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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: AN 

EXAMINATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 17, 2012 

Serial No. 112–92 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. James G. Duncan, Assistant Administrator, Office of Professional Responsibility, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

Mr. Timothy M. Moynihan, Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: AN 

EXAMINATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS 

Thursday, May 17, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Marino, Keating, and Clarke. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the ethical policies, 

conduct, and alleged criminal activities within the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

May 6 through the 12 was Public Recognition Week. We set aside 

time each year to honor our public servants who keep us safe, care 

for our veterans, control our borders, and find cures for rare diseases. They make our country stronger and make a difference in 

the world. 

Most of our employees understand that public service is a public 

trust. Each one has a responsibility to the United States Government and the citizens they all serve to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above private gain. Most public servants adhere to this trust. 

However, the Pew Research Center interviewed more than 3,000 

adults about their views of our Government. Fifty-four percent said 

the Federal Government is mostly corrupt while 31 percent said 

mostly honest and 11 percent said they don’t know either. 

The survey also showed just a third of Americans has a favorable 

opinion of the Federal Government: The lowest positive rating in 

its 15 years. 

A measure of dissatisfaction these days is to be expected. The 

country is in economic trouble and our leaders promise things they 

cannot deliver. What compounds this dissatisfaction are Government scandals. 

There have been many reports of Federal employees wasting taxpayer dollars and in some cases, committing crimes which erodes 

the trust American people put in our Government. 

The General Services Administration employees spent over 

$800,000 on a conference in Las Vegas. The Department of Home-
2 

land Security spent nearly $1 billion on the Secure Border Initiative Network with little return on this investment. 

We have also found criminal activity within our bureaucracies. 

Custom and Border Protection personnel collaborating with drug 

smugglers, cartels, Immigration and Custom Enforcement personnel filing fraudulent travel claims, and TSA personnel stealing 

personal belongings of passengers. 

Since 2004 over 130 agents of the United States Custom and 

Border Protection have been arrested, charged, or otherwise prosecuted on corruption charges. Allegations and convictions include 

alien and drug smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. The 

DHS acting inspector general, Mr. Charles Edwards states that 

Mexican drug cartels attempt to corrupt DHS employees and this 

impacts our National security. The inspector general also reports 

that since 2004 there has been a 38 percent increase in the number 

of complaints against CPB employees. 

As recently as February 2012 an ICE agent pled guilty to 21 

counts of obstruction and corruption violations. These charges include illegally obtaining and disseminating Government documents 

to individuals with ties to drug trafficking organizations. 

There have also been allegations of convictions of ICE agents accepting thousands of dollars of bribes from immigrants seeking 

U.S. documentation. A former intelligence chief for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is accused of embezzling more than 

$180,000 stemming from a travel voucher fraud, a kickback scheme 

that defrauded the Government of more than $500,000. Four other 

ICE employees pled guilty to involvement in a scheme to defraud 

the Government. 

In the past year alone there have been numerous incidents of alleged misconduct on the part of TSA officers and employees. Thousands of dollars in cash and items have been reported stolen. Dozens of TSA officers were fired over improper luggage screening because they had allowed thousands of pieces of luggage onto flights 

without proper screening. 

TSA officers have allegedly taken bribes, allowing passengers expedited security checks. A number of additional allegations range 

from racially-charged statements and actions to inappropriate sexual harassment. A recent 22-count indictment alleges TSA employees took payments to provide drug couriers unfettered access 

through Los Angeles International Airport so that drugs could be 

smuggled into the United States. 

Executive branch employees are subject to Executive Orders 

issued by the President and ethics regulations issued by the U.S. 

Office of Government Ethics. Some agencies also have issued supplemental ethics regulations that apply to their employees. Even 

though there are stacks of Government manuals, training materials, and yearly briefings about ethics, these lapses continue. They 

not only waste taxpayer dollars, they are a threat to the security 

of our Nation. 

While the majority of bureaucratic personnel are law-abiding, 

this hearing will examine the ethical policies and procedures of selected components of the Department of Homeland Security in an 

attempt to understand why these ethical lapses continue and what 

is to be done to prevent them from happening in the future. 
3 

One final note; it is unfortunate the Department of Homeland 

Security in the face of such serious ethical mishaps refuses to provide witnesses from leadership to discuss these matters in the open 

before the American people. We requested the leadership from 

CBP, ICE, and TSA. However, only CBP recognized the importance 

of these issues. 

With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

MAY 17, 2012

May 6–12 was Public Recognition Week. We set aside time each year to honor our 

public servants who keep us safe, care for our veterans, patrol our borders, and find 

cures for rare diseases. 

They make our country stronger and make a difference in the world. 

Most of our employees understand public service is a public trust. 

Each one has a responsibility to the United States Government and the citizens 

they all serve to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above 

private gain. And most public servants adhere to this trust. 

However, the Pew Research Center interviewed more than 3,000 adults about 

their views of our Government. Fifty-four percent said the Federal Government is 

‘‘mostly corrupt,’’ while 31 percent said ‘‘mostly honest,’’ and 11 percent said they 

did not know, or neither. The survey also showed just a third of Americans has a 

favorable opinion of the Federal Government, the lowest positive rating in 15 years. 

A measure of dissatisfaction, these days, is to be expected. The country is in economic trouble and our leaders promise things they cannot deliver. What compounds 

this dissatisfaction are Government scandals. 

There have been many reports of Federal employees wasting taxpayer dollars, and 

in some cases committing crimes, which erodes the trust American people have in 

our Government. 

The General Services Administration employees spent over $800,000 on a conference in Las Vegas. The Department of Homeland security spent nearly $1 billion 

on the Secure Border Initiative Network with little return on investment. 

We have also found criminal activity in our bureaucracies; Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) personnel collaborating with drug smugglers, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel filing fraudulent travel claims and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel stealing personal belongings of passengers. 

Since 2004, over 130 agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection have been 

arrested, charged, or otherwise prosecuted on corruption charges. Allegations and 

convictions include alien and drug smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. 

The DHS Acting Inspector General, Dr. Charles Edwards, states Mexican drug cartels attempt to corrupt DHS employees and this impacts National security. 

The IG also reports that since 2004 there has been a 38% increase in the number 

of complaints against CBP employees. 

As recently as February 2012, an ICE agent pleaded guilty to 21 counts charging 

obstruction and corruption violations. These charges included illegally obtaining and 

disseminating Government documents to individuals with ties to drug trafficking organizations. 

There have also been allegations and convictions of ICE agents accepting thousands of dollars in bribes from immigrants seeking U.S. documentation. 

A former intelligence chief for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is 

accused of embezzling more than $180,000 stemming from a travel voucher fraud 

and a kickback scheme that defrauded the Government of more than $500,000. 

Four other ICE employees pleaded guilty to involvement in the scheme to defraud 

the Government. 

In the past year alone, there have been numerous incidents of alleged misconduct 

on the part of TSA Officers and employees. Thousands of dollars in cash and items 

have been reported stolen. 

Dozens of TSA Officers were fired over improper luggage screening because they 

allowed thousands of pieces of luggage onto flights without proper screening. TSA 

Officers have allegedly taken bribes allowing passengers expedited security checks. 
4 

A number of additional allegations range from racially charged statements and actions to inappropriate sexual harassment. 

A recent 22-count indictment alleges TSA employees took payments to provide 

drug couriers unfettered access through Los Angeles International Airport so that 

drugs could be smuggled into the United States. 

Executive branch employees are subject to Executive Orders issued by the President and ethics regulations issued by the U.S. Office of Government Ethics. 

Some agencies also issue supplemental ethics regulations that apply to their employees. Even though there are stacks of Government manuals, training materials, 

and yearly briefings about ethics, lapses continue. They not only waste taxpayer dollars, they are a threat to the security of our Nation. 

While the majority of bureaucratic personnel are law-abiding, this hearing will examine the ethical policies and procedures of selected components of the Department 

of Homeland Security and attempt to understand why these ethical lapses continue, 

and what is being done to prevent them from happening. 

One final note; it is unfortunate the Department of Homeland Security, in the 

face of such serious ethical mishaps, refuses to provide witnesses from leadership 

to discuss these matters in the open before the American public. We requested the 

leadership from CBP, ICE, and TSA. However, only CBP recognized the importance 

of these issues. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

holding today’s hearing examining the ethical standards at the Department of Homeland Security. 

In the beginning I would like to point out there were over 

220,000 Department of Homeland Security employees who work 

every day to secure our homeland from dangerous threats and natural disasters. So, before I begin, I would like to thank them for 

their service. 

Unfortunately there are some among them that use their position 

of public trust for their own personal gain. In doing so they put the 

very Nation they were sworn to protect in harm’s way. 

Since October 2004, 137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

CBP, employees have been indicted or convicted of corruption-related charges. Many coming in recent years as the Border Patrol 

doubled in size. During fiscal years 2010 and 2011 there were at 

least 33 incidents of corruption or mission-compromising corruption 

at CBP. 

Furthermore, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

ICE, Office of Professional Responsibility Investigations, they have 

had investigations and allegations of misconduct occurring at both 

CBP and ICE. The number of allegations pursued by that office is 

staggering. 

In 2012 alone, and this is only May, there have been a total of 

101 corruption allegations involving ICE employees, and 362 from 

CBP. At the Transportation and Security Administration in 2011 

there were three allegations involving corruption, 33 involving security and intelligence violations, and 210 alleged general 

misconducts. 

Although these allegations have not been proven, they are a testament to the fact that eliminating public corruption in the Department of Homeland Security is in dire need of improvement. I am 

therefore pleased that representatives from TSA, CBP, and ICE are 

testifying this morning, and look forward to hearing from them regarding the steps that they are taking to remedy this situation. 

Of course there are other incidents of corruption that we can 

point to. But what sets the situations at ICE, CBP, and TSA apart 

is the risk to National security. That is inherent in the public trust 

violations on the border and at our Nation’s airports. 
5 

I am troubled by allegations of turf battles within the Department and disagreements on who should be in charge. Recent efforts 

have been implemented to improve working relationships among 

DHS, OIG, CBP, Internal Affairs—in addition to CBP Internal Affairs—and ICE Office of Professional Responsibilities. 

I hope that new memoranda of understanding will truly cause 

each agency to understand the delayed investigations as a result 

of internal disputes will not only undermine efforts, they will also 

perpetuate this kind of misconduct. Again I look forward to hearing 

from the witnesses and I thank them for their participation in this 

important hearing. 

I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Keating follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER WILLIAM KEATING

MAY 17, 2012 

There are over 220,000 Department of Homeland Security employees who work 

every day to secure our homeland from dangerous threats and natural disasters. I 

would like to thank them for their service. 

Unfortunately, there are some among them that use their position of public trust 

for their own personal gain. In doing so they put the very Nation they were sworn 

to protect in harm’s way. 

Since October 2004, 137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees 

have been indicted on or convicted of corruption-related charges—many coming in 

recent years as the Border Patrol doubled in size. 

And during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, there were at least 33 incidents of corruption or mission compromising corruption at CBP. 

Furthermore the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional Responsibility investigates allegations of misconduct occurring at both 

CBP and ICE. The number of allegations pursued by that office is staggering. 

In 2012 alone, and this is only May, there have been a total of 101 corruption 

allegations involving ICE employees and 362 from CBP. 

At the Transportation and Security Administration, in 2011, there were 3 allegations involving corruption, 33 involving security and intelligence violations, and 210 

alleging general misconduct. 

Although these allegations have not been proven, they are a testament to the fact 

that eliminating public corruption at the Department of Homeland Security is in 

dire need of improvement. 

I am therefore pleased that representatives from TSA, CBP, and ICE are testifying this morning and look forward to hearing from them regarding steps that are 

being taken to remedy this situation. 

However, ICE, CBP and TSA are not unique in that serious allegations of public 

trust violations occur Department-wide. 

Likewise, DHS is not unique in that each and every Executive branch agency 

faces similar challenges and always have. 

However, what sets these situations apart is the risk to National security that is 

inherent in public trust violations on the border and at our Nation’s airports. 

I am troubled by allegations of turf battles within the Department and disagreements on who should be in charge. 

Recent efforts have been implemented to improve working relations among the 

DHS OIG and CBP Internal Affairs in addition to CBP Internal Affairs and ICE 

Office of Professional Responsibility. 

