SAILORS

AND

SCHOLARS

THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

EN

John B. Hattendorf

B. Mitchell Simpson, III

John R. Wadleigh
On October 6, 1884, the Secretary

ofthe Navy, William E. Chandler,

founded the Naval War College

by a General Order which said

simply, "A college is hereby

established for an advanced

course of professional study for

naval officers to be known as the

Naval War College." Rear

Admiral Stephen B. Luce became

the first president of what is now

the oldest continuing institution

of its kind in the world.

Fleet Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz, Commander in Chief of

Pacific Forces in World War II,

later recalled:

The war with Japan had been

reenacted in the game rooms at the

Naval War College by so many

people, and in so many different

ways, that nothing that happened

during the war was a surprise . . . absolutely nothing except the

kamikaze tactics toward the end of

the war; we had not visualized

these.

A book about an institution

especially a government institution—can be deadly dull. Particularly if watered down to eliminate all the controversies, leaving

only a bland recital of facts and

figures.

Continued on back flap

:. . . .si;:-; -^x/smm :W:-:;

: .;-:.-s ^.mm^L

m^mmm:amsMm s* VHhI

BISSl

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, 1827-1917, founder and first president of the Naval

War College. Painting by Frederic P. Vinton, 1900, in the Naval War College.
SAILORS

AND

SCHOLARS

THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE

U.S. NAVAL WARCOLLEGE

by

John B. Hattendorf

B. Mitchell Simpson, III

John R. Wadleigh

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS -Newport, Rhode Island

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock No. 008-047-00364-1
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Hattendorf, John B., 1941-

Sailors and scholars: a centennial history of the U.S. naval war

college.

Bibliography: pp. 354. Includes index.

1. Naval War College (U.S.)—History. I. Wadleigh, John R., 1915-

. II. Simpson, B. Mitchell III, 1937- . III. Title. V420.H37 1984 359.4'07'1173 84-8257
CONTENTS

List of Illustrations viii

President's Foreword xi

Author's Preface xiii

CHAPTER 1

The Navy that the War College Joined 1

Spur to World Naval Revival • Professional Development • Link Between Historical Study and Naval Intelligence

CHAPTER 2

A Struggle for Existence: the Era of Luce and

Mahan, 1884-1893 11

The Concept of the War College • Establishing a College • The First Course • Mahan's Arrival • Fight for

Survival

CHAPTER 3

From Education to Application, 1893-1909 38

A Model Course in 1894 • A General Staff for the

Navy • Planning for the War With Spain • The College

Threatened Again • The Course and the College 1900-

1909 • The War College and the General Board • The

1908 Battleship Conference

CHAPTER 4

The End of an Era and the Introduction of

Naval Doctrine, 1909-1918 69

Development of Doctrine • Instituting the Long Course • Three-Course Plan • The Great War • A German U-Boat

at Newport America Enters the War
vi CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5

Sims Charts the New Course, 1919-1927 112

Sims' Return to Newport • The College Reopens • The

Reorganized College • The Sims-Daniels Controversy

• The Course, 1919-1927 • The Junior Course Established • Pratt Reorganizes College Administration • Joint Exercise, 1927 • Emphasis on Logistics

CHAPTER 6

Educating Leaders for World War, 1927-1939 137

Newport—Hometown for the College Curriculum

Modifications • Renewed Emphasis on Tactics • The

Advanced Course College Expansion • The Concept of

the College in the 1930s • The "Green Hornet"—Sound

Military Decision

CHAPTER 7

Interlude: The College During World War II,

1939-1946 164

Kalbfus's Valedictory • Newport in Wartime • ANSCOL:

The Army-Navy Staff College • The Pye Board

CHAPTER 8

The Naval War College in Quandary, 1946-1953 179

Plans for Postwar Naval Education • Return of Spruance

• World War II: A Logistician's War • Henry Eccles and

the Logistics Course • The Logistics Library • World

War II Battle Evaluation Group • Naval Planning

Manual Postwar Newport, a Year-Round Fleet Base • Command and Staff Course • Round Table Talks—Broadening the Curricula • The Naval War College Review • The Search for Civilian Faculty Vice Admiral Richard

Conolly • New Courses • Research and Analysis Department • Naval Warfare Course

CHAPTER 9

The Continuing Quandary, 1954-1966 229

Establishing the Naval Command Course • Changes in

Courses and at the Helm • Long-Range Studies Project • Electronic War Gaming • Summer White House, 1957-

1962 • The Military Media Conference • Four-Year

Term for College President • The George Washington

University Program • Melson's Presidency, 1964-1966
CONTENTS vii

CHAPTER 10

Watershed for Change, 1966-1972 250

Hayward's Innovations • Core Curriculum and Civilian

Faculty • Military Management Studies • The College

and Its Place in an Officer's Career • Support from

Admiral Moorer, CNO • Construction Program • Colbert's Return to Newport • Expanding the International

Role of the College • Carrying Modernization Programs

Forward • The Naval War College Foundation • The Era

of "Z-Grams" • Vice Admiral Semmes at the Helm • Planning for the Naval Staff Course • Changes at Top and

at the College

CHAPTER 11

The Beginning of a New Curriculum, 1972-1977 275

Turner's Concept for the Naval War College Implementing the Concept • Continuing Problems • "The

Turner Revolution" LeBourgeois at the Helm

CHAPTER 12

Toward a Second Century, 1977-1984 302

CNO's Policy for the Naval War College • Trends in

Syllabus Revision • Growth and Change • Pointing

Toward Fleet Operations • Center for Naval Warfare

Studies • Cooperative Degree Program • Admiral

Watkins Appoints Service from the Sixth Fleet An After

Look-out Reports

Appendix A 324

Chronology of Courses and Significant Events at the

United States Naval War College, 1884-1984

Index 337
ILLUSTRATIONS

Frontispiece: Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce i 1. Navy Department General Order No. 325 of October 6,

1884 94

2. Stephen B. Luce 94

3. The Naval War College, former Newport Poorhouse 95

4. First Naval War College Order, September 2, 1885 96

5. Title page of Stephen B. Luce's copy of Mahan's first book

on seapower 97

6. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan 97

7. Army-Navy Joint Exercise, Newport, R.I., November 1887 98

8. Naval Torpedo Station, Goat Island, ca.1880 98

9. Naval Training Station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport,

R.I. 1889 99

10. Lt. Tasker A. Bliss, USA 100

11. Professor James Soley 100

12. Classroom lecture, 1888 100

13. Naval War Gaming, 1894 101

14. First foreign students 101

15. Lieutenant William McCarty Little 102

16. Captain Henry Taylor 102

17. Luce Hall, built in 1892 102

18. President Theodore Roosevelt arrives at Coasters Harbor

Island 103

19. George Grafton Wilson, Harvard Professor of Law 103

20. Staff and students, 1897, with visiting Assistant Secretary

of Navy Theodore Roosevelt 104

21. View of the Naval War College and the Naval

Training Station, ca. 1 903- 1 907 1 04
ILLUSTRATIONS ix

22. Interior of the Library, 1923 105

23. A Naval War Game on the third floor of Luce Hall,

ca.1910 106

24. Lt. Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis, USMC 106

25. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels with Rear Admiral

Austin Knight 107

26. The President's house (Quarters AA). View of ca. 1914 107

27. View of Coasters Harbor Island, 1915 108

28. German Submarine U-53, anchored south of Coasters

Harbor Island, October 7, 1916. USS Birmingham in

background 108

29. Visiting Japanese delegation, February 13, 1924 109

30. Rear Admiral William S. Sims, Naval War College

president and staff and students, 1922. 109

31. Pringle Hall, to the left of Luce Hall, in this view of 1963

was built in 1934 110

32. War Gaming Room, Pringle Hall. A game in progress,

ca.1950 110

33. World War II Admirals Nimitz, King and Spruance,

graduates of the Naval War College during the interwar

period 1 1

1

33.a. NWC Class pictures: Nimitz '23, King '33, Spruance '27 111

34. Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Naval War College president,

1934-1936, 1939-1942 211

35. Student cartoon on Naval War College education, 1938 21

1

36. Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance, class of 1927 212

37. Command Class, 1943 212

38. Entrance to Sims Hall, former Naval Training Station

Barracks C 213

39. A Logistics war game, Sims Hall, ca.1950 213

40. Umpire Area, Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator, Sims

Hall, 1960 214

41. Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, Head of the Logistics

Department, 1947-1951 214

42. Admiral Richard L. Conolly, College president 215

43. Students and staff of the first Naval Command Course,

September 1956 216

44. Summer visitors President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Fleet

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN (Ret.) 216

45. President John F. Kennedy, 28 September 1961 with Allen

W. Dulles and John A. McCone 2 1

7

46. Naval War College campus, 1968 217

47. Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, War College president,

1966-1968 , 218
ILLUSTRATIONS

48. Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, War College president,

1968-1971 218

49. Vice Admiral B.J. Semmes, War College president, 1971-

1972 218

50. Naval War College Foundation Board of Trustees,

November, 1981 219

51. Civilian faculty line up for academic procession,

convocation, June 1970 219

52. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, College president,

presides at convocation, 1973 220

53. First Naval Staff Course, 1972 220

54. Vice Admiral Julian LeBourgeois, College president, in RI

Independence Day celebration in Newport, May 4, 1975 221

55. Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty, College president, with

the Naval War College Board of Advisors, May 1977 221

56. Lecture in Spruance Hall auditorium. Spruance Hall, first

of three new buildings constructed during the 1970s, was

completed in 1972 222

57. View of the Naval War College campus, 1978 222

58. Interior of the Naval War College Musuem, Founders Hall,

1981 223

59. Change of command, August 1979. Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch, Jr., relieves Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale as president 224

60. Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1981 224

61. Umpire Area, Center for Naval War Gaming, Sims Hall,

1981 225

62. Convocation on Colbert Plaza, August 1983 225

63. Close-up of faculty group, Convocation, August 1983 226

64. A group of key civilian employees and staff, 1984 226

65. Rear Admiral James E. Service, College president,

and foreign officer delegates with Secretary of the

Navy John Lehman 227

66. Naval War College Executive Policy Group, May 1984,

plus CNO 228
PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

One spring day in 1978 at a long forgotten meeting

in Conolly Hall the idea of a centennial history was discussed. The Naval

War College would be 100 years old in 1984 and its inception, growth and

contribution spanned a period of incredible expansion in the history of

the United States. The Navy's participation and that of its War College

were inextricably woven into the fabric of those times and plainly

deserved to be told. What better way than with a Centennial History?

Vice Admiral James Stockdale, then President of the Naval War

College, lent his prestige and support to the project and discussed it

frequently and enthusiastically at meetings that followed in spring and

summer of that year. It was no secret that preparation of a credible history

took great patience, talent and time. A start in the near term, by qualified

authors and researchers, was absolutely necessary if the work was to be

finished in time for the Centennial celebration in 1984. In August, Jim

Stockdale received his first serious proposal. Retired Rear Admiral John

R. Wadleigh wrote that, "such a history can be of benefit to the Navy and

the War College and can serve as a worthwhile addition to naval and

academic history." Jack Wadleigh proposed to team up with retired LCDR

B. Mitchell (Tony) Simpson, III and compile "a volume which will suitably

commemorate the first century of service of the world's oldest senior

military educational institution."

Wadleigh and Simpson's proposal was everything it needed to be

detailed, logical and doable. In due course it was approved and the project

was launched. By the time I arrived in Newport in the fall of 1982, the

lion's share of the research was finished and drafts for many chapters had

been prepared for comment. Fred Hartmann, my Academic Advisor and

an experienced, accomplished author in his own right, became the project

manager. Publishing a book, I was to learn, was not an uncomplicated

effort and I needed a solid professional to navigate around the currents
xii PRESIDENTS FOREWORD

and shoals of the publishing world. Professor John Hattendorf, newly

returned from the University of Singapore, joined the team next as the

deadline loomed ever larger. John's expertise as an author and historian

were invaluable ingredients that added to the already high quality of the

research and assured us of success—on time. It was a collaboration that

was close and continuous and one in which I took immense personal

pride.

Other principal members of the Naval War College team have

contributed substantially to the production of this book. Mr. Frank Uhlig

contributed wise counsel, sound editorial advice, and consistent guidance

on style. Mr. Robert Laske handled printing arrangements for Library of

Congress cataloging and provided a priority listing for distribution of the

finished work. Mr. Roger Levesque handled the difficult and complex

problem of the production of print-ready copy. Mr. Anthony Nicolosi

made the initial selection of pictures and wrote the captions. Mr. Tony

Sarro, with his usual flair, coordinated the design for the covers and the

Centennial insignia.

Special thanks go to Mrs. Carole Boiani for her outstanding work of

phototypesetting, and to Barbara Atkins, Rose Lundy, and Rachelle Lapre

of the Word Processing Branch, who made the initial inputs of the entire

text. The demanding requirements of the final layout and pasteup of

camera-ready copy were efficiently handled by Mrs. Eleanor Silvia, Mrs.

Margaret Corr, and Mrs. Jackie Audet Cayer of the Editorial/Copyright

Branch. My appreciation also extends to Ian Oliver, John Ramos, and

Gerard Lamothe in the Graphics Arts Department. Photography was

handled by James Deffet, William Arnold, and Thomas Cookinham.

The Naval War College Foundation generously provided the financial

backing which assured production of a book whose quality would in

every way reflect the prestige and academic excellence of the Naval War

College.

It is my great personal pleasure to commend this history to you. It has

been a rewarding professional opportunity for me, as 41st President, to

direct the activities of the Naval War College in the last two years. The

College continues to grow in importance and to justify the expectations

of the Naval Establishment and the nation.

I am sure that, as you read this history of the College, you will come

away with some real sense of the human dramas which have marked the

institution's evolution during a period which is almost exactly the second

century of the national existence of the United States of America.

James E. Service

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

President
AUTHORS' PREFACE

The Naval War College was founded in October

1 884 at a time when the U.S. Navy was a minor force among the world's

naval powers. In the century since, extraordinary changes have taken

place in the life of the nation, the role and size of its Navy, and the role

and size of the Naval War College.

This account of the life of the college in its first century is intended

to present an overview of the major events and developments the

college has experienced. It is not an "institutional history," narrowly

confined to events at the War College—a dry-as-dust recital of

curricula changes. Since the Naval War College is the professional

intellectual extension of the U.S. Navy, we thought it would be

practical and useful to link the development and changes at the War

College to the events affecting its parent and sponsor. And in

portraying the Navy's development as a continuous background theme,

we have also shown the gradual expansion of national policy. We

believe that the history of the War College is made both more

meaningful and certainly more interesting through this effort.

Previously published accounts of the college's history have concentrated on one period or another, or on a single aspect of concern. But

there has been no reasonably concise history of the entire first century

of the Naval War College for the informed reader. This volume seeks to

fill that gap.

Achieving a well balanced account is always challenging. The later

history of the War College has its share of controversies (just as in the

early decades] but with the difference that many participants in recent

events are still alive to comment! We made it a rule to show all later

sections of the manuscript to every principal participant. In some cases
xiv PREFACE

we had the demanding responsibility of deciding between directly

opposing viewpoints.

In writing this centennial history we had the considerable college

archives at our disposal, which we have used and relied upon

extensively. Unfortunately, for the early period of the college's history,

up to about 1920, there was no deliberate and orderly collection or preservation of administrative documents. Valuable material remains

from other aspects and other periods of the college's history. All the

remaining records have been brought together and arranged in

the Naval Historical Collection of the Naval War College in a readily

accessible way for scholarly research through the dedicated effort of

Anthony S. Nicolosi. Little of value could have been achieved without

his preliminary work, and that of his assistant, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak. As

archivists and manuscript curators their contribution is significant.

We have gratefully utilized the valuable research on various periods

carried out by scholars such as Rear Admiral John D. Hayes on Luce,

Doris Maguire on Mahan and Chadwick, Dr. Robert Seager on Mahan,

Dr. Ronald Spector on the early years of the college, Commander

Thomas Buell on Spruance, King and Sound Military Decision, Dr.

Gerald J. Kennedy on the inter-war years, and Commander Nepier Smith

on the post war years. In addition we are deeply in debt to earlier college

historians who blazed the trail for us with unpublished, typescript

histories. We are particularly grateful for the work of Rear Admiral

Austin Knight and Captain W. D. Puleston who prepared a draft history

in 1916, and to the many college staff members who endeavored to

up-date it in the years up to 1937. In the late 1950s and early 1960s,

officers such as Captain Paul R. Schratz and his successors recorded

useful data in their efforts to meet the requirement for the annual

command history.

The work of Dr. John T. Mason with the Naval Institute's Oral

History Program has proved very useful and the copies of the growing

collection of transcripts deposited in the college's Naval Historical

Collection provided a valuable source. In preparing this history for publication, the detailed, candid and

constructive editorial criticism of Frank Uhlig, Jr., quickly established

high standards. We have gratefully followed his sound advice.

We are particularly grateful to Frederick H. Hartmann, the college's

Special Academic Advisor since 1966, for his patient and sustained

advice, comments and suggestions. As our "project manager," he piloted

this project through all its phases. As a knowledgeable witness to many

of the events since 1966, he provided valuable insights.

Numerous participants and witnesses to recent War College history

kindly read and commented upon the relevant chapters. They also

freely shared their own observations with us. They were: VADM
PREFACE xv

Frederick Bennett, Capt. David G. Clark, Prof. Philip A. Crowl, RADM

Henry E. Eccles, Dr. William R. Emerson, Capt. Clarence O. Fiske, Prof.

Philip Gamble, Capt. Robert S. Guy, Prof. Frederick H. Hartmann, VADM

John T. Hayward, Col. John B. Keeley, Cdr. Robert M. Laske, Dr. J. Kenneth

McDonald, Capt. James F. McNulty, Prof. Richard Megagee, Capt. Arthur

F. Newell, Anthony S. Nicolosi, Capt. Hugh G. Nott, Capt. Jack Q. Quinn,

Capt. William C. Rae, Prof. Warren Rogers, VADM F. S. H. Schneider, Prof.

Earl R. Schwass, VADM Benedict J. Semmes, Capt. Paul R. Schratz, VADM

James B. Stockdale, Prof. William E. Turcotte, ADM Stansfield Turner,

VADM Thomas R. Weschler, Prof. Robert S. Wood and RADM Joseph C.

Wylie.

We alone are responsible for the contents of this volume.

John B. Hattendorf

B. Mitchell Simpson, III John R. Wadleigh
xiv PREFACE

we had the demanding responsibility of deciding between directly

opposing viewpoints.

In writing this centennial history we had the considerable college

archives at our disposal, which we have used and relied upon

extensively. Unfortunately, for the early period of the college's history,

up to about 1920, there was no deliberate and orderly collection or preservation of administrative documents. Valuable material remains

from other aspects and other periods of the college's history. All the

remaining records have been brought together and arranged in

the Naval Historical Collection of the Naval War College in a readily

accessible way for scholarly research through the dedicated effort of

Anthony S. Nicolosi. Little of value could have been achieved without

his preliminary work, and that of his assistant, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak. As

archivists and manuscript curators their contribution is significant.

We have gratefully utilized the valuable research on various periods

carried out by scholars such as Rear Admiral John D. Hayes on Luce,

Doris Maguire on Mahan and Chadwick, Dr. Robert Seager on Mahan,

Dr. Ronald Spector on the early years of the college, Commander

Thomas Buell on Spruance, King and Sound Military Decision, Dr.

Gerald J. Kennedy on the inter-war years, and Commander Nepier Smith

on the post war years. In addition we are deeply in debt to earlier college

historians who blazed the trail for us with unpublished, typescript

histories. We are particularly grateful for the work of Rear Admiral

Austin Knight and Captain W. D. Puleston who prepared a draft history

in 1916, and to the many college staff members who endeavored to

up-date it in the years up to 1937. In the late 1950s and early 1960s,

officers such as Captain Paul R. Schratz and his successors recorded

useful data in their efforts to meet the requirement for the annual

command history.

The work of Dr. John T. Mason with the Naval Institute's Oral

History Program has proved very useful and the copies of the growing

collection of transcripts deposited in the college's Naval Historical

Collection provided a valuable source. In preparing this history for publication, the detailed, candid and

constructive editorial criticism of Frank Uhlig, Jr., quickly established

high standards. We have gratefully followed his sound advice.

We are particularly grateful to Frederick H. Hartmann, the college's

Special Academic Advisor since 1966, for his patient and sustained

advice, comments and suggestions. As our "project manager," he piloted

this project through all its phases. As a knowledgeable witness to many

of the events since 1966, he provided valuable insights.

Numerous participants and witnesses to recent War College history

kindly read and commented upon the relevant chapters. They also

freely shared their own observations with us. They were: VADM
PREFACE xv

Frederick Bennett, Capt. David G. Clark, Prof. Philip A. Crowl, RADM

Henry E. Eccles, Dr. William R. Emerson, Capt. Clarence O. Fiske, Prof.

Philip Gamble, Capt. Robert S. Guy, Prof. Frederick H. Hartmann, VADM

John T. Hayward, Col. John B. Keeley, Cdr. Robert M. Laske, Dr. J. Kenneth

McDonald, Capt. James F. McNulty, Prof. Richard Megagee, Capt. Arthur

F. Newell, Anthony S. Nicolosi, Capt. Hugh G. Nott, Capt. Jack Q. Quinn,

Capt. William C. Rae, Prof. Warren Rogers, VADM F. S. H. Schneider, Prof.

Earl R. Schwass, VADM Benedict J. Semmes, Capt. Paul R. Schratz, VADM

James B. Stockdale, Prof. William E. Turcotte, ADM Stansfield Turner,

VADM Thomas R. Weschler, Prof. Robert S. Wood and RADM Joseph C.

Wylie.

We alone are responsible for the contents of this volume.

John B. Hattendorf

B. Mitchell Simpson, III John R. Wadleigh

CHAPTER 1

THE NAVY THAT THE

WAR COLLEGE JOINED

A navy and its institutions reflect the nation they

serve. In 1 884, the year the Naval War College was founded, the United

States felt no great or imminent danger from the sea. Since the Civil

War, the Navy's strength and capability had withered away because

there had seemed no immediate need for a large navy. Writing in 1880,

Chief Engineer J.W. King noted that epochs of exceptional naval

activity alternated with periods of decay during the first century of

American naval history. "The several great national emergencies have

each called forth most remarkable displays of maritime capabilities and

powers," King wrote, "to be followed, when the crisis is past, by a reversion to the other extreme of inefficiency and neglect." 1 By comparison to Britain's Royal Navy, the largest in the world, the

U.S. Navy with 92 ships, 32 of them in commission, and 8,000 officers

and men, was small indeed. Britain had 359 ships with 63,598 officers

and men, followed closely by France with 329 ships and 47,950 officers

and men. There was then a large gap in relative numbers to the level of

the Russian, Spanish, Italian, and German navies. After them ranked

the navies of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.2 Some people argued that its

total numbers placed the U.S. Navy in the middle group. Others said it

ranked only among the other navies of the western hemisphere,

considering its poor equipment and training. A U.S. Senator from South

Carolina declared that in battle with a "vessel of any other power in the

civilized world our guns would compare with theirs almost as a popgun

with a long range rifle." Going further, he told the Senate

I venture to say that the most insignificant, the least valuable ship

of the Italian Navy is better than the best one in the American

Navy.3
2 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

In 1 884, the only vessel classified as a first-rate ship on the U.S. Navy

list was the wooden, steam frigate Tennessee, flagship of the North

Atlantic Squadron. When the ship was sold in 1887, Secretary of the

Navy William Whitney commented in his annual report for that year,

"She had a short life, but as a consumer of money, a brilliant one."4 Earlier the Secretary had reported to the President, "It is questionable

whether we have a single naval vessel finished and at sea at the present

time that could be trusted to encounter the ships of any important

power—a single vessel that has either the necessary armor for

protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defense."5 In Washington, the Secretary directed the U.S. Navy from his office in

the State-War-Navy building overlooking the west side of the White

House. He was the only central figure in a cumbersome, decentralized

administrative scheme that spawned bureaucratic competition. Since

1842, Secretaries had administered the Navy through eight independent Bureaus, each headed by a senior officer and each competing for

prestige, power, and money. Often the lines of responsibility among the

Bureaus were indistinct, and sometimes they overlapped. The Secretary

personally sent all operational instructions, by mail or cable, to the five

squadrons in the North and South Atlantic, Eastern Pacific, East Asian,

and European waters.6 The most important of these petty principalities in 1884 was the

Bureau of Navigation, headed by Commodore John G. Walker.

Although the Secretary made all decisions on fleet operations, Walker's

Bureau served as the means of implementing instructions. In the

absence of the Secretary, the Chief of that Bureau became Acting

Secretary. In addition, the Bureau of Navigation was responsible for

officer assignments, for the Naval Academy, for the Office of Naval

Intelligence, and for the Office of Naval Records and Library. When the

Naval War College was established in 1 884, it was added to the Bureau's

responsibilities. In Newport, Rhode Island, two other Bureaus had

interests. The Bureau of Ordnance, under Commodore Montgomery

Sicard, controlled the Naval Torpedo Station and its school on Goat

Island, and the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, under Commodore

Earl English, was responsible for recruit training at the Naval Training

Station, which shared Coasters Harbor Island with the College.

Each head of a Bureau was equal to the heads of all the others. In the

administrative structure, there was no single naval officer senior to any

one of them. However, there was an Admiral of the Navy, the most

senior officer on active duty. Although he held a position of great

prestige and status, he had little authority or power. Since 1870,

Admiral David Dixon Porter had held this position. Although his

attempts to bring power and authority to his exalted rank ended in

frustration, Porter remained an influential figure in naval affairs. 7
THE NAVY THE WAR COLLEGE JOINED 3

To the casual observer, the U.S. Navy appears to have been at a low

point in its history. Its ships were outmoded, it had little financial

support from Congress, and it had a confused and overlapping system of

administration. Yet beneath that superficial impression, deeper

streams of development pointed toward a dramatic resurgence of

American naval power over the next quarter century.

Spur to World Naval Revival

In international terms, 1884 was a turning point for navies. In

England, the year marked the end of public complacency toward the

Royal Navy. "The Dark Ages of the Admiralty" began to give way to the

era of naval revival. Relations among the great powers had been

generally calm for several years, but in 1884 the situation changed.

Russian moves in Central Asia seemed to menace British India.

Britain's refusal to evacuate Egypt irritated France, and German

relations with England grew tense as Chancellor Bismarck encouraged

German colonial expansion in Africa and the Pacific. To make matters

worse, good relations between France and Germany created rumors

that a continental maritime league was about to be formed against

England.

In September 1884, the Pall Mall Gazette published a series of

anonymous articles which exposed the need for naval improvements at a time of growing crisis. Even the First Sea Lord joined the critics, asking

for increased naval expenditure to keep pace with France, Germany,

and the other great powers.8 The public outcry in 1884 forced the

British government to increase dramatically its expenditures for

warships, naval ordnance, and coaling stations.9 This political discussion was reported widely, bringing to the attention of the reading public

in America the intensive naval building programs that were under way

in Europe. By following the English political situation, readers learned

of naval developments in France, Italy, Germany, and other countries

and began to realize that the American Navy lagged far behind. 10 In the United States, professional naval officers knew of these

developments long before the public became aware of them. In 1877

and 1878, Chief Engineer J. W. King, USN, had been ordered to

investigate European naval construction. He published his findings in

1880 in his book, The Warships and Navies of the World. American

perceptions of these naval developments abroad helped to form criteria

by which both the public and the professional naval officer judged the

capabilities of the U.S. Navy. These perceptions were as important as those which correlated the Navy to American foreign policy.

In 1884, the principal concern of American naval men was the U.S.

Navy's traditionally defensive posture. Responsible American officials
4 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

focused entirely on two primary roles for the Navy, the defense of

overseas trade and coast defense. It would be several years before

imperialism and ideas of overseas expansion began to have a serious

influence on naval policy and development. There were, however, a number of forces already at work that were turning American interests

outward and that made possible future use of the Navy as an effective

tool in seeking political goals beyond American waters. 11 At the close of the American Civil War, the United States had the

most numerous and innovative fleet of ironclad warships in the world.

John Ericsson's monitor designs had provided the seed for future

battleship design, but it was not developed in America after 1863. The

decline from this far-reaching pinnacle down to a motley collection of

obsolete and unarmored, steam-sailing vessels, armed largely with

smooth bore ordnance, gave pause for reflection. One Secretary of the

Navy reported that the accumulation of old hulls, machinery, and

stores in the navy yards "presents an unsightly appearance sometimes

ghostly and discouraging to those whose labors are to be performed near

it." 12 The situation suggested, without any other factors, that a cleanup

was necessary. It encouraged officers to seek a variety of ways to build

up the Navy at a time when the prospects for future advancement, and

even employment, in the Navy caused a great deal of anxiety. 13 While the U.S. Navy had seriously declined in strength and capability, it was not moribund. Its ships cruised worldwide. Although there

were few ships in the fleet, perhaps insufficient for their limited

purposes, they represented an established pattern of wide-ranging

activity. Beginning with USS Ticonderoga's world cruise in 1878, the

Navy Department was preoccupied with the Navy's role in protecting

American overseas commerce. Naval officers commonly based their

strategic views on the belief that a growing industrial nation, like the

United States, must export its products in order to maintain harmony

and prosperity at home. 14 Several events in the 1870s and 1880s forced American naval men to

think clearly and sensibly about the Navy's ability to carry out its

traditional role in a period of decline. The first event was the Virginius

affair in 1872-1873. This incident in the Cuban Revolution of 1868-

1878 had a profound effect by creating a situation which could have

been dealt with by combined fleet action and amphibious operations.

The inability of the U.S. Navy to act effectively raised a series of

questions for American naval men about tactics, training, ship types,

roles and the direction of the Navy in wartime. Although a minor

incident in overall terms, the situation illuminated important and basic

issues which were continually discussed by professionals over the next

two decades. 15 The importance of these same issues was
THE NAVY THE WAR COLLEGE JOINED 5

underscored for American naval officers by the victory of Chile's new

navy in the War of the Pacific, the threats to American interests created

by French plans for a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and German

moves in Samoa. 16 The means by which these various incidents were

translated into impulses for a revived American Navy were complex,

but the ideas that this process engendered were also those that

contributed to the foundation of the Naval War College.

Several subsequent developments that occurred in the 1 870s created

the means of progress. First, the relationship between the Navy and

Congress underwent a subtle transition. A change in the relative

continuity of duties for congressmen, senators, and naval officers

played an important part. In the early years, the Chiefs of Naval Bureaus

remained in office for many years. Rear Admiral Joseph Smith, for

example, headed the Bureau of Yards and Docks for a record 23 years

between 1846 and 1869. On the other hand, there was a fairly rapid

turnover in the memberships of the congressional committees dealing

with naval affairs. By 1875, the situation had reversed so that Chiefs of

Bureaus, and even Secretaries of the Navy, changed rapidly, while the

average length of service on the congressional committees became

much longer. In this way, men such as Eugene Hale could dominate the

Senate Naval Affairs Committee from 1883 to 1911, and Washington C.

Whitthorne and Benjamin Harris could serve important and continuing

roles on the House committee which outlasted institutional conser- vatism within the Navy and changes in the White House.

Second, the means to reform the Navy were facilitated by growing

professionalization within the Navy. During the last decades of the

1 9th century, many occupations in America began to develop a sense of

group identity, which was expressed by the formation of professional

associations and journals that promoted the development of a specialized and theoretical knowledge relating to the occupation. In

America, no occupational group had fully developed this status, but

lawyers, doctors, educators, and engineers were each moving in this

direction. Within the armed forces, the same developments were

discernible. Since 1 845, the Naval Academy had provided a basis for the

naval profession by creating a standard system of education and a means of officer selection. About the same time, naval lyceums were

established at several navy yards as a means to promote discussion on

naval issues. The New York Naval Lyceum published the first, but

short-lived, professional journal, The Naval Magazine. 16 A more effective and lasting professional organization, the U.S. Naval

Institute, appeared in 1873. Organized by Stephen B. Luce, Foxhall

Parker, and David Dixon Porter, the organization and its Proceedings

became a primary vehicle for the advancement of professional and

scientific knowledge among American naval officers. It became the
6 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

organization which was needed to elevate the naval officer's occupation to professional status. 19 By providing a means for officers to

publish their professional thoughts, the Naval Institute cultivated a sense of mental determination and self-discipline among its members,

which provided guidance and constructive thought for the naval

revival in the United States. By 1884, the Naval Institute had served

this function for more than 10 years and had made a great contribution

by providing a basis for the formulation of a theoretical and comprehensive maritime philosophy in the future as well as helping to define

the need for professional education.20

Professional Development

The professional development in the Navy took two forms which

were, at the same time, complementary and competing. On one hand,

officers saw the need to develop technical and scientific expertise

which would allow full use of modern armaments. The establishment

of the Torpedo Station on Goat Island in 1869 is an example of this

approach. On the other hand, they also saw the need to develop the

critical and analytical skills which would facilitate a full examination

of the purposes, functions, and limitations of naval power and allow

Officers to formulate effective strategy, tactics, and logistics. These two

lines of development were complementary in their purpose, but they

were built on quite different intellectual foundations that required

different sets of academic values and different approaches in solving

problems.

Some, but not many, naval officers have excelled in both lines of

professional development. This has created tensions and rivalries

between those officers who favored one side of the professional outlook

and those who chose the other. Members of each group supported the

establishment of institutions that fostered and promoted their own

professional outlook. Not uncommonly, some individuals believed

that one or the other outlook should be not only preeminent but the

exclusive basis of development. The tension between the two groups is

readily discernible in the pages of the Naval Institute's Proceedings in

the 1880s.21 In origins, however, one must go back to the controversy

between the line and the staff which broke out following the establishment of the engineer corps in 1 842. The wide-ranging and entangled

debate was complicated by the fact that both groups were struggling for

professional standards without clear-cut or fully developed concepts. It was an intellectual contest blurred by issues of status, authority, pay,

and promotion.22 While the Naval Institute Proceedings provided the jousting ground

for these debates, it, like other professional publications such as the
THE NAVY THE WAR COLLEGE JOINED 7

Army-Navy Journal, was not an official journal and was not formally

backed by any official organization. The first important, official

organizational change within the Navy Department that reflected the

new thinking was the establishment in 1882 of the Office of Naval

Intelligence (ONI] within the Bureau of Navigation. In its early work,

the Office of Naval Intelligence concentrated on collecting technical

data about foreign naval construction, organization, and equipment.

The information was useful and welcomed by Bureau Chiefs involved

in planning the new American steel warships. Less welcome to such

technical specialists was the tendency among officers in ONI to be

distracted by broader war problems, higher strategy, and naval history.23

Link Between Historical Study and Naval Intelligence

Naval history was a new area of inquiry. It was part of the

development of the serious academic study of history that was only just

beginning to be accepted. The first doctorates in history were awarded

by Harvard University in 1876, and in 1881 the first academic chair in

history was established at Cornell. In both America and England, the

study of history was growing up outside the universities and then

"crashed the conservative academic portals" to secure a permanent

place. The early practitioners of naval history, such as John Knox

Laughton, John Colomb, and A. T. Mahan, became more perceptive and

accurate as they carried on with their pioneer work in the 1870s and

1880s. The impulse which set naval men reading about the past was

clearly a growing dissatisfaction with the increasing narrowness of the

technical viewpoint within the naval service.24 Increasing emphasis on

naval improvement, material change, and industrial development was

so readily accepted that little thought was given to the purpose and the

use of the new machines. The newly forming school of history offered a means to consider naval issues in broad perspective unencumbered by

the distractions of either contemporary political passion or rapidly

advancing technology.

Several American officers had already demonstrated a keen interest

in naval history and had written historical articles for the Naval

Institute's Proceedings during the 1870s. One of the leaders in this

endeavor was Professor James R. Soley, a prolific writer, Naval Academy

instructor, and international lawyer. In 1882, he was appointed

Librarian of the Navy Department Library, in the Bureau of Navigation.

Immediately upon taking up his duties, Soley consolidated the rare books scattered throughout Navy Department offices, established a collection of historical naval prints and photographs, and began to

build the 7,000 volume collection. He also made the first serious

attempt to collect and preserve American naval records. In 1884,
8 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Congress encouraged Soley's efforts further by appropriating funds

for the publication of the documents on naval operations in the Civil

War. Although this series did not begin to appear in print until 1894,

Soley began the initial work and research to gather and use these

historical records as a means of "ensuring the efficiency of the naval

service."25 As a matter of administrative convenience during their early years,

the newly established Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of

Naval Records and Library shared the same rooms in the State-WarNavy Building. The location of this early historical work close to the

work of intelligence compilation created a link in the approach and

concerns of both enterprises. Intelligence officers seemed to become

increasingly interested in historical insight while the historical work

was kept specifically on the professional and service aspects of the

topic.

The development of professionalism within the United States Navy,

engendering both technological and analytical progress, was the

hallmark of the naval revival in the 1880s. Numerous obstacles stood

in the path, deflecting and slowing growth. Party rivalry in Congress,

inexperience, defective administrative organization, lack of manufacturing facilities, prejudices from the earlier period, as well as geographical and political isolation were all obstacles to be overcome

but the work of naval reconstruction was clearly under way. In 1882,

Congress had limited the amount of money that could be spent for

repairing the old wooden ships, as a means to phase out the old ships. In

the following year, Congress took the first step in replacing the old

ships by authorizing four steel vessels, the nucleus of the "New Navy."

These were tentative steps which signified further change to come but

required great effort in the future. By the end of 1884, Congress had

compelled the retirement of many outmoded ships, but provision for an

adequate number of new ships to replace them was still needed along

with clear ideas for their design and use. In 1 884, the United States Navy was in a period of transition which

reflected the broad developments in American intellectual perceptions, the growth of industrial power, technological progress, and

general professional development. The undercurrents that created a new navy were already discernible even while the old appearances

remained. Change was in the air, and suggestions for future

development were heard in many different areas. In Newport, Rhode

Island, The Mercury reported in the spring of 1884 that Coasters

Harbor Island in Narragansett Bay might be the site of either a school

for the advanced instruction of naval officers, or perhaps it would

become the site of a naval asylum.
THE NAVY THE WAR COLLEGE JOINED 9

Notes

1. J. W. King, The Warships and Navies of the World, 1880 (Annapolis,

Naval Institute Press, 1982], p. 377. Reprint of 1880 edition.

2. Quoted in Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy

(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1979], p. 49, from U.S. Congress 48th, 1st and

2nd Sess., Congressional Record, 15, pt. 2, p. 1391.

3. Ibid.

4. Quoted in Frank M. Bennett, The Steam Navy of the United States

(Pittsburgh: Nicholson, 1896), p. 544.

5.U.S. Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,

1885, (Washington: Govt. Print. Off.), p. xxxiii.

6. For general history of administration, see C. O. Paullin, Paullin's History

of Naval Administration, 1775-1911: A Collection of Articles from the U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968).

7. Kenneth J. Hagan, American Gunhoat Diplomacy and the Old Navy

1877-1889 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 14-28, and "Admiral David

Dixon Porter: Strategist for a Navy in Transition," USNI Proceedings 94 (July

1968), pp. 140-43; James R. Soley, Admiral Porter (New York: Appleton, 1903).

8. Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British

Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (New York: Knopf, 1940),

pp. 1 19-121, and N. A. M. Rodger, "The Dark Ages of The Admiralty, 1869-85,"

Mariners Mirror, Vol. 61 (1975), pp. 331-334; Vol. 62 (1976), pp. 33-46, and pp.

121-128.

9. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York:

Scribners, 1976), p. 178.

10. Marder, op.cit. For a summary of general naval developments at the time, see J. W. King, The Warships and Navies of the World, 1880.

11. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United

States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1973), p. 169-70.

12. U.S. Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary, 1881-82, p. 25. Quoted in Sandler, see footnote 13.

1 3. Stanley Sandler, "A Navy in Decay: Some Strategic Technological Results

of Disarmament, 1865-69 in the U.S. Navy," Military Affairs, XXXV (December

1971), pp. 138-142; Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy (New York: Free Press,

1972), pp. 277-325.

14. Kenneth J. Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy

1877-1889, pp. 188-191.

15. Lawrence Carroll Allin, The United States Naval Institute Intellectual

Forum of the New Navy: 1873-1889 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs,

1978), pp. 45-49.

16. Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 23.

1 7. Robert G. Albion, "The Naval Affairs Committee, 1816-1 947," U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, 78 (1952), pp. 1227-37, and Makers of Naval Policy

1798-1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 206, pp. 634-38.

1 8. S. de Christofar, "The Naval Lyceum," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 78

(1951), pp. 869-870.

19. L. C. Allin, op.cit., pp. 21-24; Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval

War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport: Naval

War College Press, 1977), pp. 3-4.
1 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

20. Allin, op.cit, pp. 71-120, 219-23, 343.

21. See, for example, Ibid., p. 219-23.

22. See F. M. Bennett, Steam Navy of the United States, pp. 75-88, 177-192,

603-21, 732-43, 750-56; Lance C. Buhl, "Mariners and Machines: Resistance to

Technological Change in the American Navy, 1 865- 1 869," Journal ofAmerican

History, Vol. 61, No. 3 (1974), pp. 703-27.

23. Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of

Americas First Intelligence Agency 1865-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 1979], pp. 24-25.

24 D. M. Schurman, The Education of A Navy: The Development of British

Naval Strategic Thought 1867-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1965], pp. 5-6. See also Allin, United States Naval Institute, pp. 223-235.

25. U.S. Department of the Navy, Official Records of the Union and

Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (Washington: Govt. Print. Off.,

1 894], I, p. viii. For a history of the Navy Department Library, see John McElroy's

unpublished manuscript in the Navy Department Library, "Office of Naval

Records and Library 1882-1946," p. 1, and W. J. Morgan and Joye L. Leonhart, A

History of the Dudley Knox Center for Naval History (Washington: Govt. Print.

Off., 1981], pp. 1-4. 26. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-

1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980], pp. 190-197; George T. Davis, A

Navy Second to None (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp. 37-43.

27. The Mercury, 22 March 1884.
EN

CHAPTER 2

A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE: THE ERA OF LUCE

AND MAHAN, 1884-1893

The idea of the Naval War College was conceived

in the mind of Stephen B. Luce. Through Luce's outspoken leadership,

the institution formed on his concept was both an expression and a part

of the forces that were leading toward America's naval revival. All the

reformers met many of the same obstacles, but the college represented a new element in the reform movement. Luce always saw the requirement for a practical testing of ideas, but his college clearly emphasized

the analytical line of professional development and, by its very

intellectual foundations, differed from the technological approach.

This different outlook created tension, and the War College became

fair game in the endemic rivalry among the Bureaus in Washington.

In July 1 884, Stephen B. Luce was appointed Acting Rear Admiral, in

command of the North Atlantic Station. Having served more than 40

years on active duty, he had attained the senior and most prestigious

flag assignment at sea. Luce was widely recognized as one of the most

capable officers in the Navy at that time. He had served at sea in a variety of capacities, including the command of seven different ships

under sail and steam. In 1863, Luce had commanded one of the Navy's

most modern warships, the Ericsson-designed monitor Nantucket.

Promoted to commodore in 1 88 1, he gained further practical experience

for fleet work when he commanded the squadron of ships devoted to sea training for apprentice seamen. 1 Training, administration, organization, and education were the principal underlying themes of Luce's career. These were unusual types of

activity for a naval man at the time, but Luce devoted his life to

improving the Navy in these areas. Much of his experience and practical

achievement and most of his published works were related to these

professional subjects.
1

2

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

From his earliest days in the Navy, he expressed an interest in naval

administration and education. As a lieutenant and instructor at the

Naval Academy in 1861, Luce complained of the Navy's weakness in

intellectual pursuits. "Compared to the Army with their wealth of

professional literature," he wrote, we in the Navy "may be likened to the

nomadic tribes of the East who are content with the vague tradition of

the past."2 Even then, Luce was determined to do something about it. He

started with practical textbooks. His first publication was a revised and

updated gunnery manual. In the same year, he compiled the first

seamanship textbook for the Naval Academy, a volume which would

become, through later revision, the standard American work on the

subject for nearly 30 years.3 Luce's association with the Naval Academy in 1860-1863 was

important not only for his contributions to professional literature at

that time but for his first close acquaintance with Newport, Rhode

Island, where he would later choose to establish both a Naval Training

Station and the Naval War College. Soon after the beginning of the Civil

War in 1 86 1, the Naval Academy was moved north to Newport where it

could continue its work more safely.4 There Luce saw that Newport

offered some great advantages in education for naval officers. In

Annapolis, "it is always the battalion, the musket, a banner, and a drum

and fife!" But at Newport "it was different; there in a seaport town the

youngsters inhaled the sea breezes by day and at night were lulled to

rest by the roar of the Atlantic surf." Above all, Newport offered a location where students "can come in daily contact with seamen fresh

from the ocean."5

It was not only Newport, but Coasters Harbor Island in Narragansett

Bay, which struck Luce as an ideal place for a naval school. Remembering his days as a lieutenant commander at the Naval Academy in

Newport, Luce recalled that in 1863 "Commodore Blake, the superintendent of the Naval Academy, at that time in the Atlantic Hotel,

Touro Park, Newport, R.I. invited me to accompany him on a drive to

look at a site at Coasters Harbor Island for a new building for the Naval

Academy. Mr. George Mason, an architect of Newport, made one of the

party. Mr. Mason was then engaged in preparing plans under the

Commodore's direction for the building; for there was good reason then

for thinking that the Naval Academy would remain in Newport

permanently . . . , The proposed site was on Coasters Harbor Island. As

we stood on the highest point of the Island . . . and looked upon the

broad expanse of the waters of Narragansett Bay, the Commodore grew

very eloquent upon the many advantages of the harbor and bay as a naval station, and the perfect adaptability of the site where we stood for

a Naval Academy. The very favorable impression made upon my mind

at that time was never effaced."6 Despite Commodore Blake's plans, the
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 13

Academy returned to Annapolis, but even before that Luce was ordered

to command the monitor Nantucket in the South Atlantic Blockading

Squadron.

While in command of Nantucket, Luce began to write his first series of

articles which suggested plans for improving naval apprentice training

and creating a parallel program for the merchant marine. With these

articles, the young naval officer began a long connection with W. C.

Church's Army and Navy Journal and publicly laid the foundation for his

lifetime campaign to improve nautical education and training. Luce's

first success came in the campaign for merchant marine schools. His

active work directly resulted in the Marine Schools Act passed by

Congress in 1874 and the establishment of what later became the State

University of New York Maritime College at Fort Schuyler.7 Luce's campaign for the improvement of professional naval education

and training proved to be a far more complicated affair. He had in mind a complete view which included the training of apprentice seamen, chiefly

in gunnery, engineering, and practical seamanship. Luce added both

religious and naval instruction and stressed the value for apprentice

training in old Navy ballads and songs as well as in naval history. Luce's

plans came to fruition with congressional authorization in 1875 for the

enlistment of 750 sixteen to eighteen-year-old boys into the Navy. The

USS Minnesota was made the naval apprentice training ship.8 At the same time, Luce approached the president of the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology and pointed out that the new Marine Schools Act

of 1874 authorized the establishment of a branch, in an already

established institution, for instruction in naval architecture and marine

engineering. Although the MIT president encouraged Luce and others to

join in the effort, a school of naval architecture was not established at

MIT until 18 years later.9 In 1877, Luce took command of the Minnesota and devoted himself

to developing an enlisted training program on a permanent and uniform

basis. The acrimonious debate that ensued centered on such issues as the value of sail training, the control of training by a Bureau that would

support it, and the location of a base for enlisted training. 10 By the 1 890s

Luce's position on sail training had been soundly defeated, and young

apprentices were moved ashore where close order drill replaced the

discipline of handling yard, sail, and sheet. Despite this setback to his

ideas, Luce remained a major force in developing the enlisted training

program. 11 In the process, he achieved one success which later found a place in his plans for advanced officer education. Luce believed that the

apprentice training program could reach its potential quickly if the

various elements of training were united in one place, under one man.

In November 1880, the Secretary of the Navy appointed Luce to a board of officers to select a location for, the headquarters of the
14 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

apprentice training squadron. After careful consideration of both

New London, Connecticut, and a site near Newport, Rhode Island, the

board chose Coasters Harbor Island in Narragansett Bay. Luce had

already prepared the way for this decision by encouraging in 1 878 the

establishment of a committee of the Rhode Island General Assembly

to select a suitable site in Narragansett Bay for a training station and,

at the same time, encouraging the city fathers of Newport to give to

the Navy Coasters Harbor Island where the city poorhouse was

located.

"The object and sole object," Luce wrote, "in getting possession of the

Island was to have a place where the boys might land occasionally for

drills under arms and recreation." The apprentices lived on board the

anchored ship-of-the-line New Hampshire, swinging to the wind and

tide just to the south of Coasters Harbor, where the apprentices could

become accustomed to shipboard life. On 16 December 1880, the

Secretary of the Navy designated the island a temporary training

station. Following this, on 9 February 1881, the State Assembly of

Rhode Island ordered the island to be ceded to the federal government

by a deed dated 2 March 1881. The station was made a permanent one

on 4 June 1883 after Congress formally accepted the gift. 12 With this work done, Luce wrote to his son-in-law in July 1883:

My great hobby now—now that the Training System is fairly

established—is to erect a "War School" for officers, the prime object

being to teach officers the science of their own profession, the

Science of War ... I have the plan roughly mapped out and the

Alms House on this Island is to be the College . . . Whether it will

end in smoke or not I cannot say . . . . 13

The Concept of the War College

The idea of a college for professional naval officers to study the

science of warfare was a much more complex and intellectual problem

than Luce had faced in his plans for merchant marine or apprentice

training. Those had required training in specific, practical skills. The

War College, in Luce's mind, went far beyond that to educating the

mind for perception and analysis.

Luce, a self-educated man, was well read and sensitive to the new

intellectual trends of his day. Following Herbert Spencer, the English

philosopher, who applied the principles of evolutionary progress to all

branches of knowledge, Luce believed that education was a process

through which each individual discovered for himself the nature of the

world around him. To Luce, truth and understanding were found

through the discernment of basic and immutable laws in nature. As

scientists had demonstrated that there were basic physical laws of the
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1 893 1

5

universe, Luce and many others believed that similar laws could be

found in human affairs. These, however, were to be discovered by

individual reading and research in a cooperative effort by a wide variety

of people.

Luce thought that laws of human nature could be found through two

complementary methods of reasoning, the comparative and the

inductive. The comparative method was reasoning by analogy. Here

Luce saw great relevance in examining the recent developments in

studies of law, history, literature, science, technology, and education.

In this he was profoundly influenced by his reading of the historian

Thomas Buckle and the philologist Friedrich Max Miiller, both of

whom were great exponents of comparative study. Luce drew from

them his conviction that the comparative method was essential to

establishing a science of naval warfare. Going a step further, he saw that

the study of naval warfare must be coordinated with military science

and art. The complementary approach to the comparative method was

through inductive reasoning, by which a person proceeded from

thinking about specific events to making broad generalizations. The

generalizations, however, were conceived at a level of understanding

that was thoroughly steeped in theoretical developments in a wide

variety of fields.

In all of this, the study of history was important. Luce thoroughly

agreed with the historian Macaulay that "no past event has any

intrinsic importance; the knowledge of it is valuable only as it leads to

form just calculations for the future." Like Lord Bolingbroke, Luce

firmly believed that "History is philosophy teaching by example."14 The

value in historical study was to be found in its effects on individual

thinking, on the process which comes from dealing with a range of

specific examples and developing generalizations from them.

Luce believed that a theoretical basis could be developed for the

naval profession. He saw the technological revolution that was about

to transform the Navy, and he proposed an intellectual method by

which professional officers could effectively deal with the technological conundrums of the new Navy. Luce believed that first one must

understand what a Navy does and why it exists, before one can

effectively select the means, the tactics, and the weapons by which it is

to be employed.

Luce developed his ideas largely through his wide reading and

extensive professional experience, but he was also influenced by

several individuals in the process. He believed that the seed of his

thinking was planted in January 1 865, when he met General William T.

Sherman during the siege of Charleston, South Carolina. Sherman

explained the Navy's strategic failures in a few sentences and declared

that he would make the city fall without a battle. "I will cut her
1

6

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

communications and Charleston will fall into your hands like a ripe

pear" Sherman said, "and that is just exactly what came to pass," Luce

related. 15 This demonstration of military thinking was a revelation

for Luce and opened his eyes to the proposition that certain

fundamental ideas underlay operations. "In other words," Luce wrote

later, "the Civil War demonstrated conclusively the necessity of a War College and a general staff." 16 In Luce's mind, the War College

was the essential prerequisite for the establishment of proper

military direction of the armed forces, so it was on education that he

concentrated first.

Establishing a College

About 1877, Luce encountered a second Army officer who

stimulated his thought further along this line. This was Brigadier

General Emory Upton, then commanding the Artillery School at Fort

Monroe, Hampton Roads, Virginia. Based on ideas that had come out

of American military experience in the Civil War and were merged

with the new trends in thought revealed by German success in the

Franco-Prussian War, the Army's Artillery School had become

America's model institution of higher military learning. Like the

Navy, the U.S. Army was passing through a period of decline, neglect,

and struggle for professional identity. Upton was one of the Army's

leaders who fostered the cultivation of professional study and

encouraged others along the same lines. 17 It is not surprising that two

like minded men found much to share. While in command of a ship at

Norfolk, Luce had met Upton and had an opportunity to examine the

curriculum of Upton's school. On 8 August 1877, Luce wrote to the

Secretary of the Navy, forwarding a copy of the "Programme of

Instruction" at the Artillery School and recommending that a similar

school be established for the Navy. "The leading feature of the

postgraduate course would be the carrying of the young officers

through a course of instruction in the Art of War," Luce wrote, adding

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal

business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his

profession. The U.S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and

less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval

warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct

of naval operation . . . . 18 Luce shared his ideas with Upton who supported and encouraged

them. After reading one of Luce's articles, Upton wrote to him, "It gave

me quite new ideas as to the similarity between land and naval

tactics, and I can now fully comprehend your scheme in relation to a
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 17

postgraduate course as a means of educating the officers of the Navy

in the strategy and tactics of their profession." 19 Although the Secretary of the Navy seemed to receive Luce's

proposal favorably, no action was taken to establish a new school. In

April 1883, Luce again took the initiative. In a lecture before the

recently formed Newport Chapter of the United States Naval Institute,

he described the various "War Schools" that the Army had established,

and focused primarily on the Artillery School at Fort Monroe. Luce

emphasized the Army's precedent and stressed that naval officers, as well as army officers, should have the basic knowledge of the art and

practice of war "so far as it can be acquired from books." In addition, the

naval officer "should be led into a philosophic study of naval history" so that he might see the manner in which theory has been illustrated and

where a disregard of it had led to disaster.20 During 1 883, Luce found another means of getting his ideas across to

the people who could implement them. In the summer of 1882, he had

been appointed senior member of a commission to investigate Navy

yards. The Commission's final report was completed in December 1 883,

and gave Luce the additional opportunity to present to the Secretary of

the Navy and senior officers his ideas on naval education, strategy and

administration. At the same time, he encouraged the editor of the Army

and Navy Journal to publish articles on the subject, and "thus start a controversy and a BOOM."21 On 6 November 1882, Luce wrote a formal letter to Secretary of the

Navy W. E. Chandler recommending a naval school for "the higher

branches of the naval profession: the science of war, naval tactics,

military and naval history, international law, military and naval law,

modern languages, and such elective branches as might be found

desirable."22 Citing the Artillery School at Fort Monroe and the Infantry

and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth "as examples worthy of

imitation," Luce went on to point out that with the land and buildings

on Coasters Harbor Island readily available, the plan could be put into

effect immediately with no congressional action required "and but

trifling expense."23 Following conversations with Chandler and Admiral of the Navy D.

D. Porter in early 1884, Luce submitted a draft General Order for the

Secretary to issue.24 In response to this letter, Chandler ordered on 30

May 1884 that Luce be president of a board to consider and report on

the subject. Lieutenant Commander Caspar F. Goodrich and Captain

William T. Sampson were ordered as members of the board. Before

meeting, Luce wrote to both younger officers, suggesting that they read

his article on "War Schools" and consider his opinion "that we should

have for the Navy what the Army has in the schools at Fort Monroe and

at Fort Leavenworth."25 They were also asked to review, as a possible
1

8

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

model, the organization of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich,

which was described in Professor Soley's book on Naval Education.16 Greenwich and its predecessor at Portsmouth had offered higher

technical training to officers since 1 839. It was at Greenwich that John

Knox Laughton began the modern study of naval history in 1874,

although the subject played little role in its curriculum.

The purpose of this board was to discuss the proposal and to draw up

a plan of organization for the proposed college. It was not a forum for

discussion of opposing views. Luce had already raised strong opposition

by his published article. Notable among the opponents was Captain F. M. Ramsey, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, who believed

that the War College would detract from the Academy's course of

instruction by creating a rival academy.27 Others wanted to amalgamate

it with the Torpedo Station School on Goat Island, but Luce, with

Sampson and Goodrich, set out to define the character of the new

college. In a report written on board the flagship of the Training

Squadron, USS New Hampshire, then moored at South Point on

Coasters Harbor Island, the three agreed that naval officers are "too apt

to lose sight of the ultimate object of all" and become devoted to the

application of electricity to torpedoes, chemistry to explosives, or metallurgy to ordnance instead of the central issue, "success in war."28 The board of officers declared that the United States Navy should

have

a place where our officers will not only be encouraged, but required,

to study their profession proper—war—in a far more thorough

manner than has ever heretofore been attempted, and to bring to

the investigation of the various problems of modern naval warfare

the scientific methods adopted in other professions.29 The fact that the United States had no adequate naval force at the time

made it even more difficult for officers to gain professional knowledge.

Luce, Goodrich, and Sampson believed that a War College was an

absolute necessity in that situation. Like other professions, the Navy

was beginning to form specialties of knowledge among its officers, and

the board believed that in this process, warfare, "the one subject par

excellence of the naval profession" was being ignored. "Failing to

produce specialists in this one branch, we fail utterly in our whole

system of naval education, for all others are but subordinate or

accessory."

The board also outlined a proposed course for the college. To appease

the opposition, the board suggested that the course could be linked

with and supplement the technical course in ordnance at the Torpedo

Station on Goat Island by offering an additional six months' study in

the science and art of war, law, and history. The courses in war would

include study of strategy, tactics, and campaigns, from the military,
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 19

naval, and joint standpoints. "As the principles underlying all hostile

movements are at bottom the same, whatever be the nature of the field

of action, the board is of the opinion that an intimate knowledge of

military operations is essential to the naval strategist."30 The war course would also be paralleled by a study of modern

political history and general naval history. In addition, international

law was added as a subject "of the utmost importance in its bearing

upon action taken by our naval commanders abroad."

The board recognized that the college would eventually need to

provide additional courses that would accommodate "the increased

complexity of certain branches of the profession," but these should be

offered as electives in a way that did not detract from the main thrust of

the study of warfare.

For all the college's academic work, the board recommended that no

one should be permitted to engage in the courses who could not pass a satisfactory examination. Additionally, those who finished the instruction with credit were to receive certificates of proficiency and a signifying letter or mark would be placed by their names in the Navy

Register as a means of denoting their professional attainment.

The board, however, did not conceive only of academic and library

study. Luce, in particular, believed that practical tactical exercises were

an important part of the curriculum. The board suggested that "the

North Atlantic Squadron affords the nearest approach to be found to a proper course in naval tactics." It also suggested that at a stated time,

once a year, the squadron should demonstrate the whole range of its

operation for the college class.

That factor made Newport the best choice among the other locations

contending for the school: Washington, Annapolis, New York, and

Boston. Among them, only Boston and Newport had buildings and

ground readily available. Boston had the eminent professors and

excellent libraries available, but they were also within reach of

Newport. As a seaport with ready access to the fleet, Newport offered

"exceptional advantages," as Luce had seen many years before. In

addition to an excellent anchorage for the fleet, the Torpedo School

could readily extend its technical instruction in sciences in a way that

would complement the War College's course of study. War College

students could also avail themselves of special courses at "the great

institutions of learning at Boston."

When the report was submitted in mid-June 1884, Luce was still

Commander of the Training Squadron. A month later he was ordered to

command the North Atlantic Squadron with the rank of acting rear admiral. With approval for his fledgling Naval War College imminent,

Luce preferred to continue his work for the college rather than accept

permanent appointment as rear admiral in command of the squadron.
20 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Before relinquishing his command, and resuming the rank of

commodore, Luce welcomed home from the Arctic the Greely Relief

Expedition, entertained President Chester A. Arthur when he visited

the squadron, and conducted one of the Navy's first amphibious

exercises at Gardiners Island, near the eastern end of Long Island.

As early as February 1 884, Luce had begun to cast about for possible

faculty members. He first approached Caspar Goodrich to take up the

position in naval strategy and tactics, which later was given to

Mahan.31 Among others, he requested Richard Wainwright and

Professor J. R. Soley and began to search for an Army officer as well.32 Even before the War College was formally established, Luce was

detached from command of the squadron and ordered to assume the

duties as "Superintendent of the College at Coasters Harbor Island."

Reporting the changes of command which took place on board USS

Tennessee in Newport Harbor, the Army and Navy Journal noted

Commodore Luce is expected to come to Washington shortly for

the purpose of consulting with Secretary Chandler regarding the

establishment of the postgraduate school. He has not been

communicated with on the subject, but his coming is regarded as

a matter of course. He was relieved from the command of the

North Atlantic Station by Commodore Jouett on the 20th of

September, with the usual ceremonies, with the addition of a salute from the Torpedo Station. The two officers made brief

addresses to the officers and crew. Immediately after being

relieved of the command of the squadron, Commodore Luce

proceeded in his barge to Coasters Harbor Island to carry out his

orders. He was accompanied by Captain Yates and Lieutenant

Symonds, of the New Hampshire, and by the members of his late

staff, Lieutenants Very, Tilley, and Mulligan, Ensign Everett, and

Midshipman Wells. Arriving at the building on the island, he put

his hand on the door and said: "Know all men by these presents,

and in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, I christen this

building the War College of the American Navy."33 Three weeks later the same journal reported, "the new college . . . has been dubbed by naval officers at the Navy Department,

the 'Trinity College,' a name they have derived from the manner in

which the institution was christened."34 On 6 October, Secretary of

the Navy Chandler signed General Order 325 which formally established the Naval War College as "an advanced course of professional

study." The principal building on the island with the surrounding

structures and immediately adjacent grounds was thereby transferred

from the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting to the Bureau of

Navigation. At the same time, the War College was placed in charge of

a president, not to be below the rank of commander. He, with the

faculty, constituted a board that was given authority to arrange the
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 21

course of instruction. The course was to be opened to all officers above

the grade of naval cadet.35 With its formal establishment, the Naval War College entered the

endless bureaucratic struggle within the Navy. From the outset, the

placement side by side on the same island of two separate entities,

belonging to two different bureaus, created difficulty. Even though

both were the product of Luce's effort, the Bureau of Equipment and

Recruiting saw the War College as an intruder from the Bureau of

Navigation on an island that rightly belonged to the Training Station.

At the same time, officers at the Naval Academy in Annapolis feared

that the War College was a kind of academic postgraduate school that

would become a rival.

Despite the orders given to establish the Naval War College, no

immediate action was taken to carry them out. Only Luce was on the

scene. In order to draw attention to the new enterprise, he wrote an

article for the United Service Magazine, clearly pointing out the

rationale behind it, and simultaneously persuaded the Army and Navy

Journal to publicize the college. Luce was also in close contact with

Rhode Island Senator Nelson Aldrich in making plans for the college.

By early February 1885, still no action had been taken for the college.

To inquire into this matter, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution

directing the Secretary of the Navy to report to the Senate on the steps

that were being taken. The report was made, but no funds were allotted

to the college. Eventually, naval officers were ordered to the college as students. In the first class there would be four lieutenant commanders

and five lieutenants.

The First Course

At the opening ceremony of the War College, on 4 September 1885,

Rear Admiral Daniel Ammen, a distinguished officer and author of a naval history of the Civil War, gave the main address. Aware that he

was dedicating a new enterprise, he told the students that it was a matter of prime necessity for the nation to have officers who understood the nature of war. A school such as Annapolis provided a basis of

understanding the special appliances required for war. But here, in

Newport, he said, the "economy of war" should be a specialty, "that we

may not sacrifice ourselves and those under us unnecessarily."36 With

those thoughts in the minds of the small audience, Luce brought

attention to the fact that it was an inauspicious beginning for such a serious and important purpose. With no money for books, furniture,

heat, or light, Luce reminded the audience that the building offered

little but shelter from the winds of Narragansett Bay. The cornerstone

for the building had been laid on 25 June 1819 to be Newport's
22 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

poorhouse and deaf and dumb asylum. Luce declared the college open

by saying, "poor little Poorhouse, I christen thee the United States

Naval War College."37 The class that convened for the next four weeks made do with

borrowed furniture and could hear only the visiting lecturers who were

willing to spend their own time and money to come to the college. The

first course was hardly what Luce had hoped to have, but it was the best

he could get. Professor James Soley temporarily left his duties as librarian in the Navy Department to lecture on international law. The

Army sent Lieutenant Tasker Bliss to lecture on military affairs, and

Luce gave several lectures.38 Less than a week after the opening of the first class, Admiral Luce

participated in the dedication ceremony of a statue to one of Newport's

naval heroes, Oliver Hazard Perry. Ironically, the ceremony brought

Luce together with another important figure in naval education, the

Newport summer resident and historian George Bancroft, who as Secretary of the Navy in 1845 had established the Naval Academy.

Luce took the opportunity to point out the difference between the

two institutions. The War College was designed, he said, to take the

academy graduate, only after an interval of sea service, into the highest

realm of professional thought: war. "That particular name has been

given to the college in order that its special mission may be kept

steadily in view—that it may never be lost sight of," he said. "War and

its cognate branches constitute the college curriculum. It is only by a close study of the science and art of war that we can be prepared for war,

and thus go very far toward securing peace."39 Luce explained that the

college was not an ordinary course of instruction, "not teaching war,"

but giving the student the opportunity of understanding it. 40 Many years later, he explained his idea further when he declared

that "there are no professors competent to teach" warfare. "All that

the College can do," he said, "all that it professes to do, is to invite

officers to come to it; and to offer them every facility for pursuing the

study . . . All here, faculty and class alike, occupy the same plane,

without distinction of age, rank, or assumption of superior

attainments . . . In the beginning I, myself, . . . announced myself as one of the class in attendance ....

"41 The War College, Luce

believed, "is a place of original research on all questions relating to

war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of

war."42 The concept that lay behind the college was not widely understood.

Critics poked fun at the Navy for having as its only full-time staff

member an Army lieutenant. Despite the criticism, Luce was generally

pleased by the first experiment and set about plans for the next session

to open in the following year. In January 1886, however, Luce was
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 23

promoted to the permanent grade of rear admiral and ordered again to sea in command of the North Atlantic Squadron.

Mahan's Arrival

In September 1885, Luce had arranged for Captain Alfred T. Mahan to

be ordered to the college to be lecturer in naval strategy and tactics.

Enroute from command of a ship on the South American station,

Mahan was ordered home to New York to pursue studies at the Astor

Library and the New York Public Library in preparation for the Naval

War College course beginning in September 1886. Meeting Mahan at

Newport on 20 October 1885 to discuss plans, Luce directed Mahan to

work in two areas, fleet battle tactics and history. In Luce's mind, these

two subjects were directly related. He stressed to Mahan that he should

employ the comparative method, avoid the purely naval point of view,

and consider the interrelationships among naval and military tactics,

strategy, diplomacy, and national power. As Mahan wrote to his old

friend and Academy classmate, Samuel Ashe,

I want if I can to wrest something out of the old wooden sides and

24-pounders that will throw some light on the combinations to be

used with ironclads, rifled guns, and torpedoes; and to raise the

profession in the eyes of its members by a clearer comprehension of

the great part it has played in the world than I myself have hitherto

had.43 This work became his lectures in the following year and resulted five

years later in Mahan's first famous book, The Influence of Sea Power

Upon History 1 660- 1 783. Although he would become the most famous

member of the college in its early years, Mahan's work was only part of

the concept that Luce had in mind. Luce had been able to win, at least

temporarily, the favor of the Bureaus in Washington, gain an $8,000

appropriation for its maintenance, accumulate a small library through

gifts, and arrange for the main lecturers. Tasker Bliss of the Army was

still the only permanently assigned officer, other than the president of

the college. With Luce's departure in June and Mahan's arrival delayed

until August, there was no activity at the college that summer.

When Mahan arrived to take up residence in the college building, he

discovered that he was its sole occupant, Bliss having accommodations

in town. "As I walked around the lonely halls and stairways," Mahan

wrote, "I might have parodied Louis XIV, and said, "Le College, c'est

moi." Although there was a steward who made his meals and his bed,

Mahan commented,

There was but one lamp available, which I had to carry with me

when I went from room to room by night; and indeed, except for the

roof over my head, I might be said to be 'camping out.'44
24 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

When the class convened on 6 September for the two-and-a-halfmonth course, 21 officers attended, including two commanders, eleven

lieutenants, six ensigns, and two Marine Corps officers. The course was

more successfully modeled on Luce's plan than the first year had been.

Sixteen lectures were on the tactics of naval gunnery, by Lieutenant

William B. Hoff, the author of a recent book on the subject. Professor

Soley returned again from Washington with a series of 20 lectures on

international law dealing with the relations of states, in both peace and

war. Lieutenant Bliss gave 18 lectures on military tactics, minor

military operations, and the principles of modern strategy. Additional

lectures were given on subjects of general interest such as coastal

defense, hygiene, and Civil War history. During the first 10 days of the

course, Rear Admiral Luce was present with his flagship, USS

Tennessee, which he allowed the college students to use for practical

exercises 45 In general, its friends praised the small beginnings of the college and

were heartened by the progress of its second year. The Admiral of the

Navy, David Dixon Porter, wrote in his annual report, "The War College

has had a struggle for existence owing to the prejudice existing against

it in the Navy, although none of those who have antagonized the

institution can give a single good reason why it should not be

fostered."46 A retired lieutenant, William McCarty Little, was one of the

enthusiastic supporters of the War College. Forced to leave active duty

following an eye injury, McCarty Little volunteered his services to

Luce at the opening of the college. He continued to work with Mahan

by drawing some of the maps that Mahan used in his lectures and that

later appeared in his books. At the same time, Mahan and McCarty

Little, working together, devised a system to examine and to explain

the tactics of historic battles by using cardboard vessels of different

colors for the contending navies moved over a sheet of drawing paper.

When satisfied that the graphic representation corresponded with the

facts and the technical conditions, Mahan then fastened the cardboard

in place. Through this method, Mahan and Little were able to apply

their technical knowledge of ships and begin to work out with care the

principles of naval tactics. This was the beginning of war gaming at the

college. McCarty Little began to develop the idea further and suggested

some broader uses of war gaming in his lecture on "Colomb's Naval

Duel Game," delivered to the 1886 class.47 As the second year of the War College drew to a close, Mahan

reflected his thoughts and his new situation when he wrote to a friend,

Our position entirely out of Newport, indeed in the very opposite

direction from the fashionable quarter, has advantages of view and

air over the latter. The island which is connected by causeway with
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1 893 25

the main is windswept and almost treeless, but the old house

(formerly an almshouse) faces the Seabreeze and looks straight

down the narrow entrance through which, over a hundred years

ago, D'Estaing sailed in with the French fleet under the fire of the

English batteries . . . . 48 By the end of the course, Mahan was pleased that the college had

managed to stay clear of the kind of postgraduate course that might be

considered a follow-on to instruction at Annapolis. As Luce had

planned, the War College devoted itself to the much needed, broadly

based study of warfare. "The want had been proved, and a means of

filling it offered," Mahan wrote, and "the listeners had been persuaded."49 Mahan's optimism stemmed from his academic success, but at the

same time a serious threat was brewing in Washington. In the autumn

of 1886, Mahan suddenly realized that there was strong opposition to

the War College in Congress. Hilary Herbert, Chairman of the House

Naval Affairs Committee, considered the college a postgraduate school,

and therefore, better placed in Annapolis where the laboratories and

equipment already existed. He let it be known that he would prevent

any appropriation to support the college. Mahan began immediately to

develop a campaign to protect the college. He believed that if technical

subjects were allowed into the curriculum, inevitably they would

predominate over the study of warfare. The college would then decline

into an instrumentality merely to promote mechanical perfection. He

decided to avoid any discussion of materiel, thus removing grounds for

the argument that the college was a postgraduate school. At the same

time, influential officers such as Francis M. Ramsay and Winfield Scott

Schley criticized the college for its emphasis on the comparative

approach as a means of developing naval theory. Mahan pled his case

before congressional leaders. He failed. About Herbert, Mahan later

wrote, "In vain did I try to divert his thoughts ... He stopped his ears

like Ulysses, and kept his eyes fixed on the necessity of strangling

vipers in their cradle."50 Despite the support of many others, the War College received no

money for 1887. In writing to Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island,

Mahan apologized for the appearance of his letter, "The poverty of the

college does not admit of my having a clerk—and the typewriting is

done by the kindness of my aide, who is not yet very expert."51 As winter

came on, there was no fuel to heat the building. Mahan submitted a request through the routine channels, and coal was delivered before

Washington noticed that there was no appropriation to pay for it. Finding that the delivery had already been made, officials in Washington eventually decided not to freeze the college out literally, but

paid for the coal through the Bureau to which the Training Station
26 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

belonged. A fact "which would not nullify its feelings," Mahan

commented. Mahan searched through the refuse left over from

converting the poorhouse into a school and dwelling. He collected,

sorted, and sold the bits and pieces to support the college, using some of

it to purchase books for the college's small library.

Later, Mahan looked back with pleasure on his two years living in the

old building. In so isolated and exposed a location, the thick walls and

small windows of the building proved to be a great advantage. After the

first repairs were completed, Mahan and his family never suffered from

cold in the winter or heat in the summer. The rooms on the front, or south side, were both warmer in winter and airy in the summer, and

Mahan nearly always kept his office window open. Although it was not

large, the building housed not only Mahan's quarters but also rooms for

teaching, offices, library, and a lecture room. Mahan tried to separate

home and school, but visiting lecturers slept, sometimes for weeks, in

the college part of the building and dined with Mahan and his family.

Despite all efforts the building was not well suited for teaching. The

lecture room was not high enough to display properly the necessary

large maps. There were too few rooms for student offices and too little

space to use as a lounge between lectures. Makeshift arrangements

were necessary for meals when the college remained in session during

an entire day. Fortunately, the library was sufficient, but only because

the collection of books was small. Toilets and washing facilities were

available only in a run-down out building.52 Despite the strength of his feelings on the issue, Mahan assuaged the

critics by modifying the course in 1887 to emphasize current naval

issues. Nonetheless, he kept the substance of the course as it had been

maturing over the previous two years. In reporting on the activities for

the now lengthened three-and-a-half-month course, Mahan stressed

that new material had been introduced, "all bearing upon the practical

question of carrying on naval war to the best advantage." In particular,

the students considered the naval problems arising in the Caribbean

and Gulf of Mexico out of French interest in an isthmian canal.

That autumn Lieutenant Charles C. Rogers of the USS Galena

delivered four lectures on duties of a general staff. This was the first

presentation on a subject that would grow in importance for the War

College in later years. In the same course, William McCarty Little gave

the first series of six lectures on war gaming, reflecting the work he was

doing to develop a system of naval war games.

To emphasize the practical aspect of studies, Mahan reported that

Admiral Luce had brought the North Atlantic Squadron into Narragansett Bay, and its exercises were arranged specifically "to illustrate and

give point to teaching given orally in the lecture room, as well as diffuse

information connected with the new materiel of the Navy."53 These
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1 884- 1 893 27

maneuvers were a major innovation by Luce. They were part of his plan

to have a squadron of evolution that would test and put into practice

the theories of sea warfare worked out by the college. The maneuvers,

comprising one of the first fleet exercises of the U.S. Navy, involved the

passage of five ships, including two of the new steel ships and four

torpedo boats, through a minefield, under the opposing guns of Fort

Adams at the entrance to Narragansett Bay, and a landing, repulse, and

reembarkation of nearly 400 men, with artillery, at Coddington Point.54 Mahan was greatly pleased with the general program of the college

and the success of his own series of lectures with the students. The

opponents of the War College, however, were not to be silenced. Mahan

commented privately, "their ignorance and my success alike testify to

the want of the college."55 After the course was over, Mahan returned to

Washington to lobby for the college in 1888. Initially, it appeared as though 10 of the 13 members of the House Naval Affairs Committee

would vote for a separate budget to sustain the War College. The

Secretary of the Navy told Mahan that he would not oppose the college,

but neither would he allow Mahan to report he approved of it. Mahan's

plea for the War College was on the grounds that it was the world's only

institution devoted to military and naval theory that was not dominated by reference to technological development. It was a plea that only

a few in Congress understood or supported, but the initial appropriation measure supporting the college managed to pass the House and

was referred to the Senate. Secretary of the Navy Whitney appeared

before the Senate Appropriations Committee and suggested, unexpectedly, that the House legislation be amended. He suggested that, for

reasons of economy and administrative efficiency, the War College be

consolidated with the Torpedo School on Goat Island. The combined

forces could then use the facilities on Goat Island under the control of

the Bureau of Ordnance. The building on Coaster's Harbor Island could

then be returned to the apprentice training station administered by the

Bureau of Equipment and Training. With this change, Secretary

Whitney recommended that the Senate approve the $ 1 0,000 budget for

the college. This was approved by Congress.

To make matters worse, Secretary of the Navy Whitney ordered on 1 August that the four month course of instruction that had been

scheduled to begin in less than a week was to be shortened by a month.

"In view of the fact," the Secretary announced, "that during the last

year's course less than an average of two lectures per day were

delivered, including Saturday and Sunday, the Department feels that

the interest attached to the course will not be impaired by condensing

the course into a shorter period."56 Both Mahan and Luce were livid with anger. Not only did the

Secretary of the Navy fail to understand the educational approach of
28 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the War College but he threatened its very existence. The college

curriculum required large blocks of time for the students to read and to

think actively about the abstract problems presented. It was not a course in which data was poured into the ears of the students by a series

of lectures. The lectures were only a stimulus to the main thrust of the

college. Mahan pointed out that the two schools could be joined in

several ways, "but if by consolidation is meant the merging of two lines

of thought radically distinct and in temper of mind opposed, under a single directing intellect, the result will be the destruction of one or the

other."57 Luce joined the protest with a formal letter to the Secretary of the

Navy, signed by his ally, Admiral of the Navy David Dixon Porter, and

six other officers. They suggested that consideration would best be

carried out through the appointment of a high ranking officer to

command all the activities on Narragansett Bay, but allowing each a separate and healthful growth. "The subjects treated by the War

College, though of the highest importance, have been and are neglected

by naval officers generally, in favor of material," they wrote, adding "the

merging of the college will stifle at birth a movement which gives the

highest promise of future usefulness ....

"58 In the midst of these protests, the course of 1888 was in session. The

course opened for only 14 officers with nearly the same staff offering

lectures to cover a more fully developed version of the previous year's course. Among the additional lecturers for 1888, Admiral Luce had

been able to obtain thirty-year-old Theodore Roosevelt, whom Luce

had known since Roosevelt's days as a member of the New York State

legislature in 1882-1884. In 1882, Roosevelt published his book The

Naval War of 1812. Having recently reread the book, Luce wrote to

Roosevelt in February 1888, from his flagship at Barbados, to explain

the purposes of the Naval War College. "We are now giving some

attention to the subject of naval history, or what may be called a philosophical study of naval history; and on the part relating to the War

of 1 8 1 2 your work must be our textbook."59 Luce encouraged Roosevelt

to contact Mahan to learn more about the college in the hope that

Roosevelt's work in naval history would lead him to take an active

interest in the college. It resulted in Roosevelt's first lecture at the

college and the beginning of Mahan's association with the future

Assistant Secretary of the Navy and President.

Upon completion of the 1888 course, Mahan was ordered to head a commission that was to select a site for a navy yard on the northwest

coast. Thus exiled, Mahan was no longer in a position to carry on the

fight. Any hope for the college lay in procrastination and the hope that

the newly elected administration of Benjamin Harrison would be more

friendly to the aims of the college. Mahan felt frustrated and defeated
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1 884- 1 893 29

by the turn of events. "I have determined not to move a hand with

reference to any attejnpt to reestablish the college," he wrote Luce. "I should feel that I was fighting in the dark and might at anytime be

blown up in the rear."60

Fight for Survival

Luce took up the standard without hesitation and led the battle to

reestablish the college. "The triumph of the enemies of the Navy will be

but temporary," he wrote David Dixon Porter.61 In Washington,

however, the lines had been laid for a plan to kill the college and let it be

overwhelmed by technical instruction at the Torpedo School. When

the 1889 class convened at the War College on Goat Island, only 12

officers enrolled after completing the torpedo course, and of that tiny

group only six stayed to complete the eleven week War College course. The course remained true to the general outlines that Luce and

Mahan had envisaged. The lecture topics and many of the lectures

themselves, remained familiar. Among the visitors during the course

was Major William R. Livermore, then stationed at Fort Adams, but

who was the foremost American authority on Army war gaming.

Livermore's ideas and the German Kriegspiele, an example of which had

been purchased for the college by Commander French E. Chadwick, the

U.S. naval attache in London, were important in the development of the

naval war gaming system in Newport.62 The practical application of

tactical study, however, proved impossible. Luce was not allowed to

arrange fleet maneuvers for the class, although the students were able

to witness some of the trials of the new cruiser USS Chicago.

In March 1889, Congress provided $100,000 for constructing a new

building on Goat Island for the combined use of the Torpedo School and

War College. This allocation, made in the last days of the outgoing

administration, was the first target which Luce chose to attack in his

battle to restore the War College to Coasters Harbor Island. "The

placing of a $100,000 building on Goat Island ... is a rank absurdity,"

he wrote," . . . before any steps are taken the further wishes of Congress

should be known."63 This argument was the means by which Luce and

Porter opened up to the new administration the full question of the

nature and site for the Naval War College.

In the meantime, the college was finding supporters. The move to

Goat Island might well have meant the instant end of the War College,

but quite by chance the ordnance specialist in charge happened to be

Commander Caspar F. Goodrich, an old friend whom Luce had chosen

six years earlier to sit on the board that had selected Coasters Harbor

Island for the college and laid down its original curriculum. Reminiscing about the situation years later, Goodrich recalled, "The evident
30 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

purpose in this move was to kill the college. It happened, however, that

the latter fell into friendly hands, and I made a point of honor of keeping

it alive."

Goodrich claimed that the appropriation was made by Secretary

Whitney as an especial and personal favor to him, quoting Whitney:

I am doing this merely because Goodrich wants it, and because I am

fond of Goodrich; but why Goodrich wants it, I am blessed if I can

understand.64 While a friend had been found in Goodrich at the local level, Luce

continued to work for favor in Washington. Encouraged by Senator

Aldrich, the new Secretary of the Navy, B. F. Tracy, became interested in

the college. Five days after the inauguration of the new administration,

Tracy wrote to Luce, "I can assure you that I consider no matter of

greater importance than the education of our officers in the subjects

which have been introduced at this college."65 Tracy took immediate action and wrote in his annual report for 1889

that the legislation which had authorized the construction of the

$100,000 building on Goat Island should not be undertaken until

Congress expressed itself more definitely on the issue. He went further,

however, in recommending specifically that the War College be

returned to Coasters Harbor Island and that the new building be built

on that island with the money for it appropriated to the Bureau of

Navigation. "The present condition of things, in which the college is

made a sort of appendage to the Torpedo Station, under the Bureau of

Ordnance, should be corrected. It is attaching the greater to the less."

The Naval War College, Tracy declared, "is of the highest importance . . . nothing should be done that will in any way interfere with its

efficiency."66 The return to Coasters Harbor Island was approved by Congress in

the Appropriation Act of 30 June 1890, and the Torpedo School was

discontinued, although the name, Naval War College and Torpedo

School was retained in the Act and officially used until 1898.

In July 1890, the college gained even greater support when Professor

James R. Soley was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy under

Tracy. Having attended every session of the War College course and

delivered all its international law lectures, Soley was the most

knowledgeable person in Washington on the work of the college. With

Luce's retirement from active duty in 1889 at the statutory age of 62,

Soley was its most important spokesman. The only cloud in this bright

sky was the appointment of the college's old opponent, Commodore

Ramsay, to replace the friendly John Walker as Chief of the Bureau of

Navigation.

Because of the administrative changes taking place and the move

from Goat Island, no classes were offered at the War College in 1 890 or
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1 893 3

1

1891 and there was no staff or faculty assigned. The future seemed

bright, however, as construction of the new building was begun on

Coasters Harbor Island on 1 4 September 1891, under the supervision of

Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Stockton, who had been ordered to

Newport for that purpose, reporting to Captain F. M. Bunce, then acting

as officer in charge of the War College and Torpedo School as well as Commandant of the Training Station.

Although detached from the War College in January 1889, Mahan

played an important role in selecting the site for the new building and

designing it through his reports and letters to the bureau chiefs. The

original college building had the best site on the island, and it was far

too substantial to be removed. The next best location in Mahan's view

was just to the west of the old building where the ground was a uniform

grade until the bluffs were reached at the shoreline. Placed there, the

new building would leave six acres for the Training Station's ballfield

and drill grounds to the south and a meadow of ten acres to the north,

where a naval hospital was then located. That site offered the best

location in terms of space, sewerage, and sea breeze, but not

unexpectedly, the Training Station objected. The expansion of the War

College, Training Station officers argued, would interfere with

apprentice drills.67 In mid- 1889, Admiral Luce published his article, "Our Future Navy,"

in both the widely read North American Review and the Naval

Institute Proceedings. It deeply influenced the new Secretary of the

Navy. Based on historical example, Luce argued that a balanced fleet

should be built around battleships and its primary duty should be

offensive. In May 1890, Mahan's Influence of Sea Power Upon History

appeared and provided the detailed historical argument from which

Luce's thinking was derived. These two published works provided

concrete evidence of the War College's work and helped to sustain the

effort for its revival. Secretary Tracy saw that Mahan could provide the

codification and clarity of expression necessary for public understanding of his plans for the new Navy.68 Mahan had returned to his home in New York "on special duty" upon

completion of his work in the northwest, during which he had helped

select Puget Sound as a site for a navy yard. Expecting that a course

would be held at the college in 1 890 and 1 89 1, Mahan devoted his time

to continuing his research and writing, taking advantage of the fact that

he had no administrative responsibilities. From Mahan's point of view,

it was an excellent situation. "The college slumbered and I worked," he

recalled.69 Mahan was ordered to resume the presidency of the War College, but

he was allowed to remain at his home in New York until the new

quarters were ready in Newport. On 10 May 1892, the political
32 i SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

situation was eased temporarily by the removal of the college from the

direct administrative control of the Bureau of Navigation and placement under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. During

the spring of 1892, Mahan completed the draft of his course of lectures

and, on 21 July, relieved Captain F. M. Bunce of command of the joint

War College and Torpedo School, the Training Station remaining under

Captain Bunce. In arranging for the new course, Mahan made a special

point in requesting permission to revert to what "was formerly the

practice," that "officers connected with the college not be required to

wear uniforms within its limits, except on special occasions." In

obtaining this, Mahan emphasized the academic character of the War

College and differentiated it from the Training Station.70 The new college building was completed by the contractor on 28 May

1 892 to the designs drawn by George C. Mason & Sons. Flemish in style,

it had three stepped gables on its facade, which faced Narragansett Bay

and the open sea beyond Newport harbor. The structure cost only

$82,875 to construct and the remainder of the $100,000 appropriation

was used to install heating and other equipment. The college lecture

rooms, library, and offices were located in the center of the building,

and each of the four corners of the building contained separate, twofloor apartments to be used as quarters for the officers of the staff. This

arrangement had been particularly pressed by Mahan. He argued that

the essence of the college was the close association of the students with

capable instructors and a good library. A college building that provided

living quarters for the staff as well as a library and lecture room would

provide the staff with "the most favorable condition for their work,"

Mahan argued.71 In opening the new building and launching the revived course of

study on 7 September, Mahan devoted his remarks to a carefully

thought out defense of the War College. The difficulties the college had

experienced and the criticism it had endured led Mahan to stress "the

Practical Character of the Naval War College." The new and revived

American Navy was clearly in preparation. The Navy Act of 1 892 had

authorized the armored cruiser Brooklyn and the battleship Iowa with

the heaviest armor, most powerful ordnance, and highest practicable

speed. Improvements were rapidly being made to armor and ordnance.72 While the material was being readied, "there is time yet for study; there

is time to imbibe the experience of the past, to become imbued, steeped

in the eternal principles of war, by the study of its history and the

maxims of its masters," Mahan declared. "Use the time of preparation

for preparation . .

. ; to postpone preparation to the time of action is not

practical."73 The course for 1892 was short, lasting only seven weeks with 24

students. The new course was designed to follow the basic ideas used in
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1 884- 1 893 33

the earlier courses, but in order to meet the opposition, all lectures dealt

directly with naval subjects; no lectures were devoted to international

law or military affairs. Mahan delivered a series of lectures on naval

history which, after the course was completed, were published under

the title, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and

Empire, 1 793- 181 2. In the preface to the book Mahan paid tribute to the

Naval War College. Whatever success his books had is due, he wrote,

"wholly and exclusively to the Naval War College, which was instituted

to promote such studies." Equally as important, he paid tribute to the

influence of Admiral Luce who had given Mahan the guidance "into a path he would not himself have found."74 By the end of the year, friends of the college were pleased with its

success and gratified by Secretary Tracy's report that

The Department is deeply impressed with the importance of the

college to the Navy, as a means of insuring the development of the

science of naval warfare as distinguished from the development of

the naval material. 75 The glow of success was short lived. In November 1892, the antiexpansionist Grover Cleveland was returned to the White House. The

college had not fared well during his first administration, and there

seemed little hope for any different treatment in the new term of office,

particularly with the hostile Commodore Ramsay as Chief of the

Bureau of Navigation. Although the Bureau no longer controlled the

college, it was still responsible for assigning officers to their duty

stations. Ramsay continued to believe that the college was in the wrong

location and teaching the wrong things. "I am strongly in favor of the

higher education of officers and am ready to assist in it in every way in

my power," Ramsay wrote, "but I do think that the present War College

system has very much the appearance of a farce." Ramsay insisted that

the only proper type of higher education for officers was a direct

continuation of the Naval Academy curriculum at a higher plane. "We

have the means of furnishing officers with excellent postgraduate

courses," he declared, "and we can do it in a much better manner than

has been done at the War College."76

It was difficult enough to have the Chief of Bureau hold such views,

but to make the outlook worse, Cleveland appointed the hostile Hilary

Herbert as his Secretary of the Navy. The new Assistant Secretary was

William McAdoo, a former representative from New Jersey and once a member of Herbert's Naval Committee. It was he who charged, "There is a well founded suspicion that this so-called munificent gift on the part

of Rhode Island to the United States Government was given for the

purpose of enhancing the charm of her well-known watering place, The

City of Newport." Wealthy hotel owners would profit, he suggested, and

while doing a little study, naval officers will "find some time to devote
34 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

to the festive dance; and the giddy maidens, who disport themselves on

the rocks in sunbonnets." The alleged War College is "but really a dancing school" for those who "find quite a romantic charm in

sometimes strolling on the shining beach with the epauleted,

embryonic Admirals of our decaying and dilapidated Navy."77 Within two months after the new administration came to power,

Mahan was ordered away from the college to take command of the new

cruiser Chicago. Although long overdue for a sea assignment after eight

years ashore, Mahan preferred to stay to continue his historical

research and to carry on his study into the The War of 1812.

Contemptuous of Mahan's predilection, Ramsay told one of Mahan's

advocates, "It is not the business of a naval officer to write books."78 Mahan was detached on 10 May 1 893, leaving the college in the charge

of Commander Charles H. Stockton. If not bleak, the future was

uncertain. There were only two staff members in addition to Stockton,

and the Navy Department authorized no course to be given in 1893.

