NO T F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0408n.06 No. 07-6148 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DA NI EL A LF OR

D, DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE Defendan t-Appellant. ___________________________________/ BEF OR E: M AR TIN , SU HR HEI NRIC H an d WH ITE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Def endant Daniel Alford appea ls from the judgment of the district cour

t following his convic tion for possession with intent to dis tribute cra ck coc aine,

and a re su lti ngse nte nc e of

40 0 mo nth s im

pr iso nme nt. We A F F I RM. I. Bac kgr ound On July 19 , 20 05 , De fe nd ant wa s c ha rg e d in a on e -c ount ind ic tme nt wi th po sse ss io n wi th intent to dist ribute five g rams or more of cr ack c ocaine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) a nd (b)( 1)(B ). On Fe bruar

y 3, 2006, shortly b ef

o re t ri al, counsel filed a motion for a me ntal evaluation, which the c ourt g rante d. Def endant was sent to the Metropolitan Corre ctional Center in Ne w York. The e x amining psy cholog ist, Dr. W illiam J
. Ry an, conc luded that Def endant did not have a rational

and fa c tua l un de rs tand ingof

the pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t him a nd wa s in c a pa ble of a ssi sti ngc ouns e l in his de fense

. Dr. Ry an diag nosed De fenda nt as suffe ring from Schizoaffe ctive Disorde r, De pressive2

Ty pe. B ased on that repor

t, on Ma y 16, 2006, afte r an e videntiary hear ing, the district court found that D e fe nd ant w a s n ot c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l and or de re d D e fe nd ant r e tur ne d to a ps y c hiatr ic fac ility for f urther tr eatment a

nd evaluation. Defe ndant was sent to the Fe dera l Medical Center for Prisoners in Springf

ield, Missouri. O n J u l y 3 , 2 0 0 6 , t ri al co u n s el fi l ed a no t i ce o f i n t en t t o as s er t an i n s an i t y d e f e n s e . In response , the g overnme nt filed a motion for a mental eva l u at i o n t o d etermine if Def endant wa s i n s an e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o ff

en s es ch ar gedi nt h e i n d i ct m en t
. On J u l y 1 9 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e m agi s t ra t e j u d ge grant edt h e go v ern m en t ’s m o t i o nan d o rd er edt h e s t af

f a tt h e S p ri n gfi el d , M i s s o u ri fa ci l i t y to perfor m
a co m p et ency

evaluation. Defe ndant was e x amined by Dr. Richar

t L . DeMier . Dr. De Mier disag ree d with Dr. R y an’s diagnosis, concluding that Def endant did not have a mental illness that
wo uld pr e c lud e him

fr om u nd e r s t a n d ingthe natur e and

po te nti a l c on se qu e nc e s o f t he c ha rg e s a g a ins t him, and th at h e h ad the ability to assist properly

in his defense should he choose to do so. On Se pte mbe r 6 , 2 00 6, the ma g istrate jud g e found that, b a se d o n D r. De Mie r’ s p sy c ho log ic a l r e po rt , Def endant wa s competent a

nd set the ca se for

trial. Trial beg an on Apr il 2, 2007. The following fac ts are de rived fr om the Gover nment’s trial witnesses. On the nig ht of J uly 1, 2006, Of

fi ce rs C hristopher B ell and Joseph Huckleby of the Knoxvi lle Police Depa

rtment wer e working extra secur ity detail at Club Malibu 7 on Martin Luther King Boule vard in Knoxvill e, Te nnessee . Offic er B ell testified that he obse rved D efe ndant driving his car w estbound on Martin L uther King Boulevar d. Offic er B ell had known De fenda nt for y ear s and had inter

viewed him in conne ction with an unre lated investig ation sever al day s ear lier. From that investigation, Bell knewthat Def endant did not have a valid drive r’s l i ce n s e, so he c ontacted the records operator at the pol ice department to deter mine the s tatus of Def

endant’ s license. Of

fice r3

Be ll then positi oned his patrol ca r so he c ould initi ate a

traff ic stop and turned on his in-car video
came ra. When De fenda

nt passed by

ag ain, B ell activate d his blue lights and e ffe cted a traff ic stop. Be ll arre sted Def

endant f or driving without a license and place d him in the back seat of the patrol
car . Officer H uckleby

acte d as bac kup. As Be ll was taking Def endant into custody , Huckleby walked up to De fenda

nt’s vehicle a

nd remove d the key s from the ig nition and placed the m on the hood of the c ar. H e obser ved two cle ar pla stic bags, s i d e b y s ide, on the fr ont seat. One bag contained a

n off- white, roc k-like substance , and the other bagcontained a white powder

y substance. Huckleby direc t ed Be l l ’s attention to the drug s. Offic er B ell testified that, like Huckle by , he believed the bag s contained c rac k and coc aine powde r. Th e c ra c k c oc a ine ha d b e e n c ut i nto tw e nty -o ne sma ll ro c ks that B e ll e sti ma te d h a d a str e e tva lue of a pp ro xima te ly

