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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAFAR AFSHAR,

NO. CIV. S-04-1088 LKK/JFM

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

CITY OF SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO

POLICE DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF

SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; and SHERIFF

LOU BLANAS, individually and in his

official capacity as Sheriff of the

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for

reconsideration of the court’s March 27, 2006 order. In that

order, the court denied cross-motions for summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s Monell claim, but granted defendants’ motion as to all

other claims raised in plaintiff’s complaint. The court also

granted defendants’ motion as to defendant Blanas’ liability in his

official capacity but denied defendants’ motion as to Blanas’

liability in his personal capacity. 

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a “court may relieve a

party . . . from final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons . . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief

from the operation of judgment.” Generally speaking, before

reconsideration may be granted there must be a change in the

controlling law or facts, the need to correct a clear error, or the

need to prevent manifest injustice. See United States v. Alexander,

106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In the case at bar, the court committed clear error when it

denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to

defendant Blanas’ liability in his personal capacity. On February

27, 2006, the court heard oral argument on the cross-motions for

summary judgment. During argument, the following dialogue took

place between the court and counsel for plaintiff (Mr. Gorski): 

COURT: Mr. Gorski, what you have argued, as best I can tell,

is whether or not there is a cause of action under Monell

against the County. You have not responded at all to any of

the other claims, and I assume that you have just waived

those? 

MR. GORSKI: Correct, your honor. 

A plain reading of the hearing transcript makes clear that

plaintiff’s counsel waived all his claims, with the exception of

the Monell claim against the county. It was therefore an error for

the court to deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the

claims against defendant Blanas. 

The court’s March 27, 2006 order is hereby AMENDED to include

the following language: with respect to all claims against

defendant Blanas, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

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GRANTED. The hearing on the motion for reconsideration originally

scheduled for May 15, 2006 is hereby VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 1, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 2:04-cv-01088-LKK -JFM Document 114 Filed 05/02/06 Page 3 of 3