firms. Arms exports,

including quartermaster goods, vehicles, and weaponry, reached

nearly US$975 million in 1982 but declined during the rest of the

decade, reaching only US$50 million in 1988. In 1989 Seoul an- nounced that its fledgling aerospace industry was planning to produce an indigenously designed high-performance jetfighter for

its air force within two decades. The South Korean aerospace in- dustry also developed a Korean Fighters Program in cooperation

with McDonnell Douglas of the United States, with the goal of "ac- quiring the capacity to design and manufacture supersonic jetfighters."

Construction

Construction has been an important South Korean export in- dustry since the early 1960s and remains a critical source of for- eign currency and "invisible" export earnings. By 1981 overseas

construction projects, most of them in the Middle East, accounted

for 60 percent of the work undertaken by South Korean construction companies. Contracts that year were valued at US$13.7 bil- lion. In 1988, however, overseas construction contracts totaled only

US$1 .6 billion (orders from the Middle East were US$1 .2 billion), a 1 percent increase over the previous year, while new orders for

160
The Economy

domestic construction projects totaled US$13.8 billion, an 8.8 per- cent increase over 1987. The result was that South Korean construction companies concentrated on the rapidly growing domestic

market in the late 1980s. By 1989 there were signs of a revival of

the overseas construction market—the Dong Ah Construction Company signed a US$5.3 billion contract with Libya for the second

phase of Libya's Great Man-Made River Project, which, when all five phases were completed, was projected to cost US$27 billion. South Korean construction companies signed over US$7 billion

of overseas contracts in 1989.

Textiles and Footwear

Textiles, clothing, and leather products made up about 24 per- cent of South Korea's manufacturing output in 1980. Over 10,000

textile and footwear enterprises employed more than four workers

each, and 34,000 smaller shops manufactured such products in

1978. Throughout the 1980s, textiles played a critical role in Seoul's

exports, accounting for US$11.9 billion, or 19.6 percent of total export earnings. In 1989 the export of textiles (valued at US$15,340

million) grew 8.5 percent over the 1988 level. Textile manufacturers, concerned about diminishing export competitiveness because

of wage increases and won revaluation, expanded their overseas investments in 1987 and 1988. Seoul approved sixty-six investment

projects totaling US$38.4 million from January 1, 1978, through

the end of September 1988. Most of these investments were locat- ed in the Caribbean Basin region and Southeast Asia. Upgrading

product lines—particularly towards high fashion—and further shift- ing to the expanding domestic market were expected to cause slow

growth in the industry in the early 1990s.

South Korea's footwear industry also expanded in the late 1980s.

Footwear exports in 1988 totaled US$3.8 billion, a 34.7 percent

increase over 1987, 6.3 percent of Seoul's total exports by value.

Economic forecasters, however, predicted that the industry would

decline in the 1990s despite the surge of orders in 1989; they at- tributed the 1989 surge to political unrest in China, normally a major producer of footwear.

Chemicals

The chemical industry began full production in the 1970s.

Although dependent on imports of raw materials and certain hightechnology commodities, the chemical industry supplied many of

the intermediate inputs for textile, plastic, synthetic rubber, rubber shoe, and paint factories, and had made South Korea virtually

self-sufficient in fertilizers. The chemical fertilizer industry, a

161
South Korea: A Country Study

large part of the chemical industry, met most of South Korea's

domestic consumption demands.

In 1987 chemical and pharmaceutical exports increased by 27

percent over the previous year, but accounted for only 2.8 percent

of total exports; imports in that category comprised 11.2 percent

of total imports. The chemical industry was expected to expand

in the early 1990s, with new capacity coming online and Seoul committed to spending money for research and development and constructing new production facilities. Pharmaceuticals, agricultural

chemicals, dyes, pigments, paint, perfumes, surface active agents

(surfactants) including synthetic detergents, and catalysts were tar- geted as major areas for investment.

In the late 1980s, petrochemical production facilities included

twenty-five companies, thirty-six plants, two naphtha crackers, and

three aromatics extraction plants, with an aggregate total production capacity of 505,000 tons of ethylene per annum. There were

two large petrochemical complexes, one in Ulsan, the other in Yosu.

South Korea was an important producer of chemical fertilizers in

the late 1970s (671,000 nutrient tons exported in 1980), but both

exports and production declined in the 1980s.

Energy

The Korean Peninsula is only modestly endowed with natural

resources, and North Korea has far more natural resources than

South Korea. During the Japanese colonial period (1910-45), the

north served as the center for mining and industry whereas the

south, with somewhat greater rainfall, a warmer climate, and slightly greater arable terrain, served as the center for rice production,

(see Physical Environment, ch. 2). South Korea's mineral production is not adequate to supply its manufacturing output. Energy needs are also met by importing

bituminous and anthracite coal and crude petroleum. In 1987 approximately 23.4 million tons of anthracite coal, approximately

4,000 tons of tungsten, 565,000 tons of iron ore, and 47,000 tons of zinc ore were mined. Lesser amounts of copper, lead, molybdenum, gold, silver, kaolin, and fluorite also were mined (see fig. 9). Energy producers were dominated by government enterprises,

although privately operated coal mines and oil refineries also existed. In 1990 South Korea still had no proven oil reserves. Offshore oil possibilities in the Yellow Sea and on the continental shelf between Korea and Japan yielded nothing through the 1980s, but

exploration continued. South Korea's coal supply was both insuffi- cient and of low quality. The potential for hydroelectric power was

very limited because of tremendous seasonal variations in the

162
The Economy

weather and the concentration of most of the rainfall in the sum- mer months. Accordingly, Seoul placed an increasingly heavy emphasis on developing nuclear power generation.

Electric power in South Korea was provided by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). When KEPCO's predecessor,

KECO, was founded in 1961, annual power production was 1,770

million kilowatt-hours (kwhr); production reached 73,992 million

kwhr in 1987. The ratio of usage during 1987 was 17.9 percent

for residential customers, 16.2 percent for public and service businesses, and 65.9 percent for the industrial sector. Energy used in

electric power generation consisted primarily of nuclear, coal, oil, and liquified natural gas (LNG). Of the 54,885 million kwhr of

electricity generated in 1985, 22 percent came from nuclear plants

then in operation, 74 percent from thermal plants (oil and coal),

and 4 percent from hydroelectric sites. It was predicted in 1988

that the generation structure by the year 2000 would be 10.2 per- cent hydroelectric, 12.2 percent oil, 22.9 percent coal, 10.2 per- cent LNG, and 44.5 percent nuclear.

South Korea placed a heavy emphasis on nuclear power generation. The country's first nuclear power plant, the Kori Number

One located near Pusan, opened in 1977. Eight plants were operational in 1987 when atomic power generation was an estimated

71,158 million kilowatts, or 53.1 percent of total electric power.

South Korea's first antinuclear protests occurred in December

1988 when residents near the Kori complex demonstrated against

low-level waste that had been secretly buried just outside the plant.

In 1989 residents near other nuclear reactors protested the environmental damage they said was caused by the units. Sixteen antinuclear

groups joined together to form the Movement for the Eradication

of Nuclear Power Plants. The government, however, asserted that

the South Korean nuclear program was well run and that none

of the 193 antinuclear protests reported since 1977 was serious.

Agriculture

At the start of the economic boom in 1963, the majority of South

Koreans were farmers. Sixty-three percent of the population lived

in rural areas. In the next twenty-five years, South Korea grew

from a predominandy rural, agricultural nation into an urban, newly industrialized country and the agricultural workforce shrunk to only 21 percent in 1989 (see fig. 10). Government officials expected

that urbanization and industrialization would further reduce the

number of agricultural workers to well under 20 percent by 2000.

South Korea's agriculture had many inherent problems. South

Korea is a mountainous country with only 22 percent arable land

163
South Korea: A Country Study

Seoul

Demarcation line and demilitarized zone,

Hwach'dn • ^ 9

Ch'dngp'ybng-ni

Fe

Mukho

9

' nUL.SamclTdk

Inch'dn q q

'Fe

Changhang

Mokp'o

<?0 a

Ulsan

3 AlDC

Pusan

Chinhae

Vdsu Cft 'ungmu

A

1

B

National capital Populated place

Iron and steel Shipbuilding and repair Textiles Food processing Q> Chemicals Cement

^ Fertilizer Plywood and veneer A Smelter Automotive assembly

Electronics

(Ife Petroleum refining j£l Thermal electric power

ft Hydroelectric power

Major fishing port W Tungsten Fe Iron ore Cu Copper Sn Tin G Graphite Ka Kaolin j Anthracite coalfield

Source: Based on information from K.P. Wang et al., Mineral Industries of the Far East and

South Asia, Washington, 1988, 74-75. Figure 9. Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 1988

164
The Economy

and less rainfall than most other neighboring rice-growing countries (see Land Area and Borders; Climate, ch. 2). A major land

reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s spread ownership of land

to the rural peasantry. Individual holdings, however, were too small

(averaging one hectare, which made cultivation inefficient and dis- couraged mechanization) or too spread out to provide families with

much chance to produce a significant quantity of food. The enor- mous growth of urban areas led to a rapid decrease of available

farmland, while at the same time population increases and bigger

incomes meant that the demand for food greatly outstripped supply. The result of these developments was that by the late 1980s

roughly half of South Korea's needs, mainly wheat and animal feed corn, was imported.

Compared with the industrial and service sectors, agriculture

remained the most sluggish sector of the economy. In 1988 the contribution of agriculture to overall GDP was only about 10.8 percent, down from approximately 12.3 percent the previous year. Most economists agreed that the country's rural areas had gained more than they had contributed in the course of industrialization.

Still, the growth of agricultural output, which averaged 3.4 per- cent per year between 1945 and 1974, 6.8 percent annually during the 1974-79 period, and 5.6 percent between 1980 and 1986, was credible. The gains were even more impressive because they

added to a traditionally high level of productivity. On the other

hand, the overall growth of the agriculture, forestry, and fishing

sector was only 0.6 percent in 1987 as compared with the manufacturing sector, which grew 16 percent during 1986 and 1987. During the first half of 1989, the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sector grew 5.9 percent, as opposed to manufacturing's 2.9 percent.

Major Crops

Rice was the most important crop and yields were impressive.

As noted by Donald S. Macdonald, however, rising wage levels and land values have made it expensive to produce. Rice represented about 90 percent of total grain production and over 40 percent

of farm income; the 1988 rice crop was 6.5 million tons. Rice was

imported in the 1980s, but the amount depended on the success of domestic harvests. The government's rice support program

reached a record US$1 .9 billion in 1986, as compared with US$890

million in 1985. By raising procurement prices by 14 percent over

the 1986 level, Seoul achieved a rice price structure that was about

five times that of the world market in 1987.

Barley was the second most important crop. Its production

declined from about 1 .5 million tons in 1970 to about 561 ,500 tons

165
South Korea: A Country Study

1980 WORK FORCE = 13.7 MILLION

MINING AND

MANUFACTURING

23%

1988 WORK FORCE = 16.9 MILLION

OTHER

(INCLUDES CONSTRUCTION AND SERVICES) 51%

Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Information, Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook ofKorea, Seoul, 1982, 489; Byung-Nak Song, The Rise ofthe Korean Economy, Hong Kong, 1990, 109; and Europa World Yearbook, 1990, 2, London, 1990, 1556.

Figure 10. Employment by Sector, 1980 and 1988

166
The Economy

in 1988. Other crops included such grains as millet, corn, sorghum,

buckwheat, soybeans, and potatoes. Fruits and vegetables included pears, grapes, mandarin oranges, apples, peaches, Welsh onions, Chinese cabbage, red peppers, persimmons, cabbage, peaches,

and radishes. Other important cash crops included cotton, hemp,

sesame, tobacco, and ginseng. In 1988, livestock heads included

native Korean cattle (2 million), hogs (4.9 million), and poultry

(almost 59 million).

Forestry and Fishing

South Korean farmers have always used the nation's forests for

fuel and household products, but centuries of overutilization and

poor resource management had practically denuded the countryside by the end of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910). World War

II interrupted Japanese efforts to replace the ravaged forest stock

and the Korean War brought to a peak the destruction of Korea's

forests. After the 1950s, Seoul slowly developed the organizational

and technical expertise to save the nation's trees. Despite frequent

setbacks, reforestation had proceeded fairly successfully by the

1970s; the total volume of timber had grown from a low of 30.8

million cubic meters in 1954 to over 164.4 million cubic meters

in 1984. The density of the woodlands expanded from an average

of 4.8 to 17.8 cubic meters per hectare of forest during the same

period.

By 1984 over 20 percent of the nation's 6.5 million hectares of

forest belonged to the government; most was managed by the Office

of Forestry, a branch of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Another

8 percent was owned by local public authorities; 72 percent was

privately owned. In 1985 about two-thirds of South Korea was

covered by forests. Until the 1970s, reforestation had taken place

primarily in national forests; as a result of this situation, the density of government-owned forests was about three times greater than

that of private forests. Most forest owners were smallholders with

inadequate financial resources to purchase and maintain seedlings.

However, upon the introduction of the Saemaul Movement, an

ambitious rural development program launched by Park in 1971,

the performance of the Village Forestry Associations—similar to and often overlapping with the agricultural cooperatives—improved

significantly. Between 1972 and 1979, forestry agents and village

associations planted 1 .4 million hectares with 3.4 million seedlings.

Although the fuel needs of most farmers were met by wood from

local forests or coal briquettes, the growing industrial demand for timber was not adequately supplied by domestic production. In

1977 South Korea imported 88 percent of its timber, mostly from

167
South Korea: A Country Study

Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1985 South Korea imported US$538

million worth of wood, lumber, and cork; imports were US$549

million in 1986.

South Korea's fishing industry contributed both to the welfare

of the consumer and to export earnings. Although the value-added

income from fishing contributed less than 1 percent of GNP and

the fishing population decreased by over 18 percent during the 1970s

(to 745,000 persons), fishery products contributed 5 percent of the

value of commodity exports. Fishery production totaled 470,000

tons in 1962, 1.3 million tons in 1972, 2.6 million tons in 1982,

and 3.3 million tons in 1987. In 1988 South Korean fishing households earned about US$10,000 on average.

Most of the expansion of production in the 1970s and 1980s was

the result of deep-sea fishing operations. The major fishing ports were Ulsan and Masan. In the late 1980s, the production of sea- weed, oyster, and other products of coastal and offshore breeding

farms declined, but the catch of tuna and squid in deep-sea fishing

rose. Fishing trawlers brought in about 250,000 tons of pollock off the coast of Alaska in 1985, a catch that both contributed to the

South Korean diet and was exported to United States food processors. In 1985 there were 90,970 fishing vessels harvesting a total catch

of 858,471 tons. Of these vessels, 71,836 were motorized (836,633

tons) and 19,134 (21,838 tons) were nonmotorized. These numbers reflected a major change from 1962, when only 6,085 vessels out of 45,504 were motorized.

The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s

Agricultural labor costs rose as young people left rural areas for urban jobs, and farm work mainly was done by women and old men. Farmers' relative earnings improved during the 1970s, but

fell in the 1980s. The gap between incomes of urbanites and people in rural areas widened considerably in the late 1980s. In 1988

the average income of people in gun (counties) amounted to 79.1

percent of that of people in cities, as compared with 84.7 percent

in 1985. South Korean farming households earned about

US$12,000 in 1988, up 24.4 percent from 1987. In comparison,

the average income for an urban family in 1989 was about

US$15,000. Nonfarm income in 1989 comprised 39.5 percent of

average farm household earnings, as compared with more than 50

percent in Japan and approximately 70 percent in Taiwan.

Farm families accumulated debts averaging about US$4,620 per

household in 1988 and had average assets of about US$66,057.

The purchase of modern farm machinery as well as of many new

consumer goods contributed to higher debts. The 35 percent rise

168
The Economy

in assets between 1987 and 1988 mainly was because of a 41 percent

increase in the price of land. Budgetary pressures from the government on agricultural price supports also reduced farm income.

There was increased rental of farmland in the 1980s. The per- centage of rented farmland among total farmland rose from 2 1 per- cent in 1980 to 30.5 percent in 1985. The percentage of farm

households renting some of their land among total farm households

expanded rapidly from 37.1 percent in 1980 to 64.7 percent in 1985.

Nonfarmer ownership of tenant farmland also increased to 63 per- cent in 1985.

The farmers who rented land were mainly the small-landed farmers adversely affected by Seoul's agricultural open-door policy of

the 1980s. Under this policy, the government sought cheap cereal

prices by increasing cheap imports and promoted large-scale farming where crops could be produced more cheaply and efficiently.

In the early 1970s, a farm family could meet almost 100 percent

of household expenses by farming 0.5 to 1 hectare, but by 1985

such small plots of land only met 59.8 percent of expenses. Many

farmers had to rent extra land to augment their incomes.

Poor prospects on the farm depleted farm villages as the young

left and the old died. Parents sent their children to the towns and

cities for a better education. Young farmers who could not find

wives also left for the cities. The government initiated various programs to improve rural conditions. The most extensive of these was the New Community

Movement (Saemaul undong, known as the Saemaul Movement).

Its goal was to mobilize villagers in their own service. At first Saemaul projects were aimed at improving household living conditions.

Later, projects were directed more to the village as a whole and

included the construction of roads, bridges, irrigation ditches, and

common compost plots. Next, the program focused on more eco- nomic concerns—group farming, common seed beds, livestock

production, forestation, and even joint marketing and factories. Better health and sanitation as well as beautification of the environment also became program goals. The government provided the

materials and small amounts of money to the villagers, who supplied the labor. In the early 1980s, President Chun removed control over the Saemaul Movement from the Ministry of Home Affairs

and left most decisionmaking to the Saemaul leaders and bureaucrats, headed by the president's younger brother, Chon Kyonghwan. The Saemaul Movement initially was quite successful but

deteriorated in the early 1980s. Chon Kyong-hwan, arrested on

a variety of corruption charges in 1988, was accused of large-scale

169
South Korea: A Country Study

extortion and embezzlement while he was chairman of the move- ment between 1981 and 1987.

South Korea, a high-cost agricultural producer, prohibited unrestricted beef and rice imports and severely limited many other

agricultural imports. Foreign trading partners such as the United

States pressured South Korea to open up the agricultural market,

but Seoul said that its farmers would be hurt badly by the importation of inexpensive beef, rice, tobacco, and other products. In

April 1989, Seoul released a list of 243 agricultural products scheduled for import liberalization by 1991, but the list did not include

beef. In the late 1980s, many farmers, already deeply in debt, were

told by the government that they might have to compete in the

world market and took to the streets to protest against foreign demands and to demand further protection from the government.

In the late 1980s, farmers gained political strength through the

increased activities of various farm associations and the formation

of new organizations, such as the National Association of Farmers

(Chon'guk-nongmin hyophoe) established in 1987. The Korean

Catholic Farmers Association and Protestant Farmers Association

became active in 1987. These and other independent farm groups

applied strong pressure on the government to alleviate their problems.

Rural residents made up less than one quarter of South Korea's

voters, but they elected almost half of the National Assembly; thus,

they exercised virtual veto power over farming legislation.

Prospects

The long-term prospects for agriculture were not encouraging.

Traditionally the peninsula's rice basket, South Korea had not been

self-sufficient agriculturally for many years. In the late 1980s, almost

half the nation's foodstuff needs were imports, mostly wheat and

animal feed corn. Natural disasters compounded the problems of

farmers in the 1980s. As a result of these factors, the share of the

GNP provided by the agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector share

of the GNP shrank 5.2 percent in 1987.

However, the situation was not totally bleak in the early 1990s.

Although the purchasing power of the agricultural sector had been

declining since the early 1960s relative to other sectors of the econ- omy, the rate of agricultural productivity increased in the 1980s.

Livestock raising and rice cultivation had come to dominate the

agricultural sector over a variety of traditional agricultural pursuits.

Service Industries

Service industries included insurance, restaurants, hotels, laundries, public bath houses, health-related services, and entertainment

170
The Economy

establishments. There were thousands of small shops marketing

specialized items, large traditional marketplaces, and streamlined

buildings housing corporate and professional offices. Game rooms

featuring Ping-Pong tables, or billiards, and tearooms serving a

variety of beverages were located on almost every downtown city corner. South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics from September 18 to October 2, 1988, made 1988 a boom year for tourism.

More than 2 million tourists spent US$3.3 billion, an increase in

the number of tourists and the dollars spent, respectively, of 24.9

percent and 42.2 percent over 1987. Japanese visitors accounted

for 48 percent of the total; tourists from the United States made

up 14.9 percent. The Korean National Tourist Corporation predicted that in 1990 almost 3 million tourists would visit the country.

An improved transportation and communications infrastructure,

increasing incomes, enhanced consumer sophistication, and government tax incentives encouraged the development of a modern dis- tribution network of chain stores, supermarkets, and department

stores (see Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.).

In the mid-1980s, the largest employer of South Korea's ser- vice sector was retail trade. A growing number of workers were employed by the mostly department stores (most of which were owned by chaebol) that were opening rapidly in the downtown areas of major urban centers. The vast majority of retailers were small

merchants in cities, towns, and villages, each with a modest storefront, or stand, limited stock, and poor access to capital, but the

great majority of South Koreans made their purchases from these

small retailers. In 1986 there were approximately 26,054 wholesale and 542,548 retail establishments and 233,834 hotels and

restaurants that employed about 1 . 7 million people (these figures

probably do not include family members working in small stores)

.

The distribution system was far from perfect, and managers

recognized the need for better organization and management. Most

of the nation's wholesalers were located in Seoul and accounted

for most of the turnover of goods. Most of the sales outlets were

located in the heart of urban centers. Cargo truck terminals and

warehouse facilities were spread irregularly through city neighborhoods.

Money and Banking

When Park Chung Hee became president in 1961 , he organized

a highly centralized government with the power to direct the econ- omy. Park quickly nationalized all banks, took control of foreign

borrowing, and merged the agricultural cooperative movement with

171
South Korea: A Country Study

the agricultural bank. The government also took control of all forms

of institutional credit, giving Park great control over the business

community.

The government began to liberalize the banking system in the

mid-1980s by denationalizing several banks, but refused to allow

individual chaebol to acquire controlling shares in these banks. The

government still maintained strong managerial controls over these

banks through the Bank of Korea's Office of Bank Supervision and

Examination, which, under the guidance of the Monetary Board,

supervised and regularly examined banking institutions. Most of

the credit provided by these banks went to the chaebol, but the banks

also were required by law to make at least one-third of their busi- ness loans to small and medium-sized firms.

South Korea's financial sector in the late 1980s included a diversified commercial banking system, a securities market, and a wide

range of secondary financial institutions. The banks kept pace with

the rest of the economy, particularly after the liberalization and

modernization of financial institutions in the mid-1980s and the

establishment of the capital market system based on the Fifth FiveYear Economic and Social Development Plan.

The Bank of Korea was established as the central bank on June

12, 1950. Its major functions included the issuance of all currency;

the formulation and execution of monetary and credit policies; the

conduct of the bulk of foreign exchange control business; the

research, collection, and preparation of statistics on many aspects

of South Korea's financial system; and the supervision and regulation of the activities of private banks. The Bank of Korea en- gaged in loan and deposit transactions for the government;

additionally, the bank transacted various government business

activities. It also made loans to and received deposits from other

banking institutions; all banks maintained their solvency through

balances at the Bank of Korea.

South Korea's five major commercial banks (Chohung, Commercial, First, Hanil, and Seoul) were privately held. Together with

two city bank joint ventures—the Kor-Am Bank and the Shin-Han

(co-owned with the United States and Japan respectively)—there were 961 commercial bank branches across South Korea at the end

of 1987. Local banks were found in every province.

The Bank of Korea regulated all commercial banking activities under the provisions of the General Banking Act passed in 1954.

Commercial banks got their money through deposits from the

general public, international loans, and funds borrowed from the

Bank of Korea. The lending activities of commercial banks focused on short-term loans or discounts because long-term lending was

172

South Korea: A Country Study

still the prerogative of such specialized banks as the Korea Exchange

Bank, Korea Housing Bank, and National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation. In the late 1980s, the banking industry operated

according to a "prime" bank system whereby each major South

Korean bank was assigned one domestic commercial bank. Under specific legislation designed to achieve certain functions or to

assist special markets, six special banks received funds from the

government and from the sales of debentures.

Three other financial development institutions supplied credit

for business and government projects. The Export-Import Bank

of Korea extended medium- and long-term credit to both suppliers and buyers to facilitate exports of capital goods and services,

major resources development, and overseas investment. The Korea

Development Bank, which was the government's shareholder in state-run enterprises, raised funds from the government as well as from international financial institutions and foreign banks to fund

key industries and infrastructure projects. The Korea Long-Term

Credit Bank financed equipment investment.

Small and Medium-Sized Businesses

Small and medium-sized businesses—generally those with less than 400 employees—accounted for US$1 1 billion, or 32 percent,

of South Korea's exports in 1986. By 1987 these businesses generated an estimated US$14 billion, but the export percentage dropped

to 30 percent as large automobile and electronics groups led ex- port growth. Small and medium-sized businesses contributed 38.9

percent to the GNP in 1986 when calculated on a value-added basis. Many of South Korea's smaller firms manufacture specialized

parts or equipment for the larger chaebol. As is the case with keiretsu in Japan, many of the chaebol in South Korea assemble and market goods under their own brandnames, but rely on smaller support firms to manufacture most of the individual parts. Wages are

often lower in the smaller firms than at the chaebol, and working

conditions often are worse.

Starting in 1 983 , Seoul selected a number of the more promising smaller firms to receive special government assistance. These

businesses were eligible for a number of tax breaks, help in secur- ing financing, and consultations and technical education from the

Ministry of Trade and Industry. Small businesses were central to the government's policy of producing more sophisticated technology locally; additionally, they were critical to the government's

strategy of encouraging regional development away from the over- crowded area around Seoul. In 1989 the government announced

a plan to spend billions of won to help small and medium-sized

174
The Economy

industries seek structural improvements so that they could move

away from labor-intensive production in favor of technologyintensive production.

The Labor Force

Despite significant increases in wages in the 1980s, labor unions

in the late 1980s continued their wave of strikes demanding better

working conditions and wages. The ferocity and sheer size of the

labor movement caught management and the government by surprise. During his first year or so in office, President Roh Tae Woo

was confronted with considerable labor unrest; there were more

than 300 strikes in the first three months of 1989 (see Interest Groups, ch. 4). Emboldened by the political reforms of 1987 and

by reports that the rate of South Korea's economic growth was

greater than the improvements in their own incomes and life-styles,

many workers agitated for a greater share of the nation's prosperity

and sought more freedom and responsibility at the workplace and

an end to the traditional paternalism of management. Lost production was estimated to have climbed to US$6 billion in 1989 from

US$4.4 billion in 1988.

Workers were caught in a revolution of rising expectations, as a wave of rising urban land values and housing costs outpaced aver- age real wage increases of more than 70 percent during the 1980s.

Moreover, wages for manual workers, who were responsible for much of the production and export that fueled the economy, were much lower than the national average. In the late 1980s, working

families still found themselves struggling to meet minimum stan- dards of living. Employees also were expected to work long and

often erratic hours in exchange for steady employment and were

frustrated over a lack of benefits and individual say. One labor acti- vist noted in 1989 that the labor movement "is not a class struggle.

We just want better working conditions and better status for workers. We have been looked down on in Korea for a very long time. '

Worker complaints were focused on three areas: low wages, long

working hours, and a high number of industrial accidents. In 1986

the average wage of a South Korean worker was US$381 a month

(339,474 won), including overtime and all allowances. The basic

wage was US$287, or 255,408 won, but, according to the government, the basic wage necessary to sustain a "decent" way of life was US$588 (524,1 13 won). Thus, the average worker only earned

two-thirds of what the government thought necessary to sustain a family of four. In 1987 semiskilled workers typically received

US$1 .50 to US$2.00 per hour and worked fifty-five to sixty hours

175
South Korea: A Country Study

a week; unskilled workers worked twelve-hour days seven days a week, earning US$125 a month.

There were, however, dramatic increases in wages in 1988 and

1989. Labor stoppages in the manufacturing sector, coupled with

a scarcity of labor, led to 20-percent salary increases for workers

in the manufacturing sector in 1988 and 25-percent salary increases

in that sector in 1989. These raises later spread, increasing wages

across the entire economy 18.7 percent in 1989. By 1989 some South

Korean economists were worrying about the effect that skyrocketing wages would have on the cost of domestic-made goods and the

consequent impact on export prices. The situation was especially

worrisome because the wages paid to workers in South Korea's

major competitors were growing far more slowly.

South Korea was known for having the world's longest working

hours. In 1986 the Korean worker averaged about 54.7 hours a week. This situation was the natural consequence of the low wage

system that necessitated extended hours and extra work to earn minimum living expenses.

Wages and Living Conditions

The economic expansion of the 1980s caused rapid improvements

in the living conditions of many South Koreans, which does not

mean, however, that all lived comfortably. Indeed, one had only

to wander the narrow alleys of Seoul, Inch 'on, or other South

Korean cities to see poor living conditions. In 1990 families in slum

areas of Seoul usually had electricity and running water, as well

as a small range for cooking, a television, and a radio or two. But

living space was crowded, furniture was shabby, and buildings were

badly built and gloomy. People in poorer families seemed to be

fairly healthy and had adequate diets. The level of starvation, as well as the cost of some foodstuffs, seemed low. Beggars and the

homeless who wandered the streets were infrequent. Although there were some noticeable exceptions, farming families generally lived

in small houses, with few of the basic luxuries of middle-class ur- ban families.

Living conditions in South Korea's cities, however, were improving in the late 1980s. According to the Economic Planning

Board, in April 1988, the average monthly income in Seoul and

other major cities was 612,400 won (US$868) a rise of 16.1 per- cent over the previous year. A composite portrait of average middle-class families in Seoul

would show the following: a husband in his early forties, a wife

about six years younger, and two children, aged thirteen and ten. The family would live in a fairly small apartment, consisting of

176
The Economy

a hallway, one small bedroom with bunk beds for the children, a

small room with several bureaus and with mats as floor coverings, a television set and a videocassette recorder, and a hi-fi stereo. This

room would serve as an eating area and family room during the

day and as the parents' sleeping area at night. There also would

be a larger room partitioned off into three sections: a living room

with three elaborate easy chairs, a more formal dining area, and

a small kitchen with an oven-range, sink, washing machine, shelves,

and cabinets. The mother would stay at home; the father would

work from 9:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. six days a week. There would

be a fairly new car, probably a Hyundai, which the father would

use to drive to work.

A survey of income distribution in South Korea in 1985 and 1988

showed that average household income had risen on average 14.8

percent per year, from 5,857,000 won (US$8,645 based on the 1989

exchange rate of US$1 = 677.5 won) to 8,863,000 won (US$13,081).

The Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of income distri- bution, dropped slightiy from 0.3449 in 1985 to 0.3355 in 1988.

The comparable figure stood at 0.285 in Japan in 1985 and at 0.364

in the United States in 1978.

As noted by David I. Steinberg, economic growth translated into

fairly equitable income distribution when compared with other nations experiencing similar development and its attendant problems.

When Park took office, approximately 40 percent of the population lived below the poverty line; by the late 1980s, less than 10

percent of the population lived under the poverty line, although

incomes at the top of the scale had increased faster than those at the bottom. Salary increases had not been constant under Park's

regime because Park did not want high labor costs to detract from

the competitiveness of South Korean goods on the international

market. By the late 1980s, capital-intensive higher technology was more important. Further, although wages had increased substantially in the late 1980s, this increase was not because of the good

will of the chaebol or the government, but was the result of a great

many strikes and a shortage of skilled workers as industry expanded

and large numbers of workers moved to the Middle East to work

on construction projects.

The purchasing power of the average citizen rose rapidly in the

1980s. Real per capita GNP more than doubled between 1983 and

1988 (from US$1,914 to US$4,040) and was expected to reach

US$5,100 by 1991. South Korea was already transforming itself into a durable consumer society. By the late 1980s, television sets and refrigerators had become a standard part of the average household, and ownership of an automobile was not unusual. Families

177
South Korea: A Country Study

tended to consume more meat, fresh vegetables and fruit, canned

or processed foods, and to eat less rice than in previous decades.

They also dressed in modern fashions made from quality fabrics.

Higher incomes led to significant shifts in consumption patterns.

For example, in 1963 the average family spent 57.4 percent of its budget on food. Twenty years later, the share going to food had

fallen to 40 percent and was expected to continue to fall (but not

as rapidly as in the past). Despite the decreasing share of food in

the consumer budget, the absolute value of food consumed grew

regularly in the 1970s and 1980s and was expected to continue to do so in the 1990s. Rising incomes, the increased mobility of the

average person, and a high literacy rate demonstrated evident so- cioeconomic progress.

Industrial Safety

Of the almost 5 million workers employed in 70,865 South

Korean factories in 1986, some 142,000 (nearly 3 percent) were

so badly injured that they had to be hospitalized for more than four

days. There were 1,660 workers killed in industrial accidents, meaning an average ofjust over four workers died each day. Long working hours and bad working conditions contributed to high rates of injury and death.

Transporation and Telecommunications

Roads

Domestic transportation improved greatly during the 1980s, and

growth was evident in all sectors. The rapid improvement and ex- tension of public roads and the increasing availability of motor vehicles contributed enormously to the mobility of the population.

Approximately 51,000 kilometers of roadways spanned the country in 1988, 46.3 percent of which were paved. Express highways

facilitated travel between major cities and reached a combined

length of 1,539 kilometers in 1988, as compared to 86.8 kilometers in 1967 (see fig. 11). The 1980s saw the increased paving of

roads and the building of ultramodern highways around Seoul (especially in the vicinity of the Olympic stadiums) and between Seoul

and such major cities as Pusan and Taegu. In 1989 the government announced that it would start construction on nine new ex- pressways with a combined length of 1,243 kilometers. In 1996,

when the expressways and two additional projects were expected

to be completed, South Korea was expected to have twenty-one

expressways with a combined length of 2,840 kilometers.

The total number of motor vehicles climbed rapidly in the 1980s.

178

mgyang

® National capital

• Populated place

Expressway

Road

1111 Railroad

+ International airport

?

rill IL/ipdl pui I

1 25 50 Kilometers 25 50 Miles

P'ohang

Pusan

\Chinhae

\Masan c

Sea

of

Japan
The Economy

By 1987 there were approximately 845,000 passenger cars and

748,000 commercial vehicles, up from a combined total of about

744,000 in 1980. In 1988 South Korean automakers produced

504,000 vehicles for domestic sale and 576,134 vehicles for export.

In the first nine months of 1989, domestic sales reached nearly

800,000 vehicles.

The expansion and rapid improvement of South Korea's longdistance highway system led to the growth of an excellent intercity

bus system in the 1980s. In 1988 there were ten express bus companies operating a fleet of some 900 buses connecting all of the

major cities of Korea.

Subways and Railroads

In 1990 subways were gradually replacing buses as the main

means of transportation in Seoul. The Seoul subway, the first part

of which opened in 1974, was operated by the Seoul Metropolitan

Rapid Transit Company. In 1985 the system carried approximately

3 million passengers daily. In 1990 the subway had more than 200

kilometers of track, enabling commuters to reach any station within

the 45-kilometer radius of the capital city within an hour. One line connected Seoul with Inch 'on. Four subway lines served Seoul,

in addition to the lines of the Korean National Railroad.

South Korea has an excellent railroad network. The first rail- road, which linked Seoul and Inch 'on, was opened in September

1899. Other major lines were laid by the Japanese during the colonial period; these included lines originating in Mokp'o, Masan, and

Pusan. These lines connected to Seoul and to Sinuiju in North

Korea, where they were linked with the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The railroad network was badly damaged during the Korean War,

but it was later rebuilt and improved.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean National Railroad, a state-run corporation under the Ministry of Transportation, was

in charge of all rails and continued electrifying heavily used tracks

and laying additional tracks. As of 1987, the combined length of

the country's railroad network was approximately 6,340 kilometers, including approximately 761.8 kilometers of double-track rail- roads and 1,023 kilometers of electric railroads. Suburban lines were electrified and connected to the Seoul subway system. Rolling stock included 459 diesel locomotives, 90 electric locomotives,

133 motor coaches, and 370 electric motor cars. In 1989 Seoul

announced that it was studying the possibility of constructing highspeed railway systems similar to those in Japan and France.

Railroads in the 1980s were useful primarily in the transportation of freight, but they also were important for passenger traffic

181


South Korea: A Country Study

around Seoul and in the heavily-traveled corridor linking the capital with the southern port of Pusan. Although the railroad system

grew little during the 1980s (there were already 5,600 kilometers

of tracks in 1980), rail improvements—the increased electrifica- tion of tracks, replacement of older tracks, and the addition of rolling

stock—allowed rail traffic to boom. Some of the busiest lines south

of Seoul linking the capital with Pusan and Mokp'o had three or

four tracks. The 1980s also saw the introduction of high-speed trains

connecting Seoul with Pusan, Chonju, Mokp'o, and Kyongju. The

famous "Blue Train" between Seoul and Pusan (via Taejon and

Taegu) took only four hours and fifty minutes and offered two class- es of service, first class and special. In 1987 approximately 525 million passengers and 59.28 million metric tons were transported by

the railroad system.

Civil Aviation

Although most interurban travel was either by express bus or by train, air service between major cities was increasingly available and popular, especially among business travelers. Korean Air,

founded by the government in 1962 and privately owned since 1969, was South Korea's sole airline until 1988. Korean Air served nine

major domestic routes in 1988 and also offered international ser- vice to Japan, the United States, Canada, West Germany, France,

Hong Kong, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United

Arab Emirates. A second carrier, Asiana Airlines, was established

in 1988 to serve three domestic cities. Seoul's Kimp'o International

Airport nearly doubled in size by 1989 (largely because of the Seoul

Olympics) to accommodate the rapidly growing number of air travelers. There also were international airports at Pusan and

Cheju; another was planned for Ch'ongju.

Telecommunications

Communications services improved dramatically in the 1980s

with the assistance of foreign partners and as a result of the development of the electronics industry. The number of telephones

in use in 1987 reached 9.2 million, a considerable increase from

1980, when there were 2.8 million subscribers (which, in turn, was

four times the number of subscribers in 1972).

Radio, and in more recent years television, reached virtually ev- ery resident (see The Media, ch. 4). The Japanese established a

radio station in Seoul in 1927; by 1945 there were about 60,000

radio sets in the country. By 1987 there were approximately 42

million radio receivers in use, and more than 100 radio stations

182
The Economy

were broadcasting. Transistor radios and television sets have made

their way to the most remote rural areas. Television sets, now mass- produced in South Korea, became far less expensive; most city people and a significant number of rural families owned or had access

to a television. Ownership of television sets grew from 25,000 sets when broadcasting was initiated in 1961 to an estimated 8.6 million sets in 1987, and more than 250 television stations were broadcasting.

Foreign Economic Relations

Exports were the key to South Korea's industrial expansion. Until

1986 the value of imports was greater than exports. This situation was reversed, however, in 1986 when South Korea registered a

favorable balance of trade of US$4.2 billion. By 1988 the favorable balance had grown to US$1 1 .4 billion. Financing this persistent, although not unexpected, gap between domestic and imported

resources was a principal concern for economic planners. In the

1950s and 1960s, much of the trade deficit was financed by for- eign aid funds, but in the last two decades, borrowing from and

investment in international capital markets have almost completely

substituted for economic aid. Aid, Loans, and Investment

Foreign economic assistance was essential to the country's recov- ery from the Korean War in the 1950s and to economic growth

in the 1960s because it saved Seoul from having to devote scarce foreign exchange to the import of food and other necessary goods,

such as cement. It also freed South Korea from the burden of heavy

international debts during the initial phase of growth and enabled

the government to allocate credit in accordance with planning goals

(see The Post-War Economy, ch. 1). From 1953 to 1974, when

grant assistance dwindled to a negligible amount, the nation

received some US$4 billion of grant aid. About US$3 billion was

received before 1968, forming an average of 60 percent of all in- vestment in South Korea. As Park's policies took effect, however,

the dependence on foreign grant assistance lessened. During the

1966-74 period, foreign assistance constituted about 4.5 percent

of GNP and less than 20 percent of all investment. Before 1965

the United States was the largest single aid contributor, but thereafter Japan and other international sponsors played an increasingly

important role. Apart from grant assistance, other forms of aid were offered;

after 1 963 South Korea received foreign capital mainly in the form

of loans at concessionary rates of interest. According to government

183
South Korea: A Country Study

sources, between 1964 and 1974 such loans averaged about 6.5 per- cent of all foreign borrowing. Other data suggested a much higher

figure; it seemed that most loans to the government were concessional, at least through the early 1970s. International Monetary

Fund (IMF—see Glossary) data showed that imports financed

through such means as foreign export-import loans with reduced

rates of interest totaled 11.6 percent of all imports from 1975 to 1979. The aid component of these loans was only a fraction of their

total value.

During the mid-1960s, South Korea's economy grew so rapidly

that the United States decided to phase out its aid program to Seoul.

South Korea became increasingly integrated into the international

capital market; from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, development was financed with a series of foreign loans, two-thirds of which came

from private banks and suppliers' credits. Total external debt grew

to a high of US$46.7 billion in 1985. Positive trade balances in

the late 1980s led to a rapid decline in foreign debt—from US$35.6

billion in 1987 to an expected US$23 billion by 1991 . Account sur- pluses in 1990 were expected to enable Seoul to reduce its foreign

debt from its 1987 level of about 28 percent of GNP to about 10 percent by 1991.

United States assistance ended in the early 1970s, from which

time South Korea had to meet its need for capital investment on

the competitive international market and, increasingly, from domestic accounts. The government and private industry received funds

through commercial banks, the World Bank (see Glossary), and

other foreign government agencies. In the mid-1980s, total direct

foreign equity investment in South Korea was well over US$1

billion. The fact that South Korea was so dependent on foreign trade

made it very vulnerable to international market fluctuations. The

rapid growth of South Korea's domestic market in the late 1980s,

however, began to reduce that dependence. For example, a dramatic rise in domestic demand for automobiles in 1 989 more than

compensated for a sharp drop in exports. Furthermore, while

Seoul's huge foreign debt left it vulnerable to changes in the availability of foreign funds and in international interest rates, Seoul's

economic and debt management strategy was very effective. South Korea's philosophy concerning direct foreign investment

had undergone several major changes tied to the changing politi- cal environment. Foreign investment was not allowed through the

1950s. In 1962 the Foreign Capital Inducement Act established tax holidays, equal treatment with domestic firms, and guarantees of profit remittances and withdrawal of principal. Despite the

184
The Economy

provisions of the act, there was little foreign investment activity

until after the establishment of diplomatic relations between South

Korea and Japan in 1965.

Seoul had to mobilize both external and internal sources when

it launched its First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962.

The Foreign Capital Inducement Act was amended in 1966 to en- courage a greater inflow of foreign capital to make up for insuffi- cient domestic savings. A rapid inflow of investment followed until

1973, when the act was changed to restrict the flow of investments.

Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the government gradually

began to remove restrictions as domestic industries began to grow

and needed to be strengthened to cope with international competition. But until the early 1980s, South Korea relied heavily on borrowing and maintained a somewhat restrictive policy towards

foreign direct investment.

Donald S . Macdonald has pointed out that under the liberalization policy, restrictions on foreign direct investment were eased

in 1984 and 1985. Seoul changed its control policy on foreign invest- ment from a * 'positive list" to a "negative list" basis, which meant

that any activity not specifically restricted or prohibited was open

to investment. An automatic approval system was introduced under which all projects meeting certain requirements were to be immediately and automatically approved by the Ministry of Finance.

Seoul twice revised the negative list system after its initial introduction—first in September 1985 and again in April 1987—to open more industrial sectors to foreign investors. In 1984 there were 339 items, or 34 percent of the 999 items on the Korean Standard

Industrial Classification, on the negative list. As ofJuly 1987, there were 788 industrial sectors open to foreign investment. In the

manufacturing sector, 97.5 percent of all industries (509 out of 522) were open to foreign investment.

In December 1987, Seoul announced a policy to liberalize the

domestic capital market by 1992. The program called for liberalizing

foreigners' investment funds, offering domestic enterprises rights on overseas stock markets, and consolidating fair transaction orders.

Seoul planned to allow direct foreign investment in its stock market in 1992.

Of the total direct investment in South Korea from 1962 to 1986,

which amounted to US$3,631 billion, Japan accounted for 52.2

percent and the United States for 29.6 percent. In 1987 Japan in- vested US$494 million, or 44.9 percent of the total foreign investment of US$1.1 billion. Japan invested mainly in hotels and

tourism, followed by the electric and electronics sector. Direct in- vestment from the United States showed a remarkable increase since

185
South Korea: A Country Study

the early 1980s, accounting for 54.4 percent of the 1982-86 total investment. The United States invested a total of about US$255

million, or approximately 24 percent of the 1987 investment. Cumulative United States investment was about US$1 .4 billion by 1988.

There was a dramatic rise in foreign investment in the late 1980s.

Approvals of foreign equity investments reached an all-time high

of US$1,283 billion in 1988, a 16.6 percent increase over 1987.

As in previous years, approvals for Japanese investments were the

dominant factor; they totaled US$696 million (up 41 percent from

1987), followed by United States investors with US$284 million

(up 1 1 percent), and West European sources, US$240 million (up

14 percent). Investment approvals in the service sector doubled in

1988 to US$561 million, which included two large Japanese hotel

projects totaling US$344 million. Investment approvals in the

manufacturing sector, however, declined from US$775 million in

1987 to US$710 million in 1988.

South Koreans began investing abroad in the 1980s. Before 1967

there was virtually no South Korean investment overseas, but thereafter there was a slow growth because of Seoul's need to develop

export markets and procure natural resources abroad. In the 1970s,

South Koreans invested in trading, manufacturing, forestry, and

construction industries. By the early 1980s, a sharp reduction in

development projects in the Middle East led to a decline in South

Korean investment there. Mining and manufacturing investments

continued to grow throughout the decade. In 1987, out of a total South Korean overseas investment of US$1,195 million (745

projects), US$574 million was invested in developed countries and

the remaining US$621 million was invested in developing countries.

One of the most noticeable economic achievements in the 1980s was Seoul's reversal of the balance of payments deficit to a surplus. This improvement was largely attributable to strong overseas demand for South Korean products and to the reduction in

expenditures for oil imports. In addition, the "invisible" trade ac- count (monies from tourism and funds sent home by nationals)

had improved considerably in the late 1980s because of temporary

increases in revenue from tourism, receipts from overseas construction, and structural decreases in interest payments (see table 5, Appendix).

South Korea's success in achieving a balance of payments sur- plus, however, was not without some drawbacks. It led to harsh

trade disputes with the United States and other developed nations,

as well as to inflationary pressures. To cope with these problems,

Seoul had to modify its enthusiastic promotion of exports in favor

of a policy restraining trade surpluses within reasonable limits.

186
Sixty-three-story Daehan Life Insurance Building, a popular

tourist attraction and one of the tallest buildings in Asia

Courtesy Oren Hadar

187
South Korea: A Country Study

An important measure restraining the growing foreign trade imbalance between South Korea and the United States was Seoul's

decision to revalue the won against the United States dollar. A

stronger won made American imports cheaper, increased the cost of South Korean exports to the United States, and slowed, but did

not reverse, the growth in the South Korea-United States trade

deficit as of 1989. The United States pressed for further appreciation of the won in 1989. In April 1989, the United States Department of the Treasury accused South Korea of continued

' 'manipulation" of the South Korean currency to retain an artifi- cial trade advantage. South Korean officials and businesspeople,

however, complained that the already rapid appreciation of the won

was slowing economic growth and threatening exports. In May

1989, South Korea avoided being called an unfair trader by the

United States and forestalled possible United States trade sanctions,

but the nation paid a high price by promising to open up its agricultural market, ease investment by foreigners, and remove many import restrictions (see table 6, Appendix).

Foreign Trade Policy

Seoul stated in 1987 that its foreign trade policy was structured

for further expansion, liberalization, and diversification. Because

of the paucity of natural resources and traditionally small domestic market, South Korea has had to rely heavily on international

trade as a major source of development. Seoul also sought to diversify trading partners to ease dependence on a few specific markets

and to remedy imbalances in the present tendency to bilateral trade. Exports and Imports

The rapid growth of South Korea's economy in the late 1980s

led to significant increases in exports and imports (see table 7 , Appendix). In the wake of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea's

trade surplus exceeded US$1 1 billion and foreign exchange revenue had increased sharply. Seoul's trade with communist countries

surged in 1988. Trade with Eastern Europe was US$215 million,

trade with China almost US$1 .8 billion, and trade with the Soviet

Union US$204 million.

In 1989 total exports grew to US$74.29 billion, and imports to- taled US$67.21 billion. South Korea's annual trade exceeded

US$100 billion for the first time in 1988, making it the world's

tenth largest trading nation.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the commodity structure of

Seoul's principal exports changed from the production of primary

goods to the production of light industrial goods. After 1974 there

188
The Economy

was a rapid expansion in the production and export of heavy in- dustrial and chemical products. By 1986 the share of heavy industrial and chemical products in total exports had expanded to 55.5

percent (as compared to 18.9 percent in 1980) whereas the share

of light industrial products had shrunk to 40.9 percent (as compared to 71.1 percent in 1980).

South Korea had depended greatly on the United States and

Japan as its major trading partners, with 75.6 percent of all ex- ports going to these markets in 1970. Success at diversifying ex- port markets led to a reduction in the United States-Japan export

market share to 55.6 percent in 1986. The Middle East accounted

for 12 percent of South Korea's export trade from 1972 to 1977,

but its share declined to 5.2 percent in 1986 because of the col- lapse of the construction boom in the Middle East and the Iran- Iraq war (1980-88). Exports to Western Europe declined from 18.8

percent in 1979 to 15 percent in 1986. Exports to developing areas, such as Latin America (0.8 percent in 1972; 3.6 percent in 1986)

and Oceania (0.9 percent in 1972; 1.4 percent in 1986), grew.

Indirect Seoul-Moscow trade was estimated at about US$20 million in 1978, with Moscow importing electronics, textiles, and

machinery and exporting coal and timber. By the late 1980s, South

Korea's global fur trader, Jindo, was expected to produce US$20

million worth of fur garments annually in a joint venture with the

Soviet Ministry of Light Industry. South Korean businesspeople were offered such Soviet products as instruments for nuclear en- gineering and technology for processing mineral ores and concentrates. In the first ten months of 1989, bilateral trade between Seoul

and Moscow reportedly increased 156 percent from 1988 figures

to US$432 million.

Since the early 1960s, the structural pattern of imports had shown

changes, particularly in the relatively decreasing share of imported consumer goods and the accelerated growth of industrial supplies and capital equipment imports. The share of consumer goods

imported in 1962 was 24.1 percent of total imports; this share

declined to 9.8 percent of total imports in 1986 because of increased

South Korean production of these goods for the domestic market.

The declining share of raw materials as a percentage of imports

during the early 1970s was reversed in 1974 because of the increased

value of oil imports (caused by the 1973 war in the Middle East).

By 1979 crude oil was 25 percent of South Korea's total import

requirements. This figure dropped to 8.4 percent in 1988 because

of the use of other sources of energy and the decline in the price

of petroleum in the late 1980s.

189
South Korea: A Country Study

South Korean exports to the United States in 1988 rose to US$21.5 billion, a 17-percent increase over 1987; imports rose to US$12.8 billion, a 46-percent increase over the 1987 level. The per- centage of total South Korean exports destined for the United States market decreased to 35.3 percent in 1988 from 38.7 percent in 1987.

At the same time, the United States' share of total South Korean

imports rose to 24.6 percent, up from 21.4 percent in 1987. By 1988

Seoul's favorable balance had grown to more than US$8.7 billion. In 1989 imports rose to US$57 billion (up 18 percent from 1988)

whereas exports reached US$61 billion, a 2-percent increase from

1988. The trade surplus was reduced from US$11.5 billion to US$4.3 billion and was projected to decline even more. Invisible

receipts rose 10 percent, but payments, mainly reflecting a big in- crease in South Korean travel abroad, were up 20 percent. Thus,

the surplus on invisible trade was reduced from US$1.3 billion to US$400 million.

Korea in the Year 2000

The Setting

South Korea's high GNP growth rate during the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by growth in the labor supply and a rising share

of national product going into capital formation—from 15 percent

in the early 1960s to more than 30 percent in the late 1970s. In

1988 South Korean economic planners predicted that in the 1990s

the share of the GNP devoted to capital formation would not continue to rise and, in fact, might fall slightly. Lower birthrates and

an aging population would result in slow growth of the labor force. In the late 1980s, South Korean economic planners expected

growth to continue at somewhat reduced rates through 2000, a result of slower growth in inputs. Large increases in productivity,

however, could be expected to push GNP growth beyond 1988 levels. The rapid growth of exports had enabled the country to specialize in the products it made best and to import those it produced

less efficiendy. No change in this balance was foreseen. However,

domestic producers would have to rely more on the domestic market for growth than in the past. Protection of domestic producers

might prompt less productivity; but if competition against foreign

products were allowed, a favorable impact on productivity might

be expected.

The government borrowed heavily in the 1960s and 1970s to finance economic development. By the mid-1980s, South Korea

was one of the world's major debtors. South Korea recorded a

favorable balance of trade for the first time in 1986; there was an

190
The Economy

even more favorable balance in 1987. Funds generated from this trade surplus allowed South Korea to reduce its total foreign debt

to US$35.6 billion by 1987 and were expected to allow a further

reduction to US$23 billion by 1991. Since 1986 there had been

a drastic change in domestic savings, with savings growing to 36

percent in 1987 as compared to 33 percent in 1986. The twin fac- tors of increasing debt and low domestic savings that had threatened growth in the past had been mitigated to a considerable

degree.

The Role of Science and Technology

The most important sources of productive growth for South

Korean manufacturers had traditionally been directly or indirectly related to the ability of South Korean companies to acquire new

technology from abroad and to adapt it to domestic conditions,

rather than paying the cost of research and development. However,

as Seoul's industry and exports continued to evolve toward higher

levels of technology, domestic research and development efforts needed to be increased. Fortunately for South Korea, its high level of well-educated workers, who constitute a formidable brain trust for future research and development, are its major asset. The Seoul government began investing in technology research

institutes soon after the republic was established. The Korean Atomic Energy Commission founded in 1959 was responsible for research

and development, production, dissemination, and management of

technology for peaceful applications of atomic energy. In the

mid-1960s, the government established the Ministry of Science and

Technology to oversee all government research and development

activities and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology to function as an industrial research laboratory. In the 1970s, in order

to better coordinate research and development, two scientific communities were established—one in Seoul, the other near Taejon.

The Seoul complex included the Korea Institute of Science and

Technology, the Korea Development Institute (affiliated with the

Economic Planning Board), the Korea Advanced Institute of

Science, and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. Plans

for the Daeduk Science Town near Taejon were far more ambitious. Modeled after the Tsukuba Science City in Japan, by the

late 1980s the Daeduk Science Town accommodated laboratories

specializing in shipbuilding, nuclear fuel processing, metrology,

chemistry, and energy research. The government founded the

Korea Advanced Institute of Science to develop and offer graduate science programs, and it also encouraged universities to develop their own undergraduate programs in science.

191
South Korea: A Country Study

The tremendous growth of Samsung since the mid-1980s was

strong evidence of the high productivity in such modern industries

as electronics. The group's total sales nearly doubled (8.4 billion

won to 14.6 billion won) between 1984 and 1986, while the number of employees only increased from 122,000 to 147,000. The rea- son for this high degree of productivity was South Korea's move

away from labor-intensive industries to those that were highly au- tomated.

South Korean planners realized that the country needed to ad- vance quickly in such areas as high technology if the economy were

to grow while matching foreign competition. POSCO's decisions

to build the Pohang Institute of Science and Technology and the

Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology were ex- amples of this trend. POSCO also used a great deal of money to lure back more than 100 top South Korean scientists and researchers

who had emigrated abroad.

The Pohang Institute of Science and Technology also maintained

a major undergraduate and graduate school. By 1988 the institute

had a faculty of 132 teachers, about 500 undergraduate students,

and approximately 110 graduate students. Only one of every fifteen applicants was accepted and only those students who scored in the

top 2 percent of the nation's college entrance examinations were

allowed to apply.

POSCO's efforts represented a great change from the past. As

of the late 1980s, many of South Korea's younger scientists, technocrats, and economic planners in had received their graduate education in the United States. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the

government sponsored the scientific and technical education of

many graduate students at prestigious institutions, such as Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The success of the Pohang Institute of Science and Technology

meant that many of South Korea's future scientific and technical

leaders would be educated at home.

In 1 990 Seoul announced an ambitious plan to promote science

and technology so that high-technology activities would dominate

the economy by the year 2000. The Ministry of Science and Technology intended to coordinate technology-related projects between

government and industry in a variety of fields including semiconductors, computers, chemistry, and new materials.

The anticipated slowdown in economic growth could well be

counteracted by the continued high rate of capital formation, in- creased productivity of labor, and expansion of the education sys- tem. Until South Korea's per capita income reached that of the most

advanced industrial nations and as long as South Korea remained

192
The Economy

a

4 'follower" country benefiting from the experiences of others while

avoiding their mistakes, it was likely that strong growth would

continue.

In 1987 the Korea Development Institute issued a report, Korea

Year 2000, that profiled South Korean economic development in

2000. The Korea Development Institute noted that the industrial structure would be highly developed and would resemble that of

advanced countries inasmuch as high value-added industries, hightechnology industries, and soft industries grew relatively rapidly.

Further, changes in industrial structure were expected rapidly to reduce the demand for unskilled workers while simultaneously in- creasing the demand for professional and technical manpower,

resulting in further change of the employment structure. The Korea Development Institute also noted that the Ministry

of Science and Technology had prepared a long-range plan of

science and technology for the twenty-first century that took into

account limited available resources. Accordingly, Seoul selected

its comparative advantage areas, including informatics

particularly information storage and retrieval and electronic data

processing—, fine chemicals, and precision machinery in the short

term; biotechnology, new materials, and public benefit areas, such

as the environment, health, and welfare, in the mid-term; and

oceanography and aeronautics for the mid- and long term.

