The Future of

NATO’s Tactical Air Doctrine

BY

LINDA E. TORRENS

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF

ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF

GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 1996
ii

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author.

They do not reflect the official position of the US government, Department of Defense,

the United States Air Force, or Air University.
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................ ii

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1

The Goal: Stability And The Spread Of Democracy....................................................2

Airpower Doctrine And Why It Should Be Kept Current.............................................5

Preview And Methodology..........................................................................................6

ISSUE BACKGROUND.................................................................................................8

The NATO Air Doctrine Process ................................................................................8

Out–Of–Area Operations .......................................................................................... 11

The PFP And NATO Enlargement ............................................................................ 13

OUT OF AREA IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S AIR DOCTRINE ............................. 25

Potential Areas For Doctrinal Revision...................................................................... 28

Conclusion................................................................................................................ 44

ENLARGEMENT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S AIRPOWER............... 49

Immediate Considerations For PFP Integration.......................................................... 50

The Cold War Military Legacy.................................................................................. 51

Training And Equipment ........................................................................................... 53

The Cold War Deployment Of Assets........................................................................ 54

Suggested Solutions.................................................................................................. 55

Long Term Implications For PFP Integration ............................................................ 57

Conclusion................................................................................................................ 64

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS............................................................................... 67

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 70
iv

Abstract

This study analyzes the need for changes to NATO airpower doctrine to reflect

current Post–Cold War realities. NATO air doctrine does not yet reflect the actuality of

today’s operations, nor does it anticipate the probable future employment of NATO’s

airpower. Out–of–area operations and PFP participation in NATO operations will have

profound effects on combined doctrine, training, organizational structures, exercises and

employment of forces. NATO’s tactical doctrine revision process served the alliance well

during the Cold War. But today, the international environment has drastically changed:

both the nature of the threat and the use of NATO airpower during conflict have changed.

The current doctrinal revision process has proven too slow and cumbersome to provide

adequate direction for air strategists during ongoing operations. There are many new

doctrinal areas that must be thoroughly addressed so that NATO can chart a course for

the future that in the end provides the best, most effective mix of forces.
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

The unexpected end of the Cold War presented both challenges and opportunities for

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The organization that focused forty

years of effort against a single threat suddenly debated its very reason for existence. If

NATO was to continue as an Alliance, what should be its new focus? Should NATO

become involved in “out–of–area” operations? Should NATO enlarge, responding to the

desires of new countries wishing to join? Both out–of–area operations and enlargement

present many challenging issues for NATO. The future of NATO’s tactical air doctrine

will be affected by NATO’s new role in Europe, by the results of NATO’s decision to

conduct out–of– area operations, by the immediate participation of Partnership for Peace

(PFP) countries in NATO operations, and by the probable enlargement of the Alliance.

NATO tactical air doctrine does not yet reflect the realities of today’s operations, nor does

it anticipate the probable future employment of NATO airpower.

Out–of–area operations and PFP participation in NATO operations will have

profound effects on combined doctrine, training, organizational structures, exercises and

employment of forces. The integration of non–compatible forces is only one obvious area

that must be addressed. This thesis will investigate the future of NATO’s tactical air

doctrine and how that doctrine might provide the best guidelines for employing, building,
2

and training NATO air forces into the 21st century. This thesis reviews and assesses

currently proposed revisions, discusses possible areas for improvement, and analyzes how

NATO airpower doctrine might best respond to the demands of the changing security

environment.

The Goal: Stability And The Spread Of Democracy

This is a time of transition for Europe as well as for NATO. We do not know what

the world will look like in twenty years, but tomorrow’s stability may well depend on the

choices that NATO makes today. The Central European states are struggling to make

democracy succeed. Russia is fighting to implement economic reforms. Engagement

among NATO, central Europe, and Russia, if accomplished with foresight and vision,

could well provide an impetus for positive change and enhanced future security of all

members. NATO’s goal during this transitional period is to provide a strategy for

projecting stability throughout the region. The PFP program provides an opportunity for

the spread of democracy. PFP helps participants manage defense reforms plus establish

and strengthen democratically controlled militaries. Additionally, PFP participation should

aid in national defense planning, resource allocation, budgeting, along with parliamentary

and public accountability. Many of these are skills which the former Warsaw Pact

countries previously relied upon the Soviet Union to accomplish.1

The NATO Alliance has proven its worth over four decades as the foundation for

stability in Europe.2 It offers communication channels, heightens confidence among

member nations, and provides an opportunity for continued US involvement and influence

in European affairs. With the Alliance’s traditional purpose of opposing the now defunct
3

Warsaw Pact disrupted, NATO is now at a crossroads: determining where and when to

become involved. Since its inception, the mission of NATO forces has always been to

protect and defend the member countries. The demise of the Soviet Union and the

Warsaw Pact provide an opportunity for NATO forces to project stability outside of

NATO’s traditional borders with less fear of east–bloc confrontation. Stability in many

crisis situations may be enhanced by the use of NATO’s instruments of power, whether it

be by political or military persuasive means. For example, during the Gulf War NATO

forces deployed to Turkey. Alliance airpower helped defend and maintain the cohesion of

the coalition while simultaneously stabilizing the northern Iraqi border. When Bosnia

erupted into crisis in 1991, a more forceful use of NATO’s power might have restored

stability earlier, perhaps even diminishing the magnitude of crisis. In the future, NATO

may choose to use military force as a form of persuasion to project stability into crisis

situations. Alliance efforts during the Gulf War and now in Bosnia indicate that NATO

will choose to do out–of–area operations when the interests of the members are at stake.

To do so and to project stability into southern and eastern Europe as well as North Africa,

NATO will have to further develop its capacity to operate out–of–area.3

 An out–of–area

operation includes any use of Alliance forces outside of the traditional NATO area. The

use of NATO’s airpower for this purpose necessitates changes to tactical air doctrine.

Should NATO become involved in out–of–area operations, this would not address the

separate question of enlargement. The 1949 Washington Treaty excluded out–of–area

operations, but provided specific provisions for NATO expansion. Expanding Alliance

membership can serve to extend security and stability. Even without the Soviet Cold War

threat, there are still many hazards to European stability. The war in the former
4

Yugoslavia, difficulties in Chechyna and Georgia, and even problems in Ukraine indicate

the situation on NATO’s eastern border may be less than peaceful. Many countries on

NATO’s periphery are facing economic, social, and political difficulties that might erupt

into crisis. A resurgent, nationalistic Russia combined with turmoil in eastern Europe

presents an unpredictable environment with unique problems for European security. In

the past, the NATO alliance fulfilled vital functions in deterrence, crisis management,

peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and alliance defense. It can continue to do so, and

its effectiveness can be enhanced through engagement with the states of central and

eastern Europe especially if new members help to increase NATO’s capabilities.

Enlargement provides both a current and long term challenge for NATO’s tactical air

doctrine. Through planning actions, joint exercises, seminars, workshops, and day–to–day

representation in Brussels and Mons, PFP members are currently participating in NATO

affairs.4

 NATO exercises since 1994 have included PFP members and will continue to do

so. PFP countries are making doctrinal and force changes in order to effectively function

within the alliance and NATO, as well, must adapt. The participation of PFP countries

(with non–compatible weapons systems, training, and force structures) demands some

immediate change to employment procedures for airpower. Future operations may also

have to contend with a larger defensive area as the NATO perimeter expands through

enlargement. Doctrine will have to respond to an ever, growing base and diversity of

military forces, as training, exercises, command structures, and employment procedures

are adjusted for a larger NATO.
5

Airpower Doctrine And Why It Should Be Kept Current

In 1948, General Curtis LeMay stated that “Doctrine is of the mind, a network of

faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of

men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy.”5

 Doctrine is

influenced by theorists, technologies, and political, economic, and social realities. It is

affected by combat experiences and should reflect not only the past employment of

airpower, but the anticipated future use of airpower. Doctrine provides a guide for actions

during both peace and wartime. It sets the basis for decisions regarding training, systems

procurement, weapons development, and organizational structures — thus having a

profound impact on the capability of forces to engage in the next conflict. The USAF

Basic Doctrine manual summarizes current thoughts about doctrine:

Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace

power and the best way to do the job. It is based on experience, our own

and that of others. Doctrine is what we have learned about aerospace

power and its application since the dawn of powered flight. While history

does not provide specific formulas that can be applied without modification

to present and future situations, it does provide the broad conceptual basis

for our understanding of war, human nature, and aerospace power. Thus,

doctrine is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment rather than a

set of rules to be followed blindly. It is the starting point for solving

contemporary problems....Doctrine should be alive — growing, evolving,

and maturing.6

NATO’s current tactical air doctrine is almost exclusively a product of Cold War

thinking, reflecting the use of traditional NATO forces against a Warsaw Pact threat. Yet,

due to an altered international environment, NATO’s airpower is no longer employed in

this fashion. Member states are now operating out–of–area and new members with widely

differing backgrounds are participating in NATO operations, providing challenges never

envisioned by the Cold War doctrine. The current doctrine has ceased to function as a
6

useful tool. It has become slowly reactive to past events, no longer serving as a

prescriptive guide for the future employment of airpower forces. Cohesive doctrine

supports the development of more capable forces and helps establish unity of effort.

NATO’s airpower doctrine would be more helpful to planners, strategists, and operators if

it were to lead or at least accompany changes of airpower employment, and not simply

serve to document changes already underway.

Preview And Methodology

It is evident that NATO will change as a result of new military missions, PFP

participation, and eventual enlargement. This thesis investigates the relationship among

NATO members, new mission areas, and the PFP. It focuses on the future of NATO air

doctrine and strategy. Assumptions are made that NATO will continue to function as a

viable security organization, future alliance operations will include out–of–area missions,

and NATO will proceed along the path toward eventual enlargement. Chapter 2 provides

a brief background and current status of the out–of–area and enlargement issues. Chapter

3 discusses the implications of out–of–area operations on NATO tactical air doctrine.

Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of PFP incorporation and eventual enlargement on NATO

air doctrine. And finally, Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations for both

current and future changes to tactical air doctrine and future actions regarding PFP

participation in NATO.

Notes

1

 . “Study on NATO Enlargement,” (Brussels, BE: NATO Publications, September

1995), p. 13.

2

. Ibid., p. 5.
7

Notes

3

. Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” EuroSec, New York Review of Books

August. 10, 1995, p. 5.

4

. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” p. 13.

5

. U.S. Air Force Manual 1–1, “Basic Doctrine,” 16 March 1984.

6

. U.S. Air Force Manual 1–1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine,” March 1992, p. vii.
8

Chapter 2

Issue Background

The NATO Air Doctrine Process

The development of NATO’s tactical air doctrine has evolved over the years into a

formal and somewhat bureaucratic process. The Military Agency for Standardization

(MAS) is the governing body for NATO’s doctrine and publications. The Air Board,

administered by the MAS, oversees the efforts of eighteen different working parties which

address doctrinal and airpower issues ranging from airlift to search and rescue to tactical

air doctrine.1

 The Tactical Air Working Party (TAWP) oversees NATO’s tactical air

doctrine which is embodied in seven main allied tactical publications (ATPs), and eleven

standardization agreements listed below:

• NATO Tactical Air Doctrine — ATP 33, STANAG 3700

• NATO Offensive Air Support Operations — ATP 27B, STANAG 3736

• NATO Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations — ATP 34, STANAG 3703

• NATO Counter Air Operations — ATP 42, STANAG 3880

• NATO Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War — ATP 40,

STANAG 3805

• NATO Air to Air Refueling — ATP 56, STANAG 3971

• NATO Doctrine for Recon and Surveillance — ATP xx, STANAG 70 (not yet

written)

• NATO Methods of Warning own Aircraft of Enemy Fighter Attacks — STANAG

3275

• NATO Quals for Fixed Wing Above Water Warfare/Air Defence Aircraft

Controller — STANAG 1183

• NATO Air Control Terms and Definitions — STANAG 3993
9

• NATO Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers — STANAG 3797

The TAWP meets at least once a year to improve procedures and interoperability

among NATO forces engaged in tactical air operations.2 Currently there are no lower tier,

supporting doctrinal publications; thus each ATP provides doctrine, specific procedures,

and some tactics for the employment of NATO’s air forces. However, plans are in work

to establish a tiered doctrinal system with the new Allied Joint Operations Doctrine

(AJP–1) established as the “overarching keystone document.”3

 ATP–33, renamed

“NATO Air Power Doctrine,” would support AJP–1, with the specific functional

documents tiered beneath ATP–33. In addition, future TAWP plans include writing

supporting tactical air publications to clarify specific procedures.4

 For nearly fifty years,

the term “tactical air doctrine” adequately described the planned use of NATO’s

airpower: in crisis, air assets were to be employed mainly in a tactical versus an

operational or strategic role.5 The renaming of ATP–33 and the new AJP–1 publication

indicates that NATO is now beginning to recognize a wider role for airpower.

