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i 

75–669 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–147] 

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS— 

NOW AND ACROSS THE FUTURE YEARS 

DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 26, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JAMIE LYNCH, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 26, 2012, Civilian Workforce Requirements—Now and Across 

the Future Years Defense Program .................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 26, 2012 .......................................................................................... 33 

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2012 

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS—NOW AND ACROSS THE 

FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 3 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Farrell, Brenda, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Military 

and DOD Civilian Personnel Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office 7 

Vollrath, Frederick E., Principal Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for 

Readiness and Force Management, U.S Department of Defense ..................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Farrell, Brenda ................................................................................................. 50 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 37 

Vollrath, Frederick E. ...................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 74 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 74 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 79 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 98 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 97 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 100 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 99 

(1) 

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS—NOW AND 

ACROSS THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 26, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished witnesses to today’s hearing that will focus on civilian 

workforce requirements now and across the future years’ defense 

program. 

I particularly want to thank our witnesses for their patience during this series of votes, and we apologize to you for the delay. 

The civilian workforce provides an invaluable contribution to the 

DOD [Department of Defense] mission, both at home and abroad, 

frequently deploying to the combat zones alongside military and 

contractor personnel. 

I welcome this discussion today and the opportunity to better understand how the Department of Defense is forecasting its future 

workforce requirements and balancing the critical skills required 

across all components of its workforce. 

Additionally, I want to understand the impact of directed reductions. 

Right now, there are two possible reductions that could negatively impact the civilian workforce in the short term: sequestration, and the proposed Senate NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] language. 

Let us start with the Senate committee-passed language that directs civilian and service contractor workforce reductions commensurate with military end-strength through fiscal year 2017, which 

would be expected to be in excess of 5 percent. 

Based on the numbers provided in fiscal year 2013, simple math 

would suggest that more than 39,000 civilian full-time equivalents 

would be eliminated. 

Next, we have sequestration. Nobody wants it to happen, most 

especially not me. But we have been talking about it for a while 

and it appears that there is little to no planning associated with 

this legislative mandate. 
2 

Assuming an exemption for military personnel, we calculate 

there would be an approximate 11.3 percent reduction across all 

other counts. Again, simple math would suggest that an additional 

89,000 civilians would be eliminated. 

When you add the two figures, we are talking about more than 

128,000 people. And informally, some in the Pentagon have indicated that sequestration alone could be as high as a quarter of the 

total civilian workforce or almost 200,000 people. 

The result of any such cuts, particularly without analytical underpinning, would be long-term irreversible damage to the workforce. And let us not forget the costs that would have to be calculated to implement, and the sunk cost from the first quarter of 

the year. 

Fundamentally, I have opposed any effort without the necessary 

details that support the proposal. 

In the case of the Senate reductions and the mindless implementation of sequestration, both appear to lack any basis in fact or reason. That is why I believe the more prudent approach to managing 

the civilian and contractor workforce is to assess the requirement 

and then to shape the workforce to meet those decisions. 

I look forward to discussing all of these issues later in this hearing. 

So where does that leave us? 

Well, according to the statutory requirement in 10 U.S.C. 1597 

[Title 10 United States Code 1597], any involuntary reductions in 

force require notification both to Congress and the employee. So if 

sequestration were to take effect in January, DOD would be required to notify us at the end of September. 

In light of potential reductions, what generally concerns me is 

the Department of Defense is planning for its future workforce requirements and negotiating the appropriate balance among civilian 

contractor military personnel. 

Since 2001, GAO [Government Accountability Office] has listed 

Federal human capital management as a government-wide highrisk area because of the need to address current and emerging critical skill gaps that are undermining agencies’ abilities to meet their 

vital missions. 

And we know that approximately 30 percent of the DOD workforce and 90 percent of its senior leaders, are eligible for retirement 

as early as 2015. 

I look forward to hearing about what analysis DOD has undertaken to identify and document critical skills and competencies required in each component of the workforce, particularly should directed reductions occur, and what recommendations GAO has for 

that DOD process. 

We were also recently notified that the Department just extended 

its civilian personnel cap through fiscal year 2018. 

Does that presume that budget is driving DOD workforce requirements or vice versa? 

And I look forward to clarification of how this cap is not in direct 

contradiction to the statutory requirement set forth in 10 U.S.C. 

129 [Title 10 United States Code 129], which clearly precludes any 

constraint or limitation in terms of maximum number of employees. 
3 

We, in Congress, and namely this subcommittee have exercised 

great oversight of civilian workforce issues to ensure DOD best 

plans for its requirements. 

Total force management in particular directs a holistic perspective of workforce requirements across civilian, military, and contractor personnel. However, I am not convinced that we even have 

perfect knowledge into our civilian requirements. 

I look forward to our discussions today and delving into these 

topics further. We need to exercise appropriate oversight of the 

process to ensure that sequestration, or other reductions, do not 

blindside our workforce. They deserve to know what lies ahead and 

it is our job to ensure the public is informed. 

Joining us today to discuss the DOD civilian workforce are two 

distinguished witnesses: Mr. Frederick Vollrath, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management at the Department of Defense; and Ms. Brenda Farrell, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

We thank you both for being here. We are looking forward to 

your testimony. 

I would now like to recognize my friend, the ranking member, 

Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I welcome our witnesses today. And we appreciate your testimony before the subcommittee. 

The Department of Defense—— 

Testing. 

The Department of Defense civilian personnel workforce provides 

a critical support to our warfighters. The civilian workforce is essential to making our country’s military so effective. 

The civilian workforce provides experience. They provide expertise and continuity. I personally value continuity of staff within 

programs and offices at DOD. 

I cannot emphasize enough how important the civilian workforce 

is to our Nation’s defense. 

Management of the civilian workforce is especially important in 

an era of austere budgets. Strategic human capital management is 

slowly evolving in the Department of Defense, but too slowly, in my 

opinion. 

Congress has made it very clear that we want requirementsbased management of the total force to include military, civilian, 

and contractor personnel. In fact, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 called for DOD to develop a strategic 

plan for managing its civilian workforce to include analysis of any 

gaps in capability. 

As late as last year in the fiscal year 2012 NDAA, Congress further refined the requirements of this report to provide guidance for 

DOD in regard to total force management. 
4 

The most current strategic workforce plan was submitted by 

DOD in March of this year. And GAO will complete its review of 

the most current plan by next month. 

Congress has provided the DOD the statutory tools necessary to 

shape the workforce, but it is going to take continued leadership 

on this matter to make sure that it is done right. 

Having clear requirements-based civilian personnel management 

in place avoids the pitfalls that come with arbitrarily cutting the 

workforce. 

I appreciate that Ms. Farrell, in her testimony, highlighted the 

risks associated with the last civilian workforce downsizing. And 

that was in 1990. 

Those cuts to personnel were void of any requirements-based decisions. And as such, DOD took significant risk with its civilian 

workforce, supporting certain capabilities. 

This was never more evident than in the downsizing of the acquisition workforce and the problems that DOD faced with acquisitions during the middle of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In sequestration, cuts to civilian personnel would need to be requirements-based so that we don’t assume more risks than is absolutely necessary. We know that the current budget situation will 

require the Department of Defense to downsize the civilian workforce. But this process must be rational and not arbitrary. 

As such, I hope that our witnesses this afternoon will touch on 

the Senate’s proposed language in their version of this year’s Defense Authorization Bill that calls for arbitrary cuts to the civilian 

workforce and what impact or risk is associated with this approach. 

I also hope that our witnesses can touch on the lessons learned 

from former Secretary Gates’ efficiencies initiative, the impacts of 

which are still being felt in terms of caps on hiring and targeted 

civilian personnel reductions. 

What has been learned from these initiatives and having those 

lessons being incorporated into the revised strategic workforce 

plan? 

I am concerned that cuts to the civilian workforce have been focused on meeting budget targets rather than a comprehensive analysis of requirements and capabilities that need to be retained in 

DOD. 

Finally, before we see any further arbitrary cuts in the civilian 

workforce, it is imperative that the Department of Defense provide 

Congress with the inventory of contractor services that are supporting the Department. 

We need more information to make the difficult decisions that 

will be required with our current budget situation. Total force management is only successful when good planning, good information, 

and solid leadership are in place to manage human capital. 

And again, I look forward to this discussion with our witnesses. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding this time. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. 

And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent that it be made in order to depart from regular order, so that 

members may ask questions that follow the train of thought from 

the preceding member. I think this will provide a roundtable type 
5 

forum and will enhance the dialogue on these very important 

issues. 

Without objection, that is so ordered. 

Now, Mr. Vollrath, we would love to hear your opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK E. VOLLRATH, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT DEFENSE SECRETARY FOR READINESS AND 

FORCE MANAGEMENT, U.S DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

and other members of the subcommittee. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Vollrath, you might want to put that microphone up a little closer. Sometimes they are a little finicky. 

Thank you. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Thank you. 

The civilian workforce must be addressed within the larger context, as you all have mentioned, of the Department’s total force of 

the Active and Reserve military, the civilians and the contracted 

service. 

As we look to the future we must continue to strive to achieve 

the most effective, efficient, and appropriate mix of our workforce. 

The Department’s current plans, reflected in the President’s 

budget request for fiscal year 2013, represent a carefully coordinated approach that addresses operational needs, satisfies mission 

requirements and recognizes the fiscal constraints. 

Our future plans require us to align capabilities and costs for all 

elements of the total force. As discussed in greater detail in my 

written statement, these elements cannot be managed in isolation 

if we are to avoid the hollow force and unnecessary expense. 

Total force management is complex. It is a lifecycle process used 

to ensure the Department’s capabilities are enabled by a mix of 

military, civilian, and contracted support to deliver the requisite 

readiness, while minimizing the costs. 

During this period of constrained defense budgets, the Department must ensure that a sufficient number of Federal civilian personnel are available to meet the support needs of our military 

forces. 

The Department must also prioritize and reduce less critical missions while we ensure that military and civilian personnel are performing all inherently governmental jobs, and that there are sufficient numbers to perform critical oversight, management, and 

readiness functions. 

The Department sourcing decisions must be made on the basis 

of law, cost, policy, and risk. And we are committed to ensuring 

those decisions are made consistent with title 10 requirements regarding workforce management. 

To achieve these objectives, we must ensure decisionmakers have 

access to relevant information and data. We must also have the 

flexibility and tools necessary to appropriately align workload and 

balance the Department’s workforce. 

In an effort to significantly reduce excess overhead costs and 

apply the savings to warfighting capability, force structure and 

modernization and readiness, the Department carried out a num-
6 

ber of initiatives, beginning in fiscal year 2011, including directing 

components to maintain civilian personnel at fiscal year 2010 levels. 

The fiscal year 2013 President’s Budget Request reflects an objective and reasonable approach that decreases spending on all 

components of the total force. However, we recognize that we operate in a dynamic and changing environment, and therefore must 

retain the flexibility to adapt our workforce accordingly. 

The current budget request continues to fund the civilian workforce at fiscal year 2010 levels, with some exceptions. 

While we continue to deliver a flexible, responsive civilian workforce that mitigates risk and ensures continuity of operations; promotes the organic knowledge that we need to retain, and ensures 

mission requirements are met most cost-effectively and efficiently; 

given the strategic direction of the Department, the planned reductions among the uniformed force; and in order to meet the requirements of the Budget Control Act, the funding for civilian positions 

is currently planned to decline by approximately 2 percent over the 

next 5 fiscal years. 

We continue to assess whether further reductions and realignment of civilian personnel can be made in the context of adjustments to the total force and the new defense strategy. And we will 

keep this subcommittee informed of the results. 

The Department, however, is keenly aware that our civilian 

workforce is extremely talented and critical to success in meeting 

our strategic goals, performing key enabling functions for the operating force, and delivering vital services that support our uniformed men and women. 

Changes in the civilian workforce must be done in a way that 

preserves mission-essential skills and abilities over the long term, 

and in a manner that enables us to recruit and retain the most talented individuals. 

We also recognize the need to review and assess levels of contracted support in order to ensure appropriate and cost-effective 

utilization of such support. 

Additionally, with the possibility of sequestration looming on the 

horizon, we cannot yet say precisely how bad the damage would be. 

But as Secretary Panetta noted earlier this year, it is clear that 

sequestration could risk hollowing out our force and reducing military options available to the Nation. 

In summary, the Department has programs in place to address 

our needs for an effective and appropriately resourced total force. 

We continue today to discuss GAO’s observations on DOD’s civilian 

personnel requirements. 

DOD’s Federal civilian workforce consists of approximately 

783,000 personnel and performs a wide variety of duties, including 

cus on lifecycle management for the civilian workforce by integrating strategic workforce planning, competency management, and 

workforce professional development initiatives to ensure that plans 

support the development of a ready civilian workforce. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. 

I thank you and the members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to address you and help work on the Nation’s issues. 

I stand by for your questions, sir. 
7 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vollrath can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Vollrath. 

Ms. Farrell. 

STATEMENT OF BRENDA FARRELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, MILITARY AND DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FARRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bordallo, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO’s observations on DOD’s civilian personnel requirements. 

DOD’s Federal civilian workforce consists of approximately 

783,000 personnel, and performs a wide variety of duties, including 

some traditionally performed by military personnel. 

In 2001, GAO placed strategic human capital management across 

the entire Federal Government on our high-risk list. And it remains there today. 

We did so because of the longstanding lack of leadership in the 

area, and in part because critical skill gaps could undermine agencies’ abilities to accomplish their missions. 

With the long-term fiscal challenges facing the Nation, reductions to the civilian workforce may be considered to achieve cost 

savings. Human capital has remained a critical missing link in reforming and modernizing the Federal government’s managing practices. 

GAO has observed that the Federal Government has often acted 

as if people were costs to be cut, rather than assets to be valued. 

My main message today is that strategic workforce planning is 

critical to help ensure that DOD has the right number of civilian 

personnel, with the right skills at the right time, to carry out their 

mission. 

My statement today is based on GAO’s reports issued from 

March 1992 through June 2012. 

My written statement is divided into two parts. The first part addresses DOD’s prior experience with civilian workforce downsizing. 

DOD’s prior efforts in the 1990s were not oriented towards shaping the make-up of the force, resulting in significant imbalances in 

terms of shape, skills, and retirement eligibility. 

DOD’s efforts in the 1990s to reduce its Federal civilian workforce levels below that of 1987 were hampered by incomplete data 

and a lack of a clear strategy for avoiding skill imbalances and 

other adverse effects of downsizing. 

For example, DOD used incomplete and inconsistent data related 

to workers, workload data, and projected force reductions. Further, 

DOD’s approaches had unintended consequences. 

The use of voluntary attrition, hiring freezes, and financial separation incentives mitigated some adverse effects of workforce reductions, but were less oriented towards shaping the makeup of the civilian workforce. 

For DOD, this was especially true of its acquisition workforce. 

DOD was put on the verge of a retirement-driven talent drain in 
8 

this workforce after 11 consecutive years of downsizing. Now, DOD 

is trying to rebuild that workforce. 

In 2001, we concluded that considering the enormous changes 

the DOD civilian workforce had undergone, and the external pressures and demands faced by the Department, taking a strategic approach to human capital would be crucial to organizational results. 

As I will discuss next, this is no less true today than it was in 

2001. 

The second part of my written statement addresses DOD’s current strategic human planning efforts. 

DOD has taken positive steps to identify its critical skills. In 

2006 as noted earlier, Congress required DOD to have a strategic 

workforce plan that included specific elements. 

GAO has closely monitored DOD’s efforts in this area. We have 

found that DOD has identified 22 mission-critical occupations, such 

as contracting, accounting, and information technology management that it identifies as critical skills. However, DOD has not conducted competency gap analyses for the majority of their missioncritical occupations. 

Gap analysis is critical to develop specific strategies to address 

the workforce needs for today and the future. 

For example, gap analysis enables a department to determine 

where they need to grow, and where they could possibly cut back. 

We remain concerned that DOD lacks critical information it 

needs to effectively plan for the workforce requirements. 

Mr. Chairman, the last point I wish to make is that DOD’s workforce includes military personnel, Federal employees, and contractors. And changes made to one of these groups may impact the others. 

Thank you, that concludes my opening remarks. 

Be happy to take questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. FORBES. Let me thank you both for your testimony, and also 

for your written statements, which we will make a part of the 

record. 

And, Mr. Vollrath, we are delighted to have you today. 

As I mentioned at the outset, you are the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management 

at the Department of Defense. So you bring with you a great deal 

of responsibility on your shoulders and expertise. And we thank 

you for that. 

All of us are concerned about sequestration. We are 5 months 

from that coming into place. 

And as I look at the statute, it says that the same percentage 

sequestration shall apply to all programs, projects, and activities 

within a budget account; with programs, projects and activities as 

delineated in the appropriation act or accompanying report for the 

relevant fiscal year covering that account; or for accounts not included in appropriation acts. 

Basically, we are talking about across-the-board cuts is essentially what we are looking at. 
9 

Now, noting that sequestration is the current law, noting that we 

are about 5 months out from when that comes into play, what will 

be the impact on the civilian workforce when sequestration hits? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Mr. Chairman, I wish I could give you a definitive answer, but I can’t, because there are some decisions that 

could be made relative to the military workforce. 

And if sequestration were to be a fact, the civilian workforce 

money is in the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] account. And 

defense and other agencies could make decisions about where the 

priorities would be placed within that account. 

For example, other things that are affected would be things like 

fuel, training support dollars, et cetera. 

And so some decisions would have to be made as to where the 

priorities are placed. But they would also have to be relative to 

what the overall objective is if sequestration hit. We would have to 

make some decisions about priorities on national defense. 

Once those are made, we could begin to make reasoned decisions 

that would affect our civilian workforce, as well as the military. 

When that would happen, we clearly would have to take a look at 

the military, the support our civilian workforce provides to it, and 

then the impact of the contract services. 

There are the three moving parts. And so I can’t answer the 

question with any direction. I wish I could. But there are that 

many moving parts to this problem. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Vollrath, we know that sequestration is the law. 

It is not just something that could happen. It is currently the law. 

Unless it is changed, it is going to be there no different than if we 

passed a budget. 

Can you tell me what specific steps you are taking now to prepare for it, to answer the questions that you say are a number of 

moving parts that need to be answered? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Secretary of Defense is still suggesting that 

this needs to be addressed. We need to work with Congress to understand what the impacts of this could be. 