$4 0 p e r r oc k. B e ll t e sti fi e d th a t D e fe nd ant d id n ot h a ve a pip e ne c e ssa ry to smoke the cr ack in his possession or vehic le. B ell s ea rc h ed Def endant incide nt to his arrest and fo un d $ 23 0 in

c a sh , in $2 0 d e no min a tio ns e xce pt f or thr e e $1 0 b ill s. B e ll a dv ise d D e fe nd ant o f h is Miranda rig hts after Def endant wa s place d in Be ll’s patrol ca r. Def endant told B ell that the powder coca ine was his, a

nd that he had sold c rac k coca ine bef ore, but de nie d th a t he ha d s old c ra c k c oc a ine that da y . Te sti ng re ve a le d that on e ba g c on ta ine d 2 .7 g ra ms of coc aine hydrochloride , or powde r coc aine, and the ot her bag contained 5.7 gr ams of coc aine ba se,
or cr ack c ocaine

. Ag ent Dave L ewis with the DrugEnforc ement Administration ( DEA) testified as an e x pert wi tness in narc otic drug traff icking prac tices. L ewis testified that a street- level cr ack de aler g e ne ra lly po sse sse s nume ro us ro c ks of c ra c k c oc a ine to s e ll to indi vid ua l bu y e rs , w he re a s a

us e r w ill4

ty pically obtain only

one or two c rac k rocks at a time. L ewis ex plained that, beca use crack is such

a hig hly a dd ict iv e drug , a

pe rs on wh o u se s c ra c k b e c ome s in sta ntl y a dd ic te d, c ann ot f

un c tio n in society , cannot maintain e mploy ment, and will use all of his money to buy cra ck. Fur ther, a cra ck addict g ener ally

has no money

except the amount nec essar y to buy the next rock. L e w i s t e s t i f

i e d t h a tc r a c k p o s s e s s e d

f o r p e r s o n a l u s e g e n e r a l l y w i l l b e a “ v e r y s m a l l qu a n t i t y” that can be consumed in one sitt ing. A us er of cra ck will possess one or two cra ck roc ks, as well as

a pip e or g la ss t ub e , a nd wi ll g o to the ne are st l oc a tio n to smo ke it a ft e r p ur c ha sin g it. L e wi s testified that, base d on his ex perie nce, pe rsons who distribute cra ck possess sums in denominations of $20 bills since cra ck roc ks are sold for $20 and $40 a piece

. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, De fe nd ant a sk e d wh e t h e r L e w i s ’ s o p i nio n w ou ld b e dif fe re nt i f L e wi s knew that De fenda

nt had a “ $300 to $500 a day habit” usi ng cra ck cocaine. L ewis responded that if De fe nd ant h a d su c h a

dr uga dd ic tio n, he wo uld

no t ha ve ha d th e c a shhe po sse sse d a nd he wo uld not have both powde r and c rac k coca ine. L ew i s al so stated that, in his ex perie nce, c rac k users g ener ally are not in possession of both sums of ca sh and drug s at the same time. Def endant’ s only

witness was his half- brother, Ca lvin Carson. Carson testified that he had used powde r

an d c r a c k c o c a in e f o r a b o u t t w e lv e y e ar s an d

c o u ld u s e u p to $ 5 0 0 w o rth

o f p o w d er
coca ine a da

y and up to $300 a da

y of cr ack coca ine. Carson testified that he could e asily smoke 20

r o c k s o f c r a c k c o c a i n e a d ay “ b e c a

u s e i t j u s t d i dn ’ t l a s tt h a tl o n g ” an d t h a th e w o u l d

b u y i nqu a n t i t y. Carson testified that Def

endant was smoking c rac k at the time Carson quit using it. Carson did not believe that Defe ndant had “ ever quit using drug s.” On c ross-examination, Ca rson stated that whe n he wa s addicted, he never went any wher e without his crack pipe , but added that if he did not have it w ithhim , h e c ou ld a lw ay s ma ke a pip e us ing a bo ttl e . Cars on e xpla ine d th a t a s so on