Prior to 1970, the employment of NATO’s airpower relied solely on national air

doctrines. However, when the Alliance adopted the strategy of Flexible Response, the

need increased for air, land, and sea forces to integrate effectively together. Under

pressure from the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), the MAS formed

the Tactical Air Working Party in order to develop combined tactical air doctrine and

common procedures for allied air operations.6

 NATO’s airpower doctrine is constantly

undergoing revision and modification through the TAWP process, but change is slow and

doctrine has yet to undergo the sweeping changes required to reflect post–Cold War

realities. The TAWP assigns each document to a custodial nation, which coordinates
10

change requests, manages revision reviews, and distributes updated data.7

 The TAWP

charter stipulates that STANAGs and ATPs under their responsibility will be reviewed at

least once every two years.8 Changes are discussed at TAWP meetings, and then staffed

individually by each nation. Fourteen of NATO’s sixteen members have TAWP delegates

(Iceland has no forces and Luxembourg’s interests are represented by Belgium).9 The

French also attend TAWP sessions and vote on airpower issues.10 Doctrinal change is thus

an iterative, slow–moving process, and revisions have traditionally been relatively modest

in scope. Joint doctrine takes months to coordinate in the US, and the NATO process is

lengthened considerably by the complexities of coordinating among different nations.

Other NATO members may or may not develop joint positions on proposed changes,

depending on their organizational structures.11 Final positions on doctrinal change are

affected by national military traditions and capabilities, but also by political and economic

imperatives. Most nations have demonstrated a reluctance to accept changes in doctrine

that would ultimately result in increased costs, in turn limiting the scope of possible

change.12

NATO’s air doctrine is thus a result of compromise and negotiation among the

NATO nations which attend the TAWP and choose to participate.13 It is also likely that

the airpower doctrine revision process will be slowed by the incorporation of new states

into NATO. More voices will translate into more complexity and debate before consensus

can be gained on airpower issues, unless NATO takes action to streamline the doctrinal

revision process.
11

Out–Of–Area Operations

The surprising events of 1989 and 1991 caused NATO to reevaluate its mission.

After much controversy and debate, the NATO ministers determined that it would put

more emphasis on the political aspects of the alliance rather than its military means.14 The

London Declaration in mid–1990 acknowledged that the USSR was no longer the main

threat; nevertheless, it vowed that NATO would still have an important role to play. The

Alliance would continue to provide border security for its members, but would also

“expand its mission to promote security and stability across Europe.”15 To do this, forces

would have to be capable of operations outside the traditional NATO areas.

At the November 1991 Rome Summit, NATO representatives reiterated their desire

for the organization to serve as the primary security apparatus for all of Europe. NATO’s

new Strategic Concept acknowledged the more uncertain security environment presented

different risks for the Alliance. NATO would increasingly be “called upon to undertake

missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defense of its

members....” In January 1994, the NATO ministers even offered to support missions

including peacekeeping or other operations under United Nations (UN) or OSCE (the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) authority.16 However, at the same

time, mounting budgetary pressures caused the Alliance to announce plans to transfer

many units to the reserve and shrink conventional forces by approximately 25 percent.17

NATO ground forces were to be reduced from the thirty–two divisions of the Cold War to

only eleven active ground divisions (which included US and French units), and NATO

would begin to rely more heavily than ever before on airpower.18 Throughout the Cold

War, NATO had built a deterrent posture based on strong defenses. The challenge now
12

would be to maintain sufficiently capable forces to preserve security within Europe and

project stability elsewhere. 19

Although NATO as an organization was involved in the Gulf War in a very limited

way, NATO’s training and experience in combined operations would prove extremely

helpful in combat. The Gulf War lesson for NATO was that there was an increasing need

to be prepared for such out–of–area operations.20 In Bosnia, NATO forces maintained

the no–flight zone for several years. NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995

helped secure protective zones and contributed to the Dayton peace settlement. These

operations were conducted mainly under the influence of US employment plans in the

absence of relevant NATO doctrinal procedures. They are indicative of the new use of

Alliance forces and especially NATO’s airpower, in today’s shifting security environment.

In out–of–area operations, NATO has proven to be the only European organization

capable of taking effective military action. The Western European Union (WEU) served

as a “technical coordinator” for limited mine–sweeping operations in the Gulf War and

also provided an initial response during Operation Sharp Guard enforcing embargo

operations against Bosnia.21 However, after the WEU was replaced by NATO’s forces in

the Adriatic, it quickly became evident that the WEU did not have the competency or

capabilities of NATO.22 The WEU, which was originally established in 1948, has recently

been resurrected as a potential security arm for the European Union; however, it is not

adequately organized for military operations.23 Its nine members are dedicated to

collective defense and they have limited out–of–area capabilities.24 With insufficient

infrastructure, trained forces, or support structures, the WEU is not capable of sustaining

even medium–sized out–of–area operations.25
13

No other European security group has the ability to project power (and thus stability)

like NATO. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has fifty–

three members and suffers from a cumbersome management process. With no security

council, the OSCE is incapable of decisive action. In addition, the organization does not

have the military forces or command structure to enforce its decisions.26 Neither the

WEU nor the OSCE is an effective vehicle for major military operations or peacekeeping.

While both organizations can promote communication and foster cooperation, NATO will

continue to be the “security framework of choice” for the near future.27 With no

immediate Russian threat and NATO’s decision to project stability outside its traditional

borders, the Alliance will increasingly become involved in out–of–area operations.

Airpower doctrine must adapt to this reality.

The PFP And NATO Enlargement

NATO’s tactical air doctrine is already being affected by the possibility of

enlargement. PFP countries are participating in NATO exercises and peace operations,

necessitating immediate modifications to specific ATP procedures. Eventual membership

in NATO could immensely affect NATO’s core tactical air doctrine. In January of 1994,

NATO formally agreed upon the PFP concept in order to respond to those eastern

European states anxious for NATO membership. The purpose of the PFP is to enhance

the growth of democracy and stability, to encourage civil–military reforms, intensify

cooperation, communication and good relations, as well as to fortify common defense.28

The prospect of eventual NATO membership provides incentives to reforming countries to

strengthen their democratic and legal institutions, liberalize their economies, respect
14

human rights, and foster peace through peacekeeping operations.29 Currently, twenty–six

countries have joined the PFP. All of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, as well as

the states of the former Soviet Union are members. The PFP roster includes Albania and

Slovenia, in addition to Austria, Sweden and Finland.30 It is a diverse group with widely

differing reasons for joining PFP. Not all aspire to NATO membership and not all have

the capacity or ability to take part in NATO military operations.

Eventual admission will be fostered and possibly accelerated through immediate

participation in NATO exercises and operations, providing a timely incentive to address

the applicability of current airpower doctrine. While enlargement will occur through a

gradual, deliberate process, there are no fixed, specific requirements for inviting new

members to join.31 Prospective members must illustrate a commitment to democracy and

liberty, demonstrate internal stability, and the capability to contribute to allied defense.32

An invitation for membership requires consensus among the sixteen NATO members, and

each country will be considered on its individual merits. In the US, the Senate must

eventually ratify by a two–thirds majority the extension of American protection to new

NATO members, to include any nuclear guarantees.33

Precedence does exist, though, for NATO membership without strict adherence to

Alliance principles or without the ability to contribute military forces to NATO

operations.34 In 1949, Italy, a former Axis power, was offered NATO membership against

initial Allied desires. However, the Allies finally agreed that rebuffing Italy would

“increase the communist influence and discredit the present Christian Democrat

government.”35 Thus, Italy was offered membership to foster democracy and stability.
15

Neither Luxembourg nor Iceland has the military capacity to contribute to NATO defense,

yet both are members.36

Resolution of disputes has also not been a deterrent to NATO membership in the past.

Greece and Turkey have long been members, and NATO has helped to improve relations

between these two traditional rivals, perhaps keeping them from going to war.37 Thus, it

is possible that NATO will accept some new members who do not have sizable military or

air forces, who are not capable of defending the alliance, and who still harbor intrastate

rivalries.

Each PFP member has signed NATO’s Framework Document, committing them to

the basic principles of democracy and mutual security. Each country submitted Individual

Partnership Programs (IPPs) which list that nation’s particular goals and plans for

cooperation with NATO.38 The IPPs address force modernization, air defense needs,

equipment shortages, and other military matters, generally detailing a future course for

each country.39 Eighteen PFP countries have already established offices at NATO

headquarters, and twenty have military representatives at the Partnership Coordination

Cell at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe).40 Thus far, the primary

focus of early PFP military efforts have been in the area of peacekeeping and humanitarian

assistance. In 1994, three major peacekeeping exercises were conducted with PFP

participation; at least ten such exercises were conducted in 1995.41

Upon joining, new NATO members must accept the full obligations of the

Washington Treaty, and they will receive the full obligations of membership to include

sharing risks, responsibilities, and costs. Obligations include contributing to decision

making, the alliance military force, command structures, and infrastructure.42
16

Alternatively, NATO accepts the burden of alliance protection for new members, and this

in turn will affect NATO’s military strategies and airpower doctrine. There is some room

for alternate relations with NATO (variations on participation). French military

contributions to NATO operations depend on internal political direction and are made in

accordance with specific Military Agreements. The Spanish also have a unique relationship

with NATO. Their participation is overseen by Coordination Agreements which form the

basis for detailed planning between Spanish and NATO commanders. Spanish

contributions are carried out through independent, coordinated, or combined operations.43

PFP force integration into tactical air operations poses a number of issues. The

nations concerned possess widely diverse military forces. Additionally, peacekeeping

operations could occur out–of–area, perhaps to assist PFP member states; thus, the

potential geographic area for NATO operations is large and varied. Military forces of PFP

countries run the gamut from the small Latvian army to the Ukraine with its hundreds of

strategic nuclear weapons.44 Consequently, PFP members can be grouped roughly into

four categories in relation to their likely effect on NATO tactical air doctrine.

The first group consists of the westernized nations, who have joined the PFP simply

to better orient themselves to peacekeeping efforts and who generally do not aspire to

NATO membership.45 Finland, Austria, Sweden, and Malta joined the PFP to better

coordinate with NATO for joint peacekeeping operations and to focus on contributions to

humanitarian missions.46 With mostly western compatible military equipment and ample

experience in previous UN peace missions (Sweden alone has already supplied more than

60,000 troops to the UN since 1948), this group should not present any significant issues

for future NATO tactical air doctrine.47
17

The second group includes those countries far removed from NATO’s borders and far

from successfully implementing the principles of democracy and economic liberalism:

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

Some of these countries are dealing with issues of human rights abuses, rampant crime and

horrendous economic problems. These countries have no interest in joining NATO but

have joined the PFP in order to receive training, technical military assistance, and foreign

funds.48 They will not likely stimulate many changes to NATO tactical air doctrine in the

near future, although their participation may require some thought when incorporating

their (mostly ground) forces into NATO peacekeeping operations.

The third group of countries includes those that strongly desire to join the EU and

NATO in order to gain defensive guarantees. Many countries realize that NATO

membership translates into increased security and most importantly, access to Western

monies. These countries include: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These nations are

most vocal about their desire to join NATO. They are concerned about a resurgent

Russian threat, worried that if they are not among the first group of nations to be admitted

into NATO, they will end up on the wrong side of a “new iron curtain.”49 Poland, the

Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, and perhaps Slovenia, will likely be the first to

join NATO as full–fledged members. All have established civilian control of their

militaries, and all are currently participating or cooperating with UN peacekeeping efforts.

Poland and the Czech Republic have already hosted NATO–PFP exercises. Slovenia is

trying desperately to distance itself from troubles in the Balkans, and while it separated

from Yugoslavia with few military forces, it has a stable government with a fast growing
18

economy. 50 Each country is also taking great steps forward in resolving internal and

external tensions. Hungary recently concluded bilateral agreements with Slovakia and

Romania, guaranteeing the inviolability of borders and the rights of ethnic minorities.51

Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia present potential

immediate changes to NATO tactical air doctrine.52 NATO AWACs currently use

Hungarian airspace in order to support Bosnian peace operations, and NATO may soon

find itself using bombing ranges located in Slovenia. Incorporation of these countries into

training and exercises greatly expands the territory and airspace for exercises and training.

Poland alone is one of Europe’s largest nations in terms of its geographic size and

population.53 The addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and

Slovenia will greatly expand NATO’s area of responsibility.

In addition to the above countries, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania also present

special problems for close association and employment alongside NATO air forces. These

countries also desire to join NATO; however, they have not progressed as far in political

or economic reforms.54 Corruption and slow privatization efforts afflict Romania. Even

with recent signs of economic growth, Albania is still the poorest country in Europe.55

Resurgent socialist parties, tension between civilian authorities and the military, and armed

forces poorly equipped with Soviet armaments make incorporation of these forces into

NATO problematic.