I don’t have details about that. I know that Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Carter is slated to appear before the Armed Services Committee on the first of August to address more robustly the potential 

impacts of sequestration. 

I do not have enough information to give you a straightforward 

answer. 

The implications, of course, if sequestration were to happen, are 

significant. 

First of all, when the decisions are made in terms of the impacts 

and where they are taken, if you translate that and bring it back 

into the Government civilian workforce, you mentioned that we 

have a certain legal requirement in terms of process to notify. We 

also have other things that we would have to deal with. 

We have our labor partners and contracts with them that we 

would have to work. On the contract for services side, there are 

contracts that we would have to adjust. 

And given the other authorities, okay, to reduce the workforce 

and shape it intelligently, we, for sure, would have to be back with 

you and other members of Congress to get some changes to the 

laws and internal to the Department of Defense on the policies in 
10 

order to shape the force appropriately, so that we do, in fact, avoid 

the kinds of problems that were alluded to in the 1990s. 

I have to just tell you, I lived that dream in the 1990s of trying 

to downsize the force, take the peace dividend, and shape. And it 

was not, okay, an easy task then. 

It is not going to be an easy task under sequestration. That is 

for sure. That is for sure. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Vollrath, we heard Ms. Farrell say that the Department has been criticized for using incomplete data. And, as I 

recall, it was a lack of a comprehensive strategic plan in terms of 

the workforce. 

Can you walk me through the RIF [Reduction in Force] process 

and the timeliness requirements that are going to be required? 

Because, as you know, again, I come back to the fact sequestration is not just some pipe dream out there. It is the law. It is on 

the books. It is scheduled to take place in January. 

Can you tell me what the RIF process is, and kind of walk us 

through that and the timeliness generally of that? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. A normal RIF process would begin by an intelligent review of requirements. But in terms of timing and notification—— 

Mr. FORBES. Let us start with the intelligent review of the requirements. 

How long would that take? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I would estimate the best case would be at least 

3 to 4 months. And I say that because an intelligent review has to 

be mission-based. 

Mr. FORBES. If it would take 3 to 4 months and we only have 5 

months, does it surprise you that we haven’t started and undergone that process yet? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. No, because I don’t think anybody has been able 

to come to grips yet with the severity of what sequestration means. 

Mr. FORBES. Is it your opinion that people in the Department of 

Defense do not understand that this is the law. And it is going to 

take place in January? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Mr. Chairman, they understand that it is the 

law. 

Mr. FORBES. If it is the law, what I don’t understand is, if it is 

going to take us a minimum of 4 months to do the analytical review, has anybody instructed you to begin that process or has anyone instructed you not to plan for sequestration? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Neither. 

Mr. FORBES. Then why would your Department not have begun 

this analysis if you know it is scheduled to take place in January, 

and you know it is going to take 4 months at least to do the analysis before you even begin the process? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Well, as the Secretary of Defense has said, he intends to continue to work with Congress to address the effects of 

sequestration. And I believe a much more robust discussion can be 

had around that question when the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

appears on the first of August. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Vollrath, I don’t disagree that we need to have 

a robust discussion. We have been trying to have it for a year now. 
11 

But you have heard the Senate say that they are not going to 

taking any action. You have heard the President say he would veto 

any action regarding sequestration. 

It is the law. It is coming. 

This is what is baffling me. If we had a budget that was coming 

on line with these kind of major cuts, I would think that your office 

would have already been doing some kind of analysis, so that they 

just don’t hit us blindsided in January. 

And it baffles me that we have undergone no process at all to 

do the kind of analysis that Ms. Farrell says is crucial for us to do 

before these cuts take place. 

Is it because the Department of Defense just continues to just 

hope it is going to get changed? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I don’t believe that it is a hope that it gets 

changed. I believe there is a lot of work to try to address the problem. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you tell me any proposal that you have seen 

floating right now that would suggest that it is going to be addressed? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Personally, I have not. 

Mr. FORBES. Who would make the decision within your Department to start this analysis? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. That would have to start with the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Mr. FORBES. And the Secretary of Defense has given you no instruction at all to begin that analysis to date? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I personally do not have that kind of instruction. 

Mr. FORBES. But you would know if that was going to take place 

based on your position, would you not? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Not necessarily, because this is a large strategic 

movement. 

Mr. FORBES. So then as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Readiness and Force Management at the Department of Defense, if you wouldn’t know, who would know above you? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. At this stage, I would defer to the Secretary of 

Defense and to the President, and where they intend to—— 

Mr. FORBES. Well, the President and the Secretary of Defense 

aren’t going to do the actual planning. They would have to give 

that instruction. 

But who would know in the Department if such instructions have 

been given to begin the planning, if you wouldn’t know? 

Could this planning take place if you didn’t know it? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Probably not. 

Mr. FORBES. So then you would know it if the planning was 

going to take place? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I am not aware of any planning. But that does 

not mean that there is no planning. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, help me with this. 

It is your testimony that if the planning were taking place, you 

would know it. Then you said you don’t know it. But then you said 

the planning could still be taking place. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. If there were any planning taking place that had 

any specificity to it, I would anticipate that I would be aware of 

that. 
12 

Mr. FORBES. And today in your testimony, you are not aware of 

that. 

Is that your testimony? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. That is correct. 

Mr. FORBES. Are you aware that anyone has told you not to do 

the planning? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. No one has told me not to do planning. 

Mr. FORBES. And the only way the planning could be generated 

would be for the Secretary of Defense to begin that. 

Is that your testimony? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I believe that to be correct, because there would 

have to be some decisions, as I mentioned before, about the force 

and its shape and decisions relative to that. 

Mr. FORBES. Walk me through the timeline, if you would, regarding the 45-day notification, 60-day notification, et cetera, that we 

have to give for a RIF process. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Once a decision is made, and it is a decision 

made, then we would give the employees, that would be affected, 

a 60-day notice. Prior to those employees being notified, we, by law, 

must notify Congress of our intent to conduct a reduction in force. 

And so that is a minimum of a lead-time of 105 days in order 

to conduct a reduction in force. 

Mr. FORBES. And that date, as I understand it, from January 4th 

would be September 21st? 

Is that to the best of your knowledge? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. To the best of my knowledge, I will agree with 

that date. 

In my mind, I peg it somewhere around the 18th of September, 

but clearly the middle of September. 

Mr. FORBES. Middle of September. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. But at this particular point in time, you have done 

no analysis to determine what that would be. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. That is correct because there is—— 

Mr. FORBES. Now, assuming that we do not reduce the workforce, 

doesn’t that mean we would have a disproportionate impact on our 

other accounts? 

You mentioned two of them, fuel and training specifically. 

Would it not stand to reason that if it is going to take 4 months 

to do this analysis, and we haven’t done the analysis, and if you 

would have to give the notices out by September 21st, 18th, somewhere thereabout, that we wouldn’t be able to make that timeframe. 

Doesn’t it mean sequestration would have a disproportionate impact on other accounts such as fuel and training? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. It could. 

Mr. FORBES. How could it not? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. By other decisions that would be made. 

Mr. FORBES. Give me one. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Where you take that impact in the O&M account. 

Mr. FORBES. But it would have to be somewhere other than personnel, correct? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. That is correct. 
13 

Mr. FORBES. And if it is somewhere other than personnel, that 

means we would have to put more on some other accounts somewhere else. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Potentially. It is clearly, as you stated, a zerosum game. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Vollrath. 

I have got a few more questions I will ask at the end. 

Ms. Farrell, I will have some for you at the end. 

But I am going to go now to Ms. Bordallo. We would love to hear 

her questions. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a couple of questions here, Ms. Farrell, and also to you, 

Mr. Vollrath. 

Can you please comment on the risks associated with the Senate’s proposed arbitrary cuts to the civilian workforce? 

What risks might be associated with their approach if it were enacted into law? 

And also with that question, today, what is the percentage of the 

civilian workforce that carry out duties not available today with 

the military workforce? 

I don’t—if you can give me some idea. Because I know for sure 

that there are particular positions and duties that the civilian 

workforce carry out today that the military do not. 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Let me begin with, we don’t comment on proposed legislation. 

But we can draw from our body of work of what we have seen that 

might be useful to you, as well as to DOD, in the face of reductions. 

And we would encourage DOD to look at their workforce planning. Specifically, you start with critical skills and competencies. 

And we have discussed that DOD has identified critical skills in 

their mission-critical occupations—22—and that is their starting 

point for workforce planning. 

First, you identify your needs. Then you identify the competencies that are associated with those. Measure that against your 

existing workforce. Measure that against your future workforce. 

And that way you can determine gaps or where you might have 

some overages or where you might have a workforce that is not 

aligned with your strategic planning. 

So that would be my first encouragement based on the body of 

work we have done to look at the workforce planning and starting 

with those mission-critical occupations. 

As far as the percentages of civilians doing military personnel 

jobs, if I understand you correctly, that would be difficult. 

We have looked at insourcing. We have looked at outsourcing. 

The numbers, as you know, are not clear in terms of a contractor 

inventory. 

We have looked at work regarding civilians deployed in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. And we are constantly monitoring that. We know that 

there is a number of civilians that do serve in those positions rather than the military force. 

But I would have to do further research to give you a more specific number unless my colleague can. 
14 

Ms. BORDALLO. I think you have partially answered it. 

What I mean is that if you were downsizing the civilian workforce today, certainly there must be positions. Because, you know, 

when you go into the military, you are there for combat duty mainly. 

So there must be a great number of positions, particular positions, in the civilian workforce that are not being held by military. 

And I just wondered, what are these critical positions that, if you 

were to downsize today, we would be in a heap of trouble. 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, currently, DOD does not have a strategy for 

the appropriate mix of personnel—that being military, civilians and 

the contractor force. That was a legislative requirement to DOD to 

include an assessment of the appropriate mix of personnel in their 

overall strategic human capital plan. 

When we last issued our report looking at that, we did note that 

DOD had taken some steps in terms of providing guidance as to 

use the least costly mix of personnel to achieve the mission using 

the military requirements. 

As you may know, there is also a mandate to GAO to look more 

closely at that guidance, and do an assessment of the methodology 

that makes that determination of the least costly way to go about 

making that determination. But there is not a strategy or definite 

numbers that is in the strategic human capital plans that we have 

reviewed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Vollrath. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Let me try to—I can’t give you finite numbers. 

But let me try to at least address what I believe to be your point 

and the question. 

The question, if I have it right, is what positions or jobs or skills 

do our Government civilians perform that are more aligned with 

what they would be doing versus what the military would be doing. 

Ms. BORDALLO. That is correct. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In a simple statement, it would be, many of the 

base support requirements, acquisition requirements, RDT&E [Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation] requirements. 

When I talk about base and support requirements, the way that 

I look at the strategic management of the workforce is once you decide what the military’s strength is going to be, and where it is 

going to be, you then bring in the next look from a strategic perspective, the Government civilian workforce that is necessary to 

support that. 

And then last you bring on the contract for services where there 

would be cost-savings and things are not inherently governmental. 

Let me go back to the base support. 

Another strategic way that we take a look at shaping this force 

is, if you look at a base, it could be Army, it could be Air Force. 

But we tend to talk in terms of power projection platforms. 

We look at that installation as a way to get off to war, because 

we are not going to engage in combat, we hope, there. So that we 

use the civilian workforce to support that power projection platform, and so we look for any military skills that might have been 

siphoned into that base support, and try to move them back into 

that warfighting capability. 
15 

And we have, I think, done a very reasonable job of that in the 

last several years. 

Now when we take that idea, and we move it into contract services, that is a supplement to both of those. And some of that can 

be ramped up or it can be ramped down depending on what our 

direction is and use of our national strategy. 

And so combining all three is what we believe to be the strategic 

look at the workforce. But it is fundamental to supporting that 

military. 

Now, we have put out guidance, very recently again. But as the 

components and the Services start to work their fiscal year 2014 

budget, and look at the out-years, that they be very attuned to the 

shaping of the force so as not to make decisions that could result 

in borrowed military manpower. 

So if you overextend, or don’t properly identify the civilian workforce that you need, the probability goes up that military might be 

siphoned off to take care of that gap. So we are keenly aware of 

the historic problems that have been around when we do these 

kinds of downsizing. 

So right now, the strategic look is, start with the military, build 

in behind it. The Government civilians who are inherently Government work, and then use contracts for services. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

There is one other question for the two of you. 

What lessons were learned from former Secretary Gates’ efficiencies initiative that could be helpful in developing the requirements-based workforce management plan? 

And how are issues associated with that initiative addressed in 

the strategic workforce plan? 

Let us start with you. 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes. We have work under way looking at the current DOD overall—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Can you come a little closer to the mic, please? 

Ms. FARRELL. We have work—can you hear me now? 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

Ms. FARRELL. We have work looking at the current overall DOD 

strategic workforce plan. And we are looking at that against certain requirements that Congress put in law for DOD, as well as 

events that may have taken place in the last couple of years, such 

as the Secretary’s initiatives. But we are not in a position at this 

time to comment on that. 

I would say that these initiatives were of a much smaller scale, 

and may serve as some lessons learned for DOD in the event that 

there are much more significant reductions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. What we have learned from that is that we need 

to expand, and are expanding, some of the information tools to help 

guide us better. 

For example, the inventory of contract services was not robustly 

supported in the past. We now believe that we have that built, 

along with information technology support, to get a much better 

handle on what we are getting for those contracts for services that 

we have left. 
16 

We also have, as you have heard, we have improved and expanded the strategic workforce plan and the support mechanisms 

to get greater fidelity in there for the civilian workforce. 

Now, that strategic workforce plan has in it also a military component. But the real focus, frankly, is to get a better handle on the 

civilian workforce and its projected requirements. 

Now, I would not sit here and tell you that we will have this totally figured out and it will be done in 2015, because it is a moving 

target. It always changes. 

But we believe that as a result of the past efforts we have much 

better tools in place, or about to be in place, that will help us shape 

the force better than we have been able to ever do in the past. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In your opinion, Mr. Secretary, why has it taken 

so long for DOD to develop its strategic workforce plan? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Because of its complexity. Because of its complexity. A strategic workforce plan, it depends on how you want to 

look at what a strategic workforce plan is. 

The big problem has been to try to get all three components 

clearly identified and, if you will, in a box that you can take a look 

at it together. And so it has taken time to shape those tools to get 

them all in one holistic look, and I believe, frankly, GAO has 

helped us immensely, okay, with their look at our work and our 

progress, and their suggestions to make this better. 

It is not going to ever be, I emphasize again, a thing of beauty 

because it has so many moving parts. As I mentioned, it is three 

workforces: military, Government civilians, contract. It is spread 

across four Services. 

There are sets of laws associated with each one of them. The 

force is disbursed over the globe, literally. 

And then you have the dollar dimension that is added every 

year, that has to be taken into consideration. And then there is 

time. 

And so those are a complex set of things that have to be considered in the strategy of managing the workforce. 

For example, cyber—if you took a look at the strategic workforce 

plan, if you went back about 5 years, cyber was barely a term. It 

has now come to the front. And so we are now looking at cyber and 

the skills required for that. 

And in the civilian workforce component, what does that mean? 

What are the competencies? 

As a matter of fact, in looking at cyber, the Government civilian 

workforce is a real opportunity for us, because we can hire into the 

mid-grades people with those kinds of skills. 

On the military side, if we want to build that kind of competency, 

we don’t have the ability to hire mid-grade. We bring them in, we 

train them, and we grow over time. 

So the civilian workforce of the Department of Defense is critical 

to national defense to give us that flexibility to get the job done. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Secretary, just cutting back on the original 

question, what do you think about the Senate proposal on the cuts? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I would recommend against having any particular arbitrary number. Because if we ever do that, I don’t know 

how you do good strategic planning. 
17 

Now, that is not to say that you don’t, for the sake of looking at 

potential impacts, take a look at cuts or dollar cuts in the budget. 

That is what we get paid to do to try to shape that force. We cannot do it in a vacuum. 

We would prefer to have the flexibility to manage the force in a 

more strategic do. But whether any—you know, if Congress decides 

that we need to move in a slightly different direction, that is up 

to you all. 

It would probably be better expressed in terms of a budget number for our flexibility. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine. 

The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUNYAN. I thank the chairman. 

And thank both of you for your testimony. 

And I want to—it is in the wheelhouse. I am going to talk about 

civilian workforce, but not as it relates to sequestration. Because 

personally—not even personally, I think there are many other 

bases around the country that have a very similar problem I have 

that actually came out of the 2005 BRAC, and a lot of it is pay parity. 

And it is a huge pay parity issue in the civilian workforce which 

they are asking us to help support our warfighters. 

The base I have is Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. When it 

was made a joint base in the 2005 BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment], the McGuire-Dix side was in a Philadelphia wage and 

the Lakehurst side was in New York wage. 

And it still currently sits there for the wage grade employees. 

The General Service employees went over to the New York wage 

grade. 

So it is a huge inequity that is out there left over from that. And 

we have addressed that in this committee in both the fiscal year 

2012 and the fiscal year 2013 NDAA. 

And, really, what I am looking for as we ask how we are going 

to do whatever we have to do when and if sequestration hits, we 

have another looming issue out there if you are going to—maybe 

it might come to the fact where you have to backfill a lot of this 

stuff with more civilian workers. But yet we still have this looming 

issue hanging out there. 

And I would, Mr. Secretary, I would like your comment on what 

the DOD is doing to help try to correct a situation like this. And 

I know it is not just at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. It is at 

other ones. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Unfortunately, I don’t know specifically about, 

you know, McGuire-Dix and the wage grade. So I will take that 

question get you an answer for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 74.] 

Mr. VOLLRATH. But let me take that and go a step further. Because you mentioned base closure and the sequestration and the effects that it has on the workforce. 
18 

Clearly if sequestration were to happen, that is just another dimension of the decision process, you know, that we would have to 

go through. There are other dimensions. 

You talked about the workforce at that installation. We would 

have to do more work in terms of seniority. We would have to— 

you know, who stays, who goes. 

We would have to be very careful in how we manage that 

downsizing the workforce, so that we retain enough flexibility in 

that workforce for our future okay. 