Undaunted, Stockton and his two colleagues prepared for their lectures,

but no students were ordered. The newspapers reported that the old

arguments had been raised again, but with a new twist. After Mahan

had left, the new Assistant Secretary of the Navy, William McAdoo,

came to Newport, reportedly to look over a suitable site for a marine

barracks and the feasibility of combining the Naval War College with

the Torpedo Station again. The New York Times commented that the

War College building was occupied only part of the year while the

apprentices lived in crowded conditions and the marine guard had to

live in tents, even in the winter. By July, Washington gossip suggested

that the War College might most economically be transferred to

Annapolis where there was already a library of 30,000 volumes.79 In August, Secretary Herbert embarked in USS Dolphin to inspect the

naval activities at Newport. He left Washington with every intention

of closing down the War College. Rumors were widespread that the end

of the college was near. Earlier in the summer, Bowman McCalla, the

former assistant to Commodore Walker as Chief of the Bureau of

Navigation, called on Commander Stockton in Newport and learned

the seriousness of the situation from him. McCalla was disturbed for he

had long seconded Walker's friendly attitude toward the college and

saw the college as a means of improving the Navy's direction. Not

knowing what to do, McCalla wrote to his old friend, Lieutenant

Benjamin H. Buckingham, then commanding Dolphin. Buckingham

had served with McCalla in 1885 on a board which had recommended

reorganization of the Navy. At that time, both were convinced of the

role that the Naval War College could play in educating officers to

reform the Navy's administration. When Secretary Herbert boarded the

dispatch boat for the trip to Newport, Buckingham suggested he read on
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 35

the trip a copy of Mahan's new book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon

the French Revolution. Upon returning to Washington, Herbert sent

for Buckingham to return Mahan's book to him. "This book alone is

worth all the money that has been spent on the Naval War College,"

Herbert told him. "When I embarked on this cruise, I had fully intended

to abolish the college; I now intend to do all in my power to sustain it."80 Thus the War College earned a reprieve at the last minute. Born in the

mind of Stephen B. Luce, it earned its justification in the fruit of the

historical research which Luce dreamed it would engender. The work of

Alfred Thayer Mahan was both the result and the saviour of the college

in its first decade.

Notes

1. For biographical studies of Luce, see Albert Gleaves, Life and Letters of

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College

(New York: Putnam, 1925); John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, The Writings

of Stephen B. Luce (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1975), "Introduction," pp.

3-35 and "Chronology," pp. 237-249.

2. Quoted in Hayes and Hattendorf, Writings, p. 8. 3. Ibid., pp. 164-65,218-19.

4. For a general history of the Navy's connection with Narragansett Bay, see Anthony S. Nicolosi, "Foundation of the Naval Presence in Narragansett Bay:

An Overview," Newport History, vol. 52, (1979), pp. 61-82. A description of the

Navy's 1832 survey of Narragansett Bay is in William J. Morgan, et al., Autobiography of Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes, USN, 1798-1877 (Washington:

Govt. Print. Off., 1979), pp. 286-93. A history of the Naval Academy's years in

Newport may be found in J. Sweetman, The U.S. Naval Academy, An Illustrated

History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), pp. 62-83.

5. Quotes from Gleaves, op. cit, p. 94.

6. NWC Archives, RG 1 4, S.B. Luce, "A Talk on the History of the Naval War

College," 20 August 1906.

7. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., pp. 9, 166-67.

8. Gleaves, p. 146.

9. Ibid., pp. 330-336.

10. Ibid., pp. 154-160.

1 1

.

Frederick S. Harrod, Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978),

pp. 18-21,75-76.

12. Ibid., p. 20; Nicolosi, op. cit., p. 70; quote from Gleaves, op. cit., p. 158.

13. Luce to Boutelle Noyes, 19 July 1883. Quoted in Gleaves, op. cit., pp.

162-64.

14. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 45-46. See also Luce's best

expression of these concepts in his article, "On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science," annotated in Ibid., pp. 47-68. Quotes from Ibid., pp. 27, 74n.

15. Luce, "Naval Administration, III" U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XXIX, no. 4

(1903) 1-13.

16. Ibid.

1 7. For a study of Upton, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964).

18. Quoted in Gleaves, op. cit., p. 169.
36 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

19. Ibid., p. 170.

20. S. B. Luce, "War Schools," U.S.N.I. Proceedings, vol. XIX, no. 5 (1883), pp.

633-57.

21. John D. Hayes, transcripts of S. B. Luce letters: Luce to W. C. Church, 2

Nov 1882.

22. Ibid., Luce to Chandler, 6 Nov 1882.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., Luce to Chandler, 8 March 1884.

25. Ibid., Luce to Goodrich, 6 May 1884.

26. James R. Soley, Report on Foreign Systems of Naval Education

(Washington, 1880) [46th Congress 2nd Session, Senate Executive Document

51].

27. Gleaves, op. cit., pp. 174-75.

28. "Report of Board on a Post-Graduate Course" 13 June 1883. In 48th

Congress, 2d Session, Senate Ex. Doc. No. 68. Letter from the Secretary of the

Navy Reporting . . . Steps taken by him to establish an advanced course of

instruction for Naval officers at Coaster's Harbor Island . . . 1885, p. 4. 29. Ibid., p. 3. 30. Ibid., pp. 4-6.

31. Robert Seager II and Davis Maguire, eds. Letters and Papers of Alfred

Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975) I, p. 577.

32. Hayes transcripts, Luce to Walker, 29 Aug 1884.

33. Army and Navy Journal, 27 September 1984, p. 168.

34. Army and Navy Journal, 18 October 1884, p. 225.

35. "Letter from the Secretary . . . ," op. cit., pp. 6-7.

36. Naval War College Archives, RG16, "Addresses" Box 1. 37. Gleaves, op. cit., p. 179.

38. Two of the lectures are printed in Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., Chapters

III and IV. 39. Inauguration of the Perry Statue, September 10 1885 with Addresses .... (Newport, 1885), p. 42.

40. Ibid., p. 43.

41. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., p. 38.

42. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

43. R. Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters, (Annapolis:

Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 165-66; Seager and Maguire, eds., Letters, I, pp.

603, 606-07, 610, 612, 614, 616-24. Quote from Mahan to Ashe, 2 Feb 1886, p. 625.

44. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, (New York: 1907), p. 293.

45. Seager and Maguire, Letters, I, pp. 636-8; Austin M. Knight and William D.

Puleston, "History of the United States Naval War College," unpublished

typescript, 1916, in Naval War College Library, Chapter: 1886.

46. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, p. 294.

47. John B. Hattendorf, compiler, Register of The William McCarty Little

Papers (Newport: Naval Historical Collection, NWC, 1981), pp. 1-2. 48. Seager and Maguire, Letters, I, p. 636.

49. Mahan, op. cit., p. 296.

50. Ibid., p. 297.

51. Seager and Maguire, op. cit., p. 639.

52. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, p. 297; Letters, II, pp. 3-7.

53. Seager and Maguire, Letters, I, pp. 642-44;

54. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., pp. 197-99 and references noted therein.

55. Seager and Maguire, Letters, I, p. 646.
THE ERA OF LUCE & MAHAN, 1884-1893 37

56. Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, pp. 180-183.

57. Seager and Maguire, op. cit, p. 661.

58. Hayes transcripts: Porter, Luce, et al., to Secretary Whitney, 18 August

1888.

59. Ibid., Luce to T. Roosevelt, 13 Feb 1888.

60. Seager and Maguire, op. cit., p. 677.

61. Hayes transcripts: Luce to Porter, 9 March 1889.

62. Spector, pp. 77-78; Seager and Maguire, op. cit., p. 689; P. Coletta, French E. Chadwick (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1980) p. 110.

63. Hayes transcripts: Luce to Porter, 9 March 1889.

64. NWC Archives, RG 1: Goodrich to Sperry, 5 March 1906.

65. Quoted in B. F. Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Tracy (Hamden, Ct: Archon,

1973), p. 72.

66. U.S. Navy Department, Report of the Secretary of the Navy . . . 1889, p. 37.

67. Seager and Maguire, Letters II, pp. 4-5, 25.

68. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., pp. 203-05; Cooling, Tracy, pp. 72-74.

69. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, p. 303.

70. Seager and Maguire, op. cit., pp. 72-75, 81, note discrepancies in dates;

Seager, Mahan, pp. 242-43.

71. Knight and Puleston, op. cit, 1892, p. 1; Seager and Maguire, op. cit., p. 25.

72. W. R. Herrick, Jr. The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1966), pp. 142-45.

73. A. T. Mahan, "The Practical Character of the Naval War College," U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 19, 66 (1892), p. 165.

74 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution

and Empire, 1793-1812 (Boston: Little Brown, 1892), pp. v, vi. 75. U.S. Navy Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy

1892, p. 57.

76. Ramsay to H. C. Taylor, quoted in Cleaves, op. cit, p. 187.

77. Quoted in J. A. S. Grenville and G. B. Young, Politics, Strategy, and

American Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 21.

78. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, p. 311. See also Seager, Mahan, p. 242, and

footnote 22, p. 649.

79. "Mr. McAdoo at Newport, New York Times, 24 May 1893, p. 4:6; "Uncle

Sam's Naval Schools; All within sight of each other in Newport Harbor, New

York Times, 29 May 1893, p. 9:1; "Summer Talk in the Capital," New York

Times, 9 July 1893, p. 2:5. 80. P. E. Coletta, Bowman Henry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor (Washington:

University Press of America, 1979), p. 37; Seager and Maguire, Letters, II, pp. 1 42,

1 44-45; Doris Maguire, ed. French Ensor Chadwick: Selected Letters and Papers

(Washington: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 178-79.
CHAPTER 3

FROM EDUCATION TO

APPLICATION, 1893-1909

Secretary Herbert's recognition of Mahan's

work in 1 893 was a great victory for the War College and provided a new

impetus for its work. The battle for the college's survival was by no

means won, but the tide had turned in its favor, and with it came the

practical application of the theories that were being worked out in

Newport.

By and large, naval officers were not convinced that the War College

had an important role to play. In its first decade, the college had taught

barely 200 students, and only a few intellectually minded officers

outside the college understood its purpose. The technically minded

men agreed with Captain Richard Meade's 1888 criticism that naval

officers should study "modern war," not the useless and boring

historical studies carried on by the advocates of "naval conservation" in

the War College's "Department of Ancient History." 1 In 1 892, the Chief

of Naval Engineers complained that contemporary historians, such as Mahan, ignored "the immense influence upon modern history by the

steam engine. They follow in the same well-worn ruts, giving dubious

descriptions of battles, names of monarchs . . . and the whole array of

puppets who seem to push the car of time, while they are only flies upon

its wheels."2 Such critics were unconvinced that the college could make

a practical contribution to future naval development. One naval

engineer even suggested that it was merely a line officer's scheme to

expand the number of their shore billets.3 To continue the work of the college, Secretary Herbert chose Captain

Henry C. Taylor to be the new president of the Naval War College.

Having commanded one of the ships in Luce's training squadron in

1 880- 1 884, Taylor was well known to Luce and understood his ideas. In

1885, Taylor had given a lecture to the opening class. A firm believer in

the college, Taylor had not incurred the direct hostility that other
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 39

college advocates had. Generally considered in the service to be a very

capable officer and excellent tactician, he combined both sympathy for

its purpose and widespread respect.4 Taylor relieved Commander Stockton on 15 November 1893 and

immediately faced the long standing hostility of the Training Station.

The issue Taylor faced was a plan of the Station's commanding officer,

Captain F. M. Bunce, to gain control of the college's new building. As a

first step in December, Bunce succeeded in getting the quarters at the

northeastern corner of the new college building assigned to Commander F. W. Dickens of the Training Station, and boasted that within

six months his apprentice boys "would be eating their grub in the

lecture room."5 On 14 March 1894, the Secretary of the Navy removed the War

College from the direct responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of the

Navy and agreed to carry out the earlier recommendations of Porter and

Luce by consolidating the various naval activities in Narragansett Bay

under one senior officer. Unlike the earlier attempt at consolidation,

this plan provided for the separate development of the War College,

Training Station, and Torpedo Station, but improved overall military

administration by removing the duplication of offices. The only

problem with the new arrangement was that Captain Bunce was the

senior officer present and, therefore, was named Commandant of the

new U.S. Naval Station, Newport. His personal hostility to the college

did no permanent harm, but Taylor's position was a difficult one. He

privately confessed, "I find the work here interesting . . . ,but we

prosecute the work with the unpleasant dread of ugly personal

attacks."6 A Model Course in 1894

Under Taylor, the college curriculum took a revised form, which was

largely unchanged for the next 15 years and provided the basis for the

course for another 10 years, up to 1919. In previous years, the course

had been offered in the autumn or late summer. Beginning in 1894, the

standard course was offered over a four-month period in the summer,

from June to September.

In opening the new session in June, Assistant Secretary of the Navy

William McAdoo substantiated the official approval of the college as a means to foster professionalism in the naval service. It is anomalous, he

said, that in a season of profound peace the study of war as a profession

should be inaugurated, but he pointed out "our Achilles' heel is at the

water's edge." Noting that the nation's wealth and population were on

the seaboard, he alluded to the danger of possible invasion, and he

discussed the future interoceanic canal to be built in Central America.
40 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

He concluded that "in these days of wonderful modern implements of

warfare, more than ever depends upon skill and ability to use them well."7 The revised course of instruction was divided into seven parts: ( 1 ] lectures on professional subjects, including international law; (2) the

war problem for the course; (3) war charts and defense plans; (4) war

games; (5) steam launch exercises; (6] torpedo instruction; and (7)

reading. The lectures were similar to those offered in previous years,

but modified slightly to focus attention on the course's war problem.

Taylor's basic purpose was to establish a unified course and to

stimulate active thinking in students whose training and experiences

tended to establish a set routine. "The idea of this summer's course,"

Taylor declared, "has been primarily based upon the desire to promote

professionally a mental activity, and to dispel a certain passive

condition of the brain which receives and passes in review all questions

that are brought before it, but which does not of its own accord seek for

such questions."8 The annual war problem was designed to create a concrete situation for the students so they would have a common

practical basis on which to concentrate while the lectures provided

new perspectives and raised theoretical debate.

The problem for 1 894 was placed before the students at the outset. It supposed a Red (British) fleet off New York harbor with six battleships

and ten cruisers about to be joined by an invasion force from Halifax

with 100 transports, 10 battleships, 20 cruisers, and other smaller

vessels. The opposing Blue (U.S.] force had only 5 battleships, 15

cruisers, and other small vessels. The students were asked to prepare a plan for the best disposition of Blue forces to meet Red.

This naturally led to a consideration of defensive measures and the

study of tactical defense plans. That in turn led directly to a consideration of the part of the course which dealt with the preparation

of war charts, defense plans, and war gaming. The exercises with steam

launches illustrated the practical problem of various formations

developed on the war game board and raised by the technical training

given at the Torpedo Station.

In addition to the stimulation of lectures and participation in

problems, all the students were obliged to complete a reading course

that paralleled the lectures. Although reading had always been an

important part of the course, this was the first time in which a set list of

books was recommended for individual reading. It ranged from Jomini,

Mahan, Hamley, and Colomb on strategy and the art of war, to Barrow

and Clarke on naval history, and Wheaton and Snow on international

law.

In addition, two other important innovations were made in the

course. Both stressed the traditional method of inductive reasoning

which the college employed in its teaching. Individual and special
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893-1909 41

cases were used not only in the problem but also in war gaming, naval

history, and international law as a means of stimulating broad, original

thinking about naval warfare.9 In the study of international law, Dr. Freeman Snow of Harvard

University gave a series of 22 lectures which paralleled the student's

consideration of hypothetical cases in naval application of international law. The case method of teaching international law had been

introduced at the Harvard Law School and soon became the accepted

method of teaching the subject in America. Snow was one of the

pioneers of this method but at the time there was no American book

adaptable to the method. Following Dr. Snow's death at the midst of the

1894 course, Taylor directed Commander Stockton to edit Snow's War

College lectures and to expand them, where necessary, from Snow's

notes. Published in 1895, this was the college's first publication in

international law. Together with Snow's 1893 book, Cases on International Law, it established an important part of the basic nucleus of

American textbooks on the subject. For the Naval War College, the

emphasis on the case method in international law, as in other areas of

the curriculum, was to foster an active interest "in the principles of the

science" by looking at specific issues. 10 The 1 894 session of the college also saw a new use of war gaming as a means of linking broad principles to specific issues. Previously, war

games had been used for occasional demonstrations and examination

of particular problems, but in 1894 they became an integral part of

instruction. Three different types of games were employed. Admiral

Colomb's dual game, revised by a staff member, Lieutenant (j.g.) Henry

B. Wilson, used two ships. A tactical game had been prepared by

Commander Bowman McCalla and modified by the experience of

Austrian and German games. It was played on a board or table and

represented a fleet action. Third was the strategic game that had been

developed over the years at the college, based in part on a study of

Kiiegspiel and other foreign games. The strategic game was played upon

charts with players in separate rooms, in order to represent an entire war. It proved to be invaluable in teaching strategy and strategic

geography. 11 William McCarty Little, although only a volunteer on the

college staff, was the driving force behind the development of these

games. He believed that in the games the college played, "It is a matter

of small moment who is adjudged the winner, while on the other hand it

is of great importance to ascertain as nearly as possible what conditions

make for success or failure." In carrying out its function, Captain Taylor

believed that "the war game has been useful to a degree far beyond my

most sanguine anticipation." 12 For the students who came to the Naval War College in 1894, the

results of the course were more than a brush with theory. The 18
42 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

regular members of the course were joined by officers of the U.S.

Revenue Cutter Service, the Rhode Island Naval Militia, and the

College's first foreign students—Commanders Carl-Gustaf Flach and

Gbsta af Ugglas of the Royal Swedish Navy. In 1 895, an officer from the

Royal Danish Navy, Captain Fritzer, attended the course. Later, as matters under discussion became increasingly more sensitive, foreign

officers were no longer included. In addition to the other changes in

1 894, the college added to its role as a school of theory the attributes of

an organization that could test and plan future uses of the Navy. Taylor

told the students at the end of the course, "Our plans will be formulated

and ready for instant use." As the work continued in future years, it would develop, he said, into the naval equivalent of the planning that

had successfully prepared Prussia for wars with Austria and France. In

addition, while preparing these plans, Taylor suggested,

in the study of the principles of warfare necessary to perfect them,

of naval and military history in order to utilize past experience, and

in the lectures of experts keeping us abreast of the latest developments of tactical forces and weapons, we shall learn the immutable

laws that govern the Conduct of War. 13 At the end of the 1894 course, the college published an abstract of its

course as a means to publicize its accomplishments and to explain to its

critics what was done at the college. Since assuming the presidency,

Taylor was convinced that the best means of winning friends and

support for the college was through an active public relations

campaign. The invitations to officers of the naval militia and to foreign

officers were part of that program. Taylor stressed the practical results

the college achieved and, during the three years of his presidency, he

published the various conclusions which the college had reached. In

1894, for example, he listed 1 1 tentative conclusions that had resulted

from the course, the first six of which were:

1. Men-of-war of each class should be more alike in order that

squadrons might be homogeneous.

2. The militarily useful limit in size and cost for ships seemed to have

been reached and passed by modern navies.

3. U.S. fighting ships should draw less water than those at present in

service in modern navies.

4. The Navy should not strive for extreme high speed in fighting

ships.

5. Discussions as to thickness of armor were not conclusive.

6. The weight of guns and projectiles should not be allowed to

increase unduly; rapidity of fire must be maintained.

In the practical problem for 1894, the students and staff concluded

that the U.S. Navy could only deal with a superior naval force by
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1893-1 909 43

effectively using bays, sounds, and interior waterways for engagements

with the enemy. The United States, they believed, did not have the

capacity to win a fleet battle in the open sea. This conclusion led to the

additional conclusions that

7. Naval officers should navigate frequently and for long periods the

channels, sounds, and bays of the coast.

8. Preparation should be made in peacetime for "a great flotilla of

gunboats, torpedo boats, and rams" in Peconic Bay, to defend New York.

9. The system of lookouts, signaling, and transmission of information ashore should be perfected in peacetime.

10. Officers should improve their ability in shiphandling in squadron

maneuvers in shallow waters.

11. A ship canal across Cape Cod would have important strategic

value. 14 In the courses for 1895 and 1896, these deductions were reaffirmed

and, in addition, it was suggested that a standard classification of ship

types be established, confidential sailing directions be issued for

coastal areas, and that a suitable coaling port was needed in the

Aleutian Island chain to defend the United States in the Pacific.

Numerous questions in regard to submarine mines and torpedo boats

were raised but could not be answered without further practical

experience. The college recommended that preparations be made in

these areas with a view toward joint maneuvers with the Army. 15 A General Staff for the Navy

As this type of war gaming experience and general criticism

accumulated at the Naval War College, it began to create a body of

doctrine that could be used in the absence of a central strategic

planning office in the Navy Department. 16 This was an important

aspect in the line of thinking behind the development of a military

staff that had come from Prussia. By the 1890s, military and naval

writers no longer recommended a slavish imitation of Prussian

organizational methods, but broader applications of it. 17 In American

naval thinking, the recognition of the need for war planning in

peacetime was part of the same perception that had created the Office

of Naval Intelligence as a body to collect data and had created the

Naval War College. The course at the War College stressed the

advantage of a staff system for the U.S. Navy. The War College

became the leading institution within the Navy which was pressing

for the creation of what later became the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations. Not surprisingly, many of the War College presidents, as well as its students, became the leaders who developed and applied

the staff system to the needs of the Navy.

,
44 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

From the beginning, Stephen B. Luce had seen the reform of naval

administration and the creation of a naval staff as integral parts of a concept which embodied both improved training for enlisted men

and officer education. Luce's published writings on naval administration date from 1 864, and by 1 9 1 1

, he had written 1 6 articles on the

subject. In 1888, he stated the issue directly:

On looking into the constitution of the U.S. Navy Department, one

is struck at the first glance with its utter incapacity for dealing with

the problems of war, or with military questions in general. 18 With the Naval War College on a surer footing after 1 893, both Luce

and Henry Taylor continued the campaign. Now retired from active

service, Luce devoted his energies to writing articles and using his

influence with individuals. Taylor ordered staff members to lecture on

various types of administrative methods. Studies were made of business

organization, the British Admiralty, and the German Army's General

Staff. Taylor and others at the War College concluded that the German

system was best, but it would have to be changed to suit American

political conditions. Taylor explained the value of a general staff to the

Governor of Rhode Island, using this argument:

The events which procede and follow war progress too quickly to

allow for general or special reconnaissance of the theater of

operations, either at home or abroad. Hence this work which took

place formerly in time of war should be made in time of

peace . . . [The] measures taken upon the eve of war—a time of

emergency and excitement—will naturally be imperfect, ill digested, and extravagant. 19

In making this statement, Taylor expressed the pervasive attitude at

the Naval War College that warfare was a logical and rational

enterprise, conducted by professionals on the basis of principles

deduced by reason, guided by international law, and limited in purpose

to clearly defined objectives. Carefully planned preparations were a key

part of this basic approach.20 Taylor and the War College discovered immediate and strong

opposition to the establishment of any new organization which would

carry out the tasks that were envisaged. The Bureau Chiefs objected to

any measure which seemed to lessen their power, and the civilian

Secretaries of the Navy opposed any plan which increased the policy

making influence of naval officers. The lack of unanimity among

officers and the nature of bureaucratic routine added to the burden of

static inertia and prevented any reform.21 By 1 896, Taylor reluctantly concluded that a naval staff would have

to grow slowly. He and Luce agreed that the best way to do this was to

create the methods and establish the procedures, using existing
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 45

institutions to do what could be readily done. They would have to wait

on later laws and regulations to create the necessary bureaucratic

machinery. Luce hoped that if an evolutionary approach was the best

method, it would occur at the War College and not within a bureau.

Ramsay, at the Bureau of Navigation, opposed this.

With these ideas in mind, Taylor employed the War College

curriculum as a means of not only educating naval officers in theory,

but demonstrating to them, in both hypothetical and actual situations,

the functions of a general staff.

The work that the students began in the summer course was carried

on by the college staff and completed during the winter months.23 The

results were then summarized and sent to Washington where they were

filed in the Office of Naval Intelligence and were available to be used by

ONI in advising the Secretary of the Navy. In this way the first body of

naval plans was developed for the defense of the East Coast. In addition,

the general strategic situations of the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean

Sea, and the Great Lakes were examined, along with the Japanese threat

to Hawaii. As early as 1894, students were specifically assigned papers

on "Strategy in the Event of War With Spain." In 1896 and 1897, the

main problem was devoted to possible war with Spain and the need to

refuel the U.S. Fleet in the Caribbean. One of the recommendations

which resulted from the discussion was a proposal to burn oil, rather

than coal, in ships. At that time the only known naval use of fuel oil was

by the Russian Navy in the Black Sea.24

Planning for the War With Spain

In the years leading up to the Spanish-American War, the curriculum

at the Naval War College played an initially modest but growing role in

the perceptions of naval officers and national leaders, such as Theodore

Roosevelt, as they began to think out possible courses of action in a war

with Spain. Although three students had considered war with Spain in

their 1894 essays, the issue was not a central one for the class of 20

officers. As the revolt in Cuba became more acute in international

terms, both Admiral Luce and McCarty Little advocated a full-scale

study of the possibility of American involvement in a conflict with

Spain. McCarty Little approached Taylor with the idea, and Taylor

directed that the 1895 class consider two problems, a general problem

devoted to the defense of New England against Britain, and a "special

problem" devoted to war with Spain. Taylor justified the double

workload for the students by stressing the great importance of both

issues "in the near future to the country."

In the earliest study of the problem, two different scenarios were

considered. One considered Spain and Britain allied against France and
46 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the United States. A second considered a war between only the United

States and Spain. In January 1 896, following the previous classes' work,

the War College developed a more advanced study in which three

options were considered:

1. Direct attack on Spain.

2. Attack on Spain's Pacific colonies: Philippines and Guam.

3. Attack on Spain's American colonies: Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Of the three options, the War College concluded that the first was too

expensive and risky; the second would be safe but not decisive; and the

third would probably not be decisive, but would place the burden of

continuing the war on Spain.

These early considerations in 1895 had some influence on thinking

in Washington, but the next important step came with a consideration

by Lieutenant W. W. Kimball in the Office of Naval Intelligence. His

plan envisaged a purely naval war based upon a blockade of Cuba,

which would allow the Cubans to establish their own nation, avoiding

an American invasion and preventing Spanish interference in Cuba.

Two secondary naval campaigns were proposed. One would hold the

Spanish fleet in its home waters by an American naval attack on trade

and coastal cities; the other would capture Manila in order to control

Spanish commerce from the Philippines. Kimball postulated that the

subsequent release of the Philippines back to Spain would induce her to

accept peace and the liberation of Cuba.

The Naval War College staff and students were dissatisfied with the

Kimball plan when it was examined during the 1896 course. Much

influenced by Mahan's historical deductions and American Civil War

experience, they concluded that a blockade of Cuba would not be

decisive and, moreover, an effective blockade could not be established

until the enemy's fleet had been defeated. In place of these plans, Taylor

recommended, in November 1896, that the best course was to concentrate the main effort on a joint Army-Navy attack on Cuba, which

would result in the capture of Havana by a force of up to 60,000 troops

in a period of less than 30 days, the time that Spain would need to

reinforce her troops. At the same time, American ships could attack

and blockade the Cuban coast, obtaining Cienfuegos, Bahia Honda, or Matanzas as bases. A parallel operation was envisaged against the

Philippines, but American naval operations in European waters were to

be carefully avoided until the Cuban campaign was completed.

In December 1896, the Navy Department was not satisfied with

either the War College or the ONI alternatives. Secretary Herbert

convened a special board of officers to review the situation. The board

was headed by the War College's old nemesis, Admiral Ramsay, and

included Bunce, now a rear admiral in command of the North Atlantic

Station, as well as Captain W. T. Sampson, Richard Wainwright, and
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 47

Taylor. Taylor was ordered to Washington for duty in connection with

this board and was relieved as president of the Naval War College on 3

1

December 1896 by Commander Caspar F. Goodrich. Despite Taylor's

objections, the new board explicitly rejected the War College plan and

devised a new one that had broad similarities to Kimball's ideas.

In March 1897, the new administration of William McKiniey took

office. With it came a new Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, and

Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt. The new Secretary called the

planning board into session, but its membership was altered by new

officers having succeeded the older members in their billets. Goodrich

carried on with an attempt to promote the War College view, but, like

Taylor, he met with little success. The second board adopted a plan

similar to the Kimball plan with some alterations. Despite that, the

plan did not represent any consensus of view among political leaders in

Washington, and no action was taken to prepare for war along the lines

indicated by the naval officers' plan. Differences of opinion and

contradictions remained. In July 1897, the War College staff was no

longer convinced that war with Spain was certain and thought that

other threats were equally important. Great Britain and Japan also

appeared as threats, and Theodore Roosevelt directed the War College

to consider as a "special" problem a possible clash with Japan over the

Hawaiian Islands.

Although none of these plans and considerations turned out to have

a direct bearing on the war that followed the sinking of the Maine in

1898, the basic point at issue was the War College's strong belief in

advance planning, detailed preparation, and rational consideration

coupled with rapid execution in the event of war. It was one of the

specific points which Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt took up

in his thinking. And it was what he had in mind on 25 February 1898

when, left in temporary charge by the absence of the Secretary of the

Navy, he gave orders to move ships and distribute supplies putting the

Navy in a position to act in the event of war. Often considered the

brainchild of Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, it was, in fact, the type

of preparation that had been long advocated by a significant group of

naval officers, particularly those associated with the Naval War

College.25

The College Threatened Again

The antagonism between the Naval War College and the Naval

Training Station continued quietly but unabated. In the 1890s, the

Training Station changed its approach and moved further and further

away from the shipboard training that Luce had envisaged when he

established the Apprentice Training system- Up to 1889, the recruits
48 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

lived aboard the old ship-of-the-line New Hampshire, berthed alongside

the wharf at Coasters Harbor. In that year, however, the increasing

numbers of recruits along with the difficulty in maintaining proper

sewage forced the recruits to move ashore where the sailors in training

were housed in tents and temporary buildings on the island. From this

point on, the Training Station began to agitate for the construction of

buildings ashore and to expand its use of Coasters Harbor Island. Much

of the island had been leased for the use of local farmers, but in 1895,

the Training Station stopped this practice. In its expansion, the officers

in command of the Training Station failed to carry on the same

appreciation that Luce had shown for the two complementary organizations. Following Captain Bunce's promotion to rear admiral and his

departure from Newport in 1 894, the Training Station came under the

command of another like-minded officer, Captain Francis W. Dickens,

the occupant of one of the War College's quarters. Early on he declared

his hostility to the college and, like Bunce, wished to remove it for the

advantage of the Training Station. In a conversation with McCarty

Little, Dickens declared that the use of the Training Station for "the

training of the man behind the gun" was the most important thing in

the Navy after the "education of officers at the Naval Academy."26 There was no place, in Dickens' view of the Navy, for a War College.

Officers of the War College had been worried about the Training

Station's intentions for several years, and by 1895 they sensed that a strong and well planned move to construct barracks for the apprentices

would be used to mask an attempt to take over the college's buildings.

In an effort to stop the bickering on the island, the Secretary of the Navy

had explicitly told Henry Taylor that the Secretary's support for the

college was dependent on the college refraining from interference with

the Training Station's plans. "This would mean," as McCarty Little put

it, "that Johnny musn't cry out should Tommy see fit to beat him in the

head. It seems quite possible that the barracks will be placed as to be

very close to the north windows of the College and flank it, so that in

the course of time the college building will be in the very position for

the offices of the Training Station."

"Do you begin to perceive a slight mousy odor?" McCarty Little

asked.27 During the spring of 1896, there was an attempt by members of

Congress to amend the naval appropriation bill in that year by adding

an item of $100,000 for a barracks on Coasters Harbor Island. Luce

began a letter writing campaign which pointed out to Rhode Island's

congressional delegation that the purpose of this appropriation was

really part of a larger effort "to drive the college from the island and

secure its building for the Training Station."28 The Training Station did

not receive authorization for its barracks in 1896, but it continued to
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 49

expand and built a handsome residence to house its commandant on

the edge of the hill to the east of the old almshouse.

In 1 896, Captain Dickens was ordered to Washington as an assistant

to Rear Admiral Ramsay, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. By August

1897, Dickens was Acting Chief of the Bureau and, in that capacity, he

renewed his attack on the War College. This time, he exploited the

tension between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the War College

over war planning. The War College and ONI had sought to ease the

difficulties that had arisen from their joint need to obtain and use

intelligence information by promoting an exchange of junior officers.

In January 1 897, Ensign John V. Chase of the War College staff spent the

month at ONI as a beginning step in this direction. In 1890, Assistant

Secretary Soley had already taken the War College, ONI, and the Office

of Naval Records and Library directly under his administration as a means of coordinating their related activities. Dickens, however, saw

that the overlapping functions could be used to attack the college and

he could, therefore, counteract the efforts that college officers were

making to demonstrate the college's practical usefulness through its

ability to examine actual war plans in the light of theory and through

war gaming. As acting Bureau head, Dickens was responsible for

detailing officers to their assignments. Under the guise of a recommendation to prevent duplication of effort, Dickens suggested to Assistant

Secretary Roosevelt that ONI should be "augmented by officers of

experience and all work now done at the War College by its staff

removed to Washington and made part of the functions of the Office of

Naval Intelligence." Acknowledging the value of the main problem as a worthwhile and useful study, Dickens took the line of those critics who

valued only practical experience unaugmented by study and reflection.

The main war problem, he said "could be sent out to the fleet, the

country thus having a real War College where the art of war can only be

practically learned, at sea."29 Caspar Goodrich, the college's president, was called upon once again

to come to assist the college as he had in 1884 and again in 1889. In an

impassioned letter to Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, Goodrich

defended the college's independence of thought, academic integrity,

and location away from the immediate pressure of Washington's

political life. "To suggest or to appear, in even a remote way, to suggest

that preliminary reading and study are unnecessary to success in naval

warfare," Goodrich wrote, "is to ignore the essential facts in the lives of

both Nelson and our great Farragut, who were earnest students of the

history and literature of their profession and even noted for intellectual

activity." Pressing the point further, Goodrich pointed out that

Dickens clearly misunderstood the War College's curriculum. There

was no other institution which offered the opportunity for the type of
50 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

study undertaken at Newport. Moreover, "knowledge can be gained in

the science of war in one way only—careful study in time of peace—and

this study cannot be carried on amid the numerous distractions of life

aboard ship. It is idle to claim the contrary."

Turning to Dickens' suggestion that the fleet undertake the main

war problems instead of the college, Goodrich replied, "The college is

now, as always heretofore, desirous of the cooperation of the fleet in

solving tactical problems and it greets with ardor the proposal ... to

inaugurate practical exercises with the fleet as a measure of the highest

importance to the Service, supplementing the work done here.

'Practical' work in strategy must, however, be done ashore." The War

College could provide preparation and thinking that could make fleet

exercises more productive. "The information obtained from one single

strategic game in three hours could not be secured by the North

Atlantic Fleet in as many weeks," Goodrich declared.

In concluding his argument, Goodrich suggested that the critics of

the college were merely members of a dying breed.

There is nothing new under the sun. The same spirit of opposition

which combated the establishment of the Naval Academy and

afterwards sought to cripple and deprecate it, still survives; but

failing of its original purposes, now turns its criticisms against the

later child of professional progress. Such things may be expected.

Sidney Smith said he once knew a man to speak disrespectfully of

the equator.30 A supporter of both ONI and the War College, Roosevelt urged

Goodrich to publish a "moderately strong" defense. In November 1897,

the correspondence between Goodrich and Roosevelt appeared in the

Army-Navy Register. Its publication effectively quashed Dickens

proposal and nothing more was done to carry it out. Although the

proposal had been defeated, it was not the last attempt to destroy the

college.

In March 1 898, Goodrich was ordered by the Navy Department to carry

out a previously worked out plan to establish signal stations along the

Atlantic coast. Before that order could be carried out, however, war with

Spain was declared on 19 April. On 23 April, Goodrich was ordered to

command the USS St. Louis, a passenger liner converted to a cruiser, and

plans for a summer course were suspended for the duration of the war. The War College building was placed in the custody of the Commandant

of the Naval Training Station, Newport. Officers attached to the Training

Station were also sent to sea, and by June all the quarters in the college

building had been vacated by the Training Station. For the first time since

1 894, the college was now in possession of everything under its own roof.

There was little activity at the War College, but in early June Commander

C. H. Stockton was ordered to duty there to prepare a new edition of
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 51

Professor Freeman Snow's War College lectures on International Law.

The widely read book, which Stockton had edited in 1 894, was now out

of print and a new edition was in demand.

On 12 August, after only three months, the war came to an end, but

no immediate moves were taken to revive the college. In September,

Admiral Luce wrote an alarmed letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,

The days of the War College are few and short. It must soon cease to

exist. The enemies of the college are now all powerful in the Navy

Department and are so bent on its destruction, that the end is already in sight unless the Secretary of the Navy himself comes to

its relief.31 Rumors were already rife that the new Chief of the Bureau of

Navigation, Captain A. S. Crowninshield, wanted the War College

removed from Newport. The first move in this campaign seemed to be

Secretary of the Navy's General Order 496 which revoked the 1894

order consolidating the Training Station, Torpedo Station, and War

College as separate and independent activities under the Commandant,

Naval Station, Newport. The Training Station, thus, became the

college's direct, administrative commander. When asked to resume the

presidency of the college, Henry Taylor looked at the new situation and

refused outright. "As president I would be practically subordinate to my

junior in rank at the Training Station," he wrote.32 The War College had lost a knowledgeable advocate of its work when

Theodore Roosevelt resigned his position of Assistant Secretary of the

Navy to go off to join the Army as a "Rough Rider" in May 1898. His

successor, Charles H. Allen, had no previous knowledge of the War

College. His first visit there came on 14 October 1898 while on an

inspection tour of various naval stations. No class was in session and

there was little activity, and Allen received the false impression that

the college was a graduate school built along university lines. With this

in mind, he suggested that Annapolis was the best location. There it

could complement the Naval Academy in the way the universities had

patterned the relationship between undergraduate and graduate

education. The existing Naval Academy could become the basis of a

"great Naval University," he suggested. The libraries, laboratories, and

instructors could be shared as they are in universities. Furthermore, the

central location of Annapolis would allow naval officers to visit it more

frequently and Senators and Congressmen could easily attend lectures.

The more moderate climate of Annapolis allowed practical exercises

the year around while in Newport they could only take place in the

summer.33 None of these arguments were new, although the direct

parallel with recent developments in American higher education added

a new twist to the arguments of those who saw the college as only a postgraduate course.
52 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The supporters of the Naval War College quickly came to its defense

and argued the essential errors in Allen's thinking. As Luce consistently pointed out, any move would destroy the distinctive characteristics of the college. Although the college took advantage of the best

academic expertise it could obtain for its purpose, it was not designed

to offer a set course of instruction that followed strictly the established

lines of academic training in universities.34 It was not a place where

masters taught disciples, but where faculty and students formed "a sort

of cooperative or joint-stock affair, where all work in unison for the

common good."35 In making this point, Luce stressed that the science of

naval warfare was just in the process of development and had not yet

reached a stage where there was any consensus about its basic

character. The real work of the college, he said, was "the investigation

and analysis of problems which represent conditions of modern warfare

especially as would arise in defense of our own territory."36 This

essential characteristic would be lost if the War College were moved to

Annapolis and made part of the more rigid, academic process of

education there. Similarly, a move to Washington would force the

college into the bureaucratic machinery of Washington. Luce believed

that the ultimate purpose of the War College should be educational,

but in a professional sense, not an academic one. Its separate and

distinct location in a cool climate and at a deep sea port were key

ingredients to ensure its essential characteristics.

Luce's views carried great weight, and his younger friends and

followers, Mahan, Sampson, Taylor, Goodrich, Chadwick, and

Stockton, had all earned a position from which they could carry on

Luce's fight. The college remained without a president from the time of

Goodrich's departure in April until 2 November 1 898 when Stockton

was ordered to assume the presidency. Immediately upon taking office,

Stockton wrote a series of letters to Assistant Secretary Allen, pointing

out the value of the college in terms of its international position:

The War College is unique in its character, a prototype of the Berlin

General Staff School, and it has been followed in its general lines by

the schools since established in Russia, France, and to be established

in Sweden and Japan. The establishment of these, copying our

struggling institution, give testimony to its standing and worth, and

place a grave responsibility upon those who would extinguish it by

an affiliation with and absorption by a school for cadets.37 While the dispute simmered in the winter of 1898-1899, the Bureau

of Navigation indicated to Stockton that the demand for officers at sea and other assignments was so great that no officers could be spared for

student assignments at the War College. In March 1 899, The New York

Times reported that there would be no session because of the expected

move to Annapolis, although many officers had indicated a keen
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 53

interest in studying and critiquing the strategy and tactics of the recent

war with Spain.38 Stockton reacted to these threats, but with a more

moderate tone than the extreme views of Luce. He thought that

although the two institutions should be in touch mentally and

professionally, but a move to Annapolis would be fatal. A move

elsewhere was not nearly so serious a threat. The main arguments for

Newport were that the facilities existed already and that a move to any

location further south would require a winter course instead of a summer one. As Stockton wrote, Newport has "a climate much more

congenial for mental work in summer. . . . "39 The failure of the Bureau

to assign any students on the grounds that they were engaged in more

important duties was both a fallacious argument and a policy that

would be fatal to the War College. "There is no more important duty on

shore, except the absolutely essential professional administrative

work, than the study of naval warfare," Stockton countered.40 While the

college defended itself along these lines, it became clear that it could

not be removed from its location on Coasters Harbor Island without

congressional authorization.41 The War College had several influential

friends in Congress, including Senator William E. Chandler of New

Hampshire, the former Secretary of the Navy whose order had

established the college, as well as Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode

Island and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.

Thwarted by the college's supporters in Congress, the Bureau of

Navigation continued to insist that no students were available. So

Stockton turned to Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander-inChief of the North Atlantic Fleet, an old friend of the college, and a member of the original board which had planned the college in 1 884. He

obtained the Secretary of the Navy's approval for the North Atlantic

Fleet to rendezvous at Newport, thereby allowing fleet officers to

attend the course. Stockton and Sampson arranged a course in which

each day's work was as nearly complete as possible, thus allowing for

shipboard duties and possible ship movements. On 29 May, the

armored cruiser New York, and the battleships Indiana, Massachusetts,

and Texas anchored in the bay off the college. They were followed by

the cruisers New Orleans and Brooklyn and the old steam sloop

Lancaster. The course was spread over several months, beginning on 31

May and ending in October, with an average daily attendance of about

18 students.42 Much of the study revolved around a group of guest lectures given by

Captain Bowman McCalla on the lessons of the war with Spain.

McCalla, one of the more colorful officers of the period, had been on the

college staff in 1 897 and at the outbreak of the war had taken command

of the small cruiser Marblehead. As the senior naval officer in the

capture of Guantanamo Bay from the Spanish, McCalla had found
54 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

himself confronted with mines, happily old and inefficient, but new to

U.S. Navy men. He pointed to health problems in tropical waters that

became acute for the troops embarked in hastily commandeered

transports.

McCalla pointed out that tactically the fleet had been unprepared for war. It had few torpedo boats and misused those it had. The evidence of

the battle of Santiago demonstrated the need for torpedo boat

destroyers. He severely criticized the sinking of the collier Merhmac in

the channel at Santiago in an attempt to trap the Spanish squadron in

port. Also he emphasized the demonstrated need for smokeless powder

and for some way to reduce coal smoke from the boilers. In general,

McCalla demonstrated the consequences of lack in doctrine and

advance preparation.

Secretary Long's War Board, of which Mahan was a member, came in

for severe criticism. McCalla, with many others, believed that the War

Board had mistakenly endeavored to direct tactics from Washington. It was a makeshift affair which failed to perform effectively the function

of a naval staff.

In the first discussion of convoying at the college, McCalla objected

to the practice, used in moving American troops to the Philippines,

Cuba, and Puerto Rico, of placing the escort ships under the operational

Gpmmand of the senior Army officer afloat. Believing that the Navy

should control all aspects related directly to naval activities, McCaUa

further recommended that the Navy should control not only the ports

but also the coastal artillery which defended them.43 McCalla's lectures raised a debate throughout the U.S. Navy on

tactical issues and fueled the already bitter controversy between Rear

Admirals W. T. Sampson and W. S. Schley over their respective roles in

the war. Future classes at the Naval War College repeatedly returned to

McCalla's controversial criticisms over the years as they re-examined

those actual operations in the light of theory, exercises, and war

gaming. Not all McCalla's ideas were adopted by the Navy, but they

provided a new and innovative perspective which laid a foundation for

the later evolution of American tactical thinking.44 The McCalla

lectures were only a portion of the 1 899 course, but certainly they were

its most memorable portion.

The Course and the College 1900-1909

By the opening of the new century, the foes of the college conceded

defeat, at least temporarily. The four month summer course for 1900

opened with 30 students, 20 of them from the Navy. The others

consisted of six Marine Corps officers, two Army officers, and two

officers from the Revenue Cutter Service. One of these, Lieutenant H.
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1893-1909 55

G. Hamlet, later became Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. In the

years which followed, the classes included several other officers who

later distinguished themselves. Among them were Austin M. Knight,

Royal R. Ingersoll, Bradley Fiske, W. B. Caperton, Hugh Rodman, W. A.

Moffett, and Louis McCarty Little of the Marine Corps, son of William

McCarty Little. In 1901, E. M. Shepard was the first student to attend

the course as a rear admiral.

The subject areas studied were the same as those examined in 1894,

but in order to organize the larger number of students more effectively,

the class was divided into four committees. Each committee prepared a solution to the main problem and discussed the obvious subjects at

hand. To emphasize that the matters dealt with were of the utmost

gravity to the naval profession, college president Captain C. S. Sperry

stressed the professional character of the College over its function as a school. To do this, he ordered in 1904 that the words course and class

were to be replaced, when describing the college, with the term

conference.

The lectures were of two kinds, those directly related to the

conference work and those of a more general academic interest. Among

the latter were lectures by well known academics and visitors such as Brooks Adams, Albert Bushnell Hart, James F. Jameson, Frederick

Jackson Turner, and A. C. McLaughlin, all of whom spoke on aspects of

American history.45 In the study of international law, the college made several innovations. By direction of the Secretary of the Navy in 1 899, Captain C. H.

Stockton and Captain Asa Walker prepared a Code of the Law and

Usages of War at Sea, elaborating on the legal conventions established

by the recent Hague Conference. The Code, drawn up at the college, was

approved by the Secretary of the Navy in June 1 900 and established as a directive for American naval officers to follow. This was the beginning

of the modern effort to codify maritime international law, following the

U.S. Army's earlier initiative to codify the law of land warfare.46 Discussions at the college in 1903 concluded that the Code would

restrict American naval forces in war without similarly restricting an

enemy. In February 1904, the Secretary of the Navy approved the

college's recommendation that it be withdrawn as a directive, although

retained as a guideline.47 The Code served, however, as a guide for the

American negotiating position at the Second Hague Peace Conference

in 1907 and the London Naval Conference of 1908-1909, in which the

United States was represented by C. H. Stockton and two of his

successors as president of the Naval War College, Rear Admirals C. S. Sperry and J. P. Merrell.

The study of international law followed the practice established by

Stockton and Freeman Snow in 1894 by dealing with the subject in
56 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

terms of specific situations likely to arise in modern conditions. In

1 90 1, this approach was given renewed emphasis under the direction of

Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University. An Assistant

Secretary of State during the Spanish-American War, Moore later

became a judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The

discussions he led at the Naval War College in 1901, together with the

students' reasoning and tentative solution, formed the first volume of

the college's series of nearly 60 "blue books" on international law,

which were published during its first century.

On Moore's suggestion,48 the Naval War College appointed George

Grafton Wilson, a professor of sociology and political science at Brown

University, to be lecturer in international law. Wilson, like Moore and

Freeman Snow, was one of the pioneer teachers of international law. He

had begun teaching the subject as an undergraduate course at Brown in

1891. He had first lectured at the Naval War College in 1900 on the

legal aspects of "insurgency." Moving from Brown in 1910 to become

professor of international law at Harvard, Wilson retained his Naval

War College lectureship until he retired in 1937. For that long period,

he gave form and substance to the education of naval officers in

international law. One of the founders of the American Society of

International Law, Wilson's major contribution to the subject lies in

the 7,000 pages of international law blue books which he edited at the

college, "every one of which was intended to provide the naval officer at

home and alone in foreign ports with precise answers to problems he

might face."49 In the study of tactics, the college staff made several modifications to

the previous arrangement. Tactical situations at sea were developed

corresponding to the problems set by von Moltke for the Prussian

Army. As a means to produce readiness of mind in naval emergencies,

only half an hour was allocated for each student to give his solution to a problem. Reviving Admiral Luce's original ideas from the first years of

the college, a series of small landing operations was undertaken by the

students to give naval officers a soldier's point of view and to compare

tactical problems afloat with those ashore. In a further development,

battle problems were introduced into the course in 1 90 1 . Using the war

gaming board, they were designed to examine an overall battle

situation with emphasis on problems of attack, situation problems, and

problems of unequal speed. The war games were continued and

remained the main coordinating feature in the various elements of the

conference. "The principles of strategy and tactics may be gleaned from

history," Captain French Chadwick wrote,

but the games afford the only practicable means known whereby

these principles may be supplied. The strategic game teaches the

admiral how to dispose his forces in a maritime campaign, the
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1893-1909 57

tactical game how to handle his fleet in action, while the duel game

shows the commander how to best fight his ship.50 As the course settled into a mold, new orders from the Navy

Department returned several familiar figures to the college. In 1901,

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce was ordered back to active duty at the

college, having taken only an informal part in the work of the two

previous sessions. Luce remained on active duty at the college until

1910, when at the age of 83, congressional critics forced his

retirement. He wrote, lectured, and influenced the ideas of students

and staff alike. Bradley Fiske, who came to know Luce during this

period, later recalled that Luce, more than any other man, "taught the

Navy to think, to think about the Navy as a whole."51 In December

1900, before his formal return to duty, Luce had been honored by the

college with a large portrait by Frederic Porter Vinton. The college

paid the artist $1,000.00 from a fund raised by subscription.52 In 1903, Lieutenant William McCarty Little was promoted to the

rank of captain by special Act of Congress and ordered to active duty

at the Naval War College in recognition of his nearly 20 years of

voluntary work, chiefly in war gaming. He continued to devote his

attention to this area until his retirement a dozen years later in 1 9 1 5. For many years, Little read to the students Mahan's lectures on

naval strategy. In 1906, Luce began a campaign to persuade Mahan to

revise and to update them to be what Luce termed "the capstone, as it

were, of the great monument you have reared."53 Consenting after two

years of persuasion, Mahan began work on his last major book, Naval

Strategy. He argued with the War College and the Navy Department

as to whether he would be paid as a captain, or as a rear admiral, the

rank he had been promoted to on the retired list. But to Mahan's

displeasure, the law prevented pay at a higher level than for the grade

held before retirement. In October 1908, he reported for duty at the

War College, by letter from his home at Quogue, on Long Island. His

orders specifically directed him to prepare his lectures for

publication. He completed the book in 1911. His detachment in June

1912 marked the end of his long association with the Naval War

College.54 During these same years, the college began to expand its physical

plant. In June 1 903, the president occupied for the first time Quarters B,

the house built for the Commandant of the Naval Training Station. Five

months later, when Chadwick left the college, the house reverted to the

Station, but in 1906 it was returned to presidents of the Naval War

College, who, with one exception, have occupied it since that time.55 In 1903, the college also obtained its first automobile, an electric

vehicle, which seemed to offer cheaper transportation than horses for

the occasional uses which the college had.56
58 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

At the same time work was in progress for a new library. Completed

on 1 7 June 1 904, the new building was reached from the main part of the

college by a covered bridge, which led to a staircase ascending to the

main reading room. The library's rotunda was supported by eight

columns, each capped with ornamental capitals cast, apparently at

Luce's suggestion, at the Washington Gun Factory from old bronze

naval cannon.57 The ground floor of the new annex was designed to house the

archives, which were the main source for intelligence and data used in

conducting war games and evaluating war plans. Adjacent to the

archives and chart rooms was a meeting room for the General Board.

There was also an office designated for the Secretary to the General

Board. When the board met in Washington during the winter months,

these spaces were used as lecture rooms.58

The War College and the General Board

It was entirely appropriate for the General Board to have a meeting

room in Newport, as the board was a direct outgrowth of the same

movement which had created the War College. It was part of the War

College's campaign to establish a naval version of the General Staff.

The General Board was the creation of Henry C. Taylor more than of

any other individual. As president of the Naval War College, 1 893- 1 896

Taylor had hoped that the nucleus of a General Staff would evolve from

the joint planning efforts of ONI and the War College. His efforts were

at first strongly opposed by Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, who

feared that a permanent naval chief of staff would usurp the power of

the civilian Secretary. The experience of the Spanish-American War

and the new, worldwide responsibilities of the United States Navy

which followed the acquisition of colonies in the Pacific and the

Caribbean, made a reorganization necessary. Even the experience of the

Civil War had shown the old Bureau system was inadequate for the

task.59 By 1900, Taylor's persistent effort paid off and Secretary Long agreed

to establish a more effective staff organization. Taylor took the

opportunity to propose an elaborate organization headed by a chief of

staff. The proposed staff had three basic functions: to gather information on foreign powers; to prepare war plans; and to train officers in the

art of war making and war planning. Taylor recognized that the Naval

War College and ONI contained the basic structure for these functions,

but that they needed to be coordinated by a common superior. He

suggested that the board be headed by George Dewey, the hero of

Manila Bay, who had been promoted by Act of Congress to the lifetime

rank of "Admiral of the Navy."
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 59

Secretary of the Navy Long did not fully endorse Taylor's proposals,

but he saw the advantage in creating the means to employ Dewey,

whose high rank made him too senior for nearly any other position.

With this in mind, Long tenuously approved a modified version of

Taylor's proposal, establishing the General Board of the Navy on 13

March 1900 with the proviso that it was an experiment which could be

dissolved the moment it was no longer useful.60 The General Board met for the first time in Washington at the State,

War, and Navy Building on 16 April 1900. It consisted of six ex-officio

members and five individual members. The ex-officio members were

the Admiral of the Navy, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the

Chief of Office of Naval Intelligence, his principal assistant, and the

president of the Naval War College with his principal assistant. Each

member received one vote. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was

to have custody of the war plans, direct the War College and ONI in

furnishing the information required, and act as presiding officer in the

absence of Admiral Dewey. Although he did not hinder its progress at

the board's inception, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation showed

little interest in its success. He delayed until 16 December 1901

bringing the War College back under his direct administrative control.

The lackadasical attitude of the Bureau changed radically in April

1 902, when Henry Taylor was promoted to rear admiral and assigned as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Taylor's vested interest in the board

and active support for it expanded the board's influence. In promoting

the board, Taylor used the War College as the intellectual reservoir

from which it could draw. In the board's early period, few naval officers

had any training in strategic problem solving, but the majority of those

few were found at the War College and among its 200-odd graduates.

Taylor encouraged the practice of submitting questions to the War

College for study. This gave students practice in the solution of

concrete issues and increased the value of their work in Newport. The

college played a key role in the development of war plans by analyzing

them critically and testing them on the college game board, then

supporting or revising the plans in the light of the results obtained.

With the War College president as a voting member of the General

Board, the college's direct influence on war planning was firmly

established and promoted.61 The creation of the General Board, as one officer put it, was "the first

glimmerings of light on a true naval policy" for the United States. The

full development of the strong General Staff, envisaged by Luce and

other early reformers, did not materialize. The General Board never

acquired the status or the authority to centralize control of the Navy

Department, eliminate the autonomy of the Bureaus or relieve the

Secretary of the Navy of his responsibilities for directing operations.62 Taylor regarded the General Board as only an evolutionary step. In
60 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

February 1 903, when the U.S. Army established the Army General Staff,

the way was open to create the Joint Board in July 1903, with Dewey,

Taylor and two other members of the Navy's General Board as members.63 This was the first step toward the development of a national

defense staff.

Through these means, the work of the Naval War College had a direct

influence on naval policy, which was augmented by the General Board's

practice of meeting at the War College during the summer months. The

General Board's first summer meeting at Newport took place on 26 June

1900, but the practice was criticized by those who saw the duty with the

board only as "a pleasant place for those who wish to winter in

Washington and summer in Newport."64 Dewey, made it a rule not to

attend the summer sessions. The meetings scheduled to be held in

Newport were cancelled in 1 903, even though some of the members and

the board's records were already there.

In the first decade of the century, the college participated deeply in

war planning. Contingency plans for future wars were considered,

ranging from the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-190365 to the Black Plan

for war with Germany and Orange Plan for war with Japan.66 In the

process, the college did not always find itself in agreement with the

General Board. Specifically, the Naval War College consistently

supported the doctrine of naval concentration. In 1903, the college

concluded, "The battle fleet should at all times be concentrated in the

Atlantic .... Habitual concentration is Blue's [the United States]

only safeguard unless the battle fleet is at least one and one-half times

the strength of Black's."67 This conclusion opposed the views of

former college leaders such as Luce, Mahan, and Taylor who

staunchly insisted on the presence of an American battle fleet in the

Far East. The War College, however, persisted in its view, and after

reviewing the experience of the Russo-Japanese War,68 reaffirmed the

opinion that "the battle fleet should at all times be concentrated in

the North Atlantic. The policy of concentration is paramount.

Concentration is the policy of all great powers."69 In 1 906, the college

succeeded in making its point; the American battle fleet was ordered

to be concentrated in the Atlantic. No sooner had this been done than

War College analysts began to weigh the relative threats offered to

the United States by Germany and Japan. By 1910, the War College

again clashed with the General Board and developed a plan for the

fleet to be based on the Pacific coast, equidistant from the Philippines

and the main base at Guantanamo Bay.70 This proposal was rejected

by the Secretary of the Navy, and the president of the Naval War

College was warned that there would be "no vote or conclusion ... or any publicity" from the War College that would contradict the

General Board's decision. 71
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 6

1

While strategic employment of the battle fleet was a major concern

for the Naval War College in its planning effort, the college also became

embroiled in controversy over ships' design and characteristics.

Beginning in October 1903, the General Board began to expand its area

of concern, looking into questions of ships' speed, steaming radius,

armament, armor, free board, and displacement. The board's consideration of these technical matters was controversial in itself and led to

strong objections from the Bureaus, the traditional authorities in

technical matters. The split in professional thinking between strategic

analysis and technical development entered the issue as each group of

professionals contended that their view was paramount. Naval

constructors took affront at this challenge to their domain while the

line strategists were infuriated at the failure of the constructors to take

strategic and tactical factors into consideration.

The ship design controversy fragmented the naval officer corps to

such a degree that the issue spilled out into the popular press just at the

time that the Navy was enjoying great popularity at home.

The 1908 Battleship Conference

During the winter and spring of 1908 the operations of the American

battle fleet, "Great White Fleet," in its round-the-world cruise were

reported frequently in the press as the ships cruised south, visiting

Brazil, skirting Argentine waters, and winding through the tortuous

Strait of Magellan. Stops on the west coast of South America were

followed by maneuvers in Mexican waters. Several correspondents

embarked with the fleet and filed stories at each stop. Rarely had the

peacetime Navy received such favorable publicity.

In contrast, the January issue of McClure's contained an article

entitled, "The Needs of Our Navy," by Henry Reuterdahl, American

editor of Jane's Fighting Ships. The article summarized many of the

complaints made by the General Board and drew much of its inspiration

from insurgents in the Navy such as Captain Bradley Fiske and

Commander William S. Sims, who were ever more restless with the

Bureau organization of the Navy Department. These and several others

had written and spoken critically of ship designs, officer promotion

rules, and departmental organization. Some of the insurgents were

graduates of the War College, where they had the opportunity for

thinking, reading, and discussing of these issues. Others were well

known to the President, particularly Sims, his naval aide. Roosevelt

publicly viewed the McClure's article as ill-timed and obnoxious,

contrasting it with complimentary reports of the fleet cruise. He knew

that Sims supported Reuterdahl's thesis and may even have assisted the

author. Secretly agreeing with most of the shortcomings Reuterdahl
62 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

described in the McClure's article, Roosevelt saw them also as

politically unwelcome for his Administration.

In Congress, and particularly in the Senate Naval Affairs Committee,

McClure's had waved a red flag in the bullring. The powerful chairman,

Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, commenced a full investigation of

Reuterdahl's criticisms, which became the subject for numerous press

comments and editorials during that winter of 1908. Many of these

were accusations against the Administration in Washington. The

ensuing Senate investigation can at best be viewed as a draw in a contest between the Navy Department, represented by the bureau

chiefs supported by Hale, and the insurgents, symbolized by Sims, the

President's naval aide and Commander A. L. Key, a former naval aide to

Roosevelt, acting ostensibly on their own, but with encouragement

from the White House. Both Key and Sims testified at length before

Hale's generally hostile committee. In return, Hale encouraged refutations from the various bureau chiefs. Rear Admiral Washington Capps,

Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was most emphatic in

opposing the criticisms of the battleships under construction. The

investigation ended in late March and no specific changes in ship

designs or other actions were taken as a result.

Key at this time was the prospective commanding officer of the scout

cruiser Salem, under construction at the Fore River Shipyard in Quincy,

Massachusetts. On a nearby slipway the new battleship North Dakota

was being readied for launching. A Dreadnought type, she and the

identical Delaware followed on from the first American all-big-gun

battleships, South Carolina and Michigan. Reuterdahl's article was

especially critical of the new ships. After a careful inspection of North

Dakota and her plans, Key put Reuterdahl's and other criticisms into an

official letter to the Navy Department. His letter reached Secretary of

the Navy Truman Newberry early in June. Undoubtedly, the President,

as well as Sims, had copies. Simultaneously, Newberry had already

received a lengthy report from Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans

concerning defects in the operating battleships uncovered during the

long transit to the West Coast.

Roosevelt, in characteristic fashion, ordered the General Board to

convene for a joint conference with the War College. With the college's

staff and students as well as other officers from Washington, the

conference, numbering 50 line and staff officers, was to study the Key

letter and Evans report. Recommendations on what was required to

correct deficiencies in the North Dakota class and what changes should

be made in plans for the next class of battleships, the Florida and Utah,

were to be made and forwarded to President Roosevelt.

The 1908 War College summer conference now turned into "the

battleship conference." Rear Admiral John P. Merrell as War College
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 63

president was chairman of the conference, which was divided into four

committees, each studying a major item in the Key memorandum (for

example, armor distribution, main battery arrangement, torpedo

defense, and characteristics of the future battleships]. The conference,

representing the entire Navy, addressed problems heretofore exclusively in the hands of naval constructors. As the committees reported,

it became apparent that many officers thought design changes were

necessary but they were unwilling to vote for them at the risk of delays

and extra costs in construction.72 President Roosevelt attended and served as chairman of the 22 July

session of the conference. Arriving in Narragansett Bay on board the

presidential yacht Mayflower, he was the guest of Admiral Merrell in

the War College president's house. Roosevelt made the principal talk of

the day with what a correspondent for the Army and Navy Journal

reported as "an address which was primarily formal platitudes carefully

framed for public consumption, while the real purpose of the meeting,

behind closed doors and with double guards, was known to be specific

discussion of controversial forms of construction and the safeguarding

of the lives of officers and men of the American Navy."73 The same

writer noted that among naval officers the conference was regarded as one of the most important events in upgrading the fleet.

During the summer, Roosevelt kept up to date on the discussions in

Newport. On 15 August he sent a memorandum to Admiral Merrell,

spurring on the conferees and noting that he wanted to know defects

and whether there would or would not be delay in construction. Six

days later he received the final conference report recommending only

some modifications in North Dakota and Delaware, but requesting a major change in the turret distribution of the next class of battleships.

He studied the report at his summer home at Oyster Bay, Long Island,

with the assistance of his former and current aides, Key and Sims. In

announcing approval of the conference recommendations, he also

replied to a reporter's question as to whether the plans of the North

Dakota were unsatisfactory. "There is no question about the plans

being unsatisfactory," he stated, "merely whether they can be made

better. The North Dakota class is far better than any ships afloat. The

conference is simply engaged in an effort to try and make them

better."74 The battleship conference officially ended with the submission of

the report to President Roosevelt. Both before and after the conference,

the college attempted to carry on its regular course with 25 students in

attendance. But this could not be done and little was accomplished

beyond the international law discussions. However, the battleship

conference was important to the Navy and for the War College. For the

first time the President of the United States, acting as Commander in
64 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Chief, had involved himself directly in the work of the War College and

in the details of naval planning (in this case, for ship design) for the

future. The conference had made decisions on new construction

previously left entirely to the naval constructors. Although the

conference had not accepted all of Commander Key's recommendations, enough were accepted to confirm that the ship designing process

within the Navy was unsatisfactory. In this respect, one of the most

important reasons of the conference was its resolution that called for

future ship designs to be approved by a special board of officers. The

implementation of this resolution marked the end of the Bureau of

Construction's domination of warship design.75 The battleship conference and the publicity surrounding it created a momentum for administrative change within the Navy. In 1 909, former

Secretary of the Navy, W. H. Moody, now a Supreme Court Justice, was

appointed to head a commission to study naval administration. Luce

and Mahan were both appointed as members. This group recommended

to President Roosevelt that the Navy Department gain tight control of

the Bureaus and that it be divided into five functional areas, one of

which would be headed by a chief of naval operations. This officer

would be the Secretary's principal military advisor. The Moody Board's

recommendations were far too radical to be accepted by Congress, but,

following the recommendations of another board of officers under Rear

Admiral William Swift, a modified version of the Moody Commission's

recommendations was adopted.

Following the Swift Board's recommendations in October 1909,

President William Howard Taft's Secretary of the Navy, George von

Lengerke Meyer, appointed four rear admirals to be in charge of Navy

Department activities. Using the simplified form of spelling fashionable at the time, he called them Aids. There were Aids for Fleet

Operations, Material, Inspections, and Personnel, each of whom would

coordinate the work of the Bureaus whose functions related to his areas

of responsibility. Two of the Aids, those for Material and Operations,

became ex-officio members of the General Board. The Aid for Operations and the General Board had an overlapping responsibility for fleet

operations, although the Aid for Operations was the individual who

issued orders to the fleet. Rear Admiral Richard Wainwright, a SpanishAmerican War hero and former War College lecturer, became the first

Aid for Operations.

Two important changes for the Naval War College followed in the

wake of this administrative reorganization. First, the Naval War

College was removed from under the Bureau of Navigation and placed

directly under the Aid for Operations. This tied the War College even

more closely to the strategic planning process. The new arrangements

in Washington also had given the General Board full responsibility for
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION,. 1 893- 1 909 65

defining ship characteristics. With no additional staff to deal with the

detailed and time consuming technical questions involved, the War

College found that the General Board was moving away from its

original role as a war planning agency. The increased burden of

responsibility and the altered direction in General Board activity

quickly threatened to overwhelm the teaching staff in Newport.76 Time

devoted to wide reading, teaching, reflection, and innovation was

rapidly lost to Washington's demands for the college's advice on

immediate problems and involvement in technical issues. By 1911,

college president Raymond P. Rodgers formally requested that either

the college staff be augmented or the college be relieved from the

additional duty imposed by Washington. No new staff members were

sent, but in October 1911, the Secretary of the Navy directed that the

college's participation in the formulation of war plans be restricted

only to areas that could be carried out as part of the college's

educational mission.77 Application had reached the point where it

threatened proper education.

Notes

1. Quoted in Peter Karsten, Naval Aristocracy (New York: Free Press, 1972]

p. 345.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Knight and Puleston, typescript "History of the Naval War College,"

chapter 1 893, p. 3; Spector, Professors of War (Newport: NWC Press, 1 977] p. 64.

5. Quoted in Spector, op. cit., p. 64.

6. Quoted in Knight and Puleston, Chapter 1894, p. 1. 7. Naval War College Archives: RG19: Abstract of Course (Washington,

1894], p. 4. Full address is in RG16: Addresses, 1894.

8. Naval War College Archives, RG16, Box 2, Addresses: H. C. Taylor,

Address delivered . . . Upon the Closing of the Session of 1894.

9. Abstract of Course 1894, pp. 29-30.

10. Freeman Snow, International Law: A Manual Based upon Lectures

Delivered at the Naval War College (Washington: Govt. Print Off., 1895]; John

M. Raymond and Barbara J. Frischholz, "Lawyers Who Established International

Law in the United States, 177 6-1914," American Journal of International Law,

vol. 76, no. 4 (October 1982], pp. 816-18.

11. Taylor, Closing Address; Knight and Puleston, op. cit., 1893, p., 4. 12. Abstract of Course 1895, p. 37; Knight and Puleston, op. cit., p. 5. 13. Taylor, Closing Address.

14. Abstract of Course 1894, pp. 34-37.

15. Abstract of Course 1895, pp. 38-39; . . . 1896, p. 45-46.

16. Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution, (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana University Press, 1966] pp. 171-72.

17. Jay Luvaas, "European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870-1914," in M.

Howard, ed. The Theory and Practice of War (Bloomington: U. of Indiana Press,

1975), p. 90.
66 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

18. S. B. Luce, "Naval Administration," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.

XIV, No. 3 (1888|, p. 584. See also Hayes and Hattendorf, The Writings of

Stephen B. Luce (Newport, Naval War College Press, 1975), pp. 199-200, 251.

1 9. Quoted in D. J. Costello, Planning for War: A History of the General Board

of the Navy 1 900- 1 91 4 (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Fletcher School, 1968), p. 13

and R.G. O'Connor, "Origins of the Navy General Staff" in O'Connor, ed.,

American Defense Policy in Perspective (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 140-141.

20. Spector, op. cit., p. 85-87.

2L O'Connor, op. cit. 22. Costello, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

23. P. A. Coletta, Admiral Bradley H. Fiske and the American Navy (Lawrence,

1979), p. 48.

24. Knight and Puleston, op. cit., 1896, p. 3. 25. Spector, op. cit., pp. 92-97; David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898

(New York: MacMillan, 1981), pp. 72ff; J.AS. Grenville and G. B. Young, Politics,

Strategy and American Foreign Policy, (New Havan: Yale Univ. Press, 1 966), pp.

267-73.

26. Library of Congress, Luce Papers: McCarty Little to Luce, 15 September

1895.

27. Ibid.

28. Quoted in A. Gleaves, Life and Letters of Stephen B. Luce (New York:

Putnam, 1925), p. 189.

29. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 1 979), p. 54; Spector, op. cit., p. 97; Knight and Puleston, op. cit., 1 897, p. 1

.

30. "The Future of the Naval War College," Army and Navy Register, 20

November 1897, p. 332.

31. Quoted in Gleaves, op. cit., p. 190.

32. Spector, op. cit., p. 99.

33. U.S. Navy Department, Annual Report of the Secretary, 1898, vol. I, pp.

99-100.

34. Spector, op. cit. 35. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit., p. 39.

36. Quoted in Spector, op. cit., p. 99.

37. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, [Hereinafter NHC] Ms.

Coll. 56, Box 2; C. H. Stockton papers; Letterbook as president, NWC, 1898-

1900, p. 49: Stockton to Allen, 25 Nov 1898.

38. "The Naval War College: Removal to Annapolis Expected at Newport,"

The New York Times, 26 March 1899, p. 3:3. 39. NHC Stockton papers, loc. cit., p. 62; Stockton to A. M. Knight, 5 Dec

1898. See also p. 72 Stockton to Goodrich, 9 Dec 1898.

40. Loc. cit., Stockton papers, p. 124, Stockton to Goodrich, 23 Feb 1899.

41. Loc. cit, Stockton papers, p. 92, Stockton to Luce, 3 Jan 1899.

42. "Outline History of the Naval War College" in unpublished typescript in

the Naval War College Library, History of the Naval War College to 1937.

43. See Paolo E. Coletta, Bowman Hendry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor,

(Washington: University Press of America, 1979), pp. 73-102 and NWC

Archives, RG15: B. H. McCalla guest lecture, 1899, "Lessons of the Spanish

American War."

44. Doris Maguire, ed., French Ensor Chadwick Selected Letters and Papers

(Washington: University Press of America, 1981) pp. 272-79: President, Naval

War College to President General Board, 24 May 1902, Tactical Signal Book,

1897. Report by Capt. B. H. McCalla.

45. Knight and Puleston, op.cit., Chapters: 1900-1909.
FROM EDUCATION TO APPLICATION, 1 893- 1 909 67

46. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise. 8th ed. H. Lauterpacht, ed.

(New York, 1955), p. 59 footnote 3. 47. Naval War College, International Law Discussions 1903: The United

States Naval War Code of 1900 (Washington, Govt. Print Off., 1904), pp. 90-97;

Calvin De Armond David, The U.S. and the Second Hague Peace Conference

(Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1975) pp. 144, 307.

48. See Doris Maguire, ed., Chadwick Letters, Chadwick to Moore, pp. 229,

262.

49. Denys P. Myers, "In Memoriam: George Grafton Wilson," American

Journal of International Law, vol. 45 (1951), pp. 549-50.

50. Quoted in Knight and Puleston, op. cit; 1901, pp. 4-5.

51. B. A. Fiske, "Stephen B. Luce, An Appreciation," U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings, vol. XLIII, No. 9 (Sept. 1917) pp. 1935-40.

52. Doris Maguire, ed., Chadwick Letters, pp. 220-22.

53. Hayes and Hattendorf, op. cit, pp. 21-22.

54. Seager, Mahan, pp. 547-559; Seager and Maguire, eds., Letters, III, pp.

269,460, 464.

55. The exception was the presidency of W. L. Rodgers, Nov 1911 to Dec

1913, when the house was occupied by the senior officer at Newport, Captain

Albert Gleaves, Commander, Training Station.

56. Maguire, ed. Chadwick Letters, pp. 286, 297.

57. Ibid., pp. 285-86, 300, 301, 303, 304, 308.

58. NWC Archives, RG 1, Box 3 File 22. Construction memoranda.

59. Ronald Spector, Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of

George Dewey (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp.

125-27.

60. Daniel J. Costello, Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the

Navy 1900-1914 (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy, 1968), pp. 19-22.

61. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

62. R. G. O'Connor, "Origins of the Navy 'General Staff" op. cit., p. 143, with

quote from Captain John Hood.

63. Costello, op. cit., p. 40.

64. Ibid., p. 56.

65. R. G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy op. cit, pp. 332-33.

66. For detailed studies of these plans, see for example, Louis Morton, "War

Plan Orange," "Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, Vol. XI (January 1959),

pp. 221-50; J. B. Hattendorf, "Technology and Strategy" in B. M. Simpson III, ed.

War Strategy and Maritime Power (Rutgers, 1 977); Michael Vlahos, "The Naval

War College and the Origins of War Planning Against Japan," Naval War

College Review, Vol. 33, (July-August 1980), pp. 23-41; John H. Maurer,

"American Naval Concentration and the German Battle Fleet, 1900-1918," The

Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (June 1983), pp. 147-179.

67. Maurer, op. cit., pp. 1 54. Quoted from NWC Archives, RG 1 2. "Solution to

Problem, 1903."

68. Spector, op. cit., pp. 106-07; Maurer, p. 155.

69. Quoted in Maurer, p. 156.

70. Spector, op. cit., p. 107.

71. Maurer, op. cit., p. 163.

72. Costello, op. cit., p. 78.

73. Army and Navy Journal, 25 July 1908.

74. Ibid., 11 September 1908.
68 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

75. Costello, op. citv pp. 87-89. See also Hattendorf, "Technology and

Strategy" op. cit v Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American

Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), pp. 201-15. NWC Archives, RG 27:

Battleship Conference; Report of the Board to Consider CDR A. L. Key's

Comments on the Design of the Battleship North Dakota Decisions.

76. Costello, op. cit, p. 97.

77. Ibid., pp. 117-118.
CHAPTER 4

EN THE END OF AN ERA AND

THE INTRODUCTION OF

NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918

The Aid system was associated with the Naval

War College and with the views of prominent War College men who

sought increased military control of naval operations along with

improved naval administration. Although the Aids had no executive

power, being only advisors, the four admirals met daily as a council in

the office of the Aid for Operations to coordinate their work, to

discuss major issues, and to pass upon proposed regulation changes,

proposed general orders and legislation, recommendations to the

General Board, as well as orders to captains and admirals ashore and

afloat. The system improved management and direction, but left

much to be desired.

In the process of their work, however, the Aids directly supported

the Naval War College and sought to place War College graduates in

responsible positions. 1 This emphasis by the Navy's most senior

officers helped to increase the prestige of the Naval War College

within the officer corps. As the Western world was experiencing the

end of an era in the years preceding World War I, the Naval War

College in its own way reached an end of an era. The struggle for

survival was over, the founders were gradually disappearing from the

scene, and the college was beginning to reassert its educational role

as it withdrew from direct and active participation in the preparation

of naval war plans. With this change came a new and different

emphasis which grew from the adoption of the German "applicatory

system," an approach that grew to dominate Naval War College

thinking.
70 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Estimate of the Situation

The applicatory system was known popularly among Naval War

College students and staff as the "estimate of the situation." It was only

the first of three fundamental steps in dealing with a military or naval

problem: ( 1) analyzing or estimating the situation to determine the plan

of action and decisions to be made; (2) translating the decisions to be

made into orders; and (3) translating the orders into action.

The Naval War College's adoption of this method may be attributed

to Commander W. L. Rodgers' assignment to the Army War College in

Washington. The Army War College had begun its first year of

systematic instruction in 1 903 under Brigadier General Tasker Bliss as commandant. Bliss, one of the first staff members at the Naval War

College who served as lecturer on military strategy in the college's first

three academic years, 1885-1887, had a long time interest in the

professional link between the Army and the Navy. As Army War

College president, he established a link between the two colleges by

arranging for joint studies of war problems. The study of these problems

produced a set of rules for joint maneuvers and standard procedures for

army transports to follow them under naval convoy. Bliss' successors

carried on with further arrangements, and in 1906-1907 the first two

naval students were sent to the Army War College. One of them,

Commander H. S. Knapp, had been graduated from the Naval War

College in 1897.2 In the autumn of 1907, W. L. Rodgers was sent to Washington to act

as liaison officer between the two colleges and to be Naval Advisor to

the Army College staff concerning naval matters. "The method of work

of the Army War College was- the applicatory system," Rodgers wrote.

It used specific situations as a basis of study and passed from these

to generalizations. Lectures, the preparation of monographs, and

field exercises and studies all were employed as auxiliaries in the

effort of the staff to teach. The college regarded it as a duty to

instruct the class in sound methods of thought and to inculcate a common doctrine of war, so as to prepare graduates of the college

for ready cooperation and mutual support through knowledge that

the same principles of warfare were accepted throughout the Army

in all its branches.3 During Rodgers' second year at the Army War College, 1 908- 1 909, he

continued to serve on its staff and helped to introduce new war gaming

techniques that had been developed in Newport by Little. Instead of

following the course a second time, Rodgers devoted his energy to

applying Army methods to solving some of the naval problems that had

been set in Newport in previous years and then comparing the analyses

and solutions. "This work of a year convinced me that the Army
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 71

method was not only practicable but desirable," Rodgers said, "and it

was necessary if the [Naval] War College was to remain alive and

progress and grow."4 Returning to Newport in May 1909, Rodgers submitted his views to

William McCarty Little, who was deeply interested in them. When

Rodgers thereupon suggested that adapting Army methods be formally

proposed to the president of the Naval War College. "Captain Little

advised me against this course," Rodgers recalled

He said that Admiral Merrell would no doubt require some weeks

to consider the proposal before formally adopting it, and then the

session would be well advanced and the class would be annoyed by

a change in procedure. On the other hand, if he and I were to start the class on this method as a matter of accepted administrative

detail, they would never know anything had been "wished on" them

and would go on cheerfully. This we did, and although we had to be

easy with some points because we had no recognition by authority

to back us, yet at the end of the session the results were good.5 At the end of the 1909 summer conference, Admiral Merrell was

relieved as president by Rear Admiral R. P. Rodgers, a relative of

Commander Rodgers. Admiral Rodgers, however, was also appointed

Commandant of the Naval Station, and he left many of the details in

developing the curriculum for the 1910 conference to Captain Little.

The introduction of the ideas behind the applicatory system in 1909

began to excite interest in the staff. The available literature on the

applicatory system was not extensive, but several U.S. Army officers

had been at work trying to apply the ideas and adapt them for American

use. In 1906, Major C. H. Barth published his translation of Otto von

Griepenkerl's Letters on Applied Tactics, which expounded the system.

In the same year, Major Eban Swift published Field Orders, Messages,

and Reports, and in 1 909, Army Captain Roger S. Fitch wrote Estimating

Tactical Situations and Composing Orders. These three works, in

particular, became the standard sources of reference over the next few

years as the Navy began to develop its version of the applicatory

system.

In the autumn of 1 909, after the summer conference had ended, there

was time to reflect on the new ideas. Perhaps inspired by a reference in

the 1 909 lectures, Major John H. Russell, USMC, a future commandant

of the Marine Corps, sought out a copy of Earth's translation of

Griepenkerl. While he was reading it, McCarty Little stopped in his

office and the two discussed the book. Russell was impressed with its

soundness and potential utility in the work of the Naval War College,

but he doubted it would be possible to interest other staff members in

it; Russell was not aware of Rodgers' earlier interest. Little borrowed the

book, read it, and discussed it with Admiral R. P. Rodgers. Thereupon
72 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Rodgers appointed a committee consisting of McCarty Little,

Lieutenant Commanders Frank Marble and Carl T. Vogelgesang, and

Lieutenant Walter S. Turpin to report on the utility of the applicatory

system for the Navy. The committee developed a plan to revise the

curriculum, and the system was explained to the students at the

summer conference of 1910. The following year, Vogelgesang

elaborated on the subject in his lectures.6 The link between military and naval thinking was made even

closer in November 1911, when W. L. Rodgers was ordered to duty as president of the Naval War College. Since his detachment from the

Army War College, Rodgers had been promoted to captain and had

commanded the battleship Georgia. Reinforced by these recent

experiences Rodgers reformed the course of study at the Naval War

College to include ideas from the Army. The "estimate of the

situation," the "order form," and war gaming were brought together to

provide a new direction for the Naval War College's course. As one

contemporary writer noted, "A great white light broke on the service,

especially in 1912 when the War College first laid emphasis on the

importance of doctrine."7 From this point, for more than half a century, the Naval War College

course stressed the doctrine and procedures of the applicatory system.

This was an important expansion of Luce's conception of the college as a place of voluntary, original research in the creation of a naval science

and Henry Taylor's use of the college as a direct part of the war planning

process. The new approach embraced a system of procedures which in

combination approximated the Jominian laws of warfare that Luce had

sought and also stressed the German methods that Henry Taylor had

advocated for war planning.

As it was explained to the students, the estimate of the situation was

a "mental process which leads up to and expresses a decision." The

estimate consisted of four steps that were to be covered in sequence: ( 1

)

a statement of the mission; (2) an assessment of enemy forces—their

strength, disposition, and possible intentions; (3) an assessment of one's

own forces—their strength and disposition, and (4) the courses of

action open. It was a logical process of thought to be applied to concrete

situations to enable a commander to reach a definite decision. It was by

no means a prescriptive formula to be followed religiously; rather, it

was an orderly method for analyzing a problem. Only after such a process, its advocates concluded, should orders be written and

executed.

The faculty presented to the students specific fleet problems and

required individual rather than group or committee solutions. The

students were not only required to pursue the mental processes of the

sstimate of the situation but were also required to draft the ensuing
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 73

orders in a logical, clear, and coherent form. The orders were then

executed in war games which gave as much realism as possible to the

endeavor.

The drafting of orders to execute the commander's decision and its

actual execution were obviously as important as the mental processes

that gave rise to the decision. The faculty explained, "War is not simply

fighting; it is fighting for the attainment of a definite purpose. Now

since each act of war should be in harmony with the general purpose, it

is evident that there must be a supreme control to direct the act of

war."8 The exercise of command required not only personal leadership

and technical competence but also required—and still does—

a

disciplined habit of mind, the result of systematic self-training.

The introduction of the estimate of the situation thus represented

the triumph of two ideas in a new and fruitful coordination. The first

was that war could be studied in the same way that law or medicine

could be studied. This was one of the major concepts upon which Luce

had founded the college in 1884, but at that time he had lacked an

effective intellectual vehicle for systematically utilizing that approach.

Once a science of naval warfare was accepted and established, then it

could be studied and learned. This meant that junior officers as well as their seniors could acquire by means of mental discipline the habit of

mind from which action would flow by the exercise of reason. What

before may have seemed higher mysteries were now no longer to be

reserved for admirals. They could be known, shared, and understood by

all officers.

The implications were profound. Where formerly seniors commanded and juniors obeyed without question, now the full range of

what was involved in any given strategic or tactical situation could be

known and understood by all. Juniors would still exhibit proper

subordination, but instead of giving blind obedience, they would

intelligently execute orders from their seniors, because they could be

aware of the objectives sought and how they were to be achieved. Thus,

they would be able to adapt to the fluid and ever-changing conditions of

war while still pursuing the objective their seniors sought.

Development of Doctrine

The intelligent execution of orders should be a product of mutual

understanding between junior and senior officers and a common body of

procedures to be followed under more or less recurring circumstances

and in similar conditions. In time, this common body of procedures came

to be known as doctrine. Thus, if both juniors and seniors were familiar

with and understood a duly authorized, widely promulgated, and

commonly understood doctrine, there would be little doubt in anyone's
74 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

mind about what actions ought to be taken at any level. With a doctrine

established, officers would not find it necessary to write new orders (in

varying degrees of detail] to cover a wide range of points. Specific

directives would be necessary only for the really different or unique

circumstances. Because such naval doctrine did not exist before 1910, it had become necessary to invent it. The senior officers at that time had

been trained as midshipmen at sea in sailing ships, although they had

received a certain degree of exposure to the physical sciences and their

application at sea by way of steam engineering and electricity. Yet, the

intangible service traditions were rooted in an earlier and very different

age. The requirements of naval warfare in the early twentieth century,

with new technology, increased mobility and firepower, demanded a much stricter intellectual dimension. The mental process of the estimate

of the situation filled the need and was used as the basis for naval science.

The summer conference of 1 9 1 1 opened on 2 June with Secretary of the

Navy George von L. Meyer the principal speaker for the occasion. The

college's founding father, the eighty-four-year-old Luce, was invited to

speak as well. It was to be his last address to the college, but rather than

reminisce, he seized the opportunity to make a strong and public plea for a two-year course. Meyer spoke first, but he took some of the wind out of Luce's sails by

stating that he intended to see to it that at least some officers would be

detailed to the college for a longer period than the customary four

months. Luce was delighted to hear Meyer state officially what he was

about to urge. Nevertheless, when Meyer finished, Luce delivered his

prepared remarks to provide added justification and to stress that the

college should educate officers, not draft war plans for the General Board.

Luce reviewed the reasons for establishment of the War College,

saying, "The object of this college is to enable officers to fit themselves to

prepare war plans." He was frankly worried because there was so much

interest in the Naval Post Graduate School of Engineering, recently

established in Annapolis, and still so little support for the War College.

Officers still seem to care little for understanding the main purpose of

their profession. "Let officers who have completed their terms of sea

service in their respective grades come here for a two-year course of

study," Luce declared. Pointedly, he added:

not for discussion, but for study. On the completion of such a course they will then be eligible as conferees to discuss intelligently

questions relating to naval warfare—and not before. 10

Instituting the Long Course

As college staff members developed the ideas of the applicatory system

after 1910 and began to infuse them into the curriculum, the college
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1909-1918 75

continued to be concerned about the length of the course and the low

numbers of students who attended it. In 1910 and 1911, college president Rear Admiral Raymond Rodgers

presided over summer conferences of four months in length, with the

curriculum still built around a main problem. The brevity of these

courses precluded examination in depth of the strategic and tactical

issues involved and severely restricted the amount of time available to

students for individual study and reading. After a quarter of a century

the War College was firmly established as a part of the Navy, but

responsible officials in the Department did not take it seriously enough

to send students for a full year of study. As Rodgers' term began, there

were nearly 800 officers in the Navy whose rank was suitable for

assignment to the staff or student roster. However, with the Navy

expanding rapidly in terms of men and ships, the Bureau of Navigation

was unable to assign four on a regular basis to the faculty or even to find

20 or 30 more for students. Luce believed that it was high time the

course was expanded to what he thought was its proper length. W. L. Rodgers and McCarty Little had urged in 1909 the establishment of a

1 6-month course lasting over two summer sessions for a small, selected

group of officers. After the 1910 summer conference, McCarty Little, a good friend of Rear Admiral Nicholson, Chief of the Bureau of

Navigation, was sent to Washington to try to get the Bureau to assign

20 student officers for such a course. Nicholson was outwardly

unimpressed, stating that the War College still had lowest priority in

the assignment of officers.

Citing the danger of crude views held by bright, but not fully trained

minds that left the college after too short a period of study, Luce

admonished the students,

Your profession is the art of war and nature will be avenged if you

violate one of its laws in undertaking to make a part greater than

the whole. 11 Although Luce's remarks might have seemed unnecessary following

Secretary Meyers' address, they provided forceful statement from the

college on its educational purpose and the need for a longer course. The summer conference for 1 9 1 1 continued, from its opening in June

through September, to complete its usual four months. The conference

was based on the model used in previous years, but now included

lectures on the applicatory system and the formulation of orders which

had begun in the previous year. At this early stage, the two approaches

were used in a complementary fashion that stressed the study of

individual situations as the means to develop general principles

through inductive reasoning. In October 1911, four students from the

summer conference were assigned to the, newly established long
76 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

course. A sixteen month long study, the course as established under R.

P. Rodgers involved no new features but allowed greater time for the

full treatment of the subjects in the existing summer course. The

students assigned were Captains William S. Sims and Josiah McKean,

Commander Yates Stirling, Jrv and Marine Captain Earl H. Ellis.

All of these new students distinguished themselves in later years.

Sims, McKean, and Stirling reached flag rank, and Ellis, although he

died mysteriously in 1923 as a lieutenant colonel, was a pioneer

student of amphibious warfare in the Pacific. As a long course student

in 1911-1912 and a staff member in 1913, Ellis wrote a series of papers

on advanced base forces, the defense of the Pacific islands, and began to

develop the idea of offensive amphibious operations, which were used

so successfully 30 years later in the war against Japan. 12 At the time, Sims was one of the best known officers in the Navy. As

an advocate of improved naval gunnery, Inspector of Naval Ordnance,

and naval aide to President Roosevelt, Sims had become an important

and outspoken critic of naval policies. In 1 906, he successfully attacked

Mahan's interpretation of the Russo-Japanese War and proved him

incorrect on several issues. 13 In 1910 as commanding officer of USS

Minnesota, then visiting London, Sims replied to a welcoming speech

by the Lord Mayor of London at Guildhall. In his reply, Sims declared

his personal opinion that "if ever the integrity of the British Empire be

seriously threatened by an external enemy, they might count upon the

assistance of every man, every ship, and every dollar from their

kinsmen across the sea." In concluding his remarks, Sims asked all the

American naval officers and men to stand and proposed to the Lord

Mayor three American cheers for three British things: the Sailor King,

the British people, and the integrity of their Empire. 14 Sims' speech was warmly received by the British press, but when

reported in America it raised such violent public criticism that the

incident was fully discussed at a cabinet meeting in Washington. The

critics wanted Sims punished, but the Secretary of the Navy realized he

was one of the Navy's most capable officers. There was still a chance

that the incident might damage Sims' future career. Finally, in April of

the following year, Sims' friends and supporters arranged for him to

have orders to the War College, where it was hoped he would "tone

down his ideas" to "make him proper stuff for an able Commanderin-Chief." 15 Like many students in the early years, Sims came to the summer

conference somewhat unwillingly. On receiving his orders, he wrote to

his wife, "Soon I may get some duty I would like better—something in

closer touch with practice and less on the theoretical side." 16 However,

during the 1 6 months that Sims was a student in the first long course at

the college, a close relationship grew between him and the senior
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1909-1918 77

instructor on the staff, Commander William Veazie Pratt. Pratt came to

the staff in 1 9 1 1 without having been a student and frankly admitted he

had a hard time keeping ahead of those taking the course. Though nine

years senior to Pratt, Sims took him as a friend and equal. As Pratt's

biographer remarked, "Pratt was not the antithesis of Sims but quite

different. . . . What Pratt was best at was logical analysis—his thought

processes always started with an estimate of the situation.' One gets

the impression that Sims sensed a solution to most problems and then

drafted his estimate' to match his conclusions."17 In later years Pratt said that he could remember little of a factual

nature learned at the college that would be of lasting importance, but

he added, "I began to learn the intimate connection between the Fleet in

being and the War College, the home of thought. Strange perhaps as it

may seem, the deeper I became involved in complicated mass

movements, the less their inherent value appealed to me, but more and

more there appeared as a dominating factor . . . the inherent characteristic of the leader who used the material things which he held power

over."18 Sims and the other students began the academic day at 9:30 a.m. There were three periods devoted to lectures, discussion, and individual work, two of which were scheduled before lunch. Classes were

over at 3 p.m. Some students who lived with their families in

Jamestown across the bay, commuted by War College boat, which left

the Coasters Harbor Island daily at 3: 1 5. Others living in Newport used

the Newport Electric Railway trolley from Washington Square in

downtown Newport to Training Station Road just outside the main

gate. Classes were also held Saturday mornings from 9:30 until noon.