The Baltic countries are similarly struggling with reforms. They have small militaries

with many lingering problems. In Lithuania, the former communist party regained

government control.56 The Baltics’ strong desire to join NATO, coupled with Russia’s
19

equally vehement desire to keep them out of NATO. The Baltics’ strategic coastal

location relative to Russia also presents a special challenge for NATO.57

The final group consists of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia, and all could

constrain or limit the employment of NATO air forces. None of these nations have

expressed an immediate desire to join NATO. Moldova desires a neutral status, while

Belarus wants closer ties to Russia.58 Ukraine is struggling with democratic reforms and

economic instability. Lingering border disputes with neighbors, quarrels with Russia, the

presence of large military forces (to include nuclear weapons), in addition to their close

proximity to NATO’s eastern region make both Ukraine and Belarus potential areas of

concern for NATO’s airpower.59

Russia should be considered separately due to its military potential and historical

threat to NATO. At various times, Russian politicians have expressed grave concerns

over NATO enlargement, the stationing of NATO resources in eastern Europe, and use of

NATO airpower in areas adjacent to Russia.60 President Boris Yeltsin warned that

expansion would “sow seeds of mistrust,” possibly resulting in a “cold peace.”61

Endangered by western expansion, Russia has threatened CFE (Conventional Forces in

Europe treaty) non–compliance and denunciation of START II.62 Defense Minister Pavel

Grachev stated in April 1995 that NATO expansion could cause Russia to foster military

action “in the most threatening directions,” also warning that Moscow might respond by

strengthening the military capabilities of a “CIS bloc.”63 NATO strategists must carefully

consider the use of airpower in eastern Europe to avoid encouraging Russian insecurities

which might have unfavorable consequences on European stability.
20

In summary, NATO’s tactical air doctrine will undergo extreme change in the next

few years. Already, proposals have been made to completely revamp the tactical air

doctrine structure, and work has slowly begun on updating present publications. Future

tactical air doctrine must reflect the realities of the post–Cold War era. Airpower’s usage

will no longer be limited to a particular region against a specific foe with known

capabilities. NATO airpower can and will be used out–of–area, presenting new challenges

and new missions for NATO’s air forces. The participation of outside countries in NATO

operations demands immediate change to specific procedures and tactics, as well as a re–

examination of the core airpower doctrinal concepts. Doctrine affects basic decisions

regarding training, systems procurement, weapons development, and organizational

structures — thus having a profound impact on the capability of forces. NATO must be

proactive, addressing the full implication of employment issues before forces are

committed.

Notes

1

. Wallingford, Steve, Lieutenant Colonel. Telephone interview, NATO Air Board.

February 23, 1996.

2

. David Stein, Kimberly Nolan, and Robert Perry, Process and Problems in

Developing NATO Tactical Air Doctrine (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1988), p. 5.

3

. Report of the custodial meeting, 27–28 June 1995. Tactical Air Working Party

Meeting Minutes, Wunstorf, Germany, p 1.

4

. Ibid., p. 1.

5

. The terms ‘tactical,’ ‘operational,’ and ‘strategic’ in relation to airpower missions

are defined in terms of the objective that the air strike is intended to achieve. A tactical

mission would be prosecuted primarily to achieve a tactical objective, although it could

also have some ancilliary operational or strategic affects. A strategic attack aims to

achieve overarching, strategic objectives. An example of a strategic strike might be an

attack against command and control nodes, intended to cut the enemy leadership off from

the troops in order to destroy the enemy’s ability to continue to fight.

6

. David Stein, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine: 1970–1985 (Santa

Monica, CA: RAND, 1987), p. 14; Maris McCrabb, “The Evolution of NATO Air
21

Notes

Doctrine.” School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, Unpublished

Paper, 1995, p. 16.

7

. McCrabb, p. 6.

8

. Report to the Air Board of the 18th Meeting of the Interservice Tactical Air

Working Party held on 24–28 April 1995, NATO document, Military Agency for

Standardization, Air Board, April 1995, p. c–2.

9

. McCrabb, p. 3.

10. Vittori, Jay M., Lieutenant Colonel. Telephone interview, Air Force Doctrine

Center, Langley, VA. May 21, 1996.

11. The British and Germans do consolidate joint positions on proposed changes.

Other NATO nations often use air personnel only in reviewing doctrinal iterations.

12. Stein, Process and Problems in Developing NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, pp. 12,

14.

13. McCrabb, pp. 3–4.

14. Richard Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the

Cold War (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1993), p. 495.

15. Ibid., p. 537.

16. NATO Handbook, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels, BE: NATO

Office of Information and Press, 1995), pp. 270–1.

17. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War ,

p. 541. This was a decision made independent of CFE mandated cuts, and was mainly due

to pressure for declining defense budgets.

18. Ibid., p. 542.

19. Ibid., p. 520.

20. Ibid., p. 539.

21. Naslund, p. 32.

22. David Lasalle, “The New Strategic Concept and NATO Crisis Management,”

Department of the Air Force (Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center,

1993), p. 23. During the Gulf War, seven WEU members deployed to support coalition

efforts; however, a separate command and control organization or reporting structure was

not established.

23. Naslund, p. 31; Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military

Operations, pp. 64–69. The members of the WEU are: Britain, France, Germany, the

Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy, and Portugal. In June 1991, the WEU

ministers endorsed the goal of building a European specific security identity; however,

they wanted to do so within the NATO framework. The EU Maastricht Treaty also

declared a commitment to a separate European defense identity, and claimed that the

WEU would be the most appropriate organization for achieving it. However, the WEU

has yet to be expanded or modified to take on such a role.

24. Naslund, pp. 31–2; Richard Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of

Area Military Operations, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, Ca:

RAND, 1994), p. 64, 68, xii; LaSalle, p. 22. The WEU authorized out–of–area operations

in the June 1992 Petersburg Declaration. Its mandate thus surpasses NATO’s in out–of–
22

Notes

area operations; however, WEU members are obligated only to provide collective defense

for direct attacks against member nations. For out–of–area threats, WEU states are only

obliged to “consult” in dealing with the threat.

25. Lasalle, pp. 22–23. The WEU has only a small military staff composed of less than

40 officers. They have decided to treat out–of–area operations on a case–by–case basis,

thus, they do very little advance planning for these crises. They also have no operational

control over any forces in peacetime. Thus, NATO’s capabilities in out–of–area

operations greatly surpasses those of the WEU.

26. Willard Naslund, NATO Airpower: Organizing for Uncertainty (Santa Monica,

Ca: RAND, 1993), pp. 31–2; Richard Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of

Area Military Operations, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, Ca:

RAND, 1994), pp. xii, 62–3.

27. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” (Brussels, BE: NATO Publications, September

1995), p. 7.

28. Ibid., pp. 1–2.

29. Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” EuroSec, New York Review of

Books, Aug 10, 1995, p. 2; NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On

the Road to Alliance Membership? Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, March 1995), pp. 1–3.

30. “NATO’s Partnership for Peace: A Record of Success,” EuroSec Fact Sheet,

Brussels, NATO Release, p. 1; Robert Hunter, “Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for

Projecting Stability into Central Europe,” NATO Review, May 1995, p. 6.

31. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” p. 3.

32. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership, p. 1; Talbott, p. 2.

33. Talbott, p. 1.

34. Robert Bailey, “NATO Moves East,” Air War College (Maxwell, AL: Air

University Press: 1994), p. 4–6.

35. Talbott, p. 2; Dale Fuller, “NATO’s Out–Of–Area Disputes: Prospects for

Common Western Strategies in the Middle East,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,

CA, Unpublished Paper, December 1992, pp. 19–27. Initially, France was the sole

supporter for offering Alliance membership to Italy. Many, including statesmen in the US,

heatedly argued that the Alliance should be restricted to the North Atlantic area in order

to avoid “undesirable consequences” or strategic overextension. Italy’s opponents’ main

argument was that Italy had insignificant military forces which would drain alliance

military resources. Opponents also argued that historically, Italy was unreliable as an

alliance partner. (Italy had switched sides in both world wars). However, the arguments

that exclusion would only serve to push Italy towards the Communist Party eventually

ruled the day and Italy was offered membership.

36. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? p. 2.

37. Talbott, p. 2.

38. Hunter, p. 6.
23

Notes

39. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 2–6.

40. “NATO’s Partnership for Peace: A Record of Success,” p. 1; “Projecting Stability

in an Undivided Europe: Partnership for Peace and a Pact on Stability in Europe,”

Subcommittee on Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, NATO Publications,

Draft Interim Report, October 1995, p. 2.

41. Hunter, p. 6.

42. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” pp. 15–16.

43. North Atlantic Treaty Organization publication AJP–1, “Allied Joint Operations,”

Promulgated July 1994, p. 2.7, Section 232–233.

44. Jane’s Sentinel, The Unfair Advantage: Ukraine (Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s

Information Group, 1995), pp. 19–20.

45. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 4–6, 9.

46. Ibid., pp. 2–9.

47. Ibid., pp. 4–6, 9–10. Finland does still retain some Soviet–type equipment in its

military inventories. However, since 1992 when Finland abandoned its relationship with

Russia, Finland has begun purchasing western equipment and procuring a large number of

its fighter aircraft from the US. Other nations in this group have built some of their own

equipment, but have done so with western standardization and compatibility in mind.

48. Ibid., pp. 12–14.

49. Talbott, p. 1.

50. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 8–9.

51. Ibid., p. 6.

52. Ibid., p. 1.

53. DMS Market Intelligence Report: Poland, Jane’s Information Group (Newtown,

CT: Forecast International, July 1995) , p. 5.

54. Stephen Larrabee and Thomas Szayna, East European Military Reform after the

Cold War, (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1995), p. 2.

55. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 3–4.

56. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

57. Stephen Larrabee and Allen Lynch, Russia, Ukraine, and European Security:

Implications for Western Policy, Project Air Force, (Santa Monica, Ca: National Defense

Research Institute, 1994), p. 17.

58. Krzysztof Osinski, Poland: From Partnership for Peace to Membership in NATO

(Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University Press, April 1995), p. 7.

59. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 11–15.

60. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

61. Ibid., p. 10.
24

Notes

62. Stanley Sloan, NATO Enlargement and Russia: from Cold War to Cold Peace?

(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, May 1995), pp. 2–5. The CFE treaty

has the effect of scaling back the massive conventional forces maintained during the Cold

War. Treaty limits were agreed upon for military manpower, tanks and armored command

vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft and serve as caps for both Allied

and former Warsaw Pact nations.

63. Ibid., pp. 2–6, 20. The CIS is the Commonwealth of Independent States, which

some have referred to as the follow–on organization to the Warsaw Pact.
25

Chapter 3

Out of Area Implications for NATO’s Air Doctrine

Wartime experiences, the international environment, available technologies, and force

structures help shape airpower doctrine. Europe has experienced dramatic change in all of

these areas in the last five years. The end of the Cold War and the recent Gulf War

experience are already influencing doctrine. In addition, modern weaponry now offers a

degree of precision and long range targeting capability never before available to the air

strategist. Weapons costs are escalating while defense budgets continue to decline. The

inventories of many NATO nations contain aging fighters and older transport airplanes

while NATO is simultaneously cutting forces at a faster rate than ever before in its

history.1 The central and northern European NATO nations are reducing their active

ground forces by 45 percent, mobilizable ground forces by 25 percent, air forces by 25

percent, and naval forces by 15 percent.2 These realities affect future airpower doctrine

while also providing both constraints and opportunities for the future employment of

airpower.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO expected conflict with the Warsaw Pact to be short

but violent. Six Western European corps were dedicated to a linear forward defense to

counter the threat of a Soviet attack. Hopefully, ample warning time would permit quick

deployment of NATO reinforcements in order to blunt the expected Warsaw Pact
26

advance. Each NATO nation was assigned to defend a specific section of territory along

NATO’s border, and this imposed distinctive requirements on each national force. Some

allies had large artillery forces, others had many tanks or numerous infantry assets, and

each ally developed highly specialized employment doctrines. NATO action to counter a

concentrated Warsaw Pact opponent who was advancing over known terrain relied upon

tactical maneuver and firepower. With a defensive focus, NATO forces were unprepared

for sustained operations, for offensive campaigns, or for extensive sweeping maneuvers.3

Airpower strategists planned mainly to employ airpower in a supporting role to ground

and naval forces.4

 Allied air forces were trained for close air support and limited

interdiction missions rather than deep strike. Most NATO allies had no long or even

medium range bombers. NATO fighters were, for the most part, short range assets

designed to hit targets near forward battle lines. Air defense held first priority, followed

by attack of the Pact’s second echelon forces in order to shape the close battle. Airpower

doctrine relegated third priority to support of the engaged ground forces.5

Today’s security environment, with its potential for out–of–area operations, should

influence Cold War airpower employment plans. The Cold War environment has been

replaced by an unpredictable, uncertain climate. In the future, NATO might find itself

faced with hostile countries threatening or actually using weapons of mass destruction

against allied territory or interests. 6 Conflict on the periphery could spread into NATO

territory or refugees could flow into Europe, disrupting Alliance stability. The current

security environment is characterized by rapid population growth in less developed

countries, extreme religious and ethnic hostilities, and frustrations among minority groups.