The Economic Future

The Korea Development Institute also forecasted in 1988 that

South Korea's per capita GNP would exceed US$10,000 early in

the twenty-first century. The institute predicted that Seoul would

enjoy a higher sustained growth rate than average through the

1990s; that the manufacturing industry would play a pivotal role in the economy in the twenty-first century; and that the service

industry would become knowledge-intensive in order to meet the

needs of a highly diversified industrialized society. The share of

the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) would sink

to nearly 5 percent by the turn of the century, whereas the secondary sector (industry) would rise to over 40 percent and the service sector would be at about 55 percent. Major areas of industrial

growth would include automobiles, electronics, and machinery.

In 1988 Kim Duk-choong of Sogang University listed five main

points that were expected to make the "Korean economic future

look bright." He noted that South Korea had drastically reduced

its foreign debts since 1985, greatiy increased the rate of domestic

savings, improved on the equitable distribution of income throughout the population, increased the role of small and medium-sized

193
South Korea: A Country Study

corporations in the economy, and made the transition from a labororiented to a technology-oriented economy. He expected that these

positive economic developments would easily outweigh existing

problems and lead to real growth in years to come. Kim's optimism had merit, but there were other important is- sues that could inhibit economic growth, for example, rising protectionist sentiments in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere.

Another problem was the fact that the chaebol tended to restrict subcontracting and to keep as much production as possible inhouse,

which meant that the smaller industries and businesses, which bore

the brunt of slowdowns in Japan, would not be able to act as shock

absorbers. Moreover, as South Korea moved up the technological

ladder, it would face stiff competition from advanced nations like Japan and up-and-coming nations like Thailand. There also was

the intangible problem of the resolve of South Korea's workers,

who labored six days a week with little vacation time. What effect would a slackening of resolve have on the South Korean worker

by the 2000? In general, the future of South Korea's economy

looked very bright, but there were enough intangibles to make ac- curate predictions difficult at best.

* * *

There are numerous excellent works on the South Korean econ- omy that offer a variety of perspectives. Historical studies charting the nation's colonial and modernization periods include Andrew

C. Nahm's Korea underJapanese Colonial Rule and Ramon H. Myers' and Mark R. Peattie's TheJapanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945.

Donald S. Macdonald's The Koreans provides information on the

Korean economy from colonial times through contemporary soci- ety. Among the general works on the postwar economy are David

I. Steinberg's South Korea's Economy and Chaebol; Han Sung-joo and

Robert Myers's Korea; Edward S. Mason et al.'s The Economic and

Social Modernization of Korea; Jene K. Kwon's, Korean Economic Development; G. Cameron Hurst Ill's Korea 1988; Alice H. Amsden's

Asia's Next Giant; David S. Bell, Jr., Bun Woong Kim, and Chong

Bun Lee''s Administrative Dynamics and Development; Karl Moskowitz's

From Patron to Partner; and The Rise of the Korean Economy by ByungNak Song.

Opposition groups' views of the South Korean economy are best

expressed in Minjungsa's Lost Victory. The Far Eastern Economic

Review publishes frequent articles on the economy, as does Asian

Survey. For a South Korean perspective on the economy, articles in

194
The Economy

the English-language Korea Newsreview and the various publications

of the Korean Economic Institute in Washington are valuable. (For

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

195

Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Hwaso Gate, with parapet, Suwon Castle
THE CRISIS OF JUNE 1987 brought public dissatisfaction with

the Chun Doo Hwan government to a head (see The Demise of

the Chun Regime, ch. 1). The next eight months saw the beginning of a compromise between the ruling and opposition camps

that marked a potential watershed in South Korean politics. Politicians who had been in exile or under house arrest for many years

returned to leadership roles. The media, unleashed from both censorship and official guidance, began a qualitative and quantitative

explosion. A newly critical press probed previously hidden aspects

of the military, the national security agencies, and the government more aggressively than ever before.

For the first time since the fall of the Syngman Rhee regime in

1960, the Republic of Korea produced a constitution through

deliberative processes rather than through military intervention or emergency measures. Moreover, elections for the presidency in December 1987 and for the National Assembly in April 1988 redefined the political process; a minority president leading a minority

party began a five-year term with full awareness that, at least in

the near term, compromise was necessary for political survival.

The search for the political middle ground was handicapped by

external pressures upon ruling and opposition parties alike. On

President Roh Tae Woo's right, conservative bureaucrats, military leaders, and Democratic Justice Party members held over from

the Chun period watched the president carefully. During the first two years of Roh' s rule, the rightists grew increasingly suspicious

of the process of compromise and upset with the direction taken

by South Korea's emerging left, both within and outside of the

political process. The traditional opposition parties—the Reunification Democratic Party and the Party for Peace and Democracy

led by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, respectively—felt similar pressures from younger and more progressive elements within

their parties, as well as from the more radical opposition outside

the political process. By mid- 1989 the Roh government appeared

to have reached its limit of reform and began to return to earlier

patterns of political control, including the broad use of the National

Security Act and national security agencies to limit dissent.

The National Assembly came into its own in the late 1980s and

at least temporarily achieved the balance of powers provided for

in the 1987 Constitution. For the first time in South Korea's his- tory, the government party, as a minority in the legislature, was

199
South Korea: A Country Study

forced to seek procedural and substantive compromises with three

opposition parties. Partisan conflict was temporarily muted for the

Seoul Olympics in September 1988 but surfaced again at the end

of the year in a series of legislative committee hearings concerning

corruption under Chun. Further debate in 1989 led to a political

compromise late in the year that resolved the question of the "legacies" of the Fifth Republic (1980-87) that had animated politics

in the legislature since the beginning of the Roh administration.

A judicial revolt in mid- 1988 forced the resignation of a chief

justice appointed by the Chun administration, the subsequent appointment of a more politically independent successor, and the

replacement of several dozen senior judges. An administrative re- form commission conducted a surprisingly independent investigation of numerous government agencies, including the national

security bodies that had long interfered in the political process. The pattern of politics outside the formal institutions of government continued to change as the 1990s began. New interest groups,

particularly within the intellectual professions, emerged to challenge

the government-sponsored professional associations in fields such

as journalism, teaching, and the arts. These developments in turn

often provoked heavy-handed responses from the government, long

accustomed to controlling professional organizations through na- tionwide umbrella groups. Cause-oriented groups of various political persuasions prepared to launch new parties, stimulated by

the prospect of local council elections to be held in 1990.

Many of the political developments of the late 1980s reflected

important and irreversible social and economic changes that had

occurred during the previous two decades. As the 1990s began,

a key question of South Korean politics remained the degree to which the development of a better-educated and more affluent

populace—essential to South Korean modernization, yet corrosive

of the older style of political leadership—would contribute to greater

political liberalization.

The Constitutional Framework

Despite centuries of authoritarian and autocratic rule, reform

thinkers in nineteenth-century Korea had debated the subject of

government and advocated the rule of law and eventual constitutional government as early as the 1890s. The notion of a government limited by checks and balances under a constitutional order was not entirely new to the Korean political setting in 1945. Organizations such as the Self- Strengthening Society (Chaganghoe) used

translations to promote the study of numerous European constitutions and legal codes during the years just before Japan annexed

200
Government and Politics

Korea in 1910. During Japanese rule (1910-45), a self-styled

Korean government in exile in China drafted several charters and

constitutions. Within colonial Korea, a small Protestant community conducted self-governing denominational meetings in accor- dance with rules of parliamentary procedure. Japanese rule in

Korea, however, was itself largely exempt even from Japanese constitutional constraints (see Korea under Japanese Rule, ch. 1). Despite Korean interest in the idea of constitutionalism, therefore,

the colonial experience provided Koreans with little opportunity

to experience the practice of limited government.

Since the formation of an independent South Korean republic

in 1948, the term constitutionalism—as it is popularly understood

in Western democracies—has become a major focus of political

strife. Although the concept has been interpreted in various ways,

there has been at least a nominal consensus that constitutionalism

would foster, if not guarantee, a general framework for benevolent and effective government. The constitution would help protect

certain individual rights and provide safeguards against the concentration of power in the hands of a dictatorial group.

There have been numerous difficulties in adapting constitutionalism to South Korea, not the least of these being the reluctance

of incumbent leaders to step down peacefully and prepare for a

transfer of power through the constitutional process. The politics

of constitutional manipulation has been deadly serious, calculated

to bolster or prolong the tenure of incumbent presidents or to lend an aura of legitimization to a regime brought to power by a coup

(see table 8, Appendix). South Korea experienced its first peaceful transfer of power since independence only in 1987 (see Politi- cal Dynamics, this ch.). In most of the leadership changes prior

to 1987, the incumbents used forceful tactics—including martial

law and other surreptitious parliamentary maneuvers—to change

the constitution. The 1990s began with discussions of possible fur- ther changes in the fundamental law. It appeared that South Korea

had yet to escape a pattern in which both powerholders and their

political rivals perceived a constitution as a tool for holding power

rather than as a framework for long-term governance, and in which

each administration required one or more constitutional revisions.

The constitutional framework of the Sixth Republic, which started in 1987, was based on a constitutional bill that was passed by the

National Assembly on October 12, 1987, and subsequently approved

by 93 percent of the voters in a national referendum on October

28 (see The Legislature, this ch.). The bill was the product of painstaking negotiation and compromise among the major political parties

in the National Assembly, unlike the preceding two constitutions,

201
South Korea: A Country Study

which were essentially unilaterally drafted by the executive branch

and then submitted to referendums under emergency measures or martial law. The 1987 Constitution became effective on February

25, 1988, when Roh Tae Woo was inaugurated as president. The

new Constitution, which consisted of a preamble, 130 articles, and

supplementary provisions, strengthened the power of the National Assembly and considerably reduced the power of the executive.

Its adoption marked only the second time that the government and

opposition parties had produced a constitutional amendment bill by consensus in South Korea's modern history and the first time

that such cooperation had been successful (the first occasion, in

1980, was cut short by a military coup d'etat). The new fundamental

law, the first since 1960 not intended to extend the rule of the in- cumbent president, provided for direct election of the president, an issue the opposition parties had campaigned for since 1985. It also eliminated or modified a number of provisions that had come

under criticism since theyusin (revitalization) constitutional amendment in 1972.

The 1987 Constitution declares South Korea a democratic republic, its territory consisting of "the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands. " Popular sovereignty is the norm of the state; all public

officials are described as servants of the people; and the tenure and

political impartiality of these officials are protected by the provisions of law. In language not found in earlier constitutional amendments, the Constitution states that the "Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy." In another innovation clearly aimed at the past influence of

the military on politics and political succession, the Constitution

stipulates that "political neutrality shall be maintained" by the

armed forces. The section on fundamental rights reflects continued evolution

toward the affirmation of civil rights and due process of law (see

Human Rights, this ch.). Individuals may not be punished, placed

under preventive restrictions, or subjected to involuntary labor "except as provided by law and through lawful procedures. '

' The protection of habeas corpus, restored in the 1980 constitution but rarely

honored in practice in political cases under the Chun government,

is further reinforced. People detained or arrested must be informed

of the reason and of their right to be assisted by counsel. Family

members of those arrested or detained must be informed of the

fact "without delay." Prosecutors' failure to indict a criminal sus- pect or accused person placed under detention might entitle the

person to claim compensation for wrongful arrest. Warrants must

202
Late nineteenth-century

and early twentieth-century

buildings, Seoul

Courtesy Carpenter Collection,

Library of Congress

be issued by a judge "through due procedures" rather than at the mere request of prosecutors, as had often occurred, especially in

political cases, in the past. Other new provisions include the right

of citizens to receive aid from the state if they suffer injury or death

because of the criminal acts of others; the autonomy of institutions

of higher learning; and recognition of extended labor rights.

The articles on rights, like other portions of the Constitution,

originated during a process of political compromise that deferred

a number of complex or controversial issues until a later date. A

number of new social welfare provisions were left to subsequent

legislation. These measures included aspirations to protect working women from unjust discrimination, state protection for citizens

incapacitated by disease and old age, environmental protection

measures, housing development policies, and "protection for mothers" (see Public Health and Welfare, ch. 2). As in earlier constitutions, the formal provision of a right was

often qualified by other constitutional provisions or by related laws.

The most significant of these pre-existing laws was the National

Security Act, which severely truncated rights of due process specified in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (1954)

for persons accused of a variety of political offenses.

The Constitution affirms both the right and the duty to work

and requires legislation for minimum wages and standards of working conditions to "guarantee human dignity." Special protection

203
South Korea: A Country Study

is provided to working women and working children. Except for workers in important defense industries, workers have the right

to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective

action—a marked change from the 1980 constitution, which stat- ed that collective action could be regulated by law. By 1990,

however, not all of the numerous laws that restricted the exercise

of labor rights had been thoroughly subjected to the scrutiny of

the Constitution Court (see The Judiciary, this ch.).

Chapter Nine of the Constitution, which is concerned with the

economy, continues the theme of the previous constitution in committing the state to fostering economic growth and foreign trade.

As was the case under the 1980 constitution, tenant farming is tech- nically prohibited, but leasing or proxy management of farmland

is recognized in the interest of increasing agricultural productivity

and rational land utilization. The new Constitution permits regulations designed to "ensure the proper distribution of income" and

prevent "abuse of economic power." In an implicit recognition

of severe disparities in regional development in the past, the state

is also charged with ensuring balanced development of all regions

of the country. The government is responsible for establishing national standards and for developing technical, scientific, and human resources. Separation of powers came from the political process as well as from the formal structure of government embodied in the Constitution. The Sixth Republic's Constitution provides greater formal

balance than earlier constitutions among the three branches of

government. In important substantive areas, it strengthens the legislature and the judiciary. In other areas, it sets broad policy guidelines but leaves legislation to the legislators. The resulting formal

checks and balances were reinforced by the outcome of the April

1988 general elections, in which the president's party—the Democratic Justice Party—lost a working majority in the legislature for the first time since the establishment of the Republic of Korea.

The process for amending the Constitution received public atten- tion in early 1990 when the Democratic Justice Party and two of

the three major opposition parties announced plans to merge and

to amend the Constitution to provide for a cabinet-responsibility

system. Proposed amendments to the Constitution could be introduced by the president or by a simple majority of members of the

National Assembly. A favorable vote of two-thirds of the National

Assembly members is required before amendments can be placed

before a national referendum. To be successful, amendments re- quire a majority vote by at least one-half of the electorate eligible

204
Government and Politics

to vote in general elections. An incumbent president may not benefit

from an amendment extending the term of the presidency.

The Government

The Legislature

The unicameral National Assembly consists, according to the

Constitution, of at least 200 members. In 1990 the National Assembly had 299 seats, 224 of which were directly elected from singlemember districts in the general elections of April 1988. Under

applicable laws, the remaining seventy-five representatives were

appointed by the political parties in accordance with a proportional

formula based on the number of seats won in the election. By law,

candidates for election to the National Assembly must be at least thirty years of age. As part of a political compromise in 1987, an

earlier requirement that candidates have at least five years' con- tinuous residency in the country was dropped to allow Kim Dae

Jung, who had spent several years in exile in Japan and the United States during the 1980s, to return to political life. The National Assembly's term is four years. In a change from the more

authoritarian Fourth Republic and Fifth Republic (1972-80 and

1980-87, respectively), under the Sixth Republic, the National Assembly cannot be dissolved by the president.

Legislators are immune from arrest or detention, except in cases of flagrante delicto, while the National Assembly is in session. If an arrest occurs before the National Assembly session begins, the

legislator concerned must be released for the duration of the ses- sion. National Assembly members also enjoy legal immunity for statements made in that forum. Greater freedom of the media and

independence of the courts, combined with the power of the opposition parties in the legislature, gave greater substance to this immunity during the first two years of the Sixth Republic than under

the preceding government, when prosecutors and the courts did

not honor such immunity.

The position of the National Assembly in the Constitution is much stronger than it had been under the Fifth Republic (see ta- ble 9, Appendix). The annual session of the National Assembly was extended to 100 days. Extraordinary sessions of thirty days

each might be called by as little as one-quarter of the membership

(versus one-third in the 1980 constitution), and there was no limit on the number of such sessions that could be called each year. The

power to investigate state affairs also was strengthened. The National Assembly now held the power to remove the prime minister

or a cabinet minister at any time, rather than having to wait a year

205
South Korea: A Country Study

following appointment, as had been the case before. The consent

of the National Assembly was required for the appointment of all Supreme Court justices, not just the chief justice. The National

Assembly performed a tie-breaking function in presidential elec- tions and was required to approve or to disapprove presidential

emergency measures before they took effect, time permitting.

Failure to obtain National Assembly approval would void the emer- gency measures. The Executive

The president, according to the Constitution, is head of state, chief executive of the government, and commander in chief of the

armed forces. The Constitution and the amended Presidential Election Law of 1987 provide for election of the president by direct, secret ballot, ending sixteen years of indirect presidential elections

under the preceding two governments. Presidential succession is for a single five-year term by direct election, which must be held

at least thirty days before the incumbent president retires. If a presidential vacancy should occur, a successor must be elected within

sixty days, during which time presidential duties are to be performed

by the prime minister or other senior cabinet members in the order

of priority as determined by law. While in office, the chief executive is exempt from criminal liability except for insurrection or

treason. The president may, at his own discretion, refer important policy matters to a national referendum, declare war, conclude peace

and other treaties, appoint senior public officials, and grant amnesty (with the concurrence of the National Assembly). In times

of serious internal or external turmoil or threat, or economic or

financial crises, the president may assume emergency powers "for

the maintenance of national security or public peace and order."

Emergency measures may be taken only when the National Assembly is not in session and when there is no time for it to con- vene. The measures are limited to the "minimum necessary."

The 1987 Constitution deleted the 1980 constitution's explicit

powers to temporarily suspend the freedoms and rights of the people. However, the president is permitted to take other measures

that could amend or abolish existing laws for the duration of a crisis. It is unclear whether such emergency measures could temporarily suspend portions of the Constitution itself. Emergency measures must be referred to the National Assembly for concurrence. If not

endorsed by the assembly, the emergency measures can be revoked;

laws overridden by presidential orders regain their original effect. In this respect, the power of the legislature is more vigorously

206
Government and Politics

asserted than in cases of ratification of treaties or declarations of

war, in which the Constitution simply states that the National Assembly "has the right to consent" to the president's actions. In a change

from the 1980 constitution, the 1987 Constitution stated that the

president is not permitted to dissolve the National Assembly.

The president works out of an official residence called the Blue

House, so named because of the building's blue roof tiles. He is assisted by the staff of the Presidential Secretariat, headed by a

cabinet-rank secretary general. Apart from the State Council, or

cabinet, the chief executive relies on several constitutional organs

(see fig. 12).

These constitutional organs include the National Security Council, which provides advice concerning the foreign, military, and

domestic policies bearing on national security. Chaired by the president, the council in 1990 had as its statutory members the prime

minister, the deputy prime minister, the ministers for foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and national defense, the director of

the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP, known as the

Korean Central Intelligence Agency—KCIA—until December

1980), and others designated by the president. Another body was

the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy, inaugurated in June 1981 under the chairmanship of the president. From

its inception, this body had no policy role, but rather appeared to serve as a government sounding board and as a means to disburse

political rewards by providing large numbers of dignitaries and

others with titles and opportunities to meet periodically with the

president and other senior officials. The president also was assisted in 1990 by the Audit and Inspection Board. In addition to auditing the accounts of all public insti- tutions, the board scrutinized the administrative performance of

government agencies and public officials. Its findings were reported

to the president and the National Assembly, which itself had broad

powers to inspect the work of the bureaucracy under the provisions of the Constitution. Board members were appointed by the

president.

One controversial constitutional organ was the Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen, which replaced a smaller body in February

1988, just before Roh Tae Woo was sworn in as president. This

body was supposed to be chaired by the immediate former president; its expansion to eighty members, broadened functions, and

elevation to cabinet rank made it appear to have been designed,

as one Seoul newspaper said, to "preserve the status and position

of a- certain individual. " The government announced plans to reduce the size and functions of this body immediately after Roh's

207
South Korea: A Country Study

PRESIDENT

PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING

AUDIT AND INSPECTION BOARD

PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY FORCE

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON STATE

AFFAIRS ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PEACEFUL UNIFICATION POLICY CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE CENTRAL ELECTION MANAGEMENT

COMMITTEE

NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISORY

COUNCIL

|SUBBLOCKS|

I TEAMS |

1SUBBL0CKS|

I TEAMS

| TOWNS || TOWNSHIPS |

j BLOCKS | j VILLAGES | [sUBBLOCKsj TEAMS

Figure 12. Structure of the Government, 1989

inauguration. Public suspicions that the council might provide for- mer President Chun with a power base within the Sixth Republic were rendered moot when Chun withdrew to an isolated Buddhist

temple in self-imposed exile in November 1988.

The State Council

The top executive body assisting the president in 1990 was the

208
Government and Politics

State Council, or cabinet, the members of which in 1990 included

the president, the prime minister, and from fifteen to thirty heads

of various ministries and their equivalents. More often a technocrat

than a politician, the prime minister is appointed by the president

with the consent of the National Assembly. Other cabinet members, also presidential appointees, are supposed to be recommended

by the prime minister but actually are chosen by the president.

As was also true under the 1980 constitution, no member of the

military may hold a cabinet post unless he is retired from active

service.

The State Council is responsible for the formulation and implementation of basic plans and policies concerning a wide range

of government functions. The results of deliberation by the council are conveyed to the Presidential Secretariat and the Office of

the Prime Minister, the two principal units responsible for coordination and supervision relating to various government agencies.

Given the importance of economic performance to the stability and

security of the nation, the Economic Planning Board plays a significant role in the administrative and economic process. The

minister of the board by law doubles as deputy prime minister;

his senior assistants, many of them holding advanced degrees from

foreign universities, have been among the ablest public servants

in the country.

As South Korean observers have noted, the president's power

to appoint persons to senior and deputy ministerial positions not

only has administrative significance but also is an important political tool for balancing factional interests within the president's party

and for rewarding loyalty. The South Korean media closely scruti- nize high-level appointments for clues to politics within the ruling

party. The announcement in early 1990 of plans to merge the rul- ing party and two of the three major opposition parties and to insti- tute a cabinet-responsibility form of government produced even more intensive interest in cabinet appointments.

In 1989 a presidentially appointed Administration Reform Commission concluded a fourteen-month study concerning the struc- ture of the government. In reporting its findings to the president,

the panel proposed a number of changes, including the merger or

abolition of several State Council ministries and other government

agencies. Faced with strenuous lobbying by officials of the agencies concerned, the ruling party and government administration

tabled most of the recommendations. Several proposals were implemented. The new Ministry of Culture, established in late 1989

from the former Ministry of Culture and Information, was placed

209
South Korea: A Country Study

under the initial direction of Yi O-yong, a prominent essayist and

literary critic. The new ministry continued the cultural and artistic functions of its predecessor and also took over responsibilities

concerning national and public libraries and national language policy

from the Ministry of Education. The establishment of the Ministry of Environment, upgraded from the former Office of Environment within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, acknowledged

that national development over the preceding three decades had

often neglected environmental concerns. Its establishment redeemed

a pledge made in both the 1980 and 1987 constitutions that the

people of South Korea ''shall have the right to a healthy and

pleasant environment," and that the government would take measures for environmental protection.

The Presidential Secretariat

The Presidential Secretariat, often referred to in the Western

media as the Blue House staff, in 1 990 included a secretary general

of cabinet rank and six or seven senior secretaries with responsibility for political, economic, and other specialized areas. As in

other political systems, these top aides enjoyed special presidential confidence. They were widely believed to control access to the

chief executive and to influence personnel appointments and policy

decisions.

The Judiciary

The administration of justice was the function of the courts as established under the Constitution and the much-amended Court

Organization Law of 1949. A number of provisions of the 1987

Constitution were intended to improve judicial independence, which was long held, even within the judiciary itself, to be inadequate

(see Events in 1988, this ch.; table 10, Appendix).

At the top of the court system in 1990 was the Supreme Court,

whose justices served six-year terms, giving them a measure of independence from the president, whose single term was only five years

(lower-level judges served ten-year terms.) All other judges were

appointed by the Conference of Supreme Court Justices and the

chief justice. This process reverses the more centralized appointment process that had been in place since theyustn system of 1972,

in which the chief justice (under the direction of the president, in

practice) appointed lower court judges. All but the chiefjustice may

be reappointed. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal

in all cases, including courts-martial; except for death sentences,

however, military trials under extraordinary martial law may not

be appealed.

210
Government and Politics

High Courts in Seoul, Kwangju, and Taegu hear appeals against

decisions of lower courts in civil and criminal cases. They also may

assume jurisdiction over litigation brought against government

agencies or civil officials. Courts of first instance for most civil and

criminal matters are the district courts in Seoul and major provincial

cities. The Family Court in Seoul handles matrimonial, juvenile,

and other family law matters; in other cities such issues are adjudicated in the district courts. The Constitution divides responsibility for constitutional review

of laws and administrative regulations between the Supreme Court

and the Constitution Court. The Supreme Court reviews only regulations, decrees, and other enactments issued by the various ministries of other government agencies. The constitutionality or legality

of the regulation to be reviewed must be at issue in an ongoing

trial. The Constitution Court has much broader powers. It decides on the constitutionality of laws enacted by the National Assembly

when requested by a court to aid in the resolution of a trial, or

in response to a constitutional petition, which may be brought by

any person who has exhausted available legal remedies. The Constitution Court also has exclusive power to rule on the dissolution

of political parties and impeachment of the president, cabinet members, and other high officials. All nine members of the Constitution Court must be qualified to be judges. The president, National

Assembly, and chiefjustice each select three members of the court's nine-member panel.

The Constitution Court began operation in late 1988. Unlike

its predecessors, which since the early 1960s had made only three

rulings, the new body gave rulings in 400 of the more than 500

cases considered during its first year. Most of the cases heard were

constitutional petitions. In a series of major decisions, the court declared unconstitutional a law prohibiting creditors from suing

the government, directed the National Assembly to revise a portion of the National Assembly Law requiring independent candidates to pay twice the deposit of party-affiliated candidates, declared

the Act Concerning Protection of Society unconstitutional, and upheld the constitutionality of a law prohibiting third-party involvement in labor disputes.

The Civil Service

For centuries the most honored profession in Korea was government service, which had been more or less preempted by the scholarofficial class (see Traditional Social Structure, ch. 2). In modern

South Korea, however, the civil service has lost some of its earlier

prestige, partly because financially rewarding jobs have been more

211
South Korea: A Country Study

plentiful in private industry and commerce. Nonetheless, the upper levels of the civil service, particularly in the economic ministries, generally draw upon some of the best-trained and most

technically competent members of the population.

Civil servants have generally enjoyed reputations as competent

and dedicated, but the proverbial corruption in the bureaucracy

has also unfairly brought disrepute to the profession as a whole.

Efforts to eliminate malfeasance have been continuous, although

they have been perhaps most pronounced (in the fashion of traditional Chinese and Korean dynastic succession) after the assumption of power by a new regime. The record of reform often has

been mixed. In 1980 Chun Doo Hwan announced a far-reaching

program intended to "purify" the bureaucracy. Many South

Koreans welcomed investigations of former cabinet ministers and

the confiscation of large, unexplained fortunes from other leaders,

such as Kim Chong-p'il, accused of enriching themselves under

the preceding Park Chung Hee regime. Chun also dismissed more

than 200 high officials and 1,000 lower-level functionaries. Politi- cal motives were clearly evident in the ouster on vague charges of

all opposition politicians of any prominence and in the removal

of public officials and staff members of state-run corporations likely to remain overly loyal to the late president's political machine.

The anticorruption reforms of Roh Tae Woo, marked by great- er attention to due process and broad political participation than

those of his predecessor, won considerable public support. In his

presidential campaign, Roh had joined other presidential candidates in promising exposure of financial irregularities under the

Fifth Republic and had pledged broader disclosure of public offi- cials' assets through the amendment of existing laws. The first promise was largely honored. The question of Fifth Republic cor- ruption was dealt with through vigorous prosecution of former highlevel officials and relatives of former President Chun Doo Hwan

charged with abuse of power or other irregularities. The opposition parties played a major role in the process by participating in an unprecedented series of National Assembly hearings conducted in late 1988. These riveting sessions, often televised, attracted

millions of viewers, emptying the streets of Seoul while the hearings were taking place and drawing greater members even than

the broadcast earlier in the year of the Seoul Olympics. By late 1989, the courts had tried and sentenced numerous Chun relatives

and former high officials, including a former ANSP chief, on var- ious corruption or influence-peddling charges.

Despite these successes, the disclosure of senior officials' assets remained an elusive goal as the 1980s came to a close, hampered

212
Government and Politics

by the lack of legal measures to penalize nondisclosure. The National Assembly had finally passed a law concerning public ownership of property that would require land owners to register property

in their true names, but still had not ratified a more controversial

bill that would impose stiff penalties for the failure of assemblymen, ministers, and vice-ministerial level officials to report their

financial dealings.

The civil service is managed by the Ministry of Government Administration. Recruitment for the most part occurs through competitive examinations held annually in two categories, "ordinary"

and "higher" examinations. Those passing the higher tests generally are recognized as bright and able and are loosely known as members of the so-called higher civil service examinations clique.

They are given preference in appointment and over the years have

become the nucleus of bureaucratic elites scattered in three major

government functions—general administration, foreign affairs, and

the administration ofjustice. The foreign service and judiciary are

recruited through separate examination systems that are extremely

selective. Faculty members at state universities, although selected

according to traditional academic criteria rather than solely by ex- amination, also are part of the civil service system, as are those

who have passed examinations to become public school teachers.

The Constitution provides that "all public officials shall be ser- vants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people"

and guarantees the political impartiality of public officials. From

the perspective of the citizen needing to do some business in a street- level government office, however, the ethos of service sometimes

gives way to the traditional self-regard of the official, a situation

encapsulated in the traditional phrase kwanjon minbi (respect for the official, contempt for the people). Political neutrality also has

been undercut by the persistence of political and bureaucratic pres- sures on civil servants, especially during national elections. These

pressures can be especially intense upon low-ranking officials at the bottom of the bureaucratic chain of command and on those

officials in the upper five of the nine civil service grades who serve

as presidential appointees.

In early 1989, the number of government officials totaled

700,026, most of whom worked for the executive branch of government. About 7,200 civil servants worked for the judiciary. The new

importance of the National Assembly under the Sixth Republic was

reflected in an increase in staff hired by the legislative branch to some 2,700 employees—500 more than during the final year of the

preceding administration. In the 1980s, about one-third of civil service employees worked in local government. The civil service

213
South Korea: A Country Study

still represents a cross section of society. However, graduates of

the so-called big three universities—Seoul National University,

Yonse University, and Koryo University (more commonly called

Korea University in English)—continue to enjoy an advantage.

Graduates of these schools, all of which are located in Seoul, continue to have an edge in gaining employment in the government

as well as in the private sector and are disproportionately represented

in the higher civil service grades.

Local Administration

South Korea in 1990 was divided into six provincial-level cities

the special city (t'ukpyolsi) of Seoul (Soul-t'ukpyolsi to Koreans)

and the five cities directly governed (chikhalsi) by the central

government—Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on, Taejon, and Kwangju

and nine provinces, or to (see Glossary), including Cheju Island

(see fig. 1). Major cities were divided into wards (ku) and precincts

(tong). A province was composed of counties (gun) and cities (si) with a population of more than 50,000. A county consisted of towns

(up) with a population of 20,000 and more each, townships (myon),

and villages (rc). Both cities and towns had further subdivisions

designed to facilitate communication between government and people on local community matters. The need for local self-government was first recognized in 1948; a local autonomy law was enacted in 1949. It was not until December 1960, however, that local elections for the mayors of Seoul

and Pusan, provincial governors, and local councils—the first in

Korean history—were held. Under the system in operation from

the military coup d'etat of May 1961 until late 1969, Seoul, Pusan,

and the provincial governments were under the direct control of

the central government. In view of its special importance, Seoul was controlled by the central government and made subordinate

to the Office of the Prime Minister. Provincial administrations and

the special cities reported to the Department of Local Affairs of

the Ministry of Home Affairs. Likewise, administrative departments

of provincial and city governments maintained close contacts with

the regional and central offices of the respective cabinet ministries.

The police apparatus in each locale also was administratively responsible to the National Police Headquarters in Seoul. The mayor of

Seoul was appointed by the president and usually was regarded

as his close confidant. Heads of other administrative divisions were recommended by the minister of home affairs for presidential approval. Mayors of ordinary cities and county chiefs—members of the

civil service—were recommended by the provincial governor for appointment by the president. Heads of towns and townships were

214
Government and Politics named by county chiefs, heads of wards and precincts by mayors,

and village chiefs by heads of townships.

Under the system of proportionality in use in the National Assembly in 1985, the majority of the at-large seats—two-thirds

was given to the party that came in first. This arrangement dis- proportionately favored the government party, with its traditional

advantages of incumbency. Thus, in the 1985 general elections,

the government party ended up with a little over 35 percent of the

popular vote—the largest share—but held more than 53 percent

of the seats in the legislature. Conversely, the second-placed party,

with roughly 29 percent of the votes, occupied just over 24 per- cent of the seats after the at-large seats were distributed. The twomember district system used in 1985 also helped the government

party, which had litde chance of finishing first in many proopposition urban districts, but could hope to win a second-place

seat (see table 11, Appendix).

In late 1989, the National Assembly passed legislation designed

to increase local autonomy over the following two years. Under

the newly amended Act Concerning Local Autonomy, local auto- nomy was to be introduced in several phases. Local councils would

be elected by June 1990. The central government was to continue

appointing local administrative heads—including mayors of the six special cities and nine provinces—until elections for those posts,

scheduled for 1991, could be held. The government would retain

full control over deputy heads of special cities and provinces for

the first four years, after which the central government would merely

ratify the choices of the mayors and provincial governors. In a last- minute compromise, the National Assembly acceded to the opposition parties' position, permitting political parties to nominate candidates for local elections either individually or in coalition with

other parties. Related laws scheduled for National Assembly consideration in 1990 were expected to address other details of local government, including the question of financial autonomy.

Political Dynamics

Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987

The period from late June through December 1987 saw rapid

implementation of political reforms in an unusual mood of compromise between the ruling and opposition parties. In July the

government paroled 357 political offenders, amnestied more than

2,000 other prisoners, and restored full political rights to prominent opposition figure Kim Dae Jung. In August the National

215
South Korea: A Country Study

Assembly established a committee to study constitutional revision.

Representatives of four parties took one month to negotiate and

propose a draft constitution that incorporated most of the provisions long sought by the opposition parties: greater press freedom

and protection for civil rights, a stronger National Assembly, and

direct presidential elections. After the bill passed the National Assembly, more than 93 percent of the voters approved the new draft

in a plebiscite on October 28, 1987.

Anticipating the presidential election of December 1987, the four

major presidential candidates (Roh Tae Woo, Kim Dae Jung, Kim

Young Sam, and Kim Chong-p'il, collectively referred to in the media as "one Roh and three Kims") began their informal campaigning with a series of public appearances and speeches in October.

In April 1987, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had led their

respective factions, who together included seventy-two National

Assembly members, out of the New Korea Democratic Party

(NKDP) to form the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP).

Summer-long efforts to produce a single RDP presidential candidate failed. By late September, Kim Young Sam was finally left in control of the party when Kim Dae Jung and his followers departed to form a new party of their own—the Party for Peace and

Democracy (PPD). Kim Young Sam announced his candidacy on

October 10, and the RDP convention proclaimed Kim the party's

candidate on November 9. Kim Chong-p'il was affiliated with the

New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP).

Hoping to benefit from the inability of Kim Dae Jung and Kim

Young Sam to agree on a unified candidacy, Roh Tae Woo's

Democratic Justice Party (DJP) expected to win the election with

a plurality of 1 million votes and sweep about 45 percent of the

total vote. The party's strategy was based on the substantive ap- peal of Roh Tae Woo's June 29 declaration in favor of a new

democratic constitution and other reforms, along with a massive

public relations campaign. The public relations campaign—roundly

scored by Roh's political rivals —portrayed the former four-star

general and division commander (he had helped Chun depose the

army chief of staff in December 1979) as a simple, "ordinary man"

who would bring about a society in which other ordinary people

could live comfortably and more affluently. The Roh campaign

also avoided the traditionally strident slogans of South Korean

politics, preferring promising phrases such as "Commitment to a Bright Future."

DJP strategists seeking the youth vote, which accounted for nearly

60 percent of the electorate, acknowledged the party's likely problem

216
Government and Politics

with the more opposition-minded liberal arts college graduates;

instead, they focused on segments of the young population believed

to be more easily won, such as high- school graduates and technical college graduates. As the campaign continued, Roh increasingly attempted to distance himself from his patron, Chun Doo

Hwan, admitting that the government had committed torture and

"other mistakes' ' and affirming that not even the head of state could

be exempted in eradicating corruption.

The other conservative candidate, viewed by some of the press

as a "spoiler' ' who would take votes from Roh Tae Woo, was Kim

Chong-p'il. Kim's campaign used the "man of experience" theme

and was structured around small meetings (especially outside his

native South Ch'ungch'ong Province), some larger rallies, and carefully chosen television spots financed from the coffers of the Frater- nal Association of National Revitalization and by other affluent

and conservative South Koreans. In his speeches, Kim criticized

Roh's long association with the evils of the Fifth Republic and outlined a tentative program of financial relief for farmers, coal miners,

and others.

Like the other major candidates, Kim Young Sam took advantage of the liberalized political climate to begin his presidential campaign with a series of public rallies even before the October 28

national referendum on the new constitution. The failure to agree

with Kim Dae Jung on a unified opposition candidacy required

a two-pronged offensive, designed both to divert blame for potentially splitting the opposition vote in the election and to attack Roh

Tae Woo. The RDP's slogans, "End Military Government with

Kim Young Sam" and "A Man for Peace, Harmony, and

Honesty," reflected the dual objectives of the campaign. On October 17, 1987, Kim told a home-town audience of 1 million in Pusan that, unlike Roh, he would lead a corruption-free government

that would end a "long tradition of military-backed governments"

and would make appropriate monetary and symbolic compensation to those killed and wounded in the 1980 "civilian uprising"

in Kwangju. In a large rally in Taejon on October 24, Kim sug- gested that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy would "bring about sharp

confrontation among Cholla and Kyongsang people. " In keeping

with the name of his party, Kim also publicized his plan for "Five

Steps to Peaceful Unification" on October 12. Kim Dae Jung's populist campaign themes were national reconciliation, a just economy, political neutrality of the military, and

pursuit of reunification. The platform struck a balance between

appeals to Kim Dae Jung's hoped-for constituency among workers, farmers, and lower middle-class voters and reassurances to

217
South Korea: A Country Study

voters who feared that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy could inflame

regional loyalties or result in vindictive purges against those who

held power during the Fifth Republic. One of Kim's sons directed

specialized party organs such as the United Democratic Youth Association to attract younger voters. Like Roh and Kim Young Sam,

Kim Dae Jung was able to assemble 1 million participants in rallies in Seoul and in home-province appearances, while drawing

somewhat smaller crowds in other provinces.

In addition to the four principal candidates, several minor parties also offered candidates. These included relative unknowns, such

as Kim Son-jok of the Ilche Party (Unified Party), Sin Chong-il

of the Hanism Unification Party, and Hong Suk-cha of the Social

Democratic Party. Another candidate, Paek Ki-wan, was prominent in dissident circles. Most of these candidates faded as the campaign progressed, eventually withdrawing their candidacy in

support of one or another major candidate.

The election results closely followed projections based on the

regional origins of the four major candidates, despite protestations

by all that regionalism should not divide the country. Of the major

candidates, Roh took 36.9 percent of the votes, Kim Young Sam

28 percent, Kim Dae Jung 26.9 percent, and Kim Chong-p'il only

8 percent.

Losers in the election had been charging the government party

with illegal electioneering activities ever since it became clear in

late September that Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam would

not be able to agree on a unified candidacy. The traditional advantages of incumbency were evident early; by October the busi- ness pages of Seoul's daily press were already discussing the

"election inflation" caused by election-related spending, which in- cluded government disbursements for development projects. Such

spending, common in many countries prior to elections, included

a substantial decrease in the price of heating oil, an increase in

the official purchase price of rice, and a salary increase for civil servants. Also common, although by no means limited to the rul- ing party, were customary "transportation costs" given to people

to attend rallies and the wide distribution of small gifts, such as the cigarette lighters bearing Roh Tae Woo's name, dispensed by

the ruling party. Political cartoonists could easily make light of the

latter practice, probably because it had been many years since the votes of South Koreans, even in rural areas, had been swayed by

simple gifts such as a bowl of rice wine or a pair of rubber shoes.

One candidate seemed to sum up the prevailing attitude in remarks

at a mid-November rally: "If they give you money, take it. If they

218
Government and Politics

take you to Mount Sorak for sightseeing, then have a nice journey. But on 16 December, be sure to give your vote to me."

More serious irregularities reported prior to and during the elec- tions included acts of violence or intimidation against election observers, biased television coverage, mobilization of local officials and neighborhood organization officers to encourage people to vote

for Roh, and fraudulent handling of ballot boxes. In one working

class district in Seoul, for example, election observers seized two

ballot boxes being surreptitiously brought in to a polling station on the morning of the election. The government, which removed

the observers by force two days later, claimed that the boxes contained absentee ballots, but had no explanation for why they were

delivered in commercial trucks carrying fruit, bread, and other con- sumer goods.

Conversely, few election observers commented on the intimidating effect—no less on potential voters than on candidates—of acts of violence that repeatedly occurred against all major candidates.

Candidates were forced to hire phalanxes of bodyguards with plastic

shields for protection against flying objects and often were made

to cut short public speeches during appearances in regional strongholds of other candidates. In spite of local abuses, it was difficult to estimate what fraction of Roh Tae Woo's plurality of almost

2 million votes, out of 23 million cast, may have been improperly

influenced. Extravagant claims of wholesale manipulation in the

computerized vote tabulation were made difficult to assess by the

failure of those who had made such charges to present convincing

evidence. Claims of election rigging also were undercut at the time

by the continued insistence of both the Kim Dae Jung and Kim

Young Sam camps that their candidate was the one to whom the

election rightfully should have gone.

Within a week after the election, public anger at the outcome was divided. Protests continued against election irregularities but were accompanied by increasing criticism of the two major opposition leaders for their failure to produce a unified candidacy that

could have defeated the government party candidate. The RDP

and PPD, embarrassed by the fact that Kim Dae Jung and Kim

Young Sam together received 54 percent of the vote to Roh's 36

percent, both apologized to the public, while vowing to continue

disputing the results of the election. Both major opposition parties, together with Kim Chong-p'il's party, gradually turned their

attention to the question of upcoming National Assembly elections.

Events in 1988

President-elect Roh Tae Woo outlined his 1988 political goals—both

219
South Korea: A Country Study

old and new—in a New Year's interview. Some of Ron's comments

echoed the authoritarian language of President Chun's 1987 New

Year's speech, which had typically called for ' 'grand national harmony" in which transcendent political leadership would see the

country through, if only the people would "rid themselves of all vestiges of the old habit of confrontation and strife." Roh made

ample reference to traditional themes, speaking of *

' suprapartisan

operation of national affairs," "rooting out corruption," and a mixture of persuasion and "stern measures," if necessary, to bring

leftist elements back into the fold. Roh also seemed to promise

genuine innovations: to eliminate authoritarian practices, to in- vestigate and punish people guilty of past financial scandals, to protect the press from harassment by law enforcement authorities, to reorganize intelligence agencies, to demilitarize politics, and to resolve the 1980 Kwangju incident by restoring honor to the vic- tims and providing remuneration to the bereaved.

Other leaders and other political forces also had their own agendas

for the new year. Under the heading of "Liquidating the Legacy of

the Fifth Republic," the opposition parties of Kim Dae Jung and

Kim Young Sam sought to investigate corruption in the Fifth Republic, to reexamine the Kwangju incident, and, as well, demanded

the release of all political detainees and the reform of numerous

laws that had been used to control nonviolent political activity and

free expression. Like Roh, Kim Dae Jung's ability to compromise was limited to a degree by his own desire not to lose influence with an offstage constituency, in this case the dissident community and

other elements to his left. Kim Chong-p'il's presidential campaign

had also made use of these themes in its attacks on the government party's candidate, Roh Tae Woo. Of even greater importance,

however, was restoration of the reputations and professional careers of numerous individuals from the Park Chung Hee era who, like Kim himself, had been purged in 1980 during Chun Doo Hwan's

takeover. These individuals included more than 8,800 civil servants and officers of state corporations as well as several dozen senior

military officers (from the army chief of staff down), who had lost both ranks and pensions. Successful resolution of these issues greatiy

increased Kim's ability to work with the government party.

Other groups in society had their own expectations. Members

of labor unions at many of South Korea's large corporations, fresh

from a major campaign of strikes in late 1987, hoped for the right

to elect their own leaders and organize outside the framework of

the government-sponsored Federation of Korean Trade Unions

(see Interest Groups, this ch.). Some dissident organizations hoped

that the forthcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics could be held jointly

220
National Assembly in plenary session, Seoul

Courtesy Korean Overseas Information Service

in P'yongyang and Seoul (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Leftist stu- dents also sought opportunities to meet with North Korean stu- dents. Some activist students hoped to establish firmer contacts with

farmers and the growing labor movement, while at the violenceprone fringe of the radical student movement others planned to continue to dramatize their grievances through arson attacks against

United States and South Korean government facilities (see Politi- cal Extremism and Political Violence, this ch.). Still other dissidents

planned to continue demonstrating against the Roh government out

of conviction that it was a simple continuation of the previous militarized regimes.

After his inauguration in February 1988, Roh took steps to honor some of his campaign promises, appointing a woman to his cabi- net and approving the rehabilitation of thirty-one generals dismissed

in Chun's coups of 1979 and 1980. Another commitment, to appoint members of the opposition parties to cabinet posts, was not

met when the two major parties failed to propose names for consideration. Four of the new cabinet appointees, however, were from

the Cholla provinces.

Negotiations among the major political parties promptly began

over amending the National Assembly Election Law, one of the

major political issues left unresolved in the 1987 Constitution. At

221
South Korea: A Country Study

stake were two variables: the size of the electoral districts and the

degree of proportionality. Each party took a position that it believed would be to its advantage. Initially, the government party

and Kim Chong-p'il's NDRP favored different mixtures of large

and small districts. Kim Young Sam's party was divided between

its rural members, who also favored multiple-member districts, and

the leadership, which argued for single-member districts. Kim Dae

Jung's party, which in the presidential election had swept all but

two districts in Seoul, hoped to use its heavily concentrated constituency in the Cholla provinces to become the largest opposition

party with a single-member district system.

The ruling party eventually shifted to a single-member district formula close to that proposed by the PPD, but finally withdrew

from the negotiations, claiming that the other parties could not come

to agreement in time. In a manner reminiscent of the tactics of

the Park Chung Hee era, the ruling party took advantage of its legislative majority to pass unilaterally its own draft amendment

in a one-minute session held at 2:00 A.M. on March 8, 1988. The

newly amended law reinstated single-member electoral districts,

last used in the general election of 1970. It also diluted the ele- ment of proportionality somewhat by reducing the number of at- large seats to 75, or about one-fourth of the total of 299, and by more evenly distributing them among the participating parties. The

opposition parties strongly protested (Kim Dae Jung's party less vigorously than the others) and then started to prepare their campaigns.

According to most observers, the results of the general election

of April 26, 1988, set the stage for a new political drama. For the

first time in South Korean history, the government party lost its working majority in the legislature. The government party had

hoped to emerge victorious, as the two largest opposition parties

again split the antigovernment vote. With 34 percent of the popular vote, however, the DJP held only 125 seats (87 district seats and the remainder at-large), well under the 150 needed for a majority. Kim Chong-p'il's party, the NDRP, ended up with a total of

thirty-five seats, enabling it to form its own bargaining group in

the National Assembly. Kim Young Sam's RDP gained a small

number of seats, but lost in overall ranking in the larger body. Kim

Dae Jung's PPD took the senior opposition party position with more

than 19 percent of the vote and 23 percent of the total number of

seats (see table 12, Appendix).

There were several reasons for the upset. The government party

might have made a stronger showing had not Roh, intent upon consolidating his control of a party that still contained many holdovers

222
Government and Politics

from the Chun period, replaced one-third of incumbent legisla- tors with political newcomers. Because the new candidates were

not able to build up quickly the personal networks necessary for success at the district level, the ruling party in effect gave up one

of its strongest campaign assets on the eve of the election. Other

factors included the ruling party's lack of a following among younger

and better-educated voters and its failure to distance itself suffi- ciently from the Chun government (the former president's brother was arrested on corruption charges one month before the election).

Increasing regionalism also played a role, especially in the Cholla

provinces, where the government party candidates failed to win

a single district seat. The impact of the new balance of political forces in the National

Assembly, characterized by the press asydsoyadae (small ruling power, large opposition power), quickly became evident. Even before

the thirteenth National Assembly convened in late May 1988, the

floor leaders of the government and opposition parties met to agree

upon procedures and to discuss the release of political prisoners.

These four-way talks became common during the next two years,

especially for routine business matters. Four-way talks also were

used to negotiate in advance such political issues as the distribution of committee chairmanships (nine for opposition parties, seven

for the government party) and the National Assembly's investigation of dozens of cases of corruption or other irregularities committed under the preceding Fifth Republic.

The judiciary also moved toward greater political independence

in 1988. In June one-third of the nation's judges demanded that

the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Kim Yong-ch'ol, resign

as a measure to restore public trust in the politicized court system.

Two weeks after the chiefjustice resigned in disgrace, the two major

opposition parties abstained from the National Assembly vote to confirm Roh's first choice for the vacancy, thereby causing the

nomination to fail. This action resulted in the nomination of Yi

Il-kyu, a more independent-minded figure known for not bending

to political pressure. A Supreme Court justice during the Chun

presidency—until his appointment was not renewed in 1986—Yi

had won wide public respect for overturning lower court rulings

in political cases. Yi's appointment as chiefjustice led to National

Assembly approval of thirteen new Supreme Court justices and

a major reshuffle of the judiciary in July that affected some thirtyfive senior District Court and High Court judges. At a meeting

of chiefs of all court levels in December 1988 when the Supreme

Court was drafting a revision to the Court Organization Law that

would give the judiciary full control over its own budgets, Chief

223
South Korea: A Country Study

Justice Yi Il-kyu called on the judiciary to "take a hard look at ourselves for the situation in which the public felt distrust for the

judiciary" and pledged that he would "never tolerate any outside

influence in court proceedings."

Under Yi's leadership, the South Korean judiciary became more

independent. This trend continued into 1989, as courts overturned

the parliamentary election victories of two government party candidates on charges of illegal campaigning and sentenced numerous former officials and relatives of former President Chun Doo

Hwan to prison terms on corruption and power-abuse charges. In

another unprecedented action in late 1989, a judge acting on his

own initiative granted bail to a student activist charged with violat- ing the National Security Act. The Seoul Olympics, scheduled to begin in September 1988, contributed to a tacit political truce where the more contentious and

difficult political questions, such as the revisions of "bad laws"

sought by the two larger opposition parties, were concerned. The

primary focus of partisan politics during 1988 was the settling of

old accounts concerning the Fifth Republic. These issues, in turn, were divided into two categories: questions related to Chun's sei- zure of power in late 1979 and early 1980, including the Kwangju

incident, and questions concerning corruption and other irregularities during the period of Chun's rule through 1987. In July 1988,

following the president's veto of two bills that would have expanded the legislature's inspection powers—for example, enabling the

National Assembly to order judicial warrants forcing subpoenaed

witnesses, such as former President Chun, to testify—the government party agreed with the three major opposition parties to hold

hearings into numerous irregularities of the Fifth Republic. Other

special committees established in July were charged with studying

reunification policy, democratization issues, problems of regionalism in politics, the conduct of the Seoul Olympics, and irregularities in the recent presidential and general elections.

In twenty meetings held between late September and midDecember 1988, the committee investigating corruption under the

Chun government interviewed dozens of witnesses, many of them

high-level civilian and military officers. The televised hearings dazzled the public with revelations concerning the suppression of media independence in 1980, the extortion of political funds from large

corporations, and improprieties connected with the Ilhae Institute, a charitable foundation established by Chun Doo Hwan (see The

Media, this ch).

The hearings had several effects. Pressures against the former

president grew as the hearings continued; in late November 1988,

224
Government and Politics Chun appeared on television to apologize to the nation, taking

responsibility for what he termed the "tragic consequences" in

Kwangju in 1980. He also stated that he would surrender US$24

million in cash and property and announced that he would seek

seclusion in a Buddhist monastery in repentance. The hearings led

to subsequent criminal prosecutions of numerous members of

Chun's family, as well as former high officials, including the former

director of the Agency for National Security Planning, Chang Se- dong. The hearings also gave many South Koreans their first opportunity to see their legislators in action and set a precedent for future broadcasts of National Assembly business.

The drama of the hearings drew attention away from the more

prosaic business of the National Assembly, which during the year

passed dozens of laws and decided on a 1989 budget. Despite often

strong disagreements among parties, these results underscored the

role of four-way talks in the process of political compromise, previously a rare commodity in South Korean politics. The resulting

de facto coalition foreshadowed the merger of three of the four parties in early 1990.

People dissatisfied with Roh's first year as president overlooked

significant political factors, including the restraining impact of world

attention prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics on Roh's conduct. Roh

did make effective moves to consolidate his political position during the year, including a series of appointments and reshuffles

within the Democratic Justice Party, the cabinet, and the senior

ranks of the military. Changed political circumstances in 1989 made

it possible for Roh to move more decisively to deal with opponents

inside and outside the National Assembly.

Returning to the Politics of National Security, 1989

In his 1989 New Year's address, President Roh promised greater

efforts in reaching out to communist bloc countries and in improving

relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North

Korea). He also emphasized continued democratization, coupled

with stability. The emphasis on stability was shared by the NDRP,

which in its New Year's statement noted the need to correct the

unbalanced distribution of wealth and to eliminate conflicts based on regionalism but also rejected "any action to undermine political

and social stability." Both the RDP and the PPD viewed 1989 as the year for the final resolution of Fifth Republic issues and called

for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate impartially criminal charges stemming from the National Assembly in- vestigations.

225
South Korea: A Country Study

The president's willingness to move toward tighter social controls was given further impetus by developments in the first few

months of the year. In February farmers angry over the government's liberalization of agricultural trade staged large-scale, sometimes violent, demonstrations in Seoul. During the same month,

the nationwide leftist student organization, the National Association of University Student Councils (Chondaehyop) challenged the

government's desire to retain the initiative between the two Koreas

by announcing plans to send members to Pyongyang's World

Youth and Student Festival scheduled for July. In March a subway workers' strike paralyzed commuter transportation in Seoul

for seven days. Nationwide labor unrest continued through April

with a violent strike by Hyundai shipyard workers. Student demonstrators continued to match police tear gas with Molotov cocktails

through the early months of the year. In May the nation was

shocked when students who had taken police officers hostage in a building at Tongui University in Pusan set a fire that took the

lives of seven police officers who had stormed the facility.

These events were accompanied by signs of uneasiness among

advisers of President Roh. In March a cabinet minister, known

as a spokesman for those in the military seeking a crackdown on

labor union and student radicalism, resigned. A week later, at graduation ceremonies of the Korea Military Academy, the academy superintendent twice failed to salute the president and in his

speech complained that "people have such confused perceptions

about which are hostile and which are friendly countries that they

do not know who our enemy is." Pressures on the president to curb what these and other conservatives in the military and the

government party believed was a trend toward deterioration in- creased further in late March, when it became known that two

prominent South Korean dissidents had traveled to P'yongyang,

where they met with North Korean leader Kim II Sung and at- tended a church service. These developments and others, such as the announcement in June that a former opposition legislator had

made an unauthorized trip to North Korea in 1988, gave the president the rationale to reverse another trend—the declining involvement of the national security agencies in domestic political life. During the political openness of 1988, a report of the government's Administration Reform Commission had denigrated the

Agency for National Security Planning, on grounds that the agency

had in the past "violated human rights on many occasions and

interfered in politics, thus incurring the condemnation of the public." As ruling and opposition parties studied ways to limit the agency's role in domestic political surveillance, the ANSP also appeared

226
Government and Politics

to take a new approach, announcing that it was scaling back domestic operations, sharing classified documents on external security

issues at press conferences, and sending new agency directors to pay respects to the presidents of the opposition parties. By early

1989, political agreement had been reached on a revised ANSP

law that would require the agency to observe the right of habeas

corpus, remain politically neutral, and end other forms of interference in domestic political life. The president's response to the growing political crisis of early

1989 was to grant a renewed mandate to the police and security

agencies. In view of increasing attacks on police boxes, a longstanding program to provide police with M-1 6 rifles was stepped

up and new rules of engagement issued, permitting police to fire in self-defense on Molotov cocktail-throwing demonstrators. In the

aftermath of the Tongui University incident, the National Assembly quickly passed a law providing special penalties for the use of

Molotov cocktails. In early April, the president established a Joint

Security Investigations Headquarters to coordinate the work of

police, intelligence, and national security agencies. This organ,

which was in existence from early April through late June 1989,

investigated student union groups, dissident organizations, and an

antigovernment newspaper, eventually arresting more than 500 per- sons (including the pair who had traveled to North Korea in March) on suspicion of "aiding an antistate organization" —North

Korea—under the broad terms of the National Security Act. The Joint Security Investigations Headquarters was disbanded

in June under pressure from the National Assembly. Public prose- cutors and the Agency for National Security Planning, however,

continued making arrests and pursuing investigations into a variety of political activities on national security grounds. There also was a resumption of the quasi-legal or illegal practices common

in national security cases before 1988: breaking into the campaign

headquarters of an opposition candidate in a by-election in July;

publishing lists of banned "antistate" books even after a civil court ruling that such a ban was illegal; arresting people for reading or

possessing books considered to be pro-North Korean; arresting an

antigovernment journalist for planning unauthorized coverage of

North Korea; and ignoring court orders to allow arrested political

detainees to meet with their attorneys. By the end of 1989, all people

who had traveled to North Korea without authorization had been

convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The role of the ANSP was further strengthened during the rest of the year. As part of a cabinet shuffle in July, Roh appointed

a former high- school classmate, with a reputation for a hardline

227
South Korea: A Country Study

approach as a prosecutor under the Fifth Republic, as head of the

ANSP. In the National Assembly, discussion of amendments that

would ease sections of the National Security Act and restrict the

powers of the ANSP were indefinitely postponed. In September

the government introduced an amendment that would enable the

ANSP to bypass the constitutional guarantees of access to a lawyer in national security cases. In late 1989, the government claimed

that 342 people had been charged under the National Security Act

during the year. Parties and Leaders

Unlike the two former military leaders who had preceded him,

Roh Tae Woo followed an indirect course to the chairmanship of

the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and the presidency. A Korea

Military Academy classmate of Chun Doo Hwan and Chong Hoyong and a 1959 graduate of the United States Army Special

Warfare School, Roh had passed through a succession of career- building military commands, including a brigade of the Special

Warfare Command, before moving a regiment of his frontline Ninth

Division into Seoul to support Chun's forcible removal of the army

chief of staff and other senior military leaders on December 12,

1979. As Chun consolidated his political position through the spring

and summer of 1980, he placed Roh in the most politically sensitive military posts, naming him to be commander of the Capital

Garrison Command and, later, the Defense Security Command.