The 1911 summer conference, like its predecessors, was divided into

student committees. The senior officer in each committee was in

charge, and he was responsible for the attendance of the other students

and for the timely submission of academic work. The college

specifically instructed the students that "For the sake of uniformity,

the solutions will be submitted in ink." Typing services were available

upon request.

The course of instruction consisted of tactical games, introduced

with a lecture by Commander Pratt; lectures on the estimate of the

situation by Lieutenant Commander Carl T. Vogelgesang; a lecture on

explanations of the strategic game by William McCarty Little; and five

lectures on naval strategy by Alfred Thayer Mahan read by a staff

member. Professor George Grafton Wilson delivered lectures on

international law, after which the students were required to write

solutions to five law problems that he had formulated on neutral

vessels and contraband cargos. There was also instruction on recent

aspects of technical innovation in the areas of engineering, wireless
78 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

telegraph, battleship design, and mining operations, discussing their

tactical and strategic meaning. The students were divided into two

committees which were given specific problems to discuss and on

which to prepare a committee response. One question was,

Should well-established and accepted obligations in regard to

foreign policies influence the naval policy of a country? Discuss the

necessity of proper coordination between the State and Military

authorities in arriving at a proper naval policy, and in the conduct

of war. 19 One student committee commenced its response, "The serious

business of diplomacy is carried on by diplomatic notes, which are, in

effect, promissory notes of war." Continuing in the same vein and with

the same metaphor, the students concluded bizarrely, "The Navy and

Army are diplomatic instruments. War is the political substitution for

discounted and protested diplomatic notes and unavailing ultimatums."20 The college continued to concern itself with strategic planning, but

limited its participation to aspects that could be accomplished within

the course. In 1910 and 1911 the college completed work on a contingency plan for war with Orange (Japan]. In this period, War

College students saw Japan as a potential enemy for three reasons: (1)

Japanese incursions into Manchuria were perceived as creating points

of friction by violating the Open Door Policy and by creating trade

rivalries with the west; (2) they suspected Japan of harboring aspirations

to prevent American mastery of the Pacific by seizing both Guam and

Hawaii as a means to choke American hold on the Philippines; and (3)

they were aware that racial antagonisms toward Japanese then in the

United States, particularly those in California, could lead to serious

trouble. In their analysis, they commented, "The conditions which

cause war are intimately connected with the object for which the war is

waged; hence, by a study of those conditions, the ultimate objective of a possible war is brought into view, and on this the strategy of the war

should be based."21 While Japan was a potential threat in the Pacific, Germany was seen

as presenting a possible threat in the Atlantic. The summer conference

of 1911 dealt with specific aspects of a German naval threat to the

Western Hemisphere. The students were given a problem reminiscent

of that caused by the Spanish fleet in 1 898 in which the Black (German)

fleet proceeded to the Caribbean by way of the Cape Verde Islands.

They were directed to examine the logistics of the coal supply for such

an operation and for the maintenance of this fleet in the Caribbean,

while also considering possible Blue (American] reactions. These

issues were considered further both by the long courses and the
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 79

summer conferences in 1911, 1912, and 1913, culminating in a formal

document on American strategic posture in the event of war with

Germany—the Black Plan. As finally developed by the General Board

with assistance from the Naval War College, the plan was based on the

conclusion that if parity existed in battleship numbers between Blue

and Black, "it would be suicidal for Black with a fleet only approximately equal to that of Blue ... to attempt a descent upon . . . the

Caribbean."22 This view complemented War College reasoning which

advocated an American naval building program that would match

Germany's rather than Japan's. In War College opinion, the United

States would soon match Japan, but Germany presented both a more

immediate threat and a stronger force.23 The four-month summer conference of 1911 was excellent preparation for Sims and his three colleagues in the long course. At the end of

September they commenced the year-long course in which they studied

in greater depth what had been covered in the summer.

In November 1911, Captain W. L. Rodgers succeeded his kinsman as president of the Naval War College. He was pleased with the progress

that had been made in developing the applicatory system and establishing the long course during his two and a half years' absence from the

college. During the next two years he devoted his effort to broaden "the

scope of the work to include studies of national policy as the

foundation for laying out naval plans of expansion and also of logistics,

organization, and administration of navies as the basis of strategy and

tactics of battle."24 The students in the long course studied tactics, strategy, policy, and

logistics, each for two months. Their time was more or less equally

divided among reading, discussion, solution of problems, and testing

the solutions in war games. The reading lists were impressive,

thorough, and weighty. They included many European authorities on

land and naval warfare, such as von Moltke, Griepenkerl, Jomini,

Clausewitz, Daveluy, Darrieus, Clerk of Eldin, Corbett, Wilkinson, and

Hamley. Mahan's works were appropriately included, and Thucydides'

classic on the Peloponnesian War was also read.

The students were told to make notes "of tactical principles, gleaned

from any of those sources, that may be considered to be applicable to

present-day conditions in naval warfare." The purpose of this directive

was to force students to derive general principles from their studies.

Luce had insisted upon inductive reasoning as appropriate to the study

of the art of war, and Mahan had used this method to reach his

conclusions in his studies of the influence of seapower upon history.

Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences was prominently

included in the reading list as an example of the relationship of

national policy to war and the use of war to achieve national objectives.
80 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

For logistics, the readings were mainly in recent European and

American military history. The college directed that the students,

when writing their papers in this area, must deal with the subject "not

only in the abstract, but illustrated by concrete historical examples of

the bearing of logistics on the conduct of war."

Besides these essentially academic endeavors/the students received a naval problem fortnightly. They were required to provide an "estimate of

the situation" and "formulation of orders." When these steps were

accomplished, their solution was tested on the game board. Although

this phase of the course was an exercise, its purpose was hardly academic.

Students were expected to present a solution to some definite, concrete

tactical or strategic situation "in which we may be directly interested."

These exercises were preparation for the final four months of the yearlong course, during which time the long course students worked on

preparation of contingency plans for the General Board.

The final four months of the course included the summer conference

of 1912. During these months, long course students commenced a major planning exercise in which they prepared and drafted a plan for a possible campaign.

At the end of the second long course on 1 October 1913, the college

issued diplomas for the first time. They were awarded at that time to

the members of both the first and second long course.

Three-Course Plan

The system of having both a four month summer conference and a

1 6-month long course continued from 1911 through 1913. During 1913,

in the last year of his War College presidency, Captain W. L. Rodgers

proposed a three course plan for the War College. This consisted of ( 1 ] the elementary course; (2) the preparatory course; and (3] the War

College course. In July 1913, on the personal initiative of Secretary of the Navy

Josephus Daniels, 50 officers of the Atlantic Fleet were ordered to the

two-week elementary course. As an introduction to the work of the

Naval War College, they were given lectures on the applicatory system,

were presented a strategic problem, with tactical war game, and were

required to write a thesis on loyalty.25 The four-month preparatory

course was the summer conference renamed, and the long course was

now renamed the War College course. Still, the college was concerned

about the brevity of the courses it offered. As the Secretary of the

Navy's report for 1913 indicated,26 the 16 months that the long course

students had was short when compared to the three years that the U.S.

Army devoted to extraregimental work or to the two-year courses

provided by war colleges in Berlin, Paris, and Rome.
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 81

The Secretary's report noted that a naval officer had two classes of

duties to perform. The first was to perfect his command and to maintain

it in efficient condition. The Naval Academy and its postgraduate

school were created to furnish the education and training for this duty.

The second, and equally important, duty for a naval officer was "to

make himself an efficient leader, ably wise to use the warlike

instrument which he has created." Education for that duty was the

mission of the Naval War College. Moreover, the report stated

The War College training is of the utmost importance to the

development of the Navy, demanding the sole and entire time of

officers taking it. 27 The two-week elementary course and the four-month preparatory

course created administrative difficulties. While the two-week course

was successful, it created difficulty in finding short-term accommodation for so many officers, while, at the same time, officers commanding

ships in the fleet found it difficult to carry on with their operations and

resented the college's "unwarranted interference" with their work.

Similarly, the Bureau of Navigation found it administratively difficult

to maintain each year two small, four-month preparatory classes, six

months apart.28 Rodgers sought to adjust the college course to meet these objections.

He took the initiative in introducing correspondence courses to

replace the two-week elementary course, giving fleet officers an

introduction to War College work. Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight,

commanding the Reserve Fleet, was one of the first to undertake these

correspondence courses as a means to acquaint himself with the work

of the college, knowing that he would soon relieve Rodgers as college

president.29 Early in November 1913, Rodgers prepared for Secretary of the Navy

Daniels a draft General Order which recognized the new course

changes that Rodgers had made. The Aid for Operations, Rear Admiral

Fiske, declined to approve the draft, noting that it might hinder

Admiral Knight in developing the policy which he thought fit for the

college. Relieving Rodgers in December 1913, Knight reviewed the

plans which Rodgers had made and recommended their approval, with

only minor amendments.

In January 1914, Secretary of the Navy Daniels issued a General

Order which, in effect, abolished both the elementary and preparatory

summer courses. The standard course was established as one of 12

months duration, with two groups in classes of no less than 15 each.

One group assembled in January of each year, and the other in July.

Using the curriculum previously designed for the long course, the

War College offered the new one-year course from January 1914 until

1917. Although some student writing had been required since 1912,
82 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

under the new course of 1 9 1 4 all students were required to write theses.

They were required to write in five different areas: ( 1

1 strategy, in its

principles and practice; (2) policy—its relation to war and preparation

for war; (3) logistics; (4) tactics; and (5) the strategy of the Pacific.

On 1 April 1914 the Secretary of the Navy issued another General

Order, on the college's recommendation, which established a correspondence course at the Naval War College designed for those naval officers

who were not available for assignment to Newport. Two courses were

made available to be sent out in a series of numbered installments.

Extension Course A was designed for groups of officers to participate in

jointly under the direction of one of the students in the group.

Extension Course B was prepared for individual officers who were

situated where they could not join a group. This General Order gave the

Navy Department's approval to a long-standing War College effort in

bringing the work of the college directly to the fleet. While it was not

practical to bring the fleet to Newport as Luce and Sampson had done

on occasion, the college could now reach officers at sea by correspondence.30

The Great War

As the July crisis gripped European diplomats in 1914, students and

staff at the Naval War College watched the events with intense

interest. Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Aid for Operations, asked

permission from the Secretary of the Navy to spend the month of

August in Newport with the General Board, instead of taking the

customary summer leave offered to Navy Department officials at that

time. Reaching Newport on 3 1 July, Fiske was aware that war in Europe

was imminent. In Newport, Fiske found himself in an anomalous

position. As the Navy's chief staff officer, he was equivalent to the

senior officer of other armies and navies, and he felt that he could best

perform his duty in direct consultation with the Navy's planning body,

the General Board. The Naval War College was administratively under

Fiske as Aid for Operations, yet the college's president, Austin M.

Knight, was senior by date of rank, besides being additionally the

Commandant of the Second Naval District, and the senior officer of the

General Board after the 76-year-old Admiral Dewey.

Fiske's reading of the latest dispatches from Europe on 31 July

convinced him that war was imminent and that he should act

immediately to prepare the U.S. Navy for war. The United States, he

felt, could not escape being dragged into the war. On the evening of 31

July, Fiske asked Admiral Knight to convene a meeting of the General

Board at the Naval War College as early as possible the following

morning and to urge the Navy Department "to take immediate steps to
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 83

put the Navy on a war footing." Meeting on 1 August 1914, the Board

sent an urgent letter to the Secretary of the Navy pointing out the

possible causes of danger to America, especially in regard to American

neutrality. In particular, the General Board recommended that all

battleships, except those needed in Mexican and Caribbean waters, be

sent to their home yards for immediate docking and repairs for war

service. As Aid for Operations, Fiske sent a personal letter to the

Secretary stressing the same points.

Fiske remained at the Naval War College throughout August 1914

for the meeting of the General Board. He reported, "Naturally, the

subject of the war occupied our minds virtually all the time." Seeing

ahead a situation of great peril, Fiske left Newport on the evening of 30

August and arrived at his office in Washington at nine o'clock the

morning of 1 September. "I expected to find an atmosphere of tension

and excitement," Fiske remembered, "but I found perfect calm. No one

seemed to think that anything in particular had happened or was going

to happen." No preparations had been made for war and no orders had

been sent to the fleet. As Fiske wrote in his diary, "Sec. has created office

of 'Aid for Education' and is much stuck on idea! Gosh!"31 Increasingly, Fiske found himself at odds with Secretary of the Navy

Josephus Daniels. Daniels quietly allowed three of the Aid positions to

fall vacant without refilling them and undoubtedly wished to be rid of

Fiske. Fiske, a prickly and opinionated character in any circumstances,

passionately fought for a strong, reorganized Navy with an effective

General Staff. Daniels, however, saw Fiske's ideas as an attempt to copy

German militarism. By the end of December 1914, a deep division had

developed between Fiske and Daniels over a number of issues,

including the development of naval aviation, increased fleet strength,

fleet efficiency and, not least, naval administration. Voicing the

attitude of many naval officers, Fiske took his campaign directly to

Congress in early January 1915 without Daniels' knowledge. Working

with Representative Richmond P. Hobson, a Spanish-American War

naval hero, then a member of the House Naval Affairs Committee,

Fiske was joined by several War College graduates including Captains

H. S. Knapp, John Hood, Lieutenant Commanders W. P. Cronan and D.

W. Knox, as well as Fiske's assistant and member of the July 1915 War

College class, Lieutenant Commander Zachariah Madison. Working

together, this group of officers provided Hobson with data and secretly

drafted legislation to create an Office of Naval Operations whose chief

would be "responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and be

charged with its general direction." Hobson took their draft and

maneuvered to get it attached to the naval appropriations bill. On 26

January 1915, War College president Austin Knight was called out of a meeting of the General Board and reprimanded by Daniels at President
84 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Woodrow Wilson's order. The day before, Knight had criticized Navy

Department organization and supported the kind of staff that Fiske

envisioned. Wilson indignantly told Daniels that Knight should

confine his remarks to answering the direct questions asked by

congressional committees.32 On 3 March 1915, Congress passed the Act which included provision

for a Chief of Naval Operations and a staff of 1 5 who would constitute a General Staff. As passed, the Act of Congress modified Fiske's concept

by retaining management of the Navy in civilian hands and leaving the

Bureaus uncoordinated. It was, however, a further step in the

evolutionary process. Taking the title from that proposed by the

Moody Commission in 1909, the new Chief of Naval Operations was

charged directly with operation of the fleet and with preparations and

readiness of plans for use in war. This included the direction of the

Naval War College.

Fiske's office of Aid for Operations was absorbed in the new office of

Naval Operations headed by the first Chief of Naval Operations,

William S. Benson. While he liked Benson and admired him in many

ways, Fiske thought that Daniels' appointment of Benson was a mistake. "For the position, the first requirement was a clear apprehension of strategy and a fine mind," Fiske wrote.

I had never heard that he had ever shown the slightest interest in

strategy or been on the General Board, or even taken the summer

course at the War College.33

Fiske's statement was unfair for, although Benson was not part of

Fiske's group of reformers, he had qualifications for the position and his

views were certainly attractive to Daniels. Benson had not completed

the Naval War College course, but he did attend part of it in 1 906, even

if the Bureau of Navigation ordered him to it late and detached him

early, leaving him less than a month in Newport.

Fiske had sacrificed his own naval future in the campaign for the

Chief of Naval Operations. Having more than a year to go before

reaching the statutory retirement age of 62, Fiske was soon rusticated

to Newport where he was assigned to the Naval War College. Fiske had

no duties at the college and was an obvious incongruity for the staff.

Admiral Knight "gave me a desk in the delightful library of the War

College" Fiske remembered,

from the windows of which I would see in three directions most

beautiful and inspiring views of Narragansett Bay and its greencovered shores and islands. The library is an excellent one, and is especially complete in books written on history, government, and

the naval and military arts.34 Fiske mingled with the students and attended lectures, but the majority
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 85

of his time was spent in the library reflecting on the role of armaments

and navies in the future. His thoughts brought forth a series of articles,

published in late 1915 and early 1916, which raised great public

attention and stressed the need for preparedness. Secretary Daniels

became so incensed over Fiske's writings that he ordered Fiske to make

no public statements without prior approval from the Navy Department. Newspapers picked up Fiske's criticisms and began an investigation of his charges. Fiske once again aired his views in testimony before

the House Naval Affairs Committee. He retired from active duty while

assigned to the Naval War College on 13 June 1916.

A German U-Boat at Newport

At 2 p.m. on the afternoon of 7 October 1916, the American

submarine D-2 sent an urgent coded message to the Commandant,

Naval Station, Newport, reporting that she had sighted a surfaced

German submarine three miles east of Point Judith and standing in

toward Newport. D-2 approached the U-boat and paralleled her course

in order to escort her into port. Flying the German man-of-war ensign,

commission pennant, and armed with two deck guns, the German

submarine requested permission from D-2 to enter Newport harbor. As

she approached the anchorage, the Germans signalled USS Birmingham, flagship of Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, Commander, Destroyer

Force, Atlantic Fleet, requesting a berth. She was assigned to berth one,

a mooring buoy located southwest of the college. Rear Admiral Knight,

president of the Naval War College and Naval District Commandant,

ordered his aide, Lieutenant W. D. Puleston, to take a boat alongside

and "to make the usual inquiries, but with instructions not to go on

board, as no communications had yet been had with the health

authorities."35 At 3 p.m., the commanding officer of the German submarine came

ashore in a boat supplied by Birmingham to make a formal call on

Admiral Knight. Identifying himself as Kapit'anleutnant Hans Rose,

Imperial German Navy, commanding U-53, he appeared in uniform,

wearing the Iron Cross. He told Admiral Knight, "apparently with pride,

that his vessel was a man-of-war, armed with guns and torpedoes. He

stated that he had no object in entering the port except to pay his

respects; that he needed no supplies or assistance, and that he proposed

to go to sea at six o'clock."36 Rose's call on Admiral Knight was returned

by Lieutenant Puleston, and the German officer's call on Admiral

Gleaves was returned by his aide, Lieutenant Mark Bristol. The officers

and men of U-53 politely showed their visitors, both naval and civilian,

over their boat, generally answering a wide variety of questions. When

the commanding officer of the destroyer tender Melville, Commander
86 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

H. B. Price, came on board, he asked the German engineer officer if he

spoke English. "No," the German replied, "I speak American." They

"spoke our tongue with careful correctness, though not fluently," Price

observed, "and answered all questions except when we asked their

names, which they obviously declined to give. We refrained from

seeming too inquisitive."37 The visitors were told that the 65-meter long submarine had been

built in 1916 and had traveled in 17 days from Wilhelmshaven,

touching at Heligoland, passing north of the Shetland Islands and along

the coast of Newfoundland. They were also told that the vessel had a cruising range of 10,000 miles and could travel 450 miles on its

unrecharged batteries alone. She carried six weeks' provisions and

could theoretically remain on the bottom for four days, but two days

was the longest they had remained submerged.

Getting underway at 5:30 p.m., the German crew manned the rail,

facing several passing vessels. After passing and saluting USS Melville,

the officers and crew waved their caps to the last destroyer they passed.

The following day, U-53 captured and sank three British ships, and

two neutrals, a Dutch and a Norwegian ship, all of about 3,000 to 5,000

gross tons in international waters off Nantucket Lightship.

The visit of the German submarine was the first direct contact which

the War College had with the war. Within six months the war not only

dominated the attention of the college, but caused suspension of its

operations.

America Enters the War

In the months before America entered World War I, the Navy made

little preparation for modern naval war in the Atlantic. The Navy of the

Wilson Administration was too busy in Mexican and Caribbean waters

to study carefully the implication of the growing German U-boat fleet.

At the Naval War College, students and staff were engaged in following

the standard course and writing their usual theses with only peripheral

study of current affairs. Reports on the war were followed in the press

and professional journals and since 1914, the college had the additional

advantage of receiving copies of American naval attache reports. These

were available for students and staff to read. Only a few guest lectures

for 1916 and early 1917 dealt directly with the war. In 1916, Captain

William S. Sims came as a visiting lecturer to speak on "Military

Character" to a group of civilian volunteers for a naval training cruise,

and Surgeon Archibald Fauntleroy spoke on "Politico-Military Aspects

of the European War" to resident students. In March 1917, International

Law Professor George G. Wilson lectured on "Armed Merchantmen," a subject of intense interest as the Navy considered ways to protect its
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 87

commerce in wartime. In the study of tactics at the college, battleship

operations and the use of destroyers to screen and protect them

predominated. In general, Atlantic Fleet officers believed that submarines and aircraft were not capable of keeping up with the fleet, so no

plans were laid for their use in engagements with an enemy fleet. Some

War College staff members criticized this idea and suggested that such

rigidity and single focus be avoided by examining additional means of

employing all types of naval forces. In addition to German submarine

operation, such as U-53's impressive, trans-Atlantic passage, the

College showed interest in the general implications for moving

submarines. This followed the towing of the American submarines F- 1

,

F-2, and F-3 from Hawaii to California during 19 16.38 The Naval War College stressed, however, that it existed not to

provide immediate answers to specific questions or to establish

specific rules of warfare but, rather, to elucidate general principles and

to develop a habit of mind in its students which applied those

principles logically to new situations.39 The presidencies of William L. Rodgers and Austin M. Knight at the Naval War College marked a new

aspect in the college's history. During their terms, coinciding with the

tenure of Josephus Daniels as Secretary of the Navy, both Rodgers and

Knight found the Navy Department appreciating the War College's role

in educating officers and promoting professionalism within the service.

Together, Rodgers, Knight, and Daniels succeeded in putting the

college on a stronger basis and enabling it to reach a wide spectrum of

officers, for the first time, through Navy-wide General Orders and the

Secretary's personal and direct support of the college.40 As Austin

Knight described it in 1916, the Naval War College had finally become

"an institute of definite aims, pursued by definite and above all

organized methods."41

It is clear in retrospect that when the college used the applicatory

method for problem solving, it found a logical and practical approach

which revolutionized its outlook. "Of all the changes the last years

have wrought," Austin Knight told the students, "the greatest is this

that the college has been vitalized by a new comprehension of its

mission and a new consciousness of its power."42 The staff was well

aware that it could not hope in a year's time to make its students

finished tacticians or finished strategists, but it hoped to ground them

in the elementary principles of warfare, acquainting them with the

methods by which the principles might be studied and applied. It was

hoped the students would also be inspired with ambition to continue

their self-education with widened reading, continuing with the

foundation they had received in Newport.43 If the college did no more

than bring naval officers together for discussion, it would provide a valuable service, but it did more by promoting the German approach in
88 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the applicatory system. The college "not only makes us understand

each other's ways of thinking," Knight reminded the students, "but it

makes us think alike, this of course, through the guiding influence of

the college superimposed upon the mere association of mind with

mind."44 Significantly, the introduction of the applicatory method brought

about an unintended development: it coincided with the demise of

theoretical work at the college. The central focus changed to an

emphasis on tactics rather than strategy. Although the case study

method had originally been intended to form the basis for an inductive

approach that would develop naval theory and help to formulate broad

principles, the use of case studies with the applicatory system, in fact,

moved the students' interest away from a synoptic view of naval

science. No historian had been a resident member of the staff since

Mahan's departure in 1893, and no similar general studies on the nature

of naval warfare were undertaken by anyone in the years to come. The

result was that instead of dealing with fundamental questions of naval

warfare, War College students after 1912 were encouraged to concentrate on smaller areas with emphasis on the procedures of higher

tactical command.45 On 16 February 1917, Captain William S. Sims succeeded Rear

Admiral Knight as president of the Naval War College. Sims was

certainly the leading officer in the Navy who could carry on with the

new program at Newport. Sims had not been happy when he had been

ordered to the War College as a student in 1911, but by the time he

completed the first long course, he had completely changed his view.

"Any man who compares certain opinions he brought to the Naval War

College at the beginning of the long course with those he took away at

the end," Sims said in 1914, "must realize the unrivaled advantages of

full and free discussion; and now recognize the extreme improbability

that his own undiscussed opinions are always infallible."46 A year after leaving the War College, Sims had been assigned

command of the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla in July 1913. With

about 30 destroyers in his flotilla, Sims was allowed to develop his own

organization and to choose his own staff. This was an entirely new

development, since his predecessor had no staff at all. Sims chose

officers whom he had met at the War College, including Commander

W. V. Pratt from the War College staff, who would command his

flagship and serve as his chief of staff, and Dudley W. Knox, a graduate

of the second long course. Sims went to his new command with the idea

that "the torpedo fleet could be made an enormous game board ... for

trying out all kinds of maneuvers at small expense. There is a lot to be

learned .... But one thing is sure, and that is that it can only be learned

by study combined with actual maneuvers with the fleet."47
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 89

Sims' idea was clearly to apply War College methods to fleet problems.

He did so first by using the conference approach which came from the

applicatory system. Unlike the "old man idea," which was entirely

dependent on a single leader's understanding, Sims believed that the

"organized team idea produced the maximum result of which the

organization is capable."48 Sims stressed that it was impossible for a commander in chief to provide detailed orders with every new and

changing situation. A captain must know what to do without any

particular orders from his superior beyond an initial one. With no

established doctrine, Sims created what he called a War College afloat. "I am not a practical man in these affairs," Sims told his officers. "I am not

capable of knowing from one station to the other in the night what to do,

but you people ought to know that .... Here is the cabin floor, and there

are a dozen or so model ships, and we will work out a scheme."49 Plans were made, tried out in varying conditions, revised and

redevised until a doctrine of attack was worked out and reduced to 31

coded words for radio use. Using ideas drawn from the applicatory

system learned at the Naval War College, Sims and his staff created an

effective naval doctrine for destroyers, the first naval doctrine developed and used in the U.S. Navy.50 In 1916, just before returning to the Naval War College, Sims

published an article in the Naval Institute Proceedings entitled, "Cheer

Up!! There is No Naval War College."51 In suggesting the demise of the

college, Sims wanted to stress to naval officers the changes that had

taken place in recent years. The Naval War College, he said, was "no

highbrow institution that imposes theoretical ideas on the fleet in

words that had to be looked up in a dictionary." It was now conducted

and controlled as part of the fleet; "let the fleet officers therefore cheer

up," he wrote,

and instead of criticizing their own fleet War College across the

wardroom tables, get busy, read the books, take the correspondence

courses, get up chart maneuvers, and learn the great game the

successful playing of which in war is their only reason for

existence.52 By the time Sims relieved Knight as president of the War College, it

was clear that America would soon enter the war. Sims was called to

Washington for conferences with the General Board and National

Advisory Committee in February and March. During those periods,

Captain Benton C. Decker directed the activities of the college. On 19

March, Sims was promoted to rear admiral, and on the same date, the

first of a long series of students and staff were detached for duty

elsewhere, interrupting the course. In the last week of March, Sims

received a telephone call ordering him to proceed secretly to

Washington. Returning briefly to Newport, Sims sailed under an
90 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

assumed name from New York for Liverpool on 3 1 March. It was several

weeks before it was public knowledge that Sims had gone to begin

discussions to prepare for cooperation with the Royal Navy.

By the time Congress declared war on 6 April 1917, regular War

College instruction had already been suspended. From that time until

January 1919, the War College building was devoted to training naval

reservists in the Second Naval District. Only a nucleus War College

staff was retained under the direction of retired officers who had been

recalled to active duty for the purpose. Since Sims had only been

relieved as president of the college temporarily, in the following year

and a half his place was filled by a series of acting presidents:

Commander Charles P. Eaton, Commodore J. P. Parker, and Captain R. R.

Belknap, who would become head of the strategy department in 1919.

The Chief Clerk's Office, the Secretary's Office, and the Library were

maintained. The Secretary's Office received copies of naval attache and

intelligence reports, filing them in the vault and indexing them.

Correspondence courses were continued and various War College

publications continued to be distributed to the fleet. One of the most

important of these was Commander W. S. Pye's, mathematical tables

developed from war games that were designed to assist in fleet

maneuvers. The library's collections were maintained and expanded,

and the library was used extensively by officers assigned to the training

station, particularly by reserve officers.53 Although the War College course of instruction had been suspended,

the spirit of the college survived with Sims in Europe. Once again, he

employed War College methods as his work in London expanded from

that of a diplomat and advisor to commander over 370 ships of all

classes, 5,000 officers, and 70,000 men distributed over 45 bases. The

Planning Staff at Sims' London headquarters consisted entirely of Naval

War College graduates who applied and developed further what they

had learned in Newport. Among the men assigned to the Planning Staff

were H. E. Yarnell, F. H. Schofield, Dudley W. Knox, R. H. Dunlap, Luke

McNamee, and Louis McCarty Little. The performance of that pioneer

group in actual wartime planning seems to have been the force that

inspired the establishment of its regular counterpart in the office of the

Chief of Naval Operations at the end of the war. War planning finally

had become a separate duty. As H. E. Yarnell put it, there was "a

considerable number of capable youngsters with War College training

and full of vim and vigor"54 to get on with naval planning.

On 27 July 1917, Stephen B. Luce died at the age of 90. In the two years

prior to his death, he had given up most of his active association with

the college. His death marked the end of the first generation of War

College men. Of the leading lights in that generation, Henry Taylor had

died an early death in 1904; Mahan died suddenly in December 1914;
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 91

and William McCarty Little in March 1915. Chadwick lived until

January 1919, and only Stockton and Goodrich survived until 1924-

1925. The deaths of these men and the suspension of classes in 1917

marked the end of an era in War College history. They were the men

whose prolonged and dedicated efforts had firmly established the Naval

War College. Its future course would be determined by other hands

from another generation.

Yet the seeds of the college's influence in later years had already been

planted. Among the students and staff at the War College in the years

1910-1917, W. B. Caperton, W. S. Sims, Josiah McKean, Royal Ingersoll,

Yates Stirling, W. V. Pratt, Halsey Powell, Reginald Belknap, W. D.

Puleston, D. W. Knox, H. E. Yarnell, Nathan Twining, Mark Bristol, and

V. O. Chase were names that would come to be remembered in the U.S.

Navy. It was while many of them were students that the Naval War

College first came to develop the method of creating an effective naval

doctrine for fleet operations.

Notes

1. Damon E. Cummings, Admiral Richard Wainwright and the United

States Fleet (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1961), p. 243.

2. George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College 1901-1967

(Carlisle Barracks: Alumni Assoc. Army War College, 1967), pp. 33, 37, 49, 51,

78.

3. NWC Archives, RG. 2, Box 37, File A-l 2: W. L Rodgers to Secretary of the

Navy, 14 Feb 1921 enclosing "Memorandum Regarding the History of the Naval

War College," p. 6. 4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. J. H. Russell, "A Fragment of Naval War College History," U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, vol. 58, (August 1932), pp. 1 164-65.

7. Hattendorf, "Technology and Strategy" in B. M. Simpson, III, ed., War,

Strategy and Maritime Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1977)

Quote from W. P. Cronan, "The Greatest Need of the United States Navy: Proper

Organization for the Successful Conduct of War, An Estimate of the Situation,"

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 42 No. 4, (July-August 1916), p. 1 153.

8. NWC Archives, RG 14: lecture by F. N. Schofield, "Estimate of the

Situation and Formulation of Orders," Summer Conference, 1912.

9. W. L. Rodgers "Memorandum..." op. cit, p. 7.

1 0. Luce "On the Relations Between the U.S. Naval War College and the Line

Officers of the U.S. Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3., (1911), pp. 787-99. Quoted in Hayes and Hattendorf, Writings of Stephen B. Luce, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1975), p. 233.

11. Ibid.

1 2. Naval Historical Collection: Staff-Student File: Ellis; J. J. Reber "Pete Ellis: Amphibious Warfare Prophet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 103, No.

1 1, (November 1977) pp. 53-64.

13. E. E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy, (Boston:

Houghton, Mifflin, 1942), Chapter 2.
92 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

14. Ibid., pp. 278-79.

15. Ibid., p. 287.

16. Ibid., p. 289.

1 7. Gerald Wheeler, A Sailors Life—Admiral William Veazie Pratt (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 70.

18. NWC Archives RG 15, W. V. Pratt, Lecture, "Aspects of Higher

Command," 30 Aug 1929.

19. NWC Archives RG 12: Report of 1912 Summer Conference, p. 3. 20. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 21. NWC Archives, RG 12: Report of 1911 Conference, Vol. I, p. 20. For

Mahan's criticism of the 1911 Orange War Plan, see Mahan to Rodgers, 22 Feb, 4

March, 1 9 1 1, in Seager and Maguire eds., Letters and Papers of Alfred T. Mahan,

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975], Vol III, pp. 380-388, and 389-94.

22. Quoted from Black Plan in j. H. Maurer, "American Naval Concentration

and the German Battle Fleet, 1 900- 1 9 1 8," The Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 6, no. 2, (June 1983), p. 164.

23. Ibid.

24. NWC Archives, RG 2, op. cit., W. L. Rodgers, "Memorandum," pp. 7-8. 25. Ibid., and Knight and Puleston, Unpublished Typescript "History of the

Naval War College 1913," p. 3. 26. Typescript "History of the Naval War College to 1937," pp. 66-67.

27. Ibid., p. 68.

28. NWC Archives, RG 2, op. cit., W. L Rodgers "Memorandum," p. 8. 29. Ibid.

30. Knight and Puleston, op. cit., 1914, pp. 4-9. 3 1

.

Bradley A. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral (New York: Century

Co., 1919), pp. 544-549.

32. P. E. Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the American Navy, (Lawrence:

Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), pp. 151-52.

33. Fiske, Midshipman to Rear Admiral, p. 585. But see David F. Trask,

"William Shepherd Benson" in R. W. Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations

(Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1980), pp. 3-20.

34. Ibid., p. 592.

35. NWC Archives, RG 8, Series II: Attache Reports: November 1916: Ul 1:1, pp. 30-34, 43; Navy Department, Office of Naval Records and Library, German

Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and Canada

(Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1920), pp. 18-23.

36. NWC Archives, loc. cit., p. 30.

37. Ibid., p. 33.

38. NWC Archives, RG 14, Faculty and Staff Presentation, 1915-17; RG 15

Guest Lectures, 1915-17; RG 8, Series I: UNOpM 1915-17; XTAP: Rough NWC

staff notes on C-in-C, Atlantic Fleet's "Tentative General Plan for Operations of

the Fleet in an Engagement with the Enemy," April 1916; UNS: Submarines

1915-17.

39. NWC Archives RG 16, Opening Addresses: AM. Knight, 5 July 19 16, pp.

15-16.

40. Spector, Professors of War (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. 125.

41. Knight and Puleston, op. cit, 1916, p. 2. 42. NWC Archives, RG 16: Opening Addresses: Knight, 2 Jan 1917.

43. Loc. cit., Opening Address: Knight, 5 July 1916.

44. Loc. cit., Graduation Address: Knight, 22 Dec. 1916.

45. Spector, op. cit, pp. 128-129.
INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL DOCTRINE, 1 909- 1918 93

46. W. S. Sims, "Naval War College Principles and Methods Applied Afloat/'

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 41, No. 2, (March-April 1915), p. 385.

Published version of 1914 War College lecture.

47. E. E. Morison, Admiral Sims, p. 292.

48. W.S. Sims, op. cit., p. 307.

49. Morison, op. cit., p. 297.

50. Ibid., p. 296.

51. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May-June 1916), pp.

857-860.

52. Ibid., p. 860.

53. "Brief History of the Naval War College from 16 Feb. 1917 to 31 Dec.

1919," (NWC 1921), in typescript "History of the Naval War College to 1937."

54. Morison, op. cit., p. 369; R. G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947,

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 89-90. Yarnell quote in Albion, p. 90. W. S. Sims, Victory at Sea (New York: Doubleday, 1920), pp. 253-54.
General Order, No. 325.

October 6, 1884.

A college is hereby established for an advanced course of professional study for

naval officers, to be known as the Naval War College. It will be under the general

supervision of the Bureau of Navigation. The principal building on Coasters' Harbor Island, Newport, R. L, will be assigued to its use, and is hereby transferred, with

the surrounding structures and the grounds immediately adjacent, to the custody and

control of the Bureau of Navigation for that purpose.

The college will be under the immediate charge of an officer of the Navy, not below

the grade of commander, to be known as the President of the Naval War College.

He will be assisted in the performance of his duties by a faculty.

A course of instruction, embracing the higher branches of professional study, will

be arranged by a board, consisting of all the members of the faculty and including

the president, who will be the presiding officer of the board. The board will have

regular meetings at least once a month, and at such other times as the president may

direct, for the transaction of business. The proceedings of the board will be recorded

in a journal.

The course of instruction will be open to all officers above the grade of naval cadet.

Commodore S. B. Cuce has been assigned to duty as president of the college.

WM. E. CHANDLER,

Secretary of the Xavy.

1 . Navy Department General Order No. 325 of October 6, 1 884 establishing the Naval

War College on Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, R.I. and designating Stephen B. Luce

president.

ADMIRAL LUCE.

2. Stephen B. Luce at about the

time the Naval War College was

established. Harpers Weekly illustration.

94
3. The Naval War College, former Newport Poorhouse (built 1819]. Harper's Weekly

illustration, 1885.

95
/

/** ***** * £ £TH, tjt

it

'fit f.

>4U> *& &\»*

*

CM*

#*^-i»-€L*

C V>t /w

T

\\

w '/' &*•*

4. First Naval War College Order, September 2, 1885, signed by Commodore Stephen B. Luce, War College president.

96
^^X^c^

THE INFLUENCE

SEA POWER UPON HISTORY

1660-1783

CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN

DXTTID STATE HAVY

BOSTON

LITTLE, BHOWN, AND COMPANY

1890

5. Title page of Stephen B. Luce's copy of

Mahan's first book on seapower.

6. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, lecturer

on naval history and strategy and War

College president, 1886-1888, 1892-1893.

97
7. Army-Navy Joint Exercise, Newport, R.IV November, 1887. The North Atlantic

Squadron under Rear Admiral Luce passes Fort Adams at the entrance of Narragansett

Bay. Harper's Weekly illustration.

8. Naval Torpedo Station, Goat Island, ca.1880. The College was transferred to Goat Islan I 98
,:'>s"S

--

:.:.. . : ;

wiiiifllilnlilBth Hll :

*>®f»fc>K, 4h

9. Naval Training Station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, R.I., 1 889. View showing

USS New Hampshire, headquarters and recruit quarters ship, tied up at South Point.

in 889. Harper's Weekly illustration.

99
1 0. Lt. Tasker A. Bliss, USA, lecturer on

military strategy and tactics, 1885-1887.

Later, Army Chief of Staff, 1917; Member,

Supreme War Council in France, 1917-

1918, and Commission to Negotiate

Peace, 1918-1919. Harper's Weekly illustration.

1 1 . Professor James Soley, lecturer on

international law, 1885-1888. Director,

Office of Naval Records and Library,

1882-1890. Later appointed the first

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1890-

1 893. Harper's Weekly illustration.

12. Classroom lecture, 1888. Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper illustration.

100
13. Naval War Gaming, 1894. Illustration by the noted naval illustrator Rufus F. Zogbaum, Sr. Representatives of a delegation from China, which was visiting the War

College, are in the background.

14. First foreign students: Commanders

Carl-Gustaf Flach (right) and Gbsta af Ugglas

(left], Royal Swedish Navy. From a student

and staff photograph of 1 894.

101
15. Lieutenant William McCarty

Little, about the time he joined the

Naval War College Staff, 1885.

16. Captain Henry Taylor, War College president, 1893-1896.

1 7. Luce Hall, built in 1 892 and named in honor of the founder of the War College in

1934. View of about 1910 showing Naval Training Station recruits on Dewey Field.

102
1 8. President Theodore Roosevelt arrives at Coasters Harbor Island for the Battleship

Conference at the Naval War College, 1908.

19. George Grafton Wilson,

Harvard Professor of Law and Naval

War College Lecturer on international law, 1901-1937. Courtesy of

the Harvard University Law School.

103
-A>

20. Staff and students, 1897, with visiting Assistant Secretary of Navy Theodore Roosevelt.

21. View of the Naval War College and the Naval Training Station, ca. 1903- 1907. The two

104
22. Interior of the Library, 1923. A Library-Archives annex was built directly behind

Luce Hall in 1904. The building was named in honor of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer

Mahan in 1936.

t*i Maval Training Station vessels in the foreground are the USS Hist and the USS Constellation.

105
23. A Naval War Game on the third floor of Luce Hall, ca.1910.

24. Lt. Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis,

USMC, one of four students of the first

Long Course, 1911-1912. Ellis was the

principal proponent of the advanced

bases concept for a possible Central

Pacific offensive strategy. Courtesy of

the Marine Corps Historical Center.

106
25. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels with Rear Admiral Austin Knight, War

College president, staff and students, 1914. Captain William S. Sims, wearing armband, is seated on right.

26. The President's house (Quarters AA). View of ca.1914, when Rear Admiral Austin

Knight and his family were in residence.

107
.,. '

BHBE

27. View of Coasters Harbor Island, 1915, showing the Naval War College, a naval recruit

parade, and ships of the Atlantic Fleet in the bay.

28. German Submarine U-53, anchored south of Coasters Harbor Island, October 7, 1916.

USS Biimingham is in background. Courtesy of the Naval Historical Center, Washington,

D.C.

108
:?' ^ :

:

I

»fts

;

< ,

: ::---' :" . . ,., . ; /. ;! .

¥v%

is «l 9> »

;J!S >ilV S|

29. Visiting Japanese delegation, February 1 3, 1 924. Included are Vice Admiral K. Ide and

aide Captain I. Yamamoto.

. - ^ ^*88*

: .,-,v;:::,,. y ' - "'

. ,

:

:

30. Rear Admiral William S. Sims, Naval War College president, and staff and students,

1922. Commander Chester W. Nimitz, future World War II Admiral, is in the last row

directly behind Sims.

109
31. Pringle Hall, to the left of Luce Hall, in this view of 1963 was built in 1934. It was

named in honor of Rear Admiral Joel Roberts Poinsett Pringle, president, 1927-1930.

32. War Gaming Room, Pringle Hall. A game in progress, ca.1950.

110
33. World War II Admirals Nimitz, King and Spruance, graduates of the Naval War

College during the interwar period. Taken on board the USS Indianapolis in the Pacific,

1944.

33.a. NWC Class pictures: Nimitz '23, King '33, Spruance '27.

Ill
CHAPTER 5

SIMS CHARTS THE NEW

COURSE, 1919-1927

By the time the Armistice was signed in

November 1918, Admiral William S. Sims had become an American

naval hero. When he became president of the Naval War College in

1917, he had had a full and distinguished career which few other

officers could equal, earning him both national and international

prominence. He had been promoted to the temporary grade of vice

admiral in May 1917, only nine months after he had been selected for rear admiral, the junior officer on a list of 30 rear admirals in the U.S.

Navy. In December 1 9 1 8, he was promoted to admiral. Praise, gifts, and

honors showered on him and it seemed that any high office of his

choice might have been open to him. Commander in Chief of the U.S.

Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations, or Chairman of the General Board

were all conceivable options had he wanted to choose them. Instead,

Sims requested Secretary of the Navy Daniels to reappoint him

president of the Naval War College, then a rear admiral's position.

When his request was granted in December 1918, Sims wrote on the

bottom of Daniels' telegram, as it was received in his London

Headquarters, "Note how pleased all hands are to give me the college. It relieves them from the embarrassment of not knowing what to do with

me."1 For Sims, the office of Chief of Naval Operations was too limited in

authority to make it as effective as it should be. A return to the fleet

would seem to be an anti-climax after the war to end all wars. In Sims'

mind, the Naval War College offered the greatest possibility for making

a contribution to the Navy. Sims was highly critical of the manner in

which the Wilson Administration conducted the war and, undoubtedly, he was happy to avoid a role that would require him to act on

similar postwar policies. The presidency of the Naval War College
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 1 13

attracted him not because it was a post in which he could play elder

statesman but because the Naval War College carried the seeds of the

Navy's future.2 From his London office, overlooking Grosvenor Gardens adjacent to

Victoria Railway Station, Sims composed a long letter to the Secretary

of the Navy which summarized his general recommendations concerning the War College in January 1919. "It is my conviction," he

wrote, "that the Naval War College should be made one of the principal

assets of the Naval Service." Brains, information, and professional

training for officers were the essential elements that made the fleet

useful for national defense, Sims declared. "Ships and equipment taken

alone mean nothing other than the quantity of material they represent." "Therefore," he argued, "the art of command and coordinated

effort, should be given precedence over all other considerations."3 Attacking directly the long-standing reluctance of the Navy

Department to assign appropriate numbers of officers to the college,

Sims urged that its personnel needs be given precedence over all others.

"In fact, I would go as far as to say," Sims wrote, "that the college should

be maintained with a capable and adequate staff and student body even

if such a course can be carried out only by actual reduction of the size of

the fleet." In other words, it might "be necessary to place a ship out of

commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education

of our officers."

While the detailed plans for the War College would necessarily wait

until the college's staff could be reassembled in Newport, Sims had several

important ideas that would guide those plans when they were made.

First, he believed that the college must be closely defined as an

educational institution. Too many people misunderstood its mission

and attempted to show or to deny concrete results accomplished by the

college. "The aim of the college is to cause officers to educate

themselves in many lines, which the unavoidable limitations of the

course at the Academy and the routine duties at sea prevent. It should

be well understood by the service that the college is in no sense a planmaking body, nor has it any administrative or executive functions."

The college's accomplishments, he remarked "are not subject to

specific compilation or statement."

Second, Sims recommended that the principal members of the staff, or at least the two principal chairs of strategy and tactics, should be

held by flag officers. Because Sims viewed their functions primarily as supervising war games and tactical problems, he believed that the

conclusions drawn needed to be impressed upon the students with the

full weight of authority. In this respect, the head of each department

was put in the role of a teacher and an authority. Rejecting as "wholly

illogical" Luce's belief that the students were mature professionals who
1 1

4

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

were capable of deriving their own lessons from the course, Sims

maintained that it was impossible from a psychological point of view to

disassociate the staff from the role of teacher. For that reason, he

recommended that the two principal staff members be senior to the

students.

Third, officers for the college teaching staff should be conversant and

sympathetic with its work and be men "who are generally popular, and of

all-round, so-called good practical' service reputation." In recommending

that the college avoid staff members who had great ability, but who might

suffer, even unjustly, from unpopularity, Sims was concerned that the

college would give a bad impression to the service in general. Careful

selection of staff was important to give "the college a fair start." , Fourth, Sims saw that the War College had suffered in the past from a lack of continuity in its policy and in its methods. The dedicated and

voluntary efforts of Stephen B. Luce and William McCarty Little had

provided only an informal continuity which counteracted the constant

change of naval personnel. To remedy this, Sims recommended that the

War College employ at least four civilians who were experienced men

from university life. At a minimum, these should include a civilian in

both the strategy and tactics departments, an experienced librarian, and

an archivist. These four appointments would ensure that historical and

actual experience was obtained and employed along proper lines while

also affording permanent contact with the university world and maintaining continuity in shaping the courses. "There are many important

branches of education which are, of necessity, neglected in a naval

officer's education," Sims reflected. Civilian academics could be

extremely valuable "for example, in the field of economics as it affects

international law, trade relations and government interests, and in the

broad field of political science and many other subjects." To obtain the

right type of men, Sims believed that the college should establish

attractive pay levels corresponding with university appointments and

academic standard titles beginning with assistant professor.

Finally, Sims recommended that funds be increased in order to

provide for leading authorities on "international law, history, political

science and government, economics, trade relations, policy, logic,

psychology, scientific management, and many other subjects which

should have an influence on our profession." In addition, he recommended that the two resident courses begin in November and May

rather than January and July as they had previously done. In this way,

college students avoided competition for housing with summer

residents and tourists. He also pointed out the need to refurbish the

college building and provide new equipment.

Sims requested that as college president he be given complete

discretion to spend college appropriations and to select the staff to be
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 115

assigned to the college for its first six to twelve months "regardless of

any other considerations which may he advanced." He stressed the

importance of the college presidency; Sims pointed out that it should be

the sole duty of the officer assigned. No other administrative or military duties, such as naval district commandant or base commander,

should be added.

Sims forwarded his ideas to the Secretary of the Navy through the

Chief of Naval Operations. In reviewing Sims' recommendations, W. S. Benson approved nearly all of them, but did not agree to give Sims free

rein in obtaining all the officers he wanted or to allow him to spend

college funds without first reviewing an estimate of funds necessary for

each fiscal year. Having no direct experience of the War College,

Benson sought the advice of Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, who had studied

at the War College in 1897 and been a staff member in 1903-1904 and

1906. Following Sims' departure from London, Knapp succeeded him as both naval attache and Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Although Knapp and Benson agreed that the War College had outgrown

"the town meeting idea" and that "the staff should be looked upon as teachers," they saw no need to assign flag officers to head the strategy

and tactics departments. While it might be desirable, the men selected

for those jobs "must of necessity be specialists in their line, and no

right-minded man can object to learning from specialists whether they

be senior or junior, and whether they be older or younger."4In

disagreeing with Sims' views on assignments to the War College, Knapp

noted that the value in attending the college had "been so demonstrated

by this war that any doubts about it should forever be dissipated. Yet it

is a very large demand that the college be given precedence over every

other personnel need. ..." Furthermore, as the Navy returned to

peacetime duties, it was important to consider the personal interests of

officers. Certain officers whom Sims had in mind had served long

periods on staff duty ashore and were overdue for assignment to sea. "Before being ordered to the War College," Benson concluded his

endorsement, "they should be given a chance to express their wishes as

to whether or not they are willing to take the chances which are perfectly apparent from a casual reading of the statutes governing

promotions at the present time."

Despite Sims' notion that the college was a practical extension of the

fleet, his view of it as the Navy's most important resource conflicted

with the promotion regulations based on the view that practical sea experience was more important than intellectual preparation.

The implementation of Sims' ideas had to await his retuYn to

Newport from London. In the meantime, work had begun to prepare the

buildings in Newport to be used once again by Naval War College

students. Plans for extensive renovation were halted, however, by
1 1

6

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Benson's personal opinion that the college was best located in or near

Washington.5 Despite this, improvements were made to the existing

building which would allow the college to handle more students. The

four sets of quarters at the east and west ends of the building were

converted into offices, but the mantelpieces and oak trim were left in

several rooms, giving them a gracious and formal ambience. The

interior staircases were relocated to provide better access between

the old apartments and the main section of the building. The heating

system was revamped and exterior repairs made. The third floor

received additional rooms, and space was provided in the basement

for library storage, the chart collection, and the college printing shop.

Sims' Return to Newport

After a series of farewell celebrations in March, Admiral Sims left

London and sailed for America. Arriving in New York on board the liner

Mauretania, he was greeted by flags flying, whistles blowing, and

people shouting. Traveling by train, he was received in Washington by

Secretary Daniels and other senior naval officers at the train station.6 After a brief stay in the capital, Sims traveled home to Rhode Island for

a reunion with his wife and children. 7 Arriving by train in Providence, Sims made the remainder of the

journey down Narragansett Bay in the destroyer Sampson (DD-63),

escorted by both a torpedo boat and a low-flying seaplane. Appropriately, Sampson had seen extensive wartime duty in European waters

and was named for the admiral who had so effectively supported the

college in its early years.

Sims' arrival in Newport on 1 1 April 1919 was a gala occasion for

the city. Business had been formally suspended for half a day, but

many enthusiastic shopkeepers closed their doors early to join the

growing crowds that lined the streets and crowded the wharves to

catch a glimpse of the returning hero. The city's fire whistle sounded

a prearranged signal as Sampson hove into sight. After the destroyer

anchored in Newport's inner harbor, Sims boarded a steam launch for

the trip to Government Landing in downtown Newport, near

Bowen's Wharf. It was a short and rough journey, but Sims was seen

at the hatchway waving a greeting to his wife and children on the

wharf.

Government Landing was jammed with official, civilian, and military

greeters. Mayor Mahoney of Newport solemnly declared, "Newport and

its people rise as one man today to bid you a sincere, cordial, and hearty

welcome home." Sims inspected the military honor guard and then he

and the other dignitaries boarded their carriages for a triumphal parade

through the streets of Newport.
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 117

Sixteen carriages led the parade, made up of veterans, civic, and local

groups, such as the Italian Progresso Society, the Congregation of

Jeshuat Israel, and school children, accompanied by several bands.

Several thousand Newporters turned out to give the returning hero a tumultuous reception. While all the ships in the harbor sounded their

whistles, the bells of nearby Trinity Church chimed joyously and the

crowds shouted their welcome.

The parade followed a circuitous route through the city to the Sims

house on Kay Street at Mann Avenue. First it went south on Thames

Street, then onto Young Street, and back north on Spring Street. Up the

hill at Pelham Street, down Bellevue Avenue to Touro Street and

Washington Square, out Broadway to Powel Avenue, and finally onto

Kay Street they went. A reviewing stand had been erected in front of the

Sims house, and it was here that the admiral finally joined his family.8 Sims stood before the cheering crowd to review the parade that

followed him, wearing his old uniform blouse with two stars on each

side of the high collar. Thus, he signified that he had reverted to his

permanent grade as a rear admiral to take up the presidency of the

Naval War College.

Sims and his wife had already decided against moving into their old

home. Instead, they rented it and moved into the War College

President's House. But it was government quarters, and Mrs. Sims

quietly attended to the many chores necessary to turn it into a home for

the Sims family.

Sims spent much of the following month away from Newport on an

extensive speaking tour of the midwest on a "Victory Bond" drive.9 When

he settled in to his work at the college, Sims found most of the staff there,

already hard at work making the multitudinous preparations for the

incoming class of 31 officers who would arrive at the end of June and for

another class of 30 officers who were due in December. Within two years

Sims convinced the Bureau of Navigation to send only one class of 60 or more officers instead of two classes of 30 or so each year.

Sims was not able to realize all his plans. He had been able to obtain

two rear admirals for the staff, but one of them, C. S. Williams, took up

the duties of chief of staff, while the other, A. H. Robertson, served only

a short time as head of the tactics department before he had to succeed

Williams who had been ordered back to the fleet. Several civilians were

also obtained. Dr. Edwin Wiley was appointed librarian, and Tracy B.

Kitteridge, a reserve lieutenant formerly with the Hoover Relief

Commission, was appointed archivist. Professor George Grafton

Wilson of Harvard continued to be the college's professor of international law and J. M. Scammell became the technical assistant in the

tactics department. The civilian position envisaged for the strategy

department, however, was not filled.
1 1

8

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The College Reopens

Opening day arrived on 1 July 1919. Many officers from the Training

Station, from Fort Adams, and from the Atlantic Fleet vessels present in

the harbor joined the staff and students of the Naval War College in the

gymnasium of Training Station Barracks B. Among the 31 student

officers were two army officers, two marines, a Navy doctor, and a naval

constructor. Captain Joel R. P. Pringle, a future president of the college,

and Captain Joseph K. Taussig, a future chief of staff of the college, were

among their numbers, as well as Sims' close friends and former London

colleagues, Commander J. V. Babcock and Captain Hutch I. Cone. The

opening ceremony was simple, consisting of an address by Sims in

which he explained his views of the college's purpose, its relation to the

Navy Department and to the fleet. "You will thus recognize," Sims told

his audience,

. . . this is not really a college. Perhaps it would have been better if

it had never been so designated, for in reality this assemblage is nothing but a board of practical fleet officers brought here to

discuss and decide the extremely important question of how we

would best conduct naval war under the various conditions that

may arise.

Taking his point further, Sims stressed that "our work is wholly

practical, because we base our conclusions upon our own experience

and upon that of those who have gone before us; and that therefore

there can be nothing theoretical about the principles of fighting that we

decide to be the correct ones ....

" 10 The employment of the applicatory system by W. L. Rodgers and

"The introduction of the long course marked the most radical and

progressive step in the development of the college that has ever taken

place . . . with a continuing student body in which individual work and

development was a prominent object," Sims believed. 11 In his view the college existed solely to develop and to teach certain

general principles. He did not propose to establish a code or rules by

which naval warfare could be conducted. Rather, he believed, through

training, students could acquire a habit of mind which applied the basic

principles "logically, correctly, and rapidly to each situation that may

arise." The principles that Sims had in mind were the three cardinal

points of the applicatory system:

1. A clear conception of the mission to be attained.

2. An accurate and logical estimate of the situation, which involved a mustering of all information available, and a discussion of its bearing

upon the situation under consideration.

3. A decision that was the logical result of the mission and the

estimate.
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 119

It was a strict and practical method of problem solving, which

correlated ends with means and objectives and directed attention to

operational and tactical issues. It did not attempt an analysis of the

assumptions behind the objectives.

At the same time, Sims denied that the Naval War College "is, or should be, the planmaking branch of the Navy." Undoubtedly its staff

and students were capable of doing this if there had been more of

them and if they were supplied with the data not readily available

outside of Washington. In light of those limitations, Sims argued that

such a planning section should not be located at the War College.

Moreover, planning would detract significantly from the ability of

the staff to carry out its teaching functions. "While we cannot supply

strategic plans required by the Navy Department," Sims pointed out,

"we hope to supply officers who can formulate such plans." Similarly,

while the College was unable to provide tactical plans for the wide

variety of circumstances the fleet would meet, "if the college course

proves successful it will supply commanders-in-chief and fleet staff

officers competent to prepare and carry out such plans." Planning

work, Sims emphasized, would force the college to cease teaching to

supply plans instead of supplying trained officers.

Correspondingly, Sims believed that as the college stressed

principles and made no claim to show what should be done in any

particular situation, it should never pass judgment upon actual

operational decisions made by the U.S. Navy in tactics or in strategy.

To do this would put the College in a controversial position, creating

antagonism between it and the rest of the Navy. "If the college is to

succeed in teaching the art of war to willing pupils," Sims concluded,

"it must at all times work in complete harmony with the service." 12 To

do this, Sims organized the college to concentrate on promoting a common

methodology in the officer corps for dealing with the practical

aspects of naval planning.

The Reorganized College

Under Sims' tutelage the college was organized into four major

departments: command, strategy, tactics, and the correspondence

department. In addition, there was a fifth department for administration.

The command department had cognizance of such matters as plan

making, estimate of the situation, and formulation of orders; that is,

the various elements of the applicatory system as developed in the

years immediately before World War I. It also included doctrine,

dissemination of information, art of command, discipline, organization, administration, and leadership. Nominally headed by the War
1 20 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

College chief of staff, the command department was effectively

directed by Captain Dudley W. Knox.

The strategy department was concerned with policy, strategy,

logistics, chart maneuvers, and international law. The major focus of

the work was on war gaming where the problems under consideration

were tailored to consider actual geographic areas with opposing forces

from fleets of existing nations which could conceivably be a possible

enemy of the United States. This focus required rules and problems

that stressed current conditions and the practical experiences of the

1914-18 war rather than abstract ideas. The requirement for students to

write theses, which had been introduced for the long course in 1912,

was maintained and expanded by adding a topic on command. But

instead of making them abstract considerations, Sims directed that

they be devoted to specific, concrete subjects. A thesis on policy was

required in the strategy department; so as to make it conform to the

new emphasis, the students were told to examine U.S. policy in the Far

East, a subject which continued to be a major interest for many years.

In dealing with strategic war games, free discussion of every problem

was an essential characteristic, but a staff solution was also presented

along with a critique by staff members of the student solutions.

Through this approach, staff members were able to perform more

effectively as teachers while also encouraging free and general discussion- In addition, discussion was aided by showing game moves on

slides immediately after the game was completed. This was a vast

improvement over the old, slow method of preparing blueprints for

each move. Finally, the strategic war game was improved by significantly increasing the numbers of ships involved in the games.

Submarines and aircraft were added, using more careful definitions in

defining the missions of various types of ships. 13 The tactics department was modified to respond to the same changes.

The development of aircraft and submarines as well as a clearer

definition of types and classes of ships required a change in the way

tactics was taught at the college. New tactical war games were

developed to include submarines and aircraft which had to be formed

and maneuvered in accordance with fleet standing orders. A tactics

department staff member, Captain Luke McNamee, was responsible for

rewriting all the instruction pamphlets used in tactics. In undertaking

this task, McNamee attempted to reflect the latest fleet practice as well

as the experience of the war. Under his direction, Commander J. T. G.

Stapler provided the college's first text on "Submarines and

Submarine Operations" and Admiral Sims' aide, Lieutenant Commander W. A. Edwards, prepared a similar compilation for aviation. One

important wartime idea that was developed further in war gaming at

Newport was the idea of the aircraft carrier. In December 1920, Sims
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 121

told the General Board during its consideration of converting scout

cruisers, aircraft carriers were in use on the gameboard at the War

College, and problems in which they were used showed their efficiency

in scouting to be such as to refute the statement that "experimental

work is in reality the main argument for the conversion of the scout

cruisers," as assumed by the General Board.

The more urgent argument is that the fleet needs aircraft carriers,

and that these converted cruisers will supply them in much less

time than we can hope to get the larger vessels. But the principal

argument in favor of the proposition is that converting two of the

ten scouts to aircraft carriers will very materially increase (1| the

areas the ten vessels can cover in scouting; (2) the efficiency of the

group as a scouting line —as an information getter; and (3) the

efficiency of the group as a fighting force, particularly if opposed by

vessels of greater individual gunpower than the unconverted

scouts. 14

In the tactical war games the staff did not submit a solution as it did

in strategy, but the head of the tactics department critiqued the

maneuvers, called attention to various issues, and encouraged discussion. The general thrust of the game, however, was to coordinate the

students' ideas and to indoctrinate them in methods which could be

applied to fleet practice. 15 Sims sought to strengthen the library by increasing its collection and

improving its staff. Writing to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he

declared that the college librarian should be

a man who combines the expert knowledge of library science, a special knowledge of the literature, history and techniques of naval

and military science, of international law, and, in addition, must be

capable of translating material on these subjects from French,

German, Spanish, Italian and other modern languages. 16 To meet these increased demands, the library staff was increased and

small collections of books in great demand were placed in convenient

locations throughout the college. In 1920 alone, the collection grew by

7,000 to a total of almost 45,000 items. During that same period, 5,000

items were borrowed, averaging 83 volumes per student per year. Not

surprisingly, naval science, history, political science, and international

law were most popular, but a significant amount of fiction was also

borrowed. 17 The correspondence course was also emphasized by Sims as the best

means to get the college's work to the fleet. In the first five years of its

existence, 828 officers enrolled and a small number continued to submit

work during the war. By 1919, however, only 30 officers had completed

the entire course by correspondence. Sims introduced a stronger system

to follow up students' work and to monitor their progress.
1 22 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

By 1 920, the rejuvenated Naval War College had reached a level such

that Secretary Daniels could write in his annual report, "I hope to see the time when every officer will be able to take advantage of the courses

offered by the War College, and it will be as much a part of preparation

for high command as is the course at the Naval Academy for

commissioned rank." 18 While the Secretary lauded the College, his 1920 report also raised an

old issue recommending that the college was better situated in Washington than in Newport. This time the rationale was slightly different.

Daniels stressed that the 1914-1918 war had taught the great need for

close cooperation between the Army and Navy. Now that the Army War

College was established in Washington, "the best" reason to move the

Naval War College to Washington was to develop close cooperation

between the two colleges as well as to bring the Naval War College in

closer touch with the Navy Department and the Naval Academy. In

mid-December 1 920, a small notice buried in the middle of the New York

Times reported that Daniels was drafting a bill for Congress to transfer

the Naval War College to the District of Columbia where it would be

established in a special building as a naval war memorial. 19 Sims protested against the renewed effort to move the college, and

after the inauguration of Warren G. Harding in March 1921, the issue

died, not to be raised again. In some respects, Daniels threat to move the

college was only an incident in the wider dispute that arose between

Sims and Daniels in 1919 and 1920.

The Sims-Daniels Controversy

Sims' controversy with Daniels, which quickly turned bitter, arose from questions involving decorations awarded for wartime service.

Prior to World War I no decoration other than the Congressional Medal

of Honor and campaign ribbons were authorized. In early 1919,

Congress made provision for awarding the Distinguished Service

Medal and the Navy Cross. Commanding officers were authorized to

recommend awards, and Daniels established a board to review these

recommendations. Its chairman was Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight,

Sims' predecessor as president of the Naval War College. However,

Daniels abolished the board before it had completed its work.

In December 1919, Daniels published his annual report as Secretary

and appended his own list of "Medals of Honor, Distinguished Service

Medals, and Navy Crosses Awarded." The list reflected significant

changes in the recommendations of both the respective commanders

and those that the Knight Board had made. Daniels' list was based

solely upon his judgment and he awarded higher decorations to some

men and lower ones to others.
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 1 23

Sims took great exception to Daniels' handling of this matter for a number of reasons. First, he believed a commanding officer was in the

best position to judge the merits of each case. Second, he disagreed with

Daniels' view that sea duty was more important than staff duty ashore.

Third, the DSM had been awarded to many commanding officers who

had lost their ships. Fourth, and perhaps most important of all, Daniels

had failed to provide any guidance or clear Navy Department policy

upon which recommendations could be made.20 The immediate upshot was that Sims refused to accept the DSM

awarded to him, and he hoped that other officers would spontaneously

refuse their decorations in protest over what he saw as a grave injustice,

destructive of good morale. As a result, the Senate Naval Affairs

Committee commenced an investigation into the controversy and Sims

became a star witness.

At one session in January 1920, Sims was told that if he had any

further correspondence with Daniels about the "question of awards and

their effect on the morale of the service," the committee would receive

it. Sims then produced and read a lengthy letter he had written to

Daniels about "Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War." The substance

of this letter had already been leaked to the press. The Washington Post

a few days before described it as "a frank and fearless expose of the

hopeless story of maladministration, mistakes, and blunders into

which the American Navy has fallen as a result of Mr. Daniels'

policies."21 This letter was a bombshell. It had the effect Sims intended: a widening of the committee's inquiry into the preparations of the Navy

for war and its conduct of the war. Sims returned to Newport where he

prepared for the forthcoming March hearings. Returning to Washington, he took with him his closest associates, Captain Hutch I. Cone,

Commander J. V. Babcock, and Captain Dudley W. Knox, as well as Captain Joseph K. Taussig, and the college archivist, Tracy B. Kittredge.

Sims was aware that his letter would produce an uproar. Nevertheless, he persisted in his testimony because he was convinced that until

the Navy could be properly organized and run it would not operate

effectively under all conditions. A better reorganization of the Navy,

not a personal vendetta against Daniels, was Sims' motive. Moreover,

he was being entirely consistent with what he had done before in a career marked by his insistence that the Navy organize itself and

operate as a modern professional fighting force.

In order to justify a reorganization of the Navy, Sims had to prove that

in 1 9 1 7 it was unprepared for war and that it was slow to act in the first

five or six months of hostilities. He marshaled and presented

convincing evidence that in April 1917 the material condition of the

Navy was not in shape for war; that personnel readiness in terms of
1 24 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

numbers and training was unsatisfactory; that war plans and overall

strategic planning were inadequate; and that the Navy Department

failed to grasp the nature of the sea war within the first few months of

American participation.22 Part of the problem, especially in discretionary areas, could not be

attributed to Daniels alone. It lay with the policies of the Wilson

Administration, which precluded prudent moves such as systematically placing existing ships on some kind of wartime footing and

organizing flotillas of destroyers and other potential antisubmarine

ships and craft because such preparations were warlike and might be

considered overt acts by the Germans.23 To make his case effective and to convince not only the Senate

Committee but ultimately influential segments of public opinion, Sims

had to overcome several obstacles. The chief one was partisan politics.

It was an election year. Wilson and his supporters, of whom Daniels

was one of the staunchest, had recently suffered a humiliating defeat in

the Senate over the peace.

Also, Sims was faced with demonstrating that a navy which had been

on the victor's side had failed to do what it should have done. It was an

insurmountable task to prove to the public that it had been successful

despite the Navy Department's failure to prepare properly for war or to

conduct it more efficiently.

The hearings degenerated into a game of partisan politics, thick with

slander. Sims' opponents painted him as a commander with a grievance

and an Anglophile who loved Britain more than America. The serious

professional issue which Sims had in mind was ignored as Daniels won

support for the traditional, populist view that capable forces could

always be effectively mobilized whenever war came.24 With the controversy past after a new administration came to power

on 4 March 1921, the Naval War College continued its development

unscathed. The college, however, remained clearly identified with

Sims' viewpoint. On the eve of Sims' retirement in 1922, the admiral

was feted by War College students at a dinner in Newport's Clambake

Club. Spirits ran high that evening as the well-wishers sang irreverent

parodies of popular songs. The chorus of one in particular, rang through

the rafters rhyming Daniels' first name with Sims' wartime telegraphic

address:

Away, away with Josephus

He's the one that made the muss,

His brand of bull don't go with us,

For we are strong for Simsadus.25 On 14 October 1922, Sims retired from active duty in the U.S. Navy

after 42 years of service. He read his orders and saluted, transferring

command to his chief of staff who would administer the college until
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 125

the arrival of Rear Admiral C. S. Williams. Sims shook hands with each

of the officers on the college staff, and walked down the hill, across Dewey Field, between two rows of recruits from the Training Station.

When he reached the waterfront landing, he boarded his barge for the

trip to Government Landing in Newport. As he was piped aboard, a 13

gun salute rang out. Moments later, his two-star flag was struck from

the mizzen of the old frigate Constellation, moored alongside the quay

at Coasters Harbor Island. The Sims years were over, but the spirit lived

on for many more years in the course of study he had devised for the

Naval War College.

The Course, 1919-1927

The college curriculum and organization changed little in the following

years. Each department scheduled lectures on the matters under its

cognizance and provided a required reading list for the students. In

addition, a recommended reading list was an expansion of the required

list. The books on these extensive lists were well chosen and included

not only the standard works in the area but also classics of military

history and analysis. One student, Commander Harold R. Stark,

compiled for his colleagues a 179-page digest of the 1 13 books on the

policy, command, strategy, and tactics reading lists. It was printed and

distributed to students as an intelligent and useful encapsulation of the

principal works that an educated naval officer at that time should

read.26 The lectures covered a wide variety of topics, some of which were

chosen on the basis of general interest and others because they

provided necessary professional information. New developments in

warfare were not neglected.

In addition to the instruction provided by lectures and the selfinstruction derived from reading widely and in depth, the students

were required to write a thesis for each department. The purpose of this

exercise was to force each student to come to grips with the relevant

materials and to set them forth in a logical and coherent manner. Most

papers were approximately 50 typewritten pages in length, but

frequently they extended to almost 100 pages. Commander Chester W.

Nimitz expressed the typical concerns of the time in his paper on

policy. Nimitz noted the climatic and geographical factors and their

influence on policy. Like many, he worried about the effect of racial

heterogeneity in the United States and its inhibiting effect on the

formulation of a coherent national policy that would enjoy wide,

popular support. Nimitz thought immigration ought to be suspended

and an intensive campaign of education for newer citizens be

undertaken. Immigration policy was hardly a professional problem for a
1 26 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

naval officer and Nimitz s policy essay was an ordinary piece of work,

but his thesis on naval tactics properly reflected his professional

brilliance. The duty of a naval tactician is "to plan the employment of

available forces in battle against any opponent, and to ensure that the

utmost strength is developed at the crucial time and at the decisive

point," Nimitz wrote.

To accomplish this task the tactician has available not only such

experience as he can bring to bear on theproblem but, in addition,

he can draw on the lessons to be learned from the innumerable

examples of failure and the comparatively few instances of decisive

victory recorded in history. A study of the mistakes of the past will

usually yield a better harvest than a study of the successes. In most

instances, it has been the errors of the vanquished rather than the

brilliant tactics of the victor that brought success to the latter.27 Another student, Captain Thomas C. Hart, wrote that militaristic ideas

and institutions were losing ground in Japan and that "probably many

Japanese were forsaking their teaching that war pays."

Hart's thesis on tactics was a model statement of the subject,

reflecting mature consideration and a wide practical experience at sea. Several men had deduced the principles of war from a study of history,

and along broad lines they were in agreement, Hart wrote,

Knowing those principles and enunciating them is an easy task for

many men. It is in the application of principles that the difficulties

lie —and wherein the dozen or so of really great leaders have

excelled all others. They have frequently succeeded by entirely

new applications—have thus surprised. Able to estimate the

attendant conditions better than others, they have often subordinated theory and rules to the needs of the moment and have even

discarded them. In so doing, those leaders have seemed to disregard

principles. But in all cases having that appearance it has rarely, if at

all, been violation of fundamental principle but rather new

application which surprised by diverging from the stereotyped

methods that inferior men had come to regard as thoroughly

established principles. In that same way will the "great" leader of

the future surprise his enemy.28

In 1923 fellow students and future admirals such as Hart, Nimitz, and

Stark all considered the same problem. They each wrote a three-part

tactics paper which examined a naval war against Britain, a war against

Japan, and an examination of the Battle of Jutland. As the college

viewed the situation, future wars in the Atlantic and the Pacific would

be different. In the Atlantic "the War College conception of the naval

battle of the future . . . follows closely the general plan employed by

both fleets in the Battle of Jutland."29 Future war in the Pacific, however,

would be a slow battle of attrition and logistics. Nimitz's reflection on
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 127

his War College year, written in response to a request from college

president Charles Melson in 1963, has been often quoted:

The enemy of our games was always Japan, and the courses were so thorough that, after the start of World War II, nothing that

happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected. Each student

was required to plan logistic support for an advance across the

Pacific, and we were well prepared for the logistic efforts required to

support the operations of the war.30

It was a kind and generous statement by an old graduate, but what he

actually wrote in 1923, trying to analyze a future war, is more

interesting:

To bring such a war to a successful conclusion Blue must either

destroy Orange military and naval forces or effect a complete

isolation of Orange country by cutting all communication with the

outside world. It is quite possible that Orange resistance will cease when isolation is complete and before steps to reduce military

strength on Orange soil are necessary. In either case the operations

imposed upon Blue will require the Blue Fleet to advance westward

with an enormous train, in order to be prepared to seize and

establish bases en route . . . The possession by Orange of numerous

bases in the western Pacific will give to her fleet a maximum of

mobility while the lack of such bases imposes upon Blue the

necessity of refuelling en route at sea, or of seizing a base from

Orange for this purpose, in order to maintain even a limited degree

of mobility.31 From 1921, most games involved Blue versus Orange forces in the

Pacific, although often other forces were considered, namely those of

Britain and Germany.32 The purpose behind the Blue-Orange conflict

was for Blue to impose its will on Orange, disrupting its economic life

and for the Navy "to gain and to exercise command of the sea, and to

operate offensively against Orange.33 These studies were important

reflections on American thinking about a future war with Japan at a time when the U.S. Navy still had little experience in the Pacific. In the

summer of 1925, the Battle Fleet, augmented by a division of new

cruisers from the Scouting Fleet, made a six-week cruise to Australia

and New Zealand; it was the first such deployment to the Antipodes

since the Great White Fleet of 1908.

One historian has described these war games against Orange as "So

intense ... so hypnotic was the ritual rehearsal, repeated in unnumbered war games at Newport, that historical reality flowed, naturally,

effortlessly, necessarily."34 In more stereotyped style, Secretary of the

Navy Curtis Wilbur wrote in 1925, "The Naval War College tests

strategic policies of the department by making them the basis for

problems which are worked out and played on the gameboard."35 In the
1 28 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

next 1 5 years naval weapons changed rapidly and so did tactics; but the

focus on Orange did not change.

While naval men were generally enthusiastic about the approach,

some Marine officers were not. Holland M. Smith was a member of the

first class to convene after the war. He found that Sims was too

narrowly naval in his outlook and Smith thought it

bogged down in obsolescence. The lessons learned from World War

I appeared to point backward instead of forward and the mass of

pertinent timely information furnished by the war just

concluded had been ignored in favor of long established principles

which a novice could see would never apply to future problems.36 While Smith saw Sims as brilliant within his own particular field he

considered Sims hidebound in his opposition to the changes needed in

the Navy to develop amphibious warfare.

By a curious coincidence, as this intense interest in a possible war

with Japan was being created in the 1920s, the College received a visit

from some distinguished Japanese naval officers. On 13 February 1924,

the Japanese naval attache and his assistant arrived with the director of

training for the Japanese Navy, Vice Admiral K. Ide, and his aide,

Captain Isoruku Yamamoto, the man who would insist on the Pearl

Harbor attack nearly 1 8 years later.

The Junior Course Established

In 1923, one of the innovations that Sims had hoped to establish

finally became reality. As far back as 1919, Secretary Daniels had

questioned both the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War

College on their proposed budgets. In response to these questions, the

Chief of the Bureau of Navigation decided that more systematic

guidance was needed in planning for officer education in the future. He

therefore ordered Captain Ernest J. King, Head of the Postgraduate

School, Commander Dudley W. Knox of the Naval War College, and

Commander William S. Pye, Executive Officer of USS Pennsylvania, to

study the subject and to recommend a policy for advanced naval

education. In the next nine months these three men met periodically

and, in the summer of 1920, they submitted a 28 page report, charting

the education of officers through their service careers. As with many

reports submitted to the Department, this one was approved but not

fully implemented. In all probability it would have been completely

forgotten except that King submitted it to the Naval Institute and it

was published in the Proceedings for August 1920.

The three members of the board believed strongly that a naval officer

needed to have a working knowledge of a wide range of arts, sciences, and

technical developments, which were each continuously developing. It
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 1 29

was impossible, they believed, to equip an officer at the outset of his career with all the knowledge he would need as he advanced through his

service. The board concluded that naval officers should be given periods

of education at recurring periods in their career, each period building on

the previous one and appropriate to the duties an officer would expect to

meet at the next phase in his career. Knox, Pye, and King identified four

phases in a naval officer's career, each of which should be preceded by a course that they outlined. As they outlined the plan, the Naval Academy

prepared an officer for the first phase as a division officer, but a general

line course was needed to prepare for the second phase as a department

head. Similarly, a junior War College course was needed to prepare for

command of a single ship, and a senior War College course was

appropriate to prepare for flag rank.37 The Knox-Pye-King Board, as it was

known, not only incorporated Sims' ideas on progressive education

represented by Knox, but suggested paralleling the Army course at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. Graduation from this Army Command and

General Staff course had by this time become a prerequisite for further

advancement in the peacetime army. The footnote to the Board's

published report echoed a typical reaction to suggestions for improving

officer education:

This report is published by permission of the Navy Department for

the information of the service. The report of the Board has been

approved, but the shortage of officers will not permit the recom- mendations to be carried into effect at present.38 Two years later, however, in December 1922, Assistant Secretary of the

Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. convened a conference to consider the

entire War College effort. Besides Rear Admiral C. S. Williams as college

president, the conferees included the Chief of Naval Operations, the Fleet

Commander-in-Chief, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, the

Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the Commandant of the Marine

Corps. On his return to Newport after the meeting, Williams believed

that the battle for a junior course had been won, and directed the staff to

prepare its implementation.

On 6 March 1923, Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby issued General

Order 98, which in essence provided what the college needed to go ahead.

Included was the requirement that students assigned must have

"special aptitude." The initial junior class opened in the summer of 1923

under the direction of Captain William McDowell. There were 22

officers, who had been commissioned between 1907 and 1915. The

Department announced a goal of 60 officers per class, but it was never

attained. In 1 929 there were 52 officers, the largest group until the 1 950s

when the title changed from Junior Course to the Command and Staff

Course. Physical facilities of the college were severely strained, but by
1 30 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the time funds for new facilities were approved in the 1930s, the junior

class had grown smaller because of the requirements of the expanding

fleet for more officers. The Bureau never agreed to the concept of

progressive education, and the curriculum of the new course gradually

paralleled the existing senior course, with both classes participating in

some of the same operations problems and gameboard work. Both

groups attended the lectures. By the beginning of World War II, only a few officers had attended both junior and senior courses.

Pratt Reorganizes College Administration

In September 1925, Rear Admiral William Veazie Pratt relieved C. S. Williams as college president. A highly regarded officer, Pratt felt the

need to revitalize the college and to assure that it remained responsive to

change within the Navy. A few months after his arrival in Newport, Pratt

saw that the college was not achieving the goals he felt it should achieve.

The statement of the college mission in Secretary Wilbur's report for

1 925 said, "The mission of the Naval War College is to furnish a medium

whereby naval officers in peacetime may study the conduct of naval

warfare and the art of command in relation thereto." Pratt objected, "That

most important work, the conduct of joint operations in a grand

campaign of war" was not even mentioned. Furthermore, he said, "The

mission of the Navy is not only how to conduct efficient war in time of

war, but in time of peace the Navy must know how to keep the peace."39 To implement his ideas, during his second year in Newport, Pratt

restructured the War College staff to parallel more closely the organization of the General Staff of the Army and the Office of Naval Operations.

Pratt believed that a new arrangement would repair the unnatural

emphasis that he believed had been created by dividing strategy and

tactics into two separate departments. In his view, strategy and tactics

were inseparable. Moreover, Pratt was convinced that future naval

operations would fail unless naval leaders viewed the totality of

modern warfare. Strategy and tactics should "merge together under the

head of operations," Pratt said, because

operations, even purely naval, cannot hope to succeed unless

careful attention is paid to materiel, personnel, and the thousand

detailed difficulties attendant upon war.40 Pratt concluded that there were six principal elements in warfare: (1)

personnel, materiel and supply; (2) information; (3) operations; (4)

policy; (5) inspection; and (6) finance.

Heretofore, the college had stressed the operations segment and paid

little attention to the other equally important areas. In order to rectify

this and to make the college curriculum a more appropriate preparation

for practical staff duty in Washington, Pratt reorganized academic

instruction into four departments and designated by letters:
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 131

(A) Logistics.

(B) Information.

(C) Operations.

(D) Policy and Command.

Under this scheme, the logistics department would deal withlssues of

material, personnel, supply, transport, and relative priorities. The

information department would deal with the library, intelligence and

archives. Operations would teach war planning, estimate of the

situation, order forms, military and naval operations, and the policy

and command department would deal with the correspondence course,

the lecture courses, policy, international law, and foreign relations.41 With the changes, Pratt believed he had brought the college into

closer resonance with both the development of the office of the Chief of

Naval Operations and the way in which the U.S. Army was thinking.

Joint Army-Navy operations would be extremely important in the

future, and Pratt believed it was important to further the similarity of

professional thinking. "After all, there is no difference in principle," he

wrote, "between naval and military strategy and tactics, though there

are essential differences in movement and time."42 While Pratt stressed

the similarity in principles he also saw that one area which required

greater emphasis for naval education was the study of international

relations. Pratt believed that the Army only became involved in foreign

affairs after a war was declared. The Navy, however, was constantly

involved in international relations in both peace and war. "The Navy is

the external buffer between our federal state and other sovereign

states," he declared.43 With this in mind, Pratt substantially increased

the number of lectures that students heard on topics relating to current

affairs.

Joint Exercise, 1927

Complementing Pratt's efforts in the Naval War College's classrooms,

the U.S. Navy participated in the largest joint Army-Navy exercise

which had been staged up to that time. In May 1927, just as Pratt's war

college presidency was coming to an end, the joint exercise took place

off the coast of southern New England. The Battle Fleet had come east

to the Caribbean and joined the Scouting Fleet for their annual Fleet

Problem. In the spring of 1927, Fleet Problem VII had a number of

phases. In its first stage, Blue forces were sent to establish a base of

operations against Black in the West Indies and to exercise in the

wartime operation that would be required to support a large, expeditionary force at Panama. In the second stage, a Blue fleet attempted to

rendezvous from dispersed bases in the West Indies and to concentrate

its forces while threatened by a Red fleet with heavier guns, but fewer
1 32 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

ships. Third, enroute from the Caribbean to New York, the fleet exercised

its torpedo tactics. In early May, after the entire fleet had enjoyed leave

and liberty in New York City, the final phase of Fleet Problem VII was the

week-long, joint Army-Navy exercise between Blue and Black, conducted

this time near the entrance to Narragansett Bay. Blue forces included army

units in the New England area, units of the Scouting Fleet, and some

Marine aircraft flown up from Quantico and based at Newport Airport,

then located in the Wanumetonomy area of Middletown, as defending

fighters. Black forces consisted of the Battle Fleet, including the carrier

Langjey ("the Covered Wagon") and its two squadrons of planes. Black

attempted to land an expeditionary force somewhere between Cape Cod

and Long Island. Newport was the headquarters for the defending forces as well as for the umpires of the war games.

There was considerable press interest, and a war correspondents'

center was set up at Fort Adams with regular briefings on the progress of

"the war." There were air and surface contacts at sea, a simulated

bombardment of Newport by the Black battleline of nine ships, and a simulated landing near Watch Hill, R.I., which the umpires ruled a

failure. While these exercises were being carried out by the fleet, War

College students played a parallel game on the college's gameboard and

then joined the fleet officers for the discussion. On May 21, the same

day that Charles Lindbergh flew solo across the Atlantic, the entire

fleet entered Newport for a week's visit during which time the

Commander in Chief, Admiral Charles F. Hughes, presided over the

critique of the exercise at the Naval War College. For the first time

since 1901, the main body of the fleet and the Naval War College were

directly involved in working together on an exercise. The class of 1 927

heard the exercise discussed by umpires and opposing commanders.

They could see that the views of Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves,

recently head of the tactics department at the college, were correct

when he told Pratt a few months before the exercise,

I have long felt that one of our weakest spots was in the Plans

Division of Naval Operations because of its wholly inadequate

personnel. I felt this so keenly while I was at the War College as to

be apprehensive that in a large overseas operation of the

amphibious nature, we would find the Army plans forced upon us because of lack of any adequate plans of our own.44 From this point onward, amphibious warfare assumed an increasingly

important role in college studies at the same time that the Fleet Marine

Force was gradually evolving during the 1930s.45 At the same time,

Pratt's emphasis on joint operations in the college curriculum developed further the connection with the Army War College, emphasizing

further the development of the joint war games between the two

colleges.
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 1 33

Emphasis on Logistics

While joint operations had an important place in Pratt's thinking, it

was no accident that in the college's reorganization, a department was

devoted to logistics. The subject was not new to the college; visiting

lecturers had dealt with the subject since the 1890s and Mahan had

written that "logistics is as vital to military success as daily food is to

daily work."46 In 1911, Commander C. T. Vogelgesang told college students,

"Logistics comprehends all the operations outside the field of battle and

which lead up to it—it regulates the execution of those movements

which in combination become the function of strategy."47 Pratt had

been on the staff with Vogelgesang at that time and he undoubtedly

heard his lecture. A few years later, World War I mobilization showed

the importance and complexity of logistics to the nation. The Army

had recognized this by establishing the Army Industrial College in

1923, but within military education, the Industrial College was viewed

as something on a lower plane than a War College course. In the Navy

as well, there was a widespread view that logistics was a problem for

staff corps specialists, not an issue of great concern to line officers. Pratt

argued against this line of thinking and stressed the importance of

logistics in studying the whole subject of warfare. By creating a separate

department for logistics, Pratt raised that area of concern to equal

status with operations, plans, and intelligence.

The new logistics department had four officers, but not a single naval

line officer among them. It was headed by Captain R. E. Bakenhus, CEC,

assisted by Colonel Frank E. Evans, USMC; Captain A. H. Van Keuren,

CEC, and Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Reed, U.S. Army.

In its first studies, the logistics department worked on developing

plans for a joint overseas expedition, which was later carried out by a Navy and Marine Corps landing force on the north side of Hawaii. As a result of this work and in preparations for the Joint Army-Navy

exercise on the southern New England coast in 1927, the logistics

department developed a rational system of designating transport

capacities and troop loads. Since much of the college's work was

devoted to the problem of a fighting fleet opposing an enemy's fighting

fleet, the logistics department devoted its primary attention to the

control of trade routes over the ocean, the object for which the fleets

were fighting.48 The academic year 1926-1927 saw the formal implementation of

Pratt's concepts into the college curriculum. These changes emphasized and expanded upon the vision which Sims had charted in 1919.

More than ever, the college was an institution for the practical training

of officers in fleet and staff positions. While Sims had emphasized the
1 34 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

fleet aspect; Pratt had recognized the rapid growth of staff arid planning

positions; both ashore and afloat, and he attempted to meet the need for

proper training in these new areas. By the end of Pratt's term as president of the Naval War College, he had established firmly the two

courses, senior and junior, envisaged by Sims and recommended by the

Knox-Pye-King Board. The two courses were closely related, and during

the latter part of the academic year, the junior course students assisted

the senior students in both operations problems and committee work.

Similarly, the correspondence course was related to the work of the

resident students as preparation for the junior course.49 These courses

related to the three phases that Pratt saw in a naval officer's career:

preparatory, executive, and command. Each was paralleled by a course

at the Naval War College. In the highest phase, Pratt told the graduating

class in 1927, "Through careful reading, training, experience, and

thought, you should have arrived at a position where your services become

invaluable to the government on account of the good and sound advice

which you are able to give." In the exercise of supreme command,

"character and knowledge display themselves in breadth of vision,

determination, undeviating purpose when once a decision has been

thoughtfully arrived at, unselfishness, simplicity, knowledge of men

and of fundamental principles, based upon a background of sound

practical experience."50 In this, the Naval War College played an

important role as a place to learn and reflect on the established,

fundamental principles of warfare.

Notes

1. E. E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1942), pp. 333-34, 466-469. Quote from p. 467. The Title

Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet, was in use during the first half of 1 9 1 9. It was

then dropped and not revived until 1921.

2. Ibid., pp. 467-68.

3. This and the following paragraphs with their quotations are taken from

W. S. Sims to Secretary of the Navy, 1 5 January 1919, with endorsement of W. S. Benson, 23 January 1919. NWC Library, typescript, "History of the Naval War

College to 1937," pp. 88-99.

4. Ibid., p. 97.

5. Ibid., p. 98.

6. "Welcomed in Washington; Navy Department Heads at Station to Greet

Sims." The New York Times, 9 April 1919, p. 10:7.

7. Morison, Sims., p. 432.

8. Newport Daily News, 12 April 1919.

9. Gerald J. Kennedy, "United States Naval War College 1919-1941: An

Institutional Response to Naval Preparedness," unpublished typescript, 1974,

Naval War College Advanced Research Project.

10. NWC Archives, RG16: Opening Address. W. S. Sims, 1 July 1919.

1 1. NWC Archives, RG2, Box 37, File A- 12: Sims to SECNAV, 5 Jan 1921.
SIMS CHARTS NEW COURSE, 1919-1927 135

12. Sims "Opening Address/' op. cit. 13. "History of the Naval War College to 1937," pp. 105-06.

14. Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers (Annapolis, Naval Institute

Press, 1981), p. 38. See also pp. 7, 33, 40, 57, 81, 84.

15. "History of the Naval War College to 1937," p. 107.

1 6. Sims to T. Roosevelt, Jr., 27 August 1921. Quoted in G. J. Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 33-34, fn 25.

17. "History of the Naval War College to 1937," p. 1 15.

18. Ibid., p. 115.

19. Daniels to Draft Naval College Bill," New York Times, 15 December

1920, p. 14:7. 20. E. E. Morison, Admiral Sims, p. 436.

21. Joseph Morrison, Josephus Daniels, The Small d Democrat Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1966], p. 124.

22. Tracy B. Kittridge, Naval Lessons of the Great War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1921], p. 76.

23. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967], p. 357.

24. E. E. Morison, Admiral Sims, pp. 455, 458.

25. NWC Archives, RG27: Presidents File: Sims. The chorus is to the tune of

"Away, Away with Sword and Drum," widely known from Naval Academy days.

26. NWC Archives, RG17: Staff Studies 1923, H.R. Stark, "Extracts from

Books Read in Connection with War College Reading Courses: Policy,

Command, Strategy, and Tactics," arranged alphabetically by author, two

volumes.

27. C. W. Nimitz, "Naval Tactics," Naval War College Review, NovemberDecember 1983, p. 9. Excerpt from 1923 thesis in NWC Archives, RG12.

28. NWC Archives, RG12: student theses, T. C Hart, 1923.

29. NWC Archives, RG15 Staff Presentation, 1922: Harris Laning, "The

Tactics Department of the War College and the Relations between it and the

Fleet." 30. E. B. Potter, Nimitz, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976], p. 136.

31. Nimitz, op. cit, pp. 12-13.

32. For a detailed list of games, see M. Vlahos, The Blue Sword (Newport:

Naval War College Press, 1920], pp. 166-178.

33. Ibid., p. 121 quoting War Plan Orange: WPL-8-16.

34. Ibid.

35. Navy Department, Annual Report . . . 1925, p. 20.

36. H. M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass (New York: Scribners, 1 949], pp. 47-54.

37. "Instruction and Training of Line Officers," U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings, Vol. 36 (1920], p. 1265-1292.