I hope that new Memoranda of Understanding will truly cause each agency to understand that delayed investigations as a result of internal disputes will only undermine efforts and perpetuate misconduct. 

Again, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and thank them for their participation in today’s hearing. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank the Ranking Member. Other Members of 

the subcommittee are reminded opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 
6 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

Today’s hearing will focus on the ethical standards in place at the Department 

of Homeland Security and allegations regarding employee misconduct at the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and the 

Transportation Security Administration. I would like to say at the outset that these 

three agencies form the backbone of our homeland security enterprise. 

Everyday CBP employees work tirelessly to secure our land and maritime borders 

at and between ports of entry. At ICE—the second-largest Federal law enforcement 

agency—over 20,000 employees enforce Federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. And everyday almost 2 million travelers at 450 airports across the United States depend on TSA employees to implement our multilayered approach to aviation security. 

While we discuss the small percentage that represents the bad apples in the barrel, I want to first acknowledge those that perform their mission with integrity and 

thank them for a job well done. However, as the saying goes, a chain is only as 

strong as its weakest link. It is imperative that the Department take seriously each 

and every allegation of employee misconduct. 

Department of Homeland Security employees come into contact with sensitive, 

sometimes classified, information and, in many instances, are National security interests literally lie in the palms of their hands. As a result, corruption or ethical 

misconduct occurring at the Department can have far greater National security implications than misconduct occurring at other Federal agencies. Therefore, the Department must have robust internal policies, standards, and procedures in place 

that address head-on employee corruption. 

The DHS Office of Inspector General is independent and has the primary authority within the Department for investigating allegations of criminal misconduct 

among Department employees. Yet, the OIG’s budget declined in fiscal year 2011 

and only received a slight increase in fiscal year 2012. Moreover, it is woefully 

understaffed given the size and magnitude of the Department’s mission. 

To put this in perspective, the Department of Homeland Security has over 220,000 

employees. The Department of Health and Human Services has 65,000 employees, 

approximately one-third of the Department’s workforce. Yet, the Department’s OIG 

budget was less than half of the HHS OIG budget in fiscal year 2010 and 2011. The 

HHS OIG had a fiscal year 2010 budget of $312 million and a fiscal year 2011 budget of $342 million. In comparison, the Department’s OIG budget was $151 million 

in fiscal year 2010 and $150 million in fiscal year 2011. 

In light of the OIG being understaffed and underfunded, it comes as no surprise 

that there exists a backlog of cases needing further attention. Moreover, I am concerned about whether the numerous agencies responsible for investigating employee 

misconduct at the component level operate in a cooperative manner with the DHS 

OIG and with each other. Hopefully, the witnesses can shed light on this today. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel 

of witnesses before us here today on this very important topic. 

First, Mr. Charles Edwards is acting inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security. He is a frequent guest here before 

this subcommittee. He assumed this position in February 2011, 

served as deputy inspector general of the Department of Homeland 

Security, has over 20 years of experience in the Federal Government. 

Next we have Mr. Thomas Winkowski who is the acting deputy 

commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In this 

capacity Mr. Winkowski serves as chief operating officer overseeing 

the daily operations of CBP’s 60,000 employees, and manages an 

operation—operating budget of $11.5 billion. He began work with 

the U.S. Customs Service in 1975 as a student. We thank you for 

your service, Mr. Winkowski. 

Next we have Mr. James Duncan who was appointed as assistant 

administrator of TSA’s Office of Professional Responsibility in 

2011. Mr. Duncan has more than 16 years of experience supervising and handling employee misconduct cases at OPR in the Department of Justice, my alma mater as well. 
7 

Next Mr. Tim Moynihan is assistant director at the Office of Professional Responsibility at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He has more than 23 years of experience working for 

the U.S. Government, has been in his current position since 2009 

where he focuses on workforce integrity, personnel screening, inspections, and security management. 

I want to thank all of you for being here today. With that the 

Chairman now recognizes Mr. Edwards for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today about ethical standards 

within the Department of Homeland Security. 

The vast majority of employees within DHS are dedicated civil 

servants focused on protecting the Nation. While a small percentage of employees have committed criminal acts and other gross 

misconduct, those few should not be used to draw conclusions about 

the character, integrity, or work ethic of the many. 

Over the past year DHS employees continue to demonstrate this 

ethic of service from responding to 99 Federally-declared disasters 

to unprecedented efforts to secure America’s borders, and to advances in protecting the Nation’s transportation networks and critical infrastructure, while those who violate their sworn duties, a 

few, even one corrupt agent or officer who allows harmful goods or 

people to enter the country puts the Nation at risk. 

Corruption within the ranks of DHS can have severe consequences. A corrupt DHS employee may accept a bribe for allowing what appear to be undocumented aliens into the United States, 

while unwittingly helping terrorists enter the country. Likewise, 

taking a bribe to allow the entry of what appears to be drug contraband could expose the Nation to weapons of mass destruction such 

as chemical or biological bombs. 

OIG has made investigating employee corruption a top priority. 

Both the personnel and organizational independence of OIG investigators, free to carry out their work without interference by agency 

officials, is essential to maintaining the public trust in not only the 

work of the OIG, but also in the DHS’s workforce as a whole. 

The OIG investigates all allegations of corruption involving DHS 

employees or compromise of systems related to the security of our 

borders and transportation networks. For example, OIG received 

information about that a CBP officer was using his position at a 

large, urban airport to support an international drug trafficking organization. OIG joined a multi-agency investigation led by ICE 

OPR, which led to the dismantling of the entire drug trafficking organization and the arrest of multiple offenders, including the CBP 

officer. 

On at least 19 separate occasions the CBP officer had bypassed 

airport security using his own badge to smuggle money and weapons for the drug traffickers. In December 2010 he was convicted 

and sentenced to 8 years in prison. 

In another case, OIG conducted an investigation into allegation 

of theft involving a transportation security officer at the Orlando 
8 

International Airport. The TSO had stolen more than 80 laptop 

computers, cellphones, and iPods, estimated at $80,000, from passenger luggage over the 3-year period from 2008 to 2011. 

TSA terminated his employment in March 2011. In August 2011, 

the TSO plead guilty to Federal charges of embezzlement and theft 

in connection with the investigation. In January 2012, was sentenced to 24 months of probation. On May 1, 2012, the former acting director of intelligence of ICE plead guilty to defrauding the 

Government of more than $180,000 in a 3-year scheme involving 

fraudulent travel vouchers and time and attendance claims. Sentencing is scheduled for July 2012. 

He faces a likely prison sentence of 18 to 27 months. Three other 

ICE employees and a contractor employee previously plead guilty 

to charges related to the scheme, which cost ICE more than 

$600,000. These examples of intolerable behavior by a very small 

number of DHS employees, each represent a threat to our Nation’s 

security and the public’s perception of DHS and its mission. DHS 

employees are held to the highest standards of professional conduct 

and OIG is committed to aggressively pursuing those who violate 

DHS standards. 

Chairman McCaul, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would 

be happy to answer any questions that you or other Members may 

have. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS

MAY 17, 2012 

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. I am Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General 

of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for inviting me to testify 

today about ethical standards within the Department. 

First, let me state clearly that the vast majority of employees within DHS are 

dedicated civil servants focused on protecting the Nation. While a small percentage 

of employees have committed criminal acts and other egregious misconduct warranting stiff sanctions, including incarceration and removal from Federal employment, those few should not be used to draw conclusions about the character, integrity, or work ethic of the many. Over the past year, DHS employees continued to 

demonstrate this ethic of service—from a historic response to 99 Federally-declared 

disasters, to unprecedented efforts to secure America’s borders, to advances in protecting the Nation’s transportation networks and critical infrastructure. These accomplishments would not be possible without workforce commitment and sacrifice, 

including long hours and time away from families, frequently in demanding work 

environments. I am personally grateful for the hard work and commitment to mission demonstrated daily by the DHS workforce. 

SCOPE OF CORRUPTION ISSUE

As I have testified previously, the smuggling of people and goods across the Nation’s borders is a large-scale business dominated by organized criminal enterprises. 

The Mexican drug cartels today are more sophisticated and dangerous than any 

other organized criminal groups in our law enforcement experience. As the United 

States has enhanced border security with successful technologies and increased 

staffing to disrupt smuggling routes and networks, drug trafficking organizations 

have become not only more violent and dangerous, but more clever as well. The 

drug trafficking organizations have turned to recruiting and corrupting DHS employees. The obvious targets of corruption are Border Patrol agents and Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) officers who can facilitate and aid in smuggling; less 

obvious are those employees who can provide access to sensitive law enforcement 

and intelligence information, allowing the cartels to track investigative activity or 

vet their members against law enforcement databases. 
9 

As demonstrated by investigations led by the Office of Inspector General (OIG), 

border corruption may take the form of cash bribes, sexual favors, and other gratuities in return for allowing contraband or undocumented aliens through primary inspection lanes or even protecting and escorting border crossings; leaking sensitive 

law enforcement information to persons under investigation and selling law enforcement intelligence to smugglers; and providing needed documents such as immigration papers. Border corruption impacts National security. A corrupt DHS employee 

may accept a bribe for allowing what appears to be simply undocumented aliens into 

the United States while unwittingly helping terrorists enter the country. Likewise, 

what seems to be drug contraband could be weapons of mass destruction, such as 

chemical or biological weapons or bomb-making material. While those who turn 

away from their sworn duties are few, even one corrupt agent or officer who allows 

harmful goods or people to enter the country puts the Nation at risk. 

OIG has made investigation of employee corruption a top priority, as we work to 

help secure the integrity of our immigration system, borders, ports of entry, and 

transportation systems. However, our investigations are complicated by the brutality the cartels use to control their organizations and coerce witnesses; and the 

sophistication and advanced technologies available to organizations with unlimited 

money. Drug trafficking organizations use their monetary resources to purchase and 

deploy sophisticated and military grade equipment and weapons to carry out their 

crimes, avoid detection, and evade law enforcement. Criminals use the same sovereign borders they are attempting to breach as a barrier to law enforcement efforts 

to conduct surveillance and collect evidence. 

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN DHS FOR EMPLOYEE CORRUPTION

Through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), Congress established statutory Inspectors General, in part, in response to questions about integrity and accountability and failures of Government oversight. The IG Act charged Inspectors 

General, among other tasks, with preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in agency programs and activities; conducting investigations and audits; and recommending 

policies to promote efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. The position of Inspector 

General was strengthened by provisions in the IG Act creating independence from 

the officials responsible for programs and activities overseen, providing powers of investigation and subpoena, and mandating reporting not just to the agency head but 

to Congress. 

Inspectors General play a critical role in assuring transparent, honest, effective, 

and accountable Government. Both the personal and organizational independence of 

OIG investigators, free to carry out their work without interference by agency officials, is essential to maintaining the public trust in not only the work of the OIG, 

but also in the DHS workforce as a whole. The American public must have a fundamental trust that Government employees are held accountable for their crimes or 

serious misconduct by an independent fact finder. 

The DHS Management Directive (MD) 0810.1, The Office of Inspector General, implements the authorities of the IG Act within DHS. MD 0810.1 plainly establishes 

OIG’s right of first refusal to conduct investigations of criminal conduct by DHS employees, and the right to supervise any such investigations that are conducted by 

DHS internal affairs components. The MD requires that all allegations of criminal 

misconduct by DHS employees and certain other allegations received by the components be referred to the OIG immediately upon receipt of the allegations. 

For statistical and reporting purposes, the OIG classifies its investigative cases 

into four categories: 

(1) Employee Corruption.—Abuse of public office for private gain, financial, or 

otherwise. Examples include: 

• bribery; 

• deliberate disclosure of classified, law enforcement, or National security-related information; 

• theft; 

• espionage; 

• kickbacks; and 

• smuggling. 

(2) Civil Rights/Civil Liberties.—Violations of civil rights or the deprivation of 

personal liberties by DHS employees while acting under color of their official 

authority. Examples include: 

• coerced sexual contact; 

• coercion of a statement from a witness or arrestee; 

• custodial death; 

• detainee/prisoner/suspect abuse; 
10 

• profiling; and 

• excessive use of force. 

(3) Program Fraud/Financial Crimes.—Alleged activity targeting DHS programs and/or financial systems, seeking to defraud the U.S. Government of program tax dollars. Examples include: 

• contract fraud; 

• conflict of interest; 

• grant fraud; 

• misapplication of Government funds; 

• cost mischarging/defective pricing; 

• product substitution; 

• immigration program fraud; and 

• program benefits theft. 