After Chun became president in 1980, however, he retired Roh

from the military and used him to fill a series of government posts,

beginning with a position as second minister of political affairs, a position that was apparently created especially for Roh. After a short period as minister of sports in the spring of 1982, Roh served

for fifteen months as the minister of home affairs. In retrospect it seems clear that Roh's ability simultaneously to benefit by, yet distance himself politically from, his association with

Chun began in mid- 1983 when he was moved from the post of

minister of home affairs to take the chairmanship of South Korea's

Olympic Committee, which he held through 1986. With the Olympic Committee portfolio, Roh was able to avoid entanglement in

increasingly tough police handling of the student movement while

remaining in the public eye as the person who had successfully

managed the campaign to have Seoul selected as the site of the 1988

Games of the XXIV Olympiad. After his election to the National

Assembly in April 1985, Roh emerged as a significant figure in

the DJP when Chun appointed him to the party presidency.

228
Government and Politics

At the end of the first two years of the Roh presidency, the DJP

was a different party from that bequeathed by Chun in 1981 . Roh

had surprised political observers when he dismissed one-third of

the party's local chapter chairmen and denied the party's nomination in the April 1988 National Assembly election to 126 incumbent party members in favor of relatively unknown and new party

members. These decisions undoubtedly cost the party heavily in

the number of seats won, but they also enabled Roh to begin to reshape the party in his own image. By December 1988, Roh was

ready to consolidate his control of the DJP. Within four days, Roh

replaced twenty of twenty-three cabinet ministers, eliminating vir- tually all those carried over from the Chun administration. He also reshuffled the senior DJP leadership, removing Park Chun-kyu,

a former adviser to Park Chung Hee's Democratic Republican

Party, from the chairmanship.

The numerically dominant membership, or mainstream, of the

DJP was made up of figures from the city of Taegu and North

Kyongsang Province, a group sometimes characterized by the press

as the TK Mafia, or TK Division (TK for Taegu and Kyongsang).

This trend had become evident during the Fifth Republic under

Chun and within the Democratic Republican Party under Park

Chung Hee before him. Roh also attempted, however, to replace

Chun loyalists within the party with individuals who were more

likely to owe him their primary loyalty. Roh supporters included some members of an influential subset of the TK group made up

of individuals who had graduated from Kyongbuk High School,

Roh's alma mater. In December 1988, for example, all of the president's senior staff were Roh's fellow high- school alumni. Taegu

Kyongsang ties also extended to numerous civil and military posts,

most notably all army chiefs of staff after 1980, one-quarter of

director-level officers in the Korean National Police, and 120 of

662 prosecutors in 1989.

A second group that supported the president comprised a number of older politicians whom the Seoul press termed the New Elders

Group. Members of this group fled from North Korea in the 1940s

or during the Korean War, held senior positions in various walks

of life, especially journalism, and played an important role in rallying the votes of other former North Koreans in Kyonggi and Kangwon provinces in the 1987 presidential election. For this service,

they were allowed to return to political life, in many cases for the

first time since persons of North Korean origin lost political in- fluence following the fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960 and the 1961

229
South Korea: A Country Study

coup d'etat of Park Chung Hee. As a group, they were strongly

anticommunist and favored the restoration of * 'law and order" in

the face of rising dissent in South Korean society.

Political alignments within the ruling party tended to form around

personalities rather than ideas because of the importance of per- sonal networks in South Korean society and the fact that under

the Constitution Roh could not succeed himself. In August 1989,

President Roh removed Yi Chong-ch'an from a senior party post.

Yi, the leader of a group of DJP members hailing from the Seoul

area, was known to favor greater democracy within the party and

to oppose revision of the Constitution to create a cabinet-responsible

system. After the announcement in early 1990 that the parties of

Kim Young Sam and Kim Chong-p'il would merge with that of

Roh Tae Woo, observers expected the roles both of ideas and of

personal alignments or factions to be even more significant in the

new, enlarged Democratic Liberal Party.

New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) leader Kim Chongp'il had been nominated as the presidential candidate of the

Democratic Republican Party following Park's assassination in late 1979, but Kim was arrested by Chun on corruption charges during the latter' s takeover in 1980. Kim was accused of corruption

and stripped of most of his personal assets in South Korea. He spent

six years in the United States. In March 1986, he returned to South

Korea to attempt to reconstruct Park's old party and restore his

own political fortunes. In a series of speeches in 1986 and 1987,

Kim spoke of the need to continue the "revitalizing" tasks of the

yusin phase of Park Chung Hee (see South Korea under Park Chung

Hee, 1961-79, ch. 1). His appeal initially was to former officials,

cashiered military leaders, and others who had lost their positions

in 1980. As Kim's message changed to emphasize his association

with the beginnings of South Korea's modern economic development in the 1960s, he began to attract some younger, conservative South Koreans, and many from his native Ch'ungch'ong

Province. By October 30, 1987, when Kim's NDRP was formally

established, people under the age of forty made up more than half

of the party's 3,000 charter members. Others included the twenty- one National Assembly members of the now defunct Korea

Nationalist Party, which during the 1980s had provided a home

for political survivors of Park Chung Hee's party.

Kim Young Sam was a veteran politician with a strong constituency in Pusan and in South Kyongsang Province. As a National Assembly member for the opposition New Democratic Party

(NDP) in the 1960s, he fought a series of losing battles against Park

Chung Hee on such issues as normalization of relations with Japan

230
Government and Politics

in 1965. By 1970 he had risen to the top policy-making committee

of the NDP. He lost the party's nomination to political rival Kim

Dae Jung in the presidential election of 1971 but continued to hold

top party posts through 1979, when the government-dominated

National Assembly expelled him after he called for the resignation

of Park and the abandonment of the yusin system. This incident

contributed to large-scale unrest in Pusan and nearby Masan and

may have indirectly contributed to Park's assassination.

Kim Young Sam, like other well-known political figures, such

as Kim Chong-p'il and Kim Dae Jung, was banned from politics

in 1980 by Chun Doo Hwan; he spent the early 1980s under house

arrest. A Presbyterian elder, Kim used the enforced leisure in well- publicized self-improvement along traditional cultural lines common

to exiled South Korean politicians. He was occasionally photographed while practicing calligraphy in his book-lined study, or while on permitted outings with his Democratic Alpine Club.

Government censorship prevented detailed press coverage of his

twenty-three-day hunger strike against the Chun government in

May and June 1983. Although Kim's house arrest was lifted after the hunger strike, his political rights were not restored until after the February 1985 National Assembly elections. Kim subsequently joined his faction members in the newly formed New Korea

Democratic Party as an official party adviser; his long-time rival,

Kim Dae Jung, directed his own faction in the party from outside

it as a member of the Council for Promotion of Democracy.

In the late 1980s, South Korean political observers, increasingly interested in the question of leadership succession within the opposition parties, focused their attention more on generational

groupings than on factions. Seen this way, the RDP was broadly

divided into old-line Kim Young Sam loyalists and some additional

experienced opposition politicians in their fifties and an emergent

group of younger politicians, mostly in their forties. Many of the

latter group began their first terms in the National Assembly in

1988. They typically brought to their political careers progressive

political credentials earned in human rights law, labor relations, or other fields. Several members of this group received nationwide

attention for their cogent interrogation techniques during the National Assembly hearings in late 1988.

At the time of the presidential elections in December 1987, sixtytwo-year-old opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from the Cholla

region was in many ways the South Korean political candidate best

known outside of South Korea. A one-time newspaper publisher, a Roman Catholic of eclectic views, and a charismatic popular

speaker elected to the National Assembly four times in the 1960s,

231
South Korea: A Country Study

Kim had an international reputation that stemmed largely from

the continuous efforts of the South Korean government to keep

him out of the country, in prison, or under house arrest following

his near-victory over Park in the 1971 presidential election. He

had built active support organizations among South Koreans in

Japan and the United States by the time the Korean Central Intelligence Agency kidnapped him at a Tokyo hotel in 1973. Following United States intervention to save his life during the

abduction, he was brought back to South Korea to stand trial for alleged violation of the election law and Park's Emergency Measure Number Nine. He served several years of imprisonment and

house arrest, then was released and had his civil rights restored

in 1980 on the heels of the October 1979 assassination of Park.

Again arrested under martial law in May 1980, Kim Dae Jung

was accused of fomenting the Kwangju incident and sentenced to death by a military court on sedition charges that the United States Department of State described at the time as "far-fetched" (see

The Kwangju Uprising, ch. 1). Under pressure from the United

States government, his death sentence was subsequendy reduced

to life and then to twenty years' imprisonment. This term was sus- pended in late 1982 when Kim went to the United States to seek

medical treatment. In the United States, Kim divided his time

among a research appointment at Harvard University, the Korean

Institute for Human Rights in Alexandria, Virginia (informally

known as the Kim Dae Jung Embassy), and wide-ranging travels

to speak before Korean-American groups and United States civic,

academic, and human rights organizations. Kim returned to South

Korea in February 1985 on the eve of the National Assembly elec- tions. In March 1985, he was released from the 1980 general ban

on political activity, although the suspended criminal charges still in effect meant that he could neither belong to a party nor run for

office. He immediately joined with Kim Young Sam, who had also had his ban lifted, to establish the Council for Promotion of

Democracy. Although Kim Dae Jung spent most of the next two

years under house arrest, he telephonically provided informal

guidance to his faction within the New Korea Democratic Party

and, after April 1985, within the Reunification Democratic Party

(RDP). As part of the political understanding reached in late June

1987, the government dropped all outstanding charges against him

and he reemerged to participate fully in politics. After negotiations

with the Kim Young Sam faction of the RDP failed to reach agree- ment concerning a unified candidacy, the Kim Dae Jung faction

and its supporters left in October 1987 to form the Party for Peace

232
Government and Politics

and Democracy (PPD). The December 16 election was fast approaching when Kim received his party's presidential nomination on November 12. As the 1990s began, the PPD was made up of at least three dis- cernible groups. The first group comprised old-line Kim Dae Jung

followers who occupied the senior positions in the party hierarchy

and gave unquestioning loyalty to the party leader. A second group,

making up more than one-half of the party's seventy-one National Assembly seats after the April 1988 election, consisted of first- termers obliged by custom to play a low-key role in party affairs until they acquired more political experience. Within this group,

however, was a subgroup of activists with long experience in cause- oriented groups and human rights law. Many of these activists had

worked for the party in the National Assembly elections in 1985; a few had run as independents in 1988 before formally joining the

party. Many of this group, organized as the Study Group for Peaceful and Democratic Reunification (P'yongminyon) within the party,

participated conspicuously in National Assembly hearings in 1988.

Collectively, they constituted the party's left wing and its link with

the broader dissident movement outside of the National Assembly. Political speculation in late 1989 centered on whether this group

would continue to exert a leftward pull, seeking to bring the position of the PPD closer to that of South Korea's emergent left. Observers noted that several PPD members of this group also were members of the Coalition for a National Democratic Movement

(Chomminyon) formed in January 1989 and were likely to be in- volved with that organization's plans to form a progressive politi- cal party to participate in the first local council elections scheduled

to take place in 1990.

Chomminyon was one of a variety of groups that considered plans

to form cause-oriented political parties in anticipation of local council

elections. These bodies included a group of some fifty former cabinet

members and retired generals who believed that the government

party was not conservative enough and at least two groups of en- vironmentalists who planned to establish parties dedicated to that

issue. A proposed Green Party, like its European counterparts,

planned to emphasize antiwar and antinuclear issues as well as the cause of the environment, but also supported a concept of "Oriental

humanity" that would promote respect for the elderly and other

traditional virtues. Interest Groups

Despite its Constitution and formal structure, the South Korean

government has never fully conformed to the liberal democratic

233
South Korea: A Country Study

model that sees the state as a simple summation of diverse and competing interests within society. In politics, as in economic life, South

Korea has more closely fit the "strong state" model, in which the

government has tended to outweigh particular social or group interests. Nonetheless, the balance between the government and var- ious interest groups showed some dramatic changes in the late 1980s; as the 1990s began, observers found it likely that such

changes would continue, despite efforts by the government to re- tain its traditionally strong position.

During most of the postwar period, the South Korean government had encouraged organizations for the communication of

economic interests, but had not encouraged professional or occupational interest groups to voice political demands. Independent or unsanctioned interest groups had come into existence from time

to time to challenge fundamental policies of the government. In

the late 1980s, such challenges accounted for a sizable proportion

of extragovernmental political activity.

The relationship between government and business associations

in South Korea had its roots in the period ofJapanese colonial rule,

when the governor general established the Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other industrial associations as a means

of communicating economic policies to the business community.

Since 1952 all businesses have been required by South Korean law

to belong to the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the

bylaws and initial membership of which closely paralled those of

the Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the colonial period. Since 1961 , when the Park government began its economic development plans, the Federation of Korean Industry has represented

the major conglomerates. A larger organization, the Federation

of Small and Medium Industries, has had much less influence. The

Korea Traders' Association and the Korean Federation of Textile

Industries round out the four major industrial associations. In 1989

there were some 200 additional business associations licensed by

the state (see The Government and Public and Private Corporations, ch. 3). In most cases, the government recognizes only a single association as the representative of that industry. Major business leaders

may have individual access to administrators through personal ties and might be able to influence the government in minor ways, such

as obtaining exemptions from specific taxes. For the most part,

however, business associations through the 1980s were dominated

by the government. As noted by one specialist, "It is through in- dustry associations that the Korean government implements its policies, enforces routine compliance, gathers information, and

234
National Museum of Korea, Seoul

Courtesy Oren Hadar

monitors performance." In the 1980s, this process was sometimes

facilitated by the placement of retiring senior military or national

security officials in industry association positions.

Institutional changes and pressures toward open markets began

to change the traditional government-business relationship in the

mid-and late 1980s. Larger corporations became interested in having a role in policy formulation more commensurate with their contribution to more than two decades of economic growth. This

interest took several forms, including substantial corporate contributions to all major political parties during elections. As eco- nomic ministries grew in influence within a more decentralized

economic planning structure in the 1980s, the related industry as- sociations gained a greater voice, just as was true in Japan and

the United States. Growing liberalization of the domestic market

under foreign pressure also led to greater friction between the in- terests of specific economic sectors and the need of the government

to satisfy its foreign critics or risk a loss of access to vital foreign

markets. As the 1990s began, these frictions seemed likely to continue and to lead eventually to further readjustments.

In general, the higher-paid professions establish and administer

their own associations and cooperate closely with the appropriate

government ministries but receive no government support. These

235
South Korea: A Country Study

associations are chiefly concerned with maintaining standards and

the economic status of the professions concerned and have been

traditionally regarded by the government as politically safe. The

major exception has been the Korean Bar Association, which be- came increasingly outspoken on human rights and related legal is- sues in the 1970s and 1980s.

The government has attempted to keep tight controls on the in- tellectual professions, sponsoring the formation of the Korean Federation of Education Associations and the Federation of Artistic

and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Membership in the Korean

Federation of Education Associations was compulsory for all teachers through high-school level. Members of these umbrella

groups received significant medical benefits, and they tended to avoid political controversy. The Korean Newspaper Association

and Korean Newspaper Editors' Association were politically cautious during the early 1980s, but became much less constrained

during the early years of Roh's rule. Dissident associations have frequently grown from the intellec- tual sector of society. The Minjung Culture Movement Association (mtnjung means populist) was formed in 1985 by dissident artists and writers who did not want to belong to the state-controlled Federation of Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Similar

organizations of dissident journalists, such as the Association of

Journalists Dismissed in 1980, or the Democratic Press Movement

Association, often were dealt with harshly under the Fifth Republic. The Association of Korean Journalists, although more broadly based and less ideological, was quick to resist censorship and,

after a change in the law in 1988, supported the formation ofjournalists' unions.

The government has been especially sensitive about unauthorized professional associations among teachers. Many teachers, and some opposition political leaders, have been determined to reduce

the state's control over the political views of teachers and the content of education. In early 1989, President Roh vetoed an

opposition-sponsored amendment to the Education Law that would

have allowed teachers to form independent unions. In spite of the

president's veto, activist leftist teachers—numbering about 10 per- cent of the nation's primary through high-school faculties

announced their intention to form such a union. The National

Teachers Union (Chon'gyojo), inaugurated in late May 1989, criti- cized the Korean Federation of Education Associations as progovernment and weak in protecting teachers' rights (see Primary

and Secondary Schools, ch. 2). The Ministry of Education responded by dismissing more than 1,000 members of the new union in

236
Government and Politics

the spring and summer of 1989, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of more than 10,000 additional teachers. The Agency for National Security Planning conducted a well-publicized investigation into the union's ideology, with the implication that members

could be charged with aiding an antistate organization under the

National Security Act. Police broke up pro-National Teachers

Union rallies; members participating in a signature-gathering campaign to support the union were charged with traffic violations.

Eventually, several teachers' union leaders received prison terms on various charges. The Ministry of Education produced new guidelines that permitted teachers' colleges to deny admission to stu- dents with activist records and that allowed district education boards

to screen out "security risks" when testing candidates for employment. These measures effectively halted the activities of the National

Teachers Union.

The modern Korean labor movement, including unions of skilled and unskilled workers, dates to the first decade ofJapanese colonial

rule. South Korean law and constitutions since 1948 have recognized the "three rights" of labor: the right to organize, the right

to bargain collectively, and the right to take collective action. In

practice, however, the government has consistently attempted to control labor and mitigate the effects of unionism through the use

of a variety of legal and customary devices, including companysupported unions, prohibitions against political activities by unions,

binding arbitration of disputes in public interest industries, which

include 70 percent of all organized labor, and the requirement that

all unions be affiliated with one of the seventeen governmentsponsored industrial unions and with a general coordinating body,

the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). In the 1980s,

large companies, often supported by the police and intelligence

agencies of the government, also exerted pressure on unions to pre- vent strikes, to undermine the development of white-collar unions,

to retain control of union leaders, and to prevent persons with some

college education from attempting to organize workers by taking

positions as industrial laborers.

Despite such measures, the government has never exercised

total control of the labor movement. Even the FKTU occasionally

has been able to file administrative suits against government rul- ings or to lobby—sometimes successfully—against laws that would

have a negative impact on working conditions or rights of unions.

Through most of its existence, however, the federation has been

able to do little beyond submit proposals for legal reform to the

government. Throughout the postwar period, dissenting labor or- ganizations either have attempted to function apart from the

237
South Korea: A Country Study

government-sanctioned structure under the FKTU, or have formed

rival umbrella organizations, such as the National Council of Trade

Unions, established in 1958.

South Korea experienced an explosion of labor disputes from

1987 through 1989 under the more open political conditions fol- lowing the crisis of late June 1987 and the pressures created by

long-deferred improvements in wages and working conditions (see

table 13, Appendix; Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea,

ch. 2). More than 3,500 labor disputes occurred from August

through November 1987. Most were quickly resolved by negotiated

wage increases and by the prospect that another common

demand—freer scope for union activities—would be met in forth- coming legislation. In 1988 labor-related laws were amended to make it easier to establish labor unions and to reduce government

intervention in labor disputes. Unions were still prohibited,

however, from articulating any demands that the government in- terpreted as political in nature. In 1988 the number of unions increased from 4,000 to more than

5,700. This figure included numerous new white-collar unions

formed at research institutes, in the media, and within the larger

corporations.

There was a general privatization of labor-management conflict

during 1988 and 1989 as the government adopted a more neutral,

hands-off stance. Companies experimented widely with tactics such

as lockouts (5 in 1987; 224 in 1988), and labor unions achieved

new levels of joint action by workers in different regions and in- dustries. The government's ability to manage organized labor

through the traditional means of controlling the FKTU declined.

The FKTU, under criticism for the many years it had represented the government more than labor, also began to take a more in- dependent posture as the 1980s came to a close. In 1989 the

once-docile umbrella organization prepared to sponsor union candidates in anticipated local elections (an illegal activity under existing law) and held education seminars and rallies to press for "economic democracy" through revision of labor laws and other

reforms. Notwithstanding the increasing ability of labor to organize

and to present economic demands, however, the government con- tinued to suppress leftist labor groups that appeared to have broad

political goals or that questioned the legitimacy of the government,

such as the National Council of Labor Unions (Chonnohyop), which was formally established in early 1990. In early 1990, the government announced new measures to support its return to more restrictive policies governing strikes. The

number of intelligence agents at key industries was more than

238
Government and Politics

doubled (from 163 to 337) and a special riot police task force

sixty-three companies in strength—was deployed against "illegal"

strikes. During the postwar period, articulation of workers' interests had

been weakest for South Korea's farming population. In 1946 the

government used the Korea Federation of Peasants to mobilize the

rural population against leftist peasant unions. The Federation of

Agricultural Cooperatives, established in 1957, was also largely

funded and administered by the state. Its purpose was not to represent farmers' interests but to facilitate government control over

the purchase and sale of grain and farmers' purchases of fertilizer. Although most South Korean farmers continued to belong to cooperatives, two pressures converged in the late 1980s to change

the way in which farmers' interests were represented. First, as rural- urban income disparities grew in the late 1970s and 1980s, farmer

dissatisfaction with the government cooperatives' role in setting

crop prices and the costs of agricultural supplies also increased (see

Agriculture, ch. 3). Some farmers turned to independent organizations, such as the Korean Catholic Farmers Association or the

Christian Farmers Association. These groups, which were viewed

as dissident organizations by the government, performed a variety of services for farmers and also took public positions on government agricultural and price policies, sometimes using mass rallies. The second change, which affected larger numbers of farmers, was

the result of South Korea's growing trade surpluses in the late 1980s

(see Foreign Trade Policy, ch. 3). As the government responded

to pressure from major trading partners, such as the United States, to open South Korea's domestic markets, farmers became increasingly active in large-scale protest rallies against both the government

and the major political parties. As the 1990s began, it was clear

that the traditional harmony of political interests between a conser- vative rural population and conservative governments had ended.

Political Extremism and Political Violence

The deliberate use of violence, including occasional assassination, to express or advance political goals was common among both

the right and the left in South Korea after liberation in 1945 and

up to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Subsequent

political violence up to the 1980s, apart from exchanges between

police and participants in political demonstrations or rallies, was

largely limited to the illegal government use of violence or the threat

of violence to suppress dissent and intimidate political opponents.

During the presidency of Syngman Rhee (1948-60), for example,

the government mobilized the Anticommunist Youth League and

239
South Korea: A Country Study

members of street gangs to smash facilities of critical newspapers

and intimidate opposition candidates for election (see The Syngman

Rhee Era, 1948-60, ch. 1). The Park government continued ille- gal police practices, including torture of some dissidents, intellec- tuals, and even members of the National Assembly, and was often

indirectly involved in violence. The Korean Central Intelligence

Agency (KCIA) also used various means, including physical threats, to intimidate South Korean journalists in the United States. Such

methods continued under Chun, occasionally resulting in the deaths

of political defendants under police torture. Police were passively

present while hired thugs broke up dissident religious services or union meetings. Under Roh Tae Woo, police handling of politi- cal suspects retained some of the illegal violence of earlier times,

although improved media freedom also meant greater scrutiny of

police misconduct. In contrast with earlier regimes, however, the

Roh government permitted prosecution and conviction of police

officers and even of military personnel in several cases involving

violence during its first year in office. Under a special "afforestation program" administered by the

Defense Security Command, more than 400 student activists were

punitively induced into the army during the Chun years. According to a Ministry of National Defense report, at least five committed suicide or were killed, and many were forced to become

informants (see The Defense Security Command, ch. 5). At least 50 people died (of some 10,000 incarcerated) in the government's

"triple purity" (samch'ong) reeducation camps in the early 1980s.

Ten years after the May 1980 Kwangju incident, many South

Koreans continued to believe that the initial violence committed by

armed Special Forces troops against civilian demonstrators on that

occasion was deliberate. The former martial law commander for the

region told a National Assembly committee in 1988 that civilian protests were not violent enough at the beginning to justify the use

of elite forces and that army brutality aggravated the situation.

Public violence against government institutions was rare from

the 1950s through the early 1980s. When students overthrew the

Syngman Rhee government in April 1960, mobs destroyed the

headquarters of Rhee's Anticommunist Youth League. More spontaneous forms of violence often occurred during student protest

rallies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when small numbers of rockthrowing students at the edges of large rallies clashed with clubwielding riot police, or security forces dispatched martial arts experts and plainclothes officers to beat or arrest demonstrators.

Students also occasionally beat up police informants or plainclothes

240
Government and Politics

officers. This pattern changed following the killings of students and

other demonstrators in Kwangju in May 1980.

The Kwangju incident permanently stained the legitimacy of the

Chun government for subsequent generations of student activists,

many of whom also blamed the United States for what they believed to be its supportive role. The use of Molotov cocktails by some elements among student demonstrators, both as a counter

to increasingly effective police use of tear gas and as a reflection

of increased militancy, became a feature of student demonstrations

during the 1980s.

Another threshold was crossed in March 1982, when several stu- dents deliberately set a fire in the American Cultural Center in

Pusan, causing severe damage and, inadvertently, the death of

another South Korean student studying in the building at the time.

In a related statement, the students said they were beginning an

anti-United States struggle to eliminate United States power from

South Korea. The students blamed the United States for causing

"the permanent national division of Korea" and for "supporting

the military regime that refuses democratization, social revolution,

and development."

In April 1985, radical students, together with veteran activists released from prison the year before, formed the Struggle Committee for the Liberation of the Masses, the Attainment of Democracy, and the Unification of the Nation, or Sammint'u. The ideology

of this organization borrowed from dependency theory in blaming a "dependent industrialization process" dominated by the United States for South Korea's social and political problems.

Sammint'u supported various forms of direct action, including infiltration of labor unions and forcible occupations of United States and South Korean government facilities. Sammint'u activists con- ducted a number of such actions, including a three-day seizure of

the United States Information Service (USIS) building in Seoul

in May 1985 and the occupation of two regional offices of the Ministry of Labor in November of the same year. Although Sammint'u

was suppressed in 1986 under the National Security Act as an "anti- state" organization, its emphasis on well-organized occupations

and other actions (rather than the more spontaneous forms of tradi- tional student protest) and its ability to mobilize students across campus lines marked a permanent change in student protest tactics (see College Student Activism, ch. 2). By the late 1980s, violence-prone student radicals, although a

small minority even among politically active students, demonstrated

increasing effectiveness in organizing occupations and arson as- saults against facilities. In 1988, under the general guidance of the

241
South Korea: A Country Study

National Association of University Student Councils (Chondaehyop) and the Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils

(Soch'ongnyon), small groups of students armed with Molotov cocktails, metal pipes, and occasionally tear gas grenades or improvised

incendiary or explosive devices and staged more than two dozen

raids on United States diplomatic and military facilities. Students

also conducted a similar number of attacks against offices of the

government and ruling party and the suburban Seoul residence

of former President Chun (see table 13, Appendix).

Anti-United States attacks in 1989 began in February with a sei- zure of the USIS library in Seoul and attempted arson at the American Cultural Center in Kwangju. Additional incidents continued

through the year at about the same level as in 1988, culminating

in the violent occupation of the United States ambassador's resi- dence by six students in December. In the spring of 1989, there were numerous incidents of arson and vandalism against Hyundai automobile showrooms in many cities, as Chondaehyop mobilized member organizations nationwide to support a strike by

Hyundai shipyard workers. Other attacks occurred throughout the

year against Democratic Justice Party (DJP) offices and South

Korean government facilities. As the 1980s ended, however, violence-prone radical groups also suffered setbacks and found themselves under increased pressure

from the courts, police, and public and student opinion. The deaths

of seven police officers in a fire set by student demonstrators in

Pusan in May 1989, the arrest of Chondaehyop leaders on National Security Act charges stemming from the unauthorized travel of a member of the organization to P'yongyang over the summer,

and the beating to death of a student informer by activists at one

university in Seoul in October contributed to this pressure. In stu- dent council elections throughout the country in late 1989, students

at many campuses defeated student council officers associated with

the Chondaehyop's "national liberation" strategy, often replacing them with other leaders who favored a "people's democracy"

approach, emphasizing organizational work among farmers and

the labor movement over violent assaults on symbolic targets, at least for the near term. Many South Korean commentators interpreted the outcome of

the 1989 campus elections as a renunciation of violent methods or

as a turn away from radical student activism. Other observers noted,

however, the ideological and organizational complexity of "people's democracy" elements, some of which had in the past equaled

or exceeded Chondaehyop's commitment to violent activism. As

the 1990s began, it seemed likely that at least some radical elements,

242
Government and Politics

although perhaps increasingly driven underground like their counterparts in Japan, would remain committed to the use of violence

as a political tool. Human Rights

Traditional Korean political thought, rooted in neo-Confucianism,

placed some emphasis on benevolent rule and on the government's

paternalistic responsibility to redress grievances of the population.

These ideas were carried further in the nineteenth century by the

Tonghak Movement (tonghak means Eastern Learning), which es- poused equality of the sexes and of social classes. Interest among

Koreans in modern human rights, however, and especially in civil and political rights protected by law began late in the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) with the natural rights ideas of enlightenment

movement (kaehwa) reformers, such as Kim Ok-kyun, So Chaep'il, and Pak Yong-hyo (see The Choson Dynasty, ch. 1). The Japanese colonial period (1910-45) saw further diffusion

of such ideas. In 1919 Koreans who had fled Japanese colonial rule

established a government-in-exile in Shanghai that affirmed wideranging civil and political rights—freedoms of the ballot, religion,

press, movement, property, and social and sexual equality. Within

Korea in the 1920s, labor and tenant farmers unions spread the

idea of rights and provided experience in organizational and protest techniques. As colonial rule continued, many Korean nationalists came to assume the desirability of a modern legal order and

due process of law, especially while experiencing dual legal stan- dards and abuses such as torture and fabrication of evidence in

political cases. Meanwhile, Koreans serving in the colonial police

and receiving training in the Japanese Imperial Army often absorbed the increasingly stringent and authoritarian perspective of

Japanese militarism.

Human rights performance did not immediately improve fol- lowing the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule in 1945. Many

factors—national division, ideological conflict, and violent confrontation even before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950

contributed to this problem. Japanese-style practices held over from

the colonial days also were to blame. The United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48), confronted with serious

problems of public order, found itself retaining the old colonial

police apparatus and its Korean personnel (see South Korea under United States Occupation, 1945-48, ch. 1). United States- sponsored legal reforms, such as an effort to institute habeas corpus

in 1946, often failed; attempts by United States advisers to prevent

South Korean police from using torture, especially in political cases,

243
South Korea: A Country Study

also were unsuccessful. Under Syngman Rhee, South Korea con- tinued the prewar pattern of using law and the police for political

purposes—intimidating the judiciary, arresting journalists, and ap- plying extralegal pressures against the teaching profession and members of the new National Assembly.

Under the presidencies of Park and Chun such problems worsened, and there were increasing signs of tension between the government and its supporters, who sought to ignore or minimize such

rights, and many South Koreans, including some even within

the government, who believed that civil, legal, and political rights

should be honored. This tension was evident in the affirmations

of rights found in most of South Korea's postwar constitutions and

especially in the government's need for increasingly stringent measures to control a restive judiciary under theyusin constitution. The

forced resignations of judges and the resort to military tribunals

in some political trials were rationalized on national security

grounds, but only served to show that by the mid-1970s the government was, on such matters, no longer able to command the

respect and cooperation of a significant part of the country's legal

profession.

The Chun government modified some of the worst features of

the yusin constitution by removing the admissibility of confessions

as evidence, for example, but continued most of the abusive police

and judicial practices of the Park period with little change. Penal

sentences for people found guilty of offenses under certain politically relevant laws—the National Security Act and the Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration, for example—actually were

harsher under Chun than under the preceding yusin system.

In addition to the growing disaffection of the legal profession

in the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea's modernization had generated two social trends—rapid urbanization and dramatic increases

in literacy and education levels—that were essential to industrialization, irreversible, and highly corrosive of traditional authoritarian practices. Public outrage against the police torture and killing

of a student during an interrogation in early 1987 helped to fuel the growing political crisis that culminated in the tulmultuous events

in June.

The agreement in late 1989 between opposition and government

parties concerning the legacy of the Fifth Republic left unresolved

the question of what the press and many politicians referred to as revision of akpop (evil laws). These were laws long used in South

Korea to restrict and punish nonviolent political activity. The abolition in 1988 of one such law, the Basic Press Act of December

1980, had important and immediate effects on freedom of the press.

244
Government and Politics

Other laws remained on the statute books and were increasingly

used in 1989 as the Roh administration reached the apparent limits

of its willingness to tolerate dissent. Despite Roh's initial reputation for moderation, police records reported in the press show that

by late 1989 the Roh government had more than doubled the Chun

administration's rate of arrests for political offenses.

As measured in numbers of persons under investigation, standing trial, or serving sentences, the Act Concerning Assembly and

Demonstration continued under Roh, as under the Fifth Republic, to be the law most frequently used to restrict and control nonviolent political expression. The law gave police chiefs, of whom

there were twenty-four in Seoul alone, the authority to deny per- mission, without appeal, for any proposed demonstration. Police

also had wide discretion over treatment of participants in illegal

demonstrations, determining whether a given participant was to be charged with sponsoring an illegal demonstration, which car- ried the threat of a seven-year prison term, or with varying degrees

of participation, which could be punished as a misdemeanor or even

with a simple warning. Police had on occasion taken actions under the law to prevent persons from attending meetings that the

police believed were "likely to breed social unrest."

The National Security Act, as amended in 1980, restricted "antistate activities" that endangered "the state or the lives and free- dom of the citizenry.

'

' However, Seoul used the law not only against

espionage or sabotage, but also to control and punish domestic dis- sent, such as the publication of unorthodox political commentary,

art, or literature, on the grounds that such expressions benefited an "antistate organization." In divided Korea, almost any act of

opposition to the South Korean government could be and has been

characterized as benefiting North Korea. Arrests under the law have

been made for a wide variety of actions, including the sale of cassette tapes containing antigovernment songs; the sale, possession, or reading of books and other publications on the government's

banned list; or chanting anti-American slogans at a student rally.

Ordinary procedural protections of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not provided for defendants for offenses under this law.

Any liaison with antistate organizations was also punishable under the law, although in the late 1980s there was considerable debate concerning the government's selectivity in allowing some

politicians and businessmen to travel to North Korea or meet with

North Korean officials while severely punishing critics of the government who did the same thing. There was a surge in prosecutions

for various offenses under the National Security Act in 1989, despite

continuing talk of amending the law to facilitate broader contacts

245
South Korea: A Country Study

with the north. In early 1990, as the third year of Roh's administration began and as the government mulled over plans to sign

several international agreements concerning human rights, it was

still unclear whether or when the promise of Roh's 1988 inaugural

speech, that "the day when freedoms and human rights could be

slighted in the name of economic growth and national security has

ended," would be redeemed.

The Media

Modern Korean journalism began after the opening of Korea

in 1876. The Korean press had a strong reformist and nationalistic flavor from the beginning but faced efforts at political control or outright censorship during most of the twentieth century. Many

Korean journalists established a tradition of remaining independent. They were often critical of the government, zealously protesting any attempts at press censorship. At annexation in 1910,

the Japanese governor general assumed direct control of the press

along with other public institutions. Following the March First

Movement in 1919, Japanese authorities loosened their overt control over cultural activities and permitted several Korean

newspapers to function while maintaining some behind-the-scenes

direction over politically sensitive topics. During the 1920s, Korean

vernacular newspapers, such as Tonga ilbo (East Asia Daily), and

intellectual journals, such as Kaebyok (Creation), conducted run- ning skirmishes with Japanese censors. Japanese authorities prohibited sales of individual issues on hundreds of occasions between

1926 and 1932. Japan's war mobilization in the ensuing years ended

any semblance of autonomy for the Korean press; all Koreanlanguage publications were outiawed in 1941.

Following the period of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48), which saw a burgeoning of newspapers

and periodicals of every description as well as occasional censorship of the media, almost all subsequent South Korean governments have at times attempted to control the media. Syngman

Rhee's government continued the military government's Ordinance

Number Eighty-Eight, which outlawed leftist newspapers. Rhee

also closed moderate newspapers and arrested reporters and publishers on numerous occasions between 1948 and 1960. On taking

power in 1961, Park Chung Hee's Supreme Council for National

Reconstruction closed all but fifteen of Seoul's sixty-four daily

newspapers and refused to register a comparable percentage of the

country's news services, weeklies, and monthly publications while

using its own radio and news agencies to promote its official line. The Park government also used the Press Ethics Commission Law

246
Government and Politics

of 1964 and, after 1972, emergency decrees that penalized criti- cism of the government to keep the media in line. In 1974 the

government ordered a number of journalists fired and used the

KCIA to force Tonga ilbo to stop its reporting on popular opposition to the Park government by intimidating the paper's advertisers.

During the Park and Chun years, the government exercised

considerable control and surveillance over the media through the

comprehensive National Security Act. In late 1980, the Chun government established more thorough control of the news media than

had existed in South Korea since the Korean War. Independent news agencies were absorbed into a single state-run agency, numerous provincial newspapers were closed, central newspapers were

forbidden to station correspondents in provincial cities, the Christian Broadcasting System network was forbidden to provide news

coverage, and two independent broadcasting companies were absorbed into the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). In

addition, the Defense Security Command, then commanded by

Roh Tae Woo, and the Ministry of Culture and Information or- dered hundreds of South Korean journalists fired and banned from

newspaper writing or editing.

The Basic Press Act of December 1980 was the legal capstone

of Chun's system of media control and provided for censorship and

control of newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast media. It also

set the professional qualifications for journalists. Media censorship was coordinated with intelligence officials, representatives of vari- ous government agencies, and the presidential staff by the Office

of Public Information Policy within the Ministry of Culture and

Information using daily "reporting guidelines" (podo chich'im) sent

to newspaper editors. The guidelines dealt exhaustively with questions of emphasis, topics to be covered or avoided, the use of government press releases, and even the size of headlines. Enforcement

methods ranged from telephone calls to editors to more serious forms

of intimidation, including interrogations and beatings by police.

One former Ministry of Culture and Information official told a

National Assembly hearing in 1988 that compliance during his ten- ure from 1980 to 1982 reached about 70 percent.

By the mid-1980s, censorship of print and broadcast media had

become one of the most widely and publicly criticized practices of

the Chun government. Even the government-controlled Yonhap

News Agency noted in 1989 that "TV companies, scarcely worse

than other media, were the main target of bitter public criticism

for their distorted reporting for the government in the early 1980s.

Editorials called for abolition of the Basic Press Act and related

practices, a bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the National

247
South Korea: A Country Study

Assembly to the same end, and a public campaign to withhold compulsory viewers' fees in protest against censorship by the KBS net- work received widespread press attention. By the summer of 1986, even the ruling party was responding to public opinion.

The political liberalization of the late 1980s brought a loosening

of press restraints and a new generation of journalists more will- ing to investigate sensitive subjects, such as the May 1980 Kwangju

incident. Roh's eight-point declaration of June 29, 1987, provided for "a free press, including allowing newspapers to base cor- respondents in provincial cities and withdrawing security officials from newspaper offices." The South Korean media began a rapid

expansion. Seoul papers expanded their coverage and resumed the

practice of stationing correspondents in provincial cities. Although

temporarily still under the management of a former Blue House

press spokesman, the MBC television network, a commercial net- work that had been under control of the state-managed KBS since

1980, resumed independent broadcasting. The number of radio

broadcast stations grew from 74 in 1985 to 1 1 1 (including both AM

and FM stations) by late 1988 and to 125 by late 1989. The number of periodicals rose as the government removed restrictions on

the publishing industry (see Transportation and Telecommunications, ch. 3; table 15, Appendix).

There also were qualitative changes in the South Korean media. The Christian Broadcasting System, a radio network, again

began to broadcast news as well as religious programming in 1987.

In the same year, the government partially lifted a long-standing

ban on the works of North Korean artists and musicians, many

of whom were of South Korean origin. A newspaper run by dissi- dent journalists began publication in 1988. A number of other new

dailies also appeared in 1988. Many of the new weekly and monthly

periodicals bypassed the higher profits of the traditional general

circulation magazines to provide careful analyses of political, eco- nomic, and national security affairs to smaller, specialized audiences. Observers noted a dramatic increase in press coverage of

previously taboo subjects such as political-military relations, fac- tions within the military, the role of security agencies in politics,

and the activities of dissident organizations. Opinion polls dealing

with these and other sensitive issues also began to appear with in- creasing regularity. Journalists at several of the Seoul dailies organized trade unions in late 1987 and early 1988 and began to press

for editorial autonomy and a greater role in newspaper management.

In 1989 South Korea's four largest dailies, Hanguk ilbo, Chungang ilbo, Choson ilbo, and Tonga ilbo, had a combined circulation of

248
Government and Politics

more than 6.5 million readers. The antiestablishment Hangydre sim- mun (One Nation News) had 450,000 readers—less than the major

dailies or smaller papers like Kyonghyang simmun or Soul simmun but

larger than four more specialized economic dailies. All the major

dailies were privately owned, except for the government-controlled

Hanguk ilbo. Several other daily publications had specialized readerships among sport fans and youth. Two English-language newspapers, the government-subsidized Korea Herald and the Korea Times,

which was affiliated with the independent Soul simmun, were widely

read by foreign embassies and businesses. A Chinese-language daily

served South Korea's small Chinese population (see Population,

ch. 2). The Yonhap News Agency provided domestic and foreign news

to government agencies, newspapers, and broadcasters. Yonhap

also provided news on South Korean developments in English by

computerized transmission via the Asia-Pacific News Network. Additional links with world media were facilitated by four satellite link stations. The International Broadcast Center established in

June 1988 served some 10,000 broadcasters for the 1988 Seoul

Olympics. The government's KBS radio network broadcast overseas in twelve languages. Two private radio networks, the Asia

Broadcasting Company and Far East Broadcasting Company,

served a wide regional audience that included the Soviet Far East,

China, and Japan.

The South Korean government also supported Naewoe Press,

which dealt solely with North Korean affairs. Originally a propaganda vehicle that followed the government line on unification policy

issues, Naewoe Press became increasingly objective and moderate

in tone in the mid-1980s in interpreting political, social, and eco- nomic developments in North Korea. Vantage Point, an Englishlanguage publication of Naewoe Press, provided in-depth studies

of North Korean social, economic, and political developments.

Except for two newspapers (one in Korean and one in English)

that the government owned or controlled and the state television

network, ownership of the media was for the most part distinct from

political or economic power. One exception was the conservative

daily, Chungang ilbo. Under the close oversight of its owner, the

late Samsung Group founder and multimillionaire Yi Pyong-ch'ol,

the paper and its affiliated TBC television network generally supported the Park government during the 1970s. Its relations with

the government became strained after 1980, however, when Chun

Doo Hwan forced TBC to merge with KBS. A journalists' strike

at Chungang ilbo in 1989, in one of many similar incidents at the

249
South Korea: A Country Study

major South Korean newspapers, won even greater management

and editorial independence.

Most of South Korea's major newspapers derived their financial

support from advertising and from their affiliation with major publishing houses. The Tonga Press, for example, published not only

the prestigious daily Tonga ilbo, but also a variety of other periodicals, including a newspaper for children, the general circulation

monthly Sin tonga (New East Asia), a women's magazine, and specialized reference books and magazines for students. Throughout the

postwar period, Tonga ilbo has been noted for its opposition sympathies.

South Korea's principal antiestablishment newspaper, Hangyore

simmun, began publication in May 1988. It was founded by dissident

journalists who were purged by the government in the early 1970s

or in 1980; many of the paper's reporters and editorial staff left positions on mainstream newspapers to join the new venture. The struc- ture and approach of the paper reflected the founders' view that in

the past the South Korean news media had been too easily co-opted

by the government. The paper had a human rights department as well as a mass media department to keep an eye on the government's

press policy and to critique the ideological and political biases of

other newspapers. The paper's nationalism and interest in national

reunification were symbolically represented in the logo, which depicted Lake Ch'onji at the peak of Mount Paektu in North Korea; in

the exclusive use of the Korean alphabet; and by the type font in

which the paper's name was printed—the font dated from a famous

Korean publication of the eighteenth century. The paper was printed

horizontally, rather than vertically like other Seoul dailies. In other

innovations, the Hangyore simmun relied on sales revenues, private

contributions, and the sale of stock, rather than on advertising from

major corporations, in line with its claim to be "the first newspaper

in the world truly independent of political power and large capital. " The newspaper came under increasing government pressure

in 1989 (see Political Dynamics, this ch.).

South Korea also had extensive and well-developed visual media. The first Korean film was produced in 1919, and cinemas subsequently were built in the larger cities. The result of the spread

of television sets and radios was the dissemination of a homogenized

popular culture and the impingement of urban values on rural communities.

Foreign Policy

Organization and Operation

The Constitution of the Sixth Republic vests the conduct of foreign

250
Government and Politics

affairs in the presidency and the State Council, subject to the approval of the National Assembly. The president and the State Council, through the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs,

make periodic reports on foreign relations to the legislature. The

president receives or dispatches envoys without legislative confirmation; treaties, however, must receive legislative consent. Declarations of war, the dispatch of troops overseas, and the stationing

of foreign troops within the national borders also are subject to legislative approval (Article 60 of the Constitution). The National Assembly has a standing Foreign Affairs Committee that reports its deliberations to plenary sessions of the assembly. The assembly may

also establish ad hoc committees to consider questions of special

importance to the state. Constitutionally, major foreign policy objectives are established

by the president. The chief foreign policy advisers in the State Council are the prime minister, who heads the cabinet, and the minister

of foreign affairs. From time to time, these officials may be questioned by the National Assembly; the Assembly may pass a recom- mendation for the removal from office of the prime minister or a

State Council member (Article 63). The president is assisted by

the National Security Council in the formulation and execution

of foreign, military, and domestic policies related to national security

prior to their deliberation by the State Council (Article 91). The

Agency for National Security Planning, its mission akin to that

of a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, has direct access to the president and

operates at his personal direction in the overall conduct of foreign

policy (see The Agency for National Security Planning, ch. 5). Diplomatic missions abroad conduct foreign policy. The Ministry

of Foreign Affairs was established with functional and area divi- sions. The foreign ministry staff consists of civil service members

and a highly professionalized career foreign service corps, select- ed on the basis of at least a college education and performance in a highly competitive examination supervised by the Ministry of

Government Administration. Regarded as prestigious social positions, diplomatic posts attract ambitious and bright individuals who

undergo an intensive training program conducted by the Foreign

Affairs Research Institute. The institute in the late 1980s had a very rigorous curriculum in international diplomacy, specialized area training, and intensive language training.

Basic Goals and Accomplishments

The external posture of South Korea in general, and toward

North Korea in particular, began a new chapter in the 1980s. While

251
South Korea: A Country Study

retaining its previous goal—enhancing political legitimacy, military security, and economic development by maintaining close ties with the West—South Korea greatly expanded its diplomatic

horizons by launching its ambitious pukpang chongch 'aek (see Glossary), northern policy, or Nordpolitik. Nordpolitik was Seoul's ver- sion of the Federal Republic of Germany's (West Germany)

Ostpolitik of the early 1970s. Although the policy's origins can be

traced back to 1973 under Park, it was greatly invigorated by Roh.

Seoul's Nordpolitik was designed for a number of rather ambitious but initially ill-defined objectives. Seoul's basic dilemma in

its Nordpolitik appeared to be how to reconcile its traditional ties with the West with its new opportunities in the East. First,

policymakers felt that their economic and military reliance on the

West was excessive, mendicant, and too lengthy. Seoul sought to correct this situation by establishing its own self-reliant global

posture. This desire to be less dependent became particularly acute

as Seoul's Western allies greatly improved relations with Eastern

Europe, the Soviet Union, and China.

Second, Nordpolitik was designed to expand and diversify trade

relations on a global scale to cope with increasing trade protectionism from the United States. Intentionally or not, the policy

aroused anti-Americanism. Ironically enough, the rising antiUnited States feeling was accompanied by increasing demands for economic and political democracy, culminating in the Kwangju

incident in May 1980.

Finally, Nordpolitik involved the pursuit of wide-ranging rela- tions with socialist countries and contacts and dialogue with North

Korea. It had often been observed that political leaders in Pyongyang and Seoul utilized their confrontational postures to sustain

their political legitimacy. Claiming that Pyongyang's response had

been far from satisfactory, Seoul's policymakers solicited assistance

and cooperation from Pyongyang's socialist allies to induce and

persuade P'yongyang to become more accommodating. Yet Seoul's

success in improving relations with P'yongyang' s socialist allies had

not resulted in substantially improved relations with P'yongyang

by 1990. In fact, for the short term, Seoul even might have less- ened its chances for improved relations with P'yongyang by having improved its relations with North Korea's socialist allies and

by raising the question of whether Nordpolitik was primarily

designed to confront and compete with P'yongyang. Thus far,

Nordpolitik clearly demonstrated the limited power of P'yongyang'

socialist allies, particularly Moscow and Beijing, vis-a-vis the ex- tremely self-reliant North Korea. In reality, Seoul may have grossly

underestimated Pyongyang's firmly established independence.

252
Twenty-two-story combined government and ministerial building, Seoul

Courtesy Korean Overseas Information Service

253
South Korea: A Country Study

On the whole, however, Nordpolitik was successful, and Seoul's

accomplishments could be readily observed in sports, trade, and

diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst for Nordpolitik. It was the first Olympic Games in twelve years not marred

by a bloc-level boycott and had the highest participation ever—1 59

nations and more than 9,000 athletes. Seoul gained new global

recognition and visibility as more than 3 billion people around the

world watched the games being televised live. Had it not been for the North Korean bombing of KAL 858 over

the Andaman Sea in November 1987, Seoul might have been more

willing to reach out to P'yongyang. While the much-feared and

predicted North Korean misbehavior over South Korea's staging

of the Olympics did not materialize, Seoul probably was relieVed

by Pyongyang's absence from the games.

Seoul's international trade record has been impressive (see Foreign Economic Relations, ch. 3). While encountering, along with

other newly industrialized nations, mounting trade friction with

the United States and other major markets, Seoul emerged in the

late 1980s as the world's tenth-largest trading nation. Economic

reforms and the open-door policies of socialist countries, coupled

with their recognition of Seoul's economic growth, pushed economic

trade and cooperation between South Korea and socialist countries into full swing.

Perhaps Seoul's most impressive success was in diplomacy. Literally implementing the 1988 Olympics slogan, "From Seoul to the

World, and from the World to Seoul," by the beginning of 1990

South Korea had established diplomatic relations with 133 countries and had 138 diplomatic missions, including representative

offices and a consulate department in Moscow. Conversely, North

Korea had diplomatic relations with 102 countries and 85 overseas

missions. An impressive number of young South Korean diplomats were trained in the West and actively implemented Nordpolitik. These diplomats were also supported by the aggressive

worldwide market diversification programs of South Korea's big

business establishments, the chaebol, and by an increasingly large

number of overseas South Koreans, many of whom become

salespersons of South Korean products (see The Origins and Development of Chaebol, ch. 3). After Roh's inauguration in February 1988, Nordpolitik was particularly invigorated. In a July 7, 1988, statement primarily aimed

at insuring the success of the Olympics, Roh unveiled a six-point

plan to ease forty years of bitter confrontation between Seoul and

P'yongyang and to clear the way for peaceful unification of the

divided peninsula. In the afterglow of the Olympics, Roh made

254
Government and Politics

his diplomatic debut as the first South Korean president to address

the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, on October 18, 1988.

Roh's speech called for a six-nation consultative conference to dis- cuss a broad range of issues concerning peace, stability, progress,

and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Pledging unilaterally never to use force first against North Korea, Roh proposed to replace the

existing 1953 armistice agreement with a peace treaty.

Relations with the United States South Korea's relations with the United States have been most

extensive and intense since 1948. This relation was perhaps inevitable because South Korea was primarily established by the United

States and was saved from a total collapse in the course of the

Korean War (1950-53) by the United States-initiated, United

Nations- sponsored rescue operation. During the subsequent four

decades, however, Seoul came of age economically, politically, and

even militarily and was no longer as economically or militarily dependent on the United States. Instead, by the 1990s it was seeking

to establish a partnership for progress. The Seoul-Washington rela- tionship in this transition was increasingly subject to severe strains. Trade had become a serious source of friction between the two

countries. In 1989 the United States was South Korea's largest and

most important trading partner, and South Korea was the seventhlargest market for United States goods and the second-largest market

for its agricultural products. Friction, however, had been caused

in the late 1980s by South Korea's trade surplus. Correcting and

eliminating this trade imbalance became the center of economic

controversy between Seoul and Washington. Although Seoul gave

in to Washington's demands to avoid being designated as a "priority foreign country" (PFC) under the United States "Super 301

provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,

economic policymakers in Seoul greatiy resented this unilateral eco- nomic threat. They also feared that the PFC designation would

fuel anti-Americanism throughout South Korea.

Security was another source of strain. Some policymakers in

Seoul and Washington maintained that United States forces should

remain in South Korea as long as Seoul wanted and needed them.

Not only did 94 percent of South Koreans support the presence

of United States forces, but even the vocal opposition parties fa- vored a continued United States military presence in South Korea.

Stability in the peninsula, they argued, had been maintained be- cause strong Seoul-Washington military cooperation had deterred

further aggression.

255
South Korea: A Country Study

Other policymakers, however, felt that United States troops

should gradually be leaving South Korea. They argued that South

Korea in the late 1980s was more economically, militarily, and politically capable of coping with North Korea. Moreover, they doubted that P'yongyang could contemplate another military action,

given its acrimonious relationships with Moscow and Beijing. In

Washington, meanwhile, an increasing number of United States policymakers advocated gradual troop withdrawal for budgetary

reasons. The consultations on restructuring the Washington-Seoul

security relationship held during Secretary of Defense Richard B

Cheney's February 1990 visit to South Korea marked the beginning of the change in status of United States forces—from a leading to a supporting role in South Korea's defense. In addition, Seoul was asked to increase substantially its contribution to defense costs. Although the precise amount of savings would be difficult to measure, the United States would likely save at least US$2 billion to US$3 billion annually if defense costs were restructured as the United

States wished. Furthermore, disengagement would avoid the potential for American entanglement in complicated internal South Korean

politics. In short, it was suggested that it was time for Seoul to be

treated as an independent entity responsible for its own security.

Politics also strained relations between Seoul and Washington.

An increasingly sensitive South Korean nationalism was faced with

what Seoul viewed as a hardened Washington. The United States

role in the May 1980 Kwangju uprising was the single most press- ing South Korean political issue of the 1980s. Even after a decade,

Kwangju citizens and other Koreans still blamed the United States

for its perceived involvement in the bloody uprising.

Washington's policymakers applauded Nordpolitik as a neces- sary adjustment of the relationship between Seoul and Moscow.

However, the South Korean press contributed to a distorted zero- sum notion of the situation, suggesting that improving ties with

the Soviet Union would cause strains in the relationship with the

United States. In his February 1989 speech to the South Korean

National Assembly, President George Bush defined continuity and

change as the guideposts in Seoul-Washington relations.

Relations with the Soviet Union

Seoul-Moscow relations entered a new era in the 1980s. In many

ways, Roh's Nordpolitik and Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" had something in common—they were attempts to reverse

their nations' recent histories. Their efforts, while supported by

popular longings, still confronted serious resistance from conservative and powerful bureaucracies. In a fundamental sense, the

256
Government and Politics

Soviet economic crisis appeared responsible for Moscow's improved

relations with Seoul. Politically, Gorbachev had signaled Soviet

interest in improving relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific

region irrespective of sociopolitical system, including South Korea,

as was clearly spelled out in his July 1986 Vladivostok and August

1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches.

Improved Seoul-Moscow relations appear to have been carefully and systematically planned in three related stages: sports, trade,

and political relations. The Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst.

The Soviets were eager to participate in the games, if only for the

sake of the athletic competition. Seoul's most honored guests were from the Soviet Union. Moscow sent more than 6,000 Soviets to South Korea. Soviet tourist ships came to Pusan and Inch'on, and

Aeroflot planes landed in Seoul. And when the Soviet team headed for home, it also took along thirty- six South Korean television

sets, seven minibuses, four large buses, four cars, and one copy

machine—all gifts from Daewoo.

Economically, Seoul and Moscow were natural partners. South

Korea had been seeking to trade with the Soviet Union even before Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev desired foreign capital

and high technology, as well as Seoul's help in alleviating the Soviet

economic crisis through direct investment, joint ventures, and trade. Moreover, with the advantage of geographic proximity, South

Korea was an ideal source of badly needed consumer goods and

managerial skills. As early as May 1979, during a visit to Helsinki,

then South Korean minister of foreign affairs Pak Tong-jin signed an agreement obtaining Finnish assistance in exporting South

Korean products to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Seoul

has welcomed trade opportunities with Moscow and considers the

Soviet Union a significant part of the global market. Moreover,

the natural resources Seoul increasingly needs—oil, metals, timber, and fish—are abundant in the Soviet Far East. Trade with

the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China would also allevi- ate South Korea's apprehension over the United States' increasing trade protectionism. Moreover, South Korea's expanding trade

with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union initially was encouraged

by the United States, although Washington later became increasingly concerned over possible high-technology transfers. Because of the lack of diplomatic relations, most South KoreanSoviet trade initially was indirect; Eastern Europe, Hong Kong,

Japan, and Singapore served as intermediaries. With an increasing volume of trade, Seoul and Moscow began trading direcdy, using

facilities near Vladivostok and Pusan. Several major South Korean

257
South Korea: A Country Study

businesses, including Daewoo, Sunkyong, and Lucky-Goldstar,

traded directly with the Soviet Union in 1990.