38. Ibid.

39. NWC Archives RG28: Pratt, President's File: "The Mission and Work of

the Naval War College," April 1926.

40. Ibid., p. 13. 41. Ibid., p. 16. 42. Ibid., p. 17. 43. Ibid., p. 18. 44. NWC Archives, RG2: J.M. Reeves to Pratt, 24 March 1927; quoted in

Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 136-37 footnote 9. 45. George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College

Alumni Assoc, 1967), p. 1 18; NWC Archives, RG8 Series I, UNOpP.
1 36 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

46. A. T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (Boston: Little Brown, 1912], p. 196.

47. NWC Archives, RG14, C. T. Vogelgesang lecture, 1911: "Logistics: Its Bearing on the Art of War."

48. "Outline History to 1937," p. 181.

49. Ibid., p. 208, president, NWC to CNO, Annual Report, 14 June 1927.

50. NWC Archives, RG16: Graduation Address, W. V. Pratt, "The Three

Phases of a Naval Career, Some Reflections of an Older Officer," 27 May 1927,

pp. 10, 12.
EN

CHAPTER 6

EDUCATING LEADERS

FOR WORLD WAR, 1927-

1939

The concept of the Naval War College, which

Sims had established in 1919 and Pratt had refined in 1926, formed the

basis for War College work in the years leading up to World War II. There were administrative readjustments, course modifications, and

gradual expansion during these years, but the philosophy of education

and methodology of the War College remained the same. The college

limited itself to training officers for practical work in their future

assignments; during these years it did not attempt to encourage

original research as Luce and Mahan tried to do, or to emulate the

practice of a university graduate-level course. The Naval War College

stayed within the limits of a professional training institution.

Through William Veazie Pratt, the college achieved the widespread

recognition that Sims and others had fought to achieve. Recognized

early as a man with a future, Pratt was the only president in the college's

first century to become Chief of Naval Operations. The role the college

presidency played in Pratt's career and the stress Pratt placed on the

Naval War College as he continued to rise to prominence promoted the

college's image.

The importance of a War College diploma was symbolized by an

incident that occurred during the 1927 graduation ceremony. Secretary

of the Navy Curtis Wilbur delivered the address on that May day and

personally handed diplomas to each of the 70 graduates. To everyone's

surprise, he produced one more diploma which he presented to Pratt.

From 1928, Pratt's name in the Navy Register was followed by the code

number indicating that he was a graduate of the 1927 senior course at
138 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the Naval War College. Navy watchers of the day considered Wilbur's

surprise diploma an indication of both the importance of the War

College course to an officer's career and Pratt's imminent advancement. 1 Two months later, Pratt was promoted to vice admiral and

ordered to command Battleship Divisions, Battle Fleet. He was relieved

by Rear Admiral J. R. P. Pringle.

Newport—Hometown for the College

Newport, Rhode Island, a city of about 30,000 in the 1 920s, was both a summer colony and a navy town—a base for the fleet in the summer

and home of the Training Station, War College, and Torpedo Station

year round. The summer residents who occupied the magnificent

"cottages" along Bellevue Avenue and the Ocean Drive included many

of New York's fabled 400. Property taxes from these estates helped the

city. Its other sources of income were the Navy and naval families who

moved through the community. Up to the early 1930s, the summer

visits of the Scouting Fleet brought swarms of bluejackets ashore on

liberty, but their pay was small and only a few waterfront areas

benefited. During the remainder of the 1930s up to World War II, most

of the Navy's ships were in the Pacific, although the fleet came east in

1934 and again in 1939.

The civilian work force at the Torpedo Station, Newport's largest;

industry, had become long-term residents. The War College classes, of

up to 100 officers in the 1930s, provided a lush market for local real

estate, particularly for the rental of homes that would otherwise remain

vacant during the long New England winter. No systematic housing

arrangement for the students existed. In the several Newport naval

shore activities, only a few officers or senior enlisted personnel were

assigned government quarters.

Early in his tour as president, Admiral Sims had tried to change the

situation. He urged the Navy to acquire quarters for student officers,

stating that "real estate agents here are fully informed as to every

officer's circumstances and his urgency in obtaining a house, and they

do not fail to take advantage of such urgency."2 Sims' efforts failed at

this time; bachelor officers and, on occasion, married officers with their

families continued to find lodging in the many boarding houses in the

Kay Street and Touro Park areas of Newport, where weekly rates for the

winter continued at high summer levels.

The War College presidents continued to occupy the commodious

President's House on Coasters Harbor Island. As senior officer present

for most of the year, the president led naval social life and was also

included in many of the summer colony's activities, with honorary

memberships at the Newport Reading Room and Spouting Rock Beach.
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 139

Few other War College officers were offered or could afford

memberships in such exclusive clubs.

The students often appreciated a year of family life devoid of naval

responsibilities and sea duty. Noticeably warmer in winter and cooler

in summer than nearby Boston, Newport had a pleasant atmosphere

that gave students a chance to unwind and enjoy their families.

William F. Halsey, a student in the class of 1933, recalled,

Few years in a naval officer's life are more pleasant than this one. It is restful because you have no official responsibilities, and it is stimulating because of the instruction, the exchange of ideas, the

chance to test your pet theories on the game board, and the

opportunity to read up on professional publications.3 Another student, Ernest J. King, remembered his War College year as "refreshing and valuable." During that time he had

in addition to the prescribed course of study, time to browse in the

excellent library, to reflect upon . . . past and future service, and to

consider the world situation, particularly in those aspects that

appeared to be leading toward war.4 For the wives and families living in rented accommodations in

Newport, life was relatively pleasant. The naval medical officer would

make house calls, groceries ordered from the commissary would be

delivered to the door, and the Navy Exchange laundry made home

pickups and deliveries.5 But there were problems to face. Remembering

her Newport year in 1922-1923, Mrs. Catherine Nimitz wrote,

My memories of the War College are vivid! Three children who

took that time to have all the contagious diseases in succession. A

coal shortage, a hard winter, a house really meant only for summer,

etc. We had to burn soft coal and could only buy one half ton at a time. The house had five bedrooms and was very large. We arrived

late in a Transport from Honolulu and had to take what we could

get. The situation was laughable afterwards, but not at the time. On

the day of graduation I awoke to find Chester lying beside me and

reading 'The Last Engagement of the Battle of Jutland.' I laughed and

congratulated him on getting that battle over. He remarked he

knew that battle by heart. What memories I have.6 Working hours during the six-day work week at the War College

were appealing, 0900 to 1530, with afternoons free on Wednesday and

Saturday. Although the college courses were demanding and most

evenings had to be devoted to writing papers and reading, there was

plenty of social activity, particularly on the weekends. In the era of

national prohibition, which began in 1919 and did not end until

December 1933, and before World War II brought officers' clubs,

entertaining was largely confined to individual homes, where small

dinner parties were commonly followed by a table or so of bridge.
1 40 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Domestic help was within reach of commanders and captains in

Newport, adding another facet to a pleasant year for the wives. By 1 927

duty on the War College staff enhanced a naval career. Students

selected for continuation on the staff were generally pleased to stay on

in Newport, and a few were lucky enough to move into quarters on the

Naval Training Station.

There was little in the way of sports facilities. In 1919, Sims had

complained, officers

are left to their own devices as regards the matter of their physical

fitness. Newport, for example, offers little or no encouragement for

exercise outside of the few tennis courts .... It is true, of course,

quite true that walking facilities exist in the vicinity of Newport,

but this is not, to my mind, a successful solution to the problem.7 In 1926, several Army officers organized a league for "kitten ball,

indoor baseball played out of doors." Played every Wednesday afternoon and Friday after a lecture, weather permitting, the War College

teams were pitted against officers from the Training Station and the

Torpedo School. As one Army student wrote, the games "were always

well played and closely contested but not withstanding the youth' of

the junior class, 'the old men' of the senior class won the majority of the

games." The half-hour games "helped them physically more than any of

them really know ... so that when they came back to work at 1 :30, they

were wide-awake and ready for 'an estimate of the situation' or a

lecture."8 For the college, the Newport scene of the 1920s and early 1930s

would not have been complete without the presence of William

Sowden Sims, who, like Stephen Luce 35 years earlier, had settled in

Newport until retirement. After moving to Boston for the winter, he

continued to spend the pleasant part of the year in Newport. Sims knew

his successors well. Williams, Pratt, Pringle, and Laning had all served

under him or with him in Europe and at the college. In these years Sims

was a familiar figure in the city and at the college, as a parade marshal

on Memorial Day, in cap and gown at graduation at St. George's School

where he was a trustee, or riding straight and tall on his bicycle,

escorting his youngest son Ethan to Miss Weaver's Day School where

the Newport Creamery now stands on East Main Road. Sims in this

period was truly an elder statesman at the college and on Aquidneck

Island.

Curriculum Modifications

In 1927 the United States made another effort to limit the world's

navies by convening a conference of major naval powers at Geneva to

discuss limiting the construction of ship types not included in the 1922
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 141

Washington Treaty. France and Italy refused to participate, and the

other three Washington signatories, Great Britain, Japan, and the

United States held divergent views on the proper size and gun power

for new cruisers. By the time Admiral Pringle relieved Pratt in

Newport, the conference had become a stalemate with each country

wanting parity of naval force solely in terms of its own strategic

requirements.

In Washington, plans were made to push ahead with modernizing

battleships and building carriers, cruisers, and destroyers as well as resuming battleship construction in 1931, when the Washington

Treaty expired. It was an ambitious program, but an exciting one for the

future naval leaders in classes at Newport. Against this background,

Pringle's first classes followed a curriculum largely planned by the

previous college president, but the next year saw changes. The new

classes of 1929 found some of Admiral Pratt's innovations modified.

The separate logistics division was now combined with strategy and

tactics into an operations department, beginning with the academic

year 1928-1929. Pringle, drawing on his previous staff background at

the college, believed that tactics flowed from strategy (national,

military, and naval) and that operations were based on both strategical

and tactical decisions. Although logistics disappeared from the

organizational chart, it remained a vital element in each operations

study and a part of game board play.

War College student problems continued to focus on the Pacific area with the Blue-Orange games reworked and updated to reflect the

modernization of the fleet. Using updated rules and scoring techniques,

the senior classes concentrated on the strategic, logistical, and tactical

elements for a Blue advance westward across the Pacific, which

required taking advance bases to support the fleet. Concurrently, the

class also developed Orange plans for thwarting a Blue advance.

Throughout the entire academic program, increasing emphasis was

placed on Japan as a likely enemy.9 The operation department's plan for the senior course attempted to

broaden the students' perceptions by concentrating on four areas:

1. Joint Army-Navy attack on and defense of islands.

2. Defense of and attack on lines of communication.

3. Naval defense of a specified area.

4. Fleet use in a naval campaign.

The department envisaged that this concentration would facilitate

student effort in thinking about a future war in the Pacific. At the same

time, the plan for the junior course was similar but focused at a slightly

lower administrative level of fleet organization. Both classes, however,

worked together in their studies of World War I battles and campaigns

at Jutland, Coronel, Gallipoli, Dogger Bank, and the Falkland Islands.
1 42 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The experience of World War I continued to play an enormous role in the

way officers envisaged the future.

In tactical theses, the battle of Jutland continued to receive the greatest

attention. The names of the opposing admirals in that engagement

became a litany of basic responses for the students. Examining the battle

from the standpoint of tactics, performance of ship types, and leadership,

it was only in the area of individual leadership that the student officers

revealed any variety in their perception. 10 The student theses on policy

stressed the historical development behind policy decisions, but the

authors often failed to pursue their analyses thoroughly. In 1926,

Commander H. E. Kimmel's thesis on policy followed the usual form,

with fundamental definitions of types of policy, factors influencing the

formulation of policy, and the relationship of war to policy. In his

conclusions, however, Kimmel argued against the general feeling that

Japan would be a major opponent for the United States. American policy

in the Orient, he believed, was "consistent and sound." The most probable

conflict in that region would be between Japan and Russia over Japanese

policy in China. Only intensification of Japanese imperialism could bring

European nations and the United States into that war. 11 In 1927,

Commander Royall E. Ingersoll thought that American foreign policy in

the twentieth century had changed from one "purely political in

character" to one more shaped by economics. His classmate, Raymond

Spruance, concluded that America had become unpopular because of her

overemphasis on the collection of war debts and failure to participate in

the settlement of postwar political problems. "Time will serve to soften

this," Spruance wrote, "and then it is hoped that the real United States will

be seen."12 In 1929, Commander J. B. Oldendorf was exceptional in his class for

focusing on Europe rather than the Far East. He maintained that the

reparations question was a substantial problem in achieving European

peace. Commander Alan G. Kirk thought that although American

isolationism was admirable in the past, America must now step forward.

Taking another view, Commander John S. McCain approved of American

policy which avoided "entangling alliances."13 Looking back over the immediate past, War College President Harris

Laning told the class of 1933 that too many students came to the college

with the assumption that all matters pertaining to war had already been

thought over and should be presented to the students on a silver platter.

Students often became discouraged and critical of the college, he warned,

when they found that most of their theses were considered only a "rehash" of the obvious and that the college expected hard, perceptive,

and innovative thinking. However, he admitted, "very few of the two

preceding classes did any such reasoning." 14 His exhortation for change

brought little result.
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 1 43

Renewed Emphasis on Tactics

Captain Reginald Belknap had written to Admiral Sims in July 1923,

"In any war within fifteen years our naval leadership would be in the

hands of those who served under you at the War College." Belknap was

right, considering the size of the Navy in 1923. The influence of Sims

can be directly traced to the 1 930s through Harris Laning, who had Been

one of Sims' "band of brothers" in the Torpedo Flotilla of 1913-1914.

After World War I, Laning's year as a student and a subsequent year as head of tactics at the college explain the emphasis he gave to tactics in

the curriculum during his three years as president. At the end of his

term, in 1933, he spelled out this emphasis:

Those to whom the handling of forces in war is entrusted are in

duty bound to so handle them that those forces will exert their

maximum power in the battle that is the campaign's crucial and

decisive point. 15 Although strategy was not forgotten, the tactics of the fleet action

received greater attention than before. After guiding and observing the

1930-1931 academic year that was based on a curriculum planned by

Pringle, the new president significantly altered the staff when he

created a research department for statistical studies. As head of the

tactics department, he had emphasized the value of statistics in

planning for battle; now a new department housed a separate group that

included statisticians. The work of the new research department,

headed by Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, was

1

.

To keep full records of the details of all games played and from

study and analysis of these records to ascertain the salient points and

features relating to gunfire, torpedo fire, bombing, smoke screens,

damage received and inflicted by the different types, use of aircraft,

etc., together with statistical data as to material features and

2. To make a complete study of all questions presented to the

War College for consideration from time to time. 16 In addition, special consideration was given to the operation of types of

ships, their speed, armament, ammunition, supply, and their use. An

intensive historical study was begun in 1931 on battleships, cruisers,

aircraft and carriers, destroyers, and submarines. 17 This work was later

expanded after 1 933 to include the accuracy and damage effect of aerial

bombing, a study of grand strategy in World War I, 18 and a number of

historical studies on ship types, as well as collating and editing

translations by naval reservists of the German official history of the

World War and parts of Raoul Castex' multi-volume work, Theories

Strategiques.

The work of the research department stressed the increased emphasis

placed on the fleet battle tactics, which by 1931 formed most of the
1 44 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

operations study program. Engagements on the maneuver board

between opposing battle lines eventually reverted to the lessons

learned in the one great modern battleship engagement, the Battle of

Jutland. That battle was studied and analyzed throughout most of the

1930s. Laning, in a letter to Commander John Shafroth, a recent War

College graduate, spoke in glowing terms of the improvements made in

student execution of tactical problems:

We start them out with a verbal picture of The Naval Battle, then

give them some papers Captain Coffey (tactics instructor] has

prepared on the tactical handling of the battle line, and the tactical

handling of light forces. Other papers on the tactical operations of

air forces and submarines are now about ready .... With revised

procedures, the students are getting a lot of splendid groundwork in

fundamentals that heretofore were only brought home by the trialand-error method, which method wastes a lot of time and doesn't

always take anyhow.19 The emphasis on tactical handling of the fleet was sensible not only

in Laning s view but also in the view of many others. They felt then, as many were to feel half a century later, that a war would be fought with

what was available. Depression, tight budgets, a national administration committed to disarming for economy as well as for its own sake,

and few new developments produced an outlook that emphasized the

tactical handling of existing forces. The prevailing view was clearly

stated by Pratt when, commenting on Fleet Problem XII, the annual

fleet exercise for 1931, he emphasized

the inexorable advance of the heavy battleship, even though

encumbered by a large convoy. There are many who believe the day

of the battleship is over. It is my opinion those who hold this view

don't know what they are talking about, and that most of them

belong to a pure pacifist class who would like to see the Navy done

away with altogether, or else they belong to that class of people

who when ill go to the quack, instead of the specialist. 20 Naval War College Operations Problem IV, the last of the annual war

games in Laning's term, formed the basis for college recommendations

to the General Board and was studied and analyzed more thoroughly by

the college than any such operation problem up to that time. In this

particular problem, the Blue Fleet commander was Captain Ernest J. King, the senior student officer, and a man who a month before had

been selected a year early for promotion to rear admiral. In the problem

scenario, Orange had already seized the Philippines and King's objective

was to work out their recapture by Blue forces. There were several

possible routes for Blue forces based in Hawaii. King favored a movement north of the Marshall and Caroline Islands, then through

the Marianas to retake the Philippines, but Admiral Laning insisted
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1927-1 939 1 45

that King use the route south of the Marshalls and Carolines. King

objected that Blue forces would be subject to flank attacks by Orange

along the entire route and then be caught in a bottleneck between New

Guinea, Morotai, and Mindanao.

The head of the operations department, Captain Stephen C. Rowan,

told King that he could continue to play only if he would agree to play

the "school solution." King replied that he would carry out "the solution

of a berth-deck cook" rather than miss the chance to manage a fleet,

even on the maneuver board.

King kept his war game command, but still attempted to persuade

Laning to use the northern route. Laning, however, was not convinced.

Laning believed that by changing Blue Fleet's speed from 1 2 to 14 knots,

the southern route would be easy.

If only for the sake of peace in the game room, it was probably

fortunate that King was unexpectedly detached in the middle of the

game to become chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. This sudden

assignment for King was necessitated by the death of Rear Admiral

William A. Moffett in the crash at sea of the dirigible Akron on 4

April 1933. King was not disappointed when he suddenly gave up

command of the Blue Fleet, knowing the outcome would frustrate

him.21 A long critique of Operations Problem IV followed. It emphasized the

effects of the lack of logistical support for the Blue Fleet west of Hawaii,

particularly the absence of repair facilities for battleships in the

Philippines. Furthermore, the Japanese, with fewer capital ships than

the Americans, were not likely, at first, to seek out a battle line

engagement, preferring to attack with light forces and wear down the

U.S. Fleet as it steamed further and further from its own bases. The

student Orange Fleet commander, Captain C. R. Train, spoke for many

students who doubted the viability of the Blue plan when he asked, "Is

it a good thing for us to give so much attention to this [trans-Pacific]

crossing, when it is pretty well established that it could not be done?"22 Captain Adolphus Andrews, chief of staff at the War College, replied by

saying that because of the treaty ratios as applied to battle fleets, even

with casualties, the United States could expect to reach the Philippines

with a battle fleet equal to Japan's. Many students were unconvinced

and they urged that other methods of a campaign against Japan be

explored, even "strategic" bombing. King, who finished his final thesis

in pencil before hastening to Washington, foresaw actual events eight

years later when he wrote:

Japan will assume the offensive initially to acquire an advantage

where she can assume the defensive and defy us to alter the

situation, not that her defensive attitude will be in any degree

passive—it will not. 23
1 46 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The difference of opinion in this war game was typical of the whole

range of games that were played throughout the inter-war year. By 1940

two separate schools of thought had developed in Newport over the

best way to deal with a war against Japan. One argued for a quick dash

across the Pacific to relieve Manila and to establish a base there,

bypassing Japanese forces in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines.

This plan held that battleships were essential to controlling the sea and

also involved a decisive naval battle between the two fleets as the U.S.

Fleet approached the Philippines. The opposing school of thought

advocated a step-by-step method, in which the fleet, with its Marine

force, advanced first to the Marshall Islands, then moved westward,

establishing bases across the Pacific to the Philippines. Less hazardous

than the quick dash plan, the step-by-step plan always kept the fleet

within range of an advanced base and avoided risking everything in one

large battle. 24 These war games typified the Naval War College's approach to

educating officers in the 1920s and 1930s. After completing the 1933

course at the Naval War College, William F. Halsey went on for an

additional year of study as an exchange student at the Army War

College in Washington. Looking back, he compared the two:

At Newport we had studied the strategy and tactics of naval

campaigns with emphasis on logistics. At Washington, we studied

on a large scale—wars, not campaigns—and from the viewpoint of

the top echelon . . . . 25

Halsey had correctly described the situation when he was a student.

College presidents and staff had long sought a higher-level course for a selected group of students at the Naval War College.

The Advanced Course

A week after the 1933 graduation, Rear Admiral Luke McNamee

relieved Laning as college president. Coming ashore from a four-star

assignment in command of the Battle Force, McNamee, like Sims before

him, now reverted to the rank of rear admiral. At the age of 62 he

anticipated a two-year tour in Newport before mandatory retirement.

McNamee, a former student staff officer, may have realized that it

would be difficult with retirement so near to make a real contribution

or to effect specific changes in so short a time at the college. In any

event, a year after his arrival he requested early retirement to become

president of the Mackay Radio and Telegraphy and Federal Telegraph

companies; but in that short year, he accomplished something his

predecessors had been unable to do. He obtained approval for the

establishment of the advanced course.
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1927-1 939 1 47

McNamee had also been on Sims' staff in London and carried with

him the ideas of his wartime leader. Sims tried unsuccessfully as college president to establish such a course, which would provide one

additional year of study for selected graduates of the senior course. In

Sims' mind, however, the establishment of a junior course took priority.

He believed that the work he had undertaken at the college was

beneficial, first as a student in the traditional short summer course of

1911 and then the advanced work in the first long course in 1911-1912.

Presidents following Sims had continued to recommend an advanced

course, but a reluctant Navy Department, more specifically the Bureau

of Navigation, had pigeonholed these recommendations. In 1927,

Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur had issued a General Order which

specified that an advanced course, when established at the War

College, would include "the drafting of war plans and advanced phases

of naval campaigns,"26 but the course was not implemented. Various

boards on education and training had continued to support the need for

an advanced course, including the most recent one headed by Captain

Joseph K. Taussig in 1929.

In 1933, even before arriving in Newport, McNamee took up the

campaign for an advanced course. Looking at the Navy Registers pages

of flag officers and senior captains, McNamee noted to the Chief of

Naval Operations that there were few who had not completed the

senior course. With planned reductions in the Navy's shore establishments, senior officers should be available for additional study at the

college. At the same time, completion of the new wing under construction would provide badly needed facilities. He recommended that an

advanced course commence in the summer of 1934 with ten senior

officers, five from the present senior course and five from the fleet.

Also, the course should include an Army and a Marine officer, who

were graduates of either the Army or Naval War Colleges or the Army

Industrial College. In August 1934, Admiral W. H. Standley, the Chief

of Naval Operations, approved McNamee's recommendation, but

observed,

The drafting of war plans referred to in the request is only for the

purpose of training and would have no connection with war plans

which are now prepared in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.27 McNamee and his staff laid out an initial curriculum with the

expectation that succeeding courses would evolve from it. He was

particularly concerned with selecting the highest-quality officers who

would be ordered to the first advanced class and with the identity of its

senior student who would work directly with the president of the

college in developing the course. Finally and with agonizing slowness,

the Bureau of Navigation issued orders, but ignored the college's
1 48 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

recommendation that selected students of proven capacity from the

present senior class be continued for a second year. Similarly, the

Bureau ignored McNamee's request that the students be ordered for a two-year period to the advanced course. Several early nominees, such as Rear Admiral E. C. Kalbfus and Captain W. F. Halsey, Jr., were

unavailable. By July 1934, however, a class of 1 1 officers assembled in

Newport as the first advanced class. The senior student was Rear

Admiral W. S. Pye, who had long been interested in naval education.

Other students included Robert A. Theobald, Walter N. Vernou, Byron

McCandless, Ellis B. Miller of the Marine Corps, and Edward M. Offley

of the Army. The advanced class took over the old General Board room

in the lower floor of the library for classes and committee work, and

each officer was assigned a separate office in the first floor of the east

wing of the main building.

The advanced class was not in the same category as other classes at

the college. There was no connection between the college staff and the

class, although students attended the lectures given by prominent

educators. Instead, the immediate supervision of the class was given to

the senior member of the class who consulted almost daily with the

college president and carried out the policy laid down by the president.

The advanced class was concerned with international relations,

major strategy, and the broader aspects of warfare, with particular

attention to German and Japanese aspirations. There was no set

curriculum, but the class investigated subjects of immediate concern

to policymakers in Washington. The first class analyzed the policies of

the United States and Japan, the conflicts between those policies, and

the probable political objectives that would develop in event a war

should occur between the two countries. In addition, a plan for

American grand strategy was formulated along with an outline for joint

Army-Navy action in a war against Japan.28 The results produced by the first class were not encouraging. By and

large, the college staff placed the blame on the failure of the Navy

Department to order the best-qualified students to the advanced

course. What was needed were the officers of greatest analytical ability

in the service, but the college was unable to convince the Navy

Department that this criterion should override a qualified officer's

assignment to other duty. Up to 1940, subsequent advanced course

students continued with the same studies in preparation for a future

war with Japan, yet their work, too, was plagued by late arrival of several

students and early detachment of others.29

College Expansion

Since the reopening of the college in 1919, college presidents had
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 1 49

repeatedly requested funds for physical improvements. By 1928,

student numbers had already reached nearly 80 a year, and the staff

steadily expanded from 1 4 in 1 9 1 9 to 35 in 1 934. Students crowded into

offices with four and five to a study room, and the library had outgrown

the quarters built 30 years before. With the exception of the library, the

college was confined to the 1 892 building that had been constructed to

house four officers and teach only 18. During the 1920s, no funds had

been available for construction. Finally in 1933 the urgent pleas of the

college were heeded. Under the Emergency Relief and Construction

Act of 1932, $360,000 was allocated to construction of a new wing to

house an auditorium, a large gaming room, and additional office space

for staff and students. Approval for this expansion came at the same

time that Admiral McNamee was able to obtain approval for the

advanced course. Looking forward to the completion of the wing, McNamee thought

it appropriate to name the two buildings in honor of Luce and Mahan.

McNamee recommended that the older building with the 1904

library annex be named for Luce and the new building named for

Mahan. Chief of Naval Operations W. H. Standley approved the

selection of Luce's name, but directed that the new wing be named

after Admiral Pringle, noting it was when he was Chief of Staff [1924]

that the first steps were taken in regard to the new War College wing

and during his incumbency as president [1930-33] that the plans of

the building were completed and approved. In addition, Pringle had

distinguished himself in a number of ways but had not been widely

recognized. During World War I, he had commanded USS Melville,

Sims' flagship at Queenstown, Ireland, and served also as Chief of

Staff, Destroyer Flotillas, European Waters. Mahan, the CNO noted,

was honored in so many ways throughout the Navy that there was no

impelling reason to name for him a building "with which he had no

connection whatever."30 Since 1932 a move had been afoot in Washington to transfer the

college from the direct responsibility of the Chief of Naval

Operations back once again to the Bureau of Navigation. The Chief of

the Bureau, Rear Admiral F. B. Upham, argued that the college was

"primarily a technical school for the training and education of line

officers"31 and that it was best administered through the Bureau of

Navigation in the same way as the Postgraduate School and the Naval

Academy. In October 1934, the Naval War College was placed under

the administrative jurisdiction of the Bureau, but policy decisions

regarding the War College remained subject to the approval of the

Chief of Naval Operations. At the same time, the president of the

Naval War College was removed from the now perfunctory ex-officio

membership on the General Board.
1 50 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The change in administrative responsibility raised a hope that

further construction funds could be obtained to expand the college

library. In 1934, the college president complained that

the library was completely inadequate, the small adjoining room,

which is used as a reading room for newspapers and periodicals,

contains but two small tables, both completely covered with

current publications. There can be no provision at present for

retention of important magazines.32 With little space for the main collection, the library continued to divert

some of its holdings into the small reference collection that had first

been dispersed to convenient locations around the college in 1920-

1 92 1 . By 1 940, these small collections had grown from the original 1 to

54, averaging 60 to 100 volumes apiece.

In 1935, the Bureau of Navigation agreed to name the 1904 library

annex in honor of A. T. Mahan. This time, the building was one in

which Mahan had actually worked, albeit briefly during his few visits

between 1908 and 1912. Finally in 1937, construction was begun on an

addition to the 1904 building. A large, paneled reading room with a stack area to the north was added and completed in the spring of 1938.

Mahan Hall and the library it housed made an impressive memorial

as well as being an integral feature of the life of the college. Only a portrait of Captain Mahan was lacking. In 1939 Rear Admiral C. P. Snyder started a campaign for subscriptions to provide the necessary

funds to commission such a portrait. His successor, Rear Admiral

Kalbfus, continued the effort by a direct appeal to the nearly 1,400

living graduates of the college for contributions of only one dollar from

each man. This appeal was made following the observation of the

centennial of Mahan's birth in September 1940. It was successful, and

Alexander James, son of the Harvard philosopher and psychologist

William James, was commissioned to paint the portrait using photographs and a specially made rear admiral's uniform from the 1906

period. James received $1,650 for the portrait, which was unveiled at

the brief ceremony in August 1 945, commemorating Mahan's arrival at

the college in August 1886. It was designed to hang above the fireplace

in the rotunda of Mahan Hall.33 In the college's physical expansion, the immediate need was to

accommodate the increased numbers of staff and students as well as to

provide larger space for long-established activities such as the library

and war gaming. The construction of the large auditorium in Pringle

Hall reflected the change in instruction methods that had followed the

reopening of the college in 1919. Lectures had always played a role at

the college, but from 1919 the number of lectures reached 50 a year

from noted civilian and service experts, in addition to presentations by

staff members. In tone and purpose, the lectures supported the general
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1927-1939 151

proposition that the college was involved in training, not advanced

education. There were lectures to inform students about current issues,

part of the college's mission "to develop and coordinate systematic

courses of instruction and training for officers."34 In 1932, Harris Laning explained the rationale for lectures, as he saw

it: We use all the lecture time to cover certain things not coverable by

reading . . . lectures on policies, especially the present-day policies

of our own and other countries and the conflict between them.

Then we have lectures on the happenings in our own and other

countries to show the conditions, the state of mind, etc. in these

countries .... Our next series of lectures have to do with

economics, international trade, commerce, etc., arranged in such a way to bring home to the student some idea of how to use economic

strangulation in the strategy of war .... Although economic

pressure through control of the sea has always been a particular

role of the Navy in war, very little has been done in our Navy in the

past to perfect ourselves for carrying out that role.35 There were also lectures on international law and recent historical

subjects such as the Gallipoli campaign, which provided the substance

of a lecture nearly every year. The new auditorium was used for the first

time to house these lectures on 20 April 1934 with a lecture by

Professor W. S. Myers on "Comparative Organization of Government

for War."

The year 1934 marked the War College's semicentennial. To begin its

second 50 years, the college received a new president, Rear Admiral

Edward C. Kalbfus. Relieving McNamee in mid-June, Kalbfus had

already been a flag officer for four years, two in the Navy Department as Director of War Plans, and two in the fleet as Commander, Destroyers,

Battle Force. A 1 927 War College graduate, he stayed on the staff for two

years, first as head of the logistics department, then as head of the

intelligence department. In succeeding years, he kept in close touch

with War College presidents and senior staff officers. When he returned

he needed little briefing to take up his new duties.

Kalbfus arrived soon after the Navy and the War College had taken a new and more confident look into the future. The day after ground had

been broken for the new wing to be named Pringle Hall, a new American

president had been inaugurated. He had the personal interest, reliance

on, and knowledge of the Navy that his distant cousin, Theodore

Roosevelt, had shown 30 years earlier. Both had been Assistant

Secretaries of the Navy and both were well known within the naval

service. During their terms of office, both followed the operations of the

fleet closely. Both enjoyed being with the fleet, and both sponsored

major fleet expansions. From 1933 on, classes at Newport were looking
1 52 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

at an expanding and more modern Navy in their problem solving, and

the college physical plant would also benefit from having a sailor in the

White House.

Narragansett Bay was a busy place in the summer of 1934. President

Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Newport in Vincent Astor's yacht

Nourmahal, and there was another British challenge for the America's

Cup. The white American J-boats were already competing in the waters

west of Coasters Harbor Island for the honor of meeting the blue-hulled

British challenger Endeavor, soon to arrive. For the past two summers,

only ships of the U.S. Navy's Training Squadron had visited Newport. But

in early June 1934, the United States Fleet, after being reviewed by

President Roosevelt off New York on 31 May, arrived in Narragansett

Bay. It was the fleet's first visit to the East Coast since 1927, and it

received an enthusiastic reception Newporters were jubilant; the Daily

News editorialized, "Newport loves the Navy, and at last it has come

back."36 On 1 1 July, the new auditorium in Pringle Hall was the scene of a gathering of some 200 fleet officers of all ranks. The principal speaker

was the new Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Joseph Mason

Reeves, the first fleet commander-in-chief to be qualified in aviation,

and a former head of the college's tactics department. Tall and

picturesque with an impressive white goatee that reputedly concealed

an anchor tatooed on his chin, Reeves was a gifted extemporaneous

speaker. Only a month after he took up his command, the charismatic

admiral delivered an extemporaneous address to the fleet that marked

the beginning of the transition from a peacetime fleet to one in which

men were mentally and emotionally prepared for a future war. Appropriately, he chose the Naval War College as the place to launch

fleet reform. Addressing fleet officers in Pringle Hall, he said,

In everything we do, we must ask ourselves: does this directly

advance preparation for war?

Our Fleet today is over-organized, over-educated, over-theorized,

over-instructed, over-administrated, over-complicated, and over- whelmed with red tape, correspondence, paperwork and books!

I believe the Fleet can be handled far more effectively and

practically than is the case today if the number of tactical books

used by the Department is limited to four. Any commander may

indoctrinate his command in any way he chooses, except by

complicated books and pamphlets on tactical procedures.

If war comes, this Fleet must fight 'as is.' You must fight at sea and

not on paper. Victories are won by practical results. Practical

results are obtained by application at sea of our studies, theories,

and analyses on shore.

You will get licked with your nose in the wrong book and your

pocket full of red tape and fine forms unless you lock your library in
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 153

the safe, stand up, and face a practical sea situation in a practical

seamanlike way, using your own brains and making your own

decisions.37 Reeves was making a point long supported by the Naval War College

that theories and analyses belonged properly within its walls, but the

application of the ideas it developed should be embodied in doctrine,

standardized procedures, and order forms which avoided overwhelming

paperwork. It was the basic assumption of the college's "estimate of the

situation" teaching.

The Concept of the College in the 1 930s

By the late 1930s the concept behind the War College had developed

into a clear educational philosophy, the result of the cumulative efforts

of several presidents and many staff officers spanning two decades.

Since William S. Sims resumed the college presidency in 1919, the

college had consistently perceived a clear role for senior naval officers

in the defense of the country. They were being groomed in the practical,

mental discipline necessary to command naval forces at sea rather than

to manage a bureaucracy or to make policy. Their education, training, sea duty, and practical experience were directed toward making the

existing naval forces work at all levels. The college took for its area of

work the education of senior officers in problems of command.

In this the college staff believed that its principal role was to teach

naval officers how to make sound decisions when in command

positions. A commander's subordinates, whether on a staff or in a ship,

tended to the multitude of administrative and operational details

associated with his decisions. Thus, as the college saw it, the chief

quality a naval commander must have is good judgment. That

judgment must be perceptive and must produce the best possible

decisions under existing conditions. Good judgment might be the

result of rare, inherent genius. It could also be developed through study,

reflection, and mental exercise. In the 1920s and 1930s, the college saw

its purpose as the development of judgment by these means.38 In practice this meant that students were first required to master

"accepted principles of reasoning" through study of the methodology

first introduced in 1908 as the applicatory system and further

developed in the ensuing quarter of a century. Then, they applied it to

the solution of assumed strategic and tactical problems, which they

expressed in terms of military decisions. Finally, they drew up plans

and formulated orders to translate their military decisions into

effective action.

When all this had been accomplished, the students played their

solutions first as chart maneuvers, with every member of the class
1 54 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

participating in a command or staff capacity, and then later on the

tactical game board. In 1 934, this war gaming activity was shifted to the

commodious second floor of recently completed Pringle Hall, where

the tile floor resembled a large checkerboard, its squares providing

scales for distance and range. Agallery extending along the four sides of

this large room permitted close observation without encumbering the

players.

The prime motive for playing war games was to provide mental

exercise so as to develop sound judgment. Student preparation began

with an estimate of an assumed situation for which they formulated

plans and orders. This estimate of the situation had to be rigorous and

demanding, and it provided the basis for the plan. It embraced a systematic procedure for the selection of appropriate objectives to be

achieved by naval forces. Thus it was necessary for the commander in

each hypothetical problem to understand the underlying strategic

purpose of the campaign, so the achievement of the immediate naval

objective could further that purpose, and to weigh the relative fighting

strengths of his own and enemy forces, as influenced by the various

characteristics of the theater of operations.

In addition, these problems provided a means of familiarization with

the composition and capabilities of foreign fleets and with important

strategic areas such as the Caribbean and North America's Atlantic

Coast. Primarily, however, games were set in the central and western

Pacific. The college intended the increased mental facility the students

gained from meeting assumed situations to be practical grounding in

the fundamentals of strategy and tactics. This was a clear echo of Sims'

insistence that the college course be predominantly practical rather

than theoretical. The games were a means to that end; they provided a means to link theory with practical application.

By this time the college had also come to follow a clear philosophy of

the role of armed forces in the affairs of the state. It was reflected in a lecture by Captain C. W. Magruder in 1 938, when he told students that

national policy will initiate war and will prescribe the political

objective. Echoing Clausewitz, he said, "Policy throughout the war will

continually exercise a guiding hand over its conduct and finally the

policymakers—not the military leaders—will have the last word in

deciding when hostilities shall cease." Continuing to expand on his

exposition of the classic Clausewitzian concept of war as an instrument

of national policy, he told his audience, "War for us should not mean

that diplomacy has failed—that the armed forces are called in to bail

out the State Department—but rather it should signify the decision by

the administration to employ violent means to accomplish national

ends that cannot be attained by peaceful purposes."39 Obviously, a competent government will have a clear conception of its political
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1927-1939 155

objectives, and it must decide their relative importance by identifying

which are vital and which are subordinate; and competent statesmen

will know where the objectives their country seeks conflict with the

rights and desires of other powers. These objectives, Magruder

concluded, grow and develop from basic causes. They are frequently of

long standing "while statesmen are often mere political accidents of

temporary tenure."40

The "Green Hornet"—Sound Military Decision

The crowning expression of the college's philosophy during this period

came with the publication of Sound Military Decision. During his first

term as president from 1934 to the end of 1936, Kalbfus commenced a revision of the college's pamphlet, Estimate of the Situation, which had

been used since 1910 to teach the applicatory system to the students. The

Estimate was small, only 42 pages, and was already in its eighth version

since it first appeared during the presidency of Rear Admiral R. P. Rodgers. The revised editions had been written under the direction of W.

L. Rodgers in 191 1-1912, Austin Knight in 1915, W. S. Sims in 1921, C. S. Williams in 1924, W. V. Pratt in 1926, J. R. P. Pringle in 1929, and Harris

Laning in 1932. Most of the revisions were minor, but in 1915 Austin

Knight stressed the importance of logical progression. "The estimate is

not for the purpose of justifying a decision previously arrived at," Knight

wrote "It is a reasoned solution of a problem where each step in the

process approaches a decision, [which] without those steps could be

arrived at by accident only."41 The 1 924 and 1 926 editions obscured some of the simple logic behind

the process by adding a detailed series of questions that needed to be

answered in order to identify a commander's mission. The manner in

which these questions were framed led to confusion in differentiating

between "missions" and "tasks." This confusion caused the estimate to

become only a recurring process for a commander as he went from one

crisis to another, always in hope he was accomplishing "the ultimate

mission of the superior" in the process.42 A further difficulty was

presented by the 1 926 edition which combined The Estimate pamphlet,

for the first time, with another War College pamphlet, The Formulation

of Orders, Doctrine, and Dissemination of Information. Although the

two pamphlets appeared between the same covers, they were not yet

effectively united as a single conceptual work.

The 1929 edition made conceptual progress by defining a commander's mission as an assigned task coupled with an explanation of

the purpose of the task. Then after considering the situation as a whole,

a commander should analyze all the obstacles opposing accomplishment of the task, including the strength and capabilities of both the
1 56 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

enemy's and one's own forces. With this done, a commander could

proceed to analyze the courses of action open to him and to select the

one best suited to accomplish the task of the mission. This in turn

provided the basis for making auxiliary decisions and formulating

tasks to be carried out by subordinates.43 Further minor amendments were made in the 1932 edition under

Laning. Both Laning and his predecessor, Pringle, had felt that previous

editions of the pamphlet had become too long. Pringle's staff tried to

"cut it down and simplify it."44 Laning declared that his version

"contains solid meat and that not one idea can be overlooked even

though expressed in only one sentence." But, he added pensively,

"Perhaps we were too optimistic as to what one sentence can do."45 In 1933, Captain Forde A. Todd, the head of strategy studies for the

senior class in the department of operations, prepared a booklet

entitled, A Study and Discussion of the Estimate of the Situation, as an

adjunct to the Estimate of the Situation, to provide students with a keener appreciation and clearer understanding of the basic elements.

Todd dealt with many of the common difficulties that student officers

experienced with the Estimate, using a dialogue format between a typical student and staff officer. At the end of the booklet, the

hypothetical student asked what benefit derives from this study. The

staff officer replied

A. As I conceive it, the principal benefit of this course is acquiring

mental and moral experience.

Proficiency in any art can only be had by practice. This practice is to increase our experience so that we unconsciously, as it were, do

the right thing.

In peacetime we can only have complete practice in war by such

sub-caliber war as we conduct here. But in all our games and

maneuvers here, the elements of chance, courage, and material

efficiency are, necessarily, incapable of being injected into the

solutions. They remain units for each side.

Consequently, striking out the elements of units on both sides, as in mathematics, we have left only the intellectual qualities of

knowledge and experience and the moral quality of character to

develop.

After listening to some further advice, the student exclaimed,

Q. Well, with all these, I'm sure that I can tackle the next problem

with more intelligence.

A. No, experience. You can't add a iot to your intelligence. Well, so

long.

Student officer (to himself): He seems to expect me to be a Jove,

Neptune, and Mars combined in one.

Staff officer (to himself): That chap had me crowding on all sail. He

knows much more than he thinks he does.46
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1927-1939 157

To add credence to the effort, the college staff looked for some

estimates that were actually made in wartime and rewrote the original

documents in the format the college used. As an appendix to Todd's

book, Captain R. B. Coffey translated into War College form General

Grant's order to Major General G. G. Meade of 9 April 1864 for the

Potomac campaign. To supplement this, a version of a battle order was

prepared by a member of the junior class, using Nelson's Trafalgar

Memorandum as a basis.47 Undoubtedly good fun, it was also the first

published attempt by the college to explain The Estimate more fully.48 When Kalbfus took up the college presidency in 1934, he believed

that a new revision was essential. "At the time that this change was in

process of contemplation," Kalbfus recalled,

it was not generally accepted by the Navy that their business was to

fight although, of course, if confronted with this question, they

would have agreed that that is what they were hired for. But, within

the range of my own observation, both ashore and afloat, I saw that

the keeping of office hours and the performance of sundry routine

tasks were more in order than an intensive study of the Navy's real

business.49 Todd's work had already suggested that the Estimate pamphlet had

become too short, and Kalbfus believed it was vague, misleading, and

confusing. Kalbfus sought more than a revision, he wanted a complete

recasting of the pamphlet, turning its terse outline form into a book on

the art of logical thinking, which would be appropriate to every

military situation.

To Kalbfus, the key to improving the work was developing it along

more logical lines. To do this, he sought outside assistance. Since 1920,

W. E. Hocking, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, had been

a regular lecturer at the college, speaking on a variety of subjects such

as "Morale," "Psychology," and "Leadership." In 1934, Kalbfus asked

Hocking to change his usual topic to a new one that would directly help

the college revise The Estimate. Using this lecture, "Logic and its

Process," as a basis, Kalbfus ordered the staff to begin rewriting the

pamphlet. A year later, however, little had been accomplished. In the

summer of 1935, an army infantry major, Edward S. Johnston, reported

as a student in the senior course. A University of Indiana graduate and

writer on the art of war, he had made a name for himself by publishing a critique that condemned the Army Field Service Regulations for their

failure to deal with fundamental values, rather than changing factors in

warfare. In the year before coming to Newport, Johnston had served on

an Army War College committee devoted to discovering the basic

factors in planning and executing joint operations. Its purpose touched

on the same ideas which Kalbfus sought, and it may be that Kalbfus

arranged for Johnston to be assigned to the Naval War College with that
1 5 8 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

thought in mind. At any rate, Johnston soon became a collaborator in

Kalbfus' work, serving also as a sounding board for his ideas and

stimulating his thought.

In addition, Johnston was directly responsible for the idea which

Kalbfus called "the fundamental principle for the attainment of an end."

This was a three part text for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability

which asked

1. Will the course of action accomplish the mission?

2. Will the available resources allow the mission to be carried out?

3. Is the cost worth the price?

The first draft of Kalbfus' work was completed in May 1936 and

distributed to staff and students for comment and criticism.

Committees were established to review the comments during the

summer. Three of them were headed by distinguished staff members:

Captain Robert A. Theobald, head of strategy in the senior class;

Captain Raymond A. Spruance, head of tactics in the senior course, and

Captain Richmond Kelly Turner, assistant for air operations in the

department of operations and one of the college's most effective

lecturers on naval strategy.50 The draft was controversial. Many thought the book had become too

long, others said it was too complex. Some staff members disapproved of

Kalbfus' innovative work, but hesitated to earn the admiral's wrath.

Others, such as Raymond Spruance, objected to Kalbfus' ponderous

style and his rejection of the so-called "principles of war." In 1934, the

list contained nine principles: objective, offensive, superiority, cooperation, simplicity, economy, surprise, movement, and security, and had

been part of the basic doctrine in the Army since 1921, 51 but they had

never been fully accepted by the Navy. In 1933, Captain Todd's

explication of The Estimate declared that if war could be conducted by

formula, one "could not have distinguished Nelson, John Paul Jones,

Decatur, or Farragut from their fellow officers." It is a simple matter to

collect maxims, but "the difficulty always lies in applying rightly those

deductions. Sound decisions depend, fundamentally, on character,

knowledge, and experience."52 These ideas were long engrained at the

Naval War College and Kalbfus was their latest exponent. The use of

the principles of war as a means of exercising effective command was,

in Kalbfus' opinion,

a very dangerous condition, for it led the unwary to believe that if he remembered the names of these nine so-called principles, which

were, however, merely nine nouns and not statements of cause and

effect, he could feel that he did really understand the fundamentals

of warfare, particularly if this practice were approved and in effect

at the only institution we had which covered the study of naval

warfare.53
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 159

Spruance disagreed with Kalbfus on this and argued with his boss,

Captain J. W. Wilcox, head of the operations department. Wilcox

thought Kalbfus' work was magnificent and forbade Spruance to

criticize it. In Spruance's view, Wilcox lacked courage to tell the truth.

The two argued; Spruance disobeyed Wilcox and went directly to

Kalbfus with his criticisms. Outraged, Wilcox threatened to destroy

Spruance's career for his insubordination. When the incident finally

came to the admiral's attention, Kalbfus vindicated Spruance, over- ruling Wilcox's demand that Spruance be punished.54 With all the criticisms collated, Kalbfus proceeded to put his book in

print, but in the process he came to the conclusion that his work should

supersede the old Estimate pamphlets and not be merely another

edition. In order to differentiate it, his new 91 -page booklet was titled

Sound Military Decision.

Kalbfus was just leaving the college to take up his new position as vice admiral commanding Battleships, Battle Force, when the book

came off the press. His successor as president of the Naval War College,

Rear Admiral C. P. Snyder, evaluated the book for a year and then issued

his own version in May 1938. Snyder recast part of three chapters and

attempted to make a more precise treatment of the order form while

clarifying portions of Kalbfus' text.55 Kalbfus was outraged that Snyder had tampered with his text.

Promoted to full admiral in command of the entire Battle Force in 1 938,

Kalbfus was persuaded by his chief of staff, Captain C. J. Moore, to avoid

a public confrontation with Snyder over the issue. In June 1 939, when it

became apparent that he would not be given a Washington appointment, Kalbfus requested a return to the Naval War College to finish his

work on Sound Military Decision. Resuming his two-star rank, Kalbfus

brought back with him Edward S. Johnston, now a lieutenant colonel.

As a result of Kalbfus' intervening experience as Commander, Battle

Force, he was able to make an important addition to the book. Up to

that time, the work only examined the process up to the point where a decision had been made. Now Kalbfus could see clearly that it had been

a serious omission not to include a chapter on "The Supervision of the

Planned Action." He immediately added it and in 1 940, several drafts of

the new and expanded version were circulated, with another draft

appearing in 1941. From 1940, the book was given a green paper cover

and soon became known among the students as the "Green book" or the

"Green Hornet." In March 1942, a full edition appeared and was

reprinted several times during the year. It was distributed widely

throughout the Navy as the only published guide for naval planning

that was available to officers involved in writing the multitude of plans

and orders used during the war. At the Naval War College, the staff under Kalbfus' successor, Rear
1 60 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Admiral W. S. Pye, revised the book three times between 1943 and 1945

for purposes of instruction within the college and distributed new

versions in mimeographed copies. One version came into use in

October 1 943 and was superseded by another revised version in January

1944. In June 1944, Pye issued a new mimeographed book entitled The

Operational Function of Command, Including Sound Military Decision,

which he claimed superseded Kalbfus' work. An abridged version of this

was used in the college from April 1 945. In 1 944, Admiral Ernest J. King

issued a portion of Sound Military Decision as COMINCH P-l: Naval

Directives and the Order Form. In issuing it, King wrote "the matter

contained in this publication is prescribed as standard in the United

States Fleet for use in the formulation of Naval Directives."

The most widely known and used edition of Sound Military Decision

was Kalbfus' own 1942 version. Like the Estimate pamphlet which it

superseded, Sound Military Decision was prey to revisionists who

would follow. The significance of the 1942 version, however, is that it

presented a fairly comprehensive theory of war. A work of this kind is

an enormous undertaking; that it was undertaken by a man whose

training and background were more naval and military than scholarly

and philosophical makes it even more remarkable. Kalbfus' purpose

was to elaborate upon the methodology of the applicatory system,

encourage deep thinking on the nature of professional judgment, and to

relate the role of armed forces to the implementation of national policy.

Kalbfus' view of war as the ultima ratio regum was a statement of the

classic concept espoused by Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, and other

leading philosophers and commentators whose works formed the bulk

of the required and suggested reading lists at the college. Kalbfus went

further. He related this concept to the military commander whose task

it is to lead and to direct armed forces in combat. As a professional naval

officer, he recognized that the commander must keep uppermost in his

mind the strategic effect that would be achieved by the successful

accomplishment of the military task at hand. He emphasized that the

chief task of the commander was to make sound military decisions

through the exercise of good judgment, obviously based upon known

and knowable facts.

The methodology of the applicatory system as it was used at the

college was the tool by which a commander and his subordinates could

order data, relate them to ultimate purpose, and ascertain the best or most likely means of producing the desired effect. In this sense it was

essentially a descriptive theory, meeting the requirements that

Clausewitz elaborated. Even so, it was not abstract. It was eminently

practical. Many believe it was and still is the most valuable contribution to military thought made at the Naval War College in the past

century.
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 161

Despite its high purpose and the weighty and useful ideas and

techniques it contained, Sound Military Decision was flawed. Its chief

flaw was that it did not illustrate its excellent ideas by practical,

concrete historical examples that would impress practical-minded

readers. Moreover, its prose was ponderous. The final product was mor^e

of a treatise, albeit an excellent one, than a useful publication for other

naval officers.

In any event, as the protracted struggles of Luce and others at the

college had clearly shown, the U.S. Navy as an institution has always

had difficulty reflecting on the art and science of war. Sound Military

Decision enjoyed only a short period in vogue before it was shelved by

more literal-minded officers after World War II. By the time Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941,

the Naval War College had already made its most significant contribution to the war effort by its earlier training of officers in a methodology

for problem solving. Kalbfus' Sound Military Decision was the most

important expression of the college's philosophy, embodying both the

focus and understanding expressed in college classrooms throughout

the inter-war period. When the United States entered World War II, every flag officer qualified to command at sea, but one, was a graduate of

the Naval War College,56 and had become accustomed to think in terms

it had established.

Notes

1. "The Naval War College," New York Times, 19 Sept. 1927, p. 24:3, and

Army-Navy Journal, 4 June 1928.

2. NWC Archives, RG 2: W. S. Sims to Chief Bureau of Navigation, 20

September 1920.

3. Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., USN, and Lieutenant Commander J. Byran III, USNR, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York: McGraw, Hill, 1947], p. 54.

4. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral

King (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 242.

5. Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and the Naval War

College—Part I," Naval War College Review (March 1971), p. 36. Based on Naval

War College, Information for Student Officers (Newport, 1927), pp. 3-10.

6. NWC Archives, Staff-Student File: Nimitz: Mrs. Catherine Nimitz to Vice

Admiral Stansfield Turner, 2 April 1973.

7. Sims to Secretary of the Navy, 16 June 1919, quoted in G. J. Kennedy,

"Naval War College," p. 179, fn. 44.

8. "Outline History," p. 189.

9. G J. Kennedy, "Naval War College," p. 160.

10. Ibid., pp. 172-73.

11. Ibid., pp. 166-67.

12. Ibid., p. 168.

13. Ibid., p. 170.

1 4. NWC Archives, RG 1 6: Harris Laning, Opening Address, 1 July 1 932, p. 3. 15. NWC Archives, RG 4: Harris Laning, "The Naval Battle," May 1933.
1 62 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

16. "Outline History/' pp. 369-371: Research Department Memo of 18 May

1932.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 388; Research Department Memo of 17 July 1933; p. 398,

"Research Department, 1933-34;" and p. 41 1, "Research. 1934-35."

1 9. NWC Archives, RG 2, Box 34, P 1 1 -3 Lectures 1 930-32: Laning to Shafroth,

28 Nov. 1932.

20. Army and Navy Register, 14 March 1931, interview with W. V. Pratt. 21. King and Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King, p. 239.

22. NWC Archives, RG 8: Operations Problem IV: Captain C. R. Train

critique notes.

23. King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 237.

24. Frederick C. Sherman, Combat Command (New York: Dutton, 1950], pp.

43-44.

25. Halsey and Byron, Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 54.

26. General Order 168, 21 Sept. 1927.

27. NWC Archives, RG 2, File A 3-1: CNO to Chief, BuNav, 16 Aug. 1933.

28. "Outline History," p. 409. These plans have not been located. See

Kennedy, p. 279, footnote 22. See also, Staff Study, U.S. Naval War College, 1 954.

Annex N: E. C. Kalbfus "Memorandum Notes on NWC History."

29. "Outline History," pp. 434-35; Kennedy, pp. 280-281.

30. Kennedy, pp. 215-216, 233-35, 272. Quote on Pringle, pp. 234-35.

31. Ibid., p. 210. Quoting Chief, BuNav letter to CNO, 6 August 1932.

32. Ibid., pp. 273-74.

33. NWC Archives, RG 2, Box 28. File PG-5. For appeal, see "Secretary's

Notes," USNI Proceedings, Vol. 65, No. 5 (May 1939], p. 779.

34. NaVy Department, Annual Report of the Secretary . . . 1933, p. 34.

35. NWC Archives, RG 2, Box 34, File PI 1-3: Laning to Shafroth, 28 Nov.

1932.

36. Newport Daily News, 22 June 1934.

37. Quoted in John D. Hayes, "Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, USN (1872-

1948): Part II- 1931 to 1948: Commanding the U.S. Fleet and in World War II," Naval War College Review, (January 1972], Vol. XXIV, No. 5, p. 59.

38. NWC Archives, RG 19: "Prospectus of the Naval War College Courses,

1938-40."

39. NWC Archives, RG 14: Staff lectures: C. W. Magruder, "Policy and

Warfare," 8 Dec. 1938.

40. Loc. cit., C. W. Magruder, "The Potential Economic Strength and

Weakness of Japan," 24 April 1939.

41. C. W. Cullen, "From the Kriegsacademie to the Naval War College: The

Military Planning Process," Naval War College Review (January 1970), Vol. 22,

No. 5, p. 15.

42. Ibid., p. 16.

43. Ibid.

44. T. B. Buell, "Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Naval Planner's Holy

Scripture: Sound Military Decision," Naval War College Review, Vo.. 25, No. 5

(May-June 1 973), p. 32. Quoting J. K. Taussig letter to J. T. G. Stapler, 1 8 January

1929.

45. Ibid., quoting Laning to M. H. Simons, 10 October 1932.

46. F. A. Todd, A Study and Discussion of the Estimate of the Situation

(Newport, 1933), pp. 36-37.

47. Ibid., pp. 38-46.
EDUCATING LEADERS FOR WORLD WAR, 1 927- 1 939 1 63

48. Cullen, op. cit., p. 16.

49. Staff Study, 1954, op. cit., Kalbfus "Memorandum," p. N-5.

50. Buell, op. cit., pp. 33-35.

51. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1977), pp. 212-14, 512, footnote 42.

52. Todd, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

53. Staff Study, 1954, op. cit., p. N-6. See also Sound Military Decision (1942),

pp. 25-28.

54. Buell, The Quiet Warrior (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 73.

55. Sound Military Decision (Newport, 1938), p. 1. 56. The exception was Rear Admiral, later Vice Admiral, Randall Jacobs,

Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, 1941-1945.
£N

CHAPTER 7

INTERLUDE: THE WAR

COLLEGE DURING

WORLD WAR II, 1939-1946

In 1938 and 1939, the Naval War College

reflected the slow adjustment of Americans to the possibility of a second world war. German, Italian, and Japanese ambitions posed

threats to the long-term national interests of the United States; yet, like

most Americans in those years, the lecturers, students, and staff at the

Naval War College did not anticipate the international arrangements

that would be required to forestall those threats.

Even in 1 938, the theoretical possibility of a war between the United

States and Great Britain was still entertained at the college. Admittedly, it was unlikely to occur, but the staff thought it was of interest as an academic discussion as well as a means to measure the capability of

the U.S. Navy. In Tactical Operations Problem VI, conducted in

February 1938, the students grappled with a Blue-Red War in the

Atlantic, with Crimson (Canada) coming in as an ally of the British.

Blue planned to capture Halifax, and to engage the Red Fleet off Sable

Island. Repeatedly played in 1932, 1933, and 1934, the final "Battle of

Sable Island," demonstrated American naval capability by conceiving

of British forces turning away with a dozen disabled battleships. 1 While

measuring American capabilities against traditional British naval

prowess, the college did not go further to examine the now likely need

to cooperate with the Royal Navy in combat against a common enemy.

Moreover, the exercise was fought against a similar fleet, not the

dissimilar navy the United States eventually faced in battle.

In discussing current issues, opinion varied widely and, with

hindsight, some of it appears quite inaccurate. A few weeks after
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1 939- 1 946 1 65

Germany's attack on Poland, a visiting lecturer, Bruce C. Hopper,

expected "the boot [will] tighten on Germany," and he thought at that

time Hitler would offer to abdicate. Clearly, the Fuhrer would be forced to

leave Germany. Hopper sarcastically told the student body, "No nation is

equipped to give refuge to a man-made god, unless it be the United States;

there is always Hollywood."

In a more serious vein, he expected a changed world to emerge from the

war, explaining, "A civilization that spends up to 50 percent of its income

for war is doomed to disaster." Despite the portents of doom that were so

clear late in 1939, Hopper was optimistic. Taking a long view, he stated,

"This war is only one violent aspect of that change which is nothing less

than the rebirth of all human society, comparable in historical significance and greatly exceeding in magnitude the previous rebirth of

Western society beginning 400 years ago—the Renaissance."2 In the tactical area, the role of aviation in modern warfare continued to

excite interest at the college. Captain A. H. Douglas of the staff pointed

out in December 1939 that "aviation can be counted upon for the

execution of important tasks in the three fields of information, of

security, and of attack." It is "no mystery, nor is it the property of any

small group of military specialists," he declared; naval aviation is "here to

stay."3 Following the German conquest of Western Europe and the start of

the Battle of Britain in 1940, Commander Henry S. Kendall surveyed the

employment of aviation in naval warfare for the staff. He clearly and

accurately saw that one operational effect of aviation would be an

enlargement of the "area of tactical contact and action [by] merging along

the coastline of the spheres of influence of the military and naval forces."

Moreover, carrier-based aircraft heralded "the availability of a new

weapon, effective ... in the tactical offensive against all classes of

vessels." One result of this development, in Kendall's opinion, would be

the "relative reduction in the importance of destroyers and submarines as

a means for inflicting attrition." Therefore, he concluded, it would be

necessary to expend considerable strength and effort toward "the early

destruction of enemy air power and the continuous protection of our

own. 4 The enfolding developments of the war in Europe showed that new

techniques had to be mastered and that new lessons had to be learned.

Nevertheless, according to Captain John L. Hall, head of the strategy

department, the fundamental concept for the strategic employment of

the fleet remained unchanged. Echoing old concepts, he declared, "The

only reason for the formation of a fleet is to provide battle power.

Therefore, the chief strategic function of the battle fleet is the creation of

situations that will bring about decisive battle under conditions that will

ensure the defeat of the enemy."5 It would not be long before a wider

concept of naval warfare became current at the college.
1 66 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

By early 1940, however, the War College had begun to come to grips

with the implication of American participation in the war. In April, the

advanced class, under the direction of Captain Hall, presented the

results of its study of possible American involvement in a two-ocean

war. Although at the time it seemed unlikely that the President would

take the recommended action, the class believed that the United States

should increase its military power and assist other democratic states.

Should America become involved in the war, the group held that the

prime responsibility for the United States was the defense of the

western hemisphere. In naval terms, this meant concentrating the fleet

in the Caribbean with patrols in the Atlantic, leaving only a secondary

force on the West Coast. The students' most significant conclusion was

that in the event of war with both Germany and Japan, American forces

should first be concentrated against Germany, remaining on the

defensive against Japan. Then as forces became available, the United

States should begin a limited offensive against Japanese sea lines of

communication.

This study was an early step toward official acceptance of the

"Germany first" strategy. Admiral Harold Stark's "Memorandum on

National Security Policy" in November 1940—"Plan Dog," as he called

it—was likely to give the United States the most advantage by stressing

"Germany first." It became official policy through the ABC-1 staff

agreement with Britain in March 1941, and the United States Joint

Army and Navy Basic War Plan, "Rainbow 5," developed in May and

June 1941.6

Kalbfus's Valedictory

As the war progressed in Europe and tensions increased in Asia,

American naval leaders realized that it would probably not be long

before the United States was directly involved. At any rate, the world

crisis and the rapid American naval buildup under President

Roosevelt's direction required increasingly more naval officers at sea and in major billets ashore. This, of course, made it hard to find suitable

students for the War College. The experiences of the Spanish-American

War and World War I suggested that, as in earlier conflicts, the college

might be closed shortly. Immediately after war broke out in September

1939, the Bureau of Navigation advised the college to be prepared to

have all or part of its staff and students detached. Making a hasty trip to

Washington, Kalbfus first persuaded the Chief of the Bureau of

Navigation, Rear Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, that depletion of the

college staff beyond a certain point, would make it impossible to do any

worthwhile teaching. Nimitz agreed to a compromise which required

only 27 students to be detached, but a further problem arose when the
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1939-1946 167

Army ordered all its students at the Naval War College withdrawn. In

Kalbfus's view, "These Army students, who had already benefited by

the superior educational system of the Army, made a real contribution

to the college and to the advancement of the military because of their

mature views and opinions."7 Returning to Washington, Kalbfus was

successful in having the Army not only restore its students but double

their number.

At the same time, Kalbfus discovered that the existing war plans

required, in the event of national mobilization, that the War College

would be automatically closed and turned over to the First Naval

District for use as quarters and offices. Kalbfus pointed out to Nimitz

that such a decision, without knowledge of the circumstances that

might exist at the time of mobilization, violated the first precepts of

planning, as taught by the college. Although unable to refute entirely

the idea that the college might be closed, Kalbfus was able to have the

plans amended to include the phrase, "if and when ordered."

Kalbfus saw clearly that it was unlikely for officers to be sent to the

War College for a full 1 1 -month course during wartime. During several

visits to Washington, Kalbfus and Nimitz worked out a plan to keep the

college open, but with abbreviated courses. Although the plan was

formulated in February 1940,8 it was not until March 1941 that Nimitz

issued the order that prevented the exigencies of war from closing the

college. When the three regular college courses, the advanced, senior

and junior, were completed on 15 May 1941, Nimitz directed that "these

courses in their current form will be suspended for the duration of the

present emergency."9 The advanced course was terminated, but the

college's correspondence courses were to continue without modification. In place of the two resident courses, two new ones were

established: the command course and the preparatory staff course. Both

were designed to provide, through a series of lectures,a background for

the study of world politics, economics, and strategic geography.

Satisfactory completion of either course was regarded as qualification

in tactics and strategy for promotion examinations.

In particular, the command course was designed to cover in five

months the area previously dealt with in twice that time by the senior

course. It was open to both line and staff officers with more than six

years' commissioned service. The Navy also encouraged the State

Department, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to send students. 10 The preparatory staff course was intended primarily for junior Naval

Reserve officers who had already seen some service. The instructors in

this course sought to promote familiarity with staff procedures, with

the elements of tactics and strategy, and with the application of

international law to likely situations at sea. 11 At the outset, the

preparatory course was composed of carefully selected officers, most of
168 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

whom were graduates of the Naval Academy. Later, the course included

officers who had demonstrated high ability in civilian life.

Interestingly, the courses were designed to run for five months and

one day, instead of five months. The additional day was added when the

college discovered that five months' duty or less constituted temporary

duty and did not allow for transportation of dependents and household

effects. 12 Despite the shortened time available for study under the new system

and the need to take as students some officers merely because they

happened to be available, Admiral Kalbfus believed it essential that the

college be kept open so that after the war it could resume its long-range

function. In particular, he feared that the value of the college could be

destroyed if "the equipment peculiar to the exercise of its functions"

were not maintained. Continuity, he believed, was the key to preserving

the essential and irreplaceable elements such as the library, the

archives, and the uniquely qualified civilian staff. The brief courses,

with their obvious educational shortcomings, were only one means to

achieve this goal. Kalbfus moved simultaneously in another direction

to achieve the same thing.

As the U.S. Navy began to react to the increasing possibility of

entering the war in 1940, it began to examine its own command

structure, including the shore establishment and naval districts. In

1919, Admiral Sims had convinced Secretary Daniels that the War

College president should be separated from these administrative duties

that fell on naval district commanders. 13 This position was reaffirmed

by the Chief of Naval Operations, William D. Leahy, in 1937. 14 Kalbfus

suspected that in wartime a flag officer would be appointed to the

college presidency only if he were saddled with additional military and

administrative duties. He believed a flag officer was essential in the

billet to preserve the prestige of the college and to prevent it from being

dispersed while the Navy, at large, was concerned with the war. "Even

though his duties as Commandant of the Naval Base may occupy most,

if not all, of his time during war," Kalbfus told the CNO, "his office as President, Naval War College, will remain alive and the college will

continue as an entity."16 With these thoughts in mind, Kalbfus recommended that the various

naval activities in the Narragansett Bay area be administered through a single base commander. As the senior officer in the area, the president

of the Naval War College would naturally be appointed the commandant. 15 Kalbfus' recommendation was approved and the Secretary of the

Navy created the Naval Operating Base, Newport, on 31 March 1941.

Kalbfus took charge as commandant of the base on 2 April. In addition

to the presidency of the Naval War College, he took administrative

charge over the commanders of the Naval Training Center, Naval Net
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1 939- 1 946 1 69

Depot, Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, Naval Torpedo Station, Naval

Fuel Depot, Melville, and the Naval Hospital. When Kalbfus's two-star

flag was broken at the flagstaff atop Luce Hall as Commander, Naval

Operating Base on 2 April 1941, it was the first time that an admiral's

flag had been flown over the college since Sims' request to be relieved of

military duties had been approved. 17 The base commander was given a separate staff to administer the base, and no officer other than the

president was given additional duties, thereby preventing administrative functions from interfering directly with the work of the college.

This arrangement remained in effect until 23 June 1944 when the

college was removed from the administrative control of the Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newport, and reestablished as a separate activity under the Chief, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Vice

Admiral Randall Jacobs. With this move, the college returned to the

same bureau, which before 1942 had been known as the Bureau of

Navigation and had so often administered the college in previous years.

By the time Kalbfus completed his second tour of duty as president of

the Naval War College on 2 November 1 942, he had already drafted his

views and recommendations for future War College education in a paper entitled, "The Study of the Science and Art of War in Relation to

the Safeguarding of the Nation's Future." 18 His recommendations

became, as he intended, the guidelines which two of his successors,

Raymond Spruance and R. L. Conolly, used in reviewing the college's

courses in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Kalbfus believed that to exercise command efficiently an officer

must understand the fundamentals of war. "There are fundamentals

common to all, irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been

land, sea, or air." 19 The best means to understand these fundamentals is

through concentrated study of military and political history. "Technological evolution has always exerted great influence on methods of

operation, but the extent of this influence cannot fully be understood

and measured unless there be ability to sift technical details from

fundamental truths,"20 Kalbfus wrote. Peacetime is the proper time to

prepare officers in this way, but in peacetime it is particularly difficult

to detect the early need for subtle changes in method required by

technological advances. At the same time, these changes cannot be

skillfully applied to particular situations unless "with the science of

war as a basis, war against a particular (potential) enemy or enemies be

continuously made the subject of study by resourceful, competent, and

suitably trained officers."21 The Naval War College was the only naval institution where,

without the distraction of administrative or technical matters, officers

could study the fundamentals, debate views, and discuss military

topics. But the Navy's educational policy up to that time showed a
1 70 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

disturbing trend. Those in high command in 1942 had attended the

college, but in the previous decade attendance by the junior officers

who would eventually succeed those presently in command had fallen

off. The 1942 Register of Naval Officers listed 2,510 line commanders

and lieutenant commanders. Only 241, or about 10 percent, had been

given the opportunity to study at Newport. Kalbfus pointed out to the

Secretary of the Navy that these figures "indicate a forced trend away

from the guided and undisturbed study of war by those upon whom the

burden of conducting war necessarily falls."22 Since the rapid buildup of

American naval forces, which began about 1933, operational, technical,

and administrative demands had progressively forced the study of war

into the background. By 1943, only a handful of junior naval officers

had been properly educated. Kalbfus urged that the United States

maintain a strong armed force in the peace that would follow World

War II, so he was particularly concerned that there be proper provision

for the continuing study of war. The nation expected officers to be

proficient in the art of war, but "mere mastery of a particular technique,

without the fundamental knowledge from which it emanates, does not

meet this requirement."23 Without a grounding in the fundamentals,

the experience and associations of individual officers provided them

with only a narrow viewpoint and basis of judgment with which to

conduct warfare.

Kalbfus believed that it was vital for officers to learn the fundamentals early in their careers. To delay such education until an officer

reached the rank of commander or captain yielded results "far from

what they should be." Such delay meant that the senior course had to be

devoted to the fundamentals rather than to advanced work. In

consequence, it paralleled closely the content of the junior course. "To

have it otherwise," Kalbfus wrote, "would have been to lay undue stress

on the greater practical experience of the officers of the senior class and

to have assumed, without justification, that all who have attained

command rank are grounded in fundamentals."24 To rectify this

unsatisfactory situation, Kalbfus recommended that

1. All line officers receive compulsory grounding in the fundamentals of warfare in a Naval War College staff course between the

time they reach the middle of the lieutenant's list up to the time they

reach the middle of the lieutenant commander s list. This course would

be a prerequisite to promotion to commander.

2. The senior or command course be composed of officers "selected

for this assignment because of demonstrated capacity and probable

future usefulness."25 One of the great advantages of study at the Naval War College, Kalbfus

declared, was "a rubbing of elbows as between officers of the college

staff and the students, and among the students themselves."26 With that
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1 939- 1 946 171

in mind, Kalbfus strongly believed that both courses should be taught

by the same faculty members at the Naval War College in order to

achieve uniformity of thought and method as well as the utmost

opportunity for staff and students to exchange views. Above all,

Kalbfus concluded, a coordinated postwar educational system among

all government departments was necessary. Within that system an

obligatory study in the art and science of war should be an integral part

of the Navy's educational program. With those sentiments, Kalbfus left a fund of views based on his nine years' association with the Naval War

College. Although not especially original, they revitalized old ideas and

provided a basis for others to plan postwar educational policy at the

Naval War College.

Newport in Wartime

If there was a "front line" in the continental United States in World

War II, Newport was on it. Army units garrisoned forts and batteries

from Sakonnet to Point Judith. The Torpedo Station at Goat Island

went to three-shift production. The new Naval Air Station at Quonset

Point grew as air groups formed, an overhaul and repair facility was

organized, and specialty schools opened. At Davisville, battalion after

battalion of Seabees were trained and sent overseas. At the Melville

fuel depot, a motor torpedo boat base was established in 1941, and PT

boat crews formed, trained, and shipped out to man new boats.

Of particular significance to the fleet and the Navy's wartime

training system was the Precommissioning Training Center, formed

from the old Naval Training Station. That station, which had reopened

in 1937, was gradually transformed into a center for training crews of

the many large combat, amphibious, and auxiliary ships being

constructed in East Coast shipyards. For three years practically every

such crew was collected and trained on Coddington Point. Under the

command of Commodore Cary W. Magruder, a rare three-time graduate

of the War College (junior, senior, and advanced courses], several

hundred thousand officers and men went through periods of up to three

months of rigorous training. It was the Navy's largest receiving station

in history. Liberty for the embryo crews was closely controlled and the

term concentration camp was used on more than one occasion as a fast-moving, production-line type of training evolved. When possible, a ship enroute to war would be delayed to permit some on-board training

for the organizing crews, but usually training was shorebound.

With the new crews were a proportionate number of ships' officers,

some of whom brought their families to Newport, compounding an

already serious housing shortage. War College students, about 100 at

any time, had to compete for housing with the large numbers of officers
1 11 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

attached to other commands. Bachelor officers could find rooms in

hastily constructed barracks, which provided the basic necessities but

few comforts. Many of these temporary buildings continued in use for

more than 30 years.

The college received numerous inquiries from incoming students as to

the availability of quarters. One Army colonel who was ordered to the

Joint Army-Navy Staff College for one month wanted to bring his family.

He had been abroad for 1 8 months and expected another long separation.

He told the college that he required two bedrooms, a bathroom, kitchen,

living room, and garage. A house meeting his needs was available, but two

other students living in an attached apartment would have joint use of

the kitchen with his family. The college chief of staff, Captain H. H.

Crosby, "strongly advised" him to accept this house.27 Many townspeople made houses, apartments, and even spare rooms

available to military tenants. The owner of one mansion on Ocean

Drive offered several apartments in his summer "cottage" to War

College students. However, rents were high. Two rooms, the occupants

of which shared a bath, at 91 Rhode Island Avenue rented at $10

weekly. An unfurnished six-room apartment on Red Cross Avenue was

offered at $70 per month. House rentals were even more expensive.

Most exceeded $100 per month.

One of the most practicable arrangements was offered by St. George's

School in Middletown. Rooms were made available for $15 per week,

which included not only the room and a linen change but also three

meals daily. Even though the rooms were in the dormitory of a boys'

preparatory school, they stood in sharp contrast to many of the inflated

local rents.

In order to prevent rent gouging by unscrupulous landlords, the

Office of Price Administration established wartime regulations

governing rent. Landlords were required to produce a registration

statement showing the approved rent on their property. Repeated

student complaints about the failure of some landlords to produce the

statement and about the excessive rents they were charged prompted

the War College president to write to the Area Rent Director. He cited

specific examples. Commander C. M. Block was charged $43 per week

for a furnished room and bath at 19 Greenough Place. This complaint

was typical of many the college received, but given the large number of

military tenants the relative percentage of complaints was actually

very small.28 By 1944 Newport's recreational facilities for officers were excellent.

The Navy rented the second floor of the Newport Casino on Bellevue

Avenue for an officers' club. Ping-pong tables, a juke box, and a reading

room were available. A good meal could be purchased in the dining

room for a mere $ 1 .25. Four of the exceptionally fine grass tennis courts
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1 939- 1 946 1 73

at the casino were permanently available for club members and their

guests. Fees were 25 cents per day, or $2.50 monthly.

The officers' club planned the usual activities. There was a tennis

tournament in the summer of 1944 for officers in the Narragansett

Bay area. Matches were scheduled "so as not to interfere with official

duties." Entrants competed for the Mrs. M. Barger-Wallach Challenge

Cup. There was also a fashion show for the benefit of the Navy Relief

Society, which featured fall and winter clothes by Peck and Peck.

Married students were asked to take the notice announcing this

event home to their wives. There was also a get-acquainted tea dance

in December 1943, presumably for single officers and local young

ladies.29 At the conclusion of the war, it was apparent that an officers' club at

the Newport Casino would no longer be practical. The advisory

committee met at the end of November 1945 and discussed the future

use of Building 95 on Coasters Harbor Island. Soon thereafter this

building, which was no longer needed as a machine shop, was converted

into what is now the NETC Commissioned Officers Mess (Open], "The

O Club." Situated at the foot of the hill below the War College, the club

boasts a magnificent view of Narragansett Bay. It is convenient to the

War College as well as to the other commands in the Newport area. One

additional benefit of moving the officers' club back onto the base was

that it was possible to remove the package store from the basement of

Mahan Hall where it had been located for most of the war.30

ANSCOL: The Army-Navy Staff College

Admiral Kalbfus was succeeded by Vice Admiral W. S. Pye in

November 1 942. A graduate of the college, a former staff member, and a participant on the well-known Knox-Pye-King Board, he had long been

keenly interested in the War College and in the development of naval

education. Although Pye was undeniably well qualified by his experience, his appointment to the presidency of the Naval War College

followed an unfortunate set of circumstances. At the time of the attack

on Pearl Harbor, Pye had been Commander, Battle Force, and Task Force

One of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. When Admiral Kimmel was relieved

following the attack, Pye succeeded him as acting Commander in Chief,

Pacific Fleet, until Admiral Nimitz could arrive in Hawaii. During that

brief period, Pye appeared to be reluctant to engage the Japanese, and he

was blamed for allowing the enemy to occupy Wake Island without

dispute from the Pacific Fleet.31 Unfortunately, the stigma of these

controversial events followed Pye and reflected on the prestige of the

college as an institution devoted to promoting excellence of command

in wartime.
1 74 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Under Pye the college continued to carry on the wartime courses

which Kalbfus had instituted. Early in 1943, however, General H: H.

Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, recommended to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a course be set up to prepare officers for

duty on joint staffs. The early experience of World War II stressed the

need for mutual understanding of the roles and functions of the various

armed services so that staff officers could "have at least a rudimentary

knowledge of the technique of operations of all types of armed forces,

ground, sea, and air, and of the methods of coordination of such forces

in joint operations."32 When Admiral Pye reviewed the proposal, he said

"the number of officers who possess such knowledge is negligible. The

need for officers who possess such knowledge is urgent."33 He saw that

Newport was the best place to give the proper education on the naval

aspects of the problem. Unlike the Army War College in Washington,

whose buildings had largely been taken over by Headquarters, Army

Ground Forces,34 at Newport the facilities were readily available in

Luce Hall.

In response to the obvious need, the Joint Chiefs established the

Army-Navy Staff College to coordinate a four to five-month course for

senior officers. Established in Washington, D.C., in buildings at 21st

and Virginia Avenue NW, 12 classes attended the new Staff College in

1943-1945. The classes first went to the Army Air Force School of

Applied Tactics at Orlando, Florida, for a four-week course. For the

second four weeks, Army and Marine officers were sent to the Naval

War College to learn about the Navy, while the naval officers in the

course went to the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth to learn

about the Army. The group reunited again in Washington for the final

eight weeks of the course. After the fourth class, the course was

lengthened by four weeks so that all officers could have the same

background and attend classes at both the Naval War College and Fort

Leavenworth. Between June 1943 and September 1945, 337 students

were trained at the Naval War College. Of this total, 213 were Army

officers, 77 Naval officers, and 19 Marine Corps officers.

The classes also included the first Foreign Service officers to attend the

college and the first foreigners (Britain, Canadian, and Australian] to

attend a Naval War College course since 1895. This mixture of foreign

officers, civilian government officials, and officers from all the armed

forces studying joint operations together provided a successful model.

At Newport, the school was allotted the entire third floor of Luce

Hall. There the Naval War College contribution was conducted by

Captain F. S. Steinwachs, assisted by Commander Thomas A. Brown, SC,

USN, and Miss Willie Mae Owenby.

One student described the naval phase of the ANSCOL course in

irreverant verse:
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1 939- 1 946 175

We were sent up to Newport, R.I. To that barracks of wood known as "ply"

Op Problem X was a terrible bore

Logistics of clambakes a more pleasant chore

We can handle a cruiser with skill

Our objective the top of a hill

In the heat of a battle

This knowledge will rattle

Around in our heads like a pill.

So we're saying goodbye to Pye Tech

To the Washington windstorm we'll trek

Bless the PT boats

We cruised in the Sound

Bless those dammed busses

That bounced us around

We are calloused in points to the rear The state of our eardrums we fear

Destroyers and tankers

Torpedo net anchors

Do you wonder we left with a cheer.35

Newport was the last stop before the students went on to the final

portion of the course in Washington. The first class did not reach there

until August 1943, but when the class finally convened in the capital, it

was met with an enthusiastic official welcome. Commodore Foy, the

senior naval staff member in Washington, described it for Admiral Pye:

We got off to a pretentious start last Thursday. Admiral King,

Generals Marshall and Arnold spoke. All the rank in town were

here, including the General Board (in a body], the representative of

the British Chiefs of Staff, the Marine Band, etc., etc.36 The Pye Board

In March 1944, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox appointed Vice

Admiral Pye to the presidency of a board of officers to study the

methods of educating naval officers. This group of five naval officers, a Marine Corps officer, and a civilian educator, Dr. F. B. Snyder, president

of Northwestern University, were directed to study the entire field of

officer education, except that for chaplains, medical and dental officers.

Heading the first study since the Knox-King-Pye Board of 1920 to view

the entire picture, Pye sought once again to stress the need for a complete system of education, taking into account the deficiencies

that the war had revealed. According to the board, the present war had

demonstrated that:
1 76 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

1. All naval officers must have a more thorough knowledge of the

capabilities, limitations, and general principles of employment of

forces and their logistic support.

2. A larger percentage of officers must be educated and trained for

operational staff duties.

3. A larger percentage of officers should be specially qualified in

applied communications.

4. Officers should be given special education and training for

command at an earlier age. For officers of the command branch,

education and training in material is important but distinctly

secondary to education and training for command.

5. Education must be progressive and must be provided at appropriate periods in an officer career . . . 6. Periods of education should precede periods of increased

responsibility . . . 7. While no one man can be master of all aspects of the naval

profession, the Navy as a whole must include and means must be

provided for the education of some officers specially qualified in

each of the various arts, industries, and sciences, which can, in any

way, contribute to the advancement of the conduct of naval

warfare.37

In examining an officer's education after he had received his

commission, the board decided that the conclusions of the 1920 KnoxKing-Pye Board were still sound. In the postwar period, the 1944 Board

envisaged that at all times approximately 15 percent of naval line

officers would be engaged in educational pursuits. For officers being

trained for command, the board believed that a typical career fell into

five phases. For the first stage, as a division officer, the Navy provided

adequate education before commissioning. After five years of service,

however, an officer had reached the department head level. Before

entering this phase, he needed a general line course. Then, in

preparation for the third phase, in command of a large ship, an officer

required a command and staff course. The fourth stage was that of

division commander. Before entering into those duties, an officer

required a Naval War College course and, in addition, some officers

should go on to take either the Army-Navy Staff College course or the

Army War College course. The fifth and highest phase of an officer's career was as a flag officer commanding forces or fleets or filling high

administrative posts ashore. To be prepared for these duties, the board

recommended that a flag officer attend an advanced War College

course.38 Pye envisaged three tiers at the Naval War College, the command and

staff course, the War College course, and the advanced course. With a large postwar Navy, this would involve expansion of War College

facilities to deal with 1,000 students, nearly ten times the capacity of
THE COLLEGE DURING WWII, 1939-1946 177

the buildings available. Consequently, the board recommended that

the Naval Training Station on Coasters Harbor Island be closed and its

facilities turned over to the War College. "The need for these expanded

courses will be urgent. Each year's delay after the armistice means the

loss of vital periods of postgraduate education."39 Just as its predecessor, the Pye Board's recommendations were not

implemented fully, but its views would be repeated over and over again

in future years. The Naval War College continued its series of

abbreviated wartime courses up until the summer of 1 946. Pye received

orders that he would be relieved by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance as college president, but Spruance would not arrive in Newport until the

middle of the tenth shortened course in March 1 946. As soon as the war

had ended, Pye had begun to make preparations to reopen the college on

its normal schedule, teaching two full-year courses. By the time

Spruance arrived in Newport, Pye and his staff had been working for

more than six months on the new curriculum and he was able to

present Spruance with a well-grounded plan for the new president to

implement. It could not be merely a return to old ways at Newport; the

experience of World War II had clearly changed the Navy. It was now a much larger Navy with wider responsibilities, but naval officers had

also come to view their needs for professional education in a different

light.

Notes

1. NWC Archives, RG 4: "Operations Problem VI, 3 Jan. 1938; Michael

Vlahos, The Blue Sword (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1980), p. 109.

2. NWC Archives, RG 15: Lectures, Bruce C. Hopper, "The Role of Soviet

Russia in the European War," 1939.

3. NWC Archives, RG 14: Staff Presentation, Captain Archie Douglas, "The

Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare," 14 Dec. 1939.

4. NWC Archives, RG 14: Staff Presentation, Commander Henry Kendall,

"The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare," 14 Sept. 1940.

5. NWC Archives, RG 14: Commander John Hall, "The Strategic Employment of the Fleet," 2 Nov. 1939.

6. R. G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947 (Annapolis: Naval

Institute Press, 1980), pp. 550-53.

7. NWC Archives, RG 1 7: Staff Study, The United States Naval War College

(Newport: Naval War College, 1954), Annex N: "Memorandum Notes on Naval

War College History—RADM E. C. Kalbfus," p. N-9.

8. NWC Archives, RG 2: File: A 2- 1 2(b 1 940), Kalbfus to Nimitz, 5 Feb. 1 940.

9. NWC Archives, RG 2:, Box 37, A3-1 (1937-1943), Chief of the Bureau of

Navigation to All Ships and Stations, "Modification of Naval War College

Courses During Current Emergency," 25 March 1941.

10. Loc.cit., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to Commandant, U.S. Coast

Guard, 27 March 1 94 1

; Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, 26 May 1941.

11. Loc.cit., BuNav to All Ships and Stations, 25 March 1941.

12. NWC Archives, RG 17: Staff Study, 1954, pp. N-10, 1 1.
1 78 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

1 3. NWC Archives, RG 2, Box 37, file A- 1 2: Sims to Daniels, 1 5 May 1919. See

Chapter 5. 14. NWC Archives, Loc.cit, Commandant, First Naval District to All

District Units, 26 April 1937. Quoting OPNAV letter to COMONE, No.Op

13C-jc A2-9 (370330) of 15 April 1937.

1 5. NWC Archives, Loc.cit., CNO to Commandant First Naval District and

President, Naval War College, Op 13A-l-jc (No. 259513] of 27 Dec. 1940 with

COMONE to CNO, NONB/NC3, of 31 Dec. 1940; National Archives,

Washington, D.C. RG 24: Records of the Bureau of Navigation. General

Correspondence 1925-1940 Box 573, NC3: Kalbfus to Stark, 31 Dec 1940.

16. Ibid. Kalbfus to Stark, 31 Dec 1940.

17. NWC Archives, RG 17: Staff Study, 1954, p. N-12.

1 8. NWC Archives, RG 28 President's File: Kalbfus. R. L. Conolly memo of 26

March 1951 transcribing Kalbfus to Secretary of the Navy, 15 January 1943.

19. Ibid., p. 5. 20. Ibid., p. 6. 21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 23. Ibid., p. 8

24. Ibid., p. 10.

25. Ibid., p. 12.

26. Ibid., p. 14.

27. NWC Archives, RG 2, Box 26, Files N4-1, N4-5.

28. Ibid.

.29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

3 1

.

For a study of this action, see S. E. Morison, History of Naval Operations in

World Warll, vol. 3: Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1939-April 1942 (Boston: Little,

Brown 1948], pp. 250-54.

32. NWC Archives, RG 27, Subject Files: Army-Navy Staff College: CDR

Thomas A. Brown, SC, USN, "ANSCOL at the Naval War College." Appendix A,

"Study of the Desirability and Practicability of Establishing a United States

Staff College," by W. S. Pye.

33. Ibid.

34. George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, The US Army War College 1901-1967

(Carlisle Barracks: Alumni Association of The U.S. Army War College, 1967) p. 139.

35. CDR Thomas A. Brown, op.cit., p. 15.

36. NWC Archives, RG 2, Box 4, File A2- 1 2 ( 1 943) "Army-Navy Staff College,

Foy to Pye," 10 August 1943.

37. NWC Library, W. S. Pye, "Report of Board to Study the Methods of

Educating Naval Officers, 1944." Photocopy of typescript. Shelf number:

V41 1.U56., pp. 6-7. See also NWC Archives, RG 3 Box 2: File 5216: Pye Board

Correspondence.

38. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

39. Ibid., p. 91.
<6N

CHAPTER 8

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY,

1946-1953

For two decades following the end of World War

II, the Naval War College was in a quandary. The college was widely

acclaimed within the Navy as the apex of professional education; yet it

encountered insurmountable obstacles in carrying out the actions that

would logically flow from that position. First, as Vice Admiral Robert B.

Carney told War College students in 1 947, "World War II upset our neat

little Navy world and necessitated the inclusion of many specialized

skills, which could not be mastered by what we used to call the 'wellrounded officer.'

"

l Second, naval officers, in general, had no clear

concept of sea power or of maritime strategy. In the aftermath of the

war, it became apparent that strategic thinking involved a broad range

of knowledge that spanned several academic disciplines and, at the

same time, lacked a coherent theoretical basis upon which an effective

study could be constructed.

These problems gave rise to doubts about the curriculum and course

content, and other problems brought into question the very purpose

and function of the college. In order to carry out its stated mission, War

College staff members saw the need to expand the size of the classes to

accommodate the increased size of the naval officer corps. These plans

were consistently approved by the Navy Department, but funds, staff,

and student officers to carry them out were not forthcoming. The

situation exacerbated the trend begun in 1933 with an increasingly

smaller percentage of officers attending the college. At the same time,

the increased demand for officers at sea made it impossible for the

Bureau of Personnel to select only the best officers as staff and students.
1 80 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Often officers were assigned because they happened to be available

when vacancies at the college occurred, not because they were

particularly qualified or talented for War College work. A result was

that a decreasing number of War College graduates were selected for

promotion to flag rank.

In contrast to the prewar view, the Naval War College no longer

appeared to be an essential step in the promotion process or in

preparation for higher command. Two factors made it extremely

difficult to reverse this process easily. The pattern of a naval officer's career and cycle of promotions had been dramatically shortened in

comparison to the prewar period. Total length of service was generally

shorter and subsequently time in each grade was shorter. Therefore,

there was much less time available for each officer to have the

necessary sea and shore responsibilities that would prepare him for

high command. Finally, the Naval War College found that the establishment of the joint service colleges had inadvertently created a threat

to its function by drawing away from it some of the most highly capable

students. These successful naval officers went on to high command

with a joint service college education, but without the experience of

their own service college. The success of many of these officers began

to create a pattern that supported joint service education rather than

single service war college education. Because the Naval War College

continued to be devoted to professional naval matters, it was not

successfully competing with the joint service colleges which focused

on higher levels of national policy.

The Naval War College experienced many of the same problems that

other service colleges also faced in the period from 1946 to 1966.

