Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A05-1609-CR-2244 | May 3, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jacob P. Wahl

Ripstra Law Office

Jasper, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Corey A. Wharton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 3, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

82A05-1609-CR-2244

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Hon. David D. Kiely, Judge

The Hon. Michael J. Cox, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No. 

82C01-1606-F6-3598

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A05-1609-CR-2244 | May 3, 2017 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Defendant Corey Wharton appeals from his convictions for theft and 

resisting law enforcement, which arose from an incident where he was observed 

shoplifting merchandise in an Evansville department store. After being advised 

of the perils of self-representation, Wharton chose to proceed pro se. Wharton 

consistently advanced the argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction 

over him due to his alleged “Moorish” nationality. Wharton represented 

himself at trial, after which a jury found Wharton guilty of theft and resisting 

law enforcement, both as Class A misdemeanors. Wharton then pled guilty to 

the enhanced charge of Level 6 felony theft, and the trial court sentenced him to 

two years of incarceration for theft and one year for resisting law enforcement, 

both sentences to be served concurrently in therapeutic work release. Wharton 

contends that the record establishes that his waiver of counsel was not made 

voluntarily and intelligently. Because we disagree, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of June 17, 2016, Felicia Johnson, a security camera operator at 

Dillard’s department store in Evansville, observed Wharton shoplifting clothing 

inside the store. Johnson recognized Wharton because he is her first cousin. 

Johnson notified Evansville Police Officer Stephen Kleeman, then working 

security part-time for Dillard’s, who confronted Wharton. Because Wharton 

did not cooperate with Officer Kleeman, he called for additional officers. 
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Wharton remained belligerent when officers attempted to pat him down before 

placing him in a police cruiser. 

[3] On June 21, 2016, the State charged Wharton with Level 6 felony theft and 

Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. At a hearing on June 30, 

2016, Wharton informed the trial court that he intended to represent himself, 

and the trial court advised him as follows: 

THE COURT: Let me, I have to advise you of the perils of 

representing yourself, I know we’ve been through this before, but 

I want to make a record on this. First of all sir I am advising you 

that I think it’s best if you had an attorney because they have 

experience that you don’t have and the education that you don’t 

have, do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And also I’m going to have to hold you at the 

same standard that I would an attorney when it comes to trial 

procedure and the trial rules and the evidence rules, do you 

understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand you’ll be responsible for 

making arguments, questioning the witnesses, and selecting 

jurors?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that an attorney has 

experience and trial strategies and (inaudible) that you may not 

have as far as (inaudible) questions so as not to open the door?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: The possible penalties in this case, it’s a level 6, 2 

1⁄2 years, minimum 6 months, you could be fined up to $10,000 

and the Court could enter judgment as an A misdemeanor. On 
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an A misdemeanor, maximum term 1 year, minimum no time, 

do you understand the range of penalties that could be imposed?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Tr. Vol. I pp. 4-5. 

[4] Wharton then asked permission to address the court:

THE DEFENDANT: Judge, my Honor, with all due respect to 

this Court and the men and women of the association, bar 

association of the United States of America, I concede in the 

name of law justice that I myself cannot be tried in this union 

states courtroom by said union states, law of land, and I have my 

legal proof right here sitting before me. The present union states 

municipal and civil law codes of demand is an incorporated 

political unit, a self-government established by the political 

powers of the general assembly of the union based on the running 

(inaudible) and the city of Philadelphia PA 1854 which governs 

all the Caucasian people, Christians and Jews of 1863 union 

states right republic (inaudible) to ever become citizens of this 

union state republic. I have my national card right here, I’m a 

Salvadoran citizen.

Tr. Vol. I pp. 5-6. The trial court took Wharton’s address to be a motion to 

dismiss, which it denied. Wharton told the trial court that his name was 

Majestic Shavazz El. The trial court also appointed standby counsel for 

Wharton. 

[5] At a hearing on July 26, 2016, Wharton rejected a plea offer from the State. 

When the trial court informed Wharton that he could not have hybrid 

representation and Wharton’s standby counsel said that he would be unable to 

make Wharton’s argument based on his alleged “Moorish Nationality,” 

Wharton chose to continue representing himself with standby counsel. Tr. Vol. 
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I p. 14. On August 1, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Wharton’s motion 

to suppress, and Wharton reiterated his Moorish-Nationality argument and 

once again rejected the State’s plea offer. The trial court denied Wharton’s 

jurisdictional claim and his motion to suppress. 