Based on mutual economic interests, the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and the Soviet Chamber of Commerce

and Industry exchanged a trade memorandum in 1988 pledging

mutual assistance in establishing trade offices in 1989. During a

six-day visit to Seoul in October 1988, Vladimir Golanov, deputy

chairman of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was

received by officials of South Korea's major multinationals.

KOTRA president Yi Sun-gi signed the trade memorandum in

Moscow in December 1988. Seoul's trade office in Moscow opened

in July 1989; Moscow's trade office in Seoul opened in April 1989.

In December 1989, Seoul invited Soviet officials to attend a trade

exhibition where members of the Soviet state-run Tekhsnabeksport

displayed impressive high-technology items.

Political relations were developing gradually. South Korea's new- found wealth and technological prowess had been attracting the

interest of a growing number of socialist nations. In initiating Nordpolitik, its chief architect Pak Ch'6r-6n—Roh's confidential for- eign policy adviser—was rumored to have visited Moscow to consult

with Soviet policymakers. Kim Young Sam visited Moscow from

June 2 to June 10, 1989, with the apparent approval of the Roh

administration. Selected from among several other South Korean

politicians (including Kim Dae Jung, who had reportedly been in- vited to Moscow) to make certain that the newly emerging SeoulMoscow relationship would proceed steadily, Kim Young Sam was

received as a guest of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and

International Relations (IMEMO). He participated in talks with

various Soviet officials, including the newly elected chairman of

the Supreme Soviet, academician Yevgeni Primakov. In a joint state- ment, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and IMEMO

pledged to promote closer trade and cultural ties between the two

nations. While Kim Young Sam was in Moscow, the Kremlin

announced that it would allow some 300,000 Soviet-Koreans who

had been on the Soviet island of Sahkalin since the end of World

War II to return permanently to South Korea—clearly a reflec- tion of the continuing improvement in Seoul-Moscow relations.

Moscow even arranged a Seoul-P'yongyang meeting. During

the meeting, which was planned by IMEMO, Kim Young Sam,

with Roh's prior approval, met with the North Korean ambassador

to the Soviet Union, Kwon Hui-gyong, who reportedly proposed

a regular exchange between the RDP and the Korean Workers'

Party (KWP), as well as a North-South summit meeting. Kim

also met with Ho Tarn, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful

258
Government and Politics

Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), who came to Moscow

from P'yongyang.

The progress in Seoul-Moscow relations was extraordinary.

Given the complementary and parallel interests between Seoul and

Moscow, their relations were likely to proceed even if there were

temporary setbacks. A highly experienced South Korean diplomat,

Kong No-myong, was assigned to the Moscow consulate; an equally

experienced Soviet diplomat was posted to Seoul. In June 1990,

Roh held his first summit with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev

in San Francisco. Moscow's "Seoul Rush" may be regarded as an effort to reconcile (and possibly to terminate) its past politicalmilitary obligations to P'yongyang with the new economic and stra- tegic opportunities in Seoul. Seoul's "Moscow Rush" had been

conceived primarily as a way to utilize its growing economic power

for political purposes, particularly in its relations with P'yongyang. On the other hand, if indeed the final destination of Nordpolitik was P'yongyang, Seoul had thus far proved to be less successful than Moscow.

Relations with Japan

Korea is geographically close, yet emotionally distant from Japan.

Given the historical relationship between the two countries, the

paradoxical nature of their relation is readily understandable. Since

normalizing relations in 1965 at the urging of the United States,

Seoul and Tokyo have held annual foreign ministerial conferences.

The usual issues discussed have been trade, the status of the Korean

minority population in Japan, the content of textbooks dealing with

the relationship, Tokyo's equidistant policy between P'yongyang

and Seoul, and the occasional problems (see Foreign Policy, ch. 1). At the first of three ministerial conferences held in 1987 (in Seoul,

New York, and Geneva, respectively), the two countries' foreign

ministers discussed pending issues, including Seoul's trade deficit with Tokyo. The Japanese minister of foreign affairs pledged to assist Seoul in its role as host of the Olympics. Seoul and Tokyo signed a bilateral agreement on sea rescue and emergency cooperation.

The 1988 foreign ministerial conference was held in Tokyo. There

the two countries agreed to expand exchanges of youths, students,

and teachers and to establish the twenty-first century committee

between the two nations, as well as a joint security consultative

committee for the Seoul Olympics.

Roh's Nordpolitik somewhat relaxed Seoul's vehement opposition to Tokyo's approach to P'yongyang. TheJapan Socialist Party,

in particular, has become active in improving relations not only

between P'yongyang and Tokyo, but also between itself and Seoul.

259
South Korea: A Country Study

As the Japan Socialist Party has abandoned its posture favoring

P'yongyang, Seoul has welcomed the new equidistant policy, in- viting a former secretary general of the Japan Socialist Party,

Ishibashi Masashi, to Seoul in October 1988. Ishibashi's visit was

unusually productive, not only in improving his party's image in

Seoul, but also in his reported willingness to mediate between Seoul

and P'yongyang. Although Tokyo appeared willing to assist Seoul

in improving relations not only with P'yongyang but also with Beijing, it did not seem to welcome the much-improved Seoul-Moscow

relationship. Further, Seoul-Tokyo relations became somewhat

strained when in 1989 Tokyo began steps to improve relations with

P'yongyang.

Relations with China

Nordpolitik has been viewed as less attractive in Beijing than

in Moscow. Beijing's needs for Seoul in the 1980s were hardly

matched with those of Moscow, particularly in economic terms.

Still, because of complementary economic needs and geographic

proximity, South Korea and China began to trade actively. The

absence of any official relations, however, made it difficult to ex- pand trade between Seoul and Beijing because South Korea could

not legally protect its citizens and business interests in China.

Beijing, in comparison with Moscow, has been politically closer

to P'yongyang, a situation that has slowed political improvements

between Beijing and Seoul despite the increasing volume of trade

between the two countries. Furthermore, China has attempted to mediate between North Korea and the United States and North

Korea and Japan and also has initiated and promoted tripartite talks among P'yongyang, Seoul, and Washington.

Active South Korean-Chinese people-to-people contacts have

been encouraged. Academics, journalists, and particularly families divided between South Korea and China were able to exchange

visits freely in the late 1980s. Nearly 2 million ethnic Koreans, es- pecially in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China's

Jilin Province, have interacted with South Koreans.

It has been difficult to determine what effect the political tur- moil in China will have on Sino-Korean relations. After the military crackdown on demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989,

P'yongyang predictably came out in support of Beijing's repressive actions. Seoul, on the other hand, produced a more muted

response that did not condone the actions in Tiananmen Square

but did not condemn them either. Trade between the two countries continued to increase.

260
Government and Politics

Relations with North Korea

Nordpolitik's final destination—P'yongyang—has proved difficult to reach. After nearly two decades, inter-Korean relations had not

improved measurably. In fact, it may be argued that political leaders

in Seoul and P'yongyang have skillfully used the perceived mutual

threat to maintain and justify their political legitimacy. Their postures may seem reasonable, given that until the precarious 1953

armistice agreement is replaced by a permanent peace treaty, the

Korean War cannot be considered completely over. Nevertheless,

Seoul and P'yongyang have been increasing their contacts across and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in a gradual and un- even fashion. These expanding contacts appear quite natural be- cause there are an estimated 10 million separated family members.

Moreover, South Korean business leaders have been keenly aware

of potential economic benefits in improved relations with North

Korea. Inasmuch as inter-Korean contacts are gradually becoming a "growth industry," their prospects appear promising.

Inter-Korean relations may be divided into four periods. The

first stage covered the period between 1972 and 1973; the second

stage was initiated by Pyongyang's delivery of relief goods to South

Korea after a typhoon caused devastating floods in 1984; and the

third stage began with the exchange of home visits and performing artists in 1985. The fourth stage, activated by Nordpolitik under Roh, was represented by expanding public and private contacts between the two Koreas. These working-level contacts have included

Red Cross talks aimed at exchanging home visits by divided families and performing artists; sports talks aimed at establishing a unified team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games; economic trade at the level of premiers; preliminary talks for joint parliamentary meetings; and expanded academic and religious exchanges.

The Nordpolitik blueprint—Roh's declaration ofJuly 7, 1988

opened a new chapter in inter-Korean dialogue. Calling for the

building of a single "national commonwealth," Roh solicited the

assistance of Washington and Tokyo to improve Seoul's relations

with Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, he encouraged Washington and Tokyo to improve relations with P'yongyang and to ex- pand inter-Korean exchanges. Roh urged a positive response from

P'yongyang; North Korea's reaction, however, was not positive.

P'yongyang issued an immediate and detailed statement on July

11, 1988. The CPRF dismissed Roh's proposal as old wine in a new bottle, claiming that only the 1972 three basic principles for Korean reunification—reunification by peaceful means, by tran- scending ideological differences (nationalism), and without external

261
South Korea: A Country Study

interference (self-determination)—could be the basis to improve

inter-Korean dialogue. Seen from Pyongyang's perspective, Roh's

July 7 proposal was nothing more than a political ploy to cope with

increasing radical student agitation that opposed Seoul's hosting

of the Olympics without Pyongyang's participation. Consequendy,

Roh's statement angered rather than mollified Pyongyang's

posture, which was based on Kim II Sung's proposal to establish a Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea.

Meanwhile, Seoul began to speak more openly about the rising

level of direct and indirect inter-Korean trade, much to the dis- pleasure of P'yongyang. P'yongyang claimed that Seoul had fabri- cated these trade stories. By 1988, however, Seoul began to reduce

tariffs and other duties to liberalize trade with P'yongyang. Trade

statistics provided by Seoul and P'yongyang on north- south trade were largely unreliable inasmuch as each government had its own

reasons for reporting high or low figures. Much of the trade was

conducted through third parties.

Pyongyang's response to Seoul consisted of three points: asking for the repeal of the National Security Act, which designated

P'yongyang an enemy; making a declaration of nonaggression; and

establishing a "Peaceful Reunification Committee." Over the next

few months, Roh's government attempted to make progress toward

satisfying each of these requirements. In his October 18, 1988, United Nations speech, Roh advocated convening a six-nation consultative conference to achieve a permanent peace setdement in Korea

and called for establishing a partnership with P'yongyang. In his

1989 New Year's address, Kim II Sung extended an invitation to the presidents of the major South Korean political parties and re- ligious leaders, including Cardinal Kim Soo Hwan, Reverend Mun

Ik-hwan, and Reverend Paek Ki-wan, for a leadership-level interKorean reunification meeting to be held in P'yongyang. However,

any meaningful inter-Korean dialogue bogged down at Pyongyang's objections to the annual United States-South Korean Team

Spirit military exercises.

Economic relations have demonstrated more promise. An authorized public visit to North Korea by Chong Chu-yong, honorary

chairman of the Hyundai Group, in early 1989 (in technical violation of South Korea's National Security Act) was a remarkable

breakthrough. After years of behind-the-scene efforts, Chong,

through a South Korean intermediary in Japan, was invited by

P'yongyang and fulfilled his long-cherished dream of seeing his

relatives at his native village, near scenic Kumgang-san. Chong

was received in P'yongyang by Ho Tarn, Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, and by

262
President Roh Tae Woo

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington

business leaders eager to discuss large-scale economic cooperation,

such as joint ventures and development of the tourist industry.

Chong's visit caused euphoric expectations and also engendered other

visits. Many of Chong's expected business dealings, however, suffered

temporary setbacks after his return to South Korea. These setbacks were primarily caused by the unauthorized visits to North Korea

of Reverend Mun Ik-hwan (March-April 1989), South Korean lawmaker So Kyong-won (who had secretly visited P'yongyang in August 1988, had been accused of the visit in June 28, 1989, and had

been sentenced in December 1989 to fifteen years in prison), and

dissident South Korean student representative, Im Su-kyong (who

had attended the thirteenth World Youth and Student Festival, July

1-8, 1989, in P'yongyang and later had been sentenced to a prison

term). The government's harsh handling of these visits clearly

showed that it intended to keep the initiative in dealings with North

Korea, but the action also appeared to some Koreans to contradict

Roh' s July 7 statement encouraging free inter-Korean contacts at various levels. That Roh's statement itself seemed to disregard the

National Security Act added momentum to dissident calls for the

law's abrogation or revision.

Relations with International Organizations and the Third World

South Korea has been very active in the United Nations (UN)

263
South Korea: A Country Study

even though, as of 1990, it was not a member. Seoul has taken

a vigorous part in the activities of various subsidiary and specialized UN agencies, as well as other international organizations, and

has had active permanent missions to the UN, the UN Economic

and Social Council and its Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the European Community. An increasing number of UN Security Council members, including the Soviet

Union, tended to consider seriously Seoul's bid for separate entry

into the UN. This move was vehemently opposed by North Korea,

which claimed that such a recognition would make the division of

Korea permanent.

Seoul's activities in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer- ence (PECC) were particularly noteworthy. As a founding member of the PECC, South Korea played a key role in liberalizing trade

networks throughout the entire Pacific region. The South Korean

national committee of the PECC represented academic, business,

and government interests. The national committee was extremely

useful not only in formulating Seoul's trade policies, but also in communicating these policies to other members' national committees and

in successfully negotiating mutually advantageous trade agreements.

Equally impressive has been Seoul's diplomacy toward the developing world. Being a developing nation itself, South Korea has

identified with other developing nations. For this reason, and in ap- parent competition with P'yongyang, Seoul has been actively seeking to improve relations, particularly with nonaligned nations, based on the principles of good neighborliness, reciprocity, and equality.

As ofJanuary 1990, Seoul had full diplomatic relations with seventyeight members of the Nonaligned Movement, including Yugoslavia and Algeria. To promote economic assistance and expand trade,

Seoul established the Economic Development Cooperation Fund in

1987. South Korea signed three loan agreements: US$13 million

for a road construction project in Indonesia, US$10 million for modernization of fishing vessels in Peru, and US$10 million for rail- way projects in Nigeria. To promote better relations with developing countries on the basis of south-south cooperation, Roh made

state visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei in November 1988.

Future Prospects

Seoul became more globally conscious in the 1980s. South Korean

contacts with foreigners have been largely a post-Korean War

phenomenon. Indeed, Seoul's expanding foreign business contacts have been greatiy stimulated by the fierce rivalry with North Korea.

Seoul's basic goals are still to enhance political legitimacy, military

security, and economic development vis-a-vis P'yongyang. After the

264
Government and Politics

1988 Seoul Olympics, however, South Korea's diplomatic horizon was greatly expanded because of Roh's Nordpolitik, which had successfully transformed South Korea's sports industry, economic re- lations, and diplomacy (although its success with P'yongyang was

limited)

.

Lacking a reconciliation with North Korea—the final destination of Nordpolitik—Roh's remarkable accomplishments will re- main incomplete. In his 1990 New Year policy statement, Roh

observed that "the East European wave of reform toward freedom

and prosperity is bound to teach North Korea before long. '

' He

added that he hoped that "similar change will take place in the

North in an orderly and peaceful fashion." Roh pledged "[a]llout efforts ... to convince North Korea . . . that it should join

the trend of world history and open up."

* * * A number of introductory books on South Korean domestic politics and foreign relations are available in English. Ki-baik Lee's

A New History ofKorea is a Korean scholar's perspective on Korean

political history, valuable chiefly for its examination of the period

before 1945. Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie's The Japanese

Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 sheds light on the colonial roots of subsequent South Korean political cultural and behavior. Young Whan

Kihl's Politics and Policies in Divided Korea compares political leadership and styles in the two Koreas, while Ralph N. Clough's Embattled Korea is a thorough and cogent treatment of diplomacy and

extradiplomatic foreign policies as seen through the prism of rivalry

between the two Koreas. Dae-Kyu Yoon's Law and Political Authority

in Korea is an excellent and detailed study of the interaction between law and politics in the Republic of Korea.

A number of useful articles on South Korean foreign relations

and the United States-Korean relationship are contained in Robert

A. Scalapino's and Hongkoo Lee's Korea-U.S. Relations. Donald

Stone Macdonald's The Koreans, although not limited to politics,

is a useful survey. David I. Steinberg's The Republic of Korea contains many insightful observations on South Korean politics. Kim

Dae Jung is the only major political figure to have his views published extensively in English. Mass Participatory Economy gives his

views on South Korean political economy as of the mid-1980s; Prison Writings presents his thoughts on South Korean political culture

and other subjects. Human Rights in Korea, edited by William Shaw,

contains several chapters on postwar South Korean political and

human rights issues. The United States Department of State's June

265
South Korea: A Country Study

1989 "United States Government Statement on the Events in

Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980" also is a valuable

document.

Following the abolition of the Basic Press Act in 1988, the South

Korean media became a rich source of both factual and interpretive material on politics and government. Korea Newsreview, based on coverage of the government-owned Korea Herald newspaper,

presents weekly articles concerning politics and foreign affairs,

generally from a progovernment point of view; beginning in 1987,

the publication has also printed the writings of dissenting guest

columnists. The full spectrum of Seoul's Korean-language news media coverage on political topics is sampled and translated in the

Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia.

The United States Embassy in Seoul publishes its Press Translations: Korea six days each week.

Outside political analysis may be found in monthly periodicals,

including Asian Survey and TheJournal ofNortheast Asian Studies. The

monthly Korea Update contains news and commentary on politics

and human rights issues. Perceptive accounts of the political scene

are found in Far Eastern Economic Review and Asian Wall Street Journal, as well in major United States dailies such as the Washington

Post, New York Times, and Christian Science Monitor.

Among annual publications are Korea Annual, published by the

state- sponsored Yonhap News Agency, and the Asia Yearbook, published by the Far Eastern Economic Review. Amnesty International's

Report on Human Rights contains a chapter on South Korea in each

annual edition, as does the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

266
Chapter 5. National Security
Signal Fire Tower, Suwon Castle, sited with a view of the royal villa. The

tower offered an important means of communication.
DURING SOUTH KOREA'S Fifth Republic (1981-87), the

modernization of the armed forces was one of the highest priorities of Chun Doo Hwan's administration. As a result, when Chun's

term in office ended, he left behind one of the best-equipped military forces in Asia. Army units had been reorganized and equipped

with indigenously produced weapons. The improvement of defense

fortifications and supply systems along the southern side of the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) ensured that ground forces were better prepared to defend South Korea than at any time since the end

of the Korean War (1950-53). An automated air defense system,

jointly managed by the army and air force, reduced the possibility

that South Korea would be caught unprepared in the event of a

surprise attack. As a by-product of rapid industrialization and

coproduction agreements with United States and West European

firms, South Korean aircraft producers and shipbuilders were able

to supply most of the country's needs for modern fighter aircraft,

helicopters, coastal patrol vessels, and other equipment required

by the air force and navy.

A tenuous peace held throughout the 1980s on the Korean

Peninsula—tenuous because the government of the Democratic People 's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in P'yongyang continued

to expand its armed forces and to deploy two-thirds of all military

units—army, navy, and air force—in a combat-ready status close

to the DMZ. Moreover, North Korean-directed terrorist activity

against South Korea threatened to provoke a renewal of hostilities. In 1980 P'yongyang and Seoul each had about 600,000 military personnel on active duty. From 1980 to 1985, the North Korean

armed forces increased by 150,000 people, whereas the South

Korean armed forces expanded modestly by about 5,000 people.

In 1990 North Korea's armed forces had 1.4 million military per- sonnel on active duty. South Korea's armed forces had 650,000

persons on active duty and another 1,240,000 persons in the

reserves. Under Chun's leadership, Seoul cautiously promoted a peaceful dialogue with North Korea and encouraged the expansion of

north-south contacts in the early 1980s; P'yongyang remained uninterested in these overtures and on at least two occasions perpetrated terrorist attacks that increased tension on the Korean Peninsula.

The primary purpose of South Korean peace proposals in 1981

and 1982 was to realize a summit meeting between Chun and North

269
South Korea: A Country Study

Korean president Kim II Sung. South Korean leaders hoped that

the establishment of a government-to- government dialogue would

lead to agreements reducing the size of the armed forces of both

countries and establishing the framework for a peace plan to replace

the 1953 armistice.

In October 1983, a P'yongyang-directed terrorist attack result- ed in the cessation of the peace process. A bomb that exploded in

Rangoon, Burma, killed twenty-one people, including seventeen

high-ranking officials of the South Korean government then visit- ing Burma. The bombing was planned and executed by personnel

drawn from North Korean army units. Chun's decision not to retali- ate with force set a precedent that won him praise from abroad

and sympathy for his unpopular regime at home. Seoul's reliance on diplomatic and economic measures to counter terrorism rather

than a small-scale attack on a North Korean target, which could

be used as an excuse for beginning an all-out war, effectively mobilized international public opinion to limit trade and other contacts with North Korea.

Another terrorist attack occurred in September 1987 when two

North Korean saboteurs placed a bomb on a Seoul-bound Korean

Air Boeing 707 aircraft carrying ninety-five passengers and twenty crew members. The plane exploded over the Andaman Sea (south

of Burma), killing all aboard. Chun, following the precedent set in 1983 after the Rangoon bombing, ruled out military retaliation

and asked the international community to condemn North Korea

for its continued belligerence.

South Korea also experienced an increase in politically motivated

domestic violence during the 1980s. For the first time, a small, vocal

segment of the population persistently challenged former and cur- rent military leaders, including Chun, to stay out of politics. The

1980 Kwangju rebellion was used by disenfranchised politicians

and disillusioned radical students as a rallying cry. Moderates were

encouraged to pressure Chun to change the constitution and public security laws to guarantee that soldiers, police, and the intelli- gence services would never again be turned against the people.

Seoul's claims that the radical student organizations were fronts

for North Korea gradually lost credibility, particularly in 1985,

when student participation in the political process contributed to the high proportion of votes cast for the New Korea Democratic

Party in that year's parliamentary elections. Public indignation con- cerning increasingly brutal attacks on dissidents by police became

a major political issue in January 1987 when Pak Chong-ch'ol, a Seoul National University student, was tortured and subsequently died while in police custody. From March through June 1987,

270
National Security

combat police units of the Korean National Police responsible for crowd control were constantly on the move as antigovernment

demonstrations, sometimes including tens of thousands of ordinary

citizens, became everyday occurrences in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju,

and other cities. After the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as president in February 1988, attention once again reverted to North Korea as the fore- most threat to security. Roh made good his promise to ensure the

safety of athletes and spectators from around the world who came

to Seoul for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Japan and the United States provided direct security assistance during this period, the former

by closely monitoring the thousands of airline flights and visitors

passing through Tokyo and other Japanese cities en route to the

event, the latter by deploying additional air, naval, and security

units in and around South Korea before and during the Olympics. Following the Olympics, Roh relaxed restrictions on South

Korean contacts with North Koreans, gave in to increasing demands

for social spending, and acknowledged growing skepticism about

the threat from P'yongyang, all of which resulted in reducing the

percentage of the budget spent on defense. These policies were

designed to encourage reciprocal moves by North Korea and to reduce tension between the two Koreas.

In 1989 Roh publicized plans to restructure the South Korean

armed forces to enhance their defensive capabilities. Seoul also

planned to acquire new types of technologically sophisticated

weapons to prepare the armed forces for warfare and defense in

the twenty-first century.

Development of the Armed Forces

KoguryO, Si I la, and KoryO Kingdoms

Historical records suggest that the Koguryo Kingdom was the first Korean state to emphasize the military arts. From the first through

the fourth centuries A.D., the Koguryo tribes frequently fought

with Chinese and other groups for control of the region from the

Liao River south to the Yalu River, the latter forming today's in- ternational boundary between North Korea and China. Modern

South Korean textbooks emphasize an unbroken history of foreign

incursions. Like the early warrior kings of Paekche and Silla,

however, King Kwanggaet'o, who ruled Koguryo from 391 to 412,

significantly added to his state's territory by military conquest, absorbing neighboring tribes and fortified towns throughout present-day

northeastern China and down into the Korean Peninsula (see Silla;

271
South Korea: A Country Study

Koryo, ch. 1). The Koguryo established military units in each of

their five tribes. Each tribal army had about 10,000 men. An elected

leader in charge of all military forces in the kingdom headed the

chain of command. It was considered an honor for a man to be

selected to be a soldier by the council of elders. In the seventh century, the Silla Kingdom united Korea south

of the Taedong River and successfully resisted repeated campaigns

by the rulers of Sui (581-617) and Tang (618-907) China to con- quer all of Korea. Under Silla rule, the king placed military commanders in charge of civil and military affairs in all of the country's

local districts. A military academy was established in the capital

city of Kyongju and was open to young men of aristocratic birth.

Upon completion of their training, these young men were given

the title hwarang, meaning Flower Knight. Most of the great military leaders of Silla trained at this academy and dedicated their

lives to military service.

During the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392), Korea remained in- dependent until the kingdom was invaded by the Mongols in 1231

King Taejo (918-39) was a merchant and military leader who re- unified the peninsula after the political fragmentation that followed

the decline of the Silla Dynasty in the late ninth century. During

the reign of King Munjong (1046-83), Korea's northern boundaries once again reached the Yalu and Tumen rivers. King Munjong established two military districts along the northern border

and based army units there to defend the kingdom. Following a

military coup led by socially and economically disgruntled generals in 1170, Koryo kings (most notably those of the Ch'oe family)

became virtual puppets of military leaders from 1196 to 1258. In

1259, at the end of several years of warfare with the Mongols, Koryo

capitulated, becoming a vassal of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty

(1279-1364) based in Dadu, which is modern Beijing (see The Evolution of Korean Society, ch. 1). King Kongmin (1351-74),

however, increasingly resisted Yuan-imposed institutions and sided

with the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) against the Mongols. Yi Songgye, one of Kongmin's commanders, rebelled against the effort of

Kongmin' s son to reverse Korea's pro-Ming orientation and in

1392 established the Choson Dynasty.

The Choson Dynasty and the Japanese Colonial Period

In 1592 Japan dispatched a force of approximately 170,000 men

in 700 ships to conquer Korea. The Japanese army landed at Pusan in March and controlled most of the Korean Peninsula by July.

The small Korean navy under Admiral Yi Sun-sin used ironclad

battleships known—because of their appearance—as turtle boats

272
National Security

to make frequent attacks on the Japanese fleet attempting to resupply Japanese forces in Korea. King Sonjo requested military assis- tance from Beijing and, as the Chinese and Korean armies gradually

pushed the Japanese south, the Korean navy frustrated Japanese

efforts to initiate new attacks on the Korean Peninsula. Although

Japan's first attempts to subjugate Korea were unsuccessful, many

of the central organizations of the Korean imperial military sys- tem were weakened by the impact of the invasion. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Korean rulers generally devoted little attention to the military, although King Injo

(1623-49) did reorganize the army and establish five permanent

military bases in the country. Military service became unpopular

after the Japanese invasion. The yangban (see Glossary) class no

longer provided a large source of strong military leaders, and the

lower classes generally preferred to pay a tax that exempted them

from conscription. Because Korean rulers had little contact with

the outside world, the Korean military establishment remained

uninformed about developments of new weapons and modern battlefield tactics until the middle of the nineteenth century.

In the late 1860s, the advisers of King Kojong (1864-1907),

alarmed by the interest of the United States, France, Russia, and

other Western countries in opening Korea to foreign trade, con- vinced him to modernize the Korean army. During the next two

decades, Korean military missions travelled to China and Japan

to study modern warfare. King Kojong had neither the money nor

the will to establish a large army, and he continued to rely primarily on the Chinese for military protection. In the 1880s, Chinese advisers trained 2,000 Korean troops and organized them into four

elite units that were intended to be King Kojong' s palace guard.

The Tonghak Rebellion in Cholla Province in 1894 provided Japan

with an excuse to dispatch troops to Korea, and Japanese forces were sent in July with the dual mission of eliminating Chinese in- fluence on the Korean Peninsula and laying the foundation for the

eventual colonization of the country.

Japanese victories in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and

the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)—both partially fought in

Korea—left Korea without any foreign powers willing to oppose

the Japanese annexation of Korea. Soon after the Treaty of Ports- mouth was signed in July 1905, formally ending the Russo-Japanese

War, Japan stationed large contingents of police and army units

in Korea and disbanded the Korean army. Korea became a Japanese colony in August 1910.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the main staging areas for Korean military groups whose aim was to end Japanese rule in Korea were

273
South Korea: A Country Study

in Nanjing, China; along the Korean border in Jilin and Liaoning provinces; and in Irkutsk in the Soviet Union. The Nanjingbased groups received military training from and supported Chiang

Kai-shek's Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT—the National People's Party, or Nationalist Party). Until 1939 there were several

small Nationalist and communist military groups that used guerrilla tactics to harass the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria (as

northeast China was then known). By the end of 1940, the Japanese

Imperial Army had destroyed most organized resistance along the

Korean border with China; many Korean communists who had

belonged to these groups joined the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army of the Chinese Communist Party (see Korea under

Japanese Rule, ch. 1). A small number of Soviet-controlled Korean

military units were organized in Irkutsk as early as 1921.

The South Korean Army after World War II In November 1945, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48) began the task of organizing Korean mili- tary and police forces. In December a school for training military

officers was established; the South Korean National Constabulary was organized in January 1946. The United States originally had

planned to assist South Korea in developing only those police and

military organizations necessary to maintain law and order during the period Korea was to be under the five-year Soviet-American

trusteeship. By 1948, however, it was apparent that South Korea

would need to expand the National Constabulary into a larger and more conventionally organized army to adequately defend itself from a possible invasion by North Korea. For this reason, the United States provided funds and training to expand the eight provincial units and one capital city unit of the National Constabulary

from regiments to brigades (see South Korea under United States Occupation, 1945-48, ch. 1). In November 1948, the Republic of Korea National Assembly

passed the Armed Forces Organization Act. Under the provisions

of this act, the National Constabulary was reorganized into an army

comprising seven divisions. In June 1949, when the last United

States Army units deployed in Korea as part of the post-World War

II occupation forces withdrew, leaving behind a 500-person military advisory group, the leaders of the South Korean army controlled an organization that had been internally weakened by

subversion and political factionalism and that lacked enough trained

personnel and modern weapons to prepare adequately for war. North Korea's effort to win control of the south using guerrilla

warfare forced South Korea's military leaders to concentrate on

274
Courtesy

counterinsurgency operations. In the fall of 1949, North Korean

guerrilla units attempted to gain control of remote areas and small

towns in the mountainous areas of eastern and southern South

Korea. It was estimated that as many as 5,000 guerrillas trained

in North Korea were infiltrated into these areas by the winter of

1949. Two South Korean army divisions and one army brigade were quickly deployed to conduct sweep and destroy missions to eliminate the guerrillas. Counterinsurgency operations were initiat- ed in South Cholla Province in October 1949. In some areas, South

Korean villages were evacuated both to protect civilians and to assist counterinsurgency units in locating guerrilla bases. By April

1950, less than 500 North Korean guerrillas remained in South

Korea. Although the counterinsurgency program succeeded in ending the threat posed by the guerrillas, it had a deleterious effect on the army, necessitating reorganization and retraining for conventional war preparedness.

War on the Korean Peninsula

When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, the poor

quality of the South Korean armed forces immediately became apparent. Although South Korea had 94,000 troops when North

Korea began its all-out surprise attack, one week later only 20,000

troops could be accounted for. By early September 1950, the

275
South Korea: A Country Study

invading forces held all of South Korea except for the Pusan-Taegu

corridor in the southeast.

The United Nations (UN) Security Council, upon the request

of the United States, condemned North Korea's invasion of South

Korea and asked members of the UN to assist South Korea. Fifteen

nations besides the United States and South Korea eventually

provided troops; all forces fought under the UN flag and under

the unified command of General Douglas A. MacArthur, com- mander in chief of UN forces. These combined forces successfully

broke North Korea's extended supply lines by landing at Inch'on

in September 1950. The invading forces were pushed back to near

the Chinese border. Only the massive intervention of the Chinese

People's Volunteers (CPV) in October averted the defeat of the

North Korean forces. United Nations and communist forces fought

to a standstill. In July 1953, an armistice was signed that in 1990 remained the

only agreement preventing the renewal of hostilities on the peninsula. The armistice fixed the boundaries of the 241 -kilometer DMZ

as the border between North Korea and South Korea. It also established a Military Armistice Commission, comprising China,

North Korea, the United States, and South Korea, to resolve ar- mistice violations and prevent the resumption of hostilities. As of

1990, the Chinese representative still was posted to the Military

Armistice Commission, attended its plenary sessions, participated in secretarial meetings, officers of the day meetings, language

officers meetings, and observed Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission meetings, but deferred to North Korea's representative.

South Korea's Response to the North Korean Military Buildup

In the 1960s, P'yongyang began a sustained expansion of its armed forces that continued without interruption through the 1980s

(see fig. 13). Under presidents Syngman Rhee and Park Chung

Hee, the South Korean military remained largely dependent on

the United States to deter a second North Korean invasion and

to provide much of the training and equipment needed by the armed

forces. When the First Republic (1948-60) fell, South Korea's mili- tary institutions were stronger relatively than most of its other

government agencies. Each service had a well-established school

system and adequate supplies of weapons, ships, and aircraft from

World War II and the Korean War.

Because of internal politics and Syngman Rhee's policy of controlling the promotion and assignment of all general rank officers,

the military leadership was already at the edge of involvement in the

nation's politics. Park Chung Hee and the other military leaders

276
National Security

who participated in the May 1961 coup d'etat that brought down

the Second Republic (1960-61) were motivated largely by dissatis- faction with their corrupt and ineffective military and civilian su- periors (see The Democratic Interlude, ch. 1). They believed that

South Korea's survival as a nation depended on the reestablishment of social and economic stability. They viewed the strength

of the armed forces and the reinstitution of the National Security

Act of 1960 and other laws intended to reduce civil disturbances

as necessary means to restore order and promote sound economic

development. By 1963 when Park won election to the presidency

of the Third Republic (1963-72) as a civilian, he already had placed

other former military leaders, mostly members of the eighth class of the Officer Candidate School who had graduated in 1949, in

key government positions.

Two of Park's major objectives during the Third Republic were

to improve defense cooperation with the United States and to modernize the armed forces (see South Korea under Park Chung

Hee, 1961-79, ch. 1). In pursuit of these goals, Park devoted onethird of all government spending to defense in 1965. As a sign of

support for United States policies in Southeast Asia and in exchange

for the substantial financial and material contributions for modernizing the army, Park deployed units of the South Korean army

and marine corps to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

In the early 1970s, the Park administration, with United States assistance through its Foreign Military Sales program, promoted

the establishment of an indigenous defense industry. Park's military advisers were concerned that Kim II Sung already had built a North Korean arms industry. The Nixon administration was call- ing for Washington's allies to assume more responsibility for their

own defense. Nixon's national security advisors also feared that

Seoul might be too weak to deter a North Korean invasion unless

it began to manufacture some of its own weapons.

A Defense Industry Bureau was established in the Ministry of

National Defense, and planning for a defense industry was incorporated into South Korea's first Force Improvement Plan

(1971-76). Some of the weapons were assembled in governmentowned plants. Licensed production of the United States-designed

Colt M-16 rifle was initiated in 1971, with select South Korean

companies supplying the government assembly plant with most of

the parts for the weapon. In other cases, coproduction responsibility was entirely delegated to civilian-managed companies, many of

which already had produced nonmilitary items with technical assis- tance from various United States firms. The Tacoma Boatbuilding

Company, for example, assisted a South Korean shipbuilding

277
South Korea: A Country Study

1200

lu 1000

O

CO

DCLU

CL

COQ

Z

<

CO

Z)

O

i

800

600

400

200

SOUTH KOREA

NORTH KOREA

1980 1990

Figure 13. Comparative Growth of the Armed Forces of South Korea and

North Korea, 1950-90

company based in Chinhae in constructing several classes of patrol

boats, including the Paegu-class derived from the Asheville-class,

which was equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles.

Park's assassination in 1979 did not obscure his regime's contributions to improving the armed forces during the eighteen years

he was in power. He reorganized the Ministry of National Defense

and each of the armed services to enhance the government's capability to manage any military contingency, including an all-out attack by North Korea across the DMZ, small-scale infiltrations along South Korea's extensive 8,640-kilometer coastiine, and var- ious types of low-intensity conflict, such as commando raids that

targeted industrial, power, and communications facilities, or at- tempts by terrorists to assassinate key government officials. President Chun Doo Hwan perpetuated the military's dominance

over politics from December 1979 until Roh's inauguration in

278
National Security

February 1988 and protected Park's legacy of simultaneously improving the country's economic and military capabilities. Chun

continued Park's policy of devoting one-third of all government

spending to the military, outstripping estimated North Korean mili- tary expenditures during most of the 1980s. Chun also continued

Park's policy of promoting defense-related research and development and commercial agreements with the United States, Japan,

and Western Europe—a policy that provided Seoul with access to more advanced defense technologies. Particular emphasis was

placed on expanding the air force and establishing a modern air defense network.

Korean Air, then South Korea's only civil airline, began

coproduction of Northrop F5-E/F fighter aircraft in 1982. At the

end of Chun's term in office, Seoul was considering coproducing

either the General Dynamics F-16 or the McDonnell Douglas

FA- 18. During Chun's administration, South Korean shipbuilders

increased production of various types of frigates, missile-equipped

fast attack craft, and other, smaller naval vessels. Civilian industries also became more involved in coproduction of defense ord- nance, including armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery,

tanks, and communications equipment.

The Military's Role in Society

As the 1990s began, the armed forces remained the largest and

most influential government organization in South Korea. Over

75 percent of South Korean males over the age of twenty had served

in the regular army, the reserves, or the Homeland Reserve Force,

or had been assigned duties supporting the armed forces under the

Conscription Law of 1949. The National Technicians Law gave

the Ministry of National Defense the authority to order civilian

industrial plants to produce military items and to draft technicians

with special skills into military service during wartime. The Act

Concerning Protection of Military Secrets limited the freedom of

the press to report on military affairs. The Military Installation

Protection Law restricted civilian access to areas around military

installations.

The Defense White Paper, 1988, a report on the armed forces and

military preparedness and the first comprehensive document ever prepared by the Ministry of National Defense for the public, not- ed several initiatives the Roh administration had undertaken to address these concerns. During both the Park and Chun administrations, students who demonstrated against the government had been

expelled frequently from school and drafted into the army, where

they were treated harshly unless they demonstrated a willingness

279
South Korea: A Country Study

to accept government doctrine on opposing communism, promoting the common good of society, and showing respect for military

and political power figures. In the Defense White Paper, 1988, the

Roh administration announced that new conscription policies had

been formulated that would standardize selection procedures and

end past abuses. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

were under orders to follow a new military protocol that respected

the rights of soldiers as citizens. Another measure announced in

1988 was the abolition of the Student Defense Corps, a military

training organization established at South Korean colleges in 1969

to provide mandatory lectures on the government's national security policies and mobilization plans and instruction in handling

weapons and military tactics. Changes in the living and working environment on military bases were to include the gradual elimination of barracks and office buildings constructed in the 1950s, expansion of education programs

to prepare soldiers for selected jobs in the civilian sector before their

discharge, and small increases in pay. Additionally, in order to al- leviate civil-military discord, the Roh administration planned to relocate many of the bases in urban areas to suburban or rural areas

as soon as possible. Urban growth around military installations in

large cities, including Seoul, Pusan, Taejon, Inch'on, Ch'unch'on,

Masan, YVonju, Uijongbu, and Chinhae, had compromised the

security of these bases and day-to-day military activities; in turn,

the bases had disturbed the normal commercial and social activities of civilians. In the 1980s, in addition to their regular military duties, military units continued the traditional practice of aiding farmers in

planting and harvesting rice, assisting civil authorities in preventing loss of life and property during and following natural disasters,

delivering medical services in rural areas, and providing other social services. In 1987 a total of 561,000 military personnel helped

local farmers plant their rice, and 392,000 military personnel were made available for harvesting the crop. The army and the

Homeland Reserve Force—more than 1 million troops—were mobilized in July 1987 to perform rescue operations and repair wind

and flood damage caused by a typhoon. Stranded civilians were

evacuated to safety, temporary dikes were constructed to prevent

flood damage, debris was cleared from roads, and temporary

shelters were constructed for the homeless.

Government policies on emergency preparedness were designed

to quickly mobilize civilian personnel and resources to support the

military during wartime. The Military Manpower Law delegated

responsibility to the Office of Military Manpower Administration

280
National Security

of the Ministry of National Defense for maintaining computerized

records on all civilians who were eligible to serve in the Homeland

Reserve Force. Men and women between the ages of twenty and

sixty who had not been assigned duties in the military reserves but

had technical skills needed by the military could also be assigned

to support the military during wartime or a national emergency

declared by the president and approved by the National Assembly

under Article 77 of the 1987 Constitution. As the 1990s began, an estimated 5 million men and women were available for wartime duties in the Homeland Reserve Force and designated civilian industries that would produce, repair, and deliver defense goods

to the military in wartime. Another important element of emergency preparedness was a plan to mobilize civilian ships, aircraft,

heavy construction equipment, and other types of vehicles and

equipment useful to the military in wartime.

Under provisions of the Emergency Prepared Resources Management Law, provincial and local government authorities were responsible for registering civilian assets that were to be included in the

plan. Periodic exercises of the plan were conducted to test mobilization procedures. Local governments were required to provide

the Ministry of National Defense and other appropriate ministries,

including the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Transportation, with their mobilization plans.

Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces

The National Security Council and the Ministry of National

Defense were the primary executive bodies responsible for military affairs. The former, comprising the prime minister, the director

of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), and the

ministers of national defense, foreign affairs, home affairs, and

finance, was responsible for advising the president on security is- sues and was convened at the pleasure of the president. The Ministry of National Defense was organized into bureaus responsible

for force development, budget, personnel, reserve forces, logistics,

military installations, medical affairs, the defense industry, and the

military education system.

Army

The ground forces were organized into three armies and several independent operational and functional commands (see fig. 14).

The First Army and the Third Army occupied well-fortified positions stretching southward from the DMZ about fifty kilometers.

The First Army's mission was to defend the eastern section of the

DMZ. The Third Army, South Korea's largest and most diversified

281
South Korea: A Country Study

Figure 14. Deployment of South Korean and United States Forces in South

Korea, 1990

combat organization, was responsible for guarding the most likely

potential attack routes from North Korea to Seoul^—the Munsan,

Ch'orwon, and Tongduch'on corridors. The Second Army had

operational command over all army reserve units, the Homeland

Reserve Force, logistics, and training bases located in the six southernmost provinces. Select army troops were assigned to the

Capital Defense Command (formerly the Capital Garrison Command), whose active duty component, really more a countercoup

282
National Security

force than a defensive force, was a little less than a division in 1990,

organized into three separate security groups or regiments. They

were assigned to defend the Blue House (the presidential residence),

major government and Ministry of National Defense buildings,

and Kimp'o International Airport. The wartime strength of the

Capital Defense Command comes from multiple division reserves, which would be mobilized during a conflict. The Capital Defense

Command also was responsible for peacetime training of all Seoul

area reserves. Functional commands included the Counterespionage

Operations Command, subordinate to the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and responsible for interdicting North Korean

saboteurs and espionage agents; the Defense Security Command,

the army's internal security organization; and the Logistics Base

Command, which was established to manage the movement of supplies to the frontlines.

Active-duty infantry units were organized as combined armed

forces with armor and artillery forces subordinate to the division or brigade commander. The Third Army and First Army controlled

nineteen infantry divisions and two mechanized infantry divisions.

In 1987 each infantry division had about 14,716 soldiers but in

terms of transportation and communications and other equipment was considered "light" by United States standards. Each infantry

division had four battalions per regiment, three infantry regiments

and one artillery regiment, a reconnaissance/ranger battalion and

an armor battalion (some only had armor companies), and a reasonable facsimile of combat support and combat service support units in comparison to United States counterparts. The two

mechanized infantry divisions each had three mechanized/ maneuver brigade headquarters, a cavalry battalion, and a mix

of nine armor and mechanized infantry battalions.

The army was responsible for the ground component of South

Korea's air defense network and had two surface-to-surface missile battalions and several antiaircraft gun battalions. The surfaceto-surface missile battalions were equipped with United States- produced HAWK and Nike Hercules missiles, the former having

a range of 42 kilometers, the latter a range of 140 kilometers. The

field armies had small quantities of three types of man-portable,

shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. These included the

British-produced Javelin and the United States-produced Redeye

missile. Additionally, there were three types of antiaircraft guns

in use: the Swedish-produced Bofors L/70 40mm; the Swissproduced Oerlikon GDF-002 35mm; and the domestically produced

Vulcan 20mm.

283
South Korea: A Country Study

The Special Warfare Command had seven brigades trained for wartime missions behind enemy lines. Although information on

the organization of these units was unavailable in 1990, they probably were among the best-trained and most combat-ready forces

in the army.

A single aviation brigade operated several types of attack and

transport helicopters that could be strategically deployed to support combat operations of the infantry divisions and special forces. Some 200 McDonnell Douglas 500-MD helicopters were produced

under license by Korean Air between 1976 and 1984. At least fifty

of these helicopters were equipped with TOW antitank weapons.

The remainder were used as transports and for other support missions. In 1990 South Korea also had about 50 McDonnell Douglas AH-IS attack helicopters and 144 McDonnell Douglas

UH-1B/H transport helicopters.

The role of women in the army has changed in the late twentieth century. A small, all-volunteer Women's Army Corps (WAC)

was made a separate unit of the army in 1971. Women were re- quired to be high-school graduates, they were enlisted for a twoyear tour of duty, and their military occupational specialties were

limited to nursing and a few other noncombat positions.

In September 1989, the National Assembly revised the military

personnel law which governed the WAC, and the WAC was offi- cially deactivated on December 30, 1989. Female soldiers were for- mally reassigned to seven branches within the army: infantry,

administration, intelligence, finance, education and information,

logistics, and medical service. A separate WAC school and per- sonnel center remained.

Between 1980 and 1990, the army increased in size by only a

small margin. During this same period, however, new units were

formed; the procurement of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, field artillery, antitank guns, air defense missiles, helicopters,

and other types of military equipment significantly improved the

defensive capabilities of the ground forces (see table 16, Appendix). In 1980 the army had approximately 1,200 United States- produced M-47 and M-48 tanks and 500 mostly United States- produced M-l 13 armored personnel carriers (also some Fiat 6614

wheeled armored personnel carriers). By 1990 South Korea had

manufactured 200 of the domestically produced T-88 tank and had

upgraded most of its M-48s to M-48A3s or M-48A5s. During the

period from 1980 to 1990, the number of field artillery pieces more

than doubled, going from 2,000 to 4,200 pieces, and South Korea

began to introduce larger guns to extend the effective range of fire. In 1980 the army was equipped with 57mm, 75mm, 90mm, and

284
National Security

106mm recoilless rifles for antitank use and TOWs. In 1990 the

TOW and LAW still were the primary antitank weapons. The

106mm/90mm recoilless rifles increased in numbers and were the

basic antitank system for the infantry, although lower caliber

weapons still existed. The TOWs were relatively scarce and were

organized into independent units separate from the infantry divi- sions' main organization and equipment. The national air defense

network comprised only 100 Vulcan antiaircraft guns and a small

number of Nike-Hercules and HAWK surface-to-air missiles in

1980; by 1990 there were 600 antiaircraft guns, and the NikeHercules and HAWKs had both increased in number and undergone significant upgrades.

Air Force

The air force was organized into three commands operating approximately 700 aircraft from eight major airbases: the Combat

Air Command controlled the bulk of the roughly 500 jet combat

aircraft; a small Air Transportation Command had 37 transport

aircraft; and the Air Training Command used 7 types of trainers

(see table 17, Appendix). In 1990 the air force had 40,000 personnel on active duty. Most of these personnel were stationed at large,

well-defended air bases located at Suwon, Osan, Ch'ongju, Kangnung, Taegu, Kunsan, Kwangju, and Sunch'on. The air force also operated an unknown number of smaller airbases. Civilian airfields,

including three international airfields at Seoul, Pusan, and Cheju,

would be utilized in wartime, as would specially designed sections

of major highways.

The Combat Air Command, headquartered at Osan, controlled

aircraft that included twenty-two squadrons of ground attack fighters/interceptors, twenty-three counterinsurgency aircraft in one

squadron, twenty reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron, and

fifteen search-and-rescue helicopters in one squadron. All of these

aircraft were produced in the United States, with the exception of

sixty-eight Northrop F-5E/Fs that were coproduced with Korean

Air. The 294 Northrop F-5s and 36 General Dynamics F-16C/Ds

were the primary ground attack aircraft. Approximately 130

McDonnell Douglas F-4s were deployed for air defense but were

equally useful in ground attack. All three types of aircraft were capable of being used in either role, depending on their armament. The

air force supported army counterinsurgency programs with twentythree Cessna A-37 aircraft, used as forward air controllers, but

which could also be used in ground attack. Eight Northrop F-5s

and twelve McDonnell Douglas F-4s were equipped solely for

285
South Korea: A Country Study

reconnaissance. A total of fifteen Bell UH-1B and UH-1H helicopters were available for search-and-rescue operations.

During the 1980s, the air force modernization program focused

primarily on the formation and deployment of twelve new fighter

aircraft squadrons and the establishment of an automated air defense

network. The F-16 provided South Korea with an aircraft believed

to be technologically superior to similarly designed communist air- craft, including the Soviet-produced MiG-29, the most sophisticated aircraft employed by the North Korean air force. South

Korea-United States coproduction of F-5 aircraft demonstrated the

resolve of South Korean military planners to promote a defense

industry that simultaneously utilized advanced United States technology while enhancing indigenous efforts both at establishing an

aviation industry and increasing access to Western technology.

The Tactical Air Control Center at Osan became operational

in 1983. Reconnaissance aircraft and air defense radar sites in- formed the center about potentially hostile aircraft before they en- tered South Korean airspace. In wartime this capability was

expected to allow South Korean air controllers more time to as- sess threat and the ability quickly to communicate orders to interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile sites. Navy and Marine Corps

In 1990 the navy and marine corps remained small forces primarily dedicated to protecting the nation's territorial waters and islands. There was one large naval base at Chinhae, and seven small naval

stations located at Cheju, Inch'on, Mokp'o, Mukho, Pukp'yong-ni,

P'ohang, and Pusan. Both the navy and marine corps were subordinate to the chief of naval operations, who was a member of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The navy, with 35,000 personnel, was organized into three fleet commands and separate commands for aviation,

amphibious operations, mine warfare, training, and logistics—all subordinate to the first vice chief of naval operations. The marine

corps, with 25,000 personnel, was organized into two divisions and

one brigade under the Marine Corps Command. Although part

of the navy, marine units often operated under army control.

During the 1980s, the navy's modernization program focused on antisubmarine warfare and the deployment of new types of in- digenously produced submarines, frigates, missile-equipped fast attack craft, and patrol boats. Naval vessels deployed with the

Eastern, Western, and Southern fleets were equipped with modern

sonar equipment, depth charges, and torpedoes to counter more

effectively North Korea's growing submarine force (see table 18,

Appendix). Two types of United States-produced and one type of

286
National Security

French-produced shipborne surface-to-surface and surface-to-air

missiles were used by the navy on its destroyers, frigates, and fast attack craft. United States-produced Harpoon surface-to-surface

missiles, with a ninety-kilometer range, were deployed on Gearingclass destroyers, Ulsan-class frigates, and Paegu-class fast attack

craft derived from the Ashville-class. French-produced Exocet

surface-to-surface missiles, with a seventy-kilometer range, were employed on Donghae frigates and Kirogi-class fast attack craft. Paegu fast attack craft were equipped with United States-produced

Standard surface-to-air missiles.

The Naval Aviation Command and the Naval Amphibious Command operated small fleets of aircraft and landing craft, respectively, to support naval fleet and marine corps operations.

Twenty-five Grumman S-2 aircraft, twenty-five Hughes 500-MD

helicopters, and ten Bell SA-316 helicopters were shore based. They

were deployed for surveillance of surface ships and for antisubmarine warfare.

The marine corps was assigned the defense of the Han River

estuary and five northwestern islands located close to North Korea.

The Naval Amphibious Command operated fifty-two amphibious

craft in support of the marine corps. Reserve and Civil Defense Forces

The reserve forces included mobilization reserve forces for each

of the armed services and the Homeland Reserve Force, a paramilitary organization responsible for community and regional defense.

Between 1968 and 1988, males between the ages of eighteen and

forty were eligible for defense call-up duty; there was no clear policy on the age at which a recruit was eligible for retirement. In January 1988, a new policy was instituted that reduced the age-group

of the male population subject to service in the reserves: only males

who had been drafted for service between the ages of nineteen and

thirty-four were required to serve in the reserves. The period of

service was limited to between six and eight years, depending on

the individual's age at conscription.

The mission of the mobilization reserves was to provide each

of the services with well-trained personnel prepared to enter combat as soon as possible in wartime. In 1990 there were 1,240,000

men in the reserves: 1,100,000 in the army; 60,000 in the marines;

55,000 in the air force; and 25,000 in the navy. Most recruits had

served on active duty in their respective services and were assigned

to a reserve unit upon completion of their term of enlistment. Units

287
South Korea: A Country Study

in the reserves probably closely resembled active-duty organizations. Mobilization reserve personnel attended regularly scheduled

training about one day a month and also participated in an annual field exercise that lasted about one week. Active-duty officers and NCOs were assigned to command and staff positions in the

reserves at battalion and higher levels. The Homeland Reserve Force was established in April 1968 as part of a nationwide program to increase defense preparedness in

the wake of North Korean provocations. In January 1968, a North

Korean commando unit infiltrated Seoul and attacked the Blue

House in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.

That same month, two additional North Korean commando units

launched attacks on towns on the east coast in attempts to encourage

the South Korean populace to overthrow the government.

Homeland Reserve Force personnel were given basic training in

physical fitness, weapons familiarization, and defense tactics against

various types of attacks by enemy forces. In wartime these units

would remain close to or in their own cities, villages, or towns,

where they would guard roads, power plants, factories, and other

potential military targets.

In 1975 the National Assembly passed the Civil Defense Law,

which was promulgated to establish organizations in every com- munity to protect lives and property during wartime and natural

disasters. Males between the ages of nineteen and fifty who were

not drafted for service in the military were recruited for service

in civil defense units. In 1980 there were over 90,000 civil defense

personnel in the country. By 1990 their numbers were more than

3.5 million. Their missions included air raid defense, search and

rescue, and building and road repair.

Recruitment, Training, and Conditions of Service

All males, except for a small percentage of individuals considered

physically or socially undesirable for military service, could be draft- ed into the army. In 1990 there were 407,000 males nineteen years

of age who were required to register for military service. Approximately 9.2 percent of these young men were rejected for conscription for one of the following reasons: having a physical or mental

disability; possessing a criminal record; being an orphan; and being born out of wedlock or having one parent who was not a South

Korean citizen. Conscripts were required to have at least an elementary school education; 77 percent of those drafted had at least a high school education.

The Military Manpower Agency was responsible for assigning

recruits to the army, navy, marines, the Korean Augmentation

288
Army troops participate in offshore training exercise. Courtesy Republic of Korea Army

of the United States Army (KATUSA), and the combat police units

of the Korean National Police. Recruits could request assignment

to a particular service and were assigned based on their education,

technical skills, and physical condition. About 85 percent of eligible recruits were drafted for periods of between thirty and thirtysix months. Candidates for the KATUSA program were required

to be high school graduates with some English-language training.

In 1990 approximately 5,000 men in KATUSA served with the

United States Army units in South Korea. In 1990 the air force was an all-volunteer force. The conscription system was flexible and allowed most young

men to plan their service in a way that would promote their in- dividual career goals. High school graduates who had been accepted

into a college or technical school or who were attending such schools were granted deferments. Conscripts with good education records

and aptitudes suited to particular military specialties were select- ed to be trained as specialists in combat support branches such as

signals, ordnance, and engineers. Even conscripts assigned to combat, however, were encouraged to take classes during their terms

of duty to prepare for employment when they left the service.

The army, navy, and air force each had a full range of recruit

training centers, schools for technical military occupational specialties,

289
South Korea: A Country Study

and officer training courses. Army recruits were transported from

provincial induction centers to one of the Second Army's recruit

training centers for basic training. Each branch of the army had

one or more schools that offered curricula for enlisted personnel,

NCOs, and officers. The large number of schools and the diversified training programs available to servicemen supported the ar- my's need for skilled personnel to use, maintain, repair, and

resupply combat forces during wartime. The air force had schools

for pilots, air technicians, communication and electronics specialists, aircraft maintenance specialists, and air traffic controllers. The navy

had its own schools oriented to the needs of the three fleets and

the marine corps.

All officers and enlisted personnel were closely supervised and

had to obey strict security regulations that limited their contacts with civilians, including their own families. All military personnel were provided with food, clothing, housing, and medical services.

A variety of entertainment and recreational programs were or- ganized on military installations to reduce boredom and promote

the physical health and morale of service personnel.

Officers and Noncommissioned Officers

Officers were graduates of army, navy, or air force service academies, reserve officer training cadet programs offered at civilian col- leges, or were recruited from enlisted personnel for selected

short-term service in noncombat occupational billets. More than

90 percent of the field- grade officers chosen to command combat

units at battalion and higher levels were graduates of the Korea

Military Academy (in the case of the army), the Air Force Academy, or the Naval Academy. Applicants were chosen on the basis

of their academic records, performance in competitive examinations, physical condition, and dedication to the mission of the armed

forces. Each academy offered a four-year curriculum to provide

the cadet with a bachelor's degree and practical military skills. Graduates of the military academies were required to serve ten years

in the military and made up 5 percent of the newly commissioned

officers each year. Approximately 40 percent of the new second

lieutenants were commissioned from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) after two years' training and a two-year, threemonth obligation. Another 40 percent of the new second lieutenants were from the Third Military Academy, which had a twenty- to

thirty-six week training course. The remaining 15 percent were

direcdy commissioned specialists, including personnel in the medical

290
National Security

corps, judge advocates, and chaplains. Most of the recruits of the

Third Military Academy were newly graduated from junior col- leges or regular colleges. At one time the Third Military Academy

was itself a two-year college. Historically, most of the ROTC officers

left after completing their obligation, but the graduates of the Third

Military Academy often stayed on to field-grade rank and were

the dominant source of commission at that rank.

Advanced individual training for officers was provided at the

Army's Command and General Staff College, the National Defense

College, and military training institutes in other countries. The

Command and General Staff College prepared selected field- grade

officers for command and staff duties at division, corps, and army

levels. The National Defense College trained a limited number of

selected senior officers of the three services and some civilian government officials for the highest command and staff positions.