During these years, however, the college was more or less left to adapt

to circumstances as best it could. The college was in the position of

trying to carry out an educational concept that required both expansion

and development of its own program as well as coordination with other

service colleges. At the same time, though, it lacked the necessary

power and influence at high levels within the Defense and Navy

Departments that would enable it to carry out the program.2

Plans for Postwar Naval Education

In 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed Admiral J. O.

Richardson to head a board to consider the unification of the armed

services in peacetime. Following one of the recommendations of this

group, the Joint Chiefs also appointed Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt,

commandant of the Army-Navy Staff College in Washington, to prepare

a "General Plan for Postwar Education of the Armed Forces." Approved

by the Joint Chiefs in June 1945,3 the plan carried forward one of the
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 181

recommendations made by the Navy's Pye Board a year earlier,

proposing a college of national defense with students from all the

armed services as well as the State Department. All the services agreed

on the need for such a college,4 and the success of ANSCOL during the

war seemed to support continuation and expansion of its approach on a permanent basis as the National War College. The JCS Plan made three

basic recommendations.

First, a small number of officers would be sent early in their careers to

schools of other services in order to broaden their outlook and prepare

them for joint service. This relatively small group would provide a core

of officers that could adequately meet expected joint service requirements. Second, there would be a new level of military education above

that provided by the Naval War College and its sister colleges in other

services. Only selected students would be sent on to this new level of

education but then only after they had completed their respective

service's war college course. Students at this new higher level would be

educated in "military strategy and war planning" by a broad appreciation of the interrelationship between national and international policy

and the military force by which such policies are sustained and

enforced. "The factors that enter these relationships are many and

complex, and include social, political, and economic considerations as well as those of a military nature."5 In this general scheme of education, the Naval War College would

continue to carry out its prewar function as the highest institution

devoted to in-depth study of naval affairs, but would not focus

primarily on the broadest questions of warfare. The JCS, however, went

further, and recommended that the War College also provide a joint

service function by having 30 percent of its student body come from

other services.6 As envisaged by the JCS plan, a naval officer would

proceed from fleet schools to the Postgraduate General Line School at

Monterey, California, in about the sixth year of service, complete the

junior or naval command and staff course at the Naval War College in

about the fourteenth year, then proceed to the senior or Naval War

College course, reaching the joint college level in about the twentyfifth year of service.7 In September 1945, the Secretary of the Navy convened a board to

study the proper form, system, and method of postwar naval education.

The board was headed by Rear Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., who had

served as aide to Admiral Laning at the Naval War College in 1931-

1932. It included among its ten members James P. Baxter, president of

Williams College; Henry T. Heald, president of the Illinois Institute of

Technology; and Captain Stuart H. Ingersoll, a future War College

president. In Part III of the report devoted to all aspects of naval

education, the Holloway Board considered graduate education, taking
1 82 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

into account the recommendations of both the 1944 Pye Board and the

JCS General Plan.8 Following these earlier studies, the Holloway Board concluded that the

General Line School was the cornerstone of education for all officers,

regardless of their source in receiving a commission. Beyond that step at

the eighth to twelfth year of commissioned service, the Holloway Board

wanted the two Naval War College courses to be equivalent to the

courses offered by the joint service colleges, and for the Naval War

College to have an advanced course for flag officers above both the senior

War College course and the National War College course. Approving the

earlier recommendation for the exchange of students among the various

services, the board concluded that

this policy of mutual understanding should include a lively awareness of the strategic tactical implications of scientific

development at all levels of graduate education. The subject of

logistics has assumed such dominant importance in modern war,

and is of such complexity, that the Board likewise believes positive

provision must be made for its inclusion in all line courses subsequent to the General Line School.

The board went on to suggest that line courses, such as those offered

by the Naval War College "should fill the gaps in . . . experience left by

limitations in variety of duty at sea."9 At the same time, the board

agreed it was fundamental that all courses relating to naval staff work

should be located at the Naval War College, even though this required

an expansion of facilities in order to produce "a cohesive effect." The

board also took into account the recommendations made by the board

headed by Captain H. A. Spanagel on the new postgraduate school to be

established at Monterey, stressing its role as a general line school, but

cautioning "that maximum use should be made of the facilities of

civilian colleges for graduate education of specialist officers." 10 Admiral Holloway later summarized his view of the plan by noting

the changed functions of naval officers:

From the springboard of professional knowledge and ability, our

officers, particularly upon and after attaining command rank, must

operate effectively in manifold areas in addition to the technical,

tactical, or operational. To mention a few, there are personnel

research, public relations, foreign commissions, legislative and

congressional liaison, organization and direction of research,

instruction and education, all types of administration, duty with

Reserve components, fiscal control, and planning at high levels

involving historical, political, sociological, and economic perceptiveness of the highest order. All these are things to which a diverse

intellectual input into the Line of the Navy should contribute,

through creation of a synthesis of thinking, expression, and
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 183

experience which will serve to improve the capacity of the corps of

officers in a while. 11 The success of this plan, however, depended on several uncertain

factors: the expansion of educational facilities to meet increased

student numbers, the rapid rotating of officers to and from specific sea

billets with appropriately placed periods of education, and a sufficient

excess in the number of officers in the service to allow for manning

responsible positions as well as assignments to student and instructor

billets. 12

Return of Spruance

Admiral Raymond Spruance relieved Pye as president on 1 March

1946. Spruance was well acquainted with the college having graduated

in the class of 1927, served as head of the correspondence course in

1932-1933, as head of the tactics section in 1936-1937, arid as head of

the operations department in 1 938. Some four months before returning

to Newport, Spruance had relieved Fleet Admiral Nimitz as Commander

in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area when Nimitz moved on to

become Chief of Naval Operations. Always a strong supporter of the

college, Nimitz had a more important task for Spruance than command

of a shrinking fleet with diminishing responsibilities. He wanted to

revitalize the Naval War College and to restore its prestige. With a thin

postwar budget and a plan for naval education based on some uncertain

factors, Spruance faced a difficult task. 13 He entered his task with the conviction that the Naval War College

was best suited to seek out and to develop thinkers. It was not the

appropriate place, he believed, to instill a fighting spirit. Knowing his

fellow officers, Spruance put them into three categories: (1) "tactical

types" who were good on the bridge of a ship, but were deficient in

abstract imagination and reasoning; (2) the energetic and industrious

who were not themselves creative, but who could grasp the ideas

created by those who were; and (3) "the strategical type" with inventive

intellect. The second and third types were those best qualified to attend

the Naval War College, Spruance believed. "If imagination, tempered

and guided by common sense and reason is the scarce and valuable

quality which I believe it to be, it behooves us to recognize the

individuals who possess this disciplined imagination, to encourage and

make full use of them." 14 This was Spruance's goal as he set about

revitalizing the college. If he could stimulate at least one creative mind

in each class, each year, Spruance believed that the college would be

successful. 15 The curriculum, the staff, and the student body were the three

crucial elements in revitalizing the college. First, Spruance sought to
1 84 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

build understanding and cooperation between the various specialties

within the Navy by bringing officers of all branches to the college. He

particularly tried to avoid the prewar situation in which he believed the

college had been dominated by battleship-oriented officers and

shunned by naval aviators. 16 Moreover, he knew that interservice

rivalry had on occasion hampered the American war effort, and he

emphasized the example of ANSCOL in bringing officers from all

services together with Foreign Service officers at the Naval War

College. Above all, he wanted academic freedom, so students and staff

might express their views uninhibited by official policy. "The Naval

War College advocates no dogma, nor doctrine, nor any set of rules by

which campaigns can be conducted or battles won," Spruance said.

There are no such rules. But it can and does endeavor to show that

there are certain fundamentals, the understanding of which assists

a commander in orderly thinking and planning necessary to solve a military problem. 17 With that thought, Spruance clearly echoed the basic theme that

War College leaders had stressed since the founding of the college. But

Spruance was not merely content with prewar ideas. He was clearly

concerned with new problems in warfare, while stressing the need to

attend to fundamentals in approaching them. "We study military

history for the lessons it has to teach us," Spruance warned, "but we

must not expect necessarily to obtain from history the correct answers

to future problems."18 Immediately upon his arrival at the War College in March 1946,

Spruance directed that a new curriculum be readied for the year-long

courses, which would start again in July of that year. In constructing a revived War College, Spruance moved in several directions simultaneously, but each of them complemented his conception that in

planning for the future one must deal with fundamentals and take into

account the lessons of experience. He appointed Commodore Penn L. Carroll to develop strategic problems and war games which stressed the

tactics and weapons of the future: nuclear weapons, air warfare,

missiles, mines, electronic sensors. 19 At the same time, he began an

entirely separate course in logistics, under Captain H. E. Eccles, built on

the experience of World War II but directed toward future operations.

Then, he arranged for Commodore Richard W. Bates to head a battle

evaluation group that would analyze the combat experience of World

War II. Finally, Spruance sought to publish a permanent, uncontroversial naval planning manual. He hoped it would provide the basis for

college teaching and establish standard procedures throughout the

service. While reviving the basic structure of the college along the lines

which Kalbfus had recommended after his retirement in 1942,
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 185

Spruance's main contribution to the college involved these three

topics: the logistics course, the battle evaluation program, and the

planning manual.

World War 11: A Logisticiaris War

While the principal thrust of the wartime ANSCOL course was on

building an understanding between the services that would promote

more efficient joint operations, the continuing thread that ran through

the course was an emphasis on logistics. The experience of World War

II continually stressed supply and transport of necessary goods as well

as production of war materiel and the use of a wide variety of industrial,

technical, and professional expertise that had previously been thought

of as remote, civilian occupations. During World War II, officers began

to realize that the armed forces had become intricately complex

communities in which the traditional distinction between combatant

and noncombatant skills had become blurred.

Despite Admiral Pratt's early initiative in creating a logistics

department in 1927, the emphasis on the subject gradually had

dwindled and been incorporated into the many subjects dealt with

under the rubric "naval operations." At the beginning of World War II, the American naval officers had some general knowledge of the

principles involved in logistics but knew nothing of its theory and little

about either the interdependence of logistic matters, general logistic

planning, or its organization. 20

It had been battle problems that had excited great interest among

professional naval officers. At the Naval War College the Battle of

Jutland continued to be studied, analyzed, and commented upon from

1919 until World War II as a segment of every year's curriculum. This

interest channeled much thinking in the Navy at large along the

tactical lines of a major battlefleet action, and tactical proficiency

naturally continued to be a requisite for promotion. There was a corresponding tendency to brush aside as too academic the study of the

business of supply and resupply of overseas forces, although there were

a few notable exceptions.21 The global aspects of World War II changed these concepts. As allied

forces gathered momentum to mount the final offensive, naval officers

found themselves busily engaged with planning for and carrying out

jungle-based air operations, surface and submarine operations, and

amphibious operations. To do this, naval officers discovered they must

also support a large floating air force of their own, operate freight lines,

engage in base construction, stockpile materials, and do dozens of other

jobs that were foreign to their prior training. The Navy became acutely

aware of such things as tons-of-supplies-per-man and usage rates of all
1 86 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

manner of ammunition and equipment—in short, with the down-toearth spadework of what it takes to wage war. World War II proved that

"strategy and tactics provided the scheme for the conduct of military

operations and . . . logistics provided the means therefor."22 In light of these facts a board, convened to study postwar naval

logistics training, recommended that study of the subject begin at the

Naval Academy or college NROTC and continue at the Naval War

College. It also recommended establishment of a separate naval logistics

institute. After being approved by the Secretary of the Navy, this latter

recommendation was modified by another committee, which recommended that instead of an institute, the Naval War College be expanded

to include a logistics course. This new course would be co-equal with the

senior course at the college. Both courses should be headed by an officer

of flag rank, directly under the president of the college.23

Henry Eccles and the Logistics Course

Henry E. Eccles and the study of logistics at the Naval War College

are synonymous. Drawing on his extensive first-hand experience in the

Pacific during the war, Eccles returned to the college in the late spring

of 1946 to lecture on advanced base development. A few months later

he received orders to command the battleship Washington. Shortly

after he assumed command, the Navy Department decided to decommission the ship within a few months and she proceeded to the New

York Naval Shipyard in Brooklyn to make the necessary preparations.

Eccles, then a senior captain, started looking for his next billet. He soon

found it. 24 On a trip to Washington a friend showed him the directive signed by

the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, which established

the logistics course at the Naval War College and called for a flag officer

to head the course. Eccles was asked if he could suggest anyone for the

job. When he mentioned two or three names, he was told those officers

were either not available or not interested. Finally, he was asked if he

might be interested. He was. He said he would take either the number

one or the number two position. Admiral Spruance knew Eccles and,

believing that commitment and knowledge were more important than

rank, eagerly approved assigning him to lead the course even though he

was not a flag officer.

There was important high-level interest in establishing the course. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics, Vice Admiral

Robert B. Carney, who supported the idea, made $90,000 available to

convert the then unused Training Station Barracks "C" (later named

Sims Hall) into suitable spaces. For more than two months Eccles

alternated his weekends, commuting from his ship in Brooklyn to
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1946-1953 187

either the college in Newport or to Washington in his efforts to recruit

qualified officers for his staff and to oversee the renovation of the

barracks.

Gathering a staff was a difficult matter. Eccles was told that his

number two man should be an aviator. He requested the assignment of

either of two captains, who were also aviators: George W. Anderson and

James H. Russell. The detail officer for captains laughed at such

presumption, reflecting the widespread attitude within the Navy that

duty in connection with logistics was the kiss of death for a line officer

in the furtherance of his career. Nonetheless, Eccles was able to gather a competent staff and have them on board in sufficient time to prepare

for the opening of the course in July 1947. He received unqualified

assistance and support from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,

which assigned several outstanding Supply Corps officers.

Soon after Eccles reported to the college, an attractive young blonde

was assigned from the demobilizing Naval Station to be his secretary.

Miss Mary V. Murphy was extraordinarily competent. Her quick wit,

calm disposition, and ability to cope effortlessly with the hurly-burly

connected with establishing a new course qualified her to work directly

with the dynamic Eccles. Upon Eccles' reassignment in 1951, the

president, Vice Admiral Richard L. Conolly, appointed Miss Murphy as the president's secretary, and she remained in that assignment until her

own retirement in 1979.

By early July 1947, 46 officer students, representing all the U.S.

armed forces and also Britain's Royal Navy, reported for the logistics course. This new course was co-equal with the regular course in

strategy and tactics. Both courses were integrated for the first two

months, which were devoted to common background work in general

principles and in the capabilities of ships, planes, and weapons, and

other combat forces. There was also study of weather, communications, and intelligence.

Then the logistics students broke off and concentrated for eight

months on their subject. A considerable amount of time was devoted to

joint amphibious operations. Moreover, the logistics students solved

naval problems, working them out on the game board. These ranged

from a quick tactical problem to a major one involving a global war. In

addition, each student was required to write papers on two subjects, "A

Comparison of the War Potential of the United States and the U.S.S.R."

and "The Effect of New Weapons on Naval Logistics." Besides the

obvious educational benefits of research, arriving at conclusions, and

reducing thoughts to writing, the thesis topics had the additional

virtues of requiring every student to look forward in regard to the most

likely enemy and of requiring each one to focus on problems that

logisticians might have to face in the future.
1 88 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Among other things, the logistics war games examined the concept of a "one-stop" replenishment ship. As early as 1948, Eccles proved the

effectiveness and efficiency of a concept that did not become an

operational part of the fleet until 1964 when USS Sacramento (AOE-1)

was commissioned. In addition, Eccles wrote the Navy's first logistics

manual, Operational Naval Logistics, which was published in 1950. It was a philosophical approach to the study of logistics as a command

responsibility "devoted to the thesis that while we can expect to make

new mistakes in the logistics of a future war, we should not repeat the

old ones."25 In the succeeding three years refinements were made to the logistics

course, but the basic concept remained the same: to teach logistics from

the point of view of command. In 1950 the name of the course was

changed to strategy and logistics in recognition of their close relationship. Considerable difficulty attended the search for a qualified relief

for Eccles in 1951. Although logistics was a responsibility of the line,

officers of the line failed to support the course. Thus, shortly after

Eccles' reassignment, the logistics course was fully integrated into the

regular college curriculum and the subject was once again relegated to a position of secondary importance.

The Logistics Library

Emphasis on logistics study at the college brought about a local

problem in logistics. The Navy's wartime efforts produced an enormous

body of logistical experience, which was recorded in a great variety of

ways in literally millions of pieces of correspondence, reports,

directives, manuals, instructional texts, standard operating manuals,

plans and orders, reference data, and the like. These records were stored

in desks, file cabinets, and offices throughout the Navy.26 The problem was how to collect, organize, catalogue, and make

available a representative cross section of this recorded experience,

organize it, catalogue it, and make it available to those who would come

to depend on it in the future. Probably the first logistics library was

established in 1944 at the Advanced Supply Base Training Center,

Williamsburg, Virginia. When that command was decommissioned the

following year, the library was absorbed by the Logistics Research

Library at Bayonne, New Jersey. By January 1 947, this library comprised

approximately 20,000 accessions. When the logistics course was

established at the War College later in 1947, it seemed only natural to

transfer the library from Bayonne to Newport.

Commander C. C. Mathas of Eccles' staff at the War College

concluded that only about 3,000 items of the entire collection at

Bayonne were of any value to the Naval War College. Transferred to
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 189

Newport in June 1947, the 3,000 items, combined with material from

other sources, formed the nucleus of the logistics library. As originally

conceived, the library would not only serve the college but would be

directly useful to the entire Navy.

Unfortunately, only Eccles, his staff, and a handful of others in the

Navy had a grasp of the field of logistics broad enough to know what

was involved, what were its limitations, and how best to organize it for

future reference. The life of the logistics library was short. The high

classification of its documents required security, but there was no

appropriate place for it to be separately housed. It was moved from place

to place and eventually was dispersed.

World War II Battle Evaluation Group

During the course of World War II, the Combat Intelligence Branch

of the Office of Naval Intelligence prepared a confidential series of

combat narratives to give naval officers "a clear view of what has

occurred, and form a basis for a broader understanding that will result

in ever more successful operations."27 These studies gave the most

reliable current information, but they were no substitute for a detailed

analysis of all accounts of battle experience.

In September 1944, Admiral E. J. King directed that the Naval War

College answer all requests made for analysis of battle action reports. In

May 1 946, Admiral Nimitz ordered the college to study and to evaluate

those World War II battles in which the U.S. Navy participated, using

all sources available.28 To undertake this task, Spruance selected Commodore Richard W.

Bates. "This is a new and important responsibility for the War College,"

Spruance told Bates, ". . . success will depend upon obtaining especially

selected officers, and particularly upon the officer who heads up the

group."29 Bates had both War College training and battle experience. A

graduate of the Naval War College senior class in 1 94 1

, he had stayed on

to be an instructor in strategy, 1941-1943. In 1943-1944 Bates commanded the heavy cruiser Minneapolis and then became chief of staff to

Admiral J. B. Oldendorf. He was with Oldendorf in the battle of Surigao

Strait, at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, and Okinawa. In May 1945, he assumed

command of the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, Pacific Fleet.

Bates headed the project of analyzing battle reports until it was

disbanded in 1958. The group began as the department of analysis, was

then renamed special projects department, and in 1952 became the

World War II battle evaluation group.

The group's purpose was to derive lessons from war experience for

the benefit of officers seeking to improve their professional judgment. By attempting to portray the mental processes, decisions, and
1 90 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

actions of combat commanders, Bates emphasized the study of

command and decision.30 By 1950, Bates' group had published confidential, single-volume

studies on the battles of Midway, Coral Sea, and Savo Island. In 1950, the

group embarked on an eight-volume study of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, of

which only volumes 1-3 and 5 were completed. Portions of volumes 4, 6,

and 7 were drafted, but only a few notes were gathered for the projected

volume 8, which would have distilled the lessons to be learned from the

experience at Leyte. In 1958, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Arleigh Burke, ordered the project discontinued for lack of funds. Despite

attempts by Admiral Claude Ricketts and others to reestablish the

project, using private funds, it was not continued.

In lengthy and detailed technical analyses of each battle action, Bates

and his team were often critical of individuals, but throughout they

attempted to maintain the analysis on professional terms of judgment,

which reflected the long-established principles that the college had

taught in its work, culminating with Admiral Kalbfus' Sound Military

Decision. Bates elucidated some of these abstract principles in the

context of recent battle experience. Interpreting the Coral Sea operation

as a raid, for example, Bates wrote:

This whole operation stresses the strategic principle that a raid may

have strategic consequences far above those originally

contemplated. This raid was too small to do substantial physical

damage, yet its political effect, caused by fear of additional raids, was

great and, in this case, appears to have caused Japan to alter military

timetables for other theaters.31

Examining the Battle of Midway, Bates noted that both the Japanese and

Americans relied on surprise in their basic planning, but neither was as successful as had been hoped. "Surprise must not be counted on too

strongly in planning," Bates concluded, "although it should be considered

as the soul of every operation. There must be sufficient means available

to ensure success even though surprise be not obtained."32 Looking carefully at American defeat in the Battle of Savo Island, Bates

said that the Navy can best prepare its prospective commanders for

command in four ways:

1. By instilling in them as early as possible the fundamentals of

warfare, which in turn requires a knowledge of history by land, sea, and air.

2. By providing them with the maximum mental training in the art and science of war.

3. By giving them the opportunity for study and reflection, and for

exchange of views within and among the several echelons of

command.
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 191

4. And finally by providing them with the maximum practical

training in the fleet and task group maneuvers as well as in

maneuvers of lesser scope.33 After this, "there should be ... a ruthless and impartial elimination of

those whom such maneuvers and mental training show to be lacking in

initiative or to be lacking in the ability to make prompt and sound

decisions under the pressure of fast moving events."34 In writing his

studies, Bates followed his own precept in judging commanders in

action. The results, as one might expect, caused a great deal of

controversy among senior naval officers. Many opposed the project and

tried to stop it.35 Despite this, Bates' work earned praise from Samuel Eliot Morison. In

his inaugural address as president of the American Historical

Association for 1951, Morison spoke to the gathered historians about

the importance of intellectual honesty in their work. He used as an

example the two years of work that Bates and his assistants had devoted

to the 42 minutes of the Battle of Savo Island. "They have tried to find

out exactly what happened and why, sparing nobody, praising few,

although shocked to the core at the faulty tactics that their search

revealed," Morison said. Of Bates he said,

Like the best professional historian, he took no shortcuts, tested all a priori generalizations by ascertainable facts, and hesitated not to

scrap his charts and shape a new course whenever new soundings

revealed uncharted reefs. His Savo Island monograph is a fine

example of intellectual honesty, because it was motivated by an

earnest desire to explain the event exactly as it happened.36 Morison was fully aware of Bates' methodology and procedures in his

research work. In early 1 942, Morison, who held the Jonathan Trumbull

chair of American History at Harvard, volunteered his services to the

Navy to write a History of U.S. Naval Operations in the war. Approved

personally by President Roosevelt, Morison was commissioned a lieutenant commander in the naval reserve and given authority to read

official reports, visit ships, and interview senior officers. "The Navy

Department did everything possible to enable Morison to make his

research exhaustive and to afford him first impressions,"37 Secretary of

the Navy James Forrestal wrote. The result was the work of an

independent scholar, published privately. It was not an official history

reflecting official conclusions. During the war, Morison had been

assigned an office in the Naval History Division of the Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations,38 and that office continued to assist him in

later years. In the summer of 1 946, however, Morison with two officers, a yeoman and a cartographer, brought his project to Newport. Morison

lived aboard his 36-foot yawl, which he requested be berthed "close

aboard USS Constellation,"39 in Coasters Harbor. Morison wrote to
192 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Spruance, "It will be a great help in writing the history to work in such

pleasant surroundings and to be able to ask your advice on many

subjects."40 Morison had met Bates in the Pacific, and in 1 946, he and his

research assistants were already housed at the Naval War College when

Bates arrived to take up his official work on the classified analyses of

battle.

The two projects were entirely separate.41 Morison's official assignment to the Naval War College was limited to the brief period from June

1946 until his return to regular teaching at Harvard in the autumn of

that year. Although the official connection was brief, Morison

continued to make good use of advice he obtained at the college

throughout the period he was writing the history. From time to time, he

worked on it in the college library and archives,42 giving credit for the

assistance he received from Bates and other staff members, as well as from librarians and cartographers.

Naval Planning Manual

The third area that Spruance directed the college to develop was the

publication of a standard manual to guide officers in planning. These, of

course, were waters in which the college had fished for half a century,

but Spruance wanted to avoid the constant revision to which the old

"estimate of the situation" pamphlet had been subjected. Remembering

clearly his dislike of Kalbfus' Sound Military Decision, Spruance

wanted a reduced and simplified standard publication "which is not to

be changed by a shift in command at the War College or by new ideas of

individuals every one or two years."43 Spruance was not opposed to the

purpose for which the earlier publication had been written. However,

he thought that the constant revisions were not only unnecessary but

prevented the work's full acceptance and use throughout the Navy. By

simplifying and standardizing the text, Spruance believed, "a fixed

meaning will grow up from midshipman to flag officer as to certain

features of the estimate of the situation."44 Spruance was not alone in his views on the subject. As early as November 1945, Captain Bern Anderson of the college's strategy

department had submitted to Admiral Pye a proposed draft of a naval

planning manual. Based on his own experience as planning officer with

the Seventh Fleet and teaching at the college, Anderson, like Spruance,

wanted it "to be purely a practical guide," omitting "insofar as practicable theoretical and philosophical discussions."45 Spruance recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations in March

1946 that a manual be published with a standardized "check off sheet"

for the estimate of the situation and standard format for orders. The

latter agreed.46
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1 953 1 93

By March 1947, the college had published for its own teaching

purposes the Naval Manual of Operational Planning, and forwarded it

to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval and servicewide

distribution. In the foreword, Spruance wrote that the new manual

"attempted to combine, in the clearest and simplest terms, the various

existing instructions in effect for planning naval operations."47 In 1 948,

the book became the U.S. Navy's basic planning manual. In 1953, after

several, perhaps unavoidable, revisions, the college issued the manual

under a new title, Naval Operational Planning (NWP-1 1). With minor

revisions, it has continued in use since that time.48 There were no formal retirement ceremonies on 30 June 1948 when

Spruance hauled down his flag. No senior Navy Department official

was on hand, and no relief had been designated. Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith, chief of staff, assumed the presidency temporarily. By special act

of Congress, Spruance would receive the pay and allowances of a full

admiral for his lifetime, the best the Navy Department could do to give

this World War II leader and hero equal status with the dashing Fleet

Admiral William F. Halsey, Spruance's opposite number in the Pacific

campaigns and admired friend. On the morning of 1 July, Admiral

Smith's two-star flag had already replaced Spruance's four stars at the

War College flagstaff on Luce Hall as Admiral and Mrs. Spruance got

into their fully laden car at the President's House and drove to Gate 1,

expecting to slip quietly by the sentry. There in the early morning

sunlight were the Naval Base Band, a full guard from the Marine

Barracks, War College staff officers, and many others from the Fleet and

the Base. Watching from the sidelines were many families. The band

sounded off with four ruffles and flourishes and the admiral's march

while all hands saluted. Spruance got out of his car and greeted those

who had come to say "farewell," then drove on. World War Ifs "Quiet

Warrior" retired quietly from the Navy in which he had served for 45

years.49 Spruance succeeded in reasserting the college's position as the

Navy's senior educational institution, lending it both dignity and

prestige. Yet, essential questions relating to course curricula, student

selection, educational philosophy, and institutional purpose remained

to be answered as the Navy grappled with understanding its own role

and function in a new era of warfare.

By 1948, the recommendations of the Pye, JCS, and Holloway boards

had still not been fully implemented in respect to middle-and seniorlevel officer education. In March 1948, the Chief of Naval Personnel,

Vice Admiral T. L. Sprague therefore convened another board under

Rear Admiral C. C. Hartman to recommend a program of education and

training of line officers to provide the best feasible means to prepare

them for high command.
1 94 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

In preparing its recommendation, the Hartman Board emphasized that

"high command requires an education ensuring knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of all the tools with which modern naval warfare is

waged." This education must be progressive and, as an officer advances in

rank, concentrate less on specialized duties and more on broad areas of

high command. "In other words," the board noted, "his identification with

any particular specialty or branch becomes less marked as he moves on in

his career."50 The board perceived the basic problem to be that "new weapons produce

dominant groups of officers."

The importance of each new weapon, if only because it is new, gives

prestige to the officers skilled in its use. That acts as an incentive for

that group to seek special privilege, authority, and autonomy. This is natural and normal. Therefore, it becomes incumbent that the Navy

establish a training and educational system which constantly emphasizes the importance of high command relative to any specialty.51 In its final recommendation, the Hartman Board revived the Pye

Board's proposal for a command and staff course to replace the Naval

War College junior course. After completion of this course a specified

number of officers should then be sent on to one of the command and

staff or war college courses provided by the Army, Air Force, or Marine

Corps. Above this level, the board recommended two further educational assignments in an officer's career, one in the grade of commander

and another at the captain or flag officer level. These levels of

education would be controlled by a career planning board under the

Chief of Naval Personnel, which would balance an officer's qualifications and experience with the future needs of the service and "ensure

that . . . no group of officers subconsciously imposes their ideas on the

naval service."52 Both these Navy boards agreed on the basic principles of an

educational structure for the Navy, but, at the same time, none of their

recommendations were able to remedy the existing situation of the

Naval War College which needed high-quality officers to be diverted

from operational, administrative, and staff positions, and Navy funds to

be diverted for service education.

Postwar Newport, a Year-Round Fleet Base

Vice Admiral Donald B. Beary hoisted his flag as president of the

Naval War College on November 1, 1948 as Spruance's successor and

became Senior Officer Present, Narragansett Bay. The postwar Newport

Naval Base was in full operation, commanded by Rear Admiral T. Ross

Cooley. The primary mission of the base was to support units of the

Atlantic Fleet with home ports in the Bay.
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1 953 1 95

The Naval War College continued to be a tenant activity located at

Naval Station, Newport. Other activities included the Quonset Point

Naval Air Station, the Naval Hospital, Naval Supply Depot, and the

Naval Station. In the years ahead there would be various base

reorganizations as new commands, such as the Naval Communications

Station and the Naval Schools Command, were formed. The important

postwar change for the city of Newport was that it became the home

port of more than one quarter of the Atlantic Fleet. With the exception

of station ships and experimental craft at the Torpedo Station, no units

had called Narragansett Bay home port before 1946.

In 1949 Newport's portion of the Atlantic Fleet included a carrier

division, berthed at the large pier at Quonset, and Commander

Destroyer Force, Atlantic on board a tender at Melville, with berthing

there for a squadron of destroyers. There were also a cruiser division

and several more destroyer squadrons with tenders and Service Force

ships mooring to buoys in the East Passage of the bay. For the crews of

these ships it was a perilous existence in wintertime, and the arrival of

additional ships during the Korean war compounded the problem.

Boating between ships and shore was frequently suspended, and

Newport as a home port for ships had few votes of approval from the

sailors. Reenlistment figures of the period in Newport emphasize this

point, as do police statistics for the Thames Street and West Broadway

areas. In March 1953, the sinking of a loaded liberty launch from U.S.S.

Yellowstone, in which some 20 lives were lost, finally brought Navy

Department approval of money for piers at Coddington Cove. In

another four years there was pier space for most of the destroyers. The

cruisers were then based in Boston, and only a lonely oiler could be seen

swinging to a buoy off the War College.

The fleet making its home port in Newport brought economic

benefits to the area and, although the Navy constructed several

housing projects, private construction boomed, particularly in

Middletown and Portsmouth, which grew rapidly. In 1951, the Army

vacated Fort Adams and the Navy took over the property, using its old

and spacious officers' quarters for the War College staff. A low-cost

housing project, known as Brenton Village, was constructed on the

former parade ground. Here both War College students and fleet

officers vied for housing to be allocated by the Naval Base

Commander. Traditionally, the designation and allocation of quarters

ashore have been a delicate administrative problem, often settled

only at the top level of command. Newport, with its large Navy

population from many divergent commands, was no exception.

Stacks of correspondence on the relative merits of sea or shore duty in

the assignment of quarters attest to a never-ending problem for

Newport's base commanders.
1 96 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

With the fleet based in the Bay area, one important goal of Luce, Sims,

and later War College presidents seemed to have been realized as fleet

officers often attended lectures at the War College and analyzed and

evaluated fleet exercises in Pringle Hall. The War College and the fleet

were drawing closer together once again.

Command and Staff Course

When regular War College classes resumed in the fall of 1946, the

junior course, originally established in 1 923, consisted of 35 officers in

the rank of commander and lieutenant commander, including officers

of equivalent rank from the other services. The course curriculum

paralleled the senior course, with most of the lectures attended by both

classes. Game board problems found the junior class taking subordinate

positions on each side. When the logistics class was formed in 1947, the

junior class continued in concert with the senior strategy curriculum,

attending certain logistics lectures with them.

By 1947, the college was making plans to reorient the junior class

curriculum toward more detailed staff work, following the recommendations of the Pye Board. The Army since 1900 had operated its

Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, graduation

from which was almost mandatory for promotion and further education. An Army Air Corps Command and Staff School had opened in

1 946 at Maxwell Field, Alabama, and in the next year the Armed Forces

Staff College opened in Norfolk. The Navy needed a similar course with

a larger output of graduates to educate its intermediate-level officers.

For naval officers there was no adequate stepping-stone from initial

postgraduate-level, technical education at the General Line School to

the senior-level war colleges. Spearheaded by Captain Claude Ricketts

of the college's strategy department, Admiral Beary's staff reorganized

the junior class curriculum with emphasis on understanding the

fundamentals of warfare. The new course, which would begin in 1950,

stressed operational planning, staff organization, staff functions, and

headquarters procedures afloat and ashore.

Round Table Talks—Broadening the Curricula

During Admiral Beary's presidency, the college made a significant

attempt to broaden the students' view by bringing knowledgeable

civilians to Newport for a conference. The seeds for these discussions

were sown with the arrival at the college of Rear Admiral C. R. Brown in

1948. At first, Brown was special assistant to Admiral Spruance, and

with the departure of Rear Admiral Smith that fall, he became the

college's chief of staff. Brown had been the Navy's representative at the
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 197

Air War College after the war and as such had first-hand knowledge of

the Air Force's view of service unification and of Air Staff philosophy.

He had been impressed by the contact which the Air Force fostered at

every opportunity with the world of business and industry. In his first

few months as chief of staff, Brown organized a week of round table

talks to take place shortly before graduation of the three college classes

in May 1949. In these talks prominent civilians and a few senior

officers from the three services joined the staff and students for a five-day period of study and discussion on "the future strategy of the

United States." Visitors were carefully integrated in student sections to

participate in this final exercise of the academic year and to expose

them to the ideas and thinking of the prospective graduates. In turn, the

graduates about to return to the fleet would hear the views of leading

civilians as well as officials from Washington on many current issues

with military implications.

Initially, most of the invited participants came from the business

community to support the economic and logistic portion of the year's

study. In view of the important work of the World War I War Industries

Board, the Army Industrial College had already established close

relations with industry. Bernard Baruch, head of that board, lectured in

the Naval War College's logistics course in 1 947- 1 948, and he may well

have encouraged the War College to follow a similar pattern in its

round table discussions. After three years, the round table talks were

renamed Global Strategy Discussions, and gradually included a broader

segment of civilians. Each day's session included one lecture from an

important civilian or military visitor for the entire group.

These sessions were and still are an important part of the school year.

Invitations are eagerly sought after, and the sessions are as much a benefit for visitors as for their hosts. By 1 954, Global Strategy Week had

become an institution, requiring detailed planning, funding, and

assistance from Newport's fleet units to provide accommodations and

transportation for the visitors. Students were enthusiastic but also

quite exhausted by the end of the busy week of lectures, seminars, and

reports plus a busy social schedule in the evenings. More than one

weary student's wife exclaimed, "What a wonderful week, but why do

we have to pack up and move three days later?"

The Naval War College Review

In a separate attempt to widen the contacts of the war colleges, the

Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral T. L. Sprague, suggested in early

1948 to the commandants of all the joint service colleges and the

president of the Naval War College that they begin to publish a lecture

reprint series, in order to make them "available to the majority of
1 98 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

officers, who for various reasons are not able to attend the college."53 Responding to this suggestion, Admiral Spruance told Sprague that the

college was prepared to institute an "Information Service to Officers"

upon receipt of definite authority. The contents of the publication, he

advised, would be at the discretion of the president, Naval War College.

It would be highly selective, not normally classified higher than

"Restricted" and available only to individuals, not activities. Published

by the correspondence course department, it appeared in October 1948

with Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney's lecture, "Logistical Planning for

War" as its lead piece. Initially planned for distribution to officers in the

grade of commander and above, the college was authorized in June 1 949

to expand its distribution to lieutenant commanders and Marine Corps

majors. Beginning with 3,000 copies in its initial issue, it was expanded

to 6,000 copies per month by 1952 and distributed to major commands.

In its fifth year, the college altered its name to The Naval War College

Review. It continued to publish predominantly college lectures and to

retain its "Restricted" classification until December 1953 when it was

downgraded to "For Official Use Only." The classification of the Review

sharply circumscribed its reading audience, a fact which Chief of Naval

Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke noted in a memorandum in 1958:

Both the Air Force and the Army have non-classified publications,

published primarily by their war colleges, which are distributed to

civilian subscribers and which probably have great influence on

civilians who are interested in military affairs. Our Naval War

College publications are For Official Use Only and, consequently,

have practically no influence on civilian thought.54 The situation, however, was not altered until the September 1964

issue when all classification was removed. The change to include

articles written by academics did not occur until the editorship of

Commander R. M. Laske, 1968-1975, when the lack of articles forced

Laske to search for contributors at American Political Science Association conventions and the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed

Forces and Society.

The Search for Civilian Faculty

As Spruance was preparing to leave the college in May of 1948, he

approved a plan to employ a professor of history and education because

he and other officers on the staff felt the need for continuity and

professional advice in the field of education. At the same time,

Spruance saw the importance of having a lecturer who could broaden

the outlook of the staff and students by giving lectures on social,

political, and naval history.55 As the concept for the position evolved,

the acting president of the college, Rear Admiral A. E. Smith, wrote to
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1953 199

the Secretary of the Navy, "At the present time, there is widespread

confusion of thought in the evaluation of the effect of science, industry,

and new weapons on national strategy and the conduct of war." As a result of this, the American public seemed to have lost sight of sea

power in the country's national development, and the Navy had also

lost prestige because it had failed to explain the case for sea power. All

the new developments had both increased efficiency and complicated

modern living, but as Smith wrote, "they have not changed the basic

facts of life, either in peace or in war." The case for sea power was as strong as ever, he believed. "It only needs to be spelled out, as Mahan

was able to do once before when sea power was under challenge." While

the short-range effort in convincing Congress and the people lay with

leaders in Washington, "The Naval War College is ideally suited to

exert long-range leadership in our efforts to bring land, sea, and air

power back into true perspective." The presence of a military and naval

historian at the college would provide both continuity and a rallying

point "for those within the Navy who possess the energy and the

perspective to reinterpret sea power in the light of modern war."56 As C. R. Brown, the chief of staff, told Admiral Beary,

We seek more than anything else a student of military history. We

seek a thinker who, with the aid of practical students of sea power, can apply his background of military history and his ability to

think to the problem of sea power. A professor of military history

will be one of the means by which we clarify our thinking on the

significance of sea power and maritime transportation in modern

civilization. He will be one means by which the Naval War College

will regain, maintain, and exercise world leadership in naval

thought.

As I see it, it is the task of a lifetime's work. If properly chosen, he

will not get into a rut but will constantly develop and grow richer in

experience and knowledge.57 This proposal was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 29

December 1948, but "for lack of funds" the chair was not filled until

three years later.58

Vice Admiral Richard Conolly

A second series of round table talks in early June 1950 preceded

graduation, at which Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the Chief of Naval

Operations, spoke. Vice Admiral Beary, undergoing medical treatment

in late June, was detached, and the college presidency was once again

temporarily delegated, this time to Rear Admiral Cooley, Naval Base

Commander. Cooley allowed the college's capable chief of staff,

Captain Harry Felt, to deal with almost all issues relating to the college.
200 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Students arriving in the summer of 1950 found that the Navy was at war. On 25 June, a well-organized North Korean army invaded South

Korea. It was an act which seemed, at the time,strangely reminiscent of

Hitler's moves in 1939.

On 11 August 1950, the college's first command and staff course

convened with only 31 officers. The Korean war can be blamed in part

for the smaller number of students than the last of the junior courses

that had preceded it. But there were clear suggestions that the War

College continued to have low priority in the eyes of detail officers at

the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Some students and staff were ordered to sea because of the Korean

war, but Naval War College classes convened on schedule and were

welcomed by Rear Admiral Cooley. Cooley was detached two months

later, turning the college over to Captain Felt. By this time the orders for a new president had been published. He was Admiral Richard L. Conolly, then serving as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces,

Europe and the Mediterranean (CINCNELM). On 2 December 1950, he

hoisted his flag as a vice admiral over Luce Hall.

Conolly came ashore after almost continuous command and staff

assignments in the fleet since May 1939. A destroyer man and

amphibious leader, he brought a wealth of war and postwar experience

to Newport. In his four years as CINCNELM with headquarters in

London he reorganized the Navy's forces in the European area, changing

the structure from one primarily in support of U. S. occupation forces to

a tactical fleet, the backbone of NATO's naval power in the Mediterranean Sea. Like Luce, Sims, Pratt, and Spruance, he came to the Naval

War College with a clear and up-to-date knowledge of the Navy's

operational problems and commitments.

New Courses

Conolly marked his presidency by attempting to broaden the curriculum. Shortly after he arrived at the Naval War College, he quickly

realized the dilemma the institution faced. The Bureau of Naval

Personnel continued to pursue its general policy, which allowed a proportion of officers the opportunity to attend only one War College

level course in their careers. Following the reopening of the Army's War

College, first at Fort Leavenworth in 1950 and then moving to Carlisle

Barracks in 1 95 1

, the Army revised its policy of officer assignment to the

junior colleges. The Navy followed suit, and both services thereafter sent

officers in the rank of lieutenant commander and major to the Armed

Forces Staff College. The Navy viewed the three remaining colleges,

National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Naval

War College, as the highest level of education for naval officers.
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1946-1953 201

The Bureau of Naval Personnel declined to follow the Army's

example in issuing a policy statement identifying its own War College

as the apex of the Navy's educational system. Instead, the Navy merely

established a policy by which only 47 percent of each promotion group

of naval officers would be assigned to a senior war college course. Of the

total number, 29 percent would be sent to the Naval War College, 9

percent to the National War College, and another 9 percent to the

Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Despite this policy, staff

members in Newport believed that the Army and Air Force continued

to evaluate the Naval War College senior course as one of relatively

lower standard than senior courses at other war colleges because the

Navy had failed to implement the recommended policies requiring

prior attendance at the General Line School and War College juniorlevel courses.59 Conolly had his own clear views of strategy, based partly on his own

studies as a student and then as a staff member at the Naval War

College in 1929-1931 and partly on his experience as a destroyer

squadron and amphibious commander in the Atlantic and Pacific

during the war plus his postwar experience as a Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations and as CINCNELM.60 In approaching the presidency,

Conolly sought to revitalize the institution through new courses. His

first move was to establish a course in advanced study in strategy and

sea power and to create a research and analysis department.

Approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, Forrest Sherman, in July

1951, the new course in advanced study in strategy and sea power was

headed by Captain J. C. Wylie. Officers ordered to the new course were

expected to stay up to three years and to be limited to flag officers,

selectees for flag rank, and captains who had completed the resident

course.61 The motivation behind the course was the college's dissatisfaction

with the state of thinking on sea power. "The poverty of contemporary

naval strategic thought is, I think, self-evident," Captain Wylie wrote. He

added,

Naval participants in the unification hearings displayed a considerable degree of confusion, internal contradiction, and lack of

originality whenever they spoke about strategic meanings of sea power. Navy professional journals show a striking reluctance to

discuss controversial strategic problems. The Navy, it would seem,

has been unable to successfully educate the American people in

the imperatives of modern naval strategy and largely because the

Navy has no clear concept of just what its strategic necessities

are. 62 Wylie attributed this situation to the lack of any person in the Navy

who was assigned the primary job of speculating, evolving, and forming
202 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

strategic naval thought. To change this, students would first have to be

given a sound working relationship with the relevant social sciences.

"The Navy has, to a reasonable degree," Wylie wrote, "isolated itself

from the general cultural developments which bear directly upon

modern strategy."63 Students needed contact with social psychologists,

anthropologists, economists, political scientists, and other groups

which were unknown to the classical thinkers such as Clausewitz,

Jomini, and Mahan.

This process would take at least a year. It would be paralleled by

participation in the senior course at the War College plus an intensive

course in naval history to give depth to the students' only superficial

understanding of their own profession. In the second year, the students

would undertake a piece of research which in a third year could be

worked up to a book or article. After that, each student would be ready

to undertake a piece of original writing on strategy. "If the project were

wildly successful," Wylie suggested, "we might discover two or three

men every five or six years who have a real feel for strategy, a creative

impulse in expressing themselves, and with the broad conceptual type

of intelligence that would allow them to become strategic thinkers of

the first quality."64 There were seven members of the first group to undertake the course:

Rear-Admiral Ralph Earle, Jr.; Captains George R. Phelan, James H.

Hogg, Robert A. Theobald, Jr., Charles J. Odend'hal, Jr., and Marine

Colonel George A. Roll, with Captain J. C. Wylie as the staff member. Of

the seven, five continued to the second-year stage, but only two, Phelan

and Theobald, completed the three-year course of study. During that

period a number of individual studies were undertaken, including an

examination of "Strategies Open to Russia", "Malta and Restricted

Waters," and other aspects of maritime strategy.26 Rather than seek

wide publication of their work, the group decided among themselves

that the best means of disseminating their ideas was to volunteer their

services as speech writers to senior flag officers and civilian officials. At

the same time, they offered their services to planning officers on fleet

staffs who were writing or revising fleet operation plans. Through these

methods, they focused attention on the purposes for which sea power

was used. In particular, they stressed the idea that the end purpose of sea power was not command of the sea, but to project American power

on distant shores, in a variety of ways.

In order to support the high-level course, Admiral Conolly moved to

revive the 1948 approval of civilian professors at the Naval War

College. "The naval officer, in general, is a man trained and experienced

in dealing with concrete facts," Wylie explained. "The problem in this

course is the different one of dealing with ideas in their abstract form."27 The question was one of intellectual reorientation for the student, so
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1 953 203

the question as to what kind of professor filled the chair of history was

extremely important. Wylie suggested that there were three types of

knowledge to be had from historians: knowledge of what happened,

knowledge of how to fight better based on an analysis of mistakes, and

the study of historical interpretation as a tool to improve analysis. "It is

the third area of knowledge—that of how to think better—that we are interested in here at the War College."67 But this was easier said than done. The interpretative historian

interested in the matters that related to naval strategy and who could

stimulate current thinking by careful thought about the past was "a

very rare bird indeed." The college needed a thinker who had devoted

his lifetime to an academic exploration of strategy, military philosophy,

and naval history; yet there were few such people available. With a few

notable exceptions, American historians seemed to be recorders and

narrative historians rather than interpreters of the type the War

College had in mind. This posed a problem. The college was looking for

someone in Mahan's mold who could provide a knowledge of what had

happened in the past and at the same time pursue an analytical thread

that crossed academic boundaries in the study of international

relations, historical synthesis, political science, economics, military

science, philosophy, and other disciplines. Eventually, the college staff

realized that it was unlikely to find all these attributes in a single man

and moved, instead, to obtain the advice of several scholars whose work

would complement each other in producing the wider outlook that the

college sought.

In searching for an appropriate scholar, Conolly obtained the advice of

Rear Admiral Charles J. Moore, Dr. James Phinney Baxter III, and

Professor Harold Sprout. But even together, they found serious additional

problems in finding scholars who were willing to alter their focus and

move entirely out of the university environment to devote a career to the

area the college wished to explore. Captain Wylie and his assistant,

Lieutenant Commander Eugene Burdick, consulted a number of other

academics in the search. Among them, Professor John von Neumann at

The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and Professor Harold

Lasswell, a sociologist at Yale, impressed upon Wylie the need for a theory of sea power and a vocabulary to talk about the theory.68 Although the college was unsuccessful in finding an academic to

come to Newport for a long-term appointment, Professor Thomas C.

Mendenhall of Yale University agreed to accept the professorship on a part-time basis from September 1 95 1 to March 1 952. He offered a series

of ten seminar discussions on maritime history from the Age of

Discovery to 1900, concluding with a two-day session devoted to

defining the role of sea power in the contemporary world in the light of

the historical overview. Finishing the course, Mendenhall told Admiral
204 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Conolly, "I have nothing but praise to say of my students. They had

been admittedly a little rusty in the kind of intellectual activity we

were proposing, but their innate ability, industry, and willingness to

lose themselves in the subject of a piece of research soon became

apparent." The course, he said, was "a long-term investment in

education, the fruits of which will become apparent only as these men

return to their professional duties."69 The first year of the course was a further step in the college's postwar

attempt to establish the study of "war and strategy, and particularly

maritime strategy, as manageable units of study in theory and in

generality."70 Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson clearly

supported the idea behind it when he told the 1953 graduating class,

It is true that genius such as Mahan's shows itself rarely. Whether

or not another man of his calibre comes along within fifty years or

five hundred is something over which you have no control. What

you can control, and which is of the utmost importance, is the

intellectual climate of the Navy's highest educational institution.

Upon that factor, more than any other, depends the success or

failure of your mission. It is an essential ingredient to the success

or failure of the Navy itself. Axiomatically, the intellectual failures

of today are the strategic failures of tomorrow.71 Stressing the need to go beyond the traditional goal of furthering an

understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, Anderson said, "This

War College has the duty of providing intellectual leadership in sea power and maritime strategy, not only for the Armed Forces, but for the

United States as a whole."73 In the second year of the advanced study course, with assistance from

outside scholars, the college strived to maintain the intellectual

climate. After 1953, when Wylie was detached as staff member for

advanced study, the course turned increasingly away from its initial

emphasis on theory and became more of a problem-solving effort. But

the need for both historical background and training in interpretive

analysis led the college to seek the establishment of more civilian

professorships and to establish three visiting professorships, each to be

filled for a full academic year. In July 1951, the Chief of Naval Personnel

authorized a full-time professorship of international law in addition to

the professorship of military history. Since the 1890s, the college's

professor of international law had continued his full-time teaching

duties elsewhere with occasional visits to the War College to lecture

and to edit the International Law "blue book." Since 1946, the

international law position had been held by Manley O. Hudson of

Harvard. Ill health prevented Hudson from accepting the new full-time

position, although he was retiring from Harvard. Through his assistance, the college was able to appoint Professor Hans Kelsen as the first
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1 953 205

full-time resident professor of international law. In November 1951 a chair of social sciences was also authorized, and in 1 953 the Secretary of

the Navy approved naming two of the chairs, the Ernest J. King Chair of

Maritime History and the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and

Political Philosophy.

The first full-time resident holder of the history chair was Professor J. H. Kemble, followed by Professor Charles H. Haring, who occupied the

chair at the time it was named in honor of Fleet Admiral King. The

social sciences chair was first held by Professor W. M. McGovern,

followed by Professor W. T. Jones.

In the following year, 1954, the college saw the need to expand

further the civilian faculty and requested the establishment of three

additional civilian academic positions, one each in political, economic,

and social elements of national power at the assistant and associate

professor level, to teach for six months. Titled as academic consultants,

the first to hold these positions were Dr. Alfred D. Chandler, Dr.

William Reitzel, and Dr. Robert E. Osgood, in 1955. The civilian staff

was further expanded by the establishment of a chair of physical

science, first held by Professor W. E. Albertson.73 All these civilian appointments were short-term ones, changed

usually once a year. Through this method, the college was able to

expand its contacts in the university world and broaden both its

outlook and perspective by using civilian academics in all areas of the

curriculum. At the same time, however, the constant rotation of both

military and civilian staff prevented continuity in curriculum development.

Research and Analysis Department

Concurrently with the establishment of the advanced study in

strategy and sea power, Admiral Conolly created a new department

devoted to research and analysis. Begun with Captain W. W. Strohbehn

as its first head, the research and analysis department was separated

from the advanced study of strategy and sea power course. The latter

aimed toward the higher education of officer students and the

enlargement of knowledge on the nature of strategy and sea power.

Conolly designed the department of research and analysis to provide a service to the other departments of the War College and to the Navy, as

a whole, by furnishing tools for more effective solution to operational

problems, and to deal with specific research projects and problems.

The department worked on the naval planning manual, began to

collect data on the Korean war, and undertook extensive work on naval

logistics. To support the work on logistics, the George Washington

University Logistics Research Project supplied the department with a
206 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

secretary, and retired Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles was engaged by

George Washington to work part-time in the research and analysis

department. From the series of research papers which Eccles wrote at

this time, he produced his book, Logistics in the National Defense,74 a study which President Henry Wriston of Brown University commended to a wide audience.

Naval Warfare Course

To complement the advanced work done by the research and analysis

department and the advanced study of strategy and sea power, Conolly

wanted to upgrade the regular courses. When Conolly took command

at the Naval War College, the command and staff course was already in

its first year of operation. At the senior level, the curricula of the

strategy and logistics courses were separate, but had grown closer.

Following the Pye report, which called for increased strategic-level

education, including "joint military thought such as combined staff

procedures and combined exercises,"75 more speakers brought a greater

variety of topics to the Pringle Hall podium. Conolly continued this

trend but soon realized that there was a limit to what could be

effectively assimilated during a ten-month academic year.

To solve the problem, a lengthened senior course seemed a good

option. With support from the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Robert B. Carney, who had urged the 1947 establishment of the

logistics course, and his new Chief of Personnel, Vice Admiral James L. Holloway, the War College staff planned a revised senior education

program, combining the separate strategy and logistics courses into a single two-year course, titled naval warfare. Conolly directed three

members of the staff, Captain S. M. Barnes, and Commanders W. M.

Kaufman and H. T. Gannon, to prepare a staff study exploring the

rationale for a new course, but before their work was completed,

Conolly went ahead and proposed a new two step course. Starting from

the basic premises that had been approved by Admiral Carney, the new

course, naval warfare 1, would lead directly into the second year, naval

warfare 2 (which could be taken in whole or in part].

The first year would be suitable for commanders and junior captains,

and the second year was a high-level course suitable for senior captains

in preparation for flag rank. This change to the curriculum was

designed to make the college courses available to the maximum

possible number of officers and at the same time make allowance for a

full and useful education for high command, taking into account "the

complexities and advances in modern and future warfare."

This approach was based on the premise that the Naval War College

must carry through to the highest level and not be relegated to an
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1 953 207

intermediate role. If naval officers were to make proper military

decisions that related to political reality, they had to be educated in

international political factors, military decisions, the theory of

strategy, social and political science, natural economics, mobilization,

international law, and the principles of logistics. As the staff committee

declared, "Lack of more thorough and widespread education in higher

military matters has hampered the Navy ... in the past and will

continue to operate against the best interest of the Navy, the national

defense, and the nation unless and until remedied.'76

The staff committee's work was deep and broad, ranging from

consideration of the basic purpose of the college to its relation to the

exercise of high command. The committee asserted, "higher education

in the Navy must so prepare senior naval officers [that]—in future

positions of great responsibility, harassed by the daily pressures

created by the conduct of important affairs —called upon suddenly for

thought, they need not rely entirely on memory of past experiences to

guide their decisions."77 As explained by the staff study, the first year naval warfare course

was devoted to the fundamentals of warfare. It emphasized the

integrated employment of all the elements of naval power, seeking at

the same time to develop the students' powers of logical thought in

military affairs. In the second year, the course was to further an

understanding of fundamentals by emphasizing strategic employment

of the Navy in relation to national objectives, and developing breadth

of vision and highly developed reasoning power. Conolly hoped that

the two-year course sequence would be temporary; it really represented

"catch-up" ball. He planned that much of the naval warfare 1 curriculum

would soon be included in the command and staff course. Then, as attendance at the latter course increased, officers returning for the

senior-level courses could go directly to naval warfare 2. The separate strategy and logistics courses ended in Conolly's last

year, and in August 1 954 naval warfare 1 and 2 classes convened for the

first time. The two-year curriculum lasted for five years before further

changes were made. Actually, few students stayed for two full years.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel filled the classes to about 60 each, but

the War College segregated them on the basis of their qualifications.

From those who stayed for the entire two years, there was a mixed

reaction. Most lectures were attended by those in both courses, and in

more than 150 talks each year duplication was inevitable. The

distinction between the courses was lost in a few years' time. At the

War College "cabaret" in 1955, a group of second-year naval warfare

students serenaded the president and an amused audience with the

"Song of the Bilgers," using the old Naval Academy term suggesting that

they had been failed and held over for a second year of Newport study.
208 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Conolly's reforms to the War College were substantial and important

ones, which reflected many of the insights gained in World War II; however, the college still lacked a clear Navy or Defense Department

policy that firmly defined the college's role and purpose. Moreover, the

constant flux in faculty and staff appointments prevented the longterm continuity Conolly's new plans required. Conolly's retirement

from the Navy in 1953 to become president of Long Island University

left the reforms without their prime mover.

Notes

1. "Lecture Remarks by Admiral Carney at the Naval War College, 1947,"

Part VI of Annex G, p. G-35 of S. M. Barnes, W. M. Kaufman, and H. T. Gannon,

Staff Study, "The United States Naval War College," 1954. NWC Library, shelf

number U420 U5 1954. [Hereinafter, staff study 1954.]

2. Nepier V. Smith, "Historical Analysis of the Organizational Success of the

Naval War College During the Twenty-five Years Following the Second World

War," NWC Advanced Research Project, 1974, pp. 145-149.

3. JCS 962/2 of 22 June 1945.

4. John Masland and Lawrence Radway, Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton,

Princeton University Press, 1957], pp. 130-34.

5. NWC Archives, RG3, Box 2. File A2- 12(B) ANSCOL: JCS 962/2, 22 June

1945. Annex D to Appendix A, p.30.

6. Masland and Radway, op. cit.. 7. NWC Archives, R6 3, Box 2. File A 2-1 2(B): JCS 962/4 of 17 Aug 1945.

8. Loc. cit. Report of Holloway Board. 29 Sept 1945.

9. Ibid., p. 2. 10. Ibid., p. 3. 11. J. L. Holloway, Jr. "The Holloway Plan—A Summary View and Commentary," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 73, No. 1 1 (Nov. 1947), p. 1303.

1 2. NWC Archives RG 3, 1 945-68, Series Box 2, File 5213. "Education of Naval

Officers of the Post War Navy," Briefing presented to Secretaries Sullivan,

Kenny, and Brown, 3 Nov. 1947 by Captain J. M. Will, USN.

13. Thomas Buell, The Quiet Warrior, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 383-4.

14. Quoted in ibid., p. 385.

15. Recollection of RADM H E. Eccles. Conversation with J. B. Hattendorf,

20 Dec. 1983.

16. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 387.

17. Quoted in ibid., pp. 387-88.

18. Quoted in ibid., p. 388. Commencement Address, University, 1948.

19. Ibid., p. 390.

20. Robert M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,

1940-43 (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1955), pp. 62-68.

21. Henry E. Eccles, Operational Naval Logistics (Washington, 1950), p. 2. 22. NWC Archives, RG 27, Subject File: Logistics Course: Lecture by Ralph E. Smith, "A History of Logistics at the Naval War College."

23. Ibid., p. 4. Quoting address of VADM Robert B. Carney at Naval War

College, 12 July 1947.

24. Interview with RADM Eccles, 27 June 1980.

25. NHC, MSS Collection 52: H. E. Eccles Papers: Eccles to F. H. Whitaker, 2

Dec. 1 947. These paragraphs are based on conversations with and comments by
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN QUANDARY, 1 946- 1 953 209

RADM Eccles. The quotation is from H. E. Eccles, Operational Naval Logistics

(Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, April 1950] NAVPERS 10869, p. iii. 26. NWC Archives, RG 27: Logistics Course Subject File: Lecture by Ralph E. Williams, "A History of Logistics at the Naval War College," pp. 25-32.

27. E. J. King, "Foreword" dated 8 January 1943, printed in each volume of the

series "Combat Narrative" by Publication Section, Combat Intelligence Branch,

Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, 1943-45.

28. NWC Archives, RG 23: Battle Evaluation Group Records, Box 3, File H:

Official Correspondence 1946-56. CNO to President, Naval War College ser. 0331P34 of 24 May 1946 and COMINCH Conf. memo 03072 of 4 Sept. 1944

29. NHC Bates Papers, Ms. Coll. 28, Box 5, Folder 17: Spruance to Bates, 19 June

1946.

30. NWC Archives, RG 23, Box 3, File 5: "Relief Folder," p. 1. 31. NWC Archives, RG 23, Box 1: The Battle of the Coral Sea: Strategical and

Tactical Analysis (1947), pp. 114-15.

32. Loc. cit., The Battle of Midway: Strategical and Tactical Analysis (1948], pp.

213-14.

33. Loc. cit., Battle of Savo Island: Strategical and Tactical Analysis ( 1 950), p. 359.

34. Ibid., p. 360.

35. H. E. Eccles, "Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, 1892-1973," NWC Review

(May-June 1974), p. 7. 36. S. E. Morison, "Faith in An Historian," American Historical Review LVI (Jan.

1951), pp. 26 1 -75. Reprinted in By Land and By Sea: Essay and Address by Samuel

Eliot Morison (New York: Knopf, 1953). Quote from pp. 349-50.

37. James Forrestal, "Preface" to S. E. Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations

in World War 11 (Boston: Little Brown 1947), Vol. I. 38. NWC Archives, RG 3, Box 12, File A-12: Naval History Memo-2-49 of 25

May 1949.

39. NWC Archives, RG 3, Box 2, File A12-2.

40. Loc. cit., Morison to Spruance, 13 May 1946.

41. HC Ms. Coll. 28: Bates Papers, Box 5, Folder 17: RADM A. E. Smith to R W.

Bates, 26 July 1946.

42. Loc. cit, Box 33, File A-12 (1981), Morison to R. L. Conolly, 16 May 1951.

43. NHC, Ms. Col. 37: T. B. Buell (Collector) Research Materials Relating to

Raymond Spruance. Box 2: Chief of Staff Memo for the Staff, 12 March 1946.

44. Ibid.

45. NWC Archives, RG 3, Box 1. File A16-1. Captain Bern Anderson to

President, NWC. 5 Nov. 1945.

46. NWC Archives, RG 27: Subject File, Military Planning Process: CNO to

President, NWC, serial 321P30 of 3 Oct. 1946.

47. Loc. cit, Subject File 1947.

48. C. W. Cullen, "From the Kriegsacademie to the Naval War College: The

Military Planning Process," NWC Review (January 1970), p. 17. 49. Buell, The Quiet Warrior, p. 398.

50. Loc. cit., Hartman Board report, p. 2. 51. Ibid, chart #5.

52. Ibid, chart #7.

53. NWC Archives, R63: 1948 Box 11 File PI 1-3: CNP to War College

Commandants, 26 April 1948.

54. NWC Archives, RG33: CNO Memo for OP-90 of 22 Jan 1 958, copy to NWC.

Quoted in NWC Review Editor Memo to President, 6 March 1970.
2 1 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

55. NWC Central Files: 12040, chairs, establishment of: President, NWC, to

SECNAV, 28 July 1948.

56. Loc. cit., President, NWC to SECNAV, 20 Oct 1948.

57. NWC Archives, RG3. 1 2040: (P- 1 1 ] Chair of Military History, Folder 1 : C.

R. Brown Memo to Admiral Beary, 18 Nov 1948.

58. NWC Central Files: 1 2040: Chairs. Chief of Naval Personnel to President,

NWC, 28 Jan 1949.

59. Staff Study, 1954, pp. 27-28.

60. See Donald G. White, "Admiral Richard G. Conolly: A Perspective on his

Notions of Strategy," NWC Review (Nov. 1971), pp. 73-79.

6 1

.

NWC Archives, Advanced Study in Strategy and Sea Power Records: CNO

to President, NWC, Ser 130PO3 of 3 July 1951.

'

62. Loc. cit. J. C. Wylie to Adm C. J. Moore, 13 July 1951.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Captain J. C. Wylie's study, "On Maritime Strategy," appeared in the USN

Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 5 (May 1953), pp. 467-477.

66. NWC Archives: Advanced Studies in Strategy and Sea Power Records. J. C.

Wylie Memo to President, NWC, 9 June 1953, para. a. 67. Loc. cit., J. C. Wylie Memorandum on Military History, 2 April 1951.

68. Conversation: Hattendorf-Wylie, 18 January 1984. Wylie letter to B. M.

Simpson, 23 March 1982.

69. Loc. cit., T. C. Mendendall to R. L. Conolly, 19 March 1952.

70. Loc. cit., J. C. Wylie memo to President, NWC, 9 June 1953.

7 1

.

NWC Archives, RG 1 6: Graduation Address: Robert B. Anderson, 1 June

1953.

72. Ibid.

73. NWC Central Files: 12040: Case file: Chairs, establishment of

74. H. E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (Harrisburg: Stackpole Co.,

1959). See also NWC Archives, RG 27: Subject File: Research and Analysis

Department.

75. Staff Study, 1954, pp. 1-3. 76. Ibid., p. 117.

77. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
34. Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus,

Naval War College president,

1934-1936, 1939-1942.

COMDR. B5 A«,vfS

NAVAL WC. JULY,

l<?37 PtfPAtffD fORA

S£KtMLY MED/TATlve

Y£AK, WITH JT/MUiAT/VC

exeqcise AND SOML

IIGHT PKQFE&IQNKL.

RtNHNG .THROUGH

KtNEmNGr OLP ASSOCIATIONS AND IMrmiNG H/5GCUF,

HE HOnSTOftCOYe*

^0/VI HIS STfBNUOUJ

JME MARCHES W !

(OMRMih/AAY.^S,

35. Student cartoon on Naval War College education, 1938.

211
36. Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance, class

of 1927, staff member 1932-1933, 1936-1938

and War College president, 1946-1948.

37. Command Class, 1943. Commander Henry E. Eccles is in second row (extreme left).

212
.

^

i8iNlfB^

m

38. Entrance to Sims Hall, former Naval Training Station Barracks C, acquired by the

Naval War College in 1946 to house the Logistics Department.

39. A Logistics war game, Sims Hall, ca.1950.

213
p. *'

It 1

* Mllil't $

WfPJ ^"C

m*k •

sHi0 v

40. Umpire Area, Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator, Sims Hall, 1 960.

41. Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, Head of

the Logistics Department, 1947-1951, and

authority on military philosophy, strategy

and logistics in association with the Naval

War College for over thirty years.

214
Ill

--';::'.,:;;.;,

42. Admiral Richard L. Conolly,

College president, poses for a bust

by noted sculptor and friend of the

College, Felix deWeldon, 1953.

215
: - ;

: : . !;

.

: v ... .... ... .

:..'... .^ . :

as:;:;;'*';

:V."v.. tmmw>m<i>*< , i i i nn > mmnHmMum h i

43. Students and staff of the first Naval Command Course, September 1 956, during a visit

to the Capitol, Washington, DC. Captain Richard Colbert, director of the course, is in the

back row (second from right).

44. Summer visitors President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Fleet Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz, USN (Ret.) confer with Naval War College president Vice Admiral Bernard Austin,

1960. 216
45. President John F. Kennedy, 28 September, 1961. With the President are Allen W.

Dulles, retiring Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and John A. McCone, his

replacement. President Kennedy announced the change in a news briefing at the War

College.

46. Naval War College campus, 1968.

217
47. Vice Admiral John T.

Hayward, War College president,

1966-1968.

48. Vice Admiral Richard G.

Colbert, War College president,

1968-1971.

49. Vice Admiral B.J. Semmes, War College president, 1971-1972, comments after the unveiling of

his official college portrait by college artist Tony

Sarro at a Hail and Farewell party, June 1972.

218
50. Naval War College Foundation Board of Trustees, November, 1981. (left to right)

Messrs. Freund, Anderson, Mrs. Crown, Mr. deWeldon, Rear Admiral Wadleigh,

Ambassador Estes, Commander Albrecht, Ambassador Middendorf Board President, Rear

Admiral Welch, NWC president, Mr. MacDonald, Mrs. Sturtevant, Messrs. Ruger,

Caragianis, Mays, and Fairchild.

51. Civilian faculty line up for academic procession, convocation, June 1970. (left to

right] Clyde Sargent, Oliver Lissitzyn, Neil Huntley, John M. Roberts, T.H. Williams,

Stephen E. Ambrose, Phillip L. Gamble, J.C. Aller, Frederick H. Hartmann, August Miller,

and Earl Schwass. 219
52. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, College president, presides at convocation, 1973.

Seated to the right of Vice Admiral Turner is Secretary of the Navy William J. Middendorf

.

53. First Naval Staff Course, 1 972. College deputy president Rear Admiral W. Harris and

course director Captain J. Quinn are in the front row. 220
m \ m

$'' k!

'.s-fs*;* .>.|li 11 j 1

SS11I 1 in 1

^.;.j|T ;V

;

: |li' mitt 1 1

;;: 18P:' "..,..., ;;

: c:-"-?k:;V Si ";AS?; •.:; r

, mmmm nil

ItIf 11 II It II II in

54. Vice Admiral Julian LeBourgeois, College president, participates in a Rhode Island

Independence Day celebration in downtown Newport, May 4, 1975. With Admiral

LeBourgeois are members of the Newport Artillery Company.

55. Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty, College president, with the Naval War College

Board of Advisors, May 1977: seated, Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.; Hardisty.

Standing left to right, Admiral Horacio Rivero; Dr. David M. Abshire, Lieutenant General

W.K. Jones, USMC; Vice Admiral James F. Calvert; Mr. Malcolm Forbes; Dr. Robert E. Ward;

Mr. Richard Beverly Corbin, Jr.; Admiral Charles K. Duncan.

221

.
56. Lecture in Spruance Hall auditorium. Spruance Hall, the first of three new buildings

constructed during the 1970s, was completed in 1972.

57. View of the Naval War College campus, 1978.

222
58. Interior of the Naval War College Museum, Founders Hall, 1981.

223
59. Change of command, August 1979. Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch, Jr. relieves Vice

Admiral James B. Stockdale as president during college convocation ceremonies. In

background (left to right) are Naval War College Foundation

representative J. William Middendorf, II and Under Secretary of the Navy R. James

Woolsey.

60. Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1981. Strategic Studies Group I with visiting CNO

Admiral Thomas Hayward, college president Rear Admiral Edward Welch, Jr., and center

director Robert J. Murray.

224
61. Umpire Area, Center for Naval War Gaming, Sims Hall, 1981.

X^nSU <

62. Convocation on Colbert Plaza, August 1983.

225
63. Close-up of faculty group, Convocation, August 1983.

64. A group of key civilian employees and staff, 1984.

226
65. Rear Admiral James E. Service, College president, and foreign officer delegates with

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, International Seapower Symposium, 1983

227
66. Naval War College Executive-Policy Group, May 1984, plus CNO.

Front row: Rear Admiral James E. Service, President, Naval War College

Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval Operations

Second row: Professor Frederick H. Hartmann, Special Academic Advisor

Professor Robert S. Wood, Dean/ Director of Naval Warfare Studies

Captain James M. Conway, USN, Dean of Academics

Captain Robert B. Watts, USN, Deputy

Captain Richard D. Coogan, USN, Dean of Administration

Captain William K. Sullivan, USN, Dean of Students

Third row: Mr. Edward L. Killham, Department of State Advisor

Professor Earl R. Schwass, Director of Library Department

Captain Robert A. Hall, USN, Director of Continuing Education

Captain Wright H. Ellis, USN, Director of Naval Command College

Captain Joseph P. Marnane, USN, Director of Naval Staff College

Captain Marshall B. Brisbois, USN, Director of Center for War Gaming

Fourth row: Colonel Laurence R. Gaboury, USMC, Advisor, U.S. Marine Corps

Colonel Richard E. Bauchspies, USA, Advisor, U.S. Army

Captain Nelson H. Keeler, USCG, Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard

Captain David A. Albrecht, USN, Staff Judge Advocate

Professor Alvin H. Bernstein, Chairman, Department of Strategy

Captain Jerome F. Watson, USN, Chairman, Department of Naval

Operations

228
CHAPTER 9

THE CONTINUING

QUANDARY, 1954-1966

The problems of the immediate postwar decade

continued unsolved. Following Admiral Conolly's retirement from the

Navy, the Bureau of Personnel delayed naming a new president of the

Naval War College. The chief of staff, Rear Admiral Thomas H.

Robbins, Jr., was named acting president in November 1953. A

thorough military scholar, Robbins took a deep personal interest in

naval strategy and in international relations.

The delay in assigning a new president came at an inopportune time

for the college. Not only did it create uncertainty at a time when the

college was trying to implement a new curriculum, but the delay gave

the impression that the college was being given low priority. This

impression only added to the doubts which the college already faced in

terms of its role and position in service education. The delay in making

the appointment also gave rise to speculation as to what type of officer

was most suitable for the position and what impression his assignment

makes to the naval officer corps. For some officers in the Navy, it

seemed most appropriate that the college president be a man who was

seen to be rising in the Navy and who had potential for the highest

positions, instead of a final comfortable post for a man who was about

to retire and to leave the service. For others, the college seemed to be

the best place for a man of great experience, a kind of elder statesman

among naval officers, who could help to educate younger officers in the

light of his long career. After a six-month delay, the Navy Department appointed Vice

Admiral Lynde McCormick as president, allowing Robbins to resume

his position as chief of staff in May 1954. McCormick was a distinguished officer who had already served 39 years in the Navy when he
230 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

arrived at the college. Qualified in submarines, he had been a Naval

War College student in 1937-1938 and commanded battleships in

World War II. Appointed Vice Chief of Naval Operations in 1949, he

served as Acting Chief of Naval Operations in 1951 following the

sudden death of Admiral Forrest Sherman. He returned to the Naval

War College after serving as Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Jleet and

Atlantic Command. In that position, McCormick had been the first to

be Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Clearly McCormick was an elder statesman and he set about carrying

out, in a quiet yet forceful manner, the plans which Conolly had laid.

The basic college courses were stabilized, but in 1956 McCormick dealt

with two important changes. First, the course in advanced study in

strategy and sea power was discontinued and a new course for senior

officers from other navies was established.

On 1.6 August 1956, before these changes could be fully developed

and the day before a new class was to convene, the flags of more than 40

warships in Narragansett Bay and all local shore installations were

lowered to half staff. An "All Ships and Activities" radio message from

Commander Naval Base announced the sudden death of Lynde

McCormick, president of the War College and Senior Officer Present,

only a few days after he had celebrated his sixty-first birthday.

On 1 7 August, Rear Admiral Robbins, the chief of staff, and once

again acting War College president, greeted the 1957 classes in Pringle

Hall. The 287 officers in four incoming classes constituted the largest

group that had convened up to that time. Noting that Admiral

McCormick would have wanted no delays or changes in the routine of

the college, Robbins stated, "The Admiral's love and devotion to this

college could not be excelled. He spent his last days here devoting

himself selflessly of his energies, broad experience, and wisdom to keep

this college in the forefront of the military education field and in

preparing officers to better serve our country in these perilous times."1

Establishing the Naval Command Course

Two weeks after the 1956-1957 academic year started, Robbins

received orders to become president of the college in his own right for

his fifth and last year on Coasters Harbor Island. The most significant

event that year was the inauguration of the naval command course

(NCC). Thus, at McCormick's death, the Naval War College entered a new phase in its history, for among the officers greeted by Admiral

Robbins as the year began were senior naval officers representing 23

free world navies. They were the members of the naval command

course. From then on, the Naval War College was more than a national

school. By embarking on an international course, it became a school to
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1 954- 1 966 23

1

influence both the strategy and thinking of allies and friends of the

United States worldwide.

The establishment of the NCC put on a permanent and regular basis

the participation of foreign officers in college courses, which had first

occurred in 1894-1895. After that, foreign officers had not been seen in

the classroom again until the ANSCOL course in 1943-1945, and the

assignment of 15 officers from the Royal Navy as students in Naval

War College courses between 1947 and 1951.

The move toward putting allied service education on a more

systematic basis got a start in 1951 with the establishment of the

NATO Defense College in Paris. When Admiral McCormick reported

to Newport after two years as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander,

Atlantic, graduates of the NATO College were appearing in both

European and Atlantic allied staffs. McCormick had commanded

several Atlantic NATO operations, including the largest allied

peacetime sea operation up to that time, Mainbrace, in the North

Atlantic. He was well aware of the need for better understanding among

the allied navies and for better knowledge of each other's intentions

and methods of operating. Admiral Arleigh Burke, too, realized this

need, and in 1 955, his first year as Chief of Naval Operations, he started

working toward a solution.

Ten years earlier Burke had been chief of staff to Vice Admiral Marc

Mitscher, Commander, Task Force 58, the Pacific Fleet's fast carriers.

Off Okinawa, TF 58 was joined by the new British Pacific Fleet, built

around four carriers. Rather than attempt to integrate the two groups,

Mitscher assigned the British separate target areas, thus avoiding the

complications of different operating procedures.

Soon after the end of the war, Burke was again Mitscher's chief of staff

in the new Eighth Fleet, preparing for possible Mediterranean duty.

Early in 1 946 Burke accompanied his superior on a trip to Europe to talk

with naval officers in Great Britain, France, and Italy concerning a possible war with Soviet Russia. Referring to Allied cooperation at that

time, Burke reminisced, "We didn't have time to do much, but even that

would have been a godsend if we had had trouble with the USSR."2 Six years later in 1952, Burke was director of OpNav's Planning

Division (Op30). Here he found that NATO planning was difficult

because American officers did not know their opposite numbers in

London, Paris, and other NATO capitals. In the winter of 1955, as Commander, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, Burke had a chance to see how NATO plans were working out in operation. In the weekly coffee

hours that Burke hosted for his captains based in Newport, the subject

of NATO exercises came up frequently. Reports from the destroyer

captains reinforced Burke's conviction that a most important factor in

war was to know your friends. It followed naturally that soon after
232 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

becoming CNO, Admiral Burke began laying the groundwork for

bringing the U.S. and other NATO navies closer together. From a global

viewpoint he also realized the need for closer coordination with

friendly navies in the Pacific and the Americas.

In the next few months Burke made contact with leaders of several

navies concerning ways of improving Allied naval operations. One

option was to offer a year's course of study for senior officers at the

Naval War College, a course modeled generally along the lines of the

curriculum for the naval warfare 1 course. NATO naval officers seemed

generally enthusiastic Burke said:

As I remember, about the only objection they voiced was sending

the wives over with their husbands. This was not a requirement,

but it took a couple of years before foreign Navy Departments

decided it was worth the extra cost to let the wives come too.3 By the spring of 1 956, 23 navies had accepted Burke's invitation and had

assigned officers for the first class, to convene that summer.

In Newport, Vice Admiral McCormick, at that time still in command,

was convinced of the value of such a course to future naval planning

and operations around the world, and he cooperated fully with Burke's

plans. If enthusiasm at lower levels in Newport was initially restrained,

it was because of worry that such a course might impinge on regular

courses at the college. Burke later commented:

He [Admiral McCormick] was absolutely correct that this new

course should not reduce the caliber of the other work the War

College was doing. The president and his staff made many helpful

suggestions right from the start and after it was going awhile, their

enthusiasm grew, perhaps due to the quality of foreign officers

assigned.4 Burke continued to be involved in getting the new course off to a successful start:

I had already learned that the CNO could not just give an order and

expect to have it carried out. He had to get somebody who was in

agreement with the project, who was just as enthusiastic about it, who was capable of running it without supervision, who could get

things done, and who could use the authority delegated to him

wisely to take charge of the project. That man was Dick Colbert.5

In January 1956, Captain Richard G. Colbert was a student in naval

warfare 1 at the college. Recently promoted to captain, he had already

been selected to remain for the next academic year as a student in naval

warfare 2. Colbert was well known to Admiral Burke, having been one

of his action officers when Burke was director of the Plans Division in

OpNav. At that time Colbert was serving in the International Affairs

Division with an office directly across the hall from Burke in the
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1954-1 966 233

Pentagon's "E" ring. Colbert had worked closely with Burke on many

position papers and plans. Friendship and a mutual respect developed.

Burke realized that few of the many staff action officers with whom he

worked had Colbert's competence and background in the field of

international relations. Colbert had not only been aide to Admiral

Conolly, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, for two years

but he had served temporarily as aide to Admiral Forrest Sherman

during his trip to Europe in the summer of 1951.

Putting his studies behind him, Colbert undertook to organize, guide,

and instruct a most diverse group of senior seagoing officers. Four years

earlier, while in Washington, he had written a brief staff study

recommending such a course, and much of what he had learned then

helped him to get started. As a relatively junior officer and with a myriad of personnel and logistic matters to be tackled, Colbert had to

proceed with tact to find adequate resources. The east wing of Sims Hall

had to be renovated to provide a separate area of offices, lecture rooms,

and a small library for the foreign students on the social, political, and

cultural background of the United States. One civilian professor was

added to the college staff to work primarily with the new course. He was

August C. Miller from Wheaton College. Miller was assigned as professor of international relations, a position which in 1961 was

named the Milton E. Miles Chair of International Relations. Miller held

the chair until his retirement in 1 974. There was little holiday leave for

Captain Colbert in the summer of 1956 following his graduation from

naval warfare 1 and serving as a student moderator for a global strategy

seminar group. Less than eight weeks later, the students for the new

course had arrived.

The naval command course generally followed the curriculum of

naval warfare 1. Students were included in as many of the regular War

College lectures as consistent with security. When the other War

College classes concentrated on highly classified matters, such as nuclear operations, the foreign officers took field trips. Using his

extensive personal contacts, Colbert arranged for visits not only to U.S.

military and naval activities but also to industrial plants in Buffalo, the

International Telephone and Telegraph laboratories near New York,

and the New York Stock Exchange.

On 25 August, the members of the new naval command course joined

1,000 U.S. officers from the fleet and shore establishment to hear and to

question Admiral Burke in the base theater. Socially in Newport and

professionally at the college, the class soon proved that Admiral

Burke's request for topnotch officers had been understood well and

acted upon in the capitals of the Allied nations.

The naval command course has continued much along the lines

pursued by that first 1 956- 1 957 group. The problems that faced Captain
234 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Colbert, Professor Miller, and six other staff officers have changed

little. Predictably and foremost, there is a language barrier to be

overcome in varying degrees by both students and instructors, but the

security problem has diminished with time. As a 1959 student wrote:

It is surprising how much classified information is released to this course. It certainly looks to me as if an effort has been made by the

U.S. Navy Department to go as far as it possibly can. In addition,

officers of flag and general rank have made short and exceedingly

frank 'off the cuff remarks at our lectures. In general I am surprised

anyway at the amount of information concerning the U.S. armed

forces that is continually being released to the general public.6 At the beginning of the course, staff and students resembled a mutual

admiration society. That gradually gave way to greater frankness in

criticizing problem solving, presentations, and lectures. The same 1 959

student pointed out that with more than 20 nationalities present there

would always be reluctance knowingly to hurt another's feelings.

Changes in Courses and at the Helm

As Robbins approached the end of his term as president, the college

faced a difficult problem in managing the curriculum that Admiral

Conolly had established. Conolly had envisaged that in 10 years it would be possible to revert to a one-year naval warfare course. The

two-year course was needed only to prepare for the senior course those

students who had been unable to attend a command and staff course. Conolly had hoped that by the 1 960s the Bureau of Personnel would be

able to send enough officers to command and staff level courses that

there would be a sufficient number of appropriately educated captains

and commanders who could attend the naval warfare course without

having to provide a preparatory course.

In less than three years from its establishment, Robbins faced the fact

that the Bureau of Naval Personnel had not been able to carry out the

commitment to the two-year program. The demand for officers at sea and in staff positions was so great that the Bureau was not able to allow

students completing naval warfare 1 to proceed on to the second year of

the course; with the exception of officers on the college staff who had

received certificates of completion, only 13 student officers had

completed the full two-year course.

In March 1957, Robbins recommended to the Chief of Naval

Operations that in view of this situation, the naval warfare courses

should be combined as soon as practicable and be pitched at the naval

warfare 2 level. Approved to take effect in 1958, this alteration would

put the college's courses more in line with those offered by the other

war colleges. At the same time, it simplified the task of the Bureau of
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1 954- 1 966 235

Naval Personnel and those assigned to schedule and administer courses

at the college.7 However, it marked the end of Conolly's idea to expand

and deepen the education of senior naval officers. The shortening of the

course meant, also, the end of logistics as a distinct part in the study of

strategy and high command in the college's curriculum. In the years

immediately following World War II, prominent naval officers such as Spruance and Carney had believed that logistics had been ignored in

naval education before World War II. Only a dozen years after the end of

the war, this initial "lesson" of that war's experience was put aside.

The inability of the Bureau of Personnel to find enough senior

officers to fill billets afloat and ashore has always been the main

rationale for the Bureau's reluctance to assign students to the Naval

War College. In 1956, Vice Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., used the

same reasoning when he advised the War College that no further

officers were available for the course of advanced study in strategy and

sea power. "The reason is a simple one;" Holloway wrote, "our

commitments are already beyond our resources."

The bare fact is that we are operating our naval establishment with

a practical deficit of some 250 line captains .... No one could be more appreciative than I of the benefits likely to

be gained from a full staffing of the Advanced Study group. We are

in an era of transition of the very nature of sea power, faced with the

absolute and over-riding requirement to maintain our present

forces at maximum effectiveness while striving to ready our

personnel for the technological advances they must cope with in

the future forces. In this transition, our operating forces must rely

heavily on the experience existing in our captains. One hundred

fifty-one of such captains are now assigned as students or staff to

the Senior Service Schools. To immobilize any additional captains

in a purely academic area is not justifiable.8 Although the problems that the Bureau of Personnel faced were

undoubtedly difficult, Holloway's statement played down what others

would argue was the even greater importance of theoretical study in a time of transition. At the same time, however, it was a recognition that

good theoretical work requires long years of intellectual development

and exploration. If Naval War College staff members clearly saw the

need to continue in this area, Washington policymakers had little

interest in it. For them, studies that helped to justify the Navy's policy

positions were more appropriate and useful.9 In June 1957, Robbins officiated at the largest graduation up to that

time, including the awarding of diplomas to students of the first class of

the newly established naval command course. Among the graduates

were 24 members of the college staff who, although they had not taken

the course, were given diplomas in recognition of their teaching it.
236 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Shortly after the ceremony, Robbins received orders to the Office of the

Secretary of the Navy, and later went on to be Commandant of the

Potomac River Naval Command. He was the first college president

since World War II who did not immediately leave active service.

The incoming president, Vice Admiral Stuart H. Ingersoll, was also

an aviator. When he came to Newport he had already served for 12

years as a flag officer, and he brought not only aviation expertise but a broad background of planning and command assignments in postWorld War II unified commands, including the directorship of

strategic planning in OPNAV. He had no Navy or joint postgraduate

education and he was the first president in many years not to be a Naval War College graduate. He was forceful, direct, and blessed with

a dry wit. Ingersoll summarized bluntly his aims while commanding

at the War College:

The United States today is engaged in a protracted conflict and

needs more people who are conflict-minded and who can develop

into conflict managers. 10

Long-Range Studies Project

In 1958, in an attempt to deal with rapid technological

development within the Navy and its relationship to naval strategy,

doctrine, and operations, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Arleigh Burke, directed the formation of the naval long-range studies

project at the Naval War College, following a recommendation from the

Naval Research Advisory Committee.

The purpose of this project was to assist the CNO in forecasting

long-range requirements of the operating forces of the Navy for

equipment, personnel, and supporting services. The Naval War College

had been selected as headquarters because of its naval-oriented,

academic atmosphere, library, educational responsibilities, and location away from Washington, yet near to centers of learning and

industry. 11 Six officers under the leadership of a newly selected Rear

Admiral, Edwin B. Hooper, reported to Newport in the fall of 1959 and

were given office space and support by the college. Admiral Ingersoll's

War College directive supplementing Burke's instructions pointed out

that "although the project headquarters is located at the War College, it

is not an integral part of the Naval War College."12 It would come under

the college president's direction only for the portions of the work

carried out by the college's students or staff.

Some early cooperation took place between the college's research and

analysis department and the long range studies project, but by and large

their functions were entirely separated, with the project director

reporting directly to OPNAV as one of its component offices. The
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1954-1966 237

original designation OP-93X, was changed in May 1960 to OP-09E to

indicate more accurately the OPNAV office through which the director

reported. At the suggestion of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the

name of the project was changed in February 1961 to the Institute of

Naval Studies. In 1960 that same name had been given to a civilian

contractor representing the Institute for Defense Analysis, an association of universities engaged in research at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The naval portion of that group, also located in Cambridge, was a component of the War College group.

In 1961, the War College staff joined with the Institute in its Limited

Warfare Symposium, and the same year staff and students joined in an

Institute panel discussion of "Future Naval Tasks." Following the Navy

Department's long-standing desire to consolidate its study effort

through one contractor, the Institute was removed from the Naval War

College in 1963 to form the Center for Naval Analyses, coordinating

with other contract groups. 13 In 1965, the college made a short-lived attempt to establish a Maritime Strategy Group under Captain Thomas H. Stetson. Its purpose, however, was to promote study and research rather than to

undertake it. 14

Electronic War Gaming

During the Ingersoll presidency a major change in war gaming took

place. The old game board in Pringle Hall was replaced with the

commissioning of the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS) on 7

November 1958 in the central wing of Sims Hall. Since 1945 this

complex giant had been under design and construction by the Navy

Electronics Laboratory of San Diego and various subcontractors

including the Navy Training Devices Center. It was the post-World

War II successor to game board and chart maneuvers introduced by

William McCarty Little in the 1880s.

NEWS continued the traditional war game, blending it with modern

techniques. The unveiling of the NEWS in 1958 completed 13 years of

design and construction at a cost of $7.25 million. The machine was

described enthusiastically as

the most flexible and intricate training device ever built, here a war

game can be laid out simulating any section of the globe, varying

from 40 to 4,000 miles on a side. The flag plot, individual command

centers, umpire plots, twenty individual c'ommand centers, communication centers, and allied equipment to accommodate a wide

range of variables in weapon, ship, missile, and aircraft performance

occupy 35,000 square feet of floor space. 15

Fleet commanders, seeing its value to train fleet units, heartily
238 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

supported funding for the NEWS. Since 1947, Newport-based destroyer

squadrons had exercised their tactical teams on the BZ trainer of the

General Line School. At a higher level, the Naval War College's NEWS

offered simulated operations for task group, force, and fleet commanders. Proper scheduling ensured no interference with the college

classes. In May 1958 the NEWS was included as a major element in the

new Navy war games program under the direction of the Chief of Naval

Operations. The NEWS staff became the war gaming department in

1 959, and operations in support of fleet forces were integrated with the

war games of the naval warfare, command and staff, and naval

command courses.

In 1965 the NEWS devoted 36 days to war games for the college, 15

days for various Atlantic Fleet staff exercises, and 12 days for the

Destroyer School classes from Newport. By the mid-1960s the NEWS

was able to provide

the basic elements of mobility, firepower, vulnerability, and

intelligence so that opposing commanders might exercise their

professional judgment in the employment of assigned forces during

a war game. 16 Summer White House, 1957-1962

In September 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower moved to the

Naval Base for a month's vacation. It was the first of three summers

during which Newport was host to the President of the United States,

his staff, and a large press contingent. The Executive Offices were

established in the original building of the War College. Although the

President had little direct contact with the college, he made a point of

meeting with the foreign officers in the second naval command class. In

September he informally received them in front of Founder's Hall for a few minutes while photographers crowded around for picture taking.

During their first visit, the Eisenhowers occupied the quarters then

assigned to the base commander, directly across the street from the

War College president's house. In the following summer and again in

1960, President Eisenhower and his family occupied the old post

commander's home at Fort Adams, designated at that time as quarters

for the War College chief of staff. In these two years, the chief of staff

was tactfully on leave or traveling during the presidential visit. In 1 958

the chief of staff, Rear Admiral Charles H. Lyman, made a South

American trip, visiting the war colleges of that area. Eisenhower's successor as President, John F. Kennedy, also came to

Newport on several occasions during his term, visiting at Hammersmith Farm, the estate of his mother-in-law, Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss. In

September 1962, President Kennedy saw the America's Cup Races on
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1954-1 966 239

board the destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., named for his older brother.