Increasing economic disparity between developed and developing countries surrounding
27

NATO also helps to foster instabilities.7

 These problems are accentuated by the inability

of many Third World governments to adequately deal with the resulting conflict and

instability.8 In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may exacerbate

these potential conflicts. By the year 2000, twenty nations will possess ballistic missiles,

thirty will have chemical weapons, and eight may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons.9

Undoubtedly, NATO will be forced to deal with conflict in some form on its perimeter.

The end of the Cold War enabled NATO to expand its areas of interest. NATO’s

1991 “Strategic Concept” declared the access to vital resources, prevention of terrorism

and sabotage, and halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to all be within

the Alliance’s interest.10 Future employment of NATO airpower must take potential

threats in each of these areas into account and possess the ability to respond appropriately

and effectively at each level of conflict. NATO forces might next encounter an

unpredictable enemy in a long duration, low–intensity conflict. Intelligence could prove

more difficult in out–of–area operations as unknown opponents and relatively unfamiliar

terrain take their toll on Allied actions. Out–of–area operations may call for offensive

actions and airpower might be more effectively used in a strategic role. Doctrine should

address these scenarios before forces encounter them during conflict. Currently, out–of–

area operations are conducted in a relatively ad hoc manner.11 Today’s doctrine does not

adequately cover the range of threat scenarios in which airpower might be called to act.

Out–of–area operations are a reality for NATO’s forces. In 1992 alone, serious conflict

elicited the participation of 25 percent of all nations, and there is no reason to think that

European states will not continue to be involved in out–of–area crisis situations.12
28

Airpower doctrine is slowly changing to cover out–of–area contingencies and the

probable employment of NATO’s air assets. However, while the TAWP cautiously

considers and debates changes and new wording, airpower planners in the field are

grappling with the reality of new conditions in out–of–area operations. Many of the ATPs

are currently undergoing revision, but garnering consensus on the new documents could

take several years. ATP–33, for example, will no longer focus on tactical airpower. The

new document will become “NATO Airpower Doctrine,” and it will cover the

employment of all aspects of air power, including command and control and the planning

and targeting of joint air operations.13 Supporting documents covering offensive air

support, counter air operations, airspace control, and other topics are all under review for

revision. And some topics of airpower doctrine are yet to be addressed. The following

section will discuss areas which deserve attention in the update of NATO’s airpower

doctrine to reflect post–Cold War realities.

Potential Areas For Doctrinal Revision

The first aspect of NATO’s airpower doctrine that must be addressed in response to

out–of–area operations is the defensive orientation of the Alliance. The NATO ministers

generally view the defensive focus as necessary in order to maintain alliance cohesion.

NATO was founded and maintained on the principle of defense, and many nations might

not accept an outright declaration otherwise. NATO’s Strategic Concept carefully

specifies that the alliance will continue to remain defensive in nature, and this need not

necessarily conflict with the use of forces in out–of–area operations. While some might

argue that any use of force in out–of–area operations represents offensive action, others
29

would define offensive action in terms of the objectives pursued or protected. Operations

in Bosnia could be termed “strategically defensive” in the sense that Europeans desire to

contain the conflict and keep it from spreading into NATO territory. NATO operations in

Turkey during the Gulf War were specifically defensive, and even coalition operations

during the Gulf War could be labeled strategically defensive since Iraqi control of the flow

of oil would threaten the economic stability of the European alliance. However, despite

these differences in verbiage, the employment of forces at the tactical or even operational

level in out–of–area operations will not resemble the clear–cut “defensive” employment of

forces planned against the Warsaw Pact. Cold War forces were expressly tailored to

march to NATO’s borders but no further.14

Cold War airpower focused on support of friendly forces, with only short range

incursions authorized across the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The use of

airpower in out–of–area operations will thus require new thinking. Some NATO nations

(Germany, for example) must make constitutional changes in order to fully support out–

of–area operations. NATO air assets must be able and ready to perform the core roles of

military power: deterrence, defense, compellence, and demonstration.15 To defuse crisis

situations, NATO airpower should be capable of performing offensive strikes,

maneuvering along a changing front, or supporting offensive–type forced entry operations.

Airpower may be used to seize defended ports or other facilities out–of–area. Air assets

may be needed to assist in blockade and quarantine operations or to control enemy air

movements.

NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of airpower: “The

Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in
30

self–defense.”16 But, out–of–area defensive operations will have to be redefined in light of

the new threats likely to be encountered. Operations at the tactical level might be more

offensive in nature, while still supporting a defensive strategic objective. Airpower’s

previous defensive orientation needs to be reinterpreted or modified as NATO follows a

more active crisis management policy.

With the reduction of ground and naval forces, doctrine should address the use of

airpower in a more independent role. Currently, the TAWP is working on this issue as it

contemplates independent air actions.17 The increased precision and lethality of modern

air weapons may enable NATO airpower to gain the limited objectives typical of out–of–

area operations before ground troops are even needed. Airpower also allows NATO to

commit military force with lower risk than a similar commitment of ground forces.

 NATO has already begun to use airpower somewhat exclusive of friendly actions on

the ground. NATO’s 1995 airstrikes in Bosnia witnessed airpower in an independent role

to compel the warring parties toward a peace settlement. The use of airpower in the Gulf

War in the initial air campaign helped “prepare the battlefield” and minimized risk to

friendly forces. Airpower can be used to signal NATO’s political commitment, to

illustrate intent, or to show determination. In some situations, it can coerce the enemy in

order to achieve objectives. Airpower is inherently maneuverable, providing quick

mobility for the projection of NATO force. In addition, NATO and the West have

superior airpower capabilities. This provides an advantage against the threats that NATO

is likely to encounter in out–of–area operations, allowing NATO to pit its strengths

against probable enemy weaknesses. Many out–of–area operations will still require the

use of ground personnel to enforce or obtain objectives; however, future doctrine should
31

address the possibilities and potential benefits of using airpower in a more independent

role.

The types of missions that airpower will be expected to perform during out–of–area

operations will also greatly differ from those that were anticipated during the Cold War.

No longer can NATO plan to fight on a traditional linear front against a known threat. As

occurred in Bosnia and Somalia, out–of–area operations may include the protection of

enclaves as well as the presence of many, unrelated and perhaps unidentifiable threats. The

TAWP recognizes the new out–of–area environment and characterizes it as a “less dense,

very fluid, non–linear battlefield with greater difficulty in predicting contact between

ground forces.”18 The procedures and doctrine to cover these battlefield conditions have

yet to be written.

For conflicts with a rapidly changing FEBA or which have no clear–cut battlefield

forward lines, new methods of control must be arranged. ATP–27, “Offensive Air

Support Operations,” currently specifies the designation of a fire support coordination line

(FSCL) which will be used to control and coordinate the attacks of air, ground, and sea–

based systems.19 Short of the FSCL, fires must be coordinated through the ground

commander, while attacks forward of the FSCL are coordinated through the designated

supported commander (normally the air commander). Not only may the non–linear

battlefield invalidate the concept of an FSCL, but more fluid ground movement and

longer–range weaponry suggest that coordination between ground, air, and naval forces

must be improved.

In addition to planning for conventional combat, NATO airpower forces are already

involved in lower intensity tasks. Airpower doctrine does not yet fully address these types
32

of missions. Doctrine for peacekeeping and peace–enforcement must be thoroughly

developed, to include the establishment and protection of free–fire zones and safe havens

via airpower. These types of out–of–area operations also generally involve more

restrictive rules of engagement. Airpower might be asked to protect civilians, separate

warring parties, ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies, or provide surveillance,

reconnaissance, and monitoring of settlement agreements. These differing mission types

that NATO forces are likely to encounter in out–of–area operations represent challenges

for the future employment of airpower. New or different command organizational

structures, force training methods, and systems procurement ideas may be appropriate. In

addition to addressing the full ramifications of the non–linear battlefield, future airpower

doctrine for out–of–area operations must expand Cold War thought to cover all probable

types of NATO missions.

New technologies have greatly affected possibilities for the employment of airpower.

Out–of–area missions may be conducted at a higher tempo than envisioned for airpower

during the Cold War. High speed data rates and communications connectivity allow

information to pass more quickly than ever before. Targets can be fed in real–time right

into the cockpit and individual air assets can be directly controlled by senior–level military

strategists. In general, the commander who is able to act and react quicker will have a

battlefield advantage.20 AJP–1, “NATO Allied Joint Operations Doctrine,” states that

All commanders and authorities involved in the planning of allied joint

operations must strive to keep the reaction time as short as possible.

Generic contingency planning in peacetime, forward positioning of forces,

equipment and supplies, timely establishment of communications and the

issue of warning orders are among the most essential means to achieve this

goal.21
33

While greater information rates provide opportunities for shorter spans of control and

perhaps new command and control structures, there will also be opportunities for high–

level micro–management. Technology is allowing more and more near real–time combat

data to be available at multiple control elements (for example, AWACS, air operations

centers, home base, and task force headquarters). When things go wrong or when a high–

visibility mission encounters the unexpected, there will be a powerful urge by each element

to provide control inputs. This leads to confusion and command problems. New

organizational arrangements, command and control procedures, and doctrinal concepts

should support doctrinal concepts of command and execution. In the past, airpower has

primarily focused on the principle of centralized control through decentralized execution.

In the future, this concept may need to be altered for some out–of–area situations.22

Airpower doctrinal procedures must be established to effectively utilize the information

capabilities now made available by modern communications rates.

Modern, long range target acquisition and attack systems increase the tempo of

warfare, as well as accentuate the problems associated with coordination between ground

and air forces.23 Improper coordination or rushed operations could exacerbate airspace

control and separation issues, as well as increase the risk of fratricide. In addition, the

ability to target at night and during all kinds of weather serves to increase the potential for

higher tempo operations. Concern over collateral damage may limit some missions, but as

targeting systems become more reliable, more precise, and more capable, the tempo and

intensity of air operations will increase. Airpower doctrine does not currently address the

full ramifications of higher tempo operations. The TAWP is currently working on night–

time close air support procedures for inclusion in ATP–27, but other issues should also be
34

addressed. For example, operations in Bosnia have been complicated by convoluted

command structures located within the UN, NATO, the US, and other participating

nations. Portions of headquarters and control facilities have at times been located in

Naples, Geneva, Vicenza, Ancona, Zagreb, and Sarajevo. New command structures may

improve the speed and effectiveness of high tempo operations. Similarly, pre–planned

procedures and responses, as well as better communications and targeting methods, could

enhance the decision making process.

NATO airpower doctrine has always recognized the desirability of air superiority.24

However, due to the expected sudden nature of a Warsaw Pact attack with their

overwhelming forces, NATO recognized that air operations would probably commence

without complete air superiority. Cold War doctrine (ATP–33) stated that “air

supremacy is a desirable goal but may not be feasible or economical to attain. Where air

supremacy cannot be achieved, the object of air power will be to establish and maintain a

degree of air superiority that may be limited in both time and space.”25 NATO strategists

hoped that local air superiority could be initially gained over critical ports and lines of

communication, which NATO would rely upon during initial reinforcement movements.26

Thus, doctrinal procedures for gaining and maintaining complete air superiority were not

fully addressed.

The limited nature of out–of–area operations against less competent adversaries

allows airpower doctrine to place a much greater emphasis on air superiority. Air

superiority provides freedom of movement and security for friendly forces, facilitating

other NATO air missions.27 Against an inferior enemy who has lesser air capabilities,

there are few reasons to risk ground forces before air superiority is achieved. Actions in
35

the Gulf War supported the importance of air superiority when it helped minimize risks to

friendly forces. NATO’s new AJP–1, “Joint Operations Doctrine,” specifies only that the

purpose of joint air operations will be “to gain control of the air and then to allow friendly

forces to exploit this control.”28 It may be possible that air superiority alone could achieve

some NATO objectives before other types of force are even introduced. In any event, air

superiority is a most desirable condition prior to the commencement of other operations.

Airpower–specific doctrine should espouse the necessity of achieving air superiority and

clarify the intended means of doing so. It may still remain necessary in some crisis

situations to take prompt actions before enemy air operations have been inhibited;

however, it is unlikely that NATO will be willing to commit ground forces in many out–

of–area operations before complete air superiority is achieved.