Each army branch, as well as the air force, navy, and marine

corps, was responsible for selecting NCOs for training in their oc- cupational specialty. Those selected were required to reenlist for two to seven years, depending on the availability of replacements

in their branch. Army staff sergeants were selected from civilian

applicants and eligible enlisted personnel who had completed the

required courses of studies in branch schools. The navy recruited

petty officers through examination at the time of conscription. After finishing basic training, candidates were trained for their duties

in a branch school. The air force followed a procedure similar to the navy's. Combat marines were sent to army schools for NCO

training, whereas marines in service branches usually attended navy

schools.

Enlisted Personnel

Recruit training in each of the services lasted about sixteen weeks

and focused on physical conditioning, basic military skills, and the

functions of combat and combat support units. Conscripts select- ed to serve in the army and marine corps were sent to Second Army

recruit training centers for basic training. The navy and air force

operated their own recruit training centers. Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

The rank and grade structure of the three services corresponded, with minor exceptions, to that of the United States forces, as did the correlation between rank and responsibility (see fig. 15).

In peacetime, the army and air force were each commanded by

a four-star general; a lieutenant general commanded the marines,

and an admiral commanded the navy.

291
South Korea: A Country Study

292
National Security

Service uniforms also resembled those of the United States forces

in color and style. Service personnel wore a summer uniform of

denim and a winter uniform of wool. Troops in forward areas wore

a more expensive padded winter uniform. Noncommissioned

officers of the army and air force wore a tunic buttoned to the top;

navy noncommissioned officers wore the United States-type sea- man's blouse. Officers' uniforms were similar to those worn by

officers of the United States. Defense Spending and Military Production

From the end of the Korean War to 1990, South Korea had

evolved from a country dependent on other nations for its national security to a strong and growing nation, increasingly capable

of meeting its own defense needs. Civilian industries maintained

military assembly lines as a separate, and generally small, part of

their corporate activities. Defense Spending

Seoul's defense budget increased in proportion to the growth of

the national economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrating how strongly national leaders felt about improving the armed

forces (see fig. 16). Between 1971 and 1975, defense spending in- creased from US$411 million to US$719 million. Defense expenditures averaged about 4.5 percent of the country's gross national

product (GNP—see Glossary). In 1976, the first year that the

government included proceeds from the defense tax in published

figures for military expenditures, the budget for the armed forces

and defense industries increased 100 percent over the 1975 figure

to US$1 .5 billion. The costs involved in initiating weapons production and the loss of military grant aid from the United States were

the major reasons for the gradual increase of defense spending from

5.2 percent of GNP in 1979 to 6.2 percent of GNP in 1982. By

1990 defense spending had increased to almost US$10 billion a year, but because of the dramatic growth in the country's economy, this figure was below 30 percent of the government's budget and less than 5 percent of GNP for the first time since 1975.

Annual defense budgets were proposed by the Ministry of National Defense and approved by the president following consultations with the National Assembly. Beginning in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1979, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a budget

management system based on the United States Department of

Defense project planning budget system. The South Korean system

293
South Korea: A Country Study

g

6

5

-J 5

O

Q

S

4

C/> z

o

3--

d 2

NORTH KOREA** SOUTH KOREAn n

nnir

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 YEAR

In constant 1988 United States dollars. ** Estimate.

Source: Based on information from United States, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, Washington, 1989,

53.

Figure 16. Comparison of Defense Expenditures, South Korea and North

Korea, 1978-88

focused on force modernization and the maintenance of military

organizations in peacetime at 70 percent of their wartime strength.

The government's mobilization and resource management plans

for support of the military were designed to bring the armed forces

up to full strength quickly and to maintain the country's capability to supply the military during wartime. Under the 1987 Constitution, the National Assembly was accorded more responsibility

to review the defense budget and to recommend appropriate levels of spending. In 1990, however, the president continued to have

the final say on budget matters. Approximately 40 percent of the defense budget was devoted

to weapons and equipment modernization in 1990. Defense plan- ners established a number of long-range goals: to establish an

294
National Security

independent reconnaissance system with intelligence satellites and

early warning aircraft; to improve the quality of firepower and the

accuracy of domestically produced weapons; to deploy indigenously

produced surface-to-air and tactical surface-to-surface missiles; and

to replace outdated fighter aircraft and naval vessels with technologically advanced models that would neutralize the threat of North

Korea's modern weapon systems.

The operational costs of the three armed services constituted approximately 35 percent of the defense budget. Improvements in

training, logistical support to combat units, and pay and benefits

provided to military personnel were a part of the increased cost of supporting the armed forces. The acquisition of sophisticated

new types of weapons, although contributing to national security,

also increased operational costs. The remaining 25 percent of the defense budget was mostly al- located among the armed forces reserves; South Korea's share of

the United States-Republic of Korea combined defense improvement program; research into new defense technologies; and construction and maintenance of military installations.

Military Production

The Defense Industry Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense was the government agency responsible for managing the quantity and quality of domestically produced weapons and equipment.

In 1990 South Korean industries provided about 70 percent of the

weapons, ammunition, communications and other types of equipment, vehicles, clothing, and other supplies needed by the military.

Weapons production for the army began in 1971 when the Ministry of National Defense constructed a plant to assemble United States- designed Colt M-16 rifles. The memorandum of agreement between

the United States and the Republic of Korea authorized production of enough rifles to supply South Korean army units. However,

the agreement prohibited the production of additional M-16s

without the permission of Colt Industries and the United States government. In the mid-1970s, South Korea signed agreements

to begin licensed production of many types of United States- designed weapons, including grenades, mortars, mines, and recoilless rifles, with the same stipulations as those for the M-16 rifle. South Korea also began to manufacture ammunition for the

weapons it produced for the army.

By 1990 South Korean companies had army contracts to produce

tanks, self-propelled and towed field guns, two types of armored

vehicles, and two types of helicopters. A division of Hyundai

295
South Korea: A Country Study

produced the 88 Tank (formerly called the K-l tank) at Ch'ang- won. The K-l was the result of ajoint United States-South Korean

design. The 88 Tank's 105mm gun was an improved version of

the same caliber gun that was standard on South Korea's M-48A5

tanks. Although a few components of the tanks' fire control and

transmission systems were imported, Hyundai and South Korean

subcontractors manufactured most of the systems. One of the Samsung Group's businesses produced 155mm M-109 self-propelled

howitzers. Kia Machine Tool was the manufacturer for the KH-178

105mm and the KH-179 155mm towed field guns. The KH-178

and KH-179 guns were derived from United States-designed artillery but were considered indigenously designed. Daewoo Industries and Asia Motors had a coproduction agreement for an

Italian-designed wheeled, armored personnel vehicle. Bell Helicopters Textron of the United States and Samsung coproduced UH-1

helicopters. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, also of the United States,

had a contract with Daewoo to coproduce H-76 helicopters.

In December 1989, the Ministry of National Defense selected

the McDonnell Douglas FA- 18 to be the second United States- designed fighter aircraft to be coproduced in South Korea. Samsung's aerospace division was awarded a contract to manufacture

the airframe and engine; Lucky-Goldstar became the subcontractor for the aircraft's avionics. McDonnell Douglas agreed to deliver

twelve FA- 18s to the South Korean air force in 1993 and to assist Samsung with the later assembly of 108 aircraft in South Korea.

As of 1990, the entire FA- 18 program was under review because

of increased costs. Korean Air used its depot maintenance facili- ties at Kimhae to overhaul most types of aircraft in service with

the South Korean air force. Additionally, the United States Air

Force contracted with Korean Air for the maintenance of its F-4,

F-15, A-10, and C-130 aircraft stationed in South Korea, Japan,

and the Philippines.

In 1990 South Korean shipbuilders were building two indigenously designed naval vessels, and they had coproduction agreements

with United States, Italian, and German companies for several other

types of ships. Four shipbuilders—Hyundai, Daewoo, Korea Tacoma, and Korean Shipbuilding and Engineering—constructed

South Korean-designed Ulsan-class frigates and Tonghae-class cor- vettes for the navy. During the 1980s, Korea Tacoma, a South

Korean-owned subsidiary of the United States Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, produced one class of patrol gunboat and one class of landing ship for the navy. The Kirogi-class patrol boat was a

larger model of the Tacoma-designed Schoolboy-class patrol boat

manufactured in South Korea during the 1970s. The Kirogi-class

296
National Security

patrol boat, a 170-ton vessel, required a thirty-one-person crew and was equipped with five guns: one 40mm single-barreled Bofors on the bow, two 30mm twin-barreled Emerson Electrics in the stern, and two 20mm Oerlikon twin-barreled guns behind the bridge. The

Kirogi-class patrol boat, with a range of 700 kilometers and a max- imum speed of 38 knots, was well suited for its inshore patrol

mission.

The Mulgae-class landing ship, another naval vessel designed

and produced in the United States by Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, was ordered by the navy to augment a small amphibious

fleet that comprised several models of obsolescent transport craft produced in the United States during World War II and trans- ferred to the South Korean navy in the 1960s and 1970s. The

Mulgae-class landing ship was designed to carry an infantry company with its weapons, mechanized and wheeled vehicles, and other

supplies. It had a range of 560 kilometers and a maximum speed

of 13 knots. In 1986 South Korea's Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation began construction of the Swallow/Chebi class minehunter,

which was based on the Italian-designed Lerici-class. At that time,

the South Korean navy had only eight United States-produced

Kunsan-class minesweepers in service with the three fleets. The

Swallow-class minehunter had new types of sonar and mine coun- termeasure equipment that was expected to improve the navy's

capability to locate and to eliminate minefields in international shipping lanes during wartime.

In the late 1980s, production of submarines designed by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was initiated. Three

150-ton submarines designed by the Howaldswerke Shipbuilding

Corporation were in service with the navy in 1990. Howaldswerke

also had plans to provide technical assistance for the construction

of three Type 209 submarines, about 1 ,400 tons each. South Korean

military planners were interested in using submarines to protect

critical shipping lanes from North Korean submarines in wartime.

Strategic Planning for War

Under the terms of the 1954 Republic of Korea-United States of America Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and South

Korea agreed to cooperate in defending the security and strategic

interests of both countries. South Korea's deployment of army and

marine units to South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated its commitment to meeting its obligations under the treaty.

By 1990 the United States had stationed 44,500 military personnel in South Korea—a signal to North Korea and other countries

297
South Korea: A Country Study

in the region that Washington would meet its security commitments

to Seoul under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

United States Forces in Korea

In the confusion of the early days of the Korean War, Seoul

placed its armed forces under the command of General Douglas

A. MacArthur as United Nations (UN) commander. This arrangement continued after the armistice. For some twenty-five years, the United Nations Command headquarters, which had no South

Korean officers in it, was responsible for the defense of South Korea,

with operational control over a majority of the units in the South

Korean military. The command was the primary peacetime planning organization for allied response to a North Korean invasion

of South Korea and the principal wartime command organization

for all South Korean and United States forces involved in defending South Korea. In 1978 a binational headquarters, the South

Korea-United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), was

created, and the South Korean military units with front-line missions were transferred from the United Nations Command to the

CFC's operational control. The commander in chief of the CFC,

a United States military officer, answered ultimately to the national

command authorities of the United States and the Republic of

Korea (see fig. 17).

Historically, operational control of South Korea's tactical armed

forces has made the United States commander vulnerable to the

politics of association. United States commanders have rigidly

avoided commentary on South Korean party politics, confining

public statements to purely military matters on such issues as arms

buildups and threats from North Korea. However, in the complex

politics of the Korean Peninsula, the United States commander's

military opinions often have been publicly manipulated as support

for Seoul's authoritarianism.

In May 1961 and December 1979, the command structure was

breached by South Korean troops participating in military coups.

A more complex set of circumstances occurred in May 1980, when

troops were withdrawn from the CFC under existing procedures

and dispatched to Kwangju to respond to the student uprising. Confusion in the South Korean public over the particular circumstances

of the incident, the United States position, and the limits of the

CFC's control led many South Koreans to believe that the United

States fully supported the violent suppression of the uprising. The

lack of an accurate historical record for nearly ten years generated widespread misunderstanding, and it has been credited with

298
National Security

the rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea, a movement which

continues.

Only after President Chun stepped down at the end of 1987,

and the opposition in the National Assembly grew stronger, did

the United States begin answering the questions concerning United States involvement in Kwangju. On June 19, 1989, Washington issued the "United States Government Statement on Events

in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980," in response to formal requests from the National Assembly. The statement addressed a series of questions related to the rise to power of then

Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan. The statement noted no prior

knowledge of the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, nor warning of the December 12, 1979, incident, in which a group of

South Korean army officers led by Major General Chun seized

control of the military. It was revealed that Washington repeatedly protested to the government and the military leadership about

the misuse of forces under the Combined Forces Command. The

report also stated that South Korean authorities gave the United

States two hours advanced warning of the extension of martial law on May 18, 1980, and no prior warning of the military's intention

to arrest political leaders or to close both the National Assembly

and the universities.

The statement clearly noted that none of the South Korean forces deployed at Kwangju were, during that time, under either the operational control of the CFC or the control of any United States

authorities. Additionally, the United States had neither prior

knowledge of the deployment of special forces to Kwangju nor

responsibility for their actions there. The report addressed the use

of the Twentieth Division, CFC, and clarified that the CFC agreement allowed both the United States and South Korea to assert control over its forces at any time without the consent of the other.

According to the statement, the United States was informed in ad- vance of intentions to use elements of the Twentieth Division to reenter Kwangju, that United States officials, after cautioning

against the use of military force to solve a political crisis, accepted

that it would be preferable to use the Twentieth Division rather

than Special Forces units (but the latter were also involved) . The

report further documented that the United States repeatedly protested public distortions of Washington's actions and policy by Seoul

and the South Korean press, namely allegations that the United

States knew either of the December 12 incident in advance or of

the extension of martial law, or that Washington approved of the

Special Forces actions in Kwangju.

299
South Korea: A Country Study

oc %

i|

<

5b

(O UJ

iS

2 5

-s <

UJ (/) < O

w «£ Q LU £ o

oZ

<

s

soo

(0

UJo

ocou.Q

HIz

CD2

O

C

in

(0

(ft

3i< o

oc °

o w

* 5

o

UJ q. x o

O —J>

<

z

is

< UJ

I- o (ft DC

u- O O LL

u- OC a«

o

£ z So

i§

H < i8o

300
National Security

While the report rebutted most of the myths of American cul- pability for events in 1979 and 1980, the ten-year delay in issuing

the report did little to resolve the misgivings held by many South

Koreans, who still persisted in believing that the United States was

in some way a party to the military takeover in May 1980, and

the harsh suppression of the Kwangju demonstrations that followed.

In 1990 a few hundred United States military personnel were

assigned to the United Nations Command headquarters in P'anmunjom, in the DMZ, and were responsible for representing the

United States at meetings of the Military Armistice Commission.

Because the Seoul and P'yongyang governments had never negotiated a peace agreement after the Korean War, the sometimes shaky

1953 armistice concluded between the United Nations Command,

North Korea, and China remained the only formal channel for handling complaints about violations of the truce. There were 32,000 United States Army personnel in South Korea

in 1990; most were assigned to the Eighth Army, which included

the Second Infantry Division, the Seventeenth Aviation Brigade,

and other detachments deployed north of Seoul as part of the joint

South Korean-United States forward defense strategy. If a conflict were to occur, the Second Infantry Division would be expected to serve as a reserve force for the South Korean army on one

of the main invasion routes between the DMZ and Seoul. United

States Army personnel with command or planning responsibilities

for combat units also were assigned to the headquarters of the CFC

and to the headquarters of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Field Army, of which the Second Infantry Division was

the main American component. The remaining United States Army

personnel were assigned to support the missions of selected United States and South Korean combat units, serving primarily in communications, logistics, and training positions.

There were 12,000 United States Air Force personnel in South

Korea in 1990. They were assigned to units responsible for early

warning, air interception, close air support of United States and

South Korean ground forces, combat support, aircraft maintenance,

and the transportation of personnel and supplies from the United

States, Japan, and other United States military installations in the

Pacific. The Seventh Air Force, headquartered at Osan Air Base, was the command element for all United States Air Force organizations in South Korea. United States Lockheed U-2 high-altitude

reconnaissance and South Korean Grumman E-2C early warning aircraft patrolled the North Korean border and monitored the

Soviet Union's air and naval activities in the Sea of Japan area.

301
South Korea: A Country Study

Advanced F-16 fighter aircraft were used by tactical fighter squadrons based at Osan and Kunsan. These squadrons operated

alongside South Korean air force tactical squadrons in both air in- terception and close air support roles. South Korea and the United

States jointly managed the South Korean tactical air control sys- tem, which had wartime responsibility for Korean airspace and the

entire South Korean coastline. The United States Military Airlift Command was responsible for transporting United States military

personnel, weapons, and supplies from the United States and lo- cations in the Pacific to South Korea.

United States Navy and United States Marine Corps personnel

in South Korea consisted of about 500 officers and enlisted per- sonnel who occupied critical staff and liaison positions in the CFC.

The United States Pacific Command in Hawaii frequently deployed

units of the United States Pacific Fleet, based in Japan, and units

of the marine corps, based in Okinawa and other locations in the

Pacific, to South Korea for joint training exercises, particularly

Team Spirit, held every spring to promote South Korean-United

States military cooperation and readiness. During the 1988 Seoul

Olympics, the United States Seventh Fleet operated in the Sea of

Japan and was assigned specific missions to assist units of the CFC

in discouraging P'yongyang from attempting to disrupt the Olympic

Games.

South Korean and United States Cooperation

In 1968 the United States and South Korea held their first an- nual Security Consultative Meeting. This meeting provided highlevel defense experts from the two countries with an official forum

for reassessing the nature of the North Korean threat to South

Korea, for agreeing on an overall defense strategy for South Korea,

and for outlining the roles of both countries in deterring a North

Korean invasion.

During the 1989 Security Consultative Meeting in Washington

(the meetings were held in alternate years in Seoul and Washington), the two nations agreed that the Moscow-assisted modernization of Pyongyang's air force and army indicated that the military

situation in Northeast Asia remained tense and unpredictable.

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev's Korean policy, focused on

promoting unofficial contacts with Seoul though Moscow, continued

to bolster Pyongyang's military establishment.

South Korean and United States leaders who attended the 1 989

Security Consultative Meeting considered it unlikely that the Soviet

Union would initiate a military conflict targeting South Korea. They

believed, however, that increasing Soviet military support for North

302
National Security

Korea made it highly probable that the Soviet Union would continue to assist North Korea if war broke out. For this reason, United

States secretary of defense Richard B. Cheney and South Korean

minister of national defense Yi Sang-hun agreed to strengthen stra- tegic planning through existing organizations, such as the CFC.

Internal Security

From the founding of the Republic of Korea, its leaders, while

professing liberal democratic ideals, consistentiy held that the security threat posed by an aggressive, communist North Korea re- quired some modification of Western democracy to fit Korean

realities. Confronted with a heavily armed enemy determined to reunify the peninsula on its own terms—by force, if necessary

successive South Korean governments gave top priority to exter- nal and internal security, guaranteed by large and well-organized

security services. The need for social order and discipline in the

face of this threat remained central to the government's approach.

Faced with a divided country, even "loyal" opposition often was

suppressed as dangerously disruptive. On more than one occasion,

political opposition was confused with communist subversion. The

communist threat at times provided political justification for

authoritarian regimes to maintain power and to suppress public

criticism or demands for democracy. In both 1961 and 1980, the

military cited these concerns to justify its interventions in South

Korean politics.

The Threat from the North

After the division of the peninsula, North Korea used subversion and sabotage against South Korea as part of its effort to achieve

reunification. North Korea was unsuccessful at developing a covert

political infrastructure in South Korea or forging links with dissi- dents resident in South Korea, and after the early 1960s Pyongyang's efforts were unproductive. Based on available evidence, in

1990 it appeared that P'yongyang placed or recruited only a limited number of political agents and sympathizers in the southern part

of the peninsula. Pyongyang's agents acted individually for the

most part, did not maintain regular contact with one another, and

received only intermittent support and guidance.

Peacetime infiltration by North Korean agents was a fact of life in South Korea after the armistice in 1953. There were, however,

clear shifts both in the number and method of infiltrations over

the years and in their goals. Through the mid-1960s, P'yongyang

sent agents primarily to gather intelligence and to try to build a

covert political apparatus. This tactic was followed by a dramatic

303
South Korea: A Country Study

shift to violent attempts to destabilize South Korea, including com- mando raids along the DMZ that occasionally escalated into fire- fights involving artillery. These raids peaked in 1968, when more

than 600 infiltrations were reported, including an unsuccessful at- tempt at a commando attack on the Blue House in Seoul and the

infiltration of over 120 commandos on the east coast. In 1969 more

than 150 infiltrations were attempted, involving almost 400 agents.

In 1970 and 1974, agents attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate

President Park. In the 1974 attempt, during an August 15 ceremony

marking National Liberation Day at the National Theater in Seoul,

the assassin's shots missed President Park but killed Mrs. Park.

Subsequently, Pyongyang's infiltration efforts abated somewhat,

and the emphasis shifted back to intelligence gathering and covert networks.

From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, most North Korean in- filtration was done by heavily armed reconnaissance teams, which

increasingly were intercepted and neutralized by South Korean

security forces. After shifting to infiltration by sea for a brief period in the 1980s, P'yongyang apparently discarded military recon- naissance in favor of inserting agents from third countries. North

Korea did not abandon violence, however, as was shown by the

abortive 1982 attempt to recruit Canadian criminals to assassinate

President Chun Doo Hwan, the 1983 Rangoon assassination at- tempt that killed seventeen South Korean government officials and

four Burmese dignitaries, and the 1987 destruction of a Korean

Air airliner with 115 people on board. In the airliner bombing,

North Korea broke from its pattern of targeting South Korean

government officials, in particular the president, and targeted or- dinary citizens. North Korean propaganda concentrated on weakening the social fabric and sowing discord between the South Korean government and the population. Indirectly, North Korea sought to turn

dissident elements within South Korean society into propagandists

and agitators who would undermine the government. P'yongyang

achieved some limited indirect success in this effort, as indicated

by the repetition of some of its themes by student dissidents. North

Korean coverage of dissident activity in the south was on occasion

so timely and accurate as to lead some members of the South Korean

government to believe that dissent in the south was directed from

the north. However, despite similarities between North Korean

propaganda and dissident statements, South Korean security agencies never convincingly established a direct connection between

the dissidents and the north, although in the late 1980s some ele- ments among dissident groups increasingly used Marxist-Leninist

304
Armed Forces Day parade

Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Washington

language and North Korean political themes (see Political Extre- mism and Political Violence, ch. 4). Seoul's Response

The pre-Korean War period was marked by political turmoil

and widespread demands for sweeping political, economic, and social change. As the communists entrenched themselves in the north

and right-of-center politicians emerged in control in the south, the

possibility for peaceful unification of the peninsula disappeared.

In the autumn of 1946, a series of unorchestrated leftist-led labor

strikes and rural peasant rebellions were suppressed by the fledgling Korean National Police after some 1,000 deaths and 30,000

arrests. The communist South Korean Workers' Party led a partly indigenous guerrilla movement in the south after a major rebel- lion on Cheju Island in April 1948 that claimed tens of thousands

of lives. South Korea's military and paramilitary forces were beset by mutinies and defections but eventually gained the upper hand.

In reaction to the communist-based Yosu-Sunch'on rebellion of October 1948, a harsh national security law was passed in December

1949 that made communism a crime. However, the law was so comprehensive and vague that it could be used against any opposition

group. Under the law, members of the South Korean Workers'

305
South Korea: A Country Study

Party were arrested and some 150,000 persons were barred from

political activity. Guerrilla warfare continued until the end of 1949,

coupled with skirmishing along the thirty-eighth parallel. North

Korea's conventional attack followed when it became clear that the

insurgents would not triumph easily.

Recollection of this chaotic period and the invasion from North

Korea colored subsequent South Korean government attitudes

toward internal security. Domestic opposition, especially from the

left, was suspect. President Syngman Rhee's call for national unity provided political justification for limiting the activities of the

opposition during the 1950s. Although the regime did not suppress

all opposition or independent sources of information, it suppressed some organized opposition and criticism (see The Media, ch. 4). In the late 1950s, as Rhee became more authoritarian, the government increasingly resorted to using the police force and, to a

lesser extent, the military security forces, for political purposes.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, whose charter ranged from intelli- gence and investigative operations to supervision of local and

provincial affairs, emerged as a powerful political force. The police,

with a strong core of veterans from the Japanese colonial police

(approximately 70 percent of the highest ranking officers, 40 per- cent of the inspectors, and 15 percent of the lieutenants), was both

effective and feared. The police used strong-arm tactics to coerce support for the ruling party during elections and harassed the political opposition. The prerogative of the police to call in anyone

for questioning was a powerful tool of intimidation. These circumstances inevitably led to police corruption, politicized law enforcement, and exploitation of the populace in the name of internal

security. Rhee's political survival became more and more dependent on the police. When police control wavered at the time of the

April 19 student revolution in April 1960, his regime fell. The short-lived Chang Myon government (July 1960 to May

1961) did not survive long enough to articulate an internal security

policy but was committed to a more open political system. However,

because of internal conflict within the ruling party and the obstructions of the conservative opposition, society was in a state of political and social turmoil.

Following the May 16, 1961, military coup, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was formed on June 19. Directly

under the control of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the KCIA, with nearly unlimited power, emerged as the or- ganization most feared during the Park Chung Hee era. Under

Kim Chong-p'il's direction, the organization weeded out anti-Park

elements and became the prime tool keeping the regime in power.

306
National Security

Under Park, the lack of advancement in civil liberties continued

to be justified by referring to the threat from North Korea. The

political influence of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police

declined in the face of the KCIA's power. The relationship between

the police and general public, however, was not significantly al- tered. As Se-Jin Kim wrote in 1971: "The former still act with

arbitrary arrogance; the latter respond with fear but not respect.

'

The government often used martial law or garrison decree in

response to political unrest. From 1961 to 1979, martial law or a

variant was evoked eight times. The October 15, 1971, garrison

decree, for example, was triggered by student protests and result- ed in the arrest of almost 2,000 students. A year later, on October

17, 1972, Park proclaimed martial law, disbanded the National

Assembly, and placed many opposition leaders under arrest (see

Constitution; Human Rights, ch. 4). In November the yusin constitution (yusin means revitalization), which greatly increased

presidential power, was ratified by referendum under martial law.

The government grew even more authoritarian, governing by

presidential emergency decrees in the immediate aftermath of the

establishment of theyusin constitution; nine emergency decrees were

declared between January 1974 and May 1975. The Park regime

strengthened the originally draconian National Security Act of 1960

and added an even more prohibitive Anticommunism Law. Under those two laws and Emergency Measure Number Nine, any

kind of antigovernment activity, including critical speeches and writings, was open to interpretation as a criminal act of "sympathizing with communism or communists" or "aiding antigovernment

organizations." Political intimidation, arbitrary arrests, preventive detention, and brutal treatment of prisoners were not un- common.

Opposition to the government and its harsh measures increased

as the economy worsened in 1979. Scattered labor unrest and the

government's repressive reactions sparked widespread public dis- sent: mass resignation of the opposition membership in the National Assembly and student and labor riots in Pusan, Masan, and

Ch'angwon. The government declared martial law in the cities. In this charged atmosphere, under circumstances that appeared

related to dissatisfaction with Park's handling of the unrest, on October 26, 1979, KCIA chief Kim Chae-gyu killed Park and the

chief of the Presidential Security Force, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, and then was himself arrested. Emergency martial law was immediately

declared to deal with the crisis, placing the head of the Defense

Security Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, in a position of considerable military and political power.

307
South Korea: A Country Study

Popular demand for the restoration of civil liberties after Park's

death was immediate and widespread. Acting President Ch'oe Kyuha revoked Emergency Measure Number Nine, which had forbidden criticism of the government and the yusin constitution. Civil

rights were restored to almost 700 people convicted under the emer- gency decrees. The illegitimacy of the yusin constitution was ac- knowledged, and the process of constitutional revision begun.

The slow pace of reform led to growing popular unrest. In early

May 1980, student demonstrators protested a variety of political

and social issues, including the government's failure to lift emergency martial law imposed following Park's assassination. The stu- dent protests spilled into the streets, reaching their peak during

May 13 to 16, at which time the student leaders obtained a promise

that the government would attempt to speed up reform. The military's response, however, was political intervention led by Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, then KCIA chief and army chief

of staff. Chun, who had forced the resignation of Ch'oe' s cabinet,

banned political activities, assemblies, and rallies, and arrested

many ruling and opposition politicians.

In Kwangju, demonstrations to protest the extension of martial

law and the arrest of Kim Dae Jung turned into rebellion as demonstrators reacted to the brutal tactics of the Special Forces sent to the city. The government did not regain control of the city for nine

days, after some 200 deaths.

General Chun Doo Hwan, as chairman of the standing committee of the Special Committee for National Security Measures

(SCNSM), assumed de facto leadership of the country. The

pronouncement of martial law announced as a result of Park's as- sassination remained in effect until January 24, 1981. Under the

Special Committee for National Security Measures and the Legislative Council for National Security that replaced it, sweeping political controls were instituted. Established political parties were

disbanded and over 800 people banned from politics; the media

were restructured, many journals were abolished, and hundreds

ofjournalists were purged; some 8,000 employees were purged from

government or government-controlled companies and some 37,000

people were arrested and "re-educated" in military training camps

under the Social Purification Campaign; and military court jurisdiction was extended to such civilian offenses as corruption and

participation in antigovernment demonstrations. The new National

Assembly Law and the amended National Security Act (which was

rewritten to incorporate elements of the 1961 Anticommunist Law)

also were passed. OnJanuary 10, 1981, the Martial Law Command

308
Checkpoint at the Demilitarized Zone

Tank trap north of Seoul

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

309
South Korea: A Country Study

allowed people to resume limited political activities in preparation

for the presidential election.

The Fifth Republic's constitution marked significant progress

from the yusin constitution. As implemented by the newly elected

Chun government, however, it fell far short of popular expectations of democraticization that had been raised after Park's death.

The constitution was attacked by students and dissidents as Park's

yusin system under new trappings. The government attempted to defuse discontent by "decompression" as well as repression, gradually returning civil rights to those banned in 1980. Additionally, the government opened up the political system slightly in 1983

and to a greater degree in 1985, although the dissident movement

continued.

Discontent was kept under control until 1987 by the regime's

extensive security services—particularly the Agency for National

Security Planning (ANSP, the renamed KCIA), the Defense Security Command (DSC), and the Combat Police of the Korean National Police (KNP). Both the civilian ANSP and the military DSC

not only collected domestic intelligence but also continued "intelligence politics."

The Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration was used to limit the expression of political opposition by prohibiting assemblies likely to "undermine" public order. Advanced police notifi- cation of all demonstrations was required. Violation carried a maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment or a fine. Most

peaceful nonpolitical assemblies took place without government in- terference. However, the act was the most frequently used tool to control political activity in the Fifth Republic, and the Chun re- gime was responsible for over 84 percent of the 6,701 investigations pursued under the act. The security presence in city centers, near university campuses,

government and party offices, and media centers was heavy.

Citizens, particularly students and young people, were subject to being stopped, questioned, and searched without due process. The

typical response to demonstrations was disruption by large numbers of Combat Police, short-term mass detention of demonstrators, and selective prosecution of the organizers. Arrest warrants

required by law—were not always produced at the time of arrest

in political cases. The National Security Act increasingly was used after 1985 to suppress domestic dissent. Intended to restrict "antistate activities endangering the safety of the state and the lives and freedom

of the citizenry," the act also was used to control and punish nonviolent domestic dissent. Its broad definition of offenses allowed

310
National Security

enforcement over the widest range, wider than that of any other

politically relevant law in South Korea. Along with other politically

relevant laws such as the Social Safety Act and the Act Concerning Crimes Against the State, it weakened or removed procedural

protection available to defendants in nonpolitical cases. Questioning by the security services often involved not only psychological or physical abuse, but also outright torture. The 1987

torture and death of Pak Chong-ch'ol, a student at Seoul National University being questioned as to the whereabouts of a class- mate, played a decisive role in galvanizing public opposition to the

government's repressive tactics. The security services not only detained those accused of violating laws governing political dissent, but also put under various lesser forms of detention—including house arrest—those people, including

opposition politicians, who they thought intended to violate the laws.

Many political, religious, and other dissidents were subjected to surveillance by government agents. Opposition assembly members

later charged in the National Assembly that telephone tapping and

the interception of correspondence were prevalent. Ruling party

assembly members, government officials, and senior military offi- cials probably also were subjected to this interference although they

did not openly complain.

Listening to North Korean radio stations remained illegal in 1990

if it were judged to be for the purpose of "benefiting the antistate

organization" (North Korea). Similarly, books or other literature

considered subversive, procommunist, or pro-North Korean were

illegal; authors, publishers, printers, and distributors of such material were subject to arrest. Use of tear gas by the police (over 260,000 tear gas shells were

used in 1987 to quell demonstrations) increasingly was criticized; the criticism eventually resulted in legal restrictions on tear gas use

in 1989. The government continued, however, to block many "ille- gal" gatherings organized by dissidents that were judged to incite

"social unrest." In 1988 government statistics noted 6,552 rallies involving 1.7 million people. There were 2.2 million people who

had participated in 6,791 demonstrations in 1989.

Intelligence Agencies

The Agency for National Security Planning

The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) was originally established on June 19, 1961 as the Korean Central Intelli- gence Agency (KCIA) directly under the Supreme Council for

311
South Korea: A Country Study

National Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the May

16, 1961, military coup. Its duties were to "supervise and coor- dinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and

criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, in- cluding that of the military.

'

' Its mission was akin to that of a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

The first head of the KCIA was Kim Chong-p'il. Kim, utiliz- ing the existing Army Counterintelligence Corps, built a 3,000-

member organization—the most powerful intelligence and investigatory agency in the republic. The KCIA maintained a complex set of interlocking institutional links with almost all of the

government's key decision-making bodies. The KCIA had a near- monopoly over crucial information concerning national security

under the charter of the Act Concerning Protection of Military

Secrets and, more importantly, possessed considerable veto power over other agencies through its supervisory and coordination

functions.

The KCIA's practically unlimited power to investigate and to detain any person accused of antistate behavior severely restricted

the right to dissent or to criticize the regime. The frequent questioning, detention, or even prosecution of dissidents, opposition

figures, and reporters seriously jeopardized basic freedoms and

created an atmosphere of political repression.

After the 1979 assassination of President Park Chung Hee by

the KCIA director, the KCIA was purged and temporarily lost much of its power. Chun Doo Hwan used his tenure as acting direc- tor of the KCIA from April to July 1980 to expand his power base

beyond the military. The organization was renamed the Agency

for National Security Planning, and its powers were redefined in

presidential orders and legislation. The ANSP, like its predecessor, was a cabinet-level agency directly accountable to the president. The director of the ANSP continued to have direct presidential access. In March 1981, the ANSP was redesignated as the principal agency for collecting and processing all intelligence. The re- quirement for all other agencies with intelligence- gathering and

analysis functions in their charters to coordinate their activities with

the ANSP was reaffirmed.

Legislation passed at the end of 1981 further redefined the

ANSP's legally mandated functions to include the collection, compilation, and distribution of foreign and domestic information

regarding public safety against communists and plots to overthrow

the government. The maintenance of public safety with regard to documents, materials, facilities, and districts designated as secrets

312
National Security

of the state was the purview of the ANSP, as was the investigation

of crimes of insurrection and foreign aggression, crimes of rebellion, aiding and abetting the enemy, disclosure of military secrets, and crimes provided for in the Act Concerning Protection of Military Secrets and the National Security Act. The investigation of

crimes related to duties of intelligence personnel, the supervision

of information collection, and the compilation and distribution of

information on other agencies' activities designed to maintain public

safety also were undertaken by the ANSP. By 1983 the ANSP had

rebounded and again was the preeminent foreign and domestic in- telligence organization.

As of 1990, the organizational structure of the ANSP was considered classified by Seoul, although earlier organizational information was public knowledge. Despite the social and political

changes that came with the Sixth Republic (1987- ), the ANSP

apparendy still considered the support and maintenance of the president in power to be one of its most important roles. In April 1990,

for example, ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) coleader Kim

Young Sam complained that he and members of his faction within the DLP had been subjected to "intelligence maneuvering in

politics" that included wiretapping, surveillance, and financial in- vestigations.

Nevertheless, the ANSP's domestic powers were indeed curtailed

under the Sixth Republic. Prior to the change, the ANSP had had

free access to all government offices and files. The ANSP, Defense

Security Command, Office of the Prosecutor General, Korean National Police, and the Ministry ofJustice had stationed their agents

in the National Assembly to collect information on the activities of politicians. In May 1988, however, overt ANSP agents, along

with agents of other intelligence agencies, were withdrawn from

the National Assembly building. The ANSP's budget was not made

public, nor apparently was it made available in any useful manner to the National Assembly in closed sessions. In July 1989, pres- sured by opposition parties and public opinion, the ANSP was

subjected to inspection and audit by the National Assembly for the

first time in eighteen years. The ANSP removed its agents from

the chambers of the Seoul Criminal Court and the Supreme Court

in 1988.

As of 1990, however, the ANSP remained deeply involved in

domestic politics and was not prepared to relinquish the power to prevent radical South Korean ideas—much less North Korean

ideas—from circulating in South Korean society. Despite an agree- ment in September 1989 by the chief policymakers of the ruling

and opposition parties to strip the ANSP of its power to investigate

313
South Korea: A Country Study

pro-North Korean activity (a crime under the National Security

Act), the ANSP continued enforcing this aspect of the law rather

than limiting itself to countering internal and external attempts to overthrow the government. The ANSP continued to pick up radical student and dissident leaders for questioning without explanation.

In another move to limit the potential for the ANSP to engage

in "intelligence politics," the ANSP Information Coordination

Committee was disbanded because of its history of unduly influencing other investigating authorities, such as the Office of the Prosecutor General. Additionally, the ANSP, responding to widespread

criticism of its alleged human rights violations, set up a "watchdog' ' office to supervise its domestic investigations and to prevent

agents from abusing their powers while interrogating suspects.

Aside from its controversial internal security mission, the ANSP

also was known for its foreign intelligence gathering and analysis

and for its investigation of offenses involving external subversion

and military secrets. The National Unification Board and the ANSP

(and the KCIA before it) were the primary sources of government

analysis and policy direction for South Korea's reunification strategy

and contacts with North Korea. The intelligence service's reputation in pursuing counterespionage cases also was excellent. The ANSP monitored visitors, particularly from communist and

East European countries, to prevent industrial and military espionage. Following the diplomatic successes of the late 1980s—the

establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and

the countries of Eastern Europe, and the increased informal contacts with China, Mongolia, and Vietnam—this mission grew in

importance. The security watch list contained 162 out of 3,808

visitors from communist nations in 1988 and 226 out of 6,444

visitors in 1989.

The Defense Security Command

It was Syngman Rhee, not the military, who initiated the political involvement of the military in intelligence activities. The turning

point came in 1952 when Rhee proclaimed martial law—and the

presence of military police in the chamber of the National Assembly guaranteed passage of the constitutional amendment he sought over the objections of a recalcitrant legislative branch and still- independent judicial branch. Throughout Rhee's administration,

two military units—the Joint Military Provost Marshal and the

army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC)—engaged in extralegal and

violent political tactics, apparently not excluding the outright murder of politically undesirable people. Although the details never

314
Infantry mobile training exercise Courtesy Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea

were disclosed fully, more than a few minor political figures' dis- appearances were connected to the two units.

Under Park, the provost marshal's political role declined, while

the CIC and its successor, the Army Security Command (ASC),

concentrated on internal military security. The CIC/ASC, which was under Park's direct control, maintained strict surveillance over

all high-ranking officers. It acted as a deterrent to would-be coup

leaders. It tried, less successfully, to prevent the rise of disruptive

factions within the military.

The Defense Security Command was formally activated in October 1977. This merger of the Army Security Command, the Navy

Security Unit, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations

produced a single, integrated unit under the direct command and

operational control of the minister of national defense. Although

technically subordinate to the minister, the DSC commander operated semiautonomously and typically had personal, direct access

to the president. Given the disparity in service size, the old ASC

predominated within the DSC. The strength of the DSC varied over time within a probable range of 5,000 to 7,000 people during

the 1980s.

The DSC (and its predecessors) was created to deal with the real question of loyalty within a military on a divided peninsula. It was

315
South Korea: A Country Study

inspired by the Guomindang model, in which political officers monitored the military services for subversion or disloyalty. The DSC

was responsible for monitoring the military for loyalty; for safeguarding military information; for monitoring domestic political, economic, and social activities that might jeopardize military

capabilities and national unity; for maintaining defense industrial

security—both physically and in terms of counterespionage; for countering North Korean infiltration; for detecting espionage and

anticommunist law violations; and for conducting special investigations at the direction of the president.

The DSC assigned small elements to all major military units to monitor security and loyalty. These elements operated outside the

unit's chain of command and performed a highly effective independent audit function. The DSC representatives never rivaled unit

commanders as political officers occasionally had in communist mili- tary units. Their input into officer evaluations, however, often

played a decisive role in career progression, giving DSC members

influence far beyond their rank and producing friction between them

and the "regular" military. Corruption within the DSC was difficult to verify, but political manipulations, misappropriation of operating funds, and undue influencing of promotions certainly occurred

and were particularly rampant in the mid- to late 1970s.

For most of the Park regime, the ASC/DSC remained concerned

primarily with internal military matters and was involved in the

Yun P'il-yong incident in 1972 and removing the army chief of

staff, General Yi Se-ho, in 1979 for corruption. Yun P'il-yong,

head of the Capital Garrison Command, was court martialed, along

with several close followers, on charges of bribery and corruption.

His "real" offense, however, was creating a faction among the class- es of the four-year graduates of the Korea Military Academy. Yun's

faction did not disappear when he was purged. The group of young

officers, who called themselves the "Hanahoe" (One Mind Society), had its origins in an alumni group, the Taegu Seven Stars,

of seven young officers, including Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae

Woo, from the first graduating class of the Academy (Class 11).

The Hanahoe evolved into a group of some 200 members through

ten graduating classes. In 1979 and 1980, Chun drew on the Hanahoe in his ascent to power. The irony of Park's death at the hands

of his KCIA chief in 1979, however, was compounded by the rise to power of the commander of the DSC, then Major General Chun

Doo Hwan, who used the military's anticoup apparatus to ensure

the success of his own coup (see The Chun Regime, ch. 1). During and following Chun's rise to power, the DSC greatly

expanded its charter into domestic politics and during the early

316
National Security

1980s was, perhaps, the dominant domestic intelligence service.

The DSC was "credited" with masterminding the media reorganization of 1980 and with being the midwife for the first political parties of the Fifth Republic. Many former DSC members played

prominent roles in Chun's administration and in the ruling

Democratic Justice Party.

The end of the Fifth Republic brought the DSC under even more

pressure than had been brought against the ANSP to cut back on

its domestic political activities. Both the DSC and the ANSP withdrew from the National Assembly at the same time in 1988. In

October 1988, Minister of National Defense O Cha-bok reported

to the National Assembly that the DSC would concentrate on counterespionage activities, preventing the spread of communism, con- ducting "relevant research," major restructuring, and would

discontinue the investigation of civilians. Subsequently, the DSC

eliminated the Office of Information that had been charged with

collecting information on civilians, whose members had been active in local government offices. As a result of this move, 116 small

detachments were disbanded, and the DSC announced plans to cut 860 personnel, or 14 percent of its 1990 strength. Additionally, the DSC curtailed its involvement in security screening of nonmilitary government personnel. An official of the DSC claimed that surveillance of politicians was turned over to "another agency."

Given the historically broad interpretation of national security

threats espoused by DSC personnel, however, many analysts doubted that the DSC had totally disengaged from domestic political sur- veillance. Despite the democratic trends of the late 1980s,

intelligence and security agencies still were populated by individuals

who were both institutionally and personally loyal to the president

and ready to use any means at their disposal to support him.

Korean National Police

Organized by the United States Army Military Government in

1945, the Korean National Police (KNP) force was formally acti- vated in 1948 by the new Korean government and placed under

the Ministry of Home Affairs. Even after the establishment of a

separate military service in 1948, the police force retained a paramilitary role and was employed in military operations during

the Korean War.

Attacked in its early years as a remnant ofJapanese colonial rule

(1910-45), beset by low professionalism, factionalism, endemic cor- ruption, and political manipulation, the Korean National Police

nonetheless still evolved into a relatively modern and effective force. Although the police force was used by the Rhee regime in such

317
South Korea: A Country Study

a flagrantly political way that it was held in low esteem by the

citizenry, reforms made after the 1961 military coup began the

police force's slow evolution into a professional force. Reorganization, recruitment by examination, merit promotion, and modern

concepts of management and training were instituted. Further improvements came during the 1970s when modern communication,

data processing, and crime detection practices were introduced.

In 1975 the director general of the KNP was elevated to viceministerial rank directly under the minister of home affairs. The

KNP reported through its own channels to its headquarters in Seoul.

Provincial governors and local officials had no authority over the

police.

In addition to the regular police functions of law enforcement,

criminal investigation, and public safety, the KNP was responsible for riot control, countering student demonstrations, and other

public disorders. Coastal security, including patrolling coastal

waters, antismuggling operations, and coordinating counterespionage operations with the navy and the air force, were also its purview. "Combat operations" against small-scale North Korean

infiltration attempts; the monitoring of foreign residents in South

Korea; anticommunist operations, including counterintelligence

activities and monitoring of "security risks" (historically expanded to including monitoring political, labor, economic, academic,

religious, and cultural figures); and counterterrorist operations were

all part of the mission of the KNP. There sometimes was competitive overlap between the KNP, ANSP, and the DSC.

In 1989 the KNP was a 130,000-person organization that consisted of a headquarters, thirteen metropolitan/provincial police

bureaus, the Combat Police, the National Maritime Police, an antiterrorist unit, the Central Police Academy, and other support ser- vices, such as a forensics laboratory, a hospital, and other police

schools. As of January 1989, there were 201 police stations and

3,220 police substations and detachments throughout the country.

The National Police Headquarters exercised authority over all police components. Metropolitan and provincial police bureaus were

responsible for maintaining public order by directing and supervising their own police stations (see fig. 18).

The police station was responsible for maintaining public peace

within its own precinct. The police station had seven functioning

sections: an administration and public safety section, responsible

for operation and supervision of police substations and boxes, liti- gation of minor offenses, traffic control, and crime prevention; a

security section, responsible for maintaining public order; an in- vestigation section, responsible for investigating criminal incidents,

318
National Security

lawsuits, booking criminals, custody of suspects, detention-cell

management, and transference of cases and suspects involved in

criminal cases to prosecution authorities; a criminal section, responsible for crime prevention; a counterespionage section; and an in- telligence section, responsible for collection of intelligence and

information. The police substation or police box took preliminary

actions in all criminal incidents, civic services, and accidents.

Police boxes were the South Korean equivalent of the cop on

the beat. They provided direct contact between the people and the

police. Police box personnel were supposed to know their areas and

the people who lived and worked in them. Police boxes were com- manded by lieutenants or sergeants and had reaction vehicles avail- able on a twenty-four-hour basis. Weighed down by a wide range of administrative duties, KNP

personnel spent only 1 5 percent of their time on routine enforcement duties in 1989. Among other things, the KNP collected fines,

approved death certificates, and processed security checks for pass- port applicants. The personnel shortage was acute; official statistics showed that there was only one police officer (excluding the

Combat Police, who accounted for nearly half the strength of the

KNP) for every 680 South Koreans, as compared with one police

officer for every 390 people in the United States, one for every 318

people in West Germany, and one for every 551 people in Japan

(the lowest ratio for any major industrialized noncommunist country). This shortage was compounded by a tight budget and the con- tinued preoccupation with riot control, which left the force ill equipped to deal with the demands of an increasingly affluent and

sophisticated society.

Recruitment and training were done through the Central Police

Academy, the National Police College, and the Police Consolidated Training School. The Central Police Academy was established

in 1987. It had a maximum capacity of 35,000 recruits and was

capable of simultaneously offering a six-week training course for police recruits, a two-week training course for draftees of the Combat Police, and a variety of basic specialized training courses for junior police. Officials planned to recruit about 10,000 new police

officers a year from 1989 to 1991 to alleviate the personnel shortage, although their ability to maintain the quality of the force, given

the low starting pay, was questioned. Only 12 percent of police

applicants were university graduates in 1989. Screening unsuitable recruits was problematic because neither psychiatric nor polygraph assessments were administered. (In 1982, for example, an

unstable police officer killed fifty-four people in one night following a domestic dispute.)

319
South Korea: A Country Study

CO

U. cc o <

cc u- UJ u- i- <

CO Ml

O (O

cr

UJ 1< ^ s

uj O O I II I J

°= CO

uj cc < 2 9 2 O cc o < o o.

o <

CO g uj —

cc uj

uj cc

t- o

Z LL Oo

<\z2

o < O 0l

z o

< £ C5 S

I— DC co a. 5 31 5 82a

? ° OL UJco

2*

cc o

o cc

a. 3

QC O

X => O uj

320
National Security

By 1989 the National Police College had graduated some 500

officers since its first class graduated in 1985. Each college class had about 120 police cadets, divided between law and public administration specializations. The National Police College began admitting women in 1989; five women were admitted each year. The

cadets shared a collective life for four years at the college. The goal was to establish a career officers corps similar to those created by

the military academies.

The Police Consolidated Training School provided advanced

studies, basic training for junior police staff, and special practical

training courses for security and investigative officers from the counterespionage echelons of police agencies. It also trained Maritime

Police instructors, key command personnel for the Combat Police

force, and foreign-language staff members.

Revolvers and carbines were the customary weapons; billy clubs were carried by patrol officers. The gradual replacement of car- bines by rifles began in 1981. In 1989 the KNP reemphasized the

planned replacement of carbines with M-16 rifles. Approximately 4,300 M-16s were to be supplied to police boxes and stations

in 1989; by 1999 a total of 110,000 M-16s was scheduled to be

distributed. Transportation was by motorcycle, bicycle, jeep, truck,

and squad car. The KNP's special weapons and tactics squad was known as Force 868. Organized in 1982, its members were trained in martial

arts and counterterrorist tactics. It received significant support and

advice from United States and West European counterterrorist task

forces preceding the 1988 Seoul Olympics and was well supplied

with the more specialized equipment needed for combating ter- rorism.

The Combat Police force was technically subordinate to the

Ministry of National Defense, but the Ministry of Home Affairs

and the Korean National Police were responsible for its operational

management and budget. During hostilities, the Combat Police

reverted to the Ministry of National Defense. The members of the

Combat Police were conscripted at age twenty or older and served

for approximately two-and-a-half years. Divided into companies,

the Combat Police force was assigned to the metropolitan police

bureaus. Except for supervisory personnel who were regular KNP

officers, members of the Combat Police were paramilitary; their

primary responsibilities were riot control and counterinfiltration.

Under normal conditions, they did not have law enforcement powers as did regular KNP officers. In 1967 the Combat Police force was organized to handle counterinfiltration and antiriot duties.

321
South Korea: A Country Study

Approximately half of the total strength of the KNP was formed

into 350 Combat Police/riot control companies. The percentage

of Combat Police in the total force increased during the 1980s. In

1982 there were 39,706 Combat Police, about 40 percent of the

police total. By 1987 Combat Police represented 45.8 percent of

the total force with 54,100 members. Since service in the Combat

Police was regarded as fulfilling a military obligation, young men

who did not wish to serve the compulsory minimum thirty-month

service in the military could choose instead a thirty-five-month stint with the Korean National Police as combat police. Draftees into

military service also could be assigned to the Combat Police force

after completion of basic training.

Although the police were relatively well trained and disciplined,

illegal police behavior in the conduct of investigations or handling

of suspects was occasionally a serious problem. In 1985, for example, as a result of some form of official misconduct, one-fourth of

Seoul's detectives were transferred, demoted, or otherwise dis- ciplined. Rough treatment of suspects before a warrant was obtained was a continuing problem. Redress in cases of official misconduct normally was handled internally and rarely resulted

in criminal charges against police officials. Historically, the use of excessive force by the police was pervasive. In violent confrontations with student demonstrators, police

units generally remained well disciplined, but rioters were beaten on apprehension, often by plainclothes police. Charges of police

beatings in nonpolitical cases were made fairly frequently and sometimes were reported in the press. Antigovernment youth activists were subjected to repeated and severe physical torture, which at times resulted in death during interrogations. Various degrees of

physical maltreatment, including sleep and food deprivation, electric shocks, beating, and forced water intake were common during police

interrogations under the Rhee, Park, and Chun regimes. With the

founding of the Sixth Republic, such reports declined. However,

according to the United States Department of State's reports on human rights, some credible allegations of torture were made during

the last half of 1989 by persons arrested under the National Security Act. Credible allegations of cruel treatment also continued in

1990. Although political cases received the most publicity, mistreatment of people detained or arrested for nonpolitical crimes is al- leged to be widespread.

Criminal Justice

Throughout Korea's history, the assimilation of foreign laws has

taken place in waves. Korea assimilated the codes of the Chinese

322
Police box

Courtesy Korean National Police

Qin, Wei, and Tang dynasties in the early Three Kingdoms period, the codes of the Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties in the Koryo

period (918-1392), the Ming Code in the Choson Dynasty

(1392-1910) period, Western civil law at the close of the Choson

Dynasty and during the Japanese occupation, and both Continental

Law and Anglo-American law after liberation in 1945. The Choson Dynasty also produced numerous codifications of Korean law

and created new laws as necessary to deal with economic, social,

and other public policy issues. Confucian values exerted strong in- fluence on Korea's traditional law.

With the end of the Choson Dynasty in 1910, decisive changes

occurred in Korean law. Traditional Korean institutions were suddenly replaced. Reform measures, characterized by the introduction of Western institutions, began with the Kabo Reforms

(1894-95) forced on Korea by Japan and modeled on the Japanese

reforms of the Meiji Restoration (1868). These hasty reforms

produced many laws translated from Japanese codes, which in turn

had their origins in Roman and Germanic laws. The imposition

of institutions by the Japanese and their post- 19 10 use for repressive colonial control constituted a sharp break with the Korean past.

The Westernized legal system's key features included its origin

in the European civil law tradition; prominent roles for legal scholars,

323
South Korea: A Country Study

university professors, and legislators, rather than judges; codified

law rather than precedent as the major source of law; and an in- quisitorial rather than adversarial court procedure. In other respects,

however, Japanese colonial rule continued several features of the

traditional Korean legal order. Under Japanese colonial rule, for example, there was no constitutional law, no guarantee of rights,

and no judicial review of the exercise of political power. The legal

system of Korea under Japanese rule was composed essentially of

rules, duties, and obligations. Further, there was little institutional or procedural separation of powers. The Japanese governor

general had even greater executive and legislative power than tradi- tional Korean kings and ruled through a large, efficient, and modern

bureaucracy.

After independence, revulsion over the Japanese occupation motivated Korean officials to devise a new codification designed to replace all Japanese laws, decrees, and orders, as well as the regulations and decrees of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48) with Korean codes. The process took ten

years. Eventually, the Criminal Code (1953), the Code of Criminal Procedure (1954), the Civil Code (1958), the Civil Procedure

Law (1960), and the Commercial Code (1962), as well as other

codes—deliberately distinguished from previous Japanese codes

were adopted. In most substantive areas, however, South Korean

law retained the most fundamental principles and procedures of

continental jurisprudence as originally received through Japan.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (1954) governed most aspects

of the enforcement of criminal justice. The code retained the basic

characteristics of the European continental legal system and had some features of Anglo-American law. Among the features adapted from the United States legal system were a requirement for judicial warrants; modification of preliminary examination;

strengthening of the system of state-appointed counsel; rejection

of hearsay evidence as a matter of rule; and a requirement for cor- roborating evidence obtained in confessions.

The first exclusionary ruling on a confession in a South Korean

court based on the constitutional guarantee of the right to legal

counsel occurred in late 1989. Law enforcement and security agency

officials, however, did not consider themselves compelled to adhere to legal precedents or court rulings when subsequently investigating other cases. Police and prosecutors, especially in political or espionage cases, still limited the frequency and length of defendants' meetings with counsel, except when taking written state- ments. Legislative action was needed for the South Korean system

324
National Security

to proceed beyond court redress of specific violations in specific cases to the establishment of general guidelines.

Crime

During the late 1980s, South Korea experienced a jump in its traditionally low rates of violent crime. A growing number of violent crimes were directed against women, a fact that drew special

public concern. The Korean National Police authorities denied that there was

any "organized crime" in South Korea, although police boxes in

Seoul in 1990 posted signs encouraging citizens to report any in- formation concerning p'ongnyokpae, violent bands of men armed with

knives and improvised weapons who contributed to the rise in violent assaults throughout the city. Although there were some ties between Japan's underworld—the yakuza (Japanese gangsters)

and South Korean criminal groups through ethnic Koreans residing in Japan, yakuza "bosses" did not direct the extension ofyakuza

activities into South Korea. Nevertheless, the disturbing increase

in violent crime and apparent disputes between criminal groups

suggested that if organized crime did not yet exist in South Korea

in 1989, its precursors were evident.

Historically, narcotics abuse in South Korea had been very low;

it was confined primarily to marginal urban low-income groups

and did not include either heroin or cocaine abuse (see Health Conditions, ch. 2). In the late 1980s, narcotics abuse remained low

but had steadily increased, becoming a social and political issue. In reaction to this increase, enforcement responsibility was trans- ferred from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to the Narcotics Division of the Supreme Prosecution Administration under

the Ministry ofJustice. This action gave narcotics enforcement a higher priority, more staffing, and more funding. (Drug-related

arrests had increased from 810 in 1985 to 1,227 in 1987 and to 1,606 in 1988.) Most drug-related criminal activity involved the

manufacture or abuse of methamphetamine and South Korea's

emergence as a major Asian producer of hirropon, an illicit methamphetamine. A related problem was transshipment of Asian heroin

destined for the United States and other world markets.

Criminal Procedure

In the absence of martial law or emergency decrees, both of which

historically had been exercised by the government and provisions

for which remained in the 1987 Constitution, criminal procedure

in other than political cases followed a set format. Both public prose- cutors and the police were authorized to conduct investigations of

325
South Korea: A Country Study

criminal acts. Public prosecutors were under the direction and su- pervision of the Office of the Supreme Prosecutor General; the

supreme prosecutor general was appointed by the president. In 1990

there were four branches of the Office of the High Prosecutor General and fourteen district offices. Theoretically, police authority to investigate criminal acts was subordinate to the direction and review

of the prosecutors. Also, the arrest of a suspect required a judicial

warrant except in cases of flagrante delicto or when it was believed

that the suspect would flee or commit the act again. The request

for a warrant could be made only by the prosecutor.

