Air University

Joseph J. Redden, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Command and Staff College

John W. Rosa, Col, Commandant

James M. Norris, Col, Dean

Stuart Kenney, Maj, Series Editor

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The Wright Flyer Papers

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Role of Airpower in

Urban Warfare

An Airman’s Perspective

TIMOTHY L. SAFFOLD

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 6

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

December 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are s

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US govern

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wr

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our s

dents to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in th

own professional development and in “advancing ae

space power.” The series title reflects our desire to p

petuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier gene

tions of airmen. Projects selected for publication comb

solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentat

in exploring war at the operational level. With this bro

perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an ecle

range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and 

erational questions. Some of these studies provide n

solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us 

leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. 

making these research studies available in the Wr

Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical exami

tion of the findings and to stimulate further research 

these areas.

John W. Rosa, Col, US

Commandant

iii

Preface

This research project addresses how I believe airpow

should be employed in urban warfare to achieve ope

tional and strategic results. I chose this topic becau

there is an apparent disconnection between how milit

planners and operators view urban combat and their awa

ness of airpower’s unique and potentially decisive con

butions in this environment. This disconnect could pr

disastrous for military forces operating on urban terrain

Urban warfare has been given considerable attention 

the United States Army and Marine Corps. Although th

concerns are soundly based on changes in the strate

environment, I believe their focus is misplaced at the ta

cal level of warfare. Airmen from all services need to reo

ent their thinking towards employing airpower to achi

“war-winning” operational and strategic results in this 

ficult environment. I sincerely hope this paper genera

new thought and debate on how urban warfare should 

planned and executed.

I wish to thank all of my Marine Corps, Army, Navy, a

Air Force war-fighting peers attending the Air Comma

and Staff College who patiently listened to my ideas a

graciously offered their suggestions. I especially want 

thank Maj Ed “K-9” Kostelnik, one of the few Air Fo

officers who has seriously been involved in studying urb

warfare, for his candid insight and arguments on the subjec

v

Abstract

Increased emphasis on urban warfare creates an urg

need for airmen to focus serious thought toward w

airpower’s role should be in this difficult environment. T

ditionally, military forces have viewed urban warfare 

infantry action executed at the tactical level of battle. T

emphasis on surface force employment stifles innovat

thought as to how military forces can achieve operatio

and strategic effects by employing airpower as the 

instrument of force in urban warfare.

Airpower plays a unique and decisive role in urban w

fare by exploiting the very characteristics that limit surf

forces on urban terrain—small operational units, clo

range weaponry, presence of civilians and their prope

defensive bias, and absorption of manpower. Und

standing the role of airpower requires this study to exa

ine first why military forces should consider urban warf

so important. Then, the study analyzes the urban envir

ment to explain why these characteristics make airpow

the key instrument of force. Airpower’s contribution 

weighed against those characteristics to show that o

airpower can achieve battlespace dominance by match

targets, weapons, desired accuracy, and platforms in ne

real-time operational-level actions that achieve operatio

and strategic effects. Finally, an airpower theory for urb

warfare is proposed.

Airpower, via the integrated application of C4ISR a

precision strike supported by other forces, is the only 

strument of military force that can effectively prosec

urban warfare by shaping and controlling the battlesp

through precise applications of lethal and nonlethal fo

that nearly simultaneously affect the tactical, operation

and strategic levels of urban combat.

vii
The Role of Airpower in

Urban Warfare

An Airman’s Perspective

The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when

there is no alternative.

—Sun Tzu

Dilemma

Urban warfare is undesirable warfare. Warriors who h

waged war in urban areas and planners who prepare fo

agree that it is an environment to avoid. It is violent, 

source intensive combat that consumes the lives of co

batants and noncombatants with equal fervor. Historic

producing levels of destruction unmatched in open fie

maneuver warfare, urban combat yields shocking con

quences and far too often, unmatched horror. Nevert

less, military forces, either by design or by inadvert

stumbling, continue to enter urban landscapes and s

military decisions that, hopefully, will support national 

litical objectives.

The United States military is no exception. US for

have tasted urban combat’s bitterness in the far flu

cities of Palermo, Aachen, Manila, Hue, Beirut, Pana

City, and, most recently, Mogadishu. This list is by 

means inclusive and it obviously fails to account for ot

nations’ experiences. Nonetheless, it clearly illustrates t

the US military, albeit reluctantly in some cases, has 

gressively engaged in both limited- and full-scale urb

warfare and will continue to plan and prepare for it in 

future. In fact, the 1997 Joint Strategy Review (JSR) sta

“Increased urban terrain in 2010, especially in develop

countries, will increase the probability of urban conflict. 

US forces will likely be required to conduct military ope

tions on urban terrain more frequently.” 1

In recent years, the United States Marines Corps (USM

and the Army stepped to the forefront of urban warf

thought and tactics development, while the Air Force quic

responded with studies and evaluations of urban close 

support (CAS). Much of the Corps’ efforts focus on Mar

1
specific operations (for example, the role of the Mar

air-ground task force in tactical-level urban combat). Mu

of the Army’s efforts focus on urban warfare between m

bile, mechanized field armies fighting tactical engageme

in cities against enemies that resemble former Wars

Pact forces. Apparently, Air Force focus is on how to supp

these ground units with tactical-level close air support.

The common thread to all of these approaches, and o

that accentuates the dilemma of urban warfare, is foc

on the tactical level of battle. This focus is not surpris

since the very nature of urban combat predisposes one 

think at the tactical level. However, this predisposit

perpetuates mindsets that stifle innovative thought as 

how military forces can achieve operational and strate

effects. Specifically, this mode of thinking has stifled id

about how armed forces should employ airpower in urb

warfare to achieve not only tactical effects, but “war-winni

operational and strategic effects as well.

Airpower plays a unique and decisive role in the s

cessful prosecution of urban warfare. Airpower’s poten

is so significant, commander in chief (CINC) and joint ta

force (JTF) planners should consider airpower the key co

ponent in a joint urban warfare operation. To understa

this, we must examine why the consideration of urb

warfare is so important and why the Marines and Ar

invest so much time and effort studying it. We must exa

ine the nature and characteristics of the urban envir

ment to ascertain what characteristics drive airpower to 

the key component. This understanding will flow from a

lyzing how urban terrain affects the movement and e

ployment of surface forces at the tactical level. In order 

move from merely thinking on the tactical level to think

on the operational and strategic levels, we must exam

why all the services have failed to define airpower’s role 

urban warfare apart from CAS. Has this failure nega

rational thinking and planning from an operational or stra

gic perspective? If so, what should we consider airpow

role to be in the urban environment? Such analysis w

lead us to contemplate seriously whether or not any of 

services are willing to realistically acknowledge the h

costs of urban warfare. Finally, we must determine if th
is an airpower theory that will match the unique contrib

tion airpower can make to the complex and violent are

of urban warfare.