NATO air doctrine, due to its defensive nature, has always neglected the area of

strategic attack. Strategic attacks are defined by their effects. An attack which

contributes directly to the achievement of strategic goals would be dubbed a strategic

attack. Due to its inherent long range and maneuverability, airpower is uniquely suited for

direct attack in pursuit of strategic effects. The defensive orientation of the Washington

Treaty meant that Cold War airpower planners found it unacceptable to even consider

conventional attacks deep into Soviet territory, regardless of the effects or objectives that

might have been obtained. Strategic attack plans (to support deterrence) were completely

reserved for US nuclear forces. As a result, European NATO members did not develop or

field long range air assets.

Until recently, NATO airpower doctrine recognized counter air, interdiction,

reconnaissance, offensive air support, and tactical transport as valid airpower missions;
36

but, doctrine ignored the issue of strategic attack. In 1985, NATO accepted the idea of

Follow–on Force Attack (FOFA) in response to Soviet plans to move their forces forward

in succeeding waves against NATO defenses.29 Although FOFA was never officially

incorporated into NATO air doctrine, it was the first significant deviation from airpower’s

historical role in direct support of ground troop movements.30 FOFA involved attacking

Warsaw Pact second echelon forces before they entered the main defensive area. FOFA

attacks were not necessarily intended to achieve strategic objectives, but for the first time

NATO had begun to consider the idea of early border crossing authority, perhaps with the

idea of achieving longer term effects than could be achieved through tactical strikes.

With the end of the Cold War, NATO air doctrine has begun to acknowledge the

importance of strategic attack. The newest NATO draft doctrine (AJP–1A) recognizes

that direct attack against key enemy centers of gravity offers potential benefits much

greater than traditional air missions flown in the tactical support role.31 AJP–1 states that

strategic targets may be conducted to “disable critical C2 nodes, degrade offensive

capabilities, and breach defenses . . . conducted to attack centers of gravity deep in enemy

territory . . . to produce strategic or operational effects.”32 Induced by recent experiences

and new threat scenarios, these ideas are revolutionary in terms of NATO airpower

doctrine. The rewrite of ATP–27 will address battlefield air support, air interdiction, and

strategic attack.33 Germany, the custodial nation, is to propose a layout and structure of

the new publication at their next annual meeting.34 The TAWP has begun the process of

updating doctrine to include strategic ideas. However, while NATO airpower is already

prosecuting strategic attacks in out–of–area operations, specific strategic doctrinal

concepts have not yet been fully developed.
37

One area of continued dispute in NATO airpower doctrine concerns the suppression

of enemy air defenses (SEAD). SEAD is air activity which “neutralizes, destroys, or

temporarily degrades enemy air defenses by physical attack and electronic warfare.”35

USAF doctrine considers SEAD to be a mission coequal with offensive and defensive

counterair. SEAD considerations have “driven [USAF] aircraft design, routing, force

packaging, targeting and tactics.”36 NATO, on the other hand, relegates SEAD to a

subordinate tasking.37 ATP–33 states that “SEAD is not a specialized mission in its own

right . . . The mere presence of enemy air defense systems on the battlefield does not

constitute a requirement to counter those systems.”38 NATO nations have continued to

resist the acknowledgment of SEAD as a separate mission, fearing that it would translate

into a requirement for them to buy SEAD platforms.39 To overcome enemy air defenses,

NATO strategists instead planned to either rely heavily on USAF SEAD capabilities or to

practice threat avoidance via high speed, low–level flight in order to reduce the probability

of radar engagement.40

Meanwhile, the importance of the SEAD mission has been repeatedly demonstrated in

combat. During the 1973 Arab–Israeli conflict, large numbers of SAMs limited the

effectiveness of air attack. By 1982 in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley, the Israelis had learned

the value of SEAD and they orchestrated a sophisticated and successful SEAD campaign

to counter enemy defenses.41 Coalition operations in the Gulf War and in Bosnia relied

upon American SEAD doctrine. During the Gulf War, over 2,000 high–speed

antiradiation missiles (HARMs) were launched against enemy air defenses, validating the

usefulness of SEAD.42 The Gulf War airpower survey claimed that “no single weapon

was as significant as the HARM.”43 The HARM missile was the central component of
38

efforts to defeat enemy air defenses. The missile effectively suppressed enemy SAM

systems, allowing aircraft to fly above antiaircraft artillery altitudes. Among the major

lessons learned during Desert Storm was the need for PGMs, stealth, C3

I, and SEAD.44

Some NATO members argue that extensive SEAD campaigns either serve to expand

political objectives beyond that intended or waste Allied efforts.45 Although the decision

was contentious, recent NATO attacks against Bosnian Serb targets in Operation

Deliberate Force were preceded by a comprehensive SEAD effort, and NATO’s Air

Component Commander directed that all subsequent strike missions include SEAD

support.46 Even in the permissive threat environment over Bosnia, NATO aircraft

required US SEAD protection to minimize their risk.

The demonstrated need for SEAD campaigns, the proliferation of the SAM threat

even amongst developing countries, and the need to minimize casualties during out–of–

area operations indicate that SEAD will continue to be a high priority in NATO

operations. With the higher unit cost of individual weapons systems, the need for force

protection increases. NATO countries are unable or unwilling to afford stealth or other

technologies which might preclude the need for SEAD, so it is likely that the requirement

for SEAD will continue in the near future. In some cases, the Alliance might by unwilling

to use available stealth aircraft which could obviate the requirement for SEAD. This was

the case when political factors caused Italy to refuse to allow F–117 stealth aircraft to

base out of their country during the Bosnia campaign. This served to strengthen the

argument for SEAD. In practice, due to force protection necessities and US influence,

NATO air employment has somewhat acknowledged the priority of SEAD; however,

doctrine has lagged behind. Recognizing this, European NATO nations have begun to
39

independently develop SEAD capabilities. Spain now has an EF–18 capability available

for air defense suppression, and the Royal Air Force ALARM missile development was

expedited in time for use in Desert Storm. Germany’s Electronic Combat and

Reconnaissance (ECR) Tornado aircraft with HARM capability is now operational, and

Italy plans to purchase a similar system.47 The development of these systems, particularly

in light of shrinking defense budgets, seems to validate the serious need for SEAD.

NATO airpower doctrine should reflect the prevailing importance placed upon the SEAD

mission, and procedures should be developed to reflect current practices in out–of–area

operations.

Out–of–area operations will require a new emphasis on airpower support and

infrastructure systems. NATO airpower doctrine has never stressed the need for long–

haul mobility assets or large unit deployable support packages. Cold War forces had

limited resources capable of bare–base airfield construction and few deployable

maintenance units. NATO also did not have deployable C3I units that could perform in

austere environments or transportation units to move ammunition and supplies over long

distances.48

Out–of–area operations will almost certainly require upgrades in all of these areas.

As an example, deployment of only one modern fighter squadron for twenty–one days to

bare–base conditions requires extensive logistics support: 24 fighters, 587 personnel, 72

vehicles, 1485 tons of munitions, 1.09M gallons of fuel, and 472 tons of miscellaneous

cargo.49 The deployment of large numbers of ground troops would currently require

extensive US lift resources. Many heavy–lift airplanes would be necessary to supplement

ground or sealift transportation, especially if NATO needed to respond quickly to the
40

crisis area. Alliance participation in many conflicts, depending on the location and

available infrastructure, will depend on airlift alone.50 Out–of–area missions will require

comprehensive logistics support which the Europeans do not presently have the capability

to provide. Thus, many NATO out–of–area operations will be reliant on heavy US

involvement. With extensive US commitments throughout the world, it would probably

be wise for NATO to develop some alternative mobility capabilities.

Current airpower doctrine does little to address the need for logistics support of out–

of–area operations. The 1991 Strategic Concept calls for the development of rapid and

responsive reinforcement capabilities; however, airpower doctrine has yet to reflect these

wishes.51 The new AJP–1 stipulates that mobility assets, transportation networks, and

support infrastructure will be required in order for NATO to respond “to a wide range of

possible contingencies.” 52 Yet, airpower doctrine as reflected in ATP–33 and other

publications still fails to address strategic or operational transportation needs.53 To

adequately address out–of–area operations, airpower doctrine must stress the importance

of the mobility and sustainability requirements. Pre–positioned supplies, forward basing,

and deployable units would help to support out–of–area missions. Equipment stocks,

deployable command units, and supply controls need to be in place and operational prior

to large scale out–of–area operations in order to reduce the confusion and complexity of

deploying assets.

Out–of–area operations may also require different organizational structures for the

control of logistics support. NATO logistics have always been a national responsibility

with each ally responsible for their own supply needs. Out–of–area operations which may

take place in many different locations with different force types might suggest the need to
41

establish a more permanent support structure. Logistics coordination centers organized by

region might be one possible solution. These more permanent organizations could plan

for deployments, contingencies, and help to manage the supply infrastructure required for

out–of–area operations.54 Whatever the solution, NATO air assets will be forced to

address the sustainability of forces to out–of–area locations. Airpower doctrine must

emphasize the importance of strategic and operational sustainability, while also covering

major procedures and controls for these missions.

In response to the out–of–area issue, NATO has begun to develop rapid reaction

capabilities. In May 1991, the NATO ministers decided to create a corps–sized NATO

Ready Reaction Force (RRF), composed of three rapidly deployable divisions.55 In

addition to the ground component, the Alliance will create a subordinate Reaction Force–

Air. The subordination of the air component to the ground commander does not

necessarily dictate a specific use for airpower, but certainly implies a continued tactical

mentality for airpower (land–supporting). By June 1992, plans called for a “Reaction

Force Air Staff” which would manage SAM units, a command and control element, and

approximately 380 aircraft.56 These air forces were later broken into two categories:

immediate response (hours to days) and rapid response (days to weeks) forces. By late

1994, the planned responsibilities of the Reaction Force Air Staff had dwindled. There

would be no major peacetime planning office, and air assets would be “plugged in” to

whatever command and control arrangements were identified for each particular

operation.57 Employment plans would also be determined on a case–by–case basis. The

Reaction Force Air thus provides separate air packages to support out–of–area
42

operations; however, with no peacetime operational command arrangements and little

wartime employment planning underway, force effectiveness may be in question.58

Plans for the Rapid Reaction Force are overly ambitious. The Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which was activated in October 1992, is supposed

to be movable within seven days of receiving orders. However, with recognized deficits in

lift, long range communications, and self–contained deployable control elements, the RRF

is somewhat of an unrealizable capability.59 It is true that initial ARRC elements deployed

rather quickly to Bosnia in mid–1995; however, many of the elements were already in

place and US deployment assets were readily available. In general, national contingencies

suffer from deficiencies. France’s Force d’Action Rapide contains five divisions which are

trained for out–of–area missions, but without transport and supply support, only one

division of 9,000 soldiers is sustainable. The UK maintains three lightly configured

brigades and has assets to move them, but none to adequately sustain them. The out–of–

area forces of other nations are small. Most nations have assembled the personnel,

logistics support, and lift capacity only for brigade size operations. Besides the lack of

mobility support, there are problems with C3I to control deployed forces. NATO’s RRF

thus promotes an impression of greater out–of–area capability than actually exists.60

 Additionally, since troops assigned to the RRF are multinational, implementation

delays may occur or some members may refuse to participate in out–of–area operations.

Each out–of–area crisis will induce a national re–appraisal of security interests and the

need for participation.61 NATO out–of–area operations can “consist only of capabilities

volunteered by the member nations — a coalition of the willing, sanctioned by the
43

collective organization.”62 Thus, it is possible that the complement of forces in each out–

of–area crisis may be different. This may negatively impact force effectiveness.

 Even with the RRF identified, there is still a need for realistic doctrine, training, and

exercises for out–of–area operations. Airpower doctrine does not currently recognize

possible employment of RRF or task–organized forces. Doctrine must be developed and

support structures built for rapid reaction capabilities to become a reality. Procedures

must also be put in place to reflect the impact of voluntary participation of national forces

in out–of–area operations. If the UK, Germany, or even the US chooses either not to

participate or to limit participation in the next out–of–area mission, NATO air strategists

should have some type of plan in place to facilitate the achievement of NATO’s objectives.

The high probability of future out–of–area operations suggests a re–assessment of

NATO’s planning process. Crisis action planning procedures should be refined and

expanded upon. Crisis situations greatly complicate the once predictable Cold War

planning process. Crises generally require more immediate action. In a study published by

the Center for Naval Analyses, nearly half of the twenty–three cases studied since 1983

indicated that Joint Task Force commanders had less than 72 hours to plan and prepare for

military crisis action. In these cases, military forces often had to take immediate action in

operations spanning the spectrum from humanitarian assistance to conventional combat

operations.63

The initial stages of conflict generally are characterized by a lack of information,

which serve to confuse the crisis situation. The greater time and distance from NATO’s

planning staffs, the expected complications in out–of–area operations, restrictive rules of

engagement, and the problems inherent in conducting a massive mobility operation in the
44

midst of conflict are problematic.64 Specific doctrine and crisis planning procedures

should be developed and practiced — crisis activation is no time to become inventive with

the planning process.