a s h e g ot a5

cra ck roc k, he would put it in his pi pe and sta rt smoking it. Carson testified that a fter he smoked the rock, he would use any money to pur chase more rocks or steal to g et more money , and ag ree d that money did not stay

in his pocket very

long. The pa rties re sted at the e nd of the da y . The ne x t morning the district court instructe d the jury . The jury

convicted D efe ndant of possession wit h intent to distribute five gra ms or more c rac k
coca ine. At sentenc ing, D efe ndant was deemed a car eer offe nder pur suant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 base d on a prior state felony drugconviction for a ttempted possession with intent to s ell less than 1/2 g ram of c oc a ine hydrochl ori de in s ta te c ourt , a nd a pr ior fe de ra l c on vic tio n f

or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it arson, resulting in a tot al offense level of 37. Def endant’ s prior convic tions resulted in 17 criminal history points, which was re duced to 16 points as limited by the Guidelines. B eca

use De fenda

nt was on probation for

misdemeanor a ssault and had also been r elea sed fr om fede ral c ustody on the ar son conviction for le ss than two y ear s, he rec eived an addition of 3 criminal history points, for a total of 19 criminal history

points. This put Def

endant in a c riminal history cate g ory VI , which wa s also the cate g ory applicable based on his ca ree r off ender classification. W ith a total offense level of 37, the advisory G u id e li n e s r an g e w a s 3 6 0 mo n th s to li f e . T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt c h o s e a s e n te n c e o f

4 00 months. Th is a pp e a l f oll ow s. II. Ana lys is A. Sua Sp ont

eCo m pe te nc y He ar ing On appe al, Def

endant c ontends that based on the conflict be tween the two psy chologi cal
re po rt s d a te d le ss t

ha n f our m on ths a

pa rt , t he di st ri ct c ourt su a s po nteshould have sche duled an6

evidentiar y hear ing w here he could subject the t wo B urea u of Prisons (BO P) psy cholog ists’ opinions to cross-e x amination and that the f ailure to do so violated the D ue Proce ss Clause. A d istri c t c ourt

is r e qu ir e d to or de r a com pe te nc y he ari ng“ if

the re is r e a so na

ble c a us e to be lie ve that th e de fe nd ant m ay pr e se ntl y be su ff e ri ngfr om a

me nta l di se a se or

de fe c t r e nd e ri nghim mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to under stand the nature and conse quence s of the proc eeding s ag ainst h i m o r as s ist properly in his defense .” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) . “A c riminal defe ndant is incompetent if he la cks ‘suff icient pre sent ability t o consult with his lawy er w ith a
rea sonable de g ree of rational understanding ’ or if he does not have ‘a r ational as we ll as fac tual understanding of the proc eeding s ag ainst him.’” United States v. Miller , 531 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir.) (q u o t i n g Dr op e v . M

iss ou ri , 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 307 (2008). De fe nd ant’ s c on te nti on

is d isi ng e nu ou s at be st. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a compe tency

hear ing a fter it re ceive d eac h BO P psy cholog ical eva luat i o n an d that Def endant intentionally

chose not to cr oss-examine Dr. DeMier

. At the sec ond competenc y hear ing, A ttorney Be ll (Defe ndant’s counse l) told the mag istrate judg e that “he had spoken at leng th with the clinical psy cholog ist who evaluate d Def endant, that he had revie wed the Reports with Defe ndant, and that Def endant did not ag ree with said Reports.” Rather than subpoena

and cr oss-examine Dr. De Mier, De fe nd ant r e qu e ste d f

un ds to secu re a

thi rd e va lua tio n b y a pr ivate ps y c ho log ist . T he ma g istrate g ra nte d thi s re qu e st. De fe nd ant wa s the n pr ivate ly e va luate d. Th e pr ivate ps y c ho log ist a g re e d w ith Dr. De Mier and c oncluded that De fenda nt was compe tent. Def

endant did not file this thi rd re port wi th the dis tr ic t court and did no t re qu e st a thir d c omp e te nc y he ari ng . H e a lso did

no t a g a in r a ise the issue of his compete ncy and notified the c ourt that he wa s not pursuing a n insanity defe nse.7

