United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 2011 Decided November 4, 2011 

No. 10-3024 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

PATRICK C. DAVID, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:93-cr-00306-1) 

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and John 

P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges. 
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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 1993 appellant 

Patrick C. David was convicted of several drug and firearm 

offenses relating to his possession of 427 grams of crack 

cocaine. In 1997, after his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1) was overturned in light of Bailey v. United States, 

516 U.S. 137 (1995), he was resentenced—to 188 months in 

prison. In 2008 he filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2), which authorizes district courts to reduce 

sentences when the Sentencing Commission has amended the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) to reduce the 

applicable sentencing range for an offense and has made the 

amendment retroactive. In this case David invoked the 

Sentencing Commission’s reductions in the offense level (and 

thus the sentencing range) for certain crack cocaine offenses. 

The district court denied David’s motion, noting on the record 

a host of facts about David’s criminal record and his 

disciplinary infractions in prison. David appeals, arguing that 

the district court failed to determine the extent of the 

reduction for which he was eligible before denying his 

motion. In particular, he believes that the court may have 

underestimated the permissible reduction in the sentencing 

range, and that this hypothetical underestimate might have 

played a role in the court’s refusal to make any reduction at 

all. Although we agree with David that a motion under 

§ 3582(c)(2) requires the court first to compute the sentence 

reduction available, we find that the record here establishes 

that it did so. 

* * * 

Section 3582(c)(2) allows the court, “upon motion of the 

defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” to reduce 

a sentence in cases where the applicable guideline range has 
3

been reduced. In responding to such a motion, the district 

court must engage in a “two-step inquiry.” Dillon v. United 

States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010). The court must first 

“determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence 

modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” Id.; 

see USSG § 1B1.10(b). Only then may the court consider the 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide “whether the 

authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part.” 

Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691. Dillon thus structures the district 

court’s decision so that it first resolves the range of its legal 

authority, and then looks to a broad array of factors that may 

influence its discretion within that range. 

David contends that the district court never met its 

obligation to determine the extent of the sentence reduction 

for which he was eligible. He faults the court for not 

explicitly stating that he was eligible for a 37-month 

reduction, particularly in light of two probation office 

memoranda submitted to the court that confused both David’s 

original sentencing range and the new range to which his 

sentence could have been reduced. 

Although David’s sentencing history was complex, we 

find no trace of the probation office’s confusion in the court’s 

ruling. He had been sentenced in 1994 for possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine base, and the court correctly noted 

that this implied an offense level of 33; given his criminal 

history category of II (which has never changed), the court 

observed that that level entailed a range of 151 to 188 months. 

See Mem. & Order, United States v. David, No. 93-306, at 1-2 

(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2010) (“District Court Decision”). Thus the 

court clearly understood the range resulting from offense level 

33 for someone with David’s criminal history. With an 

additional mandatory and consecutive five years added for use 

of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1), the total 1994 sentence was 211 months. Id. 
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On appeal we vacated David’s five-year sentence under 

§ 924(c)(1). United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). As removal of that sentence brought related gun 

possession enhancements under USSG § 2D1.1(b) into play, 

we remanded to the district court for application of those 

enhancements. See United States v. Rhodes, 106 F.3d 429, 

432-33 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding no constitutional or 

statutory bar to such a procedure). Resentencing David in 

1997, the district court added two offense levels, yielding a 

level of 35. The court here correctly observed that offense 

level 35 entailed a range of 188 to 235 months and that David 

had been resentenced, at the lower end of that range, to 188 

months. District Court Decision at 2. 

Finally, the court observed that the Sentencing 

Commission’s 2007 amendment for crack cocaine provided 

for a “two level reduction.” Id. 

In short, the court expressed a clear understanding (1) that 

the 1997 188-month sentence had been at level 35, with a 188 

to 235 month range, (2) that offense level 33 implied a 151 to 

188 month range, and (3) that David was eligible for a twolevel reduction in offense level. David in effect asks us to 

believe that the court, having handled all these numbers 

completely accurately, either failed to do the simple arithmetic 

of subtracting two from 35 and getting 33, or that somehow 

after making that subtraction it had forgotten its statement, 

about 12 lines higher on the same page, that level 33 entailed 

a range of 151 to 188 months. We cannot believe that. 

Of course the district court could have averted any risk of 

appellate (or defendant) doubt by expressly stating the 

maximum reduction permitted by § 3582(c)(2). As we have 

said, “Justice is better served through clarity on the record.” 

In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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But where, as here, the court’s ruling reflects an accurate 

grasp of all the relevant information as to offense levels and 

sentencing ranges, as discussed above, we are confident in 

inferring that the district court performed the basic arithmetic 

needed to understand its authority to grant a reduction of up to 

37 months. Unlike the situation in United States v. Lawson, 

494 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2007), where we could not be sure 

of the “starting point” for the court’s application of the 

§ 3553(a) factors, id. at 1058, here we have adequate grounds 

for inferring that the court knew that point exactly. The court 

fulfilled its obligation to determine the extent of the reduction 

authorized. We thus have no basis for thinking that a 

misunderstood starting or ending point could have skewed its 

exercise of discretion. 

* * * 

The decision of the district court is 

Affirmed.