[6] On August 5, 2016, jury trial was held, at which Wharton immediately renewed 

his jurisdictional claim. When the trial court asked, Wharton refused to give 

his birthdate or social security number, and he repeatedly insisted on being 

addressed as Majestic Shavazz El. Wharton also made an objection (which the 

trial court overruled) to the deputy prosecutor on alleged conflict-of-interest 

grounds because he had represented Wharton in 2013 in a previous criminal 

matter. 

[7] Wharton made the following opening statement to the jury:

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. In this case, I don’t know if many of 

you know about the law, there’s a difference between legal and 

the law, policies and people’s rights. Today I’m defending 

myself, I’m not a lawyer, to prove my innocence in this case. 

You will see in this case, just like any of you, anybody can be 

wrongfully accused, anybody can be stereotyped, anybody can be 

targeted in any case if we allow this case to go on, but 

constitutionally you will see where my rights were violated. I 

was stereotyped, number one, then off a play of words I was 

sought out, I was, had a gun drawn on me, a taser gun, in front 

of my son, drawn on me in this case. I was thrown to the 

ground. I was dragged out of the Mall and I was just out 

shopping with my family and I wear a brace on my leg and they 

dragged me through the store and my shoe came off because my 

brace, it won’t stay on very well, but they drug me through the 

store and helped me put that brace and shoe back on and they 
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said that was resisting arrest. Also, I said I wish not for you to 

search me. So first you will see that I was accused and 

stereotyped off of hearsay, no personal knowledge of anybody 

shoplifting. You will see the video. I was followed through the 

store. I never pick up anything that I don’t pay for that I didn’t 

want and put back. I also will bring in Dillard’s receipts and 

they’re going to say, well we couldn’t find the pair of jeans, that 

doesn’t mean I committed a crime because it’s not against the 

law if I left something in the dressing room or someone picked it 

up, I don’t know, but it’s not a crime if I leave something in the 

dressing room. It’s not a crime and like ladies and gentlemen as 

you will see in this case, this is not just about me, this is about 

my constitutional rights. They still are in the play. They still 

have to follow policies. They still have to follow legal policies, 

Dillard’s shoplifting policies, security policies, he was working 

off duty in uniform as a Dillard’s security officer. He never 

approached me as a security officer, but yes, he had on his 

uniform so I know he’s a cop so I’m not going to go against that, 

I’m going to do what he ask me to do, but I have the right to 

know what is going on when I have no prior knowledge of why 

this man is wanting me to lay on the floor of Finish Line, in an 

Affidavit they said it was Foot Locker, I was never in Foot 

Locker, I was in Finish Line, and why do I need to lay on the 

ground and I have a right to say, hey, what’s going on, why am I 

being arrested officer, am I being detained. He says nothing, he 

just pull, he speaks to me with his taser and a beam at my head in 

front of my son. My son was crying, and you’re going to see this 

because I’m very passionate about this because you guys got kids 

and nobody needs to go through this and I rest my case right 

there.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 26-28. Wharton’s closing argument largely mirrored his opening 

statement, with him specifically alleging that he was targeted without probable 

cause and that the State failed to prove he intended to steal anything from 

Dillard’s. 
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[8] The jury found Wharton guilty of theft and resisting law enforcement, both as 

Class A misdemeanors. Wharton then pled guilty to the enhanced charge of 

Level 6 felony theft. On August 31, 2016, the trial court sentenced Wharton to 

two years of incarceration for theft and one year for resisting law enforcement, 

both sentences to be served concurrently in therapeutic work release. 

Discussion and Decision

Waiver of Counsel

[9] Wharton contends that his waiver of counsel was not made voluntarily and 

intelligently. 

The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the 

right to counsel before he may be tried, convicted, and punished. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed.

2d 562 (1975). This protection also encompasses an affirmative 

right for a defendant to represent himself in a criminal case. Id.

However, “[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions 

defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by 

their own unskilled efforts.” Id. at 834, 95 S. Ct. 2525. Because 

the defendant who waives his right to counsel and proceeds to 

trial unrepresented is forgoing “many of the traditional benefits 

associated with the right to counsel.... the accused must 

‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” 

Id. “[H]e should be made aware of the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation, so that that the record will 

establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 

with eyes open.’” Id. at 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. 