This case is a

nalog ous to United States v. De nkins , 367 F.3d 537 ( 6th Cir. 2004). There , the defe ndant moved to withdraw his g uilty plea based on his alleg ed lac k of compe tency
. Denk ins , 367 F.3d at 542. The dist rict court gr anted the de fenda nt’s reque st for a c ompetency evaluation. After that evaluation deemed him compete nt, the defe ndant withdrewhis blanket objection to the prese ntence repor

t, which alleg ed that the de fenda nt was not competent in any fashion to under stand the proc eeding s. Id. at 543. This Court held that the de fe n dant’s dec ision not t o raise the inc omp e te nc y

argum e nt a ft e r t

he e va luatio n ( pr e su ma

bly be c a us e it d e e me d h im c omp e te nt) “constituted an abandonme nt of the compe tency issue, plain and simple.” Id. at 544. We there fore found that the d ef

en d an t’s objection on appe al was “ fore ver f orec losed” a

nd that it could not be “re surre cted on this appe al.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Simi larly here , having abandone d the opportunity for a n evidentiar

y hear ing a fter the rec eipt of the sec ond BO P report, and having failed to reque st a third competenc y hear ing, D efe ndant ca

nnot now complain on appeal that the di strict court should have sua sponte provided that relief

. Ac c or d United States v. W

ashington , No. 03-6566, 2008 WL 822257, at *5 (6th C ir. Mar. 25, 2008) (holding that th e d e f e n d an t w a iv e d

h is ar g u me n t t

h a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt s h o u ld

h a v e o r d e r e d

anadditional competenc y

evaluation where the def endant withdre w his reque st for fur ther e valuation; citing Denk ins ). Even if Def

endant’ s claim was considere d forf eited and not w aived, there is no plain error

. See D enkins , 367 F. 3d at 542-43 (noting that forf eiture, unlike w aiver , does not exti ng uish “err or” under F ed. R. Ci v . P. 5 2 ( b ) )

. D e f e n d an t d o e s n o t c o n te s t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s f in d in g th a t h e was competent to stand trial, nor the dis t rict cour

t’s conclusion that the incompe tency finding by

Dr. Ry an wa s the result of De fenda nt’s manipulation of t he first evaluation. He a lso fails to identify any8

actions which should have cause d the district c ourt to que stion his competenc y . I n fac t, Defe ndant’s actions demonstrate that he understood the proce eding s ag ainst him. I n a pro se letter to the district court just prior to trial, Def endant requested a m eeting with the court “to bring certain thi ng s to y our
a tte nti on ,” inc lud inge vid e nc e tha t he did no t po sse ss t

he c ra c k roc ks that we re se ize d f ro m hi m w ith the intent to resell them. At the be g inning of trial, Def enda nt personally

addre ssed the cour

t and

a sk e d f or a c ha ng e of ve nu e be c a

us e he fe lt that he was no t bei ng tr e a te d f a ir ly . In s ho rt , th is argument is without support. I n any event, a s noted, Def

endant a bandoned the incompetenc y issue. B. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence Def endant a rg ues that aside f

rom Ag ent L ewis’s e x pert testim o ny that the coc aine wa s pa c ka g e d f

or re sa le , the e vid e nc e wa s ins uf fi c ie nt to su sta in a

fi nd ingof

po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o distribute it bey ond a re asonable doubt. Be cause Def endant failed to r enew

his moti on for judg ment of a c qu itt a l a t th e c on c lus ion of a ll the e vid e nc e , thi s iss ue is wa ive d. Th e re fo re we re vie w o nly to deter mine whether

there was a

“manife st miscarriag e of justice,” which exis ts only when the r ecor d is “devoid of e vidence pointing to g uilt.” United States v. Paige , 470 F.3d 603, 608 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). I n order to sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) , the Gover nment must prove that the de fe nd a nt (1) know ing ly (2 ) p os se sse d a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e (3 ) w ithint e nt t o d istri bu te it. United States v. Coffee , 434 F.3d 887, 897 ( 6th Cir. 2006). I nit ia lly , w e no te tha

t D e fe nd ant i mpl ic itl y

conce de s th a t th e te sti mony of Ag e nt L e wi s, if
c re dit e d, su

pp or ts the jur y ’s fi nd ingthat D e fe nd ant p os se sse d th e c ra c k w ithint e nt t o d ist ri bu te it. L e wi s te sti fi e d th a t, i n h is o pin ion , D e fe nd ant p os se sse d th e c ra c k with int e nt t o d istri bu te it b e c a us e9