(4) Miscellaneous.—Alleged violations of law or regulations with a nexus to DHS 

programs, employees, or operations (not otherwise classified as Corruption, Program Fraud/Financial Crimes or Civil Rights/Civil Liberties) which may, or may 

not, be criminal in nature, or which reflect unfavorably or suspiciously upon the 

character and integrity of DHS, its employees, or operations. Examples include: 

• child pornography; 

• computer fraud; 

• false statements; 

• harassment; 

• unauthorized personal use of DHS computers/networks; 

• unexplained affluence; and 

• contact with foreign governments/nationals. 

In this context, ‘‘DHS employee’’ means an individual, who at the time of the alleged offense, is appointed, contracted, or officially engaged under authority of law 

in the performance of a Federal function on behalf of DHS. This includes contractor 

employees, interns, Coast Guard military personnel (active and Reserve), Coast 

Guard Auxiliarists, and employees detailed to DHS from other Federal agencies. 

The IG Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, establish a clear 

line of authority for investigating allegations of criminal misconduct by DHS employees. The statutes vest investigative authority in the DHS OIG, with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 

having authority to investigate those allegations involving employees of ICE and 

CBP referred to it by OIG. The CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA) investigates noncriminal allegations against CBP employees referred to it by ICE OPR. 

Component internal affairs units, such as CBP IA, have a crucial complementary 

role to OIG’s criminal investigative function. For example, CBP IA focuses on preventive measures to ensure the integrity of the CBP workforce through pre-employment screening of applicants, including polygraph examinations; background investigations of employees; and integrity and security briefings that help employees recognize corruption signs and dangers. These preventive measures are critically important in fighting corruption and work hand in hand with OIG’s criminal investigative activities. 

Congress has identified the OIG as the focal point for criminal investigations of 

employee misconduct. Within DHS, MD 0810.1 requires referral of all criminal allegations against DHS employees to OIG and prohibits any investigation, absent exigent circumstances, unless the OIG declines the case. DHS OIG operates a hotline 

for complaints which may be accessed through telephone, facsimile, electronic mail, 

or paper correspondence. In March 2004, ICE and CBP established the Joint Intake 

Center (JIC) responsible for receiving, documenting, and appropriately routing allegations of misconduct involving ICE and CBP employees. The JIC is staffed jointly 

by ICE OPR and CBP IA. Both the OIG hotline and the JIC provide DHS executive 

management with insight into the nature and volume of allegations made against 

employees as well as the results of investigations. 

In addition to working closely with internal affairs elements within DHS, we also 

work with ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate. HSI investigates activities arising from the illegal movement of goods and people into, within, 

and out of the United States. HSI investigates human smuggling and smuggling of 

narcotics, weapons, and other contraband that typically form the predicate, or underlying, offense for most border corruption cases. Consequently, we work very 

closely with HSI and ICE OPR on many CBP employee corruption cases. 

DHS OIG RECENT CASE TRANSFER

It is the OIG Office of Investigations’ policy to open all allegations of corruption 

of DHS employees or compromise of systems related to the security of our borders 
11 

and transportation networks. OIG has a total of 219 full-time, permanent criminal 

investigators (GS–1811s) deployed at 33 offices around the country, with a concentration of resources in the Southwest. 

The growth of the OIG workforce necessary to investigate allegations of criminal 

misconduct by DHS employees has not kept pace with the growth of the DHS employee population, now over 225,000 strong, including Coast Guard military personnel. In fiscal year 2010, the OIG Office of Investigations increased by 10 authorized positions to address allegations of criminal wrongdoing across the entire DHS 

workforce. The Border Patrol alone increased to more than 20,700 agents in fiscal 

year 2010, double its size from 2004. With the increasing DHS workforce, by fiscal 

year 2011, the OIG Office of Investigations saw a 38% increase from fiscal year 2004 

in complaints against just CBP employees. The increased complaint volume led to 

increased case openings and the DHS OIG investigative staff was taxed beyond its 

capacity, even with the addition of CBP IA detailees under the provisions of the 

agreement executed between DHS OIG and CBP in August 2011. The average per 

agent caseload is 12, while OIG’s goal is an average caseload of 8. 

Last month, as part of DHS OIG’s commitment to ensuring that all allegations 

of employee corruption are fully investigated, ICE Director Morton and I agreed 

that OIG would transfer approximately 370 OIG initiated investigations involving 

various criminal and administrative allegations against named employees of CBP 

and ICE to ICE for completion. Under the supervision of OIG, these cases will be 

investigated by ICE OPR which will work with investigators from CBP IA and HSI. 

This effort is part of OIG’s effort to leverage all investigatory resources to ensure 

that corruption allegations are swiftly investigated. The actual transfer of case material will be done at the field office level and is expected to be completed no later 

than June 1, 2012. 

Because DHS OIG continues to have oversight of the component internal affairs 

elements, such as ICE OPR, OIG is requiring periodic reports from ICE OPR on the 

status of the transferred investigations until each investigation has been resolved 

or closed. 

DHS OIG INVESTIGATIVE CASE STATISTICS

The charts below show investigative statistics related to indictments, arrests, and 

convictions arising out of OIG investigations involving ICE, CBP, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for fiscal years 2008 through fiscal year 2012 

to date. The numbers show a somewhat steady increase in convictions over this period which may be attributable to OIG’s policy, adopted in 2009, of opening 100% 

of corruption-related allegations. 

ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED INDICTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 

30, 2012 

Fiscal 

Year 

2008 

Fiscal 

Year 

2009 

Fiscal 

Year 

2010 

Fiscal 

Year 

2011 

Fiscal 

Year 

2012 

Year To 

Date 

Total 

CBP ........................... 46 52 54 60 20 232 

ICE ............................ 36 16 28 30 20 130 

TSA ........................... 19 12 10 21 3 65 

TOTAL ........... 101 80 92 111 43 427 

ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED ARRESTS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 30, 

2012 

Fiscal 

Year 

2008 

Fiscal 

Year 

2009 

Fiscal 

Year 

2010 

Fiscal 

Year 

2011 

Fiscal 

Year 

2012 

Year To 

Date 

Total 

CBP ........................... 44 63 92 77 66 342 

ICE ............................ 46 22 32 40 28 168 

TSA ........................... 19 12 14 25 14 84 
12 

ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED ARRESTS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 30, 

2012—Continued 

Fiscal 

Year 

2008 

Fiscal 

Year 

2009 

Fiscal 

Year 

2010 

Fiscal 

Year 

2011 

Fiscal 

Year 

2012 

Year To 

Date 

Total 

TOTAL ........... 109 97 138 142 108 594 

ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED CONVICTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 

30, 2012 

Fiscal 

Year 

2008 

Fiscal 

Year 

2009 

Fiscal 

Year 

2010 

Fiscal 

Year 

2011 

Fiscal 

Year 

2012 

Year To 

Date 

Total 

CBP ........................... 33 51 58 38 33 213 

ICE ............................ 20 21 27 29 14 111 

TSA ........................... 12 10 15 21 8 66 

TOTAL ........... 65 82 100 88 55 390 

Even with the case transfer to ICE discussed above, it remains the OIG Office 

of Investigations’ policy to open all allegations of corruption of DHS employees or 

compromise of systems related to the security of our borders and transportation networks. The OIG continues to work the majority of allegations of the most serious 

criminal misconduct and corruption within DHS. For example, OIG developed information that a CBP Officer was using his position at a large urban airport to support 

an international drug trafficking organization. OIG initiated a multiagency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force investigation that ultimately led to the 

dismantling of the entire drug trafficking organization and the arrest of multiple offenders, including the CBP Officer. 

DHS OIG’s investigation revealed that on at least 19 separate occasions, the CBP 

Officer bypassed airport security using his own airport security badge in order to 

smuggle money and weapons for the organization. In December 2010, he was convicted and sentenced to serve 8 years’ incarceration for money laundering, bulk cash 

smuggling, entering an aircraft area in violation of security procedures, carrying a 

weapon on an aircraft, fraud and related activity in connection with computers, and 

conspiracy to commit marriage fraud. 

The CBP Officer had been employed at CBP since 2003. Suspicions of corruption 

first surfaced in 2008. He did not provide any cooperation during the investigation 

and throughout the sentencing other than his admission of guilt. 

In another case, OIG conducted an investigation into allegations of theft involving 

a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) at the Orlando International Airport. The 

investigation revealed that, over a 3-year period from 2008 through 2011, the TSO 

had stolen more than 80 laptop computers, cell phones, and iPods, estimated at 

$80,000, from passenger luggage while ostensibly performing his duties at the airport. The TSO admitted to fencing the items to a middleman in Osceola County, FL. 

TSA terminated his employment in March 2011. In August 2011, the TSO pleaded 

guilty to Federal charges of embezzlement and theft in connection with the investigation and in January 2012 was sentenced to 24 months probation. This case was 

initiated based on a tip from a coworker reported to the Orlando Police Department 

and was worked jointly with that Department. 

On May 1, 2012, the former Acting Director of Intelligence for ICE pled guilty to 

defrauding the Government of more than $180,000 in a 3-year-long scheme involving fraudulent travel vouchers and time and attendance claims. Sentencing is scheduled for July 2012. He faces a likely sentence of 18 to 27 months in prison and a 

potential fine. Additionally, as part of his plea agreement, he will forfeit the money 

that he wrongfully obtained. Three other ICE employees and a contractor employee 

previously pled guilty to charges related to the scheme. The actions of the individuals cost ICE more than $600,000 in total. 

The former Acting Director of Intelligence personally submitted fraudulent travel 

vouchers and time and attendance claims. However, in addition, he took a share in 
13 

kickbacks of fraudulent proceeds obtained by his subordinates who also submitted 

fraudulent travel vouchers. The case was investigated jointly by DHS OIG, ICE 

OPR, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

CONCLUSION

The above cases are examples of egregious behavior on the part of a very small 

number of DHS employees. These criminal acts represent a threat to our Nation’s 

security and undermine the vast majority of honest and hard-working employees 

who strive to maintain the integrity of the Department. DHS employees are held 

to the highest standards of professional conduct. DHS OIG will aggressively pursue 

those who choose to ignore the standards. 

Chairman McCaul, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Members may have. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Winkowski for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, ACTING DEPUTY 

COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, and 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protections’ ethical standards in our effort to combat corruption and misconduct within our workforce. I would like to begin by recognizing 

the dedication, bravery, and honor demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of CVP agents and officers who put their lives 

on the line each day to protect our Nation. 

As the largest uniformed law enforcement agency in the country, 

CBP deploys over 60,000 agents, officers, and mission support personnel in support of our critical mission of securing America’s borders against threats while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. 

As we continue to see success in our efforts to secure our Nation’s 

borders, CBP employees will continue to be targeted by criminal organizations and individuals that grow more desperate in their attempts to smuggle people and illegal contraband into this country. 

I am here today to discuss the vulnerability and the proactive 

steps we have taken to mitigate this threat. As you mentioned, Mr. 

Chairman, we recognize that public services is our—is a public 

trust. At the center of the CBP’s core values, is integrity. It is of 

the utmost importance to all of our employees—that all of our employees are guided by the highest ethical and moral principles. 

I am proud that the overwhelming majority of the men and 

women in the CPB workforce serve with honor and integrity. While 

only a small fraction of the workforce have engaged in the illegal 

or unethical behavior since the inception of CBP, any such behavior 

disgraces the agency and betrays the trust of the American public. 

One instance of corruption within our workforce is one too many. 

Our commitment to integrity begins as soon as an employee applies 

for employment and continues throughout a CBP employee’s career. 

We utilize multiple tools including improved applicant screening 

and exhaustive background investigations to ensure a thorough 

vetting of the men and women seeking employment with CBP. 

Since 2008, CBP has conducted pre-employment polygraph examinations on law enforcement applications, a critical important tool 

used to screen applicants before placing them on the front line. 
14 

CBP is building the capacity to polygraph 100 percent of all law 

enforcement applications in compliance with the mandates of the 

Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 and is on track to achieve this 

goal well in advance of the January 2013 deadline. 

In addition to pre-employment prevention efforts, CBP has also 

strengthened its capacities and capabilities to detect and investigate corruption within our existing workforce. With approximately 200 experienced investigators Nation-wide, CBP internal affairs uses behavioral science, analytical research methods to flag 

indicators of potential workforce corruption and provide an intelligence-driven response. 

