J-S11038-17

2017 PA Super 67

T.K.

v.

A.Z. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1261 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2016-2624

BEFORE: OLSON, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 14, 2017

A.Z. (“Appellant”) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Cambria County granting the petition for Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) filed 

by his former wife, T.K. (“Appellee”). After careful review, we affirm.

Appellant and Appellee were married for eleven years before they 

separated in March 2009. The couple share custody of their minor children. 

As the parties had a strained relationship following their separation, they 

exchanged custody of the children at a local police station and were required 

by a court order to communicate through a court-monitored application. On 

July 20, 2016, Appellee filed for the PFA against Appellant. On August 3, 

2016, the lower court held a PFA hearing at which both parties testified. 

____________________________________________

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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellee alleged that Appellant had harassed and stalked her 

throughout the seven years following their separation; Appellee identified 

exact dates of recent incidents as recorded in her diary. Appellee accused 

Appellant of putting a nail in the tire of her car on July 9, 2016, while she 

took their children to their therapy appointment. Although Appellant was 

not allowed to contact Appellee by a previous court order, Appellant would 

have the children and other individuals “scream stuff into the phone” to 

Appellee on repeated occasions. N.T. Hearing, 8/3/16, at 5-6.

In addition, Appellee testified to numerous instances in which she felt 

that Appellant was stalking her. Appellee contended that Appellant would 

follow her in her vehicle almost every day, drive past her, and honk his car 

horn. Appellee noticed numerous times that Appellant was following her 

around the local grocery store. Appellee claimed that, at the local football 

game, Appellant would follow her when she would go to the bathroom as 

well as sit near her in the stands and make comments about her within 

earshot. On another occasion, Appellee and the children detected Appellant 

watching them and hiding while they were sled riding. Appellee asserted 

that Appellant would constantly call their children, tell them he was near 

Appellee’s home, and honk his car horn as he passed by. As a result of 

Appellant’s behavior, Appellee expressed fear and concern for her safety.

Appellant testified and denied all of Appellee’s allegations, but offered 

no explanation or any specific response to Appellee’s assertions. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the lower court entered an order granting Appellee 
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the PFA against Appellant. In doing so, the lower court found Appellee did 

not present sufficient evidence to show that Appellant was responsible for 

the nail found in her car tire. Nevertheless, the lower court found Appellee 

testified credibly to Appellant’s behavior, which it characterized as stalking 

and harassment. The lower court indicated that its order would be in effect 

for the statutory period of three years. Appellant filed this timely appeal and 

complied with the lower court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises two issues for our review on appeal:

(1) Whether the entry of a Protection from Abuse Order and 

finding of abuse following hearing [sic] is contrary to the 

evidence presented and as such an error of law?

(2) Whether the entry of a Protection from Abuse Order 

following hearing for a period of three (3) years is contrary 

to the evidence presented and as such an abuse of 

discretion?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Our standard of review is well-established: “[i]n the context of a PFA 

order, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law or 

abuse of discretion.” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa.Super. 

2014). This Court has emphasized that “[t]he purpose of the PFA Act is to 

protect victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate such abuse, 

with the primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” 

Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2008). The 
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PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122, defines “abuse,” in relevant part, as 

follows:

“Abuse.” The occurrence of one or more of the following acts 

between family or household members, sexual or intimate 

partners or persons who share biological parenthood:

***

(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or 

repeatedly committing acts toward another person, 

including following the person, without proper authority, 

under circumstances which place the person in reasonable 

fear of bodily injury. The definition of this paragraph 

applies only to proceedings commenced under this title 

and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions 

commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and 

offenses).

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a).

On appeal, Appellant concedes that he acted in the manner described 

by Appellee at the PFA hearing, but argues that his behavior, while it may be 

considered “rude,” “fall[s] far short of the definition of abuse as set forth in 

the statute.” Appellant’s Brief, at 11. Moreover, Appellant asserts that 

Appellee “never testified to being afraid of or even having a fear of 

Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13. We disagree.

Appellant’s behavior falls squarely within the definition of abuse in 

Section 6102(a) which includes “[k]nowingly engaging in a course of conduct 

or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including following the 

person, without proper authority, under circumstances which place the 

person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). Appellant 

does not contest Appellee’s assertions that he repeatedly followed her in his 
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vehicle, in the local grocery store, at sporting events, and in other locations. 

Appellant does not deny that he kept track of Appellee’s whereabouts, and 

constantly drove past her home and honked the car horn. Appellant 

concedes that he tried to yell to Appellee while talking to their children on 

the telephone despite a court order requiring him to communicate through a 

court-monitored application. This course of conduct constitutes abuse within 

the definition set forth under the PFA Act.

We also reject Appellant’s assertion that Appellee never testified to 

being afraid of or even having a fear of Appellant. At the hearing, Appellee 

testified as follows:

You don’t know what it’s like to walk in a store and wonder 

is this the time he does something, is this going to be the 

time I get shot. I can’t sleep. My family is not safe. People 

walk with me to and from my car at work. Why can’t I go in the 

store and shop without him being behind me making noises or 

letting me know he’s there[?]

When [Appellant] gets angry, I feel threatened. 

When [Appellant] doesn’t like something that happens in court, 

harassment happens. There’s a pattern before and after 

hearings. When he doesn’t like something the Court does, you 

know, he gets other people to engage in these behaviors with 

him.

***

What am I to [Appellant]? If he doesn’t follow the Court 

Orders and he doesn’t care when people tell him to stop, what 

am I to him? Why wouldn’t he hurt me? This [PFA petition] 

is the only thing, Your Honor, that has given me peace for the 

last three weeks. My kids are doing better. They’re sleeping. 

They’re not upset. It’s stressful when someone is screaming into 

the phone. We don’t act like that at my house. It’s stressful, 

and this is the only thing that has given me peace. This is the 

most peace I have had in seven years. And it needs to stop.
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N.T. Hearing, 8/3/16, at 15 (emphasis added). Although Appellee did not 

use the specific word “fear,” she clearly testified to her deep concern for her 

safety, opining that Appellant’s behavior would eventually escalate from 

repetitive stalking to seeking to cause her bodily harm. Accordingly, we 

conclude there is sufficient evidence to support to justify the entry of the 

PFA order as Appellant engaged in a repeated course of conduct which 

placed Appellee in reasonable fear of bodily injury. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102.

Appellant also asserts that the lower court abused its discretion as the 

length of the PFA order is “excessive.” Appellant’s Brief, at 15. However, 

other than this bald, one-sentence assertion, Appellant offers no authority or 

analysis to support this claim. “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide 

any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to 

develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that 

claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 604 Pa. 176, 191, 985 A.2d 

915, 924 (2009) (citations omitted). As a result, we find this argument is 

waived for lack of development.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/14/2017