United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 

L. Ed. 268 (1942)). 
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There is no particular formula or script that must be read to the 

defendant. The information that must be given “will depend on 

a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant’s 

education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature 

of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.” Iowa v. Tovar,

541 U.S. 77, 88, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 158 L. Ed. 2d 209 (2004). 

Courts determining whether a waiver of counsel for trial was 

made voluntarily and intelligently must consider (1) the extent of 

the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other 

evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant 

understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, 

(3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the 

context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. We have 

drawn these factors from case law in the Seventh Circuit, see 

United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 2001), and applied 

them in situations as diverse as trial for battery, Poynter v. State,

749 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind. 2001), and for capital murder, Kubsch v. 

State, 866 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. 2007). 

Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 617-18 (Ind. 2011). 

[10] On June 30, 2016, the trial court advised Wharton of the perils of selfrepresentation, advice that Wharton does not claim was deficient in any 

respect. There are also other indications in the record that Wharton understood 

the perils of self-representation. On July 26, 2016, the trial court further 

discussed Wharton’s representation, with Wharton wanting to represent himself 

in part and have his standby counsel represent him in part, apparently so that

Wharton could make the Moorish-Nationality argument that his standby 

counsel refused to make but still have representation during trial. When the 

trial court told Wharton that he could not have hybrid representation, he again 

stated that he would represent himself. The above indicates that while 
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Wharton understood that he might be better served by having counsel during 

trial, he made the conscious choice to advance his Moorish-Nationality 

argument instead. 

[11] As a whole, the record indicates that Wharton’s background has provided him 

with a fairly thorough understanding of the criminal justice system. Although 

Wharton’s formal education is limited (he has earned a GED), he has a lengthy 

criminal history, including six prior felony convictions, several misdemeanor 

convictions, and two juvenile adjudications, dating back to 1993. Wharton’s 

actions while defending himself indicate that his lengthy association with the 

criminal justice system has taught him much. Prior to trial, Wharton filed 

several pro se motions. Before and during trial, Wharton advanced his MoorishNationality argument, raised an alleged conflict-of-interest claim against the 

deputy prosecutor, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, objected to questions 

by the State, presented his own evidence, chose not to testify, and made a 

cogent opening statement and final argument to the jury. Wharton’s education 

and background indicate that his waiver of counsel was voluntary and 

intelligent. 

[12] Wharton’s main argument is that his waiver of counsel occurred in a context of 

incompetence, pointing, of course, to his Moorish-Nationality argument as 

evidence of that alleged incompetence. Wharton argues that he relied heavily 

upon his belief system, which he describes as based on “‘radical political 

ideals’” or “detached from reality” to support his defense. Appellant’s Br. p. 9. 

While Wharton’s argument regarding his alleged Moorish nationality is wholly 
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without merit and could be described as peculiar, his decision to pursue it does 

not indicate incompetence. Indeed, a fair reading of the record indicates that 

the argument was likely intended to disrupt and frustrate the process, perhaps in 

an attempt to make such a nuisance of himself that the State would be willing to 

offer a better plea agreement.1 Be that as it may, the record clearly indicates 

that Wharton was able to present lucid, reasonable arguments based on actual 

legal concepts when it suited him, as he did during his opening statement and 

closing argument. The record in this case does not support a conclusion that 

Wharton was incompetent. As such, Wharton has failed to establish that his 

waiver of counsel was not voluntary and intelligent. 

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur. 

 

1

 It is worth noting that Wharton is the latest in a line of criminal defendants advancing variations of the 

argument that the courts of Indiana do not have jurisdiction over them due to their “Moorish” status. See, 

e.g., Brown v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1219, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Here, Ankh-El [a/k/a Brown] asserts that 

the trial court denied his request to retain ‘Consuls from the Moorish American Nation’ because they did not 

have licenses to practice law in Indiana.”) (bracketed material added); Taylor-Bey v. State, 53 N.E.3d 1230, 

1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Tyreese Taylor-Bey was convicted of murder. He now appeals, arguing that the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction based on his status as a ‘Moorish American National Sovereign’ and ‘Secured 

Party Creditor.’”).