Since each out–of–area operation might potentially involve a different cast of

contributing nations, the crisis planning cell needs to be flexible within known procedural

parameters. Without a well–established crisis planning process in place, NATO forces will

be placed at a disadvantage. The new AJP–1 provides for an Allied Joint Force activation

and specifies the most basic planning responsibilities of its commander.65 Lower level

airpower doctrinal manuals need to reflect crisis action planning methods as well as

expand upon the procedural details and structure of the out–of–area planning process.

Conclusion

Overall, the TAWP has done a thorough job of highlighting areas for doctrinal

revision. However, since the doctrinal update process is so slow, NATO planners have

been forced to improvise during recent out–of–area operations. There are many potential

areas for change in post–Cold War airpower doctrine. Airpower can play a larger role in

crisis response, perhaps acting independently to achieve objectives. Since out–of–area

operations will place new demands on airpower, doctrine must address new expected

missions and employment of airpower. Finally, the ability to support forces in out–of–area

operations will be critical. NATO forces are no longer organized along Cold War

defenses, and multinational forces will probably be integrated at lower levels.

Coordination requirements will increase and even the TAWP recognizes that NATO

forces need clearer, more “unambiguous and easily understood common doctrine.”66
45

Airpower doctrine is moving in the right direction to cover the out–of–area domain,

but there is still a long way to go. The integration of PFP countries into NATO

operations will complicate doctrinal issues. NATO planners need to clarify and update

current outstanding out–of–area doctrinal issues as soon as possible in order to ease PFP

incorporation into NATO operations. Chapter 4 will discuss the implications of PFP

participation on NATO airpower doctrine.

Notes

1

. Mark Lorell, “The Future of Allied Tactical Fighter Forces in NATO’s Central

Region,” Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp. vi–vii, 38–41.

2

. Richard, Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military

Operations, National Defense Research Institute, (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1994), pp.

103–104. The downsizing nations include Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway.

3

. Ibid., p. 106.

4

. Maris McCrabb, “The Evolution of NATO Air Doctrine,” School of Advanced

Airpower Studies, Maxwell, AL, Air University, Unpublished paper, 1995, p. 19.

5

. Ibid., pp. 43–44.

6

. Gregory Schulte, “Responding to Proliferation: NATO’s Role,” NATO Review, July

1995, p. 15.

7

. John Galvin, “Conflict in the Post Cold War Era,” in Low Intensity Conflict: Old

Threats in a New World, eds. Edwin Corr and Stephen Sloan (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1992), p. 63; Edwin Corr and David Miller, “United States Government

Organization and Capability to Deal with Low Intensity Conflict,” in Low Intensity

Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, eds. Edwin Corr and Stephen Sloan (Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 18.

8

. Edwin Corr and David Miller, “United States Government Organization and

Capability to Deal with Low Intensity Conflict,” p. 18.

9

. Galvin, p. 63.

10. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept: 7–8 November 1991,” NATO Handbook,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels, BE: NATO Office of Information and

Press, 1995), p. 237, para. 12.

11. Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military Operations, p.

xiii.

12. Max Manwaring, “The Threat in the Contemporary Peace Environment: The

Challenge to Change Perspectives,” in Corr and Sloan, p. 46.

13. Report of the Custodial Meeting, 27–28 June 1995, Tactical Air Working Party

Meeting Minutes, Wunstorf, Germany, Section 2.4.
46

Notes

14. Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military Operations, pp.

106–107.

15. David LaSalle, “The New Strategic Concept and NATO Crisis Management,”

Department of the Air Force (Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center,

1993), p. 27.

16. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept: 7–8 November 1991,” p. 242, Section 36.

17. McCrabb, p. 19.

18. Report of the Custodial Meeting, 28–30 June 1995, Section 2.1.

19. ATP–27(B), p. 2–5, Section 210.

20. David Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for Strategic

Paralysis,” Master’s Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies (Maxwell, AL: Air

University Press, 1994), pp. 13–15.

21. NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP–1, “Allied Joint Operations Doctrine,” July

1994, p. 2–4, Section 213.

22. The author is not suggesting that the “centralized control–decentralized execution”

principle is no longer appropriate — only that NATO planners need to carefully

investigate the full implications of out–of–area operations on all aspects of airpower

employment. It may be that certain types of missions (those requiring very restrictive

ROEs, for example) could call for a very centralized command and execution structure.

23. Report of the Custodial Meeting, 28–30 June 1995, Section 2.2.

24. McCrabb, p. 19.

25. NATO Allied Tactical Publication ATP–33(B), “NATO Tactical Air Doctrine,”

Brussels, BE: Military Agency for Standardization, November 1986, pp. 2–5 through 2–6,

Section 209.

26. Ibid., p. 43.

27. Ibid., p. 19.

28. NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP–1, p. 12–2, Section 1203.

29. AVM Hawkin, “Follow–On Force Attack: Now and in the Future,” Air War

College Research Report (Maxwell, AL: Air University, April 1990), p. 4.

30. McCrabb, pp. 27–8.

31. NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP–1(A) First Preliminary Draft, “Allied Joint

Operations Doctrine,” Brussels, BE: Military Agency for Standardization, 1995, Chapter

18, para 1805; and McCrabb, p. 48.

32. NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP–1, p. 12–2, Section 1204–1205.

33. Report of the Custodial Meeting, 5–7 December 1995, Tactical Air Working

Party Custodial Meeting Minutes, Furstenfeldbruck, Germany, pp. 3–4.

34. Ibid., p. 3, section 3.

35. NATO Allied Tactical Publication ATP–33(B), p. 4–2, Section 406.

36. U.S. Air Force Manual 1–1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the USAF,” Volume II,

March 1992, p. 192.

37. McCrabb, p. 21.

38. NATO Allied Tactical Publication ATP–33(B), p. 9–4, Section 917.
47

Notes

39. David Stein, Kimberly Nolan, and Robert Perry, Process and Problems in

Developing NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1988), pp. 12, 16–

17; Hunt, p. 6.

40. David Stein, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine 1970–1985, (Santa

Monica, CA: RAND, 1987), pp. 45–49.

41. Peter C. Hunt, “USAF Capability and Requirements for Suppression of Enemy Air

Defenses: The Impact on Multinational Operations,” School of Advanced Airpower

Studies, Maxwell, AL, Unpublished paper, February 1996, pp. 2–3.

42. Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report

(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 229.

43. Ibid.

44. Keaney and Cohen, pp. 229–230; and Mark Lorell, “The Future of Allied Tactical

Fighter Forces in NATO’s Central Region,” pp. 42–43.

45. Political objectives in Bosnia were reflected in the UN resolutions. Some NATO

members argued that SEAD missions went outside the boundaries established by the UN

mission which specifically called for the protection of safe areas, and did not focus on the

elimination of air defensive facilities located outside of safe areas. Others argue that the

principle of economy of force is violated by extensive SEAD efforts. For example, a small

package of attack aircraft could be strengthened if the accompanying SEAD assets were

used for operational targeting as opposed to SEAD. NATO strategists need to come to a

consensus on this topic.

46. Hunt, pp. 3–7; Lt Gen Mike Ryan, “NATO Air Operations in Bosnia–

Herzegovina: Deliberate Force 29 August – 14 September 1995,” 1995 Corona

Conference slides. Operation Dead Eye proceeded the Deliberate Force airstrikes. The

Dead Eye operations were conducted to disrupt enemy air defense systems in order to

reduce risk to friendly aircraft. Air defense communications facilities, command and

control nodes, early warning radars, SAM sites, and SAM support facilities were among

the Dead Eye targets. The results of this operation were very good.

47. Charles Bickers, “Europe’s Wild Weasels,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 11 April

1992, p. 615; Hunt, p. 8.

48. Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military Operations, pp.

xiv, 106–7.

49. Willard Naslund, NATO Airpower: Organizing for Uncertainty, (Santa Monica,

Ca: RAND, 1993), p. 14.

50. Ibid., p. 14.

51. LaSalle, pp. 37–39.

52. NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP–1, p. 2–6, Section 227.

53. NATO Allied Tactical Publication ATP–33(B), p. 8–1.

54. Naslund, p. 15.

55. Christopher Melhuish, “NATO Combined Joint Task Force,” Naval War College

(Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 1995), p. 5; Richard,

Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, (Santa
48

Notes

Monica, Ca: RAND, 1993), pp. 537–8; Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out

of Area Military Operations, pp. 108–9..

56. LaSalle, p. 33; Richard, Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance

Partnership Won the Cold War, (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 1993), pp. 537–8; Kugler,

US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military Operations, pp. 108–9.

57. Naslund, pp. 28–32.

58. Ibid.

59. Melhuish, p. 5.

60. Kugler, US–West European Cooperation in Out of Area Military Operations, pp.

108–9.

61. LaSalle, p. 36.

62. Paul Miller, Retaining Alliance Relevancy: NATO and the Combined Joint Task

Force Concept, National Security Paper No. 13, (Hollis, NH: Puritan Press, 1994), p. 52;

Melhuish, p. 14.

63. Melhuish, pp. 7–8.

64. Naslund, p. 21.

65. NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP–1, pp. 4–1 through 4–4.

66. Report of the Custodial Meeting, 28–30 June 1995, Section 2.4.
49

Chapter 4

Enlargement and the Implications for NATO’s Airpower

Since PFP members are already participating in NATO exercises and operations, there

is some need to make immediate adaptations to airpower employment in order to

successfully integrate PFP forces. In the short term, NATO and the PFP must overcome

differences in employment philosophy, incompatible equipment, and variances in training

and culture. Over time, with continued participation and coordination between NATO

and PFP countries, many of these differences will diminish. However, NATO enlargement

will still present new challenges for Alliance air doctrine. Possibly because enlargement is

still years away, the topic has not been fully studied at NATO headquarters, by NATO air

planners, or within the TAWP.

This chapter will not present definitive answers to the open questions regarding

enlargement, but will highlight many of the areas which need to be addressed. Since the

specifics of PFP enlargement have not yet been determined by the North Atlantic Council,

the discussions regarding implications for air doctrine which follow will cover broad

concepts rather than specific doctrinal revisions. This chapter will review immediate

considerations for employment of PFP forces alongside NATO air assets, followed by long

term concerns for PFP integration into NATO. While much of the following information
50

might apply to all PFP nations, this chapter will concentrate on those PFP nations most

likely to join NATO and thus most likely to have the greatest impact on its air doctrine.

Immediate Considerations For PFP Integration

With ongoing crisis and conflict operations, there is an immediate need to modify

NATO procedures and operations to facilitate and enhance PFP participation. Cultural

issues, Cold War military philosophies, and PFP training and equipment incompatibilities

must be considered now to ensure the effective integration of PFP forces. Cultural issues

include linguistic differences, ethnic and interstate rivalries, and a history of conflict which

must be taken into account when bolstering, supporting, or employing PFP forces. One

immediate problem is the lack of English language skills by many PFP pilots and aircrew

members. English is the internationally accepted language of aviation, and the extreme

importance of reliable military communications dictates that a common language be

spoken by all NATO and PFP air personnel. In many Eastern European countries, scandal

and ethical issues have tainted the transition to civil control and parliamentary oversight of

the military. In the Czech Republic, a group of Slovak soldiers propagated ethnic tensions

within the military and secretly orchestrated the downfall of a defense minister.1 In a bid

to strengthen his own control over the military, Bulgaria’s civilian defense minister

attempted to illegally retire most of the senior officers.2 Problems like these are

compounded by the ethnic tensions and religious conflict that exist in some countries.

Furthermore, many of the PFP countries share an outdated, common military legacy due

to their involvement in the Warsaw Pact.
51

The Cold War Military Legacy

Effective integration with NATO forces will require both the PFP and NATO to

overcome or accommodate deeply ingrained Cold War military philosophies. Warsaw

Pact militaries were subordinate components of the Soviet forces, controlled and

dominated by the Soviet Union. As opposed to NATO forces, which were defensive in

nature, the Warsaw Pact countries had offensive forces with appropriate support

structures designed to expedite the movement of units into NATO territory. 3 Each

former Warsaw Pact country had specific tasks assigned for conflict with the West.