Why?

Yea though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I

will fear no evil.

—Psalm 23:4

If urban warfare is so difficult and costly, then why fi

the urban battle? The Army’s capstone urban warfare m

ual, Field Manual (FM) 90-10, Military Operations on 

banized Terrain (MOUT), clearly stresses that urban co

bat operations are conducted only when required and t

built-up areas are usually isolated and bypassed rat

than risking a costly, time-consuming operation in t

difficult environment.2

 Army rationale is soundly based 

experience. Unfamiliarity with the environment, large nu

bers of noncombatants, a high political profile, short 

gagement ranges, devastating casualty rates, a dense b

tlefield (Southeast Asian jungles and Germany’s Huert

Forest cannot match the three-dimensional complexity o

city), and rapid consumption of ammunition stores: th

are but a sampling of urban warfare’s historical offering

Given these characteristics, it comes as no surprise t

commanders generally have little desire to expose th

forces to the potential ravages offered by the world’s cit

If this is true, why are the Army and Marine Corps foc

ing so much on urban warfare? The answer lies in u

precedented demographic changes in the strategic envir

ment due to population growth and urbanization.

Increasing global urbanization is a predominant po

World War II (WWII) trend. In 1920 the United Kingd

was the only nation with more than 50 percent of 

population in cities or towns of more than 20,000. 

1960, however, one in every four people lived in urb

areas. Ten years later, 12 percent of the world lived 

cities with populations over five hundred thousand. 4

 T

trend continues as the global population will likely exc

seven billion by 2010, an increase of 25 percent over 19

with the greatest increase occurring in developing cou
tries. Littoral regions will experience the greatest popu

tion growth, a condition not overlooked by the USMC. 

fact, by 2010, persons living within 500 kilometers of 

sea could very well comprise around two-thirds of 

world’s population.5

People in developing countries, seeking an impro

quality of life, will migrate increasingly to urban are

Urbanization and population growth will seriously str

fragile societies and weaken infrastructures in some dev

oping states. In overcrowded urban areas, the negat

impact of man-made and natural disasters could be m

nified exponentially. Any or all of these conditions co

foster political radicalization of populations, and this ra

calization in conjunction with increased urban terrain 

2010, especially in developing countries, will increase 

probability of urban conflict.6

The 1997 JSR states that military forces must be p

pared to conduct combat, humanitarian, civil relief, a

law enforcement operations simultaneously in urban en

ronments. It further states that any significant milit

activity on urban terrain will place great demands on 

resources of all services, and while most military techn

ogy enhancements are advantageous in urban operatio

the requirement for manpower to control such terrain a

its populations is nevertheless great. As a result, jo

doctrine for all military tasks across the full range of m

tary operations must accept the likelihood of operating 

urban terrain as routine.7

These predictions with associated guidance provide 

sight as to why the Marines and Army have increased th

emphasis on urban combat despite doctrinal inclinatio

to avoid it. The JSR clearly and most emphatically p

scribes increased emphasis on urban combat. JSR emp

sis on littoral regions provides justification for an extend

Marine Corps role; its reference to using manpower-int

sive surface forces to control urban terrain certainly p

vides the Army with a long-term role. Responding w

“911” urgency, USMC Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMF

1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defen

states, “The increasingly probable terrain for political re

forcement tasks under unanticipated, time-sensitive 
cumstances is urban.”8

 The rationale for this statem

resides in the fact that US embassies and legations 

located in cities where host-country political and econom

leadership is concentrated and where US nationals tend 

seek economic opportunities. This rationale, combined w

the fact that the Marines, historically, have evacuated 

nationals from urban areas, drives the USMC toward 

urban warfare mindset, a mindset not necessarily uniq

to the Marines. Of particular interest to the Navy is 

fact that some 60 percent of politically significant urb

areas (those whose political or economic activity have w

ranted establishment of a US embassy, legation, or ot

government agency) outside allied or former Warsaw P

territory are located along or within 25 miles of a coastli

75 percent are within 150 miles of the sea; 87 perc

within 300 miles; 95 percent within 600 miles; and 

within 800 miles.9

What all these statistics point to is that each of 

services recognizes a variety of reasons why a military m

fight in a city. The city may be a vital port with access 

critical lines of communications; it may be located betwe

two natural obstacles denying a maneuvering army 

possibility to bypass. On the other hand, it may be 

only place the enemy is actually located. There may 

overwhelming political considerations that dominate 

military decision, or in the case of operations other th

war, the entire mission and focus may center on a city

Finally, above all else, one must consider that the popu

tions of all nations are urbanizing. It is highly unlik

that a military can fight in the future without conduct

some or all of its combat in cities. In fact, it is hig

probable that the majority of future combat will take pl

in and around urban areas.11

Therefore, the answer to the question “why” is, The m

tary instrument of power as an instrument of natio

policy must be able to engage any threat, in any envir

ment, at any time. As long as our National Security Str

egy states, “We must be prepared and willing to use 

appropriate instruments of national power to influence 

actions of other states and non-state actors . . . we m

demonstrate the will and capabilities to exert global le
ership and remain the preferred security partner for 

community of states that share our interests. . . . Am

can leadership and engagement are vital for our secur

and the world is a safer place as a result.” 12 And 

National Military Strategy states, “Engagement serves 

demonstrate our commitment; improve interoperability; 

assure allies, friends and coalition partners; promote tra

parency; convey democratic ideals; deter aggression; a

help relieve sources of instability before they can beco

military crises.”13 Then, military forces must prepare 

enter urban environments and defeat any adversary 

operations ranging from operations other than war to hi

intensity combat.

Consequently, “why” is not the question. Rather, “ho

and “with what” require careful consideration. If milit

forces are employed in urban warfare operations, how sho

they be committed and what assets will be most approp

ate for achieving strategic and operational objectives? P

disposed thinking that focuses on achieving tactical-le

objectives using surface combatants as the predomin

instrument of force stifles thinking at the operational a

strategic levels. To understand why the nature of urb

warfare can quickly drive thought to the tactical level, 

must examine the characteristics of the urban envir

ment and analyze how forces, historically, have approac

the urban problem. This examination will show that a

power should be the preferred instrument for achiev

operational and strategic objectives because airpower c

exploit those very characteristics that constrain and dr

surface combatants to piecemeal, tactical-level operation

The Abyss

To him was given the key to the bottomless pit. He opened the

bottomless pit, and smoke arose out of the pit like the smoke

of a great furnace . . . the sun and the air were darkened

because of the smoke of the pit.