After an arrest, the suspect had to be transferred to the public

prosecutor within ten days and indicted within ten days of the prose- cutor' s gaining custody. The judge was permitted to extend detention another ten days; the suspect could request court review

of the legality of detention.

The public prosecutor initiated legal action. The name of the

accused, the alleged crime, the alleged facts of the case, and the

applicable laws were stated in the indictment. The prosecutor had

significant discretionary power to decide whether or not to bring

the case to court based on his interpretation of the law and evi- dence, or in consideration of a suspect's age, character, motive,

or other circumstances, even though a crime had been committed.

Prosecutors normally indicted only when they accumulated what

they considered overwhelming evidence of a suspect's guilt. The

courts, historically, were predisposed to accept the allegations of

fact in an indictment. This predisposition was reflected in both the

low acquittal rate—less than 0.5 percent—in criminal cases and

in the frequent verbatim repetition of the indictment as the judgment. The principle of " innocent until proven guilty" applied in

practice much more to the pre-indictment investigation than to the

actual trial. During the 1980s, there was a dispute within the legal system

over the judiciary's power to check prosecution. The prosecution

and judiciary differed over whether or not the law gave the judiciary

grounds to arraign suspects before issuing warrants. The judiciary

tried repeatedly in the 1980s to institutionalize this right and in

1989 asserted it in a proceeding. The judiciary was riot able to compel the prosecution to accept this view, however.

At the prosecutor's discretion, a case could be brought before the court by summary indictment if the offense were punishable by

fines. In such a case, the judge gave a summary judgment without

holding a public hearing. The accused could request an ordinary trial. Once indicted, the accused had the right to be released on bail. Exceptions could be made if the offense were punishable by death,

326
Emergency training, Korean National Police Courtesy Korean National Police

life imprisonment, or imprisonment over ten years; if the defendant were a recidivist; if there were suspicion that the defendant

would destroy evidence; or if there were reasonable grounds to sus- pect that the defendant would flee; or if the residence of the defendant were unknown. In 1989 bail was granted in a National Security

Act case for the first time.

The constitutional right to representation by an attorney was

not interpreted as applying to the investigation and interrogation

phases. In National Security Act cases, access to counsel was regularly denied during the investigation phase. In 1989 lawyers sought

court orders granting access, but neither the ANSP nor the Prose- cutor General's Office felt compelled to comply when the National Security Act was involved.

There was no jury system. Cases that involved offenses punishable by the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for not less than one year were tried by three judges of a district or branch court. The remaining cases were heard by a single judge.

Political and criminal cases were tried by the same courts; military courts did not try civilians except under martial law.

At least five days before trial, the defendant was served a copy

of the indictment. The defendant had to be represented by counsel if the offenses were punishable by death or imprisonment for

327
South Korea: A Country Study

more than three years. The court appointed defense counsel if the

defendant was unable to do so because of age, mental capacity,

poverty, or other handicaps that might impair choice or communication.

Hearings generally were open to the public. If danger to national

security or prejudice to public peace or good morals were involved,

the judge could close the proceedings. Charges against defendants

in the courts were declared publicly. Trial documents, however, were not part of the public record. In lengthy and complex indictments, the relationship between specific alleged actions and violations of specific sections of the penal code could become unclear.

In cases involving a mixture of political and criminal charges, this situation at times led to charges of unfair proceedings. A defendant had the right to remain silent and free from physical restraint

in the courtroom. Judges generally allowed considerable scope for the examination of witnesses.

Either the defendant or the prosecutor could appeal a judgment

on the basis of law or fact. Appeals could result in reduced or in- creased sentences. A Constitution Court was established in 1988

to relieve the burden on the Supreme Court (see The Judiciary,

ch. 4). When the constitutionality of a law was at issue in a trial, the Supreme Court requested a decision of the Constitution Court.

The president, chiefjustice, and the National Assembly each named

three members of the nine-member Constitution Court.

The Supreme Court retained the power to make final review

of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations, or actions when at issue in a trial. Grounds for an appeal

to the Supreme Court were limited by the Code of Criminal Proce- dure to violation of the Constitution, law, or regulation material

to the judgment; abolition, alteration, or pardon of penalty; a grave

mistake in factfinding; or extreme impropriety in sentencing. An

interpretation of law in an appeal had binding effect on the inferi- or court only when the case was remanded. In other cases, however,

a decision of the Supreme Court only had persuasive effect. Judges were trained professionally and were among the best

products of one of the toughest education systems in the world.

The qualifications for a judge were the completion of two years

of courses at the Judicial Research and Training Institute after pass- ing the national judicial examination, or the possession of qualifications as a prosecutor or an attorney. Judges were members of a tiny elite; the institute had only 3,692 graduates from 1949 to 1988. In 1988 there were only 940 judges, 668 prosecutors, and

1,593 practicing attorneys. There were additional requirements for higher positions: fifteen years of legal experience for the chiefjustice

328
National Security

and justices of the Supreme Court; ten years of experience for the

chief judge of an appellate court, the chiefjudge of a district court,

the chief judge of a family court, and the senior judge of an appellate court; and five years of experience for the judge of an appellate court, the senior judge of a district court, and the senior judge

of a family court. South Korea's president, with the consent of the

National Assembly, appointed both the chiefjustice and, upon the

recommendation of the chief justice, the other justices of the

Supreme Court. Under the 1987 Constitution and the Court Organization Law, lower justices were appointed by the chiefjustice

with the consent of the Conference of Supreme Court Justices.

Historically, the executive branch exercised great influence on

judicial decisions. However, there were some indications of in- creased judicial independence in 1989. In a number of cases, the

Constitution Court found that the government had violated the

constitutional rights of individuals. Moreover, the Supreme Court

invalidated the results of the elections for two National Assembly

seats, citing election law violations by victorious ruling party candidates.

Penal administration was controlled and supervised by the Ministry of Justice. There were four detention facilities (for unconvicted detainees), twenty-seven correctional institutions, ten juvenile

training institutes, and four juvenile classification homes. Conditions in correctional institutions were austere and particularly harsh

in winter. Discipline was strict. Prisoners who broke rules or protested conditions sometimes were physically abused. Under nor- mal circumstances, however, convicts were not physically punished.

Most accusations of mistreatment involved persons detained or awaiting trial in detention facilities, rather than those who were

already convicted and serving their sentences in prison. Visitation was strictly limited to legal counsel and immediate families. Mail was subject to monitoring and occasional censorship. There was

no significant difference in the treatment of prisoners on the basis

of wealth, social class, race, or sex. The treatment of political

prisoners could be better or worse than that of regular prisoners.

On some occasions, special provisions were allowed for political

prisoners, and as late as 1989 it also was alleged by human rights

activists that political prisoners sometimes were subjected to sleep

deprivation and psychological pressure. There were a number of probationary devices that permitted

police to supervise suspected or convicted criminals, including deferral of prosecution and suspension of sentence. These measures in- creased judicial flexibility and were often used to show clemency.

Probationary devices also had frequently been used to ensure that

329
South Korea: A Country Study

released political offenders behaved in a manner acceptable to the

government. Criminals who showed repentance regularly were freed

in amnesties, often linked to holidays. Amnesty often was declared

to showcase the beneficence of the state in forgiving criminals.

* * * Three excellent sources on the South Korean armed forces are Edward A. Olsen's "The Societal Role of the Republic of Korea

Armed Forces" in The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies; Eugene Kim's "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role"

in Political Changes in South Korea; and Young Woo Lee's insightful

article "Birth of the Korean Army, 1945-50" in Korea and World

Affairs. The Asian Defence Journal often has comparative analyses

of the military capabilities of the North Korean and South Korean

armed forces. Larry A. Niksch's "The Military Balance on the

Korean Peninsula" in Korea and World Affairs and Richard L. Sneider's The Political and Social Capabilities of North and South Korea for

the Long- Term Military Competition provide useful information on the

Korean arms race. Dae-Kyu Yoon's Law and Political Authority in Korea is an excellent and detailed study of the interaction of law

and politics in South Korea. Two books by South Korean army

officers, Colonel Lee Suk Bok's The Impact of United States Forces

in Korea and Brigadier General Taek-Hyung Rhee's U.S.-ROK

Combined Operations provide the South Korean perspective on United

States-South Korean military relations. English-language sources on national security issues are published regularly by the Seoul

government, South Korean universities, and two daily newspapers,

Korea Herald and Korea Times. The Ministry of National Defense

publishes an annual White Paper that provides a comprehensive ex- amination of military organization, defense spending, and training in the South Korean armed forces. The National Police

Headquarters annually publishes Korean National Police, a pictorial

and textual description of that organization. Manwoo Lee, Ronald

D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon's (eds.), Alliance under Tension:

The Evolution of South Korean- U.S. Relations is another useful source. The subversive activities of North Korea in South Korea and

abroad and the causes for increased domestic violence in South

Korea in the 1980s are discussed in official reports published by

the United States Department of State and the Committee on For- eign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives. The

Bombing of Korean Airlines Flight KAL-858, by the United States House Committee on Foreign Relations, provides a comprehensive examination of North Korea's past use of and capabilities for

330
National Security

future acts of terrorism targeting South Koreans. Donald N. Clark's

The Kwangju Uprising examines aspects of the Kwangju incident

following Chun Doo Hwan's December 1979 coup. Selig S. Harrison's The South Korean Political Crisis and American Policy Options

discusses the goals of radical organizations in South Korea in the

mid-1980s. For information concerning the history of the Korean

legal system, Chun Bong Duck, William Shaw, and Choi KaiKwon's Traditional Korean Legal Attitudes should be consulted. Articles in the Far Eastern Economic Review and Asian Survey should also

be consulted. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

331

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Major Economic Indicators, 1986-89

3 Central Government Expenditures, 1984, 1986, and 1987

4 Central Government Revenues, 1984, 1986, and 1988

5 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-88

6 Trade with the United States, 1982-89

7 Principal Trading Partners, 1986 and 1988

8 Constitutional Amendments, 1948-90

9 Status of the National Assembly under the 1987 Constitution

10 Executive Domination of the Judiciary, 1972-86

11 National Assembly Election Returns, February 1985

12 National Assembly Election Returns, April 1988

13 Strikes and Labor Disputes, 1987-90

14 Principal Radical Organizations, 1985-89

15 Media Statistics, 1986, 1988, and 1989

16 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Ground Forces

of South Korea and North Korea, 1990

1 7 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Air Forces of South

Korea and North Korea, 1990

18 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Naval Forces of

South Korea and North Korea, 1990

333

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2

) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

Table 2. Major Economic Indicators, 1986-89

Indicator 1986 1987 1988 1989 Gross National Product 1 102.7 128.4 169.2 204.0 Economic growth 2 12.9 12.8 12.2 6.5 Per capita income 3 2,503.0 3,098.0 4,040.0 4,830.0 Consumer prices 4 1.4 6.1 7.2 5.2 Gross savings 5 33.1 36.3 37.7 35.8 Trade account 6 4.2 7.7 11.4 4.6 Current account 6 4.6 9.9 14.2 5.0 Total foreign debt 1 44.5 35.6 31.2 30.3 Gross investment share 4 29.3 29.4 29.9 33.4

1 In billions of United States dollars.

2 In percentage change.

3 In United States dollars.

4 Annual percentage change.

5 As percentage of gross national product.

6 In billions of United States dollars, balance of payments basis. Source: Based on information from Korea Economic Institute of America, Korea's Economy, Washington, 1990.

335
South Korea: A Country Study

Table 3. Central Government Expenditures, 1984, 1986, and 1987

(in billions of won) *

1984 1986 1987 Expenditure Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage

National defense 3,539.9 28.2 4,335.5 28.3 4,793.5 26.1 General 6,822.1 54.4 8,577.0 56.0 10,009.0 54.5 Fixed capital formation 949.6 7.6 1,284.4 8.4 1,391.5 7.6 Net lending -2.4 — 9.5 — 0.5 —

Other 1,225.1 9.8 1,113.7 7.3 2,170.7 11.8 TOTAL 12,534.3 100.0 15,320.1 100.0 18,365.2 100.0 —means negligible.

* For value of the w6n—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Bank of Korea, Annual Report, 1987, Seoul, 1987, 68; and The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574.

Table 4. Central Government Revenues, 1984, 1986, and 1988

(in billions of won) *

Source 1984 1986 1988

. . . 6,697.4 8,464.0 12,545.1 1,593.7 1,942.5 2,573.3

, 1,511.3 1,878.9 2,978.4 284.8 372.4 512.3 866.0 984.0 874.0 Government enterprise receipts (net) . . . 232.3 238.3 340.8 Other ... 2,012.0 2,398.5 4,185.4 TOTAL . . . 13,197.5 16,278.6 24,009.3

* For value of the w6n—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Bank of Korea, Annual Report 1987, Seoul, 1987, 68; and The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574.

Table 5. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-88

(in millions of United States dollars)

Year

Current Account

Balance Trade AccountBalance Year

Current Account

Balance Trade AccountBalance 1965 . . 9 -240 1985 .

-887 -19

1970 .

-623 -922 1986 . . 4,617 4,206 1975 .

1,887 -1,671 1987 . . 9,854 7,659 1980 . . -5,321 -4,384 1988 .

14,266 11,561

336
Appendix

Table 6. Trade with the United States, 1982-89

(in billions of United States dollars)

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

6.28 8.26 10.52 10.78 13.92 18.38 21.47 20.64

5.95 6.27 6.87 6.55 6.54 8.76 12.75 15.91 0.32 1.98 3.65 4.23 7.37 9.62 8.71 4.73

* Figures may not add because of rounding. Source: Based on information from United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United

States: Korea, Washington, June 1989; United States, Department of Commerce,

International Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Korea, Washington, April 1990; and Korea Economic Institute of America, Korea Economic Update, 1, No. 2, Summer 1990, 4.

Table 7. Principal Trading Partners, 1986 and 1988

(in millions of United States dollars)

1986 Exports Country by Rank Volume

United States 13,880 Japan 5,426 Hong Kong 1,691 Canada 1,248 West Germany 1,242

Britain 1,034 Saudi Arabia 855

France 543

Australia 535

Singapore 532

1986 Imports Country by Rank Volume Japan 10,869 United States 6,545 West Germany 1,216

Australia 1,080 Malaysia 902 Canada 709

France 706 Saudi Arabia 635

Britain 454 Oman 440

1988 Exports Country by Rank Volume

1988 Imports Country by Rank Volume

United States 21,404,087 Japan 12,004,068 Hong Kong 3,560,944 West Germany 2,367,803

Britain 1,950,899 Canada 1,692,327 Singapore 1,355,260 Saudi Arabia 1,130,309 France 1,064,886

Australia 864,821

Japan 15,975,786 United States 12,756,657 West Germany 2,073,987

Australia 1,797,390 Malaysia 1,331,354 Canada 1,196,816 France 1,134,851 Taiwan 1,071,264

Britain 914,503

Indonesia 905,297

Source: Based on information from Korea Trade Promotion Corporation, How to Trade

with Korea: 1987—A Practical Guide to Trade and Investment, Seoul, 1987, 20-26; and

The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574.

337
South Korea: A Country Study

Table 8. Constitutional Amendments, 1948-90

Date Description

July 4, 1954 To amend 1948 constitution to allow direct popular elec- (First Republic) tion of president rather than election by National Assembly, in which President Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party lacked a stable majority. Passed in late-night National Assembly session under martial law with some

opposition members under arrest and others forcibly assembled to form quorum. November 27, 1954 To eliminate limits on presidential terms in office to per- mit incumbent president (Rhee) indefinite tenure. Bill carried (after two earlier failures) by fraudulent rounding of fractional number required for two-thirds

majority. June 15, 1960 To replace presidential system with parliamentary form

(Second Republic) of government following overthrow of President Rhee. Provided extensive civil rights and established Central Election Management Committee. November 23, 1960 To allow ex post facto legislation for punishment of rig- ging of March 1960 presidential elections and other

actions by officials under former Rhee government. December 17, 1962 To reestablish presidential form of government in civilian (Third Republic) form for military leaders under Park Chung Hee, who

staged coup d'etat in May 1961. October 17, 1969 To remove two-term restriction to permit President Park

indefinite tenure. November 21, 1972 To increase executive power by permitting broad use of (Fourth Republic—yusin presidential emergency measures, to undercut power

constitution) of National Assembly, and to restrict many civil rights. Ratified by referendum under martial law. October 22, 1980 To end^ui-m political order and provide new constitu-

(Fifth Republic) tional framework for military leaders under Chun Doo

Hwan, who staged coup d'etat in May 1980. Restored some civil rights, which were qualified by accompanying legislation. Ratified by referendum under martial

law; coupled with measures barring all major civilian politicians from political participation. October 28, 1987 To void Fifth Republic constitution and provide for direct (Sixth Republic) popular election of president; coupled with measures

restoring rights of political participation to all politi- cians barred in 1980. Drafted by joint committee of

ruling and opposition party representatives following

public pledges by ruling party presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo in June 1987. Restored stronger civil rights provisions of 1960 and 1962 constitutions. Source: Based on information from Korea Annual, 1988, Seoul, 1989, 91-94; John Kie-Chiang

Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, Ithaca, 1968, 43, 48; and Constitution of the Republic

of Korea, Seoul, 1987.

338
Appendix

Table 9. Status of the National Assembly under

the 1987 Constitution

Area of Power Provision Symbolic Text concerning National Assembly precedes text con- cerning executive. National Assembly National Assembly member apprehended or detained and State Council prior to opening of session must be released during

session on request of National Assembly (except in cases of flagrante delicto). Requires one-quarter of membership to convene extra- ordinary session (versus one-third in 1980 constitution).

Deletes provision limiting business in presidentially called extraordinary session to bills introduced by president.

Deletes 150-day limit on assembly sessions.

Deletes reference to dissolution of assembly. Extends power of inspection or investigation of specific matters of state affairs to include matters under crimi- nal investigation or trial.

Deletes provision disallowing motion for removal of prime minister or State Council member(s) within first year after appointment.

Deletes provision for removal of entire State Council if prime minister is removed.

Judicial appointments Requires consent of National Assembly for all appoint- ments to Supreme Court (not just chief justice). Presidency Vote by majority of National Assembly breaks tie in presidential elections. Requires convocation of National Assembly if there is time, prior to emergency measures or presidential orders having legal effect. Failure to obtain National Assembly approval voids emergency measures and re- stores effect of previous laws. Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Information, Korean Overseas Information Service, Constitution ofthe Republic ofKorea, Seoul, 1980; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Information, Korean Overseas Information Service, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1987.

339
South Korea: A Country Study

Table 10. Executive Domination of the Judiciary, 1972-86

Year Developments 1972 President Park Chung Hee dismisses nine Supreme Court

justices who had overturned a law denying relatives of war

veterans right to claim compensation from state. Park's 1972

yusin constitution rescinds Supreme Court's power to review

constitutionality of laws. 1980 . Six Supreme Court justices are interrogated by security agency and subsequendy forced to step down for their minority views

that Kim Chae-gyu, President Park's assassin, had not conspired to overthrow government.

Early 1980s A number of law students are blacklisted from enrolling in Judicial Training and Research Institute after demonstrating

against 1980 Chun Doo Hwan coup d'etat. 1985 Two Seoul District Court judges are punitively reassigned to provincial posts after acquitting accused student demonstrators. A third judge is transferred after protesting the reas- signment.

Supreme Court reverses its earlier decision in appeal case of Kang Chong-gon, a National Security Act offender under con- tinued detention after his original sentence had expired. 1986 Justice Yi Il-kyu is denied reappointment to Supreme Court. Among his independent decisions are a 1963 determination

that voided coerced confession made by suspect on spying

charges and questioning jurisdiction of 1980 military court

in 1985 appeal by lawyer linked with opposition figure Kim

Dae Jung.

Table 11. National Assembly Election Returns, February 1985

Number of Seats Percentage Percentage

Party Direct Proportional of Vote of Seats Democratic

Justice Party 87 61 35.3 53.6 New Korea

Democratic Party 50 17 29.2 24.3 Democratic Korea Party 26 9 19.5 12.7 Korea

Nationalist Party 15 5 9.2 7.2 Other and

independents * 6 6.8 2.2 Total 184 92 100.0 100.0

* Most independents subsequendy joined one of the four major parties. Source: Based on information from Byung Chul Koh, "The 1985 Parliamentary Election

in South Korea," Asian Survey, 25, No. 9, September 1985, 883-97.

340
Appendix

Table 12. National Assembly Election Returns, April 1988

Number of Seats Percentage Percentage

Party Direct Proportional of Vote of Seats Democratic

Justice Party 87 38 34.0 41.8 Party for Peace and Democracy 54 16 19.3 23.4

Reunification Democratic Party 46 13 23.8 19.7 New Democratic

Republican Party 27 8 15.6 11.7 Other and

independents 1 10 7.2 3.3 Total 2 224 75 100.0 100.0

1 Most independents subsequently joined one of the four major parties.

2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Chan Wook Park, "The 1988 National Assembly Elec- tion in South Korea: The Ruling Party's Loss of Legislative Majority," Journal

of Northeast Asian Studies, 7, No. 3, Fall 1988, 65.

Table 13. Strikes and Labor Disputes, 1987-90

Number of Year Events Comments

1987 3,749 70.1 percent over pay. 1988 1 ,873 Average duration 10 days; 51.6 percent over pay, 16.9 percent over the right to bargain

collectively, 7.1 percent over working

conditions, 5.9 percent over dismissal, 3 percent over employers' unfair acts. 1989 * 1,678 Average duration 17.8 days, 47.6 percent over

pay, 25.5 percent over collective bargaining; 69 percent of events ruled ille- gal under Labor Dispute Adjustment Law.

* January through October.

341
South Korea: A Country Study

Table 14. Principal Radical Organizations, 1985-89

Date Established Organization

April 17, 1985 National Federation of Student Associations (Chonhangnyon).

Action wing is Struggle Committee for the Liberation of the Masses, the Attainment of Democracy, and the Unification

of the Nation (Sammint'u). Both outlawed as "anti-state or- ganizations" under National Security Act and suppressed in 1986. March 21, 1986 Struggle Committee Against Imperialism, the Military, and Fas- cism, and for the Nation and Democracy (Mimmint'u) in- augurated at thirty-eight universities. Mimmint'u ideology

emphasizes political linkages and cooperation among students, workers, and farmers.

April 11, 1986 Committee for the Anti-U.S. Struggle for Independence and the Anti-Fascist Struggle for Democracy (Chamint'u) formed at Seoul National University and Korea University. Chamint'u

ideology emphasizes struggle and direct action against the government and the United States presence in South Korea. May 1987 Seoul Area Council of University Student Representatives

(Sodaehyop). Combines Chamint'u and Mimmint'u

elements. August 19, 1987 National Association of University Student Councils (Chondaehyop) established in Taejon. Replaced and enlarged Sodaehyop.

May 1988 Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils (Soch'ongnyon).

Source: Based on information from Wonmo Dong, "University Students in South Korean

Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs [Seoul], 40, No. 2, Winter-Spring 1987, 233-55; and "Monthly Views Two Dissident Groups' Interactions," Sin tonga [Seoul], March 1, 1989, 268-85, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, April 7, 1989, 26-38.

Table 15. Media Statistics, 1986, 1988, and 1989

Media 1986 1988 1989

8 9 18 Local newspapers 1 10 10 24 News agencies 2 2 2 National radio stations 2 3 3 3

Affiliated local 47 49 48

2 2 2 Foreign press 40 50 50

2,500 n.a. 3,500

n.a. —not available.

1 Newspapers are Korean-language dailies, excluding sports newspapers.

2 Excluding Far Eastern Broadcasting Company.

3 Estimated.

342
Appendix

Table 16. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Ground

Forces of South Korea and North Korea, 1990

Category South Korea North Korea

Active-duty personnel

Military units

Equipment

575,000 1 930,000

3 army headquarters 16 corps headquarters

10 31 infantry divisions 2 headquarters 2 2 mechanized 15 armored

infantry divisions 2 brigades 2 21 infantry divisions 2 24 infantry brigades 2 7 special forces 25 special forces brigades brigades

8 independent

infantry brigades/

armor/infantry/ marine

1 aviation brigade

2 ^i i rfa rp-tn- «n i rf*a rp surface-to-surface

missile battalions missile battalions 3

1,560 tanks 3,500 tanks 1,550 armored personnel 1,960 armored personnel

carriers carriers 4,200 field artillery 7,800 field artillery pieces pieces 140 multiple rocket 2,500 multiple rocker launchers launchers 5,300 mortars 11,000 mortars

12 surface-to-surface 70 surface-to-surface

missiles missiles —means negligible.

1 Includes 25,000 marines.

2 Includes subordinate armor and artillery units.

3 Number of units unknown.

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 165-66; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989,

Seoul, 138-40.

343
South Korea: A Country Study

Table 17. Order of Battle and Major Equipment for Air Forces of South Korea and North Korea, 1990

Category South Korea North Korea

Personnel 40,000 1 70,000

Military units 1 22 ground attack/ 3 bomber regiments

interceptor squadrons

1 reconnaissance 18 ground attack squadron regiments

l search-and-rescue surface-to-surface squadron missile battalions 2 4 transport 6 + transport squadrons regiments

2 defense artillery divisons

5 surface-to-surface 7 air defense

missile battalions regiments

2 air defense

artillery brigades

1 counterinsurgency

squadron

Equipment

Fighter aircraft . . . 90 F-5A/B 40 J-7

36 F-16C/D 160 J-6

204 F-5E/F 100 J"5 130 F-4 40 Q-5

20 RF-4/5 10 Su-25

23 A-37 24 MiG-29

46 MiG-23

120 MiG-21

300 MiG-17

20 Su-7 Bombers 80 H-5

Transport 37 280

Helicopters 400 3 142

1 Data on transportation, helicopter, and training units not available.

2 Number of units unknown.

3 In army and naval aviation units. The army, navy, and air force have an additional 263 support aircraft, including helicopters, trainers, and transports. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 165-66; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989,

Seoul, 1990, 138, 141.

344
Appendix

Table 18. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Naval Forces of South Korea and North Korea, 1990

Category South Korea North Korea oO,UUU

fleet commands East Coast Fleet

1I aviation command \AIf±Qt Cnact Tn*»*»t

11 amphibious

command

1 logistics command

1 mine-warfare command

1 training command

3 minisubmarines 24 submarines

11 destroyers 2 frigates 17 frigates 4 corvettes

11 missile-attack craft 29 missile-attack craft 68 patrol boats 330 patrol boats 9 minesweepers 40 minesweepers

52 amphibious craft 125 amphibious craft 10 Grumman S-2

aircraft 35 Hughes 500-MD

helicopters Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, 1989, London, 165-66; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989,

Seoul, 1990, 141.

345

Bibliography

Chapter 1 Amsden, Alice H. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the

Army, 1961.

Bibliography ofAsian Studies, 1985. (Ed., Wayne Surdam.) Ann Arbor, Michigan: Association for Asian Studies, 1990.

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953. New

York: Times Books, 1988.

Buss, Claude A. The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

Chandra, Vipan. Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth- Century Korea: Enlightenment and the Independence Club. (Korea

Research Monograph No. 13.) Berkeley: Center for Korean

Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988.

Cho, Soon Sung. Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1984.

Ch'oe, Young-ho. The Civil Examinations and the Social Structure in Early Yi Dynasty Korea, 1392-1600. Seoul: Korean Research

Center, 1987.

Clough, Ralph N. Embattled Korea: The Rivalryfor International Support. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.

Cole, David C, and Princeton N. Lyman. Korean Development: The

Interplay of Politics and Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Eckert, CarterJ. Offspring ofEmpire: The Koch }ang Kims and the Colonial Origins ofKorean Capitalism, 1876-1945. Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 1991.

Fairbank, John K., Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig.

East Asia: Tradition and Transformation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1973.

Gleysteen, William H., Jr. "Korea: A Special Target of American Concern." Pages 85-99 in David D. Newsom (ed.), The

Diplomacy ofHuman Rights. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987.

347
South Korea: A Country Study

Grajdanzev, AndrewJ. Modern Korea. New York: Octagon Books,

1978.

Haboush, JaHyun Kim. A Heritage of Kings: One Man 's Monarch in

the Confucian World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Han, Sung-Joo. The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1974.

Han, Woo-keun. The History of Korea. (Trans., Lee Kyung-shik;

ed., Grafton K. Mintz.) Honolulu: East-West Center Press,

1971.

Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1968.

Henthorn, William E. A History of Korea. New York: Free Press,

1971.

Hinton, Harold C. Korea under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic.

New York: Praeger, 1983.

Hong, Wontack, and Anne O. Krueger (eds.). Trade and Develop- ment in Korea: Proceedings of a Conference Held by the Korea Develop- ment Institute. Seoul: The Institute, 1975.

Jacobs, Norman. The Korean Road to Modernization and Development.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985.

Kihl, Young Whan. Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Kim, Chong-won. Divided Korea: The Politics of Development:

1945-1972. Cambridge: East Asia Research Center, Harvard

University Press, 1975.

Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Han-Kyo Kim. Korea and the Politics ofImperialism, 1876-1910. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Kim, Han-Kyo (ed.), with the assistance of Hong Kyoo Park. Studies on Korea: A Scholar's Guide. Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies,

University of Hawaii Press, 1980.

Kim, Se-Jin. The Politics ofMilitary Revolution in Korea. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971.

Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy Systems ofNorth and South Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Koo, Youngnok, and Sung-Joo Han. Foreign Policy of the Republic

of Korea. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

Lee, Chae-Jin, and Hideo Sato. U.S. Policy TowardJapan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Lee, Chong-Sik. Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension. Stanford:

Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1963.

Lee, Hahn-Been. Korea: Time, Change, and Administration. Honolulu:

East-West Center Press, 1968.

348
Bibliography

Lee, Ki-baik. A New History of Korea. (Trans., Edward W. Wagner, with Edward J. Shultz.) Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1984.

Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. New York: Longman,

1986.

Mason, Edward S., et al. The Economic and Social Modernization of

the Republic ofKorea. (Studies in the Modernization of the Republic

of Korea, 1945-1975, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No.

92.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Matray, James Irving. The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy

in Korea, 1941-1950. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

McCune, George McAfee, with Arthur L. Grey, Jr. Korea Today.

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982.

McNamara, Dennis L. The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise,

1910-1945. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Nam, Joo-Hong. America's Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine. New York: Cambridge University Press,

1986.

Newsom, David D. (ed.). The Diplomacy ofHuman Rights. Lanham,

Maryland: University Press of America for the Institute for the

Study of Diplomacy, 1986.

Oh, John Kie-chiang. Korea: Democracy on Trial. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1968.

Oliver, Robert T. Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea,

1942-1960: A Personal Narrative. Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978.

Pak, Chi-Young. Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960. Seoul:

Seoul National University Press, 1980.

Palais, James B. Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. (Harvard

East Asian Series, No. 82.) Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1975.

Rhee, Whee Yung, Bruce Ross-Larson, and Garry Pursell. Korea's

Competitive Edge: Managing the Entry into World Markets. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Robinson, Michael Edson. Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea,

1920-1925. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-Sik Lee. Communism in Korea.

(2 vols.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Hongkoo Lee (eds.). Korea-U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security. Berkeley: Institute of East

Asian Studies, University of California, 1988.

Shaw, William. Legal Norms in a Confucian State. (Korea Research

Monograph No. 5.) Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1981.

349
South Korea: A Country Study

Sohn, Pow-Key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup. The History

of Korea. Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO,

1970.

Steinberg, David I. The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation

and Social Change. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989.

United States. Congress. 99th, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Human

Rights and International Organizations and Subcommittee on

Asian and Pacific Affairs. Political Developments and Human Rights

in the Republic of Korea. Washington: GPO, 1986.

Yang, Sung Chul. Korea and Two Regimes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1981.

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian Survey, 1980-90; Asian Wall

Street Journal [Hong Kong], 1980-90; Far Eastern Economic Review

[Hong Kong], 1980-90; and Journal of Northeast-Asian Studies,

1982-90.)

Chapter 2

Ajia Chuto Doko Nempo 1986 (Annual report on developments in

Asia and the Middle East, 1986). Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo

(Institute of Developing Economics), 1986.

"Authorities Move to Check Rising Drug Abuse," Korea Newsreview [Seoul], 18, No. 43, October 28, 1989, 9. Beasley, W.G . Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Brandt, Vincent S.R. A Korean Village: Between Farm and Sea. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 84.) Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1972.

. "Social Trends, Environmental Factors, Political Culture,

and National Integration in South Korea." (Paper presented at Hudson Institute Workshop, "Future Prospects for the Korean

Peninsula in a World Context," June 12-15, 1982.)

' ' Sociocultural Aspects of Political Participation in Rural

Korea," Journal of Korean Studies, 1, 1979, 205-24.

"Some Ways of Looking at Village Values. " Pages 84-97

in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), Studies in the Developmental Aspects of

Korea. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1969.

Ch'oe Yong-ho. "Commoners in Early Yi Dynasty Civil Examinations: An Aspect of Korean Social Structure, 1392-1600,"

350
Bibliography

Journal of Asian Studies, 33, No. 4, August 1974, 611-31.

Ch'oi Syn-duk. "Korea's Tong-il Movement," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society [Seoul], No. 43, 1967,

167-80.

Chang Dae-hung. "A Study of a Korean Cultural Minority: The

Paekchong." Pages 55-88 in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), Traditional Korea: Theory and Practice. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies,

Western Michigan University, 1974.

Chang Yunshik. "Colonization as Planned Change: The Korean

Case," Modern Asian Studies [London], April 1971, 5, No. 2,

161-86.

Chee Ch'angboh. "Shamanism and Folk Beliefs of the Koreans."

Pages 141-58 in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), Traditional Korea: Theory

and Practice. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western

Michigan University, 1974.

Choijai-sok. "A Sociological Study of Sindonae," Transactions of

the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society [Seoul], No. 43, 1967,

104-56.

Chong Dae-gyun. "Nihonron to Kankokuron no fukona rentai"

(The Unfortunate Connection Between Theories ofJapanese and

Korean National Identity), Chad koron (Central Review) [Tokyo],

104, No. 5, May 1989, 248-60.

Chung Young-lob. "Kye: A Traditional Economic Institution in

Korea." Pages 89-112 in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), Traditional Korea: Theory and Practice. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies,

Western Michigan University, 1974.

Clark, Donald N. Christianity in Modern Korea. Lanham, Maryland:

University Press of America, 1986.

Crane, Paul S. Korean Patterns. Seoul: Hollym, 1967.

Critchfield, Richard. The Changing Peasant, Pt. 4. The Confucians.

(American Universities Field Staff, Fieldstaff Reports, Asia, No.

26.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

Curzon, George Nathaniel. Problems of the Far East: Japan, Korea,

China. New York: Longmans, Green, 1896.

Darlin, Damon. "Humble Span Gains Curious Cachet in South

Korea," Asian Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], September 21,

1989, 1,8.

"Sony's Hollywood Move Poses Dilemma for Korea,"

Asian Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], December 6, 1989, 1. Dix, Griffin. Studies on Korea in Transition. Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii Press, 1979.

Dixon, John, and Hyung Shik Kim (eds.). Social Welfare in Asia.

London: Croom Helm, 1985.

351
South Korea: A Country Study

Dong, Wonmo. ' 'Assimilation and Social Mobilization in Korea."

Pages 146-82 in Andrew G. Nahm (ed.), Korea under Japanese

Colonial Rule. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western

Michigan University, 1973.

Douglas, James Dixon. The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1974.

Dredge, C. Paul. "Speech Levels and Social Structure in Korea:

The Apparent and the Real in a Rural Village." Unpublished

paper. N.d.

Earhart, H. Byron. "The New Religions of Korea: A Preliminary

Interpretation, '

' Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic

Society [Seoul], No. 49, 1974, 7-25.

Fisher, James Earnest. Democracy and Mission Education in Korea. (Contributions to Education Series, No. 306.) New York:

Teachers College, Columbia University, 1928.

Gale, Jason S. "The Influence of China upon Korea," Transactions

of the Korea Branch oj the Royal Asiatic Society [Seoul], I, 1900, 1-24.

Goldscheider, Calvin (ed.). Rural Migration in Developing Nations:

Comparative Studies of Korea, Sri Lanka, and Mali. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Han Sang-Bok. Korean Fishermen: Ecological Adaptation in Three Communities. Seoul: Population and Development Studies Center,

Seoul National University, 1977.

Harvey, Youngsook Kim. Six Korean Women: The Socialization ofSha- mans. (American Ethnological Society Monograph No. 65.) St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1979.

Hurst, G. Cameron. "'Uri Nara-ism': Cultural Nationalism in

Contemporary Korea." (Universities Field Staff International,

UFSI Reports, Asia, No. 33.) Indianapolis: 1985.

Hyde, Georgie D.M. South Korea: Education, Culture, and Economy.

Basingstake, Hampshire, United Kingdom: Macmillan Press,

1988.

Ito Abito (ed.). Motto shiritai Kankoku (Know More about South

Korea). Tokyo: Kobundo, 1985.

Jacobs, Norman. The Korean Road to Modernization and Development.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985.

Janelli, Roger L., and Dawnhee Yim Janelli. "Lineage Organization and Social Differentiation in Korea," Man [London], 13,

No. 2, June 1978, 272-89.

TheJapan Year Book, 1938-39. Tokyo: Kenkyusha Press for the For- eign Affairs Association of Japan, 1938.

Ji Moon Suh. "Changing Attitude Toward the National Heritage

in Modern Korean Literature," Asia Quarterly [Seoul], Summer

1985, 10-16.

352
Bibliography

Jo, Toshio. "Hall Near Seoul Depicts Colonization," The Japan

Times [Tokyo], November 23, 1989, 3. Jones, LeroyP., and II Sakong. Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case. (Studies in the

Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975; Harvard

East Asian Monographs, No. 91.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Kalton, Michael C. (trans, and ed.). To Become a Sage: The ( Ten

Diagrams on Sage Learning' by Yi Toegye. New York: Columbia

University Press, 1988.

Kendall, Laurel. The Life and Hard Times of a Korean Shaman: Of

Tales and the Telling of Tales. Honolulu: University of Hawaii

Press, 1988.

Kennedy, Gerald F. "The Korean Kye: Maintaining Human Scale

in a Modernizing Form," Korean Studies, No. 1, 1977, 197-222.

Kim Chin-wu. The Making ofthe Korean Language. Honolulu: Center

for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii Press, 1974.

Kim Kyong-Dong. "Social Change and Societal Development in

Korea since 1945—Modernization with Uneven Development,"

Korea and World Affairs [Seoul], 9, No. 4, Winter 1985, 756-88.

Kim Sin-bok. "Recent Development of Higher Education in

Korea," KoreaJournal [Seoul], 23, No. 10, October 1983, 20-30.

Kim Soo-Young. "National Medical Insurance System Comes of

Age," Korea Newsreview [Seoul], 18, No. 32, August 12, 1989, 4. "Spread of AIDS Harms Health Officials," Korea Newsreview [Seoul], 18, No. 41, October 14, 1989, 8. Kim Young-Oak. "Fallacy of Identity: Barrier to Genuine Understanding, " Japan Foundation Newsletter [Tokyo], 15, Nos. 5-6,

May 1988, 10-15.

Kim Yung-chung. Women of Korea: A History from Ancient Times to 1945. Seoul: Ehwa Woman's University Press, 1976.

Kim, C.I. Eugene. "South Korea in 1986: Preparing for a Power

Transition," Asian Survey, 27, No. 1, January 1987, 64-74.

Kim, Eugene C. "Education in Korea under Japanese Colonial

Rule." Pages 137-45 in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), Korea under

Japanese Colonial Rule. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies,

Western Michigan University, 1973.

Koh, B.C. "North Korea in 1987: Launching a New Seven-Year

Plan," Asian Survey, 28, No. 1, January 1988, 62-70.

Koh, Hesung Chun. "Characteristics of Korean Culture Through

the Arts." (Paper presented at Korea Seminar, November 19,

1982.) New York: Columbia University, 1982.

Koo, Hagen. "The Political Economy of Industrialization in South

353
South Korea: A Country Study

Korea and Taiwan," Korea and World Affairs [Seoul], 10, No.

1, Spring 1986, 148-80.

Korea Economic Institute of America. Korea's Economy. Washington, 1990.

Korea Institute for Population and Health. Journal ofPopulation and

Health Studies [Seoul], 8, No. 2, December 1988, 11. Korean National Commission for UNESCO (ed.). Main Currents of Korean Thought. Seoul: Si-sa-yong-o-sa, 1983.

Kuroda Katsuhiro. "Kankokuron ni motto 'bunkashugi' " (More

"Culturalism" in Theories of Korean Identity), Chuo koron (Central Review) [Tokyo], 104, No. 3, March 1989, 256-63.

Lee Chae-Jin. "South Korea in 1984: Seeking Peace and Prosperity," Asian Survey, 25, No. 1, January 1985, 80-89.

Lee Hyo-jae, in collaboration with Choi Syn-duck, et al. "Life in

Urban Korea, '

' Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic

Society [Seoul], No. 46, 1971, 7-90.

Lee Hyo-jae. "The Changing Family in Korea," Journal of Social

Sciences and Humanities [Seoul], 29, December 1968, 87-99.

Lee Kwang-kyu. Kinship System in Korea. (2 vols.) (HRAFLEX Series.) New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1975.

Lee, Byung-jong. "Korea Proposes 19.8. Budget Increase," Asian

Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], September 22, 1989, 3. Lee, Ki-baik. A New History of Korea. (Trans. Edward W. Wagner, with Edward J. Shultz). Seoul: Ilchokak, 1984.

Lee, Peter H. (ed.). The Traditional Culture and Society of Korea: Art and Literature. (Papers of the International Conference on Traditional Korean Culture and Society.) Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii Press, 1975.

Linton, Stephen. Coverage of the United States in Korean Textbooks: An

Analysis of Educational Policy, Tone, and Content. Washington:

United States Information Agency, October 1988.

Manguno, Joseph P. "Korea Faces Prolonged Clash on Education," Asian Wall StreetJournal [Hong Kong], December 5, 1989,

1, 8. Maruyama, Masao. Studies in the Intellectual History of TokugawaJapan.

(Trans., Mikiso Hane.) Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974.

Mason, Edward S., et al. The Economic and Social Modernization of

the Republic ofKorea. (Studies in the Modernization of the Republic

of Korea, 1945-1975, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No.

92.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Mattielli, Sandra (ed.). Virtues in Conflict: Tradition and the Korean

Woman Today. Seoul: Samhwa, 1977.

McBrian, Charles D. "Kinship, Communal, and Class Models of

Social Structure in Rising Sun Village." Pages 102-24 in David

354
Bibliography

R. McCann, John Middleton, and Edward J. Shultz (eds.),

Studies on Korea in Transition. Honolulu: University of Hawaii

Press, 1979.

McCune, Shannon. Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography. Rutland, Vermont: Tuttle, 1956.

McGinn, Noel F., et al. Education and Development in Korea. (Studies

in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975. Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 90.) Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1980.

McGrane, George A. Korea's Tragic Hours: The Closing Years of the Yi Dynasty. Seoul: Taewon, 1973.

McNamara, Dennis. "The Keisho and the Korean Business Elite,"

Journal of Asian Studies, 48, No. 2, May 1989, 310-23.

Mills, Edwin S., and Song Byung-nak. Urbanization and Urban

Problems. (Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea,

1945-1975, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 88.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Moore, Mick. "Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea: The

Saemaul Movement in Retrospect," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver],

57, No. 4, Winter 1984-85, 577-98.

Moos, Felix. "Leadership and Organization in the Olive Tree

Movement," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic

Society [Seoul] No. 43, 1967, 11-27.

Nahm, Andrew C. (ed.). Korea underJapanese Colonial Rule. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973.

Studies in the Developmental Aspects of Korea. Kalamazoo:

Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1969.

Traditional Korea: Theory and Practice. Kalamazoo: Center

for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1974.

Newman, Anne. "Korean Immigrants in U.S. Struggle Hard for

Success," Asian Wall StreetJournal [Hong Kong], December 15,

1989, 1,8.

Oh, In-whan, and George Won. "Journalism in Korea: A Short

History of the Korean Press," Transactions of the Korea Branch of

the Royal Asiatic Society [Seoul], No. 51, 1976, 1-55.

Pak Chi-won. Yangban Chon (Tale of a Yangban: Upperclass Culture in Yi Dynasty Korea). (Trans., Giles Ryan.) Seoul: Inter- national Cultural Foundation, 1973.

Palais, James B. Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. (Studies in

the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 82.) Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1975.

355
South Korea: A Country Study

Park, Moon Kyu. "Interest Representation in South Korea: The

Limits of Corporatist Control," Asian Survey, 27, No. 8, August

1987, 903-17.

"The Perils of Development," Economist [London], 312, No. 18,

September 9, 1989, 34.

"The Price of Prosperity," Asiaweek [Hong Kong], 12, No. 16,

April 20, 1986, 46.

Republic of Korea. Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean

Overseas Information Office. A Handbook ofKorea. Seoul: 1978.

National Bureau of Statistics. Economic Planning Board.

Korea Statistical Handbook, 1987. Seoul: 1987.

. National Bureau of Statistics. Economic Planning Board.

Korea Statistical Handbook, 1989. Seoul: 1989.

Schoenberger, Karl. "South Korea Seen as Major Source of 'Ice' Narcotic," Los Angeles Times, October 14, 1989, A12.

Shupe, Anson. "Sun Myung Moon's Empire Retreats to Asia,"

Asian Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], November 2, 1989, 10. Sohn Ho-min (ed.). The Korean Language: Its Structure and Social Projection. Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii,

1975.

"South Korean Films: Set to Make a Splash by 1988," Economist

[London], July 13, 1985, 91-99.

The Statesman's Year Book, 1988-1989. (Ed., John Paxton.) New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.

Steinberg, David I. The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation

and Social Change. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989.

"Sociopolitical Factors and Korea's Future Economic Poli- cies," World Development [London], 16, No. 1, January 1988,

19-34.

Steinberg, David I., and David Kim. South Korea's Military: Political and Social Roles and Profiles ofKorean Leaders. (Asia Society Media

Briefing.) New York: Asia Society, August 1988.

Suh Kuk-sung et al. (eds.). The Identity of the Korean People. Seoul:

Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1983.

United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

the Pacific. Statistical Yearbookfor Asia and the Pacific, 1984. Bangkok: 1986.

Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.

Statistics Office. 1986 Demographic Yearbook. New York: 1988.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Statistical Yearbook, 1988. Paris: 1988.

Yi Ki-moon. "Language and Writing Systems in Traditional

Korea." Pages 15-32 in Peter H. Lee (ed.), The Traditional Culture and Society of Korea: Art and Literature. (Papers of the

356
Bibliography

International Conference on Traditional Korean Culture and

Society.) Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of

Hawaii, 1975.

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in

the preparation of this chapter: Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong

Kong], 1984-89; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily

Report: Asia and the Pacific; KoreaJournal [Seoul], 1973-87; Korea Herald [Seoul], 1988-89; Korean Studies, 1985-89; Social Science Journal

[Seoul], 1985-89; and Tonga ilbo [Seoul], 1988-89.)

Chapter 3

Amsden, Alice H. Asia 's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Armstrong, Rodney. "Fish and American-Korean Relations,"

Korea's Economy, 2, No. 6, October 1986, 15-17.

Balassa, Bela A., and Marcus Noland. Japan in the World Economy.

Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988.

Bank of Korea. Annual Report: 1987. Seoul: 1987.

Clifford, Mark. "Junior Partners Promoted," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 139, No. 11, March 7, 1988, 67.

Cole, David C, and Princeton N. Lyman. Korean Development: The

Interplay of Politics and Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Cumings, Bruce. "The Legacy ofJapanese Colonialism in Korea."

Pages 478-96 in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.),

The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1984.

The Two Koreas. (Headline Series, No. 269.) New York:

Foreign Policy Association, 1984.

Eckert, Carter J. Offspring ofEmpire: The Koch 'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins ofKorean Capitalism, 1876-1945. Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 1991.

The Europa World Year Book, 1989. London: Europa, 1989.

The Europa World Year Book, 1990. London: Europa, 1990.

Farrukh, Iqbal. "Financing Korean Development." Pages 147-56

in Han Sung-joo and Robert J. Myers (eds.), Korea: The Year 2000. (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

Ethics and Foreign Policy Series, No. 5.) Lanham, Maryland:

University Press of America, 1987.

Han, Sung-joo, and Robert J. Myers (eds.). Korea: The Year 2000.

(Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Ethics

357
South Korea: A Country Study

and Foreign Policy Series, No. 5.) Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987.

Ho, Samuel Pao-san. ''Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung." Pages 347-98 in Ramon H. Myers and

Mark R. Peattie (eds.), TheJapanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Hurst, G. Cameron, III (ed.). Korea 1988: A Nation at the Crossroads. (Conference and Colloquium Series, No. 3.) Lawrence:

Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1988.

Jane's World Railways, 1989-90. (Ed., Geoffrey Freeman Allen.)

Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group,

1989.

KEPCO Annual Review, 1988. Seoul: KEPCO, 1988.

Kim, Bun Woong, David S. Bell, Jr., and Chong Bun Lee (eds.).

Administrative Dynamics and Development: The Korean Experience.

Seoul: Kyobo, 1985.

Kim, Dae Jung. Mass-Participatory Economy: A Democratic Alternative for Korea. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1985.

Kim, IlpyongJ., and Young Whan Kihl (eds.). Political Change in South Korea. New York: Paragon House, 1988.

Kim Kyong-Dong. Man and Society in Korea's Economic Growth: Sociological Studies. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1984.

Koo, Bon-bo, and Tae-ho Pak. "Government Policies, Recent

Trends, and the Economic Input of Direct Foreign Investment

in Korea," Korea's Economy, 4, No. 4, December 1988, 3-5.

Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry. KCCI Quarterly Review

[Seoul], April 1988.

Korea Development Institute. KDI Quarterly Economic Outlook

[Seoul], Spring 1988.

"KDI Forecast: Per Capita GNP to Reach $10,000 in Early 2000s," Korea Trade and Business [Seoul], June 1988.

Korea Economic Institute of America. Korea Economic Update, 1, No. 2, Summer 1990, 4. Korea's Economic Policies. Seoul: Federation of Korean Industry,

1987.

Korea Trade Promotion Corporation. How to Trade with Korea: 1987—A Practical Guide to Trade and Investment. Seoul: 1987.

Kuznets, Paul W. Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic ofKorea. New Haven: Yale University Press for Economic Growth Center,

Yale University, 1977.

Kwan Suk Kim. "An Analysis of Economic Change in Korea."

Pages 99-112 in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), Korea under Japanese

Colonial Rule. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western

Michigan University, 1973.

358
Bibliography

Kwon, Jene K. (ed.). Korean Economic Development. New York:

Greenwood Press, 1990.

Kyong Cho Chung, Phyllis G. Hafner, and Frederic M. Kaplan

(eds.). The Korea Guidebook. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

Lee, Hahn-Been. The Age of the Common Man in Korea. Seoul: Bak

Young SA, 1987.

Macdonald, Donald Stone. The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and

Society. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

"Major Economic Indicators," Korea's Economy, 5, No. 1, July

1988, 2. Mason, Edward S., et al. The Economic and Social Modernization of

the Republic ofKorea. (Studies in the Modernization of the Republic

of Korea, 1945-1975, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No.

92.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Minjungsa. Lost Victory: An Overview of the Korean People's Struggle

for Democracy. Seoul: Minjungsa Press, 1988.

Moskowitz, Karl. From Patron to Partner: The Development of U.S.-

Korean Business and Trade Relations. Lexington, Massachusetts:

Lexington Books, 1984.

Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie (eds.). TheJapanese Colonial Empire, 1895-45. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Nahm, Andrew C. (ed.). Korea underJapanese Colonial Rule. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University,

1973.

. Korea: Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean

People. Elizabeth, New Jersey: Hollym, 1988.

"1,000 Hyundai Workers Strike for Free Union Election," BiWeekly Report, 7, No. 4. March 1, 1988, 5-6.

Pak Duck-Moon. "Changing Prospects for Foreign Direct Invest- ment in Korea and Overseas Investment by Korean Firms."

(Paper presented at South East Governors' Association, Third

Joint Conference between Southeast United States and Korea,

November 14, 1988.)

Park, Yung-chul. "Financial Liberalization and Prospects for Resource Mobilization in Korea." Pages 175-205 in Han SungJoo and Robert J. Myers (eds.), Korea: The Year 2000. (Carnegie

Council on Ethics and Policy. Ethics and Foreign Policy Series,

No. 5.) Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987.

Perkins, Dwight H. "Korea's Economy in the Year 2000." Pages

157-73 in Han Sung-Joo and Robert J. Myers (eds.), Korea: The

Year 2000. (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Ethics and Policy Series, No. 5.) Lanham, Maryland:

University Press of America, 1987.

359
South Korea: A Country Study

Piatt, Adam, David Bank, and Peter Leydem. "Ending a Battle,

but not the War: Labor Unrest at Hyundai," Newsweek, 113,

No. 15, April 10, 1989, 37.

' TOSCO Celebrates 20th Anniversary," Asian Trade [Seoul], 2,

No. 2, May 1988, 25.

"POSCO: Success Story," Korea-Europe Economic Report [Seoul],

3, No. 6, June 1988, 30-31.

"Reborn with Steel," KCCI Quarterly Review [Seoul], 4, No. 2, June

1988, 28-29.

Republic of Korea. Economic Planning Board. The Korean Econo- my: Past Performance, Current Policies, and Future Prospects. Seoul:

Economic Planning Board, 1988.

. Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. Facts About Korea. Seoul: Hollym, 1985.

Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. A Handbook ofKorea. Seoul: Seoul International Publishing House, 1982.

Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. A Handbook ofKorea. Seoul: Seoul International Publishing House, 1987.

Song Dae Hae. "The Role of the Public Enterprise in the Korean

Economy." (Paper presented at seminar on Industrial Development Strategies in Korea, Seoul, April 4-14, 1987.) United States Information Agency.

Song, Byung-Nak. The Rise of the Korean Economy. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Steinberg, David I. Chaebol: Engine of South Korea's Growth. A Background Report. New York: Asia Society, August 1988.

South Korea 's Economy: Past Successes, Future Prospects. A Background Report. New York: Asia Society, August 1988.

Sullivan, John, and Roberta Foss (eds.). Two Koreas—One Future? Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America for American

Friends Service Committee, 1987.

Taiwan Power Company. Energy Use Trends in Newly Industrialized

Countries. Taipei: Taiwan Power Company, 1987.

United States. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implicationsfor the Unit- ed States: Korea. (FET 88-111.) Washington: GPO, March 1988.

. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implicationsfor the United States: Korea. (FET 89-76.) Washington: GPO, June 1989.

. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implicationsfor the United States: Korea. Washington: GPO, April 1990.

360
Bibliography

Wang, K.P. , et al. Mineral Industries of the Far East and South Asia.

Washington: GPO, 1988.

World of Information. Asia and Pacific: Review 1985. Saffron Walden, Essex, United Kingdom: World of Information, 1985.

"World Steel Production," Korea Businessworld [Seoul], 4, No. 10,

October 1988, 47.

Woronoff, Jon. Korea's Economy: Man-made Miracle. Seoul: Si-sayong-o-sa, 1983.

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian Survey, 1985-89; China Post [Tai-pei], 1985-89; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong],

1985-89; Korea Newsreview [Seoul], 1985-89; and Korea Times

[Seoul], 1988-89.)

Chapter 4

Amnesty International Report, 1991. London: Amnesty International, 1991.

Asia Watch Committee. A Stern, Steady Crackdown: Legal Process and

Human Rights in South Korea. Washington: Asia Watch, 1987.

Atkin, Rose. "Olympics Seoul '88," Christian Science Monitor, October 3, 1988.

Bandow, Doug. "Leaving Korea," Foreign Policy, 77, Winter

1989-90, 77-93.

Blum, Andrew A. (ed.). International Handbook ofIndustrial Relations: Contemporary Developments and Research. Westport, Connecticut:

Greenwood Press, 1981.

Cho, Myung Hyun. Korea and the Major Powers. Seoul: Research

Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1989.

Clifford, Mark. "A Christian Dialogue," Far Eastern Economic

Review [Hong Kong], 144, No. 14, April 6, 1989, 11. Clough, Ralph N. Embattled Korea: The Rivalryfor International Support. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.

Cumings, Bruce. "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," International Organization, 38,

No. 1, Winter 1984, 1-40.

"Document from Korea: Instances of Ruling Party Campaign

Fraud and Irregularities, November 18-28," Korea Update, No.

85, December 1987, 13-21.

Dong, Wonmo. "University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s, "Journal of International Affairs [Seoul], 40, No. 2, Winter-Spring 1987, 233-55.

361
South Korea: A Country Study

Flanz, Gisbert H., and Hakjong Andrew Yoo (eds.). "Republic

of Korea." In Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.),

Constitutions ofthe Countries ofthe World, 8. Dobbs Ferry, New York:

Oceana, November 1980.

Gleysteen, William H., Jr. "Korea: A Special Target of American Concern." Pages 85-99 in David D. Newsom (ed.), The

Diplomacy ofHuman Rights. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987.

Gorbachev, Mikhail S. The Coming Century of Peace. New York:

Richardson and Steirman, 1986.

Speech by Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok. Moscow:

Novosti Press, 1986.

Han, Sung-Joo. "South Korea in 1988: A Revolution in the Making," Asian Survey, 29, No. 1, January 1989, 29-38.

Hanguk Immyongnok (Korean Biographies). Supplement to Yonhap

Yon'gam, 1983 (Yonhap Annual, 1983). Seoul: Yonhap T'ongsin, 1983.

Hyun, Roy. "Why Seoul Says Don't Fix What Isn't Broken,"

New York Times, September 7, 1989.

Kihl, Young Whan. Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Kim, Chul-Su. "Super 301 and the World Trading System: A

Korean View." Paper presented at seminar at Columbia University, New York, December 1989.

Kim, Dae Jung. Mass-Participatory Economy: A Democratic Alternative for Korea. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1985.

Philosophy and Dialogues: Building Peace and Democracy. New

York: Korean Independent Monitor, 1987.