As the chairman mentioned we have a very senior force, eligible 

for retirement. We are very cognizant of the fact that we have to 

work on bringing more into the middle and more into the bottom 

in order to mitigate that potential effect. 

Same would be true during sequestration. It would be a disaster 

to do a salami slice for anything that way. 

We would be paying for that sequestration for years to come. 

So I understand the question about wage grade. I don’t have a 

specific answer for you. But I will take it for the record—— 

Mr. RUNYAN. I would appropriate that. 

And we have been working with OPM [Office of Personnel Management] on it a lot. And it is really at that level of OPM and anything we can do to do that. 

Because when you go back and interact with these—with civilian 

employees, majority of them are our veterans also. And we are in 

that world of, you know, taking care of the men and women that 

take care of us and it falls right back in line with that. 

So I thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Bordallo for doing this event today, this hearing today. 

And I want to thank both of you for being there, as well. 

I think all of us understand and certainly accept that the civilian 

workforce performs critical work on behalf of our troops and our 

national security. 

At the Rock Island Arsenal, which I am very familiar with, they 

work every day to build the equipment that keeps our troops safe 

on the battlefield. And when called upon to do so they have produced equipment. And they have really done their job. 

They have gotten to our troops in the field when needed, and 

when no one else is able to. I think that is important to keep in 

mind, as well. 

When armor was needed, for example, for the Stryker vehicles to 

protect our troops, the men and women at the Rock Island Arsenal 

worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to produce the lifesaving 

ballistic shield kits that our troops needed at that time. 

And I know that those workers are very proud of the work that 

they did, as well, because they have told me many, many times 

how proud of that work they are. 

And it is because of examples like this, of what our civilian workforce does every day on behalf of our service members that I am, 

of course, like everyone here, I think, extremely concerned about 
19 

any proposals, as was mentioned, that arbitrarily cut the workforce 

without regard of the effect possibly on our critical missions and 

our capabilities. 

I think we are all in agreement about that. 

Mr. Vollrath, Secretary Panetta has repeatedly highlighted the 

importance of protecting the defense industrial base, which in response to questions from me and other members of this committee, 

he has said includes both organic and private sector facilities and 

capabilities. 

It appears that the Senate Armed Services Committee attempted 

to protect some elements of the industrial base from the cuts mandated in their bill, but failed to include organic manufacturing facilities such as Army arsenals. 

What assurances, if any, can you provide that DOD leadership 

will protect the remaining organic defense industrial base, or critical Army arsenals from cuts that would undermine our essential 

capabilities and reduce efficiency? 

And would the Department have the ability to base decisions regarding the reductions on readiness and critical capabilities? Or 

would the Department have to take an across-the-board approach 

across facilities and DOD offices? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Sir, is your question relative to sequestration or 

how we manage the force? 

Mr. LOEBSACK. How we manage it, but it could be sequestration. 

It could be other cuts that come down the pike. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. As you correctly point out, we need to make reasoned decisions and set priorities as we execute, quote—‘‘strategic 

human capital management,’’ or workforce management. 

In terms of process there are guidances given in the development 

of the coming budget and the projected years—normally out 5 years 

in the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] process. 

That guidance is generally focused on those key and critical functions, particularly where the civilian workforce is the backbone. So 

as the process occurs that guidance is developed. 

I am just not current on the guidance for that particular element 

that you highlight. I do know that we have guidance in the development for our next budget and for the POM out, to ensure that 

we take care of that part of it that has to do with reset. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Yes, I am concerned, obviously, about some of the 

cuts that the Senate has been talking about—what they have approved. And so that is why I am asking that question. 

I have got a number of other questions. In the interest of time, 

I think I am going to cut myself off here just a little bit early, 

which almost never happens in Congress, obviously. 

I think I have about four other questions. And if I may, Mr. 

Chair, I am going to submit those for the record to you. And to you, 

Ms. Farrell, as well, we have at least one for you, if that is okay 

with you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, that will be fine, Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you very much. And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And the gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes. 
20 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank our witnesses for being here today. 

I just have some questions. When I think of DOD civilians, think 

the Department of Defense. And typically I think of the military. 

Can you tell me how many of your DOD civilians actually have 

veteran status or have served in the military? 

I know they may not have their 20 years, but—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I cannot, but I will be glad to take that, because 

I know we have that information. I just don’t know it. 

So if I can take that for the record, I will absolutely give you the 

answer for that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 74.] 

Mr. VOLLRATH. A large portion—I will just tell you. A large portion of our civilian workforce has veteran status. 

And in the hiring process veterans have some preference in hiring. And, frankly, we need some of that talent that was developed 

over those many years in the military to move into our civilian 

workforce. 

That is in many respects how we fill that middle requirement in 

our civilian workforce. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I agree with you 100 percent. I think veterans coming off and the experience that they have gleaned over whether it 

is 10 years, 20 years, or 30 years. Being able to come in and sit 

next to a true civilian who has never worn the uniform or been in 

a combat situation or boot camp-like scenario can help. 

He will bring his skillset. He will kind of bridge the gap between 

the civilian and the military. 

And there is definitely a culture that the military and DOD 

should not, you know, kind of mold itself to the civilians. But that 

civilian employee needs to understand the military culture because 

that is what makes our military so great, and has kept our country 

so strong for so long. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Administration—just to follow up on that— 

has a very robust program across all of the Federal departments 

to hire veterans. I sit on that committee. And we report out regularly how each one of the various different agencies is doing to 

focus on those veterans. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Can DOD civilians unionize? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The answer is yes. They may unionize. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Just out of curiosity, how many DOD civilians have 

been fired in the past year? 

I am sure you might not have that number in your head, but—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I don’t have a number in my head. I would have 

to—define fired, okay? 

Mr. PALAZZO. Terminated, but—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Terminated for cause is one way. And I can get 

back to you again—and take that—others, but terminated because 

of a reduction in the last year, meaning a RIF? 

Mr. PALAZZO. Not a RIF. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. All right. I do not know that number, but if—— 

Mr. PALAZZO. Unproductive, insubordinate, you know, typical 

things that will get you—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I don’t know. Relatively—— 
21 

Mr. PALAZZO [continuing]. In the military—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I understand. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In terms of percentage of the workforce, it is 

going to be relatively small. But with your agreement, I will take 

it for the record, Mr. Chairman, and get back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 75.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. What sort of tax breaks would DOD civilians get 

for serving in combat zones? 

I know a lot of them have been serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

Djibouti and pretty much everywhere there is military personnel. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I do not know, other than the standard tax 

breaks that you would get. I am not up on exactly what additional 

tax breaks they get that are unique to that Service in the CEW [Civilian Expeditionary Workforce] workforce. 

It is a voluntary workforce but—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 75.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. It is probably more hazard pay as opposed to a 

tax—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Again, I don’t know—I don’t know—— 

Mr. PALAZZO [continuing]. It used to be 1 day—if you step, 1 day, 

in a combat zone, during the month, for military—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. For military—— 

Mr. PALAZZO. A whole month up to a certain cap based on rank? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Correct. Correct. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Also, I was reading your bio and I noticed 

that you are responsible for all matters related to civilian and military personnel, readiness of the force, military community, and 

family policy, and so forth and so on. 

I was just curious. Are military personnel banned from attending 

political events in uniform? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Yes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. 

There seems to have been an exception to that policy this past 

couple of weeks where uniformed military personnel were allowed 

to march in a political parade in California. 

Did that decision come from your area, readiness and force management? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. It did not come from my area. But I am not sure 

that we correctly characterize that as a political event. 

I mean, it was a unique event. But I am not sure there was a 

clear, political—— 

Mr. PALAZZO. There must have been some concern that it was political or could be perceived as political, because it was very quickly 

noticed, oh, this is a one-time exception. 

Do you all have any internal discussions on who authorized that? 

And do you think it actually went through the proper chain of 

command? 

Because I would think that would be under your area of responsibility, and not maybe some public affairs or general council? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. It was made by the right—the people that made 

it had the right authorities to do that. And it is a one-time excep-
22 

tion, clearly, because we do need to assess follow-on impacts potentially to that. But it was not ill advised or taken lightly. Let us put 

it that way. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, I see my time is over. 

Tradition is one thing that has served the military extremely 

well from the days our country was founded. And breaking with 

tradition, I don’t think, is a good thing to do at this time. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

And, Mr. Vollrath, how can you say that the proper people and 

the proper authorities made the decision when you don’t know who 

made the decision? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I know who made the decision. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you tell us who made the decision? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. It was in the public affairs part of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. FORBES. But it wasn’t with the Joint Chiefs or any of the 

chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, was it? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I don’t know. 

Mr. FORBES. Then you don’t know? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I would have to get—— 

Mr. FORBES. But they didn’t know about it? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I do not know that. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Both Mr. Vollrath and Ms. Farrell, I have sat in this committee, 

as well as in the major committee, and have asked many people, 

including all the chiefs and the joint chiefs, a very simple question, 

in my mind, which is what is the military of the future going to 

look like? 

And to my surprise, no one knows. 

As a matter of fact, I think General Chiarelli said it best when 

he said, ‘‘All I can tell you is that we have been 100 percent correct 

in not being able to predict it at all.’’ 

I am basically summarizing it. 

And now that is why I come back to what both of you have said, 

Ms. Farrell in her written testimony, you in your statement, is you 

talked about a new defense strategy in terms of the civilian workforce. And Ms. Farrell talks about, on page eight, mission-critical 

occupations. 

So my question to both of you is, when you both say that, what, 

Mr. Secretary, is that new defense strategy that you are looking to 

the civilian workforce, our workforce, to get to? 

And, Ms. Farrell, when you talk about your mission-critical occupations, what is the definition of mission, and what makes it critical? 

So beginning with you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Thank you. 

When I talk about this as a strategy, it is a framework for a 

strategy. As I mentioned before, several years ago—define that, 

maybe, as 5 or 6, cyber would not have been on the table. It is now. 

What I am trying to convey is that, in the strategic workforce 

planning, we have now put inside the capability to have greater 
23 

visibility of contracts for services, the civilian workforce in the military, side by side. That is a markedly different approach than we 

have historically pursued. 

I do not want to leave you with the impression that, because of 

that, we have this now greatly improved ability to look out 8 years 

and see what that workforce is going to be. 

We do not. But we do, in this process, try to push the limits out 

as far as we can. 

For example, I mentioned cyber. One way is to say, well, we will 

just grow the military and that will take a long time. 

The other is to say can we complement that with the civilian 

workforce? 

The answer, as I gave you before, is yes, we can. We can input 

that talent much faster and at a higher level, in order to accomplish the change that is coming. 

Now, we aren’t any better because of the processes in divining 

what is going happen 6 years from now. We are paid to try to do 

that. 

We are paid to come up with systems that would assist us in 

doing that. And frankly, as we get better at this, we are going to 

make some guesses, and they may not turn out to be exactly right. 

But the good news is we are now in that position to start taking 

that professional look further out, with more information on which 

to make those types of decisions. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Ms. Farrell. 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes. It is in the National Defense Authorization 

Act for 2010 that requires DOD to include its critical skills for its 

existing workforce, as well as for the future. 

The 2010 was an amendment—actually, they have been required 

since to develop such a plan. 

So DOD chose to use what they call mission-critical occupations 

to identify their critical skills. They came up with those occupations through discussions at very senior levels, and with the functional community managers. That is our understanding. 

The NDAA requires DOD to report their critical skills and competencies for the year that they are issuing, as well as 7 years out. 

So it is not 10 or 20 or 30 years in the future. 

It is 7 years from the issuance date of the plan. And the plan 

is required through this year. There will be another plan that will 

be, for example, 2012, and then we will project for 7 years out. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So, Ms. Farrell, would you agree with me that 

basically what you were studying was basically their best guess at 

what we would need? 

Ms. FARRELL. They are not our identification. We are—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that. 

What you are doing your analysis on is their best guess, DOD’s 

best guess of what we are going to need in terms of workforce for 

the next 7 years. 

Ms. FARRELL. We are looking for what decisions they are making 

that are data-driven. There are ways to identify skills and competencies to gather data, including what are emerging issues and 

information technology management. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But it is still based on their best guess. If they 

don’t know, that is what—— 
24 

Ms. FARRELL. No, there could be data that they could collect from 

functional community managers, as well as doing surveys to identify what those critical skills and competencies that are needed 

today, as well as what is on the horizon. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Mr. Chairman, I will ask to be able to follow up 

in writing. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Let me just, if I can, close a couple of the gaps. 

Mr. Vollrath, you mentioned that you wanted to accomplish the 

change that was coming. 

What is that change? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I am not sure that I can recall what that was 

about. I want to accomplish the change? 

Mr. FORBES. You said you wanted to prepare in order to accomplish the change that is coming, that was I thought you said. 

Maybe I misunderstood you. 

That is okay. Let me move on. 

You also mentioned that the Department would prefer a modification to sequestration to more effectively implement the negative 

consequence associated with sequestration. 

Do you recall that? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In the context of what the Secretary of Defense 

has been looking for in terms of relief, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, considering the implementation deadline is 

early January, when does the Administration intend on providing 

that legislative proposal? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In this case I would defer to Secretary Carter and 

the work that he will do with the committee on the first of August. 

Mr. FORBES. Have you seen any such a proposal? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I have not. 

Mr. FORBES. What would the negative consequences be expected 

without this legislative proposal? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. A compressed timeframe to make some very significant decisions that affect the lives of the fine men and women 

that defend our Nation. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Farrell, based on GAO’s previous work, do you 

believe that the Department of Defense has analyzed and documented the critical skills and competencies in its workforce, civilian, contractor and military to identify their requirements and gaps 

in the existing workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, I have noted earlier that DOD has mixed results from their strategic human capital plans. And we are currently reviewing their latest that was issued March of this year. 

Last time we did the review we noted that they did not meet the 

legislative requirement to assess the appropriate mix of military, 

civilians and contractors. 

They have taken some steps, as you may know, to better identify 

the contractor inventory, for example. They have issued guidance 

to determine the least costly mix of personnel needed to meet military requirements. 

But at this time there is not a strategy or an assessment of the 

appropriate mix. 

Mr. FORBES. The report that you are talking about that was filed 

in March, to be released as I understand it in September, what 

timeframe was that for? 
25 

Ms. FARRELL. That was their 2010 human capital plan. 

And then it was based looking 7 years out from that date that 

was issued in March of this year. 

Mr. FORBES. So essentially the plan that has been filed, which 

was in March of 2012, was for 2010. And it has still not yet been 

released. It will be released in September. 

Ms. FARRELL. It has been released to us. We are currently reviewing it. 

You are correct, though. It was issued this year but it is actually 

2 years old to begin with. And we are looking to see if it does take 

into account things as the Secretary’s initiatives, which did affect 

the civilian workforce. 

Mr. FORBES. Is a plan that is 2 years old before it is submitted, 

is that timely enough to be used in a competent fashion for planning strategically with our workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. We would hope that DOD would continue to work 

on their workforce planning whether GAO was looking at what 

they are doing or not. 

I know that they are already thinking about the next workforce 

plan that will be due. And we would encourage them to move forward and not wait for any legislative requirement. 

Mr. FORBES. Based upon your analysis, do you feel that DOD is 

in a good position to properly prepare for downsizing in the workforce now? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, again, I probably sound like a broken record, 

but it is workforce planning, workforce planning. That is where we 

feel that an organization should look to determine what their needs 

are. 

And then if they are in a position, such as what DOD may be 

facing, that that is the starting point. 

We did work back in the mid 1990s looking at organizations outside of DOD that were considered to be successful during their 

downsizing periods. Those were, I believe, 17 private organizations, 

about 5 states and about 3 foreign governments. 

And each organization had to tailor its approach for downsizing. 

But each of them had a common theme, and that was that workforce planning was essential for their downsizing efforts. 

They all felt that without the workforce planning, they would 

have lost more critical people than they did. And it would have 

definitely impacted their ability to meet their mission. 

Mr. FORBES. And you are being polite in saying that we need to 

do this and we need to do it better. 

But what we need to determine as this committee is, is DOD in 

a position today, with the workforce planning that they have done, 

to properly do the downsizing it needs for its workforce. 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes. Again, I know I sound like a broken record, 

but we still have the impact of across-the-board reductions that if 

an agency does not know what their needs are and what the impact is, there could be severe harm. 

But we have not looked, let me be clear, we have not looked at 

the sequestration impact. Our analysis is based on lessons learned 

or observations that we have from the 1990s, and organizations 

that went through the downsizing efforts outside of DOD. 
26 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Vollrath, 10 U.S. Code 129 [Title 10 United 

States Code Section 129] prohibits any constraint or limitation in 

terms of maximum number of employees. 

Based on that, how is DOD able to impose a cap on civilian personnel at fiscal year 2010 levels and extend that cap through fiscal 

year 2018? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. That is a good question. Let me try to put it in 

a context. 

First of all, from my perspective, and I think I have this correct, 

these were set as targets with exceptions. Now, let me try to explain this because it needs to be in a context. 

And that goes back to how can you best manage a force. And I 

am back to three pillars of the support of national defense: the 

military, the Government civilians, and the contract-for-services 

people. 

In the case of the military, the military workforce is defined annually in terms of end-strength. Army, at the end of, will have 

520,000. The Reserves will have X. 

And so that is a finite number. There is a dollar. There is a 

budget behind that. But it is a finite number. 

On the contract-for-services side, we now have a capability to 

measure the contract-for-services in terms of contract FTEs [fulltime equivalent] for comparison purposes. With your guidance and 

help, we have instituted that far more robustly than we ever have. 

So on the military side we look at end-strength. On the contractfor-services side we now are able to account for that. It is still dollar-driven. 

And so when we want to have an intelligent discussion about the 

future, we need to include the number of Government civilians in 

that mix. 

When it comes to execution, it clearly, as in the other three 

areas, will be impacted by the budget. But let me give you an example in my office. 

As you heard in testimony yesterday from the Secretary of Defense and the Veterans Affairs and also from the President, we are 

standing up and implementing a new veterans transition program, 

the new and improved, to try to properly take care of our 

transitioning veterans. 

In my office, we have overall responsibility for that program. We 

sat down some time ago and said what do we think it would take 

to properly manage this program from the defense level. And when 

we—— 

Mr. FORBES. That is a difference between saying these are what 

we are projecting and between putting caps on, is it not? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I don’t think so. 