—Revelation 9:1-2 

The most important, fundamental characteristics of 

ban warfare stem directly from the nature of the urb

environment. Extreme three-dimensional density and h
erogeneity characterize this environment. Subterranean a

multiple-story structures provide numerous locations 

ground forces to fight below, on, and above the eart

surface. This situation, combined with narrow streets a

a large noncombatant population that doesn’t necessa

know when or how to get out of the way, means milit

forces face an environment that by its very nature thwa

the advantages of speed, maneuver, superior firepow

command and control, and leadership. This conclusion 

clarified by analyzing urban characteristics under five ca

gories that combine to present unique and complex ch

lenges to military forces: small operational units, close-ra

weaponry, civilian presence (lives and property), defens

bias, and absorption of manpower.

Historically, when surface forces enter urban landscap

the streets and buildings of that environment fragm

warfare into conflict between squad- and platoon-size un

Generally, insufficient space exists for the deployment a

maneuver of larger units. Complexes of buildings beco

(or can be relatively easily converted into) defensive po

tions, and battles rapidly disintegrate into series of more 

less separate and isolated conflicts around “mini-fortresses.

A consequence of this fragmentation is a loss of cont

by commanders and resulting devolution of responsibi

to small group leaders and individuals, which accounts 

part for the distrust of a professional officer corps in co

mitting forces to a battle over whose progress it has mi

mal control.15 Minimal control situations emphasize in

vidual motivation, reliability, and initiative and the qua

of junior leadership, rather than the wider regulatory d

ciplines and esprit de corps upon which most professio

armies are based. These conditions create potential asy

metric relationships between forces that can produce u

expected results. For example, fragmentation of con

may favor individually motivated guerillas over technic

competent, well-organized professionals; fragmentation m

favor the personal skills and self-reliance of such “regu

irregulars” as paratroops, commandos, Green Berets, a

the like, rather than units trained for more conventio

warfare.16
Units with these special characteristics generally h

fought the most fiercely contested urban battles. For 

stance, Stalingrad pitted a Wehrmacht, which paid p

ticular attention to the quality of small-unit leadersh

against a Red Army, which stressed the importance 

individual motivation.17 Stalingrad highlights the imp

tant fact that when military forces engage in urban c

flict, the force that is clearly superior in open terrain m

reassess the hazards of attempting to pursue that succ

into the streets and alleys of cities. German failure to re

sess following a brilliant offensive through western Rus

led to defeat at Stalingrad. Learning from Wehrmacht m

takes, Soviet commanders emphasized the necessity of i

lating and encircling a city if speed and surprise could 

be employed to achieve an immediate, overwhelming v

tory. The Soviets also emphasized the use of “assault 

tachments” composed of infantry, combat engineers, a

flame thrower troops supported by tanks and self-prope

artillery in combined-arms operations.18 This combinat

of force at the small unit level produced victory from St

ingrad to Berlin at an incredible cost in Soviet lives a

resources. Just over 50 years later in Chechnya, it appe

the Russians either forgot those lessons or the lessons 

longer apply. Despite tremendous urban warfare exp

ence gained from fighting the Germans, the Russians co

not translate that experience into victory against Chech

rebels in Grozny partially because they failed to consi

that the high costs of WWII tactics might no longer 

acceptable.19

Another fundamental feature of the urban environm

is that buildings limit visibility. The most important con

quence of this simple condition is that the employm

ranges of surface force weaponry are necessarily sh

Ranges are too short for the safe operation of much he

weaponry and confine the bulk of urban fighting to han

held or hand-thrown infantry weapons. This is a histori

by-product of a tactical mindset that emphasizes the u

of infantry in urban warfare and also suggests that m

supporting artillery, armor, and air or sea forces are gen

ally unable to sight targets.20 In addition, this mind

suggests that heavier weaponry can be counterproduct
because any attempt to hit targets in a city creates coll

eral damage over a wide area surrounding the target. C

lateral damage, in turn, likely reduces accessibility, visi

ity, and recognition by blocking roads as well as by creat

infantry positions among the rubble. Undeniably, the 

mulative effects render the coordination of combined-ar

action through speed, maneuver, and firepower largely 

effective.21

Allied experience in Aachen, Germany, during WWII 

lustrates this condition quite well. “The shock effect of 

superior [Allied] firepower, especially the 155-mm guns, h

a psychological effect on the defenders allowing U.S. for

to capture the inner city. It also created extensive rub

that impeded movement and provided the German defe

ers with excellent defensive positions. Glass and other 

ter punctured tires forcing medics to rely on tracked ve

cles for evacuation of wounded.”22 The difficulties 

visibility and recognition, exacerbated by damage to bu

ings and streets, frequently result quite simply in un

becoming lost in a maze of unfamiliar terrain. Conse quen

however advanced their communication systems and 

support, small units become dependent upon their o

resources and fight individual battles without secure fla

or secure rear areas and without reference to the wi

battle context.23

What we find then is that the density of urban terrain 

a major determinant in the selection of tactics and 

support for a military operation that emphasizes the use 

surface forces for three reasons. First, urban terrain w

never allow the same potential for conventional maneu

as open terrain and may render certain firepower syste

(i.e., armor, artillery) inappropriate for their traditional ro

Second, if combatants seek to minimize collateral dama

noncombatant casualties, and loss of public support, 

ban terrain density will limit the firepower support surf

combatants have traditionally enjoyed. Third, density 

the urban terrain will force the meeting engagement 

occur at such close ranges (25 to 100 meters) that su

porting arms must be ultra-precise and yield controlle

Consequently, insufficient clear fields of fire and arm

distances will generally limit the use of such weapons 
ground-based, wire-guided missiles. Typical buildings 