In conjunction with these efforts, we have developed the Analytical Management Systems Control officer—Office—called AMSCO, 

which analyzes data in the ports of entry environment to identify 

anomalies that may indicate potential misconduct. CBP’s Office of 

Field Operations and Office of Border Patrol have also established 

integrity and ethics committees which provide strategic recommendations to combat and—to combat corruption and promote 

integrity in the agencies distinct operational environments. These 

efforts feed into CBP’s Integrated Planning and Coordination Cell, 

or the IPCC. The IPCC, which includes representatives from our 

law enforcement partners, examines best practices and seeks to coordinate integrity-related initiatives within the agency. 

CBP recognizes that collaboration and information sharing is a 

critical factor in maintaining border integrity and effectively addressing allegations of corruption lodged against CBP employees. 

We have established MOUs with the OIG and ICE authorizing the 

co-location of agents in order to assist in investigations of CBP employees. We are also active participants in the 22 FBI lead bordercrossing task forces Nation-wide. Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

subcommittee, integrity is essential to CBP’s identity and effectiveness as guardians of the Nation’s borders. 

I thank you and the Members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today and make clear our core values and strategic approach. I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have. 

[The statement of Mr. Winkowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI

MAY 17, 2012 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, I am Thomas Winkowski, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It is a privilege and an honor to appear before 

you today to discuss CBP’s efforts to address issues concerning corruption and misconduct in which CBP employees are involved. Ensuring the employees of CBP conduct themselves with integrity and in accordance with the ethical standards so critical to the positions of public trust they occupy is of the utmost importance to CBP. 

CBP has taken several preemptive and proactive steps to reinforce with all its employees the standards of conduct to which they must adhere both on and off duty. 

These efforts include recruiting applicants of the highest integrity and moral character to become members of the CBP workforce; developing and enhancing ethics 

and integrity training delivered on a recurring basis throughout all levels of the organization; implementing methodologies and utilizing existing information and technology to enhance early detection of potential employee misconduct; enhancing our 

internal affairs program which includes the use of polygraph examinations in the 

hiring process for CBP law enforcement applicants; establishing an investigative 

support capacity within the Office of Internal Affairs (IA); and reinforcing a unified 
15 

message that honor comes first and all employees must maintain their personal and 

professional integrity as public servants. 

BACKGROUND

As America’s frontline border agency, CBP is responsible for securing America’s 

borders against threats, while facilitating legal travel and trade. To do this, CBP 

deploys a multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of our borders 

while facilitating the flow of lawful people and goods entering the United States. 

This layered approach reduces our reliance on any single point or program that has 

the potential to be compromised. It also extends our zone of security outward, ensuring our physical border is not the first or last line of defense, but is instead one 

of many. Ensuring the continued integrity of the CBP workforce is essential to the 

successful execution of the CBP mission. 

CBP is the largest law enforcement agency in the country. We deploy over 60,000 

law enforcement officers and mission support personnel along the U.S. borders, at 

ports of entry and overseas on a continuous basis in support of our critical border 

security mission. Not only do our officers and agents serve under difficult circumstances and in dangerous environments, they do so in an environment where 

transnational criminal organizations attempt to exploit our workforce for criminal 

gains. 

After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP experienced a level of growth in personnel resources unprecedented in the history of U.S. 

law enforcement. Since the creation of CBP in March 2003, the U.S. Border Patrol 

more than doubled in size to a force today of 21,370 agents. During that time, CBP 

hired extraordinary men and women, many of whom continue to serve our country 

with great distinction and integrity every day. During the same period of time, CBP 

integrated the Office of Field Operations from the workforces of CBP’s legacy agencies and grew the capabilities of the Office of Air and Marine to its current level. 

The overwhelming majority of the men and women who comprise the CBP workforce serve with honor and integrity, adhering to the high standards demanded of 

CBP personnel. Our high standards are reflected in the quality of the people we 

hire, as well as in how we train and evaluate our employees. Central to our standards is an absolute commitment to integrity. Without integrity we cannot accomplish the mission which the Nation has entrusted to us. Our commitment begins at 

the time of application for employment with CBP and continues throughout the careers of our officers, agents, and mission support personnel. It defines our relationship with one another and the Nation we serve. 

While the overwhelming majority serve with honor and integrity, a small minority 

have disgraced the agency and betrayed the trust of the American public and their 

fellow CBP employees by engaging in illegal and unethical behavior. Since October 

1, 2004, 138 CBP employees have been arrested or indicted for acts of corruption 

including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. During this same period more than 2,000 CBP employees have been charged in other 

criminal misconduct, including off-duty behavior that serves to undermine the confidence of the public that we serve. 

CBP takes all allegations of misconduct and corruption very seriously and is addressing the issue of misconduct and corruption through a comprehensive strategy 

that integrates prevention, detection, and investigation capabilities to deter and, 

when necessary, rectify incidents of corruption and misconduct in the CBP workforce. No act of corruption or misconduct within our agency can or will be tolerated. 

CBP’s leaders, including myself, are committed to creating and maintaining an organization in which all employees have the strength of character and support to reject 

all opportunities for corruption, in whatever form they may take, and to reveal them 

when discovered. 

The standards cited above form the basis of CBP policy with regard to integrity 

and are in complete alignment with the mandates of Public Law 111–376, the AntiBorder Corruption Act of 2010. This law requires that by January 2013, all CBP 

law enforcement applicants must receive a polygraph examination before being 

hired. The law further requires that CBP initiate all periodic personnel reinvestigations that were overdue for initiation and that Congress receive bi-annual reports 

on CBP’s progress toward meeting these requirements for a period of 2 years. These 

requirements—background and periodic investigations as well as polygraph examinations—are consistent with, and form the basis of, a comprehensive workforce integrity plan. 

CBP’s comprehensive integrity strategy includes improved initial screening of applicants, pre-employment polygraph examinations of law enforcement candidates, 

and an exhaustive background investigation that commences upon the initial selec-
16 

tion of a prospective employee. Each tool is capable of identifying vulnerabilities 

that the other cannot, and in combination allow for a thorough vetting of the men 

and women seeking employment with, or employed by, CBP. Periodic reinvestigations of an employee’s background are conducted every 5 years throughout an onboard employee’s career and may identify emerging integrity and conduct concerns 

that have the potential to impact execution of the CBP mission. 

Currently, CBP is working diligently to increase its capacity to polygraph all applicants for law enforcement positions consistent with the statutory requirements. 

Polygraph exams, properly administered, can be a valuable tool to screen law enforcement applicants and to help ensure workforce integrity; and where possible, for 

use with on-board employees on a voluntary or exculpatory basis. 

Logistically, in an effort to increase efficiencies in the background and periodic reinvestigation processes, the IA is moving to a paperless environment. This effort will 

allow CBP to most efficiently and effectively leverage its financial and human resources. Based upon our progress to date, CBP is on track to fully meet the requirements 

of the Anti-Border Corruption Act, including implementation of 100 percent testing 

of all applicants for CBP law enforcement positions by January 2013. Additionally, 

CBP will complete its backlog of periodic reinvestigations by June 30, 2012 and will 

remain current with initiation of periodic reinvestigations that will continue to come 

due in future years. 

TRAINING

Throughout an employee’s career, CBP provides training that focuses on integrity, 

ethics, and ethical decision making as part of an anti-corruption continuum. When 

employees initially join CBP they receive training promoting workforce integrity as 

part of CBP’s New Employee Orientation program. Newly-hired CBP law enforcement officers receive an expanded level of mandatory integrity and ethics instruction as part of the basic training curriculum. 

Recurring integrity training is also an integral part of the advanced and specialized training for CBP employees beyond their initial entry on duty. This training, 

combined with proper leadership, oversight, and management at all levels of the 

agency fosters a culture of personal accountability and integrity within CBP. It 

clearly communicates the standards of conduct with which all CBP employees must 

comply and identifies the consequences of engaging in inappropriate behavior. Most 

importantly, periodic in-service training equips CBP employees with the tools they 

need to recognize, report, and respond to integrity challenges they will encounter 

both on- and off-duty. 

Our focus on integrity is not limited to our non-supervisory personnel. CBP supervisory and leadership training programs such as Supervisory Leadership Training, 

Incumbent Supervisory Training, the Second Level Command Preparation, the CBP 

Leadership Institute, and the Department’s Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program incorporate classroom instruction and a series of practical exercises that prepare CBP leaders to guide and direct the workforce in a manner that 

promotes personal integrity and accountability through critical thinking and integrity-based, ethical decision making. 

ADDITIONAL INTEGRITY PROGRAMS

In 2006, IA was tasked with promoting the integrity and security of the CBP 

workforce. Since then, IA has aggressively reconstituted and reinvigorated its internal investigative capability as part of a comprehensive strategy to counter the 

threat of workforce corruption. The IA staff now includes nearly 200 experienced investigators who investigate employees suspected of misconduct and assist in investigations of corruption, as well as personnel responsible for the prevention and detection of these acts within prospective and on-board employees. 

IA’s comprehensive strategy integrates prevention, detection, and investigation capabilities to deter, identify, and respond to corruption and serious misconduct in the 

CBP workforce. The strategy includes background investigations as explained previously, as well as security clearances; employee misconduct investigations; physical, 

informational, industrial, internal, and operational security; and management inspections. 

The integrity strategy includes the application of behavioral science and analytical 

research methods designed to flag indicators of potential workforce corruption. 

These tools support an intelligence-driven response to potential instances of corruption. 

In 2011, CBP convened the Integrity Integrated Planning and Coordination Committee (IPCC). This committee is a collaborative effort amongst internal CBP compo-
17 

nents and its external law enforcement partners. The Integrity IPCC allows each 

participating entity to openly discuss integrity-related issues and ideas and to share 

best practices among the members. 

In concert with IA’s efforts, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) has taken significant steps to utilize its resources to identify operational data anomalies. Under the 

leadership of OFO’s Analytical Management Systems Control Office (AMSCO), CBP 

law enforcement officers and agents use CBP’s automated systems to analyze crossing, referral, and results data to identify anomalies that may be indicative of integrity issues. This analysis is especially important as CBP continues to implement 

new systems to process travelers and cargo electronically in a more efficient and effective manner. The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) also works in collaboration with 

AMSCO and IA to identify and mitigate any potential threats. 

When AMSCO identifies an anomaly in the manner in which a CBP employee is 

performing his duties, the office works collaboratively with IA to mitigate any potential threat to the CBP mission. As a result of the excellent work AMSCO is doing, 

CBP has already identified and corrected operational vulnerabilities that created potential opportunities for employee corruption. The efforts AMSCO has undertaken 

have also resulted in the development of new approaches, methodologies, and tools 

that, once fully tested, will be deployed at the ports of entry to identify performance 

deficiencies and counter potential acts of corruption as well as serve as an important 

training and instructional tool. 

The OFO also established the OFO Integrity Committee, composed of members 

from Headquarters Office of Field Operations, the Directors of Field Operations, 

Port Management, CBP IA, OBP, and Human Resources Management Labor and 

Employee Relations. The objectives of the OFO Integrity Committee include reviewing various types of misconduct and corruption cases regarding OFO employees that 

have resulted in arrests; analyzing misconduct and corruption trends to determine 

what actions OFO can take to eradicate those types of behavior; and assessing current OFO integrity initiatives. OFO has also established Integrity Officers within 

each of its 20 Field Offices. These officers act as liaisons to field personnel on integrity issues and are a conduit to headquarters for potential integrity concerns. Integrity Officers participate in local task forces, committees, and working groups, and 

collaborate with various Federal law enforcement agencies to provide assistance in 

operational inquiries, research, and analysis to assist in the detection and deterrence of corruption and misconduct. 

The U.S. Border Patrol has an Integrity Advisory Committee (IAC)—comprised of 

selected field leadership ranging from first-line Supervisory Border Patrol Agents 

through members of the Senior Executive Service—to proactively combat the threat 

of corruption within its ranks. The IAC provides a strategic analysis of 

vulnerabilities to corruption that can exist due to the unique nature of the Border 

Patrol operating environment and provides recommendations to effectively address 

and reduce vulnerabilities. In addition, the Border Patrol has established ethics 

committees in the majority of its 20 sectors—many of which have integrated with 

other CBP offices in a cooperative effort to build greater character and integrity 

within the workforce. 

CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS

Beyond our proactive measures to prevent corruption before it begins, CBP is prepared to address allegations of employee corruption and misconduct in a timely and 

effective manner to ensure the integrity of the border. CBP maintains a cadre of 

experienced IA agents assigned to headquarters and 22 Internal Affairs field offices 

strategically located throughout the United States where the potential threat of 

workforce corruption is most acute. CBP coordinates its internal investigative activities with the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement’s Office of Professional Responsibility (ICE OPR), the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), and numerous other Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement authorities. Effective collaboration and information sharing among the 

Federal agencies that have a stake in border corruption is a critical factor in maintaining border integrity and security and effectively addressing allegations of corruption lodged against CBP employees. 

These efforts were enhanced in December 2010, when CBP and ICE executed a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that established protocols for IA agents and 

ICE OPR to collaborate in CBP employee-related misconduct and corruption investigations. The collaboration of CBP IA and ICE OPR agents in these CBP employeerelated investigations provides a level of insight and dialogue not previously available to the CBP leadership team and has increased CBP’s and ICE’s combined ability to ensure the integrity of the border. 
18 

In August 2011, CBP entered into a similar MOU with the DHS OIG and deployed approximately 14 CBP IA agents to OIG offices across the United States. 

Today, CBP IA agents are working side-by-side with DHS OIG agents in approximately 90 CBP employee-related investigations of alleged corruption and misconduct. 

CBP is striving to more effectively and expediently use existing administrative authorities to mitigate the threat caused by CBP employees accused of corruption during the course of an investigation. This may include reassignment to administrative 

duties, administrative leave, indefinite suspension, suspension of law enforcement 

authorities, or other appropriate actions. Where a preponderance of evidence indicates that a CBP employee is engaged in corruption or serious misconduct, CBP 

managers will take appropriate actions without undue delay to address the issue 

and where appropriate, remove the employee from his or her position. This forwardleaning approach provides CBP with the flexibility to address the threat posed by 

employee corruption and misconduct in a manner that reduces the impact on the 

agency, its mission, and its responsibilities to the American public. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Keating, integrity is central to CBP’s 

identity and effectiveness as guardian of the Nation’s borders. It is the cornerstone 

of leadership and success not only for an organization such as CBP, but also for individuals. I thank you and the Members of the subcommittee for the opportunity 

to appear today and make clear our core values and strategic approach. I will be 

pleased to answer any questions that you might have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Winkowski. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Duncan for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES G. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. DUNCAN. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is 

a privilege and an honor to appear before you today. Every day 

nearly 57,000 full-time TSA employees work to ensure the security 

of our Nation’s vast transportation networks. TSA employs riskbased, intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks 

and reduce the vulnerability of our transportation network to terrorism. 

Our goal is to maximize security while protecting privacy and facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce through a 

multi-layered system of transportation security. TSA’s workforce 

accomplishes its security mission by screening passengers and baggage at more than 450 airports in the United States. Every week, 

we vet 14 million passenger reservations and 13 million transportation workers against the terrorist watch list. 

Our efforts facilitate the secure air travel for 1.8 million persons 

each day. Success of our mission depends upon the dedication and 

integrity of our workforce. Therefore, everything we do at TSA, 

from hiring, promotion, and training to inspections, investigations, 

and adjudications, is driven by our commitment to the highest ethical standards. Administrator Pistole has made clear that integrity, 

professionalism, and hard work are the bedrock principles for the 

entire TSA workforce. 

When a TSA employee fails to live up to our high standards, he 

or she violates the public trust, tarnishes the excellent work of the 

rest of our workforce, and damages TSA’s reputation with the 

American people. For that reason, we hold all of our employees to 
19 

the same high professional and ethical standards and we have zero 

tolerance for any kind of criminal activity in the workplace. TSA’s 

Office of Human Capital publishes the policies that govern employee conduct. All employees are required to know our standards 

and to re-review them on an annual basis. 

To further assist, TSA’s on-line training center provides training 

to all new or first-time TSA supervisors to give them the tools to 

identify, report, and prevent misconduct. When allegations or incidents of misconduct arise, they are investigated by TSA’s Office of 

Inspection, an independent investigative arm of the agency that reports directly to the TSA administrator and deputy administrator. 

The Office of Inspection reviews allegations and reports them to 

the DHS Office of the Inspector General and conducts investigations if the OIG elects not to handle them themselves. 

The Office of Inspection also proactively conducts independent 

oversight inspections of operational programs, procedures, and policies, both in the field and at TSA headquarters. The inspections 

check on compliance and equally important, they provide employees an opportunity to raise allegations of misconduct in a confidential setting. To promote consistency, timeliness, and accountability 

in the disciplinary process, TSA has created an Office of Professional Responsibility, OPR. OPR adjudicates all allegations of misconduct involving senior-level officials and law enforcement personnel. 

OPR officials also review each reported investigation involving a 

TSA employee where the investigation is conducted by the Office 

of Inspector General. Working with TSA’s Office of Human Capital, 

OPR is developing a unified database that will allow us to track 

all disciplinary matters throughout the agency. This is going to 

help us promote consistency and accountability. OPR has also created greater consistency and transparency in the entire TSA disciplinary system by creating a table of offenses and penalties. The 

table, which is available to all TSA employees, provides ranges of 

penalties for each type of offense and guides the decisions of officials both at OPR and in the field. 

As we strive to continue strengthening transportation security 

and improving the overall travel experience for all Americans, we 

always bear in mind that the success of our mission depends on the 

integrity of our workforce. The freedom to travel is a—is fundamental to our American way of life and TSA is fully committed to 

ensuring that everyone can do so securely. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be pleased to address 

any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Duncan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES G. DUNCAN

MAY 17, 2012 

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about 

the importance of ethical standards and professional standards of conduct in workforce issues related to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

SECURITY DEMANDS DILIGENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Both in the field and at headquarters, the nearly 57,000 full-time employees who 

comprise the TSA workforce are tasked daily with ensuring the security of people 
20 

and commerce that flow through our Nation’s vast transportation networks. TSA 

employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks and 

to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism. Our 

goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving 

terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce. TSA’s security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. 

The TSA workforce occupies the front line in executing the agency’s transportation security responsibilities in support of the Nation’s counterterrorism efforts. 

These responsibilities include security screening of passengers and baggage at 450 

airports in the United States that facilitate air travel for 1.8 million people per day; 

vetting more than 14 million passenger reservations and over 13 million transportation workers against the terrorist watch list each week; and conducting security 

regulation compliance inspections and enforcement activities at airports, for domestic and foreign air carriers, and for air cargo screening operations throughout the 

United States and at last point-of-departure locations internationally. 

The success of TSA’s mission is ultimately dependent upon the dedication and 

professionalism of our workforce. While technology and instruction manuals support 

our efforts, it is our people that protect travelers. Public service is a public trust 

and demands adherence to the highest ethical and personal conduct standards. As 

public servants charged with protecting the Nation’s vital transportation systems, 

we owe the American people nothing less. All aspects of our workforce regimen— 

hiring, promotion, retention, training, proactive compliance inspections, investigations, and adjudications—are driven by adherence to the highest ethical standards. 

TSA Administrator Pistole has made clear that integrity, professionalism, and hard 

work are bedrock principles and expectations that he has for the entire TSA workforce. 

Whenever a TSA employee fails to live up to TSA’s high standards of conduct and 

violates that public trust, the security standards that all of our employees work so 

hard to establish and maintain are tarnished. In addition to diminishing the hard 

work of colleagues, the misconduct of any employee can damage TSA’s reputation 

with the American people. TSA holds all of its employees to the highest professional 

and ethical standards and has a zero tolerance for criminal activity in the workplace. Accountability is an important aspect of our work, and TSA takes prompt and 

appropriate action with any employee who does not follow our procedures and engages in misconduct. 

A DEDICATED WORKFORCE ADHERING TO PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

TSA is fortunate to employ a diverse workforce. Approximately 23 percent of our 

employees have served our Nation honorably in uniform through prior military experience. Our commitment to recruiting and hiring veterans continues, and TSA 

continues to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense, veterans groups, 

and other outside agencies towards that end. We are also proud of the dedication 

our workforce has to the mission. Overall attrition including full-time and part-time 

employees was 7.2 percent in fiscal year 2011. This is a significant decrease from 

18 percent in fiscal year 2004. As TSA marks its 10th anniversary, the average 

Transportation Security Officer (TSO) has been with the agency nearly 6 years and 

more than half have spent more than 5 years on the job. 

With many members of the TSA workforce dealing directly with the public at airport checkpoints and in other transportation venues, and with a large number of 

employees occupying sensitive security positions, their conduct is held to the strictest standards. TSA’s Office of Human Capital (OHC) provides the workforce with 

policies governing employee conduct, which state that conduct directly affects the accomplishment of employee duties and emphasizes the importance of public trust in 

the success of TSA’s mission. 

TSA has outlined employee responsibilities and conduct in policy documents that 

address a broad range of employee matters, including behavior towards the public, 

use of alcohol and illegal drugs on- or off-duty, reporting requirements for arrests 

and criminal activities, and other fitness for duty requirements. The Employee Responsibilities and Conduct policy is communicated to all employees during employee 

orientation and all employees are required to read and certify that they have read 

and understand this policy. This policy requires all employees to seek advice and 

guidance as needed concerning their responsibilities through their supervisory 

chain, local Human Resources Specialist or ethics counselor. To further assist employees, TSA’s Online Learning Center provides required training on ethics in the 

Federal Government for all new, first-time TSA supervisors to enable them to iden-
21 

tify and report situations that may result in waste, fraud, or abuse, or the appearance of trying to influence a person or situation for personal or private gain. 

ACTING AFFIRMATIVELY TO ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT

The overwhelming majority of TSA employees meet and exceed the highest ethical 

and professional standards of conduct. While allegations and incidents of misconduct 

arise from time to time, such cases are investigated by TSA’s Office of Inspection 

(OOI), which reports directly to the TSA Administrator and Deputy Administrator. 

OOI reviews allegations and complaints made against TSA employees, reports all 

allegations to the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and conducts investigations when necessary. OOI conducts investigations in accordance with the standards published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, 

and consults with appropriate law enforcement or other Government officials regarding specific allegations or complaints. The Office prepares and issues a comprehensive report of investigation of criminal and/or administrative matters to appropriate TSA management officials. OOI also proactively conducts independent 

oversight inspections of operational programs, procedures, and policies at TSA headquarters and at our Nation’s airports to check on compliance and afford employees 

an opportunity to discuss allegations of misconduct in a confidential setting. 

ADJUDICATING INSTANCES OF EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT

TSA has a streamlined disciplinary process in comparison to most other Federal 

agencies. Leveraging the flexible personnel authority that Congress provided under 

the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA requires only a 7-day advance 

written notice period for disciplinary actions as compared with the 30 days advance 

written notice required under Title 5. More significantly, TSA’s policy includes a 

one-step removal action, which allows TSA to remove immediately TSOs whose misconduct involves theft, illegal drug and on-duty alcohol usage, and intentional serious security breaches. TSA’s streamlined disciplinary process enables TSA to act 

quickly to ensure that employees are held accountable for any misconduct. 

To promote consistency, timeliness, and accountability in the disciplinary process, 

TSA created the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which performs its responsibilities through a combination of direct adjudication and oversight. First, OPR 

adjudicates all allegations and misconduct involving employees and law enforcement 

personnel, reviews evidence, and determines whether to charge the employee with 

misconduct. Additionally, the OPR Appellate Board, a unit within OPR, adjudicates 

the appeals of adverse actions—removals and suspensions of 15 days or more— 

taken against the uniformed workforce. Finally, OPR has visibility into all misconduct cases adjudicated in the field by officials outside of OPR. Working with 

TSA’s OHC, OPR is helping to develop a database that will afford OPR and OHC 

insight into all disciplinary actions throughout the agency to drive consistency and 

fairness throughout the agency. 

OPR has promoted greater consistency and transparency in the entire TSA disciplinary system by creating and implementing a Table of Offenses and Penalties. 

The Table, which is available to all TSA employees, provides ranges of penalties for 

each type of offense and guides the decisions of officials both at OPR and in the 

field. OPR has also worked to promote greater efficiency and timeliness for disciplinary actions by introducing specific time lines for investigating and for adjudicating 

allegations of misconduct. These steps have resulted in integrity and efficiency built 

into the disciplinary system. 