Prison Writings. (Trans., David R. McCann and Sung-il

Choi.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Kim, Hong Nack. "The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South

Korea," Asian Survey, 29, No. 5, May 1989, 480-95.

Kim, Roy U.T. "Moscow-Seoul Relations in a New Era," Pacific Review, 2, No. 4, December 1989, 339-49.

Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy Systems ofNorth and South Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

"The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," Asian

Survey, 25, No. 9, September 1985, 883-97.

Korea Annual, 1988. Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 1988. Korea Annual, 1989. Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 1989.

Lee, Chong-Sik. Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension. Stanford:

Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

Lee, Kee-bong. "Jung-on" (Witness). Seoul: Wonil Chung-bo,

1989.

362
Bibliography

Lee, Ki-baik. A New History ofKorea. (Trans., Edward W. Wagner,

with Edward J. Shultz.) Seoul: Ilchokak, 1984.

Lee, S6k-ho. "Hanguk ui pukpang chongch'aek (Korea's Northern Policy)." Woe-gyo (Foreign Diplomacy) [Seoul], March 1989,

6-17.

Lu Yun. "The Korean Autonomous Prefecture," Beijing Review

[Beijing], 30, No. 51, December 21-17, 1987, 27-29.

Maas, Peter. "Seoul Puts Top-Level Corruption Probe on TV,"

Washington Post, November 9, 1988, A21.

Macdonald, Donald Stone. The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and

Society. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

"Monthly Views Two Dissident Groups' Interactions," Sin tonga

(New East Asia), [Seoul], March 1, 1989. Foreign Broadcast In- formation Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-066.)

April 7, 1989, 26-38.

Moskowitz, Karl. "Limited Partners: Transnational Alliances Between Private Sector Organizations in the U.S. -Korea Trade

Relationship." Pages 149-75 in Karl Moskowitz (ed.), From Patron to Partner: The Development of U. S. -Korean Business and Trade

Relations. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1984.

Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie (eds.). TheJapanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Newsom, David D. (ed.). The Diplomacy ofHuman Rights. Lanham,

Maryland: University Press of America.

Ogle, George. "South Korea." Pages 499-514 in Albert A. Blum

(ed.), International Handbook ofIndustrial Relations: Contemporary Developments and Research. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,

1981.

Oh, John Kie-chiang. Korea: Democracy on Trial. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1968.

Okonogi, Masao. North Korea at the Crossroads. Tokyo: Japan Insti- tute of International Affairs, 1988.

Park, Chan Wook. "The 1988 National Assembly Election in South

Korea: The Ruling Party's Loss of Legislative Majority, "Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 7, No. 3, Fall 1988, 59-76.

Pak, Ch'6r-6n. "T'ongil chongch'aek (Unification Policy)." Sin

tonga (New East Asia), [Seoul], September 1988, 204-15.

Republic of Korea. Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean

Overseas Information Service. Constitution of the Republic ofKorea. Seoul: 1980.

. Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Seoul:

1987.

363
South Korea: A Country Study

National Unification Board. A White Paper on South-North

Dialogue. Seoul: 1988.

. National Unification Board. To Build a National Community Through the Korean Commonwealth: A Blueprintfor Korean Unification. Seoul: 1989.

Roh Tae-Woo. "Address Before a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress." Washington, D.C.: October 18, 1989.

Sanger, David. "Seoul Officials See Accord on U.S. Troop Cut,"

New York Times, February 1, 1990.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Hongkoo Lee (eds.). Korea-U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security. Berkeley: Institute of East

Asian Studies, University of California, 1988.

Shaw, William (ed.). Human Rights in Korea: Historical and Policy

Perspectives. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies and East

Asian Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 1991.

Shim, Jae Hoon, and Louise de Rosario. "Heart to Heart," Far

Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 144, No. 15, April 13,

1989, 12-13.

"Statement of Purpose of the Party for Peace and Democracy, 30

October 1987," Korea Update, No. 85, December 1987, 54-55.

Ungar, Stanford J. "A Korean Exile's LongJourney Home," New

York Times, June 23, 1984, A32.

United States. Congress. 101st, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. A Bill Relating to the Security Relationship Between

the United States and the Republic ofKorea. Washington: GPO, 1989.

Department of State. Briefing Paper: South Korean Relations

with the Soviet Bloc and China. Washington: July 1989.

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 1989. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 101st,

2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign

Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washington: GPO, February 1990.

Department of State. "United States Government State- ment on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May

1980," Washington: June 19, 1989.

Yoon, Dae-Kyu. Law and Political Authority in Korea. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press and Seoul: Kyungnam University

Press, 1990.

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian Survey, 1980-90; Asian Wall

Street Journal [Hong Kong]; Asia Yearbook [Hong Kong], 1980-90;

Christian Science Monitor, 1980-90; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong

Kong], 1980-90; Joint Publications Research Service, Korean Affairs

364
Bibliography

Report, 1985-88; Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 1980-90; Korea Herald [Seoul], 1987; Korea Newsreview [Seoul], 1987-89; and Korea

Update, 1980-90).

Chapter 5

Ahn, Byong-man, Soong-hoon Kil, and Kim Kwang-woong. Elections in Korea. Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1988.

Amnesty International Report (annuals 1980 through 1991). London:

Amnesty International, 1980-91.

Amnesty International. Political Imprisonment in the Republic of Korea. London: 1987.

Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of Korea: March 27-April 9, 1975. London: 1977.

Republic ofKorea Violations on Human Rights: An Amnesty International Report. London: 1981.

. South Korea: Violations of Human Rights. London: 1986.

. Violations of Human Rights in South Korea: An Amnesty Inter- national Report. (Excerpts.) London: 1981.

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the

Army, 1961.

Asia Society. Korea at the Crossroads: Implicationsfor American Policy:

A Study Group Report. New York: Council on Foreign Relations

and the Asia Society, 1987.

Asia Watch Committee. A Stern, Steady Crackdown: Legal Process and

Human Rights in South Korea. Washington: Asia Watch, 1987.

Baker, Edward J. "American Policy and Human Rights in South

Korea in the 1980s: Diagnosis and Prognosis." (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies,

March 1984.) Washington: March 1984.

Billet, Bret L. "South Korea at the Crossroads: An Evolving

Democracy or Authoritarianism Revisited?" Asian Survey, 30,

No. 3, March 1990, 300-11.

Bok, Lee Suk. The Impact of US Forces in Korea. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987.

Bond, Douglas G. "Anti-Americanism and U.S.-ROK Relations:

An Assessment of Korean Students' Views," Asian Perspective

[Seoul], 12, Spring-Summer 1988, 159-90.

Burgess, John. "Protests Turned a New Page in South Korea,"

Washington Post, July 5, 1987, Al, 18. "Seoul Controls the Flow of News with Guidelines, Beatings, Jail," Washington Post, March 1, 1987, A41.

365
South Korea: A Country Study

Chun Bong Duck, William Shaw, and Dai-kwon Choi. Traditional

Korean Legal Attitudes. (Korea Research Monograph, No. 2.)

Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian

Studies, University of California, 1980.

Chuter, Andrew. "Bell Helicopters Textron Signs Korean Agreement, " Jane's Defence Weekly [London], 6, No. 7, August 23, 1986,

329.

Clark, Donald N. Christianity in Modern Korea. Lanham, Maryland:

University Press of America, 1986.

The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

Clough, Ralph N. Embattled Korea: The Rivalryfor International Support. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.

"Constitution Court's Ruling on National Security Law: Both National Security and Basic Rights of the People Recognized," Ton- ga ilbo [Seoul] (Daily Seoul Press Translations, United States Embassy in Seoul.) Seoul: April 3, 1990.

Cotter, Donald R., and N.F. Wikner. "Korea: Force Imbalances

and Remedies," Strategic Review, 10, Spring 1982, 63-70.

Cotton, James. "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South

Korea," Political Studies, 37, June 1989, 244-59.

Deen, Thalif. "South Korea's Growing Industrial Strength, "Jane's

Defence Weekly [London], 12, No. 4, July 29, 1989, 162-65.

Detrio, Richard T. Strategic Partners: South Korea and the United States. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989.

Gleysteen, William H., Jr. "Korea: Asian Paradox," Foreign Affairs, 65, Summer 1987, 1037-54.

Haberman, Clyde. "Is South Korea Ripe for Democracy or More

Repression?" New York Times, December 13, 1987, 3. Hahm, Pyong-choon. KoreanJurisprudence, Politics, and Culture. Seoul:

Yonsei University Press, 1986.

The Korean Political Tradition and Law: Essays in Korean Law

and Legal History. (Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, Monograph Series, No. 1.) Seoul: Hollym, 1982.

Han, Ki-hyong. Events in Korea and Asia Viewed in 100 Editorials (1970-1979)from the Korea Times. Seoul: Han'guk ilbosa ch'ulp'

an'guk, 1981.

Han, Sung-Joo. "The Emerging Political Process in Korea," Asian

Affairs, 8, No. 6, November-December 1980, 76-88.

"South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,"

Asian Survey, 28, No. 1, January 1988, 52-61.

Han, Woo-keun. The History of Korea. (Trans., Lee Kyung-shik;

ed., Grafton K. Mintz.) Honolulu: East-West Center Press,

1971.

366
Bibliography

Harrison, Selig S. The South Korean Political Crisis and American Policy

Options. Washington: Washington Institute Press, 1987.

Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. Washington: Office

of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1966.

Hinton, Harold C. Korea under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic.

New York: Praeger, 1983.

Hyung, Baeg Im. "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in

South Korea," World Politics, 39, No. 1, January 1987, 231-57.

International Cultural Foundation. Legal System of Korea. (Korean

Cultural Series, No. 5.) Seoul: Si-sa-yong-o-sa, 1982.

International League of Human Rights and International Human

Rights Law Group. Democracy in South Korea: A Promise Unfulfilled. A Report on Human Rights, 1980-1985. New York: Inter- national League on Human Rights, 1985.

Jacobs, Gordon. "Armed Forces of the Korean Peninsula: A Comparative Study," Asian DefenceJournal [Kuala Lumpur], 12, No.

11, November 1982, 12-31.

Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1985-86. (Ed., John Taylor.) London: Jane's Publishing, 1985.

Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1988-89. (Ed., Christopher F. Foss.) London: Jane's Publishing, 1988.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983-84. (Ed. , John Moore.) London: Jane's

Publishing, 1983.

Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1985-86. (Ed., Ian V. Hogg.) London:

Jane's Publishing, 1985.

Jane's Weapon Systems, 1987-88. (Ed., Bernard H.L. Blake.) London: Jane's Publishing, 1987.

Jenerette, Vandon E. "The Forgotten DMZ," Military Review, 68,

No. 5, May 1988, 32-43.

Jho, Sung-do. Yi Sun-shin: A National Hero ofKorea. Chinhae, Republic of Korea: Naval Academy, 1970.

"KCIA Renamed to have Functions Modified," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, No. 248,

December 23, 1980, El-2.

Kihl, Young Whan. Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Kim, Bun Woong, and Wha Joon Rho (eds.). Korean Public

Bureaucracy: Readings. Seoul: Kyobo, 1982.

Kim, C.I. Eugene. "Civil-Military Relations in the Two Koreas,"

Armed Forces and Society, 11, No. 1, Fall 1984, 9-31.

"Emergency, Development, and Human Rights: South

Korea," Asian Survey, 18, No. 4, April 1978, 363-78.

"The South Korean Military and Its Political Role."

Pages 91-112 in Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl (eds.),

367
South Korea: A Country Study

Political Change in South Korea. New York: Paragon House, 1988.

Kim, Chong Lim. Legislative Process in Korea. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1981.

Kim, Dae Jung. Building Peace and Democracy. New York: Korean

Independent Monitor, 1987.

Prison Writings. (Trans., David R. McCann and Sung-il

Choi.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Kim, Han-joon. "The American Military Government in South

Korea, 1945-48: Its Formation, Policies, and Legacies," Asian

Perspective [Seoul], 12, Spring-Summer 1988, 51-83.

Kim, Ilpyong J., and Young Whan Kihl (eds.). Political Change in South Korea. New York: Paragon House, 1988.

Kim, Jae-Hyup. The Garrison State in Pre- War Japan and Post- War

Korea: A Comparative Analysis of Military Politics. Lanham,

Maryland: University Press of America, 1978.

Kim, Quee-Young. The Fall of Syngman Rhee. (Korea Research

Monograph No. 7.) Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Press, 1983.

Kim, Se-Jin. Government and Politics of Korea. Silver Spring,

Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972.

The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971.

Kinney, Robert A. "Students, Intellectuals, and the Churches:

Their Roles in Korean Politics," Asian Affairs, 8, No. 1 , JanuaryFebruary 1981, 180-95.

Korea Annual (annuals 1975 through 1980). Seoul: Hapdong News

Agency, 1975-80.

Korea Annual (annuals 1981 through 1989). Seoul: Yonhap News

Agency, 1981-89.

"Korean Arms Control," Korea and World Affairs [Seoul], 12, No.

3, Fall 1988, 485-95.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "South Korea's Dissatisfied Students: A Batde

Is Won: They Want More," New York Times, April 4, 1987, A13.

Kristof, Nicholas D. , and Sang Ho Woo. ' 'A Moderate Tells Why

Students in Korea Fight," New York Times, August 2, 1987, A3.

Lachinca, Eduardo. "Two Opposition Leaders Figure Heavily in

U.S. Efforts to Quell Chaos in Korea," Wall StreetJournal, June

24, 1987, 23.

Lee, Chae-Jin. "South Korea in 1983: Crisis Management and

Political Legitimacy," Asian Survey, 24, No. 1, January 1984,

112-21.

Lee, Changsoo (ed.). Modernization ofKorea and the Impact of the West. Los Angeles: East Asian Studies Center, University of Southern

California, 1981.

368
Bibliography

Lee, Chong-Sik. "Political Change, Revolution, and Dialogue in

the Two Koreas," Asian Survey, 29, No. 11, November 1989,

1033-42.

"South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and

Transition." Asian Survey, 20, No. 1, January 1980, 63-76.

Lee, Hong Yong. "South Korea: Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and

the Northern Threat." Pages 131-51 in Raju G.C. Thomas

(ed.), The Great-Power Triangle and Asian Security. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983.

Lee, Manwoo, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon (eds.).

Alliance under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

Lee, Young Woo. "Birth of the Korean Army, 1945-50," Korea and World Affairs [Seoul], 4, No. 4, Winter 1980, 639-56.

Lensen, George Alexander. Korea and Manchuria: Between Russia and

Japan, 1895-1904. Tallahassee, Florida: Diplomatic Press, 1966.

Lerner, Michael. "The Fire of Ice," Newsweek, 114, November

27, 1989, 37-40.

Lord, Mary. "Korea's Brave New World: Democracy Waits in

the Wings—If the Military Doesn't Have Other Ideas," U.S. News and World Report, 103, July 13, 1987, 32-33.

Lovell, John P. "The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea."

Pages 155-56 in John P. Lovell (ed.), Korean Politics in Transition. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.

Macdonald, Donald Stone. The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and

Society. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

Manguno, Joseph P. "Koreans Impatient for Promised Reform:

Accumulated Anger Defying Easy Appeasement," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1987, 8. "Seoul's Heir Apparent Must Prove His Political Agility: Former General Faces Both Determined Opposition and

Wary Military," Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1987, 30.

Marett, James D. "The Republic of Korea Army: The Light Infantry Division," Military Review, 67, No. 11, November 1987, 65-71.

Martin, James Robert. "Institutionalization and Professionalization of the Republic of Korea Army: The Impact of United States Military Assistance Through Development of a Military Schools

System." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Cambridge: Department of

Government, Harvard University, 1973.

McLaurin, Ronald D. "Security Relations: Burden-Sharing in a Changing Strategic Environment." Pages 157-90 in Manwoo

Lee, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon (eds.), Alli- ance under Tension: The Evolution ofSouth Korean-U.S. Relations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

369
South Korea: A Country Study

Menetrey, Louis C. "The U.S. Military Posture on the Korean

Peninsula," Asian Defence Journal [Kuala Lumpur], 18, No. 8,

August 1988, 12-20.

' 'World's Attention on ROK Puts U.N. Forces on Alert,

'

Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, 18-23.

Merrill j John. Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War. Newark:

University of Delaware Press, 1989.

The Military Balance, 1989-1990. London: International Institute

for Strategic Studies, 1989.

Minjungsa. Lost Victory: An Overview of the Korean People's Struggle

for Democracy. Seoul: Minjungsa Press, 1988.

Moon, Chung-in. ''U.S. Third Country Arms Sales Regulation

and the South Korean Defense Industry: Supplier Control and

Recipient Dilemma." Pages 79-102 in Manwoo Lee, Ronald

D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon (eds.), Alliance under Tension: The Evolution ofSouth Korean- U.S. Relations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.

Morrocco, John D. "South Korea Drives Toward Greater Military Autonomy," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 130, No.

24, June 12, 1989, 179-82.

Mueller, Gerhard O.W. (ed.). The Korean Criminal Code. (Comparative Criminal Law Project, School of Law, New York

University.) London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1961.

Myers, Ramon H. "The Republic of Korea: Great Transition and

Coming Crisis," Vital Speeches of the Day, 55, May 1, 1989,

418-20.

Nahm, Andrew C. Korea: Tradition and Transformation: A History of

the Korean People. Elizabeth, New Jersey: Hollym, 1988.

Nahm, Andrew C. (ed.). Korea underJapanese Colonial Rule. Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973.

Nam, Koon Woo. South Korean Politics. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1989.

Nam, Sunwoo. "The Taming of the Korean Press," ColumbiaJournalism Review, 15, March-April 1978, 43-45.

"New APC From Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly [London], 4, No.

14, October 5, 1985, 737.

Niksch, Larry A. "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula," Korea and World Affairs [Seoul], 10, No. 2, Summer 1986,

253-77.

"North Asian Naval Forces," Asian Defence Journal [Kuala Lumpur], 15, No. 1, January 1985, 70-72.

Oka, Takashi. "South Korean Presidential Campaign Shaped by

Moral Imperatives," Christian Science Monitor, August 7, 1987, 8.

370
Bibliography

Okonogi, Masao. "South Korea's First Steps in Democracy, "Japan

Echo [Tokyo], 15, Autumn 1988, 26-31.

Oliver, Robert T. Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea,

1942-1960: A Personal Narrative. Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978.

Olsen, Edward A. "The Societal Role of the ROK Armed Forces."

Pages 87-103 in Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika (eds.),

The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies. (Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1986.

Oxman, Stephen A. South Korea: Human Rights in the Emerging Politics. (Report of an ICJ Mission from 25 March to 12 April 1987.)

Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1987.

Pae, Sung M. Testing Democratic Theories in Korea. Lanham,

Maryland: University Press of America, 1986.

Pak, Chi-Young. Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960. Seoul:

Seoul National University Press, 1980.

Park, Anna. "International Election Observation: The 1987 South

Korean Presidential Election," Harvard International LawJournal,

29, Spring 1988, 423-49.

Park, Joon Young. "The Political and Economic Implications of

South Korea's Vietnam Involvement, 1964-1973," Korea and

World Affairs [Seoul], 5, No. 3, Fall 1981, 471-89.

Pletka, Danielle. "What Do the Students Want? Democracy As

They See It," Insight, 5, May 22, 1989, 34-35.

"Precedent-setting Ruling on National Security Law Made,"

Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, April 13, 1990.

Preston, Antony. "Trends in Asian Navies," Asian DefenceJournal

[Kuala Lumpur], 18, No. 8, August 1988, 4-10.

Reese, David. Crisis and Continuity in South Korea. London: Insti- tute for the Study of Conflict, 1981.

Republic of Korea. "Article 42 of the Court Organization Law

[Popwon chojikpop], Law 3992, December 4, 1987, as last amended

by Law No. 4017." Seoul: August 5, 1988.

Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. An International Terrorist Clique: North Korea. Seoul: 1983.

Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. Korea's Fifth Republic in Perspective. Seoul:

1984.

Ministry of Culture and Information. Korean Overseas

Information Service. Nationwide Martial Law. Seoul: 1980.

Ministry of Court Administration. Supreme Court. Justice in Korea. Seoul: 1981.

371
South Korea: A Country Study

. Ministry of National Defense. Defense White Paper, 1983.

Seoul: 1984.

Ministry of National Defense. Defense White Paper, 1987.

Seoul: 1988.

. Ministry of National Defense. Defense White Paper, 1988.

Seoul: 1989.

Ministry of National Defense. Defense White Paper, 1989.

Seoul: 1990.

. Ministry of National Defense. A Short History of the ROK

Armed Forces, 1945-1983. Seoul: 1983.

National Assembly. Selected Laws Governing the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. Seoul: 1970.

National Assembly. Selected Laws Governing the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. Seoul: 1971.

National Assembly. Selected Laws Governing the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. Seoul: 1981.

National Bureau of Statistics. Economic Planning Board.

Korea Statistical Yearbook: 1988. Seoul: 1989.

National Bureau of Statistics. Economic Planning Board.

Social Indicators in Korea: 1985. Seoul: 1986.

National Police Headquarters. Korean National Police. Seoul:

1989.

National Police Headquarters. National Police College: Republic of Korea. Seoul: 1985.

Rhee, Taek-Hyung. US-ROK Combined Operations. Washington:

National Defense University Press, 1986.

Rhee, Young-pil. The Breakdown ofAuthority Structures in Korea in 1960:

A Systems Approach. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1982.

Ro, Kwang H. ' 'The Characteristics of the Praetorian Military

in South Korea: 1961-1979," Asian Profile [Hong Kong], 17,

August 1989, 311-26.

Ropelewski, Robert R. 4 'U.S. Pacific Air Forces Modernization:

Revitalization Effort Sparked by New Theater Defense Concepts," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 7, 1983,

38-46.

Shaplen, Robert. "Letter From South Korea," New Yorker, 56,

November 17, 1980, 174-207.

Shin, Myungsoon. "Political Protest and Government Decision

Making: South Korea, 1945-1972," American Behavioral Scientist, 26, January-February 1983, 395-416.

Sigur, Gaston. "Korean Political Transition," Department of State

Bulletin, 87, April 1987, 19-21.

"Sikorsky-Daewoo Deal for AUH-70s in South Korea," Jane's

Defence Weekly [London], 6, No. 10, September 13, 1986, 570.

372
Bibliography

Sneider, Daniel. "Push for Democratization in South Korea Shifts

to Factories: Mood of Protests Spreads and So Do Strikes," Christian Science Monitor, August 13, 1987, 7-8.

Sneider, Richard L. The Political and Social Capabilities of North and

South Koreafor the Long-Term Military Competition. Santa Monica,

California: Rand, 1985.

Sohn, Hak-Kyu. Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea. London: Routledge, 1989.

"South Korea Unveils Its K-l MBT," Asian DefenceJournal [Kuala

Lumpur], 17, No. 11, November 1987, 82-83.

SRI International. Korea in the 1980s. Menlo Park, California: 1982.

Starr, Barbara. "Offsets Key to F/A-18 Deal," Jane's Defence Weekly

[London], 13, No. 2, January 13, 1990, 47.

Steinberg, David I. "South Korea's Military: Political and Social

Roles." Washington: Asia Society, 1988.

Steinberg, David I. The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation

and Social Change. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989.

Stokes, Henry Scott. "Cracking Down in Korea," New York Times

Magazine, October 19, 1980, 110-27.

. "Korea's Church Militant," New York Times Magazine,

November 28, 1982, 67-69, 104-08.

Suh, Dae-Sook. " South Korea in 1981: The First Year of the Fifth

Republic," Asian Survey, 22, No. 1, January 1982, 543-59.

Suk, Chin-Ha. "The Human Rights Issue in South Korea: A

Reappraisal," Asian Thought and Society, 13, October 1988,

187-94.

Sung, Cheon Kum. Chun Doo Hwan: Man ofDestiny. Los Angeles:

North American Press, 1982.

Szulc, Tad. "Inside South Korea's C.I. A.," New York Times Magazine, March 6, 1977, 41-50.

Thomas, Raju G.C. (ed.). The Great-Power Triangle and Asian Security. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983.

Tracey, Gene D. "U.S. Military Co-Production Programmes: A

Case of Skewing the Americans?" Asian Defence Journal [Kuala

Lumpur], 19, No. 8, August 1989, 50-59.

"US-ROK Co-Production: The Case of the M-16 Rifle," Asian DefenceJournal [Kuala Lumpur], 19, No. 9, September 1989, 64-69.

United Nations. General Assembly. 39th Session. Report of the Secretary General: Consideration of Effective Measures to Enhance the Protection, Security and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions and

Representatives. New York: 1984.

United States. Congress. 95th, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on

373
South Korea: A Country Study

International Organizations. Investigation of Korean-American Relations. Washington: GPO, 1977.

Congress. 95th, 1st Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- national Organizations. Rules of the Investigation ofKorean-American

Relations. Washington: GPO, 1977.

Congress. 95th, 2d Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- national Organizations. Investigation of Korean-American Relations. Washington: GPO, 1978.

Congress. 95th, 2d Session. Senate. Select Committee on

Ethics. Korean Influence Inquiry. Washington: GPO, 1978.

Congress. 99th, 2d Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Human Rights

and International Organizations and Subcommittee on Asian

and Pacific Affairs. Political Developments and Human Rights in the Republic of Korea. Washington: GPO, 1986.

. Congress. 100th, 1st Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The Presidential Election in Korea. Washington: GPO,

1988.

Congress. 100th, 1st Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Update on Political Developments in Korea, June 1987.

Washington: GPO, 1987.

Congress. 100th, 1st Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Human Rights

and International Organizations. Assessing the Prospects for

Democratization in Korea. Washington: GPO, 1988.

Congress. 100th, 2d Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The Bombing of Korean Airlines Flight KAL-858.

Washington: GPO, 1989.

. Congress. 100th, 2d Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The Status of Democratization Efforts in the Republic of

Korea. Washington: GPO, 1989.

Congress. 101st, 1st Session. House of Representatives.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Developments in United States- Republic of Korea Relations. Washington: GPO, 1990.

Congress. 101st, 2d Session. House of Representatives.

Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Study Mission to Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, Laos, and Hawaii (January 3-14,

1990). Washington: GPO, 1990.

374
Bibliography

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989. Washington: GPO, 1990.

Department of State. "Korea: New Beginnings," Depart- ment of State Bulletin, 87, No. 9, September 1987, 32-34.

Department of State. "United States Government State- ment on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May

1980," Washington: June 19, 1989.

Whitaker, Mark. "South Korea's Miracle Week," Newsweek, 110,

July 13, 1987, 26-28.

Williams, Nick B. "1980 Uprising: Memories of Kwangju Haunt

Korea," Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1987, 14. Wilson, Robert W. "Wellsprings of Discontent: Sources of Dissent in South Korean Student Values," Asian Survey, 28, No.

10, October 1988, 1066-81.

Wysocki, Bernard. "Growing Disillusionment Fuels Expansion of

Korean Opposition," Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1987, 23.

"South Korean Election Isn't Only Politics," Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1987, 12. Yang, Sung Chul. "The North and South Korean Arms Race and

a New Alternative," KoreanJournal ofInternational Studies [Seoul],

20, No. 3, Fall 1989, 431-81.

Yi, Sang-u. Security and Unification in Korea. Seoul: Sogang University

Press, 1983.

Yoon, Dae-Kyu. Law and Political Authority in Korea. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press and Seoul: Kyungnam University

Press, 1990.

Yoon, Woo Kon. Korean Public Bureaucracy. Seoul: Sung Kyun Kwan

University Press, 1982.

Youm, Kyu Ho. "Press Freedom under Constraints: The Case

of South Korea," Asian Survey, 26, No. 8, August 1986, 868-82.

Youm, Kyu Ho, and Michael B. Salwen. "A Free Press in South

Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture," Asian

Survey, 30, No. 3, March 1990, 312-25.

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in

the preparation of this chapter: Asian DefenceJournal [Kuala Lumpur], 1985-89; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], 1987-88;

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia,

1989-90; Korea Herald [Seoul] , 1985-90; and Korea Times [Seoul],

1985-90.)

375

Glossary

chaebol—Korean translation of the Japanese word zaibatsu, or busi- ness conglomerate. A group of specialized companies with

interrelated management servicing each other.

chip (jip) —The household, i.e., family members under one roof; the term k'unjip (big house) refers to the main family of the

eldest son, while the term chagunjip (little house) refers to the

branch family households of the younger sons. Ch'ondogyo—Teachings of the Heavenly Way, an indigenous

monotheistic religion stressing the equality of man and the unity

of man and the universe. Formerly Tonghak (q. v. ), Ch'ondogyo

had approximately 27,000 followers and 66 churches in South

Korea in 1988.

chuch 'e (juche)—The political ideology promulgated by Kim II Sung.

The application of Marxism-Leninism to the North Korean

experience based on autonomy and self-reliance. chungin—The "middle people," a small group of technicians and

administrators in traditional Korea, subordinate to the yangban (q.v.), that included astronomers, physicians, interpreters,

legal specialists, and artists. Demarcation Line—Established under the Korean armistice agree- ment of 1953; marks the actual cease-fire line between South

Korea and North Korea.

DMZ (Demilitarized Zone)—The 4-kilometer-wide buffer zone

along the approximately 241 -kilometer-long Demarcation Line

(q.v.). fiscal year—calendar year. Five Relationships—The Confucian concept of ideal social rela- tionships, formulated by classical Chinese philosophers such

as Mencius (372-289 B.C.), which states that there should be

affection between father and son, righteousness between ruler

and minister, attention to their separate functions between husband and wife, proper order between old and young, and faith- fulness between friends.

GDP—gross domestic product. The total value of all final (consumption and investment) goods and services produced by an economy in a given period, usually a year. GNP—gross national product. GDP (q. v.) plus income from overseas investments minus the earnings of foreign investors in the

home economy.

377
South Korea: A Country Study

han'gul—The Korean phonetic writing system, developed by schol- ars in the court of King Sejong in the fifteenth century, which

is used either by itself or in conjunction with Chinese characters.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members

(including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans

frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal

economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

p'a—The lineage, a kinship unit consisting of all descendants of a common male ancestor who, in many cases, was the founder of a village. Some p'a contain thousands of households

chip (q.v.) —and members conduct ceremonies at the common

ancestral gravesite. In some villages or hamlets in traditional

Korea, many or most of the people were members of the same

p'a- pukpang chdngch'aek—Also seen as Nordpolitik, or northern policy.

Reconciling traditional ties with the West with new opportunities in the East; establishing self-reliant global posture; ex- panding and diversifying trade relations on global scale to cope

with trade protectionism from the United States; improving

relations with P'yongyang.

to (do) —Province, used in combined form, as Kangwon-do for Kangwon Province, or Chungch'ong-pukto for North Ch'ungch'ong Province. There are eight mainland provinces and one

island province in the Republic of Korea. Do, or to, also means

island, as in Cheju-do.

Tonghak—Literally, Eastern learning, an indigenous religious

movement founded by Ch'oe Che-u in the early 1860s, which

spearheaded a popular, anti-foreign rebellion in 1894-95. Later

renamed Ch'ondogyo (q.v.). won—The monetary unit. In January 1989, the exchange rate was W682.4 per US$1.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but

378
Glossary

administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu- tions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,

member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

q.v.).

yangban—The scholar-official ruling class of traditional Korea, dis- tinguished for its knowledge of neo-Confucianism and its monopoly of high government positions; more broadly, families

with lineages descended from scholar-officials and scholars who

had passed the civil service examinations even though they had

not secured an official post.

379

Index

abortion, 79 account surpluses, 153, 184

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 129-30

Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration, 244, 245, 310

Act Concerning Crimes Against the State, 311 Act Concerning Local Autonomy, 215 Act Concerning Protection of Military

Secrets, 279, 312, 313

Act Concerning Protection of Society, 211 Administration Reform Commission,

209, 226 Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen, 207-8

Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification

Policy, 207 Agency for National Security Planning

(ANSP) (see also Korean Central Intel- ligence Agency), 207, 225, 281, 310, 311-14; activities of, 227, 237, 314; conduct of foreign policy by, 251 ; functions of, 312-13; Information Coordination Committee of, 314; limitations on powers of, 226-27, 228, 313, 314;

organizational structure of, 3 1 3 ; origin

of, 312; reluctance of, to limit power,

313-14, 327; role of, strengthened, 227-28 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and Cooperation, xxxvi

agricultural: bank, 171-72; development,

44; subsidies, 47; technology, 47; trade, 226; workforce, 45, 163

agricultural cooperative movement, 141, 167; merged with agricultural bank, 171-72

agricultural economy: government's emphasis on, 142; under Park, 46; pre- twentieth century, 139

agricultural productivity, 165, 167, 170; growth of, 165; under Saemaul Movement, 47

agricultural products, 165, 167, 255;

barley, 165, 167; imports of, xxix, 170;

livestock, 167; price supports for, 169;

rice, 165

agricultural sector (see also farmers): contribution of, to gross domestic product,

165; decline in, xxix, 46; problems in, 163-65; prospects for, 170; share of, in gross national product, 193

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Ministry of, xxix AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

air defense system, 269; army's responsibility for, 283, 285

air force, 285-86, 289; aircraft, 285-86;

base locations, 285; commands in, 285;

materiel, xxxix; modernization pro- gram, 286; organization of, 285; per- sonnel, 285; role of, xxxix Air Force Academy, 290

Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 315

airports, 182 Air Training Command, 285 Air Transportation Command, 285

akpop (evil laws), 244

Algeria, 264

Allen, Richard V., 60 American Cultural Center, 241, 242

ancestor worship, 11; function of, 100; in kinship system, 100; in urban families, 104 ANSP. See Agency for National Security

Planning

anti-American sentiment, 55, 62, 221,

241, 255; aroused by Nordpolitik, 252; aroused by Kwangju uprising, 241,

299; fueled by Reagan's support of Chun, 60; violence in, 241, 242 Anticommunism Law, 307 Anticommunist Youth League, 239, 240

April 19 Student Revolution, 34, 306 armed forces. See military; see also under in- dividual branches Armed Forces Organization Act, xxxixxl, 274

army, 281-85; aircraft of, 284; air defense network, 283, 285; Capital Defense Command, xxxix, 282-83; Counterespionage Operations Command, 283; Defense Security Command, 283, 307, 381
South Korea: A Country Study

310, 313, 314-17; disbanded by Japanese, 273; dissident students drafted

into, 279-80; First Army, xxxviii- xxxix, 281, 283; infantry units in, 283, 285; Logistics Base Command, 283;

materiel, 284-85; organization of, 281;

responsibilities of, 283; Second Army,

xxxix, 282; Special Warfare Command,

284; Third Army, xxxviii-xxxix, 281-

82, 283; weapons, 283, 284-85; women

in, 284 Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC),

312, 314 Army Security Command, 315

art: Buddhist influence on, 15; calligra- phy, 16; Chinese influence on, 16; gold

objects, 15; Indian influence on, 15; under Japanese rule, 22; painting, 16; pottery, 15-16; sculpture, 15; tomb

paintings, 15, 123

artists, 16 Asia Motors, 296 Asiana Airlines, 182

Asia-Pacific News Network, 249

Association for Korean Residents in Japan. See Mindan

Association of Journalists Dismissed in 1980, 236

Association of Korean Journalists, 236

associations, xxxii-xxxiii, 170, 200, 234-

236, 243 Audit and Inspection Board, 207

automobiles, 156; domestic demand for, 138, 158; parts for, 160 automotive industry, xxviii, 156, 158,

160; government emphasis on, 142, 158, 160

balance of payments: effects of, 186; in 1970s, 138; in 1986, 138; surplus, 186

balance of trade, 183, 190-91 Bank of Korea, 142, 172; Office of Bank

Supervision and Examination of, 172 Bank of Seoul and Trust Company, 154

banks, 149, 172, 174; decline in, 154-55;

money-deposit, 154; nationalized, 141,

171; under Chun, 58; under Park, 141;

trust services of, 154

Basic Press Act (1980), 244, 247; public

criticism of, 247-48

Bell Helicopters Textron, 296

birth control. See family planning

birth rate, 29, 79; projected, 190; urban, 84

Blue House, 207, 283, 288, 304

borders, 3, 7, 70

Bright Society Rallies, 58

Britain, 157; treaty with, 12 Brunei, 264 Buddhism, xxvii, 123, 128; decline of, 124; dominance of, 7; effect of land re- form on, 9-10; influence of, 10, 15, 70; number of adherents to, 127; opposition to, 10; Won (Wonbulgyo), 126 Bush, George, 256

business associations, 234; history of, 234;

relationship of, with government, 234, 235

business conglomerates. See chaebol businesses: contribution of, to gross national product, 174; financing of, 155; government assistance to, 174-75; gov- ernment discrimination among, 97; under Park, 43; relationship of, with government, 235; small and mediumsized, 174-75; wages in, 174; working

conditions in, 174 bus system, 181

cabinet. See State Council Cairo Conference, 24

Capital Defense Command, xxxix, 282-

83; responsibilities of, 283

capital equipment, 189

Capital Garrison Command, 228, 282, 316

capital market, 172

Carter, Jimmy, 51 Central People's Committee, 27, 28

Central Police Academy, 318, 319 CFC. See United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command

Ch'aChi-ch'61, 41, 42; assassinated, 42, 307

chaebol (business conglomerates), xxxiii, 148, 194; access of, to foreign tech- nology, 149; characteristics of, 148; co- operation of, with government, 148; department stores owned by, 171; de- velopment and origins of, 43, 146-49;

diversification programs of, 254; ex- ports by, 148-49; government favorit- ism toward, 97, 141; growth of, 148-

49; largest, 147; precursors of, 95, 140; 382
Index

revenues of, 147; under Rhee, 147; role

of, in economic development, 141, 147; working conditions in, 147 Ch'ae Man-sik, 22

chaeya seryok (opposing political forces), 53

chagunjip. See household Ch'a Kyu-h6n, 56 Changanghoe. See Self-Strengthening Society Chang My5n John M. Chang), 34, 37-

38, 140, 306 Chang Se-dong, 225 Chang To-yong, 38 Cheju Island, 71, 75, 305; administration

of, 214; airport, 182; dialect of, 113; land area of, 71; shamanism on, 106; women on, 77, 106

chemical industry, 139, 141, 161-62; areas

for investment, 162; expansion of, 44, 189; exports by, 144, 162, 189; fertiliz- ers in, 161-62; government emphasis

on, 142, 144; growth in, 144; imports

by, 162; role of chaebol in, 149 Cheney, Richard B., 256, 303 Chiang Kai-shek, 27, 274

China: borders with, 3; contacts of, with South Korean people, 260; cooperation

with, xxxiv; diplomatic relations with,

xxxiv; ethnic Koreans in, 260; influence

of, xxiv, 4, 5, 12, 16, 18, 33, 89, 123; invasion of Kory6 by, 8; as mediator,

260; military trained in, 273; Nordpolitik viewed by, 260; relations with, 8; role of, in Korean War, 32; ties with,

xxxiii, 61, 252, 260; trade with, xxxii,

xxxiii, xxxiv, 7, 188, 257; in trusteeship, 27; war with, 271, 272; Western

influence in, 11 Chinese Communist Party, 274

Chinese Eastern Railway, 14 Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), 276

Chinhae, 85 Chinhan, 4-5

chip. See household Ch'oe Che-u, 124 Ch'oe Kyu-ha, 53-53, 308; elected presi- dent, 52 Ch'oe Nam-son, xxv Chohung Bank, 172 Cholla region, xxxii, 273; development

in, 77; discrimination against people of, 97; rebelliousness in, 77; rivalry of, with KySngsang region, 56, 76-77

ch'ommin class, 91, 93, 94; shamans in, 122 ChomminySn. See Coalition for a National Democratic Movement

Chdndaehyop. See National Association of University Student Councils Chondogwan (Evangelical Church), 126 Ch'ondogyo (Teachings of the Heavenly

Way), 90, 124-26; number of adherents, 128 Ch'ongch'on River, 4 Ch6ng Chu-yong, 262 Chdng Ho-yong, 56, 228 ChSngjo (King), 11 Ch'6ngju, 182 Chong Mong-ju, 16 Chong Mung-jun, 149 Chongsin Girls' School, 107 ChSng Yag-yong, 1

ChSn'gyojo. See National Teachers Union

Chonju Yi, 102 Chon Ky6ng-hwan, 169-70 Chonnam University, 55 ChSnnohyop. See National Council of Labor Unions

Cho Pyong-ok, 37 Chosen soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), 6 Choson Dynasty, 9-15, 323; art in, 15; Chinese influence in, 16; deforestation

in, 167; education during, 114; founded by Yi Song-gye, 8-9, 272; genealogy

in, 19, 92; Japanese attacks on, 10; Manchu attacks on, 10; medicine in, 130; natural disasters in, 11; neo- Confucianism in, 88, 123; problems in, 10; reforms in, 9; revolts in, 11; secularism in, 10; shamanism in, 106;

ties of, with United States, 25; urban

population in, 81; yangban in, 20, 91 Choson ilbo, 248 Choson Kingdom, 4; isolationism in, xxiv Christian Broadcasting System, 247, 248

Christian Farmers Association, 239

Christianity, xxvii, 11, 123-24; growth of, 124; influence of, 90; prohibition of, 124; Protestantism, 124; Roman Catholicism, 123

Christians: concept of minjung promoted

by, 99; missionaries, 123, 124; number of, 124, 127; persecution of, 124;

as political radicals, 53; resistance by,

to Japanese occupiers, 110, 124; role

of, in modernization, 124 383
South Korea: A Country Study

Chun Doo Hwan, xxix, 77, 228, 316; at- tempt to assassinate, 304; coup d'etat

of, xxxvii, 53, 54, 307, 308; elected president, 56; government of. See Fifth Republic; investigation of Park by, 52; public apology by, 225; purges under,

57-58, 220; reaction of, to Kwangju

uprising, 56; self-exile of, 208, 225

Chungang ilbo, 248, 249; strike against, 249-50 Ch'ungch'ong provinces: stereotype of, 77 Chun government (Fifth Republic), xxix- xxx, 249, 310, 317; banks under, 58; censorship under, 247; compromise

and reform under, 215-19; control of news by, 247; crackdown on journalists under, 236; crackdown on protesters by, 54-55; demise of, 61-63, 199; econ- omy under, 59; effect of Kwangju

uprising on, 241 ; emphasis of, on education, xxv-xxvi; human rights viola- tions under, 244; junta committee, 56; military under, 278-79; military spending under, 279; modernization of armed

forces under, 269; purge of bureaucracy

by, 212, 230; purge of Korean Central

Intelligence Agency in, 312; reeducation program of, 58, 240; Saemaul

Movement under, 169; ties of, with Reagan administration, 59-60; vio- lence used by, 240 Chun government corruption: committee

investigating, 224; convictions of offi- cials in, 224; effects of hearings into, 224-25; hearings investigating, 200, 212-13, 225, 233

chungin class, 16, 91, 93 Chungsanggyo, 126 Ch'usok (Autumn Harvest Festival), 104 CIC. See Army Counterintelligence Corps

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent

States cinemas, 250

Civil Code, 324

civil defense, 288

Civil Defense Law, 288

civil service {see also yangban), 211-14; cor- ruption hearings on and prosecution of

officials in, 212-13; examinations for, 213; management of, 213; number of employees in, 213; prestige of, 211-12;

qualifications for, 91; recruitment for, 213; reform of, 212

Cleansing Committees, 58

climate, 72-75

clinics, 131

Coalition for a National Democratic Movement (Chomminyon), 233 Code of Criminal Procedure (1954), 203, 324, 328 Cold War, xxiv; effect of Korean War on,

33; revisionist view of, 62-63 Combat Air Command, 285 Combat Police, 310, 318, 321; conscription of, 321; as military obligation, 322; personnel, 322; responsibilities of, 321 Command and General Staff College, 291 Commercial Bank, 172 Commercial Code, 324 Committee for Peaceful Reunification of

the Fatherland (CPRF), 259, 262 commodity: structure, 188-89; trade vol- ume, 137 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), xxxiv Conference of Supreme Court Justices, 210

Confucianism {see also neo-Confucianism):

dominance of, xxvii, 7, 123; hierarchy

in, 89; influence of, on art, 16, 69-70;

influence of, on education, 114; number of adherents to, 127; as a political theory, 89, 124; revival of, xxvii; as social ethic, 128 Confucius (Kong Zi), 88, 89

conscription, xxxviii, 279, 279, 280, 288, 289; rejection for, 288; role of, in de- velopment, 96

Conscription Law of 1949, 279

conscripts: assignment of, 288-89; basic training of, 290; rights of, xxxviii constitution (see also under individual constitutions): drafting of, 201-2; perception

of, 201

constitution of 1948, 31; amended, 33; re- vised in 1960, 37

constitution of 1962, 39; amended, 39; presidential power under, 39

constitution of 1972 (yusin constitution), 40, 42, 244, 307; presidential power

under, xxx; revised in 1987, xxx

constitution of 1980, 53, 57, 202, 204, 206, 207, 310; presidential power

under, 57

Constitution of 1987, 202-5, 325; amend- ment process, 204-5; drafting of, 216; 384
Index

due process under, 202-3; elections under, 221; foreign policy under, 250-51; National Assembly in, 202, 221-22; neutrality clause in, 202; outline of, 202-3; people's duties and

rights in, 202-4; presidential power under, 202, 207; separation of powers in, 204; unification policy in, 202

constitutional framework, 200-205; his- tory of, 200-201; of Sixth Republic, 201-2

constitutionalism: difficulties in adapting

to South Korea, 201 ; as focus of politi- cal strife, 201; idea of, 201

constitutional review, 211

Constitution Court, 211, 328, 329

construction industry, xxviii, 142, 160-

61; domestic, 160; in Middle East, 160, 177; overseas, 160 consumer goods: imports of, 189; low

production of, 45 consumption patterns, 177-78

Council for Promotion of Democracy,

231, 232

Counterespionage Operations Command,

283

counterinsurgency program, 275 Court Organization Law (1949), 210, 223

courts. judiciary; see also under individual

courts CPRF. See Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland CPV. See Chinese People's Volunteers

credit policies, 172, 173

credit associations. See kye crime, 325 Criminal Code, 324

criminal justice system, 322-30; acquittal rate, 326; amnesty in, 329; appeal, 328; arrest, 326; bail, 326-27; Chinese

influence on, 323; Confucian values in, 323; detention, 326; hearings, 328; key

features of, 323-24; political prisoners

in, 329; probation in, 329-30; public

prosecutors, 325; rights of accused,

202, 324-25, 327; right to legal counsel under, 324-25, 327-28; sentences, 244; summary indictment, 326; Western influence on, 323

criminal procedure, 325-30

culture: Chinese influence on, xxiv, 18; as element in ethnic identity, 75; re- pression of, under Japanese rule, 23;

role of hut in, 123; under Three Kingdoms, 15-18; United States influence on, xxiii; Western influence on, xxiv Cumings, Bruce, 140 curb market, 155

currency: devaluation of, 43; revaluation

of, 188

current account balance: in 1988, 149; in 1989, 149 Curzon, George (Lord), 71

Daeduk Science Town, 191 Daewoo, 147, 157, 160, 257, 258; defense production by, 296

death: causes of, 129; rate, 128

defense industry, 160, 295-97; aircraft produced by, 285; coproduction ar- rangements in, 160, 269, 277-78, 279, 285, 286; domestic, 277, 295-96; li- censed production in, 277; research and

design in, 279; role of chaebol in, 149;

technical assistance in, 211-1$

Defense Industry Bureau, 277 Defense Security Command (DSC),

xxxix, 54, 61, 228, 240, 247, 283, 307, 310, 313, 314-17; corruption in, 316;

political activities of, 316-17; reform of, xxxviii defense spending, 146, 271, 293-95; an- nual budgets for, 293; under Chun,

279; National Assembly review of, 294;

in 1965, 277; in 1970s, 293; as operational costs, 295; as percentage of gross national product, 293; on weapons, 295

Defense White Paper, 1988, 279-80 Demarcation Line, 70

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 70, 269; es- tablished, 276 Democratic Alpine Club, 231 Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea,

xxxvi, 262 Democratic Declaration, 40 Democratic Justice Party (DJP), xxx,

199, 204, 228, 317; loss of majority by, 222-23; political alignments in, 230; Roh's restructuring of, 229; student activity against, 242 Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), 230, 313; coalition, xxxii; creation of, xxxi Democratic Party (DP), 34, 37; creation

of, xxxii Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

See North Korea 385
South Korea: A Country Study

Democratic Press Movement Association, 236

Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 41, 230; established, 39; revival of, 53 demonstrations (see also student demonstrations), 245; by farmers, 226, 305;

against martial law, 55; police response

to, 310; against Roh government, 221; of spring 1987, 271; statistics on, 311;

against United States, 30 Department of Local Affairs, 214

dissidents (see also student dissidents), 226;

arrested, 227, 311, 314; associations of, 236; detained, 311, 312; police attacks on, 270; prosecution of, 312

divorce, 105 DJP. See Democratic Justice Party

DLP. See Democratic Liberal Party

DMZ. See Demilitarized Zone

domestic capital market: liberalization of, 185 domestic market, 138-39, 184; liberaliza- tion of, 235, 239

domestic savings, 185 Dong Ah Construction Company, 161 DP. See Democratic Party

DPRK. See North Korea

droughts, 75 DRP. See Democratic Republican Party

drug abuse, 130, 325 DSC. See Defense Security Command

due process of law, 243

Eastern Europe: exports to, 257; revolutions of 1989 in, xxxiii; ties with, xxxiii, 252; trade with, xxxii, 188, 257

Eastern Learning Movement. See Tonghak

Movement

economic depression, 10 economic development: under constitution, 204; effect of industrial growth on,

155; financing of, 153-55; government

role in, 140-46; under Japanese rule, 22, 139-40; under Park, 43-45, 141,

143, 234; population density as a fac- tor in, 81; problems caused by, 59; role of chaebol in, 141, 147 Economic Development Cooperation

Fund, 264

economic development plans (see also five- year plans), 43, 143, 149; emphases of, 142

economic growth, xxviii; under Chun, 59;

class structure altered by, 96; under

constitution, 204; under Fifth Five- Year Economic and Social Develop- ment Plan, 59, 137; influence of education on, 1 15; Japanese influence on,

140; under Park, 41, 44, 45, 137 economic modernization, 96 Economic Planning Board, xxvii, xxviii, 45, 79, 81, 144; established, 43, 141-

42; role of, 142, 209 economic policies: influence of, on urbanization, 35; of Park, 38, 43-45 economic recession, 41, 145 economic restructuring, 139; role of chaebol'in, 141; role of public enterprises in, 141 economic services, 146 economic stabilization measures, 45; under Chun, 59; for prices, 44 economic structure: transformation of, under Park, 137; transition of, to tech- nology-oriented, 194 economy: under constitution, 204; decline

in, 155-56; future of, 193-94; industrial, 142; inflation, 29, 145; under Chang, 37; under Chun, 59; under

Japanese rule, 21-22, 29; postwar, 36; problems in, 29; purchasing power in, 177; under Roh, 177; under United

States occupation, 29-30

education, 114-22; centralized control of, 115; during Choson Dynasty, 114; Christian influence on, 90; under Chun, 120; Confucian influence on, 69-70; government expenditure on, 115-16, 146; influence of, on economic

growth, 115; influence of, on job opportunities, 46; influence of, on politi- cal awareness, 35; influence of, on

population growth, 78; influence of, on

social system, 35, 116; influence of modernization on, 96; underJapanese

occupation, 114, 140; as key to social mobility, 98; management of, by women, 107; as reason for urban

migration, 85; reforms of, 120; under

Rhee, 114-15, 35; social importance of, 46, 98-99; United States influence on,

xxiii, 114; of women, 107

education, higher, 118-21; attendance,

46, 115, 118-19, 120; changes in, xxvi; emphasis on, xxv-xxvi; entrance ex- aminations for, 118; faculty in, 213; 386
Index

hierarchy of universities in, 98; in- fluence of, on political patterns, xxvi, 244; necessity of, for social mobility,

116; overseas, 98; required failure quotas in, 121; science and technology programs in, 191, 192; for women, 107 Education Law, 236 Ehwa Woman's University, 98, 107, 118 Eighth Army, 301

elections, National Assembly: of 1960, 37; of 1967, 39; of 1971, 39; of 1978, 41; of 1985, xxx; of 1988, xxxi, 199, 222; of 1992, xxxii

elections, presidential, 206; of 1956, 34; of 1960, 34; of 1967, 39; of 1971, 39; of 1987, xxx-xxxi, 199, 216, 218-19

electric generation, 149, 152-53; energy used in, 163; under Japanese occupation, 139; nuclear, 153; for rural areas, 47; under United States occupation, 29

electronics industry, xxviii, 156, 157; de- pendence of, on Japanese components,

157; exports, 157, 189; government emphasis on, 142, 144; growth of, 157;

overseas production in, 157; production,

157; role of chaebol in, 149; value of, 157

elite (see also yangban), 91-92, 97 Emergency Measure Number Nine, 40, 42, 232, 307; revoked, 52, 308 emergency measures, 40, 206-7, 307 emergency preparedness, 280-81 Emergency Prepared Resources Manage- ment Law, 281

emigration: to Africa, 88; to Canada, 88;

to China, 86; to Europe, 88; to Hawaii,

86; to Japan, 86; to Latin America, 88;

to Manchuria, 86; to Middle East, 88; reasons for, 86, 88; to Soviet Union,

86; to United States, xxiii, 86, 88

emigres, 86, 88, 95, 258

energy, 162-63; in electric generation, 163; imports for, 162; inadequacy of, 162; nuclear, 163 enlightenment movement (kaehwa)

reformers, 243

entertainers. See kisaeng ethnic identity (see also culture; Korean

people), xxv, 18, 108-14; under Chinese rule, 18; elements in, 75; influence of geography and history on, 3, 5; underJapanese rule, 21; search for, 70; sense of, 70 European Community, 264

examination hell, 118, 119-21

examinations: objectivity of, 120; for secondary school, 117; for higher education, 118; for yangban, 20, 91 examinations, civil service, 213; Confucian, 94 exogamy, law of, 100, 102 Export-Import Bank of Korea, 174

export markets, 189

exports, 188-90; of armaments, 160; of automobile industry, 158; by chaebol, 148-49; of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 162; under Chun, 59; decrease

in, 155-56; to Eastern Europe, 257; ef- fect of, on economic development, 155;

effect of growth in, 45; of electronics, 157; encouraged under Park, 43, 44, 144; expansion of, 44, 147; under Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, 59; of footwear, 161; growth of, 188; incentives for, 142; in- creased level of, 142, 143; under Park,

148; of textiles, 161; to Soviet Union,

257; to United States, 190

export targets, 141

external debt, 184

factories: 156; under United States occupation, 29

family: economic relations in, 103-4; gender status in, 103; importance of, 19, 100, 104; nuclear, 69, 103, 104 Family Court, 211 Family Law (1977), 105

family life, traditional, 99-102; decline of, 102-3; filial piety in, 99; role of first son

in, 100

family life, urban, 102-3, 104

family planning: abortion, 79; activities, 78; agencies, 78; cultural attitudes toward, 79; impact of, xxvii; incentives

for, xxvii, 79; under Rhee, 78; sterili- zation for, 78-79; success of, 78

farmers: demonstrations by, 226, 305; in- come of, xxix, 46, 47, 168; indebtedness of, xxix, 168; under Japanese

occupation, 94; lifestyle of, xxix, 47;

political strength of, 170, 239; protests by, 239; and Saemaul Movement, 47, 97; tenant, 97, 169, 204, 243; timber

as fuel for, 167

farmers' associations, xxxii-xxxiii, 170, 243 387
South Korea: A Country Study

Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- many), 44, 157, 295

Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, 239

Federation of Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea, 236

Federation of Korean Industry, 234

Federation of Korean Trade Unions

(FKTU), 220, 237, 238

Federation of Small and Medium Industries, 234

Federation of Textile Industries, 234

fertility rates, 79

Fifth Republic. See Chun government

filial piety (hyo or xiao), 99

films, 250

financial sector: changes in, 154, 155; components of, 172

First Army, 281, 283

First Bank, 172

fishing, 168; exports, 168; labor force in, 45; population, 168; products, 168; share of, in gross national product, 193

Five-Province Administrative Bureau, 31 Five Relationships (o ryun or wu lun), principle of, 19-20, 89, 99

Five Steps to Peaceful Unification, 217

five-year plans: First Five-Year Economic

Development Plan (1962-66), 137, 144, 185; Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-7), 144; Third

Five-Year Economic Development Plan

(1972-76), 144; Fourth Five-Year Eco- nomic Development Plan, (1977-81), 144-45; Fifth Five-Year Economic and

Social Development Plan (1982-86), 59, 145, 172; Sixth Five-Year Economic

and Social Development Plan (1987-

91), 145, 153; Seventh Five-Year Eco- nomic and Social Development Plan

(1992-96), 145 FKTU. See Federation of Korean Trade

Unions

flooding, 72, 75

folk art, xxvi Folk Village, xxvi

food, 165

footwear industry, 161 Force 868 (special weapons and tactics squad), 321 Force Improvement Plan, 277

Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 251

foreign aid, 36, 183-86, 188; from Japan,

60; as percentage of budget, 36; as per- centage of gross national product, 183; from United States, 36, 43, 141 Foreign Capital Inducement Act, 184-85

foreign credit, 153

foreign debt, 60; build-up of, 143; for eco- nomic development, 153; reduction in, 138, 191

foreign economic relations, 183-86, 188- 90

foreign exchange earnings, 44, 45, 188

foreign investment, 137, 143, 154, 183-

86, 188; concessionary loans, 183-84;

control policy, 185; equity, 184; in- crease in, 186; by Japan, 185-86; lib- eralization policy, 185; prohibition

against, 184-85; in stock market, 185; by United States, 185-86

foreign loans, 183-86, 188 Foreign Military Sales program, 277

foreign policy, 250-52, 254-65; accomplishments of, 252, 254-55; goals of, 251-52, 254-55; organization and

operation of, 250-51; prospects for, 264-65

foreign service: examinations for, 213; missions abroad, 251; recruitment for, 213

forestry: share of, in gross national product, 193

forests, 167-68; deforestation of, 167; ownership of, 167; reforestation of, 72, 167; used for fuel, 167 Four Eastern Districts, 4 Fraternal Association of National Revitalization, 217