Other destroyers were sent out to serve as escorts and assist the Coast

Guard in patrolling the race course. The rush for passes to ride aboard

these ships was phenomenal, and last-minute directives from White

House and naval authorities were often conflicting. The Destroyer

Force chief of staff, who was responsible for operations of the

participating Navy units, commented

There were two crises in this Force in 1962, the America's Cup

Races at Newport in September, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in

October. Of the two the former was by far the most traumatic. 17

The Military Media Conference

The increasing presence of the civilian press corps in Newport was

reflected also in the establishment of the Naval War College's first

Military-Media conference in 1960. For the two-day affair, modeled in

part on the successful global strategy discussions, the press announcement of the first session stated:

Over fifty experts in the Public Relations and Press, Radio, and

Television industries will gather with the War College classes to

study Public Relations as it affects the U.S. Navy as a part of the

nation's defense establishment. 18 The chief of Navy public information, Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick,

was a featured speaker. He was followed by several newsmen, a panel

discussion with questions from the floor, and an afternoon of seminars

in 24 groups.

Since the 1960 conference, military-media sessions have continued

almost annually. The format has generally remained the same, and each

year has brought interesting speakers from press and television,

representatives from some of the nation's leading periodicals, and

senior public information officers from the Department of Defense. At

times, debate and questions have been acrimonious, and although it is

doubtful that either government officials or members of the press

changed long-held convictions, they each may have come to a better

understanding of one another's views.

As the Naval War College Review reported about a later conference,

Government-press relationships have been described as a game of

cops and robbers. The object of the cops is to conceal information,

while the robbers seek to disclose it. The cops seldom ask

themselves why they want to conceal particular bits of information, and the robbers often fail to analyze why they choose to

disclose the information they do. 19 During the Vietnam war, relations with the press may have reached a
240 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

low point, but in 1972 the War College president closed the conference

with words that echoed the original purpose of the gathering:

I think nothing could endanger our nation and its freedom more

than to generate a military-media complex. I feel the adversary

relationship is a healthy one and in the interest of a free and

effective media.20

Four-Year Term for College President

On 30 June 1960, Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin relieved Admiral

Ingersoll as president. Austin, the college's twenty-seventh president,

remained for four years in that position, the longest presidency in the

college's history. A veteran of submarines and destroyers, he had a service record unexcelled in breadth and diversity in this era of the U.S.

Navy. A wartime destroyer captain and squadron commodore, Austin

was a veteran of several actions in the Solomon Islands, sailing with

Arleigh Burke's "Little Beaver" squadron. Later as a spot-promoted

commodore on Admiral Nimitz' Pacific Fleet staff, Austin became the

Navy's youngest flag officer. He had had NATO duty in Europe and had

been Director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. He reported to Newport

after a year as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans. At the age of

58, Austin was truly an "elder statesman" in the service. His nickname

"Count" had been acquired as a plebe in the Naval Academy, and

befitted this dignified, courtly, and articulate college president. One

Austin innovation, the president's hour—periodic sessions where

students could address any question to the admiral—led to a later

comment by Austin that these sessions too often produced questions

from the same students, those who in any lecture "must" be heard.

The change of administration in Washington in 1961 brought a new

civilian team to the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara. They recommended that the naval command course

include more pro-American propaganda for the visiting foreign

students. With up to 25 different nations represented, NCC staff

officers had studiously avoided any glossing of subject matter or any

attempt to guide students' attitudes. Austin talked with emissaries

from Washington interested in guiding the curriculum. His statement

that "the very best propaganda in the world is no propaganda" carried

the day. It remains the basis of instruction at the naval command

course. The terms of both Ingersoll and Austin were interrupted, often on

short notice, by special assignments. Ingersoll participated in planning

for future disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet

Union, the forerunner of the SALT talks of later years. Austin was

ordered to head investigations on three separate occasions. The most
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1 954- 1 966 24

1

important was the Court of Inquiry into the loss of the nuclear

submarine Thresher east of Cape Cod on April 10, 1963. Although a military organization is geared to accept successive commanders, such

absences did not contribute to continuity in policy. Senior education at

Newport still needed a higher priority within the Navy.

The George Washington University Program

A growing area of concern for naval officers from the 1950s onwards

was their perception that an advanced academic degree enhanced an

officer's chances for promotion, and hence, a more successful career. In

1 956, an after-hours voluntary cooperative program was begun with the

Graduate School of Boston University. This program offered interested

staff members and students an opportunity to earn a Master of Arts

degree in political science (international relations]. At the end of the

first year, Boston University found that the Naval War College's

students had not performed successfully enough for them to continue,

but the university allowed staff members to continue up to 1963.

Similar attempts were made to further the education of staff members

with other institutions. In 1955, for example, two officers on the staff

attended the summer course in Arctic geography offered by McGill

University in Canada. From 1956 to 1960, a number of staff members

also participated in Harvard University's defense policy seminar, under

the direction of Barton Leach, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., and later,

Henry A. Kissinger.

In 1960, the commandant of the Army War College established a cooperative master's degree program in international affairs with

George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The purpose of

the program was to complement the Army War College's curriculum in

the international affairs field, to further the mid-career development of

officers, and to provide recognition to successful students in the form

of an academic degree.21 The plans for this trial course were discussed at the first annual

meeting of heads of senior, joint, and service colleges in the autumn of

1960. This conference, later known as the Military Education

Coordinating Conference (MECC), had been created that year as an

alternative to unified control of the war colleges by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. It provided a means for the war colleges to discuss common

problems in dealing with similar basic curricula for students from all

services.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel was strongly in favor of implementing

the program at the Naval War College, and Admiral Austin approved a

trial course for Newport for the academic year 1961-1 962, to be put into

full operation the following year. The course found support in
242 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Washington, particularly in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.22 As

established at the Naval War College, staff and student officers were

given the opportunity to undertake, on a voluntary basis, four nineweek terms ending in May each year. Each class met twice weekly for

two hours and carried three hours of academic credit. Three more hours

of academic credit, for a total of 15, were earned in an outside^eading

course. The degree program also included writing a thesis. The course

was taught by a team of professors from George Washington

University. The first resident head of this team was Dr. Hiram M. Stout,

followed in later years by J. K. McDonald, Clyde Sargent, and Peter A.

Poole.

In announcing the inauguration of the George Washington University program, Austin recognized the need for a high level of education

in the officer corps and for a clear understanding of foreign affairs

officers exercising high command. But, he warned,

Participation in The George Washington University Cooperative

Program is an after hours activity. Work in connection with the

program must not infringe upon nor interfere with the performance

of regularly assigned duties or the resident courses at the Naval

War College. . . . Only those students who have the capacity for a very heavy academic work load should participate.23 Traditionally, senior naval officers had always been involved in

international affairs during peacetime, but most officers on duty in

Washington or on large staffs had generally received only on-the-spot

training in the subject. During three Washington tours as a flag officer,

Austin had seen Army and Air Force officers outshine and sometimes

outmaneuver their Navy cohorts on the multitude of international

problems tackled in the Pentagon. Both the Army and Air Force had

made great efforts to provide academic education in international

relations to middle-grade officers. By the early 1960s, the Navy was far

behind the other services in the number of officers who had graduated

from university postgraduate courses at such institutions as Oxford,

Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Harvard, and

Stanford. Officers who had earned degrees from these institutions were

often designated subspecialists in international relations, but the Navy

had few of them.

The planners in the Bureau of Naval Personnel saw that the new

course at Newport would quickly increase the number of officers with

the qualification of an academic degree who could be designated

international affairs subspecialists without taking them away from

active service for additional courses in civilian universities. Officers

who volunteered for the additional course found the Navy ready to pay

the tuition, and often, the Bureau of Naval Personnel allowed time after

War College graduation for thesis work.
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1 954- 1 966 243

Although many naval officers thought that the course was a successful one, there were some reservations on the part of the War

College faculty. There was a growing feeling that the requirements of

the degree course, which represented an additional 20 percent work

load on a student, detracted from the regular curriculum. Similar

worries surfaced in the other service colleges and were brought out in

the 1963 Military Education Coordinating Conference, at which the

college commandants concluded:

Realizing that the military have now become involved in many

non-military matters, we nevertheless agree that the Service War

Colleges should consider whether the trend toward non-military

subjects has gone too far. 24 Moreover, as the program spread to all the war colleges, critics

thought that its quality declined. At the same time, some officers who

wanted to go on with advanced academic work found that course

credits from the George Washington War College program were not

recognized.

After Vice Admiral Charles Melson relieved Austin as college

president in July 1964, he expressed doubts about the true value of the

course:

Personally I did not place a great deal of credit in these degrees. It seemed to me there was something lacking, and to give a man a degree while working on an outside course like that just seemed to

me he was missing something. He either wasn't doing his work at the War College and that was my big objection, or he wasn't doing

the proper amount of work on his course to get a degree. In short, I felt the degrees were not demanding enough of the individual and

that their standing would not be very high in the educational

world.25 In May 1965 Admiral Melson and his staff hosted the Military

Education Coordination Conference at Newport. As chairman of this

gathering of commandants and members of the staffs of the senior,

joint, and service war colleges, Melson prepared a report to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It stated:

The George Washington University master's degree program

detracts from college mission accomplishment to a prohibitive

degree. The student conflict in meeting both sets of requirements

is too often solved in favor of the George Washington University.26 Despite this comment, the JCS made no move to stop similar

programs in the joint service colleges under their jurisdiction. The

Navy Department stood by its position on subspecialization. Although

the other service colleges found great difficulty in their relationship

with the George Washington University, the program at the Naval War

College ran smoothly and successfully. Vice Admiral Benedict J.
244 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Semmes, Chief of Naval Personnel, stated, "The Navy Department

considers the George Washington University cooperative program an

asset in the subspecialty program of officer education."27 Despite some

reservations in Newport, the program continued. In 1964, the Graduate

Record Examination was introduced to raise standards, screening out

those with low aptitude for the master's program. As a result, the 1965

enrollment at the Naval War College was reduced by more than 100

students to 115.28

Melson's Presidency, 1964-1966

Looking back on his term as War College president, Melson recalled,

"I really had no tangible objective in mind, but I had always enjoyed the

War College—I'd been a student there—and I just thought it was a fine

way to end my career at the War College."29 During a part of his year and

a half in command, Melson was assigned additional duties as Commander, Newport Naval Base. Taciturn and direct, "Charlie"

Melson supported greater emphasis on basic naval subjects, questioned

the value of the George Washington University program, and expanded

the use of the NEWS for war gaming by both courses. If at times he

wondered about the support given his college from the Navy

Department, he could reflect on a letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz sent him

shortly before Nimitz's death:

I credit the Naval War College with giving me the wisdom and

foresight to see the need for many important changes in our

personnel war planning. I regard your job as President as being

second only to that of the Chief of Naval Operations in importance.30 Early in Melson's term, Congress appropriated $335,000 for a much

needed addition to the Mahan Library. It was the first significant

addition to the college's physical plant since Sims Hall was acquired

from the Naval Station at the end of World War II. The new addition

permitted space for another 110,000 volumes. But classroom and

student office space was crowded for the student population of about

350. Melson considered the possibility of using land at Fort Adams, but

favored expansion on Coasters Harbor Island, with Luce Hall as the

center. As U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam expanded during

Melson's War College tour, there was little enthusiasm in the Navy

Department to support additional buildings. Melson's later view of the

financial support the college received during his presidency is a classic

understatement: "Speaking as an ex-War College president, I would say

the Department was not very liberal."31 In September 1 965, Melson saw that the quandary in naval education

had not been solved, and he urgently recommended that the Navy
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1954-1 966 245

"develop and issue a policy providing for the orderly growth and

progression in formal professional education of naval officers through

the grade structure." Melson's proposal was approved and Vice Admiral

B. J. Semmes, the Chief of Naval Personnel, initiated a study.32 On the basis of Melson's recommendations, Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations, slightly revised the formal

definition of the college's mission:

To provide naval officers advanced education in the science of

naval warfare and related subjects in order to improve their

professional competence for higher responsibilities.33 But in a private letter to Melson, McDonald revealed more explicitly

his view of the college's function:

At the career point at which naval officers attend the Naval War

College, they have been working hard at sea and ashore. Our career progression is such that the pace is intense. A year at the Naval War

College offers an opportunity for a needed change of pace, a change

in perspective and in pressure. In addition to formal matters of

substance and procedure, the Naval War College opportunity to

think in relative tranquility, to research against the largest

backdrop, to exchange searching broad ideas and ideals, to weigh

comparatively the ideas of distinguished speakers and stimulating

classmates, and to argue alternatives through to meaningful

conclusions are indeed energizing processes of the first order. How

to think clearly, then, is as important as what to think.34 About the same time, the college's three academic departments were

redesignated as the school of naval warfare, school of naval command

and staff, and school of correspondence, but the curricula and administration were only slightly affected. The distinction between the naval

warfare and the command and staff curricula continued along the lines

Admiral Austin had established in 1960 when he told incoming

students that in the naval warfare course the emphasis was on

education and in the command and staff course emphasis was on

training.35 In both schools after 1965, lectures and emphasis were given

more than before to the subject of counterinsurgency, and a correspondence course in this subject was initiated.

As Admiral Melson's term drew to an end, he and his staff received a

visit by a Department of Defense group of 12 civilian and military

officials, formed by Secretary of Defense McNamara to report on the

service and joint colleges providing education for senior and middle

grade officers. It was one sign of the increasing and direct interest in the

Naval War College and service college affairs that was now evident at

high levels in the Department of Defense. By coincidence the visit of

this group under Thomas Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Manpower, took place on 1 December 1965, the day the Navy
246 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Department announced that Melson would retire on 31 January 1966

and be relieved by Vice Admiral John T. Hayward.

Five years earlier, McNamara had arrived in the Pentagon, bringing

his team of young thinkers and planners from industry and academia.

The Navy adjusted slowly to the innovations brought by this new

administration, and it was a while before the Naval War College

became directly involved. Staff and students had been caught up in the

many problems of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as they translated

them into lectures, operational scenarios, and war games. They noted

the efforts of Secretary McNamara to carry out civilian command as distinguished from civilian control of the armed forces. It was public

knowledge that Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations from 1 96 1 to 1 963, had served only a two year term because he had

disagreed with the McNamara philosophy. The current Chief of Naval

Operations, Admiral David McDonald, found himself wrestling with

the same problem, as U.S. participation in the Vietnam war slowly grew.

Already he had addressed the War College classes three times, and

these concerns were reflected in his comments. In Washington, the

McNamara team, with support from President Lyndon Johnson, was

taking an ever more detailed role in combat operations in Southeast

Asia. The President was not averse to giving direct orders to units in the

combat area. By the time Admiral Melson's retirement was announced,

McNamara's young "Whiz Kids" seemed to be in "complete domination

of the Department of Defense."36 In March 1965, Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., who, before becoming

a director of the American Council on Education, had served under

McNamara as deputy assistant secretary of defense for education,

sounded a clarion call in an article in the U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings, entitled "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War

College."37 "At the War Colleges . . .," Katzenbach wrote, "the sense of military

professionalism has been on the wane. The mystique—that sense of

mission and that excitement of being part of a tightly knit professional

body—is barely felt. Service may be becoming a job."38 Katzenbach

charged that the War Colleges had civilianized their curricula to a degree that they were no longer service-oriented; at the same time they

did not reach the high quality of civilian universities. Among the

service colleges, only the Naval War College retained a major concentration upon its warfare specialty, but its curriculum, too, was

"something between great issues courses and extended Administration

policy briefings."39 Katzenbach pointed out that there were four

characteristics of war college courses:

1. The faculty did not teach in the classical sense of imparting

knowledge from a storehouse of knowledge.
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1954-1 966 247

2. The students claimed to learn more from their fellow students

than through instruction.

3. The student had the opportunity to earn a master's degree at

another institution while studying full time at the war college.

4. The breadth of view presented by the curriculum was so extreme

that it precluded depth of view in any subject.

There was a baffling sameness in the programs of all the war colleges,

and none dealt effectively with systems analysis, the major intellectual

tool used by the McNamara team in the Defense Department. In

Katzenbach's view, the solution was a simple one. The curriculum

should be reoriented.

To date the trend in the war colleges has been to discuss national

problems, hopefully tying these in some way to military problems.

This should be reversed. Military problems should be central to the

discussion and due reference made to the pressures, political,

economic, and technical which prescribe the peripheries within

which solutions must, or can, or cannot be found.40 Case studies of military problems should be developed, war college

staffs should include research analysts to develop suitable teaching

materials where none existed, and more use should be made of politicalmilitary war games. Finally, he argued, high standards should be used to

select faculty, staff, and students, and officers should be sent to the War

College before, not after, a staff assignment. In short, the college should

be the locus of the teaching, development, and analysis of strategic

concepts, tactics, weapons, and criteria, "that gamut of matters which

encompasses military professionalism."41 Katzenbach's views reflected some of the traditional ideals which the

Naval War College had espoused in years past. But few agreed with

them when stated by a civilian in a professional military journal.

Katzenbach was accused of "shooting from the hip," for confusing the

missions of the senior war colleges and the command and staff level

schools. Naval leaders accused Katzenbach of forgetting "that in the

world of 1965, a senior officer must be knowledgeable of a variety of

national and international problems."42 He was also criticized for

advocating essentially "a Prussian approach" to senior officer education

in "the teaching of established doctrine."43 A future four-star admiral,

then a newly promoted captain, noted that Katzenbach's recommendations would make the war colleges into advanced schools "producing

graduates who had clocked a certain number of hours in a certain

number of subjects. The present system turned out more professional

officers than Katzenbach offered."44 Not everyone defended the status quo. One Naval War College

graduate and former staff member indicted the Navy's policy on senior

officer education:
248 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

With our philosophy of the supreme importance of command, it is understandable that the Navy has the least effective educational

plan for training top-notch staff officers. We send our best officers

to junior and senior war colleges, but rarely to both. This is equivalent to sending our youngsters to high school or college, but

not to both. We do not ordinarily seek out at junior officer levels

those outstanding officers who are most 'educable' and progressively educate them for top staff assignments.45 The Naval War College had faced an ever increasing problem in

obtaining appropriate students since the 1930s, partly because of

shortages in officer strength, more because of the lack of a systematic,

progressive system of professional education for middle grade and

senior naval officers. The problem had only grown in proportion as the

Navy expanded over the years and took on more operational assignments. The newer problem, however, was how to incorporate into the

War College course the new perceptions of professional needs gained

during and since World War II. In the 20 years since the war had ended,

the Naval War College had succeeded in broadening the outlook and

perspective of its students. But it had not yet succeeded in achieving

consistently high academic standards, or linking broad perspectives

with a professional understanding of naval power.

Notes

1. NWC Archives, RG 16: Address by T. H. Robbins, 17 August 1956.

2. Letter, Arleigh Burke to J. R. Wadleigh, 12 December 1980.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. E. H. Van Kee, "Reflections of a foreign student," U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings (February 1959], p. 39.

7. NWC Archives, RG 3: President, NWC, letter, serial 485-57 of 15 March

1957; CNO letter, serial 140P60 of 17 April 1957.

8. NWC Archives, RG 3 File A3-1 (5400] Course of Advanced Study in

Strategy and Sea Power. J. L Holloway, Jr. to L. D. McCormick, 5 April 1956.

9. Nepier Smith, "Historical Analysis of the Organizational Success of the

Naval War College during the Twenty-five years following the Second World

War," NWC Advanced Research Project, 1974, pp. 1 19-20.

10. NWC Archives, RG 16: S. H. Ingersoll Convocation Address, 23 August

1959.

11. OPNAVINST 5010.16 of 31 March 1959.

12. Naval War College Instruction 5400.24 of 20 May 1959.

13. NWC Archives, RG3 File 5400/Naval Long-Range Studies Project, 1959-

1965. See also, D. A. Rosenberg, Historical Perspectives in Longrange-Planning

in the Navy (Naval Research Advisory Committee Report, 1980], pp. 39-59.

14. Loc. cit, File 5420: Maritime Strategy Study Group, 1965.

15. NWC Archives, RG 32: Command History, 1958, p. 44.

16. Command History, 1965, p. 28; See also F. McHugh, "Games at the War

College," USNI Proceedings (Sept. 1959), p. 53.
THE CONTINUING QUANDARY, 1 954- 1 966 249

1 7. Conversation during turnover of duties, Captain D. Willman, USN, to

Captain J. R. Wadleigh, 14 March 1963.

18. NWC Archives, RG 7: NWC press release, 14 April 1960.

19. "Military Media Symposium at the Naval War College," Naval War

College Review (Jan-Feb 1973), p. 49.

20. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, Ibid., p. 50.

21. Robert Carter Burns, George Washington University

Program inlnternational Affairs at the War Colleges (Washington; George

Washington University School of Public and International Affairs, 1982), p.7.

22. Ibid., pp. 37-39; Nepier Smith, op. cit., pp. 108-09.

23. NAVWARCOL NOTICE 1550, July 1962. Quoted in Burns, George

Washington University Programs, p. 40.

24. Nepier V. Smith, op. cit., p. 109.

25. NHC Oral History Collection: Charles Melson, p. 392.

26. NWC Archives, RG3: Report of Third Annual MECC.

President, NWC to Chairman, JCS. 30 June 1965.

27. Loc. cit., Chief of Naval Personnel Endorsement on Combs Board Report,

1965.

28. NWC Archives, RG32: Command History, 1965, p. 38.

29. NHC Oral History Collection: Charles Melson, p. 384.

30. NWC Archives, RG28: President's file, Melson: Nimitz to Melson, 24

September 1965.

31. NHC Oral History Collection: Charles Melson, p. 384.

32. NWC Archives, RG3, Box 123: File 5400; Mission and Tasks: Melson to

CNO, 1 7 September 1 965, serial 2355; B. J. Semmes to Melson, 1 1 October 1 965,

OpLO serial 12425.

33. OPNAV Instruction 1520.12B of 3 April 1965.

34. NWC Archives, RG3, Box 123, File 5400: Missions;

McDonald to Melson, 25 Nov. 1965.

35. NWC Archives, RG16: Convocation Address, B. L. Austin, 19 August

1960.

36. R. J. Stillman "The Pentagon Whiz Kids," USNI Proceedings (April 1966),

pp. 53-60.

37. Edward Katzenbach, Jr., "The Demotion of Professionalism at War

Colleges," USNI Proceedings (April 1965), pp. 34-41.

38. Ibid., p. 34.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

41. Ibid., pp. 38 and 41.

42. Anthony Harrigan, "Comment" in USNI Proceedings (September 1 965), p. 112.

43. E. R. Schwass, "Comment" in USNI Proceedings (June 1965), p. 1 10.

44. H. E. Shear, "Comment" in USNI Proceedings (September 1965), p. 112.

45. Paul R. Schratz, "The Ivy-Clad Man on Horseback," USNI Proceedings

(April 1965), pp. 47-48.
CHAPTER 10

WATERSHED FOR

CHANGE, 1966-1972

The year 1 966 marked the beginning of the first of

two major periods of change and reform that took place at the Naval

War College between 1966 and 1974. The origins of these changes can

be found in the growing criticism directed toward service colleges since

the mid- 1 960s. The critics gained the attention of high level officials in

the government, and a search for solutions to the problem was

stimulated by pressure from both President Lyndon Johnson's staff in

the White House and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's in the

Pentagon. The first series of resulting changes stemmed from the

appointment to the college presidency of Vice Admiral John T.

Hayward, 1966-1969, and from the personal interest taken by Admiral

Thomas B. Moorer, first as Chief of Naval Operations, 1968-1970, and

later as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Essentially, the college faced three major issues: the longstanding

need to improve and expand its facilities, the need to provide an

appropriate and demanding curriculum,, and the need to educate

students in a progressive manner.

In late 1965 and early 1 966, both the Department of Defense and the

Navy Department were beginning to examine seriously the educational

problems faced by service colleges at the same time that a new

president was needed to succeed retiring Vice Admiral Charles Melson.

Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze had strong views as to the type of man

who should be chosen. He believed that the Navy should

seek out a 3-star admiral who had distinguished himself intellectually, as well as professionally. On top of that, [the Navy] needed

someone with dash, creativity and push. It is a truism to say that

the sum of a man's knowledge is an inadequate measure of his
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 251

intellectual capacity. The extraordinarily capable man is one who

uses this knowledge in a creative way—an innovator. Such a man is particularly needed to head an educational institution to resist the

natural trend to conservatism which blocks attempts at curricular

reform. 1 The man chosen to fill these requirements in 1966 was the Navy's

senior vice admiral, John T. Hayward. A naval aviator with a probing

mind and seemingly unlimited energy, he had an established

reputation as a dynamic officer. Soon after World War II, as a commander, Hayward had flown a large, land-based Navy bomber from

the deck of an aircraft carrier to demonstrate that the Navy could

deliver nuclear weapons. His passengers on this experimental flight

included the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The flight justified the construction of aircraft carriers to help deliver

these weapons. This in turn ended the monopoly of them by the new

U.S. Air Force and its Strategic Air Command.

Hayward's Innovations

A high school dropout and a bat boy for the New York Yankees,

Hayward began his long naval career in Newport. In May 1925, he

enlisted in New York and was sent on a Fall River Line steamship to the

Newport Naval Training Station for recruit training. At that time

Barracks C (now Sims Hall) was used to house the newest recruits, or

"boots," and Hayward underwent his first naval training there. He

disliked it intensely.

The Catholic chaplain, Commander John J. Brady, took an interest in

him and successfully tutored him for the Naval Academy entrance

examination. Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1930,

Hayward's career was marked by a driving desire for professional

excellence through education. Scientific study at a variety of

universities complemented his wartime service in the Pacific and his

subsequent assignments in the development of rockets and of atomic

weapons. As Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development, he

was closely involved in the construction of the world's first nuclear

powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, and later flew his flag in her

as the first commander of a nuclear powered task force.2 When Hayward took command at the Naval War College, he was

determined to bring new academic and intellectual vigor to the

curriculum. He had no preconceived notions and was willing to search

and to experiment. The concurrent examination of education policy

within both the Navy and the Defense departments, however, gave him

the material with which to work.

Shortly after taking up the War College presidency, Hayward wrote

to Under Secretary of the Navy R. H. B. Baldwin:
252 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

My overall appraisal at this time is that the course has not been

demanding enough of the better students, and that changes are in

order for both them and us to derive maximum benefit from their

attendance.3 Hayward saw the process of education as a complex one which must

be tailored to promote individual growth as well as to impart a basic

professional knowledge. "As a philosophy at Newport, I attempted to

make it an intellectual experience for each individual,"4 Hayward

wrote. In restructuring the college curriculum, he sought the advice of

specialists such as Dean Fuller of the Harvard Business School and

Alain Enthoven on McNamara's staff in Washington, and also

attempted to develop closer ties with neighboring universities. "Our

reorganization program, to be effective without being disruptive, must

be evolutionary," Hayward decided. "I believe that one of our troubles

here has been the fact that the evolution in curriculum development

has not kept pace with either the other educational institutions or the

surrounding world environment."5 The lack of continuity in the college's curriculum had been evident

for many years. The constant rotation of naval officers was matched by

the even faster rotation of civilian academics who came to the college

for six-month or one-year appointments. However, even before

Hayward's arrival at the college, the appointment of one civilian

professor on an extended-term contract had been approved in principle

by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.6The holder of this position as special academic advisor was to provide continuity in curriculum

development, to offer academic expertise, and to serve as a link to

civilian universities. On 1 July 1966, Professor Frederick H. Hartmann

took up this position, first holding the Nimitz chair, then assuming the

newly created Alfred Thayer Mahan chair of maritime strategy.

Core Curriculum and Civilian Faculty

Utilizing Hartmann's advice, Hayward started with the premise that

he could not deal with students as a homogenous group. He knew that

their professional and educational backgrounds were extremely diverse

and he sought to revise the curriculum to take this diversity into

consideration. First, incoming students were required to take the

graduate record examination. The results would be used to determine

their overall academic capabilities. Then, following a pattern common

to many leading universities to deal effectively with diverse backgrounds, he established a basic curriculum to give the students a common professional beginning point. The instruction of both the

school of naval warfare and the school of command and staff were

consolidated during the initial period of the academic year in order to
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1 966- 1972 253

provide the academic and military fundamentals common to both.7 The

title of the course, "Fundamentals of Strategy," was a misnomer. It implied an elementary level of inquiry; however, its scope and pace

were hardly elementary. It was a wide-ranging review designed to bring

the students rapidly up to a graduate-level course in international

affairs and strategic issues. Students had to come to grips with the

essentials of international relations (including conflict resolution),

economics, the functioning of the U.S. economy and its relationship to

military expenditures, international law, the history of strategic

thought and theories of war, the organization of the federal government,

and the roles and missions of the armed services.

Without great financial resources, the college could not hire a large

faculty to teach each of these areas in depth to small classes. In order to

meet the needs of the course on a limited budget, Hayward chose to

expand the system of visiting professors by widening the range of

academic disciplines they covered. In addition to the chairs already

existing, Hayward took the initiative in establishing the Theodore

Roosevelt chair in economics, first held by Professor Franklin Root of

the Wharton School of Finance; the James V. Forrestal chair of military

management, first held by Professor Z. S. Zannetos of the Sloan School

of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the

Stephen B. Luce chair of naval science, first held by retired Captain

Edward L. Beach; and the chair of comparative cultures, first held by

Professor J. M. Roberts.

The greatest drawback to this system of professorial chairs was their

small number. The college lacked enough qualified academicians in

any one discipline to lead the dozen or so small student seminars on

that subject. The faculty instead delivered lectures in their discipline

to the assembled student body. In addition, the professors gave

introductory lectures on the research approaches in their respective

disciplines and went on to supervise student research efforts, thus

enriching the overall program. It was less than an ideal teaching

arrangement, but considering that the college faculty was predominantly military, the result produced a broadening of perspective in a curriculum heavy in military value and outlook. With this in mind,

Hayward specifically fought against the notion that there was a military mentality. "It is ridiculous . . . how people try to isolate today

something called the 'military mind,'" he wrote. "There is no such thing.

The armed forces have been intimately involved in all the progress of

this Nation . . . ."8 It was clear that

if the military were to take their rightful place in the scheme of

things, they had not only to be better educated themselves in all areas but also better educate others with whom they deal on just

how broad and deep their knowledge has become.9
254 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The civilian chair holders played an essential role in this, both to

broaden the students' perspective and to carry a knowledge of this

breadth back to their civilian colleagues in other institutions. Each of

the civilian chair holders, after his portion of the fundamentals course,

in the later portion of the academic year pursued his subject with the

two separate courses and in giving electives.

Once the students had finished the fundamental portion of the

course and had received a common background, the seniors began a study of how policy was made, then applied it to major geographical

areas. In addition, they became acquainted with questions raised by the

New Left and New Right, the news media, and their effects on public

opinion and public diplomacy. Additional topical and contemporary

problems followed, such as national strategy, foreign policies, the

economic, political, military, and the socio-psychological sources of

national power.

As the academic year progressed, the course turned to naval matters.

The naval warfare course examined the historical implications of sea power and the maritime capabilities of the United States, the Soviet

Union, and their respective allies. The final two months of the core

curriculum were devoted to enhancing the knowledge of the students

in the art and science of naval warfare generally. Specifically, they

examined naval capabilities of the United States to engage in worldwide operations in support of national policies. They conducted war

games to confirm or to disprove their assessments. While the senior

level course studied such issues, the command and staff course

concentrated on operational matters and especially on the complexities of planning for military operations. Gaming played a large role.

Throughout the year the core curriculum was pitched to the

"average" student. An electives program was designed to enrich the

curriculum and to provide either further background courses or to

challenge the most advanced students. The students chose from an

extensive list of diverse elective courses, such as maritime history,

economics of war, foundations of modern China, Cold War operations,

and the legal aspects of modern warfare, among others. The educational

background of the students was extremely varied. Some had advanced

academic degrees and others lacked undergraduate education. Arrangements were made with neighboring universities to assist the college.

The University of Rhode Island allowed some War College students to

earn credits for their bachelor's degree. In addition, qualified students

could gain entrance to work for advanced degrees in oceanography and

ocean studies with War College courses counted for academic credit

and a common thesis for both institutional programs. Nearby Brown

University in Providence admitted a few selected students to pursue

advanced seminars in political science.
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1956-1972 255

By far the most elaborate and extensive degree program at this time

was the already established George Washington University curriculum

to provide a master's degree in international affairs for resident War

College students. Hayward strongly supported it, regarding the George

Washington professors as, in effect, an augmentation of college

resources. Their classes were treated by the War College as an

additional set of electives, but were held after regular college hours.

Credits earned from these courses, plus satisfactory completion of the

War College course, entitled students to a master's degree in international affairs.

Consequently, the George Washington curriculum was not simply

laid on in addition to the regular War College courses. It was carefully

coordinated with the resident course of study to the extent that credit

earned in an appropriate college elective had sufficient academic worth

to be applied toward the George Washington degree. Similarly, work

done in the George Washington course was acceptable to satisfy War

College requirements.

Military Management Studies

The basic program that Hayward established contained some new

subjects for the college. One of these new areas of study involved the

related subjects of military management, economics, and systems

analysis. For the six years since Secretary of Defense McNamara had

come into office, many officers in the Navy had scoffed at the approach

to management that McNamara had introduced. Part of this reaction

may have been caused by McNamara's failure to develop a cohesive

team feeling between the men in uniform and the civilians who

accompanied him. "These bright, developing military leaders were

astonished at first. That quickly changed to resentment and was

probably one of the biggest incentives our young people had," Hayward

wrote. "They became determined to know more than the so-called 'whiz

kids.' Today they are spread all over the land, attending universities . .

.

in many areas once thought foreign subjects for military training."10 Hayward saw military management as part of the broad spectrum of

knowledge that is required for a professional officer. Emphasizing this

point, he wrote:

We should not let strong differences be drawn between these

components of national strategy. These are all areas in which we

must be knowledgeable and be able to contribute. We must avoid

becoming mere technicians. Economics must concern us as well as other facets of our profession. Military deployments contribute to our balance of payments problems, so if we are to be able to evaluate

them one must of course be familiar with the economics of the

situation. 11

\ -
256 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

In modifying the War College curriculum to include "systems

analysis," the current approach to evaluating weapons systems in the

light of their cost effectiveness, Hayward established a three-part

program. He included a segment on the principles of management and

the Department of Defense's program planning system in the introductory fundamentals course, established an elective for more indepth study in operations research and defense programming, and

increased emphasis on current issues in this area. 12 In addition, a three-week management course for newly selected flag and general

officers was offered during the summer recess and taught by faculty

from the Sloan School of Management at MIT. Hayward sought to

make the study of management as relevant to actual problems as possible by using drafts of recent memoranda in this area from the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House. Commenting favorably on

the innovative use of these documents, the Vice Chief of Naval

Operations, Admiral Horacio Rivero, wrote, "Not only will they

create an awareness of the many new concepts being generated, but

they will also show how essential the quantitative analytical

approach is to the justification of force levels." 13 Hayward believed that field study was an important ingredient in the

curriculum and he took steps to increase it. "The perspective which can

be gained by actually witnessing events which are carefully curriculum-integrated can not be duplicated in textbooks or on lecture

platforms," Hayward declared. 14 Among other visits, he arranged for the

school of naval warfare to visit the United Nations and for command

and staff students to visit the headquarters of Strike Command, thus

emphasizing the two different levels at which these courses were

pitched. In addition, he was able to obtain additional funds to support

extensive travel and conference meetings for students involved in

research work.

In general, Hayward sought to widen the outlook of future naval

leaders and to stimulate them. Neil Ulman, staff reporter for The Wall

Street ]ournal, described his impression of.Hayward's curriculum

changes after a visit to the college in 1968:

Its 10-month course has traditionally concentrated on battle

planning, fleet maneuver and control, logistics and weapon

systems.

But now a guest lecturer blasts the U.S. presence in Vietnam. A

professor tells his class that the State Department's rationale for

the Cuban quarantine is all wet. A picture of Ho Chi Minh hangs

prominently in an administrative office. And a favored new text is Che Guevara on Guerilla Warfare. 15

In Hayward's view, open discussion and complete academic freedom

went far in stimulating intellectual growth. "When I got here," Hayward
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 257

said, "there was an obsession with the procedures of military planning.

That's strictly mechanical—not an intellectual exercise." 16 The

curriculum that Hayward designed to produce this effect was a basic

one which assumed little prior knowledge by the students but at the

same time gave them as broad a view as possible and increased the level

of study in increments, reaching the graduate level in January.

The College and Its Place in an Officer's Career

Revising the curriculum was only one aspect of the problem Hayward

faced. The quality of the student body and the role of the college in an

officer's professional career was an important issue and one which lay in

the wider realm of educational policy within the Navy and the

Department of Defense. Along with all War College presidents, Hayward

believed that the quality of the student body was central to the future of

the college. He saw that far too many students were not destined for

important and sensitive positions in whatever time remained in their

careers. Although he believed that the college should do more than

educate future admirals, he was committed to the idea that the student

body should consist of officers with excellent service records. Obviously,

if the student body did consist of such men, a fairly high proportion of

them would be elevated to flag rank some time in the future.

A review of the 1966 Navy Register indicates that of 229 line flag

officers on active duty, only 64 were graduates of a course at the Naval

War College. Eighty-seven were graduates of the National War College,

where the 20 classes since World War II had contained far fewer Navy

students than the comparable classes at Newport had held. The status

of the senior joint service college and the convenience of a one-year

Washington tour close to the center of power were obviously attractive.

At the same time, the relative importance of the Naval War College to

the professional development of ambitious naval officers had declined.

Such men tended to think they could no longer spare a year away from

cockpits, reactors, ship's bridges, and staff duty in Washington. By the

1960s, officers expected much shorter service careers than they had in

previous generations. In order to be promoted up through the grades,

officers needed to have specific types of experience at different

promotion levels. To do this within the constraint of a relatively short

service career created pressures to exclude any duty assignment that

did not obviously meet the accepted criteria for promotion. The

competition among officers to obtain such "career enhancing billets," as they were called, was swayed toward technologically oriented

positions. The armed forces needed a large number of officers who

could swiftly assimilate technical data and master rapidly changing

technology. This need put a premium on technological education over
258 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the analytical and broadening approach which the Naval War College

represented. In short, the college was unattractive in an era of relatively

short service careers and emphasis on technology. If officers with

promising futures were to be attracted once again to Newport, either

the college had to offer them and the Navy something more than it was

doing, or career pressures and patterns had to be altered. The college

faced a dilemma in that its longstanding belief in progressive education

required that students proceed from one level to another in a structured

manner. Every trained educator who looked at the issue supported this

notion; yet it was an idea that appeared to be impractical. The Deputy

Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Vice Admiral B. J. Semmes,

put the issue clearly when he told the college:

The philosophy of providing for the professional development of

officers through a formal education process must be carefully

weighed against other 'high priority' programs of the Navy.17 The demands of the nuclear power program, Vietnam, anti-submarine

warfare, research and development, and increasing requirements from

outside the Navy meant that in 1 967, for example, there was a shortage

of 1, 1 54 lieutenant commanders in the Navy, with only 86.5 percent of

the lieutenant commander billets being filled. "To enforce a hard and

fast rule," Semmes continued, "that an officer must attend a junior

service college prior to attendance at a senior college could discriminate against many outstanding officers who could not be spared from

operation type billets."

The attempt that Admiral Conolly had made to institute progressive

education in 1953 had lasted only three years. "In analyzing the

reluctance of the Navy to establish an effective progressive professional military education program," Hayward protested in December

1966,

it is very evident that greater emphasis has been placed on the

importance and prestige of formal, specific, specialized postgraduate education than on the less tangible, but equally important War

College type [of] progressive officer education. It is insupportable

for the records to show through the years that the Navy cannot

produce the funds and facilities, as well as program personnel, to

provide the long agreed required number of senior officers with

progressive education in the broad fundamentals of their profession .... The continuing lowering since World War II of the

percentage of professionally educated senior officers in the Navy is a phenomenon that can only invite criticism. 18 Unable to move the Navy Department in its view toward progressive

education, the War College turned to other issues relating to the role of

the college in an officer's career. In early 1966, Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Manpower Thomas D. Morris had observed a wide
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1 966- 1 972 259

divergence in the ways that senior service colleges evaluated their

students' academic achievement. The Naval War College had no

grading system, but the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the

Army's Command and General Staff College used grades and established a student's class standing. At the same time, the National War

College faculty evaluated students and prepared lists of class standing,

but this information was not made known to the students. With

Morris's criticisms in mind, the Navy Department directed the Naval

War College to institute some kind of a system, which, at least, would

select the top 10 percent of the students for outstanding academic

achievement. Replying to this directive in 1966, Hayward cautioned:

Considering the maturity of the officer students and the important

objective of encouraging them to develop their reasoning power and

decision-making ability, overemphasis upon academic competition

in an evaluation system would be self-defeating. However, even an

unobtrusive evaluation process will provide a subtle extra stimulus. 19 Hayward went on to suggest that a specifically designed officer

fitness report be used for naval officers under instruction. This

suggestion, however, was not taken up by the Bureau of Naval

Personnel.20 At the same time, Hayward experimented with a grading

system at the college. After about a month, he found that it could not be

effectively employed without a larger academic staff, which would

have more time to spend with individual students.

The basic difficulties the college faced were still unresolved, and the

college continued to decline in importance for the general pattern of

officer careers. In 1967, for the first time in the naval warfare course,

students from other services actually outnumbered Navy students: 57

from other services to 38 naval officers. Moreover, the proportion of

naval officers sent to the college failed to increase commensurately

with the growth of the total number of officers in the Navy. If this trend

were not reversed, the Naval War College would end up educating

primarily officers from the other services, if it remained open at all. In

terms of the Navy's educational policy, the outlook was no better. In

1968 the Navy's quota of seats at all senior service schools was 196, of

which 129 were filled. Given the demand for officers in operational

assignments, filling two thirds of senior service school quotas might

appear credible. However, all the empty seats but one were at the Naval

War College. Further, only 59 percent of Navy captains had some

service college education, compared to 73 percent of the Air Force

colonels, 79 percent of the Marine Corps colonels, and 96 percent of the

Army colonels. At the same time, 1,442 naval officers of all ranks were

enrolled full time in a variety of postgraduate and other educational

programs. The Navy had not turned its back on advanced education.

Only professional military education had been eclipsed.
260 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Support from Admiral Moorer, CNO

Hayward and his staff and faculty received valuable support from the

new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, a 1953

naval warfare course graduate. About the time that he became CNO,

Moorer recalled in a U.S. Naval Institute lecture that World War II had

made him aware of the interdependence of all the armed services and

the Korean war impressed upon him the close relationship between

military strategy and national policy. It was in the midst of the Korean

war (during Admiral Conolly's presidency) that Moorer came to the

Naval War College to study and had his first opportunity to develop his

ideas about large military issues, particularly about American foreign

policy and joint strategic planning.21 This was an important personal

experience which Moorer believed should be encouraged in younger

officers.

Soon after his appointment as CNO, Moorer asked Hayward to focus

his efforts in making a "hard-hitting presentation" to convince highlevel officials in the Navy and the Defense departments of the

necessity for the advanced professional education of middle-grade and

senior officers. 22 To prepare for this effort, Hayward ordered a thoroughgoing review of the necessity for professional education, an

examination of the state of Navy professional and postgraduate

education, and an ambitious concept for expansion of the physical

plant of the college. This review for the CNO was written by Hayward

with the assistance of Captains Aloysius J. Pickert, Jr., and Daniel J. Morgiewicz.

The review argued that it was time to redefine both the requirements

for being a naval officer and the concepts with which naval officers

viewed their own profession. The purposes, they said, for which

military and naval forces existed had expanded far beyond the

relatively narrow and familiar uses of World War II. Because policy

goals and military means were inextricably related, they believed it was

necessary for officers to understand the realities of practical international politics. They recognized the post-World War II development

within the armed forces that encouraged reliance on new insights from

the social sciences to questions of national security.

Hayward's presentation to the CNO emphasized that the formation

of policy, the preparation of plans, and the execution of programs had

both a military and a political character. The critics of the war colleges

had insisted that professional military officers needed to understand

the political consequences of their actions, whatever they might be or however they might be made. This could be accomplished best when

officers were freed from immediate administrative and policy concerns

but still had access to upper levels of the military policymakers. This,
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1 966- 1972 26

1

Hayward argued, was a need that the Naval War College could clearly

meet.

In order to carry out the plans that Hayward and his staff formulated

for the college, two groups were established. At the local War College

level, the Secretary of the Navy established on 2 March 1967 a 12-

member board of advisors to recommend improvements in the

curriculum, augmentation to the faculty, plans for the library, and a 10-year construction program for new college facilities. The board,

designed to provide general policy guidance to the president, was

composed of leaders in a variety of fields. As a group, their ideas and

recommendations could provide effective weight when necessary to

counter opinions expressed by senior civilians in the Department of

Defense. The board met three times a year; its first members were Vice

Admiral Bernard L. Austin, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Inter-American

Defense Board; Mr. Emilio Gabriel Collado, Executive Vice President

and Director, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; Mr. John S. Dickey,

President, Dartmouth College; Mr. William W. Foshay, Senior Partner,

Sullivan and Cromwell, New York City; Vice Admiral Stuart H.

Ingersoll, USN (Ret.), Beachmound, Newport, R.I.; Professor George F. Kennan, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.

Also, Mr. S. M. McAshan, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Anderson,

Clayton and Company, Houston, Tex.; Mr. Stanley Powell, Jr., President,

Alexander and Baldwin, Inc., San Anselmo, Calif.; Mr. Henry S. Rowen,

President, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. Dr. Maurice F. Tauber, Melvil Dewey Professor of Library Science, Columbia University; Dr. Edward Teller, Associate Director, Lawrence Radiation

Laboratories, University of California; and Mr. Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Chairman of the Board, International Business Machines.

A year later, Admiral Moorer as CNO established a steering group

under the direction of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to develop a schedule and feasible plan to carry out Hayward's objectives for the

Naval War College. The group consisted of the VCNO as chairman; the

Director, Navy Program Planning; Chief of Naval Personnel; Deputy

Chief of Naval Operation (Plans and Policy); Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations (Logistics); and Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Development. Simultaneously, Admiral

Moorer ordered that the Naval War College have a clearly delineated

sponsor within the OPNAV staff.23 In November 1 968, this was done by

appointing the Deputy CNO for Manpower (OP-01) as the college's

sponsor, with command and support of the college delegated to the

Chief of Naval Personnel.24 Admiral Moorer's personal interest in the College was undoubtedly a key factor in carrying out the administrative reorganization necessary

to success. The very words used within the Navy to describe functions
262 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

were constantly being changed in this period, adding to the difficulty

involved in normal development. Commenting on the creation of a new

administrative relationship for the college, the Commandant of the First

Naval District referred to the Navy's overall administrative problem

when he wrote, "We have been reorganizing continuously for five years

and are getting more muddled all the time .... In our constant change

syndrome, we simply can not permit a system to work long enough to

make the adjustment in the mind of the participants."25 But that was not the only difficulty. After the CNO's steering

committee had established the Naval War College development plan in

1968, the Department of Defense delayed approving the necessary

"program change requests" which would put the plan in effect. Finally,

Admiral Moorer personally obtained the coordination of various offices

within the Department of Defense, without using the normal administrative methods, so that the plan could be implemented.

Construction Program

The expansion plan announced by the Chief of Naval Operations was

an ambitious one. If it could actually be carried out, it would ensure that a significantly greater proportion of unrestricted line officers would be

educated at the college. It would also make the existing facilities

hopelessly inadequate. Hayward and his staff faced the enormous task of

identifying specific needs, arranging for preliminary studies, garnering

congressional support for funds, and finally, starting the work.

The plan to increase enrollment to 700 students at the college by 1980

spurred the most comprehensive review and plan for the expansion of the

physical plant in the college's 80-year history. From 1 89 1 to 1 968 the total

cost of construction at the college had been only $1,636 million. The

proposal in 1 968 for three additional buildings carried an estimated price

tag of $7,625 million.

The first and most important item in the 1968 proposal was a Professional Education Center containing a divisible auditorium with

1,200 seats plus academic study office area for 50 students. The second

was a combined academic, command, and administration building. It would accommodate 100 students in addition to the academic, planning,

and administrative functions then currently performed in Luce Hall,

including a fully equipped print shop. The Secretary of the Navy

approved naming these two buildings, respectively, for Admiral

Raymond A. Spruance and Vice Admiral Richard L. Conolly, both former

presidents of the college.

The next priority was another academic building, originally referred to

as "Conolly second increment." It was to replace Sims Hall to house the

command and staff course and the correspondence course.
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 263

The 1968 expansion plan had at first included both a separate, new

library building, and a new structure for war gaming. But as student

increases lagged, plans for these buildings were cancelled.

Although there was little real opposition within the Navy Department to a major physical expansion of the college, there was little real

interest in it. Using his considerable powers of persuasion, Hayward did

not hesitate to approach members of Congress whom he had known in

earlier tours of Washington duty and to use key members of his board of

advisors to help carry the message. Two influential members of the

Armed Services Committees, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington

State and Congressman Robert Sikes of Florida, agreed with him on the

necessity for expansion. With these two powerful allies, the initial

appropriations for military construction were obtained from Congress,

and the ground for Spruance Hall, first of the new buildings, was broken

in 1971. As Hayward recalled some years later, "People knowing the

infighting in the Navy itself for military construction funds know the

problems we faced. These strong allies [in Congress] won the day for me

and deserve the credit .... if we had not fought, it would never have

happened; as in Luce's day, Congress was the key to success."26 Retiring

in 1968, Hayward left the college demonstrably better than he had

found it with an expanded curriculum and a sound, detailed program for

expansion and construction.

Colbert's Return to Newport

Hayward's successor was Richard G. Colbert, then serving in Norfolk

as Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Ephriam Holmes, Supreme Allied

Commander, Atlantic. Colbert had been aide to Admiral Conolly in

1948 and had absorbed some of his views toward professional

education. As a student in the War College in 1956, Colbert had been

chosen by the then CNO, Admiral Burke, to head the first international

course at Newport. In 1968, Hayward thought that Colbert, although a relatively junior rear admiral, was the ideal man to succeed him, and he

said so in Washington. In July, Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius

announced that Colbert would succeed Hayward upon the latter's

retirement from active duty. This selection represented a break in

Department policy prevalent since World War II. College presidents

since Edward Kalbfus had all been in their final tour of active duty, and

in every case could be termed "elder statesmen" in the Navy hierarchy.

Colbert at the age of 53 was serving in his second flag assignment, and

after a normal tour at Newport could expect further duty afloat and

ashore. Colbert, known as a "comer" among his contemporaries, was

also familiar with the Naval War College and its progress in the years

since he had been a student.
264 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

The Colbert presidency remained deliberately low-key with respect

to the evolution of the academic program, which he believed was then

in excellent shape. After the ferment of the Hayward years, the college

needed a period of relative calm and stability. Colbert's mission was not

to revolutionize the college; Hayward had already done that. The new

president consolidated and strengthened the academic program

initiated by his predecessor. He added a new civilian chair of war

gaming, however, to increase the rigor and scope of the expanding

games being played on the NEWS. Assuming the presidency in July

1968, Colbert quietly declared his belief in the role of the Naval War

College. "In the face of the challenge that confronts us, I would hope

that 'on my watch' we will be able to generate new and meaningful

thinking," Colbert declared. "If the kind of research and creative

thinking necessary to sound military knowledge is not done at the

Naval War College, there is danger that it will not be done at all."27 Colbert's primary attention was given to enriching the existing

overall program through better student housing, creating a War College

Foundation, and establishing Newport as a center for international

naval discussions through symposia, conferences, and courses. He

wanted to expand the influence of the college by providing the means

by which the U.S. Navy and other navies could seek out common

ground and start working toward common solutions to common

problems. At a time when the United States government officially

recognized in the Nixon Doctrine that this country alone could not

bear the burden of the defense of the free world, Colbert's contribution

in furthering this policy in the maritime community of the free world

navies was significant and remains largely unsung.

Expanding the International Role of the College

Colbert was a happy choice to continue the reforms started by

Hayward and to add to them in a broader field, the arena of international

naval discussions. When Colbert reported to Newport for the second

time, he had added significantly to the experience gained in his years

with the naval command course from 1956 through 1958. He had had

service in the planning directorate (J-5) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

later on, the policy planning group of the Department of State. Afloat,

he had spent a year commanding an auxiliary ship with the U.S. Sixth

Fleet whose home port was Barcelona, Spain. This tour had been

followed by command of the guided missile cruiser Boston, serving on

occasion as flagship for the Commander, Sixth Fleet. In both these

assignments he visited many Mediterranean ports and observed as well

as partook in the power projection role of the Navy. His most recent

position at the Norfolk headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command,
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 265

Atlantic, provided a fertile field for expanding his knowledge of dealing

with U.S. allies and meeting their senior naval officers. After Hayward,

an intellectual and a scientist, who improved dramatically the

academic credibility of the college, Colbert was well suited to carry on

and to develop the plans further. Fully accepting the Hayward

curriculum, Colbert turned his considerable skills to the delicate but

important task of quiet naval diplomacy.

Since the U.S. Navy was broadly connected with other countries

through their navies, it was possible through Colbert's informal

contacts and more formal symposia to discuss a wide range of ideas and

concepts. From the first, these conferences were largely out of the

public eye. What made them feasible was the deliberate decision to cast

them as an exchange of views between professionals on common

problems under a mantle of academic freedom rather than as an official

negotiation among governments. In this way, it was possible to test and

to discuss new ideas without appearing to challenge official government positions and policies. Under Colbert's immediate guidance and

with the express blessing of CNO, Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Naval

War College in 1 969 hosted the First Seapower Symposium attended by

the chiefs of naval staff and senior officers from 37 navies. In addition,

Colbert hosted a meeting of the presidents of the war colleges of the

Americas in 1970. The next year, the new CNO, Admiral Elmo R.

Zumwalt, sponsored the Sixth Inter-American Naval Conference,

which was also held at the college under Colbert's aegis. All of these

international events were administered by Captain Clarence O. Fiske,

who had also been elected the coordinating secretary of the Conference

of the Naval War Colleges of the Americas.

The sea power symposium was a meeting of heads of the free world

navies to discuss matters of mutual interest. Going to sea, operating

ships, and running navies have many similar characteristics the world

over, regardless of the size of the navies or the number of ships. There is a bond among men who have gone to sea and have experienced both the

thrill and the challenge of experience at sea. There is also an unspoken

feeling that sailors have problems and concerns that landlubbers

cannot fully comprehend. Whatever the reason, naval officers the

world over, regardless of the size or mission of their navy, have much in

common. In making his closing remarks at the first international sea power symposium, Colbert stressed his view of personal, international

naval diplomacy,

Over the years each of us has had the opportunity to observe

developments on the world maritime scene . . .. [Our] points of

view—the basic beliefs which have arisen from them—and the

pure professional naval competence which each of us can bring

into the consideration of these matters —all could provide
266 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

threads of a cloth which might be woven into a durable and

serviceable fabric. 28 Colbert capitalized on the common experience and outlook of the

naval profession. Working closely with the Chief of Naval Operations

as the official host, Colbert arranged for the sea power symposium to

meet in Mahan Hall for wide-ranging official discussions. There was

also plenty of opportunity for the various foreign naval leaders to meet

with one another and with their American hosts. The sea power

symposium quickly achieved popularity around the world, and others

have followed. In 1983, the seventh symposium took place at Newport

and was attended by representatives of 49 navies, including 22 chiefs of

naval staff, many of whom were graduates of the naval command

course.

Similarly, the Conference of Presidents of the Naval War Colleges of

the Americas brought together the senior officers of the various

hemispheric war colleges for discussions of mutual problems. These

meetings had begun in 1962 and have continued every two or three

years at Newport or in Latin America. The point, which Colbert

emphasized, was that the war colleges had much in common and that

each college had something to offer the others. The list of countries

participating was impressive: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,

Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,

Uruguay, and Venezuela. It is difficult to measure the effect of these

navy-to-navy contacts, but their intent is to bring about, at the very

minimum, a mutual awareness of common problems and to construct a community of common maritime interests.

Carrying Modernization Programs Forward

These major international conferences were only a part of Colbert's

extensive efforts to bring the college to the attention of the broader

community, not by press releases alone, but by substantial performance; and to bring the broader community to the college. The global

strategy discussions were an excellent vehicle to attain this goal on a broad national scale. Started 20 years earlier as round table discussions,

the global strategy discussions by 1 968 had evolved into major five-day

meetings of prominent civilians, numerous flag and general officers,

and the entire staff, faculty, and student body of the college. Colbert put

to good use his extraordinary web of contacts and succeeded in

attracting unusually distinguished and influential men and women to

the college.

Within the college he kept going the momentum that had already

been started. He refused to make changes for their own sake, building

instead upon the foundations of his predecessor. The focus of the
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 267

curriculum was on foreign affairs and on the military concerns at

higher levels as well as at operational and planning levels. As

Hayward had found before him, Colbert was unable to obtain a sufficiently large civilian teaching faculty to permit a radical

departure from the traditional lecture format of the college

curriculum, but he did make a determined effort to upgrade his

military faculty, creating a system of 10 military chairs in 1969. Each

such chair had a sponsor within the planning and operational

divisions of the Office of Naval Operations in Washington. The idea

behind the military chair system was clearly stated by Colbert when

he wrote to the Chief of Naval Personnel:

In the military area, however, the developments in all naval

warfare areas of new weapons systems, tactics and doctrine brought

on by the tremendous rate of technological change, and the need for

the Naval War College students to receive a thorough background

in these areas have created a challenge in the study of military

subjects. Changes in the world balance of sea power, coupled with

these technological changes, pose major problems in naval strategy.

In the past, there has been no institutional provision for military

specialists as effective as the civilian scholars have been in their

area. A program of military chairs, therefore, is being established to

improve the balance of military and academic curriculum

programs.

To ensure that the individuals who occupy the Military Chairs

are of the highest caliber and represent the best and most current

thought in their specialty areas, nominations will be solicited from

the Bureau of Naval Personnel, requesting that the Division of

OPNAV bearing principal responsibility in each warfare area be

called upon for advice. 29 The first chairs to be established were those of air strike warfare and

naval strategy. While the addition of these chairs brought more

academic and professional talent to the college, there were still too few

professors available to change the chief mode of instruction from the

lecture system, but students exchanged ideas raised in the lectures in

discussion groups under the guidance of a uniformed faculty member.

The extensive offerings of the electives program coupled with the

requirement to do independent research on a given subject individualized the academic program to suit the needs and desires of the students.

George Washington University continued to offer courses leading to a master in science degree in international relations. The cooperative

degree program with the University of Rhode Island, now including a maritime affairs option, continued.

Colbert was able to maintain the momentum for the building program.

He used his skill and influence to bolster congressional support for

necessary funding when required. During his administration he oversaw
268 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the refinement and the final design of the three major additions to the

college complex—Spruance, Conolly, and Hewitt Halls. Working with

the noted sculptor Felix de Weldon and with Carter Brown, head of the

National Gallery of Art in Washington (both were Newport residents),

Colbert arranged to use granite facings for these new buildings which

would weather to the color of the granite used in Luce Hall in 1 89 1 and

subsequently in the other buildings, Pringle and Mahan Halls. This

meant reopening the original quarry and transporting a significant

amount of granite several hundred miles.

Student housing at Fort Adams was deteriorating at an alarming rate.

Colbert conceived the idea of new student housing on vacant land near

the old fortifications. His concept was an extensive housing development in a style compatible with colonial Newport. With the support of

Rhode Island Senator John O. Pastore, he was able to obtain funds and

congressional authorization for it and other projects. By 1975 it was

largely completed. The design of the project met Colbert's high

standards of impeccable taste, and many of the units have an

unexcelled view of the narrow entrance to the east passage into

Narragansett Bay.

The Naval War College Foundation

One of Colbert's lasting and most significant achievements was the

creation of the Naval War College Foundation. His experience while

head of the naval command course and in global strategy discussions

through the years convinced him that there was a wealth of civilian

interest in improving the college to mutual advantage. The board of

advisors whose task was to furnish guidance and recommendations to

the president was already in existence, but some of the board's

proposals were impractical because of budgetary limitations. An

alumni organization or other group of supporters was needed to help

the college. Most educational institutions depended on help from

foundations in various ways.

The Naval Academy had an active alumni association as well as the

Naval Academy Foundation, both nonprofit organizations contributing

significantly to the projects that the superintendent believes necessary.

Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, who had stayed in Newport and who

had been closely associated with the Naval War College since 1946,

along with several important civilian attendees at global strategy

sessions were enthusiastic about such an idea. In 1 969, the Secretary of

the Navy approved organizing a Naval War College Foundation, and it

was chartered as a nonprofit organization under the laws of the state of

Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. John Nicholas Brown, former

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air and a prominent Rhode Island
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 269

philanthropist, became the first Foundation president, with Rear

Admiral Bates as executive director. With more than 100 founding

members, including corporation heads and many Rhode Island citizens,

the Foundation was off to a good start. By its charter, support could be

provided for activities and projects which the War College president

wished to carry out that would benefit the institution but could not be

funded officially.

The Era of "Z-Grams"

Two years after Colbert's arrival in Newport, Secretary of the Navy

John H. Chafee selected Vice Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Commander,

Naval Forces, Vietnam, as Chief of Naval Operations, succeeding

Admiral Moorer, who had been picked to be the new chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Zumwalt, 14 years junior to Moorer, became the

youngest CNO to date. He had graduated from the command and staff

course at Newport in 1 953, the same year his predecessor had graduated

from the senior strategy and tactics course. The new Chief of Naval Operations assumed his post on 1 July 1 970

and lost no time in instigating a number of radical changes in

traditional personnel policies, based on his experiences as naval

commander in Vietnam. He wanted to ensure that modern youth would

be attracted to serve in the Navy and was willing to change timehonored rules and traditions to do so. Within a few weeks, the Navy was

receiving serially numbered "Navops," popularly known as "Z-grams" in

the fleet, which covered a wide range of personnel policies. Some

officers, particularly senior officers and senior enlisted men, viewed the

Z-grams with suspicion and sometimes with downright hostility. As

the 1970-1971 academic year progressed at Newport, the Z-grams

received close scrutiny. Officers returning to command and executive

billets realized that changes were being made within the Navy, which,

for better or worse, would affect their work afloat or ashore in the

immediate future. In seminars and student offices, the new directives

were discussed and debated in detail.

Colbert had continued the tradition of the president's hour, started

under Admiral Austin in 1962. Periodically, the president met with

students and responded to any questions or comments they might

have. At a president's hour with the command and staff students, one

officer suggested that middle-grade officers be given a chance to express

opinions on the entire Z-gram effort directly to Admiral Zumwalt.

After Colbert passed this suggestion on to him, Zumwalt issued

Z-gram 62. Pursuant to this order, a forum was set up in both classes at

the War College to discuss means to improve the Navy. Twelve

students summarized the results of the forum and made a 25-minute
270 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

briefing to the Secretary of the Navy, Zumwalt, and other flag officers in

February 1971. The presentation stressed the importance and the need

for personnel stability to increase the combat readiness of the fleet.30 Another 1971 Z-gram (Z-41) instituted an academic chair in surface

strike warfare to be filled by a commander or captain with a record of

outstanding performance in command. In the same Z-gram, Zumwalt

established a command excellence forum at the Naval War College "to

identify, discuss, and promulgate the ideas and command leadership

qualities of our most successful commanding officers and thus enhance

overall common excellence."31 The forum met during the period 26-30

April 1971, led by Captain J. E. McQueston, the first holder of the

military chair of surface strike warfare. One of the 16 participants,

Captain C. S. Christensen, Jr., summed up the forum succinctly:

The quintessence of the Forum, to this participant at least, was the

conviction that bureaucratic practices are eviscerating Navy

management effectiveness. In a bureaucratic Navy, it is hard to

attract and keep the best men in the fleet once they discover that

the real "action" is in the bureaucracy ashore. We found this

frightening, because when the chips are down, naval battles are won or lost at sea.32

Vice Admiral Semmes at the Helm

In April 1971, largely through Colbert's efforts and contacts at the

Norfolk Virginia headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander,

Atlantic, (SACLANT), 42 naval warfare students made a three-day field

trip to the United Kingdom, hosted by the Royal Navy. Each National

War College class made a longer field trip, with sections going to

different areas. Budget considerations precluded the naval warfare trip

from becoming a regular part of each curriculum, as Colbert had hoped.

Soon thereafter, Secretary Chafee announced that Colbert, after three

years at the college, would become Chief of Staff to SACLANT, Admiral

Charles K. Duncan. The new college president would be Vice Admiral

Benedict J. Semmes, then serving on Admiral Zumwalt's staff as Deputy

Chief of Naval Operations for Operations (Op-03|.

The new president, "B. J." as he was known throughout the fleet, was

in his thirteenth year as a flag officer at the age of 58. A National War

College graduate, his career afloat had been primarily with cruisers and

destroyers. Ashore, he had emphasized personnel planning and

administration. He was no stranger to the Naval War College with

almost five years of fleet duty in Newport. He had been chief of staff to

the Commander, Destroyer Force, when Colbert had led the first naval

command class in 1956 and 1957, providing from the force staff

lecturers and other assistance for the foreign officers. In 1 963 and 1 964,

he had commanded the Cruiser-Destroyer Force at Newport, had
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 271

lectured to naval warfare and command and staff, and as senior officer

afloat had worked closely with Vice Admiral Austin, the college

president at that time. His duty in the Bureau of Personnel, first as a

detail officer, then as deputy for plans, and finally four years as Chief of

Naval Personnel, had given him a continuing view of problems of

student and faculty qualifications and student loading at Newport. In

his last tour afloat as Commander, Second Fleet, and Commander,

NATO Striking Fleet, Atlantic, he was well known by our allies with

forces committed to the Atlantic area. When Semmes arrived at the college, the curriculum for the coming

academic year was set. Still, he saw that one of his tasks was to preside

over some degree of shift in its emphasis, away from foreign and

international affairs to management concepts—which would be more

in keeping with the prevailing notions in Washington.

A few months after Semmes arrived, a second sea power symposium

was held at the college. Vice Admiral Colbert, who was largely

responsible for the extensive organization and plans for this gathering,

returned to the college to attend it. At the conference, the Chief of

Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, in an informal conversation with

Admiral Sudomo, head of the Indonesian Navy, made a commitment to

help the Indonesians in their transition from Soviet to Western

advisors. As a result of this commitment, Semmes and Captain Walter

B. Woodson, director of the naval command and staff course, went to

Indonesia in early 1972 to advise the Indonesians on instituting

professional education in the Indonesian Navy. Semmes and Woodson

were excellent choices for what was essentially a diplomatic mission.

Planning for the Naval Staff Course

During the 1971-1972 academic year, final plans were put together

for a new course at the college, setting a convening date for the first

class in mid-July. At the first international sea power symposium,

interest in a junior course, complementing the naval command course,

had been expressed. Such a course would parallel much of the regular

command and staff curriculum. In order to accommodate more students

and curb individual student expenses, the course would last for five

months, as did the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk. There would

be two classes each year for officers in the grade of lieutenant

commander and lieutenant. It would include junior officers of navies

already represented in the naval command classes and officers from

smaller navies of Third World countries friendly to the United States.

Semmes picked Captain Jack Quinn, an experienced naval aviator in

the 1972 naval warfare class, to organize and head the first naval staff course. Quinn faced many of the problems that Colbert had faced 16
272 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

years earlier with the command course, but as a talented and innovative officer, Quinn established a strong beginning for the course, and

the first students quickly created an enviable spirit of their own. Quinn

remained the head of the naval staff course for eight years. At the time

of his retirement in 1980, he had led 16 groups through the five-month

curriculum complementing the naval command course.

Changes at Top and at the College

In late 1970, the office of Naval Education and Training was

established in Pensacola, Florida, to coordinate educational policy and

planning within the Navy. Its first chief, Vice Admiral Malcolm Cagle,

was also the Director of Naval Education and Training on the staff of

the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-099). With the establishment of this

office, the administrative chain of command for the War College was

altered and the president of the Naval War College reported directly to

the Chief of Naval Education and Training along with superintendents

of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval Academy.

While this administrative change was being made, names and faces

were changing in high positions. At the beginning of President Nixon's

second term in 1 972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird resigned and, in

May, Secretary of the Navy John Chafee resigned to reenter politics in

his native state of Rhode Island. Chafee's successor, Under Secretary of

the Navy John Warner of Virginia, was already indoctrinated in the

ways of the Department and had a reputation for disagreeing with

Zumwalt, Chafee, and Laird over Zumwalt's personnel policies.

Shortly after Semmes returned from Indonesia, he announced that he

would retire at the end of June. Both Semmes and the college staff had

been surprised to learn that he would not be allowed to continue to fill

out two years at the college. Under Semmes' guidance, the faculty and

staff had already prepared plans for the forthcoming academic year, but

the announcement of Semmes' retirement was a clear sign that major

changes were in store for the Naval War Colleges. Semmes, the senior

vice admiral in the Navy, retired after 38 years of naval service, on 30

June 1 972. In the ceremony which marked this occasion in Pringle Hall,

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner relieved Semmes.

There had been significant gains at the college since 1966. The

curriculum had been improved, firm plans had been laid to expand the

physical plant and increase the student body, a means had been

established to maintain continuity in academic policy through the

long term appointment of a civilian academic advisor, and important

innovations had been made in establishing international naval

contacts. Yet the college had neither a stable faculty nor a large,

stringently selected student body. The college's expansion into a
WATERSHED FOR CHANGE, 1966-1972 273

number of special activities, supporting conferences and symposia,

produced benefits for the Navy by establishing contacts and promoting

a greater understanding of the U.S. Navy, but at the same time, it greatly

increased the administrative staff and distracted officers assigned to

those portions from academic work. By 1972, the college faculty and

staff were proud of their accomplishments in rectifying the weaknesses

in the college curriculum which had been attacked in the 1960s, but, at

the same time, the college's reputation within the Navy had not

changed significantly.

Notes

1. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze to LCDR D. S. Strole, 7

December 1968, quoted in D. S.Strole, "Professional Excellence and National

Security: The Educational Philosophy of Vice Admiral John T. Hayward," Naval

War College School of Command and Staff. Thesis prepared for the George

Washington University degree, Master of Science in International Affairs,

1967, p. 39.

2. Paul Gallico, "The Dropout Who Made It To The Top," Off print from

Readers Digest, November 1966.

3. NWC Archives, R63, Box 124: File 5400 Mission and Tasks: Book Two:

Hayward to Baldwin, 6 April 1966.

4. Loc. cit., Hayward to T H. Moorer, 7 July 1969.

5. Loc. cit., Hayward to Baldwin, 6 April 1966.

6. Loc. cit., Box 123, File: Mission, VCNO Horacio Rivero to President,

NWC, Op- 10 C2 serial 87P01B of 26 May 1965, approving President, NWC

letter serial 714 of 26 March 1965.

7. Loc. cit., Memo: Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to Staff, 1 Nov. 1966.

8. J. T Hayward, "The Second-Class Military Advisor: His Cause and Cure,"

Armed Forces Management (November 1968), p. 68.

9. Ibid., p. 69.

10. Ibid., p. 67.

1 1

.

J. T. Hayward, "Challenge," Naval War College Review (September 1 978],

p. 1.12. NWC Archives, R63, Box 124. File 5400: Mission: Hayward to Rivero,

serial 1754 of 27 July 1966.

13. Loc. cit., Rivero to Hayward, 12 Oct 1966.

14. Loc. cit., Hayward to B. J. Semmes, ser 890 of 22 April 1966.

1 5. Neil Ulman, "School for Admirals," The Wall Street Journal, 28 June 1977,

p. 1.16. Ibid.

17. NWC Archives, R63, Box 123. File 5400 Mission and Basics. DCNO

Manpower to PresiDent, NWC, Op- 10 serial 1 1401 P 10 of 20 August 1967.

18. President, NWC to CNO, serial 3208 of 7 December 1966, quoted in

Nepier Smith, "Historical Analysis of the Organizational Success of the Naval

War College During the Twenty-Five Years Following the Second World War,"

NWC Advanced Research Project, 1974, pp. 131-33.

19. NWC Archives, R63. Box 123. File 5400: President, NWC, to CNO, serial

1275 of 3 June 1966.

20. Loc. cit., Chief, Bureau of Personnel to President, NWC, Pers E23 of 9

August 1966.
274 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

2 1 . }. K. McDonald, "Thomas Hinman Moorer" in Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The

Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, 1980), p. 354.

22. Moorer personal letter to VADM Hayward, 17 January 1968 quoted in

Nepier Smith, op. cit., 134.

23. NWC Archives, RG3. Box 123. File 5400: CNO memo to VCNO, Op 00

Memo 301-68 of 6 May 1968; VCNO Memo to Director, Navy Program

Planning, Op-09 ser 240P09 of 5 May 1968.

24. Loc. cit., CNO memo serial 2500P09B33 of 28 November 1968.

25. Loc. cit., RADM Roy Benson to Hayward, 24 June 1968.

26. J. T. Hayward, "I Had A Dream," Shipmate (October 1975], p. 19.

27. Quoted in "Admiral R. G. Colbert, 1915- 1973" Naval War College Review

(May-June 1974], p. 4. 28. Ibid., p. 5. 29. NHC Ms. Coll. 30 Colbert Papers, Series 2, Box 18 Folder 20 Colbert to

CNP, Serial 2579 of 29 Aug 1969.

30. Loc. cit., Box 19, Folder 66.

31. Loc. cit, CNO Message 121935Z Oct 70 (NAVOP Z-41) in Ms. Coll 30.

Series 2, Box 29, Folder 67.

32. Loc. cit., Capt. C. S. Christensen, Jr., to CNO, 25 July 1971.
CHAPTER 1

1

THE BEGINNING OF A

NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-

1977

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt reached the mid-point

in his four-year term of office as Chief of Naval Operations before his

fundamental policy changes for the Navy had a direct and substantive

effect on the Naval War College. Throughout his tenure, Zumwalt

stressed radical and forceful change, rather than gradual evolution, as the best means to reshape underlying trends in naval policy and

thought. 1 The changes which occurred at the Naval War College in

1972-1974 were no exception.

Zumwalt's policies were based on his perception that he had become

CNO at a time of great military and naval crisis for the United States.

While a large proportion of the defense budget was being spent on the

Vietnam war, he believed that the United States was not matching the

growth of Soviet military power. In particular, he pointed to the rapid

increase in the size and sophistication of the Soviet Navy at a time

when the U.S. Navy was shrinking. Further, Zumwalt felt increasingly

frustrated that naval officers generally failed to break away from their

orientation toward a particular type of naval activity, whether it was

surface, submarine, or air, in addition to their failure to understand

clearly the Navy's overall mission.3 In order to establish a clear general understanding of the Navy's

broad mission, Zumwalt took several steps. He established the Navy

Net Assessment Group to create a gauge by which the U.S. Navy could

measure its likely effectiveness against the Soviets; he sponsored
276 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Project 2000 to give a new long-range review of policy beyond the

five-year planning cycles established by Secretary McNamara, and he

sought to broaden naval thinking by revising the curriculum at the

Naval War College. Although Zumwalt had considerable experience as

a systems analyst, he believed that the college had strayed from its

proper role in studying tactics and strategy by allowing too much

emphasis on defense management. A graduate of both the Naval War

College in 1953 and the National War College in 1962, he believed that

the Naval War College course of instruction was neither rigorous nor

challenging. As he looked back over his career, he believed his college

days in Washington had been far more important than those in

Newport.4 To carry out that part of his broad vision that applied to the Naval

War College, Zumwalt chose Stansfield Turner, then a relatively junior

rear admiral, to be the college's president, a position which for the

previous 20 years had been held by a senior vice admiral. Turner

wanted very much to be involved in naval education, and Zumwalt had

planned to appoint him Superintendent of the Naval Academy. When

opposition arose to Turner's appointment there, Zumwalt suggested to

him that he go to the Naval War College for a year prior to taking

command of the Sixth Fleet. Assuming that he would have only a year

to make changes at Newport, Turner had to act quickly.5 Promoted to vice admiral upon taking up the Naval War College

presidency, Turner was given full freedom to devise a new curriculum

and to make whatever changes he saw fit at the college. Turner

proceeded with Zumwalt's full support and with no policy guidance

other than the CNO's express desire that the college accomplish two

things: broaden officers who are often preoccupied with their area of

specialty; and help them to learn to analyze problems.6

Turner's Concept for the Naval War College

In order to achieve these two basic goals, Turner wanted immediate

results, not gradual evolution. Like Zumwalt, Turner believed that

radical and dramatic change was essential not only to focus attention

on his goals and to sharpen the difference between his approach and

previous practice. He believed it essential to eliminate the restrictions

on intellectual development which he perceived to be at the Naval War

College.

A Rhodes scholar at Oxford University, Turner had never attended

any war college course even though, in the early 1 960s, as a commander,

he had been selected to attend the Naval War College. When he heard

the news of his selection, he recalled, his only thought had been "How

can I get out of it?" 7 Instead of attending what he believed to be a poor
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 277

institution, Turner wanted a more valuable experience. Avoiding the

Naval War College, he went to the Harvard Business School and became

involved in systems analysis work in the office of the Secretary of

Defense.

A firm believer in preparing for his next assignment before reporting,

Turner wanted to have a concept and a general plan before he came to

Newport. He did not wish to interfere with the college's operations

before taking command. Turner made a particular point of avoiding

contact with officers then at Newport, largely because he thought they

would represent "vested interests" at the college. Instead, he sought

articulate people who knew the college and would be willing to give

him their frank views. Representative of those who answered Turner's

requirement was Commander James A. Barber, then commanding USS

Schofield (DEG-3). Barber had been plans officer at the college and, later,

Stephen B. Luce Professor of Naval Science. Turner asked Captain Hugh

G. Nott of his Washington staff to go to Newport to discuss the current

college curriculum. Although Turner was unaware of the reforms that

had been made since 1966, the college's general reputation led him to

conclude that the curriculum was of little value. He decided that he

would examine independently what the purpose and focus of the

college should be, and then proceed to use the resources at Newport as appropriate to his newly developed concepts.8 While he was still Director of the System Analysis Division in

OPNAV (OP-96), Turner began to form his own ideas. In late January and

February 1972, he started discussions on the new directions for the

college with members of his Washington staff, three of whom would

later come with him to Newport: Captain Nott, Lieutenant Commander

David G. Clark, and Robert D. (Rusty] Williams. In March 1972, he

convened a formal conference at the Center for Naval Analyses in

Rosslyn, Virginia, which brought together some 20 selected War

College graduates, businessmen, senior officers, academics, and defense

analysts, including, among others, Commander Barber, Professors

Philip A. Crowl of the University of Nebraska, Robert Osgood of Johns

Hopkins University, Robert Bowie of Harvard, Alfred Kiel of the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. William R. Emerson of the

National Endowment of the Humanities, Thomas Phillips of Raytheon,

and L. C. Ackerman of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock

Company. Admiral Zumwalt attended part of the meeting, making a short address.

This meeting suggested to Turner that the academic needs of naval

officers were wide, too wide in fact to be met in a single year's course of

study. What was important in education, the conference suggested, was

not to accumulate facts, but to learn the process to best go about one's

profession.9 As Turner emphasized, "With an infinite number of
278 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

requirements it was important to be sure that they learned to know

something, not just give them breadth." 10 Although this conference and other early discussions with a cross section of specialists did not provide any explicit answers, they

confirmed Turner's impression that since 1945 the selection of

students for the Naval War College had had little or no relationship to a candidate's potential for flag rank. Moreover, he concluded, as Edward

Katzenbach had in 1965, that the college's curriculum had little depth.

Worse, it was largely a passive experience for the students as they

listened to lectures, rather than engaged their minds in rigorous study.

Turner believed that officer-students needed to learn to reason

through problems and to see that there was more than one answer to

any problem. He wanted to teach them to deal with uncertainty. And he

believed that if students, curricula, and faculty met uncompromising

standards of excellence, Naval War College graduates would be

regarded, assigned, and promoted as top-notch, professionally educated

officers. In this way, the college could establish itself within the

Department of Defense, by virtue of its academic excellence and the

quality of its products, rather than by a bureaucratic directive that

stated its position in service education.

In searching for a solution, Turner was much influenced by his days

as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University in 1 947- 1 949. He remembered

particularly the beneficial academic shock he had experienced as an

American in Oxford. Unlike at an American university, lectures often

had little direct relationship to the student's work. What mattered

most at Oxford was a student's ability to explore intellectual issues on

his own initiative and to develop his individual skills through writing

essays and defending them in discussions with his teacher in weekly

tutorials. Turner explained his vision in 1973 to fellow Oxford

graduates and Rhodes scholars when he wrote,

As Oxford tried to teach us to look beyond the shrinking

boundaries of right and wrong answers, so my staff and I hoped to

raise questions in the minds of our students which could never be

resolved by the neat formulae for a shore bombardment or a submarine search pattern. As Oxford thrust upon us roles as philosophers and historians for which we may have been ill- prepared, so we hoped to encourage new dimensions of thought

upon our students. In order to deal effectively with the protean

conditions of war and peace, an officer must possess a negative

capability whereby he can abandon his prejudices at will and look

upon the problems confronting him with an eye forever new. 11 To apply this idea to the Naval War College, Turner gathered around

him a second group of key advisors. This time, most of them were

former Rhodes scholars and Oxford-educated men who, despite varied
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 279

professional experience and education in America, shared a similar

reaction to their Oxford experience. Prominent among them was Dr.

William R. Emerson, a 1 948 Rhodes scholar and military historian, who

had been Ernest J. King professor of maritime history at the Naval War

College in 1963-1964. Since 1969, Emerson had been in Washington as director of the office of research grants of the National Endowment for

the Humanities.

Soon after Turner learned about his appointment to Newport, he

asked Emerson, as one well-acquainted with the Naval War College,

what he could do to improve it. Emerson replied that for a start, he could

assign Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Turner took up the idea

and later asked Emerson to join him for further discussions. In a series

of meetings, Emerson, Turner, and members of Turner's staff examined

possibilities for the course. 12 By late March, after about three weeks of meetings, Emerson was able

to distill their initial discussions, based on a nearly unspoken appreciation of their common Oxford experience, into a basic curriculum

concept for the Naval War College. Proposing to divide the curriculum

into three basic sections, strategy, management, and tactics, each to be

taught intensively, and to be followed by a period of research seminars,

Emerson wrote that their concept was

based on the conviction that naval commanders must deal with

problems arising partly from history, in the sense that the large

forces and fixed interests and concerns which influence policy and

strategy stem from the past, and partly from current technology

(naval and otherwise] which shapes the ways in which such

permanent historical factors manifest themselves at any given

point in time.

Central to this concept is the parallel conviction that sound

pedagogy at any level (but especially in dealing with officers of

mature years) consists in involving the student most actively in

the educational process and at the furthest level of particularity

which time and circumstance permit .... Where a choice must be

made, the proposed curriculum rests on the assumption that it is always best to teach what is teachable, which promises to develop

the student's own powers of analysis, of synthesis, and of discrimination rather than subjects which, while of great significance at the moment, do not easily lend themselves to the educational

process and to actual discussion in the seminar format, which is the

Naval War College's basic teaching mechanism.13 Emerson's distillation of Turner's discussions with his staff and

advisors became a seminal document. It was distributed within

Turner's circle as they planned the specifics of the curriculum over the

next three months, and was jocularly described among them as "one of

the most widely xeroxed documents in history." 14 In the initial
280 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

discussions, an unexpected displacement of viewpoints occurred.

Emerson, the academic historian, stressed the importance of tactics and

naval operations in the curriculum, and Turner, the professional

officer, stressed the value of historical study. 15 Despite this apparent

incongruity, Turner emphasized the study of strategy over other areas. He believed that naval officers knew most about tactics and had some

understanding of defense management, but the area in which they were

weakest was in understanding the purposes of their profession. 16 The prospective president believed that the War College courses he

was developing should be so demanding that students could not do

justice to both college courses and the George Washington University

cooperative degree program in international affairs at the college. He

objected to the failure of students to give their full allegiance to the

Naval War College course and was determined to make it challenging

and all-absorbing. He wanted to excite them about their profession, not

the academic study of history or political science. Suspecting that War

College students were using the George Washington degree program

mainly for retirement employment opportunities, Turner did not care that the program at Newport had been the best of the George

Washington University's Master s degree courses at the various service

colleges and that the college had the most cordial relationship of any of

them with the University. 17 Turner advised Dean Burton M. Sapin of

the University's School of Public and International Affairs that he

intended to terminate the program for the naval warfare students

immediately upon taking command at the War College and that he

would make a decision on continuing it for the command and staff

students in January 1973. 18 Turner also concluded that the expensive field trips to the United

Nations, London, and other places, which War College students had

made, should be eliminated, because they detracted from the serious

academic reading and individual thought required by the new

curriculum. Moreover, he wanted to use the money that had been spent

on these trips to supply students with the basic books of the

curriculum, with which they could go back and restudy in future years.

Having made these initial decisions before he assumed the presidency of the college, Turner proceeded to gather together the people

who could put the ideas into effect and to teach the new courses.

Implementing the Concept

The academic year was scheduled to begin in August, and a great deal

of preparation was necessary in the few remaining months. Rejecting

recommendations that the new program be delayed for a year until it

could be fully prepared in all respects, Turner chose to implement it
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 281

immediately. While gradual evolution might be appropriate in a university environment, he believed there was little to gain from a prolonged effort to gain consensus among the staff and faculty of the

college and that no speedy agreement would be found, given the natural

tendency of bureaucracies to resist change. He planned to institute the

new concept immediately in the naval warfare course; the cQmmand

and staff course would continue temporarily on its previous lines.

Because the three new courses would be taught one after the other, the

immediate problem was the strategy and policy course that opened the

academic year for the senior-level course. Through Emerson's academic contacts, Turner recruited J. Kenneth

McDonald, a George Washington professor and former director of the

George Washington University's program at the Naval War College,

who was completing his doctorate in history at Oxford, along with

military historian Philip A. Crowl, and James E. King, Jr., a 1937 Rhodes

scholar and political scientist specializing in nuclear warfare. Casting

around for other military historians, Turner asked friends at West

Point and Annapolis to suggest names from their history faculties.

Through these connections, he recruited Josiah Bunting, III, a 1963

Rhodes scholar and Army major, who resigned his commission in June

1972 following publication of The Lionheads, his novel about the Army

in Vietnam, and Richard Megargee, a volunteer from the Naval

Academy history department. Together, this new group of civilian

academics joined those who had already been on the faculty at

Newport: Martin Blumenson, Robert Delaney, and Frederick Hartmann. Together, they became the long awaited civilian strategy

faculty.

The final syllabus in strategy was developed in June and July 1972,

first by Bunting and McDonald, then refined and completed by Crowl,

who served as Ernest J. King professor and permanent head of the

strategy department until 1980. As it finally emerged, the strategy

course stressed readings of about 1,000 pages per week, and tried to

develop deep investigations of carefully selected historical case studies

that illustrated recurring and major problems in the formulation and

execution of foreign policy and military strategy. The emphasis, as Crowl pointed out in his introductory lecture, was on the word "and."

As he told the students,

We are concerned with military strategy and foreign policy, with

the inter-relationships between them, with the political uses of

military power—or, to use the phrase coined by the great German

strategic thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, with 'war as an extension of

politics by other means.'19 In selecting the readings, whole books were favored rather than short

articles and excerpts. In lieu of the previous parade of visiting lecturers,
282 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

only one academic expert was invited each week to lecture, attend

seminars, and be available for discussions.

During their two and a half day working visits, these visiting

lecturers faced a rigorous schedule, which Turner hoped would force

the maximum number of students into a direct, intellectual encounter.

In support of the visitor's theme, one faculty member delivered a complementary lecture. The remainder of the week was used by the

student for in-depth reading in assigned and recommended works, for

writing an assigned essay, and for attending one three-hour seminar.

Using a system that had worked successfully at Swarthmore College

and later in graduate seminars at the University of Nebraska, Crowl

instituted procedures by which student essays were circulated in

advance to each member of a small seminar group numbering 10 to 12

students. These essays, presented by the author and critiqued by a fellow student, sparked general discussion of the issues in a three-hour

seminar. Later, the instructors returned the students' papers, fully

marked and graded.20 With Turner's concept for a new curriculum already far advanced,

the college president, Vice Admiral Semmes, designated his special

academic advisor, Professor Hartmann, to go to Washington and

establish liaison with Turner to facilitate the transition. Meanwhile,

several civilian and military staff members established direct contact

with Turner, providing personal and unofficial recommendations.

Among them were Lieutenant Commander B. M. Simpson, III, Colonel

John Keeley and Professor Robert Delaney.21 By the time Turner had relieved Semmes in June, he was already the

center of controversy. While he wanted to be discreet and not interfere

with the college before he assumed official responsibility, Turner had

relied on advice from outside the college, and developed a radical plan.

His concept meant totally scrapping the detailed program that the

college staff under Semmes had carefully prepared for the year, hiring

new civilian faculty members who would outnumber those already in

Newport, reassigning military officers to newly formed militarycivilian teaching teams, instituting a new curriculum, establishing the

basis for what would become three new academic departments,

ordering new books and reading materials, arranging for visiting

lecturers, and creating the need for a fundamental reorganization of the

college's administration. Wherever possible, qualified military staff

members were to be diverted from administrative duties and paired

with civilian professors to form teaching teams.

In short, his concept rejected much of what the college had stood for

in recent years. Those who were closely associated with it and had

devoted great effort to its improvement were offended. In this situation,

the difficult and unenviable task of handling the vast array of
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 283

administrative details to put Turner's concepts into effect was given to

the college's new chief of staff, Captain Nott, and two successive

deputies, Rear Admirals William L. Harris and Charles S. Williams, Jr. When the college opened on 24 August 1972, the 467 new students and

the staff expected change, but many were unprepared for the convocation

ceremony and Turner's address. To stress the academic nature of the

college, Turner directed that the opening ceremony would include an

academic procession with the entire staff and faculty in appropriate

academic robes.

Following the example of two previous War College presidents, Mahan

and Sims, both of whom had received honorary degrees from Oxford

while wearing academic regalia over their naval uniforms, Turner

ordered that the same combination be followed in the ceremony held on

Dewey Field, south of Luce Hall. The combination of academic and

military insignia created difficulty in establishing seniority. Some senior

officers with only bachelor's degrees were offended at the thought of

some of their juniors with doctorates preceding them. At the same time,

doubt arose as to whether it was appropriate to wear service dress or

tropical white uniforms under the academic robes. The most difficult

problem was whether to wear an academic cap or a uniform cap. In the

end, no caps were worn.

The long academic column formed in the shaded roadway between

Luce, Mahan, and Pringle Halls and then made its way out into the

blazing August sun to Dewey Field, where all 467 new students and

another 500 guests witnessed the ceremony. As college president, Turner

came at the rear of the procession. He made an imposing figure, his

service dress white uniform contrasting with his black, short-sleeved and

open gown with the crimson hood of an Oxford Master of Arts askew on

his shoulders. As he came onto the field, the Navy band finished Elgar's

"Pomp and Circumstance," and struck up the "Grand March" from Verdi's

Aida.

Turner's address to the students was as blunt and articulate as any

delivered by Luce or Sims in their time at the college. To a surprised

audience, he explained his new curriculum and his reasons for adopting

it. This year's shift of emphasis toward a deeper study of strategy on the

one hand and toward more attention to management and tactics on

the other is really not something new at the Naval War College. They

represent a return to our great traditions —to the strategic and

historical contribution of men like Mahan; to the tactical and

operational studies of men like William Sims, Raymond Spruance,

Kelly Turner who were the experts in naval warfare in their day.22 Turner expressed particular alarm over what he called the "creeping

intellectual devitalization in all war colleges since World War II." He said
284 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

that prolonged briefings had been substituted for rigorous intellectual

development. Intimating that the college had become only a gentleman's club where students could relax between demanding assignments, he noted, "It appears that no student in recent years has ever

flunked." Although none would flunk out under his command, the

assembled student body was appropriately impressed by his further

observation, "As of this moment, those who do not perform have no

guarantee of a full year at the Naval War College." Starting with the

current year, students would be graded in order to assess more

accurately their performance. The course of instruction would be

rigorous, and "we will expect lots of individual effort in reading, in

writing, and in solving case problems."

These statements were startling enough. But the real blockbuster, as

far as many students were concerned, came when Turner announced

that because the new course would be so time consuming, students in

the senior course would not be allowed to participate in the George

Washington University master's degree program. Returning to his

basic point, Turner declared:

You can run the risk of abusing your freedom, or you can use it for

self-development. You are on your own to get your higher education

in military decision making during these next ten months. My

basic premise is that if we point you in a reasonable direction and

just turn you loose, you will conquer every height ahead of you on

your own. Always keep in mind that the product which the country

desperately needs is military men with the capability of solving

complex problems and of executing their decisions. Scholarship for

scholarship's sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your

sights on decision making or problem solving as your objective.