Because if in my office, for example, we said unconstrained, we 

would like to have 21 people to do this, unconstrained. But then 

we have to bring it back into the reality of how many people do 

we have, and what could we possibly afford. 

Mr. FORBES. But—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. That then becomes a discussion—— 

Mr. FORBES. The statute says specifically, the management of 

such personnel in any physical year shall not be subject to any con-
27 

straint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-strength, full-time 

equivalent positions or maximum number of employees. 

Based on that, how was DOD able to impose a cap on civilian 

personnel at fiscal year 2010 levels? And—— 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I do not believe that we have imposed a cap. We 

have put it out in terms of a target, with exceptions to have that 

intelligent discussion. 

I don’t know how else you do that, frankly. If we just give a dollar value, I am not sure what that means. 

I have to, in terms of deciding the number of people that it takes 

to prosecute the mission, I need to have a way to look at that and 

some reasonable management effort. We have not told the Services 

that they may not increase their civilian workforce. 

As a matter of fact, the exceptions are there. We are looking at 

exceptions—language training, in order to support that. That is the 

most current one that has been working. 

Mr. FORBES. So you feel that when it says that you can’t impose 

any constraint, that you feel that you can impose whatever constraints you want as long as you have exceptions to that. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In part I would agree, but I keep coming back to 

we need to have a reasonable basis on which to have the discussion. 

Mr. FORBES. I don’t think anybody would challenge the fact that 

we need to have reasonable basis to have discussion. I think what 

they would challenge is whether or not we are complying with the 

intent, either the letter or the spirit of that law. 

Let me take you back to some of our force structure reductions. 

It is my understanding that should DOD undertake a reduction 

in force, that a determination regarding which individuals to retain 

is based on essentially two things. 

You talked about longevity in service. And yet if you are looking 

at longevity in service, we are talking about a situation where 90 

percent of the senior leadership is going to be retirement age in 

2015, and about 30 percent of the DOD workforce is going to be in 

retirement age by 2015. 

Then the other criteria you talked about to the gentleman from 

Mississippi was the veterans preferences that you had in there. 

If you have those two pincers, basically, that are coming into 

your workforce, how are you going to possibly be analyzing and 

look at skills and capability gaps? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. As we take a look in this strategic workforce 

planning, one of the critical elements that we look at is the age of 

the force, the retirement eligibility of the force, and also the ability 

to hire. And so when we do that strategic planning, and we look 

for those skills and gaps that have been discussed, those are the 

types of things that we look at. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay, now, let me just ask you this. 

Have you done that strategic planning now to look at those skills 

and capabilities, and what we need projecting out in the future? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. We are in the process of doing that. 

Mr. FORBES. When did you start? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I would say we started in earnest in 2011 with 

creating this ability to get the visibility to do that. 
28 

Mr. FORBES. But right now, we don’t have any analysis to say 

what those critical skills and capabilities are. 

Is that true? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. No, that is not correct. We have started that. We 

have done it for at least 22 now. 

What we are doing now is driving it further and further down 

the workforce and broader and broader now. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Ms. Farrell. 

Ms. FARRELL. It is true that DOD has identified their critical 

skills for the existing workforce. 

The area that we have been trying to steer them toward is the 

gap analysis that we talked about earlier. That once you determine 

what your mission-critical occupations are, as DOD refers to them, 

their critical skills, then the next step is to measure those against 

the existing workforce in order to determine where your gaps are 

in some cases. 

And it always has to be tailored to what is going on in that particular field. In some fields, you have to consider how long it takes 

to train someone up. And in that case, retirement eligibility may 

become more of a factor in your strategy to fill those positions. 

In other cases, you may look at an emerging field and see that 

it is just going up and down each year and it is not very steady. 

In those cases, that is when you may want to develop a strategy 

that may rely more upon contractors if it is not for a position that 

is inherently governmental. 

But we would like to see more gap analyses. 

DOD did have a plan to have gap analyses completed for their 

22 mission-critical occupations by 2015. We would encourage them 

to expedite those analyses. 

Mr. FORBES. So Mr. Vollrath, right now we have not done that 

gap analysis. 

Is that a fair conclusion? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. We have not completed it. We have started that 

process. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, if you have started the process, the process 

doesn’t do you any good until you have completed it, does it? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I am not sure I would agree with that. As we will 

learn as we go along. And we will have—we are doing it—— 

Mr. FORBES. Can you give to this committee today anything that 

we can look at to see what those gaps are? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I believe we can give you in some instances, yes, 

because we have started that. We have not completed it. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, will you supply to us whatever that you have 

in terms of that gap analysis now? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Certainly. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 73.] 

Mr. FORBES. And have you looked at how sequestration is going 

to impact that gap analysis? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Have not. 

Mr. FORBES. If it has taken you a year or more to just get to 

where you are now, why are we waiting when we only have 5 

months left before sequestration before we look at these impacts? 
29 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I will have to defer to Secretary Carter and—— 

Mr. FORBES. Do you think that is reasonable to wait? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. At this point, I don’t know. I know what the rules 

are. I know what potential implications could be. 

Mr. FORBES. But you don’t know whether it is reasonable or not 

for the Department of Defense 5 months out from a $1⁄2 trillion of 

cuts across the board to not be doing any planning on what kind 

of gap analysis we would have should sequestration hit? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Again, I will defer to Secretary Carter and testimony on the first of August. 

Mr. FORBES. But you don’t have any opinion on that? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. I don’t have any opinion other than that which 

I expressed in terms of how the mechanics would have to work. 

Mr. FORBES. Madeleine. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have just a couple of questions here. 

First, to Mr. Vollrath. 

How does the strategic workforce plan inform the workforce on 

budget decisions in DOD, if at all? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. It does inform the leadership on the budget. 

Again, in that analysis, supported by the strategic workforce plan, 

we have in there a look at the military, a look at the Government 

civilian. And when we also have on top of that what is called the 

ICS [Inventory of Contract Services] to look at the contracted services. 

That is used every cycle to try to get the best mix possible for 

the next budget submit and for, I will use the term normalization 

or rationalization of a look 5 years out as to what we believe we 

need to ask for in the 5-year strategic look. 

And so we are using that product and that process today. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So in your opinion, then, the workforce would be 

adequately informed. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The need for a workforce and what that workforce is, I believe we have good information to make reasoned decisions. We do not normally use that to, quote—‘‘inform the workforce,’’ meaning public announcements, et cetera, because that is 

not what it is designed for, if I am getting your question proper. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Right. Okay. 

My second question is, how does the DOD synchronize, separate, 

and discrete civilian military and contractor funding decisions and 

ensure that proposed savings from reducing one category of manpower are not offset by increases in other categories of manpower? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. A very good question. 

The first answer to that is we have drawn a line and said you 

may not outsource those functions which are inherently governmental. We also have guidance in law that says we may not increase the dollars spent on contracts for services above the fiscal 

year 2010 level, as indicated in the President’s budget submit for 

fiscal year 2010. 

And so there is a relatively bright line for that right now. 

In terms of Government workers and military, what we have 

said in terms of planning guidance, as I mentioned earlier, is be 

careful, commanders, as you build your workforce, to make sure 
30 

that you don’t create the situation where you are forced into the 

position of having to use borrowed military manpower. 

If you have a legitimate reason-need, for which you have no other 

choice but Government civilians, then that is the answer. And you 

should ask appropriately. And if exceptions are required, then you 

have that responsibility to ask for those exceptions. 

We need to make the right decisions for the people, and in the 

context of national defense and the budgets that drive it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you. You have made that very clear. 

Ms. Farrell, what observations can you offer regarding DOD’s efforts to plan for its civilian workforce requirements? 

And in your estimation, is the implementation of total force management helping to identify the core requirements by workforce 

type, civilian, military and personnel? 

And what improvements could be made in the process to determine requirements and critical skills across the workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. I would like to talk about the civilian workforce 

plan to begin with. 

We bounced it around quite a bit. And I think we all agree that 

it is key. 

But the overall civilian strategic human capital plan that we 

looked at in 2010 was far from being mature enough to make informed decisions regarding the mix of personnel or the cost or the 

trade-offs that we are discussing today. 

There has been an update to that plan. And we are looking at 

that. But I think it is probably safe to assume that DOD has not 

progressed at the rate we all would like to see in terms of the competency-based gap analysis. 

I keep coming back to that. Gap analysis is very key to determine what you need today and what you need in the future. And 

that is what we would like to see the decisions based on. 

Again, the plan is based on leading principles that OPM and 

GAO identified that were key to developing human capital management. 

DOD had been reluctant to develop such a plan in 2000, 2002, 

2004. And then in 2006 Congress stepped in and mandated. 

These are the elements from leading practices. This is what we 

would like to see for your overall strategic human capital plan. 

And then as well, the single leader workforce, which is the senior 

executive service, and those that are at the top leadership in the 

intelligence community, and then there are very specific requirements again, that are based on leading practices of how to develop 

such a plan for the acquisition workforce. 

The plan includes appendices that address different subcomponents, information management technology, medical. And these 

plans, subcomponents, are in different levels of maturity. 

But again the overall plan that we have reviewed is not mature 

enough to make informed decisions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I just want a direct answer on this one. 

In your opinion then is DOD driving manpower decisions by resources or by requirements in critical skills required across its 

workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well again, we refer to workforce planning as a 

way to determine what the size of the workforce should be, and 
31 

what the makeup of the workforce should be. And there are principles that can help you obtain the data and do the analysis to 

come up with that. 

Now at a certain point, management may have to come in and 

make tradeoffs. But we would encourage DOD to have data-driven 

analysis in their human capital plan to make such decisions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Mr. FORBES. I would like to thank the members and our witnesses. And members certainly can submit any questions we would 

like. 

Gentlemen,—Mr. Vollrath, thank you for being here. 

Ms. Farrell, thank you. 

Both of you for your service to our country and for your willingness to be here and your expertise, and I think you can see whether we are Republicans or Democrats here, we are very concerned 

about this issue. 

We are united and being concerned about the fact that, Mr. 

Vollrath, as you come in here with all of your expertise that we appreciate and respect so much as the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management for the 

United States Department of Defense, that today it is our understanding in this committee that we really do not have a gap analysis today to show us the gaps that we have in our critical skills 

and our competencies today. 

And that is before sequestration hits, which is just 5 months out 

from today. And at that particular point in time we don’t even have 

an opinion of whether or not we think it is reasonable or unreasonable that we should be preparing for that. 

And, you know, that is a message that I just hope you will take 

back to your friends at the Pentagon. And just say, you know, 

again, we are united as this committee in saying, as Ms. Farrell 

said, that we think it is absolutely crucial that we do a workforce 

analysis that we have some planning instead of just pulling these 

numbers out of the air and moving forward with those. 

And so for all of your help and expertise, all the members who 

were here today, and for my friend from Guam, we want to thank 

you for being here. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 26, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 26, 2012 

(37) 

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness 

Hearing on 

Civilian Workforce Requirements—Now and 

Across the Future Years Defense Program 

July 26, 2012 

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished witnesses to today’s hearing that will focus on ‘‘Civilian Workforce Requirements—Now and Across the Future Years Defense Program.’’ 

The civilian workforce provides an invaluable contribution to the 

DOD mission both at home and abroad, frequently deploying to 

combat zones alongside military and contractor personnel. I welcome this discussion today and the opportunity to better understand how the Department of Defense is forecasting its future 

workforce requirements and balancing the critical skills required 

across all components of its workforce. 

Additionally, I want to understand the impact of directed reductions. Right now, there are two possible reductions that could negatively impact the civilian workforce in the short term—sequestration, and the proposed Senate NDAA language. Let’s start with the 

Senate committee-passed language that directs civilian and service 

contractor workforce reductions commensurate with military end 

strength through FY17 which would be expected to be in excess of 

5%. Based on the numbers provided in FY13, simple math would 

suggest that more than 39,000 civilian Full Time Equivalents 

would be eliminated. 

Next, we have sequestration. Nobody wants it to happen, most 

especially not me. We have been talking about it for awhile, but, 

it appears there is little to no planning associated with this legislative mandate. Assuming an exemption for military personnel, we 

calculate there would be an approximate 11.3% reduction across all 

other accounts. Again, simple math would suggest that an additional 89,000 civilians would be eliminated. When you add the two 

figures, we are talking about more than 128,000 people. And, informally, some in the Pentagon have indicated that sequestration 

alone could be as high as a quarter of the total civilian workforce, 

or almost 200,000 people. The result of any such cuts, particularly 

without analytical underpinning, would be long-term, irreversible 

damage to the workforce. And, let us not forget the costs that 

would have to be calculated to implement, and the sunk costs from 

the first quarter of the year. 

Fundamentally, I have opposed any effort without the necessary 

details that support the proposal. In the case of the Senate reduc-
38 

tions and the mindless implementation of sequestration, both appear to lack any basis in fact or reason. That is why I believe the 

more prudent approach to managing the civilian and contractor 

workforce is to assess the requirement and then to shape the workforce to meet these decision. I look forward to discussing all of 

these issues later in this hearing. 

So, where does that leave us? Well, according to the statutory requirement in 10 U.S.C 1597, any involuntary Reductions In Force 

require notification—both to Congress and the employee. So, if sequestration were to take effect in January, DOD would be required 

to notify us at the end of September. 

In light of potential reductions, what genuinely concerns me is 

the Department of Defense’s planning for its future workforce requirements, and negotiating the appropriate balance among civilian, contractor and military personnel. Since 2001, GAO has listed 

Federal human capital management as a Government-wide, highrisk area because of a need to address current and emerging critical skill gaps that are undermining agencies’ abilities to meet their 

vital missions. And, we know that approximately 30% of the DOD 

workforce and 90% of its senior leaders are eligible for retirement 

as early as 2015. 

I look forward to hearing about what analysis DOD has undertaken to identify and document critical skills and competencies required in each component of the workforce, particularly should directed reductions occur. And, what recommendations GAO has for 

that DOD process. 

We were also recently notified that the Department just extended 

its civilian personnel cap through Fiscal Year 2018. Does that presume that budget is driving DOD workforce requirements, or vice 

versa? And, I look forward to clarification of how this cap is not in 

direct contradiction to the statutory requirement set forth in 10 

U.S.C. 129 which clearly precludes any ‘‘constraint or limitation in 

terms of . . . maximum number of employees.’’ 

We in Congress, and namely this Subcommittee, have exercised 

great oversight of civilian workforce issues to ensure DOD best 

plans for its requirements. Total Force Management in particular 

directs a holistic perspective of workforce requirements across civilian, military, and contractor personnel. However, I am not convinced that we even have perfect knowledge into our civilian requirements. 

I look forward to our discussions today and delving into these 

topics further. We need to exercise appropriate oversight of the 

process to ensure that sequestration or other reductions do not 

blindside our workforce. They deserve to know what may lie ahead 

and it is our job to ensure the public is informed. 

Joining us today to discuss the DOD’s civilian workforce are two 

distinguished witnesses: 

• Mr. Frederick Vollrath, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Readiness and Force Management at the Department of Defense; and 

• Ms. Brenda Farrell, Director of Defense Capabilities and 

Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

We thank you both for being here. We are looking forward to 

your testimony. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 26, 2012 

(73) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department is committed to improving its strategic workforce 

planning capabilities in order to fully meet the requirements of section 115b of title 

10, United States Code by fiscal year (FY) 2015. A key challenge is normalizing data 

and requirements across the military and civilian workforces, as well as contracted 

support, in order to accurately assess and project future needs. The Department has 

made considerable progress in developing and implementing practical tools and 

strategies to make data-driven decisions in managing mission-critical skills. 

The current FY10–18 DOD Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP) was delivered to Congress in March 2012. The plan provides details on the steps already taken and the 

way ahead to meet the 2015 goal (see summary table below). Following are some 

specific examples of steps taken since FY10 to improve the SWP and institutionalize 

use of the plan for workforce shaping decisions. 

The Department expanded its functional communities from 12 to 23 to cover all 

major occupations in the workforce versus only the Mission Critical Occupations 

(MCOs) covered in previous plans. 

DOD led a Federal-wide initiative to develop new government-wide criteria for determining MCOs based on mission goals and priorities, and determining high-risk 

skills based on staffing and competency gaps. As a result, 33 DOD MCOs, including 

three high-risk MCOs, were identified in March 2012 based on the new criteria. 

In October 2011, the Department issued guidance on reframing the DOD SWP 

and issued additional guidance in November 2011 on the enterprise competency 

management framework. 

A new governance structure for strategic human capital management was also implemented providing integrated decisions between functional community and component leaders in the expanded functional community construct. 

The Department implemented standard competency taxonomy for identifying and 

assessing occupational competencies across the workforce. Competency models for 

all DOD MCOs will be in place by the end of 2012, and a DOD-wide tool for assessing employee competency gaps is planned for deployment in 2013. 

Additional initiatives are underway to improve total force data and requirements 

needed for a comprehensive approach to assess total force mix, implement more robust enterprise planning tools for use across the Department, and strengthen and 

mature workforce planning capability and results. [See page 28.] 
74 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has authority to redefine Federal Wage System (FWS) wage areas and to assign geographic designations 

to a specific wage area. The Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee (FPRAC), 

comprised of labor and management members, makes recommendations for wage 

area changes to the Director of OPM. The FPRAC majority recently made a recommendation to the Director of OPM to realign many wage areas. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. VOLLRATH. As of June 30, 2012, the number of DOD civilians with prior military experience or veteran status is 336,229, representing 42.99% of the total DOD 

civilian workforce. [See page 20.] 
75 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, as of June 30, the Department of Defense has removed or terminated 1,936 civilian employees out of a total workforce 

of 782,029 civilian employees due to unacceptable or unsatisfactory performance, 

misconduct, or delinquency. This figure represents 0.24% of the total workforce (less 

than 1%). In FY 2011, the Department removed or terminated 2,587 civilian employees for similar reasons. [See page 21.] 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Federal civilian employees do not receive combat zone income tax 

exclusion. Section 112 of title 26, United States Code provides tax benefits for military members serving in combat zones, but there is currently no comparable provision for Federal civilians. [See page 21.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 26, 2012 

(79) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. How is DOD managing its future force structure requirements in 

light of the reductions in military personnel as you draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan? And, specifically, is the DOD expecting to reduce its civilian and contractor 

workforce commensurate with the military personnel reductions? If not, why not? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Currently proposed reductions in military end-strength are linked 

to declines in our current overseas commitments; expiration of the temporary endstrength increases associated with Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom; revised 

strategy, posture and operational planning; and changes to our force structure. The 

military reductions currently planned for ensure that the Active Duty end-strength 

of the Department is nearly the same as it was prior to September 11, 2001. Under 

the current budget plan, ground force capabilities within the Army and Marine 

Corps will remain at slightly above 2011 levels, while Navy and Air Force levels decrease. These decreases are attributable to reductions in ship and aircraft inventories and modernization of the respective fleets. 