he ha d tw e nty -o ne $4 0 roc ks , with a tot a l val ue of $8 40 , in his pos se ssi on , as we ll as $2 30 mos tly in $20 bill d enomi nations and an e ight ba ll of powder c ocaine worth $250 to $300. The jury was fre e to ac cept his expert opinion, which was suf ficient to mee t the g overnme nt’s burden of proof. Other evidenc e also supported the jury ’s finding of intent to distribute. Defe ndant admitted upon arr est that he possessed the powder, and admitt ed that he had distributed cra ck before, just not on that day . Def

endant did not have any

thing on his pe rson or in his c ar w ith which to smoke the
c ra c k. Cars on , c on sis te nt w ithAg e nt L e wi s’ s te sti mony , s ta te d that ty pica lly a c ra c k a dd ic t w ill purcha se a small amount of crack and i mmediately smoke it and then seek to buy more. F inally , the amount of cr ack Def

endant possessed exceede d the amount normally associate d with personal use

. See, e.g ., Un ite d S

tat es v . Ni c ho ls , 1 8 4 F
. A p p ’ x 5 3 2 , 5 3 5
- 3 6 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( h o ld in g th a t t he evidenc e was sufficie nt to support finding of intent to distribute whe re the defe ndant possessed e ight
cra ck roc ks, which althoug h not indiv i dually wra pped, we re posse ssed in an ar ea know n for dr ug tr a ff ic kin g and

the de fe nd ant ha d no me ans to smo ke the c ra c k in e ith e r his c ar or on his pe rs on ); see als o U nit e d S tat es v . H arris , 192 F.3d 580 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (holding that jury could re asonably

have found that the de fenda

nt intended to distribute 5.9 g rams of c rac k wher e evide nce a lso established that rocks wer e individually wra pped, defe ndant was in a

rea known for drug traff

ickin g, an d was
car rying a pistol). Cf. United States v. McCreary -Redd , 475 F.3d 718, 724 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the def

endant’ s stipulation t o fac tual basis stating merely that he possessed 3 g rams of c rac k individually

wra pped, without more, wa s insufficient to establish intent to distribute).

C. P r oba ti ve Va lue of Le wis’ s Te st im ony Def endant a rg ues that the district cour t’s failure to assess the r eleva ncy and probative value of Ag e nt L e wi s’ s tes tim on y pr ior to its ad mis sio n wa s pla in er

ro r. De fe nd ant f

a ile d to ob je c t a t tr ia l,10

s o in s te a d o f r e v ie w in g f

o r a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n, Un i t ed S t a tes v. Be nder , 2 65 F .3 d 4 64 , 4 72 (6 th Cir .2 00 1) ( “ A d istri c t c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of e xpe rt te sti mony , ho we ve r, wi ll no t be dis tur be d unle ss the dis tr ic t court a

bu se d its disc re tio n. ” ), we re vie w the c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of su c h te sti mony

fo r p la in
err or. See U

nited States v. Anderson , 89 F.3d 1306, 1310 n.2 ( 6th Cir. 1996). I nitially we note that D efe ndant arguably waived the issue by declining to voir dire L ewis at trial when spe cifica lly

invited to do so by

the dis t ri ct court. See U nited States v. Olano , 5 07 U. S. 725, 733-34 (1993) (stating that a wa iver is an i ntentional failure to object when g iven the op po rt un ity to do so)

. I n an y

e ve nt, De fe nd ant a c kn ow le dg e s th at th is C ourt ha s c on sis te ntl y

he ld that e xpe rt

te sti mony

by a law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r a bo ut the me tho d of ope ra

tio n of dr ugde a le rs is admissible pursuant to Fe d. R. Evid. 702, see, e .g., United States v. Thomas , 7 4 F .3 d 6 76 , 6 82 (6 th Cir . 1 99 6) (a

nd c a se s c ite d ther ein ), and

that th is C ourt

ha s d e e me d A g e nt L e wi s q ua lif ie d in thi s
are a, se e Un ite d Sta te

s v . Li st , 200 F. App’ x 535, 545 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion admitting e x pert testim ony of Age nt L ewis because he had 22 y ear s of experience and extensive drug -investig ation training , testified about illeg al drugop er ations information beyond the ken of the ave rag e lay

man, and the district c ourt g ave the usual ca utionary ins tr uc tio n r e g ard inge xpe rt

te sti mony

). I ns te a d, he argue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto assess the r eleva

ncy and probative value of

L ewis’s testimony

. Th e re is n o p la in e rr or . L e wi s’ s te sti mony wa s h ig hly

re le vant and hel pe d th e jur y in resolving the ce ntral issue of whet h er L ewis possessed the cra ck with intent to distribute. As discussed above , Def