clude thick walls that will require penetrating weapo

with minimum explosive content to prevent excessive r

ble. Limited explosive yields will also factor heavily in t

ing to minimize noncombatant casualties. Additionally, 

ban terrain will limit line-of-sight communications and fa

combatant use of ambush techniques. Any combination 

these conditions can lead to great confusion for grou

combat units and their fire support assets. 25

This confusion can be magnified further by urban h

erogeneity, which presents attackers and defenders w

numerous engagement conditions. Line of sight in urb

areas varies from a few feet to several thousands of mete

Target acquisition and engagement are far more likely 

be at the lower end of this spectrum: only 5 percent of 

targets in urban operations appear at more than 10

meter range; 90 percent are confronted at ranges of 

meters or less. Human targets are generally acquired at 

meters or less.26 Soldiers, therefore, often have limi

time to acquire and engage before being engaged the

selves. Targets rarely present themselves for more tha

few seconds, and frequently, in that few seconds, onl

small part of an individual or vehicle is exposed. 27

Weapon characteristics can be decisive in these sho

range engagements. A weapon may have a minimum ar

ing distance too great for close targets. Some systems a

have “dead space” within which an operator cannot eng

a target because of the elevation or depression limits of 

weapon’s barrel. Height and proximity of buildings cau

further dead-space problems; targets may be difficult 

impossible to engage with supporting artillery systems 

cause rounds are unable to clear obstacles and reach t

gets without striking other edifices. These terrain char

teristics not only tend to neutralize firepower advanta

but also to increase the probability of inadvertent nonco

batant casualties due to munition impacts on other-th

intended targets.28

All of the above interacts with the third fundamen

characteristic of urban terrain, the presence of civilia

and their property. The need to limit noncombatant ca

alties and minimize collateral damage may impose rest
tions on movement, fields of fire, targeting, weapon cho

and many other military options. Of course, attitudes 

ward the city’s civilian inhabitants, and thus the seve

of the constraints upon the military, depend upon politi

or humanitarian considerations. For example, during 

Allied advance through western Europe in 1944–45, 

liberation of cities inhabited by friendly civilians (in Fran

and the Low Countries) imposed more limitations upon 

occupying armies than did the cities of Germany. 29

Whether such limitations are imposed or not, a div

sion of manpower and resources may be required for 

care of civilians. Even if this care is unnecessary, civilia

will nevertheless impose some constraints upon milit

action in protection of their lives and property, or by j

being in the way. This coincidental presence and accid

tal involvement of civilians in the conflict is exacerbated 

some of the other characteristics of the urban envir

ment. For instance, the short ranges involved, and th

fast reaction times, make it difficult to identify targets c

rectly which, in turn, could increase civilian casualt

Similarly, regular forces will be aware that urban terrain 

ideally suited to the concealment, ambush, and withdra

techniques of partisans, creating a predisposition to reg

civilians with suspicion. Thus, the presence of civilians 

the battlefield at best imposes constraints on the cond

of battles and at worst leads to a breakdown in the m

tary/civilian distinction, increasing both the hardships s

fered by civilians and the difficulties faced by the military.

Although the circumstances described above apply 

both attacking and defending forces, there is reason 

argue for an in-built bias in favor of the defense. This b

stems in part from the characteristics of the battlefi

environment—the density of buildings and rubble that p

vide opportunities for ambush, mining, booby-trapping, a

the like, all of which are essentially defensive. Such ch

acteristics offer easily adapted and camouflaged positi

for defending infantry, while limiting visibility for adva

ing armored vehicles, hindering their mobility, and forc

them to approach within range of antitank projectiles. 

only do cities favor infantry, which is more likely to 

used in defense, over armor, which is more likely to spe
head an attack, but, more generally, cities present a 

cumstance in which troops who are inferior in equipme

training, or morale can be pitted against superior forces 

more even terms.31

The implications are quite clear for US military forc

Conventional US surface forces translate superior firepow

mobility, and logistics on an open battlefield into offens

actions that seize the initiative and dictate the tempo 

operations. Conversely, urban environments impose lim

on mobility and firepower, allowing the defender to cont

the tempo of surface operations. By forcing a fight 

urban terrain, our opponents’ weaker forces could level 

playing field. They could level the playing field not only 

negating the superior firepower, speed, and mobility of 

surface forces but also by exploiting America’s lust 

mythical, clean wars that produce few casualties and ca

little collateral damage.32

Urban battles fought in Beirut, Mogadishu, and Gro

attest to the fact that urban terrain provides the defen

with a force multiplier. Given the doctrinal aversion 

urban combat of most technologically sophisticated m

tary forces, a competent defender will do everything in 

power to draw the fight into the city. Ramzan Maltsegov

Chechen fighter in Grozny, stated, “We were very hap

they [the Russians] came into the city, because we can

fight them in an open field.” 33 Maltsegov fully underst

that in urban terrain, the defender has a much bet

opportunity to control the tempo of operations by creat

an operational and moral dilemma for the attacking fo

in terms of attrition, delay, discrimination of combata

versus noncombatants, proportionality of weapons effe

and negative media coverage.34 Typically, such urban 

fenders use mutually supporting strong points through

a defense in depth. They attempt to break up the attack

unit’s cohesion, deny mutual support, and isolate indiv

ual elements for annihilation.35

Absorption of manpower is the last of the five char

teristics of urban warfare and is largely a resultant of 

operation of those already mentioned, but it remains 

most important military consideration governing the cho

of cities as battlefields. Quite simply, the amount of 
sources (especially human resources) needed to cond

urban warfare using surface forces in a combined-ar

action is extremely high in relation to the area of the b

tlefield.36 The urban environment creates a physically str

tured, but fragmented series of compartmentalized bat

fields that can absorb large quantities of personnel—w

once committed, are difficult to extricate, regroup, or re

force. Whether casualties will be heavier (as a percent

of the committed manpower, rather than in terms of sp

won or lost) is arguable, but the tying down of large nu

bers of troops for long periods, and thus the delaying 

other operations for limited spatial objectives, is not. Si

larly, the type of battle dictated by the urban environm

imposes particularly severe strains on those subjected 

it. The continuous high level of alertness demanded 

close actions, the physical discomfort, and the insecu

of isolated small unit operations without fixed lines, sec

flanks, or protected rear—all contribute to the rapid on

of battle fatigue within hours rather than days. 37

By analyzing small operational units, close-range we

onry, civilian presence, defensive bias, and absorption 

manpower, this section has tied together some of the cr

cal characteristics of the urban environment and explai

how that environment constrains and limits surface co

batant employment. The compartmentalized, three-dim

sional world of urban warfare forces surface combatants 

employ in small units. These small units have limited f

power support and can be easily cut off and annihilated 

enemy forces. Firepower is limited to handheld, direct-

weaponry because of range limitations and the desire 

limit collateral damage. Leadership and command and c

trol are driven to the lowest level, making operational co

dination virtually impossible. Rubble presents obstacles 

maneuver while buildings present obstacles to maneu

and communication. Combat occurs at extremely close ran

due to line-of-sight and target-acquisition problems. Ci

ians get in the way and get killed, negatively affecting 

war fighter and the politicians who sponsor the fight. T

tics succumb to two-dimensional thinking in a three

mensional world. Manpower is absorbed at a rate mu

faster than in open, maneuver warfare. The cumulat
effects of these factors create severe limitations, mak

urban combat extremely risky for surface combatants.