Poland’s forces were specifically designed to wage war against West Germany and

Denmark. Czechoslovakian forces planned offensive action against Italy, and Bulgaria

was to pit its strengths against the southern NATO nations.4 Warsaw Pact countries

lacked individual military doctrines of their own, relying instead upon the direction of the

Soviet General Staff. The Soviets, in turn, did not share plans for the use of their forces

with their Warsaw Pact allies.5

 The Soviets planned, budgeted, and made all Warsaw Pact

procurement decisions directly from Moscow. Thus, PFP countries inherited militaries

with limited capabilities for autonomous action and virtually no independent planning

abilities.6

After years of corruption and mismanagement, many Eastern bloc military

inefficiencies and outdated attitudes will be difficult to overcome. Within Eastern

European countries, the Cold War communist regimes maintained firm control over their

militaries. Militaries were thoroughly politicized and a complex structure of incentives,

inducements, and punishments governed the behavior of personnel. Party membership

was a prerequisite for advancement while prestige and material goods were routinely
52

offered in exchange for loyalty. The officer corps was closely monitored via both formal

and informal channels.7 Since the end of the Cold War and the cessation of Soviet

sponsorship, the former Warsaw Pact countries are attempting to transform their militaries

into appropriate and effective instruments of power. However, a deep distrust still exists

between the politicians and the military. Immediately after the fall of communism, open

debates questioned the competence and loyalty of the officer corps, and civil–military

relations began to break down.8

 The military was suspicious of new leaders who in

general had no experience or expertise in national security affairs. The new civilian

leaders, on the other hand, were wary of a military which had formerly served the

communist party.

Simultaneously, defense expenditures in the former Warsaw Pact countries

plummeted. Forces were cut back, benefits disappeared and morale fell. In Hungary, a

lack of funds has cut training and wounded morale: one–third of military officers earn a

salary below the national minimum wage standard while flight time has been drastically

cut.9

 Procurement in most countries is essentially non–existent, as budgets have dropped

over fifty percent (in real terms) since 1989. Defense budgets are further strained by

CFE–mandated cuts which require the expensive destruction of PFP heavy weapons.10

The PFP countries have been left with a legacy of military philosophy peculiar to the

Cold War. With an outdated strategy, inadequate command and control systems,

inventories full of obsolete Soviet equipment, and no money to upgrade or modernize,

PFP militaries are struggling. In the midst of this transition period, PFP nations are

attempting to demonstrate military reform and competency in order to earn NATO

membership. The effectiveness of NATO forces in the future will depend, in part, upon the
53

West’s ability to successfully integrate the PFP forces which are struggling to overcome

weaknesses left behind by the Cold War. Altering PFP employment philosophies and

improving confidence in military capabilities will require patience and dedication. NATO

exercises, training, education, seminars, joint operations, and day–to–day contact will aid

and quicken the PFP military reform process. Efforts to fully incorporate PFP air

resources into NATO employment plans should be increased. The sooner that doctrinal

issues are addressed and resolved, the smoother the transition will be after enlargement.

Training And Equipment

While the cultural and historical military philosophies of the PFP countries must be

overcome, existing differences in PFP training and equipment must also be addressed.

Eastern European air forces and their associated equipment are generally outdated.

During the Cold War, armaments not purchased directly from the Soviets were

manufactured under local license. But Soviet distrust of their own satellite states often

caused them to deny information on the their most modern weapons.11 PFP militaries rely

on Soviet equipment, much of which is obsolete and not interoperable with NATO

equipment.12 Some PFP countries are striving to update obsolete equipment. Hungary

recently swapped Soviet debt for MIG–29s and is procuring some US–made equipment to

update the aircraft.13 Poland has initiated efforts to develop its own combat aircraft;

however, it will likely be decades before Soviet–made equipment can be replaced by

NATO–compatible platforms.14

In addition to the reliance on Soviet technologies, many PFP countries are desperately

in need of replacement parts. Procurement budgets have waned, and many nations cannot
54

afford to repair, replace, or modernize. In Hungary, equipment reserves are diminishing

while two–thirds of all armaments need to be replaced due to poor maintenance.15

Shortages in supplies afflict many countries, with ammunition stocks at seriously low

levels.16 PFP air forces are especially hard hit by the scarcity of fuel supplies. Many PFP

pilots fly less than 100 hours a year, which greatly degrades their effectiveness in combat

as well as their ability to cross–train to NATO standards. Hungarian pilots have averaged

only seventy–five hours a year.17

While some Warsaw Pact satellite countries had an array of airpower capabilities, the

smaller nations were assigned individual airpower tasks. During the Cold War, Hungary’s

Warsaw Pact responsibility was aerial combat. Over ninety percent of their recent training

has been devoted to outdated Warsaw Pact air combat techniques, making the use of these

forces for other missions questionable.18 The Baltic countries have a lack of trained

officers and insufficient funds to increase or add training.19 NATO is dedicated to

incorporating PFP forces and supporting their transition towards NATO membership.

Currently, NATO doctrine assumes all forces have like capabilities. In order to

successfully integrate PFP air assets, NATO procedures, training, and exercises must take

into account PFP shortfalls. Air doctrine should suggest effective employment methods

for the use of these available forces which have widely varying capabilities.

The Cold War Deployment Of Assets

The end of the Cold War left the Eastern Europeans with their armies and air forces

still concentrated against the NATO threat. This leaves a widely skewed force

deployment pattern as air bases and equipment piles are still consolidated in western
55

regions. With the Warsaw Pact disbanded, PFP nations were left with great gaps in air

defense coverage.20 Polish SAM sites and radar protection facilities are still concentrated

in western Poland, since the Poles found obsolete air defense equipment too expensive to

move.

21 Other PFP nations have similarly not had sufficient funds to re–station assets or

equipment. The threat to Eastern Europe no longer comes from NATO. The recent

agreement between Belarus and Russia should focus some of their attention (and defenses)

eastward. A lack of maintenance and parts shortages have further disrupted PFP air

defense capabilities. The number of Poland’s operational SAMs has fallen more than fifty

percent since 1989.22 In addition, PFP air defense systems are also supported by

inadequate command and control systems and outdated communications technologies. To

effectively defend NATO after enlargement, these issues must be addressed now.

Suggested Solutions

There are several possible propositions for the upgrade of PFP capabilities in order to

more closely conform to NATO standards. Besides the obvious solution of providing

Western funds for military modernization programs, international military education and

training programs could be further increased. Western powers could arrange for licensing

and co–production agreements to eventually replace obsolete Soviet equipment. Weapons

sales programs might also serve to increase PFP capabilities, or outdated NATO

equipment which is currently being replaced could be transferred to PFP countries.23 All

of these ideas have merit, but several drawbacks prevent their implementation. Providing

ample funds for PFP force modernization does not have many political supporters.

Weapons transfer or sales programs which serve to decrease reliance on former–Soviet
56

parts and equipment could antagonize or exacerbate financial problems within Russia.

The possibilities of democratic reversals in eastern Europe which could leave Western

equipment in the hands of an unfriendly state discourages transfer programs. In addition,

providing equipment or sales to PFP countries must be carefully considered to avoid

provoking pre–existing rivalries between PFP states.

In the short term, NATO and the PFP must overcome differences in employment

philosophies and variances in training. Equipment incompatibilities and cultural

differences must be addressed to facilitate the employment of PFP assets alongside NATO

forces. The current participation of PFP forces in NATO operations will aid in

cooperation, coordination, and integration, but many differences will not be overcome in

the short term. Perhaps NATO air planners will find that the former Warsaw Pact

orientation of forces could be used to advantage. The offensive characteristics of the PFP

militaries could supplement NATO capabilities in out–of–area operations. National

expertise in one area of airpower might be expanded upon and exploited, instead of trying

to develop expertise in unfamiliar mission areas.

In the short term, the PFP will continue to fly Soviet–made equipment which has, at

best, limited compatibility with NATO. Soviet fighters cannot receive the full complement

of JSTARS data (Joint Surveillance Target and Recognition System), identification of

friend or foe becomes complex, and even refueling from Western tankers is problematic

for those with Soviet inventories. PFP forces will probably not grow in quantity or

capability in the short term. It will be up to NATO to address military discrepancies in

order to employ the assets that the PFP can provide in the most effective manner possible.

Instead of handling incompatibilities as they arise in an ad hoc manner, NATO air doctrine
57

planners need to provide a vision for the short and long term employment of PFP air

forces.

Long Term Implications For PFP Integration

There are many possible paths towards incorporating PFP countries into NATO air

doctrine. The current strategy is to treat the PFP nations as out–of–area until asked

individually to join NATO, with each PFP nation separately responsible for upgrading

their military and political processes. Alternatively, PFP states could be divided into

sectors and assigned sponsoring nations to help develop defensive capabilities. Or PFP

nations could be encouraged to develop their forces individually, with NATO

compatibility in mind, until a level of modernity is reached that merits NATO inclusion.

Besides the changes required of PFP forces, most of these courses of action will involve

some changes to NATO’s own air doctrine. The NATO ministers are dedicated to the

enlargement concept; putting off the study of enlargement implications only delays the

eventual process. The integration of PFP air forces should be deliberated upon now and a

cohesive course for PFP integration determined so that the most effective and efficient

methodology is embarked upon.

The first concept that must be addressed is the question of whether all PFP countries

should be treated equally. If NATO neglects the development of those PFP countries that

are most likely to join NATO, these nations might not receive the training or acquire the

best possible force mix to later contribute to NATO defenses. Those PFP countries

nearest to NATO’s borders and those who will eventually join NATO will have the

greatest impact on air doctrine. The Baltic states, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,
58

Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania all fall within this group. Should NATO concentrate on

the near–term capabilities of these nations or continue to treat all PFP states equally?

Another issue to be addressed is how air doctrine should deal with those countries

which have limited self–defense capabilities and/or no air force. Each of the Baltic

nations, for example, have no air force, but they are eager to join NATO and they are

strategically located. If air defense capabilities are not developed by the Baltic nations,

how might NATO plan to defend Baltic territory if they are asked to join the Alliance? A

doctrinal analysis of possible strategies might determine that NATO could be divided into

spheres, with sponsoring NATO nations independently assigned to help defend the Baltics

and other PFP nations. Or perhaps Hungary could augment Baltic air defense while the

Baltics bolster Hungarian ground forces. Russia might view Hungarian or PFP activity in

the Baltics with less trepidation than a permanent NATO deployment.24 The important

point to remember is that an early investigation of possible strategies might facilitate or

ease the eventual inclusion of PFP territories into NATO.

Any proposed change to NATO’s air doctrine regarding PFP should consider the

effects on the former Soviet Union. The integration of PFP countries into NATO

operations or later into the formal NATO structure could affect Russia’s political stability.

NATO’s policies and air doctrine must not develop too aggressively or encourage the

growth of another Warsaw Pact–type alliance. Russian politicians recently expressed

aspirations towards increasing ties with former Warsaw Pact countries. In March 1996,

Russia’s lower house of parliament voted to denounce the 1991 accord which led to the

dissolution of the Soviet Union.25 Russia initiated an alliance with Belarus, which stops

just short of merging the two governments.26 Russia, though no longer a world
59

superpower, continues to be the strongest military nation in Europe. They still maintain

75 percent of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, 50 percent of all maneuver divisions, and

85 percent of its defense industry.27 Russia cannot disappear from NATO’s scope. The

West must consider implications for Russia when evaluating potential airpower doctrine

and employment plans for the PFP.

NATO has always relied upon a concept of forward defense. Forward defense during

the Cold War meant that NATO would only grudgingly give up territory. NATO defenses

were stationed at the forward edge of the alliance’s borders and any violation was grounds

for NATO retaliation, which could include a nuclear response. In November 1991, the

allies agreed to relinquish the concept of forward defense in favor of a “reduced forward

presence.”28 Does this mean that NATO might be now willing to give up territory rather

than resort to nuclear force? Or does this indicate that NATO is placing new emphasis on

deployable assets, which might include longer range strike capabilities? The idea of

forward defense may have become obsolete altogether with the dissolution of the Soviet

Union. How will this concept change as new territories are added, especially in light of a

reduced threat from the east? PFP defenses could be based on a hub system where clusters

of fighter bases surround large embarkation ports, much as Ramstein and Aviano now

serve as hubs for operations in Bosnia. Perhaps a Krakow mobility hub surrounded by

PFP fighter bases and supported by NATO assets could serve as an Eastern extension of

this model. Aid to PFP defenses and the stationing of NATO supplies or forces on PFP

soil could help to support a reduced forward presence, but the implications of the new

concept need to be fully investigated.
60

Airpower doctrine should take a more active role in addressing the threat posed by

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With four members of the PFP now home to over

2,350 nuclear warheads and the greater threat of proliferation on NATO’s periphery, the

issue of WMD cannot be ignored. At the January 1994 summit, the NATO ministers

declared that WMD and their delivery methods constitute a “threat to international

security and is a matter of concern to NATO.”29 They promised to develop policies to

fight proliferation. The former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) are

plagued with a shortage of funds and trained personnel to adequately maintain the nuclear

weapons on their territories.30 Even Russia is experiencing a shortage of adequate

security and storage space for the additional weapons being transferred to its soil.