endant a cknowledg es this in his brie f. This Court routinely allows qualified law enf orce ment o fficials to testify that circ umstances a

re c onsistent with drug distribution rather than per sonal use. Se e, e .g ., Un ite d S tat es v . S waf for d , 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6 t h C i r. 2004) (a nd11

c a se s th e re in) ; United States v. Combs , 36 9 F .3 d 9 25 , 9 40 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; Thomas , 74 F.3d at 682. F ur the rm or e , th is C ourt

ha s a lso he ld that su c h e xpe rt te sti mony is no t un du ly pr e jud ic ia l, e sp e c ia lly if the district c ourt has g iven a ca utionary instruction. United States v. Be nder , 265 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2001). D. Sc ope of Le wis’ s Ex pe r ti se Def endant a lso complains that Ag ent L ewis’s testim ony reg arding the quantit ies of coc aine ba se that are con sis te nt w ithpe rs on a l us e and the qu anti tie s th a t are c on sis te nt w iththe int e nt t o distribute clear ly

exceede d the scope of his e x pertise. There is no err or, plain or otherwise, for the
rea sons discussed above

. Def endant a lso arg ues that the district cour t plainly err ed bec ause L ewis improper ly stated

an opinion a s to D efe ndant’s mental state, which is ba rre d by Fe d. R. Evid. 704(b). This Court has declined to find plain err or base d on testimony simil ar to L ewis’s in other c ases. See, e .g., United S t a t es v. Johnson , 4 88 F .3 d 6 90 , 6 98 -9 9 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; Swa

ffo rd , 3 8 5 F
. 3 d a t 1 0 2 9

- 30 & n.3.; United States v. Holloway , 257 F. App’x 869, 871-72 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 178 (2 00 8) . M or e ov e r, the state me nts De fe nd ant com pl ain s o f w e re e lic ite d b y De fe nd ant o n c ro sse xami na tio n w he n L e wi s wa s r e pe a te dly a sk e d if De fe nd ant c ou ld h a ve po sse sse d th e c ra c k f or his persona l use. Under

these c ircumstance s there is no plain e rror . E. Failure t o Give Cautionary Instruction Def endant a rg ues that the district cour t erre d in failing to give an additional ca utionary ins tr uc tio n r e g ard ingL e wi s’ s r ole a s an ex pert wi tne ss. De fe nd ant f a ile d to ob

je c t be low , s o th is issue is reviewe d for plain e rror .12

There is none. Althoug h no cautionar y instruction was g iven when L ewis testified, the fo llo wi ngins tr

uc tio n r e g ard ingL e wi s’ s te sti mony wa s g ive n w he n c ha

rg ingthe jur

y : Members of

the jury , y ou h av e hear d the testimony of Dave L ewis and Celeste White, expert witnesses. An expert witness has sp ecial knowledg e or experience that allows that witness to g ive an opinion. You do not have to a cce pt an expert’s opinion. I n decidinghow much we ight to g ive it y ou should consider that wi tne ss’ [s] qu a lif

ic a tio ns and ho w he or s he re a c he d h is o r h e r c on c lus ion s. Remember that y ou alone de cide how much of a witness’[s] testimony to be lieve and how much we ight you think it deserves. This Court in Swa

ffo rd approve d this same instructi o n as “properly caution[ing]” the jury

. See Swafford , 3 85 F .3 d at 10 30 n. 4; see also Holloway , 257 F. App’ x at 872 (noting that jurors we re instructed that they

did not have to acc ept officer’ s opinion and that it was their duty alone to dec ide how much we ight to g ive his testimony ). F urther, this instruction was g iven the morningafte r a one day trial. Cf. United States v. W heaton , 517 F.3d 350, 362-63 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding no plain err or in f a ili ngto g ive an a dd ition a l c a uti on ary ins tr uc tio n c on c e rn ingthe te sti mony of tw o p a id informants whe re the jury “re ceive d ample noti ce” that it should view their te stimony with suspicion in acc ordanc e with Six th Circuit pattern jury instructions). There is no plain error here