Free and Subsidized Medical Aid Pro- gram, 131

gangs, 325

gangsters, 130, 325

genealogy: counterfeit, 93; destruction of, 93; importance of, 19, 92, 93; foryangban, 92 General Association of Korean Residents

in Japan. See Chosen soren General Banking Act (1954), 172 geography: coastlines, 70-72; influence

of, on ethnic identity, 3, 5 GNP. See gross national product

Golanov, Vladimir, 258 Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 256, 302; Kras- noyarsk speech of, 257; New Thinking

388
Index

of, 256-57; summit of, with Roh, 259; Vladivostok speech of, 257 government (see also under individual

branches; individual presidents): budget, 145-46; civil service, 211-14; control of business, 141; control of media, xxx; cooperation of chaebol with, 148; dis- satisfaction with, xxx; executive, 206-8;

executive agencies, 207-8; judiciary, 210-11; legislature, 205-6; misconduct,

xxxi; pensions, 133; Presidential Secretariat, 210; prime minister, 209; revenues, 145-46; spending, 145-46;

State Council, 208-10; under Japanese

occupation, 140 government, local, 214-15

Graegert, Edward, 94

Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions

(Hyangyak chipsongbang), 130 Great Collection of Medicines and Prescriptions (Uibang yuch'wi), 130 Great Man-Made River Project (Libya), 161 Green Party, 233

gross domestic product, 155; agriculture

as percentage of, 165

gross national product (GNP): agricultural as percentage of, 193; business as percentage of, 174; contribution of business to, 174; defense spending as per- centage of, 293 ; under Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development

Plan, 59; fishing as percentage of, 193; foreign aid as percentage of, 183; for- estry as percentage of, 193; government

budget as percentage of, 146; growth

in, 143, 190; in 1950s, 36; in 1980s,

177; in 1990s, 177, 190; projected, 193;

ratio of domestic savings to, 137; share of industry in, 193; share of primary

sector in, 193; share of service industry in, 193 Guomindang (Nationalist Party), 27, 274

Haeinsa Temple, 128 Hamgyong Province, 77 Hanahoe (One Mind Society), 316

hancha (Chinese ideograms), 112 Han Dynasty, 4, 5-6 Hanguk ilbo, 248

han'gul (Korean script), 12, 112-13; de- velopment of, 10, 17, 112

Hangyore simmun (One Nation News), 249, 250

Hanil Bank, 172 Hanism Unification Party, 218 Han River, xxxix, 4, 72 Hansik (Cold Food Day), 104 Han Yong-un, 23

Heartless, The (Yi Kwang-su), 22 heavy industry, 141; developed under

Japanese occupation, 139; expansion of, 44, 189; exports by, 144, 189; govern- ment emphasis on, 142, 144; growth in, 144, 149 High Court, 211

high-technology industry, xxviii, 145,

192; growth in, 149; shift toward, 156

high-technology transfers, 257

hirropon (methamphetamine), 130, 325 Ho Chong, 36-37; transitional govern- ment, 37 Hodge, John R., 27, 28 Ho Kyun, 17 holidays, 104 Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of the World Christianity. See Unification Church Home (Yi Ki-yong), 23 Homeland Reserve Force, xxxviii, 279, 280, 287; established, 288; mission of, 288; number of personnel in, 281 homosexuality, 129 Honam plain, 72 Hong Suk-cha, 218

hospitals, 131 Ho Tarn, 258, 262

household (chip orjip), 100-101 ; big house

(k'unjip) in, 100; little house (chagunjip)

in, 100

housing, 85, 103 Howaldswerke Shipbuilding Corporation, 297 human rights, 243-46; newspaper cover- age of, 250 Hun River, 6 Hwanghae Province, 77 hwarang (Flower Knight), 272

Hyangyak chipsongbang (Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions), 130

hyo. See filial piety

Hyundai, 147, 157, 150; defense production by, 296; strike against, 226, 242; student activity against, 242 Hyundai Heavy Industries, 149 389
South Korea: A Country Study

Ilche Party (Unified Party), 218 IMEMO. See Soviet Institute of World

Economy and International Relations Imjin River, 72

imports: of agricultural products, xxix,

170; under Chun, 59; of coal, 162, 189; of consumer goods, 189; for energy,

162; of food, 165, 189, 257; liberalized, 145; of oil, 162, 189, 257; under Park,

43, 145; structural pattern of, 189; of timber, 189; from United States, 190; value of, 188 Im Su-kyong, 263

Inch'on, 32, 81; administration of, 214; landing at, 276; population of, 84; public transportation in, 181 income {see also wages): disparity, 137, 239;

distribution, 99, 177, 225; of farmers,

xxix, 46, 47 , 168; growth in per capita, 137; of manual workers, 175-76; in

rural sector, 168, 239; from Seoul Olympics, 171, 188; in urban sector, 168, 176 independence: campaign for, 12, 30; choice for, over unification, 30; of

judiciary, 210, 223-24, 329; United

Nations recognition of, 30 Independence Hall, 110 Independent Club, 12

India, 15 Indonesia, 264

industrialization: class structure altered by, 96; effect of, on society, 45, 244;

industrial policies, 143-44

Industrial Manpower Supply Program,

xxviii industrial sector: government emphasis

on, 137, 142; growth of, 36, 143, 155;

share of, in gross national product, 193;

structure, 138; under Park, 144

industry (see also under individual industries), xxviii, 155-62; associations, xxxiii, 234-35; corruption in, 147; develop- ment of, 95; intelligence agents in, 238;

location of, 156; secondary, 45; under

United States occupation, 29

infant mortality rate, 128

inflation: under Fifth Five-Year Economic

and Social Development Plan, 59, 138; under Fourth Five-Year Plan, 145;

after Korean War, 36; in 1980s, 138; under Park, 41, 45; resulting from

balance of payments surplus, 186; under United States occupation, 29

infrastructure: development of, with foreign aid, 141; development of, under

Japanese occupation, 94, 139; govern- ment's emphasis on, 138, 142, 146; in- vestment in, 138

Injo (King), 273

intellectuals: campaigns by, to amend

1972 constitution, 40; concept of min- jung promoted by, 99; as followers of Kim Dae Jung, 53; opposition of, to normalized relations with Japan, 51; opposition of, to Park government, 46;

restrictions on, 40

interest groups, 233-39

International Atomic Energy Agency, xli International Broadcast Center, 249

International Monetary Fund, 184

intelligence agencies (see also Agency for National Security Planning; Defense

Security Command), 311-17

investment, 59; foreign, 137, 143, 154, 183-86, 188; in industry, 158, 162; overseas, 186; savings for, 154; trust corporations, 155

invisible receipts, 190

invisible trade account, 186

Iran-Iraq war, 189

Ireland, 157

Irkutsk, 274

Ishibashi Masashi, 260

Italy, 12

Japan: aid from, 183; attacks by, on Choson Dynasty, 10; contrast with, 110-11; dependence of South Korean

industry on, 157; financial diplomacy

with, 43-44; influence of, xxiv, 70; in- fluence on, 71; interest in Korea by,

110; invasions by, 15-16, 272-73; in- vestment by, 143, 150; Koreans living

in, 86-88; Mongol-Koryo invasion of, 8; penetration by, 11-12; as rival, 109-

111; Soviet declaration of war against,

24; surrender by, in World War II, 24; textbook controversy, 110; trade with,

7, 189; "unequal treaty" imposed by,

xxiv; Western influence in, 11 Japanese gangsters. See yakuza

Japanese Imperial Army, 243, 274

Japanese occupation, xxiv, 14-15, 20-24,

323; art under, 22; assimilation policy

under, 23-24, 110; business associations under, 234; cultural repression

390
Index

under, 23; development of infrastruc- ture under, 94, 139; diet under, 22; economy under, 21-22; education

under, 114; government in exile during, 201, 243; human rights ideas in, 243; industrial development under, 95; Korean identity under, 21 ; land survey under, 94; legacy of, 95; literature under, 22; media under, 246; reforesta- tion efforts under, 167; reforms under,

14; resistance to, 24, 273-74; Russian

influence on, 14; social transformation

under, 94; treatment of Koreans under,

20, 95; urban population during, 81; United States endorsement of, 14 Japanese-South Korean relations, 50-51,

60, 259-60; and abduction of Kim Dae

Jung, 40, 51; financial, 50, 51, 60; and

fishing rights, 50; foreign ministerial conferences, 259; normalized, 39, 50,

150; and reparations paid by Japan, 50; role of Nordpolitik in, 259; in Seoul Olympics, 259, 271; trade deficit and, 259 Japan Export-Import Bank, 150 Japan Socialist Party, 259-60

Jilin Province, 260, 274

Jindo, 189

jip. See household

Joint Chiefs of Staff, xxxix, 283

Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence

Command, xl Joint Military Provost Marshal, 314; under Park, 315

Joint Security Investigations Headquarters, 227

journalists, 244, 247; crackdowns on, 236;

detained, 312; prosecuted, 312; purged,

250, 308

judges: appointment of, 210, 326; number of, 328; qualifications of, 328; re- quirements for promotion, 328-29;

training of, 328

Judicial Research and Training Institute, 328

judiciary, 210-11; appointments to, 210;

courts, 210-11; examinations for, 213; independence of, 210, 223-24, 329; in- telligence agents stationed in, 313; recruitment for, 213; reshuffle of, 223;

revolt by, 200; used for political purposes, 244 Jurchen tribes, 18

justices, Supreme Court: appointments

of, 210, 329; chief, 328; term for, 210

Kabo Reforms (1894-95), 94, 323

Kaebyok (Creation), 126, 246

kaehwa. See enlightenment movement {kaehwd) reformers Kaesong, 8 Kanghwa Island, 71 Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation, 297 Kangwon Province: population density

of, 81; stereotype of, 77 KATUSA. See Korean Augmentation of

the United States Army

KBS. See Korean Broadcasting System

Kaya, 5 KCIA. See Korean Central Intelligence

Agency

KECO. See Korea Electric Company

KEPCO. See Korea Electric Power Corporation Khubilai Khan, 8 Kia Machine Tool, 296 Kia Motors, 160 Kim Chae-gyu, 42, 307 Kim Chi-ha, 108-9 Kim Chin-wu, 111-12 Kim Chong-p'il, xxxi, 42, 53, 222; ar- rested by Chun, 55, 230; campaign of, 216, 217; as director of Korean Central Intelligence Agency, 38, 306, 312;

political agenda of, 220; purged by

Chun, 58 Kim Dae Jung, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 55, 60, 128, 199, 215, 219, 222, 231; abduction of, 40, 51 , 232; arrested by Chun,

55; campaign of, 216, 217-18; career

of, 231-32; death sentence of, 232; fol- lowers of, 53-54; formation of PPD by, 232-33; placed under house arrest, 232;

political agenda of, 220; released from

house arrest, 52 Kim Dong-jo, 51 Kim Duk-choong, 193-94 Kimhae Kim, 102 Kim II Sung, 31, 41, 86, 226, 277 Kim Ku, 27, 30 Kim Kyong-Dong, 96 Kim Kyu-sik, 27, 28, 30; United States backing of, 30-31 Kim Man-jung, 17 Kim Ok-kyun, 243 391
South Korea: A Country Study

Kimp'o International Airport, 182, 283 Kim, Se-Jin, 307 Kim Son-jok, 218 Kim Soo Hwan, 262 Kim So-wol, 23 Kim Yong-ch'61, 223 Kim Young Sam, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 53, 199, 219, 222, 232; campaign of, 216,

217; career of, 230-31; challenge to government, 41-42; desire of, for re- unification, 41-42; as leader of New

Democratic Party, 53; ousted from National Assembly, 42; placed under

house arrest, 231; political agenda of, 220; surveillance of, 313; visit of, to Moscow, 258

kindergarten, 116-17

kinship system {see also family; genealogy;

lineage): ancestor worship in, 100; clan

{tongjok or pongwan), 102; decline of, 102-3; household {chip orjip), 100-101;

lineage (p'a) in, 101; line of descent in, 101; mourning group {tangnae) in, 101

kisaeng (female entertainers), 93, 106 Kitan Liao tribe, 7-8, 18 Koguryo Kingdom, xxiii, 5; conflict of, with Sui Chinese, 7; destruction of, by

Tang Chinese, 7; expansion of, 6-7;

military in, 271-72; ruled by Han

Chinese, 6; tomb painting in, 15, 123 Kqje Island, 158 Kojong (King), 20, 273 Kongmin (King), 272 Kong No-myong, 259 Kong Zi. See Confucius Kor-Am Bank, 172 Korea {see also North Korea; South Korea):

division of, 24-25; factions in, 12; in- fluence of, on Japan, 71; provisional

government in, 25; Soviet invasion of, 24; trusteeship in, 25, 27, 28, 274;

unification by Silla of, 7; Western in- fluence in, 12 Korea Advanced Institute of Science, 191 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 191 Korea Development Bank, 174 Korea Development Institute, 98, 142, 191, 193 Korea Electric Company (KECO), 152, 163 Korea Electric Power Corporation

(KEPCO), 150, 152-53

Korea Exchange Bank, 174 Korea Federation of Peasants, 239

Koreagate, 51, 59

Korea Herald, 249 Korea Housing Bank, 174 Korea Institute of Family Planning, 78 Korea Institute of Science and Technology, 191 Korea Long-Term Credit Bank, 174 Korea Military Academy, 98, 226, 290; alumni of, 228 Korean Air, 182, 279; defense production

by, 296 Korean Air (KAL) 858 bombing, 61 , 254, 270, 304 Korean Augmentation of the United

States Army (KATUSA), 288-89 Korean Atomic Energy Commission, 191 Korean Bar Association, 236 Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), 247, 249 Korean Catholic Farmers Association,

170, 239 Korean Central Intelligence Agency

(KCIA) {see also Agency for National

Security Planning), 38, 42, 58, 311-12;

abduction of Kim Dae Jung by, 40, 50, 232; censorship enforced by, 247; led by Chun Doo Hwan, 54, 58, 312; led by Kim Chong-p'il, 306, 312; scandals

in, 38, 58; violence used by, 240 Korean Chamber of Commerce and In- dustry, 234 Korean Communist Party, 27-28 Korean Democratic Party, 28, 30 Korean Federation of Education Associations, 236 Korean Fighters Program, 160 Korean Institute for Human Rights

(United States), 232 Korean-Japanese Parliamentary Confer- ence on Security Affairs, 51 Korean language, 12, 18, 111-14; Chinese loanwords in, 113; dialects, 113-

14; as element in ethnic identity, 75; and English vocabulary, 113; govern- ment policy on, 210; hierarchy reflected

in, 112; history of, 111-12; similarities

of, with Japanese, 111-12; standard,

113; suppressed under Japanese occupation, 110, 246; United States influ- ence on, xxiii; written, 112-13 Korean Language and Education

Research Association, 113 392
Index

Korean National Police, 289, 305, 313, 317-19, 321-22; Combat Police of, 310, 318, 321; duties of, 319; illegal be- havior of, 322; improvements in, 318;

investigations by, 325-26; organization

of, 318; personnel, 318-19; quality of, 319; recruitment of, 319; responsibilities of, 318; special weapons and tactics squad (Force 868), 321; stations and substations of, 318-19; training of, 319, 321; transportation for, 321; weapons of, 321; women in, 321 Korean National Railroad, 181 Korean National Tourist Corporation,

171 Korean Newspaper Association, 236 Korean Newspaper Editors' Association, 236 Korean Peninsula (see also Korea): borders

of, 70; Chinese influence on, 4; as cul- tural bridge, 71; land area of, 71; topography of, 71-72 Korean people (see also ethnic identity): diversity of character in, 89-90; homogeneity of, 70, 75; identity of, 18; origins of, 4; regional differences among, 76; stereotypes of, 77 Korean People's Republic, 27, 28 Korean Provisional Government: organi- zation of, 27; recognition of, 27 Korean script (see also han 'gut) , 12, 112-13; development of, 10, 17, 112 Korean Shipbuilding and Engineering, 296 Koreans living overseas, 254; population

of, 86, 88 Korean Standard Industrial Classification, 185 Korean Stock Exchange, 155; foreign in- vestment in, 185 Korean Trade Promotion Corporation

(KOTRA), 258 Korean Volunteer Army in China, 32 Korean War, xxiv, 31-33; armistice of, 276, 301; cease-fire in, 32; deforestation caused by, 167; dislocation caused

by, 84; effects of, 32-33, 35; legacy of, for role of military, xxxviii-xxxix; role of United States in, 32 Korea Strait, 72 Korea Tacoma, 296

Korea Times, 249 Korea Traders' Association, 234

Korea University. See Koryo University

Korea Year 2000, 193 Koryo Dynasty, 7-9, 323; art in, 15; Buddhism in, 10, 123; land reform

under, 9; 2nd Mongol Empire, 8, 272; neo-Confucianism in, 88; yangban in, 91 Koryo University (Korea University), 98, 118, 214 KOTRA. See Korean Trade Promotion

Corporation

Kumgang-san Dam (North Korea), 72 Kum River, 72 Kum River basin, 72

k'unjip (big house). See household Kuomintang. See Guomindang

kut (shaman services). See shamanism

Kuznets, Paul W., 140 Kwanggaet'o (King), 6, 271 Kwangju, 77; administration of, 214; demonstrations in, 271; population of, 84, 85 Kwangju uprising, 55-56, 61, 77, 217,

232, 252, 270, 308; anti-American sen- timent resulting from, 241, 299; crushed by army, 55, 240; effect of, on

Fifth Republic, 241; investigation of, 224; resolution of, 220; role of United

States forces in, xxxvii, 56, 60, 241, 256, 298-99, 301; United States report on, 299, 301 Kwon Hui-gyong, 258

kye (credit associations), 107 Kyongbuk High School, 229 Kyonggi Province: employment in, 156; population density in, 81; stereotype of, 77 Kyonghyang simmun, 249 Kyongsang region: development in, 77;

rivalry of, with Cholla region, 56, 76-77

labor disputes, 238

labor force, 46, 175-78; in agriculture, 45, 163; in fishing, 45

labor unions, 98, 237-38, 243, 248; concept of minjung promoted by, 99; government hostility toward, 97-98,

237; history of, 237; infiltration of, 241;

political agenda of, 220; rights of, 237;

strikes by, 175, 226

land reform: effect of, on Buddhism,

9-10; under Japanese occupation, 94;

in Koryo Dynasty, 9; repercussions of, 393
South Korea: A Country Study

9-10; under Rhee, 35, 165; after World

War II, 95

land survey, Japanese, 94

language. See Korean language

Latin America, 189 Ledyard, Gari K., 112

Lee, Ki-baik (Yi Ki-baek), 11, 110

Legislative Council for National Security, 57, 308 Liaodong Basin, 4 Liaoning Province, 274

Liao River, 6, 271

Liberal Party, 33, 36

Libya, 161

life expectancy, 120

light industry: exports by, 189; govern- ment emphasis on, 142

lineage (p'a), 101-2; continuity of, 100; descent of, 101; importance of, 19, 100; male heir in, 100

literacy, 244; underJapanese occupation,

140; rate, 115

literature: folk tales, 17-18; under

Japanese rule, 22; p'ansori, 17; poetry, 16-17; social and political themes in, 22; socialist influence on, 22-23; ver- nacular, 17

living conditions, 176

living standard: population density as a

factor in, 81

Logistics Base Command, 382 Lolang (Nangnang), 4, 5 lower class, 273; rural, 97; urban, 97; women, 108

Lucky-Goldstar, 147, 157, 258; defense production by, 296 Lyuh Woon Hyung (Yo Un-hyong), 28, 30

MacArthur, Douglas, 32, 276, 298 McCormick, Gavan, 140 Macdonald, Donald S., 139, 154, 185 McDonnell Douglas, 160, 296 Mahan confederation, 4, 5 Malaysia, 264 Manchuria, xxiv; Soviet invasion of, 24 Manchus, 10, 18 Mandate of Heaven, doctrine of, 90 manufacturing sector {see also industriali- zation; industrial sector; industry), 149; growth in, 44, 137 March First Movement, 20, 246

marine corps, xxxix, 286-87 Marine Corps Command, 286

marriage: arranged, 103; interviews (son pogi) for, 103; love-match (yonae), 103;

traditional purpose of, 100; women's

rights in, 105, 107; women's role in, 104-5

martial law, 307; declared by Park, 40, 307; declared in Pusan, 42; declared by

Rhee, 33, 314; demonstrations against, 55

Martial Law Command, 55, 56, 58, 308, 310 Masan: as fishing port, 168; population

growth in, 85; student demonstrations

in, 42

materiel: air force, xxxix; army, 284-85;

coproduction of, 269, 277-78, 279, 285, 286, 295; domestic production of, 295-96

Maternal and Child Health Law (1973), 79 media, 246-50; censorship of, 40, 246, 247, 31 1

; criticism by, of government,

199, 244; government control of, xxx,

xxxvii, 39, 246; increased coverage by, 248; opinion polls in, 248; ownership

of, 249; purged by Chun, 58; reformist tendencies of, 246

medical: facilities, 131; insurance pro- gram, 131-33; personnel, 131 medicine: modern, 130; shamanism as, 122; traditional, 130-31 Mencius, 89; philosophy of, 89, 90, 99, 100 mental health, 129 middle class, 46, 96, 97; average family

in, 176-77; necessity of higher education for entering, 116 Middle East: construction projects in, 160, 177, 189

migration, urban, xxv, 81; attempts to stem, 84; effect of, on urban population, 84; under Park, 46, 47; to Seoul,

29; of women, 108; after World War

II, 29, 96; of young people, 169

military: academies, 290, 291; academy,

in Silla Kingdom, 272; basic training

in, 290; under Chun, 278-79; duties, 280; effect of, on social system, 35; elite, 96; equipment, xxxviii; headquarters

moved to Taejon, xxxix, 85; increase in, 269; insignia, 292; mobilization plans, 394
Index

294; modernization of, xxxviii, 273,

277; under Park, 276; personnel, 290-

91; in politics, 39-43, 276-77, 314; population, xxxviii; preparedness, 280-81; purges in, 37; ranks, 291; re- forms, xxxviii; reorganized, 278;

resource management plans, 294; under Rhee, 276; role of, xxxvii, 202, 279-81; schools, 274, 289-90; security

regulations, 290; spending, xxxviii; sta- tus of, 20, 96, 272, 273; surveillance in, xxxviii; in Three Kingdoms period, 271-72; troops, 32, 269; uniforms, 293; weapons, xxxviii Military Armistice Commission, xl, 276, 301

Military Installation Protection Law, 279

military installations: living conditions on, 280, 290; relocation of, 280

Military Manpower Agency, 288-89

Military Manpower Law, 280 Mindan (Association for Korean Resi- dents in Japan), 86 Ming Dynasty, 8, 272, 323 minhwa painting, 16 mining, 29, 162 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, xxix Ministry of Culture, 209-10

Ministry of Culture and Information,

209, 247; Office of Public Information

Policy, 247

Ministry of Education, 115, 117, 118, 120, 210, 236-37

Ministry of Environment {see also Office of Environment), 210

Ministry of Finance, 142, 185

Ministry of Government Administration,

213, 351

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 78, 129, 131, 210, 325

Ministry of Home Affairs, 78, 167, 169, 281j 306, 317, 321; Department of Local Affairs in, 214; political influence

of, 307

Ministry ofJustice, 313; Supreme Prose- cution Administration, 325

Ministry of Labor, 142, 241 Ministry of National Defense, 240, 279,

281, 283, 321; budget management sys- tem of, 293-94; Defense Industry Bureau in, 277, 295; Office of Military

Manpower Administration in, 280; reorganized, 278; responsibilities of, 281 Ministry of Science and Technology, 191

192, 193

Ministry of Trade and Industry, 142, 155, 174 Ministry of Transportation, 181, 281

minjok (race). See ethnic identity

minjung (the masses), 99, 121 Minjung Culture Movement Association, 236

minorities, 75 Molotov cocktails, 226, 241, 242; penalties for using, 227 monarchy: weakness of, 19 Monetary Board, 172 Mongol Empire, 8, 272 Mongols; invasion of Koryo by, 8, 272 Moon, Sun Myong (Rev.), 126-27 motor vehicles, 178, 181 mountains, 71 Mount Halla, 71 Movement for the Eradication of Nuclear Power Plants, 163

mudang. See shamans

Mun Ik-hwan, 262, 263 Munjong (King), 272 Mun Son-myong. See Moon, Sun Myong

Naemul (King), 5 Naewoe Press, 249 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 60 Naktong River, 5, 72 Naktong River basin, 72 Nangnang (Lolang), 4, 5 Nanjing, 274

National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, 174

National Assembly, 205-6, 228, 244, 274, 294, 311, 317; business leaders in, 149; conduct of foreign policy by, 251; dis- solved by Park, 40, 307; distribution of

seats in, 215; electoral districts for, 222; Foreign Affairs Committee of, 251; in- telligence agents stationed in, 313; legal immunity of members of, 205; mass

resignation in, 307; representation in, 222; rights of, xxx

National Assembly Election Law, 221-22

National Assembly elections, xxx, xxxi,

xxxii; of 1948, 31 National Assembly hearings on Fifth Republic, 223 395
South Korea: A Country Study

National Assembly Law, 308

National Association of Farmers, 170

National Association of University Stu- dent Councils (ChondaehySp), 226, 242

National Conference for Unification, 40,

52, 56

National Constabulary, 274

National Council of Labor Unions (Chonnohyop), 238

National Council of Trade Unions, 238

National Defense College, 291

Nationalist Party. See Guomindang

National Maritime Police, 318, 321

National Police College, 321 National Police Headquarters, 214, 318

National Security Act, xxxvi, 199, 203, 244, 245, 262, 277, 305, 307, 308, 310-11, 313, 314, 327; arrests under,

227, 237; attempts to amend, 228; cen- sorship enforced under, 247; student

organizations suppressed by, 241; surge

in prosecutions under, 245

National Security Council, 207; conduct

of foreign policy by, 251; responsibilities of, 281

National Teachers Union (NTU) (Chon'gyojo), 117, 236, 237

National Technicians Law, 279

National Unification Board, 314 Naval Academy, 290 Naval Amphibious Command, 287 Naval Aviation Command, 287

navy, xxxix, 286-87 Navy Security Unit, 315

neo-Confucianism, 11, 88; filial piety in, 99; Five Relationships in, 89, 99; in- fluence of, on political system, 243; in- fluence of, on social system, 69-70, 88;

in mid-1500s, 89; revival of, 114; self- control in, 89; social relations in, 88-89

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 276 New Democratic Party (Simmindang), 41, 53-54, 230; creation of, xxxii, 37; and

Kim Dae Jung, 53; and Kim Young

Sam, 41-42, 53, 230-31 New Democratic Republican Party, 222, 225, 230; members of, 230; merger of, with Reunification Democratic Party, xxxi New Elders Group, 229-30 New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP),

216, 231, 232, 270

newspapers, 250; censorship of, 246, 247;

circulation of, 248-49; closed, 246; under Sixth Republic, 248 New Year's, 104

Nigeria, 264

Nine Cloud Dream, The (Kim Man-jung),

17 Nippon Steel, 150 Nixon, Richard M., 160, 277 NKDP. See New Korea Democratic Party Nonaligned Movement, 264

Nordpolitik (northern policy) (pukpang

chongch'aek), xxxiii, 61, 256; accomplishments of, 254; Chinese view of, 260; objectives of, 252; prospects for, 265; under Roh, 254-55; trade rela- tions under, 252; United States reac- tion to, 256

Northeast People's Revolutionary Army,

274

northern policy. See Nordpolitik

North Korea: creation of, 3, 31; family

meetings in, 261; humanitarian aid to South Korea by, 75, 261; insurgency, 274-75; invasion of South Korea by,

32, 275-76; joint projects with, xxxv;

military buildup in, 31-32; nuclear weapons development by, xli; political organization in, 31; prime ministerial

talks with, xxxvi; propaganda by, 304;

refugees from, 95; relations with, xxxiv-xxxvi; Soviet influence in, 27;

talks with, xxxv, xxxvi; terrorism by,

against South Korea, xxxv, xxxvi, 269,

270, 288; trade with, 262; visits to, 226, 227, 262, 263, 271 North Korean intelligence system, 303-4 North Korean military: buildup of, 269; equipment, 32; number of troops, 32, 269 North Korean Provisional People's Committee, 31 North Korean-South Korean relations, 50, 261-63; attempts to mprove, 225; dialogue in, 262, 269-70; increased

contacts in, 261; Nordpolitik, 251-52;

overtures in, 261-63; proposals for unification, 50 North Korean threat, 302, 303-5; as

justification for authoritarian govern- ment, 303, 307 North Korean Workers' Party, 31 North-South Coordinating Committee, xxxv 396
Index

NTU. See National Teachers Union

nuclear facilities, xli, 163 nuclear weapons: North Korean, xli; withdrawal of United States from Korean Peninsula of, xli

Oceania, 189 O Cha-bok, 317

Office of Environment (see also Ministry

of Environment), 210

Office of Forestry, 167

Office of the High Prosecutor General, 326

Office of Information, 317

Office of Military Manpower Administration, 280

Office of Public Information Policy, 247

Office of the President, 142

Office of the Prime Minister, 209, 214

Office of the Prosecutor General, 313, 327

Office of the Supreme Prosecutor General, 326

Officer Candidate School, 277

officers: commissioned, 290-91; noncommissioned, 291

oil: exploration, 162; imports of, 162, 189, 257; shocks of 1970s, 41, 44, 138, 153 Okp'o, 158 Olympic Committee, 228

Olympics, 1988 Seoul, xxv, 228, 249; as

catalyst for Nordpolitik, 254; effect of, on political conflict, 224; income from,

171, 188; participation in, xxxiii; pro- posal to cohost with North Korea,

xxxvi, 220-21; security for, 271, 302 Opium War, 11 opposing political forces. See chaeya seryok Ordinance Number Eighty-Eight, 246

o ryun. See Five Relationships

overseas investment, 186

Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), 264 Paehwa Girls' School, 107 Paekche Kingdom, xxiii, 5; art in, 15; military in, 271; rivalry of, with Silla Kingdom, 77

paekchong class, 93 Paek Ki-wan, 218, 262 Pak Chi-W6n, 17, 92

Pak Chong-ch'61, 63, 244, 270, 311 Pak Ch6'r-6n, 258 Pak T'ae-son, 126 Pak Tong-jin, 257 Pak Yong-hyo, 243 P'anmunjom, 32

p'ansori, 17 Park Chung Hee, 77, 96, 229; assassination of, 42, 278, 299, 307; assassina- tion of, effect of, 52; attempted

assassination of, 40, 288, 304; coup

d'etat of, xxxvii, 38, 96, 140, 277, 312;

election of, 39, 277; martial law

declared by, 40, 307; national emergency declared by, 39-40; obsession of, for development, 42-43 Park Chung Hee government: agricultural economy under, 46; banks under,

141; business under, 43; censorship

under, 246-47; economic development

under, 43-45, 137, 141, 234; economy

under, 38, 41, 143, 171; emergency

measures of, 40; family planning pro- gram under, 78; human rights vio- lations under, 244, 306; industry restructured under, 144; military

under, 276, 277; objectives of, 277; opposition to, 46; provost marshal under,

315; purge of bureaucracy by, 212;

revival of Confucianism under, xxvii; Saemaul Movement launched by, 84;

society under, 45-47; student opposition to, 54; violence used by, 240 Park Chun-kyu, 229 Park Tong Sun, 51 Park Yung-chul, 154

Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD),

xxxi, 199, 219, 222, 225; formed, 232-

33; groups in, 233 Peace Dam (South Korea), 72 PECC. See Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference

people's committees, 27

periodicals: censorship of, 246, 247; under

Sixth Republic, 248

Perry, Matthew C, 11 Persian Gulf conflict, xxiii Peru, 264

petrochemical industry, 144, 162

Philippines, 14

physicians: population per physician ratio, 131; women as, 106 Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea,

78 397
South Korea: A Country Study

poetry. See sijo P'ohang, 85, 152 Pohang Institute of Science and Technology, 192 Pohang Iron and Steel Company

(POSCO), 150, 152, 156, 192

police {see also Korean National Police): attacks by, on dissidents, 270; purges

in, 37; strong-arm tactics of, 306, 311; used for political purposes, 244, 307; weapons, 227

police boxes, 318-19; attacks on, 227

Police Consolidated Training School, 321

political compromise, xxxi

political institutions, 19-20

political protest; tradition of, 90

political unrest, 41; xxx; under Chang,

37; in June 1987, under United States occupation, 29-30

political values: Christian influence on, 90

politics: military in, 39-43

pollution, 86, 129

p'ongnyokpae (gangs), 325

population, 77-81; age distribution of, 84; density, 79-81; elderly, proportion of, xxvii, 190; factors affecting growth rate, 78; under fifteen years, 78; homogeneity of, 70, 75; of Koreans living overseas, 86, 88, 254; male-female ratio in, xxvii; median age of, 78; minorities in, 75; policies, xxvii; projected, 79, 81;

rural, 84

population, urban (see also population of

Seoul), 84; in Choson Dynasty, 81 ; defined, 84; density, 81; effect of migration on, 84, 85; growth rate, 85; increase in, 35-36, 45-46, 85; under

Japanese occupation, 81; effect of migration on, 84, 85; in 1940, 81; in 1945, 81; in 1985, 81; projected, 84

population growth rate, xxvii, 29, 77-78,

79, 85

population of Seoul, 84, 85; in eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries, 81; growth

rate, 85; in 1985, 85; in 1990, xxv

population of South Korea: in 1949, 77; in 1985, 77, 84; in 1989, 78; in 1990, xxv POSCO. See Pohang Iron and Steel Company

poverty, 143, 177 PPD. See Party for Peace and Democracy

practical learning. See Sirhak Movement

precipitation, 75, 165

president, 206-8; conduct of foreign policy by, 251; elections for, xxx-xxxi, 39, 206; legal immunity of, 206; power of, xxx, 39, 206-7, 209; succession of, 206;

transfer of power between, 201

Presidential Election Law (1987), 206

Presidential Secretariat, 207, 209, 210

Presidential Security Force, 41

press. See media

Press Ethics Commission Law, 246-47 Primakov, Yevgeni, 258 prime minister, 209

prisons, 329 Proclamation of Independence, 20

professional associations, xxxii, xxxiii, 200, 235-36

Proletarian Artists' Federation, 22-23

Protestant Farmers Association, 170

public enterprises: areas of, 149; cate- gories of, 150; employment in, 150;

privatization of, 150; purged by Chun,

58; role of, 149-50; role of, in economic

restructuring, 141

public health, 128-31, 133

public safety, 312-13 Pukhan River, 72 pukpang chongch 'aek. See Nordpolitik

Pulguksa Temple, 15, 128

purges: under Chun, 57-58, 212, 220,

312; ofjournalists, 250, 308; of Korean

Central Intelligence Agency, 312; under Park, 212, 316; under Roh, 212

Pusan: administration of, 214; demonstrations in, 271; martial law declared

in, 42; population of, 84; population

density of, 81; population growth in, 85; religious believers in, 127; student demonstrations in, 42 P'yongan Province, 77 P'yongminyon. See Study Group for Peaceful and Democratic Reunification P'yongt'aek coastal plain, 72 P'yongyang, 6 Pyonhan confederation, 4, 5

Qin Dynasty, 4, 323 Qing Dynasty, 11, 14 Qin Shi Huangdi, 4

race (minjok). See ethnic identity

398
Index

radio, 182-83, 250; censorship of, 246; under Sixth Republic, 248

railroads, 181-82; Blue Train, 182; under United States occupation, 29 Rangoon bombing, 270, 304 RDP. See Reunification Democratic Party Ready Made Life (Ch'ae Man-sik), 22 Reagan, Ronald, 52; support by, for Chun, 56 Red Banner Bandits, 8

reeducation programs, 58, 240, 308

reform movement (1898), 12

refugees, 84; number of, 95; after World

War II, 95

religion (see also under individual religions), 122-28; ancestor worship, 11; commit- ment to, xxvi-xxvii; new religions, 124-27, 128; role of, 128; shamanism,

122-23

repatriation, 86, 88, 95, 258

Republic of Korea. See South Korea

Republic of Korea-United States of America Mutual Defense Treaty, 297-98

research and development, 191; in defense industry, 279; government emphasis on, 146; in science and technol- ogy, 191 Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology, 192

reserve forces, 287

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC),

290

retail trade, 171

reunification (t'ongil), 250; basic princi- ples of, 261-62; choice for, over in- dependence, 30; desire for, 109; ethnic

identity as element in desire for, 75; of

families, xxxv; Kim Young Sam's

views concerning, 41-42; policy, in constitution, 202; Roh's proposal for, xxxvi; strategy for, 314

Reunification Democratic Party (RDP),

199, 216, 219, 222, 225, 258; merger

of, with New Democratic Republican

Party, xxxi; young politicians in, 231 Rhee, Syngman, xxxvii, 12, 25; campaign by, for independence, 30; elected president, 31, 33-34; exiled, 37; family planning program under, 78; as head of provisional government, 27; and military involvement in intelli- gence, 314; society under, 35-36

Rhee government: businesses under, 147; corruption in, 147; difficulties in, 33; education under, 114-15; human rights violations under, 244; internal security

policy of, 306; legacy of, for economic

development, 141; martial law declared

by, 33; media censorship by, 246; mili- tary under, 276; overthrow of, 240;

political environment under, 33-34; re- elected, 33; violence by, 239-40, 244

Ricci, Matteo, 123

rivers, 3, 72

roads, 178, 181 Roh government (Sixth Republic), 225; Agency for National Security Planning

under, 313; arrests for political offenses under, 245; constitutional framework

of, 201; demonstrations against, 221; four-way talks in National Assembly

during, 223, 225; labor unrest under,

175; political appointments in, 221;

press freedom under, 248; purge of bureaucracy by, 212; reform under,

199; rehabilitation of those purged by

Chun, 221; violence used by, 240 Roh Tae Woo, xxx, 63, 199, 247, 316; campaign of, 216; career of, 228; as member of Chun junta committee, 56;

political goals, 219-20; public relations campaign of, 216-17; speech of, to United Nations, 255; summit of, with Gorbachev, 259 ROK. See South Korea

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 24 ROTC. See Reserve Officer Training

Corps

rural sector: age distribution in, 84; de- velopment in, 137, 138; income in, 168, 239; living conditions in, 176; women

in, 106

Russia: influence of, 14; treaty with, 12 Russo-Japanese War, 14, 273

Saemaul Movement (Saemaul undong)

(New Community Movement): agricul- tural productivity under, 47; under Chun, 57, 58, 169; deterioration of, 169; established, 44, 47; focus of, 47; impact of, on class structure, 97; impact of, on farmers, 47, 97; under Park,

84; projects of, 169; reforestation in, 167, 169 399
South Korea: A Country Study

Saemaul undong. See Saemaul Movement

Sammint'u. See Struggle Committee for the Liberation of the Masses, the At- tainment of Democracy, and the Unifi- cation of the Nation

Samsung Group, 147, 157, 192, 249; defense production by, 296

sangmin class, 91, 93 Ssangyong Motors, 160

sanitation, 129

savings, domestic: growth, 44; for invest- ment, 154; in 1960-62, 153; in 1970-

72, 153; in 1975, 153; in 1979, 153; in 1980, 153; in 1987, 153; in 1989, 154;

ratio of, to gross national product, 137

school, middle, 46, 47, 115

school, primary, 115, 116; teachers, 116

school, private (sdwdri), 114

school, secondary, 46, 47, 115, 116, 117

science and technology: access to, 279; de- velopment of, 145; programs in higher

education, 191, 192; promotion of, 192; research and development in, 191 SCNR. See Supreme Council for National Reconstruction SCNSM. See Special Committee for National Security Measures

Sea of Japan, 5 seasons, 75 Second Army, xxxix, 282

Securities and Exchange Commission,

155

securities market, 172

security, internal, 303-8, 310-11

Security Consultative Meeting, in 1989, 302-3; in 1990, xl Segye ilbo, 127 Sejong (King), 10, 112

Sekai nippo, 127

Self-Strengthening Society (Chaganghoe), 200

semiconductor industry, xxviii Seoul: administration of, 214-15; air ser- vice in, 182; core zones in, 85; demonstrations in, 271; employment in, 156; migration to, 81, 85; population of, in 1990, xxv, 85; population density of, 81; public transportation in, 181; reli- gious believers in, 127; student demonstrations in, 42; temperature in, 75 Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils (Soch'ongnyon), 242

Seoul Bank, 172

Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 234

Seoul Criminal Court, 313

Seoul Imperial University, 118

Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit Company, 181 Seoul National University, 98, 118, 214

service industry, 145, 170-72, 174-75; elements of, xxviii; growth in, xxviii; share of, in gross national product, 193 Seven-Year Economic Development Plan, 36 shamanism, 90, 122-23; on Cheju Island, 106; in Choson Dynasty, 106; influence

of, on social system, 70; kut (services)

in, 122, 123; revival of, xxvi shamans (mudang), 93, 106, 122 Shin-Han Bank, 172

shipbuilding industry, 156, 157-58; coproduction in, 277-78; decline in, 158; defense production by, 296; government emphasis on, 142, 144; new orders for, 158; projected expansion of, 158

sijo (poetry), 16-17

Silla Dynasty, 7, 123

Silla Kingdom, xxiii, 5, 7; art in, 15; mili- tary in, 271, 272; rivalry of, with Paekche Kingdom, 77 Simmindang. See New Democratic Party

Sin Chong-il, 218

Sin Hyon-hwak, 54

Sin Ik-hui, 34, 37 Sino-Japanese War, First, 14, 273

Sino-Japanese War, Second, 21, 23 Sino-Russian treaty (1896), 14

Sin tonga (New East Asia) magazine, 250

Sirhak Movement (practical learning), 1 1

123

slavery, 93, 94 Sobaek Range, 5, 71 So Chae-p'il, 12, 243

Soch'ongnyon. See Seoul Area Federation

of Student Councils

social class, 96-99; influence of education

on, 116

Social Democratic Party, 218

social institutions, 19-20

socialism: influence of, on literature, 22-

23

socialist countries: ties with, 252; trade

with, 254

Social Purification Campaign, 308 400
Index

Social Safety Act, 311

social security insurance programs, 133

social services: government spending on, 146

social structure, 88-96; Confucian in- fluence on, 69-70; inequality in, 97; in- fluence of urbanization on, 69

social values, 88-91; population density

as a factor in, 81

society: military in, 279-81; under Park, 45-47; under United States occupation, 29-30 SOFA. See Status of Forces Agreement

Sogang University, 193-94 Sokkuram Grotto, 15, 128 So Kyong-won, 263 Somjin River, 72 Song Dynasty, 8, 323 Songgyungwan, 114 Songui Girls' School, 107 Sonjo (King), 273

Soul simmun, 249 South Korea: establishment of, xxiv, 3, 30-31 South Korea-Japan Ministerial Meeting

(1969), 160 South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, 28 South Korean Workers' Party, 28, 305-6

Soviet-American trusteeship, 25, 27, 28, 274

Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 258

Soviet Institute of World Economy and

International Relations (IMEMO), 258

Soviet Ministry of Light Industry, 189

Soviet Union (see also Commonwealth of Independent States; Russia), 30; as agent in diplomatic affairs, 258; decla- ration of war against Japan by, 24; in- vasion of Korea and Manchuria by, 24; joint venture with, 189; Koreans living

in, 86; occupation by, xxiv, 27; role of, in Korean War, 32; support of, for North Korea, 302; ties with, xxxiii- xxxiv, 61 , 252; trade office of, in Seoul, 258; trade with, xxxii, 188, 189, 257

Soviet Union-South Korean relations, 256-59

sowon. See school, private

Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM), 56, 308

Special Forces, 240, 308

Special Warfare Command, 228

Stalin, Josef V., 24

State Council (cabinet), 207, 208-10; con- duct of foreign policy by, 251; Roh's

appointments to, 221

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),

xl-xli

steel industry, xxviii, 139, 141, 156-57; government emphasis on, 144, 150

Steinberg, David I., 97, 98, 143, 147, 177

sterilization, 78-79

Story ofLady Sa, The (Kim Man-jung), 17

strikes, 175, 226, 242, 249-50, 305; gov- ernment policies restricting, 238-39; by

Hyundai workers, 226, 242; in late 1980s, 175, 220

Struggle Committee for the Liberation of

the Masses, the Attainment of Democracy, and the Unification of the Nation

(Sammint'u), 241

Student Defense Corps, xxxvii; abolished,

xxxviii, 280

student demonstrations, 54, 121-22, 226, 307, 308; as cause of Chun's demise,

62; under Chang, 37; in Choson Dynasty, 121; against Chun, 63; against

Japanese rule, 20, 121; in Kwangju,

55, 241, 308; for new constitution, 53; against Park, 121; against relations with Japan, 39; against Rhee, 121;

against Roh, 221; tradition of, 90, 114,

121; against United States, 63; violence during, 240-41; women in, 107-8; after Y.H. Incident, 42

student dissidents, xxvi, 62, 241-43; campaigns by, to amend 1972 constitution,

40; concept of minjung promoted by, 99, 121; conscripted as punishment, 240, 279-80; detained, 314; folk drama by,

17; as followers of Kim Dae Jung, 53; hypothesized control of, by North

Korea, 304-5; police treatment of, 322;

political agenda of, 221; public sympathy for, 62; released by Ch'oe, 52; re- strictions on, 40; revisionist history of, 62-63; Rhee government overthrown

by, 240; violence by, xxxiii, 241-43

students, xxxvii; limited job opportunities for, 116, 119; in 1980, 54; opposition of, to Chun, 54; opposition of, to Park government, 46, 54; as percentage

of population, xxvi; political demands,

54; status of, 114; violence renounced

by, 242 401
South Korea: A Country Study

Study Group for Peaceful and Democratic

Reunification (P'yongminyon), 233

suicide, 119-20

Sui Dynasty, 7, 272 Sunkyong, 147, 258 Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), 38, 246-47, 306, 312 Supreme Court, 211, 223-24, 313, 323,

329; appointment of justices to, 206, 210 Supreme Prosecution Administration, 325

surnames, 102

Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, 277-78, 297

Tactical Air Control Center, 286 T'aebaek Range, 5, 71 Taedong River, 4, 7 Taegu, 77; administration of, 214; population of, 84; religious believers in, 127; student demonstrations in, 42 Taegu Seven Stars, 316

Taejo (King), 272

Taejon: administration of, 214; govern- ment agencies moved to, xxv; military

headquarters moved to, xxxix, 85; population of, 84

Taejong-gyo, 109, 126 Taft-Katsura Agreement, 14

Tale of a Yangban (Pak Chi-won), 17, 92

Tale of Hong Kil-tong, The (Ho Kyun), 17 Tang Dynasty, 7, 272, 323 Tan'gun, 109; worship of, 109, 126

teachers, 116, 117, 118; examinations for, 213; union for, 117-18, 236

teachers' associations, 236 Team Spirit exercises, xl Tears of Blood, 22

technology. See high-technology industry; science and technology

Tekhsnabeksport, 258

telecommunications, 182-83; industry,

141, 149

telephones, 182

television, 182-83, 250; in rural areas, 47; under Sixth Republic, 248

temperature, 75

terrorism: by North Korea against South

Korea, xxxv, xxxvi, 269; against United

States representatives in South Korea,

60, 221; measures to counter, 280

textile industry, xxviii, 161; exports by,

161, 189 Third Army, xxxviii-xxxix, 281-82, 283 Third Military Academy, 290, 291 Three Kingdoms period (see also Koguryo

Kingdom; Paekche Kingdom; Silla Kingdom), xxiii, 4-7, 76, 323; central government in, 19; cultural expression

under, 15-18, 19-20; religion in, 123;

society under, 15-20; stratified social system in, 19

timber, 167-68, 257 TK Division (TK Mafia), 229

Tonga ilbo (East Asia Daily), 246, 247,

248, 250 Tonga Press, 250 Tonghak Movement (Eastern Learning

Movement), 124, 243 Tonghak Rebellion, 12, 14, 273

t'ongil. See reunification T'ongilgyo. See Unification Church

Tong-nip simmun (The Independent), 12 Tongui University incident, 226, 227

torture, 243, 244, 311, 322

tourism, 171

trade, foreign: under constitution, 204; dependence on, 184; disputes over, 186; diversification of, 252, 254; poli- cy, 188; record, 254; surplus, 188, 255; value of, 188

trade deficit, 183

traditional culture: attraction of, 108-9; government use of, 109; revival of, xxvi

transportation systems, 178, 181-82; bus

system, 181; civil aviation, 182; rail- roads, 181-82; roads, 178-81; sub- ways, 181-82

Trans-Siberian Railway, 14, 181 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, xli Treaty of Portsmouth, 273 Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), 14 Truman, Harry S, 24 Tumen River, 3, 70, 272 Turkey, 157 typhoons, 75

Uibangyuch'wi (Great Collection of Medicines and Prescriptions), 130

Ullung: land area of, 71 Ulsan, 85, 157, 162, 168 402
Index

Unification Church (Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of the World

Christianity), 126-27

Unified Party (Ilche Party), 218 United Democratic Youth Association, 218 United Nations, 30, 32; activities in, 263-64; admission to, xxxvi; bid for ad- mission to, 264

United Nations Command, xl, 298, 301 United Nations forces, 276

United Nations General Assembly: Roh's

speech to, 255 United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, 36 United Nations Temporary Commission

on Korea, 30 United States: cooperation, 302-3;

emigration to, xxiii; foreign aid from,

36, 43, 141, 183; influence of, on education, xxiii, 114; influence of, in South Korea, xxiii; Koreans living in, 86;

liberation of Korea by, xxiv; Philippines occupied by, 14; policy toward

Korea, 25-26; role of, in Korean War,

32; role of, in Kwangju uprising, 256;

terrorist attacks against, 60, 221, 241,

242; ties of, with Choson Dynasty, 25;

treaties with, 12 United States Air Force: aircraft patrols, 301-2; assignments, 301; personnel, 301 United States Army Military Government, xxiv, 27, 243, 246, 274, 324; demonstrations against, 30 United States Army Special Warfare

School, 228 United States Department of the Treasury, 188 United States forces in South Korea, xxiii, xxxvii, 255-56, 297, 298-99, 301-2;

financial support for, xl, 256; proposed

reduction of, xl, xli, 51, 256; role of, in Kwangju uprising, xxxvii, 56, 60, 241, 256, 298-99, 301-2; role of, in Olympic security, 271, 302; strategic planning by, 301; withdrawal of, 51, 52 "United States Government Statement on Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980," 299, 301 United States Information Service (USIS), 241, 242 United States Marine Corps, 302

United States Military Airlift Command,

302 United States Navy, 302 United States occupation, xxiv, 25-31; withdrawal of forces under, 31, 274

United States Pacific Command, 302 United States Pacific Fleet, 302 United States-Republic of Korea Combined Field Army, xl, xli, 301 United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC), xxxix,

xl, 298; structure of, 298 United States-Republic of Korea Ground

Component Command, xl United States-South Korea military rela- tions, xxxvii, 255; assistance in, 51; grant aid from, 293; coproduction of

materiel in, 269, 277-78, 285, 286, 295; improvement in, 277

United States-South Korea relations, 232, 255-56; under Chun, 59-60; economic,

xxvii; effect of Koreagate on, 51; his- tory of, 255; political, 256; trade, xxiii, 189, 190, 255 United States-Soviet joint commission,

25, 26 Urban Industrial Mission, 128

urbanization, xxv, 81, 84-86; class struc- ture altered by, 96; effect of economic

policies on, 35; influence of modernization on, 96; influence of, on mental

health, 129; influence of, on population

growth, 78; influence of, on social struc- ture, 69, 244 urban sector: development in, 138; in- come in, 168, 176; living conditions in, 176 USIS. See United States Information

Service USSR. See Soviet Union

utilities industry, 141

Vantage Point, 249 Vietnam War: troops to fight in, 39, 51, 277

Village Forestry Associations, 167

violence: against government, 240; gov- ernment use of, 239-40; political, 270; by p'ongnyokpae, 325

voting: for president, 33

WAC. See Women's Army Corps

403
South Korea: A Country Study

wages: average, 175; in business, 174; in- creases in, in late 1980s, 176; for manual workers, 175; necessary, 175; for semi-skilled workers, 175-76; for unskilled workers, 176 Wang Kon, 7 Washington Times, 127 weapons: acquisition of new, 271, 295; coproduced, 160, 286, 295; domestically produced, 160, 295-96 Wei Dynasty, 5, 323 Western Europe: coprOduction of materiel with, 269; trade with, 189 Western influence, xxiv, 12, 273; banned,

11; campaign for independence from,

12; in China, 11; in Japan, 11; on legal system, 323; on social system, 70 West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany

wholesale trade, 171 Wickham, John A., Jr., 56 women: in the army, 284; changing role

of, 104-8; of Cheju Island, 77, 106; comportment of, 107; crimes against, 325; discrimination against, 97, 104; duty of, to provide male heir, 104; education of, 107, 119; in family relations, 103, 105; household duties of, 107; in Korean National Police, 321; in neo- Confucianism, 104; in politics, 221; powers of, 106; rights of, 105; segre- gation of, 105-6; as shamans, 122; sta- tus of, in Choson Dynasty, 104; status

of, in Koryo Dynasty, 104; urban

migration of, 108 women as workers, xxvii; in agriculture,

106; constitutional protection of, 203-4; demonstrations by, 41; in factories, 106; influence of, on population

growth, 78; in lower class, 108; after marriage, 108; number of, 108; in

offices, 106; opportunities for, 119 Women's Army Corps (WAC), 284 won. See currency Wonbulgyo (W6n Buddhism), 126

workers: constitutional protection of, 203-4; demonstrations by, 41; in industry, 96, 156; under Japanese occupation, 95 working conditions, 175; in chaebol, 147; hours, 175, 176; industrial safety in, 178 World Bank, 184

World Youth and Student Festival, 226, 263 World War II, 24-25 wu bin. See Five Relationships

xiao. See filial piety

yakuza. ^Japanese gangsters Yalta Conference, 24 Yalu River, 3, 4, 5, 70, 271, 272

yangban (scholar-official elite), 10, 91, 94, 273; entry into, 20; families, 91-92;

honorary, 92; under Japanese occupation, 94; neo-Confucianism and, 89; power of, 20; requirements for, 92; vir- tues, 77; women, 105-6 Yellow Sea, 72 Yen, 4 Y.H. Incident, 41, 42 Y.H. Industrial Company, 41 Yi Chong-ch'an, 230 Yi Dynasty. See Chosn Dynasty

Yi Hwang (Yi T'oe-gye), 88 Yi Il-kyu, 223 Yi In-jik, 22 Yi Ki-baek (Ki-baik Lee), 11, 110 Yi Ki-bung, 34 Yi Ki-mun, 111 Yi Ki-t'aek, xxxii Yi Ki-y6ng, 23 Yi Kwang-su, 22 Yi 6-yong, 210 Yi Py6ng-ch'6l, 249 Yi Sang-hun, 303 Yi Sang-hwa, 23 Yi Se-ho, 316 Yi S6ng-gye, 102, 272; Choson Dynasty

founded by, 8-9; reforms by, in Koryo

Dynasty, 9 Yi Su-kwang, 11 Yi Sun-gi, 258 Yi Sun-sin, xxvi, 110, 272 Yi T'oe-gye (Yi Hwang), 88 Yongjo (King), 11 Yongsan plain, 72 Yonhap News Agency, 247, 249 Yonse University, 98, 118, 214 Yosu, 85, 162 Y6su-Sunch'6n rebellion, 31, 305 Y6 Un-hyong (Lyuh Woon Hyung), 28, 30 404
Index

Yuan Dynasty, 272, 323 yusin (revitalization) constitution. See ConYugoslavia, 264 stitution of 1972 Yun P'il-yong incident, 316 Yun Po-sSn, 37, 38, 40 Zhu Xi, 11, 88

405

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-87 Greece 550-98 Albania 550-78 Guatemala

550-44 Algeria 550-174 Guinea

550-59 Ancrnla 550-82 Guyana and Belize 550-73 A r ctr ntin a fll fc£ Clllllld 550-151 Honduras

550-169 Australia 550-165 Hungary

550-1 76 riUoll Aii QtriLCLa 550-21 India 550-1 75 RantrlaHpsri 550-154 Indian Ocean

\J550-170 sJ\J ± f \J Rpl cniim 550-39 Indonesia

xJU\J 550-66\J\J UUll Rnl l \/i V laa 550-68 *J \J\J \J\J Iran 550-20 Brazil 550-31 Iraq 550-168 Bulgaria 550-25 Israel 550-61 Rnrma UUi ±11 CI 550-182 Italy 550- 5fl CUU UUUla 550-30 Japan

550-166 Cameroon 550-34 Jordan

550-159 Chad 550-56 Kenya

550-77 Chile 550-81 Korea, North

\J\J\J 550-60\J\J China 550-41 Korcs. South 550-26 Colombia 550-58 Laos

OUIllilUJIl WCcxlLIl Vjal lUUCall, 550-24

Islands of the 550-91 Congo 550-38 Liberia 550-90 Costa Rica 550-85 Libya 550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 550-172 Malawi

550-1 52 Cuba 550-45 ivi cxi a. y old 550-22 Cyprus 550-161 Nlauritania OOU-l JO r> u i Czechoslovakia ^n 7Q ivlexico 550-36 Dominican Republic and 550-76 Mongolia

Haiti 550-52 Ecuador 550-49 Morocco

550-43 Egypt 550-64 Mozambique

550-150 El Salvador 550-35 Nepal and Bhutan

550-28 Ethiopia 550-88 Nicaragua 550-167 Finland 550-157 Nigeria 550-155 Germany, East 550-94 Oceania

550-173 Germany, Fed. Rep. of 550-48 Pakistan 550-153 Ghana 550-46 Panama

407
550-156 Paraguay 550-53 Thailand DDU-lOJ Persian Gulf States Tunisia 550-42 Peru 550-80 I urkey 550-72 Philippines 550-74 Uganda

550-162 Poland 550-9/ Uruguay

550-181 Portugal 550-71 Venezuela 550-160 Romania 550-32 Vietnam

D0\J-o/ Rwanda and Burundi DDK)— lOO Yemens, The

550-51 Saudi Arabia 550-yy Yugoslavia 550-70 C _ 1 Senegal 550-67 Zaire 550-180 Sierra Leone 550-75 Zambia

DDU-lo^r Singapore t\^n 171 Zimbabwe

550-86 Somalia 550-93 South Airica oou— Soviet Union

550-179 Spain 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-27 Sudan

550-47 Syria 550-62 Tanzania

<rU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1992 311-824/60005

408



PIN: 004205-000