Additionally, growing political instabilities and internal conflict make an accidental launch

or even proliferation to outside forces more likely than ever before.31 NATO and

especially the PFP countries might encounter proliferation problems that expand into

friendly territory. It is in NATO’s best interest to address the proliferation problem before

it arises. Airpower has many inherent capabilities that would be useful in

counterproliferation efforts. At little risk or cost to NATO, airpower can be used for

deterrence, defense, defusing, or destruction.32 Since NATO has dictated that

counterproliferation policies be developed, NATO air planners should investigate the

implications of counterproliferation policy on air doctrine for both NATO and the PFP.

Incorporation of PFP countries into NATO merits an investigation of the division of

responsibilities in the defense of NATO interests. During the Cold War, the defense of

NATO was mainly accomplished by sector, with a general focus placed on the central

area. The sector division recently lost favor within NATO as many felt it was no longer
61

necessary in the absence of the Cold War threat. Out–of–area operations and crisis

situations will now generally see the formation of a task force–type organization. The

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept is well–suited for the integration of PFP units

since each CJTF is individually tailored to the crisis situation. In the long term, however,

airpower doctrine must determine how best to integrate PFP forces into NATO’s

command structure. The long term defense of NATO territory would call for a more

permanent command structure. NATO territorial defense after enlargement raises the

issue of how responsibilities will be divided up between NATO and new NATO members.

The incorporation of PFP nations into NATO will greatly expand NATO’s boundaries,

exposing a larger and more vulnerable area to attack. The PFP countries currently have

widely varying air capabilities. Perhaps in the short term, it may be best to use mission

type taskings in order to effectively utilize PFP assets. In the long term, NATO air

planners must design a defensive program to either utilize these existing PFP capabilities

or develop needed ones.

PFP incorporation into NATO will also require new airspace designations. Airspaces

are ordinarily designated to facilitate command and control of air assets, thus improving

effectiveness and reducing the chance of air mishaps. With inadequate radar control

coverage in PFP states, Eastern European airspace delineations during crisis situations

become more critical. Extensive procedures for air separation during large scale combat

and integrated airspace coordination concepts should be developed for NATO and PFP

forces which are flying incompatible airplanes. NATO air doctrine should also address

airspace control standardization for both overland and overwater operations.33 Airspace

control is currently specified in two NATO publications, ATP–40 (Doctrine for Airspace
62

Control) and ATP–34 (Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations). These two

documents need to consistently specify procedures for the control of both NATO and PFP

air assets.34

Additionally, today’s modern, long–range weaponry operated by ground and naval

forces reach into the domain which was previously limited to air and strategic systems.

This significantly complicates NATO targeting and air coordination.35 Future NATO air

doctrine must address airspace coordination issues for long range weaponry, for dissimilar

forces, and for the large increase in territory presented by the PFP nations which are likely

to join NATO.

NATO has appropriately placed a new emphasis on standardization. Incorporation of

PFP nations, who have different capabilities, different systems, and differing doctrinal

philosophies places unique demands on standardization. There are some standardization

requirements which PFP countries simply cannot meet in the short term. Currently,

NATO is undergoing a review of all publications in order to determine the minimum

requirements necessary for operational effectiveness. NATO will then need to complete a

country by country assessment, as well as develop education and training programs to aid

the PFP nations develop standard, interoperable capabilities.36 In 1992, NATO initiated

efforts to develop comprehensive standardization requirements for the PFP countries. The

Standardization Organization was established and assigned responsibility for all

standardization issues and collaboration matters. Standardization items to be addressed

include planning, policies, and operational procedures.37 These issues, however, are

currently worked at a high level and have yet to address lower force level issues.
63

NATO standardization priorities include doctrinal and procedural commonality,

equipment interoperability, command and control compatibility, and combat support

adaptability. However, with over 1,200 NATO agreements and publications in existence,

PFP compliance with NATO standards will be expensive (in terms of funds, materials,

resources, training time, and other PFP assets). Complete standardization will probably

not be possible in the medium term.38 Standardization is not a strict requirement for

NATO membership. Airpower is not specifically addressed by the standardization

committee. Air doctrine planners need to investigate the full implications of compliance

and noncompliance with standardization requirements. Standardization efforts might also

include the PFP industrial sectors. Perhaps, if PFP factories could manufacture NATO

armaments, NATO members could purchase them, PFP could use them, and the PFP

would receive a cash infusion to help modernize their own forces. NATO should

prioritize standardization prerequisites in terms of immediate PFP participation as well as

in light of NATO enlargement.

Another area that NATO air doctrine planners should devote more thought to is the

PFP planning process. The Partnership Coordination Cell located in Mons, Belgium was

established to plan the implementation of PFP military programs.39 This planning currently

occurs in the short term as the immediate details of exercises and exchanges are worked

out between NATO and the PFP. However, longer term planning must be coordinated in

order to effectively integrate PFP assets into NATO air operations. NATO members need

to be more involved in the PFP’s design processes. For example, the Alliance would suffer

if Poland builds airplanes that will not hold German pallets or can not shoot NATO–

supplied missiles. Many PFP initiatives are intended for the long term, and NATO
64

planners need to get involved early in the PFP decision process to ensure later

compatibility for all types of air missions.

Conclusion

In summary, PFP and eventual enlargement will influence future NATO air doctrine.

Although there are many initial obstacles to overcome, integration and assets from the

PFP may offer NATO flexibilities and capabilities not previously available to airpower

strategists. Air planners must vigorously attack differences in training, military

philosophies, and unique cultural issues in order to most effectively employ PFP resources

alongside NATO air assets. Analysis of the long term implications of NATO enlargement

will affect the future direction of air doctrine. It is important to establish broad concepts

for the future defense of NATO so that PFP capabilities can be strengthened and

developed now.

Notes

1

. Thomas Szayna and F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Military Reform After the

Cold War, (RAND: Santa Monica: CA, 1995), p. 33.

2

. Ibid., p. 22.

3

. Ibid., p. ix.

4

. Ibid., p. 27.

5

. Ibid.

6

. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. (Washington DC:

Congressional Research Service, March 1995), pp. 16–17; Szayna, p. 19.

7

. Szayna, pp. 6–9.

8

. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 16–18; Szayna, pp. 10, 20.

9

. Jane’s Sentinel, The Unfair Advantage: Hungary (Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s

Information Group, 1995), p. 13.

10. Szayna, p. 30.

11. Ibid., p. 29.
65

Notes

12. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 13–18.

13. Jane’s Sentinel, The Unfair Advantage: Hungary , p. 14.

14. DMS Market Intelligence Report: Poland, Jane’s Information Group (Newtown,

CT: Forecast International, July 1995), pp. 7–9.

15. Jane’s Sentinel, The Unfair Advantage: Hungary , p. 13.

16. Szayna, p. ix.

17. Ibid., p. 32.

18. Jane’s Sentinel, The Unfair Advantage: Hungary, p. 19.

19. NATO Enlargement: Partnership for Peace Members — On the Road to Alliance

Membership? pp. 10–12.

20. Ibid., pp. 13–15.

21. Szayna, p. 28.

22. DMS Market Intelligence Report: Poland, p. 9.

23. Szayna, pp. xii, xiii.

24. Russia might oppose PFP activity in the Baltics, especially if that activity is

sponsored or subsidized by NATO. However, the point remains that Russia is likely to be

somewhat less fearful of PFP activities in Eastern Europe than they would be if actual

NATO troops were to take actions in Eastern Europe.

25. “Russians enter into Alliance with Former Soviet Republic,” Charleston Post and

Courier, Sunday March 24, 1996, p.16–A.

26. Ibid.

27. John Galvin, “Conflict in the Post Cold War Era” in Low Intensity Conflict: Old

Threats in a New World, ed. by Edwin Corr and Stephen Sloan (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1992), p. 64.

28. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept: 7–8 November 1991,” NATO Handbook,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels, BE: NATO Office of Information and

Press, 1995), p. 243, section 40.

29. Karl–Heinz Borner, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and

International Insecurity: NATO’s Approach to a New Threat,” Air War College, Air

University, Maxwell, AL. Unpublished Paper. April 1995, pp. 16–17.

30. Ibid, p. 11.

31. Ibid, pp. 11–13.

32. Ibid, p. 17.

33. Report of the Custodial Meeting, 28–30 June 95, Tactical Air Working Party

Custodial Meeting Minutes, Wunstorf, Germany, p. 3.

34. Ibid., p. 4, comment 71.

35. Ibid., p. 4.

36. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” (Brussels, BE: NATO Publications, September

1995), pp. 25–26.

37. Gunner Lange, “The PCC: A New Player in the Development of Relations

Between NATO and Partner Nations,” NATO Review, May 1995, p. 34.

38. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” pp. 24, 25–26.
66

Notes

39. “Partnership for Peace Invitation: Issued by the Heads of State and Government

participating in the Meeting of the north Atlantic Council held at NATO HQ, Brussels on

10–11 January 1994,” NATO Handbook, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels,

BE: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), p. 266.
67

Chapter 5

Findings and Conclusions

For 50 years NATO has served as a bedrock of stability. As we enter the next

century, NATO may continue to function as a stabilizing force in central Europe. With

the dissolution of the Cold War threat, NATO can now project power and stability into

areas that might before have previously caused an east–west confrontation. Involvement

in out–of–area operations and cooperation with the states of the PFP may serve to

promote Europe’s long term defense. Every attempt in the 20th century to reshape the

European continent has been hamstrung by a poor compromise between competing

powers. NATO now enjoys a unique opportunity that is time sensitive. Positive

engagement with border states will enhance stability on NATO’s periphery.

The process by which NATO derives its airpower doctrine positively affects on

airpower. The Tactical Air Working Party provides a forum for reassessment and analysis

for the best use of airpower. Doctrinal revision stimulates discussion and cooperation.

With the changing security environment, NATO has decided to revise many Cold War

airpower documents. The new AJP–1, “Joint Operations Doctrine,” is a keystone

document, providing direction in many areas that doctrine had not addressed during the

Cold War. However, the lower level airpower documents do not yet reflect or expand

upon many of the changes in AJP–1. The TAWP has begun the long, drawn out process
68

of revising air doctrine, but in some cases is still at the stage of discussing format for the

new doctrinal manuals. The most important contextual issues have yet to be fully debated

and evaluated. The product of the TAWP should be a set of principles which outline the

most effective employment of airpower in combat. When airpower employment plans

must be improvised during out–of–area operations, occurring in the absence of written

doctrine, this indicates that the system may have become administratively bogged down.

The TAWP process served NATO well in adequately revising doctrine in the more static

Cold War environment. But today, the international environment has drastically changed:

both the nature of the threat and the use of NATO airpower during conflict have changed.

The current TAWP process has proven too slow and cumbersome to provide adequate

direction for air strategists during ongoing operations.

Eight years ago, NATO’s pressing concern was an attack from the Warsaw Pact. The

current issue of how to include the air forces of the former Warsaw Pact in NATO air

doctrine raises the very complicated issue of the purpose of NATO in a post–Cold War

Europe. While NATO rushes to define its new role, the advantage of effectively enlarging

the alliance can not be ignored. The cost is enormous in monetary terms, but the cost of

lost opportunity may be even larger. The historic trend of isolationism by victorious

powers following conflict has never proven effective. Countries ignored in times of peace

usually do not prove to be effective warfighters. Incorporation of the PFP countries into

NATO’s airpower framework could provide capabilities and flexibilities not previously

available to the alliance. The probable enlargement of NATO will have implications for all

European nations including states that do not eventually join the organization.1

 There are

many areas that need to be thoroughly addressed so that NATO can chart a course
69

towards effective integration of PFP countries. Specifically, a bold NATO staff must

address a new world. Out–of–area operations for NATO are already a part of its dynamic

history. Whether this history will be written as a success depends on an aggressive

adaptation to new realities. Doctrine for the engagement and integration of new countries

to the East must be investigated in–depth and debated now. The framework which

replaces the Warsaw Pact can be influenced and shaped by NATO. The opportunity

exists, albeit at a cost of money and effort, to weave a new and stronger blanket of

security across the European continent. At the end of 1995 Dr. Sheila Widnall, Secretary

of the USAF, summarized the importance of forward–thinking action when she stated:

Without a vision we become incrementalists, adjusting and reacting to the

world environment as it unfolds. With a vision, we can become proactive,

anticipate the changing environment, and shape it to benefit our nation.2

This is precisely what NATO desires to do — shape the environment if at all possible to

provide a more favorable European security environment into the 21st century. NATO

strategists can aid the process by fully addressing the implications of out–of–area

operations and enlargement, and envisioning the best use of NATO’s airpower for

tomorrow’s world.

Notes

1

. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” p. 6.

2

. Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Executive Guidance,” Washington DC:

Air Force Strategy Division, December 1995, p. 6.
70

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