. F . Ineff ect ive Assistance De fe nd ant c la ims that hi s tr ia l c ouns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e fo r fa ili ng to re ta in an e xpe rt wi tne ss to contradic t L ewis’s testimony on the issue of intent to distribute. Def en d an t acknowledg es that in ge nera l this Court will not revie w a claim of inef fec tive assistance of counse l on direct a ppeal, but claims that th e record is a dequate ly develope d to fit within t he exception. See U nited States v. Lopez-Me dina , 461 F.3d 724, 737 ( 6th Cir. 2006). There is no proof in this reco rd t h at s u ch an
e xpe rt wa s ava ila

ble or tha t r e ta ini ngsu c h a

n e xpe rt is w ith in t

he pr e va ili ng pr of

e ssi on a l no rm

in13

dr u g c a s e s . I ns h o rt, th e r e c o r d is n o t a d e qu a te ly

d e v e lo p e d

o nth is p o in t, an d

th is Co u rt d e clines to r e vie w this c la im o n d ir e c t a pp e a l. G . C ar e e r Offen de r St at us Def endant a rg ues that hi s caree r off

ender status significa

ntly overr epre sents his criminal history and that the district cour

t erre d in failing to reduc e his sentenc e on this basis. He points out that th e pr ior

fe lony dr ugc on vic tio n invo lve d le ss t ha n 1 /2 g ra m of c oc a ine , c le arl y a pe rs on a l us e qu an t i t y. This Court reviews a

district court’s sente ncing deter mination for reasona

bleness, using an abuse- of-discr etion standard. United States v. Alex ander , 5 43 F .3 d 8 19 , 8 21 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) . T his
re as o n ab l en ess inquiry

involves both procedur al and substantive c omponents. Id. at 8 2 1 -2 2
. In assessing proce dural re asonable ness, we look to see if the district co u rt p ro perly calc ulated the g uid e lin e s r a ng e , tre a te d the g uid e lin e s a s a dv iso ry , c on sid e re d th e § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s, and

a de qu a te ly explained the sentenc e, including an explanation for any varia nce from t he g uidelines rang e. United States v. Presley , 547 F.3d 625, 629- 30 (6th Cir. 2008). As for substantive reasona bleness, the ove rall conc ern is whe ther the district c ourt imposed

a sentenc e sufficie nt, but not g reater than nece ssary , to c omply with the purposes of t h e s t at utory
se nte nc ingsc he me . 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ); Alexande r , 5 43 F .3 d at 822

. A se nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly
un re a so na

ble if the dis tr ic t c ourt

se le c ts a se nte nc e arb itr ari ly , b a se s th e se nte nc e on imp e rm iss ibl e fac tors, fails to consider the rele vant sentenc ing f actor s, or gives an unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor. Presley , 547 F.3d at 630-31. Def endant ha s failed to re but the presum p tion that his sentence within the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e is re asonable . The district cour t was within its dis cre tion in finding thatCrimi n a l h is to r y c a te g o r y V I w a s a ls o th e a

p p li c a b le c a te g o r

y d u e to D e f e n d an t’ s car eer 1 offe nder c lassification. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)

. 14 Def endant’ s car eer

offe nder status did not overr epre sent his criminal hi story
. Def endant’ s argument b as ed o n h i s p re d i ca t e fe l o n y dru g co n v i ct i o n b ei n g fo r a sm al l am o u n t i s u np er s u as i v e. Al t h o u gh Def endant wa s permitted to plead to this offense, the char g e in that ca se wa s based upon De fenda nt’s po sse ssi on

of fo rt y -t hr e e ro c ks of

c ra c k in a pl ast ic bag that he tos se d a s h e fl e d f ro m of fi c e rs . Mo re ov e r, De fe nd ant’ s c ri min a l h is to ry c a te g or y wa s n ot i nc re a se d b y

his c are e r o ff

e nd e r s ta tus
. Defe nd ant h a d 1 9 c ri min a l hi sto ry po int s. Cr imi na l hi sto ry c a te g or y VI is tri g g e re d at 13 po int s. 1 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s in tim a te ly fa

mil iar wit h De fe nd ant’ s cr imi na l histo ry , ha vin g se nte nc e d h im
on th e ars on c on vic tio n in 19 98 , a nd su pe rv ise d h im w he n h e wa s r e le a se d o n th a t c on vic tio n in Dec ember

2002. The c ourt also t wice revoke d Def endant’ s supervised relea se; when he committed
ne w o ff e ns e s b e fo re his fu ll- te rm re le a se in O c tob e r 2 00 4. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt sp e c if ic a lly no te d th is f a c ta ts e n t e n c i n g , a s w e l l a s D e f e n d an t ’ s e x t e n s i v e i n v o l v e m e n t i nt h e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m . In short, Def endant is not entitled to rese ntencing