The Department’s FY 2013 budget reflects a balanced workforce that reflects our 

best judgment, representing a carefully coordinated approach based on the Department’s strategy and policy that balances operational needs and fiscal reality without 

placing national security and our overall defense posture at risk. 

The Department’s sourcing of functions and work among military, civilian, and 

contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable laws and guidance. 

Even during this period of constrained defense budgets, we must ensure that we 

have a sufficient number of Federal civilian personnel to meet the support needs 

of our military forces. We must also be sure that military or Federal civilians are 

performing all inherently governmental jobs, and that sufficient levels of civilians 

are available to perform critical oversight, management, and readiness functions of 

the Department. 

The Department also recognizes that we operate in a dynamic and changing environment and must retain the flexibility to adapt our workforces accordingly. 

Mr. FORBES. What analysis has DOD undertaken to identify workforce levels 

based on requirements? Or, are the number of personnel driven by fiscal constraints 

and budgetary imperatives? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President’s Budget request reflects an 

objective and reasonable approach to all components of the Total Force: military, 

Government civilians, and contracted services. During this period of constrained defense budgets, the Department must ensure that a sufficient number of Federal civilian personnel are available to meet the support needs of our military forces and 

deliver operational readiness. The Department must also prioritize and reduce less 

critical missions. In an effort to significantly reduce excess overhead costs the Department carried out a number of initiatives beginning in FY 2011 including directing Components to maintain civilian personnel, with certain exemptions and exceptions, at FY 2010 levels. Components were directed to make trade-offs and separate 

core mission workload and requirements from less compelling support needs based 

on organizational assessments and mission/function prioritization. This reflects a 

commitment to challenge workload requirements and size our workforce to meet our 

most pressing and critical priorities. Exceptions to this have been granted on a case 

by case basis, where justified by workload or other specific rationales. 

Mr. FORBES. What analyses has the DOD completed in order to determine the 

core or critical functions that would be most appropriately performed by each category—civilian, military, and contractor workforce? And, what analyses has the 

DOD done to ensure that it has the right mix of people with the right skills in order 

to perform these critical functions? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The many Components of the Department execute a wide-range 

of missions and functions, and as such, have varying skill and capability requirements. These requirements are mission and workload driven, and are affected by 

operating environment, risk levels, local labor market conditions, and other factors. 

The Department’s ‘‘sourcing’’ of functions and work between military and civilians, 

or through contracted services, must be consistent with workload requirements, 
80 

readiness, and management needs, as well as applicable laws and statute. There are 

many tools and processes available to help inform such decisions. These include, but 

are not limited to, the Strategic Workforce Planning construct of functional communities and mission-critical occupations; the inherently governmental and commercial 

activities inventory; the inventory of contracts for services; and force and infrastructure classifications. 

Accordingly, the Department remains committed to ensuring and delivering a balanced, flexible, responsive workforce with the right skills and competencies that: is 

the appropriate mix of labor; mitigates risk, ensures continuity of operations, and 

promotes an organic knowledge base; delivers core and critical functions necessary 

to maintain operational readiness; and ensures mission requirements are met most 

cost effectively and efficiently. DOD Components request funding and manpower resources based on workload requirements, including the most critical functions necessary to meet their respective missions. 

Mr. FORBES. Why has the DOD extended its civilian workforce cap through 2018, 

and what savings do you expect to garner as a result of which? And, how does DOD 

reconcile the workforce cap with current law and statute in 10 U.S.C. 129 which 

precludes such limitations by number of employees? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department does not have a cap on its civilian workforce. As 

part of its budget building process for the past few years, the Department directed 

that components maintain fiscal year 2010 civilian levels as a departure point for 

prioritizing and shaping its workforce, and in an effort to ensure resources are applied to our most compelling requirements. DOD organizations may exceed their fiscal year 2010 civilian workforce levels as needed to meet mission and workload requirements, consistent with section 129 of title 10, United States Code. Where necessitated by mission and workload, exceptions to fiscal year 2010 civilian levels 

may be granted. Those decisions will be reflected in the FY 2014 President’s Budget. 

Mr. FORBES. How do you expect that sequestration will impact the civilian workforce, and when would DOD be required to notify personnel of an impending Reduction in Force? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. We believe that civilian RIFs would result in added costs, or at 

most only small savings in FY13, so RIFs are not a viable tool for accommodating 

that FY13 sequester. To accommodate sequester in FY13, we would need to focus 

more on eliminating temp hires, hiring freezes, and perhaps unpaid furloughs. All 

of these would harm readiness and our ability to support military operations. 

RIFs also do long term damage in the workforce because they are based primarily 

on length of service as opposed to maintaining a workforce that is responsive to mission needs. RIFs also take time. Involuntary separations conducted under Reduction 

in Force rules require a 45-day congressional notification followed by a 60-day notification to employees. This can further be complicated by the need to bargain with 

individual unions. For all these reasons, RIFs are not a viable tool to accommodate 

sequester. 

Mr. FORBES. In light of the fact that 30% of the civilian workforce is eligible to 

retire in 2015, and 90% of your senior management, how is the DOD managing its 

workforce and developing critical skills to ensure a viable workforce in the future 

with the requisite skills? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. At the enterprise level, the Department manages its workforce 

through a functional community construct. The Department forecasts retirements 

and other losses through the DOD Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP). 

DOD and its Components work together to track and manage skill gaps and to 

develop and implement recruitment, retention, and development strategies to close 

projected skill gaps due to retirement and other losses. 

Current DOD workforce data shows that 20.6% of the overall workforce (GS 1– 

15 and equivalent) and 51.3% of the senior leader workforce are eligible to retire 

by the start of 2015. DOD monitors and tracks retirement eligibility in mission-critical occupations (MCOs) on an ongoing basis as part of its SWP process. The goal 

is to ensure strategies are in place to manage knowledge transfer and succession 

for critical skills and competencies needed. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Strategic Workforce Plan inform workforce and resource allocation decisions in DOD, if at all? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The DOD Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP) serves as a guide for 

managing civilian positions across the Department within functional communities 

and components. The SWP is informed by validated missions. DOD Components request funding and civilian full-time equivalents based on validated workload. By focusing on specific strategies for closing mission-critical and high-risk skills gaps, the 

SWP guides leaders in making workforce decisions to meet changing mission strategies, environmental and labor market conditions, and budget constraints. Allocated 
81 

resources then are aligned by DOD Components to their most critical missions/priorities, informed by workforce gaps identified in the DOD-wide SWP. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the DOD synchronize separate and discrete civilian, military and contractor funding decisions and ensure that proposed savings from reducing one category of manpower are not offset by increases in other categories of manpower? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Departmental guidance on manpower management is intended to 

ensure that Components align the best manpower mix to missions, tasks, and functions and requires associated risk mitigation and consideration of costs. Components 

prioritize their manpower requirements/funding requests in developing their annual 

program and budget submissions and may make adjustments within the Total Force 

mix. Their priorities are a reflection of their requirements, which are driven in part 

by the National Military Strategy, the Secretary’s Defense Planning Guidance, 

Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Combatant Command operational planning documents. Once requirements are submitted as part of initial budget submissions, a 

corporate review is conducted to assess and prioritize requirements in a holistic 

manner. Where necessary, resource and manpower trade-offs are identified and recommended courses of action are presented to the Secretary of Defense for final decision. Adjustments to manpower requirements, and their mix, can be a result of 

changes in force structure, mission prioritization, and workload. 

Mr. FORBES. What steps is the DOD taking to improve the visibility of contracted 

services to ensure that such services get the same scrutiny as civilian and military 

workforce end strengths? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In November 2011, the Department submitted a plan to the Congressional defense committees delineating both short- and long-term actions to fully 

implement the requirements of section 2330a of title 10, United States Code. As a 

result of this plan, and subsequent guidance issued in December, the Department 

will have increased visibility and accountability into contracted services. Specifically, improvements currently underway will enable the Department to more accurately identify contracted level of effort based on direct labor hours and associated 

data collected from private sector providers. Additionally, DOD Component heads 

must now certify, in writing, that they have completed comprehensive reviews of 

their contracted services to ensure appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and 

alignment to mission need and priority. Along with restrictions on contract spending 

included in the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, these reviews 

will help inform subsequent budget requests, and ensure that requests for contracted services receive scrutiny similar to that afforded civilian personnel levels 

and military end-strength. 

Mr. FORBES. What would be the impact of the SASC NDAA reductions of civilian 

and contractor workforce by 5% over the next 5 years? And, has the DOD assessed 

the critical skills it needs to retain in each workforce? If so, what are some examples? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Given the planned decreases to force structure, the streamlined 

new strategic direction of the Department, and continued fiscal pressures, the Department continues to evaluate the size of our Total Force, including our civilian 

and contracted services workforces. Any changes must be done in a holistic, analytically based, and responsible manner that is consistent with the Department’s responsibilities under sections 129 and 129a of title 10, United States Code. 

The Department’s civilian and contracted support workforces perform key enabling functions for the operating forces, such as critical training, equipment modernization and reset, medical care, family support, and base operating and infrastructure services—all vital services that support our men and women in uniform. 

Within these functional communities, the Department has identified 33 mission-critical occupations (MCOs). The DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plan forecasts future MCO 

requirements and provides recruitment, retention, and development strategies to 

close workforce gaps ensuring that critical skills are maintained in each. 

Furthermore, the Department’s sourcing of functions and work among military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, 

funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable laws 

and guidance. Even during this period of constrained defense budgets, we must ensure that we have a sufficient number of Federal civilian personnel to meet the support needs of our military forces. We must also be sure that military or Federal civilians are performing all inherently governmental jobs, and that sufficient levels 

of civilians are available to perform critical oversight, management, and readiness 

functions of the Department. 

Mr. FORBES. In the past, GAO has stated that across-the-board cuts could have 

an adverse effect on essential programs if the DOD does not take a strategic view 
82 

1GAO, Human Capital: Further Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Civilian Strategic Workforce Plan, GAO–10–814R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2010); Human Capital: Opportunities 

Exist to Build on Recent Progress to Strengthen DOD’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, 

GAO–09–235 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2009); The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human 

Capital Strategic Plan Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements, GAO–08–439R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2008). 2GAO, DOD Civilian Workforce: Observations on DOD’s Efforts to Plan for Civilian Workforce 

Requirements, GAO–12–962T (Washington, D.C: July 26, 2012). 3DOD is required by law to develop periodic strategic human capital plans containing certain 

specific elements, which have changed over time. The current plan requirement is codified at 

10 U.S.C. § 115b. 4GAO–08–439R. 

5 According to DOD officials, enterprisewide mission-critical occupations are used in DOD’s updated strategic plan to refer to both critical skills and competencies. 6GAO–12–962T and GAO–10–814R. 

of ensuring that those employees with the critical skills needed to perform the 

DOD’s critical functions are not arbitrarily cut. What recommendations would you 

offer based on previous GAO analysis for how the DOD could best manage that 

process? 

Ms. FARRELL. While we have not evaluated the potential impact of across-theboard cuts on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) current workforce, since 2008 we 

have reviewed DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Workforce Plans and identified opportunities for improvement. 1 Our reviews of those plans have found that DOD addressed the requirement to assess its critical skills. Specifically, the overall civilian 

workforce plan identified 22 mission-critical occupations, which, according to DOD, 

represent the Department’s assessment of critical skills. However, we also found 

that DOD’s plan lacked such key elements as competency gap analysis and monitoring of progress. Our prior work has identified competency gap analyses and monitoring progress as two key elements in the strategic workforce planning process. 

Specifically, competency gap analyses enable an agency to develop specific strategies 

to address workforce needs and monitoring progress demonstrates the contribution 

of workforce planning to the achievement of program goals. As we have reported, 

without a competency gap analysis, DOD will continue to rely on incomplete information concerning the size, composition, and needs of its civilian workforce. Inclusion of these elements in an agency’s strategic workforce planning efforts can help 

the agency design and fund the best strategies to fill their talent needs through recruiting and hiring and make appropriate investments to develop and retain the 

best possible workforce. 2

Mr. FORBES. What observations can you offer regarding DOD’s efforts to plan for 

its civilian workforce requirements? In your estimation, is the implementation of 

Total Force Management helping to identify the core requirements by workforce 

type—civilian, military and personnel? And, what improvements could be made in 

the process to determine requirements and critical skills across the workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. We have reviewed DOD’s mandated Strategic Human Capital 

Workforce Plans since 2008, and found that DOD’s earlier efforts did not meet many 

of the mandated requirements. 3 In our assessment of DOD’s original plan, which 

was submitted to Congress on November 6, 2007, we found that it partially addressed two of the eight statutory requirements. 4 For example, while DOD’s plan 

listed current critical skills that DOD called enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, 5 it lacked a ‘‘gap analysis’’—an assessment of the difference between the existing and future critical skills and competencies of the civilian workforce. We recommended that DOD provide Congress a plan that addressed all of the legislative 

requirements. DOD disagreed, noting that its response to the congressional reporting requirements reflected a centralized enterprisewide strategic perspective—as opposed to providing the information specified by law such as recruiting and retention 

goals. We noted in our 2009 review of DOD’s update to the plan that the Department had made progress in implementing the eight statutory requirements in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 when compared with its 

first plan; however, the 2008 update only partially addressed each of the eight requirements. For example, the update still did not include an assessment of its future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that cover a 10-year period, as was 

then required by law. The statutory requirements governing DOD’s strategic human 

capital plans 6 have been amended several times in the intervening period, and we 

have continued to closely monitor DOD’s efforts to address the statutory requirements. In our September 2010 review of DOD’s 2009 update to its human capital 

strategic plan we found that, although DOD had addressed additional legislative requirements, several key elements continued to be missing from the process—including such elements as competency gap analyses and monitoring of progress. Regard-
83 

7GAO–10–814R. 

8GAO–12–962T. 

9GAO, Workforce Reductions: Downsizing Strategies Used in Selected Organizations, GAO/ 

GGD–95–54 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 1995). 10GAO–12–962T. 11GAO/GGD–95–54. 12GAO–12–962T. 

ing total force management, our September 2010 review also found that the Department had issued a directive stating that missions should be accomplished using the 

least costly mix of personnel (military, civilian, and contractors) consistent with 

military requirements and other needs. However, as our report noted, the Department’s workforce plan did not provide an assessment of the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, is DOD driving manpower decisions by resources or 

by requirements and critical skills required across its workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. Both requirements and resources help to shape DOD’s workforce decisions. We have previously reported on DOD’s efforts to strategically manage its 

civilian workforce, but have noted that opportunities exist for further improvement. 

For instance, we reported in 2010 7 that DOD’s 2009 strategic workforce plan assessed the Department’s critical skills and identified 22 mission-critical occupations, 

such as acquisition and financial management. However, DOD’s plan only discussed 

competency gap analyses for 3 of its 22 mission-critical occupations. We have reported that competency gap analyses are key to enabling an agency to develop specific strategies to address workforce needs. For example, we found that DOD had 

not conducted a competency gap analysis for its financial management workforce, 

and we remain concerned that DOD lacks critical information it needs to effectively 

plan for its workforce requirements. We are currently reviewing DOD’s latest strategic workforce plan, which was released in March 2012. The results of our review 

are expected to be released in September 2012. 8

Mr. FORBES. Based on previous GAO analysis, what recommendations would you 

offer for the best practices to manage civilian workforce downsizing? 

Ms. FARRELL. Our prior work 9 has found that workforce planning is essential in 

identifying positions to be eliminated and pinpointing specific employees for potential separation. We have reported that in organizations where planning did not 

occur or was not effectively implemented, difficulties arose in the downsizing. For 

example, a lack of effective planning for skills retention can lead to a loss of critical 

staff, and an organization that simply reduces the number of employees without 

changing work processes will likely have staffing growth recur eventually. 10 More 

specifically, simply reducing staff does not make the work that they were doing go 

away, and may be costly, indiscriminate, and inconsistent with continuing productive work flow with fewer staff. However, with proper planning, downsizing can be 

targeted to specific skills the organization no longer needs in its revised structure. 

Our work has also found that an important lesson learned is for organizations undergoing downsizing to carefully examine their functions and identify needed structural changes and other revisions to traditional methods of operation as a precursor 

to making decisions on where and to what extent workforce cuts are appropriate. 

However, a number of factors may constrain organizations’ use of downsizing strategies, such as public sentiment, budget limitations, legislative mandates to maintain 

certain programs, and personnel laws. 