What are the Marines and Army doing about it? Th

are looking for technologies that will enhance tactical-le

operations. They are focusing on the infantry soldier as 

primary instrument of force projection; this emphasis w

not get the results they desire. What we need is new thin

ing about airpower as the three-dimensional force to dr

three-dimensional urban warfare operations. We need n

thinking about battlespace management and what it ta

to achieve operational and strategic effects in urban w

fare in any theater of operations. This thinking must ma

airpower the key instrument of military force for condu

ing urban warfare at the operational level.

Airpower

Of what use is decisive victory in battle if we bleed to death as

a result of it?

—Sir Winston Churchill 

Airpower is the only instrument of military force t

can transform urban warfare from tactical-level, infant

oriented, attrition warfare favoring the defender to ope

tionally focused, offensive-centered combat orchestrated 

achieve strategic objectives. Airpower is the only inst

ment of military force that can eclipse the limitations 

small operational units, close-range weaponry, presence 

civilian lives and property, defensive bias, and absorpt

of manpower. Yet none of the services address any serio

role for airpower outside the mission of close air suppo

This mindset perpetuates the dilemma: the only way 

conquer the abyss in the traditional manner is to feed 

exorbitant quantities of resources in small servings ove

long period of time so that, in the end, victory doesn’t lo

much different than defeat. There is a better way!

Given the traditional emphasis on small unit operati

in urban combat, it is easy to understand why war fig

ers, airmen and soldiers alike, view CAS as airpowe

premier role in urban warfare. An earlier section explain

how traditional, supporting arms such as mortars a

artillery are virtually impossible to employ because urb
terrain presents too many obstacles to successful tar

engagement. The Germans discovered this in WWII a

relied heavily on CAS to support urban infantry. Ha

Ulrich Rudel, in Stuka Pilot, writes,

This is the thought which occupies our minds as we fly sortie afte

sortie against the Red fortress [Stalingrad]. The section of the cit

held by the Soviets borders immediately on the west bank of th

Volga, and every night the Russians drag everything needed by th

Red Guardsmen across the Volga. Bitter fighting rages for a block

of houses, for a single cellar, for a bit of factory wall. We have to

drop our bombs with painstaking accuracy because our own soldier

are only a few yards away in another cellar behind debris of anothe

wall. We fly in, map in hand, and it is forbidden to release a bomb

before we have made sure of the target and the exact position o

our own troops.38

As significant as Rudel’s experience with providing C

in Stalingrad were the tactics the Soviets employed 

counter the Stuka pilots. The Soviets implemented n

urban ground-combat tactics that forced meeting enga

ments to occur at extremely close ranges. Although th

close-range engagements cost the Soviets heavy casualt

the tactics denied the Germans the use of attack aviat

out of fear that Stukas would engage their own troop

Gen Vasil I. Chuikov, the Soviet commander in Staling

stated, “I came to the conclusion that the best method 

fighting the Germans would be close battle, applied d

and night in different forms. We should get as close to 

enemy as possible so that his air force could not bomb o

forward units. . . . it seemed to me that it was precis

here, in the fighting for the city, that it was possible 

force the enemy into close fighting and deprive him of 

trump card—his air force.”40

There is little reason to doubt that future enemies 

urban settings would apply the same tactics to elimin

the US airpower trump, especially if CAS is the only w

that trump card is configured. Yet today’s Air Force pl

ners and operators continue to focus on CAS. Maj Edw

A. Kostelnik, A-10 pilot, states in a 1996 Urban Close 

Support Tactics Development and Evaluation Test Pl

“Conceivably, U.S. or Allied Forces, involved in milit

operations on urban terrain (MOUT), may require CAS t

prevents or limits collateral damage to urban structu

and noncombatants. Correct and precise targeting w
improved and very accurate weapons delivery platfor

using precision-guided munitions, may provide a meth

for such CAS.”41

Granted, CAS is an important mission that significan

enhances the firepower of the combined-arms team in a

environment, including urban. However, focusing solely 

tactical-level CAS puts the United States in a position 

make the same critical mistakes the Luftwaffe made d

ing the battle for Stalingrad. “The fundamental tact

error was compounded by the Luftwaffe effort being d

persed against a wide variety of targets. If, instead of dr

ping thousands of tons of bombs on the sea of rubble t

was Stalingrad, the bombers had been employed with s

gle-minded persistence in an interdiction role against 

Volga [river] traffic, enough of the ferrying craft might h

been destroyed to starve the defense into submission

Had the Luftwaffe not been so focused on relegating a

power to a tactical arm of surface forces, it might h

realized the significance of interdicting resupply traffic 

the Volga. Certainly, shifting focus to interdiction wo

have created a more operationally oriented perspective 

scope and depth that might have provided the Germa

the chance to stave off defeat. However, the Luftwaffe co

not achieve this perspective because urban warfare w

viewed as a surface combatant problem, no matter h

excessive the casualties.

With the ascendancy of airpower, what should airpow

role be in urban warfare? Should airpower be relegated 

a tactical arm of surface forces to be squandered in 

piecemeal, tactical application described above? Shoul

be the great equalizer when leaders become frustrated ab

excessive casualties? Consider the German approach in 

battle of Brest-Litovsk. “It was obvious that a more s

tematic and less bloody method was now needed to dig 

surviving Reds out. Throughout the day ‘sudden’ conc

trations of fire and propaganda broadcasts by loudspe

ers tried to induce the encircled Russians to surrender. . 