. The district cour

t stated t hat i t had considered the nature and cir cumstance s of the off ense, the history

and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt, the advisory guideline ra ng e, as w ell as the other fac tors listed in § 3553(a). In considering Def endant’ s history

and cha rac teristics, the cour

t noted that Def endant wa s thirty -one y ear s old a n d h ad b ee n involved in criminal conduc t since he w as fourte e n . T h e c o u rt a d d e d th a t D e f e n d an t h a d “ c o n ti n u e d to c o mm it n e w o f f e n s e s ” w h il e on supervised r elea se,” and had been revoke d twice by the district c ourt. The c ourt found De fenda nt has a “propensity for violence” as ref lected by sever al arrests and convictions involving assa ult, and was fa cing char g es for felony first-deg ree murder and ki dnaping and participating in the killing of15

the victim. Furthe r, t he court noted t hat Defenda nt has no verifia

ble work history and has c ontinued to us e dr ug s de sp ite re c e ivi ng tr e a tme nt. I n the c ourt ’s op ini on , “ Soc ie ty ne e ds pr ote c tio n f

ro m th is defe ndant.” I n sum, the district c ourt’s sentenc ing w as both proce durally and substantively

rea sonable. No r d id t he c ourt e rr in r e fu sin g to g ra

nt D e fe nd ant a

do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e on th e groun d that

a Criminal History

score VI substantially

overr epre sented the se riousness of his cr iminal hist ory . See U. S.S. G. § 4 A1 .3 (b )( 1) . Adis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on no t to de pa

rt do wnwa rd is n ot r e vie wa

ble un le ss the re cord shows that the court wa s unawa re of , or did not understand, its discre tion to gra nt such a depa rture. United States v. J

ohnson , 553 F.3d 990, 999 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Not h i n g in the rec ord ref lects that the district cour t misunderstood its di scre tionary authority

. F ina lly , the re c or d als o doe s not re fl e c t tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d a po lic y dis a g re e me nt w ith the re levant g uidelines nece ssitating a rema nd in lig ht of Kimbrough v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 558 (2007). Se e Un ite d S

tat es v . G ue

st , – F. 3 d

– , No
. 07-1922, 2009 WL1175172 (6th Cir. May 4, 2009). H. P endin g Charges L a stl y , D e fe nd ant a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in re lyingon

the pe nd ingc h a

r g e s a g a ins t him in selecting his sentence

. The char g es wer e the subject of an indictment and wer e sche duled for trial on Octobe r 2007. The district c ourt ref err ed to the cha

rg es in t h e co n t ext of finding that De fe nd ant h a d a

pr op e ns ity

tow ard vio le nc e and

in c on c lud ingtha

t “th e on ly pr ote c tio n o f s oc ie ty would be an e x tremely

leng thy period of imprisonment.” The dist rict court did not err in considering the pendingchar g es while sele cting a sente nce within the advisory

g uideline ra

ng e. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (dir ectingthe c o u rt t o co n sider theSome courts have held that the pre sentenc e re port must provide specif ic fa cts underly

ing the 2 arr ests to justi fy

an upwa rd depa rture. See United States v. Hawk W ing , 433 F.3d 622, 628 ( 8th Cir. 2006) (discussing case s). The pr esente nce r eport in this case does so. 16 “history and cha rac teristics” of the defe ndant as we ll as the nee d to protect the public) ; U .S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a )(2) (D) (2006) (providing that a dis trict court may consider pe nding c harg es in deter mining whether an upwa rd depa rture is wa

rra nted). Se e als o U

nit e d S tat es v . Ca mp be ll , 221 F. App’x 459, 461 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating t h at j u d ge m ay consider othe r cha

rg es pendingwhen se ntencingthe defe ndant); United States v. Trevino , 268 F. App’ x 277, 278 (5th Cir. 2008) (holdin g that district
c o u rtd i d n o te r r i naw a r d i n g u p w ar d d e p artu r e b a s e d

o n t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s e x t e n s i v e c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y, inc lud ingpe nd ingc ha

rg e s in state c ourt ); Un ite d S

tat es v . E lli

s , 2 0 6 F. App’x 325, 327 (5th Ci r. 2006) (pe r cur iam) (holding that district court is pe rmitted to c onsider pending char g es as basis for up wa rd de pa rt ur e ). De fe nd ant d id no t oth e rw ise c ha lle ng e the fa c tua l ba sis fo r t he pe nd ingc ha

rg e s. 2 III. Conclusi on Th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IR M ED
.