Problems are not solved by standard or pat solutions, especially not

in times of such rapid change as we are experiencing .... Mainly, though, I adjure you to take advantage of this opportunity. If you find yourself taxed hard, overtaxed in cases, do not let

that discourage you. If we tailored a course to the average student,

we would fail to tax those who are most ready to proceed.

Remember the related point that course content is secondary. It is the development of habits of thinking that counts. If you cannot

cover everything that is assigned, do what you do accomplish well, so that you think creatively. Ploughing through a wealth of

material just to absorb it is not what we want or what you need. A

modicum of excellence and understanding will far outbalance a plethora of mediocrity and superficiality.23

The final point in his address was the announcement that the first

meeting to discuss Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War would take

place that day immediately after lunch. For many students, that was an
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 285

unknown book about an apparently irrelevant war by an author with an

unpronounceable name. Yet to Turner it was the essence of his

approach. "This was absolutely the best example of how you could use

historical case studies to teach contemporary or strategic problems,"

Turner recalled. The story of the Athenian government's attempt to

conduct an ever more expensive, protracted, overseas war in the face of

political disaffection at home had broad similarities to the United

States in Vietnam. By 1972 many students had served in Vietnam and

held passionate views about the war. "To get them in a room and try to

dispassionately talk about whether we should or should not have been

in Vietnam and what were the strategic implications of a sea power

going into a prolonged engagement overseas would have been

impossible. Yet they talked about Vietnam when they talked about the

Peloponnesian Wars, and they understood."24 With the idea of getting at

basic and recurring problems in strategy while avoiding the passions of

current political views and personal experience, Turner's course

stopped at the end of World War II. Turner's speech was the keynote of his term as college president. A

clarion call for reform, progress, and high intellectual standards, it also

had some unsought effects. By throwing out a challenge as he did, he

drew down a storm of protest from graduates, senior officers, and staff

members who interpreted his comments as a direct attack on their own

personal achievements and values. The other service colleges objected

strenuously that Turner had tarred them with the same brush when he

declared that "our increasing reliance on civilians and on 'think tanks'

to do our thinking for us" reflected a failure of war colleges in general.

Many officers resented the implication of a lack of quality and

innovation in current military and naval thought when Turner said,

"We must be able to produce military men who are a match for the best

of the civilian strategists or we will abdicate control of our profession.

Moreover, I am persuaded that we can be a profession only as long as we

ourselves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field."25 The reaction of students was typified by a resentful officer who told a professor in the strategy department,

You are a professional historian. Suppose that in the middle of your

career, say in your early forties, you had been told that you would

have to take an advanced, graduate-level course in aero-dynamics,

graded, and that you might even flunk. And suppose that you knew,

or even suspected, that if you flunked, your career as a historian

and teacher would be finished. What would have been your

reaction?"26 The idea of grading at the Naval War College was not new. Luce had

proposed in 1 884 that the successful passing of academic examinations

should be a prerequisite to attendance at the college. Most recently in
286 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

1 966, Hayward had briefly used a grading system before he found it too

cumbersome to administer with a small academic staff. Turner had the

large teaching staff necessary to evaluate student performance carefully. Moreover, he believed that because officers were marked and

graded all through their careers there was every reason to grade their

academic performance in the Navy's highest professional course of

study.

Although there were inherent difficulties and although it took

several years before the idea and practice of grading became standardized, it succeeded immediately in focusing student attention on

academic work, making them take it seriously, and giving them a yardstick to evaluate their own performance in dealing with varying

types of strategic and tactical problems. The course required carefully

thought-out essays; mid-term and final examinations; and spontaneous

discussion in seminar. But the students were not the only ones to

object. The manager of the officers' club reported that the profits of his

bar were down by two thirds from the previous year,27 and a Newport

clergyman blamed Turner's new academic program for the decline in

attendance at his church services.28 With the strategy course well under way, Turner saw the newly

created management and tactics departments begin to develop their

courses, which would follow on from strategy. The management course

was first headed by Professor Robert D. Williams, who was followed a year later by Warren F. Rogers. Emerson had been the key person behind

the ideas for the strategy department, and Williams provided the

inspiration for the management department. Turner's concept for this

course stressed systems analysis in making "choices between weapon

characteristics, choices between weapons; choices between weapons

and other necessary elements of military power such as personnel; and

choices of how to procure and manage military forces."29 As in the strategy course, Turner used case studies, but instead of

history, the management course used largely theoretical and hypothetical examples, even taking a case study from the Harvard Business

School syllabus about street lighting.30 After the first year, the course

was renamed "Defense Economics and Decision Making" to reflect

more precisely its content. It, too, used a blend of military and civilian

faculty, with two civilians already on the staff, Philip L. Gamble and

Felix Moos, joined by new faculty members, Jacques Naar, Charles

Shirkey, J. Sweeney, and Francis J. West, Jr., to form the nucleus of a long-term civilian teaching faculty in the subject.

The third phase of the curriculum was tactics. Its "object was to teach

people to understand the principles behind what you can do with

weapons and sensors,"31 as Turner explained. The tactics course, as

initially planned, was divided into seven studies: the military planning
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 287

process, fundamentals of naval weapons systems, engagement analyses, sea control, projection, presence, and strategic nuclear deterrence. As a whole, the course was designed to acquaint students with the technical,

operational, environmental, legal, and political elements that directly

affect a tactical commander's decisions.32 In order to provide the

viewpoint and expertise of an important naval ally on the teaching staff

of the tactics department, Turner proposed, in January 1972, to

establish an exchange of officers between the Naval War College and

the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, England. The exchange was

approved in July 1973.33 Captain Edward M. C. Walker, RN, having just

completed the naval command course, became the first officer of

another navy to serve on the faculty of the Naval War College. Walker

was followed successively in this position over the next decade by

Royal Navy commanders M. G. M. W. Ellis, E. M. England, Noel

Unsworth, and Brian Needham. Largely staffed by active duty officers

on two- or three-year assignments to the Naval War College, the

department was chaired first by Captain W. K. Yates, followed by

Captain E. C. Kenyon.

In a related area, Turner was particularly opposed to the way in which

naval war games were being played at the college. He thought that war

games should be used primarily for teaching individual students. The

games involved the writing of complex operation orders and allowed

only a few to play decision-making roles, but Turner wanted every

student to have the opportunity to play an admiral's role. In order to do

this, he ordered changes in plans for the computerized war gaming

center that had been envisaged by previous presidents, and delayed its

completion by two years in order to modify the equipment. As Turner

explained his purpose,

I wanted it so that they could actually see on a screen how their sonar beam went out. Then they would see the submarine closing

and, as the beam would cross the submarine, the dice roll. On the screen you would see that you had a 50% probability and you did or

didn't make it that time. That would let them understand what

probability means. It would let them see what would have

happened if they had used their sonar in a different way. You could run the action over and over again and let the man go back and

make a different decision.34

Turner stressed simplified war games by students instead of

encouraging fleet use of the war gaming center. With the assistance of

Professor Jacques Naar, the first occupant of the McCarty Little chair of

gaming and research techniques, tabletop war games were developed

that gave as many students as possible an opportunity to play decisionmaking roles.
288 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

Additional Changes and Modifications

Before coming to Newport, Turner had envisaged that the three-part

curriculum would be instituted for both junior and senior courses. But it

was logistically impossible to change both courses simultaneously, so Turner moved ahead first with the senior course and followed up with the

junior course later.

Additional modifications were involved. As the courses were

actually put into operation, Turner began to expand his original concept.

First, he decided to integrate the senior foreign officers' course, putting

the naval command college students into the naval warfare course. Recognizing that the naval command college is the counterpart of the

senior course for United States officers, Turner included the foreign

officers in the new curriculum, beginning with the management course

in February 1 973. Taking the advice of two foreign-born faculty members,

Jacques Naar and Felix Moos, Turner decided that part of the challenge

for foreign officers should be direct participation in the college's courses

on an equal basis alongside U.S. students. Moreover, he believed that U.S.

students would gain immeasurably from hearing the viewpoints and

perspectives of the foreign students as they worked side by side.35 Despite

thejieep concern of Admiral Richard G. Colbert, then Commander-inChief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, who feared that this change might

destroy the international bond which the course had developed in the

years since he had founded it, Turner proceeded with the change.

Bearing the brunt of the new curricular changes, the students in the

senior course were unhappy and restive. They failed that year to produce

the Gaities, the theatrical parody on college life which had been annually

produced by students for many years. At the same time, the students in

the junior course were listening to Turner's rhetoric on the new senior

course curriculum. Part way through the first year, a delegation of

students in the college of command and staff persuaded Turner to

implement the new curriculum for the junior course sooner than he had

planned.

For many years, the college had promoted the idea that the senior or naval warfare curriculum should be built on the academic foundation the

students had acquired in the college of command and staff. Although the

idea had been under consideration in the Navy Department since 1919,

the bureau responsible for officer assignments had never been able to

carry out this goal. In 1 973, only 1 5 percent of the college of naval warfare

students were graduates of any command and staff course.36 In a reversal

of the viewpoint expressed by previous college presidents, Turner

concluded

The Navy's policy of sending very few people to both courses is basically sound. It is doubtful that the Navy, with its relatively few
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 289

homogeneous sea units, requires the same sort of exacting junior

officer staff work as is required by the Army . . . there is not the same

distinction between the body of material required at the command

and staff and senior levels in the Navy as in the Army.37 Although naval officers might well have only one opportunity in their careers to attend a war college, Turner opposed the idea of integrating

the two groups into a single course. "There are some pedagogical

differences in teaching two groups of students when one of them has a significantly greater depth of experience,"38 he said,

The officers in the junior course were generally more willing to

accept new ideas and concepts. They proved they could handle the

curriculum as well as —and in many cases better than—officers one

or two ranks superior. They were intellectually more curious, more

involved, more receptive, less conscious of minor prerogatives.

They were also less mature and more hasty in reaching conclusions.

On the other hand, the exceptional officer—the top ten percent or

so—came from the ranks of the senior course.39 In February 1 973, the command and staff students were phased into a program similar to that of the senior course, beginning with strategy in

the second term and management in the third term. The two courses

sought the same goal of expanding "logical reasoning capacity and

analysis of the elements of choice rather than familiarization with

factual material."40 The two courses were to achieve these identical

goals, with the senior one having only a slightly longer period in which

to study policy and strategy and the junior course having a slightly

longer period with tactics.

The implementation of the new curriculum in the junior class had

several implications. First, it allowed the same faculty to teach similar

courses to both senior and junior classes. But it meant also that the

junior students would not be allowed to continue with their participation in the George Washington University program. Accordingly,

Turner completely discontinued the program at the college at the end of

the 1972-1973 academic year.

Unlike the senior class, however, the junior class could not easily

incorporate its international counterpart, the naval staff course. Initiated

as a result of Admiral Colbert's proposals in 1970, its first class met in July

1972. This course was designed to parallel the command and staff college.

Unlike the others, it was a short course of only five months' duration and

with two sessions annually. Because there was so little time, the

curriculum changes that Turner was making did not easily fit in. The

naval staff course, therefore, under its first director, Captain Jack Q.

Quinn and his staff, more or less followed the earlier command and staff

syllabus. Through Quinn's efforts, the students rapidly developed their

own esprit d'corps, giving the course a life of its own.
290 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

In other areas important to the intellectual life of the college, the plans

for new building construction were modified. Turner dispensed with the

office space planned for Hewitt Hall and installed instead student carrels

which he hoped would promote closer intellectual contact among the

students. A lack of funds prevented him from carrying out his original

intention of locating the carrels in the new Hewitt Hall library book

stacks, which would have allowed students a greater opportunity to

become more familiar with books and interested in ideas.41 The carrels

were placed on the upper floors, and the basement and first floor provided

a much needed modern and functional library under its director, Earl R.

Schwass. Turner decided that the old library building, Mahan Hall, should

house the recently established Naval Historical Collection. Under its

director, Anthony S. Nicolosi, this collection became the college's

depository for archives, manuscripts, and original historical materials

relating to the history of the college and naval warfare in general. At the

same time, Turner instituted a series of historical monographs published

by the newly established Naval War College Press, which he hoped would

also publish a wide range of books on professional naval subjects. The first

volume in the historical series was The Writings of Stephen B. Luce (1975),

edited by John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, followed by studies in

other areas, including The Development of Naval Thought: Essays hy

Herbert Rosinski (1977), edited by B. Mitchell Simpson, III; Understanding

the Soviet Navy ( 1 979) by Robert B. Bathurst; and Military Power in A Free

Society (1979) by Henry E. Eccles.

Turner took another important step forward by implementing plans

developed with the University of Rhode Island to open a branch bookstore

at the college. The store was to stock texts and to encourage students to

buy their own books. In addition, he gave each student the textbooks and

readings that he used during the year as the basis for a personal

professional library.

Turner established the "contemporary civilization" lecture series,

specifically to stimulate widening intellectual interests in areas outside

the college curriculum. The first speaker in that series was Herbert

Nicholas, Rhodes professor of American History and Institutions at

Oxford University, who had been Turner's tutor. His address on

DeTocqueville was followed in later months by an illustrated lecture on

Matisse by the art critic and writer, Rosamond Bernier. The first annual

Spruance lecture was given at Turner s invitation by the novelist Herman

Wouk the day before the new Spruance Auditorium was dedicated on 7

December 1972. "When the creator of Captain Queeg addresses the Naval

War College, a smoky trace of revolution already is in the air," Wouk

remarked.

Evidently you have decided to overlook that well-known aphorism,

'the Navy is a master plan designed by geniuses for execution by
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 291

idiots.' Of course I never said this; Lieutenant Keefer of the U.S.S. Came said it. Much like a flesh-and-blood parent, an author has

limited control over the utterances of his phantom offspring. I suppose forgiveness comes the more easily here at the Naval War

College, where obviously I address only the geniuses.42 For Wouk, the building of great and costly weapons at a time when many

lacked food, clothing and shelter approached the most disgusting of

absurdities. "Yet, you must go on serving in such a military system," Wouk

declared, "and not only that, you must recruit clear-eyed, free, critical

young men in great numbers or the U.S. Navy will wither." The task of the

naval officer in an age of revolution, he declared, is

not to solve the great ongoing problems of social stress nor to despair

at the immensity and complexity of these problems outside our

country and inside, but to stand and to serve. To improvise, to make

do with what we have; to serve in still another kind of revolutionary

warfare, a contest which one wins only if no weapon is ever fired; to do

battle against great odds of political trouble within and without our

land, odds of events running almost out of human control; and with

this fight, and with this service, to give freedom one more chance for one more generation.43 Such lectures were a hallmark of Turner's presidency: an insistence

upon sponsoring the widest variety of viewpoints, bringing to the fore

jarring, responsible viewpoints which challenged the common perceptions naval officers had of themselves and demanded that they develop

their own well-thought-out philosophies. He brought to the college the

widest cross section of opinion he could find, from critical newspaper

correspondents to John William Ward, an anti-military activist and

president of Amherst College.

While trying to broaden the perspectives of resident students in

extracurricular activities, Turner took steps to widen contacts of the

college both within the Navy community and the academic world. Formal

ties were established when the college joined the Association of American

State Colleges and Universities and the Rhode Island Council on Higher

Education. Through these connections, he participated in conferences

with local university educators and brought them to the Naval War

College to hear special lectures and join in academic ceremonies. Within

the Navy, he sought to increase student and faculty contributions to the

Naval War College Review, making it a bimonthly journal with an

increased emphasis on work produced at the college. At the same time, he

widened circulation by allowing naval lieutenants and above to obtain

personal subscriptions. For officers who could not attend the War College

resident program, Turner initiated plans for students taking correspondence courses through the Center for Continuing Education to participate

in off-campus seminars for their courses. Turner's initiative here was to
292 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

apply an approach already in use for inactive naval reserve officers and to

use it for active duty officers with a modified version of the new

curriculum he had implemented for the resident course. He opened a course for Naval War College student wives at Newport in

"an effort to get them to feel what their husbands were doing was

worthwhile for the sacrifice they were both making" as the student

demanded peace and quiet at home for his studies. While Turner hoped

that he might even have saved some marriages, it did not entirely succeed

intellectually. One of the 1 10 wives who attended the specially designed

wives' strategy course reportedly exclaimed to him, "Oh Admiral, my

husband and I are enjoying the course so much. We are absolutely

thrilled with Thuckadee and the Polynesian Wars."

Continuing Problems

The new curriculum that Turner established rapidly shifted the focus

at the college from breadth of knowledge in numerous areas to depth in a few select areas. Coupled with the decision to discontinue the George

Washington University degree program, it raised several issues which

continued to be a matter of serious concern both to Turner and his successors. First, students no longer had an opportunity to gain an

academic master's degree, an achievement which many officers argued

had great significance when they were being considered for promotion

and assignment. Second, there was a need to provide more extensive

advanced work for the 10 or 15 percent of the students who were being

sent to their second war college course. Third, the fact that the Naval War

College had independently developed a curriculum quite different from

other service colleges caused difficulties in coordination, implicitly

questioning the other colleges' way of doing a similar job.

In order to meet the first issue, the college explored an idea that had

been under consideration for many years, the possibility of awarding its

own academic degree. In order to do this, the college courses would

require formal accreditation by national educational authorities and the

program would have to meet requirements of academic disciplines. Many

hurdles would need to be cleared, including the passing of an act by

Congress and coordinating the program with other war colleges. A

serious potential difficulty was raised by the thought that if the college

were to award a master's degree, it might have to compromise meeting the

needs of the naval profession so as to meet the demands of academic

accreditation committees. The academic subjects which interested the

War College were quite different from the technical areas in which the

Naval Postgraduate School met specific and clearly defined professional

needs. At the same time, the purpose of the Naval War College has always
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 293

been different and has been devoted to enhancing the ability of naval

officers to make command decisions in their professional world.

While borrowing much from the academic world, Turner believed

that the college would not be able to meet fully the professional needs

of officers if it were forced to accept all the criteria for awarding a university degree. To make the best of the situation, the college

continued its practice of obtaining current evaluations of its courses

from the American Council on Education, thus enabling individual

students to transfer credits to other universities. On the professional

side, however, the college could authoritatively state on both the

students' fitness report and diploma that the graduate level curriculum

was recognized by both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of

Naval Personnel "as the professional military counterpart of an

academic master's degree."44 As for the small percentage of naval officers who were able to attend

both war college courses in their careers, Turner hoped that the newly

established advanced research department would allow them to opt out

of any portion of the basic curriculum that seemed repetitive in order to

do individual research.

When Turner brought Professor James E. King, Jr. to the college, it

was primarily to establish that advanced research department. As a one-man operation at the outset, King established the outlines of an

organization that would provide for student research, encourage

faculty research, and give assistance to outside scholars in projects

relating to the Navy and to national security studies. Through it, a wide

variety of work was undertaken by outsiders, ranging from the work of

mature scholars to students undertaking doctoral work at universities

such as Johns Hopkins, Yale and Oxford.

The third problem, that of a different method of teaching and

different course content from the other service colleges, was serious,

especially in regard to the command and staff level of education. The

basic issue here was that the Navy, unlike the other services, did not

regard the command and staff course as a prerequisite to a more

advanced professional course. The issue was not solved for several

years; its resolution involved a fundamental change in educational

policy by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

"The Turner Revolution"

Stansfield Turner's presidency at the Naval War College has often

been called the "Turner Revolution," and in some respects it was

revolutionary. Sharing with Mahan and Zumwalt a distrust of any

bureaucratic organization's ability to reform itself, Turner forced

reform on the college. He did it rapidly and with advice and assistance
294 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

from outside, almost completely disregarding that from the resident

staff until after the basic decisions for reform had been made. For the

strategy department, he prepared an entirely new and unique syllabus,

hired a faculty and ordered a wide range of books in less than three

months, perhaps a record in academic course planning. The odd thing

about it was that it worked and the students acknowledged appreciation of it in the course critiques after the first term.45 The subject matter of the curriculum did not change radically from

what it had been before Turner's time, although there was a definite

change in emphasis from current data and contemporary international

relations to historical case studies that raised and illustrated recurring

issues in the study of strategy. The most significant change was in

establishing a teaching methodology which demanded more individual

effort from the students. This was created by hiring a permanent

civilian faculty, eliminating a large number of visiting lecturers,

instituting a long and required reading list, setting aside large amounts

of time for individual student reading and writing, requiring term

papers and frequent written papers, making examinations mandatory,

establishing highly structured seminars led by faculty members, and

grading students on their written work and oral performance in

seminar.46 These far-reaching innovations were accompanied by a strong

reaction against them. In pursuit of his program, through radical and

forceful change, many thought that Turner had overstated his case,

that he had been unjustifiably rude and needlessly tactless. Knowing

little about the history of the college, and indeed little was available, he

was not interested in relating his innovations to it. Ironically, he gave

the appearance of a revolutionary, but he was actually a reactionary to

the extent that he introduced concepts and pedagogical techniques

that were consistent with those of Luce, Mahan, and Sims. Those men

would have wholeheartedly subscribed to Turner's view that the

problems facing a naval commander arose from historic interests and

political factors and that a proper understanding of history was

indispensable to understand contemporary and future problems.

Mistakes and shortcomings were balanced by substantial and

noteworthy achievements. Turner succeeded where his predecessors

had not in establishing a faculty of professional teachers and scholars.

Thanks to funds from both the usual and unorthodox sources within

the Navy, Turner was able to pay civilian professors generous, even

handsome, salaries. Skillful use of the techniques of public relations

and his own indefatigable efforts and numerous public appearances in

Rhode Island and around the country produced an external impression

of academic rigor. Perhaps even more important was a slow but

increasing groundswell of grudging approval among more senior
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 295

officers for his program. In this respect, he contributed to the upgrading

of the student body in terms of enhanced rates of selection for

promotion.

Among his predecessors, Turner may be compared most readily with

William S. Sims who left the college in the year before Turner was born,

half a century before Turner became college president. Each held values

in professional education similar to the other's and each had an

exceptionally strong personality. Both were controversial; both had

devoted admirers and ardent detractors; both were abrasive in doing

exactly what they thought was right; both equated opposition to their

positions with error; both thought their opponents were hopelessly

wrong and misguided. Each left the college a very different place from

what it was when he arrived. And they both set it on a course that

continued for many years after their departure.

Having stayed twice as long as he originally expected, Turner had

fulfilled most of his plans for the college when he was relieved as president by Vice Admiral Julian J. LeBourgeois on 9 August 1974.

Turner went on first to command the Second Fleet, then as a four-star

admiral to be Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and

subsequently Director of Central Intelligence.

LeBourgeois at the Helm

As president of the Naval War College from 1974 to 1977,

LeBourgeois faced a difficult problem. Well aware that neither the

Navy nor the college could afford more radical changes in the college

curriculum, he announced that he would devote his tenure to "consolidating and refining the innovations" that Turner had made.47 He

encouraged the further refinement of the three basic courses and

expanded the initiative Turner had taken in the off-campus program

through the Center for Continuing Education. Under its director, Vice

Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, USN (ret.), the entire correspondence

curriculum was rewritten to reflect more accurately the courses taught

to resident students. Several experiments were conducted with offcampus services at a variety of bases. The most successful of these was

that run by Dr. Charles Chadbourn in Washington, D.C.

LeBourgeois began quietly to reassess the curriculum. He soon

expanded the elective program, giving it academic credit, where Turner

had allowed it only as an extracurricular activity. LeBourgeois dropped

the requirement for a term paper, and in its place reintroduced the staff

study prepared by a committee of students. Most important, the

process of differentiating between the junior and senior level courses

was begun again. Coming to the college after four years in various flag

billets associated with NATO, LeBourgeois was keenly interested in
296 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

the two courses for officers from other navies. Well aware of the

long-range problems posed by the newly expanded civilian faculty, he

devoted much time and effort to selection of new professors who would

continue the development and refinement of the curriculum and teach

the students, who were being chosen for the Naval War College on a more careful basis by the Bureau of Personnel. At the end of his term, he

could declare

The faculty is two-thirds military and one-third civilian academicians. Almost all have advanced degrees—and today all but two

civilian faculty members have doctorates from great universities.

The military faculty members have excelled in their professional

specialities and they are mainly concentrated in the areas of

instruction relating to naval operations. The American Council on

Education has evaluated the faculty as being comparable with the

better faculties teaching similar work in civilian institutions.48 Bringing a sense of stability to the institution after a period of sudden

change, LeBourgeois initiated other important changes, as we will see,

but carefully avoided drawing attention to them or creating controversy.

In 1974, the Naval War College reacquired the building that had been

its first home 90 years before. Following the removal of the CruiserDestroyer Force from Newport and the subsequent disestablishment of

the naval base that had used the building as its administrative

headquarters, the college took over the building it had last used in

1 889. Renamed Founder's Hall, it housed college administrative offices

until 1976, when Admiral LeBourgeois announced that it would

become the Naval War College Museum. A museum had been

established in 1952 by Admiral Conolly, but for nearly a quarter of a century no suitable space had been found to exhibit the historical

materials that had been collected. Developed by its director, A. S. Nicolosi, the museum was devoted to the history of naval warfare and

the history of the Navy in Narragansett Bay.

On 28 April 1976, LeBourgeois dedicated the final element in the

college's building program, Hewitt Hall, housing the new library, as well as more classrooms and student study areas. As a follow-up to Turner's advanced research department, LeBourgeois

obtained official recognition from both the Secretary of the Navy and the

Chief of Naval Operations that advanced research was an important part

of the college's mission. In a letter to the Secretary written in December

1974, LeBourgeois sent a detailed plan to establish a Center of Advanced

Research, as an extension of the college's work. "The needs of the Navy

for clear conceptual thought and tough-minded research are particularly

pressing," the plan stated, "as we move into the area of a smaller but vastly

more modern Navy with substantial problems not fully defined."49 Citing
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 297

the incomplete understanding of future naval roles, missions, and

tasks, LeBourgeois made it clear that the college offered an appropriate

place for careful professional thought away from the day-to-day

pressure of Washington life. To carry on from the beginning made in

1972, the college needed to centralize its research activity, and devote

more money and faculty effort toward it. Looking back over the

research works that had been supported, the college believed that

several civilian academians had produced respectable, and, in some

cases, highly original work, such as W. R. Louis's Imperialism at Bay:

The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire and

Williamson Murray's The Change in the European Balance of Power

1 938-39. Other studies, such as Richard Burt's "SALT and Naval Force

Capabilities;" Mark Janis's on "The Law of the Sea;" James A Nathan and

James K. Oliver on The Future of U.S. Naval Power and Edward Luttwak

on "American Naval Power in the Mediterranean," excited more

interest within the Navy and the Defense Department. In order to

stimulate more work of direct value to policymakers, both the

Secretary of the Navy, J. William Middendorf II, and the Chief of Naval

Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, endorsed the LeBourgeois

proposal in early 1975. Echoing the original conception of the college

envisioned by Luce, they approved an addition to the formal statement

defining the college's mission:

To conduct research leading to the development of advanced

strategic and tactical concepts for the future employment of naval

forces.50 With this mandate, the college established the "Center for Advanced

Research" under its first dean, Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN (ret.), who

held the position until December 1980.

Opening in March 1975, the center, or CAR as it became known,

became a useful place for both students and resident scholars to pursue

their research. Selection of students to work in the center was

restricted to only the most promising. One of the first projects

undertaken was a study of the potential uses for, and tactics of, the new

Harpoon missile which would soon enter the fleet. This was followed in

the years up to 1981 with a variety of projects, including a plan for the

size and shape of the Navy in the year 2000, several studies on Soviet

military aviation, an examination of potential operations in the

Norwegian Sea, a concept of operations for the Marines, an attempt to

delineate Soviet vulnerabilities, and a study on synthetic fuels.

With the establishment of CAR, LeBourgeois included the Naval

War College Review as one of its activities. The policy of restricting

articles to locally produced research in the Review had proved largely

unsuccessful. Much of the work submitted to the Review for
298 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

publication was of low quality, and by 1 975 the Review had been forced

to reduce publication, going from a bimonthly to a quarterly. In

attempting revive the Review, LeBourgeois established a basic policy,

creating a clear chain of command for the editor, from the director of

CAR to the president of the Naval War College. LeBourgeois also

wanted to emphasize strategic and tactical issues with "strong

student/faculty input leavened with external source material." If we

had to choose between two superb articles, LeBourgeois told the editor,

Lieutenant Commander B. M. Simpson, "one student/one external, take

the student paper. However, whatever the source, quality is first."51

It took nearly four years to attract a sufficient number of quality

articles from academics for the Review to increase its number of issues.

In February 1979, Commander W. R. Pettyjohn edited the first in the

new series of bimonthly issues.

The most significant development in the LeBourgeois period

stemmed from the great interest shown toward the college by the Chief

of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral James D. Watkins. In July 1975,

Watkins and Vice Admiral James B. Wilson, Chief of Naval Education

and Training, began a joint effort to define their function, responsibilities, and inter-relationships as they related to naval education and

training. The two men agreed that Watkins, in his dual role as Deputy

CNO for Manpower (OP-01) and as Chief of Naval Personnel, had

overall responsibility under the CNO for all facets of personnel policy,

including the determination of the nature and extent of education that

must be provided at proper times to officers. Wilson, in his dual role as Director of Naval Education and Training (OP-099) and as Chief of

Naval Education and Training, had responsibility under the CNO for

the entire education and training establishment of the Navy,

conforming to the broad policy set by the Chief of Naval Personnel.

With this basic agreement made, the mission statements defining the

function of their positions were rewritten.52 Following this agreement, Wilson and Watkins issued a joint

education and training memorandum in March 1976, which related

this agreement to the specific responsibilities that each undertook for

the intermediate and senior level service colleges.53 These broad

policies were formulated without the knowledge of the Naval War

College president or his staff. When this fact came to the attention of

Wilson and Watkins, they took immediate steps to ensure that any

future important policy statement on professional military education

be coordinated with LeBourgeois and other commanders who had a principal interest in the issues.54 Following this, LeBourgeois and his staff were asked to make their

recommendation for a revised statement on professional military

education. First, the college objected to the statement in the Watkins-
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 299

Wilson joint memorandum that would limit cooperative degree

programs with civilian universities to meeting the specific requirements of officer subspecialties, rather than allowing them to perform a broader educational purpose. The college also objected to the move

lengthening the chain of command between the CNO and the War

College. Historically, the college had always had a close and direct link

to the Navy's top leader, but the plan put forward by Wilson and

Watkins placed both the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Chief of

Naval Education and Training above the War College president. While

this would improve the coordination of educational policy within the

Navy, it obscured the direct link to the Chief of Naval Operations

which ensured that the college was at the forefront of professional

development.

In order to resolve this issue and to draft a policy statement on senior

college education for the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, representatives from the staffs of the War College, Chief

of Naval Education and Training, and Chief of Naval Personnel began a

series of meetings in early 1 977. The Naval War College representatives

were Captain William A. Platte, deputy to the president; Captain

Huntington Hardisty, dean of academics; and Professor Frederick

Hartmann, special academic advisor.

Following these discussions, Wilson, Watkins, and LeBourgeois

agreed on most issues. However, Watkins and LeBourgeois came to an

impasse on one fundamental issue, which was referred to Holloway for

decision. The issue was the concept and context of the command and

staff course. Before any decision or policy could be established on this

point, however, LeBourgeois reached the end of his term as president.

He retired in April 1977, but the decisions that emerged from the

exchange of views initiated by Watkins, LeBourgeois, and their staffs

established a firm high-level policy in making further refinements and

changes to the Naval War College curriculum, setting the tone for the

remaining years of the college's first century.

Notes

1. Norman Friedman, "Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr.," in R. L. Love, Jr., ed., The

Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, 1980), p. 365.

2. Ibid., p. 368.

3. Ibid., p. 369.

4. Ibid., p. 370; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memo (New York:

Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 27-29. This and the views cited above confirmed by

conversation, 4 May 1984: Hattendorf-Zumwalt.

5. Stansfield Turner, draft of portions from Oral History conducted by John

T. Mason, U.S. Naval Institute, provided to the authors by Admiral Turner.

6. NWC Archives, R6.28: President's File: S. Turner; postscript on Turner

letter to F. H. Hartmann, 1 June 1972.

7. Conversation, 13 April 1984: Hattendorf-Turner.
300 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

8. Stansfield Turner, draft Oral History; conversations, 5 March 1984:

Hattendorf - Emerson; 7 March 1984: Hattendorf-Barber.

9. Ibid.

10. Conversation, 13 April 1984: Hattendorf-Turner.

1 1

.

Stansfield Turner, "The Role of Higher Education in Today's Navy," The

American-Oxonian, Vol. LX, No. 4 (October 1973) pp. 186-192.

1 2. Turner, Oral History.

13. NWC Archives, Staff-Student File, W. R. Emerson, memorandum:

Curriculum Concept for the Naval War College, 24 March 1972.

1 4. Loc. cit., W. R. Emerson lecture, "Strategy and History Discussions: Phase

I -Strategy (The New Approach)," 2 August 1972, p. 2. 15. Conversation, 5 March 1984: Hattendorf-Emerson.

16. Conversation, 13 April 1984: Hattendorf-Turner.

17. Ibid.

18. Robert C. Burns, George Washington University Program in International Affairs at the War College (Washington, 1982), p. 48.

19. Quote provided by P. A. Crowl, 9 April 1984.

20. Conversation, 9 March 1984: Hattendorf-Crowl.

21. NWC Archives, Staff-Student File: B. M. Simpson III: Turner-Simpson

correspondence.

22. NWC Archives RG28, President's File: Turner: "Convocation Address by

President of the Naval War College, 24 August 1972."

23. Ibid.; see also the description of the address in NWC Archives, StaffStudent file, McDonald: Philip A. Crowl, and J. Kenneth McDonald, "New

Courses at the Naval War College," paper presented at the Inter-University

Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 1973 annual conference, University of

Chicago. Third Seminar (I), 12 October 1973, p. 1 1. 24. Turner, Oral History.

25. Quoted from Convocation address in Brooke Nihart, "Revitalization of

the War Colleges: Intellectual Wasteland...or Challenge," Armed Forced Journal

(March 1973), pp. 26-32.

26. Quoted in Crowl and McDonald, op. cit., p. 12.

27. NWC Archives, RG 28, President's File: Stansfield Turner, "The Time for

Thinkers Has Come," address in Philadelphia, 27 October 1972, p. 1 1. 28. Turner, Oral History.

29. Turner, "Convocation Address."

30. Turner, Oral History.

31. Ibid.

32. "Annual Report of the President, Naval War College, 1972-73," Naval War

College Review (Sept-Oct 1973), p. 44.

33. NWC Archives, RG3 1973 Records Box 9, File 5400: "Students at Foreign

War College," RADM C A. Hill, Jr. to RADM W. D. S. Scott, RN, 1 1 Jan 1973.

34. Turner, Oral History.

35. Conversation, 13 April 1984: Hattendorf-Turner.

36. "Annual Report." 1973, p. 15.

37. Naval War College. Second Annual Report of the President, 9 August

1974, p. 11.

38. Ibid.

39. "Annual Report," 1973, p. 15.

40. Ibid., frontispiece: "Mission of the Naval War College."

41. Conversation, 13 April 1984: Hattendorf-Turner.

42. Herman Wouk, "The Naval Officer in an Age of Revolution," Naval War

College Review (March-April 1973), p. 4.
BEGINNING A NEW CURRICULUM, 1972-1977 301

43. Ibid., pp. 8-9, 10.

44. "Annual Report," 1973, pp. 12- 13. The 1973 wording of the diploma stated

"Chief of Naval Personnel," but this was changed to "Chief of Naval Operations"

in 1983.

45. Crowl to Hattendorf, 9 April 1984.

46. Ibid.

47. President Naval War College, Report to the Leadership of the Navy Past,

Present, and Future, 1977, p. 1. 48. Ibid., p. 8. 49. NWC Archives, RG3, 1975 Records Box 6; File 540Q: Missions and Tasks:"

President, NWC, to SECNAV, letter serial 2130 of 1 1 December 1974. See also

NWC Archives, RG28: Subject file "Advanced Research" and H. G. Nott, U.S.

Naval War College Center for Advanced Research General Concept Plan 1976

to 1979. Report prepared by Ketron, Inc., under Office of Naval Research

Contract dated 12 February 1976.

50. Ibid. The CNO's endorsement was dated 27 Jan 1975, and the Secretary's

approval, 27 February 1975.

51. NWC Review Files: "Operating Directives": Memo: Simpson to

LeBourgeois, 12 August 1975, annotated by LeBourgeois, 21 August 1975.

52. NWC Archives RG 27: Subject File "Professional Military Education,

BUPERS/CNET NOTE 5430 Pers-1 of 16 July 1975.

53. Loc.cit., Joint Education and Training Memorandum (JEM- 10) of 29

March 1976: "Officer Professional Military Education."

54. Loc.cit., CNET Memo for 01, Code 00 15 April 1976. July: JEM 10-76.
CHAPTER 12

TOWARD A SECOND

CENTURY, 1977-1984

In July 1977, Admiral James L. Holloway III, the

Chief of Naval Operations, issued a statement on service college

education which became a turning point in the development of the

Naval War College. Holloway's was the first high-level statement of

policy that defined the college's goals, functions and curricula.

Moreover, it placed them within the bounds of a practical personnel

policy and established procedures that could coordinate the needs of

the various institutions and commands dealing with naval education.

The announcement of this policy came after Admiral Le Bourgeois

had been succeeded in April 1977 by the newly promoted dean of

academics, Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty.

When Hardisty, who had come to the college as a captain in the

summer of 1976 to be dean of academics, was selected for flag rank

while serving in that position, it was the second time in three years that

a serving dean of academics was selected for promotion to the rank of rear admiral. Charles Williams had been selected in 1974. Two years

later, Joseph Ekelund was selected from the same position that

Williams and Hardisty had held. These selections went far to announce

to the Navy that not only was it possible to make flag rank at the

college but also that the college might be a good place to make it. As a newly promoted flag officer, Hardisty, although he would have liked a

full term, knew he would probably be replaced by a more senior officer,

designated for promotion to vice admiral. His half-year tenure was too

brief for a lasting impact or for real contributions. He was popular with

the faculty and students, spending more time listening and learning

than in demanding, and he possessed a fine sense of balance.
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 303

CNO's Policy for the Naval War College

As president of the Naval War College, Hardisty had the immediate

responsibility of carrying out the policy that had resulted from Le

Bourgeois' discussions with Rear Admiral James L. Watkins, the

Chief of Naval Personnel, in developing Admiral Holloway's service

college education policy. The major point that had not been resolved

at the time of Le Bourgeois' retirement centered on the curriculum for

the command and staff course. Le Bourgeois believed that the course

structure had to take account of the fact that less than 10 percent of

the Naval War College command and staff graduates could be

expected to return to Newport for the senior course. For that reason,

Le Bourgeois believed that the curriculum should go a substantial

way in preparing a student for the full range of future assignments,

rather than be merely an intermediate course concentrating on the

naval operations and planning segments of the curriculum, which

would be most immediately useful to an intermediate grade officer.

Therefore, Le Bourgeois agreed that it made sense to expand the naval

operations segment of the command and staff course, but he did not

want to do so at the expense of shortening the strategy and policy

segment.

Watkins argued that "our first priority in a command and staff

course must be to ensure that the graduates possess a level of

competence in naval operations and planning commensurate with

the duties to which they will be assigned.'^Having received reports

that there was a significant weakness in these areas among officers at

sea, Watkins believed that the Navy was not preparing mid-career

officers properly to discharge their responsibilities at sea and on fleet

and shore staffs. The senior level course at the War College was

fulfilling its objectives, Watkins believed, but the command and staff

course should not be allowed to continue with a significant overlap in

its curriculum. "While I firmly believe a fundamental shift in the

focus of the command and staff course is called for," Watkins wrote, "I do not think an abrupt change is necessary. The intent is not to be

disruptive but to migrate through an evolutionary reorientation back

to a course that fulfills Navy needs."2 When the two contrasting viewpoints were presented to the CNO,

Holloway decided in favor of Watkins' view. In his policy statement

in July 1977, Holloway declared, "The Naval War College plays the

preeminent role in the professional development program for

prospective naval leaders."3 Holloway went on to establish a firm policy on the number of

officers who would attend service colleges. He directed that 30 to 35

percent of all unrestricted line captains and 25 to 35 percent of all
304 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

unrestricted line lieutenant commanders should be graduates of a service college. Of these, at least 50 percent should have attended the

Naval War College. To carry out this policy,

The Naval War College will offer two major resident courses in

the college of naval warfare and the college of naval command and

staff, respectively, each at the graduate level of intellectual

challenge but differing in subject focus. The senior-level course

for selected captains and commanders will provide emphasis on

strategy and policy. The intermediate-level course for selected

mid-career officers will stress naval operations and planning and

provide the opportunity to increase the professional competence

associated with those areas. These two courses shall cover the

broad spectrum of knowledge and expertise required to command

forces in a combat environment and to assume positions of

increasing responsibility in the Navy, the Department of

Defense, and the highest levels of government.4

Stressing that college courses should cultivate individual capacities

for logical reasoning, decision making, innovative thought, and articulate

expression, Holloway encouraged advanced research in strategic and

tactical concepts. In addition, he reflected the guidance of the 1975

Defense Department Committee on Excellence in Education headed by

Under Secretary of Defense W. P. Clements, Jr., by defining three

components: (1) a common core useful to all officers on strategy and

policy, management and decision-making techniques and staff procedures; (2] a specific mission related to naval warfare, current naval

technology, policies, and future capabilities; and (3) an elective program

to permit students to enhance their knowledge in specific subjects of

high interest to the Navy.

Establishing a clear policy on these issues, Holloway went on to

clarify the command relationship of the college, giving it the clear

direction it had lacked earlier. He preserved a clear link to the CNO by

directing that authority and responsibility for command and support of

the Naval War College was assigned to the Chief of Naval Education

and Training to be exercised through the president of the Naval War

College. Delegating responsibility to the president to carry out the

CNO's policy, Holloway also named the Deputy CNO for Manpower

and the Director, Naval Education and Training, to act as his principal

agents in coordinating his policy for the college. In addition, Holloway

established the Policy Advisory Board for Service College Education,

chaired by the CNO, to develop future policy on the Naval Postgraduate

School, the Naval War College, and on the Navy's participation at other

U.S. and foreign armed forces service colleges.

Following on from Holloway's policy statement, Hardisty developed

an action plan to change the curriculum over three academic years. On
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 305

forwarding the plan to Holloway, Rear Admiral W. L. Harris, Deputy

Director, Naval Education and Training, stressed that it "details the

evolutionary (vice revolutionary) curricular changes"6 designed for the

Naval War College. By June 1 979, Hardisty's plan called for the curricula

of the college of naval warfare course and the college of command and

staff course to be altered to "reduce the percent of commonality between

the two courses from 78 percent to about 62 percent."7 This meant that at

the end of the three-year period, the command and staff students would

devote about 50 percent of their time to naval operations, 25 percent to

defense economics, and 20 percent to strategy. This contrasted with the

college of naval warfare students who would devote 30 percent of their

time to naval operations, 32 percent to defense economics, and 38

percent to strategy.

With the implementation of these policies during Hardisty's short

tenure, the college was placed firmly on a well-coordinated plan to refine

its curriculum, meeting a Navy policy for service education. At the same

time that these changes were taking place, the faculties of the three

departments were refining and improving their syllabi.

Trends in Syllabus Revision

Continuing on from modifications begun under Le Bourgeois, some

clear trends were evident in the way in which the faculty was dealing

with the curriculum. The 1972-1974 changes had emphasized the

importance of a large teaching faculty. Many of the changes and

modifications that were made in the following years resulted from the

collective experience and knowledge of the faculty. The mixture of

long-term and visiting faculty members began to make an enduring

contribution to the curriculum. This was not possible in the early years

when presidents, staff members, and faculty all rotated on short-term

assignments, leaving no one in an influential position to nurture the

gradual growth of an intellectual enterprise. Unlike so many earlier

curricular revisions, the enduring changes that took place after 1972-

1974 involved many individuals.

In the strategy department, the basic idea of using historical case

studies has been retained to examine recurring themes involved in the

interaction between military power and the political process, between

strategy and policy. It has been faithful to the notion that Secretary of

Defense James R. Schlesinger expressed in his 30 May 1975 address to the

college:

One of the things I hope would be accomplished in a year at the Naval

War College is that the mind is stretched and this larger compass of

the relevancy of military power is understood .... The purpose of

military power ... is the extension of policy by other means. You've
306 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

got to understand military policy in relation to national policy if you are to fully understand how military power can best be

utilized . . . . 8 Indicative of the changes in the strategy department was the fact that

after the first year the title of the course changed from strategy and

history to strategy and policy. Very quickly the content began to shift

toward more concern with the present than in its original version. By

the time Professor P. A. Crowl retired as head of the strategy department

in 1 980, fully a third of the course dealt with post-World War II matters,

such as the Cold War, Vietnam, and nuclear strategy. Under Crowl's

successor, Professor Robert S. Wood, a political scientist who was

chairman 1 980- 1 983, and Professor Alvin H. Bernstein, a classicist who

became chairman in 1984, the balance was maintained between the

political and military on the one hand, and the diplomatic on the other.

While they increased emphasis on the analytical themes that run

through the course, strategy faculty members made plain the way in

which the various elements in strategy change character and importance from one set of historical circumstances to another. In this way,

the strategy faculty sought to avoid false analogies between history and

contemporary affairs. At the same time, the strategy course benefited

from an additional case study in classical history on the Second Punic

War, complementing the study of the Peloponnesian Wars, as well as an

increased emphasis on naval history in the course. Throughout, the strategy faculty has taken care to teach with the

idea that it is developing a basis for strategic thinking rather than

simply broadening a student's understanding of international relations.9 A number of eminent scholars came for one-year appointments

in the strategy department. Long-term teaching contributions were

made in the period up to 1984 by Professors Jerome K. Holloway,

Richard Megargee, and Steven T. Ross.

The management course, established in 1972-1974, has changed

substantially in its approach, but has probably met more closely the

original role envisaged for it. Under its new name, defense economics

and decision making, the department has been chaired since 1975 by

Professor William G. Turcotte. During that period, the course has

moved away from emphasizing systems analysis to the broader basis

of developing and exercising a framework for choosing and supporting future forces under the constraints posed by national finance.

The faculty over the years has developed an extensive set of

theoretical readings, which in all teaching sessions are applied to a wide variety of faculty-developed cases dealing with critical national

defense situations. As it evolved, the course and its faculty have

divided into three segments that focus on choosing future forces:

defense analysis, non-quantitative factors in defense decision
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 307

making, and defense economics. The department examines the

conflicting viewpoints and interests confronting fundamental defense

resource allocation issues that face senior defense officers.

As the course evolved, Dr. George Brown, who has since become vice

president of Data Resources, made original and basic contributions to

its development. Professor Richmond Lloyd initiated and developed

the force planning aspects of the course, which became its dominant

theme. Lawrence Korb, who taught at the college for five years and who

in 198 1 became Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve

Affairs, and Logistics, was responsible for much of the original

development of the non-quantitative issues in defense resource

allocation. 10 Like defense economics and decision making, the tactics course

has taken a number of years to develop and has seen significant shifts

in emphasis. Renamed the naval operations department in 1975, it

has been staffed largely by active duty officers on two- or three-year

assignments to the Naval War College. During the chairmanship of

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler (ret.), 1977-1981, the course was

substantially modified to stress a joint force approach and decision

making at the fleet and task force level rather than individual or small unit tactics. The naval operations course for the college of

naval warfare and the college of command and staff were differentiated by the distinction that the senior-level course was built around

a four-star admiral's point of view, and the junior-level course, a two-star admiral's point of view. As developed by Weschler, the

course was multi-faceted, building on concepts from history, strategy,

physics, logic, and fleet and personal experience. The pervasive

theme throughout the course was decision making, both to make

optimum use of resources in developing tactics and to choose

optimum tactics in achieving a strategy. Using case studies, the

principal method of learning was in seminar groups, supported by

lectures and war games. In the course, the capabilities of both U.S.

naval forces and possible enemy forces were considered while

concentrating on tactics and principles of War, operational planning

and staff procedures, total force and the character of possible

aggressors, international law and controls on the application of

power, and decision making through historical analysis and war

gaming practice. 11 In 1977, a "total forces week" was added to the naval operations

curriculum in order to provide a basic introduction to all the services.

Following the distinction between an admiral's and a rear admiral's

point of view, a greater separation was drawn between the junior and

senior courses by emphasizing the employment of naval forces in the

junior course and the selection and application of forces in the senior
308 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

course, In later changes, the senior course moved to emphasize the

unified command level in place of the previous emphasis at the fleet

command level.

In October 1980, the naval operations department held the first of

several tactical symposia. Developed from an idea presented by

Professor Lawrence E. Brumbach in 1979, the symposium brought

together fleet representatives, flag officers on duty in Washington, and

War College students to exchange ideas, promote respect for the

benefit of reflective thinking on modern tactical questions, and to

stimulate students into examining areas that require innovative

thought. From this introduction, each student in the naval operations

course prepared a research paper on a selected tactical subject. After

evaluation by the faculty, the best papers were circulated to fleet

commanders and Navy Department officers for consideration and

possible use in developing experimental tactics. 12 The two international courses were also affected by these developments in the curriculum. The naval command college course was

affected the most because it was almost entirely integrated into the

academic course followed by the college of naval warfare. While the

college continued to emphasize academic concerns over the professional contacts that develop naturally in this international group, it was faced with an increasing problem in the naval operations part of the

curriculum. The growing emphasis on classified information and

current, state-of-the-art data posed a problem for a class of foreign

officers. In the academic year 1983-1984, the naval command college

developed a separate course for the naval operations phase of the

curriculum. Developed by Commander Brian Needham, Royal Navy, a member of the naval operations department faculty, it followed the

course given to U.S. students, stressing the same aspects and using the

same lecturers, but at a lower level of classification. In addition, foreign

students were encouraged to use their own expertise in composing and

contrasting U.S. practice with that of their own navies, and in providing

knowledge in areas that were not common in the U.S. Navy. 13 This new

course marked a return to the pre- 1972 curriculum.

In 1979, the intermediate course for officers from foreign navies was

renamed the naval staff college to reflect more accurately the rigorous

nature of its course and the breadth of the material covered. In January

1981, the naval staff college moved to Pringle Hall in closer proximity

to the other resident academic programs. At the same time, Commander

Keith Robinson made a number of innovations as the naval staff

college's academic coordinator, making greater use of the faculty from

the strategy, defense economics and naval operations departments, and

structuring the course to follow an abbreviated version of the course

followed in the other colleges. In addition to the required reading,
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 309

research paper, country presentation, and graded examinations, the

naval staff students were then given an increasing amount of contact

with U.S. students and resident faculty members, several combined

seminars with command and staff students, and participation in the

electives program. Each student has a sponsor from the Naval War

College student body or staff. In addition, the students participate in a wide variety of athletic activities with their U.S. counterparts. 14 The trends traceable to the syllabus changes that took place in the

period between 1977 and 1984 were paralleled in other developments

during the tenure of each president of the college.

Growth and Change

Soon after the 1977 graduation, Rear Admiral Hardisty received his

orders to go to the Philippine Islands as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,

Philippines, and as Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay. Later, he

became Commander, Battle Force, Seventh Fleet, Deputy for Operations

on the Staff of Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and a Vice Admiral,

Director for Operations (J-3) on the Joint Staff. Hardisty turned the War

College presidency over to Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale on 13

October 1977.

Stockdale came to the Naval War College after serving as Director of

Strategic Plans in the Navy Department. In 1965, Stockdale had

commanded Carrier Air Wing 16 and had been shot down and taken

prisoner by the North Vietnamese. Upon his release from captivity

nearly eight years later, in 1973, Stockdale had been promoted to rear admiral and awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for the valor

and heroism of his leadership while senior officer in prison camp.

During his captivity, his wife Sybil had become a leader among the

POW wives at home and an articulate spokeswoman in reminding the

American public of those in enemy hands in Southeast Asia. Stockdale

was not a War College graduate, but he had earned a master's degree

from Stanford University in 1962. These two different aspects in his

background, his experiences as a prisoner of war and as a graduate

student, played an important role in the way in which he perceived and

sought to add to the college's curriculum. Its three subject focus he

thought was too narrow.

While basically accepting the general thrust of the program that had

been developing since 1972, Stockdale remembered that in his years at

Stanford he had benefited from the wide range of courses he had been

allowed to take. It was those courses, particularly one called the

"Problem of Good and Evil," given by Professor Philip Rhinelander,

which helped him to develop fortitude during the long years of his

imprisonment. As he told the Naval War College community when he
3 1 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

took up the college's presidency, "If I can firmly establish and

illuminate to the students here the inevitable blindnesses of these

particularized specialties of disciplines in which we must work

blindness to the psychological and subjective, as well as to the

objective totality of the human experience we call war—I think I will

have done something for my country."15 Stockdale wanted officers to

understand the irrationality and unpredictability of war. "War is a serious business," Stockdale stressed. "People get mad in war, and . . . the

laws of logic are valueless in bargaining under such conditions."16 Stockdale thought that to some extent War College students had too

much of "a lock-step curriculum," and he asked his special academic

advisor, Professor Frederick H. Hartmann, to plan a comprehensive

electives program outside of the three departments. The free choice a student was offered to add one course each trimester to the required

course, gave students the opportunity to choose whatever they felt was

needed to round out their education. Stockdale's proposals were based

on his own experiences and they were backed by the words of John

Ruskin, "The education which makes men happiest in themselves also

makes them most serviceable to others."17 During Turner's presidency a few electives had been available, but no academic credit was given for

them. These had been expanded by Le Bourgeois to about 20 topics as extensions of departmental topics for extra credit study by students.

But in the military-civilian staff and faculty of more than 80 people,

Stockdale was sure there was undoubtedly much untapped knowledge

and talent in additional subjects that could be made available to

interested students. At a staff-faculty meeting in early February 1978,

Stockdale told the assembly,

If you have something to say and it can be taught within the bounds

of an academic discipline—that is to say it has boundaries, it has

unique assumptions, it has a literature, it has established authorities (and often a special vocabulary]—and if you can assemble a creditable reading list and lesson plans of the sort that our academic review committee would recommend as appropriate for

academic credit, and further if you can draw a crowd, then I say 'Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred thoughts contend.'18 Response from the faculty was excellent: seventeen electives were

planned for the first trimester of the forthcoming year. The core curriculum was planned to continue to occupy 80 percent of the

students' time, and electives would take the remaining 20 percent.

The electives covered a wide variety of topics and included a course

taught by Stockdale, "Fundamentals of Moral Obligation." As a prisoner

of war, Stockdale had vowed to himself that if he ever got out alive, he

would teach a course in moral philosophy. After his release, he

explained, "When I ejected from that airplane in 1 965, 1 left my world of
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 311

technology and entered the world of Epictetus. I was alone and crippled:

self reliance was the basis for daily life." 19 With the background of his Stanford years coupled with the

experience of his long imprisonment, Stockdale went on to establish his course. With Joseph G. Brennan, professor emeritus of philosophy at

Barnard College of Columbia University, Stockdale devised a course

that began with his own reflections on Epictetus' The Enchiridion,20 the

little book his Stanford professor had given him as a parting gift, that

had sustained him during his imprisonment. From that, the course went

on to readings and discussion of the Book of Job, the Socratic dialogues

of Plato, Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, Kant's Foundations of the

Principles of the Metaphysics of Words, and Mill On Liberty and

Utilitarianism. Supplemented with selections from Camus, Conrad,

Dostoyevsky, Solzhenitsyn, and others, it ended with a careful

examination of The Enchiridion. 21 For Stockdale, a War College course in moral philosophy did not need

to be organized directly around military ideas or on military writing.

Classical philosophy and modern literature expressed the essential

ideas better than writings in social science, Stockdale believed. At the

same time, reading philosophy books would benefit War College

students as human beings as well as military officers. Behind this belief

lay Stockdale's conviction that individual character, freedom, and

personal responsibility were more important than rules in moral life.

But as Stockdale stressed,

The important thing, of course, is not that all our charges [i.e., students] come to the same conclusions on these issues, but that

each think out how his particular assumptions on the nature of the

universe and man logically lead to his ideas of the proper norms of

behavior. . . that man, each man, sort his system out in a consistent

manner.22 The students responded eagerly to Stockdale's course and the the

variety of other subjects offered, including such technical matters as "Advanced Electronic Warfare" and "Application of Ocean Research."

Staff and faculty sorted out their talents for a full schedule in the year

commencing in August 1978, and in the years following, some 20

courses were usually offered each trimester. Some feared initially that

students would take electives in which they were already proficient.

Stockdale's reply was based on a comment a retired flag officer made to

him,

Jim, when you go up there to Newport, don't spend all your time

trying to box in the dope-offs. The few you'll get are not worth it, and

they won't be kidding anybody. Spend your time doing the best you

can to inspire those tigers at the other end of the spectrum. That's

where the long-run payoff of your institution resides. 23
3 1

2

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

It was natural that Stockdale, looking ahead toward retirement from

the Navy, leaned toward further work in the educational field. In the

spring of 1979, the trustees of The Citadel, a private military college,

offered him its presidency. On 1 July 1979, the Navy Department

announced that Stockdale would retire two months later to accept the

Citadel position, becoming its fifteenth president and the first naval

officer to head it. Stockdale, noting with regret that he was retiring early and somewhat

suddenly, stated, "But when the train stops for you, it is better to get

aboard. There may not be another train coming."24 This early retirement

left a three-star billet available at a time of reductions in the numbers of

flag and general officers in the armed services. With brief interludes, the

Naval War College had been headed by a vice admiral since 1948. Despite

greater visibility in the past two years and many supporters at various

levels in Washington, the three star billet was lost. In early August, the

Navy Department announced that Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch would

become the fortieth president of the Naval War College.

Pointing Toward Fleet Operations

Rear Admiral Welch was relatively unknown to the college when his

orders were announced. A submariner, a National War College

graduate, and former dean of academic affairs at the National War

College, Welch was an expert in the complex business of disarmament

negotiations. In his opening statement, Welch emphasized that the

Naval War College must point toward the fleet. Therefore, he placed

continued emphasis on courses having to do with operational matters

coupled with use of the improved naval war gaming facilities. For three

academic years under Welch, this trend continued.

An important innovation begun in these years was the global war

game. These were begun in 1979 by Captain Hugh Nott, Commander J. Hurlburt, and Professor Francis J. West, Jr., who in 1981-83 served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The

global war game was created to identify issues that required attention in

planning global strategy. Like no other war game in use in the United

States, it involves all aspects for worldwide military operations including

logistics, strategy, and tactics in an effort to explore changing options

within the matrix of policy, strategy, and technical capabilities.25 This emphasis on combined areas was reflected in another development at the college in 1981.

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

At the Current Strategy Forum in April 1981, the Chief of Naval
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 313

Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward, in the final address of the

forum announced that a Center for Naval Warfare would soon be

established at the War College. The center would be staffed by "the best

strategic thinkers in the world."26 Within the audience of staff,

students, and civilian guests, knowledgeable in college affairs, this

statement provoked more than a few looks, whispers, and winks. Many

thought that once again Washington was passing the ball back to

Newport for planning support. That ball had been passed before,

beginning in the days of Luce and Mahan when strategical concepts

originated in the writings of Mahan. From time to time the War College

had been called on for assistance in Navy planning. On other occasions

War College presidents had been told that planning was exclusively a function of the Navy Department and later of the Office of Naval

Operations. Through the years, what the college sent to Washington

formally or informally had been used or ignored, depending on such

factors as the personalities involved, timing, the problem at hand, and

the organization of the Navy Department. Many wondered whether the

CNO's announcement in Newport and the follow-up directives from

his headquarters would change the position of the college in the

strategic thinking and planning of the Navy.

In July 1981, Welch announced that the new Center for Naval

Warfare Studies would be headed by former Under Secretary of the

Navy Robert J. Murray. As Murray recalled,

In July 1981, nobody knew what the Center for Naval Warfare

Studies was to be, including me. It grew out of conversations I had

with flag and general officers in the Navy and Marine Corps,

including the CNO and the Commandant. We saw we did not have

enough naval officers who were thinking broadly enough about

war-fighting issues. And we certainly had nothing that we could

call naval strategy. There were lots of ideas, but there was nothing

that we could call all-encompassing as to how the Navy would

operate in war. We didn't even have a system for producing such a concept. In other words, naval strategy was a mystery for many

folks —certainly for most defense civilians.

So Admiral Hayward decided that we ought to have such a place

as the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and Secretary of the Navy

John Lehman said it was something he believed worth doing and

would support. So I went to figure out what a Center for Naval

Warfare Studies should be. 27 As established, the center brought together under one structure these

organizations which already existed at the college: the center for

advanced research, the center for war gaming, and the naval war

college press. To this, Murray added as the centerpiece the strategic

studies group, comprising eight officers, six Navy captains (or
3 1

4

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

commanders) and two Marine colonels chosen by the CNO and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps. All were men of considerable

operational experience, drawn from all the warfare communities, and

assigned to the center for a year to help develop better ways for the

Navy to contribute to national strategy. "One year is not a long time to

do this," Murray explained, "but I wasn't interested in building career

strategists; I wanted to give naval officers a chance to think through

war-fighting issues and then go back to the fleet to spread the word."28 With Welch's support and insistence that war gaming be an

important part of the center, Murray developed it in 1 98 1 - 1 983 with the

help of key staff members: Commander Kenneth McGruther and Dr.

Thomas Etzold, and Lieutenant Colonel O. E. Hay. Murray brought

Frank Uhlig, formerly senior editor at the Naval Institute, to serve as editor of the Naval War College Press, which published the Naval War

College Review and a small number of monographs dealing with

strategy and naval history.

After two years at the center, Murray concluded,

I think, frankly, you first have to discard the term naval strategy,

and even its slightly more modern variant, maritime strategy, and

talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy. So

what we need is neither a maritime strategy nor a continental

strategy but a national strategy that has ample and balanced

proportions of naval, land, and air forces, organized so that it can

achieve national objectives, or more accurately, alliance objectives.29 Going further, he maintained that the center's studies had supported

the conclusion that naval forces still contribute in their three

traditional ways: "by establishing a military and naval presence in areas

of interest, by responding to crises, and by helping deter or if necessary

fight a general war."30 In Murray's vision, at its core, the center was an intellectually

dynamic group of officers and civilians with access to everyone, no

matter at what level, in the Navy and Marine Corps, anywhere in the

world. Arguing real-life questions of strategy and tactics, testing real

war plans, and developing new concepts of operation, the center in fact

soon won widespread respect within the Navy. By concentrating on the

uses of naval forces rather than entering the debate about specific

budget programs, the center helped the college in its old task of

building the foundations for better decisions. At the same time, the

experience of broadly based advanced research, war gaming and highly

experienced officers doing broad Navy thinking provided stimulus to

both students and teaching faculty. The center was not the Navy's war

planning agency; it was the place where new ideas were examined and

tested for possible incorporation into war plans. The war gaming
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 315

center at the college was the heart of all Navy war gaming at the

battlegroup level and above. As Murray explained, "it is the place where

the Navy is asking itself, how do the forces fit together—first at the

tactical level, then at the theater level, and then worldwide."31 As a result of these efforts, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies strengthened the link between the college and the fleet.

Cooperative Degree Program

The establishment of a cooperative degree program was the product

of a long development under many presidents. This was the search for a means for students to obtain an advanced academic degree in conjunction with their War College studies.

Within a few years after the George Washington University

cooperative degree program had been terminated in 1973, the War

College was searching for alternative methods for its students to obtain

degrees. Because it was the only war college not to offer a cooperative

degree program, some officers were reluctant to accept their orders to

Newport when they perceived that greater advantage and recognition

could be obtained elsewhere. With this problem in mind, Admiral Le

Bourgeois had obtained approval in 1975 for a joint program to be

offered with the Naval Postgraduate School for Naval War College

graduates in the Washington, D.C., area. However, an insufficient

number of students applied to make it a practicable effort.

In March 1981, Admiral Welch's attention was drawn to the statistic

that more than 90 percent of the students at the Air War College had an

advanced degree while at the Naval War College, with a similar student

population, less than 50 percent of the Navy and Marine Corps officers

had more than a bachelor's degree. Welch was concerned that in recent

years naval officers had been unsuccessful in obtaining key Defense

Department, Joint Staff, and NATO billets because they lacked the

necessary advanced academic degrees.32 To remedy this situation, he

recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B.

Hayward, that the college establish a master's degree program. After

considering of the pros and cons of the issue, Hayward approved the

recommendation on the conditions that the program be voluntary, that

it not detract from the Naval War College curriculum, and that it be

given "off-hours" for those willing to spend the extra time in pursuit of a graduate degree.33 The college staff entered into extensive negotiations with a number

of neighboring colleges and universities, including Boston University,

the University of Rhode Island, Providence College and Salve Regina

College, in order to find an institution that would be able to meet the

needs of the Naval War College. Some of the proposed courses of study
3 1

6

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

suggested by these institutions had such extensive requirements for

additional work beyond the college's courses that those programs

would have provided too much competition for the college's curriculum, thereby detracting from it. Salve Regina, a Catholic community college located in Newport,

offered an attractive program which, by granting the full academic

credits which the American Council on Education recommended for

the Naval War College's basic courses, would require only three

additional courses to earn a master of arts degree in international

relations or a master of science degree in management. In addition,

the fees for the courses would be amply covered by each student's

entitlement to educational benefits from the Veteran's Administration.

After obtaining confirmation of approval from the new Chief of Naval

Operations, James D. Watkins, the course was begun on a trial basis 16

October 1982 with 110 students, 44 of whom were naval officers.34 Since

its first year, the course has been expanded. Located at the Salve Regina

campus in Newport, the course was opened to students of both

institutions but, after the trial run, had no official administrative link

with the Naval War College.

Admiral Watkins Appoints Service from the Sixth Fleet

When Admiral Watkins became Chief of Naval Operations in the

summer of 1 982, he started with what, from the standpoint of the Naval

War College, were two priceless assets: he knew the War College's

curriculum thoroughly from his days as Chief of Naval Personnel, and

he knew how to carry out his ideas as CNO in terms of ensuring the

necessary changes in the personnel assignment area. Admiral Watkins moved quickly to give greater prominence to the

Naval War College. One of his first concerns was the flag appointments

which would be made in the fall of 1982. In mid-July Watkins sent a personal message to Rear Admiral James E. Service, then commanding

Carrier Group Two with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean telling

him, Jim,

My initial attack on the fall slate is complete, and the Secretary has

concurred in your assignment as the President, Naval War College.

My decision follows a careful examination of the increasing role of

the War College in the enhancement of tactical competence and

professionalism in our officer corps. As you are aware, NWC is being assigned additional Navywide responsibilities in the areas of

wargaming, tactical development and formulation of concepts of

maritime operations at the battle group, theater and global levels.
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 317

For obvious reasons, I want a borad-based, operationally oriented

president with extensive experience as an OIC afloat.35 In August 1982, Welch retired and was relieved by the War College

deputy, Captain David Self, as interim president, until Rear Admiral

James E. Service could take command in October. Service ha4 become a naval aviation cadet while attending Pennsylvania State University

early in the Korean war. Having flown combat missions in both Korea,

and in Vietnam, Service was unusual in that he had served tours in

fighter, attack and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, he had been a

test pilot and instructor and had also commanded two squadrons and

two ships, USS Independence (CV-62) and USS Sacramento (AOE-1).

Service earned his bachelor's degree in political science from the Naval

Postgraduate School. He was a student at the Army War College in

1 972- 1 973, and he also earned a master of science degree in communications at Shippensburg State College. Service came to the Naval War

College after serving as Commander, Battle Force, Sixth Fleet. While in

that position, F-14 fighters from his battle force shot down two Libyan

aircraft during operations in the Gulf of Sidra.

With his extensive operational experience, Service's appointment as president of the Naval War College reflected Admiral Watkins' belief

that the college was the proper place for capable fighting leaders and the

place for innovative thought on future naval tactics and strategy. His

presidency was marked throughout by emphasis on those areas. During his initial speech as CNO at the college in August 1982,

Watkins said, "We look to [the] War College to play a leading role in

inculating into our professional officer corps a larger grasp of strategy

and integrated tactics."36 To emphasize Watkins' initiative in this area,

Service came all the way from the Mediterranean to be present at

Watkins' speech during the combined convocation and retirement

ceremony for Rear Admiral Welch.

With the intent of revitalizing the naval operations and tactical

aspects of the college's curriculum, Watkins declared in a message to

senior naval commanders that the college would be the "crucible for

strategic and tactical thinking."37 Significantly, Watkins also

announced how this would be achieved: through the infusion into the

student body of high quality officers who had recently completed duty

in command. This highly motivated student body would be guided by

an operationally oriented faculty, be given extensive war gaming

experience and have appropriate interaction with the strategic studies

group. With this in mind, Watkins declared, "We will be able to test and

harmonize our tactical thinking in a wide variety of strategic applications. At the same time these students will develop a solid base of

strategic thought as they prepare for important and demanding followon assignments at sea and shore."38
3 1

8

SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

To allow more officers to come to the Naval War College, Watkins

ordered a more effective use of technical training time elsewhere

through compressing some courses and eliminating others. Simultaneously, he extended the length of command tours of duty, thus getting

more effective use out of officers. Hoping to obtain close to a 30 percent

reduction in time spent in officer training, Watkins specifically

planned to assign to the Naval War College the officers made available

in these ways.

Watkins' plan had both interim and long term aspects. For the long

term, he planned an increase of post command officers in the 10-month

college of naval warfare course. Starting with only 10 to 15 officers in

March 1983, Watkins planned to increase this number five times by

August 1984. This would significantly raise the percentage of

unrestricted line captains who had attended the college of naval warfare

course. Changing the percentage from Holloway's 25 to 35 percent,

Watkins established the figure at 35 to 45 percent of line captains who

would be graduates of a senior service college, with 50 percent of those

from the Naval War College.

As an interim measure, Watkins established a short post command

course, to begin in February 1983. This course met for six weeks of

seminars and war gaming with emphasis on the tactical and strategic

aspects of naval operations at the theater and local level. With the idea of

giving 60 to 80 officers per year an abbreviated and intensive course,

Watkins began it with the initial intention of phasing it out as soon as attendance in the 10-month course could be substantially increased.39 Following the success of the interim course, Watkins later directed that

the course be continued on a permanent basis, but this in no way altered

his earlier decision that the majority of successful commanding officers

would attend the ten month senior course. Watkins insisted that both

courses maintain the highest quality and that the personnel assignment

system be strained to the limit in an attempt to ensure that as many

potential flag officers as possible attend the Naval War College.40 Watkins also stressed the importance of the CNO Policy Advisory

Board for Professional Military Education, which was established

originally by Admiral Holloway in 1977. Watkins believed that the

board's role should be institutionalized to ensure that the naval

operations curriculum at Newport remain current and be in line with

the latest concepts approved by the Office of the CNO and the

Department of Defense.41 With this in mind, he used the board to

review the whole Naval War College curriculum in January 1983.

Watkins stressed these ideas to the naval commanders in chief at

annual conferences he convened at the Naval War College in 1982 and

1983, using Newport rather than the usual location in Washington or Annapolis. These conferences were a significant signal by Watkins that
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1 977- 1 984 319

Newport had become a far more important place for professional thinking

in the U.S. Navy.

Looking back on the record of war gaming at the Naval War College,

Watkins underlined its use in connection with operational research

and tactical analysis. As Rear Admiral William T. McCauley, Director

of the Program Resource Appraisal division in the Office of the Chief

of Naval Operations, commented,

As we all know, war gaming has been practiced at the Naval War

College for decades. The naval aspect of our current concept,

though, is its ready applicability to tactical and strategic analysis

and its acceptance by top Navy leadership (as demonstrated by

recent CINC war games] as a valued and proven tool. Thus, naval

analysts are beginning to make a new kind of impact by using

analytical tools to support war gaming and drawing on war gaming

results.42 A series of new war games incorporated many new concepts and

helped to verify the best choice of fleet defenses as well as to test some

ofthe issues raised in developingthe Navy's Program Objective Memorandum

(POM] for 1986. At the same time, Service increased the amount of

student war gaming three-fold, using crisis action, theater and worldwide games.

Linked with his emphasis on an up-to-date naval operations

curriculum and on experienced, high-quality students, Watkins now

developed a direct link for the Naval War College with war gaming, fleet

exercises, and operational planning. Using the strategic studies group

and war gaming, in particular, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at

the Naval War College came to play an important role. Under Robert S. Wood, who became the director of the center in 1983, the four main

elements of the center—war gaming, advanced research, the strategic

studies group, and the press—were increasingly integrated to form a

single entity, as the center became the CNO's "think-tank" of first

resort. Thus, the center became the focus for a variety of studies and

conferences on current issues, with topics ranging from terrorism to

nuclear weapons problems and a host of political-military studies. For

example, the first two strategic studies groups examined global warfare,

and the third group in 1983-1984 looked at crises and contingencies

short of general war. As Chief of Naval Operations, Watkins thus implemented many of the

same ideas that he had recommended to Admiral Holloway six years

earlier. In his own statement on service college education policy, Watkins

asserted, "The Naval War College does not prepare officers for their new

assignment; it prepares them for the rest of their careers. The curriculum

is designed to aid officers in meeting the intellectual demands of the

second phase of their careers by fostering intellectual flexibility and

rectitude essential for handling the unforeseen contingencies."43
320 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

An After Look-out Reports

Looking 100 years back, the Naval War College has left a discernible

wake in the development of the naval profession in the United States.

Defined by a continuing devotion to the education of naval officers for

high command, it has stressed to its students an understanding of the

fundamental ideas in the conduct of strategy and tactics, branching out

from these basic concerns to related areas such as international law,

logistics, management, and economics. The college has always sharply

contrasted its approach with technological and scientific education,

arguing consistently that its focus was on the highest professional

aspects in understanding the nature and character of naval warfare, the

purpose, function, and limitations of a Navy.

From the very beginning of the Naval War College, this view of

education has consistently been opposed fiercely within the Navy. The

college has had to battle all its life to obtain recognition and widespread

appreciation for its goals from a service that has accepted much more

easily the rationale for technological education, practical training at

sea, and on-the-job training in staff positions.

Over the years, many of the dominating figures in the college's

history have been reformers who have not always had a wide following

among their colleagues. Men such as Luce, Mahan, Taylor, Sims, and

Turner, strong-willed characters, not only criticized the Navy's system

but tried to change it. Perhaps only naturally, those figures in the

college's history who have been most widely accepted and played key

roles in positions outside the college, men such as Pratt, Spruance, and

Colbert, changed the college less dramatically during their presidencies. This very fact, however, has sometimes identified the Naval

War College with reformers, rather than as the representative of the

mainstream view. In many respects, this reputation has been unwarranted, yet more often than not it has taken the continuing personal and

direct interest of the Secretary of the Navy, or in later years, the Chief of

Naval Operations, to allow the college to achieve its long-standing

goals in educating the most capable officers in the Navy. In this respect,

Secretaries of the Navy William E. Chandler, B. F. Tracy, and Josephus

Daniels, along with Chiefs of Naval Operations W. V. Pratt, Chester

Nimitz, Robert F. Carney, Arleigh Burke, and the successive chiefs

following Thomas Moorer, Elmo Zumwalt, James Holloway III, Thomas

Hayward, and James Watkins, have played direct and key roles in

bringing the college to the forefront of the naval profession in the

United States.

The Naval War College's course was clearly charted by Stephen B.

Luce a century ago, but like any course line it has been set by winds,

currents, and helmsmanship over the years. While rarely straying far,
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 321

the actual track suggests a sinuous course which at one time or another

favors one set of elements among the larger number that make up the

college's area of interest: national policy, maritime strategy, fleet

tactics, operational planning, international law, management, eco- nomics, logistics, international relations, diplomatic, military, and

naval history. Often, leaders have steered toward either practical

application or theoretical research, rather than the direct relationship

between them which Luce had envisaged. At times, there has been a tendency to promote either breadth or depth of thought in the

curriculum, each at the expense of the other. An institution such as the

Naval War College needs to remain responsive to the continually

changing elements within the naval profession. The shifts in emphasis

that have gone too far in either direction might well be attributed to the

absence of a corporate memory and to a lack of continuity in policy,

faculty, and staff, which did not begin to be rectified until the final

chapters ending the story of the college's first century. Through much

of its history, many naval officers have been reluctant to come to the

Naval War College. Many have doubted that it could help their careers. Detailers in the Bureau of Personnel, and its predecessor, the Bureau of

Navigation, have been reluctant to send "front runners," and students

have at times suspected that only the second-rate officers were selected

in the end. Although a pioneer in promoting advanced professional

education along broad lines, the Naval War College has never achieved

the full acceptance of its role that other service colleges in the United

States have achieved in their own services. Ironically many of the other

service colleges have adopted ideas first applied at Newport, as the

Naval War College has also used concepts and approaches taken from

its sister colleges. And non-naval students have often won from naval

officers the Naval War College's own academic prizes and achieved its

highest marks. Curiously, the Naval War College has at times been

better regarded by officers from other services than by its own. Perhaps,

in view of the significant changes of the last years, this will no longer be

true in the future.

The nature of modern navies produces a natural conflict in outlook

between the divergent views which stress extensive technological

knowledge of equipment, practical experience at sea and on staffs, and

broad understanding of the nature of warfare. Although the doubters

and critics of the college might often stress one aspect over another, the

challenge that Stephen B. Luce made to the Navy remains the

continuing inspiration of the Naval War College in its work to lead

officers to understand the total range of the naval profession as they

prepare for high command. "One thing must be borne in mind," Luce

reminded us: At the firing of the first gun proclaiming war, the so-called
322 SAILORS AND SCHOLARS

'inspiration of genius' may be trusted only when it is the result of

long and careful study and reflection.

Art is a jealous mistress; most of all so is the art of war.

If attendance here will serve, in any degree, to broaden an officer's

views, extend his 'mental horizon on national and international

questions, and give him a just appreciation of the great variety and

extent of the requirements of his profession, the college will not

have existed in vain.44 As the Naval War College ended its first century of service, it had

clearly recovered from the long period of uncertainty that had followed

World War II. Successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in the 1970s and

1 980s established a degree of emphasis and interest in the college which

had not been seen in 50 years. By 1984, the prime requisites to achieve

fully the vision which Luce had proclaimed were finally in place:

systematic guidance at the highest level within the Navy, carefully

chosen college leadership, and increasingly more students selected on

merit in courses taught by a first class, resident faculty. These permit

the highest academic standards and the best available information to be

used to engender innovative professional thinking while, at the same

time, balancing a broad outlook with in-depth investigation.

At the beginning of its second century, the doors of the Naval War

College remain open to the most capable officers as the only institution

in the United States devoted to educating officers in the highest aspects

of the naval profession, preparing them for the most responsible duties

that can devolve upon them.

Notes

1. NWC Archives, RG3: 1977 Files 1500, Training and Education, NN-DEC:

Watkins memo to CNO, Pers-40, serial 40 of 13 April 1977.

2. Ibid.

3. Loc. cit., Holloway memo to DCNO (Manpower], DNET, CNET, president,

NWC, on Service Education Policy, Ser, 00/000315 of 1 1 July 1977.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Loc. cit., DNET memo for CNO, on Service College Education Policy,

serial 099/142663 of 22 November 1977.

7. Ibid., and president, Naval War College, letter, serial 1866 of 8 September

1977.

8. NWC Archives, RG11: Syllabus: Strategy and Policy, November 1983-

March 1984, p. 1. 9. Conversation, 19 April 1984: Hattendorf-Wood; A. H. Bernstein memo to

strategy faculty, 27 February 1984.

10. Memorandum, Turcotte to Hattendorf, 10 April 1984.

1 1

.

NWC Archives, RG 1 1 : Syllabus: Naval Operations: Employment of Naval

Forces Course, 1980-81.

12. Memorandum, Weschler to Hattendorf, 14 April 1984.

1 3. Conversation, 23 April 1 984: Hattendorf-CDR J. J. Hinds, and HattendorfNeedham.
TOWARD A SECOND CENTURY, 1977-1984 323

14. NSC office files, "Naval Staff College Newsletter 1981-82/' pp. 1-3. 15. NWC Archives, RG28: President's File: J. B. Stockdale, Change of

Command address, 13 October 1977.

16. Ibid.

1 7. Quoted J. B. Stockdale, "The Problem of Ethical Brinkmanship," p. 1 0. Talk

given to the Third Taft Values Institute, 9-14 July 1978, Taft School. NWC

Archives, RG28: President's File.

18. J. B. Stockdale, "Taking Stock," NWC Review (Summer 1978], p. 2.

1 9. Quoted in Joseph Gerard Brennan, "The Stockdale Course" in Michael J. Collins, ed., Teaching Values and Ethics in College (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

Inc.], 1983, p. 69, from New York Times, Sunday 1 April 1973.

20. J. B. Stockdale, "The Word of Epictetus," Atlantic Monthly (April 1978).

21. Brennan, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

22. Stockdale, "The Problem of Ethical Brinksmanship," p.9.

23. J. B. Stockdale, "Taking Stock," Naval War College Review (Summer 1978],

p. 7.24. J. R. Wadleigh notes on J. B. Stockdale, "Remarks to NWC Foundation," 23

June 1977.

25. NWC Archives, Subject File: Advanced Research. LTCOL D. E. Hay,

USMC, presentation at Advanced Research Symposium, March 1984.

26. Hayward, Speech to Current Strategy Forum, 8 April 1981.

27. Robert J. Murray, "A War-fighting Perspective," USNI Proceedings

(October 1983], p. 68.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 70.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 74.

32. NWC Central Files, File 1500, COOP DEGREE: Welch to Hayward, serial

598 of 18 March 1981.

33. Loc. cit. VADMLandoW.Zech memo to CNO, 23 April 1981, and CNOto

president, NWC, serial 1 14H/371555 of 7 July 1981.

34. Loc. cit., J. E. Service to CNO Watkins, serial 2252 of 14 Oct 1982.

35. CNO message to ComCarGru Two 142053Z Jul 82.

36. Quoted in Rick Maze, "CNO Orders Cuts in Officer Training," Navy

Times, 4 October 1982. See also James D. Watkins, "This Is Your Ticket to

'Compete' . .

. ," Naval War College Review (Nov-Dec 1982], pp. 4-7.

37. CNO Message 221307Z, Sep 82, to NAVWARCOL.

38. Ibid.

39. CNO Message 151315Z, Nov 1982, NAVOP 125/82.

40. NWC Central Files, 5420 Boards: CNO Policy Board for Professional

Military Education. Memorandum for the record. Memo 095/22-83 dated 26 Jan

1983.

41. Ibid.

42. RADM W. F. McCauley, "Fight Smart," PHALANX: Newsletter of Military

Operations Research Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (February 1984], p. 10.

43. NWC Central File, 1520 Training and Education: CNO Service College

Education Policy, serial 00/3U448779 dated 12 December 1983.

44. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, The Writings of Stephen B. Luce

(Newport: Naval War College Press, 1975], p. 44.
APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF COURSES AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

AT THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

1884-1984

Year

1884

Date

May 3

1884 June 13

October 6

1885

1886

September 4

June 22

August 26

September 6

1888

1889

August 6

January 11

1890

August 5

Julyl

1891

1892

1893

May 28

July 22

May 10

October 4

1894

November 15

June 12

1895 June

1896 June 1 December 31

1897

1898

June 1 April 19

Event

At suggestion of Commodore Stephen Luce, Secretary of the

Navy W.E. Chandler appoints a board of three officers to report on the subject of postgraduate education for officers. Board headed by Luce recommends establishment of a war

college.

Navy Department General Order No. #325 establishes a Naval War College at Newport with Luce as "Superintendent."

First course begins with 9 students. Ends September 30. Luce detached for sea duty without relief. Captain A.T. Mahan reports and assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with 21 students. Ends November 20. William McCarty-Little introduces first lecture on war

gaming.

Course begins with 14 students. Ends November 5. Navy Department orders consolidation of College with

Torpedo Station. Mahan detached on temporary duty.

Commander Caspar Goodrich assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with 12 students. Ends October 25. No course held.

Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, by Mahan

is published.

No course held. Bureau of Navigation cites shortage of

officers. First new building (present Luce Hall) completed.

Mahan returns and assumes NWC presidency.

No course held.

Mahan detached for sea duty. Commander Charles Stockton,

acting president.

First visit by a Secretary of the Navy. Hilary Herbert

inspects NWC.

Commander Henry C. Taylor assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with 25 students, including first foreign

officers, two from Royal Swedish Navy. Ends September 30.

Course begins with 25 students. Mahan returns as lecturer. Ends October 15. Course begins with 27 students. Ends October 15. Captain Taylor detached for sea duty. Goodrich returns and assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with 22 students. Ends September 15. United States declares war on Spain. Staff including

Goodrich ordered to sea. Planned course cancelled.
APPENDIX

Year Date

August 12

November 2

1899 May 31

1900 March 12

June 1

October 25

1901 June 2

November 27

1902 June 2

1903 June 2

November 16

1904 June 1

June 17

1905 March 3

June 1

1906 May 24

June 1

1907 June 1

1908 June 1

July 8

1909

1910

1911

1912

July 22

September 1 June 1

October 1

June 1

June 2

October 1 November 20

June 1

325

Event

Cessation of hostilities between U.S. and Spain.

Captain Stockton assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with four students. Others from fleet in bay

attend part time. Ends October 1. General Order No. #544 constitutes Navy General Board.

NWC president assigned as ex-officio member.

Course begins with 30 students including 2 from Revenue

Cutter Service. Ends September 30.

Stockton detached for sea duty. Captain French E. Chadwick

assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with 28 students including Rear Admiral

Shepherd (first flag officer student). Ends October 1. U.S. Army War College established in Washington, D.C.

Course begins with 25 students. Main problem plays a Russo-Japanese conflict in Far East. Ends October 1. Course begins with lecture by Stephen Luce to 21 students.

Main problem, U.S.-German war in Far East. Ends October 1. Chadwick detached for sea duty. Captain Charles Sperry assumes NWC presidency.

Course, redesignated "Summer conference," begins with 21

students. Nine flag officers attend on temporary duty. Ends

October 1. New Library (present Mahan Hall) completed.

First librarian, Frederick Hicks, appointed.

Summer conference begins with 21 students. Ends

September 30.

Sperry promoted and detached for sea duty. Captain John P. Merrell assumes NWC presidency.

Summer conference begins with 1 7 students including W.S.

Benson, later first Chief of Naval Operations. Ends October

1. Summer conference begins with 15 students. Ends 1 October.

Summer conference begins with 25 students. Ends October

1. Conference interrupted at direction of President Theodore

Roosevelt. General Board and Dept. Bureau Chiefs join

NWC staff and students in "Battleship Conference."

President Roosevelt at NWC and chairs conference for the

day.

Secretary of the Navy Metcalf closes Battleship Conference.

Summer conference begins with 26 students plus General

Board in attendance on occasion. Ends September 30.

Merrell retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers assumes NWC presidency.

Summer conference begins with 26 students plus General

Board in attendance on occasion. "Estimate of Situation and

Formulation of Orders" introduced. Ends October 1

.

Summer conference begins with 28 students. Ends

September 30.

Long course begins with four students from summer

conference; course ends September 30 1912.

R.P. Rodgers retires from active duty. Captain William

Ledyard Rodgers assumes NWC presidency.

Summer conference begins with 28 students. Ends

September 30.
326 APPENDIX

Year Date

October 1

1913 February 1

June 2

October 1

December 15

1914 January 1 January 17

April 1

July 13

1915

December 1 January 1 March 3

1916

March 14

July 5 January 2

May 31

July 5 October 7

1917 January 2

February 16

March 24

April 6

May 1

June 9

November 21

1918

1919

November 1

1

March 15

1920

April 11 Julyl

December 2

March 20

Julyl

December 1

1921

December 28

May 6

June 30

Event

Long course begins with six students from summer

conference.

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School established at Annapolis,

Md.

Summer conference begins with 26 students. Ends October 1 —last such course. 1912 long course ends. Diplomas awarded to graduates of

1911 and 1912 long courses. 1913-14 long course begins

with six students. Ends July 3, 1914.

Rodgers detached for sea duty. Rear Admiral Austin Knight assumes NWC presidency.

Long course begins with 13 students. Ends December 22. General order No. #70 establishes NWC curriculum at two

long courses per year. General Order No. #89 establishes NWC correspondence

courses. Long course begins with six students. Secretary of the Navy

Josephus Daniels speaks. Ends June 26, 1915.

Death of Alfred Thayer Mahan in Washington, D.C.

Course begins with 14 students. Ends December 22. Formation of Office of Naval Operations in Navy

Department.

Death of William McCarty Little in Newport, R.I. Course begins with 20 students. Ends June 26, 1916.

Course begins with 15 students. Ends December 15. Battle of Jutland between British Grand Fleet and German

High Seas Fleet—most studied action at the NWC.

Course begins with 19 students. Disbands in April 1917.

German submarine U-53 at Newport. CO calls on NWC

president.

Course begins with 20 students. Course disbands in April.

Knight detached for sea duty. Captain William Sims assumes NWC presidency.

Rear Admiral Sims reports to Navy Department for duty.

United States enters World War I. NWC closes except for

Library.

Commander C.P. Eaton (Ret.) assumes NWC presidency

(acting).

Sims detached from NWC.

Commodore James Parker (Ret.) assumes NWC presidency

(acting).

Armistice Day, end of World War I hostilities.

Captain Reginald Belknap assumes NWC presidency

(acting).

Sims returns to Newport and assumes NWC presidency.

Course begins with 31 students. Ends June 2. Course begins with 30 students. Ends November 20. Sims in Washington to testify before Senate Naval Affairs

Committee regarding World War I naval operations.

Course begins with 30 students. Ends May 21, 1921.

Secretary of the Navy in annual report recommends NWC

be moved to Washington, D.C.

Course begins with 45 students. Ends November 20, 1921.

Approval by Bureau of Navigation to schedule one course per year. 1922 class begins with 45 students. Ends May 20, 1922.
APPENDIX

Year Date

1922 March 20

April 18

July 3

October 14

November 3

1923 March 6

July 7

1924 February 13

February 21

July 7

1925 January 24

July 5

September 5

September 25

1926 Julyl

July 2

1927 May 21

May 24

Julyl

September 17

September 19

1928 May 31

July 3

1929 Julyl

1930 January 27

May 30

June 16

Julyl

September 10

1931 Julyl

July 21

October 28

1932 Julyl

1933 February 16

327

Event

U.S. Senate ratifies Washington Treaty of Naval Limitations.

Samuel Gompers, labor leader, addresses NWC.

1923 class begins with 50 students including Chester W.

Nimitz, Harold Stark, Thomas Hart. Ends May 20, 1923.

Sims retires from active duty. Captain D. Blamer acting.

Rear Admiral Clarence Williams assumes NWC presidency.

General Order No. #48 establishes NWC junior course. 1924 classes begin with 49 senior, 22 junior students.

Graduation May 29, 1924.

Japanese delegation visits NWC. Included is Captain

I. Yamamoto IJN, later C-in-C Combined Fleet, 1940-43.

U.S. Army Industrial College established in Washington, D.C.

1925 classes begin with 46 senior, 25 junior students.

Graduation May 29, 1925.

NWC observes total eclipse of sun with temperature at 6°F. 1926 classes begin with 43 senior, 25 junior students.

Graduation May 27, 1926.

Rear Admiral Williams detached for sea duty. Rear Admiral

William Veazie Pratt assumes NWC presidency.

Formation of "Kitten Ball league" (softball). First organized

NWC athletics.

Logistics division included in NWC staff. 1927 classes begin with 44 senior, 26 junior students.

Graduation May 27, 1927. Senior class includes Raymond

Spruance.

U.S. Fleet in Narragansett Bay after Army-Navy exercises off New England.

Critique of exercises held at NWC by C-in-C, Admiral

Charles Hughes.

1928 classes begin with 40 senior, 38 junior students.

Graduation May 29, 1928.

Pratt detached for sea duty.

Rear Admiral Joel Pringle assumes NWC presidency.

NWC initiates correspondence courses for Naval Reserve

officers. 1929 classes begin with 48 senior, 52 junior students. Senior

class includes H. Kent Hewitt. Graduation May 28, 1929.

1930 classes begin with 48 senior, 35 junior students.

Graduation May 26, 1930.

Admiral H.K. Tu, Chinese Navy, visits NWC.

Pringle detached for sea duty. Captain S.W. Bryant, acting.

Rear Admiral Harris Laning assumes NWC presidency.

1931 classes begin with 44 senior, 37 junior students.

Graduation May 29, 1931.

First America's Cup Races held off Newport.

1932 classes begin with 42 senior, 37 junior students.

Graduation May 27, 1932.

U.S. Senate ratifies London Treaty of Naval Limitations.

General of the Armies John Pershing and Marshal Petain of

France visit NWC as part of Yorktown Sesquicentennial

celebration.