On 29 June all hell broke loose as Air Field-Marshal K

selring committed an entire Stuka wing of over 90 aircr

to pulverize the Eastern Fort. Both 1000 and 4000 pou

bombs were used. The massive battering finally proved 
much and, in the late afternoon, over 600 troops a

many civilians surrendered.”43 Consider the USMC appro

during the battle for Hue City in Vietnam. “But the he

casualties suffered by the Marines and the tenacity of 

Vietcong prompted the lifting of most sanctions [restrict

use of firepower]. Fire support from naval gunfire, artille

air strikes, and napalm contributed to the devastation 

Vietcong wreaked on the city and left it in shambles.” 44

Logically, airpower’s role is defined along the entire c

tinuum of operations from piecemeal application to 

application that could lead to total annihilation of the 

ban area. To realize airpower’s full potential, it is imp

tant to think beyond CAS. And it is important to th

beyond total annihilation. Airpower must be considered 

a full complement of resources, both manpower and ma

rial, that will provide integrated C4ISR, psychological 

erations (PSYOP), and force projection to influence the 

ban environment at the tactical, operational, and strate

levels of warfare near simultaneously.

The very characteristics of small operational units, clo

range weaponry, the presence of civilians and their pr

erty, defensive bias, and absorption of manpower ma

airpower the key component to conduct urban warf

successfully. Think of it this way: In urban warfare, m

tary leaders have objectives derived from politically m

vated guidance; that political guidance is certain to 

restrictive in nature and forces what one senior lea

during Operation Urgent Fury (1983 seizure of Grena

describes as a mindset of “wage war, but don’t hurt a

one or break anything.” The dense nature of the urb

environment (dense in structure and population) requi

the precise implementation of a strategy that makes 

use of precise lethal and nonlethal force. To implem

that strategy, command and control is essential. To ena

command and control, communications become criti

Operational efforts by the forces involved must concentr

combat power by achieving synergistic application of 

sources to achieve persistent effects that balance risk w

operational necessity to achieve the strategic and polit

objectives of our national leadership. From this analy

four key facets stand out: concentration, persistence, s
ergy, and balance. Airpower is the instrument of milit

force that can effectively create the effects desired by 

plying all four of these facets. It can do that by shaping 

battlespace and directing the correct force, both lethal a

nonlethal, to precise locations on the urban terrain.

To prevent urban warfare from fragmenting into tacti

conflicts between small units that have no reference to 

wider battle context and the subsequent loss of comma

and control associated with this phenomena, a robust co

mand, control, communications, computers, and inte

gence (C4I) system is required to manage the variab

that stem from the complexity of the urban environme

An airman who also has access to information, surv

lance, and reconnaissance assets that will facilitate 

transfer of near-real-time information to airborne platfor

best manages this C4I system. Current and evolving C4

technologies promise a capability to match targets, we

ons, desired accuracy, and platforms in near real time 

an iterative fashion that connects and controls sensor-

shooter architectures and facilitates the effective, effici

employment of joint air and space assets. 45 The impli

tions for urban warfare are compelling. Rather than vi

ing the urban environment as a fragmented collection 

built-up areas, airmen, from a three-dimensional persp

tive, can view the environment as an integrated battlesp

that can be exploited through operational and strate

effects. Consequently, rather than employing surface for

in fragmented engagements, airpower can exploit the th

dimension and operate across the entire urban envir

ment shaping the battlespace and fragmenting enemy for

so that they can be precisely targeted and defeated 

detail.”

Precision strike by airborne platforms can solve many 

the problems associated with short-range weaponry, 

presence of civilians and their property, and absorption 

manpower. Precision strike allows airpower to shape 

battlespace from a distance—to significantly influence 

adversary’s area of operation from outside that area a

beyond the enemy’s reach—thereby minimizing the pla

ment of friendly forces in harm’s way. The fewer US for

at risk, the more credible US commitments and the m
effective operational employment.46 During Operation 

sert Storm, few scenes were as vivid on television as 

picture of a precision-guided bomb going through a ven

lation shaft in an Iraqi office building. In fact, the strik

that inflicted the bulk of the physical damage to Ir

leadership and command, control, and communicati

targets involved precision munitions, carried out prin

pally by F-117s. Given the hardness, small size, and lo

tion in urban areas of many of the targets involved, p

mary reliance on the F-117 and precision-guided muniti

made considerable sense, both for certainty of destruct

and limitation of collateral damage.47

Precision strikes produce massed effects without the n

to mass forces. The ability of one pass or mission to achi

one or many kills not only provides efficiency but a

frees other airpower assets to cover more targets, ther

permitting either breadth of coverage or intensity of f

power as needed.48 The operational possibilities for t

capability in urban warfare are endless. Airpower co

effectively isolate the urban terrain by cutting main lin

of communication, by destroying enemy supply networ

and by targeting precise locations of enemy resistan

Even more importantly, airpower permits the simulta

ous execution of these actions throughout the entire urb

battlespace. Additionally, precision-strike capabilities 

crease the probability and predictability of success a

decrease the prospects of civilian casualties and collate

damage.49

Thus airpower could actually reduce the disparity 

tween limited destruction/limited casualty rules of enga

ment (ROE) and the military necessity to apply violen

and destruction to achieve maximum effects. In war, pr

sure for quick victory is exerted for a variety of reaso

weather considerations, consolidation of gains prior to o

side interference, minimization of casualties and collate

damage, and maintenance of public support. Urban c

flict seems to magnify many of these concerns, resulting 

extreme pressure for quick results that are hard to achi

when surface forces are the principal instruments of for

This vicious “Catch-22” tends to escalate the conflict ev

further in the bid for quick success despite the fact t
rules of engagement are frequently tightened in an effor

preserve civilian life and minimize collateral damage.

50 M

nations attempt to use minimal force and restrict the R

until the costs of the restrictions in lives or time beco

prohibitive. Rules of engagement are then relaxed to sp

the battle or break the deadlock to minimize further loss 

friendly forces.51

If casualties and collateral damage are to be minimiz

airpower is the instrument of force the military needs 

get the job done. Modern airpower strike assets prov

the means to deliver both lethal and nonlethal force t

precise location with a precise yield under ROE that 

pose constraints where the prospect of collateral dam

exists. Honoring the constraints does not diminish airpow

effect, because airpower produces physical and psycholog

shock by dominating the fourth dimension—time.

52 The le

of destruction wrought on an enemy in the urban envir

ment may not be as important as the precision and tem

with which the force is applied. The timing and tempo 

force application could provide a means for imposing c

trol over the enemy’s behavior. This, in and of itself, co

evolve into a form of psychological warfare that progr

sively shapes enemy actions by denying his response 

tions and paralyzing his capacity to organize effective m

tary operations, further reducing the level of violence impo

on the urban landscape. All this is gained with minim

destruction and loss of civilian lives or other collate

damage.