CONCLUSION

As we strive to continue strengthening transportation security and improving the 

overall travel experience for all Americans, we must always remember that our success is defined, in large part, by the conduct of our people. Whether it is for business 

or for pleasure, the freedom to travel from place to place is fundamental to our way 

of life, and to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at TSA is fully committed. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am pleased to address 

any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. 

Let me just say that while we certainly appreciate your presence 

here today, we did request a witness at a higher policy level, either 

Administrator Pistole or his deputy. I think it is important to have 

someone at the policy level to discuss these important issues and 

yet TSA failed to produce that witness. 
22 

Next, the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Moynihan for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY M. MOYNIHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Good morning. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the ways in which ICE upholds DHS standards 

for integrity and professionalism. 

The overwhelming majority of ICE employees demonstrate the 

highest levels of integrity and perform their duties with honor 

every day. However, as in any large organization, isolated acts of 

employee misconduct do occur from time to time. 

My testimony today focuses on the mechanisms that are in place 

to ensure robust process for investigating allegations of employee 

misconduct and ensuring the integrity of the ICE mission. 

Since the creation of DHS, the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility has been delegated the authority to investigate allegations 

of criminal and administrative misconduct committed by ICE and 

CBP employees. 

Although we refer allegations of misconduct to the DHS Office of 

the Inspector General for review and potential acceptance, many 

are referred back to ICE OPR for appropriate investigative action. 

ICE has a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates training, prevention, detection, and investigation capabilities to deter 

and respond to misconduct in the ICE workforce. 

This strategy involves collaboration with other law enforcement 

entities, a vigorous comprehensive screening process for new hires 

and education and training of existing employees. 

OPR is comprised of three operational divisions that play a major 

role in maintaining the highest level of ethical standards. The investigations division conducts criminal and administrative misconduct investigations through personnel maintained in 26 field offices Nation-wide and in Puerto Rico. 

OPR field offices are responsible for investigating allegations of 

criminal and serious administrative misconduct, reporting investigative results to the principle offices, conducting field-delivered 

integrity training to ICE employees, and providing integrity guidance to all offices within their areas of responsibility. 

The Inspections Division reviews ICE offices, programs, and detention facilities to ensure compliance with agency regulations, 

policies, and applicable detention standards in order to provide executive management with an independent review of the agency’s 

organizational health and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 

the overall ICE mission. 

Finally, the security division is responsible for the implementation of agency-wide security programs including personnel, physical, information, operational, and counterintelligence. 

Screening employees on the front end is an important step we 

take toward ensuring the integrity of our mission. 
23 

ICE’s vigorous screening process includes pre-employment security checks followed by full background investigations and periodic 

background investigations every 5 or 10 years. 

In addition, once employees are on board, we apply proactive 

training measures and oversight and management of employees at 

every level to ensure the integrity of the ICE workforce. 

In addition to the training provided by ICE OPR, the ICE Ethics 

Office provides training and guidance to all ICE employees with respect to the standards of the conduct and the Federal conflict of interest statutes. 

Collaboration among Federal agencies is critical to the mission of 

enhancing employee integrity. 

In 2010, ICE and CBP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding whereby CBP internal affairs investigators are assigned 

to OPR field offices to participate in all investigations of CBP employee criminal misconduct; thus enabling CBP management to 

make informed decisions when considering alternative administrative remedies. 

This collaboration has solidified ICE’s commitment to providing 

CBP with complete and timely awareness of involvement and 

criminal investigations of CBP employees. 

Recently DHS OIG transferred approximately 370 cases to OPR 

regarding criminal and administrative allegations involving ICE 

and CBP employees. The cases regarding CBP employees would 

work in conjunction with CBP internal affairs and OPR will provide monthly status updates to DHS OIG. 

In summation, we have taken aggressive proactive steps toward 

ensuring that all allegations of misconduct within the agency are 

swiftly addressed. We do everything we can to uphold the agency’s 

values. 

I speak for Director Morton when I say that ICE’s leadership is 

proud of the integrity and professionalism of our workforce. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today 

and for your continued support of ICE and its long—law enforcement mission. 

[The statement of Mr. Moynihan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY M. MOYNIHAN

MAY 17, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the ways in which U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upholds the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) standards for integrity and professionalism. The ethical 

and integrity issues faced daily by ICE and our employees are neither straightforward nor easy to resolve; however, ICE provides priority attention to these issues 

and is heavily invested and effective in ensuring that our employees uphold the 

public’s trust and confidence. 

ICE is the principal investigative agency with the largest team of criminal investigators in DHS. With more than 20,000 employees Nation-wide and in 47 countries, 

ICE promotes homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil 

enforcement of Federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE’s primary priorities are to prevent terrorism and enhance security; protect 

the borders against illicit trade, travel, and finance; and protect the borders through 

smart and effective interior immigration enforcement. 
24 

The overwhelming majority of ICE employees demonstrate the highest levels of 

integrity and perform their duties with honor every day. However, as in any other 

large organization, isolated acts of employee misconduct do occur from time to time. 

My testimony today will focus on the mechanisms put in place to ensure a robust 

process for investigating allegations of employee misconduct and ensuring the integrity of the ICE mission. 

THE ICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigates allegations of 

criminal and administrative misconduct involving ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees. OPR also contains an inspection branch that ensures ICE operates consistently with the high standards we promulgate to regulate 

our program offices and civil detention system. OPR is also responsible for the employee suitability and security clearance processes. We accomplish this mission by 

preparing comprehensive reports of investigation in a thorough and impartial manner for judicial or management action; conducting inspections and reviews of ICE 

offices and detention facilities to assess adherence to policies and applicable standards; and managing a layered security approach in order to protect ICE personnel, 

facilities, and information from criminal and/or terrorist organizations. 

Roles and Responsibilities 

Since the creation of DHS, OPR has been delegated the authority to investigate 

allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct committed by employees of 

ICE and CBP. Although DHS policy requires ICE and all other component agencies 

to refer allegations of misconduct to the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

for review and potential acceptance for investigation, many are referred back to 

OPR for appropriate investigative action. OPR is staffed by a workforce of criminal 

investigators who have an expert knowledge of immigration and customs laws, regulations, and procedures. 

In 2010, ICE and CBP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) ensuring that the integrity of DHS employees remains critical to fulfilling the DHS 

mission. ICE and CBP have established a program whereby CBP Office of Internal 

Affairs investigators are assigned to OPR field offices to participate in the investigations of CBP employee criminal misconduct, thus enabling CBP management to 

make informed decisions when considering alternative administrative remedies. 

This collaboration was not always available prior to the MOU, and has solidified 

ICE’s commitment to providing CBP with complete and timely awareness and involvement in criminal investigations of CBP employees. 

Recently, the DHS OIG transferred approximately 370 cases to OPR regarding 

criminal and administrative allegations involving ICE and CBP employees. The 

cases regarding CBP employees will be worked in conjunction with the CBP Office 

of Internal Affairs (IA). OPR will provide monthly status updates to the DHS OIG. 

Composition of the Office of Professional Responsibility 

OPR comprises three operational divisions that play a major role in maintaining 

the highest level of ethical standards: Investigations, Inspections, and Security. OPR 

has a current staff of 517 full-time equivalent employees, including 265 criminal investigators. 

The Investigations Division conducts criminal and administrative employee misconduct investigations through personnel maintained in 26 field offices across the 

United States and Puerto Rico, including an investigative unit based at ICE headquarters in Washington, DC. OPR field offices are responsible for investigating allegations of criminal and serious administrative misconduct; reporting investigative 

results to principal offices; conducting field-delivered integrity training to ICE employees; and providing integrity guidance to all offices within their areas of responsibility. 

The Inspections Division also evaluates and inspects ICE offices, programs, and 

detention facilities to ensure compliance with agency regulations and policies and 

applicable detention standards. This Division reviews ICE offices, programs, and 

processes in order to provide executive management with an independent review of 

the agency’s organizational health and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

overall ICE mission. 

The Security Division is responsible for the implementation of agency-wide security programs, including personnel, physical, information, operational, and counterintelligence. 

In fiscal year 2011, ICE and CBP’s Joint Intake Center (JIC), which serves as the 

central clearinghouse for receiving, processing, and assigning allegations of misconduct involving ICE and CBP employees and contractors, received 10,374 
25 

unconfirmed allegations of misconduct and other reportable information. Most of the 

information reported to the JIC is less serious in nature and is best addressed by 

referring the matter to ICE and CBP management for review and appropriate action. As a result, OPR initiated over 1,030 investigations resulting in the criminal 

arrests of 16 ICE and CBP employees and 70 civilians, 86 indictments and 55 convictions. OPR also completed 265 administrative investigations involving ICE employees. Some of the violations investigated included bribery, narcotics smuggling, 

theft of Government money/property, wire fraud, and the trafficking of counterfeit 

goods. The civilian arrests consisted largely of impersonation of DHS officers or 

agents and attempted bribery of DHS personnel. These arrests reflect the commitment ICE personnel have in maintaining the highest levels of integrity, and can be 

attributed to continual integrity awareness education and training. 

COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRITY STRATEGY

ICE has a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates training, prevention, 

detection, and investigation capabilities to deter and respond to misconduct in the 

ICE workforce. This strategy involves collaboration with other law enforcement entities, a vigorous comprehensive screening process for new hires and education and 

training of employees. OPR’s investigative strategy is a multi-layered approach utilizing the full capabilities of the three operational divisions previously mentioned. 

Collaboration 

OPR collaborates with numerous other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

authorities in criminal misconduct investigations. This collaboration among Federal 

agencies is critical to the mission of enhancing employee integrity. 

One noteworthy example of this collaboration is the corruption investigation of 

former CBP Officer (CBPO) Devon Samuels in Atlanta, Georgia. CBPO Samuels utilized his position of trust with CBP to bypass Transportation Security Administration security measures at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport to 

smuggle narcotics, currency, and firearms for a major Jamaican drug trafficking organization. This OPR-led investigation was conducted in close coordination with various Federal and State law enforcement partners, including ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations; the DHS OIG; CBP IA; the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Internal Revenue Service; the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia; the DeKalb County 

[Georgia] Police Department; the Jamaica Constabulary Force; and the corporate security department for Delta Air Lines. Through a coordinated effort, the investigation resulted in a total of 17 arrests, 18 indictments and the seizure of 15 firearms, 

1 kilogram of cocaine, 314 pounds of marijuana, over 750,000 units of ecstasy, and 

over $226,400 in U.S. currency. CBPO Samuels pled guilty to conspiracy to commit 

money laundering and trafficking in firearms and was sentenced to 8 years’ incarceration. 

Another significant example of collaboration is the investigation of former ICE 

Special Agent (SA) Jovana Deas. Former SA Deas utilized her position of trust to 

access law enforcement databases illegally, and shared the accessed information 

with members of a drug trafficking organization which included members of her 

family. The investigation was conducted by OPR and the FBI under the auspices 

of the Southern Arizona Border Corruption Task Force. Former SA Deas was arrested and on February 1, 2012, pled guilty to a 21-count indictment for misuse of 

a Government computer; false statements; conversion of public money, property, or 

records; obstruction of agency proceedings; and conspiracy. SA Deas’s matter is 

pending sentencing. 

Comprehensive Screening Process for New Hires 

ICE requires a vigorous screening process for new applicants. This includes preemployment security checks, followed by full background investigations and periodic 

background investigations every 5 or 10 years (depending on the sensitivity level of 

the position). OPR then administers a continuous evaluation program, a method of 

evaluating people after their initial investigation and adjudication. These evaluations depend on employees and supervisors to report misconduct as well as events 

that could potentially have a significant effect on an employee’s personal finances, 

thereby potentially making them susceptible to committing acts of fraud. 

Education and Training 

Once a new employee begins working for ICE, we apply proactive training measures and oversight and management of employees at every level to ensure the integrity of the ICE workforce. This professional development continues throughout the 
26 

entire careers of all employees. ICE also developed a mandatory annual Integrity 

Awareness Program Training for all employees, which reinforces the standard that 

every employee is responsible for upholding the integrity of ICE. The course encompasses sections on integrity, professional conduct, and reporting misconduct. 