1933 classes begin with 48 senior and 48 junior students.

Ernest J. King and William F. Halsey included in senior

class. Graduation May 26, 1933.

Marine Corps Schools team presents advanced base problem

to NWC.
328 APPENDIX

Year Date

May 13

June 3

July 6

1934

August 16

May 8

May 29

June 18

July 1

July 11 October 9

1935 Julyl

1936 May 15

July 2

September 28

December 15

1937 January 2

Julyl

1938 May 17

July 6

September 21

October 1

1939 May 27

June 30

July 5

1940

September 1 September 8

July 3

September 18

1941 February 1 March 25

June 10

December 1

December 7

Event

Laning detached for sea duty. Captain Adolphus Andrews,

acting.

Rear Admiral Luke McNamee assumes NWC presidency.

1934 classes begin with 52 senior, 36 junior students.

Graduation May 25, 1934.

CNO approves advanced course at NWC.

Pringle Hall dedicated.

McNamee retires from active duty. Captain H.D. Cooke,

acting.

Rear Admiral Edward Kalbfus assumes NWC presidency.

1935 classes begin with 1 1 advanced, 45 senior, 40 junior

students. Graduation May 24, 1935.

Admiral Joseph Reeves, C-in-C U.S. Fleet, addresses NWC.

Change to Navy Regulations deletes NWC president from

General Board membership and shifts NWC from CNO to Bunav direction.

1936 classes begin with 1 1 advanced, 45 senior, 22 junior

students. Graduation May 22, 1936.

Colonel Robert McCormick, publisher of Chicago Tribune,

addresses NWC.

1937 classes begin with 12 advanced, 50 senior, 10 junior

students. Graduation May 14, 1937.

Death of William Sowden Sims in Boston, Mass.

Kalbfus detached for sea duty. Captain H.D. Cooke

acting.

Rear Admiral Charles P. Snyder assumes NWC presidency.

1938 classes begin with six advanced, 52 senior, 15 junior

students. Graduation May 13, 1938.

Congress passes Vinson-Trammell Act authorizing "Two

Ocean" Navy.

1939 classes begin with nine advanced, 53 senior, 17 junior

students. Graduation May 27, 1939.

Major hurricane strikes Narragansett Bay area. Addition to Mahan Hall completed to expand Library

facilities. Snyder detached for sea duty. Captain J.W. Wilcox acting.

Kalbfus returns and assumes NWC presidency.

1940 classes begin with nine advanced, 53 senior, 17 junior

students. Graduation May 26, 1940.

Outbreak of World War II in Europe.

President Roosevelt declares "limited national emergency."

1941 classes begin with advanced, 28 senior, 5 junior

students. Graduation May 15, 1941.

President Roosevelt visits Narragansett Bay area including

NWC.

Formation of U.S. Atlantic Fleet under Admiral E.J. King

Navy Department announces discontinuance of regular

NWC courses for duration of national emergency. NWC to remain open for short courses as directed.

First short courses begin with command class of 34

students, preparatory staff class of 18 students. Graduation

December 2. Kalbfus retires from active duty and is recalled to duty as NWC president in rank of rear admiral (retired), raised to rank of admiral (ret.) in June, 1942.

U.S. enters World War II.
APPENDIX 329

Year Date

December 30

1942 January 9

March 26

May 13

July!

November 2

January 1

June 1

Julyl

January 1

Julyl

1943

1944

1945

1946

1947

July 15

January 1 May 6

Julyl

August 16

October 10

January 2

March 1

April 1

July 13

August 1 August 10

January 20

February 2

July 12

August

Event

U.S. Fleet reorganization effected with Admiral Ernest J. King as Commander-in-Chief (COMINCH) in Washington,

D.C.

Courses begin with 24 command, 9 preparatory staff students. Also special plotting course of eight. Graduation

June 6. Duties of CNO and COMINCH combined undfr Admiral

King.

Bureau of Navigation redesignated Bureau of Personnel.

Courses begin. 38 command, 56 preparatory staff students.

Graduation December 1 8. Kalbfus detached to Navy Department Rear Admiral

William S. Pye assumes NWC presidency.

Courses begin with 32 command, 54 preparatory staff students. Graduation June 15. First Army-Navy staff college class arrives for month of

study at NWC. Classes continue until end of war with 337

students in 12 classes. Courses begin with 28 command, 48 preparatory staff students. Graduation December 15. Courses begin with 29 command, 56 preparatory staff students. Graduation June 14. Rear Admiral Pye retires from active duty and is recalled to duty as NWC president in rank of vice admiral (ret.) Courses

begin with 27 command, 58 preparatory staff students.

Graduation December 16. Pye Board reports on postwar officer education.

Courses begin with 27 command, 5 1 preparatory staff students. Graduation June 28. V-E Day. Germany surrenders.

Courses begin with 32 command, 53 preparatory staff students. Graduation December 16. V-J Day. Japan surrenders.

COMINCH headquarters in Washington dissolved.

Course begins with 29 students in command and staff class. Graduation June 15, 1946.

Pye retires. Admiral Raymond Spruance assumes NWC

presidency.

Army Industrial College redesignated Industrial College of

the Armed Forces (ICAF).

1947 classes begin with 65 senior, 36 junior students. First State Department attendee in senior class. Graduation May

25, 1947.

Commodore Richard W. Bates begins work on World War II battle evaluation.

National War College opens in Washington with 105

students.

U.S. Navy General Line School opens at Newport with 600

students.

First planning meeting for new NWC logistics course: Spruance, Vice Admiral R.B. Carney, and Captain H.E. Eccles. Armed Forces Staff College opens in Norfolk with 150

students.

1948 classes begin with 69 senior, 34 junior, 46 logistics

students. Graduation May 15, 1948.

Logistics begins under Eccles.
330 APPENDIX

Year

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

Date Event

September 18 Establishment of unified Military Establishment (NME)

with Army, Navy, and Air Force, under Secretary of Defense.

October 1 Air War College established at Montgomery, Ala.

January 2 Navy opens Second General Line School at Monterey, Cal.

May 22 Sims Hall (former Barracks C of Training Station) dedicated

by NWC.

June 10 First two-week Reserve Officer course begins at NWC.

July 1 Spruance retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Allen

Smith, Chief of Staff, assumes presidency.

July 10 1949 classes begin with 65 senior, 52 logistics, 34 junior

students. Graduation May 13, 1949.

September 1 NWC starts publishing "Information Service for Officers."

November 1 Smith detached for sea duty. Vice Admiral Donald Beary assumes NWC presidency.

April 4 Formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

May 9 First "Round Table Discussions," forerunner of present

Current Strategy Forum, begin.

August 10 National Military Establishment becomes Department of

Defense (DOD).

August 12 1950 classes begin with 64 senior, 53 logistics, 36 junior

students. Graduation June 16, 1950.

February 10 New command & staff department organized within NWC

staff. April 10 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, RN, visits

NWC.

May 28 Beary hospitalized. Rear Admiral T. Ross Cooley,

ComNavBase assumes additional duty as NWC president.

June 25 Korean war begins.

August 11 1951 classes begin. 56 strategy and tactics (S&T), 31 strategy

and logistics (S&L), 31 command & staff (C&S) students.

Graduation June 13, 1951.

October 2 Army War College reopens after World War II closure.

October 1

7

Cooley detached, Captain H.D. Felt acting.

December 1 Vice Admiral Richard Conolly assumes NWC presidency.

May 24 Financeer Bernard M. Baruch addresses NWC.

August 10 1952 classes begin with 66 S&T, 47 S&L, 73 C&S students.

Graduation June 14, 1952.

June 9 First "Global Strategy Week" begins, replacing Round Table

Discussions.

July 14 CNO authorizes establishment of a Naval War College

Museum.

August 9 1953 classes begin with 4 S&S, 73 S&T, 56 S&L, 108 C&S

students. New advanced class, strategy & seapower (S&S)

included. Graduation June 10, 1953.

First civilian academic chairs established.

September 1 "Information Service for Officers" renamed Naval War

College Review.

July 27 Korean armistice effective.

August 14 1954 classes begin with six S&S, 130 NW, 96 C&S students.

S&T and S&L courses replaced by naval warfare (NW).

Graduation June 16. November 2 Conolly retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Thomas

Robbins, Chief of Staff, assumes NWC presidency.

May 2 Vice Admiral Lynde McCormick assumes NWC presidency.

August 23 1955 classes begin with 5 S&S, 67 NW2, 66 NW1, 1 14

C&S students. Naval warfare course split into first year
APPENDIX 331

Year Date

1955 August 18

1956

1957

1958

1959

March 17

April 19

August 16

August 17

August 13

August 14

September 5 May 29

August 15

August 15

November 7 November 19

June 2

August 21

1960 February 12

April 21

June 30

July

August 15

August 19

November 6

1961 February 2

June 19

August 18

September 27

October 3

October 12

Event

(NW1) and second year (NW2) sections. Graduation June 15,

1955.

1956 classes begin with 2 S&S, 59 NW2, 72 NW1, 124

C&S students. Graduation June 12, 1956.

NWC briefing team to indoctrinate Naval Reserve units

formed.

Major winter storm hits area, doing extensive damage to ships at recently completed Coddington Cove piers.

CNO approves new naval command (international) course at NWC.

McCormick dies suddenly at Newport. Rear Admiral

Robbins, Chief of Staff, again assumes NWC presidency.

1957 classes begin with 5 S&S, 59 NW2, 74 NW1, 132

C&S, and 23 naval command (NC) students. Graduation

June 12, 1957.

Robbins detached for duty in Washington. Vice Admiral

Stuart Ingersoll assumes NWC presidency.

1958 classes begin with 71 NW2, 95 NW1, 127 C&S, 28 NC

students. Graduation June 1 1, 1958.

President Eisenhower spends month vacationing on Naval

Base. Meets with officers of new naval command course. Cardinal Francis Spellman addresses NWC.

1959 classes begin with 156 NW, 1 1 1 C&S, 25 NCC

students. NW1 and NW2 classes are combined in naval

warfare (NW). Graduation June 10, 1959.

Eisenhower again vacations in Newport, occupying quarters

of NWC Chief of Staff at Fort Adams.

Commissioning of Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator

(NEWS) in Sims Hall.

Madame Chiang Kai Shek addresses NWC.

Separate war gaming department formed, removing NEWS

from strategy department.

1960 classes begin with 157 NW, 171 C&S, 25 NC students.

Alexander Haig, Secretary of State in 1981-82, included in

C&S class. Graduation June 15, 1960. Naval Long Range

Studies Project established at NWC.

NWC directed to provide NEWS time and instruction for

fleet units.

First military-media conference.

Ingersoll retires from active duty. Vice Admiral Bernard

Austin assumes NWC presidency.

Eisenhower again vacations at Fort Adams.

Correspondence Course Department redesignated

Extension Education Department.

1961 classes begin with 153 NW, 178 C&S, 24 NC students.

Graduation June 14. NWC hosts first conference of heads of senior service

colleges.

Naval Long Range Studies Project becomes Institute Of

Naval Studies (INS).

INS conducts Limited War Symposium at NWC.

1962 classes begin with 156 NW, 149 C&S, 26 NC students.

Graduation June 20. President John F. Kennedy visits NWC.

General of the Army Eisenhower addresses NWC.

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz addresses NWC.
332 APPENDIX

Year

1962

Date

April 9

May 28

August 17

August 18

October 22

1963 April 11

August 16

November 1 November 22

1964 February 24

April 10

June 8

July 31

August 14

September 10

1965

December 9

April 3

May 18

August 13

December 1

1966 January 24

February 15

March 29

June 10

August 12

1967

November 23

April 1 May 5 Julyl

August 14

Event

NWC hosts first conference of Heads of Naval War Colleges

of the Americas.

Two-week counterinsurgency course closes 1961-62

academic year at NWC.

1963 classes begin with 150 NW, 175 C&S, 26 NC students.

Graduation June 1 9, 1 963.

George Washington University graduate degree program

begins with 1 80 enrollees.

Cuban Missile Crisis —Newport based ships deploy to Caribbean.

Austin on temporary duty for Court of Inquiry—loss of

submarine USS Thresher.

1964 classes begin with 159 NW, 160 C&S, 27 NC students.

Graduation June 7. Institute of Naval Studies relocated to Cambridge, Mass. and

becomes Center for Naval Analyses (CNA).

Assassination of President Kennedy. Word passed at NWC

during lecture by Chief of Naval Personnel.

First George Washington University degrees presented to 16

students from NWC faculty and staff. Founders Hall, serving as Base Headquarters, becomes

National Historic Landmark.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk opens Global Strategy session.

Austin retires, Vice Admiral Charles Melson assumes NWC

presidency.

1965 classes begin with 154 NW, 189 C&S, 24 NC students.

Graduation June 16, 1965.

Second extension to Mahan Hall for Library stack space

approved.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson addresses NWC.

CNO approves reorganization of NWC built around school

of naval warfare, school of command & staff, and

correspondence school.

NWC hosts meeting of Military Education Coordination

Conference (MECC).

1966 classes begin with 150 NW, 191 C&S, 22 NC students.

Graduation June 15. Department of Defense team, led by Assistant Secretary of

Defense Morris, visits NWC, first stop on inspection tour of

senior military colleges.

Melson retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Francis E. Neussle, Chief of Staff, assumes NWC presidency.

Vice Admiral John T. Hayward assumes NWC presidency.

General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS, addresses NWC.

Commander Rita Lenihan, NWC staff, selected as Director

Waves, USN.

1967 classes begin with 143 NW, 146 C&S, 21 NC students.

Graduation June 14. Secretary of State Dean Rusk addresses NWC.

Automatic data processing (ADP) introduced in NWC

administrative work.

First meeting of Naval War College Board of Advisors.

NWC budgetary support shifted from Bupers to CNO (Op

09B).

1968 classes begin with 95 NW, 117 C&S, 31 NC students.

Graduation June 26. Interim C&S class commences two
APPENDIX 333

Year Date

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

July!

July 14

August 16

August 30

November 28

January 1

February 1 August 22

September 1 November 1 November 28

August 21

November 9

February 1 March 13

April 27

July 21

August 17

August 23

Julyl

August 7 August 15

August 24

December 6

Event

weeks of NWC instruction wi,th remainder of work through

correspondence school.

Position of Professor of Libraries established. Professor E. Schwass incumbent.

First senior officers executive management course convenes,

40 attendees. Course primarily for flag and general officer

selectees. Four-week duration.

1969 classes begin with 143 NW, 152 C&S, 26 NC students.

Graduation June 25. Hayward retires from active duty. Vice Admiral Richard G.

Colbert assumes NWC presidency.

CNO approves NWC plan to expand facilities for 700

students by 1980.

NWC budgetary support returned to Bureau of Naval

Personnel.

Naval historical Collection established. A.S. Nicolosi,

director.

1970 classes begin with 169 NW, 190 C&S, 30 NC students.

Graduation June 22. Chair of Air Strike Warfare, first military chair established.

Chief of Naval Operations hosts First International Sea

Power Symposium at NWC.

Naval War College Foundation established under laws of

Rhode Island. John Nicholas Brown first president. Rear

Admiral Richard Bates, USN (Ret.), executive director.

Classes of 1971 begin with 181 NW, 225 C&S, 30 NC

students. Graduation June 21. Dedication of William McCarty-Little war gaming room in

Sims Hall.

Student team from C&S presents personnel study in

Pentagon to SecNav and CNO.

President Richard Nixon at NavBase for graduation of sonin-law, Ensign David Eisenhower from Officer Candidate

School.

Establishment of deputy to president billet. Rear Admiral G.

Tahler reports.

Establishment of Naval Education and Training Command

at Pensacola, Fla. Colbert detached. Vice Admiral Benedict J. Semmes assumes NWC presidency.

1972 classes begin with 202 NW, 244 C&S, 29 NC students.

Graduation June 29. Semmes retires from active duty. Vice Admiral Stansfield

Turner assumes NWC presidency.

Naval staff course begins with 15 students. Graduatibn

December 20. NWC bookstore opens in Navy Exchange Bldg. west of Sims

Hall.

1973 classes begin with 186 NW, 232 C&S, 32 NC students.

Formal convocation and academic procession on Dewey

Field. Graduation June 30, 1973. George Washington

University courses end for naval warfare students.

Author Herman Wouk gives first "Spruance Lecture" in

auditorium of completed Spruance Hall. Building formally

dedicated next day with Mrs. Spruance and Rear Admiral

S.E. Morison, participating.
334 APPENDIX

Tear Date

1973 January 22

April 17

June 25

August 6

August 30

October 23

November 30

December 27

1974 January 28

March 1 March 28

June 25

August 25

August 9

August 28

1975 January 20

March 1 May 8

July 28

August 29

October 13

November 10

1976 January 13

January 16

April 28

June 25

July 4

July 8

July 10

July 13

July 26

Event

Second naval staff course begins with 16 students.

Graduation June 30.

DOD announces major shore reductions and fleet withdrawals from area. Global strategy discussions replaced by three-day Current

Strategy Forum. Governor Jimmy Carter, USNA classmate of

Turner, speaks to Forum.

Third naval staff course begins with 14 students.

Graduation December 21. 1974 classes begin with 181 NW, 222 C&S, 31 NC students.

Graduation June 28. NWC hosts visit Brazilian Naval War College staff and

students.

Death of Richard Colbert at Bethesda, Md.

Death of Richard Bates in Newport, R.I. Fourth naval staff course begins with 17 students.

Graduation June 14. Naval Base, Newport becomes Naval Education and

Training Center (NETC).

Dedication of Conolly Hall.

Dedication of Colbert Plaza, seaward of new building

complex.

Fifth naval staff course begins with 1 8 students.

Graduation December 20. Turner detached to sea duty. Vice Admiral Julien

LeBourgeois assumes NWC presidency.

1975 classes begin with 214 NW, 176 C&S, 38 NC students.

Graduation July 1. Sixth naval staff course begins with 21 students. Graduation

June 13. Opening of NWC Center for Advanced Research (CAR).

Soviet officers from warships at Boston visit NWC.

Seventh naval staff course begins with 1 7 students.

Graduation December 19. 1976 classes begin with 137 NW, 167 C&S, 32 NC students.

Graduation June 1 7. The 200th Anniversary of U.S. Navy. NWC president

reviews parade and speaks at Newport ceremonies.

The 200th Anniversary of U.S. Marine Corps. Ceremonies on Dewey Field. Eighth naval staff course begins with 19 students.

Graduation June 1 1. Formation of National Defense University (NDU) in

Washington.

Dedication of Hewitt Hall which includes new library.

Tall ships visit Newport. Ships depart for N.Y. July 1. National Bicentennial Day. Full honors at noon by NETC

and ships.

NWC hosts Naval Command Course Conference celebrating

20th anniversary of founding of the international course. President Ford visits NWC and NETC to greet Queen

Elizabeth and Prince Philip embarked in H.M.S. Britannia.

Dedication of International Plaza, area between Spruance

and Mahan Halls.

Ninth naval staff course begins with 15 students.

Graduation December 1 7.
APPENDIX 335

Year Date Event

August 25 1977 classes begin with 150 NW, 186 C&S, 32 NC students.

Graduation June 30. October 1 Disestablishment of First Naval District. NWC now within

Fourth District.

November 29 Canadian Forces Staff College conducts exercise on NEWS.

1977 January 24 Tenth naval staff course begins with 16 students.

Graduation June 17. April 1 LeBourgeois retires from active duty. Rear Admiral

Huntington Hardisty assumes NWC presidency. NWC

commences six-week extension course at New London

Naval Base for Polaris-based officers. June 30 Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, USN (Ret.) completes 25 years'

service on NWC staff since reporting upon his retirement

from active duty 1952.

July 18 Eleventh naval staff course begins with 13 students.

Graduation December 16. August 15 1978 classes begin with 138 NW, 181 C&S, 39 NC students.

Graduation June 27. October 13 Hardisty detached for overseas duty. Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale assumes NWC presidency.

1978 January 16 Twelfth naval staff course begins with 19 students.

Graduation June 16. March 8 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger addresses NWC.

May 26 Dedication of Founders Hall as NWC Museum.

June 30 First NWC Alumni gathering addressed by Stockdale in

Washington.

November 1 6 Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Board on Education and

Training meets at NWC.

July 12 Thirteenth naval staff course begins with 18 students.

Graduation December 15. 1979 January 15 Fourteenth naval staff college class begins with 22 students.

Graduation June 15. April 20 The 105th annual meeting of U.S. Naval Institute (first ever held in Newport), held in Spruance Auditorium.

July 15 Fifteenth naval staff college class convenes with 18

students. Graduation December 14. August 22 Stockdale retires from active duty. Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch assumes NWC presidency.

1980 classes begin with 127 NW, 156 C&S, 32 NC students.

Graduation June 25. 1980 January 9 Sixteenth naval staff college class begins with 20 students.

Graduation June 13. July 1

1

Bicentennial of arrival of Rochambeau's Army in Newport.

NWC president is principal speaker at City of Newport

ceremony in Eisenhower Square.

July 16 Seventeenth naval staff college class begins with 21

students. Graduation Dec. 19

August 20 1981 classes begin with 1 10 NW, 137 C&S, 31 NC students.

Graduation June 24. 1980 classes begin with 127 NW, 156 C&S, 32 NC students.

Graduation June 25. 1980 January 9 Sixteenth naval staff college class begins with 20 students.

Graduation June 13. July 1

1

Bicentennial of arrival of Rochambeau's Army in Newport.

NWC president is principal speaker at City of Newport

ceremony in Eisenhower Square.
336 APPENDIX

Year Date Event

July 16 Seventeenth naval staff college class begins with 21

students. Graduation Dec. 19

August 20 1981 classes begin with 1 10 NW, 137 C&S, 31 NC students.

Graduation June 24. October 30 NWC hosts first Tactical Symposium.

1981 January 7 Eighteenth naval staff college class begins with 22 students.

Graduation June 12. June 26 NWC International Park between Luce & Founders Halls

dedicated.

July 1 Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) established.

Honorable R.J. Murray first director.

July 15 Nineteenth naval staff college class begins with 26 students.

Graduation Dec. 18. August 18 1982 classes begin with 162 NW, 147 C&S, 37 NC students.

Graduation June 25. August 27 Humorist Art Buchwald lectures on Colbert Plaza to more

than 1500 attendees.

1982 January 20 Twentieth naval staff college class begins with 26 students.

Graduation June 25. July 21 Twenty-first naval staff college class begins with 17

students. Graduation December 17. August 1

7

Welch retires from active duty. Captain David Self, Deputy, assumes NWC presidency. 1983 classes begin with 141 NW,

148 C&S, 36 NC students. Graduation June 24. October 14 Rear Admiral James E. Service assumes NWC presidency.

October 28 CNO hosts conference of Fleet Commanders-in-Chief at NWC. Updated Naval War Gaming System (NWGS) is used

to show latest war gaming developments.

1983 January 19 Twenty-second naval staff college class begins with 20

students. Graduation June 24. February 7 First Post-Command class begins with 12 students.

Graduation March 18. Courses continue through 1983 as follows: March 28-June 17, 12 students; May 9-June 17, 21

students; June 27-August 5, 23 students; September 12- October 14, 21 students.

June 4 Centennial of Naval Training Station (presently NETC,

Newport). Founded by Luce.

July 18 Twenty-third naval staff college class begins with 17

students. Graduation December 1. August 16 1984 classes begin with 154 NW, 159 C&S, 34 NC students.

Graduation June 22. September 24 U.S. loses "America's Cup" to Australia in seven race series

off Newport.

November 1 8 First formal graduation ceremony for phased-input naval

warfare and command and staff college students.

1984 January 9 1984 Post-Command courses begin. Schedule as follows:

January 9-March 2; March 26-June 15; June 9-August 31; and

September 10-November 2. Total of 75 students in four courses anticipated.

January 18 Twenty-fourth naval staff college class begins with 19

students. Graduation June 22. July 16 Twenty-fifth naval staff college class begins. Graduation

December 1. August 21 1985 classes begin.

October 1 Centennial Week at Naval War College ending on October

6. 100th anniversary of founding of the college.
<EN

INDEX

Abell, John, 228 (illus)

academic consultants, NWC, 205

Acheson, Dean, Sec. State, 332

Ackerman, L.C., 277

Adams, Brooks, 55

Administration Dept., NWC, 119, 2S2

advanced academic degree, 241, 259

advanced base development, 186

Advanced Course, NWC, 146, 147, 166,

167, 171, 176, 182,205

Advanced Electronic Warfare, elective course, NWC, 311

advanced research, 293, 296, 314, 315,

319

Advanced Supply Base Training Center,

Williamsburg, Va., 188

Aids, Navy Dept., 64

Aid for Education, 88

Aid for Fleet Operations, 64, 69, 75, 77-83

aircraft, 87, 128

aircraft carriers, 121, 165, 251

Air War College, Montgomery, Ala., 1 97,

315

air warfare, 184, 185, 267

Albertson, W.E., 205

Albrecht, D., 219, 228 (illus)

Aldrich, Nelson, Senator, 21, 25, 30, 53

Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime

Strategy, NWC, 252

Allen, Charles, Asst. SecNav., 51, 52

Aller, J.C., 219 (illus)

Allied Command, Atlantic, NATO, 230,

231

Ambrose, S.E., 219 (illus)

American State Colleges and Universities,

Assn. of, 291

American Council on Education, 296, 316

American Historical Association, 191

American Political Science Association,

198

American Society of International Law, 56

America's Cup Races, 152, 239

Amherst College, 291

Ammen, D. RAdm., 21

amphibious warfare/operations, 20,

185

Analysis Dept., NWC, 189

Anderson, Bern, RAdm., 192

Anderson, George, Adm., CNO, 187

Anderson, H.H., 219 (illus)

Anderson, R.B., SecNav., 204

Andrews, Adolphus, Adm., 145

Annapolis, Md., 19, 34, 51, 52, 63, 74, 281,

318

Annual Report, President, Naval War

College, 306

Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, 79,

81, 122

antisubmarine warfare, 259

Application of Ocean Research, elective course, NWC, 311

applicatory system, NWC, 69, 70, 71,

73, 74, 78, 79, 86-88, 112-1 19, 153, 160.

See also estimate of the situation, and

formulation of orders

Apprentice Training System, 47
338 INDEX

appropriations, NWC, 23, 25, 29, 30, 263

Aquidneck Island, 140

archives, NWC, 58, 131, 290

archivist, NWC, 114, 117

Argentina, 266

"Armed Merchantmen," Wilson, 86

Armistice, World War I, 1 12

Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.,

196,200,271

Army Air Corps/Forces, 174, 196

Army Air Force School of Applied Tactics,

Orlando, Fla., 174

Army Command and General Staff School,

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 129, 259

Army Field Service Regulations, 157

Army Ground Forces, 1 74

Army Industrial College, Washington,

D.C., 123, 147, 197

"Army-Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow

5,1941", 166

Army-Navy Journal, 7, 13, 17, 20, 21, 63

Army-Navy Staff College, Army-Navy

Register, 50

ANSCOL, 172-174, 180-185

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 200,241,315

Army War College, Washington, D.C.

69, 70, 72, 122, 133, 146, 147, 158,

174, 176

Arnold, Henry, General, 174, 175

art and science of war, 17, 22, 119, 171,

254

Arthur, Chester A., U.S. President, 20

Artillery School, Fort Monroe, Va., 16

Ashe, S., 23

Ass't. Secretary of Defense, Int. Security

Affairs (ISA), 312

Ass't. Secretary of Defense, Manpower,

245, 307

Ass't. Secretary of the Navy, 151, 268

Ass't. Secretary of State, 56

Astor Library, 23

Astor, Vincent, 152

Atlantic area/ocean, 79, 127, 132, 154,

166,231

Atlantic Fleet, U.S., 79, 86, 108 (illus), 195,

201, 230, 238, 328

Atlantic Fleet Torpedo Flotilla, 88, 143

Auchincloss, H.D., 238

Austin, Bernard, VAdm., NWC President,

216 (illus), 240, 241, 243, 261, 269, 271,

331

Australia, 127, 174

Automatic Data Processing (ADP), NWC,

332

aviation/naval aviation, 1 26, 1 65, 1 83

Babcock, J.V., 123

Bahia Honda, Cuba, 46

Bakenhus, R.E., 133

Baldwin, Robert H., Under SecNav., 25

1

Bancroft, George, SecNav., 22

Barber, James, 277

Barnard College, 3 1

1

Barnes, S.M., 206

Barth, C.H., 71

Baruch, Bernard, 197

Bates, Richard W., RAdm., 184, 189-192,

218,269

battle fleet employment, 60, 61, 165, 185

Battle Fleet/ Battle Force, U.S., 127, 131,

159, 173,309,317

Battleship Conference, NWC, 61-64, 103

(illus)

battleships/battleship operations, 87,

143,183,230

Battleship Divisions, Battle Force, 138,

159

Bauchspies, R.E., 228 (illus)

Baxter, James P., 181, 203

Beach, Edward L., 253

Beary, Donald B., VAdm., NWC President,

194, 196, 199

Belknap, Reginald R., RAdm., 90, 91, 143

Benson, William S., Adm., CNO, 84, 115,

116

Bernier, R., 290

Bernstein, A.H., 228 (illus), 306

Bismarck, Otto, Chancellor of Germany,

79

Blake, George, Cdre., 12

Blamer, D.C, 326

Bliss, Tasker, General, 22-24, 78, 100

(illus)

Block, CM., 172

The Blue Sword, Vlahos, 177 (fn) Blumenson, Martin, 28

1

Board for Advanced Education, 1919

(Knox-King-Pye Board), 128, 129, 134

Board for Postgraduate Education, 1884

(Luce Board), 17-19,53

Board of Advisors, NWC, 221 (illus), 261,

263

Bolivia, 260

Book of Job, 311

bookstore, NWC, 290
INDEX 339

Boston, Mass., 19, 139, 195

Boston University, 241, 316

Bowie, Robert, 277

Brazil, 61, 266

Brazilian Naval War College, 334

Brennan, Joseph P., 31

1

Brenton Village, Fort Adams, 195

Brisbois, M.B., 228 (illus)

Bristol, Mark L., Adm., 85, 91

Britain, Battle of, 165

British Pacific Fleet, 231

Brown, Carter, 268

Brown, Charles R. Adm., 197, 199

Brown, George, 307

Brown, John N., Ass't. SecNav., 268, 333

Brown, Thomas A., 1 74

Brown University, 206, 254, 307, 315

Bryant, Samuel, RAdm., 327

Buckingham, Benjamin H., 34, 35

Buchwald, Art, 336

Buckle, Thomas, 1

5

Buell, Thomas B., 208

buildings, NWC, 116, 118, 149, 244, 260,

262, 267, 272, 290

Bunce, F.M., RAdm., 31, 33, 39, 46, 48

Bunting, Josiah, 28

1

Bureau Chiefs, 44, 59, 61, 62, 64

Bureau of Aeronautics, 145

Bureau of Construction and Repair, 61,62,

64

Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, 2, 20,21,27

Bureau of Naval Personnel, 179, 193, 194,

197, 199-201, 204, 206, 229, 234, 235,

241, 242, 244, 259, 271, 293, 296, 298,

303,316,321

Bureau of Navigation, 20, 21, 30, 32-34

45, 49, 52, 53, 55, 60, 65, 75, 80, 84,

117, 128, 147, 149, 153, 166, 169,321

Bureau or Ordnance, 2, 27, 30

Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, 187

Bureau of Yards and Docks, 5 Burke, Arleigh, Adm., CNO, 190, 198, 231-

233, 236, 240, 263, 320

BZ trainer, Newport, 238

Cagle, Malcolm, VAdm., 272

California, 79

Canada, 164, 174,241,266

Canadian Forces Staff College, 335

Cape Cod/Cape Cod Canal, 43, 132, 140

Cape Verde Islands, 79

Caperton Wm. B., Adm., 55, 91

Capps, Washington, RAdm., 62

Caraginas, Chris., 219 (illus)

Caribbean area/sea, 26, 45, 79, 83, 86, 132,

159, 166

Carney, Robert B., Adm., CNO, 179, 186,

198,206,235,320

Caroline Islands, 144-146

Carroll, P.L., Cdre., 184

Carter, Jimmy, U.S. President, 334

Cases on International Law, Snow,

41

case study method/case studies, NWC,

89,281,285,296,305,307

Castex, Raoul, 143

Centennial Week, NWC, 336

Center for Advanced Research (CAR),

NWC, 296,334

Center for Continuing Education, NWC,

291, 295

Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), 237,

277

Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS),

NWC, 224 (illus), 313,315, 319

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 295

"Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War,"

Sims, 123

Chadbourne, Chas., 295

Chadwick, French E., RAdm., NWC President, 29, 52, 56, 57, 91,

Chafee, John H., SecNav., 269, 270, 272

Chair of Surface Strike Warfare, NWC,

270

Chandler, Alfred D., 205

Chandler, William E., SecNav., 17, 20, 53,

320

"Change in the European Balance of

Power, 1938-1939," Murray, 297

Chase, Jehu V., Adm., 49

Chase, Volney O., 91

Cheer Up! There is no Naval War College, Sims, 89

Chester Nimitz Chair of Social and

Political Philosophy, NWC, 205, 252

Chiang Kai Shek, Madame, 331

Chief, Naval Education and Training, 304,

305

Chief Clerk's Office, NWC, 90

Chief of Information, Navy Dept., 239

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 64, 112,

115, 137, 147, 149, 183, 186, 190, 193,

196, 206, 230, 231, 236, 238, 244, 245,

275, 291, 298, 302-304, 313, 316-318,

320, 322
340 INDEX

Chief of Staff, NWC, 1 17, 1 18, 120, 145,

172, 193, 197,229,230,238

Chile/Chilean Navy, 5, 266

China/Chinese Navy, 142, 254

Christensen, C.S., 270

Church, William C, 13

Cienfuegos, Cuba, 45

Citadel, The, 311

civilian academic chairs, NWC, 330

civilian professors, NWC, 113, 203, 233

252-254, 267, 294, 295

civilian staff, NWC, 138, 168, 226 (illus) Civil War, 21, 46, 58

Clambake Club of Newport, 1 24

Clark, David G., 277

Clausewitz, Karl von, 154, 160, 202, 281

Clements, William P., DepSecDef, 304

Cleveland, Grover, U.S. President, 33

Coasters Harbor Island, 2, 8, 12, 14, 17, 18,

27, 29, 53, 103 (illus), 108 (illus), 125,

138, 151, 173, 177, 192,220,244

Coddington Point/Cove, 27, 171, 195,

331

"Code of the Law and Usages of War at Sea," Walker, 55

Coffey, Reuben B., 157

Colbert Plaza, 225 (illus), 334

Colbert, Richard G., Adm., NWC President, 216 (illus), 218 (illus), 232, 233,

263,264,271,288,320

Cold War operations, 254, 308

Collado, E.G., 261

Colomb, John, 7, 41

Columbia, 260

Columbia University, 56, 261

Command and Staff Course/College,

NWC, 130, 176, 194, 196, 199, 206, 234,

238, 245, 247, 252-254, 267, 280, 284,

288, 289, 293, 299, 303-305, 307, 309

command, control, communications (C^),

187

Command Course, NWC, 167, 170, 212

(illus), 271

Command Department, NWC, 199

Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces,

Southern Europe (CinCSouth), NATO,

288, 295

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet

(CINCUS), 61, 75, 112, 119, 132,

(COMINCH), 328

Command excellence forum, NWC, 270

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, 70, 128,

167,259,313,314

Cominch P-l, Naval Directives and the

Order Form, King, 160

"Comparative Organization of Government for War" Myers, 151

concept of the War College, 137, 1 79, 276,

277,286

Cone, Hutchinson I., 1 23

Conference of the Naval War Colleges of

the Americas, 265, 266

Congressional Medal of Honor, 123, 309

Conolly Hall, 268

Conolly, Richard L., Adm., NWC President, 169, 215 (illus), 229, 230, 232-

235, 259, 260, 262, 263, 296

Construction Battalions (Seabees), 171

Contemporary Civilization lectures,

NWC, 290

convocation ceremony, NWC, 283

convoy operations, 54, 70

Conway, James M., 228 (illus)

Coogan, R.D., 228 (illus)

Cooke, H.D., 328

Cooley, T. Ross, RAdm., NWC President,

195, 199

Coral Sea, Battle of, 190

Corbett, Julian, 79, 160

Cornell University, 7 Coronel, Battle of, 141

correspondence courses, NWC, 81, 82,

119, 122, 124, 167, 183, 245, 262

counterinsurgency, NWC, 245

Court of Inquiry, 240

criticism of War College, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34

35, 47, 48, 51-53, 68, 116, 246, 247, 320

Cronan, William P., 83

Crosby, Howard R, 172

Crowl, Philip, 271, 281, 306

Crown, Robert Mrs., 219 (illus) Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet,

270, 296

Cuba, 46, 54

Cuban Missile Crisis, 239, 246, 256

Cuban Revolution, 4, 45

Current Strategy Forum, NWC, 334

curriculum, NWC, 28, 33, 39, 42, 49, 72,

79, 81, 85, 90, 125, 130, 134, 141, 147,

148, 168, 177, 183-185, 193, 196, 200,

206, 207, 229, 232-234, 246, 250, 252

255-257, 261, 267, 271, 272, 276, 278,

280, 282, 288, 289, 292, 299, 302, 305

308,309,311,317-319

Daniels, Josephus, SecNav., 80, 81, 83-85,
INDEX 341

87, 107 (illus), 112, 116, 122-125, 129

168,320

Darrieus, 79

Dartmouth College, 261

Daveluy, 79

Decatur, Stephen, 158

decision making, NWC, 207, 304

Decker, Benton C, 89

defense analysis, NWC, 306

Defense Department (DOD), 180, 208,

239, 245, 247, 250, 251, 256, 257, 260-

262,273,297,304,316,318

defense management, NWC, 276

Defense Economics and Decision Making

course, NWC, 286, 306, 307

defense programming, NWC, 256

Delaney, Robert, 281, 282

Dean of Academics, NWC, 302

"The Demotion of Professionalism at the

War College," Katzenbach, 246

Denby, Edwin, SecNav., 1 29

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,

Development (Op-07), 251, 261

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,

Logistics (Op-04), 186,261

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower (Op-01), 258, 261, 304

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Operations (Op-03), 270

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans

(Op-06), 261

Destroyer Flotillas, European Waters,

149

Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, 85, 195,

231,239,276

destroyers/destroyer operations, 87, 89,

143, 165,240

Destroyers, Battle Force, 151

Destroyer School, Newport, 238

Development of Naval Thought—Essays,

Rosinski, Simpson, 290

deWeldon, Felix, 215 (illus), 219 (illus), 268

Dewey, George, Admiral of the Navy, 58,

59, 60, 82

Dewey Field, 283

DeWitt, John L. LtGen., 180

Dickens, F.W., 39, 48, 50

Dickey, J.S., 261

diploma, NWC, 236, 326

Director, Systems Analysis Div., OpNav

(Op-96), 277

Director, Joint Staff, JCS, 240

Director, Naval Education and Training,

OpNav (Op-099), 298

Director of War Plans, Naval Operations,

151

dissemination of information, NWC, 1 20

Distinguished Service Medal, 122, 123

Denmark, Royal Danish Navy, 42

doctrine, NWC, 69, 72-74, &9, 91, 119,

153, 184

Dostoevski, 311

Dogger Bank, Battle of, 141

dogma, NWC 184

Dominican Republic, 260

Douglas, Archibald H., 165

Duncan, Charles, Adm., 270

Dunlap, R.H., Brig. Gen., 90

Earle, Ralph RAdm., 202

East Coast, 45

Eaton, C.P., 90

Eccles, Henry E., RAdm., 184, 186-188,

206, 212 (illus), 214 (illus), 290

economics/economist, NWC, 114, 202,

320, 321

Ecuador, 266

Edwards, Walter A., 120

Ekelund, J.E., RAdm., 320

Eisenhower, David, 333

Eisenhower, Dwight D., U.S. President,

216 (illus), 238

Eighth Fleet, 231

elder statesmen, 229, 240, 263

electronic warfare sensors, 1 84

electives/elective program, NWC, 254-

256,267,295,305,309,316

Elementary Course, NWC, 80, 81

Ellis, Earl, Col., 78, 106 (illus)

Ellis, M.G., 287

Ellis, W.H., 228 (illus)

Emerson, William, 277, 279, 281, 286

English, Earl, Cdre., 2

Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History,

NWC, 205, 279

The Enchiridion, Epictetus, 311

England, F.M., 287

Enthoven, Alain, 252

Estes, Thomas, Ambassador, 219 (illus)

estimate of the situation (applicatory

system), 70, 72, 73, 11, 80, 119, 131,

140, 153-156, 192

Estimating Tactical Situations and

Composing Orders, Fitch, 71

Europe, 82
342 INDEX

Evans, Frank Ev 133

Evans, Robley D., RAdm., 63

examinations, NWC, 285, 294

Executive Management Course, NWC,

333

Extension Course A, NWC, 82

Extension Education Dept., NWC, 332

Faculty, NWC, 31, 34, 71, 86, 171, 198,

226 (illus), 242, 246, 247, 253, 261, 267,

271, 272, 278, 282, 286, 293-295, 302,

305, 306, 310, 314-315, 317, 320,

321

Fairchild, Wm., 219 (illus)

Falkland Islands, 141

Fall River Line, 257

Far East, 60, 120

Farragut, David G., Adm., 49, 158

Fauntleroy, Archibald, 86

Federal Telegraph Co., 146

Felt, Harry D., Adm., 200

Field Orders, Messages, and Reports,

Swift, 71

field trips, NWC, 233, 280

Fiske, Bradley, RAdm., 55, 57, 61, 80-82, 85

Fiske, Clarence O., 265

Fitch, Roger S., 71

Flach, Carl G., 42, 101 (illus)

Fleet Commanders-in-Chief Conference,

335

Fleet Marine Force, 132, 146

fleet exercises, 27, 29, 319

fleet problems, 132, 144

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,

Tufts Univ., 242

Fore River Shipyard, 62

formulation of orders (applicatory

system), 74, 79, 119, 131

Formulation of Orders, Doctrine, and

Dissemination of Information, Todd,

155

Forrestal, James, SecNav., 191

Fort Adams, R.I., 27, 29, 112 (illus), 120,

195, 232, 244, 268

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1 29, 1 74, 196, 200

Fort Schuyler Maritime College, N.Y., 13

Foshay, William W., 261

Foundations of the Principles of the

Metaphysics of Words, Kant, 311

Founders Hall, NWC, 25-27, 278, 296

Foy, E.J., Cdre., 175

France, 52, 141, 231

Franco-Prussian War, 16

Fraser, Sir Bruce, Admiral of the Fleet,

330

Free World/Free World navies, 230

Freund, S.E., 219 (illus)

Fritzer, B., 42

"Fundamentals of Moral Obligation,"

Stockdale, 311

Fundamentals of warfare, 207

Fundamentals of Strategy, NWC cse., 253

Future Naval Tasks, NWC panel, 237

Gallipoli campaign, 141, 151

Gamble, Phillip, 219 (illus), 286

Gannon, H.T., 206

Gaboury, L.R., 228 (illus)

Gardners Island, N.Y., 20

General Board, Navy Dept., 1 12, 121, 144,

148, 149, 175

General Line School, Monterey, Cal., 329

General Line School, Newport, 181, 182,

196,201,238,329

General Orders, Navy Dept., drafts, 1 7, 8

1

82, 87, #48, 326, #70, 326, #89, 326, #98,

128, #325, 20, 93 (illus), #496, 129,

#544, 325

"General Plan for Postwar Education of

the Armed Forces," DeWitt, 1 80

general staff, 26, 43, 52, 58-60, 83, 84, 130

Geneva, 140

George Washington University, 206, 241-

244, 258, 267, 284, 289, 292, 315

Germany/German, 43, 56, 60, 72, 79, 80,

86, 148, 164-166

"German Official History of the World

War," 143

Gleaves, Albert, RAdm., 85

Global Strategy Discussions, NWC, 197,

239, 266, 330

Global War Game, NWC, 312

Goat Island, 2, 6, 18, 27, 29, 171

Gompers, Samuel, 327

Goodrich, Casper, RAdm., NWC

President, 17, 18, 20, 29, 30, 47, 49, 50,

52,90

grades, NWC, 284-286, 294

graduates, NWC, 150, 180, 260, 315

Graduation, NWC, 235, 276, 285, 303,

326-335

Graduate Record Examination, NWC,

244, 252

Grand Fleet, British, 326

"Grand March from Aida," Verdi, 283

Grant, U.S., Gen., 157
INDEX 343

Great Britain, 43, 47, 121, 126, 141, 164,

174,231,270

Great Lakes, 45

Great White Fleet, 61, 127

Greeley Relief Expedition, 20

"The Green Hornet," Kalbfus, 155, 159,

161, 180, 182

Griepenkerl, Otto von, 79

Guam, 46, 78

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 53, 60

GulfofSidra, 317

Hague Peace Conferences, 55

Haig, Alexander, General, Sec. State, 332

Hale, Eugene, Senator, 5, 62

Hall, John L., Adm., 165, 166

Hall, Robert A., 228 (illus)

Halsey, William R, Fit. Adm., 139, 146,

148, 193,327

Hamlet, H.G., VAdm., 55

Hamley, Edward B., 79

Hammersmith Farm, Newport, 238

Hampton Roads, Va., 16

Harding, Warren G., U.S. President, 122

Hardisty, Huntington, VAdm., NWC Presi- dent, 221 (illus), 299, 302, 304, 306

Haring, Charles H., 205

Harpoon, missile, 297

Harris, W.L., RAdm., 220 (illus), 283, 304

Harris, B., Congressman, 5

Harrison, Benjamin, U.S. President, 28

Hart, Albert B., 55

Hart, Thomas C, Adm., 1 26

Hartman, Charles C, RAdm./Hartman

Board, 194

Hartmann, Frederick H., 219 (illus), 228

(illus), 252, 281, 299,306,310

Harvard Business School, 276, 286

Harvard Law School, 41

Harvard University, 7, 41, 56, 157, 191,

192,205,241,242,252,277

Hattendorf, John, 290

Hawaii/Hawaiian Islands, 45, 47, 78, 144,

145, 173

Hay, Orville, 228 (illus)

Hayward, John T., VAdm., NWC President, 218 (illus), 246, 25 1-253, 255-263,

267, 286

Hayward, Thomas B., Adm., CNO, 224

(illus), 313, 315, 320

Heald, Henry T., 181

High Seas Fleet, German, 326

"Historical Analysis of the Organizational

Success of the Naval War College

during 25 years after the Second World

War," Smith, 208(fn)

history, naval, 41, 113

Heligoland, 86

Herbert, Hilary, SecNav., 25, 33, 34, 35,

38,46

Hewitt Hall, NWC, 268, 290, 296

Hewitt, Henry Kent, Adm., 327

Hicks, Frederick, 325

Hitler, Adolf (der Fiihrer), 165

Hobson, Richmond, Congressman, 83

Hocking, W.E., 157

Hoff, William B., 24

Hogg, James, 202

Holloway Board, 181, 193

Holloway, James L., Jr., Adm., 181, 206,

235

Holloway, James L. Ill, Adm., CNO, 297,

298,302,304,318,320

Holloway, Jerome, 306

Holmes, Ephriam P., Adm., 263

Honolulu, Hawaii, 139

Hood, John, RAdm., 83

Hooper, Edwin B., VAdm., 236

Hopper, Bruce, 165

House Naval Affairs Committee, 25, 27,

33, 82, 85

Hughes, Charles F., Adm., 131, 327

Hudson, Manley, 205

Hurlbert, J.L., 312

Ide, K., VAdm., IJN, 104 (illus), 128

Ignatius, Paul B., SecNav., 263

Illinois Institute of Technology, 1 8

1

Illustrated Newspaper, 100 (illus)

immigration policy, 1 25, 1 26

Indonesia, 271, 272

inductive reasoning, 40

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

(ICAF), Washington, D.C., 259

Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1

7

Influence of Sea Power upon History,

1660-1783, Mahan, 31, 98 (illus)

Influence of Sea Power upon the French

Revolution and Empire, 1 793- 1812,

Mahan, 33, 35

Information Service to Officers, NWC,

198

Inter-University Seminars on the Armed

Forces and Society, 198

Ingersoll, Royal R., RAdm., 55
344 INDEX

Ingersoll, Royal E., Admv 91, 142

Ingersoll, Stuart S., VAdm., NWC President, 181, 236, 237, 240, 261, 330, 331

Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,

203

Institute of Defense Analysis, Cambridge,

Mass., 237

Institute of Naval Studies (INS), 237

insurgency, NWC, 56

Intelligence Dept, NWC, 151, 187

Inter-American Defense Board, 261

Inter-American Naval Conference, 265

international law, NWC, 22, 30, 40, 41, 49,

55, 76,86, 114, 119, 137, 141, 157, 167,

204,207,253,307,320,321

"International Law Blue Books," 56, 205

International Park, NWC, 335

International Plaza, NWC, 334

International relations/affairs, 131, 148,

229, 241, 242, 253, 255, 280, 316

International Seapower Symposium, 333

J boats, America's Cup races, 152

Jackson, Henry, Senator, 263

Jacobs, Randall, VAdm., 163(fn), 169

James, Alexander, 1 50

James Forrestal Chair of Military

Management, NWC, 253

James, Mark, 297

James, William, 150

Jameson, James E., 55

Jamestown, R.I., 77

Jane's Fighting Ships, 6

1

Japan, 45, 47, 52, 60, 76, 79, 126, 128,

141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 164, 166, 190

Jeshuat Israel Synogogue, Newport, 1 1

7

Johns Hopkins University, 277, 293

Johnston, Edward S., 157-159

joint Army-Navy exercises, 43, 99 (illus)

Joint Board (Army-Navy), 60

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 180, 181, 241,

243, 256, 264, 269

joint operations, 46, 69, 129, 130, 141, 148

joint service colleges, 180, 257

Joint Staff, JCS, 309, 315

Johnson, Lyndon B., U.S. President, 250

Jomini, Henri, 72, 79, 202

Johns, John Paul, 158

Jones, William T., 205

Junior Course, NWC, 129, 147, 164, 171,

194

Jutland, Battle of, 126, 139, 141, 142, 144,

185

Kalbfus, Edward C, Adm., NWC President,

148, 150, 151, 155, 157-159, 166-171,

173, 174, 184, 190, 211 (illus), 263

Katzenbach, Edward L., 241, 246, 247

Kaufman, William M., 200

Keeler, Nelson, 228 (illus)

Keeley, John, 282

Kelsen, Hans, 205

Kemble, I.H., 205

Kendall, Henry S., VAdm., 165

Kennan, George F., Ambassador, 261

Kennedy, John F., U.S. President, 217

(illus), 238, 239

Kenyon, E.C., 287

Key, A.L., 62, 64

Kiel, Alfred, 277

Killham, E.D., 228 (illus)

Kimball, W.W., RAdm., 46, 47

Kimmel, Husband E., Adm., 142, 173

King, Ernest J., Fit. Adm., 1 10 (illus), 127,

139, 144-145, 175, 189

King, James E., 281, 293

King, J.W., 1, 3

Kirk, Alan G., Adm., 142

Kirkpatrick, C.C., RAdm., 239

Kissinger, Henry, Sec. State, 241

"Kittenball" league, NWC, 140

Kittredge, Tracy C, 1 17, 123

Knapp, H.S., VAdm., 70, 83, 1 15

Knight, Austin M., Adm., NWC President,

55,81,85,87, 107 (illus), 155

Knox, Dudley, 83, 88, 90, 91, 123, 128, 129

Knox-King-Pye Board, 128, 129, 134, 173,

175, 176

Knox, Frank, SecNav., 175

Korb, Lawrence, Ass't. SecDef., 307

Korean War, 199, 200, 260, 317

Kriegspiele, 29, 41

Laird, Melvin, SecDef., 272

Laning, Harris, Adm., NWC President,

140, 142-146, 155, 156, 181

Laske, Robert M., 198

Laswell, Harold, 203

Laughton, John Knox, 7, 1

8

The Law of the Sea, Janis, 297

Leach, Barton, 241

Leahy, William D., Fit. Adm., 168

LeBourgeois, Julian, VAdm., NWC

President, 221 (illus), 295, 298, 302,

303,305,315

Lehman, John, SecNav., 227 (illus)

Lenihan, Rita, 332
INDEX 345

Letters on Applied Tactics,

Griepenkerl, 71

Leyte Gulf, Battle of, 190

Librarian, NWC, 114, 117

library, NWC, 26, 49, 58, 90, 103-104

(illus), 121, 148-150, 168, 236, 244, 261,

263, 290, 296

Libya/Libyan, 317

Limited War Symposium, NWC, 227

Lindbergh, Charles, Brig. Gen., 132

Lingayen Gulf, Battle of, 189

The Lionheads, Bunting, 28

1

Lissitzyn, Oliver, 219 (illus)

Little, Louis McCarty, Maj. Gen., 55, 90

Little, William McCarty, 24, 26, 41, 45, 48,

55, 57, 70, 71, 75, 77, 91, 101 (illus)

114,237

Livermore, William R., 29

Lloyd, Richmond, 207

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Senator, 47, 5

1

"Logic and Its Process," Hocking, 157

"Logistical Planning for War," Carney, 198

logistics, NWC, 78-80, 82, 120, 184-186,

188, 196, 207, 235, 263, 312, 320

Logistics Course, NWC, 186, 188, 207

Logistics Dept., NWC, 131, 133, 134, 141,

151, 185

Logistics in the National Defense,

Eccles, 206

Logistics Library, NWC, 188, 189

Logistics Research Library, Bayonne, N.J., 188

London, England, 112, 113, 115, 116, 231

London, Lord Mayor of, 76

London, Naval Attache at, 29, 1 15, 128

London Naval Conference, 55

London Treaty, 327

Long Course, NWC, 74-76, 79, 81, 1 18,

147

Long, John D., SecNav., 47, 54, 58, 59

Long Island University, 208

Long Range Studies Project, 236

Louis, W.R., 297

Luce Hall, 29, 31, 32, 102 (illus), 149, 169,

174,200,268,283

Luce, Stephen B., RAdm., NWC President,

5, 1 1-19, 21,24, 27-30, 33, 45, 47, 51-53,

56, 57, 60, 64, 72-76, 79, 82, 90, 94

(illus), 113, 114, 137, 140, 149, 161, 196,

200, 263, 294, 297, 313, 320, 321

Luzon, 189

Lyman, Charles H. RAdm., 238

Maccauley, Thomas, 15

Macdonald, Peter, 219 (illus)

Mackey Radio and Telegraph Co., 146

Madison, Zachariah, 83

Magruder, Cary W., Cdre., 154, 155, 171

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, RAdm., NWC

President, 7, 20, 24-29, 31, 34, 35, 39, 46,

52, 54, 57, 60, 64, 76, 77, 79, 88, 90, 97,

(illus), 137, 149, 150, 160, 199, 202, 204,

283,293,294,313,320

Mahan Hall, 58, 105 (illus), 150, 173, 244,

266, 268, 288, 296

Mahoney, William, Mayor of Newport,

116

Mainbrace Operation, NATO, 231

Main Problem, NWC, 40, 45, 46, 49, 55

"Malta and Restricted Waters," NWC

study, 202

management, 1 14, 279, 286, 288, 304, 316,

320, 321

Management Course, NWC, 250

Manchuria, 78 maneuver board, "NWC, 144

Manila, 146

Manila Bay, Battle of, 58

Mays, Clarke, 219 (illus)

Marble, Frank, 72

Marianas, 144, 146

Marine aircraft/aviation, 132

Marine Barracks, Newport, 193

Marine Schools Act of 1874, 13

Marnane, J.F., 228 (illus)

Marshall Islands, 144-146

Maritime strategy, 314, 320

maritime Strategy Group, NWC, 237

Mason, George, 12, 34

Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

13, 253, 256, 277

master's degree program, NWC, 241, 246,

292,315,316

Matanzas, Cuba, 46

Mathas, C.C., 188

Maxwell Field/Air Force Base, Ala., 196

McAdoo, William, Ass't. SecNav., 33, 34,

40

McAshan, S.M., 261

McCain, John S., VAdm., 143

McCalla, Bowman, RAdm., 34, 41, 53, 54

McCandless, Byron, Cdre., 148

McCarty Little Chair of Gaming and

Research Techniques, NWC, 287

McCarty Little War Gaming Room, NWC,

333

McCauley, W.T., RAdm., 319
346 INDEX

McCormick, Adm., Lynde, NWC President, 230, 232, 330

McCormick, Robert, 328

McClure's Magazine, 6

1

McDonald, David L., Adm., CNO, 245

McDonald, J.K., 242, 281

McDowell, William, 129

McGill University, Montreal, 241

McGovern, William M., 205

McKean, Josiah S., Adm., 76, 91

McKinley, William S., U.S. President,

47

McLaughlin, A.C., 56

McNamara, Robert S. SecDef., 240, 245,

. 247, 250, 252, 255, 276

McNamee, Luke, Adm., NWC President,

90, 120, 146, 147, 149, 151

McQueston, J.E., 270

Meade, George G., General, 157

Meade, Richard, RAdm., 39

Mediterranean Sea, 231, 264, 316-317

Megargee, Richard, 281, 306

Melville, R.I., 195

Melson, Charles L., VAdm., NWC President, 127,243-245,250

"Memorandum on National Security

Policy," Stark, 166

Mendenhall, Thomas C, 203

Merrell, John P., RAdm., NWC President,

55,61,63,71

Metcalf, V.H. SecNav., 325

Mexico/Mexican, 61, 83, 86, 206

Mexico, Gulf of, 26, 45

Meyer, George von L., SecNav., 64, 74

Middendorf, William, SecNav., 219 (illus), 220 (illus), 224 (illus), 297

Middletown, R.I., 132, 195

Midway, Battle of, 196

military-civilian teaching team, NWC,

282

Military Education Coordinating Confer- ence (MECC), 241, 243

military history, 204, 321

military management, 255, 256

military-media complex, 240

Military Media Conference, NWC, 239,

331

Military Power in a Free Society, Eccles,

290

Miller, August, 219 (illus), 233

Miller, E.B., 148

Milton Miles Chair of International

Relations, NWC, 233

mines/mining operations, 79, 1 84

mission, 118, 119

mission, NWC, 81, 1 19, 150, 245, 296, 297

mission, U.S. Navy, 275

Mitscher, Marc, Adm., 23

1

mobilization, 47, 152, 167

Moffett, William A., RAdm., 55, 145

Monterey, Cal., 181, 182

Moody Board, 64, 84

Moody, William H. SecNav., 64

Moore, Charles J., RAdm., 159, 203

Moore, John Bassett, Ass't Sec. State, 56

Moorer, Thomas, Adm., CNO, 250, 260,

261,265,269,320

Moos, Felix, 286, 288

Morgiewicz, Daniel, 260

Morison, Samuel Eliot, RAdm., 178, 191,

192

Morris, Thomas, Ass't SecDef., 245, 257,

259

MTB Squadrons, Pacific Fleet, 189

Muller, Max, 1

5

Murphy, Mary V., 187

Murray, Robert J., UndSecNav., 224 (illus), 313,315

Murray, Williamson, 297

Myers, W.S., 151

Naar, Jacques, 286-288

Nantucket Lightship, 86

Narragansett Bay, 12, 21, 26-28, 32, 97

(illus), 1 16, 1 17, 132, 152, 168, 173, 195

National Advisory Board—World War I, 89

National Bicentennial, 334

National Defense University (NDU),

Washington, D.C., 334

National Military Establishment, 334

National War College, Washington, D.C.

181, 182, 200, 252, 259, 270, 276, 312

NATO Defense College, Paris France, 231

Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., 2, 5, 11,

21, 22, 23, 48, 5 1, 8 1, 1 13, 1 14, 1 22, 124,

149, 169, 195, 208, 240, 268, 271, 281,

315

Naval Academy Foundation, 268

naval administration, 83

Naval Air Station, Quonset Pt., R.I., 168,

171

naval aviation, 83, 165

Naval Base Band, 193, 283

Naval Base, Newport, 175, 199, 230, 244

Naval Base, Subic Bay, 309
INDEX 347

Naval Command Course/College (NCC),

216 (illus), 230-233, 235, 238, 240,

270, 272, 288, 308

Naval Commanders-in-Chief Conferences, 318

Naval Communications Station, Newport,

195

Naval District/Districts, 82, 85, 90, 167,

168,262

Naval Education and Training Center,

Newport, 334-336

Naval Education and Training Command,

272

Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator,

(NEWS) NWC, 214-215 (illus), 237,

238, 244

Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and

Mediterranean, C-in-C (CINCNELM),

200, 201

Naval Forces, Europe, 90, 130

Naval Fuel Depot, Melville, 109, 171

Naval Historical Collection, NWC, 280,

290

naval history, 306, 321

Naval History Division, Navy Dept.,

191

Naval Hospital, Newport, 109, 195

Naval Intelligence, Office of (ONI), Navy

Dept., 2, 7, 8, 43, 45, 46, 50, 58, 59, 189

Naval Long Range Studies Project, NWC,

331

The Naval Magazine, 5 Naval Manual of Operational Planning,

NWC, 193

Naval Net Depot, Melville, 168

Naval Operational Planning Manual

(NWP-11), NWC, 193

Naval Operating Base, Newport, 168

Naval Operations Dept., NWC, 307, 317

"Navops," messages, 269

Naval Postgraduate School, Annapolis,

Md., 74, 81, 128

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,

Cal., 292, 304, 315, 317

Naval Records, Office of, Navy Dept., 2, 49

Naval Research Advisory Committee, 236

Naval Reserve/Reservists, 90, 167, 292,

327

Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps

(NROTC), 186

Naval Schools Command, Newport, 195

Naval Staff Course/College, NWC, 220

(illus), 271, 272, 289, 308

Naval Station, Newport, 39, 71, 85, 195,

244

Naval Strategy, Mahan, 57

Naval Supply Depot, Newport, 195

Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, 2, 6, 1 8, 30, 34, 39, 51, 98-99 (illus), 138, 169,

171, 195

Naval Training Station, Newport, 2, 1 2, 25, 31, 32, 38, 47, 48, 50, 99 (illus), 102

(illus), 138, 140, 168, 171, 177

Naval War College, Command/Support

Activity, 20, 50, 64, 84, 261, 328

Naval War College Development Plan,

292

Naval War College Foundation, 2 1 9 (illus), 264, 268, 269, 333

Naval War College Museum, 223 (illus), 296, 330, 335

Naval War College Press, 290, 314

Naval War College Review, 197, 198, 239,

291,297,298,330

Naval War Gaming System (NWGS),

NWC, 336

naval warfare, 74, 118, 154, 252, 254, 256,

259,270,271

Naval Warfare Course/College, NWC,

228, 245, 280, 281, 204, 304, 305, 307,

308,317

Naval Warfare 1, NWC, 206, 232, 233

Naval Warfare 2, 206, 232, 234

Naval War of 1812, Roosevelt, 28, 34

Navies, comparative strengths, 1884, 1 Navy Acts, 30, 32

Navy Cross, 122

Navy Department, 2, 7, 26, 34, 43, 46, 57,

62, 74, 82, 84, 87, 113, 118, 122-124,

147, 148, 176, 179, 186, 191, 193, 229,

234, 243, 244, 250, 251, 258, 260, 263,

288,297,304,308,312,313

Navy Electronics Laboratory (NEL), San

Diego, Cal., 237

Navy-Marine Corps landing force, 133

Navy-Marine Corps team, 314

Navy Net Assessment Group, 275

"Navy Outer Air Battle," wargame

scenario, NWC, 318

Navy Register, 137, 147, 170, 257

Navy Training Devices Center (NTDC),

237

Needham, Brian, 287

Nelson, Horatio, Adm., 49, 158

Neussle, Francis E., RAdm., 332

Newberry, Truman, SecNav., 62
348 INDEX

New England, 45, 131, 133

Newfoundland, 86

New Guinea, 145

"New Left", 254

New London, Conn., 14

Newport Artillery Co., 221 (illus)

Newport Casino, 172, 173

Newport Daily News, 152

Newport Mercury, 8

Newport Reading Room, 138

Newport, R.I., 2, 12, 19, 21, 33, 53, 57, 60,

70, 71, 76, 82, 84, 88, 89, 1 13, 1 15, 125,

128, 130, 138, 146, 147, 151, 173, 192,

194, 196, 197, 233, 236, 240, 251, 252,

258, 263, 264, 266, 270, 276, 280, 292,

303,315-316,321

"New Right", 254

New York Maritime College, 13

New York Naval Lyceum, 5 New York Naval Shipyard, 1 86

New York, N.Y., 19, 31, 43, 85, 1 15, 131,

261

New York Public Library, 23

New York Stock Exchange, 233, 234

New York Times, 34, 52, 122

New York Yankees, 251

New Zealand, 127

Nicholson, R.F., RAdm., 75

Nicolosi, Anthony, 290, 296, 332

Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle, 31

1

Nimitz, Chester W., Fit. Adm., 1 1 1 (illus), 125, 126, 166, 167, 183, 186, 189, 216

(illus), 240, 241, 320

Nimitz, Mrs. Catherine, 139

Nitze, Paul, SecNav., 250

Nixon Doctrine, 264

Nixon, Richard, U.S. President, 271, 272,

333

Norfolk, Va., 196,264

North American Review, 31

North Atlantic Squadron, 19, 23, 26, 50, 99

(illus)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

NATO, 200, 231, 232, 240, 295, 315

North Korea, 200

North Vietnam/Vietnamese, 309

Northwestern University, 175

Norwegian Sea, 297

Nott, Hugh, 277, 283, 312

nuclear operations, 235, 287

nuclear power, 259

nuclear powered task force, 251

nuclear warfare, 1 84

nuclear weapons, 319

Ocean Drive, Newport, 138, 172

oceanography, 254

Odenhall, C.J., 202

Officer Candidate School (OCS), Newport,

R.I., 333

Officers' Club, Newport, R.I., 1 72, 1 73, 286

Office of Price Administration (OPA), 172

Offley, Edward M., 148

Okinawa, 189

Oldendorf, Jesse B., Adm., 142, 189

On Liberty and Utilitarinnism, Mill, 3 1

1

On Watch, A Memoir, Zumwalt, 274(fn)

Open Door Policy, 77

operations research, NWC, 256

Office of Naval Operations (Opnav), 43,

83,84,90, 112, 130, 168,318

operations, NWC, 141

The Operational Function of Command

Including Sound Military Decision,

Pye, 160

Operational Naval Logistics, Eccles, 188

operational planning, 196, 307

Operations Problem IV, NWC, 144, 145

Orient, 142

Osgood, Robert E., 205, 277

"Our Future Navy," Luce, 31

Owenby, W.M., 174

Oxford University, 242, 276, 278, 279, 283,

290, 293

Oyster Bay, N.Y., 63

Pacific Fleet, U.S., 173, 183, 231, 240

Pacific/Pacific Ocean Area, 43, 58, 60, 76,

78,82, 127, 141, 146, 154,232

Pall Mall Gazette, 3

Panama/Panama Canal, 5, 26, 131

Paraguay, 266

Paris, France, 80, 231

Parker, Foxhall, Cdre., 5 Parker, James F., Cdre., 90, 326

Pastore, John, Senator, 268

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 129, 173

Peconic Bay, 43

The Peloponnesion War, Thucydides,

279, 284, 285

Pennsylvania State University, 317

Pensacola, Fla., 272

Permanent Court of International Justice,

the Hague, 56

Pershing, John J., General of the Armies,

327
INDEX 349

personnel research, NWC, 182

Perry, Oliver Hazard, Cdre., 22

Peru, 266

Petain, Henri, Marshal of France,

327

Pettyjohn, William R., 298

phased input classes, NWC, 336

Phelan, George, RAdm., 202

Philippines/Philippine Islands, 46, 54, 78,

144-146,309

Philips, Thomas, 277

physical improvements, NWC, 149

Pickert, A.L., 260

planning methodology/process, 1 19, 254,

260

Plans Division, Opnav, Navy Dept., 231,

232

Platte, William K, 299

Point Judith, R.I., 171

Poland, 165

Policy Advisory Board for Service College

Education, 304, 318

policy, NWC, 82, 1 14, 128, 240, 280, 281,

303,305,310

Policy Planning Group, State Dept., 264

political science, NWC, 1 14, 202, 241, 254,

260

"Politico-Military Aspects of the European

War," Fauntleroy, 86

"Pomp and Circumstance" (march), Elgar,

283

Poole, Peter, 242

portraits, NWC, 150, 213 (illus)

Portsmouth, R.I., 1 95

Post Command Course, NWC, 318,

336

postwar educational policy, 171

Potomac campaign, 157

Potomac River Naval Command, 236

Powell, Halsey, 91

Powell, Stanley, 261

Pratt, William Veazie, Adm., CNO, NWC

President, 71, 88, 91, 130, 131, 133, 134,

137, 138, 141, 155, 185, 200, 320

Precommissioning Training Center,

Newport, 171

Preparatory Staff Course, NWC, 167, 170

President's Hour, NWC, 209, 240

president, Naval War College (also see individual presidents), 20, 111, 113,

114, 116, 137, 138, 149, 151, 153, 168,

188, 196, 229, 230, 240, 261, 271, 272,

295,303,305,312

President's House/Quarters, NWC, 48, 57,

107 (illus), 117, 138,238

Price, H.B., 86

Princeton University, 203, 261

Pringle Hall, NWC, 1 10 (illus), 150-152,

196, 206, 230, 237, 268, 283, 308

Pringle, Joel R.P., VAdm., NWC President,

118, 138, 141, 149, 155, 158,327

prisoner of war (POW), 309

problem solving, 119

Professional Education Center, NWC, 262

program planning system, DOD, 256

Program Objective Memorandum (POM),

319

Program Resource Appraisal Division,

Opnav, 319

Project 2000, Opnav, 276

propaganda, pro-U.S., 240

Providence, R.I., 116

Providence College, 315

Prussia/Prussian Army, 43, 56, 247

public relations, 182

Puerto Rico, 54

Puget Sound, 31

Puleston, William D., 85, 91

Punic Wars, 306

Pye Board, 1944, 175-177, 181, 193, 194,

206

Pye, William S., VAdm., NWC President,

90, 128, 148, 160, 173, 174, 183, 192,

196

Quantico, Va., 132

quarters, NWC staff, 32, 48

quarters, NWC students, 138, 139, 264,

268

The Quiet Warrior, Buell, 208

Quinn, Jack, 220 (illus), 289

Quogue, Long Island, N.Y., 57

Ramsey, F.M., RAdm., 1 8, 25, 30, 33, 34, 45,

46,49

Raytheon Corporation, 277

Reading list, NWC, 125, 294

Reed, Walter, 133

Reeves, Joseph M., Adm., 132, 152

Reflections and Reminiscences,

Bismarck, 79

Reitzel, William, 205

Research Dept., NWC, 143

Research and Analysis Dept., NWC, 201,

205, 206, 238

research and development, 258
350 INDEX

Reserve Officer Course, NWC, 329

Reuterdall, Henry, 61, 62

Rhinelander, Philip, 310

Rhode Island, 33, 115, 268, 294

Rhode Island Congressional delegation,

48

Rhode Island Naval Militia, 42

Rhodes, Herbert N., 296

Rhodes Scholar, 276, 278, 281

Richardson, J.O., Adm., 1 80

Ricketts, Claude, Adm., 196

Rivero, Horacio, Adm., 256

Robbins, Thomas H., RAdm., NWC President, 229, 230, 234-236

Roberts, John M., 219 (illus), 253

Robertson, Ashley H., VAdm., 1 1

7

Robinson, Keith, 309

Rodgers, Raymond P., RAdm., NWC President, 65, 71, 75, 76, 155

Rodgers, William L., Adm., NWC President, 70-72, 80, 81, 87, 155

Rodman, Hugh, Adm., 55

Rogers, Charles C, RAdm., 26

Rogers, Warren F., 286

Roll, George A., 202

Rome, 80

Roosevelt, Franklin D., U.S. President,

151, 152, 166, 191

Roosevelt, Theodore, U.S. President, 28,

45, 47, 49-51, 61, 63, 76, 103 (illus), 104

(illus), 151

Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr., Ass't SecNav.,

129

Root, Franklin, 253

Rose, Hans, 85

Ross, Stephen, 306

Round Table Talks, NWC, 196, 197, 266

Rough Rider, 5

1

Rowan, Stephan C, 145

Rowen, Henry S., 26

1

Royal Navy, 80, 164, 187, 270

Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 18, 287

Ruger, William B., 219 (illus)

Rusk, Dean, Sec. State, 332

Ruskin, John, 316

Russell, James H., Adm., 187

Russell, John H., Maj. Gen., Comdt,

USMC, 71

Russia/Russian Navy, 45, 52

Russo-Japanese War, 60

St. George's School, Middletown, R.I., 140,

172

Sakonnet, R.I., 171

salaries, NWC, 294

SALT and Naval Force Capabilities, Burt,

297

SALT Talks, 240

Salve Regina College, Newport, R.I., 315,

316

Sampson, William T., RAdm., 17, 18, 46,

52, 53, 82

Santiago, Battle of, 54

Sapin, Burton M., 280

Sargent, Clyde, 219 (illus), 247

Sarro, Tony, 218

Savo Island, Battle of, 190

Scammell, J.M., 118

Schlesinger, James R., SecDef., 305

Schley, Winfield S., RAdm., 25, 54

Schofield, Frank K, Adm., 90

School of Public and International Affairs,

George Washington University, 280

Schratz, Paul R., 249(fn)

Schwass, Earl, 219 (illus), 228 (illus), 290

scout cruisers, 120

Scouting Fleet/Scouting Force, 127, 131,

138

Seabee Center, Davisville, R.I., 171

Second Fleet, 271, 295

Secretary, NWC, 90

Secretary of the Navy (see also individual

secretaries), 21, 22, 27, 33, 44, 45, 47,

48, 53, 55, 60, 65, 76, 77, 1 13, 1 15, 127,

128, 168, 170, 181, 186, 236, 251, 261-

263,266,276,296,313,320

Secretary of the Navy Board on Education

and Training, 335

Self, David, 317

Semmes, Benedict J., VAdm., NWC President, 218 (illus), 244, 245, 258, 270,

272, 279, 283

Senate Appropriations Committee, 27

Senate Naval Affairs Committee, 5, 62,

122, 123,326

Senior Course/Class, NWC, 129, 167, 170,

171, 182, 186, 189, 196,202,318

Senior Officer Present (SOP), 138, 168, 195,

221, 230

service colleges, 285, 292, 302, 304, 321

Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, 195

Service, James E., RAdm., NWC President,

227 (illus), 228 (illus), 316, 317

Seventh Fleet, 192,309

Shafroth, John F., VAdm., 144

Shephard, E.M., RAdm., 55
INDEX 351

Sherman, Forrest P., Adm., CNO, 199, 201,

203, 233

Sherman, William T., Gen., 1

5

Shetland Islands, 86

Shippensberg State College, Pa., 317

Ships, (All United States Navy-U.S.S.—

unless noted otherwise)

Akron (dirigible), 145

Birmingham (scout cruiser), 85, 108

(illus)

Boston (missile cruiser), 264

Britannia, H.M.S. (Royal Yacht), 334

Brooklyn (armored cruiser), 32

Chicago (protected cruiser), 29, 34

Conste2Idtion(sailing frigate), 105

(illus), 125, 192

D-2 (submarine), 85

Deleware (battleship), 62, 63

Dolphin (despatch vessel), 34

Endeavor (J-class racing sloop-British),

152

Enterprise (nuclear attack carrier), 25

1

F-l (submarine), 87

Florida (battleship), 62

Galena (wooden steamer), 26

Georgia (battleship), 72

Hist (patrol vessel), 105 (illus)

Independence (aircraft carrier), 317

Indiana (battleship), 53

Iowa (battleship), 32

Joseph P. Kennedy (destroyer), 239

Langley (aircraft carrier), 132

Lancaster (steam sloop of war), 53

Marblehead (unarmored cruiser), 53

Massachusetts (battleship), 53

Mauretania (Cunard Liner), 116

Mayflower (converted yacht), 63

Melville (destroyer tender), 85, 86

Merrimac (collier), 54

Michigan (battleship), 62

Minneapolis (heavy cruiser), 189

Minnesota (sail training ship), 13

Minnesota (battleship), 76

Nantucket (monitor), 11, 13

New Hampshire (training ship), 18, 48,

99, (illus)

New Orleans (protected cruiser), 52

New York (armored cruiser), 53

North Dakota (battleship), 62, 63

Nourmahal (private yacht), 152

Pennsylvania (battleship), 128

Sacramento (replenishment ship), 317

St. Louis (auxiliary cruiser), 50

Salem (scout cruiser), 62

Sampson (destroyer), 116

Schofield (guided missile frigate), 277

South Carolina (battleship), 62

Tennessee (steam frigate), 2, 20, 24

Texas (battleship), 53

Thresher (nuclear submarine), 240

Ticonderoga (steam sloop), 4

17-53 (German submarine), 85, 108

(illus)

Utah (battleship), 62

Washington (battleship), 186

Yellowstone (destroyer tender), 195

Shirkey, Charles, 286

Shore Establishment, 168

Sicard, Montgomery, RAdm., 2

Sikes, Robert, Congressman, 263

Simpson, B. Mitchell, 282, 290

"Military Character," Sims, 86

Sims, William S., Adm., NWC President,

61, 63, 76, 11, 86, 88, 90, 109 (illus), 112-

119, 121-125, 129, 131, 137, 138, 140,

143, 147, 153-155, 168, 169, 196, 200,

283, 294, 320

Simsadus, 124

Sims-Daniels controversy, 122-123

Sims, Mrs. William S., 117

Sims Hall, 186, 212, 214-215, 225 (illus), 233,237,244,251,262

Sixth Fleet, 264, 276, 316, 317

Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.,

Cambridge, mass., 253, 256

Smith, Allen, E., VAdm., NWC President,

193, 197, 199

Smith, Holland M., General, 128

Smith, Joseph, RAdm., 5

Smith, Napier V., 208(fn)

Snow, Freeman, 41, 51, 55, 56

Snyder, Charles P., Adm., NWC President,

150, 159

Snyder, F.B., 175

social psychologists, 262

"Socratic dialogues," Plato, 311

Solzhenitsyn, 311

Soley, James R., Ass't SecNav., 7, 8, 1 8, 20,

22, 24, 30, 49, 100 (illus)

"Song of the Bilgers," Cabaret at NWC, 207

Sound Military Decision, Kalbfus, 155,

159, 161, 190, 192 (see also "Green

Hornet")

South America, 61, 238

South Korea, 200

Soviet Russia, 231, 240, 254, 275, 297
352 INDEX

Spain, 45

Spanagel, H.A., RAdmv1 82

Spanish-American War, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53,

56,58,64,88, 166

Special Academic Advisor, NWC, 252, 282

Special Plotting Course, NWC, 329

Special Projects Dept., NWC, 189

Spencer, Herbert, 14

Sperry, Charles S., RAdm., NWC President,

55

Spouting Rock Beach, Newport, R.I., 138

Sprague, Thomas L., Adm., 194, 198

Sprout, Harold, 203

Spruance Hall, NWC, 222 (illus), 263, 268,

290

Spruance, Raymond A., Adm., NWC President, 111 (illus), 142, 158, 159, 169,

177, 183-186, 192, 193, 197, 198, 200,

212 (illus), 235, 262, 283, 320

Spruance, Mr. Margaret, 1 93

Squadron of Evolution, 27

staff corps specialists, 133

Staff, NWC, 31, 32, 46, 55, 112-1 14, 139,

148, 149, 179, 183, 195, 286, 310, 320

staff organization, 196

staff solution, NWC, 120

Standley, William H., Adm., CNO, 147,

149

Stanford University, 242, 309, 311

Stapler, John T.G., 120

Stark, Harold R., Adm., CNO, 125, 166

State Department, 154, 167, 256, 264, 306

State, War, and Navy Building, Washington, D.C., 8, 59

steam launch exercises, NWC, 40

Steering Group, NWC, 261

Steinwachs, F.S., 1 74

Stephen B. Luce Chair of Naval Science,

NWC, 253

Stetson, Thomas H., 237

Stirling, Yates, RAdm., 77

Stockdale, James B., VAdm., NWC President, 224 (illus), 309-312

Stockdale, Mrs. Sybil, 309

Stockton, Charles H., RAdm., NWC President, 31, 34, 41, 50, 52, 53, 55, 90

Stout, Hiram, 242

Straits of Magellan, 61

Strategic Air Command, U.S. Air Force,

251

strategic bombing, 145

Strategic Studies Group (SSG), NWC, 224

(illus), 314, 319

"Strategies Open to Russia," NWC study,

202

Strategy Department/Course, NWC, 77,

78, 80, 82, 84, 89, 113, 115, 118, 120,

130, 131, 141, 143, 165, 167, 184, 185,

188, 202, 207, 229, 236, 247, 252, 255,

260, 267, 279-281, 285, 286, 289, 294,

303,305,306,312,319

Strategy & Logistics Class, NWC, 206

Strategy & Seapower Class, NWC, 201,

205, 206, 230, 235,

Striking Fleet, Atlantic (NATO), 271

Strohbehn, W.W., 205

students, NWC, 24, 28, 29, 32, 41, 53, 54,

74, 79, 104 (illus), 116, 117, 137, 138,

171, 174, 176, 179, 183, 189, 199, 207,

240, 244, 246, 248, 251, 257, 272, 278,

292, 302, 303

student athletics, NWC, 140

student sponsor, NWC staff, 309

student solutions, NWC problems, 1 19

student theses, NWC, 80, 82, 120, 125,

126, 142, 187

"The Study of the Science and Art of War

in Relation to the Safeguarding of the

Nation's Future," Kalbfus, 1 69

Sturtevant, Mrs. Barbara, 219 (illus)

submarines/submarine operations, 87,

120, 143, 165, 185, 230, 247, 275

"Submarines and Submarine Operations,"

Stapler, 120

subspecialists, U.S. Navy, 242

Summer Conference, NWC, 62, 71, 77, 80

Sweden/Royal Swedish Navy, 42, 324

tactical symposia, NWC, 308

tactical thinking, 54, 56

Tactics Department/Course, NWC, 77,

79, 82, 113-115, 117-121, 126, 130, 141,

143, 152, 167, 182, 185, 186, 247, 276,

279,280,286,289,307,312

Taft, William Howard, U.S. President, 64

Tahler, G., RAdm., 333

Task Force One, 1 73

Task Force, 58, 231

Tauber, Maurice E., 26

1

Taussig, VAdm., J.K., 118, 123, 147

Taylor, Henry C, RAdm., NWC President,

38, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 58, 60, 90,

102 (illus), 320

Teller, Edward, 261

term papers, NWC, 294, 295

terrorism, 319
INDEX 353

Theobald, R.A., RAdm., 158

Theobald, R.A., Jr., 202

Theodore Roosevelt Chair of Economics,

253

Theories Strategiques, Castex, 143

think-tank, 319

Third World, 271

three course plan, NWC, 80

Thucydides, 279, 284

Todd, Forde A., RAdm., 156-158

Torpedo School, Goat Island, 1 8, 27-30, 32,

132, 140

total force week, NWC, 307

Tracy, Benjamin, SecNav., 30, 31, 33,

320

Train, Charles R., RAdm., 145

Training Squadron, 18, 19, 152

Trinity Church, Newport, 1 1

7

"Trinity" College, NWC, 20

Tu, H.K., Adm., Chinese Navy, 327

Tufts University, Medford, Mass., 242

Turcotte, William E., 228 (illus), 306

Turner, Frederick, J., 55

Turner, Richmond K., Adm., 158, 283

Turner, Stansfield, Adm., NWC President,

220 (illus), 272, 276-295, 320

Turpin, Walter S., 72

Twining, Nathan C, RAdm., 91

two ocean navy, 328

two ocean war, 166

two year course, NWC, 74, 148, 200, 207,

234

U Boat Fleet, 86

Ugglas, Gosta, 42, 101 (illus)

Ulman, Neil, 256

Understanding the Soviet Navy,

Bathurst, 290

unification of the armed forces, 1 80, 205

United Nations, 256

United Service Magazine, 21

U.S. Air Force, 197, 242, 251, 259

The U.S. and the Decolonization of the

British Empire, Louis, 297

U.S. Armed Forces/Services, 234

U.S. Army, 16, 51, 60, 70, 80, 122, 131, 167,

242, 259

U.S. Coast Guard/Revenue Cutter Service,

42,54,55, 167

U.S. Fleet, 45, 112, 145, 146, 152, 160

U.S. Marine Corps, 54, 55, 194, 259, 297

U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines, 309

U.S. Naval Institute, 5, 6, 17

U.S. Naval Institute, Newport Chapter,

17

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (USINP),

6,7,31,89, 128,260

U.S. Navy, 1, 3, 4

U.S. Strike Command, 256

U.S. Senate, 21

University of California, 26

1

University of Indiana, 157

University of Nebraska, 277

University of Rhode Island, 254, 290, 315

Unsworth, Noel, 287

Upham, Frank B., Adm., 149

Upton, Emory, Brig. Gen., 16

Vlahos, Michael, 177(fn)

Van Auken, Wilbur K., 143

Van Keuren, Alexander H., 133

Venezuela/Venezuelan crisis, 60, 266

Vernou, Walter N., VAdm., 148

Veterans Administration, 316

Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO),

230, 237, 252, 256, 261

Vietnam/Vietnam War, 244, 256, 258,

269,275,281,285,306,317

Victoria Station, London, 1 13

Victory Bond Drive, 117

Vinson-Trammell Act, 328

Virginus affair, 4

Vinton, Frederic Porter, 57

Vogelgesang, Carl T., RAdm., 72, 77, 133

Von Moltke, General, 56, 79

Von Neumann, John, 203

Wadleigh, John R., RAdm., 219 (illus)

Wainwright, Richard, RAdm., 20, 46, 64

Wake Island, 173

Walker, Asa, RAdm., 55

Walker, John C, RAdm., 2, 30, 34

Walker, M.C., 287

Wall Street Journal, 256 war correspondents' center, 132

Ward, John W., 291

warfare, six elements of, Pratt, 130 war gaming, NWC, 24, 26, 29, 40, 41, 49,

56, 69, 72, 73, 80, 90, 101 (illus), 106

(illus), 110 (illus), 120, 121, 141, 144,

146, 150, 154, 188, 196, 213 (illus), 227,

238, 244, 263, 264, 287, 307, 312, 314,

316-319

War Gaming Center, NWC, 314-315

War Industries Board, World War I, 197

war, principles of, 158
354 INDEX

Warner, John, SecNav., 272

War of the Pacific, Chile-Peru, 5 war planning/plans, 43, 59, 60, 64, 65,

116, 124, 130

War Planning, NWC Color Code

Black—Germany, 60, 78, 79

Blue—United States, 40, 78, 79, 127,

128, 144, 145, 164

Crimson—Canada, 164

Red—Great Britain, 40, 127, 164

Orange—Japan, 60, 78, 121, 129, 141,

144, 145 war preparations, 81, 82, 124

"War Schools," Luce, 1

7

war problem, 40

Warships—Navies of the World, King, 3, 9

Washington, D.C, 19, 25, 29, 47, 52, 54, 58,

65, 76, 89, 116, 119, 127, 131, 186, 187,

197, 233, 236, 241, 242, 252, 257, 263,

268,276,313,318

Washington Gun Factory, 58

Washington Post, 1 23

Washington Square/Eisenhower Square,

Newport, 1 1 7, 335

Washington Treaty of Naval Limitations,

141

Watch Hill, R.I., 132

Watkins, James D., Adm., CNO, 228 (illus), 298,299,303,316-320

Watson, J.P., 228 (illus)

Watts, Robert B., 228 (illus)

weapons systems, 256, 287

weather, 187

Welch, Edward F., RAdm., NWC President,

219 (illus), 224 (illus), 312, 314, 315,

317

Weschler, Thomas, VAdm., 295, 307

West, Francis, J., 286, 312

West Coast, 166

Western Europe, 105

West Indies, 131

Wharton School of Finance, Philadelphia,

Pa., 253

Wheeler, Earle, Gen., Chairman, JCS, 332

"whiz kids," 255

White House/White House Executive

Offices, 151,238,239,250

Whitney, William C, SecNav., 2, 22, 28, 30

Whitthorne, Washington C, Congressman, 5

Wilbur, Curtis, SecNav., 128, 137, 138, 147

Wilcox, John W., RAdm., 159

Wiley, Edwin, 117

Wihelmshaven, 86

Wilkinson, Spenser, 79

Williams, Charles S., RAdm., 283, 302

Williams, Clarence S., RAdm., NWC President, 117, 125, 129, 140, 155

Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.,

181

Williams, Robert D., 277, 286

Williamsburg, Va., 188

Wilson, George Grafton, 56, 77, 86, 103

(illus), 118

Wilson, Henry B., Adm., 41

Wilson, Woodrow, U.S. President, 83, 1 12,

134

Wood, Robert S., 228 (illus), 306, 319

Woodson, Walter B., 271

Woolsey, James R., Under SecNav., 224

(illus)

World War 1, 68, 82, 89, 114, 122, 133, 141,

143, 149, 160

World War II, 130, 137, 139, 161, 170, 179,

184, 185, 189, 193, 230, 235, 237, 244,

248, 260, 268, 283, 285, 306, 321

World War II Battle Evaluation Group,

NWC, 184, 185, 189

Wouk, Herman, 290, 291

Writings of Stephen B. Luce, Hattendorf

& Hayes, 290

Wriston, Henry, 206

Wylie, J.C., RAdm., 201, 202, 204

Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 203,

Yamamoto, Isoruku, Adm., IJN, 109

(illus), 128

Yarnell, Harry E., Adm., 90, 91

Yates, W.K., 287

Yorktown Sesquicentennial, 327

Zannetos, Z.S., 253

Z-Grams, 269, 270

Zumwalt, Elmo, Adm., CNO, 265, 269-271,

275-277, 293, 320

&U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1984—702-122/2801


This is not such a book. It is the

history of an institution, to be

sure, in its first hundred years.

But it is told with the controversies and arguments left in.

Those differences of opinion and

preference are about real issues

some of them never settled. The

issues arose repeatedly because

an institution like the Naval War

College, in providing an appropriate professional military education, has to cope with enormous demands on a limited

amount of student time. This

history tells how the Navy made

these difficult choices over ten

decades.

The history of the College is

also necessarily the history of

the Navy which gave it birth,

sometimes left it to its own

devices, and sometimes not. This

book deliberately and carefully

traces these connected developments at critical points in the

evolution of the U.S. Naval War

College.

The book is arranged chronologically, in twelve chapters and

is illustrated with 67 photographs showing significant

events and changes between 6

October 1884 and the present.
John B. Hattendorf

John B. Hattendorf is the Professor of Naval History at the Naval War College.

Educated at Kenyon College, he served nearly eight years on active duty as a naval officer. Assigned to sea duty on board destroyers in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, he served

ashore as Assistant Head of the Ships' Histories and Research Sections, Naval Historical

Center, Washington, D.C., and on the faculty of the Naval War College.

After obtaining his doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford,

England, he returned to the civilian faculty of the Naval War College to teach in the

Strategy Department. In 1 98 1 -83, he was Visiting Professor of Military and Naval History

in the National University of Singapore. Hattendorf is the author of several books and

articles on naval history, specializing in the history of strategic thought.

B. Mitchell Simpson

B. Mitchell Simpson, III is a practicing lawyer in Newport, Rhode Island. After

graduation from Colgate University, he earned his law degree at the University of

Pennsylvania before embarking on a naval career. He served extensively with the

Amphibious Force, in an aircraft carrier, and in destroyers. While on active duty, he

attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, where he obtained

his Masters Degree and Doctorate in Diplomatic History.

After serving in U.S.S. Perry (DD 844), he was assigned to the Naval War College where

he taught International Relations, Strategy, and Naval History. He was editor of the

Naval War College Review. He is the editor of War, Strategy and Maritime Power and of

Herbert Rosinski's The Evolution of Naval Thought. He is writing a biography of Admiral

Harold R. Stark.

John R. Wadleigh

John Wadleigh, son of a Marine officer, and grandson of two admirals, grew up in

Newport in the Sims-Laning period of the War College. Graduating from St. George's

School in 1 933, he received his Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy

in 1937. During World War II he survived the sinking of carrier Yorktown (CV5) at Midway and saw action in Pacific fleet cruisers from the Solomons to western Pacific.

Postwar service afloat was in destroyers ancheruisers with assignments in naval

communications ashore. Selected for Rear Admiral irvJ965 he served as Director of

Operations, Defense Communications Agency, commanded/Cruiser-Destroyer Flotillas

4 and 12, and retired from active duty in 1^71 as Commander, Training Command,

Atlantic Fleet. His writings in naval history have appeared in the Proceedings and other

professional journals. . ._