In contrast, historical examples of surface force empl

ment (as in Hue City, Mogadishu, and Stalingrad) dem

strate that once surface forces become heavily engag

the constraining characteristics of the urban environm

actually escalate the violence and destruction until ther

disengagement. Consider the USMC experience in Hue Cit

Reflecting on the engagement in an interview after the war

Harrington (commanding officer of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines) evoke

a phrase coined elsewhere in South Vietnam during the Te

Offensive. “Did we have to destroy the town in order to save it

Well, I don’t think that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong wer

about to give up even if we’d surrounded Hue and tried to starv

them out. . . . But we didn’t go in there simply to show how grea

our weapons were, how much destructive power we possessed. W
did our best to avoid malicious damage. Yet when we had t

destroy a house, we destroyed it.”53

In fact, the heavy casualties suffered by the Marines a

the tenacity of the Vietcong in set-piece tactical enga

ments prompted the maximum application of force fr

both direct and indirect fire assets. Maximum applicat

of force contributed to the devastation the Vietcong wrea

on the city and left it in shambles. 54

This type of urban fighting accentuates the “defensi

bias” mindset characteristic of surface force engagemen

airpower shatters that mindset. Airpower is primarily 

offensive weapon. The combination of a robust C4ISR s

tem and precision-strike capability gives airpower the 

formation superiority and offensive punch to seize the ini

tive in urban warfare. This integration of offensive capab

enables sustaining a high tempo of operations, which, w

combined with responsive, adaptive forces (surface forc

will allow US forces to anticipate the enemy’s decision a

action cycles. These real-time, mutually supporting, ad

tive capabilities will create unexpected opportunities 

cause the opponent will never quite be in step. Therefo

the opportunity to initiate operations with a minimum 

deliberate planning or preparation means that US forces c

exploit opportunities created in this complex battlespac

In this concept, as opposed to the more traditional views 

air and space power as the supporting force, air and sp

power can be the principal offensive, supported instrum

of force in urban warfare. Further, this concept would ma

mize the ability of airpower to be devastatingly lethal agai

massed forces by combining air and space assets w

ground maneuver elements that compel the opponent to c

centrate or be defeated in detail by the integrated force. 56

It is important to emphasize here that surface forces w

still play an extremely important role in orchestrating 

erational synergies in urban warfare. However, surface for

must accept a paradigm shift from being the suppor

instrument of force to being a supporting instrument. A

power’s ability to shape and control the battlespace in a

around the urban environment uniquely positions airm

to orchestrate all facets of urban warfare operations. C

tinuous air and space operations, instead of episodic 
pearances in the battlespace, would allow airpower to c

ate an “air overwatch” to dominate all tactical operatio

beneath.57 Airmen, using robust C4ISR assets, will be a

to precisely insert surface force tactical-level firepower, fu

supported by tactical-level airpower (close air support), wh

it can achieve the greatest tactical success to support 

erational and strategic objectives. Such a situation d

not mean that airmen would command and control surf

forces once on the ground. It simply ensures that surf

forces fully integrate into the operational game plan a

that they do not fall prey to piecemeal, tactical enga

ments that are divorced from the overall operational str

egy. It also balances the tactical necessity of the act

with operational requirements and the associated risks 

introducing surface combatants into the formidable urb

environment. This should alleviate a large part of the “

sorption of manpower” characteristic that has historic

made urban terrain warfare’s deadliest landscape.

Negating the absorption of manpower characteristic a

requires a fully integrated complement of airpower asse

Creating a robust C4ISR system requires space-based, a

breathing, and land-based airpower assets integrated i

a mutually supporting architecture. This system will pa

an accurate picture of the urban terrain, enemy order 

battle, and friendly order of battle. This picture will per

commanders not only to shape the battlespace but also 

control the battlespace to ensure attainment of strate

and operational objectives. To this end, unmanned ae

vehicles offer tremendous possibilities for reconnaissa

and information gathering that could directly complem

the efforts of such platforms as the TR-1, EC-130, a

joint surveillance target attack radar system. Precision stri

with cruise missiles complement precision strikes de

ered by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Munitions must 

designed to meet a variety of requirements ranging fr

total destruction to controlled neutralization of targets 

ing both lethal and nonlethal effects. Airborne PSYOP m

complement the activities of special operations forces 

affect the decision cycle of enemy forces. Airpower brin

all of these assets to the urban fight, and when prope

orchestrated, airpower transforms the nature of urban co
bat from manpower intensive, tactically focused, defens

actions to offensive actions that influence urban warf

on an operational and strategic scale.

This influence may go beyond merely applying force wit

the urban environment. Assuming that the urban terr

in question is only one aspect of an overall theaterw

effort, airpower could make isolating and bypassing 

urban terrain a lucrative possibility. It probably can 

said that in the past all or most urban warfare was c

ducted because it had to be conducted; that is, the bel

erents, both attackers and defenders, had to fight on 

ban terrain in the pursuit of their strategic designs. T

reason, as every military leader from Hannibal to Eis

hower saw it, was that the key to all warfare was 

conquest and retention of enemy territory. Generally, 

cities in such territory were strategic prizes, related to 

actual physical war-making ability and the psycholog

reserves of the belligerents.58 However, WWII changed th

when for the first time air forces began to play an imp

tant role in reducing the strategic value of various types 

territory including cities.

Airpower had become a new dimension of mobile w

fare that made the conquest of some urban areas strate

cally much less significant than mastery of the skies. Ev

the value of urban areas as obstacles declined. Airpow

and the increased speed and maneuverability of armo

forces made it possible to destroy them (e.g., Rotterda

Coventry, and Dresden) or at least render them larg

uninhabitable and paralyzed.59 Today, airpower’s increa

range, speed, and ability to mass devastating effects w

fewer resources has magnified this condition exponentia

Those same C4ISR and precision-strike assets that ma

airpower the premier force to use in the urban envir

ment could also provide the strategic and operational si

ational awareness to avoid a potentially costly urban 

gagement. Airpower then becomes even more valuable 

only because of what it can do but also because of wha

might prevent.

Highly mechanized, technologically sophisticated m

taries must leverage new capabilities to move away fr

the serial application of tactical combat power to para
applications that produce operational and strategic effec

Airpower provides the capabilities to achieve this sh

Airpower is the key instrument of military force that p

vides CINC and JTF planners the wherewithal to deve

war-winning strategies to execute urban warfare in a m

ner that will produce victory that in no way resemb

defeat. Whether engaging the enemy on urban terrain 

establishing the conditions for bypassing urban areas, 

power is the key instrument of force that points to a bet

way!