Mr. FORBES. If sequestration were to occur, what recommendations would you 

offer DOD to consider now to best manage its directed manpower reductions? And, 

what, in your opinion, would be the impact of sequestration on the DOD workforce— 

civilian, contractor and military personnel? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has not conducted the work necessary to make recommendations related to or analyzing the impact of a sequestration. However, our prior 

work 11 has found that workforce planning is essential in identifying positions to be 

eliminated and pinpointing specific employees for potential separation. We have also 

reported that in organizations where planning did not occur or was not effectively 

implemented, difficulties arose in the downsizing. For example, a lack of effective 

planning for skills retention can lead to a loss of critical staff, and an organization 

that simply reduces the number of employees without changing work processes will 

likely have staffing growth recur eventually. 12

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Farrell, in your statement, you devote a portion to discussing 

DOD’s downsizing efforts of the early 1990s. Specifically, you note that DOD’s approach to its civilian workforce reductions was not focused on shaping the makeup 

of the workforce—as it typically does when managing its military downsizing— 

which resulted in significant imbalances in terms of shape, skills, and retirement 
84 

13GAO–12–962T. 14GAO, Defense Force Management: Expanded Focus in Monitoring Civilian Force Reductions 

Needed, GAO/T–NSIAD–92–19 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18, 1992); and Defense Force Management: Challenges Facing DOD as It Continues to Downsize Its Workforce, GAO/NSIAD–93–123 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 1993). 

eligibility of the civilian workforce. Could you elaborate on whether or not DOD had 

a strategy guiding that downsizing and what the effect of that downsizing was on 

the civilian workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. As noted in my statement, 13 DOD’s civilian workforce downsizing 

efforts in the 1990s were not oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce, 

which resulted in significant imbalances in terms of shape, skills, and retirement 

eligibility of its workforce. Specifically, in our reviews 14 of these efforts, we found 

that DOD’s efforts in the 1990s to reduce its Federal civilian workforce to levels 

below that of 1987 were hampered by incomplete data and lack of a clear strategy 

for avoiding skill imbalances and other adverse effects of downsizing. For instance, 

in 1992, GAO found that DOD used incomplete and inconsistent data related to 

workers, workload, and projected force reductions. Further, the approaches DOD 

has previously relied on to accomplish downsizing have sometimes had unintended 

consequences. The use of voluntary attrition, hiring freezes, and financial separation 

incentives allowed DOD to mitigate some adverse effects of civilian workforce reductions, but were less oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce than was 

the approach the Department used to manage its military downsizing. For DOD, 

this was especially true of the civilian acquisition workforce. Our work has also 

found that use of strategies such as financial separation incentives makes it difficult 

to document or estimate the actual cost savings of Government downsizing efforts, 

especially in cases where the work previously performed by the eliminated personnel continues to be required. For example, if the work continues to be required, 

it may need to be contracted out to private companies and contract costs should be 

considered in determining whether net savings will result from workforce reductions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed the Department of Defense to take a more holistic approach to its manpower 

requirements in order to achieve the appropriate balance in its total workforce, 

rather than simply managing to budgetary targets. The Secretary was required to 

develop a total force management plan that would provide the means to establish 

the appropriate mix of manpower to perform the Department’s mission, whether by 

military (Active or Reserve), civilian, or contractor personnel. The committee is concerned, however, that the budget request does not reflect this holistic approach. 

What steps is the Department taking to help ensure that the budget request reflects 

a more holistic approach? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department has extensive guidance regarding manpower 

management and workforce mix. Consistent with this guidance and applicable statutory requirements, including those included in the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD Components identify the requisite manpower and resources needed to execute their missions, tasks, and functions. The Department remains committed to ensuring and delivering a balanced, flexible, responsive workforce with the right skills and competencies that: is the appropriate mix of labor; 

mitigates risk; ensures continuity of operations; promotes an organic knowledge 

base that delivers core and critical functions necessary to maintain operational readiness; and ensures mission requirements are met cost effectively and efficiently. 

Through the program and budget review process, Component manpower and resource requests are prioritized and trade-offs are made in a manner that ensures 

a holistic, analytically based, and responsible allocation of limited resources to our 

highest priorities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Why has it taken so long for the Department of Defense to develop 

its Strategic Workforce Plan? Further, I am concerned that the current plan uses 

data from 2010 and may not provide DOD with the right type of requirements-based 

gap analysis that is really needed. Does the Department of Defense have the tools, 

leadership and data it needs to make strategic decisions? Is there something impeding the timely development of this plan? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. In May 2011, using 2010 baseline on-board data, DOD drafted the 

current Fiscal Year (FY) 10–18 Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP), which was submitted to Congress in March 2012. The SWP planning process is extensive in scope 

and complexity, covering a workforce of over 780,000 employees across multiple 
85 

functional communities, the military departments, and defense agencies and activities. The normal planning cycle is 12 months. Efficiency reviews and major budget 

shifts during the planning cycle can delay planning requiring changes in workforce 

planning targets and forecasts. The SWP considered major budget decisions that 

were made before the final draft was approved. Budget shifts since then are now 

being assessed against the baseline set by the current SWP. 

Per the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (Public Law 112–81), the 

Department is now on a biennial planning cycle, allowing time for implementation 

and progress evaluation before developing the next plan. Each SWP starts with 

baseline on-board data from the current year, identifies targets for future years 

based on budgeted manpower requirements, then forecasts hiring and attrition to 

identify current and projected skill gaps. The FY12–18 SWP which is currently 

under development will follow this approach using 2012 baseline data. The next biennial SWP development began in May for the FY12–18 planning cycle, which corresponds with the budget established in the Future Years Defense Program. This 

plan is expected to be delivered to Congress in 2013. 

Ms. BORDALLO. DOD’s 2010 Strategic Workforce Plan states that most of the Department’s civilian mission-critical occupations are projecting some growth through 

2018, roughly 4%. With regard to the current fiscal environment and caps on the 

civilian workforce at the 2010 strength level, how does the Department expect to 

maintain as well as grow these mission-critical occupations without having a negative impact on other missions or personnel requirements? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department does not have a cap on its civilian workforce. As 

part of its budget building process for the past few years, the Department has directed that components use Fiscal Year 2010 civilian levels as a departure point for 

prioritizing and shaping its workforce in an effort to make sure resources are applied to our most compelling needs. Components are asked to make trade-offs, ensuring civilian personnel are aligned to the most critical missions and requirements. 

Where trade-offs are not achievable, and where necessitated by mission and workload, exceptions to Fiscal Year 2010 civilian have and will continue to be granted. 

Where appropriate, this will include those mission-critical occupations covered by 

the Department’s Strategic Workforce Plan. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As we have seen in the past, across-the-board, arbitrary cuts of 

thousands of civilian employees could have an adverse effect on essential programs 

if the Department does not take a strategic view of ensuring that those employees 

with the critical skills needed to perform the Department’s critical functions are not 

arbitrarily cut. How does the Department plan to help ensure that reductions in civilian employees will be done with the assurance of maintaining those skills critical 

to the Department’s mission? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Changes in the civilian workforce must be made in a way that 

preserve mission essential skills and abilities over the long term and in a manner 

that enables DOD to recruit and retain the most talented individuals consistent 

with mission requirements and priorities. As currently programmed reductions are 

implemented, DOD will continue to focus on ensuring the appropriate mix of skill 

sets and competencies needed to execute our mission. 

In fiscal year (FY) 2012, the Department identified mission-critical occupations 

(MCOs) and high-risk skills in the Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP) based on new 

Federal-wide criteria and staffing gap data. This data-driven, systematic method 

aligns strategic mission goals and priorities to mission-critical occupations and assesses staffing gap risks. As a result, recruitment, retention, and development strategies can be targeted to reduce skill gaps in MCOs. 

In addition, the Department has implementing a standard competency taxonomy 

for identifying and assessing occupational competencies across the workforce. Competency models for MCOs will be in place by the end of 2012 and a DOD-wide tool 

for assessing employee competency gaps is planned for deployment in 2013. These 

tools will give DOD far more insight into employee skills—including strengths, gaps, 

and future needs—to improve workforce planning and decisions in a fiscally constrained environment. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How many civilian personnel positions does the Department intend to eliminate between FY12 and FY17, broken down by years? How many civilian personnel positions would the Department have to eliminate between FY12 and 

FY17, if Section 341 of S. 3254 is enacted? Would such cuts be in addition to cuts 

in civilian personnel planned by the Department? Would such cuts be in addition 

to those that might be required by sequestration? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The President’s Budget request for Fiscal Year 2013 reflected an 

approximate 2% decrease in the Department’s civilian workforce (excluding foreign 

nationals) by Fiscal Year 2017. This equals 13,668 civilian positions—from 751,172 

in Fiscal Year 2012 to 737,504 in Fiscal Year 2017. Annual levels through Fiscal 
86 

Year 2017 are as follows: FY12—751,172; FY13—743,815; FY14—738,880; FY15— 

739,561; FY16—738,440; and FY17—737,504. As currently written, section 341 

would not require a specific reduction in civilian workforce levels. Legislatively directing reductions in selected elements of the workforce simply because well-reasoned reductions are being taken in other elements would preclude the Department 

from appropriately sizing its workforce to meet its mission workload. 

In terms of sequestration, the Secretary’s focus remains on precluding, not planning, for sequestration. If sequestration does occur, it would have across the board 

impacts on the Department’s readiness and capabilities, including critical missions 

and tasks performed by DOD civilian employees. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In which functional areas has the Department added personnel 

since FY09, broken down by numbers of positions and by years, and why are these 

increases necessary? To what extent, if at all, are these increases related to changes 

in military end-strength? In which functional areas does the Department anticipate 

adding civilian personnel, between FY12 and FY17, broken down by numbers of positions and by years, and why are these increases necessary? To what extent, if at 

all, are these increases related to changes in military end-strength? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Across the Department of Defense, civilian personnel levels have 

increased in a number of mission-critical occupations and functional communities 

since Fiscal Year 2009. These increases reflect the Department’s appropriate response to changing missions, needs, and requirements. These increases include, but 

are not limited to, personnel performing critical acquisition oversight, intelligence, 

cyber operations, information technology, security, medical care, and financial management functions. In some instances these increases are tied to operational tempo, 

end-strength levels, and military force structure. The Department’s current budget 

request calls for an overall decrease in civilian personnel of approximately 2% by 

Fiscal Year 2017. However, some functional capabilities (e.g. IT, cyber and medical) 

will likely see some limited growth during that time to adapt to missions and workload. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How many civilian positions are included in each of the following 

four items: the Mission Critical Occupations as defined by the Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan of the Department of Defense, the Acquisition Workforce Plan 

of the Department of Defense, personnel employed at facilities providing core logistics capabilities, and the Office of the Inspector General? Please indicate which functional areas and the numbers of civilian personnel who perform such functions 

would not be included in those four categories. Please also indicate the GS and WG 

status of the civilian personnel who would not be included in those four aforementioned categories. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Fiscal Year 2010–2018 (FY10–18) Strategic Workforce Plan 

delivered to Congress in March 2012 covered 22 mission-critical occupations 

(MCOs). DOD has expanded the functional community construct to cover ALL major 

occupations in the civilian workforce across 23 functional communities, including 

Acquisition and Logistics communities. The table below provides a current overview 

and representation of the Department’s current 23 functional communities, the occupations and number of employees associated with each, and the 33 current DOD 

mission-critical occupations, including Wage Grade occupations. 
87 
88 

Ms. BORDALLO. Has the Department determined that the functions excluded from 

cuts by Senate FY13 NDAA Section 341 need not be reviewed for efficiencies? Do 

the exclusions mean that for purposes of complying with Section 341 that non-excluded functions will have to be reduced in excess of what the Department had 

planned? Will the Department be reviewing those excluded functions for efficiencies, 

regardless of whether Section 341 is enacted? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department has not undertaken any planning specifically related to the provision in the Senate Armed Services Committee mark-up of the fiscal 

year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. Legislatively directing reductions 

(and possible exclusions from such reductions) to the civilian workforce would preclude the Department from most appropriately, effectively, and efficiently sizing its 

Total Force to meet mission and workload. We are committed to ensuring all aspects 

of the civilian workforce are aligned to workload, consistent with mission priorities, 

and that we execute such workload as efficiently and effectively as possible and in 

compliance with sections 124 and 129a of title 10, United States Code. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do civilian personnel perform functions related to the maintenance and repair of military equipment but who are not employed at facilities providing core logistics capabilities? Section 341 would exclude from cuts those contractor ‘‘personnel performing maintenance and repair of military equipment’’. Is 

that contractor workforce comparable in terms of functional areas to the civilian 

workforce that provides core logistics capabilities pursuant to 10 USC 2464? If the 

former includes functional areas not included in the latter, which ones would they 

be and how many civilian employees perform those functional areas that are not included? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department does have both civilian and contractor personnel 

performing functions related to the maintenance and repair of military equipment 

some of whom are not employed at facilities providing core logistics capabilities. The 

contracted skill sets are comparable to those within the civilian workforce in terms 

of the functional areas needed to perform the required maintenance and repair. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are all civilian positions related to the provision of medical and 

financial audit services included within the Mission Critical Occupations as defined 

by the Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan of the Department of Defense and the 

Acquisition Workforce Plan of the Department of Defense? If not, which positions 

and how many positions are not included for each function? 
89 

Mr. VOLLRATH. There are five occupations in the Medical Functional Community 

and four occupations in the Financial Management Functional Community designated as Mission Critical Occupations (MCO). The table below lists all the occupations in these communities, including those designated as MCOs and high-risk occupations. Functional communities are based on the occupational series assigned to civilian positions. 
90 

Ms. BORDALLO. What process did the Department undertake to determine the extent to which military end-strength should be reduced? Did it arbitrarily assign a 

percentage in determining how much military end-strength should be reduced? Or 

did it first engage in thoughtful analysis? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The currently planned for reductions in military end-strength are 

the result of extensive planning and thoughtful analysis, including a comprehensive 

review of the Nation’s military and defense strategies called for by the President 

of the United States, and are not based on an arbitrarily assigned percentage reduction. Military end-strength reductions are based on changes to our overall force 

structure; reduced operational tempos and commitments associated with Operations 

Iraqi and Enduring Freedom; and a shift in our strategic priorities to the Asia-Pacific area of operations. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Within the last eight months, Personnel and Readiness has issued 

three different guidances to prevent work performed by civilian employees from 

being illegally and inappropriately converted to performance by contractors and 

military personnel. 
91 

a) What role did the cap play in the issuance of these guidances? 

b) It is our understanding that while Personnel and Readiness attempts to follow 

up on credible reports of violations of those guidances that it is ultimately powerless 

to prevent components from carrying them out. Is that true? 

c) In the Army’s March 29 HSGAC testimony, it was written ‘‘When faced with 

hiring decisions, people are therefore being placed in the unenviable position of having to decide whether to comply with the civilian cap, or to comply with the other 

statutes governing the workforce . . . ’’ That seems to be an implicit acknowledgement that the cap compels commanders to violate the law. Does that testimony accurately describe why commanders may feel compelled to defy Personnel and Readiness’ guidances? 

d) What additional power does Personnel and Readiness need to enforce the guidances and the underlying laws? 

e) House report language directed the Department to make it clear that the guidances also covered functions performed by Non-Appropriated Fund employees. Has 

this been done? If not, why? 

f) Will the imposition of an arbitrary cut in civilian employees, as proposed by the 

Senate, make it more difficult to enforce laws against direct conversions and the Department’s guidances to enforce those laws? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Each question within the broader question is answered individually: 

a) The guidance was issued in order to remind Commanders and managers of 

their obligations under title 10 and DOD policies to ensure that efficient and workforce mix. The guidance focused our efforts in the context of the efficiencies initiatives eliminating low priority workload and limiting resources for overhead and administrative functions in order to sustain core mission capabilities due, in part, to 

the changing budgetary landscape. 

b) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

(OUSD (P&R)) provides policy and guidance. In cases where there have been reported instances of workload re-alignment that are potentially in contradiction to 

statutory requirements or established policies, OUSD (P&R) has engaged with Components, based on Secretary of Defense authority, to ensure that appropriate component leadership attention is given to those reports. 

c) I cannot speak to the Army’s testimony to the HSGAC. However, DOD decisionmakers must make daily decisions based on mission workload, resource availability, 

and risk mitigation. These decisions often require consideration for multiple policies, 

statutes, and directives and will result in trade-offs and workload prioritization. 

OUSD (P&R), as a policy and oversight office, works with those decisionmakers to 

ensure compliance with appropriate statutory requirements and internal policies. 

d) OUSD (P&R) does not require any additional power or authorities beyond those 

currently provided for in law and as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. 

e) No, the Department has not yet issued clarifying guidance regarding the application of these statutory sourcing provisions to Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) employees. While we appreciate the concerns expressed in the House report the Department is currently assessing the application of our workforce sourcing policies, 

in the context of statutory requirements, and reconciling them with the personnel 

management policies for NAF employees and the policies that govern the day-to-day 

operations of NAF instrumentalities. Existing policies will be updated as needed. 

f) Any arbitrary reduction in civilian employees, whether legislatively directed or 

internally executed, would create challenges with regard to appropriate and effective 

workforce mix and workload alignment. The Department’s sourcing of functions and 

work among military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with 

workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as 

well as applicable laws and guidance. Legislatively directing reductions in selected 

elements of the workforce simply because well-reasoned reductions are being taken 

in others would preclude the Department from appropriately sizing its workforce to 

meet its mission workload. Even during this period of constrained defense budgets, 

we must ensure that we have a sufficient number of Federal civilian personnel to 

meet the support needs of our military forces. We must also be sure that military 

or civilian personnel are performing all inherently governmental jobs, and that sufficient levels of civilian personnel are available to perform critical oversight, management, and readiness functions of the Department. The Department is committed to 

ensuring all aspects of the civilian workforce are aligned to workload, consistent 

with mission priorities, and that we execute such workload as efficiently and effectively as possible. 
92 

Ms. BORDALLO. Does the Department have the same sort of visibility and control 

over service contract spending as it does over civilian personnel spending? Is it easier to cut and actually enforce cuts in civilian personnel spending than in service 

contract spending because of the absence of an inventory of service contracts that 

has been integrated into the budget? Is it accurate to say that the Department is 

far more likely to realize the arbitrary cuts in civilian personnel imposed by Section 

341 than the arbitrary cuts in service contract spending? The Comptroller claims 

that one of the principal reasons that the Department doesn’t have better cost information on service contractors is that it is not possible to distinguish between base 

and OCO spending. However, the Army, which is recognized as the leader on the 

contractor inventory insists that the two categories of spending can be substantially 

distinguished. Who’s right? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department does not have the same visibility into service contract spending as it does over civilian personnel spending. However, in November 

2011, the Department submitted a plan to Congress delineating both short- and 

long-term actions to fully implement the requirements of section 2330a of title 10, 

United States Code. As a result, the Department will have better fidelity, visibility, 

and accountability into contracted services. Improvements currently underway will 

enable the Department to more accurately assess contracted workload based on direct labor hours and associated data collected from private sector providers. Additionally, DOD Components must now certify that they have completed comprehensive reviews of their contracted services to ensure appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and alignment to mission need and priority. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department has claimed significant savings from insourcing. 