All new law enforcement agents and officers, as well as all new supervisors, receive integrity training at the ICE Academy. ICE OPR also conducts periodic integrity presentations to ICE programs which emphasize that actions and decisions by 

employees can often have implications that not only affect the individuals involved, 

but also DHS as a whole. 

In addition, ICE OPR also provides numerous information security-related training courses/briefings to the ICE workforce. The subject matter of the training programs include counter-intelligence awareness, operational security, foreign travel 

threats, security awareness, and classified information protection. The ICE OPR-developed training is designed to provide the ICE workforce with information that will 

assist them in performing their duties effectively and in a safe manner. In addition 

to the training provided by ICE OPR, the ICE Ethics Office provides training and 

guidance to all ICE employees with respect to the standards of conduct and the Federal conflicts of interest statutes. All new employees must complete the ICE ethics 

orientation for new employees within 90 days of coming on board. In addition, all 

required financial disclosure filers receive mandatory ethics training annually. 

For years, ICE OPR has provided anti-corruption outreach training to international law enforcement partners. The training program informs our strategic allies about procedures used by OPR to combat corruption and other criminal misconduct. The program is coordinated through the ICE Office of International Affairs, 

the U.S. Department of State, and the World Customs Organization. 

As noted earlier, ICE has offices in 47 countries, in addition to our domestic offices. In furthering its efforts to promote integrity in the foreign environment, ICE 

OPR provides pre-deployment integrity presentations for ICE employees departing 

for long-term foreign assignments, as well as mandatory on-site integrity training 

when conducting inspections of foreign offices. 

CONCLUSION

ICE takes employee misconduct extremely seriously, and we are heavily invested 

in addressing these issues to ensure that ICE upholds the public trust and conducts 

its mission with integrity and professionalism. Thank you again for the opportunity 

to testify today, and I would now be pleased to answer any questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Moynihan. 

Let me also reiterate, we certainly appreciate you being here and 

your testimony. We requested that either Director Morton or someone at—or a deputy or a policy level to appear before this committee and unfortunately your agency failed to produce that witness. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes 

for questioning. 

You know, I worked in the public integrity section in the Department of Justice. I serve now on the ethics committee and so I have 

always believed that the public service is a public trust. While the 

vast majority of your employees are honest and hard-working, unfortunately the actions of a few bad apples taint the entire organization. 

The purpose of this hearing is not to taint the overall organization at all, but rather it is to look at the specific abuses and determine how can we fix the problem. 

I will go with each agency. I will start with you, Mr. Winkowski. 

CBP, you know, the allegations of Border Patrol agents, CBP officers working with drug traffickers to facilitate their business is just 

unconscionable. You know the threat from a National security 

standpoint and you know that they are trying to infiltrate our organization. 

I want to first start and ask you about your polygraphs that you 

do conduct with employees prior to employment. If you can elabo-
27 

rate on what some of your findings have been in terms of these preemployment screenings. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

that question. 

As I mentioned in my oral interview, we have begun—we began 

doing polygraphs in 2008 and we have done about 10,000 polygraphs, about 400 a month come January 2013 under the Anti-Border Corruption Act that we mandated to do all law enforcement officers. We will meet that mandate of 2013. As a matter of a fact, 

we will meet that mandate sometime this summer. 

So this summer, we will have 100 percent of our law enforcement 

officers undergoing a polygraph prior to coming on board as a law 

enforcement officer. 

So of those 10,000 polygraphs that we have done, we have discovered a whole host of individuals that apply to be the Border Patrol 

agents or Customs and Border Protection officers and the polygraph was able to identify individuals that had a very, very questionable past. 

Let me just give you several examples, Mr. Chairman. We had 

a case where between 2002 and 2009 applicant smuggled several 

bundles of marijuana within the United States and was paid $200. 

On at least there occasions, the applicant personally unloaded 

duffle bags of drugs from vehicles and stored them at his—at this 

residence and the applicant also accepted $1,000 in exchange for allowing vehicles loaded with marijuana to be stored at his home. 

So the polygraph was able to identify that and obviously the employee was not hired for a law enforcement position. 

In another example, in March 2009, the applicant and a friend 

became involved in transportation of cocaine and marijuana. The 

applicant’s friend profited an unknown amount of the transportation of marijuana and he profited from $3,500 for the transportation of the cocaine. 

So we have these individuals that, in some cases I believe, their 

sole purpose of wanting to become a Customs and Border Protection officer or a Border Patrol officer is to infiltrate us. The way 

in which we have robust background process while we have 

AMSCO-type systems that I talked about in my oral reply and data 

mining and looking for anomalies, we really believe that the polygraph is going to be a real game changer for us. 

So we are ready for that. We have been doing polygraphs, but 

come this summer will undergo one. 

I think one of the things, also that both you and the Ranking 

Member has talked about is the National security positions. I view 

the CBPs and the Border Patrol agents as National security positions. As such, I think we need to take a different view of that position. 

So for example, while we are starting the polygraph prior to their 

employment and weeding out those individuals that are deceptive, 

our data indicates that really a—an officer goes on the other side 

at about 8.8 years into service. 

So the question becomes, while we have data mining and we are 

doing AMSCOs and doing—looking for anomalies and we have the 

periodic reinvestigations every 5 years, I think we need to be looking at polygraphs throughout the employee’s career. I think that is 
28 

very, very important and we will work with the Office of Personnel 

Management towards that end. 

But I couldn’t agree more with what you said and Mr. Keating 

said about the National security positions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, let me say I agree with you that it really is 

a National security issue and I think the cases that you discussed 

in terms of pre-employment screening with polygraphs demonstrates that they are trying to infiltrate our law enforcement. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. There are other law enforcement agencies that require post-employment polygraphs and you and I talked about this 

yesterday; can you tell me some of the hurdles because, you know, 

as a former public corruption prosecutor, usually the corruption occurs after employment—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. After they have been down on the border or—— 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. Points of entry where they are then 

corrupted by organizations with high dollar amounts to infiltrate 

the United States with drugs and human trafficking. 

So can you elaborate on what would be the challenges and hurdles to require post-employment polygraph? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. One of the challenges we have is working 

through the hiring policies that we have in the Office of Personnel 

Management and I will make it very clear, we have not approached 

the Office of Personnel Management on this particular issue but we 

will do that. 

I have asked my staff to begin the process of identifying what 

those hurdles are. So, you know, the Anti-Border Corruption Act 

clearly gives us the authority on the pre-employment. We need to 

work through internally, with our personnel offices as well as the 

Office of Personnel Management, to look at what it will take to do 

polygraphs from a standpoint of—at the time of the periodic reinvestigations and in between those periods of time, whether it is 

looking for reasonable suspicion or looking at more like a drug 

screening type of process where randomly we do polygraphs. 

I think we have a lot to learn from other agencies that employ 

polygraph on a more routine basis and we are going to undertake 

that endeavor. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, let me just say, I would like to work with you 

and CBP and I hope the Ranking Member would like to join me 

in this in terms of changing that policy. Certainly if any legislation 

is required to—making that change, I think this is vitally important. I will try to keep my time limited, but Mr. Duncan, turning 

to TSA, allegations and indictments of TSA employees stealing personal belongings of passengers, improper luggage screening, which, 

you know, after we saw the latest attempt out of Yemen to potentially smuggle a explosive device onto an airplane, again a National 

security issue. 

We can’t afford to have corrupt TSA officers. So what is TSA 

doing to address that? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, there are three aspects to TSA’s efforts to 

prevent and detect the kind of corruption that the committee is 
29 

justly concerned about. The first echoes what Mr. Winkowski has 

discussed in terms of background checks to make sure that we are 

not hiring people into TSA who are going to be problems. In the 

last 3 years, our background checks have actually disqualified more 

than 5,600 applications who were subjected to criminal history 

checks, financial checks, and other mechanisms to make sure that 

we are not bringing people in who have vulnerabilities. 

The second aspect really has to do with prevention. We have undertaken various prevention initiatives in the wake of scenarios 

such as Honolulu where we did determine that there was a large 

number of bags not being screened or subject to security. Some of 

the working groups that we have created in the wake of Honolulu 

have focused on identifying tools the local leadership can use to 

prevent and detect violations of our security protocols. 

I know there are some recommendations that they have come up 

with working in conjunction with our investigative office and those 

recommendations are focusing on metrics and on other kinds of reports that can be used by field leadership so that we can, you 

know, identify difficulties before they blossom into full-blown corruption. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes, let me—because my time is limited. A 22- 

count indictment TSA employees took payments to provide drug 

couriers unfettered access through the Los Angeles International 

Airport so that drugs could be smuggled into the United States. 

That is outrageous and really unacceptable. I understand what you 

are trying to do pre-screening. As I understand it, you mentioned 

a system—a tracking system that you are implementing to—basically a systematic tracking system to look at these—this misconduct. 

You have 400 different offices out there. Yet it is not integrated 

into one system. I understand you are trying to develop that. When 

do you anticipate that that will be completed? 

Mr. DUNCAN. I don’t have a specific time frame for you, sir. But 

I know as a result of the IG audit that has recently been released, 

that the TSA is working, not just on coming up with a workable 

single definition of security breaches, but to overhaul its reporting 

system so that security breaches are reported consistently. That 

they are validated and that the headquarters gets the information 

from all 450 airports so they can study it and come up with more 

comprehensive—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Again when—what is the time frame when this 

would be completed? 

Mr. DUNCAN. I will have to get back to you on that, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The TSA integrated database is a case tracking system that currently supports 

the investigation and disciplinary action activities of the Office of Inspection (OOI), 

the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), and the Office of Human Capital, 

Employee Relations (ER). The integrated database is web-based, which permits authorized users to access the system TSA-wide. All disciplinary matters, whether 

handled by OPR at TSA Headquarters, or by ER users at more than 400 airports, 

are input into the system and are accessible to authorized users to promote consistency of adjudication. 

In addition, when each case is input, it is coded to the relevant section of the TSA 

Table of Offenses and Penalties, which will enable all adjudications to be tracked 

for consistency. At present, the integrated database is ‘‘live’’ and all cases are 

uploaded into it. The contractor with whom TSA is working—Lockheed Martin—has 
30 

represented to TSA that it will incorporate the OOI Hotline into the system, and 

continue with system improvements and enhancements. Lockheed Martin should 

have the full functionality of an integrated reporting capability complete this fall. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay, I would appreciate that. Moving onto—to 

ICE. You know, accepting thousands of dollars in bribes to provide 

documentation, you know ties to drug trafficking organizations. 

This is exactly the kind of thing that terrorists want to exploit, getting documentation to get into the United States and attack the 

American people. Again this is—it is just really unacceptable. What 

are you doing within ICE to remedy this? 

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman we have a vigorous pre-employment screening process and thorough background investigation to 

try to weed out those individuals, you know on the front end prior 

to employment. Subsequent to that, it was constant. All new employees go through ethics and integrity training. We have an annual requirement to take an integrity awareness program, which is 

a policy for all employees to kind of refresh our responsibilities and 

rules of conduct. 

All new supervisors attend—get extensive integrity training at 

the ICE Academy, as well as all law enforcement officers, a much 

more extensive integrity training. We put out constant guidance regarding the guidelines in reporting employee misconduct. Oftentimes information is received from a co-worker or colleague that 

sees that something is not—doesn’t seem right or they have actual 

information. 

So we kind of—constantly going back and educating the workforce and making sure that they know what the standards of integrity, what the agency expects from them, and the proper ways to 

report that. I discussed briefly about—we have offices located Nation-wide. You know, upon receiving the allegation, we are required 

to refer it to the DHS OIG and either may be working the investigation collaboratively with them. But if they decide to not retain 

that for investigation, refer it back to our office and you know, we 

would address it as swiftly as possible. 

Mr. MCCAUL. In conclusion, we need to move on. I did look to 

some of your manuals. There really—doesn’t seem to be any overarching policy within ICE and there is no specific ethics policy for 

ICE employees. It is very generic. I would ask that you maybe go 

back and look at that in terms of specific ethics policies that you 

could direct towards your employees. A lot of this is just commonsense though. You know as I said, a public service is a public trust. 

When you see that violated in these egregious examples, it is just 

unacceptable and again they are—overall though, the majority of 

employees are honest and hardworking. Do a great job every day. 

With that I now recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of comments 

I want to make first. First of all, taxpayers are spending enormous 

amounts of money to try and make sure that safety is ensured in 

their travel. American citizens are going through enormous personal intrusions themselves. Going through the gate, getting 

screened, getting scanned, having their belongings gone through. 