Victory

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the

character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt them -

selves after the changes occur.

—Douhet 

If the United States military wants victory in urban w

fare to be more than a casualty-ridden misnomer, then 

must seriously consider airpower’s ability to achieve 

erational and strategic effects in this environment. Go

are the days when planners and operators can mer

think of urban warfare as infantry actions that must 

supported by the tactical application of airpower. Staling

refutes the traditional premise; Hue City echoes the dang

of this outdated thinking; and, more recently, Mogadis

and Grozny provide all too vivid reminders that the urb

environment can quickly become an abyss that consum

the lives of combatants and noncombatants with eq

disregard.

All of the services appreciate the complexities and 

dangers of urban warfare. All document its pitfalls a

limitations in doctrine and operations manuals. Howev

none of the services, including the Air Force, have s

ously considered airpower’s ability to transform this en

ronment into an offensively oriented, fully integrated b

tlespace that employs forces that negate many of the pitf

associated with small unit operations, close-range we

onry, the presence of civilians and their property, def

sive bias, and absorption of manpower. If the predictio

and associated guidance provided by the Joint Strat
Review are indeed accurate (i.e., military forces will 

expected to fight more frequently on urban terrain), is th

an airpower theory that will match airpower’s unique 

pabilities to the complex, violent environment of urb

warfare? The answer is yes.

Airpower, the integrated application of C4ISR and pre

sion strike supported by other air and surface forces t

impact the aerospace medium, is the only instrument 

military force that can effectively prosecute urban warf

by shaping and controlling the battlespace through prec

applications of lethal and nonlethal force that affect 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels near simulta

ously. This theory encompasses every major aspect of t

study and drives home the premise that airpower is 

key to success in urban combat.

It is absolutely critical for airpower thinkers, planne

and operators from all the services to give airpower’s r

in urban warfare much more serious consideration. T

Marine Corps and Army are forging new vistas using o

dated paradigms that could potentially minimize crit

airpower contributions. Within the Air Force, airmen 

pear content to remain focused on tactical applicatio

rather than expanding their thoughts to more operati

ally oriented applications that could yield strategic effec

Airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines owe it to each ot

as joint war fighters to reflect on operational capabilit

that will achieve operational and strategic objectives 

urban warfare. Settling for piecemeal tactical applicatio

may only feed the urban warfare abyss exorbitant quan

ties of the services’ most important resources, the m

and women who will bear our nation’s arms in this d

cult environment. Airpower is the better way!

Notes

1. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategy Review (U), W

ington, D.C., 1997, 4. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-10, Military Operat

on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), 15 August 1979, 1-1.

3. Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell, A Consideration of Constra

Urban Warfare, RAND Report MR-780-A/DARPA (Santa Monica, C

RAND, 1996), 2.

4. Ibid., 2–3.
5. Joint Strategy Review (U), 29. (Secret) Information extracted is 

classified.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1-2, The 

of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, June 1991, 3-13.

9. Ibid., 1-2, 3-13.

10. Lt Col T. R. Milton Jr., USA, “Urban Operations: Future W

Military Review, February 1994, 38.

11. Ibid.

12. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Cent

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1997), 2.

13. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of 

United States of America, Washington, D.C., 1997, 7.

14. G. J. Ashworth, War and the City (New York: Routledge, Chap

and Hall, 1991), 117.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 118.

17. Ibid., 119.

18. Lt Comdr James W. O’Connell, USN, Is the United States Prep

to Conduct Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain? Research Report 

92-12753 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1992), 10.

19. Timothy L. Thomas, “The Russian Armed Forces Confront Ch

nya: The Battle for Grozny, 1–26 January 1995 (Part I),” Low Inten

Conflict & Law Enforcement 5, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 409–33. Mr. Thom

article provides an in-depth account of how the Russian military di

garded the need for isolation and encirclement of Grozny when it 

apparent that speed and surprise would not lead to an overwhelm

defeat of the rebels. It also explains why the Russians were unabl

mount an effective combined-arms operation of the scope and magnit

used in WW II. From this article we see the dangerous evolution 

tactical thinking applied to operational problems that require more t

just piecemeal blundering at the small unit level. Highly mechani

technologically sophisticated militaries must leverage new capabilitie

move away from the serial application of tactical combat power to par

applications that produce operational and strategic effects.

20. Ashworth, 119.

21. Ibid.

22. Maj Charles A. Preysler, Going Down Town: The Need for Preci

MOUT (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies

Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 10.

23. Ashworth, 119.

24. Maj Jon M. Davis, Urban Offensive Air Support: Is the Un

States Military Prepared and Equipped? Research Report no. 97-

(Quantico, Va.: US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Ma

Corps University, April 1995), 7.

25. Ibid., 8.

26. Glenn, 10.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 11.
29. Ashworth, 121.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 120.

32. Davis, 4–5.

33. Ibid., 14.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 15.

36. Ashworth, 121.

37. Ibid.

38. Hans Ulrich Rudel, Stuka Pilot (London: Vale and Oakley, 19

62.

39. Vasil I. Chuikov, The Battle for Stalingrad (New York: Holt, R

hart, and Winston, 1964), 72.

40. Ibid.

41. Maj Edward A. Kostelnik, USAF, Urban Close Air Support Ta

Development and Evaluation Test Plan, ACC Project no. 96-561FR (N

AFB, Nev.: Air Combat Command, Air Warfare Center, August 1996), 1

42. V. E. Tarrant, Stalingrad, Anatomy of Agony (London: Pen 

Sword Books, 1992), 77.

43. Lt Comdr James W. Chattin, USN, Battles for Cities on the Eas

Front During World War II, Student Study Project (Fort Leavenwo

Kans.: Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 15–18.

44. O’Connell, 14.

45. Daniel Gouré and Christopher M. Szara, Air and Space Powe

the New Millennium (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and 

ternational Studies, 1997), 112.

46. Ibid., 15.

47. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Su

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums 

gram, 1993), 67.

48. Gouré and Szara, 14.

49. Ibid., 17.

50. O’Connell, 10.

51. Ibid., 13.

52. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Po

(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), 28

53. O’Connell, 15.

54. Ibid., 12.

55. Gouré and Szara, 31–32.

56. Ibid., 32.

57. Ibid.

58. Lilita I. Dzirkals, Konrad Kellen, and Horst Mendershausen, 

tary Operations in Built-Up Areas: Essays on Some Past, Present, 

Future Aspects, RAND Report R-1871-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RA

June 1976), 85.

59. Ibid., 82
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