According to testimony, the Army’s once robust insourcing program was significantly 

responsible for a dramatic drop in service contracting costs. Unfortunately, the 

insourcing effort came to a halt as a result of the imposition of the FY10 cap on 

the civilian workforce. Will the Department be forced to leave inherently governmental and other important/sensitive functional areas in the hands of contractors 

due to the collapse of the insourcing effort? (The Army has told the GAO that one 

of the reasons it can’t insource inherently governmental functions is the FY10 cap 

on the civilian workforce.) Will the Department fail to generate cost savings from 

insourcing because of the cap on the civilian workforce? (The Army has testified that 

service contracting costs increased when the imposition of the cap on the civilian 

workforce all but killed off insourcing.) Will the imposition of arbitrary cuts in civilian employees make it even more difficult to use insourcing to save money and reassert public control over important and sensitive functions? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department does not have a cap on its civilian workforce. As 

part of its budget building process for the past few years, the Department directed 

that components maintain Fiscal Year 2010 civilian levels as a departure point for 

prioritizing and shaping its workforce, and in an effort to ensure resources are applied to our most compelling requirements. DOD organizations may request to exceed their Fiscal Year 2010 civilian workforce levels as needed to meet mission and 

workload requirements. 

The Department remains committed to its statutory obligations under title 10 to 

annually review contracted services and ensure appropriate performance of functions that are inherently governmental; closely associated; otherwise exempted from 

private sector performance (to mitigate risk, ensure continuity of operations, build 

internal capability, meet and maintain readiness requirements, etc); and in the most 

cost effective manner possible. Contracted services that meet the necessary criteria 

should be in-sourced to Government performance. Where appropriate, DOD organizations may in-source, and in fact continue to do so, by absorbing work into existing 

Government positions by refining duties or requirements; establishing new positions 

to perform contracted services by eliminating or shifting equivalent existing manpower resources (personnel) from lower priority activities; or requesting an exception to their civilian levels. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Section 341 includes ‘‘Section (d) Limitation on Transfers of Functions’’. Work performed by civilian employees is already being illegally directly converted to contractor performance because of the arbitrary caps the Department has 

imposed on the civilian workforce. Imposition of an additional arbitrary cut in the 

civilian workforce will surely exacerbate this problem. What impact if any will this 

‘‘Limitation on Transfer of Functions’’ language have in stopping illegal direct conversions caused by arbitrary constraints and cuts in the civilian workforce? Will this 

language prevent the Department from insourcing work for cost reasons, even if inhouse performance would be cheaper? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. If section 341, as contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee mark-up of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, were to 

be enacted and become public law, paragraph (d), regarding the limitation on trans-
93 

15GAO–10–814R. 16GAO–12–962T. 17GAO/T–NSIAD–92–19 and GAO/NSIAD–93–123. 

fers of functions, would reinforce the Department’s current policies. Namely, reductions in civilian workforce must be tied to reductions in workload and mission and 

cannot result in either the transfer of work to contract performance (consistent with 

section 2461 of title 10, United States Code and existing legislative prohibitions on 

the use of public-private competitions); or the transfer of non-military essential 

work to military personnel performance (consistent with DOD policies concerning 

military essentiality and the alignment of workload). Similarly, reductions in contracted services must also be tied to reductions in mission and workload, unless the 

work is appropriately transferred from contract to civilian performance (insourcing). In-sourcing is appropriate in instances where contracted work was determined to be inherently governmental, critical, or so closely associated with inherently governmental as to pose risk to Government operations; or more cost effectively performed by Government personal. Such workload realignment, or insourcing, would be justified under the language in paragraph (d) of section 341 as 

proposed and consistent with existing statutory authorities in section 2463 of title 

10, United States Code. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In order to make more strategic decisions about the right workforce mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, and to better align resource 

needs through the budget process to achieve that mix, DOD needs adequate information on the appropriate mix of these three groups. Based on GAO’s reviews of 

DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plan, does DOD have a strategy for assessing the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities? 

Ms. FARRELL. Our September 2010 review of DOD’s 2009 strategic workforce plan 

found that although the Department had issued a directive stating that missions 

should be accomplished using the least costly mix of personnel (military, civilian, 

and contractors) consistent with military requirements and other needs, the Department’s 2009 plan did not provide an assessment of the appropriate mix of these capabilities. 15 We currently have ongoing work assessing DOD’s 2010–2018 Strategic 

Workforce Plan, which the Department released in March 2012. The results of our 

review are expected to be released in September 2012. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In your statement, you devote a portion to discussing DOD’s 

downsizing efforts of the early 1990s. Specifically, you note that DOD’s approach to 

its civilian workforce reductions was not focused on shaping the makeup of the 

workforce—as it typically does when managing military manpower downsizing—resulting in significant imbalances in terms of shape, skills, and retirement eligibility 

of the civilian workforce. Could you elaborate on whether or not DOD had a strategy 

guiding that downsizing and what the effect of that downsizing was on the civilian 

workforce? 

Ms. FARRELL. As noted in my statement, 16 DOD’s civilian workforce downsizing 

efforts in the 1990s were not oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce, 

which resulted in significant imbalances in terms of shape, skills, and retirement 

eligibility of its workforce. Specifically, in our reviews 17 of those efforts, we found 

that DOD’s efforts in the 1990s to reduce its Federal civilian workforce to levels 

below that of 1987 were hampered by incomplete data and lack of a clear strategy 

for avoiding skill imbalances and other adverse effects of downsizing. For instance, 

in 1992, GAO found that DOD used incomplete and inconsistent data related to 

workers, workload, and projected force reductions. Further, the approaches DOD 

has previously relied on to accomplish downsizing have sometimes had unintended 

consequences. The use of voluntary attrition, hiring freezes, and financial separation 

incentives allowed DOD to mitigate some adverse effects of civilian workforce reductions, but were less oriented toward shaping the makeup of the workforce than was 

the approach the Department used to manage its military downsizing. For DOD, 

this was especially true of the civilian acquisition workforce. Our work has also 

found that use of strategies such as financial separation incentives makes it difficult 

to document or estimate the actual cost savings of Government downsizing efforts, 

especially in cases where the work previously performed by the eliminated personnel continues to be required. For example, if the work continues to be required, 

it may need to be contracted out to private companies and contract costs should be 

considered in determining whether net savings will result from workforce reductions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What are the risks associated with both the Senate’s proposed arbitrary cuts to the civilian workforce and the cuts that would be imposed on thousands of DOD civilians by sequestration? 
94 

18GAO–10–814R. 19GAO–12–962T. 20GAO–12–962T and GAO–10–814R. 21DOD has identified 24 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations; 22 of these occupations 

are associated specifically with the overall civilian workforce and are discussed in the strategic 

workforce plan, while, the remaining 2 are acquisition-related occupations—contracting and 

quality assurance—and are discussed in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy (published as a separate report). 22GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD–00–21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 23GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select Efficiency Initiatives Should Be 

Shared Governmentwide, GAO–11–908 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2011). 24GAO–12–962T. 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has not conducted the work necessary to comment on the Senate’s proposal or the effects of a sequestration. However, as our prior work 18 has 

noted, strategic workforce planning is an integral part of human capital management and helps organizations to determine if they have staff with the necessary 

skills and competencies to accomplish their strategic goals. To facilitate effective 

workforce planning, we and the Office of Personnel Management have identified six 

leading principles such workforce plans should incorporate, including: 1) aligning 

workforce planning with strategic planning and budget formulation; 2) involving 

managers, employees, and other stakeholders in planning; 3) identifying critical 

skills and competencies and analyzing workforce gaps; 4) employing workforce strategies to fill the gaps; 5) building the capabilities needed to support workforce strategies through steps to ensure the effective use of human capital flexibilities; and 6) 

monitoring and evaluating progress toward achieving workforce planning and strategic goals. 19 Specifically, with regard to critical skills and competencies and analyzing workforce gaps, we have found 20 that DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plan identified 22 mission-critical occupations 21 that, according to the Department, represent 

the results of its assessment of critical skills. However, our work also found that 

DOD’s plan only discussed competency gap analysis for 3 of its 22 mission-critical 

occupations. Further, DOD was in the initial stages of assessing competency gaps 

for its senior leader workforce, but it had not completed the analysis needed to identify gaps. Without including analyses of gaps in critical skills and competencies as 

part of its strategic workforce planning efforts, DOD and the components may not 

be able to design and fund the best strategies to fill their talent needs through recruiting and hiring or to make appropriate investments to develop and retain the 

best possible workforce. Further, DOD leadership may not have information necessary to make informed decisions about future workforce reductions, should further 

reductions to its workforces become necessary. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What lessons were learned from former Secretary Gates’ efficiencies initiative that could be helpful in developing a requirements-based workforce management plan? How are issues associated with that initiative addressed 

in the Department’s strategic workforce plan? 

Ms. FARRELL. Our prior work reviewing former Secretary Gates’s efficiencies initiative found that the Department does not have complete and reliable major DOD 

headquarters activity data available for use in making efficiency assessments and 

decisions because the Department continues to have challenges in identifying and 

tracking personnel and other resources devoted to headquarters. According to our 

internal control standards, an agency must have relevant, reliable, and timely information in order to run and control its operations. 22 In addition, we have previously 

identified key practices from Federal and state efficiency initiatives, which include 

1) using change management practices to implement and sustain efficiency initiatives, such as setting implementation goals and a timeline; 2) targeting both shortterm and long-term efficiency initiatives by identifying efficiency initiatives that can 

generate immediate returns as well as more substantive changes to operating procedures, programs, and organizational structures; and 3) building capacity for improving efficiency through the use of a department-level office to standardize guidance 

and training and facilitate sharing best practices. 23 These key practices from Federal and state efficiency initiatives may help guide DOD’s strategic workforce planning efforts. We are currently reviewing DOD’s latest strategic workforce plan, 

which was released in March 2012. The results of this review are expected to be 

released in September 2012. 24

Ms. BORDALLO. In which functional areas has the Department added personnel 

since FY09, broken down by numbers of positions and by years, and why are these 

increases necessary? To what extent, if at all, are these increases related to changes 

in military end-strength? In which functional areas does the Department anticipate 

adding civilian personnel, between FY12 and FY17, broken down by numbers of po-
95 

sitions and by years, and why are these increases necessary? To what extent, if at 

all, are these increases related to changes in military end-strength? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has not conducted a detailed review of DOD’s past or planned 

personnel growth or determined the extent to which any growth can be attributed 

to changes in military end-strength. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do civilian personnel perform functions related to the maintenance and repair of military equipment but who are not employed at facilities providing core logistics capabilities? Section 341 would exclude from cuts those contractor ‘‘personnel performing maintenance and repair of military equipment’’. Is 

that contractor workforce comparable in terms of functional areas to the civilian 

workforce that provides core logistics capabilities pursuant to 10 USC 2464? If the 

former includes functional areas not included in the latter, which ones would they 

be and how many civilian employees perform those functional areas that are not included? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has reviewed various aspects of DOD functions related to 

maintenance and repair of military equipment, but has not conducted a detailed review of DOD’s civilian personnel performing functions related to the maintenance 

and repair of military equipment that are not employed at facilities providing core 

logistics capabilities. Starting in 2012, section 2464 of Title 10 of the United States 

Code requires DOD to submit to Congress biennial and annual reports on its core 

depot-level maintenance and repair capability requirements. The statute also requires GAO to review DOD’s reports for completeness and compliance and provide 

findings and recommendations to the congressional defense committees not later 

than 60 days after the report is submitted to Congress. The statute does not require 

specific reporting on civilian personnel performing maintenance and repair. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are dollars for contracted workload constrained or limited to the 

same degree as are dollars for OMA funded civilians? (The Army has testified that 

for every one dollar cut from service contracting, ten dollars are cut from civilian 

personnel.) Service contracting expenses more than doubled in the Department over 

the last ten years, while civilian personnel expenses held steady. Given that most 

if not almost all of that immense growth in service contracting was premised on it 

being short-term and non-recurring, should both civilian personnel spending and 

service contract spending be cut by the same percentage, as would be required by 

Section 341? 

Ms. FARRELL. We have not conducted work that would enable us to comment upon 

the appropriate level of potential reductions in civilian personnel or service contract 

spending. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Army testified at a March 29 HSGAC subcommittee hearing 

that the civilian workforce cap ‘‘has the unintended consequence of limiting the 

flexibility of the Army in managing its workforce. Cost-effective workforce management decisions ought to be based on allowing for the hiring of civilians to perform 

missions, rather than contractors, if the civilians will be cheaper.’’ Do you agree 

with the Army’s assessment of the cap—that it is preventing DOD from using civilian employees even when they’d be cheaper? Do you think such cap-generated inflexibilities and inefficiencies are limited to the Army? The Department claims that 

there is an exceptions process to the civilian personnel cap. Given that it is so forbidden and cumbersome, do you really think that there actually is a viable and 

workable exceptions process to the cap? We understand that when the Department 

is assigned new functions that must be performed by civilian employees that comparable numbers of civilian employee positions elsewhere must be eliminated to offset any overall increases to the civilian workforce. How can that possibly be justified? Surely, that is evidence that there is not a viable and workable exceptions 

process to the cap? Are there comparable constraints on service contract spending? 

For example, does the Department require that new contracts and increases in existing contracts be offset by comparable reductions elsewhere? 

Ms. FARRELL. To date, GAO has not issued any work on the Department of Defense’s or the Department of the Army’s efforts to cap its civilian workforce that 

would allow us to comment on the Army’s experience with implementing the cap. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Within the last eight months, Personnel and Readiness has issued 

three different guidances to prevent work performed by civilian employees from 

being illegally and inappropriately converted to performance by contractors and 

military personnel. What role did the cap play in the issuance of these guidances? 

It is our understanding that while Personnel and Readiness attempts to follow up 

on credible reports of violations of those guidances that it is ultimately powerless 

to prevent components from carrying them out. Is that true? In the Army’s March 

29 HSGAC testimony, it was written ‘‘When faced with hiring decisions, people are 

therefore being placed in the unenviable position of having to decide whether to 

comply with the civilian cap, or to comply with the other statutes governing the 
96 

25GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve Accountability for DOD’s 

Inventory of Contracted Services, GAO–12–357 (Washington: D.C.: Apr. 6, 2012). 26GAO, Defense Workforce: DOD Needs to Better Oversee In-sourcing Data and Align Insourcing Efforts with Strategic Workforce Plans, GAO–12–319 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2012). 

workforce . . . ’’ That seems to be an implicit acknowledgement that the cap compels commanders to violate the law. Does that testimony accurately describe why 

commanders may feel compelled to defy Personnel and Readiness’ guidances? What 

additional power does Personnel and Readiness need to enforce the guidances and 

the underlying laws? House report language directed the Department to make it 

clear that the guidances also covered functions performed by Non-Appropriated 

Fund employees. Has this been done? If not, why? Will the imposition of an arbitrary cut in civilian employees, as proposed by the Senate, make it more difficult 

to enforce laws against direct conversions and the Department’s guidances to enforce those laws? 

Ms. FARRELL. To date, GAO has not issued any work on the Department of Defense’s efforts to cap its civilian workforce that would allow us to comment on DOD’s 

or the Department of the Army’s experience with implementing the cap. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Does the Department have the same sort of visibility and control 

over service contract spending as it does over civilian personnel spending? Is it easier to cut and actually enforce cuts in civilian personnel spending than in service 

contract spending because of the absence of an inventory of service contracts that 

has been integrated into the budget? Is it accurate to say that the Department is 

far more likely to realize the arbitrary cuts in civilian personnel imposed by Section 

341 than the arbitrary cuts in service contract spending? The Comptroller claims 

that one of the principal reasons that the Department doesn’t have better cost information on service contractors is that it is not possible to distinguish between base 

and OCO spending. However, the Army, which is recognized as the leader on the 

contractor inventory insists that the two categories of spending can be substantially 

distinguished. Who’s right? 

Ms. FARRELL. Congress has mandated that DOD use the inventory of contracted 

services and the associated review process to help DOD ensure that contractors are 

performing work that is appropriate, to support development of DOD’s annual strategic workforce plan, and to specify the number of contractor full-time equivalents 

included in DOD’s annual budget justification materials. For example, the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 added section 235 to Title 10 of the 

U.S. Code, which requires DOD to include information in its annual budget justification materials regarding the procurement of contracted services. Specifically, the 

legislation requires each budget account to identify clearly and separately (1) the 

amount requested for the procurement of contract services for each DOD component, 

installation, or activity, and (2) the number of contractor FTEs projected and justified for each DOD component, installation, or activity based on the inventory and 

associated reviews. DOD’s fiscal year 2013 budget guidance to DOD components requires the budget estimates to be informed by the fiscal year 2010 inventory of contracted services. While we did not assess DOD’s implementation of this requirement 

as part of our April 2012 report, we did find that DOD, with the exception of the 

Army, has much further to go in addressing the requirements for compiling and reviewing the inventories of contracted services. 25 For example, DOD continued to 

rely on the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation for the inventory 

for most defense components other than the Army. As such, DOD acknowledged a 

number of factors that limited the utility, accuracy and completeness of the inventory data. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department has claimed significant savings from insourcing. 

According to testimony, the Army’s once robust insourcing program was significantly 

responsible for a dramatic drop in service contracting costs. Unfortunately, the 

insourcing effort came to a halt as a result of the imposition of the FY10 cap on 

the civilian workforce. Will the Department be forced to leave inherently governmental and other important/sensitive functional areas in the hands of contractors 

due to the collapse of the insourcing effort? (The Army has told the GAO that one 

of the reasons it can’t insource inherently governmental functions is the FY10 cap 

on the civilian workforce.) Will the Department fail to generate cost savings from 

insourcing because of the cap on the civilian workforce? (The Army has testified that 

service contracting costs increased when the imposition of the cap on the civilian 

workforce all but killed off insourcing.) Will the imposition of arbitrary cuts in civilian employees make it even more difficult to use insourcing to save money and reassert public control over important and sensitive functions? 

Ms. FARRELL. While we have not issued any work on the civilian workforce cap 

to date, in February 2012 we reported 26 that DOD stated in its fiscal year 2010 
97 

budget submission to Congress that it expected to save $900 million in fiscal year 

2010 from in-sourcing. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense stated he was not 

satisfied with the Department’s progress in reducing its over-reliance on contractors. 