This is a very serious matter and I would think given the fact that 

our security and what the public puts into this, that at this hearing 
31 

we would at least get the people that were requested from TSA and 

from ICE to show up. 

That to me says something about how seriously they are taking 

this issue, or how not seriously they are taking this issue. Now I 

want to be clear about that in the beginning. Second, this is just 

an old saw that we have had. It is before my time here as well. 

The 9/11 Commission has made it clear that one of the primary 

problems that has to be addressed is the issue of jurisdiction. This 

patchwork quilt of jurisdictions conflicting with each other, still is 

with us. 

It seems in every hearing we have, it is an underlying theme 

that we have and I think it is here again today. So it prompts a 

couple of questions I have. Mr. Edwards and Mr. Winkowski, last 

year in testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Commissioner Bersin stated, and I 

quote, ‘‘That there is more than tension and friction between CBP, 

IA, and DHS IOG.’’ So between Customs and Border and Department of Homeland Security, there was ‘‘outright confrontation and 

an unacceptable situation.’’ 

The fact that CBP and OIG, both part of one Department of 

Homeland Security, had to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding in the first place for OIG to perform a function that statutorily belongs to that office, raises some grave concerns. Has the inclusion of CBP IA employee as required by that memorandum, improved that cooperation at all? Even though we had to do that to 

get there, has that improved the situation? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Senator for the question. August 11 

of last year I signed the MOU with Commissioner Bersin. I can assure you that we have taken every step to work closely. In a number of my offices I have CBP IA agents working closely jointly with 

us, some cases. There is absolutely no turf battle. OIG, CBP, and 

ICE, we are all working together because this is not just a DHS 

problem, this is a problem for the entire Nation. We want to make 

sure that we address each investigation effectively and in a timely 

manner. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Just a couple of comments. I agree with Mr. 

Edwards that the MOU I believe has done a good job of really laying out the path forward. As Mr. Moynihan had indicated, cases 

are being transferred from the IG over to ICE, and CBP is part of 

that process. So I think we have come a long way since former 

Commissioner Bersin’s testimony. 

Mr. KEATING. Just a couple of questions too that came to mind. 

If it is possible to give us a generalization. The bulk of the people 

that have been involved in this corruption, unethical conduct, what 

is their salary range for—I know, you know I just want to get a 

generalization. How much are these people getting paid? Most of 

them that are committing these things? 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. I would say in the average of a base salary 

when you look at a Border Patrol agent or a CBP officer at the GS– 

12 level, which I think is about $75,000.00 a year. Then there is 

overtime associated with that. Especially when you look at the 

Southwest Border, they are some of the highest-paying individuals 

down there in some of those communities. 
32 

Mr. KEATING. A question for Mr. Edwards? Your office’s primary 

authority over the investigation instances of public corruption and 

employee misconduct within the Department of Homeland Security. 

However, you have the right of first refusal there as well. Now recently there has—that right has been heavily exercised. Your office 

has transferred hundreds of cases to CBP and ICE to handle. What 

contributed to that? 

Was it a result of a backlog that you did that? What contributed 

to that backlog if that is what led to this? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Sure. Thank you, sir. We have 2,360 open cases. 

I have 219 agents. Clearly the workload for each agent is more 

than 12 cases per agent. I have been working actively with CBP 

to have their agents detailed to our office to work the cases jointly. 

There is 38 percent increase in Border Patrol allegation corruption 

in the last several years. Border Patrol agents have doubled in size. 

OIG has not had the resources that he had requested. 

In short, I cannot keep piling up these cases. I need to act on it. 

This is a DHS problem that we have to address. So, under my supervision I have transferred 374 cases of named subjects to CBP— 

I mean ICE OPR, the CPB IA folks have detailed over there. 

I am not transferring any CRCL cases. It is employee corruption, 

program fraud, and miscellaneous cases; 301 of those cases are 

CPB cases and 73 of those cases are ICE cases. Still, because ICE 

OPR has an average right now of about 41⁄2 cases per agent. So, 

clearly I am taking their resources and you know in some of my 

FEMA fraud cases an agent is carrying 22 to 25 cases. 

So, clearly we need to—you know I cannot keep taking these 

cases long time to close. I need to address them quickly and bring 

resolution to these cases quickly. So, for this one time on the 

named subjects we took that effort. 

All of those 2,260 cases, 40 percent of them are unnamed subjects. We have an analysis group to vet those unnamed cases. But 

CBP also has those resources. So does ICE. So, our intention on 

this is to work jointly on those unnamed subjects and try to see if 

we can come up with some leads on that and then investigate. 

So, I think you know talking to John Morton and David Adler 

this is a joint effort. This one time I am fairly confident with the 

systems we have put in place. With this initiative we are going to 

address this problem effectively and as soon as possible. 

Mr. KEATING. It is partially resulting in your budget situation—— 

Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. And your—situation. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. KEATING. All right. I want to be clear on that. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. The gentlelady from 

New York is recognized. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank all 

of our panelists for coming in to share their insights with us this 

morning. I want to follow up and pick up on Mr. Keating’s last 

question, and ask that both Mr. Edwards and Mr. Moynihan respond to this. 
33 

From fiscal year 2010 to the present ICE OPR has received a 

total of 26,983 allegations of employee misconduct. Some involve 

corruption while others did not. In any event, this number is extremely high. In addition to investigating these matters I want to 

know, does ICE OPR work with ICE at large, and CBP, to incorporate lessons learned from these investigations into new standards and procedures? 

Given what you just stated, Mr. Edwards, having to deal with 

the budgetary constraints, you know how does this actually work 

out when ICE seems to have a whole host of their own investigations to conduct? I mean, I think if you add up all of the allegations 

together I don’t even know how personnel is able to manage. But 

that is for you to answer. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for your question. 

Even for OIG the complaints we have received in fiscal year 2012 

so far has been 10,438. Nonetheless, I think even before these investigations this is—there needs to be—and all the components are 

doing is the proactive effort in terms of the prescreening, the preemployment screening, background investigation, integrity briefing, 

and ethics briefing; we do a number of those as well. Also let the 

employees know what to look for when there is potentially fraud 

happening. Then when the allegation comes in you know we go to 

the vetting process just like ICE does the same vetting. When a 

criminal case is there then we work jointly not only with ICE OPR, 

with ICE HSI, with FBI, with any number of partners jointly because you know the more aggressively we try to do this is going 

to get to a resolution sooner. So, looking at our caseload and what 

ICE has presently I think this effort that we have taken on is going 

to address these problems quickly. 

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you, ma’am. 

You know first I would like to—you know the Joint Intake Center is like the central clearinghouse for ICE and CBP for reporting 

allegations of misconduct as well as other reportable information. 

That is a collaborative effort. It actually sits in CBP’s office space 

and it is staffed by both ICE and CBP Internal Affairs personnel. 

So, which is a great working relationship and a collaboration that 

has existed since the creation of DHS. 

The number represented as far as allegations, those are actually 

items that were reported to the Joint Intake Center so—and they 

involve less degrees of misconduct or items such as lost, missed 

things, stolen property—things that are not necessarily allegationbased. 

So, that number seems much larger then. It is things that we 

want to document and ensure there is a proper record of. But not 

all those 26,000 allegations are true allegations of misconduct and 

warrant investigation. I can get back to you as far as the specific 

number of what was. 

From our case inventory perspective, we have about 600 cases in 

our inventory right now. Then in addition to the 374 that Mr. 

Edwards will be transferring here shortly. But we are working 

closely with CBP Internal Affairs, full participation, we—during 

this transfer. 

Obviously it is a big lift. You know it is a large number of cases 

at one time. We set up teams together to triage, look at cases that 
34 

have, you know, viable leads and most egregious allegations that 

are showing us the greatest vulnerability. We will do that as collaboratively in an effort to address them as quickly as possible and 

the most serious—— 

Ms. CLARKE. My question is what happens with those employees 

who are—who have alleged to do something? Do they remain in 

their posts? You know, how was that handled? Because you know 

certainly we are concerned about the public and their interactions 

with these individuals who have alleged to have some sort of misconduct, whatever that may be, and also their colleagues. Sometimes one bad apple can spoil a bunch. So, how is that managed? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, ma’am. I also want to, before answering your question about the number of open cases, I just want to 

make it clear you know we have open cases and we have closed 

cases. But as you may know that a lot of cases that we have done 

all the investigations that we have done and then we are waiting 

for some judicial action. So, there is another category that really 

is not classified. We have within our systems working with our 

partners here we are going to classify another like a J-case. Many 

law enforcement agencies have the J type-of cases. 

While we are carrying on with this criminal investigation we also 

get the—we want to get the administrative portion of it working as 

well because a lot of times there is the U.S. attorney is not going 

to accept the criminal—as a criminal case. We want to make sure 

that we have done enough work on their administrative front end 

so the components can take quick administrative action. So, it is 

a dual-front end that we have worked with the components. 

Ms. CLARKE. Do you want to add anything to that, Mr. Moynihan? 

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Ma’am, I was just going to say that you know 

every case stands on its own merits. You know just the receipt of 

an allegation, depending on egregiousness or as the case develops 

and evidence is developed; you know we work closely with whether 

it is ICE management or CBP management to make a decision of 

whether that vulnerability of leaving that person in that particular 

position, the vulnerability is too great. 

We may need to put them onto administrative duties while the 

investigation continues or reassign them; or depending on the level 

of evidence and seriousness or the level or position of that individual, they may be put on administrative leave or things. But that 

would be—each case would be—would stand on its own and the 

facts and circumstances of that would be—would help us base that 

decision. 

Ms. CLARKE. If you just indulge me for a moment, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Winkowski, I think that you looked as though you may have 

had something to add. 

Mr. WINKOWSKI. Yes. I would just like to add a couple of issues 

here, a couple thoughts. I think you know it is very, very important 

that these allegations be worked quickly. So, we have a responsibility to exonerate people as well. When someone writes a—and I 

think the panelists would agree with me on that. We have a responsibility to do that. 

But we also have a responsibility if we have an individual that 

is under some kind of suspicion that we really need for that inves-
35 

tigation to move quickly because that individual is still on the line, 

if you will, is still processing people. They are still processing 

cargo. Once we are notified by the investigation and the investigators that there is an issue, we will take that person off the line and 

put them in administrative duties as Mr. Moynihan said. 

Once an indictment takes place and that individual is put on 

what we call indefinite suspension and then it is dealt with 

through the court systems. Right now we have about 11 people that 

are on indefinite suspension. To the other point of your question, 

ma’am, was—and I think it is a really good point here—what do 

we do after that? So, we have the investigation. There is an indictment. There is a conviction. You know what do we do next? 

What we do in CBP is through our Office of Internal Affairs, we 

dissect that. We look at where the vulnerabilities are, what do we 

need to do from a standpoint of changing policies or changing processes so our management controls or internal controls so it doesn’t 

happen again? So, it is a constant layer effect that we have implemented in CBP, which I think is very, very important from the 

standpoint of making inroads in this very, very important subject. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me just in closing associate myself with the 

Ranking Member’s remarks. In terms of the seriousness of these 

charges and indictments and convictions, Federal law enforcement 

bribes taken by TSA to improperly screen luggage. You know first 

of all, stealing personal belongings as people go through these 

screeners all the time and scanners. Yet the idea that TSA officials 

are stealing personal property. 

But beyond that as a National security implications, the idea 

that a TSA officer would take a bribe to allow thousands of pieces 

of luggage to go through improperly screened, or to allow drug trafficking organizations to have unfettered access. This is precisely 

what the terrorists are looking for; ICE providing, you know, fraudulent documentation. You know, all these cases that we look at 

are—they are trying to get things through airports, improper 

screening, improper documentation, that is exactly the way they 

are trying to exploit, you know and then of course CBP, you know, 

taking bribes from drug cartel organizations. 

Given the seriousness of this, I do first want to say thank you 

to CBP for Mr. Winkowski, for you showing up at the policy level, 

but I do want to express my extreme disappointment that TSA and 

ICE, given these allegations—and not just allegations but proven 

fact—did not bring forth the policy-level witnesses that we requested. So it sends a signal to the Congress that either they are 

not taking it very seriously or these officials are just trying to hide 

from the American people. 

So I am not very happy with that. I, again, associate myself with 

the Ranking Member, with his remarks. 

With that, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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