Also, representatives from the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel 

and Readiness) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) told us that DOD 

avoided some contracted support services costs due to the budget decision associated 

with in-sourcing, although total spending across all categories of service contracts 

increased in fiscal year 2010 by about $4.1 billion. To accelerate the process and 

achieve additional savings, the Secretary directed a 3-year reduction in funding for 

service support contracts categorized by DOD as contracted support services. He 

also directed a 3-year freeze on the level of DOD civilian authorizations at OSD, the 

defense agencies, and the Combatant Commands, and stated that with regard to insourcing, no full-time OSD civilian authorizations would be created after the thencurrent fiscal year to replace contractors, except for urgent needs. We also noted 

that the statutory requirement to regularly consider in-sourcing contracted services 

remains in effect, and DOD officials told us that, accordingly, in-sourcing continues 

in the Department, though on a more limited basis. 

Our report also found that—under DOD’s policy for determining the appropriate 

mix of military and DOD civilians and contractor support—risk mitigation shall 

take precedence over cost savings when necessary to maintain appropriate control 

of Government operations and missions. This policy provides manpower mix criteria 

for assessing which functions warrant performance by military or civilian personnel 

due to their associated risks, and which functions will therefore be considered exempt from performance by contractor support. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How is the Senate’s proposed arbitrary cut in funding for civilian 

personnel different from the sequestration that would result from the Budget Control Act? Aren’t both arbitrary cuts in funding that would mindlessly eliminate defense industrial base jobs and undermine our economic recovery? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has not conducted the work necessary to analyze the Senate’s 

proposal or the impact of a sequestration. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Section 341 includes ‘‘Section (d) Limitation on Transfers of Functions’’. Work performed by civilian employees is already being illegally directly converted to contractor performance because of the arbitrary caps the Department has 

imposed on the civilian workforce. Imposition of an additional arbitrary cut in the 

civilian workforce will surely exacerbate this problem. What impact if any will this 

‘‘Limitation on Transfer of Functions’’ language have in stopping illegal direct conversions caused by arbitrary constraints and cuts in the civilian workforce? Will this 

language prevent the Department from insourcing work for cost reasons, even if inhouse performance would be cheaper? 

Ms. FARRELL. We have not assessed the implications of implementing Section 341 

of S. 3254, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

that was reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2012. The 

proposed bill has been placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, but no further 

action has been taken. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. In their version of the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee attempted to protect some elements of the 

industrial base from the civilian personnel cuts mandated in their bill, but failed 

to include organic manufacturing facilities such as Army arsenals. What assurances 

can you provide that DOD leadership will protect the remaining Army arsenals from 

cuts that would undermine essential capabilities and reduce efficiency? Would the 

Department have the ability to base decisions regarding the reductions required by 

the Senate Armed Services Committee’s bill on readiness and critical skills and capabilities or would the Department have to make across-the-board cuts across facilities and DOD offices? How would those critical skills and capabilities be determined? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department has not done an assessment based on the SASC 

NDAA provision requiring reductions to civilian and contractor workforces. The 

DOD will determine how best to implement any reductions included in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. If the Senate Armed Services Committee’s proposed reductions 

were enacted, would they be carried out in addition to the cap on the civilian workforce and reductions that have already been announced by the Department? Or 

would the already announced caps and reductions be applied to meet the cuts mandated by the Senate Armed Services Committee? 
98 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department has not undertaken any planning specific to section 341, as contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee mark-up of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. The Department does not have 

a cap on its civilian workforce. As part of its budget building process for the past 

few years, the Department has directed that components use Fiscal Year 2010 civilian levels as a departure point for prioritizing and shaping its workforce in an effort 

to make sure resources are applied to our most compelling needs. DOD organizations may, and have, by exception exceeded their Fiscal Year 2010 civilian workforce 

levels as needed to meet mission and workload requirements. If the section 341 

were to be enacted as proposed and became public law, it would require reductions 

in the civilian workforce from Fiscal Year 2012 to Fiscal Year 2017. The current 

budget request includes estimated Fiscal Year 2012 levels that reflect reductions 

taken as a result of efficiencies in Fiscal Years 2010, 2011, and 2012. This includes 

the direction to maintain 2010 civilian levels with exceptions. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. How does DOD determine what the right mix of military, civilian, 

and contractor personnel is? What analysis is performed to ensure that it is the 

right mix and how does the Department determine what work is done by each 

group? In addition, when reductions in one area are made, is it determined whether 

the work being done by that group will have to be transferred to another group? 

If so, is a cost-benefit analysis performed to determine whether the reduction will 

actually result in cost savings? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Strategic Workforce Planning construct of functional communities and mission-critical occupations; the inherently governmental and commercial 

activities inventory; the inventory of contracts for services; and force and infrastructure classifications are among the tools and processes used to determine appropriate 

workforce mix. Departmental guidance on manpower management is intended to ensure that Components apply the best workforce mix (military, civilian, or contract 

support) to missions, tasks, and functions; and requires associated risk mitigation 

and consideration of costs. Reductions in elements of the Department’s Total Force 

of military, civilian, and contract support is based on a change in mission and associated reduction in workload, or an outright elimination of lower priority functions. 

If warranted, workload may be realigned from one sector of the workforce to another 

consistent with existing statutory and legislative requirements, as well as Departmental policies. These adjustments require that unless otherwise justified by mission or nature of work (e.g., inherently governmental, critical to mission readiness, 

maintain Government oversight and control), a cost benefit analysis must justify 

workload realignment. In all cases, under currently enacted laws, the realignment 

of workload from civilian to contract performance is currently prohibited regardless 

of any potential cost benefit. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

Ms. HANABUSA. In page five of your testimony, you say that ‘‘Changes in the civilian workforce must be done in a way that preserves mission essential skills and 

abilities over the long term.’’ In regards to this statement I have some questions: 

What constitutes how you determine ‘‘mission essential’’? 

Specific example, would maintenance on a Virginia class submarine be essential? 

How would this be preserved during cuts to the workforce? During sequestration? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Mission essentiality will vary dependent on each organization’s 

missions, tasks, and functions. Moreover, work, tasks, and functions (and associated 

skills) essential to mission success in the Navy will differ from those in the other 

military services or those in Defense-wide agencies or activities, such as DOD Education Activity or the TRICARE Management Activity. 

In the specific example of Virginia class submarine maintenance, the Naval shipyard mission is to accomplish maintenance on ships and submarines, ensuring operational readiness by returning them back to the fleet on time, within budget, safely 

and with high quality workmanship. In order to sustain readiness, the Department 

of the Navy will balance essential requirements with available resources. 

Ms. HANABUSA. In your testimony, when asked if your workforce management 

plan was based on the ‘‘best guess’’ of DOD, you stated that the plan was data driven. Yet, Mr. Vollrath stated repeatedly at the hearing that their gap analysis was 

incomplete, and you yourself stated that DOD has not progressed on a competent 

gap analysis. If this is the case, then what specific data are you using to plan? 

Ms. FARRELL. At this time, we have work underway reviewing DOD’s mandated 

2010–2018 Strategic Workforce Plan. The results of our review will be released in 

September 2012. GAO’s assessments are based on the data that DOD provides to 
99 

27GAO–10–814R. 

us related to how the Department developed its own plan. We found 27 in a September 2010 report that DOD’s workforce plans to date had mixed results. In that 

report, which assessed DOD’s 2009 plan, we found that DOD had demonstrated 

some progress in addressing the legislative requirements related to its Civilian 

Human Capital Strategic Workforce Plan, but several key elements continued to be 

missing from the process—including such elements as competency gap analyses and 

monitoring of progress. Competency gap analyses enable an agency to develop specific strategies to address workforce needs and monitoring progress demonstrates 

the contribution of workforce planning to the achievement of program goals. For example, at the time of our review, because the plan discussed competency gap analyses for only 3 of the 22 mission-critical occupations and did not discuss competency 

gaps for the other 19 mission-critical occupations, we determined that the requirement was only partially addressed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. What data does the Government need to make accurate assessments 

of the costs of the Federal civilian versus the Federal contractor workforce? Please 

also specify whether this data should or should not include: costs of whether the 

work is performed on Government property; the total amount billed by contractors 

for the services provided; the total amount billed that is attributable to overhead 

costs of the contractor and of subcontractors of the contractor at any tier, and the 

percentage of total billing that is attributable to such overhead costs; the total costs 

to the Government if the services had been performed by Government employees, 

in accordance with Department of Defense cost-comparisons models, pursuant to 

section 129a(a) of Section 2330a of title 10; and the number of employees used by 

the prime contractor and by subcontractors of the contractor at any tier. 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Comparisons of costs to perform work can be influenced by any 

number of criteria and factors. The Department recognizes that numerous studies 

have been conducted both inside and outside of the Government related to such 

comparisons and what criteria are most appropriate. The data elements specified in 

the question can, in some instances, be useful to make an accurate cost comparison. 

There may be instances, based on other variables, where these elements may not 

be determined necessary for well-reasoned comparison. The Department is working 

with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on its effort to develop guidance 

and tools, including cost comparisons, to help agencies determine where rebalancing 

of work can save money. 

Ms. SPEIER. What do you attribute the disparity among our forces in implementation of effective cost analysis modeling? Do you believe that the approach the Army 

has taken would work for the other forces? How long would it take to implement 

across the Department? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department has had a standardized set of business rules in 

place since January 2010 regarding the estimating of military, civilian, and contracted support performance of functions. A complementary cost modeling software 

solution has been under development, is undergoing final beta testing, and will soon 

be available Department-wide. The fielding of this software, and updated guidance 

that incorporates best practices and lessons learned from Department-wide cost 

analysis experiences, will ensure a more standardized implementation. 

Ms. SPEIER. What are DOD’s current requirements for implementing effective cost 

analysis modeling to compare the costs of service, Federal, and contractor employees? What efforts does DOD have in place to improve these cost analyses? Are any 

of these improvements also seeking consistent cost modeling? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department’s requirements are contained within Directive 

Type Memorandum (DTM) 09–007, Estimating & Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian & Military Manpower & Contract Support. The policies and requirements contained within this DTM are currently being institutionalized in a DOD Instruction 

that incorporates lessons learned and best practices. To support this issuance, the 

Department is also preparing to field a costing software solution, the Full Cost of 

Manpower Tool, which is currently under final beta testing. 

Ms. SPEIER. What data does the Government need to make accurate assessments 

of the costs of the Federal civilian versus the Federal contractor workforce? Please 

also specify whether this data should or should not include: costs of whether the 

work is performed on Government property; the total amount billed by contractors 

for the services provided; the total amount billed that is attributable to overhead 

costs of the contractor and of subcontractors of the contractor at any tier, and the 
100 

28GAO, Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of Contractors 

as Contract Specialists, GAO–08–360 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2008). 29GAO, Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus 

Contractors for Security Services in Iraq. GAO–10–266R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 2010). 30GAO, DOD Met Statutory Reporting Requirements on Public-Private Competitions, GAO– 

11–923R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 2010). 31GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, GAO–08–572T (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 11, 2008). 

percentage of total billing that is attributable to such overhead costs; the total costs 

to the Government if the services had been performed by Government employees, 

in accordance with Department of Defense cost-comparisons models, pursuant to 

section 129a(a) of Section 2330a of title 10; and the number of employees used by 

the prime contractor and by subcontractors of the contractor at any tier. 

Ms. FARRELL. The executive branch encourages Federal agencies to obtain commercially available services from the private sector when doing so is cost effective 

and when the work is not inherently governmental. To make accurate assessments 

of the costs of the Federal civilian versus the Federal contractor workforce, it is important to have reliable and accurate data. The Office of Management and Budget’s 

Circular A–76 provides agency management with a structured process for comparing 

the public and private sector approaches and costs of performing commercial activities. 

Although we have not conducted work that addresses all of the costs in the question, we have issued reports on the costs and other issues related to civilian- and 

contractor-performed work. For example, in March 2008, we reported that the Army 

Contracting Agency’s Contracting Center of Excellence paid up to almost 27 percent 

more for its contractor-provided contract specialists than for similarly graded Government employees but that the contractor employees had on average more contracting experience than the recent Government hires. 28 We considered a variety 

of costs, including overhead and whether the work was performed on Government 

property. In March 2010, we reported that for three of the four task orders awarded 

by the State Department for security in Iraq that we examined, the cost of using 

Federal employees would be greater than using contractors. 29 We considered a 

range of costs and estimated the total cost to the Government if the work had been 

performed by a Federal employee or contractor. In addition, in September 2011, we 

assessed DOD’s review of various aspects of its public-private competition policies 

and found that the Department’s review met statutory reporting requirements on 

public-private competitions. 30 We reiterated our prior finding that the overhead rate 

used in the costs comparisons did not have a sound analytical basis, which leaves 

some uncertainty about whether that rate may be understated or overstated for any 

given public-private competition. 

More generally, we reported that in making the decision to use contractors, agencies have experienced challenges such as: determining which functions and activities 

should be contracted out and which should not to ensure institutional capacity; developing a total workforce strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the 

appropriate mix of contractor and Government personnel; identifying and distinguishing the roles and responsibilities of contractors and civilian and military personnel; and ensuring appropriate oversight, including addressing risks, ethics concerns, and surveillance needs. 31

Ms. SPEIER. What do you attribute the disparity among our forces in implementation of effective cost analysis modeling? Do you believe that the approach the Army 

has taken would work for the other forces? How long would it take to implement 

across the Department? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has not conducted the work necessary to respond to this question. 

Ms. SPEIER. What are DOD’s current requirements for implementing effective cost 

analysis modeling to compare the costs of service, Federal, and contractor employees? What efforts does DOD have in place to improve these cost analyses? Are any 

of these improvements also seeking consistent cost modeling? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has not conducted the work necessary to respond to this question. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. What are the workforce requirements that the U.S. needs in order 

to ensure there is not a single point of failure in our defense manufacturing capabilities? 
101 

32GAO, DOD Assessments of Supplier-Base Availability for Future Defense Needs, GAO–10– 

317R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2010) and Department of Defense: A Departmentwide Framework to Identify and Report Gaps in the Defense Supplier Base Is Needed, GAO–09–5 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2008). 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The Department successfully maintains and manages, within acceptable and manageable risk levels, our defense manufacturing capabilities. Given 

the future outlook of defense requirements, it is likely the Department will see a 

further contraction and consolidation of commercial and organic manufacturing. In 

order to mitigate risk, a Government workforce of highly trained personnel in armaments and ammunition manufacturing, among other things, is essential. Such a 

workforce is increasingly relevant if more production is privatized. A highly skilled 

workforce, which captures historic knowledge, will help ensure continuity of operations. 

Mr. SCHILLING. In your strategic plan you mentioned the need for a highly skilled 

civilian workforce. Does this include the organic manufacturing base? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. The DOD Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP) focuses on mission-critical occupations at the enterprise level. In addition, the next iteration SWP that is 

currently under development will also assess overall workforce health of each DOD 

functional community, including occupations supporting logistics and manufacturing 

work, through functional community managers at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The organic manufacturing base 

does require a highly skilled civilian workforce to maintain continuity of operations 

and strategically plan for the future of the Department. For example, the ammunition supplied by the organic industrial base is critical to meeting the needs of the 

warfighter and requires highly skilled scientists, engineers, and acquisition professionals who have knowledge in armaments manufacturing. Maintaining a highly 

skilled civilian workforce to manage the organic manufacturing base reduces the 

risk that critical processes and the lessons learned from their implementation are 

lost. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How do you determine the definition of mission essential skills in 

the organic base, specifically arsenals? 

Mr. VOLLRATH. Mission essential skills in the organic industrial base that are specific to arsenals should be determined based on the unique capabilities and/or processes performed by the individual arsenals. In the circumstance of the Army’s three 

ammunition production arsenals (Pine Bluff Arsenal, Rock Island Arsenal and 

Watervliet Arsenal), the highly skilled scientists, engineers and acquisition professionals that are necessary to operate, maintain and manage the armaments manufacturing process have mission essential skills. Mission essential skills at these locations may include knowledge of chemical/biological defense production and repair, 

knowledge of prototyping and manufacturing, integration, testing and logistics, as 

well as procurement and product assurance for cannons, howitzers, mortars, and associated armaments for weapon systems. 

Mr. SCHILLING. What are the workforce requirements that the U.S. needs in order 

to ensure there is not a single point of failure in our defense manufacturing capabilities? 

Ms. FARRELL. GAO has reported on the challenges that DOD faces in managing 

the defense industrial base, but has not specifically reviewed the workforce requirements for maintaining defense manufacturing capabilities. 32 DOD, through its Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, reports on the health of various defense sectors, including the extent to which they face workforce challenges. For example, in the most recent report in September 2011, DOD cited concerns about the 

challenges faced by the aviation industry with an aging workforce and a decreased 

likelihood that a younger engineering workforce will remain in the industry due to 

the lack of new challenges and interesting things to do. Based on this, DOD recommended that adequate funding be identified to encourage innovation and to mitigate risk taking through company sponsored independent research and development 

activities. It also identified a growing need to address shortages in specific criticalskill sets, such as structural analysis, systems integration, and other critical military unique skills. The report also cites that efforts are underway through the current administration, private industry, and DOD programs to revitalize the U.S. 

Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics education, but does not specifically identify those efforts. In addition, DOD’s Office of Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Office of Manufacturing and Industrial 

Base Policy is conducting a comprehensive sector by sector study of U.S. industry 

to guide the Department in sustaining the health, vibrancy, and efficiency of the industrial base, which may identify additional workforce challenges. 
102 

33GAO–10–814R; GAO–09–235; and GAO–08–439R. 34DOD has identified 24 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations; 22 of these occupations 

are associated specifically with the overall civilian workforce and are discussed in the strategic 

workforce plan, while the remaining 2 are acquisition-related occupations—contracting and 

quality assurance—and are discussed in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy (published as a separate report). 

Mr. SCHILLING. Do you believe that arsenals are being included as they should 

be in the workforce requirements of DOD? 

Ms. FARRELL. Since 2008, we have reviewed DOD’s Strategic Human Capital 

Workforce Plans. 33 Our reviews of those plans have found that DOD addressed the 

requirement to assess its critical skills. More specifically, the overall civilian workforce plan identified 22 mission-critical occupations, 34 which according to DOD represent the Department’s assessment of critical skills. Given that each agency has 

its own set of unique challenges and its own approach for handling those challenges, 

we believe that the Department is in the best position to determine its critical skills 

and which segments of its workforce should be included as part of its determination 

of critical skills. 

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